Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism

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It is impossible to talk about 21st Century terrorism without first discussing some of the changes we see occurring in terrorism today. Here I think there are five key points that we have to think about regarding the stereotypical terrorists in the past compared to terrorists today.1

- First, terrorists today are not part of defined organizational entities with visible and discernible command control apparatuses. Rather, what we see are more amorphous, less distinctive organizations.

- These organizations are not organized as hierarchical, pyramid-shaped structures, identified by their leader or commander-in-chief at the top. They are much flatter organizations, along the lines of networks or organizations that function much more competitively. You can see the difference today as we try to get our arms around Al-Qaeda, the organization—or maybe the movement—associated with bin Laden. Compare it with more stereotypical terrorist groups of the past. We knew who the leaders of the Red Army Faction were—Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof. In fact, we generally referred to the group as the Baader-Meinhof Organization after its leaders. Similarly, few people called the Fatah Revolutionary Council by that name; instead, we called it the Abu-Nidal Organization. These groups were distinct entities with leaders.

- Also, we knew what they wanted. We may not have agreed with them. We may have found their aims and objectives heinous, objectionable, intolerable, but at the same time, at least we could understand what they were about. We knew what motivated them, what their aims were, how they dovetailed their actions to suit their agendas, and we had a sense of what they wanted and who they were.

- Also, what we see today is groups that have been changed. As the stove-piped command-control apparatus or structures have eroded,
groups feel that in their independence they are more able to carry out ambitious types of operations. Essentially you see a greater willingness by groups to inflict massive indiscriminate casualties. You have to pause here and think for a moment, go back to the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. Now, putting aside whether it was possible to actually topple the North Tower onto the South Tower and kill 60,000 people, consider the goal. Just pause to compare that to the previous decade, to heinous acts of international terrorism—committed by the sorts of guys we thought were the really bad terrorists, public enemies number one, such as Abu-Nidal, Baader, Meinhof, and others. Very rarely, if at all, do we have evidence of these groups contemplating World Trade Center types of very grand, very ambitious terrorist events. They planned incidences of hijacking, planted bombs on planes, but still those types of things would kill at most in the low hundreds, and more likely, only a handful of deaths. They weren’t contemplating incidences of violence that were expected to kill tens of thousands. So that is an important difference too.

• Finally—and I think this is a fundamental point—groups today claim credit less frequently than they did in the past, for a variety of reasons. For some groups, terrorism is less of a means to an end than an end itself, serving God or the cathartic self-satisfaction of striking a blow against the hated enemy, for example. Violence is less tailored and as the violence has become more indiscriminate, the terrorists themselves have become more reluctant to claim credit for events. Compare this to the 1970s and 80s. Terrorists routinely were proud when they carried out an operation. In fact, they told us that they did so. They issued communiqués. They not only told us what they did, but often in turgid, overwrought, agonizing, complex prose, explaining exactly why they did it. Think back a few months ago to the assassination of a labor leader in Italy by a group reviving or resuscitating the Red Brigade (a group assuming the Red Brigade’s mantle). The modus operandi was the
same—a selected and directed discriminate act of violence committed against one individual, then a claim of credit saying that they did it, followed by a 28-page diatribe or treatise explaining exactly why the organization carried it out. Now compare that with some of the most significant and spectacular terrorist acts of the past decade, such as PanAm 103, the bombing of the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires in 1994, the attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995, the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah office building in Oklahoma City in 1995. None of those incidents have had credible claims attached to them. No group or individual has come forth to claim responsibility. Although in some of the cases we know who is responsible, there have been no claims made, not in the sense that was common practice in earlier eras of terrorism. So that is one set of big changes.

The second set is that these changes are affecting the operations, organizational dimensions, and even the targets of terrorism, as well. Terrorist groups in the past were, for want of a better word, numerically constrained. Let’s talk about organizations that were notable. The Red Army Faction, throughout its twenty years of existence, never varied from having more than roughly 25 to 35 hard-core members. The West German police would sweep up one generation by displaying “Wanted” posters with about twenty faces, and a few years later you’d see another twenty faces. The faces changed, but the numbers never got larger. The Red Brigade, at its high point, was slightly larger, with 75 persons. But to get to larger terrorist groups, you have to look at the IRA, with estimates suggesting that membership was about 400 hundred—that is members who were trigger-pullers, bomb throwers, and active terrorists. Or you can look to the Fatah Revolutionary Council, which was estimated to have in excess of 500 members in the 1980s. And, we saw that as terrorist groups with stereotypical structures grew too large, there were lots of problems. How many books have appeared in the recent past by ex-IRA leaders, telling of traitors who started to forsake terrorism and people who couldn’t be trusted. The Red Brigade has similar stories. While the Fatah
Revolutionary Council, Abu-Nidal’s organization, was the biggest of its era, there were two major fratricidal, internecine blood-lettings. As the group got larger, the disputes got bigger and essentially the group turned inward on one another other. That is what undermined the organization and made it less of a threat. Compare that to today, when it is very difficult, if not impossible, to get a bearing on how many people are members of Al-Qaeda, maybe 4000? 5,000? Is it less? Is it more? What we are talking about is a different type of process, a different type of terrorist, and different type of group.

Another difference is that in the past, operations were directed against a comparatively narrow target set. Left-wing terrorists would target government officials, capitals of industry, bankers—people who they blamed for the wrongs of the system. The nationalist terrorists would target government officials, representatives of the state, policemen, or members of rival communities. But the violence was still largely constrained and fairly narrowly focused.

And then the last change. In the past, terrorists operated out of a set of defined sanctuaries or safe-havens and engaged in activities within a somewhat limited area of operations. For example, Middle Eastern terrorists would largely travel from the Middle East and carry out international terrorists acts predominately in Europe, very rarely in Latin America, for example. We knew where the terrorists were based, we knew how they were trained, what their capabilities were, essentially what their aims were—we could more-or-less reach out and touch them. Compare that to today and what is happening as the terrorist sanctuaries are destroyed or disappearing. Of course, the collapse of the Soviet Union was the first step, but now, with countries like Libya moderating their policies and other countries, such as Afghanistan, with an uneasy form of government, decreasing their safe-havens—even the Taliban has engaged in some discussions with the U.S. with regard to bin Laden—terrorist sanctuaries are disappearing.

All of these changes and the decline in safe-havens does not mean that terrorism is going to go away anytime soon. It does mean it will change.
What we see is that in the past, the terrorist threat was at least palpable. We knew what it was, where it was coming from, who was doing it, and what they wanted. And, needless to say, we never had to worry about the prospect of terrorist use of chemical or biological weapons. What they were doing was essentially of limited consequences and effects. You could anticipate them, and their violence was kept within bounds that were acceptable.

I would argue that the changes that we see will not only continue but grow. Terrorists are like sharks in water; if they stop, they do not succeed. Terrorists always have to stay one step ahead of what their enemies are doing and one step ahead of the counterterrorism technology curve. If they do not stay ahead, they are not going to succeed. And if they do not succeed they will not achieve their objectives. As I said, diminishing sanctuaries does not mean that terrorism is going away. Rather, I would argue that if the terrorists don’t have a safe place to hide out in any more, they are going to burrow themselves deeper into worldwide networks. We already see this to an extent occurring throughout the world, in bin Laden’s organization, for example. One of the persons under indictment in New York is a U.S. citizen, a resident of Texas. Another bin Laden follower is a resident of West Virginia; another was a member of the U.S. Army. And it is not only bin Laden’s organization. Groups like the PKK and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are spreading throughout the world. As they lose their traditional sanctuaries, they are turning to transnational communities where they are burrowing themselves and using the community as almost a remote base of operations, rather than having a set base in one part of the world, as was the case in the past. Associated with this, these groups are relying increasingly not just on the professional hardcore terrorists but a much broader network of amateur terrorists, activists, lackeys, helpers, sympathizers, and supporters.

With the lack of bases and lack of patrons, these groups are turning increasingly to crime and towards greater involvement with formal criminal links—not only as a means to raise money to sustain operations but also as a means to increase patronage and increase their hold over transnational
communities. In other words, it is like the old style bosses in the U.S. at the
turn of century. When immigrants came off the boat, they were met by a
political machine that gave them jobs and in return got their votes. The same
sort of process is occurring in these transnational communities. These
organizations are giving individuals work, in both the legal and illegal sectors,
and they are winning their allegiance and winning their support. These groups
are consciously reversing the pattern of immigrants who came to a country and
sought the melting pot, sought to be absorbed, to become more American than
Americans. These organizations, as a means both to prey upon and keep their
control over the community and to enhance their patronage, are actively
working to erect barriers to prevent people from integrating into society. We
see how the more adept groups of this sort are able to generate an income
stream, estimated to be between $1 million and $3 million per month. So, bin
Laden is not the only sugar daddy, not the only revolutionary philanthropist
out there. Many of these organizations, the PKK, the Tamil Tigers, and others
have incomes estimated in this range from both illegal and “legal” activities.

I think in terms of the changes we will see, the impact of diminishing
sanctuaries, greater involvement in crime, and high-income streams will be
very profound. But when we look at the types of weapons and tactics
terrorists will use, we have to be more careful. Terrorists, as radical as they
may be politically, are just as conservative operationally. They want to
succeed; they have to succeed. For that reason, they rarely deviate from
established patterns and therefore stay within a fairly narrow tactical
repertoire. They use what they have high confidence in, things they know will
work, with only minor deviations. Larger and more powerful car and truck
bombs have been about the only innovation in recent terrorist acts.

I think the next step up from car bombs, as we harden embassies and
other likely terrorist targets and make it more difficult for terrorists to reach
out and strike at the targets they traditionally hit by car/truck bombs, they will
need to turn to alternative weapons. They are not going to lay down their arms
and give up, so they will find other weapons and tactics and means to reach
their targets. And here is an obvious class of weapon choices: ultralights, UAVs, all types of distance and stand-off weapons, surface-to-air missiles, rocket-propelled grenades fired from a distance, remote control mortars, and Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS). Rather than saying that these are tactics or weapons that terrorists will use, I believe terrorists are experimenting with these types of weapons today and perfecting them for use.

Then there is the whole issue of chemical, biological, and radioactive terrorism. Why the interest now? Given the whole past patterns of terrorist activity and their mindsets, I think it is likely that we will see some act involving these types of unconventional weapons within the next five years. But there are two important caveats. One, it is not going to be the type of destruction of entire cities and mass havoc we anticipate. Rather, I think it will have more in common with the 1995 attack on Tokyo’s subway—an unsuccessful, even discrete and limited attack that, nevertheless, had profound and far reaching psychological repercussions.

Would terrorists resort to the indiscrete use of weapon of mass destruction (biological) when a far more limited discrete use of a chemical weapon, which is easier to fabricate and release, can achieve the same end? I have no doubt that terrorists would want to cross to weapons of mass destruction (especially biological and radiological) and investigate this new form of violence. But I think we have to look back to the past to see that even if terrorists have motivation to use this type of weapon, there are formidable technological barriers that, at least for now and perhaps in the near future, will constrain them from doing so. Look at Aum Shinkyo. Aum was not a stereotypical terrorist organization. It was a national industry with membership estimated at up to 50,000. It was not one of the organizations operating on a shoestring budget; Aum assets were estimated to be as high as $1 billion. We are not talking about terrorists who sat in back rooms of tenements and basements, making pipe bombs. These people were fitted out with state-of-the-art war tools, the best tool-and-die machines that could be purchased. These weren’t people with just a modicum of experience, a high
school education that they brought to bear in making bombs with all kinds of improvised explosives. Instead, they were deliberately recruited, the cream of the Japanese intelligensia, the cream of the Japanese scientific and engineering community, the best people they could find. So, you had a group with enormous resources, and with all those resources the group embarked on an attempt to use biological weapons. And it failed miserably. Not only was Aum reduced to using sarin, a chemical weapon, but look at how they used it. Can you imagine a less sophisticated attack than putting sarin in plastic trash bags and wrapping it in newspapers? This is not to say that our concern about terrorists use of these weapons is misplaced or unfounded. It is only to say that terrorist ability to utilize or operationalize them is still difficult. For that reason, when we see terrorist use of these weapons, they will most likely use the simplest ones—which are chemical weapons—and the devastation will probably be on a much more limited scale than predicted today.

The changes that we see, though, in terms of weapons and tactics, will extend beyond group imperatives and beyond even the outright use of violence to different tactics, such as non-violent tactics and the increasing use of information to thwart counterterrorist techniques. There has been a tremendous amount of focus on destruction of systems, on paralyzing cities, shutting down air traffic control, and so on. But the point is terrorists are success freaks. They need intelligence; they are intelligence freaks, as well. If they can get into a system and mine that system to get information to facilitate their conventional paths, that is exactly what they are going to do. The pattern of terrorism in the past bears this out. The IRA, for example, was able to get onto a main computer. Instead of shutting the system down, they used it to get information on home addresses of policeman, politicians, and prison guards. In short, they extracted information that they could use for conventional operations. Other terrorists might get this information and shop it and sell it to other people who might find it useful to buy as a commodity. It is also instructive to note that two years ago, when the IRA wanted to black out London, wanted to shut down the entire city, they didn't recruit hackers, they
didn’t resort to trying to penetrate the system electronically. They got together some good old fertilizer for the public libraries, the plants, the switching stations and transformers around London, and set about making bombs. They intended to drive around that night and blow them up systematically. So, it is not to say that information age warfare is not a threat. But, we have to think that the terrorists will use it first to get information, not necessarily to destroy it—and, of course, as we see now, to spread the word. You just have to go on the Net to see that. My students used to give me a list of 40 or 50 sites that virtually every terrorist in search of national liberation would use. The Net to them is useful. They want to exploit it; they want to keep it up and running because that is how they are getting the message across. That is one thing.

The second issue, tied to the transnational communities, is the increasing emergence of above-ground support groups who engage in intensive lobbying and political pressure as a means of legitimization, to enhance the stature of these groups, as a means of PR to try to convince countries that the groups are not terrorist organizations. They also use it as a means to harass their enemies or any government that takes action against them. They use legal means to strike back. We see this happening now in Washington, where the group Mujihadeen and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are suing the United States government in the District Court to be taken off the list of thirty organizations designated as terrorist by the Secretary of State in October 1997 that are prohibited from fund raising in the United States.

Finally, we’ll see greater networking and help provided to other terrorists and criminal groups. Increasingly, we are seeing weapons used by terrorists, in say, South Asia turning up in Lebanon, in turn Israel, also in Turkey. These groups are sharing their weapons, their expertise, and they are also attempting to leverage off the transnational lines of communication of other communities or other groups.

So, when one sees this picture, we come to the conclusion that it is a different type of terrorism. Military force and economic sanctions—two
weapons and two means traditionally relied upon—are going to be of fairly limited use against these amorphous, stateless, transnational groups. I think this is already borne out by the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, which I think underscore how terrorism is very much a highly dynamic phenomenon, constantly changing and evolving in order to obviate or overcome the security measures and physical barriers placed in their path. So terrorists who want to attack an embassy are not necessarily going to be deterred by a large setback, such as buildings far from the street. Rather with larger and more exponentially powerful bombs they have and will be able to overcome that setback and still take down buildings and commit their acts. Or, as I said earlier, if we prevent the use of car/truck bombs, the terrorist will find other means to carry out these missions, as borne out in East Africa.

Similarly, the retaliatory U.S. cruise missile attacks demonstrated the difficulty and complexities in countering terrorism, in responding to terrorism. The results showed that when force is used, sometimes the repercussions cannot be anticipated but can prove to be counterproductive. By this, I'm talking about the lionization of bin Laden that followed the attacks and the shift away from the victims and the targets of bin Laden's attacks to the target or victims of our retaliatory strikes. And what this new dynamic or this new calculus suggests is the need for innovative full-capacity responses that do not follow just one path but meld together different strands into a coherent strategy. This process begins with the realization that terrorism is not a phenomenon amenable strictly to military solutions alone.

Military force has a part to play, but it can not be seen as the be all and end all. In this sense, we need to understand better what force can and cannot achieve. To do this, we do not have to go back to 1998; we can go back thirteen years ago to another case where military force was used in response to terrorism. I am not making a judgement about whether military force should or should not be used, but I am trying to assess the effects of it. The 1986 air strike on Libyan forces was widely touted and believed to be an archetype of success of using flying forces against terrorists. I would argue,
however, that this is one example where we may have felt good and indeed it may have sent a powerful message, but in point of fact it had little if any discernable effect on the terrorists or their patrons. Libyan terrorism afterward not only continued, but escalated. According to statistics that we keep at RAND, in the year following the 1986 air strike, Libya was identified as responsible for at least fifteen acts of state-sponsored terrorism, many of which were directed against the U.S. and against Britain as punishment for having allowed U.S. jet fighters to take off from British bases. Not only that, but Qaddafi actually escalated his support for terrorism. Libya went out and got some hired guns, the Japanese Red Army faction, who he paid to carry out attacks on behalf of Libya in retaliation for the U.S. air strikes. It also shows how much terrorism has changed today from then. When the Japanese Red Army (JRA) engaged in these attacks, they did not say the JRA did it, they said the AAIB (Anti-Imperialist International Brigades) carried out the attack. This was a sort of shorthand at the time, so we would have a pretty good idea who was behind JRA in the operating capacity. Not only did Qaddafi go out and get hired guns, but he also escalated Libya’s attacks. In 1987, he attacked U.S. and British diplomatic facilities in Spain and Indonesia. In 1988, Qaddafi upped the ante. He sent a Japanese Red Army terrorist, Yu Kikumura, to the U.S to carry out an attack that was supposed to coincide with the second anniversary of the U.S. bombing. Five years before the World Trade Center bombing, Kikumura’s orders were precisely to go to the financial center of New York. When he was arrested on the New Jersey Turnpike, officials found in the trunk of his car several hollowed-out fire extinguishers that contained not only black powder but roofing nails, crude antipersonnel devices. That same day that the attack was scheduled to go off, a car bomb exploded outside a USO club in Naples, Italy, killing seven persons. So Qaddafi did not stop. Not only that, as punishment to Britain, he began to ship an estimated 140 tons of arms to the IRA. Finally, in terms of having deterrent effects on other groups, the evidence is also marginal. During the six months before the U.S. retaliatory strike, there were 41 terrorist attacks on U.S. targets; in the six
months afterwards, there were 54. Thus, the actual cause and effect was reversed even on other terrorists groups; the deterrent value was not evident, against Libya or other terrorist groups.

Then there is another problem—inflicting collateral casualties. During the U.S. air strikes, despite our best efforts to avoid civilian casualties, none-the-less and tragically, 36 Libyan civilians were killed and 96 others were wounded. Terrorism is predominantly psychological warfare. What we do by inflicting collateral casualties is to automatically hand over to our enemies the fodder to vilify or attack us, just as we did recently. We become the problem, not so much the terrorists. Also, from a moral standpoint, innocent civilians are innocent civilians, whether they are Americans or Libyans. If we are going to retaliate, if we are going to maintain the moral high ground against terrorists, we have to be careful and ensure we do not inflict collateral casualties. All of this is to say, not that we should not use military force, it is to say that by itself it cannot be the only solution.

That does not mean we have been able to come up with many other better solutions, because other non-military responses have had equally mixed results—economic sanctions, for example. Certainly Iraq is a case in point, where the effect of sanctions has not been what we hoped. Arguably, they have had little effect on Iran after more than 20 years. This is a major issue of debate between the U.S. and its European allies. Europeans say that their positive and constructive engagement in critical dialogue is more likely to win Iranians over than the U.S. hard-line and sanctions. I am not sure about that, but U.S. economic sanctions have not lived up to their expectations. Even the recent developments in Libya are not clear-cut evidence of the value of sanctions, but may be more of a reflection of Qaddafi’s weakness. He is not the main player in the Middle East. Moreover, Libya is a fairly isolated, weak country itself, and not a major player or renegade in Middle Eastern politics. Sanctions might work, but they are not an immediate solution. And then, in my book, I cite a 1997 State Department analysis where the intelligence community itself was dismissive of the effects of economic sanctions. Not
one of the countries listed on the U.S. State Department’s list of state sponsors has ever reneged or declared publicly that they will no longer engage in terrorism.

Given this state of affairs, what does one do? How do you respond to terrorism? The first step is to realize and accept the limitations of military force against terrorism in strategic terms. Military force certainly does have a place but probably more at a tactical rather than strategic level. Sometimes military force is the only and perhaps the best way to communicate a specific tactical end, e.g., disrupt a plot, sabotage a pending attack, damage logistical support networks, and others—it certainly has a place there. But as a strategic tool, having an overall effect on the problem, the phenomenon, its effects are less clear. We see that military force's real utility is in containing control of the pattern, not solving it. I think we have to conclude that there is no one ultimate solution to terrorism. There can certainly be improvements in human intelligence, international cooperation, and strengthened responses to make it more difficult for the terrorists to operate, but that by itself is not going to stop them. To do so, what we need is to use military forces as part of a broader framework, a comprehensive plan, an overall approach that harnesses force and uses it alongside other practical non-lethal approaches. History repeatedly shows that individual and sporadic application of force by nations has borne very little fruit. It has to be part of a pattern or plan to have any effect. And here, formulating a response strategy obviously cries out for fresh thinking, innovative approaches to this phenomenon, especially a phenomenon that is changing.

Part of our response to terrorism, and I do not mean this in a negative way, is that as a nation we derive a certain cathartic satisfaction from getting back, striking back at our enemies. That is part of it too, but to really come to grips with this model perhaps we have to break that cycle. In this respect I think the challenge is to avoid the fate of the apocryphal German generals of WWI. When the story is told, the apocryphal generals planned to fight the last war, and were not victorious generals but generals locked into defeat. The
German general staff was supremely confident that they had the world’s most capable military force, with sophisticated armaments and a sophisticated technological plan. Of course, we see what happened. They failed to anticipate the changes in warfare that resulted in a very different form of conflict. In conclusion, I would say terrorism is a dynamic phenomenon and one that requires a similarly innovative, dynamic response—one that is just as dynamic and innovative as the terrorists’.

What are those approaches? These are my thoughts, this is not the result of a RAND research project or serious research. I am trying to think—we know what has not been successful, but what might work; what sign posts are there for the future that we might leverage off of, that would be food for thought that would push us in different and perhaps more productive directions? The first would be to explore alternatives emphasizing the nonviolent approach. Certainly this circuit is a whole psychological operation inherent to special operations forces and inherent to our military. But in this respect it may be useful not to just study the open literature because if you follow the open literature the main response to terrorism is cruise missiles which is perhaps the most low-risk, but is of questionable efficacy. You have to go back to our response to the East African bombing to understand what I am talking about. When you talk about it, it was viewed by many Muslims as a blow by Mohammed. We have to counter the popular alienation and polarization that fuels terrorism.

How do you do that in practical terms? We had an opportunity and we missed it precisely because we focused on the use of force and did not think about the psychological connection. Only 12 of the 267 persons killed in the embassy bombings were in fact Americans. Indeed, amongst the Tanzanian and Kenyan casualties, there were many Muslims. And, in fact, at the time moderate opinion in the Arab world, particularly on the Iranian peninsula, was appalled; they were horrified by the fact that innocents were killed and also that Muslims were involved in it. And then what happens? Newspaper accounts push people more in the direction of condemning bin
Laden and terrorism. Then what happens? The cruise missile attacks come along and in an instant negate those sentiments. That is not to say we should not have fired the cruise missiles, but it was a lost opportunity to influence opinion against terrorists and terrorism. We were oblivious to the nuances and insensitive to the response. Moderate opinion in the Arab world was not necessarily against the cruise missile attacks in toto. In fact, they thought the attacks against Afghanistan were justified; there were terrorist bases there, terrorist training camps. But with the attack on the Sudan, notwithstanding the controversy that has since surfaced about whether it was VX or not, but even at the time, the controversy of taking that strong of an action against another nation, took the focus away from the U.S., Kenyan, and the Tanzanian victims and put it on Sudan as a victim and contributed to the lionization of bin Laden. The point here is that sometimes more can be gained by not using force than by using it. The bottom line is that to plan these operations we have to pay greater attention to the psychological connection.

So where does this leave us in terms of trying to deal with terrorism? First, we have to accept that terrorism is not a problem that is completely solvable, nor can it be completely eradicated. And this is why I think it is mistaken to call or analogize terrorism to a war. This raises unrealistic expectations in the American public. But also calling what is actually a tactic a war inflates the terrorist's power, inflates the coercive abilities of our enemy. It also creates a different sense. A war is something that has a definable beginning and widely has definable ends. It begins with a conquest and a vanquishment, which is seen as the end. It is then followed by a truce, an armistice, and negotiations to settle the problem. That is not what terrorism is about. It is a far more multifaceted, idiosyncratic, worldwide phenomenon.

The difficulty in countering the problem of terrorism does not mean that we give up but that we need to have much more realistic expectations and we marshal our enormous energies and our attention when and where they are most effective, if not to solve, at least to ameliorate the problem and reduce it. Here I would argue, we are missing the point, we are increasingly focusing on
terrorism too much as an organizational phenomenon, as an organizational
dynamic, and what we are forgetting is that terrorism is a phenomenon that
draws individuals to it, that often results in individual choices in becoming
terrorists. One unexplored area related to terrorism, one thing that is ignored,
is the personal choice aspect and personal inducements. When one studies the
past quarter century of terrorism countermeasures used throughout the world,
one example constantly comes onto the screen, and that is the Italian
government's use of the repentance program against the Red Brigade. That
was used as a wedge to woo people away from terrorism. But it is mistaken in
the popular mythology that this was a way to rehabilitate terrorists, to integrate
them back into society. It was nothing of the sort. It occurred at a time when
the Italian authorities were so frustrated by the lack of intelligence they had on
the group that they turned to this means as a way to uproot the group, to gain
information, to gain intelligence that they could use to bore in at the leadership
of that organization and then systematically dismantle it. And it worked.
Indeed, in talking to Italian government officials in intelligence they offered
another example. When the Mafia was bombing art galleries, they used the
same approach: money, personal inducements, to get information that they
could use against criminals and that proved effective.

I want to give another example. It is an example of how thinking
differently can pay greater dividends than plowing the same field that we have
been stuck in for a long time. In May 1998, I had the opportunity to go to
Israel in the Gaza Strip and to talk to people there who ten years ago were on
the terrorists’ side who are now senior officials in the Palestinian authority. I
fell into a conversation with someone who had been a senior leader in the
Fatah, and we were talking about the general problem of HAMAS. He was
talking about his frustrations, which were no different from those discussed
here in Washington. And he stopped and said to me, putting this idea in my
head about thinking “outside-the-box” and thinking along different, even
outlandish lines. Since much of what were doing is not having a big effect,
maybe some other ideas can make a difference. He said that the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) had a problem in the 1970's. “We had an organization called the Black September organization. This was the most elite terrorist group we had. They were suicidal, not in the sense of religious terrorists who surrender their lives to ascend to heaven, but in the sense that we could send them anywhere to do anything and they were prepared to lay down their lives to do it.” And of course the success of Black September was manifold. The assassination of the Jordanian Prime Minister, the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre where eleven Israeli athletes were killed, the seizure of the Saudi Embassy at Khartoum where the American ambassador and chargé were killed, were big events. Then there came a time when Black September was no longer needed. The Palestinian Liberation Organization had gained the world's attention. Arafat was invited to address the United Nations General Assembly and Palestine was granted observer status in the General Assembly. Terrorism became an embarrassment, so Arafat instructed his senior aide to turn off Black September. The senior aide tried to decide what to do with these guys, these zealous fanatical terrorists. The PLO spent months thinking of all different ways to stand down Black September and then they came up with a very simple idea. They had the idea of marrying them off and getting them families to keep them away from violence. They went around to refugee camps and places where the PLO had offices in the Middle East and told attractive woman in their twenties that they had a mission of the highest importance to the nation, and invited them to Beirut to be introduced to young men of Black September. In short, they created a mixer. Then they told the members of the Black September “If you get married, we will give you $3,000 and an apartment with a gas stove, refrigerator, a color TV, and a job with the PLO; and if you have a child within a year, we will give you an additional $5,000.” The senior aide worried that the PLO would laugh at this idea, but it worked. Without exception, all the guys found wives, settled down, had children and were periodically tested. The PLO would give them legitimate passports and offer to send them on legitimate PLO missions, to their offices in Geneva and Paris. Without exception, not one of them wanted...
to travel abroad for fear of being arrested and losing all that they had. I am not
telling you that we should institute the policy in the U.S. of having mixers and
introducing terrorists to women, but what I am saying is that this is a different
approach on the individual level that has also worked in other countries. I
attribute the success of Northern Ireland, not so much to Gerry Adams’s
moderation or Martin McGuinness’s moderation or other things, but for the
past 15 years the Northern Ireland office has, on an individual basis, taken
some of the hardest core terrorists in prison and let them out on parole, let
them go back to their families and see their parents getting old and let them
see the political situation, the economic situation, the social situation and see
that that Northern Ireland is changing for the better. And the black and white
polarization that they felt when they became terrorists, when they went in, has
changed and is not as bad. And almost without exception, that program
workd to wean individuals away from terrorism. So rather than
concentrating, as we have been, on the organizational dimension and one has
to say not getting very far; it makes more sense to use force alongside
psychological operations, alongside ways we can reach out at the terrorists and
get them away from violence, that may prove more effective than what we do
now. I do not know if that will be the case, but I know it can not be any less
effective. The question is, could policy makers and the public be sold on it?

1 For a later update on Hoffman’s evolving characterization of the “new
terrorism” see his remarks in “America and the New Terrorism: An