AMERICAN AIRPOWER COMES OF AGE
General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold's World War II Diaries

Volume 2

Major General John W. Huston
USAF Retired
American Airpower Comes of Age
General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s
World War II Diaries

Edited by

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN W. HUSTON
USAF Retired

Volume 2

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This volume is dedicated to my wife Dorothy B. Huston and my children Ann Huston Faris and John B. Huston. All of them lovingly tolerated my preoccupation and ill humor while this was being completed.
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Foreword

This volume has richly enhanced General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s reputation as the father of today’s United States Air Force. Major General John W. Huston, himself an Army Air Forces combat veteran of the war, has edited each of Arnold’s World War II diaries and placed them in their historical context while explaining the problems Hap faced and evaluating the results of his travels. General Huston, a professional historian, has taught at both the US Air Force Academy and the US Naval Academy. A former Chief of the Office of Air Force History and an experienced researcher both here and abroad in the personal and official papers of the war’s leaders, he has been careful to let Hap speak for himself.

The result is an account of the four-year odyssey that took Arnold to every continent but one as he took part in deliberations that involved Allied leaders in major diplomacy/strategy meetings with Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S Truman, Winston Churchill, Josef Stalin, Charles de Gaulle, and Chiang Kai-shek. At those meetings, Hap recorded the comments of the various participants. His 12 diaries contain his own thoughts, which range from being lost over the Himalayas to comforting the wounded as they were airlifted from the Normandy beaches. He experienced an air raid in London and viewed the carnage in recently liberated Manila. Arnold recorded his honest impressions, from private meetings with King George VI in Buckingham Palace to eating from mess kits with his combat crews in the North African desert—all while perceptively commenting on the many issues involved and assessing the people, the culture, and the surroundings.

This volume offers the best assessment we have of Hap as he survived four wartime heart attacks and continued to work tirelessly for proper recognition of airpower. It will also continue my emphasis while Chief of Staff of the US Air Force on encouraging professional reading through making historical
accounts available to personnel of the finest air force in the world, a success achieved in large part because of Hap Arnold.

RONALD R. FOGLEMAN
General, United States Air Force, Retired
Major General John W. Huston was born on 6 March 1925 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He began his military career as an aviation cadet and was commissioned at age 18 following completion of navigator training. After flying a combat tour in B-17s with the 379th Bombardment Group of England in 1944 and teaching navigation in Liberal, Kansas, he left the Army Air Forces in 1945 and returned to college. He earned the BA degree from Monmouth College (Illinois) and the MA and PhD degrees from the University of Pittsburgh. He began a teaching career at the University of Pittsburgh and continued it at the US Naval Academy, where he became Chair of the History Department. His teaching career also took him to the University of Maryland, the University of Rochester, and Ball State University. He has published in a number of professional journals.

General Huston also served in the US Air Force Reserve, flying in C-46, C-119, C-124, and C-130 aircraft. He served in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, as the Mobilization Assignee to the Commander of the 20th Air Division, and as a
Major General Mobilization Assignee to the Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel at Headquarters USAF. General Huston was recalled to active duty in 1976 as Chief of the Office of Air Force History. He served in that capacity until his retirement from the US Air Force in 1981, when he returned to the faculty of the US Naval Academy. When he retired from the Naval Academy, General Huston was a Distinguished Visiting Professor at the US Air Force Academy.
Preface

Although the need for a comprehensive biography of Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold exists, this volume does not constitute such a biography. However, to promote a better understanding of both man and diary, a brief biographical and circumstantial sketch precedes the diaries here. Nor is this work intended as a history of the Army Air Forces in World War II. The aim of the editor has been to place in historical context the thoughts and immediate impressions of Arnold as he recorded them in the diaries he kept through each of his 12 trips abroad during the war. The diaries provide centerpieces for the 12 chapters of this work, each of which is devoted to the trip covered therein.

To promote a better understanding of the man and his journals, a brief biographic note introduces the diaries. Additionally, a brief description of the political and military background, some explanatory notes, and a postscript analysis are provided in each chapter for a clearer understanding of the setting and events of that chapter. These rely wherever possible on Arnold’s papers and other manuscript sources both in the United States and abroad. In all cases, the aim has been to let Arnold’s notes speak for themselves as he recorded them in his diaries.

These journals represent his immediate thoughts and spontaneous reactions rather than the reflective ruminations of a professional American military officer. Arnold had worn an Army uniform for almost 38 years when he began these volumes. His travels over the 51-month span included six major wartime diplomacy/strategy conferences that took him to all but one continent, into most war zones, and through four heart attacks. No matter where he traveled or what topics were discussed, his freshly recorded impressions made at the end of a busy day were not revised or supplemented by second thoughts or considerations of propriety. To this editor, they appear honest, illuminating, and reflective of the character, strengths, and shortcomings of General Arnold. No other American senior officer has left such an extensive, revealing, and contemporary account of World War II from such a vantage point.

Arthur Bryant’s assessment of Lord Alanbrooke’s journals seems equally applicable to Arnold’s diaries: “This book is not
a biography, nor is it a history of the war. It rests on a diary compiled in the heat of pressing events. It reveals how the diarist saw himself and those around him, but not how they saw him.” Bryant continued, cautioning that “a diary has limitations too, as history . . . written amid the passions and anxieties” of the time.* Arnold probably would have agreed.

Acknowledgments

As all researchers quickly discover, they incur immense debts to dedicated scholars, archivists, librarians, and others who have aided in many ways, from answering numerous obscure questions to listening ad nauseam about the diaries. These helpful people are too numerous to be mentioned individually, but the staff of the reference section, United States Naval Academy Library, always went far beyond the dedicated professional service librarians seem to have been born with. Barbara Parker was particularly helpful. The same excellence was always provided by S. J. Keller, now of the Culpeper County, Virginia, Library System. The staff of the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base has been a tower of research strength. During academic year 1994–95, a delightful intellectual climate was provided by the United States Air Force Academy as I enjoyed a pleasant yet challenging year as Distinguished Visiting Professor in the History Department. The academy library’s special collections proved invaluable, as did the assistance of archivist Duane Reed.

The contributions of knowledgeable historians who read portions of the manuscript resulted in a considerably improved final product. Among those readers were Professors James C. Bradford and Roger Beaumont of Texas A & M University and Tony Arthur of California State University at Northridge. My brother, Robert S. Huston, an emeritus history professor of Ball State University, provided excellent analysis and endured with good humor more of the manuscript than family ties required. Roger A. Freeman of Dedham, England, a careful student of the operational aspects of Eighth Air Force, made helpful suggestions. General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, British Army, retired, provided warm hospitality and excellent suggestions in Moulsford, England, while hearing with exceedingly good grace more about this project than friendship should have tolerated. Long before this project was seriously considered, I enjoyed many luncheons with the late William Bruce Arnold, Hap’s second son, who freely discussed his father and allowed me to copy those Arnold papers that have remained in the possession of the family. Gen Jacob Smart, USAF retired, a gentleman airman of the old school,
painstakingly annotated, on the basis of his travels with him, portions of Arnold's journal. Lt Gen Devol H. Brett, USAF Retired, kindly allowed me to use the papers of his father, Lt Gen George H. Brett, for the years 1940–41. Despite this expert assistance, the errors that remain are my responsibility.
Editorial Notes

Several years ago, when Chief of the Office of Air Force History, I was invited to deliver a paper assessing the contributions of Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold. In researching the topic, I consulted the diaries that form the basis of this volume. They represent General Arnold’s thoughts on each of the twelve trips he took abroad during World War II.¹

For reasons that are not clear, scholars have used these diaries unevenly. Forrest C. Pogue, for example, does not cite them in his biography of George C. Marshall, with whom Arnold worked very closely. Similarly, the seven-volume official history of the Army Air Forces (AAF) in World War II was written without access to these journals. They were, however, used by General Arnold in writing Global Mission, which appeared in 1949.

Maintenance of a diary was not a new experience for General Arnold. He had kept a journal, however briefly, during his earliest years as an officer, and he maintained a detailed account from 30 September to 21 December 1918, during his 67-day trip to England and France in the closing days of World War I. Fresh encouragement for maintaining a record on his first World War II trip to England was provided by Lt Gen Delos C. Emmons, an old friend from their cadet days at West Point. After suggesting a list of people to see, installations to visit, and matters to investigate, Emmons advised Arnold to “keep a diary and complete it at the end of each day.” He confessed that his own tendency during his 1940 trip to England was to “postpone entries with the result that I forgot some important things.”²

During these trips, Arnold recorded his impressions of each day’s activities in notebooks small enough to fit in his shirt breast pocket. The entries were normally not complete sentences but clauses separated by dashes. Written in private at the end of a generally long and demanding day, Arnold did not seem to have given any thought to the earliest of these being used other than as a reminder of things to be done upon his return. There is some evidence in the later ones that he was considering writing memoirs for which these notes could prove to be valuable resource material.³
When Arnold returned to Washington, his handwritten notes for that trip were given to a secretary who provided typed copies. In rare instances, minor editorial changes were made to promote clarity. However, no revisions were made to any judgments or observations. The few changes noted were those of spelling or for clearer identification of people or places. For consistency and to avoid confusion, Arnold’s notes on the trip covered in each chapter are presented as “The Diary.” Hap’s own title for that trip’s diary then introduces his entries for that journey as found in the typed version located in the manuscripts division of the Library of Congress.

At the diplomatic/military wartime conferences, official secretariats were responsible for preparing, distributing, and maintaining files. They organized and printed classified records of the deliberations. Additionally, AAF staff officers who accompanied Arnold at the later conferences maintained official notes of the issues involved in those conferences. As a result, he often confined his diary comments to nonofficial matters. Given the demanding schedule faced by Hap and the other conferees, it is remarkable that he found the time to write as fully as he did in these accounts. Not even Chief of Staff George Marshall, his superior and closest companion on many of these trips, was aware that a diary was being kept. No other American participant seemed able or interested in maintaining such an extensive commentary on a regular basis at these gatherings.

In preparing this manuscript, my aim was to retain Arnold’s phrasing, thoughts, and expressions. Even in the typed versions, his jottings were usually clauses separated by dashes. I have combined these clauses into complete sentences and paragraphs without adding to, deleting from, or rearranging in any way the phrasing of the original typed manuscripts. Similarly, Arnold frequently added a period after each letter in acronyms (A.A.F., R.A.F., U.S.) and he usually did not insert a comma in numbers of one thousand or greater (1000). In keeping with current style and to avoid reader confusion, the periods have been removed and the commas have been inserted. Finally, whereas General Arnold was inconsistent in denoting lists designated by numerals or by letters, I imposed an internal consistency within each list. Brackets indicate the few additions I made, but where mis-
spellings of proper names or places occurred, the items have been corrected without brackets.

**Dates:** Arnold’s generally consistent practice of using the civilian style for dates (April 30, 1956) rather than the military style (30 April 1956) has been retained. Wherever Hap did not include the day of the week in the heading to each day’s entry, it has been provided without brackets.

**Time:** When flying, Arnold utilized the 24-hour system for denoting time (1400 hours); when on the ground, he most often used the civilian method (2:00 or 2 PM). Whichever method he used has been retained here.

**Place Names:** Arnold was not consistent in listing the names of the cities or countries relevant to that day’s journal entries; names of the major locations visited on that day have been added in brackets.

**People:** Most of the individuals cited in the diaries were United States Army Air Forces military personnel. They have been identified at first mention by rank, full name, and assigned position at the time of the notation was made. If not otherwise noted, they were USAAF personnel. Although the Army Air Forces was officially termed the Army Air Corps prior to July 1942, the terms “Army Air Forces” and “AAF” have been used throughout the annotations unless clarity required use of the term “Army Air Corps.” The traditional abbreviations of USA, USMC, and USN refer to the United States Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, respectively. No attempt was made to identify the specific corps or branch (other than AAF) in which someone served; nor was any distinction made between officers holding regular commissions and those who were reservists serving on extended active duty.

Foreign military personnel are identified at first mention by rank, full name, nationality, branch of service, and assigned position at the time of the diary entry. Civilians are identified by full name, title, nationality if other than American, and position held at that time.

Given the many changes in rank and assignment during the four-year span of these diaries, there was no attempt to re-identify individuals who had been mentioned earlier or to list
their new rank or assignment unless re-identification was necessary for understanding.

**Cables:** Arnold often referred to cables, both received and sent. Where located and relevant, the contents of the cables are cited; where they were not found, there is no indication of that fact.

**Parentheses and Drawings:** Parentheses of this nature ( ) are where they appear in the original. The few drawings in the text, all made in Arnold’s hand, have been reproduced as they were in the typescripts.

**Identification of Units:** Although Arnold and his transcribers were not always consistent, USAAF units are identified in the notes provided in the style of *Air Force Combat Units of World War II*. Squadrons, Groups, Wings, and Divisions are designated by cardinal numbers (525th Bombardment Squadron, 379th Bombardment Group, 41st Bombardment Wing, 1st Air Division). Commands are designated by Roman numerals (VIII Bomber Command), numbered Air Forces by ordinal numbers (Eighth Air Force). Arnold’s original designations, although not always consistent with what became standard practice, remain in the text as he recorded them.

**Deletions:** The single deletion from the original journals was the name of an officer who was summarily dismissed from an operational command by Arnold because of excessive alcohol use. In view of the officer’s relatively recent death, and the survival of his descendants, his specific identification did not seem appropriate. The fact that a deletion has been made, however, is noted in the relevant chapter.

**Notes**

1. The handwritten diaries are in the Gen Henry H. Arnold Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., hereinafter cited as AP.
2. Delos C. Emmons to Arnold, 7 April 1941, AP.
3. It is difficult to be specific as to when Arnold appeared to be thinking of using the diaries in preparation of a postwar memoir, but those of chapter 8 and after hint of later usage. By the time of chapter 10, kept in the final weeks before the German surrender in the spring of 1945, the suggestion of their importance as a later reference is strong. The nature and content of the diaries, regardless of the time period, do not seem to change significantly over their 51-month period.
Hap at Midpoint

Since becoming chief of Army Air Forces (AAF) with its 20,196 people operating 1,792 aircraft in September 1938, Arnold had led the expansion of the Army air arm. By 1943, this force had already experienced exponential growth and was still expanding. The more than 64,000 aircraft on hand in 1943 was double the number possessed the previous year and the AAF was now flying more than 12,000 of them on every continent but one.1

What then of its leader, Lt Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, in many ways the driving force (and some would say the driven man) behind these changes, as he returned from his fifth trip of the wartime era? He continued to meet the many demands imposed on him in expanding the AAF, including his full-fledged membership and participation in the deliberations of the joint chiefs of staff (JCS) and combined chiefs of staff (CCS), his travels abroad, and an exhausting domestic travel schedule.

The Army reorganization of 1942, changes in the structure of the AAF, and the increasing confidence expressed in his abilities by the White House, the civilian leadership in the War Department, and the Army chief of staff, allowed Hap increasing latitude in directing the AAF. Although Army aviation’s growth and worldwide deployment required increasing reliance on the Air Staff, now mostly organized and staffed according to Arnold’s aims, it never operated as smoothly or efficiently as its Army counterpart, in large part due to Arnold’s essentially undisciplined use of it. Humorous tales, not completely apocryphal but often embellished in the later postwar recounting, were told of the frenetic, disarmingly smiling Arnold, striding quickly between Pentagon meetings immersed in thought about the AAF and its problems. He was reputed to have abruptly halted in his tracks an aviator of any rank, learned his name, and instructed the bewildered officer to investigate and quickly report to him on whatever was foremost in Arnold’s thinking. The rank or expertise within the AAF of the temporarily empowered flier mattered not at all to the commanding general (CG). As a result, senior staff officers instructed their subordinates to report immediately the details and ad hoc
assignments emanating from chance meetings with General Arnold in the Pentagon passageways so that a proper response could be prepared for the AAF’s impatient leader.

Hap’s wide-ranging interest and extensive knowledge about most phases of Army aviation, combined with his driven nature, contributed to his reluctance and/or inability to delegate significant authority to Pentagon subordinates. As a consequence, more issues and decisions were elevated to his Pentagon E ring office for resolution than should have been the case. As the diaries reflect, this tendency did not stop at the water’s edge. Overseas commanders, particularly during or in the wake of one of his whirlwind visits, received on-site comments, most often followed by Washington-originated letters or cables demanding responses about issues ranging from major to seemingly minor ones. On the other hand, he rarely interfered with operational decisions.

Well aware of his shortcomings, Arnold knew that his method of operating did not allow time for the necessary detached long-range planning and thinking denied by the demands of day-to-day coping. As a result, Arnold established a group in the Pentagon that became known as the Advisory Council. It was functioning within 60 days of Pearl Harbor. Physically located very close to Hap’s office, and having unlimited access thereto, the Council consisted of trusted colonels (originally all of them pilots and West Point graduates) who were tasked with thinking in depth about the AAF, its problems, and its prospects. One author has described their work in relation to Hap this way: “It provided a sounding board for the countless ideas and problems which faced him daily. This included advance planning, strategy, organization, interservice relations, technical equipment and manpower, and many other things which contributed to the training and deployment of air forces in combat.”

As one of its members recalled after the war, what “our ‘business’ was, however, was anything but clear to us.” But “the vagueness of our function was a strength of the office,” as we were “brought face-to-face with the complete range of Arnold’s problems.” Another council member recalled Arnold instructing him, “Your job is to do my thinking for me.”
As was the case with other senior staff officers, this was not a permanent assignment. Council members were rotated to other duties, often outside the Pentagon and to combat or positions of increased responsibility. Changing membership brought fresh perspective to the Council, and the colonels were encouraged to think broadly—beyond the minutiae and limited purview of any specific AAF staff section. They regularly shared the results of their thinking with the general and drafted papers for his consideration. On several occasions, a Council member accompanied Hap on his travels abroad. The Council’s changing membership included some of the brightest and most successful colonels of the day. Among the group at various times during the war were Lauris Norstad, Jacob Smart, Laurence Kuter, C. P. “Pre” Cabell, and Emmett “Rosie” O’Donnell, all but one of whom became generals during the war and advanced to four-star rank in the postwar period. The exception to wartime advancement had been shot down during the war and became a prisoner of war after his stint on the Advisory Council.

Arnold’s disappointment in not getting to combat in France 25 years earlier prompted him to rotate many promising senior officers (generally of colonel rank and above), as well as those on the Advisory Council, between Washington staff assignments and combat commands or duty in overseas theaters. The major criterion appeared to be Arnold’s assessment of the officer’s performance in the Pentagon and the anticipated enhanced utility of the officer elsewhere. If he succeeded in his new assignment, the vast expansion of the AAF afforded ample opportunity for increased responsibility as well as promotion. Among the many examples of rapid advancement during the course of the war were aviators Elwood R. Quesada, who progressed from major to lieutenant general; Carl A. Spaatz, from colonel to four-star general; Ira C. Eaker, from lieutenant colonel to lieutenant general; George C. Kenney, from colonel to four-star general; Archie J. Olds, from captain to brigadier general; Frederick W. Castle, from captain to colonel in 12 months; and James H. Doolittle, from major to major general in 12 months. On the other hand, perceived lack of accomplishment could and did result in relief from an
important assignment, stagnation, or even reduction in rank and/or reassignment to a post where fewer critical problems existed. Among the examples of unsuccessful officers was Maj Gen James E. Chaney, who was relieved and reassigned. He served his final duty in the relatively undemanding position as commander of US forces on Iwo Jima after the island had been secured. Another was Martin F. Scanlon, a long-time pilot who, although a brigadier general in October 1940 and the senior aviator in London during Arnold’s first visit there, was never promoted during the war and was identified by Hap in June 1945 as one of the officers to be sent home to retire. As Scanlon explained to the editor of these diaries, “Arnold had lost confidence in me and my abilities.” Excessive alcohol use was another reason for Arnold relieving at least one extremely effective combat group commander whose unit at the time of his sacking was probably the most effective of its genre in an important and very active combat theater. This officer had learned to fly during World War I and had been awarded a rare peacetime Distinguished Flying Cross while gaining considerable fame for the Air Corps in the 1920s. Nor were Hap’s concerns limited to the performance or behavior of senior personnel. He insisted that his generals, even in combat zones, attempt to check what he found as instances of “complete let down of moral standards” and “loose living on bases.”

Although labeled by some as ruthless in his personnel dealings, Hap was not insensitive to the difficulty in relieving, shunting aside, or failing to promote a close friend, a West Point colleague, or a fellow aviator whom he had known, flown with, and raised families with, over several decades. He rarely ruminated long, but the record reflects attempts to explain sympathetically to the relieved officer that the war simply did not permit any criterion other than the maximum effort that Arnold exerted himself and required from other AAF leaders. Although Arnold’s role is still not clear in the relief/reassignment in 1943 of Ira Eaker, his coauthor and one of his very closest friends, the evidence is convincing that Hap’s increasing frustration at what he believed was less than maximum utilization of the Eighth Air Force resulted in Arnold’s counternancing, if not being the driving force behind the reassign-
ment to the Mediterranean of this trusted associate and long-
time close personal friend of Hap and his family.  

As important as Arnold’s willingness to promote rapidly was
his normal acceptance of the judgments and recommenda-
tions for promotion from his major field commanders. He was
usually able to find room in the rank structure to allow
advancement of those recommended, particularly those in the
combat theaters. By this point in the war, Chief of Staff George
C. Marshall, although not always in agreement with Arnold’s
assessments and recommendations, generally allowed AAF
aviators to be advanced to the levels recommended by Arnold
as long as this did not do violence to the senior grade struc-
ture of the entire Army. Even so, Arnold was careful not to
engage in “empire building.” He wrote Eaker, then commander
of the Eighth Air Force in June 1943, “there are too many
headquarters in our organization” because “we have too many
people trying to make and trying to be Generals.” Conse-
quently, he temporarily withheld approval of Eaker’s recom-
mendation that Colonels Curtis E. LeMay and Patrick W. Tim-
berlake, both successful combat commanders, be promoted.
Both were promoted later.  

Arnold appeared to operate similarly to the other service
chiefs in not retaining a second in command or senior deputy
over any extended period in the Pentagon. The result was that
no assistant to the chief in either the Army or the Navy devel-
oped significant power, recognition, or longevity just below the
top in wartime Washington. In the case of the AAF, Arnold
rotated his second in command three times during the war
and generally limited his deputy’s ability to act on major
issues without the chief’s imprimatur. On occasion, this inhib-
ited smooth and rapid decision making in the AAF when Hap
was away from the Pentagon for extended periods or during
his incapacitation as a result of his heart attacks. Particularly
after his fourth attack in January 1945, the following six-week
convalescence in Florida, and the ensuing two extensive trips
abroad, the civilian leadership in the War Department
expressed concern that there was no strong, credible, senior
spokesman for the AAF in the councils of the JCS and CCS.
They were particularly concerned as the war appeared to be
ending and major long-range decisions needed to be made. Illuminating is Arnold’s April 1945 diary entry, written while in Europe: “Since my departure AAF has been ignored in all high-level conferences; he [Assistant Secretary of War Robert A. Lovett] wants me to come back home at once.”

The Army chief of staff’s considerably different personality traits seemed to complement Arnold’s, resulting in an effective, trusting relationship that transcended the official one and grew warmer and more personal during the war. Marshall appeared outwardly more cerebral, laconic, deliberative, and occasionally diffident, in contrast with his ebullient and often impetuous aviator subordinate. Marshall reputedly bristled on the single occasion when Roosevelt addressed him as “George,” whereas Arnold was pleased that the chief executive addressed him as “Hap.” Both officers clearly understood their roles and the nature of their responsibilities within the Army as well as to each other. In many ways, Marshall succinctly summed up the crux of their relationship in his postwar comment that Arnold “was always loyal.”

Hap had recognized and lauded Marshall’s talents 30 years earlier when they had served together in the Philippines. Their critical World War II association began with Marshall’s assignment as deputy chief of staff in September 1938, the month Arnold became Air Corps chief. Arnold recalled that the new chief of staff needed “plenty of indoctrination” about airpower. Marshall’s biographer has observed that “Arnold and his air-minded friends lost no time in instructing General Marshall on the needs of the Air Corps.” An effective early teacher was the former CG General Headquarters Air Force (GHQAF), Frank M. Andrews, who flew Marshall, no doubt with Arnold’s encouragement, on an eight-day educational trip to airfields and manufacturing plants, at the same time explaining “the nature of the disagreement between air and ground officers of the army.” As Marshall remembered the general staff he inherited in 1939, it was, as most aviators had charged, one where the “Air had almost no representation... [had] little interest in the Air... [with] everyone on the staff hostile to... [and with] little understanding of the Air.” It became clear that Marshall, once he became chief of staff,
whatever his previous views on airpower had been, did not appear to the aviation community to operate with the hostility and suspicion they felt had previously marked the general staff. Never pretending an in-depth knowledge of Army aviation, among Marshall’s strengths was his providing overall guidelines while permitting the AAF and other specialized branches to operate with considerable latitude. This does not mean that Marshall did not find it necessary on occasion to restrain not only the more zealous of AAF’s aviators but also its leader. On the other hand, Marshall sometimes found it necessary to push Arnold to promote promising officers faster than Hap seemed willing. Marshall rarely opposed Arnold in critical areas such as aircraft allocation, opposition to Navy efforts to limit Army aviation, emphasis on Europe rather than the Pacific, and concentration on strategic bombing. In terms of strategic and tactical employment, Marshall generally allowed the AAF leader maximum operating latitude that one author has called “controlled autonomy.” This was normally given as long as the logistical support, usually furnished by units external to the AAF, was available within the resources of the Army. Arnold’s gamble in building the B-29 earned Marshall’s support. Even Hap’s error in emphasizing bomber construction to the detriment of fighters did not elicit criticism, either at the time or later, from the chief of staff about this significant flaw in Arnold’s thinking. Hap had successfully presided over the prewar AAF buildup that was directed by Roosevelt and supported by a generous Congress, and he had not overemphasized AAF needs to the detriment of the other elements of the US Army that were being championed by Marshall. They differed concerning Arnold’s optimistic hope, not completely abandoned by him in 1943, that strategic bombing would invalidate the need for massive ground operations in northern Europe. In contrast, Marshall never changed his mind about the more realistic need for large-scale ground operations on the European continent or the Japanese home islands to win the war. The chief of staff was more than satisfied with the forging of the sound, effective air-ground tactical relationship, encouraged and supported by Arnold, that the AAF and Army ground commanders began to develop effec-
tively in North Africa after the Torch invasion and evolved so importantly in northern Europe after D-Day.

The Marshall–Arnold relationship has not been as fully documented as the historian would like. The proximity of their Pentagon offices to each other allowed frequent unrecorded interchanges that were occasionally continued in their homes, where they lived side-by-side once Arnold moved into quarters on nearby Fort Myer in 1942. As the diaries reflected, they often traveled together and were billeted near to each other or together during wartime conferences. Their walks of several miles after long hours of deliberations at several of these meetings provided physical and mental relaxation along with time for serious private discussions away from the tedious sessions. This helped to forge a closeness that continued in the midst of their wartime stress. They shared a love of fishing and hunting and, as the diaries indicate, were able to indulge occasionally in these relaxing pursuits. By this point in the war, Marshall was ending his unofficial correspondence to Arnold with a word rarely used by him with other officers: “Affectionately.”

On the other hand, Marshall was rarely reluctant in advising, chastising, or criticizing Arnold (albeit not in public) when necessary. His admonitions ranged from his September 1942 perceptive advice as Arnold prepared for his Pacific trip, for the aviator not to get mad and to “let the other fellow tell his story,” to sharp rebukes of what Marshall considered as Arnold’s extravagant and wasteful expenditure of his limited physical energies following Hap’s heart attacks. Their work habits differed, with Marshall effectively using rare free weekends to slip away from his quarters on Fort Myer to his nearby Leesburg home where he relaxed and tended his gardens. Arnold, on the other hand, viewed the arrival of the weekend, when many of the AAF staff would normally not be available, as a delay in getting the war won. More often than not, Hap was in his Pentagon office with part of his staff during some if not the majority of wartime Saturdays and Sundays.

Whatever disagreements existed between the two of them were rarely articulated for the record. In JCS and CCS sessions, Arnold expressed his viewpoints but remained aware that he and the AAF were integral parts of, and subordinate to,
the chief of staff. As indicated elsewhere, Hap’s recorded remarks were normally confined to air matters and their ramifications, leaving broader issues to Marshall and King. This may have spawned both Admiral King’s disparagement of Arnold as being a “yes man” for Marshall and Portal’s remark that Arnold had trouble following the strategic arguments, neither of which appears as a balanced assessment of the airman’s contributions. Serious contrary or dissenting thinking from Marshall’s viewpoint did exist but was resolved in private. One observer has recalled spirited CCS sessions with “Admiral King red in the neck and inarticulate, General Arnold furious but quiet.”

Similarly effective relations appeared to mark Arnold’s relationship with Secretary of War Stimson and the civilian leadership in that office. Stimson’s continuing vigorous support of Arnold against Henry L. Morgenthau Jr., in their White House battles for a more equitable allocation of aircraft for the AAF was merely a harbinger of the secretary of war’s increasingly general agreement with and support of most AAF positions and their leader. The Stimson diary is replete with examples of the secretary of war embracing and strongly advancing the arguments of Arnold and the AAF to the president, including such important issues as continuing the emphasis on strategic bombardment. The secretary of war’s assessment of Arnold continued to be extremely favorable, evaluating Hap as “brilliant in his presentations and fearless and undiplomatic,” and, from his observation, a “good counterpose to Marshall who is a little overdiplomatic.” Further, the secretary labeled Arnold as one with a “quick mind [who] doesn’t hesitate to make his views clearly felt,” labeling the AAF leader as an integral part of “our smoothly working military,” and a “tower of strength in all the conferences.” Additionally, Arnold was viewed as not hesitating to “espouse the unpopular side of a discussion and make it very clear even in the face of his accuser.” On the other hand, Stimson understood Arnold’s impetuosity and frenetic nature, confiding on more than one occasion that he had to intercede or quash some “half-baked action” by Arnold.

The addition of Robert Lovett as special assistant to the secretary of war in December 1940 and assistant secretary of war
in April 1941 forged another healthy amalgam of diverse talents. Lovett’s legal background and ability to remain more composed than Arnold during the heat of the bureaucratic battles was enhanced by grudging respect for him from the US Navy, where he had earned the Navy Cross while piloting night bombers in World War I. In his early AAF service, Lovett concentrated on production problems. His previous involvement with the investment banking community in the prewar years enhanced his rapport with the aircraft manufacturers and proved valuable to Hap and the AAF. His most significant contribution may well have been his role as a calm, reasoned counterweight to Arnold’s impetuosity. He appreciated, as did Stimson, Arnold’s frenetic nature. On many occasions, after the General had become very agitated over a problem, Lovett calmly dissected the issues involved and worked with Hap to begin an effective, less emotional dialogue towards a rational solution. As Arnold conceded in his autobiography, Lovett was “one of three men who helped me most with my job” and “possesses the qualities in which I was weakest.”

From this point on, Arnold’s health became a significant factor, although Hap rarely articulated to anyone other than his wife any concern in this area until his fourth serious attack in January 1945. The two attacks suffered thus far did not seem to have significantly altered his optimism, resolve, or demanding work habits.

At midpoint Arnold maintained his strong faith in the eventual efficacy of strategic bombardment and directed the bulk of his efforts towards that strategy. As a result, many of his frustrations during 1943 were due to the limited results of the strategic bombing efforts over the skies of Europe. His belief that the Allies should continue to emphasize the war in Europe first was reflected in ensuring that the bulk of Army air assets were delivered to that theater. Unfortunately for the historian, the pace of his involvement did not allow him to leave any extensive personal contemporary reflections. Nevertheless, his imprimatur remained and would continue to dominate most facets of the AAF throughout the remainder of the war. This was Arnold at midpoint.
Notes


7. The controversy over Eaker’s relief/reassignment seems very much alive after 50 years. During the five years I was privileged to serve as Chief of the Office of Air Force History in Washington, among its pleasures was the opportunity to lunch frequently with General Eaker and to meet him and his wife on social occasions. In the many luncheon discussions that occurred (although not protracted because of General Eaker’s desire to keep his standing daily date with bridge partners downstairs at the Army Navy Club), the many topics of discussion ranged over the war, personalities, and memories. There were occasions when others present attempted to draw Eaker out on such controversial, and to him difficult, issues such as his “reassignment” in December 1943 or his being brought back from Europe in March 1945 just as the war ended there. Never in my hearing, however, was he lured into saying anything that could have been interpreted as disparaging in any way of Arnold or his actions.

8. Arnold to Eaker, 28 June 1943, AP.


13. Ibid.


19. Ibid., 20 January 1943.

Chapter 6

England
31 August–8 September 1943

Introduction

Six months elapsed between Arnold’s January–February 1943 extended trip to North Africa, India, and China, and his next journey, his third wartime trip to England. In the interim, two additional important CCS meetings with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill were held but circumstances prevented Hap from being present at the first and from providing an extant diary from the second.

Hap’s opportunities to cover in detail the problems he encountered in his six-week January–February journey were limited since he had barely settled back into his Pentagon office when he was stricken with the first of four heart attacks he was to experience during the war. The illness was probably brought on in part by the exertions of the six-week trip and exacerbated by the energy he applied to the tasks he tackled in his first week back. In his autobiography, Arnold has provided a synopsis of the more than 60 items in the “pile of accumulated papers” on his desk that greeted him in the Pentagon. They ranged over the entire spectrum of AAF issues, far too many of which should not have been elevated to his level, thus confirming Hap’s reluctance to delegate problems to his subordinates.1 After recuperation in Florida, Arnold was back in Washington by 22 March.2 There he continued to concentrate on two of the major problems that had been emphasized during the January–February Casablanca discussions and his travels to India and China. Specifically, they were AAF command and operations in China, including air tonnage over the Hump, and implementation of the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) agreed on at Casablanca. The problems in China continued, reappearing as major issues at the Washington, D.C., Trident Conference in May, which Arnold could not
attend because he had experienced his second heart attack, and at the Quebec, Canada, Quadrant meeting in August 1943. Arnold attended the Quadrant Conference, but his diary is not extant.

Arnold, Eaker, Spaatz, and Andrews had to have been encouraged by the approval of Roosevelt, Churchill, and the CCS at Casablanca to continue the daylight as well as the night air offensive against Germany, which was now formally embodied in the CBO. Although it appeared to end British insistence that the AAF join them in night operations, the agreement carried with it an implicit obligation to make the Eighth Air Force effort more effective. The Eighth had flown relatively few sorties, none over Germany proper, since it had begun operations in August 1942. On his return to Washington, however, Arnold viewed the CBO as not much more than an approved concept in need of effective and early implementation. It lacked not only a sizeable AAF bomber force in being but also a long-range plan of attack, which Hap thought should include a system of targets beyond the general categories specified in the CBO agreement. Neither was easily obtained.

AAF intelligence sources did not lack what the official history has called a “great mass of factual data concerning German industry” but it did lack “any rational system of [target] selection.” In the month before Casablanca, Hap revealed his understanding that the daylight strategic effort from England was to contribute primarily to allowing a successful invasion of northern Europe. To plan for this, he directed an analysis of “the rate of progressive deterioration that should be anticipated in the German war effort as a result of increasing air operations” and requested an estimate of when the invasion could succeed. Over the next three months, the Committee of Operations Analysts, a civilian-military group that had been established in response to Hap’s request, incorporated data from varied United States and British sources and used scientific methodology to identify 19 critical German war industries. In their 8 March report to Arnold, the committee members indicated that they could not determine the date by which destruction of German targets would permit an invasion. They
were handicapped by a lack of knowledge about both the size of the bomber force that would be employed and the results of the unimpressive four raids over German territory that had been flown since January. First in priority on their target list was the German aircraft industry, a reinforcement of the importance accorded this industry in the Air War Plans Division (AWPD) -42 of September 1942. Next in importance were the ball bearing, petroleum, grinding wheel, and crude abrasives industries. Any shortcomings in constructing the list were due to a lack of adequate information about the German economy.

Arnold’s influence on the group is not clear, but he had approved the membership, which included six AAF officers. Hap met with the committee and directed that a similar analysis be made of Italy and Japan. He concurred in their recommendation that the bombing offensive should attempt to cause a significant level of damage in a few areas rather than “a small degree of destruction in many industries.” This approach, the committee optimistically predicted, would “gravely” impair the Axis “war effort.” The committee articulated one of Hap’s most difficult problems when it recommended, “in view of the ability of . . . air power . . . to impair the industrial sources of the enemy’s military strength, only the most vital considerations should be permitted to delay or divert the application of an adequate striking force to this task.” Curiously, it seems that neither Secretary Stimson nor Assistant Secretary Lovett were informed of the existence or work of the committee before Arnold left for Casablanca. Upon learning of it, Stimson labeled the effort a “rather half-baked action by Arnold.” However, when he was later given additional information about the project, he approved and fully supported the effort.

On his return from Florida, Arnold assessed the findings of the group and, after receiving the comments of Norstad and Cabell of his advisory council, had the document hand-carried to England for delivery to Eaker, Air Marshal Charles F. Portal, and Lt Gen Frank M. Andrews, who had succeeded Dwight D. Eisenhower as CG European Theater of Operations United States Army (ETOUSA). In the cover letters, Arnold suggested
that, in view of the facts we now have, “I believe we should review the bombing priorities set out” (and approved) at Casablanca. He stated the obvious, that the CBO “directive itself is in broad terms and apparently needs to change.”8 Hap was optimistic in estimating that the resulting study to be made in England “may result in air action that will prove the decisive factor in the European conflict.” Arnold asked Andrews to evaluate the ball-bearing industry, a target within the “capabilities” of the force expected to be deployed in England during the year, and one whose “destruction would virtually paralyze all German industry.”9

Major General Eaker provided Hap’s directive to a group that consisted of experienced members of his staff and representatives of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare as well as the RAF. They presented a document that became known as the Plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom or, more simply, the CBO Plan. It identified a “final” list of 76 targets in six industries, grouped in three objectives. The primary ones included German submarine works and operating bases as first priority, along with oil and the German aircraft industry other than fighters. The secondary objectives included synthetic rubber and tires, along with military transport vehicles. The emphasis on German submarines continued because the Battle of the Atlantic was in such “precarious condition” that no plan “was likely to be accepted by the . . . [JCS or CCS] unless an attack on German submarines were [sic] given a prominent position.”10 However, in a curious example of literary legerdemain, the CBO plan created an “Intermediate” objective that stated, “German fighter strength must be considered as an Intermediate objective second to none in priority.”11

Once the objectives had been established, the next task undertaken by the group was to determine the number of aircraft necessary and the chronological order in which the six systems should be attacked. Given the nature of the precision attacks planned, the bulk of the raids were expected to be flown by the Eighth’s heavies in daylight even though Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris and the RAF pronounced the RAF-AAF efforts as “exactly complementary.”12
Arnold had informed the JCS that 300 bombers were the absolute minimum “that must be in the air within supporting distance of each other on any penetration deep into Germany.” Yet he was aware that it would require at least 600 to 900 of them in reserve to provide the 300 for any given mission. In mid-March, General Eaker’s Eighth Air Force possessed only 281 heavy bombers, and conditions were not improving. The Eighth had flown only eight raids over Germany prior to the completion of the CBO plan. Of the eight raids, two involved slightly more than 100 aircraft. The average number of planes dispatched for the raids was 88. In March, three heavy bomb groups promised to Eaker were diverted elsewhere and he was informed in April that he would get only 25 of the 157 replacement crews that had been promised.

The CBO plan recommended an increase in force levels in chronological periods, calling for a minimum of 944 heavy bombers to be in the theater by the end of June 1943—less than 90 days away. Given the shortage of trained crews and other limiting factors in this first period, the targets were to be those within the range of fighter escorts except for two beyond, namely the Rumanian oil fields at Ploesti and the German ball-bearing works at Schweinfurt in Bavaria. During the second phase, ending in October of 1943, 1,192 heavy bombers were required and by January 1944 the number needed increased to 1,746. By 31 March 1944, when it was considered possible that an invasion of the continent could be successful, 2,702 were necessary. Andrews, Portal, and Harris of RAF Bomber Command approved the report and Eaker returned to Washington where he briefed the proposal to the JCS on 29 April.

Although Hap labeled Eaker’s presentation “superb,” the demands the plan would place on production, shipping, and the requirements of other theaters raised logical questions within that group. Arnold wrote to General Andrews about the JCS discussion, saying “there are certain individuals,” no doubt referring to Adm Ernest J. King, who were “asking questions as to where the airplanes will come from, and whether, if we meet the requirements in England, there will be sufficient available to also meet emergency situations in the Pacific.”
Hap said “we have satisfied them on that point.” However, he continued with tempered optimism, “the battle has not yet been won for there will always be attempts made to send these planes elsewhere up to the time they actually arrive in England.” The JCS approved on 4 May, recommending that it be presented for approval to the upcoming CCS Trident meeting now scheduled with Churchill and FDR to convene in Washington within the next 10 days.17

Although Arnold was sidelined for almost a month because of illness, the AAF had made considerable strides, many of them as a result of his efforts, in the three months since his return from the Casablanca Conference. In spite of a continuing shortage of aircraft and crews, tonnage over the Hump was moving towards the desired level and command changes within the China–Burma–India (CBI) theater promised increased effectiveness in fighting the Japanese from that theater. In implementing the CBO, which Arnold had to have considered the most important accomplishment at Casablanca, the AAF had identified strategic bombing targets and established a timetable for operations over Germany aimed at defeating the Luftwaffe and allowing an invasion of the northern European continent.

On 9 May 1943, two days before the arrival of Churchill and the British delegation of 100 on the Queen Mary for the Trident Conference, Hap suffered his second heart attack. Stimson initially, in view of Arnold’s 160 pulse rate, labeled it “severe,” but he found Hap “in fine fettle” five days later. “chafing” at not being able to participate in the Trident deliberations.18 His recovery seemed rapid enough for his physician to allow him to leave Washington a week after being stricken. Mr. and Mrs. Arnold flew to Oregon for some fishing and relaxation in what Hap called the “big timber country.” He returned to Washington two days after the conference concluded and continued his daily schedule despite having been cautioned by both Stimson and Marshall to reduce his activities.19

Within the week after his return to the Pentagon, Arnold’s health had apparently continued to improve sufficiently for him to fulfill his commitment to deliver the commencement address to the 504 graduates at West Point on 1 June. Among
the graduates was his second son, William Bruce Arnold. Although probably written by his staff and cleared through the War Department, the speech reflected some of Arnold’s thinking about the war. He used the occasion to emphasize the strategic bombing campaign, insisting optimistically that the morale of the enemy was “already beginning to crack” and that the “tide was turning” in favor of the Allies. Insisting to the new officers that the Axis powers had initiated the bombing of cities, Arnold explained that, in contrast, we choose “only military objectives.” He conceded that we occasionally “miss” our targets but claimed that we are attaining an accuracy not achieved by our enemies. Hap pointed to propaganda characterizing the Allied aerial campaign as one directed against noncombatants as evidence of declining Axis morale. He included in the speech much of the rationale for strategic bombing, saying that its continuation would in the long run end the war sooner and “cut down the casualties,” an item of concern to the young officers and their families. Optimistically, he declared that the Allies were approaching a decisive year, pointing out that the United States was now manufacturing as many aircraft in 130 days as had been produced in the entire 36 years from the first Kitty Hawk flights in 1903. He tempered any optimism, however, by telling the new officers that we had a “long, hard job” ahead and that Germany and Japan were still “mighty military powers.”

During the Trident Conference, 13–25 May, the AAF was represented by Deputy Chief of Staff Lt Gen Joseph McNarney. The major strategic issue, essentially the strategy to be followed in the European theater now that the Allied North African campaign appeared successful, was one that had concerned the CCS for the previous year and would prove to be difficult for the next 15 months. The crux of the matter was that the US chiefs wanted to get an agreement with the British on a planning date for the invasion of northern Europe, whereas the British insisted on a continuation of Mediterranean operations. Two weeks before the conference began, Arnold expressed his estimate of British strategy, which probably also reflected the thinking of both Marshall and King. As
he confided in an internal memo, Hap believed that the “British have no intention of invading northern Europe.”

At the opening CCS Trident session, Churchill articulated the British position as “Torch was over, Husky was near, what should come next?” Lest anyone present feel that his question was rhetorical, he continued by saying that the first objective was “in the Mediterranean.” The great prize there was “to get Italy out of the war.” Marshall framed the US position when he responded that land operations in the Mediterranean area “would prolong the European war” and “create a vacuum which would constitute a drain on our available resources.” The Army chief of staff asked if the British regarded “Mediterranean operations as the key to successful termination of the European war.” Although the topic was debated further throughout the conference, the final report instructed Eisenhower “to plan such operations in exploitation of HUSKY [Sicily invasion] as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the War.” Churchill flew to Algiers immediately from the conference to meet with Eisenhower, requesting that FDR allow him to take General Marshall along lest the impression be gained that Churchill “exerted undue influence” on Ike. Who, knowing Churchill’s wiles, could even think such a thing of the British leader? The US chiefs felt that a major concession had been gained in getting the British to agree on a planning date of 1 May 1944 for the cross-Channel invasion.

On other matters relating to the AAF, the conference approved the CBO plan essentially as briefed by Eaker to the US chiefs on 29 April. It called for the “progressive destruction and dislocation” of the German military, industrial, and economic structure, along with “undermining” their morale and weakening their capacity to continue the war, a plan that obviously approved of both AAF day bombing and RAF night bombing. Additionally, they endorsed the intermediate objective of the CBO plan calling for the destruction of the Luftwaffe fighter force. Another agreement of importance to the AAF was that the plan for bombing the Ploesti oil fields should be submitted to Eisenhower for his recommendation. The report also called for 10,000 tons of cargo per month being delivered over the Hump into China by early fall 1943. Along with this
achievement, sufficient facilities should be developed in Assam, India, to support air activities against Japanese holdings in Burma. At the same time, operations in the Pacific were not ignored. The report also called for an ambitious program, including air support, against Japanese holdings in the Central and South Pacific areas. Had Arnold been present, he no doubt would have been surprised by their conclusion that there are sufficient air forces to meet all requirements in all theaters.\textsuperscript{25}

Although Arnold’s reaction to the conference does not seem to have been recorded, he had to have been pleased by the endorsement of the CBO Plan to continue strategic bombing. He also had to have been aware of the difficulties involved in this approval, since there was now a specific planning date, less than a year distant, for the invasion of northern France, which had to be supported by air superiority over the Luftwaffe if it was going to be successful. At the same time, although the conference confidently stated that there were sufficient airplanes to meet worldwide requirements, Hap knew there would be additional demands for aircraft to implement the Trident decisions, including air assets in Italy, increased Hump tonnage, the Ploesti attack, and air support for Pacific operations. If there were still those in the AAF (earlier, this had included Arnold) who felt that bombing alone could compel Germany to end the war, Trident’s embrace of the CBO plan demolished that thinking. It was now clear that the primary reason d’être for daylight strategic bombing was to allow the ground invasion of the continent. Arnold’s primary efforts from this point through the end of 1943, now driven by the invasion timetable, were focused on securing the aircraft, crews, and logistical support required for execution of the CBO plan. In pursuit of this goal, he vigorously attempted to ensure that the Eighth Air Force, the main AAF instrument for bombing Germany, made full use of its assets and opportunities.

As a result, Hap inserted himself into Eighth Air Force matters beyond his policy role in the Pentagon and, although he was far removed from the details of combat flying, attempted to manage too many aspects of Eighth’s operations. His health may have been a contributing factor to his seemingly increased irascibility, and this campaign saw his relations with the RAF, Eaker, and...
others severely strained over his efforts to implement more quickly the strategic bombing offensive.

This rift had its beginning when Arnold expressed his unhappiness over the limited AAF bombing from English bases almost immediately upon returning from the Casablanca meeting. As he explained, he had been put "on the defensive" at the conference by Churchill as well as FDR over that issue. Hap felt the explanations coming from Eaker and Spaatz "seemed very weak" and concluded that we are doing "practically nothing" with the heavies in England. He suggested a cable to Gen Frank Andrews, indicating that the 207 heavies then possessed "cannot be held on the ground" for any extensive period "without subjecting us to severe criticism." Part of the problem, discovered during his trip to Casablanca and Asia, was that there was a "serious shortage of aircraft in the hands of the units in contact with the enemy." He directed his Pentagon operations staff to build up the combat units to "full strength," requiring the noncombat units to resort to "makeshift" means to achieve their full complements of aircraft.

Even before the CBO plan had been developed, Arnold and Eaker were communicating about acquiring and using sufficient assets for the Eighth. The exchanges between these two old friends were frank but not always overly amicable. In a long, carefully reasoned letter labeled "statement of our critical needs" and sent to Arnold in March, Eaker expressed concern over the growing strength of the German fighter force and the need for the Eighth to be given the assets required to "redeem its unkept promise." He claimed that his aircrews "will pay for the mistakes of their superiors," a not-very-veiled disparagement of Washington leadership. Stung by the criticism, Hap commented to his staff, "Eaker thinks I am personally responsible" for the dispersion of planes to North Africa. He conceded that Eaker had been the "forgotten" man, since others had viewed aircraft sent to England as a reservoir from which planes could be drawn, and informed Spaatz that, if left alone, he could get a "decent sized" air force to England by fall. His response to the Eighth leader in reference to the needs of other Air force commanders around the world was that he had "eight youngsters to feed" but that he "will do the
best I can for you." Earlier in March, while Arnold was in Florida recuperating, Eaker had requested a flow chart outlining the numbers, types of aircraft, and the dates he could anticipate receiving reinforcements. On his return to the Pentagon from his convalescence in Florida, Arnold informed Eaker that he expected the Eighth to have 19 heavy Groups by 30 June 1943. (Eaker possessed seven heavy Groups at the time.) By the end of 1943, that number should increase to 37 and, by the end of June 1944, to 44 Groups. Hap cautioned, however, that the promised aircraft “cannot and positively must not be used as definite commitments.”

During the three months following the Trident Conference, and prior to the trip covered in this diary, communications between Arnold and Eaker continued to reflect their frustrations with their problems and each other. Hap’s concerns ranged the gamut from operational matters best left to the aviators involved in combat to personnel matters that should have been handled in England. Hap’s assessment that Eaker’s subordinate leaders, the commanders of Eighth Bomber Command as well as Fighter Command, were lacking in aggressiveness and “finding excuses and alibis for not going on missions” had to have been disconcerting to the Eighth Air Force CG. Arnold went so far as to strongly recommend replacement of these officers, a prerogative normally accorded the commander. Nevertheless, they were replaced effective 1 July. In other personnel matters, Arnold withheld recommendations of promotions to brigadier general for several bomb group commanders who had proven records as combat leaders, including Col Curtis E. LeMay. In other operational matters, Arnold, who should have known better, failed to appreciate that total numbers of aircraft possessed by the Eighth Air Force did not always equate to those operationally available. Eaker faced the problems of combat damage, parts shortages, lack of effective depot maintenance, crew availability, modification of arriving aircraft, and operations at altitudes and under conditions never previously attempted by American bombers. The number of planes physically present in no way represented the number available for combat missions.
Eaker’s primary problems, aside from the constant urging and often unwelcome direction from Washington, were those to be expected in air units newly engaged in combat against a formidable enemy. The Luftwaffe had more and better airplanes at the time, as well as more experienced pilots, and they were operating over their own territory with increasingly successful technological adaptation to aerial warfare. As George Washington had known that the Continental Army was in fact the Revolution, Eaker understood that the Eighth Air Force was the strategic bombing offensive. Its loss had to be prevented, just as had loss of the Continental Army during the American Revolution. At the same time, Eaker knew that the Eighth, like Washington’s Army, had to be engaged. Accordingly, Eighth’s loss rate had to remain acceptable to the American public, its aircraft and crews had to be continuously replenished, and it had to devise an effective defense against enemy fighters.34

Along with these difficulties were the vicissitudes of weather over England as well as the continent, the lack of an effective fighter aircraft to perform escort duty much beyond the English channel, and the morale and mental health of his crews. These latter factors were clearly influenced by loss rates and the necessity for constant training of replacement crews, all of whom arrived green from United States qualifying schools or officer training units (OTU). Promised resources in planes, men, and materiel, often the basis for planning in England and expectations in the Pentagon, either did not arrive or were too often diverted to other tasks. An effective central logistical base was in the process of being developed in England, but the maintenance support provided for the bulk of 1943 was inadequate to provide the in-commission rate that Washington thought should have prevailed for the Eighth. The arrival of General Andrews in February, replacing Eisenhower as CG ETOUSA in England, was beneficial to both Arnold and Eaker. Officially, Andrews’ headquarters was the channel through which formal communication was conducted between AAF headquarters and the Eighth Air Force. He had known personally and been closely associated with both leaders for many years, however, and was able to buffer some of their disagree-
ments. His crash and death on 3 May lessened what had been an important moderating influence. His replacement was a nonaviator who, although sympathetic to the AAF and its needs, could not effectively fill the ameliorator role.

To what degree Assistant Secretary of War Robert Lovett’s six-week trip to England in May, undertaken after Arnold’s second attack, was aimed at examining and resolving some of these issues is not clear. He was billeted with the Eighth Air Force leadership, where he gained a clearer appreciation of their problems. On his return, he generated a host of memos to Arnold covering in detail many facets of operational problems in England. Although Eaker felt that Lovett’s visit had helped smooth over some of his difficulties with Hap, the tone of communications between Arnold and Eaker appeared increasingly impatient and less tolerant of each other. Particularly was this true in the months following the Trident Conference, which had established a target date less than a year away to achieve success with the strategic bombing offensive.35

Arnold’s deputy accurately described the situation in the Pentagon to Eaker in June, following Hap’s convalescence: “General Arnold is back in the driver’s seat.”36 The next day, Arnold cabled Eaker about the low in-commission rate of the Eighth, concerned not only for the present but for what might happen with the planned additional arrivals.37 Eaker’s immediate response outlined the problem of his and other commanders, reporting that although there were 664 heavies in the theater only 385 of them were immediately available for operations. The Eighth commander continued very frankly: “You are not satisfied with conditions here. Neither am I, and I am not satisfied with the support I have had. . . . We get nowhere with recriminations. I can do this job if I get the same support from you I am getting from Theater Commander [Devers].”38 Relations had not improved from Theater Commander [Devers]. Relations had not improved three days later, as Arnold asserted that his efforts and communications were aimed at toughening up Eaker and making him a better commander.39 Eaker’s response two weeks later was long and equally candid, indicating that he had always felt Arnold was more demanding of him than others lest they think his success was due to their friendship. He identified much of the personality differ-
ences between them when he continued: “I shall always accept gladly and in the proper spirit, any advice, counsel or criticism from you. I do not feel, however, that my past service . . . indicates that I am a horse which needs to be ridden with spurs.”

A week later, a temporary lull in the storm appeared as Arnold clearly reaffirmed his confidence in Eaker while at the same time excusing in part his own criticisms: “But you must know me well enough by this time to know that I am very outspoken. I say what I think and do what I think best.” While the rhetoric of the Arnold-Eaker correspondence continued to reflect an increasing level of frustration that threatened their two-decade professional association and personal friendship, both of them attempted where possible to improve the effectiveness of Eighth Air Force.

Among Eaker’s efforts was the introduction of the YB-40, a more heavily armed B-17 that he called a “bomber destroyer,” whose mission was to be that of a flying defender of the bomber stream against German fighters. However, it proved too slow and was plagued with other problems. The experiment failed, with Eaker conceding “we had a good idea, but we have not quite gotten the aircraft for carrying it out.” Although this experiment was quickly abandoned, it evidenced Eaker’s willingness to experiment. He continually urged Arnold and the Air Staff to improve the range of the P-47, which first appeared in combat as an escort fighter with the Eighth on 15 April 1943. Jettisonable metal drop tanks were the eventual solution, but Eaker and his staff had attempted to extend the P-47’s range with strengthened paper drop tanks before the metal drop tank solution was found. Arnold and the Air Staff had placed a high priority on developing the metal drop tanks that eventually allowed long-range escort of the bomber formations. As indicated above, Eaker relieved the commanders of both Bomber Command and Fighter Command as of 1 July.

Given the worldwide shortage of Allied shipping, the new US bomb Groups that flew to their bases in England were often unaccompanied by their essential ground equipment and support crews. As a consequence, Eaker and his commanders had to improvise until the bomb loaders, fueling trucks, and other specialized tools and personnel arrived. Maintenance problems
were partially alleviated by the arrival of Col Hugh J. Knerr, one of Arnold’s most bitter prewar critics and Andrews’ strongest supporter, who would successfully head the VIII Air Service Command. Other innovations aimed at crew safety included the flak suit devised by the Eighth’s flight surgeon, Brig Gen Malcolm C. Grow. Its first use by aircrews was in the 1 February 1943 mission against Hamm. While urging greater accomplishments from Eaker and the Eighth, Arnold continued his efforts to equip and support the strategic bombing offensive. Among his endeavors was the search for an effective long-range fighter to escort the bombers to their destination and then back home. In his typical blunt fashion, and in part responding to Lovett’s memos of four days earlier, Hap instructed his deputy, Barney M. Giles, “you have got to get a fighter to protect our bombers. Whether you use an existing type or have to start from scratch is your problem.” One author has labeled this the most important memo written by Arnold during the war. It prompted Giles’ immediate travel to the North American aircraft factory, which resulted in a vastly improved P-51 that became available in numbers after January 1944 as an additional long-range fighter escort. Arnold journeyed to the West Coast himself for, in his words, “the main purpose of putting the fear of God in the . . . aircraft industry so as to keep our production from dropping off.” He felt he had been successful in knocking “some of their complacency out of them.” Eaker and others who had been and would continue to be recipients of Arnold’s constant harangues would have agreed with Hap’s self-appraisal at the time: “I’m personally never satisfied.” On 1 August 1943, the day the Ploesti mission was flown, Arnold directed that nose turrets be installed on the heavy bombers “at the earliest practical date.”

Arnold never seemed to appreciate the reasons for the difference between the numbers of aircraft and aircrews reported to be in theater and their dispatch on combat missions. During the month of June 1943, although the Eighth possessed a daily average of 775 heavies assigned, its effective combat strength was only 222 and on only four days during the month were missions flown against targets in Germany. Repair and modification of bombers, along with the in-theater training required for the crews, were the primary causes of these dif-
ferences. As to this latter problem, the statistical report for June 1943 showed a daily average of 419 crews in the Eighth, of which only 287 were "fully operational."\(^{48}\) In an effort to remedy the crew shortages, Arnold relieved or replaced the commanders of each of the four stateside air forces that were responsible for training crews for overseas duty once the aviators had acquired the basic skills at the training command. Arnold conceded in August that Eaker had only 400 crews even though he had 800 aircraft. Hap further acknowledged that those flying, given the losses they had experienced and could anticipate, were "war-weary."\(^{49}\) Hap's letter to Maj Gen Davenport Johnson, a long-time pilot and fellow West Pointer whom he had relieved as CG of Second Air Force, revealed some of his thinking—and even anguish—in this critical period: "It is awfully hard in cases like this not to allow the personal element to enter into it. . . . As you know, you are all friends of mine and I like you all, and in addition, I am not naturally at heart an SOB. I am trying my damndest to get this war over in the shortest space of time so that we can all go back to a normal way of living. I was not picking on you when I relieved you from command. I was trying my damndest to get the maximum efficiency out of an organization."\(^{50}\)

In broadest terms, the major problems faced by Arnold and Eaker as well as others were that they were laboring under difficult time constraints and extremely heavy demands made on them and their resources. None of them, particularly in the case of Arnold and Eaker at this time, seemed fully appreciative, understanding, or forgiving of the perspective or problems of the other.

The May Trident Conference had authorized the plan for bombing the Rumanian oil fields in Ploesti, drawn up by Col Jacob E. Smart of Arnold's Advisory Council, to be submitted to Eisenhower for his consideration. When approval was given, the plan was to send three Eighth Air Force Groups from North African bases to attack the refineries. The raid, flown from the Bengasi area of Libya on 1 August, was the longest major bombing mission yet attempted by the AAF. It resulted in the heaviest losses sustained to date in a single operation. Of 177 B-24s dispatched, 54 were lost, as were 532 airmen.
Other than the serious losses incurred, Eaker and the Eighth were concerned that the three groups participating were gone from their English bases for four months after having been promised that they would be away for three weeks.51

Although it had been only 11 weeks since their last meeting, the CCS, Churchill, and Roosevelt met at the Quadrant Conference in Quebec from 14 through 24 August. The Prime Minister’s motivation in urging the meeting was explained as his being “anxious to pin the Americans down before their well-known dislike of European operations except cross-Channel gets the better of them again, and they pull out their landing craft and send off their ships to the Pacific.”52

It is curious that Arnold’s day-by-day account of the Quebec meeting has not survived even though his diary of the other 12 World War II journeys are among his papers. Arnold recalled in his memoirs that, while piloting the plane returning from Canada, he “temporarily missed” the “unauthorized” notes he had taken at the meeting but that when his blouse was brought to him in the cockpit, he “found the papers.”53 Although this confirms that the usual diary was kept at the conference, it does not seem to have been available or used in writing his memoirs. What he did include of this gathering was covered in *Global Mission* in only the most general terms. Significantly missing were his normal observations of the issues discussed, personalities present, and the minutiae of the conference. Although many of the topics discussed there clearly related to the AAF, his comments in his memoirs appeared to concentrate only broadly on issues such as Southeast Asia, command relationships, Burma, and tonnage over the Hump. As a result, the coverage in *Global Mission* was compressed into three pages about a meeting that lasted for 11 days.54 By contrast, relying heavily on an earlier diary, he used 12 pages of his autobiography to describe his 11-day trip to England covered in chapter three.55 Further, for the second Quebec Conference held a year after this meeting and included as chapter nine of this work, Arnold used seven pages of his memoirs to cover the five days of events.56 It is difficult to conclude other than that the diary maintained at this first Quebec or Quadrant meeting was not available when his autobi-
ography was written. Nor is it, as are the other 12 diaries, extant among his papers in the Library of Congress.

At Quadrant, the British were lavish in their praise of the AAF Ploesti mission of two weeks earlier. In the opening session, Portal felt that daylight bombing was “extraordinarily effective” and called the attack “perhaps the most brilliant and outstanding single air operation of the war.” However, consistent with British advocacy of continued operations in Italy and the Mediterranean, he insisted that AAF efforts would be vastly enhanced by operating from bases to be obtained in northern Italy. In the same session, Arnold pointed out that estimates of replacement of aircraft and aviators had proven too low and conceded the additional problem of “war-weary” crews. He was optimistic in telling the CCS that the aim of the AAF was to have 1,900 heavy bomber aircraft with two crews for each plane in the theater by 1 January 1944. The reality of the moment, however, was not encouraging. The promised build-up, approved at Trident, called for 1,068 heavies to be in the Eighth by 15 August. By that date, however, there were only 921, including the more than 100 still in North Africa. The first session also found Arnold reporting that superiority was now being achieved in the air against the Japanese and that a pipeline (which the conference agreed to) was necessary to supply the bomber force operating and planned to operate from Chinese bases. Hap then announced that only bases in China would be available to support air operations against Japan once Germany was defeated, prompting Portal to express his skepticism about future RAF use of Pacific island bases, a harbinger of further difficulties over British participation in the war against Japan. In other matters of importance at the meeting, Arnold made the case for AAF use of the Azores as a transit stop for aircraft en route from the United States to Europe, Mediterranean, Middle East, and Far East areas. He pointed out that use of facilities there by AAF aircraft would save 15 million gallons of gasoline per month over the 5,400-mile-longer South Atlantic route into the United Kingdom. The British government was just completing arrangements for their use of the Azores with the Portuguese government and it was not considered prudent to push the US
cause at the moment. Portal did assure Arnold that pressure would be exerted to acquire AAF use as soon as possible.61

Equally important was the agreement at Quadrant on “strategic bombing operations from Italian Central Mediterranean bases.” This agreement was prompted by the July raids on Rome and other Italian cities by Mediterranean-based heavies, which probably influenced the fall of the Mussolini regime, and by the long distances flown from Libyan bases to bomb Ploesti on 1 August. Two weeks after the Quadrant decision to use Italian bases, the raid by groups on loan from the Eighth against aircraft factories in Wiener Neustadt, Austria, together with the losses on the Schweinfurt attack of 17 August, convinced Spaatz of the need to establish permanent bases in Italy. He wrote to Lovett, while the Quadrant discussions were proceeding in Washington, that he still believed bombing alone could force a German surrender, and the process could be speeded up “if suitable bases are available in the Mediterranean area.”63 He had earlier tried to convince Arnold that the shorter distances to be flown to southern German and Austrian targets and the prospects of better weather in Italy were significant advantages. He argued that an important further advantage from operating in Italy would accrue by forcing the Germans to split their fighter and antiaircraft (AA) flak opposition between the two theaters. Arnold’s concentration on building up the Eighth to support cross-Channel operations caused him to oppose diversion of heavies to Italy in July, but his opposition had been lessened by the time of Quadrant. He was probably influenced by Spaatz’ logic and the huge AAF losses at Ploesti and Schweinfurt, which had been caused in part by the long distances required to reach the targets and return.64 Other factors included Mussolini’s overthrow on 25 July and the prospects of using existing Italian airfields. By the time of Quadrant, Arnold appeared willing to agree to the permanent stationing of heavies in Italy. The creation of a second strategic air force would strengthen his argument for a single strategic air commander who could coordinate the efforts from both England and Italy. Since the current overall tactical air commander for Overlord was British and the majority of heavies operating from the two countries
would be American, it was not illogical to assume, at least in Arnold’s mind, that the strategic commander would be from the AAF. The idea of a single strategic commander and the presumption that he would be an American became a very important issue with Arnold. It would affect continuing discussions and decisions at the next CCS conference and later.

Encouraged by the capture of the Italian air base complex at Foggia, 95 miles north of Naples, Arnold submitted to the JCS on 9 October his proposal to create the Fifteenth Air Force. It was to be equipped with groups already in Italy, supplemented by 15 more from the United States. CCS approval was given on 22 October. The new Air Force came into being on 1 November with Maj Gen James “Jimmy” Doolittle as its commander. Understanding that a major consequence would be diversion from the Eighth, Eaker opposed its creation. Arnold’s comment to Eaker as he landed in England on 1 September, “Don’t worry you didn’t lose anything,” [at Quadrant] might not have been accurate or appreciated from Eaker’s perspective.

If Arnold needed support for the continuation of the buildup of the Eighth and an end to the diversion of its assets, he got it from Portal in Quebec. The British airman’s remarks during the CCS meeting on 16 August seemed to articulate Arnold’s sentiments as he asked the CCS to make “victory in the battle of the air as certain as possible before the autumn”—clearly an impossible task in the time remaining. He continued, saying, “diversions from the 8th Air Force should be stopped, loans of aircraft . . . to other theaters must be returned, and the bomber command of the 8th Air Force must be built up and reinforced to the maximum possible.” At no point did Portal appear to comprehend that the required air support for further Mediterranean operations urged on the Americans by himself and the British CCS diminished the AAF’s ability to continue the Eighth Air Force buildup. The CCS agreed that Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory of the RAF be appointed Air Commander for Overlord, a choice that would later create problems for the AAF. In other actions, Vice Adm Louis Mountbatten was appointed commander of the newly created Southeast Asia Command in an effort, in Churchill’s words, “to revitalize operations in Burma,” an area Arnold found of
little interest to the resident British during his visit to India outlined in chapter 5.\textsuperscript{70}

If there was praise for the Ploesti raid, there was no mention in the official record or in Arnold’s papers of the Schweinfurt–Regensburg missions that were flown the day following Portal’s laudatory words. Launched from East Anglia bases on the anniversary of the Eighth’s first mission of 17 August 1942, the attacks later earned superlative praise as being the “deepest,” “one of the most important of the year,” “greatest,” “most disastrous” (in terms of losses), and as having provoked air battles “without parallel.” Sixty of the 315 B-17s that attacked during this raid on the ball-bearing industry in Schweinfurt and the sprawling Messerschmitt factories in Regensburg were lost (a 19 percent loss rate), the bulk of these to German fighters.\textsuperscript{71} Combined with the Ploesti raid of 16 days earlier, the AAF strategic bombing initiative had lost a total of 114 airplanes in two days. There is no record of Arnold mentioning these raids to the conferees although the attacks and their results had to have been known. There appears no contemporary record of Arnold’s reactions to these raids, but he had to have appreciated their potential effect on the strategic bombing offensive since only eight months remained before air superiority would be necessary for the Overlord landings. After the war, Secretary Lovett recalled that at the time of this 17 August Schweinfurt–Regensburg raid, Arnold, the eternal optimist, was “beginning to have his doubts” and possibly “losing his faith in daylight bombing.” He “was having a hell of a time hanging on.”\textsuperscript{72}

It would be 10 days before the Eighth was able to fly again, this time only to coastal France. Another 10 days would pass before an aerial assault against German targets could be mounted. Arnold departed for England on 31 August, the trip covered in this chapter, just one week after the close of the Quadrant Conference and two weeks after Schweinfurt.

In explaining his reasons for making this trip to England, Arnold wrote, “I had been receiving reports, letters, and telegrams from overseas, and verbal accounts from returning officers, that made it apparent I was getting out of touch with the Eighth Air Force in England. I therefore decided to make a
personal inspection of its operations, to find out for myself what they needed in the way of equipment and personnel.”

As was the case with other journeys he made, however, there were additional reasons for this travel, among them being the need to evaluate the impact of the losses experienced in the two most extensive raids yet undertaken by aircraft from the Eighth Air Force. These setbacks represented a blow to the hopes and theories of long-range strategic bombing enthusiasts, among whom Arnold remained the foremost American military advocate. These missions raised questions about the wisdom of committing aviators, aircraft, and other scarce resources to an AAF campaign that had failed to live up to its trumpeted hopes. It had produced only insignificant results and conceivably unacceptable losses. In making this trip, Arnold wanted to have firsthand information to meet any criticism that might ensue and to plan effectively for the future. Additionally, he wanted to determine for himself the morale of the crews that had been and would be involved in the bombings. There seems little doubt that an additional reason was Arnold’s interest in achieving greater efforts on the part of the Eighth and its commander. Hap could not have left Washington in a very optimistic mood.

The Diary

TRIP TO ENGLAND
August 31, 1943–September 8, 1943
GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD

Tuesday, August 31, 1943 [Washington, D.C., to Gander, Newfoundland]

Baggage left house at 7:30 A.M. with Pete.74 Arrived at Gravelly at 8:30, check in at Operations, received instructions in lifeboat drill. Took off 9:00 A.M., arrived Gander 4:40 P.M., dis-
tance 1,600 miles. Took off for Prestwick 9:15 P.M. [Before take-off] Toured post with General Strong, Captain Hutchins (Navy) and Post Commanding Officer. Saw Anderson, Group Commanding RAF Detachment, called on Andy and Mrs. Andy at their quarters. Post needs:

(1) More men for band.
(2) Policy re rotation of officers and men, one year minimum, eighteen months maximum.
(3) New policy re enlisted men leaving Post for recreation; restrictions placed due to poor recreation facilities, small towns, poor railroad facilities, high venereal rate in towns.

Canadians have women workers who seem to perform many duties day and night, we do not. Our men poach on Canadian preserves.

Passenger List:

1. Arnold, General
2. Strong, Major General
3. Grant, Brigadier General
4. Hansell, Brigadier General
5. Waitt, Brigadier General
6. Hutchins, Captain, USN
7. Javits, Lieutenant Colonel
8. Humphreys, Lieutenant USN
9. Thackery, Captain USN
10. Peterson, Lieutenant Colonel
11. Thompson, Major
12. Puzenski, Master Sergeant

Crew:

1. Niswander, Captain
2. Souten, 1st Officer
3. McClelland, 2nd Officer
4. Fisher, Navigator
5. Mastrullo, Engineer
6. Cazapuskyy, Radio
7. Mason, Purser
Bowhill was coming into Gander. We waited 15 minutes and then took off without seeing him. Post much cleaner than I have ever seen it. Inspected hospital, saw mostly injured from volleyball. Put on Mae Wests on take-off. Weather typical for Newfoundland: rain, low clouds, mist, fog. Off 9:15, distance [to go] 2,100 miles.

Wednesday, September 1, 1943 [Gander, Newfoundland, to Prestwick, Scotland and London, England]

Plane C-54: gross weight 63,000 pounds; gasoline, 35,000; mail 3,800; crew and passengers, 3,600; cargo: plane, net 41,000. Made good speed during night. Landfall Ireland at 7:30, low clouds and showers. Held in air by [arriving] B-17s and bad weather, cruised in circles over lake with its airport. Control sent us to an airport nobody ever heard of. Decided to go to Prestwick, over Prestwick in 11 hours, should have landed in 9:30. Waited to clear up [landing] B-17s and B-24s. Finally landed exactly 12 hours after taking off from Gander. Radio control of incoming planes lousy; we lost 2 out of 17, 2 crews lost.

Eaker and Edwards here to meet us. Had lunch with Eaker, Edwards, Peabody and Burrows. Rained until 2:30, sky clear and [visibility] unlimited at 3:00. Cancelled arrangements for train and took off in Devers' plane at 4:00, course to SW to Isle of Man, to North Wales. Weather impossible, low clouds, rain when we hit Wales. Over top to north of London, came down through and landed at Hendon with ceiling 200 feet.

Most of war precautions gone: barbed wire, AA crews at guns, armored cars, not in sight. Landed at 6:30, Devers met me and I came to Claridge's in his car. Dinner at Dorchester with Eaker, Edwards and Devers. Returned to Claridge's. London still very carefully blacked out, no lights anywhere. Gave Eaker his packages; in bed at 12:00.

Thursday, September 2, 1943 [England]

Hard to get used to blackout, 2 curtains on all windows. Up at 7:30, breakfast with Ordway at 8:00. Took off at 8:30 for Eaker's headquarters, arrived at 9:15, band, escort of honor.
Met his staff and went through his headquarters. Went through Miller’s headquarters, met all of Miller’s staff. Reception at 1:00 and met all officers connected with both headquarters. Lunch with Eaker’s commanders, conference in War Room. Couldn’t take any more today, back to Claridge’s, rested, dinner with Ordway, bed early.

Friday, September 3, 1943 [England]

Up at 7:00, breakfast at 7:30; Grant, Devers and I started for Heston 8:00. Took off Heston in Devers’ DC-3 for Hethel, landed at 9:00. Met by General Fred Anderson, station of Second Wing, Ploesti outfit. Met Colonel Timberlake their commanding officer. Escort of honor, crews assembled in hangar, gave them a brief (rotten?) talk. Inspected their station, met scads of people.

Took off at 10:00 for Bury St. Edmunds, Fourth Wing, Schweinfurt and Regensburg outfits. Met General Williams (who lost an eye in bombing of London), Colonel LeMay (Regensburg), and Colonel White (Ploesti). Officers and crews assembled in hangar, Aaron Kessler in front row, Clark Gable in background. Fred Castle is Group CO and doing a fine job. Gave much better talk. Saw a B-17 badly shot up, being repaired; one tail flipper gone, right wing with hole big as a bushel basket, holes in fuselage from stem to stern, control rod to right aileron shot off, one engine blown from wing, but it came home with but 2 men wounded. One Group returned from mission over France while we were there.

When weather thickest at Prestwick, [on our arrival September 1] six B-17s cruising around in fog, control tower trying to keep them under control, all trying to get down somewhere and land safely, then out of clouds above came this: “Well, you won’t have to worry about me any longer for I am out of gasoline.” Whereupon he came down through the soup, saw the beach, and slid up the beach into the meadow, landed on his belly 3 miles from Prestwick, crew all OK.

Went through briefing of crews, found it very interesting. Went through bomb dump area, well-camouflaged. Took off for Heston 11:30, arrived 12:30, at Claridge’s at 1:15, lunch 1:30.
Rested in P.M., saw J. C. H. Lee in hotel. Called on Portal 5:00, dinner with Winant 7:30.

Goering has given orders [learned through] (radio intercept) to his fighters that Fortresses must be destroyed. Pilots will close in and attack [main] formations and not attack stragglers. Anyone violating this will be courtmartialed.

Devers received a cable from General Marshall re fraternizing [between] British and Americans, suggesting British use American Red Cross huts. That was tried with result that British who have many clubs and have homes of their own used our Red Cross huts too. Result: 87% of all visitors British, hundreds of Americans could not get in. Now Americans can and do invite British soldiers, sailors, airmen, WACS, WAVES, etc., 74% American, 26% British. It gives Americans a chance to return social obligations.

B-17 on last of twenty-five missions. Tail gunner took pint brandy with him. Told crew they would have alcohol [with which to celebrate] upon return. Put pint in pocket of flying clothes. Shot down, gunner bailed out over Channel and took to boat, cold and chilled, drank brandy. Rescued by British Rescue Service, still cold, told by British CO to go down and get warm. American: "I am not one to be where I am not wanted," and jumped into the sea, then rescued again.


Saturday, September 4, 1943 [England]

Departed Heston 8:30 with Eaker, Edwards and Ordway, landed Duxford at 9:40. Met Kepner, Towle, Anderson, Peterson, 3 aces, Bill Irvine, Sol Rosenblatt, all available COs. Talked to assembled crews in hangar. Inspected equipment: new Sabre Typhoon, P-47 with paper [fuel] tank, P-51 with new cockpit cover to permit better visibility. Spitfire with eight rockets, B-24 with rocket carrier (four rockets), capable of
reloading in three minutes in flight. Saw P-47 scramble, talked with crews and Group COs re P-47 performance and comparison with [FW] 190s and [Me] 109s. Saw scramble, found everyone very well satisfied with P-47s. They need more tanks (150 gallon) and shackles to hold in place, these must be expedited. We should also step up construction of tanks in US: paper? plastic? Took off at 10:30, landed at Earl's Colne, mb [medium bomber] station. Met by Candee and various other officers. Addressed assembled officers in hangar. Saw __________, he looks like hell, has been drinking again, should be sent home and canned, told Ira so. Inspected station, said goodbye and took off at 11:30, back to hotel for lunch.

George's [Marshall] interview with papers is back in circulation. Someone in Washington, probably Navy, all worked up. Am getting information to present on my return. Address newspapermen myself at 4:00 p.m. Maybe I can stay clear of trouble. News conference apparently went off OK. Edwards and Ordway went with me. Dodged all of the embarrassing questions. After conference talked with Giles over phone and approved station changes of General officers. Also told him that I wouldn't return via North Africa.

Left hotel with Ira and went to RAF Bomber Command, then to Harris' quarters, gave Jill [Harris] gifts, met Swinton, ex-Secretary of State for Air and his wife. Harris, Swinton and I left for Wing Ding at Bomber Command. Met lots of old friends at old-time Wing Ding: Hunter, Hoyt, Dinty Moore, Kessler, Miller, Kepner, Bob Williams and Slim Turner. It was a good show, excellent dinner, a movie of me in which the words and sounds did not synchronize with movement of mouth. Sometimes mouth moved, no words, and sometimes mouth closed and lots of words. Gave them a talk, home and talked until 12:00 with Harris and Swinton. Harris against single command for strategic bombers, main reason is that CAS would lose control. That is what his arguments indicate.

**Sunday, September 5, 1943 [England]**

Up at 8:00, breakfast at 8:30, all present. Grow, Grant and Ordway waiting at 9:00. Final talk in garden with Harris:
peaches, plums, figs, geese, chickens, mushrooms in barn. Reached Oxford at 10:00, met at General Hospital, by Hawley and staff, visited several wards and talked to about 150 AF patients, most of them battle casualties, far too many in for frostbite, fingers and toes lost due to intense cold. 1/2 minute without oxygen and a man is dead at 30,000 feet. When oxygen fails, off come gloves to get new mask or make repairs, and then fingers on hand are frozen. We must: (1) Get better clothing. (2) Get better heating units. (3) Get better oxygen equipment and do it fast.

Motored back to Eaker’s house for lunch with his staff and commanders. Back to hotel by 4:00, dinner at hotel with Devers and Edwards, 7:30. [According to] Harris: in August our [RAF] losses were 392 hbs [heavy bombers], we almost reached total replacement of 400 we had available; in September the strike in the Lancaster plant put us back on easy street again, saturation point.120

Monday, September 6, 1943 [England]

Left hotel with Ordway and Peterson at 8:30, took off Heston with Miller, Knerr, Martenstein, Griffith and Dave Baker at 9:00, arrived Burtonwood 10:30.121 Tour ed shops [where we] overhaul, modify, repair planes and engines. British operated first and put up a target of 60 engines a month to shoot at; then said that 80 per month was maximum that could be turned out. There are now some 10,000 Americans there with 4,000 British who should have left with others long ago. Our output last month was 570 engines and we can double that if we have to. There are no more engines in UK [United Kingdom] needing repair, hence engines are being brought in from North Africa. We should get rest of British out as soon as we can. Service Commands need additional men of all kinds, should not wait for units, so notified Washington.122 Started back to Heston at 11:30, arrived 12:45, hotel 1:15, fifteen minutes late to lunch at Savoy, 1:30. Nye gave lunch with Morgan123 and several British brass hats: Eaker, Candee and Edwards, Americans present. Nye talked very impressively re Italian campaign, German rearrangement of forces, Russian advance, effect of bombing on interior Germany.
Had talk with Admiral Neville Syfert (Pound’s assistant). He gave another story of [German] radio bomb. First wave of 13 missed targets completely; second wave of twelve made two hits; one sank cargo ship, the other hit a destroyer, almost sinking it. It made port with difficulty. He considers this weapon a distinct menace to shipping. U-Boats now hugging Spanish coast until past Cape Finisterre some 200 miles. We have destroyed 21 in August. Belief is that U-Boats will come out with new devices soon. Nye said two German divisions had been brought from Russian front to Italy. Germany has few reserves on Russian front, that Germans were not retreating but Russians were advancing. I could not agree in statement but rather Germans were withdrawing to shorten front and get reserves. Left luncheon and went shopping with Ira. Back to hotel at 4:30 P.M., dinner by Ira at 7:45; all my friends there: Trenchard, Winant, Portal, Balfour, Harris, Grow, Devers, Edwards, Slessor, Lee, Crawford, Stark, Morgan and many others. Trenchard still has a good brain and a very good concept of air warfare. Had a chance to talk to most of these people.

Bed at 11:00. Air raid sirens, first since my arrival, but I heard them only indistinctly in my dreams.

Tuesday, September 7, 1943 [England, en route to Scotland and Iceland]

Yesterday’s American raid: Stuttgart was bombed, our losses over 30, less than 50, ten crews missing, picked up in Straits [of Dover], four crews landed in Switzerland, perhaps more picked up, perhaps more landed in Switzerland. Strong-Marshall-Devers.

10:00 A.M. met Lieutenant General Morgan, talked about many things until 10:45: France; Italy; Russia; Air, strategic and tactical, airborne; Japan. Messages to Marshall re Supreme Commander. 10:45 to 11:10 talked to Morgan and [Leigh-] Mallory; went into details of [Overlord] operations. 11:15 [met with] Sir Archibald Wavell: he regrets leaving Army and going into diplomatic colonial service.

11:30 Sir Charles Portal, with him until 12:00: covered Mallory, Butler, Hansell, large staffs, “empire builders,” scope of

Lunch: Devers, Eaker, Peterson, Ordway and P. L. Williams. P. L. must go to Brereton as soon as job is finished. Missed Brereton, will see him in Washington.\textsuperscript{135} Missed Elliott Roosevelt; need new man for photography, Eaker said we couldn't have Hull, he changed his mind. We will order him to take over photography.\textsuperscript{136}

Rode with Devers and Eaker back to Bovingdon,\textsuperscript{137} took off at 2:00 for Prestwick: Arnold, Peterson, Grant, Grow, Hull, Strong, his aide; Flickinger, Grow's aide; Puzenski, Bean (Winant's office)\textsuperscript{138} and Hoyt back to the hospital.

Swivel tail wheel for P-47: boys forget to unlock and then tail wheel tire trouble.\textsuperscript{139} Arrived Prestwick 4:00 P.M., took off for Iceland 5:10 P.M.

Bomber group[s] doing a grand job. Losses, which look very large, have not so far affected morale. Remarkable the way the youngsters are: students, who must be told everything in the US are matured and experienced men in a very short time, operational accidents are very few. Pilots, copilots have done the impossible in landing planes without rudders, one flipper, ailerons shot away, holes in wing and fuselage large enough to put a wheelbarrow through, and yet they are brought home. B-26s have been brought back without ailerons and on one engine. These things are done by pilots who a few days before could scarcely fly the plane and who had high percentage (compared with peacetime) of accidents in states. Similarly the fighter pilots master the P-47 and fly rings around the German FW 190 and the Me 109. The belly tank has made it possible to do things that the Spits cannot ever approximate. These [American] fighter pilots go with the bombers all the way to the Ruhr; the [British] Spits then return when they reach the coast [of Europe]. We are doing things that the RAF cannot or will not attempt.

At Prestwick one hour to gas up and get tea. Saw Jake Crane and Bunny Hobson, en route to Africa;\textsuperscript{140} Burrows, Elliott Roosevelt and the rocket B-17.\textsuperscript{141} Arrived Iceland 10:00.
Met Mickelson, Balchen, Cochran and many others. Had dinner and a discourse on Iceland by staff officer. Sent wire asking that Balchen be ordered to Washington for one week. Outlined plans for sending 60 new pilots here and forwarding 50 vets to England. Took off at 12 midnight.

**Wednesday, September 8, 1943** [Iceland; Goose Bay, Labrador, en route to Washington, D.C.]

Weather into Iceland last night poor, solid overcast, ceiling 300 feet. Good runways, visibility 8 miles, sleet. Iceland winter never gets below 5°F. No trees except some scrub birch, thousands of Iceland ponies that live on natural vegetation, thousands of sheep, horsemeat eaten, ptarmigan, ducks, geese and fish.

After 8:45 [hour] flight with good weather and wonderful Northern lights we approached Goose; landed 4:20 Goose time. Everything shipshape, greatly improved since my last visit. Breakfast, took off at 6 A.M. Clear weather but I don’t know what time: GMT [Greenwich Mean Time], Goose? NY [New York], we will wait and see.

Trip to Hartford [Connecticut], all on instruments, then lower overcast broke. Looks as if we will make it, London to Washington in about 27 hours, of which we had stops:

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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>Prestwick</td>
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<td>Iceland</td>
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<td>Goose</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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or about 22:05 flying time. It was a grand trip.

**Postscript**

If Arnold needed any reminder of the importance and imminent nature of the Overlord assault, for which Eighth Air Force success was vital, four of the officers flying with him to England on this journey were headed for duty with Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), the invasion planning staff. While in the United Kingdom, although his time was spent almost entirely with the Eighth Air Force and...
its problems, Arnold nevertheless discussed the ongoing planning with Lieutenant General Morgan of the British Army and Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory, the chief planner and the tactical air commander, respectively, of the invasion.

Arnold’s seven days during this third World War II trip to Britain were busy ones. He concentrated on the strategic bombing initiative of the Eighth Air Force as he visited all the elements necessary for its success. Given what must have been the relatively low morale of the aircrews who had survived the costly August Ploesti and Schweinfurt raids, Arnold flew first to their bomber bases where he continued his practice of meeting them, congratulating them, and carrying on conversations with them. His remarks were no doubt aimed at emphasizing the importance of their efforts and discussing the increase in the number of bombers and crews scheduled for the theater as their replacements. In addition, he told them of the changes he foresaw in a variety of areas, ranging from increased long-range fighter protection to planned improvements in their aircraft; for example, the power-operated, forward-firing chin turret on the newly arriving B-17Gs. After talking with the bomber crews, he visited the fighter and medium bomber bases and repeated the procedure.

Missions were launched on three days while Arnold was in England. Results of two of them, if made completely known to Hap, were not impressive. On the 3 September raid, when he witnessed the planes returning to their base at Bury St. Edmunds, the aircraft erroneously bombed dummy rather than operational airfields in France. The second raid, three days later, was termed a “complete failure” by Arnold in his memoirs.144

Hap met only briefly with Portal and the RAF, evidence of his emphasis on the AAF and the Eighth. During their meeting, they discussed problems in planning for Overlord. More important, Arnold stressed again to Portal the need for an overall strategic air commander. Since the selection of British airman Trafford Leigh-Mallory as the tactical air commander for Overlord had already been made by the CCS, the implicit logic that the strategic commander would be an American resulted in little British encouragement for, or acceptance of,
Arnold’s thinking. This issue continued as a significant one to Hap as he attempted to secure recognition for the AAF. The diary reflected that Arnold’s Anglophobia was still alive as he contrasted the exploits of the Eighth with what he considered the lesser accomplishments of the RAF.\textsuperscript{145}

One of the most important results of this trip was Arnold’s increased realization of the immediate need for more effective long-range fighters. As his diary recorded, while he was shown the physical damage inflicted on AAF bombers that managed to stagger home, he also tried to assess the physical and mental damage that was being done to aircrews during their five-hour air battles with German fighters. A significant by-product of the trip was his conclusion, noted on his last day in England, that their heavy combat losses had not affected crew morale. Strike photos were no doubt shown to Hap, providing some encouragement about the efficacy of the Eighth’s raids and suggestions as to how much more damage could be inflicted if longer-range fighter escorts could be provided. Eaker recorded after Hap’s visit that the AAF chief had not fretted over the Schweinfurt losses, which “look very large.”\textsuperscript{146}

Although not recorded in the diary, Hap urgently cabled Marshall during his second day in England: “Operations over Germany conducted here during the past several weeks indicate definitely that we must provide long-range fighters to accompany daylight bombardment missions.” An additional cable to the Pentagon asked for the dispatch “at the earliest practical moment” of the 200 additional B-17s that had been planned. In another message to Marshall the next day, Hap reversed his earlier agreement to send P-38s to Eisenhower in the Mediterranean. As Arnold cabled the chief of staff in the Pentagon, “the complete destruction” of the German Air Force was approaching its “most crucial stage”; hence, Hap “strongly” recommended that Eisenhower’s request be denied.\textsuperscript{147} The fighter aircraft problem continued to attract the attention of Arnold and Washington as a result of this travel, but its resolution was at least several months away.

Hap discussed with Eaker the personnel changes that were being implemented and the promotions of senior officers, primarily at the wing and group levels. He consulted about a very
effective group commander who, although a longtime friend with an otherwise distinguished record, was to be relieved and allowed to retire as a result of Arnold’s concern over his excessive alcohol use. Eaker himself was promoted five days after Arnold arrived back in Washington. However, he would be relieved and/or reassigned 100 days later. The planned three new air bombardment divisions, although operational as opposed to administrative organizations, were activated with experienced combat aviators in command during the week after Arnold’s return. The necessary social amenities, honors, and other activities served to fill his schedule. As he prepared to return home, he reflected very positively on what he perceived as the morale, valor, and skill of the combat aircrews. At the same time, he continued his normal practice of not commenting adversely on others in these diaries, leaving the impression that he remained not fully convinced about the effectiveness of the leadership of the Eighth, including General Eaker. In other matters, he involved himself in considerable detail in the aircraft maintenance problems in England.148

On his return to the Pentagon, the expected pleasantries and exchanged words of thanks reflected the temporary rapprochement that occurred between Arnold and Eaker as a result of his trip. The Eighth’s commander reported that Arnold was jolly and upbeat during the visit. He wrote Hap, saying, “We all wish you could have stayed with us longer.”149 However, it did not take long for relations between these two men to return to their tense chill. Arnold’s main problem with the Eighth was his inability or unwillingness to accept weather, limited aircraft and crews, lack of long-range fighter escort, or the need to rest as valid impediments. Hap expected the maximum effort for every mission on every day that weather permitted. Hap’s correspondence with Eaker reflected his impression that Eaker and the Eighth were not doing their best under the circumstances. Hap praised Eaker on his return from this journey and recommended him for promotion. Soon, however, he was criticizing Eaker and attempting to cajole the Eighth’s commander into greater efforts. In postwar comments, Eaker was much more gracious than Arnold. He understood the pressures operating on Hap and hence took no
offense at Arnold’s comments, some of them fairly strong in view of their more than 20 years of close personal relationship.\textsuperscript{150}

Evidence of the paradox in their relations was Eaker’s editing and revising their coauthored volume \textit{Winged Warfare} while Hap was in England. Eaker continued the task during any few moments he could spare from leading the Eighth and answering communications, often angry, from the Pentagon. Revealing is Assistant Secretary Robert Lovett’s postwar comment that Arnold’s disappointment with the performance of the B-17 resulted in the AAF chief transferring much of his frustration to Eaker.\textsuperscript{151}

It would be almost three weeks after Hap’s departure before a significant raid against Germany was mounted. In the interim, however, Eighth heavies did not remain idle. They were directed against French coastal targets in Operation Starkey, an effort to convince the Germans that an invasion of the \textit{Pas de Calais} area was imminent. By the end of September, reasonable weather and the end of the diversionary attacks on French coastal targets saw eight raids flown against Germany, most of which employed more than 300 heavies. One such mission encompassed a new high of 399 aircraft.\textsuperscript{152}

Losses continued to mount, the most striking event since Hap’s return being the 14 October (still referred to as Black Thursday by its survivors) revisit of 320 B-17s to Schweinfurt. Sixty planes fell to the rocket and cannon attacks of 700 Luftwaffe fighters. These losses, added to the 30 B-17s that had been lost in the mission of 10 October, were severe but not thought to be crippling of the Eighth’s operations. Eaker’s analysis was upbeat, insisting that the raid proved that the “air battle has reached its climax.” He asked Arnold for replacement planes and crews, fighter escorts, and drop tanks. His optimism was reflected in his comments that we could replace our losses whereas the Germans could not. He intended to continue the air battle, insisting that there was “no discouragement here.”\textsuperscript{153} Stimson, Marshall, Arnold, and Portal all sent congratulations.\textsuperscript{154} Hap, continuing to appreciate that the large loss rate was caused in large part by the lack of effective long-range escort fighters, undertook a crash program to increase the number of fighters available to the
Eighth. He informed air commanders in other theaters that their planned allocations would not be met because of diversions to the Eighth.\textsuperscript{155}

All that followed was not positive, given Arnold’s ill-chosen words at his press conference where he spoke of expected loss rates of 25 percent. The media took the unintended impression that the Luftwaffe might have been tipped off as to the raid. This led to Eaker’s appropriately informing Arnold of the unfortunate impact of such remarks on the morale of bomber crews as they assessed their mathematical odds of completing a combat tour of 25 missions.\textsuperscript{156}

Even this important second attack on Schweinfurt did not bring a halt to Hap’s urging greater accomplishments by the Eighth, to which he now added the RAF. One way Arnold mistakenly thought he could obtain greater results for the Eighth and the strategic bombing initiative was by making both Eaker and Portal “mad” through the tone and nature of his correspondence with them.\textsuperscript{157}

Hap’s and Portal’s relations dated from the American aviator’s second trip to England in May–June 1942. Although outwardly cordial and pleasant, Hap’s latent Anglophobia and the heritage of the RAF’s obtaining more than what Arnold felt was its share of American-produced aircraft lingered. It would continue throughout the war, exacerbated at this time by the issue of fighter use. Upon returning from this trip in September, he had written Portal for more escort support from P-51s that the United States had furnished to the British. He asked that the RAF chief “provide accompanying support or make the P-51s available to me.”\textsuperscript{158} On the day the second Schweinfurt mission was flown, Arnold followed up with a letter that he knew “will make Air Chief Portal mad.” Carefully read in retrospect, it was an indictment of Portal’s direction of the CBO. Arnold indicated that there had been deviation from the Casablanca CCS target objectives and suggested, “we are not sufficiently alert to changes in the overall course of the war.” Hap’s main complaint was the failure of AAF and RAF forces to hit the German Air Force in “adequate numbers.” He went on to assert boldly that Portal’s “thousands of fighters” were not making “full use” of their potential. He cited specifics such
as the Regensburg–Schweinfurt raids of 17 August. He criticized the RAF Spitfires for not attacking the German airfields there while the Luftwaffe was refueling to make a second attack on the American bombers as they returned to England. Other complaints involved what he considered the failure of the RAF to put long-range tanks on the Spitfire and his assertion that our “staggering air superiority” was not being used. Asking for a candid reply to what he said was his candid assessment, Arnold suggested that we put all our fighters into “effective offensive action.”

Portal solicited comments from Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, then responsible for fighter defense of the United Kingdom, and informed his superior, Secretary of State for Air Archie Sinclair, of the contretemps. Leigh-Mallory informed Portal that instead of the 1,000-to-3,000 fighters Arnold estimated the RAF had, there were approximately 800 operationally ready fighters, many of which were required for the defense of the United Kingdom. He also told Portal that it had been considered “unlikely,” when the AAF daylight operations began, that the B-17s would require escort and that, even if they were needed, they were to be provided by the AAF. Nevertheless, he wrote that his command was making arrangements for increasing the range of RAF fighters.

Portal’s response to Arnold 10 days later was no more polite than Hap’s. Sarcastically calling Arnold’s letter “incisive” and “detached,” he insisted that he was operating consistent with the Pointblank directive. He said the RAF had fewer than half the number of fighters Arnold credited them with and insisted that one out of every three RAF fighters that left the ground in the previous quarter “did so in order to provide protection for the Eighth Air Force.” He further wrote that Arnold’s comparison of the P-47 with the British Spitfire was not correct and that any tactical advantage the Eighth had was “largely thrown away by the slow rate of the build-up which you have achieved.” He alluded to Arnold’s criticism of RAF use of the P-51 by stressing the “great deal of prejudice,” clearly meaning from the AAF, about getting that plane into production. In concluding, however, he indicated that British fighter command was being reorganized to provide more support for the bomb-
ing offensive. Overall, Portal tried to answer or dismiss all of Arnold’s complaints.161

Archie Sinclair’s response to Portal, after Hap’s letter had been answered, showed that the British secretary of state for air was as anti-American as Arnold was Anglophobic. The British minister labeled Hap’s arguments “unsound,” insisting that the American airman had fallen into the “vulgar error” of ignoring the beam in his own eye while observing the “motes” in ours. Portal had, in Sinclair’s words, given Arnold a “good and salutary drubbing.” Nevertheless, Sinclair went on to point out that in spite of the bombing, German fighter production appeared to be increasing and to ask whether Harris’ Bomber Command could back up Eaker’s efforts by closer coordination between the two. Harris responded on the difficulties inherent in their different operations. When Portal went on to suggest that Eaker husband his forces until good weather was assured, the American airman responded that any period of inactivity was bad for the morale of his aircrews. Eaker added that inaction would not be understood in Washington and would result in diversion of prospective assets to other theaters.162

Possibly somewhat chastened by Portal’s comment, Arnold’s response was probably deliberately curt. He informed the British chief that his reaction to Hap’s suggestion, that the RAF provide the AAF with P-51s, was “not on the scale or at the time I had hoped for.” Further, Arnold indicated that he was stopping any P-38 or P-51 aircraft from going to any theater other than the United Kingdom during the quarter ending in December.163 If the exchange of letters between Arnold and Portal was less than warm, Hap’s efforts nevertheless paid some dividends. Eaker reported that some RAF officers, “instead of taking offense,” conceded that much of the criticism [by Hap] “was justified.” They were reevaluating their procedures, attempting to extend their fighter range with drop tanks, and being more aggressive in the use of their fighters.164 It was in this atmosphere that Arnold would meet with Portal in less than two weeks.

Arnold’s dissatisfaction with the efforts of the Eighth continued throughout the remainder of October although atrocious
weather that set in and appeared to dominate until year’s end probably lessened some of Hap’s criticism. One author has indicated that the losses at second Schweinfurt “blunted” the Eighth program until more long-range fighters were obtained, even though 23 missions were flown between 14 October and the end of the year. All of them over Germany were escorted. Innovations such as dropping bundles of strips of tinfoil, called chaff, were tried by the Eighth in an effort to distort the radar of the enemy. Additionally, there was experimentation of bombing through the seemingly ubiquitous cloud cover, using British-devised systems, the more limited-range one being “Oboe,” the more extensive one “H2X” or “H2S.” As was to be expected, Eaker protested the proposed 1 November creation of the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy, insisting that its potential assets should be furnished to the Eighth. Arnold, however, was convinced that the Eighth’s major nemesis other than German fighters or bad weather might be eliminated in part by operations from the Italian boot, particularly as it became possible to operate from the Foggia airfields about 100 miles north of Naples. Hap insisted on its creation, and it became effective on 1 November.

Eaker was not, and should not have been, hesitant in defending the Eighth’s record. In a letter of 22 October, he told of meeting with his commanders to reassess their procedures to ensure that the Eighth did not remain “rigid or inflexible” as Arnold had feared in an earlier letter. While thanking Arnold for the letters of congratulation for second Schweinfurt, he expressed understanding for the pressures Arnold worked under. At the same time, Eaker continued to defend himself and his Eighth Air Force by insisting that they had not been “lazy, cowardly or ineffective.” This fragile truce dominated as preparations were under way for Arnold to travel to his next overseas CCS high-level conference, which resulted in a different relationship between Arnold and Eaker.

Arnold reflected in his memoirs that the interim between the two Schweinfurt missions of 17 August and 14 October was the “high-water mark of our daylight bombardment without fighter escort.” His visit to England, which occurred in the middle of this period, had several important results. Most important to the future conduct of the air war was the additional impetus given to
the acquisition of long-range fighter escorts. Although Arnold indicated that the AAF had “planes and replacement crews” to sustain a 25 percent loss rate, he conceded correctly that it was impossible to determine whether or not this could be maintained. Since bad weather intervened after second Schweinfurt until early in 1944, the question was never answered whether the American public would tolerate such losses. The problem was on the way to being resolved with the arrival, beginning in January, of drop tank-equipped P-51s and P-47s in relatively large numbers.170 Already some in the media were speculating to members of Arnold’s staff that the American public “might not stand” for losses “every couple of days,” the equivalent of the cost of “half a dozen destroyers or one big cruiser or small aircraft carrier.”171

In no small measure, Arnold’s belief in the invulnerability of the B-17 to enemy fighters was responsible for the lack of long-range fighter escorts; yet he was clearly motivated by this visit to increase his efforts in furnishing the long-range escorts to Eaker. At the same time, Allied intelligence, in spite of the optimism of Arnold, Eaker, and the bulk of other airmen in the theater, was not able to evaluate to what extent these sacrifices were necessary in order to accomplish the goal of destroying the Luftwaffe before the Overlord invasion or, in the long run, to validate the concept of strategic bombing. Available statistics on German fighter production did not show any appreciable decline. In fact, German fighter production increased during much of 1944.172

Among other important results of the trip, it seems probable that Arnold felt without articulating it that Eaker’s days as Eighth Air Force commander were numbered. One can empathize with Eaker as he labored to achieve success, limited as he was by inadequate resources and habitual bad weather, while enduring with inordinate patience the hectoring from his chief who was also one of his two closest friends in the AAF. Arnold’s concept of strategic bombing as the raison d’être of a current and postwar air force overshadowed Eaker’s vision as a theater air commander. The opportunity to replace Eaker with another seasoned airman having both tactical and strategic experience, who was supported by Eisen-
hower, was not to be missed by Arnold during his next trip abroad.

Notes

4. Ibid., 353.
5. Ibid., 355.
7. Diary of Henry L. Stimson, 20 January 1943, Sterling Library, Yale University, New Haven, Conn. Stimson's initial displeasure with the group, particularly denying approval of Elihu Root Jr., going to England with the committee and the reversal of his decision, are covered in Perera, 81–83.
11. Craven and Cate, vol. 2, 367–70, has a brief critique of the CBO Plan.
12. Arnold to Portal, 25 September 1943, AP.
17. Arnold to Andrews, 2 May 1943, AP; and Copp, 383–87, has an excellent brief account.
18. Stimson Diary, 10, 12, May 1943; and Arnold to Marshall, 10 May 1943, George C. Marshall Papers, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va., hereinafter cited as MPMS.
19. Stimson Diary, 14 May 1943; Marshall to Arnold, 14 May 1943, MPMS; and Arnold to Churchill, 27 May 1943, AP.
20. A copy of the speech is in AP. New York Times, 2 June 1943, covers the speech.
21. Arnold, Memo for Record, 1 May 1943, AP.
25. Ibid., 368–70.
26. Arnold to Stratemeyer, 26 February 1943, AP.
27. Arnold to Assistant Chief, Air Staff, A-3, 23 February 1943, AP.
29. Arnold to Andrews, 24 March 1943; and Arnold to Spaatz, 22 April 1943, AP.
30. Arnold, undated memo to staff, circa March 1943; Arnold to Eaker, 26 March 1943, AP.
31. Eaker to Arnold, 1 March 1943; and Arnold to Eaker, 24 March 1943, AP.
32. Arnold to Andrews, 26 April 1943, AP.
33. Along with LeMay, Col Edward J. Timberlake was temporarily denied promotion; see Arnold to Eaker, 28 June 1943, AP.
34. Parton, 261–81.
35. The Lovett memos cited inter alia the need for more gunnery practice, engine boosts to obtain more power, fuel tank improvements, larger propellers, and improved rear visibility for the P-47. For the bombers, he noted the need for more timely arrival of maintenance crews and more modifications of airplanes before leaving the states. Lovett to Arnold, 18, 19 June 1943, AP. Eaker’s impression that Lovett’s visit had helped with Arnold is in Eaker to Lovett, 6 June 1943, Ira C. Eaker Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
37. Arnold to Devers for Eaker, 12 June 1943, AP.
38. Devers from Eaker to Arnold, 12 June 1943, AP.
39. Arnold to Eaker, 15 June 1943, AP.
40. Eaker to Arnold, 29 June 1943, AP.
41. Arnold to Eaker, 7 July 1943, AP.
42. Eaker to Giles, 29 June, 9 July 1943, Eaker Papers.
43. Parton, 265.
44. Eaker to Lovett, 28 June 1943, Eaker Papers. Ironically, Knerr arrived in the United Kingdom the same day that his hero, Frank Andrews, was killed. Copp, 395–97.
45. Copp, 365. The apron-like flak suit with heavy front and rear panels was composed of heavy cloth material that covered strips of metal. Although available for aircrew use in the theater throughout the remainder of the war, its bulky nature and weight limited the mobility of the wearer within the aircraft. This editor’s personal experience was that its use varied by aircrew member, depending on such variables as his position within the crew, his need for mobility in the plane, his personal preference, his daring, and the threat posed by flak.

46. Arnold to Giles, 22 June 1943, AP. Extracts are printed in Copp, 413–14, who terms it the “most important memo.”

47. Arnold to Col Gene Beebe, 23 July 1943, is the source of the trip to the aircraft manufacturers; turrets installation is from Arnold to Eaker, 1 August 1943, AP.


49. FRUS, W-Q, 854.

50. Arnold to Maj Gen Davenport Johnson, 10 September 1943, AP. Johnson apparently took his relief with some good grace and understanding. As indicated elsewhere, by contrast Maj Gen James Chaney, another long-time pilot and West Point graduate, was unhappy enough about his April 1942 removal as CG First Air Force that he sought and was granted a meeting with Secretary Stimson, who offered little sympathy. This was Chaney’s second relief, having been earlier replaced by Eisenhower as the senior Army officer in England in 1942. See Stimson Diary, 18 April 1943.

51. See the accounts in Craven and Cate, vol. 2, 477–84; and Copp, 414–17.


54. Ibid., 442–44.

55. Ibid., 308–19.

56. Ibid., 523–29.

57. FRUS, W-Q, 852–53.

58. Ibid., 852–55.

59. Craven and Cate, vol. 2, 713.

60. FRUS, W-Q, 859–62, 1125.

61. Ibid., 886–87. The British permission for landing rights was given orally by the Portuguese leader Salazar on the last day of 1943. The British then proceeded to obtain permission from the reluctant, wary Portuguese government for US aircraft to transit through their facilities. As soon the Quadrant Conference was over, Arnold, working through Hopkins attempted to get as much diplomatic pressure as possible applied by the White House for AAF permission to use the Azores. The result was that the British allowed the US aircraft “through the back door” to use the facilities. See the brief account of the early efforts of the AAF to use the Azores in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, vol.
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64. Spaatz to Arnold, 24 June 1943, AP.


67. Coverage of the Quadrant Conference from Eaker’s viewpoint is in Parton, 302–7.

68. FRUS, W-Q, 872.

69. Ibid., 905, 1124.

70. Ibid., 1160.


73. Arnold, Global Mission, 444.

74. Arnold’s aide and pilot, Lt Col Clair A. Peterson.

75. Maj Gen George V. Strong, USA, chief, War Plans Division, War Department; Capt Gordon Hutchins, USN, plans officer, COSSAC, the planning staff for the Overlord cross-Channel invasion of the continent, both of whom accompanied Arnold on this trip. The post commander is not otherwise identified.

76. The Andersons are not otherwise identified.

77. Brig Gen David N. W. Grant, chief flight surgeon, AAF. Arnold had suffered his second heart attack on 9 May 1943 and was accompanied on this and subsequent overseas trips by an AAF physician. Brig Gen Haywood S. Hansell Jr., an AAF plans officer had recently become deputy to Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, RAF, who headed the air section of COSSAC. Brig Gen Alden H. Waitt, USA, assistant chief, Chemical Warfare Service. Lt Col Jacob E. Javits, USA, later US Senator from New York, was assigned to the Chemical Warfare Service and served as General Waitt’s assistant on this trip. Arnold spelled the name as Humphries in Global Mission, 444, but this officer is not otherwise identified. Capt Lyman A. Thackery, USN, spelled Thackery in Global Mission, 444, plans officer, COSSAC. Maj Thompson, not otherwise identified, served as Arnold’s aide. MSgt Henry Puzenski had been Arnold’s crew chief during his B-10 flight to Alaska in 1934 and, according to Arnold, “remained my crew chief until I retired . . . some thirteen years later.” Global Mission, 146. Arnold’s letters designed to assist him in obtaining warrant officer rank in the USAF in 1948 are in AP.

78. The crew is not otherwise identified.

79. Inflatable individual life preservers so named for their resemblance to the silhouette of the American movie actress.
80. Note the contrast from Arnold’s earlier assessment of the control at Prestwick, which he found much more effective on 25 May 1942, when he landed there. He termed the operation then “a fine set-up.”

81. Maj Gen Idwal H. Edwards, deputy for operations, European Theater of Operations (ETOUUSA); Brig Gen Hume Peabody, CG, School of Applied Tactics, Orlando, Fla.; Col Paul E. Burrows, CO, European Wing, ATC.

82. Lt Gen Jacob L. Devers, USA, had replaced Lt Gen Frank M. Andrews as CG ETOUSA following Andrews’ tragic death, 3 May 1943.

83. The Isle of Man, approximately 45 miles west of the coast of England in the Irish Sea and about 75 miles due south of Prestwick would have been on a direct course between Prestwick and Wales.

84. Hendon was an RAF airfield just northeast of London in Middlesex.

85. Col Lucius Ordway, USA, Chief of Staff, to General Devers.

86. Maj Gen Henry J. F. Miller, CG, VIII Service Command, whose main headquarters was in Milton Ernest, just north of the town of Bedford in Bedfordshire. In view of the elapsed time, Arnold could not have traveled to that location. Instead, he visited their small liaison headquarters collocated with the Eighth Air Force.

87. Eighth Air Force and VIII Service Command.

88. Heston was an RAF airfield on the western outskirts of London, near Hounslow.

89. Brig Gen Frederick L. Anderson Jr., CG, VIII Bomber Command. The headquarters of the 2d Bomb Wing of the Eighth Air Force was located at Hethel, Norfolk, seven miles southwest of Norwich. Col Edward J. Timberlake Jr., was promoted to brigadier general the next month and assumed command of the unit. Aircraft from this wing had participated in the raid against the Ploesti, Rumania, oil fields on 1 August 1943, the attackers losing 54 of their 177 planes. Concerning the event, Timberlake recalled: “Arnold’s visit was a perfunctory one. I had gathered up about 100 officers and men who had made the Ploesti mission one month before. He [Arnold] barely mentioned it. He was off the station in thirty minutes [sic]. Arnold was a B-17 man.” Timberlake to editor, 12 August 1986. Considerable redesignation of group, wing, and division names (but not their numbers) had taken place in August 1943. For example, the previously named 1st Bombardment Wing became the 1st Combat Bombardment Wing (Heavy). In this study, for reasons of simplicity, the units will be referred to by the shorter names used before the redesignation and since by the leaders, crew, most veterans, and writers; hence, 1st Bomb Wing.

90. Bury St. Edmunds, Suffolk, was the location of the 94th Bomb Group and the 4th Bomb Wing, whose B-17 aircraft had participated in the costly 17 August raids against the ball bearing plants at Schweinfurt and the Messerschmitt factory at Regensburg, both Bavarian cities.

91. The CG of 1st Bomb Wing, Maj Gen Robert B. Williams, had known Arnold since the early twenties, when both had served at Rockwell Field, Calif. Their friendship dated from those sunny days. Williams had just been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for leading the wing on the Schwe-
infuriat mission of 17 August. As Arnold recorded, Williams had earlier suffered the eye loss while serving as an observer during the Battle of Britain. This was Arnold's first meeting with Col Curtis E. LeMay, who commanded the 4th Bomb Wing. As with other officers, Arnold may well have been sufficiently impressed with them and their reported performance that he concurred in their promotions and/or reassignments. In order to encourage Eaker, Arnold recommended the latter's promotion to lieutenant general, which became effective just five days after Arnold's arrival back in Washington. LeMay was promoted to brigadier general in October and became the commander of the 3d Bomb Division only 10 days after Arnold's meeting. This is significant in view of Arnold's having turned down Eaker's earlier request on 28 June 1943 for LeMay's and Col Edward J. Timberlake's promotions to brigadier general. The correspondence is in AP. No Colonel White appears on the roster of the 94th or 389th Bomb Groups at this time; the reference was probably to Col Jack W. Wood, who commanded the 389th at Hethel and who had led his B-24s on the 1 August raid against Ploesti. Colonel White, otherwise unidentified, might have accompanied Arnold from Hethel to Bury St. Edmunds.

92. Col Alfred A. Kessler Jr., former CO of the 95th Bomb Group, would become CO of the 13th Bomb Wing at Horham, Suffolk, on 16 September 1943. This was one of several leadership changes at the operating level made as a result of Arnold's visit. Gable, the noted actor, had enlisted in the AAF as a private and had been serving since 28 January 1943 as a captain with the 508th Squadron of the 351st Bomb Group at Polebrook, Northamptonshire, where he was assigned to make a training film showing the day-to-day activities of a typical bomb group in combat. For Gable's service, see Steven Agoratus, "Clark Gable in the Eighth Air Force," *Air Power History*, 46, 1999, 4–17.

93. Col Frederick W. Castle, at this time CO of the 94th Bomb Group, was one of the eight officers who had accompanied Brig Gen Ira Eaker to England in February 1942 as the nucleus of the Eighth Air Force. Promoted to brigadier general while commanding the 4th Bomb Wing, Castle was killed on Christmas Eve 1944 flying over friendly troops near Liege, Belgium. He refused to bail out of his damaged B-17 and was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously. Arnold enjoyed a special rapport with Colonel Castle since the latter was the "class baby" of Arnold's 1907 class at West Point. Tradition then dictated that the first child born to a class member was given that title and Arnold had enjoyed a close friendship with the "class baby" as well as Castle's father, Arnold's classmate. Hap undertook the difficult task of informing the senior Castle of his son's loss. A copy of his letter is in AP.

94. Industrial areas in and around Paris were bombed this day by 140 bombers of the Eighth Air Force including the 94th Bomb Group whose returning 18 aircraft Arnold observed. According to one author, in talking with the returning crews (the Group did not lose an aircraft during that mission) Hap did not learn that they had "bombed an airfield as a target of opportunity while not recognizing it as a dummy." See Roger A. Freeman,
Maj Gen John C. H. Lee, USA, CG, Services of Supply, Europe.

96. Goering’s instructions are not otherwise identified.

97. Arnold used the American terminology for British servicewomen. In the US military, Army women were first known as WAACS (Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps) and after September 1943 as WACS (Women’s Army Corps); Navy as WAVES (Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service). Their British counterparts were ATS (Auxiliary Territorial Services) for the Army; WRENS (Women’s Royal Naval Service) and WAAFS (Women’s Auxiliary Air Force).

98. The gunner meant to furnish a drink to all crew members to celebrate their safe return from their last required mission. After flying 25 heavy bombardment missions at this time in the Eighth Air Force (later increased to 30 and still later to 35) the aviators were then returned to the United States and most relieved at least temporarily from further combat duty.

99. The Germans were increasingly using rockets fired from FW 190 and Me 109 aircraft at American bombers from a distance anywhere from 1,000 to 1,700 yards. See discussion in Craven and Cate, vol. 2, 699.

100. The first attacks by Eighth Air Force aircraft against what became known as the German rocket sites or Lowball targets were flown on 27 August during the week prior to Arnold’s visit; Freeman, Crouchman, and Maslen, 100. Arnold would be in England later when the first of the German V-1 rockets were sent across the Channel on 13 June 1944. See chap. 8.

101. Duxford, town 10 miles south of Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, where the 78th Fighter Group, commanded by Col James J. Stone Jr., flew P-47 aircraft.

102. Maj Gen William E. Kepner, had recently become CG, VIII Fighter Command; Col Stewart W. Towle Jr., Chief of Staff VIII Fighter Command. Although there were several Andersons in the theater at the time, Arnold probably referred to Col Samuel E. Anderson who commanded the 98th Bomb Wing located at Marks Hall, Essex, six miles east of Braintree and about 30 miles from Duxford. The reference to Peterson may have been to Maj Gen V. L. Peterson, USA, Inspector General of the US Army who had conducted an earlier inspection of the Eighth Air Force, but probably referred to Arnold’s aide and pilot who accompanied him on this trip but traveled separately to Duxford. The relatively limited US aerial combat in Europe by fighter aircraft thus far had produced only three American aces (defined by the AAF at the time as those who had shot down at least five enemy planes) and Arnold met them all at Duxford on this visit. They were Maj Eugene P. Roberts, Capt Charles P. London, and Capt Gerald W. Johnson. Roberts and Johnson were then stationed at Duxford with the 78th Fighter Group; London flew with the 56th Fighter Group, Halesworth, Suffolk. All flew P-47s. The reference to Irvine may have meant Col Shortridge Irvine, assistant to AC/AS Material for Aircraft Production at AAF Headquarters. Rosenblatt was a New York lawyer who had served as motion pic-
ture administrator in the National Recovery Administration in the 1930s and was then serving as a colonel with the US Army in England.

103. The Hawker Typhoon became operational with the RAF in September 1942 but early models were plagued with a Sabre engine “installed long before its teething troubles were over”; Owen G. Thetford, *Aircraft of the RAF Since 1918*, 6th ed. (London: Putnam, 1976), 327.

104. The P-47 had come into the European theater in early April 1943 and had a good many problems in its first operational months. Jettisonable wing tanks manufactured both in the United States and Great Britain and made of either paper or steel were tried with only limited success in the early months. The problem of wing tanks with sufficient fuel capacity and satisfactory operational performance was not resolved fully until early 1944, giving the aircraft the capability by March of escorting the bomber formations into any portion of Germany. The development and production of wing tanks was given considerable attention by Arnold and the Air Staff as a result of this trip. See the discussion in Craven and Cate, vol. 2, 654–55.

105. Called the Malcolm Hood after its designer, Wing Comdr H. G. Hood of the RAF, the improved canopy vastly increased pilot visibility.

106. The B-24s were RAF Coastal Command aircraft used in antisubmarine work.

107. The 78th Fighter Group at Duxford dispatched fighters this date on sweeps in the Antwerp, Belgium area with no loss of AAF aircraft. There is a brief comparison of the performance characteristics of the P-47 with the Me 109 and FW 190 in Craven and Cate, vol. 2, 334–36.

108. Earl's Colne was an AAF base 12 miles west northwest of Colchester, Essex, where the 323d Bomb Group commanded by Col Herbert B. Thatcher, flew B-26 aircraft.


110. The officer involved whose name has been deleted by the editor died during the preparation of this volume. It did not seem necessary in view of his surviving relatives to specifically identify the officer. His friendship with Arnold dated from the first World War and during the 1920s the aviator gained considerable favorable fame. At the time of Arnold’s visit the officer was the oldest bomb group commander in the Eighth Air Force where he led a very effective B-26 group. Extremely popular with his men they tried to “cover” for his drinking problem. He was relieved of this position shortly thereafter, no doubt as a result of Arnold’s suggestion and returned to the United States where he retired, albeit during wartime in February 1944. See Arnold to Eaker, 11 September 1943, AP.

111. Marshall’s earlier interview with the newspapers, the role of the Navy and Hap’s subsequent involvement are not otherwise identified.

112. A copy of Arnold’s remarks to the press is in AP. Given wartime censorship Hap’s comments were predictable, lauding the work of the Eighth and praising the success of the combined RAF-AAF bombing.
113. Maj Gen Barney McK. Giles, Chief of the Air Staff, AAF Hqs. Many of these changes involved not only general officers but other operational commanders of units Arnold had just visited and were discussed with General Eaker before being implemented. Most of these were made within the week after Arnold’s visit. Three new Bombardment Divisions were activated on 15 September 1943, each with an experienced combat officer in command: 1st by Maj Gen Robert B. Williams; 2d by Brig Gen James B. Hodges; the 3d by Col Curtis E. LeMay.

114. The Earl of Swinton had served as the British Secretary of State for Air from 1935 to 1938.

115. AAF aviators often referred to lively unit parties as “wingdings.”

116. Brig Gen Ross G. Hoyt, CG, 65th Fighter Wing, Saffron Waldron, Essex; Col John G. “Dinty” Moore, until June 1943 had commanded the B-17 equipped 94th Bomb Group, Bury St. Edmunds, Suffolk; Brig Gen Howard M. Turner assumed command of the 40th Bomb Wing at Thurleigh, Bedfordshire, 16 September 1943.

117. At this discussion Arnold argued for a single command for US-British strategic bombers. Arnold thought Harris’ opposition was based on the fear that the RAF probably would not be given command of such an organization and would lose the virtual autonomy the RAF Bomber Command then possessed which saw Harris go directly to Churchill rather than proceeding through RAF channels. Arnold reflected in his 1949 memoirs that it was “not such a good suggestion after all,” although he had been considering the need for a supreme air commander in Europe as early as December 1942. The command of the strategic bombers was a continuing issue discussed in several of Arnold’s diaries. In the planning for the Overlord invasion Eisenhower requested with the threat of “going home” if denied, control by him of the AAF and RAF strategic heavies. This was agreed to by the CCS and was the way control was exercised in the preinvasion period and through September 1944. Their post-invasion control was a major issue involving Arnold at the second Quebec Conference in September 1944 and is covered in chapter 9 of this diary. See Arnold, *Global Mission*, 449; Arnold to Spaatz, 28 December 1942, AP; and Introduction to chapter 9 and Arnold diary entries for 11–12 September 1944.


119. Brig Gen Paul R. Hawley, chief surgeon, Eighth Air Force. This was the Second General Hospital of the AAF located at Headington in the northeast suburbs of Oxford. It was affiliated with and staffed in part by Presbyterian Hospital, New York, N.Y.

120. The reference to the “strike” here is not clear. The British newspapers of the time although subject to wartime censorship contained no reference to significant change at the A. V. Roe works where Lancaster bombers were manufactured. If the reference was to a labor dispute it probably referred to the end of the strike. The RAF published figures for availability of aircraft to Bomber Command do not address the numbers specifically available on this date. However 515 aircraft were available in the command in
January 1943 rising to 974 by March 1944. During this visit Arnold recorded that RAF losses were “proportionally as heavy as ours.” Arnold, Global Mission, 449. See Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945, vol. 4, Annexes and Appendices (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), Appendix 39, 428.

121. Col Austin Martenstein, maintenance officer, Eighth Air Force; probably John S. or Perry B. Griffith, both aviators, but not further identified; Col David H. Baker, chief, Plans Division, VIII Service Command. USAF VIII Service Command’s large Burtonwood depot, operated at this time jointly with the British Ministry of Aircraft Production was located in Lancashire just southwest of Harrington between Liverpool and Manchester. It was the “chief repository for Eighth Air Force supplies and equipment in the theater,” Craven and Cate, vol. 2, 613.

122. As a result of this trip large numbers of AAF personnel not assigned to specific units were sent as individuals to depots such as Burtonwood. A discussion of their utilization is in Craven and Cate, vol. 2, 640–41, vol. 4, 391, 395.

123. Lt Gen Frederick E. Morgan of the British Army had been appointed on 1 April 1943 as head of the planning staff for the cross-Channel attack. As indicated above his formal title was Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Command or COSSAC.

124. Vice Adm Sir Edward Syfret, RN, Acting First Sea Lord.

125. The reference is probably to the HS 293 glider bomb launched by German aircraft from distances up to 15 miles from the target allowing the launching plane to remain clear of defensive gunfire. First used on 27 August just 10 days previously the weapon was eventually neutralized by the Allies in the spring of 1944 by shipborne radio command jamming equipment.

126. Cape Finisterre is in the extreme northwest corner of Spain.

127. Maj Gen Robert W. Crawford, USA, chief, Services of Supply, Middle East; Adm Harold R. “Betty” Stark, USN, now commander, American Naval Forces, Europe.

128. Several of the Groups Arnold had visited earlier on 3 September contributed to the 157 B-17s dispatched this day against Stuttgart in Baden-Wurttemberg, in southwest Germany, a mission termed a “complete failure” by Arnold in his memoirs (Arnold, Global Mission, 449–50) where he provided an extensive account of the raid. Freeman’s Eighth Diary, 106, described the mission as “one of the most costly fiascos in 8AF history” because “clouds frustrated attacks on objectives and formations became separated.” The units lost a total of 18 aircraft that date although the records are not complete as to how many of those planes went to Switzerland where stricken US planes landed if unable to return over enemy territory en route back to British bases. International law and current practice required that both crew and their aircraft be interned there for the duration of the war. See Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 3, Europe: Argument to V-E Day, January 1944
129. This reference is not clear; see note 133 below.

130. Field Marshal Sir Archibald P. Wavell of the British Army, termed by Cadogan as the “luckless Wavell,” had been relieved as Commander in Chief, India and became Viceroy of India, 1 July 1943.

131. They discussed the assignment and responsibilities of Maj Gen William O. Butler who had been CG, Eleventh Air Force in Alaska and was en route to the theater to become Deputy Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Forces, in October, 1943. Maj Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg replaced him as Deputy Commander in May 1944, although the change had been discussed as early as March 1944. As the official history commented in Craven and Cate, vol. 3, 82, the change “was a belated effort to reduce friction within the AEAF” and was not necessarily a reflection on General Butler. Arnold’s discussions were a harbinger of more serious American concern over the command structure, use and responsibilities of American air forces, particularly for the projected invasion of France. Leigh-Mallory, never a favorite of many American aviators, had been appointed by the CCS as commander of the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces (AEAF) at Quadrant. His limited experience as a fighter commander in the Battle of Britain and what many Americans viewed as his “empire building” proclivities did not endear him to any of the American leadership with whom relations became increasingly strained. As late as 10 weeks before the invasion, even ever-patient Eisenhower felt that the British did not “trust Leigh-Mallory to be directing head of my air forces.” See Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Eisenhower Diaries, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1981), March 22, 1944, 114. Spaatz’ difficulties with the British officer are covered in Davis, 309–19.

132. It is possible the reference was to an article 10 months earlier in the London Times of 13 November 1942, titled “Air War in the Middle East: How Allies Won Superiority, Sir A. Tedder’s Review.” Dated Cairo the previous day Tedder discussed the air campaign in the Middle East, indicating that it was remarkable to what degree ground and air were coordinating their efforts. He indicated that Italians in their Macchis were deserving of greater recognition than the German Luftwaffe. Calling the airmen of the Allies forces “grand,” Tedder opined that air could provide cover for all ships in the Mediterranean if provided the necessary bases. As discussions were continuing on air operations with ground and naval elements in preparation for Overlord, these sentiments would have been relevant.

133. The message is not otherwise identified. Maj Gen Sir Kenneth W. D. Strong, British Army, became Eisenhower’s Chief of Intelligence.

134. Not located. Morgan was a strong supporter of Gen George Marshall to be selected as commander of Overlord and Marshall indicated that if he was chosen for that position, Morgan was his choice as his chief of staff. Roosevelt and Churchill had tentatively agreed at the Trident Quebec Conference, 11–24 August that Marshall would command the invasion forces.
Although this decision was not announced then, considerable sentiment had arisen for its disclosure. FDR later changed his mind and Eisenhower was selected to command Overlord, a fact recorded by Arnold on 6 December 1943 in chapter 7. See Pogue, vol. 2, 260–62; and vol. 3, 275–77.

135. Brig Gen Paul L. Williams, CG, Northwest African Troop Carrier Command. In considering the possibility of using airborne troops in Overlord, Arnold logically wanted Williams’ experience available. Maj Gen Lewis H. Brereton had arrived in the UK from Egypt on 10 September just three days after Arnold’s departure. Brereton became CG, Ninth Air Force, which controlled troop carrier operations in northern Europe.

136. Col Elliott Roosevelt commanded the Northwest African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing. Lt Col Harris Hull, formerly a Washington, D.C., newspaperman, had been one of the original cadre of Eighth Air Force personnel who traveled to England in February 1942. A close rapport existed between Eaker and Hull and the former was unwilling to see Hull transferred from his staff. When Eaker was reassigned to command the Mediterranean Air Forces in December 1943 Hull accompanied him.

137. Approximately 25 miles northwest of London and 10 miles northeast of Eighth Air Force headquarters at High Wycombe, Bovingdon in Hertfordshire was the closest operational base to General Eaker’s headquarters. The base’s main function at this time was as the primary operational training base and reception center for Eighth Air Force combat crews upon their arrival and departure in the UK from the United States. Eisenhower’s B-17 was based there.

138. Strong’s aide is not otherwise identified. Col Donald D. Flickinger, an AAF flight surgeon, was an aide to General Grow. No doubt Arnold meant Jacob Beam, Counselor of the US Embassy, London.

139. To help in taxiing the P-47 it was possible to lock the tail wheel into a straight-ahead position. During take-off failure to unlock the wheel could cause serious control problems at high speed on the runway before reaching flying speed.

140. Probably Carol J. Crane, rank and assignment unknown at this time; possibly Col Kenneth B. Hobson, assigned at the time to the War Department General Staff, Washington.

141. The reference is to an experimental B-17 fitted with rockets to provide quick/short take-offs. The device was not operational in this theater and never extensively used.

142. Probably Brig Gen Arthur E. or Stanley R. Mickelson, specific assignment at this time unknown. Col Bernt Balchen, Norwegian-born expert on arctic aviation, had been commissioned directly in the AAF by Arnold in 1942 and supervised building of Bluie West 8 airfield in Greenland. He was detailed to accompany Arnold to Washington on this trip for one week’s duty, after which he was transferred to England where he supervised Project Sonnie, which used unmarked B-24s carrying Free Norwegians between Sweden and Scotland, later flying supplies to the Norwegian resistance movement in that country. His earlier exploits no doubt impressed
Arnold. Balchen had succeeded in landing a PBY patrol craft in the snow in Greenland in February 1943 to rescue the AAF crew of a downed B-17 followed by a landing on 6 April to rescue additional crewman. See New York Times, 4 May 1943 for the visit of some of the rescued airmen with General Marshall. Cochran is not further identified.

143. Arnold's previous visit to Goose Bay had been during his spring 1942 trip to England when he stayed overnight on 23 May and stopped again briefly during the night of 3 June en route back to Washington.

144. The 3 September mission is covered in Freeman, Eighth Diary, 103–5; the 6 September one against Stuttgart, with losses of 18 B-17s, he labeled as “one of the most costly fiascos in 8AF history” is covered on page 106. These were in addition to the loss of 27 B-17s that day against other targets. Hap’s account in his memoirs of the Stuttgart raid hinted at considerable skepticism on his part about the validity of reports “sent up through channels” since “certain features of the operation never did find their way into reports.” He concluded that these omissions were one of the reasons why he found it “profitable” to make trips such as this one and although not articulated this hardly inspired confidence in data sent back to the Pentagon by Eaker and the Eighth. Arnold, Global Mission, 449–50.

146. Eaker to Lovett, 16 September 1943, Eaker Papers.
148. Eaker to Arnold, 11 September 1943, AP.
149. Ibid.; Eaker to Lovett, 16 September 1943, Eaker Papers.
151. Parton, 279, 291.
152. Freeman, Eighth Diary, 118–21.
153. Eaker to Arnold, 15 October 1943, AP.
154. Marshall’s cable said he was “tremendously impressed” and that he “lik[e]d the tone” of Eaker’s message, adding “no great battle is won without heavy fighting and inevitable losses.” Marshall for Devers pass to Eaker, 15 October in Marshall Papers, vol. 3, 157–58. Arnold, although indicating he was “highly pleased with the results” felt Eaker could “handle the morale situation” but then went on in typical Arnold fashion in this period to instruct Eaker to “change your formations and techniques more frequently,” Arnold to Eaker, 15 October 1943, AP. Portal opined that the Schweinfurt attack “may well go down in history as one of the decisive air actions of the war,” Portal to Eaker, 15 October 1943, Eaker Papers. Churchill in the week earlier through Arnold had congratulated Eaker and the Eighth on their success in the attacks of 9 October. Extracts are printed in Arnold, Global Mission, 484.

155. For diversions of aircraft see Arnold to Kenney, 28 October 1943; Arnold to Spaatz, 29 October 1943, AP.
156. Eaker to Arnold, 22 October 1943, AP. Cozzens, as one of his speech writers during the years 1944 and 1945 despaired of Arnold’s occasional departure from his prepared text and making extemporaneous remarks.

157. For making them “mad,” see Kuter to Col Joe Loutzenheiser, 13 October 1943, Gen Laurence S. Kuter Papers, United States Air Force Academy Library, Colorado Springs, Colo.

158. Arnold to Portal, 25 September 1943, AP. In his memoirs Arnold wrote that Portal shipped by water three P-51s to Arnold. After their arrival the AAF attached sufficient wing tanks to allow the aircraft to fly back to England and as Hap somewhat snidely informed Portal: “The Spitfires you sent me by ship have landed at London after crossing the Atlantic under their own steam.” See Arnold, Global Mission, 495–96.

159. PRO, Air 8/1108, Arnold to Portal, 14 October 1943; also in AP.

160. PRO, Air 8/1108, Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory to Portal, “Comments on the points raised in General Arnold’s letter to the CAS dated 14 October 1943,” 22 October 1943.

161. Ibid., Portal to Arnold, 24 October 1943.

162. Ibid., Archie Sinclair to Portal, 31 October 1943; and Portal to Sinclair, 2 November 1943.

163. Arnold to Portal, 31 October 1943, AP.

164. Ibid., Eaker to Arnold, 22 October 1943.


166. The first mission of the Eighth using the British H2S system, termed H2X as used by the AAF, was over Emden on 27 September. See Freeman, Eighth Diary, 118–19. Copp, vol. 2, 444, mentions the use of chaff, which was used throughout the war. The editor recalls assisting other crewmen in loading it aboard our B-17s throughout much of 1944.

167. Eaker’s objections to creating the Fifteenth are in his letter to Devers, 1 October 1943, Eaker Papers.

168. Eaker to Arnold, 22 October 1943, Eaker Papers.


170. Ibid., 495.

171. Kuter to Arnold, 11 October 1943, Kuter Papers.

Chapter 7

Cairo, Tehran, Palestine, Cairo, Italy
11 November–15 December 1943

Introduction

Two months after Arnold’s return from his 10-day journey to England, covered in chapter 6, he traveled with the president and the JCS on a five-week trip to Cairo and Tehran. There, he attended three strategy conferences that included Hap’s first meeting with Josef Stalin as well as sessions with Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek. Returning home via Palestine and Egypt, Arnold visited Italy, where he viewed the war, its operations, and its consequences from as close a vantage point as safety allowed.

It had been 10 months since Hap had attended a major diplomacy/strategy meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill for which there is an Arnold diary. In the interim, Allied fortunes continued to prosper although not as successfully as Arnold had hoped in the AAF strategic bombardment of Europe. Changes in leadership were to result from these conferences. In the Mediterranean, British optimism for quick success in Italy had not proven correct, even though the invasion of Sicily had been completed during July and August. Further east, the Soviets continued their struggle against the Wehrmacht. During the summer months, Soviet troops advanced more than 150 miles over a 600-mile front, regaining control of Kursk, Kharkov, and Smolensk by September. In the Pacific, the American strategy of attacking only key Japanese-held islands and bypassing others began to be followed as the US Navy defeated Japanese attempts to reinforce New Guinea in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in March. US Marines landed at Bougainville in early November and, three weeks later, invaded Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands—their bloodiest engagement yet. In the air, AAF P-38s shot down Adm Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese architect of Pearl Harbor, near
Bougainville. Elsewhere, AAF attacks on the Ploesti oil fields and the German ball-bearing and aircraft plants at Schweinfurt and Regensburg showed the increasing range and strength of US strategic airpower. But these raids also produced heavy casualties and some doubts. The struggle for control of the Atlantic turned in favor of the Allies 10 days after Arnold had returned home. The Royal Navy’s battleship *Duke of York* sank the German battleship *Scharnhorst* in the Battle of North Cape, removing a major threat to Allied convoys to Russia. In the 10 months following Arnold’s strategy conference at Casablanca, Allied forces continued to prosper.

Arnold’s odyssey, chronicled in his diary, started with 10 days aboard the Navy’s newest battleship, the USS *Iowa*. Neither Arnold nor his companions commented that the day of their departure marked the 25th anniversary of the Armistice ending World War I. Greeted with generally tolerable November weather while at sea, their leisure was disturbed only by occasional strategy sessions with the commander in chief, which provided a rare but welcome respite from the demands of the Pentagon. One result was that the American delegation, given their access to FDR and opportunities to plan while on the *Iowa*, began these meetings better prepared than at any other wartime conference thus far. Their routine at sea was dominated by long restful days, followed by a motion picture and the rare opportunity for pleasure reading. This routine allowed Arnold to include seemingly irrelevant data in the diary. He confided there that he was “having a grand rest, not a worry in the world.” Nevertheless, Hap used the meetings with the JCS and the commander in chief to promote an important change in the command and organizational structure of the AAF; he called for a single Allied strategic air force commander in Europe.

Hap’s interest in this arrangement had existed almost from the beginning of United States entry into the war. Increasingly in 1942, as US aircraft production and deployment of units to Europe and the Mediterranean area increased, Arnold desired a single commander for all bombers. Free of control by a nonaviator theater commander and operating “directly under the Combined Chiefs of Staff,” the strategic bomber commander could coordinate the bomber operations against Germany and
validate the claims of Arnold and other bombing enthusiasts. Hopefully, the strategic bomber commander would be an American aviator of rank equal to the theater commander. Headquarters would be in London, where the commander would have access to the British intelligence network and communications facilities, and could coordinate if not control AAF and RAF bomber operations. Success for such a command would enhance Arnold's postwar goal of a separate AAF.¹

Arnold was pleased that the approval of the Combined Bomber Offensive gained at Casablanca earlier in the year had been a first step toward this goal. However, executive direction of its operations was vested in Air Chief Marshal Charles Portal of the RAF. During Arnold's brief visit to England, covered in chapter 6, he had raised the issue of a single strategic air commander with the Eighth's Ira Eaker, Bomber Command leader Arthur Harris, and Portal. Not unexpectedly, Harris opposed the idea. He might lose the freedom of action he enjoyed as head of Bomber Command, dealing with Churchill directly when the circumstances dictated. Portal's reaction was not recorded by Hap, but the proposal was not greeted with any enthusiasm. Arnold's strained relations with Portal in the aftermath of the October Schweinfurt mission, covered in postscript to chapter 6, also would have encouraged Hap to seek a change. Establishment of the Fifteenth Air Force in November added another reason for an overall air force commander in the theater. Consequently, the JCS considered the matter and submitted a draft of a strategic US Air command on 18 November while on board the Iowa. The responsibilities would place the commander on a par with the ground theater commander, achieving recognition and prestige for an airman. Arnold probably felt that the commander would be an American. In the assessment of Spaatz' biographer, "Even if an RAF officer got the job, Arnold would still have taken a large step toward eventual postwar autonomy for the AAF."² By the time they reached Cairo, the JCS had determined that they would attempt to secure approval of a US Strategic Air Command. During the Cairo deliberations, several attempts were made by the Americans to get British agreement to an Allied strategic air command; they were not successful.³ On

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the final day of the second Cairo meeting, the US chiefs were able to get grudging British agreement to the establishment of an American, but not Allied, commander for strategic air forces to be embodied in an organization called United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe or USSTAF.4

Although the secretariat that recorded the exchanges at these meetings represented both nations, the intensity and occasional testiness of the arguments come through in the printed version of their deliberations. At the afternoon CCS session on 4 December, Portal made a long statement setting forth the many reasons that had been advanced consistently by the British against a single Allied commander of the strategic air forces. His position was that, “quite frankly,” the US chiefs could organize their forces as they “saw fit.” But he advised “most strongly” against it because it would not achieve its aims and was “quite unnecessary and would prove inefficient.” He listed other objections, including the fact that the “close integration” of the RAF and Eighth Air Force would be broken up. From Arnold’s viewpoint, Portal’s most revealing statement probably was that he “could not undertake to subordinate the operations of the R. A. F. to those of the 8th Air Force.” Portal indicated, in a disparagement of Arnold, that in his opinion Eaker was doing as well as possible with only 75 percent of his resources. Arnold responded with some statistics that revealed the dissatisfaction with the Eighth that he had been expressing almost since the CBO at Casablanca and that were a criticism of Portal’s direction of the CBO. Arnold “could see no reason why at least 70 percent of the planes available should not be regularly employed,” insisting that the “failure to destroy targets was due directly to the failure to employ planes in sufficient numbers.” Arnold’s most telling indictment of both Portal and Eaker was: “At present, the necessary drive and ideas are coming from Washington.” He threatened that, since there were more planes in the United Kingdom than were being used, “unless better results could be achieved no more planes should be sent.” General Marshall’s remarks reflected his agreement with Arnold. The US chief of staff was direct in pointing out that Portal’s arguments were based in part on the RAF chief’s unwillingness to lose power as executive agent of the CBO. Marshall said it had always “proved
the case” that a combat commander (Portal’s position under the CBO) was “loath to release any forces in his possession lest they should not return to him.” Marshall continued to support Hap, commenting that a huge force could not be allowed to collect in the UK “unless it was employed to the maximum.” Curiously, Arnold summed up the proceedings of the entire day in fewer than 10 lines. He called it a “hard day” and emphasized in his journal that Eisenhower was getting the Overlord command rather than recording the Portal–Arnold–Marshall exchanges. Nevertheless, in their final meeting of the conference, although not recorded in Arnold’s diary except for his note, “many knotty and controversial problems solved,” the CCS approved the creation of USSTAF. The British chiefs added a caveat that they “do not agree in principle” with the US decision. Achievement of a single commander for American strategic forces in the Europe–Mediterranean theaters was not the maximum that Arnold sought, but it was another step towards validation and recognition of strategic bombardment’s role in this war as well as a raison d’être for a separate postwar air force.

It remains apparent that, for a variety of reasons including security considerations, Arnold’s journal included only a passing coverage of the substantive issues involved in these meetings. Other reasons included time constraints, the complexity of the issues, the lengthy discussions of them, and the realization that the secretariat present was preparing a comprehensive record of the deliberations that would be printed and available for reference.

Hap’s diary covered the three diplomacy/strategy conferences, two in Cairo and one in Tehran. Since the Soviets were not at war with Japan, they declined being present in Cairo when Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese were represented, hence the need to meet separately. Among the topics at the first of the Cairo meetings was the reappearance of the question of retaking Burma. Chiang continued to insist on an amphibious assault on the Andamans to enable coordination with Chinese ground forces from Yunnan province. The British displayed their reluctance to engage at all in the operation. As Robert Sherwood has written, Churchill “considered Burma solely as an outpost of the Empire, rather than as an area of
strategic importance.” Roosevelt, however, “wanting to give the Generalissimo something to show for his trip to Cairo,” agreed that the operation against Burma would proceed with American logistical support. The difficulties involved in getting any agreement prompted Arnold’s diary comment about the difficulty of bringing “conflicting racial aspirations and prejudices together.” Arnold did not comment on the sense of déjà vu that he must have felt, since this issue had been an important factor during his trip to India and China. Among other issues considered at Cairo was the British desire to pursue eastern Mediterranean operations and induce Turkey to enter the war. The British also continued to display less enthusiasm for the invasion of northern France than the American JCS. Before they left Cairo, there was some suspicion among the Americans, clearly without foundation as they learned when discussions unfolded in Tehran, that the Soviets might side with the British on expanding Mediterranean operations.

Next, the British and Americans moved on to Tehran where they remained for six days. Arnold attended the plenary session on 29 November and the CCS session on the following day, participating only briefly in their deliberations. He apparently found time to carry on a lengthy discussion with Stalin, however. Although not recorded in his diary, this meeting was presumably held following the three-hour “brass hats” session on 29 November. This conversation furnished the basis for Hap’s impressions of Stalin recorded in his diary entry of 1 December as the airplane flew from Tehran to Jerusalem. In their conversations recounted in his memoirs, Arnold was “surprised” by Stalin’s considerable detailed “knowledge of our planes.” There was mention of the modification center in Iraq, and Arnold was agreeable to Stalin’s request for heavy bombers for the Soviets, providing that Soviet personnel were trained by American personnel in their maintenance and operation. Arnold recalled promising 300-400 B-24s in return for the use of Soviet bases for shuttle bombing against the Germans, but the offer “was never followed up.” He appeared almost in admiration as he recounted his impressions of Stalin as a “man of steel, fearless, brilliant mind, quick of thought and repartee, ruthless, a great leader, courage of his convictions.” Arnold, who had joined
Marshall in emphasizing operations against northern Europe as opposed to the British preference for the Mediterranean, had to have been pleased at Soviet insistence on a specific date and commander for Overlord as well as the invasion of southern France that was being planned.  

Hap’s diary reflected his intense interest in the sites he saw and visited during their overnight stop in Jerusalem before returning to Cairo for seven days. There were meetings with the British on five of them, the Chinese having returned home at the end of the first series of meetings in Egypt. Since he was flying into a combat zone before returning home, security considerations again limited Hap’s diary entries to the barest outline of the topics discussed. Among the actions taken relating to the AAF was the president’s cancellation of his commitment, made 10 days earlier to Chiang, to support the Burma invasion. Although he did not comment in his diary, Arnold could reflect that the situation, given Roosevelt’s retraction of his earlier promise to Chiang, was now exactly where it was when Arnold departed China and India 10 months earlier. The major difference was that the AAF was now delivering more than 10,000 tons a month over the Hump. It was at this second Cairo conference that Arnold and the JCS secured the unenthusiastic British consent to the creation of USSTAF.  

The selection of Eisenhower to command Overlord, made by FDR in Cairo, elicited no substantive comment from Arnold although he had earlier expressed his ambivalence to the president concerning Marshall getting that assignment. In stating his “preference” for Marshall, Hap appreciated the opportunity for command it would provide but also understood the importance of Marshall being in Washington, where the chief of staff had been a strong supporter of Arnold and the AAF. He had also become a close and trusted friend.  

The choice of Eisenhower as Overlord commander with British Gen Sir Henry “Jumbo” Wilson as Allied commander in chief, Mediterranean Theater, presented Arnold and the JCS with the question of who would command the AAF/Allied air units there. The Overlord announcement was made the same day that the CCS approved the creation of USSTAF, which raised the additional issue of who would be its commander.
The ensuing changes resulted in Spaatz going to England as the USSTAF commander, Eaker very reluctantly going to the Mediterranean as air commander in chief of Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, and Doolittle succeeding Eaker as commander of the Eighth Air Force. If not instituted by Arnold, these changes had his imprimatur.

From Cairo, Arnold traveled to Italy to assess the operations of Fifteenth Air Force, which had been established only five weeks earlier, and to witness the ongoing war. He had to have been pleased with what he saw of AAF’s tactical bombing results. As was now becoming normal for his trips, he visited flying units, talked with the airmen, and attempted to assess their morale. His visit to a field hospital brought him close to the human realities of war. He recorded these in some detail while observing the ground war at close range. Later, he was able to escape much of the war during a restful night on Capri and another in Marrakesh, where he had stayed earlier. His return across the Atlantic followed the normal route dictated by the limitations of the aircraft, which included brief stops in Brazil and Puerto Rico before ending his 35-day odyssey.

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**The Diary**

**TRIP TO SEXTANT**

November 11, 1943–December 15, 1943

**GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD**

**Thursday, November 11, 1943 [On the Potomac River]**

Cloudy, rainy day. Arrived at *Dauntless* at 7:48. Followed General Marshall aboard Admiral King’s flagship, the *Dauntless*; 22 Admirals, Generals, Colonels and Captains, naval Aeronautics representative late[, ] Doyle[,] taxicab trouble, shoved off 15 minutes late. Trip down Potomac to *Iowa*. Passenger list: King, Marshall, Arnold, Somervell, Cooke,
Handy, Bieri, Kuter, Hansell, Badger, O'Donnell, Roberts, Doyle, Burrough, Bessell, Smith, Royal, Chapman, Freseman, and Long. Trip down river very uneventful but cold outside. Reached Iowa at 4:00 p.m. Filled with AAA guns, a dozen or more. Ship about 800' long with 120,000 HP. Pulled alongside, moored and went aboard, given cabin 204, telephone #00, life raft 11.

Went around ship with my guide, Lt. Lafferty; met Commander Brumby: both asked about Ernie. Dinner at 6:45. Movies: *Stage Door Canteen*. Bed at 11:00.

Friday, November 12, 1943 [Potomac River en route to Hampton Roads, Virginia and the Atlantic Ocean]

Last night at dinner General Marshall told of his final meeting with Churchill and Staff at Algiers. After long, heated discussions a decision was reached. Before parting Marshall said: “Well, you certainly fixed my clock.” Sometime later, one of Churchill’s staff officers asked Marshall: “Did the Prime Minister really fix one of your clocks so that it would run?”

No daylight can enter my cabin as everything is dark out. Arose at 7:20, breakfast at 8:00. Walked on the big, main deck from bow to stern. Never saw so many sailors and so much saluting in my life. It is a big ship, with two seaplanes that look like midgets. The Potomac came alongside at 9:00 A.M. [with] Leahy, Hopkins and Pa Watson and the boss [Roosevelt]. Transferred their baggage and other supplies until 10:00. Steamed on down the bay. To date: 30 hours elapsed, 100 miles traveled. Took off for Hampton Roads [Virginia] from mouth of Potomac at 9:30. Arrived at sub net at 4:00, anchored about 5:00 and took on oil. After dinner had been served we were summoned to movie with President: Marshall, King, Leahy, Arnold, Hopkins, Somervell, McIntire, Watson and Brown. Back to room at 10:00, bed 10:30, grand rest.

Saturday, November 13, 1943 [Atlantic Ocean]

Last night Harry Hopkins bet Pa Watson $5.00 that he could catch a fish off the deck of this goliath. Pa took him up. In the middle of *Rosie O'Grady* in came Harry with four fish, a
Marine and a mess boy. All swore that Harry caught the fish; Pa said “icebox,” but had to pay.

Left Hampton Roads at 12:01, out in Gulf stream by 10:00. Weather clear but cool, gradually getting warmer. Sea smooth but getting rough; quite rough by 1:00 when chair went shooting across dining salon. Battle stations with gun drill at 2:00. One 16” went out of whack so 5 continued synchronized drill alone. Not much else to do but wander about the ship and look for new things and there are plenty. Loudspeaker just said that there would be a movie tonight, *Rosie O’Grady*, we saw it last night. Twenty-five knots zigzagging gives a net speed of about 23 knots; 4 props, 4 engines. Destroyers seem to be having a terrible time, heavy seas continued until sundown. Occasional planes flew overhead, part of our escort. After dinner, [movie] *The Phantom of the Opera* with the President and same guests as last night. Bed at 10:00 P.M.

**Sunday, November 14, 1943 [Atlantic Ocean]**

Made two bets on A&N [Army-Navy] game: King, $5; Hopkins, $10. A rather quiet day, up at 8:00, having a grand rest, not a worry in the world. Routine activities until 2:30. Gunnery practice at balloons by 5”, 40 mm, 20 mm and .50 cal. Great volume of fire and balloons soon destroyed. Right in the middle of practice conditions changed: “This is not a practice.” A torpedo wake came at the *Iowa*; alarm came from one of the destroyers. The whole character of the maneuver and practice changed; we really began to zigzag in our course. The wake of the torpedo became quite clear, a depth charge went off, all the guns started shooting. No hit, a miss, a thousand sighs of relief. From whence came the torpedo? Were there more? Practice being over, everyone went back to normal duties and pursuits. We had a preview of the JCS tomorrow, very important subjects:

1. Command of all strategic bombing by one man. Probably nonconcurrency by RAF.
2. Command of all Mediterranean by one man. We will probably agree.
3. Supreme Commander for all European operations (?)
(4) Summary of war against Germany.
(5) Summary of war against Japan.
(6) Postwar airways and bases.

This evening we saw [a movie] Princess O’Rourke; part of it takes place in the White House, all enjoyed it.30

Back in room at 9:30, bed at 10:00. Who shot the torpedo? Sea calm, weather good, temperature about 75, too hot for overcoat.

Monday, November 15, 1943 [Atlantic Ocean]

Perhaps it was the US Destroyer Porth that accidentally fired the torpedo that caused so much trouble and worry aboard the Iowa.

Another perfect day. We changed destroyers at 9:30. Meeting this a.m. of JCS. Lunch; meeting of JCS with President at 2:00; 4:00 hunted for a place where sailors were not washing the deck or saluting, found neither.

[At JCS, the chiefs discussed]31

1. French colonies under French for civil administration; not for military control.
2. New agreement re Galapagos wildlife preserve.32
3. Rearmament of French not be too hasty, only such as Eisenhower can use.33
4. Agenda for Generalissimo and Red Joe.34

Climbed into 16'' gun turret, had operations explained by gun crew; quite a device, wonderful gadgets for handling. Marshall had dinner in Ward Room, rest in Flag Officer’s Mess.

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Movie with President, Russia and her wars, a very powerful but gruesome picture.36

Tuesday, November 16, 1943 [Atlantic Ocean]

Herewith is photo of 30' statue in Basra. It shows the rape of Iran by the British Lion.37
Gin rummy score to date - Harry Hopkins 0 - Hap Arnold $3.00 but look out for the deluge. “You can use the brilliant but lazy man as a strategist, a brilliant but energetic man as a Chief of Staff, but God help you with a dumb but energetic man”: MacArthur’s estimate of GB [George Brett] one of the most charming damn fools I have had the pleasure of meeting.38

George Marshall’s story of Joe Levy: He was a Jew at VMI [Virginia Military Institute]. Family quite wealthy; the cadets used to use him to get funds. For instance, although there was no lake there and no crew, Joe always wrote home for money to buy an oar for the crew, for toboggan for the winter sports team, etc. Time passed, 18 years. Marshall accompanied [Gen John J.] Pershing on his tour of the US.39 At Omaha in the crowd appeared Joe. Marshall had him come up on the rear platform of the train, shake hands with Pershing, one of a very few who stood in line receiving people in the car as the crowd passed through. Finally he was up on the stand at the big parade and reception. After it was all over, Pershing asked: “George, who was that fellow Joe Levy, we met everywhere?” Marshall: “He runs a second-hand clothing store here in town.” Pershing: “My God, how did he get up here in the midst of everything?” Then Marshall told of his cadet days and how the family had lost their money. Pershing: “My Gawd.”

Another lazy day; weather cool and clear, showers on horizon. Our course 95˚. We passed some 40 miles north of Bermuda and some 150 miles south of the Azores. After dinner, movie; a lousy show. Harry won all his money back at gin.

Wednesday, November 17, 1943 [Atlantic Ocean]

Strong wind, fairly heavy seas, some rain. Carrier escort in addition to 3 destroyers, put planes in air. Report from Cairo that censor had released information re conference. JCS meeting today, went over agenda. Another meeting tomorrow.

Meeting, President and Arnold re destination and necessity for change after conference with Pa Watson. Then conference with Marshall, King, Arnold; and President, Marshall. King, Arnold. Message to Ike with Khartoum as destination.40 Dinner in Ward Room, short talk, movie with President, Lucille

**Thursday, November 18, 1943** [Atlantic Ocean]

Read a mystery last night until 12:30. We have been putting our watches forward 1 hour every night, deprives us of that much sleep. JCS at 10 A.M. Up on deck most of afternoon. Saw a PBY boat off some 30 miles to starboard. Passed Madeira [Islands] 30 miles to starboard. Heavy seas, strong wind, rain squalls, but generally fair. Ship very steady, Destroyers rolling, pitching and taking water from stem to stern.

A smoking lamp: smoking lamp has been extinguished, smoking lamp is not burning. What is it? Years ago on the windjammers, on frigates, when fire was a definite hazard, men were allowed to smoke pipes, but only when the Captain approved. No matches were allowed. The Captain had a lighted lamp on the bridge. There the men came to light their pipes. When the lamp was burning they could smoke. When the Captain had it extinguished, “no smoking.” Today on board some ships of the Navy such as the *Iowa* we still have smoking on decks regulated by reference to the smoking lamp.

Bagpipes before dinner, drum and bugle, drum and fife, an English and British Navy custom [to] notify the gentlemen that it is dinner time, get ready for it. Not aboard all ships but aboard the *Iowa*.

We are within range of land-based aircraft now; all files and documents of JCS have been stored away. We soon reach port; tomorrow night.

**Friday, November 19, 1943** [Atlantic Ocean to Gibraltar to Mediterranean Sea to Malta]

Heavy seas all night, green water came in over bridge, crashed against outside of my cabin up here on third deck. JCS this A.M. Picked up the USS *Brooklyn*, 2 more US destroyers, and two British destroyers. Sea and wind abated. Off Casablanca about 11 A.M. Meeting with big boss, 3:00 to 5:00. Really better informed and prepared on this trip than
any conference so far. Entered Straits of Gibraltar at 2:30 P.M. Packed bags, bed at 9:30 P.M. at Malta.

Saturday, November 20, 1943 [Mers-el-Kebir, Algeria to Tunis, Tunisia]

Up at 6:00, still dark, lights along African Coast, Oran lights in distance. *Brooklyn* leading way, almost invisible in darkness. [At] 7:00 we turn toward harbor lights, still following *Brooklyn*. Skyline of hills can be distinguished. Lights on ships in harbor recognizable. Pick up pilot, enter sub net opening and stop engines. Turn and twist back and forth until we can make a 90˚ turn and proceed toward anchorage. British cruiser with 4 star (Admiral Cunningham’s) flag aboard, does not realize that we have royalty aboard. Our Navy officers show consternation, great consternation, how can we salute. The junior must salute first. Ultimately we swallow our pride, sound our bugles, line up our sailors and do all the things that well disciplined sailors do when passing foreign men-of-war. But how did the British know we had royalty [the President] aboard? They didn’t. French cruisers and destroyers, merchant ships, tugs, scows, dinghies, two harbors, Mers-el-Kebir and Oran. We anchor at Mers-el. The boss goes out on deck, his hat, his cigarette and holder, his profile, the angle of his cigarette are a dead giveaway and all the French sailors take a look-see. So is our secret.

In due season in accordance with a published order baggage goes overboard with a small boat; personnel for plane #1, then personnel for plane #2, then personnel for plane #3. Others wait in comfortable spot until—. So we go overboard, leave the *Iowa*, a wonderful, modern man-of-war. We land at air dock. Met by Admiral[____] RN, Colonel McCarthy and many others. We are given slips: you take car 7, go to destination and embark in plane 3, upon reaching destination get in car 4 and go to Villa 3; secret and mysterious. The cavalcade starts: first the motorcycles, then the party of the 1st part [Roosevelt] and Secret Service, followed at a distance by General Marshall and 3 cars, then a distance, more motorcycles and Admiral King and a car with General Arnold.
Soldiers along streets at intersections, at curves, all doing their best to protect. Some face out to repel invaders, some stand like traffic cops directing us straight ahead or around a corner or stand to prevent us from going over a cliff where the road turns. All inviting crowds to gather: Arabs, Frenchmen, American soldiers, all looking, all attracted. Through American and French camp to the airport. We do not stop at the hangar, we go directly to a plane where a soldier stands with a large #3. There I meet a few Air Force officers, get a package of mail. Learn that: plane #1 will take off soon with Eisenhower and the Big Boss; plane #2 with Secret Service men and General Marshall; plane #3 in due season with Admirals King, Badger, Cooke; Generals Arnold, Hansell and Colonel O'Donnell.50

The countryside is very much like Southern California: olives, oranges, figs, grapes by the mile. Only discordant note the natives, and the French. The American influence has been felt: natives wear US GI shoes, trousers and blouses, so do the French, but they also have our rifles, tin hats, etc. Their wagon trains, however look like that of General Villa.51

In due season the planes take off, each on a different course: #1 with fighter escort via the coastline; #2 slightly inland, no escort; #3 via Biskra, Kasserine Pass52 to Tunis. Take off 11:05 and 2:15 P.M. Had to circle while #1 and #2 made their landing. Had another glimpse of Biskra, Garden of Allah, Marlene Dietrich's sitting stone.53 Saw Kasserine Pass where Hank had his real start as a fighting soldier.54

Country all very, very rugged and hard to fight over. Hills open and subject to accurate fire from enemy, are too rugged to traverse, few roads, practically no water. Tunis in a very fertile coastal plain. As we landed we could see the age-old viaduct, or ruins of it, leading into Carthage. We were to sleep with the ruins of that city under and around us. The library, the temple, the arena where Christian met lion all fairly well preserved in their ruins, parts remaining such as to be readily recognizable. Marble and carvings well-preserved; even the dens where Christians and lions were kept; central underground passage from which they emerged and area into which
they came and the seats for the spectators; the docks, now awash, the grain vaults, the ruins of the houses.\textsuperscript{55}

We were met by Eisenhower, Spaatz, two Roosevelt boys, Elliott and Franklin. [Went] To the White House where Ike lived until yesterday. A general how-do-you-do with everyone, a light lunch. Then leaving Spaatz I went to his villa, a gigantic affair with some 20 or more rooms. MacDonald, Dick, Robb, Curtis and a few more all live there.\textsuperscript{56} Spaatz sleeps in his caravan; Norstad.\textsuperscript{57} A review of the Photo Section commanded by E. Roosevelt by the President,\textsuperscript{58} then back to Tedder’s Headquarters where I met Portal. To Tooey’s headquarters where I spent an hour with Norstad, O’Donnell, Spaatz, Doolittle. Dinner with all of the occupants: Somervell, Handy, Badger, Cooke.

Pete\textsuperscript{59} showed up after being held at Natal for two days to put in new engine, [brought] letter from home and a large stem of bananas. Knowing British have none, I called Portal and turned them over to him for shipment to England.

General talk about this and that until time for bed when we realized that in spite of regimentation we had been informed that we would leave at 6:30, 7:30, 9:30 P.M., 10:00 P.M. and back again and no one knew when. Tooey, who had been dining with the Big Boss, came back and said 9:30 P.M.\textsuperscript{60} All other info; any hour one desired to choose. Finally McCarthy arrived [announced take-off at] 7:30 A.M. Bed at 10:30.

\textbf{Sunday, November 21, 1943 [Tunis, Tunisia to Cairo, Egypt]}

Up at 6:15, breakfast at 6:45, left villa at 7:00, tour of city, airport 7:20. King and I in plane #3, took off 7:40; Marshall, followed; President 9:30 A.M. Arrived Cairo 5:15, Tunis time, 6:15 Cairo time, just getting dark. The trip was one of intense interest from start to finish.

The Carthaginian ruins all around Tunis, the ships in the harbor on their sides, sunk on bottom with masts and funnels showing. Bomb craters all over the place, wars and desolation superimposed, BC to 1943 AD. What a world! Ancient civilization with facilities and nicer things of life that were lost to the civilized world through the centuries that followed.
Our trip covered a 1,500 mile battlefield, desert country that stretches the imagination to find a reason for fighting for it. German orthodox trench systems, British fox holes, extended through necessity to larger ones and finally to detached strong points. Groups of these defensive works in definite areas where during the Spring and Autumn hunting meets [take place]. Either the British or Germans attacked and the other one defended. Barbed wire partially covered with sand; tracks of armored cars and tanks in all directions, but sometimes following definite courses where a turning movement was apparent. Wrecked tanks, trucks and armored cars, some black from burning, others with camouflage paint, many partially covered with sand, all making a shadow that identified them in the desert; thousands of them here and there over that 1,500 mile stretch of desert. Airdromes occupied in turn by RAF, GAF, AAF with wrecks of German planes sprawled out flat on the ground like animals whose legs have given way and could no longer support the weight. Bengasi, Tobruk, Sollum, where the AAF and RAF might have blasted out the road going up the cliff, filled the cut and might have blocked the road and stopped Rommel, but were stopped from doing so by the British high command as they wanted the road in shape for them to use; and finally El Alamein, with scars of war multiplied by hundreds over the other localities. Then the Nile Valley: green, running water, small villages, cities, the sun setting over the desert. Landing at dusk, met by Harriman, Winant, Deane, Stratemeyer, Royce, Chennault, Dill and many others. Then on to Villa #4.

Monday, November 22, 1943 [Cairo]

The Villa was and probably is owned by a Greek. It has room enough for 8 people but only 2 baths. Therein are: Marshall - Aide; Arnold - Aide; Somervell - Aide; Handy, Deane - Total 8. Visitors last night: Pat Hurley, Winant, Royce, Stratemeyer, Chennault and Stilwell. Marshall reluctantly saw Hurley and then was through, but by hook or crook he was invited to dinner and stayed to talk afterwards. Marshall was provoked to put it mildly. Pat Hurley told of new oil field in Iran that
extends over 1,000 miles, greater than the California and Texas fields combined, extends right down to the seaport.

We have a lot of preparing to do for conference; must straighten out the Russian and Chinese situations before we go to sessions with the British. About 10 minutes by car among camels, donkeys, Arab men, women and children and not too alert British soldiers driving trucks.

Generalissimo and Madame [Chiang Kai-shek] arrived last night with no one to meet them. The plane with the advance party landed afterward and with great secrecy asked if another plane had yet arrived. It had but with no reception committee of the kind that royalty expects; Chennault fortunately did the honors.

The Pyramids stand out in the morning sun like mountains and are quite inspiring, when the sticky flies permit one to relax and enjoy them. Our offices are at the foot of the pyramids in the Mena House.64 I can almost reach out and touch the largest one; shades of Napoleon, Caesar, Mark Antony and Cleopatra. I hope they got more of a kick out of them than I have. As a matter of fact I see very little change during the 34 years since I first saw them.

At 9:30 the JCS met.65 Talking, each presenting his own problem were: Winant, Deane, Stilwell, Al Wedemeyer, England, Russia, China, India, almost the whole world covered. Lunch with Stilwell, Wheeler and Stratemeyer.66

Took Marshall, McCloy67 and visited the Pyramids and the Sphinx; had an Egyptian guide. The planning, cutting, trimming and moving of the stones would be a feat even today. Blocks of granite 30' by 8' by 6', stone cut with an angle to fit in a corner, stones with slots and keys, alabaster. Most of the granite facing of the pyramids has long since been taken away for other construction; the white limestone is slowly eroding.

CCS at 3:00;68 Cunningham taking Pound's place, only new face; Portal, Brooke, Cunningham, Dill and Ismay. Long talk with Dill after meeting. Returned to villa about 5:00. Met Deane and Pete, dinner 7:30. Meeting with President and Prime Minister, CCS, Generalissimo, Stilwell, Stratemeyer, Chennault at 9:00. Quite a meeting, Mountbatten presented Burma campaign.69
Tuesday, November 23, 1943 [Cairo, Egypt]

Up at 7:30, met with staff in the shadow of the Pyramids at 9:30. On to White House, historic meeting at 1100; President, Prime Minister, Generalissimo, Madame [Chiang], CCS Mountbatten, Stilwell, Stratemeyer, Dill, 4 Chinese generals. More discussion re campaign against Japs. Became quite open with all the cards on the table, face up at times, re naval aid to Army and Air in campaign. Lunch at villa: Marshall, Phillips and I; Gilbert Cheeves came in with his aide.

CCS meeting with Chinese present, they could say little due to Generalissimo not having given his opinions. Worked until 6:30; went to British Chiefs of Staff dinner: Leahy, King and I. Marshall had to go to dinner with Prime Minister, Portal, Dill, Brooke, and Cunningham. They live in house of Egyptian princess, quite racy in choice of paintings and other fixtures. British Chiefs of Staff here, 10 men, 3 baths and no hot water. Excellent food, good wine and splendid service. Discussed history of the world: Genghis Khan, Kubla Khan, the Knight Templars of Malta, Carthaginians, the Turks conquering the shores of the Mediterranean. Home at 10:30.

Wednesday, November 24, 1943 [Cairo, Egypt]

Up at 7:30, meeting with Kuter, Hansell and O'Donnell; JCS at 9:30. Meeting with President, Prime Minister at 11:00, all Chiefs of Staff present. Lunch with Harriman and Deane at villa; discuss Russia and approach to our problem. CCS meeting at 2:30, Chinese generals present. They told why our plans to lick the Japs would not work; 5:15, tea with Mountbatten, Portal, Kuter, Hansell. Discussed command set-up in India, China. Selected Board to fix up suitable organization.

Villa at 6:45, movie after dinner, Cary Grant in *Mr. Lucky*. Awfully difficult to bring conflicting racial aspirations and prejudices together: Chinese, Russian, British and American, have so many different ideas as to methods of doing things and their effect upon the future of their different countries. Marshall gets increased stature in comparison with his fellows as the days pass; the President, Prime Minister and Generalissimo all want his counsel and advice at the conference.
P.M., I took the President out to see the Sphinx today, the world’s three most silent people.77

Thursday, November 25, 1943 [Cairo, Egypt]

Eisenhower arrived at 7:00, his staff and RAF and British with him. JCS meeting trying to unscramble the present SEA [Southeast Asia] mess. Eisenhower gave us a talk on Mediterranean operations.78

Hurried back to villa, changed my clothes and back to President’s villa where all had pictures taken. Thanksgiving day, CCS and a merry party. Hard sledding on fundamentals, action postponed until tomorrow.79

Tedder said: “Decorate Kesselring for destroying the GAF; decorate Rommel for teaching the British Army how to fight.”

Ambassador Winant’s for a few minutes, saw Harriman and Winant. Took Winant to a most impressive service in the Cathedral given by the British for Americans. Cathedral crowded for this Thanksgiving service, all CCS present, everyone at the service but the cat and the dog.

Camels and caravans, little ones and big ones, all heading either toward the Pyramids or away from them; donkeys and sheep and goats, Arabs and more Arabs. Dinner and then movies, a good show, Ginger Rogers as a twelve year old.80

Long discussion with Handy and Somervell re command status of Mountbatten and the relationship of Stilwell and Stratemeyer and the Tenth Air Force.81 Bed at 10:00.

Friday, November 26, 1943 [Cairo, Egypt to Tehran, Iran]

At office, 7:45; discussion with Rosie [O’Donnell], Larry [Kuter], and Possum [Hansell]; Royce at 8:30; Mountbatten at 9:00; JCS at 9:30; Generalissimo at 11:00. Long discussion re tonnage over the Hump. He [Chiang] wanted to completely divorce Mountbatten from the China operations, when without the Burma show there may be no Hump traffic. He cannot see anything but his own requirements. After long and hard arguments he accepted fact that we were, or I was doing all I could to increase tonnage over Hump but he would not admit any connection between Hump operations and Mountbatten’s
Burma campaign. Poor fellow, he has a most acute attack of “localitis.”

Lunch with Stilwell, Stratemeyer, O'Donnell, Somervell and Vandenberg. CCS meeting re European campaigns; almost resulted in a brawl. We finally almost reached an agreement but not on one part, the amphibian operations of Mountbatten.

Walked back to villa with Marshall, about 4 miles; excellent exercise. Almost run down by British Army, RAF, Egyptian and US Army trucks by the score.

Dinner and movies, Andrew Johnson picture.

Saturday, November 27, 1943 [Tehran, Iran]

The Nile, cradle of civilization, a valley, probably most fertile in the world, 2,000 miles long, providing sustenance for mankind (at least they approach humans) for over 50 centuries. How come? Why did it start and continue here? One explanation, the Nile is a two way route for travel. Motive power is furnished both ways: the current of the river takes the Feluccas downstream; the prevalent wind from the north fills their sails and takes them upstream.

About bedtime word came that General Chen had changed our account of the meeting with the Generalissimo. We all agreed that couldn’t be done by anyone but the authors. In any event in the midst of my packing I put on a robe and met with Somervell and Chen. The correction was typical Chinese: the Generalissimo had taken one of his statements from the first part of the conference and was putting it in the last paragraph as a conclusion. Outside of the fact that it committed me to putting about 13,000 tons a month over the Hump, 2,000 tons more than I could possibly carry, the change meant little. I struck out “only” and put a period after President Roosevelt. Struck out the balance of the sentence and asked Chen to take that back to the Generalissimo for approval. He said “yes.”

Completed packing by 12:00, called at 5:30, breakfast at 6:00, car showed up at 6:30, new car, new driver. As Rosie [O'Donnell] had lost his baggage on last leg of trip, he was taking no chances. Hence we put our bags in the car with us. New car, new driver and in 20 minutes we were lost between Cairo and Heliopolis; we reached our plane on time, took off at 8:00 A.M.
Over desert and more desert and more desert, Suez Canal, shore of Mediterranean Sea, miles of desert. Passed Bersheba, the Dead Sea and it is dead; country that looks like that surrounding Death Valley [California].

Jerusalem and Bethlehem in the distance. No trees, no green vegetation, no green grass, only desert for miles. Habbaniyah, the Euphrates, Tigris, cultivated for centuries and centuries until the ground is covered with a salt deposit from flooding after flooding, each one depositing a small amount of salt; now acre after acre are untillable. Villages, cities, towns, mud huts, one after another until they seem to join onto each other. Mountains and deserts, snow-capped mountains, a railroad, a motor road, both looking out of place. Landed Tehran at 1:25 P.M., Cairo time or 2:55 Iran time. Russian soldiers everywhere over the field. Big boss landed almost immediately following, Red Joe arrived yesterday, Prime Minister this A.M.

Tehran is located in a large valley with high mountains, going up to 19,000 feet in some cases. The city about 600,000 made up of small compounds with high walls around. Most all adobe walls, probably to keep out bandits and robbers. People of Iran much better dressed, look healthier, more happy and contented than other countries we have seen. Russian, British and Americans have taken over Persia. North of mountains to Caspian Sea and Russia is all controlled by Russians. We drove through Tehran to American camp where 2,500 US soldiers live. Here we were assigned rooms in Bachelor Officers Quarters.

Mountains in back of us rise to about 14,000 feet and are well covered with snow down to 6,000 foot level. Russian influence is seen in large collars on horses and long overcoats on officers. Russian Embassy, British Embassy and American Embassy all guarded heavily by soldiers and military guards inside and outside of high walls. Strange [thing] about country there is no vegetation anywhere except where irrigated, no trees.

Saturday, November 28, 1943 [Tehran, Iran]

Breakfast at 8:00, meeting JCS 9:30, with President at 11:00. Streets lined with Ghurkas.
Moving day, late lunch, took off with Marshall for trip through mountains, very interesting. Water system made up of gurts, small craters where shafts are sunk and tunnels driven in both directions to carry water. In some cases shafts are 200-300 feet underground. System runs in some cases many miles from mountains to cities. In cities water runs in ditches through city; people bathe, wash, drink, cook with it. They do not seem to mind, Americans get the gyp tummy.

Newton Baker, the West Point graduate, has inculcated in him [Marshall?] a cultured reserve so necessary for communication between gentlemen.92

Upon our return we found that there had been a conference called for 4:00 P.M.;93 Uncle Joe, Prime Minister, the Boss; King had to do the honors for our JCS. Apparently Uncle Joe gave out his ideas as to war against Germany; it was very much in accordance with ours.94 King, Deane, Royal told us all details. Planners working tonight. After dinner, movies; bed, 11:30.

Sunday, November 29, 1943 [Tehran, Iran]

The bazaar, miles and miles of small, cubbyhole stores under roof behind the Mosque. Dirt, filth, all kinds of humanity, walking, talking, jabbering. Copper, brass, silver, rugs, meat, meal, bakeries, shoe leather, jewelry, hardware goods from all over the world. Prices about four times as high as they should be; rugs are cheaper in New York. Harry Hopkins, Connolly, a State Department [official] [Tehran Colony] [and I] went through bazaar together.95 We became separated. After we wandered around about an hour they were convinced that we were lost, hence a search party. We came out about a mile from where we went in.

Went into Russian Legation and met Harriman, Hopkins, Hurley and Leahy. Talked over conference, past and future; Russian aid to us, such as airports, weather, etc.; postwar decisions re Germany, France, Poland; boundaries, colonies, treatment of all concerned.96

Lunch at Post, everyone kidding me re my absence yesterday. Conference with President at 2:15. Pictures with all the big boys at Russian embassy at 3:30. Meeting with all brass hats 4:00 to 7:00.97 [Seating chart]
Supper at 7:30. My 2 year report caught up with me and I read it over until 1:00; Captain Newhouse brought it. Bed.

Monday, November 30, 1943 [Tehran, Iran]

Bright, sunny day as usual. Meeting of CCS at 9:30; after 1½ hours we agreed as to course we would steer. Harry Hopkins told of meeting with Prime Minister in which he made an about face. Lunch at camp. Meeting at 4:00 at Russian Embassy, same people as yesterday; everything went along as smooth as silk.

Tuesday, December 1, 1943 [Tehran, Iran to Jerusalem, Palestine]

The tents are down, the caravan moved to the airport and the military personnel are on their way. History in the making, history has been made. The President, the Prime Minister and Stalin have met, have studied each other and by contact have been able to break through the inexecrable [sic—inscrutable?] exterior, the diplomatic front, and see what lies behind his mask. What is a fair estimate of action to win the war and what for national aspirations in postwar?

Left Tehran at 8:25 A.M. Three truly great men: the President, Prime Minister and Stalin, at a birthday party, the Prime Minister’s 69th. Toasts and more toasts; everyone toasting his opposite, but the Prime Minister trying to outshine, perhaps better, carrying on true to form. The Prime Minister in one speech after another, glorifying the President, Stalin, the USA, our Army, Air Force, Navy, the Red Army, General Marshall and just making a toast. The President: reserved, listening and enjoying the meeting, talking when he thinks necessary, master of the situation. Stalin: the man of steel, fearless, brilliant mind, quick of
thought and repartee, ruthless, a great leader, courage of his convictions as indicated by his half-humorous, half-scathing remarks about the British, the PM and Brooke. I doubt if either was ever talked to like that before.\footnote{102}

Stalin dressed in a light brown uniform, red trimmings, two red stripes on trousers, large gold epaulets on shoulders with star (extra large) and coat of arms of Russia, the insignia of a Marshal of the Russian Army. He wears but one medal, a red ribbon in a gold border with the Russian star suspended below.\footnote{103} He is not tall, about 5'9", handsome as a soldier and knows his onions. Very interested in aviation and recognizes its true value in warfare; asked innumerable questions concerning our old and new planes, particularly the P-63.\footnote{104} Harry Hopkins made the best speech, his memory of things that passed is wonderful. Practically every one at the table was toasted; Portal gave his to me and I reciprocated. At 11:00, the Prime Minister gave his last toast. Stalin went all the way around the table to click glasses with all military men, not with diplomats or civilians. History was made and how.\footnote{105}

En route to Jerusalem, took off Tehran 8:25. Over the cradle of civilization, the Tigris, the Euphrates, Baghdad, with nothing but mile after mile of desert, gurts and gurts [sic], miles of them, towns, villages by the score, with no visible means of support except a few scant acres of cultivated land. Water supplies one village from the line of gurts and then runs into another. The first well pollutes it and then the second uses it as we do: clear, clean, fresh spring water. One would think that after all these years, these centuries, there would have been a modern irrigation system installed and many thousands of these acres under cultivation.

Endless tracks crisscrossing the desert, coming from nowhere and going to nowhere. Oases perhaps, but certainly not visible from the plane. The pipeline to Haifa, clear and distinct, but how the fellows at the pumping stations survive, I cannot see.\footnote{106} On to Jerusalem, the Golden, where the British Chiefs of Staff are our hosts.\footnote{107} We land at 1:20 P.M. Tehran, Persian, Iran time, 11:50 Cairo time, but what time in Jerusalem language?
Stalin said last night that our production of planes was 8,000 per month, more than the combined production of Russia, Japan and England. He then said his production was 2,500 and he would build it up to 3,000 per month. When there was a discussion among the British as to what their production was, he said: “I will tell you, it is 2,500 a month and you can’t increase it.” Prime Minister: “But they are all combat types.”

Landed airport thirty miles from Jerusalem at 1:30 P.M., met at airport by British Chiefs of Staff. Assigned an aide, Captain Kirker, and a car. Rode into Palestine through well-cultivated fields, so different from Persia (Iran). Delightful rooms at St. David Hotel. Portico that looks out on Mount of Olives, across to mountain other side of Jordan River, bougainvillea, green pines and shrubs, beautiful roses, star pines, the walls of Old Jerusalem opposite me on the hill.

Lunch at 1:30; at 2:30 with guides we took off for the Old City. Not a soul knows we are here but the streets are lined with civilians, looking, watching, pointing. Jerusalem today is what remains of 5 cities, each one destroyed by a conqueror and later one superimposed over the former, as a result walls appear out of the ground. Arches here and there just at the level of the ground which should be twenty feet in the air. Parts of the Old City are thirty feet down in the ground. Doors, windows, walls protruding through later construction. At one point down 20 feet we ran into the old flagstone roadway with the markings for the games played by the Roman soldiers cut in the stone. Twenty feet below that was the aqueduct that was used at the time of Christ. Here and there it is possible to identify parts of the old wall, gates through the wall and parts of old buildings. About 100 AD one of the Roman emperors leveled the city to put a stop to the Christian religion; 300 AD Emperor Constantine and his wife, St. Helena, came to Jerusalem to locate the famous spots insofar as possible and clear them out.

Today we were shown the pool, thirty feet below present ground level where Christ met the cripple and said: “Pick up your bed and walk,” where Christ stood before Pontius Pilate and was judged guilty and sentenced to be crucified. It was 20 feet below the ground upon which we stood. The various places where He picked up the Cross, the route to Calvary,
where His mother stood as He passed by, where His mother was born, where He was crucified, His tomb. We were taken down to a level 30 feet below the ground in an old sewer. There the Cross was thrown with that of the 2 thieves, identified by the nails in it; taken out and sent to Constantinople but a storm came up and the ship sank; only 2 pieces remain, small pieces. All these sites may be correctly located but most are the result of reconstruction, educated guesses, logical deductions, and in some cases, possibly actual identification. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre is falling down, is now held up by false trusses inside and out. It looks more like a construction job than a Cathedral. The Russians, the Greeks, the Latins, the Moslems are all here and all have their churches near holy spots.

At one point I heard a voice: “Hello Hap.” It was a San Friscan padre. I talked with him a long time and finally he admitted that he knew me only from reading about me in Time. Here I thought was an old friend.

Today passing Sea of Galilee, River Jordan, Dead Sea, Damascus, Haifa, Acre, Jaffa, was one of the most interesting of my career as far as travel is concerned. Dinner with British Chiefs of Staff at St. David Hotel, too much to eat and drink. I restrained myself without difficulty. Bed at 11:30.

**Wednesday, December 2, 1943 [Jerusalem, Palestine to Cairo, Egypt]**

Had a lot of trouble opening up windows as Jerusalem has blackout rules and regulations; finally had shutters open before went to bed. Awake at 6:00 with sun shining in door, breakfast with Portal. Bat man had a lot of trouble packing my junk in my bags, he was not used to American luggage.

Party started out in autos and went into Old Walled City; visited Mosque of Omar, built on site of Holy of Holies of Temple of David. It seems that Omar, Leader of Arab Moslems, head of their church, came to Jerusalem and tied his horse nearby to the wall. His followers immediately declared this place holy. Omar built the mosque on the
site where the Jews under Solomon made his [sic] sacrifices. It is a typical moslem mosque with stained glass and carved columns galore. The floors for hundreds of feet are covered with wonderful Persian rugs. We had to put on big shoes over ours, we looked as if we were wearing snowshoes. Most wonderful mosaics. Solomon’s Temple with all its glory has long since gone, not a trace. We left there and went to the Wailing Wall where the Jews, who cannot enter the walled city, stand outside to do their bit, quite a noisy business. Then we went to the Garden of Gethsemane117 and the Mount of Olives; olive trees 1,200 years old and perhaps 2,000, who knows, certainly no one for certain. Then back to hotel, took off for aviation field at 11:30. Decided to return to Cairo with Portal, Brooke, Cunningham and Dill in Portal’s York, a converted Lancaster. Has some very good features, its appointments are in general better than ours, noticeably its galley. On the other hand it has some disadvantages; it is so noisy that conversation is out of the question. Good view as it is a high wing plane.118

Took off 12:15, arrived Cairo 1:45. On the way to town saw our guards lining road, so it looks as if the Big Boss will land this P.M. Had lunch with J. C. H. Lee; discussed topics and events with Kuter, Vandenberg and Hansell. Told Van to return to US via England and bring Anderson back with him as I am not satisfied with: a. Number of bombers being used out of total available; b. Amount of bombs being dropped on targets as targets are not being destroyed. Van leaves tonight.119 Read over cables and CCS papers until dinnertime, dinner and then movie, bed.

Thursday, December 3, 1943 [Cairo, Egypt]

Breakfast at 7:30, office in fog, thick fog, 8:00. Read papers and saw folks until 9:30. JCS until 12:00. Heard Sutherland discuss MacArthur’s South Pacific plan.120 Lunch at villa, talked with Pete re trip home via Azores. CCS at 2:30; locked horns over Rhodes, Dodecanese, Dardenelles, etc.121 President with Marshall, Leahy and King at 5:00 to 6:45, Hopkins. Dinner and movie. Hope to leave here on Monday A.M. Looks like there is still lots to do prior to that.
Friday, December 4, 1943 [Cairo, Egypt]

The start of a hard day, but it didn't look so. Up at 7:20, breakfast and office at 8:00, JCS at 9:30. President and Prime Minister and CCS at 11:00. Had long involved discussion over war: invasion France, Burma campaign, Andamans, Aegean Sea, principles to apply to our strategy. Did't get out until 1:00 P.M.; I didn't get a haircut either. CCS at 2:30. Marshall had lunch with President; he doesn't get Overlord, Ike does.

Long and hard discussion with CCS over many topics. Adjourned at 6:00, dinner at 8:00, Coney Island until 10:30. What a day! Read cable, I own a ranch, hope.

Saturday, December 5, 1943 [Cairo, Egypt]

JCS, 9:00; CCS, 10:00; President and Prime Minister and CCS, 11:00; long session with lots of talking but the decision re Andamans not made. CCS, 3:00; President and JCS, 5:00, decision partly made and looks as if we may reach decision. Portal 6:00 to 7:35, home at 7:50 for a haircut. Had British Chiefs of Staff for dinner at 8:00. I came in [at] 8:15, Marshall took care of them. Duck for dinner, Peterson shot forty. Movie: The More the Merrier with Jean Arthur; most of the British and American Chiefs of Staff had seen it but all wanted relaxation and stayed. King had shown it to same bunch on his yacht in Washington when last we met.

Sunday, December 6, 1943 [Cairo, Egypt]

Office at 8:00; JCS, 9:00; CCS, 10:30; lunch with Marshall and Dill at 1:30; office until 4:30 with CCS waiting to see President and Prime Minister from 6:00 to 7:35. President and Prime Minister and General Smuts, Chinese Ambassador, [met at] Kirk's Pyramid House, Villa “B” until 8:10. They approved our final report without a murmur; easiest approval of final report we have ever had. Too tired from working on Turks all day to argue. Turks don't want to fight, want to get in on the gravy train just before Peace.

Marshall poll as to when peace with Germany: Dill, February; Brooke, March–April; Cunningham, September;
Monday, December 7, 1943 [Cairo, Egypt]

JCS, 9:00; CCS, 11:00, many knotty and controversial problems solved. Lunch with Tedder, discussed personalities and new organization. Met Jumbo Wilson and had talk with him. Returned to Villa at 5:00 and packed, read and rested until 8:15. Dinner with Prime Minister, second anniversary of Pearl Harbor: [guests] Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, Field Marshal Dill, General Brooke, Air Marshal Portal, Admiral Cunningham, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Lord Leathers, Field Marshal Smuts. Prime Minister in fine form, talked over history, History in the making, our conference, the Russians, European situation, Air, Navies, Peace. General Smuts had captured the Prime Minister during the Boer War. Churchill tried to talk himself out of being a prisoner, but no soap; later he escaped. Today Churchill is Prime Minister of England and Smuts a Field Marshal in the British Service. Another peace poll: consensus of opinion that if Germany doesn't crack at the end of winter she will not fall. Churchill still fears Russia and warns us of period 20 years from now. They breed like flies, we US and British are far more conservative. Now US plus British white population about equal to Russia. In 20 years, such will not be the case.

Smuts says we must sugarcoat the term “unconditional surrender.” Churchill, his interpretation of unconditional surrender, taking away from the enemy all possibilities of the will to fight but insure the individuals and rights of free people. Left at 12:15.

Tuesday, December 8, 1943 [Cairo, Egypt to Tunis, Tunisia to Sicily to Foggia, Italy]

Returned to Villa, changed clothes, said good-bye to Marshall. Took off with Rosie in car for airport. Met B-17 with Pete, Ritland, Anders, Puzenski, Meade. Took off from Payne Field, Cairo, 1:10. Slept all night on coat, landed Tunis, 9:35 Cairo time, 8:35 Tunis time. Met by Curtis and Norstad. President and party
just left for Malta. Went to Curtis' house and cleaned up; breakfast.
Went through museum and saw many relics from Carthaginian and Roman days. Strong similarity between markings on pottery of Egyptians and Carthaginians and [American] Navajo Indians. Took off for Sicily at 11:30; arrived to find airdrome closed, landed 12:30. Everyone lined up waiting for President. I talked to Clark, Patton. President’s plane landed at 2:15; saw Harry Hopkins, the President, Admiral Leahy and Pa Watson. Talked to Beadle Smith and Eisenhower; both agreed that Spaatz was man for job, wouldn’t take anyone else, not even Tedder.

Used Tooeys plane, he was with me as we took off 3:15, arrived Foggia 5:15, met by Hank. Drove through ruins, bombed city of Foggia and [I am] now living in home of Fascist, who ran out as British came in. Tooey and his staff now use it, a fine house. Long and ardent discussion re employment of aircraft. President asked about Marshall’s trip and I told him; he seemed surprised and wanted to know when it was decided; Marshall returning via Australia.

Wednesday, December 9, 1943 [Foggia to Bari to Foggia, Italy]

Foggia hard hit by bombs, debris all over the streets. Station and railroad yards a mess, with machine shop a pile of junk machinery and masonry. Italian people seem satisfied and in this section have plenty to eat. Left house at 9:00, took off at 9:30, landed Bari at 10:15. The harbor filled with sunken ships. a. Navy (British) had ships in outer harbor moored side to side with ammunition ship in center. b. Warning service did not work [when city was bombed]. US Army Air Force Beaufighters [?] stood on ground with crews in place while British controller endeavored to get RAF airmen [to take off?].

Called on General Alexander and discussed Cairo and Tehran conferences. Visited Fifteenth Air Force Headquarters and had war situation explained.

Took off for Foggia at 12:20, landed 1:00, lunch, took off at 2:25, landed at terminal at 3:00.

Visited several groups including 57th, El Alamein to Tunis group. Decorated several officers and enlisted men, one Seth
Cook’s son. Met the Commanding Officer, 99th Squadron and talked with him. Back to Foggia in B-25, landed 5:15, dinner. Discussed with Spaatz, Doolittle, House, Cannon, O’Donnell, implications of Cairo, Tehran conferences and what it means to them. Hank went around with me.

Thursday, December 10, 1943 [Foggia and other locations in Italy]

Left Casa Spaatz 8:45, took off from Foggia airport at 9:10. Flew across the plains and then mountains. Some mountains 9,000’ are covered with snow down to 4,000’. The plains and valleys are all cultivated so that there should be an abundance of green food. Plenty of space for airdromes around Foggia; also many new airfields being built.

Vesuvius, with its smoke first seen above clouds as we approach Naples, then the town situated on the hills. The airport is grass-covered, no hard surfaced runways. The buildings around the airport are a wreck. Impossible to say what was done by bombing and what by German demolitions. Hundred or more wrecked planes, the result of our bombing around the field. The railroad station and cars on the sidings a shambles, never saw such wrecks, some cars blown a hundred feet or more from the tracks. The city itself not much hurt by bombs, just here and there near the railroad a wrecked building or a hole from a stray bomb. The Italian people are not starving. They probably need bread and flour but not much else. In Naples, Bari, or Foggia they seemed to be in a daze, are neither glad nor resentful of Americans being here.

Caserta: we went to our billet in the King of Naples’ palace, built over a hundred years ago, a building as large as Munitions Building. The gardens have a vista cut through the woods, a cascade of water coming down the hill in the distance and then pool after pool and fountains between. Statues in the gardens and among the trees. The King was so pleased that he decorated the architect and honored him in many ways. Then came the dawn: a Royal Visitor commented on the similarity in appearance to Versailles. The architect was stripped of his medals and thrown in the clink. In any event that is where we are living.
We called on Clark and talked war a few minutes, then visited House’s Headquarters. Had lunch with him. Took off after lunch and visited the 47th Group, 324th Fighter Group; decorated several officers. Talked with as many as I could. Then back to the Palace for a while before going to dinner with Clark. It took 36 years to build this Palace, but only 18 months to build the Pentagon.

Friday, December 11, 1943 [Caserta, Italy]

A bare, lonesome place is a Palace: my bedroom, 50’ x 25’; my bath 25’ by 15’; one light hanging from the center of bedroom. Modern battle: jeeps and mud, trucks and tanks, more mud, trucks and road jams, bridges and culverts blown out by bombs and demolitions of the Germans. Bomb holes, mine holes, railroad ties cut in two by German heavy ploughs pulled by locomotives. Villages and towns demolished, partly demolished. Destruction and devastation everywhere, mud and more mud. Trees cut down by explosives to block the road.

Hospitals, field and evacuation, ambulances, operating room, removing bomb and shell splinters from the soldier’s head, pulling a mangled hand together, tying a body together after a shell fragment tore loose a hip and almost all of a buttock, wounds in the abdomen, holes in back and abdomen the size of a football, blood, transfusions, a scared Moroccan who refuses to have a tube put into a distended stomach to relieve suffering. Hands, legs, shoulders separately and together in plaster casts to rebuild broken and shattered bodies. Nurses doing their part, working overtime, smiling. Patients gritting their teeth and saying: “I’m feeling fine.” All in tents with mud, mud, and more mud. The doctors working night and day, taking it all in their stride. A man with only half his innards dying but still smiling and saying: “I’m all right.” All this, but a few feet from the road, Naples to Rome. Guns: AA, 105, 155, 75, 8”, barking at the Germans on a hill just beyond. Aircraft fighting overhead. Whistling shells going overhead with their loud bangs as they explode. Bombs and shells bursting on the German positions a scant 1,800 yards away. Men crouching behind walls in the mud, tents under bushes and trees. Wet feet, shoes muddy and wet, never dry; trench feet. More
whistling shells and their deafening explosives and our guns barking. AA guns opening up [against] FW 190’s and [Me] 109’s overhead. Spitfires coming into the fight, bridges out, infantrymen crouching behind any kind of cover. German observers watching our movement up the road from the hill beyond. A tank blown to bits from running over a mine, five bodies lying in small pieces on the ground. Civilians, men and women, clinging to desolated and despoiled houses, and mud, mud, mud. The Germans over on the hill watching us, perhaps wondering who could be so foolish to come up there. Such was the view I had of the war in Italy, 60 miles north of Naples when our troops were meeting the Germans and wresting one mountain after another from them.

[Accompanied by] Clark, Spaatz, Cannon, O’Donnell, Hank. Mud, trucks, traffic jams. Back to 34th Division headquarters. Walker, Jeff Keyes, Lucas, lunch, after reviewing the situation, a good lunch. [Took] puddle jumpers back to Naples, over Capua of Sparta’s fame. Reviewed buildings, old forts, modern trenches and strong points, fox holes, bomb craters, but no sign of the amphitheater. Naples harbor, ruins, ruins, ships on their sides, on their backs, with only funnels and masts showing. Docks destroyed, railroad tracks, cranes torn apart, wrecks towed, pushed, shoved away so that today 20,000 tons of shipping are unloaded each day.

[Sailed in] 45 minutes by boat to Capri. No signs of war: sunshine, Villas, hotels, flowers, cheerful Italians, blue water, Naples and Vesuvius in the distance. Peace, freedom from worry, rest, in a Villa the size of a hotel; built and owned by a contractor who fled to Rome and is now there.

Saturday, December 12, 1943 [Capri to Naples, Italy, to Tunis, Tunisia, to Marrakesh, Morocco]

Eisenhower and Tedder. Discussed: organization and command; Spaatz’ Strategic Air Force, and later Ike’s American Air Force Commander; Eaker to Mediterranean to replace Tedder as Commander, Allied Air Forces; Doolittle to 8th, Cannon to 12th, Twining to 15th, Royce to Deputy to Administrative Executive. No other changes in personnel.154

Lunch with Tedder and Mrs. Tedder, Dr. Zuckerman, Larry Norstad. Decided to go on through to Marrakesh and bypass Algiers. Pete showed up with plane, got out of mud at Naples with bulldozer. Tunis, sunshine, no clouds, warm weather. Met Kuter and turned Wildman over to him. Took off at 2:20 P.M., head winds all the way, intermittent clouds, landed Marrakesh, 9:00 P.M. Billeted in same villa that I stayed in last February.156

Sunday, December 13, 1943 [Marrakesh, Morocco to Dakar, Senegal en route to Belem, Brazil]

Took off Marrakesh 9:30. Wanted to return via Azores but weather was against me. Landing at Azores is at present a gamble. There is but one runway and the weather sometimes is atrocious; the wind whips up, goes across the strip, makes landing impossible. Bryan in the President’s aerial yacht flew there and made two passes, almost wrecked his plane and returned here, eventually returned via Belem. That storm has been there now for 3 days, the weather man says it will be there for at least 2 more. Perhaps I would save time by waiting for a change in weather, perhaps not. In any event, we must build up a landing field and do it quickly that will permit of all direction landing.157

Hence on to Dakar. It was very pleasant stopping off at the Taylor villa, now taken over by the ATC and to date is none the worse for wear. French much more in appearance now than during my last visit. Of course the flying school we opened for them helped.158 French cavalry on Arabian horses, beautiful horses of all colors, French Moroccans, Arabs, camels, delightful climate.

On to Dakar, arrived 4:10 P.M. Dakar, a French colony. Natives in rags, thin, scrawny, infected with many kinds of disease, natives who will always live in poverty. Dakar still showing signs of the fear of invasion. Barbed wire, trenches, pillboxes all set up
to keep the British and Americans out. The only visible means of carrying on any trade is peanuts; peanuts by the ton, peanut oil, beer made from peanuts. A grand harbor with boats, but not much to ship. A railroad to St. Louis, the head of the French province, but the entire area is infested with malaria, everyone seems to have it. Horses are poor. The native section of the city is clean. The French colony seems fairly well off. The town not much to offer from a scenic point of view. No special wares produced by the natives for the tourists. The airfield crammed full of planes from Natal with more enroute; 100 at Natal, 20 enroute across the Atlantic, over 50 at Dakar, 50 at Marrakesh, the pipeline is full. Hundreds of young pilots awaiting clearance for the Mediterranean or Britain.

Dinner with Colonel Peck, who comes from St. Jo [St Joseph], Missouri. Took off at 9:00; distance to Belem 2,400 miles. Went to bed at 9:00 and slept fitfully.

Monday, December 14, 1943 [Belem, Brazil to Borinquen Field, Puerto Rico]

[Slept] until 7:00 A.M. Dakar time, 4:00 Belem time. Took my turn at the wheel and landed at Belem at 10:08, that was 7:08 Belem time. Argonaut II made an excellent trip as did its predecessor. Bob Walsh met us. Post looks better each trip. Had a bath, shave and breakfast. Took off for Borinquen at 8:30, arrived Borinquen 6:25. Weather good, no untoward incidents.

Tuesday, December 15, 1943 [Borinquen Field, Puerto Rico to Washington, D.C.]

Took off 8:15, arrived Washington 4:25 P.M. Argonaut II covered 22,000 miles quite handily.

Postscript

A significant result to the AAF of the Cairo and Tehran conferences was the change that ensued in the leadership of overseas units. As stated earlier in this chapter, the CCS, over strong British objections, had approved on 7 December the creation of USSTAF to coordinate the US strategic air effort in
the European theater. In approving it, the combined chiefs asked Arnold to “hear the views” of Eisenhower, Tedder, and Wilson concerning the new organization. As his diary reflected, Hap lost no time in discussing the matter with them, meeting with Wilson and Tedder at lunch immediately following the approval and with Eisenhower the following day. There seems to have been little doubt in Arnold’s mind that Spaatz would be the USSTAF commander, since this had been discussed earlier with him in Washington and his name as CG was included in the draft that was discussed on board the Iowa. Also, the president had included Spaatz in the dinner party in Tunis on 20 November, enabling Roosevelt to assess the airman whom he had not known. With Spaatz departing the Mediterranean theater for England, it became necessary to replace him with a senior experienced American airman since the British General Wilson was to be the theater commander. It is not possible to determine when or by whom the final mosaic of American air commanders resulting from Spaatz’ departure was conceived. As Arnold’s diary reflected, Eisenhower during an 8 December meeting with Hap on Sicily had “agreed that Spaatz was [the] man for job, wouldn’t take anyone else.” Although both Spaatz’ and Eaker’s biographers identified Spaatz as the author of all these changes, it seems likely that they were discussed by Arnold and Spaatz before becoming the topic of conversation at dinner on the night of 9 December.

The new alignment of American airmen would send Eaker to the Mediterranean as air commander in chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, with General Doolittle replacing Eaker at the Eighth. Brereton would remain as CG, Ninth, while Lt Gen John Cannon would become commander of Twelfth and Maj Gen Nathan F. Twining was to become CG of the Fifteenth, the latter two air forces to be under Eaker’s command. The delay in informing Eaker of his reassignment is not readily explained except that Arnold, as of 9 December, had not discussed the changes in full with Eisenhower. This was done in Hap’s two-hour meeting on 12 December during his stop in Tunis, which probably was made for that reason. Arnold continued home from there, arriving in Washington three days
later on 15 December. It was not until 18 December, the second day after Arnold returned to his Pentagon desk, that Eaker was informed of his reassignment. Arnold had been in touch with Eaker through other cables that week, informing him of his wife Ruth Eaker’s progress in battling pneumonia. It is not unreasonable to speculate that Arnold held off informing Eaker of his reassignment until his wife’s condition had improved. Nevertheless, Eaker would refer years later to his learning of his new command as the “darkest hour” of his career.

Eaker’s biographer has speculated that had Arnold been “thoughtful or considerate enough to send a personal letter” informing Eaker of the change, the Eighth commander would have accepted it without demurrer. Instead, deeply hurt, Eaker took it as a dismissal and made every effort to prevent its implementation ("dig in his heels" in the words of his biographer), particularly since Arnold’s 18 December notification had indicated that this was “tentative.” Eaker then contacted Arnold, Jacob L. Devers, John G. Winant, Portal, Eisenhower, and Spaatz, seeking assistance in reversing the planned action. None proved successful and, four days after Eaker was informed of the change, the Army Adjutant General cabled him that orders had been issued with the new assignment effective 1 January, ending any thought that the reassignment was still tentative. Although deeply affected by the action, Eaker cabled Arnold the next day that he would comply with the issued orders.

The contretemps was not finished, however. On returning from his trip to Australia, traveling the long way home after the Cairo conferences, Marshall saw the issue from a different perspective. The impression he drew was that Eisenhower, now departing the Mediterranean for England as the Overlord commander, was going to “gut” the leadership of the southern headquarters, leaving a “most complex situation to be handled by General Wilson” since he was taking Spaatz, Doolittle, Beedle Smith, and Tedder with him. Additionally, Marshall went on to decry the “selfish” and nonobjective “pressure” of Tedder and Spaatz “to move Eaker to the Mediterranean because to me he did not appear at all particularly suited for
that theater.” Spaatz’ biographer has speculated that Hap “seemed to have created the impression that not he, but Spaatz and Tedder, wanted Eaker ousted.” Spaatz himself, in the midst of this, confided to his diary that Arnold “has not stated them [the change of command decisions] firmly to Marshall but has thrown it all into the lap of Eisenhower.” However, Spaatz appeared to contradict himself in his own diary in which he wrote, on 9 December, that he had recommended Eaker be sent to the Mediterranean.

There seems little doubt that Arnold had coordinated the changes with the chief of staff, most probably before Marshall left the second Cairo conference for his trip to Australia. While Arnold may well have tried to shift any blame to others, he would have stressed Eaker’s suitability for the Mediterranean assignment based on his success in working with the British at the highest levels, including Churchill, Sinclair, Portal, and Harris. Such an argument would have been a strong point in securing Marshall’s agreement. Even before Marshall’s 23 December cable was sent to Ike, the chief of staff had discussed the problem with Arnold earlier that day, which makes it difficult to understand Marshall’s comment about Eaker not being suited for that theater. Additionally, Marshall was well aware of Arnold’s dissatisfaction with the progress of the Eighth and hence would not have been surprised at a suggested change of command involving Eaker. Ike responded on Christmas Day to Marshall that Eaker’s transfer had been suggested “from time to time” but was specifically proposed by Arnold and Spaatz in Sicily on 8 December. Eisenhower continued, saying Eaker was “completely acceptable to me” but he was only “accommodating Arnold and Spaatz.” He went on, in what could have been considered a crucial point favoring Spaatz over Eaker in preparing for Overlord, that he was anxious to have officers “experienced in the air support of ground troops,” since this was a technique “not widely understood.” Otherwise, this would result in a commander “forever fighting with those air officers who, regardless of the ground situation, want to send big bombers on missions that have nothing to do with the critical effort.” Ike responded to Eaker that same day, insisting that he would have been “delighted” to have him but orders had already been issued. He added that it would
have been a waste to have “both you and Spaatz in England” since we “do not have enough top men to concentrate them.”

The furor died on 28 December when Marshall, seemingly content with Ike’s responses, cabled Eisenhower that he was “agreeable to Eaker to the Mediterranean.” Eaker remained in London to share his knowledge of the Eighth with Spaatz and Doolittle before departing for Italy and his new assignment.

In examining the reassignment from the perspective of the three major players, Arnold, Spaatz, and Eaker, a common thread is that all three were intensely dedicated, professional airmen intent only on winning the war, preferably through a strong air effort. A second factor is that the close friendship of the three of them went back at least 20 years when Arnold was briefly in command at Rockwell Field. They knew each other’s families and there is little doubt that their closest prewar association in the military was with each other. This made the actions all the more difficult when Eaker was replaced (albeit not directly in the Eighth but to USSTAF) by Spaatz, all directed by their third close friend Arnold in the Pentagon.

Eaker was clearly disturbed over the manner in which the reassignment was handled; but finesse, as Eaker knew, was not Arnold’s style. More important, it had to have been heartwrenching, as Arnold had to have appreciated, for Eaker to lose command of an organization that he had supervised and nurtured, and for which he had directed progress for almost two years. There was little compensation in the fact that he was now to have command of two air forces rather than just the Eighth. Particularly was this true when it appeared that most of the serious teething troubles were behind the Eighth with an increasing number of aircraft and crews arriving, effective depot maintenance established, and a large supply of long-range fighters on the horizon. Was Eaker naive not to have realized, as Spaatz’ biographer has phrased it, that he was “on slippery turf” with Arnold? The increasingly difficult tone of their correspondence over the past year should have raised the possibility of relief or reassignment to Eaker, particularly knowing Arnold’s impetuosity and near obsession that the Eighth success was to be the validation of strategic bombing and a postwar AAF. Arnold’s action in
relieving others was no secret to the leadership of the AAF. This had already been demonstrated with Swede Harms in Newfoundland, Jim Chaney first in England and then in New York, and Davenport Johnson in Colorado Springs. Add to that list the most effective B-26 Group commander in the Eighth and Arnold’s pressure on Eaker to relieve his Bomber and Fighter command leaders. Still ahead was the relief of Haywood S. “Possum” Hansell Jr. Yet Eaker could not be faulted; he had done his best and had built an excellent record with the Eighth, given its many problems. But for Arnold, these efforts were not enough and the opportunity to have an experienced American airman in command of the air in that theater was not to be missed. The official AAF history, written while Arnold was still alive, was at best naive in suggesting, “If Arnold’s dissatisfaction over the rate of Eighth Air Force operations entered into the decision [to relieve/reassign Eaker], the record apparently has left no evidence of it.” The sentence might well have been written, more accurately, as “Arnold’s dissatisfaction over the Eighth Air Force was the primary reason for the decision.”¹⁸¹ Some of the ill feelings that resulted from his assignment appeared to have disappeared by 13 April when Arnold sent warm birthday greetings to Eaker.¹⁸²

There is not the slightest hint that Spaatz acted in any way other than what he considered best for the air force. He, along with Eaker, shared Arnold’s hopes for the success and increased role of strategic bombardment, and he had compiled an enviable record commanding both strategic and tactical operations. His personality and some of his habits, such as his fondness for poker, had puzzled Eisenhower, but Arnold’s noting that Ike “wouldn’t take anyone else, not even Tedder,” for the USSTAF job was accurate.¹⁸³ Neither Spaatz nor Eaker had any doubts as to their ability to work together in England, but Spaatz was perceptive in noting, as Eisenhower agreed, that probably one of them would be wasted there, given the need for a seasoned, respected airman in the Mediterranean. Spaatz had experienced no problems in working with the British military, but he no doubt had already begun to share Arnold’s dislike of Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the RAF airman designated as the tactical air commander for Overlord.¹⁸⁴
Knowing of British opposition to USSTAF and any extension of its control to RAF Bomber Command, Spaatz may have felt that his approach, less tactful than Eaker’s, might have given the AAF a better chance of achieving a single Allied strategic air command and having USSTAF remain free of Leigh-Mallory’s command. He also may have speculated that he might have better success than Eaker in achieving US air goals in the preparation and execution of Overlord, given his rapport with Eisenhower.

It is interesting to assess Arnold’s actions in this. In simplest terms, it seems easy to agree with Spaatz’ biographer that Arnold “seized on the command shuffle stemming from the Cairo and Tehran conferences to cloak a decision he had probably already reached.” It could be added, however, given Tooey’s diary entries, that Arnold found it very convenient to accept the suggestion made by Spaatz that Eaker be reassigned to the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, Arnold would have conceded that he as CG AAF was responsible for the decisions. Eaker also knew Arnold’s impetuous nature better than any other airman except Spaatz. As a result, he was aware that Arnold had been unyielding as well as unfair in refusing to concede the impact of the many legitimate factors limiting the Eighth’s operations. Arnold instead preferred to charge these difficulties to Eaker’s lack of imagination and aggressiveness. Arnold’s letter to Spaatz, presumably written in February during “Big Week,” is important in explaining more of Arnold’s reasoning. As Hap wrote, his reason behind the creation of USSTAF was unity of AAF command in Britain and Italy. He continued that an additional important motive was his “desire to build an American Air Commander to a high position prior to the defeat of Germany” that would be “parallel” to Bomber Command and Eisenhower’s.

If you do not remain in a position parallel with Harris, the war will certainly be won by the RAF, if anybody. Already the spectacular effectiveness of their devastation... has placed their contribution in the popular mind at so high a plane that I am having the greatest difficulty in keeping your achievement (far less spectacular to the public) in its proper role not only in publications, but unfortunately in military and naval circles and, in fact, with the President himself. Therefore, considering only the aspect of a proper American share in credit for suc-
cess in the air war, I feel we must have a high air commander some place in Europe. Today you can be that commander.\textsuperscript{186}

The recognition of USSTAF at Cairo and the reassignment of Eaker were part of Arnold’s continuing struggle for the success as well as the recognition of the US strategic air offensive. An important result of the second meeting in Cairo that was to have considerable impact on the AAF was the agreement by the CCS at their 6 December meeting that a “strategic bombing force will be established in Guam, Tinian, and Saipan for strategic bombing of Japan proper.” Optimistically, it was anticipated that Allied control over the Marianas would be achieved by October 1944 with B-29s operating from them by December. The agreement on operations in the Central Pacific has been assessed by one historian as an agreement between Admiral King and Arnold, each seeking “the same physical objective, although for entirely different reasons. The King-Arnold alliance provided the impetus needed to break the impasse on strategic planning in the Pacific,” resulting in the 6 December agreement. Security considerations dictated that Hap not commit this information to the diary.\textsuperscript{187}

On a personal note, Hap learned while on this trip that negotiations for the ranch he wanted to buy had been completed. He now owned a ranch just outside Sonoma, California. From this point on, Arnold would involve himself with the property. He traveled there shortly after returning from this trip and visited it en route to the Pacific in June 1945. He anticipated retirement there and a life of leisure once the war was over.\textsuperscript{188}

His health was apparently not a major factor during this 35-day journey since he made no mention of it in his diary. He had the benefit of medical attention during the sea voyage and while at the three diplomatic conferences. Also, his stops en route home were in locations near American medical facilities. His omitting any mention of his health in the diary was good news in view of the two heart attacks he had experienced during the first five months of the year.

Other problems that had concerned him as recently as a year ago now seemed resolved, foremost among them aircraft production and distribution (other than the B-29). Three days before they departed on this trip, Arnold furnished the chief of
staff some revealing data on the production and distribution of heavy bombers, which to Arnold remained the main instrument for winning the air war from bases in the UK. Of 916 heavy bombers delivered to the AAF during October 1943, more than 42 percent went to the AAF in the UK. In the next overseas distribution, 14 percent went to North Africa, with other overseas locations, including the Pacific, India, and China, receiving a total of 13 percent of the heavies. The remaining 30 percent were retained in the US for training purposes, with 271 or more than 28 percent going to the Second Air Force and the Training Command, the two agencies most heavily involved in training the bomber crews. In a very different allocation from two years earlier, the British received only 37 of them, roughly 4 percent. This distribution reflected the continuing emphasis on the strategic bombing offensive, from operations in the UK to US organizations training aircrews.  

Given the feverish preparations for Overlord, the changes in AAF leadership in England and Italy did not bring any respite from Arnold’s insistence on increased activity by the Eighth Air Force. Spaatz became subjected to almost as intense badgering as Eaker had been.

Notes

3. FRUS CT, 326, 334.
4. Ibid., 757, 787–89.
5. Ibid., 681–86; Diary of Gen Henry H. Arnold, 4 December 1943, Henry Harley Arnold Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Marshall’s diplomatic comment about a commander, clearly meaning Portal, being “loath to release any forces” was a nice way of summarizing the loss of power that creation of USSTAF presaged for the British airman. Under its adopted provisions, Portal would remain “responsible” for “coordination” of all strategic operations. However the USSTAF commander, under Portal’s “direction,” would determine priorities for targets, “techniques and tactics employed,” and be “authorized to move units of Eighth and Fifteenth . . . between theaters.” Appreciating that Spaatz as
of Eighth and Fifteenth . . . between theaters.” Appreciating that Spaatz as USSTAF commander would be less diplomatic and probably more forceful than another potential USSTAF commander, Portal could appreciate that his actual power, no matter what the directive said, would be lessened under the new structure. See also FRUS CT, 788–89.

6. FRUS CT, 757; and Arnold Diary, 7 December 1943.


11. Arnold Diary, 1 December 1943.

12. FRUS CT, 576–85.


14. Sloop, commissioned as USS Delphine in 1921, now used as Admiral King’s flagship.

15. A relatively extensive log of people, times, places, movements and meetings (without coverage of the substantive issues of the discussions) of the group, including the president, from their departure from Washington on 11 November throughout most of the journey, was prepared by Lt Jg William M. Ridgon, USN. From Washington to Cairo is covered in FRUS CT, 270–90; while in Cairo, the events of 22–26 November are at 293–300; en route Cairo to Tehran and meetings at Tehran, 27 November–2 December, at 459–74; Tehran to Cairo and Second Cairo Conference, 21–27 December, at 655–61. An account of the return of the president from Cairo to Washington is printed in US Department of State Bulletin 9, 11 December 1943, 410–12.

16. Capt Austin K. Doyle, USN, specific assignment unknown.

17. US battleship, Iowa class, commissioned August 1942.

18. Vice Adm Charles M. “Savvy” Cooke, USN, chief of staff to Admiral King; Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy, USA, OPD, War Department; Rear Adm Bernard H. Bieri, USN, assistant chief of staff, Plans, Office of CNO; Brig Gen Laurence S. Kuter, AC/AS Plans and Combat Operations, AAF Headquarters; Brig Gen Haywood S. Hansell, assistant CG, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, (COSSAC); Rear Adm Oscar C. Badger, USN, assistant CNO for Logistics and Plans; Col Emmett O’Donnell, chief, Advisory Council, AAF Headquarters; Brig Gen Frank N. Roberts, USA, Strategy Section, OPD; Capt Edmund W. Burrough, USN, Strategic Planning Committee, JCS; Col William W. Bessell Jr., USA, Strategy Section, OPD; Col Joseph Smith, USA, Joint War Plans Committee, JCS; Capt Forrest B. Royal, USN, secretary, JCS; Maj William W. Chapman, USA, assistant deputy secretary, JCS; Capt William L. Freseman, USN, Office of the CNO; Cmdr Victor D. Long, USN, aide to Admiral King.
19. The president’s log lists the ship as 888 feet in length with 210,000 horsepower. FRUS CT, 277.

20. Neither Lafferty or Brumby is otherwise identified. At the Battle of Eastern Solomons in September 1942, Arnold’s son-in-law, Ernest M. Snowden, had served as a lieutenant commander leading VS-72 on board the USS Wasp; at the battle of Gilbert Islands, November-December 1942 he commanded VB-16 on board the USS Lexington and by the Philippine Sea engagement of June 1944, as a commander, was the skipper of Air Group 16 on board the USS Lexington.

21. *Stage Door Canteen* was movie released in 1943 with many movie personalities, including Bette Davis. The story centered around the World War II serviceman’s canteen founded by show business people in New York.

22. Marshall had conferred with Churchill and his staff in Algiers from 29 May to 3 June 1943. This is an example of the United States and Britain being separated by a common language.

23. Rear Adm Wilson R. Brown, USN, Naval Aide to the President.

24. Recently released *Sweet Rosie O'Grady*, with Betty Grable, Robert Young, and Adolph Menjou, was the story of a Brooklyn, New York, girl who became a society entertainer in Britain.

25. This 1943 version with Claude Rains and Susanna Foster was the account of a disfigured composer who took a pretty singer as his protégé and roamed the sewers of Paris.

26. Assuming that he bet on his alma mater, Arnold lost since Navy defeated Army 17-0 in their annual football game on 27 November.

27. The torpedo had been fired accidentally, much to the embarrassment of Admiral King and the other naval officers on board the *Iowa*, from the USS *William D. Porter*, a destroyer of the Fletcher class, commissioned in 1943. See the account in Thomas B. Buell, *Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King* (Boston: Little Brown, 1980), 419–21 and the president’s log, FRUS CT, 279–80.

28. In view of the discussions that had taken place immediately before embarking and later concerning a Supreme Commander responsible for all European operations (Eisenhower was named as the Overlord commander on 7 December 1943) it was logical that there should have been a consideration of one commander for strategic daylight AAF and night RAF bombing. Although Arnold correctly predicted RAF opposition to such an arrangement, the CCS approved on 7 December 1943 at the second Cairo meeting, the creation of a US Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF), not an overall commander for both US and British operations. The British paper opposing the change appears in FRUS CT, 432–35; a discussion of the issue by the CCS is in 682–86; the coordinated position and a draft of the governing directive appears in 787–89 and acceptance by the CCS is on 757. As a result Spaatz became USSTAF commander in January 1944 along with other staff changes.

29. Gen Sir Henry Maitland “Jumbo” Wilson of the British Army, as a result of decisions made on 5 December 1943 during the Second Cairo
Conference assumed the position of Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater in January 1944.

30. This was a newly released comedy with Olivia DeHavilland, Robert Cummings, Charles Coburn, and Jane Wyman. The movie concerned an airplane pilot who assisted and fell in love with a lady passenger in distress who was revealed as an exiled princess.

31. The items Arnold listed were among but were not all of those considered at this 2 p.m. JCS meeting with the president. Among the other issues discussed were Balkans-Eastern Mediterranean strategy, command of Overlord, the Strategic Air Forces in Europe and the Mediterranean, Rome as an open city, the nature of the Italian government replacing Benito Mussolini, trusteeship of Pacific islands, issues from the recent Foreign Ministers Moscow conference and civil affairs in recently liberated countries. See the account in FRUS CT, 194–99.

32. These islands were famed as wildlife preserves and the site of Charles Darwin’s research, approximately 650 miles west of and controlled by Ecuador. The AAF had maintained a communications station there as early as 6 May 1942 and the US Navy operated an air base there.

33. This item concerned the armament of the Free French forces. The agreement was for support to be furnished only for those units that would be used by the supreme commander in the invasion of France. Churchill, in a telegram of 10 November to FDR had expressed concern over de Gaulle’s power in a postwar France. In these discussions, while concerned that de Gaulle might use the proposed Allied-equipped divisions to “enhance his own position,” the JCS agreed to delay resolution of the issue until they talked with Eisenhower at their upcoming meeting. FRUS CT, 174, 194–95.

34. The references were to Chiang Kai-shek and Josef Stalin, both of whom would be in attendance at separate meetings on this trip. The meetings were held individually primarily at the insistence of the Russians who at the time were not at war with Japan, China’s enemy. The planners on board drafted three different agendas for the first meeting of Roosevelt with Chiang Kai-shek and for later meetings with Churchill and Stalin. They are referenced in FRUS CT, 198–99, reproduced in 245–47. Apparently they were submitted to FDR without JCS consideration. The agendas were discussed further at the 19 November meeting of 2:00 P.M. with the president and are printed in FRUS CT, 257–61.

35. This reference is not clear.

36. Called The Russian Story, this was a recent propaganda film portraying Russian valor in wartime, emphasizing their then current struggle, so the Russian-made film said, “for freedom.”

37. No photo has been located and the reasons for inclusion of this entry are not clear.

38. The reference is to Lt Gen George Brett, formerly MacArthur’s air commander. Upon his relief from this assignment, primarily because of MacArthur’s lack of confidence in him, he was reassigned as CG of the Caribbean Defense Command where he spent the remainder of the war.
Arnold does not reveal anywhere in his correspondence his opinion of Brett, but his assignment to a less than viable war theater and his retention there throughout the remainder of the war are revealing. Arnold mentioned the adage in his memoirs without identifying Brett as the object of the comment. Arnold, Global Mission, 456. The quote is attributed to Frederick the Great. It is not clear what prompted this entry unless he had discussed it with Marshall during this trip. The relatively undemanding days at sea permitted Arnold the luxury of including this comment as well as the next paragraph. For a brief assessment of the MacArthur-Brett relationship, see Thomas E. Griffith Jr., MacArthur’s Airman: General George C. Kenney and the war in the Southwest Pacific (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 49–56.

39. Marshall had accompanied General Pershing as his aide during most of January 1919.

40. Roosevelt, alarmed at a United Press dispatch of 13 November from Cairo which pointed to “conversations [of] great portent” to be held at nearby Mena House, cabled Churchill through Eisenhower on this date proposing the meeting site be changed to Khartoum. Eisenhower responded from Malta the next day, recommending retaining the original location of Cairo but suggested considering using Malta as an alternative if necessary. Churchill concurred in a separate communication that same day, stating that Khartoum was not feasible. FDR agreed on 19 November to proceed to Cairo as originally planned. The communications are printed in FRUS CT, 87–99.

41. This was a movie released in 1943 with Lucille Ball, June Allyson, and Gloria DeHaven based on the George Abbott musical about the problem of a high school prom queen being shunted aside by a flashy, mature film star. The song “Buckle Down Winsocki” was prominent in the film.

42. The eight position papers bearing this date on board the Iowa probably furnished the basis of discussions at this meeting. The most important issue to Arnold was his proposal for the creation of a US Strategic Air Forces in Europe with Lt Gen Carl Spaatz as commanding general. The idea would be discussed several times with the British in the upcoming meetings who eventually but reluctantly agreed to it on 7 December 1943 at the second Cairo meeting. Other topics dealt with an estimate of the enemy in Europe as well as the Far East; also Russian and Chinese capabilities and intentions as well as operations to defeat Germany. Papers are in FRUS CT, 210–43.

43. The Madiera are Portuguese islands in the Atlantic 400 miles west of Morocco.

44. FRUS CT does not record the substance of this meeting.

45. Light cruiser, Brooklyn class, commissioned November 1936.

46. The main topics at this meeting included command in the Mediterranean theater, spheres of influence in postwar Germany, and agendas for meetings with Churchill, Stalin, and Chiang Kai-shek. See FRUS CT, 248–61.
47. This was Adm John H. D. Cunningham, RN, commander in chief, Allied Fleet in the Mediterranean. His flagship was the HMS *Warspite*, battleship, *Queen Elizabeth* class, commissioned in 1913.

48. Mers-el-Kebir, port, northwest Algeria on the Gulf of Oran, six miles west of Oran, scene of destruction in July 1940 of much of the French fleet by the British to prevent it falling into German hands.

49. The president’s log showed that he was met, inter alia, by Adm John H. D. Cunningham of the Royal Navy, but also by US Navy Vice Adm Henry K. Hewitt, the latter serving as Commander, US Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters. Lt Col Frank McCarthy, USA, continued as Gen Marshall’s aide. See FRUS CT, 285.

50. The American leadership flew in four different C-54s for safety and security reasons.

51. Pancho Villa was a Mexican revolutionary whose exploits in northern Mexico and southerwestern United States led to Gen John J. Pershing’s abortive expeditions against him in 1916–1917. Villa had become known for his disdain of military discipline, dress, and procedures, hence the comparison was not meant to be complimentary.

52. Kasserine Pass is a two-mile-wide gap in the Grand Dorsal section of the Atlas Mountains in central Tunisia, scene of heavy fighting in February 1943.

53. See Arnold’s diary for 25 January 1943.

54. Arnold’s oldest son Hank was serving as an artillery officer with the 45th Division.

55. Arnold viewed some of the very few remains of the city of Carthage, located near the present-day city of Tunis.

56. Col George C. MacDonald, chief of Intelligence, Northwest African Air Force; Commodore R. M. Dick, RN, chief of staff to the commander in chief, Allied Naval Forces Mediterranean; Air Vice Marshal Sir J. M. Robb, RAF, Deputy to Tedder; Brig Gen Edward P. Curtiss, chief of staff, North African Air Force. The villa was in La Marsa, suburban Tunis.

57. Brig Gen Lauris Norstad was assistant chief of staff for Operations for the Northwest African Air Force and would become director of Operations for the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces in December.

58. Interestingly enough the 90th Photographic (Reconnaissance) Wing, a new unit to be commanded by Col Elliott Roosevelt, was activated two days later at La Marsa, Tunisia, the site of Spaatz’ headquarters.

59. Arnold’s pilot continued to be Col Clair A. Peterson.

60. In view of Arnold’s recommendation endorsed by the JCS that Spaatz command the proposed combined strategic air forces in Europe, FDR used this occasion to evaluate the aviator whom FDR had not known previously.

61. Bengasi, a city and port in Libya, was the departure point for the B-24s that attacked Ploesti on 1 August 1943. Sollum is a city and gulf, western Egypt, scene of considerable fighting and change from British to German control in 1941 and 1942. El Alamein was a railway station, 60 miles west of Alexandria, Egypt, scene of decisive British defeat of the Germans in
October-November 1942, ensuring Egypt would not fall to German forces, and the beginning of the Axis retreat to Tunisia. Arnold’s pilots had been instructed to fly at a comparatively low altitude to give their passengers an excellent view of the recent battle environment. Pogue, 303.


63. Maj Gen Patrick J. Hurley, USA, had been working since early November in Chungking, China, to complete the protocol for Chiang Kai-shek’s forthcoming meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill. His report to the president from Cairo, dated 20 November, is printed in FRUS CT, 263–65. Now a major general, George E. Stratemeyer had been, since June 1943, CG of the India Burma Sector and Air Advisor to the CG, CBI Theater, Lt Gen Joseph W. Stilwell.

64. See descriptions of Mena house in the papers of James Parton, Harvard University Library; Arthur Bryant, *Triumph in the West: A History of the War Years Based on the Diaries of Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1959), 50.

65. The printed account of the conference shows the meeting to have taken place at 11 A.M. and records only the remarks of Ambassadors Winant and Harriman. The former provided his assessment of the “state of mind of the British with respect to the current situation.” Harriman followed with “his view of the present attitude of the Soviets.” They are printed in FRUS CT, 301–3, 327–29.

66. Maj Gen Raymond A. Wheeler, USA, chief, Services of Supply, CBI.

67. John J. McCloy, assistant US Secretary of War.

68. Procedural matters, together with adoption of a 6 November 1943 “Basic Policies for the next US-British Staff Conference,” seem to have been the major items of business here. See FRUS CT, 157–58, 304–7.

69. The meeting continued until 11:10 P.M. Curiously, no detailed minutes appear to have survived this gathering but those who have commented on it emphasized that the main topic was Mountbatten’s explaining his planning and requirements for the forthcoming Burma campaign. The brief mention of the meeting in FRUS CT, 308, questions whether Chiang Kai-shek was present. See also FRUS CT, 294.

70. President Roosevelt’s quarters were in the villa of the US Ambassador to Egypt, Alexander C. Kirk, and logically termed the White House by the participants and the press. There is a brief description of it in FRUS CT, 293–94. At this meeting, where at least 27 people were present, Mountbatten outlined many of the specifics covered at the 9 P.M. session of the previous night. See the account in FRUS CT, 311–15.


72. This meeting, which began at 2:30 P.M., included six senior Chinese officers who attended the latter part of the discussions and covered several
topics. Among them were China’s role in the defeat of Japan, future operations of the Southeast Asia Command, and the current strategic situation. See FRUS CT, 316–22.

73. In addition to the JCS, 23 others were listed as present where the bulk of the reported discussions concerned Ambassador Harriman and General Deane offering their recommendations on procedures and topics for the forthcoming meeting with the Soviets. See FRUS CT, 326–29.

74. In the first part of this meeting, discussion centered on the Mediterranean theater, its relationship to Overlord, and Russian plans beyond Overlord. Other topics included the role of Turkey, aid to Yugoslav partisans, and the logistics relationship between the fighting in Italy and preparing for Overlord. Command relationships in Europe were also a topic. See FRUS CT, 329–34.

75. The question of whether to include Russian and Chinese representatives at CCS meetings resulted in no structural change for the present except that representatives from these two Allies could be invited to attend CCS meetings when “their own problems were being discussed.” They also considered possible topics that might arise with the Russians at Tehran. Major discussions continued regarding Southeast Asian operations, for which Chinese representatives were brought into the meeting. See FRUS CT, 335–45.

76. Cary Grant appeared along with Laraine Day and Charles Bickford in this 1943 film about a professional gambler.

77. In his memoirs, Arnold conveys an impression different from that of having been one of the world’s three most silent people. He recalled that he and FDR talked about the “single commander” for Europe, with Arnold preferring Marshall, as well as tonnage over the Hump into China. Arnold, Global Mission, 462–63.

78. Arnold covers Ike’s appearance briefly in Global Mission, 463.

79. The problems here involved Chiang’s request for more aircraft and tonnage over the Hump. Differences were significant enough for Admiral Mountbatten to attempt to get written agreement from Chiang Kai-shek regarding the Burma campaign projected for 1944. See FRUS CT, 346–49.

80. The movie was Billy Wilder’s Major and the Minor in which Ginger Rogers’ role was that of a female impersonator.

81. In Global Mission, 463–64, Arnold wrote that as a result of these discussions it was “decided that to employ our equipment with greatest effectiveness there must be some closely knit organization,” and “everything should be under Mountbatten.”

82. Arnold applied the term “localitis” to the thinking of the Generalissimo as well as others who concentrated on their own problems to the ignoring or detriment of other worldwide tactical and strategic considerations. At this meeting the Generalissimo demanded “a fixed tonnage of 10,000 tons per month” regardless of any demands levied on the Hump aircraft for support of the Southeast Asia Command. At the end of the meeting he appeared to understand that the AAF would attempt to secure “the great-
est possible increase in tonnage.” FRUS CT, 354–55; and Stilwell Papers, 246–47.

83. Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke and General Marshall were the main participants in a heated exchange (called by Brooke’s biographer “the father and mother of a row”) provoked when the former suggested abandoning the proposed invasion of the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal. The British proposed concentrating the resources instead in the Aegean-Eastern Mediterranean for an attack on the island of Rhodes. It was during a meeting over this issue that Marshall stated, “not one American soldier is going to die on that goddamned beach.” The account in FRUS CT, 358–65 provides only a hint of the acrimony involved. FDR, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek resolved the issue for the time being in favor of continuing to plan for the Andaman invasion, codenamed Buccaneer. Bryant, 307; and Pogue, 307. In the first part of the meeting General Eisenhower briefed the CCS on the fighting in Italy and its implications for Overlord. General Wilson brought the CCS up to date on the Middle East after which Eisenhower, Wilson and the members of their staff left the meeting. FRUS CT, 359–63.

84. An early 1943 release starring Van Johnson as the beleaguered reconstruction-era President. Entitled Tennessee Johnson, it also featured Lionel Barrymore and Majorie Main.

85. These were narrow, fast, lateen-rigged vessels common to the Mediterranean environment.

86. Gen Shang Chen, director, Foreign Affairs Bureau, Chinese General Staff. Document in question was the account of Arnold’s meeting with the Generalissimo the previous day and printed in FRUS CT, 354–55 and cited in note 83 above.

87. Beersheba in southern Palestine, now Israel, is the principal city of the Negev desert. The Dead Sea on the Israel-Jordan border at almost 1,300 feet below sea level is the lowest point on earth. As they had in the trip from Tunis to Cairo, the pilots flew low to give their passengers a better view of the countryside. Pogue, 309.

88. Admiral King asked General Arnold if their plane could detour for a view of the city and they circled Tehran at 6,000 feet for a few minutes before landing. They landed at Caleh Morgeh, the Russian airfield in the city. American, British, and Russian troops were stationed there to aid in moving lend-lease supplies through Iran to Russia. Arnold covers the flight in Global Mission, 465; see also Ernest Joseph King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (New York: W. W. Norton, 1952), 513.

89. The Elburz Mountains are visible to the north of Tehran, with 19,000 foot-high Demarent peak, less than 50 miles northeast of the city.

90. FRUS CT, 476–82, recorded that the meeting began at 11:30 and continued until 1:00 P.M. The bulk of the discussion ranged over continuing operations in the Eastern Mediterranean versus carrying out the promise to Chiang Kai-shek of Buccaneer operations in the Andaman Islands. The shortage of landing craft continued to be a major problem in determining the
strategy to be followed. Pogue explained that FDR “reviewed the US strategic position with his advisors.” Pogue, 309.

91. Gurkhas are a race of Rajput Hindus, noted for their warlike characteristics, who settled in the province of Gurkha, Nepal, in the eighteenth century and soon became dominant in the area. Forty battalions of Gurkha troops served with the British Armies during World War II.


93. At 1:00 P.M., when the session with the president ended, FDR indicated that no meeting was planned for the afternoon. At lunch with Stalin and Churchill, the schedule was changed to call for a formal session at 4:00 P.M. By then, Marshall and Arnold had begun their sightseeing tour north into the mountains. Marshall’s account is in Pogue, George C. Marshall, Organizer of Victory, 310; and Arnold’s in Global Mission, 465.

94. FDR met at 3:00 P.M. alone (except for interpreters) for a short time with Stalin and, at 4:00 P.M., briefly with Molotov. Elliott Roosevelt has commented briefly on the latter meeting, of which no other account exists. During the former with the Soviet leader, several topics were discussed including fighting on the Soviet fronts but much of the recorded conversations dealt with France, General de Gaulle, and postwar colonial possessions. The 4:00 P.M. first plenary meeting with FDR, Churchill, Stalin, the CCS, and four Russians was presided over by FDR and proved to be a very important session. Churchill very ably presented his arguments for pushing for the capture of Rome, inducing the Turks to enter the war and continued British-American operations in the eastern Mediterranean, even at the risk of delaying Overlord for two to three months. His most clever ploy was that neither he nor the president could “make any decision until they knew the Soviet views on the subject[s].” Stalin response was unequivocal in that he “questioned the wisdom of dispersing allied forces,” insisting on the need for Overlord and Anvil, and emphasizing the need for both of these promised invasions of France. The Soviet leader further predicted correctly that Turkey would not enter the war in spite of any inducements and stated that once Germany was defeated Russian reinforcements could be sent to Siberia “and then we shall be able by our common front to beat Japan.” The accounts of all the meetings are in FRUS CT, 482–508. See also Bryant, 61–63.

95. The reference is to Maj Gen Donald H. Connolly, USA, CG, Persian Service Command and an old friend of Harry Hopkins. A US State Department official, otherwise unidentified, also accompanied them.

96. It is not clear why Arnold met with this group instead of attending the Tripartite Military meeting that took place at 10:30 and lasted for three hours that morning. The five major participants at the latter included Leahy, Marshall, Brooke and Portal plus Voroshilov of the USSR. The discussions
centered on logistics, Overlord, and airpower. Not only does Arnold’s absence seem significant but Admiral King was not present. See the account of the Tripartite Military meeting in FRUS CT, 514–28; Pogue, George C. Marshall, Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945, 311–12; and Bryant, 63–75.

97. This long meeting opened with Brooke and Marshall briefly recounting what had been discussed that morning at the Tripartite Military meeting. The bulk of the deliberations that followed, however, were a repeat of the strategy arguments raised at the first plenary session. Churchill continued to argue for continued operations in Italy, the taking of Rhodes, and urging Turkey to enter the war. Stalin’s response to Churchill’s request to hear the Soviet leader’s views on general strategy had to have been disappointing to the Prime Minister. The Soviet leader again labeled operations in the Mediterranean “as only diversions” and insisted that Overlord could not “be considered as really in progress” until a supreme commander and a specific date for its execution were established. Stalin posed a question that had to have been on the minds of many Americans present, including Arnold, when he asked Churchill whether “the British really believe in OVERLORD” or were they only saying so to reassure the Russians. Any hope by Churchill that he could gain Russian support or even understanding of expanded Mediterranean operations as a means of drawing German forces from the Eastern Front were clearly dashed by this meeting. The account appears in FRUS CT, 533–52. Arnold, in a discussion with Stalin, possibly in conjunction with this meeting, offered to provide “additional American bombers in return for permission to use Soviet bases for shuttle bombing.” Arnold, Global Mission, 466–67; and FRUS CT, 533, note 2.


99. This was the formal two-year report on the AAF to be submitted to the president by Arnold and a draft of this document was brought to him from Washington for his approval by Captain Newhouse, a WAC officer assigned to General Marshall’s staff.

100. The chiefs agreed in this 45-minute gathering, clearly influenced by what had happened in the Big Three meeting of the previous afternoon, on continuing the advance in Italy, to plan that an operation in southern France for the same time as Overlord, and on informing Stalin that Overlord would be launched in May. See FRUS CT, 555–64; Pogue, George C. Marshall, Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945, 313–14; and Bryant, 65–66.

101. Brooke reported to Stalin of the morning agreement by the CCS to launch Overlord in May along with a “supporting operation in southern France,” which became Anvil and, later, Dragoon. Stalin promised a simultaneous Russian offensive in the East. FDR announced that an appointment of a supreme commander for Overlord would be made within three or four days after he and Churchill returned to Cairo for further deliberations. FRUS CT, 576–78; Pogue, George C. Marshall, Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945, 314–16; and Bryant, 65–67.
102. Stalin’s language was a continuation of his scathing remarks at dinner the previous evening where, according to Charles Bohlen who was interpreting, Stalin “lost no opportunity to . . . dig at Churchill” and “every remark . . . addressed to the Prime Minister contained some sharp edge.” FRUS CT, 553; and Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945, 313. Bryant ignored Stalin’s remarks about Churchill; Bryant, 67–70.

103. The medal is the Order of Lenin.

104. The P-63 Kingcobra, Bell Aircraft Corporation’s single-seat, low-wing, cantilever monoplane was an enlarged version of the earlier P-39. Of the 3,273 P-63s accepted by the AAF during the war, “at its peak inventory in August 1944,” the AAF possessed only 339, with the Soviet Union having received the vast bulk of those delivered to the AAF. See Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 6, Men and Planes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 211.

105. A written account by Arnold of this dinner held in the British legation along with a seating chart is in Arnold Papers. See also FRUS CT, 582–85, and Bryant, 67–70. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945, 316, covers the dinner briefly.

106. Under construction since 1932, the pipeline had been completed in January 1935, linking Haifa, Palestine, with the oilfields at Kirkuk in northeastern Iraq.

107. The visit to Jerusalem as guests of the British chiefs of staff was intended to repay the hospitality of the American chiefs when the British had been entertained in May 1943 with a trip to Williamsburg, Virginia, during the second Washington conference. Arnold flew to Palestine from Tehran in an RAF aircraft in order to assess the airplane and observe their procedures.

108. Otherwise unidentified British officer. At least one of the American chiefs felt that their escort officers had been carefully handpicked and schooled in not only the history of Jerusalem and Palestine but in the current political problems of the area. Arnold’s “thank you” note to his escort, Captain Kirker, was not able to be delivered to that officer and still remains in the Arnold Papers. See King and Whitehill, 521–22.

109. The King David hotel is a noted luxury hostelry dating from 1930, just west of the Old City where they were billeted. Mount of Olives is a ridge just east of Jerusalem; in the Christian faith, accepted by most as the scene of Jesus’ ascension.

110. The reference is to the Emperor Hadrian who destroyed much of the city in 135 AD.

111. Arnold’s information was not quite correct. Constantine I or Constantine the Great, after his conversion to Christianity in 326 AD, gave orders to locate the sites of Jesus’ tomb and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. His mother, Helena, later canonized, is reputed to have been divinely guided in discovering the remnants of the crosses on which Jesus and the two thieves were crucified.
112. Several New Testament references write of Jesus curing the crippled or palsied. This one is his admonition to “rise, take up thy bed and walk” in John 5: 8-9. The incident took place in the pool in the sheep market in Bethesda in the northeast section, probably under the Crusader’s Church of St. Anne’s near St. Stephen’s Gate. The site where Pilate stood is now thought to be occupied by an Arab school on the south side of the Dolorosa in the Old City. The route Jesus traveled is thought to have been along this same street.

113. The tomb in which the body of Jesus was laid after crucifixion and the site of his death are both said to be marked by the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Constantine had two churches erected on this site, one over the tomb and the second over the site where his mother, Helena, reputedly found the crosses. They were destroyed in 614 AD. The present church dates from the basilica erected by the Crusaders.

114. Although Arnold’s face was less familiar than some of the other American wartime leaders, such as Roosevelt and Marshall, illustrated articles about him and the AAF had appeared at least four times in the previous 18 months in *Time* magazine. He had also appeared on the cover of that publication in the 22 June 1942 issue.

115. Although Arnold is not specific, these locations were probably viewed during the flight from Tehran to Lydda airport, 30 miles northwest of Jerusalem. The logical route would have had the plane flying over Damascus, Syria, then possibly between the Sea of Galilee and the ports of Acre and Haifa, then south-southeast over the river Jordan to the Dead Sea just east of Jerusalem, and then over Jerusalem before landing west-northwest of the city.

116. The current wall surrounding the Old City dates from the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (Ottoman Sultan, 1520–1566 AD). The city is divided into four sectors, the northeast being Muslim, northwest Christian, southwest Armenian, and southeast Jewish. Omar Ibn Al-Khattab, second of the Mohammedan caliphs (c. 581–644 AD), is said to have built the Mosque of Omar, also known as the Dome of the Rock. It has significance for several faiths, being thought in the Christian religion to be the site where Abraham prepared to sacrifice his son Isaac. The followers of Islam believe that Mohammed ascended to heaven from this site. Nothing is extant of the Temple of David; its site is subject to varying interpretations.

117. The present Wailing Wall, running north and south along the western edge of the Dome of the Rock, is thought to be the only possible remains of Solomon’s Temple. The Garden of Gethsemane is an enclosed piece of ground to which Jesus and his disciples withdrew on the eve of his crucifixion. It is on the lower slope of the Mount of Olives, east of Kidron.

118. Designated LV 633 and named Ascalon, it was one of the few Lancaster bombers converted for very important person (VIP) use by British officials. The new fuselage gave the craft twice the cubic capacity of the normal Lancaster. It was powered by four Bristol Hercules engines. This type was used as a commercial transport by the British after World War II.
119. Brig Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, deputy chief of the Air Staff in Washington, took with him Maj Gen Fred Anderson, deputy commander for Operations, Eighth Air Force. As he indicated, Arnold continued to be disappointed with what he considered the less than satisfactory success of the Eighth Air Force. This would lead in part to Ira Eaker’s relief as commander of the Eighth and reassignment to the Mediterranean within the month.

120. Occupied with the current fighting in New Guinea, MacArthur did not accept the invitation to attend the conference but instead sent his Chief of Staff, Lt Gen Richard K. Sutherland, USA, to brief conferees on specifics of MacArthur’s plans to move north into the Philippines. No written account appears extant concerning other matters discussed here.

121. Churchill’s obsession with operations in the eastern Mediterranean transcended his interest in the proposed Overlord cross-Channel invasion and that of southern France (Anvil). The British felt there was no need to implement the commitment made to Chiang Kai-shek to undertake operations across the Bay of Bengal and in the Andaman Islands area. The limited number of landing craft available and the Soviet promise to enter the war against Japan once Germany was defeated contributed heavily to the prime minister’s perspective. Instead, Churchill proposed use of the craft in the eastern Mediterranean—at the expense, thought the Americans, of support for Overlord and Anvil. As a result, much of the discussion at the JCS and CCS over the next two days dealt with these problems. The announcement, made on this date, that the president planned on leaving at least by Sunday (three days later) evoked considerable criticism of the Americans by Brooke. In his diary, he complained that the US (for whom he little admiration) “had completely upset the whole meeting . . . before we had settled any points with them.” He continued, “it all looks like some of the worst sharp practice that I have seen for some time.” Much of the day’s meeting was in closed session precluding a full account in FRUS CT, where a brief record appears in 675–81. The problem of the conflicting commitments was resolved by FDR “caving in” on 5 December to the repeated British argument that the promise to Chiang Kai-shek and the Andamans, made less than two weeks earlier, be abandoned. From then on, discussions and agreements followed smoothly. Final approval is reflected in Arnold’s diary entry for 6 December. Discussion of the topics at this meeting was continued the next day in the CCS meeting, which began at 11:00. See entry for 4 December below. The Brooke quotes appear in Bryant, 72.

122. The 11:00 a.m. CCS meeting discussed the problems caused by the shortage of landing craft inhibiting the ability of the Allies to launch operations against France as well as the Andamans and northern Burma. Also affected would be British hopes for further operations in the eastern Mediterranean. According to Brooke: “We made no progress.” Bryant, 73; and FRUS CT, 675-81.

123. The discussion centered on Portal’s opposition to Arnold’s proposal to vest command of only the US Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces in the new organization to be called US Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF). Portal continued
to oppose creation of the new command that would be authorized at the CCS meeting of 7 December. FRUS CT 757. In the interchange, Arnold's continuing disappointment with the progress of the Eighth Air Force was again outlined. Other topics considered were Southeast Asia and postwar responsibilities in Germany. In comparing this long CCS meeting with the earlier 11:00 A.M. one, Brooke complained: “We did not get very much further.” Bryant, 79. See FRUS CT, 681–90.

124. If the reference was to a movie, it could have been the musical of that title released in 1943 with Betty Grable, George Montgomery, Cesar Romero, Charles Winniger, and Phil Silvers, set in the New York amusement park at the turn of the century. More likely, given Arnold's habit of specifically identifying the movies and the limited time available following dinner at 8:00 along with the strain of a long day of important meetings, the reference was probably to a popular card game of that name.

125. Negotiations had just been completed to purchase a small ranch in Sonoma, California, 40 miles north of San Francisco, where Arnold retired in 1947. Jack Warner, the Hollywood producer, advanced money for this purchase.

126. No account exists of the JCS meeting at 9 A.M. At all three CCS meetings of this day, the main topic continued to be operation Buccaneer in the Andamans and its impact on the shortage of landing craft, operations in the Mediterranean, and the planned invasions of France. Other issues were considered only briefly. See the printed accounts in FRUS CT, 699–711; 719–25; and Bryant, 74–76.

127. The president had convened the JCS to inform them that he had agreed reluctantly to abandon the Andaman project. As FDR explained the next day, “The British just won’t do the operation and I can’t get them to agree to it.” There is the hint that FDR's acceding to the British arguments on canceling Buccaneer was a quid pro quo for Churchill's agreement at Tehran to setting a date and naming a supreme commander for Overlord as well as supporting the planned Anvil landing in southern France. Gilbert appears to agree as he wrote: “With ‘ANVIL’ now set, at Britain's insistence to replace ‘BUCCANEER.’” Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill*, vol. 7, *Road to Victory, 1941–1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), 595. Also see FRUS CT, 725–26.

128. This was a musical farce released that year, with Charles Coburn, Jean Arthur, and Joel McCrea, regarding the shortage of hotel rooms in wartime Washington.

129. The CCS discussed war in Asia, particularly changed conditions brought about by cancellation of Buccaneer. They delayed discussion of control of strategic air forces in Europe until the next day. Importantly they approved the draft of their report for presentation to FDR and Churchill that evening. See FRUS CT, 735–38.

130. The delay was caused when Roosevelt and Churchill, with the British Prime Minister taking the lead, met with President Inonu of Turkey and his staff in an unsuccessful effort to get them to enter the war.
131. The meeting lasted less than 40 minutes. Now that FDR had “caved in” and Churchill had succeeded in having the Andaman Islands operation abandoned, the prime minister described the report as a “masterly survey” and “in accordance with the principles of war.” FRUS CT, 749.

132. Since the surrender occurred on 8 May 1945, Portal made the closest estimate with Arnold and Brooke not far behind.

133. As indicated elsewhere, Wilson was approved as Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater. With Spaatz, at least in Arnold’s mind, now slated to leave for England to command what was to be USSTAF, the question was important in terms of an American air commander in the Mediterranean. The CCS meeting is covered in FRUS CT, 753–63.

134. Lord Leathers (Frederick James) was British Minister of War Transportation. Accounts of the dinner are in Arnold, Global Mission, 474; and Bryant, 77–78.

135. Probably Osmond J. Ritland, USA, rank and assignment unknown. No Anders appeared in the Army Register of this date. Logically it was not Lt Gen Wladislaw Anders, Corps Commander of the Polish Government in Exile troops then fighting on the Italian front whom Arnold would visit in Italy on 24 April 1945.

136. Payne Field, Cairo, billed then as one of the world’s largest airports, was dedicated 25 October 1943, by Maj Gen Ralph Royce, CG, US Forces in the Middle East. It had been rebuilt in 58 days from a former RAF reconnaissance base. It was named for Lt Col John Payne of Austin, Texas, killed January 1943 while on a mission with the Ninth Air Force.

137. Arnold probably visited the Musee Alaoui, located in the northwest environs of the city near the ancient palace called the Bardo, and known for its Carthaginian and Roman antiquities.

138. The discussion, confirmed with the Overlord commander, was on the leadership and operation of the new USSTAF to be established in England. This decision would eventually result in several personnel changes of AAF personnel mentioned below. It appears strange that Arnold does not devote more attention in the diary and in his memoirs to the decisions made at this second Cairo conference dealing with the strategic air offensive against Germany. Although it is barely mentioned in Global Mission, one result of the Casablanca meeting of January 1943 had been the issuance of the CCS 166/1/D of 21 January, which although it established priorities for strategic bombing of Germany by the US Eighth and RAF Bomber Command, “made no mention of the system of command under which the combined offensive was to be conducted.” No doubt the omission of specifics was intentional and the system as it evolved provided for control of US bomber operations to be in the hands of RAF Chief of Staff Portal acting as agent for the CCS. This direction of US bomber operations in Britain would be in the hands of the British as a “matter of command rather than agreement with US commanders,” whatever that phrase meant. Actual operations would be “the responsibility of US commanders to decide the technique and method to be employed.”
Following the Trident Conference in Washington in May 1943 (which Arnold did not attend due to hospitalization), a CCS directive had provided that RAF Bomber Command would be “designed as far as practicable to be complementary to the operations of the Eighth Air Force.” This appeared to presage less integration of the two forces and as a result a Combined Operational Planning Committee was established in Britain in June 1943. This body was an advisory rather than an executive one and contained representatives from the headquarters of both the American and British fighter and bomber commands. It was this cumbersome arrangement with no specific effective machinery for coordination that Arnold hoped to change when discussions were held on board the *Iowa* en route to Cairo. He later pushed for agreement at the sessions of the CCS, resulting in acceptance by the CCS on 7 December of the American plan for the establishment of USSTAF in Europe with General Spaatz in command as of 1 January 1944. This new structure eliminated Portal as the coordinating agent for the CCS of the daylight bombing effort (in large part explaining the British opposition to its creation throughout the discussions at these meetings) and resulted in personnel changes for senior AAF officers in the European theater, outlined below. The reference by Arnold here is to Spaatz being selected for the new position. The quotes are from the discussion in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, vol. 2, *Europe: Torch to Pointblank* (1949; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 306, 374.

139. This was an Italian town near the Adriatic, 80 miles northeast of Naples.

140. The house and its Italian owner are not otherwise identified. General Marshall had determined, upon reaching Cairo for the opening of the conference, to return via Australia and what he considered a necessary visit to MacArthur. His biographer indicates his plans were kept secret from the president since his previously planned trips had been changed by either Roosevelt or Churchill. Flying in the C-54 aircraft General Sutherland had used to travel to the second Cairo meeting above, Marshall landed briefly in Ceylon for fuel and, bypassing India, flew for 17 hours directly to Australia. He returned via Los Angeles and arrived home in Washington three days before Christmas. See the account in Pogue, *Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945*, 322–24.

141. Adriatic port in Italy, due east of Naples, where a raid only a week earlier had resulted in the loss of 17 ships. According to Eisenhower, it was “the greatest single loss from air action inflicted upon us during the entire period of Allied campaigning in the Mediterranean and in Europe.” Another raid would occur only 11 days later. Craven and Cate, vol. 2, 587–88; Dwight David Eisenhower, *The Eisenhower Diaries*, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), 204; Bryant, 85.

142. Relocated to Bari only eight days earlier.
143. 57th Fighter Group, equipped with the P-40 and commanded by Col Arthur G. Salisbury, had fought in North Africa and was now operating from Amendola, Italy. Seth Cook’s son is not otherwise identified.

144. The 99th Fighter Squadron, equipped with P-40 aircraft, was attached at the time to the 79th Fighter Group stationed at Foggia. The commanding officer of what was then essentially a Negro unit was Lt Col Benjamin O. Davis Jr.

145. The discussion covered personnel changes in the AAF resulting from Eisenhower’s selection as supreme commander and the creation of USSTAF in Europe under Spaatz. Details were discussed with Eisenhower and Tedder three days later, at which meeting tentative assignments were agreed upon. Maj Gen Edwin J. House was CG of Twelfth Air Service Command at Bari. See note 141 above and diary entry for 12 December.

146. Vesuvius is the active volcano southeast of Naples.

147. Caserta is an Italian town 20 miles north of Naples noted for its 803-foot-long palace built in the period 1754–1774 by the Italian architect, Luigi Vanvitelli, for the Bourbon King Charles III but not completed until his son Ferdinand IV came to the throne in 1774. Headquarters of the Mediterranean Allied Air Force was concentrated here by February 1944. The Munitions Building in Washington, located on Constitution Avenue, was the predecessor of the Pentagon prior to the latter’s completion in January 1943.

148. House’s Twelfth Air Service Command was at Bari. Lt Gen Mark W. Clark was CG, US Fifth Army. The A-20 equipped 47th Bombardment Group commanded by Col Malcolm Green Jr., was operating from Vinzenzo airfield, five miles due east of Naples. The 324th Fighter Group flew their P-40s under the command of Col Leonard C. Lydon from nearby Cercola airfield.

149. Most authorities disagree with Arnold’s dates. The palace was built during the period 1754–1774, a span of 20 years. The Pentagon was built in 16 months, from September 1941 to 15 January 1943.

150. The 34th Division was operating approximately 40 miles north of Naples at this time. Maj Gen John P. Lucas, USA, CG, US VI Corps.

151. Capua was taken during the Second Punic Wars by Hannibal but was recaptured by the Romans in 211 BC and became an important colony in their empire.

152. Capri is a small island in the Bay of Naples, just south of the city of Naples, where the AAF had established several rest facilities for their personnel.

153. No account exists of Arnold’s remarks but a Public Affairs AAF officer commented that the press conference “was a smashing success from the reporters’ viewpoint.” See Capt Jay Vessels to Colonel Westlake, 13 December 1943, Book 12-007, records of USAF Photographic Center, Washington, D.C.

154. The changes were: Spaatz from deputy CG of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces to CG of USSTAF; Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, RAF, went from Air commander in chief, Mediterranean, to deputy commander, SHAEF; Maj Gen James H. Doolittle from CG, Twelfth AF, to succeed Maj
Gen Ira Eaker as CG of the Eighth Air Force; Eaker to commander in chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces; Maj Gen John K. Cannon, deputy CG of the Allied Tactical Air Forces, to CG, Twelfth Air Force; Maj Gen Nathan F. Twining from CG, Thirteenth Air Force in the Pacific, to CG Fifteenth Air Force; and Maj Gen Ralph Royce went from CG, US Forces Middle East, to deputy CG, Ninth Air Force.

155. Professor Solly Zuckerman, a British professor of anatomy, became interested in the effects of bombing on the human body. He studied the attack on Pantelleria and became an advisor to the RAF on bombing efficacy and results. See his volume From Apes to Warlords (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1978).

156. Arnold stayed at the Taylor Villa in Marrakesh on 13 January 1943, but not February.

157. The issue of the United States use of the Azores was still being discussed by the CCS. See FRUS CT, 760 for the 7 December 1943 meeting.

158. Beginning in April 1943, the AAF began to operate flying schools for Free French pilots, primarily in the southeastern United States. An account is in Histories of Eastern Flying Training Command at Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell, AFB, Ala.

159. Senegal, port on the Atlantic, approximately 120 miles north-northeast of Dakar.


161. Arnold’s specially equipped B-17.

162. FRUS CT, 757; and Arnold Diary, 7–8 December 1943.

163. FRUS CT, 231–32, 287.

164. Arnold Diary, 8 December 1943.


166. Arnold Diary, 12 December 1943.

167. Arnold to Devers for Eaker, 18 December 1943, AP.


169. Quoted in Davis, 274.


171. Ibid., 337–39; and Davis, 275–77.


173. Eaker to Arnold, 24 December 1943, AP.


175. Davis, 277; and Diary of Gen Carl A. Spaatz, 9 December 1943, Carl A. Spaatz Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
176. MP, 202–3; and Marshall to Eisenhower, 23 December, received 24 December 1943, George C. Marshall Papers, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va., hereinafter referred to as MPMS.

177. Eisenhower to Marshall, 25 December 1943, MPMS.


179. MP, 210–11; and Marshall to Eisenhower, 28 December 1943, MPMS.

180. Davis, 273.

181. Craven and Cate, vol. 2, 750.

182. Parton, 391. As expected from a professional officer, Eaker exercised restraint in expressing his feelings in official correspondence over his reassignment. However, his aide, Capt James Parton, offered some insight into the impact of the change. As he wrote home seven weeks after his last letter, he apologized for the long interval which he said was a “direct result of the emotional and physical tumult incident to General Eaker’s reassignment.” He added, “it is tough to nurse a great project . . . only to leave [it] to someone else . . . under the circumstances Christmas was not very jolly.” Parton to family, 10 January 1944, James Parton Papers, Harvard University Library, Cambridge, Mass.

183. Arnold Diary, 8 December 1943.

184. See the letter, written two days before Arnold left Washington for Cairo, of Hap having “received” Leigh-Mallory and given “him the roughest treatment I have ever seen accorded a high ranking airman.” Arnold “accused RAF of being defense minded and completely lacking in any initiative or imagination.” Hansell to Eaker, 9 November 1943, Eaker Papers.

185. Davis, 279.

186. Arnold to Spaatz, c. 25 February 1944, AP.


188. AGWAR for AMSME (Giles to Arnold), No. 1174, 3 December 1943, AP. There appears to be an accompanying rough drawing in Arnold’s hand, done after receiving the news, showing the physical characteristics of the property.

189. Arnold to Marshall, 8 November 1943, AP.
Chapter 8

England, Normandy Beaches, Italy
8 June–21 June 1944

Introduction

This diary, covering Arnold's two-week trip in June 1944 with the JCS to England and the invasion beaches, had its origins as early as the 1942 American advocacy of an assault on the continent of northern Europe. The proposal for what became Overlord had emerged almost as soon as the United States entered the war but was delayed for several reasons, foremost among them the Allies' lack of power as was illustrated in the August 1942 debacle against Dieppe. As a consequence, strategic bombing became the most viable method of attacking the Germans, who held mastery of the continent throughout 1942 and 1943. Now in 1944, after finally gaining British support for a spring assault, preparations were underway for the Overlord invasion that would require air superiority over the beaches. Hap had been devoting much of his energy and the resources of the AAF towards providing the means of accomplishing that goal—including relieving one of his closest friends as commander of the Eighth Air Force. This unhappy event was followed by redoubled efforts on his part during the first part of 1944 towards the success of strategic bombing.

The assignment of new leadership to the AAF effort in England, with the transfer of Eaker to the Mediterranean and the arrival in Britain in early January 1944 of Spaatz and Doolittle, did little to change the imperatives from Arnold's standpoint. Hap's main concentration remained gaining air supremacy for Overlord through daylight strategic bombing. Even before Spaatz' arrival in England, Arnold's New Year message to him, Doolittle, and his other commanders worldwide was clear: "The time is short, the enemy's means are limited . . . our . . . air strengths greatly exceed" his. Continuing that airplanes were built and crews trained for "just one pur-
“pose,” he concluded, “This is my personal directive to you: DESTROY THE ENEMY AIR FORCES, IN ITS FACTORIES ON THE GROUND AND IN THE AIR.”1

It is naive to suggest, given the close association and friendship between Arnold, Spaatz, and Eaker, that Tooey Spaatz was not aware of Arnold’s unhappiness over the performance of the Eighth and the demands that would be made on him to improve the daylight bombing offensive. As Arnold informed his deputy, General Giles, during the first week of the new year, the planes and crews “are not utilized as fully and effectively as possible.” This had been caused by “excuses offered” for the “lack of firm endeavor and . . . coordination” along with insufficient attention given to reducing the time required to train newly arrived airmen. He asked Giles to “impress” on the new Eighth leadership the need to overcome “all obstacles” rather than “finding reasons for not using” the planes. Hap wanted the Eighth commanders to “attack their problem with the same determination expected of the crews in attacking their targets.”2

The change of command in England did not bring about any better weather. This uncontrollable variable, along with the still limited numbers of aircraft and qualified crews, continued to be among the most difficult problems faced by Spaatz and Doolittle throughout the remainder of the winter and much of early spring. If Arnold failed to appreciate these limitations on Eighth Air Force operations under Ira Eaker, there was little reason to expect him to understand their impact under the new commanders. Not surprisingly, Spaatz soon found himself subjected to the same prodding as Eaker. Hap’s 24 January letter began, “As you know I have been much concerned over the small number of bombers dispatched to destroy an important target.” He went on to question “why with the great number of airplanes available . . . we continue to send a boy to do a man’s job,” resulting in our seeming to be “pecking away at the German aircraft industry.”3 The day before Hap’s message, Spaatz appeared to have anticipated Arnold’s complaints. Tooey wrote that he intended to concentrate on the German Air Force with a “full-out” effort against fighter factories along with the “maximum destruction of the German air force in the air and on the ground.” Addressing one of Arnold’s main com-
plaints against Eaker, Spaatz wrote that he knew Hap would “become very impatient with me if this very large striking force spent most of its time on the ground.” Nevertheless, during January 1944, the first month under new leadership, the Eighth was able to launch daylight bombing missions against Germany on just nine days, with an average number of 597 bombers dispatched per raid.

Whether or not influenced by Arnold’s strong encouragement for greater action, several consecutive days of good weather over the continent allowed the Eighth to undertake, in conjunction with the Fifteenth and RAF Bomber Command, “Big Week,” the most extensive campaign yet against German aircraft production targets. Although Arnold had rhetorically asked Spaatz, on 24 January, “Can’t we, some day and not too far distant, send out a big number—and I mean a big number—of bombers to hit something in the nature of an aircraft factory and lay it flat?,” the project had been planned as early as October 1943 under Eaker’s leadership. Dubbed “Big Week” by the press, the six days of missions were directed primarily against German aircraft manufacturing targets from 20 February through 25 February. The Eighth averaged 722 heavies and 768 fighter aircraft dispatched, with a total loss of 147 heavies and 44 fighters. According to one recap of the effort, the United States Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF), which would have included Eighth heavies and mediums as well as Fifteenth aircraft, lost at least 266 bombers and 2,600 aircrew. The Eighth alone lost 299 bombers during the month of February.

The results of Big Week, however, were measured in broader terms than the numbers of aircraft committed, those lost, or enemy fighters and targets destroyed. Many students mark this effort as a watershed in the daylight campaign, and the official history has concluded that the “six February days had more effect in establishing the air superiority . . . than did the bombing of industrial plants.” From this point, the Luftwaffe, instead of mounting all-out opposition to Allied aircraft over their home territory, chose instead to dispatch only limited numbers, husbanding large forces opportunistically to attack unescorted units and strung-out formations. Other results included German reorganization of aircraft production and an even greater effort to
disperse their aircraft assembly plants. This latter action, while increasing German fighter production during the first six months of 1944, put considerable strain on a transportation system that later would provide major AAF targets. These missions also appear to have produced psychological results, as AAF leaders mounted their first major attack on Berlin within 10 days after Big Week ended. They gained confidence that their bombers could fly, preferably with escorts, to any part of Germany. Equally important were the statistics that the Eighth had dropped as much bomb tonnage in February as they had during their entire first year of operations with a loss rate of six percent, roughly the same as the RAF suffered in night attacks. This was proof, its defenders said, of daylight strategic bombing's viability and AAF's ability to compete with the RAF night raids. In a further comparison, the Eighth flew 5,400 more sorties and dropped 5,000 more tons of bombs than did the RAF during the month of February.10

In some ways, Spaatz' success in his first two months as commander of USSTAF, however deservedly laudable, represented the fruits of much of Eaker's labors since the beginning of the Eighth. Although bad weather remained a constant under both commanders, other factors changed appreciably in favor of the new leadership. The shipping bottleneck was now eased by Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic, permitting the arrival of men and equipment on a level not previously enjoyed. The shortage of AAF fighter aircraft was on its way to being resolved earlier when the first P-38 group entered the theater in mid-October 1943, followed by P-51s arriving in increasing numbers, particularly after January of 1944. Although the first external drop tanks were made of paper, the appearance in March of P-51s with metal tanks meant that the Mustangs were now capable of accompanying the bombers anywhere over Germany. The blind bombing technique based on the British-developed H2X was improved, and the number of AAF heavies with such equipment was increased to allow limited bombing through the seemingly ubiquitous clouds.11

The most important difference, however, between operations under Spaatz as contrasted with Eaker was a philosophical one that Tooey was able to adopt now that larger numbers of
aerial and crews were arriving. As Spaatz optimistically con-
ceded to Arnold in the first four weeks after his arrival, “we
now have sufficient force in this theater.” During Eaker’s
tenure, the lack of aircraft and trained crews had forced the
use of the fighters almost exclusively in an escort role. As
announced at an Eighth commanders’ meeting in September
1943, given the limited number of both escorts and bombers,
“fighters must escort the bombers whether they bring down
any German fighters or not.” When Spaatz assumed command
of USSTAF, the role of AAF fighters was changed to “meet the
enemy and destroy him rather than be content to keep him
away” from the bombers.

Spaatz now enjoyed the relative luxury of being able to use
the fighters in an offensive mode as well as the defensive one
in escorting bombers. Their increased range permitted them to
escort over all of Germany and, if not challenged by the Luft-
waffe in aerial combat, strafe and attack airfields and other
targets of opportunity on their way back to England. As Spaatz
wrote, fighter pilots are now briefed to “shoot up any moving
targets within Germany.” The effectiveness of this new capa-
bility was noted by Maj Gen Adolph Galland, leader of the Ger-
man fighter force in the West, who wrote convincingly of the
toll such tactics took on his fighter force. Spaatz also bene-
fiited from many other contributions his predecessor had made
during the formative period of the Eighth. Eaker had struggled
with devising, establishing, and refining procedures and
equipment for formation flying and bombing, escape and eva-
sion, and air sea rescue, in addition to the laborious and time-
consuming task of creating and maintaining an in-theater
training program for all new aircrews. The bulk of benefits
obtained from the efficient maintenance and repair depots,
which had begun under Eaker, accrued to Spaatz.

Even though Arnold was pleased with the attacks of Big
Week and the first AAF raid on Berlin on 6 March, he retained
his commitment to ensuring that sufficient assets continued
to flow to the Eighth. Learning from Spaatz in March that
there were 200 B-17s without crews and that 500 fighter pilots
were lacking, Arnold ordered his deputy to ensure that the
necessary pilots and crews were en route to England, charac-
teristically instructing that their move begin within the next 10 days. Equally as important was Hap’s concern over the lack of any machinery to govern the orderly flow of replacement crew members. As Hap emphasized, “we must not hamper his [Spaatz] operations due to shortage of personnel.”

Although philosophically there were significant differences between them, Arnold and Spaatz never lost sight of the limited time available to obtain air superiority as the invasion plans continued to develop. Spaatz continued to believe as late as two months before the invasion that Overlord was unnecessary and “highly dangerous.” He was concerned that German power would prevent the landings if the invading troops “had only the benefit of air power applied tactically for their immediate support.” Strategic airpower he felt, if properly applied and given the time, could force the surrender of Germany without the necessity of an invasion. Arnold on the other hand, from his vantage point in the Pentagon, had since abandoned any earlier belief that strategic airpower alone could negate an invasion of the continent. He has left no clear statement of his thinking in the spring of 1944 on the role of strategic bombing vis-à-vis the necessity for an invasion. However, he had to have appreciated the disparity between the continuing optimistic reports of his commanders in Europe about the present and forthcoming success of their efforts and the realistic timetable now established for implementing Overlord. On the other hand, Hap did not remain aloof, either before, during, or after Overlord, from the organizational arguments that Spaatz was engaged in on behalf of strategic versus tactical use of airpower and the question of command of air assets.

Given the increased flow of crews and planes, AAF problems in England in the spring of 1944 concerned the most effective organization and proper use of airpower to ensure success for Overlord. That is an oversimplification, of course, and the situation was further complicated by the personalities involved. Air Chief Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory of the RAF, never a favorite of any of the American leaders, had been designated at Casablanca as what became commander in chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Forces (AEAF). He was to exercise control over the
British 2d Tactical Air Force and the AAF Ninth, but he immodestly conceived his powers as including the Eighth and RAF Bomber Command as well. Air Marshal Harris of RAF Bomber Command already operated in a semiautonomous fashion, often bypassing Air Chief Portal and the Air Ministry while relying for support on his close rapport with Churchill. “Bomber” Harris had no intention of abandoning his freedom of action to a fellow RAF officer whose background was essentially limited to the tactical employment of airpower, primarily fighters.

Spaatz, aside from a clear dislike of Leigh-Mallory, believed that command of the AAF strategic forces could not be intelligently exercised by this British RAF officer with no experience in the strategic area. Leigh-Mallory argued that the critical battle for air superiority would be fought over the landing beaches and that air assets should be used to destroy the enemy’s lines of transportation and communication prior to the invasion. Spaatz dissented, insisting that the heavy bombers should be used strategically to destroy the German air force through attacks on its factories, oil production, and other targets the Third Reich considered valuable enough to defend with German fighters. As these fighters rose to the battle, they would be destroyed in the air by AAF’s increasingly numerous and able fighters. Spaatz felt that it would be too late to fight the Luftwaffe in air engagements over the invasion beaches. He insisted instead that the AAF’s strategic forces must have defeated the German fighters before Overlord was launched. Supported by Arnold, Spaatz also insisted that the Ninth AF medium bombers (under the control of Leigh-Mallory) assist the Eighth strategic efforts by diversionary raids, including attacks on German airfields. Soon after becoming USSTAF commander, Spaatz pressed the matter of deployment of the heavies and mediums. With Arnold’s backing, he got Portal to direct “maximum support” by Leigh-Mallory to the strategic offensive. Harris never abandoned his belief that the German will to carry on the struggle could be destroyed by area bombing of its population centers. Further, he believed that RAF Bomber Command’s methodology and aircraft did not allow them to provide major tactical support for the preinvasion raids.
The organizational problems were resolved when Eisenhower centralized all air operations under his deputy, the veteran RAF airman Arthur Tedder. These included Ike’s assuming “direction” on 14 April of the strategic AAF and RAF forces. Arnold had no problem with this arrangement, which Spaatz approved. Hap had been advocating this structure prior to Casablanca and had partially achieved it by centralizing control of AAF assets with the creation of USSTAF in December 1943. Arnold hoped this precedent could be used later to expand USSTAF, including RAF bombers under an American commander.\textsuperscript{18}

While discussions over organization were continuing and weather conditions were not improving, the Eighth in the first two months under new leadership saw progress towards the defeat of the German fighters. Greatly facilitating this progress were increased numbers of crews, planes, and H2X-equipped aircraft. In those months, the German force lost 30 percent of its pilots and had a 90 percent turnover of its aircraft. The Eighth lost 40 percent of its bombers, 190 fighter pilots, and 172 fighter aircraft in the same period.\textsuperscript{19} Although these were serious losses to both sides, the AAF was far better able than the Luftwaffe to replace them. The Germans had to compensate for the loss of experienced fighter pilots, and they needed to conserve aircraft to defend Germany proper rather than committing them to possible loss over an invasion battlefield.

The second major argument beginning in early February remained the optimum way to use air in support of the invasion. Leigh-Mallory, supported by British scholar Dr. Solly Zuckerman, emphasized what became known as the transportation plan. This called for the concentration of air assets, including the heavies operating out of England, against bridges and transportation facilities, assaulting the railroads, their marshaling yards and repair facilities as well as their rolling stock. Spaatz and Harris opposed the proposal, insisting that the AAF could deny oil to the German war machine and destroy its fighter manufacturing capability, thus ensuring air superiority over the invasion beaches. Harris’ Bomber Command would continue its attacks on German cities and the enemy’s will to fight. Eisenhower, after a protracted debate, agreed essentially on 26 March with the transportation plan while allowing some continuation of
the strategic aerial offensive—including Spaatz’ oil targets. Arnold had supported Spaatz in these discussions, even soliciting Marshall’s aid in persuading Ike to adopt Tooey Spaatz’ proposals. However, both Arnold and Marshall conceded Ike’s command prerogatives in determining the use of his air assets to support the invasion.20

The decisions being made during March on the command structure and the use of the strategic bombing forces did not deter the Eighth’s efforts, which continued to reflect the increasing numbers of planes and aircrews arriving in England. Statistically in their most productive month yet, AAF bombing missions were dispatched on 23 days, 14 of them against German targets including four against Berlin itself. Eight missions were flown against targets in France, and there were raids on both Germany and France on one other day. On five of those occasions, more than 700 heavies were dispatched with over 800 fighters accompanying them on each of seven days. The zenith in protection thus far was reached with a high of 960 fighters flying in escort on 27 March. This was not without cost, however, with the Eighth showing losses in March of more than 295 heavies and 156 fighters while 99 of the Fifteenth Air Force’s aircraft failed to return.21 A student of the German air force for this period has written that the Luftwaffe’s losses in that month were 511 pilots and more than 56 percent of their aircraft. An increasingly important difference was the continuing ability of the AAF to replace its losses in both aircrews and planes. However, for the American airmen flying those and later missions, including this editor, the retrospective assessment of the AAF official history that the “GAF was a defeated force” by the end of March 1944 seems unduly optimistic.22

The AAF strategic effort increased during April when 15 raids were launched during the month, 13 of them against German targets. In spite of Ike’s decision on the primacy of the transportation plan, the first attack on German transportation facilities by the heavies was not made until 21 April. The delay was occasioned in part by British concern over potential civilian fatalities of French workers in and around the transportation facilities. Arnold and Spaatz were disappointed that the
strategic emphasis against German oil and aircraft production targets was also vitiated by the priority accorded Crossbow raids, which were aimed at destroying the launching platforms and supply facilities for what became the unmanned missiles. The first of these were sent against England while Arnold was there during this trip.23 These activities resulted in the most US losses thus far in any given month—422 heavy bombers. However, the Eighth had 39 Groups of bombers operating by then, almost 1,900 aircraft producing a relatively low sortie loss rate of 3.6 percent. On the other hand, German air force losses continued to mount as 447 pilots or 20 percent of their total force, along with 43 percent of their fighters, were lost to the struggle in April.24

As the AAF buildup and seemingly successful offensive continued in the spring of 1944, several aspects of the bombing occupied Arnold. Always closely attuned to the importance of public relations, Hap shared Spaatz’ concern over the type of coverage as well as the resulting credit given to the aerial offensive in the press on both sides of the Atlantic. Since successful strategic bombing was to be an essential ingredient of the raison d’être for an independent land-based US air arm in the postwar period, the question as to who received credit for defeating Germany through the air was of considerable importance to Arnold, Spaatz, and other American airmen. Part of Spaatz’ objections to the transportation plan was based on the fact that AAF aircraft, given the need for daylight precision attacks that were not thought to be within the capability of the RAF heavies, would be required to be the main implementing force. Spaatz complained that while US bombers were diverted away from important strategic targets such as oil and aircraft manufacturing to transportation opportunities, RAF Bomber Command under Harris was “being allowed to get off scot-free. He’ll go on bombing Germany and will be given the chance of defeating her before the invasion while I am put under Leigh-Mallory’s command.”25

The issue of credit for bombing success was a complicated one. Many American leaders viewed the British press, although subject to wartime censorship, as tending to evaluate and publicize unfairly their opinion of the effectiveness of the air efforts, particularly in contrasting the RAF with the AAF. Arnold had
found hostility and disparagement of US daylight efforts by Peter Masefield in the *Sunday Times* as early as August 1942, even before the first mission of the Eighth had been flown.²⁶ Now, two years later, the numbers of US aircraft over Germany exceeded those of the RAF and the Eighth commander was concerned that the British press was intent on belittling and discrediting the Yank effort. Particularly was this suspected in the days immediately after the considerable publicity accorded the Eighth’s first raid against Berlin on 6 March.²⁷

If an anti-American bias existed on the part of the British press, it was not diminished by RAF official press releases. One such on 12 April 1944, while outlining correctly the increase in Luftwaffe strength over the winter, indicated that only the current bad weather had lessened German fighter opposition to the heavies, clearly appearing to denigrate the US battles against the FW 190s, Me 109s, and Germany’s production facilities. Legitimately concerned for the impact of such statements on his aircrews, Spaatz adroitly was able to get a copy of his protest of the British pronouncement to Churchill, writing that such discrediting comments could create a serious morale problem for his airmen and were “disastrous” to Anglo-American relations. The timing of the British press release was particularly ill-chosen, occurring on the day following the Eighth’s raid on German and Polish targets that resulted in the loss of 64 heavy AAF bombers.²⁸ To counteract this, no doubt with Arnold’s blessing, Spaatz worked with influential American foreign correspondents and the US Office of War Information to ensure that a more balanced but accurate account of the work of the Eighth was publicized.²⁹

In some ways, the AAF itself contributed to the unfavorable press accorded American exploits over European skies. In the earliest days of operations, conflicting claims by AAF gunners had resulted in inflated claims of enemy fighters destroyed. Also, AAF interpretations of strike photos often emphasized destruction of a targeted activity when in fact the target required only several weeks of reconstruction before resuming almost total operations. Arnold himself often made claims to the press that proved later to have been overly optimistic, such as his 18 October boast, “now we have got Schweinfurt.”³⁰
Arnold had expressed his frustration at the coverage of AAF versus RAF bombing almost as soon as Spaatz assumed command of USSTAF. In Washington Hap felt that the American public was gaining the “impression” through “banner headlines” that we are only partially destroying our targets and that the British are finishing the work which we have only started “and that we had left only half done.” No doubt this attitude, although expressed six months before the trip covered in this part of the diary was commenced, contributed to Hap’s disparagement of the RAF during the trip.31

Even the nuances of reporting the bombing offensive were being carefully considered; for example, Spaatz reported to Arnold that H2X bombing through clouds was not to be labeled “blind bombing” in press releases. Instead, such tactics should be identified euphemistically as “overcast bombing technique,” “bombing through the overcast,” or even “with navigational devices over clouds.” Additionally, efforts were being continued in the Eighth’s releases to “restrict” use of the word “raid.” As Spaatz explained the semantics, German attacks on London are “raids” but “our attacks against Germany” are “major battles that are phases in a campaign.”32

The RAF-AAF competition, in Arnold’s thinking, had been in evidence earlier when the USSTAF, at Arnold’s urging and in spite of RAF opposition, had been created in December 1943. Hap’s expressed purpose in its formation was to build “an American air Commander to a high position prior to the defeat of Germany”; he wanted the US air command to be parallel to RAF Bomber Command. As Arnold complained, even after the creation of USSTAF and Spaatz’ arrival in England to assume command, “If you [Spaatz] do not remain in a position parallel with Harris, the air war will certainly be won by the RAF if anybody.” Even more optimistically, Arnold felt that, given the larger size of the AAF in the UK, RAF Bomber Command should eventually become one of the units under Spaatz.33

Seeking even longer-lasting credit for the European strategic air offensive, Spaatz suggested to Arnold in early April 1944 that a survey be undertaken to determine the effectiveness of the bomber offensive. The idea struck an immediate favorable response from Hap, who termed it a “splendid idea,”
feeling that the findings could be of value in the air war against Japan. Two weeks later, Spaatz again raised the issue with Arnold, reporting rumors of other US government agencies contemplating a similar study. Tooeys proprietary interest in strategic bombing was reflected in his suggestion that it was necessary to take “immediate steps” and seek approval by the president, “otherwise we may find that some other organization has been authorized to do the job, and we will be left playing second fiddle.”

In two letters during the week of the Overlord invasion, Arnold outlined in some detail to Spaatz his current thinking about what was by then being called the Combined Bomber Offensive Survey. No doubt the product of much of the thinking of the Air Staff, Hap’s letters stressed that the proposed study should emphasize the “time factor and operational requirements . . . against Japan, leaving the question of important future AF doctrine in the background.” While requesting that the JCS have the AAF initiate the study, Hap conceded the possibility of US Navy and Army ground forces providing representation. Arnold further desired a “purely American Group,” calling for only coordination with the RAF in view of the differences between the British and the American methodology and aims in bombing. Several persons were suggested as possible chairmen of the study, among them the president of Harvard University. Arnold was careful in proposing that the study be submitted to him rather than Spaatz lest criticism be leveled at the USSTAF for conducting a critique of its own bombing. This assessment became the US Strategic Bombing Survey. The tone of Arnold’s communications in these days just prior to the invasion reflected a tempered optimism about success for the air phases of the forthcoming Overlord, brought about in large part in Hap’s mind by strategic bombing.

In the last month before D-Day, the USSTAF possessed 59 heavy bomb groups, 39 in the Eighth operating out of England and 20 with the Fifteenth in Italy. In aggregate, they contained more than 2,800 heavy bombers, a far cry from the 664 that Eaker possessed a year earlier. As the weather improved during May, the Eighth, which shared with the Ninth the pri-
mary responsibility for hitting invasion targets, was able to fly heavy bomber missions on 25 of its 31 days, the majority of them against rail, transportation, and launching sites in France and nearby German points. Eighth losses during the month numbered 308 heavies and 174 fighters—an acceptable figure, given the more than 17,000 heavy and 15,000 fighter sorties flown during May. These losses were caused not only by German fighters, but by flak, midair accidents, and ditching.37 The Luftwaffe continued to conserve its strength, generally mounting little or no fighter opposition when the Eighth's objectives were rail, transportation, or Crossbow targets. German fighters now responded in force only in defense of Berlin and synthetic oil refineries. This could reflect the attrition and possible weakening of their forces following attacks against their aircraft manufacturing plants, oil resources, and their fighter aircraft, both in the air and on the ground. However, it could also mean, as Spaatz speculated in the month before D-Day, that they were husbanding their fighters to control the air space over the invasion landings.38

Even though the intelligence services of the Allies, blessed with intercepts of some German communications, attempted to estimate the air opposition to be expected over the invasion beaches, neither Arnold nor Spaatz was overly optimistic about the prospects for D-Day. Six weeks before the invasion began, Arnold felt and Spaatz concurred, that a “great air battle” would occur during the first three or four days. Earlier, Eisenhower had put only a slightly better light on the prospects when he wrote, “At the very best we are going to have here lively air opposition.”39

The exact origins of the JCS plan to travel to England soon after the invasion was underway are not clear although the possibility had been discussed before D-Day. Most probably, they had considered the idea as soon as they learned of Churchill’s unsuccessful efforts to get Roosevelt to travel to England and observe the enterprise.40 As a Marshall biographer has written, the JCS rationalized their travel on the basis of being available in London to make any decisions necessary about the invasion; more understandably, they “now wanted to see their greatest assault in progress.”41 Hap and his colleagues had to have been
encouraged by the fall of Rome two days before D-Day with the good news continuing as the Normandy invasion proceeded slowly but successfully, the latter a significant triumph for the AAF in view of the lack of German air opposition.

Their routing and travel arrangements for the trip did not evoke any sense of urgency as they proceeded along a route familiar to Arnold, through Newfoundland and across the North Atlantic into Scotland, landing in Wales because of weather conditions which then dictated their proceeding to London by train. The eight days spent in England during Hap’s fourth World War II visit there was a welcome change from that of nine months earlier. He had discovered a variety of problems in 1943, many of them associated with a shortage of aircraft, crews, effective logistical support, and a lack of aggressive spirit.

Arnold’s first full day in England included a briefing at Eisenhower’s headquarters, a meeting of the CCS, and an afternoon discussion with Spaatz concerning the progress of the air war. At the end of the day, he and his companions had some time for relaxation, which included viewing the usual motion picture. Whatever his first impressions gained from the discussions of the progress of the invasion, Hap’s diary contrasted his pride in the accomplishments of the AAF with disparagement of the RAF. His second day in England was taken up with more briefings, CCS meetings, and proceeding to Churchill’s private train for dinner and preparations to visit the beachhead on the following day.

Hap understated as “one of the most interesting days yet” the events of 12 June when they crossed the Channel to the invasion areas. The fact that Churchill and the CCS, including Arnold, arrived in France so near to the fighting within six days after D-Day spoke volumes about the progress of the war and the dominance of Allied air cover. Hap recorded the excitement and confusion of the scene but, except for a brief visit to some of the wounded awaiting further treatment, he and his colleagues were spared a closer look at the human dimensions of the ground fighting. He seemed very impressed by what little he saw of the results of the air war and recorded that the few hours in France before flying back to England were enough to rekindle his anti-French sentiments.
The next day was more typical of events during this trip; there were meetings with the CCS and an almost obligatory visit by the CG AAF to “show the flag” at three operational Eighth Air Force units—heavy bomber, medium bomber, and fighter. There he noted that none of them appeared in need of anything and concluded, “what a change from my last visit.” The next two days brought routine discussions with the CCS and the American staffs, a return visit to Buckingham Palace, and a dinner with Prime Minister Churchill, King George VI, and the CCS at 10 Downing Street. On the day he left England, Arnold had meetings with Ike, Lovett, and Spaatz before he and Marshall traveled to Chequers for dinner with Churchill en route to the airport. The most interesting event of that day, however, was the crashing of a V-1 weapon near Hap’s lodgings in Sussex. The first of these had been fired against England three days earlier and the number sent against the greater London area would eventually total more than 2,300. He visited the site of the crash and noted with considerable interest many of its details, filing away much of the information for possible future use.

He and Marshall then flew to Italy. Their circuitous route of flight was explained by security considerations. The four-hour stop in Algiers was probably dictated by fuel limits but while there they lunched with Gen Jacob Devers, the senior US Army officer in the Mediterranean theater. From the larger standpoint of overall strategy, the discussions with the CCS in London had not resulted in complete agreement about the landings in southern France, eventually called Dragoon, which the British had opposed and would continue to resist. As a Marshall biographer has expressed it, the Army chief of staff “had attempted to clear up disagreements over future operations in the Mediterranean” by the trip to Italy.42

From the AAF viewpoint, Arnold had several reasons for visiting Italy. This was his first opportunity to assess in detail the operations and command structure in this theater, which was clearly dominated by the British except for the predominance of AAF air. Arnold wanted to visit the Fifteenth Air Force, which he had established there in the previous November to enhance the strategic air offensive—hopefully in better
weather than prevailed in Britain. His visit there in December had been too soon after its activation to allow a valid assessment. The Mediterranean Air Forces had just completed several important operations, the most recent being the nine-day “shuttle” mission, led personally by Eaker, on which Fifteenth Air Force heavies bombed several Balkan targets before landing in the Soviet Union. They had returned to their Italian bases just two days prior to Arnold’s arrival in London. Earlier, the AAF in Italy had been involved in Operation Strangle, a two-month tactical operation that had just ended in May. Its 36,000 sorties and 33,000 tons of bombs dropped have been described in the official history as “the largest program of interdiction of lines of communication ever attempted up to that time.” Its successes, as measured in destroyed bridges, tanks, and railroad facilities, were viewed with great satisfaction by Arnold and Marshall during this visit. Hap was as impressed by the visible results of the AAF-caused destruction in Rome and other Italian locations as he was by the lack of German air force opposition there and in Normandy. His diary has provided no comment on his relations with Eaker, given their severe strain with Eaker’s reassignment in December. He paid the requisite visit by the commanding general to US air bases, where he met with the crews and their leaders. He and Marshall also attended a dinner with most of the Allied senior officers in the area. His two days in Italy were well spent in assessing conditions and operations there.

The 27-hour trip to Newfoundland en route home was broken by two stops for fuel and food at air bases in Morocco and the Azores, with which Hap was familiar. Never overly effusive about his or institutional accomplishments, Hap had to have been very pleased by what he had witnessed. As he took off from Casablanca, he learned of the first B-29 raids against the Japanese home islands, excellent news that added to the encouraging mosaic that had been woven of Allied superiority in the air over the beaches of Normandy. Contributing to this Allied superiority were the tactical and strategic air efforts in Italy and the significant work on the new AAF base Hap visited in the Azores. Even though they had flown all night from the Azores, as a traveling companion noted, the “fly rod, Atlantic salmon and fast flowing
rivers . . . provided a profitable reason for delays” as Arnold and Marshall took time out from the war to fish. The eight-hour recreational break in Newfoundland as Marshall and Arnold indulged in their shared hobby of angling was a well-earned respite and probably reflected the satisfaction and optimism about the future they felt as a result of this journey.44

The Diary

TRIP TO ENGLAND
June 8, 1944–June 21, 1944
GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD

Thursday, June 8, 1944 [Washington, D.C., to Stephenville, Newfoundland en route to Great Britain]

[Departed] Washington, D.C., Crew [of the] C-54
Pilot Major J. G. Tilton
2nd Pilot Major J. C. Hayes
Co-pilot 2d Lieutenant R. H. MacGuyer
Navigator Captain W. B. Hicks
Radio Opr Sergeant W. R. Babington
Flight Engr Sergeant S. Fedinick
Steward Sergeant J. A. Giordano
Passengers Marshall, Arnold, Lindsay, Redmon, Munson, Freeman, 1 orderly

Took off 9:12 A.M., weather clear, tail wind. Arrived Stephenville, 3:07 P.M. EWT [eastern war time], distance Washington to Stephenville 1,079 miles; lv Stephenville 4:36 P.M. EWT, 10:36 B[ritish] WT. Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, CO, an enthusiastic fisherman; good salmon, sea trout, trout, cod and lobster fishing within 30 miles of Stephenville. Quite cool here, snow still on hilltops, snowed last week. Town small, about 200 people, used to live off cod fishing, now some 700 work at [air]field, 400 live on Post. Weather 0 when we were 100 miles out, clear weather when we landed.48 Sky clear
over coast. Many icebergs out over ocean for 50 miles, quite a few large ones, some carry their own lakes with them.

Friday, June 9, 1944 [En route to London, England via Wales]

Overcast and undercast, blue sky, full moon (or it looked full) and bumpy clouds, smooth riding and rough. Set watch ahead 6 hours to agree with BWT. Talked about everything from mice and men to cabbages and kings with George Marshall. Finally went to bed at 3:00 A.M., slept soundly until 7:00 A.M., called at 8:00, would land in 35 minutes. Clouds with occasional break; saw Ireland occasionally through breaks. Held over Prestwick above clouds for 1 hour and 20 minutes, 3 planes below us, ceiling dropping. Made one pass, couldn’t connect. Sent to field NW [northwest] tip of Wales, 150 miles [away], course 197 [degrees] from Prestwick. Solid overcast, broke through at 10:00; at 11:07 BWT, 3 other planes below overcast, 11:00 over Wales. Landed at Valley Station, Wales, 11:15.49

“Hereward the Wake”-Chas. Chealin (?) “Triple Splendor.”50 Note: look into officer in Air Forces taking flying training, Captain Clifford, Boston U[iversity], qualified.51 Intermittent rain, broken clouds, sunshine and blue sky to London. Came through on Irish Mail, [boarded at] Valley Station, an ATC base where war-weary planes start for USA. Left Valley Station or _______at 1:45, special car.52 Arrived London, 7:45 P.M.

Brooke, Portal, Cunningham, Handy,53 Ismay, Spaatz and many others waiting for us on platform. Kuter,54 McCarthy flew down from Prestwick and met us at Valley Stream.[sic]

Am billeted at a wonderful house, more about it later. Rode to Staine[s] with Spaatz;55 so tired went to sleep in car when talking to him; 2½ hours sleep does not go very well any more. Dinner: Marshall, King, Handy, Kuter, etc. Meeting over war with Beedle Smith and Bull brought us up to date.56 Bed at 11:30, dead to world.

Saturday, June 10, 1944 [London, England and its environs]

Up at 7:30, breakfast at 8:00, left for Eisenhower’s headquarters57 at 8:30, arrived at 9:00. Talked over war with Ike
and his staff, very optimistic. German Air Force not so hot according to people here. I have doubted RAF, G-2 and A-2 reports all along. Now it appears that:

a. German Air Force does not have numbers.
b. Does not have crews.
c. Lacks training.
d. Does not have will to fight.
e. Has lost its morale.

Case 1 – 19 JU-88s met 12 Spitfires and all JU-88s were shot down, 0 Spitfires lost.
Case 2 – 39 torpedo bombers headed from Southern France for the Beachhead. Ran into own flak, 20 turned back; ran into more flak - 4 were shot down and 10 turned back. Remaining 5 continued for a spell, got tired and turned back. All this [obtained] from German radio. If the GAF was as strong as indicated by G-2 and A-2:

(1) Why didn’t they hit the ship concentrations prior to invasion? The ports in south of England were crowded.
(2) Why didn’t they hit the invasion forces when crossing channel in 4 narrow lanes?
(3) Why didn’t they hit congestion at beachhead?
(4) Why are only 60 planes in combat readiness out of 500 concentrated to operate against us?

Answer: we accept the RAF estimate blindly. Should we? What have RAF done to defeat GAF since Battle of Britain? Have they tried to increase range of their fighters? Did they give us any encouragement when we said that we were going to force the GAF to fight us and we were going to defeat and destroy them? Did they keep the belly tanks on the P-51s we gave them? No. Have they used any to penetrate into the heart of Germany? No. Could they put additional gas in their Spitfires? No. We did and raised the range to 1,300 miles. It took us but 2 months, and yet they tell the world the strength of the GAF and we accept their figures.

CCS meeting in London at 11:30: [present] Brooke, Portal, Cunningham, Ismay, Secretaries, Marshall, King, Arnold, Secretaries. Discussed:
(2) Traffic over Hump.
(3) Future operations in North Burma and cargo plane requirements; also cargo plane requirements of British troops near Imphal.58
(4) Possibilities of next meeting with agenda.
(5) Trip of Prime Minister, Marshall, King, Arnold to beachhead.59

Adjourned at 1:15 back at Staine at 2:00, lunch. At Spaatz’ headquarters at 3:20, went over Air war with Spaatz and his Staff.60 Found that he had no special logistic problems; had plenty of planes, crews, and gas and bombers. Neither Spaatz nor Knerr had any question as to 3 months reserve gas being sufficient.61

Returned to Gibson house, called on Mr. and Mrs. Gibson who lived in garage while we lived in their house. Now as to the house: it belongs to Mr. and Mrs. J. W. Gibson, the engineer who built the big dams on the Nile, quite a wealthy man. Specializes in Frisian and Jersey cattle, pure bloods. Their estate is 200 acres; the large house, originally built by Henry VIII as a hunting lodge, takes care of about 20 guests comfortably. It is beautifully furnished, has many pieces which might well be in a museum. The estate is famous for its 3 way crossing; one creek flows over another and a path crosses both on a bridge.62

Quite an unusual bit of construction.

Movie with Danny Kaye and Dinah Shore, saw it before.63

Bed at 11:00.
Sunday, June 11, 1944 [England]

Up at 8:20. A doleful mishap: [Adm] King and I decided to go to SHAEF and get some first-hand information, up to date [on the invasion]. It was suggested that the information would be 6 hours later if we went to [Leigh-] Mallory’s Headquarters. We started, after assuring ourselves that the aide (Pittinger) and the chauffeur knew the route, 20 minutes from Gibson House. After 45 minutes we were hopelessly lost. We asked airmen, soldiers, Bobbies and civilians to no avail; we finally returned with no new war information.

Marshall had not returned from Chequers. We will get envoy from [Leigh-] Mallory’s Headquarters here [for briefing on the invasion] at Gibson House at 12:45. Lunch for CCS at 1:30, progress of war after lunch. Then meeting of CCS, [discussed] preparations for trip to Beachhead tomorrow.

Depart 8:00 [P.M.] for Prime Minister’s private train, dinner with Prime Minister at 8:30, train was late, 40 minutes. We waited at station: Marshall, Kuter and I sitting on bench, [Adm] King pacing back and forward. On train were Prime Minister, Tommy and Marshal Smuts. Dinner was quite a success, everyone in a very jovial mood.

[In Arnold’s hand] PM’s Dinner 6/11/44

McCarthy
Tommy [Commander Thompson] Goode
Kuter Marshall
Smuts Prime Minister
Arnold [Admiral] King
Martin (Sec. to Prime Minister) Smuts Jr.
Kirkpatrick (Aide to [Adm] King)

At 11:00 Prime Minister said we must get up early tomorrow so we go to bed after we have had another drink, and so we did. In bed at 11:30 on Prime Minister’s private train.

Monday, June 12, 1944 [England to Normandy beachhead and return]

One of the most interesting days yet. Up at 5:30, breakfast at 5:45, train arrived at Portsmouth at 6:15. Argument last night as to our return today: Marshall and King will return on
destroyer and Prime Minister’s train; 4 hours on destroyer and 7 hours on train. I stood pat on returning by plane, 1 hour and 30 minutes.

Met at train by Ike; Kuter carried tin hats and gas masks. Portsmouth harbor jammed with ships. We boarded the USS destroyer *Thompson* [Admiral] King, Marshall, Eisenhower, Arnold, Kuter, McCarthy, Kirkpatrick. As we left the harbor we passed (30 knots) literally hundreds of ships of all kinds, escorted and proceeding singly. Such a mass one never saw before, uninterrupted and unimpeded. As we approached the coast of France there were literally hundreds anchored offshore. What a field day for the GAF if there is a GAF; skip bombing could not miss. Every once in a while an explosion, German mines being destroyed. We left destroyer and went aboard subchaser; Admiral Kirk and Admiral Hall joined us. We left destroyer and went aboard subchaser; Admiral Kirk and Admiral Hall joined us.72 Harbor formed by breakwater of floating tanks in long line, backed by 16 ships sunk bow to stern.

Headed by British battleship *Centurion*, then *Phoenix*.

Tremendous blocks of concrete, hollow, 60 feet high, towed across channel and sunk in line to form harbor and pier.73
Ships of all kinds: cruisers, [USS] *Augusta* and [USS] *Tuscaloosa*; Battleships, British and American; destroyers, Liberty ships, tankers, LST, lc [landing craft] ships, DUCKS, crocodiles, going and coming, pushed up on beach to unload. Some broken in half by mines, on the beach wrecked. Trucks being driven from LSTs over beach and up road. The ever present sound of explosions: bombs, mines being set off by Engineers. Airplanes on the cliff top taking back wounded to shore. A regular mad house but a very orderly one in which some 15,000 troops a day go from ship to shore and some 1,500 to 3,000 tons of supplies a day are landed. But where is the GAF?

After a tour of the harbor a DUCK comes alongside. We leave subchaser and start toward beach. The tide is low and we lift the top off an obstruction. Fortunately there were no mines; we slid off and continued through obstacles to beach. Passed by the wrecks and ships unloading, then out we climbed.

Met Bradley, Royce, Quesada, Corlett and many more of my old friends. We all piled in jeeps and scout cars and up to the landing strip; Marshall, King, Ike and I went aboard a C-53 filled with wounded, 17 of them. Said hello to those who could speak, talked to the nurse. On to Bradley’s Headquarters by way of the field hospital. Saw a German battery of 155s still in position, one piece destroyed by thermite; others OK.

Germans left in a hurry for the cattle and chickens are still on farms, crops untouched. Telephone and telegraph lines are not destroyed; roads, bridges still in place and very few mines were planted. [Given] An appreciation of present positions by Bradley and then lunch: Courtney Hodges, Collins, Gerow, etc. After lunch, I left party with Kuter and Quesada. Visited Air Force headquarters with its various sections, 4 landing strips, 1 used now, 1 used by tonight, 2 to be available in 48 hours, 1 additional in another 72 hours.

Hundreds of US planes but not one of the GAF. Four thousand planes, US and RAF in air today. Plenty of evidence of war: wrecked buildings, shell holes, bomb craters, guns, shooting, dust and more dust, a few French returning to their homes, some snipers—one a French woman who was shot. French surely a poor, sickly-looking lot. Doubt if they have the
courage, determination, love for freedom to ever regain position as a first-rate power. Tooey [Spaatz], Brereton, Royce trying to catch up with us but never making it.

Back to airport at 5:00, took off at 5:10. Flew over ship concentrations; it was a wonderful but terrifying sight to think what a few skip bombers could do. But our planes are flying overhead, not the GAF. [US] Navy shot down 4 P-51s, 3 Spits, and hit 3 others; our own Navy far more dangerous than GAF in spite of fact that they demand overhead cover from our Air Force.

Landed at Heston at 6:00, tired, dirty, no car. Royce and Brereton drove Kuter and me to Gibson House; a bath and am feeling grand; a drink and I will feel no pain.

Tuesday, June 13, 1944 [England]

Up at 8:00, breakfast, read cables, etc., on to Ike’s Headquarters at 9:30. Conference with Beadle Smith to 10:45, on to London for CCS meeting at 11:30, lunch with British Chief[s] of Staff at 1:30. Yesterday when Ismay took notes for messages to be sent to Wilson and Ike, he apparently took them to his boss [Churchill], who probably rewrote whole thing, hence its dissimilar appearance when it got to us. When we changed it to conform to what we had agreed to, British couldn’t accept until received blessing from Prime Minister.

At 2:30 took off for Heston, Marshall and I; Fred Anderson waiting for us with Lockheed. Went to see 91st Heavy Bombardment Group, B-17; 325th Fighter Group, P-51; 355th Medium Bombardment Group, B-26. Doolittle met us and went around with us, Kepner also. Saw Ross Milton who is getting along fine, is now a Group Executive. Could find nothing that any of those folks wanted; seemed to have all the planes, crews and parts they needed, what a change from my last visit.

Back to Heston at 7:10, at Gibson House at 7:30, dinner at 7:45: [present]

Ambassador Winant
Ambassador Phillips
General Marshall
General Handy
General Kuter
General B[edell] Smith
Admiral King
Admiral Cooke
Captain Goode
Colonel McFarland
General Arnold

Conference with the Ambassador and the Generals and Admirals until 11:30.

Wednesday, June 14, 1944 [England]

Go to Buckingham Palace to see King [George VI] today. Breakfast 8:20, office 8:45, Spaatz’ headquarters 9:45. Conference: Spaatz, Brereton, Doolittle, Knerr, [Fred] Anderson, Vandenberg until 11:38 when I hurried out to the car to get to Buckingham Palace by 12:15 to meet His Majesty, the King. Was with him from 12:15 until 1:07.

Went to Senior Officer’s Mess where I gave a lunch for Vandenberg, Fred Anderson, Cabell, O. Anderson, Wildman, Kuter, Pittinger, Maxwell, ________(?) Hurried to CCS meeting at 2:30, lasted until 5:00, back to Gibson House at 5:30, 8:15 at #10 Downing Street, dinner with the Prime Minister and King [George VI]; [seating diagram]

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Dinner quite an affair, Prime Minister and King [George VI] in good form. One principle or feeler advanced by Prime Minister: citizens from either country should be able to go to other and be citizens under local laws. Toast and discussions, got away at 2:30, home at 3:00 A.M. At 1:00 A.M., King [George VI]: “Don’t [sic] anyone ever go to bed around here?” Prime Minister: “This is early yet, we have lots to talk about.”
It has been three years since I was at Buckingham Palace. I arrived there then just after a heavy GAF bombardment in which some considerable damage was done. The King and Queen narrowly escaped injury, the windows in the Palace were broken, the drafts through the halls made it a most cheerless place. The King was looking for a ray of sunshine. How different now when there is no German threat from land, sea or air. It is a very welcome change, one that is commented on by all, the results of air supremacy and air power.

For expense account: lunch for Senior Allied Officers in London, $24.80.

**Thursday, June 15, 1944 [England]**

Not much sleep but up at 8:30, breakfast at 9:00, office at 9:30, departed for [Leigh-] Mallory’s Headquarters 9:50, arrived 10:45. Met Harris, Douglas, Roderick Hill and all American Air Force staff, heard presentation. Ran out before it was through at 11:45 to get to Portals at 12:00, actually arrived at 12:30. Discussed this and that and went to lunch at 1:00 at Dorchester with Portal and wife, returned to Air Ministry at 2:30 for conference with Courtney and Portal, CCS at 3:30. Discussed Pacific and SE Asia; very good meeting, everyone in accord, adjourned at 5:30. Portal, Cunningham go with King [George VI] to Beachhead tomorrow to see Montgomery. Admiral King leaves at 12:30 for Plymouth and then Oran; Marshall, Kuter, Handy and I go to Bovingdon at 10:00 P.M. and take off for Algiers. So ended one of the best conferences that we have ever had.

**Friday, June 16, 1944 [England, en route to Algiers, Algeria]**

On June 12 the German Crossbow went into action; 29 fired, most went into channel, 4 hit London, most hit open fields. Apparently a small airplane, 20’ wing spread, carries about 4,000 pounds explosives; engine based on jet principles, low-grade gasoline, compresses air that shoots out through jet and forces plane forward, Gyro-pilot and compass. Last night at 11:45 an air raid alarm, 5:30 this morning a long series of explosions, many within a very short period. Area covered sev-
eral miles from Gibson House, but several very close by. Charges quite heavy. Rockets? Pilotless planes? Bombs? There were some delayed fuses. What were they? They were pilotless planes, over 200 of them have landed in and around London. One of them just missed the Gibson House, came down out of the clouds in a dive, levelled off and then started a slow turn and finally crashed into the ground, exploded about 1½ miles away. The force of the explosion just about lifted all of us out of our beds, about 27 hit within 5 miles of our house. They finally settled down to a regular frequency during the day, about 1 every 5 minutes. Off for Algiers from Bovingdon at 22:55.

At 6:00 A.M. there was a terrific explosion that shook everything. Sleep thereafter was impossible so I got up, dressed and had breakfast. At that time I did not know where any of these things had landed. Read cablegrams and war reports until 9:10. Then I learned that one of the planes had hit nearby, what I really learned was the location of one of them. I took off to see the effects and what remained.

The “Drone” landed in an orchard about 100 yards from a small village. The explosion had knocked out all window panes, crushed in roofs, blown down a few trees, made a crater about 6 feet across and 4–5 feet deep, but no other damage. As a matter of fact there was an old shed, looked as if it might well be pushed down, still standing. Accordingly I judge that the gadget had not more than 1,000 pounds, probably about 500 pounds explosive. It was made of pressed steel, about 26 feet wing spread, jet-propelled, automatic gyro-pilot controlled. This particular “Drone” came down through the clouds in a dive with a dead engine, then levelled off and made a semicircular course before it hit the ground. Around the crater was the steel cylinder fuselage, bolted together, steel sheet wings, the jet tubing from engine, hundreds of feet of flexible cable, insulating tubing, hundreds of small, finger-size dry batteries, actuating valves, bell cranks for controls, many, many small pieces of sheet metal, 1½ inches square, synthetic rubber gaskets, a very sturdy piece of metal probably engine bearer, pieces of wing one part looked as if it had been perforated by anti-aircraft, pieces of cylinders.
My reaction was if the Germans were as efficient as we were in our fabrication they could produce the “Drones” with about 2,000 man hours and at a cost of about $600.00 They could launch them from the tracks at a rate of about 1 every 2 minutes per track. With 48 tracks they are supposed to have serviceable, 24 per minute, 1,440 per hour or 14,000 in 24 hours [sic]. That will cause consternation, concern and finally break the normal routine of life even in Britain and dislocate the war effort. No one can predict where they will hit; you can hear them coming with a swishing noise; they are hard to dodge. One went over General Eisenhower’s headquarters while we were there.

I wonder if the Germans have followed this all through or if through desperation they will start using them before they have enough to send them over at regular intervals every day for months. Our answer must be to hit the factories where critical parts are made. Perhaps we have already hit some. That may explain the delay in launching their attack and the comparatively small number sent over. In any event we can not destroy their launching platforms under 10 feet of concrete and the constant air raid alarms and the explosions are quite disconcerting.98

Returned to Gibson House, had picture taken with Marshall, King and Gibsons. Then back to crater and “Drone” wreck with Marshall and King. Met local air defense officials who told of damage done, 200 casualties, many buildings destroyed.

On to Ike’s Headquarters. Here we were brought up to date about the war, talked over de Gaulle problem; sent message to President.99 Had lunch with Ike, Marshall, Smith, Crawford and Bull.100

Said my goodbyes to Ike’s staff, talked over Air organization with Smith and Ike. Both agreed to reorganization to provide for American control of fast-growing, very efficient, much more effective AAF. Do not see need for so many RAF officers between Brereton and Ike. We have strength and have demonstrated that we know as much about operations as RAF, probably more.101
“Drone” has speed of about 340 miles per hour. “Drones” are picked up by radar and plotted on takeoff. Most come from Calais area. Our planes have down 12: 4 last night—8 during the day, all exploded in air when hit.

Went to Spaatz’ house at 2:00, talked to Lovett and all of his [Spaatz’] senior officers until 3:15, then went into conference with Spaatz and Lovett. Said goodbye at 3:45. Back to Gibsons. Had to repack all my bags; my striker had best intentions in world but did not make provisions for the trip as we make it. Rested, what a change, until 5:30. Went out at 6:00 and saw the Gibson’s 2 bulls, 1 Frisian, 1 Jersey, both fine animals. Incidentally, Gibson insists upon sending me a bull for the farm. Goodbye to all the officers and the Gibsons. Marshall talked to enlisted men, so did I.

[Admiral] King left at 12:00 for Plymouth and then Oran; Marshall and I then started for Chequers at 6:45, arrived at 7:30, met by Prime Minister’s brother. Churchill made appearance at 7:50, Mrs. Churchill at 8:00. Fine dinner and very pleasant talk, left Chequers at 9:30.

Mrs. Churchill, upon hearing of Bee and Hap riding in oxcart to Agana when we landed at Guam when we might have used Ford said: “Tell Mrs. Arnold when Winnie and I were on honeymoon, visited Venice. I wanted to ride in gondola, he insisted on a motor launch. Said it was far more healthy, the fumes killed the germs, etc. and etc. We rode in a gasoline launch. Not much romance in Winnie.”

Prime Minister said 15 minutes to Bovingdon airport; he meant 15 miles. Arrived there 10:15, took off 10:25; Marshall, Handy, Kuter, McCarthy, Lindsay, Munson, Arnold and the same crew that brought us out.

Saturday, June 17, 1944  [England to Algiers, Algeria to Naples, Italy]

No unusual incidents during night, smooth flying, good sleeping, not a cloud in the sky. Our course, due west from Lands End, S[outh] 300 miles W[est] of W[est] tip of France, SE [southeast] to Port Lyautey, Africa, which we hit at 6:30 A.M.; almost due east to Algiers, passed Oran to our left. Due in Algiers at 9:30 GMT [Greenwich Mean Time], actually
landed 9:45. [Met by] Edwards, Barr, Larkin, Truscott, Patch, Gil Evans, Buron Fitts, etc.  
Auto convoy to Algiers, lunch at Devers auto caravan, back to airport and took off for Naples at 2:10 P.M. local time. Edwards and Barr went with us. Had escort of 8 P-38s, clear weather. Passed Bizerte, Sicily and finally Capri, circled Vesuvius and saw lava flow from last eruption, landed at 6:10. Eaker, Devers, Wilson at airport to meet us officially, Hank there to meet me personally. Went to Wilson’s Headquarters and had conference on war. Slessor joined Eaker, Wilson, Devers, Marshall, Handy, Arnold. Went to Eaker’s cantonment and I had an hour with Hank. Dinner at 8:30, bed at 11:10.

Sunday, June 18, 1944 [Italy]

Up at 5:00 A.M. which turned out to be 7:00, breakfast at 7:30, took off by auto for the airport at 8:00, [party consisted of] Marshall, Barr, Devers, Eaker, Handy, McCarthy, Arnold. Hank went to Naples, took off about 8:20. Flew up beach to Anzio and Aronna perimeter. It certainly is a battle-scarred, bomb-cratered, shell-marked bit of land. The Littoria marshes extend for miles, the roads and railroads were blocked by broken and dislocated bridges. We landed at the beach airstrip, wounded being taken off by the hundreds in C-47s.

Met Freddie Boyea, Bruce’s Tac at West Point in 1941. He is now in 30th Infantry, had been through entire beach campaign. Saw the foxholes and tunnels that the men lived in, shell holes everywhere, made one wonder how they kept alive. The saving grace was that there was no shortage of supplies, as a matter of fact there was a great abundance.

Marshall went to cemetery to see grave of step-son. Eaker, Handy and I went down to Port, it certainly was a wreck, houses destroyed, partly destroyed and damaged. Port facilities very sketchy, but by tearing down houses to make a waterfront and using LCTs and LSTs and bringing them up to sea wall, it is possible to unload about 1,000 tons a day normal, and up to 3,000. Four ships lying offshore but heavy seas prevent unloading. Saw rough terrain on British front and many wadies that prevented their advancing. Also thousands of tons of supplies that GAF should have destroyed if
they had an air force. Returned to air strip. Talked to officers and men of Photo [reconnaissance] Squadron who were doing such a grand job in P-38s, getting pictures for the ground troops. Took Marshall and went over to visit sick and wounded in 20 ambulances, waiting to load up planes. Visited each ambulance in turn and spoke to men. The Texas man showed no bashfulness, in fact he was eager to say that he came from Dallas. The Pennsylvania man waited for Marshall to pass and then said to me: “I am from Pittsburgh.”

Climbed aboard plane and took off for Rome, flew over marshalling yards. The River Tiber is about as wide as Constitution Avenue. The city is remarkably free from damage from bombs. Landed at airport and was met by Clark; Johnson, marshal of the city; Cannon and Saville. Marshall departed with Clark, Handy, McCarthy and Barr. Eaker, Johnson, Cannon, Saville and I took off [in] another direction. Here I might say that Clark, Truscott, Wilson and Alexander all unanimous in saying that without our Air operations the Italian campaign would not have been possible.

Drove into Rome and picked up an Italian colonel who was doing patriot-partisan undercover work during German occupancy. He acted as guide and he took us through Forum, different arches, St. Peters, Amphitheater, the spot where Caesar said: “Et tu, Brute!” and finally to the marshalling yards. What a mess! Most done by B-26s; over 800 railroad cars thrown around, turned upside down, burned, tossed on top of one another, over a stretch of the entire yard. Certainly it would take weeks to open up one track through. The station and the warehouses completely destroyed. It was a delightful mess from my viewpoint. None of the apartments bordering the yards were injured in any way. On one train (remains) were a French car, an Italian one and a German one. One look at these three yards and it is apparent why the German Army was doomed to destruction.

Lunch at the Hotel where Johnson had his headquarters, a delightful lunch. Incidentally there were no signs of starvation or even hunger among the thousands of Italians that I saw. In fact they all looked disgustingly healthy. The fields are all full of grain; uncut, partially harvested and entirely cut.
Cows, horses, and mules in pastures. Rome is full of American and British soldiers and Italian ex-soldiers. Saw the portico where Mussie, Benito, the ex-strong man, delivered his orations to thousands of his subjects, who now hate him.122

The Germans were apparently hard taskmasters. They gave the Italians only sufficient to keep them in good shape, were brutal in their dealings when a German was killed or wounded; 30 Germans killed in an explosion of bomb from partisans, 600 Italians shot. City full of printing press money. We have taken over hotel for our airmen, charge them $1.50 per day. I went over to hotel and went through it, talked to many of the crew members, all seemed to enjoy the place immensely.

Took cars and drove to Viterbo, what a trip.123 Our Air Forces have destroyed 5,200 vehicles and tanks and damaged 5,000 more. I think I saw them all along the road to Viterbo. Tanks from the big Tiger with its 88 mm. down to the small baby size; trucks, large and small, half-tracks,124 passenger cars, lorries, buses, rolling kitchens, wrecking trucks, winches, tank trucks, gasoline drums, trucks loaded with everything, typewriters, food. Some burned, some half-consumed, some just wrecked. In most cases the rubber tires were off the wheels. Most had been dragged from the road either by the Germans to aid in their escape or by our troops to open the road. These wrecks were along the road for over 40 miles and gave pictorial evidence of the desperate straits the Germans were in as they fled northward, with their Divisions breaking up and disintegrating into small helpless bodies of men. This all caused by our Air Force striking with machine-guns and bombs at the retreating columns. Here and there bridges were blown out by bombs, roads made impassable and at Viterbo a tunnel was blocked by our bombing, completely cutting off the railroad. Towns held by Germans as strong points completely shattered with stone and brick buildings turned into piles of debris on the streets. All this from our Air Force, a Force that changed the German divisions from fighting units into small, almost panic-stricken men rushing northward to escape capture. A significant comparison with
the GAF that can not hit our ships supplying the bridgehead on the northwestern coast of France.

Returned to Rome and took plane to Naples, flew over Cassino and the Abbey, two more wrecked targets, monuments to the destructive force of Air Power.\textsuperscript{125}

\textbf{Monday, June 19, 1944 [Italy]}

Had intended to go to Bari\textsuperscript{126} today but weather looks bad and weatherman says it will get worse. For years we have been hearing about “Sunny Italy.” As a matter of fact tourists have been visiting this place because of the advertised sun during the winter months. We decided to move our H. B. [heavy bombers] here so that we could take advantage of the weather and always have some H. B. striking at the heart of Germany. It is quite obvious now that either tourist sunny winters are not the proper yardstick to use for bombing weather or as usual this is the worst winter in 47 years.\textsuperscript{127}

Went to Eaker’s office, heard his war presentation in his War Room, it was excellent. Saw Si Marriner, Twining, Born, and other commanders from 15th Air Force, had lunch with them.\textsuperscript{128} Had a conference with all Eaker’s senior commanders and gave them outline of our world-wide air problems and estimate of troubles brewing in the future. Back to Eaker’s village for hour and half with Hank. Then back to Medium [bomber] Headquarters in Caserta Palace for conference with Wilson, Cunningham, Slessor, Devers, Rooks,\textsuperscript{129} Arnold, Kuter, Eaker. This conference went into plan for future operations of Wilson’s forces and their effects upon Eisenhower’s operations, lasted until 7:15,\textsuperscript{130} back to Quarters by 7:30, dinner by Eaker at 8:00. Present:

- Kirk, diplomat
- Murphy, diplomat\textsuperscript{131}
- Marshall, Chief of Staff, US Army
- Wilson, Supreme Commander, Mediterranean Theater
- Alexander, Commanding General, Allied Armies in Italy
- Devers
- Eaker
- Arnold

164
Twining  
Cannon  
Kuter  
Slessor  
Barr  
and about 6 others

Had long talk with Alexander re de Gaulle and his place in the French affairs and re fighting efficiency of the German Army. I was apprehensive of a collapse of the German Army without our being able to anticipate it as occurred with GAF. Alexander thought that while disintegration had not started the German Army had begun to topple. It was not fighting with the same vim, it lacked leaders, particularly NCOs [noncommissioned officers], it did not have supplies, evidence was piling up. As to de Gaulle, he [Alexander] was in accord with our ideas: de Gaulle was a selfish, egotistical man who was interfering with our operations and definitely giving no consideration as to whether his actions were seriously hampering the Allied Commanders or not. Two instances: a. his branding the Francs that the Allied Armies were using in France as counterfeit; his circulating that idea among the French. Those Francs had the backing of the US and British Governments; France had no Francs nor a government. b. His refusal to permit the trained French liaison officers to accompany the Allied forces in France. There were some 200 trained but none went across. A fine patriot, a great help, de Gaulle.

Packed my grips and went to bed, take off early.

Tuesday, June 20, 1944 [Italy to Casablanca, Morocco to Azores en route to Newfoundland]

My time today is GMT, two hours behind local Italian time.
Arose at 2:15 GMT, breakfast at 2:45, went to airport, adios to Eaker, Devers, Barr, Edwards. Barr wants to be remembered to Bee, helped her with symphonies in Washington a few years ago. Took off for Casablanca 3:30, all [times cited are A.M. Flock of US papers on plane, all dated June 16th, main news items, B-29 operations over Japan.
The general impression among the higher officers in the Allied Air Forces is that the high command of the GAF has made one blunder after another, not only in their technique of employment but also in their grand strategy. However, our people did not credit all the errors to the GAF command and staff. They volunteer the information that: “Our secret weapon is Hitler; hence do not bomb his castle. Do not let him get hurt, we want him to continue making mistakes.” It looks now as if he is taking his place in a similar niche for the ground troops, for the decisions made with regard to German ground dispositions have been to our distinct advantage when we might have been having one awful time. “Hitler, the Secret Weapon of the Allies.”

Weather perfect until 100 miles West of Algiers and then we were above the overcast, came down through and landed at Casablanca at 11:00 A.M. Lunch with Meloy and Asp at the old German villa that Patton had after landing on beach. Noted all the planes on the field and asked for inventory, far too many for work being done.

Took off at 12:25 P.M., arrived Lagens, Azores, 6:35, met by A. D. Smith. He drove Marshall, Handy and me all over the Island Terceira, ended up at his quarters where we washed up and had a drink. Then to the mess hall where we met the RAF CO and all had dinner. About 35 to 40 planes a day pass through Azores; new runways being constructed so that there will be no tie-ups due to cross winds. Took off at 9:15 P.M. for Stephenville. Big change in Azores since my first trip. The islands still look wonderfully well-kept, few spots not planted, crops look good, but most of the men work at the airports instead of in the fields, that makes for a shortage of food. Stone fences, boulders and cobbles, no cement or binder. Houses built same way but have mud covering on outside. Hence when there is a heavy explosion from charge on runways, houses go down and US has to pay the bill.

Wednesday, June 21, 1944 [Stephenville, Newfoundland to Washington, D.C.]

Landed Stephenville 7:00 GMT, 5:00 A.M., NFT, now changing to Washington, WST, 3:00 A.M. Maxwell waiting for us and
we went to his house for breakfast. Weather from Azores OK except for about ½ hour when we went through a small cold front, not very rough. Found newspapers of yesterday at Maxwell’s house, also Jim Bevans en route to England.138 He had to wait for 2 hours to get engine fixed.

Maxwell fixed us all up for a fishing trip, took aboard Mr. Sullivan, local fishing expert, and Mr. Wolfe, sports editor for a magazine in US, and an employee of Newfoundland.139 Rode in Diesel engine car to Fischell River, 35 miles from airport. It was a grand river but was much too high for fishing.140 Marshall caught the 1st fish, a grilse about 3 pounds. Thereafter a total of 4 fish were caught; 1 salmon, 4 grilse, total for day. It rained hard and we all got soaked and I don’t mean maybe. Had a wonderful change, even if fishing was rotten. Returned on rr [railroad] diesel car.

Took off for Washington at 2:45 P.M. in slight rain storm, arrived Washington 8:30. An area of bad, not too bad weather extended from Newfoundland to New York, one cold front after another, I guess. Left Naples yesterday morning at 5:30 NT, arrived Stephenville 5:00 NFT, arrived Washington, 8:30 P.M., EWT. 1½ days [elapsed time].

Postscript

The Allied successes in France and Italy, which were viewed by Arnold and the JCS during their two-week travels, resulted in considerable optimism among the American military leaders. This would be tempered, however, by the 10 months of intense fighting that ensued before Germany surrendered. On the day they departed England, Arnold and Marshall were no doubt pleased that the Allies could count more than 550,000 Allied troops ashore, this only 10 days after the invasion began. From the AAF viewpoint, this had been made possible in large part by the lack of Luftwaffe opposition. As Arnold’s diary reflected, he found little in England or Italy that appeared to be serious AAF problems; yet, as was his custom, he followed up on some issues highlighted by the trip.

Although not noted in his journal, Arnold ensured that pieces of the German V-1 that landed near his quarters and
had so intrigued him were returned immediately to Wright Field where, after a study of the components, a duplicate was produced. The degree of Arnold and Lovett’s interest in the project was reflected by the fact that it was only three weeks after receiving the retrieved parts that Arnold had sent from England that an AAF copy was tested. Although neither Spaatz nor Eaker could visualize any “immediate requirement for the use of pilotless aircraft” in Europe, Hap and AAF leaders persisted, feeling that the development of a missile similar to the German V-1 would give the United States another effective weapon and, as important, give the lead in the postwar development and control of guided missiles to the AAF.141 Labeled JB-2 by the AAF, more extensive flight tests were begun in October 1944, after which Arnold unrealistically tried to expand the program to allow 1,000 launchings per month. Competition with vital wartime programs together with the lukewarm interest shown by Spaatz and Eaker, which was based essentially on the inability to pinpoint intended targets for the weapon, kept production low. The result was that when the manufacturing program was terminated in August 1945, only 1,391 had been produced. Nevertheless, research and development continued through much of 1946.142

On other matters, as indicated in his entry for 20 June, the first B-29 attacks on the Japanese homeland had been made four days earlier and Hap now was able to devote more attention to getting that increasingly troublesome airplane into full operation. He did not hesitate to urge greater effort from Maj Gen Uzal Ent, CG Second Air Force, whose command had primary responsibility for training B-29 crews in preparation for proceeding overseas.143 Hap had earlier selected Brig Gen Emmett O’Donnell, the former chief of his Advisory Council who had accompanied him on the trip covered in volume 2, chapter 7, to command the 73d Bombardment Wing now undergoing intensive B-29 training in Kansas. Aided by Arnold’s urging, the 73d began to deploy, within the month after Hap’s return, to their new facilities on Saipan to launch their attacks on the Japanese home islands.144

Arnold was not extensively involved in the discussions that continued between the British and the American leaders over
the proposed invasion of southern France, now code-named Anvil but later changed to Dragoon. During each of the CCS meetings in London during this trip, as indicated in the endnotes to this chapter, this issue had been discussed. Churchill and the British chiefs strongly advocated that instead of the southern France landings, a concentration of assets in Europe other than those committed to the success of Overlord should be maintained in Italy. With these, they hoped to defeat the German forces, cross the Adriatic to Trieste, and push on through the Ljubljana gap. The army divisions and the landing craft required if committed to Anvil would limit prospects for further Allied advances in Italy and the Balkans. As indicated earlier in this chapter, Marshall’s travel to Italy with Arnold was in part spurred by his desire to assess the situation there. During this two-day visit, the two US leaders discussed the competing proposals with both British commanders and American commanders. The argument continued in varying degrees of intensity through the end of June. Arnold’s participation in the controversy was minor, in view of the fact that he and his air commanders were convinced that there was now sufficient air assets available for both strategic and tactical support in the Mediterranean as well as for the southern France invasion.

As Hap’s diary indicates, he had been very impressed on this trip with the intensity and accuracy of the tactical air support in Italy as well as the lack of any opposition by the Luftwaffe in the week following D-Day. Nevertheless, the British considered the issue of Italy versus southern France a vital one and Churchill pulled out all the stops in order to get Anvil cancelled. He went so far as to keep his personal airplane on alert in order to fly to Washington if necessary in a last-ditch effort to convince FDR of the British position. The tone of the communications across the Atlantic was reflective of the intensity of feelings as the British chiefs cabled their American counterparts that it “would be a grave strategic error” not to pursue the Italian option. In response to Roosevelt’s final rejection of the British strategy, the British prime minister cabled the White House that he was “deeply grieved” at Roosevelt’s response and that the decision to proceed in southern
France was “the first major strategic and political error for which we two have to be responsible.” The American chiefs, including Arnold, may well have translated this as being the first major instance in which Churchill had failed to persuade FDR to follow a course of action favored by the British but opposed by US military leaders.

Arnold had to have been optimistic and encouraged by what he had observed on this journey. He had noted the absence of German air opposition to the Normandy landings and had seen an increasingly large tactical air force deploying from English bases to France in support of the anticipated movement inland. He had witnessed success in Italy in both tactical and strategic operations, and had received news of the first successful B-29 combat missions in the Pacific. Diplomatically, the British had been unable to gain the support of American leaders for continuing Mediterranean operations, a theater Hap and the JCS had always believed as secondary to Northern Europe. At the same time, the movement towards what Arnold hoped would be a validation as well as a comprehensive assessment of strategic bombing in Europe was moving ahead through the planning stages.

However euphoric on his return, Arnold, as was his custom, continued to look to the future. Shortly after his return to the Pentagon, he articulated some of the challenges that he felt the AAF faced. He indicated correctly that the problems were “of staggering scope” and ranged over the entire spectrum of AAF operations. Hap identified them as follows:

- the plan for the ultimate defeat of Japan;
- the proposed Department of National Defense and air forces autonomy;
- the disposal of lend-lease and war-weary aircraft;
- world airline problems;
- postwar expeditionary force and police problems;
- demobilization;
- long-range fighter support for VHBs (B-29s);
- the building up of a day and night all-weather quality air force;
- jet propulsion; and
- radar potentialities.
If these were not enough, he added to the list the transfer of AAF units around the globe to seize islands closer to the Japanese homeland in the war against Japan. Another problem identified by Arnold was the need to train AAF officers for “positions of importance on Allied higher staffs.”

The demands on Arnold as chief, which he had shouldered for the past six years, would not be measurably lessened as he and the AAF worked to complete these tasks.

Hap and his companions may have been aware of, but their extant correspondence does not reflect, another significant result they observed on this trip: The pendulum had swung from British domination of the alliance and its strategy to the American. Arnold and his traveling companions saw the vast ship armada, the mass of logistics, troops and aircraft, most of them American, supporting the invasion. Hap was not only pleased but well aware of the airpower assets now operating in greater numbers by the AAF in Britain and Italy than those of any other nation. The British were at least aware of the change, as Churchill was informed by his staff in Washington that the invasion was “the last chance we shall have to put across to the American public the magnitude of the British military effort.” Further, the prime minister learned that the American newspapers were creating “an impression ‘in the mind of the average American’ that the ‘major part’ in these operations was ‘being played by the United States forces.’”

As Brooke articulated the change by the end of June, the Americans “now begin to own the major strength on land, in the air and on the sea. They, therefore, consider that they are entitled to dictate how their forces are to be employed.” If Hap appreciated the change, he had to have been pleased by the contributions of the AAF.

Notes

2. Arnold to Giles, 5 January 1944, AP.
3. Arnold to Spaatz, 24 January 1944, AP.
4. Spaatz to Arnold, 23 January 1944, AP.


9. Craven and Cate, 46.

10. Summaries of Big Week are to be found in Craven and Cate, 30–48; and Davis, 319–27.

11. Craven and Cate, 22–24, 49; and Davis, 358–61. The editor was detached from his assigned bomb group in 1944 in the Eighth and became a member of a crew that flew only on H2X missions. The complexity of operating the equipment meant the aircraft were used on special missions where the targets were large urban centers and/or locations clearly defined by surrounding water. The difficulty of maintaining the equipment required concentration of the planes at one base in the Division where they flew as lead or deputy lead aircraft with their normal bomb groups. The system was still fraught with considerable difficulties in terms of maintenance and effective operation at this time in 1944.

12. Spaatz to Arnold, 4 February 1944, AP.

13. The 1943 decision is cited in Davis, 198; the 1944 change is in Minutes, Eighth Air Force Commanders’ Meeting, 21 January 1944, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala.


15. Giles to Spaatz, 27 February 1944, Spaatz Papers; and Arnold to Giles, 22 March 1944, AP, emphasis in the original.

16. Craven and Cate, 83; and Davis, 327–29.

17. Portal to Spaatz, 15 February 1944, Spaatz Papers.

18. Spaatz to Arnold, 1 March 1944, AP; Arnold to Eisenhower, 17 January 1944, AP; and Craven and Cate, 79–83.


20. Craven and Cate, 78–79; Arnold to Marshall, 13 March 1944, AP; and Davis, 348.
21. Freeman et al, 190–212; and Davis, 358. There are differences in their loss figures, Davis citing 299 heavies and 232 fighters for the Eighth; Freeman does not list Fifteenth losses.


24. Davis, 379.


26. Peter Masefield’s articles critical of the performance of the B-17 appeared in the *Sunday Times*, 16 August and 23 August 1942. See this British journalist’s claim, although not mentioned in Hap’s diary for chap. 3, that Arnold invited Masefield to his hotel room in London in 1942 to discuss AAF daylight bombing and presumably encouraged a more favorable treatment of the AAF. Masefield recalled, albeit 19 years after their meeting, that he told Arnold, “daylight bombing was very hazardous and unless escort fighters would be provided the casualty rate would be likely to exceed the benefits.” Peter G. Masefield, 10 July 1971, Oral History Interview (OHI), Special Collections, United States Air Force Academy (USAFA), Colorado Springs, Colo.

27. Davis, 381.

28. Spaatz to Portal, 13 April 1944, Spaatz Papers. The AAF leaders in England were constantly attempting to assess the morale of the aircrews, probably with little or no accuracy except those estimates made by the chaplains and/or flight surgeons. The editor during his combat tour as an officer with a B-17 Bomb Group of the Eighth during 1944, found that we all had our own method of calculating the odds of completing the required number of combat missions before being allowed to return home. This issue was probably the foremost one in everyone’s thinking even though rarely articulated to others. Although almost never apprised officially of the total losses suffered on a given mission in even our own Group, to say nothing of those at Wing, Division, or Eighth Air Force level, we were keenly aware of the losses in our squadrons (the unit where we lived and had our strongest attachments, aside from those often formed with our individual crews). Our close living conditions quickly educated us about those who failed to return. At my bomb Group there were no single rooms for aircrew officers and the enlisted men lived in open bay barracks containing large numbers of beds, each separated by only a foot or less. Hence it quickly became apparent which occupants and how many were not returning to the bunks they had left that morning. This became even more pronounced with the visible, somewhat gruesome routine of gathering up the personal possessions of the dead/missing airmen to be shipped home to the next of kin. For a recent study of morale and stress, see Mark K. Wells, *Courage and Warfare: The

29. Davis, 383.

30. See, for example, Eaker’s mild reproof of Arnold for his 18 October Schweinfurt press statement, Eaker to Arnold, 22 October 1943, AP. Major Cozzens’ problems with Arnold’s press remarks and revision of material written for Hap are documented in many of Cozzens’ diary entries. For example, see his entry for 24 June 1944, in which Cozzens confides, “Mr. A. back since Thursday, was off on a talking jag,” Also see entries for 26 and 27 June 1944, 62–63. James Gould Cozzens. A Time of War: Air Force Diaries and Pentagon Memos, 1943–1945, ed. Matthew J. Bruccoli (Columbia, S.C.: Bruccoli Clark, 1984).

31. Arnold to Spaatz, 24 January 1944, AP.

32. Spaatz to Arnold, 10 January 1944, AP.

33. Arnold to Spaatz, c. 4 March 1944, AP.

34. Spaatz to Arnold, 5–20 April 1944, AP.

35. Arnold to Spaatz, 3–5 June 1944, AP. For the US Survey, see David MacIsaac, Strategic Bombing in World War Two: The Story of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (New York: Garland Press, 1976). The British had more difficulty in establishing theirs, in large part because of the opposition of Churchill who regarded it as a “waste of time and money” resulting in US assessors beginning their work on the ground in Germany two months before the Nazi surrender and before the British survey had even been approved. The editor of a recently published account of the British assessment has called it “an unwanted child.” See Sebastian Cox, ed., The Strategic Air War Against Germany, 1939–1945: Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit (London: Frank Cass, 1998), xvii.

36. Davis, 395.


38. Cited in Davis, 396.


42. Ibid., 403.

43. Craven and Cate, 384.

44. Kuter to Lt Col F. W. Wildman, 27 June 1944, Laurence S. Kuter Papers, Special Collections, USAFA Library, Colorado Springs, Colo.

45. Crew is not otherwise identified.
46. Brig Gen Richard C. Lindsay, AC/AS Plans, Headquarters AAF; Brig
Harold Redmon, British Army, Plans Officer; Col Granville F. Munson, USA,
Chief, Personal Affairs Division, War Department; the orderly is not other-
wise identified.

47. Lt Col H. H. Maxwell, commander, Harmon Army Air Base, New-
foundland.

48. Aviators then and now are accustomed to identifying weather condi-
tions in terms of two numbers, although Arnold uses only one here. Nor-
mally the first number indicated the horizontal visibility at the airfield
expressed in statute miles or fractions thereof; the second number was the
height above the ground of the base of the lowest clouds or ceiling expressed
in hundreds or thousands of feet, as applicable. The common expression of
zero zero in aviation parlance meant that forward visibility was zero miles
(actually less than one-quarter of a mile) and the cloud base or fog was zero
feet high or “on the deck.” Each airfield could have its own minimum
requirements for safe flying dictated by many factors such as terrain, air-
craft characteristics and performance, runway length, communications
facilities, and prevailing atmospheric conditions.

49. Valley Station was a village in Anglesey, Wales, where the AAF, ATC,
and RAF operated an air base for AAF aircraft using the South Atlantic ferry
route into England. Arnold was essentially correct in his navigational
details, although the course from Prestwick to Valley Station was closer to
180 degrees.

50. Although the references appear in the typescript in quotation marks,
it is not clear what Arnold meant. If the references were to motion pictures
no recent films with titles cited by Arnold were produced at this time nor
does Charles Chealin appear to have been a person connected with that
industry. Charlie Chaplin made no films between 1942 and 1952. Another
possibility was Arnold’s considering writing his memoirs for which these
titles might not have been inappropriate to have been considered before
Global Mission was chosen. No book titles such as those cited by Arnold
appear in any references of the time.

51. The officer is not otherwise identified.

52. In view of their weather-forced diversion, the special train provided
for the party at Prestwick, Scotland, was not used. Instead, they flagged
down the London Mail, a London-bound train on the LMS line to which Mar-
shall’s aide, Lt Col Frank McCarthy, managed to get a special car attached.
Although the coach was unheated, the “conductor provided a large tin con-
tainer of strong, scalding tea, into which each officer dipped his cup.” Pogue,
392–93. If they did not board at Valley Station, the next stop was Llanfaelog,
five miles further east.

53. Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy, USA, OPD, War Department.

54. Maj Gen Laurence S. Kuter, AAF, now AC/AS, Operations and Plans,
Headquarters AAF.

55. Arnold, Marshall, and Admiral King were billeted at Stanwell Place,
Staines, Middlesex. See entry for 10 June 1945 and note 62 below.
56. Lt Gen Walter Bedell Smith, USA, chief of staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF); Maj Gen Harold R. “Pinky” Bull, USA, chief of operations, SHAEF. Arnold and his companions were briefed on the progress of the Normandy invasion, then in its fourth day.

57. Eisenhower’s headquarters were located in Bushy Park, Teddington, extreme southwest London, approximately 10 miles from Hyde Park.

58. Imphal in Manipur province, northeast India, was important as a base of operations in support of Allied efforts to stem the March 1944 Japanese advance from northwestern Burma into India. The city had been isolated except by air resupply from the end of March through 23 June 1944. Considerable numbers of AAF troop carrier units had been shifted from their Mediterranean bases in early April to assist, but they remained only through early May when they returned to the European theater in anticipation of their use there. The issue was still in doubt when the CCS met and discussed the problem at this meeting. The Japanese conceded when the siege was lifted 13 days later that their failure at Imphal was caused by “lack of supplies and air supremacy.” See discussion in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, vol. 4, *The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944* (1950; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 498–510, quotations on 509–10. Arnold’s account of this meeting is in H. H. Arnold, *General of the Air Force, Global Mission* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 505, where he recalled his optimistic report to the CCS that 11,000 tons had been flown into China in May and he was now confident that demands for airplanes were “being met everywhere.” Brooke’s very brief account is in Arthur Bryant, *Triumph in the West: A History of the War Years Based on the Diaries of Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1957), 156, where he wrote that there was a “general review of the whole front.” Pogue, 392, provides a brief synopsis.

59. The reference is to their planned visit to the Normandy beachhead, scheduled for 12 June, two days later. See entry for that date.

60. Spaatz’ headquarters were collocated with Eisenhower’s SHAEF at Bushy Park.

61. Maj Gen Hugh J. Knerr, now CG, Air Service Command, USSTAF. A 90-day supply of fuel was the normal reserve for US aircraft in the UK, although the British argued for a 180-day reserve. See Arnold, *Global Mission*, 505.

62. Their quarters were in Stanwell House at Staines, Sussex, just southwest of London. This was the home of John W. Gibson (1875–1947), noted civil engineer who had lived in Washington in 1916 while representing the British Minister of Munitions. Between the wars, he had gained fame for building dams and canals in the Sudan and Egypt. At the time of Arnold’s visit, Gibson was the controller of building construction in the British Ministry of Supply. He was knighted in 1945 for his work in planning and constructing the artificial Mulberry harbors used in the Normandy
invasion. In gratitude for his hospitality, Marshall, Arnold, and King arranged to have General Eisenhower present a JCS flag and plaque to the Gibsons in July 1944. See correspondence in AP.

63. The movie *Up in Arms*, with Kaye, Shore, and Dana Andrews was the story of a chronic complainer and his problems as an Army draftee.

64. Although Air Chief Marshal Trafford L. Leigh-Mallory, RAF, had two headquarters, one at Stanmore in Middlesex very close to Arnold’s quarters, the other at Norfolk House in London, it is clear that Arnold and his companions set out for the former.

65. Maj James S. Pittinger, AAF, executive officer to the Deputy Commander for Operations, USSTAF, was assigned as Arnold’s aide while he was in London.

66. Marshall had spent the weekend at Chequers with Churchill. Pogue, 392, speculates that the proposed southern France invasion, which the prime minister continued vigorously to oppose, was “almost certainly . . . the main topic of conversation” between Marshall and the prime minister.

67. Perhaps because Churchill was absent, there seemed to be considerable agreement on such issues as the American suggestion of halting the Italian campaign at the Apennines or the Pisa-Rimini line as well as consideration of either the southern France landing or, as the British suggested, one in western France, its final location to be determined later. Arnold reported that transport aircraft would be available for support of either landing. This second France landing issue would not be settled here because of Churchill’s continuing opposition to the proposal. Arnold does not cover the meeting in *Global Mission*; Bryant briefly discusses it on 156; Pogue discusses it on 394–95.

68. Capt J. B. Goode, USN, assignment at the time unknown. Maj J. C. Smuts, South African Army, was aide de camp to his father.

69. Capt Charles C. Kirkpatrick, USN, Admiral King’s aide.

70. Portsmouth, Hampshire, was the major British channel port used as the Allied embarkation point for the invasion.

71. USS *Thompson* was a destroyer, Ellyson class, commissioned in 1943.

72. They toured the harbor in a subchaser before boarding a DUKW “Duck,” a 15,000-pound, 31-foot amphibious vehicle used in landing on a portion of the coast designated by the US Army as Easy Red. Rear Adm Alan G. Kirk, USN, commander Western Task Force; Rear Adm John L. Hall Jr., USN, commander Eastern Task Force.

73. The pre-World War I British battleship *Centurion* along with “tired old merchant ships” called “Gooseberries” were sunk along with large concrete caissons called “Phoenixes” as breakwaters to facilitate the invasion landings and resupply. In addition, two huge artificial harbors constructed in Britain, called Mulberries, were towed across to the invasion area in an attempt to lessen the pressure on the Allied invaders to capture a channel port. The one in the American sector was made inoperable by the storm of 19 June. An explanation and a diagram are in E. B. Potter and Chester W.

74. Liberty ships were merchant vessels based on an 1895 British design first mass-produced in World War I and later in World War II. After 1942 a faster and sturdier type was produced in the US called Victory Ships. Landing ships, tanks (LST) were shallow-draft vessels with bows that could be lowered for quick unloading. Most were about 300 feet long, displaced approximately 6,000 tons and were able to haul 1,600 to 2,000 tons of cargo; in the case of LSTs, four Sherman tanks. They were the most widely used landing vessel in World War II combined operations. This class of ships, as well as landing craft assault or personnel, designated LCA or LCP were built in several configurations depending on their intended use.

75. Lt Gen Omar N. Bradley, USA, CG, US First Army Group; Maj Gen Ralph M. Royce, deputy CG, Ninth Air Force; Maj Gen Elwood R. Quesada, now CG, Ninth AF Fighter Command; Maj Gen Charles H. Corlett, USA, CG, USA XIX Corps.

76. Bradley’s headquarters were located at the time in a tent in an orchard near St. Pierre du Mont. The field hospital is not otherwise identified.

77. Thermite is a mixture of aluminum oxide and an oxide of another metal, usually iron, which produces intense heat upon ignition.

78. Lt Gen Courtney H. Hodges, USA, CG, US First Army; Maj Gen J. Lawton Collins, USA, CG, US Seventh Army Corps; Maj Gen Leonard T. Gerow, USA, CG, US Fifth Army Corps. The lunch consisted of Army C rations (canned food) and biscuits.

79. Ninth Air Force temporary operating headquarters had been located in France since 8 June at Grandcamp-les Baines, on the beach midway between Utah beach on the west and Omaha beach on the east. See Thomas Alexander Hughes, *OVERLORD: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

80. Maj Gen Lewis H. Brereton was now CG, Ninth Air Force.

81. This meeting elicited little comment from its attendees, Brooke indicating only that they confirmed agreements of the previous day and that the CCS “drew up directives” for Eisenhower and Gen Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, British Army, CG, Allied Forces Mediterranean, the latter of whom Arnold and Marshall would visit later on this trip; Bryant, 160. Neither Arnold nor Pogue mentions the session.

82. Maj Gen Frederick L. Anderson, deputy for operations, USSTAF; the aircraft was the Lockheed Lodestar.

83. The B-17 equipped 91st Bomb Group was located at Bassingbourn, Cambridgeshire, and commanded by Col Henry W. Terry. Arnold erred since the 325th Fighter Group was in Italy at the time; he meant instead the 355th Fighter Group flying P-51s and commanded by Col William J. Cummings Jr., operated from Steeple Morden, only five miles from Bassingbourn where he visited on this date. The B-26 unit visited was probably the 344th at

84. Maj Gen William E. Kepner, CG, VIII Fighter Command.

85. Lt Col Ross Milton was then assigned to the 91st Bombardment Group at Bassingbourn. His father, Alexander M. Milton, had been a West Point classmate of Arnold.

86. His previous visit had been only nine months earlier. See vol. 2, chap. 6.

87. Ambassador William Phillips served as political advisor to Eisenhower until he resigned that post on 17 August.

88. Col Andrew J. McFarland, USA, deputy secretary JCS.

89. There appears no extensive record of the discussion at this meeting.

90. Maj Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, now deputy Air CINC, Allied Expeditionary Air Forces, would become CG, Ninth Air Force, in August.

91. Col Frederick S. Wildman Sr., now plans officer, Headquarters AAF.

92. Of the attendees, only Brooke recorded that the topics discussed concerned the Pacific with agreement reached on “strategy based on Northwestern Australia . . . towards Borneo”; Bryant, 161.

93. Arnold was not certain if Churchill was serious about the proposal for reciprocal citizenship between US and British subjects similar to the common passport that permitted citizens of any British Commonwealth nation to enjoy citizenship in any other Commonwealth member nation.

94. Arnold’s first visit to the palace was 24 April 1941, covered in vol. 1, chap. 1.

95. Air Marshal Roderick M. Hill, RAF, AOC Air Defense of Great Britain. This organization had previously been designated Fighter Command and it would revert to that name in October 1944. The presentation dealt with the air phases of the ongoing invasion.

96. According to Brooke, the discussion centered on Burma but the British general felt that Marshall “has not even now grasped the true aspects of the Burma campaign”; Bryant, 160.

97. Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, British Army, now CINC, British 21st Army Group.

98. Actually, the assault by German V-1 rockets, called Crossbow by the British, began on 13 June when the first missile fired from Pas-de-Calais in France hit a railroad bridge in central London. Essentially aerial torpedoes with wings and the first “cruise missiles”; more than 16,000 V-1s would be fired against Britain and continental targets before the German surrender in 1945. It seems curious that Arnold did not comment in the diary on their similarity to the “bug,” in which he had become so intensely interested during World War I. He had envisioned the bug as the main weapon to be employed by the AAF in World War II against Germany. There is an analysis of the V-1 weapon in Craven and Cate, chap. 4. Arnold had pieces shipped immediately to the United States for replication. See Postscript to this chapter.

99. The ever-difficult Gen Charles de Gaulle continued to frustrate Eisenhower and Churchill as the invasion of France was undertaken. Most
immediately troublesome were de Gaulle’s instructions to civil officials in France to treat the newly printed Francs issued to the invasion troops as counterfeit and his refusal of permission for all but 20 of the trained 180 French-speaking Allied liaison officers scheduled to accompany the Allied invasion forces. Eisenhower presented these latest problems to the visiting American JCS. Marshall made at least one trans-Atlantic telephone call to Secretary of War Stimson on 15 June. The message to the president is not located. An account of the military implications of the imbroglio is in Pogue, 396–403.

100. Maj Gen Robert W. Crawford, USA, logistics officer, SHAEF.

101. With the removal of the AAF Ninth Air Force from the Middle East to Britain in September 1943, Brereton and his “boys with sand in their shoes” had encountered chain of command difficulties. By December 1943, the Allied Expeditionary Forces (AEAF) under Leigh-Mallory assumed “operational control” over the Ninth and Spaatz, as commander of USSTAF, informed Brereton in February 1944 that USSTAF would exercise control over administrative and training matters. The official history has noted that the new air force “found itself in the position of a vassal owing homage to two suzerains who had conflicting conceptions of their authority.” An already complicated command structure was further exacerbated by the April 1944 decision that Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, as AEAF Tactical Air Force Headquarters commander, would “direct” the Ninth as well as the RAF’s Second Tactical Air Force through an advanced headquarters of the AEAF during the assault phase of Overlord. See the discussion in Craven and Cate, 107–110.

102. A striker is a British aide, similar to a batman.

103. The bull was not sent.

104. John “Jack” Churchill, six years junior to his more famous brother, handled the prime minister’s personal affairs during the war.

105. En route to the Philippines in 1913, the newlywed Arnolds’ ship had stopped briefly in Guam.

106. Port Lyautey is a city just north of Rabat, Morocco, where the US Navy had an air station. The route was no doubt chosen for reasons of safety.

107. Maj Gen Idwal H. Edwards, now deputy CG, Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTOUSA); possibly John E. Barr, USA, West Point class of 1931, rank and assignment unknown; Maj Gen Thomas B. Larkin, USA, CG, Services of Supply, MTOUSA; Maj Gen Lucian Truscott, USA, now CG, Sixth Army Corps; Maj Gen Alexander M. Patch Jr., CG, US Seventh Army; Brig Gen Frederick W. Evans, CG, I Troop Carrier Command; Arnold probably meant Albert B. Pitts, AAF pilot, probably serving as a brigadier general, assignment not identified.

108. Lt Gen Jacob L. Devers, USA, now CG MTOUSA.

109. Capri is an island, Tyrrhenian Sea, just south of Naples, where Arnold had spent a night during his visit to Italy covered in chap. 7.
110. The Anzio-Aronna perimeter was then the extent of the front lines of the American Fifth Army and the German forces they faced.

111. In Latium, between the city of Lottoria and the Mussolini canal in the west, the Littoria marshes had not remained successfully drained during the war. By the time of this diary entry, they were very difficult to penetrate.

112. Although the typescript reads Boyea, Frederick W. Boye Jr., had served as the “TAC” or tactical officer responsible for the company to which cadet William Bruce Arnold had been assigned during the latter’s West Point career prior to his 1943 graduation. Boye’s rank and specific assignment in the 30th Division at this time are not known.

113. Lt Allen Brown, USA, General Marshall’s stepson, had been killed by a German sniper near Velletgria, Italy, three weeks earlier, on 29 May 1944.

114. Wadies are ravines through which intermittent streams flow, similar to a dry wash or arroyo in the US west.

115. If members of the 3d Reconnaissance Group, commanded by Maj Thomas W. Barfoot Jr., they were flying F-5 aircraft, a specially modified P-38 for reconnaissance missions, from their main base at Nettuno, Italy, where they had recently moved. If this was the 5th Reconnaissance Group, their main operating base was at San Severo, Italy, where they flew F-5 aircraft under the command of Maj Lloyd R. Nuttall.

116. Constitution Avenue is a main thoroughfare, six lanes wide or more, in downtown Washington, D.C.


118. Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, British Army, CG, Allied Forces Italy.

119. The Italian colonel is not otherwise identified. Arnold saw most of these landmarks, ranging from the marketplace ruins of the Forum to the Vatican Basilica of St. Peter’s. The amphitheater undoubtedly refers to the Coliseum. Caesar’s murder on 15 May, 44 B.C., is generally accepted to have taken place in the Porticus of Pompei in Pompei’s Theater near the present Campo dei Fiori. Arnold, as the diary reflects, was more impressed by the efficacy of US bombing than the antiquities of Rome.

120. In the spring of 1944, as the Allied ground forces in Italy encountered strong resistance against their moving north, a debate ensued concerning the use of airpower against communications and transportation facilities. While one argument favored hitting rail marshalling yards, the other advocated bombing bridges and viaducts to interdict German logistical support for troops south of Rome. The criticism levied against the US bombing of Monte Cassino on 15 February ordered by British Gen Henry Maitland Wilson, and the potential for destruction of historic sites in Rome, necessitated that targets be bombed with precision to prevent destruction of
adjacent sites. The result was Operation Strangle, conducted from March through May 1944, during which various targets were struck, essentially forcing most German resupply from the north onto the highways rather than the railroads. What Arnold saw confirmed his belief that surgical strikes on designated targets without destruction of neighboring areas were possible. A discussion of the problem in and around Cassino and Rome in 1944 is to be found in Craven and Cate, 361–96. Arnold’s point of view is in Global Mission, 514. See also the extensive folder on the bombing of Cassino, prepared probably in order to answer questions that Arnold might ask of General Eaker. This was presumably prepared by his aide, Maj James Parton, and is in James Parton Papers, Harvard University Library, Cambridge, Mass.

121. The hotel is not otherwise identified.

122. Living in the Palazzo di Venezia on the Piazza di Venezia, one of the busiest squares in central Rome, the Italian dictator addressed the faithful from his balcony overlooking the Piazza.

123. Viterbo is a town 50 miles north of Rome.

124. The reference is to the German heavy Pz. Kw Tiger tank, of which two models, the Tiger I and Tiger II, were produced; half-tracks were over-land personnel carriers with tank-like tracks in lieu of rear wheels.

125. This was the controversial 15 February 1944 bombing of the Monte Cassino Abbey by 229 aircraft of the Fifteenth Air Force, ordered by British Gen Henry Maitland Wilson.

126. Bari is an Italian Adriatic seaport just east of Naples, where the Fifteenth Air Force headquarters and others were located.

127. To increase the opportunities for bombing Axis-held territory, the AAF Fifteenth Air Force had moved to Bari on 1 November 1943, having been activated only a month earlier in Tunisia. It was anticipated that they would experience better operating weather than that prevailing over England and northwestern Europe. Arnold was clearly disappointed in the weather conditions he now encountered.


129. The Caserta Palace in Bari was headquarters for most major Allied activities in Italy, including the Fifteenth Air Force. See descriptions of it in Parton, 355, 386–91. Maj Gen Lowell W. Rooks, USA, deputy chief of staff, G-3, SHAEF.

130. Arnold’s account in Global Mission, 515, offers little more information about the meeting than he recorded in this diary.

131. US minister to Egypt, Alexander C. Kirk was appointed US member of the Italian Advisory Council on 4 April 1944; US Ambassador Robert D. Murphy was political advisor to the supreme commander of the Allied Forces Mediterranean and became political advisor to Eisenhower in August 1944.

132. In the period since the Arnolds had arrived in Washington in early 1936, Mrs. Arnold had been busily engaged in a variety of charitable and civic activities.
133. These were accounts of the initial B-29 raid on 15 June against Japan proper, the first since Doolittle’s daring B-25 attacks of April 1942. There is little doubt, given the teething problems and Arnold’s long involvement with implementation of the plane, that Hap was pleased by what he read.

134. Although not committed to his diary while approaching Casablanca, Arnold’s C-54 was buzzed by an American pilot in a P-38. General Marshall was riding in the copilot’s seat at the time and, according to Arnold, the P-38 missed the general’s aircraft by only 15 feet. Arnold was extremely unhappy with General Eaker’s subsequent explanation, even though in the remainder of the chastising letter, Hap was extremely laudatory of Eaker’s overall efforts and what he and the chief of staff had otherwise observed on this trip. See Arnold to Eaker, 2 August 1944, AP. Arnold’s recollections in Global Mission that the buzzing plane was a P-39 piloted by a Free French officer is not correct, although this was what he was told upon landing. Gen Vincent Meloy’s immediate erroneous identification to Arnold of the pilot as a Frenchman sparked Hap’s impetuous reaction that the French would not get a “single airplane from now on until his [sic] men learn how to fly.” General Kuter, who was in the airplane with Arnold and apparently present during the contretemps on the ground, provided a later and clearer assessment of the incident, including identifying the pilot correctly as an American flying a P-38. See Arnold, Global Mission, 516; Kuter to Maj Gen Idwal H. Edwards, 9 July 1944, Laurence S. Kuter Papers, USAFA, Colorado Springs, Colo.

135. Brig Gen Vincent J. Meloy, now CG, Africa-Middle East Wing, ATC; Col Melin B. Asp, CO, Marrakesh Army Air Field. Patton’s villa is not otherwise identified.

136. The RAF officer is not otherwise identified.


139. Sullivan is not otherwise identified. Mr. Lee Wulff wrote an article titled “Fishing with General Marshall and Arnold,” which appeared in the March 1945 issue of Outdoors magazine.

140. The Fischell River meanders east and west, approximately 17 miles south of Stephenville, Newfoundland.


142. See the discussion in Craven and Cate, vol. 6, Men and Planes, 255–58.

144. A member of Arnold’s Advisory Council before becoming CG of the 73d, O’Donnell understood Hap’s interest in getting the B-29 fully operational in the Pacific. Hence there was little delay with the 73d departing Kansas for Saipan on 17 July 1944.


146. Arnold to Spaatz, 29 June 1944, AP.

147. Quoted in Gilbert, 805.

148. Ibid., 827.
Chapter 9

Quebec
11 September–16 September 1944

Introduction

This five-day World War II conference, attended by Churchill, Roosevelt, and their chief military advisors, was the second gathering Arnold attended in this historic Canadian city. Unfortunately, as indicated in chapter 2, Arnold’s diary notes of the August 1943 Quebec Conference have not survived.

In the hundred days since the launching of the Overlord invasion and Arnold’s last trip abroad, Allied fortunes had improved steadily. As Churchill proclaimed to the assembled leadership during their second day at Quebec, everything the Allies “touched had turned to gold,” bringing about “an unbroken run of military successes during the previous seven weeks.”1 On the Eastern Front, Soviet troops had crossed into prewar Polish territory by 27 July. Four days later, they had advanced to within 10 miles of Warsaw. Further south, Soviet troops reached the Danube in Rumania, forcing acceptance of Soviet terms for surrender by 23 August. A week later, Soviet forces occupied the Ploesti oil facilities, site of earlier costly raids by Allied bombers. By the end of August, Soviet successes in the east had cost the Wehrmacht 1,200,000 casualties and 50 divisions.

In Western Europe, Allied ground advances had forced the surrender of 50,000 German troops during the third week of August. Another 10,000 were killed while trying to escape the Falaise Gap trap. That same week, American landings in southern France had been carried out with less difficulty than overcoming Churchill’s relentless opposition to undertaking the operation. By 22 August, American, French, and Algerian forces were in the outskirts of Marseilles. Further north, Paris was liberated three days later. This was followed by other Allied successes, including the surrender of Brussels on 3 September and
Antwerp the following day. Twenty-four hours later, US troops reached the Moselle River. On the 19th day since the northern France invasion began, the Allies counted more than two million troops ashore. Three days before the convening of this conference, US forces invaded the Netherlands. The day after the conference ended, 20,000 Allied airborne troops were dropped in Holland in what became the costly failure of Market Garden, essentially a British-inspired operation whose results contrasted sharply with Churchill’s assessment of Allied operations turning to gold. In southern Europe, Rome had fallen the day before Overlord began and British forces had reached Florence by 4 August.

In the Pacific, where the majority of Allied forces were American, US forces attacked Saipan on 15 June, with the Guam and Tinian invasions following in the next five weeks. By early August, after some of the fiercest fighting thus far in the Pacific, the bulk of the Marianas had been taken. These islands provided air bases from which the B-29s would commence bombing the Japanese homeland on 24 November. Ten days after D-Day, the US Navy destroyed three Japanese carriers and 425 of their aircraft in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Japanese Premier Hideki Tojo labeled the loss of Saipan “a great disaster.” As a result of this and other reverses, his cabinet fell in mid-July. During the Quebec deliberations, US Marines secured Peleliu. On New Guinea, Biak had been secured during the month before the Quebec Conference. American progress in that theater allowed Adm Chester W. Nimitz and Gen Douglas A. MacArthur, while at Quebec, to request permission from the JCS to advance their projected invasion of the Philippines by two months, from December to October 1944.

Clearly, Allied successes around the world were vastly different from those of the first Quebec meeting 13 months earlier; yet by no means was the war at an end. The first of 8,000 German V-1 rocket bombs had been launched against southeast England a week after D-Day. The British felt sufficiently confident, however, that the now weakened Luftwaffe could not attack their cities with conventional aircraft that, during the week before the conference opened, they lifted the black-
out restrictions that had been in existence for more than four years. Unfortunately, Londoners were jolted only two days later when the first V-2 rockets, the most powerful and lethal of Hitler’s new weapons, fell on the West End. As a result of their overall successes thus far, the mood of the conferees as they gathered was optimistic as they dealt with ongoing strategic/military problems worldwide, concentrating on the Pacific where ultimate success appeared much further distant. At the same time, they sought agreement on several postwar issues.

As evidence of the optimistic viewpoint they had gained from their earlier visit to the Overlord beaches and Italy in June, Arnold and Marshall were able to indulge in a day’s fishing en route back to Washington in June. Continuing Allied success around the world allowed Marshall and Arnold in August to escape the immediate demands of the Pentagon and relax while camping, hunting, and fishing in the High Sierras near Bishop, California. They returned to Washington from their nine-day diversion only 10 days before departing for this Quebec meeting.2

From Arnold’s viewpoint, a major question at Quebec concerning the AAF was RAF Chief Portal’s proposal for a return to the operational and organizational structure of the strategic air forces in Europe that had existed before Overlord. In March 1944, during planning for the invasion and after Eisenhower had threatened to “go home” unless his authority over them was established, the strategic air forces were brought under his “direction.”3 This new system, replacing CCS control, had proven effective. Much of its success was attributable to the mutual respect and effective working relationship that had been forged between Eisenhower and his airmen, Spaatz, Doolittle, Tedder, and Coningham, during their Mediterranean campaigns and continued as a sound basis for cooperation in the planning and execution of Overlord. As the official AAF history has expressed it, this smooth operation was brought about by “good sense and proper spirit” together with an “intense conviction . . . that the invasion had to succeed.” Even Air Marshal Harris and his Bomber Command had appeared to work well under Ike’s direction. The agreement

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provided, however, that once Overlord was firmly established on the continent, this new structure would be reassessed.\(^4\)

Ten days before the meeting, Spaatz informed Arnold that British air chief Portal would propose a reversion to the pre-Overlord arrangement. Eisenhower joined Spaatz in strongly recommending to both Arnold and Marshall that the change not take place. Although an administrative and bureaucratic nightmare on paper, the supreme commander had experienced no problems with the structure, resulting in the heavies dropping more than one-half of their bombs since D-Day on targets in support of the ground forces.\(^5\) Additionally, the bombers continued their assault on German industries and cities, reducing over the long haul the ability of the Wehrmacht to withstand the advancing Allied armies. If Portal’s recommendation were accepted at Quebec, “executive responsibility” for the strategic air forces in Europe would once again be vested in Arnold and Portal. Immediate “control and local coordination through consultation” would revert to Air Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley of the RAF and Lt Gen Carl Spaatz of the AAF.\(^6\)

As Hap’s diary reflected, Portal broached the issue informally with Arnold at tea as soon as they arrived. The British airman then introduced the topic formally the next day at the afternoon session of the CCS. In discussing the proposal there, it was clear that Hap, with support from Adm William D. Leahy and General Marshall, was opposed to any change in the status quo. In the interchange, Arnold pointed out that the AAF now had more than 4,400 heavies with two crews each in the European theater and asked, is this proposed change “the best setup to obtain the maximum use from this very large force?”\(^7\) Presumably at Arnold’s suggestion, the CCS agreed to defer the topic until the next morning to allow Hap the opportunity to discuss it over the trans-Atlantic phone with Spaatz. After brief consideration the next afternoon, 14 September, Hap agreed with the CCS on the reversion.\(^8\) The change returned control to the pre-Overlord arrangement, with first priority the “progressive destruction and dislocation of German military, industrial and economic systems and the direct support of land and naval forces” according to the precedence
“now established by the Supreme Commander.” It also provided “beyond all question” that Ike could get heavy bomber assistance at any time. Of two new paragraphs in the directive, one authorized attacks on “important industrial areas” by “using blind bombing technique.” A second one authorized strikes in support of Soviet armies.9

Curiously, Arnold has omitted in his memoirs the reasons for his having “flopped over” to Portal’s views and agreeing to support the change of 14 September. However, he outlined the reasons for his thinking to Spaatz in an “eyes only” letter two weeks later. Arnold explained that he had agreed to the reversion since there was “no control lost” by US command authorities and that Eisenhower was assured of getting bomber support for ground operations. In a rationale that seemed to reflect concern for the postwar period, Hap said the chance of having Spaatz “as my representative determine the targets and objectives for Strategic Air Force on a co-equal basis with Portal gives us a position in the scheme of things that we have never had before.”10 This in effect elevated the American strategic air commander to a position of equality with the head of the already independent RAF. As the AAF official history explained the change, it would “put Spaatz in better position to become the titular as well as the actual American air commander in Europe, a post which Arnold endlessly but vainly sought for him.”11 Hap had just recommended to Ike Spaatz’ promotion to four-star rank on 4 September but Eisenhower, concerned about parity with his ground commanders in the field, did not support the move at the time. Spaatz achieved the rank six months later. Arnold also was influenced by the realization that the change would be a step towards accomplishing Spaatz’ pre-invasion recommendation that the “progressive integration of all US air forces operating against Germany” be implemented after Overlord.12

There was probably some hesitation in Arnold’s agreeing with Portal on an issue that was initially opposed by Marshall, Eisenhower, and Spaatz. Yet it is logical to assume that Hap agreed in large part because the new arrangement promised an enhanced semiautonomous organizational role for the AAF with continuing emphasis on the primacy of strategic
bombing. It was to be directed by a proven senior American airman and staff in whom Arnold, Eisenhower, and Marshall had confidence. In looking towards the postwar US military, both Arnold and Spaatz anticipated and desired the separation of the AAF from the American Army. In striving for independence, it would be important to demonstrate to the senior Army ground forces leadership that air support had been and would be provided no matter what the organizational structure. Arnold was also aware that the change back to the pre-Overlord arrangement would essentially eliminate interference from the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces (AEAF), which had proven a difficult and unnecessary layer of command under Leigh-Mallory, particularly to Spaatz but also to most of the American air leadership. Given their increasingly close relationship, Arnold probably discussed the issue and secured the concurrence of Marshall before agreeing to the reversion on 14 September, it having been a topic for discussion between Hap and Marshall during their four-mile walk following the 3:30 CCS session on 12 September. To Arnold, as long as Eisenhower and his commanders received the support they needed, the postwar implications of the change towards validating the effectiveness of airpower through this semiautonomous command had to have been a major factor influencing his decision.

According to Spaatz, Ike was “a bit disappointed” by the change, which he later labeled “clumsy, awkward and inefficient.” However, once assured by Marshall and Arnold that his requests for strategic support would be met, Eisenhower said he had no difficulty with the change. Eisenhower appreciated that his bomber support from the Strategic Air Forces would provide him “just as much” as before. In the drafting of the first directive of 23 September under the reverted system, Spaatz’ influence was seen in the identification of oil “as first priority,” reaffirming the primary objective he had been advocating since becoming chief of United States Air Forces in Europe in January 1944.

There is little doubt that Portal was motivated by a need to regain control over Harris. His biographer has labeled the change a “success” for him at Quebec because, as Arnold
explained to Spaatz, the RAF Chief “had no control over Harris” and the AOC of Bomber Command “did as he damned well pleased” and Portal “felt it was essential to get Harris back under . . . control.” A British author has explained that by Portal “re-establishing his control of Bomber Command, it might yet be possible for the RAF to play a leading part in the conclusive attack of the war on German oil supplies.” Otherwise, the “8th Air Force” will complete the task “single handed.” This would leave the RAF “to rest on the withered laurels of their area campaign against the cities.” Not unexpectedly, Harris denounced the change as “unfortunate”; Spaatz, reflecting the mutual confidence he shared with Arnold and Eisenhower, quickly responded, “there is nothing in the new setup which will not work.”

A second topic that appeared vital to Arnold, the AAF, and the American military was the British insistence on British participation in the Pacific War. From the prime minister’s suggestion six months earlier that another “heads of state” meeting was required, he had reiterated to Roosevelt several times that one of the main topics would be “our [British] promise to help” in the war against Japan “to the very utmost of our strength.” Disappointed that FDR did not seriously consider coming to Europe to observe the Overlord invasion, Churchill in the month after the American JCS had been in London and toured the beaches, impatiently cabled FDR: “When are we going to meet and where? That we must meet soon is certain.”

Drafted en route to Quebec on the Queen Mary, to “save time” their memo said, the British submitted a “tentative programme and time-table” which was agreed to with slight modification by the CCS as the agenda for the conference in their first meeting on 12 September. Discussions on three of the proposed four days of sessions were to consider some aspect of “British participation in the Pacific in the war against Japan.” The length of time the British proposed to devote to the issue was probably reflective of the importance of the subject to them as well as the difficulty they anticipated in securing the necessary agreement from the Americans.

On the day they arrived in Quebec and before any formal meetings had been held, Churchill spoke to Admiral Leahy
about the assistance of the British fleet in the Pacific and was informed by the President’s senior military advisor that their offer had been accepted. The prime minister next mentioned the topic to FDR that first day in their early afternoon meeting. Clearly, Arnold’s “chatty time” and talking over “everything on my chest with all interested” the next evening at dinner included Churchill and the issue of RAF planes in the war against Japan. The prime minister had to have been discouraged by Hap’s candid questioning whether there would be sufficient land masses available to support RAF operations. Consequently, during the first working meeting with FDR and the CCS on 13 September, the prime minister lost no time in continuing the discussion of the topic of the night before with Arnold, in which Churchill presented a strong case for British participation in the Pacific. He may well have included Arnold, given their conversation of the previous evening, in his oral indictment to the assembled conferees that certain elements inimical to Anglo-American good relations were “putting it about that Great Britain would take no share in the war against Japan.”

After discussing the proposed role of the British fleet, Churchill paused to ask Roosevelt if their offer “to take part in the main operations against Japan under United States Supreme Command” was accepted. The president affirmed that it was. Assuring the group that any British fleet would be self-supporting, the prime minister promised that it would not “interfere in any way” with MacArthur’s command. Other British military forces were projected to include 1,500 RAF heavy and medium bombers to assist the AAF while six Army divisions were to be dispatched immediately after Germany’s surrender with the prospect of six more to follow. He also held out the possibility of providing 15 additional divisions then in Burma. Churchill stressed the desire for an “advance across the Bay of Bengal and operations to recover Singapore, the loss of which had been a grievous and shameful blow to British prestige.”

After what Brooke labeled his “long statement,” the British prime minister sensed the less than enthusiastic response of the American chiefs, particularly Admiral King who parried
Churchill’s statements with the response that the matter of utilizing the British fleet was “under examination.” General Marshall replied unenthusiastically that he and Arnold were “trying to see how best to fit in the maximum number of aircraft.” Churchill countered their obvious reluctance by asking Roosevelt a second time in the presence of the CCS whether the British offer of assistance was accepted, again eliciting an affirmative response from FDR. It can only be conjectured whether the less than enthusiastic response of the American chiefs to Churchill’s demand for a role in the Pacific war contributed to his appearing “very glum” at the luncheon immediately following. The minutes of the afternoon CCS meeting reflected that the military leaders agreed, paradoxically, that although British operations against Japan were “not yet approved,” they would agree as soon as possible on “the size of the British forces to be employed.”

The culmination of the discussion over British participation against Japan occurred in the contentious morning session of the CCS the next day. Arnold’s diary comment, “hell broke loose” over the issue, appears an accurate if euphemistic assessment according to others present. For example, Marshall’s biographer noted “King’s obvious displeasure” and Brooke commented, “King lost his temper entirely.” Portal recalled that there were “blunt speeches and some frayed tempers” and, as British Admiral Cunningham recounted it, “King hotly refused to have anything to do with it.” King’s sympathetic biographer called it “one of their most emotional and acrimonious confrontations during the war.” King’s own account, however, with its convenient omissions where his habitual bad manners were concerned, makes no mention of a tempest. The American admiral remarked only that he was opposed to a British fleet in the Pacific that he could not “employ or support.”

In the ensuing discussion, it became apparent that others of the American JCS were as unenthusiastic about British participation as was Admiral King. Arnold, echoing his previous remarks to Churchill at dinner, pointed out that no “definite answer” concerning RAF operations was possible at the moment and that future deployment and utilization of British
aircraft would be dependent on “development of suitable facilities.” Hap and the other chiefs were aware that the ferocious fighting in the Marianas, where the British shorter range aircraft would have to be based, had only ended in the month before the conference and that time would be needed to construct the necessary air bases and support facilities. Arnold had already planned to use these airfields, which would have to be constructed within a limited usable land area, as the primary bases of operations for the B-29s. After tempers had cooled, the CCS agreed that the British fleet “should participate in the main operations” with assurances that it would be “balanced and self-supporting” and would be employed “in accordance with the prevailing circumstances,” a clause that might be subject to a multitude of later interpretations. As to the RAF, Portal was “invited” to submit an “estimate in general terms” of proposed RAF contributions. There seems little doubt that the American joint chiefs were temporizing, given Roosevelt’s two public endorsements of Churchill’s request, and were trusting that a variety of unpredictable circumstances might intervene.24

In many ways, this considerable difference of opinion on the role to be played by the British in the war against Japan was reflective of the changed and changing relationship between these two Allies, essentially brought about as a result of their recent military successes and emphasized in this conference. Churchill, with his sense of history, was well aware of the changes that had taken place and their implications. From the British viewpoint, circumstances as they now met in Quebec were very different from the first two years of American involvement. In the earliest days of US participation, the Americans had been saddled with crushing defeats in the Pacific, were embarrassed by their inability to undertake any militarily meaningful operations in the Western Hemisphere, and sorely lacked deployable, trained fighting forces. Thus the strategic direction other than in the Pacific had been in large part determined by the British. Disturbing to the British in this early period had been the naive if not dangerous underestimation by their American cousins of the difficulty of defeating Hitler and a feeling (probably justified) that at least
one member of the American JCS failed to embrace the “Europe first” strategy. The American chiefs on the other hand were uneasy if not disturbed by Churchill’s ability to sway Roosevelt to strategic courses of action considerably different from their collective thinking and recommendations. As Brooke conceded, the American JCS admired Churchill “as man, have little opinion of him as a strategist.”25 On the other hand, the British felt that they had saved the Americans and themselves from certain disaster in securing delay of the second front until 1944. The Americans, however, remained distrustful of British motives; Churchill and his advisors had secured FDR’s agreement to attack in North Africa, Sicily, and then Italy, all of which were, in the minds of the American military leaders, too far removed from the beaches of Normandy and too reflective of British Mediterranean interests. As the British expressed it, they had “led the Americans by the nose from Casablanca to Italy.”26 They took some solace, however, in realizing that what they viewed as American inexperience and lack of sound strategic thinking were in part compensated for by the vast US manpower, materiel, and industrial resources now reaching their zenith.

The British felt that their considerable experience in the air, in both defending their homeland and carrying the air war to enemy cities, had been virtually ignored by the brash Americans. The Yankee aviators insisted on daylight operations and implied, when they did not openly proclaim, that their aircraft, aviators, and methodology were superior to those of the proven RAF. On the ground, the British were approaching the limits of their manpower, which had been drained by five years of fighting around the world. They felt that the Americans, with their large resources of personnel, failed to appreciate the degree to which this limitation could affect deployment of British forces. On the high seas, the major US effort had been in the Pacific where their carrier and amphibious operations had been extremely successful. Except for the Battle of the Atlantic, less attention had been paid to the role of navies in the European theater, where the shortage of landing craft proved to be a key limiting factor. The British often questioned
whether more of these American-produced vessels should have been allocated to support the “Europe first” strategy.

The 6 June Overlord invasion, wherein the predominant manpower, materiel, air support, leadership, and even strategy proved to be American, represented a turning point—a fact not unnoticed by either the British or the Americans. As Brooke expressed it, since “the Americans now begin to own the major strength . . . therefore . . . [they] consider that they are entitled to dictate how their forces are to be employed.”

Other circumstances appeared to validate the changing relationship between the two English-speaking Allies. As the fighting continued in northern France, success in the British sectors did not come as rapidly as in the American. Nor were British successes reported as strikingly as were US advances. To many Americans, British Gen Bernard Montgomery appeared more and more to exhibit the extreme caution of Gen George B. McClellan in his 1862 campaign before Richmond during the American Civil War. This encouraged General Eisenhower to assume operational command of the ground forces, a position previously held by Montgomery, effective 10 days before the opening of the conference. Churchill reacted by promoting Montgomery to Field Marshal, making him senior in rank to Eisenhower, Arnold, Marshall, and Bradley. In northern France, airpower continued to forge a solid relationship between the ground commanders and the medium bombers, fighter-bombers, and fighters of the tactical air forces, which were predominantly USAAF. In many ways, the liberation of Rome and Paris, which was accomplished primarily by US forces, appeared to overshadow, at least in much of the public press, the British successes in capturing Antwerp and Brussels. It appeared clear in many ways that Overlord and its aftermath represented US superiority in materiel, men, and accomplishments.

A recent disagreement over strategy was disappointing to the British, and it probably contributed to Churchill’s and his military staff’s demand to play a significant role in the defeat of Japan. In simplest terms, the difference of opinion had been whether the planned Anvil (later renamed Dragoon) landings in southern France following D-Day were to take place. The
operation had been agreed upon in December 1943 at Cairo. Although Eisenhower, in the two weeks following the launching of Overlord, insisted that implementation of this operation was “vital” because of the need for additional port facilities, the British had been opposing the operation for more than two months. In their opposition, Churchill and the British chiefs of staff argued that the troops and landing craft for Anvil should instead remain intact in Italy, there to be part of the continuing assault on Albert Kesselring’s stubbornly resisting German armies. The British argued that the next Allied move, following the German defeat in Italy, should be across the Adriatic into Istria, through the Ljubljana Gap, and eventually to Vienna. The Mediterranean theater, its main forces now concentrated on the Italian peninsula, was essentially a British one, with British leadership at the top and in command of their 16 divisions, and naval forces—everything except the US Fifth Army and the predominantly AAF air assets. The British clearly did not want what they considered their primary theater weakened in any way.

British doubts concerning Anvil had appeared as early as 14 April, when Admiral Cunningham sought “a clear cut decision now” to abandon the proposed landings. Two days later, Churchill, who had said at Cairo in December 1943 that the southern France invasion “would contribute largely to the success of Overlord,” now insisted that circumstances had changed and Anvil should not be undertaken. On the day after D-Day, the British chiefs of staff urged Churchill to resist the American plan to withdraw troops from the Italian battlefield “in readiness for Anvil.” Arnold, Marshall, and King, during their visit and meetings in London immediately following D-Day, were exposed to considerable British pressure against the southern France landings.

Churchill lost no opportunity in urging the abandonment of Anvil on Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Marshall, and even Harry Hopkins during the closing days of June. The British prime minister continued to refer to the proposal in a variety of disparaging terms. He lamented that his splendid Army in Italy was being “pulled to pieces,” and deplored “the ceaseless withdrawal of important elements,” which he indicated had been
done “ruthlessly” by American strategy. The bitterness of Churchill’s resentment was captured in his 6 July memo to his military chiefs, written five weeks before Anvil was launched and after he had failed again to secure Roosevelt’s agreement to kill the proposal.

Let them [the Americans] take their seven divisions. . . . Let them monopolize all the landing craft. . . . But let us at least have a chance to launch a decisive strategic stroke with what is entirely British and British command. I am not going to give way about this for anybody. . . . I hope you realize that an intense impression must be made upon the Americans that we have been ill-treated and furious . . . if we take everything lying down, there will be no end to what will be put upon us.

Although Churchill reproduced part of this angry memo in his postwar Triumph and Tragedy, he did not include there the scathing judgment with which he concluded the original message. The omitted sentence was: “The Arnold-King-Marshall combination is one of the stupidest strategic teams ever seen.” This was an interesting assessment coming from the architect of Gallipoli.

Two days after visiting this new front and viewing the virtually unopposed landings in southern France, Churchill maintained his disappointment as he wrote of them as an “irrelevant and unrelated operation.” This was the first major strategic decision that Churchill had lost to the Americans, and his as well as British pride appeared to have been wounded, thus increasing their later insistence on securing a major British role in the war against Japan where a modicum of face might be salvaged. Neither the Americans nor the British could accept or forget their early defeats at the hands of the Japanese, and the American plan of regaining the Philippines, now nearing implementation, did not seem to emphasize an Allied attack to regain Singapore, a prewar symbol of British power in the Pacific.

The British inability to cancel Anvil had not only ended their hopes of continuing Mediterranean operations but, more important, it had confirmed their relegation to a junior partner role in the alliance. If an issue here was wounded British pride, was not the opposition by the American chiefs to according their ally a significant role against the Japanese
also explained in part by similar motivation? Although there had been, were, and, given the unwillingness of Roosevelt to designate a single supreme commander, would be difficulties within the US operations in the Pacific, the American chiefs were aware that this area had become essentially an American theater and they seemed intent on retaining their primacy. From their optimistic viewpoint, now that the war in Europe seemed on the verge of being completed, they seemed to harbor little doubt that American forces could prevail against the Japanese without major British assistance. They anticipated that their dominance would limit British strategic suggestions to a minimum even though they reasoned that Churchill would continue to attempt to sway FDR to the British prime minister's strategic thinking.

A striking confirmation of the US chiefs' belief in the dominance of their Pacific role, as well as their intention of retaining it, transpired on 14 September. At the dinner hosted by the Canadians, a cable was received from Admiral Nimitz. The admiral offered to provide fleet and amphibious forces to General MacArthur for an assault on Leyte in the Philippines, the operation to take place as early as 20 October instead of the 20 December date that had been planned. Arnold, Marshall, and King excused themselves, agreed with the proposed change, and dispatched an immediate affirmative answer without bothering to consult their dining British colleagues.33

As to British naval participation, King's biographer has noted accurately, "the pride and prestige of the Royal Navy and Great Britain were at stake." Their historic naval superiority had been superseded by the American buildup of powerful armadas. As his biographer continued, "not only was King unwilling to share in the glory, but, most galling of all, he called the Royal Navy a liability." Although the British units that did reach the Pacific war before its end contributed measurably, primarily Task Force 57 under Vice Admiral Sir H. B. Rawlings, King's opposition stemmed not only from pride but concern that the Royal Navy's logistical support would come from the US Navy.34

As to the air war, the AAF had failed in Europe to achieve Arnold's early optimistic if not unrealistic hope that strategic
bombardment would negate the need for a large-scale invasion of the continent. In the Pacific theater, however, Hap continued to entertain the hope of being able to demonstrate the efficacy if not the primacy of strategic aerial warfare against the Japanese home islands with their much more compact land areas and far less air opposition. If the AAF had its way, the attacks would continue to be dominated by the B-29, the latest (and most troublesome) airplane in the AAF inventory. Arnold was convinced that the Superfortresses could be successful and that there was little need to share the task with the RAF. Arnold himself would have a much more direct impact in leading this assault since the JCS had created the Twentieth Air Force five months earlier to operate the B-29s with Arnold as commanding general from his office in the Pentagon. Plans were already underway for moving the bulk of B-29 aircraft, crews, and support from India to the Marianas as airfields there continued to be prepared for the arrival of the bombers.

It is not possible to determine whether any of Arnold’s Anglophobic sentiments, which he had articulated as a young officer in World War I and which had reappeared on occasion prior to this meeting, still lingered. Hap’s relations with the British since becoming Air Corps chief in 1938 had not been altogether amicable. He probably sensed how close he had been to removal by Roosevelt for opposing the president’s efforts to furnish the bulk of American aircraft production to the British in the days before Pearl Harbor. Even after the United States entered the war, Arnold found it difficult to agree with the British on a mutually acceptable allocation of aircraft, given the competing needs of the burgeoning American training establishment and the requirement to equip AAF units for overseas deployment. These differences had prompted Arnold’s first two trips to England that he covered in his diaries.

Hap was aware that another major problem was that the British, led by Churchill and his military chiefs, had made a concerted effort to have the AAF abandon their planned daylight bombing and join the RAF in night attacks. It was not until January 1943 at Casablanca that Arnold and Eaker were finally able to get Churchill’s concurrence with day operations as acknowl-
edged in the Combined Bomber Offensive. Earlier, Arnold had vigorously opposed the British-inspired diversions of American airpower, particularly heavy bombers, away from Arnold’s main objective of bombing Germany. The British insisted on diverting aircraft to support operations in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. Although Arnold never wavered in his respect and admiration for the RAF for its success in the Battle of Britain, he was disparaging of the British air effort as recently as the three months before this Quebec gathering. During the June JCS visit to the Normandy beaches, he rhetorically asked, “What have the RAF done to defeat GAF since the Battle of Britain?” In his memoirs three years after the war, Arnold felt that Churchill had been “needled” by the RAF into supporting their proposals for deployment against Japan. If Churchill’s petulance over the issue of British participation in the Japanese war remained in 1953 when the Prime Minister wrote his postwar history, neither had Arnold’s concern subsided. Hap wrote in 1948, regarding the British proposal for an active Pacific role, that since it “would influence or interfere with our global operations, I could not agree.”

Winant, from his perspective as US Ambassador to Britain, made a strong case for the United States allowing the “gallant” British to participate against Japan in a letter to Harry Hopkins written 10 days before the opening of the Quebec meeting. He insisted with some hyperbole that US failure to do so “will defeat everything that men have died for in this war.” He may not have been too far wide of the mark, however, in understanding some of Arnold’s opposition when he suggested that the United States not “shuck the British air force in order to prove our own dominance in the air.” Later in the war, when the Canadians sought a role in the air war against Japan, the United States offered them short-range A-20 planes. The Canadians declined, commenting that it was “evidence that the AAF wanted to run the air war in the Pacific without any outside help.”

It is logical to assume that Arnold’s opposition to British air participation in the war against Japan was motivated in large part by pride in the superiority and potential of the air arm he had created. This, he anticipated, would contribute to validating the concept of strategic bombardment as well as strengthening the raison d’etre for a postwar separate Air Force. This was in
addition to whatever Anglophobia remained, exacerbated by the
difficulties he had experienced with the RAF and the British.

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The Diary

TRIP TO QUEBEC CONFERENCE
September 11, 1944–September 16, 1944
GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD

Monday, September 11, 1944 [Portland, Maine to Quebec, Canada]


Met at airport by our ATC representative and local CO RCAF.39 Met at Hotel Frontenac by Kuter, Fairchild and ¼ doz. photographers.40 Pete got out of auto first much to their consternation.41 Met by flock of Mounties and Manager Hotel, [B. A.] Neale.42

President and Prime Minister arrived at 10 A.M. at [railroad] station and this caused commotion and confusion and no one knew which one to greet first. Finally agreed on Prime Minister first and President afterwards.

Dill, Noble, Welsh arrived from US;43 Portal, Cunningham, Brooke, Ismay with Prime Minister on the Queen [Mary].44 Marshall arrived at 17:30, King came in at 15:30. Plenty of papers to read and settling to do. Cocktails with Lt. Gen. [John Carl] Murchie, Chief of Staff, Royal Canadian Army and Air Marshal Leckie, RCAF, and Vice Admiral Jones, RCN.45 Too many papers in P.M.

Tea with Portal in which he asked:

(1) More C-54s, two per month for run Ceylon-Australia.46

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(2) Change in command of Strategic Air Forces to Committee of RAF-AAF operating under Portal and Arnold for CCS.47

(3) British CO for American forces under Mountbatten, gave me letter in that regard from Dickie.48

(4) Lancasters for operation against Japan; new [fuel] tanks, longer range. I did not commit myself on any.49

Invitation to dinner at Governor-General, His Excellency, etc., 8:00 P.M. at the Citadel. See dinner table diagram.50

After dinner Marshall gave me several messages from Russians and Harriman re Polish patriots in Warsaw. For some time it has been apparent that if some help was not given to Polish patriots they would be exterminated in Warsaw. Last time the RAF sent in planes with supplies they lost some 48 [aircraft] or about 35% and the Germans got most of the supplies dropped. Now the British are trying to force the Russians to assist in the enterprise. The Russians would just as soon have all of the Warsaw Poles exterminated; they are only interested in the Ukranian Poles. Hence they reportedly stood by and watched while the debacle was happening in Warsaw. Now when public opinion is aroused at the lack of help, the Russians come back with:

Who started the unfortunate uprising in Warsaw?
Why weren't we notified of it? How can you get our help if you don't let us know?
That is our war theatre and you must not interfere.
We will do the job.

If you now feel that you want to help the Poles, give us your plan and we will look it over.

With that in mind I went to bed and dreamed of alligators lurking in the shadows, awaiting such victims as came their way.51

Tuesday, September 12, 1944 [Quebec]

Got off a cable to Deane and one to Spaatz before breakfast. At least I had concurrence from Marshall–Portal but did not complete job until JCS meeting at 10:00 A.M. Told Spaatz to
arrange details for supplying Patriots in Warsaw with Deane and told Deane to coordinate with Russians. JCS meeting on various subjects until 11:30, CCS Meeting at 12:00 until 1:00, solved many problems. Held command of strategic bombers in abeyance until tomorrow; I wanted to hear what Spaatz had to say on subject. Adjourned at 1:00, lunch with Portal, Welsh and Kuter. Met again at 2:30, adjourned at 3:30. Walked with Marshall 4 miles back along river to Museum on Plains of Abraham, then car home, wet to skin. Bath, cocktails with Peterson, Sheffield and Dahlman. Dinner with Elite at 7:00: [Admiral] King, Brooke, President, Princess Alice, Prime Minister, Marshall, Major General______, Arnold, Cunningham, Mrs. President [Roosevelt], Governor General, Mrs. Prime Minister, Leahy, Portal; quite a chatty party. Sometimes I ride high and sometimes my indifference does not go so well. Had a very chatty time and talked over everything on my chest with all interested. At 11:00 the Mrs. President said: “Frank, it is almost eleven o’clock,” and the party broke up.

The Prime Minister thinks it is a matter of National import that they get planes, ships, soldiers into the final battle against Japan. Where can we put the planes? I told him that there were not enough land masses to use the planes, H. B. [heavy bombers], that we had available in Europe. As a matter of fact we could use only 1,500 [AAF] out of 3,500 in Europe. Where can we use the RAF heavies? Who knows? National pride is a very strong stimulant and may be almost a compel-lant if used in the highest levels.

Wednesday, September 13, 1944 [Quebec]

Up at 6:45, worked on American Legion speech until I didn’t have time for breakfast and all my other chores. Weather closed in, raining about noon. American Legion speech needed complete rewriting. After short staff meeting had JCS. On to Citadel at 11:15, CCS present with President and Prime Minister. Talked mostly about British participation in the Pacific, what may happen in Italy and what will be done with troops, air and Navy there,
Russian operations in the Balkans, Russian desires for a small group of small German states and British desires for a small number of larger states as a buffer between the snowy mountains of Russia and the snow white cliffs of Dover; Prime Minister versus Stalin. Prime Minister very complimentary about our Normandy and Southern France operations after his violent opposition several months ago. Fala present for conference.

Returned to Frontenac at 1:15; lunch with Pasco, Pete and Sheffield; 2:30 CCS Meeting, nothing unusual; JCS meeting at 4:00. Prepared XX Air Force paper. Reception by Mackenzie King and Madame at 9:00. Pete took one buck away from me at gin rummy. The buffet reception was graced by Mrs. Roosevelt, Mrs. Churchill, Mr. and Mrs. Prime Minister of Canada and all the lesser lights. Buffet supper at a table with Minister of Air of Canada, Portal, Breadner, Leckie, Arnold, Kuter, Welsh and several other Air officers and some of their wives. Bed at 11:30.

Thursday, September 14, 1944 [Quebec]

In the conference yesterday there was no doubt as to the Prime Minister desiring for political reasons to be in at the kill when we hit Japan. He wanted to be there with his main Fleet and some 500 to 1,000 H. Bs. There was also no doubt as to the President’s being in accord, [who said] “The British could not hold up their heads if such was not done.” [Churchill said] “With all your wealth of airdromes you would not deny me a mere pittance of a few!” There was also a decided feeling on the part of the British that they were losing far too many men in their Burma operations, far too many from sickness.

Breakfast, JCS at 9:30, everything normal, CCS at 10:00, not much excitement. Everything normal until British participation in Pacific came up; then Hell broke loose. King could not agree that there was a place for British Navy in the Pacific except in small force; the tempest subsided in time. The meeting continued and we adjourned. Photos taken of JCS and CCS, band concerts on boardwalk outside of window. Lunch with Leckie, joined by Sir John Dill, Regg! and Marshall. Talked over RCAF participation in Pacific war, 47 squadrons.
Walk with Marshall at 4:00, rode out into country for a while and then got out of car on a gravel road, told him [driver] to drive on for two miles and wait, then one mile more and finally one mile more, a total of four miles. Dinner at Colonel Clarke’s. He apparently runs or rather owns large pulp mills, has home in New York and spends a little of his time in Quebec, owns several fine fishing places.67

Had long talk with Brooke, we talked taxes, he pays a 50% tax at source, he never sees that money. As a Field Marshal, he gets 400 pounds a year, 200 are taken away at start, another 100 as a surtax, he finally gets 75 pounds out of his extra Field Marshal pay.68

At the dinner Brooke, Cunningham, Portal (British); Marshall, King, Arnold (American); Murchie, Jones, Leckie (Canadian); Ismay, Somervell. Made a bet with Brigadier Edmond Blais (another wealthy Canadian who normally lives in New York) that the Yankees would not win the pennant, $10.00.69 Portal took me to the dinner and brought me back. Clarke has a fine, big house with all modern conveniences.70 Bed at 11:30.

Friday, September 15, 1944 [Quebec]

Breakfast 7:30, presentation, 8:15. Worked on American Legion speech, JCS 9:30, CCS 10:00. No acrimonious arguments or anything. All business decided in a normal manner, completed by 11:45. Agreed (when I saw I was licked) to withdraw my request for an American Air Commander under Mountbatten.71 Told Portal he could not have any C-54s for the time being.72 Lunch with Marshall and Portal. Went to Airport with Portal to see the “Honeymoon Express”; he got quite a kick out of it.73 Made up a party of CCS to see Canadian Army show. When time came to go British Chiefs of Staff had date at Citadel to discuss our final report of this meeting. Apparently there are several changes that the Prime Minister will insist on.74

Marshall was called in by Prime Minister at the 10th hour, hence King, Sheffield, Pete and I went to the show and were greatly amused. However my sensibilities were shocked to see negro men dancing and almost caressing white girls and a
white man doing the same to a negro gal. The negro gal came from Detroit and the two men; one from Texas, the other from Oklahoma. Outside of that, it was an excellent show. Bed at 11:00.

Saturday, September 16, 1944 [Quebec to Washington, D.C.]

Schedule for today: JCS 10:30, CCS 11:00, with Prime Minister and President 12:00. I hope home this P.M. JCS went off according to schedule; CCS remarkably free from discussion [dissention?]. I sent Portal memos re Hornet, C-54s and Strategic Aviation. Went to the Fort for meeting with Prime Minister and President. Thought that the President looked very badly; he did not have the pep, power of concentration, could not make his usual wisecracks, seemed to be thinking of something else, closed his eyes to rest more than usual.

The Prime Minister and President accepted our report with but a few changes. We talked over Burma more than anything else. Prime Minister had the thought of 300,000 British soldiers, sick, disabled, out of action due to the terrible Burma climate on his mind. Reminded me of his talks prior to invasion of Normandy when he used to refer to 300,000 dead British soldiers floating in the Channel. There can be no wars without someone getting killed and someone getting hurt.

I talked to the President and Prime Minister about the bombing catastrophe at Freckleton and received their OK to give money indemnity to the nearest of kin of the children killed. Took it up with Portal who also OK’d it. Now will give to Winant to put over for me.

Back to Frontenac at 1:15, did not go in, went direct to Airport, no lunch. Waited for lunch and [revision of] American Legion Speech [from Washington]. Took off with Pete, Meade, Leger, Sheffield, Kuter at 2:39 P.M., arrival was 5:00. One of the best conferences yet from all angles.

Postscript

If this conference at Quebec represented an appreciation by both nations of the now paramount American role in the US-British partnership, it was also at this meeting that Arnold
exerted more influence than at any other Allied diplomacy/military conference. His stature with FDR and Marshall permitted him considerable latitude in areas ranging from coordinating, with both military and diplomatic personnel, airdrops for beleaguered Polish insurgents to delaying an allocation of aircraft requested by Portal and Churchill. In postponing (and effectively denying) British requests for the latest US-manufactured transports, Arnold continued to consider postwar problems. In this decision, he continued to act on his previous suspicions, shared with FDR, that the British, using American aircraft furnished them without cost under Lend-Lease, were seeking to position themselves advantageously against American carriers in postwar civil airline competition.

Arnold’s personal feelings in this diary seem to reflect his having become inured to the horrors of war as he opined that there “can be no wars without someone getting killed.” At the same time, his racial attitudes, stemming from long military service where few Negroes existed, appeared unchanged with his “sensibilities... shocked” at the sight of interracial dancing and caressing in a Canadian army show.

This was not the first meeting with Churchill and FDR in which major diplomatic issues were considered by the two civilian leaders without reference to the CCS and hence their omission from mention in Arnold’s diary. These included, among other items, Morgenthau’s proposed harsh postwar treatment of Germany, the division of Germany into zones, and the continuation of Lend-Lease after the German defeat.

Roosevelt and Churchill brought their wives to the conference and, along with the ladies of their Canadian hosts, they made this gathering the most social high-level wartime conference of the Allies. This meeting marked Arnold’s fifth meeting with the major members of the British-American political-military leadership. His diary reflected his ease in socializing freely with the assemblage. Although unforeseen at the time, this would be Arnold’s last planning meeting with the British leadership for almost a year. It would prove to be Arnold’s final major Allied conference with President Roosevelt, since Hap’s fourth heart attack precluded his attendance at Yalta, which was followed by FDR’s death two months later. Arnold’s heart
problems in January 1945 would cause serious concern by the US military and civilian leadership since Hap, in spite of three previous attacks, continued his reluctance to delegate all but a few of the important decisions. At the same time, he maintained, as his American Legion speech in the week following the Quebec meeting illustrates, an extremely demanding domestic schedule of travel, speechmaking, correspondence with his commanders in the field, and a punishing six- and often seven-day routine of work in the Pentagon. As was his practice at several previous conferences, Arnold continued in this diary to record but a bare outline of the deliberations that did not involve air matters. The more mundane task of providing details of these deliberations was left to the increasingly efficient Allied secretariat and Hap’s own somewhat larger staff that accompanied him and maintained rapid contact with the Pentagon.

Arnold’s comment as he left the five-day meeting that this was “one of the best conferences yet from all angles” seems accurate from his viewpoint. He and the leadership assembled there reflected strong but very premature optimism over the end of the European war, and the agreements reached there reflected the emerging diplomatic, strategic, and military dominance of the United States. German resistance continued stronger than anticipated, however, and temporary but costly reverses such as the Battle of the Bulge awaited Allied forces.

Arnold’s optimism reflected the success of the AAF as witnessed by the presence of over 4,500 fully manned and well-supplied American heavy bombers in the European theater and the growing fleet of B-29 Superfortresses en route to Pacific bases to attack the Japanese homeland. In Europe, where thebulk of American aircraft remained committed to the strategic bombardment campaign, Arnold could contrast the change in the two years since the Eighth Air Force flew its first mission of 12 B-17s against a French airfield only 150 miles from London. During the first three days of the Quebec meeting, the Eighth alone flew three missions against targets in Germany proper, averaging 1,015 heavies and 540 escorting fighters each day. In addition, Ninth Air Force, now flying from bases in France, flew thousands of tactical missions, and
the Fifteenth’s heavies were operating from Italian soil. In spite of traditionally bad European weather, the Eighth was enabled by better radar, more accurate weather forecasting, and a seemingly inexhaustible supply of technologically improved aircraft to dispatch heavies on major raids on an average of 18 days each month from now through the remainder of 1944. In addition, the Eighth now had more and better trained aircrews and more lethal munitions. In these missions, it was not unusual that 1,200 or more of the bombers were escorted by more than 800 fighters, culminating in the Christmas Eve raid of 2,084 heavy bombers escorted by 853 fighters.\footnote{The last of the shuttle bombing missions from Soviet bases in the Poltava area flew on the second day of the conference (13 September), the termination caused by Soviet success in the summer offensive, which had placed the American bases too far from the front lines. The 19 missions that had been flown in that operation, which began four days before D-Day, proved little in terms of either strategic or tactical success except as another frustrating example of attempting to work cooperatively with the Soviets and a harbinger of difficulties to come.\footnote{Not only was AAF superiority represented in the numbers and efficacy of aircraft now flying from England and Italy but, at least in Arnold’s mind, their efforts appeared to be validating the strategic bombardment concept. In the week before the conference, Roosevelt signed the directive that created the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), which Hap was convinced would provide the empirical data proving conclusively the dominant role of strategic bombing in the prosecution of the war in western Europe. As indicated elsewhere, the idea of such a survey had originated six months earlier, with suggestions from Spaatz as well as the Air Staff. Shortly after the directive was signed, Franklin D’Olier, president of Prudential Insurance, accepted the offer to head the USSBS. Within the month, he arrived in London with the advanced element of his initial authorization of more than 1,200 officers, civilians, and enlisted personnel. Interestingly, he established headquarters in Grosvenor Square in the same building that Arnold had used for himself and a small staff during his first
and third World War II visits there. Arnold would receive their preliminary report while in the Pacific in July 1945.83

As work began to transform the newly captured Marianas into bases for the B-29s to operate against Japan, Arnold demonstrated the same impatience at their completion and operational use as he had shown in the spring of 1942 as the Eighth proceeded overseas to its English airfields. Operational commanders became the recipients of the same kinds of cajoling and urging that Spaatz and Eaker had endured in England while Hap continued to search for validation of the strategic bombardment concept.

Arnold had to have been pleased that, at Quebec, the AAF appeared increasingly accepted as a separate military service, virtually equal with the already independent RAF. Additionally, Arnold was well aware of and pleased with the emergence of the tactical partnership that had come into being in Europe between the US Army and the close air support the AAF was now fully supplying. If the AAF as an institution was being treated now as a virtually autonomous entity, this was reflected in the latitude accorded Arnold at Quebec. There he had a major voice in the organizational structure of Allied air in Europe. The one he chose to support reflected his desire that air support would be available to Army commanders no matter what the jurisdictional command lines showed. Quebec represented the emergence of the United States as the senior partner in the Anglo-American coalition, Army airpower as a significant factor in that dominance, and Arnold as the acknowledged responsible and respected spokesman and leader of these forces.

Notes


AMERICAN AIRPOWER COMES OF AGE

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 320.
6. Draft proposal, 18 November 1943, FRUS, Quebec, 1944, 432–33.
8. Ibid., 432–34.
9. Ibid.
11. Craven and Cate, 321.
12. Arnold to Eisenhower, 4 September 1944, AP; and Eisenhower to Arnold, 11 September 1944, AP.
15. Davis, 546–47.
18. FRUS, Quebec, 1944, 40–41.
19. Ibid., 299–300.
20. Ibid., 315.
21. Ibid., 315–16.
22. Ibid., 315–21.
24. FRUS, Quebec, 1944, 333.
25. Bryant, 208.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 167–68.

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29. Ibid., 799; and chap. 8, this volume.
31. Ibid., 843.
32. Ibid., 899.
34. Buell, 469–72.
35. Chap. 8, this volume; and Arnold, *Global Mission*, 524.
36. Winant to Hopkins, 1 September 1944, FRUS, Quebec, 1944, 254.
38. Arnold had spent at least one day en route to the conference at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, where he discussed ongoing scientific aviation developments including advanced radar. He then proceeded to relax, fish, and visit with his family at Kezar, a nine-mile-long lake in southeastern Maine, about 60 miles northwest of Portland. Mrs. Arnold and their youngest son David were spending the summer there and 10 September was the Arnolds’ 31st wedding anniversary. Arnold then drove from Lake Kezar to enplane at Portland, Maine, on the morning of 11 September. See Arnold to Dr. L. A. Dubridge, 13 September 1944, AP.
39. Neither person is otherwise identified.
40. The Frontenac is a famous Quebec City hotel where the military representatives were billeted during this as well as the previous Quebec conference of August 1943. Now a major general, Kuter was AC/AS Plans and Combat Operations, AAF Headquarters; Maj Gen Muir S. Fairchild, member Joint Strategy Survey Committee, JCS.
41. American military protocol provided that the senior officer normally rode in the right rear seat of a sedan and that except for aides in the front seat, the senior officer, in this case Arnold, emerge first from the automobile. No doubt Col Peterson alighted first and the assembled photographers, unfamiliar with American uniforms and rank, assumed he was Arnold and photographed him.
42. Royal Canadian Mounted Police were used to guard the conference participants. Photographs of the conference show the Mounties in the background. See for example FRUS, Quebec, 1944, plates 1, 8, following page 194.
44. As they had for the first Quebec conference in August 1943, the British delegation traveled together aboard the *Queen Mary*, availing themselves of the voyage’s five days to prepare further for the meeting. Although the seas were calm, Churchill’s humor and temper provided a “rough passage” for many of the accompanying British military. Because of the acri-
mony, there was even consideration of resignation then and at the conference by some of the British service chiefs. Churchill makes no mention in his memoirs of the internecine quarreling, writing disingenuously instead that, on the crossing "we reached agreement about what we would say to our great Ally." So much for significant omissions in Churchillian history. The vessel docked at Halifax, Nova Scotia, on 10 September. Contrasting accounts from Churchill's recorded behavior in his memoirs are in Baron Hastings Lionel Ismay, Memoirs (New York: Viking Press, 1960), 171; Richards, 276–77; and Bryant, 198–203. See particularly Ismay's recollection that Churchill told the British chiefs that he was "going to take exactly the opposite line to what they recommended when he got to Quebec." Ismay, 177. The Churchill quote is in Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 5, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), 149.

45. Air Marshal Robert Leckie, RCAF, chief of the Air Staff, RCAF; Vice Adm George C. Jones, Royal Canadian Navy, member Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada–United States.

46. Arnold turned down Portal's request four days later on 15 September (see diary entry) but there is little doubt that Arnold had advance warning that such a request would be forthcoming at Quebec. On 6 September the CG, ATC, Maj Gen Harold L. George, submitted a four-page letter to Arnold, outlining reasons why C-54 aircraft, the only planes available for transportation of substantial payloads over great distances, could not be assigned to the British. His logic was that the current established requirements could not be met by the numbers of C-54s on hand plus those projected to be manufactured. He also expressed concern for the possible transfer of these aircraft from the RAF Transport Command to the British Overseas Airways Corporation at a time when US civil air carriers did not possess the planes. No doubt Arnold asked for more data from ATC after Portal broached the subject on 11 September, for another ATC letter replete with statistics on allocation and utilization of the planes was prepared on 13 September and furnished to Arnold prior to his announced decision two days later. Portal responded to Arnold on 15 September, stressing the need for 50 of the planes to institute daily service between Ceylon and Australia. His logic was that the British had concentrated their production on combat type aircraft "while relying on American production to meet our war needs in transport aircraft." His closing argument was not untypical of British reasoning in urging reallocation of resources. They often pointed out the disparity between America's perceived vast resources as contrasted with the limited British assets, insisting that whatever was being asked of the Americans was a mere pittance in terms of what they considered as US bounteous materiel reserves or capabilities. As Churchill phrased it: "I have no hesitation, therefore, in asking you to make the relatively small sacrifice in the American target which would enable us to have this one squadron of the best and most modern transports." Arnold agreed in a letter to Portal on 14 September that 20 C-54s would be provided to the British on the condition that they be used specifically on the Ceylon–Australia route (which the AAF was also operat-
ing) but that delivery dates would probably not be prior to 1 June 1945. Reduction of production in late 1944 and early 1945 precluded delivery of the aircraft. No doubt Arnold’s reluctance was further confirmation of his long suspicion, shared and approved by the White House, of postwar British civil aviation ambitions. The correspondence is in Records Group 18, 452.1E Foreign Files (British Isles), US National Archives (NA) and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

47. See introduction to this chapter on this issue.

48. Mountbatten’s letter was not located.

49. Portal’s proposal was for 40 squadrons of RAF Lancasters (20 of tankers and 20 of bombers) to be based on Formosa or the nearby China coast and to use as yet unperfected aerial refueling techniques, to obtain in Churchill’s phrase, “a share for the British long-range air force in the process of bombing Japan to bits.” Arnold’s objections were based inter alia on the limited range and bomb carrying capability of the Lancasters as contrasted with the American B-29s as well as the lack of available Pacific airbases from which the British aircraft could operate. Although Portal felt that the conferees had agreed at Quebec to study the issue further, the war ended before the RAF estimate of September or October 1945 as the initial date of their operational capability for the Lancasters was reached. See the introduction to this chapter on this issue. The Churchill quote is in Richards, 278.

50. Maj Gen the Earl of Athlone was governor general of Canada. Roosevelt and Churchill and their wives were his guests at the Citadel, his summer home, where the two leaders had stayed during the first Quebec Conference of August 1943. The Citadel had been built in the eighteenth century to protect Quebec from assault from the St. Lawrence River and from the Plains of Abraham on the west. Since 1870, it had been used as the vice-regal or summer residence of the governor general. In addition to those noted as present by Arnold, Brooke explained, “all the rank, fashion and clergy of Quebec plus the American COS were present.” Bryant, 203. Although a list of attendees is printed in FRUS, Quebec, 1944, 288–89, no seating diagram is found in AP.

51. Arnold was disappointed with the situation in Poland as Russian troops on the outskirts, after having called on the Poles to rise, failed to advance into Warsaw, leaving some 80,000 Poles (including the bulk of the underground movement under General Bor-Komorowski) to be slaughtered by the retreating German forces. Hap’s concern was shared by others of the CCS at Quebec as Portal wrote of the conference going well, apart from the “agony of Warsaw.” Arnold recalled his discouragement at the predicament: “I cabled [11 September] General Spaatz to arrange with General Deane, heading our Military Mission to Moscow, about supplying the Warsaw patriots. I sent another cable to General Deane to coordinate this action with the Russians. That was as far as we were able to go.” Arnold, Global Mission, 525. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, prime minister of the Polish Government in Exile in London, had pleaded for assistance to the Warsaw insurgents with
both Roosevelt and Churchill in telegrams sent on 10 September. On Hop-kins’ recommendation, the president responded with a brief cable to Mikolajczyk the next day from Quebec: “We are taking every possible step” to provide assistance and acknowledging the “urgent importance of this matter.” Given the delay in receiving permission from the Russians to use the shuttle-bombing bases, the AAF Eighth Air Force was not able to provide relief until a single mission of 107 B-17s was flown a week later on 18 September. Results were not encouraging, with only somewhere between 130 and 298 containers of the 1,284 dropped reaching the Polish insurgents (who were forced to surrender on 2 October). See the details in FRUS, Quebec, 1944, 204–5, 396–407.

52. With Brooke in the chair at this and subsequent sessions, the bulk of the discussions centered on the ground war in the European theater. An account is in FRUS, Quebec, 1944, 300–6.

53. Arnold’s holding of the discussion “in abeyance” until tomorrow referred to the afternoon meeting since there is no record of this topic being considered at the earlier 12-1 P.M. session. At the 2:30 meeting, following a brief consideration of coordination with the Russians in the field and establishing zones of occupation in postwar Germany, the bulk of the discussion dealt with control of the strategic air forces in Europe. It is clear from the exchange between Arnold and Portal that Hap opposed at the time any reversion of control from the supreme commander of the 4,482 AAF heavies, each with two crews, then in the theater. After the meeting, Arnold talked with Spaatz via trans-Atlantic telephone, a transcript of which is in AP. See the discussion in the introduction to this chapter.

54. The museum is located in the National Park on a bluff 300 feet above the St. Lawrence River, part of the upper town of modern Quebec City, site of British general Wolfe’s famous victory over the French general Montcalm in September 1759. Capt Thomas C. Sheffield was Arnold’s aide and Miss Dahlman a civilian secretary normally assigned to Arnold’s office in Washington.

55. Princess Alice, Countess of Athlone, wife of the Earl of Athlone, governor general of Canada; Adm of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, Royal Navy, First Sea Lord. The record of the dinner attendees printed in FRUS, Quebec, 1944, 311, does not list any major general but does include Field Marshal Sir John Dill, whose name was omitted by Arnold in his diary.

56. Although Mackenzie King recorded from his perspective that Churchill was pleased that the “conversation . . . flowed freely and pleasantly during the evening between the American and British chiefs,” the British prime minister was probably not impressed with Arnold’s questioning the availability of airfields to support RAF Pacific operations. Diary of William Lyon MacKenzie King, Public Archives of Canada, 12 September 1944. As Churchill wrote in Triumph and Tragedy, 147: “What I feared most at this stage of the war was that the United States would say in after-years, ‘We came to your help in Europe and you left us alone to finish off Japan.’
We had to regain on the field of battle our rightful possessions in the Far East, and not have them handed back to us at the peace table.” King Diary.

57. Arnold was awarded the American Legion’s Distinguished Service Medal and spoke at their national convention in Chicago five days later on 18 September. He emphasized, in a speech that had been written by his staff in Washington, the need for the United States to institute postwar universal military training. Not all in the Pentagon who had contributed to its drafting were pleased with the changes Arnold made in their work. See James Gould Cozzens, A Time of War: Air Force Diaries and Pentagon Memos, 1943–1945, ed. Matthew J. Bruccoli (Columbia, S.C.: Bruccoli Clark, 1984), diary entry of 19 September labeling it a “deplorable effusion.” Excerpts of the speech are in AP.

58. See introduction to this chapter on this issue.

59. President Roosevelt’s Scotch terrier dog.

60. Lt Col H. Merrill Pasco, USA, aide to General Marshall.

61. The paper has not been located.

62. Hap’s reference to “Madame” in the diary entry for 12 September in two lines above, and “Mrs. Prime Minister” here, are confusing since William Lyon Mackenzie King, the Canadian prime minister, was unmarried. Neither Roosevelt nor Churchill were present; instead, they dined with seven others at the Citadel where the topic appeared dominated by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau’s harsh proposal for postwar Germany. The account is in FRUS, Quebec, 1944, 324–28.

63. C. G. Power was Canadian minister of National Defence for Air Service; Air Marshal L. S. Breadner, RCAF, air officer commander in chief, Royal Canadian Air Forces Overseas.

64. See introduction to this chapter for an assessment of this problem and the discussion at this and other sessions. Arnold gave a noncommittal answer to the question as to how British airpower might be used, saying that such a response “could not be given now” and would be dependent on “development of suitable facilities.” As a result, Portal was invited “to put forward a paper containing an estimate in general terms of the contributions the Royal Air Force would be prepared to make in the main operations against Japan.” Arnold, Global Mission, 527. Churchill remained displeased over American opposition as late as 1953 when he lamented, in Triumph and Tragedy, 152 (and after the death of both Arnold and Admiral King), “Certain troublemakers said that we would take no share in the war against Japan once Germany had been defeated.”

65. Major Reginald Winn, British Army, had served as member of the British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, assignment at this time unknown.

66. Arnold also wrote, in his memoirs, “Just where we were to base them, I don’t know.” It can be speculated that the rest of the US JCS were as pleased as Arnold that time settled this issue, for the Japanese surrender “came too quickly.” Arnold, Global Mission, 527.

67. Col Frank W. Clarke had homes in Quebec and New York City as well as and hunting and fishing lodges in northern Quebec province, where he
entertained the British chiefs of staff for four days following the conference. Brooke wrote of Clarke: "I have seldom met anybody kinder or more hospitable." The founder of several Canadian corporations bearing his name, he was a colonel stationed at the time in Quebec with the Canadian army as assistant to the adjutant general in charge of prisoners of war. An account of the fishing and the quote are from Bryant, 208–9.

68. The British pound at this time was worth slightly more than $4.00, making Brooke’s net pay approximately $300 per year. This contrasted with Arnold’s salary of $8,000 per annum plus $4,000 flying pay, which at the time would have been taxed in the amount of approximately $2,300, leaving Hap $9,700 from his pay, equivalent at the time to more than 2,370 pounds Sterling. Other allowances for Arnold included the $2,200 entertainment personal money allocated to four-star officers and $504 subsistence as well as government housing that was provided, none taxable. Although their exact duties and numbers are not known, both officers had the assistance of assigned military personnel such as drivers and other aides for help in entertaining, and so forth. Brooke’s perquisites are not specifically known but he had benefits similar to Arnold’s, aimed at defraying some of the costs involved in being a serving senior officer.

69. Brig Gen Edmond Blais, Canadian Army, CG, Military District of Quebec. The American League pennant in 1944 was won by the St. Louis Browns, making Arnold the winner of the wager.

70. Clarke lived on St. Louis Road in a house called Thornhill, then located in a fashionable district along the northwest side of the Plains of Abraham in Quebec City.

71. At the 10 A.M. CCS meeting, the military chiefs approved a draft final report to be submitted to the president and prime minister. The session also dealt considerably with preparations for the war with Japan, including movement of forces from Europe to the Pacific. See the account in FRUS, Quebec, 1944, 354–59. Mountbatten as supreme Allied commander, Southeast Asia, had as his air deputy, Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, RAF. With the deployment of B-29s to that theater and a probable reorganization of the command and the retirement of Peirse, Arnold sought the appointment of an American as air deputy. Most probably, Arnold desired Maj Gen George E. Stratemeyer, at this time, CG, Eastern Air Command. Mountbatten, however, replaced Peirse with Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, RAF, on 1 December 1944. See correspondence between Arnold and Maj Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA, deputy chief of staff, Southeast Asia Command in AP.

72. Arnold confirmed his decision in a memo of 14 September, which stressed that diverting any C-54s from the planned allocation "would critically affect the ability of the Air Transport Command to carry out its several directives." See Arnold to Portal, 14 September 1944, AP. Also see introduction to this chap. and note 46 above.

73. No movie of this or a similar name appears in the press of the time. Possibly a Canadian army production or a play that is not indexed in any major American newspaper.
74. Apparently Churchill made very few changes. See diary entry for 16 September.

75. The account of the JCS 10:15 meeting, printed in FRUS, Quebec, 1944, 372–74, reflects that they discussed zones of occupation in postwar Germany. Additionally, they considered and approved a draft message, which was sent by FDR to Chiang Kai-shek, urging greater Chinese assistance in the ongoing operations in the Salween River area in Northern Burma where Roosevelt indicated the Allies were facing disaster without increased Chinese commitment. The telegram and its implications were also discussed at the 11 A.M. CCS meeting that followed and is printed in FRUS, Quebec, 1944, 364–66. The deliberations of the JCS meeting appear in FRUS, Quebec, 1944, 474–77. They also approved a communication to Gen Sir Henry Maitland Wilson in the Mediterranean regarding operations there and continued to discuss occupation zones in Germany.

76. Encouraged by the success of their wooden-construction bomber-reconnaissance Mosquito aircraft, deHavilland Aircraft Company began to produce the Hornet, a single-seat, twin-engine, cantilever, mid-wing, wooden monoplane, in July 1944. Construction began less than 13 months after design was initiated. Arnold’s memo of 16 September has not been located but it probably indicated a willingness to have the Air Staff in Washington consider Portal’s suggestion that the aircraft be produced in the United States. Arnold responded more fully to Portal from Washington on 26 September, doubting the advisability of producing the Hornet in the United States. Hap indicated that the skill necessary “to fabricate wooden structures” was one peculiar to British workers and that metal was the “American medium, lending itself as it does to our mass production methods.” See Arnold to Portal, 26 September 1944, Records Group 18, 452 1E Foreign Files (British Isles), NA. No doubt, Arnold referred here to his memo of the previous day dealing with the C-54 allocation cited above. No memo to Portal has been located dealing with strategic aviation.

77. Arnold referred to the Citadel where at the 11:00 final meeting of the conference, the final report was read and amended as desired by Roosevelt and Churchill. Problems in Northern Burma were also discussed. The final report is printed in FRUS, Quebec, 1944, 377–83.

78. Among others present who shared Arnold’s concern over the President’s health at this meeting were Churchill, Admiral Cunningham, and Mackenzie King. Churchill and the British Admiral both used the phrase “very frail,” and Cunningham continued that the President seemed hardly able “to be taking in what was going on.” Cited in Gilbert, vol. 7, 958, 965. William Lyon Mackenzie King’s diary entries are for 11 and 17 September 1944.

79. On 23 August 1944, an AAF B-24H, serial #42-50891, on a test flight, crashed into the village school and a nearby cafe at Freckleton, Lancashire, England, killing 59 people including 50 British, among them 37 school children. Attempting a landing at Warton Base Air Depot during a storm, the plane possibly having been struck by lightning, the pilot overshot
the runway. The memorial was built and dedicated immediately after the end of the war, on 19 August 1945. See Arnold’s memo for FDR, 14 September 1944, AP.

80. Meade was a British officer who continued to serve as Dill’s aide in Washington. He had traveled with Arnold and Dill to India and China in January–February 1943. Leger is not otherwise identified.


Chapter 10

Paris, Cannes, Italy, North Africa, South America
31 March–8 May 1945

Introduction

After Arnold’s return from the second Quebec Conference, continuing Allied successes, along strategic guidelines that he had helped develop, allowed him to remain close to Washington. By January 1945, the Allied ground offensive in northern Europe was attempting to regain the momentum lost to the December German counteroffensive in the Battle of the Bulge. Although the Wehrmacht experienced temporary success there, made possible in part by weather that prevented effective US air support, the German army appeared unable to prevent the Allies from crossing the Rhine on 7 March, less than three months later. In the south of Europe, Gen Mark Clark’s Fifteenth Army Group, which contained the somewhat forgotten Fifth US Army, continued their movement up the Italian boot. The opposition they were encountering now appeared less of a threat than the difficulties to be faced if Allied forces had to cross the Alps. The Luftwaffe, long a major concern, now seemed unable to deter in any significant way the Allied strategic and tactical air and ground offensives. The once master of the skies over Europe was now reduced to a nuisance role. As an AAF wag had penned on a bulletin board in Europe at the time, “Who’s afraid of the big Focke-Wulfe?”1 The Russians continued their inexorable western advance in the East, finally occupying Warsaw on 17 January.

In the Pacific, American forces were redeeming MacArthur’s pledge to return to the Philippines by early 1945—Manila fell on 3 March. Allied prospects all around the world had improved significantly since Arnold’s last trip to Europe in June 1944. Even in the strategic/diplomatic area, all seemed to be proceeding reasonably well; only one conference of the
Allied wartime leadership had been held in the last nine
months, that having been the second Quebec meeting covered
in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, Arnold remained frus-
trated in early January 1945 by the seeming loss of momen-
tum by the Allies. Urged by Marshall, he wrote to Spaatz seek-
ing “greater destruction than we have been getting” in the
hope of bringing the war “to a close sooner.” Spaatz did not
respond immediately, waiting no doubt until Arnold’s health
seemed sufficiently improved to continue a dialogue. Always
candid with his chief, the European AAF commander cau-
tioned Hap against “following the chimera of one air operation
that might end the war;” which, he concluded, “does not exist.”
Spaatz appeared in agreement with “Bomber” Harris that
there were no “panacea” targets. Realistically, Tooey made a
point Arnold would not have welcomed: that the “success of
our effort is unmeasurable, due to our inability to exploit the
success of our results achieved.”

Even if Allied military fortunes for the most part seemed to
be improving, Arnold’s health was not. On 17 January, as
preparations were being completed for Hap to accompany Roo-
sevelt and the JCS to meet with Churchill and Stalin at Yalta,
Arnold was stricken with his fourth and most serious heart
attack. He was flown to the AAF hospital in Miami Beach,
Florida, where he remained for the next two months under
close medical supervision. Although he attempted to continue
to lead the AAF from his sickbed, the perceived seriousness of
his illness at first limited visitors, correspondence, and tele-
phone calls. Early in his convalescence, his physician dis-
couraged if not prohibited visitors, including even his wife,
prompting rumors of his incapacitation among Army aviators.
Because of the uncertainty of his return to full duty, Stimson,
Lovett, and Marshall seriously considered replacing him as
AAF chief through forced medical retirement. They were con-
cerned about whether he would continue his self-imposed,
punishing wartime pace even if he was able to return to duty
in the Pentagon. There were those in the capital who felt that
a journey away from Washington, even considering the exer-
tion required for the travel, was the only way to protect him
from the heavy demands he placed on himself. Given his
intense work habits and general reluctance to delegate important tasks to senior subordinates as he worked at his desk 12 or more hours a day, six or seven days a week, they were probably right. His deputy, Lt Gen Barney Giles, reported that orders from General Marshall were “to keep General Arnold out of this office for at least a month.” What better way to achieve this than to encourage the AAF chief to witness what was anticipated to be the closing days of the war in Europe, see at first hand the results of Allied bombing while discussing future plans, programs, and assignments with senior officers there? It was also clear that Arnold enjoyed his travels abroad and welcomed a change of pace.

On the other hand, both Lovett and Marshall were ambivalent about Arnold’s proposed absence from the Washington scene. They were particularly concerned that the aviator already had been absent from the Pentagon during the last 10 days of January, all of February, and the first 21 days of March while recuperating in Florida. Although Arnold could maintain effective rapid communication with Washington while traveling, his counsel and influence would be missed in the capital. The AAF chief had proven successful in the White House, Congress, and the JCS. In addition, his familiarity with the planning for a postwar American military establishment and his credibility were significant assets to the future of the AAF. General Marshall, in a relationship that was now as personal as professional, normally deferred to or relied heavily on Hap’s judgment in Army aviation matters. Since there was no one of Arnold’s stature to replace him, his voice would be missed in any deliberations that would take place during his absence. As evidence of his importance, General Arnold’s replacement, en route to the Yalta Conference, complained in a letter to Hap, “without you we are just tolerated from bottom to top.”

Among his aims while in Europe would be discussions with those involved in the numerous personnel changes he was considering for many senior aviators. Many of the successful air commanders in Europe were to be reassigned to the Air Staff in the Pentagon. In Washington, where reputation was often as important as accomplishment, many of these combat
veterans would be known to their military counterparts as well as the political elite of the capital and some of the American public, hopefully enhancing their chances for success in the bureaucracies. Others in Europe were to be reassigned to the Pacific, where they would lead the ongoing air offensive against Japan. At the same time, the postwar composition, utilization, leadership, and positioning of the AAF units destined to remain in Europe were to be discussed on this trip. In addition, Hap carefully arranged his itinerary to allow him to assess as closely as possible the destruction wrought by the AAF in the three years of combat over Europe, which he believed would reinforce his steadfast belief in the efficacy of airpower. Arnold had already begun to implement the Strategic Bombing Survey, which had been authorized in September 1944 to provide a comprehensive assessment of the results of the bombing in the European theater. At long last, Arnold and other Army aviators hoped the realities to be found among the ruins of German industries and cities by this group would validate the theories and unfulfilled promises of air advocates over the past two decades.

The question of who spoke for Army aviation in his absence was exacerbated by Arnold’s practice of ensuring that all of his senior staff experience active combat command, something that the vicissitudes of both world wars had denied him. This policy led Arnold to make frequent changes among his immediate high-level subordinates. Consequently, there was no recognizable deputy with tenure, sufficient rank, experience in the Pentagon, and credibility within the executive and legislative branches to speak authoritatively for the AAF. This would be remedied in part, Marshall and Arnold hoped, by the reassignment back to Washington of Hap’s close friend, Lt Gen Ira Eaker, now CG of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces and the combat leader of the Eighth Air Force in its first two years over Europe. This would place in the Pentagon Arnold’s longtime colleague and coauthor. Ten years Hap’s junior, Eaker had served three previous tours in the Washington environment and was a combat leader with a proven record. In addition, he held a graduate degree in public affairs and had extensive experience in dealing with wartime Allies at the highest level,
particularly the British. Eaker arrived back in Washington before Arnold left, and the longtime friends discussed the dimensions of Eaker’s new responsibilities. The announcement of Eaker’s being “ordered home” to the “toughest” job in the AAF in “alas, Washington” was “staggering news.”7 Further discussion of this new assignment on this trip would provoke the brief contretemps recorded by Arnold in his diary entry of 19 April.

Lovett and others continued to be uneasy about the AAF chief’s illness and projected absence when major European, Far Eastern, and postwar issues remained to be decided. Lovett’s letter asking him to return home immediately, noted in Arnold’s diary entry of 26 April, is ample evidence of his stature in the capital. Lovett and Marshall wanted to retain the “workaholic” airman in Washington, where his considerable influence was important; at the same time, they were aware of the possible advantages to Arnold’s health of sending him abroad. There, under close medical supervision away from the telephone, extended meetings, and a mountain of paperwork, he might continue a recuperative, relaxed, yet constructive routine.

Arnold looked forward to this journey. His physical presence overseas in a combat theater would contradict the rumors of his incapacitation and this prospect influenced his plans to fly not only to Europe but to continue around the world to the Pacific before returning to Washington. There appears little doubt that Arnold had worked diligently to convince his friend and superior, George Marshall, of the feasibility of this extensive travel on the condition that he take along a senior medical officer. He chose the physician who had treated him during his recent hospitalization in Florida, was familiar with his health problems, and understood his impatience. He promised to follow Dr. Gilbert Marquardt’s orders, and he planned periodic rests in Bermuda, the French Riviera, and other pleasant locations. His itinerary called for most stops to be in large cities or in major American military headquarters where modern medical facilities would be available immediately. There seems little doubt that Arnold, clearly aware of the limitations which his recent illness had dictated, was anxious to make
this trip where the restraints and regimen would be less than in Washington and more under his own control. He wrote to his son less than three weeks before his departure: “In my opinion, I will recuperate a darn sight faster going places and seeing things, with enough rest in between than I will in trying to ride the bucking bronco back in the Pentagon building.” Additionally, the demands he placed on himself in fulfilling his official duties had put a serious strain on his relations with his wife and family. Hap’s letters to a very close family friend from Florida illustrate the dilemma he felt about the needs of the AAF juxtaposed with obligations to his family. He posed the problem this way: “Shall I fight for my health for the benefit of the AAF or shall I let the doctor’s orders go and fight for my family?” This extended trip in improving health away from his family in Washington might provide a fresh perspective to a marriage that had been essentially a very happy one for 32 years but had been subject to almost four years of inordinate wartime stress.

His choice of longtime associates as convivial traveling companions, several of whom had journeyed with him previously, reflected his feelings that there would be relaxing aspects to this trip. The journey would also be a tonic now that the war in this part of the world appeared to be ending. He counted on seeing at firsthand the accomplishments of the AAF in Europe—accomplishments that could be viewed only vicareously in the Pentagon through relatively sterile strike photos, after-action reports, and the mass of paperwork that passed over his desk.

In view of his serious health problems, Arnold’s attitude towards his role in the future AAF is not clearly expressed in this diary or elsewhere. Not unexpectedly, the serious nature of his illness and the long convalescence had lessened even Hap’s normal optimism. Just before returning to the Pentagon, he wrote “sometimes I think it would be best for all concerned were I to ask for retirement and let nature take its course.” Beyond this temporary pessimism, however, he probably had not and could not have fully thought out his future plans. Hap was aware, though, that Marshall, concerned about his friend’s health, might force his medical
retirement. It is curious to note that Hap has provided no explanation in his autobiography for this five-week odyssey. He continued, however, to plan improvements on his California ranch where he anticipated retiring.

While ill in Florida, Arnold had clearly shared his thinking about retirement, his future, and his successor with Marshall. In an “eyes only” letter written to the Army chief of staff, Hap indicated that in his opinion the new AAF chief would be one of two unnamed generals then serving overseas. Probably the most logical of these choices was either Carl Spaatz or Joseph McNarney.11 Although there is no specific mention in this diary, there is little doubt that his precarious health and his concern for the future of the AAF prompted discussions in Europe with Spaatz and Eaker about his retirement plans as well as who might succeed him. If he continued around the world, as anticipated on leaving Washington, he could raise this and other issues with Gen George C. Kenney, now successfully operating as MacArthur's air commander in the Philippines.

The seriousness of his latest illness seemed to have made Hap unusually willing to adhere to the regimen prescribed by his accompanying physician. There are numerous instances, before leaving on the trip and in this diary, in which Arnold acknowledged the limitations dictated by his health.12 As a result, he carefully husbanded his strength and dispatched accompanying members of his staff to observe conditions in other parts of the European theater while he rested in southern France.

Arnold has left no record of his thoughts as his airplane lifted from the signs of an early spring in the nation’s capital. Although it appeared relatively certain that the war in Europe, where he had traveled five times previously, was in its closing days, there had to have remained many uncertainties that he pondered. Foremost among them was concern for his health and his doubts about whether, even if capable, he should continue to attempt to lead the Army air arm he had headed for almost seven years. The role of the AAF in prosecuting the war against Japan was among the major problems facing Hap, all against a background of the AAF’s future in a postwar American military. Arnold, not uncharacteristically, has left little hint of his thinking.
The Diary

TRIP TO EUROPE AND RIO
March 31, 1945–May 8, 1945
GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD

Saturday, March 31, 1945 [Washington, D.C. to Bermuda]

Washington to Bermuda: [passengers] Arnold, Beebe, Peter-son, Proctor, Lindsay, Marquardt, Darby and Sheffield.13

[ Crew]

1st Pilot Major Dice
Co-pilot Major Conde
Navigator Captain Wagner
Radio Operator M/Sgt Babington
Engineer M/Sgt Ranger
Engineer M/Sgt Lueck14

Took off 2:35 P.M., arrived Bermuda, 6:30, distance 830 miles; good trip, no bad weather. Dinner 8:15, bed 9:00. Bermuda looked wonderful in P.M.; rich colors, vivid contrasts.

Sunday, April 1, 1945 [Bermuda, en route to Azores]

Good breakfast, rode over island, very interesting; lots of Easter lilies, bananas, coral rocks, coral houses, white and clean, many different flowers; whites and blacks. Took the bunch to church, very high Episcopal; they didn’t like it. Received invitation to lunch with Lord Burghley; no soap.15 Wanted us to sit in his pew, but was afraid I might have to read the text as George Marshall did last year.16 Rode out to end of point, beautiful view, guide was Burghley’s Naval aide.17

Then to Government House and awaited Governor’s return from other church. He has to visit all of them, it seems, on Church days. Lord and Lady Burghley arrived after about ¾ hour. He was Olympic hurdler 1924, ‘28 and ‘32 [at] Los Ange-les, finalist all three competitions, winner in 1928.18 Govern-ment House grounds very beautiful. Took movies of everything from flowers to rare animals and birds. Water scarce, no rain and below normal for winter.19 Orve Anderson here with B-17 awaiting hop-off to England.20 We all took off about 6:30.
Monday, April 2, 1945 [Bermuda to Azores to Paris, France]

2,060 miles to Lagens Field, Azores. Dinner aboard at 7:00 after winning 4 bits from Gene Beebe. Bed at 8:00 which is 10:00 Azores time. Rather bumpy during night but slept well. Awoke at 6:15, shaved, washed and ready to land at 6:45 A.M., Azores time. Took off 8:05 Azores time, distance to Paris, 1,730 statute miles. Regulations require we go via Lands End. A. D. Smith not on Lagens, over on Santa Maria. Overcast weather; left Azores with not much to see except miles of sea.

Weather good until French coast at Brest; overcast solid, went through and over. First saw Versailles. Evidences of bombing around all factories, railroad yards, airfields, many buildings knocked flat. Eiffel Tower stood out like a sore thumb. Paris as a whole looked good; French refugees streaming back in all kinds of funny clothes. Spaatz, Anderson, Hoag and Hank Pool met us at airdrome. Went to Ritz, with Tuey and Hank Pool. Talked with bunch until dinner at 8:15 French time. Dinner with Hank, Tuey and ______.

Patton was asked by Tuey: “Don’t you worry about getting so far out? What about your flanks?” Patton: “No worry, the AAF takes care of my flanks.” Tuey: “But how about your supplies, your logistics. Don’t you worry about that?” Patton: “Not a bit, I have my G-4, he worries about my logistics. He has fainted 3 times today, so far.” This was during the big push beyond the Rhine. To bed at 9:10 in a wonderful suite at the Ritz on the Plaza Vendôme.

Tuesday, April 3, 1945 [Paris to Rheims, France and return]

The Doc must have given me a slug for I didn’t waken until 8:15. Have a war room right next to me in hotel for daily presentation [on the war]. Weather today good. Tuey arrived at 10:30; at 11:00 we, Tuey, Hank, Marquardt and I left for D-12 airport. Took B-25 and went to Rheims.

Paris is a sorry city, stores closed up mostly. Scars from street battles, factories bombed out and scars in neighborhood of other bombs. People not badly dressed and look well fed, try to make a lot out of a little. DeGaulle [sic] trying to make a vic-
torious nation out of one whose divisions have not won a fight. Calling on the wide world for representation at the peace table when, after we have given him equipment and supplies by the 100 millions, only one French Division has crossed the Rhine and that was a Moroccan. There is no apparent shortage of food anywhere; the cattle and horses are fat and well-kept; the fields are all tilled and there should be a bumper crop. The Germans did not destroy fruit trees or farmhouses and yet we Americans will be called upon to feed the starving French.

Rheims airport shows the result of our war efforts. We surely bombed it to death, destroying all buildings and many German planes.

Had lunch with Eisenhower, Tuey, and Ike’s British aide. After lunch, Ike, Tuey, and I talked. Ike’s views: [he favors]

1. A Department of National Defense with 3 equal parts: ground, sea, and air. Common supply for all articles used by all three; must have to cut down expenses.
2. Air, ground and naval forces of size required to job, not a size based upon money.
3. Universal military service of 1 year.
4. British ownership of island bases to prevent our altruistic Americans from giving the people freedom or returning them to Japan or Germany.
5. Support aviation must be part of ground forces.
6. Naval air limited to carrier and seaborne.

Saw Beadle Smith for a few moments. Hank [Pool] and Gil [Marquardt] went through the gigantic 3,000,000-bottle champagne celler of what used to be Mumrus [sic Mumm]. He was a German, is now in Germany.

Left Tuey at his headquarters at Rheims and returned to Paris. Met my crowd for drinks in my room before dinner; tomorrow they split up and go on their various trips. Dinner with Hank and Gil. Played gin rummy for ½ hour. Bed at 9:30 after being in bed resting for 2 hours before dinner and sleeping for ½ hour.

Wednesday, April 4, 1945 [Paris, France and its environs]

Awakened at 8:15, temperature 44°. Clear sky, most of flags down from around Place de Vendôme, none on Napoleon’s
statue. Ike very certain as to war’s end: only fly in ointment is the unthinkable, impossible, Russians holding back. Ike has no idea as to what more air can do; it is doing everything possible. He is most enthusiastic about air support. He wants to go to his 30th [West Point] reunion in June. I told him that he could have as many C-54s as necessary to take members of his class. He will go, arrive unannounced.31

I have just been told that the suite I was occupying was used by Goering on his visits to town. I have looked around but have found no evidence. Had conference with Fred Anderson, Bob Harper, P. L. Williams and Louis Brereton; very satisfactory information from all.32 Our troop Carriers took 250,000 gallons of gas to troops last Friday, and over 500,000 last Saturday. Talked over our redeployment and the part Airborne and TC [troop Carrier] would play in Pacific and Post War. Cable to Marshall.

After lunch with Brereton, P. L. Williams and Hank Pool took rest for 1 ½ hours. German prisoner of war, Fay, then was brought in by General MacDonald.33 He had landed a brand new Me 262 at Frankfurt, was a test pilot for Messerschmitt, was tired of war.34 262 to go Dayton [for evaluation]. Fay gave some information re interior Germany: railroads gone, factories destroyed, no oil, best pilots killed, no experience in squadrons, bomber pilots flying jets without sufficient training, war can’t continue for more than 2 or 3 weeks; all organized resistance will be gone then.

Took auto ride through Paris to St. Cloud, Versailles.35 Paris was not hit hard by our bombs; factories, airports, railroad yards destroyed, but very little else. Germans did no destruction. French in Paris are not starving, no evidence of malnutrition in any part of Paris. Horses well fed and fat, goats grazing which would not be if people were hungry. Lines at bakeries and butcher shops, about 24 maximum. A lot of bunk re helping starving French.

Thursday, April 5, 1945 [Paris, France to German cities and return to Paris]

Up at 7:30; breakfast at 8:00 with Lowell Thomas, 8 other commentators here. Left hotel for airport at 9:15, took off for Frankfurt at 10:00, via Aachen, Bonn, Cologne, Coblenz. Aachen almost completely destroyed, bombs; Duren, a mass of wreckage, bombs; Cologne, terrible, 2 bridges over Rhine down, thousands of houses a mass of rubble; bomb craters everywhere; abandoned trucks, tanks and trenches; by passes for destroyed bridges. Bonn not destroyed as much but bridge down, two pontoon bridges being used. Balloons to protect pontoon bridges. Bridges down all along Rhine, barges, and tugs sunk. A few hundred feet away from Rhine all peaceful and quiet, no signs of war. Coblenz not so badly hurt, but quite badly at that.

Frankfurt a big city, railroad yards and airports a shambles, runways pock marked and unusable. The balance of the field filled with craters. Such was the field SW [southwest] of town we were told to land on: 2,000, 3,000, 4,000 men, trucks, bulldozers working on it; it was impossible. We went to one SE [southeast] of town. There we saw a good runway, several of our [C-]46s and 47s and a B-17 but radio told us to go to airport 66 miles S [south] of the first one we saw, so away we went. Our flight has taken us over the front where ground troops were slugging it out to capture the encircled Germans. From Cologne to S [south] of Coblenz, and yet not a single German plane, the impotent GAF made so by our air power.

On the airport where we landed was a runway marked by flags, 15 or more transports lined up nose to tail. Had delivered their supplies and were now taking on wounded, but of all things as many German wounded as our own. No nation in the world probably would have done such a thing; [others would] leave the Huns there to die, get our boys back, but we must clean out the Huns to make room for ours. So it goes, 6 Americans, 4 Huns. Transports, puddle jumpers, fighters and our B-25 landing on a strip that was so short that in spite of excellent piloting, we stopped just 30 feet from the end. Met by BG [Brig Gen] Barcus. Cars awaiting but I had to go over to see the wounded being put in the transports. The airport was
but 15 miles from the front but the transports came and went unmolested by German aircraft.

The Auto Bahn is a wonderful road. There is a perfect net of them extending in almost all directions, connecting all important centers; we set out for the one we wanted. German AF barracks scarred, damaged, destroyed by our bombing, machine shops a mass of debris, but in the woods almost miles away from the airport were airplanes, bombs, gasoline and repair hangars concealed from above, all accessible to the airport. Some of the planes undamaged others destroyed by the Germans, still others hit by our own bombers. Bridges over the autobahn blown up but we ran along to Patch’s Headquarters at 60 [miles per hour]; there we met Patch, Hank Arnold, and who should come in but Eisenhower, Spaatz, Webster. All had lunch in Darmstadt as guests of Barcus.

Ike said he was feeling war; it had taken a lot out of him but he forced himself to go on and would until whole mess was cleaned up. Gave Hank his two boxes but we don’t need to worry about liquor for him; he captured a German warehouse with case after case of scotch, brandy, benedictine and Cointreau; he is set for balance of war; also has a German radio.

Eisenhower and Spaatz took off for Rheims after lunch. I went with Hank Arnold and Marquardt to Frankfurt to see Patton. Darmstadt, Frankfurt, a mass of rubble. Germans look well fed and fairly well clothed. Auto Bahn made trip very easy, passed many convoys, German parks for airplanes near airports, bombs and gasoline in woods.

Patton unchanged; his headquarters in old German barracks. Says there is nothing in front of him, could go right through and join up with Russians tomorrow but headquarters is holding him in present position until First Army on his left and the Seventh Army on his right catches up. German sniper shot at one of his staff right in his headquarters even yesterday. Completely destroyed a town in his front yesterday because guerillas [sic] refused to surrender; burned it down. Back over Auto Bahn to airport near Darmstadt. Took off in rain for Paris. Note attached: Order of Patton’s is typical.
Brought Hank [Arnold] back to Paris with me. Arrived at hotel at 6:45, in bed at 7:05, up at 8:15 for dinner. Gave Hank 50 bucks to see Paris with Hank Pool. In bed for night at 9:30; dinner with Hank Pool and Hank Arnold.

Friday, April 6, 1945 [Paris, France]

Up at 7:30, nothing scheduled for day. Breakfast with Hank Arnold. Hank is living in Himmler’s suite, 2 bedrooms, etc., etc., 1 bed, 8 by 8.47 My bed room is tremendous, my bathroom is large. The bath tub is extra large, it is made of porcelain; Goering must have sat down with a thud for the porcelain is cracked.

German will to fight is going, our airmen shot down behind German lines come back through the lines and rejoin their units. One of them brought back the entire AA battery that shot him down; he was a Norwegian.

Loafed all day. In P.M. rode to Bois de Boulogne and walked about 2 miles.48 Then on to Notre Dame which has most of its stained glass windows removed.49 Louvre looks abandoned and badly in need of repair on outside, did not go inside.50 Upon coming out of Notre Dame, there were quite a bunch of GIs waiting to get pictures. I stopped and two nurses came up and asked to be photoed with me; one had been in England and France 26 months and one 18 months. Returned to hotel, arrived at 5:00.

Hal Bowman walked with me and I outlined his new job.51 General Legge, [US] Military Attaché from Switzerland, came in for a few minutes and I told him, upon his requesting it and saying what a fine thing it would be, that when I got to Cannes I would tell him if and when I could go to Switzerland for one day, have lunch with Swiss C of S [Chief of Staff] and CO aviation and smooth[e] their ruffled feathers for our bombing their towns.52 In bed at 9:30.

Saturday, April 7, 1945 [Paris, France to Luxemburg]

Up at 7:45 after a fine night’s rest. Delayed in departing for Luxemburg until 10:15. We flew over a lot of the old war front; arrived Luxemburg 20 minutes late. Spaatz, Vandenberg, Wey-
land, Quesada, Stearley and lots of others awaiting.53 We went at once with military escort, and it is needed because there are still German snipers around, to the Athletic Bowl where we had a review and I decorated 12 Air Force officers with DSMs and DFCs. Then to lunch with Bradley and all of Van’s officers. To bed at 2; slept 45 minutes and up at 3:30. Met Vandenberg and Spaatz at 3:45. Went over Van’s operations until 4:30. Talked with radio commentators at 5:00, auto ride through city, crowd of 4,000 people awaiting at door, quite an ovation; they like Americans.54

City very clean, very little battle damage. Railroad yards a wreck and some buildings nearby completely destroyed or partially damaged, one a church but in general city shows no signs of war but for the soldiers. Built on top of hill and up a deep ravine, mostly of stone as there is lots of it. People look prosperous. Across Plaza from hotel at station, large crowd of people awaiting evacuees. When a collaborator comes in they beat him nearly to death with crowd yelling: “More, more.”

Bradley certain there is no organized resistance in front of him. First wants to destroy enemy in pocket then move rapidly forward. Thinks resistance will be over in 6 weeks or 2 months. Dinner with Van’s staff and Tuey, bed at 9:15.

Sunday, April 8, 1945 [Luxemburg to Paris, France]

Awakened at 7:00, up and shaved and back to bed, breakfast at 8:30. Presentation by Bradley’s staff (war situation) at 9:15. Bradley has outlined a line of Department P [D?]-is already on it.55 When pocket is reduced all armies will move forward. It looks as if pocket will fall within 10 days by armored elements cutting through. Somewhere between 120,000 and 150,000 in pocket.56 Bradley sees no organized effort ahead. Wonders when Russians will move forward.

Bradley, Simpson, Hodges,57 Patton and many Corps and Division COs have written excellent letters to Spaatz and Vandenberg re air’s part in war. Met many of Bradley’s staff and departed for airport at 10:20; said adios to Van and Tuey and with escort of four P-51s took off for Paris at 10:40; arrived Paris on a beautiful day at 11:15.

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Hank [Arnold] awaiting us on return, as were Beebe, Lindsay, Darby; haven't seen Pete or Proctor yet. Lunch alone with Hank, bed at 1:45, up at 3:15. Went out in car with Hank, Tom and Gil to Bois de Boulogne; saw Paris in [the] Spring, France without a care, France with utter disregard of war a few hundred miles away. Men, women and children by the thousands, hundreds of thousands of all ages, walking, riding bicycles, driving in horse drawn vehicles and in motor cars; men, thousands of them of draft age. The horse vans of the racetrack, charcoal burning engines as well as gasoline engines, 50 thousand people at the track. Many hundred bicycles outside, scores of autos parked outside, then the heterogeneous collection of antique horse drawn vehicles that might well have been collected from 1800 to date, some kinds and types that beggar description.

Paris in [the] spring, Paris playing while the war is on. What kinds of horses they had running I do not know but the horses drawing the coaches, barouches, tallyhos, etc., were all in excellent condition.58

Drove back to hotel and met Lindsay, Beebe, Darby; Pete and Proctor showed up later. Dinner with all the bunch later, and to bed at 9:15.59

Monday, April 9, 1945 [Paris, France]

A kind of mixed up day, nothing much to do but everything was confused. I arose at 7:45, breakfast with the 2 Hanks, wrote letters and had war presentation, took a walk for about an hour, and lunch with Hank Jr. In bed for 1 1/2 hours at noon. [A] barber, Tuey, Anderson and Knerr awaiting me when I got up. Had conference re future operations in Europe and Pacific and future of AAF after getting a haircut.

Message from Marshall showing concern over my well being; decided not to go to London,60 sent Beebe, Lindsay, Pool, Proctor, Peterson and Darby; Sheffield, Marquardt and I go to Cannes.61 Went for an auto ride through Paris. Saw M. G. Osborne for a few minutes.62

All the visits we have made and all the reports from observers indicate that the damage done by our bombers has been much worse than that indicated by our photo interpreta-
tion. This must come out to the public. We need someone who thinks of presentations and it looks as if we will have to have a new A-2 to do it, probably Quesada. Dinner with Hank and Woolly. Woolly in fine form, in bed at 9:10.

Tuesday, April 10, 1945 [Paris to Nice and Cannes, France]

Hank packed for me last night, up at 7:45. Prepared and signed letter to Nancy Dill, another to Jimmy Doolittle for his command. Had breakfast with Hank and Beebe. Gave them instructions re what to do and say in London.

Mix-up over Hank’s getting his plane to 45th Division but all straightened out. He left before I was half-through talking to him. He finally received one of the lost boxes; reached him yesterday. Got the bunch started for London at 9:15.

We finally said goodbye to and paid tips to 200 more or less minions at the hotel. One small boy fell down elevator shaft (bell boy) and came out of it with nothing worse than a bump on his head. Finally got all baggage aboard a truck, started for airport and B-25; took off at 10:40. Wrote cable for Marshall I will send from Cannes; everything should be under control. I hope. Clear day, not a cloud in sky from Paris to Mediterranean. Alps beautiful at a distance, very little evidence of war. Cannes and Nice are delightful towns that remind one of Southern California; olive trees, palms, oranges, wisteria, bright sunshine and blue waters.

Germans, either to keep Italians busy or to put up a real defense against us, lined all main roads with concrete blocks, about 5 feet high and 4 feet on a side, shaped like a pyramid; they made hundreds of thousands of them. Similarly they placed these same pyramids in the water just off shore so as to prevent our L.C.s [landing craft] from coming in; mines were placed everywhere on land and in the sea. They are still exploding in spite of all the minesweeping. We are about 15 miles from the French-German lines and can hear their morning and evening exchange of heavy artillery very clear. Yesterday a French destroyer, feeling the urge, went in close to shore and we could hear their salvos one after another.

We landed on a strip on the beach at Nice; were met by Commander Roberts (ex-manager, Mayflower Hotel) [in Washington]
who runs all recreation centers here on the Riviera for the AAF. He guided us to Spaatz’ villa which is a grand one right on the shore of the bay looking across to Cannes; big, roomy, with all furnishings specially designed and made for villa; specially-shaped lights, furniture of the modernistic type. One tile platform after another dropping down to water, an outdoor bar between wings of house, must have cost $150,000 for house and furnishings. My suite has bedroom, bath, dressing room, clothes room, windows 10 feet wide. Owned by a British lady of wealth who married a Pittsburg[?] man; she now lives in Palm Beach. The bar has a modernistic picture of half-nude men and women of the Tahiti type in rear. We landed at Nice at 12:50, had lunch (excellent) at 2:30. I was in bed at 3:15 to 5:00.

Only drawback to place is stairs, as many as in our house at Ft Myer; I am restrained in my climbing. Stopped enroute and checks made to see effects; so far none, will try two ascents a day under observation.

Sat on tile terraces in grand chairs, overlooking bay and city beyond until dinner time, 7:30; in bed at 9:30. French here are different, look poorly dressed and I am told have hard time getting food. Guns still booming when I went to sleep.

Wednesday, April 11, 1945 [Cannes, France]

Up at 7:30, clear blue skies; breakfast on porch outside of my bedroom, warm and delightful. Spent morning catching up on reports, letters and doing nothing. Spent time until lunch in sun on balcony from my room. Tatti Spaatz came over from Cannes with 2 other Red Cross girls and 3 aviators to swim and enjoy the sunshine. She looks fine, is tall but has mannerisms and looks a lot like Ruth. She says the aviators are war-happy pursuers who are goofy. After lunch went to bed and stayed for 1:45.

Got car and went for drive through Cannes toward Marseilles. Had excellent opportunity to see German beach defenses, dragon teeth all along roads and under water along all probable landing beaches. Barbed wire everywhere, along land side of beaches as well as strung between piles driven into sand below low tide. Pillboxes so camouflaged to conform to walls of house at the most unusual and unexpected places. All crossroads covered by
strong points all made of heavy concrete. Gun positions also built in to conform to walls and houses. Many buildings partially or completely destroyed by bombs and gunfire, bridges out. The villa I live in hit by many machine gun bullets.

Messengers from Spaatz with cables from Marshall at villa on return. Bradley told me and repeated that he was very glad that he did not have Beretton as his Tactical Air Commander; he considered Vandenberg so much better; there was no comparison between them. I am hoping to get Quesada as A-2 and Jimmy Doolittle as CO Materiel to take Knudsen's place. Perhaps Vandenberg to take over A-1. I will talk these things over when I get back. Eaker will be most interested, a month will make no difference for most of these changes.

We have in the meantime the following staffs to augment and to strengthen: 1. AAF-Washington; 2. Giles-Pacific; 3. Kenney's; 4. LeMay's; 5. Wedemeyer's. The only source is from European theater; my suggestion is McNarney take over Air Force Occupation Command and we use such officers as are available.

Cannes is such a restful place to think things out. Tuey and Doolittle due here tomorrow. Dinner at 7:30; in bed at 9:30.

Thursday, April 12, 1945 [Cannes, France]

Showers this morning, up at 7:30; showers continued all morning. Wrote a few reports and a letter and played cribbage. Had lunch upstairs after briefing. In bed 1:30, up at 3:15. Went for a walk with Tom [Sheffield]. Ran into a hill and being afraid of results if I climbed it, went back to get jeep. On way back met 3 busloads of GIs taking tour; they had stopped on point of peninsula to see gorgeous view. As I was walking past, one recognized me and asked: “Can I take your picture?” Then: “Can I have my picture taken with you?” Then from inside bus: “Jesus, a five star general.”

When we reached top of hill we saw a general layout of magnificent estates like Santa Barbara [California] but all run-down and unkept. This section was certainly a most beautiful part of the country once. We walked for a mile or so when Marquardt arrived in car. We then took-off for Nice via the coast road. Mile after mile of German defense works. Had our Air not laid a carpet of bombs over the shore line and neutralized
these works and positions, the doughboys would have had a
difficult if not impossible job. The strong gun positions and pill
boxes are so colored and outlined as small houses and garages
that they can’t be recognized for their true place in the defense
until one is right on top of them. We returned from Nice by the
back country; it looks just like Pennsylvania or Vermont or
any other place, except the Germans in their retreat destroyed
all bridges and put in many trenches. Return to villa and
awaited Spaatz and Doolittle. They got in at 7:30, dinner at
8:30, music; Tatti Spaatz and her Red Cross pals. I left table
at 9:30 and went to bed.

Friday, April 13, 1945 [Cannes, France]

Up at 7:30. Marquardt came in and told me that President
Roosevelt was dead; that may be a calamity of a kind and
extent the people of the US do not realize; I hope not.78

Story from Doolittle: a B-17 came in shot to pieces, hit by
aerial rocket and one could not understand how it could stay
together in the air; the entire tail section almost severed from
the rest of the ship. Doolittle, in order to say something, it was
one of those moments, when the tail gunner crawled out
[said]: “You were in there when the ship was hit?” The tail gun-
ner (a little red-headed, tough guy) said: “Yes sir, all the time.”
Doolittle passed on. The other officers heard the gunner say:
“Where in the hell did the bald-headed bastard think I was,
selling peanuts in Brooklyn?” One of the other crewmen said:
“That was General Doolittle.” The tail gunner said: “I know, I
have seen his pictures.”

With Spaatz and Doolittle discussed proper procedure of
events as a result of President’s death; decided on a message to
go to Mrs. Roosevelt,79 and that, if possible, Quesada should be
aide to President; started wheels to make it possible.80 Decided
to have an officer come from European theater [to Washington]
once each week to make air presentation as there are so many
interpretations and evaluations that we miss in the US.

Decided that, after talking over with Eaker, the following
officers should come to the US; Fred Anderson to A-1; Harmon
to Spaatz; Cabell to Air Plans; Kuter to Giles; Doolittle to
replace Knudsen; Vandenberg to A-3; Kepner to replace
Doolittle; Larson to Doolittle; O. Peck to replace Larson; J. Parker to Doolittle; Lawrence (15) to replace Parker; McNarney to take over Air C-in-C to CG, American Troops in Europe; Cannon to take over 9th Air Force in Europe.  

Decided that we should have war-experienced Air Forces in US after war rather than 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th; perhaps 8th, 12th, 15th, 10th; will take up with Eaker.  

Spaatz wants me to return to Washington and by only working part-time to get the Air Force back in the sun again. I am of the opinion that I would only make an invalid of myself if I returned before Eaker and the men whom I am getting from Spaatz. I realize that there is much spade work to be done right now with a new President and war in Germany coming to a close. I cannot see my way clear to deliberately ruin myself again physically when there is so little chance of permanent change in Air Force activities. I will wait and see what is being done and to be done before making my decision.  

Tuey and Jimmy Doolittle left for Rheims. Good lunch, too much good food, excellently prepared. Usual Monday [sic noonday?] rest from 1:15 to 3:00. Went up hill in auto and then for a walk. Visited a few of the large mansions on the hill, all very expensively built and furnished but none occupied. The one used by Eisenhower is owned by a Major Allen of New York. He and his wife used it for 2 years, and haven’t seen it since; it was built 1937–39. He has a caretaking detachment of 4 French. The property looks in fine shape in contrast to others that are overgrown, hedges need trimming, lawns are tangles of underbrush, walks and lanes are overgrown with grass, etc., etc. The walk was quite long and I was tired when I got back to villa. Had cocktails, dinner, as usual well-prepared and too much food. Tom played the piano and sang some of his Yale songs after dinner. Bed at 9:00 but I am getting fed up on this life of rest; I can’t see just what is ahead.  

Saturday, April 14, 1945 [Cannes, France]  
Awakened at 6:30, read from 7:00 to 7:25. Bright, sunny day. Last night sent for Twining and Cannon to come and see me Sunday. Spent all morning dictating; sent cable to C of S [Chief of Staff] re my future plans. Lunch on porch, rest after lunch.
Beebe and Pete arrived when I came downstairs; they had fine and valuable trip to England. Went through hospital up on hill, highest east of Cannes; a fine building, originally built as hospital, used and stripped by Germans; now an area hospital used by Americans. Very well equipped and efficiently operated but most of doctors are Jews, too many of them. German prisoners do all the chores.87

Had dinner with McCloy and Pinky Craig.88 McCloy asked for Echols and ______ (BG at Wright) for use in connection with reconstruction and reorganization of Germany; I told him yes.89 They had fine trip through battle front, told of large underground engine and plane factory South of Heidelberg at which we had no representatives; I told him we would get someone there at once. Make jet planes and is very extensive.90 Also told of finding some V-2s intact; no Air Force men present at either place.91 In bed by 9:10.

Sunday, April 15, 1945 [Cannes, France]

Up at 7:30, breakfast with Beebe. Spent morning preparing cables and letters; briefing at 11:00; long conference with Pinky Craig, McCloy. Rest period.

Conference with Cannon and Twining; they agreed to let me have Cabell, and that Rush’s Wing headquarters should go to US at once.92 Gave Hal Bowman information re presentation required upon my return.93 Found 2nd box to Hank lost for such a long time; Cannon had it. Had Proctor, Darby, Pete, Hank, Lindsay, Gene, Cannon, Twining, Ogle and Sheffield all for drinks.94 Told Darby, Proctor and Lindsay to leave tomorrow to go Devers’ Headquarters and take Hank’s box with them.95 Told Sheffield and Dice to go to Italy with Cannon and Twining and arrange for our party in Florence and at Bari.96 Dinner with [Fred] Anderson, who arrived just in time; Cannon, Twining, Lindsay and Beebe. In bed at 9:00.

Monday, April 16, 1945 [Cannes, France]

Up at 7:30, breakfast with Fred Anderson; outlined to him some of the duties and troubles he would have in his new job.97 Gin rummy with Hank Pool.
Lunch with Vandenberg; went over some of his problems and told him to go ahead and cut down on Tactical Units, to get men to take over German air facilities and developments pending arrival of technical men and to take care of demobilization of GAF. To bed at 1:30, up at 3:30.

Van thinks the time is ripe to announce that the air war in Europe is over. I think so too and will tell Eaker but with it must come an announcement of our accomplishments, not so many towns, factories or airplanes destroyed, but what each destruction did, its part in preventing the enemy from doing something or permitting us to do something.

I don’t remember whether I entered in this book the following:

(1) In my room there are 3 bullet holes, in the house many more, all from airplanes entering high and striking low. All .50 caliber from American planes.
(2) Each window has the following coverings: a. outside sliding steel shutter; b. sliding screen; c. sliding glass; d. Venetian blinds; e. pull drapes, all very easy to handle.

Took a walk for an hour and a half all by myself through the back lanes and paths; met a different kind of Frenchman; he tried to be pleasant, tried to talk English. One said, with a smile on his face, “Goodbye” as I came up to him. In bed at usual time.

Tuesday, April 17, 1945 [Cannes, France]
Up at 7:30, breakfast with Hank. Dictated letter to Andy [Fred Anderson] re getting a better policy for determining which officers are suitable for Regular Army.98

Auto trip to Aga Khan’s villa; very large and occupied only by the Secretary to the Princess; she stayed during all the German occupation. Managed to ship out most of the valuable furnishings; kept the Germans from occupying or looting. The villa is called “Jane Andree” after his French wife. When the place is completely furnished, it must be something. The secretary is French but speaks very good English.99

The gardens are beautiful; the Khan’s specialty is camellias; he has pink, deep red, white and various combinations of those colors; the wisteria is beautiful, one special plant has
blooms almost 18 inches long. Pete went back when I was asleep and took some colored pictures. The Khan seems to have plenty of money and also women. The chalet here belongs to his ex-wife, a French gal, princess. It is generally accepted that the Khan (spiritual ruler of 80 million Moslems) is so holy that his bath water is sold to his believers; what a racket. His followers extend from Afghanistan through India, Persia, Arabia, down well into central Africa. The only man who has twice been weighed in gold, from $300,000 to $600,000 depending on the price per ounce, once in India on his golden jubilee and once in South Africa. He is now 67.100

Had movie taken, appendix to “Two Down and One To Go,” made in front of villa along shore of bay.101 Talked to Legge and made plans subject to change for a trip to Switzerland starting Friday.102 Wire from Marshall doesn’t show much confidence in my judgment as to taking care of myself.103 To bed at 9:00.

Wednesday, April 18, 1945 [Cannes, France]

Up at 7:30, went for walk in morning. Looks like an impossible job for 200 Germans to hold this cape.104 There are so many villas and so much area. The first thing they did was to run out all Frenchmen but 20; then they erected barbed wire barriers everywhere, pillboxes, gun emplacements. Then they opened up a terror campaign. Knowing where all the 20 Frenchmen and women were, they checked on them at all hours of the day and night, asking who was with them, etc. All 20 Frenchmen were required to show their papers at the most unusual times. Guards were placed on roads where entry and exit were permitted. If all pillboxes, gun emplacements and strong points had been occupied, it would have required about 1,800 men. The Germans were ruthless in entering any and all villas, occupied or unoccupied. Windows broken and still open so what surprises await the owners they will find out upon their return. Over two-thirds of the villas are still unoccupied and have no caretakers. In spite of all their efforts the French and Italians came and went.

Presentation at 11:00; lunch and rest period, up at 3:00. Went up to lighthouse location on highest point on Cape. Old masonry lighthouse was 150 feet high. Germans made a
strong point out of it. Nearby was stone church built in 1300 and something. When the Germans pulled out, they destroyed the lighthouse and the church.  

Sheffield returned with all arrangements made for trip to Italy; looks OK for stay in Florence. Pete and Hank returned from trip to Marseilles; that must be one awful place; filthy, filled with scum of the earth. Worst example of Negroes and Whites living together and co-mingling with venereal rate going up by leaps and bounds. Overcast most of the day; rather cool. Dinner with all present for a change; bed at 9:00.

**Thursday, April 19, 1945 [Cannes, France]**

Up at 7:30, overcast sky. Holding weight steady, 182-3 in morning, 185-6 in evening. French destroyer sunk by German E-boat some 50 miles from here 2 nights ago. Went for walk with Hank Pool; lunch and rest.

Ira and Tuey came in at 3:30. Conference became “heated” at times, especially when Ira said: “I didn’t ask to go to Washington.” Then I exploded: “Who in the hell ever did ask to go to Washington? Do you think I asked to go there and stay there for 10 years? Someone has to run the AAF. We can’t all be in command of AF [Air Forces] around the world!” Tuey stepped in and calmed us down.

In any event, it was finally decided:

a. Jimmy Doolittle would go to command XX Bomber Command in Pacific.

b. Fred Anderson would be A-1.

c. A new A-2 would be found.

d. Vandenberg would be A-3.

e. Norstad would go to Plans.

f. LeMay would take over A-4.

g. Knerr would take over Knudsen’s job.

h. Harmon would go to Spaatz.

i. Hodges would be asked to retire.

j. Wilson would take over Valparaiso.

k. Gardner would go overseas.

l. Echols already scheduled for Clay’s outfit.

m. Hale to take Parker’s AF.

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n. Parker to go to Spaatz.
o. Larson to go overseas.107

These changes to cover a period of months, some to start at once.

Apparently neither Nimitz nor Hale have received the word about the Long-Range Fighters going to Pacific being part of Twentieth Air Force; I told Eaker to look it up and get word out.108 LeMay’s Headquarters should go to Saipan; Eaker was told to take care of that.109 Giles’ headquarters has to be made strong. MacArthur and Nimitz both want the Twentieth Air Force. Eaker was on MacArthur’s side until I pointed out that Kenney’s Air Force had never done a real strategic mission. The Twentieth Air Force was still using planes for which spares were limited. The [B] 29 was not a completely proven article.110

It was also decided that for political as well as safety reasons I would not go to Switzerland. Pool, Pete and Tom will go for a trip; I will stay here until Sunday and then go to Florence. After Italy, if all is well, I will go to Rio. Dinner, then bed at 9:20.

Friday, April 20, 1945 [Cannes, France]

Up at 7:30, letter to Lovett.111 Inspected Hotel Martinique where Air Force officers stay in Cannes; officers can stay 7 days.112 Rooms are all modern, dining room open at almost any hour, entertainment, dancing, movies provided, shows, bar, reasonable prices; 300 officers at a time can stay; all officers in AAF have the opportunity of coming here or of going to resorts on South coast of England.

Lunch with Darby, Lindsay and Proctor who have returned after having a wonderful trip at Devers’ headquarters, Patch’s headquarters, Haislip’s Corps, 3rd Division and 45th Division, while they were capturing Nuremberg.113 Saw Hank and delivered box; he was in fine shape.

After rest went to Nice with Roberts and Proctor; inspected the two hotels we have there for GIs; first the Hotel D’Angleterre.114 Everything is done for the enlisted man; he is treated just like a guest. All the service is done by the French. In the dining room, they are met by a headwaiter and escorted to a table. The food is drawn from the Quartermaster and prepared by French cooks. Each man is checked in and allowed to stay for 7 days; rooms are not crowded. We take care of 400 men in two hotels; the
number will be built up to 1,200 men soon with new hotels. Ground Commander is trying to get control and have some uniformity as on an Army Post; standard menus for all GIs at Nice in all hotels; same kind of administration and control as is found in training areas. So far we have been able to maintain our AAF standards of service for the GIs instead of the reverse.

Returned from Nice and found message from Tedder asking to come up and see him at 6:00. Met his aide, Wentworth, at the roadblock in Cannes; followed his jeep up the hill through narrow lanes and finally landed at a very grand villa: Tedder, Lady Tedder and his daughter. Talked to Tedder about his visit to Stalin and Post War Aviation. Stalin apparently came through with all information available re his plans and received same from Tedder re ours. The great Russian problem is transportation, so much time is required to get supplies to prepare for a push. Everything, says Tedder, is going as Uncle Joe said it would.

Tedder thinks war in Germany will be over in another 2 months. Only hitch in Post War Aviation between Great Britain and United States is that of carrying passengers by foreign airlines between cities in any country. I thought that had been ironed out long ago; FDR and I talked that over and he was very firm on the point; foreign lines could cross US and bring passengers to New York or San Francisco but could not pick up passengers at New York for San Francisco, the same principle to apply to our lines.

Invited Tedder, Lady Tedder and daughter to dinner for Saturday night (tomorrow). Dinner at home, sat up until 9:15 and then to bed.

Saturday, April 21, 1945 [Cannes, France]

Up at 7:30. Pete, Hank and Tom did not return yesterday, expect them today. Dark overcast, chilly day; clouds broke over Nice yesterday but not over Cannes.

Tedder said yesterday that Stalin fully realizes that he controls the German bread-basket: Roumaina [sic], Ukraine, Poland, Hungary. Without those sources of food Germany starves unless we, the United States and Great Britain, keep
them alive. Germany has not the production to support her-
self; this may well be a source of trouble.

Yesterday while inspecting the rooms at the GI hotel, there
was a commotion in the corridor. The officers accompanying
me were trying to keep two GIs from getting to me. I motioned
to let them come, although they were quite under the influence
of liquor but not drunk in the soldiers’ accepted meaning of
the term. The conversation:

GIs: “Those fellows say we can’t talk to you.”
HHA: “Why sure you can talk to me. What’s on your mind?”
GIs: “They said we couldn’t get near you.”
HHA: “Well here you are. What outfit were you with?”
GIs: “The 101st Parachute.”
HHA: “A wonderful outfit - did you jump in Holland?”
1st GI:: “Sure we did.”
2nd GI: “You know you didn’t.”
1st GI: “Of course, to hell we did.”
2nd GI: “Did you mean the first time or second.”
HHA: “The first jump in the Arnheim area.”
Both GIs: “Sure we both jumped there.”
HHA: “And in Normandy.”
GIs: “Sure did.”
HHA: “My heartiest congratulations on a fine job.”
GIs: “I knew you would let us talk to you.” Someone: “Let me
take a picture.”
HHA: “Sure; then to the 2 101st GIs, ‘Come and get in the
picture.’” In they came, one on each side and put
their arms around me. So the picture was taken.
GIs: “You’re a grand Joe.”

As we were leaving the hotel in front of the crowd, happy as
could be were the 2 GIs, standing at attention, slightly sway-
ing, with smiles on their faces from ear to ear, and although
saluting is not required in that area, both had their hands at
salute in their most rigid military posture. Those 2 GIs came
from the Ground Force hotel when somehow word got around
that I was there at the AAF hotels. They were wonderful with
their chests full of decorations.
Went back to Notre Dame de Garoupe built in 980 A.D., church for mariners. Has inside in fair condition in spite of destruction by Germans; pictures, paintings of incidents in which [church] members in all parts of the world perished, some dating back to 1760. One as typical: a scene on a farm, stacking hay in mow, the tackle broke, down went farmer to death with St. Peter in sky receiving him.\footnote{119}

Had a Lieutenant Lynch, bombardier from B-25 squadron, in for chat. On his 54th mission while over Brenner Pass he was shot down. Landed safely but when asking Italian peasants for help, was turned in to Germans. Taken to Verona, interrogated, put in solitary for week, marched through Brenner Pass with 3 other prisoners, thumbing ride when he could. Germans scared to death of our planes, hiding by day in tunnels along Lake Garda, traveling at night.\footnote{120} Ended up on railroad in Nuremberg. All Germans, whole divisions, going through pass on foot. All trucks coke burners. In prison camp food was lousy; 2,500 of Americans, British, Poles and Russians. 4 camps of 1,000 each. When 45th Division and 3rd Division came towards Nuremberg 10 days ago, moved prisoners towards Munich. Our P-47s strafed column and Lynch escaped in woods, walked with Sergeant toward our lines, was passed by hundreds of Germans when Sergeant accompanying him was sick. Sergeant too sick so they went to town and gave themselves up. Ended up back in camp at Nuremberg when tanks, doughboys of 45th broke into town and liberated them. Whole experience was between March 8th when shot down and April 18th when 45th liberated them. He had to hide aviator’s clothing on account of intense feeling against our airmen; took off all insignia. Believes that all American and British prisoners will be held as hostages.

Had Tedder and Lady Tedder for dinner, in bed at 9:30.

\textbf{Sunday, April 22, 1945 [Cannes, France to Florence, Italy]}

Up at 7:15. Pool, Pete and Tom should be back this A.M.; the wandering boys got home at 9:30; what a spin everyone was in. I went to briefing alone and awaited afterward for Tom and Hank to pack. Finally at 11:00 we took off from villa Aujour d’hui, reached the airport, talked to about 50 of our enlisted men who
were returning to their bases after 7 days on the Riviera. Took off at 11:45 only one hour later than planned.

According to the crew who visited Switzerland the economic life has changed but little; stores full of articles for sale and prices reasonable; good food of excellent quality, fresh milk and good beer. Minister of War and Chief of Staff sent me an invitation to come back any time, maybe I can some time.\textsuperscript{121}

Our course due East with flying time of about 1 hour 20 minutes to Florence. Trip across Mediterranean was a grand one: Alps to North with snow caps, towns and cities along coast, blue Mediterranean, South end of German line not 40 miles away, North edge of Corsica, the Italian coast, broken clouds, glimpses of Italian towns, farms, roads, rivers and railroads, Florence through the clouds.

The airport with hundreds of planes, landing at 1:15; met by Ben Chidlaw and Myers.\textsuperscript{122} Trip to town, after seeing the destroyed hangars, very few destroyed houses or buildings. A delightful villa owned by Rubens, now in San Francisco, American girl, Jew[ish] man.\textsuperscript{123} Grand lunch, in bed at 2:30, up at 4:00 P.M.

Went to Chidlaw's Headquarters, looked over situation map and then made plans for our stay. Took ride through city and visited many of the points of interest. Took pictures; people all well dressed, no signs of lack of food, no thin children or grown-ups, not like Venice or Bari. Dinner, bed in villa at 9:15.

**Monday, April 23, 1945** [Florence to Pisa to Florence, Italy]

Up at 7:00. Comments re Red Cross; many hundred tons of supplies in Switzerland, our prisoners getting none during last 2 months. In fact our prisoners are suffering: out of 200 who marched from East Prussia to Nuremberg only 8 arrived, other died or left sick en route. Prisoners in Nuremberg living on little or nothing. Germans when giving our food to prisoners knocked holes in cans so that it would spoil. Red Cross telling American public how they are caring for our prisoners, getting money on those grounds. Man in charge in Switzerland, a playboy from Riviera, who is more interested in having a good time than in trying to do a mighty hard job.\textsuperscript{124}
Breakfast at 8:00, left house 8:30, took off for Pisa, 9:00, arrived Pisa 9:30. Accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Nero Maura, CO, 1st Brazilian Fighter Squadron. Inspected airfield and 350th Fighter Group of which Brazilians are part.† Brazilians have shown themselves capable of being accepted as part of AAF team. Have lost 17 [aircraft] in combat and 3 war-weary, total 20; equipped with P-47s. General Israel there, inspected his control center.‡ Went to Pisa and took photos of Leaning Tower and visited Cathedral, a magnificent building with wonderful paintings.† Back at airport at 11:45, landed Florence, 12:00, back at villa at 12:30, resting at 1:30, up at 3:05. McNarney and Cannon came at 4:00, Chidlaw at 4:30, decorated Chidlaw with DSM, had presentation. Dinner at 7:30, bed at 9:15.

McNarney is worried about attitude of Russians. They now have so many restrictions on actions of Americans that we can do practically nothing in the Balkans or in the Vienna area. As a matter of fact, Crane (our head of Mission in Austria) has to get permission 48 hours in advance to have his mechanics to go out and work on his plane.† McNarney or no one else can land at Vienna without starting 48 hours ahead of time to get permission. He looks for trouble.

Tuesday, April 24, 1945 [Florence to General Clark’s headquarters to Bologna to Florence, Italy]

Up at 7:15, sent for Tuey to talk over plans for air command in Pacific.¶ Went to 24th General Hospital and talked to GIs and officers in 2 wards, about 120 all told, from 88th, 34th and 91st Divisions; machine gun, mortar, shrapnel, land mine and booby trap wounds. Visited Mark Clark and after presentation of war situation, had lunch: [present] Gruenther, Clark, Chidlaw, Beebe, Saltzman and RAF representative.† Back to house at 1:45, rest until 3:15.

Spaatz and [Fred] Anderson arrived at 6:00 P.M. Andy has just returned from Germany. He says that the destruction by bombers is so complete that Germany cannot recover for 100 years: cities, towns, power plants, factories all leveled to the ground, much worse than any of us had believed possible, oil refineries completely wrecked.† However the underground
works had developed to such an extent that we were very lucky to get by. We caught them once again just before they were ready to start their operation. Had they completed the underground plants we could not have possibly destroyed them; the shops and warehouses were too far underground to be harmed by our bombs.

He saw the concentration camps and says that the atrocities were much worse than depicted in the papers; they are indescribable. When the Mayor and his wife of the town nearby were taken and made to look and comment they both committed suicide.\textsuperscript{133} Hundreds of political prisoners lying in bunks and on the floor unable to get up, some dying right before his eyes.

My itinerary:

April 26 - Leave Florence.
   Arrive Bari.
April 28 - Leave Bari.
   Arrive Marrakesh.
April 29 - Leave Marrakesh.
   Arrive Dakar.
April 30 - Leave Dakar.
May 1 - Arrive Recife.
May 3 - Leave Recife.

Arrive Rio, stay there 4 or 5 days, then Belem, Borinquen and a check-up at Miami for 4 days. Then Washington.

Left villa at 9:15, arrived General Clark's Headquarters, 9:30,\textsuperscript{134} presentation of war until 10:00. Met General Anders, Commander-in-Chief, Polish Army\textsuperscript{135} at 10:00. Take-off for airport, 10:15, in plane C-45 at 10:30, arrived Bologna,\textsuperscript{136} 11:00.

Rode around city with Clark, Truscott\textsuperscript{137} and returned to airport at 12:10. Awaited Marquardt until 12:20 and as Clark and Truscott were waiting to take-off in Cubs on an inspection trip to the Po, Chidlaw and D'Arcy\textsuperscript{138} were waiting to go up to advanced airdromes and they would not leave until I started with my 2 pilots, Sessions and Wadman, Hank Pool and a young B-25 pilot.\textsuperscript{139}
We took off for Florence at 12:20, arrived Florence, 12:40. The young pilot had flown a B-25 over from the States, flown it in 75 missions and was doing staff duty, plane still being used.

As to war it is consensus of opinion that German Army in Italy is disorganized and broken; 1 Corps commander, 1 Division commander with most of their staffs captured. Trucks, railroad cars, tanks being destroyed by the hundreds every day. Tanks and motor vehicles found abandoned with no gas, supply dumps being blown up, German troops being captured in pockets. Both British and Americans are across the Po; Truscott says he will be in Verona tonight. He expects to be through the Brenner Pass on north side by May 10th. G-2 here says that the 24 German divisions now are equal to only 10–12 normal divisions; the war is folding up.

General Anders was in command of Polish troops, captured by Russians [in 1939] held prisoner for a couple of years, released weighing 100 pounds. Organized a new army, was doing excellent work with Corps in Italy only to hear of Yalta agreement that put homes of practically every one of his men in Russian territory. He does not know what to do now; where do his men go when war is over? They don't want to go to Russia. I don't believe anyone knows where they should or can go.

Bologna was an excellent sample of super bombing: the railroad yards, the bridges, the airport and a huge supply dump all destroyed but very little of the city damaged. The University, the oldest in the world, is only slightly damaged and it can be repaired easily. The city is different from Rome, Naples, Florence, perhaps due to its age dating from early Roman times; first courses in anatomy were given at the University.

As Truscott, Clark and I rode through the city we saw thousands of people all well-dressed and well-fed. They did not seem happy to see us nor did they show displeasure; they looked very bewildered, dazed. At the center square a crowd collected and when one guy shouted there were cheers, hand waving for a block or two, but in remainder of city only looks, curious bewildered looks.

Pete, Proctor and Beebe took off this A.M. Clark and Truscott speak very highly of Air Force work and they should for it is our destruction that made their advance possible. Photogra-
phers galore all over Bologna. Bridges over Po or lack of bridges may mean difference between total disaster or just heavy losses for Germans.

Had talk with Tuey and Fred Anderson and as a result sent two cables to Washington re personnel for AAF staff. Tuey and Andy took off this A.M. After lunch took a rest, 2:30 to 3:30, nothing on for balance of day.

The air war in Italy as in France is about over; there are very few targets for the Heavy Bombers. 'Tis true there are a few in the German redoubt area but not too many. It won't be long before we can take all kinds and types of units from the European theater and send them to the Pacific. Weather has been perfect ever since we arrived here.

Wednesday, April 25, 1945 [Florence to Bologna, Italy]

After trip to Bologna up and about after rest at 3:30. Loafed all P.M., dinner and then to bed at 9:15. Clark reported that he had Genoa. Prisoners captured by his army now above 54,000; Germans have no gasoline, trucks and tanks abandoned; trucks pulled by horses and oxen; Brenner Pass cut. Interior Germany destroyed so that it will require 100 years to rebuild. All communications cut, enlisted men wanting to surrender. Such is the condition confronting what used to be a world-feared and formidable Army.

Thursday, April 26, 1945 [Florence, Caserta, Bari, Italy]

Up at 7:15, packed, loafed around villa until 9:30, then took off for airport. Surprise: met at airport by guard of honor, band, Generals Clark and Chidlaw. Guard consisted of British and United States troops; superior bearing, neatness and condition of equipment. Took honors and then inspected escort. It was an honor most unexpected but greatly appreciated.

In plane, took off 9:55 for Caserta. Fifteen days [before his troops are] into Austria, according to Clark. Arrived Caserta 11:30, trip without incident. Cannon met us, went to headquarters MTO [Mediterranean Theater of Operations]. Had briefing by Cannon's officers; gave talk to British-American Air officers on requirements for Pacific war against Japs. Then to
Cannon’s office. Received very pessimistic letter from Lovett; since my departure AAF has been ignored in all high-level conferences; he wants me to come back home at once.

Upon leaving Palace at Caserta, quite a crowd of American and British soldiers, WACs, WAVES, etc., congregated around my auto to get a look, all voluntary and quite thrilling. Lunch with Field Marshal Alexander, General Cannon, General Roberts, General Morgan, Air Marshal Garrod, Major General Lemnitzer, USA.144

Alexander thinks the war in Italy is about over. Gives Clark all credit for handling troops for breakthrough; believes he will be in Austria in 2 weeks. Doesn’t believe that Germans will continue fighting much longer and that they will surrender.145 Thinks Himmler will be the one to make overtures. Thinks Hitler has brain trouble (hemorrhage) and is on an island in the Baltic. Report will go out that Hitler was killed in defense of Berlin. In 5 years if conditions are right he will suddenly reappear from the dead and become a new threat. I cannot agree as I do not believe there will be anything in Germany to provide a threat. Alexander thinks that Russians are very jealous of United States and British and that they are savages at heart. They have good high-level staff planning but poor leadership and staffs in lower levels; I agree.

Left after excellent lunch; came to Cannon’s cabin where I rested from 2:20 to 3:50. Saw McNarney at 4:00 and discussed conditions in Washington. Took off Caserta 4:35, arrived Bari 5:20, met by Twining and his staff. Cross wind of 25 miles an hour in opposite direction from normal.

Rode into town and was billeted in old Italian Air Force building, excellent accommodations. Told Beebe and Proctor they were to leave tomorrow on special mission to Mr. Lovett.146

Had dinner with all of Twining’s Wing COs and his staff.147 Bari is still the poor, destitute town that it was on my last visit, this in spite of the many square miles of farm-lands all around it. The people just look as if they will always be poor, even though they were given wealth and everything they desire. They are thin, poorly dressed, and have no idea of cleanliness, either personal or sanitary. To bed at 9:15.
Friday, April 27, 1945 [Bari, Foggia, Bari, Italy]

Up at 7:15. Even the olive trees are sorry looking, no leaves to speak of and very scraggly. The children have body lice, visible from several feet. Bari might well be a beautiful city; the Italians started out all right with magnificent modern concrete buildings on the waterfront, then Mussolini thought that he was predestined to be Caesar.

Everywhere I go there are stories of Russian prohibitions of our activities: we can’t go here, we can’t do this or that, we can’t land there or see the results of our bombing at this place or that place, we can’t go in this city or land at that airport. Some day there will be a showdown: Spaatz, Clark, Alexander, McNarney, Twining and Cannon all say the same thing. The Russians have no fear of our Army or Navy but do fear our Air Force; we must remember that. The Russian Army is larger than ours and probably more rugged, but their Air Force is amateurish. Sometime soon we will have to get tough with the Russians, tell them what we are going to do and stick to it.

Took off for Foggia at 9:05. Bari harbor and waterfront still show the damage resulting not only from explosion #1 just before my last visit, but also of #2 just about a week ago, when gas drums were thrown all the way out to the airfield: gas, oil, steel, bombs, all over the city; offices, houses damaged, glass windows broken.

Landed Foggia 9:35, inspected 345th and 349th Groups. Took off for Bari 12:00, landed at 12:30. The filth of the Italians is indescribable in the small towns. They use the sidewalks as latrines and have no sense of propriety about it all, no embarrassment.

No shortage of planes, crews or spares, in fact everyone in the 8th, 9th, 12th and 15th Air Forces happy and content. These groups are all raring to go and with a short time in the States will be ready to go to fight the Japs. They are not willing as yet to go home and call the war over. Met one officer and one enlisted man who served in the 7th Squadron in Panama. Decorated 4 bombers [bombardiers] of the 345th Group who laid all their eggs yesterday in a circle 1,000 feet in diameter at the marshalling yards at Linz. All of these units are running out of targets; we should stop sending them sup-
plies and start getting them back to the United States. It makes no difference from here on whether the Groups send out 50 or 20 planes.

Rested from 2:00 to 3:30. Took a ride through Bari; visited a beautiful villa, some 4-6 miles out of the city; must have cost $60,000-$80,000, right on coast. Modern in all respects with fine furniture except it has only 1 bath in the entire house, a small room, not even a room, just large enough for a small wash basin and a stool. It is on 1st floor; what a race of people.

Drove through dock area and saw the wreckage from last explosion. The ship, loaded with bombs that blew up, disintegrated at the stern and midship, drove the bow, what was left of it, forward about 50 feet into the dock. Pieces of boiler and sides of the ship were blown on deck [dock?]. Other pieces of ship and cargo thrown for miles; cranes overturned and wrecked; a hole 100 feet x 75 feet was blown in the concrete dock; 2 other ships were burned and towed out to sea and burned. Houses were wrecked ½ mile away. Other ships were scarred and had bridges, davits, lifeboats, damaged or completely destroyed, the whole place was a wreck. To bed at 9:15 after a conference with McKee from Washington and fixing up a cable on deployment.

Saturday, April 28, 1945 [Bari, Italy to Marrakesh, French Morocco, now Morocco]

Up at 6:45, packed, breakfast; talked quite a while with McKee, hence got a late start to the airport. Twining came out with me; said goodbye to Twining, Cannon and McKee and took off for Marrakesh at 8:30. Weather overcast and cloudy but not bad, clear as we passed Sardinia.

Time has come when all supplies to Europe but gasoline should stop. There are enough in depots and in the pipeline; sent message to Eaker telling him so. Across Italy, just missing Naples, past Sardinia’s South coast, just North of Algiers, over Oran and Fez and on to Marrakesh; landed at 4:30. The city looks beautiful from the air; in the valley below the mountains orange groves, green spots of vegetation in the midst of the desert and below the brown mountains; the Sultan’s Palace extending for several blocks in the heart of the
city;\textsuperscript{157} the coloring of the blue flowers on the trees, the red Bougainvillea, the Jacaranda, the brilliant blue flowers on the trees. We went immediately to the Taylor villa and it was filled with gay colors from the various flowers.\textsuperscript{158} Took my camera and made pictures of Arabs, flowers, trees, bright colored houses. Arabs all asked for money or chewing gum when pictures were taken.

Saw threshing of grain by having mules tied together, 6 of them driven round and round over the grain. Prisoners marched down street with guard. Then got a book and went to read in the library while the others went downtown. The same dirty Arabs, sitting, lying in rags in the dirt, along the walls, in the shade of trees; dirty as they are they are not as filthy as the Italians of Bari. Excellent dinner as usual at villa Taylor.\textsuperscript{159} In bed at 9:00.

\textbf{Sunday April 29, 1945 [Marrakesh, French Morocco now Morocco to Dakar, French West Africa, now Senegal]}

Up at 7:00. Anticipating that war will end very soon, I sent a message to Marshall telling him that I was back in the ring and would like to be notified when the CCS was going to have its meeting so that I could change my itinerary accordingly. Went to Post Exchange this morning, fine shape, good assortment of items.\textsuperscript{160} Lunch at 12:00, in bed at 12:45, up at 2:15.

Met Malcolm Grow outside of villa. He was touring French posts with General Claire, French Chief of Flight Surgeons.\textsuperscript{161} This is his last stop except a barbeque with Arab Chieftains in desert tomorrow before taking Claire back to France and then on to England. Took off from Marrakesh at 2:55 P.M., arrived Dakar 9:50; good trip, desert, blowing sand, we went over at 6,500 feet but had sand in plane.

\textbf{Monday, April 30, 1945 [Dakar, French West Africa, now Senegal to Recife, Brazil]}

Took off Dakar 12:01, arrived Recife 6:48, which is 5:48 local time; actual flying time 9 hours 48 minutes. Rain all along coast, hit shore at Natal. Met at airport by Bubb,\textsuperscript{162} Kay Francis at Hotel de Gink so I used Wooten's room.\textsuperscript{163} Wooten and Walsh will
get here at 5:00 P.M. Weather now clearing; Hotel de Gink right on beach. Showers all A.M., clearing in P.M.

Big change in Recife since 1st visit. All personnel buildings for [housing] 1/2 personnel on beach. Excellent hospital. Went through enlisted men’s mess. Talked to civilian employees, about 30 American girls, USO, WACs, 8 nurses. Whole set-up greatly improved. Went through Navy and Brazilian personnel area, all look grand on beach. Wooten and Walsh due in between 4:00 and 5:00, will make plans then.

Last night, when we were at Colonel Foster’s house (CO Dakar) he gave me a French swagger stick, one end loaded like a blackjack, covered with leather. Has a French bayonet attached to heavy handle, bayonet inserted into stick proper, all French officers carry them. Had usual rest in P.M.

Took ride into Recife and went through market. Had chauffeur only with me; he knows a little English and with my little Spanish, we make up a little Portuguese, although it is surprising the large number of words which are the same in both Portuguese and Spanish. Went through enlisted men’s messes and clubs; they are all OK. Enlisted men at clubs get opportunity to buy drinks of practically all kinds, good drinks at reasonable prices; keeps them away from towns. When I returned Admiral Munroe, Walsh and Wooten were here; had cocktails and then dinner. To bed at 9:00.

Tuesday, May 1, 1945 [Recife, Brazil and environs]

Up at 6:45, morning cool and clear. Looks though as if it is going to be hot. Bought 10 mangoes at market yesterday, they cost me 25¢; probably could have bought them cheaper but I didn’t argue, they were large ones. Made plans to go Rio tomorrow. Received no word from Marshall or Lovett yesterday. See Bill Streett re personnel for Brazil, post-war activities, Riddle-McCabe. Spent morning getting speech and press ready for Rio. Talked with Bob Walsh and Ralph Wooten; after lunch rest.

3:00 P.M. went with Admiral Munroe to see Navy Farm; it is a fine operation, chickens 13,000, pigs 600, ducks 200. Started with 4 wild turkeys from South Carolina and now has over 40; vegetables, starting fruit trees. All being done with aid
of Brazilian Department of Agriculture; has a young fellow from Delaware running the place.\textsuperscript{168} Sells most of produce to Navy installations, 1st priority to Navy hospital.

Returned by way of Admiral Munroe’s house, a fine set-up; met his staff. Brazil back-country has unlimited possibilities. Navy farm was cut right out of jungle. Went through hospital; got weighed, 194 with clothes. Dinner: Admiral Munroe, Brigadier General Seco, Representative of Air Minister; other Navy and Brazilians, and regular mess.\textsuperscript{169} Bed at 9:00.

\textbf{Wednesday, May 2, 1945 [Recife, Rio, Santa Cruz, Brazil]}

Up at 6:00, ready to leave too soon, also too hot to sit and wait, hence a ride around the Post was in order. Reached plane at 7:45, said goodbye to Brazilian general (decorated yesterday)\textsuperscript{170} and went aboard plane. Took off for Rio at 7:50, distance, 1,200 miles.

Cooled off as soon as we were in air. Weather overcast with occasional showers. We could see the coastline and the very infrequent towns and harbors; also an occasional new landing field. New passengers: Brigadier General Seco, Assistant Chief of Air Staff; Major General Wooten; Major General Walsh. Recife $8^\circ$ South, Rio $23^\circ$ South, Georgetown $7^\circ$ North.\textsuperscript{171} Send 1 pair of Bee’s old shoes to Belem to be reproduced. Weather broke about 400 miles out of Rio, landed 1:50.

Rio is surrounded by hills that grow into mountains as you get farther away from the city. The city seems to flow along the water fronts at the foot of the mountains. It streams through the passes so there are beaches covered with homes, apartment houses and hotels for several miles but only 3 or 4 blocks back from the water line.

We landed at Santa Cruz, were met by many Brazilians and our military attaché, General Kroner.\textsuperscript{172} I had to review the air troops and receive honors. We then took a C-47 and flew back to Rio, 40 miles, passed by Sugar Loaf, 1,500 feet high at entrance to harbor, and landed at an airport right next to the city. We could see the Santo Cristus statue 280 feet high up on the hills.\textsuperscript{173}

We were met by Minister for Air and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, countless Navy and Army officers, General Gomes,
There was guard of honor made up of Aviation Cadets. Once again I had to inspect and receive honors and stand at attention while both the United States and Brazilian national anthems were played.

Berle, Bob Walsh and I finally got into car and started for hotel, landing there at 3:00 P.M. After getting to my suite I went to bed and rested for 1 hour 20 minutes. Due to getting in late, did not meet press until 4:30. That rushed appointment with President Vargas at 5:00 but we made it. Then on to Minister of War, next Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Naval Affairs. [Minister of Air was at Vargas' house, so we agreed to no calls. Back to hotel at 7:00 where I had dinner in my room with Hank Pool. Bed at 9:00.

Everyone from Vargas down I believe is sincere in trying to make Brazil into a progressive nation, a world power. They have the resources, the raw materials, the area, but lack communications and experienced man power. Brazil has done more to progress than any tropical country I have seen and Brazil is tropical for it extends from 2º North to 24º South of the equator. Rio is a modern city, clean and equipped with modern facilities, new buildings. Berle went with me to visit the President and Ministers; as a matter of fact, there was quite a party: Wooten, Walsh, Kroner, Seco, etc., etc. The buildings, they have excellent offices; Vargas' official residence, all magnificent buildings, wonderfully furnished. More like Versailles, Caserta, than you would expect to see here. Weather last night was cool, 1 blanket not enough.

Thursday, May 3, 1945 [Rio, Galeao, Rio, Brazil]

Up early, too much sleep. Hotel we are stopping at is Copacabana. Berle wanted me to stop at Embassy but did not think it would be best. Went out and took some movies of Rio at 7:00 A.M.; the Cristus, queer looking houses, men and women were on the beach, some playing a game with the shuttlecock from badminton, hitting it with their hands.

At 9:30 we took off for Galeao where there is a Brazilian Aviation Technical School and an aircraft plant building Fairchild training planes. I was tendered 3 reviews by 3 parts of the school. Talked with our instructors and with their students.
The Minister of Air went with me as did General Seco. We finished up with a ride around the bay in a launch; saw the harbor in all its glory. Had a chance to talk to Salgado about his future air arm and civilian aviation. Had lunch with Walsh, Wooten and Kroner. To bed at 2:00 and up at 5:00.

Took walk with Walsh, back in time to go Ambassador Berle’s place, the Embassy, where I decorated 4 Brazilians and 2 Americans. Talked with Mrs. Berle and explained why it was better for me not to stay at Embassy. Met Mrs. Dutra and Mrs. Salgado, various Army and Navy wives, including Mrs. Wood, an Air Force wife whose husband [Colonel Floyd B. Wood] is in charge of mission. Returned to hotel and talked with Riddle.

Dinner by Salgado at which was Dutra, Minister of War Games, now out of his office, both running for President. With them were Minister of Marine and most of Brazil’s senior officers, Ambassador Berle also present. Excellent dinner, started at 9:00 P.M. and over at 11:00 P.M., in bed at 11:15. Two speeches only; one by Salgado and one by HHA.

Friday, May 4, 1945 [Rio, Sao Paulo, Rio, Brazil]

Up at 7:15, went to airport at 9:00 and met Salgado, he had scads of Aides and Assistants, so did I. Paul Riddle was the key man as it was his school we were to inspect at Sao Paulo. We took off about 10:00, landed Sao Paulo at 11:30.

The valley we flew over has a steel mill at Volante Redondo which will turn out 800,000 tons of steel a year. We passed over the Rio water reservoir which is 2,000 feet above Rio. It has its own power plant which furnishes light and power to Rio. Brazil has coal and iron ore. At the next town was their Military Academy. Then on to Sao Paulo, a city of 1,500,000 modern in every respect. Beautiful large houses and grounds, wide streets, fine parks, Poinsettia growing like trees, flowers twice as large as those in Los Angeles.

The Interventor (Governor) met us and we had a review at the airport, then on to the technical school. The ceremony there was one of the most impressive that I have seen. The school has 1,800 students; besides airplane technicians, it trains mechanics for army and has 2 Uruguay students. They were all assembled with band and instructors.
[The program]

1. National anthem of Brazil by band.
2. A standing silence of 2 minutes in honor of war dead.
3. Raising of Brazil and United States' flag.
4. Singing by everyone present of Brazilian national anthem and of Star Spangled Banner.
5. Talk by HHA, not too good.
6. Talk by Salgado.
7. Review of all students; excellent.

Then on to office of Director; there we had a drink and met most all of the folks. They gave me a desk set, leather and Bee a necklace; all party got presents.

Then lunch; Mr. Costa, Interventor and Salgado sat on both sides of me; no speeches. Salgado toast to President of the United States, HHA toast to President of Brazil. The school is excellent. Took off for Rio at 2:45, landed Rio 4:10. Met by Kroener who took me to NBC [National Broadcasting Company] where I made a record for VE day. At hotel 5:15, in bed at 5:30, up for dinner 7:30, bed at 9:00.

Saturday May 5, 1945 [Rio, Brazil]

Yesterday was about the toughest day I have had yet. The climb up the long flight of stairs to make the disc for broadcast was the final test. It looks as if I came through OK. Up at 6:35, took a walk from 6:55 to 7:45. Bob Lovett sent word that he thought that the broadcast should be changed by deleting one paragraph; after reading it over again and taking into consideration the presentation on the disc I had to disagree; let it stand as is. In autos at 8:40; beautiful country along shore road to South of Rio; banana plantations, excellent golf courses, fine horses. To Dos Alfonso where Brazilians have flying school: primary, basic, advanced, 1,200 cadets, 1,800 enlisted men, course 3 years.

Air Minister met there with big staff. Reviewed troops and then took tour around field; their athletics much like ours for individual physical fitness: obstacle course, swimming, etc., but much more intensive. I gave them a talk on development
of air war, all officers and cadets, about 2,000. Then at a big review, Salgado presented me the Order of Merit Aeronautic, only one other issued to President Vargas; was I surprised. 189

Rode back to town, had 15 minutes rest and then to my lunch; had Gomes, Dutra, and Salgado, all Presidential possibilities. Had Berle give a speech and I gave one, then Salgado. Ended at 3:45, instead of 2:30. Hence I completed my conference with Gomes at once. He wants a change in constitution that will: 1. Limit term of president; 2. Provide for Congress; 3. Give better opportunities to aliens who come to settle. He left and I went to bed for 1 hour.

Then at 5:00 I was up to receive Minister of Foreign Affairs who was in office when we put in our bases in North Brazil. Then Bob Walsh and I called on Dr. and Mrs. Salgado, met their two boys, 1-16, 1-18. Dinner with Marquardt and Hank (Pool); my first night out; went to a nightclub at 9:30 and was in bed by 11:00; a big day.

Sunday, May 6, 1945 [Rio, Santa Cruz, Brazil]

Up at 7:45, breakfast with Hank and Marquardt. Auto trip to Park where I took pictures of Cortilas, Sugar Loaf and scenes in park. Went through Brazilian army hospital, much more modern and up-to-date than I thought it would be. Lunch at Jockey Club with Salgado and about 50 men and women. 190 Back to hotel at 3:30, rested until 5:00. Returned Wooten’s light uniform to him, dinner with 6.

Made arrangements with Wood to have 12 additional officers attached to Mission for duty with CAA in Brazil. Salgado, Minister of Foreign Affairs and about 12 others came to hotel to say good-bye. Berle came to airport with many others. 191 Had a conference with Salgado re CAA mission personnel. 192

Took off Rio 8:45, arrived Santa Cruz 9:15, took off Santa Cruz in C-54 at 9:35; additional passengers, Walsh and Riddle.

Monday, May 7, 1945 [Santa Cruz, Brazil to Georgetown, British Guiana to Borinquen Field, Puerto Rico]

Arrived Georgetown [British Guiana] 2,500 miles from Rio, landed 9:30; trip uneventful. Gave Walsh and Lindsay an ear-
ful of things to be done at Borinquen. Took off at 10:10 for Borinquen, distance 980 miles, landed at 3:20 P.M. Inspected B-29 installations and found so much variation between crew chiefs, engineers, plane pilots as to reliability that I left Pete there to find facts and I went to dress. Forest Harding’s boy, Lt. Col. Harding, is in command of B-29s. He just returned from Italy with B-17.193

Tuesday, May 8, 1945 [Borinquen, Puerto Rico to Miami, Florida]

Took off 8:00 for Miami, 980 miles. Will complete 17,900 miles; landed 12:58. I find upon return to the United States:

1. Letter from President Truman in which he says that he has complete confidence in me.194
2. A columnist writing that on account of my actions as CG/AAF, Truman is going to ask for my resignation.195
3. A columnist who brands me as the hero of the air age.196
4. Widespread reports that I am going to retire on account of heart trouble and high blood pressure.197
5. My doctors telling me that I am better than I have been for ten years.198 Where am I?

Postscript

After Arnold arrived in Europe and viewed the destruction, he seemed almost nonchalant about the prospects of the end of fighting there. His lack of emotion may be explained by the fact that the surrender had been discussed and predicted in Washington for the past previous weeks. In anticipation of this, he and the other American military chiefs were preparing statements to be broadcast when Germany surrendered. Hap’s had been drafted by his staff in the Pentagon and would be revised by him and recorded for broadcast while in Rio during the last week of this trip.199 The devastation he witnessed combined with the realization of the tasks that still remained in the Pacific probably limited any rejoicing over the Nazi collapse. There is little doubt that he identified with Eisenhower’s
comment to him that the ETO commander was “feeling the War” and that it had “taken a lot out” of him but he “forced himself to go on.”\textsuperscript{200} Arnold recorded no emotion in his diary at the news of the German surrender when it reached him as his airplane landed in Miami on the last leg of this trip.\textsuperscript{201}

This fifth World War II trip to the European theater led him to a variety of locations affected in different ways by the war. He passed first through beautiful, untouched Bermuda on Easter Sunday, an island first visited by him on his initial World War II travel abroad almost exactly four years earlier. He then stopped only briefly to refuel in the Azores, another area remote from the ravages of the conflict but one Arnold had visited several times and was now at last the site of a major AAF base. He then flew to Paris where only limited destruction had occurred in a city he had not seen since the end of World War I. His Francophobia, dating from his first visit more than 30 years earlier, was now fed not only by what he viewed as the seeming detachment of the Parisians from the conflict but from what he felt had been limited French contributions to the war. Ever since his first meeting with General de Gaulle, he had been disappointed at what he considered the pretensions of the leader of the Free French and the French people.

Using Paris as a base of operations, he witnessed at first-hand from the air the devastation wrought in a series of European cities, including several German ones recently occupied by Allied forces. He and his staff then traveled to the south of France, a scene of recent fighting, where he seemed to enjoy the respite of a full week’s rest. His desire to continue to be involved, his need to be able to think while far from the demands of Washington, as well as the requirement for continued recuperation, resulted in his very revealing diary entry of 11 April: “Cannes is such a restful place to think things out.” His leisure was interrupted only by scheduled meetings with his major air commanders who journeyed there for discussions with their chief.

Arnold then flew south to Italy where he had not been since June 1944. The six days he spent there, this time in pleasant weather, allowed him to visit fighting units of the AAF as well as US and Allied headquarters. He continued to be disparag-
ing of Italy and its people and was much more impressed by the results of AAF bombing than the Italian people or the antiquities of Rome.

Leaving Europe, he stayed overnight in familiar surroundings in Marrakesh before recrossing the Atlantic to spend another comparatively restful seven days in Brazil. He had since abandoned his plan of continuing around the world, in part because of General Marshall's cables scolding him about caring for his health. He also may have come to appreciate the diminution in energy and stamina that his recent illness revealed during this trip. The visit to Brazil was a delayed one, Arnold's original plan having been to travel in January to Latin America en route to the Yalta Conference. There, in a role that was as much that of a diplomat as a warrior, he discussed with his hosts a variety of matters dealing with that nation's success and continuing role as an active ally in the European war as well as postwar civil aviation matters. He also visited training sites where he observed Brazilians learning to fly and maintain aircraft using American methods and equipment.

He continued to observe the climate, geographical, historical, and architectural characteristics of the areas he visited. He recorded fewer specifics of Air Force operations and dealt, at least as noted in the diary, with broader issues of policy. This reflected his increasing confidence and respect for the abilities of his on-site commanders as well as the fact that the war was winding down in this theater. Also, many of the AAF details similar to those he had recorded earlier were now referred to his somewhat larger accompanying staff, who noted them for later resolution or relayed them immediately to the Air Staff in Washington.

A major accomplishment during this trip was Hap's discussing with the two senior AAF leaders there, Spaatz and Eaker, a slate of projected new assignments for senior officers then serving under their command in the European theater. Although Arnold knew many of them personally, he solicited and received the impressions of his two old friends as to the potential of these officers, continuing to reflect his concern for the future of a viable AAF. In many ways, however, this trip more than any other in the diary seems to have permitted him
much more time away from a grueling schedule to record more of the minutiae of his surroundings. Although not always committed to the diary, it appears that the relatively relaxed schedule followed on this trip allowed him to think in depth about his health, his family, and his own future as well as the institution he had successfully led for the past six and a half years. This personal reflection and rumination, far removed from pressing operational matters, was not typical of Arnold. However, to the dismay of the historian, too little of it was recorded in his diary or in his correspondence on his return.

Never pompous over rank or its perquisites, Arnold seemed genuinely pleased as well as amazed at the startled reaction of American service personnel in Europe when they encountered a five-star general in the field. He appeared to enjoy meeting them, talking with them, and acceding to their requests that he be photographed, a practice he had maintained since his first visits to American troops overseas in 1942.

Many discussions held in Europe affected the continuing Pacific struggle. Arnold was aware that, with the planned increase in the size of the B-29 fleet and the escorting fighters, supplemented by crews and aircraft that had more recently flown against the Luftwaffe, the AAF lacked a senior officer with the rank, prestige, and strategic experience necessary to direct the air war against Japan from a central Pacific location. Consequently, he discussed with “Tooey” Spaatz, the senior air commander in Europe, the latter’s forthcoming transfer to the Pacific. Arnold felt confident that Eisenhower’s experienced air leader had the background, rank, and stature to deal with Pacific problems, among them continuing friction with the US Navy. At the same time, Arnold set in motion during this trip the speedy return of many European-based units to the United States en route to a brief stay and period of training in new aircraft. They were then to supplement the air armada being assembled to continue the air war against Japan.

During this trip, Arnold had the opportunity to assess the results not only of the strategic but of tactical air operations as well. He was encouraged by the unsolicited praise of the Army ground commanders about the close air support furnished by
the AAF. Hap had to have been impressed by this effective application of airpower, paradoxically in the primary dimension that the nonaviator leadership in the US Army advocated as the major role of Army aviation in the two decades before World War II. This concept of tactical air had been given less attention by Arnold and most of his close associates in their advocacy of the panacea of strategic bombardment.

The impact of this trip on Arnold’s health did not appear to have been detrimental. He confided to his diary, as his airplane landed in Miami, his amusement at the conflicting reports of his health and future plans by the pundits of the press. However, he did not return immediately to Washington but remained for four days at the AAF hospital in Florida where he had recuperated following his January heart attack. It appears safe to assume that the medical personnel found no adverse effects from this travel, for he began to plan for an extended trip to the Pacific as soon as he returned to Washington. There, the course of events towards the conclusion of that war was moving much faster than even Arnold could have anticipated. He was to remain in Washington less than a month before departing to assess the air war in that theater, a favorable commentary on his strength and the state of his health from Hap’s as well as his doctors’ viewpoint.

In the four weeks before departing for the Pacific, Arnold worked hard at implementing the decisions and results of this European and Latin American journey. The bulk of the personnel changes outlined while in Europe were proceeding, along with the continuation of the orderly movement of European combat units to the Pacific either directly or staged through the United States. His desk diary showed that his work habits now reflected an appreciation of the severity of his recent illness and the need to continue to limit his exertions. Routinely he was now in the office for only two or three hours in the morning, followed by lunch and a nap at his nearby Fort Myers quarters before returning for two or so more hours in the afternoon, a noticeable change from his punishing self-imposed preattack routine. His volatility remained but was more controlled than before this latest heart attack.202
His concern for the future of the AAF extended to considering who among the many serving wartime generals would be competitive in a much smaller postwar air structure. As a consequence, Arnold continued the practice he began in Europe of soliciting from his most senior officers their confidential ranking of all active generals. This action had been suggested by General Marshall and reflected the chief of staff's continuing confidence in Arnold. Hap, following discussions with the senior leadership in Europe, appears to have concluded that the reasons for discouraging any campaigning for a separate Air Force remained valid. He nevertheless felt that the case for air bombardment had been made and was being confirmed by the Strategic Bombing Survey.

His commanders with whom he met in Europe could not have failed to notice the changes in his physical appearance and stamina wrought by the January heart attack. However, one observer in Washington, who saw him frequently both before and after his heart attack, commented in the week before his departure on this trip that he “seems physically well” and “never saw him looking better.” Another observed that Hap’s physicians were worried about “emotional upsets and worry” and the staff on his return limited the numbers going into his office so that he “would not be excited by a crowd.” One of his staff recorded discouragement by Arnold’s physical appearance, reporting, “in the glimpse I got of him, he looked like death,” and said Hap “swore loudly anyway.” Yet there could be little doubt among his observers in Europe and his staff in Washington that, in spite of the limitations brought on by the illness, he remained in charge of the AAF and was devoting the bulk of his somewhat limited energies to planning for the future.

In spite of any relief over the end of the European war that Arnold might have felt but did not articulate, he was well aware that continued planning in the JCS did not anticipate an early or easy end to the fighting in the Pacific. Probably encouraged by his physical response to this 39-day, 18,000-mile trip to Europe and challenged by the problems still remaining for the AAF in the Pacific war, Arnold began planning for a trip to that theater. His optimism about his ability...
to carry on was clear in his diary entry of 29 April. He cabled Chief of Staff Marshall from Marrakesh that he was “back in the ring and would like to be notified” when the CCS was going to have a meeting so that I could change my itinerary. None could have predicted that, within three months of Arnold’s return to the Pentagon from Europe, a second atomic bomb would have been dropped on Japan and World War II was at an end. But not before Hap made his second wartime trip to the Pacific and attended a final military/diplomatic conference in Europe.

Notes

6. Kuter to Arnold, 28 January 1945, AP.
7. The quotes are from Maj James Parton’s letter to his family, 31 March 1945, Maj James Parton Papers, Harvard University Library, Cambridge, Mass. The recommendation that Eaker return as Arnold’s deputy appears to have been made originally by Marshall and quickly concurred in by Hap while the latter recuperated in Florida; Marshall to Arnold, 15 March; Arnold to Marshall, 19 March 1945, George C. Marshall Papers, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va., hereinafter cited as MPMS. In a note that probably came close to an apology, the AAF chief wrote Eaker three months after the latter had come to Washington that he realized “fully the disappointment which you felt” when “on the threshold of victory, you were forced to lay down command . . . the development of which you made so tremendous a contribution” to undertake a position in Washington “never sought by any airmen . . . of your experience”; Arnold to Eaker, 8 June 1945, AP. It is not unreasonable to speculate that Hap may have had some pangs of conscience from having concurred in this new assignment as well as his role in the reassignment of Eaker as Eighth Air Force commander in December 1943 covered in vol. 1, chap. 5.
8. Hap to Bruce Arnold, 10 March 1945, Henry H. Arnold Personal Papers, Arnold Ranch, Sonoma, Calif., hereinafter cited as APR.
10. Ibid.
11. Arnold to Marshall, 19 March 1945, MPMS. For speculation among AAF officers closely associated with Hap and his office in the Pentagon while Arnold was abroad that there would be a new AAF CG who would be Spaatz, see James Gould Cozzens, A Time of War: Air Force Diaries and Pentagon Memos, 1943–1945, ed. Matthew J. Bruccoli (Columbia, S.C.: Bruccoli Clark, 1984), diary entries for 25 and 27 April 1945, 274, 281. The careers of the two four-star generals then serving in Europe as possible successors to Arnold, Spaatz, and McNarney, had many similarities. Six and eight years respectively younger than Arnold, McNarney graduated from West Point a year after Spaatz and they both became pilots. Both served in France during World War I where Spaatz was credited with shooting down three German Fokkers. In the postwar period, they both worked under Arnold in California and attended the requisite staff schools before being assigned to the General Headquarters Air Force. Both had been sent by Hap as observers of the air war over Britain before Pearl Harbor. After the US entered the war, Spaatz saw much more extensive combat command, McNarney not arriving overseas until October 1944, two and one-half years after Spaatz. Meanwhile, McNarney had served in positions of increasing responsibility within the War Department, representing the AAF successfully at high-level conferences when illness or travel precluded Arnold’s participation. Hap’s rapport with Spaatz was much warmer, including a closeness between their two families, and the Hap–Tooey correspondence evinces a relaxed, confident candor as opposed to the stiffer, essentially businesslike but not unfriendly communications with McNarney. Although McNarney was viewed more as a headquarters staff officer than an active combat commander, he was much more familiar with the wartime Washington environment, its protocol and bureaucracy, much of which was appreciated but essentially disdained by the operationally oriented Spaatz. Arnold’s choice of Tooey as the strategic air force commander in the Pacific when the war in Europe ended reflected his complete confidence in this airman. It is difficult to conclude other than Arnold’s choice at the time would have been Spaatz, although they were both promoted to four-star rank within days of one another in March 1945 while Arnold recuperated in Florida. Hap’s interest in Spaatz becoming his successor was illustrated in his conversation with Eisenhower at Potsdam on 20 July. According to his recollection, Hap “wanted to discuss with him whom he would like” since he considered that Ike would “undoubtedly” succeed Marshall. The result was that it “was decided then and there that General Spaatz would take my place.” H. H. Arnold, General of the Air Force, Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 587.
12. Hap to daughter Lois Snowden, 22 February 1945, AP; and Arnold to Marshall, 22 March 1945, MPMS.
13. Arnold’s companions were Eugene H. Beebe, now a Brigadier General as special assistant to Arnold; Col Clair A. Peterson was assigned to Arnold’s office, as was Col Robert Proctor who served as executive assistant; Brig Gen Richard C. Lindsay was AC/AS, Plans, Headquarters AAF; Col Gilbert H. Marquardt was Arnold’s physician on this trip; Col William O. Darby, USA, War Department General Staff; Maj Thomas Sheffield continued to serve as Arnold’s aide.

14. Although the crew is not otherwise identified, Maj Levi H. Dice served as Arnold’s pilot on the later trips covered in chaps. 11 and 12.

15. Lord David Burghley, governor general of Bermuda.

16. The event had taken place in April 1942 when the Pan American Clipper carrying General Marshall to England was delayed in Bermuda over Easter Sunday, 5 April, and the American chief of staff was asked and read the scripture at the Anglican service that morning. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942 (New York: Viking Press, 1965), 307; and Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1958), 100–01. A copy of the bulletin for the Easter Sunday Cathedral service Arnold attended on this 1945 trip is in AP.

17. Not otherwise identified.

18. Burghley won the 400-meter hurdles competition in the 1928 Olympics in Amsterdam.


21. Land’s End is in Cornwall, southwesternmost region of the English mainland. Continuing wartime precautions required all air traffic bound for the continent from the Azores to follow a prescribed, controlled route.

22. Brig Gen A. D. Smith, responsible for construction in the Azores, was temporarily on Santa Maria Island.

23. Maj Gen Frederick L. Anderson, deputy commander for operations, United States Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF); Brig Gen Earl S. Hoag, CG, Africa, Middle East Wing, ATC; and Col J. Henry “Hank” Pool, Mrs. Arnold’s brother, served on the staff of the CG, USSTAF.

24. Famous Paris hotel in the Place de Vendôme.

25. Arnold probably meant A-42D airport at Villacoublay, only two miles from SHAEF and USSTAF headquarters at Versailles.

26. Rheims is a northeastern French city, scene of the German surrender to the Allies, 7 May 1945.

27. The reference here is to the French First Army commanded by Gen Jean de Lattre de Tassigny and mobilized primarily in North Africa of Free French and colonial troops who had fought in Tunisia and Italy and crossed the Rhine five days earlier on 29 March 1945.

28. Ike’s British aide is not otherwise identified.

29. Lt Gen Walter Bedell Smith, USA, now chief of staff to Eisenhower.
30. G. H. Mumm and Company, dating from 1827 operated as one of Germany's largest champagne manufacturers.

31. With the end of the war in Europe, Eisenhower returned to the United States and the 30th reunion of his 1915 class, staying overnight at West Point, 20 June 1945. Hardly unannounced, he received a reception in New York City the previous day at a parade witnessed by an estimated four million people.

32. Maj Gen Robert W. Harper, chief, Air Division, US Occupation Forces, Germany; Maj Gen Paul L. Williams, CG, IX Troop Carrier Command; and Lt Gen Lewis H. Brereton, CG, First Allied Airborne Army. Brereton recorded that more than 732,000 gallons of gas were transported "east of the Rhine" on the next day. There is a brief mention of the meeting in Lewis H. Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries: The War in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1946), 416–17.

33. Hans Fay was a civilian Messerschmitt jet pilot who had become disillusioned with the course of the war. He had signaled his intentions to surrender by flying over the Frankfurt airfield with his Me-262 wheels down. After landing and turning the aircraft over to the AAF, as Arnold's diary reflects, he had proven very helpful in providing intelligence. As a result, Arnold directed that Fay be sent to Wright Field to assist US personnel in evaluating the aircraft, even suggesting that Fay test the Me-262 in mock combat against American fighters. There was concern, however, that Fay not be placed in a POW camp but sent instead to the United States. Final disposition of Fay and the Me-262 are not clear from the documents available. See Brig Gen George McDonald to Maj Gen James Hodges, A-2 (Intelligence), AAF Headquarters, 21 April 1945, George McDonald Papers, Special Collections, US Air Force Academy Library, Colorado Springs, Colo.

34. Messerschmitt Me-262, first German operational turbojet aircraft of the war; low-wing, twin-engine, fighter/attack bomber.

35. After touring St. Cloud, a residential suburb in the west of Paris on the Seine, famous for its race track, Arnold and party toured the palace of Louis XIV and the surrounding gardens of Versailles. Hap had visited some of the same sites in late 1918.

36. Maj or Lt Col N. B. Woolworth, assignment in Europe unknown.

37. General Arnold wanted to view as much of the destruction wrought by air attacks and the recent ground fighting as possible. To enable him to do so, the aircraft flew northeast from Paris over the German towns of Aachen, Duren, and Cologne and then south-southeast up the Rhine over Bonn and Koblenz before resuming an east-southeast course to Frankfurt.

38. Brig Gen Glenn O. Barcus, CG, XII Tactical Air Command.

39. Autobahns are the German express highway system built over segments of Germany prior to the war.

40. Lt Gen Alexander M. Patch, USA, CG, US Seventh Army, had headquarters at this time at Gensingen, 10 miles southwest of the German city of Mainz.
41. Hank Arnold was now a battalion commander with the 45th Division: Maj Gen Robert M. Webster, CG, First Tactical Air Force.
42. Darmstadt is a town, south central Germany, 20 miles south of Frankfurt, where General Barcus had his headquarters.
43. The packages contained articles from home.
44. Patton’s headquarters were located at the time at Hersfield, central Germany, approximately 30 miles south of Kassel.
45. The town is not otherwise identified.
46. In Arnold Papers, there is a copy of General Orders 70, dated 23 March 1945, from Lt Gen George Patton, Commanding, extended “heartfelt admiration and thanks” to the Third Army and “our Comrades of the XIX Tactical Air Command” on their crossing the Rhine the previous night, and assured them of “even greater glory to come.”
47. Heinrich Himmler, Nazi head of the SS and Minister of Interior.
48. Bois de Boulogne is a Parisian park, bordering the western suburb of Neuilly-sur-Seine.
49. Notre Dame is the famed twelfth century cathedral of Paris situated on the Ile de la Cite from which the windows had been temporarily removed to prevent their destruction. They were reinstalled within the year.
50. The Louvre is the foremost French museum of art completed in the seventeenth century, located only a short distance from Arnold’s hotel.
51. Col Harold W. Bowman, chief, public relations, USSTAF, until 3 May 1945 when he became chief, Office of Information Services, Headquarters AAF.
52. Brig Gen Barnwell R. Legge, USA, was the US Military attaché in Switzerland. Opportunistic bombing by American aircrews through broken cloud cover, of towns presumed to be in Germany, resulted in accidental attacks on nearby Swiss communities several times during the war. Schaffhausen, a town just west of Lake Constance on the German border, on 22 February 1945, and Basel and Zurich on 4 March, were bombed when the US crews mistook the Swiss towns for the German city of Freiburg. Five Swiss were killed and 19 were injured, provoking renewed Swiss protests. A cable two days later from Marshall ordered Spaatz to go immediately to Switzerland with “no publicity and maximum secrecy.” Spaatz felt that as a result of his visit there on 7–8 March, that the Swiss were “more than satisfied” with the results of his visit and reported that the Swiss asked for 10 P-51 aircraft from the United States as partial payment for the damage inflicted. Unfortunately, several other incidents occurred later in the month and Spaatz returned to Switzerland on 16–17 April. Gen Henry Guisan was chief of staff of the Swiss Army; their Aviation chief is not otherwise identified. See War Department 48750 to Spaatz, 6 March; Spaatz to WD [War Department], 4 March; Marshall to Spaatz, 5 March; WD to Spaatz, 6 March; Spaatz to C/S USA, 10, 13 March 1945, Spaatz Papers; and George C. Marshall, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Aggressive and Determined Leadership, June 1, 1943–December 31, 1944, ed. Larry I. Bland, asst. ed.
Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) hereinafter cited as MP.

53. Lt Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, now CG, Ninth Air Force; Maj Gen O. P. Weyland, CG, XIX Tactical Air Command; Maj Gen Elwood R. Quesada, CG, IX Tactical Air Command; and Brig Gen Ralph F. Stearley, CG, IX Tactical Air Division.

54. When Arnold returned to his hotel after a ride throughout the city, news of his arrival attracted a crowd in front of his hotel. Arnold, *Global Mission*, 547.

55. The reference is not clear but may have been to a Department of Defense, eventually established by Congress for the US military in 1947.

56. Bradley probably discussed with Arnold the US Army’s reduction of the German Ruhr pocket where German resistance ended 10 days later on 18 April producing 325,000 German prisoners of war.


58. Varieties of four-wheeled carriages.

59. One of Arnold’s traveling companions recorded that the dinner was “with General Arnold and full party in his private dining room.” Although Arnold then retired for the night, other members of the group went to the Lido nightclub on the Champs Elysees where they found “much beauty, accompanied by good music and champagne.” See Diary of Richard C. Lindsay, Arents Library, Syracuse University, N.Y., copy in Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala., n. d., c. 8 April 1945, 2.

60. General Marshall sent Arnold a cablegram on this date which began an exchange of messages concerning the state of Arnold’s health and to what extent he was resting rather than overextending himself on this trip. Marshall’s message on this date stated: “I read of your presence and statements with various active commands. Where is the Bermuda rest; the lazy days at Cannes; the period of retirement at Capri? You are riding for a fall, doctor or no doctor.” The exchange of messages between them continued through 19 April as indicated below. No doubt this message influenced Arnold’s decision to go and rest at Cannes instead of traveling to London. See Arnold, *Global Mission*, 547–48; Marshall’s cable is in both AP and MPMS.

61. Arnold’s instructions to those going to London are not extant but his representatives were not overworked there. They met with Lt Gen Doolittle at Eighth Air Force headquarters and then observed a bomber mission from planning to implementation. At the Group level (each of the staff went to a different location) they saw the crew briefings and preparations for a mission. On the staff’s return to London, there appeared ample time for sightseeing, dinner, and dancing as well as dining with Doolittle at his headquarters at High Wycombe. See Lindsey Diary, n. d., 3.

62. Maj Gen Frederick H. Osborne, USA, director of Information and Education Division, Army Service Forces.
63. Quesada returned to the United States later in the month as AC/AS for Intelligence, A-2.

64. Although the reason is not clear why he wrote a letter to Nancy Dill, widow of Field Marshal Sir John Dill who died in September 1944. Arnold may have written to thank her for presenting the late Field Marshal’s cigarette lighter to Arnold as a memento of their friendship. See AP.

65. The letter to General Doolittle has not been located, but his response to Arnold the next day thanked Hap for his congratulations on the success of the Eighth Air Force against Germany. See AP.

66. No record has been found of Arnold’s instructions. See note 59 above.

67. The personal and top-secret cable to Marshall explained: “Your message of 8 April and concern over my well-being are greatly appreciated. I assure you that appearances are deceptive and my doctor has been taking care of me. We have been following a very carefully planned program. I was in Paris for eight days and during that time I made three trips, one of them lasting for about twenty-four hours. However there has been not a single night since I left the US that I went to bed later than 9:30 and in most cases was in bed by 9:00. I have never gotten up before 7:30 A.M. I have taken a rest during every day for at least one and one-half hours and on most days for two hours. My nights have all been in a modern hotel, the Ritz Paris, with finest equipment except one that was in an equally good hotel. My doctor permits me to see people for a maximum of four hours on any one day. As to my health, I am feeling fine and have no symptoms of any kind of trouble. My visits have done much good in stopping the many current rumors concerning my being an invalid for life or something worse. I hope this will to some extent allay your concern over my not getting proper rest and relaxation. Will be in Cannes for several days.” Copies in AP and MPMS.

68. The incident is not otherwise identified.

69. Commander Roberts is not otherwise identified.

70. Neith Spaatz’ villa nor its previous owner is otherwise identified.

71. Arnold had moved at the request of General Marshall in March 1942 to Quarters #8 on Fort Meyer, just south of the Pentagon building. There were numerous steps in the house, a problem for Arnold, given his history of heart trouble. There were six steps to negotiate from the street to the first floor of the quarters, then either 18 or 19 steps to the second or sleeping floor, depending on whether the front or rear stairway was utilized. There were 17 steps to the third floor from the second floor and 14 steps from the first floor to the basement.

72. One of three daughters of General Spaatz, Tatti (Katherine) was serving with the American Red Cross. Mrs. Ruth Spaatz was the wife of the general and longtime Arnold family friend.

73. Marshall’s cables have not been located but no doubt were in response to Arnold’s of 10 April dealing with the latter’s health.

74. Lt Gen William S. Knudsen, former president of General Motors Corporation, had joined the US Army in January 1942 and became director of
AAF Materiel and Services at Patterson Field, Ohio, in July 1944. He was making plans to return to industry, which he did on 1 June. He was succeeded by newly promoted Lt Gen Nathan F. Twining, rather than Doolittle. Vandenberg did not take over the personnel function on the Air Staff. See note 107 below.

75. As early as 25 March 1944, before Arnold left Washington, Eaker had been tasked to return to Washington as deputy chief of the AAF and chief of the Air Staff, where he would be working closely with the newly assigned officers. See introduction to this chapter and Diary of Maj Gen David M. Schlatter, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

76. The staffs, in addition to the Air Staff in Washington, were Lt Gen Barney McK. Giles, who became CG, AAF, Pacific Ocean Area (AAFPOA); Gen George C. Kenney was CG, Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific; Maj Gen Curtis E. LeMay was CG, XX Bomber Command; and Lt Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA, was CG, US Forces, China Theater. The order listed may have reflected the priority Arnold accorded them.

77. Gen Joseph T. McNarney was at the time CG of the USAAF in the Mediterranean Theater and in September became Acting Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, succeeding Eisenhower as CG in December 1945.

78. Roosevelt had died the previous day.

79. The message was presumably one of sympathy and, although not mentioned, Arnold sent a message this same day to President Truman. See AP.

80. Quesada, as indicated above, although he had considerable experience as an aide to high-ranking officials, did not become military aide to Truman, the position going instead to an old friend of the president, Maj Gen Harry Vaughan, USA. This appointment later proved to be somewhat embarrassing to the president.

81. Arnold’s tentative planning was not implemented as proposed here. See note 107 below. The meaning of the number 15 in parenthesis is not clear.

82. The prewar numbered Air Forces were located at Mitchell Field, New York (First); Fort George Wright, Washington (Second); Tampa, Florida (Third); and March Field, Riverside, California (Fourth). All of these remained in the United States, some at different locations than their prewar sites through most of the postwar 1940s. In addition, six combat Air Forces were headquartered at various times and locations in the United States after the war, specifically the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth.

83. The war had taken a toll not only on Arnold’s health but on his family relationships as well. There is a brief glimpse into the strains that the war had caused in the Arnold marriage in a plaintive letter Hap wrote to a longtime close friend of both himself and Bee. See Arnold to Mary St. Clair Streett, n.d., c. March 1945. copy in possession of editor.

84. Neither the mansion nor its owners are otherwise identified.
85. Maj Gen Nathan F. Twining was commander of the Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Forces; Lt Gen John K. Cannon was Air C-in-C of Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean and would become CG of USAF in Europe in May.

86. Arnold's message to Marshall outlined the airman's thinking about continuing around the world. Arnold cabled that he would first travel to Switzerland and Italy before flying to the Pacific, where "I have not been" for over two years. After informing Marshall that his doctor reported he could either return home or continue to the Pacific, Arnold ended his message with a request from Marshall for "an expression from you as to your desire on this matter." This elicited a return cablegram of 16 April from Marshall, chastising Arnold again for not taking more rest. Marshall continued: "I certainly would not have you hurry back to Washington for the start of action here and on the other hand I am rather depressed at seeing you start on another of your strenuous trips, this time carrying you around the world. It may demonstrate to the Army and to the public that you are certainly not on the retired list but it also may result in your landing there. I will have to trust to your judgement though I have little hope that you can curtail your wasteful expenditure of physical strength and nervous energy." Copies of the exchange are in AP and MPMS; see note 103 below.

87. The location of the hospital is not established. An examination of both the handwritten as well as the typed copies of this diary fails to make Arnold's meaning clear. In both versions, the sentence appears as: "Very well-equipped and efficiently operated but most of doctors are Jews—too many of them." At least two obvious conclusions can be drawn, one being that Hap meant that there were too many doctors in the hospital given the limited fighting taking place in the area at the time. The less flattering one is that this was an expression of anti-Semitism on Arnold's part. It is impossible for the historian to interpret this with any degree of certainty. However, there is no other suggestion of anti-Semitic feelings on Arnold's part in the more than 300 boxes of his papers in the Library of Congress, those to and still retained by the family, or the correspondence emanating from him and his office in the National Archives. Nor is there any suggestion of Arnold having any anti-Semitic views in the papers of Spaatz and Eaker.

88. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy was accompanied by Maj Gen Howard A. Craig, who was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Staff, USA.

89. Maj Gen Oliver P. Echols, AC/AS Materiel and Services. The Brig Gen at Wright Field is not otherwise identified.

90. The underground factory was probably located at Necharelz, approximately 20 miles east-southeast of Heidelberg. See Associated Press dispatch from Berlin, 16 July 1945, "Underground Plants," copy in AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

91. The location of those found intact is not otherwise identified but it is more than probable that Arnold's staff had AAF representatives dispatched to the sites quickly.
92. Brig Gen Charles Pearre “Pre” Cabell was then serving as A-3 of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces at Caserta, Italy, and was reassigned as Chief of Strategy and Policy Division at AAF Headquarters; see Charles P. Cabell, *Man of Intelligence: Memoirs of War, Peace, and the CIA*, ed. Charles P. Cabell Jr., Brig Gen, USAF Retired (Colorado Springs, Colo.: Impavide Publications, 1997), 207–8. Brig Gen Hugh P. Rush, commanded the 47th Bombardment Wing at Manduria, Italy, consisting of B-24 Groups. The decision to return the Wing to the United States was implemented immediately, and Wing headquarters (which would not necessarily have included either aircraft or combat crews) arrived in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, during the month of May 1945.

93. The presentation not otherwise identified but probably dealt with the public information policy to be developed regarding the efficacy and extent of Allied bombing in Europe.

94. Col Dan M. Ogle, staff surgeon, Fifteenth Air Force.

95. Gen Jacob L. Devers, USA, CG, Sixth Army Group, was operating the furthest south in Germany of any American units. His headquarters were in Bavaria at this time, between the cities of Fulda and Meiningen.

96. These were the Italian cities which Arnold and his party visited from 23 to 27 April.

97. As indicated above, Maj Gen Fred Anderson would be responsible in his new assignment for personnel matters at AAF Headquarters.

98. No copy of a letter or an official policy has been located. However, Arnold was soliciting the opinion of some of his most senior leadership as to which generals, although having performed effective wartime service, should be retained in a much smaller and competitive peacetime Air Force. The issue would continue to be considered by him during his trip to the Pacific, covered in chap. 11.

99. The location of the villa in the Cannes area is not specifically identified. The Aga Khan had recently divorced Andree Carron of France and married Yvette Blanche Labrousse, 38, also French. His secretary is not otherwise identified.

100. It was not unusual for the Aga Khan to be weighed by followers who then presented him with that weight in metal or precious stones. He usually weighed in around 264 pounds, equivalent of 600,000 carats of precious metal or stones. With gold worth $32 per ounce at this time, this would bring him $135,168.

101. The reference was probably to “home” movies taken during the trip by Arnold and his aides. If so, the “two down and one to go” referred to the defeat of the Italians and the imminent surrender of the Germans, with only the Japanese still fighting.

102. As indicated above, Arnold did not make the trip to Switzerland. See entry for 19 April.

103. The Marshall cable, dated the previous day, sternly chastised Arnold. The chief of staff cabled that he would not have Hap “hurry back to Washington” but he was “rather depressed” at the prospects of Arnold pro-
ceeding around the world. Such a trip Marshall felt “may demonstrate . . .
that you are not on the retired list but also it may result in your landing
there.” He continued that he had “little hope” that Arnold would “curtail [his]
. . . wasteful expenditure of physical strength and nervous energy.” Marshall
to Arnold, 16 April 1945, MPMS.
104. This was Cap d’Antibes just east of Cannes.
105. The lighthouse and the Notre Dame de la Garoupe church, built in
981 A.D., were located side by side on the highest ground in Cap d’Antibes.
106. The engagement is not otherwise identified.
107. The planned reassignments were implemented as follows: (1) Lt Gen
James H. Doolittle, then CG, Eighth Air Force, began to take his unit to the
Pacific theater but he reverted to civilian status as vice president of Shell Oil
Company in May 1946; (2) As indicated above, Maj Gen Fred Anderson left
his assignment as deputy CG for Operations, USSTAF to become AC/AS Per-
sonnel (A-1) in Headquarters AAF; (3) Maj Gen Elwood R. Quesada left from
CG, IX Tactical Command to become AC/AS Intelligence (A-2) in Headquar-
ters AAF; (4) Lt Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, CG, Ninth Air Force, became
AC/AS, Operations and Training (A-3), Headquarters AAF; (5) Brig Gen Lau-
ris Norstad, serving at Headquarters AAF as Chief of Staff, Twentieth Air
Force, and deputy chief of the Air Staff, remained in AAF Headquarters as
AC/AS, Plans; (6) Maj Gen Curtis E. LeMay would continue as Chief of Staff,
US Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific (USASTAF) before returning to the
United States to be assigned to Air Materiel Command and, shortly there-
after, to Headquarters AAF to be the first AC/AS for Research and Develop-
ment (A-6); (7) Maj Gen Hugh J. Knerr, deputy CG for Administration,
USSTAF, became director of AAF Materiel Services, Wright Field, Ohio; (8)
Maj Gen Hubert R. Harmon, then AC/AS Personnel (A-1) Headquarters AAF,
became CG, AAF Personnel Distribution Command; (9) Maj Gen James P.
Hodges, AC/AS Intelligence (A-2) at Headquarters AAF, became CG, Western
Flying Training Command; (10) Maj Gen Donald Wilson, deputy AC/AS
Commitments and Requirements in the A-3 office at Headquarters AAF
became CG Air Proving Ground, located in Valparaiso, Florida; (11) Brig Gen
Grandison Gardner, CG, Air Proving Ground, became deputy to Chairman,
US Strategic Bombing Survey; (12) Maj Gen Oliver P. Echols, AC/AS Main-
tenance and Services, in the A-3 office at Headquarters AAF, became chief,
Internal Affairs and Communications Division, US Control Council for Ger-
many; (13) Maj Gen Willis H. Hale had become CG, AAFPOA (Army Air
Forces Pacific Ocean Area), on 3 March 1945, replacing Lt Gen M. F. Har-
mon, whose airplane was lost at sea. Hale would become CG, Fourth Air
Force, replacing Maj Gen James E. Parker; (14) Maj Gen James E. Parker,
CG, Fourth Air Force, became deputy CG for Administration, AAFPOA. (15)
Maj Gen Westside T. Larson, CG, Third Air Force, became deputy CG, Eighth
Air Force and, in August 1945, CG, Eighth Fighter Command in the Pacific.
108. Given the success of P-47 and P-51 fighters escorting bombers in
Europe, the end of combat in that theater and the acquisition of islands
closer to Japan made it possible to consider sending these droptank-
equipped escorts to the Pacific theater where they were scheduled to become part of the Twentieth Air Force, escorting B-29s. Both Nimitz and General Hale would be involved in their support.

109. The plan to locate on Saipan, optimistically away from Navy control, was not realized and LeMay's Twentieth Air Force headquarters arrived on Guam 16 July 1945, where it remained until moving to Kadena, Okinawa, in May 1949. Thomas E. Griffith Jr., MacArthur's Airman: General George C. Kenney and the War in the Southwest Pacific (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 225–30.

110. Arnold, well aware of the service jealousies in the Pacific, continued to control the Twentieth Air Force as its executive agent for the JCS through the end of the war. Although the B-29 had flown as an experimental model in September 1942, the first production aircraft were not delivered to the AAF until July 1943 and modifications continued throughout most of the war. Among the problems with the airplane at this stage were underpowered engines that quickly overheated and difficulties with pressurization and turrets. See a careful, contemporary analysis of these from an onsite commander struggling with the problems, Brig Gen Emmett P. O'Donnell Jr. Papers (of the 73d Bombardment Wing), Special Collections, US Air Force Academy Library, Colorado Springs, Colo.

111. Although the specific letter has not been located, there are several letters from Assistant Secretary Robert Lovett lamenting Arnold’s absence, particularly when many decisions were being made in Washington that would affect deployment to the Pacific and preparations for a postwar Air Force. Arnold was sufficiently concerned that, six days later, he sent two trusted members of his staff who had been accompanying him throughout Europe back to Washington to confer with Lovett. See correspondence in AP and diary entry for 26 April.

112. Hotel Martinique is not otherwise identified.

113. Nuremberg is a German city, southeast Bavaria. All roads leading out of that city were blocked by 18 April. The official date given for its fall is that of this diary entry, 20 April, taken by Maj Gen Wade H. Haislip’s, XV USA Corps.

114. Hotel D’Angleterre is not otherwise identified.

115. RAF lists show no individual named Wentworth who could have been serving as an aide to Tedder. Arnold probably meant Air Commodore G. L. Worthington, RAF, Tedder’s chief of administration.

116. Nina Una Margaret Tedder was his daughter.


118. This was essentially the way foreign airlines operated in the United States in the immediate postwar period.
Located in the center of Cap d’Antibes, the church had many murals depicting maritime and other scenes. The specific paintings mentioned are not otherwise identified.

Lt Lynch is not otherwise identified. Brenner Pass through the Alps connects Innsbruck, Austria, with Balzano, Italy; Verona is in northeast Italy, just east of Lake Garda, approximately 100 miles south of Brenner Pass.

Karl Kobelt was Swiss Minister of War.

Just recently promoted to major general, Benjamin W. Chidlaw was CG of Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Forces. Brig Gen Charles T. Myers, chief of staff, Twelfth Air Force.

Neither the villa nor its owners are otherwise identified.

The Red Cross official is not otherwise identified.

The 350th Fighter Group, equipped with P-47 aircraft and commanded by Col Ariel W. Nielsen, was based at Pisa, Italy. The Brazilian squadron was attached to and operated with the Group.

Brig Gen Robert S. Israel Jr., CG, XXII Tactical Air Command.

The cathedral in this northwest Italian town of Pisa dates from 1063.

Maj Gen John Alden Crane, USA, commander, US Forces Austria.

Spaatz would become CG, US Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific theater (USASTAF), in July. The ramifications of this new assignment were discussed in this meeting between these two old friends.

The hospital, located at the time in Florence, was classified as an “Affiliated Unit,” its staff furnished in part by Tulane University, New Orleans, La.

Mark W. Clark, just recently promoted to the rank of general, had been commander of the US Fifteenth Army Group since December 1944; Maj Gen Alfred M. Gruenther, USA, chief of staff, US Fifteenth Army Group; Col John S. Salsman, assigned to Headquarters Middle Central Procurement Division, RAF; the RAF representative is not otherwise identified.

John Stuart Mill is reputed to have remarked, correctly in the case of post-World War II in West Germany, that the time needed to repair the ravages of war has always been overestimated.

The mayor, his wife, and the town are not otherwise identified.

Gen Clark’s headquarters were then located eight miles north of Florence. General Clark prevailed on Col William O. Darby, USA, who was traveling with Arnold on this trip, to remain and become assistant division commander of the US Tenth Mountain Division. Darby was killed five days later and was promoted posthumously to brigadier general.

Lt Gen Wladyslaw Anders, commander, Second Polish Corps, which had fought under General Clark’s command in Italy. See note 141 below.

Bologna is a city, north central Italy, 80 miles north of Florence.

Lt Gen Lucian K. Truscott Jr., was now CG US Fifth Army.

Brig Gen Thomas C. Darcy was CG, XXII Tactical Air Command.
139. Col John W. Sessums, assistant chief of staff, Twelfth Air Force, was probably one of the pilots, along with Col John W. Wadman, who became commander of the 62d Fighter Wing at Antignano, Italy, in early May 1945. The “young pilot” is not otherwise identified.

140. The German 362d Infantry Division had just been surrendered by its commander, Maj Gen Friedrich von Schellwitz, to the US Army’s 88th Division on 23 April while Gen Gerhard Graf von Schwerin, commander of the German LXXVI Panzer Corps surrendered his forces to the British at the same time.

141. The controversial agreement at Yalta, made by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin in February 1945, could not have pleased Anders and other Free Poles, given their traditional distrust of their eastern Russian neighbors. These fears had been heightened by the Russo–German partition of Poland, which took place after Poland’s surrender in September 1939, and by the 1943 news of the Russian massacre of 10,000 Polish officers in the Katyn Forest, which prompted a diplomatic break between Anders’ Polish Government-in-Exile in London and the Soviet Union. From August to October 1944, the Polish “underground” army led by General Bor-Homorowski, battled the Germans in Warsaw while the approaching Russian troops who encouraged the uprising did nothing to assist the non-Communist Poles (which Arnold mentioned in chap. 9 above) and blocked United States and British aid. At the Yalta Conference, although all agreements were not made public at the time, the Soviet “puppet” government at Lublin was to be recognized as the “legitimate” Polish government. The Russians promised to organize it on a “broader democratic basis” to include representatives of the London Government-in-Exile. As disturbing as the potential dominance of the Lublin government in postwar Poland was, the agreement to move the Polish borders approximately 100 miles west into prewar Germany and expand Russia’s border approximately the same distance into what had been prewar Poland was probably even more difficult to accept. The effect of all this on Anders and his men as they fought against the now seemingly defeated Germans in Italy must have been devastating. As a result, Anders and many of his troops never returned to their native land. See Wladyslaw Anders, An Army In Exile: The Story of the Second Polish Corps (London: Macmillan Co., 1949).

142. The University of Bologna was founded about 1088, but its law school dated from 425 A.D. and medical courses were first taught there in the fourteenth century.

143. Genoa is a Ligurian Italian city approximately 120 miles north of Clark’s current headquarters.

144. Lt Gen Sir William D. Morgan, British Army, chief of staff to Alexander; Air Marshal Sir Guy Garrod, RAF, deputy commander, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces; Maj Gen Lyman K. Lemnitzer, USA, deputy chief of staff to Alexander.
145. Negotiations with the German forces in Italy were already underway and the instrument of surrender for them was signed five days later, on 29 April 1945.

146. Fifteenth Air Force headquarters were located in the former regional headquarters command of the Italian Air Force, a four-story modern building overlooking Bari harbor with living quarters in an apartment building in the rear overlooking a plaza. See Lindsey Diary for a description. No further details appear extant concerning Beebe and Proctor’s trip to Washington but it was intended in all probability to allay some of Lovett’s concerns expressed in his letter mentioned above in this day’s diary entry. See note 111 above.

147. Arnold was asked to speak to the assembled Fifteenth Air Force staff and wing commanders. His topic was “Where Are We Headed?” An observer labeled it a “very fine and human talk,” Lindsay Diary.

148. Foggia is an Italian town 80 miles northeast of Naples.

149. This explosion that occurred on 9 April 1945, less than three weeks before Arnold’s visit, was caused by the accidental blow up of an ammunition ship with the loss of 360 lives and 1,730 injured. An eyewitness account confirmed Arnold’s notation that people in the street had been covered with oil from the blast. See Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 2, Europe: Torch to Pointblank, August 1942 to December 1943 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 587; Times (London), 13 April 1945; and Fifteenth Air Force Report, 9 April 1945, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala. Arnold mentions an earlier one about the time of his visit in 1943 in his diary, 9 December 1943, covered in chap. 7.

150. Arnold was mistaken in identifying the Groups he visited. His airplane landed at Stornara, the site of the B-24 equipped 456th Bombardment Group commanded by Col Thomas W. Steed. He also visited the 459th Bombardment Group commanded by Col Henry K. Mooney, which flew B-24s from nearby Giulia airfield.

151. Although the senior officers he met probably gave Arnold their honest impression of being “all raring to go” to the Pacific, this editor, having flown one tour of combat during the previous year from England, is very dubious that the average aircrews would have exuded the same enthusiasm as their seniors to fly an additional combat tour. Arnold had commanded the 7th Squadron in Panama in 1916.

152. The bombardiers who were decorated by Arnold came from the 744th, 745th, 746th, and 747th Bombardment Squadrons of the 456th Group. They had successfully placed 100 percent of their bombs within 1,000 feet of the aiming point of their target on the previous day, the railroad marshalling yards at Tarvisio, Italy, about 60 miles north of Trieste. Lt Mullen of the 745th Squadron was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross by Arnold who then autographed the strike photos from the raid. The visit to both Groups followed a now standard pattern, with Arnold inspecting their facilities and spending considerable time talking with the crews and
the enlisted personnel. There are accounts and photos of Arnold’s visit to both Groups in the unit histories at AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

153. The missions of 26 April were among the last flown by the Groups, which were returned to the United States after the war ended in Europe 10 days later. Both arrived in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, in August. This illustrated the speed with which units were being moved out of Europe to the United States for possible retraining or equipping for use in the Pacific.

154. The villa is not otherwise identified.


156. Fez is a city in north central Morocco, 150 miles east of Casablanca.

157. Dar Si Said Palace, constructed in 1591, has been converted into a museum of modern Moroccan art since Arnold’s visit.

158. Arnold as well as Churchill and Roosevelt had stayed at different times in 1943 at the Taylor villa in Marrakesh. See chap. 5.

159. News reached Arnold during this dinner of Himmler’s 23 April 1945 offer to surrender unconditionally to the United States and Great Britain but not to the USSR, a proposal rejected by Eisenhower three days later. According to a fellow diner: “There is much consternation.” Lindsay Diary, 28 April 1945.

160. Apparently, the Post Exchange was opened specifically for Arnold’s visit, the day being Sunday. A fellow shopper observed: “Much money is passed in return for some goods of the realm.” Lindsay Diary. Many of the items purchased on this and other trips were sent to his daughter, Mrs. Ernie Snowden. See their correspondence in AP.

161. Brig Gen Malcolm C. Grow, now chief of Medical Services, USSTAF; General Claire is not otherwise identified.


163. Kay Francis was a Hollywood figure on a tour of American service installations in Latin America: Maj Gen Ralph H. Wooten, USA, CG, US Army Forces South Atlantic. Hotel de Gink was an expression dating from before the war to denote hotels in which the airmen normally stayed, often-times the officially recommended or required one and not always a term of admiration for its facilities.

164. Arnold had first visited Recife on 15 February 1943. See chap. 5 of this publication.

165. Arnold meant Col George C. Fraser, commander of Dakar Army Airfield. It is difficult to determine precisely what was given to Arnold, but it may well have been a poignard-dragonne-belters.

166. Vice Adm William R. Munroe, USN, commander South Atlantic Forces.

167. Now a major general, St. Claire Streett was deputy CG, Continental Air Forces, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C. Details are not known of the specific matters to be discussed with Streett on Arnold’s return. Paul Riddle operated flying schools in several Allied countries on a contract basis for the
AAF. Maj Emmett McCabe was at the time one of Arnold’s executive assistants but the reference is not clear. It could have dealt with postwar employment of McCabe by the large Riddle organization.

168. The locations of the US Navy farm and hospital have not been specifically determined nor is the person responsible for the operation of the farm otherwise identified.

169. Brig Gen Vasco Alves Seco, assistant chief Air Staff, Brazil, represented the Brazilian Air Minister, Dr. Joaquim Pedro Salgado Filho.

170. The Brazilian general is not otherwise identified.

171. It is not clear why Arnold felt it necessary to insert the latitude of the two Brazilian cities and that of Georgetown, British Guiana, now Guyana.

172. Brig Gen Hayes A. Kroner, USA.

173. The Santa Cruz area is approximately 40 miles west of Rio. Sugar Loaf is a conical rock, 1,296 feet high on the west side of the Bay of Rio. The Santo Cristus statue of Christ, built in 1931, is 135 feet high and sits atop the 2,300-foot-high Corcovado (Hunchback) peak that divides the city.

174. Jose Roberto Macedo Soares was Acting Foreign Minister and Maj Gen Duarado Gomes commanded No. 2 Air Zone of the Brazilian Air Force.

175. Adolph A. Berle Jr., US Ambassador to Brazil.

176. The press conference was scheduled for 4 p.m. New York Times account the next day reported that HHA “did not divulge the object of his visit.” The article said that Arnold’s trip was linked to retention of US bases in Brazil and that the American General would confer with Brazilian authorities on that subject. Getulio Vargas had been President of Brazil since 1930.

177. Gen Aurelio de Goes Monteiro was Minister of War; the Minister of Marine was Vice Adm Henrique Aristides Guilhem.

178. Arnold’s geography was slightly incorrect; the limits of Brazil stretched from 4 degrees north to 33 degrees south latitude.

179. The Copacabana Palace Hotel was located on the beachfront.

180. The popular Brazilian game is called pelota.

181. Galaeo is just west of Rio, where Fairchild Aircraft Division built the M-62, a two-seat, single-engine primary training monoplane, for the Brazilian Air Force.

182. Arnold’s schedule called for him to decorate four Brazilian generals and a major with the US Legion of Merit for their assistance in the development of US bases in northeastern Brazil. Two Americans, Capt Samuel M. Ackerman and Col Floyd B. Wood, the US Air Attaché, were also decorated by Arnold. See VIP Program, AP.

183. Arnold meant Volta Redonda, the town founded in 1941 on the Paraiba River to take advantage of the hydroelectric power and the proximity of other materials to make steel. Its first product was turned out in 1946.

184. Agulhas Megroes Military Academy was located in Resende, 80 miles northwest of Rio.

185. Fernando Costa was Interventor of Sao Paulo state.
186. Joao Mendes de Silva was commandant of the Escola Tecnica Caviaco in Sao Paulo.

187. With the surrender of Germany thought to be imminent, President Truman and each of the service chiefs prerecorded remarks to be radioed to American forces on VE- (Victory in Europe) day. Hap’s speech had been drafted by his staff in Washington and recorded by him in Rio, then flown to Washington. Arnold and his traveling companions heard the recorded message four days later on Tuesday, 8 May, over his aircraft radio en route to Miami. A copy of the message is in AP and Arnold, Global Mission 558–59; see Cozzens Diary, 3 May 1945, 282, for revisions being made of the speech by his staff in Washington.

188. The school was located at Campos dos Alonsos, about 40 miles west of Rio. The three phases of primary, basic, and advanced flying training, each involving approximately 60 hours of flying time to train USAAF pilots before they received their wings, was widely copied by Allied air forces, including Brazil. A major difference was that the flying phase for American wartime pilots normally lasted only six months.

189. The Brazilian medal is not otherwise identified.

190. According to a colleague who bet along with HHA on the races at the Jockey Club, “General Arnold and I win some but lose more.” Lindsay Diary, 6 May 1945.

191. In his autobiography, Berle recorded his thoughts on Arnold’s departure: “I was thinking as Arnold’s plane pushed off into the night that he had probably done as much as any one military man to win this war.” Adolph A. Berle, Navigating the Rapids, 1918–1971: From the Papers of Adolph A. Berle, eds. Beatrice Bishop Berle and Travis Beal Jacobs (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1973), 534.

192. The US Civil Aeronautics Administration personnel, along with the US military, were to be utilized at the discretion of the US Ambassador to assist the Brazilian government develop its aviation routes, airfields, and communications. See correspondence in AP.

193. Maj Gen Edwin F. Harding, USA, two years behind HHA at West Point, had commanded the US 32d Division in the Southwest Pacific until relieved by MacArthur in March 1942. He was now serving with the JCS in Washington. His son, Edwin F. Jr., now a Lt Col, had served with distinction in the AAF with the 301st Bombardment Group in Italy and was now at Borinquen Field with the “Gypsy Task Force” of the Second Air Force, training with B-29s in preparation for operations in the Pacific. The first Superfortresses had arrived in Puerto Rico on 3 December. Within a month, 39 of them were practicing with P-39s and P-63s simulating interceptor attacks by Japanese fighters. The task force had left Puerto Rico for the Pacific by 16 May 1945. See History of Borinquen AAF, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

194. Letter from President Truman not located.

195. Columnist writing that Arnold would be asked to resign not otherwise identified.
196. Marquis W. Childs’ syndicated column of 7 May entitled “Arnold, Hero of the Air Age” was titled differently in some papers, such as the New York Post of that date, as “Blasting of Reich by Arnold: A Testimonial to Arnold.” was extremely laudatory to the general. Copies in AP.

197. New York Herald Tribune article of 7 May was apparently reprinted elsewhere. Lowell Thomas wrote to his friend Arnold that he had read of Hap’s rumored incapacitation in a Paris newspaper and offered his radio program to “contradict the rumors.” Arnold responded that since his return to his office in Washington the “rumors and insinuations have disappeared into thin air” and indicated that Thomas’ offer “doesn’t seem at all necessary.” Nevertheless, in his broadcast of 27 June, Thomas credited Arnold with having recently flown 45,000 miles in 12 weeks [sic], commenting “you have to be plenty rugged to do that.” See Thomas–Arnold correspondence and transcript of 27 June 1945 Thomas Broadcast in AP.

198. Arnold remained in Miami, where he had been treated previously by AAF physicians in the past for his heart problems. He was given a complete physical after this trip. No doubt the medical findings were sufficiently optimistic to permit Arnold to plan to travel to the Pacific, beginning a three-week journey there less than a month after his return from this travel.

199. Cozzens, 23 May 1945, 282.

200. Arnold Diary, 5 April 1945.

201. Cozzens, from his vantage point near Arnold’s office, speculated that it was “unlikely that anyone would feel an urge to celebrate” the end of the war in Europe; 8 May 1945, 283.

202. Ibid., 28 March 1945, 261.

203. Ibid.
Hap with the 94th Bomb Group in England, September 1943.
Arnold with Maj Gen Ira Eaker, Eighth Air Force Commander, September 1943.
General Arnold, Marshal Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill at the Tehran Conference, 1943.

Photo courtesy of US Army
Lt Gen Omar Bradley points out a feature of the expanding Normandy invasion, June 1944. From left: Generals Arnold, Eisenhower, Marshall, and Bradley. Admiral King is at right.

Hap notes point number one as he and Lt Gen Carl Spaatz learn about air operations, June 1944.
Arnold and Bradley walk inland from the invasion beaches, June 1944.
Hap and his RAF counterpart, Air Chief Marshal Portal, in the Chateau Frontenac at the Quebec Conference, September 1944.
Hap and Lt Gen Mark Clark, 15th Army Group Commander, June 1944.
Arnold visits a forward base in Italy, May 1945.
Arnold and his son, Lt William Bruce Arnold, on Okinawa, June 1945.

Arnold with his commanders on Guam, June 1945.
General of the Army Arnold discusses B-29 problems with a crew chief of the 314th Bomb Wing, Guam, June 1945. General LeMay observes.


General Arnold in Newfoundland, en route home from Potsdam, July 1945.
President Harry S Truman awards the Distinguished Service Medal to General of the Army Henry H. Arnold, 1946.
Chapter 11

Hawaii, Guam, Iwo Jima, Philippines
6 June–24 June 1945

Introduction

Arnold had not been in the Pacific theater since his September 1942 trip covered in chapter 4, reflecting not only his other commitments but his belief, as well as that of Roosevelt, Churchill, and most of the CCS, that a “Europe first” strategy was the quickest and most productive way to win the global war. Now that the conflict in Europe had ended, hastened he felt in large part by the strategic bombing offensive, he could concentrate his efforts on the Pacific, where the bulk of Arnold’s and the AAF’s problems seemed involved with the operation of the emerging B-29. His preparations before leaving Washington, concentration on this trip, and activities in California did not cause him to notice in the diary that he left the nation’s capital one year to the day after the successful D-Day invasion of northern Europe. On reaching California, he spent 36 hours there, much of the time attending to details concerned with the property he intended as his retirement home—convincing evidence that a more relaxed future was a major part of his thinking.

If strategic bombing by B-17 and B-24 bombers had been significant in causing important destruction and diminution of military power in Germany, how much more damage could the B-29 with three to four times the bomb-carrying capacity of a B-24 create in the much more densely populated Japan? The main island of Honshu occupied only two-thirds of the land area of Germany, and its antiaircraft and fighter defenses had not proven nearly as effective or lethal as those faced over German skies. The success of the B-29s against the industrialized Japanese nation would strengthen the claims of Arnold and others about the efficacy of strategic bombardment.
The B-29 Superfortress, the main aircraft being used and projected to be the workhorse of operations against the Japanese home islands, not only represented a relatively new weapon but required a different organization, operating methods, support, and leadership. Given its considerable development problems, the plane had consumed much of Arnold’s and the Air Staff’s energies in the birth and deployment stages of this very long-range bomber. Arnold was interested in evaluating its operations during this trip.

Even before development had begun, Arnold’s vision and gambling instincts were apparent in his request for authorization to develop an experimental four-engine long-range bomber with a radius of 2,000 miles. He had taken this action in November 1939, only six weeks after the outbreak of World War II in Europe. Although originally conceived as a backup to the B-17, the success of the Flying Fortress and its companion B-24 Liberator in the European theater, as well as the problems associated with the development of the B-29, delayed large-scale production of the latter until 1943.1

Following the selection of Boeing as the primary contractor for development, Arnold took the unheard of step of placing an order in May 1941 for production of the giant plane, seven months before the United States entered the war and before a prototype aircraft had been produced and service testing completed.2 Its size, anticipated range, capacity to carry bombs, and the need for a more powerful engine than then existed, together with innovations such as pressurized cabins and remote control firing systems, posed major engineering challenges in a wartime nation where technical expertise was in short supply. The result was an uneven development period marked by the tragic crash of the second experimental model in February 1943, costing the life of Boeing’s leading test pilot and 10 engineers. Consequently, the initial production model was not delivered to the AAF until July 1943, the first of more than 3,700 completed before the end of the war.3 Its slow but successful development appeared to validate Arnold’s gamble on an unproven aircraft—one, however, with as yet an unclear mission and competing for scarce wartime materiel, manpower, and manufacturing facilities.
Once production began, further delays were caused by strategic as well as bureaucratic considerations as to how and where the weapon should be used. The US Navy, a vociferous opponent of allocating scarce assets to B-29 production, saw no inconsistency in demanding that, once manufactured, the aircraft be allocated to the Navy for use in antisubmarine and mine-laying operations. Other claimants for the Superfortress ranged from the strategic bombardment enthusiasts in Europe to MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific, Stilwell in China, and commanders in Alaska and elsewhere. It was not until April 1944 that the JCS approved concentrating the weapon against Japan, staging initially from India and later from the Marianas. As the airplane was being fine-tuned, and once its major bases of operations had been determined, its command and operational structure remained to be established.

Problems of command and control were complicated if the precedent that appeared to have produced effective results in Europe were to be followed. In the war against Hitler, air and other assets were allocated to the theater commander for employment. FDR, contrary to most JCS recommendations, remained unwilling to designate an overall theater commander in the Pacific.

The B-29 would operate across several different command and theater jurisdictional lines as the bombers staged from India through bases in China or operated in the future from the mid-Pacific islands. Logistical support, command and control, target selection, escort and protection of the aircraft, and rescue of downed crews would be among the most obvious problems any arrangement might pose. As early as September 1943, the Air Staff had conceived of the need for a command structure with “a cohesive overall control of strategic air operations, free of the direction [commanders] of local areas, and subject only to the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff.” It was not until five months later that the White House approved giving control of the B-29s to Arnold as Commanding General of the Twentieth Air Force exercising “executive direction” for the JCS with headquarters to be retained in Washington. Two months later, the JCS approved this plan with even the Navy agreeing to the organization of the Twentieth Air Force, which
had been constituted six days earlier on 4 April 1944. In his memoirs, Arnold expressed his reluctance at taking command, writing “there was nothing else I could do, with no unity of command in the Pacific.” It was “something I did not want to do.” On the other hand, the official history, written in 1952 two years after Arnold’s death, provided different speculation.

In World War I, in spite of strenuous efforts to get an overseas assignment, Arnold had been held to an administrative post in Washington. Now, in the second war, he had seen contemporaries and the younger men he had raised go out to combat commands, and he would have been unlike his kind if he had no regrets in commanding the world’s largest air force without being able to direct a single bomber mission. A headquarters air force would give him at least a role comparable to that of his British opposite number, Portal, and one might suspect that his reluctance was tempered with some satisfaction. At any rate, the formal papers of the Twentieth Air Force bear no trace of demur on Arnold’s part.

Whatever satisfaction may have come from this command, it was further evidence of the continuing confidence that the president now had in Arnold, a far cry from the low esteem in which he had been held when seriously threatened with forced retirement just prior to his trip abroad in April 1941. It also represented recognition of the de facto if not de jure independence of the AAF, since the operation of the Twentieth Air Force would parallel the freedom of action that the RAF Bomber Command was now exercising and the Independent Force RAF had operated under in World War I. It seems curious that Admiral King, who detested Arnold and disliked the Army air arm and what he viewed as their ambitions, does not seem to have protested this organization. AAF success in this endeavor could further enhance the Army aviators’ claims for legitimacy if not independence in the future, to be gained in many ways at the expense of the Navy.

With creation of the organization that he could control from Washington, along with more difficult operational and maintenance problems than had existed for any other World War II AAF airplane, Arnold increasingly felt the need to view in person the operations as well as the bases, leaders, and crews under his command. In the minds of many army aviators, the bulk of the difficulties with the B-29 in the theater were thought attributa-
ble to the Navy. Hap’s latent suspicion of that service dating from the early twenties had not been diminished by almost daily wartime contact in the JCS exacerbated by what he viewed as its difficult leader, Admiral King. The seemingly ponderous methods of the Navy appeared to airmen in the field, such as LeMay, as frustrating at best. When viewed by AAF aviators within the demands of operational immediacy, Navy methodology oftentimes appeared as a crippling and incomprehensible impediment to flight operations. Their system, associated with many months of necessary dry-docking, refitting, and repairing naval vessels, seemed bewildering to airmen who anticipated that most AAF maintenance problems were expected to be corrected overnight, either by scrapping the aircraft or correcting its deficiencies in an effort to return the wounded plane to combat duty on the next flying day. Even though command and control of the B-29 aircraft rested with an AAF five-star general in far-off Washington, logistical support in the Pacific, which in effect determined the numbers, bomb load, range, and targets of the B-29s, was the result of a supply system operated by junior naval officers who controlled the priorities assigned to materiel to be carried to the Pacific in US Navy vessels. On-site Navy commanders, whether in Hawaii, Guam, or elsewhere, were generally higher ranking than their AAF counterparts (Arnold was convinced that this was by design), adding further problems. Maj Gen Curtis LeMay, as the operational commander of the B-29s in the Pacific, reported several times in his memoirs as well as to Arnold and the Air Staff instances of having run out of incendiary bombs, thus curtailting his operations over Japan. At the same time, he was dismayed at seeing materiel arriving in Guam that he felt was being used or stockpiled for what he and others considered as postwar naval installations. LeMay complained in his autobiography that it was “on the fifth page of the priority list that we got anything to fight with,” a copy of which he sent directly to Arnold. Other combat commanders were thus encouraged, and they provided Hap with examples of operational problems they were experiencing that were attributable to Nimitz’ headquarters. One account sympathetic to LeMay recorded that Nimitz’ staff was again “rationing the bombs to be delivered to LeMay.”
By the beginning of this trip, Arnold’s main concern was achieving tangible results with the B-29 in the Pacific theater. He had already relieved a long-time associate, superb planner, advocate and practitioner of strategic bombardment, Maj Gen Haywood S. Hansell Jr. His sin, if any, as the combat commander of the B-29s, had been his failure to achieve more significant results in the air war over the Japanese home islands quickly enough to satisfy Arnold. In February, Hap had brought in Maj Gen Curtis E. LeMay, like Hansell a proven combat leader from Europe who had been commanding B-29s in the CBI theater since July 1944, as a replacement. LeMay’s daring incendiary attacks on Tokyo during the nights of 9–10 March 1945 (of which Arnold had no previous knowledge) appeared to many to have justified his replacement of the more cautious Hansell. To strengthen the overall Pacific command element, Arnold while abroad in Europe in April had reassigned his old friend, confidant, and successful strategic air forces leader in Europe, four-star Gen Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz, to direct the overall air offensive against Japan. Tooey would arrive at his headquarters on Guam on 6 July. Arnold had discussed problems to be encountered in the Pacific with Spaatz during his visit to Europe chronicled in chapter 10, but Hap would have a greater appreciation of them and their difficulty of solution as a result of his own travels.14

Consequently, Hap intended to meet face-to-face with Army and Navy leaders stretching from Hawaii through the Pacific islands to Guam and the Philippines. He hoped to get a clearer picture of the nature and scope of any difficulties and attempt an accommodation with the many layers of command and support to ensure success by the AAF and its new weapon. In Arnold’s mind, the strategic air offensive in Europe had played a major role in winning the war in that theater, and Hap was determined to ensure that the potential success of the B-29 was not in any way limited. Optimistically, he might help to ease or eliminate some of the interservice squabbling, logistical deficiencies, or other limiting factors by his visit.

Arnold had enjoyed less than warm relations with the Navy, which essentially controlled the Pacific theater. Nevertheless, he developed a nagging suspicion, first articulated in his diary
when he reached Hawaii, and confirmed later, that some of the
difficulties reported to be existing in the Pacific were of the
AAF and the Army’s own making. This resulted in Arnold’s
identifying several senior officers he met on this trip who were
to be sent home and retired. Hap was not unaware that his
new five-star rank would put him and the AAF on an equal
basis with the five stars of residents Nimitz and MacArthur. If
there were any pleasant aspects anticipated for this journey,
it was likely due to Arnold’s having enjoyed his previous six-
week trip away from the Pentagon. During that trip, he had
interspersed at his own pace a variety of conferences, deci-
sions, and inspections, with considerable periods of rest and
relaxation, far from the pressures of Washington.

Arnold’s health during this trip cannot be assessed accu-
rately. Although it is not known what his physicians found
during his checkup in Miami less than four weeks before he
began this journey, it seems reasonable to assume that he
continued to be aware of the need for prudent rest, proper
diet, and regulated exertion to govern his routine. Hap took
along with him the same physician who had accompanied him
to Europe and South America and who had presided over his
checkup in Florida. Although Arnold recorded his daily rests
on this Pacific journey, he rarely indicated any strain due to
his travels, as he had noted during the previous trip. This does
not mean that some trauma did not appear. His habits follow-
ing his checkup in Miami after his previous trip showed an
appreciation of the need to control his emotions and exertion.
As indicated earlier, the hours he spent in his Pentagon office
continued to be limited to about two in the morning and the
same number following lunch and a nap, much as they had
been after his January heart attack.15

This travel would take him to the tropical climate of the Philip-
ines, where he contrasted the devastation of war with the
peaceful, familiar surroundings where he had spent happier
days as a young lieutenant 30 years earlier. Not surprisingly, he
was appalled at the physical destruction he now saw and the
accounts he heard of atrocities against the civilian population
alleged to have been committed by the Japanese military. Con-
sequently, even though he and his commanders in the European
theater had concentrated the AAF heavy bomber attacks against strategic targets, Arnold expressed little concern in the diary for the fate of the enemy as a result of American B-29 raids against population centers. Three weeks before the devastating 9–10 March fire raid on Tokyo proper, Arnold “directed further experiments with fire raids” following an earlier limited incendiary attack against Kobe. On the day following the incendiary attack on Tokyo, which claimed more than 80,000 lives, Arnold cabled LeMay: “Congratulations. This mission shows your crews have got the guts for anything.”

As LeMay followed up the Tokyo raid with incendiary attacks on other important Japanese cities, no demurrer was forthcoming from Hap, who was traveling in Europe, or from the Pentagon. On arriving back in Washington from Europe, Arnold followed up his earlier cable with a commendatory letter that began “My dear Curt” and continued with “you should then [by 1 July, with the 1,000 B-29s anticipated] have the ability to destroy whole industrial cities should that be required.” This concurrence with LeMay’s methodology continued even after Arnold arrived in Guam and saw strike photos and intelligence reports of destruction caused by the raids and plans for their continuation. Clearly, Arnold’s lack of compassion was no different from other members of the JCS when that group identified 33 cities in Japan as “major targets.” Arnold’s cable to Marshall, setting forth Hap’s thinking for the JCS meeting with the president scheduled for 18 June, called for making “plans for the complete destruction of Japan proper.”

It is reasonable to agree, as Michael Sherry and Ronald Shaffer have argued, that Hap accepted without demurre the use of incendiary raids, and later the atomic bombs, against population centers in Japan. It would have been more surprising had he opposed their use, since his primary aim coincided with that of most American military and political leaders and the American people: conclude the fighting as quickly and with as few American casualties as possible. What he had seen on his recent trip to Europe had convinced him of the importance and contributions of strategic bombardment in bringing the war to a close more rapidly and with fewer Allied losses.
There appears little doubt that Hap along with many other Americans had become somewhat anesthetized to the death and cruelty of war highlighted by news of the horrible conditions in the recently captured German concentration camps. Now that the war in Europe had ended, the United States could turn its increasing power against the nation that, in the minds of most Americans, had “started” this conflict at Pearl Harbor. Other factors no doubt entered the equation, among them the extensive coverage in the American press of kamikaze attacks and the ferocious fighting that marked the defense of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, all confirming what many felt was the Japanese lack of respect for human life. These actions, juxtaposed with Arnold’s knowledge of the estimates of American casualties if the planned November 1945 invasion of Japan proper were to be undertaken, precluded any sympathy for the victims or their cities. Nor was Hap receptive to criticism of the methods employed by the B-29s.

Hap’s discussions with General MacArthur and Gen Joseph Stilwell, both strongly influenced by having fought the Japanese for almost four years, suggested that these American commanders countenanced the use of poison gas against the enemy. Even scrupulous Secretary of War Stimson appeared satisfied with Arnold’s explanation of the difficulty in target selection and bombing in distinguishing Japanese “cottage industries” from the homes of noncombatants. As one scholar has described the change, “whatever moral restraint the United States [and this would include Arnold] had shown in refraining from participation in Britain’s deliberate campaign of terror bombing against Germany disappeared with astonishingly few regrets in the Pacific.”

Arnold honestly confided to his diary his doubts over the optimistic assessments of LeMay and others on the scene that within the next 10 weeks “Japan’s industrial facilities would be completely destroyed.” His recorded skepticism, “we will see,” was understandable in light of the rosy predictions that had been made by his senior commanders in Europe over a period of the past two years that bombing of German targets would soon end the war or at least cripple the enemy’s ability to continue the conflict. Although Hap had a clear recollec-
tion of the devastation inflicted from the air that he had wit-
nessed in Germany during his recent visit and had just
received D'Olier's preliminary report of the Strategic Bombing
Survey for Europe, he had to have appreciated realistically
that the Germans were able to continue the war far longer
than probably he, his commanders, and other advocates of
strategic bombing thought possible. The uncertain progress of
the atomic bomb, whose successful testing was less than a
month away, offered little specific encouragement to Arnold
about this weapon's ability to conclude the war against Japan.
For many reasons, dominated by security considerations,
Arnold, as was his style in all his diaries, made no mention
during the trip of its progress or possible use.

During his meetings in the islands with MacArthur and his air
commander, Gen George Kenney, the latter of whom had visited
Arnold as recently as March during his Miami convalescence,
Hap noted MacArthur's increased faith in the role of airpower.
The excellent air support and leadership provided by Kenney had
impressed MacArthur and appeared to have modified the latter's
thinking about the role and operation of land-based air.
MacArthur's tour as Chief of Staff of the US Army a decade ear-
lier had not endeared him to very many airmen; they suspected
that his creation of GHQAF had been a maneuver to control if not
squelch the airmen's latent and occasionally overt desire for
independence. However, MacArthur, still a potentially powerful
force in political Washington, could now be added to the chorus
of American Army ground generals who, on the basis of the
wartime performance of the AAF thus far, were no longer
opposed to air independence if not actively in favor of it.

Arnold's response to Marshall's cable for AAF representation
at the proposed meeting of the JCS with Truman on 18 June
is puzzling. The purpose the president stated was that he
"wanted to know definitely how far we could afford to go in the
Japanese campaign."24 Hap's reasons for sending LeMay to
Washington in his stead are not explained in his memoirs, and
his diary offered no hint that he seriously considered return-
ing himself for these potentially important discussions. It is
difficult to imagine that Arnold, given the briefings he had
attended the past several days from LeMay and his staff,
emphasizing that Japan’s major cities would all be destroyed by 1 October 1945, would not have seized this opportunity to bring this information personally before the JCS and the new president. Recent strike photos, statistical estimates of industries and homes destroyed, casualties, people dislocated, and other results, offered a chance to emphasize the accomplishments of strategic bombardment that LeMay and his staff predicted would negate the need for the scheduled ground assault against Japan. The disappointment within the AAF and Arnold, that the ground invasion of Europe had not been eliminated by the strategic bombardment campaign, could be offset by the overwhelming success anticipated for the theories as applied against Japan. Who better than Arnold, a known quantity in the JCS and ardent advocate of strategic bombardment, to be the bearer of these prospects, particularly to a new president?

There were probably some advantages in assigning the task to the 38-year-old LeMay, in some ways the archetype of an AAF combat aviator, but these would be offset by other considerations. Among the latter were his lack of rank in the JCS five-star arena, his limited knowledge of the JCS members, and his lack of experience in the workings and politics of that body. Arnold’s shortening his trip and not visiting locations planned for the remainder of the journey was not a valid reason for not making the journey himself. This was particularly true since, on the day before news of the planned meeting in Washington reached him, Arnold reported that discussions with Nimitz had resulted in the naval commander agreeing to “everything that I had asked.” Thus Arnold appeared to have accomplished one of the major purposes of this journey.25 Nevertheless, Arnold formulated his thinking in a cable to Marshall. Reflecting on his experiences thus far in this trip, his ideas included continuation of planning for the invasion of Kyushu, set for 1 November, to obtain additional airbases, “give priority” to B-29 raids, and planning “for the complete destruction of Japan proper” using land- and sea-based air. He also intended to place “postwar activities into much lower priorities” and to continue planning for the 1946 landings on Honshu but on a “postponed” basis.26
Michael Sherry, labeling the meeting a failure of the JCS to “express their version of how to win the war,” indicated that, “in a small way, the responsibility for failure was Arnold’s, for he failed to appear.” The meeting was conducted by Marshall and, in Sherry’s phrasing, was “dominated” by him. The chief of staff did not, however, ignore the role of air. He indicated that, by the anticipated 1 November invasion date, AAF would have achieved destruction of “every industrial target worth hitting” along with “huge” areas of Japan’s cities. “Air power alone,” however, was not sufficient to end the war, since it had been “unable alone to put the Germans out.” In Sherry’s view, Arnold was not present “partly because he had no clear scheme for winning the war with his bombers.” Nor, as Sherry does not mention, did any other member of the JCS have a panacea solution. He asked, rhetorically, “What happened to victory through air power?” There is no way to escape the conclusion that the B-29 assaults had thus far failed to force a Japanese surrender in spite of the almost indescribable destruction.

Was the answer a ground invasion of Kyushu, which Truman feared would create the casualties of another Okinawa? Sherry may be correct in stating that Arnold pursued the fire strategy “as zealously as the invasion strategists,” but it is not easy to agree that the fire bombing was done so as to rescue the “AAF’s flagging fortunes.” He raised an interesting but philosophical point that was then and is now impossible to answer when he indicted the strategic planners for their “indifference . . . to the question of relating destruction to surrender.” But what formula or analysis could relate them, given Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and Tarawa? With all of the US leadership lacking a clear alternative, Sherry’s point, that the “path to unconditional surrender lay through unconditional destruction,” is arresting. Without saying so, this meeting helped pave the way for dropping the atomic bomb.

In fairness to Arnold, there is the strong possibility that his health was a major factor in his sending LeMay instead of traveling to the meeting himself. An observer on this trip noted that Hap had to pause while attempting a flight of stairs. Later, he was forced to take an extended rest following his long meeting with MacArthur, which was reported by others as much more
heated and controversial than Arnold recorded in his diary. Although Arnold’s health seemed to be holding steady and not significantly declining, the potential strain of a hurried trip of more than 8,000 miles, combined with the need to prepare for an important presentation before the president and the JCS, may well explain the dispatch of LeMay. Even LeMay’s flight, in a stripped B-29, consumed 36 hours of flying time, putting him in Washington just 36 hours before the planned JCS briefing. Arnold would have been reluctant to cite health reasons for not returning, given Marshall’s continuing concern that his progress since his fourth attack in January had not been sufficient to permit him to continue during this critical period. Nor would Hap have liked to emphasize his medical problems to the White House by citing health reasons for his absence.

Eaker represented Arnold in the meeting of the JCS with Truman and the service secretaries in the White House on 18 June, perhaps due to a mix-up regarding two meetings of the JCS—the first with Truman present, the second on the following day without the president. Finally, Arnold and/or Marshall might have decided that Eaker was the most appropriate person to represent the AAF to the president and the service secretaries. In any event, LeMay was not present at the 18 June meeting. Eaker’s performance has been judged as “deferential,” although he urged quick action and indicated that Arnold had agreed, in his recent cable, with Marshall’s recommendations. To what extent this might have reflected Hap’s skepticism regarding whether raids on Japanese cities would in and of themselves end the war cannot be determined.

LeMay made his presentation of the bombing situation to the JCS the next day, 19 June, but was little encouraged by the results. He ignored the matter in his autobiography, but according to other accounts, “LeMay did very well” in making general overall remarks, which were followed by his accompanying intelligence officer’s detailed coverage. Using a “two-foot-wide roll of butcher’s paper on a frame” (the “only thing they had on Guam”) as their briefing aid, LeMay felt they had not impressed their audience since he noticed Marshall asleep during the 4 P.M. presentation. As he returned to Guam, LeMay concluded that the “whole general staff . . . believed they had
to invade Japan as they had invaded Europe.” He told his operations officer that, in the “stern atmosphere” of his briefing, he felt he had been told in a “polite” way to continue to “run his bombing operations” and “they” would “run the Joint Chiefs of Staff” as they continued to plan the invasion. This explains in part Hansell’s postwar comment that the atomic bomb was “needed . . . to save the [US] Army from its obsession with the invasion.”

It seems logical that Arnold had been very impressed on this trip with what he had seen and been briefed on about the accomplishments of the Twentieth Air Force. No single reason explains his unwillingness to rush back to Washington and attempt to influence the president and/or the JCS that the continuation of bombing alone would bring about the end of the war against Japan. To this editor, his health was the predominant consideration although speculation by others that it was lack of conviction on his part about the efficacy of AAF strategic bombing cannot be completely ignored. As with many other issues that were important, Arnold’s diary is too often silent.

The remainder of Arnold’s odyssey saw him spend three days in the Philippines, then on to Iwo Jima, Guam, and briefly to other islands for refueling en route to an overnight stop in Hawaii before flying to San Francisco. Little could he or anyone he met appreciate the events that would bring, via the B-29, the almost four-year US war with Japan to such a rapid and terrifying conclusion within 60 days after Truman’s meeting with the JCS to determine whether an invasion was necessary.

The Diary

TRIP TO PACIFIC

Wednesday, June 6, 1945 [Washington, D.C. to Fairfield, California]

Took off Bolling 9 P.M., 3,000 miles to go to Fairfield, California, via the southern route to skip bad weather in Central
US. *Argonaut IV* with Dice and crew; Peterson Co-Commander of ship, C. R. Smith and Sheffield.

Went to bed at 10:00 EWT [Eastern War Time], awakened at 6:00 EWT, dozed until 7:30 EWT, but it was only 4:30 PWT [Pacific War Time]. Over Winslow, Meteor Crater at 8:00-8:10. Traveling West there is always the question, shall we go to bed early and sleep during the Eastern night hours or shall we go to bed late and sleep during the Western night hours? I was tired after a full day of hearings before Appropriations Committee and appointments with Spaatz, Eaker, Marshall and packing my bags, so chose the Eastern sleeping hours.

**Thursday, June 7, 1945 [Fairfield and Sonoma, California]**

Landed Fairfield, California, 8:35 A.M., PWT; General Bill Ryan, General Santy Fairchild and numerous Colonels meeting us. Made tour of post; looked at plans for $18,000,000 new construction and did not accept engineers’ modernistic buildings that had countless overhead cover between buildings. Sent message to Ira [Eaker] asking for re-study so as to get twice as many buildings for same money. Talked over San Francisco conference with Santy; apparently US Delegation is fairly optimistic over results being achieved.

Said goodbye: C-54 goes to Hamilton and Tom Sheffield and I took car to Sonoma. Nice ride of an hour and we were in Sonoma. Made arrangements with deep freeze company to store any beef we kill. We must put a locked box on top of permanent boxes. They will hang after butchering and will cut up to put in box. Found out from Emparan that there is a butcher in town who will kill and clean. Emparan is looking into purchase of piece of Morris’s property to square ours with main road. Found a blacksmith to shoe Duke. On to Sobre Vista after a drink at Fat Jacks. Lunch and rest for one hour at Sobre Vista.

To ranch where I met Hansen and Newton. Trees are OK except cherry and peach; they will be replaced and will be planted in another spot. Berries and grapes are doing OK. Garden looks fine, cow and 2 calves are OK. Lo’s chickens are all alive and OK.
Newton, Hansen will have Duke shod on Monday. Deer are going into garden so have arranged for another strand of wire around top of fence. Hansen will build 50 head chicken house. Will also buy enough hay while price is low to fill barn. Picked out place North of west bridge for pig run with about ¼ acre to be enclosed. Made arrangements for taking care of 6 young steers if I can get them, 5 for sale 1 for butchering. Back to Sobre Vista for dinner; about 6 families from Hamilton here, total about 14 people. To bed at 9:30.

Friday, June 8, 1945 [Sonoma, Fairfield, California en route to Hawaii]

Up at 7:15; breakfast at 7:45 with Tom; at ranch at 8:45; with Emparan at 9:15; Hamilton at 10:30. Went through hospital and talked with wounded that came in last night from Hawaii; 80% came from Okinawa. Short rest before lunch; lunch with Barbara, Doug47 and C. R. Smith. Saw Fairchild, Melin, Mrs. Melin48 and________. Put Doug and Barbara on plane for Los Angeles, 3:00 P.M., then a hair cut. Rested until 5:00, called Bee at Washington. Dinner with Melins, Present: Stone, Sheffield, Combs, Marquardt, Dan Gilmer,49 the Melins and HHA. At plane 9:25 P.M., took off 9:50 P.M.

Saturday, June 9, 1945 [Hamilton Field, California to Hawaii]

Twenty-four hundred miles to Honolulu, time change 2½ hours, good weather all across. Up at 5:30, Hawaii time, that is 8:00 PWT. Flying above broken clouds; landed at 6:35 A.M. Richardson, Towers, Parker, Breene, McNaughton, Scanlon and many others met us.50 We had to put on neckties prior to landing; I understood they were not used over here. Also had to get my blouse from the plane as they dress up at night. I am living at Richardsons, Tom too; Richardson talks too much. Looks like a long session of coordination somewhere. Richardson is still under Nimitz in spite of new set-up that puts him under MacArthur. Conference with Richardson and his staff, they did the talking: complete story of war in Pacific from Marshalls to Okinawa; determination of Navy to make
and keep it a naval war under naval control; rigid Navy procedures which must not be changed. No flexibility in operations even though it meant complete disorganization of Army units and rendering of them inept. No criticism of Navy methods. At first our VHB [Very Heavy Bomber] operations were opposed then tolerated and now the whole Navy is on the bandwagon, but they still want control of the units.51

Lunch with Towers, Murray, Richardson and members of Richardson’s staff. Rest 1:45 to 3:10, conference with Air officers at 3:45, dinner by Richardson, movie, bed at 11:00.

Sunday, June 10, 1945 [Honolulu, Hawaii en route to Kwajalein Island]

Made my worst presentation to officers [of] Parker’s staff at Hickam Field Headquarters yesterday; off the beam. Breakfast at 8:00, conference with Towers at 9:00, presentation on war, glad to get Navy side. [As a result of] two months operations of Spruance and Mitscher carriers:53 US Navy—planes lost 750.

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Back to Headquarters, Hickam. Not always Nimitz or Richardson that keeps AAF from getting things done. Ever since our arrival, a favorite topic is: Why we can’t and how we can’t get our fighters up to Iwo Jima and Okinawa; our people were blaming everyone. As a matter of fact it was AAF’s own fault. We have ships, all we need is the will to do.

Conference with Parker and then with Ryan, ATC: [learned that we have] 17 planes each way every day San Francisco to Honolulu; 11 planes each way every day Honolulu to Guam; 7 Guam to Okinawa; 4 Guam to Manila; 253 planes en route, 181 C-54s, 171 C-47s; 270 [2,700?] patients a day. Went through hospital and saw wounded Air Evacuees coming and going: doing a grand job.
Dinner with 22 people at Richardson’s. Moss Hart and Gertrude Lawrence to see plane off.\textsuperscript{54} Took off at 10:07, 2,457 miles to Kwajalein,\textsuperscript{55} [their time is] 2\frac{1}{2} hours earlier.

**Monday June 11, 1945** [En route, Hawaii to Kwajalein]

Gone [asleep] as we passed 180º meridian.\textsuperscript{56}

**Tuesday, June 12, 1945** [Hawaii to Kwajalein to Eniwetok to Saipan to Guam]

[This day] came at 12:00 midnight; night clear but bumpy. Slept for 9 hours in spite of bumps. Up about 200 miles out, saw cloud shadows and sun spots all looking like atolls. Finally a real atoll and then nothing but more sun spots and cloud shadows on ocean until unmistakably we saw the sea breaking on Kwajalein, narrow atoll 80 miles in diameter. Ships and more ships in atoll, construction and building.

Landed at 9:37 or 7:07 Kwajalein time; [met by] General Ross, Admiral Harrill, their staff[s], Ben Wyatt (echoes of old Army-Navy San Diego feuds).\textsuperscript{57} Breakfast with staff.

Tour of atoll: sand, sun, waves, 4 feet above sea level, water pops off from squalls, 8 cargo ships in harbor, dredges making fill. Population of 6,000 sailors, soldiers and marines, 300 natives. All their coconut trees gone, no other industry; war, artillery, bombs took the trees. Now they make palm fans, mats, cigarette package holders and work for Government. Distillation plant for water, 200,000-gallon system. All planes go through going west 90% operations now Army, 10% Navy. Ross says proportion will continue, the Admiral says 60-40. Sixteen B-29s there all headed to Guam. Hospital small but good for an atoll; take off only those evacuees that need treatment, ambulators get off for an hour to walk about.

Took off for Guam via Eniwetok\textsuperscript{58} at 8:53, distance 1,631 miles. Fleet anchorage for carriers will soon be [in] Eniwetok. Jap burial grounds, holes scooped out by bull dozers, bodies thrown in, dirt pushed over, bodies covered. Jap burial grounds completed with sign posts. En route to Saipan\textsuperscript{59} by Eniwetok. Eniwetok, an atoll with an anchorage 50 miles by 50, inside more ships than anyone can imagine; 100 large
ones, maybe 200 all told, a sight that should make a Jap bomber go crazy. Land is circular in shape and has a width of about ¼ to ½ mile, 374 n. m. [nautical miles] from Kwajalein.

There is no doubt but the Navy is following out their approved policy in all regards in the Pacific. It is also clear that the Army has never had the long range view for war or post-war that the Navy has. Accordingly we have accepted Navy control, command and administration when from a cold-blooded point of view, from the paramount interest viewpoint, from the greatest interest, from the operation[all] point of view, the Army should have control of certain agencies, islands or activities. As long as the Army takes the attitude that:

(a) It is not the time to bring these matters up,
(b) We will not face the facts squarely,
(c) We must not get the Navy mad at us,
(d) We will accept things as they are rather than face a change even though the change is for the best,
(e) We will not try and do that which provides for the war effort and efficiency for the conduct of the war, we should not criticize the Navy.


Admiral Nimitz, Kuter and many friends met us, quite a contrast with my last trip 22 days out of San Francisco.62 Went to Giles’s house for bath and cooling off; gosh how I sweat in the tropics. Shelmire came down with me.63 Dinner at home: movie, J. Garland in *The Clock*. Bed.

*Wednesday, June 13, 1945 [Guam]*

Japs are still being killed, being brought in or are surrendering on Saipan, Tinian65 and Guam; 30 were taken or killed yesterday. Navy’s attitude on a Strategic Bomber Headquarters is intolerable. They would not countenance either JCS or

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WD telling them how to organize fleet units. They have had no strategic bomber experience. Time is essential and we must get things moving if we are to get maximum effectiveness of our bombing effort. Perhaps we should give up all idea of cooperating with Navy, put the Headquarters in Manila and call it a day. This is based upon radio I received from Marshall in which Navy (King, Cooke) wanted us to have nothing larger than 20th AF headquarters, etc. My answer to Marshall was in accordance with above.66

At Nimitz headquarters at 9:00 for presentation of war.67 Did not talk business, saw and met his staff. A ride around the island; Agana68 ruined, wrecked, obliterated as are other cities. New, wooden ones are springing up to replace the old Spanish stone cathedrals, commandant’s house, stores, government buildings. Wide roads with hundreds of trucks, jeeps traveling from end of Island to other, 30,000 trucks, jeeps, etc., on island, 14,800 natives of Agana homeless and had to be provided with shelter; 170,000 troops and sailors on Guam. Jungle, fruit trees, villages all gone, wrecked by War. Three cemeteries where American dead are buried. A new harbor is being built; a break water where we came in from an anchored US A. T. [Army transport in 1913], coral blown out to make harbor, the small town on the beach destroyed.

Back to the house where LeMay’s staff showed how Japan’s industrial facilities would be completely destroyed by October 1st. Thirty large and small cities all to go then Japan will have none of the things needed to supply an Army, Navy or Air Force. She cannot continue her fighting after her reserve supplies are gone. [War over by] October 1st, we will see. We did it in Germany with much more difficult targets and much more intense antiaircraft. Why not in Japan? We will see.

Lunch at house with Lowell Thomas. He is on his way home from a round the world trip, will go with me to Iwo Jima on Friday.69 Fine breeze blowing, keeps temperature down during night and most days on Guam. Conference with officers on LeMay’s staff re their operations and what help I can give.

It looks now as if there is a very complicated organization here that the Navy believes necessary but to the Army is unnecessary. Its complications make long delays in decisions a foregone con-
clusion. Also one man in the chain, a little below par, delays everything as far as our operations are concerned.

There have been delays and interferences in our operations due to action by Hoover and his men sometimes because they assume authority over Army Air matters which are really none of their business. Cases in point: hard standings for bombs; disapproval of our requisitions for bombs for 210,000 tons a month telling us in effect how many we will be allowed to drop a month; giving priority to permanent Naval postwar construction over war effort. In some cases the interference comes more from what might happen than actual events. It all comes down to this: their set-up is so far different from ours that we cannot accept the delays and interferences resulting, they accept them as a matter of course. The Army wants to take the most direct action and get the job done.

Dinner at Nimitz, very fine. Received D’Olier’s preliminary report upon my return. Its findings:

(a) Bombing did not only hasten the end of the war with Germany but had a most disastrous effect on Germany’s production.
(b) Oil, transportation, prevention of coal from Ruhr had most disastrous effects.
(c) Cities, airframes, ball bearings most disappointing.
(d) Engines, power plants, steel would have contributed greatly.
(e) To be successful attacks had to be intense and repeated.
(f) Against Japan bombing can be most effective, will result in minimum cost and American lives only if careful choice of targets and bombs, adequate scale operations are given most skillful direction and fullest support.

Thursday, June 14, 1945 [Guam]

Slept until 6 A.M.; at Nimitz headquarters at 9:00, war presentation until 9:40. Conference with Nimitz, Sherman, McMorris and Giles. As a result of my observations and this conference:

(a) Nimitz is really doing what he thinks best for winning the war. He makes his decisions accordingly regardless of what the Army, Navy or Marines think.
McMorris has his tongue in his cheek. He is for the Navy first. He is loyal to Nimitz but still has his allegiance to the Navy to think of when decisions re the Army and Navy are made.73

Sherman is most brilliant of the three. He has his first loyalty to winning the war but he would like to do it the Navy way using the Army to help, but once he gives his opinion from then on he carries out the decision as best he knows how. However he may try to sink the Army prior to the decision being made.

At the conference I found Nimitz agreeable to every one of the propositions I made to him: he wanted the Strategic Command here at Guam; he wanted Spaatz to command it; he was agreeable to having the 8th and 20th Air Forces in the Strategic Command; he could see no conflict between Headquarters that could not be overcome and was certain the advantages attained could outweigh the disadvantages.74

During the conference the very complicated set-up at certain islands developed: Guam, where there are several airports used by Army, Navy and Marines, port through which 25 to 30 thousand tons a day are unloaded, headquarters after headquarters, storage depots all over the Island, a situation that does not allow itself to be ironed out by saying the Army or Navy is in command. At Tinian it is simple, VLR [Very Long Range] bombers are there in preponderance so Kimble (AAF) is in command.75 At Iwo Jima Chaney (AAF) is in command but there are many places where the solution is not that simple.76

Nimitz has directive from JCS stating that he will command Okinawa, will be military governor of Guam. Until these directives are rescinded he will retain control. As far as intelligence, communications, personnel control are concerned AAF can have it; planning, he welcomes AAF on his staff; operations, under CG, SAAF [sic].77 He agrees to a set-up that will give [AAF] everything needed by Strategic Air Force but must have balance with other operations. Welcomes a representative from Spaatz Headquarters to sit with their people to determine priorities, shipping, etc., will have changes made to eliminate procedures that interfere with our operations. In fact in general he agreed to everything that I asked. I see many things to
be ironed out as they arise but I am firmly convinced that Spaatz and Nimitz can do this without any trouble.  

The conference was over at 12:15, lunch 12:45. 58/313. 79
Rest. Auto trip to north end of Island. Inspected the 314th Wing under General Power; 314th has been in combat for 14 missions; 80 315th under Armstrong has never been in combat; has new type B-29 designed for night and bad weather. 81 Gave them as good a pep and info talk as I could, then talked to assembled combat crew officers. Acted as host to introduce Nimitz to the plane that was christened “Fleet Admiral Nimitz”; an excellent ceremony but would rather it had not been done; superstition only. 82 Back to house, supper, movie, Bette Davis in *Growing Corn*, bed 11:00. 83

Friday, June 15, 1945 [Guam, Tinian, Iwo Jima]

Up at 7:15, first anniversary of 20th Air Force and first mission over Japan. Interview with press at 9:30, subject: First Anniversary of 20th Air Force. Took off for Tinian 10:30; distance 165 miles, arrived Tinian 11:15. Admiral Nimitz, I believe, is sincere in his feelings that there should be a Supreme Commander for Pacific Ocean Operations.

Tinian used to be a sugar cane island. It seems to be a flat, coral top balanced upon a mountain peak; the very deep waters right offshore seem to bear that out. Water is obtained from wells that tap fresh water floating on salt water below island; it all comes from the rains, about 85 inches a year. This morning on Guam there was a deluge; typical, tropical, rainy season rain storm. It lasted perhaps 40 minutes; after it passed the heat came right up out of the ground and hit you in the face. There was no wind and out of the jungle came that musty, dank, rotten, jungle smell in all tropical regions in the rainy season. On Tinian I met Kimble, island governor; C. O., 58th Wing served in China as part of 20th Bomber Command; 84 John Davies, CO of 313th.

Tinian is just one large airport; runways 8,500 feet long, 4 of them, all usable, in between are the sugar-cane fields. Roads go all over the island and the Group buildings look like small villages. I gave 4 talks to Groups yesterday and 2 today, also pinned on 8 medals today.

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Met Bart Yount at lunch and had him sit at table with Davies and his four Group COs so that I could talk to him. Shelmire came this far with me and we dropped him off so that he could return to Saipan. We can look from Tinian to Saipan and see the many cargo and personnel ships standing offshore, a bomber’s dream. At this writing there are 520 B-29s over Osaka, 3,000 tons of bombs. What a contrast with Doolittle’s 18 planes and 15 tons and the first B-29 mission a year ago with its 68 planes and 181 tons.

At lunch a cable was received, to me from Marshall, stating there would be meeting with the President and the JCS to discuss “Can we win the war by bombing?” I am sending LeMay back with all the information he has. A cable is being prepared at Kuter’s Headquarters outlining my ideas. Combs is going to Guam to help prepare cable. I will get it at Iwo Jima and edit and correct. Combs will meet me again after helping with cable when and where he can. Lowell Thomas came with me to Tinian and will go on to Iwo Jima. I will drop Giles and his aide, Chesley there too. It seems as if every time I leave Washington there is a crisis. I believe this can be handled by having LeMay establish following principles:

(a) LeMay has information not available in Washington and must make presentation to President.
(b) Strategic Headquarters must be established at once and all dillydallying about it stopped.
(c) Strategic bombing must be unhampered in its organization, administration, logistics and operations. It must have a free hand so as to drop the maximum bombs in the minimum time; that means Navy and Army must keep hands off.

Took off for Iwo Jima at 2:25, distance 745 miles. Rested; arrived at Iwo Jima at 5:40, circled until 6:00, landed 6:00. Iwo Jima an island 5 miles long, 2 miles wide at widest part, volcanic, now leveled off for aviation purposes with landing strips about 500 feet above sea level. Fifty miles to north and 50 miles to south, two lone peaks stick out of water about 3,000 feet. Steam comes up through the runways. Iwo has an extinct, not too extinct, volcano on the northeast end. Sulphur and fumes
come out of crater floor. A high hill, 2,000 feet, is located between crater and rest of island. Soil is volcanic, black. About 1,200 Japs lived there normally, raising sugarcane, harvesting sulphur and a plant from which they extract juice to make vanilla. Our Marines bumped into about 20,000 Japs with 3 Divisions and [we] lost 3,000 men killed. There are still Japs on Iwo in numbers up to 200 in caves, hiding in debris. Every once in a while they come out and get killed usually, but occasionally surrender. Last night 3 were killed.

Some time before, a few days ago, 6 came out and prepared to fight but seeing some of our Negroes (3) were so surprised, as they had never seen any before they surrendered. The Negroes searched the Japs again and again, found nothing but their pistols, took them. Then, not knowing what to do, took the Japs to the Negroes’ tent to feed them. There was nothing but canned goods. The Negroes tried to open the cans with a pocketknife but with no luck. After many failures, one Jap went deep inside his trousers and pulled out a knife a foot long and handed it to a group of 3 badly scared Negroes. The cans were then opened, the Japs fed and put in the compound.

We have made 3 landing fields on Iwo, we use them for 3 Groups of fighters and to save crippled B-29s.92 So far 1,299 crippled planes or planes out of gas have landed here. Of the 528 B-29s that went over to bomb Osaka today, 43 had to land at Iwo. Chaney is island CO, Moore is commanding troops.93 I decorated 6 men at a beautiful ceremony. They have a band and it is used most frequently. The last attack by the Japs was at the period of full moon; it seems they always come in during that period. It seems strange that the Japs do not make more determined effort to drive us out or at least to cripple our planes. Dinner, very good, with Moore; to bed at 10:30 after a very hard day.

Saturday, June 16, 1945 [Iwo Jima to Luzon, Philippine Islands]

Took off for Manila at 12:00 midnight, distance 1,560 miles; landed 7:25 A.M. Iwo Jima time, 5:25 Pacific time. Through a front; heavy, tropical rainstorm to the East coast of Luzon. Occasional glimpses of land then a break in the clouds [per-
mitting a view of Mt. Arayat; Pinatubo; Mariveles; Laguna de Bay; Corregidor; Manila Bay; City of Manila, or rather what was; Nichols Field; but little that I can remember of 29 years ago other than the same rain squalls and the rice paddies, tropical trees. Landing at Nichols before anyone knew we were coming; a trip in a jeep through the countryside while Tom was trying to get in touch with someone.

The old type of buildings are few and far between in the vicinity of Nichols, most everything has been destroyed, even the Nipa shacks knocked down and burned. Calesas and carronadatas, small stores with the usual bananas, a few papaya and the usual junk. Rode to Fort McKinley where I met George Kenney. He took me and my baggage to his house. Most of the modern and many of the native houses in and around Manila have been destroyed; that was not done by bombing but was wanton destruction by the Japs. Kenney lives in a house owned by Backarack; her husband as well as the help were machine-gunned by the Japs as they came out of the house. She was thrown out. Stratemeyer and Chuck Stone here at house.

Had meeting with my staff at 10:00 and outlined procedure for my stay: will call on MacArthur today, official call only; tomorrow will talk business with him at 5:00 P.M. Had trip through Manila, it is a shambles, all the old landmarks gone. Bridge of Spain, now called Jones Bridge, Manila Hotel, and Army-Navy Club completely gutted. Intramuros a wreck, old wall torn and battered, breached in spots. Manila streets and railroad cars all destroyed. Lunch with General and Mrs. MacArthur, back to Kenney’s house for rest at 3:00.

Apparent the atrocities by the Japs have never been told in the US: babies thrown up in the air and caught on bayonets, autopsies on living people, burning prisoners to death by sprinkling them with gasoline and throwing in a hand grenade to start a fire. If anyone tried to escape they were killed by machine guns as they came through the door. More and more of the stories, which can apparently be substantiated. There is no feeling of sparing any Japs here; men, women or children; gas, fire, anything to exterminate the entire race exemplifies the feeling. Stories of men and boys being killed while all girls
and women from ten years of age upward were raped by 1 Jap division retreating from this section of Manila. They are not pretty stories but they explain why the Japs can expect anything.

Believe that solution of problem of ending war by bombing is:

(a) Continue with plans and occupy Kyushu so as to get additional bases for 40 groups.102
(b) Press bombing attacks with B-29s and completely destroy Jap industries and major cities.
(c) Give priorities to B-29 attacks and Kyushu operation so as to step up bombing attacks.
(d) Make plans for complete destruction of Japan proper using B-29s from Marianas and Okinawa, heavy bombers and tactical planes from Kyushu and carrier-based planes to cover areas not completely effective by other planes.
(e) Give priorities and take off all administrative restrictions to bombing effort putting into much lower priorities all post-war activities.
(f) Continue plans for the main Japan [ese] effort by ground troops for landing on Honshu but keep it on a postponed basis.103

Rained hard in P.M. and at night, went to bed at 9:00.

Sunday, June 17, 1945 [Luzon, Philippine Islands]

Up at 6:45. Beautiful day with showers to the north but clear in all other directions. Usual noises from the Filipinos. I noticed yesterday crowds of Filipino children standing around company kitchens waiting to salvage any scraps left on the mess kits of the men. The most surprising thing is no bugs, few ants, mosquitoes, no scorpions or centipedes, all thanks to DDT.104 Breakfast with Stratemeyer, Chuck [Stone] and George [Kenney].

Worked after breakfast on message to JCS re bombing Japan into submission.

Joe Stilwell and Strat came down and we talked for about an hour over the unnecessary complicated system and unnec-
essenarily hard way to fight a war. Finished paper and took walk over place. Some beautiful flowers, papayas, mangoes, chicos, pineapples and avocados, an orchid house that the Japs did not keep up. Lunch and then a rest. As far as I can figure out it rains at night, in the morning or in the afternoon during the rainy season. There are showers with and without thunder and lightning but the air is hot, humid and almost suffocating and I sweat. Stilwell starts back to US tomorrow. Strat starts back to CBI tomorrow. Met Chief of Staff of Filipino Army. Tourtellot called.

Had long, spirited talk with General MacArthur:

(a) MacArthur is for a separate Air Force, including all air except that operated from strips, even including that supporting ground troops.
(b) He is willing to organize Army Air in Pacific along those lines now.
(c) He will be satisfied with either Kenney or Arnold as CG but not Spaatz.
(d) His logic is not quite clear unless I am in another league for he says that there cannot be two dominant characters in the Pacific like Kenney and Spaatz.
(e) He does not want a Supreme Commander.
(f) He says he is satisfied with JCS directive as to command.
(g) He resents Navy holding back on turning over Islands and supply system.
(h) He feels that Navy is building up a post-war organization and laying plans, completing facilities for such an organization now.
(i) He thinks that Navy gives a special course of instruction to all officers that insures loyalty to Navy first and anything else second.
(j) He knows that my Strategic Air Command organization is wrong. OK if I keep command, OK if Barney [Giles] is my Deputy, but 100% mistake if command goes to Guam.
(k) Believes that bombing can do lot to end war but in final analysis doughboys will have to march into Tokyo.
As far as moving his Headquarters to Guam for coordination and cooperation are concerned, the lid blew off. There was every reason why it should not be done, not one good reason for doing it.  

He did not understand our plan for employing B-29s in Japanese operations, destruction of 30 Jap cities and their industries, 200,000 tons [of bombs] a month to destroy targets in invasion area and 80,000 tons on invasion day. He liked it. [once it had been explained?]  

Can see no reason why we should not use gas right now against Japan proper; any kind of gas. Sees no reason for gassing Japs in by-passed areas.  

Was somewhat surprised at our B-29 build-up to maximum strength.  

Did not understand relationship of 20th Air Force to JCS, neither did Sutherland.  

He gets excited and walks the floor, raises his voice. I thought I was one of the few who did it.  

He recognizes the necessity for Army having its own supply system all the way through from the US.  

Sees Navy trying to take over Strategic Air Force and by so doing dividing Army and Air Force, and thus stopping a Department of National Defense with 3 equal subdivisons.  

Conference lasted 2½ hours; 1½ hours MacArthur and Arnold, 1 hour Sutherland and Kenney present. Home for dinner with Kenney, Strat and Stone; bed at 10:00.

Monday, June 18, 1945 [Luzon, Philippine Islands]

I did not accomplish all that I hoped with MacArthur; I did learn some of his ideas; he certainly holds his youthful appearance well.  

Okinawa will be under Navy control; MacArthur has only domiciliary rights. Naval Base Area commander will have power to clear all ships to Okinawa area, will thus control all priorities into the Island, and if Navy wants to go in for permanent construction as first priority as they have at all other
islands, Richardson believes that Okinawa must be Army-controlled in view of Army’s almost 100% interest. I agree that if we don’t there will be many troubles. Priorities must be made in accordance with necessities for prosecution of war. There must be a shipping and supply priority clearing board.

Conference with Stone, Combs, Kenney, Hutchison re air in PI [Philippine Islands]; everything was apparently ironed out OK. It looks best in view of the many restrictions to have one Air Depot and Supply System on Okinawa for both 20th Air Force and Kenney’s FEAF [Far Eastern Air Force]. Other matters were more easily adjusted. Told Strat that if he could not get Al Wedemeyer to find a place for the 10th Air Force I thought that we ought to turn it over lock, stock and barrel to Kenney. Did not as yet send wire re Negro units but believe that we must as there is no place for them here. Went out to Fort McKinley for press conference.

Same general terrain but most of the houses burned and destroyed, our house among those gone, only a few remain. No Filipino house boys or blue pants. Post Exchange destroyed, all by Japs; parade ground growing up with grass, almost a jungle. It is very hard to pick out landmarks.

Lunch with Kenney and then rest. After lunch had Gilmer for conference. He is of opinion that Staff here is not working together, will not accept any advice or suggestions (that burns OPD up), that the Air part of the command is the only one that works smoothly. Styer came and we talked over logistics. Query: “Will Okinawa be the same as Guam or Saipan?” Went down to say adios to MacArthur and was shown Nimitz answer to FEAF plan for coordinated bombing areas. Nimitz would have none of: (a) Kenney bombing ships; (b) Kenney operating ten miles off shore; (c) Navy not having first priority rights in Japan inland sea. May have to and probably will have to relieve Lynd, why not Gardner? Saw Smoak as Strat and Stone left.

Tuesday, June 19, 1945 [Luzon, Philippine Islands]

Up at 7:00, breakfast. To McKinley with Kenney, took photos of our old quarters at McKinley or what was left of them. Took off at 9:05, trip around Corregidor and El Fraile [Drum]. Corregidor badly battered. Results of bombing: disabled batteries,
destroyed facilities indicate how Kenney was able to have airborne troops take Island at small cost of life.\textsuperscript{122} Tunnel closed in and burial grounds for anywhere from 500 to 5,000 Japs.

On to Stotsenberg 60 miles from Manila.\textsuperscript{123} On route [sic] we passed over many planes Jap and US, wrecked in the rice paddies. At Stotsenburg there were at least 1,500 Jap planes in various stages of repair, disrepair and destruction all around the airport. To show the change in war conditions since 7 December 1941, our planes in larger numbers, wing to wing, stand unmolested by the Japs. Landed at 9:40, met by Kenney and Whitehead.\textsuperscript{124}

Many of the buildings at Stotsenburg have been destroyed; about $\frac{1}{3}$ of the quarters. I took a picture of the house Wainwright, Watson and McChord had; where I stayed when I came here in 1908 and '09.\textsuperscript{125} I am living in the quarters occupied by Colonel Millar in 1914 and 1915 where Bee and I stayed during our visit here when I was participating in maneuvers.\textsuperscript{126}

No Negritos few Filipinos of any kind.\textsuperscript{127} Halfway point of trip: 9,134 miles from San Francisco, 11,534 miles from Washington. Rest for 2 hours after lunch.

Took trip around Stotsenburg and secured better background for operations and logistics of Kenney's Air Forces. They have rules and techniques re placing and parking of airplanes that are unique and could not apply anywhere else, all based upon impotence of Jap Air Force: 4, 5, 6 fighters on one hard stand, planes almost wing to wing, about 1,000 planes now at Clark.

Took a trip to Mabalacat and saw the place where I lived and worked on mapping 37 years ago, the same church and (can't think of name of building) right next to church, large stone building with extra large rooms where we had our drafting rooms, lived and cooked our food.\textsuperscript{128} Back to Stotsenburg via Dow,\textsuperscript{129} railroad connection with main line.

Conference with Whitehead, Kenney and Whitey's top officers on all subjects. Freddie Smith stood out like a sore thumb.\textsuperscript{130} Had a hard time getting them to go home. Discussed:

(a) Air Commando Groups and their place in AF after war.\textsuperscript{131}

(b) General organization [of the military] after war.

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(c) Desirability of and the means of building up an AF society of 2,300,000 men who are now in Air Force.  

Went to bed at 10:00. Japs captured many AC [Air Corps] vehicles, gas trucks, cars and jeeps at Stotsenburg. Today the AC are using the same vehicles. The car I rode in all day yesterday had been captured by the Japs and is now being used by AAF, is in good condition.

Wednesday, June 20, 1945 [Luzon, Philippine Islands to Okinawa, en route to Guam]

Up at 5:00, said goodbye to Whitey. Kenney and McMullen in Kenney’s plane, my crew in mine. Took off for Okinawa at 6:25, distance 840 miles. Our time of arrival will be late as we are following Kenney’s B-17 which flies slower than our plane. Rested 3 hours; arrived Okinawa 10:25. Had an excellent view of islands as we approached.

Came in from South and saw Naval Patrol boats along South coast, all kinds of craft: BB, CVs, CLs, DDs and cargo ships along East and West coast. South section of island was war-swept and we could see artillery and bombs exploding. Japs are in a very small area about 2,000 by 1,000 yards. There are about 200,000, some say 400,000 Jap civilians on the Island. So far we have 2,500 Jap soldiers in cages. There are many Japs still at large, some are captured or killed in all parts of the Island every night. The [US] high command is about to announce all organized resistance is over.

General Buckner was killed while watching a tank attack on the South end of Island. There was but one piece of artillery that the Japs had. It was located a very short distance away, about 300 yards. The first shot hit a short distance away from Buckner, a fragment went through his chest.

General Post, Chief of Staff of 10th Army, met us at plane, so did General Woods, Marine Air Commander. We went to 10th Army Headquarters and met General Geiger and Admiral Hill. Talked over problems re getting airdromes in with least delay, and they need more engineers and Seabees, more ports and port facilities, more troops to unload, a more energetic policy from Base Commander, a message from Army
Commander to Nimitz. Most of these can be done; they will be taken up with Nimitz.

Met Bruce and visited his platoon; met his executive and enlisted men at his camp and various gun positions. Had a trip around island with him, then dinner at Headquarters 10th Army, a press conference. Then said goodbye to Kenney and McMullen. To the plane; said goodbye to Bruce and Post. Then a Jap air alert: flashes of guns, traces booming but Japs did not come near the island. Took off 10:55 P.M.

Thursday June 21, 1945 [En route to Guam]

Distance to Guam 1,500 miles. Arrived 5:40 A.M., 6:40 Guam time. Barney Giles and his aide met us; raining and continued to rain all day. Stopped with Barney and have been resting ever since. Had a teletype conversation with Larry Norstad in Washington and gave him a concentrated summary of ideas I collected on trip. Conference with Combs, Stone and Gilmer for meeting with Nimitz tomorrow. Dinner with Barney, Kuter, Lowell Thomas, Tom and __________. Movie, Dorian Gray.

Friday, June 22, 1945 [Guam]

Up at 7:00; conference with Nimitz, McMorris, Hill of Navy, Giles, Stilwell, Mandel, Combs of Army. When I made comments that

(a) There would be a backlog of 1,000,000 tons of shipping on Okinawa by September;
(b) There would not be sufficient bombs to carry out program for destruction of Japanese industry, pre-invasion bombing and support of invading army;
(c) The docks would not be completed to permit unloading of supplies;
(d) There were Seabees and Engineer battalions awaiting shipment to Okinawa;
(e) That the base there could take Engineers and Service troops as fast as they could be sent.

Nimitz's staff assured me that everything I said had been taken care of; Engineers and Seabees were being sent as rap-
idly as they were available, and etc. Accordingly I asked: (a) that a representative from Giles’s office go to Okinawa with Admiral______to get full and complete coordination and knowledge; (b) that a representative of Giles office sit in with Navy and make up a progress report periodically; (c) that the people at Okinawa be acquainted with what was going on. Nimitz agreed. He also agreed to use British Engineers, but did not want to have a special island for British operations. I told him that I would tell JCS: (a) British Engineers to go out at once if political heads said we must use RAF; (b) British Engineers be used in pool on Okinawa; (c) As Kenney’s air units moved forward British could use such airdromes as required and not needed by VHBs. Nimitz said OK if it had to be done.

I left our original directive for Strategic Bombers with Giles to bring up to date and conform with latest JCS directive re command in Pacific. Stilwell must have a new air officer, I suggest Jake Smart. Lunch with Stilwell and his staff, Giles and Lowell Thomas. Will take Lowell Thomas to San Francisco with us. Rest at 1:30, up at 3:00.

Shooting with Barney, Lowell Thomas, Shelmire with revolver; did very poorly. To Northwest Air Field to see B-29s return from missions. Four hundred eighty-four went out last night to hit aircraft factories in Japan; 4 were lost, 2 on take-off, 2 over target from phosphorous bombs. Targets were hit and destroyed according to crews I talked to. Those crews who hit targets, even after 15 hours of flying were not tired and their morale was high. Those that aborted, had engine trouble, did not get to target, were tired and morale was low. Cocktail party by Kuter, dinner and to bed at 10:00.

Saturday, June 23, 1945 [Guam to Eniwetok en route to Johnston Island]

Up at 6:30. Mike Scanlon [to be sent] home and retire; Lynd home and retire. Get some first class men to evaluate Japan, [such as] D’Olier. Strengthen:

(a) B-29 Depot representatives in Okinawa;
(b) Man on Stilwell’s staff, re Bentley;
(c) Men on priorities with Navy at Pearl to be replaced;
(d) Men to be with Navy on Guam for shipping and priorities.\textsuperscript{149}

Took off for Eniwetok at 9:10; Guam, distance 1,170 miles, landed 3:30 P.M. Guam time, 5:30 Eniwetok time. Distance 1,934 to Johnston.\textsuperscript{150} As we approached Eniwetok we passed 4 destroyers in line hunting for a sub that torpedoed but did not sink an LST; several cargo ships heading from Eniwetok to Guam, a large convoy. Within Eniwetok atoll, 20 miles in diameter, were 200 ships. Among others the LST that had been hit, apparently undamaged but had its steering gear out. We landed and took a tour of the island, 5 miles by \(\frac{1}{4}\), and then by speed boat among the ships where there is an anchorage for the fleets of the world. We stopped at a beach and had a swim, then to Captain Tugger's quarters where we had dinner, an excellent one.\textsuperscript{151} Back to the plane for a take-off at 8:35 P.M., Eniwetok time, 35 minutes late.

\textbf{Saturday, June 23, 1945 [Johnston Island to Honolulu, Hawaii]}

(All over again). Up at 6:15 Guam time. Quite cool in plane during night, needed quilt. Calm trip very few bumps. Check on development of homing devices, heat, metal, sound, etc. What is status of experiments?\textsuperscript{152} Landed at 7:00 A.M. Eniwetok time, 8:30 Johnston time. Johnston Island is 6,500 feet long and not over 700 feet wide at any point; a coral reef protects it from the sea. The island used to be but 4,000 feet long and has been built up by dredging. At present it has a complete complement of buildings.

Air evacuation patients come through and in emergency are held over. I talked to some held over due to 2 engines going sour; they came from Okinawa. ATC runs through, total 34 trips (both ways) every day. Will build up to 64 but mostly to the west. NAT [Naval Air Transport] runs through, about 18 a day total. Took off for Hawaiian Islands, 9:40, Johnston time; distance 820 miles or is it 720? Trip uneventful, scattered clouds. Rested from 12 to 1:30, Johnston W[ar] time. Passed several ships, some headed east, some west. Sighted Oahu at 1:30 Johnston time. Landed 1:40 P.M., Johnston time, 2:40 H.
I. (Hawaiian Islands) time. Met by Parker, Towers and Ruffner, Chief of Staff. Went to Richardson’s house to stay over night. Conference with Parker’s staff and then Richardson’s staff, Ruffner and G-4. Dinner with Parker, bed at 9:30.

Sunday, June 24, 1945 [Honolulu, Hawaii to Hamilton Field, California]

Up at 8:00, breakfast and then to Towers office for presentation. Nimitz is on West Coast for conference with King. Towers takes McCain’s place, Hoover takes Towers place. Press conference: gave talk from notes, mimeo distributed had a very bad statement re taking British Islands for bases. I asked the local PRO [Public Relations Officer] to pass on it before mimeographing and before distribution. He apparently did not read very well. After conference asked that all messages going out be censored and any objectionable matter be removed. Chief of Staff and PRO both agreed that such would be done. I should have read release prior to being mimeographed and distributed.

Lunch with Towers; rest for two hours. Ruffner came over with Nimitz’ disapproval of Giles request for: (a) Reception Center for replacement crews; (b) Headquarters for Strategic Air Forces. In view of port congestion and difficulties of getting supplies over beaches, limited space available on islands, possibility of not getting construction complete before either forward movement or completion, I agreed with Nimitz: (a) The Reception Center does not belong on Guam; (b) The Headquarters, Strategic Air Force, should be streamlined and not be so large, 250 officers, 1,500 enlisted men. The Headquarters must be cut down.

I wrote letter to Giles telling him to transfer Hickam to ATC, transfer a streamlined headquarters to Guam, transfer LeMay’s headquarters to Saipan, cut out the champagne and angel food and go back to beer and pretzels until the war is over. Gave copy of letter to Ruffner and original to Parker for delivery to Giles.

Dinner at Richardson’s house with Richardson’s staff and my staff. Arrived at plane 7:15, took off for San Francisco 7:25 p.m.,
Hawaiian time or 9:55 P.M. San Francisco War time; distance 2,450 miles, ETA 10:45, PWT; arrived Hamilton 10:40 PWT.

Postscript

If one of the main purposes of the trip had been to secure greater cooperation in support of the US bombing effort, the trip had to have been viewed a success although much of the credit belongs to others as well as Arnold. In contrast with his normal difficult relations with Admiral King in Washington, Arnold found Nimitz gentlemanly and cordial. He was agreeable, consistent with his other requirements, to most everything Arnold requested. Eaker’s biographer speaks of Nimitz’ agreement as “relaxed acquiescence.”159 It was also evident from the diary that part of Arnold’s partisanship was modified by his discovery that some of the AAF problems reaching Washington were the result of the AAF’s willingness to complain rather than taking action to resolve the difficulties. As was typical of Arnold, however, even with the war in Europe finished and some accommodation having been reached regarding Pacific operations, Arnold showed little inclination to relax or reduce his efforts towards ending the war.

Arnold does not mention in the diary that his arrival back in California was the morning of his 59th birthday. Mrs. Arnold, who had been visiting their daughter on the West Coast, had planned a celebration in Sonoma. To their disappointment, President Truman was in San Francisco for a celebration dinner acknowledging the signing of the United Nations charter, which was planned for the following day. Hap felt obliged to attend this official dinner instead of his birthday party. However, an abbreviated party was held for Hap the following day, before he enplaned for Washington.160

If this diary seemed to contain fewer entries about his surroundings than diaries from other trips, Arnold continued detailed observations about the places he visited in regular letters written to his wife while traveling. He particularly contrasted what he saw in these closing days of this war with what he and Bee had experienced together in peacetime Guam and the Philippines 30 years earlier.161
Planning for the upcoming Potsdam meeting, which would be attended by Truman, Stalin, and Churchill, was under way as Arnold hastened to Washington. There, he made preparations for the upcoming “Big Three” meeting and used his findings from this Pacific journey to instruct the Air Staff. He has left no comment on his health as a result of his travels although the fact that he had been on the road for 57 out of the previous 87 days suggests the return of some of his stamina as well as increased, albeit cautious, confidence in his recuperation since his January heart attack. As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, however, the robustness of his health remained in doubt.

The rapid pace of events following Arnold’s return to Washington on 26 June, together with Nimitz’ quick actions to remedy as many problems as possible, made moot many of the frustrations of the AAF in the Pacific. Arnold would be at the Pentagon for only two weeks following his return before leaving for the Potsdam conference and the onset of rapid changes that brought about the end of the war. The test atomic bomb was exploded only five days after Arnold left for Potsdam. This successful test was followed by a three-week hiatus before the first atomic bomb was dropped from a B-29 over Hiroshima. The Japanese agreement to surrender was announced eight days later. This unexpected chain of events meant that only seven weeks elapsed between Arnold’s return to California, ending this trip to the Pacific, and the final end of World War II.

Notes

2. Ibid., 7.
4. Craven and Cate, vol. 5, 123.
5. Ibid., 31.
7. Ibid., 37
8. Ibid., 37–38.
10. Craven and Cate, vol. 5, 35.
13. See LeMay’s lament, 368. “We couldn’t mount another incendiary attack for almost four weeks . . . No ammunition for the job . . . Apparently the Nimitz crowd thought that we were uttering an empty boast when we told them we’d be out of incendiaries.” The “fifth page” for priorities, (emphasis in the original) is at 340; see also 308. The rationing quote is from Thomas M. Coffey, *Iron Eagle: The Turbulent Life of General Curtis E. LeMay* (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1986), 173. See also Brig Gen Emmett O’Donnell Jr., to Arnold, 13 June 1945, the day Hap met with Nimitz: “We have been asked to forward anything that might be used in pushing your point with Adm Nimitz.” Emmett P. O’Donnell Papers, United States Air Force Academy (USAFA), Colorado Springs, Colo.
14. For Hansell’s legitimate disappointment in not having any explanation for his relief from Arnold, see Hansell to Kuter, 1 March 1945, Laurence S. Kuter Papers, USAFA, Colorado Springs, Colo.
18. Cited in Coffey, 166.
22. Weigley, 363. During a meeting with Truman the day Arnold departed for the Pacific on this trip, the secretary of war reported that he told the president he was “trying to hold the Air Force . . . to precision bombing but that with the Japanese method of scattering its manufacturers it was rather difficult to prevent area bombing.” Diary of Henry L. Stimson,

23. Arnold Diary, 13 June 1945.


25. Arnold Diary, 14 June 1945.


27. Sherry, 308–9.


29. Sherry, 306–13, contains his arguments: “flagging fortunes” is on 309; path to unconditional surrender” is on 251.


31. Cozzens, always a keen observer of wartime AAF Headquarters, has provided a description of LeMay that would ring familiar to many Americans over the next 20 years. On meeting the general on his arrival in Washington on 18 June, Cozzens noted him as “stocky, full-faced and dark. He had a dead cigar in his mouth . . . and he never moved it for three quarters of an hour, though talking around it well enough.” Cozzens, 18 June 1945, 307–8.

32. Sherry, 307; and FRUS Potsdam, vol. 1, 908.

33. For “did very well” see Cozzens, 19 June 1945, 308; LeMay OHI, cited in Coffey, 147; and LeMay, 175, 461. Also Maj Gen J. B. Montgomery, OHI, USAFA, Colorado Springs, Colo.

34. Quoted in Sherry, 345.

35. Fairfield-Suisan Army Air Field, midway between San Francisco and Sacramento, California, now Travis Air Force Base (AFB), was the continental terminus for AAF traffic to and from the Pacific.

36. Maj Gen C. R. Smith was just leaving active duty following three years AAF service, most recently as deputy CG of ATC. Before his entry into active military service he had been president of American Airlines. He returned as Chairman of the Board of that organization in June 1945.

37. The city of Winslow, Arizona, is approximately 50 miles east of Flagstaff; Meteor Crater is located approximately 20 miles due west of Winslow.

38. During the week, both Arnold and Marshall had testified before the House Appropriations Committee on the needs of the Army and AAF for fiscal year 1946.

39. Brig Gen William O. Ryan, CG, Pacific Division, ATC; Maj Gen Muir S. “Santy” Fairchild, member Joint Strategic Committee, JCS, on temporary duty as military advisor to the US delegation to the United Nations, San Francisco.
40. The founding conference of the United Nations met in San Francisco from 25 April to 26 June where its charter was drafted.

41. The ranch purchased by Arnold in 1943 was approximately three and one-half miles west of Sonoma on the south slope of the valley. Arnold spent most of the day making arrangements in anticipation of moving to this property where he and Mrs. Arnold lived after he retired in February 1946.

42. R. R. Emparan was the real estate salesman who handled the sale of the property to Arnold.

43. Arnold later purchased from his neighbor Morris approximately 9/10s of an acre adjacent to the eastern boundary of Arnold's ranch.

44. Duke was the gray mare with light-colored mane given to Arnold by Donald Douglas. The horse was ridden by Arnold and on rare occasions was hitched to a plow.

45. Sobre Vista was a large ranch nearby, where Arnold stayed during this visit. It was owned by Mrs. A. Rudolph (Alma) Spreckels, widow of the sugar magnate. Mrs. Spreckels had worked closely with Arnold during the war as president of the San Francisco League for Servicemen. Fat Jack's was a bar located on the town square in Sonoma in the Union Hotel. Jack Walton, the heavy-set proprietor, liked to spin yarns with the customers, particularly about former patrons of the bar such as writer Jack London. Neither the hotel nor the bar are extant.

46. These were men who had been hired by Arnold to work on the ranch.

47. Barbara Douglas was the daughter of Donald Douglas (Doug) of Douglas Aircraft. She and William Bruce Arnold, General Arnold's second son, were married in June 1944.


49. Brig Gen Charles B. Stone III, had been chief of staff for the Eastern Air Command in the CBI and was en route to that theater where he assumed command of the Fourteenth Air Force in July 1945; Col Cecil E. Combs, Office of the AC/AS Plans, Headquarters AAF; Col Dan Gilmer, USA, chief, Pacific Theater Section, Theater Group, OPD, War Department General Staff. All present at the dinner, except the Melins, accompanied Arnold on this trip to the Pacific.

50. Just prior to landing, Arnold “convened” his staff onboard and read a memo from Spaatz outlining the “MUSTS” for USASTAF (US Army Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific) success. Expecting opposition to some of them from Nimitz and MacArthur, Hap instructed the staff to analyze Spaatz’ list “to determine when and where not workable and who would object.” See Col Dan Gilmer to Gen H. A. Craig, 12 June 1945 in AP. Lt Gen Robert C. Richardson, USA, a class ahead of Arnold at West Point was CinC, Army Forces in the Pacific (CINCAFPAC), with headquarters in Hawaii; now a vice admiral, Arnold's old friend and sometimes nemesis John H. Towers, USN, was now deputy CINC, Pacific Fleet; Maj Gen James Parker, CG, AAF, Middle Pacific; Maj Gen Robert G. Breene, deputy CG, AAF Pacific Ocean Area (AAFPOA), with headquarters at Hickam Field, Hawaii; Brig Gen Kenneth P. McNaughton, would become assistant chief of staff for Personnel, US Army
Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific (USASTAF); Brig Gen Martin F. "Mike" Scanlon, was now CG, Air Command #2, Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific.

51. Little time was wasted and Arnold met at 10:30 less than four hours after arriving on the all-night flight from California with Richardson and staff at the latter’s headquarters. The bulk of Richardson’s 22 complaints raised in the meeting were directed against the Navy, typical among them “Nimitz giving preference to fleet requirements at Guam over AAF B-29s.” There would seem little doubt that Arnold was less than pleased over what appeared to be a gripe session in which the main topic was a litany of the perceived sins of the Navy with little initiative on the part of the Army officials to resolve them. Hap’s comment in his diary, “Richardson talks too much,” may well have been in contrast to the brief “staff” meeting Hap held on the airplane as it landed. The latter meeting with his staff probably struck Arnold as differing considerably with this extended “gripe” session with the Army staffs in Hawaii.

As indicated earlier in this chapter, one of the main purposes of this trip was for Arnold to meet with major commanders in the Pacific, specifically Nimitz and MacArthur, and attempt to secure equal representation for the AAF in the upcoming assault against the Japanese homeland. A JCS-directed reorganization of the Pacific command structure had taken place in April 1945. “By this directive MacArthur was designated Commander in Chief, Army Forces in the Pacific [CINCAFPAC], with control of all Army resources in the Pacific theater . . . all naval resources in the Pacific . . . were placed under Nimitz [as CINCPAC]. The JCS would normally charge CINCAFPAC with land campaigns and CINCPAC with sea campaigns and any exchange of units between these two was to be by mutual agreement.” General Richardson found that proximity to Nimitz’ Hawaiian headquarters made it difficult for him to be completely subordinate to MacArthur’s headquarters in Manila, 5,400 miles distant. The “brief” staff meeting in the airplane as it landed and the 10:30 briefing at Richardson’s headquarters are covered in Gilmer to Craig, 12 June 1945, AP. The quotes on the Pacific structure are from Craven and Cate, vol. 5, 682.

52. Vice Adm George D. Murray, USN, COMAIRPAC.

53. Adm Raymond A. Spruance, USN, commander, Fifth US Fleet; Adm Marc A. Mitscher, USN, commander, Task Force 58.

54. The famous American playwright along with the well-known actress accompanied Arnold to his aircraft to view his departure. While there, Miss Lawrence put her initials in lipstick on a paper plate which was placed on Arnold’s pillow on his bunk much to the amusement of the crew and passengers. Arnold was not totally impressed with the reactions relayed to him of these performers before American service personnel. In contrast to the good reception accorded Moss Hart, Gertrude Lawrence “tried to play down” to the GIs and her “semi-burlesque was a flop.” See Hap to Bee Arnold, 17 June 1945, Arnold Papers Ranch, hereinafter APR; and Arnold, Global Mission, 562.
55. Kwajalein is a coral atoll in the Ralik chain of the Marshall Islands.
56. Arnold was asleep as they passed the International Date Line and hence “lost” the 11th of June. He would “regain” a day when he returned on 23 June.
57. Brig Gen Ogden Ross, USA, Army Commander, Marshall–Gilberts; Rear Adm W. H. Harrill, USN, Navy Commander, Marshall–Gilberts; Capt Ben H. Wyatt, USN, commander, US Forces Kwajalein. The reference is to bantering and occasional serious disagreement on roles, missions, promotion opportunities, and aviation matters in general between Army aviators and Navy fliers assigned to Rockwell Field, North Island, and San Diego in the 1920s, in which Arnold had participated.
58. Eniwetok is a coral atoll, Ralik chain, Marshall Islands.
59. Saipan is a volcanic island, Marianas chain.
60. Lt Gen Barney McK. Giles, now CG, USASTAF; Maj Gen Curtis E. LeMay, now CG, XXI Bomber Command; Maj Gen Sanderford Jarman, USA, CG, US Forces Saipan until relieved on 24 May by Rear Adm Francis E. M. Whiting, USN; Brig Gen Emmett “Rosie” O’Donnell Jr., now CG, 73d Bombardment Wing operating B-29 aircraft against Japan from Isley Field, Saipan.
61. Rota is an island, Marianas chain.
62. Maj Gen Laurence S. Kuter, now deputy CG, AAFPOA. The reference is to Arnold’s 1913 stopover on Guam as a young lieutenant with his wife en route to his second tour of duty in the Philippines.
63. Col Horace W. Shelmire, an old friend going back to Arnold’s wedding days, had formerly served in Washington as Arnold’s special assistant and was now stationed at Isley Field, Saipan, with the 73d Bomb Wing.
64. This was a recent release with Judy Garland, James Gleason, Keenan Wynn, and Robert Walker; it was a story of romance by an overseas-bound soldier on a very brief furlough in New York City.
65. Tinian is a 39-mile-square island in the western Pacific, part of the Marianas chain, immediately southwest of Saipan, and was the main B-29 base complex in the final phases of the Pacific War.
66. The exchange of cables has not been located. Arnold’s account of the contretemps, written three years later in his memoirs states that Hap “thought better” of the idea of moving USASTAF to Manila and cabled Marshall that he should “tell the Navy” that AAF headquarters along with other B-29 units would be on Guam. He recalled the Navy’s attitude as “intolerable,” insisting that the Navy “would not countenance the War Department’s telling them where to locate” their headquarters. Arnold, *Global Mission*, 563–64. The reference is to Vice Adm Charles M. “Savvy” Cooke Jr., chief of staff to Admiral King.
67. Admiral Nimitz had established a forward operating headquarters on Guam in late January 1945.
68. Agana is the capital city of Guam where Arnold and his wife had stopped briefly en route to the Philippines in 1913.
69. Iwo Jima is the largest and most important of the Volcano Islands, and is where Arnold arrived the next day.

70. Vice Adm John H. Hoover, USN, commander, Forward Area, had headquarters on Guam.

71. Frank D’Olier, president Prudential Insurance Company, headed the US Strategic Bombing Survey that had recently assessed AAF bombing efforts in Europe. A copy of this preliminary report is in AP.

72. Rear Adm Forrest Sherman, USN, deputy chief of staff, CINCPAC; and Vice Adm Charles H. “Soc” McMorris, chief of staff, CINCPAC.

73. McMorris, from the AAF viewpoint was not only overly partisan but ill-mannered as well. Even the ever-rude Admiral King found it necessary to instruct Nimitz that the Secretary of the Navy directed that McMorris “should have as little to do with visitors as possible.” E. B. Potter, Nimitz (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976), 383.

74. As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, Spaatz, recently promoted to four-star rank, would arrive in July as CG, USASTAF, with headquarters on Guam. The plan was for his command to gain the Eighth Air Force, which was moving from England to the Pacific, joining the Twentieth Air Force already in operation against the Japanese.

75. Brig Gen Frederick von H. Kimble, CG, US Forces Tinian. In the typescript for this citation as well as those later in the narrative, Arnold spelled the name Kimball.

76. The meeting with Maj Gen James E. Chaney, CG, US Forces Iwo Jima, may have been strained for both Hap and General Chaney, given their previous association, which dated from 1942 and is outlined in chap. 3 of this work. Chaney, a year behind Arnold at West Point, was an example of a senior officer who failed to live up to Arnold’s expectations and suffered as a result, in terms of advancement.

77. The reference is to Spaatz becoming CG USASTAF.

78. Of this meeting, Nimitz’ biographer has written, without providing a source, “Arnold barged into CINCPAC headquarters and repeated the complaints to Nimitz of LeMay about Nimitz hampering operations of LeMay’s XXI Bomber Command.” Both Nimitz’ biographer and Arnold agreed that the meeting became a very harmonious one with Nimitz “very agreeable” to every suggestion Arnold made. As Hap recalled in his autobiography, “After this conference with Admiral Nimitz, it finally dawned on me that most of the Air Force problems . . . were a result of junior officers’ magnifying something of relative unimportance and making it a great matter.” Potter, 382–83; Arnold, Global Mission, 565–66. LeMay recounts his difficulties with the Navy in this matter in his Mission With LeMay, primarily 340–79.

79. The reference is to two B-29 wings then operating from Tinian. The 58th, commanded by Brig Gen Roger M. Ramey was flying from West Field; the 313th, led by Brig Gen John H. “Skippy” Davies had been flying from North Field since 24 December 1944. Arnold may well have visited these units briefly.
80. The 314th Bomb Wing had been operating its B-29s from North Field, Guam, since 16 January 1945 under command of Brig Gen Thomas S. Power.

81. The 315th Bomb Wing’s B-29s had arrived at Northwest Field, Guam from their previous station at Peterson Field, Colorado, on 5 April 1945 under the command of Brig Gen Frank A. Armstrong, another combat veteran of the Eighth Air Force in Europe. Their B-29s were equipped with the new AN/APQ-7 Eagle radar that had been developed specifically for bombardment instead of the existing radar whose main purpose was navigation. Additionally, their relatively late arrival in the theater had allowed for extensive training in the US in night operations. They began combat operations later that month probably as a result of Arnold’s “keen interest.”

82. Arnold’s superstition concerned naming an aircraft for a living person. The New York Times provided an account of the christening of the B-29 “Fleet Admiral Nimitz” with Arnold quoted as praising Nimitz at the ceremony: “This base [Guam] created in such a short time, is another manifestation of the support Admiral Nimitz has given and is giving to make strategic bombing a success out here in the Pacific.” The NYT account of 18 June 1945 was based on an Associated Press dispatch that erroneously gave the date of the ceremony as 18 June 1945, when Arnold was in the Philippines. The aircraft belonged to the 501st Bombardment Group commanded by Col Vincent M. Miles Jr., at Northwest Field, Guam. Nimitz apparently did not share Arnold’s superstitions for he sent out “his own painter . . . to decorate the aircraft with his name and five-star flag.” After the christening ceremony, the admiral presented the Group commander with the five-star insignia, and “a case of beer and bottle of Haig and Haig [Scotch whiskey] for the crew to celebrate with later.” There is a picture of Nimitz looking out of the aircraft from the copilot position in Steve Birdsall, Saga of the Superfortress: The Dramatic History of the B-29 and the Twentieth Air Force (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1980), 271, which is the source of the quotes.

83. Arnold meant the newly issued movie The Corn is Green featuring Bette Davis and Nigel Bruce that detailed an English schoolmaster’s difficulties in bringing education to a Welsh mining village.

84. Brig Gen Roger M. Ramey commanded the B-29 equipped 58th Bomb Wing at West Field, Tinian, where they had operated since 29 March 1945. Arnold meant India, where the 58th had operated before moving to Tinian.

85. Lt Gen Barton K. Yount, a classmate of Arnold’s at West Point, was now CG, AAF Training Command, then visiting the Pacific to assess the results of his command’s efforts.

87. The contrast was made first with the 16 B-25s that had taken off from the aircraft carrier *Hornet* on 18 April 1942 under the command of then Lt Col James H. Doolittle in the first American aircraft raid against the Japanese home islands since the war began. Arnold also contrasted this raid with the progress that had been made in B-29 operations since their first attacks in June 1944.

88. Although Marshall’s cable is not located, it set in motion a flurry of activity resulting in LeMay’s hurried trip to Washington. See note 90 and Postscript.

89. Col Harry Chesley was Giles’s aide.

90. The “crisis” was the call of President Truman to meet with the JCS on 18 June “to discuss details of the campaign against Japan” at which “he expects to be thoroughly informed of our [JCS] intentions and prospects.” The president intended to “make decision of campaign with purpose of economizing to maximum extent possible in loss of American lives” with “economies in time and money . . . comparatively unimportant.” Arnold immediately cabled instructions to his staff that Marshall felt the meeting would be “our opportunity to have our day at court.” Arnold’s priorities included establishment of USASTAF “free from interference and hindrances of all kinds,” obviously meaning the US Navy, threat of poison gas use against the Japanese homeland, and the use of psychological warfare. See cables, all undated, Giles to Arnold, Arnold to Marshall, Arnold to Eaker, Anderson, and Norstad, AP. Also Norstad to Kuter, 20 June 1945, Kuter Papers. Craven and Cate, vol. 5, 710–11, has brief coverage; Grace Person Hayes, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982), 706–7. Arnold offers less in *Global Mission* than his diary provides, 566–67. See also Introduction and Postscript to this chap.

91. The volcano did not play any significant role in the struggle for the island.

92. Called North, South, and Central fields.

93. Brig Gen Ernest “Mickey” Moore, CG, Seventh Bomber Command. Different from other diary entries, Arnold failed to mention who met him on landing at Iwo Jima where General Chaney was commander. Curious that CG Chaney was not listed as present at dinner that night on the island, possibly a reflection of their strained relations dating from Arnold’s visit to England, outlined in chap. 3 of this work.

94. Mount Arayat, 3,350 foot peak about 15 miles due east of Clark Army Air Field, Angeles, Luzon, Philippines; Mount Pinatubo, 1,759-foot-high volcano in the Cabusilian chain, 30 miles west of Clark; Mariveles is a town at the southern end of the Bataan peninsula; Lagune de Bay is a fresh water lake just southeast of Manila; Corregidor is an island in Manila Bay, just west of the city of Manila. Nichols Field is the military airfield just south of Manila.

95. Nipa leaves from the strong palm trees native to the Philippines were used in some construction.
96. These were light, animal-drawn carriages commonly used on the islands at this time.
97. Fort McKinley was a military installation five miles east of the city of Manila. This was not their first meeting of the year, Kenney having visited the convalescing Arnold in Miami, Florida, in March 1945.
98. Neither the house nor the family is otherwise identified.
99. Lt Gen George E. “Strat” Stratemeyer, now CG of India-Burma Sector and Air Advisor to the CG of the CBI theater. Among the topics discussed was command of the AAF in China. On that day, Arnold requested that Wedemeyer replace Chennault with Stratemeyer, an action that resulted in Chennault’s resignation from the service. Stratemeyer left for China the next day. See Craven and Cate, vol. 5, 270–71.
100. The Bridge of Spain was the westernmost span across the Pasig River in Manila; the Manila hotel was a five-story concrete luxurious hostelry just south of the Pasig River adjacent to the South Port area. MacArthur lived in its penthouse in the prewar period. The building had suffered serious damage during the struggle for the city. The Army-Navy Club, frequented by several generations of American officers, was located nearby. See the brief account of this destruction provided by Arnold in his letter to Bee, 17 June 1945, APR.
101. Intramuros was the walled, some 40 feet thick, oldest section of Manila just south of the Pasig River, site of many Philippine government buildings. It was the object of devastating artillery fire and destruction in late February 1945.
102. JCS strategic planning, to which Arnold had earlier contributed, as of 25 May 1945 called for initial landings on the Japanese homeland to be made on Kyushu, the southern-most island on 1 November 1945. This operation was codenamed Olympic at this time.
103. Landings on the main Japanese home island of Honshu, codenamed Coronet, were planned for 1 March 1946, but Arnold’s belief in the efficacy of bombing convinced him that this invasion would not be necessary or at least postponed except for continuation of planning.
104. DDT was the chlorinated hydrocarbon with anti-insecticidal properties that had been discovered by the Swiss scientist Paul Muller in 1939 and was widely used at this time, including heavy spraying of over 200 landing areas. Its use is now prohibited in most communities.
106. Chicos are the fruit of the sapodilla tree.
107. Maj Gen Basilio J. Valdes was the Philippine Army Chief of Staff.
108. Brig Gen George P. Tourtellot, CG, 85th Fighter Wing, Fort McKinley.
109. Since the forward operating headquarters of Nimitz had been moved to Guam in January 1945, it was being considered at the JCS level that MacArthur's be moved to that same location from Manila. The latter was never accomplished.
110. If MacArthur now seemed to favor any degree of independence for a land-based Air Force, it marked a very different viewpoint from his thinking as Army Chief of Staff in the thirties. Then it was presumably MacArthur's idea to permit creation of a General Headquarters Air Force (GHQAF), which was to report to and be subject to control by the General Staff, aimed in large part at throwing a bone to the advocates of a separate Air Force. See Arnold biography sketch in vol. 1 of this work.
111. Brig Gen David W. Hutchison, CG, 308th Bomb Wing. This unit had operated from the Philippines since October 1944 and had arrived on Okinawa just two days earlier where its P-38 aircraft could aid in the defense of the island and provide escorts for B-29s operating against Japan.
112. This depot was then in the process of being constructed and was commanded by Brig Gen Orval R. Cook when the war ended.
113. Tenth Air Force, commanded by Maj Gen Howard C. Davidson, was then headquartered at Piardoba, India, and would move to Kunming, China, by 1 August to cooperate with the Fourteenth Air Force against the retreating Japanese forces in China.
114. Cable is not located and the reference is not clear. Arnold, although clearly opposed to use of Negro troops in AAF units in 1940, by now had changed his mind. See for example his August 1945 order to his commanders to “take affirmative action to insure that equality in training and assignment opportunity is provided all personnel”; quoted in Morris J. MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, US Army, 1981), 274–81.
115. The reference to "our house" probably is to that occupied by Arnold and his wife during his second tour there in 1913. Blue pants were the distinguishing clothes worn by servants of the American military in the Philippines. Arnold had noted this during his earlier tours there.
116. Lt Gen Wilhelm D. Styer, USA, now CG, US Army Forces, Western Pacific. Japanese resistance on Okinawa would end formally three days after this diary entry and Arnold was apprehensive about logistical command and control problems, which had arisen earlier in areas under the control of the US Navy.
117. The Nimitz communication not located.
118. Maj Gen William E. Lynd, director, Air Evaluation Board, Southwest Pacific area. General Kenney shared Arnold's opinion of this officer; see Kenney to Arnold, 9 July 1945, AP. Maj Gen Grandison Gardner, former CG, Air Proving Ground, was now assigned to the US Strategic Bombing Survey. As indicated elsewhere, Arnold continued to consider which senior officers who, although performing valuable wartime service, would be superfluous in a smaller postwar Air Force. On the basis of his own estimates, buttressed by
the written evaluations of his major commanders, he was directing the retirement of some senior officers. Even his West Point classmate, Lt Gen Barton K. Yount, was not spared the strong “suggestion” that he retire. As a consequence, Lynd, Gardner, and Yount all retired within the year.

119. Major Smoak had been an aide to General Arnold in Washington prior to her reassignment in early 1945. Her current duties and assignment are unknown.

120. Arnold had been stationed at Fort McKinley twice in his career, the first time from 1907 to 1909 and the second from 1913 to 1915, just after his marriage. Upon visiting his former quarters, Arnold found only the front steps and foundation of the 1907–1909 building still remaining.

121. El Fraile, the small island fortress seven miles south of Corregidor with walls more than 25 feet thick, was finally captured by the US 38th Division on 13 April 1945.

122. The 317th Troop Carrier Group dropped the US Army’s 503d Parachute Regiment at very low altitude on Corregidor on 16 February 1945.

123. Stotsenberg was part of Clark AFB, abandoned in the 1990s by the USAF.

124. Just promoted to Lt Gen, Ennis C. Whitehead was CG, Fifth Air Force.

125. Four young lieutenants, all West Point graduates, had lived together during Arnold’s first posting to the Philippines. Lt Gen Jonathan M. Wainwright, USA, class of 1906, was still a prisoner of the Japanese; Maj Gen Edwin M. “Pa” Watson, class of 1908, had been before his death in February 1945, FDR’s military aide; Col William C. McChord, a 1907 classmate of Arnold, had been killed in a 1937 aircraft accident; McChord Army Air Field, Tacoma, Washington, now McChord AFB, had been named for him in 1940.

126. Col Millar and his quarters are not otherwise identified.

127. The dwarflike Aetas Negroid were thought to have been the original inhabitants of the Philippines.

128. Mabalacat is a town, northeast edge of Clark; the specific buildings are not identified.

129. Dow is a town, eastern edge of Clark.

130. Brig Gen Frederick Harrison Smith Jr., CG, Fifth Fighter Command, fulfilled Arnold’s expectations when he became a four-star general in 1959.

131. In the China–Burma–India theater, an air commando force had operated under Cols Philip Cochran and John Allison to support Brig Gen Frank D. Merrill and his “Merrill’s Marauders” as well as Maj Gen Orde Wingate and his “Chindits.” The air commando unit, a self-sufficient, multipurpose force, normally utilized transport, glider, observation, liaison, helicopter, fighter, and medium bomber aircraft. See the discussion of their operations in March 1944 in northern Burma in Craven and Cate, vol. 4, 503–95. While the Air Commandos title was retained to refer to US Air Force special units in the postwar period the scale and cost of the original organization was later deemed too expensive to be maintained at its wartime level. The recent accession by the US Air Force Academy Library, of the papers of
Col Curtis Enloe, USAF, Retired, a surgeon assigned to commando units during this period, should provide additional insight into their operations.

132. The organization became the Air Force Association.
133. Maj Gen Clement E. McMullen, CG, Far East Service Command.
134. Standard US Navy abbreviations for ships: BB, battleship; ACV, aircraft carrier; CL, light cruiser; DD, destroyer.
135. The next day it was announced that all organized resistance on Okinawa had ended.
136. Buckner was killed on 18 June on Okinawa.
139. US Navy Construction Battalions were familiarly known as Seabees.
140. Arnold’s second son, William Bruce, was serving as a first lieutenant in the 834th Antiaircraft Battalion of the Seventh Division on Okinawa.
141. Maj Gen Lauris Norstad, AC/AS Plans, AAF Headquarters, also served as chief of staff of the Twentieth Air Force commanded by Arnold. Although no copies have been located of their communications, they probably concerned problems and operations of the B-29, which this trip had illuminated.
142. The Picture of Dorian Gray was a 1945 release, with George Sanders, Donna Reed, Angela Lansbury, and Peter Lawford, based on Oscar Wilde’s novel about a young man who retained his youth while his portrait aged.
143. Probably Brig Gen Harold C. Mandell, USA, assignment at this time unknown.
144. Admiral Nimitz carried out his promise. Less than three weeks later, General Kenney wrote Arnold: “Thanks to your intercession with Admiral Nimitz, the arrival of engineer units into Okinawa has been speeded up tremendously.” Kenney to Arnold, 11 July 1945, AP.
145. This is another example of the reluctance of the US Army and Navy leadership (including Arnold) shown at the Quebec Conference of September 1944 and elsewhere for the British to have a significant role in the operations in the Pacific war.
146. The directive is not located. Recently released as a prisoner of war by the Germans, Col Jacob Smart was assigned instead as Secretary of the Air Staff in Washington.
147. The Japanese had utilized aircraft-launched bombs filled with white phosphorous against American bombers since 1944. The numbers recorded by Arnold here are different from Combat Chronology, page 666, which lists only 292 B-29s on raids this date against Japanese targets.
148. Probably William C. Bentley Jr., AAF officer, rank and assignment unknown.
149. The reference to men on priorities referred to those AAF officers serving with Nimitz’ staff in Hawaii where priorities were determined for the
materiel shipped to the Pacific, particularly to areas where AAF Very Long Range bombers were operating. As the text indicates, Arnold was not satisfied that high enough priority had been given in the past to items required by the AAF and replacing the current personnel, particularly given the spirit of cooperation promised by Nimitz, might achieve different results.

150. Johnston Island, southwest Pacific, was about 700 miles southwest of Hawaii.

151. Capt R. Tugger, USN, was commander, US Forces Eniwetok.

152. These experiments were being conducted at various AAF laboratories.

153. Brig Gen Clark L. Ruffner, USA, chief of staff, USAFICPA.

154. This was a one-day meeting where King informed Nimitz that President Truman had approved operation Olympic, the proposed Allied landing by 1 November on the Japanese home island of Kyushu. Nimitz was also informed of JCS approval of Operation Coronet, which proposed following Olympic by landings on Honshu by 1 March 1946.


156. Although the press release was not located, the controversy probably arose because of Arnold’s quote on page 1 of the New York Times of 25 June 1945, that Okinawa would be used as an AAF B-29 base. This could prove disconcerting to the British, who had been urging that their shorter range Halifax and Lancaster bombers should be used to bomb Japan, a prospect not encouraged by Arnold or any of the JCS.

157. The reception center was proposed for new aircrews coming into the theater.

158. Letter not located.


160. Arnold to Bruce Arnold, 6 July 1945, APR; Arnold to Sgt Joseph Trovato, 2 July 1945, AP, thanking him for the “grand birthday cake” the sergeant had baked.

161. Hap to Bee Arnold, 9, 13, 17 June 1945, APR.
Chapter 12

**Paris and Germany**

10 July–30 July 1945

**Introduction**

The impetus for Arnold’s final World War II trip abroad came when President Truman continued Roosevelt’s practice of having the JCS accompany him to major diplomacy/strategy meetings. Hap had been back at his desk in Washington for only two weeks following his Pacific trip when he set out to meet with Truman, Churchill, Stalin, and the CCS at Potsdam for what became the last major wartime conference. It had been three months since the surrender of Germany and with a new president in the White House, it was deemed important to meet with the Soviets and British on a variety of problems dealing with occupied Europe. Even more significant was the question of Soviet redemption of the promise made at Tehran, and made more specific at Yalta, to enter the war against Japan within three months after the surrender of Germany, which had occurred two months earlier. The leaders of the three major Western Allied nations also needed to discuss other important issues as they met in the bombed ruins of what had been the Nazi capital.

As discussed in chapter 11, President Truman had convened a meeting of the JCS on 18 June to question whether or not the casualties anticipated in the invasion of Kyushu planned for 1 November were acceptable. In effect, he was raising with his military leaders the issue of the ongoing strategic air offensive against Japan. Most probably because of his health, Hap sent Major General LeMay to attend the session but, for reasons not altogether clear, Lieutenant General Eaker, rather than LeMay, represented the AAF at the meeting.

The conclusion reached at this meeting between the new president and the JCS—that the planning for the 1 November invasion of the southernmost home island of Kyushu should
continue—could not have encouraged Arnold to believe that others of the JCS embraced the AAF concept of strategic bombardment. His fresh perspective on the air war over the Japanese home islands could prove valuable, however, as the Allied leaders and the CCS prepared for the Potsdam Conference; he was the only member of the CCS who had recently traveled extensively in the Pacific.

Arnold used the five days after leaving Washington and before the first session in Potsdam in a variety of relaxing as well as productive ways. A brief fishing trip in Newfoundland with his friend George Marshall en route to Europe, which would be repeated on the return journey, allowed some temporary respite from the demands of war. During his 24 hours in Paris, he met with the new AAF leaders who had replaced his friends Spaatz and Eaker as the senior air commanders in Europe. In these discussions, the AAF Chief shared details of the planning in Washington and at the same time emphasized the AAF’s need to look beyond the current problems of an occupying force and to consider and plan for what lay ahead, emphasizing the role of research and scientific development. Arnold’s concern for the future was reflected in the fact that the three generals who accompanied him on this trip to Potsdam were all from his Pentagon planning staff.

In his limited time for sightseeing, Hap revisited some of the Parisian sites he had seen during his April trip there as well as others he had not viewed since his weeklong stay at the end of World War I. This brief interlude on French soil was long enough, however, to rekindle his Francophobic feelings. Arnold observed that the French were “floundering and need leaders,” since “DeGaulle hasn’t shown much so far.”

Views from the air and on the ground as he traveled in Germany reconfirmed Hap’s strong impressions of the destruction brought by the Allied air attacks, although he seemed naively surprised by the extent of the routine activities carried on by this populace, which had been subjected to incessant bombing. The possibility of a last-ditch German stand in the Bavarian Alps, centering on Hitler’s retreat at Berchtesgaden, had been seriously considered in Washington during the last months of the European war. Arnold therefore took advantage
of the weekend before the convening of the formal Potsdam meetings to spend two restful days in the area, visiting Hitler’s retreat and the countryside. Arnold was not the only high-level curious American—both Secretary Stimson and General Marshall visited the redoubt and its environs before returning to Washington.¹

An uneventful flight to Berlin, accompanied by his artillery officer son Hank, who had been permitted to join his father, brought them to the German capital where preparations continued for the summit. In between negotiating sessions in suburban Potsdam, there was ample time to travel in and around the capital city, often accompanied by Marshall and others. Arnold’s disdain for the French and the Italians was now extended to include Soviet troops, then the most visible force occupying Berlin. He recorded his pessimism about the future of Germany, which was exacerbated by what he saw of the looting of industries and homes by Soviet troops along with his perceived avarice of the French co-occupiers.

As had been the case in his previous accounts of high-level diplomacy/strategy meetings, Arnold rarely committed any significant details to his diary about topics under discussion in the JCS or CCS. Much of the explanation furnished in earlier chapters seems applicable here, including Hap’s confidence in his accompanying staff to resolve the issues or refer AAF problems to the Pentagon. He continued to rely on the British-American secretariat to record and later print a classified account of the deliberations. As was the case when the Tehran conference had been held in an area under Soviet control, Arnold remained concerned about the security of his jottings and the possible compromising of sensitive material. It is not clear what additional measures, if any, he used to protect the security of the diary since no one else was aware that he was maintaining this record. The notebook in which he entered these impressions was two-by-three inches, small enough to have been retained safely in his buttoned shirt pockets. Nevertheless he remained circumspect and aware of security needs, on several occasions deliberately entering clearly erroneous or deceptive material to confuse any unwelcome readers. Primarily because of these concerns, this part of his diary regrettably offers only the barest
outline of Arnold’s thinking as well as the thoughts of others at Potsdam in their deliberations about the use and potential of the atomic bomb.

The first such discussions at Potsdam with Arnold about the new weapon (he had been informed all along of its development) took place on Sunday night, 15 July, shortly after his arrival in the German capital and the day before the first test bomb was exploded in the New Mexico desert. News of the success of this explosion did not arrive at Potsdam until two days later, at which time Secretary of War Stimson, whose confidence in Arnold had increased throughout the war, consulted Hap about potential use of the new device. Arnold deferred his response until he could obtain more information and a recommendation from the on-site Pacific air commander, Gen Carl Spaatz.

Fresh from directing the AAF strategic effort against Germany, Spaatz enjoyed Hap’s full confidence and had just arrived on Guam to lead the continuing aerial assault against Japan. The possibility of atomic bomb use had been discussed in Washington and Spaatz arrived with, as he had requested, written orders. Further security considerations probably motivated against his confiding to his journal whatever recommendations Spaatz provided or what Arnold himself suggested to Stimson. It is disappointing to the historian, in view of the significance of the bomb in ending the war and the subsequent debate over its use, that his concern for the safety of his writings prevented Arnold from leaving a more complete account of his thinking and the role he played as well as the discussions of others on this subject.

Eisenhower had commented to Hap two months earlier, as the war in Europe seemed to be ending, that he was tired and that the conflict had taken a great deal out of him. Arnold probably felt much the same on this journey. Although he recorded little about his own attitude or mental state, the diary covered by this chapter does not seem to reflect the same enthusiasm, emotional pitch, and occasional intensity that some of the previous diaries conveyed. His recorded feelings appeared to be more of relief and resignation, if not nonchalance, about the prospects of the war finally ending. This is hardly surprising since almost four years of demanding
wartime leadership and numerous trips abroad had taxed his energies and contributed to four heart attacks.

The future of the United States, the nature of the peace that now seemed within the grasp of the Allied leaders, and the role and structure of the AAF, which he had led for almost seven years, remained as unclear as were his personal prospects. There is little doubt, however, that he spent some time during this trip pondering what lay ahead as he looked forward, after having worn the US Army uniform for 42 years, to a less hectic work schedule and a leisurely retirement. His discussions with his colleagues revealed a similar weariness on their part. He was increasingly anxious to repair to the Sonoma, California, ranch he had owned and fussed over since the second Cairo conference almost two years earlier. His enthusiasm for the place and the prospects of pleasant living there had been enhanced by his recent visits while en route to and from the Pacific. He would announce his decision to retire less than two months after the final end of the war.

He still appeared to record in his journal much of the minutiae of what he saw. He continued to note in some detail the activities of the conference and his travels, leaving the official accounts of the deliberations of the meetings to the secretariat. It is interesting that he now included the Soviets as well as the French in his disdain, enhanced by what he viewed as the greed, ignorance, and lack of discipline of the Soviet troops. At the same time, his Anglophobia seems to have been somewhat lessened. Clearly, the approach of the war’s end and his generally successful relationship with most of the Allied leaders were important in altering his outlook. There is little doubt that Hap’s dealings with Churchill, extending over four years through private meetings and dinners along with strategy conferences, had been cordial. There appeared some uneasiness tinged with regret in Arnold’s recording in his journal that the Prime Minister, in the midst of the Potsdam meetings, had been defeated in the British election of Clement Attlee and his Labor Party—the “radicals,” as Hap labeled the victors.

He recorded no comment on the few German people he encountered during his first, albeit very limited, contact with them in their country, now devastated in large part by American
airmen implementing Arnold’s desideratum of strategic bomb- ing. The historian is denied any Arnold comments on the strik- ing differences between FDR’s demeanor, actions, and attitudes in the Allied conferences and those of the new president, Harry Truman, as Hap continued his circumspect practice of not com- menting in writing about his commander in chief.

The Diary

TERMINAL CONFERENCE
July 10, 1945–July 30, 1945
GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD

Tuesday, July 10, 1945 [Washington, D.C.]

Trip delayed by thunderstorms until T. O. [takeoff] time of 12:00 midnight. A cold front along course with thunder- storms.

Wednesday, July 11, 1945 [Washington, D.C., to Mingan, Que- bec, Canada, and Paris, France]

Took off at 11:50 P.M. for Mingan,4 1,026 miles from Washing- ton; Argonaut IV, normal crew with Dice, skipper; General Marshall, General Hull, General Norstad, General Cabell, General Jamison, Colonel Rusk, Captain Shepley,5 Major Sheffield, and yours truly. Arrived Mingan at 4:20 A.M., everyone up at 4:00, not much sleep. Met at plane by Colonel “Pop” E. P. Kern,6 breakfast at club, dressed for fishing at Kern’s house.

Weather good; auto to town of 3007 people and then up Min- gan River in canoe with outboard. One hour up river to Lodge on Island where falls is located, $1,000.00 [sic] per rod [nor- mal cost?] for fishing. We did not get a strike, although it was an excellent pool at bottom of falls and Salmon jumping all around. Back to Mingan and had a 3 hour rest.
Marshall’s plane came in. We lost from our passenger list Marshall, Hull and Shepley; we gained Cabell, Stone and Woodward. Dinner at 7:00 and took off for Paris at 8:20 P.M., EWT [Eastern War Time], distance 2,500 miles. Cold, almost like winter, to bed 9:20.

Thursday, July 12, 1945 [En route to Paris, France]

Took off 8:20 EWT, 12:20 PWT [Paris War Time]; cold and fairly calm, good night for sleeping. Up at 10:20 PWT; reached Brest peninsula at 12:00 PWT. Very few evidences of war except destruction at Brest and St. Malo. An occasional bridge out and bomb craters where there were important road junctions, railroad crossings, supply points in woods, airports. Rest of France between Brest and Paris looks as it always did: fields cultivated, cattle grazing, churches and cathedrals, small towns, boats in harbors. Landed 2:35 P.M., PWT, should be 4:35, there seems to be difference of 6 hours. Landed at Orly; Cannon, Bevans, Hoag present at field. Drove to Hotel Raphael. Not much change in France since my last visit; the French are still floundering and need leaders. They are suffering from an inferiority complex; want to be a big nation but have few if any of the attributes of a big nation. De Gaulle hasn’t shown much so far. French women and men, slave labor and POWs coming back with Polish, German, Russian children; Paris will certainly get some new blood; taken with the American, it can’t help but improve the French race.

A snack lunch and then a drive to Les Invalides; it was closed. We got in and then couldn’t get out. Finally appealed to the keeper to open up gate and let us out. Then Tom [Sheffield] got the idea to have them open up Napoleon’s tomb and give us a private tour. The French dame, upon hearing who we were, Sheffield, Dean, Norstad and me, told of having harbored, sheltered 22 of our airmen who had parachuted down, was caught by the Germans and with her husband put in concentration camp. Then took her key and opened up the Invalides. We had a private tour, all through the building and thru the holy of holies of the tomb. She showed us where the Germans had broken off pieces of bronze figures, marred and
marked the tomb, taken the key to the lower level where the tomb itself stands. Back to hotel, dinner at 8:30, [still day] light at 10:30, in bed at 11:00.

Friday, July 13, 1945 [Paris, France to Salzburg, Austria to Berchtesgaden, Germany]

Up at 7:30. While in Manila Smoak said that she never received my letter re her services in my office; why? Will look up.13 Went out to St. Germain to Cannon’s headquarters; had presentation of their status by staff, directed by Kincaid.14

It looks as if we should be out of England by November 1st if the Surplus Property people can take over by that time. Construction in occupied Germany should be completed by November 1st. Radial airdromes for H B [Heavy Bombers] in Norway, Denmark, France, Italy approved by JCS are being now considered by each Country through our Ambassadors. If we don’t have any better luck on the diplomatic level than we had with Portugal re the Azores, we will get them for the next war.15

Our [AAF] A-2 section here is copying by microfilm all German technical documents, requires about 60,000 feet of film a month. US [Army?] tells them that they can only have 6,000 a month; A-2 is doing it in England in conjunction with RAF; will have documents 50% completed by November 1st. Our technical experts are getting 100% cooperation from British and 0% from Russians. Fortunately only about 35% of the data Germans had is in Russian area. Germans in many cases destroyed original documents after making copies, then they hid the copies. We were also very fortunate in being able to find the copies; thus we should have a complete story of GAF technical development and program.16 We have been able to send back to the US samples of most of the developments, for instance 25 Me-262s, the plane in which one pilot shot down 43 of our HBs.17

Gave staff my ideas as to what we needed for our AAF development:

(a) The war with Japan is over as far as creative work is concerned. The die is cast; there is very little we can do other than see the planes and personnel with supplies get over there.
(b) All of our planning should be directed toward the future.
(c) We must have the long-haired professors in Von Kármán’s board see all the gadgets and data and drawings so as to give us a Buck Rogers program to cover the next 20 years.18
(d) We cannot let the American people down by sniping [slipping?] back to our 1938 position.
(e) Accordingly we must make accessible to the long-haired boys all information available from all sources from all nations.
(f) Our program for the future must cover not only technical development of material but also for training our personnel and for the training of units and their technique of operations.

We left most of the staff at St. Germain and Tom, Pete and I took off for the Raphael Hotel. Entered Paris via Champs Elysées. As we approached the Arc de Triomphe it was apparent that the French were going to have a parade; almost as many cops along the street as we have soldiers in the AAF.19 We didn’t stop, passed the Arc, on toward the Place de Vendôme. Finally we saw the parade approaching, cars and chasseurs in their highly polished casques, brilliant red coats, patent leather boots.20 Heading the parade a French cavalry general, in rear a column of cars. We were stopped by the police. I said that I wanted to stay where I was to see the parade. The General saw my five stars on auto and about had a fit. He saluted, waved, beckoned and almost fell out of his car; I ignored him. The parade passed with the Sultan of Morocco headed for the tomb of the Unknown Soldier to lay a wreath.21 We continued to our hotel with the self-appointed M. P. [military police] guide on a motorcycle who led the way.

Lunch with J. C. H. Lee and Cannon.22 Lee thinks that he can get all troops out of France but occupation forces by March 1, 1946. No big men in sight in France as yet; no real food shortage. As I left hotel to get into car saw that there was a big crowd, soldiers, civilians, French, Americans lining streets. They had seen my 5 stars and were waiting to see who; they cheered and clapped, I saluted and waved.
Drove to Orly with Cannon and am taking him to Salsburg with me; 498 miles [distant]; took off 2:25 PWT. Went to Salzburg via Nuremberg and Munich, arrived 5:45 P.M. Nuremberg is badly hit in center of town, industrial section about completely destroyed, thousands of houses flattened, turned into rubble and many thousands of others gutted by fire. Munich, same as Nuremberg.

Upon landing at Salzburg was met by Maj. Gen. Geof. Keyes and Brig. Gen. Tobin. Found that Hank [Arnold] had been transferred to 45th Division Staff and was at Rheims or in vicinity enroute home; had left 106th AA B [battalion] Sp staff?. Tried to get him to meet me here. Left Geof. Keyes and with Tobin, Cannon and Rusk headed for our hotel.

Germany has little to show for war except in industrial section. People are fairly well-dressed, look well-fed, fields are cultivated, stock looks in fine condition, crops are being harvested, mostly by hand.

We set out for Berchtesgaden Hof by Hitler's auto, open touring car. Beautiful drive up into mountains; reminds me of Switzerland. Hotel is place where Chamberlain, Mussolini, Prime Minister of Austria and others waited to meet Hitler. A beautiful spot: mountains, rocky peaks, snow on mountain tops and in valleys, green fields, trees and forests, houses on mountain side, meadows, crops being harvested, river with lots of water running, villages with Swiss type houses, happy people.

I was assigned suite normally occupied by Himmler; Goering suite at Ritz Paris, and now Himmler suite at Berchtesgaden. Drinks on balcony overlooking valley into Alps; dinner; entertainment by Bavarian troupe that could crash Diamond Horseshoe on Broadway without rehearsal. Excellent Moselle, bed at 10:30; what a place to rest and relax.

Saturday, July 14, 1945 [Berchtesgaden and Konigsee, Germany]

Up at 7:30, breakfast on balcony overlooking valley, peaks, rocky crag, snow, sunlight on mountain tops, firs, pines, mountain lodges, houses on mountain sides. Local inhabitants do all farming and harvesting by hand, stack hay and other crops on poles to dry, cut peat from ground and dry it.
Left hotel at 9:00 with Gen. Tobin, CG, Ind [Independent?] Brigade of Antiaircraft for Hitler’s retreat. It is located up steep mountain road at altitude of about 5,000 feet; village is about 1,500 feet; Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest at about 8,500 feet. The road, retreat, tunnels (12 miles) under retreat, the Eagle’s Nest, elevator shaft up 400 feet to Nest, power plant was four years’ work [1934–38] with 3,000 men. The road runs through several tunnels and is for long distances cut through solid rock. The elevator shaft and power plant room for the Eagle’s Nest are cut through solid granite. The cost in dollars would be almost beyond an estimate in the US. His retreat has a hotel, SS guard barracks, house for Goering, one for Goebbels and Hitler’s own house. The barracks, Hitler’s house and the garage were a wreck due to bombing. It is very hard to visualize interior due to fire. The tunnels beneath go down for the equivalent of 4 stories. The Eagle’s Nest is intact except for souvenir hunters who have taken away or broken off everything that could be detached: door knobs, electric light fixtures, locks on doors, house furnishings, they have even cut off pieces of the rugs. The building is of stone with wonderful views in all directions, large dining room to seat 20, all finished in oak. Elevator man who ran elevator for Hitler still there; elevator has trap door to lower compartment where SS men rode, carries 10 people. Operator points out with pride where Hitler, Eva Braun, etc., all sat in car.27

From there we went to Konigsee28 where we have taken over 6 hotels for recreation for enlisted men. Met Colonel Jones and his secretary, a countess whose father was German Ambassador to Argentina. She lost a husband and 2 sons in war; was educated in England and US.29 Very outspoken about Hitler, thinks he was a curse to Germany, does not believe average young German is willing to give up ideas of fighting in the future as they are inbred in youth. Only hope would be to get youths over to US (at German expense) to see what we do to keep our youth busy and how our country operates as a peaceful nation. She tried to give me a $400.00 watch, which I promptly returned.

Had lunch with enlisted men, took a ride on lake in electric launch, 8 horsepower, 12 miles per hour. Kaiser Wilhelm had
a villa there as did P R [Prince Regent] Leopold, Rudolph [sic], a beautiful spot. Back to hotel and rest at 3:00 P.M. No word from Hank [Arnold].

Looking back on the construction up on the mountain, it is fantastic beyond comprehension of a sane mind. Could be of no value to anyone but Hitler and he used it very little; the Eagle’s Nest was used only 2 or 3 times. He could have brought in 3 or 4 divisions and made a stand in a redoubt that would have caused our armies severe losses and many months of hard campaigning; that would have been a use for it. As it was it served no useful purpose other than to give a build-up to a maniac.

Colonel Jones, who commands enlisted men’s recreation centre on Konigsee, comes from Merion, Pa. Has 2 textile mills at Mauch Chunk. [I] have been using Hitler’s open sedan for past 2 days, a Mercedes touring car, works fine.

Left hotel at 7:00, went to Tobin’s headquarters, quite a grand place, much more ornate than any we have. It was Keitel’s headquarters nearby Hitler’s retreat, not anywhere near as luxurious as Hitler’s, though the furnishings were far better than any we have in the US. Wonderful paintings in dining room; rugs, furniture were of the best pre-war quality.

Just before dinner one of Tobin’s staff came to see me and said that Hank had at last been found and would arrive at 8:00. We were at dinner when he came in; he had been up in the forward area, forward for troops going home, making arrangements for 45th Division in vicinity of Rheims. Some of our various messages or messengers caught up with him. He is now on Frederick’s staff. Division is scheduled to sail August 12; I am going to get in touch with his CG and try and take him back to US with us.

After dinner we all, Keyes, Cannon, Hank, Tobin and my staff, all went back to Konigsee and saw a Bavarian folk play, fireworks given for benefit of the soldiers. It was very interesting and the lake, the mountains, lights on boats, all the surroundings made it almost like a fairy land. The headquarters, Anti-aircraft Brigade of Tobin’s presented me with an excellent example of wood carving, a deer splendidly executed in all details.
Awake at 7:20. Non-fraternization ban was lifted last night at 6:00. It was a farce for when Americans have been away from home for 1, 2, 2½ years fighting, the period of let-down, relaxation comes, they want to talk to someone besides their comrades. The British and the French made no attempt to conform to the ban. Now the [American] GIs are allowed to talk to the Germans, Austrians in public. Last night before it was lifted there were 3 GIs on one bench, 3 frauleins on an adjacent bench, that is when we were in sight. When we returned a few minutes later they had all disappeared.34

Left for Goering’s art treasures at 10:00 A.M., baggage left for plane. Our escort still with us: 1 jeep, 4 men with tommy-guns in front and 1 in rear, all with iron hats. Goering art treasures, collected from Paris, Berlin, cities in Italy and all Europe, valued at anywhere from 100 to 200 million dollars. Consists of best paintings, tapestries and statues of Europe. Some of them came from private collections such as Rothschild’s, some from best museums in Europe, some given to him by such people as Mussolini, Franco. Report has it that he bought and paid for many; most bought for him by Dr. Hofen, a famous art collector in Berlin.35

Took off for Berlin 12:47, SWT [Soviet War Time], distance to Berlin 500 miles via Frankfurt, ETA 4:40 BWT [British War Time], 3:40 SWT. Three Raphaels worth over 2 million, it is out of this world, all were rattling around in a special train when captured by 101st Airborne Division. Some of the statues lost heads and arms in the train, many of the paintings scarred and marred. Now all are in a very inflammable, insecure Inn near Berchtesgaden; it is heavily guarded, collection is being inventoried, expect that inventory will be completed by 1 month. They look strange, these invaluable, priceless paintings standing around on floors, washstands, toilets, in halls of a mountain lodge.36

Hank with me to Berlin; said goodbye to Cannon at Salzburg, rested until 4:00 on plane. Landed at Berlin [Gatow] 4:40.37 President Truman landed just ahead of me, Marshall from Frankfurt landed just in back. King has been here for 2 days.
British and Russian soldiers lined street at intervals all the way from the airport to #96 Berliner Strasse where Marshall, McCarthy, Sheffield and I live. Our house is very well furnished, soldier cook, just who lived here I do not know. Marshall and I called on the Secretary of War and had a long talk with McCloy, Bundy and the Secretary mostly re ultra-scientific developments. Back to house and study for conference at 10:00 tomorrow.

Monday, July 16, 1945 [Berlin, Germany]

The water here is awful, full of chemicals, the lake at the back of our house is like a sewer. The countryside is beautiful, trees about like the Main Line. The British and our delegation have areas side by side. The Russians have the rest of the city as far as I can see now; the US and British have parts of city, but we must be within the Russian area. I will find out more today.

In order to secure houses and equipment for British and American areas for this conference, Russians used following very effective system: they notified all Germans living in area (it is the Hollywood, the movie colony district, of Germany) to get aboard trains for Russia. They entertained no protests; when one woman objected and refused to move they shot and buried her in her front yard; there were no other protests. The houses were vacant, completely furnished when we arrived.

First meeting of JCS agreed to agendas, procedure at meetings, program to be submitted to CCS this P.M. Had 15 minutes with President, and he agreed to:

(a) Proclamation re Air Force day.  
(b) Supreme CO in Pacific (principle).  
(c) AAF recommendations for handling matters brought up by Prime Minister or Uncle Joe.

Saw Harriman for a few moments. Portal called my attention to bet made in 1942 when I bet him $10.00 that a bomb would land on Washington, check in Washington. Made another bet with Portal, dinner, that Jap war would be over nearer to December 25th [1945] than to Valentine Day, 1946. CCS meeting all according to Hoyle, no untoward instances; gave [presentation on] air situation in Pacific.
Marshall and I went to tea with British Chief[s] of Staff, then for a wonderful trip through Berlin. Out Berliner Strasse Auto Bahn, to Bismarck Strasse, Charlottenburg Strasse, Unter den Linden, through the Tiergarten down Seelig Weg to Reichstag to Chancellery, to Wilhelm____(?)____Statue, then back to Potsdam and home. We saw Berlin and Potsdam at their worst, not a house for miles, not a building regardless of whether in a row or isolated that was not damaged or destroyed in Berlin and Potsdam. People streaming into Berlin on bicycles, pushing carts, baby buggies, old and young, with all their household belongings and no place to go but amid ruins, stink and smell of rotting bodies and broken sewers. The Chancellery a wreck, Hitler's magnificent office with its marble-top desk ruined, the Reichstag like a bad dream.48

Russian soldiers striking, pushing German men and women; all women in Berlin were raped by the Russians, according to Germans. Russians paying $500 for a watch, $200 for 5 cartons of cigarettes. The Chancellery with Iron Crosses, Legions of Merit and Honorable Service Medals strewn around by the thousands where a bomb hit the reserve supply. Germans selling anything and everything to get food, the streets cleaned up but everything else a mess. Twenty-five years, fifty years, who knows what, to clean up the smell, and more smell; it was good to get back to our house.

Dinner with Tom and Rusk, Marshall dined with Prime Minister [Churchill]. Saw Russian troop train headed for Russia; it was filled with all manner of loot, most of which we would class as junk. These Russians can't read or write and never had any of the comforts of home, hence they collect anything that is different: broken furniture, old tires, chandeliers, regardless of condition, livestock, on the trains it goes, headed for Moscow. Victory Way with its statues was a wreck.49

Tuesday, July 17, 1945 [Berlin, Germany]

Fighting all through the Tiergarten,50 statues, trees, benches scarred, marred and destroyed. Benches still have signs “Verboten fur Juden.” Up at 7:15, hot water boiler exploded, no hot water. JCS meeting, nothing special.51 Hank Pool here for lunch, rest after lunch.
CCS in P.M. gave Portal, Brooke, Cunningham and Ismay books of photos showing destruction of Jap cities. Meeting over at 3:30, rested 4 to 5:45, dinner with President at 7:00 P.M. Marshall and I walked up to Truman’s shack for dinner. We walked into the yard and were accosted by the Secret Service man at the door: “Who do you want to see?” We said: “We were invited to dinner.” He said: “There’s no one here and they won’t be back until 8:00.” We walked in to check and found the mess boys setting the table; they had a seating arrangement, we were on it, but the official clock in the dining room said 6:45 and that the dinner was for 7:30, so we came home. Small dinner at 7:45, JCS with President and Secretary of War and Secretary of State, home by 9:30.

**Wednesday, July 18, 1945 [Berlin, Germany]**

It seems a shame that probably all of the fine old books in the Potsdam Library, in the private libraries, will end up in trash heaps. At the moment that is what happens for the Russians have no organized means of determining what books or anything else is of value and should be saved. The Potsdam Library has many wonderful, rare volumes.

Uncle Joe invited himself to lunch at Truman’s house yesterday. Stalin arrived at about 12:00 and when asked whether pictures could be made, replied: “After lunch.” Up to that time no one of the Truman house expected him to lunch. He stayed for lunch. JCS meeting. Lunch: during lunch word came in that the Secretary of War wanted to see Marshall and me. He had cable of successful test of S-1, 200 miles and 50 miles. CCS: British accepted our policy for control of operations in Pacific. JCS: King turned over Okinawa to MacArthur. Marshall as host took CCS to review 2nd Armored Division. It was lined up hub to hub for 1½ miles along Auto Bahn, a most inspiring sight, a terrific display of power, over 600 vehicles. Dinner at house, then Soldier Show, very good, Mickey Rooney star.

**Thursday, July 19, 1945 [Berlin, Germany]**

Sun shining after 3 days of clouds and a slight drizzle. Refugees still flocking into and out of Berlin, more going in
than coming out. Strangest and weirdest kinds of conveyances: 3-wheeled autos, trailers, horse drawn vehicles, bicycles, baby carriages, express wagons, home made wagons, men, women and children, horses pulling and pushing; men pulling 2-horse wagons with straps over shoulders; men, women and children hiking along with packs on back. There are, however, 3 women for every man and the men are all quite old or young boys or wounded.

JCS, lunch, CCS. Walking to JCS, Marshall was talking about losing his zest and about time to quit. Note: I bet him $5.00 that he would still be in office when we declared peace with Japan; he took the bet. Talk with Portal re Air Forces, past, present and future.

Took auto ride to Tempelhof. The beating all Berlin and vicinity took is indescribable; not a section in any direction that has not suffered severely. Tempelhof hangars about ½ mile long completely gutted by fire but not knocked down. Evidently the GAF used it as an assembly point as there are crates and boxes, planes (fighters) in various stages of assembly and unserviceability, destroyed and partly destroyed. Runways pock marked with bombs; it is all quite a mess.

King told me of a transformer made on the Dauntless that permits his using safety razor on any current (it is a 220-110 volt). The transformer is about 4” by 4” by 3.” He said he would have one made; I must have someone look it up when I get back.

Dinner at home. Russians on march, horse drawn vehicles with men and women aboard, some women in uniform, some just women. Wagons piled high with all kinds of things, no two wagons the same. Men and women marching hand in hand, all carrying something different. It is no wonder that it takes the Russian staff so long to make suitable dispositions for attack. There is nothing so dirty as a Russian soldier of the ordinary Divisions. Here and there are the trading posts where Russians with 3 to 4 years of pay (Russian printing press marks) meet German civilians and US soldiers. [There the rate of exchange is:]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 cigarette</td>
<td>10 marks, 1 US dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 package</td>
<td>cigarettes 20 dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 watch</td>
<td>$200 to $300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 bar chocolate</td>
<td>1 woman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Jewels, rings traded for bread but principally for canned meat. Trading posts in action with hundreds of people all day long. US finance officers change marks (anything less than 500M) into dollars; Russians print them, US redeems them; we are once again the fat boy, Santa Claus.

Friday, July 20, 1945 [Berlin, Germany]

Up at 7:15, the start of a very interesting day. JCS in morning; saw Eisenhower and “Joe” Davies just before lunch. Joe Cannon for lunch, CCS after lunch.62

A visit to San Souci, Neues Palais, Orangerie, all unharmed by bombing;63 a little damage from machine-gun, grenade, mortar and artillery fire. The paintings, some furniture still there, all under Russian control. Russians that could not speak English but each one had a German who could tell us the story of each room as we went through. The castles, palaces are beyond description; the pictures, clocks, paintings, furnishings, mantles, tables out of this world. The grotto in Neues Palais, almost grotesque with its stones from the 4 corners of the world; petrified wood given by TR [Theodore Roosevelt] to KW II [Kaiser Wilhelm]. Stones from everywhere, shells of all kinds making a wall covering. The theatre, the rooms occupied by KW II and the Kaiserine all devoid of furniture that he took to Doorn, Holland.64 The Russians looked dumbly on as Geo. Marshall, Tom Sheffield, Frank McCarthy I went from room to room. The beautiful grounds with the fountains that the Russians turned on for our benefit. Palaces built in the 1758–1760 and still habitable. Decorations in gold, silver, malachite, marble, what more can I say?

Then dinner at home. [Present]

Field Marshal Montgomery 5 stars
Field Marshal Wilson 5 stars
General of the Army Marshall 5 stars
Field Marshal Alexander 5 stars
Lieutenant General Ismay 3 stars
General of Army Arnold 5 stars
Six men 28 stars

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After dinner we went to a concert by the RAF band and we had a real galaxy of stars:

- Lieutenant General Ismay 3 stars
- General of the Army Arnold 5 stars
- Field Marshal Montgomery 5 stars
- Marshal of RAF Portal 5 stars
- General of the Army Marshall 5 stars
- Chief of Imperial Gen Staff Brooke 5 stars
- Admiral of the Fleet King 5 stars
- First Sea Lord Cunningham 5 stars
- Field Marshal Alexander 5 stars
- Field Marshal Wilson 5 stars
- Major General (Russky) 2 stars

11 generals 50 stars

What a bunch of Brass Hats, all sitting on first row.

Alexander and Montgomery both worried over the next winter in Germany and Italy. Both feeling that the diplomats and statesmen will make a botch of the peace settlement; both worried over the troubles that the Germans will have as a result of no heat, no heavy clothes, little food and medicine, improper government, probable disease and epidemics, and a future war about 20 years from now. Brooke and Cunningham saying amen. It looks now as if we might leave here on Wednesday.

Saturday, July 21, 1945 [Berlin, Germany]

PM [Prime Minister], CCS with escort and in convoy went into Charlottenberg to inspect British Desert Division; reviewing stand near 1870 Peace monument. Armored Division lined up around monument and then all the way to Branden-berg Arch. Quite a show: Army, armor, infantry and artillery, Marines and RAF. Review ride around started at 10:00 and last soldier passed reviewing stand at 11:50. Returned to JCS, meeting supposed to be at 11:30, actually at 12:15.

Lunch at 1:45. General Malony here for lunch. CCS at 3:30 meeting only lasted for about 20 minutes. Portal and Brooke off to Bavaria to go fishing. Returned to house and saw MacDonald about evaluating all the information, 20,000 feet of microfilm a day for 6 months, to the US; necessary to establish an agency. Tom Sheffield sold his Rolex watch he bought in Switzerland to a Russian for $500.00. Dinner at home, just
the 5 of us: Marshall, Tom, Frank [McCarthy], Shepley, Arnold.

Sunday, July 22, 1945 [Berlin, Germany]

Up at 7:30, decided to stay home and rest, sent all my staff to Hamburg. Read “Chronicle” of General Koller, Chief of Staff of GAF. It will be attached as appendix to first copy this diary; no copies made. Dr. Speer’s “Effect of Bombing on German Production” will also be attached as appendix, no copies made. Worked on papers most of morning.

Quiet lunch, rested after lunch. Secretary of War had me for hour before lunch on Super bombing, where, why and what effects. I told him I would get up a recommendation. Am sending Stone back to US to see Spaatz and Groves to prepare recommendation.

Echols and Hank Pool came over and we drove to Tempelhof. Saw underground and F.W. 190 assembly line; quite an affair, but output is very limited. Returned in time to meet Pete and Hank Arnold, who are now with us in compound; they live with Staff next door. Dinner with Byrnes, Harriman, Deane, Parks, Marshall and me.

Byrnes: what we must do now is not make the world safe for democracy, but make the world safe for the USA. Russia is like a greedy kid, never satisfied. When it gets one concession it always has a couple more to request. Has now taken over all marks and other securities in all Berlin banks, even opened safe deposit vaults and confiscated everything. This with its printing press marks makes it possible to practically Sovietize that part of Germany it occupies. It now has granted authority to reopen German banks on date after the Russians took all the money. The US made the plates and the Russians print the money.

Monday, July 23, 1945 [Berlin, Germany]

It looks very much as if there must be two standards of economy in Germany, one in the Russian area and one in balance of Germany. However the French by taking away all livestock and living on the country are creating a condition in which outside aid must be given to keep the Germans from starving in their area.
The US will be called upon to feed not only the French in France but also the Germans in the French area. Another point, neither the Russians nor the French show any indications of helping out with their respective coal fields; the Russians the Silesian that has been given to the Poles, and the French in the Saar.\textsuperscript{77}

Germany, to make any comeback, must start certain fundamental commercial industries. This they cannot do without coal and machine tools. The Russians have taken and are taking all machine tools and sending them to Russia. All the loot is called war booty and none is credited against the Russian reparation demands. The Russians claim that there is no way to inventory it. They are right for they haven’t the slightest idea as to what any soldier took or what has been sent back to Russia or from where it was taken. One German girl was raped 9 times by Russians in 2 days; that is typical of the lack of control of the Russian Army.

JCS at 9:30; CCS at 11:30.\textsuperscript{78} Lunch, rest. Conference with Secretary of War re ultra bombing effort and its results on Japanese desire for peace, surrounding communities, other nations, psychological reactions of Japanese, effect of weather and topography. Sent a radio to Spaatz. Some day someone will dissolve the atom, release the atomic forces and harness the resultant terrific power as a destructive explosive. When?\textsuperscript{79}

Dinner with the Prime Minister tonight. [In Arnold’s hand, right margin: Ismay-reelection]

Hank, Pete and crew of \textit{Argonaut IV} went to Berlin and met the Russians at the Barter Market; they all came back well heeled. The dinner was quite an affair: President of the US, Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, and their military staffs; three Foreign Secretaries were also present. The toasts were many as per usual; the Prime Minister, Stalin, and the President were all in good form.\textsuperscript{80}

Stalin announced with no attempt at secrecy, “now that the war in Europe is over, we have a common enemy in the Pacific, and here’s to our next meeting in Tokyo.” I told Stalin, the Prime Minister and the President that if our B-29s continued their present tempo there would be nothing left of Tokyo in which to have a meeting.

Autograph seekers ran wild and strange to say Stalin himself joined the throng and brought his menu around to have it

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signed. (Mine had already been signed by most of those present.) The RAF band gave some fine selections but the music interfered with the toasts; the music was often stopped. Finally the Big Three left the dining room and went into the music room where they could hear with no interruptions. The toasts then continued and we finally broke up at 11:45. I believe everyone came home under their own power.

**Tuesday, July 24, 1945 [Berlin, Germany]**

Meeting with President and Prime Minister at 11:30. Prior to that Hank and Pete came in and I started them off to town. At White House were President, Prime Minister and the CCS; Lord Leathers and Somervell came in late. We agreed on and accepted the CCS final report. Lunch 1:00, had 20 minutes rest, then on to Crown Princess Cecilia Palace.

We discussed the future operations in Pacific. Secretary of War came to see me re ultra Super Bombing; I told him to wait until I heard from Spaatz. Dinner with King and CCS, 201st meeting, a fine party. A couple of games of gin rummy with Howard Rusk, and then to bed at 10:15 P.M.

Louis Mountbatten gave us his Burma story at cocktails at our house prior to King's dinner; gave full credit to AF. As a matter of fact said that the Burma campaign could not have been possible except for air lift. Air supplied all of his troops during most of Burma campaign; 30,000 tons [a month] was a normal procedure, monsoon or no monsoons, mountains or no mountains. Mountbatten was very positive in statement that the whole Royal Family in Japan are morons so much inbred that they are not up to normal of rest of Japanese; that the Royal family should all be liquidated. He knows them personally. King had CCS at dinner, their 201st meeting, a grand dinner. All went to RAF musical at Neues Palace; I excused myself and went to bed.

**Wednesday, July 25, 1945 [Berlin, Germany]**

Up with impression that this would be a day of rest and relaxation. At 8:45 talking to Pete and Hank, at 9:05 the Secretary of War sent for Chief of Staff and Commanding General, AAF; at 10:45 the President sent for the Chief of Staff. At 11:15 the Chief
of Staff had Hull, Somervell, Lincoln and me in for conference that lasted until 12:00. At 11:30 D’Olier called, but I was not able to see him and sent Norstad down to do the honors. At 12:15 I had Cabell in for instructions and sent for Echols; 12:30 Jamison came in for instructions; 12:45 Norstad came in and was given his information and instructions; 1:00 lunch.

Took a long walk in P.M. Saw parts of Potsdam where Germans live, 6 or 8 people in houses, houses undamaged and well-kept, one house in midst of others badly damaged. Looked as if brick revetments had been placed around doors and that windows had been bricked up, apparently Russians suspected it, for they wrecked it thoroughly and completely. Dinner at house with Hank, Woodward, Cabell, Marshall, Tom, Frank [McCarthy] and Shepley. Hope to get away tomorrow; work with British completed and Russians can send their answers to us.

Received word that Malin Craig was dead; it is a merciful thing, his usefulness was ended long ago; he was utterly helpless. He was one of my best friends, helped me time and time again and was an excellent Chief of Staff, at his time. It was a shame that he was so isolated from his family and had never found a hobby, something to keep him busy.

Thursday, July 26, 1945 [In Arnold’s hand: Election day, England] [Berlin, Germany]

Conferences with Marshall and King re: (a) conference with Russians; (b) going home. Conference with Marshall, Hull, Lincoln, Norstad and Cabell; lunch and conference with Marshall and Harriman; picture with staff (AF); rest. Conference with Russians and JCS. Russians agreed to all of our requests and were able to make decisions at the table, although Uncle Joe wasn’t there. Antonov (Chief of Staff), Fallalev (Air), Kuznetsov (Navy); responsibilities were even delegated to the local commander at Vladivostok; what a change.

Churchill was defeated according to radio report:

355 Labor [Members of House of Commons]  
186 Conservative  
8,000,000 Labor [Popular vote]  
6,000,000 Conservative
Most of Churchill’s cabinet was defeated; so passes the man who has held the British Empire together, made it work, secured coordinated effort, held off the Germans, united all factions in England. His reward: defeat for office by the radicals.89

President down at Frankfurt90 so we still don’t know whether or not we can get away tomorrow. Agreed at 9:00 that JCS could leave tomorrow, packed, bed at 11:00.

Friday, July 27, 1945 [Berlin, Germany to Paris, France]

To airport at 9:00, took off at 9:30, Paris 547 miles [distant]. Get out my 1911 prognostication of future of airplanes in war to use in book.91 JCS broke up this A.M., British Chief[s] of Staff in London and will not come back.92 Attlee will be here to try and take up the load where the British people caused Churchill to drop it. King takes a trip to the ports and then gets back to Potsdam for the arrival of Forrestal, Secretary of Navy. Stimson has already gone to Berchtesgaden and then to Washington. Marshall and his party to Berchtesgaden for 2 or 3 days, and then on to Washington. President plans to leave about Sunday. JCS left Cooke, Hull and Norstad behind to help Leahy and the President.

Landed Paris, 12:40; met by Cannon, Hoag, etc., and came with Sheffield to Ritz where I was given same suite I had last April. Had lunch with Joe Cannon, Tom and Hank. Outlined to Joe some of the things that happened at Potsdam that he is interested in. Rested for 2½ hours. Larry Bell and Summers of CAA came in for a while.93 Dinner with the bunch and Mrs. Giles, Mr. and Mrs. Parsons, Helen Kirkpatrick, Gabrielle Andreu, General Cannon, General Schlatter.94 In bed at 10:30.

Saturday, July 28, 1945 [Paris, France to Azores en route to Stephenville, Newfoundland]

Up at 7:30; a grand night to sleep, not so light all night as at Berlin. Here it gets dark at 9:30, at Berlin about 11:00. Hank Pool picked up a room full of films of the pictorial history of the GAF. This should be shown, evaluated, digested, edited and plans made to utilize them in:

(a) AAF movie history,
(b) In theatres of US to educate public,
(c) At our AAF schools,
(d) At other schools, including High Schools and Colleges.

Took off at 10:10 for Santa Maria, Azores, distance 1,631, ETA 18:01, PWT; arrived Santa Maria 5:50 SMWT [Santa Maria War Time]. Inspected Post, went through town. Saw harbor and a very small burro with a very large pack saddle and a very old grizzled man, small and bewhiskered. I wanted to know how much of a load the burro could carry with its small, delicate legs. I asked Tom to use his best Spanish or French and the little old man said in excellent English: “About 10 bushels of corn.” Upon questioning he had lived in Connecticut for 20 years and later in the Azores for 40; he was 70 years old. Took off for Stephenville at 22:40 AWT [Atlantic War Time], 1,855 miles; ETA 7:40 AWT or 5:40 NFWT [Newfoundland War Time].

**Sunday, July 29, 1945 [Newfoundland, Canada]**

Must write letter to Mission at Sonoma re display in museum: German medals, 2 certificates signed by Hitler; SS knife, took [sic] from Berchtesgaden; Japanese 2-handled sword. Must have A-2 give me proper name for Jap sword and designate medals as to why awarded.96

Ranch: (need to check) Bullcalf, road to ranch, road to house, Guest house, any sales by Newton.

Book “Not Always Too Few.”97 Passed Lighthouse on coast of Newfoundland at 6:55 AWT; Gander at 7:10 AWT; an especially smooth trip, not a bump in the sky.

The FW 290 at Azores headed for Wright; a crude affair as compared to our C-54 or B-29; large, square fuselage, none of our refinements for best performance; has cruising speed of about 180 miles per hour. It was built as a transport and finally used for reconnaissance over the Atlantic; has room for about 20 people aboard (soldiers, not civilian passengers).98

The Portuguese Commanding Officer, Colonel___________,99 Engrs, paid his respects to me. I took him to club (last night) where the USO troupe of entertainers had a drink with me. After
about 15 minutes of conversation I took him down to plane, said “Adios” and we took off. The USO troupe was very good, had Gypsy (________)? in it. She was the gal who was in a Pan American accident at Lisbon, plays the accordion. Was pretty badly banged up, lucky to be alive, most all other passengers were killed. First time she played in over 1½ years. [Adm] King due in Azores at 1:00 A.M.; Marshall leaves, due in Paris at 8:00 A.M. today; neither one took much of a rest.

Arrived Stephenville 8:10 AWT, 6:10 NFWT. Colonel Elbert L. Edson, CO, awaiting us. Hank, Rusk and I went to his house to talk over and arrange a fishing trip. Lee Wulff, the local game warden, came in and we decided Wulff, Pete, Dice and I would go in a Navy amphibian OA9 to a lake 130 miles to the north. The rest would go in cars to the Serpentine River.

The lake was beautiful and the camp, Sam Connell’s camp, was superb; but the enlisted men all wanted to go home. The sky was overcast; rain was in the air and prognostication for good fishing nil. The 2 captains and some enlisted men had been out the day before and caught many trout, a few salmon, more grilse. We went out to fish the pools where the river runs into the lake. I had rubber boots and slipped all over the rocks and in due season went in up to my neck. Everything I had on was wet, the boots so full of water it was with difficulty that I got out. I emptied out, squeezed, wrung out, changed until I was fairly comfortable. Cast into a pool and a mass of trout rose to the fly, fly too big, it was a salmon fly. Put on a smaller one and landed 10 trout, 8 to 14 inches. Had 2 more up to shore but missed them. Caught 1 grilse. Weather changed to cold rain. It looked as if we might not get back, engine caught on fire out in lake and things looked worse. Finally everything straightened out and we came home under a 500 ft. ceiling. I was still wet all over; a hot bath and a slug of Bourbon fixed me up. The party caught salmon, grilse and trout.

Monday, July 30, 1945 [Harmon Field, Newfoundland, Canada to Washington, D.C.]

Inspected a wonderful NCO club; has all the fixings of an officer’s club; sells liquor 15¢ a drink, 5¢ for mixers and makes money hand over fist; has surplus of $20,000; never
has any trouble with NCOs. Inspected Rescue unit, 6 dog teams, 9 dogs per team, special tractors for snow. Also modified “duck” that can move equally well over swamps, snow, water or dry land.\textsuperscript{104} Took off at 11:10 A.M., SWT [Stephenville War Time], 9:10 WWT [Washington War Time], distance 1,140 miles. ETA 14:50 WWT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trip from Berlin</th>
<th>[Distance]</th>
<th>[Flying Time]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berlin to Paris</td>
<td>547 miles</td>
<td>3hrs 10min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris to Santa Maria</td>
<td>1631</td>
<td>7 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Maria to Stephenville</td>
<td>1855</td>
<td>9 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephenville to Washington</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>5 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5173</td>
<td>26 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

195 miles per hour
[All below in Arnold's hand]

| Berlin to Washington  | 1140       | 5 40          |
| Mingan to Paris       | 1026       | 4 30          |
| Paris to Salzburg     | 2500       | 14 15         |
| Salzburg to Berlin    | 498        | 3 25          |
|                        | 500        | 2 53          |
| [Subtotal for immediately above] | 4524 | 25 03       |
| [Subtotal for Trip from Berlin] | 5173 | 26 11       |
| [Final total]         | 9697       | 51 14         |

**Postscript**

The “Terminal Conference” at Potsdam saw Truman, Churchill, Stalin, and their advisors grappling with a variety of issues necessitated by what seemed at long last to be the closing days of the war. During the 13 days Arnold was there, the civilian leaders assessed issues ranging from Germany, Poland, and much of Europe to the Mediterranean and the Far East. Most of the political problems were not referred to the military chiefs. The primary concern of the uniformed leaders remained ending the war with Japan, major facets of which were, to Arnold, the continuing aerial campaign and the atomic bomb.

As his diary reflects, Hap met with the secretary of war, members of his civilian staff, and General Marshall only hours after Arnold’s arrival on 15 July, engaging in a “long talk . . . mostly re [regarding] ultra-scientific developments,” the term
Arnold used to refer to the atomic bomb, then in its final stages of development. The next day, 16 July, the very successful explosion of the test bomb took place in New Mexico. In Potsdam, Stimson received a cable with news of the successful test, which he shared with Marshall and Arnold, on 18 July. It was not until 21 July, five days after the test, that General Groves’ detailed account reached Potsdam. On 22 July, the day after the hand-carried report arrived, Arnold recorded meeting with Stimson in an hour-long discussion of “Super bombing, where, why and what effects,” with Arnold promising a recommendation on its use. He then recorded, after the session with the secretary of war, that he was sending Col Jack Stone “back to the US to see Spaatz and Groves to prepare [a] recommendation.”

Stimson continued to assess the issue with Arnold the next day, 23 July. Hap noted that they covered the “results [of the bomb] on Japanese desire for peace, surrounding communities, other nations, psychological reaction of Japanese, effect of weather and topography.” Following this meeting, probably in order to elicit a quicker response than Colonel Stone’s mission might produce, Arnold “sent a radio to Spaatz,” the newly designated air commander in the Pacific. Possibly concerned that he had committed more information about the still highly secret bomb than he should have to his diary, Hap clumsily attempted to confuse any unwanted reader when he speculated: “Some day someone will dissolve the atom, release the atomic forces and harness the resultant terrific power as a destructive explosive.” He then disingenuously asked, “When?” The next day, 24 July, Stimson again discussed the “ultra Super Bombing” with Hap, who asked the secretary of war to “wait until I hear from Spaatz.” Arnold’s laconic entries for the next day, 25 July, briefly listed the various meetings that consumed the morning and no doubt dealt with the bomb and its uses. Again, security considerations presumably limited Hap’s diary entries concerning the substance of the discussions, although it appears logical that the topic dominating the gatherings on that morning was the “Potsdam Declaration,” which was dispatched to the Japanese government on the following day.
A basis for this document was Stimson’s letter to Truman on 2 July, which he said had been prompted by the 18 June meeting between himself (Stimson), the JCS, and Truman. Eaker represented Arnold, who had remained in the Pacific. As previously discussed, it was decided at this 18 June meeting that planning was to be continued for the November land invasion of Kyushu, reflecting the consensus among those present that the ongoing strategic bombing, along with other current offensive actions would not, of themselves without an invasion, produce a Japanese surrender. Stimson’s 2 July letter to the president, after stressing the losses to be anticipated in an invasion, suggested that an alternative would be a “carefully timed warning . . . calling on her to surrender.” This would amplify the “Unconditional Surrender” terms, to include destroying the “authority and influence” of those who had “deceived and misled” Japan, limiting Japanese sovereignty to her main islands, and resolving economic issues. In addition, the Allies would withdraw from Japan after a “peacefully inclined” representative government had been established. The final declaration, containing the bulk of Stimson’s suggestions, was submitted to the JCS, who agreed on 18 July that it was “generally satisfactory.” They suggested only minor changes dealing with the institution of the emperor and the postwar Japanese government. Following minor revisions by others, negotiations with the British and Russians at Potsdam, and an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek, the declaration was dispatched to Japan during the evening of 26 July. Two days later, while Arnold was en route home from Paris via the Azores, the Japanese government responded with what the Allies interpreted as a rejection of the declaration. The first atomic bomb was dropped exactly a week after Arnold’s return to Washington. Truman’s written authorization to drop the weapon, which the general had requested, had been relayed through the War Department to Spaatz on 24 July, two days before the dispatch of the Potsdam Declaration.

The extended, contradictory, and often contentious discussions of the reasoning and rationalization of those involved in the decision to drop the bomb is beyond the scope of this study. More relevant is Arnold’s role in this event, which rep-
resented the culmination of Allied bombing in World War II. During Potsdam, Arnold appeared anxious to emphasize the extent and nature of ongoing B-29 bombing, which had been one of his major interests during his recent Pacific trip. At the first meeting of the CCS, on 16 July, he recorded having given a presentation on the “air situation in [the] Pacific.” At the CCS meeting next evening, he gave the British military chiefs “books of photos showing destruction of Jap cities.” At the tripartite dinner given by Churchill on 23 July, Stalin had toasted publicly to the next meeting of the Allies in Tokyo. Arnold recorded responding that if the B-29 raids continued their current tempo there would be “nothing left of Tokyo in which to have a meeting.”

Arnold’s attitude towards the ongoing B-29 conventional campaign’s ability to force a Japanese surrender had to have been strengthened by the 18 days he spent in the Pacific, particularly during discussions with the crews and leaders of the operating wings on Guam and Tinian. During the trip, it is to be recalled, Hap had extensive conversations not only with the Navy hierarchy but with LeMay and other air leaders. He was briefed thoroughly, and was shown strike photos and operational statistics attesting to the destruction being accomplished. At the same time, he did not appear completely convinced by the on-site commanders’ claims that Japan could be forced into quitting by continued B-29 bombing. He expressed his doubts in his diary with the comment, “We will see.”

Did this skepticism represent a loss of faith by Hap in the efficacy of bombing? In part, his doubts were caused by the optimism (unwarranted as it turned out) that had emanated from his commanders (and closest friends) in the early years of the strategic bombing campaign in Europe. Was his failure to return to Washington from his Pacific trip for the 18 June meeting with Truman and the JCS due to his realization that the bombing campaign was failing, as Michael Sherry has written, or was it, as this editor has deduced, dictated almost entirely by health considerations?

There would appear little doubt that Hap was disappointed by the inability of the strategic bombing campaign to negate the 6 June 1944 invasion of Normandy. He now hoped that
the Pacific AAF operations would be successful in negating a
ground invasion of the Japanese home islands, thus validat-
ing the claims of Arnold and strategic bombing advocates.
Additionally, Arnold and the AAF were in some ways hoisted
by their own public relations petard, which had produced
ambitious publicity efforts, mostly directed from Washington
and strongly encouraged by Arnold, to dramatize the exploits
of the AAF in Europe (and later in the Pacific) with emphasis
on strategic bombardment’s successes and potential.

The 18 June White House meeting, it is recalled, was sched-
uled because Truman was “interested in knowing what the
price in casualties for Kyushu would be and whether or not
that price could be paid.” General Marshall dominated the dis-
cussion and emphasized the need for continuing to plan the 1
November Kyushu operation. He stated that conditions now
were “practically identical with the situation which had
existed” when the Normandy invasion was proposed. The chief
of staff reported that factors favoring the invasion included the
assessment that, among other offensive operations, “air action
will have smashed practically every industrial target worth hit-
ing in Japan as well as destroying huge areas in Japanese
cities.” Marshall stressed that MacArthur had cabled agree-
ment with the proposed invasion. Secretary of the Navy Forre-
stal and Admirals Leahy and King had also indicated their
concurrence. Marshall did not mention Arnold’s cable to him.
This discussion prompted Truman to state his conclusion that
the JCS had unanimously agreed that the “Kyushu operation
was the best possible solution under the circumstances.” The
topics discussed by Truman and the JCS of “certain other
matters” has not been recorded but most probably concerned
the atomic bomb. Hap had to have concluded that the con-
sensus among these leaders was that aerial bombardment
alone would not force surrender. LeMay’s account of his brief-
ing to the JCS the next day had to be equally discouraging. He
recorded (and no doubt Arnold was informed) that the JCS
seemed to have little interest in his remarks and that Marshall
snoozed during part of his presentation. Lemay took away the
impression that the JCS in effect had instructed him to return
to Guam and continue his bombing while they would run the JCS, determine policy, and run the war.\footnote{121}

Nor was there any recorded opposition by Arnold or any of the JCS to the Potsdam Declaration, realizing, as they must have, that its rejection or nonacceptance by the Japanese would most probably lead to the dropping of the recently tested and now presumably deployable atomic bomb. Further, there is no convincing evidence that any of the American military chiefs, including Arnold and Stimson, counseled at the time against Truman’s 24 July authorization to Spaatz to drop atomic weapons on Japan after 3 August. It is difficult to believe that Stimson, Marshall, King, Leahy, and Arnold were not apprised of the president’s authorization, which was issued two days before the Potsdam Declaration was dispatched. This in spite of the fact that almost all US military leaders have insisted, albeit after the fact, that they opposed its use or felt the bomb was unnecessary. However there is no body of evidence that this opposition or reluctance was articulated to the decision maker, the president. Stimson, often the conscience of the military during the war, summed up the discussion of opposition to the use of the weapon: “At no time, from 1941 to 1945, did I ever hear it suggested by the President, or any other responsible member of the government, that atomic energy should not be used in the war.”\footnote{122}

In *Global Mission*, Arnold seems willing to finesse the issue of whether or not he favored the use of the bomb at the time. His failure to address the issue directly is in part explained by his political sensitivity to many issues current when he wrote his autobiography in 1947–48. At that time, the Cold War had continued to intensify, and considerable debate evolved about the history and usage of the bomb. Also Truman, who had made the decision to drop the weapon, was still president, assisted now by Arnold’s very close friend and mentor, George Marshall, who was serving as secretary of state.\footnote{123}

Gar Alperovitz, in *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth*, asserts that there was “some sort of understanding” between Marshall and Arnold that determined Hap’s recommendations. The assertion is interesting but hardly credible. His claim, for example, that this involved
Arnold’s support of Marshall “on the nuclear weapon decision” (which was made by Truman, not Marshall) in return for which the chief of staff would “support the . . . buildup of the postwar independent air force” is far too simplistic an explanation of their often complex relationship and interaction on this issue. Particularly suspect is the fact that Alperovitz’ single source for this conclusion is the recall 45 years after the events by an individual who was not present, but who presented this as his “recollecition,” saying, “I don’t know who told me that or why or how but that’s my recollection.”

Some insight into Arnold’s thinking may be gained from his undated communication that he submitted to the JCS at about this time. In it, he suggested that complete emphasis should be put on the “strategic Air offensive, complemented by a Naval and Air Blockade.” Conceding that the current “scale” of the aerial onslaught was “expected to create conditions favorable” to the Kyushu invasion, he suggested that an “acceleration and augmentation” of the air campaign “culminating in a land campaign” would bring defeat “with a minimum loss of American lives.” He estimated that dropping 1,600,000 tons of bombs on Japan would cause such dislocation and destruction as “might” cause their capitulation. Further hedging his bet, Arnold suggested that this increased tonnage “will in any event, assure the success of the land campaign in Japan, and reduce the loss of . . . lives to a minimum.”

On the other hand, the charge that Arnold failed to relate the degree of destruction to Japanese surrender has validity. However, this shortcoming is applicable to the military leaders of other services who also failed to relate the results of their operations and the resulting devastation to surrender, whether the destruction was caused by their submarines, carriers, blockades, occupation of large areas of enemy territory by ground troops, devastation wrought by artillery shells, or by the “dehousing” of thousands of enemy citizens by bombing. Particularly was this flaw in Hap’s thinking made evident after he viewed at close hand large sections of Germany destroyed in Potsdam, Berlin, and other areas. Was this failure to appreciate the will, spirit, and determination of the
bombed-out enemy people peculiar to Arnold and other advocates of aerial bombardment?

It is difficult to conclude that, although Arnold maintained a firm belief in the efficacy and role of bombardment in war, he appeared at the time of this conference not to have dissented from the Potsdam Declaration or to have opposed the president’s decision to use the bomb. In regard to the new weapon, he performed what was asked of him and the AAF as “only that of delivery boy.” Did he and other members of the JCS have a greater obligation, given their primary concern of ending the war as quickly as possible with a minimum of Allied lives? There is little doubt that Arnold, together with most other Allied leaders both civilian and military, along with American public opinion and presidential thinking, had made the intellectual journey from abhorrence at the news of the Nazi indiscriminate bombing of Rotterdam in 1940 to acceptance of area attacks, firebombing, and atomic attacks against Japan.

Other portions of this diary reflect characteristics of the earlier ones. In many ways it continued, like its earlier accounts, to appear almost as a stream of consciousness as Arnold recorded his impressions, probably hastily and wearily jotted at the end of long and difficult days. This final diary appears to have become a record of Hap’s spontaneous recollections of events of the day with little time, consideration, or opportunity for reflection or rumination. Most often, given the size constraints of his notebook, no distinction appeared between juxtaposition of minutiae with very significant issues.

Other traits that marked Arnold’s diaries reappear in this one. Although it was clear that the war was ending, Arnold continued his normal practice of looking ahead and continuing to plan. This planning ranged from directing that the latest captured enemy aircraft be shipped to the United States for evaluation to ensuring proper control and care of German technological documentation, for which he foresaw future use. Hap continued his keen observation of the occupying troops in Berlin and discussed future prospects and hopes, both military and diplomatic, with his colleagues. His normal optimism seemed tempered by his speculation on the nature of a post-war world, fearing war in another generation—a fear influ-
enced by a Soviet Union that he and his colleagues appeared increasingly to distrust.

The decision to enjoy a brief fishing trip in Newfoundland on his return trip appeared to Arnold not an inappropriate ending to what became his last overseas journey as chief of the Army Air Forces. By then, he had probably been informed of the Japanese failure to accept the Potsdam Declaration and was fully aware of the fatal consequences that would follow. Yet, as was typical of this and Hap’s other diaries, he was able to concentrate on the events of the day and comment on the mundane, everyday facets of life as he viewed them. Arnold’s concern for the welfare of AAF airmen, and his interest in them as people and soldiers, as well as his interest in the institution of the AAF, is reflected in his meetings with both officers and enlisted personnel at all his visits to AAF bases worldwide. The first of the atomic weapons would be dropped six days after Arnold’s plane landed in Washington; the war would be ended within the next two weeks.

**Notes**


3. Arnold Diary, 5 April 1945.

4. Mingan is a town, northeastern Quebec, just north of Anticosti Island, eastern Quebec, at the head of the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The AAF 1382d Air Base Unit located there was responsible for maintaining the airstrip at Mingan, a part of the North Atlantic Ferry route.

5. Maj Levi H. Dice had served as Arnold’s pilot on two previous trips covered in chaps. 10 and 11. The crew is not otherwise identified. Lt Gen John E. Hull, USA, now chief, OPD, War Department; Brig Gen Charles “Pre” Cabell, now AC/AS, Strategic Plans and Policy Division, Headquarters AAF; Brig Gen Coleman C. Jamison, Office of AC/AS Plans, Headquarters AAF;
Col Howard A. Rusk, Convalescent Services Division, Office of the Air Surgeon, Headquarters AAF, later health editor of The New York Times, accompanied Arnold on this trip as his physician. Captain Shepley, assigned to Arnold’s office, is not otherwise identified.

6. Lt Col Edward P. “Pop” Kern, CO 1382d Air Base Unit, Mingan.

7. Could have been either the town of Mingan, just east of the mouth of the Mingan River, or Havre de St. Pierre, 15 miles further east. Most probably it was the former.


9. St. Malo is a port, northwest France on the English Channel, set afire by retreating German forces in 1944.

10. Orly Field was located in the southeast suburbs and was the main airport servicing Paris at this time. Lt Gen John K. Cannon, now CG, US Army Forces in Europe; Maj Gen James M. Bevans, now CG, USAAF in the Mediterranean Theater; Brig Gen Earl S. Hoag, CG, European Division, ATC. The Hotel Raphael was a luxury Paris establishment located on Avenue Kleber, a main artery radiating southwest from Place de l’Etoile.

11. Les Invalides is the celebrated Parisian landmark on the left bank of the Seine near Pont Alexander III in which many French greats, among them Napoleon I, are entombed.

12. Col Fred M. Dean was Arnold’s executive officer.

13. It is not clear why Arnold would have recalled at this time the conversation with his former aide, Maj Smoak, which occurred in the Philippines, mentioned in chap. 11. This entry confirms Arnold’s continuing use of the diary, in part at least, as a reminder of tasks to be accomplished upon his return to Washington.

14. United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF) headquarters were located at Sainte Germain-en-Laye, a residential suburb west of Paris: Brig Gen Alvan C. Kinkaid, chief of staff, USSTAF.

15. Most of these airdromes, planned for postwar utilization by American aircraft, were never constructed. Arnold referred to the fact that, although negotiations were begun in 1941 with the Portuguese government, it was August 1944 before an American-operated airfield was opened in the Azores.


17. AAF records fail to identify these kills or the disposition of the Me-262s.

18. In 1944, Arnold appointed a Scientific Advisory Board headed by Dr. Theodore von Kármán of the California Institute of Technology. Arnold wanted the group, which was composed of leading scientists, to “think ahead twenty years.” Their report, Where We Stand, was submitted in August 1945. It became a blueprint for AAF and USAF development and is
discussed briefly in the biographical account of Arnold above. See the
account in Dik A. Daso, Maj, USAF, Architects of American Air Supremacy:
General Hap Arnold and Dr. Theodore von Kármán (Maxwell Air Force Base,
Ala.: Air University Press, 1997). Buck Rogers In The Twenty-Fifth Century
was a science fiction comic strip then appearing in American newspapers.
The characters, equipped with futuristic spaceships and ray guns, traveled
freely from planet to planet doing battle against the forces of evil.

19. French national parades often proceeded along the Champs-Elysees,
the 1¼-mile-long main thoroughfare in central Paris that runs from the Arc
de Triomphe to the Place de la Concorde. The holiday was celebrated on Fri-
day since the day of the traditional 14 July anniversary of Bastille Day fell
on a Saturday. As Arnold’s diary reflected, this was an occasion for consid-
erable celebration, the first year since 1940 that this holiday was observed
without German occupation.

20. Chasseurs had traditionally been light infantry or cavalry units of the
French Army. After World War I, the term denoted armored units. They were
distinguished from infantry troops by their distinctive uniforms and highly
polished casque helmets.

21. Sidi Humannad was the Sultan of Morocco.

22. Lt Gen John C. H. Lee, USA, was now CG, Communications Zones,
US Army Forces in Europe.

23. Maj Gen Geoffrey B. Keyes, USA, assignment unknown; Brig Gen
Ralph C. Tobin, USA, CG, 44th Antiaircraft Brigade, Berchtesgaden.

24. Berchtesgaden Hof is a Bavarian town in southwest Germany, four
miles east of Berchtesgaden, site of Hitler’s mountain retreat.

25. The hotel is still standing on the north side of the railroad tracks in
the center of Berchtesgaden Hof. Arnold was in error concerning the Aus-
trian prime minister. In referring to meetings associated with the Munich
agreement of September 1938, the President of Czechoslovakia and the Pre-
scriber of France were present, but Austria was not represented following
Hitler’s annexation of that country in March 1938.

26. The Diamond Horseshoe was a famous New York City nightclub.

27. Eva Braun had been Hitler’s longtime mistress whom he married the
day before the two of them committed suicide in the Fuehrer’s bunker on 30
April 1945.

28. Königsee is the five-mile-long, 630-foot-deep lake three miles south
of Berchtesgaden.

29. Neither Colonel Jones nor his “Countess” secretary is otherwise iden-
tified.

30. William II, Kaiser Wilhelm, Emperor of Germany, 1888–1918; Prince
Luitpold was Prince Regent of Bavaria, 1886–1912; Rupprecht, son of King
Ludwig III of Bavaria, later King of Bavaria, 1913–1918.
31. Merion, Pennsylvania, now Merion Station, is a city in west suburban Philadelphia, just east of Ardmore, Arnold’s home area. Mauch Chunk is a town in Carbon County, northeastern part of the state, now called Jim Thorpe, Pennsylvania.

32. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, chief of staff of Oberkommando des Wehrmacht (OKW) the Supreme Command, German Armed Forces, ratified the unconditional surrender in May 1945. He was later convicted of war crimes at Nuremberg and executed.

33. Maj Gen Robert T. Frederick, USA, was now CG, 45th Division, although he was better known as commander of the 1st US-Canadian Special Services Forces, the “Devil’s Brigade.” Hank Arnold returned with his father to Washington.

34. The official decree still revealed less than a full appreciation of the problems as the modification permitted troops in the US zone to “converse with adult Germans in public places.” See *New York Times*, 13 July 1945.

35. Goering coerced some owners, including the famed European banking family of Rothschild, into selling their art treasures to him. The German collection, valued at the time at approximately $200 million, was to be presented to the German people by Goering on his sixtieth birthday in 1953. Dr. Walther Andres Hofen was curator of the collection. As of this writing in 2001, determining the provenance, subsequent owners, dealers, and governments involved in the postwar disposition of these art works is a matter of considerable dispute and litigation.

36. The three paintings by Raphael Santi, fifteenth century Italian Renaissance painter, are not otherwise identified. Part of the art cache had been captured by the US 101st Airborne Division on a rail siding at Untersteing, a town a few miles from Berchtesgaden.

37. Gatow airfield, used jointly by the US and British delegations during the conference, is on the west bank of the Havel, due west of the center of the city. Located in what became the British zone, it was utilized extensively by the RAF during the Berlin airlift, 1948–1949.

38. The building at 96 Berliner Strasse is not otherwise distinguished. A recent photograph in the possession of the editor reflects a multistory rather nondescript concrete structure with an automobile garage now operating in its rear courtyard.

39. Harvey H. Bundy was assistant to Secretary of War Stimson. The discussion concerned the atomic bomb tests, “Sideboard,” then in progress in Alamogordo, New Mexico, success of which reached Stimson and the American party the next day. As indicated elsewhere, in this and subsequent references to the bomb, its test explosion and prospects for future use, Arnold used a variety of code names and incorrect information such as “Ultra” which he clearly knew to be erroneous, to confuse any unauthorized reader of the diary since they were housed in and held their meetings in the zone then controlled by Soviet troops.

40. The Main Line is the term for a group of suburban towns due west of Philadelphia connected by the “Main Line” of the Pennsylvania Railroad.
operating from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh and the west. Arnold was born and raised in the area.

41. Agreement had been made in principle at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that Germany was to be divided into zones but the specific boundary lines were not established until this meeting at Potsdam. At the time of Arnold’s diary entries, the city was unofficially divided into zones of occupation then controlled by Soviet, British, and American troops. As Arnold correctly speculated, he was in what became the Soviet Zone of occupation. It was to become East Germany or German Democratic Republic after 1949 until the reunification of Germany in 1989.

42. It was located in the Babelsburg area in the southwest sector of Berlin.


44. President Truman issued a proclamation designating 1 August 1945 (which the AAF proclaimed as its 38th anniversary) as Air Force Day. Arnold attended a celebration dinner held in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York City on that date, two days after arriving home.

45. Arnold, Marshall, and others had continued during the war to urge the appointment of a single Allied Supreme Commander in the Pacific. Although FDR did not follow their advice, Arnold and Marshall suggested the same to Truman. Hap’s views were buttressed no doubt by his recent Pacific trip. The unexpectedly rapid end of the war resolved the problem. The reference to handling recommendations by the British and the Soviets at the conference is not clear, but it seems logical that the AAF had prepared position papers on some of these anticipated issues.

46. There is no reference to an earlier bet with Portal in the diaries or the Arnold papers. Arnold won this later wager since the Japanese accepted terms of surrender on 14 August. In his memoirs, Arnold recalled that the bet remained unpaid in 1948. H. H. Arnold, General of the Air Force, Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 583.

47. Edmond Hoyle was an eighteenth century English writer and authority on games and rules for their conduct. The reference, in common usage at the time, was to the meeting having proceeded according to established rules, customs and expectations, as contrasted with earlier stormy sessions. The brief official account of the meeting recorded that Arnold “commented in detail on certain aspects” of a written report he submitted on AAF operations in the Pacific: FRUS, Potsdam, vol. 2, 35–38. The report is not printed.

48. This drive took them through much of central Berlin, along the thoroughfares listed. The Reichstag was located in Prinz-Albrect Strasse and had served as the meeting place of the lower chamber of the German parliament. Its burning in February 1933 was used as a pretext for declaring martial law
in Germany, which permitted Hitler to wield virtually unchallenged power. Located at 75 and 77 Wilhelm Strasse in the Tiergarten section, just west of the center of the city, the Imperial Chancellery and residence of the chancellor had been occupied by both Bismarck and Hitler in their times. Both buildings were heavily damaged by bombing. Arnold may have seen either the statue of Frederick Wilhelm III or that of Kaiser Wilhelm I, both of which are in the Tiergarten.

49. Arnold meant Victoria Strasse, running south from the Tiergarten in central Berlin.

50. The Tiergarten is a large park just west of Brandenberg Gate.

51. The “Forbidden for Jews” sign was one of the remaining visual manifestations of Nazi anti-Semitism. Arnold participated in this “nothing special” JCS meeting where the recurring issue of British forces in the Pacific reappeared. He commented that the relatively small contributions of British Air forces would add little but would complicate “problems of operations and support.” FRUS, Potsdam, vol. 2, 39–42, 49.

52. The primary issue recorded at this session was British participation in the fighting against Japan. The US chiefs continued to pay lip service to the idea “in principle.” Arnold, continuing to reflect his and the JCS’s lack of enthusiasm for a significant British role, agreed to investigate the use of about 250 tactical aircraft once Portal furnished details. FRUS, Potsdam, vol. 2, 48–51.

53. James F. Byrnes had just replaced Edward R. Stettinius as Secretary of State and, unlike Roosevelt, Truman brought this cabinet official to the conference.

54. The morning JCS session touched on British, French, and Dutch participation in the war against Japan, as well as other matters. See FRUS, Potsdam, vol. 2, 64–66. The explosion of the S-1 test atomic weapon as it was known at the time, took place on 16 July in Alamogordo, New Mexico. The reference to 200 was the distance in miles away from the explosion. The blast was measured; its light was reported as visible anywhere from 20 to 60 miles distant. See report of Maj Gen Leslie Groves in FRUS, Potsdam, vol. 2, 1361–68.

55. Discussions during the previous JCS session dealt with the recurring expressed desire of the British (as well as the Dutch and French) to participate in the final assault against Japan. Although this issue had been raised and discussed extensively at the second Quebec Conference in September 1944 and was a topic at other meetings, at this Potsdam session the British proposed a “quarter share in the control of operations.” Marshall responded that the United States was unwilling to share control but was prepared to discuss strategy with the Allies at the same time reserving final decisions to the United States. If this were not acceptable, the British could withhold their forces but the United States would continue the offensive. Brooke concluded euphemistically after Marshall’s remarks that the discussion “cleared the air a good deal,” although he appeared to lament correctly that the British “had been rather left out of the picture.” It appeared clear to the British as well as the Americans that with a new president the British would

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have much more difficulty than previously over issues such as these that the American JCS felt were important. FRUS, Potsdam, vol. 2, 82–86; Arthur Bryant, *Triumph in the West: A History of the War Years Based on the Diaries of Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1959), 362.

56. Previously within the US Navy area of control, Okinawa was turned over to the Army under General MacArthur.

57. Brooke, hardly an admirer of Americans or their military, was less impressed with these US troops than Arnold. He disparaged the US soldiers: "The efficiency of the equipment at the display left a greater mark on one than the physique or the turn-out of the men." Bryant, 362.

58. Mickey Rooney, the diminutive American movie actor, was traveling with one of the many United Service Organization (USO) troupes entertaining service personnel worldwide.

59. Nothing recorded at the 10 A.M. JCS meeting related directly to the AAF. The only recorded item at the 2:30 CCS session of immediate concern to the AAF was that the planned date for the defeat of Japan was established as 15 November 1946, hardly a ringing endorsement of the possibility of strategic bombing ending the war in the immediate future. The JCS meeting account is printed in FRUS, Potsdam, vol. 2, 99–100, that of the CCS, 112–15. Arnold won the bet; Marshall did not resign as Chief of Staff until November following the Japanese surrender in August. He did not enjoy his anticipated retirement even then, being immediately appointed Ambassador to China and subsequently serving in various positions as Secretary of State and then of Defense until 1951.

60. Probably because of security considerations, Arnold did not mention in his diary his desire to see the extensive underground aircraft manufacturing facility that had been started by the Nazis at Tempelhof in 1944 as protection from Allied bombers. It had been a major Berlin airport dating from 1922 as a grass field until improved with concrete aprons and runways in 1934. It was used heavily during the war. In 1944, the Germans sought to protect a FW 190 assembly line from Allied bombing by moving it underground, three stories deep with corridors running for four or more miles under the buildings. Engines were built five miles distant and brought in by truck. The Luftwaffe defenders of the base, subjected to a fierce Soviet artillery attack, were overrun in late May 1945. Two days prior to the arrival of the Soviet troops, the German commander, Col Rudolph Boettger, killed himself but not before destroying the bulk of the production records of the FW plant. Ransacking by the Soviets and mass looting by German civilians necessitated considerable work to clean up Tempelhof in the 17 days between the arrival of American forces on 2 July and the Potsdam meeting. It was the major airport utilized by American aircraft during the Berlin airlift 1948–1949. See 21 August 1945 entry in the history of the airfield in 715th Air Materiel Squadron, 473d Air Service Group History, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
61. It is not known whether Arnold ever obtained the then unusual transformer.

62. At the JCS meeting, Arnold spoke of the delay in getting Soviet agreement for transport between Tehran and Russia and the current lack of a Soviet response to the AAF request to shorten the route through Turkey. Hap’s draft memo to Stalin on the issue was approved. At the CCS 2:30 gathering, nothing was recorded as relevant to the AAF. The account of the JCS meeting is in FRUS, Potsdam, vol. 2, 139–40; and CCS, FRUS, Potsdam, 161–62. Joseph E. Davies, former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, served as an advisor to the president and to the secretary of state at Potsdam. His current position was chairman of the War Relief Control Board.

63. All three structures visited are in the western section of Potsdam in the park von Sansouci. The Palace of Sansouci was built for Frederick the Great in 1745–1747 while the Orangerie on the northern edge of the park with its many works of art dated from 1856. The Neues Palais, also built under Frederick the Great, was constructed from 1763 to 1769, later having been used as the summer residence of Kaiser Wilhelm II. American difficulties encountered with the Soviet guards are chronicled in Arnold, Global Mission, 587.

64. With the collapse of Germany in November 1918, Kaiser Wilhelm II, along with the Kaisernine Queen Augusta Victoria, fled to the Netherlands city of Doorn, where he lived until his death in 1941.

65. The Soviet general is not otherwise identified.

66. Charlottenberg is a borough part of and just west of the center of Berlin. This was the British Seventh Armoured Division, the “Desert Rats.” One observer of the parade commented, “I suppose I ought to have been gripped by what this all meant. Here were British troops who had come from Egypt, through North Africa and Italy, to France . . . parading where masses of German forces had goose-stepped in the past. Somehow it left me cold.” Brooke, quoted in Bryant, 363. The Siegessaule or Column of Victory in the Tiergarten was erected between 1865 and 1873 to commemorate the wars associated with German unification.

67. Now located in what was formerly East Berlin and from 1961 to 1989 isolated by the Berlin Wall as part of East Germany, the Brandenburg gate was originally erected between 1788 and 1791. It was modeled after the Propylaea in Athens.

68. Nothing in the printed account of this meeting related to the AAF. See FRUS, Potsdam, vol. 2, 197–201.

69. Maj Gen Harry J. Malony, USA, CG, 95th Infantry Division. No issue relating to the AAF was discussed at this CCS session. FRUS, Potsdam, vol. 2, 201–2.

70. Brig Gen George C. McDonald, director of intelligence, USSTAF. The film became part of the holdings of the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Arnold sent a cable this date to Eaker, creating an AAF Document Research Board as of 25 July 1945; copy in George C. McDonald Papers, US Air Force Academy Library, Special Collection, Colorado Springs, Colo.
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71. Copies of Lt Gen Karl Koller and Dr. Albert Speer, German Minister of Production, statements/interviews are in Henry H. Arnold Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C., hereinafter cited as AP.

72. This discussion dealt with the possible use of the atomic bomb against Japan, Stimson assessing it from the “standpoint of strategy” implementation and targets. Arnold emphasized his earlier recommendations, made with Marshall and Stimson on 18 July, that General Spaatz, who was in the Pacific and would be directing US operations from Guam, should make the actual selection of targets and coordinate with Maj Gen Leslie R. Groves, USA, CG, Manhattan Engineer District, which developed the weapon. Col Jack Stone’s mission is mentioned briefly in Arnold, Global Mission, 589. No copy of Arnold’s later recommendations has been found in AP. Earlier in the day, Stimson had met with Churchill and Lord Cherwell. The British Prime Minister indicated that Truman, on receiving a copy of Gen Groves’s report on the successful 16 July test explosion, was “pepped up.” He commented further that as a result the president “stood up to the Russians in a most emphatic and decisive manner.” See Diary (microfilm) of Henry L. Stimson, 21 July 1945, Sterling Library, Yale University, New Haven, Conn., excerpt also printed in FRUS Postdam, vol. 2, 225; Arnold, Global Mission, 589; Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), 176–77; and Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, vol. 5, 704–25.

73. Maj Gen Oliver P. Echols, now chief Internal Affairs and Communications Division, US Occupation Forces Germany.

74. See note 57 above on the FW 190 underground assembly line.

75. Maj Gen Deane continued to head the US Military Mission to Russia; Maj Gen Floyd L. “Parksie” Parks, USA, CG, US Occupation Forces, Berlin, was in charge of United States arrangements for the conference.

76. Arnold proved amazingly prescient. The disparity in the economic health, including their GNP, respective standards of living, et cetera, between East Germany and West Germany was dramatic in the postwar period. East Germany, created from the Soviet occupation zone in 1949, was far outstripped by West Germany, which was created in the same year by the merging of the occupation zones of France, Great Britain, and the United States. Assimilating the diverse standards of living in the former Russian-dominated East Germany with West Germany following the unification of both sectors in 1992 remains a problem for the Germans at this writing.

77. Silesia, in eastern Europe, is highly industrialized. Containing large coal deposits and mines, it is located along both banks of the Oder river north of the Sudeten mountains. Overrun by the Soviets in the winter of 1944, it was under their control at this time. Much of prewar Silesia was incorporated into the new Polish boundaries as confirmed at this conference. The coal-rich and also highly industrialized Saar, in what became West Germany, is bounded on the south and west by France, by Luxemburg on the northwest, and by the Rhineland-Palatinate in the northeast. Allied troops had gained complete control of the area in early 1945 and it was in the zone of occupation allocated to France.
78. The printed account of the JCS meeting is in FRUS, Potsdam, vol. 2, 271–72; and that of the CCS in 292–94. Neither set of minutes referred to issues relevant to the AAF.

79. As indicated above, Arnold was fully aware that this had already been accomplished and probably included this comment in order to confuse any unauthorized persons who gained access to the diary.


81. At this session, the CCS presented their military report to Truman and Churchill. After some discussion over wording in the draft, it was adopted. No issue relevant to the AAF appeared in the printed account. The record of the meeting is printed in FRUS, Potsdam, vol. 2, 339–44; the final report is on 1462–73.

82. The Cecilienhof Palace at Potsdam was a relatively modern building completed in 1913 for Cecelie of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, wife of Crown Prince Wilhelm, son of Kaiser Wilhelm II.

83. The abrupt reference is to the Tripartite (US, British, Soviet) military chiefs meeting at 2:30. General Antonov, chief of staff of the Soviet Army, spoke briefly about USSR “intentions and plans with reference to [entering the war against] the Japanese.” Arnold spoke at some length about the air war, emphasizing the AAF successes now that Okinawa had been secured. He stressed problems that the Japanese AF was having against American raids. There is an account in FRUS, Potsdam, vol. 2, 344–53. A second meeting held that afternoon at 5:30 by the CCS dealt essentially with operations in the Southeast Asia Command. The account appears in FRUS, Potsdam, vol. 2, 375–78.

84. Arnold had earlier cabled that Spaatz should coordinate the selection of targets with Maj Gen Groves; Arnold, Global Mission, 589.

85. There appears no record of this discussion; Brig Gen George A. Lincoln, USA, OPD, War Department, Washington.

86. Along with four other officers representing the Army and Navy, those named returned to Washington via the headquarters of “each Theater Commander so that we could inform each of them about what had transpired at Potsdam.” Their travels took them to Italy, India, China, the Philippines, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Guam, and Hawaii. They had no knowledge, however, of the atomic bomb, its test firing, or any plans to use it; Charles P. Cabell, A Man of Intelligence: Memoirs of War, Peace and the CIA, ed. Charles P. Cabell Jr., Brig Gen, USAF, Retired (Colorado Springs, Colo.: Impavide Publications, 1997), 211–17. Jamison’s and Norstad’s instructions are not found.

87. Gen Malin Craig, USA, had succeeded MacArthur and preceded George Marshall as Chief of Staff of the US Army in the period 1935–1939. Arnold worked closely with him after arriving in Washington in 1936. They had also formed a strong bond during the 1930s when Hap commanded March Field and Craig was the Army Area Corps commander. They were
golfing partners then and later. Arnold may well have been aware by now of the report (or the fact) that Craig had threatened to resign as Army Chief of Staff if FDR did not appoint Arnold as Air Corps Chief in September 1938. Although called to active duty for a brief time during the war to assist in personnel matters, Craig had most recently suffered a stroke; hence Hap’s comment that his demise was a “merciful thing.”

88. General Alexei I. Antonov, chief of staff, Soviet Army; Marshal of the Air Falaleyev, chief of staff, Soviet Air Force; Fleet Admiral Nikolai Gerassimovich Kuznetsov, chief of staff, Soviet Navy. At this session, held in the Cceellenhof Palace at 3 P.M., much of the discussion involved Arnold’s questions over operational control in the Manchurian-Korean border areas once the USSR entered the war. The Soviet military chiefs present, although still maintaining some reluctance to make any commitments themselves, without specific instructions from Moscow or Stalin, seemed to have been instructed to appear more cooperative. Arnold’s remarks were directed towards handling of AAF aircraft in emergency situations. Concern over local discretion accorded the Soviet local commanders arose from the handling and care of crippled B-29s and their crews that had landed in or near Vladivostok, a topic discussed as early as November 1943 at Tehran. In late 1944, for example, the Soviets forced down a B-29, 42-6365 of the 468th Bomb Group, and compelled it to land in that city. Two other B-29s in trouble, one curiously named General H. H. Arnold, had also landed there. In view of their then neutral status vis-à-vis Japan, the Soviets interned the crews but later permitted them to “escape” via Tehran. Early disposition of the crews and planes was delayed because of the normal lack of discretion permitted the local commander, since he was subject to strict control from Moscow. Not surprisingly, the Soviets retained the B-29s, which became the models for the Soviet Tu-4 bomber. See the account of the meeting in FRUS, Potsdam, vol. 2, 408-17.

89. Churchill’s Conservative Party coalition was defeated by Clement L. Attlee’s Labour Party, which won, by final count, 395 seats in the House of Commons—a majority of more than 180. The elections had been held three weeks earlier on 5 July, but announcement of the results was delayed while the absentee military ballots were counted.

90. Truman used the hiatus occasioned by the return of Churchill to England for the British elections to visit Eisenhower at his Frankfurt headquarters.

91. The 1911 document is not located in AP. It appeared clear that by now Arnold was considering writing his memoirs.

92. As the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Brooke lamented in his diary the day following the elections: “Whom shall I be dealing with in the future? Attlee as PM and who as Secretary of State? I feel too old and weary to start off any new experiments.” He reluctantly remained and served the new government until 25 June 1946. See Bryant, 366.

93. Lawrence D. Bell, president, Bell Aircraft Corporation; Summers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration is not otherwise identified.
94. It seems unlikely that the wife of either General Giles would have been in Europe at this time. Maj Gen Benjamin Franklin Giles was CG, AAF in the Middle East; Lt Gen Barney McK. Giles was still the CG AAF in the Pacific Ocean area. Mr. and Mrs. Parsons and Gabrielle Andreu are not otherwise identified; Maj Gen David M. Schlatter, deputy CG, USSTAF in Europe.
95. The numbers represent the mileage from the Azores to Stephenville, Newfoundland, and then on to Washington. See entry for 30 July.
96. No museum to house Arnold’s memorabilia was ever established.
97. The reference is not clear. The Cumulative Book Index for the 15 years prior to 1945 fails to list a book by this title. It may well have been that this was the tentative title Arnold had selected for his memoirs that he intended to write. The book was eventually called Global Mission. Increasingly in the later sections, the diary seems to have been written in part with an eye to their being used, as they were, as a significant basis for the latter part of his proposed memoirs.
98. This Focke-Wulf Condor was to be sent to Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, where testing of foreign aircraft continued in this period.
99. Colonel Serrano of the Engineer Corps is not otherwise identified.
100. Arnold meant Jane Froman, the American singer who was injured in February 1942 when a Pan American Clipper airplane in which she was a passenger en route to entertain US forces in England, crashed into the sea near Lisbon. Eighteen operations later and still on crutches, she continued traveling abroad to perform for US service personnel. She returned in September 1945 from this 8,000-mile trip. She had appeared before more than 300,000 serving Americans.
101. Col Albert F. Edson, commanded the 1388th AAF base unit at Stephenville.
102. Mr. Lee Wulff was a civilian employee of the AAF at Stephenville. His responsibilities included recreational activities for the personnel stationed there. The lake is not otherwise identified. The appropriately named Serpentine River flows east and west, emptying into the Gulf of St. Lawrence approximately 30 miles due north of Stephenville and the air base.
103. Neither Sam Connell nor his camp is otherwise identified.
104. The histories of Harmon Field, which was controlled at this time by the Newfoundland Base Command, reflect that three medical evacuation squadrons were attached to the base. However, no rescue unit was assigned there at this time. Arnold may have used the term rescue to denote a medical evacuation squadron.
105. Arnold Diary, 15 July 1945.
106. Ibid., 18 July 1945.
107. Stimson Diary, 21 July 1945; the report is printed in FRUS, Potsdam, vol. 2, 1361–68.
108. Arnold Diary, 22 July 1945.
109. Ibid., 23 July 1945.
110. Ibid., 24 July 1945.
111. Ibid., 25 July 1945.

113. Admiral Leahy's memo from the JCS to Truman is in FRUS, *Potsdam*, vol. 2, 1268–69.

114. Truman prints the authorization to Spaatz on 420–21 of his *Memories*; it also is reproduced in *Craven and Cate*, vol. 5, 696–97.

115. Arnold Diary, 16 July 1945.

116. Ibid., 17, 23 July 1945.

117. Ibid., chap. 11, 13 June 1945.

118. The optimism was not restricted to Americans alone. See for example Arnold to Frank M. Andrews, 24 March 1943, AP, which suggests that optimism had "rubbed off" on Arnold. In it, Hap identified Schweinfurt as a target whose "destruction would virtually paralyze all German industry." Arnold was quoted in the *New York Times*, 2 June 1943, as saying to the West Point graduating class of 1943 that the enemy was "already beginning to crack," and that the "tide was turning" in favor of the Allies. These estimates were essentially the result of even more optimism relayed to him from his commanders on the scene in Europe. Interestingly enough Gen George Kenney, MacArthur's air commander, although motivated in part by the need for more assets, was more realistic with Arnold, insisting that the Japanese were like playing Notre Dame every week. See Kenney to Arnold, 24 October 1942, AP.


122. Stimson and Bundy, 613.


Epilogue

Although he maintained no diary after Potsdam, Arnold continued to be concerned with significant AAF issues, most of which had appeared in his journals. Many of these would impact on a strong postwar AAF, which, as he pondered retirement, Arnold considered a legacy worth strengthening.

As the postscript to chapter 12 has indicated, the atomic bombs were dropped and Japanese leaders initiated the diplomatic steps that led to their surrender during Arnold’s first weeks after his last journal entry and his return to the Pentagon. Similar to his limited recorded reaction at the German capitulation, Arnold recorded little emotion over the final end of the war. He appeared instead to continue striving for recognition of the AAF’s accomplishments. He remembered receiving the news announcing the end of the war: “We had no celebration, just a family dinner.” He continued, saying the dinner was followed by the visits of several AAF generals and their wives throughout the evening and the sending of a congratulatory telegram to the commander in chief.1 Once he returned to the Pentagon, Hap’s attitude and actions seemed different from those of a member of his immediate staff who wrote in the week the Japanese surrendered, “it couldn’t be possible for many people to be settled in their own minds about what they did next.”2 In contrast to this assessment, Arnold continued at his normal dizzying pace with problems that had concerned him during the war.

His comments in Global Mission revealed his thinking that the Air Force’s part in the Pacific was ignored by the press as the war progressed, not insofar as the actual raids themselves were concerned, but in the buildup for the future. After the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, the attention of the media was concentrated logically on the bombs, the terrible destructiveness, the massive loss of life, the radiation, and the portent for the future. The media gave much less coverage to the B-29 delivery system, which represented for Arnold the vital concept of strategic bombardment and which had been an integral part of the growth—and as Arnold now hoped—the future of the AAF. Hap complained that the reporters “had all talked
about the *Naval* capture of the Islands . . . and use [of] them as a base. No one had mentioned using them as bases for the B-29s, yet it was the B-29s and the B-29s only that could put tons and tons of bombs on Japan." There seems little doubt that Arnold was involved in the direction of the 426 Superfortresses that flew over the *Missouri* surrender ceremony.3

At Arnold’s insistence, it was decided to emphasize the airplane, its intercontinental range, its current role, and its future role for the United States and the Army Air Forces. One method chosen was the flight of three B-29s, each piloted by a general officer, to fly nonstop from Japan to Washington. They started from Hokkaido, the northernmost home island, because of fuel limitations. The drama to be wrung from the flight was diminished when the prevailing winds during the mission proved to be the reverse of the normal and forced the planes to land in Chicago. Nevertheless, considerable publicity was generated by a press conference in the Pentagon, in which Arnold participated, after the B-29s arrived in Washington.4

Among the peacetime transition problems that concerned Arnold and other US military leaders was an orderly disposition of the armada of planes, ships, tanks, and other weapons along with a reduction in the size of the military. Most members of the armed services, who had not considered this wartime interlude as a career, were now carefully counting their accrued service “points” and calculating when they could return home. Arnold had a more difficult problem in attempting to determine how many and which leaders would be retained as the AAF drew down from its 2,400,000 wartime strength to its anticipated size of 500,000. Hap’s vision in anticipating potential problems (except, most notably, the need for fighter protection for bombers) had marked Arnold’s wartime career. Assessing the current leadership and attempting to shape the structure of the postwar air force were not exceptions.

Shortly after his fourth heart attack in late January 1945, which probably gave him a sense of urgency, he began to request that each of his major commanders rank the generals serving under them. The changes in assignments while he was in Europe, considered in chapter 10, were made more in terms
of postwar than wartime utilization, the aim being to assemble the strongest postwar AAF team possible. While in the Pacific, not waiting for the war to end, as is reflected in the diary for chapter 11, Hap began to relieve and send home to retire several generals he felt would not be competitive in the postwar AAF. While reluctant to be frank, Arnold personally wrote to generals, including a close friend and three-star West Point classmate, “you should go on retired status.”

Although no mention has been located in Arnold’s papers or wartime diaries, another facet of this problem was to retain those deemed essential to a successful postwar air force. Arnold’s frenetic routine since becoming chief almost seven years earlier had been duplicated in the lives of other generals and, as Hap looked forward to retirement on his ranch in California, he had to have appreciated that others among his colleagues longed for similar respite. Spaatz, for example, cabled Lovett less than two weeks after the Japanese decision to surrender and during the week of the Missouri ceremony, “I shall come to Washington immediately after the ceremonies in Tokyo. I am coming with all my baggage, etc., prepared to call it a day and retire.” Similar sentiments were being voiced by Eaker, now serving as deputy AAF commander and chief of the air staff in Washington. He wrote, in the same month that Arnold announced his decision to leave the service, “The date of my retirement has not been definitely set as yet but I told him [Spaatz] that I wanted to get out within a year.” Fortunately for the AAF/USAF, Eaker remained in uniform for almost two more years and Spaatz remained until June 1948 after having served as Arnold’s successor as chief of staff.

A question that had been only briefly touched on in the diaries but was present in the thinking and actions of Arnold and other senior leaders, including those opposed to a separate air force such as Admiral King of the Navy, was the role of a postwar air force in the American military structure. In Hap’s discussions as recorded in the diaries with both MacArthur and Eisenhower, they had been supportive of a department of defense in which the air force would have a coequal voice with the Army and Navy. Even before the US entrance into the war, there had been increasing agitation
from within the Air Corps as well as segments of the press and Congress for a separate service.

A full-scale assessment of Hap’s role in this issue is beyond the scope of these diaries, but there is convincing evidence that he attempted to discourage if not limit the cries of Seversky as well as some serving officers for a separate air force. Hap’s motivation stemmed from an appreciation that any struggle for air force independence or separation (the terms were used imprecisely and interchangeably in this period) would detract from the daunting task of building an air arm for what he and most other military leaders were convinced was US involvement in a war. Another reason was the fact that after 1 September 1939, the new chief of staff became a friend rather than antagonist of the airmen and supported Arnold and the AAF. Under Marshall, the reorganization of 1942 gave the AAF what has been called “controlled autonomy.” Further, his method of operating and his growing confidence in Hap resulted in Arnold being given considerable latitude. Hap understood that, in most cases, he could not afford to “lose” Marshall’s support, which he risked if the war or preparations for it became a vehicle for the attainment of immediate AAF separation. Other factors included Hap’s appreciation of the prewar lack of airmen who had the administrative, logistical, and/or technical experience to operate separately from an army that had supplied most of these talents. Arnold, recalling his earlier support of Billy Mitchell that went far beyond the courtroom and understanding that he was now the “establishment,” wrote that his crusading days were over. One of the hard-core Andrews supporters grudgingly observed, in mixed praise of Arnold in 1939, “he has got the politicians on his side and now that Hap has gotten what he is after, he is going to make a first-class chief, maybe the best one we have ever had.”

As World War II ended, Arnold established a “special office” in the Pentagon, headed by a major general, to “coordinate efforts being made to attain the coequal status.” Arnold also ensured that his views were represented on the planning staff of the JCS by selecting Brig Gen Charles “Pre” Cabell as the AAF spokesman. A West Point graduate and former member of Arnold’s Advisory Council, Cabell was thoroughly familiar with Hap’s thinking. He had been a combat commander, a plans and
intelligence officer, and an attendee at Yalta. Also, General Cabell had accompanied Hap to Potsdam. The ensuing role of the AAF in the struggle for coequal status belongs to another study, but Arnold was convinced that when the discussion over a proposed Department of Defense began, he would have the overwhelming support of MacArthur and Eisenhower as well as the senior ground generals from the European theater, including Omar Bradley, whose troops had been closely supported by AAF tactical operations. In other concerns for the future, the completed and highly complimentary Strategic Bombing Survey for Europe was now being duplicated for the Pacific.  

Arnold and the Air Transport Command undertook a strong role in the Herculean task of returning American service personnel from their far-flung locations to the United States as quickly as possible after the war. The issue was charged with political implications as Truman and many congressmen urged the services to “Get the boys [sic] back.” Massive ship movements were being used, but these voyages promised to consume weeks. In response to the president’s urging greater action in a specific inquiry in August 1945, Hap responded that the ATC was operating 2,700 transport aircraft over 180,000 route miles, employing 202,000 officers and airmen. This effort constituted a marked change from the creation of the command four years earlier, following Arnold’s return from England outlined in chapter 1. The wartime worldwide military airline, now praised by Hap to the president, was in Arnold’s mind needed not only as a vital postwar connection between bases around the world but as a vital service that would be critical in deploying forces in an emergency.  

Judging by the correspondence and activity in and out of Arnold’s office in the first three months following the end of the war and before he announced his retirement, the conclusion is justified that he had not slowed his pace from that of wartime. Even so, Arnold continued to ponder the future, particularly the leadership of the military, as he shared his thoughts concerning the results of the war with Maj Gen Maxwell Taylor, the newly appointed superintendent of West Point.

The future is greatly on my mind these days for the increasing scientific aspect of war must inevitably have a profound effect on our train-
ing and thinking. We cannot rely any longer on the old precepts of the past, but must instill in our leaders of tomorrow the importance of having flexible, imaginative minds. It will not be sufficient for officers to be merely leaders—they must be thinking leaders, capable of adapting themselves to ever-changing and rapidly changing conditions.13

As important as Arnold's interest in the prospective leadership of the military was, he continued to believe that the future if not dominance of the Air Force would be dependent on results obtained from scientific research and development. In the month of the final Japanese surrender, he flew to California where he and his decades-long friend, Donald Douglas, arranged for creation of the RAND Corporation (the acronym formed from the terms research and development). Arnold committed $10 million of AAF funds to the initial funding of the new corporation. A recent scholar has described RAND's early mission as a “technical consultant group charged with operations analysis and long-range planning to examine future warfare and the best way the Air Force could perform its missions.”14 It was originally staffed with scientists and engineers from Douglas Aircraft Corporation. While on terminal leave and not yet absent from the scene, Arnold oversaw the creation of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development in the Pentagon. The selection of Major General Curtis LeMay as its first director reflected Hap's belief that the position required direction and oversight from Washington by a proven operator rather than a scientist.

In December 1945, before Arnold left Washington, Theodore von Kármán fulfilled a charge given him a year earlier by Hap. He submitted his 33-volume report, Toward New Horizons, which was based on his preliminary report of a year earlier, Where We Stand. The title of the first volume, Science: The Key to Air Supremacy, could well have been Hap's prescription for the future.15 As Arnold saw it, one of his jobs "was to project myself into the future; to get the best brains available, have them use as a background the latest scientific developments in the air arms [of other nations] and determine what steps the United States should take to have the best Air Force in the world twenty years hence."16
Among other issues, Hap’s concern for the AAF included the future disposition of surplus US airplanes and effective use of experienced aviators. This concern resulted in his efforts in the autumn of 1945 to work with several Latin American Republics. Recalling his amicable relations with the Brazilians and the time spent assessing their training in American aircraft and procedures recounted in chapter 10, Arnold spent considerable time and effort working with other Latin American nations in 1945 and 1946. His labors were not altogether altruistic, as he confessed that he assessed their needs and attempted to help them establish “a line of outposts [that might support B-29s] to intercept any surprise blow that might fall.” This activity was first exhibited in the postwar period in a trip to Mexico in October 1945. This was followed by a January 1946 journey south in an attempt to arrange for aircraft, expertise, and training for Colombia, Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil. Red tape and opposition from US State Department personnel limited his success. Recurring health problems became his largest impediment, however, and they were exacerbated by travel within Columbia. Although his condition failed to improve, he traveled on to Peru but was soon forced to return to the AAF medical facilities in Miami. While there, he met and talked briefly with Churchill, who was vacationing prior to his “Iron Curtain” speech.17

Not unexpectedly, Arnold submitted to his friend George Marshall, on 8 November 1945, a request to retire from the military. Commencing terminal leave immediately, Hap no longer headed the AAF as Spaatz prepared to succeed him as chief.18

There seems little doubt that the less demanding routine of retirement lacked the challenge of multiple problems during his previous 12-hour days in the Pentagon. Fortunately, however, there were meaningful endeavors to help occupy part of his time. He spent a few hours each month in the office that was maintained for him at nearby Hamilton Field, where he continued an irregular correspondence with old friends, including Charles Lindbergh, Dwight Eisenhower, Sir Charles Portal, George Marshall, and Robert Lovett. In 1949, he was pleased with word from President Truman that he was now a five-star General of the United States Air Force, which had come into existence almost two years earlier, in many ways
created by Hap’s efforts. His assumption of five-star rank in the Air Force gave Arnold the distinction of being the only person to hold that rank in both Army and Air Force. The occasion was marked by a White House ceremony in the spring. During this visit to the east Coast, Hap attended the graduation from West Point of his third son, David, who was then commissioned in the Air Force.

California Governor Earl Warren appointed Arnold to the California Fish and Game Commission, thus providing involvement in activities that he had always enjoyed and found relaxing. Yet a review of his correspondence and activities in this period reveals, at least to this writer, boredom and a lack of purpose—not an unexpected reaction for a man who had lived a demanding life of deadlines and pressures, particularly those of the years 1938–45 and the responsibilities imposed by war.

Other matters required his occasional travel to Washington, although he was careful to limit these. One such trip involved testifying in November 1947 before a Senate committee investigating alleged improprieties by an AAF major general, who Arnold liked and who had earlier performed well for Arnold in troubleshooting B-29 production problems. Hap’s testimony reflected that illness had neither dimmed his sense of right and wrong nor diminished his pride in the AAF: “If, to our regret, we of the Air Force did not find a rotten apple in our barrel, we are grateful that others have done so. If we were at fault in not finding it, we must admit our fault. We thought we had reason to rely on the integrity as well as the ability of men entrusted with high responsibility.”

His retirement in California, like most whose dreams have been conditioned by a lifetime habit of constant work, did not become the idyllic leisure that he anticipated. His expectations, expressed humorously and with some element of hope, were outlined in his parting speech to the National Press Club. He told them he was going out to his ranch in California and “sit under an oak tree. From there I’ll look across the Valley at the white-faced cattle. And if one of them even moves too fast, I’ll look the other way.” He continued, concerning aircraft: “If one dares to fly low over my ranch house, I’ll grab a rifle or
something and shoot it down." Having been elected to the board of the National Geographic Society, Hap enjoyed participating in the Society’s regular deliberations in Washington.

His most demanding and time-consuming task was the penning of his memoirs, for which he relied extensively on these diaries. It proved to be a more difficult enterprise than he had anticipated. The project consumed most of the year 1947 for both Hap and his assistant, AAF Lt Col William R. Laidlaw. Arnold finally submitted the manuscript to his publisher in the spring of 1948. A year later, the book had not appeared and Hap complained of “fighting changes” with the publisher. As a result, Hap noted, he became “all riled up.”

As his health continued to decline, Arnold suffered at least his fifth heart attack at age 62, on 14 January 1948. Marshall, now Secretary of State, provided his old friend some understanding but little sympathy when he jokingly wrote of being told that Arnold “was threatening to get up and [was] cursing and swearing at everyone.” He then added that this was a “clear indication that there is really nothing wrong with you except you are getting too much care and attention.”

Two years and a day after his fifth heart attack, Arnold was dead.

Summarizing and evaluating the career of the man who more than any other single individual was responsible for the operations of the AAF in World War II is a daunting task. His diaries, however, reflect in his own words much about this man, his strengths, weaknesses, and beliefs.

A characteristic that seems accurately reflective of Arnold is that he was not a systematic thinker. During his longtime career, he was more an operator than a theorist. Yet this seeming lack of a disciplined mind was offset by his constant practice of looking towards the future and planning the next step. Conditioned no doubt by the near-revolutionary changes in aviation technology that he saw on the runways of March Field and elsewhere in the decade before he became chief, he emphasized the role of science, laboratory experimentation, and the application of technology as keys to success for the Army air arm. At the same time, he was not always comfortable with the scientists and engineers themselves, referring to them, perhaps only half in jest, as “long-haired boys.” Hap is
thus revealed as a personality having the inconsistencies that mark all humans.

Arnold’s heavy reliance on the laboratory, where results could neither be predicted nor proceed along a measured schedule, stood in sharp contrast to his impetuosity elsewhere, as often recorded in his diaries, and in his well-earned reputation for hectoring, badgering, and relieving subordinates. Hap’s thinking did have some shortcomings, among which was the major one of not appreciating the need for escort fighter aircraft, relying as he did on what was perceived to have been major technological improvements in the bomber. In his doctrinal myopia and almost religious faith in strategic bombardment, he failed to appreciate the comparable advances that were being accomplished in devising defenses against the bombers. Nor would his organizational skills likely be touted in an MBA textbook as ideal. Fortunately, he was generally a good judge of subordinates, having known and flown with many of them for decades. Their roles in key positions often acted as strong stabilizing influences for much of the Air Staff.

In contrast, as discussed elsewhere, it is difficult to explain Hap’s general unwillingness to delegate responsibility at the highest level, a characteristic that resulted in unnecessary delays in the decision-making process when he was absent or ill. This was offset to a considerable extent, however, by his willingness to consider ideas from whatever source, whether received while eating from mess kits with crewmen in tents in North Africa or from the chief of the RAF. He recognized the need to sit back and consider in depth and on a long-range basis the many problems that his self-imposed hectic schedule did not allow him to consider. He was wise enough to effectively use the Advisory Council he had created for this purpose.

Arnold was not unwilling to break with tradition and resort to innovation to attack problems. His use of any means available to achieve AAF goals included the contracting for facilities, aircraft, and instructors of civilian flying schools to train pilots and navigators, the previously unheard of recruitment and use of women as ferry pilots, and the filling with airmen
the underutilized facilities of civilian colleges and universities as well as luxury vacation hotels.

His personal instincts as a gambler, characterized by small friendly bets on an athletic contest or a horse race, carried over to issues of significance. His willingness to risk his future on the need to retain enough American production for expanding the AAF led him to oppose strongly FDR's desires that the bulk of aircraft be sent to the besieged British. Additionally, he approved development of the B-29 and obtained funds for it long before the required testing had been completed. The result was a weapon that hastened the end of the war but that also rushed into operation an aircraft with far too many—and too often fatal—teething problems.

Hap appreciated the need for extensive public relations. In fact, a detailed study could well be made of his efforts to use, and success in using, the existing media to promote the AAF. This included newspapers, the motion picture industry, radio, and personal speaking engagements, which he accepted more than his health and the demands of his office dictated. He was not deterred by the fact that he was not an accomplished speaker, a fact chronicled by Maj James Gould Cozzens, a speechwriter and successful prewar author, who was concerned about what he perceived to be Hap's tangled syntax in modifying the speeches Cozzens had written.

Arnold appeared comfortable as Marshall's subordinate in the Army hierarchy. He worked effectively and harmoniously, and he gained the respect of civilian War Department leaders Stimson and Lovett. His less than cordial interface with the United States Navy was probably as much his fault as theirs, but it was clearly exacerbated by the rudeness of Adm Ernest J. King, who strongly resented and often ignored Hap's presence in their necessary and frequent JCS and CCS gatherings. Arnold worked hard to cultivate effective rapport with congressional leaders, and he normally succeeded in winning support for AAF programs.

On the other hand, Hap was perceived, often correctly, as ruthless with subordinates. He was famed for swearing, although there is little evidence that his profanity was directed personally towards the recipient or group as individuals. It
seems instead to have been an outlet for his frustrations at what he considered less than desired performance. His voluminous correspondence is almost completely devoid of personal criticism or invective. Too quick to criticize and too slow to compliment, Arnold rarely displayed empathy with the problems subordinates faced in accomplishing their assignments. Apologies from Arnold were rare, and they were difficult for him to offer. He disliked, and often refused to provide, explanations of why a program was not or could not be successful. He was driven far too often by results only. On the other hand, it was a rare individual who worked harder than Arnold during the war.

Although promoted to a higher rank than any other Army airman had been, Arnold remained modest, often chastising the organizers (although probably being secretly pleased) for the lavish ceremonial honors provided on his arrival at air bases. He insisted to his hosts that the manpower could be used more productively towards winning the war. He was noted among the enlisted ranks for rarely failing to personally stop and thank his automobile driver and for showing his “old school” attitude by refusing to allow female enlisted soldiers to carry his luggage.

Arnold’s uneven relations with the British have been chronicled in his diaries, as has been his disdain for the French and the Italians, motivated strongly, although not entirely, by what he felt was these two nations’ limited contributions to the war. His unfavorable impression of the Russians, gained in the closing days of the war, has been captured in his journal covering Potsdam. It was also here where he had his first contact with the defeated Germans, who curiously, provoked almost no comment by Arnold. There is no strain of racism in his correspondence, but he was not inhibited in recording his impressions of other world leaders he met, including Charles de Gaulle, Chiang Kai-shek, Josef Stalin, and King George VI. His obsession with the war, the role of strategic bombardment, and the role of the AAF contributed not only to his worsening health, but also to strain within his family, particularly with his wife of more than 30 years.
Yet, in the final analysis, this unpretentious airman contributed more than any other single individual to the creation of the United States Air Force, which was achieved in September 1947. Fortunately, Hap lived long enough to see and appreciate this momentous occasion. Unlike the voluminous diaries he maintained on the 12 trips covered in this book, his personal thoughts at the birth of the United States Air Force have not been recorded.

Notes

3. The quote is from Arnold, 536, emphasis in the original. Although no direct relationship with Arnold has been established, see the competition over the atomic bomb story among the public affairs staff of the AAF and their concern that the Navy was “having the edge” in Michael S. Sherry, *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987), 345. The B-29 flight over the Missouri is covered in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, vol. 5, *The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 734.
4. LeMay’s account as one of the pilots is in Curtis E. LeMay, with MacKinlay Kantor, *Mission with LeMay: My Story* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1965), 393–95; for Cozzens’ usual, perceptive but jaundiced view from just outside Arnold’s office in the Pentagon, see his diary entries for 18–20 September 1945, 355–59. Hap also hinted that another reason for the highly publicized flight was the “Air Force being exercised over Admiral Nimitz’ claim that he won the war,” Cozzens, 30 August 1945, 346.
5. See comments in chaps. 10 and 11 of this work. For an example from several in the Arnold Papers, see Kenney’s assessment of his subordinate generals as requested by Hap in Kenney to Arnold, 9 July 1945, Gen Henry Harley Arnold Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C., hereinafter cited as AP.
6. Arnold to Lt Gen Barton K. Yount, 7 October 1945, AP.
7. Spaatz to Lovett, 26 August 1945, Gen Carl Andrew Spaatz Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.
9. See the voluminous correspondence of Hugh Knerr at US Air Force Academy (USAFA) Library, Colorado Springs, Colo. Knerr’s almost pathological dislike of Arnold and his attempts to dislodge him as chief in favor of
Gen Frank Andrews made him a natural ally of Seversky and others in their efforts not only against Hap but for immediate Air Corps separation from the Army. Their communications, of which Andrews had to be aware without either condoning or seeming to urge them to stop their efforts, provide insight into this anti-Arnold element. See also the 1940 exchange of letters between Arnold and Edwin Pederson of Los Angeles about publicity in the Los Angeles papers regarding Arnold, the need for a separate air force and Arnold as the inheritor of the legacy of Billy Mitchell. Arnold was concerned about the publicity and worked to get these issues downplayed. See Pederson to Arnold, 5 July 1940 and Hap's 8 July 1940 reply, AP.

10. See undated 1939 Arnold letter: “I gave up crusading a long time ago,” AP. The “politicians on his side” is from Walter Weaver to Tony Frank, 12 May 1939, Murray Green Collection, USAFA.


12. Arnold to President Truman, 24 August 1945; and Arnold to Spaatz, 6 January 1946, AP.

13. Arnold to Maj Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, 22 August 1945, AP.


17. Ibid., Arnold’s account of these activities is on 609–8 where the “line of outposts” appears on 601.

18. Ibid., the letter is printed on 608–9, copies in AP and the George C. Marshall Papers, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va., hereinafter cited as MPMS.


21. For his work with Laidlaw and the source of quotes see Arnold to George Marshall, 2 July 1949, MPMS; also see Coffey, 384–85.

22. Marshall to Arnold, 3 January 1948, MPMS.
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