INTERIM ANALYSIS OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT, *MEASURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN IRAQ*
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numerical Reports of Assigned and Trained Forces Contain Limitations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantial Numbers of Assigned and Trained Personnel Are Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Recruiting Exceeds Training Capacity</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortage of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers Remains a Long-Term Undertaking</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deficiencies in Logistics and Combat Support Require Continued Coalition Assistance</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Forces Needed by 2010 for Internal Security</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitioning to a Military Force for External Security Remains a Future Goal</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology for Determining Numbers of Assigned and Trained Personnel is Evolving</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Comments and Audit Response</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Scope and Methodology</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Command Relationships in Establishing, Training, and Equipping the Iraqi Security Forces</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Comments</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Acronyms</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Audit Team Members</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
JOINT SECRETARIAT
OSD POLICY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ
COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY
TRANSITION COMMAND – IRAQ
DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE


Section 9010 of the Defense Appropriations Act of 2007, Public Law 109-289, requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a quarterly report to the Congress that presents a comprehensive set of performance indicators and measures of progress toward military and political stability in Iraq. One indicator being reported is information on the number of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) authorized (required), assigned (on-the-payroll), and trained. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) reviewed available information to assess the reliability and usefulness of the number of forces authorized, assigned, and trained, as reflected in the March 2008 Department of Defense (DoD) Section 9010 report, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*; and the methodology for gathering the information, including the extent to which DoD reviews and/or validates this information.

To achieve our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed the most recent DoD March 2008 Section 9010 quarterly report relating to the ISF and compared information in that report with earlier Section 9010 reports. We also reviewed prior reports by SIGIR, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq (Jones Report), and others. We held discussions with officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). Our audit plan called for us to hold discussions and obtain information from officials at the Multi National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), and the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). As a basis for these discussions, we provided written questions related to our objectives. We received a written response to our questions through the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense late in our review cycle, and have incorporated this information in this report, as appropriate. We plan to conduct additional follow-on work with U.S. officials in Iraq to obtain a more complete understanding of data gathering and reporting methodologies, as well as efforts to strengthen related processes. Appendix A provides more information on our scope and methodology.
Results

The results of our work to this point show that efforts have been made to improve the information on the numbers of Iraqi Security Forces authorized, assigned, and trained included in DoD’s 9010 reports. However, the details included in the reports, and other available information suggests a continuing need for caution in relying on the accuracy and usefulness of the numbers. This is because:

- There are continuing uncertainties about the true number of assigned and trained Iraqi personnel who are present for duty at any one time. A substantial number of personnel still on the payroll are not available for duty for various reasons, such as being on-leave, absent without leave, injured, or killed.
- Evolving changes in reporting methodology make it difficult to compare information from one report to earlier reports.
- The numbers of personnel reported as trained are not easily correlated with those assigned, the latter including persons not yet trained. Further, both assigned and trained numbers include persons no longer on duty, and the number of trained personnel, in and of itself, is widely recognized as an inadequate indicator of force capability.
- The shortage of officers and non-commissioned officers in the Iraqi security forces remains a significant long-term shortfall that could take a decade to address.
- There is a recognized need for additional Iraqi security forces by 2010 to field a counterinsurgency force capable of protecting the country against internal threats and insurgency.
- Iraqi forces still rely on substantial logistical support of Coalition forces.
- With a current focus is on addressing internal security needs, the longer-term focus on the force structure needed to counter external threats has yet to be addressed.

Information on numbers of ISF personnel included in Section 9010 reports are reportedly derived from multiple sources within individual Iraqi ministries based on processes that continues to evolve. This includes ongoing efforts to develop an automated data system to manage Iraqi military manpower accountability and pay. DoD makes some efforts to determine and comment on the reliability of the data presented in the Section 9010 reports; however, as the Iraqi government assumes greater control over the forces trained and assigned, U.S. officials envision that they will have less visibility over data reliability. SIGIR’s follow-on work will further assess efforts to improve data collection and reliability.

Background

Since 2003, the Congress has appropriated $20.4 billion$^1$ to support the development of the ISF. The ISF is comprised of the following elements: the Police Service, the National Police, and the

---

$^1$ U.S appropriated funds include $5.0 billion in the FY 2004 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF); $5.4 billion in the FY 2005 Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF); followed by increases of $3.0 billion (ISSF, FY 2006), $5.5 billion (ISSF, FY 2007); and $1.5 billion (ISSF, FY 2008).
Directorate of Border Enforcement, under the Ministry of Interior; the Ground Forces (Army), Navy, and Air Force; and Support Forces, under the Ministry of Defense; and the Special Operations Forces under the Counter-Terrorism Bureau. According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Government of Iraq (GoI) has now exceeded the U.S. in total funding for the ISF and this divergence is expected to increase. The recently passed 2008 Iraqi budget provides about $9 billion for the ISF.

In May 2004, National Security Presidential Directive No. 36, “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” assigned responsibility for organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi security forces to the commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). CENTCOM’s subordinate command, the MNF-I, leads this effort and is authorized to do what it can to contribute to security and stability in Iraq. MNF-I’s major subordinate commands–MNSTC-I and the MNC-I–play integral roles in the development and training of the ISF.

MNSTC-I assists the GoI in developing, organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining the ISF. MNC-I is responsible for tactical command and control of MNF-I operations in Iraq and works with Iraq’s military at the division, brigade, and battalion levels, as well as with police forces at the provincial, district, and station levels. Appendix B shows U.S. command relationships in establishing, training, and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces.

In 2005, Congress emphasized the need for a more comprehensive set of performance indicators and measures of stability and security in Iraq, and directed the Secretary of Defense to submit quarterly reports. These reports, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, focus on Iraq’s progress toward political and military stability. One measure of ISF development—the number of authorized, assigned, and trained forces—is shown in Section 2 of the report (Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance). The 11th quarterly progress report was issued in March 2008. It included information on the number of ISF authorized, assigned, and trained, as of January 1, 2008, by ministry and component (see Table 1).

GAO and others have previously commented on issues related to ISF development and the limitations in reported authorized, assigned, and trained forces. For example, in a March 2007 report, GAO stated that the high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry reporting result in an overstatement of the number of security forces present for duty. A more complete listing of reports by GAO and others is shown in Appendix A.

---

Table 1—Iraqi Security Forces as of January 1, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>ASIGNED</th>
<th>TRAINED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of Interior Forces</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>288,001</td>
<td>275,300</td>
<td>155,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Police</td>
<td>33,670</td>
<td>32,389</td>
<td>41,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Enforcement</td>
<td>38,205</td>
<td>39,649</td>
<td>27,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>359,876</td>
<td>347,338</td>
<td>224,606</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Ministry of Defense Forces** |            |         |         |
| Army                        | 186,352    | 159,938 | 174,940 |
| Support Forces              | 17,369     | 18,794  | 19,750  |
| Air Force                   | 2,907      | 1,305   | 1,370   |
| Navy                        | 1,483      | 1,115   | 1,194   |
| **Total**                   | 208,111    | 181,152 | 197,254 |

| **Counter-Terrorism Bureau** |            |         |         |
| Special Operations          | 4,857      | 3,126   | 3,485   |
| **Total**                   | 572,844    | 531,616 | 425,345 |


Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials stated that the process of developing the quarterly report, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, takes about two months and involves reviews by many entities inside and outside DoD. The process begins with OSD submitting a Request for Information to the Joint Staff, MNF-I, and CENTCOM. MNF-I relies on its subcommand, MNSTC-I, to obtain force strength data from Iraq’s Ministries of Defense and Interior. MNF-I’s initial draft then undergoes numerous revisions and redrafts, with input and review from various government organizations, before being submitted to the Secretary of Defense for final review and eventual delivery to Congress. Organizations involved in the process include the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, and Treasury; the Office of Management and Budget; National Security Council; and the Intelligence Community. Table 2 shows the organizations providing input and/or reviewing the quarterly report. Although many organizations review the quarterly reports, OSD officials say, the GoI provides the number of authorized, assigned, and trained Iraqi security forces.
Table 2—Organizations Providing Input and/or Review of Quarterly Reports

| Secretary of Defense | Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) |
| Deputy Secretary of Defense | OSD (Policy)/International Security Affairs/Middle East-Iraq |
| Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff | Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Middle East) |
| Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) | Key General and Flag Officers |
| Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) | Department of State |
| OSD (Public Affairs) | Department of Justice |
| OSD (Legislative Affairs) | Department of the Treasury |
| DoD Office of General Counsel | Office of Management and Budget |
| Joint Staff | National Security Council |
| U.S. Central Command | Intelligence Community |
| Multi-National Force – Iraq | |

Source: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy)

Numerical Reports of Assigned and Trained Forces Contain Limitations

Although the March 2008 Section 9010 report, as well as earlier ones, presents an array of numbers, other information in the 9010 reports and elsewhere indicates (1) uncertainty about the number of Iraqi personnel who are present for duty at any one time; and (2) uncertainty about the capabilities of the police force because the police have greater capacity to recruit than to train—this limits the number of police on the rolls who have been trained. In addition, shortages of officers and/or non-commissioned officers in both the police and defense forces remain a significant long-term challenge that could take a decade to address.

The number of Iraqi police trained, 155,248, as reported in March 2008, is a reduction from the December 2007 report of 174,025. According to the March report, this is due to an accounting error where basic-training graduates were inadvertently double-counted. There was also a reduction of about 3,500 in the border enforcement personnel trained, also said to be due to double-counting.

Also, the number of assigned and trained defense personnel presented in the Section 9010 reports does not measure overall capabilities. For example, DoD noted that deficiencies in Iraqi Army logistics and combat support continue to require substantial Coalition assistance. According to OSD, the Coalition made a conscious decision to initially give priority to developing combat units.
Substantial Numbers of Assigned and Trained Personnel Are Not Present for Duty

According to the December 2007 report, the GoI uses data from its payroll system to ascertain the size of its security forces that is assigned (on-the-payroll). However, all of these individuals are not present-for-duty because many are absent without leave, on leave, or have been wounded or killed. In an earlier report, DoD stated that the actual number of present-for-duty soldiers is about one-half to two-thirds of those assigned. MNSTC-I, in commenting on a draft of this report, stated that those present-for-duty has increased, citing a snapshot, as of April 5, 2008, of 70% of those assigned across the Iraqi Army. MNSTC-I also stated that when growth over time is being measured against a 2010 requirement of 600,000 – 646,000, recording present-for-duty on a specific day serves little relevant purpose, and could even be misleading.

DoD stated that like the personnel killed in action, many of the wounded remain on the rolls in order for families to receive medical care and financial compensation. Further, according to both the March 2008 and December 2007 reports, there is no data on how many of the personnel trained are still actively serving in the ISF.

Earlier reports reflected numbers of Iraqis trained through the primary U.S.-funded programs. But because the GoI is now responsible for determining force requirements and counting personnel, the December 2007 report marks the first time that GoI statistics have been used to report the number of trained and assigned security forces. Within the Ministry of Interior (MoI), trained forces include those personnel who have completed a MoI-sanctioned initial-entry training course. These courses include: the three-year, nine-month and six-month police college courses, Officer Candidate School and Officer Transition Integration Program for officers; 400-hour Basic Recruit Training (BRT), Department of Border Enforcement BRT, Facilities Protection Service BRT, Emergency Response Unit BRT, the Baghdad Provincial Directorate of Police course, and the Transition Integration Program for policemen. OSD advises that those police who receive an abbreviated 80-hour training program versus the full 400-hour training are not counted as trained in the reporting statistics.

Within the Ministry of Defense (MoD), trained forces include personnel who have completed: Basic Combat Training for enlisted, training at one of the military colleges for new officers or a “re-jocker” course for non-commissioned officers, and officers who completed this training under the former regime.

Further, the number of trained personnel, in and of itself, is widely recognized as an inadequate indicator of force capability. MNSTC-I, in commenting on a draft of this report, agreed that trained personnel are not a useful indicator of capability. It added that the Operational Readiness Assessments of Units in being are a useful indicator of force capability, and are discussed extensively within the 9010 report.

Police Recruiting Exceeds Training Capacity

Police-force expansion continues, according to the March 2008 report. Table 1 above shows that the number of MoI police forces assigned (on-the-payroll) exceeds the number trained. According to the March report, this is because recruiting outstripped training capacity. One
concerning factor for the rapid expansion of the police was Coalition Provisional Authority Order 71 (CPA 71), which reportedly diluted the MoI’s control over the police by giving the provincial governments the power to approve hiring and initiate firing of provincial chiefs of police. The practical effect of CPA 71, according to the December 2007 report, was to make provincial chiefs more vulnerable to local pressures without regard to MoI funding constraints. This process did not provide for matching requirements to recruiting. It also, according to the report, negatively affected force manning, undermined attempts to build a requirements-based force structure, and made it difficult to properly train and equip the police as well as to budget for their salaries. DoD reported that the possible addition to the Iraqi forces—mainly police—of more than 19,000 of the 91,000 Sons of Iraq (formerly known as Concerned Local Citizens) currently working with Coalition forces will exacerbate the challenge of training all police who are on the force.

According to OSD, historically, Iraqi police training infrastructure capacity has been insufficient to match recruiting levels. As a result, there is a backlog in assigned police who have not yet been trained or have received abbreviated training. While construction of new or expanded police training facilities is on-going to provide minimum training, OSD states that the MoI, MNC-I and MNSTC-I are using a variety of expedient locations. The joint MNSTC-I and MoI training base expansion now in progress will accelerate police generation and should begin to eliminate the backlog, according to OSD.

OSD acknowledges that untrained police forces actively serve while awaiting training. They state that these personnel serve in probationary roles under the supervision of trained police. Some of the tasks performed by these police include checkpoint manning, administrative and operational support at police stations, and patrolling. Further, according to OSD, police training provides the basic skills for the counterinsurgency fight. Subsequent training will still be needed as the security situation stabilizes and police assume greater responsibility for security and convert to traditional law-enforcement and criminal investigation roles.

The September 2007 report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq concluded that, “The Ministry of Interior is a ministry in name only. It is widely regarded as being dysfunctional and sectarian, and suffers from ineffective leadership. Such fundamental flaws present a serious obstacle to achieving the levels of readiness, capability, and effectiveness in police and border security forces that are essential for internal security and stability in Iraq.”

**Shortage of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers Remains a Long-Term Undertaking**

An effective military force requires leadership from a well-trained and balanced officer and non-commissioned officer corps. This concern was noted in the September 2007, December 2007, and March 2008 DoD reports. The September 2007 report identified a shortage of officers and non-commissioned officers and stated that the increase in forces, a development positive at first glance, will further exacerbate the problem. The December and March reports also identified an officer shortage at all operational and tactical levels which, because of the long training cycle, will take years to address. The March 2008 report pointed to an inevitable conclusion: a
shortage of leadership at all operational and tactical levels, in both the MoD and the MoI, will constrain the ISF’s ability to secure Iraq without Coalition support.

OSD estimates that there is a shortage of 16,377 officers within the MoI and a shortage of 3,900 officers in the Iraqi Army. In an attempt to reduce the shortage in defense officers, the MoD has brought about 10,100 “former officers” back into service. OSD, however, acknowledges that it will take years to fully address the officer shortfall.

In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in January 2008, the MNSTC-I commanding general stated that “…gaps in leadership represent a very real and very tangible hole in proficiency that cannot be easily filled and it will affect [the Iraqi Security Forces] for at least a decade.”

**Deficiencies in Logistics and Combat Support Require Continued Coalition Assistance**

The number of assigned and trained personnel presented in the Section 9010 reports does not present a complete picture of force capabilities. The March 2008 report points out deficiencies in logistics and combat support which require continued Coalition assistance. According to the March 2008 report, both ministries still receive substantial logistics support from the Coalition, mostly in the form of U.S.-funded contracts, and, to a lesser degree, as direct support. OSD advised that the Coalition made a conscious decision to give initial priority to developing combat units. This decision was necessitated by the security conditions on the ground and the need to get Iraqi battalions, brigades, and divisions into the battle-space to protect the population and hold more ground. In doing this, the Coalition was aware that the Iraqi force, because it was “unbalanced,” would be dependent on Coalition forces for logistics and enablers. According to OSD that approach is changing.

While Coalition forces continue to train combat formations, the force generation of logistics units and key enablers is well underway, OSD stated. In commenting on a draft of this report, MNSTC-I stated that there has been progress in developing Iraqi logistics capability and the Iraqi Army’s ability to sustain itself is expected to be in place before September 2009.

The September 2007 report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq concluded that, “Logistics remains the Achilles’ heel of the Iraqi ground forces. Although progress is being made, achieving an adequate forcewide logistics capability is at least 24 months away.”

**Additional Forces Needed by 2010 for Internal Security**

The March 2008 report notes that since the September 2007 report, the GoI had increased its authorized force structure—the forces needed to protect against internal counterinsurgency threats—by 182,844 to 572,844. The larger number of authorized personnel represents an

---

3. “Authorized” MoD and Iraqi National Counter Terrorism Force (INCTF) forces means personnel strengths derived from Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment. This definition encompasses units that are generated, being
increase of 17,055 from the December 2007 report and an increase of 182,844 from the September 2007 report (see Table 3). In addition, that report notes that the GoI reconfirms the previous projection of future force-structure requirements, stating that the total size of the Iraqi forces—military, police, and Special Operations—could grow to between 601,000 and 646,000 by 2010.\(^4\) This requirement is based on an internal counterinsurgency requirement for the 2010 timeframe, and it is not a forecast of the long-term external defense requirement.

According to OSD, in mid-2007, four separate analyses were conducted to determine the required size of the ISF necessary to defeat anticipated internal counterinsurgency threats in the 2010 timeframe. The first was a study by the Iraqi security ministries. The second was a bottom-up review conducted by MNC-I, where subordinate commanders assessed the needs in their geographic areas of responsibility. The third analysis was conducted by the U.S. Army’s Center for Army Analysis. The fourth was the MNSTC-I assessment. These studies were largely in agreement, according to OSD, and a synthesis of the studies’ findings showed several common themes. The most significant theme was that, in order to overmatch internal security threats, the strength of the ISF should fall between approximately 601,000 to 646,000 authorized personnel. Table 3 shows the increase in authorized forces since the September 2007 report.

Table 3—Increases in Authorized Force Structure from September 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>September 2007</th>
<th>December 2007</th>
<th>March 2008</th>
<th>Projected 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>% Increase</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>555,789</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>572,844</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Transitioning to a Military Force for External Security Remains a Future Goal**

The difference between the ISF’s ability to meet internal threats and to defend against external aggression is an important distinction noted in the March 2008 report. Current efforts are in the first stage of force generation, which is focused on fielding a counterinsurgency force capable of protecting the country against internal threats. The second stage, which remains a future goal, will emphasize modernization and transition to capability against external threats. OSD officials acknowledge that this second stage force structure may or may not require additional forces, but will require additional capabilities.

4 In the December 2007 report, an analysis of future force-structure requirements by the GoI projects that the size of the Iraqi Army in 2010 will expand to between 261,000 and 268,000 personnel; to 5,000 in the Air Force; to 1,500 in the Navy; and to 4,000 in the Special Operations Forces. For the MoI, authorized forces should increase to between 307,000 and 347,000 personnel.
Methodology for Determining Numbers of Assigned and Trained Personnel is Evolving

It appears that a primary reason for the variances in numbers reported over time is because the methodological approach has changed from report to report.

OSD provided us with information indicating that the source for reported assigned strength numbers differs based on the branch of the ISF providing those numbers. OSD also notes that as the ISF and the Iraqi security ministries developed, so did the reporting methodologies. Previously, only numbers that could be verified by Coalition personnel—those witnessed by training teams or Coalition commanders in the field—were reported. This was a satisfactory methodology when Coalition forces conducted all training. Importantly, OSD points out that there is no separate source against which the numbers can be checked. MNSTC-I, in commenting on a draft of this report, noted that there was a change in accounting between the September and December 2007 9010 reports. However, except for an accounting error, there was no change in accounting procedures between the December 2007 and March 2008 9010 reports.

OSD officials report that efforts are under way to improve the methodology and reliability of reported data through automated human resource management systems. Torres Advanced Enterprise Solutions, under contract with MNSTC-I, is completing a Human Resources Information Management System (HRIMS) which is expected to be the primary information system to manage Iraqi manpower accountability and pay. It is also anticipated that the system will be able to identify and remove “ghost soldiers” from the rolls. The system was originally expected to be completed in February 2008, but has been extended. In its September 2007 report, the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq concluded that, “Another positive development in the MoD’s administrative capacity is the rolling implementation of the HRIMS which links personnel and pay functions into a single automated system and database.” SIGIR’s follow-on review will assess the status of this effort and its potential for improving reporting accuracy.

According to OSD, MNSTC-I Advisory and Training Team personnel, as well as the staff and command group, frequently review the assigned numbers reported by the Iraqis. Reports are cross-checked against each other for consistency. However, with the growth of the ISF, improvements in Iraqi ministerial capacity and reporting practices, and the withdrawal of Coalition forces from areas under Provincial Iraqi Control, Coalition verification of all numbers on the ground has, and will increasingly become, less feasible. OSD also believes that the improvement in Iraqi processes and bureaucracy allowed for sufficiently reliable source data to negate the requirement for 100% Coalition verification. At the same time, OSD acknowledges that they are not “error-free.”

Management Comments and Audit Response

OSD provided informal comments on a draft of this report, and these comments were incorporated into this report, as appropriate.
MNSTC-I provided comments on a draft of this report, which generally concurred with the report’s conclusions. MNSTC-I also provided specific comments on statements made in this report, which we incorporated as appropriate. MNSTC-I comments are presented in Appendix C.

MNSTC-I commented that our discussions on (1) shortages of officers and non-commissioned officers, (2) additional forces needed by 2010 for internal security, (3) police recruiting exceeding training capacity, and (4) deficiencies in logistics and combat support were beyond the scope of our work. Although some information in this report goes beyond the specific objectives regarding the accuracy of the numbers, the information is relevant to the broader objectives because it provides important context for understanding the accuracy and usefulness of the information being reported.

- - - - -

We appreciate the courtesies extended to all SIGIR staff. For additional information on this report, please contact Mr. Glenn Furbish, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits at (703) 428-1058 or via email at glenn.furbish@sigir.mil. For a list of the audit team members, see Appendix E.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.
Inspector General
Appendix A—Scope and Methodology

The objectives of this audit were to (1) assess the reliability and usefulness of information on the number of forces authorized, assigned, and trained, as reflected in the March 2008 Department of Defense (DoD) Section 9010 report, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*; and (2) review the methodology for gathering the information, including the extent to which DoD reviews and/or validates this information. This assignment was conducted as SIGIR project 8011. This audit was performed under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978.

In addressing our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed the most recent DoD March 2008 Section 9010 quarterly report relating to the ISF and compared information in that report with earlier Section 9010 reports. We also reviewed prior reports by SIGIR, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq (Jones Report), and others. We held discussions with officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) and reviewed written answers to questions we provided and planned to use as a basis of further discussions. Our audit plan called for us to obtain information from discussions with officials at the Multi National Force-Iraq, the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, and the Multi-National Corps-Iraq. As a basis for these discussions, we provided written questions related to our objectives. We received a written response to our questions through the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense late in our review cycle, and have incorporated this information in this report, as appropriate. However, we plan to conduct additional follow-on work with U.S. officials in Iraq to obtain a more complete understanding of data gathering and reporting methodologies as well as efforts to strengthen related processes.

We performed our work primarily in Arlington, Virginia. We conducted this performance audit from January through April 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our results based on our audit objectives. Based on those objectives, we believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our interim results.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not rely on data from computer-based systems to conduct our audit. Our audit focused on DoD published reports and discussions with responsible officials.

Internal Controls

Most of the data on Iraqi Security Forces authorized, assigned, and trained and included in the March 2008 DoD report was provided by the Government of Iraq. We did not assess the overall system of Iraqi management controls related to this data. However, we reviewed these reports and compared the information with prior reports to identify anomalies. We also obtained information on the extent to which DoD reviews the information for accuracy and consistency.
and their views as to data reliability. These steps provide reasonable confidence in our interim conclusions.

**Related Reports by SIGIR and Others**


Appendix B—Command Relationships in Establishing, Training, and Equipping the Iraqi Security Forces

Source: Department of Defense, and U.S. Government Accountability Office
MEMORANDUM FOR Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction


1. This memorandum provides the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq’s (MNSTC-I) response to the subject interim analysis report.

2. MNSTC-I generally concurs with the conclusions and recommendations contained in the interim report. See the enclosure for our comments.

3. We appreciate your assessment of the subject project. Thank you for the opportunity to provide written comments for incorporation in the final report.

4. If you have any questions please contact LTC Patrick Dailey at DSN 318-852-1359 or email patrick.dailey@iraq.centcom.mil.

Encl

Michael W. Fuller
QOL, USA
Chief of Staff
Reference Page 5: Results in Brief

“There are uncertainties about the true number of assigned and trained personnel who are present for duty at any one time”

1. COMMENT: Just as on any given day in the U.S. Armed Forces, the system would be unlikely to be able to tell you exactly how many people were present for duty, so it is the same in the ISF. In the US Army, if three different days in the same month were taken as reference points, three different answers to “Present for Duty” would be recorded due to leave, sick, injured, welfare, training etc, and each would be unlikely to be 100% accurate. Similarly in the ISF, this is not a useful metric in identifying useful trends. When growth over time is being measured against an end-state of between 600,000 - 646,000, recording present for duty on a specific day serves little relevant purpose, and could even be misleading.

“Evolving changes in reporting methodology makes comparison of information from one report to earlier reports difficult at best”

2. COMMENT: There was a change in accounting between the Sep and Dec 07 9010 reports. There was no difference in accounting procedures between the Dec 07 and Mar 08 9010, only an accounting error. As the Iraqis increase their Ministerial capacity, so their working practices change. Their personnel accounting procedures have also been refined.

“...The number of trained personnel, in and of itself, is widely recognized as an inadequate indicator of force capability”

3. COMMENT: Agreed, and MNSTC-I has never suggested that the numbers trained is an adequate indicator of force capability. Operational Readiness Assessments of Units in being are a useful indicator of force capability, and are discussed extensively within the 9010 report.

“The shortage of officers and non-commissioned officers in the ISF remains a significant long term shortfall that could take a decade to address”

4. COMMENT: Agreed, but this does not bring into question the accuracy of the numbers themselves, but is purely a force generation/capability issue. This has no link to the stated scope of the audit - assessment of the reliability of the numbers information reflected in the March 2008 9010 (Page 14).
There is a recognized need for additional Iraqi Security forces by 2010 to field a counterinsurgency force capable of protecting the country against internal threats and insurgency.

5. COMMENT: Agreed, but this does not bring into question the accuracy of available known current and projected authorized numbers. It merely highlights that the security situation might change, and so too might force levels to ameliorate the security situation. This could include both increases and decreases in overall authorized numbers over time. This has no link to the stated scope of the audit – assessment of the reliability of the numbers information reflected in the March 2008 9010 (Page 14).

Iraqi forces are still reliant on the logistical support of the Coalition forces

6. COMMENT: This comment was based on words from the Sep 07 9010 report. Things have moved on since then. The Mar 08 report talks of progress, and the aim for the ISF to be largely self sufficient in sustainment and replenishment by end 08. The Mar 08 report states that the Iraqi Armed Forces took responsibility for their own life support on 1 December 07. In any case, this statement does not bring into question the accuracy of the numbers themselves, but is purely a force generation/capability issue. This has no link to the stated scope of the audit – assessment of the reliability of the numbers information reflected in the March 2008 9010 (Page 14).

Reference Page 8: Numerical reports of Assigned and Trained Forces Contain limitations

The number of assigned and trained defense personnel presented in the Section 9010 [SIC] reports does not measure overall capabilities

7. COMMENT: Agreed, and MNSTC-I has never suggested that the numbers assigned and trained is an adequate indicator of force capability, but ORA data which is discussed extensively in Section 2 does address overall capabilities. See #3 above.

Reference Page 9: Substantial Numbers of Assigned and trained Personnel Are Not Present For Duty

In an earlier report, DoD stated that the actual number of present for duty soldiers is about one-half to two thirds of those assigned

8. COMMENT: This may have been the case previously, but is not the case now. The average present for duty, taking a snap shot as of 5 Apr 08, against those assigned across the Iraqi Army, is 70%. On the same date, the average across the Iraqi Army of those present for duty against their authorized figure was 75%. This
latter figure represents a specific Prime Ministerially endorsed over-manning measure to alleviate the issues of those on leave etc., because these forces are still in the fight. It remains a metric of dubious worth, for the reasons outlined in #1.

Reference Page 9-10: Police Recruiting Exceeds Training Capacity

“The September 07 report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq concluded that, “The Ministry of Interior is a ministry in name only. It is widely regarded as being dysfunctional and sectarian, and suffers from ineffective leadership”

9. COMMENT: While this may have been a subjective truism in Sep 07, much has been done to address this, and much detail is outlined in both the Dec 07 and the Mar 08 9010 about the measures taken to address these shortfalls. Quoting from documents some 8 months old takes no account of progress made in the interim, and can therefore be misleading. This has no link to the stated scope of the audit - assessment of the reliability of the numbers information reflected in the March 2008 9010 (Page 14).

Reference Page 11: Deficiencies in Logistics and Combat Support Require continued Coalition assistance

“The September 07 report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq concluded that “Logistics remains the Achilles Heel of the Iraqi ground forces. Although progress is being made, achieving an adequate force wide logistics capability is at least 24 months away.

10. COMMENT: Quoting old reports is potentially misleading (See 9). The IA’s ability to self sustain logistically is currently expected to be in place before Sep 09. This also has no link to the stated scope of the audit - assessment of the reliability of the numbers information reflected in the March 2008 9010 (Page 14).

Reference Page 14: Appendix A—Scope and Methodology

“Our audit plan called for us to obtain information from discussions with officials at Multi National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq, but those meetings were delayed by those offices as they sought to provide written answers to initial questions we had prepared.”

11. COMMENT: Actually, the written answers to initial questions were complete, but then SIGIR changed the questions, which induced delay. The comment as written could imply we were less than cooperative in this effort, which is not an accurate characterization.
## Appendix D—Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRT</td>
<td>Basic Recruit Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoI</td>
<td>Government of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRIMS</td>
<td>Human Resources Information Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Corps-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Force-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNSTC-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E—Audit Team Members

This report was prepared, and the audit work conducted, under the direction of David R. Warren, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Staff members who contributed to the report include:

Tinh Nguyen

Charles Thompson

Roger M. Williams
| **SIGIR’s Mission** | Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and objective:  
- oversight and review through comprehensive audits, inspections, and investigations  
- advice and recommendations on policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness  
- deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse  
- information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American people through Quarterly Reports |
| **Obtaining Copies of SIGIR Reports and Testimonies** | To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil) |
| **To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Programs** | Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline:  
- Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html  
- Phone: 703-602-4063  
- Toll Free: 866-301-2003 |
| **Congressional Affairs** | Hillel Weinberg  
Assistant Inspector General for Congressional Affairs  
Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction  
400 Army Navy Drive  
Arlington, VA 22202-4704  
Phone: 703-428-1059  
Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil |
| **Public Affairs** | Kristine R. Belisle  
Director for Public Affairs  
Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction  
400 Army Navy Drive  
Arlington, VA 22202-4704  
Phone: 703-428-1217  
Fax: 703-428-0818  
Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil |