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**Developing Army Leaders Across Components:
Assessing Knowledge Similarities and Differences**

Teresa Z. Taylor
U.S. Army Research Institute

May 2007

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**U.S. Army Research Institute
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DEVELOPING ARMY LEADERS ACROSS COMPONENTS: ASSESSING KNOWLEDGE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

To succeed in today's volatile, unpredictable operational environment, U.S. Army officers, both commissioned and noncommissioned, must be capable of performing leader responsibilities with a very high degree of expertise in a variety of skill-sets. Army leaders must demonstrate intrapersonal, interpersonal and organizational expertise in technical, tactical, and leader tasks under ambiguous and constantly changing conditions. Leaders develop their skills through a well-developed system of formal institutional training, experience gained through operational assignment and self-development. However, despite the Army's comprehensive, methodical and standardized system for developing leaders, some are more effective than others.

Research into what makes leaders effective has spanned decades and has explored leader traits; contingent roles leaders play; and leader styles. This work resulted in enhanced understanding about what effective leaders are like and what they do. However, less is understood about what leaders know that specifically facilitates the development of expertise. Recent research began the process of expanding understanding about what fulltime Army officers know. However, approximately 50% of Army units are led by reserve component officers, who must perform their leadership duties under a variety of conditions. Because all Army operations are conducted through the combined efforts of active and reserve component units, it is critical that all Army leaders share a mental model of what it takes to be an effective leader. This research takes a step towards articulating that by measuring the difference in leader tacit knowledge levels in active (AC), and reserve component (RC): Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) officers.

Procedure:

The research design employs tacit knowledge-based problem scenarios and a meta-cognitive self-assessment to measure the differences in levels of tacit knowledge and meta-cognitive awareness of individual knowledge strengths and weaknesses in AC, USAR and ARNG Platoon, Company, and Battalion level leaders. Mean scores of the respondents were also compared with previously established tacit knowledge expert mean scores.

Findings:

- A MANOVA showed statistically significant differences in levels of tacit knowledge at Platoon and Company level only, with reserve component Platoon level mean scores being higher than AC Platoon level mean scores; and AC Company level mean scores being higher than reserve component Company level mean scores.
- A one-way ANOVA measuring differences in meta-cognitive awareness of individual knowledge strengths and weaknesses was significant at the Platoon level only. Correlational

- analysis conducted comparing tacit knowledge and meta-cognitive awareness mean scores showed that USAR Platoon/Company level officers and AC Platoon level officers had the most consistent pattern of significant correlation.
- A one sample *t* test comparing expert tacit knowledge mean scores with respondent tacit knowledge scores found that USAR Platoon and Company Level mean scores were closer to the expert mean scores than AC or ARNG; with statistically significant differences between expert and respondent mean scores being found more in ‘Worse’ choices than ‘Better’ choices. At Battalion level, AC mean scores were generally closer to the expert means; and there were fewer statistically significant differences in ‘Worse’ choice categories.

Utilization and Dissemination of Findings:

The findings summarized in this report can be used to refine leader training and learning strategies which serve as the foundation for the development of curriculum during professional military education and during unit-sponsored leader development training. It could also serve as a basis on which to develop a universal mental model of how leaders should problem-solve. The information contained in this report could also be used to develop tacit knowledge scenarios that more comprehensively represent the intrapersonal, interpersonal or organizational problems active and reserve component commissioned and noncommissioned officers face. Finally results could be used to help commissioned and noncommissioned leaders cultivate the desired quality of self-awareness.

DEVELOPING ARMY LEADERS ACROSS COMPONENTS: ASSESSING KNOWLEDGE
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

CONTENTS

	Page
BACKGROUND	1
Knowledge and Expertise	1
Organizational Context.....	2
METHOD	3
Participants	3
Instrumentation	4
Design and Procedure	5
RESULTS	6
Research Question 1.....	6
Research Question 2.....	12
Research Question 3.....	13
Summary	16
DISCUSSION	17
Key Findings	17
Utilization of Findings	18
REFERENCES	21
APPENDIX A.....	25
APPENDIX B	73

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1. TKML CATEGORIES BY LEADER LEVEL	4
TABLE 2. PLATOON, COMPANY AND BATTALION LEVEL DEMOGRAPHICS.....	6
TABLE 3. PLATOON LEVEL SUMMARY OF T-TEST ANALYSIS: PERCENT OF RESPONSE OPTION DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EXPERT AND RESPONDENT MEAN SCORES	7

CONTENTS (continued)

	Page
LIST OF TABLES (continued)	
TABLE 4. PLATOON LEVEL ONE-SAMPLE T-TEST: TKML EXPERT AND RESPONDENT MEAN SCORES	7
TABLE 5. COMPANY LEVEL SUMMARY OF T-TEST ANALYSIS: PERCENT OF RESPONSE OPTION DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EXPERT AND RESPONDENT MEAN SCORES	8
TABLE 6. COMPANY LEVEL ONE-SAMPLE T-TEST: TKML EXPERT AND RESPONDENT MEAN SCORES	9
TABLE 7. BATTALION LEVEL SUMMARY OF T-TEST ANALYSIS: PERCENT OF RESPONSE OPTION DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EXPERT AND RESPONDENT MEAN SCORES	10
TABLE 8. BATTALION LEVEL ONE-SAMPLE T-TEST: TKML EXPERT AND RESPONDENT MEAN SCORES	11
TABLE 9. PLATOON LEVEL UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS FOR AC AND RC OFFICERS	12
TABLE 10. COMPANY LEVEL UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS FOR AC AND RC OFFICERS	13
TABLE 11. PLATOON LEVEL METACOGNITIVE MEAN AND TKML RESPONSE CORRELATIONS BY COMPONENT	14
TABLE 12. COMPANY LEVEL METACOGNITIVE MEAN AND TKML RESPONSE CORRELATIONS BY COMPONENT	15
TABLE 13. SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS METHOD, AND RESULTS	16

DEVELOPING ARMY LEADERS ACROSS COMPONENTS: ASSESSING KNOWLEDGE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Background

To succeed in today's volatile, unpredictable operational environment, U.S. Army Officers, both commissioned and noncommissioned, must be capable of performing leader responsibilities with a very high degree of expertise in a variety of skill-sets. The Army includes in its definition of professionalism an expectation that Army Officers, both reserve (RC) and active (AC) component, possess "expert knowledge" (FM 1, 2001, p. 7). Army Officers assigned to leader positions must demonstrate intrapersonal, interpersonal and organizational expertise in technical, tactical, and leader tasks under ambiguous and constantly changing conditions. Leaders develop their skills through a well-developed system of formal institutional training, experience gained through operational assignment and self-development (DA Pam 350-58, 1994). However, despite the Army's comprehensive, methodical and standardized system for developing leaders, some are more effective than others.

Research into what makes leaders effective has spanned decades and has explored leader traits (Stogdill, 1974); contingent roles leaders play (Fiedler, 1967); and leader styles (Burns, 1978; Bass, 1985). This research resulted in enhanced understanding about what effective leaders are like and what they do. However, less is understood about what leaders know that facilitates the development of expertise (Horvath et al., 1994a, p. 24).

Knowledge and Expertise

The Army's three-pillared leader development system (institutional training, operational assignment, and self-development) was designed to build expertise through the acquisition of knowledge and experience. Institutional training teaches Army Officers knowledge about 'what' to do. It is assumed that the experience gained through operational assignments will teach Officers knowledge about 'how' to do the tasks learned in formal training. Officers are expected to establish a proactive self-development process, which facilitates continuous learning through their Army career. Research has shown that "practically intelligent" (Sternberg, 1985) individuals are more adept at learning from experience and applying that tacit knowledge to new problems. Tacit knowledge is implicit knowledge, not formally taught, that is amassed by practically intelligent individuals, who use it to successfully adapt to, select, or shape real-world environments (Sternberg et al., 2000, p. 104), and has been linked with effective leadership (Sternberg et al., 2000, p. 198).

Research investigating the role tacit knowledge plays in the development of effective Army leaders began in 1994, through a collaborative partnership between Yale University and the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI). The Tacit Knowledge for Military Leaders (TKML) Project researchers gathered lessons learned about leadership experiences from Platoon, Company, and Battalion level AC Officers. Tacit knowledge compiled from this process was specific to each leader level, but could be organized into three basic categories: intrapersonal (knowledge one learns about oneself); interpersonal (knowledge

about how to interact effectively with others); and organizational (knowledge about how to act within the organization) (Hedlund et al., 1999a, b, c; Sternberg et al., 2000).

The TKML Project identified important AC leader tacit knowledge considered central to the development of expertise. However, fifty percent of the Army consists of RC organizations whose leaders must develop and maintain a level of expertise commensurate with that of AC leaders, although under very different conditions. While the program of instruction that trains Soldiers to become Commissioned Officers is identical for the AC and RC, the majority of AC Officers earn their commission through the Reserve Officer Training Corp (ROTC) program, which is accomplished when an individual attends college (Soldiers, 2007). Consequently, most ROTC graduates are in their early to mid-twenties, and are just beginning their military careers. Conversely, most RC Soldiers have had military experience prior to attending a Pre-Commissioning program, having at least gone through Basic and Advanced Individual Training. Additionally, while there are many similarities between AC and RC Army organizations, the RC environment has a number of distinctly unique attributes: geographical dispersion, time and resource constraints, and diverse organizational systems. RC officers tend to be older (USAR, 2006; OASD/DMDC, 1998; OASDRA, 2006), and must balance civilian and military professional commitments. Thus, problem-solving processes and solutions that are appropriate for one organization may not work in the other; and leaders in each organization may need different kinds of tacit knowledge expertise to solve problems successfully in different contexts.

Generally, experts may be distinguished from novices in a variety of ways. Experts possess not only domain-specific knowledge, but also metacognitive abilities, which are considered key, and have been identified as a “proximal predictors of leadership performance” and include superior skills in: analyzing and solving problems comprehensively and quickly; pattern detection; social judgment; and metacognitive assessment (Chi, Glaser & Farr, 1988, pp. xvii-xx; Marshall-Mies Fleishman, Martin, Zaccaro, Baughman & McGee, 2000, pp. 138-140).

In an era where the Army seeks to develop adaptive leaders, it is especially important for these individuals to be able to ‘self-diagnose’ their own metacognitive abilities. Among other key qualities, effective military leaders possess flexibility, self-monitoring, and orientation toward learning from experience (Yukl, 1999, p. 257). While AC and RC leaders who are self-aware of their own knowledge strengths and weaknesses can proactively manage their continuous learning and self-development process towards the desired level of expertise, the knowledge a leader acquires which contributes to the development of expertise can be influenced by the organization of which the leader is a member.

Organizational Context

Organizations vary by how they function, how power is distributed, and how policies are implemented. As a machine bureaucracy, the Army’s doctrine (in which is recorded its institutional knowledge) is heavily prescribed and encoded. There are clear rules, procedures and standards, and this knowledge is managed by the leaders. Managers translate individual knowledge into organizational rules and procedures which serve to filter information throughout the organizational hierarchy (Lam, 2000, 1998, p. 15).

An organization's culture or context shapes the thinking of organizational members (Schein, 1999). Depending upon the patterns of thinking within an organization, there may be support or resistance to the changes in the individual thinking necessary to develop expertise. Certain factors influence the context in which a leader might function, which will shape how the individual deals with change. These include: a) an over-emphasis on one area of work; b) organizational dynamics preventing ideas of different ways of working being raised; c) cultural, historical and financial factors; d) lack of experience and confidence to ask or do 'something different'; and e) management and leadership elements (Jensen, Malcolm, Phelps, & Stoker, 2002, pp. 38-39).

The attitude of professionalism a leader maintains and the effort or motivation he or she invests in acquiring the necessary expert knowledge is influenced by the organization of which the leader is a member. Lam (1998) argues that expertise derived from tacit knowledge is "powerfully shaped by the broader social and institutional context," and that the learning and sharing of expertise can only be understood by factoring in organizational influences (Lam, 1998, p. 2-3). Lloyd (1996) contends that an organization's approach to learning is influenced by the underlying dynamic of how power is defined in the organization, with a power-driven approach being linked to short-term goals (Lloyd, 1996, p. 5). A short term approach to learning risks undermining core organizational values, which are developed over time. This approach may be, in the long term, ineffective.

Under the current Operations Tempo OPTEMPO, the Army struggles to balance long and short-term goals, and to structure appropriate learning and development opportunities for both AC and RC leaders. An effective leader development system that compensates for the deficiencies that may exist within the context of some organizations incorporates the varieties of expert knowledge that are required by all members of the Army's organizations, as well as the contextual and cognitive differences in the professional environment. The TKML Project compiled leader tacit knowledge important to the development of AC leader expertise. Because approximately 50% of the Army is composed of RC organizations, whose Officers perform leader responsibilities under a variety of conditions, this research assesses knowledge similarities and differences across AC and RC components and identifies ways the inventory might be enhanced to address component differences.

Method

Participants

The sample consisted of 666 part-time (RC) Army National Guard (ARNG), U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and full-time AC 2nd and 1st Lieutenants, Captains, and Majors who were attending Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) institutional training in different occupational specialties. These Officers took the inventory at seven Army schools located at Forts Leavenworth (Command and General Staff College); Sill (Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses); Benning (Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses); Knox (Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses); Lee (Quartermaster Officer Basic and Advanced Courses); and Leonard Wood (Military Police and Engineer Officer Basic and Advanced Courses). The

branch schools are representative of combat arms, combat service support and combat support specialties.

Instrumentation

Tacit Knowledge for Military Leaders (TKML) Inventory.

The TKML Project resulted in the development of three versions of an inventory, which compiled tacit knowledge items for Platoon, Company, and Battalion level Officers based on lessons learned gathered from interviews with AC Officers. The inventory presents a variety of problem scenarios followed by a number of response options. Officers read the scenario and then rate, using a 9-point Likert scale (1:low; 9:high) to what degree the response option is an appropriate solution to the problem presented in the scenario. The items which were selected for inclusion on each instrument were those that best discriminated between experienced and novice Officers, as well as more and less effective leaders (Hedlund et al., 1999). Expert responses were identified based upon the input of AC Officers (59 Battalion; 29 Company; 50 Platoon) who had considerable organizational and leadership experience (Sternberg et al., 1999, p. 95). A summary of the expert responses is located at Appendix A.

The dependent variables in this research are the mean scores that each Officer achieved on the TKML Inventory as well as on the metacognitive section of the professional expertise questionnaire (described in the next section). TKML scores are further organized into ‘better’ and ‘worse’ choice categories. Table 1 presents the tacit knowledge categories relevant to each leader level (Hedlund et al., 1999 a, b, c).

Table 1
TKML Categories by Leader Level

Platoon Leader	Company Commander	Battalion Commander
Motivating subordinates	Motivating subordinates	Motivating subordinates
Taking care of Soldiers	Taking care of Soldiers	Taking care of Soldiers
Managing oneself	Managing oneself	Managing oneself
Establishing trust	Establishing trust	
Influencing the boss	Communicating	Communicating
	Developing subordinates	Developing subordinates
Establishing credibility	Directing/supervising subordinates	Dealing with poor performers
	Balancing mission and troops	Protecting the organization
	Cooperating with others	Organizational Development

Because the professional context and environment for RC leaders differs from that of AC leaders, minor changes were made to the original TKML Inventory for each level of leader to make it appropriate (e.g., references to Annual Training, and traditional RC Soldiers were included). In addition to word changes within the scenarios and options, some of the scenarios that were not appropriate within the context of reserve component organizations were left out. In the version used in this research, the TKML-Battalion has 12 scenarios; the TKML-Company has 17 scenarios; and the TKML-Platoon has 13 scenarios. A summary of these changes, as well

as the component means and standard deviations for each scenario response option, is located at Appendix A.

The Measurement of Professional Expertise: Self-Assessment Questionnaire.

Based on her theory that there were universal domain nonspecific dimensions to expertise, van der Heijden sought to “operationalize” expertise (van der Heijden, 1998; 2000, p. 11). Her research resulted in the development of the ‘Measurement of Professional Expertise Self-Assessment Questionnaire,’ which presents five dimensions that she argues can be used as general indices of professional expertise: 1) knowledge dimension; 2) metacognitive knowledge dimension; 3) skill requirement; 4) social recognition; and 5) growth and flexibility (van der Heijden, 2000, p. 11). The items included on the questionnaire reflect attributes or behaviors that have been attributed to experts or exemplary performance in various fields (van der Heijden, 2000, p. 17). Reliability coefficients for the scales associated with each dimension ranged from .83 to .87 for one group to whom the instrument was administered, and .93 to .94 for the second group. The metacognitive knowledge dimension from van der Heijden’s Questionnaire is the only scale used in the present research. A 5-point Likert scale was provided, (1:low; 5:high); with a high mean score in this 15-item dimension indicating that an individual is aware of his or her own knowledge strengths or weaknesses (van der Heijden, 2000, p. 17). The mean calculated from this dimension was treated as a single dependent variable. Appendix B contains a summary of the items included in the metacognitive knowledge dimension scale.

Design and Procedure

This research sought to measure differences in levels of tacit knowledge of AC and RC Officers at three leader levels. Multiple Analysis of Variance (MANOVA), *t*-test, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), and Pearson product-moment correlation was used to measure differences as well as identify any relations that existed. Analyses were based on individual sample and expert mean scores, from which aggregated means were calculated that represent (item-by-item) responses considered through expert analyses to be better and worse choice response options to the problems posed in each vignette. Difference scores were then computed, both item-by-item, as well as between aggregated means (Legree, Heffner, Psotka, Martin & Medsker, 2003; Hedlund, Sternberg & Psotka, 2000). This procedure was selected because it provides a more detailed analysis than the original deviation score procedure. Unless indicated otherwise, alpha was set at the .05 level. The design of this research as well as the analysis is guided by the following research questions (RQ):

- RQ1: Are there differences between AC/RC Officer TKML responses and the TKML expert responses.
- RQ2: Are there between component (AC/ARNG/USAR) differences in levels of leader tacit knowledge among Officers.
- RQ3: Are there between component differences in the level of metacognitive self-awareness of individual knowledge strengths and weaknesses among Officers.

To compose sample sizes (which ranged from 10-25 Officers), information about TRADOC institutional training course schedules and class sizes was obtained from the Army Training

Requirements and Resource System (ATRRS). The TKML and metacognitive inventory was administered on days and times specified by the institutions sponsoring the courses attended by the Officers in the sample. At the Command and General Staff College, because the class size was much larger than at the other institutions, a random number generator was used to determine the sample composition to make the sample size both random as well as consistent with the other institutions. At the other institutions, when the class size was the approximate size of the requested sample, an entire class was administered the inventory. Other samples were composed of Officers who were drawn from classes that were in session at the time of the data collection and who were not involved in testing or field training. During administration of the inventory, a brief explanation of the research was provided to Officers, as well as instructions on how to complete the inventory. Officers were also given the opportunity to read the instructions.

Results

Findings are presented organized first by research question, then by leader level. Table 2 summarizes demographic information for Platoon, Company, and Battalion level officers.

Table 2
Platoon, Company and Battalion Level Demographics

Level	USAR	ARNG	RC (Merged)	AC	Total	Combat Arms	Combat Service Support	Combat Support	Total
Platoon n	32	139	171	114	285	161	24	100	285
% of Total	11%	49%	60%	40%		57%	8%	35%	
Company n	44	149	193	116	309	184	47	78	309
% of Total	14%	48%	62%	38%		59%	15%	25%	
Battalion n	30	19	49	23	72	30	27	15	72
% of Total	42%	26%	68%	32%		42%	37%	21%	
				Total	666			Total	666

Research Question 1: Are there differences between AC/RC Officer TKML responses and the TKML expert responses.

Platoon level.

Individual item level analysis was accomplished by conducting a One Sample *t*-test between the expert mean and respondent means, by component, for each vignette response option. Detailed results are in Appendix A. Table 3 shows the percentage of response options for each vignette that differed significantly from the expert mean for each component. Two vignettes are not included in the table. The vignettes selected for non-inclusion are those where the statistical difference resulted from respondents rating the majority of the better choices more highly than the experts rated them. Both vignettes are part of the ‘Managing Oneself’ category.

Table 3
Platoon Level Summary of t-test Analysis: Percent of Response Option Differences Between Expert and Respondent Mean Scores

	AC	USAR	ARNG
Motivating Subordinates			
• Vignette P22	50%	20%	30%
• Vignette P30	57%	43%	86%
Influencing the Boss			
• Vignette P23	62%	25%	100%
• Vignette P24	45%	18%	64%
Managing Oneself			
• Vignette P25	70%	10%	60%
• Vignette P26	54%	18%	63%
• Vignette P32	55%	44%	55%
• Vignette P33	67%	33%	67%
Establish Trust			
• Vignette P27	70%	30%	50%
Establish Credibility			
• Vignette P28	70%	70%	50%
Taking Care of Soldiers			
• Vignette P31	75%	25%	75%

Twelve dependent variables that represent better and worse choices were developed for Platoon level Officers. Results of One Sample *t*-tests shown in Table 4 showed significant differences between the Officer means and the expert means.

Table 4
Platoon Level One-Sample t-test: TKML Expert and Respondent Mean Scores

Better Choices				Worse Choices			
Expert Mean	AC n=114	USAR n=32	ARNG n=139	Expert Mean	AC n=114	USAR n=32	ARNG n=139
Motivating Subordinates				Motivating Subordinates			
6.92	6.64*	6.85	6.62**	2.87	3.59**	3.77**	3.68**
Influencing the Boss				Influencing the Boss			
7.13	6.66**	6.94	6.67**	3.42	4.07**	3.46	3.75**
Managing Oneself				Managing Oneself			
7.20	6.91**	7.25	7.01*	3.49	4.45**	4.48**	4.16**
Establishing Trust				Establishing Trust			
6.43	6.19	6.39	6.17*	2.86	3.85**	3.77*	3.82**
Establishing Credibility				Establishing Credibility			
7.62	7.80*	8.03*	7.83*	2.41	3.68**	3.76**	3.55**
Taking Care of Soldiers				Taking Care of Soldiers			
7.22	6.90*	7.05	7.02	3.09	3.65**	3.46*	3.32*
Overall				Overall			
7.09	6.85	7.08	6.89	3.02	3.88	3.78	3.71

p* < .05. *p* < .01.

As shown in Table 4, among the better choices, with the exception of the category of ‘Establishing Credibility,’ AC and ARNG scores were all significantly lower than the expert mean. For that category, the mean scores of all three groups were significantly higher than the expert mean scores. Results suggest that even though the TKML Inventory was developed with AC input, this fact does not appear to give AC Officers at this level any advantage in achieving expert scores on the instrument. There was no significant difference between the scores of USAR Platoon Leaders and the Expert Mean scores on the better choice end of the scale. These results suggest that, despite being new to the Army, these Officers had nonetheless been able to develop tacit knowledge in these categories on par with the experts.

For the worse choices, the mean scores of all three groups were higher than the expert mean, with the mean scores being significantly higher, statistically, in the majority of cases. In other words, each group did not rate the worse choices as low as the expert group did. The AC group was closest one out of six times; the USAR group was closest two out of six times; and the ARNG group closest three out of six times. These results suggest that Officers at this level have accrued more tacit knowledge about what *to do* in response to problems related to these categories, and less about what *not to do*.

Company level.

Individual item level analysis was accomplished by conducting a One Sample *t*-test between the expert mean and respondent means, by component, for each vignette response option. Detailed results are in Appendix A. Table 5 shows the percentage of response options for each vignette that differed significantly from the expert mean.

Table 5
Company Level Summary of t-test Analysis: Percent of Response Option Differences Between Expert and Respondent Mean Scores

	AC	USAR	ARNG
Taking Care of Soldiers			
• Vignette C22	50%	62%	44%
Directing and Supervising Subordinates			
• Vignette C23	42%	33%	58%
• Vignette C35	86%	14%	57%
Cooperating With Others			
• Vignette C24	100%	37%	62%
Establishing Trust			
• Vignette C25	57%	14%	47%
• Vignette C28	57%	14%	14%
Managing Oneself			
• Vignette C26	80%	60%	60%
• Vignette C37	33%	0%	55%
Developing Subordinates			
• Vignette C27	83%	33%	83%
• Vignette C32	54%	18%	36%

Table 5
Company Level Summary of t-test Analysis: Percent of Response Option Differences Between Expert and Respondent Mean Scores (continued)

	AC	USAR	ARNG
Motivating Subordinates			
• Vignette C29	50%	58%	83%
• Vignette C30	60%	20%	70%
• Vignette C33	67%	42%	58%
Communicating			
• Vignette C31	50%	40%	50%
Balancing Mission and Troops			
• Vignette C34	60%	60%	60%
• Vignette C36	30%	10%	50%

Table 6 shows the results of the One Sample *t* test for the Company Level Officers. There were 18 dependent variables analyzed. One Sample *t*-test showed significant differences between the Officer means and the expert means.

Table 6
Company Level One-Sample t-test: TKML Expert and Respondent Mean Scores

Better Choices				Worse Choices			
Expert Mean	AC n=149	USAR n=44	ARNG n=116	Expert Mean	AC n=149	USAR n=44	ARNG n=116
Taking Care of Soldiers				Taking Care of Soldiers			
7.76	7.74	7.79	7.44**	3.37	3.94**	4.23**	4.02**
Directing and Supervising Subordinates				Directing and Supervising Subordinates			
7.17	6.97**	6.98	6.87**	3.13	3.55**	3.81**	4.00**
Cooperating With Others				Cooperating With Others			
7.53	6.52**	6.43**	6.25**	2.19	2.86**	2.54	2.94**
Establishing Trust				Establishing Trust			
7.34	7.30	7.46	7.20	2.25	2.46*	2.38	2.49*
Managing Oneself				Managing Oneself			
7.48	7.31*	7.35	7.28*	2.14	3.29**	3.27**	3.15**
Communicating				Communicating			
7.32	7.18	7.53	7.29	3.46	4.44**	4.07**	4.29**
Motivating Subordinates				Motivating			
7.44	7.34	7.46	7.32	3.04	3.89**	4.04**	4.07**
Developing Subordinates				Developing Subordinates			
7.79	8.13**	8.02*	7.97**	3.33	3.57**	3.70*	3.93**
Balancing Mission and Troops				Balancing Mission and Troops			
6.95	6.90	6.74	6.55**	2.46	2.76**	3.04**	3.03**
Overall				Overall			
7.42	7.26	7.31	7.13	2.82	3.42	3.45	3.55

p* < .05. *p* < .01.

At the Company level, of the four statistically significant mean scores among the better choices in the AC group, three were lower than the expert mean. There were two statistically significant differences between the expert mean scores and the mean scores of the USAR group; one above and one below. The ARNG group had six mean scores that were significantly different, with five of the scores being lower than the expert mean scores. Again, results suggest that despite the fact the Inventory was developed with AC input, this apparently gave AC Company level Officers no advantage. Also, the mean scores of the USAR Officers, again, were closer to the expert mean scores. These results suggest that these Officers may be able to draw on a variety of military and civilian experiences and apply relevant tacit knowledge to their current military position.

In the worse choice area, the mean scores of all three groups were higher in each category than the expert mean scores. While significantly different, the scores of the AC group were closer to the expert mean scores in five out of nine categories; with the scores of the USAR group being closer to the expert mean in four out of nine categories. These results suggest that Officers at this level, like Officers at Platoon level, know more about what *to do*, than what *not to do* in response to problems within these categories.

Battalion level.

Individual item level analysis was accomplished by conducting a One Sample *t*-test between the expert mean and respondent means, by component, for each vignette response option. Detailed results are in Appendix A. Table 7 shows the percentage of response options for each vignette that differed significantly from the expert mean.

Table 7
Battalion Level Summary of t-test Analysis: Percent of Response Option Differences Between Expert and Respondent Mean Scores

	AC	USAR	ARNG
Developing Subordinates			
• Vignette B22	50%	62%	44%
• Vignette B31			
Managing Oneself			
• Vignette B23	42%	33%	58%
• Vignette B30	86%	14%	57%
Protecting the Organization			
• Vignette B24	100%	37%	62%
• Vignette B25			
Motivating Subordinates			
• Vignette B25	9%	45%	9%
Taking Care of Soldiers			
• Vignette B26	27%	54%	45%

Table 7
Battalion Level Summary of t-test Analysis: Percent of Response Option Differences Between Expert and Respondent Mean Scores (continued)

	AC	USAR	ARNG
Communicating			
• Vignette B27	14%	28%	0%
• Vignette B28	12%	62%	25%
• Vignette B29	13%	33%	27%
• Vignette B32	0%	25%	8%
Dealing With Poor Performers			
• Vignette B33	40%	30%	30%

Table 8 shows the results of One Sample *t*-test analysis, involving 16 dependent variables, which showed significant differences between the Officer means and the expert means.

Table 8
Battalion Level One-Sample t-test: TKML Expert and Respondent Mean Scores

Better Choices				Worse Choices			
Expert Mean	AC n=23	USAR n=30	ARNG n=19	Expert Mean	AC n=23	USAR n=30	ARNG n=19
Developing Subordinates				Developing Subordinates			
6.80	6.53	6.44	6.24*	2.84	3.47*	3.73**	3.40*
Organization Development				Organization Development			
7.08	7.28	6.90	7.07	3.02	3.35	3.07	3.63
Protecting the Organization				Protecting the Organization			
7.50	7.24	7.11**	7.16*	3.51	3.40	3.88*	4.00
Motivating Subordinates				Motivating Subordinates			
7.20	6.93	6.55**	6.74*	3.05	3.19	3.88	3.63
Taking Care of Soldiers				Taking Care of Soldiers			
7.72	7.20*	7.19**	7.20**	3.40	4.26	4.63*	3.63
Communicating				Communicating			
7.27	7.04	6.95*	6.93*	3.62	3.92	3.80	3.86
Managing Oneself				Managing Oneself			
6.74	6.43	6.09*	6.17	2.98	3.00	3.62*	3.74
Dealing With Poor Performers				Dealing With Poor Performers			
7.65	7.13*	7.44	7.14	3.37	4.04*	3.95	4.05
Overall				Overall			
7.24	6.97	6.83	6.83	3.22	3.58	3.82	3.74

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

At the Battalion level, among the better choices, while the mean scores of all groups were lower than the expert mean, the AC group had two mean scores out of the eight that were significantly lower; while the USAR and the ARNG groups both had five of eight that were significantly lower. These results suggest that at this level, the opportunity to share knowledge, which is more available for AC Officers, may provide an advantage in the development of tacit knowledge.

Among the worse choices, ARNG group had one significantly higher score; the AC group had two significantly higher scores; and the USAR group had four significantly higher scores than the expert mean. These results suggest that Officers at this level have developed a larger body of tacit knowledge about what *not to do* as well as what *to do* in response to problems in these categories.

Research Question 2: Are there between component (AC/ARNG/USAR) differences in levels of leader tacit knowledge among Officers.

Platoon level.

MANOVA conducted initially with three component groups (AC/ARNG/USAR) was not significant. Because of the extremely uneven sample size, another MANOVA was conducted after combining the ARNG and USAR RC groups. A small but significant MANOVA, $F(1, 283) = 1.93$, eta squared = .08 was obtained for the analysis done comparing RC and AC Platoon level Officers. For the majority of items, the RC mean scores were higher for the better choices, and lower for the worse choices. Table 9 shows significant follow-up univariate F tests.

Table 9
Platoon Level Univariate Analysis for AC and RC Officers

Better Choices		Worse Choices	
AC n=114	RC n=171	AC n=114	RC n=171
Influencing the Boss		Influencing the Boss	
6.66	6.72	4.07*	3.70*
$F(1, 283) = 7.95$			
Managing Oneself		Managing Oneself	
6.91	7.05	4.45*	4.22*
$F(1, 283) = 3.97$			
Taking Care of Soldiers		Taking Care of Soldiers	
6.90	7.02	3.65*	3.35*
$F(1, 283) = 4.41$			

* $p < .05$.

Results show that while Platoon level RC mean scores were generally higher than AC mean scores in the better choice category, the significant differences in mean scores were all found among worse choices, in the categories of: Influencing the Boss, Managing Oneself, and Taking Care of Soldiers. These results suggest that RC Platoon level Officers may be able to bring higher levels of tacit knowledge to their military positions because they are able to draw on a wide variety of civilian experiences and are generally older than their AC counterparts.

Company level.

A significant multivariate $F(1, 307) = 2.97$, eta squared = .16 was obtained for the combined (USAR/ARNG and AC) component analysis. Table 10 shows the results of the univariate tests which were done to identify which of the dependent variables most accounted for the differences between the components.

Table 10

Company Level Univariate Analysis for AC and RC Officers

Better Choices		Worse Choices	
AC n=116	RC n=193	AC n=116	RC n=193
Taking Care of Soldiers		Taking Care of Soldiers	
7.74*	7.52*	3.94	4.07
$F(1, 307) = 4.376$			
Directing and Supervising Subordinates		Directing and Supervising Subordinates	
6.97	6.89	3.56**	3.96**
		$F(1, 307) = 9.061$	
Developing Subordinates		Developing Subordinates	
8.13	7.98	3.57**	3.87**
		$F(1, 307) = 7.363$	
Balancing Mission and Troops		Balancing Mission and Troops	
6.90**	6.59**	2.76*	3.03*
$F(1, 307) = 7.443$		$F(1, 307) = 4.381$	

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

While mean scores for Officers at the Company level were generally higher for AC Officers in the better choice and lower in the worse choice areas, multiple comparisons showed the RC and AC differed significantly on the better choice responses for Taking Care of Soldiers and Balancing Mission and Troops. Among the worse choice responses, the RC and AC differed on Directing and Supervising Subordinates, Developing Subordinates, and Balancing Mission and Troops. These results suggest that at this level, having the opportunity to network full-time with one's counterparts may give AC Company level Officers an advantage in developing tacit knowledge problem-solving skills in both better and worse choice areas.

Battalion level.

Multivariate analysis conducted at the Battalion level for this research question was not significant.

Research Question 3: Are there between component differences in the level of metacognitive self-awareness of individual knowledge strengths and weaknesses among Officers.

Platoon level.

Results of one-way ANOVA showed no significant differences in the metacognitive mean scores of USAR, ARNG, and AC Platoon Level Officers. Result of one-way ANOVA for an RC combined group was significant, $F(1, 283) = 4.96$. The combined group RC metacognitive mean score was 3.84; the AC mean score was 3.71. Correlations were computed to identify any relations between TKML and Metacognitive Self-Assessment variables. Correlation analysis comparing metacognitive mean scores and TKML mean scores was significant in four of six areas under the better choice category. Table 11 shows the correlation between the

Metacognitive Assessment mean scores for Platoon Leaders and their TKML responses organized by component.

Table 11

Platoon Level Metacognitive Mean and TKML Response Correlations by Component

	Better Choices			Worse Choices			
	AC n=114	USAR n=32	ARNG n=139		AC n=114	USAR n=32	ARNG n=139
Metacog. Mean	3.71	3.80	3.85	Metacog. Mean	3.71	3.80	3.85
Influencing the Boss				Influencing the Boss			
	6.66 (.155)	6.94 (.382*)	6.67 (.023)		4.07 (-.003)	3.46 (-.295)	3.75 (-.046)
Managing Oneself				Managing Oneself			
	6.91 (.192*)	7.25 (.414*)	7.01 (.175*)		4.45 (-.132)	4.48 (-.174)	4.16 (-.070)
Establishing Credibility				Establishing Credibility			
	7.80 (.208*)	8.03 (.495*)	7.83 (.131)		3.68 (-.009)	3.76 (.118)	3.55 (.044)
Taking Care of Soldiers				Taking Care of Soldiers			
	6.90 (.087)	7.05 (.353*)	7.02 (.135)		3.65 (-.084)	3.46 (-.206)	3.32 (-.132)
Overall				Overall			
	6.85 (.173)	7.09 (.486**)	6.89 (.140)		3.88 (-.069)	3.79 (-.176)	3.71 (-.093)

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

Correlation for Platoon level Officers of all components was significant between the metacognitive mean score and the TKML Intrapersonal item of Managing Oneself, in the better choice category. These results suggest that the intrapersonal ability to manage oneself is related to the intrapersonal ability to know one's knowledge strengths and weaknesses. A summary of the items included in the Metacognitive Self-Assessment is at Appendix B.

Company level.

Results of one-way ANOVA at this level showed no significant differences between the metacognitive mean scores of USAR, ARNG, and AC Company level Officers. Correlations were computed to identify relations between TKML and Metacognitive Self-Assessment variables. Correlation analysis comparing metacognitive mean scores and TKML mean scores was significant in all areas. Table 12 shows the results of this analysis.

Table 12

Company Level Metacognitive Mean and TKML Response Correlations by Component

	Better Choices			Worse Choices			
	AC n=116	USAR n=44	ARNG n=149		AC n=116	USAR n=44	ARNG n=149
Metacog. Mean	4.01	4.01	3.98	Metacog. Mean	4.04	4.01	3.98
Taking Care of Soldiers				Taking Care of Soldiers			
	7.74 (-.012)	7.79 (.218)	7.44 (.295**)		3.94 (.138)	4.23 (-.299*)	4.02 (-.005)
Directing and Supervising Subordinates				Directing and Supervising Subordinates			
	6.97 (.194*)	6.98 (.345*)	6.87 (.164*)		3.56 (-.015)	3.81 (.023)	4.00 (.053)
Cooperating With Others				Cooperating With Others			
	6.52 (.016)	6.43 (-.070)	6.25 (-.099)		2.86 (.021)	2.54 (-.238)	2.94 (-.242**)
Establishing Trust				Establishing Trust			
	7.30 (.160)	7.46 (.194)	7.20 (.158)		2.46 (-.143)	2.38 (-.478**)	2.49 (-.305**)
Managing Oneself				Managing Oneself			
	7.31 (.097)	7.35 (.602**)	7.28 (.083)		3.29 (-.276**)	3.27 (-.430**)	3.15 (-.274**)
Communicating				Communicating			
	7.18 (.067)	7.53 (.504**)	7.29 (.183*)		4.44 (.170)	4.07 (-.079)	4.29 (-.133)
Motivating Subordinates				Motivating Subordinates			
	7.34 (.143)	7.46 (.364*)	7.32 (.227**)		3.89 (.158)	4.04 (.148)	4.07 (-.103)
Developing Subordinates				Developing Subordinates			
	8.13 (-.049)	8.02 (.425**)	7.97 (.205*)		3.57 (.033)	3.70 (-.147)	3.93 (-.170*)
Balancing Mission and Troops				Balancing Mission and Troops			
	6.90 (.103)	6.74 (.447**)	6.55 (.140)		2.76 (-.045)	3.04 (-.093)	3.03 (-.169*)
Overall				Overall			
	7.27 (.134)	7.31 (.530**)	7.13 (.204*)		3.42 (.011)	3.45 (-.352*)	3.55 (-.247**)

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

At this level, there was a significant correlation for Company level Officers of all components between the metacognitive mean score and the TKML Intrapersonal item of Managing Oneself in the worse choice category. These results suggest that intrapersonal knowledge about one's strengths and weaknesses and knowledge about how *not to* manage oneself develops as one gains experience in one's job. The USAR group had more significant correlations in the better choice category, as well as the strongest overall correlations.

Battalion level.

Results of one-way ANOVA at this level indicated no significant differences in the metacognitive mean scores of USAR, ARNG, and AC Battalion level Officers. Correlations were computed to identify relations between TKML and Metacognitive Self-Assessment variables. There were no significant correlations.

Summary

Table 13 summarizes the overall results on the analyses conducted in response to each research question.

Table 13

Summary of Hypotheses, Statistical Analysis Method, and Results

Hypothesis	Statistical Method/Results
RQ1: Are there differences between AC/RC Officer TKML responses and the TKML expert responses.	One Sample <i>t</i> -test showed significant differences between AC/RC Officer means and the expert means.
RQ2: Are there between component (AC/ARNG/USAR) differences in levels of leader tacit knowledge among Officers.	Results of MANOVA showed significant differences at the Platoon and Company level, but not at the Battalion level.
RQ3: Are there between component differences in the level of metacognitive self-awareness of individual knowledge strengths and weaknesses among Officers.	Results of One-Way ANOVA were significant at Platoon level only. Correlation analysis comparing metacognitive mean scores and TKML mean scores was significant.

RQ1: Generally, with a few exceptions, for each level of Officer, the mean scores for Platoon, Company, and Battalion Officers of all components were lower than the expert mean scores in the better choice category and higher than the expert mean scores in the worse choice category. At Platoon and Company levels, more statistically significant differences were found on the worse choice side of the table, which suggests that the development of tacit knowledge about what *to do* occurs before the development of tacit knowledge about what *not to do* in response to problems. At Platoon and Company level, USAR mean scores were not significantly different than the expert mean scores, in more comparisons. This suggests that USAR junior and mid-level Officers may be able to draw from experiences outside of their current military assignment which assists them to develop their tacit knowledge problem-solving skills.

RQ2: MANOVA conducted at Platoon and Company level where Officers are aggregated by component (AC/RC) was significant. TKML mean scores of RC Platoon level Officers were higher than those of AC Platoon level Officers; and TKML mean scores of RC Company level Officers were lower than those of AC Company level Officers. There were no significant differences in the mean scores of Battalion level Officers. Effect sizes were small. These results

suggest that maturity may provide an advantage at Platoon level, while the opportunity to network while living and working together full-time provides the advantage at the Company level.

RQ3: Results of one-way ANOVA comparing the metacognitive mean scores of RC and AC Platoon level Officers showed a significant difference, with RC Officers having a higher score. Results of one-way ANOVA comparing the metacognitive mean scores of RC and AC Company level Officers showed no significant difference. There were significant correlations between the metacognitive mean score and TKML mean scores at Platoon and Company level. Results suggests there is a relationship between one's awareness of one's knowledge strengths and weakness and the individual's level of tacit knowledge. There were no significant results at Battalion level.

Discussion

Key Findings

The TKML Expert Means were developed from active Officer input. Because of this, one might logically conclude that AC mean scores might be closer to the Expert Mean scores than either the USAR or ARNG, if for no other reason than the fact that AC Officers, who live and work together, have more opportunity to network and informally share knowledge. However, more USAR Platoon and Company level TKML mean scores were closer to the TKML Expert Mean scores than either the AC or ARNG. This suggests that factors other than continuous proximity contribute to the building of tacit knowledge. Additionally, across all components there were more significant differences between Officer mean scores and the Expert Means in the worse choice category than in the better choice category. This suggests that junior and midlevel Officers develop capabilities that are oriented on what to do in response to a problem, first, and then acquire knowledge about what not to do.

Statistically significant differences in levels of leader tacit knowledge possessed by USAR, ARNG, and AC Platoon and Company level Officers were found. The TKML mean scores of RC (combined ARNG and USAR) Platoon level Officers were higher for the better choices than the AC Officers at this level; and lower for the worse choices. Conversely, the AC Company level TKML scores were higher for better choices and lower for worse choices than the RC Officers at this level. It may seem confusing trying to reconcile two seemingly contradictory findings: USAR Platoon and Company level Officers were closer to the Expert Means than AC Officers but AC Company Level TKML scores were higher than RC. A modest, but consistent finding that helps explain these results is that the ARNG TKML scores were generally lower than USAR scores, which overall lowered RC means. Combining USAR and ARNG Officers into one RC group was an appropriate step because, with one exception, the ARNG and USAR share a common RC environment, which is characterized by geographical dispersion, training time and resource constraints.

The MANOVAs conducted at Platoon and Company level were modestly significant, with small effect sizes. Because what should be considered a small, medium, or large effect size for MANOVA is unclear, (Green & Salkind, 2003, p. 204), the effect size for this analysis is

difficult to interpret. However, analyses resulting in small and medium effect sizes are common in social science research (Stevens, 2002, p. 195). This fact combined with the strong power in each analysis in this research suggests there is a significant difference between these groups that merits further study.

While there were limited statistically significant differences with respect to the metacognitive mean scores between the groups at any level, the correlations between the metacognitive mean and the TKML scores for the USAR and ARNG Officers suggest that there is a relationship between an individual's capacity to recognize valuable tacit knowledge and that person's metacognitive self-awareness. Correlation analysis done comparing metacognitive and TKML mean scores shows more significant results at the Company level than at the Platoon level, which suggests that with maturity comes more self-awareness. The interpretation of the positive correlation between TKML responses and the metacognitive mean score suggests that individuals who are self-aware of their own knowledge strengths and weaknesses also possess higher levels of tacit knowledge to distinguish better from worse choices in response to problems. This finding could serve as a preliminary construct to help Officers self-identify their own capacity to acquire tacit knowledge.

Utilization of Findings

The majority of AC Officers receive their commissions through ROTC, upon graduation from college. This means that AC 2nd Lieutenants are generally in their early 20's, and have not had the opportunity to gain much life or professional experience. RC Officers are generally older than AC Officers, for example the average age of USAR Officers is 42 (USAR, 2006); while the average age for AC Officers is 34 (OASD/DMDC, 1998). Additionally, many RC Officers have previous active duty experience, and may have had the opportunity to accrue relevant tacit knowledge from civilian professional experiences. By the time an Officer becomes a Captain, the professional 'landscape' is more complex. At the Company level, having the opportunity to share work-related experiences and problem-solving strategies may be more critical. RC Captains may be at a disadvantage here, juggling multiple demands, because by this point, Officers at this level are fully engaged in a civilian occupation, many have Families, but must now be able to solve difficult Army-related problems. ARNG Officers are further restricted in their ability to network because members frequently serve much of their careers within a limited geographical area; with many of the same individuals; have limited opportunities for assignment and career progression; and when mobilized, serve almost exclusively with other ARNG members. These factors may contribute to the development of a specific leader and organizational culture that could influence the acquisition of tacit knowledge.

There were differences between the responses of ARNG Officers and AC Officers. These differences may be justified because of the time, geographical, resource and command constraints outlined earlier. However, as noted there were also differences between how ARNG and USAR Officers responded. Within the reserve component, both USAR and ARNG organizations must contend with time, geographical and resource constraints. The one factor that distinguishes these groups from one another is that ARNG units train and mobilize as units, whereas members of USAR organizations may be mobilized individually. While this suggests that leaders (commanders) of ARNG units might influence tacit knowledge levels more

profoundly than in USAR organizations, further research to identify discriminating factors that distinguish differences between USAR and ARNG organizations should be done before firm conclusions can be drawn.

Because of the important role Company level leaders play, differences in levels of tacit knowledge between the Army's components among officers at Company level strengthen the argument for component specific leader development programs. One perspective might be that RC leaders employ different kinds of leader tacit knowledge not addressed in the AC oriented TKML instrument. Because the RC environment is so different from the AC environment, it seems appropriate to identify specific leader tacit knowledge considered central to the success of an RC Officer. The same effort could be made for Noncommissioned Officers in both the active and reserve components. Further research should be done, as well, to identify how and why ARNG and USAR organizations differ, to include which RC specific constraint has the most impact on the development and performance of leaders within these organizations. More research should be done to establish the relationship between levels of tacit knowledge and other measures of effectiveness.

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Appendix A

*Tacit Knowledge for Military Leaders:
Platoon, Company and Battalion-Level Leader Problem Vignettes,
TKML Expert and Component Responses (Means and Rankings), and Changes to the Instrument*

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; standard deviations are shown in parentheses below each mean.

Platoon-Level: Motivating Subordinates

P22. You are a new Platoon leader. The Battalion you support is preparing to conduct a night move. You assemble your Platoon and tell everyone to start packing equipment in preparation for the move that same night. When you come back to inspect their movement preparation, you find that your Soldiers have not packed the equipment and are talking to personnel from other Platoons, who are hanging around the area. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=114	USAR N=32	ARNG N=139
a.	Order the Soldiers from other Platoons to leave the area.	6.86 (1.86)	6.26** (2.14)	6.66 (2.07)	6.01** (2.04)
b.	Take charge of the situation, get your unit moving, then talk to the NCOs to bring the chain of command online.	7.40 (1.84)	7.75* (1.69)	7.13 (2.47)	7.41 (1.92)
c.	Tell the Soldiers exactly what you want done and when you will return to inspect.	5.82 (2.11)	5.70 (2.15)	6.34 (2.15)	6.07 (2.11)
d.	Assemble your entire Platoon and tell them that their work priorities are not on target.	4.42 (2.05)	5.46** (1.83)	5.50** (2.03)	5.42 (2.14)
e.	Remind Soldiers of the time urgency and the need to get many things done quickly in preparation for the night move.	5.66 (1.92)	5.63 (1.91)	6.00 (2.23)	5.92 (1.95)
f.	Use verbal leadership and commands to influence your Soldiers.	6.36 (1.92)	6.31 (1.76)	6.75 (1.9)	6.43 (1.68)
g.	Wait and see if the Soldiers do the task later on their own.	1.80 (1.48)	1.82 (1.48)	2.19 (2.18)	1.81 (1.31)
h.	Assemble your squad leaders and talk about the situation.	7.06 (1.96)	6.39** (2.11)	6.75 (2.34)	6.69* (1.98)
i.	Speak to the Soldiers in a friendly manner without emphasizing your authority as their leader.	2.76 (1.78)	2.78 (1.79)	2.38 (1.52)	2.86 (1.99)
j.	ORIGINAL: Warn the Platoon sergeant that you will consider using punishment (such as an Article 15) if the Platoon does not pull things together immediately.	2.36 (1.72)			
j.	CHANGE: Warn the Platoon sergeant that you will consider punishment if the Platoon does not pull things together immediately.		4.31** (2.37)	4.66** (2.29)	4.45** (2.36)
Rationale for Change: Members of the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve do not fall under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which prescribes Article 15 for non-judicial offenses when they are in an inactive duty training status.					

Platoon-Level: Influencing the Boss

P23. You are a Platoon leader, and your unit is training at the National Training Center. Your battery commander makes your howitzer sections dig individual positions every time you stop, even in the offense. The other batteries do not dig in as much as you do. The Observer Controllers (OCs) tell you that your sections dig good positions, but they question why you do this so much in the offense. The battery commander's order is making a big problem for you because your sections are under-strength, and digging in so much burns everyone out and has a bad effect on morale. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=114	USAR N=32	ARNG N=139
a.	Explain your view to the battery commander by talking in terms of Mission-Enemy-Terrain-Troops-and-Time (METT-T) and the effect of the decision on the unit's mission.	7.68 (1.45)	7.12** (1.55)	8.00 (1.02)	7.04** (1.83)
b.	Tell the battery commander that his directive adversely impacts the unit's morale.	5.98 (1.96)	5.18** (2.01)	5.56 (2.2)	5.30** (2.00)
c.	Go to the battery commander <u>alone</u> and ask him why he issued the directive.	6.64 (1.95)	5.12** (2.24)	6.31 (2.23)	4.98** (2.23)
d.	Try to figure out on your own why the battery commander issued the directive and explain it to your Soldiers.	4.10 (2.37)	3.94 (2.07)	3.16* (2.0)	3.63* (2.14)
e.	Speak to the Company first sergeant for advice and assistance.	6.78 (1.58)	6.56 (1.74)	6.56 (2.05)	5.88** (2.29)
f.	Enlist the support of one or two other Platoon leaders and go together to speak to the battery commander.	5.84 (1.89)	5.52 (2.46)	4.03** (2.51)	5.21** (2.15)
g.	Based on the position of your troops, make a decision not to comply with the commander's directive on the basis of "mission first," then explain your actions after the fact.	1.94 (1.27)	3.11** (2.04)	2.06 (1.56)	2.86** (2.27)
h.	Get together with the other Platoon leaders and agree on a common position, get the support of senior NCOs, and then go as a group and together state your case to the battery commander.	4.00 (2.31)	5.17** (2.88)	4.19 (2.58)	4.56** (2.71)

Platoon-Level: Influencing the Boss

P24. You have spent two months working with your new battery commander. In his last position as the Fire Support Officer for an infantry Battalion he supervised a shorthanded team. Consequently, he was required to perform many duties himself. Your commander still tries to stay involved in all of the day-to-day details of running the unit, and he generally delegates tasks less often than you would like. You believe that your commander is overburdened, and you are worried about the consequences of his time-management techniques. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=114	USAR N=32	ARNG N=139
a.	If you know that the battery commander intends to give someone a task, speak to that person before the battery commander does, so that he or she has already started the task before the battery commander meets with him or her.	4.29 (2.17)	5.10** (2.02)	4.84 (2.48)	4.72* (2.19)
b.	Wait to take action on specific things under <u>after</u> he mentions them to you.	2.51 (1.52)	3.46** (1.74)	3.13 (1.84)	3.47** (1.92)
c.	Help your battery commander to better manage his time in any way you can.	7.55 (1.26)	7.04** (1.53)	7.13 (1.89)	7.32 (1.67)
d.	Don't wait to be told what to do—anticipate what needs to be done, and if you are capable, do it.	8.31 (1.00)	7.81** (1.43)	8.13 (1.18)	7.65** (1.58)
e.	If something needs to be done but you can't do it, find someone else who can and get him/her involved—without being asked by the battery commander.	7.49 (1.61)	7.40 (1.66)	7.69 (1.45)	7.46 (1.47)
f.	Offer to take care of specific tasks <u>before</u> he mentions them to you.	7.78 (1.25)	7.50 (1.58)	7.78 (1.34)	7.71 (1.57)
g.	When he returns from command and staff meetings, meet with him right away by yourself and write down everything that has to be done.	5.65 (1.83)	5.85 (2.16)	6.81** (1.8)	6.29** (2.13)
h.	Rely on the NCO chain of command; deal with the appropriate NCO and get NCO support.	6.53 (1.61)	6.03** (1.94)	6.06 (1.99)	6.29 (2.15)
i.	Go to the first sergeant and/or executive Officer and ask for suggestions about what to do about the commander's management style.	6.04 (2.13)	5.64 (2.21)	5.19* (2.36)	5.33** (2.25)
j.	Ask the battery commander often what you can do to help and to relieve his task burden.	6.52 (1.95)	6.42 (1.91)	6.56 (1.78)	7.02** (1.77)
k.	Assume this is just the way he is and do your best to get along.	3.69 (1.76)	3.63 (2.03)	3.41 (1.66)	3.27** (1.79)

Platoon-Level: Managing Oneself

P25. During the live fire attack at the National Training Center, your tank Platoon is in an overwatch position, as part of the observation post (OP) plan. You are supposed to wait to be called forward into the attack. From your position, you watch the artillery come in on the enemy positions. The smoke from the artillery obscures the enemy's view. At this point, you should move out—you should call your commanding Officer and tell him you are moving while the enemy is blinded. Instead, you wait to be told to move out, as the OP plan called for. Consequently, you move after the smoke lifts, and you lose three tanks, including your own. You are angry with yourself and ashamed; you believe you should have known better. How should you deal with this situation?		Expert Mean	AC N=114	USAR N=32	ARNG N=139
a.	Think about this negative performance feedback from the NTC as a way to identify and repair your weaknesses.	7.32 (1.67)	7.75** (1.53)	7.59 (2.18)	7.68* (1.74)
b.	Try to understand other people's roles in the decision, if any.	6.00 (1.81)	6.25 (1.88)	6.19 (1.63)	6.29 (1.83)
c.	During the After Action Review, admit to your Soldiers that you made a mistake; take responsibility for what happened.	7.30 (1.82)	6.86* (2.06)	6.69 (2.78)	6.88* (2.21)
d.	Reflect on the decision and determine what you should have done, in order to derive the lessons learned.	8.34 (.89)	8.04** (1.08)	8.44 (.76)	8.08** (1.17)
e.	Remind yourself that you will do better on the next mission.	7.00 (1.44)	6.82 (1.60)	7.41 (1.5)	7.04 (1.95)
f.	During the After Action Review, describe your mistake to your subordinate leaders in order to develop and train them.	8.14 (1.05)	7.31** (1.73)	7.69 (1.67)	7.35** (1.75)
g.	Put the decision behind you; try not to dwell on it.	6.26 (1.80)	5.67** (2.34)	5.25* (2.45)	6.05 (2.38)
h.	During the After Action Review, try to explain the reasons for your decision to your Soldiers.	5.60 (2.04)	5.42 (2.10)	5.97 (2.46)	5.15* (2.26)
i.	Don't let the Soldiers get down on themselves because of your decision—build up their confidence and encourage them.	7.92 (1.08)	7.43** (1.68)	8.09 (1.17)	7.86 (1.62)
j.	Discuss the issue with your Company commander and convince your Company commander to allow you the freedom to exercise initiative at certain times, like this one.	7.74 (1.27)	7.30* (2.08)	7.31 (1.49)	7.31** (1.89)

Platoon-Level: Managing Self

P26. You are a Platoon leader, and one day your driver has a motivational problem while out on the field. He starts mouthing off to you while standing on top of the turret in front of the rest of the Platoon. Everyone in the Platoon is listening to what he's saying about you, and it is extremely negative and harsh. What should you not do?		Expert Mean	AC N=114	USAR N=32	ARNG N=139
a.	In front of the Platoon, order your driver to do an unpleasant task as punishment for his insubordination.	1.88 (1.39)	3.72** (2.06)	3.59** (1.93)	3.63** (3.39)
b.	Pull him aside and read him his rights: really chew his butt.	5.39 (2.37)	5.65 (2.34)	5.97 (2.21)	5.75* (2.12)
c.	Go to the PSG and tell him to take care of this problem.	4.12 (2.24)	4.66* (2.23)	4.75 (2.31)	4.86** (2.32)
d.	Order your driver to be quiet and get back to his job.	5.88 (2.02)	4.59** (2.28)	5.03 (2.36)	5.06** (2.25)
e.	Pull him aside and tell him to come speak to you in one hour.	6.08 (2.40)	5.89 (2.25)	6.41 (2.43)	6.14 (2.33)
f.	Answer your driver back immediately and defend yourself by arguing your position.	1.60 (.97)	2.53** (1.79)	2.50** (1.83)	2.35** (1.77)
g.	Tell your driver you are recommending him for an Article 15.	3.64 (2.32)	4.45** (2.06)	4.38 (2.18)	3.89 (2.18)
h.	Do nothing; walk away and wait for your driver to blow off steam.	2.44 (1.81)	2.32 (1.74)	2.41 (1.70)	2.45 (1.82)
i.	Speak to your Company commander about the problem and get his/her advice.	4.82 (2.41)	4.75 (2.28)	4.56 (2.41)	5.12 (2.54)
j.	Speak to another Platoon leader and get his/her advice.	4.88 (2.16)	5.33* (2.15)	5.59 (2.24)	5.37* (2.29)
k.	Pull him aside, talk to him in private, and ask what's wrong.	6.63 (1.94)	6.90 (1.67)	6.72 (2.10)	7.12** (1.91)

Platoon-Level: Establishing Trust

P27. Your battery commander makes a decision you do not agree with. You try speaking with him and stating your position as effectively as you can, but his mind is made up and he is not going to change his position. Other Platoon leaders agree with you that the battery commander's decision is wrong. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=114	USAR N=32	ARNG N=139
a.	Use the first sergeant or executive Officer as a voice-piece for your ideas: Convince one of them to state your opinions to the battery commander.	5.14 (2.22)	5.68** (2.17)	5.00 (2.03)	4.92 (2.23)
b.	Speak to the Battalion commander and ask for advice.	2.60 (1.93)	3.88** (2.29)	4.13** (2.35)	3.78** (2.40)
c.	Tell only your NCOs that you support the battery commander's decision.	4.72 (2.15)	4.31* (1.96)	4.66 (2.73)	4.09** (2.08)
d.	Tell your Platoon that you support the battery commander's decision, and they must implement it.	6.56 (1.93)	6.24 (2.01)	6.47 (2.44)	6.29 (2.14)
e.	Tell only your NCOs that you do not support the battery commander's decision, but ask for their help in implementing the decision anyway.	3.16 (2.05)	4.51** (2.36)	4.28* (2.68)	4.24** (2.44)
f.	Tell the NCOs that you do not support the battery commander's decision, and ask for their opinions and advice on how to handle the situation with the troops.	2.86 (1.75)	4.37** (2.19)	3.66 (2.62)	4.09** (2.57)
g.	Tell your Platoon that you do not support the battery commander's decision, but ask for their cooperation in implementing the decision anyway.	2.16 (1.68)	2.75** (2.12)	2.94 (2.64)	2.81** (2.18)
h.	Formulate the best possible argument that you can in support of the battery commander's decision, and then explain the decision to the Platoon while asking for their support.	5.58 (2.43)	5.13* (2.29)	4.63* (2.64)	5.27 (2.44)
i.	Go back to the battery commander and tell him/her that because you do not agree with the decision, it will be very hard for you to gain the support of the NCOs and troops to carry out the battery commander's wishes.	3.54 (2.46)	3.75 (2.39)	3.88 (2.55)	4.17** (2.39)
j.	Wait an hour after the meeting, then approach the battery commander with an alternative solution.	6.30 (2.12)	6.14 (1.99)	6.31 (2.21)	6.05 (2.29)

Platoon-Level: Establishing Credibility

P28. You are a new Platoon leader who takes charge of your Platoon when they return from a lengthy combat deployment. All members of the Platoon are war veterans, but you did not serve in the conflict. In addition, you failed to graduate from Ranger School. You are concerned with building credibility with your Soldiers. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=114	USAR N=32	ARNG N=139
a.	Do not change procedures that work.	7.92 (1.02)	7.61* (1.51)	7.28 (1.89)	7.66* (1.46)
b.	Ask the members of the Platoon to share their combat experience: Ask what they learned and how it can help the Platoon.	8.18 (.88)	7.94* (1.18)	8.47* (.72)	8.20 (1.17)
c.	Work hard to get into excellent physical shape so that you excel in PT.	7.55 (1.34)	8.08** (1.18)	8.16** (1.25)	7.78 (1.36)
d.	Maintain good military bearing by wearing a pressed uniform, shined boots, and having good posture.	7.02 (1.56)	7.74** (1.32)	8.28** (1.25)	7.86** (1.27)
e.	Speak to your Soldiers with a tone of voice that conveys respect for them.	7.63 (1.51)	7.86 (1.35)	8.31** (1.23)	8.01** (1.13)
f.	Study field manuals and military history in order to gain technical and tactical competence.	7.80 (1.27)	8.01 (1.36)	8.13 (1.10)	8.04 (1.14)
g.	Defer to Soldiers on matters related to their combat experience, thus acknowledging that they know more than you do in some areas.	6.73 (1.68)	7.16* (1.78)	7.47* (1.85)	7.07 (2.08)
h.	Tell your NCOs about all of the studying you have done to increase your competence.	2.69 (1.46)	4.02** (1.99)	4.00** (2.08)	4.05** (2.33)
i.	Listen frequently to your Soldiers; hear their views, opinions, comments, and suggestions.	8.17 (.91)	8.06 (1.04)	8.16 (1.14)	8.04 (1.48)
j.	Announce right up front that you are in charge and the Soldiers must accept this fact and treat you with appropriate respect.	2.14 (1.49)	3.35** (2.19)	3.53** (2.68)	3.05** (2.28)

Platoon-Level: Managing Oneself

P29. You are a new Platoon leader, and you are under a great deal of stress. Everyone is expecting a lot of you, and there never seem to be enough hours in the day to accomplish everything. There is a lot of competition for key awards and positions in the future, and other Officers are working as hard as you are. At home, your family also needs your time and attention. You also have tremendous responsibilities associated with your full time civilian job. How should you manage your stress?		Expert Mean	AC N=114	USAR N=32	ARNG N=139
a.	Find a trustworthy military person or confidante (not your rater) to talk to about your frustrations and problems—someone who will provide you with <u>positive</u> feedback about your performance.	5.52 (1.81)	6.33** (2.00)	6.81** (1.55)	6.65** (1.93)
b.	Ask a senior military leader whom you respect for specific advice and suggestions.	6.86 (1.43)	8.04 (8.78)	7.84** (1.22)	7.69** (1.53)
c.	Find a trustworthy military person or confidant (not your rater) to talk to about your frustrations and problems—someone who will provide you with <u>honest</u> feedback about your performance.	7.66 (1.26)	7.59 (1.65)	8.22* (1.34)	7.88 (1.51)
d.	Limit the amount of additional, unpaid (non-drill) time you devote to working on problems from your military assignment.	7.74 (1.51)	5.22** (1.94)	5.69** (2.13)	5.39** (2.01)
e.	If tempted to use additional, unpaid (non-drill) time to work on problems from your military assignment, ask yourself if it is really critical, or whether it can wait until the next time you are on duty.	7.96 (1.32)	6.31** (1.76)	6.31** (2.44)	6.24** (1.99)
f.	Find a trustworthy military person to talk to who will give you positive reinforcement.	5.78 (1.42)	5.82 (1.94)	6.56* (1.66)	6.09 (1.88)
g.	Put your problems in perspective by reflecting on people who are worse off than you are.	4.90 (1.83)	4.96 (2.16)	5.59 (2.39)	4.71 (2.37)
h.	Remind yourself of your long-term goals—five or more years out—and look for relationships between the current situations and your long-term goals.	6.41 (1.85)	6.57 (1.78)	7.25** (1.67)	6.86** (1.76)
i.	Take up a hobby of interest to you and do it even though you are tired.	4.88 (1.88)	5.13 (1.98)	5.78* (2.32)	4.95 (2.16)
j.	Remember to place your <u>military</u> career in perspective by focusing on the many aspects of your life that matter in addition to that.	7.84 (1.30)	6.80** (1.91)	7.59 (1.27)	7.32** (1.79)
k.	Speak to your commander about your stress, frustrations, and problems, and request her/his advice.	6.20 (2.09)	6.48 (1.97)	7.25** (1.68)	6.85** (1.81)

Platoon-Level: Motivating Subordinates

P30. You are an engineer Platoon leader training with your Soldiers. One squad is given the mission to put in a minefield for the Infantry Battalion. You pick the second squad because they are good Soldiers, have better equipment, and are better trained to do the job. But the squad is exhausted and the Soldiers really complain. They note that it is nearing the end of the exercise and they are very tired. You tell them what you want done and you make the standards clear. When you return to check, the minefield is not up to standard and the squad is sitting around eating. You talk to the squad leader, and point out that the minefield is not up to standard. He tells you in front of the squad that the squad is not interested in your standards and that what they have done is the best you are going to get. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=114	USAR N=32	ARNG
a.	Relieve the squad leader, put a team leader in charge, and provide him with your guidance to complete the task.	6.74 (2.25)	5.97** (2.16)	6.06 (2.39)	5.75** (2.28)
b.	Recognize that the Soldiers have reached their limit and tell them you recognize this and will take steps to ensure they are not pushed too far in the future.	3.82 (2.39)	4.13 (2.03)	5.41** (2.37)	5.02** (2.34)
c.	Try to convince the squad leader and Soldiers that you will not give them another mission until they have had a chance to rest, but that they must bring the minefield up to standard.	4.72 (2.40)	5.73** (2.00)	5.91** (2.43)	6.01** (2.17)
d.	Assume that the Soldiers are overworked and let them off the hook this time—do not make them complete the task.	1.60 (1.14)	2.06** (1.47)	2.22 (1.75)	2.24** (1.65)
e.	Punish the squad leader by recommending him for an Article 15 for mouthing off to you about the Soldiers not caring about your standards.	4.69 (2.62)	4.77 (2.18)	4.44 (2.33)	4.38 (2.36)
f.	Order the Soldiers to stop eating immediately and complete the task, and threaten punishment if they do not comply.	3.32 (1.85)	4.58** (1.96)	4.03 (2.04)	4.01** (2.17)
g.	Say that you recognize they are tired, but tell the Soldiers that the task must be completed, and ask what assistance you can arrange for to help them get the task done.	7.12 (1.96)	7.13 (1.83)	7.78** (1.34)	7.47* (1.84)

Platoon-Level: Taking Care of Soldiers

P31. You are a Platoon leader, and your Battalion requires the Company to turn in training schedules (ORIGINAL: six weeks) three months in advance. But the Battalion does not give you (ORIGINAL: six weeks) three months notice on requirements. Thus, there are a lot of changes to the training schedule. The Battalion tells you (ORIGINAL: six weeks) three months out is too far in the future to assign projects, yet they expect you to plan training (ORIGINAL: six weeks) three months out! The Soldiers think that these changes in the schedule jerk them around and sometimes cause (ORIGINAL: morale) problems with civilian employers. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=114	USAR N=32	ARNG N=139
a.	Tell your Soldiers to stop griping and worrying about the changes in the schedule-remind them that they always prepare their classes the night before anyway.	2.98 (1.61)	4.45** (1.76)	4.03* (2.31)	4.22** (2.07)
b.	Let the Soldiers know the changes to the schedule are not your fault, and that you appreciate their need to be able to plan.	5.02 (1.61)	5.61** (1.78)	6.06** (1.95)	5.50** (1.84)
c.	Buffer the Platoon from changes that take place higher up by filtering the information you give them about these changes—provide Soldiers with as much stability and predictability as possible.	7.78 (1.28)	6.95** (1.87)	7.06 (2.06)	7.04** (1.88)
d.	Submit all required paperwork to change the schedule to the Battalion, but for your own Platoon, publish a special calendar that is more short term but is always accurate.	6.10 (2.25)	6.98** (1.72)	6.59 (1.90)	6.83** (2.19)
e.	Tell your Platoon to ignore the training schedule, since it changes so much.	1.88 (.98)	2.59** (1.62)	1.94 (1.29)	2.07 (1.45)
f.	Speak to your Company commander about the disruptions caused by the changes in the schedule, and solicit his advice and assistance.	7.78 (1.00)	6.76** (1.84)	7.50 (1.83)	7.18** (1.92)
g.	Let the Soldiers know that you agree with them that sometimes it seems that the Battalion and the Company don't know what they are doing.	3.04 (1.71)	3.31 (1.96)	3.00 (1.68)	2.90 (2.09)
h.	Don't publish your own short-term schedule because then Soldiers will think with too short-term a focus and won't take the necessary time to prepare for classes, etc.	4.48 (1.93)	4.26 (1.68)	4.88 (1.70)	4.11* (2.19)
Rationale for Change: Due to the less frequent training periods, as well as the need to consider civilian employers when scheduling training, Army regulations require that reserve component units stabilize and publish their training schedules much earlier than active units.					

Platoon-Level: Managing Self

P32. You are a new second lieutenant. Due to numerous inactivations you have been assigned to the Battalion staff until a Platoon becomes available. You are somewhat intimidated about working with people who outrank you by such an extent—your direct boss is the Battalion executive Officer. However, as an Officer, you know you have a job to do. Rate the quality of the following strategies for establishing yourself as an effective Officer in your new position:					
		Expert Mean	AC N=114	USAR N=32	ARNG N=139
a.	Do not try to act like you know it all.	8.16 (1.15)	7.48** (1.89)	8.06 (1.46)	7.71** (1.71)
b.	Be assertive; do not be afraid of using your rank.	5.20 (2.15)	6.34** (1.85)	6.25** (1.93)	6.20** (1.85)
c.	Do not worry about upsetting people, even higher-ranking Officers, when you are doing your duty.	4.64 (2.07)	6.03** (2.01)	6.41** (2.17)	5.67** (2.21)
d.	Be careful not to use words or say things that might offend people who outrank you.	6.06 (1.86)	6.56** (1.81)	6.94** (1.64)	6.79** (1.89)
e.	Check with other lieutenants or captains and hear their opinions and get their input on an issue before taking the issue to the boss.	7.18 (1.65)	7.06 (1.57)	7.53 (1.39)	7.14 (1.80)
f.	Be respectful when you speak to Officers who outrank you.	8.42 (.81)	8.36 (.99)	8.78** (.49)	8.38 (1.45)
g.	Approach competent Officers directly, and ask frequently for their advice and help.	7.80 (1.43)	7.60 (1.43)	7.97 (1.40)	7.62 (1.79)
h.	Find out who the competent Officers are by reputation, then seek out these individuals and use them as mentors and sources of advice.	8.02 (1.27)	7.81 (1.29)	8.13 (1.34)	7.73 (1.87)
i.	Concentrate on the facts you are trying to communicate when you speak to high-ranking Officers—present the facts accurately and do not change what you are saying to avoid upsetting higher-ranking Officers.	7.96 (1.38)	7.54* (1.76)	8.28 (1.14)	7.57* (1.83)

Platoon-Level: Managing Oneself

P33. You and your Company commander don't talk about your performance very often. When you do, he usually blows up and chews you out, but never explains what you did wrong. In fact, you rarely know exactly what your Company commander thinks of you or what he expects. He generally just tells you what he wants, and that's it: He never communicates with you concerning your overall performance or development. What should you do in a situation with this type of commander?		Expert Mean	AC N=114	USAR N=32	ARNG N=139
a.	Have a friendly competition with the other PLs in order to set goals and judge your progress.	4.32 (1.52)	5.71** (1.80)	5.44** (2.14)	5.20** (2.17)
b.	Speak to another CO about your problem and ask for his advice.	3.35 (1.83)	4.86** (2.17)	4.78** (2.41)	4.57** (2.31)
c.	Avoid talking to other Officers about your complaints about your CO—figure things out for yourself as best you can.	4.59 (1.87)	4.46 (1.78)	4.78 (2.31)	4.83 (2.12)
d.	Try to learn by talking with others about the boss's likes and dislikes, in order to understand his style and expectations.	7.02 (1.35)	6.73* (1.49)	6.31* (1.75)	6.58** (1.82)
e.	Use your fellow lieutenants as a feedback group to determine how your performance compares with that of your peers.	6.22 (1.54)	6.69** (1.65)	6.66 (1.77)	6.53 (1.89)
f.	Ask ISG if your subordinates are having problems with the Company commander, so that you can counsel them.	4.22 (1.96)	4.50 (1.72)	4.53 (2.54)	4.26 (2.18)
g.	Accept the fact that this is just the way your CO is, and drive on.	5.38 (1.95)	4.82** (2.08)	4.56* (1.78)	4.76** (2.28)
h.	Ask the XO or senior lieutenant questions about the boss's opinion of you as a way of getting more information.	6.06 (1.86)	5.88 (1.96)	6.16 (1.82)	5.63* (2.17)
i.	Recognize that cooperation among the lieutenants in a Company is key to the success of a Platoon leader, and make sure that you cooperate with the other Platoon leaders.	7.68 (1.20)	7.13** (1.64)	7.63 (1.26)	7.32* (1.68)
j.	Use your fellow lieutenants as a social support group to determine if your experiences with the CO are normal.	7.04 (1.11)	6.61** (1.72)	6.81 (1.31)	6.46** (2.10)
k.	Assume that when your boss is not chewing you out, it basically means that he is satisfied.	4.92 (2.00)	5.08 (2.02)	4.38 (2.50)	4.76 (2.22)
l.	Use your fellow LT'S as a social support structure to vent your feelings and reduce your stress.	5.54 (1.97)	5.55 (1.94)	6.53** (1.93)	5.32 (2.16)
m.	Approach your CO, explain that your goal is to do and be your best, and tactfully ask him for detailed performance feedback and developmental counseling.	8.20 (.90)	7.56** (1.47)	7.97 (1.49)	7.73** (1.47)
n.	Speak to Platoon leaders in other companies about your performance and frustrations.	3.46 (1.68)	4.62** (1.90)	4.31 (2.63)	3.95* (2.26)
o.	Ask the ISG what the CO says about you behind your back.	2.52 (1.55)	3.31** (1.87)	3.22 (2.18)	2.94* (2.15)

Platoon-Level: Managing Oneself

P34. You are a medical service Platoon leader, and you have been in the unit for several months. You have frequently seen your peers yelling at Soldiers when the Soldiers make a mistake. You do the same thing when one of your squads does not follow the Platoon's standardized load plan – and you really lose control. You believe you were out of line, and you did not achieve the desired results. You also believe that yelling at people is demeaning and wrong. What should you do now?		Expert Mean	AC N=114	USAR N=32	ARNG
a.	Recognize that it is not appropriate to scream at people, and that there are other, more effective ways to handle situations.	8.38 (.85)	7.69** (1.55)	8.25 (1.24)	7.77** (1.84)
b.	Think about how your superior Officers' anger has or would affect you – try to put yourself in the shoes of the sergeant and the other Soldiers.	8.18 (.92)	7.49** (1.59)	8.19 (1.06)	7.78** (1.50)
c.	Apologize with sincerity to the squad.	6.66 (1.80)	6.35 (2.03)	6.31 (2.22)	6.37 (2.21)
d.	Write a note to yourself on your camouflage notebook that says "Control Your Temper," in order to remind you to stay in control.	5.12 (1.94)	5.82** (1.88)	6.13** (2.06)	5.38 (2.59)
e.	Ask yourself how other effective leaders at your level would have handled the situation, and make plans to modify your behavior accordingly in the future.	7.72 (.90)	7.29** (1.46)	7.59 (1.54)	7.47 (1.72)
f.	Speak to the chaplain or a counselor about how you might better control your temper.	5.72 (1.94)	6.56** (1.80)	7.41** (1.41)	6.62** (2.16)
g.	Next time you are about to lose your temper, practice a technique like counting to ten several times to delay and hopefully stifle your outburst.	6.64 (1.32)	6.46 (1.78)	7.59** (1.34)	6.73 (1.90)
h.	Sit down with your Soldiers and explain why you felt so strongly about the ambulances' standardization; try to make them see why you felt this was worth yelling about.	5.72 (2.19)	6.56** (1.79)	6.16 (1.22)	5.98 (2.21)
i.	Take deliberate action to reward Soldier initiatives in the future to encourage them to be more forward.	6.37 (1.86)	6.54 (1.72)	7.00* (1.72)	6.58 (1.86)
j.	Ask your Company commander for ideas about how you should have handled the situation.	6.48 (1.72)	6.48 (1.96)	7.19* (1.59)	6.64 (2.20)
k.	Accept that even though you may not like to do it, being in the Army sometimes means yelling at others.	4.26 (1.95)	6.06** (1.97)	6.22** (1.5)	5.42 (2.34)
l.	Ask other Platoon leaders whom you admire for their advice about handling similar situations in the future.	6.84 (1.72)	7.13 (1.92)	7.78** (1.18)	6.78 (1.93)

UNUSED SCENARIOS

Your Platoon has been working on building a range for 17 months. The assignment has been unpleasant. One reason for this is that the range site is more than an hour's drive away from the Army post. Suddenly, you are told that your Platoon has to finish the project in the next three weeks. This will mean that you will have to stay out at the range and work nights, all in the summer heat of Georgia. What should you do to keep your Soldiers motivated?

Rationale for Change: I chose not to include this scenario in the survey. While there are fulltime staff members whose job it is to assist unit operations, the majority of reservists are in a duty status every few weeks. Consequently, a scenario like this is not relevant.

You are a Platoon leader, and you receive a new private. On his second day in your Platoon, he says that he wants to kill himself. You refer the Soldier to the Medical Health Center and the Chaplain. Soon after, you learn that the medical center has not assigned a person with relevant professional training to help the Soldier. The Chaplain is not having much effect because the Soldier is not religious. In general, you have doubts about the qualifications of the people assigned to help him. You are very concerned about this situation. What should you do?

Rationale for Change: This scenario has been left out completely. While mental health issues are just as relevant in civilian life as they are within the military community, because reserve leaders see their Soldiers monthly, they would not generally be faced with this kind of problem, unless the Soldier had a crisis during a drill weekend, or during annual training. However, part-time Soldiers are not eligible for military medical health care while in an inactive duty training status, so the Soldier would still have to be cared for within the civilian medical system.

Summary of Mean Responses for Platoon Level

Better Choices				Worse Choices			
Expert Mean	AC	USAR	ARNG	Expert Mean	AC	USAR	ARNG
Motivating Subordinates							
6.92	6.64**	6.85	6.62**	2.87	3.59**	3.77**	3.68**
Influencing the Boss							
7.13	6.66**	6.94	6.67**	3.42	4.07**	3.46	3.75**
Managing Oneself							
7.20	6.91**	7.25	7.01*	3.49	4.45**	4.48**	4.16**
Establishing Trust							
6.43	6.19	6.39	6.17*	2.86	3.85**	3.77**	3.82**
Establishing Credibility							
7.62	7.80*	8.03**	7.83*	2.41	3.68**	3.76**	3.55**
Taking Care of Soldiers							
7.22	6.90*	7.05	7.02	3.09	3.65**	3.46*	3.32*

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Company-Level: Taking Care of Soldiers

C22. You take over a newly-formed Company as a Company commander. At the same time, the Company also receives a new first sergeant, two new Platoon leaders, two Platoon sergeants, and a supply sergeant. You quickly begin to perceive that the Soldiers in the Company have a bad attitude regarding training. A few weeks after taking command, you deploy the unit to the field for a (ORIGINAL: 21-day) lengthy Field Training Exercise (FTX). There, you again observe (on the second day of the FTX) that the Soldiers' performance is poor. For example, their stand-to procedures don't meet your standards. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149
a.	Call your key leaders together and communicate your training standards in terms of the Company's METL.	7.74 (1.31)	7.68 (1.16)	8.14** (.930)	7.59 (1.52)
b.	Sit down with your first sergeant, discuss the situation, and ask for his opinion.	8.08 (.88)	8.15 (1.06)	7.59* (1.60)	7.27** (1.90)
c.	Talk to the informal leaders in the Company (for example, specialists who have demonstrated knowledge gained by reading field and training manuals) <u>privately</u> to find out why the Soldiers have a negative attitude about training.	4.39 (2.21)	4.70 (2.20)	5.36* (2.46)	5.46** (2.45)
d.	Call a Company meeting and communicate clearly your training standards in terms of the Company's mission-essential task list.	5.34 (2.45)	5.97** (2.25)	6.27** (2.24)	6.10** (2.08)
e.	Speak to your Platoon leaders as a group, but away from the Soldiers, tell them your standards and show them how to deal with the stand-to problem.	7.82 (1.06)	7.63 (1.53)	7.86 (1.23)	7.42** (1.54)
f.	Speak with each of your Platoon leaders individually and privately and tell each one to deal with the problem.	4.39 (1.95)	5.07** (2.21)	4.75 (2.16)	4.36 (2.12)
g.	Give the Platoon leaders several more days to conduct their own training so that you can more closely observe and interact with the Soldiers.	4.74 (2.54)	4.59 (2.19)	4.89 (1.82)	4.33 (2.22)
h.	Personally inspect the stand-to procedures—inspect each fighting position and range card yourself.	5.76 (2.55)	5.12** (2.36)	4.75** 2.42	5.39 (2.43)
i.	Call a Company meeting, tell the Platoon leaders to stand off to the side, ask the Soldiers why their performance is poor, and listen to their reasons.	2.11 (1.69)	3.04** (2.11)	3.27** (1.90)	3.19** (2.07)
j.	Get the first sergeant and the Platoon leaders together to discuss the situation with you.	7.18 (1.77)	7.33 (1.67)	7.32 (1.41)	7.19 (1.78)
k.	Threaten disciplinary action to the entire Company if the stand-to procedures are not performed well during your next inspection.	1.42 (.83)	2.17** (1.65)	2.18** (1.61)	2.30** (1.73)
l.	Conduct an After Action Review on stand-to and define your criteria for success.	7.97 (1.1)	7.93 (1.22)	8.02 (1.10)	7.74 (1.53)
m.	Speak to the Battalion commander and get his advice and direction regarding the best way to handle the problem.	4.79 (2.28)	4.09** (2.32)	4.18 (2.16)	4.40 (2.25)

C22. Continued:					
n.	Call a Company meeting fully involving the Platoon leaders, ask the Soldiers why their performance is poor, and listen to their reasons.	3.62 (2.28)	4.08* (2.12)	4.70** (2.28)	4.31 (2.16)
o.	Investigate where the Soldiers got their prior ideas about what constituted acceptable standards.	4.32 (2.3)	4.59 (2.33)	5.09** (1.75)	4.54 (2.22)
p.	Bring in the entire chain of command, all at once, for a group discussion about the situation.	4.84 (2.13)	5.75** (1.92)	6.45** (1.54)	5.81** (2.23)
Rationale for Change: Reserve units regularly conduct field training exercises, and some of them are 21 days in length, but most frequently they are shorter in duration, so I opted to use the word 'lengthy.'					

Company-Level: Directing and Supervising Subordinates

C23. You are a Company commander on a National Training Center (NTC) rotation. Your Company is cross-attached to a mechanized infantry Battalion to form a task force. Before you deployed to the NTC, you were given a new Platoon leader, who had been transferred from another Company in order to get a second chance. You have reason to believe he is weak tactically. When the task force is organized into Company teams, you are required to provide a Platoon to an infantry Company. You have been advised by your first sergeant to send this new Platoon over to the infantry Company. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149
a.	Give the weak lieutenant specific step-by-step instructions regarding how to do his job.	4.84 (2.16)	4.31** (1.87)	4.14* (2.22)	4.48* (2.06)
b.	Talk to the first sergeant, ask him to explain the reasons for his opinion, and listen to these reasons closely before making a decision.	7.32 (1.34)	7.61* (1.47)	7.43 (1.62)	7.23 (1.79)
c.	Send your best tank Platoon over the infantry Company.	6.63 (1.79)	6.01** (2.20)	5.30 (2.30)	5.44** (2.19)
d.	Keep both your strongest and weakest Platoons and send an average-performing Platoon over to the infantry Company.	6.61 (1.33)	6.34 (1.92)	6.25 (1.93)	6.08** (1.82)
e.	Send the new Platoon leader and his Platoon over to the infantry Company.	2.66 (1.62)	3.33** (2.01)	3.36* (2.17)	3.69** (2.23)
f.	Speak to the Soldiers in the poorly-performing Platoon: Tell them you have confidence in their ability to perform well, and that to display your level of confidence you are sending them over to the infantry Company where they will represent your Company.	3.76 (2.06)	4.50** (2.07)	4.70** (2.11)	4.85** (2.33)
g.	Send the Platoon you would normally send.	7.34 (1.62)	7.23 (1.65)	7.07 (2.03)	6.69** (1.93)
h.	Send the weak Platoon leader out with a strong Company to observe and learn, without giving him any responsibility.	3.59 (2.14)	3.93 (2.32)	4.59** (2.18)	4.43** (2.35)
i.	Have a closed-door talk with the weak lieutenant: Tell him he has a free opportunity to learn here, and he should do his best to learn what he can and then call you with any problems.	6.47 (2.04)	6.44 (2.04)	6.75 (1.79)	6.42 (2.03)
j.	Speak to your Battalion commander and tell him that you were given this new, ill-prepared Platoon leader before you deployed to the NTC, and ask for his direction in making your decision.	3.21 (2.15)	3.01 (1.89)	3.20 (2.16)	3.44 (2.04)
k.	Speak to the Platoon leader; try to uncover the reasons for his weaknesses, and deal with these issues as best you can.	7.16 (1.44)	7.34 (1.57)	7.34 (1.41)	7.23 (1.76)
l.	Tell your Platoon sergeant to look out for the weak lieutenant.	5.26 (2.48)	5.12 (2.72)	4.75 (2.69)	5.44 (2.48)

Company-Level: Cooperating With Others

C24. You are a Company commander, and your Battalion commander is the type of person who seems always to “shoot the messenger” – he does not like to be surprised by bad news, and he tends to take his anger out of the person who brought him the bad news. You want to build a positive, professional relationship with your Battalion commander. What should you do?					
		Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149
a.	Speak to your Battalion commander about his behavior and share your perception of it.	5.00 (2.68)	4.01** (2.31)	3.91** (2.33)	3.90** (2.61)
b.	Attempt to keep the Battalion commander “over-informed” by telling him what is occurring in your unit on a regular basis (e.g., daily or every other day).	4.95 (1.90)	4.47* (2.24)	4.64 (2.00)	4.72 (2.09)
c.	Speak to the sergeant major and see if she/he is willing to try to influence the Battalion commander.	5.82 (2.14)	5.05** (2.40)	5.02* (2.33)	4.47** (2.18)
d.	Keep the Battalion commander informed only on important issues, but don’t bring up issues you don’t have to discuss with him.	5.50 (2.15)	6.41** (2.01)	6.32* (2.11)	5.79 (2.28)
e.	When you bring a problem to your Battalion commander, bring a solution at the same time.	8.53 (.60)	8.75** (.525)	8.64 (.532)	8.38 (1.37)
f.	Disregard the Battalion commander all of the good news you can, but try to shield him from hearing the bad news.	6.53 (2.10)	5.75** (2.33)	5.64 (2.46)	5.92** (2.29)
g.	Tell your Battalion commander all of the good news you can, but try to shield him from hearing the bad news.	1.92 (1.08)	2.23* (1.57)	1.98 (1.24)	2.21* (1.45)
h.	Tell the Battalion commander as little as possible; deal with problem son your own if at all possible.	2.47 (1.31)	3.48** (2.17)	3.11 (2.26)	3.66** (2.35)

Company-Level: Establishing Trust

C25. You are a Company commander on a Battalion-level field training exercise. Your unit has just completed a night move and has been in position for about two hours. At midnight, you learn that a weapon is missing. The Platoon sergeant with responsibility for weapons is confident that he knows where the weapon is because he saw it during the sensitive-items check completed after he arrived. A sensitive item report is due to brigade at 0400 hours. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149
a.	If you are confident the weapon will be found at first light, submit a sensitive item report stating that all weapons are accounted for.	1.11 (.390)	1.29* (.780)	1.32 (1.02)	1.51** (1.39)
b.	Do not speak to the Battalion commander until shortly before the sensitive-tem report is due; at this point, completely and honestly report all of your actions since the weapon was discovered missing.	3.29 (2.59)	3.56 (2.65)	3.23 (2.13)	3.68 (2.57)
c.	Immediately mobilize everyone in the unit, and conduct a 100% inventory followed by a hands-on search.	7.68 (1.92)	7.68 (1.85)	7.41 (2.09)	7.49 (2.07)
d.	Before the sensitive-tem report deadline, notify the Battalion executive Officer of the situation in person.	5.53 (2.49)	6.81** (1.94)	6.52** (2.02)	6.28** (2.38)
e.	Consult the standing operating procedures manual to ensure that you follow the rules correctly.	7.29 (2.01)	6.95 (2.08)	7.45 (1.78)	6.81** (2.15)
f.	Immediately notify the Battalion commander and tell him your plans for finding the weapon and resolving the incident.	7.63 (1.70)	7.22* (2.03)	7.52 (1.95)	7.07** (2.19)
g.	If the weapon is not located within one hour, notify the entire chain of command of the lost weapon.	6.24 (2.41)	6.72* (2.36)	6.77 (2.32)	6.66 (2.07)

Company-Level: Managing Self

<p>C26. You are a Company commander. Your Battalion is training for gunnery. Currently, all of the companies are well-prepared to pass gunnery. There is a great deal of competition among the companies and all of the commanders have Officer Evaluation Reports (OERs) due in the next few months. You have an NCO (Platoon sergeant) in your unit who just arrived from teaching gunnery at the branch school. He tells you about some advanced training techniques using available equipment that have significantly improved gunnery scores in other units. This information has not been made available to units in the field. After some practice with the techniques, you find that they significantly improve the scores of your sections. What should you do?</p>		Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149
a.	Do nothing—allow the information about the training techniques to be passed through NCO channels if it comes up.	2.42 (1.60)	3.19** (1.94)	2.86 (2.05)	2.60 (1.72)
b.	Share the information about the training techniques with the Battalion commander, then tell all of the other Company commanders.	8.21 (1.07)	7.48** (1.95)	7.95 (1.27)	7.90** (1.29)
c.	Train your Company using the information, execute gunnery—presumably beating all of your fellow Company commanders—then tell everyone how you did it after the fact.	2.26 (1.43)	3.34** (2.42)	3.57** (1.86)	3.66** (2.31)
d.	Initiate a meeting with all Company commanders, Platoon leaders, first sergeants, and Platoon sergeants, and have your new Platoon sergeant present and describe the techniques.	7.11 (2.12)	7.38 (1.88)	7.84** (1.55)	7.37 (1.87)
e.	Tell the Platoon sergeant to keep close hold over the information about the training techniques so that only your Company possesses this information.	1.53 (.830)	1.95** (1.47)	2.09* (1.39)	1.91** (1.47)

Company-Level: Developing Subordinates

C27. You are a new Company commander. There are a lot of things you want to fix in the Company. You have quickly become overwhelmed by the many pressures you face and the many demands on your time. You realize that you cannot possibly do everything. What should you do to better manage your key leaders and your time so that you are able to accomplish more in the same amount of time? Rate the following strategies:					
		Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149
a.	Have your key leaders execute the alternative <u>after</u> you select it.	4.42 (1.94)	4.65 (2.00)	4.98 (2.24)	4.99** (2.15)
b.	Allow key leaders <u>on their own</u> to select alternatives to solve problems and implement these strategies.	5.87 (2.27)	6.68** (1.96)	6.93** (1.70)	6.26* 2.08
c.	Use key leaders to solve problems by having them research alternatives in their area of responsibility that would solve the problems and report these alternatives to you.	7.34 (1.56)	7.98** (1.15)	7.75 (1.44)	7.78** (1.33)
d.	ORIGINAL: Try to report earlier in the morning and/or stay later at night to get more done.	3.21 (1.88)	5.08** (2.31)	4.73** (2.27)	5.34** (2.11)
d.	CHANGED: Commit additional time (above and beyond normal duty hours) to get more done.				
e.	Give your key leaders more specific directions when it comes to solving problems—tell them what to do to get the job done.	4.21 (2.09)	4.78** (1.98)	4.61 (2.20)	5.23** (2.12)
f.	Learn to spot check by walking around the Company area and getting a general idea of what's going on—don't feel compelled to check every single thing personally.	7.82 (.830)	8.21** (.956)	8.02 (1.10)	7.88 (1.18)
Rationale for Change: In reserve units, while leaders routinely work many extra unpaid hours, sandwiched around civilian responsibilities, they would not be able to report early and stay late on a daily basis.					

Company-Level: Establishing Trust

C28. You are a new Company commander who has just taken over your unit. One of your Soldiers is leaving the Army. The supply sergeant brings you a Report of Survey and a \$250 Statement of Charges for the Soldier's missing TA-50 and asks you to sign one or the other. You talk to the Soldier and learn that the equipment was lost on re-deployment and that the chain of command had not taken appropriate action. The Soldier had notified the old commander three times in writing, saying that his equipment was missing—but the commander took no action because he did not want to submit a late Report of Survey. (The Battalion Commander also did not want any late Reports of Survey.) The Soldier says he will sign the Statement of Charges because he just wants to get out. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149
a.	In spite of his dislike for late reports, notify the Battalion commander that you are initiating a late report of survey on the Soldier's lost TA-50.	7.97 (1.17)	7.97 (1.42)	8.23 (.961)	7.86 (1.60)
b.	Have the supply sergeant validate the statements made by collecting relevant information from the Soldier and other sources, put this information together, and bring it to the Battalion commander.	8.05 (1.09)	7.62* (2.00)	7.89 (1.57)	7.86 (1.64)
c.	Initiate a late report of survey <u>without</u> first informing the Battalion commander.	3.05 (1.47)	2.68* (1.86)	3.20 (2.17)	3.20 (2.13)
d.	Point out to the Battalion commander that the chain of command failed to properly uphold its responsibility and failed the Soldier, and explain that this situation must be rectified now.	6.53 (2.08)	6.96* (2.23)	6.93 (2.24)	6.67 (2.34)
e.	Allow the Soldier to sign the Statement of Charges so that he can leave.	2.13 (1.28)	3.03** (2.12)	2.45 (1.82)	2.29 (1.74)
f.	If the Battalion commander is hard on Company commanders who initiate late Reports of Survey, <u>do not</u> initiate the report.	1.66 (.850)	1.76 (1.16)	1.68 (1.02)	1.77 (1.32)
g.	Attempt to contact the past Company commander to find out why, exactly, he did not take care of the situation.	4.84 (2.27)	4.90 (2.68)	5.73* (2.60)	5.50** (2.57)

Company-Level: Motivating Subordinates

C29. You are a brand new Company commander, and you want to establish yourself quickly as an effective leader. You have assessed the current physical training program, and you believe it could use a total overhaul in order to ensure that the Company will meet the PT standards. Your Company does not have a qualified master fitness trainer. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149
a.	Ask for a volunteer from the entire Company to take charge and run the PT program, and supervise this individual very closely.	3.49 (1.80)	4.27** (2.07)	4.66** (2.15)	5.00** (1.98)
b.	Talk to your first sergeant and get his/her advice.	8.00 (.970)	8.14 (1.14)	7.84 (1.18)	7.62** (1.31)
c.	Ask for a volunteer from among your Platoon sergeants and Platoon leaders to take charge and run the PT program, and supervise this individual very closely.	4.41 (2.17)	5.63** (1.89)	5.41** (2.10)	5.72** (1.94)
d.	Offer a reward or incentive to any Soldier who comes up with the best idea for how to revamp the PT program.	4.16 (2.36)	5.07** (2.05)	5.95** (2.04)	5.70** (2.14)
e.	Publicly praise and reward Soldiers who demonstrate initiative in revamping the PT program.	5.84 (1.89)	6.48** (1.73)	6.75** (1.60)	6.99** (1.53)
f.	Consult a fellow commander who has a solid fitness program for guidance and suggestions.	7.35 (1.06)	7.46 (1.44)	8.00** (1.10)	7.75** (1.23)
g.	Ask for a volunteer from among your Platoon sergeants and Platoon leaders to take charge and run the PT program, and program overhaul.	4.86 (2.08)	5.74** (2.11)	6.00** (2.13)	5.98** (2.16)
h.	Assess the Company's other goals and decide which of the goals is most important before taking action on the PT program overhaul.	5.49 (1.98)	5.59 (2.34)	5.70 (2.28)	5.94* (2.31)
i.	Appoint the most competent person to work with you in revamping the PT program.	6.70 (1.73)	6.68 (1.83)	6.66 (1.67)	7.04 (1.71)
j.	Ask the Soldiers and key leaders for their ideas and suggestions before deciding on a course of action.	6.27 (2.23)	6.18 (2.06)	6.55 (1.75)	6.49 (2.04)
k.	Ask for a volunteer from the entire Company to take charge and run the PT program, and give this person the authority to do it his/her way.	3.89 (2.08)	3.83 (2.04)	4.36 (2.09)	4.42** (2.24)
l.	Speak with your Battalion commander to get his/her suggestions regarding the PT overhaul before deciding on a course of action.	6.14 (1.84)	4.10** (2.46)	4.34** (2.29)	4.60** (2.36)

Company-Level: Motivating Subordinates

C30. You are a new Company commander. The previous commander was a micromanager. This individual was extremely detail-oriented, gave very little positive feedback and often tore down the Platoon leaders when even the slightest infraction occurred. For example, the old Company commander noted one day that one of the Platoon leaders was wearing a dirty soft-cap and he called the entire Platoon a disgrace. This behavior on the part of the outgoing Company commander was very hard on the Platoon leaders. Several developed nervous conditions such as ulcers and sleep problems. Your goal is to create a more positive leadership atmosphere in the unit. What should you do?					
		Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149
a.	Give all unit members more responsibility than they had before, and then hold them accountable.	7.11 (1.87)	6.22** (2.29)	6.27* (2.15)	5.90** (2.22)
b.	When you must give negative feedback to your Platoon leaders, do so constructively, pointing out specific areas that need improvement and explaining how this improvement can be achieved.	8.37 (.820)	8.26 (1.15)	8.43 (.818)	8.06** (1.17)
c.	Allow the Platoon leaders and their Soldiers the benefit of the doubt—don't jump to negative conclusions.	7.95 (1.14)	7.64* (1.39)	7.93 (1.08)	7.31** (1.54)
d.	Assign work goals with clear milestones to all Officers.	7.76 (1.48)	8.07** (1.06)	8.09 (1.09)	7.98* (1.27)
e.	Involve senior NCOs in the decision-making process.	8.00 (1.16)	8.12 (1.08)	8.00 (1.38)	7.95 (1.30)
f.	Give the Platoon leaders frequent, specific positive feedback.	8.16 (.950)	7.66** (1.29)	8.05 (.914)	7.79** (1.37)
g.	Continue with the micromanagement style since it is common practice in the Company, and relieve and/or replace the lieutenants who cannot handle the stress.	1.39 (.820)	1.39 (.766)	1.45 (.951)	1.56 (1.34)
h.	Let your subordinates know your intent and then let them develop their own plans.	7.24 (1.62)	7.36 (1.73)	7.41 (1.63)	7.23 (1.86)
i.	Recognize Soldiers' achievements with awards.	7.79 (1.85)	8.06* (1.22)	8.02 (1.28)	8.07** (1.08)
j.	Have positive expectations: State often that you believe that every member of the unit has the ability to perform well if he or she applies himself or herself and works hard.	8.42 (.890)	8.13** (1.08)	7.98* (1.17)	8.00** (1.26)

Company-Level: Communicating

C31. You are a Company commander with a new brigade commander. Before the new brigade commander took over, the Battalion conducted After Action Reviews by critiquing each training task according to the Mission Training Plan. The new brigade commander asks to see how AARs are conducted in the brigade—he wants to find someone who does AARs improperly so he can use this individual as an example to show what needs to be improved. When the brigade commander observes you he says he does not like your AAR format and he feels you are critiquing instead of letting the Soldiers talk. Thus, you must now develop a system for listening more to your Soldiers while still maintaining an effective command. Rate the quality of the following strategies.

		Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149
a.	Ask yourself why you talk when you do and evaluate whether you need to speak at these times to optimally benefit your unit.	7.47 (1.64)	6.79** (1.73)	7.21 (1.83)	7.11** (1.66)
b.	Listen most to Soldiers who have the best interest of the unit at heart and have no hidden agendas.	6.55 (1.66)	6.16* (2.00)	6.68 (1.91)	6.24 (2.04)
c.	Ask around among the Soldiers to discover the informal leaders in the group, then seek out and listen to these Soldiers.	4.42 (1.67)	5.39** (1.93)	5.75** (1.90)	5.62** (1.96)
d.	Try listening at moments when you would customarily talk.	7.61 (1.15)	7.41 (1.43)	7.80 (.978)	7.56 (1.54)
e.	When Soldiers' safety is at risk, use directive leadership instead of listening.	7.45 (2.19)	7.82* (1.68)	7.89* (1.33)	7.71* (1.51)
f.	Whenever you have time, seek out your Soldiers, ask them questions, and listen to their opinions and views.	7.84 (1.13)	7.69 (1.36)	8.07 (1.04)	7.85 (1.22)
g.	Do not listen to Soldiers when they lack the knowledge necessary to make a decision.	2.50 (1.39)	3.50** (2.01)	2.39 (1.33)	2.95** (1.96)
h.	Schedule regular meetings with your NCOs when you just sit and talk about the unit—and make these meetings times when you do less talking and more listening.	7.03 (1.48)	7.20 (1.52)	7.59** (1.12)	7.26 (1.51)
i.	Listen most to Soldiers who are squared away and who command the respect of other Soldiers.	5.66 (1.66)	5.47 (1.89)	5.91 (1.85)	5.70 (2.10)
j.	Listen to Soldiers who are willing to express their opinions before a group.	5.42 (1.65)	5.59 (1.73)	6.02* (1.69)	5.81* (2.17)

Company-Level: Developing Subordinates

C32. You are a Company commander with some relatively junior lieutenants. Your goal is to develop these lieutenants. Rate the quality of the following strategies for achieving your goal.					
		Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149
a.	Involve the lieutenants in every administrative action in the Company.	5.53 (1.87)	4.66** (2.14)	4.82* (2.14)	4.99** (2.25)
b.	Beginning early on, encourage the lieutenants to determine their own goals, and use this information during counseling sessions.	7.43 (1.28)	7.72* (1.34)	7.61 (1.40)	7.63 (1.36)
c.	Involve the lieutenants only in those decisions that affect their Platoons.	3.95 (1.84)	4.26 (1.73)	3.48 (1.69)	4.17 (1.96)
d.	Explain the big picture to the lieutenants regarding upcoming missions.	8.03 (.90)	8.27* (1.06)	8.18 (1.29)	8.09 (1.23)
e.	When going on a mission, explain only their portion to the lieutenants.	2.68 (1.31)	2.31* (1.59)	2.75 (1.89)	2.66 (1.87)
f.	Tell the lieutenants when things in the Battalion are bothering you.	3.36 (1.91)	2.18** (1.32)	3.09 (2.26)	2.96* (2.10)
g.	Involve the lieutenants in administrative activities only with Soldiers from their own Platoon.	5.25 (1.86)	5.53 (2.32)	5.05 (2.26)	4.92 (2.58)
h.	Don't share ideas with the lieutenants; make your own decisions and implement them.	1.92 (1.02)	2.37** (1.52)	2.25 (1.52)	2.50** (1.75)
i.	Have the lieutenants present for administrative punishments (Article 15s, etc.) only if their schedules allow it.	2.86 (2.11)	2.95 (2.13)	3.68 (2.72)	3.58** (2.41)
j.	Start a professional development program to assist the lieutenants in their growth.	8.34 (1.12)	8.48 (.839)	8.55 (.761)	8.48 (1.19)
k.	Involve the lieutenants in all decisions.	5.03 (2.15)	5.09 (2.21)	6.48** (1.88)	5.30 (2.18)

Company-Level: Motivating Subordinates

C33. You are a Company commander. You have a Platoon leader who is causing you problems. Once he was cleaning his weapon on the mail loading dock and he pointed it at a civilian. Another time he was late to a range. He frequently argues with you and does not do what you ask him to do. This is a new problem for your first sergeant—he has never experienced this situation before. The behaviors are continuing and growing in severity to a point where the lieutenant is insubordinate. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149
a.	If a relatively severe instance of insubordinate behavior occurs in public, shift the focus and avoid humiliating the Platoon leader in public, but have him see you one-on-one later on.	4.72 (2.51)	4.52 (2.72)	5.20 (2.75)	4.62 (2.73)
b.	Use all assets available to you—but do not involve your boss (the Battalion commander).	3.19 (1.81)	4.34** (2.15)	4.05* (2.25)	3.95** (2.11)
c.	Deal with the situation immediately—do not let it fester.	8.64 (.680)	8.64 (1.05)	8.70 (.594)	8.48 (1.31)
d.	Counsel the Platoon leader only when his/her performance warrants it.	2.58 (1.57)	3.89** (2.65)	4.23** (2.65)	4.32** (2.75)
e.	Ask the Battalion commander to give him a letter of reprimand.	4.11 (1.97)	4.62* (2.26)	4.48 (2.38)	4.05 (2.37)
f.	If a severe instance of insubordinate behavior occurs in public, dismiss the Platoon leader from the room and deal with him later.	5.72 (2.47)	5.03** (2.79)	5.64 (2.81)	5.97 (2.65)
g.	Before taking action, find out if the Platoon leader has been counseled before for his bad behavior.	6.06 (2.10)	6.54* (2.28)	6.73 (2.24)	6.97** (2.15)
h.	Talk with the Platoon leader and work out the problem.	6.28 (1.63)	6.74* (1.96)	7.20** (1.25)	7.05** (1.74)
i.	Establish regular sessions during which you counsel the Platoon leader about his performance.	7.44 (1.40)	7.60 (1.47)	8.00** (1.01)	7.46 (1.71)
j.	To prepare for counseling sessions, get together with your first sergeant and role play various scenarios for dealing with the Platoon leader including his potential reactions to your actions.	5.31 (2.14)	5.94** (2.44)	7.14** (1.79)	6.30** (2.16)
k.	Wait awhile to see if the situation improves on its own.	1.53 (.910)	1.97** (1.56)	1.75 (1.01)	1.89** (1.56)
l.	If an instance of insubordinate behavior occurs between the two of you in private, immediately reprimand the Platoon leader.	7.78 (1.76)	7.91 (1.95)	7.64 (2.07)	7.38* (2.39)

Company-Level: Balancing Mission and Troops

C34. You are a Company commander, and your Battalion commander often gives directives that you believe are unreasonable. You have tried to give your commander input regarding these directives, but he has not listened to your input. The NCOs and Soldiers also feel these orders are unreasonable, and the situation is causing you considerable stress. You have generally lost respect for the Battalion commander. He gives you another order you believe is unreasonable. What should you do?					
		Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149
a.	Speak to the sergeant major and see if she/he will use her/his influence with the Battalion commander to improve the situation.	6.22 (2.13)	6.19 (2.34)	6.20 (2.22)	5.57** (2.32)
b.	Let your key subordinates know this is not your directive but rather the commander's.	2.22 (1.29)	2.61** (1.59)	3.84** (2.25)	3.46** (2.31)
c.	Do your best to gain the NCOs' and Soldiers' compliance by explaining the rationale for the commander's orders, being as convincing as you can be.	6.64 (1.62)	6.43 (1.69)	6.98 (1.74)	6.23 (2.06)
d.	Go alone to the Battalion commander and tell him/her you believe the order is unreasonable.	7.56 (1.34)	6.89** (2.01)	6.82* (1.89)	7.11** (1.82)
e.	Keep trying to give your Battalion commander input regarding his unreasonable directives.	7.47 (1.36)	7.21 (1.54)	6.91 (2.03)	7.05** (1.84)
f.	Represent the orders as your own to your key subordinates.	7.53 (1.50)	7.02** (2.05)	6.27** (2.54)	6.10** (2.36)
g.	Say that the system is to blame for the unreasonable order.	1.94 (1.37)	2.34** (1.58)	2.48* (1.70)	2.17 (1.67)
h.	Let your Soldiers know that this is not your directive but rather the commander's.	1.83 (1.28)	2.39** (1.72)	2.86** (2.00)	3.08** (2.13)
i.	Assign the unreasonable order a lower priority and accomplish it in the manner you choose.	3.39 (1.71)	3.68 (2.38)	3.77 (2.22)	3.41 (2.19)
j.	Get your key leaders together and go as a group to the Battalion commander and say that the order is unreasonable.	1.89 (1.41)	2.84** (2.32)	3.32** (2.55)	2.74** (2.12)

Company-Level: Directing and Supervising Subordinates

C35. You are a Company commander with (ORIGINAL: both military and civilian) part-time military, civilian, Technician and AGR personnel in your unit. You have no E5 sergeants—instead, you have civilians doing supervisory jobs with Soldiers working under them. You are experiencing problems in maintaining group cohesion: For example, (ORIGINAL: civilians seeing Soldiers) Technicians seeing AGR’s taking off for training and wonder why they have to keep working; (ORIGINAL: Soldiers seeing civilians) AGR’s see Technicians getting cash awards for good performance and wonder why they can’t have similar awards; and so on. You must deal with these problems to keep your unit running smoothly. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149
a.	ORIGINAL: Try to develop cohesion separately in the civilians and military members by having separate social functions.	1.65 (1.16)			
a.	CHANGE: Try to develop cohesion separately in the civilian, Technician, AGR, and part-time military members by having separate social functions.		2.02* (1.82)	1.95 (1.44)	2.45** (2.10)
b.	ORIGINAL: Educate the Soldiers and the civilians about the differing requirements of their jobs: Tell your Soldiers that they have contractual obligations and they must accept their situation; tell the civilians that their situation is different from the Soldiers’ situation.	7.32 (1.51)			
b.	CHANGE: Educate everyone about the differing requirements of their jobs: Tell the military people that they have contractual obligations and they must accept their situation; tell the civilians that their situation is different from the Soldiers’ situation.		6.89* (1.86)	7.18 (1.89)	7.32 (1.79)
c.	ORIGINAL: Have both civilian and military members of the unit draw up a poster of your organization (an organization chart) and post it where everyone can see it.	5.36 (1.48)			
c.	CHANGE: Have representatives from each group draw up a poster of your organization (an organization chart) and post it where everyone can see it.		4.99* (1.97)	5.86 (1.88)	5.55 (2.14)
d.	ORIGINAL: Form a morale committee composed of both civilian and military personnel to plan Company social functions.	7.00 (1.20)			
d.	CHANGE: Form a morale committee composed of representatives from each group to plan Company social functions.		6.39** (1.96)	6.80 (2.06)	6.68* (1.80)
e.	Create a sign-out roster, and have people sign out when they leave their place of duty, stating where exactly they are going and why.	3.92 (1.88)	4.56** (2.41)	5.02** (2.58)	5.14** (2.30)
f.	Study your own procedures to ensure that you are being fair and equitable to all personnel.	7.92 (1.04)	7.82 (1.43)	8.11 (1.58)	7.91 (1.38)

C35. Continued:					
g.	Schedule outings, pot luck dinners, parties, and dining outs that include all members of the unit and their Families.	7.97 (1.07)	7.60* (1.57)	7.61 (1.95)	7.67* (1.54)
<p>Rationale for Change: Reserve Component organizations have a mix of part and full time staff who are responsible for the administrative, training and logistical support of the unit. The individuals work under a variety of personnel rules and regulations that prescribe the length of their duty day, as well as their specific responsibilities. This differs from Active Component units, where people who perform the support tasks are members of the same unit.</p>					

Company-Level: Balancing Mission and Troops

C36. You are a Company commander, and you believe that you have an incompetent Battalion commander. This incompetence is both technical and tactical. Often this person issues directives that are not going to achieve the mission. What should you do?					
		Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149
a.	Infer the underlying intent of the directive, go to your commander, and inform him of your interpretation of the underlying intent and the steps being taken to achieve this intent.	6.65 (2.03)	7.17** (1.64)	7.02 (2.21)	7.26 (5.99)
b.	When provided with the next unworkable directive, go back to the commander immediately and try to help direct the commander's thinking into more appropriate and workable solutions.	6.92 (1.53)	6.66 (1.87)	6.75 (1.81)	6.58* (1.83)
c.	Use your first sergeant to help you develop ways to make the directive work well and look good to the troops.	6.43 (2.19)	6.84* (1.90)	6.84 (1.86)	6.29 (2.18)
d.	Speak to the sergeant major and the executive Officer, ask for any relevant information and listen to their opinions.	7.65 (1.03)	7.47 (1.61)	7.00 (2.02)	7.18** (1.77)
e.	Confront the commander and provide specific examples of why his directives are incompetent.	3.49 (2.30)	3.53 (2.19)	3.14 (2.19)	3.95* (2.50)
f.	Speak to the brigade commander about the problem, arming yourself with specific examples of incompetent directives.	2.51 (1.84)	2.58 (1.98)	2.48 (1.91)	3.35** (2.32)
g.	Continue to follow directives and let the chips fall where they may.	2.97 (1.74)	2.78 (1.78)	3.00 (2.14)	2.86 (1.95)
h.	Explain to your subordinates that the Battalion commander does not understand the area in question because it is not his primary specialty.	1.95 (1.31)	2.10 (1.48)	2.52* (1.78)	2.24* (1.71)
i.	Infer the underlying intent of the directive and develop your own strategy to solve the problem and achieve the mission.	6.57 (1.92)	6.76 (1.92)	6.36 (2.29)	6.37 (2.19)
j.	Communicate the Battalion commander's intent (rather than his specific directive) and ensure that it is met.	6.84 (1.91)	7.28** (1.70)	6.98 (1.73)	6.74 (2.06)

Company-Level: Managing Oneself

C37. You are a Company commander on deployment. Your unit is sustaining continuous operations. You are feeling the stress of the many demands upon your time, but you want to maintain your mental effectiveness and readiness. What should you do?					
		Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149
a.	Sleep.	7.51 (1.46)	7.10* (1.96)	7.14 (2.56)	7.19* (1.67)
b.	Take time alone each day to read inspirational books or materials	6.05 (1.68)	5.91 (2.19)	5.82 (2.20)	5.89 (2.13)
c.	Use your peers as a sounding board and support group.	7.27 (1.22)	7.20 (1.89)	7.05 (2.04)	6.95* (1.61)
d.	Maintain contact with family and friends back home to keep you centered and remind you there's more to life than your job.	7.38 (1.32)	7.44 (1.87)	6.93 (2.37)	6.90** (2.08)
e.	Take time alone each day to think, regroup, and work through what's on your mind.	8.14 (.980)	7.91* (1.20)	7.77 (1.68)	7.85** (1.28)
f.	Keep perspective by remembering that you have other talents and skills that are not related to your current job.	5.27 (2.06)	5.90** (2.20)	5.82 (2.12)	5.87** (2.06)
g.	Work as hard and as fast as you can: Have as your goal getting to tomorrow's work as soon as possible.	4.35 (1.99)	4.70 (2.13)	4.57 (2.12)	4.44 (2.10)
h.	Mentor or counsel troubled Soldiers regularly to keep your own problems in perspective.	5.38 (1.88)	5.43 (2.15)	5.84 (2.43)	5.13 (2.19)
i.	Each day, reflect on your successes and on what you can do better in the future—maintain a positive focus.	8.16 (.990)	8.09 (1.37)	8.30 (1.47)	8.19 (1.24)

UNUSED SCENARIOS

You are a Company commander, and your unit is dispersed and is assigned to various garrison commands. Thus, you cannot possibly exercise direct control over your troops. The garrison commanders have non-judicial authority over your Soldiers. You want to develop a good relationship with the garrison commanders. What should you do to take care of your Soldiers under these conditions?

Rationale for Change: I chose not to include this scenario in its entirety. While reserve units are geographically dispersed, the chain of command is usually clear and under the control of a single individual who would have authority over the Soldiers. Even if a reserve Soldier was assigned to a Multi-Component Unit, and had an active duty commander, unless the Soldier has been mobilized, he or she does not fall under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Oversight on this Soldier would still be maintained by a reserve chain of command.

You are a Company commander, and there has been an ongoing problem in your unit with alcoholism and especially with Soldiers driving under the influence of alcohol. Two Soldiers in the unit who previously had bad problems have since joined Alcoholics Anonymous groups and are now recovered. One other Soldier is now in jail because of a car accident he caused while intoxicated which resulted in the death of a civilian. You are extremely concerned about this ongoing problem, and you would like to do something to get through to the Soldiers about its seriousness and impact upon your unit. What should you do?

Rationale for Change: I chose not to include this scenario in its entirety. While alcohol abuse and alcoholism is certainly a problem in civilian life, reserve leaders do not have to deal with this issue on a daily basis. If a reserve Soldier gets a DUI, he or she will be handled held accountable by the civilian authorities. There would be a military penalty for this behavior, but the legal consequences would be handled through the local police, rather than within the military judicial system.

You are a battery commander. Consequently, you work for both your Battalion commander and the brigade commander whom you support. During preparation time for the National Training Center (NTC), you are also preparing for a Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). Your Battalion commander is interested in the BCTP, but the maneuver brigade commander wants you to focus on the NTC. What should you do?

Rationale for Change: I have chosen not to include this scenario in the survey. While reserve units may 'doctrinally' have the same dual support relationships, in reality, because of the severe time constraints, a reserve unit leader's time is very closely managed, and the decision would be made for that leader on who would be supported.

Summary of Mean Responses for Company Level

Better Choices				Worse Choices			
Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149	Expert Mean	AC N=116	USAR N=44	ARNG N=149
Taking Care of Soldiers							
7.76	7.74	7.79	7.44**	3.37	3.94**	4.23**	4.02**
Directing and Supervising Subordinates							
7.17	6.97**	6.98	6.87**	3.13	3.55**	3.81**	4.00**
Cooperating With Others							
7.53	6.52**	6.43**	6.25**	2.19	2.86**	2.54	2.94**
Establishing Trust							
7.34	7.30	7.46	7.20	2.25	2.46*	2.38	2.49*
Managing Oneself							
7.48	7.31*	7.35	7.28*	2.14	3.29**	3.27**	3.15**
Communicating							
7.32	7.18	7.53	7.29	3.46	4.44**	4.07**	4.29**
Motivating Subordinates							
7.44	7.34	7.46	7.32	3.04	3.89**	4.04**	4.07**
Developing Subordinates							
7.79	8.13**	8.02*	7.97**	3.33	3.57**	3.70*	3.93**
Balancing Mission and Troops							
6.95	6.90	6.74	6.55**	2.46	2.76**	3.04**	3.03**

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Battalion-Level: Developing Subordinates

B22. You are a new Battalion commander, and you want to develop detailed knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of each of your Company commanders. Rate the following strategies for their effectiveness in helping you gain this information:					
		Expert Mean	AC N=23	USAR N=30	ARNG N=19
a.	If you plan to talk to the Soldiers, discuss beforehand with each Company commander your intention to talk directly to the Soldiers and explain your reasons for doing so.	6.05 (2.40)	5.96 (2.09)	5.77 (2.46)	6.21 (2.25)
b.	For each Company, direct a sensing session of the entire Company with	3.41 (2.21)	4.00 (2.55)	3.47 (2.09)	3.89 (1.88)
c.	Ask the command sergeant major, Battalion XO, and operations Officer for their assessment.	7.69 (1.44)	7.35 (1.69)	7.07* (1.39)	7.63 (1.14)
d.	If you choose to talk to the Soldiers, express your desire to each Company commander to use the information you will learn to help with their development as leaders.	6.31 (2.27)	5.91 (1.70)	6.07 (2.39)	5.89 (1.66)
e.	Ask your Company commanders to talk to their own Soldiers and ask a specific list of questions, and then report back to you with the information they have learned.	3.83 (2.16)	4.48 (1.88)	4.43 (2.17)	3.63 (2.08)
f.	Talk directly (in private) with the Soldiers and ask them to comment on the commanders' strengths and weaknesses.	2.05 (1.46)	3.22* (2.55)	3.50** (2.14)	2.21 (1.43)
g.	Talk directly (in private) with the Soldiers and ask them their options about the quality of their training, what they are learning, and other impressions they have.	7.07 (2.12)	6.13 (2.51)	6.57 (2.19)	5.47* (3.06)
h.	Ask your Company commanders to speak to other commanders' Soldiers (not their own Soldiers) and report back to you with the information they have learned.	1.59 (1.07)	2.57* (1.92)	2.67** (1.74)	2.58* (1.89)
i.	Assign a Battalion staff member who does not rate the Company commanders to speak with the Soldiers and report to you on what he/she learns.	2.44 (1.58)	3.26 (2.13)	4.17** (2.00)	4.00** (2.05)
j.	Rely on historical statistical indicators of performance.	4.78 (2.00)	4.78 (1.59)	5.00 (1.78)	5.63 (1.80)
k.	Talk directly (in private) with the Soldiers and ask them specific questions about their work hours, their job descriptions and responsibilities, and other factual items.	6.64 (2.06)	5.87 (2.02)	5.67 (2.27)	5.00** (2.16)
l.	Speak to the Company commanders individually and ask each of them to comment on the strengths and weaknesses of the other Company commanders and units.	3.19 (2.85)	2.87 (2.30)	4.47* (2.78)	3.00 (2.38)
m.	Ask the brigade commander for his/her assessment.	6.07 (2.41)	6.43 (1.56)	5.63 (2.22)	5.89 (1.99)

Battalion-Level: Managing Self

B23. You are a Battalion commander and it is the end of your first battle at a major externally-evaluated training exercise, during which your unit revealed some major shortcomings. During the After Action Review, the Chief Evaluator is highly critical of the Battalion and dwells on all the negative things your unit did that day. You carefully record all of the negative observations, but you know full well that the Battalion also did some very positive things that day. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=23	USAR N=30	ARNG N=19
a.	Leave the After Action Review and return to your units; once there, communicate exactly what the Evaluator said.	3.02 (1.79)	3.35 (1.96)	3.07 (1.66)	3.63 (2.40)
b.	If you have a good relationship with your CSM or other similar person, discuss your frustrations and feelings with him or her.	6.28 (1.85)	5.83 (2.01)	4.93** (1.59)	5.37 (2.40)
c.	Forget about trying to get any positive feedback: Thank the Evaluator directly for the negative feedback, say you will deal with the problems immediately, and do so without expecting anything more from.	4.53 (2.32)	4.78 (2.08)	4.43 (2.01)	3.47* (2.19)
d.	Be careful not to vent your frustrations with the Evaluator's feedback in front of the Soldiers or your junior Officers.	7.60 (1.80)	7.78 (1.04)	7.43 (1.35)	7.47 (1.98)
e.	Ask the Chief Evaluator if he has anything else he would like to say.	6.25 (2.04)	6.87 (1.89)	6.97* (1.79)	7.53** (1.07)
f.	Mention one or two successes the Battalion had, and ask the Evaluator if he would like to comment on these positive events.	6.74 (2.16)	7.78** (1.04)	7.67** (1.66)	7.89** (1.19)
g.	Leave the After Action Review and return to your units, but when you report to them make sure to note the successes that occurred that day as well as the failures and shortcomings.	8.52 (.880)	8.43 (.843)	8.07 (1.66)	8.47 (.905)
h.	Speak to the Evaluator at another time, and state your desire to receive positive as well as negative feedback so that you know what the units are doing right and wrong.	7.77 (1.62)	8.13 (1.25)	7.40 (2.09)	7.11 (1.99)
i.	Share your feelings with a friend or confidante at your own level to help you work through any negative feelings.	6.42 (1.96)	6.17 (1.89)	5.90 (2.12)	5.68 (2.00)

Battalion-Level: Protecting the Organization

B24. You are a new Battalion commander and one of your most important and challenging tasks is to establish the training priorities for your unit. While everything looks important and you would like to meet every possible contingency, you also realize that you do not have the time or resources to “do it all.” Rate the following strategies for how effective they would be in helping you establish your priorities.					
		Expert Mean	AC N=23	USAR N=30	ARNG N=19
a.	Study the brigade’s training schedule.	7.71 (1.50)	7.52 (1.08)	7.33 (1.42)	7.26 (1.40)
b.	Talk to the brigade S-2, S-3, and CSM to verify your understanding of the brigade commander’s training focus.	7.98 (1.20)	7.22** (.951)	7.13** (1.59)	7.05* (1.64)
c.	Schedule meetings to discuss training with each of your staff members during your first week of command.	7.05 (1.64)	6.48 (1.70)	6.67 (1.39)	6.79 (1.71)
d.	Explain your goals and your plans for the Battalion very clearly to your Officers and staff.	8.39 (1.08)	8.09 (1.31)	8.23 (.817)	8.26 (1.44)
e.	Assess the tactical and technical competence of your Soldiers individually by giving them formal and informal tests.	4.42 (2.14)	3.83 (1.92)	3.87 (2.21)	4.74 (2.44)
f.	Rely on the assessments made by the previous Battalion commander.	5.78 (1.80)	5.00** (1.31)	4.67 (1.68)	5.68 (1.76)
g.	Select three to five upcoming missions (based on the brigade training plan) to focus your Soldiers’ energy on.	6.83 (1.60)	7.30 (1.10)	6.67 (1.68)	7.32 (1.56)
h.	Before doing anything, make sure you understand the commander’s intent two levels up.	7.64 (1.52)	7.78 (1.16)	7.93 (1.17)	8.00 (1.00)
i.	Soon after taking command, visit each staff section’s shop and get a full briefing on their operations.	7.81 (1.37)	6.96* (1.91)	7.87 (1.00)	6.84* (1.80)
j.	Talk to the brigade commander to determine his training priorities.	8.44 (1.09)	8.39 (.783)	8.43 (1.04)	8.32 (.820)

Battalion-Level: Protecting the Organization and Motivating Subordinates

B25. You are a Battalion commander. Your brigade commander has made it clear that he does not wish to speak with you about pressing issues that arise in your Battalion. Also, he expects perfection from your Battalion at all times, and he seems to view your Battalion's poor performance at the JRTC as unforgivable – he keeps harping on past failures. The brigade commander does not provide you with feedback on your strengths and how to improve your weaknesses. His communication style is formal, abrupt, and in your opinion, ineffective. He begins every conversation by reminding you that you are only an 0-5. You are frustrated because you never know where you stand, performance-wise, in your brigade commander-s eyes and you lack a person from whom to receive performance feedback. In general, you find your situation with the brigade commander to be intolerable, and morale in your unit seems dangerously low. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=23	USAR N=30	ARNG N=19
a.	Speak to the Assistant Division Commander, explain your need for extra feedback, and request feedback on your performance.	3.95 (2.19)	4.09 (1.80)	5.07** (1.83)	4.37 (2.00)
b.	Deal with the brigade commander as best you can, but hold regular sessions with the members of your unit to air concerns and voice problems in the hope of improving morale.	7.10 (1.76)	6.57 (1.47)	6.80 (1.27)	6.68 (1.66)
c.	Remain loyal to the brigade commander so you do not model disloyalty in front of the members of your unit.	7.97 (1.08)	6.87** (1.21)	6.67** (1.74)	7.21 (1.71)
d.	Seek a formal appointment with the brigade commander, state that you and he seem to have a problem, and ask him why.	7.71 (1.50)	7.39 (1.64)	7.03* (1.65)	6.89* (1.32)
e.	If you choose to speak with the Assistant Division Commander and your Officers are critical of your decision, then explain your reasons for your actions to them, and let them know they are welcome to voice concerns about how you are leading the unit.	4.75 (2.45)	5.22 (1.93)	5.67* (2.10)	5.11 (1.94)
f.	Speak to your family members, the chaplain, or other friends from outside the military in order to deal with your personal frustrations.	6.12 (1.82)	6.09 (1.53)	5.47 (2.12)	5.16 (2.81)
g.	Jump the chain of command and speak to the Assistant Division Commander about the problem with the brigade commander.	2.15 (1.35)	2.30 (1.55)	2.70 (1.62)	2.89 (1.85)
h.	If you speak to the Assistant Division Commander, prepare yourself for the possibility of a disruption of loyalty in your own unit.	4.68 (2.20)	4.55 (2.15)	4.67 (1.78)	5.42 (1.83)
i.	Talk to your fellow Battalion commanders about the problem and try to develop a joint solution.	7.12 (1.52)	7.00 (1.59)	6.53 (1.99)	6.89 (1.72)
j.	Request advice from one of your brigade commanders' superiors whom you already know and trust.	5.17 (1.40)	5.13 (1.91)	6.17** (1.80)	5.26 (2.02)
k.	Talk to the brigade XO and the brigade S3 and try to get some information.	7.19 (1.73)	7.70 (1.22)	6.83 (2.00)	7.58 (1.17)

Battalion-Level: Taking Care of Soldiers

B26. You are a Battalion commander and your goal is to implement effective training. Rate the following strategies in terms of how good they would be at achieving your goal.					
		Expert Mean	AC N=23	USAR N=30	ARNG N=19
a.	ORIGINAL: Provide Soldiers and their Families with a copy of an extended training schedule (for example, six months out).	8.05 (1.13)			
a.	CHANGED: Provide Soldiers and their Families with a copy of an extended training schedule (for example, one year out).		7.70 (1.39)	6.90** (1.97)	7.26 (2.02)
b.	Develop specific rules and procedures that your Battalion uses regularly in order to manage training.	7.83 (1.33)	7.74 (1.25)	7.80 (.961)	7.47 (1.07)
c.	Go to the brigade S-3 and demand that the training schedule not be changed.	4.88 (2.10)	4.26 (2.24)	4.63 (2.23)	3.63* (2.36)
d.	ORIGINAL: Give Soldiers three or four-day holiday weekends whenever possible.	6.92 (1.84)			
d.	CHANGED: Build in a 'fun drill' whenever possible.		6.39 (2.16)	6.73 (1.48)	5.89* (1.99)
e.	ORIGINAL: Take into consideration school vacations and events when planning training.	8.19 (1.21)			
e.	CHANGED: Take into consideration hunting season, community and school events when planning training.		5.70** (2.03)	6.53** (1.97)	6.00** (2.42)
f.	Brief Families collectively on the extended training schedule once it has been developed – have a family dinner in the mess hall, for example, and then go over the extended training schedule.	7.90 (1.47)	6.74** (1.45)	6.20** (1.78)	6.74** (1.62)
g.	Be willing to change the training schedule in order to capitalize on unplanned training opportunities.	6.14 (2.14)	6.43 (1.80)	7.13** (1.33)	6.21 (2.29)
h.	Have regular meetings with your brigade commander to keep him/her focused on what your Battalion is doing.	7.68 (1.32)	7.04* (1.29)	7.30 (1.46)	7.47 (1.30)
i.	If someone violates the training schedule without authority, and without good cause, recommend the person for appropriate punishment.	5.12 (1.81)	5.30 (2.12)	5.97* (1.86)	6.05* (1.71)
j.	Once inside the specified time limit, do not make changes to the schedule once the schedule has been distributed.	7.24 (1.62)	7.13 (1.01)	6.73 (2.14)	7.05 (1.58)
k.	ORIGINAL: If you take a Soldier's weekend for a training exercise, make sure he or she gets it back during another training cycle.	7.81 (1.37)			
k.	CHANGED: If you require your Soldiers be present for additional drill weekends for a training exercise, make sure he or she is recognized for the extra time the Soldier was willing to commit to the organization.		7.61 (1.07)	7.33 (1.34)	8.16 (1.11)

B26. Continued:					
l.	Try to dissuade your superiors from making sudden changes to the training schedule.	8.32 (.90)	7.96 (1.18)	7.70* (1.29)	8.16 (.898)
m.	Communicate your training goals and your vision to your subordinates and your superiors.	8.86 (.350)	8.74 (.541)	8.70 (.596)	8.79 (.419)
<p>Rationale for Changes: Reserve Component units traditionally train one weekend a month and two weeks per year. Because unit members spend less time together and to give employers more notice of training periods, regulations require that training schedules be provided further out. Time constraints are such in reserve units that unit members cannot be given ‘time off.’ However, reserve unit leaders do have the option to vary the training schedule and structure the training in such a way that Soldiers can include family members or employers in some events. Reserve unit leaders plan training around community events, and during the summer so as to not conflict with educational or other activities. In reserve units, hunting season is a BIG DEAL, a commander quickly learns NEVER to plan any training that will conflict with hunting season. Because it is not an option to give a Soldier ‘time off’ other steps must be taken to recognize dedication and service.</p>					

Battalion-Level: Communicating

B27. You are a Battalion commander, and you want to make sure that your Soldiers and junior Officers share your vision for the Battalion. Rate the effectiveness of the following strategies for communicating your vision to your unit.					
		Expert Mean	AC N=23	USAR N=30	ARNG N=19
a.	Distribute your command philosophy in writing to all Soldiers in your Battalion.	7.39 (1.69)	7.26 (1.57)	7.67 (1.78)	7.68 (1.63)
b.	Reinforce your vision in all daily/weekend activities and interactions, and do so for the entire term of your command.	8.29 (.930)	7.91 (1.24)	7.53* (1.81)	7.84 (1.25)
c.	Do not adhere to a single perspective—be willing to change your vision as necessary to reflect changing needs of the unit.	6.64 (2.35)	5.39* (2.58)	6.67 (2.21)	5.84 (2.73)
d.	ORIGINAL: On a daily basis, visit Company areas in the garrison and in the field, and highlight shortcomings and the progress that has been made toward achieving your vision.	6.41 (2.39)			
d.	CHANGED: Frequently visit Company areas in the garrison and in the field, and highlight shortcomings and the progress that has been made toward achieving your vision.		6.65 (1.74)	7.60** (1.56)	6.74 (2.42)
e.	Communicate your vision starting on the first day of your command.	7.78 (1.90)	8.17 (1.30)	7.87 (1.38)	7.95 (1.95)
f.	Reward those who support your vision, and punish those who don't.	4.17 (1.92)	4.39 (2.08)	3.83 (2.21)	4.26 (2.05)
g.	Solicit feedback and ideas from your junior Officers regarding your vision – be alert for ways to improve it.	8.08 (1.24)	7.70 (1.55)	7.73* (.907)	7.79 (1.35)
Rationale for Change: ‘Daily’ was replaced with ‘frequently’, because reserve units do not have the opportunity to visit Company areas on a daily basis.					

Battalion-Level: Communicating

B28. You are an artillery Battalion commander. You are in direct support of a brigade whose commander is a light infantryman, while your background is mechanized artillery. On several occasions, the differing perspectives of you and your brigade commander result in communication difficulties. For example, you are used to moving on the battlefield at a very fast pace, whereas your commander is used to moving at a slow pace. In fact, communication problems arise often between the two of you. Your goal is to improve your communication with your brigade commander. What should you do?

		Expert Mean	AC N=23	USAR N=30	ARNG N=19
a.	Ask a peer of your brigade commander, such as a DIVARTY commander, for help with the problem.	5.17 (2.20)	5.09 (2.19)	4.77 (2.09)	4.58 (1.71)
b.	Invite the brigade commander over to your house to watch a sporting event or movie and try to establish a friendship with him.	4.07 (2.24)	3.74 (1.93)	3.10* (2.10)	3.37 (1.83)
c.	Speak to the brigade commander, express <u>your feelings</u> about why the two of you sometimes have trouble communicating, and ask for his help with the problem.	7.27 (1.73)	7.09 (1.64)	6.63* (1.56)	6.53 (2.11)
d.	Make an effort to think from the brigade commander's point of view about your unit's activities and performance.	8.02 (1.03)	8.09 (1.08)	7.53** (.819)	8.05 (.911)
e.	Speak to the brigade commander, ask him why <u>he</u> believes the two of you sometimes have trouble communicating, and ask for his help with the problem.	7.31 (1.78)	7.48 (1.27)	6.77 (1.63)	6.05* (2.41)
f.	Field an interest or hobby you and your brigade commander share, then use this shared interest to develop analogies to help you communicate with him more effectively: In other words, talk in terms of topics you both understand.	6.05 (2.14)	5.96 (2.01)	5.20* (1.99)	5.32 (2.56)
g.	Make an attempt to interact with the brigade commander as a person outside of the work environment, in a wide variety of settings.	5.64 (2.13)	4.39** (2.01)	4.37** (2.09)	4.58* (1.98)
h.	Speak to your brigade commander's superior about the problem and ask for his advice.	1.92 (1.09)	1.91 (1.27)	2.43 (1.63)	2.00 (1.33)

Battalion-Level: Communicating

B29. You are a new Battalion commander and you are feeling somewhat lonely and frustrated with your job. Your goal is to manage your stress effectively so that it does not interfere with your ability and motivation to perform at your best. Rate the quality of the following strategies for achieving your goal.					
		Expert Mean	AC N=23	USAR N=30	ARNG N=19
a.	Budget time for inspirational reading.	6.54 (2.03)	6.04 (2.44)	6.90 (1.88)	6.21 (2.72)
b.	Develop a mutual support group with other Battalion commanders – talk to them frequently.	7.25 (1.54)	7.09 (1.31)	7.07 (1.43)	7.05 (1.68)
c.	Realize that dealing with stress is important to your promotion, and Soldier on.	4.58 (2.24)	5.09 (2.31)	5.50** (1.83)	6.00** (2.02)
d.	Spend more time at the office and work harder— recognize that more satisfaction will come from pushing yourself harder and getting more done.	2.73 (1.73)	3.22 (1.97)	3.70* (2.13)	2.84 (1.57)
e.	Combat stress by engaging in physical exercise or an activity you enjoy.	8.19 (.860)	8.09 (1.04)	8.10 (1.60)	8.21 (.918)
f.	Use your spouse or other close friend from outside of the military as a sounding board.	7.37 (1.79)	7.17 (1.72)	6.07** (2.39)	6.11* (2.51)
g.	Use your junior Officers to bounce ideas off of.	4.37 (2.41)	5.65** (1.82)	4.37 (2.28)	4.74 (2.25)
h.	Talk over your feelings with the brigade commander.	5.16 (2.12)	5.13 (1.74)	5.33 (2.15)	4.95 (2.41)
i.	Take up a hobby that is unrelated to your job demands.	7.08 (1.49)	6.78 (1.78)	6.73 (1.43)	6.79 (1.47)
j.	Budget time for personal reflection and relaxation.	8.03 (1.03)	7.57 (1.40)	7.33* (1.60)	7.89 (1.04)
k.	Keep a journal or notebook of ideas in order to organize your thoughts and work through things on paper.	6.86 (1.61)	6.65 (1.64)	6.93 (1.28)	7.26 (1.32)
l.	Remind yourself often that all Battalion commanders experience such feelings and that your feelings are normal and will resolve themselves in time.	6.25 (2.06)	6.09 (1.90)	5.80 (1.76)	6.21 (1.71)
m.	Take as much leave as you are entitled to, and while on leave, do not think about work or have contact with work personnel.	6.12 (1.82)	5.13* (2.24)	5.27* (2.19)	5.26* (1.75)
n.	Realize that it is your job to tough things out for 24 months.	3.8 (1.89)	4.09 (2.17)	4.47 (1.96)	5.00* (2.10)
o.	Renew your vision and remind yourself of why you wanted to be a Battalion commander.	7.25 (1.32)	6.87 (1.98)	7.30 (1.39)	7.11 (1.96)

Battalion-Level: Managing Oneself

B30. You are a Battalion commander, and one of your primary goals is to ensure that your Soldiers have predictability in their lives. Thus, you are concerned about planning training way in advance, and you make it a point to do so. For some time, your unit has been scheduled for a pre-planned Battalion-level training exercise. At the last minute, there is a brigade command and staff meeting. At that meeting, the brigade staff announces that they are making major changes in your Battalion training plan. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=23	USAR N=30	ARNG N=19
a.	Ask to have a minute alone with your commander and express your concerns to him privately, allowing him to voice these concerns openly at the meeting if he chooses to do so.	7.27 (1.92)	6.87 (1.76)	6.27* (2.22)	6.63 (2.56)
b.	After the meeting, attempt to get a consensus among all the Battalion commanders regarding this issue, and communicate this shared viewpoint to the brigade commander.	6.24 (1.85)	5.87 (1.89)	5.40* (1.95)	4.84* (2.45)
c.	Be silent, but try to recruit your commander to your position after the meeting is over.	4.76 (2.38)	4.57 (2.21)	3.87* (2.09)	4.11 (2.35)
d.	State that Soldiers need predictability in their lives, and note that the senior leaders should be setting the correct example.	5.78 (2.14)	5.65 (2.47)	5.97 (2.28)	6.68* (1.76)
e.	State that good training exercises require predictability so that leaders of all levels can learn.	6.71 (1.88)	6.57 (1.85)	6.60 (1.79)	7.05 (1.87)
f.	Stand up and remind the brigade staff, the brigade commander, and your peers about the brigade's specific doctrinal responsibilities for training.	3.92 (2.18)	4.17 (2.36)	4.87* (1.96)	5.58* (2.56)
g.	State that the brigade staff's proposal to change the short-term training schedules is a violation of training doctrine.	4.63 (2.50)	4.61 (2.64)	4.90 (1.97)	5.68 (2.54)
h.	Be silent: Do not try to second-guess the brigade staff's decision.	2.05 (1.55)	1.83 (1.26)	2.37 (1.67)	1.89 (1.41)

Battalion-Level: Developing Subordinates

B31. You are a Battalion commander. You have one Company commander who is particularly intense. He sets extremely high – even unrealistic – standards for himself. While his Company has yet to pay the price for this problem, his expectations are so high that he never can meet them, and this situation is hindering his personal health as well as his professional development as an Officer. His Company is scheduled for a major training exercise next month. Your goal is to help him better understand how he is hurting himself by maintaining unreasonable standards. Rate the quality of the following strategies for achieving your goal.		Expert Mean	AC N=23	USAR N=30	ARNG N=19
a.	Talk to all of your Company commanders as a group about potential roadblocks to their development, mentioning too high standards as one potential problem and describing examples to illustrate your point.	6.46 (1.99)	6.87 (1.84)	6.93 (1.91)	5.89 (2.02)
b.	Wait to speak to the Company commander until after he goes to the training exercise, using examples based on his experiences there to illustrate your points.	2.90 (1.84)	3.87* (1.89)	3.50 (1.99)	4.32* (2.35)
c.	Do nothing: Allow him to learn from his own mistakes that no one can successfully maintain unrealistic standards forever.	2.00 (1.31)	2.30 (1.52)	2.13 (1.27)	2.53 (1.61)
d.	Ask another Company commander to have a friendly chat with the obsessive Company commander about the need to set realistic goals.	3.58 (2.28)	3.96 (1.71)	3.93 (2.03)	3.89 (1.91)
e.	Have a discussion with the Company commander about his potential problem before he leaves for the training exercise, using examples you are aware of from your daily interactions with him in your unit.	8.08 (1.04)	7.70 (1.39)	7.87 (1.00)	7.95 (.911)
f.	Warn the Company commander before he goes to the training exercise that you believe he has a serious problem that requires his immediate attention and that may ultimately derail his career.	3.39 (2.26)	4.22 (2.50)	5.00** (2.33)	3.95 (2.36)

Battalion-Level: Communicating

B32. You are a Battalion commander, and you notice early in your command that your guidance often becomes distorted when it reaches the lower ranks. For example, one day you comment that you want the line companies at 100% personnel strength for aircraft mechanics before you will start to assign them to headquarters. A few days later, the headquarters maintenance tech asks you why you are going to fill the line units at 150% of authorized mechanics before assigning them to headquarters! Your goal is to ensure that your guidance is communicated accurately to all levels of the organization. Rate the quality of the following strategies for achieving your goal.		Expert Mean	AC N=23	USAR N=30	ARNG N=19
a.	Hold meetings with your Platoon leaders to verify what they know.	4.27 (2.05)	4.48 (2.19)	4.70 (1.80)	4.79 (1.87)
b.	When you must communicate important information verbally, try to speak directly to as many Officers and Soldiers as you can.	5.73 (2.10)	6.04 (1.77)	5.53 (2.11)	6.37 (2.08)
c.	Hold the chain of command responsible for accurately passing information down to lower ranks.	7.80 (1.01)	7.65 (1.11)	7.87 (1.16)	7.74 (1.62)
d.	Work on your relationship with your senior NCOs.	7.08 (1.32)	6.91 (1.41)	6.03** (1.79)	7.00 (1.33)
e.	Conduct periodic discussions with your Soldiers to correct misperceptions, clarify your intent, and locate sources of information loss.	7.56 (1.57)	7.39 (1.30)	6.73** (1.41)	6.68 (2.08)
f.	Ask your Company commanders to conduct periodic discussions with the Soldiers so that the Company commanders can verify that the lower levels are receiving accurate information.	7.83 (1.15)	7.57 (1.16)	7.20 (1.73)	7.00* (1.41)
g.	Whenever possible, post and distribute written statements outlining your objectives.	6.83 (2.09)	7.26 (1.51)	7.23 (1.43)	6.68 (2.18)
h.	Encourage your junior Officers to be on the lookout for Soldiers' statements about your orders that are not completely accurate – and ask the junior Officers to correct these misperceptions immediately.	7.25 (1.70)	7.09 (1.41)	6.63 (2.12)	6.37 (2.08)
i.	Develop an NCO professional development program that stresses how to pass down information properly.	6.63 (2.16)	5.87 (2.02)	6.17 (2.13)	6.11 (1.82)
j.	Spend more time leading by walking around the unit and talking to people.	8.08 (1.26)	7.91 (1.53)	7.23** (1.30)	8.00 (1.29)
k.	Look for breaks in the chain of command.	6.86 (1.55)	7.00 (1.85)	6.97 (1.45)	6.79 (1.84)
l.	Use multiple means of communicating the same message.	7.97 (1.34)	7.48 (1.72)	7.63 (1.54)	7.58 (1.17)

Battalion-Level: Dealing With Poor Performers

B33. You are a Battalion commander. Reluctantly, you gave your S-1 a Company command for his professional development, even though you had questions about his abilities. He was a loyal S-1, but not a very good one: He had problems with organization, and his work style was a bit “helter-skelter.” In conversations with lieutenants you have learned that they are having a hard time with this individual. Also, as you walk around the Battalion, you see other indications that confirm your doubts about his person’s abilities. In general, you are concerned and you have doubts about this Officer’s ability to command effectively. What should you do?		Expert Mean	AC N=23	USAR N=30	ARNG N=19
a.	Ask your sergeant major to spend more time coaching the former S1.	5.17 (2.38)	3.87** (2.20)	3.60** (2.40)	4.05* (2.17)
b.	Ask a competent Company commander to mentor the problematic Officer.	4.47 (2.42)	4.61 (2.38)	4.73 (2.57)	4.89 (2.15)
c.	Provide the former S-1 specific help with organization such as hints and strategies you and others have found useful.	8.14 (.830)	7.30** (1.10)	7.87 (1.07)	7.74 (1.04)
d.	Set the former S1 up with a strong 1SG and Company XO.	7.19 (1.94)	7.22 (1.31)	7.43 (1.33)	7.32 (2.28)
e.	Explain to the former S-1 specifically why it is important for him to change his behavior for the Soldiers’ benefit.	7.46 (1.41)	7.13 (1.57)	7.43 (.858)	6.68 (2.05)
f.	Help the lieutenants you spoke with to work through their direct superiors to solve problems.	5.41 (2.34)	5.86 (1.75)	5.63 (2.39)	5.32 (2.45)
g.	Communicate regularly with the Officer and encourage him to use you as a resource whenever he has problems.	8.10 (1.41)	7.39** (1.19)	7.47* (1.40)	7.68 (1.63)
h.	Come down hard on the former S1 about his shortcomings and threaten to take disciplinary action if he does not improve.	2.27 (1.54)	3.48** (2.04)	3.17* (1.80)	3.21* (1.87)
i.	Conduct sessions with the former S-1 during which you talk to him about aspects of his behavior you want changed.	7.34 (1.59)	6.61 (2.10)	7.00 (1.61)	6.26* (1.79)
j.	Talk to the S1’s first sergeant to get a better feel for what’s going on.	5.95 (2.15)	6.70 (1.84)	5.40 (2.52)	5.00 (2.44)

UNUSED SCENARIO

You are a Battalion commander, and there are many unmarried Soldiers in your unit. You are concerned about the special needs and problems unmarried Soldiers may have, since they do not have a regular family life. Your goal is to ensure high morale for your unmarried Soldiers. Rate the quality of the following strategies for achieving your goal.

Rationale for Changes: I have chosen to not include this scenario at all. Active units live and work together at an Army installation. Therefore, the issues of single Soldiers would be a concern for an active duty leader. In reserve units, because these units are geographically dispersed in communities where the Soldiers live and work, reserve leaders do not have to worry about morale and welfare issues for single Soldiers in their units.

Summary of Mean Responses for Battalion Level

Better Choices				Worse Choices			
Expert Mean	AC N=23	USAR N=30	ARNG N=19	Expert Mean	AC N=23	USAR N=30	ARNG N=19
Developing Subordinates							
6.80	6.53	6.44	6.24*	2.84	3.47*	3.73**	3.40*
Organization Development							
7.08	7.28	6.90	7.07	3.02	3.35	3.07	3.63
Protecting the Organization							
7.50	7.24	7.11**	7.16*	3.51	3.40	3.88	4.00
Motivating Subordinates							
7.20	6.93	6.55**	6.74*	3.05	3.19	3.88**	3.63
Taking Care of Soldiers							
7.72	7.20**	7.19**	7.20**	3.40	4.26	4.63**	3.63
Communicating							
7.27	7.04	6.95**	6.93*	3.62	3.92	3.80	3.86
Managing Oneself							
6.74	6.43	6.09*	6.17	2.98	3.00	3.62*	3.74
Dealing With Poor Performers							
7.65	7.13*	7.44	7.14	3.37	4.04*	3.95	4.05

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

TKML Scales: Each response is evaluated based upon the following scale.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad	Somewhat Bad	Neither Bad Nor Good				Somewhat Good	Extremely Good	

Appendix B

Metacognitive Knowledge Dimension Scale

I consider myself to be (not at all...extremely):

- competent to judge who can help me supplement any deficiencies in my own knowledge.
- competent to judge whether my skills are sufficiently up to date.
- competent to organize my work in terms of fixed targets and deadlines.
- competent to assess which colleagues (inside and outside the organization) I should keep in contact with to stay at the forefront of developments in the domain of my work.
- competent to join in the planning when time estimates need to be made for tasks belonging to my domain of work.
- competent to indicate when my knowledge is insufficient to perform a certain task or solve a particular problem.
- competent to distinguish main issues from issues of secondary importance and to set priorities.
- competent to indicate the causes of any obstacles that may emerge in my work.
- competent to consider the advantages and disadvantages of particular decisions, which have to do with working methods, materials and techniques in my work domain.
- competent to assess what skills I do not possess when tackling new problems or a new task in my work or in related areas.
- competent to assess what professional literature I should keep up with to stay up to date for future needs.
- competent to see the overall picture, even in complex situations.
- competent to react promptly in situations where I perceive errors, even in situations where there are obstacles and impediments.
- competent to judge who can be of assistance in helping me to supplement any deficiencies in my skills.

One item was reverse scored:

In situations where there are obstacles or impediments, I (never...very often) give up. (Van der Heijden, 1998; 2000).