A History of the Defense Intelligence Agency
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— President Ronald Reagan, 1981

"Let us never forget that good intelligence saves American lives and protects our freedom."
What is Military Intelligence?

Military intelligence is the product of gathering information about foreign military dispositions, equipment and strategic plans, analyzing the contents of that information, and disseminating the findings to decisionmakers. It appears in three basic forms — tactical, operational, and strategic. Tactical intelligence concerns information about the enemy that is designed to help decide which tactics, units, and weapons will most likely contribute to victory in an assigned area. It is a short-term, narrow-use tool that, when properly applied, can be a significant force multiplier. Operational intelligence assumes a broader approach. Its purpose is to conduct military campaigns that accomplish strategic objectives within specific areas of operation. Finally, strategic intelligence involves a focus on more overarching, but static factors such as geography and infrastructure; or long-term trends, such as the application of new tactics or the development of new resources. Strategic intelligence is an important tool in the effort to anticipate and counter threats throughout the world.

The intelligence process services the need for both tactical and strategic intelligence. The first step, information gathering, consists of collecting data and making it available for analysis. A common method of information gathering is the use of unclassified “open sources,” such as foreign websites, television, newspapers, radio, or openly published government studies. Often, this open source intelligence (OSINT) provides such basic information as population statistics, military maneuvers, and political, social, and cultural trends.

Open sources sometimes do not supply enough information, and other techniques are often necessary. Analysis of aerial imagery is one commonly employed method. A great deal of information can be gleaned from photo interpretation of detailed high-altitude pictures — so-called IMINT, or imagery intelligence — of a nation’s infrastructure, military bases, and even troop movements. Human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) can also provide military advantage over foreign enemies. All of these sources provide vital intelligence that, when properly analyzed, can provide a significant benefit to warfighters and policymakers.
The second step of the intelligence process is analysis. Intelligence analysts pull together information gathered from many sources to produce all-source finished intelligence that examines local, national, and global issues that may influence foreign threats. They assess scientific, technical, tactical, diplomatic, military, organizational, or political changes in combination with factors such as geography, demographics, and industrial capabilities to anticipate and respond to overseas dangers as well as assess enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities.

The third step of the intelligence process is production and dissemination. Once analysts have made their determinations, they compose finished intelligence reports for both military and civilian decisionmakers. Intelligence officers then disseminate these products to relevant policymakers who decide on a detailed plan of action. One of the intelligence officer’s primary duties is to anticipate the intelligence needs of decisionmakers and react accordingly, assigning projects or responding to specific requests for information. Intelligence officers often work very closely with policymakers and warfighters to anticipate information requirements and to more sharply hone the finished intelligence provided by analysts.
Military Intelligence in U.S. History

Military intelligence is an activity that stretches back to the colonial period of American history. The scope and practice of military intelligence has expanded and contracted over time as need, resources, and intelligence philosophy changed through the decades. Nevertheless, military intelligence has played a major role in many of the key moments in American history.

The American military intelligence system during the Revolutionary War was an active and effective instrument that helped counterbalance British numerical and operational superiority. After the war, however, successive presidential administrations and Congress allowed intelligence organizations to wither and disappear. It would be nearly a century before organized military intelligence was formally established in the Military Services. While decisionmakers generally recognized the importance of good intelligence during wartime, they also believed that it was unnecessary in times of peace. It was not until the aftermath of World War II, with its catastrophic intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor, that U.S. policymakers accepted the concept of a centralized peacetime military intelligence organization.

As world war turned to Cold War, a sophisticated, global intelligence apparatus became necessary to counter and contain the spread of communism. With questions about the value of peacetime military intelligence work settled, policymakers turned their attention to how that work should be carried out. At first, military intelligence activities were fragmented among the various service branches, but throughout the 1950s, momentum built for the establishment of a centralized military intelligence agency. The establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency in 1961 unified the various intelligence activities of the Armed Services. Though its success was not always assured, the concept behind DIA was a sound one. The Agency provided essential intelligence on nearly all of the Cold War’s major events, and continues to support policymakers and warfighters in the Global War on Terror in the twenty-first century.
The American Revolution: The Roots of U.S. Military Intelligence
Because of the British superiority in strength and mobility, good military intelligence was vital to the strategy of the American Continental Army. Perhaps the most famous military intelligence agent in the American Revolution was Paul Revere. At the outset of the Revolution, Revere and his secret intelligence network learned that the British planned to raid the towns of Lexington and Concord outside of Boston and confiscate the weapons stored there. He and others successfully warned the local militias, known as the Minutemen, who removed weapons caches and resisted the British raids. The Minutemen's skirmish with the British in Lexington and Concord were the opening shots fired in the American Revolution.

Throughout the war, General George Washington, an experienced soldier who recognized the value of good intelligence, spearheaded much of the colonists' military intelligence effort. No centralized intelligence organization existed at the time, but Washington himself established agent networks in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, which provided him with a great deal of knowledge about British troop dispositions and movements. He also used information gathered by his agents to plan and conduct military operations throughout the Revolution. Knowlton's Rangers, an intelligence and reconnaissance unit Washington established in 1776, provided timely and vital intelligence regarding the dispositions and strength of the British army.

John Jay was another notable intelligence officer in the American Revolution. Jay played the dominant role in America's first counterintelligence operations. He conducted hundreds of investigations, arrests, and trials involving many influential businessmen and political figures loyal to the British Crown. He also organized clandestine operatives and ran dangerous counterintelligence missions. After the war, Jay later became the first Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.

Military intelligence was of vital importance to the Continental Army during the Revolution. It helped counter the superior British strength and mobility by informing American generals about their movements while it also deceived the British into making strategic errors. After the war, Washington's administration maintained a robust intelligence establishment, but succeeding Presidencies showed little interest in developing a full-time, centralized intelligence-gathering agency. Military intelligence work continued to be done on an ad-hoc, as needed basis.
The Civil War:
Intelligence in 19th Century Warfare
Neither the Union nor the Confederacy was prepared for the intelligence demands of the Civil War, and neither side possessed a formal, centralized intelligence apparatus. Nevertheless, the intelligence practices of code breaking, deception, and covert surveillance remained vital. The Union and the Confederacy approached these intelligence challenges in a variety of ways.

The Confederate Signal Corps employed covert communications and mail interception to spy on Northern troops. Confederate agents also conducted espionage in Union territory by sending agents on covert missions to gather military, political, and industrial intelligence. To convey information gleaned from its covert missions, Confederate agents used personal columns in newspapers, and even sent messages via the postal system. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) also made excellent use of its cavalry. While this practice was not unique to the ANV, intelligence gathered by Lee’s famous cavalry officer J.E.B. Stuart most critically helped offset the numerical superiority of the Union Army. These tactical efforts were often successful, but did little to shift the strategic balance of the war in the Confederacy’s favor.

Lacking a centralized intelligence service, the Union Army left the task to the independent direction of the specific generals in various commands. For example, General George B. McClellan selected Allan Pinkerton, who had been running a private detective agency, to serve as his head of military intelligence and counterespionage. Pinkerton’s counterespionage efforts were relatively successful, but his military intelligence estimates drastically inflated the strength of the ANV, frustrating the planning of the already cautious McClellan. Under General Joseph Hooker, the Union’s Army of the Potomac created the Bureau of Military Information, an all-source intelligence unit.

(Left) Thaddeus S.C. Lowe, one of the forefathers of overhead reconnaissance, observed Confederate forces from his balloon.

(Right) J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalry was perhaps Robert E. Lee’s most important military intelligence tool. Stuart’s absence from the Battle of Gettysburg severely hampered Lee’s knowledge of Union activities during the engagement.
The Union and Confederate armies also tapped each other’s telegraph lines, but most intercepts came from captured enemy telegraph stations. For the most part, the stations were used to transmit false messages. In addition to wiretapping, the Civil War also ushered in the widespread use of another innovation in U.S. intelligence operations — aerial reconnaissance. The Union made extensive and successful use of observation balloons, while the Confederacy’s own fitful attempts were less profitable.

Both sides in the Civil War also engaged in other types of covert action at home and abroad. There were plenty of volunteers in the North and the South who were willing to serve as informants. Abraham Lincoln himself had his own private intelligence sources. The war also encouraged a full range of covert paramilitary, psychological, and political action. This work even went on overseas, as both sides sought to sway opinion within the British and French governments.

The Civil War ushered in a new set of demands for good intelligence, and both sides did their best to respond. Nevertheless, the U.S. government allowed the resources built up during the war to wither once hostilities concluded. While the U.S. Army and Navy maintained their own small intelligence apparatus, many viewed intelligence work only in terms of its wartime utility and saw little need for its peacetime maintenance.
Allen Pinkerton, left, shown here meeting with President Lincoln, was George B. McClellan’s chief of military intelligence in the early days of the Civil War.

Signals Intelligence in the U.S. Civil War

Both the Union and Confederacy depended on the telegraph for communications in the Civil War. Information about combat campaigns and normal military business routinely crossed the wires. Both sides also understood the value of gathering signals intelligence (SIGINT) as a way of obtaining reliable, actionable information.

In 1864, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant led the Union Army on a bloody campaign of attrition in Virginia in an effort to exhaust the Confederacy’s resources. Unknown to Grant, however, Confederate telegraph operators secretly tapped his telegraph line to Washington. The rebels intercepted many encrypted messages, but, as far as is known, were unable to decode any of them. Occasionally, however, Union officials transmitted plain language cables, and Confederate soldiers took advantage of the mistake.

On September 12, the U.S. Army quartermaster in Washington sent Grant’s headquarters an unencrypted message asking for a contingent of guards to meet more than 2,400 head of cattle due to arrive the next day at Coggins Point, Virginia. Acting quickly, Confederate soldiers also went to Coggins Point and arrived before the Union Army guard. They captured and made off with the cattle, along with 200 mules, 32 wagons, 300 Union troops, and 40 telegraph construction workers.

Thanks to a telegraph intercept, the Confederates, always short on food and military necessities, had captured about forty days’ worth of meat for their army and damaged Grant’s strategy of attrition warfare.
The Spanish-American War: Global Military Intelligence

Credit: Library of Congress
The United States went to war against Spain in 1898 after the battleship USS *Maine* blew up while in harbor in Cuba. U.S. citizens already strongly supported a Cuban insurgency against Spain, but when the *Maine* exploded, many blamed the Spanish and pushed the U.S. into war against Spain a few months later. This war presented a special set of intelligence demands to the United States. The primary theaters of action were Cuba on one hand and the Philippine Islands on the other, two locations on opposite sides of the globe.

U.S. decisionmakers set out three major tasks for its Army and Navy intelligence staff. The first was to observe the movements of a Spanish fleet sent to the Caribbean to harass U.S. operations. The second was to monitor a large Spanish fleet on its way to the Philippines to oppose U.S. moves there. Finally, U.S. intelligence needed to maintain a liaison with Cuban insurgents in order to keep abreast of Spanish military dispositions in Cuba.

In order to monitor the Spanish fleets, U.S. naval intelligence officers set up a large international network of intelligence agents that provided HUMINT on the location and strength of the respective Spanish fleets. This critical information allowed the U.S. military to seize initiative and dictate the pace and timing of operations. At the same time, Army intelligence in Cuba gave U.S. forces a clearer picture of Spanish strengths and weaknesses on the island and led to a decisive United States victory in the war. Intelligence operations had again proven their value as strategic and tactical force multipliers. Even so, aside from the military attaché system, which carried many other tasks besides intelligence gathering, and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the U.S. government still did not maintain a large, complex, all-source peacetime intelligence apparatus when the Spanish-American War ended.

*(Above Right) Wreckage of the USS *Maine* in Havana Harbor, 1898.*  
*(Right) The news that the USS *Maine* had blown up in Havana Harbor galvanized U.S. public opposition to Spain’s war with Cuban insurgents.*  
*(Left) This Spanish battery on Corregidor Island in the Philippines was dismantled and destroyed after its discovery by U.S. Navy sailors.*
World War I: Expansion and Contraction

Credit: National Archives
The American declaration of war against Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1917 brought an infusion of personnel and resources that the military intelligence community sorely lacked. In Washington, General Peyton C. March, the new Army Chief of Staff, restructured the Army General Staff in Washington and established within it the Military Intelligence Division (MID) in 1918. While the MID proved useful for gathering military and diplomatic intelligence, this reorganization came too late in the war to have a major strategic or tactical effect on operations.

General John J. Pershing, who commanded the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France, shaped his own military intelligence apparatus that was similar to but independent of the MID in Washington. The Intelligence Section of the AEF consisted of the Military Information Division and Air Intelligence. By the end of the war, Pershing’s headquarters had established an effective theater intelligence center for collection, analysis, and dissemination of information. The AEF engaged in more traditional intelligence gathering while also drawing upon French and British tactical doctrine by exploiting air reconnaissance products and photo interpretation.

Aerial reconnaissance reached new levels of sophistication during World War I. Some of the most important pieces of tactical intelligence developed during the war came from aerial photographs taken by pilots over enemy lines. Topographic units produced large-scale war maps, and a radio intelligence section intercepted and translated enemy messages. The Army Signal Corps provided direction-finding and interception equipment while also manning radio listening posts. This radio intelligence gathering mission also allowed friendly units to track the movements of enemy aircraft and ground forces.

World War I was an important period in the history of military intelligence. Unprecedented use of human intelligence, vigorous advances in technology, and exceptional strides in communication contributed to the Allied victory in the war. In the wake of the war, however, policymakers allowed the U.S. military intelligence establishment to wither, a situation that eventually led to one of the worst intelligence failures in history.
The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 came as a tremendous shock to the United States. Failure to predict the attack was an historic intelligence failure and clarified the need for an effective military intelligence system, even in peacetime, to detect foreign military threats to the United States. Upon the U.S. declaration of war, the United States once again entered into a global international conflict without a centrally organized intelligence system.

In the wake of the Pearl Harbor attack, both the Army and Navy made improvements that streamlined their processing and dissemination capabilities. Joint intelligence operations also brought together a modernized version of the Army’s MID and the Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) to coordinate information in each phase of the intelligence cycle: collection, production, and dissemination. In addition, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the creation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which conducted special military operations, espionage activities, and intelligence analysis. Roosevelt also directed the FBI to gather non-military foreign intelligence in the Western Hemisphere. Existing Army and Naval intelligence branches took responsibility for the rest of the world.

In Europe, American and British intelligence set up clandestine operations behind enemy lines to coordinate with local resistance forces. Agents mapped supply drop zones for Allied pilots, set up safe houses for escaped POWs, helped train resistance fighters in guerrilla warfare, and provided intelligence reports to Allied headquarters. Aerial reconnaissance was also widely used during the war. Within hours of a reconnaissance sortie, photographs could be developed, printed, and interpreted, an innovation that could have decisive effects on operations.

In the Pacific Theater, Army intelligence played the dominant role. Some of its most vital tasks included HUMINT work. This work included exploiting captured documents and interrogating prisoners of war, providing geographic intelligence on the poorly mapped areas of the theater, and deploying reconnaissance units to gather tactical military intelligence. For example, in the Southwest Pacific Area, jungle-wise “coast watchers” remained behind enemy lines to transmit Japanese movements. General Douglas MacArthur also set up a centralized SIGINT center. Much of the work of this group involved listening to enemy radio and radar emissions in order to pinpoint defensive locations and troop concentrations.

World War II had an enormous effect on U.S. intelligence gathering. It forced policymakers to recognize the value of an efficient, professional military intelligence apparatus that was capable of gathering, evaluating, and disseminating information in a timely way, even in peacetime. Technological advances engendered by the war also contributed to the development of new intelligence gathering techniques. Nevertheless, efforts to establish a unified military intelligence establishment languished after the war.
Cold War Dilemmas
As successful as it was in World War II, the U.S. military intelligence structure faced a serious dilemma as Cold War tensions with the Soviet Union rapidly forced policymakers to confront the next threat. Although the need for timely military intelligence was widely recognized, the Army, Navy, and newly founded Air Force still separately collected, produced, and disseminated information. The system proved duplicative, costly, and ineffective, as each Service provided separate, and at times conflicting estimates.

Several overlapping problems existed in the management and control of the long-established military attaché system as well. Each Service’s foreign attaché reported separately to their respective ambassadors, and each represented the U.S. separately to the host country military. The result was a duplication of effort both on post and between posts in neighboring countries. Barriers between the Services complicated the coordination of attaché activities with other DoD elements, and the cost of sponsoring three separate attaché offices was an expensive, inefficient use of limited resources. Finally, each attaché office individually collected and disseminated information, which sometimes resulted in confused reporting.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 sought to correct these shortcomings by streamlining the channels of authority within the Department of Defense and eliminating much wasteful duplication. DoD intelligence responsibilities, however, remained vertically stovepiped into the component Services. Lines of responsibility were unclear, coordination poor, and products often parochial. Although the Defense Reorganization Act did resolve some problems by rationalizing command authority within DoD, the military intelligence system remained inefficient.

(Above) U.S. military intelligence capabilities atrophied after World War II, lowering the quality of products such as bomb damage assessments during the Korean War.

(Left) The U-2 revolutionized American intelligence analysis of the Soviet threat during the Cold War. It has been key to supporting missions for the warfighter because it provided indications and warning, threat protection, order of battle, targeting, and bomb damage assessment information.
Challenge and Reorganization: The Rise of DIA
Seeking to correct shortcomings in defense intelligence, President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed a Joint Study Group in 1960 to improve ways of effectively organizing the nation’s military intelligence activities. Acting on its recommendations, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to submit to him a concept for a single Defense Intelligence Agency that would integrate the military intelligence efforts of all DoD elements.

According to the plan submitted by JCS, the new agency would report to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS as a unified body of military intelligence and counterintelligence entities. The separate Services would no longer act as a loose confederation of the independently operating groups. This new agency would adopt the mission of collecting, processing, evaluating, analyzing, integrating, producing, and disseminating military intelligence throughout DoD. Other objectives in the JCS plan included more efficiently allocating scarce intelligence resources, more effectively managing all DoD intelligence activities, and eliminating redundant facilities, organizations, and tasks.

With some minor modifications, McNamara approved the concept given to him by the JCS and established the Defense Intelligence Agency on 1 August 1961, though it would not become officially operational until that fall. In the summer of 1961, as Cold War tensions flared over the construction of the Berlin Wall, Air Force Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, DIA’s first director, planned and organized the new agency. On 1 October 1961, it began operations with a handful of employees in borrowed office space.

(Above) John F. Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, approved DIA’s Activation Plan 29 September 1961.

(Left) DIA’s John Hughes gave a televised briefing on the Cuban Missile Crisis to the nation in February 1963.
Following the establishment of DIA, the Services transferred intelligence functions and resources to the Agency on a time-phased basis to avoid any degradation in the effectiveness of defense intelligence activities. Even during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, Agency organizational efforts continued. In late 1962, DIA established the Defense Intelligence School and in early 1963, activated a new Production Center at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia. The Agency also added an Automated Data Processing (ADP) Center, a Dissemination Center, and a Scientific and Technical Intelligence Directorate, and soon assumed staff support functions of the J-2, Joint Staff. Two years later, DIA accepted responsibility for the Defense Attaché System, the last function transferred by the Services to DIA.

The Agency’s early years were trying ones. The Armed Services resisted DIA’s attempts to establish itself as DoD’s central military intelligence organization. The Cuban Missile Crisis, in which DIA analysts played a paramount role, presented the Agency with its first challenge before it had the chance to firmly establish itself. The Vietnam War also severely tested the fledgling Agency’s ability to produce accurate, timely intelligence over a protracted conflict. Other less direct, but no less for-
midable trials during the 1960s included the effort to gather information about China’s first atomic bomb test in 1964, the state of China’s armed forces during the chaotic Cultural Revolution, and increased anti-colonial unrest in Africa.

Crises only multiplied in the tumultuous later years of the decade. The ongoing Vietnam War was perhaps the most prominent, but the Six-Day War between Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel, North Korea’s seizure of the intelligence vessel USS Pueblo, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, strained DIA’s ability to handle major challenges even as its efforts at organization and consolidation continued.
A Time of Transition
DIA faced difficult transitional years in the early 1970s, as the Agency shifted focus from consolidating internal and external management roles to establishing itself as a credible producer of national intelligence. Sweeping manpower cuts between 1968 and 1975 reduced Agency manpower by thirty-one percent, a situation that led to sharp mission reductions and broad organizational restructuring. The attaché system also underwent major changes.

In 1970, DoD created a position for an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (ASD/I) to supervise Defense intelligence programs and to provide the principal point for coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence as well as other intelligence officials outside DoD. President Nixon also reorganized the national Intelligence Community (IC) and designated DIA’s Director as the program manager for a newly established General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), which coordinated and managed defense intelligence as a whole.

In 1974, DIA established a J-2 Support Office to better satisfy JCS’s intelligence needs. In October of that year, the Agency began a comprehensive overhaul of its production functions, organization, and management. As part of this reorganization, DIA created a cadre of Defense Intelligence Officers (DIOs), who served as the DIA Director’s senior staff representatives on major intelligence matters.

Diplomatic and military dilemmas continued as well. DIA confronted a variety of issues in the early 1970s, including the rise of Ostpolitik (West Germany’s efforts at détente with the East), the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the Middle East, and increased concerns about controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Massive shipyard riots in Gdansk, Poland, civil wars in Jordan and Nigeria, and U.S. activities in Cambodia also required the agency’s attention. In other crises, the DIA monitored Idi Amin’s assumption of power in Uganda, unrest in Pakistan, and continued fighting in Southeast Asia. The Agency’s reputation grew considerably by the mid-1970s as decisionmakers increasingly noted DIA’s ability to respond to such a variety of crises.

Meanwhile, a specially convened conference in Williamsburg, Virginia in 1972 examined the effects of DIA resource reductions. Conference participants recommended putting more emphasis on exploiting technology for agency purposes and upgrading DIA’s National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC). New global challenges made these changes even more urgent. North Vietnam’s overwhelming offensive into South Vietnam forced DIA and its Defense Attaché Office in Saigon to plan for the evacuation of American civilians and their Vietnamese allies. The civil war in Angola expanded into a proxy war between Eastern and Western Bloc nations, which required DIA to provide policymakers with constantly updated information on Soviet intentions in southern Africa. DIA’s knowledge of Soviet military capabilities became particularly important when the U.S.S.R. threatened to intervene in the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East, the closest the world had come to a war between the superpowers since the Cuban Missile Crisis. DIA also monitored Soviet compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements.

With American involvement in Vietnam winding down by 1975, defense intelligence faced massive resource reductions. The recommendations aired at the Williamsburg Conference three years earlier proved useful. Despite the cutback in resources, DIA was able to continue producing timely intelligence by exploiting recent technological advances. It also modernized the National Military Intelligence Center. Ultimately, the Agency maintained its support to consumers in OSD, the JCS, and the Unified & Specified (U&S) Commands despite the depletion of resources.

Intense Congressional review during 1975–76 led to uncertainty and even more change in the national Intelligence Community. Several different Congressional investigations into charges of intelligence abuse ultimately spurred President Gerald Ford to sign Executive Order 11905, which clarified the functions of the Intelligence Community and the restrictions in place on it. Within DIA, the leadership adopted the “delegated production” concept, which spread production responsibilities across intelligence organizations within each service, to offset heavy production requirements. A report from the Intelligence Management Study Group also led to a reorganization of all DIA production activities in an attempt to streamline the process.

Following the promulgation of Executive Order 12036 in 1979, which restructured the Intelligence Community and better outlined DIA’s national and departmental responsibilities, the Agency reorganized around five major directorates: production, operations, resources, external affairs, and J-2 support. Despite these and other community-wide reorganization and modernization efforts, cuts in resources and funding during the decade limited the community’s ability to collect and produce timely intelligence. Ultimately, these shortages contributed to the failure to predict the overthrow of the Shah in Iran and a misunderstanding of Soviet intentions in Afghanistan.

In fact, while resources decreased and DIA wrestled with ways to maintain quality products, intelligence requirements expanded. In the late
1970s, Agency analysts focused on global events from Central America to China. DIA took responsibility for locating and returning prisoners-of-war in Southeast Asia. It grappled with the repercussions of expanding state-sponsored terrorism, especially in the Middle East and Africa. DIA set up special task forces to monitor crises such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the overthrow of Iranian monarchy, and the internment of U.S. hostages in the American embassy in Tehran in 1979. Other events that provoked serious concern for DIA included the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the China-Vietnam border war, clashes between Libya and Egypt, the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua, and the Soviet movement of combat troops to Cuba near the end of the decade.

Defense Attachés

Military attachés play an important historical role in nearly every country around the world. The United States’ Attachés have represented the U.S. to host country militaries, advised U.S. Ambassadors, and provided information on foreign military capabilities. A formal Defense Attaché System (DAS) was established under DIA in 1965, giving the Agency managerial authority over attachés worldwide.

Today, as part of DIA, Attachés continue their time-honored work of observing and reporting on in-country and regional military-political developments and supporting the work of Ambassadors, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The photograph below was taken by a Defense Attaché during a parade in Moscow in the 1970s. In the photograph at bottom, a Defense Attaché inspects foreign equipment.
DIA Comes of Age
DIA came of age in the 1980s, focusing heavily on the intelligence needs of both field commanders and national-level decisionmakers. This was done against a backdrop of Congressional support for DoD budget increases to enhance “readiness, sustainability, and modernization.” As a part of these improvements, the Agency also broke ground for the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C. in April 1981. The opening of the DIAC in 1984 improved the DIA’s work by collocating nearly all of DIA’s disparate directorates under one roof, allowing for better information sharing and more rapid output of intelligence products. Moreover, the concept of intelligence as a “force multiplier in crises” became a predominant theme in U.S. military intelligence circles. DIA assembled an all-source integrated database to enable the Unified and Specified Commands to better assess threats as they existed in the field, thereby pinpointing enemy strengths and weaknesses. The Agency also established a Research Crisis Support Center to provide a central, secure, all-source crisis management center to support the NMIC and the various commands.

One agency product in particular brought wide acclaim. In 1981, DIA published the first in a series of white papers on the strengths and capabilities of Soviet military forces. The series, titled *Soviet Military Power*, met with great praise in military and intelligence circles. DIA published ten issues over the next decade, and they became a respected source of information on the military strength of the United States’ chief rival in the world.

(Above Right) DIA’s publication of *Soviet Military Power* provided policymakers, U.S. allies, and the American public with a better understanding of Russian capabilities in the 1980s.

(Right) A critical DIA task in the 1980s was to monitor the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan, which lasted from 1979 to 1989.

(Left) An F-14A Tomcat from the aircraft carrier USS America flies over a Soviet Balzam Class intelligence collection ship off the Virginia coast. DIA was able to compile a great deal of information on Soviet intelligence ships that prowled the U.S. coastline during the Cold War.
World crises also continued to flare in the 1980s, often in the Middle East and North Africa. In the early part of the decade, they included the Iran-Iraq war and the increasing bellicosity of Muammar Ghaddafí’s Libya, best exemplified early in the decade by the attack of two Libyan SU-22 jet fighters on American F-14s over the Gulf of Sidra. As the Iran-Iraq War spilled into the Persian Gulf, intelligence support to U.S. allies in the Middle East intensified. DIA played a significant role in Operation EARNEST WILL, the effort to protect international shipping in the Persian Gulf. It provided targeting data on Iranian surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missile batteries and intelligence on Iraqi air power.
capabilities. This information was vital for U.S. retaliatory strikes on Iranian oil platforms and in the aftermath of the Iraqi attack on the USS *Stark*.

DIA also supported decisionmakers as threats arose in other parts of the world. The intelligence provided by the Defense Attaché in El Salvador, for example, prompted massive U.S. assistance to the government’s struggle against a Communist insurgency. DIA monitored events in Britain’s 1982 war with Argentina over the Falkland Islands. When U.S. troops invaded Grenada during Operation URGENT FURY in 1983, a special DIA Task Force responded to numerous demands for briefings, papers, and intelligence information. The Agency also distributed intelligence summaries to assist field commanders during the operation.

By the middle of the decade, DIA was fully engaged in collection and analysis efforts for events around the globe. The Agency kept a close watch on Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, the Soviet imbroglio in Afghanistan, the civil war in Chad, and unrest in the Philippines. Terrorist attacks, sometimes on American targets, multiplied in the mid-1980s. Indeed, the significantly large number of hijackings, bombings, kidnapping, murders, and other acts of terrorism led observers to characterize 1985 as the “Year of the Terrorist.” Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger presented DIA with the Agency’s first Joint Meritorious Unit Award in 1986 for outstanding intelligence support in 1985, including assistance in a series of crises including the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 and the cruise ship *Achille Lauro*, the unrest in the Philippines, and counterterrorist operations against Libya. Later in the decade, the “Toyota War” between Libya and Chad and the turmoil in Haiti added to DIA’s heavy production workload, as did unrest in other parts of Latin America, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burma, and Pakistan.
The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

On December 24, 1979, U.S. intelligence began receiving reports that a massive Soviet airlift was underway in Afghanistan and that Soviet ground troops were streaming into the rugged Afghan countryside. Their aim was to replace the indigenous Afghan communist government with a proxy regime that was more willing to follow Soviet instruction. The ten-year Soviet occupation was a humanitarian disaster for Afghanistan and an economic and military disaster for the Soviet Union.

The Soviet invasion did, however, provide an intelligence windfall. DIA focused the bulk of its intelligence resources on the actions of Soviet forces. It analyzed Soviet military tactics, strategy, and capabilities over the course of the conflict and came away with a much improved understanding of Soviet doctrine in general. One early DIA report saw an emerging quagmire with few easy solutions for the occupying forces, stating “We believe the Soviets would have to double their strength to break the current stalemate.”

DIA’s improved ability to handle increased production loads in the 1980s is reflected in its expanded reporting on the conflict. It examined other factors bearing on the occupation, such as its disastrous impact on the Soviet and Afghan economies and Iranian support to the Afghan resistance. DIA analysts concluded that Iranian and U.S. interests coincided insofar as Soviet expansion in Central Asia was concerned. When the Soviets began their withdrawal in 1988, DIA monitored the removal of their forces from Afghanistan.

During this crisis period, DIA established its Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC), which served as the primary vehicle for coordinating analytic support during crises. DoD moved, renovated, and upgraded the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) so that it was collocated with the National Military Command Center—a move that encouraged the fusion of military operations and intelligence at the national level. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 designated DIA a “combat support agency,” which made it subject to the oversight of the Chairman of the JCS and thereby improved its combat readiness. DIA also moved quickly to increase cooperation with U.S. military commands. At the same time, the Agency began developing a body of joint intelligence doctrine that was even more responsive to the needs of the Services.

The occupation of Afghanistan proved too costly for the Soviet Union to maintain. Here, armored personnel carriers begin pulling out of the country.
The rapidly shifting national security environment, characterized by key issues such as the monumental changes within the Soviet Union, engagement in counternarcotics operations, and the increasing pace of contingency operations, also forced DIA analysts to develop new intelligence doctrine on warfighting capabilities and ongoing low-intensity conflicts. These doctrinal changes paid off near the end of the decade. DIA’s intelligence support to Operation JUST CAUSE—the successful U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989—demonstrated the benefits of increased cooperation between the Agency and operational force planners. DIA also provided threat data on “hot spots” throughout the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Asia, while supporting decision-makers with intelligence on important events such as the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Tiananmen Square incident in China. Counter-proliferation, counternarcotics, and counter-terrorism remained high priority issues.

(Above Right) Intelligence planning provided by DIA was central to the success of Operation JUST CAUSE, the U.S. intervention in Panama in 1989.

(Right) President George Bush (2nd from left) visits DIA’s National Military Intelligence Center for a briefing on Panama.

(Left) DIA’s mission in the 1980s included support for counternarcotics operations in South America. The Agency provided intelligence for locating and destroying coca fields and cocaine factories.
The Post-Cold War Challenge
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War brought major changes and challenges to the U.S. Intelligence Community. National security policy, focused on containing the spread of Communism for nearly five decades, was fundamentally altered, compelling DIA to examine its priorities in the new era. Drastic cuts in funding and personnel, part of the so-called “peace dividend,” forced DIA to restructure its directorates in order to operate more efficiently and with fewer resources.

This period of reevaluation and restructuring in the Intelligence Community as a whole began after the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, and the end of the Cold War. During this period, DIA emphasized improved management of intelligence production DoD-wide as resource reductions once again threatened Agency objectives and depleted staffing. This new emphasis enhanced flexibility, improved cooperation with the Service intelligence organizations, sharply reduced management overhead, and returned to intelligence basics by focusing on the areas of collection, production, and management. Throughout the world, meanwhile, defense attachés increased their work of observing military conditions, evaluating developments in their assigned countries, and advising the ambassador. Events of the early 1990s compelled a widespread review of DIA’s role, as the nation confronted a different set of challenges in a new era of diverse regional conflicts. The defining mission for DIA came in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. DIA set up an extensive, 24-hour crisis management cell designed to tailor national-level intelligence support for the coalition forces assembled to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait. At the beginning of Operation DESERT STORM, 2,000 Agency personnel participated in the intelligence effort. The Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) that DIA established in the Pentagon to integrate and coordinate intelligence produced by various agencies was the locus of this work.
DIA also dispatched more than 100 employees into the Kuwaiti Theater to provide intelligence support, and deployed eleven National Intelligence Support Teams overseas. Intelligence they produced was key to the overwhelming coalition victory. Colin Powell, Chairman of the JCS during DESERT STORM, noted after hostilities that no combat commander had ever received more benefit from as full and complete a view of an adversary as U.S. and coalition commanders did prior to and during the conflict. This DIA-led effort remains a powerful example of the force multiplying effect that excellent intelligence support can offer operational units in theater.

DIA’s restructuring early in the decade and the experience provided by Operation DESERT STORM prepared the agency for other challenges as well. Organizational reforms and intelligence threats during the opening years of the decade resulted in an unprecedented level of integra-
Intelligence provided by DIA allowed Coalition forces in Operation DESERT STORM to destroy Iraqi early warning radar sites (Far Left) and hardened aircraft hangars (Left).

(Above) DIA supported HUMINT operations against al-Qaida in Afghanistan. The Defense HUMINT Service became fully operational in 1996.

MSIC, The Missile and Space Intelligence Center (Top Right) Huntsville, AL, and AFMIC, the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (Center Right) Ft. Detrick, MD, joined DIA in 1992.

(Below Right) As the decade closed, the Agency prepared for the feared worldwide Y2K computer system problems. The preparations not only averted major intelligence failures but also improved the overall technical capabilities of DIA.

A History between DIA, the military Services, and the Combatant Commands. This arrangement served the national security community extremely well as it surged to provide intelligence support to U.S. and United Nations forces involved in places such as Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Tanzania, Congo, and Haiti.
The 21st Century: Combating Terrorism, Providing Relief
The new millennium brought even more varied challenges to the Intelligence Community. Preparations for the anticipated “Y2K” worldwide computer crash averted problems but made clear both the vulnerability of computer databases and the difficulties of database integration. In response, DIA sought to improve its databases and render them fully interoperable in order to better meet the needs of a changing world.

Major transformation in the Intelligence Community had been in progress since the 1990s, but the unprecedented challenge of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), which began with the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, ushered in a new era of integration and cooperation in intelligence. In the wake of the attacks, DIA reshaped and revitalized its workforce to meet the requirements of warfighters and decisionmakers in dealing with the asymmetric threats presented by terrorism, insurgency, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

In the months after the 11 September attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, the U.S. and its Coalition partners embarked on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan — which harbored the terrorist planners of the 11 September attacks — and installing a democratic government. Anti-terrorist initiatives took place in other parts of the world as well, including in the Philippines and the Horn of Africa. In March 2003, the United States and Coalition forces also launched Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power and install a new democratic government in Iraq. DIA provided intelligence on enemy troop disposition, weaponry, and damage assessments, as well as tactical and strategic estimative products.

The Agency also established and supported the Iraq Survey Group, an interagency body tasked with searching Iraq for weapons of mass destruction.
DIA’s experiences in the 1990s as well as the organizational improvements made to cope with the direct threat posed by transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaida have enabled the agency to provide enhanced tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence support to initiatives around the globe. Today, DIA’s assets have unprecedented global reach, and Agency personnel are deployed to theaters around the world in support of military commands and operations in the fight against terrorism.

DIA’s work is not limited to just the GWOT, however. In addition to its protracted commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Agency monitors North Korean missile launches and tracks the development of Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram. It is also heavily engaged in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, interdicting narcotics trafficking, conducting global information operations, and assessing foreign military capabilities in space.

In 2004 and 2005, DIA also provided an unprecedented level of support to foreign and domestic humanitarian missions. Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, the response to the Asian tsunami disaster in December 2004, utilized DIA assets to locate hospitals and to efficiently direct humanitarian assistance to the hardest hit locations. DIA also participated in Joint Task Force Katrina, which mobilized to assist recovery efforts after Hurricane Katrina in September 2005.
The Intelligence Community as a whole has become more integrated to confront this new challenge, and DIA has been a major part of this unification of effort. The Agency also has more than 11,000 military and civilian employees deployed around the world to support a wide range of military operations. It is increasing its investment in the development of HUMINT and technical collection capabilities to further improve its surveillance and warning capabilities. The multi-dimensional nature of twenty-first century threats means that the Agency must be prepared for rapid changes in an unpredictable and unstable global environment.

DIA’s contributions to national security have been instrumental in shaping many of the significant events in U.S. history. From the first major challenges it faced during the Cuban Missile Crisis to the current perils presented by international terrorism and arms proliferation, DIA has played a central role in gathering, processing, and producing intelligence used to defend the United States from foreign aggression. In doing so, it has also served as an effective force multiplier, allowing U.S. military leaders to project power that is greater than the sum of its parts.

DIA has evolved as the nature of national security threats has changed. During the Cold War, it was faced with more conventional threats from the Soviet Union and its allies. In response, DIA efforts focused on defeating state-sponsored militaries that adhered to informal, but generally accepted rules of conduct. The unconventional, organic nature of global, transnational terrorism and counterinsurgency has meant that Agency personnel have had to adjust to new challenges, building a more agile organization to provide intelligence warnings and to pass information quickly to combat forces.

The Future of Defense Intelligence
Directors of DIA

Lt Gen Joseph F. Carroll, USAF  
1961 - 1969

LTG Donald V. Bennett, USA  
1969 - 1972

VADM Vincent P. de Poix, USN  
1972 - 1974

LTG Daniel O. Graham, USA  
1974 - 1975

LTG Samuel V. Wilson, USA  
1976 - 1977

Lt Gen Eugene Tighe, Jr., USAF  

LTG James A. Williams, USA  
1981 - 1985

Lt Gen Leonard H. Perroots, USAF  
1985 - 1988

LTG Harry E. Soyster, USA  
1988 - 1991

Mr. Dennis M. Nagy  
1991 (Acting)

Lt Gen James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF  
1991 - 1995

Lt Gen Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF  
1995 - 1996

LTG Patrick M. Hughes, USA  
1996 - 1999

VADM Thomas R. Wilson, USN  
1999 - 2002

VADM L. E. Jacoby, USN  
2002 - 2005

LTG Michael D. Maples, USA  
2005 - Present
The Patriots’ Memorial

The Patriots’ Memorial honors the twenty-one Defense Intelligence Agency employees who died in the service of the United States. The memorial lies at the center of the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) at Bolling Air Force Base. The Patriots’ Memorial commemorates the profound individual sacrifices made on behalf of the United States by DIA members and acts as a reminder of the selflessness, dedication, and courage required to confront national challenges now and in the future. DIA Director Lt. Gen. Leonard Perroots dedicated the memorial on 14 December 1988.

The stories behind the names in the memorial are themselves monuments to the bravery of those who served in harm’s way. Major Robert Perry was the Army Assistant Attaché in Amman, Jordan in 1970. He was killed when fighting broke out between the Jordanian army and Palestinian refugees who had taken shelter in Amman. In June, a Palestinian gunman shot Perry through the front door of his house in front of his wife and children. After the incident, the United States considered sending troops to Jordan on a contingency operation to quell the violence, but the fighting subsided a few days later.

In April 1975, a U.S. Air Force C-5A Galaxy transport plane carrying 250 Vietnam War orphans crashed outside of Saigon, killing 100 of the children and many others. Among the dead were five female employees of the Defense Attaché Office in Saigon — Celeste Brown, Vivienne Clark, Dorothy Curtiss, Joan Prey, and Doris Watkins — who assisted in tending the children. After takeoff, the plane’s cargo doors blew off, damaging the hydraulic lines in the tail. The pilot tried to make an emergency landing, but the aircraft crashed two miles short of the runway, crushing the cargo deck of the aircraft.

DIA also lost seven employees to the September 11th terrorist attack on the Pentagon. Rosa Chapa, Sandra Foster, Robert Hymel, Shelley Marshall, Patricia Mickley, Charles Sabin, and Karl Teepe died in the attack.
Major Robert P. Perry, USA
Assistant Army Attaché, Jordan
10 June 1970

Celeste M. Brown
Defense Attaché Office, Saigon
4 April 1975

Vivienne A. Clark
Defense Attaché Office, Saigon
4 April 1975

Dorothy M. Curtiss
Defense Attaché Office, Saigon
4 April 1975

Joan K. Prey
Defense Attaché Office, Saigon
4 April 1975

Doris J. Watkins
Defense Attaché Office, Saigon
4 April 1975

Colonel Charles R. Ray, USA
Assistant Army Attaché, Paris
18 January 1982

Chief Warrant Officer Robert W. Prescott, USA
Defense Attaché Office, Guatemala
21 January 1984

Chief Warrant Officer Kenneth D. Welch, USA
Defense Attaché Office, Beirut
20 September 1984

Petty Officer First Class Michael R. Wagner, USN
Defense Attaché Office, Beirut
20 September 1984

Captain William E. Nordeen, USN
Defense and Naval Attaché, Greece
28 June 1988

Judith Goldenberg
Defense Attaché Office, Cairo
15 July 1996

Staff Sergeant Kenneth R. Hobson II, USA
Defense Attaché Office, Nairobi
7 August 1998

Master Sergeant William W. Bultmeier, USA, Ret.
Defense Attaché Office, Niamey
23 December 2000

Rosa M. Chapa
Defense Intelligence Agency, Pentagon
11 September 2001

Sandra N. Foster
Defense Intelligence Agency, Pentagon
11 September 2001

Robert J. Hymel
Defense Intelligence Agency, Pentagon
11 September 2001

Shelley A. Marshall
Defense Intelligence Agency, Pentagon
11 September 2001

Patricia E. Mickley
Defense Intelligence Agency, Pentagon
11 September 2001

Charles E. Sabin
Defense Intelligence Agency, Pentagon
11 September 2001

Karl W. Teepe
Defense Intelligence Agency, Pentagon
11 September 2001
“Let us never forget that good intelligence saves American lives and protects our freedom.”

— President Ronald Reagan, 1981
The dark blue background of the seal signifies the unknown or the threats and challenges of the world around us. The flaming torch and its gold color, which represents knowledge or intelligence, is lighting our way to a known world symbolized by the blue-green planet. The eternal search for knowledge and truth is the worldwide mission of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The two red ellipses symbolize the technical aspects of intelligence today and in the future. The 13 stars and the wreath identify the Agency as a Department of Defense organization.