Visions of Order: Japan and China in U.S. Strategy

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The search for order has long challenged diplomats and statesmen. Today’s liberal international economic and political order has evolved out of a century of conflict, revolution, and war into a pattern of interest-based cooperation among the world’s great powers. The international system, however, is not a self-regulating mechanism; maintenance of order, once established, requires the active and full participation of major powers with high stakes in the effective functioning of the system.

In East Asia today, Japan and China are two such powers. The former is a long-standing democratic ally of the United States; the latter is a rising power destined to shape the contours of the 21st-century international order. Since coming to office in 2001, the Bush administration has attempted to engage both countries toward support of global and regional order. Yet the strategies adopted—and exemplified by former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and current Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick—represent strikingly different approaches to order in East Asia and beyond.

The case for a Japan-centric strategy was articulated in a report prepared by a bipartisan study group chaired by Armitage and Professor Joseph Nye of Harvard, which was published by the National Defense University in October 2000.1 Armitage drew heavily on the report as a road map for policy after joining the Bush administration a few months later. The China-centric approach, by contrast, gained visibility in a speech Zoellick delivered to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in September 2005.2 It would be misleading to suggest that these two documents represent the totality of the Bush administration’s thinking on either Japan or China, but they do provide insights in the core elements and underlying logic of each approach. Particularly in East Asia, both documents are regarded as highly influential statements of American strategy.

Ultimately, the two strategies may prove compatible. The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy combines elements of the Armitage and Zoellick approaches to international and regional order in articulating a “hedge strategy” toward China.3 However, implementing the strategy will call for properly balancing its engagement and military legs. It will also require defining U.S. priorities in the interplay of global and regional interests and finding the right policy balance between China and Japan.

The Armitage Exegesis

Richard Armitage’s emphasis on Japan reflects above all an alliance-centric approach for managing change. Anticipating the challenges of the new century, the Armitage report found the U.S.-Japan relationship to be “more important than ever.” Japan not only had “the world’s second-largest economy and a well-equipped and competent military” but also stood as “our democratic ally.” In addition to many common interests, shared democratic values provide a firm and enduring foundation, allowing the two allies to cooperate readily in shaping the international order of the 21st century.

Looking back on the 1990s, the study group expressed concern that “China had become the principal focus of American policymakers,” despite the fact that since the suppression of pro-democracy forces in Tiananmen, relations
with China had been “characterized by a series of crises.” Implicit in this concern was the criticism that the attention paid to China had come at the expense of the U.S.-Japan relationship and the alliance.

The Armitage report took the Clinton administration—and Japan—to task for failing to implement the security agenda set out in the 1996 U.S.-Japan Tokyo Declaration “in large measure because of concerns over Beijing’s hostile reaction to the reinvigoration of the security partnership.” The declaration provided a post–Cold War vision for alliance security cooperation, and Japan’s subsequent 1997 Defense Guidelines committed Japan to provide rear area support to the United States in contingencies “in areas surrounding Japan.” Although Japan defined those areas in functional rather than geographic terms, China regarded this potential security cooperation as including a Taiwan contingency.

In contrast to the Clinton administration’s perceived tilt toward China, the report called for a “recognition that the time has arrived for renewed attention to improving, reinvigorating, and refocusing the U.S.-Japan alliance.” The U.S.—UK “special relationship” was posited as “a model for the alliance.” The reference pointed to the shared values and common interests at the heart of the Anglo-American relationship that historically have been the foundation for cooperation in dealing with threats to the international order. It stood as an implicit invitation to Japan to assume international responsibilities for world order similar, but not identical, to those performed by the United States and the United Kingdom. Support for Japan’s efforts to become a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council spoke to the contributions the envisaged U.S.-Japan partnership could make to global order.

The report identified the prohibition on the exercise of collective self-defense as “a constraint on alliance cooperation” and made clear that the United States would welcome a Japan “willing to make a greater contribution and to become a more equal alliance partner.” In this context, it called for enhanced intelligence and defense industry cooperation, particularly in the development of missile defense, as well as for a wide-ranging diplomatic dialogue on key long-term strategic issues—among them the rise of China and its implications for regional order.

The study group put the United States squarely on the side of Japan in its dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. More broadly, the report urged that the United States and Japan should encourage China “to become a positive force in regional political and economic affairs” and called for the two countries to “engage in an ongoing strategic dialogue on this subject.” While arguing against containment, the unstated direction of the report is toward a hedging strategy with respect to China. The United States and Japan would work to encourage China’s evolution as a responsible regional actor, but should China fail to move in that direction, it would be confronted by a reinvigorated alliance. In other words, a strong partnership was the best guarantee that China would emerge as a supporter of the existing political and economic order.

**The emphasis on Japan reflects an alliance-centric approach for managing change that invites a larger Japanese role in support of international order**

During the Cold War, the alliance with Japan served as the East Asian anchor of the U.S. global strategy of containment aimed at the Soviet Union. Today, it stands as a central element in the efforts of Washington and Tokyo to deal with the post-9/11 security challenges to international order posed by terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the future direction of states at the crossroads, notably China, India, and Russia. Within the alliance, Japan has moved to assume a larger role in support of international order, as evidenced by the assistance rendered by the Maritime Self Defense Force during Operation Enduring Freedom and the deployment to Iraq of the Ground Self Defense Force to aid in postwar reconstruction. Japan was among the first countries to support the U.S. Proliferation Security Initiative.

The Armitage vision for the alliance found expression in the joint statements issued at the conclusion of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee meetings in February 2005 and May 2006. The “2 + 2” statements set the foundation for a future strategy for the alliance, marking a convergence of bilateral, regional, and global interests and the understanding that the alliance enhances the security of both countries, the Asia-Pacific region, as well as “global peace and stability.” In effect, the joint statements transcended the military alliance, potentially transforming Japan from an Asian ally into a global strategic partner in maintaining international order.

Clearly, there are limits to what Japan can do at present. It lacks the stature of being a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Japanese governments have interpreted Article IX as constraining their country from the exercise of collective self-defense, an obligation assumed by all Security Council members. Japan, by democratic choice, has denied its Self Defense Forces global power projection capabilities. Despite its global interests, Tokyo can have only limited strategic impact absent cooperation with Washington.

**The Zoellick Zeitgeist**

In contrast to Armitage’s vision of an expanding U.S.-Japan partnership, the Zoellick view of China has a more contingent quality. Zoellick’s September 2005 speech contains the oft-cited invitation to China to become a “responsible stakeholder” supporting the existing international system. China’s growing global importance and integration into the international system are clearly emphasized; the paramount issue for Zoellick is the character and content of China’s global influence.

The speech begins by highlighting the profound impact of China’s 1978 decision to embrace globalization and integrate itself into the international system. “China is big, it is growing, and it will influence the world in the years ahead . . . the essential question is how
will China use its influence.” Zoellick argues that “China has a responsibility to strengthen the international system that has enabled its success” and proposes a U.S. policy goal of urging Beijing to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the current international system.

In exchange for assuming more responsibility in sustaining current international rules, norms, and organizations, China would gain a greater voice within these institutions and an enhanced ability to work with the United States “to shape the future international system.” Playing the role of a responsible stakeholder would not only advance China’s national interests, but also allow Beijing to pursue a larger regional and global role without sparking a destabilizing competition with Washington.

Zoellick emphasizes important U.S. and Chinese common interests that can be pursued through cooperation and proclaims a “shared interest in sustaining political, economic, and security systems that provide common benefits.” The speech devotes considerable attention to China’s economic role, noting that the nation has benefited from an open, rules-based international economic order and from access to the U.S. market in particular. But the increasing size of the Chinese economy means that it now affects the smooth functioning of the global economy: “The United States will not be able to sustain an open international economic system . . . without greater cooperation from China, as a stakeholder that shares responsibility on international economic issues.” The theft of intellectual property, currency policy, and a mercantilist energy policy are identified as areas where China currently falls short of responsible behavior.

In the realm of foreign policy, China is considered to have ample opportunities to demonstrate responsibility in dealing with issues such as North Korea, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism. Zoellick praises specific Chinese contributions to stability, while noting that in other cases, such as export controls and dealing with the Iranian nuclear program, the seriousness of China’s commitment is not clear. He also raises concerns about the underlying purposes and lack of transparency in China’s rapid military modernization and highlights the need for a “peaceful political transition” to a more accountable government.

Although his emphasis is on China’s global impact, Zoellick also grapples with the reality that its power and influence are increasing more rapidly at the regional level than at the global level. He notes that Beijing is already playing a larger role within Asia and states that “the United States respects China’s interests in the region.” Zoellick praises China’s participation in multilateral diplomacy in Asia, while expressing concerns about potential efforts to “maneuver toward a preponderance of power” in the region. Zoellick also highlights the importance of China resolving its differences with Taiwan peacefully. The speech recognizes the reality of increasing Chinese regional influence, but avoids taking a position on Chinese long-term intentions in Asia or specifying which of these interests are legitimate and must be respected by the United States.

The emphasis on China’s potential to be a constructive global actor is an enduring thread in U.S. Asia policy

The speech does not fully explicate the relationships between China’s behavior at the global, regional, and domestic levels. However, it implicitly invokes two concepts: liberal international relations theory and modernization theory.

Liberal institutionalism highlights ways in which participation in international institutions alters state calculations of costs and benefits. The theory asserts that increased integration into global and regional institutions will raise the costs of aggressive actions, thereby producing more moderate and responsible Chinese behavior at both the regional and global levels. Zoellick also invokes modernization theory in arguing that the closed politics that have accompanied economic growth over the last 25 years are not sustainable. “As economic growth continues, better-off Chinese will want a greater say in their future, and pressure builds for political reform.” Zoellick suggests these forces will eventually produce positive political changes and lead to greater convergence of U.S. and Chinese values.

The emphasis on China’s potential to be a constructive global actor is an enduring thread in U.S. Asia policy. President Franklin Roosevelt envisioned China as one of the five great powers that could stabilize the postwar world; the Chinese seat on the UN Security Council has its origins in this vision. Zoellick revived the idea of great power cooperation when he accompanied China’s foreign minister to Roosevelt’s Hyde Park estate. In the 1970s, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger viewed their opening to China as a means of extracting the United States from Vietnam and as a strategic balance against Soviet global power. In the late 1970s and 1980s, a number of senior Carter and Reagan administration officials supported intelligence cooperation and arms sales to China as a means of increasing pressure on the Soviet Union. Although China was not a true global power at the time, these officials viewed it as a strategic actor that could affect the global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Even after Tiananmen Square, President George H.W. Bush saw China as having continuing strategic value, as both a hedge against a possible resurgent Soviet Union and a potential supporter of a new world order. President William Clinton emphasized the potential for Sino-U.S. cooperation on transnational issues as a justification for working to establish a “constructive strategic partnership” with China in 1997–1998.

Some advocates of cooperation cautioned that China could become highly disruptive if alienated. Richard Nixon famously argued in 1967 that China should not be left in “angry isolation.” Beijing’s emphasis on the importance of stability to support economic development and assurances that it will not challenge the existing order have eased concerns about it playing a disruptive role. Nevertheless, China’s large size and population mean that a breakdown in domestic order or weakened government control of borders could be highly destabilizing at both the regional and global levels.

Two Visions, One Policy?

The two approaches to regional and global order differ significantly. Armitage begins with the U.S.-Japan partnership and
works outward to the regional and global level, while Zoellick starts with China’s global significance and works inward to consider that nation’s impact on regional security and its future domestic political evolution. Armitage emphasizes the importance of shared values and democracy in the U.S.-Japan alliance, while Zoellick focuses on shared U.S. and Chinese interests and managing disputes within a larger cooperative framework. For Armitage, the chief challenge to regional security lies in the potentially disruptive actions of a powerful China. For Zoellick, the concern is about China acting as a free-rider that gradually undermines the existing international and regional order.

Although Armitage and Zoellick address the issue of order in East Asia from different starting points, it should be possible, in theory, to integrate both approaches into a coherent policy. Indeed, the Bush administration’s 2006 National Security Strategy attempts such a synthesis. The document encourages China to become a responsible stakeholder in support of the international order, notes the global significance of the U.S.-Japan relationship, and explicitly endorses a hedging strategy toward China. It assumes that the two approaches are complementary, without examining the different assumptions at the core of each and the operational issues involved in making them work together.

The choice of a hedge strategy reflects uncertainty about China’s future political and military evolution. Rather than defining China clearly as an ally or an adversary, this strategy seeks to balance engagement/diplomacy and dissuasion/deterrence. The former emphasizes U.S. efforts to induce China’s cooperation and encourage integration into global institutions and the global economy as a way to shape China’s future evolution. The latter emphasizes U.S. military capabilities to guard against the possibility of a China that becomes aggressive or threatening. The challenge in implementing such a strategy is maintaining a balance between the two elements as they interact at global and regional levels.

In effect, Armitage and Zoellick represent the different components of the hedge strategy. Zoellick’s call for China to play the role of a responsible stakeholder emphasizes the engagement side and envisions common interests between the United States and China producing cooperation that will contribute to order at the global and regional levels. Armitage’s focus on the U.S.-Japan partnership (and other U.S. alliances in Asia) stresses the military side of the hedge strategy. This approach highlights the role of U.S. power and alliances in limiting China’s ability to challenge the order in Asia. Zoellick focuses on China’s potential contributions to global order, while Armitage sees Japan as a global partner.

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Ultimately, the two strategies may prove compatible. Beijing may embrace Zoellick’s stakeholder concept for cooperation in support of international order. Such an evolution would comport with the aspiration of the Armitage report that China become a “positive force” in regional affairs. Zoellick suggests that Chinese acceptance of an international role as a “responsible stakeholder” would ease international tensions over rising Chinese power and improve prospects for Chinese political reform and eventual democratization. This vision would also conform with Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso’s aspirations for China: its peaceful rise and democratic future.

Democratic peace may ultimately prevail, with U.S., Chinese, and Japanese interests being effectively managed within such a framework. In practice, however, the vision is decidedly future-oriented. Attaining that vision will depend in large part on whether U.S. strategies can manage both the challenge of maintaining order at the regional and global levels and an intensifying Sino-Japanese rivalry.

Success will require defining clear priorities in the interplay of U.S. global and regional interests and finding the right policy balance between China and Japan. Efforts to advance the international stakeholder concept at the global level with China should not compromise historic U.S. interests in East Asia. At the same time, the military hedge with Japan in East Asia should not work against U.S. efforts to advance international order with China. Success will also require addressing challenges related to internal policy coordination and domestic politics.

Balancing Relations

Dealing with China and Japan in an Armitage-Zoellick context requires a careful calibration of U.S. regional and global priorities. Current Sino-Japanese tensions will greatly complicate U.S. efforts to enlist support from both countries for regional and global order. Fundamental tensions include competition for regional leadership, the outstanding territorial disputes over the Senkaku islands and the East China Sea, concerns about each other’s military modernization, and a potential competition for energy resources. These issues have been exacerbated by the unresolved role of history in the domestic politics of both countries.

Tensions in the Japan-China relationship may also have a broader impact within Asia. The Sino-Japanese rivalry greatly affects prospects for regional cooperation and integration. It is difficult to see substantive progress toward the creation of an East Asian community if China, Japan, and South Korea are at odds over sensitive political issues, ranging from history to democracy. Issues of Japan’s historical conduct within Asia and visits to the Yasukuni shrine have not only aggravated Sino-Japanese relations, but have also given China an effective tool to attack Japanese influence throughout Asia. This both limits Japanese contributions to Asian stability and poses challenges for U.S. regional diplomacy.

Striking a balance between China and Japan is complicated by the fact that their regional rivalry coexists with the potential for both countries to make positive contributions to global order. However, securing substantive cooperation may require U.S. actions that take sides in the regional competition. This raises difficult questions: will Tokyo see...
Washington’s efforts to develop a “stakeholder” accommodation with Beijing at the global level as giving priority to China? Will efforts to develop the U.S.-Japan alliance and implement a hedging strategy work at cross-purposes with efforts to reach an accommodation with Beijing? Is a U.S.-China accommodation possible while China remains an authoritarian state and Taiwan an unresolved issue?

The Armitage report places the United States firmly on Japan’s side, while Zoellick is more circumspect about how Washington should balance its relations with Beijing and Tokyo. As Deputy Secretary of State, Armitage declared that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covered territories administered by Japan, extending to the disputed Senkaku islands. This commitment was underscored by joint exercises conducted in January 2006 by the U.S. Marines and elements of the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force that focused on the defense of unspecified remote islands. While making clear its commitment to defend Japan, the United States must also be cautious about getting drawn into Japanese territorial disputes with China (over the East China Sea and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands) and South Korea (over the Tokdo/Takeshima islands) that do not involve core U.S. interests.

Although Zoellick expresses U.S. respect for China’s interests in Asia, this statement does not address key questions such as which Chinese regional interests are to be respected and the degree of respect they deserve. Another glaring omission in Zoellick’s speech is the failure to address the degree of compatibility between U.S. and Chinese interests in Asia. For example, going back over a century to the Open Door, successive U.S. administrations have resisted efforts of Asian governments to exclude U.S. influence from the region. This raises the question as to how Zoellick would regard Chinese efforts to exclude the United States from regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Is this the “preponderance of power” he cautions China from seeking?

With respect to Taiwan, Beijing asserts important and legitimate interests in pursuing unification. China’s interests are not necessarily permanently incompatible with U.S. interests in “peaceful resolution” and a solution acceptable to the people of Taiwan. But in addition to the regional strategic issues involved, the reality of Taiwan’s democracy and China’s autocracy will ensure that the issue remains a delicate matter in bilateral relations.

The U.S. relationship with China lacks the shock-absorbing protection of shared democratic values, which are at the heart of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Given the administration’s emphasis on democracy and congressional concerns about a wide range of human rights issues in China, it is not idle to speculate over the extent to which an interests-based accommodation can be sustained in the absence of movement by Beijing toward political liberalization.

Conversely, Japanese values and most of Japan’s global interests are closely aligned with those of the United States. However, legitimate questions exist about whether Tokyo is prepared to play a global role if it requires disruptive changes at home. Domestic factors such as the strength of the agriculture lobby and visits by Japanese prime ministers to the Yasukuni shrine, in which convicted war criminals are enshrined, are already limiting Japan’s ability to play a regional leadership role, much less a global role. Although the Armitage report is correct to encourage greater contributions at both levels, the jury is still out on Japan’s willingness to step up to the challenge. Even if Tokyo does remove self-imposed political and constitutional constraints and significantly increases its contributions to global order, its efforts might be insufficient to compensate for foregone Chinese global cooperation. A more assertive Japan might also result in Chinese efforts to disrupt regional and global order.

Armitage’s emphasis on Japan and U.S. alliances ultimately represents a skeptical view about China’s future role in Asia. Thus, the focus of the Armitage report is on strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance implicitly as a hedge against China, not on defining and recognizing legitimate Chinese interests or building a framework for cooperation. This implies a much less cooperative relationship than Zoellick envisions.

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The increasing willingness of Japanese officials to describe China as a threat and support Taiwan is likely to increase China’s tendency to regard the U.S.-Japan alliance as a destabilizing regional factor. Beijing has expressed concerns about the objectives of the alliance, its role in a potential Taiwan contingency, and whether Washington seeks to empower Tokyo militarily as a counterweight to China. Aggravating Chinese concerns about regional security and Taiwan will not induce Beijing to play the role of a “responsible stakeholder” at the global level, an issue that highlights a final difference between the Armitage and Zoellick approaches. The Armitage report is skeptical about whether positive incentives can induce cooperative Chinese behavior. It emphasizes the role Japan and other U.S. allies in Asia can play in raising the cost and reducing the benefits of aggressive Chinese behavior. Armitage devotes relatively little attention to the potential negative impact on Chinese willingness to cooperate or on China’s future political evolution. Conversely, Zoellick hopes that U.S. willingness to accept China as a responsible stakeholder and respect its regional and global interests can induce positive contributions to global order and result in stable bilateral relations that increase the chances for eventual Chinese democratization. However, this implies accepting a strong China whose interests may not match those of the United States.
The Armitage and Zoellick views of sustaining international and regional order differ significantly in their assumptions, logic, and priorities. Reconciling both views into a coherent strategy theoretically should be possible, and recent U.S. strategic documents, such as the 2006 National Security Strategy, attempt to do so by using the concept of a hedge strategy to deal with uncertainty about China’s future. This aims to influence China’s policy choices and future evolution in positive directions, while guarding against the possibility of failure without becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Zoellick approach is broadly compatible with the engagement track of a hedge strategy, while the Armitage approach emphasizes the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance in guarding against a possible aggressive China.

In practice, however, combining the approaches is likely to pose difficult choices. A hedge strategy requires careful coordination to keep the military and engagement elements in balance. The degree of difficulty is heightened by the fact that the Pentagon and the State Department each manage different tracks of the strategy. Without clear leadership on China policy, it will be difficult to modulate the balance between the military and engagement legs in response to changing developments. This can exacerbate difficulties caused by uncoordinated or mixed messages sent by different parts of the U.S. Government.

Sustaining order in East Asia will also require coordinated and management of U.S. policies toward Japan and China, whose bilateral relations are likely to experience increasing strains and tensions. The choices the United States makes in regional security are also likely to affect the degree of global cooperation from China and Japan. Washington policymakers must gauge the compatibility of U.S. interests with those of China and Japan and consider how efforts to accommodate each country’s regional interests will affect their willingness to cooperate at the global level.

Zoellick’s speech does not offer details about which Chinese regional interests should be respected and the consequences for the U.S.-Japan partnership, while Armitage’s emphasis on Japan does not fully address the challenge of making China a stabilizing actor at the regional and global levels—or the potential costs of China as a disruptive force. These issues are not necessarily irreconcilable, but they deserve more attention than they have received to date.

Notes
5. All quotations in this section are from Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Also see Robert B. Zoellick, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, May 10, 2006; Slides are available at <www.state.gov/documents/organization/66187.pdf>.
12. A larger question is whether the United States should encourage regional integration or support the status quo.