Constabulary Forces and Postconflict Transition: The Euro-Atlantic Dimension

by David T. Armitage, Jr., and Anne M. Moisan

Since the early 1990s, multinational stabilization efforts in the wake of conflicts or major natural disasters have repeatedly encountered problems in filling the so-called security gap. In places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, outside interveners have faced a compelling need to use specialized capabilities that can fill the gap between the point where military operations—whether for combat, peacekeeping, or counterinsurgency—leave off and community-based policing activities pick up. In particular, ensuring a capacity to manage and defuse civil disturbances and other threats to public order has become a sine qua non for overall mission success.¹

A number of European countries—most notably France, Italy, and Spain, but also Portugal and the Netherlands—have long possessed such capacities via their well-established national constabulary services. But the United States has not made comparable investments in this kind of capability for its own needs and consequently has been slow to embrace this requirement in overseas venues. Nonetheless, pressures are growing to embrace creatively the necessary transformational shifts in U.S. military organization, doctrine, equipping, and training. Among other groups, the prestigious U.S. Defense Science Board documented the inadequacy of U.S. postconflict capabilities in detail in its seminal 2004 study, Transition To and From Hostilities.²

American consideration of European capabilities in this area has often been subordinated to policy reservations regarding the European Union’s (EU’s) nascent European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the quasi-operational European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), and low European defense spending. When it comes to avoiding unintended duplication with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), such concerns are understandable. Yet it would be unfortunate if Washington overlooked a unique and valuable European contribution in providing this intermediary support to postconflict stabilization—in essence, filling the gap between what are not quite combat operations and yet not exactly peacekeeping activities as traditionally defined by the United Nations.

This essay explores the factors that give rise to the need for constabulary capabilities in fragile postconflict settings, assesses EU efforts to develop greater capacities via the newly formed European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), discusses the implications of these developments for U.S. defense transformation, and proposes ways to strengthen Euro-Atlantic cooperation in this vital area.

Hammer vs. Scalpel

As military missions in Bosnia and Kosovo have demonstrated, postcombat operations reflect one of the most complex and challenging phases of the conflict spectrum.³ Part of the reason for recognizing this as a new phase is that, although organized hostility has ended, order has yet to be restored. The local authorities usually are too weak and unable to govern without external support. Judicial and legal institutions are broken, nonexistent, or illegitimate. The transition period from warfighting to peacekeeping and reconstruction is particularly tenuous because it represents the nexus of two different axes: the military-civilian axis and the external–internal axis.

Along the military-civilian axis, one expects to see a changing relationship between...
military and civilian actors throughout the life cycle of a postconflict operation. At more advanced stages, civilian agencies should be assuming greater responsibility for residual law-and-order duties while the military components assume a lower profile. The external-internal axis refers to the changing relationship between external security actors and internal or domestic security actors. Here the problem revolves around the inability, at least initially, of local authorities in postcombat environments to establish law and order, provide basic security for the population, and govern their own territory. To avoid turning failed or recovering states into international dependencies, the international community recognizes the need to transition effectively from externally provided security—whether military or constabulary—to security provided by local actors once the latter have been adequately empowered.

This transition period is the most critical for the conclusion of a successful mission. The aftermath of both Kosovo and Bosnia highlighted the need for the United States and its NATO allies to develop capabilities to cope with demanding, high-intensity, yet still localized threats to public order. These tasks are best suited for constabulary units than for either traditional combat soldiers or community police. In the end, all are prerequisites for successful reconstruction.

In simple terms, military forces are trained for war—force-on-force engagements against other military or armed adversaries. While the military is able to mobilize and deploy rapidly in large units, most are uncomfortable with, ill suited to, and not generally trained for police tasks that are central to postmilitary conflict operations (for example, riot control, border control, domestic surveillance, securing/protecting sensitive sites). As an analyst has noted, the military is a “blunt instrument” that is “capable only of imposing a most basic, rigid form of order,” involving attempts to “deter and limit loss of life and destruction of property, but that is about all.”

Most U.S. and allied military forces are not trained to intervene directly to deal with crime or civil violence in postconflict situations. Conflict operations. This does not mean infantry and light infantry forces and various U.S. reserve units have not done excellent work when pressed into service as peacekeepers in places such as the Balkans and Sinai. It does mean that in recent operations, the United States, for lack of better options, has routinely turned to elite Special Operations Forces (SOF) or traditional military police to address stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) tasks.

Using SOF to conduct messy postconflict operations and low-end security has overstretched these units and forced a higher than desirable operations tempo, jeopardizing other priority military missions for which only they are trained and equipped. The training that military police receive in some of the skills required for stabilization is not focused on creating competency in the full range of constabulary skills. Rather, police training emphasizes a general familiarity with tasks, relying heavily on in-the-field operational training. In addition, both special operations and military police units generally lack the full gamut of specialized equipment (lethal and nonlethal) to deal with lower levels of stabilization and nationbuilding.

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The European gendarme forces have evolved beyond their historic role of meeting domestic needs. They have conducted numerous constabulary and law enforcement operations in many parts of the world. For example, between August 1998 and January 1999, the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) in Bosnia, headed and staffed largely by Italian Carabinieri, was employed in 243 reconnaissance patrols, 87 information-gathering missions, and 33 public order interventions. The MSU dealt with refugee returns, organized crime, and terrorism. The French Gendarmerie has been involved in peace operations in Haiti, El Salvador, Cambodia, Western Sahara, Somalia, Rwanda, the Balkans, and elsewhere. Likewise, Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish forces have been deployed in various operations in Africa and the Balkans. Our European allies have substantial experience in the use of forces with the kind of training, organization, and equipment that is directly relevant for future law enforcement missions in S&R operations. There is much Washington could learn from its allies to overcome the temptation that elite SOF, military police, or special Army/Marine units can do the job alone.

Constabulary Forces

The term constabulary refers to “a force organized along military lines, providing basic law enforcement and safety in a not yet fully stabilized environment.” Europeans often describe constabulary forces as “police forces with a military status.” They are trained in military skills, but their focus and equipment is on minimal/nonlethal use of force and tasks normally associated with police functions. Unlike traditional soldiers, the goal of constabulary units is to defuse potentially violent situations through negotiations and conflict management, rather than to “neutralize” the enemy or destroy a target. While constabulary forces vary by country, they can provide order and security in a postcombat area of operation after military forces have been relieved and redeployed but before local law enforcement institutions have been restored. Often, they wear national police uniforms, so as not to be confused with those who have just done the fighting, but they are armed and ready, if necessary, to use lethal force.

Though serving as police, constabulary forces are highly skilled in the tactics and doctrine of light infantry, including rapid deployment and an ability to sustain themselves logistically. The
Dutch 

European Capabilities

Since the end of the Cold War, but most significantly after the St. Malo declaration in December 1998, EU member states have attempted to develop complementary military capacities. While the lack of tangible improvements in military capacities or significant increases in defense spending is widely criticized by commentators in the United States, less noticed—or discussed—have been efforts to develop civilian crisis management capacities, including tailored and deployable constabulary and police units.

What kind of constabulary forces do the Europeans possess? Individually, there are unique national capabilities (for example, the Italian Carabinieri and French Gendarmerie). Beyond the national level, Europeans have proven their ability to merge capabilities multilaterally, most notably in the MSU in the Balkans. In fact, the first EU crisis management operation was in January 2003, when the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina took over from the United Nations (UN) International Police Task Force.

Most recently, Europeans have sought to develop multinational constabulary capacities within a more institutionalized framework. On September 17, 2004, the Dutch EU presidency announced that five EU member states (France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) had agreed to form a European Gendarmerie Force, with a permanent headquarters in Vicenza, Italy. Intended to be operational by late 2005, the 900-person force would be tasked to ensure security and public order, fight organized crime, advise and train local police forces, as well as fill the postconflict security gap as military forces transition to peacekeeping. Other EU member states could participate as much as they were willing and able.

The EGF’s main purposes are substitution and strengthening missions. Substitution refers to missions where the local police either do not exist or are totally incapable of maintaining public order. Strengthening missions involve advising and training local police to perform public order duties, such as urban operations, crowd control, patrimonial site protection, and combating terrorism and organized crime. For example, in Haiti and Côte d’Ivoire, French Gendarmes deployed alongside military peacekeepers and helped reestablish the local police force. In Bosnia and Kosovo, Italian Carabinieri conducted joint patrols with local police. Their presence reassured fledgling local police and gave skittish refugees confidence that they could return to their homes unharmed. The Carabinieri also used their investigative skills (including plainclothes covert surveillance, crime mapping, and link analysis) to help the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia counter organized crime.

European officials envision the EGF to be deployed either along with or immediately after a military operation to maintain or establish public order and safety. The advantage of the European Gendarmerie Force is that, although it is considered a police asset, it can be placed under military command. In other words, EGF forces have the training, equipment, and background to work in a military command environment.

According to the EGF “declaration of intent,” its flexibility is the ability to deploy at every phase of a conflict:

- initial phase: along with military forces to perform various police tasks
- transitional phase: either alone or with a military force, coordinating and cooperating with local or international police units
- military disembarkment phase: facilitate the handover from military to civilian authorities, whether local or international.

On December 14, 2004, the European Union announced that the first EGF commander would be French Brigadier General Gérard Dezan. He reports to a High Level Interdepartmental Committee that is responsible for strategic management and political control, although if the EGF is used for an EU mission, the political control would fall under the EU Political-Security Committee plan.

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The commander heads a staff of about 30 planners at the EGF permanent headquarters in Vicenza. Planners are expected to work closely with the EU military staff and civilian crisis management planning cell in Brussels. Among the EGF headquarters’ tasks are monitoring at-risk areas; planning contingency and operational maneuvers; arranging and
directing combined exercises; evaluating and implementing lessons learned; and, as necessary or if requested, providing guidance to strategic decisionmaking. Thus, the goal is to incorporate EGF capacities into the ESDP so that the European Union eventually will be able to respond to the full spectrum of crisis situations, from preventive diplomacy to postcombat nationbuilding.

The EU vision of the integrated police unit (IPU) allows for Europeans to perform “robust police missions” under less stable conditions, even if this involves temporarily being placed under military command. Since the expected area of operation is likely to be characterized by the absence of internal authority, the IPU concept is a critical part of the larger framework linking EGF to EU contributions in building the country’s law enforcement and judicial institutions. As illustrated by international experiences in the Balkans and East Timor, the deployment of police forces alone does not help to create stable conditions unless there are other means to process criminals and administer justice.21

The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has aptly described the EU effort as trying to create an intervention force that is “something between the neutrality of traditional UN peacekeeping and NATO’s cruise missiles.”22 The Dutch stress that the EGF—through its training and its pre-organized unit structure—would serve as a viable framework in which other nations with similar types of police forces may choose to participate. Any EU member state possessing “a police force with a military statute” may take part in the EGF Candidates (including Turkey) that have such constabulary forces may obtain “observer status” and detach a liaison officer to the EGF headquarters. For instance, the contribution of the roughly 150,000 Turkish Jandarma may help the European Gendarmerie Force eventually solve manpower constraints, as well as facilitate EU-Turkish relations in general. Because of its unique capabilities, the EGF also may be a positive venue for repairing European relations with the United States.

### Assessing the EGF

The organizing framework of the European Gendarmerie Force is new, so it will take time to develop. However, several issues must be addressed in three main areas: training/rules of engagement, deployment, and links/relationships with other organizations and states.

#### European Gendarmerie Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Committed to EGF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Carabinieri</td>
<td>111,800</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Gendarmerie</td>
<td>101,399</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Guardia Civil</td>
<td>73,360</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Republican Guard</td>
<td>26,100</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Marechaussee</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>319,459</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,160</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Institute for International Strategic Studies, Military Balance, 2003/04*

The gendarmes in the EGF are part of the existing pool of personnel committed to civilian crisis management.23 EU members participating in the EGF plan to use the same forces as those already pledged in the 2001 Helsinki Headline Goal catalogue. Under the police category, the European Union aimed to have a cadre of 5,000 police officers by 2003, of which 1,400 would be able to deploy within 30 days. In November 2001, at a Police Capabilities Conference in Brussels, EU members reached (at least on paper) their targets, including 13 rapidly deployable integrated police units.24 The European Union already has two rapidly deployable headquarters at its disposal, one from the French Gendarmerie and the other from the Italian Carabinieri. The EGF thus seems rather similar, although less ambitious than just several years ago.

At a civilian capabilities commitment conference on November 22, 2004, EU member states (including the 10 newest members) updated the 2001 catalogue and pledged more than 5,700 police for participation in crisis management operations. Consequently, because the European Gendarmerie Force will draw from this same pool rather than raise new forces, it creates a potential dilemma with respect to deployability.

The EGF initiative stemmed from French domestic politics but reflects internal EU dynamics and new 21st-century operational demands. In 2003, French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie proposed a multinational unit that could be deployed rapidly to assist in police duties. At the time, Alliot-Marie reportedly was in a bureaucratic battle with the French finance and interior ministries. By proposing the establishment of such a force, the French defense minister might have hoped to gain additional budget resources, as well as maintain control over the use of the Gendarmerie.25

The Italians, meanwhile, who have a great deal of overseas experience with their Carabinieri, saw an opportunity to promote their country as one of the major powers within the European Union. Since Germany (for political and historical reasons) had a strict rule of separating military and police functions and Great Britain did not possess these unique types of forces, Spain also saw an opportunity to raise its profile in EU circles. The French, still smarting from EU enlargement (primarily to the East), considered the EGF as a natural fit to maintain leadership of a southern group of member states, perhaps entice the new members with these low-end specialized capabilities, and tout the embryonic ESDP. Knowing that the European Union could not compete on high-end military tasks (and seeing Washington distinctly uncomfortable with nationbuilding and struggling with S&R operations in Iraq), the French and other EU participants considered the EGF a perfect answer to filling a security niche. It also complemented other ongoing efforts on the military side of ESDP such as developing battlegroups, taking over the NATO mission in Bosnia, and establishing a European Defense Agency to coordinate weapons procurement.
The British media immediately lauded the September 17, 2004, declaration with such hyperbolic headlines as "EU flexes muscles." The BBC noted that the EGF would be sent to "places where law and order has deteriorated but not completely broken down, or where a conflict has subsided and heavily-armed troops are no longer needed."

While the concept is clear and the need is compelling, EU members nevertheless face real challenges in making this initiative work. There is no question the forces that will comprise the EGF are capable. But unanswered questions remain: How deployable are the units? What will the stress points be? Will EU governments find themselves overstretched? How long are the deployments? Where will units be sent? Whose training standards and operating procedures will dominate (French Gendarme or Italian Carabinieri)? With the demand for these types of forces growing, Europeans need to find answers quickly.

The political-military challenges are not dissimilar to those faced by NATO as it develops the NATO Response Force. EGF coordination and strategic direction belong to the high-level interdepartmental committee. However, if the EGF is used for an EU mission, the responsibility will shift to the EU Political-Security Committee. In this committee, all 25 EU members have a voice and a potential veto. Since only five EU members participate in the EGF, it remains to be seen how the other members would pursue the politics with respect to a proposed mission. In addition, each EU–5 member state retains the right to decide whether its units would participate in an EGF operation. Such uncertainty places additional demands on force planners, since one cannot be certain that earmarked units might not be withdrawn or not made available for political or other reasons.

In the end, national needs, available funding and personnel, and prestige will determine the depth and durability of national commitments to the European Gendarmerie Force. Since EGF availability and deployability are tied to meeting national requirements, there may be a gap between the numbers earmarked in a database and the actual number available for a mission. Not only are the raw numbers of forces listed small, but many of these forces are also being double-counted for the European Union, United Nations, and elsewhere. Consequently, conducting simultaneous operations may be out of the question. What happens if French gendarmes assigned to a UN mission are required for a separate EGF mission? Hard political choices would have to be made, and European allies might have to think through difficult trade-offs with other security priorities.

In 2001, EU governments established a small police unit within the Council Secretariat (under Common Foreign and Security Policy High Representative Javier Solana). The unit consists of only about 8 police officers and civilians, which is dwarfed by the EU Military Staff of over 150. It is not yet clear how the GGF headquarters will interact with the Council Secretariat’s police unit or the EU Situation Center. Presumably, there will be liaison officers to coordinate EU efforts. In late 2003, the European Union was working on developing a broad civil-military coordination concept that would integrate the myriad EU elements both in Brussels and in the field, but specific parameters have yet to be worked out. Again, the GGF is scheduled to become operational late this year. Nevertheless, numerous questions remain that the EU–5 will need to address in the coming year. Likewise, American operations are driving questions as to the ability of current U.S. military forces to meet the increasingly diverse challenges of the 21st century; and more specifically, questions regarding the disposition and transformation of American forces to meet these security gap requirements.

Struggle and Challenge

The likelihood of American or NATO involvement in a great power conflict requiring massive troop numbers in the next 15 years is low. However, weak governments, lagging economies, and religious extremism will continue to place increasing demands on Western powers for stabilization, reconstruction, and nationbuilding operations. Despite recognition of the growing and critical role constabulary forces could play in meeting these demands, the U.S. and NATO militaries are reluctant to address constructively the need for developing such skill sets. In documents as recent as the newly drafted U.S. Joint Operations Concepts for 2005, the range of interim operations identified in spectrum-of-conflict operations continues to reflect the traditional spectrum of tasks. Likewise, in the NATO Defense Planning System, the emphasis centers on combat forces to the exclusion of identifying constabulary requirements or close combat urban warfare.

Winning wars and winning peace require unique and varied capabilities. Since the 1990s, U.S. military forces have been reduced overall, including the Army, which has been cut by 40 percent to approximately 485,500 (plus 355,000 Army National Guard and Reserves), while the operational demands (every 18–24 months) have doubled, as well as the duration of operations. Similar trends are reflected in NATO efforts to reduce, professionalize, and deploy its militaries. The belief that the traditional military remains the best institution to deal with new world operational requirements needs to be challenged seriously. Although the military can quickly bring to bear large forces, equipment, and organization, the cost—both in terms of dollars, as well as scarce and highly specialized combat resources—has become increasingly high. Operational expenses in Afghanistan and Iraq alone exceed $4.5 billion a month. The debate over what type of force is required to fill the security gap is at the heart of the discussion.

The United States cannot expect Europeans to assume responsibility for constabulary operations in all the areas where they are presently needed (Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq). While European constabulary forces have the training and valuable expertise, current numbers are far too small to provide the extensive long-term support that the United States and NATO need to cover the growing operational security gaps in foreign postconflict operations. European governments are also unlikely to opt out of combat and peacekeeping missions in favor of specializing in overseas constabulary missions. They will continue to strive to maintain a balance of capabilities in conflict situations. On the American side, the solution does not rest in simply increasing the number of combat, SOF, or military police forces. It lies in better tailoring existing forces within the United States to these new security missions in postconflict environments.
The United States is wrestling with its own military transformation and force restructuring efforts to be better positioned to respond to threats and challenges. The Department of Defense defines transformation as "a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, peoples, and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities." These efforts were reflected in the mid-1990s interest in a "revolution in military affairs," as well as the latest efforts in 1997 to centerpiece transformation in the first Quadrennial Defense Review.

Despite these efforts, U.S. defense transformation efforts are bound to be flawed if we hold to outdated conceptions about war in the 21st century. The days of a preponderance of conventional force-on-force operations have given way to more complex challenges of asymmetric warfare, urban counterinsurgency, extensive civil affairs/public diplomacy work with the state's publics, stabilization, reconstruction, and nationbuilding. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been regularly engaged in one form or another of nationbuilding activity. Our greatest enemy is complacency with old stereotypes of conventional attrition warfare.

The United States should consider permitting and encouraging European constabulary forces to participate in American military academies, service schools, and think tanks coupled with misplaced faith in advanced, technically superior military forces (based on concepts of network-centric war, space-based battle stations, and long-range precision strike) and overwhelming weak, incompetent enemies. Despite this mismatch, the new threats are testing the Nation's ability to react to and prevail over enemies in the kinds of day-to-day struggles currently faced and to do so at acceptable costs.

Some analysts in Great Britain and elsewhere argue that forces to fill the security gap are central to the military's responsibility and that the military should be duly trained and equipped. In 2002, the Association of the U.S. Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies categorized four broad areas of tasks to be addressed by security gap forces: security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic development, and participatory governance. If our transformation efforts are to succeed, we must develop creative force capabilities that better meet these evolving operational requirements. The United States should reconfigure to operate exclusively as security gap fillers. Conventional war is still a risk, but, ideally, this additional capability simply reflects yet another step in the Army's transformation, which could be accomplished by tailoring a small part of its 51,000 infantry into high-quality/specialized units that possess constabulary-like training, organization, and equipment. The transformed units would be mobile, have their own unique force protection, intelligence, and civil affairs, and have adequate firepower (lethal and nonlethal) and specialized training and skill sets to support police, local security force training, and nationbuilding activities. Introducing novel approaches to organization structures, realistic training scenarios, directed technology (communications, weaponry, personal protective gear, and armored vehicles), and modularity are indispensable anchors in enabling these new units. This transformation would also require tailored rules of engagement that allow forces to shift seamlessly from a combat role to a stand-alone capacity to work with local police units.

A Way Ahead

Knowing the new era of operational demands and the need for the U.S. military and NATO to transform, how can European constabulary capabilities both help resolve this military shortfall with real capability and also provide a concrete step toward rebuilding the transatlantic relationship?

Further capacity-building is essential. Europeans should—either through NATO, the European Union, or bilaterally—establish combined training relationships and opportunities for U.S. Armed Forces, civilian police, and law enforcement officials. Slots should be reserved for Americans to attend courses at European training facilities in Italy and France. In fact, this is an area where Italy in particular—with its rich Carabinieri tradition and historic transformation of its armed forces—could take the lead. Washington should provide proper incentives for Americans—both civilian and military—to learn from the Europeans.

Reaching out multilaterally to civilian organizations is also vital. The EGF should establish liaison relationships with the Department of State's Office of Civilian Police and Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program, as well as the Department of Defense. Such interaction would permit adoption of best practices and facilitate coordination, cooperation, and planning.

The United States should take steps to promote interoperability. For example, as the United States debates its own approach to mounting more effective stabilization and reconstruction operations, it should consider permitting and encouraging European constabulary forces to participate in American military academies, service schools, and think tanks. NATO's Allied Command Transformation and Joint Forces Command can play integral roles in facilitating inclusion in both NATO and the U.S. training centers. In addition, the United States should capitalize on its combat/stabilization/reconstruction experiences by creating a cadre of expert military trainers; this cadre would be comprised of individuals returning from operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq who have experience in SOF, military police, or civil affairs, but have retired from active-duty service or no longer meet military worldwide deployability criteria due to injuries or inadequate active-duty time remaining. Capturing this expertise and focusing it on the transitional skill set requirements from combat experiences to constabulary skill to local security forces would benefit and complement EU expertise.

The United States should encourage European constabulary forces to participate in the postcombat phase of multinational military operations. Ideally, this would mean that EU constabulary functions are incorporated into U.S. (and NATO) military planning as part of an integrated whole. America would assist in providing European constabulary forces with necessary transport and intelligence support. If successful, this collaboration could become the
prototype for a new multinational instrument and a firm counterbalance to perceptions of American unilateralism and European irrelevance. Such transparency at the planning stage would allow the United States (and NATO) to focus on comparative advantages, while spotlighting European strengths and skills in postcombat operations. Consequently, the political costs of persuading others to follow a U.S. military course of action would be lowered, as the European leaders can justify the policy to their respective parliaments and publics. Europeans and the EU once again can feel (and rightfully so) that they are working side by side with the United States as equal partners capable of successfully meeting the demands of crisis operations in the 21st century.

Conclusion

We are at a critical fork in the evolution of warfare. Old concepts and organizations are no longer adequate in dealing with the asymmetric and nontraditional enemies that U.S. forces are facing in new-era conflicts. We need to develop capacities to respond to the full spectrum of conflict, from precrisis diplomacy to postconflict peacekeeping and then to nationbuilding. In the face of stabilization and reconstruction demands in Afghanistan and Iraq, both the United States and the international community must creatively embrace this transformational shift in national and multinational military organization and training. Despite the overwhelming challenges, America, NATO, and the European Union face a unique opportunity to cooperate and collaborate as equals on addressing the security gap.

Notes

1. The phenomenon of a security gap is well established in the literature on postconflict transitions. Michael J. Zdziezic has characterized this problem as the byproduct of three gaps: a deployment gap (in which intervening forces are mismatched to public security requirements); an enforcement gap (in which international police elements lack the authority or capacity to enforce law and order); and an institutional gap (in which the host nation lacks capacity to perform key law and order functions). See Michael J. Zdziezic, “Introduction,” in Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security, ed. Robert B. Oulds, Michael J. Zdziezic, and Elliot M. Goldberg (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), 8–16.


3. The terms postconflict and postcombat are used interchangeably.

4. Zdziezic, 8.


10. Ibid., 42.

11. Interview with Italian defense official, January 12, 2005.

12. Perito, 158, interview with Italian defense official.


20. The High Level Intendepartmental Committee (HLIC) is composed of representatives from the countries’ various ministries: France, Italy, and the Netherlands have representatives from their respective defense and foreign ministries. Portugal has representatives from its interior and foreign ministries, and Spain has representatives from all three (defense, interior, foreign) ministries. In addition to managing the politics of the EGF, the committee will set the operational standards of the units. The EU Political-Security Committee is composed of ambassadors from all 25 EU members and charged with advising the Council of the European Union on EU foreign and security policies.

21. Based on the Civilian Crisis Capabilities Conference in November 2004 that incorporated contributions from the 10 newest member states, the EU civilian crisis capacity includes policing (members have pledged 5,761 police officers), rule of law (members have pledged 631 judges, prosecutors, and other policing), rule of law (members have pledged 631 judges, prosecutors, and other rule-of-law experts), civilian administration (562 administrative and infrastructure experts have been pledged); and civil protection (4,988 specialists in rapid response following natural disasters). Ministerial Declaration available at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/82760.pdf>.


26. For example, see BBC News and FBIS.

27. Earle.


29. At the June 2004 Group of Eight (G–8) Summit at Sea Island, Georgia, the G–8 launched an initiative to establish a center to train personnel in constabulary operations. Although colocated at the EGF headquarters in Vicenza, the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units is distinct from the EGF in that it is geared toward training (mostly) Africans to enhance African capacities in such operations.


31. For example, there are no specific constabulary requirements listed in NATO’s Defense Planning Questionnaire.


38. See BBC News and FBIS.


40. The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at http://www.ndu.edu/nds/ndup. INSS also produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at http://www.jointmilitary.com/jfqi_pale.
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Building on an earlier study from 2001, the authors reexamine Iran's movement toward becoming a nuclear-weapons state and the implications of that development for stability in the Middle East, global nonproliferation efforts, and U.S. security and defense policy. The original study postulated that Iran was well on its way to acquiring nuclear weapons and the long-range missile systems needed for their delivery. The terrorist attacks of September 11, U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, and new evidence of Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons-related technologies all necessitated a reexamination of this issue. The authors conclude that despite strong policy preferences to the contrary, the United States may have little choice but to live with a nuclear-armed Iran.


This study takes a fresh look at the steps taken by the governments of the United States and Japan to implement the recommendations of the October 2000 Institute for National Strategic Studies Special Report, *The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership*, in light of the strategic challenges of the post-9/11 world. The study concludes with six recommendations for additional progress in the U.S.-Japan alliance.


Since its move into Balkans peacemaking in the mid-1990s, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) involvement beyond the territories of its members has posed challenges and opportunities, particularly for the Alliance’s new members and partners. This paper explores the lessons that new NATO members and partners have drawn from these expeditionary operations. It also assesses how these experiences have influenced the ongoing efforts of these countries to transform their defense postures.

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