SOLDIERS

AND STATESMEN
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SOLDIERS AND STATESMEN

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FOREWORD

I am indeed honored to be asked to provide a few brief comments by way of presenting this volume to the public. Having attended the sessions of the 1970 Military History Symposium, I can assure interested readers of both the quality and relevance of each of the formal papers and informal discussions.

This symposium, the fourth in the series sponsored jointly by the Department of History and the Association of Graduates of the Air Force Academy, was of particular interest to those of us charged with responsibility for professional education in the military services. Especially at the National War College, most of whose graduates move on to high staff and command responsibilities, the value of so enlightened a discussion of the relationships between soldiers and statesmen cannot be overemphasized.

Statecraft through the ages has called upon the soldier and the statesman to play vital roles in attaining the preeminent goal of national security. There has been a tendency, particularly in recent years, to separate and often dichotomize the two professions. In part this can be attributed to scholarly commentators who, for legitimate analytical purposes, often separate the two elements. This intellectual division is further compounded by the increasing degree of functional specialization required of the modern soldier and diplomat. Today's national security policy-maker, as compared to his predecessors of only a generation ago, requires much greater technical knowledge and expertise. It is little wonder then that a type of myopic egocentrism develops as the soldier or diplomat wrestles with the complex problems of the "here and now." Inundated with data, beset by the conflicting advice of subordinates and demands of superiors, and inexorably constrained by compressed decision time, he has little opportunity to reflect on the wider implications of his decisions.

Yet it is not an exaggeration to insist that in our age and in the foreseeable future the soldier and the diplomat must work together more closely than ever before. Nuclear weapons and Vietnam have demonstrated both the strength and the limitations that can be placed on the use of military force; the Cold War and containment have provided a similar demonstration for diplomacy. The development of a new modus vivendi poses challenges of the highest order as new power configurations emerge to displace the old and as increased demands for solution of domestic problems attain higher priority in the competition for limited national resources.
The challenge, however, is not limited to the practitioners of statecraft. It is here that the scholar must lend his talents, not only to provide the elongated perspective of history, which helps free us from generational egocentrism, but also to collect, distill, and collate the wisdom of the giants upon whose shoulders new pygmies will build.

The scholars, both guest and resident, at the Fourth Military History Symposium of the United States Air Force Academy have more than met their challenge. For this reason, therefore, I commend to statesman and soldier, as well as to other interested scholars, this, the record of their proceedings.

John B. McPherson, Lieutenant General, USAF
Commandant, National War College
INTRODUCTION

From at least the beginning of the 19th century, no problem in military affairs has been more perplexing than that of deciding what should be the relationship between the chief of state and those who advise him on national security matters. In contemporary society, increasingly directed by experts—military and otherwise—this problem has by no means been permanently resolved. Writing in 1957, Samuel P. Huntington suggested that the problem of the modern state is not so much that of armed revolt as it is that of the relation between the expert and the politician. The same theme dominated C. P. Snow’s Godkin Lectures at Harvard three years later (published as Science and Government), while Bernard Brodie’s Strategy in the Missile Age (1959) made the point, among others, that a tendency has become apparent for the military outlook to be adopted by associated civilians more so than the other way around.

Events of the last decade have served to remind us how complex have become the routes by which advice on national security matters reaches the ear of the president, the last three of whom have for varying reasons tended to rely to an increasing extent on civilian advisers operating outside the established national defense hierarchy: e.g., McGeorge Bundy, Walt W. Rostow, and Henry A. Kissinger. When determining the topic for this, the fourth symposium in the series, the planning committee settled on a historical investigation of the recent past that would, hopefully: remind us how important is the relationship between soldiers and statesmen; examine how various societies have approached the problems involved in that relationship; and determine how they have fared. We were well aware that we would achieve something less than specific solutions for today’s and tomorrow’s difficulties.

1As this volume goes to press, for example, a recent article by Morton H. Halperin, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, explores “the limitations on the President when he is seeking military advice.” “The President and the Military,” Foreign Affairs 50 (Jan. 1972): 310-24. For an earlier military view of the problem, see Colonel William E. Simons's prize-winning article, “Military Professionals as Policy Advisors,” Air University Review 20 (March 1969): 3-10.
Nonetheless, we felt it was not too much to hope that reflection upon the problem and its history might serve to emphasize its difficulties and its importance.

Having selected the topic, the next step was to structure that topic within specific frames of time and space. The approach adopted was to treat first the U. S. and Western European experience of the 19th century in the opening session, then the U. S. experience between Versailles and Potsdam, and finally the postwar experience in the concluding session. Overriding all such arbitrary divisions, the annual Harmon Memorial Lecture would address the general topic, “The Military in the Service of the State.”

An airline strike and unexpected illnesses affecting two participants notwithstanding, the symposium began on schedule on the morning of 22 October 1970. The audience consisted of more than 200 visitors from throughout the United States and Canada, along with interested members of the Cadet Wing and the Academy staff and faculty. Following an introduction by Colonel Alfred F. Hurley, Professor and Head of the Department of History, the Academy Superintendent, Lieutenant General Albert P. Clark, welcomed the visitors and commented briefly on the significance of these symposia to the Academy in general and to the cadets in particular. He concluded by reminding both participants and audience that the potential conflict that can arise between loyalty to the civil power and fulfillment of military duty is, for the career military man, a continuing problem, one on which he hoped discussion would “ultimately focus, to the benefit of all of us here and most certainly to future readers of the proceedings of the symposium.”

Colonel Hurley then introduced the members of the symposium committee, explained a few last-minute program adjustments, and introduced the chairman for the opening session, Richard A. Preston, the William K. Boyd Professor of History, Duke University. (Biographical notes on the participants precede the Index.)

The First Session

Professor Preston focuses on two English practices that antedate the 19th century, but are basic to our whole topic: the establishment of financial control over the military and the practice of cooperation between military experts and civilians on committees. The latter practice was instituted in the Royal Navy almost four centuries before it was accepted, and then over opposition, by the British army. He then mentions two later British practices of relevance to the symposium’s theme: the control exercised over Imperial
military operations at great distances by giving great power to the man on the scene, while keeping him subservient to a civilian agency at home; and the technique, when dealing with the emerging Commonwealth nations, of close cooperation at the professional, technical level, coupled with independence on the nontechnical, political level.

The two principal papers in the opening session treat the theme of Soldiers and Statesmen in 19th century France and Germany. Professor Gordon Wright of Stanford, treating the French experience, notes the relative neglect of this topic by historians of France as compared to those of Germany. After citing three complicating factors that could have enlarged the role played by French soldiers—the split over values after the Revolution, the shadow of Napoleon’s example, and the chronic instability of governments—Wright suggests (as Marc Bloch was to do of a later period of French history2) that a considerable degree of routine-mindedness among soldiers, coupled with a talent for manipulation and fast footwork among politicians, largely account for the comparative absence of crises in French civil-military relations in the period between Waterloo and Sarajevo. In fact, he suggests, no really workable system governing relationships between soldiers and statesmen was achieved until the reforms of 1911 instituted by Adolphe Messimy.

The body of Wright’s paper treats the French experience in three periods: from 1815 to 1848, 1848 to 1870, and 1870 to 1914. Citing the individual characteristics and problems of each period, with continuing emphasis on the personal factor—how Premier X related to General Y—Wright describes the continuing ineffectiveness of the General Staff, brought about largely by politicians astute enough to recognize that the German model was unacceptable for a parliamentary republic. The revived mood of patriotic assertiveness after the Morocco crisis of 1905 was significant in reviving the French military and public from the post-Dreyfus doldrums, as well as in paving the way for the 1911 reforms. Despite their shortcomings, these reforms appear to be about as far as the republic could then go toward creating a viable system of civil-military relations. That system, Wright concludes, might have sufficed in a short war.

In the second paper Professor Andreas Dorpalen of The Ohio State University treats the Prussian-German experience during the same period, seeking to answer twin questions: Why was it that by 1914 Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg considered the political implications of military plans to lie beyond his purview? And, why was it that Wilhelm II had come to accept,

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if indeed not encourage, an equality of status between civil and military authorities? As these questions do not appear until midway through the paper, Dorpalen’s method is instructive. Noting the supreme significance in German history of the relative position of soldiers and statesmen, he traces civil-military relations from the reign of the Great Elector (1640-88) all the way down to 1914 in an admirable feat of condensation that ignores no major event or figure. In essence, he shows how, by the 1870s, the army had become to a large part of the nation “the trailblazer of the united empire . . . the bulwark against the uncomfortable aspirations of the lower classes” (especially after 1848), and even, in time, “a sort of spiritual corset” against the materialism and egotism that followed economic expansion and prosperity. A growing sense of the imminence, if not inevitability, of war, fanned by such nongovernmental organizations as the Pan-German, Army, and Navy Leagues, combined to produce a situation in 1914 where the military (von Moltke) and the civilian (Bethmann), operating independently of one another, gave conflicting advice to their Austrian counterparts on the question of Austrian mobilization.

The most obvious conclusion, Dorpalen suggests, is the need for subordination of military to political leadership in all matters of policy. Another conclusion has been less widely noticed: “the ultimate decision of civil vs. military priorities rested with the nation itself” because “in the last analysis . . . militarism is a civil-political problem.”

In his commentary on the Wright and Dorpalen papers, Professor Russell F. Weigley of Temple University finds that contrasts with France and Germany, rather than comparisons, dominate the United States experience in the period up to World War I. The roles of soldiers and statesmen did not become clearly differentiated at any time in the 19th century United States, owing primarily to “a pervasive hostility to the differentiation of any specialized profession from the mass of the citizenry [lest] a specialized profession . . . become a privileged class.” Citing both the egalitarian attacks on West Point and the similar problems of the legal profession in attempting to set itself apart, Weigley’s cogent summary of the interchangeability of the soldier’s and statesman’s roles from Andrew Jackson to William McKinley leaves little room for argument. If the roots of a developing military professionalism can be traced to the late 19th century, nonetheless the army was still too small and remote to attract the concern of statesmen. Although this situation began to change rapidly after Versailles, even today the United States “still often visits for the first time places where nations like the Ger-

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3Another eminent historian has recently raised questions about this same German experience, asking whether there is anything that our nation today can learn from that experience. See Fritz Stern’s Introduction to his Failure of Illiberalism: Essays in the Political Culture of Modern Germany (New York, 1972).
mans and French have traveled often and long before."

An extensive discussion concluded the opening session and is reproduced in the text. Evenly divided between questions put to the participants and comments offered from the floor, the principal topics are geographical determinism, the effect of personality over and above institutionalized arrangements, the European view of the American Civil War (treating tactics rather than institutions), and challenges to Professor Weigley's thesis that soldiers and statesmen were interchangeable in the 19th century—certifying to the many ghosts of Samuel P. Huntington who surfaced now and then during the symposium.

The Second Session

On the afternoon of 22 October Lieutenant Colonel Elliott L. Johnson, the Acting Head of the Department of History, introduced the session chairman, Louis Morton, the Daniel Webster Professor of History at Dartmouth. Very briefly, Professor Morton links the morning and afternoon sessions by citing the Joint Board (established in 1903) as the institutional forerunner of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose relationship with the president during World War II is the subject of the principal paper in the second session.

Dr. Forrest C. Pogue of the George C. Marshall Research Foundation takes as his main theme an examination of the thesis put forth by Samuel P. Huntington in *The Soldier and the State* to the effect that (1) the Joint Chiefs of Staff, rather than the president, ran World War II and (2) they did it by abandoning their professional military values in favor of civilian ones. Opening with a long quotation in which Marshall addressed himself to similar allegations, Dr. Pogue treats first the basic relationship worked out between the president and each of the Chiefs individually, then moves back to his basic theme by citing and comparing other interpretations that both parallel and confute the Huntington thesis. Prominent among the interpretations cited are those of James MacGregor Burns, Kent Roberts Greenfield, Richard M. Leighton, Maurice Matloff, and Louis Morton. Whereas the opening session had treated the symposium theme with broad-brush reviews of relatively long periods of time, Dr. Pogue's paper sets the scene for a historiographical session observing particular soldiers and statesmen in the period between 1942 and 1944.

Selecting several cases in point—the Stilwell question in China, the *Torch* decision, the *Trident* meeting, and the first meeting at Quebec—Pogue is even-handed and judicious throughout, attempting to show by specific examples that "the full facts concerning the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" do not demonstrate that they assumed "the direction of the war in the broad sense that Professor Huntington suggests." Disagreements
arose, to be sure, between the views of the Chiefs and those of the president; but on the whole the Chiefs followed the lines laid down by the president and the principle of civilian control survived the war intact.

In the first of two scheduled commentaries, Dr. Maurice Matloff, Chief Historian, Department of the Army, continues the discussion, attempting to set the wartime decisions in the broader perspective of the pattern of civil-military relations that had evolved in the United States between Versailles and Pearl Harbor. Whereas Dr. Pogue had concentrated on personal relationships, Dr. Matloff stresses institutional arrangements, both as they had come to exist and as they had come to be viewed by the participants. Broadly, he shows how the absence of any national coordinating council on defense matters, such as the Joint Chiefs, between the wars led each of the services to think about the future essentially in service terms, especially since World War I seemed to have made it clear that determining the "what" of national policy was the preserve of the president, while determining the "how" was the military task. This pattern of thought was abetted by the tendency of the inter-war presidents to stay out of technical military matters. Thus, by the eve of the war, no meshing of political and military factors into a grand strategy for the nation had taken place, either institutionally or conceptually.

Dr. Matloff then reviews the president's own background in military affairs, treating the 1939-41 "short-of-war" period in some detail, and showing that while more prewar thinking had taken place than ever before in U.S. history, no consistent pattern had emerged. Neither the president nor the Chiefs of Staff started with a fully developed blueprint. From the beginning, circumstance, necessity, trial and error, and compromises in the changing context of war dictated decisions far more than any ideal military ethic, whether applied or surrendered. Dr. Matloff concludes with a perceptive discussion of the last year of the war, suggesting that perhaps the war itself outran both strategists and statesmen when "problems of winning the peace began to come up against those of winning the war."

In the second commentary, Professor Gaddis Smith of Yale brings to the discussion the viewpoint of the diplomatic historian. Beginning by citing several incidents during the Truman administration, seeking to show by comparison how difficult it is to determine just what constitutes a "military consideration" as opposed to a "political consideration," Smith comes down solidly against the Huntington thesis, viewing it as an application of a simple model to a complex problem which, while stimulating, is "just plain wrong." He then moves to an analysis of the long quotation from General Marshall that opens Pogue's paper. Smith shows that there are many kinds of political considerations, of which he identifies four—the politics of method, of public opinion, of international cooperation, of competitive advantage. All of these
appear to be "lurking behind General Marshall's remarks, and yet they are blended and confused," testifying, Smith believes, to the need for "broad, continuing education of military officers in history and the social sciences." Acknowledging the advances made in this direction since the 1930s, Smith proposes a corollary lesson: the need for "broad education, including some education in military history and principles, for the civilian side of national leadership."

Time prevented an extensive discussion following this session, so Professor Morton exercised his prerogative to call Dr. Richard Leighton from the audience, allowing him to offer a brief rebuttal to a number of points raised by Dr. Pogue. Dr. Leighton's remarks are reproduced in full. Following his comments are two ex post facto commentaries by Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. (USAF, Ret.), and Brigadier General George A. Lincoln (USA, Ret.), an airman and a soldier both intimately familiar with many of the decisions treated in this session. General Hansell tells us how little the potential decisiveness of the bombing offensive in Europe was understood by the political leadership, while General Lincoln reminds us how certain of the decisions were so often affected by the more mundane imperatives of logistical planning.

The Third Session

After the banquet on the evening of 22 October, General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, Principal of King's College, London, delivered the 13th annual Harmon Memorial Lecture. Sir John addresses his topic, "The Military in the Service of the State," from the standpoint of "what the relationship between the military and the state looks like today, what changes have taken place in it in our time, and what factors are at work leading to further change." The ethical aspects of that relationship are of particular concern to Sir John, since "some who have accepted that the state is master have not always accepted that the statesmen are the masters, or have done so with extreme reluctance."

Sir John concentrates on the American experience and suggests that future historians may come to see the 1945 to 1952 period as a watershed in civil-military relations. Up to 1945, the American approach to war was essentially anti-Clausewitzian, the national ethic being "not greatly in favour of the application of armed force to a political end." Here he contrasts President Truman's handling of the Berlin question in 1945 with that same president's later decision in the case of General MacArthur in Korea. War

4Although the Harmon Lectures are published separately each year, Sir John's lecture is included here since it was an integral part—I am tempted to say the high point—of the symposium.
and peace could be looked upon as separate entities prior to the nuclear age. Since we now assume, however, that in a general nuclear war the first battle will be the last, such an approach is unthinkable; as in an earlier age, war and peace can—indeed, must—coexist. For the soldier, then, in an age of limited wars for political ends, the questions of obedience and loyalty are likely to be more complex than those encountered in a crusade for freedom.

In the concluding part of his lecture, Sir John examines the question, "Where or by what is the allegiance of the military professional engaged?" All in all, his view of the future, one buttressed by hard study and some 35 years of experience, is hopeful. That it is so is owing in no small part to his faith in the military way of life as constituting a moral repository for the nation. His closing confessio fidei is as eloquent a statement in defense of the military virtues as one will find anywhere.

The Fourth Session

The concluding session convened on the afternoon of 23 October. In the chair, substituting at the last moment for Professor Henry F. Graff of Columbia, was Professor Theodore Ropp of Duke. Professor Ropp opens the proceedings by linking the second and fourth sessions, asking whether the question at issue might be if we can see evidence in the recent American past of a trend toward an unintentional militarizing of our society. He then introduces the principal speaker, Professor Richard D. Challener of Princeton and his topic, "John Foster Dulles: The Moralist Armed."

Professor Challener examines the record of Secretary of State Dulles, particularly those special qualities of the man that made him both the spokesman for and the symbol of the foreign policies of the Eisenhower years. Beginning from the standpoint that Dulles was essentially "a moralist who greatly inflated the rhetoric of the Cold War," Challener examines the Dulles of the 1930s and 1940s, stressing the religious aspects of his background that led him later to speak of "atheistic communism," giving the adjective equal weight with the noun. Discussing Dulles's work with the National Council of Churches, Challener notes his conviction that a means to bring about peaceful change among nations was essential. His firm faith in the existence of a coherent moral order in the world led him; at least until 1945, to feel "that the lack of international organization was the cause of conflict. After 1945 it led him to identify emergent communism as the new enemy of a just and durable peace. And against both, it was necessary to mount a moral crusade."

The transition was not immediate, as Challener makes clear in recount-
ing Dulles's view in 1946 that overseas air bases should be foregone lest, by carrying "to others the offensive threat we would ward off from ourselves," they "increase the risk of war." Still later Dulles questioned the original proposals for NATO, wondering whether such regional arrangements were legal under Article 51 of the UN Charter and whether it was in the nation's best interest to make long-term commitments. Although Professor Challener does not single them out, it becomes apparent that the North Korean invasion of June 1950 and the subsequent Chinese intervention in that conflict were pivotal in Dulles's intellectual development. Soon thereafter, in a letter to General MacArthur, the future Secretary of State hinted clearly at the massive retaliation doctrine he was later to espouse.

The middle portion of Professor Challener's paper treats the relationships developed by Dulles, after becoming Secretary, with the Joint Chiefs and with Secretary of Defense Wilson and goes into some detail on the intellectual origins of the massive retaliation doctrine. Recalling again Dulles's strong conviction that wars arise more often from miscalculation than from intent, Challener sees a relation between massive retaliation and the New Look in defense policy: the first was to draw the lines clearly, make positions known in advance so as to reduce the chance of the enemy's miscalculating; the second—the means of massive retaliation—he sees as a characteristically American response, with its heavy reliance on presumed technical superiority, to the frustrations of the Cold War. By 1958 or 1959, however, Sputnik and other events had begun to lead Dulles to question the efficacy, if not the credibility, of the methods he had so long espoused. His sudden death prevented many from realizing, as might later have become clear, that he was not "wedded exclusively to massive retaliation as the single basis of policy."

Challener concludes by comparing the Dulles known to those with whom he worked and the Dulles known to most of us by the image he projected, that of the simplifier and brinksmen. In the end, he suggests, Dulles was "no innovator but rather the man who carried inherited policies to their logical conclusions." As Secretary of State when the Cold War was at its hottest, he remained "the moralist armed—a man of unexamined first premises who continued policies that helped to turn the Cold War into a basic condition of American life."

Following Professor Challener's paper is the commentary of Professor William Appleman Williams of Oregon State University, read in his unexpected absence by Professor Philip A. Croll of the University of Nebraska. Professor Williams agrees with Challener that the civilian leadership in the United States "had defined the world in such a way that American foreign policy could not avoid being militarized." This process, however, goes back
at least as far in Williams’s view as the War with Spain. He reminds us that Dulles was not the first amateur theologian with a hand in foreign policy, mentioning the examples of Woodrow Wilson and William Jennings Bryan. Such men, he argues, were Christian capitalists, however, not Christian anarchists, Christian communitarians, or Christian socialists. “I simply do not think we can comprehend the Cold War without understanding that America’s civilian leaders saw themselves confronted by the challenge of a functioning alternative to a capitalist political economy.”

In concluding, Williams raises the difficult question of whether it is a duty of the military professional, if he sees the definition of the world accepted by the civilian leadership to be somehow mistaken, so to inform the civilian leadership, rather than proceed with military plans in support of that mistaken definition. Here he touches on matters closely related to those raised by General Hackett. Williams answers his question affirmatively, seeing the central function of the military academies as that of educating men capable of seeing such contradictions where they exist and having the dedication and courage to speak up. “The good captain does go down with his ship, but he also refuses to take it to sea until it is fit for his crew.”

The commentary of Brigadier General Noel F. Parrish (USAF, Retired), now of Trinity University, is informed by his long service on the Air Staff. Noting that “the orthodoxy of the moment is simply to categorize Mr. Dulles as immorally anticommunist,” General Parrish congratulates Challener on the breadth of his analysis and goes on to show numerous incidents in which Mr. Dulles was quite at odds with the views of the JCS. At the heart of his disagreement with today’s common view of Dulles is his question, To which other postwar Secretaries of State are we comparing Dulles when we categorize his attitudes and policies as essentially military-oriented? Here his comments on Acheson and Rusk are suggestive, especially when he compares the foreign aid budgets of the Eisenhower and later administrations with their military budgets. Parrish sees the “massive retaliation” policy as a logical imperative stemming from the fiscal policies of the Eisenhower administration and devotes the second half of his commentary to this point, to the charge that military leaders did not look ahead, and to some considerations of the important benefits derived from Dulles’s unflinching attitudes. He concludes by reminding us how often since 1945 the military leadership has found a closer ally in the Secretary of State rather than the Secretary of Defense.

The extensive discussion following the final session centers on the postwar period, although some questions and answers go back into the 19th century. Professor Crowl, remarking on the paper he had read for Professor Williams, makes the major point that Dulles inherited the policy of contain-
ment and had to make it fit within an era of severely limited military budgets. As the discussion proceeds, the similarities in approach of Secretaries Acheson and Rusk become more and more evident.

Two ideas dominate the greater part of the discussion. The first, raised by Professor Dorpalen in comparing American Secretaries of State with Bethmann Hollweg, is that responsible statesmen have a duty to impress upon the people the dangers of popular policies. "If they can't do it, if they feel they ought not to do it, then they ought to resign and let somebody else take over."5 This idea had been raised earlier in the case of military leaders by General Hackett and Professor Williams.

The second idea, implicit in the discussion until made explicit by Professor Morton, is that the major problem today would seem to be not whether the civilian leadership can control the military, but rather whether civilian leadership is being continually militarized in outlook. To that question, given our closeness in time to the events being discussed, every reader will have his own answer. It is at least possible, however, that some future historian will not only see the militarization of civilian leadership as generally true of the last quarter century, but will find that little else could have occurred, given the consensus to support the containment policy enunciated at the beginning of the period and called into doubt, and at first hesitantly, only twenty years later.

David MacIsaac, Major, USAF
Executive Director
1970 Military History Symposium

The First Session

SOLDIERS AND STATESMEN
FROM VIENNA TO VERSAILLES
OPENING REMARKS

Colonel ALFRED F. HURLEY (Professor and Head, Department of History, USAF Academy): General Clark, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. As chairman of the committee that administers the symposia in military history, I find it a real pleasure to see such a fine turnout for this fourth symposium. The veterans of these affairs will remember that our former Superintendent, General Moorman, made the opening remarks at the beginning of the first three symposia. We expect that he will be sitting in during the sessions today, since he retired to the Colorado Springs area. His successor came on board at the end of July, after holding a series of high-level posts, including service as the Vice Commander of Tactical Air Command and, most recently, Commander of our Air University. At this time I would like to introduce to you our new Superintendent, Lieutenant General Albert P. Clark.

General CLARK: Thank you, Colonel Hurley. Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. One of my more pleasant duties as Superintendent here is to welcome all of you to the Air Force Academy and to this fourth symposium. I believe that programs such as this play a very large part in widening the experience and knowledge of our cadets and also of our faculty and in demonstrating by example that civil-military relations need not become a problem if we all apply our talents jointly to it.

As a case in point, I am certainly pleased to see such a large number of civilian historians and other distinguished representatives from the community at large with us today. You come from more than fifty history departments across the nation and from every one of our service academies. Virtually all the senior service schools, of the army, the navy, and the air force and the National War College are represented here. We have representatives from the Army and the Air Force ROTC and from the history programs of all three services. I would like especially to extend a welcome to our Canadian guests who have come a long way, and there are quite a number amongst you this morning. This evening I will have an opportunity to extend a special welcome to our distinguished Harmon Lecturer and his lady who, coming all the way from England, have come the farthest of any of you.

We see in your presence here a testimonial both to the success of the
symposia and to your interest in a provocative and timely topic. I trust that you will enjoy your stay with us and that you should have a full opportunity while here to see the full picture of what we do at the Academy. We hope you will take this opportunity to examine our facilities and especially to talk to our officers and cadets. The total picture for us means but one thing: to provide an opportunity for the development of our graduates for a career of service as officers in the United States Air Force. To this end we hope to help our cadets gain a sense of perspective, so that they will be better prepared to meet the challenge of this and future decades. We want to give them a deeper knowledge of our nation, of other areas of the world in which they might be called upon to serve, and of the noble profession upon which they have embarked. For those cadets who desire to study history in greater depth than is possible within our basic curriculum, we offer a full program comparable to any undergraduate major anywhere and climaxed in a few cases each year by a cooperative Master of Arts program with the history department of Indiana University.

I think I should tell you that your presence here today is looked upon by all of us who constitute the Academy community as a major opportunity. Naturally those of us who can take part in the various sessions will benefit from our association with the distinguished participants and guests; but beyond that, through publication of the papers and the discussion sessions we hope to pass on a similar opportunity to our future cadets and faculty and also to add to the understanding of interested parties here and abroad on the subject of "Soldiers and Statesmen."

Finally, bearing in mind the subject of our discussions, let me conclude by presuming for a moment to speak for all of us here at the Academy, and indeed here in this room, who are members of the profession of arms. Our duty is clear: to continue the tradition firmly established by our predecessors of loyalty without reservation to the civil power. In this country, that means loyalty to the president as commander-in-chief as provided in the Constitution by our founding fathers. Yet at the same time, we all recognize our duty to provide the best possible military advice to our civilian superiors. It is in this area of interaction between loyalty and the fulfillment of duty that we expect and indeed hope discussions during our sessions will ultimately focus, to the benefit of all of us here and most certainly to future readers of the proceedings of the symposium.

I hope I have an opportunity to meet all of you in the course of the next two days. Thank you very much.

Colonel HURLEY: Thank you, General Clark.
I would like to explain two changes in our program. On Tuesday we learned that the wife of the chairman of the fourth session, Professor Henry Graff, had become seriously ill; so Professor Graff had to bow out. We are extremely fortunate to be able to obtain at short notice the assistance of an old friend of the department, Professor Theodore Ropp of Duke. He will chair the fourth session. On Tuesday we also learned that the doctors had told Professor William Appleman Williams that he was not to travel. It may not be generally known, but Professor Williams is a graduate of the Naval Academy and was medically retired from the navy because of a wartime injury. That injury has flared up again, and he faces a major operation. His paper is in the mail, and if it arrives in time, we will ask one of the members of the academic community who is here to read it in Professor Williams’s stead.

I should also explain that you may observe some shuffling going on during the course of the symposium. That reflects the fact that our cadets and faculty members do have duty commitments that preclude their attending all the sessions. The hardened veterans of professional meetings have been exposed to this sort of thing around the country. The coming and going here will not reach that level, but there will be some, and I hope you will understand.

It is a great personal pleasure to introduce to you the chairman of our opening session, “Soldiers and Statesmen: From Vienna to Versailles.” Those of you who attended our 1968 symposium on “Command and Commanders” will remember the splendid job this gentleman did as the chairman of our opening session. Because of that fine job, we have invited him back to try his hand as the opening session chairman today. [Colonel Hurley then introduced RICHARD A. PRESTON, the W. K. Boyd Professor of History, Duke University.]

The CHAIRMAN (Professor Preston): General Clark, Colonel Hurley, ladies and gentlemen. It’s being put on the spot to be reminded that I got the symposium off to a good start before and that I am expected to do the same thing again!

I think perhaps my first duty is to express on behalf of all the visitors here our appreciation for being invited to take part in this symposium, which has now become the leading symposium in the country on military history. It is a great tribute to the Academy’s Department of History, to the backing that it gets from the Academy administration and alumni, and also to the reservoir of military experience which conditions the work of preparation, including an order of the day to me, your chairman, which reads like an order to infantry about to go over the top!
But the most important thing about this symposium, and I think we would all agree with this, is that it is based solidly on a single discipline, on the established discipline of history, and not on the sort of cloudy nebula in which some of our colleagues operate in the area of strategic studies, where they talk theory and jargon and wander far from fact.

I was told when I took this job that I was to do two things: get the symposium off to a "rollicking start," and say something by way of introduction about civil-military relations in Canada and the Commonwealth. At first I thought that this was rather a contradiction in terms. There seemed nothing either rollicking or serious to say on that subject. Civil-military relations in Canada have always been rather one-sided, and I could think of no time in history when the military were in a position to challenge the civilian authorities—then we have the dramatic events of this week. [Political kidnappings and murder in Quebec had led the Prime Minister of Canada to declare a state of "apprehended insurrection" and to invoke the emergency War Measures Act. Troops and police conducted extensive manhunts and rounded up known separatists. -Ed.] I am embarrassed by thinking about all this. But of course being a bicultural country, we have certain advantages you don't possess. We can always blame the French Canadians!

However, I think that I might make one or two pertinent points about British experience in civil-military relations to start the symposium off. It seems to me that these are a necessary background for our discussion today, and especially for the commentary which Professor Weigley is going to give after we have heard the papers. Two or three practices in civil-military relations established by British military practice are basic to our whole discussion this morning. We will be dealing with the 19th century, but these practices were established in Britain much earlier than the 19th century. One of them is the use of financial control, and the second is the practice of cooperation between military experts and non-experts on committees. Both of these come from far back in the British tradition. I should be careful and say "English" tradition, because they date from before the time the Scots got in on the act and began to claim credit for everything that the English did!

As you all know, the failure of Charles I to get ship money, and of Cromwell to get his major generals to collect taxes, left unsolved the problem of providing for the military protection of the state. This was resolved in the reign of William III by the combination of an annual legislative appropriation and an annual Mutiny Act. This is the financial weapon by which the civil state now bludgeons the military. It is a pretty crude weapon, but they were pretty crude in the 17th century. You remember that they controlled the executive by chopping off the head of a minister or two—or the king's if it became necessary. This financial weapon is still about as crude as that. It has
the same kind of effect. It also makes for the possibility of danger to the state by excessive economy. But as historians we ought to look at it in another way and realize that it is, nevertheless, an effective weapon of control. The military, from the very nature of their job, inevitably tend to think in terms of what one might call "over-kill"; and furthermore, if they're given unlimited resources, they tend to get wasteful. Therefore, while it may be unfortunate, one of the best methods of making the military efficient is to introduce a 20% over-all cut into the budget. The Cardwell and the Haldane reforms in the 19th and 20th centuries are instances of economy measures that produced a more rational and efficient military system. It seems to me therefore that we should look first at that principle of financial control as introduced from British experience in civil-military relations. This is one thing that is talked about in the coming papers.

The second device is civil-military cooperation, and this again was an English contribution. For England the navy was the important service for many centuries, because of geography; and the navy happened to be from the beginning a technical service, much more so than the army. In order to control it and make it operate efficiently, it was found to be necessary to combine experts and nontechnical people in committees or commissions or boards. You got the Navy Board in the 16th century, and the Lord High Admiral was "put into commission" in the 17th century. This practice was not introduced into the British army until the 20th century, and then only as a consequence of great pressure. It came in the form of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Army Council. The Imperial General Staff was a use of the committee system in a different way, all military. But this committee method is open to question: How effectively can you produce strategy and run services by committees? It's a point on which American military personnel have criticized the British, although the National Security Council applies it on one level. Still it uses a very important and interesting innovation, and it too was a British innovation.

I think two other points might be of interest from Imperial and Commonwealth and Canadian experience. The first one is the problem that the British encountered in the 19th century, when they attempted to control military operations in their colonies at a great distance at a time when communications were very slow. The British had to face this problem long before the United States came up against it, and long before the MacArthur crisis. They gave great power to the man in the field, but kept him under the supervision of a civilian agency at home, often by appointing a retired general to be colonial governor. The conflict between Kitchener and Curzon, the civil and military leaders in India, was a consequence of delegating large powers to the men on the spot. In that instance, Kitchener won out at the time, but I believe it would be reasonable to say that afterwards the civil arm in India
and at home exercised greater control because of that earlier conflict in India. I think that this is an area that needs perhaps much more investigation than it has hitherto received.

A second point from Commonwealth experience, while it doesn't apply much to the two papers we are about to hear, applies generally to our present interest in the symposium. It is the problem of relations with small states. Because the British in the 19th century began to realize that they needed support from the millions in the self-governing colonies who were becoming virtually independent allies, they had to invent a technique which is used by you now: close cooperation at the professional, technical level, coupled with independence on the nontechnical, political level. This of course is a good way to obtain close cooperation from allies. But, as with financial control, this formula is disliked very much by some military leaders because it seems to suggest undue interference by politicians. Yet there are times when it might possibly mean greater efficiency. One example I think of is during the First World War. At an Imperial War Cabinet meeting Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian Prime Minister, blasted the British General Staff on the basis of information that he'd collected from his Corps Commander, General Currie; and he quoted Currie by name. Currie of course was a subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief in the field. It would be impossible to think of a British subordinate who had been quoted in that way surviving very long. But Currie did survive. He even became the principal of a university afterwards, which is one of the laurels that apparently go to distinguished retired generals. Currie's case is evidence that, because of a political relationship, it was possible to introduce criticism of the high command which otherwise could not have been introduced. Whether it was really valid criticism in this case is a different matter. There are people here who are experts in that field, and who might have more to say on it.

I think that such experiences as these from British and Commonwealth background may be appropriate to mention at the outset of a symposium on "Soldiers and Statesmen." If they are not peculiarly from the Canadian background, perhaps what is happening in Quebec this week may give Canadians relevant experience in this field for future use.

[The Chairman then introduced Professor GORDON WRIGHT.]

Professor GORDON WRIGHT (Stanford University): General Clark, Colonel Hurley, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. It is a great privilege for a very unmilitary historian to throw the first Molotov cocktail at this symposium. For those of you from the Air Force Academy, I want you to know that I consider myself merely an advance guard and scouting party for a more important delegation from Stanford that will be coming in about three weeks. [Referring to the upcoming Stanford-Air Force football game -Ed.]
The modern problem of civil-military relations, Samuel P. Huntington tells us, dates from the early 19th century, when a professional officer corps made its appearance. The nature of the problem was not a threat of armed revolt, but a more pervasive conflict: a kind of built-in tension between the military expert and the politician. Such tension, we are told by another scholar, became endemic in 19th century France. "French history between the revolution of 1789 and the outbreak of the First World War," says Jere C. King, "is replete with instances of open or covert conflict between the civilian statesmen and the professional soldiers."

This is the exact scope of my assignment, as defined by the planners of today's symposium: "the relationships between chiefs of state and their principal military advisers in 19th century France." If the period was really replete with open or covert conflict, as Professor King says, my task would seem to be an easy one: to collect and classify the most notable examples of such conflict and to draw some general conclusions therefrom. Yet as one browses through the standard works on 19th century France, one finds only sparse and fleeting references to such conflict, or even to the general problem of civil-military relations. With a few honorable exceptions, historians have pretty consistently avoided the topic, either because they lacked interest in it or because they considered it a non-topic, without a valid basis in fact. The contrast with Germany is striking. There we have a small library of monographs dealing with the politics of the army, with the role of the officer corps and the high command in society and the state; courses or textbooks on modern Germany can hardly be imagined without substantial reference to

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the military. Historians of France, on the other hand, seem to have preferred a policy of benign neglect. Some of them suddenly discovered the subject a dozen years ago, when the Algerian war inspired a severe military crisis; but their focus remained mainly contemporary, with little reference to the 19th century background. They were inclined to explain that until our time the French army knew its place and was content to stay in that place; that it took pride in the label “la grande muette,” silently executed orders, and rarely if ever sought to influence or control state policy. In the orthodox view, army officers did their duty in the same fashion as other bureaucrats such as postal clerks or professors; they broke the surface of history only in time of war.

There is undoubtedly some justification for this orthodox view. French history in the 19th century can be lectured about or written about without much mention of the army; the course or text would not be seriously distorted by the omission. The same would be true, I suspect, of United States history in the same era, except during the Civil War. It would certainly not be true of German history. In this case, the Rhine is a real frontier.

Nevertheless, the relative neglect of the subject in the case of France has surely been overdone. Even though the French high command rarely if ever sought to throw the army’s institutional weight in an effort to shape state policy or to win autonomous power, political and military leaders did have to relate to each other in their official capacities; and since they were human, there was room for differences of opinion and for occasionally serious tension between them. On both sides, there were fallible men who sometimes held strong convictions; professional pride and prejudice, divergent value-systems, simple personal vanity could easily intrude. This personal factor—how King or Premier X related to General Y—was perhaps the most important variable in the model of civil-military relations in 19th century France.

Three complicating factors might be mentioned at the outset. First, the deep division within the nation that had just lived through the Great Revolution—one of the most profound social upheavals of modern times. Rival value-systems coexisted uneasily after 1815; neither the pro-Revolutionaries nor the anti-Revolutionaries felt safe or satisfied. Rightly or wrongly, this conflict tended to reinforce suspicion between civilians and military men; the professional soldier was believed to prefer such Old Regime values as hierarchy and stability to the Revolutionary ideals of liberty and equality.

The second factor was the heritage of Caesarism left by Napoleon. In his time, there had been no problem of harmonizing political and military leadership; both had been embodied in a single man, whose strategic genius and charismatic appeal continued to dazzle many Frenchmen for at least a couple of generations. It was easy for suspicious civilians to suppose that
ambitious soldiers would find the Napoleonic model attractive and that they ought therefore to be watched with care.

The third factor was the pattern of French political instability that kept throwing into question all of the basic issues, including the authority of the government and the army's proper role in the state. From 1815 to 1870, no regime lasted longer than 18 years; from 1870 to 1914 a single regime managed to survive, but cabinets (and ministers of war) changed 55 times in 44 years. One would expect such chronic instability to offer great opportunities to military adventurers or to a strong and durable institution like the army, with its more stable hierarchy of leaders.

The striking thing about 19th century France is that none of these three factors gravely affected the relationships between chiefs of state (or of government) and their top military advisers. The split over values, the shadow of Napoleon, the chronic instability of government never degenerated into an open test of strength between civilian and military authorities or an attempt to restore Caesarism (barring the somewhat ambiguous case of Napoleon III). Why was this so? The answer is not easy to find; but it must lie in part in the habit of discipline and obedience deeply ingrained in most French professional soldiers, and in the sense of patriotic pride with which most civilian leaders viewed the army. Possibly there were some less admirable impulses at work too: on the part of the soldiers, a considerable degree of routine-mindedness and the kind of petty vanity that content itself with rank and decorations; on the part of the politicians, a talent for manipulation and fast footwork. Thanks to this melange of virtues and vices, there were few major crises in civil-military relations during the 19th century. This does not mean, however, that Frenchmen found it easy to work out a stable and viable set of mechanisms for formulating military policy. Instead, they limped and stumbled along through a series of regimes and found no really workable system until the eve of 1914.

In this quick survey, it will be most convenient to subdivide the century into three periods: (1) the two constitutional monarchies, from 1815 to 1848; (2) the return to a kind of watered-down Bonapartism from 1848 to 1870; and (3) the Third Republic, from 1870 to 1914. Each period had its own characteristics and problems.

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For the Restoration monarchy, the problem was how far to trust an officer corps that had served for almost twenty years under Napoleon's command and whose members owed their status and presumably their loyal-
ty to the fallen emperor. Would the danger of subversion be greater if the top echelons were purged by dismissal or retirement, or if they were allowed to remain in control of the army, a potential state within the state? The monarchy’s solution was a compromise: there was an extensive purge, yet a large number of officers retained (or were soon restored to) posts of high responsibility. For example, the two most notable ministers of war between 1815 and 1848, Gouvion St. Cyr and Soult, were both Napoleonic marshals.

All the same, the kings of both Bourbon and Orleanist dynasties remained on their guard. In the restructured army, they were careful to leave the high command amorphous and unorganized. The general staff that they created in 1818 was not a command organ, but merely a kind of bull pen of generals from which the government could choose a commander when needed. Likewise the new High Council of War, created in 1828 and composed of a dozen top generals, was entrusted with no real authority and was liquidated after only two years. By keeping the high command in this inchoate condition, the regime restricted the potential influence of the officer corps; the army had no way of making its collective viewpoint known in the shaping of state policy.

As individuals, however, soldiers played an unusually active political role in this period. For 12 out of 33 years, a military man presided over the council of ministers; in nine cabinets, a soldier was foreign minister; and in every cabinet without exception, a general held the war ministry. Many officers also entered politics in their own right by winning election to parliament. The effect at times was considerable confusion in the lines of authority. During the Algerian conquest, which dragged on for a full generation after 1830, the military commander in Algeria doubled in brass as governor-general, and in five different cases had a seat in parliament as well. Hence at times the curious example of a North African commander appearing at the rostrum of the Chamber of Deputies to defend his policies or even to criticize, openly or covertly, the government to which he was responsible. Such independence of action was possible not only because the field commander was a deputy, but even more because he usually outranked his hierarchical superior, the minister of war. A marshal in Algiers did not bend easily before a mere lieutenant-general in the post of minister.

The Algerian conquest was marked by chronic conflict between Paris and Algiers. A long sequence of unstable cabinets, sensitive to parliamentary criticism, groped with the problem of whether to stay in Algeria and how to fight the war, but they failed to develop a firm policy or to give a clear lead

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3Roland d'Ornano, Gouvernement et haut-commandement en régime parlementaire français (Aix-en-Provence, 1958), p. 44.
to the North African commanders. Yet when a commander took a strong initiative on his own, he was likely to be scolded or recalled by the government. Frustration and irritation naturally resulted. There were repeated crises and changes of command during the 1830s, but conflict reached its high point during the long tenure of Marshal Bugeaud in the 1840s. Bugeaud, who has been described as one of the two outstanding French field commanders between Napoleon and Foch, was a cantankerous and self-willed character who resented slights to his considerable dignity and was sure he knew what was right to do in Algeria. Raised to the dignity of marshal in 1843, he could confront War Minister Marshal Soult on equal terms (though Soult liked to remind him that back in 1805 they had served together at Austerlitz—Soult as a marshal, Bugeaud as a corporal). Bugeaud also took advantage of his seat in parliament to make frequent visits to Paris and to lobby there against the doves who kept proposing to cut back the military commitment in Algeria. Still worse, he intrigued behind the minister's back. He wrote complaining letters to his sympathizer, Foreign Minister Guizot, and to one of the king's sons, and on one occasion even published a pamphlet critical of Soult's alleged dovish tendencies. It is hardly surprising that Soult grew exasperated with this insubordinate subordinate who wrote candidly to the king's son that "at times, in the nation's interest, one must know how to go beyond the war minister's orders." Yet Soult dared not risk challenging this prestigious figure with his halo of desert victories, while Bugeaud was careful not to push the quarrel to an open breach. What was obviously lacking all through this episode was an organized system of relationships designed to coordinate political and military policy. If Algeria was finally conquered, it was not thanks to the system but rather in spite of it.

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The interlude of the Second Republic (from 1848 to 1851) was too brief to develop a stable new pattern, but it offered tempting possibilities to opportunists on the make. While many officers resigned their commissions rather than serve the new regime, others saw a chance for quick promotion or political preferment. By mid-1848, the bourgeois politicians were turning to the soldiers for help against the threat of insurrection by radical elements; during the bloody June Days, General Cavaignac was entrusted with extraordinary powers to crush the workers' revolt. For several months thereafter, Cavaignac remained a kind of constitutional dictator, and he seemed likely to win election in December as president of the republic. But a dark-horse

*Ibid., p. 89; Henri d'Ideville, Le Maréchal Bugeaud, d'après sa correspondance intime, 3d ed. (Paris, 1885); Général Paul Azan, Conquête et pacification de l'Algérie (Paris, 1931).*
candidate, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, emerged to catch the imagination of French voters thirsty for law and order plus national greatness, and Cavaignac dropped back into obscurity.

As bearer of the Bonaparte name and tradition, Louis-Napoleon seemed destined to restore the Caesaristic model which combined civil and military authority in a single leader. But unlike his brilliant uncle, he was only an amateur soldier with little military experience or native talent. Besides, he had promised to respect the constitution, which defined and restricted his powers. While the republic lasted, his relationships with the army leaders remained uneasy and at times tense. He was careful to choose second-rate generals as his ministers of war, but it was less easy to restrain the man who commanded both the armed forces of the Paris region and the National Guard—General Changarnier. A veteran of Algeria, a flamboyant, ambitious, and arrogant man, Changarnier had no sympathy for the flabby republic or for the Paris radicals who kept threatening the regime. For several months he tried without success to get Louis-Napoleon's consent for a military coup that would overthrow the republic and restore an imperial monarchy; but the shrewd and cautious president refused to unleash his impatient general, sensing no doubt that the real winner in such a coup would be Changarnier rather than Louis-Napoleon. The irritated general began to vent his frustration by indiscreet references to the president as that "melancholy parrot," and threats to "throw him in the clink"—comments that were promptly passed on to the melancholy parrot, who bided his time and chose his moment well. Early in 1851, Changarnier was stripped of both his commands, which were divided (for greater safety) between two less rambunctious generals. Changarnier fumed and fussed but knuckled under; even a man of his temperament was shackled by the habits of a lifetime of discipline.

The coup d'état that Changarnier had wanted was not long delayed, but Louis-Napoleon was determined to accomplish it in his own way. He needed army support, though not so much of it that he would become the army's prisoner. In 1851, his military aide, Major Fleury, went off to Algeria in search of a general who might cooperate. He found one there in General de Saint-Arnaud, a soldier-of-fortune type whose remarkable career had included two dismissals from the army, a spell as a music-hall tenor, and perhaps some even more dubious ventures. Saint-Arnaud, who had an eye for the main chance, joined the conspiracy, then threatened at the last moment to withdraw, and thus blackmailed Louis-Napoleon into elevating him to the post of minister of war. In that role he was able to keep the army in line

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during the coup of December 1851 and to use army units to put down the outbreaks of resistance that followed. He was rewarded with a marshal's baton and a generous cash settlement.6

Civil-military relationships were bound to take a new form under a ruler who bore the name Napoleon, with all its aura of military genius and glory. He could scarcely afford to keep hands off in the military sphere, as the constitutional monarchs before 1848 had done. Yet his talents as planner, strategist, or field commander were untested and unknown. Capable or not, it soon became clear that Napoleon intended to be his own commander-in-chief, with the soldiers reduced to the role of offering advice and executing his plans and orders. To make matters worse, promotions to the highest posts came to depend heavily on the imperial favor, which showed a preference for courtier types, men who were adept at charming the empress. The Second Empire did introduce greater stability at the top in the sense that ministers of war, for the only time in the 19th century, enjoyed long tenure: there were only five ministers in eighteen years. But for reasons of his own, Napoleon let the high command remain in an amorphous, unorganized state; he introduced neither a general staff nor a consultative council empowered to discuss and plan.

The shortcomings of Napoleon's military organization and doctrine were never clearer than during his first war in the Crimea, which the emperor attempted to run personally at long distance via a primitive telegraph line. The ill-conceived Crimean landing had aroused little enthusiasm among the military professionals; it was decided and planned primarily by Napoleon and his British allies, largely for political reasons. The minister of war, Marshal Vaillant, complained privately but made no open protest; "the fact is," noted old Marshal Castellane in his diary, "that [Vaillant] cringes like a dog before the Emperor, and hasn't the nerve to express his views."7 General Canrobert, soon appointed field commander in the Crimea, was a pliant yes-man who soon found himself in a quite impossible situation. Napoleon instructed Canrobert to undertake no large-scale operation without prior approval from Paris; and worse still, he sent out a personal aide, General Niel, with authority to sit in on all high-level discussions and to report directly to the emperor. Matters were made still worse by tensions between the French and British high commands. As the siege of Sebastopol dragged on, the impatient Napoleon announced that he would go out to the Crimea to take direct command. Although finally dissuaded from this action by his entourage, he proceeded to draft a detailed siege plan and instructed his emissary Niel to see that it

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6Of the several biographies of Saint-Arnaud, the most thorough and dependable is that of Quatrelles l’Epine, Le Maréchal de Saint-Arnaud, 2 vols. (Paris, 1928-29). On Fleury’s role, see the Souvenirs du Général Cit. Fleury, 2 vols. (Paris, 1897-98).
was adopted. Canrobert did his best, but the British balked; ill and disheartened, he finally asked to be relieved of his command. He was replaced by General Pélissier, who was neither a yes-man nor a courtier type. Pélissier was a rough-and-ready bulldog who had won his spurs in Algeria; as the French say, he was a man of character, which is to say difficult character.

Pélissier’s arrival changed everything. Ignoring Napoleon’s siege plan and Niel’s outraged objections, he drafted his own plan and began to implement it. When the emperor angrily wired instructions to “follow explicitly the orders I give you,” Pélissier paid no attention; when Niel protested at an allied staff meeting, Pélissier gave him a public tongue-lashing, ordered him to send no further messages to Paris without prior censorship, and threatened to pack him off home if this order were violated. When the emperor learned of this episode, he exploded. “There is no question of discussing strategy between us,” he telegraphed Pélissier, “but of giving and receiving an order. . . .” Pélissier again brushed this off, complaining that his command duties could not be carried out “at the somewhat paralyzing end of an electric wire.” The emperor, beside-himself, drafted a message intended to back Pélissier against the wall; henceforth, clear every action in advance with Paris or hand over the command to Niel. An open break was averted by the presence of mind of Marshal Vaillant, minister of war. Caught in the middle in this dispute, he chose to send the emperor’s message by slow boat rather than telegraph; and when Napoleon cooled off a bit, there was time to intercept and cancel the letter. After Sebastopol fell a few weeks later, Napoleon showed at least that he held no grudges; Pélissier was promoted to marshal. But it had required virtual insubordination by a stiff-necked soldier to arrive at the kind of autonomy needed by the field commander in such a distant war.8

This classic example of how not to run a war was not repeated in Napoleon’s later wars, even though the emperor himself was physically present and, at least formally, in active command. Perhaps that was because both of the later wars were mercifully brief. The Italian campaign of 1859 lasted only a few weeks, while in 1870, Napoleon’s illness made his role as field commander a purely pro forma affair. Even in 1870, however, he failed to entrust clear-cut command authority to any of his generals; the main field army suffered three changes of command in six weeks of fighting—hardly a recipe for military effectiveness.

True, one wonders whether things would have been much improved if the high command had been better organized and more influential during the

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Second Empire. It was not an era of brilliant leadership, of initiative and imagination in the armed forces; rather, the key word was routine-mindedness. In 1867 the high command could not even manage to organize a Kriegspiel after the Prussian model; as a substitute, the emperor ordered one of his generals to read aloud to the others from a history of the first Napoleon’s campaigns. Indeed, the emperor seems to have been ahead of the soldiers in his concern for military reforms that would strengthen the army. He had to urge their adoption of such new weapons as the chassepot rifle, and his effort to broaden the draft law to provide increased manpower met indifference from the war minister, Marshal Randon. The army’s top echelon clearly showed the damaging effects of twenty years of servility toward a ruler whose military pretensions exceeded his talent. When the Empire fell in 1870, even its defenders could hardly claim that it had developed a workable solution to the civil-military problem.

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Between the fall of Napoleon III and the stabilization of the Third Republic, France passed through two somewhat bizarre episodes. Both of them may well strike professional soldiers as a bit nightmarish, since they involved attempts by more or less civilian amateurs to interfere directly in the conduct of war, both at the strategic and the operational levels.

During the first of these episodes, in the autumn and winter of 1870, Minister of War Léon Gambetta and his deputy Charles de Freycinet made a desperate attempt to prove that an aroused nation-in-arms could throw back the Prussian invaders who had outmatched the professional soldiers. Moved by the legend of Valmy, they rounded up manpower wherever it could be found and chose their field commanders largely by chance and by instinct. Serious tensions were quick to emerge. Gambetta rode roughshod over the normal routines which were sacred to the generals; the soldiers came to detest this brash and unreasonable superior who preached audacity as the key to victory and talked of court-martialing them when they lost a battle. As for Gambetta and Freycinet, they were exasperated at their generals’ timidity and routine-mindedness. General d’Aurelle failed to come up with a strategic plan so Freycinet drafted one himself and ordered d’Aurelle to carry it out. When d’Aurelle refused either to act or to resign, Freycinet undertook to direct the operation personally from his office in the war ministry, while d’Aurelle sulked in his tent. Needless to say, the operation was an inglorious failure. Some weeks later, Freycinet drafted another plan for General Bour-

baki's forces in eastern France and to make sure it was followed, sent one of his young civilian aides to keep watch on the commander; as a final argument, the aide carried an undated order stripping Bourbaki of his command, to be used if needed. The order was never used; Bourbaki did his best under these difficult conditions, but at last, depressed and distraught, his army disintegrating, he put a bullet through his head (or tried to: frustrated to the last, he survived the attempt, as the bullet caromed off his skull). Mercifully, an armistice soon ended a war that had brought the relationships between statesmen and soldiers to an almost unbearable pitch of mutual animosity.\(^\text{10}\)

The second episode followed almost at once. This time the civilian in charge was Adolphe Thiers, newly elected president of the provisional republic at Versailles, who had to confront the insurrection known as the Paris Commune. Most politicians aged 73 would have called on a soldier to organize the siege and recapture the city. Not so Thiers. He had written a massive 20-volume work on Napoleon and had convinced himself that he was Napoleon's lineal heir as a strategic genius—for this bantam-sized politician possessed an ego that could expand to fill the universe. Thiers chose a distinguished soldier, Marshal MacMahon, to command the siege forces, but from the outset Thiers presumed to act as his own commander-in-chief. No aspect of the siege escaped his minute supervision; he visited the outposts almost daily, freely issued orders to MacMahon and the other generals, even called meetings of all the corps commanders without inviting MacMahon himself. MacMahon bore this with notable restraint until the day when the troops began their active assault on Paris. When Thiers continued to issue operational orders, MacMahon cut him off short: "Two of us can't command. I have that responsibility, and I intend to exercise it alone."\(^\text{11}\) Thiers had to swallow his disappointment; but at least this frustrated amateur general had briefly tasted the joys of active command.

With the stabilization of the Third Republic in the 1870s, there began a long and sporadic but ultimately successful effort to develop a more viable pattern of civil-military cooperation. The barriers to success seemed forbidding at first: the great bulk of the officer corps was anti-republican and even anti-civilian; it wanted not cooperation but isolation, autonomy, the right to


possess a kind of enclave into which no civilian might penetrate. For this reason (and others less justifiable), most of the republican political elite nursed a suspicion of professional soldiers and felt that close supervision was called for. From time to time political crises occurred that revived or reinforced this mutual paranoia: Marshal MacMahon’s dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies in 1877, General Boulanger’s anti-parliamentary campaign in the later 1880s, the great upheaval of the Dreyfus Affair and its aftermath. Yet in spite of all this, the regime moved jerkily toward an accommodation, and in large part achieved it just before 1914. Luckily for the nation’s security, both politicians and soldiers retained some degree of mutual trust—enough at least to permit them to try the experiment of working together. Most of the civilian leaders, stung by the humiliation of defeat by Prussia, were eager to reassert the nation’s greatness, which to them was symbolized by the strength of the armed forces. As for the soldiers, few of them were of a mind to subvert the republic, however much they might dislike the system.

What France still needed was a more effectively organized high command and a peacetime mechanism through which government and command could jointly plan for the eventuality of war. The German model had proved its effectiveness, but it was out of the question for a parliamentary republic. A Moltke could enjoy thirty years’ tenure as Chief of the General Staff, along with direct access to the head of state (bypassing the minister of war); but no French republican could possibly conceive of setting up a French Moltke.

Short of that, however, some steps could be taken; and the first of these were taken during the 1870s. A general staff was at last created, and a High Council of War made up of top generals was reestablished for the first time since 1830. Both mechanisms, however, were sharply restricted. The general staff was placed within the ministry of war rather than outside it; the chief of staff was made clearly subordinate to the war minister and found himself saddled with many of the minister’s bureaucratic chores. Furthermore, as the minister’s man, the chief of staff resigned whenever a ministry fell (which was often). Instability bred weakness and mediocrity; first-rate soldiers avoided the treacherous political posts of minister or chief of staff. What ranking general, after all, would not prefer an important corps command to the quicksands of French political life, where one spent his time performing disagreeable tasks in the company of peculiarly distasteful civilian colleagues? As for the High Council of War, its impressive appearance concealed a lack of authority and of clear-cut functions; it met only sporadically, sometimes with a year elapsing between sessions. Finally, the reforms of the 1870s left a sharp separation between, on the one hand, the function of planning and preparing the armies for war, and on the other hand, the task of wartime command. The peacetime role was assigned to the chief of staff,
while a second general was designated in advance for the wartime post of commander-in-chief (actually, commander of the principal group of armies), but was given no role in the planning process. This odd dualism in the high command, along with the embryonic nature of the command organs, left the army little better off than it had been before. Occasionally a strong individual like General de Miribel in the 1880s could make the chief of staff a kind of éminence grise at the war ministry, but only through operating outside the law. As a rule, neither the chief of staff nor the commander-in-chief-designate could exert much serious influence; the dualistic principle hampered them both.

A second phase of reform came in 1890; and by an odd irony, it was the work of the first civilian to attain the post of war minister since the consolidation of the Third Republic. That civilian was Freycinet, Gambetta's collaborator in the last phase of the Franco-Prussian War. Freycinet upgraded both the chief of staff and the commander-in-chief-designate, and in addition reorganized and strengthened the High Council of War. The Council was henceforth required to meet at regular intervals and to be consulted by the war minister, who chaired its sessions. The commander-in-chief-designate was brought into the Council as its vice-chairman, thus giving him an active role in peacetime planning. The chief of staff's official title was changed from "Chief of Staff of the War Ministry" to "Chief of Staff of the Army," implying a somewhat more autonomous function as well as longer tenure (he would no longer resign when cabinets fell). The Freycinet reforms gave the high command more clout, even though it still suffered from the dualistic principle of planning by one officer and eventual execution by another. The system could work effectively only so long as war minister, chief of staff, and commander-in-chief-designate shared common views. That was sometimes, but not always, the case. Still, it was a long step ahead.

The next step, unfortunately, was backward. The Dreyfus Affair wracked France in the late 1890s and disrupted the sense of mutual trust that had been growing among both civilian politicians and soldiers; harsh suspicion and conflict took its place. War ministers, especially the maverick General André—who had been out of harmony with the army establishment—asserted their domination of the high command, cutting back the autonomy of the chief of staff and restricting the role of the High Council of War. Mediocrities were named to the top posts; the position of commander-in-chief-designate had four different occupants in five years, all of them nonentities. The army slipped into a severe morale crisis during the first decade of the new century; a major war then would have been disastrous for France.

Then came the upturn. A revived mood of patriotic assertiveness began to take hold after the Morocco crisis of 1905; it awakened forgotten senti-
ments in the hearts of many political leaders and citizens. By 1911, civilian voices were being raised in favor of strengthening the armed forces and reinforcing the authority of the high command. A new war minister, Adolphe Messiny (himself a former career officer who had left the army during the Dreyfus crisis), decreed a fundamental reform: the old dualistic principle was abandoned and the functions of chief of staff and commander-in-chief-designate were joined in a single man, with the new title Chief of the General Staff. Joseph Joffre was chosen as the first holder of this post.

This reform, David Ralston tells us, gave Joffre more authority than any French general had enjoyed since Bonaparte. Indeed, Ralston even argues that Joffre's position was stronger than that of the younger Moltke in Germany, since Joffre had no Kaiser to overrule him. It is true that Joffre had a minister of war who was still, technically speaking, able to overrule him; the army's responsibility to the civil power remained an essential element in republican doctrine. The reform also reserved to the government the overall direction of the war once it had broken out. In practice, however, war ministers put only the loosest of checkreins on Joffre after 1911, and during the first year of fighting his freedom of action was almost complete. Never since Bonaparte's day had the army's autonomy been so great as it became after 1911.

This is not to say that the republic had now achieved really effective coordination of foreign, domestic, and military policy. The need for close daily collaboration between soldiers and statesmen was not yet a commonly-accepted idea in any country. The level of consultation in that era is exemplified in one of Joffre's first experiences as chief of staff: the premier suddenly asked him whether, in case of war with Germany, France had a 70 per cent chance of victory. When Joffre, after brief hesitation, said the odds were not that favorable, the premier replied, "Very well, we will negotiate." Joffre's only concern about foreign policy was that he be kept informed of France's external commitments so that he could plan the disposition of French troops; he discovered that for seven years (from 1902 to 1909) the army had maintained a large but useless force in the Alps because nobody had told the chief of staff about the Franco-Italian agreement of 1902.

Despite the shortcomings of the 1911 reform, the republic had probably gone about as far as it could in that era toward creating a viable system of civil-military relations. In a short war, it would presumably have worked well. That the system proved inadequate to carry the nation through the

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terrible strain of the Great War is hardly surprising. That experience, which neither soldiers nor civilians had anticipated, gradually broke down Joffre’s almost untrammeled authority, brought on a series of high command crises and a reassertion of parliament’s dominance over headquarters, and led at last to a kind of civilian dictatorship under Clemenceau, whose commitment to all-out war and victory found an echo in the army’s top echelons. Perhaps a better system might have met the test more effectively. One can only conclude that France’s wartime problems would doubtless have been even more serious if French statesmen and soldiers had not arrived, after long travail, at the flawed but workable accommodation embodied in the reforms of 1911. Survival and victory would open the way to a renewed attempt to solve a problem that, in 20th century conditions, could no longer be evaded or ignored.

14On developments during the Great War, the standard work is King’s *Generals and Politicians.*
SOLDIERS AND STATESMEN
THE PRUSSO-GERMAN EXPERIENCE: 1815-1919
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In few, if any, other countries has the question of the relative position of soldiers and statesmen been as central an issue as in Prussia and Germany. Throughout the history of these two states—from the latter part of the 17th century to the collapse of Nazi Germany in 1945—the prominence of the army has been a distinctive facet of the political and social life of Prussians and Germans.

The unusual role soldiers played in Prussia-Germany originated in the creation of a standing army in Brandenburg, the nucleus of the later Prussia, by the Elector Frederick William, better known as the Great Elector (1640-88), and above all in the military reforms of Prussia’s “Soldier King,” Frederick William I (1713-40). Frederick William I was convinced that Prussia could never attain major status in European affairs without a strong army, but he was also aware that his kingdom was far too poor to hire such an army, as was then the custom. He decided therefore to create it largely out of his state’s limited resources, both human and material. Ruthlessly and relentlessly, he drafted almost everyone, directly or indirectly, into the service of state and army: common soldiers were conscripted from among the peasantry; labor and middle class worked in an economy tightly supervised by the state and focused largely on meeting the needs of the army; and the younger sons of the nobility were pressed into service in the officer corps. This latter service was made especially attractive to the nobility and became the all-but-exclusive domain of the nobility, thus bestowing prestigious status upon the officer corps. Moreover, members of the officer corps were to enjoy an especially close relationship with the king, a fellow officer as it were, who as a tribute to the pre-eminent role of the corps took to wearing a uniform day in, day out, as if always on duty. But the arrangement was also a very profitable one for the nobles: they retained full political and judicial power on the local level and derived considerable material gains from their appointments as officers.
Here then were laid the foundations for the phenomenon of "Prussianism"—the quasi-military organization of civil society with its emphasis on state service, discipline, frugality, and the vital role of army and officer corps. The system, with some adjustments, worked well enough to enable Frederick the Great, Frederick William I's son, to fight his wars with Austria, Russia, and France against astonishing odds. Yet only twenty years after Frederick's death the vaunted Prussian army, having meanwhile grown rigid and antiquated, collapsed before the onslaught of Napoleon's forces in 1806-07.

A series of liberalizing reforms were initiated by several forward-looking generals, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau among them. These measures were meant to convert the Prussian army from its self-contained, separate status into a national, popular institution that would have the morale and striking power needed to match the French armies in a future war of liberation. The officer corps was opened to qualified commoners; universal, compulsory military service was introduced (at least in principle); and a national militia, with elected officers, was established. But once Napoleon had been defeated, these reforms, which were closing the gap between army and nation, were whittled away. Increasingly commoners were barred from the officer corps, while its noble members became vocational specialists both socially and professionally, aloof from and deeply contemptuous of civil society. The corps came to look upon itself as an instrument designed to maintain internal order in an anarchic society, rather than as the country's defense against foreign enemies. Civilians, in turn, began to look on the militia as a defense against royal and military despotism, and the question was raised whether the standing army ought not to be replaced altogether by an expanded militia.

This question became an important issue in the Prussian phase of the revolutions of 1848. The revolutionaries insisted on the withdrawal of the regular army from Berlin and the creation of a citizens' guard (Bürgerwehr) to take its place. But the tide turned quickly. The members of the Bürgerwehr, all volunteers, soon tired of their responsibilities. Absenteeism increased, and in an emergency that arose the guard proved incapable of maintaining order. Meanwhile the Prussian constituent assembly, which was to institutionalize the militia, got entangled in doctrinal quarrels and failed to do so. Inevitably the army regained the ground it had lost; its role as the only effective protector of domestic stability became even more important to upper and middle class when they learned, with deep apprehension, of the fierce battles between workers and government that raged for several days in the streets of Paris in June 1848. By that time, moreover, economic ties between aristocracy and bourgeoisie had acquired some significance. Many aristocrats were now agrarian capitalists, owners of mines, sawmills, refineries, and other enterprises, as well as heavy investors in railroads; sharing many bourgeois interests, they used their connections to help remove obsta-
cles blocking business expansion. Thus the bourgeoisie came to feel that there were ways other than a parliament to obtain greater freedom of action.

Altogether the army emerged in a strengthened position from the revolution of 1848. Not only was its protective role more widely appreciated, its leaders also secured an influence on policy decisions they had never had before. Fearful of the weakness and instability of King Frederick William IV, his entourage had established a kind of "kitchen cabinet" in the early days of the revolution in order to stiffen the monarch's backbone. The king, unsure of himself and uncomfortable with the new liberal government, readily listened to this *Gremium* composed chiefly of court generals and military aides who knew how to appeal to his divine-right mysticism and legitimism. This camarilla survived into the postrevolutionary period, and the military made the most of its newly won role. But being concerned only with rescinding and warding off all liberalizing reforms that might curb the status of the army and those feudal-aristocratic circles from which the officer corps was recruited, the camarilla had no positive program. All it could do was to delay and prevent; and in doing this, it caused the civil authorities continuous difficulties.¹

Inevitably the old tensions between army and civil society reappeared. In the Prussian parliament, which now had jurisdiction over the budget, army requests for appropriations were thoroughly scrutinized and more than a few were rejected—just because the opposition suspected that they would serve to strengthen the army as an instrument of internal repression rather than lend Prussia greater strength in dealing with other states.²

Matters came to a showdown in the early 1860s over the reorganization and expansion of the army. There was general agreement on the need for both, and the conflict that ensued between army and parliament centered on a question that was political rather than military: should recruits be retained in the army for three years rather than two as before? The issue was political because it was generally recognized that a two-year training period was sufficient from the military viewpoint. Indeed, King William I and most of his military advisers insisted on the three-year period solely in order to make certain that the draftees would be thoroughly indoctrinated with the proper spirit of monarchical loyalty. For that very reason, however, the liberal majority of the Prussian House of Delegates rejected the extension of service: it did not wish the army to become the praetorian guard of the Prussian king.

Yet the House's stance was ambiguous; it opposed the government with an evident feeling of uneasiness about challenging the authority of the state, and it was careful not to carry its opposition into the streets lest it destroy the state altogether. Bismarck was one of the few conservatives to sense this reluctance. When he became minister-president in 1862 in order to resolve the impasse between government and parliament, he simply proceeded to collect the required taxes over the head of the House of Delegates, confident that it would forgive this illegal procedure once it was shown that the reforms would redound to the benefit of the Prussian state and German unification.

He proved right. His defiance of the House was quickly forgotten when the reorganized and expanded Prussian army won two wars in rapid succession—against Denmark and Austria—and the latter victory, apart from bringing Prussia considerable territorial gains, led to the unification of northern and central Germany in the Prussian-dominated North German Confederation. Even before this, some liberal sympathizers—industrialists, bankers, railroad magnates—decided that their economic welfare did not depend on a strong parliament and could be furthered in close cooperation with army and government, a belief Bismarck readily encouraged through his liberal economic policies. After the war against Denmark, the minister-president reported that "the financiers are pressing loans on us without requiring legislative approval," and General von Roon, the Prussian minister of war, told some months later of a transaction with one of the railroad companies that "would give us a free hand in foreign policy, if necessary to mobilize the whole army and to pay for the whole campaign." The oppositional stand of the parliament could not have been sabotaged more effectively by the staunchest supporters of king and army.3

Even though Bismarck had successfully warded off the subjection of the army to full parliamentary control, relations between him and the generals never became entirely amicable. Many of the military leaders felt that, after the victory over Denmark, the minister-president should have abolished the Prussian constitution so as to free the army of all parliamentary controls. This Bismarck considered both unwise and unrealistic—an attitude that earned him the ill will of some of the king's military advisers and led to their interference, for some time, with his efforts to effect a reconciliation between king/government and parliament after the war against Austria.4 Other problems arose, especially in connection with the peace settlements after the wars against Austria and France. In both cases Bismarck was able to win the

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king's support for his views; and on the whole, political rather than military considerations prevailed in these peace treaties. During the war against France in 1871, Bismarck also had to fight an extended struggle in order to convince the king that the decision as to when to conclude peace was an eminently political matter in view of the possible intervention of other powers. Any move, therefore, touching on the question of peace, such as the negotiated surrender of Paris, ought to be solely his responsibility rather than be shared by him and General von Moltke, the chief of staff, as the latter demanded—a claim, incidentally, which the king preferred to bypass rather than reject.5

Nonetheless, soon afterwards Bismarck again came to the help of the army, as he had in the Prussian crisis of 1862. This time the Reichstag, the parliament of the newly founded German empire, sought to assert its right to control the military, and again the issue at stake was the size of the army. The military authorities asked for a permanent peacetime strength of some 400,000 men; the Reichstag called for a three-year arrangement that would have given each Reichstag a say in military matters at least once during its three-year existence.6 Bismarck resolved the developing stalemate by a compromise settlement for a seven-year period (Septennat)—an arrangement that he preferred in any event, since it would keep the army somewhat dependent on him. Yet in order to neutralize this concession as much as possible and insulate the army even further from parliamentary inquiries and criticisms, the Prussian minister of war, who was the army's spokesman before the Reichstag,7 was deprived of all jurisdiction over matters of personnel; these were assigned to the head of the king/emperor's military cabinet, who did not have to appear before the Reichstag. This, to be sure, did not quiet the army's parliamentary critics who, if anything, became more vociferous in their attacks; but they were fighting a losing battle.

The fact was that by this time the army had gained a new and powerful ally—a large part of the nation. Ultimately the army could elude the control of the Reichstag only because most of those whose views counted, that is, the upper and middle classes, approved of the army's extraparliamentary status. To them the army was the trailblazer of the united empire, it was the bulwark

5Ibid., pp. 209 ff.; Gerhard Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk (Munich, 1954-68), 1: 251 ff., 278 ff. Ritter also points out that Bismarck's attempts to interfere in matters of military tactics (assault on Paris rather than siege) were just as objectionable.

6Since, according to the constitution, the amount of money to be spent on the army was determined by its size, with a fixed sum of 225 thalers set for each soldier, the permanent establishment of the army's size would have deprived the Reichstag of all budgetary controls over the military.

7The German empire had no army of its own; its army consisted of the Prussian army into which the armies of the other German states were absorbed, except for those of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Saxony, which in peacetime retained their separate status to varying degrees.
against the uncomfortable aspirations of the lower classes. Last but by no means least, the army, with its discipline, order, and organization, was a counterweight to the growing materialism and egotism that economic expansion and prosperity brought in its wake—a sort of spiritual corset, a "school of the nation" which parliamentary divisiveness must not touch. Out of this attitude evolved during those years the militarization of social and professional relations, fostered in the schools and universities, in press and lectures, in veterans' organizations and political leagues, that was to keep alive the old Prussian virtues and with them the existing hierarchical order. In this purview, moreover, war was no longer merely a continuation of politics, but in a sense also a remedy against politics, a purgative and rehabilitation from selfishness and materialism. From an attitude imposed from above, German militarism was being turned into a self-propelled force and was raised to the level of a Weltanschauung. Indeed, the philosopher Max Scheler proudly contrasted Germany's Gesinnungsmilitarismus (militarism as a matter of principled attitude) to the Zweckmilitarismus (an opportunistic militarism adopted merely to accomplish a specific purpose) of other countries.*

Bismarck too paid tribute to these proclivities. As Prussian minister-president he had always worn civilian clothes, but as Reich chancellor he appeared in his general's uniform on public occasions. Yet as long as he headed the government, he succeeded in fending off nearly all efforts on the part of the military to intrude on his conduct of foreign policy. The most flagrant intrusion occurred in 1887, during one of the innumerable Balkan crises, this one over Bulgaria, in which Germany and Russia supported opposing candidates for the vacant Bulgarian throne. While Bismarck tried hard to keep the conflict from spreading and urged Austria, too, to remain calm, the general staff, convinced of the inevitability of a military showdown, gave its Austrian counterpart to understand that Berlin was not wholly opposed to an Austrian war against Russia and through the German military attaché in Vienna suggested the initial moves to be made.9

This type of interference came to an end, at least temporarily, when Count Schlieffen became chief of staff in 1891, but only because Schlieffen was a military technician without political interests and ambitions.10 Schlieffen...
fen's successor, General Helmuth von Moltke, a nephew of the field marshal of the Bismarck era, knew no such restraint and again took to meddling in matters of foreign policy. In 1909 he suggested to his Austrian colleague, Baron Conrad von Hötzingendorf, that Germany would come to Austria's aid, not only in a war of defense, but also in an act of aggression such as an Austrian occupation of Serbia in order to put an end to anti-Austrian activities in that country. Yet if Moltke made commitments that were not his to make, it must be added that his government, which he did inform of his message, made no attempt to repudiate him. At no time, in fact, did the political leadership attempt during those years to coordinate its policies with the plans of the military—a fact in which Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg still took pride after the debacle of the First World War, when he claimed credit for never having attempted to interfere with the work of the general staff.

Why did the chancellor consider the political implications of military plans beyond his purview? The answer was that the equality of status of civil and military authorities had now been fully accepted—if only because William II insisted on it and no one tried to point out to him the fallacies of his views. Indeed, we gain the distinct impression from a variety of contemporary statements that both chancellor and Foreign Office considered it the task of diplomacy to adjust to the military necessities as determined by the general staff. "Anyone who had any real insight into the situation," Bethmann Hollweg wrote later, "was so fully aware of the immense danger of a two-front war that a civilian who would have interfered with the carefully thought out military plans the army considered imperative, would have assumed an unbearable responsibility and would have been considered the sole cause of a subsequent defeat." Similarly, when Foreign Secretary von Jagow pointed out on one occasion that the invasion of Belgium, as proposed by the Schlieffen Plan, would draw England into the war, he dropped the matter as soon as Moltke warned him that it was the only strategy that promised success.

However, an analysis of the government-army relationship in Imperial Germany cannot end here. It can be argued—although apparently it has

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13The Schlieffen Plan proposed to divide the expected two-front war against Russia and France into two phases. Since Russia would need many weeks to mobilize her forces, the bulk of Germany's army was to launch a concentrated attack on France and defeat her in a speedy campaign, after which it would be sent to the east to deal with Russia. The plan provided for a huge wheeling movement through Belgium, in order to attack France on as wide a front as possible.

never been done—that the task of the general staff was to draw up plans for any eventuality that might arise. Thus the Schlieffen Plan was to deal with the danger of a two-front war against both Russia and France—a strong probability since the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894. If such a war presented an "immense danger," as Bethmann put it, it seems obvious that German diplomacy ought to have attempted a rapprochement with one of these two countries in order to neutralize the alliance. Yet no such effort was made, except for one rather amateurish and abortive attempt by William II some years before Bethmann became chancellor. The government accepted the Schlieffen Plan despite the risks it involved; all that Bethmann did was to take some steps to improve relations with Britain. Yet in this he failed. The naval leadership blocked his efforts to negotiate a naval arms moratorium, which might have allayed Britain's suspicions in regard to Germany's maritime goals. However, a naval détente by itself would not have settled much either. Germany's hegemonial plans in Europe were equally objectionable to London, for they were irreconcilable with Britain's stake in the continental balance of power and thus constituted as much of a threat as the naval buildup.\footnote{At one point, in 1912, Bethmann tried to secure some elbow room for his rapprochement with Britain by playing off the army against the navy. Fearful lest Tirpitz's naval program would ruin his plans, he abandoned his customary reserve and warned the hesitant army leaders that unless they submitted at once a request for an increase of the army, the navy demands would claim all the money the Reichstag could be expected to appropriate. The army put in its request, but the Reichstag did not reduce the naval demands; both bills were passed. Ritter, \textit{Staatskunst}, 2: 275-76; also Fischer, \textit{Krieg der Illusionen}, pp. 169 ff. Concerning the army's reluctance to ask for more men, see n. 16.}

The handling of these problems, moreover, was not determined by the civil and military leaders alone. Most of these questions were aggravated by pressures from nationalist or economic interest groups and an aroused public opinion. Thus the issues had to be dealt with within the context of domestic demands for power and self-assertion, the search for new markets and raw materials, and also with due regard to deep-seated worries over Germany's exposure to supposedly jealous and covetous neighbors. All these claims and anxieties were carefully nurtured by organizations created especially to cater to these varied feelings of aggressiveness and frustration, materialism and patriotism, overflowing self-confidence and diffident insecurity. The Pan-German League, \textit{Wehrverein} and \textit{Flottenverein} (Army and Navy Leagues), and similar organizations joined forces in an unceasing assault on Reichstag and government in newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, and speeches urging a more forceful foreign policy and increased military preparations both on land and at sea.\footnote{The \textit{Wehrverein} (on its purposes, see Fischer, \textit{Krieg der Illusionen}, pp. 159 ff.) also brought pressure to bear on the army itself to increase its numbers. Many military leaders were reluctant to do so, lest the increases necessitate the admission of large numbers of petty bourgeois to the officer corps and an increased influx of Social Democrats into the ranks of the noncoms. Non-noble officers like Ludendorff, then a colonel on the general staff, helped to overcome these inhibitions from within. Ritter, \textit{Staatskunst}, 2: 261 ff.; Eckart Kehr, "Klassenkämpfe und Rüstungsropolitik," in Wehler, \textit{Primat}, pp. 99 ff.; Hans Speier, "Ludendorff," in \textit{Makers of Modern Strategy}, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, 1943), pp. 308 ff.} Such efforts of course made any govern-
mental attempts to achieve a détente even less credible.

As we know now, these governmental endeavors were half-hearted in any event; recent research has shown that government and army were evidently prepared to go to war, if necessary, in pursuit of what they considered Germany's vital rights (Lebensrechte). Civil and military leaders joined hands in urging the psychological preparation of the nation for a war that seemed all but inevitable, "for such a war," as Moltke warned, "in which the very existence of the state will be at stake, requires the sacrificial approval and enthusiasm of the people." A government-inspired propaganda campaign now descended upon the country, supported by bourgeois press and political parties, by academicians and Protestant church groups, by the Pan-German and service leagues, and by banking and industrial circles which found the opportunities for investment and market expansion increasingly limited by British and French competition. The campaign warned of a rapidly approaching showdown, the dangers of weakness, and the necessity to stand up for Germany's rights. The fact that the thesis of the imminence of war was generally accepted suggests a fatalistic resignation to war's inevitability, which indeed many Germans shared and to which even some of the Social Democrats did not remain wholly immune. Only a radical group within the party kept up its opposition to any kind of war. Like Moltke, the radicals knew that no war could be fought successfully without popular support; and they strove hard to counter the government's efforts in that direction. As Rosa Luxemburg, one of the leaders, declared, "It [is not] the army who makes war, ... it is the entire population. The latter has to decide whether wars do or do not happen." 18

Given the growing expectation of war, it is noteworthy that the lack of coordination between government and armed forces did not entirely end even then. At times each branch still pursued its own plans, without much, if any, concern for the others. Even during the critical days of July 1914, when the decision between war and peace hung in the balance, coordination was not fully achieved. At the very time when Bethmann urged Austria not to mobilize against Russia in order to keep Russia from mobilizing, Moltke requested Hötzendorf, the Austrian chief of staff, to start mobilizing against the Russians, leading the Austrian foreign minister, Count Berchtold, to wonder out loud, "Who does govern in Berlin?" 19 The question summed up the grave flaws in Germany's governmental structure.

17 Craig, Politics of Prussian Army, p. 291; Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen, p. 244; Dorpalen, Treitschke, pp. 148 ff., 232-33.
19 Klein, Deutschland, I: 257.
The war brought no change in this situation. As before, the military leadership maintained its aloofness, leaving the government largely uninformed on the specifics of military developments. "That's none of the diplomats' business," General von Falkenhayn, the chief of the general staff from September 1914 to August 1916, told an aide of Admiral von Tirpitz. "They'll have to be satisfied with a Yes or No on the part of the military authorities. . . . I never mention any figures to the chancellor." This was said some time after Falkenhayn had concluded that his armies could not win the war against the combined forces of France, Russia, and Britain and that the government would have to negotiate a peace treaty with one of them.

The consequences of this contempt for the civil authorities were disastrous. Bethmann agreed on the need for coming to terms with one of the adversaries, preferably Russia, which seemed more likely than the two other powers to respond to a proposal for a negotiated peace. However, since Falkenhayn never confided to him the full gravity of the military problem, the chancellor underestimated its seriousness. Not only did he refuse to send out peace feelers at once, but he also insisted on territorial concessions from Russia that went far beyond what Falkenhayn wished to settle for. The result was that no effective approach was made to St. Petersburg.

Yet here again the difficulty was not just lack of cooperation between soldiers and statesmen. The chancellor knew that annexationist pressure groups, unaware of the declining prospects for victory, would not tolerate any major concessions on their demands. To acquaint them with the true state of affairs, he considered pointless; these groups would refuse to accept the truth and simply call for his replacement by a stronger man—preferably a military leader like Tirpitz or Hindenburg, who by that time had become something of a national hero. In fact, these circles had already been clamoring for such a change for some time. Bethmann worried also about the reaction of the lower classes to any suggestion of defeat—such reaction might well express itself in sharper opposition to the monarchy and the socio-political system, and lead in the end to revolution.


The way found out of this impasse represents a sort of climax to the struggle between soldiers and statesmen. Bethmann and others who shared his concerns concluded that Hindenburg ought to replace Falkenhayn as chief of staff, in the hope that the field marshal might still win the military victories required to meet all domestic expectations. However, should he fail, he alone, thanks to his tremendous prestige, would be able to convey that fact to the nation without plunging it into chaos. Thus the chancellor and other government leaders joined in the growing clamor for the appointment of Hindenburg as the commander of all German forces. Yet unlike the bulk of the nation, Bethmann supported the demand, not because he was certain that Hindenburg's leadership would assure victory, but because though he kept hoping for victory, he also knew that victory might no longer be attainable.23

The assumption of the supreme command by Hindenburg (and Ludendorff)24 established the full ascendancy of the military over the civil authorities, and the latter became virtually subordinated to the two generals. The Kaiser too had to submit to their requests, and chancellors, ministers, even the monarch's personal advisers remained in office only as long as they had the support of the Supreme Command. The military leadership took charge of the economy, overruled Bethmann on the question of unrestricted submarine warfare, and intruded on other decisions of great political sensitivity. Yet the country's faith in Hindenburg's wisdom was such that when defeat came, he survived it with his reputation unimpaired, and a few years later he was elected president of the Weimar Republic.25

In his capacity for survival Hindenburg was not alone; the army, as an institution, showed a similar ability. With the help of the stab-in-the-back legend, it managed to put the blame for the loss of the war on the new political leaders. The prestige of the army rose further when in the subsequent domestic turmoil it once more seemed like an island of stability; its reduction in size and the abolition of compulsory military service were regretted above all because the army could no longer function as a school of the nation, teaching discipline and subordination to German youth. Once more, during Hindenburg's presidency, the military men, with General von Schleicher as their spokesman, began to exert influence on governmental matters, helping to make and break governments, as they had not done in peacetime since the

24How disastrously Hindenburg's military abilities were overrated by the nation is evident from the fact that he became chief of the general staff only in name and Ludendorff was made co-responsible quartermaster-general, contrary to previous practice.
25On the way in which Hindenburg's national standing was systematically protected, partly by others, partly by himself, see Andreas Dorpalen, Hindenburg and the Weimar Republic (Princeton, 1964), pp. 21 ff., 44 ff., 53 ff., 58 ff.
days of Frederick William IV. But theirs was basically the same kind of narrowminded, exclusionist influence which the camarilla of the 1850s had exercised, and it was equally unresponsive to the needs of the times. Soon the generals found themselves opposed by a militarized mass movement which, as it were, made every civilian a soldier.

When the Nazis came to power, the army was quickly reduced to only one among several military organizations. Ultimately it came so completely under Hitler's control that during the Second World War even the top military commanders knew little about what went on beyond the area of which they were directly in charge. Not only strategy but tactics as well were determined by Hitler, who insisted that even minor moves had political implications that were more important than any military considerations. The army, once considered a state within the state or even the state within the state, became a mere tool in the hands of the Führer.26

The story of Prusso-German civil-military relations as it unfolded since the days of King Frederick William I speaks for itself. The one obvious conclusion it forces upon the student of this relationship concerns the need for the subordination of the military to the political leadership in all matters of policy. This of course is no novel discovery—long ago it had been postulated by Clausewitz—and requires no elaboration. There is however another lesson to be derived from the German experience. This latter conclusion has received much less attention, although it is at least as significant as, if not more fundamental than, the first one. It is evident from the course of developments in Prussia and Germany, especially since the 1860s when the nation became increasingly political-minded, that the ultimate decision of civil vs. military priorities rested with the nation itself. The Moltkes and Falkenhayn, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, Schleicher and others could not have played their particular roles if the nation had not tolerated their intrusions into the civil domain or even encouraged them, directly or indirectly. In the last analysis, then, militarism is a civil-political problem. To paraphrase the old adage, every country has the kind of civil-military relationship it deserves.

26 The definition of the army as "the state within the state" (italics in original) was coined by Carl Schmitt, Staatsgegifte und Zusammenbruch des zweiten Reiches (Hamburg, 1934), p. 12. In this pamphlet Schmitt, one of the leading ideologists of the Nazi era, provides also a revealing analysis of the National Socialist as a political soldier—the triumph and culmination, as he sees it, of the Prussian soldierly tradition. On the rationale of Hitler's attitude toward the army, see Andreas Dorpalen, "Hitler, the Nazi Party, and the Wehrmacht in World War II," in Total War and Cold War, ed. Harry L. Coles (Columbus, Ohio, 1962), pp. 76 ff.
Commentary
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The task assigned to me, as a historian of the United States and its army commenting upon Professor Dorpalen's and Professor Wright's papers, is primarily that of viewing them from the perspective of American military history.

In the period from Vienna to Versailles, it is contrasts rather than comparisons that have to be emphasized between the French and German experience with soldiers and statesmen on the one hand, and the American experience on the other. Indeed, the outstanding fact about the relationship of soldiers and statesmen in the United States during most of this period is that the roles of the two types were not yet clearly differentiated. In the United States there could not yet be the kind of contrast in roles, with resultant conflict, between the civilian and the military that developed in France and in Germany—not only because the military in the United States played a relatively unimportant part in national affairs, but also because the same persons could still pass interchangeably from a civilian to a military role or in the opposite direction. Until the beginning of the 20th century, until the final years of the period under consideration, a distinct military class and interest were only beginning to develop in American society. Through most of the 19th century, the soldier as a distinct social type had not yet made his entrance into American history in sufficient numbers or with sufficient power and influence to find himself in confrontations of opposing interest with the statesman.

I myself have pushed, as hard as any historian, the idea that under the leadership of the West Point of Sylvanus Thayer and Dennis Hart Mahan, the American military in the 19th century went remarkably far in developing officership as a profession, given American circumstances. But when focusing attention on the American military, it is easy to accord insufficient attention to that cautionary phrase, "given American circumstances." The circumstances of 19th century America were those of a pervasive hostility to
the differentiation of any specialized profession from the mass of the citizen-
ry. To Americans of the egalitarian age, a specialized profession seemed too
likely to become a privileged class. The ideal American of the Jacksonian era,
and then of the democratic ethos throughout the century, was the jack-of-all-
trades who could do everything well: clear a homestead in the wilderness,
prosper as a merchant, invent a steam engine or a new use for one, argue or
judge in the courts, command a militia battalion, and write a state constitu-
tion. The ideal American was not the man educated to any specific profes-
sion, because Jacksonian America regarded any specialized higher education
as likely to produce the oversophisticated, effete snobs whom Americans
associated with decadent Europe. The ideal American was nature's noble-
man, able by the certitude of uncorrupted natural instinct to meet all the
challenges that came his way, as Andrew Jackson himself with a minimum
of formal education moved back and forth among the roles of lawyer, planter,
merchant, financier, politician, statesman, and, not the least, soldier.

By the Jacksonian era, the fears that had led the founding fathers to
balance and divide the military power so carefully in the federal Constitution
had lost much of their vitality. Memories of the English Civil War with its
military dictatorship and of the redcoats in America as a cause of the Ameri-
can Revolution had long since faded. The few historic instances when the
American military might have become an oppressive political force, such as
the writing of the Newburgh Addresses and Alexander Hamilton's attempt
to raise a politicized army during the quasi-war with France, had found the
military threat so easily aborted, and the military as a group had so thorough-
ly and so long subsided into political neutrality, that the specter of an Ameri-
can army as a praetorian guard could no longer seem real. The suspicions
that the military aroused in the United States in the 19th century did not so
much involve fear of or hostility toward things military per se, let alone
pacifist hostility toward war. Marcus Cunliffe has shown in his book Soldiers
and Civilians how much early 19th century America was inclined to admire
and glorify the trappings of military life and the heroics of war. Rather, the
suspicions against which the American officer corps had to contend during
the 19th century were mainly those that egalitarian America turned toward
any educated and specialized profession.

Perry Miller has shown how the legal profession had to struggle to
advance itself against similar suspicions and hostility, because it wished to
perfect itself as an educated, rational profession, to maintain "against the
irrationality of democracy and of millennialism an imperative of control of
temper by logic." "... the lawyers' real controversy with their society," says
Professor Miller, "was that they stood for the Head against the Heart." But
the claims of the heart, of intuition, of natural wisdom against artificial
education were so powerful in 19th century America that the legal profession,
though it advanced its claims remarkably far, could not become the preserve of pure rationality that many of its leaders wished. “For all their professions of devotion to Socrates,” says Miller, “the lawyer had to come to some sort of accommodation with the speech of Leatherstocking.”

It was similar with the military profession. The Jacksonian attacks upon the Military Academy at West Point, voiced in Congress, legislatures, and the press, were not primarily attacks upon military strength or preparedness or upon military values, but were directed against the efforts of the officer corps to set itself apart as a distinct, professional class. The Jacksonian fear aroused by West Point was not so much fear of the military in itself as fear of any educated profession as a threat to democratic egalitarianism. “... if schools may be established by Congress,” asked a select committee of the House of Representatives to investigate the Military Academy, “to educate men for the army, at the public expense, ... may they not, by a most obvious parity of reasoning, be established to educate them upon the like easy terms, for diplomatists, or for heads of departments, or for clerks and accountants?” The plea here is not against militarism but against tax-supported professional education. The object of the House committee in its report critical of West Point was to keep “wide open all the grades of office in the army to the free and honorable occupation of all classes of citizens.”

The Jacksonians who attacked West Point did not desire to undermine the military qualities in American life, but rather they believed it was West Point that undermined true military qualities and the military strength of the nation. They proposed a diffusion of basic military training through colleges and literary seminaries throughout the country, where unlike West Point, “those in whom the martial spirit predominates should not, with their ripening years, have their ardor quenched by the cold process of mathematical demonstration, nor the minute investigation of scientific studies.” Andrew Jackson himself testified to the debilitating effects of excessive military education, with its resultant effete nature and oversophistication, as opposed to the natural military capacities of Americans. He said that the contrast was demonstrated by his own famous victory at New Orleans:

Reasoning always from false principles [the British, he said], expected little opposition from men whose officers even were not in uniform, who were ignorant of the rules of dress, and who had never been caned into discipline. Fatal mistake! a fire incessantly kept up, directed

1 Perry Miller, *The Life of the Mind in America; From the Revolution to the Civil War* (New York, 1965), pp. 119-21.
3 Ibid.
with calmness and unerring aim, strewed the field with the brave officers and men of the [British] column, which slowly advanced, according to the most approved rules of European tactics, and was cut down by the untutored courage of the American militia.4

The Military Academy at West Point survived the attacks of the Jacksonians, though the professionalizing superintendency of Sylvanus Thayer did not; but the American military profession had to muffle its claims to the possession of a body of specialized skills and knowledge and to open its ranks in wartime, even its generalships, to newly commissioned civilians. In this process, a term as a soldier became almost a standard ingredient of the preparatory career of a statesman, and to that extent in 19th century America the soldier and the statesman were not separate castes but became one. Of the eighteen presidents of the United States from Andrew Jackson through the remainder of the 19th century, six whose careers were primarily civilian nevertheless served as general officers of the army: Jackson himself, William Henry Harrison, Franklin Pierce, Rutherford B. Hayes, James A. Garfield, and Benjamin Harrison. Two of the others, of course, were general officers whose early careers were primarily military, but who went on to exchange the soldier’s blue coat for the black of the presidential statesman: Zachary Taylor and Ulysses S. Grant. Every elected president from Grant to the end of the century, except Grover Cleveland and William McKinley, was a Civil War general; and McKinley had been a brevet major too young during the war years to have had much opportunity to become a general. So little had the soldier’s role become distinct from that of the statesman, so little had leading American soldiers themselves adopted the values, as Samuel P. Huntington defines them, of military professionalism and “objective civilian control,” that such career soldiers as Winfield Scott and Winfield Scott Hancock also attempted to transform themselves into statesmen as major-party presidential candidates. So did such slightly less soldierly soldiers as John C. Frémont and George B. McClellan.

While general officers thus readily passed from the army into statesmanship, it was true that a contrary tendency toward professional differentiation of the soldier from the statesman persisted in the army despite an inauspicious national atmosphere. The rise of military professionalism in the United States was handicapped before the Civil War because, among all the other reasons, the Military Academy itself was less a school for military officership than a school of engineering. After the Civil War, the development of a growing system of postgraduate military schools and the appearance of professional officers’ organizations and periodicals helped cultivate a military

professionalism more complete than ever before in the United States. So did the self-consciously professional and anti-civilian writings of Brevet Major General Emory Upton. So also did the very isolation of most of the United States army on the Indian frontier during the postwar years.

At the same time, the isolation of the army kept the late 19th century tendencies toward the growth of a distinctive soldier class in the United States a phenomenon of which the country could remain largely unaware and to which statesmen as yet had to pay little heed. The army was too small and too remote for the enlargement of its officers' professionalism to require much attention from statesmen. At the top, the late 19th century army remained much the same as the American army had always been, its most visible soldiers not yet so distinctively professional that they were clearly set off from politicians and statesmen. General William Tecumseh Sherman was consistently a political figure, ever ready with the expression of political opinions, however sincere he may have been in disclaiming ambitions for the presidency. His successor as commanding general of the army, Philip Sheridan, was perhaps a more distinctively soldierly figure; but the next commanding general, John McAllister Schofield, had often mixed political activity with his career in and out of the army and once had been interim Secretary of War; while the final commanding general, Nelson A. Miles, made no secret of his infatuation with the White House as a home.

When the Spanish War came, statesmen and soldiers both indiscriminately mixed politics and generalship. General Miles's overt political ambitions had much to do with the McKinley administration's refusal to give him the leadership responsibilities that might have been expected to go to the commanding general of the army; he was consigned to the sideshow campaign in Puerto Rico. Politicians and statesmen still saw little reason why they should not themselves essay the soldier's role. Brevet Major McKinley was the principal strategist of the war. William Jennings Bryan pinned on his shoulders the eagles of the colonelcy of the 3d Nebraska Regiment. It did not speak much for the recognition of a differentiation between statesmanship and soldiering that Theodore Roosevelt, utterly lacking in military experience, modestly refused to accept in his 1st Regiment of United States Volunteer Cavalry a rank higher than that of lieutenant colonel. Roosevelt deferred the colonelcy to the professional medical skills of, Leonard Wood.

The aftermath of the Spanish War brought a relatively abrupt end to this American history of interchangeable soldiership and statesmanship. The responsibilities of world power and empire, entailing at least a measure of preparation for possible war with the military powers of the Old World, converged with the attitudes and standards of military professionalism that had been developing obscurely within the armed forces for a generation and
more. Helped along by a distinguished civilian statesman, Secretary of War Elihu Root, the convergence produced a reorganized military system whose institutions, especially the new General Staff of the Army, encouraged an unprecedented differentiation and separation of the professional soldier's role from the statesman's.

Yet until the First World War, the internal reorganization of the American armed forces in the direction of cultivating military professionalism so much absorbed the energy of the army and navy that little was left over to be directed toward the outer civilian world. There were still no well defined confrontations of opposing interests between the soldiers' and statesmen's worlds. Civil-military relations in the first decade and a half of the 20th century consisted largely of the soldier's calling for civilian assistance to complete the armed forces' internal reforms against old-fashioned, pre-professional resistance from within. Major General Leonard Wood's reliance on the assistance of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to assure the ascendancy of the General Staff over the War Department bureaus in the contest with Adjutant General Fred C. Ainsworth is a good example; similarly, William S. Sims invoked the aid of Congress and President Theodore Roosevelt to achieve his reform of gunnery in the navy. The soldier's assertions of military versus civilian interests might come later. For the present, there was too much to do in making the armed forces themselves truly soldierly in a full professional sense.

Perhaps it would be possible to draw analogies between the American history I have thus described and Professor Wright's account of 19th century relations between soldiers and statesmen in France. Similarities might be found between the interchangeability of American soldiers' and statesmen's roles and the frequent service of French soldiers in the cabinets of the 19th century Bourbon and Orleanist kings, or between the American soldier-presidents and the French soldier-emperor, Napoleon III. But if France was slower than Prussia and Germany in delineating soldiership from statesmanship, both European powers were far ahead of the United States in making clear the distinction. In the United States, a distinctive military profession was so long in emerging into a position where the government would have to recognize it, soldiers and statesmen so long moved easily back and forth through each other's roles, and divisions of interest between the soldier and the statesman were consequently so late in becoming issues of moment in national politics, that modern problems of civil-military relations, analogous to those which Germany and France had begun to experience decades before, did not arise in the United States until after the First World War.

Between the era of the founding of the American Republic, when problems of civil-military relations were still the old-fashioned sort revolving
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around the possibility of a military coup d'état by a praetorian guard, and the post-World War I era, when the United States for the first time began to confront the more subtle, modern problems of military influence upon policy in a great power dependent upon mass armies, intricate military technologies, and immense military expenditures—for a century between these two different eras of civil-military problems, the boundaries between the civilian and the military in the United States were blurred beyond any possibility of national political divisions along distinctively civilian-versus-military lines. If a General McClellan intervened in partisan politics from the headquarters of the army, the condition was not one in which a distinctively military influence threatened civilian values, but one in which the frontiers between soldiership and statesmanship were too inconclusively defined to prevent McClellan's kind of political adventurism.

It used to be a stereotype of some historical writing to contrast old, experienced, wise but cynical Europe with young, naive, often foolish but virtuous America. In the history of the relationships between soldiers and statesmen, that old stereotype still carries a measure of conviction. In the geography of civil-military relations, the United States in our day still often visits for the first time places where nations like the Germans and French have traveled often and long before.
Discussion

The CHAIRMAN: That was a sparkling presentation and raises a great many thoughts. Perhaps the theme of the three papers is that a nation gets the kind of civil-military relations that its social structure produces. But I wonder whether it isn't necessary to qualify this to some extent and to say that a state gets the kind of civil-military relations that its geographic position produces. The English Channel up until 1914 was something like the Atlantic in its effect in this respect. British society differed from that in North America, yet in some respects they had similar problems in civil-military relations and produced similar solutions, different from those on the European continent. This is a point that I would like to put up for further thought.

Now my job is to call for comments or questions from the floor on any of these three presentations.

Professor ROBIN HIGHAM (Kansas State University): Would Professor Wright like to comment on the geographic factor? What effect has it had on civilian attitudes toward the military?

Professor WRIGHT: I can't say much on the subject, but it seems quite clear that geographic location does play a role. I would assume that everybody would regard Germany's central location and lack of clear natural frontiers as one of the factors that tended to make the military a powerful force there, and that our American isolation produced the opposite effect. France is always like Lucky Pierre, in the middle, and therefore I suppose the French experience is somewhere between that of the German and the American.

I was also struck by Professor Weigley's comment on the American 19th century dislike of all kinds of professionalism as infringements of equality. This is something that hadn't occurred to me, and it is a very provocative and suggestive idea. And I suspect that whenever you have an older culture in which social roles have become more differentiated in hierarchical fashion, as in France or Germany, the military officer does play a different kind of role.

Professor DORPALEN: Well, it is quite obvious that geographic location does affect the attitude of people and the problems of security and defense. But I have always felt that history is made by people rather than by material
Certainly Germany was not in a more precarious position in the period 1900-1910 than she had been in the 1870s and 1880s. And yet the country did not in the 1870s and 1880s have that feeling of insecurity. It did develop after the turn of the century. I have always felt that there was something a little artificial about this feeling—that there were too many people interested in creating stronger fears than were really warranted by the geographical position. Bismarck was very much aware of Germany's precarious position. He realized that the unification of Germany upset the balance of power in Europe. There existed then a very strongly organized, unified state instead of a multitude of very small states in the center of Europe; and the result was that he was very careful in the pursuit of his foreign policy and made sure, with one or two notable exceptions, that he would not create additional fears on the part of the surrounding countries. Germany later forgot this and caused anxieties which in turn created counter-anxieties in Germany, and a vicious spiral was set in motion. But it seems to me that a more cautious leadership, a more sensitive leadership, more aware of its international responsibilities, could have helped to avoid the difficulties that arose. I am wondering how much Germans used their geographical position as a sort of alibi to justify their expansionist ambitions.

Mrs. DORIS E. CONDIT (Center for Research in Social Systems): I was wondering if anyone would like to comment upon the relative position of Germany, France, and the United States with regard to civil-military relations in 1970.

The CHAIRMAN: Does anybody want to move into the cloudy area of contemporary strategy?

Professor WEIGLEY: Well, it does seem to me that if geography is influential in determining a nation's civil-military relations, obviously our situation now is that geography has caught up with the United States and in some ways, with the range of modern weapons, left France and Germany to a degree less exposed than we are. Without pressing too far the geographical determinism on which we have touched, one of the several reasons why the United States is now traveling the road that Germany and France traveled a hundred years ago is that geography has caught up with us and technology has helped that along.

Professor DANIEL R. BEAVER (University of Cincinnati): I would like to change the subject back to institutional relationships and direct my question to Professor Wright. It is very possible, it seems to me, that the 1911 reforms in the French army were really a disaster that was only corrected in some
way by Clemenceau’s gaining power in late 1917. I wonder if you might comment on the isolation of the French army and the particular kinds of controls that came out of the 1911 reforms. Did these ultimately lead to disaster in the First World War by creating divisions whereby the civilian control of the French army was completely incapable of making itself felt until the advent of Clemenceau?

Professor WRIGHT: I think this point has a good deal of force to it. It’s quite true that the reforms of 1911 did not produce a really satisfactory military-civilian relationship for a long war such as France got into. It is quite true that terrible tensions developed and that the army tried in the first year or two of the war to run the show almost independently of the civilians. It is quite true, as Messimy himself said, that it simply wasn’t clear when the war broke out what the relative powers and functions of the two sides were. On the other hand, his reform didn’t create but rather perpetuated the isolationism of the two sides. In the long run it was disastrous and did require some kind of deus ex machina like Clemenceau. If it had been a shorter war as people expected, it would have been a very workable solution for the civilians to stand aside temporarily while the military fought the war. But it is quite clear this was not a long range solution, and one wouldn’t want to see the French try it again as they did in 1914.

Professor DAVID B. RALSTON (Massachusetts Institute of Technology): It seems to me much of this is a question of personality. In the interwar years the French go back to a dual high command with Pétain as vice president of the higher war council and a number of less ranking officers as chiefs of staff. For reasons with which I am not entirely familiar, they decide that this is an unsuitable arrangement and finally you get in 1935 a reorganization of the high command in which Gamelin is given once again the two posts, vice president of the higher war council and chief of staff. Gamelin was also able to get along with all the civilian authorities. One would argue that perhaps he got along too well with the civilian authorities. You have here civilian dominance, certainly, with an institutional arrangement that at first glance ought to be ideal. I give you the summer of 1940 as the way it worked out. I am not sure if purely institutional arrangements can be understood apart from the people who make these institutions function.

While I have the mike I also have one question I would like to address to Professor Dorpalen. It seems to me you very rightly point out this legend of the villains of German history always being soldiers, with all the misfortunes that come to the German political development being placed on the heads of the soldiers. I think it is the fact that there were an awful lot of civilians who saw eye to eye with the soldiers. I would suggest that even in the 1870s, one could argue that someone like the elder Moltke, in terms of
his vision of how a future war would be fought, was almost a limiting element as against possible German assertiveness. That is to say, everybody knew that if war came, Germany would have to fight both France and Russia. Moltke would say negotiate a solution at all costs with France and fight for some kind of limited victory within Russia. And it would seem to me that in this way the general staff had a rather limited point of view, rather than the almost megalomania of the Schlieffen generation.

Professor DORPALEN: Yes, I certainly would agree and I think you could even go a little further on this if you look at the history of Germany in the last 200 years. You will find oddly enough that in a number of cases when war broke out, the generals were not happy about it. They were either not ready or they felt the situation was not a promising one or something like that. In fact, offhand I can think of only one war, the war of 1914, that the German generals wanted to bring on, feeling that otherwise time might work against them. But certainly in 1866 the generals were not anxious to go to war against Austria. Bismarck practically pushed them in. The same of course occurred in 1939. They tried their best to limit the war then and delay an attack on France—and managed to do so a couple of times during the winter of 1939-40. They were very unhappy about the invasion of Russia. So I think you have a very good point in this, Professor Ralston.

Captain LOUIS M. McDermott (USAF Academy): Professor Dorpalen, Professor Nunn of Portland State has recently studied the Prussianization of the Chilean army. He found that after the Chilean army became professional in the 1880s and 1890s, when the government moved against it as an institution, the army responded with moves against the government. His findings in other areas of Latin America seem to indicate that after professionalization, institutionalization, Latin American armies, when they are attacked as institutions, reply with political action—that is, the overthrow of the government. Would this come out of the Prussian background or would it be a combination of Prussian military institutions being transplanted into a Spanish area?

Professor DORPALEN: I am not really competent to answer that question. To give you a layman's view, my own feeling from the little reading I have done is that in a sense the Latin American officer corps have been sort of political outlets. There was no parliamentary life, there was no political life, so anyone with political ambitions went into the officer corps. This explains why so many of the military coups (I may be completely wrong but this is my personal impression) revolved around political issues rather than military ones, and it goes so far now that some of the Latin American reform movements are being sponsored by armies. The army, feeling that the kind of caste-bound society that exists in many Latin American countries has
become completely obsolete and wanting to anticipate a popular revolution, calls for reforms. In Bolivia the army has been the champion of political and social reforms. You have a similar situation in Argentina. Whether Prussian instructors first planted certain seeds there, which made it easier for officers to assume a political role, I don't know. But my feeling is that this is an indigenous development rather than one imported from abroad.

The CHAIRMAN: Professor Wright wants to return to Professor Ralston's comment.

Professor WRIGHT: Before we get too far away from what Professor Ralston said, I would like to say that I think his comment on the role of individuals and the differences among them is a very significant one that tends to get pushed aside, but it is most congenial to me. I think the example he suggested, Gamelin, is an excellent case in point.

I also want to add that he is one of the very few people who have done anything in the area of French history that I talked about. I borrowed shamelessly from him in preparing my paper. He is the one who should have presented the paper on this topic.

Professor WILLIAM T. R. FOX (Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University): None of the speakers this morning made much reference to the American Civil War, except to point out that having high command in that war was fairly important to winning the presidency in the next three or four decades. Could any of you offer us any guidance as to whether the problems of civil-military relations in the American Civil War were digested and subsequently influenced the patterns in France and Germany, or whether, if the American problems had been studied in Europe, some of the crises of civil-military relations in World War I might have taken a little different form? I ask this question very much out of ignorance, because I am one of those people that Professor Preston was talking about who is insufficiently grounded in military history and historiography.

The CHAIRMAN: We need Jay Luvaas to answer this, but he is not here, so I'll ask Dr. Dorpalen.

Professor DORPALEN: I am not aware that the Civil War had any impact on civil-military relations in Germany. It had unfortunately a very negative impact as far as military developments were concerned. I remember reading somewhere that Moltke once was asked had he learned anything from the developments in the American Civil War, and his answer was that he was not interested in the kind of warfare which was carried on by unorganized bands of civilians. This was a very shortsighted remark to make, for the simple reason that during the American Civil War military developments
occurred which were very much to influence future tactics and strategy in Europe too. It was the first war of extensive trenches. Anyway, all the European armies went into the First World War with the idea it would be a war of movement where the troops would clash and by the end of the day, it would be decided who had won. The whole war of course wouldn't last for more than two or three months. German troops—I don’t know whether this applied to the French as much—but German troops literally had to be trained after a few weeks how to dig trenches, how to build fortifications on short notice, how to use machine guns, and that sort of thing. Now anyone who watched carefully the American Civil War or the Russo-Japanese War could have learned about this and should have wondered whether this kind of warfare would not be applicable in Europe, too, in the future. But it was not done, and the result was that all the armies were quite unprepared for the war of attrition, for the war of trenches which developed in Europe in the fall of 1914; and they paid a terrible price learning the necessary techniques and adopting them.

Professor WEIGLEY: I think that even if the institutional arrangements of civil-military relations in the United States during our Civil War had been superb, there would have been no influence in Europe, because my impression is that nobody over there was paying any attention. But the institutional arrangements of civil-military relations in the United States during our Civil War were anything but superb. They were very clumsy, and I think that to the extent that the North fought the final campaigns of the war with the civil and the military elements of government working pretty well in harness, that that outcome was the result again of individuals working well together—of Lincoln and Stanton and Grant being able to cooperate so well as individuals that they overcame bad institutions.

Colonel TREVOR N. DUPUY (USA, Ret.; Historical Evaluation and Research Organization): Although I want to express admiration for the very persuasive and interesting case for the lack of distinction between the professional military leaders and governmental leaders in post-Jacksonian America made by Professor Weigley, I was surprised that he did not mention the differences that arose between Winfield Scott, for instance, and his secretaries of war, and Sherman and his; and I think that despite a number of very senior American military men having political ambitions, these were perhaps exceptions to the rule. I would suggest that a case could be made the other way around, although I am not prepared to make it at this moment.

Professor WEIGLEY: Well, obviously to mention Winfield Scott and William Tecumseh Sherman is enough to show that you have a point: there were occasions of civil-military division. But standing by the case that I argued today, I would be inclined to take the position that the differences between
Scott and Sherman on the one hand, and their secretaries of war on the other, were less matters of differing civil-military outlooks than differences that came about because Scott and Sherman were so slightly professional, were so much political soldiers and not really professional. But you obviously have a point.

Professor THEODORE ROPP (Duke University): I am the ghost of Samuel P. Huntington . . . . Seriously, I would like to call to your attention the remark that Huntington makes, in his book on this subject, in which he deals with the notion of military science as an independent subject. It has been developed in Germany at the end of the 19th century, but was adopted by the American soldier as a kind of escape hatch, a way the American soldier could bury himself in the details of his profession and avoid conflicts with the civilian authorities. He puts this adoption of true professionalism rather late, just before the Root reforms, and sees it as a kind of compensation device to escape these problems of civil-military relations. Would any of you comment on that?

Professor WEIGLEY: Well, I think that it is certainly true that the army's very isolation in the United States helped bring on its professionalism. More than that, by the late 19th century, army officers saw so many things in civilian America that for various reasons they disliked, that they wanted to stay isolated. Therefore there probably is an element of correctness in Huntington's argument here, that pursuing professionalism was a means of continuing to remain apart from a civilian America that the army didn't quite trust, partly because of civilian America's suspicions of the army's emphasis on specialized skills.

Professor DENNIS SHOWALTER (The Colorado College): I wanted to make an observation regarding the influence of the Civil War on the European military experience and the fight over the three-year law in Germany as well. In reading the German-Prussian military press, I have been struck by the intensity with which they addressed themselves as early as the 1850s to some of the problems that the Americans would face in the Civil War—notably the question of men against fire, the problem of how to get men to advance against long-range rifles that could kill at a thousand paces. This was a major reason why the colonels, the majors, the captains argued for a third year of service. Not only would it militarize the soldiers, but it would make it possible to get them off the barracks square onto open drill grounds and teach them how to develop the innere Führung to go up against modern rifles. The reaction of many German leaders to the Civil War was not so much, "It can't be done," as "These people can't do it." In other words, our men with better training and better equipment will be able to do what the Americans couldn't, to overcome trench warfare and long-range rifles.
I think another problem, which Jay Luvaas mentioned in his study on the Civil War, was that most of the foreign military observers tended to leave after 1863, just at the time when the Civil War armies had begun to learn their trade and develop reactions to military problems that might have been useful to the Germans, the French, and the Austrians as well.

I wanted to ask Professor Dorpalen if he thinks that there may be a tendency among German historians to underplay the technical, military reasons for wanting this third year of service.

Professor DORPALEN: I must confess I have never heard about this and I find it very interesting. I have never really studied the military technical literature of Prussia at that time. The only thing I can say is that neither in the parliamentary debates nor any memoirs does this question come up, and the only other thing I can say is that the military leadership was prepared to accept a two year term as sufficient. It was the king who insisted, and again I only know of political reasons, that the men be retained for three years; and he in fact was prepared to abdicate if he didn’t get this through. This of course is when Bismarck was called in and he just proceeded on his own.

The CHAIRMAN: This attitude of the professional soldier about the American Civil War is illustrated by a story of a British engineer officer who came to inspect the war and saw cavalry behaving, as he thought, very poorly—so he borrowed a horse and showed the Northern troops how to attack entrenched infantry on horseback, which must have caused them some amusement.

Professor NEVILLE T. KIRK (U. S. Naval Academy): Replying to Mr. Fox and also addressing a comment of Professor Weigley, I think that it can be said that the American Civil War influenced England more than any other European nation, and influenced England very considerably. One gets a very detailed analysis of the whole course of the war in Blackwood’s Magazine from 1861 to 1865. Captain Hamley, who became commandant of the British staff college at Camberley, produced excellent strategic analyses in Blackwood’s from 1862. Another British officer, Captain Chesney, wrote a whole book on the administration and strategy of the war by 1863. But the interest of British soldiers in the Civil War was acute, certainly at the early stages, and I think, indeed, throughout the war—in distinction to the reactions of the Prussian and many French observers.

Professor RICHARD CHALLENER (Princeton University): I would like to comment, relative to Professor Weigley’s remarks, that perhaps the issue of professionalism appears differently if you are talking about the navy. For example, you start to find elements of professionalism and a beginning sense
of organization considerably earlier in the naval service than in the army. Moreover, once the General Board was established in 1900, many navy men were quite prepared to make statements and express ideas about the foreign policy of the United States. On the other hand, two other considerations were operative with the navy. First, what naval officers were interested in was overseas expansion, and this was the same thing that civilian leaders were interested in. Secondly (and this was very much part of the naval outlook), they continued to believe that the role of the military in this country was to advise only upon military matters. To be sure, naval officers occasionally sent off memos with policy implications, but at the same time they always pulled back from suggesting that, under the American system, they were authorized or permitted to go further than offering strictly military advice.

Professor JUSTIN B. PIERCE (Colorado School of Mines): There are two points that I would like to comment on. One of these has to do with the notion of the scapegoat being a military person in German history. Am I wrong in recalling that, particularly after the famous interview in which Ludendorff seized on the stab-in-the-back concept, the *Zentrum*, for such figures as Erzberger, and the Socialists, with Scheidemann and Ebert, were universally held as being exemplary of the failure of the civilians to support the military in war?

The second point is that unless my information is incorrect, of all the European powers who went into the conflict in 1914, Germany in particular was best equipped with regard to the use of machine guns, because as early as 1901 Wilhelm himself had interested himself in this matter and had urged the increased use of machine guns, to the effect that in 1914 the German heavy weapons companies had something better than twice as many machine guns as did the French, who were the next best equipped. The French military evaluations of casualties—I believe it was in the first seven weeks of the war—laid particular stress on the effectiveness of German tactical use of the machine gun as opposed to artillery fire, which the French had largely relied upon. It was their evaluation, as well as that of some forward thinking Britshers, that the machine gun had been particularly decisive in the hands of the German troops.

Professor DORPALEN: I could be wrong on the question of the German use of machine guns. I am not sure that I understand your first question. Is it that Ebert and Scheidemann and Erzberger were considered traitors?

Professor PIERCE: Yes, in essence. Perhaps you misunderstood a remark made by Professor Ralston, but I took the sense of his comment and your reply to be that, when it was necessary to find a scapegoat, when there had been some failure in cooperation between military and civilian in Germany,
it has always been the military who were considered the scapegoats.

Professor DORPALEN: I did not mean to imply that this was always the case. After World War I the civilians were indeed made the scapegoats by the stab-in-the-back legend, which said that Germany was never defeated militarily but was stabbed in the back by traitors back home. Yet the fact of the matter is that the military at the end of September 1918 told the civilians that the war was lost. The nation was completely unprepared for that. Of course, once this was out, then morale crumbled, and political influences made themselves felt.

The CHAIRMAN: I am watching the clock, but I want to take time before we close to express our appreciation for the three excellent papers that we have heard. A round of applause would be appropriate.
The Second Session

SOLDIERS AND STATESMEN:

FROM VERSAILLES TO POTS DAM
OPENING REMARKS

The CHAIRMAN (Professor LOUIS MORTON, Dartmouth College): This afternoon we are to deal with the period from Versailles to Potsdam. The main paper will deal with the World War II Chiefs of Staff and their relations with the president. Let me just provide a brief transition to try to link our morning session with this afternoon's.

Russ Weigley spoke eloquently and persuasively about the development of professionalism, or the lack thereof, in the 19th century, and its beginnings in the early 20th century. One of the evidences of this growth of professionalism and the beginnings of a dichotomy between the soldier and the statesman, and the problems arising therefrom for civil-military relations, was the establishment in 1900 of a General Board in the navy, of a General Staff in the army in 1903, and of the Joint Board the same year—the first, formal, joint organization of the two services. You will all remember that the Joint Board, which was the predecessor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had no legal or statutory basis, but was created by an exchange of letters between the two Secretaries and a general order of the navy and army in July 1903.

The fortunes of this joint agency concerned with operations that affected both army and navy jointly, and the relationship of the board to political matters via the State Department and the president, were mixed in the years down to World War I. Most of you are familiar with this story and I have no intention of repeating it except to say that at one point in its relationship with Theodore Roosevelt, the issue of where to establish the major American base in the Philippines, whether it was to be at Cavite or Subic Bay, led to a rift between the president and the Joint Board which finally resulted in a cessation of meetings by the Board for a year. Its fortunes thereafter were also uneven and in World War I, if my recollection serves, it met only twice, both times on matters relating to the Philippines. Certainly it was not an effective joint organization.

But the point here is that in this first, formal, joint organization for planning between the two services and in the relations of the agency with the political authorities, there clearly developed certain problems that point toward the future and ultimately the establishment in 1947 of a National Security Council—the first time actually that an institutional arrangement was made to solve some of these problems. So that in this period from the
beginning of the 20th century, as the American army became professional-
ized, the problems about the relationship between the political and military
authorities began to be explored, and institutional arrangements for reaching
agreement, or at least deciding upon how policies were to be made, were at
least beginning to be explored. Mr. Matloff will speak at more length in his
comments on the period from Versailles to World War II on the fortunes of
the Joint Board and how it was transformed, I suppose, into a Joint Chiefs
of Staff very informally in February 1942. So there is a link, there is a
relationship, between the first session that we had this morning, particularly
Mr. Weigley's comments, and the discussion we are about to have.

[The Chairman introduced Dr. FORREST C. POGUE, Executive Di-
rector, The George C. Marshall Research Foundation.]
THE WARTIME CHIEFS OF STAFF AND

THE PRESIDENT*

Forrest C. Pogue

George C. Marshall Research Foundation

As a small boy in western Kentucky, I used to attend a great many evangelistic services, and I found that you cannot make a proper oration of any length without a text; so I would like to begin my paper today with a text—a lengthy text—from General Marshall. I may return to it sometime near the end of the speech; however, I purposely put it at the beginning so that the next two speakers may use it as a basis for departure from some of the points that I have to make.

In 1956, I raised with General Marshall a number of questions relative to the failure of the United States Chiefs of Staff to consider political matters in their military decisions and the matter of the extent to which they had made U. S. wartime policy. I called attention specifically to the criticism of the military leaders by Chester Wilmot and Lord Alanbrooke. The former Army Chief of Staff, who had talked earlier with Wilmot, Sherwood, and Morison on these subjects and who had carefully read statements by Hanson Baldwin, Churchill, and Alanbrooke, replied:

In regard to the political aspects which some British historians and some British officials feel that I [and other U. S. military leaders] were not sufficiently mindful of . . . I have this to say: We probably devoted more time in our discussions, our intimate discussions, to such matters than to any one subject, because we were very fearful that we might find our whole campaign upset by some political gesture. I frankly was fearful of Mr. Roosevelt introducing political methods, of which he was a genius, into a military thing which had to be on a fixed basis. . . . You can’t treat military factors in the way you do political factors. It’s quite a different affair. You have to be very exact, very clearly informed, and very precise in what you say in regard to military things.

*This paper is based on my researches of the past several years, for writing the multivolume biography of General Marshall.
Now as to whether we did not regard diplomatic factors sufficiently, I repeat again that we discussed political things more than anything else. But that was Mr. Roosevelt's [responsibility], and our problem was to be on guard that the military picture—Army, Navy, and Air—was not completely disjointed by what I will call some irrelevant political gestures which were made without due thought to what was going on at the time. . . .

Of course, Mr. Churchill and the president were the dominant factors in all these arrangements and in all guidance. And they were the great political leaders of their countries, but they were also the military leaders and it was quite a delicate issue back and forth, particularly in matters like the Mediterranean, the soft belly of Europe, the Balkan states, the marches on Berlin, and things of that sort. Well, there were a great many factors connected with all these things, but we had to give special regard to the particular military factors and make sure there were no misunderstandings or failure in this respect. I repeat again that I doubt if there was any one thing, except the shortage of LSTs, that came to our minds more frequently than the political factors. But we were very careful, exceedingly careful, never to discuss them with the British; and from that, they took the count that we didn't observe these things at all. But we observed them constantly, with great frequency, and particular solicitude, so that there is no foundation in that charge. We didn't discuss it with them because we were not in any way putting our necks out as to political factors which were the business of the head of state—the president—who happened also to be Commander-in-Chief.

I do not think the military authorities should make any political decisions unless they are instructed accordingly, because the effects are too wide-reaching, there are too many influences involved, and it is quite a question of how much of this would be familiar to the military participants. And also it must be remembered [and he repeated this to me on three occasions] the military responsibility in operations is very, very large, and it has with it a terrible measure of casualties. . . .

Marshall thus put into perspective a position taken and adhered to for the most part by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff throughout World War II. It should be compared to the thesis advanced by Samuel Huntington in The Soldier and the State in 1957 and confuted by William Emerson, Kent Greenfield, and others in later years that (1) the Joint Chiefs of Staff ran the war and (2) that they did it by merging their identity with civilian views. Considerable material has become available since Huntington wrote his perceptive volume,
and it is worthwhile reexamining the relationship of the president and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in that light. This is particularly important since Professor James MacGregor Burns’s new book has raised again the question of President Roosevelt’s role in directing the war effort.

I think that for this audience I need not give a long outline of the formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except to call to your attention the fact that shortly after Pearl Harbor such an organization was established in Washington. General George C. Marshall, U. S. Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations; and General Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces, were the original members. Admiral William D. Leahy was added as chairman in the summer of 1942. Leahy was named, as a matter of fact, at the suggestion of General Marshall, who felt that King might not be happy with General Arnold’s sitting in the regular Joint Chiefs meeting with a full vote, thus giving the Army and the Army Air Forces two votes to King’s one. Marshall also felt, however, that in Leahy, an old friend of President Roosevelt and a man with whom Marshall himself had worked briefly, the organization would gain a man who could perform useful liaison with the president and also a man who would take a broad view toward both army and navy attitudes. Marshall was disappointed in this selection in one respect: Admiral Leahy accepted Roosevelt’s definition of the job of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which the chairman would be his “leg man,” whereas that had not been Marshall’s concept of the job. The Army Chief of Staff felt at times that Leahy limited himself far too much to bringing messages from the White House and carrying messages back, without serving as the strong voice of the Chiefs of Staff to the president, as Marshall had hoped he would be. However, for all that, Leahy played an important role in briefing the president every morning, and Leahy did tend to take a broad gauge view in most of the discussions within the Joint Chiefs.

As to Marshall’s role, and it is the one that I shall talk about most here since it is the one I know most about, I should say that in the beginning, Marshall felt he did not have the close confidence of the president. He was never quite sure how he came to be appointed to the job of Army Chief of Staff, but he believed that it was due largely to the influence of Harry Hopkins, and especially to one meeting that he had with Hopkins several months before he was appointed. Hopkins, who had been converted very late in the game to the need for quick rearmament, had talked with him, after a discussion of the use of WPA funds for army construction, about the needs of the country. At the end of a two hour session, Hopkins said, “I want to go to the president and emphasize to him the things that you have just said.”

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2Ibid., 13 Nov. 1956, 14 Feb. 1957.
Nevertheless, the general sensed that, not having had a command position in World War I, he did not initially have the president's full confidence. Marshall said of this period: "I thought it was far more important in the long run that I be well established as a member of a team and try to do my own convincing within the team rather than to take action publicly contrary to the desires of the president and certain members of Congress." And very carefully, when he testified before congressional committees in executive session, he made it a point that his full remarks were placed on the president's desk next day. He also resolved very early not to force showdowns with the president on "small matters," so that the president would know that on any occasion when Marshall said, "There must be a decision; it must come now for the good of the country," then the president would know that he was not being dealt with frivolously.

Not only did General Marshall actually become the principal spokesman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the president but, in time, of course, he became the chief proponent of the cross-Channel strategy in the discussions with Churchill. The prime minister recognized this very clearly, going out of his way, during most of the international conferences from Casablanca on, to arrange a private meeting as soon as possible with Marshall, in order to seek some sort of understanding with him about the discussions that were to follow. I don't mean by this to imply that at those meetings where the president attended, he and Churchill did not have long sessions—they had far more than the Chiefs of Staff would have liked. But in most cases, Roosevelt suggested that the Chiefs of Staff go ahead of him to talk with the British Chiefs of Staff, and then quite often Churchill would arrive before Roosevelt.

In the U. S. Chiefs of Staff meetings, on the matter of grand strategy, although Admiral King had definite views about what should be done in the Pacific, he tended to work closely with Marshall on questions such as "Europe first," and in some cases presented the Marshall strategy more strongly than the general himself did. As most of you know, General Arnold, technically under Marshall, concentrated on air matters, and Marshall for the most part left such things to him. I have the feeling that of the various Chiefs of Staff, the one that President Roosevelt personally liked to talk to most was General Arnold.

I also have the feeling that the president very seldom was completely at ease with Marshall or King. And the general went out of his way to discourage familiarity, turning down suggestions from Hopkins that he go to Hyde

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Park or Warm Springs to talk with the president. "I found informal conversations with the president would get you in trouble," Marshall said later. "He would talk over something informally at the dinner table and you had trouble disagreeing without creating embarrassment. So I never went. I was at Hyde Park for the first time at his funeral."  

By the late fall of 1943, Marshall thought that he had the president's full confidence; and it is quite evident that in 1944 and the early part of 1945, the president relied on him to a tremendous extent.

I would like to say, too, that the president never had the close rapport with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Churchill had with his own Chiefs. And Marshall—while he did not want to duplicate the experiences of the British with Churchill on those occasions when, as Lord Portal said, "He browbeat them like they were a bunch of pickpockets"—Marshall was glad to escape that type of familiarity; but he would have liked more frequent meetings, and he would have liked a greater give and take in the discussion period than he was able to get. He was particularly unhappy at the fact that it was nearly impossible to get a clear record of agreements that Roosevelt made orally with Churchill and others. In 1942 and 1943 Marshall tried to get the president to read a description of the secretariat that Ismay had set up for the prime minister and the British Chiefs of Staff. Marshall tried to get Hopkins to take this information to the president. Marshall went to the point of taking Colonel John R. Deane with him to some of the early meetings of the president with the Chiefs of Staff. Of this episode, Marshall recalled that the first time Deane attended, he had a large notebook; and the president had said, "Put that thing up." The next time Deane took a notebook so small that, while the president didn't notice it, Deane could not put any notes in it. In the summer of 1943, General Marshall worked very hard on a better administrative arrangement between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the president, and at one point suggested to Hopkins that Averell Harriman act as secretary of the group. But in a short time, Harriman was sent to Moscow and, said the Chief of Staff, "that ended that." Deane went with the Harriman mission and Marshall never was able to do much about it again.

Not being able to find on an official, regular basis exactly what the president had told various people in private conversations, Marshall began to depend in British matters on Field Marshal Sir John Dill, head of the British staff mission. These men became extremely close friends, and it is interesting to find occasionally in the files messages that Dill had sent Mar-

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*Sbid., 14 Nov. 1956.
*Interview with Lord Portal, 7 Feb. 1947
*Interview with Marshall, 13 Nov. 1956.
shall, with notes to the effect that "This is what will be presented formally to the president tomorrow. Please don't let him know what is in it." But because the president in a short time might ask the Joint Chiefs or Marshall for a paper on the subject, it was highly important that he have some advance warning.

Except on one or two matters, Marshall also depended heavily on Harry Hopkins, finding it possible to get Hopkins to bring the views of the president to the Chiefs as well as carrying the Chiefs' views to the president. But on the matter of aid to Russia, Hopkins followed the president's lead of rushing all possible aid to the Soviets in the early months after the German invasion. Marshall said of this disagreement that they finally did not discuss the problem at all. Hopkins's job, as Marshall saw it, was to carry out the president's desire that all possible aid be rushed to the Soviet Union; Marshall's job was to represent the interests of the Army and the Army Air Forces. "And I was opposed," said the Chief of Staff, "to any undue generosity which might endanger our security." When Hopkins urged the promotion of Colonel Philip R. Faymonville to brigadier general so that he could help expedite Lend-Lease deliveries to Russia, Marshall accepted the recommendation as a White House requirement after suggesting reasons against the promotion. And in the matter of the China-Burma-India theater, especially China, Marshall finally reached the point that he would no longer discuss with Hopkins the problems of General Chennault's air program and General Stilwell's strategy, because he found that Hopkins was completely on Chennault's side, opposed to Stilwell, and there was no point in pursuing any discussion.

Now let us come back to Professor Huntington's thesis, made some years ago in The Soldier and the State, about who ran the war. Huntington declared, "So far as the major decisions in policy and strategy were concerned, the military ran the war [and they ran it] just the way the American people and American statesmen wanted it run." This view has of course been challenged in more recent days, first possibly by William Emerson, who detailed instances in which FDR definitely overruled the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I suppose the strongest case against Huntington's view is that presented by Kent Roberts Greenfield in American Strategy in World War II, in which he cites more than twenty cases in which Roosevelt overruled the considered judgment of the responsible military chiefs and substituted his own estimate of the military situation or his own concept of the strategy the situation required. Greenfield mentions twelve other cases in which the...
initiative for taking an important military measure came from Roosevelt. However, since that book appeared, Lord Moran's diary has thrown light on some of the discussions between Hopkins and the American Chiefs of Staff, on the one hand, and Churchill, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, and others, which would seem to change some of Greenfield's interpretation; and I will go into that in a moment.

More moderate positions between the extremes taken by Greenfield and Huntington have been taken by Maurice Matloff and Louis Morton, who feel that both the Joint Chiefs and the president played considerable roles. I have relied heavily in some of my earlier work on their interpretations, and my independent research brings me more closely into line with their positions than with some of the others. Professor Morton in 1960 declared:

The assertion is frequently made that the United States fought World War II with no awareness of political objectives and with a single-minded devotion to the ideal of military victory. Perhaps this is the way President Roosevelt wanted it, for, by deliberately avoiding defining postwar political objectives, he left the military men largely free to pursue their own goals. This is not to say that he did not intervene in strategic matters when he felt it necessary, as in North Africa, or that the military men were unaware of political problems. As a matter of fact, they were perhaps more aware of them than most civilian officials and on many occasions sought guidance from their political superiors. When such guidance was not forthcoming they had no recourse but to base their actions on military considerations.

I should note in passing that Huntington lists the same two cases in which Roosevelt overrode the Joint Chiefs of Staff that were first mentioned, I think, by Sherwood in his Roosevelt and Hopkins. One of these has to do with Torch, the decision to go into North Africa. The president definitely took a strong stand against the Joint Chiefs of Staff's recommendation that they push ahead for some kind of cross-Channel attack in 1942 or at least in the spring of 1943, without having the diversionary action in North Africa. The other instance has to do with the decision to drop Buccaneer, the

amphibious operation which was to have supported the attack in Burma. This decision was taken, as you know, at the second Cairo conference in 1943, after certain discussions in Teheran.

James Burns's recent book has focused attention on the possibility that Roosevelt, by brushing aside the advice of General Marshall and Admiral King in 1942, helped to raise hopes in the minds of the Russians which, when not satisfied, helped to prepare the way for the Cold War. This is a somewhat oversimplified statement of his view, but I do want to raise it very briefly, so that if you want to examine it further in the discussion period, you can do so. All that I want to say here is the following. Molotov went to England in May of 1942 seeking some sort of diversionary action in the West that would take away 40 German divisions from the Eastern Front. Churchill did not know of any way that could be done, so he began to tell about other fine operations such as Gymnast in North Africa, or Jupiter in Norway, which would serve the purpose of diverting some German divisions from the East. Molotov then came on to Washington, where he talked to Marshall and to the president. General Marshall felt that, while the president should encourage the Russians to expect aid ultimately, he should not make a specific promise, and he should not give any particular publicity to any sort of statement. Despite this advice, and despite the fact that Hopkins repeated Marshall's doubts about the whole matter to Roosevelt on two occasions, the president, in an expansive mood or from a desire to encourage a hard-pressed friend, suggested that a second front would be launched much more quickly than Marshall thought possible. Then over Marshall's objection, this was given publicity. Of course, where I question Professor Burns's thesis is that I can not believe that as able a diplomat as Molotov would believe for a moment that the president could put into effect any great operation within a few months, particularly if the British had to furnish most of the resources, when it was quite clear that Churchill didn't intend to do anything of the sort. So if the Cold War started because of this disappointment, it was because the Russians wanted it to start, since Molotov had no reason to base any great faith on this point.

Now I recognize that if you drop that point and assume that Molotov expected aid, took for granted that the Soviet Union was due aid from the West on the grounds that it had been fighting the West's war for it, then it is a different story. Of if you want to take it another way, that the Russians took it for granted that the Western powers were perfectly willing for them to wear themselves out against the Germans and to do most of the fighting—that's another story, too. But actually Professor Burns seems to overstress

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this particular discussion in 1942. But to go back to the question of Roosevelt's overriding his advisers. In this case, Roosevelt did not flatly override General Marshall's advice. Marshall was not giving political advice, but was trying to explain to the president that we could not make available in 1942 resources that could divert 40 divisions from the Eastern Front. Now as you know, before that spring was over, Marshall did talk about the possibility of an emergency landing in the Cherbourg Peninsula with perhaps two divisions or something of the sort—it was a little vague at times—to make some kind of diversion. But it was nothing of the magnitude Molotov had asked for.

When you come to the decision to go into North Africa, you certainly have a clear-cut example of the president, on the basis of what he thought were political as well as military reasons, overriding the considered opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They felt that any invasion of North Africa would get us into a number of diversionary actions that would delay, if not prevent, the type of cross-Channel operation that the Joint Chiefs wanted by 1943 or, at the latest, by the spring of 1944. General Marshall later said he had learned an important lesson from this decision's going against him, a lesson he tried to point out to young officers every time he spoke at the War College: in a democracy, political leaders at times had to have action for the sake of assuring the public, and sometimes risks had to be taken to let the public feel that they were making progress toward ending the war. And Marshall had to admit that he had not thought of that particular angle in his own planning.16

Now I want to take up two points on which there has been considerable debate about the extent of Roosevelt's overriding his military advisers in the matter of cross-Channel strategy. There are some differences in interpretation of what happened between President Roosevelt and his military advisers at the Trident and first Quebec conferences, between some of us on the platform and one or more of you in the audience. The Joint Chiefs in May 1943, preparing for their meeting with the British Chiefs at Trident, persuaded the president to sit down with them at the White House and determine a basic American case on which they could all agree. Now this is important. All of them agreed that they would try to pin down the British for a cross-Channel invasion at the earliest practical date and to make full plans for such an operation for the spring of 1944. The president agreed to that, although neither Secretary of War Stimson nor General Marshall was certain that they could hold him to it. Dr. Greenfield and Dr. Richard Leighton, in accounts of this particular conference and the one that followed, are inclined to feel that the Joint Chiefs were somewhat more inflexible than I believe they were, and also that it was the president who, by some sort of

16Interview with Marshall, 13 Nov. 1956.
pressure or persuasion, got them to be a little more reasonable in their dealings with the British.\textsuperscript{17} I have the feeling, and I believe that Professor Matloff has the same in his books on coalition strategy, that this is not quite accurate.

I have the feeling that the president, in the White House conference, tended to agree with the Joint Chiefs, and that he did not basically depart from that general agreement in his later discussions, although he may have been less abrasive in his language than General Marshall or Admiral King. Dr. Greenfield, for example, I think went too far in his statement that the president had let his advisers go out on a limb that did not support their weight.\textsuperscript{18} In their own way, these descriptions of Roosevelt's actions exaggerate the president's role as framer of strategy as much as the Huntington thesis exaggerates the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the first plenary meeting at \textit{Trident}, Roosevelt made clear that he had always shrunken from the thought of putting large armies into Italy—actually a main contention of the Joint Chiefs' argument. He proposed that the Chiefs investigate the effect on Allied resources of an occupation of Italy proper, or of the heel or toe of Italy. There were about 25 Allied divisions in the Mediterranean that should be employed. The surplus in the Mediterranean should be used to build up the forces in the United Kingdom. The president and the Joint Chiefs agreed that there could be no \textit{Sledgehammer} or \textit{Roundup} in 1943, and that if they were to be mounted in the spring of 1944, preparations had to begin then. Roosevelt emphasized that one or the other should be decided on for the spring of 1944—that is, \textit{Sledgehammer}, the lesser operation, or \textit{Roundup}, the greater one. To take the weight off Russia, they should compel the Germans to fight. For this reason, he questioned the occupation of Italy, feeling that this might release the pressure on Germans now in that country. He felt that the most effective way to make them fight was the cross-Channel operation. His statement, while not calling for a specific number of divisions in the initial attack, made the point insisted on by Marshall and his colleagues that they not get involved in an Italian adventure that would make a cross-Channel operation impossible for 1943 and interfere with the main effort for 1944. From the standpoint of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, Roosevelt instead of moderating their views had instead backed them. Churchill certainly was taken aback.

Now this is the point, I say, that was not available to Professor Leighton and to Dr. Greenfield when they wrote in 1960 or 1961. Lord Moran, Churchill's doctor, kept a diary of various discussions at these conferences.

\textsuperscript{17}Richard M. Leighton, "Overlord Revisited; An Interpretation of American Strategy in the European War, 1942-1944," \textit{American Historical Review} 68 (July 1963): 919-37.

\textsuperscript{18}Greenfield, \textit{American Strategy}, p. 64.
He says that after Churchill and Hopkins had discussed this statement of Roosevelt's, Churchill seemed surprised, since he had been certain that he could again win the president to his own point of view, as he had done in 1942 over Torch. Moran later wrote: "The Americans had done some very hard thinking, and Marshall was at the President's elbow to keep in his mind the high urgency of a second front. The results, according to Hopkins, were very satisfactory. The President could now, Harry felt, be safely left alone with the Prime Minister." Churchill told Moran a short time later that "The President is not willing to put pressure on Marshall. He is not in favour of landing in Italy. It is most discouraging. . . . I cannot let the matter rest where it is." Moran suggests that Churchill hoped that by taking Marshall to Algiers with him, he could change Marshall's mind.\footnote{Charles McMoran Wilson, Baron Moran, \textit{Churchill: The Struggle for Survival, 1940-1965: Taken from the Diaries of Lord Moran} (Boston, 1966), pp. 102, 104.}

Writing of the first Quebec conference held a few months after 	extit{Trident}, Dr. Greenfield declares:

Perhaps remembering 	extit{Trident}, General Marshall took the precaution of having his chief planner, General Handy, fly to Washington from Quebec to see Mr. Roosevelt before the conference opened. When the President arrived at Quebec the next day "it was already clear," to quote the official historian [Dr. Matloff], "that a compromise was in the making and that the U. S. staff would have to accept something less than 'overriding priority.' "\footnote{Greenfield, \textit{American Strategy}, p. 70. Matloff's full quotation gives a somewhat different turn to the situation. He wrote: "On 17 August, the President arrived in Quebec to lend his support to \textit{Overlord}. By that time—after three days of staff debate—it was already clear that a compromise was in the making and that the U. S. staff would have to accept something less than 'overriding priority' for the operation" (\textit{Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944} [Washington, 1959], p. 223.).} The inference here is that Roosevelt was still holding the scales even between the U. S. Chiefs and the British, rather than actually going ahead with his earlier decision to back the strategy advocated by the Joint Chiefs concerning cross-Channel. It is instructive to look at Stimson's diary and his correspondence with the president, as well as General Handy's recollections on the nature of that trip to Washington, because Dr. Greenfield gives the impression that Handy came to find out what the president wanted done, when Handy's impression is that Marshall wanted to make sure that the president stood hitched on the position he had already agreed to.

Stimson, returning around the first of August from a trip to Europe where he had argued stoutly over cross-Channel, wrote a detailed report
to the president on August 10, just before the Quebec meeting. Stimson went over the report step by step with the president, in what the Secretary described as one of the most satisfactory discussions they had ever held. Stimson emphasized the need of pinning the British down to the cross-Channel attack, the importance of Roosevelt’s taking the leadership at the approaching Quebec conference, and the selection of Marshall as Supreme Commander of the cross-Channel attack. Stimson was then invited to sit in on the Joint Chiefs meeting. “The president,” wrote Stimson, “went the whole hog for Roundhammer or cross-Channel. He was more clear and definite than I had ever seen him. . . .” Roosevelt favored setting up rapidly in the United Kingdom forces for Roundhammer, so that before the time of landing we would have more troops in Britain dedicated to that purpose than the British would have. “He said he wanted to have an American commander, and he thought it would make it easier if we had more men in the expedition at the beginning.” I don’t think that indicates Roosevelt was being nice to the British. I concede that the military and naval conferees were astonished and delighted at his definiteness. In respect to future operations in the Mediterranean, Marshall said that after deducting divisions to return from the Mediterranean to Great Britain, Eisenhower would have 48 divisions. On hearing this, the president withdrew his suggestion, made the previous day to Marshall, that they should send six divisions from the United States to help Eisenhower in the Mediterranean. Roosevelt said he felt Eisenhower now had plenty of strength. Stimson, who was often inclined to be pessimistic about the president, concluded: “I came away with a lighter heart. If he can hold to this in the conference, it will clear up the situation.”

Roosevelt held to his course. Churchill visited him at Hyde Park shortly after the Joint Chiefs and the Combined Chiefs had gone to Quebec, and then Churchill returned to Canada while the Combined Chiefs argued strenuously over the matter of an overriding priority for the cross-Channel attack. Determined this time to see that Roosevelt had the American side of the story before he again came under Churchill’s influence, the prime minister’s “sun lamp” as they liked to call it, General Marshall told General Handy to return to Washington and make sure that the president knew what the British Chiefs of Staff were saying and what the American Chiefs had in mind. Handy talked with Hopkins, and the presidential adviser arranged for Handy to ride on Roosevelt’s train to Quebec the next day. Handy talked with the president and was convinced by the time they reached Quebec that the president was still on the same line that they had talked about in the

21Diary of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Yale Library, entry for 10 Aug. 1943.
beginning. But Handy said, "Both sides knew, and the president knew, that we had to come to an agreement."22

The point I want to make is that it was not a softening of the Joint Chiefs by the president, but the fact that the Joint Chiefs working with the president had come to a moderate position. In the meeting at Quebec, the president was firm in his determination to get an agreement on cross-Channel, and he was determined to get the supreme command for that operation for the United States. He had General Marshall prepare statistics proving that we had, or would have, by all odds the larger number of troops in that attack. Of course, this was not needed because Churchill had read the handwriting very clearly and before Roosevelt could bring up the subject, he offered the naming of the Supreme Commander to the president. Lord Moran in his memoirs underscores one of the points I have been trying to make. "The Americans," he wrote at Quebec on August 20, "are not in doubt that Marshall was right in resisting the postponement of the landing in France. It appears that the President and Hopkins are no longer prepared to acknowledge Winston as an infallible guide in military matters."23 There was also the fact that since the president himself had insisted on the supreme commander role for an American, and it was evident that it would be Marshall, Roosevelt certainly was likely to assume that he would have to protect the Marshall position on cross-Channel strategy—the position the general had been set on since early 1942. Marshall himself reported to Stimson later that the big fight was not on cross-Channel but on Burma.24

Jumping ahead from Quebec to November and December of 1943, I would like to take up briefly the matter of Buccaneer, the case in which many writers insist that Roosevelt again overrode the advice of the Joint Chiefs. Now at the first Cairo conference, Roosevelt was in a mood to assure Chiang Kai-shek of strong American support for the operation in Burma. He took from a report of the Joint Chiefs a statement that there should be an amphibious operation in support of the ground attack in Burma, and the president promised such an operation to Chiang Kai-shek. This was not a Joint Chiefs promise; it was the president's promise. In the course of the conversations at Teheran, and particularly immediately afterward, the prime minister began to say that Stalin's agreement to enter the war against Japan later on changed the situation, and that they should therefore give up the promise to do Buccaneer and use the landing craft thus freed for some other purpose.

24Stimson Diary, 5 Sep. 1943.
Under great pressure from the prime minister, the president began to weaken; but instead of a brusque overriding of the Joint Chiefs, he began to ask if there was something else that Mountbatten could do that would satisfy Chiang Kai-shek. Now many people have been surprised that the Chiefs, after their return to Cairo from Teheran, continued to support the president's former position. Later the president reluctantly, most reluctantly, gave up that operation. Such a shift can scarcely be called a bold presidential exercise of authority over his military advisers. Rather, it was an embarrassed request that they help get him out of a situation in which he had been placed by his own impetuosity and the pressure of the prime minister.

I think, however, if you want a case where he did override and almost at times warred with his advisers, you should take another issue in that theater—the whole matter of Stilwell, Chennault's program, the question of Stilwell's recall, and a few other odds and ends of that arrangement. Much of this, of course, was due to the personality of Stilwell, to his quarrel with Chennault, to the ground force theory and the air force theory, to the British reluctance to do certain things in Burma, to Roosevelt's insistence in helping China to be a great power, and to the extremely personal fight that developed among the Americans in the China-Burma theater and their advocates back in Washington. At times, Marshall became more involved emotionally and personally in his support of Stilwell than in practically any other issue. As I have said, he had reached the point where he declined to discuss the matter with Hopkins. Now the amazing thing about the fight that went on between all these people during 1942-44, before Stilwell's recall, is the extent to which the president would approach the point of suggesting that Stilwell be recalled, and the extent to which the Joint Chiefs would almost take the step of opposing the president's policy, without quite doing it. The president, for example, came closest to angering General Marshall when he put his full support behind the Chennault program in the face of Stilwell's recommendation and in the face of Marshall's strong feeling that the president was encouraging Chennault's insubordination toward Stilwell. But how you could ever figure out who was being insubordinate to whom in the China situation, I really don't know. Stilwell, technically under Chiang Kai-shek, actually opposed him. Chennault, subordinate to both Stilwell and Chiang, opposed his American superior in China. The president had invited Chennault to communicate directly with him, thus virtually inviting him to bypass both Stilwell and the War Department. Chennault insisted, over Marshall's vehement protest to the War Department and Stilwell, on the commissioning of Joseph Alsop, Chennault's civilian aide who had attacked Stilwell. And then later, when Stilwell was Mountbatten's depu-
ty, Mountbatten felt that Stilwell was undermining his authority as head of SEAC. The case illustrates some very poor lines of authority and communication; but it also illustrates that the president did not always take the advice of the Joint Chiefs, and that the Joint Chiefs were not always docile when the president took an opposing view.

Basically, during the war, the president decided on the Europe-first strategy, with which the Joint Chiefs agreed. The president outlined and held to the unconditional surrender formula, although the Joint Chiefs had reservations about it. The president personally decided against taking responsibility for southern Europe, although he later changed that attitude somewhat. The president decided on the great-power role for China, even in the face of objections from Churchill. The president at one point set one or two years as the term for the American occupation of Germany. And the president emphasized that the big powers should enforce peace after the war. It was the acceptance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the president's actions in these political matters that apparently led Professor Huntington to his conclusion that "the trouble with American policy making was not too much military thinking but too little. And this was caused directly by American insistence that their professional military servants assume power and responsibility beyond their competence."26

The full examination of this thesis would require more time than we have for it in this symposium. But I would like to raise one point, in the light of what I have said earlier, for further examination and perhaps for further discussion in today's meeting. I have in mind Huntington's statement,

In contrast to American civilian thought, the thinking of the military before the war was, in general, coldly professional and free of illusion. They were, indeed, the only significant group to have such an approach to foreign policy. If they had been able to continue to think in military terms after assuming direction of the war, the policy decisions which their critics mistakenly label the result of the "military mind" might well have been avoided. If their views had not been altered, the military leaders might have warned the country of the permanence of the struggle for power, the improbability of postwar harmony, the weaknesses of international organization, the desirability of preserving a balance of power in Europe and Asia, and the truth of history that today's allies are frequently tomorrow's enemies. But, instead, as they achieved pow-

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26Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 328.
er, the military commanders had to abandon their professional conserva-
tivism and adopt the prevailing civilian viewpoints.27

I doubt if the full facts concerning the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
will show that they did assume the direction of the war in the broad sense
that Professor Huntington suggests. Even if they had continued to think in
purely military terms, as he suggests they should have, one wonders how they
could have made their warnings effective. How, short of taking over real
control of the government, could they have imposed their point of view on
the country?

Beyond that, I think that so far as the members of the Chiefs of Staff
organization were concerned, there is little evidence that their prewar mili-
tary thinking would have brought them to the kind of position Professor
Huntington had in mind. Their general training had, of course, conditioned
them to many of the professional views he mentions, but they had also been
influenced by the U.S. experience in World War I and the reactions that
followed. The balance of power in Europe and Asia, alluded to in the Joint
Board estimate of September 1941 to which Mr. Huntington refers28 as a
realistic statement of United States policy, meant little more in fact than a
hope of returning to the status quo ante bellum. This was based, as Army-
Navy statements throughout the year indicated, on the defeat of the German
and Japanese forces. As a practical matter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the
war period could not imagine American support of prolonged intervention
in Europe and Asia to enforce the balance of power. The hope was that with
the restoration of Britain and France to their former positions and the
clearing of Axis forces from Russia and China, a balance would be reestab-
lished, at least from the standpoint of the basic defense of the United States,
which was the point on which American military strategy had been based for
generations. In this case Russia's postwar position would be balanced by the
Western European powers.

Whatever theoretical views the military had, there was the profound
conviction, born out of the inability to keep even the modest defense estab-
ishment provided for in the National Defense Act at the close of World War
I, that the American people would not pay for more than the defense of the
coast of the United States, certain areas of Central and South America, and
some areas of the Pacific. To get them involved beyond that required a special
crusade against a particular enemy, and this in turn demanded a quick
victory and speedy return home. It is hard to see how even the most profes-
sional military view could be expected to overturn this experience, short of

27Ibid., pp. 327-28.
28Ibid., p. 331.
a completely different presidential policy with some prospect of national support.

I believe that except as an academic exercise, we need not concern ourselves with the question of what the professional military leaders would have come up with had they been free of responsibilities for running the war. The facts we now have fail to indicate that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had the full direction of the war in their hands, in the sense Mr. Huntington suggested. Perhaps they could have forced different views on the president, but they felt that this was not required of them; and in the framework of American professional military thinking, it was indeed foreign to their views.
Commentary

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American Leadership in World War II

Probably no aspect of World War II history has aroused more bitter controversy than American leadership and particularly the subject of the session this afternoon—the wartime relationship of the military to the president. Two extreme positions have been set forth: one that the military ran the war with FDR simply ratifying their decisions; the other that the president manipulated and bent the staff to his will. Between these extremes lie a wide variety of shadings set forth by conventional and revisionist interpreters of American policy and strategy in World War II.

Scholars who tread their way amid the complex problems of evidence, perspective, and the conflicting stereotypes and images that have become imbedded in the postwar literature face a formidable task. The illuminating paper we have been privileged to hear today, treating the controversial subject in the even-handed, judicious manner we have come to expect from the author, is therefore particularly welcome. Distilling his findings from his intensive study of General Marshall and the American high command, Dr. Pogue has presented a perceptive, balanced portrait of a changing association, of a growing respect between the president and his military chiefs, of a loose but cooperative relationship. In passing he has criticized the Greenfield-Leighton school for overdrawing the president’s role and Huntington’s portrait for exaggerating the JCS role. I have no basic quarrel with the general picture that emerges particularly since, as Dr. Pogue so graciously acknowledged, his interpretation accords in large measure with my own reading of the evidence. In the limited time available, I should like to approach the subject of the paper in a somewhat longer time frame and broader context and, in particular, to consider the important question Dr. Pogue raised at the end of his paper concerning the validity of the Huntington thesis.
My comments are intended as extensions, rather than criticisms, and revolve around three main points: the historical context of the wartime relationship, the nature of that relationship, and its significance. Since Dr. Pogue's paper has dealt so fully with the personal side of the relationships, I shall put more stress on institutional and intellectual factors.

The first point raises the question of background and framework. The wartime relationship must be put in a proper historical setting—that is, considered in terms of the pattern of civil-military relations that had emerged by Pearl Harbor. This is particularly important since the Huntington thesis rests in part upon assumptions about prewar military thinking and values—values that presumably were surrendered when, according to Huntington, the JCS assumed the conduct of the war. What was the legacy the JCS and the president inherited and how did that legacy color their roles during the war? To understand the traditions each inherited, it is necessary to go back briefly to World War I, the great divide in the history of civil-military relations for the Western world. In underscoring civilian control over the military, it only confirmed American traditions that reached back to the Founding Fathers and the Constitution. Yet, while Clemenceau's classic epigram that "war is too important to be left to the generals" emerged from that conflict, in fact, the president of the United States had allowed General Pershing, commander of the expeditionary forces in Europe, almost complete freedom in the military conduct of the war. Wilson simply delegated many of his responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief to the supreme commander in the field, while he kept the reins of foreign policy in his own hands and retained his options as war statesman. The major decisions in Allied strategy had already been made before American entry into the war, and the president was confronted with no thorny decisions that might have brought him into the arena of controversy with his military staff or Allied leaders—before Versailles. The war therefore confirmed the American tradition that the president determined the "what" of national policy and the military the "how." It also left a legacy of ideas and institutions, of intellectual baggage, inherited by American leadership on the eve of World War II. For the military the war confirmed the doctrines of concentration and of fighting for complete victory; and out of the experience on the battlefields of Europe came the foundations of strategic faith that military leaders like General George C. Marshall later sought to apply in the multitheater context of World War II.

As has happened so often in American history between wars, after a brief moment of glory on the national stage the military retreated from society, amid public indifference and hostility, to technical pursuits and cultivated their own professionalism. The presidents became preoccupied with other concerns: with the pursuit of security in non-military terms, with domestic
problems, and with the Great Depression. In this atmosphere during the period 1919 to 1939, the military gave little if any thought to the larger questions of war and peace or to a new world after another war; they were not encouraged to think in global, political, or coalition terms. No close coordination existed between the military and the presidents. The presidents stayed out of technical military matters. This gap, added to the traditional separation of political and military spheres in American national policy, would show up later in World War II.

In the period between the World Wars, then, both the presidents and the military turned their attention inward. The important question in civil-military relations was whether, in a period of isolation from American society, the military would take refuge in a narrow or broad professionalism. Fortunately, the period proved to be an era of gestation, of experimentation, and of broad professionalism for the American military. But American strategic theory and planning developed essentially along individual service lines. Joint service committees met and planned, but no highly sophisticated joint service machinery emerged that might have produced a coherent and authoritative body of strategic theory. The Joint Board, which had met only twice during World War I and re-emerged after that conflict, straddled strategic issues that might have created controversy between the services; most of the plans evolved by the joint service planners were academic exercises.

While in the context of the times official policy stressed the defensive, offensive notes, stimulated in part by currents in European theory, crept into the strategic thought of the services. On the eve of World War II, the army fashioned its theory of war around the infantry and a heavy concentration of ground forces; the navy put its faith in the capital ship and a powerful sea offensive, especially in the Pacific; and a vigorous group of theorists in the fledgling air force, advancing a more revolutionary approach to war, built its concepts around the long range bomber and strategic air bombardment. In effect three distinct theories of war emerged from the quiet revolution in service strategic thinking between the wars.

In classical military fashion, the military continued to recognize sharp distinctions between policy, the realm of the statesmen, and strategy, the preserve of the military, a corollary of military subordination to political control. Despite service support for some kind of coordinating politico-military machinery on a high national level that might give guidance on national policy, no national coordinating council emerged.

Thus, on the eve of World War II, institutionally and conceptually, no meshing of political and military factors into a grand strategy for the United
States had taken place; nor had a suitable mechanism evolved for developing grand strategy in the event of war. Basically the services were still co-equal sovereignties. While they still had no plans for global, coalition war, beneath the surface of official planning and doctrine, the trends in military tactics, technology, and strategic theory between the wars in effect were reinforcing earlier national experience in large-scale warfare and predisposing them toward decisive, all-out, offensive war overseas in the event of a future involvement.

On the eve of World War II, the president too was being molded by his own experiences and reading of the recent past. A naval enthusiast from his youth, his service as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in World War I had made him familiar with naval planning for war against Japan; and he had been an observer at first hand of Wilson's experiences with Congress, the military, the Allies, and the enemy. Like the military he too fell heir to the American tradition that saw war and peace in absolute terms and in distinct compartments. Down to Munich, though he had supported naval appropriations, he had largely ignored the army and its air arm. His experience with World War I and its aftermath had confirmed to him that victory had to be won on Capitol Hill as well as on the battlefield.

Fortunately for the United States, the prolonged "short of war" period between 1939 and 1941 offered an opportunity for the president and the military to adjust to the new realities. Under the president's leadership the country began to mobilize. A new phase began to develop in the relationship between the president and his military staff, as he drew the Joint Board closer to him—no longer did they have to go through the Secretaries. His concern with the aggressive imperialism of the Axis powers encouraged the military planners to lay aside their academic exercises, to widen their horizons, and to gear their plans for global and coalition war. Under the new assumptions, realistic compromises began to take hold in the joint planning committees. The new joint plans—the Rainbow plans—envisaged war against more than one enemy and in more than one theater, and for the first time incorporated the idea that the United States would fight alongside allies. While the president did not commit himself to these new plans, he encouraged staff talks with the British, out of which evolved the adoption of the crucial Europe-first principle. During this period the services, now virtually three, educated him even as he prepared them for the period ahead. He extended his knowledge of military affairs to take into account army and air, as well as navy matters. The military began to appreciate that he would play an independent role in strategy and policy. When he initiated the drive for rearmament after Munich, he rejected army views for a balanced ground-air rearmament in favor of more aircraft—a form of direct help that could be used to bolster the sagging Western European countries. Nor would he always agree with his
staff's assumptions on crucial matters. With faith in his own estimates, he simply refused to accept the staff's fear that Britain might go down or that the Soviet Union might not survive the German onslaught. Tying American security to British survival, he worked directly and indirectly to widen the scope of hemisphere defense. In the process he introduced his own creative strategic innovation, Lend-Lease. While the staff, in line with its traditions, stayed aloof from the debate over national policy and could not be sure of its future drift, it did not actively press for national guidance much as it wished it. Nor, consistent with the tradition of the "how" and the "what," did the Joint Board seek to ascertain the larger objectives of possible American involvement in war abroad. The one notable exception, to which Dr. Pogue alluded, occurred in the summer of 1941 in connection with the staff study requested by the president of a Victory Program for munitions necessary to pursue a successful coalition war. To arrive at such quantitative calculations, the staff felt it necessary to make some assumptions about larger American political goals in the event of such an involvement and incorporated, as one objective, the restoration of a balance of power in Europe and Asia. While this report of the Joint Board of September 1941 went forward to the White House, there is no evidence that the proposal for the balance of power objective was either pursued by the staff or encouraged by the president, then or later. In the realm of the higher objectives, the president showed, even before Pearl Harbor, that he would wage his own war and served notice that he would be his own Secretary of State. Significantly, at the same time that the staff floated the balance-of-power trial balloon, army strategic planners, in keeping with the traditional American notion of a "sharp and decisive" war, showed a disposition to think in terms of meeting the German armies head on—and the sooner the better. To that notion, the core of the American theory of a war of mass and concentration, they would hold steadfast throughout the war.

In any event, for all the uncertainties in the quickening pace of 1939-41, the relationship between the military staff and the president became closer and the spheres for each more clearly delineated. For the first time in American history, a president and his military advisers entered a war with considerable strategic thinking having been done beforehand on how to fight it. The sum total of doctrines to which the wartime JCS fell heir tended toward an American approach toward war—total style—but there is no conclusive evidence that their prewar thinking or values gave them a concerted view of the larger objectives of the war ahead that might have led to the pursuit of a different type of war and peace. In fact, on the basis of evidence to date, despite Huntington's contention, it may be questioned whether they had such consistent values to surrender—values that might have given them a fully worked out thesis or solution for the complex era ushered in by World War II. Although the president and his military advisers drew closer in 1939-41,
the gaps in grand strategy, both institutional and conceptual, had not been closed.

So much for the legacy, a blend of old and new, by the time of Pearl Harbor. Now what about the roles of the JCS and the president with relation to strategy and policy under the impact of war? Since Dr. Pogue has surveyed the major relevant decisions, and I have presented my basic views on those roles elsewhere, I shall attempt here only to offer a few observations.

The picture that Dr. Pogue paints, of a president who interfered in military affairs more than was originally thought when Sherwood and Huntington wrote, is in accord with the evidence as I read it. So too is his basic point that, while the military thought of political matters, over the long haul they left them for the president to decide. Essentially, despite the wartime pressures, the military held to the traditional distinctions between the “how” and the “what.” Basically the pattern that began to emerge between 1939 and 1941 held throughout the war—an active and independent Commander-in-Chief in working partnership with his military advisers. The relationship suited his methods and purposes. He could work through them, he could work around them. As usual, he used any and all instruments at hand. But they did give his administration an orderly touch that was often lacking in other parts and without which it is doubtful that he could have played his independent political role. At the international conferences, they carried the burden of debate with the British, allowing the president to play his favorite mediatory role. In many ways they served for Roosevelt in the multi-theater conflict as General Pershing and eventually Tasker Bliss had served for Wilson in the essentially one-front war. The day-to-day running of the war, the hammering out of those numerous decisions to keep a global, coalition war running on the track, fell to the JCS and permitted him to concern himself with the larger ends of the war. Not that he did not on occasion interfere with military affairs and pull the rug out from under his advisers. The timing and choice of important decisions he reserved for himself.

In this connection much has been made of the number of times he overruled the staff. A kind of numbers game has sprung up in the literature to which the Greenfield interpretation, following on his reading of the Leighton thesis, contributed. I would submit that the precise number of times is not really important—whether one accepts Sherwood’s two or Greenfield’s twenty or twenty plus twelve. Indeed, as Dr. Pogue has indicated, a goodly number on the Greenfield list occurred before Pearl Harbor; a number of them, looked at closely, are somewhat suspect as to who initiated what. For every case submitted, there are literally hundreds of decisions in the military running of the war where the president did not interfere, as a reading of the JCS minutes of the war would indicate. What is important, I would submit,
is the area of the differences. And here, I would suggest, of fundamental importance were the president’s political objectives: his desire to keep the Grand Alliance functioning; to help faltering friends, such as Britain and Russia in mid-1942; to treat China as a great power; and to preserve that alliance intact through the war and house it in the United Nations. Note how rarely he interfered in decisions involving the Pacific theater, an area of American and JCS responsibility. Dr. Pogue has noted that in connection with the dispute over strategy for the China-Burma-India theater, FDR encouraged General Chennault to communicate with him. But observe that this was an exception. He normally dealt with the commanders in the field through formal channels and only met with General MacArthur once during the war, at Pearl Harbor in July 1944; and even then it does not appear that he intervened in the strategic decisions that were pending in Pacific strategy.

Did he have strong strategic convictions? I should suggest that on the basis of the evidence he had predilections, rather than firm beliefs, and took pride in what he felt to be his strategic flair. To FDR, committed to no strategic doctrine except decisive victory, strategy, like politics, was the art of the possible; and he was apt to chide the staff on occasion for its conservatism. He could bend to strong staff urgings, even as he could on occasion overrule them. Indeed, while he did not always see eye to eye with his military professionals, his respect for them grew as the war wore on. But by and large, as in 1939-41, whatever political objectives he had in the international arena he kept to himself and did not discuss fully and freely with his staff. The unconditional surrender concept, which he announced to his staff shortly before Casablanca and which fitted so well with the basic military doctrine of a war of mass and concentration, served further to close off political discussion with the staff.

Now what about the Joint Chiefs of Staff as strategists? Did they prove to be as narrow and doctrinaire as charged in postwar literature, and did they thereby mislead the president and the West? It is important to recognize that the strategy they espoused evolved in response to changing pressures, internal and external, and that the American military matured in military diplomacy as the war progressed. It is not generally realized that after the American disappointment at Casablanca, the JCS system underwent a fundamental reorganization in the spring of 1943 as military planners and chiefs sought to cope more effectively with the president and to present a more united front vis-à-vis the British at the conferences. Needless to say, the Overlord operation finally agreed upon at Teheran represented a compromise between American and British views—a compromise that was two years in the making.

In holding to their strategy against Germany for a war of concentration
and in regarding target dates as sacrosanct, the American military were entirely consistent with their traditions and strengths. As the arsenal of democracy for the coalition, they regarded a major cross-Channel attack as the pivot of the global plans. They were anxious to get on with the war against Japan, in which they bore the primary responsibility. They feared the ultimate costs, in men, money, and time, of a long war of attrition so foreign to the American approach to war and summed up so succinctly by General Marshall’s statement: “a democracy cannot fight a seven years’ war.” Critics of the American case tend to minimize their maturation as strategists in mid-war, the global context of their planning, the war of opportunism they fought in the Pacific—not unlike that advocated by the British for the Mediterranean. The critics tend to overestimate the politico-military coherence of the British case and to forget that the strategy the Americans espoused for direct, total solutions was born in good measure from European prewar doctrine, to which they had fallen heir, as well as from their own traditions.

A word should be said about the American military and politics in the larger sense to which Dr. Pogue has addressed himself. As he has illustrated, and the instances could be multiplied, the charge that the American staff was oblivious to political considerations needs to be examined closely. As the war advanced, General Marshall and his planners increasingly recognized that military planning was inextricably involved with foreign policy. The fine line between foreign and military policy became increasingly blurred, and the staff sought to close the gaps with the State Department and devise new coordinating links to handle emerging politico-military problems.

As early as the summer of 1944 the JCS advised the Secretary of State:

. . . the defeat of Germany will leave Russia in a position of assured military dominance in eastern Europe and in the Middle East . . . . The successful termination of the war against our present enemies will find a world profoundly changed in respect of relative national military strengths, a change more comparable indeed with that occasioned by the fall of Rome than with any other change occurring during the succeeding fifteen hundred years. This is a fact of fundamental importance in its bearing upon future international political settlements and all discussions leading thereto.

After the defeat of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union will be the only military powers of the first magnitude . . . .

Postwar writers who have stressed the complete absence of political sophistication on the part of the U. S. staff have overdrawn the case. But it is also apparent that from the beginning the staff accepted constraints on
their non-military thinking. Whatever modifications the military may have wished, for example, on the application of unconditional surrender, and they were neither consistent nor in total agreement on this, they never pushed for them with the vigor with which they argued for a cross-Channel operation on a definite target date. Whatever predilections they might on occasion have exhibited in the secrecy of their staff memorandums or in the privacy of their own thinking, they left politics to the president and certainly never developed a coherent politico-military strategy of their own. In this respect, far from surrendering their values, as Huntington claimed, they were entirely consistent with their traditions.

What, then, may we conclude about the significance of the wartime relationship? The simple stereotypes and generalizations that have become embedded in postwar literature need re-examination in light of the lengthened perspective, broadened context, and new evidence. The evidence suggests that neither the president nor the JCS started with a fully developed blueprint. The patterns they fashioned for victory were molded by circumstances, by necessity, by trial and error, and by compromises among themselves and with their allies in the changing context of the war. Despite wartime challenges to the historic division of labor between the “how” and “what” of policy, between principal and agent, American soldiers and statesmen remained faithful to their respective traditions and roles. The successes and failures of American leadership in World War II, it may be argued, were a product of the American system and its ingrained approach to war and peace. The relationship forged under the stress of war empowered the military to secure the decisive victory FDR wanted. It permitted them to apply the revolution in technology, tactics, and doctrine that had developed between the World Wars to the war of mass and mobility that World War II turned out to be. Just as the president could play his mediatory role with the Allies, the JCS were enabled to balance the three approaches to war with which the American services entered the conflict. Through a quiet military diplomacy, the JCS managed to reconcile the diverse service theories, to produce joint plans without generating harsh frictions, and to oversee the delicate adjustments in which no one service won its way completely. The compromises they reached without formal votes were a testament to the working partnership that developed among them. Their flexibility in terms of the military strategy they forged among themselves and with their allies under the anvil of war has been underestimated. How far the American military had come in the quarter century since World War I was reflected in the transformation from the junior partner of World War I to its large share in molding European strategy and its preeminent role in directing the war in the Pacific in World War II. The JCS proved to be a remarkably efficient instrument in waging the first really global war in American history. In the process the military formed close ties with the civilian society and
emerged from the war with greater prestige and influence than ever before.

Yet, it may also be argued in retrospect that in the end the war outran the strategists and the statesmen. Gaps, conceptual and institutional, in national policy began to show up in the last year of the war. Problems of winning the peace began to come up against those of winning the war. Questions of political and territorial adjustments arose for which no solutions had been foreseen. The basic props of presidential policy—the cooperation of the Soviet Union, the survival of Britain as a strong power, China's elevation as a great power in the near future—began to be questioned. Roosevelt died without having decided what to do about Lend-Lease. He had fought the wars against Germany and Japan and, in the American crusading spirit, the war to end war. He had succeeded in the first two, but the issue in the third was still in doubt. On the military side, the JCS ended the war as they had begun it, approaching war as a technical military game. But in the end they sanctioned the use of the atomic bomb, planning for which had grown up largely outside regular strategic channels, before a theory or doctrine for it had been developed or its place in the future of warfare or of international relations been fully comprehended.

The world of 1945 was not the world of 1919 or 1939 or 1941. In previous American wars, political and military goals had meshed neatly: thrash the bully who started the war and all could return to normalcy. In World War II, the more the immediate enemy was beaten, the more the balance was upset. The more thoroughly Germany was defeated, the greater loomed the threat of the wartime half-ally, the Soviet Union—in victory more of a question mark than ever. In this uncertain situation, neither U.S. military doctrine nor political experience offered any real precedent. Hostage to American traditions, the president and the JCS had fought the war in terms of absolutes. To the end they saw war and peace in separate compartments and tended to postpone middle and long range political problems for a general peace conference that a quarter of a century later had still not materialized.

In retrospect, a number of questions remain. Had the president and the Joint Chiefs really fought different wars—one a crusade, the other a military struggle—in which their strategies happened on the whole to be compatible? Had the military reached the zenith of professionalism in the successful military war they fought, only to find military strategy an outmoded art in the international arena emerging by 1945? Had the president come in sight of the victory he sought, only to see danger signs for the brave new world he had envisaged? Was either really prepared for the changes in warfare or in international politics growing out of World War II—changes that would affect the relations of soldiers and statesmen in the quarter century to follow?
The war's end exposed the limits of tradition in the American approach to global grand strategy, an area new to national experience. But the military instrument the president had created and the alliance he formed with it had enabled American leadership to exercise power that rivaled Hitler's and to marshal national resources more effectively than either the political dictatorship of Germany or the military dictatorship of Japan. Throughout, the military remained the servants rather than the masters of the state, and the tradition of civilian control emerged from the war intact. The harmonious partnership formed by a remarkable group of forceful civilian and military leaders enabled American leadership to remain faithful to the basic precepts of the Founding Fathers and to meet the greatest test in war the nation had ever faced.
Lest I appear under false colors, let me say I am not a military historian. I am a diplomatic historian, more concerned with the historical interpretation of the civil side of civil-military relations. My remarks will reflect this background and point of view.

Historical scholarship on any particular issue often resembles the damping down of an oscillating pendulum. One extreme interpretation calls forth another just as extreme. Next both are modified by sober scholars more interested in truth than in controversy. Dr. Pogue in this paper is a fine example of the oscillation damper. This is not a very dramatic role, but it is an honorable and necessary one, the role of the true professional rather than the publicist or ax-grinder.

His paper dampens down the oscillations on three major related issues:

1) Who ran the war, President Roosevelt or the Joint Chiefs of Staff? I think the pendulum is about to come to a halt on that. Obviously they both did.

2) How sharp was Anglo-American conflict over strategy? Is the history of coalition strategy best understood by expressing antagonism or areas of agreement, compromise, and successful negotiation? In the military field, this reminds me of the general issue of Progressive history versus consensus history. Dr. Pogue, like Dr. Leighton, belongs in the consensus school on strategy. The ability of the British and the Americans to reach agreement was more significant than conflict.

3) Did military considerations dominate the running of the war to the exclusion of political considerations? Was there a disastrous absence of sound political thought concerning the management of the war? In other words, was the wartime mix of political and military considerations a success or failure
from the long-term point of view of American national interests?

I will concentrate on this last issue, for it is the crux of the conference. It is also the aspect of Dr. Pogue's paper which yields most when subjected to analysis.

Let me begin with an excursion into the Truman administration for purposes of comparison. Secretary of State Dean Acheson once commented on the folly of believing that there was some sort of intellectual cream separator which would put all the military considerations into one bucket and all the political considerations into another. On one occasion, Secretary Acheson made a private treaty with General Bradley of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that neither would use the phrases "military point of view" or "political point of view." This dictum sounds good, very sophisticated and worldly-wise. But it does not work in practice. There is no sharp line of division, but obviously there are differences between the political and the military spheres. We cannot ask everyone involved in the management of national security affairs to be both a general and a politician. The ideal of interchangeability of which Professor Weigley spoke this morning may have been possible in the 19th century. It is clearly impossible in the 20th.

Acheson himself found it impossible to follow his own advice. He made distinctions between international and domestic political considerations. It was his job to recommend what was right, in his opinion, for the international position of the United States. It was up to President Truman to judge what was practical from the point of view of domestic politics. For example, in 1952 during the prolonged negotiations over the repatriation of Korean prisoners of war, Acheson reported to Truman that a situation had been reached in the United Nations whereby a plausible agreement could probably be concluded. A statement could be issued to the American public proclaiming an American triumph. But Acheson warned that this plausible agreement would be bogus, a situation in which the American side got the words and the other side got the substance. Even though an apparent agreement might have had a positive effect on the chances of the Democratic Party in the elections of 1952, President Truman steadfastly refused to sanction such a course. There was no agreement in 1952 on the prisoners of war. General Eisenhower won the election.

Another example from the Truman administration involves Indochina. In 1952, with the battle line settled in the vicinity of the 38th parallel in Korea, many in the administration feared a negative domino effect. The Chinese had been stopped in Korea. Now they would seek some other place to advance. Indochina, where the French were hard pressed, seemed the most likely place. Acheson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a report on what it
would take militarily to stop China in Indochina. The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that they needed first to know what the administration's political priorities were. If the overriding objective was the defense of Indochina, how could that be reconciled with the idea that the risk of a major land war in Asia was unacceptable? Which prevails when an overriding objective collides with an unacceptable risk? Acheson was annoyed by this response, because he wanted a report on military costs before he could appraise political considerations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted political considerations before they could weigh the military cost. The two sides were at an impasse.

It would seem elementary that military and political considerations must be intermingled, and yet still kept separate to a degree. Therefore, what is all the shouting about? Cannot soldiers and statesmen agree and then get on with their responsibilities? This is not likely or even desirable.

The debate over civil-military relations resembles the running battle over the political role of the Supreme Court. The conservative Court of this century until 1937 claimed that it was above politics. Its critics charged that the conservative justices of that period were extremely political and in fact were upholding the interests of a narrow class. The Warren Court, in more recent times, took deliberate notice of political and sociological reality. Its critics charged that the Warren Court was making law. This is a two-edged sword. If you do not like the outcome of a decision, you can charge that the Court is polluted by politics, or, on the other hand, you can condemn a distasteful decision by claiming that the Court closed its eyes to the political realities and the real needs of the nation.

Commentators on military affairs do the same thing. A Chester Wilmot or a Hanson Baldwin can charge that American policy failed to take political reality into account during the Second World War. On the other hand, a Stimson or Eisenhower or Marshall in 1942 can complain that President Roosevelt allowed political considerations to override sound military strategy when he ordered the North African invasion for that autumn. The Korean War provides many examples. General MacArthur complained that political inhibition imposed upon him from Washington prevented victory. Others have suggested that President Truman, at least before he summoned up the courage to dismiss General MacArthur, showed an exaggerated respect for military opinion.

Samuel Huntington, who received considerable attention in Dr. Pogue's paper, is a good example of using the issue to fix blame for a situation he found alarming, namely the power of the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Huntington was caught up in the then faddish critique of the alleged moralism-legalism in American foreign policy and was seeking to counterpose military
realism to what he and so many others at that time saw as sentimental, utopian liberalism. I agree with Dr. Pogue that Huntington is stimulating, but just plain wrong about the military in the Second World War.

Huntington created an ideal body of military realism and then leaped without evidence to the conclusion that this realism prevailed among military leaders in the 1930s until they suddenly and inexplicably abandoned their realism during the Second World War. Huntington added, rather romantically, that America would have been better served if military realism had actually controlled strategy during the Second World War. Huntington suggests that military realism would have acted on the assumption that the struggle for power is permanent, that today's allies are tomorrow's enemies, and that international organizations are futile.

Perhaps; but as long as we have wandered off into this hypothetical jungle, let me suggest the following: American military realists might have said, "Yes, today's friend could be tomorrow's foe, and that friend is Great Britain. Yes, the struggle for power is permanent, and that struggle will be between Great Britain and the United States." Huntington, writing at a time when British weakness and Russian power were so evident, forgot how Americans so often exaggerated British power during the war and denigrated Russian power. The first lesson, I suggest, is that soldiers, statesmen, and scholars have a responsibility to distinguish between the polemical use of accusations about improper civil-military relations and thoroughly documented analyses of those relations.

The issue is complicated by honest confusion of terms. What is a military consideration? What is a political consideration? General Marshall, in a long quotation at the beginning of Dr. Pogue's paper, exemplifies this confusion. General Marshall said he and the Joint Chiefs devoted more time to political considerations than to any one subject. But in the body of his remarks he is not talking about one category of subjects, but at least four.

1. The Politics of Method

Marshall was fearful, uneasy, and appalled at President Roosevelt's slipshod, unsystematic, intuitive method. What orderly man would not be similarly appalled by the president's tendency to tell different people contradictory things, to avoid planning, to drift with events, to fail to keep a record of decisions? But Marshall confuses these idiosyncrasies of Roosevelt with political method in general and contrasts them with the precision of sound military practice. This really is not a civil-military issue, but an issue between good administration and bad. President Roosevelt's method had enormous negative impact. A generation of military and civilian leaders went to school
under Roosevelt during the war, and when they moved on into the postwar period in the Truman administration shaped their practice by conscious avoidance of Roosevelt's administrative methods.

2. The Politics of Public Opinion

Marshall also feared that Roosevelt might make some domestic political gesture, some decision to satisfy public opinion, that would upset a military campaign. This is indeed a legitimate concern which has given pause to everyone who has pondered the problem of civil-military relations since the United States became a world power. It is, of course, a facet of the larger question of compatibility of democracy with an effective foreign policy. It is hard to find a civil or military leader who is truly comfortable with the thought that public opinion might take control of foreign policy. Cordell Hull, a simplistic Wilsonian, may be the one exception. Despite this wide fear, it is hard to find an example during the war of the injurious impact of the politics of public opinion upon military strategy.

3. The Politics of International Cooperation

In this category we should put decisions designed to meet the needs of allies, for example, the level of aid to Russia, support for Chennault's rather than Stilwell's strategy in China, or accepting the British Mediterranean strategy in 1942 and 1943. Here Roosevelt's influence was at its greatest and moved consistently in the direction of giving bigger consideration to the wishes of allies than might have been the case had Roosevelt been silent.

4. The Politics of Competitive Advantage

This category became the most controversial of all. To what degree should jockeying for postwar position be allowed to shape military decisions? Should the Anglo-American armies drive through the Balkans to head off the Russians on the Danube? Should Anglo-American troops push as far east into Germany as possible and remain east of the Elbe in spite of the agreement with the Russians on occupation zones? Some postwar critics charged that the United States ignored political factors. On the contrary, it seems to me that Roosevelt's political strategy and our military strategy were congruent. The quickest road to victory over Germany and the least provocative action toward the Soviet Union were identical.

All four of these types of political consideration appear to be lurking behind General Marshall's remarks, and yet they are blended and confused. The second lesson to draw, then, is the necessity to distinguish carefully what kind or kinds of political considerations are meant when the issue of the impact of politics on military policy is under discussion.
In closing, let me comment on a pervasive note of defensiveness, even inferiority, in Marshall's remarks. He speaks several times of being "fearful" of Roosevelt's political talents, and of the necessity of being "on guard" and also the military man's unfamiliarity with political affairs. In context the word "unfamiliarity" implies ignorance, naiveté, and defenselessness. The third lesson which this suggests is the necessity of broad, continuing education of military officers in history and the social sciences. The defensive tone of Marshall's remarks, coming from the most distinguished American military leader of this century, is an indictment of the narrow military environment in the United States in the first forty years of the century. Fortunately the nature of military education broadly defined is far better in the postwar period than before 1945. A corollary to this lesson, of course, is the equal necessity of broad education, including some education in military history and principles, for the civilian side of national leadership.
Discussion

The CHAIRMAN: I don’t know if there is going to be time for general discussion, but I want to say that poor Sam Huntington has been taking an awful beating here today. He is not here, of course. Some here who know him well, as I do, know that he could take care of himself pretty well if he were here. I am almost tempted to try to defend him myself, but I couldn’t do nearly as well as he could, so I won’t even try.

The late Dr. Greenfield has been taking a beating too, and obviously he can’t be here, but I would like to exercise the chairman’s prerogative. Since one half of the team that has been referred to as the Leighton-Greenfield school is here, I think perhaps we owe Dr. Leighton a few minutes to make some comments. Why don’t you come down here, Dick?

Dr. RICHARD M. LEIGHTON (Industrial College of the Armed Forces): I realize that this is not an offer of equal time, so I will make my remarks brief. Actually Dr. Matloff has made a lot of the points I would have made. I am grateful to him for that. I might take one small exception to his reference to the numbers game, trying to add up occasions on which FDR overrode his military advisers. This is a numbers game. Some of us have indulged in it more than others, but I fully agree with Maury that this is a fruitless exercise and can be pushed too far. One point, however: the 20 or 22 occasions of overruling that the late Dr. Greenfield found—most of them came not from my book but from Maury’s. It is a point both Dr. Greenfield and I have made whenever the opportunity presented.

But generally I think Maury made several points that should be kept in mind in any consideration of the relations between FDR and his military advisers. The fact is that Roosevelt’s role was dominated by his political aims, especially the aim of keeping the coalition together. This I think cannot be overstressed. Dr. Pogue has already referred to it with respect to the Soviets. In the case of the British, it meant that Roosevelt felt not only a great deal of sympathy with British aims in the Mediterranean, where they had a legitimate military and political interest, but he thought the United States should even make very substantial concessions to those aims. It was on these points that he most frequently clashed with his military advisers.

Now Dr. Pogue zeroed in on two specific areas of controversy, namely
Roosevelt's role at the Trident and Quebec conferences in 1943. And perhaps, since time is short, I had better focus on them. At Trident I think the central question to be asked is, what was the debate all about? I would submit that it most decidedly was not about whether there would be a cross-Channel invasion in 1944. For several weeks before the conference, staff studies on both sides of the water had indicated pretty clearly that any reasonable projection of visible assets would not permit a cross-Channel invasion in 1944 on the scale originally contemplated in the old Bolero/Roundup plan. The Joint Chiefs were fully aware of that; their own staffs had made it clear, and they had deliberately decided in effect to sweep this issue under the rug, that is, not to make it an issue at the conference. The paper they brought to Roosevelt on the eve of the conference merely stressed that it was important to pin the British down to a definite commitment to go through with that invasion. This is where I differ with Dr. Pogue. I see no reason to believe either that the British were not prepared at that time to go through with the invasion, or that it was a real issue in Washington among the staffs. The real question at issue was the size of the operation. I see no reason to believe that Roosevelt, since about November 1942, had backed away from the principle that a cross-Channel invasion would be necessary in 1944. The debate, I submit, was over the size and to a limited degree the timing of the invasion. But the question of timing was resolved, at this time, rather casually. The Americans proposed 1 April 1944; the British wanted 1 June, because that would coincide with the time the Russians planned to launch an offensive on their front. They split the difference on 1 May. It was not an ironclad commitment on either side. It was a target date and was so labeled, and that was part of the compromise that was arrived at.

But the stand that Roosevelt took at the beginning of the conference I think was of crucial importance. The Joint Chiefs had presented him a position paper that said, in effect, we have got to get tough with the British, we have to pin them down. All the language of the paper was in that tone. We have Roosevelt's marginal comments on that paper. We don't know exactly what was said at the meeting, but his marginal comments do indicate a high degree of scepticism and reservation as to the propriety of taking such a line with the British. And his introductory remarks at the first plenary meeting seem to me almost certainly to constitute a kind of message to the Joint Chiefs to the effect that whatever decision was arrived at with regard to the cross-Channel operations, they would have to face up to the probability that a large scale operation like the original Roundup plan would not be feasible and that a small scale operation, like Sledgehammer, would not be enough. And in effect the decision of the conference was for a medium sized operation, which was, very broadly speaking, the kind of operation that was eventually carried out.
On other points compromises were reached and Roosevelt did support his Chiefs. He supported them on their position on the Pacific, for example, where they wanted a written proviso that the United States could extend the war in the Pacific—precisely the kind of proviso that the Joint Chiefs were unwilling to grant to the British in the Mediterranean. On the Mediterranean, the decisions generally were a compromise and in the spirit of the position that Roosevelt had taken on the eve of the conference.

On the other conference, in Quebec in August, the issues involved were quite specific. They came down to dates and timing and things of that sort. The main point to be made is that the Joint Chiefs quite definitely backed down early in the conference from the position they had taken to the conference table. That position was that in the allocation of resources to the European theater during the coming year, an overriding priority should be given to the needs of the build-up for a spring cross-Channel invasion. The British boggled at that, although they were willing to continue the build-up and to plan tentatively for a cross-Channel operation. On the first or second day of the conference—I have forgotten which—the Joint Chiefs decided, as they put it, to nail their flag to the masthead on that issue. It was then that General Handy went down to Washington to report this to the president, and I think it was more than coincidence that when the president reached Quebec the next day, the Americans decided to abandon the overriding priority demand for cross-Channel invasion preparations.

Those are the principal points of controversy over these two conferences. Let me conclude with the remark that perhaps these revisionist controversies over interpretation of global strategy in World War II, as on many other issues like Turner's frontier thesis, have a tendency under examination to become fuzzy and indeterminate. The blacks and whites turn to grays and the contestants find themselves, in the last analysis, agreeing more than they disagree.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: I am very sorry that time does not allow further discussion. The issues raised are challenging. I am almost tempted to register my own disagreement with several of the comments that have been made by the speakers, but I will resist. There are people in the audience who can talk about these matters with considerable authority, and I would like very much to be able to call on some of them. But I am told that the buses are about to leave, so I will adjourn the meeting. I thank the speakers for excellent papers, and I thank Dr. Leighton.
Two Soldiers Comment

After the symposium, the papers for this session were sent to a number of officers who had participated in the events that the scholars were analyzing. Major General Haywood S. Hansell, USAF Retired, and Brigadier General George A. Lincoln, USA Retired—both of whom were key planners during World War II—agreed to comment for publication. General Hansell was assigned to the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps in 1939 and helped write the basic war plan with which the U. S. Army Air Corps prepared for combat, AWPD-1. During the war he alternated between Washington, where he helped produce the plans behind the American half of the Combined Bomber Offensive, and the command of combat units in Europe and the Pacific. Retired for physical disability at the end of 1946, he was recalled in 1951 for duty in the Directorate of Plans, Headquarters USAF, and later in the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. General Lincoln was in the European theater for most of the first half of World War II and served with the General Staff from 1943 to 1947. He then returned to his prewar assignment on the faculty of the U. S. Military Academy, where he long headed the influential Department of Social Sciences. In 1969 he retired and was appointed Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness in the Executive Office of the President.
Commentary

Major General Haywood S. Hansell, USAF (Ret.)

Dr. Pogue, Dr. Matloff, and Dr. Smith have presented papers that arouse my admiration and with which I find no disagreement. I can offer little at the level of their observations and nothing comparable in the quality of their exposition. But I had a modest experience in the field they are exploring, and this prompts me to offer comments that stem from personal experience with the machinery of the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I had no experience with the personal relationships between the president and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. My only personal contact with the president occurred when I had a brief opportunity to express to him my opinion on the progress of the strategic air war in Europe. The occasion was a breakfast meeting with the president, to which I was taken by General Arnold, in the presidential bedroom during the Quebec Conference. In reply to his inquiry, I stated that I was convinced the strategic air forces, if built up to planned strength, could literally break the back of the German industrial structure and make it possible to launch the invasion against a country on the verge of collapse. The president listened with courtesy but, I felt, without conviction.

I did, however, have many contacts with the Chiefs of Staff in my various assignments in Washington, first as a member of the Air War Plans Division and of the first Joint Strategic Committee; later as the representative at Quebec of General Eaker, who commanded the Eighth Air Force; and still later as the U. S. air member of the Joint and Combined Plans Committee during a period which included the Cairo Conferences; and as a member of General Arnold’s advisory group. My observations of the Joint Chiefs, and especially of General Marshall and General Arnold, lead me to agree with the general thesis put forward by Dr. Pogue and Dr. Matloff.

General Marshall was, in my opinion, the embodiment of the finest qualities of military leadership espoused in the doctrines of the professional military service at the outset of the war. He adopted an attitude toward his commander, the president, that reflected the idealized relationship prescribed by traditional American military professionalism.
Dr. Pogue quotes at some length from General Marshall's views on military-political relationships. Dr. Gaddis Smith offers the comment that General Marshall's attitude toward political factors bearing on the relationship of the Chiefs of Staff with the president was defensive, and there is an implied criticism that he and the other Chiefs paid insufficient attention to the political side of national strategic decision.

I see the situation differently—which is not surprising since I am a product of the indoctrination that affected all the professional military people of my era. I think General Marshall did not question the right of political leaders to override military advice for political reasons. I believe that, in the early phases of his career as head of the military element of the War Department, he felt that political policies—even political objectives—were not a primary concern of the professional soldier. He was concerned with injecting military considerations into political affairs only in response to request, or in terms of impact upon military matters. He feared that political leaders might take decisions without proper consideration of the attendant impact on military and strategic operations.

U. S. military tradition accepted as doctrine the subordinate role of the military in relation to elected civilian leadership. This doctrine was taught explicitly at the service war colleges and schools and led to a somewhat naive trust on the part of the military in the wisdom and competence of the political statesman. It was American professional military doctrine that the role of the military was to support national policy when controversy exceeded the bounds of peaceful negotiation and the civilian political leadership decided upon forceful confrontation. The professional military man of that time believed that, eventually, his role was to achieve a military victory of such proportions as would allow the statesmen to raise a revised structure that would assure the security of the country and further the national values and aspirations for which he had fought. He did not aspire to be architect of the new structure of peace. He did expect to direct the energies of the military machine toward victory, and he tended to accept political goals without question so long as they did not undermine or seriously threaten the military victory on which he was embarked.

Abstaining from the role of political architect did not excuse him from concern with the structure of international relations. Marshall, who I think embraced this traditional military doctrine, clearly accepted the need for political sophistication on the part of the military man which would lead to sound recommendations for providing the tools of military security and for support of national policy. He saw the need for expressing military judgment in describing the military implications of national policy or foreign threat. But the exercise of these policy obligations to warn and recommend was quite
different from the obligations of successful military command in war. The American military doctrine called for perception and broad evaluation of threats from abroad, general awareness of national aspirations, fearless and insistent presentation of military views to the president till there was assurance that the military points were understood, and then complete and unstinting support of the presidential decision, whether that decision was affirmative or negative.

With the progress of the war, this idealized concept which isolated military responsibility from political influence had to give way to some extent in a give-and-take with political realities. There were times when an undesirable political factor had to be recognized by the Chiefs, debated without prejudice with the president, and accepted as preferable to an even more undesirable alternative. But my own opinion is that the Joint Chiefs tried very hard, and on the whole quite successfully, to retain the idealized concept and that they sought the adoption of measures that would bring about military victory with least cost and risk, without being unduly influenced by political aspirations.

The president in turn showed high respect for the professional competence of the military Chiefs. As Dr. Matloff points out, he seldom overrode their recommendations.

As the papers point out, the occasions when the president did override the Chiefs on European strategy were associated with political factors of very high impact, often sponsored and supported by a master politician of great persuasiveness. But neither the president nor Mr. Winston Churchill, as the papers also show, overrode the Chiefs in the field of military strategy in the Pacific.

It is my own belief that the military-political relationship between the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the president in World War II was basically correct and that the personal relationship between the president and the Joint Chiefs in World War II was sound and proper. Specifically, I think it was more sound and proper than the relationship that has succeeded it, a relationship in which the Joint Chiefs are separated from their Commander-in-Chief. More recent developments under Mr. McNamara, in which the professional military body was encouraged to do what they were told and leave the provision of military composition and concepts of employment to selected civilians, have degraded the caliber of the American profession of arms at a time when professional quality and wisdom are at a premium.

The principal occasion on which the president and Mr. Churchill overrode their Chiefs of Staff had to do with the major thrust into North Africa
and the Mediterranean, as the papers point out. But the military leaders had little to complain of in this instance. They did have an opportunity to voice their objections to this tangential thrust away from the primary military objective, the defeat of Germany in Europe. They expressed their position with vigor and clarity. But the president and Mr. Churchill, having listened to these military views, had every right to conclude that political factors and objectives were more important and more persuasive. Time was a compelling factor in this decision. The military leaders wanted to focus upon a direct thrust against Germany itself. But they had to confess that no really significant surface action could be undertaken for at least a year, probably longer. North Africa offered immediate action. It is likely that the president was swayed by his appraisal of the temper of the electorate. The American people had had to subsist on a diet of disaster and defeat for nine months; they were not a patient group. Mr. Churchill was doubtless motivated by a desire to further vital Empire interests in the Mediterranean and a concern for postwar conditions in Europe if the Russian offensives swept too far westward. A movement through the Balkans might serve to limit that westward sweep. In any event, this political decision did not infringe the proper command relationship.

But another occasion arose shortly thereafter that did threaten to have a catastrophic effect upon military strategy and operations, and it was caused by the intrusion of political opinion and the application of political pressure to alter military tactics. In this case, a political leader threatened to exercise compelling pressure on the military command, not for political reasons but because the politician wished to enforce his own military views on a tactical military operation.

Just before the Casablanca Conference, General Arnold learned that Mr. Churchill planned to meet with the president and personally persuade him to abandon the daylight strategic air operations of the U.S. Eighth Air Force and to direct the adoption of the night tactics of RAF Bomber Command. This came at a very critical time for the American strategic air offensive. The Eighth Air Force was young and weak. It had been trying to find itself and to develop tactics that would permit it to reach and destroy the vitals of industrial Germany. The German Air Force was at its peak and fighter opposition was skillful and deadly. The Eighth had endured painful combat losses, but was forging ahead. Then the North African campaign had come into being and nearly half the strength of the Eighth—indeed, the most experienced portion of the Eighth—was assigned to the Twelfth Air Force, in support of General Eisenhower. Those units were lost to the strategic air offensive. And the campaign in North Africa was not two months old before General Eisenhower put in urgent requests for more of the heavy bombers. Now a new and formidable threat to the strategic air offensive appeared in
the form of that most persuasive and dynamic politician, Winston Churchill.

This proposal by Mr. Churchill would have involved abandoning the American air strategy of destruction of selected industrial installations by daylight precision bombing and adopting instead night attacks against urban areas. The proposal was based not on political objectives or humanitarian arguments but upon judgment of military tactics and methods. This was precisely the kind of thing about which both General Marshall and General Arnold had been apprehensive.

The move by Mr. Churchill was brought to a halt with great difficulty. General Arnold sent for his Field Commander, General Eaker, who commanded the Eighth Air Force. Arnold arranged for Eaker to meet with Churchill before the latter saw the president. Eaker spoke with such firm conviction and such evident courage that he brought Churchill over to his side. As a result, the Casablanca Conference adopted a policy directive that enjoyed the support of the military leaders, especially the airmen. It described the purpose of the air offensive against Germany as: “To bring about the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and undermine the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.”

The RAF and the American strategic air forces could seek their common objectives by the methods best suited to each. Military judgment and recommendation had been persuasive. But the issue had narrowly avoided the imposition of a crippling decision based purely on a political intrusion into military tactical functions. These comments do little but confirm the observations of Dr. Pogue, Dr. Matloff, and Dr. Smith.

I should like now to approach the subject of the relations of the World War II Chiefs of Staff to the president from a lower level and a different angle of perspective. I should like to comment on the composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the resulting effect of that composition on the president and his view of war strategy.

As Dr. Matloff pointed out, just prior to our entry into the war, in the last days of the Joint Board, there were three viewpoints of national war strategy: that of the army, of the navy, and of the aviation component of the army. General Arnold owed his membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the fact that the British had a full-fledged air member on their Committee and he needed an “opposite number” to talk to. The president appointed General Arnold, who was the U. S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Commanding General U. S. Army Air Forces, to be the air member of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. But General Arnold was still an army officer and
as such subordinate to General Marshall. The navy never really recognized
the air members of the various JCS committees as bona fide equals, and even
though General Marshall was one of the staunchest supporters of strategic
air power, General Arnold was far too wise ever to cross him even on air
matters. It was not quite the same thing as being the military Chief of Staff
of an old and highly respected military service; the air members were not
quite to the manor born. This had its effect upon the strategic conduct of the
war.

Dr. Pogue indicates as much byindirection. He says that Arnold was
personally popular with the president. Doubtless this is so. But in all the
references to major elements of grand strategy, it is Marshall and King who
are named as participants in the strategic discussions with the president.
Strategic air warfare was not a full partner with ground and naval warfare
at the White House.

The background to the plans for strategic air war bears upon the charge
that the professional military services were unheeding of national and inter-
national policies and politics. The charge is not quite correct.

In the fall of 1939, shortly after the outbreak of the war in Europe,
General Arnold, as Chief of the Army Air Corps, took a most significant step
that clearly indicated a breadth of vision beyond the conduct of military
operations specifically on direction. He was dissatisfied with the air intel-
gence he was receiving. He went to the Chief of Staff and got permission to
set up his own intelligence section. The Air Intelligence Section was organ-
ized under a very broad directive. Major Thomas D. White and I were
assigned to the section and left pretty much to our own devices. Among other
units of the section, we set up a Strategic Air Intelligence unit and sought
to determine how U. S. air power might be related to national policy in time
of war. We sought to determine how great industrial powers who were
potential enemies supported themselves and their military forces in time of
war. We sought to determine the key elements and systems that made their
critical industries work, and how those industries and systems might be
disrupted by bombing. And we sought to estimate the effect upon enemy
war-sustaining efforts and upon the actual survival of the enemy state as an
operating entity if those systems were destroyed.

Since we couldn't tackle this sort of job on a world-wide basis, it was
necessary to estimate who our most probable enemies might be. This was at
a time when our national war plans were perforce geared solely to the defense
of our borders, or at most to the defense of the Western Hemisphere.

The selection of Germany and Japan as the two countries for initial
strategic analysis took no exercise of genius. But the whole process was evidence of political interest and discrimination beyond that implied in the criticisms suggesting that prewar military people were not concerned with international policies and lacked vision and imagination. Incidentally, it was also evidence of an imaginative new approach, since current doctrine in the War and Navy Departments did not recognize economic and industrial analysis as valid exercises in intelligence. This was well before the development of the *Rainbow* war plans and the extension of military planning beyond the limits of Hemisphere defense. General Arnold was, of course, familiar with the undertaking and aware of the charge of unorthodoxy.

When the president directed an inquiry to the Secretaries of War and the Navy as to the requirements to gain supremacy over our potential enemies, in August of 1941, the foundation of strategic air intelligence served the Army Air Forces in good stead. The Air War Plans Division, which prepared the Air Annex to the War Department's reply, produced in some detail a plan for strategic air warfare against the Axis powers. The objective of the plan was not simply strategic air support of the army, but was a bold bid for victory through air power.

The plan naturally encountered opposition and dissent in the War Department General Staff. The preamble to the reply to the president prepared by the Joint Board underlined and emphasized the contention that sea and air forces could lend important support, but that it was an almost invariable rule that only land forces could secure victory in war. When the air plan was presented to General Marshall, there was a breathless moment in awaiting his reaction. After listening in silence to the voices of dissent, he quelled them with the statement that, in his opinion, the plan had merit and he wished the Secretary of War and Assistant Secretaries to hear it. The Secretary, encouraged by General Marshall, endorsed the plan and stated that he would arrange for a presentation to the president.

The air plan was described, of course, in terms of contingency: if the country should go to war. General Marshall and General Arnold were not recommending to the president that he undertake a strategic air war against the Axis powers—only that the military services be prepared for such action if the political leaders of the country found war inevitable or thrust upon them.

Pearl Harbor brought an end to speculation. With the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States was at one stroke engulfed in war and bereft of the usual means of waging surface warfare.

The impact on the plan for strategic air war was two-fold. Since the
means of waging surface warfare were no longer available, the strategic air war was the only means of bringing war to the enemy. The plan was adopted, but only by default. The other impact was unfortunate: the presentation to the president never took place. The terms of the air requirements were presented to him and received approval, but the basic strategic purposes of the air war were never persuasively presented. So the education of the president which Dr. Matloff noted—from naval advocate to joint army-navy advocate—never extended to strategic air warfare. The president was an ardent aviation advocate and supporter, but that is quite a different thing. He never appreciated nor understood the basic underlying objectives of strategic air warfare. He could and did seize upon exciting goals of aviation production: 50,000 aircraft a year! This was fantastic! But he never viewed the winning of the war by air power in the same perspective as he did the major land and sea campaigns.

The conduct of the strategic air war suffered. The forces intended for the death blow against Germany were diverted and employed to serve lesser roles connected with surface operations. Postwar analysis of the air war against Germany leads me to the conclusion that the German State could have been eviscerated by air—unable to sustain either its civil structure or its war effort—if the original air plan had been adhered to, if there had been anything like the zealous determination behind the air war that was lavished upon the “cross-Channel” operation.

If the air war had been supported—or if the invasion had been postponed three or four months—the hazardous operation across the Channel would have been far less costly, and the subsequent operations would have been much more akin to an occupation operation.

Whether General Arnold, or any other airman, could have been persuasive to the president if he had enjoyed equal stature to Marshall and King is, of course, highly speculative. Even with a full measure of stature on the Joint Chiefs, he would have found himself constantly caught in the situation in which one strategic airman was contending with two equals advocating surface warfare—and demanding air support for their surface ventures. General Marshall would probably have lent his support. Admiral King was a consistent skeptic on the subject of victory through air power.

In any event, the various aspects of the strategic air war were never debated at the presidential level in the same manner as those of surface warfare. The issues of the campaigns in Sicily, Italy, the Balkans, were really all subordinate to the strategic impacts of air destruction of petroleum sources and supplies; of the electric power system of Germany; of the rail transportation system there. But there was little discussion of them in high
places and almost no recognition of what would ensue from success in strategic air warfare.

Only after the war did we learn how desperately Germany had been hurt, how close she was to bleeding to death from her wounds. Dr. Matloff says:

Just as the president could play his mediatory role with the Allies, the JCS were enabled to balance the three approaches to war with which the American services entered the conflict. Through a quiet military diplomacy, the JCS managed to reconcile the diverse service theories, to produce joint plans without generating harsh frictions, and to oversee the delicate adjustments in which no one service won its way completely. The compromises they reached without formal votes were a testament to the working partnership that developed among them.

The effect of compromise is often good, but it is not always good. The strategic air war was compromised far more than it need have been. It is astonishing that it achieved so much in the face of continuous diversion of forces and effort. But it paid a price in terms of time. The surface forces would have profited more if they had not been so insistent upon diversion of strategic air effort to their support. It was a costly compromise. Perhaps it was an inevitable one.

I find myself, nevertheless, in complete accord with Dr. Matloff when he says, "The JCS proved to be a remarkably efficient instrument in waging the first really global war in American history."
Commentary

Brigadier General George A. Lincoln, USA (Ret.)

Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness

There has been considerable writing with the objective of defining the optimum "professional officer," and this writing has been a good thing. In fact, of course, this optimum professional officer, however you define him, has probably never existed since officers are human and are bound to be less than perfect on occasion.

One of the aspects of these attempts at a definition of the optimum has been the political perception and expertise of the professional officer. It seems evident that the nature of the political perception and the legitimacy of its interpolation into affairs of state are bound to vary among the particular military situations being appraised by the historians. When the political perception and guidance by civilian leadership is strong and proves sound in historical perspective, the soldier who attempts to interpolate his views will be chided or even clobbered by historians. When civilian and political leadership proves weak in hindsight, the military commander, particularly if he was successful militarily, is likely to be chided for not having shaped his military successes closely to the political needs as defined in hindsight.

These comments are not made in criticism, but just to note how things are.

Now as to the discussion about the political preparation of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff—in my observation, these men recognized the political objectives. They were conscious of the defined objectives and strove to achieve them. Their major problems are indicated in Forrest Pogue's quotation from General Marshall, stemming from the difference between military factors which are usually to a considerable extent quantitative, and political factors which are usually not so quantitative. A political decision can be made, then changed, and changed again in a matter of a few months or even a few days. The military decisions and actions to carry out a political decision normally have a long gestation period and once set in motion are often difficult to adjust to a new political decision. Hence, the continual concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the political leadership would make some quick change
for quite sound political reasons which might at worst be impossible to adjust to, and at best would mean a lavish expenditure of resources. A couple of examples of the points I am trying to make are Churchill’s interest in pushing on to the Eastern Mediterranean, even to bringing Turkey into the war, and his proposal to divert the Southern France operation, just as it was about to sail, to a landing in Brittany.

I would also like to note that when political guidance is not available, the military forces tend to make policy by the continuing momentum of their military successes.

One of the most important political decisions—if not the most important—was the unconditional surrender formula. It was also a military decision, since it was the basic definition for the resources that we had to mobilize and the military plans we had to provide. In fact, the unconditional surrender formula did not in the end have an adverse effect on the outcome of the Pacific war. It may, however, have had an adverse effect in Europe since with a less rigid formula we might have achieved some arrangement to end the war around the time of the attempt on Hitler’s life. But this last point is highly speculative. If such had occurred, the history of the world since that time would have been materially changed, as I believe everyone will agree who studies the strength and disposition of armed forces in Europe and Asia at that time.

My principal concern about the writing of World War II history is that there has been inadequate attention to the impact of logistics on strategy and, for that matter, on aspects that are sometimes called “political.” I recognize that logistics is sometimes a dull subject compared to most other aspects of military history, but it should be central to World War II history. The strategy of World War II was in very considerable part a strategy of logistics. Ships and landing craft were the bottleneck resources to a significant and even predominant degree; these two types of resources, and some related ones such as port capacity, determined both timing and the mass that could be applied. Hence, strategy was to a very considerable extent a business of priorities and allocations. It was also a matter of the art of the possible, again determined by logistical standards.

General Marshall, by the way, had to my mind a very deep understanding of logistics in the broadest sense of the term.
The Third Session

THE MILITARY IN THE SERVICE OF THE STATE

The 13th Harmon Memorial Lecture in Military History
INTRODUCTION

General CLARK (Superintendent, USAF Academy): Ladies and gentlemen.

This evening it is our honor and privilege to be present for the delivery of the 13th annual Harmon Memorial Lecture. As most of you know, the Harmon Lecture series was inaugurated in 1957 to honor the memory and accomplishments of Lieutenant General Hubert R. Harmon, distinguished soldier, student of history, and first Superintendent of the United States Air Force Academy.

Past lectures in this series, published annually by the Academy, have received wide attention both in this country and abroad. More importantly, perhaps, the series has served to cement bonds of friendship and mutual respect between the Academy community on the one hand, and the distinguished lecturers on the other. Illustrating that contention, by the way, I might note here that this evening’s audience includes four of the twelve previous Harmon lecturers.

Tonight’s speaker, I have no doubt, will not only continue the tradition of excellence now well established—he will add luster to it.

General Sir John Winthrop Hackett comes to us tonight from London, where he is now Principal of King’s College. He assumed that post following his retirement from active service after a most distinguished career spanning 37 years. An Oxford graduate, Sir John spent most of his early career in the Middle East, where, despite being involved in active operations, he found time to complete a thesis on the Third Crusade for the degree of B. Litt., Oxford. Rather like King Richard I, Sir John was delayed in his return from the Middle East to England. In Sir John’s case, however, the matter at hand was the coming of World War II, rather than his being kidnapped and held for ransom.

Throughout World War II, when he commanded the 4th Parachute Brigade, and indeed after the war when he commanded the Transjordan Frontier Force, Sir John continued in the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean Theaters. At length returning to his homeland, Sir John became Commandant of the Royal Military College of Science from 1958 to 1961.
In the following year, Sir John was called to Trinity College, Cambridge, to deliver the Lees Knowles Lectures for that year. Those lectures, published as *The Profession of Arms*, have become an essential part of our military history courses here at the Academy. Indeed, since first making their acquaintance, I have found myself returning to them more than once for both insight and inspiration.

In recognition both of his gallant combat record and unusual intellectual skills, Sir John was made Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1963 to 1964, and from 1966 to 1968, Commander, British Army of the Rhine.

Sir John's topic tonight is "The Military in the Service of the State." I know of few men more qualified than he to address that theme. Ladies and gentlemen, Sir John Winthrop Hackett.
I am much honoured by the invitation to address this distinguished gathering tonight, and my wife and I are deeply indebted to our hosts for their hospitality and for the opportunity to visit this beautiful and remarkable place. My topic tonight is one upon which much has already been said. It might reasonably be asked whether anything omitted from the distinguished writings of men like Samuel Huntington, Hanson Baldwin, Spanier, Clark, Legere, Coles, Ralston, Higgins to name only a few, as well of course as those very distinguished men, Theodore Ropp and Forrest C. Pogue, and my own good friend and countryman Michael Howard, who have also enjoyed your hospitality on similar occasions—whether anything omitted by them has sufficient importance to justify a transatlantic journey to say it. But times and perspectives change. It is perhaps worthwhile to ask, from a point in time now well advanced in a century which has seen swifter change in human affairs than any since the world began, what the relationship between the military and the state looks like today, what changes have taken place in it in our time, and what factors are at work leading to further change. To try to be exhaustive would be to succeed only in exhausting patience. I propose therefore only to outline a basic position and suggest broadly how it has developed up to our own time, to point to some of the factors bearing in a novel way upon the relationship between the military and the state in the second half of our century and to ask what their effect might be, and finally to consider some ethical aspects of the relationship.

Until man is a great deal better than he is, or is ever likely to be, the requirement will persist for a capability which permits the ordered application of force at the instance of a properly constituted authority. The very existence of any society depends in the last resort upon its capacity to defend itself by force.

"Covenants without swords are but words," said Thomas Hobbes 300 years ago. This is no less true today. Government thus requires an effective military instrument bound to the service of the state in a firm obligation.
The obligation was at one time uniquely personal. Later it developed into an obligation to a person as the recognized head of a human group—a tribe, a clan, a sept, or a nation. The group develops in structure, acquires associations and attributes (including territoriality) in a process occurring in different ways at different times in different places. The polis emerges in ancient Greece. King John is found in mediaeval England describing himself on his seal, the first of English kings to do so, as Rex Angliae, King of England, and no longer Rex Anglorum, King of the English. The state is born. In Western Europe statehood had by the mid-13th century largely replaced the concept of an all-embracing Christendom as the basic political structure. Military service continued however to be rendered as an obligation to a person, to the single ruler, to the monarch, and the personal link has persisted in one form or another right up to today.

I leave the Middle Ages with reluctance, as I always do, in a world in which the book I have been preparing on a topic in the 12th century has so often been pushed aside by the preoccupations of the 20th. As we leave the Middle Ages behind, the military profession emerges, clearly distinguished from other institutions. Continuous service, regular pay, uniforms, segregation in barracks, the revival and improvement of ancient military formations such as the Roman Legion, the development of tactics, the introduction of better materials and techniques and of firearms, more attention to logistics—these and other developments had by the early 18th century given to the calling of the man-at-arms a clearly distinguishable profile as the lineal antecedent of the military profession we know today. The 18th century regularized this calling; the 19th professionalized it. From the late 19th century onwards, armed force was available to the governments of all advanced states through the medium of military institutions everywhere broadly similar in structure and essentially manned—and wholly managed—by professionals. The soldier and the statesman were by now no longer interchangeable and the subordination of military to civil was, in theory everywhere and in your country and mine in fact as well, complete.

The Napoleonic experience led not only to the complete professionalization of the military calling: by reducing to a system the basic concept of the French revolutionary armies, it opened up the era of the nation-in-arms and thus of total war. In the 18th century, wars were conducted by a relatively small sample of the nation's manpower applying a relatively small proportion of the nation's wealth. The 19th century led to the situation where the totality of a nation's resources in men and materials was applied to conflicts in which all other belligerents were similarly mobilized. In the 18th century, war and peace could to some extent coexist. England and France were at war when the writer Sterne received his passport to travel in France from the French ambassador in London himself, with the words, "A man who laughs is never
dangerous."' Odd vestiges of the coexistence of war and peace persisted even into the 19th century: George Washington's investment account was handled by Barings of London throughout the Revolutionary War; and Russia, 70 years later, helped to finance the Crimean War against France, Turkey, and Britain by means of loans raised in London. But by quite early in the 20th century, war and peace had come to be mutually exclusive concepts and could coexist no longer.

A century and a half after Napoleon we seem to have reverted in some respects to the position evident before him. Total war is now unacceptable, total peace is apparently unobtainable. The world lives in a state between the two: war and peace again now coexist.

With the military institution professionalized, regularized, and seen to be subordinate to the civil power, what was its sphere of operation and to what or whom was it ultimately responsible? Clausewitz declared that war was the continuance of policy by other means. Military action in war must always be governed by political requirements.

But some who have accepted that the state is master have not always accepted that the statesmen are the masters, or have done so with extreme reluctance. "I can't tell you how disgusted I am becoming with those wretched politicians," said General George McClellan in October 1861— a sentiment which has possibly been echoed more than once since then. On at least one important occasion in recent years, hostility and distrust have erupted into something near open insubordination.

The principles formulated by Clausewitz have not been accepted as binding at all times everywhere. In Germany in World War I the army under the control of Hindenburg and Ludendorff became “a state within the state claiming the right to define what was or was not to the national interest.” The supreme command reserved to itself the right of defining Germany's war aims.

The history of the United States in our time has also afforded instances of tendencies to operate in a sense opposed to the concepts set out by Clausewitz. The case of General MacArthur is important here and I shall return to it later. But in quite another respect the approach of the United States to military-civil relationships up to the middle of our century could be described as anti-Clausewitzian.

1Lodwick Hartley, This Is Lorence (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1943), p. 153.
Let us look at the spring of the year 1945 as events drove swiftly on to military defeat of Germany. In spite of agreement between the Allies on postwar areas of occupation, "It was well understood by everyone," as Winston Churchill wrote, "that Berlin, Prague and Vienna could be taken by whoever got there first." The Supreme Allied Commander, writes Forrest C. Pogue, "halted his troops short of Berlin and Prague for military reasons only." As General Eisenhower himself said of this time, "Military plans, I believed, should be devised with the single aim of speeding victory."5

General Eisenhower recognized that Berlin was the political heart of Germany. General Bradley, however, in opposing the British plan for an all-out offensive directed on the capital, described Berlin as no more than "a prestige objective," though he frankly conceded later that: "As soldiers we looked naively on the British inclination to complicate the war with political foresight and nonmilitary objectives."6

Here lies the crucial difference between two philosophies. The one holds that war replaces politics and must be conducted by purely military criteria towards purely military ends. When war has been ended by the enemy's military defeat, political action can once more take over from the military.

The other maintains that war continues policy and is conducted only to a political end, that in grand strategy purely military criteria and objectives do not exist, and that military action must at all times be governed by political considerations arising out of clearly defined war aims. Under the first concept the only war aim is to win the war and to do this as quickly as possible. Under the second the prime aim in war is to win the peace. A policy of unconditional surrender is not a war aim at all, but the acknowledgment of the lack of one.

There were of course towards the end of World War II problems of national sensitivity within the alliance which complicated issues. It would be wrong now to oversimplify them. Nevertheless, whereas Churchill asked at the time whether the capture of Berlin by the Russians would not "lead them into a mood which will raise grave and formidable difficulties for the future," the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that such "psychological and political advantages as would result from the possible capture of Berlin ahead of the Russians should not override the imperative military consideration, which in our opinion is the destruction and dismemberment of the

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5Ibid., p. 377.
6Ibid., p. 378.
7Ibid., p. 380.
German armed forces.” There is no evidence whatsoever that General Eisenhower at any time put American national interests above those of the British. There is plenty of evidence that he acknowledged the complete priority in importance of the general political interest over the military. “I am the first to admit,” he said, “that a war is waged in pursuance of political aims, and if the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide that the Allied effort to take Berlin outweighs purely military considerations in this theater, I would cheerfully readjust my plans and my thinking so as to carry out such an operation.”8 The Combined Chiefs gave him no other instructions on this critically important point than to make his own dispositions. The new President of the United States, Harry S Truman, cabled Churchill on 21 April 1945 that “the tactical deployment of American troops is a military one.”

On 2 May 1945, with the Allied troops still halted according to their orders from SHAEF on or about the Elbe, the Russians completed the capture of Berlin. On 12 May, with the Allies halted on orders from the same source to the north and west of Prague, the Russians entered Prague too. I do not think I need dwell now on the consequences of these events or their effect upon the history of our own time. Let me only add a warning against oversimplification. The record stands as quoted. The Yalta agreement, however, is also on the record and it is not easy to see how the Allies could have stayed in Berlin and Prague even if they had got there first.

The decisions which led to the course of events I have outlined here were in general wholly consistent with United States attitudes up to the mid-20th century. The national ethic was not greatly in favour of the application of armed force to a political end. It is true that America had been involved in limited wars (like the Spanish-American and that of 1812-14 with Britain) and in wars against the Indians which could scarcely be justified on grounds either of absolute morality or of national survival. But the nation has in general been reluctant to fight except when there was clear and compelling danger of national overthrow or a violation of the moral code which the nation followed—a violation so grave and flagrant as to demand correction. It has then suspended normal peacetime procedures wherever the military imperative demanded, thrown its whole weight into the crushing of opposing armed force as speedily as possible and, this accomplished, returned with relief to its own way of life.

From this concept there developed a division of responsibility of which a classic exposition is quoted by Morton from an Army War College statement of September 1915. “The work of the statesman and the soldier are

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8 Ibid., p. 381.
9 Ibid., p. 385.
therefore co-ordinate. Where the first leaves off the other takes hold.”\(^\text{10}\)

The middle years of our century, however, have seen changes which have profoundly affected the relations of military and civil and have set up a new situation. Of developments in military practice, the introduction of weapons of mass destruction is the most obvious. It is not the only one. Improved and new techniques and materials abound and have been applied not only in all aspects of weaponry but over the whole range of tools for war. Developments in metals, ceramics, plastics; new sources of energy; new forms of propulsion; new techniques in the electric and electronic fields; laser beams and infrared; the startling developments in solid state physics which have revolutionized communications and control systems—these are only a few examples chosen pretty well at random from a list any military professional could almost indefinitely extend. What has been happening in space needs no emphasis nor does the dramatic rise in powers of surveillance. The flow of information from all sources has vastly increased and the application of automatic processes to its handling has opened a new dimension.

There are other developments than those in the hardware departments. International alignments have changed. The U.S. has replaced Britain in important traditional roles; Russia has been reborn; China has emerged as a major power. The Third World has grown up out of disintegrating colonial empires—British, French, Belgian, Dutch—and stresses have developed in the international community no less than at home as the rich are seen to get richer much more quickly than the poor do. International relations have grown more complex with the demise of bipolarity. The Russians have moved further from strict Marxism at home and developed a striking potential for armed action at a distance abroad. The failure hitherto of yet another attempt to establish a world community of nations in the United Nations has been accompanied by a growing impatience worldwide with warfare as a means of settling social problems, while there has been no decline at all in the resort to warfare. There has been a surge of interest everywhere in the study of defence problems, an interest which springs, in my view, from a basic realization that what is at stake is nothing less than human survival. There has been much striving towards international agreement to take account of a new situation, some of it not unpromising—the Test Ban Treaty, for instance, and SALT. The American relationship with Europe has changed and is changing further. Many other things have happened. These are only some of the more important developments in the field of external relations.

Here in the States you have seen an increase of centralized authority and

a closer scrutiny of the decision making process in relation to national security. The risks of the nuclear age and the complexity of international issues have resulted in a day to day involvement of the executive in external affairs, with all their military implications, far greater than in the past. The reasons for this, as well as for the development of defence analysis into a considerable industry, lie in the imperatives of nuclear weapon power. Armed forces cannot now be brought into being more or less at leisure after the crisis breaks, as was formerly possible for America beyond the oceans, and for Britain, protected by her navy, when Britain could afford to be content to lose every battle but the last. For in general and unrestricted war the last battle is now the first, and we know that it cannot be won. Thus it is vital not to let the war take place at all, and deterrence becomes the major element in defence. But deterrence demands an apparatus sufficient in size and performance, always up to date, always at a high state of readiness, but never used and never even fully tested. It is therefore quite inevitable that the military agency will be closely and continuously monitored by its civil masters.

From all these and other developments, the civil-military relationship now finds itself in a new frame of reference. I select two important elements in this new environment for further comment.

First of all there is the enormous rise in the cost of warlike material since World War II and the huge increase in the burden on national resource, in money, materials, and skilled manpower, which preparation for war demands. President Eisenhower spoke of the growing significance of a military-industrial complex. General MacArthur among others drew attention to the ruinous cost of preparation for war, as distinct from the cost of its conduct. The demands of the military upon national resource, in times when a world war is not being fought, can be so great that the whole orientation of national policy, not only abroad but at home as well, can be determined by them. The danger of the formal supersession of civil authority by the military can today in our two democracies be dismissed as negligible. National resource, however, whatever its size, is limited. Money spent on space cannot be spent on slum clearance. Money spent on the containment of pollution cannot be used for an anti-ballistic-missile system. Even if the usurpation of civil government by the military is no longer to be feared, the orientation of policies, particularly at home, which might be forced upon the state by demands upon material resource and money and skilled industrial, technical, and other manpower, could place the military in a position of dominance in the state scarcely less decisive in the event than formal usurpation of powers of government. In a pamphlet published in Britain this month, J. K. Galbraith speaks of the growth of a huge bureaucratic organization of defence contractors and politicians acting with service advice. It began to grow, to use Galbraith's arresting
phrase, before poverty was put on the national agenda. The danger that the military, through the demands upon resource of the military-industrial complex, would exercise too powerful an influence over the state was never high in postwar Britain. Professor Galbraith suggested to me last week in England that the British tradition of civil supremacy was probably too powerful to allow it. There are other, simpler reasons. The World Wars which greatly enriched the United States greatly impoverished the United Kingdom. Britain was made very sharply aware at the end of World War II that drastic reduction in national resource demanded a drastic review of spending priorities. Over the postwar years Britain has asserted and confirmed priorities in which social spending went ahead of expenditure on defence. In the past few years, for the first time ever, less has been spent in Britain on defence, for example, than on education.

In the United States, where resource was so much greater, the realization only came later on that resource, however great, was not unlimited. Hard priorities have had to be drawn and as this disagreeable task was faced, perhaps a little reluctantly, the demands of some other claimants on national resource have had to be heard too.

My own view is that the danger of unbalancing the relationship between military and state through inordinate demand upon national resource was never great in Britain; and now in the U.S., as national priorities come under review, it is on the decline. There is here, however, an aspect of civil-military relations to which we are not yet, I think, wholly accommodated.

Of crucial importance in this relationship between armed forces and the state is atomic weapon power. It is a commonplace now that total war is no longer a rational act of policy. George Kennan saw this earlier than most when he wrote in 1954, "People have been accustomed to saying that the day of limited war is over. I would submit that the truth is exactly the opposite: that the day of total wars has passed, and that from now on limited military operations are the only ones that could conceivably serve any coherent purpose." The implications of this situation have not everywhere been fully accepted. The concept of the nation-in-arms is in major powers no longer viable and we have to think of national security in other terms. But in what terms?

The introduction of atomic weapons has thrown new light upon a hallowed principle of Clausewitz. "As war...," he wrote, "is dominated by the political object the order of that object determines the measure of the sacrifice by which it is to be purchased. As soon, therefore, as the expenditure in force

becomes so great that the political object is no longer equal in value this object must be given up, and peace will be the result."\textsuperscript{12}

Into an equation which Clausewitz saw in relative terms, atomic weapons have now introduced an absolute. Can any political object be secured by the opening of a nuclear war which devastates both sides? Hence, of course, the whole language of brinkmanship in a situation in which one object has come to be common to all parties. This is now survival. In the context of general war we have here a completely new situation.

In the closing stages of World War II President Roosevelt showed much reluctance to impose a policy upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His successor, President Harry S Truman, was disinclined at a critical time in 1945, as we have seen, to instruct General Eisenhower to act in Europe on any other than purely military considerations. It was only five years later that this same presidential successor found himself roughly compelled to accept the logic of the new order and act in a diametrically opposite sense.

"The Korean War," says Samuel Huntington, "was the first war in American history (except for the Indian struggles) which was not a crusade."\textsuperscript{13} I cannot quite accept this, but it certainly was for the United States a war of unusual aspect. It was a war conducted according to the main concept supported by Clausewitz and not at all according to the practice of Ludendorff. That is to say, the object from the beginning was clearly defined in political terms, and limited. There were variations from time to time in the war aim. After MacArthur's brilliantly successful amphibious operation at Inchon, the aim shifted from the simple re-establishment of the status quo in South Korea to the effecting of a permanent change in the whole Korean Peninsula. The chance was seen to reunite this at a time when China was thought to be too preoccupied with the danger from the old enemy Russia to be inclined to intervene by force of arms. But China did intervene and the administration reverted to its former aim, whose achievement would in their view run small risk of furnishing the USSR with excuse and opportunity for the opening of World War III before Europe was strong enough to resist.

General MacArthur could not accept this position in terms either of the limitation of means or of the restriction of ends. He challenged the administration on both counts. In criticizing the administration's desire to prevent the war from spreading, he declared that this seemed to him to introduce a new concept into military operations. He called it the "concept of appeasement . . . the concept that when you use force you can limit that force."\textsuperscript{14}

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\textsuperscript{14}MacArthur's testimony before the Senate Armed Forces and Foreign Relations Committees quoted in Walter Millis (ed.), \textit{American Military Thought} (New York, 1966), p. 481.
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“Once war is forced upon us,” he told Congress, “there is no alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end.”¹⁵ He was not consistent here. He did not, in fact, advocate the use of every available means against China. He was strongly against the use of American ground forces in any strength on the mainland, for example, and advocated in preference air bombardment and sea blockade with the possibility of enlarging Nationalist forces on the mainland out of Formosa. He did not, in my view, either convincingly or even with total conviction argue against the acceptance of limitations on hostilities. What he did insist on was that the limitations accepted should be those of his, the military commander’s, choice and not those settled upon by his political superiors. But given the acceptance of limitation in principle, the identification of those areas in which specific limitations must be accepted is a clear matter of policy. Is that for soldiers to determine? MacArthur challenged the administration on this issue and appealed to the legislature and the American people over the administration’s head. He lost. Perhaps he underestimated the character of the president and the degree to which experience had helped him to develop since the spring of 1945. Perhaps he overestimated the support that he could expect in the Joint Chiefs. The position taken by the Joint Chiefs, however, supported that of the president. It conveyed quite clearly that the instrumental nature of the military, as an agency in the service of the state, was not going to be forgotten. In the seven years between 1945 and 1952 there probably lies a watershed in civil-military relations in the United States which future historians will see as of prime importance.

But another question arises, and this too was raised by the case of MacArthur, as it arose in the matter of the Curragh incident in Ireland in 1914 and with General de Gaulle in 1940. Where or by what is the allegiance of the military professional engaged? Personal service to an absolute monarch is unequivocal. But in a constitutional monarchy, or a republic, precisely where does the loyalty of the fighting man lie?

In Ireland just before the outbreak of World War I, there was a distinct possibility that opponents of the British Government’s policy for the introduction of Home Rule in Ireland would take up arms to assert their right to remain united with England under the Crown. But if the British Army were ordered to coerce the Ulster Unionists, would it obey? Doubts upon this score were widespread and they steadily increased. In the event, there was no mutiny, though the Curragh incident has sometimes been erroneously described as such. The officers in a cavalry brigade standing by on the Curragh ready to move into the North of Ireland all followed their brigade

commander’s example in offering their resignations from the service. This in peacetime was perfectly permissible. The Curragh episode, all the same, formed a more than usually dramatic element in an intrusion by the military into politics which seriously weakened the British government of the day and forced a change in its policy. As a successful manipulation of government by the military on a political issue, it has had no parallel in Britain in modern times. But it also raised the question of where personal allegiance lay and raised it more sharply than at any time since 1641, when the hard choice between allegiance to the King and adherence to Parliament, in the days of Thomas Hobbes, split the country in the English Civil War.

Essentially the same question was raised by MacArthur. For he not only challenged the administration on the fundamentals of policy—upon political ends, that is, as well as upon choice of military means. He also claimed that he was not bound, even as a serving officer, by a duty to the executive if he perceived a duty to the state with which his duty to the administration conflicted. His words to the Massachusetts legislature are worth quoting:

I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept, that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of the Government rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend. No proposition could be more dangerous.16

There is here a deep and serious fallacy. I do not refer to the possible violation of the president’s constitutional position as Commander-in-Chief. I have more in mind a principle basic to the whole concept of parliamentary democracy as it is applied, with differences in detail but in essential identity of intention, in our two countries. It is that the will of the people is sovereign and no refusal to accept its expression through the institutions specifically established by it—whether in the determination of policies or in the interpretation of the constitution—can be legitimate. MacArthur’s insistence upon his right as an individual to determine for himself the legitimacy of the executive’s position, no less than his claim of the right as a military commander to modify national policies, can never be seen in any other way than as completely out of order. It is ironic that MacArthur, who himself might perhaps have been brought to trial for insubordination, should at one time have sat in judgment on another general officer for that very offence. General Mitchell, though possibly wide open to charges of impropriety in the methods he used, was challenging the correctness of the administration’s policy deci-

MacArthur’s act was the far graver one of challenging his orders in war and of appealing to the legislature and people over the Commander-in-Chief’s head.

It is worthy of note that in the wave of criticism of General MacArthur from non-American sources, some of it violent at times, the voice of General de Gaulle in France was almost alone amongst those of comparable importance which was raised in MacArthur’s defence. De Gaulle himself, of course, had been there, too. He had declined to accept the wholly legitimate capitulation to a national enemy in war of a properly constituted French government. This is something for which France will always remain deeply in his debt. There is no doubt, however, of the correctness of the position taken by officers of the so-called Vichy French Forces after the fall of France. We fought them in Syria on account of it. The *Troupes françaises du Levant* had orders to defend French possessions in mandated territories against all comers and this they did. I was myself wounded for the first time in the last war, in that campaign, commanding a small force in an untidy little battle on the Damascus road which we won. After the armistice in Syria and the Lebanon, walking around Beirut with an arm in plaster, I met a French officer who was another cavalryman and a contemporary whom I had known before the war as a friend. He had the other arm in plaster and, I discovered, had been in this little battle the commander on the Vichy French side. We dined together in the St. George Hotel while he explained to me with impeccable logic how professionally incompetent the command had been on our side. The fact that we had won was at best irrelevant and at worst aesthetically repugnant. But I do not recall that in the whole of our discussion either of us doubted the correctness of his action in fighting against the Allies and his old friends.

There is sometimes a purely military justification for disobedience. Britain’s greatest sailor, Lord Nelson, exploited it. After Jutland, Admiral Lord Fisher said of Admiral Jellicoe that he had all Nelson’s qualities but one: he had not learned to disobey. What I describe as military justification rests in the opinion of the officer on the spot that he can best meet the military requirement of his superiors if he acts in some way other than that prescribed by them. This is a matter of professional judgment, and of courage, for failure can prejudice a career. It is not a matter of morals. But there are also circumstances in which men or women find themselves under a moral compulsion to refrain from doing what is lawfully ordered of them. If they are under sufficiently powerful moral pressure and are strong enough and courageous enough to face the predictable consequences of their action, they will then sometimes disobey. This, I know, is terribly difficult ground. “My country right or wrong” is not an easy principle to reconcile with an absolute morality, even if we accept a Hegelian view that the state represents the
highest consummation of human society. Early in World War I a brave English nurse called Edith Cavell, who had said that "Patriotism is not enough," was shot by her country's enemies for relieving human suffering where she found it, among people held by the enemy to be francs tireurs or partisans. Nurse Edith Cavell's statue stands in London off Trafalgar Square, around the corner from the National Gallery; and it is worth a look in passing. It bears the inscription I have quoted: "Patriotism is not enough."

In the half century since that time doubt has grown further, not only on the ultimate moral authority of the nation state but also upon its permanence as a social structure. The nation state could at some time in the future develop into something else. States have before now been united into bigger groupings, and supra-national entities are not impossible.

I do not see the nation state disappearing for a long time yet, but already we have much experience of international political structures under which groups of national military forces are employed. The United States in the last third of a century, it has been said, has learnt more about the operation of coalitions than ever before. Conflicts of loyalty are always possible where forces are assigned to an allied command. I have been a NATO commander in Europe, and as such I had on my staff an officer of another nation who was engaged in the contingency planning of tactical nuclear targets. This was less of an academic exercise for this particular officer than it might have been, say, for an American or even for a Briton, for the targets were not only in Europe but in this officer's own country and in parts of it he had known from boyhood. It was made known to me that this officer was showing signs of strain and I had him moved to other work, for the military servant of a nation state can even now be put under moral strain in situations where conflicts of loyalties arise. The tendency towards international structures will almost certainly increase and the incidence of such situations is unlikely to grow less.

Let me draw together these thoughts upon the moral, as distinguished from the professional, aspect of obedience. The fighting man is bound to obedience to the interest of the state he serves. If he accepts this, as MacArthur certainly did, he can still, rightly or wrongly, question, like MacArthur, the authority of men constitutionally appointed to identify and interpret the state's interest. He could even, like de Gaulle, flatly refuse to obey these men. Those who consider General MacArthur open to a charge of insubordination may consider that General de Gaulle was probably open to a charge of no less than treason. Neither is constitutionally permissible. A case in moral justification might just possibly be made for both, though such a case is always stronger when the results of the act are seen to be in the outcome beneficial. "Treason doth never prosper," wrote Sir John Harrington in the days of Queen Elizabeth the First. "What's the reason? For if it prosper none
dare call it treason." In the event, de Gaulle became in the fullness of time president of the French Republic. It was poor Pétain that they put on trial.

Finally there is disobedience on grounds of conscience to an order, lawfully given, whose execution might or might not harm the state but which the recipient flatly declines, for reasons he finds compelling, to carry out. This will be done by the doer at his peril; and the risk, which can be very great, must be accepted with open eyes.

Another possible cause of strain upon the military is divergence in the ethical pattern of the parent society from that of its armed forces. Samuel Huntington, in the book *The Soldier and the State*, which will always occupy a high place in the literature upon this topic, spoke in the late 1950s of tendencies in the United States towards a new and more conservative environment, more sympathetic to military institutions. He suggested that this "might result in the widespread acceptance by Americans of values more like those of the military ethic." The course of events since Huntington wrote thus, in 1956, throws some doubt on the soundness of any prediction along these lines. The qualities demanded in military service, which include self-restraint in the acceptance of an ordered life, do not seem to be held in growing esteem everywhere among young people today. In consequence, where a nation is involved in a war which cannot be described as one of immediate national survival and whose aims, however admirable they may be, are not universally supported at home and perhaps not even fully understood there, strains can be acutely felt. Limited wars for political ends are far more likely to be productive of moral strains of the sort I have here suggested than the great wars of the past.

The wars of tomorrow will almost certainly be limited wars, fought for limited ends. The nation-in-arms has vanished; the general war is no longer a rational concept. But the nation state will persist for a time yet and the application of force to its political ends will persist with it. These ends, however, will be limited and the means limited too—not by choice of the military but by choice of their employers, the constitutionally established civil agencies of the state. These employers will also be watching most carefully the level of demand being made, on the military behalf, on national resource. If this level rises so high as to prejudice enterprises higher in the national scale of priorities than preparation for war, they will be resisted. There are signs that the very high priority given to the demands of the military upon a national resource in the United States in the third quarter of the 20th century will not persist into the fourth.

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Ladies and gentlemen, in addressing myself to the topic chosen for this memorial address, "The Military in the Service of the State," I have selected only a few aspects of a big and complex theme. Let me end with something like a confessio fidei—a confession of faith. I am myself the product of 35 years' military service—a person who, with strong inclinations to the academic, nonetheless became a professional soldier. Looking back now in later life from a university, I can find nothing but satisfaction over the choice I made all those years ago as a student—a satisfaction tinged with surprise at the good sense I seem to have shown as a very young man in making it. Knowing what I do now, given the chance all over again, I should do exactly the same. For the military life, whether for sailor, soldier, or airman, is a good life. The human qualities it demands include fortitude, integrity, self-restraint, personal loyalty to other persons, and the surrender of the advantage of the individual to a common good. None of us can claim a total command of all these qualities. The military man sees round him others of his own kind also seeking to develop them, and perhaps doing it more successfully than he has done himself. This is good company. Anyone can spend his life in it with satisfaction.

In my own case, as a fighting man, I found that invitations after the World War to leave the service and move into business, for example, were unattractive, even in a time when anyone who had had what they called on our side "a good war" was being demoted and, of course, paid less. A pressing invitation to politics was also comparatively easy to resist. The possibility of going back to Oxford to teach Mediaeval History was more tempting. But I am glad that I stayed where I was, in the Profession of Arms, and I cannot believe I could have found a better or more rewarding life anywhere outside it.

Another thought arises here. The danger of excessive influence within the state to which I have been referring does not spring from incompetence, cynicism, or malice in the military, but in large part from the reverse. What is best for his service will always be sought by the serving officer, and if he believes that in seeking the best for his service he is rendering the best service he can to his country, it is easy to see why. He may have to be restrained. He can scarcely be blamed.

The military profession is unique in one very important respect. It depends upon qualities such as those I have mentioned not only for its attractiveness but for its very efficiency. Such qualities as these make of any group of men in which they are found an agreeable and attractive group in which to function. The military group, however, depends in very high degree upon these qualities for its functional efficiency.
A man can be selfish, cowardly, disloyal, false, fleeting, perjured, and morally corrupt in a wide variety of other ways and still be outstandingly good in pursuits in which other imperatives bear than those upon the fighting man. He can be a superb creative artist, for example, or a scientist in the very top flight and still be a very bad man. What the bad man cannot be is a good sailor, or soldier, or airman. Military institutions thus form a repository of moral resource which should always be a source of strength within the state.

I have reflected tonight upon the relationship between civil and military in the light of past history, present positions, and possible future developments and have offered in conclusion my own conviction that the major service of the military institution to the community of men it serves may well lie neither within the political sphere nor the functional. It could easily lie within the moral. The military institution is a mirror of its parent society, reflecting strengths and weaknesses. It can also be a well from which to draw refreshment for a body politic in need of it.

It is in the conviction that the highest service of the military to the state may well lie in the moral sphere, and the awareness that almost everything of importance in this respect has probably still to be said, that I bring to an end what I have to offer here tonight in the Harmon Memorial Lecture for the year 1970.
The Fourth Session

SOLDIERS AND STATESMEN: THE POSTWAR WORLD
OPENING REMARKS

Major DAVID MacISAAC (USAF Academy): It is my privilege to introduce the gentleman who earlier labeled himself the ghost of Samuel Huntington; he is to chair this concluding session. First, however, some of you might like to know that we invited Professor Huntington to take part in this symposium. He declined, saying that he was not a historian and would feel out of place commenting on military history. [Major MacIsaac then introduced Professor THEODORE ROPP of Duke University.]

The CHAIRMAN (Professor Ropp): Thank you, Dave.

Colonel Hurley, gentlemen, and ladies. I have been uncertain as to exactly what the chairman is to do in this afternoon's session, but I think I have an idea now of what the session is all about.

What we are studying is really the structure and process of civil-military relations over a period that is now almost two centuries long. As I thought about what I would say about Professor Wright's and Professor Dorpalen's papers, and Professor Weigley's showing that they did not apply to the 19th century United States, I decided to raise the ghost of Huntington again. What Huntington or Janowitz might see as a basic issue that always underlies these discussions of civil-military relations in an American context really is not whether the United States is becoming militaristic, but whether a long-term military commitment leads to what I believe either Janowitz or Andreski calls unanticipated or unconscious militarism. Dr. Pogue and Dr. Matloff I think concluded an old argument about the military influence on policy in the Second World War by showing that, in running their own war scientifically as men of their generation understood the term, American soldiers of the Second World War did not intrude unduly on issues of foreign policy—although I found Professor Smith's analysis of such issues may still call for further questions in the panel that will follow this session.

This brings us to a man who is uniquely qualified to ask the real question which is in effect bothering many of us at this session, and which I think deserves exploration in a session of this sort. The question is: Does a military politics lead to, and again I am quoting from, I suspect, Janowitz, "an unintentionally militarized society"? Our speaker is very familiar with the problems of unintentional militarism in the 20th century. And now he will address himself to a person who for many has become a very symbol of militant Americanism, or of what some people call the arrogance of power, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. [The Chairman introduced Professor RICHARD D. CHALLENER, Princeton University.]
Professor CHALLENER: I am afraid that to begin with, I owe all of you a sincere apology. Last night I looked through this paper a number of times and couldn't find a single way that I could mention Sam Huntington in it.

Three years ago, I came out here with a carefully footnoted paper that described the first attempt of the United States Navy to try to influence American foreign policy before World War I. Today's paper is of a much different sort. It is speculative, and it is meant to open up discussion. Large parts of it, nearly everything that relates to the period after 1953, are based on transcripts in the John Foster Dulles oral history project at Princeton University. That project was set up by Mr. Crowl, sitting over on the left, who knows, I think, more about John Foster Dulles than I do; and he will be commenting later on in the session.
JOHN FOSTER DULLES: THE MORALIST ARMED

An Assessment of His Relations with American Military Leaders and His Ideas on the Role of Military Power in Foreign Policy

Richard D. Challener

*Princeton University*

To the present generation John Foster Dulles is *the* Cold Warrior, the moralist whose platitudes reduced international relations to an oversimplified struggle between Western "good" and Communist "evil." He is the brinksmen who stood poised on the edge of Armageddon and reveled in the confrontation.

It is, therefore, most appropriate for us to be reconsidering Dulles and some of his policies. This is certainly a period when many Americans—and not simply those of the New Left—are questioning the underlying assumptions of American foreign policy in the entire postwar era. Dulles, though no innovator, was one of the principal architects of that policy. He consolidated and greatly extended the basic policies he had inherited from Truman and Acheson; he carried their assumptions to their logical conclusion. And it is especially appropriate to reexamine Dulles's relations with military men and his concept of the role of force and military power in American foreign policy since it is the military dimension of our foreign policy which is now being most heavily criticized. Dulles is remembered—properly remembered, indeed—as a Secretary of State whose policies contained an exceptionally heavy military component.

Let me, first of all, stake out a few "givens," a few of the underlying premises of this paper. I have absolutely no qualms about focusing on John Foster Dulles and his role in the policy-making process. I also see no reason to get into the controversy about whether or not Dwight Eisenhower was a "do-nothing" president whose General Staff concept of the presidency presumably led him to delegate the decision-making process to his forceful Secretary of State. (As a matter of fact, I simply do not subscribe to that interpretation. There was more of a presidential role, less passivity, more
mutuality than many of Eisenhower's critics have realized.) Still, there was a certain special quality about John Foster Dulles that made him both the spokesman for and symbol of the foreign policies of the Eisenhower years. The person who sensed this best was his successor, Christian Herter, the gentle man from Massachusetts. Contrasting his own view of the presidential role in foreign policy with that of Dulles, Herter once said,

I think the major difference between ourselves was my own feeling that the president was the constitutional officer responsible for foreign affairs. Whether he made the policy or didn't make the policy, he ought to be out in front in connection with it. . . . I didn't want it to be known as a Herter policy; I would much rather have it an Eisenhower policy.

Herter paused for a moment, then added, "but I think Foster rather liked it being a Dulles policy." 1

Let me add a few additional assumptions. Dulles was clearly a moralist who greatly inflated the rhetoric of the Cold War. While he never believed that the Soviet Union deliberately intended to launch a general war, he was thoroughly convinced that both Russia and Red China were militaristic and expansionist. He took Soviet doctrine seriously, not as rhetoric but as a statement of definite purpose. More than one official of the State Department has since recalled Dulles's frequent references to a well thumbed copy of Stalin's Problems of Leninism. One foreign service officer vividly remembered being rebuked by the Secretary for not being acquainted with a particular quotation in it. As Dulles himself once wrote to Hector McNeill of the British Foreign Office,

I showed you the volume of Stalin's Problems of Leninism, in which I had underlined a good many passages. . . . I have read this many times and found it a valuable guide. It is hard reading, but if one gets the essence, it is a good deal like Hitler's Mein Kampf. 2

The religious aspect of Dulles made him especially conscious of what he referred to as "atheistic communism," and for John Foster Dulles the adjective was just as important as the noun. Many observers have concluded that his emphasis on Soviet doctrine and his religious beliefs combined to produce a rigidity of mind which left him unprepared to understand the changes in

1 Transcript of interview with Christian A. Herter, John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, Firestone Library, Princeton University. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations in this paper are from transcripts in this collection, which numbers some 300 transcripts of tape recordings made between 1964 and 1968 by members of the staff of the Oral History Project.
2 Dulles to Hector McNeill, May 3, 1948, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Correspondence, Firestone Library, Princeton University.
the Soviet Union that occurred after Stalin's death and which, above all, inclined him to view communism not in a spectrum of colors but in simple blacks and whites. Indeed, these qualities were noted by close associates who were by no means unsympathetic to him or his policies. James Hagerty, Eisenhower's press secretary, believed that Dulles's principal weakness was a desire to slam doors on things that he regarded as evil. "He was a Roundhead," Hagerty said, "a Puritan, and I am quite certain that in the Cromwell days his ancestors were chopping down the Cavaliers in the name of their religious beliefs." Sherman Adams, that interesting combination of granite and vicuña, felt that when Dulles set out upon a course of action there was no man who was more irreconcilable. "He stuck to his objectives," Adams said. "He gave no consideration to critics of his policies when he believed that his critics were not enlightened about the situation." The late George Allen, a senior American diplomat, long remembered an evening when he was a guest in the Dulles home. During the course of conversation, Allen dropped a few disparaging comments about the quality of democratic leadership provided by Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek. Dulles leaned forward in his chair and, as Allen remembered it, his eyes were blinking:

Well, I'll tell you this. No matter what you may say about them, those two gentlemen are modern day equivalents of the founders of the church. They are Christian gentlemen who have suffered for their faith. They have been steadfast and have upheld the faith in a manner which entitles them to be considered in the category of the later leaders of the church.

Allen, not strangely, added that Dulles always gave him the impression of having a pipeline to the Almighty and a mission to fulfill. Christian Herter noted the same tendency. "I think," Herter said,

that you have to give some allowance to the fact that Foster was essentially a very religious person, and I think that the very thought of communism, and the ungodliness of communism . . . was something that he felt deeply inside . . . . He felt that this was a very basic, fundamental thing that could only be settled eventually by some form of confrontation and that that confrontation would be more serious than anything that was now envisaged.

Many of these same qualities—and I am trying to choose my words very carefully—gave Dulles a very special appeal to certain military men whose own political views were quite conservative and who tended to believe that American policy before John Foster Dulles had been marked by "softness" toward communism. General Mark Clark, for example, had been monumentally unimpressed with Dulles in the immediate postwar period. But Clark
quickly came to the conclusion that, as Secretary of State, Dulles was a man who rapidly came of age and, in Clark's words, "learned fast of the duplicity and treachery of communists." In Clark's estimate, the Dulles record would have been even stronger if the Secretary had not been held back by the numerous State Department officials who preferred a path of appeasement. I recall one of the first assignments I drew in the Dulles Oral History Project. It was during the Goldwater campaign, and I lugged my tape recorder into the office of a man who had held high military rank during the Eisenhower era. On the way into his office I had noticed the bumper stickers on his car which called for an end to the "No Win Policy" of the United States and asked for "A Choice Not an Echo." His office was filled with patriotic symbols. He told me sincerely, sometimes emotionally, that he had felt able to sleep nights during the Quemoy-Matsu crisis because he was confident that in Dulles, America at last had a Secretary of State who was prepared to push the button if that was necessary.

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Yet in the 1930s and even during World War II, Dulles had projected a far different image. In the period immediately before the German attack on Poland, Dulles was very active in the efforts of American Protestantism to avert another world conflict. In the 1930s the constant theme of his speeches and his writings was the need for peaceful change. On countless occasions he argued that Europe was heading for another senseless conflict because no European nation was willing to live up to the provisions of Article 19 of the Versailles Treaty—the article that called for the revision of peace treaties when international conditions had changed and that was intended to provide a mechanism for peaceful change in Great Power relationships. The European order, Dulles insisted, had become "artificial"; the terms of the Versailles Treaty were no longer applicable; and the status quo powers, Britain and France, were guilty of holding fast to a system that no longer corresponded to the realities. When a friend tried to secure Dulles's support for an economic boycott of Japan, he responded,

One great difficulty with all peace plans . . . is that they tend to keep the world static and in this sense try to resist an irresistible force for change . . . . It seems to me that if peace is ultimately to be assured, some vitality must be given to such a provision as Article 19 of the League Covenant with reference to the reconsideration of treaties which have become inapplicable.  

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3For additional information on Dulles in the years before and during World War II, see Richard D. Challener (with John Fenton), "Which Way America? Dulles Always Knew," American Heritage 22 (June 1971): 12-13, 84-93; and the same authors' "Recent Past Comes Alive in Dulles 'Oral History Project,' " University (Spring 1967): pp. 3-9, 29-34.

4Dulles to Lewis F. Fox, Feb. 4, 1932, Dulles Papers, Correspondence.
While Dulles always insisted that he was not an isolationist, he did oppose American involvement in World War II until the time of Pearl Harbor. Asked to support the movement to provide some assistance to France and Britain in the spring of 1940, Dulles refused. "A major question in my mind," he wrote,

"is whether the inherent nature and character of modern totalitarian war does not itself jeopardize these objectives—perhaps even more, so far as we are concerned, than would a German "victory." ... So far as Europe is concerned, I do not think that there is anything we can do or that anyone can do that will prevent the present war from impoverishing the nations of Europe and creating social and economic conditions such that a regime of personal and individual liberty, such as we aspire to, will be impracticable. This will, I fear, be true no matter who "wins."

The conclusion of this long letter scarcely suggests the immobilist of the 1950s:

"If the defeat of England and France can only be prevented by the United States assuming the role of guarantor of the status quo in Europe and Asia, then, indeed, we would have assumed a heavy responsibility. For, as I have said elsewhere, change is the one thing that can not permanently be prevented, and the effort to perpetuate that which has become artificial will inevitably break the person or nation committed thereto."

And this note, written only a few months before America became a belligerent:

"My principal objection to war is that it creates such hatred, passions, and false conceptions of ourselves and others that we are totally disqualified from working out, in a rational way, the very real international problems which exist and which, if unsolved, are bound to make war recurrent."

During the war years, Dulles devoted almost all of his time to the effort of the National Council of Churches to develop a set of political principles that would establish a lasting peace. He chaired the Council's major study group, the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, and as its leader became the principal lay spokesman for American Protestantism on the subject of war aims. His commission promoted the cause of international organization and, not surprisingly, insisted that the postwar order must make provision for peaceful change. Its major recommendations, "The Six Pillars of Peace,"

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5Dulles to Thomas Debevoise, Apr. 30, 1940, ibid.
6Dulles to Watson Pomery, Apr. 25, 1941, ibid.
were a plea for liberal internationalism. Point 3 read: "The peace must make provision for an organization to adapt the treaty structure of the world to changing, underlying conditions." Point 5 stated: "The peace must establish provisions for controlling military establishments."

In this paper I cannot attempt any detailed explanation of the reason for the differences between the Dulles of 1945 and, say, the Dulles of 1955. Though I should at least note parenthetically that this difference was always a problem for the churchmen who had worked so closely with him before and during the war. They found it exceedingly difficult to understand how a man who had worked for internationalism in the company of such liberal Protestant leaders as Reinhold Niebuhr and John Coleman Bennett could in a few short years become the advocate of massive retaliation and the close associate of Admiral Arthur Radford. Was this brinksman, they asked themselves, the same John Foster Dulles they had always known? Or was it possible that they had misread and misunderstood him in the earlier days? With time and space, I think I could adequately explain those changes, both apparent and real, in John Foster Dulles which so confounded his former associates in the church. I would emphasize his moral rejection of communism and his actual experiences in international affairs as the principal foreign policy adviser of the Republican Party and as participant in many UN sessions. Which is to suggest that there was essentially one John Foster Dulles, a man who had a consistent system of ethical principles, who always insisted on the moral worth of the individual, and who firmly believed in the existence of a coherent moral order in the world. In the earlier years, this system of basic beliefs led Dulles to think that the lack of international organization was the cause of conflict. After 1945 it led him to identify emergent communism as the new enemy of a just and durable peace. And against both, it was necessary to mount a moral crusade.

Dulles did not, to be sure, become an overnight convert to the cause of containing communism by military means. By 1946 he was already writing articles for such magazines as Life and Reader's Digest in which he made many hostile comments about communism. But there was still considerable ambivalence in these pieces, a reluctance to accept the East-West split as permanent, an unwillingness to abandon all hope in the United Nations. Indeed, certain dedicated, militant anti-communists still found reason to

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7See the pamphlet, *A Just and Durable Peace: Statement of Political Propositions Formulated by the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace of the Federal Council of Churches* (New York, 1943).


*John Foster Dulles, "Soviet Policy and What to Do about It," Life 26 (June 3 and 10, 1946). The article was condensed in the Aug. 1946 issue of *Reader's Digest.*
complain about his statements. For example, in one of his speeches in 1945, Dulles contended that the Soviets had as good reason to suspect our intentions as we had to suspect theirs. For this he was immediately taken to task by that committed anti-communist, Eugene Lyons.\textsuperscript{10}

In September of 1946 Dulles delivered a major speech in which he suggested that the United States should not attempt to keep a series of what he termed "far flung bases" around the globe. Eyebrows went up in the War Department. Assistant Secretary for Air Stuart Symington asked General Spaatz to prepare a special memorandum for the enlightenment of Mr. Dulles. Spaatz, it is hardly necessary to say, identified American national security with the possession of overseas air bases. The need for such bases, Spaatz contended, arose from "the sharply increased offensive capabilities of modern warfare." Dulles, after receiving the Spaatz memorandum, responded at length. While he conceded that the United States must maintain its military strength, he still held much of his original ground. Seizing upon Spaatz's phrase about "sharply increased offensive capabilities," Dulles referred to it time and time again in his rejoinder. If America kept such overseas air bases, Dulles argued, then the United States would also possess "sharply increased offensive capabilities against other nations with whom we want to maintain friendly relations. They automatically carry to others the offensive threat we would ward off from ourselves. That, in turn, may increase the risk of war." Dulles specifically called for the renunciation of any plans to maintain air bases in Iceland or in any of the Japanese islands. Moreover, Dulles premised much of his argument on a strict, traditionalist view of civil-military relations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, he argued, might properly advise on the technical and the military value of bases, but they were not qualified to evaluate the possible political consequences or the potential threat to other countries. Nor was it their duty to give such advice. The ultimate decision, Dulles insisted, was a political decision and must "be made by civilians, concretely the President and his cabinet advisers, and the Congress."\textsuperscript{11}

Traces of this attitude continued for some time. When NATO was first proposed, Dulles questioned whether regional arrangements could properly be made under Article 51 of the Charter. He also suggested that since the United States faced what he regarded as a temporary and transitional international situation, it might not be appropriate to make long-term commitments. And in February of 1949 he expressed to Dean Acheson his hesitations about the possible fragmentation of the UN and the globalization of American commitments.\textsuperscript{12} Some of his objections were, to be sure, simply a reflection

\textsuperscript{10}Eugene Lyons to Dulles, Feb. 7, 1945, Dulles Papers, Correspondence.
\textsuperscript{11}Dulles to Stuart Symington, Sep. 26, 1946, ibid.
\textsuperscript{12}Memorandum on NATO, Apr. 1948, and Memorandum of Conversation with Dean Acheson, Feb. 1949, Dulles Papers, Writings.
of opinions prevalent in the Republican Party, which was still reluctant to accept the full implications of the postwar revolution in American diplomatic and military policy; but they also reflect more than a few traces of the Dulles who worked with churchmen for the establishment of the UN.

Nevertheless, it is also equally clear that during these same years Dulles was in the process of resolving his doubts about the role of military power in foreign policy. Indeed, he had worked out his basic ideas on national security well before he actually became Secretary of State in January 1953. A letter to General Douglas MacArthur, written in mid-November 1950, just after the Chinese intervention in Korea, hinted at the massive retaliation doctrine Dulles would eventually sponsor: "You produced a miracle on the land in Korea, but I doubt whether you would feel that that proves we should make the Asian mainland the area for testing the relative strength of the free and the communist worlds." "My view," Dulles continued, "and my impression of yours, is that air and sea power must in the Far East be our main reliance." In the spring of 1952—before it was clear that Dwight Eisenhower would be the Republican nominee, before it was clear that Dulles would be Eisenhower's choice for Secretary of State—Dulles published a long article in *Life* that was a remarkable forecast of policies to come. For, along with a liberal garnishing of rhetoric about "regaining lost initiatives in the Cold War" and "liberating subject peoples," the article anticipated both the New Look in military policy and massive retaliation in foreign policy. It began with several lengthy, lugubrious paragraphs which bewailed the economic burden placed on the American people by great military projects that consumed some sixty billion dollars of each annual budget. (Parenthetically, it should be emphasized that this was more than rhetoric. Dulles, in the last analysis, was a Republican, and along with the great majority of his party he was concerned about the impact of expanding defense expenditures upon the national economy. Indeed, the more one examines the Eisenhower years, the more one finds himself emphasizing the centrality of fiscal questions and the extent to which the administration concerned itself with the economic implications of rising defense budgets. Indeed, in the Eisenhower defense programs economics was more important than political or strategic calculations.) After this introduction, Dulles outlined his strategic thinking:

Today atomic energy, coupled with strategic air and sea power, provides the community of free nations with vast new possibilities of organizing a community of power to stop open aggression before it starts and reduce to the vanishing point the risk of general war....

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13Dulles to Douglas MacArthur, Nov. 15, 1950, Dulles Papers, Correspondence.
Obviously we can not build a 20,000 mile Maginot Line or match the Red armies man for man, gun for gun, and tank for tank at any particular time and place their general staff selects. . . . There is one solution, and only one: that is for the Free World to develop the will and organize the means to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red armies, so that if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back where it hurts by a means of our own choosing.14

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Once appointed Secretary of State, Dulles quickly established a firm and generally solid relationship with the military establishment—especially with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their new chairman, Admiral Arthur Radford. What I am referring to is primarily a network of personal and individual relationships and not necessarily the general relationship between the Defense Department, on the one hand, and the State Department, on the other. It is undoubtedly true that the elaborate National Security Council mechanism created by the Eisenhower administration did produce greater coordination and understanding between the two departments than had existed before. It is also true that, almost to a man, those individuals who were involved in the operations of the NSC structure have since bewailed John Kennedy's dismantling of it after 1961. Nevertheless, there still remained a more or less permanent, underlying difference: State Department members suspected the military of thinking first of the use of force, while the military considered the diplomats to be a bit too political, a bit too "soft." Having reviewed the great bulk of the transcripts in the Dulles Oral History collection, I am impressed by the number of individuals associated with the Defense Department who drew a distinction between their opinion of John Foster Dulles and their overall assessment of the Department of State. For example, former Under Secretary of the Navy Thomas Gates described his efforts to reach consolidated positions on which both State and Defense could agree. He felt that the position papers from the Navy usually advocated

14John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," Life 32 (May 19, 1952): 146-60. Gen. Lucius Clay, then trying to bring Dulles and Eisenhower together, sent an advanced copy of the article to Eisenhower. The latter's reply said, in part: "Only one point bothered me . . . . What do we do if Soviet political aggression, as in Czechoslovakia, successfully chips away exposed positions of the free world? So far as our resulting economic policies are concerned, the result would be as bad for us as if the area had been captured by force." And further on, "One of the great and immediate uses of the military forces we are developing is to convey a feeling of confidence to exposed populations, that makes them feel sturdier in their resistance to Communist inroads. Military as well as economic strength is necessary to create the atmosphere in which internal aggression can be defeated. . . . This is another reason for producing a respectable military posture as soon as possible." Dwight Eisenhower to Dulles, Apr. 15, 1952, Dulles Papers, Correspondence.
action, whereas those from the State Department did not. Therefore, Gates recalled,

we used to worry in the Navy about [such] differences in point of view between the two departments. But often my work was wasted because Dulles more often than not didn’t take the position of his own staff papers. He usually took a position which was more in tune with what we were trying to espouse.

Military leaders were deeply impressed by Dulles’s ability to marshal his evidence, his apparent command of every detail of a controversial question, his familiarity with all of the facts that bore on a problem. (They were not alone in this feeling. Virtually everyone who encountered Dulles in the cabinet or the NSC reacted similarly. The great source of Dulles’s influence was his ability to present his case, to argue a reasoned and logical lawyer’s brief into which every fact had been carefully fitted.) Even more important, military leaders were persuaded that Dulles would listen to them, hear them out, respect their opinions. General Nathan Twining later recalled, “He quizzed us an awful lot . . . he apparently had a lot of faith in the military—more so than most of our people in those jobs had had before. And he dragged out these meetings with us because he wanted to get the facts.” And they also felt that Dulles would support them in the decisions which they had to make. General Lauris Norstad, recalling his days as Supreme Commander in Europe, was quite explicit: “With Mr. Dulles, as with the president, I had the feeling that whatever action I had to take—whatever I had to say or do—I had the absolute confidence that I had their support. In some cases they might even have disapproved, but they still gave support.” Most military men (with a few exceptions to be noted) also believed that Dulles had a good understanding of the role of force in foreign policy, a general grasp of the military aspects of national security, and a realization of the military implications of the foreign policies he pursued.

Yet there were some unique aspects of Dulles’s relationship with the Department of Defense. He dealt, after all, with Secretary Charles Wilson, not with a Forrestal, Marshall, or McNamara. The distinction is important, for Charles Wilson was neither interested in nor informed about foreign affairs. As Secretary of Defense he ran the department as he had run General Motors—that is, with his own concentration upon production, management, procurement, and finances. One day Dulles was late for a meeting with Wilson. When he finally arrived, Dulles said that he had been delayed on Capitol Hill by a group of senators who had taken an hour and a half to quiz him about the size of the State Department budget. The Secretary of Defense asked how much money was involved. Dulles carefully explained, “Well, we were asking for 237 million, and they were trying to cut it back to 195 million.” “Engine Charlie” was incredulous. “You mean to say that you sat
up on the Hill for an hour and a half to justify a 40 million dollar matter? Foster, I spend that much every day of the year, seven days a week, before the first coffee break."

While this little exchange may say something about national priorities in the Eisenhower era, it certainly suggests that Charles Wilson was no threat to Dulles in the area of foreign policy. Hence Dulles was inclined to go elsewhere for consultation—and "elsewhere" was quite frequently Admiral Arthur Radford, with whom, as I have noted, Dulles developed close ties. Indeed, as Radford himself later admitted, Dulles often sought him out in the first instance on policy matters which, properly speaking, should have been raised first with the Secretary of Defense. One of the principal reasons for the firm Dulles-Radford relationship was the general similarity of their views on the Far East. Dulles, I am convinced, came into office believing that the Democrats had neglected Asia and concentrated too much upon Europe. To his associates in the State Department, the Secretary consistently emphasized his belief that the United States was an Asian power and that, in consequence, the defense of Nationalist China was an imperative national interest. Admiral Radford, in keeping with the Navy's traditional interest in the Far East, felt no less strongly. Later he said that, in his judgment, Dulles "understood" the Pacific better than any of his predecessors in the State Department. To cite Under Secretary Gates once again: "Dulles was very much in tune with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at that time, Admiral Radford, particularly on Far Eastern policy, which both understood; and it was very strong policy."

Since the remainder of this paper will concentrate on two major topics—the New Look and massive retaliation—there is insufficient space to refer to many other aspects of Dulles's policies which involved, broadly speaking, military factors and military considerations. Any full study of Dulles, however, would have to analyze such matters as the following: his strong defense of the Nationalist Chinese in the Quemoy-Matsu crises, his intervention in Lebanon, his role in the Suez crisis, his sponsorship of the two congressional resolutions that attempted to spell out the lines across which the communists could not move without risking an American response, and, above all, his proliferation of national security pacts on a truly global scale. Dulles, moreover, is properly associated with the hard-liners who initially favored American action at the time of the fall of Dien Bien Phu, and the evidence also suggests that Dulles was among the first (if not the first) to believe, in the bitter aftermath of the Geneva Conference, that the regime in Saigon could be maintained by American support. In European affairs it was Dulles who was most insistent that American troops must be kept at the NATO force levels and who successfully maintained his position despite the strong desires of Republican economizers and the frequently expressed hope of President Eisenhower to reduce the size of the American troop commitment to NATO. ¹⁵

¹⁵See, on both points, the transcript of an interview with Gen. Andrew Goodpaster in the Dulles Oral History Project.
Nevertheless, it is a mistake to over-emphasize the purely military dimensions of the policies of John Foster Dulles or to suggest that he was dependent upon the military. He continued to have a strong sense of civilian supremacy. While he consulted Radford, even sought him out in the first instance, he always insisted that the ultimate decision was the prerogative of civilians. As General Matthew Ridgway recalled, "He was very sensitive to anything which he might construe as trespassing by the military into the sphere of the diplomatic." (Indeed, Ridgway remembered one NSC meeting at which the Secretary "snubbed" his friend Radford when he thought Radford was improperly intervening in forbidden civilian preserves.) Those who were responsible for the U-2 program certainly thought that Dulles was the key person whom they had to convince about the necessity of a flight and whose recommendation counted most heavily with the president when he made the final decision. In each and every instance, they recalled, the Secretary had to be convinced that the military information from a U-2 flight outweighed the possible political consequences of discovery or failure.\(^{16}\)

Certain policies, which at first glance might seem to carry almost exclusively military implications, appear differently when subjected to closer examination. SEATO, for example, was designed by Dulles to meet certain constitutional, legal, and political problems and was not really intended to be a Far Eastern NATO. When Dien Bien Phu was under siege and the French position in Indochina was collapsing, Dulles had clearly believed that the United States had to act. But he encountered immediate congressional objections, especially to the idea of unilateral American action without French or British support. Dulles then consulted the British and thought he had secured a commitment for British support from Anthony Eden. He was bitterly disappointed when the British had second thoughts and pulled back. (Indeed, to Dulles, Eden had reneged on a promise. It was a root cause of subsequent disagreements between the two men.) Moreover, international law seemed to furnish no justification for American intervention in Indochina. SEATO was therefore designed to prevent just such complications in the future. As a treaty ratified by the Senate, it would provide the president with broad powers to act—and to act immediately without the necessity of a long, complicated congressional debate. As a treaty it would also have the approval of America's allies, thereby diminishing the chance that some future Eden could "renege" on a promise. And, as a regional agreement under the provisions of the UN charter, it would provide a legal sanction for intervention in Southeast Asia. In other words, SEATO was primarily a lawyer's and

\(^{16}\) See the transcripts of Richard Bissell and Gen. Charles Cabell in the Dulles Oral History Project.
not a soldier’s document.¹⁷ In point of fact, Dulles himself never thought in terms of creating an infrastructure along the lines of the NATO model, nor did he believe that the Asian countries would provide much military strength of their own or prove to be very solid bulwarks in the alliance.

John Foster Dulles will, above all, always be identified with the doctrine of “massive retaliation.” It should be emphasized that the concept does fit in with some of his deeply held convictions. Dulles, for example, consistently believed that wars arise out of miscalculation more frequently than out of deliberate intent. He always thought that World War I need not have occurred if Great Britain had made it clear in advance that she would fight to preserve the independence of Belgium. He thought that Hitler would not have gone to war in 1939 if he had realized that the United States would aid the Allies. And he was persuaded that Dean Acheson’s National Press Club speech in 1950 on American defense perimeters in Asia was in very large part responsible for the Korean war. Thus, Dulles always wanted to draw lines, make positions known in advance, and indicate that transgressions might well trigger an American response in some unexpected area—all of this intended to narrow the possibility of misconception and miscalculation. Also, as I have noted earlier, the basic concept of atomic retaliation was contained in his 1952 article in Life. Yet Dulles was by no means the principal architect of either massive retaliation or its concomitant military posture—the so-called New Look—with its primary emphasis upon air and naval power. These policies had many and varied ideological, technical, economic, and political roots—so much so that they represent a kind of fundamental, characteristically American response to the frustrations of the Cold War. Some years ago the late Walter Millis pointed out that the concept of the atomic deterrent as the basis of policy was foreshadowed as early as the late 1940s when the first B-29s were stationed in Great Britain.¹⁸ I am certain that Professor Gaddis Smith would confirm that in the Acheson period there was a great deal of discussion about massive retaliation—using different terminology, to be sure, but of the concept of basing policy upon the atomic deterrent. Both massive retaliation and the New Look were also based on an underlying national faith in the technological superiority of America as well as on the frustrations of the stalemated, limited war in Korea—that is, out of the fear that the United States, with limited manpower, could never hope to match the Chinese or Russians man for man. They also arose out of

¹⁷Bissell transcript. Similarly, Dulles wanted to maintain U.S. troop levels in Europe not because he genuinely expected a Soviet attack but for the political symbolism involved. He reasoned that any reduction in the NATO force levels might leave the impression in Europe that the United States was reordering its priorities, which is simply to say that the size of the American contingent in Europe was a piece in his larger political and psychological game.

considerable rational calculation, for as the immediacy of the Korean crisis abated, both civilian and military planners began to argue that there ought to be a slow growth of military power, rather than a rapid build-up geared to a predetermined date of readiness. And, as I emphasized earlier, both New Look and massive retaliation were deeply rooted in the orthodox economic views of a Republican administration which was, above all, committed to the goal of a balanced budget and determined to reduce the amount of money spent for national defense.

Indeed, I would argue that these concepts served as a very important device to bring conservative Republicans into the foreign policy consensus that the Eisenhower administration was trying to achieve. During the Korean war the Taft wing of the party had been greatly outraged by the presumed loss of American independence in foreign and military policy, the consequence, they argued, of paying too much attention to the wishes of America's UN partners and her European allies. While the Taft Republicans clearly worried about the national budget, they also had increasingly fretted about this alleged growing dependence on allies. For them, massive retaliation and the New Look had many attractions: they seemed to offer greater security at less cost; they cut through some of the frustrations of limited war without "victories"; and they appeared to restore a degree of American independence to act on her own responsibility. They were, in short, the kind of bridge which brought virtually all Republicans into acceptance of the foreign and military policy apparatus of the postwar period. This being so, it seems to me that it is relatively unimportant to try to single out the specific role of a Dulles, or a Radford, or a Humphrey in creating them. Rather, the point to be stressed is that massive retaliation and the New Look reflect the totality of American assumptions, calculations, and fears at a particular stage in the history of the Cold War.

John Foster Dulles himself, it must be stressed, had a relatively sophisticated understanding of the role of force and the place of military power in his own policies. He did, without question, believe in the atomic bomb as a deterrent, and he was prepared to recommend atomic retaliation if that seemed necessary. No one who worked with Dulles was ever in doubt about his willingness to employ atomic weapons if war broke out. But he was by no means wedded exclusively to massive retaliation as the single basis of policy. In his private talks with his associates, Dulles always indicated that it was important to maintain conventional military power and to retain ground forces that were mobile, flexible, and capable of waging limited war. Admiral Arleigh Burke's 31-knot prose may not be the most elegant on the subject, but it makes the point: "Mr. Dulles was all for limited wars, much more so than he is being given credit for. He was strong for conventional forces, not nuclear power."
Through his speeches and writings, however, Dulles was the individual who was always most closely identified with the massive retaliation concept. Moreover, these speeches and articles created more misconceptions not only about the policy but also about himself. He projected an image of a bellicose America prepared to atomize large sections of the globe for something less than massive provocations. And, while his private conversations might well indicate a belief in the importance of maintaining conventional military strength, his speeches projected an oversimplified version of national security based on air and sea retaliation. Indeed, even Admiral Radford found his phraseology unfortunate. Dulles gave the impression, the admiral later recalled, “that we were just ready to pounce on everybody.” His article on massive retaliation, Radford felt, reversed the appropriate emphasis and failed to suggest that “the actual basis of the ‘New Look’ was to devise a security organization that kept everybody quiet”—that is, would prevent war. Similarly Robert Bowie, who headed the Policy Planning Staff, was critical. Bowie knew from firsthand experience that Dulles did have a complex view of the requirements of national defense, but Bowie was often concerned when the Secretary’s speeches sounded as if he had associated himself “with the Radford idea which was basically committed to the all-out strategy.”

Many of the misconceptions that Dulles created arose, ironically, from one of his principal virtues—his desire to communicate his ideas to the American public and to Congress and thereby to win general support for administration policies. But in these many attempts, Dulles had a tendency to choose striking words, catch phrases, capsule phrases—such as “massive retaliation,” “agonizing reappraisal,” “going to the brink,” and the like. These phrases, intended to make it easy for the public to understand his policies, had the unfortunate effect of making the Secretary seem both a simplifier and a brinksmen. Thus, although I fully concur with those who insist that Dulles did believe in the need for a broad spectrum of military force and that his own ideas did differ significantly from those of Admiral Radford, I would also insist that he only managed to project a bellicose image of himself and his policies. His speeches, that is, fail to suggest that his goal was the creation of a system of deterrence that would prevent breaches of the peace; rather, they suggest the atomic response that might occur if the enemy miscalculated. I also think that Dulles gradually came to recognize his error. In later speeches, for example, he emphasized that what he had been talking about was the capacity for retaliation, not the act itself.19

19 Compare his article, “Policy for Security and Peace,” *Foreign Affairs* 32 (Apr. 1954): 353-64, with his later piece, “Challenge and Response in United States Policy,” ibid. 36 (Oct. 1957): 25-43. The same analysis applies to the concept of “brinksmanship.” The idea of Dulles as the brinksmen who had three times led the United States to the edge of war emerged from an article about the Secretary in *Life* in 1955. In the course of the interview on which the article was based, Dulles had spoken at length about some very serious matters, notably how a nation should react in time of crisis when confronted by an implacable enemy. But again, he used striking phrases like “going to the brink” and “the President came up taut,” etc. The *Life* writers could not resist using these dramatic phrases, to which they added some provocative subheads and a flashy title on the cover, “Three Times to the Brink of War.” Nevertheless, the Secretary’s penchant for the simple, dramatic phrase was in large part responsible for creating the “brinksman” image.
More things were controversial about these new policies than the way in which the Secretary described them. The New Look, with its emphasis on air and naval strength, reduced the role of the ground forces; and a series of army officers, especially Generals Ridgway and Taylor, raised the cry that the composition of American forces was getting out of balance. The overemphasis on air and naval components, they maintained, meant that the United States would be unable to fight a limited war and, lacking this limited war capability, the only possible American response would be massive and atomic. In addition, at least a few of Dulles's own staff in the State Department believed in the concept of balanced forces, disliked the air-naval emphasis of the New Look, and wanted the Secretary to enter into the cabinet and NSC debates on the structure of the armed forces. Wanting Dulles to become an active participant in the great interservice controversy about the New Look, they believed that, with his great influence in the administration, his intervention would be decisive. Robert Bowie, for example, tried to convince the Secretary that he had a duty to become involved in the debate. Dulles's foreign policies, Bowie argued, involved the flexible use of force and would fail if only one choice were available. Moreover, Bowie contended, the posture that Dulles actually be able to assume in foreign affairs was directly related to the kind of military instrument being fashioned in the Pentagon. He must not, in short, let the New Look limit his options. General Taylor was direct in his criticism: "I would say, and I say it somewhat critically . . . that as a Secretary of State who was taking such a bold, firm position around the world, he was not looking at the instrument being welded for him in the Pentagon, which in the last analysis might be the support of his policy."

Yet Dulles never did intervene in the greatest interservice debate of the 1950s. There were many reasons for his silence. First of all, he did accept the estimates given him by the Pentagon, especially the information provided by Radford. They were the experts, and he respected their expertise. And they were insisting, New Look or not, that the army critics were wrong and that the United States was still capable of exercising a wide variety of military options. The new emphasis on air and naval units, they claimed, had by no means restricted American military responses to all-or-nothing strategies. "Dulles," Bowie later remembered, "was never willing to probe very deeply into the validity of that statement."

Furthermore, Dulles's unwillingness to become involved was also related to his own strong sense of the prerogatives of the Secretary of State. He brooked absolutely no interference in his own sphere of action. When a Harold Stassen or a Nelson Rockefeller intruded himself into the forbidden area of policy formulation, his days in Washington came to an abrupt end. The same logic led him to keep himself out of the affairs of the military. I think he clearly realized that, if he inserted himself into the interservice
debate over national military posture, he would, at the very least, weaken his own claim to banish poachers from his own territory. Then, too, there was the obvious fact that President Eisenhower was thoroughly at home in all military matters. Since Dulles prized his relationship with the president, it is reasonable to believe that he must have considered that it would be imprudent to involve himself in matters about which the president was himself an expert.

Yet there are signs in 1958 and 1959—that is, in the last year of his life—that Dulles was beginning to have doubts about the future viability of the policy of retaliation. Sputnik, at the very minimum, posed the issue of the credibility of the American doctrine in an era when the Soviet Union was equipping itself with its own array of missiles and could also retaliate massively. Though the evidence is not truly compelling, I sense that Dulles might even have begun to ponder the foreign policy implications of nuclear stalemate. Certainly by 1958 he was becoming concerned about discovering ways that would enable the United States to act and, if necessary, to fight limited war in a period when the Soviet Union would have its own nuclear delivery system. On his own initiative he sought out certain military leaders and discussed with them the possible need to enunciate a new national security policy. It was, and I reemphasize the fact, no more than a beginning, a tentative exploration. But, as Gerard Smith recalled,

I never saw Dulles so solemn. He talked, I would say, for an hour without any interruption at all, outlining why he thought a change in American military policy was necessary. The issue was not graduated deterrence, but what you do at Quemoy or in South Vietnam, where it isn’t credible with the opposition that you will go over to nuclear weapons.

The prospect of change was difficult for Dulles to accept. He did think that both the nuclear deterrent itself and the stated policy of retaliation had worked, had kept the peace in previous years, and still retained considerable validity. But he recognized that the United States would have to consider the possible need for new policies before being overwhelmed by external facts. But, as I have stressed, it was but a beginning. The premature death of Dulles in the spring of 1959 ended this kind of exploration, and it was left up to the Kennedy administration to pursue the whole balanced forces theme.

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It is past time to conclude this paper. But I must confess that, as an academic historian, Dulles has always made me just a bit uneasy. His constant moralizing always put obstacles in the way of my own empathy. In many respects, too, I believe that Dulles does represent a major aspect of the
tragedy of American diplomacy about which Professor Williams has so ably written. I mean tragedy in the sense that with Dulles, there were too many unexamined assumptions about "right" and "wrong" and an all-too-easy identification of American foreign policy with eternal verities.

He was, as I have said, no innovator but rather the man who carried inherited policies to their logical conclusions. What George Kennan has called the militarization of American foreign policy began long before Dulles became Secretary of State; the globalization of American commitments was implicit in earlier decisions; and massive retaliation was not so much the personal policy of John Foster Dulles as the characteristic policy of the United States in the Republican era of the 1950s.

With Dulles one confronts the contemporary issue of the civilian and the Pentagon. Here, as Robert Bowie correctly asserted, was a Secretary of State whose basic stance in foreign policy—deterrence through the threat of retaliation—rested upon the military posture of the United States. It is not sufficient to conclude that he, as a civilian, failed in his ability to cope with those who had the expertise in military matters, for Dulles, as I have tried to argue, was far better informed about military matters than all but a handful of his predecessors. But he could not and did not ask the big questions. And, while it is possible to understand why he didn't, I find myself in agreement with those who regret his failure to probe very deeply into the advice he received from the Joint Chiefs. Above all, with Dulles one searches in vain for evidence that as Secretary of State he raised fundamental questions about the long term consequences of a national policy so firmly established upon a military foundation.

John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State at a time when the Cold War was at its greatest intensity. He was able to live with and accept the logic of that confrontation. For us, now nearly two decades later, no appraisal of Dulles can be separated from our own interpretation of the Cold War and our estimate of communist intentions in the 1950s. The defenders of Dulles will concede his one-dimensional moral outlook and his provocative language. But they will also insist that in the 1950s, it was a categorical imperative of American foreign policy to convince the communist world that, if pressed to the ultimate decision, America would employ nuclear weapons. As Admiral Arleigh Burke has argued, "Dulles wanted to get across the idea, which he did, that the security of the free world was dependent upon our willingness to use nuclear weapons if we had to, and that it would be our decision when we had to." But conversely, to those who, like myself, believe that there were more options available, more choices to explore, then Dulles remains the moralist armed—a man of unexamined first premises who continued policies that helped to turn the Cold War into a basic condition of American life. And, at the very minimum, we wish that John Foster Dulles,
as Secretary of State, had paused to remember some of the questions he had raised before and during the Second World War—questions about the consequences of war and the perils of resisting change in the name of preserving the status quo.
The CHAIRMAN: Before going further in this rather mixed concluding session, let me give you an idea of the format which we will follow. Professor Crowl will read William Appleman Williams’s comments on Dr. Challener’s paper. General Parrish will then comment. Then Professor Crowl wants a couple of minutes for some remarks of his own. Finally the chairmen of the previous sessions will comment on any questions that anyone wishes to put about previous sessions of this symposium.

Professor Crowl, who is chairman of the Department of History at the University of Nebraska, former State Department official, one of the people who worked for that famous acronym known as OCMH, “Oh see more history” group, and also to most of you the Crowl of Isely and Crowl, *U.S. Marines and Amphibious War*, will read the comments that have just come in from Professor William Appleman Williams, Oregon State University. Professor Williams is probably the most important of the critics of American foreign policy in this period. The most important of his works, as I understand it, is *The Roots of the Modern American Empire*, 1969. Professor Crowl.

Professor CROWL: Thank you, Ted. Ladies and gentlemen. I feel a little like Groucho Marx at the last moment being asked to play Hamlet, or perhaps Ophelia. However, as I said to Major MacIsaac on the way up here, when I was first commissioned an ensign in the United States Naval Reserve many years ago, I was told that my first and permanent obligation would be always to be prepared to bail out the Army or the Army Air Corps. So I am delighted to be able to serve in that fashion again.

Now I am the voice of Professor Williams.
Commentary*

William Appleman Williams

Oregon State University

May I first say, through the courtesy of my proxy, that I am deeply disappointed not to be with you. But as one doctor put it, "the mind and heart propose, but the spine disposes."

Not the least of my disappointments is that, since last Saturday, I have been working on an adaptation of that old jazz favorite, "Come on Home, Bill Bailey." My version is called, "Get Back to the Ship, Ben Martin. This Is Not a Drill"—and I had intended to belt it out over the PA system about 0200. [Ben Martin is the head Academy football coach and, like Professor Williams, a graduate of USNA - Ed.]

More seriously, I am disappointed that I can not speak directly to Professor Challener when I say that he has written a fine essay. He has seen and defined the central issues in any discussion of the relationship between civilian and military leaders, and he has explored them with perception and candor. In my view, his major conclusion is irrefutable.

That is to say, in summary, that the civilian leadership of the country (including John Foster Dulles, but by no means excluding many others) had defined the world in such a way that American foreign policy could not avoid being militarized. This was a long process, not simply a result of World War II. It began with the war against Spain, which was clearly initiated by the United States after Presidents Grover Cleveland and William McKinley had formulated an implicitly bipartisan policy that arbitrarily defined Spain as being responsible for the prosperity and general welfare of the United States. Once you take that position, the only way to avoid war is to pick accommodating opponents who acquiesce.

The trouble is, of course, that the age of the autocrat of the breakfast

*Read, in Professor Williams's absence, by Professor Philip A. Crowl.
table is over in world politics just as surely as it is over in domestic politics. It is literally a gravely unfortunate matter that the Blacks and the women of America waited so long to raise the flag of rebellion. Had they shaken the ghettos and the kitchens sooner, we might have learned without so much pain that people do not acquiesce forever in being falsely held responsible for the failures of others.

While agreeing wholly with Professor Challener’s central proposition, I would like to explore a few of his secondary conclusions. Consider, for example, his judgment that there “was, essentially, one Dulles.” I wish he had gone more deeply into that important matter because it tells us a very great deal about the way civilian leaders have defined the world in a way that militarizes foreign policy. But I do not think we can understand the continuity beneath the seeming disparities simply through references to the “moral rejection of communism” and the practical business of conducting foreign affairs.

Dulles was not the first amateur theologian who had his hand in the making of American foreign policy: Woodrow Wilson and William Jennings Bryan come easily to mind. But the crucial point is that all those men, along with many others less overtly religious, were Christian capitalists. They were not Christian anarchists. They were not Christian communitarians. And they were not Christian socialists. The point strikes me rather like Jesus struck the money changers in the temple: the capitalism in their outlook is at least as important as the Christianity. I simply do not think we can comprehend the Cold War without understanding that America’s civilian leaders saw themselves confronted by the challenge of a functioning alternative to a capitalist political economy.

Another point worth examining is Professor Challener’s judgment that “SEATO was a lawyer’s and not a soldier’s document.” Given the alternatives he offers himself (and us), he makes a case for that formulation. But, considering his analysis of Dulles, the thought comes to me that the issue might better be posed in this fashion: “SEATO was a warrior’s and not a statesman’s document.” I would make it clear that I am using the term warrior in its classic meanings, including its positive connotations, and not as a sly synonym for an aggressive monomaniac. My point is that Challener’s own presentation indicates quite clearly that Dulles wanted to free the Commander-in-Chief to act on a Cold War definition of the world without any complications or delays from foreign or domestic laggards. That assumes, as with the warrior, that The Truth is known, once and for all, whereas the statesman is neither so certain about the truth nor so confident in the threat or the use of force.
In conclusion, permit me to offer a few of the more general thoughts that came to me as I reflected on Professor Challener's fine paper. As he notes, the militarization of American foreign policy was inevitable once Dulles and other civilian leaders settled upon their particular definition of the world. The consequences have been enormous. My firm judgment—based on my training as an Academy officer as well as on my observations as a historian and a citizen—is that the military today exerts far too much direct and indirect influence on the nature and the quality of American life. That power has long since become counter productive, and I am grievously disturbed that so few Academy officers have seen and acted upon the resulting dangers. Those dangers involve their ability to discharge their constitutional military responsibilities, and their implicit obligation to maintain the constitutional balance between the military and the civilian sectors of American society.

Let us first consider that second danger. At some point in the postwar era, the military establishment did acquire and proceed to exercise a certain kind of independent authority. Given the accepted definition of the world, the recommendations of the military carried the kind of intellectual power that could not be denied without changing the definition of the world.

That meant two things. First, the military's solution for the strategic and tactical problems posed by the civilian definition of the world operated in effect to limit political and economic policy. Even within the existing framework, civilian leaders increasingly lost flexibility. They lost it even at the intellectual level, as revealed during the argument over a New Look in military policy. For a debate about how best to do one thing is not a discussion of whether that one thing is the best thing. Yet countless civilians thought they were re-examining the nature of American foreign policy. Vietnam revealed the gravely serious nature of their mistake.

The result of that belated awareness serves to dramatize my other point about the way that the military's uncritical acceptance and use of its great power has served in the end to weaken the military's ability to discharge its constitutional responsibilities. For what started as an anti-Vietnam War movement has now become a far broader assault on the very structure and leadership of the establishment.

So we come to a very difficult question: what responsibility does the military leadership have to tell the civilian leadership that its definition of the world is somehow mistaken? Meaning this: for the military to tell the civilians that their view of the world cannot be translated into military policy without in the end having the nature and demands of the military policy subvert the avowed objectives of peace, prosperity, and social health at home.
I suggest that the central function of the Academies is to educate men capable of seeing such basic contradictions, and to inculcate the kind of dedication and courage that will enable those men to state such truths to their civilian masters. Note carefully that I do not say that the military leaders should propose or agitate for some specific new definition of the world. That is properly the responsibility of the citizenry. An officer can always resign if he feels impelled to participate in that primary process of self-government.

But I do say that the Academy officer has a basic and special responsibility to say no when he concludes that he cannot defend his country except through means that weaken its structure and violate its principles. That responsibility is inherent in his oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States, and it holds even unto the act of resignation. The good captain does go down with his ship, but he also refuses to take it to sea until it is fit for his crew.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Professor Crowl.

The next commentator is Brigadier General Noel F. Parrish, who for three years before his retirement in 1964 was Director of the Aerospace Studies Institute at the Air University. But for our discussion this afternoon, as I see it, the critical assignments he held were these: in 1948 he was Deputy Secretary of the Air Staff; in 1951 Special Assistant to the Vice Chief of Staff; 1954 Air Deputy to the NATO Defense College, and so on. Therefore, in the very period Professor Challener's paper deals with, General Parrish was in a position to know of the things of which Professor Challener has written. After his retirement, General Parrish took his Ph.D. in history at Rice University, and his dissertation again was directly related to the subject under discussion. It was nuclear weapons and their influence on foreign policy. I have the distinct privilege to introduce Brigadier General Noel F. Parrish.

General PARRISH: I want to thank Professor Ropp for his introduction, but I should add a footnote. There were a great many things going on in that period that I did not know—there were just too many things going on.
Commentary

Brigadier General Noel F. Parrish, USAF (Ret.)
Trinity University, San Antonio

Shortly after Eisenhower became president, he was visited by his old friend, Winston Churchill. Later, in England, Lord Moran asked the prime minister what he thought of Ike in the new job. Churchill was a bit angry with the president at the time. He replied, "Well, in the war, he had a very genuine gift for friendship and for keeping the peace. But I decided... in the States that he was really a Brigadier."

Doubtless it is as a former brigadier in the Pentagon rather than as a present assistant professor that I have the privilege of commenting on Professor Challener's paper. Brigadiers are barely members of the high brass establishment, but assistant professors are not members of anything other than the Faculty Club.

Recently, I underwent a brain transplant which exchanged my military mind for an only slightly used academic one. The transplant was accomplished under four years of induced amnesia as a graduate student. Now, I am sufficiently conscious to understand that the academic hierarchy is more rigid than the military and that seniority therein is far more important. An impatient, non-scientific assistant professor, with a deep freeze of professorial tenure above him, must become a firebrand if he hopes to crack any ice. A recent investigation disclosed that no less than fifty assistant professors at an eastern university had sided with the student radicals. My comments will therefore be in the character of an insurgent assistant professor rather than a counter-insurgent brigadier.

Before objecting to anything in Professor Challener's paper, let me first agree that it is an excellent paper, much broader in its scope than the title indicates. It treats the incredibly active Secretary of State as a complex man in thought and in action. This manner of treatment is rare, for the orthodoxy of the moment is simply to categorize Mr. Dulles as immorally anticommunist.

Professor Challener presents carefully selected samples from a variety of views about Dulles. He reviews the changing nature of the man’s opinions expressed over a full half-century of international mobility. Yet Professor Challener is able to maintain that there was essentially “one Dulles” whose basic principles, as Dulles himself said, remained constant despite the diversity of his methods and his views. Professor Challener points out that Eisenhower was no “patsy” for Dulles, as Ike’s critics have claimed—and, I would add: as Dulles’s critics also have maintained. The two leaders complemented each other and each affected the other greatly. Emmet Hughes quotes Eisenhower as saying, in effect: “Who else but Foster knows so much about foreign affairs—who else, but me?”

On the other hand, Professor Challener reports the adverse opinions about the Secretary which have been current for many years. One may wonder whether Gerard Smith and Robert Bowie, so often quoted by Professor Challener, may have inspired some of the criticism of Dulles which began during his lifetime. They match Dulles’s famous clichés with now familiar clichés of their own.

To quote Eisenhower again: “All right, I know what they say about Foster—dull, duller, Dulles and all that. But the Democrats love to hit him rather than me, even though not one of these critics of our foreign policy has a constructive thought to offer.”

The job of Secretary of State which Eisenhower shared with Dulles was more interesting to the president than the old, familiar problems of the Secretary of Defense. Yet Eisenhower could not escape being his own Secretary of Defense, for the simple reason that everyone expected it of him. It was quite proper that both he and the Secretary of State should consult often with Admiral Radford, and it is surprising that Dulles’s church friends or anyone else should consider these contacts strange. The same close relationship continued with General Twining, who succeeded Radford. Twining as Chairman of the JCS was Eisenhower’s selection, while Radford had been entirely the choice of Secretary of Defense Wilson.

Perhaps Professor Challener does not mean to imply that military men respected and trusted Dulles because he agreed with them. No such conclusion would be justified, for Dulles opposed the military on a number of issues. He advocated suspension of nuclear testing, although the Chiefs, rather wisely as events proved, strongly opposed our suspension. He advocated less secrecy on nuclear weapons, which they opposed. Earlier he had advocated going ahead with the Japanese peace treaty, while the Chiefs wished to delay

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2Ibid.
it. He opposed helping the French atomic bomb program, despite the urging of the Chiefs. He interfered with the Anglo-French attack on Egypt, when the Chiefs would have been happy to see it succeed. In addition, Secretary Dulles refused to take a definite stand on support for Quemoy and Matsu and left some of the hard decisions to American military advisers on the spot. He refused to join his own treaty organization in the Middle East, despite urging by Chiefs and the British that we should do so.  

Only one Chief of Staff was, to my knowledge, really shaken by an action of Mr. Dulles, and this occurred very early in the Eisenhower administration. Admiral Fechteler's detailed account of this little known incident shows that Secretary Dulles once prepared a message to the U.S. Command in the Far East directing the prompt withdrawal of American forces from Korea unless President Rhee acceded immediately to all our demands. Conscientious Admiral Fechteler, who happened to be the only member of the JCS in Washington at the time, discovered this message just before it was to be transmitted without coordination at the Pentagon. He called President Eisenhower, who saw Admiral Fechteler's point, called Secretary Dulles to a conference, and made it quite clear that no message of this type was ever to be sent without the Joint Chiefs' coordination. The whole matter was straightened out; the message was greatly softened and no withdrawal took place—as we all know. Evidently this was one of the many instances that proved Dulles's willingness to learn. It may have influenced his later, more careful, and more pleasant relations with the Chiefs.

Professor Challener says that Secretary Dulles is "properly remembered as a Secretary of State whose policies carried an exceptionally heavy military component." With how many Secretaries of State is Secretary Dulles compared? Except for Secretary Rogers, the only recent Secretary who achieved an equal reduction of military involvement and investment was Frank B. Kellogg, who in 1928 persuaded twelve nations (including Japan, Germany, and Italy) to sign a treaty completely renouncing war. In the following Hoover administration, there was at least a warning to Japan. From that point on, there was a steady increase of military forces and actions, into the climactic explosions of World War II. Secretary Marshall was peacefully inclined, but he favored universal military training. Secretary Acheson saw our military budget tripled.

The heaviest increases under the Truman-Acheson military plans were in the Air Force. The Eisenhower administration's first action at the Pentagon was to cut the Air Force budget so drastically that Air Force Chief

5Admiral William M. Fechteler, Columbia University Oral History interview.
Vandenberg publicly denied he had agreed to it. This led to an embarrassing Congressional investigation, but the cutback in Air Force plans and procurement was implemented nevertheless. Reductions were applied in lesser degree to the other services. During Dulles's more than six years as Secretary, two wars in Asia were ended and a war in the Middle East was halted. Except for the tranquil Lebanon landings, minor military involvements were in one way or another avoided, and no new wars were begun. Under Secretary Herter, U-2s were flown deeper while efforts were made to recoup our retaliatory missile program—a program that had been embarrassingly neglected during the tenure of Secretary Dulles. The following administration, with luckless Secretary Rusk in office, immediately escalated the military budget by some fourteen billion dollars, promoted a military disaster in the Caribbean, sent troops into Asia by the thousands, and over Cuba veered much closer to the brink than bold brinksmen Dulles ever dared. With all this happening, the most overwhelming of Pentagonions and the coldest of warriors ever, Secretary of Defense McNamara, almost took over the Department of State. It is not my purpose here to deplore these actions; I merely cite them. Also, I suspect that Mr. Dulles shared the famed Eisenhower luck. But I am bewildered by the statement, which is by no means Professor Challener's alone, that Dulles's attitudes and policies were predominantly military. The question remains: Compared with whom?

Professor Challener cannot be serious when he says that comparative budgets of the State Department and the Department of Defense may, in his words, "say a good deal about national priorities in the Eisenhower years." These budgets are in no way comparable in any administration. It is worth noting, however, that Mr. Dulles did spend many days on his vital foreign aid budgets, battling against George Humphrey of the Treasury for every one of the many billions he won. In this, his one true crusade, Secretary Dulles had the full support of the Chiefs, despite rumblings in the Pentagon that foreign aid was in competition with the military budget. Here was a true indication of priorities, for the Eisenhower foreign aid budgets reached an all-time peak, while his military spending was consistently lower than that of his predecessors and of each of the presidents who have succeeded him. In fact, Eisenhower's military retrenchments were so stringent at midpoint in his presidency that fiscal analysts have said they instigated a minor economic recession.

I wish Professor Challener had mentioned the connection between "massive retaliation" and the military de-emphasis that helped inspire it. Secretary Dulles's predecessor, Dean Acheson, has recently written that rather than blaming Dulles for deficiencies in foreign policy,

it might have been more accurate to conclude that President Eisenhower
left foreign affairs to the decisions of Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey. It was the Humphrey policy of retrenchment for fiscal and economic reasons that led to drastic cuts in Army and Navy expenditures in the early Eisenhower years. These, in turn, rather than considerations of foreign policy or military strategy, led to the Dulles rationalization of necessity—the policy of nuclear retaliation to acts of Soviet aggression.6

If Acheson is even approximately right, Dulles's two policy planners, whose frustrations arouse our sympathy in Professor Challener's paper, should have urged their chief to battle against balancers of the budget, rather than against any imbalance in the Pentagon. It is cheering to note, however, that the Foggy Bottom team interviewed by Professor Challener did agree with the military team in one respect: both wanted Dulles to become Secretary of Defense.

Acheson is less explicit about his own massive retaliation policy, but he says: "Similarly Truman's spirit of retrenchment in 1948 and 1949, so vigorously applied to the Army and Navy by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, put means out of relations with ends."7

Professor Challener makes it clear that the policy of "massive retaliation," a phrase which nowhere appears in the famous speech, did not originate with Dulles. He quotes Walter Millis as saying that the whole idea of the atomic deterrent as a basis of policy was anticipated as early as 1949, when the first B-29s were stationed in Britain. That takes it back only five years, which is not enough. Surely the policy of the bomb began with its use. It was declared in the first leaflets that were dropped on Japan after Hiroshima, and unnecessarily made doubly convincing by the bomb on Nagasaki. When a committee of scientists chose cities as targets for the two bombs, General Carl Spaatz proposed an alternative, but he dropped the bombs exactly as ordered. In later years, General Spaatz was asked if he agreed that a bomb as terrible as the atomic bomb might never be used. After reflection, Spaatz replied, "I think that would possibly be so, except that we have used it."8

The closing portion of Professor Challener's paper reflects the general assumption that responsible leaders such as Secretary Dulles, General Spaatz, Admiral Radford, General Twining, and others did not think into the future and that they seldom pondered the consequences of their actions.

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6Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 735.
7Ibid.
8General Carl Spaatz, interviews with Life magazine editors, Jan. 1947, Spaatz Papers, Library of Congress.
There is evidence against this assumption. Just four years before he became Chairman, Admiral Radford risked his future and damaged his career, when he publicly excoriated all reliance upon atomic bombs and branded them immoral weapons. More thought, and further developments, changed his views. When Captain Yeager broke the dreaded “sound barrier” in 1947, General Spaatz sadly reminded his exuberant civilian superior that while we must move ahead, we cannot assume that scientific progress will always be advantageous to us as a nation. Ten years before Sputnik, Spaatz was worrying about new problems that would arise when an aggressor might combine supersonic guidance with atomic warheads. “When that happens,” he wrote to Secretary Symington, “what is our defense?”* Vandenberg, Twining, White, and other Air Force leaders anticipated the nuclear standoff that was foreshadowed by Russian H-bomb and missile progress as early as 1953. These military leaders agreed with Secretary Dulles that it would become increasingly difficult in the future to forestall Communist invasion and domination of vulnerable portions of the free world. They shared Dulles’s conviction that it was their common responsibility to deter Communist incursions into those areas as long as they had the means to do so. They supported Churchill’s ultimate verdict that “Dulles lays down what he considers the minimum we should do if we are to hold the Communists. He makes it sound terrible. But it is necessary that someone should stand up to them.”†

That Mr. Dulles made it sound terrible is now a general view repeated by all who were questioned by Professor Challener, even including Admiral Radford. How could Mr. Dulles sound terrible to the allegedly more terrible Admiral Radford, who is pictured as the Patton of the Pentagon? Here is one clue. To at least one journalist of note, Admiral Radford has said he blamed Dr. Bowie for the phraseology which became so disturbing after the famous speech. Bowie, he said, had chosen overly strong words because he wanted to make the whole policy sound bad.‡ How much the Admiral knew about Dr. Bowie’s motivation remains a question, but it is true that Dr. Bowie was normally responsible for papers of high policy.

Dr. Bowie’s mistrust of Radford and of military leaders in general is well expressed in Professor Challener’s paper. Doubtless it is easier to mistrust men in groups when they wear the same type of clothes. The uniformed leaders had to be more personal and selective in their mistrust, and from the State Department they chose only a few outstanding examples.

Regardless of who was most responsible for Secretary Dulles’s frighten-

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*General Spaatz to Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington, Jan. 8, 1948, Spaatz Papers, Library of Congress.
‡Interview with Charles Murphy, editor, *Fortune*. 
ing image, the most famous passages in the speech were, in Bernard Brodie’s phrase, “innocuous and truistic.” Brodie thinks the furor developed because the speech as a whole seemed to forecast a reduction in ground forces. Five days elapsed before there was any critical reaction to the speech, and this was only the surprise of the *New York Times* that no one in Washington had found it very interesting. Still later, Adlai Stevenson and Chester Bowles began the public debate.\(^\text{12}\)

No doubt lack of space prevented Professor Challener from discussing the important benefits derived from Dulles’s unflinching attitudes. Was it not true that the big man’s forbidding frown served to shield as well as to emphasize Ike’s appealing smile—the smile that forced Khrushchev to compete, unsuccessfully, as a humanitarian symbol of peace? More important, as Sovietologist Herbert Dinerstein has pointed out, the open avowal of massive retaliation as a deterrent caused the doctrine that war was the best means for advancing Communism to vanish from Soviet textbooks. The Chinese disagreed, thus the unpopular doctrine became an instrument for the disruption of the Communist camp. Dulles was first to advance the idea of wooing the Russians away from the Chinese, instead of the reverse. He avoided Chou at Geneva, but publicly embraced Molotov after the Russian agreement to evacuate Austria. Far from refusing to deal with the Communists, Dulles spent the equivalent of one and a half years in earnest negotiation with them, and not quite all of it was in vain.\(^\text{13}\)

Another important result of an open commitment to massive retaliation was that it justified keeping just a few U.S. regiments in Korea and a few divisions in Europe, small forces which otherwise would be hostages to the massive Communist ground and air forces in each of these areas. The Germans agreed to contribute a dozen indispensable divisions to NATO when they were assured that our nuclear intervention would save them from being overrun by the Red Army. As Wolfram Hanreider explained it: “Limited war in Europe meant limited war from the viewpoint of the U.S. but total war from the prospect of Bonn. West Germany was interested in deterrence, not defense.”\(^\text{14}\)

Finally, the memorable speech contains an almost forgotten paragraph, which stated that the Korean war had just been ended by a warning of “massive retaliation” if it were not ended, thus establishing that the non-use of the bomb over Korea was a compromise rather than a failure of will. The possibility of a similar compromise in Vietnam was thereby implied. Such a


compromise was soon achieved at Geneva. Anthony Eden, who was Dulles's most troublesome critic, nevertheless wrote of the H-bomb threat: "I do not think we could have got through the Geneva conference and avoided a major war without it."15

In conclusion, I feel I should mention another pressure on Dulles not stressed by Professor Challener—that of the right-wing, isolationist Republicans who were then more rampant than the left-wing, isolationist Democrats are today. Some years ago, Elmo Roper wrote: "The biggest problem facing the new administration and the nation at that time was the flourishing career of Senator McCarthy." Not Senator Taft, but the uninhibited Joe McCarthy had succeeded the newly internationalist Vandenberg as dominant Republican in the Senate. After the Geneva Conference, McCarthy said he could "smell appeasement in the air." Elmo Roper explained: "the basic foreign policy problem was how to be conciliatory and internationalist without losing the support of the isolationists." The successful Eisenhower-Dulles strategy was "a series of pronouncements, usually by Secretary of State Dulles, which proclaimed a daring, militant foreign policy that had little discernible existence outside those pronouncements, while hewing to a line of action that was sober, moderate, and designed above all to reduce the scope and probability of armed conflict throughout the world." This does sound like a bit of a trick, but who is complaining?16

A final question of comparison: Professor Challener agrees that the old issue of innovation in military policy by Eisenhower-Dulles is no longer moot, but what about comparisons with Kennedy-Rusk-Johnson? Professor Challener states and implies that after Dulles, great changes occurred. In contrast, I quote from President Kennedy's most trusted journalist-friend, Charles Bartlett: "The 'brinkmanship' for which Dulles was attacked has become an avowed element of U.S. policy under both Kennedy and Johnson."17 Judged solely as so-called warrior, Dulles seems to have flown half a million miles in vain. He was only a diplomat after all.

Professor Challener shows that Dulles made no pretense of military expertise and that he found room for all to labor in the vineyard of peace. He and his military collaborators might well have altered Clemenceau's well-worn slogan—that war is too important to be left to the generals—into a new slogan about peace. Their new slogan could read: "Peace is too precious to be guarded solely by civilians." Military leaders, as I now see them from some distance, are not sufficiently numerous or influential to be exclu-

sive. They welcome others who will stand beside them in peace as in war, who will share their problems and respect their responsibilities. These broad criteria, strangely enough, since 1945 have included as allies of military leaders most of our Secretaries of State, and have excluded most Secretaries of Defense. They would, of course, include all of the great American presidents and all of the great Secretaries of State. Among the latter, as Professor Challener has shown, our military leaders would place the formidable John Foster Dulles.
Discussion

The CHAIRMAN: Professor Crowl has been promised a couple of minutes before we open the session to questions from the floor.

Professor CROWL: I am not so sure it is necessary for me to say much; General Parrish has said just about everything that I had intended to say. I do want to reinforce a point that Professor Challener made, and General Parrish remade, and that is that in my opinion perhaps the key factor in shaping the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy, at least in the first year or year and a half, was fiscal policy. I think if one is looking for a clue to the doctrine of massive retaliation, one should look perhaps to Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey rather than to Mr. Dulles himself. It seems to me that the doctrine of massive retaliation in a sense was a logical necessity that followed with unerring logic from the two premises on which Secretary Dulles had to lean. The first was the inherited doctrine of containment, which today we tend to refer to as globalism. The commitment of the United States to contain Communism—to contain a presumably aggressive, expansionist, and hostile Communist power centered in Moscow—was one with which the Eisenhower administration certainly agreed but did not originate. The new element with which Secretary Dulles had to cope was the concept of containment within severely limited military budgets.

Now to Mr. Dulles. I am assuming some things here, but I think that to Mr. Dulles, the Humphrey-Republican Party insistence on balanced budgets and the reduction of military expenditures could serve as an open invitation to Soviet probes, to Soviet expansionism. To him the way out of this dilemma seemed to be to announce to the world that the United States would indeed, or at least was prepared to, use the one element of power in which it was superior to the Soviet Union, the one element of effective power (leaving out sea power), which was the Strategic Air Command and the weapons that it could carry. It seems to me that massive retaliation was not so much a doctrine or a policy as it was almost an intellectual exercise. Mr. Dulles was nothing if he was not a logician, and the logical imperatives in his mind almost required him to state the doctrine of massive retaliation.

A word about Mr. Challener's reference to Secretary Dulles's moralism. Contrary to what Professor Williams has said and the common belief, it is my opinion that Mr. Dulles was not a man with profound religious insights.
He was certainly not a theologian. He was a churchman. His religious beliefs were conventional, just a slight modernization of those that he had inherited from his Presbyterian clergyman father. He didn't examine these very deeply, he was not much concerned. He was not a reader of Paul Tillich or of Reinhold Niebuhr. But Mr. Dulles rose to public prominence on the platform provided him by the National Federation of Churches. His constituency, if he had a constituency, was the leaders of the Protestant churches and their adherents, the thousands and thousands of people scattered throughout the country who were regular churchgoers. One might say Mr. Dulles had to consider these people; it was among such people that he had grown up and grown up politically, so to speak. Now, to announce the doctrine of massive retaliation, as Mr. Dulles felt he had to do, created in him a new dilemma, the dilemma between the prospective use of atomic weapons and the conventional, Christian dogma of "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." I think this most difficult task worried Mr. Dulles all of his life—how to reconcile the doctrine of massive retaliation with his Protestant Christian background. And my own opinion is that the sort of tortured moralism that Mr. Dulles frequently resorted to was an effort to reconcile what he regarded as the realities of foreign relations and power with his constituency of church people.

Now Professor Williams's paper brings out, I think, a very important point—though I do not concur in his use of the term "militarization of American foreign policy." That is not the proper expression. But it does suggest to me an important point. At the end of the Eisenhower administration, the doctrine of massive retaliation had obviously become obsolete as the single or even the most important element in American military and foreign policy. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, even before Mr. Dulles's death, the Defense Department was moving toward the doctrine of balanced forces. Mr. Dulles to an extent concurred in this. With the coming of the Kennedy administration, the budgetary restrictions were in effect thrown out the window, and as General Parrish has pointed out, much heavier expenditures were authorized for the military, particularly for expansion of the ground forces. Neither President Truman nor President Eisenhower nor President Kennedy nor President Johnson seriously considered another way out of the dilemma that was created by an almost total acceptance of the doctrine of containment. The issues between the Republicans and the Democrats were largely a matter of fiscal differences, it seems to me; and no one until the Nixon administration, impelled by the public reaction to the Vietnam war and encouraged by the Sino-Soviet split—no one until the Nixon administration, as far as I know, has given serious consideration to another way out of the dilemma, which is to restrict the global commitments of the United States. In other words, to simply get along without containment.
The CHAIRMAN: We are now down to the concluding panel session. The two experts in green who have joined us are familiar to all of you: Professor Morton and my colleague, Professor Preston. You are encouraged to ask questions not only with respect to Professor Challener's paper, but on any other matters that you feel this symposium ought to consider under the general rubric of “Soldiers and Statesmen.”

General CLARK: I would like to offer one comment on the basic subject, which I think would be of general interest—a vignette of history that occurred in Washington shortly after President Kennedy was inaugurated. He came over to the Pentagon and spoke to all of the general and flag rank officers assembled there. I was present. As I recall, his comments were a plea—he urged all officers of all the services to grasp the fact that our world today was much bigger and much more complex than the one they had grown up to perceive, and he urged all to grasp the significance of the political, the psychosocial, the economic, as well as the military implications. And he cited instances where at that very moment officers of one service or another in various parts of the world were performing services for him, passing him vital information on which he had to make critical decisions in national strategy, or were themselves making decisions in his name that were well beyond the scope of affairs that military officers would normally be expected to deal with. I think this gives a little insight into how at least one president, who probably didn’t live long enough to show his hand fully in the matter, viewed the problem that we have been addressing.

Mr. JOHN F. LOOSBROCK (Editor, Air Force Magazine): In Professor Challener’s paper, he cited the famous Press Club speech, in which Acheson publicly placed Korea outside the sphere of strategic interest of the United States. I have often wondered since then if it was the Russians’ believing Acheson that led to Korea and to the U.S. military buildup that followed, with the ballistic missile program and so on. And I wonder if there is not an analogy in reverse with Khrushchev’s speech on wars of national liberation. Did we believe too much when he said such wars were going to be the wave of the future? Maybe this led us into chaos and the discouraging situation in Vietnam. I wonder if any members of the panel would address that.

Professor CHALLENER: I am not sure that I can say much on the Khrushchev analogy, but a number of years ago Dean Acheson came to Princeton. We had carefully selected a group of students to meet with him and ask some questions. One of my students put his question a bit too provocatively and virtually said, “How come you invited the Communists into Korea with your Press Club speech?” Well, Acheson immediately went into orbit with no visible propellant, and gave us a 15 minute lecture on the subject: The important point he tried to make was that his speech had been read entirely
out of context. He maintained that he had actually been reflecting what had earlier been said by the Joint Chiefs and that, therefore, there was nothing in the speech that was brand new as far as defense perimeters were concerned. Secondly, he had been looking toward something entirely different: namely, the possibility that at some future date there might be a split between the Communist Chinese and the Soviets. Therefore, he wanted to avoid too close an identification of the American cause with Chiang Kai-shek. That part of the speech, he said, just never really got through.

Now, personally, I don’t know if Dulles really believed that the speech had led to the Korean invasion, but he certainly made use of this argument in some of his own speeches. And I also think that this is one of the starting points in the split between Acheson and Dulles.

Professor CROWL: As I recall that speech, the next paragraph went on to say that the United States still retained some kind of strategic interest in Korea. It was not a disclaimer of our concern with Korea.

Professor SMITH: I agree with Professor Challender that one great theme—there were two great themes—in that speech was that nationalism in Asia was the crucial fact, and that any non-Asian power, whether it was America or a European power, that tangled with that nationalism was going to get into trouble; so let the Russians get in trouble. If we were so foolish as to engage in some adventures that would divert from the Russians to our own shoulders the wrath of Asian nationalism, well, it would be our fault, and we would rue the consequences—as in fact we may have. But Acheson was also very defensive in after years about this, and he has in his office a great stack of xerox copies of the front page of the New York Times of March 1st, 1949, in which General Douglas MacArthur said precisely the same thing—and he will mail that out to anyone on request.

Now I also want to respond to Professor Challender’s suggestion, with which I quite agree, that the military component in Dean Acheson’s thinking was very strong. I would say it was a good deal stronger than in the thinking of Secretary of State Dulles, and I will tell an anecdote to illustrate the differences between the two men.

In 1949 the Russians agreed to lift the Berlin Blockade. In return the United States agreed that a council of foreign ministers would meet in Paris. John Foster Dulles was a member of the American delegation, and he said to Mr. Acheson, as the delegation was about to leave for Paris, that he felt this marked a real turning point in history. There had been great misunderstandings between Russia and the West since 1945, but now there was a chance to wipe the slate clean and start anew. Acheson could not have been
in greater disagreement. He said that the meeting of foreign ministers was not really a diplomatic event. It was simply a way of allowing the Russians to save face and to ratify a change in the military situation, because Acheson felt that with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty and with the nuclear deterrent, the monopoly of which we still had, the Russians had finally recognized that Western strength was the greater and they were retreating. We had them on the run. We weren't going to embarrass or humiliate them. We would go through the motions of having a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Now during the meeting another episode occurred involving Acheson and Dulles. This is sort of apocryphal, because it is impossible to document from Dulles's side as far as I know. The foreign ministers were meeting, the Berlin Blockade had been lifted, and then there occurred what was known in those days as a little blockade, involving a rail strike in Berlin. The railway workers who lived in the western sectors but were working in the eastern sector had a wage dispute with the Russians. The workers wanted to be paid in Western currency, and they went on strike. Acheson felt that it was important to tell the Russians that we would not continue with the foreign ministers' conference until the strike was settled. He wanted to tell them this and give them an ultimatum. Bevin of Britain and Schuman of France agreed, and Acheson was to bring it up within the American delegation. Now this is Acheson's recollection. During the meeting Dulles disagreed and said he wanted to go on record in the minutes of the delegation as opposing the ultimatum. So Acheson said, "Fine, let the minutes so indicate but this is the decision." The Russians were told and a few days later the strike was settled, whereupon, according to Acheson's memory, Foster came into Acheson's office in Paris and said, "Dean, about those minutes, have they been typed up yet? Do you think you could just leave out my intervention in the debate?" Acheson's memory is that he agreed, and of course the minutes don't show the intervention.

There was a basic cleavage between the two men at that moment, and I think it is part of the transition in Dulles's thought from the 1945 position to the 1953 position. It would be interesting to look closely at Dulles's reaction to the Russian detonation of the bomb, because this certainly was extremely important for Acheson, as was the Korean War; but in 1949 the two men were poles apart.

General PARRISH: I have one note from Dean Acheson's new book, *Present at the Creation*. He makes a spirited and rather convincing defense that the influence of his Press Club speech was somewhat misrepresented in the presidential campaign. Then he finishes—probably the result of his experience at Princeton—by saying everyone seems to have forgotten about the
speech except, strangely, college students.

Professor MEYER NATHAN (Colorado State University): I would just like to ask Professor Challener, or any other member of the panel, why a particular topic was not gone into more thoroughly—namely, this very militant rhetoric of Dulles’s, as contrasted with his very restrained course at Suez and in Hungary in 1956. You mentioned the role of Sputnik in perhaps forcing Dulles to re-evaluate his whole position. I wonder if you would care to comment further on this?

Professor CHALLENER: This is one of the central mysteries of Dulles. Any time you talk with people who worked closely with Dulles, you encounter the problem of the discrepancy—the gap—between the rhetoric of his public speeches and the language that he used in, say, cabinet and National Security Council meetings, or with his close associates. On such occasions, the rhetoric disappeared, and he was the lawyer dealing with the facts, presenting his case, marshaling his evidence. This point struck me very much as I was listening to Gaddis Smith’s and General Parrish’s comparisons of Acheson and Dulles. Perhaps the basic difference between the two Secretaries of State is much more in the outward manner in which they presented their policies than in the basic policies themselves. Certainly, when you read the Acheson memoirs, you are always struck by the way in which, time and time again, he sided with the “hardline” people. Indeed, even with Gaddis Smith present, I think it is safe to say that Dean Acheson has probably changed less over the past twenty years than anyone in public life. You measure Acheson in terms of the barometer of American public opinion which, in the late 40s and early 50s, found him too “soft,” but which now finds him too “hard.” But Acheson himself changed very little in his views. Dulles, on the other hand, is the man in whom there was far more change of opinions.

Now the matter of Dulles’s rhetoric is partly his manner of speaking, his way of trying to deal with his constituency, and he did have a way of readily falling into the moral language of the church. But I think that fundamentally he did believe that Communism was atheistic. This belief affected his views in ways that you won’t find in Acheson, who is much more a political animal.

Professor CROWL: May I just have one word on the question of Dulles at Suez? I don’t think there was any inconsistency there at all. It just wasn’t his brink. It was Anthony Eden’s brink.

Professor CHALLENER: And he also felt that Eden’s policy was wrong, that there was something really immoral about what the French and British were doing. When we were interviewing people about the Suez decisions, one of the easiest things I found—and I think Phil Crowl found the same thing—
was that you could get people pounding on the table in about five seconds whenever you mentioned the rightness or wrongness of the Suez issue. There really was a very deeply held belief that the United States *had* to act the way it did at the time of Suez, because the Anglo-French policies were morally wrong, and *had* to intervene against the British and French, even though that meant doing damage to the American alliance system.

Professor CROWL: Moreover the British were not just being immoral, they were being insubordinate, which was even worse.

The CHAIRMAN: Could I intervene? I think I see Professor Dorpalen in the back. Really his paper yesterday dealt with this. We all know of course that rhetoric is designed for internal purposes, to raise our own morale and this sort of thing. But this is precisely what we found so disturbing about German militarism before World War I and later—this constant drumming up of forces in order to get popular support for particular foreign policies. I wonder if Dr. Dorpalen would comment on this point. Was it the same kind of thing that frightened other people about American policy in the Dulles period? Let's apply this to Black Panther rhetoric. Those people don't really mean what they say: I'm suggesting that the Germans before World War I and the Americans in the Dulles period were kind of Black Panthers, brandishing their weapons to keep up their courage, their morale, and to persuade internal public opinion, and that this is very dangerous. Would you comment on that general idea?

Professor DORPALEN: Well, I think you can draw certain parallels in the sense that much of it is more a matter of emotionalism than of logic, rationality, thinking through of the consequences; but of course this is where political leadership should play its role. This is where people like Bethmann Hollweg and his associates did not measure up to their responsibilities, as I tried to point out yesterday. There were terrific pressures on them, but this is just what they should have tried to oppose by explaining what the consequences might be of the policies being advocated by the Pan-German League and the various service leagues. Bethmann was quite aware of the dangers and the risks involved. In effect even Schlieffen, who drew up the Schlieffen Plan, and Moltke, who was later its executor, realized that they were taking desperate risks, that the Schlieffen Plan was only one possible answer to a very difficult military situation. They were not sure at all that the answer would really prove helpful, so there were doubts, there were fears; and it seems to me the job of the responsible statesman is to impress upon people the dangers of popular policies that are being advocated. If they can't do it, if they feel they ought not to do it, then they ought to resign and let somebody else take over.

This brings me to a question that came up in the discussion about Dulles.
I was very much interested in the comments, which were quite new to me, that Dulles after the Second World War was somewhat more flexible and conciliatory than he was later. Now what brought about the change? Why was it that Dulles became so inflexible? Actually when he took over, as George Kennan and others have argued, he had quite possibly an opportunity to tone down the Cold War. Stalin died a few weeks after the Eisenhower administration came in, there were a number of conciliatory moves on the part of the Soviets, the deadlock over the election of a new Secretary General in the United Nations was solved. The deadlock over Korea was solved in a way. There had been difficulty over Berlin, but the Autobahnen were opened up again without any further difficulties. There was a loosening up in some of the Eastern European states. The British of course were very much interested in a summit meeting. Why was all this ignored? How does that fit in with the earlier, more flexible positions that Dulles took? This is a question on which I would like to hear Professor Challener's view.

We have had Mr. Williams telling us that Dulles's basic assumptions were wrong. We have General Parrish telling us that the basic assumption of a very serious, active Communist threat was correct. Where does the truth lie? One of these assumptions must be wrong and now, 20 years later, it should be possible to give some kind of an answer as to how to evaluate the Dulles foreign policy.

Professor CHALLENER: Let me make one or two comments without being sure that I can completely answer the question or resolve the differences of opinion that have emerged. I think Dulles was really unhappy with the containment policy as it had emerged under Truman and Acheson. To be sure, he always managed to work closely with them, but there are still a number of signs which indicate that he felt that the United States had lost the initiative. In that sense he reflected the views of many Republicans, those of the center and the right, when they came into office in 1953. I'm also convinced that Dulles felt that American interests had been neglected in the Far East and that the only thing that was now possible was to try to settle the Korean War on the best available terms we could get—but without being particularly pleased by the actual outcome.

But now you get into another problem. To what extent did the alleged threat to employ some kind of retaliation affect the Korean settlement? Did the threat end the war? A lot of Republican orators—and we are back on the question of rhetoric—have maintained that it did. However, I think myself that what happened within the Communist world after the death of Stalin was much more responsible for producing the truce that the Republicans were able to get.
But I don't think that Dulles believed that there were any significant changes in Communism at that time. Coming into office along with a lot of more militant Republicans, he wasn't tempted to think that the death of Stalin had changed very much in the Communist world. My own quarrel with Dulles is not so much with this belief as with his attitude during Eisenhower's second term in office, that is, after 1957. It seems to me that this was a time when it should have been apparent that there were real possibilities for opening up some of the questions of the Cold War, and that this was the time when opportunities were missed.

Professor DORPALEN: May I just come back to this once more, because it will help answer Professor Ropp's question to me a little more clearly. I am beginning to have the feeling that perhaps the original Dulles policy was much more dictated by domestic considerations—McCarthyism and similar phenomena—than by foreign political considerations. If this should be true, then of course Dulles would be guilty of the same charges that are raised against Bethmann Hollweg. In other words, in order to appease the domestic opposition, he pursued a foreign policy with which he was not really in agreement, the grave risks of which he was quite aware. I think this again raises the question: if he could not pursue the foreign policy which he really thought was the right one, should he then not have resigned or at least have been particularly careful with his language not to encourage the kind of pressures that he considered very dangerous?

Professor CROWL: All I can say to this is that, judging from other things he said and did, I don't believe that in Mr. Dulles's mind the death of Stalin made any significant difference to Soviet foreign policy. He was an avid reader, as Professor Challener pointed out in his paper, of Lenin. He often called attention to the failure of pre-World War II leaders in France, Britain, and the United States to take *Mein Kampf* seriously; and he was taking Lenin seriously. I don't believe that Mr. Dulles really ever thought that in the immediate future a détente with the Soviet Union was possible; and what the Soviets did in Hungary in 1956 served to confirm his hardline opinion.

In regard to whether Mr. Dulles was a captive of Joe McCarthy, I just don't think it is true. He was to some extent a captive of the Asia-first wing of the Republican Party—Senator Knowland and that crowd. But whatever McCarthy and McCarthyism represented in terms of foreign policy—and remember Joe McCarthy was not an isolationist by any means—I think McCarthy is irrelevant to Secretary Dulles's foreign policy.

Professor ALLAN R. MILLETT (The Ohio State University): I don't think any of the panel really dealt fairly with one of the major points of Professor Williams's criticism, that the state of the American economy or capitalism
had a great deal to do with Dulles's ideas about the Cold War and foreign policy. This idea is not limited just to Alperovitz or Gabriel Kolko or Mr. Williams himself, but has been suggested by Hammond and Schilling and Snyder, and various studies of policy-making in the 1950s. Their general conclusion was that the nature of the Cold War, as Dulles saw it, was a long-term, continuing economic struggle between two different systems, and that rearmament or a massive arms race was in fact a part of the Communist plan to subvert and undermine the United States. Professor Crow has noted the connection between fiscal policy and the Cold War, but I don't believe anybody has yet addressed himself to it sufficiently. Might we be more honest and just say it was George Humphrey's fault?

I would also like to ask Professor Challener whether he found in the Dulles papers this conception of a long-term, continuing struggle between Communism and capitalism and the need for changing American fiscal policy to cope with it?

Professor CHALLENER: Let me simply refer back to my paper, where I was trying to make the point that the Republicans did have a great many fears about what excessive expenditures for defense would do to the American economy, to the budget, to taxes, and so forth. Now, I've also wrestled with the questions raised by Mr. Williams and other members of the New Left, with the issue of how much the imperatives of an expanding American economy consciously or unconsciously motivated the men who made American foreign policy. My own feeling is that this isn't something that it is really possible to document; you either accept this view as an article of faith, or you don't.

But let me say one thing specifically about Dulles. He was remarkably uninterested in many of the economic aspects of foreign policy that his advisers put before him. You can see this especially in the Latin American area. Time and time again Dulles would fly into Caracas or some other Latin capital for a conference. He would always speak in global terms about the great moral confrontation of East and West—then leave immediately and let his underlings work out the specific issues that concerned local economic problems. In other words, he was never directly interested in the economic or financial aspects of Latin American relations, certainly not to the extent that you might assume that someone with his Wall Street background might have been. I'm also convinced that Dulles looked upon foreign aid budgets in terms of the political results that could be gained, rather than from the perspective of what might be gained for the American economy.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we should hear something from the boys in green [the chairmen of the previous sessions - Ed.]
Professor MORTON: Well, I thought I might take matters into my own hands. I want you to notice that we are wearing green and not blue. This is a significant victory for Dartmouth, although I did go to Duke.

About five or six years ago, when I was organizing the Macmillan series on the wars and military institutions of the United States to which reference has been made here, I asked Bill Williams if he would do the volume on the war with Spain for precisely the reason that he stated in his comments. He hadn't stated it explicitly then, but I thought this was his idea, and I thought it ought to make a very interesting book. Incidentally, he accepted my offer but later withdrew from the series.

A part of his argument really gets to the heart of what I think is the theme of this session—of the whole symposium. I happen to believe that Williams has made a very important observation, which we haven't really come to grips with in talking about the relationship between the military and the political. Each of the sessions in its own way has dealt with this under the general rubric of "Soldiers and Statesmen." It seems to me, even if you don't date it from the Spanish-American War, that his observation—and Walter Millis also noted this some time ago, at least in a conversation with me—is, we don't have any civil-military relations problem. The real problem is the militarization—although it is perhaps not the best term to use—is the militarization of the civilian, rather than civilian control of the military. And today, I would worry more about this kind of problem than whether the civilian can control the military. The president can control the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I don't see any problem about this. All our institutional mechanisms and traditions give him the power and authority to do so. The real problem is, how does the president think about these problems?

It seems to me also that General Parrish has made a very interesting observation, which has gone by without much comment, and that is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been closer to and found stronger support in our Secretaries of State than in our Secretaries of Defense. Surely if there is a problem in the military participation in and formulation of foreign policy, it might perhaps be found in this kind of observation or in this area. Has our foreign policy really become militarized in a way? These may not be the best words or the best way to phrase it, but I think this is the real problem, the central problem.

We may have had at the beginning of the 20th century a dichotomy, a differentiation, created between the military and the civilian. The military were complaining that they weren't participating in the formulation of foreign policy and that military factors were not being taken into consideration in the development of foreign policy. The problem is entirely different today.
You may date it from World War II, or from the War with Spain and the economic factors that Williams speaks about, but it seems to me that it is at the heart of the issue today; and I think he has made a very important observation. It is interesting to observe that Gaddis Smith’s characterization of his Secretary of State and Dick Challener’s observation about Dulles don’t contradict that thesis at all; and I think Bill Williams has made a very important point which goes right to the heart of our discussion here.

Professor HERMAN HATTAWAY (University of Missouri at Kansas City): The last set of comments has opened the way for what I want to talk about, a sin of omission rather than of commission. Certainly the statesman—and, I contend, the military man—is interested and often involved in the internal affairs of his nation, as well as its foreign policy. One of the most disturbing comments that I have heard during the symposium has been Professor Wright’s—and I have no intention of detracting from his paper—but he indicated that perhaps a textbook of United States history could discuss the 19th century and omit references to the army or to the military, with the exception of the Civil War. I think he is right that such a book would not be considered seriously out of focus; but I think that the profession would be incorrect in accepting it as such.

One thing that has been in my mind through the course of the symposium is the theme of the comments of Professor Weigley—a theme which he developed at greater length in The American Military. I find myself still in disagreement with much of what he said, notably with regard to the conflict issue, which he based on the easily interchangeable roles of soldier and statesman. I was especially interested in Colonel Dupuy’s citing specific instances of disagreement, and I was surprised that no one thought of the conflict between Secretary of War Calhoun and General Jackson. Nevertheless, I think the ease with which the statesmen and the military men interchanged might perhaps indicate that this conflict issue is a false issue. The relative lack of conflict may have been a way whereby the military achieved a greater degree of power over the course of American development. It may well be that the military influenced American life and culture in the 19th century much more than many historians thus far have been willing to observe.

I think also that the lack of mention of the Reconstruction period is a serious omission. We have talked about the Civil War, but the United States Army and Reconstruction is a very relevant topic, and Professor James Sefton of course has a seminal book on the subject. Sefton, Harold Hyman, and John Hope Franklin all have been concerned with this topic, but I don’t think it, or the impact of the military on the general course of American life and culture, notably in the 19th century, has been nearly adequately ex-
explored; and I submit that if we investigate the impact of the military upon domestic institutions, the settlement of the frontier, on Reconstruction, and perhaps numerous other instances, a textbook of United States history that did not take these problems into account *would* be considered seriously out of focus.

The CHAIRMAN: Professor Preston wants to comment here.

Professor PRESTON: I have to comment, to prove that we are not here just as ornaments. Another omission strikes me, but possibly not very many others here now have noted it, since I think most of the Canadians have already gone home. I am thinking that in this discussion of American policy there has been a surprising lack of any reference to the attitudes of small allies. I remember attending a conference at West Point some years ago, when I was there with a group of Canadians, both cadets and university students. We Canadians were horrified to hear almost universally from the American students present—not the cadets, but the American civilian students—the general idea, "After all, we are strong enough to tell these smaller countries what they have got to do and we should do so." Now this kind of statement led to lots of rows with Canadians who were present in the seminars. The strange thing at that particular conference was the way this idea was rejected by the keynote speaker. He was somebody I had not known much about before. He was the head of a foundation, and he spoke very eloquently on the theme that the United States must pay attention to the fact that it is not alone, but is part of a complex conglomeration of allies who have different interests and must therefore pay much attention to small powers. Two weeks later that gentleman became Secretary of State and I don't think he mentioned the interests of small states afterwards. If he did, I didn't notice it. This was Dean Rusk, of course. I agree very much with what has been said about Acheson and Dulles today, but I also think Rusk is going to appear to be the bad man of this period of history in the future.

A second point is the militarization of American civilian attitudes, like the attitudes of the civilian students at the West Point conference, so noticeable ten years ago but not now. One thing that strikes me about this was a suggestion made earlier this afternoon that Mr. Dulles, after all, was not merely thinking of strategic military interests but actually put more effort into foreign aid. I don't think it is appreciated in the United States the extent to which American aid—foreign aid—is regarded abroad as being for American military and strategic interests and purposes. You will understand this if you compare American aid with Canadian aid and policy, which is more disinterested. Canadians feel very strongly about this. The point is well made in a book by a soldier-scholar at the U.S. Military Academy, Professor Amos Jordan. He points out that the whole of American aid is directed solely for
strategic purposes. The only place where it isn't used to back up the actual Cold War struggle is in South America, where it is used to fight Communism. I think that, while this use can be explained, it ought to be taken into consideration.

The CHAIRMAN: Our host tells me it is getting time to wrap up this conference, although I think we have one more gentleman who wants to make a statement.

Dr. DENYS VOLAN (Historian, Aerospace Defense Command): I was distressed to hear Professor Challener say that he would not mention that name. It seems to me that an indecently long time has gone by since the name of Samuel P. Huntington was mentioned, because he has written one of the central books on the topic that we are discussing, *The Common Defense; Strategic Programs in National Politics*. If my memory serves me, there is a section in Huntington's book which is very relevant to the subject of massive retaliation, the New Look, the relationship between the two, and the relationship between statesmanship and strategy. The New Look preceded Dulles's speech on massive retaliation by some time. 1953 was an extremely significant year; the new Eisenhower administration spent almost the entire length of it in re-examining the defense mechanism, the military policy of the country; it wasn't until December that Dulles made his famous speech concerning massive retaliation. In all that time there was a great deal of skullduggery in the Pentagon, all of which led to the New Look—in the vernacular, the doctrine of a "bigger bang for the buck." I don't recall Dulles having participated at all in its formulation, which leads me to believe that you gentlemen were quite right in emphasizing that this was primarily rhetoric on Dulles's part, not policy making.

General PARRISH: Just one comment about Professor Preston's complaint, with which I agree. Americans do quite often forget their friends; but I would like to point out that the complaint is universal. And it is not just Americans. A few years ago, the Australian ambassador to the United Nations complained that, at the UN, unless you have A-bombs behind you, nobody listens to your speeches.

The CHAIRMAN: It is time, I think, to thank our hosts for a very delightful session and for their excellent arrangements; and I will now turn things over to the chief arranger, Colonel Hurley.

Colonel HURLEY: Thank you very much, Ted.

In conclusion today, I would like to pass on to you the thanks of General Clark. He attended practically every moment of the symposium, but had to leave a few minutes ago for an important engagement. It is a good thing to
have your chief executive officer at a university or an academy present for practically every minute of one of your affairs. But he is keenly interested in history, and certainly his support is very important in the continuance of these symposia. He asked me to thank the participants for the excellence of their papers. Many of you have come great distances to be with us, and we appreciate your support and look for your support in the future.

It should be clear that we have very consciously invited a wide range of views to expose to this symposium, with the idea in mind of achieving a basic objective of the symposia, to promote the study of military history. If we have made a contribution in that regard over these two days, then the symposium has been a success.

We hope to see all of you at the next symposium, which is scheduled to be held during academic year 1972-73, in the fall. We changed to a biennial program for various reasons, not only considerations of cost, which I am sure you have noticed in the newspapers have had an impact on the military establishment these days, but also because we have come to realize that we can do a better job if we take more time in planning. We have learned it in this one. We began this symposium more than a year ago.

I would like to conclude on a personal note of thanks to all who have made this symposium possible. I am particularly indebted to Ted Ropp and to Phil Crowl for having bailed us out so handsomely. Phil went above and beyond the call of duty, for we gave him the paper from Professor Williams only a few minutes before this session began this afternoon. I am also indebted to all the members of the History Department. It should have been apparent to you during these two days that it takes the work of more than 30 people to make the symposia a reality. I will single out the Duke man who was the chief planner, Major David MacIsaac; and his principal assistant, Captain Don Nelson, who managed to talk the upper levels of TWA management into getting Professor Dorpalen here, strike or no strike.

Thank you very much.
The Participants


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