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## Features

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## U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center

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## A Call to Leaders

There's an old saying that goes, “We're only as strong as our weakest link.” I believe you, as a first-line supervisor, are the critical link in the Army's leadership chain. You're the Army's expert when it comes to knowing and protecting your Soldiers.

I ask you to read the preliminary loss report on the following page. As you will see, three Soldiers died in an M1114 accident in Iraq. Whether Soldiers die on the battlefield or from accidents stateside, their loss affects the Army's mission, morale, resources, and overall readiness. A loss is a loss, regardless the cause.

As a retired Army NCO, I know Soldiers are only as good as the training their leaders provide. If leaders don’t train Soldiers to be safe, who will? As a first-line supervisor, you’re the first leader your Soldiers see in the morning and the last one they see before heading out at night. They depend on you to show them what “right” looks like.

You can teach your Soldiers what right looks like by training them to use Composite Risk Management (CRM). By doing so, you empower them to reduce losses, which benefits you, your organization, and the entire Army. Using CRM is not a great mystery; it’s the same five-step risk management process outlined in Field Manual 100-14, Risk Management. What makes
CRM different is it addresses not only accidental losses, but also those caused by combat, suicide, medical, and other issues. To quickly review the five steps:

Step 1—Identify Hazards: Identify what will hurt you, your Soldiers, and the mission.

Step 2—Assess Hazards: Determine the probability and severity of each hazard and establish whether the risk is extremely high, high, moderate, or low.

Step 3—Develop Controls and Make Decisions: Develop options to reduce the risk(s) and decide the best controls.

Step 4—Implement Controls: Follow through with your plan.

Step 5—Supervise and Evaluate: Make changes as needed.

CRM was designed to be ongoing and flexible to meet the changing missions and environments Soldiers encounter in garrison and on the battlefield. As you teach your Soldiers to use CRM, they can gain experience completing risk assessments for normal and long-range planning. Even better, they’ll learn how to quickly perform risk assessments under any circumstances.

Once Soldiers accept and understand CRM, they’ll automatically have their “risk mode” activated. As CRM becomes automatic, Soldiers will better protect each other—whether in combat or in garrison, day or night. And CRM isn’t just limited to on post. Soldiers who’ve taught their families to identify and avoid hazards can deploy with greater peace of mind, knowing their families will be safer.

On the battlefield, Soldiers using CRM can tell their buddies, “I’ve got your back,” confident they’ve thought through the dangers and planned for them. Because they’ve asked themselves, “What’s going to kill me or my buddies,” they’re better prepared to defeat the enemy and come home alive.

That’s why you’re so important as a first-line supervisor. The training you give your Soldiers is their best defense against the twin hazards of enemy action and accidents. You’re training your Soldiers to both win and survive!

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PLRs

Three brigade combat team Soldiers were killed in an M1114 rollover accident in Iraq. The HMMWV was the last vehicle in a three-vehicle patrol. The crew was operating in blackout drive and using night vision devices on a gravel road. The driver failed to negotiate a large washout as the road sloped and curved left. The M1114 overturned into an adjacent canal, where it remained submerged until being located by patrol and recovery operations. The 19-year-old driver (a private first class), the 27-year-old vehicle commander (a sergeant), and the 21-year-old gunner (a specialist) drowned.
The troops were excited. After years of annual training exercises at Fort Bragg, NC, the unit was deploying to Fort A.P. Hill, VA, for an Apache gunnery exercise. Many Soldiers claimed they could easily traverse the distance to Fort A.P. Hill with their eyes closed—if it weren’t for the highway traffic. So it was with quiet anticipation that the unit geared up for the 2-day movement to Virginia up Interstate 95.

Ours was a four-chalk convoy. My truck commander (TC) and I were in an M1038 HMMWV towing a trailer, and we were number three in the first chalk. In front of us was a 5-ton truck loaded with two fuel pods and hauling a flatbed trailer carrying another fuel pod. The convoy commander and battalion command sergeant major were in the lead vehicle, an M998 HMMWV.

The first leg of our trip was uneventful, and we made it to the first rest stop with no problems. We pulled into a rest area, used the restrooms, and bought snacks and cold drinks from the vending machines. We left the rest area just as the second chalk pulled up for their break.

Traffic on that early Saturday morning was typical for a summer weekend, and cars seemed to flow smoothly around our slower convoy. We’d just entered a section of six-lane superhighway when the driver of the 5-ton—which was directly in front of my vehicle—hit his...
brakes, swerved hard to the left, and entered the passing lane. The truck then jerked back hard to the right, crossed all three lanes, and entered the right shoulder. After that, the truck eased back into the convoy behind the lead HMMWV. My TC and I stared in dumbfounded silence at the performance. There miraculously hadn’t been any vehicles in the other lanes during the 5-ton’s dangerous highway ballet. Barely 5 minutes later we pulled off the highway for a rest and refuel break at a truck stop. As I was exiting my vehicle, I saw my TC head straight for the 5-ton. I turned to find the driver’s platoon sergeant, and I had a pretty good idea of what had happened. The TC confirmed my suspicions. When he walked up to the truck and opened the door, the driver was slumped over the steering wheel sound asleep. The driver was awake— albeit groggy and bleary-eyed—by the time his platoon sergeant and I got to the truck. He told us that all he could remember was being startled as his assistant driver started yelling. When he looked up, he saw the 5-ton was literally inches from the command HMMWV.

This driver worked nights at his civilian job and had shown up to drill on time, but with just 2 hours of sleep since leaving work. He was the assigned driver and felt fully capable of driving his 5-ton on the long trip. As such, he didn’t tell his platoon sergeant he’d just gotten off the night shift at work. The platoon sergeant was confident in the driver’s skills and professionalism and had no reason to question his ability to pilot the truck in the convoy. It was only the assistant driver’s warning, the driver’s quick reflexes and skills, and the lack of civilian traffic at that precise moment that prevented a disaster of nationally newsworthy proportions.

We found a replacement driver for the young, overzealous Soldier. After turning over the 5-ton’s keys, he climbed into the backseat of a HMMWV and got some much-needed sleep. We spent the night at an armory along the route, and the entire convoy arrived at Fort A.P. Hill safely the next day.

We were lucky that Saturday morning, but we also learned some valuable lessons no one in the battalion would soon forget. Like our driver, most young Soldiers are too “hooah” to admit they’re too tired to accomplish an assigned task. It’s therefore up to leaders to ensure their Soldiers are fit for duty, whether the mission is at home or in theater. Stay safe and stay fit for the fight!

Contact the author by e-mail at ruppert.baird@us.army.mil.

DID YOU KNOW?

It’s now easier for Soldiers to pin on the Army Driver and Mechanic Badge. The former requirement, which mandated that a Soldier occupy a duty position with title of driver or assistant driver of Army vehicles, recently was eliminated. To qualify under the new criteria, a Soldier must:

- Qualify for and possess a current OF 346, “U.S. Government Motor Vehicles Operator’s Identification Card,” issued in accordance with Army Regulation 600-55; and
- Be assigned duties and responsibilities as a driver or assistant driver of Government vehicles for a minimum of 12 consecutive months, or during at least 8,000 miles with no Government motor vehicle accidents or traffic violations recorded on DA Form 348-1-R, “Equipment Operator’s Qualification Record (Except Aircraft)”; or
- Perform satisfactorily for a minimum of 1 year as an active qualified driver instructor or motor vehicle driver examiner.
Winter is upon us and, depending on their location, Soldiers are encountering various weather conditions. Regardless the weather, missions must go on; as such, Soldiers must be prepared to drive in all types of conditions, be it snow, ice, or fog. Soldiers driving in these conditions must have the facts and skills necessary to complete their missions safely and successfully.

**Snow**

Snow forms when water vapor in the air freezes and creates small ice crystals. Some common hazards associated with driving in snow include reduced visibility and traction, less directional control, and increased braking distance. When snow melts and refreezes, however, drivers encounter even more hazardous road conditions. Intersections, high-traffic areas, and shady spots that were exposed to direct sunlight earlier in the day all are prone to ice over from melted snow. During snowy conditions, drivers must reduce their speed, brake moderately, make turns slowly, and increase the following distance between vehicles.

**Ice**

Another dangerous condition associated with winter weather is windshield icing. Windshields and other glass surfaces can ice over when the temperature is low enough to freeze moisture on ground surfaces. Conditions are ripe for windshield icing any time there’s visible ground haze. All ice must be removed from the vehicle’s windshield and other windows before operations begin, preferably with the vehicle’s defroster. Preventive maintenance checks and services should be performed on each vehicle to ensure the defroster and heater system are functioning properly.

It’s a good idea to keep an ice scraper in each vehicle just in case the defroster stops working. Black ice—a thin sheet of dark ice on the roadway—is extremely dangerous because it’s hard for drivers to detect before they’re actually on it. Black ice forms when light rain or drizzle falls on a road surface below 32 °F or when super-cooled fog droplets accumulate on bridges and overpasses. A roadway covered with black ice appears wet when the ambient temperature is below freezing.

Drivers must use extreme caution when driving on suspected black ice surfaces. Vehicles that hit black ice have little to no traction, which means little to no braking capability, and extremely poor directional control with a heightened possibility of skidding. Optimally, movement should stop in black ice conditions. However, if the mission must go on, drivers should reduce their speed, accelerate very slowly, increase the following distance between vehicles, brake very lightly, and make all turns gradually and slowly.

**Frost heaving**, a condition related to icing, is the uneven lifting and distortion of the ground close to the surface. Frost heaving is the result of water

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**DID YOU KNOW?**

Yes, it snows in Iraq. The mountainous regions in north and northeastern Iraq, which include the cities of Mosul and As Sulaymaniyyah, receive heavy snowfall each winter, especially during December, January, and February. Afghanistan experiences much harsher winters than Iraq. More than 49 percent of Afghanistan is made up of mountains at least 2,000 meters high. (In comparison, Mount St. Helens in Washington State stands 2,550 meters high.) Afghanistan experienced record snowfall and cold temperatures in the early months of 2005, with nighttime temperatures in Kabul dropping to -64 °F! In Kosovo, snow typically falls between November and March, with the greatest occurrences in January.
within the soil freezing and expanding. This expansion might damage the road surface and loosen tree roots. The biggest danger associated with frost heaving is the possibility of trees falling across roads, but uneven road surfaces are much more common. Such uneven surfaces can interrupt directional control, which is especially problematic in areas such as curves. Drivers should slow down and look for buckled or uneven patches on the road during freezing weather.

**Fog**

Valley fog forms when cold, dense air drains from areas of higher elevation into low areas or valleys. As the cool air accumulates in the valley, the ambient temperature sometimes decreases to the dewpoint temperature and creates dense fog. Drivers should expect reduced visibility and turn on the vehicle’s lights, slow down, and increase the following distance between vehicles when driving in fog.

Freezing fog is composed of supercooled water droplets that form when the temperature falls below 32 ºF. These droplets freeze and form ice as soon as they contact a cold surface. Freezing fog creates driving problems such as reduced visibility, poor traction and directional control, and possible skidding. Drivers should turn on the vehicle’s lights, reduce their speed, accelerate slowly, increase the following distance between vehicles, brake moderately, and make turns slowly.

**Conclusion**

Remember these guidelines when you’re performing mounted patrols and missions this winter and, most importantly, SLOW DOWN! The cold won’t last forever. If you and your Soldiers make it through the winter accident-free, you’ll have even more reason to celebrate when spring finally comes! 🌸

Editor’s note: 2LT Johnson wrote this article while serving as the Task Force Protector Safety Officer at Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. He may be contacted by e-mail at erik.n.johnson@us.army.mil.
You’ve heard the basic safety rules for handling weapons and undoubtedly will hear them again. Maybe you’ve heard them so many times you’re getting tired of them. But it’s vitally important that you understand these rules, accept their value, and, above all, follow them when you’re handling a weapon in any situation. Believe me, I know.
I graduated boot camp and infantry school with ease, and I was eager and motivated to hit the fleet. Being sent to Hawaii was a dream come true. Senior Marines were very encouraging and told me I was going to go places in the Corps.

We went on our annual unit deployment program to Okinawa, Japan, and I couldn’t have been more excited. I was assigned to stand post as a sentry at the gates of Camp Hansen, which would involve handling loaded 9 mm pistols. Not a problem for me; I thought, “I’m a machine gunner and a pistol is my secondary weapon. I know this gun inside and out.” Unfortunately, I disregarded basic safety rules and ignored what a 9 mm round can do to a human being.

On a quiet Sunday evening in June 2003, two Marines and I were scheduled for duty at one of Camp Hansen’s gates. We climbed into the back of a HMMWV to be driven to post. A quarter-mile ride to the gate was all it took for my life to change and a fellow Marine’s life to end.

A close friend and I pulled out our 9 mm pistols and began to play around with them. We pointed the weapons in all directions, including at each other; put them on “fire; “and cocked the hammers. We then began a mock tussle, which was all it took for my pistol to fire.

My world stopped moving at that point, and a tragedy began for me, my friend, our families, and many others. I went into shock and thought it couldn’t be happening, but it was happening right in front of me. I’d shot my friend and fellow Marine in the head.

I froze as he slumped to the floor of the HMMWV. Blood pooled on the floor as I scrambled to give him first aid. By this time other Marines had converged on the HMMWV. Someone said he was dead, but I found he still was breathing. I thought I could stop the bleeding with my shirt. But as I wrapped the shirt around his head, I felt tissue and other matter near the wound. I feared for my friend’s life and was numb with despair by the time EMT personnel arrived and took him from my arms. They took him to the
hospital, where he languished for 8 days before succumbing to the wound I'd inflicted.

I was handcuffed and taken to the provost marshal’s office, where the investigation and the longest night of my life began. The investigators asked detailed questions and focused on our horseplay. The process was painstaking and added a helpless feeling of regret to my fear and despair. I couldn’t see—let alone accept—that a moment of foolishness could lead to something so horrible. I was placed under suicide watch after questioning and on legal hold and liberty risk upon my release. Six months of agony and anguish passed before my court-martial, which was as heart-wrenching as a funeral and as bad as reliving your worst nightmare. Facing more than 20 years in prison and discharge from the Corps was very frightening and difficult. However, nothing was as hard as seeing and hearing what my friend’s mother, father, and sister had been through. I also had to face the effect my trial had on my own mother and brother-in-law, a former Marine who’d accompanied her to Okinawa for support.

I stood up at sentencing and told my friend’s family how sorry I was. Somehow they were able to graciously accept my apology. I believe they understand their son was my close friend and his death was an accident. Even so, I must live each day knowing I killed my friend and a good Marine.

No matter how skilled or comfortable you are with a weapon, the basic safety rules still apply. Remember “Treat, Never, Keep, Keep:"

• Treat every weapon as if it’s loaded
• Never point your weapon at anything you don’t intend to shoot
• Keep your finger straight and off the trigger until you’re ready to fire
• Keep your weapon on safe until you intend to fire

I write this from the brig as a discharged Marine with the belief I can be of some help to anyone who reads or hears my story. This tragedy, with all its pain and suffering, could’ve been avoided if I’d simply followed the above rules. Weapons don’t care if you’re just playing around and have no regard for you, your skill, intentions, or brother Marines. It’s you who must think and act with care and purpose.
In February 2005, the Army Combat Readiness Center (CRC) developed a new tool for commanders called "preliminary loss reports" (PLRs), which are generated for each Class A Army accident involving a fatality. Every PLR contains the basic facts of the accident and suggested tactics, techniques, and procedures based on the information available and lessons learned from similar accidents. The PLRs are sent to brigade commanders and above and select command sergeants major to share lessons learned. Countermeasure will spotlight certain PLRs in each issue, and this month’s “PLR Files” focuses on a negligent discharge accident that killed one Soldier.

Soldiers kid around with each other all the time. There’s nothing to laugh about, however, when a Soldier dies because the horseplay went a little too far. That Soldier’s family, friends, unit, and our Army suffer a terrible loss that can never be filled. Losses are especially painful when a Soldier is killed in a blatant act of negligence. Negligent discharge incidents have received much attention since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism. A rash of fatalities involving issued weapons occurred during late 2003 and carried over into 2004. Fortunately, the numbers have tapered off somewhat, but there still were five Soldier fatalities attributed to negligent discharges in Fiscal Year (FY) 2005. At the beginning of FY06, another negligent discharge accident tragically highlighted the importance of “treating every weapon as if it’s loaded.”

A sergeant was in a tent and had his M9 sidearm strapped on his uniform. Another Soldier told the sergeant the weapon was still loaded with a magazine. The sergeant replied the M9 was not loaded and, inexplicably, put the gun to his head and pulled the trigger. But the weapon was loaded, and the sergeant died from the resulting gunshot wound.

No one will ever know what that sergeant was thinking or why he put that gun to his head. All indications are he truly didn’t believe it was loaded. Was he trying to prove a point? Or was he just playing around? It’s not up to anyone to speculate the reasons now. The fact is a Soldier died needlessly by his own bullet. It’s every Soldier’s responsibility to make sure they and their buddies act in the safest manner possible, whether they’re on a mission, off duty in a combat zone, or on the highways back home. Safe weapons handling is an essential element of combat readiness, so ensure your unit follows and strictly enforces all established procedures. The end result of carelessness often means someone gets hurt or killed.

For more information on weapons handling procedures, visit the CRC’s Web site at https://crc.army.mil. A copy of the Army’s Weapons Handling Procedures guidebook can be downloaded at https://crc.army.mil/MediaAndPubs/magazines/countermeasure/2004_issues/safeweaponpullout.pdf. Anyone wanting more information also can contact Julie Shelley, Countermeasure editor, at (334) 255-1218, DSN 558-1218, or by e-mail at countermeasure@crc.army.mil.

Editor’s note: On 20 January 2004, PVT Markert’s general court-martial convened. In accordance with his pleas, he was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment. The military judge sentenced PVT Markert—then a private first class—to a bad-conduct discharge, 3 years confinement, and reduction in rank to private. Prisoner Markert is serving his confinement at the brig aboard Camp Hansen, Okinawa. On previous occasions, Marines from Markert’s section had been known to handle their weapons in inappropriate ways. He developed a false sense of comfort in handling his M9 while on guard duty. No matter their branch of service, NCOs must be vigilant with their younger troops and ensure their behavior, including weapons handling, is in accordance with good order and discipline.

Not doing so is the first step toward disaster, a lesson I learned on a night that I’ll never stop thinking about. Not doing so is the first step toward disaster, a lesson I learned on a night that I’ll never stop thinking about.
Driving a 72-ton tank is one of the most exciting jobs in the Army. This excitement, however, also comes with a lot of responsibility. An M1 tank crew consists of four crewmen, and each one must be well-trained and experienced in their duties. The two incidents described below are the latest accidents involving M1 tank drivers trapped in the drivers’ compartment.

In the first accident, an M1A2 crew was directed by their company commander to reconnoiter an area that was on fire. Once there, the track commander (TC) determined the fire was caused by burning brush, which included reeds between 8 and 10 feet tall. The fire was within one kilometer of the company’s command post and a possible ammunition cache. Following their commander’s guidance, the crew attempted to improvise a fire break using the M1A2. The burning brush and heavy vegetation limited the TC’s visibility, so he moved the tank up on a berm to get a better look. Against the recommendation of the other crewmembers, the TC drove the tank at an unknown speed into the burning grass. The berm gave way as the tank reached its pivot point, sending the M1A2 into a canal 10 to 15 feet below. The canal was hidden from the crew’s view by the reeds. The tank then either rolled or slid uncontrollably at a 45-degree angle with the gun tube over the front at zero degrees elevation. When the tank came to rest, the hull was submerged up to the turret and the gun tube was stuck in one of the canal’s walls. The driver was killed.

The drivers and TCs of these two tanks either underestimated the obstacles or failed to see them altogether. Both TCs also had time to conduct a risk assessment but didn’t, and they should’ve put the turret over the tank’s rear before negotiating the obstacle. All too often, these type accidents occur as tanks move cross-country and the driver attempts to negotiate an obstacle too quickly. Crewmember fatalities or serious injuries can result from these accidents, as described in pages 3 through 13 of Training Circular 21-306.

In the second incident, an M1A1 platoon was conducting driver’s training with an emphasis on “sagger” drills (evasive anti-tank guided missile maneuvers). The crew crested a slight rise at about 10 mph and identified a body of water about 8 feet wide in a concealed, low-lying area. As the crew spotted the water, the tank made a sharp turn and caused the TC to inadvertently disconnect his combat vehicle crewman (CVC) helmet cord.

Upon seeing the water below, the TC yelled for the tank to stop. Despite the TC’s disconnected CVC cord, the loader heard his instruction and began to yell “Stop!” over the intercom. The driver heard the loader just as he saw the water and applied the tank’s brakes, which caused the tracks to lock. During this time, the TC reconnected his CVC cord and re-established communication with the crew.

The tank began sliding toward the water, and the TC told the driver to take his foot off the brake to let the transmission idle down. He then directed the driver to turn the tank to the left. The tank slowly turned slightly left but continued to slide in the mud and grass until it hit the water hole. The TC told the driver to power through the water in an attempt to cross it. As soon as the tank entered the hole, however, the front end dropped to a 45-degree incline, became stuck, and started to sink. The driver suffered fatal injuries.

Unit commanders and TCs alike must remember the urgency of tactical maneuvering doesn’t outweigh the safety of the crew and
vehicle. Safe vehicle operations are affected directly by terrain and weather conditions, as described on pages 3 through 14 of Training Circular 21-306. The TC in the second accident lost communication with his crew. According to pages 3 through 5 of Training Circular 21-306, drivers “... [must] not move a tracked vehicle until intercommunications have been established between all crewmembers. If communications are lost, the vehicle must halt immediately.” Lives can be saved if leaders and crews conduct a thorough risk assessment before negotiating any obstacle. Remember, anyone can stop an unsafe act. Seconds count to save lives, so take the time to use Composite Risk Management and conduct a risk assessment before every movement.

Comments regarding this article may be directed to the U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center Help Desk at (334) 255-1390, DSN 558-1390, or by e-mail at helpdesk@crc.army.mil.
Death and injury are realities of combat. More than 58,000 U.S. troops died during Vietnam, and 15 percent of those deaths were due to a lack of buddy or combat lifesaver aid. For Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, it’s estimated that 5 to 10 Soldiers are wounded in action for each Soldier killed in action.

Battlefield Far Forward Medical Care (FFMC) has been stressed by air and land battle doctrine but continues to be a challenge for maneuver and medical leaders. FFMC teams identify and treat casualties as close as possible to the forward edge of the battlefield or the point where an injury occurs. Immediate care is essential because Soldiers are dispersed over wide areas during modern combat operations and might not be close to any medical facility.

When a major firefight occurs, there might not be enough medics to tend to every injured Soldier. First-aid kits in most vehicles and aircraft are good for minor injuries but are insufficient for major traumas caused by small-arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades, and improvised explosive devices. As a result, many of the actions traditionally performed by medical personnel are being assumed by combat lifesavers.

Combat lifesavers are non-medical Soldiers trained to provide lifesaving measures beyond the level of self or...
With proper training, a combat lifesaver can stabilize many types of casualties and slow the deterioration of a wounded Soldier's condition until higher-skilled medical personnel arrive. A patient has an excellent chance of survival if he can be stabilized and evacuated to permanent medical facilities. Ultimately, the more Soldiers we save, the more combat power we retain.

Current Army policy recommends there should be a combat lifesaver for every section, squad, or team. Some units have voluntarily increased this recommendation to a requirement, making it mandatory their Soldiers be combat lifesaver qualified before deploying to theater. Having the maximum number of trained combat lifesavers per unit will add to combat effectiveness and survivability.

Combat lifesaver training is conducted at the unit level using instructional material. Unit training managers and all other combat lifesavers must be recertified on an annual basis. Each training course or curriculum requires a combat lifesaver trainer as part of the cadre or staff. Materials such as books and intravenous needles can be requested through normal supply channels. The requirement that might be hardest to achieve, however, is finding the time and resources for all Soldiers to attend instruction, training, evaluation, and certification.

Commanders can demonstrate the importance of combat lifesaver training by ensuring they and their subordinate leaders also are trained and qualified. Soldiers in leadership positions should arrive at their unit and assume their responsibilities as certified combat lifesavers. As such, certification should become part of the graduation requirements for courses like the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, and the Officer Basic Course. Other training programs such as the Reserve Officer Training Corps and U.S. Military Academy also can make combat lifesaver certification part of their training curriculum.

All leaders should be qualified combat lifesavers. Enhanced combat effectiveness and readiness, increased survivability, and the demonstration of leadership initiative to possibly save a subordinate are just a few of the benefits. On every patrol and as part of every flight crew, there is or should be a leader and, in turn, a qualified combat lifesaver. That leader being combat lifesaver qualified could mean the difference between life and death for a wounded Soldier.

Contact the author by e-mail at jeffrey.baird@us.army.mil.
The U.S. Army Safety Center has transformed to the U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center (CRC). The CRC is a knowledge center that “connects the dots” on all information that pertains to the loss of a Soldier—our combat power! The CRC is encouraging commanders to use Composite Risk Management (CRM) as part of the Army’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program. According to the SAPR Program Web site at http://www.sexualassault.army.mil, “The SAPR Program reinforces the Army’s commitment to eliminate incidents of sexual assault through a comprehensive policy that focuses on education, prevention, integrated victim support, rapid reporting, thorough investigation, appropriate action, and followup. Army policy promotes sensitive care for victims of sexual assault and accountability for those who commit these crimes.”

**CRM Process**

1. **Identify hazards**
   - Excessive alcohol-related incidents within the unit
   - No established barracks security measures
   - Lack of adequate supervision for off-duty enlisted Soldiers
   - No education or training opportunities for sexual assault prevention

2. **Assess hazards**
   - Have alcohol-related incidents increased?
   - Have there been incidents of misconduct, theft, or violence in the barracks?

3. **Develop controls and make risk decisions**
   - Conduct alcohol abuse training as needed
   - Establish barracks security protocols and conduct random no-notice walk-throughs of common areas
   - Increase monitoring of Soldier activities and enforce sign-in procedures for all guests entering the barracks
   - Conduct sexual assault prevention training and incident reporting

4. **Implement controls**
   - Post a policy letter establishing a zero-tolerance policy for alcohol-related incidents and outlining consequences for violators
   - Implement policies in unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) and establish a duty log for supervisor no-notice security checks
   - Establish written policies in unit SOPs, encourage monitoring of Soldier activities by supervisors, procedures for all unit members during required annual training and during pre-deployment/post-deployment briefings
The CRC recently focused on the prevention aspect of the SAPR Program. Prevention approaches must exist on at least two levels—the individual or personal level and the organization or command level. The following questions are important for prevention at the individual level:

- How can I reduce my risk of being sexually assaulted?
- What is acquaintance or “date” rape?
- How can I reduce my risk of becoming a sexual offender?
- What can I do to help prevent others from being sexually assaulted?

At the organization level, leaders should ask, “What can I do to prevent sexual assault in my unit?” Statistics cited on the SAPR Program Web site suggest CRM can be used to accomplish the program’s prevention goals. These statistics reveal:

- More than half of sexual assault offenses involve alcohol.
- The largest percentage of sexual assault offenses occur in barracks.
- The majority of alleged victims are junior enlisted Soldiers.
- The majority of alleged perpetrators are junior enlisted Soldiers or NCOs.

Commanders can use CRM to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment and take appropriate steps to prevent or eliminate the risk of sexual assault within their command. Using CRM concepts and the above statistical information, the box beginning on the previous page gives an example of how to assess your organization, develop focused countermeasures, and implement appropriate controls to reduce the risk of sexual assault.

The CRC believes CRM is one approach leaders can use to reduce or eliminate sexual assault. CRM is a valid approach commanders can employ when developing policies and procedures to institutionalize the SAPR Program. More comprehensive information on CRM can be found on the CRC Web site at https://crc.army.mil/home/. If intense focus is placed on the prevention aspect of SAPR, the response requirement will decrease as prevention increases!

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Connecting the Dots

JOHN LANGHAMMER
U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center

In May 2004, the Army Combat Readiness Center (CRC) established an in-house Major Army Command (MACOM) Support Branch (MSB). The MSB is a highly motivated and responsive team of five safety professionals whose focus is improving the CRC’s partnership with the MACOM safety offices. The proactive MSB team concentrates on facilitating information exchange and capturing issues and concepts to enhance current safety programs. The MSB’s mission is to provide MACOM safety offices and the CRC a “face in the field” by assigning a liaison for coordinating and tracking safety issues. This liaison also handles requests for assistance while maintaining a forward-looking posture to enhance the Army’s combat readiness.

**MSB goals**

- Establish and maintain a positive working relationship between the MACOMs and the CRC by providing customer-focused support
- Provide support as the lead agency for integrating Army safety policy, programs, and initiatives into all MACOM safety programs
- Focus on the Army- and MACOM-level future safety requirements 12 to 24 months in advance
- Institutionalize the branch mission within the CRC and Army

**MACOM Support Branch Phone Numbers**

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**Bogus ACUs Not to Army**

CHRIS TRUMBLE
Systems Safety Engineer
U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center

Three civilian companies currently are producing Army Combat Uniforms (ACU) not to Army Standard. These civilian companies are producing ACUs that are off-shade to the Army-authorized ACU. The Army owns the copyright and is not allowing civilian companies to produce the Army-authorized, NSN-approved, stock-type ACU. The picture on the opposite page depicts correct wear of the authorized uniform.

There are three ways to distinguish the civilian-type ACU from the Army version:

- Company 1 produces a dark green Velcro zipper
- Company 2 produces the ACU with no pleat in the back of the coat
- Company 3 produces the ACU with no tab on the sleeves and a tan zipper, and the trousers do not have a drawstring in the cargo pocket.

T-shirts also are being manufactured slightly off-color from the Army ACU shade. All civilian stock numbers are either one or two numbers off from Army-authorized NSNs. The official Army version of the ACU goes on sale in April 2006. Soldiers should not waste...

Tips to Stay Healthy and Warm

To better help serve you, the MSB asks that you:
- Tell us what support you need
- Keep us informed of your issues
- Give us up-to-date contact information
- Submit and update your safety calendar
- Provide us feedback on our support rendered

- Coordinate with MACOMs, Army staff, installation management agencies, other services and federal agencies, and civilian industry regarding Composite Risk Management integration, safety program development, and leveraging of identified best practices
- Provide consultative services and develop and disseminate support materials for sustainment of base operations accident prevention programs
- Direct and track MACOM requests for assistance, training, and support
- Maintain a suspense database for CRC actions and reports to MACOMs
- Contact MACOMs and track unreported accidents to the CRC

The MSB team can be reached by e-mail at macomsupportbranch@crc.army.mil or by phone at (334) 255-3706/3576/3649/3858 (DSN 558).

Contact the author at (334) 255-2970, DSN 558-2970, or by e-mail at hans.d.langhammer@us.army.mil.

Standard

ACU worn with the black beret and pin-on skill badges

Velcro-backed rank insignia

Tilted chest pockets with Velcro closure, optimized for use with the front opening of the Interceptor body armor outer tactical vest

3-slot pen pocket for easy access, optimized for use with the OTV

Velcro sleeve cuff closure, which provides positive closure for all sizes

Forward-tilted cargo pocket for easy access whether sitting, kneeling, or standing—incorporated elastic drawstring for positive closure during movement

Combat boot hot weather, or combat boot temperate weather

their money on unauthorized uniforms. This information is also valuable for deployed Soldiers and can help them determine if the enemy is using uniforms from commercial vendors.

Contact the author at (334) 255-2372, DSN 558-2372, or by e-mail at christopher.trumble@us.army.mil.

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Class A (Damage)

- M1 tank suffered Class A damage when the HET hauling it overturned on a hillside. The tank was loaded and reportedly shifted during movement, causing the HET to roll over. The HET’s truck commander (TC) suffered a broken leg, and the driver was not injured. Seatbelt use is unknown. The accident occurred during the mid-evening.

Class A

- Two Soldiers were killed and one Soldier suffered minor injuries when their M1114 hit a pothole, overturned, and struck a passing civilian vehicle. The HMMWV was providing security for a convoy at the time of the accident. Seatbelt use on the two deceased Soldiers—the TC and gunner—was not reported; the driver reportedly was wearing his seatbelt and suffered minor injuries. The accident occurred during the early morning.
Spotlighting Soldiers who wore their seatbelts and walked away from potentially catastrophic accidents

Class A

- Two Soldiers suffered minor injuries and one foreign national was killed when an M1114 collided head-on with a civilian vehicle. The Soldiers in the HMMWV were part of a convoy and under blackout drive at the time of the accident. Seatbelt use was not reported. The accident occurred during the late evening.

- A Department of the Army civilian (DAC) was killed when the Army truck he was driving rolled over. The DAC reportedly steered the vehicle off the roadway, overcorrected, and lost control, causing the truck, which was towing a 25,000-pound drilling rig, to overturn. Seatbelt use was not reported. The accident occurred during the mid-morning.

Class B

- Soldier was killed when the M997 he was driving rolled over. The driver, who was wearing his seatbelt but not his helmet, lost control of the HMMWV and hit a concrete median while traveling in a three-vehicle convoy. Injuries to the other crewmembers were not reported. The accident occurred during the early afternoon.

- Soldier’s left thumb was amputated when the M1114 he was riding in hit a barrier and rolled over. The Soldier was serving as the HMMWV’s gunner. No injuries to the driver or other passengers were reported. The accident occurred during the early morning.

Class C

- Two Soldiers in an M998 HMMWV were not injured when the vehicle rolled over during a mounted reconnaissance patrol. The driver was making a left-hand turn on a gravel road when the vehicle began to skid. He then downshifted the HMMWV, which caused it to make a jerking motion and go further out of control. The HMMWV skidded in the opposite direction, hit an embankment, and rolled over. Damage to the vehicle is estimated at $20,000, but both occupants were wearing their seatbelts and helmets and walked away unhurt. The accident occurred during the late evening.

- The crew of an M1114 survived without injury when their HMMWV ran into a large depression in the roadway and rolled over. The depression was about 30 feet wide and 8 feet deep; however, because of the terrain, the depression was not visible to the HMMWV’s crew. The crew conducted a vehicle rollover drill, and all occupants were wearing their seatbelts. The accident occurred during the mid-evening.

- An M1114 crew escaped without injury when their HMMWV overturned. The HMMWV was traveling in a convoy when the crew encountered a dust cloud. When the vehicle emerged from the dust, the crew saw it was about to hit a median. The driver overcorrected the HMMWV to the right and caused it to fishtail, so he swerved hard again toward the left. The vehicle then rolled over. The crew executed a rollover drill, and all occupants were wearing their seatbelts and protective gear. The accident occurred during the early morning.

- Three Soldiers were killed when their M1114 caught fire. The HMMWV was carrying a double load of ammunition and four 5-gallon fuel cans secured to its rear bumper when it was rear-ended by an M1070 HET. The HMMWV and HET were part of a supply convoy on a four-lane highway and were detoured to a single lane because of an accident. The HMMWV crossed between the HET and another truck just before the accident. The fuel cans ruptured on impact and were ignited by the HET’s engine, and the fire subsequently ignited the ammunition. The accident occurred during the early morning.

- One foreign national troop was killed when the Army M923 5-ton he was riding in overturned. The vehicle rolled down an embankment as the driver, a U.S. Soldier, was negotiating a turn. The 5-ton was transporting 20 foreign national troops to a security detail position at the time of the accident. All 20 troops were ejected from the truck’s bed during the rollover. No injuries to the driver were reported. The accident occurred during the early morning.

- The crew of an M1114 survived without injury when their HMMWV ran into a large depression in the roadway and rolled over. The depression was about 30 feet wide and 8 feet deep; however, because of the terrain, the depression was not visible to the HMMWV’s crew. The crew conducted a vehicle rollover drill, and all occupants were wearing their seatbelts. The accident occurred during the mid-evening.

- Two Soldiers were killed when their M1114 caught fire. The HMMWV was carrying a double load of ammunition and four 5-gallon fuel cans secured to its rear bumper when it was rear-ended by an M1070 HET. The HMMWV and HET were part of a supply convoy on a four-lane highway and were detoured to a single lane because of an accident. The HMMWV crossed between the HET and another truck just before the accident. The fuel cans ruptured on impact and were ignited by the HET’s engine, and the fire subsequently ignited the ammunition. The accident occurred during the early morning.

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Class A

- Soldier was killed when he was struck by a speeding SUV. The Soldier was providing security along a main supply route during an accident and was dismounted from his 5-ton truck on the roadside. The SUV hit the Soldier and the 5-ton at an estimated 70 to 80 mph. The accident occurred during the early evening.

- Soldier died after completing the 2-mile run portion of the Army Physical Fitness Test. The Soldier was evacuated to a local hospital and pronounced dead about 40 minutes later. The accident occurred during the mid-morning.

- Soldier collapsed and died after he ran 3.5 miles during PT. CPR was performed, and the Soldier was transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead. The accident occurred during the mid-morning.

Class B

- Soldier’s thumb was partially amputated by the trap door of a guard tower. The Soldier was manning the guard tower at the time of the accident. Reconstructive surgery performed on the Soldier’s thumb was unsuccessful. The accident occurred during the late evening.

Lots of people drop their guard while performing mundane tasks. Who hasn’t gotten a little careless while taking empty battery acid containers to the dumpster in a combat zone? And who needs PPE for something so trivial?

Late one summer evening, a Soldier was tasked to take out the trash at his unit’s in-theater maintenance facility. Among other items, the trash included a battery acid jug that had served its purpose and was now destined for the dump. Our Soldier had been on duty for 11 hours and probably was more than a little eager to get back to his can for some well-deserved sleep. Not too enthralled with being assigned garbage detail, he grabbed the jug and other trash. Since his work was such an easy job, the Soldier left his gloves and goggles inside. What useful purpose could they possibly serve? After all, he was merely disposing of hazardous waste and his supervisor didn’t raise a fuss. No big deal, right?
The Soldier walked outside and threw everything into the dumpster. As he turned around to walk back inside, something irritated his left eye. He instinctively rubbed the eye, but it quickly became more irritated and started to burn. The Soldier realized too late that some battery acid from the jug had gotten on his naked hand. Seeing this wasn’t a good thing, the Soldier hustled back to the maintenance bay and asked another Soldier for help.

The other Soldier looked but didn’t see anything in the injured Soldier’s eye—not that one can easily spot battery acid diluted by human tears. Hoping to help, he emptied two room-temperature bottles of drinking water into the Soldier’s eye, but it quickly became apparent the lukewarm water wasn’t giving him any relief. By this time a crowd had formed, and another Soldier grabbed a cold water bottle from the refrigerator. The cold water didn’t work either, so they took the Soldier to a local medical clinic for treatment. He was diagnosed with a nasty chemical burn and lost 9 work days.

This Soldier was extremely lucky his brush with battery acid was logged as a Class C accident and not a Class A under the heading “permanent total disability.” No matter the mission, no matter the place, and no matter how tired you are, always use your PPE and exercise some common sense. You might get burned if you don’t!
You are a lethal warrior. You look straight at the enemy and predict what they might do next. Your mind is your greatest weapon. Keep it sharp.

Use Composite Risk Management (CRM) and Own the Edge.