AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. POLICY IN AFRICA

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The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:01 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald Payne (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. PAYNE. Good afternoon. Let me welcome you to this critically important hearing entitled, “An Overview of U.S. Policy in Africa.” Let me begin by extending our apologies for the voting that we just completed. Hopefully, members will be coming in, although there are a number of conflicts because of the timing of the votes. Whenever the ranking member gets here, we will interrupt and allow him to give his remarks. Currently, he is on the Senate side, but he is on his way here.

As the title suggests, the purpose of this hearing is to discuss the administration's policy on the continent of Africa. And we are very pleased to be able to have this very important hearing. We can certainly tell by the audience here that there is a tremendous amount of interest in the continent, and we are here to gain an understanding of both the overall policy toward the region and the United States' position on key and pressing issues of the day.

To that end, we have two distinguished panels, which I will introduce following the members' opening statements. Let me thank the witnesses for coming, particularly the Assistant Secretary of State, Ambassador Johnnie Carson, and USAID Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator Earl Gast, as well as our private panel consisting of Ambassador Princeton Lyman, Almami Cyllah, Witney Schneidman, and Gregory Simpkins.

As someone who has followed and worked in Africa for over 40 years, there have been many sweeping changes, especially in recent U.S. policy in Africa. The continent has gone from being a region with little strategic significance in the view of policymakers to one that holds critical and strategic economic, national security and humanitarian interests in just the last 20 years.

Indeed, the United States has moved away from a policy in Africa that hinged on containing the Soviet sphere of influence during the Cold War, a policy, as many of us here know, that too often led the United States to support dictatorial regimes on the continent with disastrous results, which in some instances are still being felt.
During the tenures of Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, U.S. interests in the continent greatly increased and the focus began to shift away from solely humanitarian interest. The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a preferential program designed to spur increased African imports to the United States and to build Africa trade capacity, and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—the landmark $15 billion, now $48 billion treatment programs were created by Presidents Clinton and Bush, respectively—both very important programs which have a tremendous impact on the continent. Both dramatically reshaped the discourse and the depth of U.S.-Africa policy. As a matter of fact, the Africa Diplomatic Corps did a great job in shaping the AGOA legislation, and we have certainly benefitted from their input.

The Obama administration showed keen interest in Africa early on with a brief visit by President Obama himself to Ghana and an 11-day trip to seven countries in Africa by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. I accompanied Secretary Clinton on part of her trip, and must say that the response was overwhelmingly positive and hopeful in terms of closer bilateral relations and partnership in each of the African countries that she visited. Many others were asking why not us because they were all anxious to see the new team. You will hear also from our Assistant Secretary, who also was on that very important trip.

In 2009, the President unveiled two new programs that will change the landscape and deepen U.S. support for long-term sustainable development on the continent.

The Global Health Initiative is a 6-year, $63 billion program which includes the $48 billion authorized from PEPFAR initially plus an additional $3 billion for PEPFAR to make that $51 billion, and the remaining of the $63 billion to help the partner countries improve health outcomes through strengthening health systems, with particular focus on improving the health of women, newborns, and children.

The U.S. Global Food Security Initiative is a welcome paradigm shift back to strong investments in agricultural development, both as a means to increased food security and as a critical element of long-term sustainable development in poor regions of the world, particularly in Africa. Both programs have significant impact on the continent.

Another program which has a major impact on Africa is the Millennium Challenge Corporation, another program started during the Bush administration. The majority of the MCC compacts are with African nations, 11 active compacts out of 20. There were 20 total compacts in Africa; however, Madagascar was suspended following the recent coup. While these initiatives are certainly very strong signs of U.S. focus on Africa, many challenges remain, particularly in the area of democracy and governance and conflict, which warrants an ongoing discussion of U.S. policy.

My concerns over Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria, and elsewhere are well known. So I will instead highlight troubling issues of three other countries emerging with problems—Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Djibouti. I am deeply concerned and troubled about the deteriorating conditions in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Peoples' Revolu-
tionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime is becoming increasingly totalitarian. A few weeks ago, the government began to jam the Voice of America Amharic program, and the Prime Minister compared the VOA to the hate radio station Libres des Mille Collines, the radio station which was used by the Rwandan Government, who committed the genocide in Rwanda. This is just unbelievable.

My concern continues for the deteriorating condition of Mrs. Birtukan, who testified right here before this committee and continues to languish in prison in Ethiopia, along with hundreds of others without access to medical care, and her situation is deteriorating as we speak. I hope to learn more today on what our policy is toward Ethiopia.

The Government of Somaliland in February handed over a woman named Mrs. Bishaaro, a registered refugee in Somaliland to Ethiopian security forces. A few years ago, she was arrested and tortured by Ethiopian security, and her husband was executed. I understand there is a delegation visiting from Somaliland currently and hope to learn what the United States’ position is on this case, and on Somaliland more broadly.

I am also concerned about the lack of development assistance funding for Djibouti, a strong ally to the United States, which plays an important role in the promotion of peace on the Horn of Africa. I will speak more details on all of these three countries during the question and answer period of this hearing.

The committee looks forward to this very important hearing and all of the witnesses and their testimonies. And let me once again thank the witnesses and all of you for being here today. And as you see, our ranking member has arrived, and so I will now turn over the time to our ranking member for his opening statement.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As you may know, I also serve as ranking on the Executive Commission on China, and we had a hearing on Google and the whole human rights issue there, which unfortunately, countries like Ethiopia and a growing number of countries of Africa are taking the capability and the expertise, technologically and otherwise, that China provides, and they are using it as a tool of repression. So this issue is certainly applicable to a growing number of African countries where there are despotic regimes.

I do want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this timely hearing to examine the current U.S. policy in Africa. I am pleased to have the opportunity to engage in this discussion with senior administration officials, the Honorable Johnnie Carson and Mr. Earl Gast, as well as our second panel of distinguished witnesses. I especially want to welcome my good friend, Greg Simpkins, vice president of the Leon Sullivan Foundation, who used to be our staff director on the Africa Subcommittee when I chaired it. And it is a delight to welcome him back to the committee this time as a witness.

While there are numerous, and I mean numerous, major issues—and you brought up Ethiopia, Mr. Chairman. And as you know, we together worked on the Ethiopia Human Rights Act. Unfortunately, President Meles shows increasing signs of deterioration when it comes to human rights and respect for other parties. I hope our distinguished witnesses will speak to that.
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But let me raise three particular issues of concern to me, but in no way is this an exhaustive list. One is with respect to U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa. There are seven such missions spanning the same number of countries. These peacekeeping operations have a critical role to play in some of the most volatile areas in the world, among vulnerable populations that have suffered extraordinary violence and human rights violations. Countries that contribute their personnel to this highly laudable undertaking are to be commended for doing so. But they must also accept responsibility for ensuring that military personnel from their country do not exploit the populations that they are assigned to protect.

Following deeply troubling reports about peacekeeping personnel engaging in trafficking of persons, I chaired several hearings—as you know, Mr. Chairman, because you were very much a part of that—that focused on those egregious abuses, particularly against children, particularly in the DR Congo. When I rewrote the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act—as you know, I am the prime sponsor of the original bill—when we did the authorization in 2005, we addressed this issue. One provision amended the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking to include an assessment of measures that respective countries are taking to ensure that their nationals who are deployed abroad as part of a peacekeeping operation do not engage in or facilitate severe forms of trafficking in persons or exploit victims through other means.

A second provision requires that the Secretary of State submit a report to Congress at least 15 days prior to a vote for a new or reauthorized peacekeeping mission that contains a description of the measures taken to prevent peacekeeping forces from “trafficking in person, exploiting victims of trafficking, or committing acts of sexual exploitation or abuse, and the measures in place to hold accountable any such individuals who engage in any such acts while participating in a peacekeeping mission.” And I would encourage the administration to clearly comply with that law. Sometimes we have less than stellar cooperation from any administration. So I would ask that you really look to live up to that.

One might question the compliance with this reporting mandate, both in terms of meeting the congressional intent of this statutory provision, and in fulfilling the purpose for which it was implemented. It is deeply disturbing that the problem of sexual exploitation and trafficking by peacekeeping personnel not only continues, but is growing worse. I learned of continuing problems when I visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo and inquired about MONUC 2 years ago. Not only were serious allegations being made against peacekeeping soldiers, but the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services that is responsible for investigating those allegations was moving its personnel to Nairobi, Kenya—far from where it could effectively fulfill its mandate.

MONUC is not the only mission where concerns about sexual exploitation apply. As a March 21, 2010, report by the Wall Street Journal points out, allegations of sex-related crimes against peacekeeping personnel in general increased last year by 12 percent to a total of 55, and some of those allegations involved minors. Furthermore, countries of accused personnel only responded 14 times
to a total of 82 requests from the U.N. for information about sexually related investigations or their outcomes.

I will be interested to explore, and I hope our panel can provide some insights into this very serious issue. When the people who are there to protect become the perpetrators of crimes, who is to protect those innocent individuals? And I know the U.N. has a zero tolerance policy. I hope we are still not talking about zero implementation. I don't think that is the case, but that was the case early on after that policy was announced.

A second issue of grave concern, of course shared by every member of this committee, is the situation in Sudan, which we all recognize is at a critical crossroads. The country may successfully traverse elections next month, and a referendum in January 2011, and establish a stable, long-term peace in Darfur along the way, or it could backslide into a state of carnage and destruction that has plagued the country for two decades.

The implications are formidable, not only for the Sudanese, but for the people in the entire region. And I would note parenthetically my friend, Greg Simpkins, joined me when we met with Bashir about 4 years ago. And frankly, the only thing that General Bashir wanted to talk about was lifting the sanctions. Greg will remember it well. Nothing about compliance, nothing about living up to international norms and human rights. But all he wanted to do is talk about lifting the sanctions. Sanctions will be lifted when there is peace and when there is respect for human rights.

And finally, as we discussed in our recent subcommittee hearing, Mr. Chairman, our PEPFAR program has had an enormously positive impact in addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic that has ravaged Africa. We must ensure that we continue to work with African countries to meet this and other global health challenges. However, I must express my grave reservations with respect to certain aspects of the President’s Global Health Initiative.

When the reauthorization of PEPFAR was being debated in 2008, references to integrating and providing explicit funding for authorization for “reproductive health,” which nobody would deny reproductive health in its clearest definition, the most applied definition used in Africa, is something we all want, but not when it is hooked with and used as code for abortion. The term as we wrote that legislation did not appear in the final legislation. Yet the new GHI emphasizes the integration of HIV/AIDS programming with family planning, as well as with various health programs. This is being undertaken in the context of a family planning program and the action taken by President Obama to rescind Mexico City Policy now includes foreign nongovernmental organizations that provide support and lobby for and perform abortion on demand.

When one considers that this involves over $715 million in funding under the 2011 proposed budget, the ability for abortion groups to leverage this funding in relation to U.S. HIV/AIDS funding under GHI is deeply disturbing. This integration priority is wrong. We are trying to prevent HIV/AIDS, not children. It is time to recognize that abortion is child mortality. Abortion methods dismember, poison, and starve to death a baby, and it wounds their mothers.
Safe abortion, Mr. Chairman—and it is used by this administration and by some in the U.N.—is the ultimate oxymoron. Child dismemberment, forced premature expulsion from the safety of the womb, chemical poisoning, and deliberate starvation—let us not forget that one of the chemicals in RU–486 denies nourishment to an unborn child. They literally starve to death, and then the other chemical brings upon labor. None of this can ever, ever be construed to be benign, cannot be construed to be compassionate, or safe.

Goal number four of the Millennium Development Goals calls on each country to reduce child mortality, while at the same time pro-abortion activists lobby for an increase in abortion. It is bewildering to me, Mr. Chairman, how anyone can fail to understand that abortion is, by definition, infant mortality. Abortion destroys children.

Let me also point out—and I hope this committee, and I hope members and the audience, will consider this—that there are at least 102 studies that show significant psychological harm, including major depression and elevated risk of suicide, in women who abort. It doesn’t happen right after the abortion. It kicks in later, leading to intermediate and long-term results. At least 28 studies, including three in 2009, show that abortion increases the risk of breast cancer by some 30 to 40 percent or more, yet the abortion industry has largely succeeded in suppressing those facts. So-called safe abortion inflicts other deleterious consequences on women, and includes hemorrhage, infection, perforation of the uterus, sterility, and death. Just last month, a woman from my own state of New Jersey died from a legal abortion, leaving behind four children.

Finally, at least 113 studies show a significant association between abortion and subsequent premature births. For example, a study by researchers Shah and Zoe showed a 36 percent increased risk for preterm birth after one abortion and a staggering 93 percent increased risk after two. Similarly, the risk of subsequent children being born with low birth weight increases by 35 percent after one abortion, and 72 percent after two or more.

Another study shows an increased risk of nine times after a woman has had three abortions. What does this mean for children, especially in Africa? Preterm birth is the leading cause of infant mortality in the industrialized countries after congenital anomalies. Preterm infants have a greater risk of suffering from chronic lung disease, sensory deficits, cerebral palsy, cognitive impairments, and behavioral problems. Low birth weight is similarly associated with neonatal mortality and morbidity.

Mr. Chairman, it is about time, I believe, that we as a nation—as you know, we have heard testimony from Dr. Jane Kagia, an OB–GYN in Kenya and others from Africa, that Africa wants its children protected, whether unborn, newborn, or 5-year-olds, and we ought to adopt a consistent policy of human rights protection that says all are welcomed, and we will shred the welcome mat for none. I yield back.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Ms. Woolsey.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am going to be very, very quick because I want to hear from the witnesses. I just have to say to the witnesses of both panels that I have confidence
that you are going to reassure me that you understand that family planning is not the same thing as an abortion, and that families or a woman's ability to choose the appropriate timing for that family or that woman for a pregnancy actually prevents abortions, saving lives, bringing stronger, healthier, wanted babies into the world. So I am looking forward to your testimonies. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Ms. Woolsey. Mr. Flake.

Mr. Flake. No comments.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Now let us take our first panel. First we have Ambassador Johnnie Carson. Ambassador Carson serves as the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of African Affairs at the Department of State. He has an established career in the foreign service. He previously served as Ambassador to Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Uganda, as well as the principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs from 1997 to 1999.

In addition to several posts in sub-Saharan Africa, he served as desk officer in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1971 to 1974, and staff officer for the Secretary of State from 1978 to 1982. Beyond the State Department, Ambassador Carson served as the staff director for the House Africa Subcommittee from 1979 to 1982, and he was a Peace Corps volunteer in Tanzania from 1965 to 1968, a few years after the inception of the Peace Corps.

During his career, Ambassador Carson received several awards, including the Department of State's Superior Honors Award, and the Centers for Disease Control's Champion of Prevention Award. Ambassador Carson holds a bachelor of arts in history and political science from Drake University and a masters of art in international relations from the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London.

Second, we have Mr. Earl Gast, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa at the United States Agency for International Development. As the senior assistant administrator, Mr. Gast oversees the bureau’s offices of Sudan programs, East African affairs, administrative services, and development programming. Mr. Gast has served at USAID for 19 years. He previously served as supervisory program officer for the USAID caucus’ regional mission and the USAID regional mission director in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldavia, and as the USAID representative to the United Nations agencies in Rome. He also held posts in Iraq and Kosovo.

Mr. Gast holds a masters degree in political science and Middle East studies from George Washington University and graduated summa cum laude from the University of Maryland with a bachelor’s degree in history and criminal law.

We will begin with Ambassador Carson.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador Carson. Chairman Payne, Congressman Smith, members of the committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Government policy toward Africa. As you know, this is my first appearance before this committee, and I salute your commitment to Africa, as well as your efforts to exam-
ine tough issues. I look forward to working closely with the Congress, and especially with you, Mr. Chairman, and the other members of this committee.

I have a longer statement for the record, which I would like to have submitted. But let me——

Mr. PAYNE. Without objection.

Ambassador CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. President Obama has a strong interest in Africa and has made Africa one of our top foreign policy priorities. This has been evident throughout his first year in office. Last year, in July, President Obama traveled to Ghana, where he met with President John Atta Mills and spoke before the Ghanian Parliament about his vision for the continent. President Obama has met in the Oval Office with President Kikwete of Tanzania, President Ian Khama of Botswana, Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai of Zimbabwe, and in September, at the United Nations General Assembly, he met with 21 African heads of state.

All of the President’s senior foreign policy advisors have followed his lead. And last August, Secretary Clinton, as you remarked, Mr. Chairman, embarked on an 11-day trip to Africa, including stops in Kenya, South Africa, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Liberia, and Cape Verde.

President Obama has said repeatedly that the United States views Africa as our partner, and as a partner of the international community. We are committed to substantial increases in foreign assistance for Africa, but we know that additional assistance will not by itself automatically produce success. Instead, success will be defined by how well we work together as partners to build Africa’s capacity for long-term change and ultimately the need for less development assistance.

As Africa’s partner, the United States is ready to contribute to Africa’s growth and stabilization, but ultimately African leaders and countries must take control of their futures. Having said that, we are committed to a very positive and forward-looking Africa policy built on five principles that reflect our interest and define the work that we have been doing over the past year.

First, we will work with African governments, the international community, and civil society to strengthen democratic institutions and protect the democratic gains made in recent years in many African countries. A key element in Africa’s transformation is sustained commitment to democracy, rule of law, and to constitutional norms. Africa has indeed made significant progress in this area. Botswana, Ghana, Tanzania, Mauritius, Benin, and South Africa are but a few examples of countries that are showing democratic commitment.

But progress in this area must be more widespread, and certainly cannot be taken for granted. Some scholars and political analysts believe that democracy in Africa may have reached a plateau, and that we may be witnessing the beginning of a democratic recession. They point to flawed Presidential elections over the last 5 years in places like Kenya, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe; the attempts by leaders and countries like Niger, Uganda, and Cameroon to extend their terms of office; and certainly in more recent months and years, the reemergence of military interventionism in countries
like Guinea Conakry, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, and just 1½ months ago, in Niger.

Moreover, democracy remains fragile in large states like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in Sudan, and arguably in Africa’s most important and most populous country, Nigeria. During my recent visit to Nigeria, I was encouraged by the steps Nigeria’s elected officials at the national and state level to elevate Vice President Goodluck Jonathan to the role of acting President.

Although political progress has been made in that country, Nigeria still faces significant political challenges and uncertainty in the run-up to the next Presidential elections, probably in May 2011. It is important that Nigeria improve its electoral system, reinvigorate its economy, resolve the conflicts in the Niger Delta, and end the communal violence that has occurred most recently in Plateau State. It is also critically important that all of Nigeria’s leaders act responsibly and reaffirm their commitment to good governance, stability, and democracy by choosing constitutional rule.

Second, Africa’s future success and global importance are dependent upon its continued economic progress and growth. Africa has made measurable inroads to increase prosperity. Countries like Mauritius, Ghana, Rwanda, Botswana, Tanzania, Uganda, and Cape Verde have made significant economic strides over the last decade, yet Africa remains the poorest and most vulnerable continent on the globe.

To help turn this situation around, we must work to revitalize Africa’s agricultural sector, which employs more than 70 percent of African households directly or indirectly. Now is the time for a green revolution in Africa’s agriculture. Through innovative approaches and nontraditional technology, we can improve the lives of millions of people across the continent, and the administration’s Food Security Initiative is designed to help do this.

The United States also wants to strengthen its trading relationship with Africa and to explore ways to promote African private sector growth and investment, especially for small and medium-sized businesses. We already have strong ties in energy, textiles, and transportation equipment, but we can and should do more in the economic field. The Obama administration is committed to working with our African partners to maximize the opportunities created by our trade preference programs like AGOA, and we will continue to encourage American investment and greater American trade with Africa.

Third, historically the United States has focused on public health and health related issues in Africa. We remain committed, and aim to help alleviate the health crisis across the entire continent. We believe that African governments, as well as the international community, must invest more in Africa’s public health systems, train more medical professionals, and ensure that there are well-paying opportunities for African medical professionals in their own countries.

We must also focus on maternal and infant health care, which are closely related to several millennium development goals. The Obama administration will continue the PEPFAR program that the previous administration launched to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa. In total, the Obama administration has pledged
some $63 billion to meet the wide range of public health challenges that confront Africa today.

Fourth, the United States is committed to working with African states and the international community to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflicts and disputes across the continent. Conflict destabilizes states and entire regions, stifles economic growth and investment, robs young Africans of the opportunity for an education and a better economic future. Although there has been a notable reduction in the number of conflicts over the past decade, areas of turmoil and political unrest in countries like Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic can generate both internal and regional instability.

Furthermore, we must not forget the extreme harm inflicted by gender-based violence and the recruitment of child soldiers. The Obama administration is working to end conflicts across Africa so that peace and economic progress can replace instability and uncertainty. The United States has been and will continue to work proactively with African leaders, civil society organizations, and the international community to prevent new conflicts.

Over the past year, we have been diplomatically engaged in Mauritania, in Guinea Conakry, in Nigeria, Niger, Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan to help resolve conflicts. We have also had discussions with leaders of a number of other countries where the political situations are fragile and unstable. As we pursue these avenues of promoting stability and peace in places like Somalia, we are also shouldering the lion’s share of humanitarian assistance in countries like Somalia, Sudan, and also Ethiopia.

Fifth, Mr. Chairman, we will seek to deepen our cooperation with African states to address both old and new transnational challenges. Africa’s poverty puts it at a distinct disadvantage in dealing with major global and transnational problems like climate change, narco-trafficking, trafficking in people, and the illegal exploitation of Africa’s minerals and maritime resources.

Finally, one of my personal goals as Assistant Secretary is to expand our diplomatic presence in Africa. I am working within the State Department and the administration, and also with those in Congress to increase resources, both funding for people and programs at our embassies and consulates in Africa. I want, because I think we need, more American diplomats working across Africa, and increased diplomatic presence is important in making progress on all of the five principles that I outlined.

I think we should be present in Mombasa as well as in Nairobi, in Goma as well as in Kinshasa, in Kano as well as Abuja and Lagos. Being in these cities will enable us to reach important audiences that we do not reach directly now. We also have to do a better job of using our diplomatic presence on the continent to listen to the people of Africa and to learn from them how we can better work together to meet the challenges that they face.

The Obama administration believes in and is committed to Africa’s future and its great promise. I think this is a vision that the members of this committee share as well. I appreciate your commitment to this shared vision and your willingness to work with me and the Department of State together to strengthen U.S.-African relations and to work collaboratively toward a future that
brings better governance, expanded democracy, greater prosperity, and economic growth to all of Africa's people.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your time, and I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]

**Statement of Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson**  
*House Committee on Foreign Affairs*  
*Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health*  
*March 24, 2010*

Chairman Payne, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the Committee:

I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. As you know this is my first appearance before this committee, and I salute your commitment to Africa as well as your efforts to examine tough issues. I look forward to working with the Congress and especially with this committee to identify appropriate tools to assist our on-going efforts.

President Obama has a strong interest in Africa and has made the continent one of our top foreign policy concerns. This has been evident throughout his first year in office. The President’s visit to Ghana last July, the earliest visit made by a U.S. president to the continent, underscores Africa’s importance to the United States. Last September, at the UN General Assembly, the President hosted a lunch with 26 African heads of state. He also met in the oval office with President Kikwete of Tanzania, President Khama of Botswana, and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai of Zimbabwe. And the President invited dozens of people to the White House to see him give the Robert F. Kennedy Prize for Political Courage to a leading women’s organization from Zimbabwe.

All of the President’s senior foreign policy advisors followed his lead—many of them travelling to Africa as well. The U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations visited five African countries last June, including Liberia and Rwanda. Deputy Secretary of State Jack Lew traveled to Ethiopia and Tanzania in June 2009.

Last August, Secretary Clinton and I embarked on an 11-day, seven-country trip across the continent. In January, Undersecretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs Maria Otero headed the U.S. delegation to the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, where we discussed a range of issues including democracy and governance, climate change, and food security. Undersecretary Otero also visited Kenya and Uganda.
From Ethiopia, I travelled to Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria where I met with senior government officials and members of civil society. We discussed the need for free, fair, and transparent elections. We also talked about other issues such as regional stability, economic development, and the responsible use of resource revenues. I stressed the need for governments, particularly those that have discovered large quantities of oil like Ghana and Uganda, to use their new found wealth responsibly.

President Obama has said repeatedly that the United States views Africa as our partner and as a partner of the international community. While Africa has very serious and well-known challenges to confront, the President, Secretary Clinton, and I are confident that Africa and Africans will rise to meet and overcome these challenges.

Last June when the President was in Ghana, he said, “We believe in Africa’s potential and promise. We remain committed to Africa’s future. We will be strong partners with the African people.” Africa is essential to our interconnected world, and our alliance with one another must be rooted in mutual respect and accountability. I echo the President’s sentiment that U.S. policy must start from the simple premise that Africa’s future is up to Africans.

The Obama Administration is committed to a positive and forward looking policy in Africa, but we know that additional assistance will not automatically produce success across the continent. Instead, success will be defined by how well we work together as partners to build Africa’s capacity for long-term change and ultimately eliminate the continued need for such assistance. As Africa’s partner, the United States is ready to contribute to Africa’s growth and stabilization, but ultimately, African leaders and countries must take control of their futures.

Just like the United States is important to Africa, Africa is important to the United States. The history and heritage of this country is directly linked to Africa. But the significance and relevance of Africa reaches far beyond ethnicity and national origin. It is based on our fundamental interests in promoting democratic institutions and good governance, peace and stability, and sustained economic growth across sub-Saharan Africa. All of these interests affect the United States. The United States will focus on these areas and others that are critical to the future success of Africa.

STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSITUTIONS
We will work with African governments, the international community, and civil society to strengthen democratic institutions and protect the democratic gains made in recent years in many African countries. A key element in Africa’s transformation is sustained commitment to democracy, rule of law, and constitutional norms. Africa has made significant progress in this area. Botswana, Ghana, Tanzania, Mauritius, and South Africa are a few examples of countries showing that commitment. But progress in this area must be more widespread across Africa.

Some scholars and political analysts are saying that democracy in Africa has reached a plateau, and that we may be witnessing the beginning of a democratic recession. They point to flawed presidential elections in places like Kenya, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe; the attempts by leaders in Niger, Uganda, and Cameroon to extend their terms of office; and the re-emergence of military interventionism in Guinea, Madagascar, and Niger.

Moreover, democracy remains fragile or tenuous in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and arguably Africa’s most important country, Nigeria, which continues to experience political tensions caused by the prolonged illness of President Yar’Adua.

The United States welcomes President Yar’Adua’s recent return to Nigeria. However, we remain concerned that there may be some in Nigeria who are putting their personal ambitions above the health of the President and more importantly ahead of the political stability and political health of the country.

Nigeria is simply too important to Africa and too important to the United States and the international community for us not to be concerned and engaged. Widespread instability in Nigeria could have a tsunami-like ripple effect across West Africa and the global community.

During my recent visit to Nigeria, I was encouraged by the steps taken by Nigeria’s elected officials at the national and state level to elevate Goodluck Jonathan to Acting President. Although political progress has been made, Nigeria still faces significant political challenges and uncertainty in the run-up to the next presidential and national assembly elections in 2011.

It is important that Nigeria improve its electoral system reinvigorate its economy and resolve the conflicts in the Niger Delta and end communal violence and impunity in Plateau State. It is also critically important that all of Nigeria’s
leaders act responsibly and reaffirm their commitment to good governance, stability and democracy by choosing constitutional rule.

Our engagement in Guinea following the September 28 massacre continues to yield tangible results. Working with international and regional partners we insured that junta leader Dadis Camara would not return to Conakry from Morocco, where he sought medical attention after an assassination attempt. He is now in Ouagadougou. Our calls for, and support of, a transitional government and clear path to elections were effective – we are moving in the right direction and elections are scheduled June 27.

Nigeria, Guinea and other African countries need civilian governments that deliver services to their people, independent judiciaries that respect and enforce the rule of law, professional security forces that respect human rights, strong and effective legislative institutions, a free and responsible press, and a dynamic civil society. This is not a list of options or some menu from which governments and leaders may pick and choose to suit their own ambitions. There has been far too much of that behavior in the past. Rather, all of these rights are requirements for a stable and prosperous Africa that will help ensure a brighter future for the African people.

The political and economic success of Africa depends a great deal on the effectiveness, sustainability, and reliability of its democratic institutions. That means a focus on process and progress, not on personalities. African leaders must recognize that the United States is engaging and building long-term ties with their countries and not just with them. Credible, strong, and independent institutions are the key to this deeper relationship. Over the next two years, 27 countries in sub-Saharan Africa will hold elections. We encourage those governments to get it right. To level the playing field, clean up the voter rolls, open up the media, count the votes fairly, and give democracy a chance.

Although elections are but one component in the process of democratization, there is a strong correlation between electoral processes, including strong and independent electoral institutions, successful elections, and efforts to consolidate democracy. And there is strong evidence that suggests that democratic governments perform better economically.

To stay abreast of developments in these important contests I’ve instituted a monthly meeting with NGO’s to discuss upcoming elections, including sharing
experiences and best practices, and ensuring that scarce resources are equitably spread throughout the continent.

In Kenya, for example, which is scheduled to hold elections in 2012, we have redoubled our efforts to strengthen democracy and governance in the wake of 2007-2008 post-election violence. Our multi-year investment in strengthening Parliament continues to show strong results: as a result of U.S. institutional capacity building and material support, Parliamentary business is now broadcast live across the country to an eager and interested audience. We also co-hosted, in conjunction with the strong assistance of the House Democracy Partnership, Members of Parliament in order that they benefit from the experience of their peers here on Capitol Hill. As part of our efforts to empower independent voices in Kenya, we sponsored the National Youth Forum, which brought together leaders from all youth-oriented civil society groups to work jointly on democracy and reform initiatives. On the other hand, the Secretary warned that there will be “no business as usual” with those who impede democratic progress. This is not an idle threat as we already revoked the visas of selected high-ranking government officials and sent warning letters to others.

We will continue to work with, support, and recognize Africans who support democracy and respect for human rights. This includes working with governments, local NGOs, and international actors to highlight concerns such as security force abuses, infringements on civil liberties, prison conditions, corruption, and discrimination against persons due to their sexual orientation.

This month, the First Lady and the Secretary presented the 2010 International Women of Courage Award to Jestina Mukoko of the Zimbabwe Peace Project and Ann Njogu of the Kenya Center for Rights Education and Awareness. The courage these women exhibited in confronting injustice in their countries is an inspiration to all of us.

The United States will continue to work with Africans, as partners, to build stronger democratic institutions and to advance democracy in Africa. It is in that context of partnership, that I am encouraged by the growing political maturity of the African Union. At the most recent African Union summit in Addis Ababa, the assembled heads of state and government adopted important new measures to strengthen the continent’s democratic institutions and make clear that it would not be a club for strongmen and coup leaders. I applaud African leaders for approving new rules and procedures that bind the AU to reject "constitutional coups" by leaders who seek to illegitimately extend their terms in office.
PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM

Africa’s future success and global importance are dependent on its continued economic progress. Working alongside African countries to promote and advance sustained economic development and growth is another Obama administration priority. Africa has made measurable inroads to increase prosperity. Mauritius, Ghana, Rwanda, Botswana, Tanzania, Uganda, and Cape Verde have made significant economic strides. Yet Africa remains the poorest and most vulnerable continent on the globe.

To help turn this situation around, we must work to revitalize Africa’s agricultural sector, which employs more than 70 percent of Africans directly or indirectly.

The United States is committed to supporting a new Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative, which builds upon the model of the African-led Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) to partner with countries and other development partners to reduce hunger, poverty and under-nutrition. The President’s commitment of at least $3.5 billion over three years to agricultural development will help us work with African farmers to employ new agricultural methods and technologies, and help them deliver their production to markets. The initiative was developed to help enhance Africa’s ability to meet its food needs through improved production, markets, and distribution systems. It will also enable African states to further develop their agricultural industries, and spur economic growth across the continent. We conducted multiple briefing sessions with the African diplomatic corps on the Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative before it was officially released. This garnered continent-wide support, as well as important input, on further development of the plan.

In addition to the Food Security Initiative we are funding smaller projects that will provide employment and income, especially in the agricultural sector. For example, in Zimbabwe we are implementing a program that promotes agricultural livelihoods through activities that stimulate agricultural production, restore the agricultural value chain and build market linkages. We are also implementing a revolving loan guarantee program that helps small landholders obtain agricultural inputs and training.
I was encouraged by the election of President Bingu wa Mutharika of Malawi as the next chair of the African Union. Malawi has made great progress in the field of agriculture and the President indicated that he plans to use his chairmanship of the AU to advance agriculture in Africa. Countries that are food secure are stronger, more stable, and better able to weather economic downturns.

The United States also wants to strengthen its trading relationship with Africa. We already have strong ties in energy, textiles, and transportation equipment. But we can and should do more. The Obama administration is committed to working with our African partners to maximize the opportunities created by our trade preference programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). And we hope more African nations will take advantage of AGOA.

We also continue to explore ways to promote African private sector growth and investment, especially for small and medium-sized businesses. The AF Bureau established an Economic Growth Working Group in 2009 that meets regularly with economic and commercial counselors from the Washington-based African Diplomatic Corps to bring together U.S. Government agencies and businesses and to create business and economic links. This group will try to leverage the opportunities under AGOA as well as work to expand trade and investment throughout sub-Saharan Africa.

The President’s Entrepreneurship Summit, scheduled for April 26-27, will highlight the important role entrepreneurship can play in economic growth and community development. It will include 24 African businesspeople, including nine women. In advance of the Summit, our embassies are holding roundtables with private sector and non-government stakeholders to explore new programs and partnerships that can continue long after the Washington event.

In the midst of these efforts, we cannot forget the critical role African women play as producers and agricultural traders – they must take part in this economic growth. We must ensure that African women are an equal part of Africa’s economic future and success.

**IMPROVING HEALTH, COMBATTING HIV/AIDS AND OTHER PANDEMICS**

Historically the United States has focused on public health in Africa. We are committed to not only continuing, but increasing, that focus. From HIV/AIDS to malaria, Africans endure and suffer a multitude of health pandemics that weaken
countries on many fronts. In addition, weak health systems mean that many Africans cannot easily access the care they need, due to transportation, stock outs of commodities, or the lack of trained health professionals, especially in rural areas. Women and children continue to become sick and die from easily preventable conditions. Desperately sick men and women cannot work and contribute to the economy, or provide for their families. They cannot serve in the armed forces or police and they cannot provide for the security of their countries.

The Obama Administration has pledged $63 billion over six years to meet public health challenges throughout the world under the Global Health Initiative, or GHI. GHI will have a particular focus on improving the health of women, newborns and children through programs including infectious disease, nutrition, maternal and child health, and safe water. Since GHI aims to maximize the sustainable health impact the United States achieves for every dollar invested, we will work in partnership with African governments and civil society, supporting their efforts to ensure that high-quality treatment, prevention, and care are accessible to communities throughout Africa. We will also engage in dialogue with partner countries, multilateral organizations, and other donors to ensure that there is a shared global response to global health needs.

Under the Initiative we will partner with Africans to invest in public health systems, including training more medical professionals and ensuring that there are good jobs in their own countries once they are trained. We will also support partner countries in focusing on maternal, neonatal, and pediatric health care, which are closely related to several Millennium Development Goals.

By linking our existing health programs, the Global Health Initiative will strengthen and leverage our existing disease-specific programs such as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), enabling us to respond in a coordinated way to the needs of African populations.

We are also working with governments on other projects that will improve the health of Africans. For example, we are working with the government of Malawi and civil society to support the distribution of supplies for point-of-use water disinfection, hygiene promotion and proper storage. We are also helping the government to spread the message on the need for good hygiene practices like hand washing with soap, protecting wells to improve water quality, and maintaining boreholes in communities to improve access to safe water.
PREVENTING AND RESOLVING CONFLICTS

The United States is committed to working with African states and the international communities to prevent, mitigate and resolve conflicts and disputes. Conflict destabilizes states and borders, stifles economic growth and investment, and robs young Africans of the opportunity for an education and a better life. Conflict can set back a nation for a generation. Throughout Africa, there has been a notable reduction in the number of conflicts over the past decade.

The brutal conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia are over, and Liberia transformed itself into a democracy through the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Africa’s first female head of state. These examples of what can be accomplished in a short period of time should make us proud and hopeful for solving the problems of seemingly intractable conflicts elsewhere. The United States provided $168 million to assist the military and police to strengthen the state’s capacity to secure its territory and promote the rule of law.

However, areas of turmoil and political unrest in countries such as Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger and Madagascar create both internal and regional instability. Furthermore, we must not forget the extreme harm inflicted by gender-based violence and the recruitment of child soldiers. The Obama administration is working to end these conflicts so that peace and economic progress can replace instability and uncertainty.

President Obama demonstrated his commitment to work with African leaders to help resolve these conflicts through the appointment of the Special Presidential Envoy for Sudan, General Scott Grorton, whose mandate is to ensure the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Special Advisor for the Great Lakes, former Congressman Howard Wolpe, is also working to address the root cause of conflict and to bring peace and stability to the Eastern Congo. Sustained U.S. diplomatic engagement in the Great Lakes already contributes to better relations between Rwanda and the DRC, a jump-start to security sector reform in the DRC, and greater stability in Burundi as it enters its second phase of elections. The Administration is also seeking to ameliorate the worst impacts of gender-based violence through USAID, State, and DoD programs to address prevention and treatment, the need to bring perpetrators to justice, and to support public advocacy efforts.

We will also continue our cooperation with regional leaders to look for ways to end Somalia’s protracted political and humanitarian crisis. We continue to call for well-meaning actors in the region to support the Djibouti Peace process of
inclusion and reconciliation, and to reject those extremists and their supporters that seek to exploit the suffering of the Somali people and impose an alien ideology of intolerance on the country.

Additionally, the United States is proactive in working with African leaders, civil society organizations, and the international community to prevent new conflicts. We are cooperating with African leaders to defuse possible disagreements before they become sources of open hostility.

The Bureau takes advantage of 1207 funding from the Department of Defense to further support peace-building requirements. In northern Uganda, USAID and 1207 funding are supporting Uganda in its post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction in the north of the country, which was previously the location of major human rights violations and humanitarian need because of the actions of the Lord’s Resistance Army.

We provide a full menu of programs to build African capacity to manage conflict, including support for the African Peace and Security Architecture. USAID provides funding for the ECOWAS early warning system. The United States also supports the Africa Standby Force at the continental (AU), subregional, and member states level with equipment, training and advisory support.

As we pursue these avenues of promoting stability and peace in Somalia, we are also shouldering the lion’s share of humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia. The United States consistently is the largest single country donor of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, providing more than $123 million in humanitarian assistance in 2009. In the past three years, the U.S. has been the lead contributor to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with over $185 million in training, logistics, and equipment. AMISOM successfully enabled the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to withstand the efforts by terrorist group al-Shabaab to take control of South Central Somalia.

We are also working to train African peacekeepers to take the lead in ensuring peace and security on their continent. The Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program is a State Department, Bureau of African Affairs program with the mission of enhancing the capacity of African partner nations to participate in multinational peacekeeping operations in Africa. ACOTA trains and equips African peacekeepers and enables African partner nations to be self-sufficient in the long term by training African peacekeeping trainers and helping to develop peacekeeping training facilities. ACOTA’s programs of instruction fully comply with United Nations standards. In
addition to soldier and staff peacekeeping tasks, the training includes HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention, human rights, and the prevention of gender-based violence, child exploitation, and trafficking-in-persons. ACOTA now has 25 African partner nations and since 2005 has trained more than 107,000 African peacekeepers of whom over 90 percent have deployed to United Nations and African Union peacekeeping operations. The objective of training 75,000 for peacekeeping in Africa was accomplished one year ahead of schedule and today African peacekeepers represent over 30 percent of global peacekeepers.

WORKING TO RESOLVE TRANSNATIONAL CHALLENGES

We also seek to deepen our cooperation with African states to address both old and new transnational challenges. The 21st century ushered in new transnational challenges for Africa and the world. Africa’s poverty puts it at a distinct disadvantage in dealing with major global and transnational problems such as climate change, narco-trafficking, trafficking-in-persons and arms, and the illegal exploitation of Africa’s minerals and maritime resources.

Meeting the climate and clean energy challenge is a top priority for the United States and the Obama Administration. Climate change affects the entire globe. Its potential impact on water supplies and food security can be disastrous. As President Obama said in Ghana, “while Africa gives off less greenhouse gasses than any other part of the world, it will be the most threatened by climate change.” Often those who contributed the least to the problem are the ones who are affected the most by it, and the United States is committed to working with Africans to find viable solutions to adapt to the severe consequences of climate change. We are making concerted efforts to persuade African countries to sign on to the Copenhagen Accord. Our Ambassadors have raised the issue at the highest levels with host governments. Additionally, Climate Envoy Todd Stern and I called in the African Diplomatic Corps to urge association with the Copenhagen Accord. These efforts resulted in more African associations with the accord.

Narco-trafficking is a major challenge for Africa and the world. If we do not address it, African countries will be vulnerable to the destabilizing force of narcotics trafficking in the years ahead. As Africa faces the impact of these new transnational problems, the United States will actively work with leaders and governments across the continent to confront all issues that are global in nature.

STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH ANGOLA, NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA
I would now like to turn to our new programs and initiatives, which work to implement our policies to move our partnership with Africa forward. We are establishing in-depth, high level dialogues with South Africa, Angola, Nigeria, and the African Union. We are increasing our cooperation with other countries interested in Africa such as Canada, the UK, France, China, Japan, and multilateral bodies such as the EU.

We also hope that increased funding for projects and programs in Africa, as requested in the 2011 budget, will be approved by Congress. With enhanced resources we can further strengthen our partnership with Africa.

**NEED FOR GREATER DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE**

Finally, one of my personal goals is to expand our diplomatic presence in Africa. I am working with the Administration and Congress to increase resources — both funding and people — at our embassies and consulates. I want more American diplomats living and working in Africa. An increased diplomatic presence is important for our mutual progress on all of these pressing issues. It is my sincere desire to open more consulates in Africa, which will enable us to reach citizens beyond the capital cities. We must be in Mombasa as well as Nairobi, we must be in Goma as well as Kinshasa, and must be in Kano as well as Abuja.

In furtherance of our goal to expand our reach on the continent, the Bureau of African Affairs is working with the Department to deploy 74 new “Diplomacy 3.0” entry-level Foreign Service positions to overseas posts in the coming months. Approximately 26 of these new officers will work on Democracy and Good Governance and 24 will focus on issues related to Economic Development. Many will cover Transnational Issue portfolios as well. The Bureau is also working, on a priority basis, to address the logistical, staffing, funding, and approval requirements to establish a facility in Kano, Nigeria, my top priority for expanding U.S. diplomatic presence in Africa.

At the same time, we are keeping pace with Africa’s technological developments to provide information about the United States via SMS text messaging and internet-enabled mobile technology. Our Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, for example, began a mobile messaging service that can handle up to 10,000 mobile phone subscribers, offering educational advising alerts, invitations to the latest U.S. Embassy cultural programming and updates for English instructors.

**AMERICAN CENTERS CAN PROVIDE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OUTREACH**
Mr. P AYNE. Thank you very much, Ambassador Carson. Mr. Gast.

STATEMENT OF MR. EARL GAST, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. GAST. Good afternoon, Chairman Payne, and Ranking Member Smith, and other members of the Subcommittee on African Affairs. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on USAID’s work in Africa today.

When I appeared before the subcommittee last April, I discussed positive trends on the road ahead for Africa. Unfortunately, some troubling political trends continue to have a negative impact on the continent’s development: The unsettled political landscape in Zimbabwe, increasing restrictions on political space in Ethiopia, evidence of democratic backsliding in Senegal.

In each of these settings, poor governance and political instability directly undermine the prospects for a better future for Africa’s children. By 2025, Africa’s population will exceed 1 billion persons, and the ability of each state to respond to its people’s needs will be tested like never before.

USAID is undertaking major programs to address Africa’s critical interlaced challenges of chronic health issues, persistent food insecurity, poverty, climate change, and weak governance. Each of these priorities is tightly linked to the others. Failure in one area will limit our progress in others. But by addressing these issues in an integrated manner, we hope to see an increasing number of democratic African countries with lower poverty rates that are on a sustainable path of growth and that are less dependent on foreign aid.

Despite the extraordinary progress we have made in addressing critical health threats in Africa, they persist, and at an unacceptable, alarming rate. That is why President Obama has reaffirmed our commitment to combat these threats with a $63 billion Global Health Initiative. As you and others have mentioned, Mr. Chairman, over the next 6 years, we aim to prevent 12 million new cases of HIV around the world, cut the numbers of tuberculosis cases in half, and prevent 3 million child deaths.
The Feed the Future Initiative is another new groundbreaking effort aimed at significantly and sustainably improving lives. Every day sees new challenges to meeting the world’s demand for food. Feed the Future will help us achieve a permanent solution to food insecurity, where every person in a society has access at all times to enough food for an active and healthy life. But because of Africa’s heavy dependence on natural resources and agriculture, food security is inextricably linked to climate change. By 2020, fluctuations in weather may halve the yield of rain-fed agriculture in some of Africa’s countries.

USAID’s approach to climate change in Africa includes integrating adaptation approaches into our bedrock development programs. We also plan to expand investments in prediction and analysis that identify vulnerabilities early enough in order to mitigate threats. We will then use this information to coordinate responses with other actors.

In each of these areas, good governance will be critical to making changes sustainable. Consistent with the President’s vision, USAID’s efforts at promoting better governance are an integral part of our development agenda. With 17 elections scheduled in 2010, we find ourselves with a uniquely far-reaching opportunity to support democratic transformation and sustainable development in Africa.

We know that Africa’s challenges extend beyond a given election and that elections are a mere snapshot of democratic trends. They are certainly not the whole story. But that is why we work to strengthen the rule of law, improve governance, support a dynamic civil society, and promote a free and independent media. These elements of democracy are just as important as the ballot box. Voices need to be heard, systems need to function, impartial justice needs to be dispensed, and human rights need to be protected every day and not just on Election Day. And this is the foundation for long-term democratic change.

In less than a month, the first multiparty election since 1986 will be held in Sudan. The process has been halting, and concerns are multiplying. But the elections are a requirement of the 2005 comprehensive peace agreement which ended Sudan’s long and bloody civil war. If we dismiss the importance of these elections out of a fear of an uncomfortable outcome, then we are letting down the people of Sudan and risking an ominous downward spiral.

If elections are not held, the crucial 2011 referenda on the future status of southern Sudan and Abyei would almost certainly be derailed as well. And should the referenda be significantly delayed or canceled, there is a very real possibility that Sudan would once again plunge into a devastating war. Our commitment to helping the Sudanese secure a peaceful and stable future for their country has never been more critical.

Amidst all of these events, it is easy to overlook the quite incremental successes also taking place. Consider the democratic transformation underway across southern Africa. During the past 18 months, Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia all experienced peaceful elections. Although these elections still face challenges, their steady democratic
progress stands in sharp contrast to the chaos and discord of neighboring Zimbabwe.

United States support for the process of democracy will be critical to creating and sustaining environments like this where it can grow and thrive. In concert with our simultaneous commitments in health, food security, and climate change, we are confident that we will soon see Africa begin to realize its full development potential.

Before I conclude, I would look to note that today is World Tuberculosis Day. Administrator Shah introduced our global tuberculosis strategy, which aims to expand treatment and control over the next 5 years. TB is curable, and our strategy pledges USAID’s continued commitment to ensure that people around the world have access to the care and treatment they need.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and other members of the subcommittee for your time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gast follows:]
Testimony by U.S. Agency for International Development
Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa Earl Gast
U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on African Affairs and Global Health
March 24, 2010

Good afternoon, Chairman Payne, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on U.S. development policy in Africa today.

When I appeared before this subcommittee last April, I discussed the road ahead for sub-Saharan Africa and how USAID is confronting challenges and promoting positive change. Unfortunately some troubling political trends continue to have a negative impact on the continent’s development: the undemocratic change of government in Madagascar, the unsettled political landscape in Zimbabwe; increasing restrictions on the political space in Ethiopia; and evidence of democratic backsliding in countries such as Senegal. Most recently, the efforts of Niger’s former president to consolidate power and remain in office past the end of his elected term led to his removal by the military, in what we hope will be a temporary setback for the consolidation of democracy in that country.

In each of these settings, poor governance and political instability directly undermine the prospects for a better future for Africa’s children. By 2025, the population of sub-Saharan Africa will exceed one billion people, more than half of whom will be under age 24, and the ability of each state to respond to its people’s needs will be tested like never before. With at least 17 elections scheduled in Africa in 2010, we find ourselves with a uniquely far-reaching opportunity to support democratic transformation and sustainable development.

USAID is undertaking major programs to address the continent’s critical, interlaced challenges of chronic health issues, persistent food insecurity, poverty, climate change, political instability, and weak governance. Each of these priorities is inextricably linked to the others; failure in one area will limit progress in all. But by addressing these issues in an integrated manner, we hope to see an increasing number of democratic African countries with lower poverty rates, on a sustainable path of growth, who are no longer dependent on foreign aid.

The story is not all bad. Many countries have made significant progress. Economic growth has become more rapid and more widespread since the mid-1990s. In 2001-08, around three-quarters of the population in sub-Saharan Africa lived in countries with at least moderate growth in per capita income. That performance is expected to improve over 2008-14 according to the most recent projections from the International Monetary Fund, with over 85 percent of Africans living in countries with at least moderate economic growth.

More rapid and widespread growth is delivering significant declines in poverty. In the 1990s, an estimated 58 percent of Africans lived below the poverty line. That fell to 51 percent in 2005 and is projected to fall further, to 38 percent in 2015 and 33 percent in 2020. This progress is
both very encouraging and very fragile. The key challenge is to maintain and build on these much improved trends.

The United States has already made extraordinary commitments to health crises such as HIV/AIDS, which have resulted in equally extraordinary progress. Ten years ago, few dreamed that we would be able to provide life-saving drugs to 2.4 million people, care for another 11 million affected by HIV/AIDS, and provide vital counseling and testing to a staggering 29 million people. We have done so, thanks to the courage and vision of the PEPFAR program. However, AIDS is still the leading cause of death among women aged 15-44, and three of every five Africans living with HIV are women. So President Obama has challenged us to again stretch our vision with the Global Health Initiative (GHI), a $63-billion program to improve health around the world. Over the next six years, we aim to do no less than prevent another 12 million new cases of HIV around the world, including in 35 African countries, and aver 54 million unintended pregnancies; to cut the number of tuberculosis cases in half and prevent three million child deaths; and to eliminate leprosy entirely. We will reduce the burden of malaria for 450 million people, representing 70 percent of the at-risk population in Africa, and expand our efforts to Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the same time, we will not only significantly improve Africa’s health, but we will also create more effective, efficient, sustainable systems that will provide services long after the initiative has ended. We are deliberately focusing on removing the barriers and constraints that huddle health systems by training health workers, improving health financing strategies, and ensuring equitable access to health services.

GHI’s nutrition programs will work in coordination with the Administration’s new Feed the Future Initiative, a groundbreaking effort aimed at significantly and sustainably reducing hunger and poverty in the developing world. Changing dietary habits, population growth, and environmental threats pose new challenges to meeting the world’s demand for food, and countries cannot grow economically when their citizens do not have enough food to eat. Feed the Future will help countries achieve a permanent solution to food insecurity, where every person in a society has access, at all times, to enough food for an active and healthy life. This solution requires sustained economic growth, stronger markets, and increased productivity in the agriculture sector. It involves taking steps to improve nutrition, and ensure that women and vulnerable groups participate in this growth and in agricultural development. It also requires a sustainable approach to protecting the natural resources upon which a large majority of the world’s poor depend for their livelihoods. Feed the Future integrates all of these needs into a comprehensive, country-led strategy to catalyze agricultural growth by raising the incomes of the poor, increasing the availability of food, and reducing under-nutrition, while supplementing our ongoing emergency programs that alleviate the immediate impacts of hunger. President Obama has pledged a minimum of $3.5 billion over three years to combating poverty and hunger through agricultural development and nutrition programs—which has in turn leveraged more than $18.5 billion in commitments from other donors. Just the U.S. portion of this effort has the potential to transform a staggering number of lives.

In Africa, Feed the Future builds on the supplemental resources that Congress provided to USAID in 2009 for the Global Food Security Response. With these resources USAID was able to increase funding for four West African countries and a regional program seven-fold, resulting
in significant increases rice yields in Nigeria and Liberia and increased sales of staple foods by smallholders in Ghana, Mali, and Senegal. This has laid an excellent foundation on which to build as the United States scales up its food security activities.

Because of Africa’s heavy dependence on natural resources and agriculture, food security is inextricably linked to climate change. By 2020, fluctuations in rainfall and an increase in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events may halve the yield of rain-fed agriculture in some African countries. Climate change could also have severe repercussions on public health, as the range and timing of vector-borne diseases, such as malaria, shifts.

USAID is focused on reducing emissions from energy use and landscapes. In many African countries, our climate change work will also emphasize adaptation. Africa is particularly vulnerable to climate change because of its dependence on natural resources and agriculture. This vulnerability is compounded by developmental challenges such as endemic poverty, weak governance, limited access to investment and capital, environmental degradation, and conflict.

Our approach includes integrating aspects of climate change adaptation into our bedrock programs in infrastructure, health, water, agriculture, conflict, education, and other sectors. We also plan to expand investments in climate science, hydrologic predictions and diffusion of information, and analysis that identifies vulnerabilities and evaluates adaptation strategies. We will then use this information to coordinate effective responses with all actors, from the affected communities to partner governments.

From climate change to food security to health, good governance will be critical to making these changes sustainable. For years we have concentrated our efforts on a few high-profile, post-conflict countries, such as Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. And while supporting stability in countries emerging from conflict will continue to be a priority, we must also begin to spend more energy and resources preventing fragile but functioning democratic systems from backsliding and addressing the festering governance challenges in countries like Guinea, Niger, and Madagascar. After years of improvement, the last two years have seen a striking increase in coups, conflict, and government oppression in Africa. In the coming years, we intend to work harder to help support and consolidate the democratic gains we’ve seen in some countries.

To do so, our missions in Africa need the flexibility to respond promptly to windows of opportunity or to mitigate the risk of backsliding. While U.S. assistance cannot determine the fate of a given country, the universities of Pittsburgh and Vanderbilt conducted a study in 2008 that clearly links our assistance to the overall democratic performance of recipient countries. Thus, our FY 2011 request reflects the need to fund democracy and governance activities to address more proactively the challenges to democratic consolidation we see in countries, such as Senegal, Mozambique, and Zambia, rather than waiting until their problems become full-blown crises.

We need to focus addressing on the long-term institutional and structural weaknesses that compromise the rule of law, erode the quality of governance, and make citizens subservient to their governments, rather than the other way around. Until these challenges are addressed, Africa will never live up to its vast development potential.
President Obama’s decision to visit Ghana on his first trip to Africa has caused some healthy soul-searching among countries that consider themselves to be more influential on the continent, but whose democratic progress is nowhere near what it should be. While in Ghana, President Obama said, “Development depends on good governance. That is the ingredient which has been missing in far too many places, for far too long. That’s the change that can unlock Africa’s potential.”

Consistent with the President’s vision, USAID’s efforts at promoting better governance are an integral part of our development agenda. Functioning, democratic states directly contribute to development gains and economic growth. This is particularly important in sub-Saharan Africa, where our democracy and governance programs will be critical to the effectiveness of our substantial investments in health, food security, and climate change.

At least 17 nationwide elections are scheduled in Africa this year alone. But Africa’s challenges extend beyond a given election, and elections alone do not make a democracy or even assure democratic transformation, they are a snapshot of democratic trends, not the whole story. That is why USAID also works to strengthen the rule of law, improve governance, support a dynamic civil society, and promote a free and independent media. These elements of democracy are just as important as the ballot box. Voices need to be heard, systems need to function, impartial justice needs to be dispensed, human rights need to be protected every day, not just on election day. This is the foundation for long-term democratic change.

In FY 2009, USAID programmed about $89 million for political competition and consensus building in Africa—a third of our budget for democracy and governance on the continent. Our goal is to support the creation of fair and credible election systems, not to determine electoral winners. We strive only for free, fair, and impartial political processes, not particular outcomes. We support the right of leaders to govern, but only if they win elections fair and square. Incumbents in several African countries, however, have no interest in receiving international assistance that aims to improve the quality and credibility of elections. Fear of losing power motivates them to manipulate laws, institutions, and processes to create a playing field so uneven that their opponents stand no chance of winning, even when a majority of citizens would support them. In these cases, USAID works closely with the State Department, other donors, local media, and civil society to exert pressure for reforms that will lead to more credible electoral outcomes.

We do so because we believe that leaders who manipulate elections are living on borrowed time. As African societies and political systems continue to develop, the expectations of people toward their governments continue to rise. Political processes that don’t meet these expectations can trigger instability and even violent conflict, which can set a country’s development progress back a generation. In these cases, USAID and its partners must consider the broader public interest as distinct from the narrow self-interest of particular political leaders.

In less than a month, the first multiparty elections since 1986 will be held in Sudan. The process has been halting. The date was postponed four times due to delays in administering the census, passing the electoral law, and other preliminary steps. Voter registration was not sufficiently
publicized and there were some allegations of fraud and intimidation. Concerns about the
credibility of the electoral process, and about citizens’ ability to freely express their will, are
multipling. But the elections are a requirement of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement,
which ended Sudan’s long and bloody civil war. If we dismiss the importance of these elections
out of fear of an uncomfortable outcome, then we are letting down the long-suffering people of
Sudan and risking an ominous downward spiral. If elections are not held, the crucial 2011
referenda on the future status of southern Sudan and Abyei would almost certainly be derailed as
well. Should the referendum be significantly delayed or cancelled, there is a very real possibility
that Sudan would once again plunge into a devastating war, from which it would be very difficult
to recover.

We are therefore working hard to ensure that these elections are the best they can be, with
assistance that focuses on civic and voter education, political party development, and election
administration and observation. We are also helping prepare for the 2011 referendum, in which
eligible voters will decide whether southern Sudan should remain part of Sudan or become an
independent nation, and in which voters in Abyei will decide whether to join southern Sudan or
remain part of northern Sudan.

Despite persistent efforts by those who benefit from the status quo, in much of Africa, we are
beginning to see real roots of change and democracy sprouting. Twenty years ago, the
organization Freedom House characterized only three African countries as free and 33 as not
free. Today, the number of free countries has risen to nine, while the number of not free
countries has dropped to 16. Amidst all the bad news, it is easy to overlook the quiet,
incremental successes also taking place. Consider the remarkable democratic transformation
underway across southern Africa. During the past 18 months alone, Angola, Botswana, Malawi,
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia have all experienced peaceful elections.
Although all these countries still face challenges over the long-term, such as the dominance of
the ruling party, their relatively steady democratic progress stands in sharp contrast to the chaos
and discord of neighboring Zimbabwe. According to the Afrobarometer public opinion surveys,
citizens of southern Africa have become gradually more accustomed to democracy and
increasingly less tolerant of alternatives, such as military rule.

Elections are only one step in a long process that is required for true democratic transformation.
Indeed, the United States’ sustained support for the process of democracy—from the halls of
government to the village household—will be critical to creating and sustaining an environment
where it can grow and thrive. In concert with our simultaneous commitments in health, food
security, and climate change, we are confident that we will soon see Africa begin to realize its
full development potential.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the Subcommittee for your
continued support for USAID and our programs.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. As you can see, we have a vote on, but I believe we will be able to do is to—I could perhaps start with a question or two, allow the ranking member to ask a question or so, and then we can recess. There will be about 15 minutes that we will be in recess because we will leave when there is no time left. And so we will be back in ample time. Those who have to leave—those who need more time can leave. You are excused.

Let me just as—and thank you both for this. And let me for a moment—I see a number of Ambassadors here. Our diplomatic corps of Ambassadors or Chargés, would you stand just to—we can acknowledge you.

[Applause]

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Mr. Ambassador, as I have indicated, with emerging elections coming in in Ethiopia, could you assess the human rights conditions, and what are your estimates of the political prisoners currently in jail now? And I wonder if you are familiar with Mrs. Birtukan’s situation, and where does that stand, and also Mr. Mudaskan.

Ambassador CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are watching ourselves with great interest the forthcoming elections in Ethiopia, and we are encouraging the Government of Ethiopia, as well as the opposition parties, to act responsibly during the election campaign and during the election itself. We do not want to see a repetition of the violence that followed the flawed elections of 2005, in which the opposition felt that it had not been treated fairly, protested after the elections, and a number of opposition leaders were killed in the streets of Addis-Ababa.

We think that it is incumbent upon the government to do everything that it possibly can to ensure that the playing field is level in the runup to the elections, that there be an opportunity for the opposition parties to participate prior to the elections in their campaigns, and that they be allowed—everyone be allowed to vote freely and fairly on Election Day. We certainly don’t want to see the violence that we saw 5 years ago.

We have had a number of conversations with the Ethiopian Government about various aspects of the election, and we continue to encourage the government to ensure that these elections are as free and fair as they possibly can be.

With respect to the human rights situation and the number of political prisoners, Ethiopia’s human rights record could indeed be far better than it is right now. There are a number of allegations that have been made that have been documented in the State Department’s human rights report that indicate shortcomings in the government’s treatment of individuals who come under their arrest. We encourage an improvement in those human rights situations, and we encourage that the government treat everyone in a humane fashion.

With respect to the exact number of political prisoners, I do not know. I can probably give you an estimate after I consult with the embassy. The issue of Mrs. Birtukan, we ourselves have asked the Ethiopian authorities about why she was rearrested after having been paroled, and whether in fact we can expect her release any time soon. I was in Ethiopia approximately 3 weeks ago. I met with Prime Minister Meles for over 1½ hours. Approximately 1 hour of
the discussion was devoted to issues related to democracy and governance and the need to have free and fair elections. I raised the case of Mrs. Birtukan, as well as a number of other individuals who were being held by the Ethiopian authorities. I encouraged the government to act in a responsible fashion in dealing with these cases, and noted very clearly that the continued imprisonment of people like Mrs. Birtukan undermine the credibility and the image of the Ethiopian Government.

We will continue to talk to the Ethiopian Government about issues related to democracy and governance and human rights as well. We think that these issues are important in our bilateral relationship.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I yield to the gentlemen, the ranking member.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your testimony and for your comprehensive statements, which were very, very good. I have half a dozen questions. I guess we are coming back after the vote. But let me just start off with what I left off with in my opening statement.

You know, when the Mexico City Policy, with all due respect to the Obama administration, was lifted, many of us said the unborn child in Africa is now at the greatest risk ever because the non-governmental organizations that will be funded see it as their mission to bring abortion on demand to those countries. And while you may not want to answer or respond, but, you know, I authored the Child Survival Fund amendment back in the early 1980s—I have been here 30 years—which provided oral rehydration therapy and vaccinations. We put $50 million in that fund because it was all about the child survival revolution, enfranchising, protecting, and putting our arms around every child, regardless of race, color, sex, or condition of dependency. And unborn children, obviously, are dependent, but they are no less human or alive than all of us in this room. Birth is an event that happens to each and every one of us.

And I do believe there are people in the room that disagree, people on the panel who disagree, but I do believe that abortion is violence against children. And the statistics clearly show it imposes serious harm upon women. Disability in many parts of Africa, as we all know, is a death sentence. I am working with a number of groups right now in both Kenya as well as Nigeria that are working on autism because so many of those children, once they manifest autism, are hurt severely. But disability, like I said, is often a death sentence for some of these children in the developing world.

We are going to see more disability, and it is absolutely predictable, because these foreign nongovernmental organizations, with a 50 percent increase in funding over the last 2 years alone, see it as their mission to promote abortion on demand in Africa. We should hold harmless those children. And I am pleading with you. I am asking you. Who we fund does matter. And let me just dispel one myth, and I know you know this to be true. Under the Mexico City Policy first announced by Ronald Reagan—that is how far back it goes—we were the largest donor of family planning funds in the world. EU—no one even came close, with the pro-life safeguards. So for those who want family planning, fine. But the line
of demarcation between prevention and the taking of that innocent child's human life is absolutely profound.

The Mexico City Policy, which has now been shredded by this administration, means that these NGOs that are pushing abortion on the continent of Africa have license and have huge U.S. taxpayer funding to do it. And I am full of sorrow over that fact. I don't know how to stop it. The administration has the ability to do what they did, but frankly, you know, babies will die, women will be wounded because of that. And I do hope somewhere, somehow, you will take another look at that at some point because those children are no less a child before birth than they are 5 years later. They are just more mature. So I ask you to consider that and look forward to coming back and asking you some questions.

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. Thank you. The time has been divided, and so all time is expired. We will recess for it would seem to me about 15 minutes. Thanks.

(Recess)

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. We will reconvene our hearing. And let me ask you, Ambassador Carson, last year, as we know, Eritrea has been having some problems. However, as you may know, I have had continued dialogue with the leadership, the President of Eritrea, and we get the impression that Eritrea is interested in trying to have some dialogue.

Now last year, I know you proposed to go to Eritrea—maybe in an effort to try to resolve some of the issues there—and there are some issues that we have raised with the President, some imprisoned persons, et cetera. However, we have always been able to have a dialogue and a discussion. I know that the Government of Eritrea has offered to send a delegation to Washington on a number of occasions, including a letter that was sent to the President last year, and I think you might have gotten a copy of it. And I understand that the Eritrean Government issued a visa for your deputy last week.

So I just wonder what kind of prospects do you feel there may be for the attempt to get some constructive dialogue with the Government of Eritrea. What is the policy of the Obama administration concerning the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea still unresolved? And as you know, there is now a border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti. In my conversation with the President there, he was indicating there seemed to be less interest in the Ethiopia-Eritrean problem but a lot of concern about the dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti. And I just wonder, has Eritrea been on the radar screen, and what is your assessment of prospects of some dialogue?

Ambassador CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question. The United States would like to have good relations with all states in Africa, including Eritrea. But I must confess that our relationship with Eritrea is very, very fragile and difficult at this moment. We have in the administration tried to reach out to that government in order to find a way to encourage it to play a much more productive role in the Horn of Africa, one of the most volatile regions on the continent.

Our efforts to do so over the last year have been met with resistance. Indeed, some 9 months ago, I sought to go out to Eritrea and
was never in fact given a visa. Secretary Clinton also attempted to reach out to the Eritrean Government at the highest level, and was also like myself rebuffed.

We have three sets of issues of concern with our relationship with Eritrea. One is a bilateral relationship that is difficult. We have had an Ambassador in Eritrea for now close to 2½ years. That Ambassador has not been allowed to present his credentials to the Eritrean Government. The Eritrean Government has obstructed the activities of our Ambassador, prevented him from making speeches, and participating in embassy related activities, and they have done the same thing to our personnel.

The Government of Eritrea has also interfered with the movement of our pouches through the airport, detaining them for weeks on end. And more than that, the Eritrean Government continues to detain several Eritrean nationals who worked at our embassy. These individuals have not been allowed to communicate with their families, with their lawyers, or with anyone else. And we do not know even today what their status is. We have insisted on more than one occasion that these individuals are innocent, local employees who were working at our embassy.

So we have bilateral concerns that go from the top to the bottom. But that is not the only set of problems we have. The second set of problems is Eritrea’s continued meddling inside of Somalia. We believe that the Eritrean Government has been one of the sources of assistance for El Shabab, which is fighting inside of Somalia against the transitional Federal Government. All of the other states in the region, including all of the EGAT states support the TFG, but it is in fact the Eritrean Government that has been the most obvious and clear supporter in the Horn of Africa of what in fact is an extremist Islamist group.

And then thirdly, we think that Eritrea has not played a constructive role in trying to resolve border conflicts, not only the longstanding decade-long conflict with Ethiopia, but also a border conflict that continues to persist with Djibouti. All three of these sets of concerns cast Eritrea in a negative light.

Indeed, you are right, my deputy has just received a visa to Eritrea, and last week the Eritrean desk officer at the State Department received a visa. But we know that one swallow in spring does not indicate that the winter is over. I think that the Eritrean Government can do a number of very, very concrete things in one of the three areas that I have mentioned that would indicate that they are serious about addressing some of the major concerns that are out there. The Eritrean Government must perform better, not only with respect to its citizens, but also with respect to its near neighbors, and also with respect to the global community.

Eritrea has one of the worst human rights records on the continent of Africa today. And the Government of Eritrea treats many of its citizens the way they treat our local employees, who have been in jail for more than half a decade without access to lawyers or visitation privileges from their families.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. And I couldn’t agree with you more that there are certainly a number of grievances. And we visited there, too, and tried to get some breakthroughs. However, one of the problems that I do confront is that we do have, it seems like,
are different policies. This is, of course, preceding—you have just been there for 6 or 8 months. But the same things will happen in Ethiopia, and we have had the closest relationship during the past 6 or 7 years with a government that puts people in prison, locks women up, beats people, has actually murdered a person in front of their spouse, and violated the border agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. But, you know, we have just continued to have no resolution at the General Assembly to sanction Ethiopia.

And so we have this balancing act that makes it difficult in some instances. You know, wrong is wrong, and all wrong should be righted, and we should have a policy against countries and people that do the wrong things. But it can’t be selective, and I think it just has got to be unilateral.

I am going to take 10 minutes because I am going to give my colleague 10 minutes. And so I have used seven of it. I went on at 5:30, so I will take just 3 more minutes to ask you a question. Well, the panel has to leave. That is the problem, and the second panel has to come. If it was up to us, we would be here until 9 o’clock tonight. But they have rights, too.

[Laughter]

Mr. PAYNE. They may have more rights than we have, from what I have been going through during the last couple of weeks, and that is domestic, so we won’t get into that.

In regard to Djibouti, our friends, there seems to have been a reduction, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, from development assistance to Djibouti, and they really have been some of our greatest supporters. And I just wonder if you could bring me up to date on that; and secondly, can either one of you, update me on assistance to the TFG. They are struggling. It seems if they could get the assistance that they needed, they could handle Al Shabab. And I just wonder if either one of you might want to handle that.

But, Mr. Gast, I will ask you about Djibouti and its assistance, development assistance. And even there is a question—I might as well throw it in—that South Sudan was also cut in an account as it deals with development. Now there could have been reshuffling or reintegrated funds, but what we saw looked as though there was not and increase but there was a reduction in development assistance for South Sudan as they try to prepare for the possibility of becoming a new nation.

Okay, I took 12 minutes. So we will have the responses, and then I will yield to my colleague.

Ambassador CARSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for those three questions, very good. And I did hear your commentary about Ethiopia, and would be willing at some point to talk in more detail about that. But let me just talk about Djibouti for a second. Djibouti indeed is a very close partner and friend of the United States, and we value that partnership and that friendship.

U.S. development assistance for Djibouti is approximately $11 million, and it probably represents something of a small decrease from where it has been in the past. But looking at the development assistance relationship between Djibouti and the United States gives a very false impression of the very large amount of assistance that the United States gives to Djibouti. As you are aware, we have an access agreement with the Government of Djibouti, and that ac-
cess agreement entitles Djibouti to receive $31 million every year from the department of Defense. And most of that money is earmarked for development assistance projects inside of Djibouti and also for infrastructure projects.

So looking at the $11 million doesn't tell the entire story. And looking at the $31 million doesn't tell the entire story as well because every time a U.S. Air Force plane lands at Djibouti, every time a U.S. Air Force plane overnights at Djibouti, the Government of Djibouti collects a substantial royalty or rental fee for those use of airport facilities.

So I think it is substantially greater than the $11 million, $11 million plus $31 million plus every time there is a flight in or out of there, and every time we have planes overnights on the ground. So it is substantially greater than that. And on a per capita basis, the number really sort of soars, and it is one of the highest recipients of U.S. assistance on a per capita basis if you figure both of those in.

My colleague may have another comment on that, on the Djibouti, but I can come back to the other two questions. Do you want——

Mr. GAST. So we are trying to divide up the work here. So let me just finish on Djibouti. And Ambassador Carson is absolutely right. If one were to look at the ratio of foreign assistance per capita, it is one of the highest rates in the world, actually.

But we have a very good relationship and partnership with the government. We are increasing the number of AID officers in Djibouti. And actually, if one were to look at the funding levels last year and compare it to 2010, there is actually a significant increase in funding of about 48 percent. So that demonstrates the strong commitment that we have to Djibouti.

Ambassador CARSON. Mr. Chairman, with respect to the TFG, the United States strongly supports the Djibouti process. It supports the TFG, and it supports AMASOM. The United States has been over the last 1 1/2 years the largest single contributor to the AMASOM presence in Somalia. We have contributed probably in excess of $150 million for that AMASOM presence.

We have also been a very strong supporter of the TFG. We have provided assistance, which we have reported both to the Congress and to the United Nations Sanctions Committee. We have provided assistance that has helped train their troops, provision their troops with non-lethal equipment, and to provide them with communications equipment. We do this in support of their effort to fight El Shabab extremists who are in Southern Somalia.

I think that it is wrong to say that if we only gave them just a bit more, that they would succeed. I think the ability of the TFG to absorb assistance is also a limiting factor. They have to go out and recruit troops in order to be trained. They have to be able to provide those troops with food, pay, and barracks once they go back. I think that we have given assistance up to the ability of the TFG to absorb it effectively and utilize it in a way that will help them.

In fact we give them too much, it leads to them perhaps using what they get inefficiently, selling of weapons, boots, shoes, and other things like that. We are giving them a fair amount. We will
continue to support them, as we have done over the last year. We want also to make it clear that what we are doing is in a supporting role, not a leading role. This effort is an African-led effort. This is something that has been endorsed by the regional body, EGAD, the East African community, endorsed by all of the states in the region, with the exception of Eritrea. It is endorsed by the AU. It is also endorsed by the Arab League.

South Sudan is more an economic question. I will let Earl speak to that if he wants to. I can as well. But it is more his——

Mr. GAST. Sure, absolutely. And let me just go back to our support to the TFG. The Ambassador mentioned our assistance on the security side. We also support them in building their capacity to deliver services, which are vitally important to the people, primarily right now in Mogadishu.

We have actually supported the Djibouti process through a large grant through UNDP, and UNDP has also contracted, if you will, to provide direct capacity support services to the TFG. What we have recognized is that we needed new instruments, additional instruments, to support the TFG. And in the last 6 months, we have initiated two new instruments supporting the TFG in carrying out services to people in Mogadishu, building capacity at the same time that people get services.

With regard to Southern Sudan, I think you are absolutely right in your assessment that it is a numbers game, if you will, because our commitment is still very strong to the South and to Sudan. There is a temporary, if you will, a 1-year bump-up in funding in 2009 to support the referenda processes that will soon get underway. But if you look at historical levels, they have actually increased slightly.

One of our objectives, U.S. Government objectives, working within the interagency, is to multilateralize the support to the South. We have been the principal provider of development assistance, and we are now trying to get more actors engaged and contribute more funding.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony again. And just let me ask—I am going to ask a series of questions, and then please as best you can answer those.

Given Eritrea’s support for El Shabab, a State Department-designated foreign terrorist organization, will the Secretary designate Eritrea as a state sponsor of terrorism? Secondly, I read recently, today, a letter that was sent out by CDC to all the ARV implementing partners, and it says in sum that the money, the expected funding, in 2011 and 2010, each partner should be expected to have a flat lined budget for ARV procurement and should not be exceeded. Then it goes on to talk about how monies will have to be gleaned from somewhere else other than the PEPFAR program.

Given the fact that there is a significant bump-up in the Global Health Initiative, ARVs have literally saved the lives of—in Uganda alone, the letter includes 100,000 HIV-infected Ugandans. It seems to me that putting a tourniquet on that will mean possible death for others who can’t get the ARVs. Is there an attempt to redirect funding to those programs so that these lifesaving chemicals and cocktails can be provided to these people? Please answer that.
Next, on Nigeria’s President Umaru Yar’Adua, have we raised the issue, especially the health crisis that he is facing? If you could answer that, and the jamming of Voice of America. As I said, I was late getting here because I am ranking member on the China Executive Committee. When I chaired the Human Rights Committee for this Congress for 8 years—as a matter of fact, I say parenthetically that Mr. Payne and I used to be the only two going late into the evening at those hearings—we had 27 hearings on China. And when Africa and Global Human Rights were combined, we had three hearings on the issue of what China is doing in terms of bad governance, jamming capabilities like VOA, as Ethiopia is doing now, sham elections, and the use of secret police to ensure that the despotic or authoritarian or dictatorial regime stays in power.

I think, Ambassador Carson, that you mentioned the democratic recession. I think it was you who said that. How much of that slide can be attributed to indigenous forces versus how much of that is being enabled and inspired by the bad influence of Beijing? We know when Chairman Payne held hearings on the genocide Olympics and the fact that Sudan has been so profoundly and negatively influenced by Beijing, but other countries too are catching the bad infection, if you will.

I know that when it comes to child limitation, there was an invite 2 years ago, and most of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa took the bait and went to the Beijing, and with the state family planning and the UNFPA hosting this conference, sold the false dogma that if you want economic prosperity you need to limit children, as if children are nothing but a drag rather than an addition to an economy.

I would note parenthetically that last week, the Economist carried—and I have been saying this for 30 years, 30 years, that because of forced abortion in China and the singling out of girls, that there would be a huge disparity over time. And there was the Economist, hardly a right-wing, conservative magazine—I read it every week, it has wonderful stories. It was entitled “Gendercide: The Missing 100 Million Girls.”

Now that model is being focused on and transported over to Africa. Paul Kagame, in his country, the President of Rwanda, came back from that conference and said, we need a three-child per couple policy if we want to imitate the PRC. Well, the PRC has such an aging problem now. Economically, they are about—you know, you could predict when their economic fall will take place because of this huge age disparity, not only missing girls, but also missing children.

Adding to that, they are becoming a Mecca, a magnet for human trafficking the likes of which we will never see again if it could ever be reversed. But what I am raising is that this bad governance model is being exported to Africa. And, you know, so if you could speak to that, you know, guns for oil would—high value minerals and materials, as I said before, sham elections. They are learning the bad rather than the good from real democracies like ourselves.

Finally, on the issue of peacekeepers and misdeeds, atrocities committed against the people they are there to protect, particularly sexual exploitation. I was in Goma in January 2008 and met with
the peacekeepers, and obviously also met with people living there. I went to several health facilities, but also met with the OIOS investigators, one of whom took me for a walk away from the facility and said, “If the OIOS investigators”—and he was the head of it—“leave here, the exploitation of children will be exacerbated, and will increase, because you will not have an independent monitoring body there on the ground.”

And I have raised this with the previous administration, and I raise it again with you because it has gone on unabated. The OIOS individuals have been redeployed to Nairobi. Only one is in Goma. And if I am a 13-year-old child who has just been abused by a peacekeeper, to whom do I go. You know, if this independent body is not there to help me and to help me bring an action against a peacekeeper, who has in this case raped or abused me in some other way. I think that is so fatally flawed. And he told me on our walk that this will mean impunity will reign. And so I ask you what you think of that, whether or not this administration—because I have raised it now half a dozen times—will do anything to try to change it.

Ambassador CARSON. Congressman Smith, you have raised a number of questions. I am going to give, if I can, rather quick answers to all of them. I would be glad to provide fuller explanations if required. Some of these—there are a couple of these that probably my colleague may want to answer with respect to the healthcare questions.

The first question about El Shabab receiving support from Eritrea and whether Eritrea should in fact be a state sponsor of terrorism, and whether we are contemplating that. There is no doubt that El Shabab is a terrorist organization. There is no doubt that Eritrea has supported the elements of El Shabab. There is no contemplation or thinking at this moment of labeling Eritrea a state sponsor of terrorism.

Your third question was about the lawyer, Mr. Birtukan. I mentioned earlier that when I was in Ethiopia approximately 3 weeks ago, I went with Prime Minister Meles. I raised the issue of Mrs. Birtukan. One of my deputies was in Ethiopia last week. The issue was raised again. This is something that is clearly on our radar screen. As I said, this continuation of this issue gives Ethiopia a bad image. We will continue to engage and discuss with Ethiopia about issues of democracy and human rights, as we should, as we do with many countries across the continent.

Your fourth question was on the jamming of VOA by the Ethiopian Government. That has two things, and I want to be very clear about it. It is deeply unfortunate that the Ethiopian Government has chosen to jam VOA signals. As we all know, there are only two or three countries in the world that actively announce that they are jamming our signals. One of those is North Korea, the other is Iran. We accept the fact that the Ethiopian Government has disagreements with the Amharic service of the VOA. Ethiopian officials have mentioned this to me on several occasions, and we have discussed this with Voice of America because the last thing we want to do is to have a station letting out information which is false or inaccurate. So it has been raised, and it is a concern. But we still are very distressed about their decision to jam VOA.
But what distresses me even more is the second part of the statement that was made, a comparison of VOA to Radio Mille Collines. In deed, Radio Mille Collines was the voice of the AMASASU, the hammer of the Rwandan Government back in 1994 that resulted in the genocide of nearly 900,000 Rwandans. To compare VOA with Radio Mille Collines is extraordinarily distressing, extraordinarily distressing. It is something that is not acceptable. This is not a comparison that should ever be made. VOA has never done anything similar to Radio Mille Collines.

So there is a concern that we have. We raise it very clearly. We have said it very clear. It is that second part that is really very, very troubling to all of those who sell that statement and who read it.

China and good governance in Africa. I am going to say that Africa has indeed made very, very good strides in the field of democratization, especially since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, we have seen tremendous strides in democratization across the continent. There is no doubt that much work remains to be done in this area. I do not believe that the politics, the domestic politics of Africa, are being influenced at this point by China.

I think that China no doubt is an aggressive economic player on the continent. But there were military coups and bad governments in Africa prior to the reengagement of China in Africa a decade ago. I think that there are enough people in Africa doing both right and wrong, and they don't need outside influences to steer them in either direction.

The last question you raised about U.N. peacekeepers and the OIOS investigators. I think that without speaking for them, the last two secretary-general special representatives in the Congo have been seized with the issue of U.N. peacekeepers sexually violating minors and others. I know that it was a concern for Ambassador Bill Swing when he was the special representative. It is a concern of Alan Doss, who is the current special representative out there.

We continue to press the U.N. aggressively to act against any U.N. peacekeepers, any U.N. peacekeeping units that are engaged in sexual exploitation of children. As the chairman pointed out last August, he was with the Secretary, I was with the Secretary when we went to Goma. This continues to be an issue of concern to us. I think that the numbers are down. I will go back and look and see what we have on record, but I think the numbers are down because we have made it an issue with Alan Doss. We have made it an issue with General Gaye, who is the force commander out there.

This is something that is unacceptable by U.N. peacekeepers, and should be unacceptable on the behalf of the Congolese military as well.

Mr. SMITH, Ambassador, would you yield on that point very briefly? The problem that I have is that without OIOS people there, we may not know if it is down or up or at ebb tide. Why would a young person necessarily feel any freedom to go to army personnel—I mean, the army is doing terrible things. I mean, there are a lot of bad actors here, and certainly the peacekeepers have done more than their fair share of these exploitations.
So, you know, by redeploying them out—and again, I got my insight while there, but especially by talking to the OIOS people themselves who said, “Please, don't let us be redeployed.”

Ambassador CARSON. If I could, Congressman Smith, say that one of the things that we have been doing very, very intensely is informing people working with NGOs in the region, Congolese NGOs, international NGOs, international organizations that are out there, working with Congolese women’s groups, working with citizens there, explaining their rights, encouraging them to let authorities know when these attacks are taking place, when these sexual assaults are taking place, to report them and to report them to a variety of people who can take action.

It is one of the major campaigns that we have underway, is to increase the level of awareness, education, increase the cadre of individuals capable of prosecuting, helping to train more Congolese women police officers and soldiers so that women and young kids who are sexually exploited will in fact have someone that they know they can go to and trust and identify perpetrators of these kinds of offenses.

We recognize the problem. We think it is an enormously serious one, and we are trying to take steps to do as much as we can to reign it in.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Real brief, ARTs.

Mr. PAYNE. Oh, yes, ARTs.

Mr. GAST. ARTs. Congressman Smith, I haven't seen the letter from CDC, so I am not aware if they sent out a directive, if you will, to some of their partners asking them to straight line the budget for ARV procurement. It could, however. I know it is a major push of the new administration to make the procurement of ARVs much more efficient, and therefore putting more people on ARVs by reducing the cost of treatment.

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. Thank you very much. Mr. Meeks.

Mr. SMITH. Get back to us, please.

Mr. MECKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you, Mr. Gast and Mr. Ambassador. I recently have come and visited about eight countries in 14 days over the period of 6 months, and one of the things in looking at these countries and others that I would like to focus on is development of Africa and the various countries.

It seems as though, as I spoke to a number of heads of states, they are concerned about their development, their capacity building so their people can have jobs and creating an economy. And, you know, I was participating in that along with some of the other things that I think that have been talked about, but they often have said that when you look at what the United States, and they are very thankful, especially in aid that we give with reference to HIV and other areas. But they don't see as much participation or the additional participation in regards to the overall economic development, the growth of businesses, the growth of making sure we maximize, for example, AGOA and going to AGOA II, so that they can feel a difference and they can begin to move forward with their folks in a much more progressive way.

One gave the example, you know, we are a nation of just, you know, a couple of—10, 20, 25 years old, and ask where was the
United States when it was 10, 25 years old, and, you know, they need some room to grow. Not talking about those countries because we did see some, and we tried to make sure we went to some—those that were good as far as democracies are concerned and some that were bad. But I want to focus on those that are trying to make those leaps positive.

In that regard, I want to focus two of my questions around—because I believe a lot in the regional aspects of it, but two things that are going on, and ask—one is in South Africa. And as you know, South Africa is one of the few countries on the continent of Africa to rank as an upper middle income country. And to me, that is a remarkable status, given the fact that it was just over 15 years ago that the South African majority gained its independence, which is what I am talking about, a relatively new democracy, from white minority rule under apartheid. And I believe that we should support the Republic of South Africa’s efforts to grow, and in so doing continue its role as a regional power and actively promote regional peace and stability.

But there has been much discussion lately about a potential $3.5 World Bank loan to ESCOM for the so-called super critical coal-fired power plant in South Africa, including also some $750 million for wind and solar power investments. I am concerned that in the discussion the significant development impacts the impending energy crisis in South Africa’s role as an economic engine of the entire region has been and/or can be lost.

It is also worth noting that this would be the first super critical coal plant on the continent using far cleaner technology than many plants in operation in the United States, and even cleaner than some plants currently that are under development in the United States. So I was wondering, could you speak to this and whether the United States will support this project in South Africa, which is critically needed for them as far as energy is concerned, et cetera. That is in South Africa.

The other question then would be dealing with Nigeria. You know, and I thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for the time that you spent with in discussing the development issues in Nigeria in particular. But given what has currently taken place in Nigeria with the risk that key governance reforms could move backwards given that there is a transition or seems to be a transition in the government right now, could you tell me your feelings of what is taking place in Nigeria? Does it look like it will be a smooth transition? I know that recently all the cabinet members were shaken up, and so I would like to have that.

And the last country that I wanted to have a brief discussion about is—I think I have some of the answers because I was talking to the distinguished chair, who is the most knowledgeable man that I know on the continent and about the continent, and that is dealing with Senegal. And I know that the President has—you know, there has not been, for example, any military coups or anything of that nature in Senegal. And I see there is a lot of investors that are still interested in investing there. And then yet you hear some concern because I guess the President is going to run for reelection, and he is 83 years old. Could you just give me your feelings on where we are with reference to Senegal? Because I think
they are important also being that they have not had any military coups and have been an example of which individuals we are looking at.

Mr. Gast. You make some very excellent points, Congressman. And if you don’t mind, what I would like to do is focus on your questions concerning development, economic development, in Africa. The administration is putting as its top priority, one of its top priorities, the integrated development, an integrated development approach to Africa to reduce imbalances in funding and also imbalances in approach.

As Ambassador Carson mentioned in his opening statement, approximately 70 percent of families in Africa are dependent on agriculture in one way or another. With the food security initiative and also with our general increase in economic development resources, we are doubling the amount of resources from 2009 to 2010 in economic development. And that will allow us to do some of the things that we had done in the past that proved to be successful. And that includes working with governments to create a pro-business environment, the regulatory environment, the policies and laws.

It is to create demand for reforms among civil society as well as private sector organizations. That will go hand in hand with the support that we are going to be providing on increasing agricultural markets, both in-country as well as on a regional basis, as well as the support that we will be providing in agriculture on increasing production.

So I think that is something that this administration should be very proud of, and I think we will be seeing some very positive results. And I would say that with the exception of last year, there has been sustained economic growth of about $1.5 to 6 percent on the continent, and this is something that we can build on.

Moving on to South Africa, you mentioned the $3.5 billion coal fired plant that the government is proposing. I think it would add some 3,400 megawatts to the grid. There is a power shortage there. However, at this point, I don’t know what the position is of the U.S. Government with regard to voting at the World Bank board.

Mr. MEEKS. Could you check and maybe get back to us just to let us know?

Mr. Gast. Sure.

Mr. MEEKS. Just so that you know, I will be sending a letter, and I was trying to get several members to sign on and sending it to the administration strongly supporting it.

Ambassador Carson. Congressman Meeks, let me come in on the issue of the coal-fired plant, which has indeed attracted a great deal of attention. And as my colleague, Mr. Gast, has pointed out, this plant would in fact provide a huge input into the South African grid. The position of the U.S. Government as respect to how we are going to vote on that issue has not been determined yet, and it is a matter of internal discussion as we sit here. We certainly will talk to our colleagues at State who deal with financial issues, business issues, and also with our colleagues at Treasury. And once a decision has been made, we will certainly share that decision with you and communicate it.

You also asked two other questions about Nigeria and about Senegal. In short, there has been a great deal of political uncertainty
in Nigeria since the middle of November, when President Yar’Adua became ill and had to leave the country for medical attention in Saudi Arabia. Approximately 3 weeks ago, President Yar’Adua came back to Nigeria. But certainly over the last 120 days, President Yar’Adua has not been seen in public and has not been seen by many of the seniors members of his government. Probably his wife and only a very small number of people other than his doctors and caretakers, caregivers have seen him.

This produced a great deal of uncertainty about the leadership of the country. The Senate and the House of Representatives in Nigeria took steps to elevate the Vice President, Goodluck Jonathan, to the position of acting President, where he has attempted over the last 30 days to bring a level of stability and leadership to Nigeria that has been missing as a result of the unfortunate of the President.

Last week, he dismissed the cabinet of the country, some 41 individuals. We hear that within the next 24 to 48 hours that a new cabinet will be nominated for approval by the Nigerian senate. We expect that approximately half of the previous members of the cabinet will be reappointed, some of them to different positions. New members will also be added to the cabinet.

Nigeria will continue to go through a period of uncertainty as long as the President of the country remains ill, and probably up until some time next year, May 2011, when the next Presidential elections are scheduled to be held in that country. We think that Acting President Goodluck Jonathan was elevated to his current position with unanimous agreement of both the Nigerian lower and upper house, as well as the unanimous support of all of the country’s 36 elected governors.

As I say, the country will continue to experience some political uncertainty as a result of the President’s absence and illness, but we hope that Nigeria will build on the 10 years of democracy that we have seen there. It is important, as I said in my testimony, that Nigeria reform and improve its electoral laws in order to be able to hold elections that people are confident in. It is important that the government continue to move in the fight against corruption in that country. It is important that they deal with the sectarian violence that has occurred in Jos, and clearly it is important that they continue the program of amnesty and reconciliation in the Niger Delta.

These are all critical issues for a country that is absolutely critical, most of all to its citizens, but to the region and to the global community. Nigeria, along with South Africa, are the two most important countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It is an extraordinarily important country. We need to give it full attention 24 hours a day.

Senegal—a quick question. President Wade was here in town on Monday and Tuesday. Senegal has been America’s strongest francophone-speaking partner in Africa, not just last week or last year, but since its independence some 50 years ago. We want and encourage Senegal’s leaders, including President Wade, to build on the democracy and the democratic institutions that exist in the country today. We do not want it to move backwards. It is important that all of those impositions of power in Senegal continue to strengthen and build and carry on that democratic legacy.
Too many countries in West Africa are both fragile and weak, and have been subject to military interventions or to extra civilian usurpation of power. It is important that Senegal continues to move forward. So as I say, it is a strong partner. Last year, President Wade was at the State Department with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The U.S. Government provided some $540 million in one of the largest MCC grants that we have given in support of that country.

It is our hope that Senegal will continue to be a beacon of democracy and will continue to move forward on its economic growth. But that is dependent upon the continued good leadership which is required for that, that continued good leadership.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. And will now hear from Mr. Royce. But I want to also say that I have met with the South African delegation regarding the coal plant, and they assured me it will be the latest technology. They also have renewable energy that is a part of the loan—and I concur that I believe that it is necessary to move forward. You know, we are trying to keep the environment clean, but actually Africa has done the least to dirty the environment, and they are really hit the hardest, not that we want to see any increase. However, I think that should certainly be kept in mind, and I have also mentioned it to some of our leadership, that I think we should support the U.S. to have a position in support of the loan. Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador, it has been good working with you over the years. I have maybe three items I would like to bring up and get your input on. One is going to be Joseph Kony. The second is going to be some more specifics or concerns that I have about Senegal. And the last is commercial diplomacy.

But first, let me say, we had a hearing in December with Special Envoy Gration for this subcommittee, and I asked him about the links between Joseph Kony’s LRA and the Sudanese regime. At that time, there were reports of an LRA commander who had surrendered, and he told of the LRA’s efforts to link with Sudanese armed forces. General Gration denied that there were links.

Earlier this month, based on on-the-ground information, a report by an NGO, which is John Prendergast’s Enough Project—it is a pretty reliable organization. They reported that a contingent of the Lord’s Resistance Army had taken refuge in areas of south Darfur controlled by the regime in Khartoum. We know from the past that Kony had gotten ammunition. He had sent his soldiers north when they were wounded to be treated by the Sudanese. And, of course, both Kony and Bashir are both wanted war criminals. What is your assessment there?

Ambassador CARSON. Congressman Royce, thank you very much. With respect to Joseph Kony, there is no doubt that earlier—and I mean much earlier than now—there were very credible reports of Sudanese support for the LRA. But over the last 2 years, we have not seen, I have not seen, credible reports indicating a linkage between the LRA and the Sudanese Government.

What we have heard and seen are things that are very, very fragmentary and circumstantial. As near as we can tell, the LRA over the last 18 months has been significantly degraded as a fight-
ing organization. Many of its top commanders have been captured or killed, and the larger organization that comprised the LRA has been fragmented into very, very small groups. Those groups have moved from the Garamba force in the northern part of the Congo up into the Central African Republic and have occasionally been inside of South Sudan. And it is my impression that today the fragmentary elements of the LRA are in the Central African Republic.

We do have reporting from our embassy in Bangui based on credible missionary sources of the most recent LRA attacks, and those are in the Central African Republic, and not in the Darfur region.

Now I will go back and look and take a look very closely. I know John Prendergast. I have an enormous amount of respect for him as an individual and a professional, and we read the Enough Project material. But I cannot substantiate it. As I say, my system has him in the CAR and not in the Darfur region. I have to say that Kony has been as elusive to the Ugandan military as Osama bin Laden has been to allied operations in the Afghan-Pakistan area. Very, very difficult terrain that he is operating in, very difficult to go after him. The Ugandans have made a real effort, but it has been pretty difficult.

Mr. Royce. Well, John, the concern I have, though, when we go into Darfur and Sudan, the guy that is on the ground to show you around is John Prendergast. And his organization, the Enough Project, really seems to have a handle on a lot of information. I met with him this morning on some other issues regarding Kony and some of these challenges with Darfur. But I think if they file a report that there is a contingent of the LRA that has taken refuge there in an area controlled by the regime, let us make sure that Sudan doesn’t give this organization room to breathe, because in the past it has. And so this is one thing I really think that sometimes the guy on the ground who lives and breathes this, you know, has access to information that we may not have.

And I would also like to discuss the Millennium Challenge Corporation. You mentioned Senegal and the $0.5 billion that it received. It was a lot of money, and there are problems with Senegal, as you have pointed out. People don’t talk about it the way they once did. It used to be that we would look at this as an impressive African model. And I think now we have seen a Presidential payment to an IMF official, North Korean-built statue that the President has a personal financial interest in, and, of course, concerns about corruption throughout the government.

There is also a commercial dispute involving a United States telecommunications investment there, I guess. So the MCC acknowledges that there are many red flags, but, you know, as far as I can tell, the MCC hasn’t come to you and asked that you weigh in on its concerns about Senegal’s drift away from transparency or issues like its involvement with the North Korean regime. And I wish the MCC would be more proactive on that. But I was going to ask you if you could look into some of the issues, Ambassador Carson. I know the Secretary chaired an MCC board meeting this morning. Given the red flags on Senegal, was that on the agenda? Did that come up, and can we do more on that front?

Ambassador Carson. Congressman Royce, I am not sure whether the Secretary chaired the board meeting or not, or whether in fact
there was a board meeting today. And as far as I am aware, if Senegal was on the agenda, I am not aware of it. But I will find out whether the Secretary was there, whether it was on the agenda, and what the discussion was, and come back to you on that.

Mr. Royce. Thank you, Ambassador Carson. Let me just finish with my last question, if I could, and that is on commercial diplomacy. We have had several conversations about this in the past. Our posts simply must get more engaged in helping U.S. businesses that get entrapped by local corruption and other government snafus. I mentioned Senegal and there are growing concerns about Ghana, which is another MCC country. And the concern I have is that a model sort of develops here that, rather than helps with the long-term development of Africa, undercuts it. What are we doing to give our Ambassadors the tools, and frankly the incentive, to fight for fair treatment, as if those Ambassadors of ours had something on the line, had something at stake in this effort to try to make progress on this corruption front?

Ambassador Carson. Corruption is a problem in many parts of the world, and it is a special problem in many parts of Africa. The tools that we employ are well-known and universal. If American companies are seen to be engaged in corrupt practices overseas, we use the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to prosecute them in the United States. Equally, when we see that American companies are the victims of corrupt practices overseas, our Ambassadors and our senior officers, our commercial officers, are requested and required to go out and serve as advocates for them to ensure that they get a fair hearing and that their cases are dealt with in an equitable fashion.

But we also have another tool at our disposal as well, and we can in fact impose visa sanctions on individuals from foreign countries, including in Africa, who are engaged in systematic corrupt practices that we are aware of and have sufficient evidence to ensure that we are identifying the right individuals. And we have in fact prevented individuals who have been engaged in corruption in Africa from receiving U.S. visas, not only the individuals, but their spouses and their children as well. So there are instruments. We do use them. And we actually use them quite a bit more than is seen in the general public.

Mr. Royce. I appreciate that it is not just some officials in Africa. It is China in a big way, too, in Africa, and now with this Senegal example, North Korea has developed a relationship with a financial interest for the President of Senegal. It is a complicated problem, but we want to make sure our State Department officials on the ground have the resources they need. And again, Ambassador Carson, thank you for your great work for this country, and hopefully your continued work to help the developing world. Thank you very much.

Mr. Payne. Well, I had to tell—the ranking member wanted to have another round. I said we will have to allow the first panel to leave. But you can see the tremendous amount of interest that we have. There are dozens of more questions I certainly would have liked to have asked, as well as the rest of the team. But let me thank you for your patience and for the wealth of information that you have given us. We look forward to working closely with you.
We can see there is a tremendous amount of interest from the turnout that we had here, and people still being here. And so we will stay in communication, and if we have some additional questions, we will have 5 days to get them to you. Thank you all very much for appearing.

We will now have our second panel. We will ask that Ambassador Princeton Lyman, Mr. Almami Cyllah, Witney Schneidman, and Gregory Simpkins come forward. I am going to start reading your bios right now.

Mr. PAYNE. We will now have our second panel. Our second panel will consist of four persons. I will read their background information. Many of you are no strangers to us. Actually, none of you are strangers to us. But we will start with Ambassador Lyman, who is an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and currently adjunct professor at Georgetown University. During his time at the Council on Foreign Relations, he served as the Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow and Director of Africa Policy Studies.

Ambassador Lyman has an extensive career in diplomacy, which includes two ambassadorships in Nigeria and South Africa and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and the Director of the Department of State’s refugee program. Ambassador Lyman has published work in the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, and in 2002, he released his book, Partner to History: The U.S. Role in South Africa’s Transition to Democracy. He holds a doctorate of philosophy and political science from Harvard University, and he has been the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria and South Africa, as I already mentioned.

Second, we have Mr. Almami Cyllah. Mr. Cyllah is currently the regional director for Africa at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). Mr. Cyllah has worked with IFES for the past 9 years serving as country director for both Haiti from 2001 to 2005, and Liberia from 2006 to 2009. Before joining IFES, Mr. Cyllah served as country director for Haiti and Kenya at the National Democratic Institute, where he directed USAID funded programs with civil and governmental entities, served as African Affairs Director at the American International USA in Washington, DC, and has participated in election monitoring specifically as an election commission for national electoral commission in Sierra Leone.

In 1980, Mr. Cyllah received his bachelor of arts in international affairs and politics from Catholic University of America. He has also published several articles in the Africa Report, the Washington Post, and Christian Science Monitor.

Following Mr. Cyllah, we will hear from Dr. Witney Schneidman, president of Schneidman and Associates International. Dr. Schneidman has worked with previous administrations. Most recently, he served as co-chair of the Africa Experts Group on the foreign policy advisory team, and a member of the Presidential transitional team for President Obama’s 2008 campaign. During the Clinton administration, Dr. Schneidman served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, where he managed economic and commercial issues in sub-Saharan Africa.
Dr. Schneidman is the author of Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire and A Ten-Year Strategy for Increasing Capital Flows to Africa: A Joint Effort by the Corporate Council on Africa, and issued the commission on capital flow to Africa.

Dr. Schneidman holds a doctorate of philosophy and international relations from the University of Southern California, and has commented extensively on relevant issues on CBS News, CNN, and BBC.

Finally, we have our own Gregory Simpkins, who is, as you know, Vice President in Policy and Program Development at the Leon Sullivan Foundation. Mr. Simpkins had been involved in democratization trade and capacity building programs since 1992, and he began work on foreign advocacy projects in 1987. He has extensive experience in election monitoring and training in sub-Saharan Africa, including the elections process in Kenya, South Africa, and Guinea. Mr. Simpkins has worked with the U.S. House of Representatives, serving as a professional staff member for the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations under then Chairman Smith from 2005 to 2006, and in 1997 and 1998, for the Subcommittee on Africa. He has testified in both congressional chambers on trade preference reform and human rights in Africa.

Mr. Simpkins was also instrumental in establishing a number of advocacy networks, including the Africa Democracy network and the U.S. Civil Society Coalition for African Trade and Investment. Mr. Simpkins maintains “Africa Rising 2010,” a blog exploring current African issues.

Thank you very much, gentlemen, and we will start with Ambassador Lyman.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PRINCETON N. LYMAN, ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW FOR AFRICA POLICY STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH AFRICA AND NIGERIA)

Ambassador Lyman. Thank you for this hearing and the opportunity to testify. Let me start with just a few remarks on overall policy. We have heard a lot of that discussion. But as you can tell from the discussion, this administration, the Obama administration, has been very proactive in its policy in Africa. In addition to the things that have been mentioned, I would say that was demonstrated by strong and very timely statements on Nigeria during this recent crisis by the Secretary and coordinated with our European allies; also the denial of visas to people in Kenya suspected of corruption; the appointment of the presidential envoy for Sudan and a State Department envoy for the Great Lakes; and the decision by the Secretary to establish binational commissions with Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa. These are all commendable steps. And as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gast talked about two new initiatives in development, food security and global health.

President Obama further set the tone of his administration on his trip to Ghana that this administration would emphasize good governance and democracy in its relations with Africa, and Secretary of State Clinton reiterated that in her trip across the con-
tinent. Nevertheless, the administration faces several serious obstacles in carrying out these objectives. The civil war in Somalia, which you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, which links to worldwide terrorist concerns, drags on, and without any easy solution, and too few alternative strategies being developed.

The peace process in Sudan is fragile, and the slow process of staffing in USAID has prevented the administration from moving very far or very fast on these two new development initiatives. The low level of staffing in the Africa Bureau, which Ambassador Carson is trying to redress, is going to make it too difficult to staff those three new binational commissions because they take a lot of work and a lot of time, and they are very important.

And finally, I would mention the increased threat of drug trafficking through Africa and an alarming linkage of drug trafficking, terrorist groups, traditional smugglers, and the corruption that goes with that, which is a very dangerous phenomena in West Africa, not only for Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, but Ghana, Senegal and other countries.

But perhaps less well understood is that even as U.S. assistance to Africa has tripled over the past decade, our leverage from that assistance has diminished. By that, I mean that the largest share of our assistance to Africa, now 80 percent of it, is in life-saving programs, HIV/AIDS, child survival, emergency food. These are very commendable programs, and we can be proud of them. But these are not the kind of aid that you can turn off or cut back on, even when recipient countries flout principles of democracy or human rights. And I think we are going to see this dilemma as we face those issues in Ethiopia, Uganda, Nigeria, and elsewhere.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would emphasize the need for a more comprehensive trade policy in Africa. In brief, despite AGOA, aid for trade, and related U.S. support for Africa’s trade capacity, African countries side with China, India, and Brazil in the DOHA trade negotiations against the position of the United States. Meanwhile, the European Union undermines the promising development of Africa’s regional economic commissions and hurts U.S. trading opportunities with its proposed Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). There has been no effective response from the U.S. We could discuss that more.

Let me comment very briefly on the country situations that you asked me to comment on. South Africa. The administration is making very good progress on improving what had been a strained relationship with South Africa under former President Thabo Mbeki. President Zuma has reversed the positions that he took and that Mbeki took on AIDS, which is a big step forward.

However, there is concern in South Africa over a drift in economic policy, over the President’s refusal there to abide by requirements for reporting his financial holdings, and holding other officials to similar account, and worries over the erosion of independence of the national prosecutor and the judiciary.

On the positive side, just last week, President Zuma spent 3 days in Zimbabwe, high-level, in intensive negotiations, which have resolved some of the issues in that country’s government of unity.

On Nigeria, very quickly, you know the crisis, and we have talked about it. But let me just say that beyond the crisis, there
are underlying problems in Nigeria. And perhaps the biggest danger in Nigeria is the danger of becoming irrelevant in all of the areas that we think Nigeria is important. For example, Nigeria is well-regarded as a major oil producer, but failing to develop and resolve key policies in oil and gas arrangements could prevent the investment that Nigeria needs to double its output, while at the same time, other countries, Ghana, Uganda, Brazil, others are increasing their production. Nigeria could become just another producer, not one of the major ones.

Perhaps more serious, failure to develop its own infrastructure, power supplies, railroads, et cetera, means that factories are closing, people are becoming unemployed. There is a serious problem in the elite commitment to the serious problems that Nigeria faces. Now the binational commission offers us an opportunity, but I hope we go beyond just our laundry list of things we want. Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson has certainly referred to them, e.g., electoral reform. But I hope we go into the commission with some positive proposals on public-private partnerships to help develop the infrastructure and mobilize the capital, using the Food Security Initiative to revive Nigerian agriculture, and that we go on through public diplomacy, engage the Nigerian business community and civil society in supporting these efforts.

Ethiopia—you have talked about that. It is a conundrum. Ethiopia is a valuable ally in our counterterrorism program. It is becoming one of Africa’s most populous and influential countries. China, India, Saudi Arabia, and other countries are investing there. Companies from all over the world searching for oil and minerals are crawling all over the country. But for all of the reasons you have discussed, both you and Mr. Smith, we are seeing a regression in democracy and a violation of human rights, et cetera.

Now here is the problem. What I said earlier about leverage, Ethiopia is one of the major recipients of U.S. aid to Africa, but 84 percent of that aid is HIV/AIDS, child survival, and emergency food. There is no room for playing with these programs for political purposes, and Prime Minister Meles knows it.

The U.S. can only hope to persuade Ethiopian leaders that it is ultimately in their interest to foster once again democratic government and find ways to address demands in the Ogaden and elsewhere. But as to our leverage, strangely enough, the more we do in these very important areas may actually be diminishing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lyman follows:]
An Overview of U.S. Policy in Africa

Hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs’
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health

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Testimony of

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United States Policy in Africa

Summary

United States policy in Africa under the current administration has been proactive. The administration has spoken out clearly and effectively on maintaining constitutional government in Nigeria, taken specific action — withholding visas — to emphasize the problem of corruption in Kenya, and has initiated new bodies — bi-national commissions — in Nigeria, Angola, and South Africa to build stronger relations in those key countries. It appointed a presidential envoy on Sudan, and a State Department special envoy for the Great Lakes region. It has announced two new development initiatives, on food security and global health. Nevertheless, the administration faces a difficult situation in Somalia with no clear outcome, a threatened collapse of the peace process in Sudan, and a series of setbacks in democratization, notably in Ethiopia, Uganda, and Senegal, as well as in smaller countries like Niger, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau. South Africa is witnessing a drift in economic policy and there is concern over the respect for law and the independence of the judiciary. Growing drug trafficking in both east and west Africa poses a threat of creating narco-states and providing financing to terrorist groups.

The President set the tone, in his visit to Ghana and in Secretary Clinton’s visit across the continent, that this administration would emphasize good governance and democracy in its relations in Africa. But the nature of U.S. aid to Africa, i.e. heavily concentrated on HIV/AIDS and emergency food, leaves the U.S. little leverage on these issues when governments in those recipient countries are determined on amassing and keeping power through limited or rigged elections and repressive acts. The slow process of staffing the senior levels of USAID has also prevented the administration from moving very far forward on its two new development initiatives. Finally, the low level of staffing throughout the Africa Bureau makes it hard to follow up on even the most important initiatives cited above, let alone address longer term issues like climate change, trade policy, and multilateral issues. Trade policy in particular seems to fall between the cracks of State, USTR, and USAID with no clear direction.

General Democratic Trends

Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, in their new book, *Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat*, demonstrate clearly that Africa is at a turning point in the democratization process. After two decades of democratic gains, with most African governments becoming elected, and since 2001 the Africa Union (AU) refusing to sit any government that comes to power by unconstitutional means, the process seems stalled and in some cases regressing. Key states like Kenya, Senegal, and Nigeria appear to be slipping backwards. Kenya has not addressed any of the fundamental problems that sparked violence after the last elections, notably land ownership, decentralization of power, and other constitutional issues. Nigeria, after three successively worse elections is struggling with issues of succession and has yet to pass electoral reform or address deep seated sources of unrest and violence in both the delta region and the middle belt. Meanwhile the country is de-industrializing, with growing unemployment and poverty, as the government fails to invest in essential infrastructure and other forward looking economic policies. Senegal is regressing back to centralized state control, with efforts to establish a dynasty rather than a progressively open political system. In South Africa, President Jacob Zuma is flouting ethics laws and leaving the country uncertain about economic direction. As a nearly one-party state, the readiness of the ANC to establish and enforce rules of democracy and good government is critical but this is now being questioned.
Human Rights and Freedom of the Press

Not surprisingly, as democratization stalls, freedoms suffer. The press has been harassed in all those states where rulers are determined to stay, e.g., in Ethiopia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and in war torn states like Somalia and Congo. Human rights suffered most in the repression of opposition parties and their supporters. Advances in women’s rights were notable, especially in Rwanda and Liberia, but women have been horrifically victimized in the wars in Congo. In Nigeria, police brutality has been reported on an alarming scale. On the positive side, civil society has been growing throughout Africa, giving voice to human rights and media groups, but many are heavily dependent on foreign financing. Attempts to deprive them of that financing have been advanced by the governments in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, threatening their survival. The Africa Union is only now establishing its human rights institutions, such as a Human Rights Court. It is still uncertain if it will exert any real influence in this area.

Extremism and Terrorism

The most dangerous terrorist threat is in Somalia and linked to the situation in Yemen across the strait. The rise of Al-Shabaab, with its proclamation of links to Al Qaeda, in the wake of the Ethiopian invasion of 2007 and the subsequent civil war, has raised the importance of Somalia in combating worldwide terror. Al-Shabaab and allied clans control most of southern Somalia, including the port of Kismayo. Of particular concern is the recruitment of some twenty or more Americans of Somali origin to fight and be trained by Al-Shabaab. The administration in charge of supporting a weak, but internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government, helping it to hold on to the capital and provide a basis for eventual national government. The TFG is defended by an African Peacekeeping Mission (AMISOM) but which can do no more than protect the port and airfield of Mogadishu and a few blocks of the capital itself. Kenya’s absorption with internal matters, Ethiopia’s special but not always helpful concerns, and Eritrea’s spoiler role all make regional players less than useful. The administration needs to think of additional or alternative strategies, e.g., appeals to clans loosely allied to Al-Shabaab, with offers of support for autonomy and with economic help, even without their allyIng with the TFG. Improving relations with the autonomous region of Puntland, and the self-declared independent Somaliland, will also provide the U.S. with more options in limiting Al-Shabaab’s advances. But this is likely to be a situation that drags on with great humanitarian cost and limited political progress.

Al-Qaeda cells are believed to operate down the east coast of Africa and perhaps elsewhere. The administration is hamstrung by limitations on staff and security concerns which keep us from a presence in the important Kenyan city of Mombasa and in being able to interact on a broader basis throughout the region.

In West Africa, the threat from the Algerian group, Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) can be exaggerated. One wing of this group is definitely ideologically driven, but for both wings the focus is on Algeria, not much beyond. AQIM does operate in the Sahelian regions of Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad, kidnapping foreigners for ransom, smuggling, and recruiting. The danger here may be mostly from the growing link between terrorist organizations, traditional smuggling groups, and drug traffickers. One estimate is that terrorist groups now get half their financing from drug trafficking. In West Africa, Latin American drug-trafficking groups are expanding to move drugs through West Africa to Europe. As in all drug trafficking strategies, these syndicates promote addiction – they pay their African smuggling
partners-in-kind— and corruption. Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, even Senegal and Ghana are in danger of being caught up in this process.

The U.S. is trying to combat this threat through the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Program (TSCTP). But TSCTP is working with poor and weak governments in the Sahel. And some of its efforts, like strengthening national military presence in the relatively “ungoverned spaces” of the Sahel, only aggravate the relations between these governments and the marginalized ethnic groups in the area who survive very much by smuggling. Economic development in this area will be slow and long and it is doubtful that the various aid programs for the region will have much impact in the near future. More needs to be done to stop the introduction of drug trafficking from Latin America, and to strengthen the overall capacity of the governments in this region, especially in their reaching political and economic accommodation with the Tuaregs and other groups of the Sahel.

Priority Countries

South Africa. The administration has made progress in improving what had been a strained relation with South Africa under former president Thabo Mbeki. President Zuma has reversed Mbeki’s resistant policies on combating HIV/AIDS eliminating one major source of friction. The establishment of a bi-national commission should help both countries address other key issues, including Zimbabwe, corruption, economic policy, development, and multilateral issues such as trade and climate change in which South Africa is a leader in forming the positions of the Africa voting bloc. But there are worrisome trends in South Africa that must concern all friends of that country.

President Zuma installed a widely diverse, if balanced team of economic officials in his administration. But he has not followed up with giving any enough authority to set direction, nor has he done so. This there are calls for nationalizing the mines or other key industries from some cabinet and African National Congress (ANC) officials, which Zuma has only weakly rebuffed, leaving uncertainty among industrialists and investors. The same uncertainty lingers over privatization, where one Cabinet member was forced to retract a commitment to that policy under pressure from the ANC. Zuma has appointed a non-executive chairman to him raising questions about the sanctity and independence of that authority. Zuma himself has resisted reporting his financial holdings, as required by law, and has not backed a call for more stringent financial reporting by all government officials. Zuma’s standing has been recently been reduced because of a personal scandal, fathering a child out of wedlock. All of these issues simmer as South Africa prepares to host the World Cup, the largest sport event in the world. If this event does not go well, though most assessments are that it will, Zuma’s position could be further weakened, giving rise to more uncertainty and drift in South African policy.

Finally, South Africa, under Zuma, has not played the same strong role in African affairs, and especially in the AU, as it did under Mbeki. With a weak government in Nigeria, the AU is deprived of its strongest backers and financiers as it tackles regional issues like Somalia, Sudan, Congo, and individual challenges to democracy and human rights in Guinea, Niger, and elsewhere. Zuma’s own record also raises questions about South Africa’s continuing to champion the principles of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) which emphasized good governance, economic management, and human rights. As of now, NEPAD seems to be fading into oblivion, with it slipping from South Africa to AU control, and with little support there.
Zimbabwe

From the outset, the U.S. has to recognize that we have little influence over the outcome there. The U.S. has neither the degree of national interest, nor the resources nor commitment, to intervene in any effective way. Sad as the decline of that country into autocracy, oppression, and economic ruin is, the U.S. can only urge those with more influence to affect change. South Africa, and its southern African neighbors, did force the ZANU government to accept a unity government with MDC head Morgan Tsvangirai as Prime Minister. But despite stopping the long economic decline by eliminating the Zimbabwe currency and taking some other steps, little has changed. South Africa moreover is largely distracted by other issues, leaving the MDC to its own devices, which are few. It is likely that the situation will come to head when the MDC and civil society proposals for constitutional reform are put on the table, and arrangements are made for the next election. Unless there is more pressure on ZANU, from within or from the SADC countries, the likelihood is another political crisis, more violence, and more instability. The U.S. can do very little, indeed by publicly denouncing the trend, only give more evidence of our frustration and impotence. The bi-national commission with South Africa will of necessity have to put Zimbabwe high on the agenda.

Nigeria

Nigeria is wrestling with its greatest crisis since the return to civilian rule in 1999. The president is ill, the Acting president is being challenged by the president’s supporters, there is much behind the scenes political scrambling to assure continued northern control in the next presidential election, and meanwhile violence continues in the oil-rich delta region and ethnic and religious violence is breaking out in the middle belt and elsewhere. Underlying these points of crisis is the failure of successive Nigerian administrations to improve the electoral system which got worse in each of the last three elections, but even more fundamentally to make the political system more responsive to people’s needs instead of upward to the powers of the ruling party and the dispensation of oil wealth. There has not been even enough vision to invest in the needed infrastructure – power, roads, and rail – to maintain Nigeria as a serious economic player. Thus plants dependent for power on basement generators are closing down in face of competition from Chinese and Indian goods, employment is declining, and the population outside of Lagos and Abuja, is poorer than years earlier.

The danger of Nigeria is that it would become irrelevant, except as a serious source of failure with widespread regional consequences. It is Africa’s most populous country, but if that population is not involved in production and growth, it is only a harbinger of more violence and despair. Nigeria is the fifth largest supplier of oil to the United States, but oil is being discovered all along the western coast of Africa, and in east Africa as well, and Brazil is poised to become a major oil supplier in the next decade. All this while Nigeria fails to reorganize its oil and gas industry sufficiently to guarantee the investment and development to reach its admitted potential of doubling its current output. Nigeria continues to fail to address the complex problems of unrest in the oil-producing delta region, now plagued by violence, oil stealing on a massive scale that involves both regional militants and government officials, and the continuing flaring of gas while Nigerian industry pleads for power. Ethnic and religious unrest is fed by land disputes, devious politicians, the availability for rioting of unemployed youth with little prospects for honest work, and a weak central government. Nigeria claims a pride of place in Africa for its size, wealth, and historic contributions to African peace and stability. But none of those contributions are now apparent as it struggles with fundamental issues that have long gone ignored.
This administration has raised Nigeria to a higher priority and has acted quickly on the current political crisis. Strong statements by the Secretary of state, coordinated with those of European allies, helped stem the temptation for military intervention, and encouraged a constitutional approach to allowing the Vice President to assume acting presidential authority. The administration still hopes to sign the agreement for a bi-national commission even as Nigerian cabinet members are being dismissed and reappointed in crisis mode.

The bi-national commission offers some possibilities to help Nigeria address its problems. But the U.S. does not have that much leverage. Our aid, as discussed more below, is not that important to an oil-rich country, and it is concentrated in HIV/AIDS work that is not subject to political bargaining. What the administration should do in the commission is not confine the discussion of our “to do list” for Nigeria—electoral reform, peace in the delta, overcoming religious tensions, corruption, etc.—important as these are, but come up with positive ideas for developing the country. Innovative schemes for public-private partnerships to develop the infrastructure—even including China—should be advanced, along with using the food security initiative to help revive Nigerian agriculture. All of this should be accompanied by an active public diplomacy that engages widespread Nigerian business and civil society in the discussion of these ideas. Nigerians are just as concerned as Nigeria’s friends about the current situation, and will rise to the occasion if offered real opportunities for change. Nigerian elites should be similarly challenged to rise to a higher level of responsibility, by both our urging and that from the Nigerian public. This is our best chance for avoiding seeing Nigeria sink further into dangerous dysfunctionality.

Ethiopia

Here is a conundrum. Ethiopia is a valuable ally in the efforts to combat terrorism and Islamic extremism in the Horn of Africa. It has a rapidly growing population making it a force of rising influence and economic potential. China, India, Saudi Arabia, and other countries are actively investing in minerals and agriculture, and companies from all over the world are actively exploring for oil and other mineral deposits there. Prime Minister Meles is one of the smartest and shrewdest leaders of any country. He is a growing force in international negotiations, e.g., in shaping the African positions on climate change.

At the same time, Ethiopia has stopped the process of gradual democratization that was taking place in the previous decade. Elections in 2005 were of questionable validity, and considerable violence ensued. Since then opposition leaders have been arrested, convicted of treason, some amnestied, but then others rearrested. The upcoming elections are unlikely to be free or fair in terms of opportunities for opposition campaigning, freedom of the press, or the outcome. The bottom line is that this regime is not prepared to be voted out of power, and it will not take the chance that that could be the result of an election. In addition, in addressing unrest in the Ogaden region, there are reports of gross violations of human rights. In sum there are serious issues of democratization and human rights in this key country.

The problem is that U.S. leverage is limited. As in several countries as pointed out below, although Ethiopia is one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid, almost none of this aid is available for political leverage. More than 80% of U.S. aid is in the form of HIV/AIDS assistance, child survival, and emergency food. There is no question of interrupting life-saving treatment for AIDS sufferers, and none for stopping emergency food deliveries. Add to that Ethiopia’s strategic position, and U.S. leverage is limited. Prime Minister Meles knows that as well.
This administration will continue to press for more democratic practices, for better protection of human rights. It will argue, more privately than publicly, that this is good for Ethiopia’s own future, and for its economic potential. But it will be caught between the public, civil society, and Congressional criticisms of Ethiopia on the one hand—and their urging of stronger administration actions—and a realistic assessment of its own leverage. Perhaps if the Somalia situation is resolved, and Kenya restores its previous positions of influence on regional affairs, and if Eritrea someday allows for a more reasonable settlement of its disputes with Ethiopia—perhaps then the strategic importance of Ethiopia will not bear so heavily on our diplomacy. But for the near future, Ethiopia will be a conundrum.

The Other Issues: Climate change and trade

Climate change. Africa will be significantly affected by climate change, indeed is already so. The predictions are that drought and flooding will become more severe, agricultural lands will change in aridity and fertility. Large-scale migrations are predicted both within Africa and in pressures on Europe and the Americas, as populations flee unproductive lands. The implications for security are only now being assessed, but they can expect to be serious as large numbers cross borders, congregate in cities, or press upon scarce resources. With USAID only slowly being staffed, the implications for aid policy, especially the new food security initiative are still to be imbedded in aid programs. African institutions have begun to analyze these factors in some depth and there is a need for much more collaborative analysis and policy development between donors and African experts.

Trade. Trade policy is another area needing much more attention. In spite of AGOA and other trade supporting activities, Africa still has a tiny share of global trade and, with few exceptions, is unable to supply major markets in the U.S. or elsewhere. One of the most promising developments in Africa is the progress toward larger economic trading and investment zones. Significant progress is being made in the East Africa Union—now comprising Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi—toward lowering trade barriers. On a larger scale similar progress is being made in the east and southern Africa association, COMESA. If the Zimbabwe situation were resolved, SADC could be making similar progress. These larger economic units offer large markets for investors, help African farmers and entrepreneurs move into larger, cross-border markets, and help Africa become more capable to undertake global levels of production and trading. Yet this process is being undermined by the EU’s proposed Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). These seek to develop individual country trading agreements that in effect will break up the unity of such sub-regional blocs. Africa is further threatened by moves to extend quota and duty free access, the concessions Africa enjoys under AGOA in the U.S. market, to all least developed countries, putting Africa into competition with major textile producers like Bangladesh, Cambodia and other countries.

The U.S. has not developed a broad trade policy in Africa that can support the sub-regional development and counter these threats. In particular, there is no consensus on how long Africa should continue to enjoy the AGOA preferences, i.e., when Africa should be forced to compete on a worldwide scale, and no real effort to counter the EPA process. One way to counter the EPAs would be to support a WTO ruling declaring Africa a single trading unit, so that the varying economic levels among African countries do not produce dysfunctional demands from the EU or others. But the U.S. has not taken up this issue.

The irony is that in spite of AGOA, reasonably substantial aid for trade programs, and other U.S. support to African trading capacity such as through the Millennium Challenge Account, African countries side
with Brazil, India and China in the Doha trade round against the U.S. and the EU. This is true even though
tariffs on African manufactured goods are as high or higher in China and India as they are in Europe or the U.S. The U.S. needs to bring its various trade-related policies and programs together, make some
decisions on what more it is prepared to do to help Africa become more effective in global trade, and then broach with Africa basic policy questions that encompass the future of AGOA, the support needed for sub-regional economic zones, and a counter to EPAs through the WTO. In the context of this total U.S. strategy the U.S. should seek greater African understanding and support of U.S. trade positions in the WTO.

Declining U.S. leverage

As we look at U.S. Africa policy, we have to recognize that for reasons of our own good intentions, the U.S. may experience diminishing leverage with African countries, especially with regard to sensitive issues as democracy, human rights, freedom of the press, and the like. This is true despite a tripling of aid to Africa under the Bush Administration and promises of even more aid from the Obama Administration. The reason is that more and more of our aid is concentrated in areas that are not amenable to political bargaining. As noted, our aid to Ethiopia is more than 80% in HIV/AIDS, child survival, and emergency food, areas that the U.S. is not prepared to reduce due to differences over political developments. But this is not an anomaly. The figures for countries experiencing similar “democracy deficits” are Niger 81%, Uganda 89%, Nigeria 91%, Senegal 58%. For Africa overall these categories constitute 75% of all U.S. aid.

There are of course other areas of assistance that are more flexible. One is the Millennium Challenge Account, but by definition this aid goes to countries doing relatively well on the index of good governance. The fact is that the U.S. will need to utilize influence of its overall leadership, character, and by engaging not only African governments but civil society and business interests in support of better governance, democracy, and human rights. Our aid burnishes our image and our credibility, but it is not something that can be used as a bargaining chip. Indeed, as the U.S. share of life-saving treatment of HIV/AIDS victims grows, the relationship between the U.S. and Africa may move into uncharted territory.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Mr. Cyllah.

STATEMENT OF MR. ALMAMI CYLLAH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Mr. CYLLAH. Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, IFES, I wish to thank you, your colleagues, and your staff for holding this hearing today. It could not have come at a more opportune time. Nearly 20 countries in Africa are holding elections in 2010. We have included in our region statement to you those elections that are scheduled for this year in Africa.

As you know, IFES is the premiere organization providing professional support to electoral democracy. Since its founding in 1987, IFES has worked in more than 100 countries around the world, striving to promote citizen participation, transparency, and accountability in political life and civil society.

Democracy, Mr. Chairman, and governance work, in my opinion, is the foundation on which all other aspects of U.S. foreign policy in Africa can be built. If you have a country with a strong democratic institution, I believe that provision of aid will be more effective, violence will be less common, and human rights will be more respected. Mr. Chairman, the right to vote is enshrined in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights. If governments are accountable to their own people through elections, everyone will benefit.

Mr. Chairman, when an election in Africa draws international attention, it is very seldom good news. For example, elections in Kenya fueled violence that left more than 1,500 people dead and about 300 people displaced, while elections in Zimbabwe suffered from massive fraud and brutal abuse. In Sierra Leone and Ghana, on the other hands, the tense, highly contested elections did not generate into violence. These elections have become historical landmarks instead for their credibility and peacefulness.

Many countries that experience field elections such as Kenya and Zimbabwe share a number of similarities. The incumbents in these countries exploited their positions of power for material gain and ran for re-election. Years of misrule, however, give rise to a popular and determined opposition. To prevent themselves from losing power to the opposition, the incumbents compromised the independence of the electoral commissions and the sanctity of the electoral process. The extremely close result in Zimbabwe led to a brutal government crackdown, while that in Kenya also led to a widespread violence.

Mr. Chairman, let me quickly point out that this violence, when you talk to the citizens of those countries, the citizens are always calling for more transparency of elections and not to abandon electoral democracy. An impartial and professional electoral management body could have prevented this violence or at least reduced its likelihood. Sierra Leone and Ghana share many of the opposite characteristics leading to successful elections in both countries. The Presidents of Sierra Leone and Ghana could not run for another term, so the incumbents had no direct stake in the election.

Moreover, the electoral commissions, who are relatively independent, enjoy the support and engagement of the various stakeholders and demonstrated their capacity to run elections. As a result, the electoral commissions were able to conduct relatively good elections resulting in those two cases peaceful transfer of power.

What are some of the lessons learned from these difficult and successful elections? Some of the lessons learned, Mr. Chairman, are electoral fraud and interference are less likely when an electoral management body is, one, independent in budget, tenure, and opinion; professional and capable of effectively implementing a credible electoral process; support by the various stakeholders. When attention is focused on the electoral management body and effective implementation of the electoral process, it is more likely that the process will run its course without significant intervention.

When an incumbent is running for re-election, and the electoral management body lacks independence, the process is more likely to be manipulated. Where poverty is widespread, when leaders flaunt their ill-gotten wealth, the opposition can mount effective mobilization. Where the population is polarized by antagonistic mobilization of support, elections are more likely to be rigged in favor of the incumbent, with a very high probability of electoral violence. Where the electoral disputes resolution mechanism is robust, aggrieved parties will be less likely to resort to violence.

Mr. Chairman, IFES has a few recommendations to you as policymakers and to the administration. These recommendations, Mr.
Chairman, are very simple: Provide assistance throughout the electoral process because elections do not begin and end on Election Day. Elections, just like democracy, are a process, but not an event. If any state of the electoral cycle is ignored or manipulated, the entire process could fall apart. Thinking in long-term and providing strategical systems contributes to much more successful and peaceful elections.

Some of the other recommendations, Mr. Chairman, include, first, special attention should be paid to how electoral management bodies are appointed in Africa. Second, during the registration process, assistance should be given to the electoral management body to clearly and fairly define procedures. Third, during the campaign period, assistance should be given to the electoral management body to establish binding campaign codes of conduct along with the legal power to enforce them. Fourth, throughout the process, the electoral management body must be helped to develop and carry out effective civic and voter education. Fifth, electoral management bodies must be assisted and accredited in domestic and international observers. Sixth, assistance must be given to the electoral management body to establish an impartial and effective dispute resolution system prior to the elections.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, countries should not be stripped of the electoral assistance after conducting a series of successful elections. This is particularly true as elections have become closer and more contentious in recent years. While this represents a welcome spread of multiparty democracy, it also represents an increasing risk of conflict. Kenya has made this painfully clear. Even countries such as Ghana and South Africa, however, which are viewed as bastions of democracy in Africa, should not be written off in terms of assistance. Assistance could help these countries further consolidate their democratic gains and assume a greater leadership role in the continent.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for holding this hearing, and I look forward to questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cyllah follows:]
Democracy and Elections in Africa

Recent Trends and the Role of the International Community

Almami I. Cyllah, Regional Director for Africa, IFES

Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health

"An Overview of US Policy in Africa"

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Democracy and Elections in Africa: Recent Trends and the Role of the International Community
Alimami Cyilah

Introduction

When an election in Africa draws international attention, the news is seldom good: elections in Kenya, for example, fuelled violence that left 1,500 dead and 300,000 displaced, while elections in Zimbabwe suffered from massive fraud and brutal suppression. Accordingly, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, former Chairman of the African Union, suggested last year that multiparty democracy in Africa can only lead to bloodshed—even some supporters of democracy in general agree that most African countries are not ready for elections.

Recent headline-grabbing electoral failures, however, do not justify abandoning efforts at developing electoral democracy in Africa. Although elections are often marred by fraud or incompetence and do sometimes result in violence, no other means have brought about nonviolent transitions of power with the same consistency. Most Africans agree—according to a 2005 Afrobarometer survey, 60 percent of Africans believe democracy is preferable to all other forms of government. Even in the countries that have suffered most from failed or flawed elections—or even from the failure to hold elections entirely—the people have responded not by abandoning democracy but by increasing their demands for accountability and reform.

Indeed, the very purpose of elections is to achieve participatory governance without violence—through political rather than physical competition—and this has succeeded in a number of African countries. South Africa and Botswana, for example, have proven themselves among the continent’s most stable democracies, while Ghana, Mali, and Benin have emerged as democratic strongholds in West Africa. Moreover, countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, among the poorest in the world and only recently emerged from civil war, have demonstrated the power of elections to foster and solidify peace.

In reality, then, Africa’s experience with electoral democracy has been mixed: progress has been made, but challenges remain. The various elections in the past several years—from Kenya and Zimbabwe to Ghana and Sierra Leone—have become historical landmarks for different reasons, varying drastically in their conduct and outcome. This mix of electoral experiences has generated considerable debate and passion on the subject of transparent, fair, and free electoral processes among election stakeholders, especially as democratic progress itself can come with further challenges; as more elections are held, and as these elections become increasingly competitive, one-party and military regimes face potentially destabilizing challenges that could increase the risk of fraud and violence.

It is thus difficult to identify a general trend in elections for the continent as a whole. In the broadest of terms, Sub-Saharan Africa is certainly more democratic and holds more free and fair elections today than several decades ago, but gains in some countries have been offset by losses in others, while a number have remained democratically stagnant since independence. Therefore, to understand recent trends in African elections, it is helpful to examine individual countries along with those others that have shared similar experiences and will thus face similar challenges and opportunities in the coming years. These various electoral experiences can serve as positive examples or critical warnings to other
countries in Africa and can help the international community, including the United States, more effectively engage with elections across Africa by learning from past failures and successes.

Despite the importance of elections, President Barack Obama was right when he remarked in Ghana that democracy "is about more than just holding elections." To be a genuine representative democracy, a country must go beyond holding free and fair elections. Democracy requires good governance, which prevails when government officials efficiently and transparently manage public institutions so as to address citizens' concerns. Democracy also requires rule of law, including judicial independence and enforcement; a transparent, accountable, and open government; and freedom from corruption. Moreover, representative democracies must include the voices of all citizens, particularly through the engagement of civil society organizations and the media, and be populated by citizens who know their rights and responsibilities. In order for all these conditions to be met, democratic governments must respect basic human rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly, without which democracy cannot thrive.

While these conditions are nominally independent of elections, elections represent an essential piece of the democratic process and serve as means to those ends—while elections do not guarantee democratic progress, they tend to advance the overall goals of democracy. For example, elections discourage mismanagement and corruption by holding leaders accountable for their actions, and democratically elected governments are far more likely to uphold human rights and serve the basic needs of their people. Moreover, elections, even if flawed, help to motivate citizens to engage with their government and become more involved in the democratic process, as well as to increase citizens' understanding of democratic principles and processes.

Elections are not only integral to all these areas of democratization, but are also the most visible representations of democracy in action. They are also, in most cases, the most complicated and expensive single event a country will ever undertake. The attached list of African elections in 2010 reveals how many of these complicated and expensive events are scheduled to take place in 2010 alone. Thus, while support to all aspects of democratic governance is crucial, particularly fostering good governance, upholding rule of law, and supporting civil society, this testimony examines all these areas in the context of elections. International support to electoral processes is crucial if democracy is to continue developing on the continent, and each country can benefit from such support, regardless of where it stands in the democratic spectrum. What follows is an overview of democratic and electoral trends in Africa, as well as considerations and recommendations as to how the United States and other members of the international community can productively support democracy and elections in a variety of contexts.

About IFES

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) is an independent, nongovernmental organization providing support to electoral democracy. Through field work, applied research, and
advocacy. IFES strives to promote citizen participation, transparency, and accountability in political life and civil society. Since its founding in 1987, IFES has worked in over 100 countries worldwide, including over 35 in Sub-Saharan Africa. IFES currently has programs in Burundi, the DRC, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Togo, as well as a program with the African Union, all detailed in the attached document about IFES’s programs in Africa.

Almami Cylah has nearly 30 years of experience in democracy development, conflict resolution, political affairs, and human rights advocacy. He has worked at IFES for the past nine years, currently as Regional Director for Africa and, before that, as Country Director in both Haiti and Liberia. He spent 17 years at Amnesty International, where he was in charge of African Affairs. Mr. Cylah also served as Election Commissioner in Sierra Leone’s Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) for two years leading into the general elections of 1996. His work and travels have brought him to every country in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Key Recommendations of IFES

Fiscal Policy
First are recommendations as to how the United States and other members of the international community should approach elections in terms of foreign policy—how to encourage free and fair elections and discourage movement away from democracy:

- **Allow no country a free ticket to forego democracy:** Democratic governance and free and fair elections are human rights and are enshrined as such in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Every country should guarantee its citizens these rights, and there is no acceptable excuse for failing to do so. The international community should thus increase pressure for free and fair elections in all countries.

- **Take a strong stance against democratic setbacks:** If rulers abolish term limits, coup leaders overthrow elected rulers, and political leaders orchestrate election violence without consequences, such transgressions are likely to continue. The international community must condemn attempts to undermine democracy and punish their perpetrators.

- **Do not rush countries to elections after conflicts:** Although elections play a critical role in building legitimate governance following conflict, countries still reeling from civil war should not be rushed to hold elections before they are ready. Elections should not be held until at least two years after a conflict to allow a country to regain stability, begin electoral preparations, and develop the capacity to hold elections.

- **Reward democratic progress:** The international community should commend and reward countries that progress along the road toward democracy. Less democratic countries must see the benefits of moving away from autocracy.

Electoral Assistance
Second are recommendations as to how the United States and other international donors can most effectively provide support to elections:

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• **View elections as processes, not events**: IFES upholds that elections do not begin and end on election day. Too often, international support spikes just before an election and plummets immediately afterward. Such short-term support discounts the advanced planning and complex activities that must begin years before an election and ignores the importance of post-election support to reform and capacity building. Long-term support to the electoral cycle as a whole, bridging the gap between elections, will result in more successful elections and greater local capacity to run future elections.

• **Transfer capacity to local electoral institutions**: Related to the above, support to elections should focus not solely on ensuring the success of an election or elections but on ensuring a country's electoral institutions have the capacity to manage future elections on their own. Without such transfer of capacity, elections will falter once international support begins its inevitable decline.

• **Promote efforts to prevent, mitigate, and prevent election violence**: Election violence has proven one of the most serious threats to democracy in Africa and will only become a more serious problem as elections become increasingly competitive and contentious in the coming years. Numerous avenues of support can help reverse this trend. For example, because a well-run election is less likely to result in violence, the international community must promote the development of independent, impartial, upright, accountable, transparent, and capable election management bodies. At the same time, it must build the capacity of local civil society groups to continuously monitor, prevent, and mitigate election violence throughout the electoral process.

To prevent election violence from emerging in the first place, the international community must also support the strengthening of election complaint and adjudication mechanisms.

• **Support all elections, but tailor the approach to the specific context**: Even if not entirely new and fair, the more process of holding an election can help lay the foundation for democracy. Even in the most unlikely places, targeted support tailored to the specific political context can improve this electoral process, facilitating a gradual move toward genuine democracy.

• **Do not prematurely support to elections**: Elections are extremely complicated and expensive, and substantial international support over several electoral cycles is necessary before any country is ready to manage elections on its own. This is particularly true in post-conflict countries, where electoral support should continue at least through the second and third post-conflict elections. A lack of long-term commitment can seriously undermine democratic gains.

• **Support regional organizations promoting democracy**: Some regional organizations, such as the African Union, are beginning to develop mechanisms to promote democracy on the continent. The international community should provide support to the development of such mechanisms, which allow Africans to share electoral experience among themselves and coordinate electoral support.

Trends in African Elections
1. Continued Use of Elections to Legitimize Autocratic Regimes

The concept of elections has become so globally predominant that almost all countries hold elections for at least some level of political office. This is certainly true for Sub-Saharan Africa, where nearly every country includes a mandate for national elections in its legal framework. Many of the countries holding elections, however, fall far short of representative democracy. Elections often serve as mere charades to legitimize rulers or regimes in the eyes of the international community and their people. Elections held for this purpose are almost guaranteed from the outset to be neither free nor fair.

Legitimizing the Status Quo

Overall, nearly ten countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have had the same ruler for over 30 years. Most have held elections at some point in time during these rulers’ tenures, and these elections have invariably resulted in lopsided incumbent victories. These victories are achieved in any number of ways, whether by suppressing or banning opposition parties, acting in such a way that opposition parties boycott the election altogether, monopolizing state resources or media, intimidating voters, or conducting outright fraud.

For example, Equatorial Guinea’s President Teodoro Obiang Nguema has been in power for more than 30 years, having deposed his uncle in 1979, making him the longest serving ruler in Sub-Saharan Africa and one of the longest serving in the world. President Nguema won elections in 1996, 2002, and 2009, each time with around 97 percent of the vote. This latest election, like those held before, was largely boycotted by opposition parties, which have refused to accept the results. The government has achieved such wide victories through a variety of means, including suppressing opposition parties, exploiting state media, manipulating results, and constraining international observers. A number of additional countries, including Burkina Faso and Cameroon, face comparable situations.

Some other countries, wary of the challenges to the status quo that elections could engender, have avoided holding elections altogether, promising to hold them but repeatedly pushing back the scheduled date. Côte d’Ivoire, for example, has postponed its elections countless times, originally scheduled to take place as early as 2005; these elections have been delayed again and again, most recently postponed in November 2009 to mid 2010.

In all likelihood, most of these countries will not experience political change or viable elections in the near future—perhaps not until the death of their current rulers and possibly not even then. The death of Gabon’s President Omar Bongo after 42 years in power, for example, led to the election of his son in a vote overshadowed by accusations of fraud and violence. It may take dramatic events, such as the 2007 elections in Zimbabwe, for the forces of change to gain momentum, and one can witness in Zimbabwe how hard the defenders of the status quo will fight to halt any momentum gained.

This determination to hang on to power is usually driven by these leaders’ total dependence on state power and the access to economic wealth and social dominance this power provides. When poverty and marginalization increase, however, political opposition strengthens, threatening incumbents’ rule. Under such conditions, incumbent rulers often use the electoral process to hang on to power, while the
opposition mounts movements to displace these rulers. The antagonism and animosity during these competitive periods are transferred and superimposed on the electoral process, as longtime incumbent leaders who fear losing power become even more determined to hang on.

In countries such as these, therefore, international involvement may seem fruitless or even counterproductive. How can the international community engage governments that lack the will to hold free and fair elections? If an election is doomed from the outset, might international involvement exceed election observation serve only to lend credibility where it is least deserved? These are critical and sensitive questions, and foreign policy priorities, as well as distribution of limited resources, are certainly relevant factors. Moreover, many such countries may not be receptive to international involvement in their domestic political affairs. These democracies-in-name-only, however, should not be completely overlooked solely based on these concerns. While direct budgetary support to elections would, needless to say, be counterproductive, targeted international assistance can still be of value, and no country should be allowed a free ticket to forego democracy.

First, although uncommon and rarely resulting in regime change, relatively free and fair elections can occur even in states not generally regarded as democratic. These elections tend to occur in single-party-dominant states where the incumbent regime does not fear losing power. For example, the 2006 legislative election in Angola, where President José Eduardo dos Santos has been in power for over 30 years, was considered relatively free and fair, notwithstanding the considerable benefit the ruling party derived from its position of incumbency.

Moreover, this election, which IES supported through critical technical assistance to Angola’s National Election Commission, was itself intrinsically valuable. According to some recent studies, the mere act of holding elections, even if not entirely free and fair, can lay the foundation for developing a democratic tradition: in going through the motions of voting, voters develop a greater understanding of the process and become better prepared to advocate for and participate in free and fair elections in the future. In the case of Angola, the 2006 election also helped develop a tradition of peaceful elections, especially important considering that the previous election had sparked a return to civil war. In this sense, then, even elections in relatively autocratic states can have some intrinsic value.

Second, in addition to supporting the electoral management process, or where working directly with the government in support of elections is not possible or desirable, the international community can focus its energies instead on other electoral stakeholders, including civil society and the media. These groups should play a central role in the electoral process of any country, but they become even more important where resistance to free and fair elections is strongest or where years of suppression have left them weak and disorganized. International support to these stakeholders can develop the voices of those advocating and fighting for legitimate electoral democracy. In addition to these groups, support should target the population at large through civic and voter education and other awareness programs that contribute to the building of a democratic culture.
Finally, to address the problem at its core, the international community, especially regional organizations in Africa, must strongly discourage rulers from extending or eliminating presidential term limits. States that allow their presidents to remain in power for decades or for life invariably move away from democracy toward autocracy. Recent developments in this area are encouraging, as, for example, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Niger from its membership and imposed sanctions after President Tandjilé Mariamou held a referendum allowing him to stay in power beyond the legal limit of two terms. Such strong responses from the international community can help discourage continued democratic regressions in the future.

Legitimizing Illegal Transitions of Power
Related to the use of elections to legitimize the status quo but with its own unique problems is the use of elections to legitimize rulers or regimes that have come to power illegally or violently. Since 2008 alone, Africa has witnessed successful coups d'état in Mauritania, Guinea, Madagascar, and Niger. Following each of these coups, the coup leaders immediately and repeatedly promised elections, seeking to legitimize their rule. In Mauritania, this election occurred less than a year after the coup, resulting in the victory of the coup leader amid accusations of fraud by opposition parties. In Guinea, the assassination attempt against the coup leader has resulted in a transfer of power and elections scheduled for June and July 2010. In Madagascar, the coup leader has tentatively set an election for October 2010, 19 months after the coup, while talk of elections is ongoing in the wake of the February 2010 coup in Niger.

As most recently demonstrated by the post-coup election in Honduras, elections such as these pose a considerable diplomatic challenge to the international community. How can the United States and other countries approach these elections so as to ensure they are free, fair, transparent, and peaceful without legitimizing the violent takeover?

In spite of promised elections, the international community must take a strong and unified stance against coups d'état and other illegal transfers of power to discourage them from the outset, regardless of the circumstances under which they occur. Regional organizations have a particularly crucial role to play in this respect and, promisingly, have begun taking on this role. ECOWAS, for example, has suspended Guinea from its membership and imposed sanctions, while the African Union expelled Guinea, Madagascar, and Niger and imposed sanctions on all three countries following their coups. The United States should support the strong actions of these regional organizations and itself continue to take a strong stance against any illegal transfers of power.

When coups lead to elections, however, the international community should not forsake these elections any more than elections in other difficult political contexts such as described previously. While returning to the pre-coup situation would be in some cases present the most desirable option, even if holding out for this possibility is not always reasonable or possible, particularly in cases where a coup follows the death of a former leader. Rather, the international community should exert pressure on the coup leader to schedule an election as soon as possible and to refrain from partaking in this election, thereby overseeing a peaceful transition to normalcy. In this case, the international community should provide
support to this election to ensure that it is free and fair, thereby expediting the country’s emergence from political chaos.

As the case of Guinea clearly demonstrates, however, such pressure is not always successful. After staging a coup following the longtime President’s death, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara promised to hold an election from which he would abstain. It became increasingly clear, however, that Captain Camara intended to participate in the election despite his promise. The situation subsequently became ever more complicated, as Captain Camara’s dictatorial and erratic rule led to the shooting of protesters and an assassination attempt that left him unfit to govern. Guinea’s interim leader has now proposed a definite date for elections later this year and has pledged not to run. Support to post-coup elections such as this can play a critical role in directing countries back toward democracy, and IFES is continuing its democracy-building work in Guinea by strengthening the capacity of civil society and media to build peace and move their country forward from its current political crisis.

2. Increasingly Competitive and Contentious Elections

Even while some countries face little prospect for political change, elections in many countries are becoming increasingly competitive. Notwithstanding certain exceptions, such as the recent elections in Equatorial Guinea, candidates are unlikely to continue winning with as vastly disproportionate shares of the vote as seen in the past.

For example, in Uganda, where President Yoweri Museveni has been in power for 23 years, the opposition has gradually gained strength; in each of the past three elections, President Museveni’s share of the vote has declined, from 75 percent in 1996 to 59 percent in 2006, while that of the main opposition party has steadily increased. Following the 2005 legislative election in Ethiopia, the long-time ruling party lost 154 seats, representing a drop from 88 to 62 percent of the total seats in the legislature.

In Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe, who has been in power since 1987, actually lost the first round of the 2008 presidential election to Morgan Tsvangirai, his main opponent, and would have lost the runoff as well, absent widespread fraud.

Upside: Multiparty Elections

On the other hand, this increased competitiveness in many countries represents a positive step forward for multiparty democracy on the continent. As opposition parties grow more organized and coherent, they can provide a more viable alternative to parties that have, in many cases, been in power since independence. Indeed, several countries have witnessed handovers of power in recent years following opposition victories, including Senegal, Mali, Sierra Leone, and Ghana.

To further the development of multiparty democracy, the United States and other members of the international community should encourage the continued strengthening of political parties. Such support has been insufficient, as many countries are reluctant to be seen as supporting particular parties or politicians. The obvious and sensible solution is to offer support to all political parties, thereby eliminating accusations of bias. In many cases, political parties lack the most basic organizational infrastructure, such as an office or a list of party members; international support can help these parties...
develop a permanent infrastructure and the capacity to self-finance over the long term. In addition, international support should be provided to help these parties develop and publicize policy platforms so that their membership is based on issues rather than ethnicity.

Downsides: Election Violence
On the other hand, however, increasingly competitive elections raise the risk of increased election violence. Increased competitiveness can raise the risk of violence in two ways. First, closer elections can increase tension throughout the electoral process; when the outcome of an election is in doubt, all stages of the process, including the appointment of the members of the electoral management body; the registration of parties, candidates, and voters; campaigning; voting; and vote counting and tabulation, become more heated. For example, Kenya erupted in chaos in 2007 when incumbent President Mwai Kibaki was sworn in hours after being declared the winner in the country’s closest presidential election ever; the ensuing violence left 1,500 dead and 300,000 displaced.

Second, as long-term incumbents witness the growing strength of opposition candidates, they may feel increasingly imperilled and crack down more fiercely on perceived threats. For example, after losing the first round of Zimbabwe’s 2008 presidential election and subsequently manipulating results to force a run-off, President Robert Mugabe presided over a wave of widespread and brutal violence against supporters of Morgan Tsvangirai to ensure himself victory in the second round.

The issue of election violence raises two primary questions for the United States and the international community: how does the international community prevent and mitigate election violence, and how does it resolve this violence when it does occur?

One key way of preventing and mitigating election violence is by building the capacity of key institutions that participate in the electoral process. One such institution is a country’s electoral management body. While election violence is often blamed on the mere occurrence of elections, such violence usually occurs not simply because an election takes place but because of shortcomings or failures in the electoral process. Countries that experience well-run, free, and fair elections rarely experience election violence. Promoting the greater independence, impartiality, integrity, accountability, transparency, and capacity of a country’s electoral management body, therefore, can help ensure that elections are better run and therefore less prone to violence.

Such support must be truly comprehensive, as efforts to prevent and mitigate violence can be carried out at any stage of the electoral cycle. During the voter and candidate registration process, for example, the procedures must be clearly and fairly defined so as not to block or disadvantage certain groups from participating. During the campaign period, when violence is most common, political parties should be encouraged to commit to codes of conduct that the electoral management body is legally empowered to enforce. Throughout the entire lead-up to election day, voters should be educated on the importance of voting and encouraged not to support candidates or parties that resort to violent tactics. To prevent tension from rising due to suspicions of results tampering, a system for counting, tabulating, and
announcing the results as transparently and quickly as possible should be put in place prior to the election.

IFES provides such comprehensive support to election management bodies throughout Africa and around the world. For example, IFES has conducted trainings using the innovative Building Resources in Democracy, Governance, and Elections (BRIDGE) program for the election management bodies of countries ranging from Nigeria to Burundi to Angola. These trainings, as well as continuous technical support and advice, help promote the sorts of best practices that contribute to elections that are not only more likely to represent the will of the people but also less likely to result in violence.

A country’s security forces, whether police or military, represent another institution critical to preventing and mitigating election violence, particularly as they have the ability to directly initiate or exacerbate this violence. In some cases, such as Liberia in 2005 and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2006, international security forces, such as United Nations peacekeeping missions, are available to provide security for elections. For countries holding elections immediately following conflicts, such international security is often necessary to ensure a peaceful transition. In the long-term, however, countries must provide their own security so as to establish national ownership of the electoral process. The international community can provide support to ensure that these security forces are adequately prepared to manage election security so as to prevent violence. Such support should build the capacity of security forces to act impartially, transparently, efficiently, and with respect for the rights of all involved in the electoral process, as well as to plan the security operation well in advance to ensure that adequate human, financial, and material resources are available.

A second way to prevent and mitigate election violence is through increased monitoring of this violence throughout the electoral process. Monitoring election violence is distinct from monitoring elections in general and must take place over the long term. For this reason, it is a task best undertaken by local civil society organizations. IFES has emerged as a leader in this method of election violence prevention through its Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) Project. Tailored specifically to each individual country, the EVER Project empowers local civil society organizations to better monitor, publicize, and mitigate violence throughout the electoral cycle. IFES provides local partners with tools to map potential and ongoing violence, trains community-based monitors to collect information on this violence, and generates alerts and produces reports on the data gathered to ensure the perpetrators are held accountable. This process raises awareness of election violence, allows for direct and rapid responses to prevent and mitigate this violence, and fosters the development of civil society networks and constructive partnerships among electoral stakeholders.

Regardless of efforts to prevent and mitigate violence, however, such violence will inevitably continue to occur and may even increase in coming years. For this reason, the international community must examine how best it can help resolve instances of violence and the tangled political situations they create. The two most horrific cases of election violence in Africa in recent years—Kenya in 2007 and Zimbabwe in 2008—were both resolved in the same way: the international community pressured the two disputing parties to enter into power-sharing agreements whereby the “victorious” incumbent
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candidate remained president while the "losing" opposition candidate became prime minister. This was viewed as a way to immediately end the violence and ensuing political impasse. Over the long term, however, neither of these power-sharing agreements has proven successful. Tensions between the President and Prime Minister in Kenya have remained high, while the coalition government in Zimbabwe has nearly fallen apart on several occasions, with the opposition recently withdrawing from the government for several weeks.

The failures of these coalition governments to provide lasting political solutions indicate that the international community, including election experts, should begin exploring alternative means of restoring political stability following election-related conflicts. One alternative is to integrate a clear and widely accepted election complaint and adjudication mechanism into the legal framework prior to elections; with a viable dispute resolution system already in place, ad hoc solutions such as power-sharing agreements may prove unnecessary. The international community must provide support, however, to ensure that dispute resolution bodies have the structure and capacity to resolve disputes, lest they prove incapable of fulfilling this function. Following the disputed 2007 presidential election in Nigeria, for example, the dispute resolution courts responded so slowly to election complaints that some disputes are yet unresolved. International support should build the capacity of electoral dispute resolution bodies to resolve disputes impartially, objectively, effectively, and efficiently. In addition, the international community should encourage traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, which can serve as viable alternatives when formal legal mechanisms prove unsatisfactory. Such support to dispute resolution can provide a means not only of resolving conflicts but also of preventing them, as aggrieved voters or parties can channel their frustrations through legal or traditional mechanisms rather than through violence.

3. Continued Use of Elections to Emerging from Conflicts
While these above examples demonstrate the potential of elections to create conflict, elections are often used as a means to end conflict and solidify peace. For this reason, elections usually form a key part of the agreements ending civil wars or conflicts. The basic principle behind these post-conflict or transitional elections is that of ballots over bullets: citizens choosing their political leaders by voting rather than fighting.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, post-conflict and transitional elections have met with a mixture of results. Despite their key role in ending conflict and solidifying peace, the politically charged atmosphere and unreasonable high expectations surrounding these elections make them among the most vulnerable to violence. The most infamous example of a failed and ultimately disavowed post-conflict election in Sub-Saharan Africa was that of Angola in 1992. Intended to end the civil war, this election instead reignited conflict for another ten years. Cases such as this have led many to argue that elections are not appropriate for post-conflict environments.

As with elections in general, however, there is no viable alternative to post-conflict elections as a means of achieving legitimate governance; a nonelected government is far more susceptible to accusations of illegitimacy than one chosen by the people, and legitimate governance must be achieved as soon as
possible following a conflict. Moreover, elections have the potential to create governments broadly representative of all disputing political factions. Demonstratively, several countries have recently held remarkably successful post-conflict elections. For example, Liberia’s elections in 2005, intended to end over a decade of civil war, were remarkably peaceful and were hailed as generally free and fair. The DRC’s 2006 elections, the first multiparty elections in 46 years, were also relatively successful, especially when considering the tremendous logistical challenges that had to be overcome. In these cases, therefore, elections facilitated an ongoing transition from devastating conflict toward greater stability and development.

How, then, can the international community, which generally plays a pivotal role in post-conflict and transitional elections, ensure that these elections resolve rather than exacerbate conflict? In answering this question, it is helpful to examine separately the first election following a conflict and then the second and third elections that take place thereafter, which have distinct problems.

First Post-Conflict Election
Elections are generally written into the peace agreements ending conflicts, and many of the provisions for these elections are thus contained therein. As members of the international community, such as the United Nations, generally play a key role in the discussions leading to those peace agreements, they have a responsibility to ensure that the electoral provisions contained within the agreements follow best practices.

One of the most important considerations in planning post-conflict or transitional elections is the scheduling of these elections. While elections represent a crucial step in moving from conflict toward peace, many post-conflict elections have failed after being scheduled too soon following the end of a conflict, not allowing enough time for the country to regain a certain level of stability. In these cases, the warring factions have simply transformed themselves into warring parties, while the underlying animosity remains. Generally, at least two years should separate the end of a conflict from the first elections so as to ensure the adequate development of a conducive and stable political environment. This also allows more time to build the capacity of a country’s election management body, effectively plan and budget for the election, and implement essential but time-consuming activities such as voter registration. Fortunately, the United Nations and other international actors have begun to realize that elections should not be held immediately following a ceasefire and to recognize the need to balance the importance of elections with their risks.

Another consideration is the conduct of the election itself. As post-conflict countries prepare for their first elections, they must build all the necessary institutions from scratch and therefore require vast international support. This support has usually been forthcoming due to intense international interest in post-conflict situations. The 2003 elections in Liberia and 2006 elections in the DRC, for example, both took place under the auspices of large UN peacekeeping missions, and these international forces managed nearly all electoral logistics. In addition to such direct logistical support from actors like the UN, support should also incorporate other areas of electoral assistance, such as working with election management bodies to budget and plan for elections, conduct voter registration and boundary...
delimitation, implement civic and voter education, train electoral staff, and manage the election itself. The international community should also closely monitor and observe these elections to ensure they are in keeping with best practices.

Liberia presents one of the best examples of successful post-conflict elections. These elections took place two years after the end of the civil war, which allowed enough time for the United Nations to restore the country to relative stability and for IFEs to build the capacity of Liberia’s National Elections Commission to manage these elections. In the years leading up to 2005, IFEs assisted the Commission with voter registration, boundary delimitation, voter education, election planning and budgeting, election dispute resolution, and other key aspects of election management. As a result, the 2005 election was free and fair, resulting in the peaceful election of Africa’s first woman president.

IFEs’s election support in Liberia, however, did not focus solely on the short-term goal of the election itself. All electoral assistance, both in post-conflict situations and otherwise, should have as its ultimate goal a country’s increased capacity to manage elections on its own. Therefore, while substantial direct support is necessary for any transitional election, support should also be provided to develop the long-term capacity of local institutions working with elections. In Liberia, for example, IFEs not only provided direct support to the National Elections Commission in managing the 2005 elections but also provided support and training to promote its development into an autonomous and professional entity capable of managing future elections without external support. Similar capacity building support should be provided to political parties, developing them beyond ethnicity-based political parties; civil society organizations and the media, which play a key role in the continuous and long-term monitoring of the government and elections; and other local institutions.

Moreover, the international community must consider the long-term sustainability of the electoral process. Often times, for example, international donors purchase expensive, high-tech registration or voting systems for countries that lack the expertise, infrastructure, or resources to manage and maintain these systems for future elections. This same problem is also found in other areas of assistance; it is equally unsustainable, for example, to fund the construction of a state-of-the-art hospital whose long-term maintenance could consume the majority of a country’s health budget. Ultimately, all countries must fully manage and fund elections on their own, and thus the sustainability of election support must be taken into consideration.

Second and Third Post-Conflict Elections
Post-conflict countries cannot, however, be expected to fully manage and fund elections on their own immediately after holding one successful election. Indeed, the second and third post-conflict elections are even more difficult than the first in a number of ways. International interest in these elections tends to fall precipitously as donors reason that, after one successful election, the country should now be capable of managing on its own. Moreover, voters tend to have high expectations based on the success of the previous, internationally assisted election, and these expectations are difficult to meet when compounded with reduced levels of international support. This combination of factors could cause a country’s second post-conflict election to reverse everything gained by the first. Afghanistan’s recent
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election, the second since the US invasion, did just that, completely reversing the relative success of the first elections in 2006.

To ensure that such a reversal does not occur, the international community must focus on long-term support that spans the entire electoral cycle and give the second and third post-conflict elections the same level of attention given the first. Support should never end the day after a country’s first post-conflict election—or any election, for that matter. The period following the election is an ideal time for reviewing lessons learned, revising the legal framework for elections, and further building the capacity of local institutions. This support should continue throughout preparations for and conduct of the second election, and even the third; a country cannot fully develop the capacity or garner the resources to independently manage elections before then, considering that an election is perhaps the most complicated and expensive single event a country will ever undertake.

4. Africans Helping Africans
This trend—increased collaboration among African countries in working toward free and fair elections—is one the international community should actively seek to develop and encourage. While assistance from outside Africa is often necessary, African countries should support and learn from each other whenever possible. This support can come from the relatively consolidated African democracies, as well as from regional organizations within Africa.

The Role of Consolidated Democracies
Despite the bad news that often dominates headlines on elections in Africa, some countries have succeeded in holding a series of successful elections on their own. South Africa and Botswana, for example, have affirmed their position among Africa’s most stable democracies, having repeatedly held free and fair elections without international support. Ghana, likewise, has emerged as a democratic bastion in West Africa; Ghana fully funds its own elections, and its 2008 election resulted in the country’s second peaceful transfer of power between political parties. Even Mali, one of the least economically developed countries in Africa, has built a tradition of peaceful elections, demonstrating that a country does not have to be wealthy to be democratic. These countries can all serve as positive examples to the region and provide hope for the future of democracy in Africa.

That said, it must be noted that nowhere in Africa should free and fair elections be taken for granted, even where democratic progress seems surest. Before its horrific 2007 election, for example, Kenya was seen as among the most democratic countries in East Africa; this election revealed to the world how fragile Kenya’s democracy really was. Ghana could easily have gone the same way in 2008 if the various stakeholders, led by the Electoral Commission and international community, had not learned from the failures of Kenya and taken steps to ensure a peaceful election. The consolidation of democracy in any African country is relative, and thus the electoral process in all countries must be carefully monitored and support provided where needed.

Nonetheless, these more developed democracies can and should play a key role in fostering free and fair elections in their less democratic neighbors. On the most basic level, they can do this by serving as
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positive examples to other countries in Africa as to how elections can and should work. Coming from fellow African countries with similar histories and contexts, these examples can be more meaningful than those provided by developed democracies elsewhere in the world. One important way for more developed democracies to share their success is by sending electoral experts to train their counterparts in less democratically developed neighbors. For example, Ghana recently sent an information technology expert from its Electoral Commission to assist with the voter registration process in Guinea. Similarly, election stakeholders from countries working toward free and fair elections should travel to observe free and fair elections elsewhere in Africa. IIEP regularly supports such exchanges, having brought, for example, members of Liberia’s National Elections Commission to observe the 2007 election in Sierra Leone and 2008 election in Ghana.

Beyond encouraging such collaboration, the international community outside of Africa should not only criticize and condemn flawed elections but also reward and acknowledge those that succeed. President Barack Obama was doing exactly that when he chose Ghana as the destination for his first trip to Africa as head of state, denying the honor to less democratic countries such as Nigeria and Kenya. As a result, Ghana has struggled to further solidify its democratic gains, and hopefully other countries will strive to emulate its success.

The Role of Regional Organizations
Regional organizations within Africa are also striving to play a greater role in elections on the continent, and the international community should encourage the continued development of this role. For example, IIEP has provided support to the African Union in setting up a Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit, which became operational in 2007. This Unit’s objectives include disseminating and promoting the AU’s instruments relating to democracy; facilitating capacity building of national electoral institutions through training and exchanging resources; coordinating, developing systems for, and implementing trainings in election observation; and processing requests for electoral assistance. This Unit has now fully assumed responsibility for AU election observation, and will be coordinating all observation missions for the upcoming elections in Ethiopia. ECOWAS set up a similar Electoral Assistance Unit in 2006, likewise deepening its commitment to building democratic electoral processes in the West Africa region.

The Association of African Election Authorities (AAEA) presents an additional example of indigenous efforts to promote democracy on the continent. This organization, to which IIEP has provided extensive capacity building support, is dedicated to the professionalisation of election administration through information exchange and regional networking. Similarly, the African Statesmen Initiative, a select group of former African leaders, seeks to encourage former heads of state to continue playing a constructive role in efforts to strengthen democracy on the continent.

Programs such as these help African countries coordinate among themselves and more effectively share electoral experiences, expertise, and sometimes even material. The international community should provide support to such indigenous African endeavors and encourage the development of similar
coordination mechanisms in other regional bodies. Ultimately, these regional organizations could develop into key resources for and providers of electoral support.

Conclusions

The above examples illustrate the wide range of democratic experiences among the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa—while some have faltered, others have made tremendous progress. The examples of progress and success, however, should demonstrate that free and fair elections are achievable in Africa. Not only that, they are essential. While elections do not constitute democracy, representative democracy is not achievable without elections. Moreover, instilling a culture of democratic elections goes hand in hand with integrating democratic values such as equality and other rights at all levels of society, including in everyday life and within the family.

Considering the importance of elections, the United States and other members of the international community must engage every country to ensure that elections are held and, where held, are free, fair, and transparent. The style of engagement will vary depending on the political context—countries that lack the political will to hold free and fair elections must be pressured to do so; those that have the will but lack the capacity must be provided support to develop this capacity, and this support must focus on the electoral process as a whole.

Ultimately, however, this engagement will have the same basic goal: ensuring that all people have a say in the way they are governed. Indeed, this is a fundamental human right and is enshrined in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: the will of the people “shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.” Elections, in this sense, have become a universal concept to which every human is entitled.

Electoral democracy, moreover, is not only a fundamental right and desirable end in itself but also tends to develop in conjunction with other human rights. This is true in part because certain rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly, are prerequisites for free and fair elections. Once developed, a tradition of free and fair elections can also bolster these other rights, as governments are held more accountable to their citizens’ demands for greater freedom from repression and want.

Africa has a long path to follow before democracy can be said to have firmly taken root on the continent. This path will not get any easier in the years to come and may, in some cases, seem impossibly daunting; the United States, after all, has been holding elections for over 200 years, while many African countries are holding their first. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of Africans to take themselves down the path toward democracy, but the international community can play a key role in providing much-needed pressure and support to help build an adapted democratic culture. Without this support, democracy on the continent would surely falter, but with it, more Africans can realize the benefits of a democratic future, which lies in the best interests of all.
Democracy and Elections in Africa: Recent Trends and the Role of the International Community
Alhaji I. Cyllah

About IFES

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) is an independent, nongovernmental organization providing support to electoral democracy. Through field work, applied research, and advocacy, IFES strives to promote citizen participation, transparency, and accountability in political life and civil society. Since its founding in 1987, IFES has worked in over 100 countries worldwide, including over 15 in Sub-Saharan Africa. IFES currently has programs in Angola, Burundi, the DRC, Guinea, Liberia, and Sudan, as well as a program with the African Union, all detailed in the attached document about IFES's programs in Africa.

Alhaji Cyllah has nearly 30 years of experience in democracy development, conflict resolution, political affairs, and human rights advocacy. He has worked at IFES for the past nine years, currently as Regional Director for Africa and, before that, as Country Director in both Haiti and Liberia. He spent 12 years at Amnesty International, where he was in charge of African Affairs. Mr. Cyllah also served as Election Commissioner in Sierra Leone's Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) for two years leading into the general elections of 1996. His work and travels have brought him to every country in Sub-Saharan Africa.
OVERVIEW

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) is an independent, nongovernmental organization providing support to electoral democracy. Through field work, applied research, and advocacy, IFES strives to promote citizen participation, transparency, and accountability in political life and civil society. Since its founding in 1987, IFES has worked in over 100 countries worldwide, including 15 in Sub-Saharan Africa.

CURRENT PROJECTS

AFRICAN UNION

IFES is implementing its USAID-funded Technical Assistance for Elections Support program through the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Specifically, IFES is working closely with the newly established Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit (DEAU) within the AU to effectively support national election commissions across the continent, as well as to create a pool of trained African electoral experts capable of effectively monitoring elections throughout Africa. Under IFES’s guidance, the AU has become fully staffed and has taken charge of all election observation missions since 2006; the Center for Research and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (CIREA) are partnering with IFES on certain aspects of the program.

BURUNDI

IFES most recently worked in Burundi from 2007-2009 while implementing a program to build the capacity of anti-corruption institutions. Currently, IFES is providing targeted and strategic support to the principal Burundian stakeholders in the context of the 2009-2010 electoral cycle, with funding from USAID. IFES’s two-year Burundi Electoral Assistance and Technical Support program seeks to build the professional capacity of electoral administrators at the national, provincial, and communal levels to lead and manage the electoral process professionally and transparently; inform and educate the general population and marginalized groups on their rights and responsibilities in the electoral process while promoting public awareness and active civic engagement in support of transparent and peaceful elections; and build the capacity of civil society to participate in the electoral process.

DEMOCRATIC REFLECTIONS OF THE CONFLICT (DRC)

IFES has been working in the DRC for over a decade, most recently with programs aimed at tackling corruption and building the capacity of civil society. Currently, IFES is implementing the USAID-funded Voice of Civil Society (VOICES) project to improve the capacity of the Congolese people to participate in the democratization and electoral processes. IFES will conduct a range of activities aimed at increasing Congolese stakeholders’ understanding and engagement in democratic processes; mobilizing citizens, particularly excluded groups, to engage with the government and participate in elections; and increasing indigenous capacity to implement civil society and electoral education campaigns. Building on a solid foundation of activities and tools, as well as lessons learned from the 2006 elections, the VOICES project is introducing a number of innovative components, including a contest leading to the production and broadcast of three popular songs promoting political participation, production of a comic book, and other media programming on democratization, and civic education outreach through nontraditional civic education across such as health workers and community leaders.
Guinea
IFS has been working in Guinea since 1999 and has since conducted several technical assessments and provided technical assistance to a variety of electoral stakeholders, including Guinea’s Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI). With USAID funding, IFS has supported the CENI in preparing for transparency, credibility, and participation in the legislative elections in 2012. This support focused on strengthening commissions, operational capacity, and commitment to electoral integrity on the national and local levels, as well as in assisting the CENI in its efforts to keep the population informed about the electoral process through a national awareness campaign targeting women and a series of electoral stakeholder roundtables. Recently, IFS has begun working toward fostering a peaceful electoral environment in Guinea.

Liberia
IFS has a rich experience in Liberia, where it has worked over the past 15 years to support democracy and elections, including the landmark 2005 elections, which set the country on a path toward stability and development. IFS’s current five-year, USAID-funded Building Sustainable Elections Management in Liberia program will support the various upcoming elections in Liberia, including the constitutional referendum, 2017 general elections, local elections, and by-elections. Ultimately, IFS aims to increase the capacity of the National Elections Commission (NEC) to efficiently, effectively, impartially, and sustainably manage elections in the coming years. The support will focus on boundary delimitation, voter registration, civic and voter education, and general capacity building.

Sudan
IFS is currently implementing a three-year USAID contract to Election Administration Support aimed at helping the Sudanese National Electoral Commission deliver technically sound and credible elections as called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This support will cover presidential, gubernatorial, and legislative elections planned for 2015, as well as the Southern Sudan and Abyei referenda scheduled for 2011. IFS’s program is designed to accompany all phases of the electoral process and aims to support election management and build the Commission’s capacity in the areas of the regulatory framework, organizational setup, operations, and training, as well as to provide support in procuring electoral commodities.

Togo
IFS’s project in Togo focused on the country’s March 2010 elections. IFS has been strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations to conduct voter education campaigns and to mobilize voters in the run-up to the election. This program helped prepare the populace for effective political participation and enabled civil society organizations to build local capacity to continue conducting public outreach using effective tools and methodologies to reach the entire electorate, particularly women, youth, and persons with disabilities.

For more detailed information, visit www.ifes.org/africa

March 2010
RECENT PROJECTS

ANGOLA

As Angola prepared for its first elections in 16 years, IFES provided technical assistance to the country’s fledging National Electoral Commission (NEC) with funding from USAID. Once the date for the 2008 election was set, IFES opened a permanent field office in Luanda and deployed a number of local and international technical experts to assist the NEC. This assistance focused on electoral operations, the design and setup of an election observation unit, assistance with election logistics, and expansion of the scope and reach of the civic and voter education campaign. Under a sub-grant from Search for Common Ground, IFES also strengthened the capacity of journalists to engage in the electoral process and facilitate the media’s role in supporting the flow of election-related information between the provinces and the capital. Throughout election day, IFES supported the NEC in overseeing election operations and conducted several trainings to build NEC capacity in election management.

NIGERIA

In preparation for Nigeria’s 2007 elections, IFES provided technical assistance and strategic capacity building to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and a range of CSOs and candidates working on electoral issues. IFES also strengthened political party participation in the election by giving particular attention to party finances and the transparency and accountability of political parties. Following the problematic elections, IFES monitored the election complaints tribunal process, initiated a conference to determine a plan for moving forward democratically, and assessed the impact of voter education through a nation-wide survey.

KENYA

IFES has worked in Kenya since 1999, conducting a number of electoral assessments and working to create more transparent and competitive electoral processes and build the capacity of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK). Following the 2007 elections, IFES, with support from the Open Society Institute of East Africa (OSIEA), conducted an evaluation and compiled a report based on a review of the Kenyan electoral process, making recommendations for credible, accountable, and effective electoral reforms. The thorough evaluation of the Kenyan electoral process was presented to the Independent Review Commission (IRC) in August 2008 in order to provide recommendations alongside the findings of the IRC. IFES was able to draw upon lessons learned from the last several years of providing technical assistance to the ECK in the compilation of the evaluation report.

SIERRA LEONE

Since 1999, IFES has conducted various activities in Sierra Leone aiming to build the capacity of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the Political Parties Registration Commission (PPRC), through strengthening and advising these bodies, IFES facilitated the work of other stakeholders, such as civil society organizations, political parties, and, ultimately, the electorate of Sierra Leone itself, with a particular emphasis on women participation. IFES’s support has included voter education trainings for NEC staff and political party representatives, assistance to civil society trainers, roadshows with stakeholders including the District Code of Conduct Monitoring Committees, and the development of regulations for transparency in campaign finance. These efforts contributed to peaceful elections in both 2007 (national) and 2008 (local).

MALAWI

In preparation for Malawi’s 2009 elections, IFES assisted the Malawi Election Commission (MEC) with civic and voter education efforts. IFES worked with the MEC to develop a voter education and voter information strategy, a detailed operational plan, and materials that accurately portray the electoral process. This technical assistance provided a framework and methodology for the MEC and civil society groups to reach potential voters and society at large, potentially vastly improving the quality of participation in democratic processes and ensuring the sustainability and viability of democratic participation.

DJIBOUTI

From 2007-2008, IFES implemented a USAID-funded program in Djibouti with the goal of building an inclusive public dialogue on the electoral system and increasing civil society participation in the peace and governance process. A series of workshops was held at the end of 2007 aimed at increasing the participation of women and other minorities at civil society in the country’s political process. In early 2008, IFES focused its programming on support for February legislative elections in the form of training for poll workers and members of Djibouti’s Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI).
### Elections in Africa—2010

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Forgoing Democracy Is Forgoing Human Rights

By Ahmanfi Cudjoe
Special to Roll Call

When most of us think of human rights, we think of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. But the declaration in which the American founders proclaimed those rights asserts another fundamental right: the right to government by popular consent. That means the right to vote.

Like the Declaration of Independence, the Universal Declaration states that the will of the people shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures." Because having a say in the way that we are governed is a human right and representative government is a necessary foundation for all other human rights to flourish, no country should be allowed a free ticket to forgo democracy.

While individual elections often receive good media coverage, few think of democratic governance or free and fair elections as human rights. Some consider democracy a "Western" concept rather than a universal right, or an ideal for which some countries are not yet prepared.

Looking at the governments of Africa, it's easy to agree with the skeptics. Many elections, including recent ones in Tunisia and Equatorial Guinea, serve only to legitimize incumbent rulers. Sometimes elections seem ineffective, as in Mauritania, and sometimes democratic processes slip rapidly away, as in Niger.

Even worse, the 2007 elections in Kenya and the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe splashed casually figures across newspapers, and some people argued that they were not only futile but dangerous. Libya's Col. Muammar Gaddafi said earlier this year that multiparty elections in Africa led to bloodshed, and similar things have been said of Afghanistan and Iraq.

But specific failures of democracy do not justify its absence. If a government persecuted a group of people for its religious beliefs, few would proclaim that country unfit for religious freedom. We should view elections similarly: their failures warrant not despair but redoubled efforts to ensure that all people have a say in how they are governed.

Nor do elections begin and end on Election Day. They are part of a broad, complicated and sometimes challenging democratic process and the foundation of a healthy society.

Indeed, even in countries that have suffered most from failed or fraudulent elections or refusal even to hold them at all, from Iran to Nigeria, people have not forsaken democracy. They have responded by increasing their demands for reform and accountability, and for recognition of their fundamental human rights, even at risk to life and limbs.

Earlier this fall in Guinea, thousands of people marched peacefully in the streets of the capital, calling on the military junta to step down and for free and fair elections to be held. The junta responded brutally, killing a reported 138 people in the streets of Conacry and injuring thousands.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Dr. Schneidman.

STATEMENT OF WITNEY W. SCHNEIDMAN, PH.D., PRESIDENT, SCHNEIDMAN & ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL

Mr. SCHNEIDMAN. Chairman Payne and Ranking Member Smith, thank you for inviting me to testify at this important hearing and timely hearing on U.S. policy toward Africa.

One of the most important issues on the African continent is the relative poverty of the nearly 1 billion people who live there. It is critical to realize that while conditions in many of the 53 nations are simply unacceptable, vital progress is being made. One of the most important trends is the slowing rate at which people are falling into absolute poverty in sub-Saharan Africa.

From 1980 until 2000, an average of 10 million people annually fell below the poverty line. Between 2000 and the onset of the global economic recession in 2008, there was a virtual plateau in the number of people entering poverty in Africa. In fact, there were 1.2 million fewer people living in poverty in 2005 than there were in 2002, which suggests that Africa is poised to enter a new era of growth, productivity, and opportunity.

Mr. Chairman, it is against this background that I would like to respond to the issues that you asked me to address, and to make several suggestions on how the administration, Congress, U.S. companies, and civil society might build on these important trends. The African Growth and Opportunity Act continues to be the essential framework for U.S.-African economic and commercial relations. Nevertheless, in the 10 years since it was passed into law, its promise as a stimulus to the creation of light industrial manufac-
turing and job creation remains to be fulfilled. My recommendation therefore is to have Congress provide an exemption from U.S. taxation for bona fide foreign direct investment income earned by U.S. companies outside of the extractive sectors doing manufacturing or service business in any AGOA-eligible country.

This would be a great stimulus for American investment in Africa and would contribute to growth domestically by encouraging companies to repatriate capital to the U.S. It is also estimated that for every dollar deferred under this arrangement, there would be an additional $5 of African income produced. The administration is to be congratulated for its effort to create binational commissions with Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola. If structured correctly, these commissions can make a genuine contribution to the deepening of relations and enhancing specific objectives.

In each commission, however, I would urge that there be a finance working group to consist of representatives from Ex-IM, OPIC, TDA, and the U.S. private sector and appropriate individuals from the partner nations. Not only would this increase the impact of the commissions, but it would provide invaluable support to American companies seeking to enter or expand in Africa’s most significant markets.

Regional economic integration is at the forefront of Africa’s development agenda, and it should have more priority on our own agenda for the region. To help achieve this, I would recommend that the assistant secretaries at State for Africa and Business and Economics, the assistant administrator for Africa at USAID, and the assistant trade representative for Africa meet as a group on a regular basis with the heads of the regional economic commissions in Africa, along with the Economic Commission for Africa at the African Union and the African Development Bank. Such a mechanism would be low-cost, and it would contribute more focus for U.S. support for regional economic integration and market development.

Candidate Barack Obama was right to say that his administration would make the millennium development goals America’s development goals. The reality for sub-Saharan Africa, however, is that a number of countries will fall short in a number of areas in meeting the 2015 deadline set by the international community. For one, there is a financing gap of an estimated $20 billion a year on aid to Africa. The immediate question for the Obama administration, therefore, is how will it respond to those countries who do not meet the MDGs.

Of course, we cannot wait until 2015 for the answer. We need to begin planning for the inevitable now. It is vital that the State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and the Strategic Development Review being drafted in the White House provide clear direction to this most important question.

On the issue of education, school enrollment in Africa is among the lowest in the world. African governments and Africa’s partners need to invest more resources in education at all levels on the continent. The President’s African Education Initiative, which allocates $600 million to benefit 80 million children through scholarships, textbooks, and teacher training programs, is an important beginning. But we have to do more, and do it with urgency. And this is why I support the African Higher Education Expansion and
Improvement Act of 2009 that will provide Africa with long-term assistance to improve the capacity of its institutions of higher education through partnerships with institutions of higher education in the United States. Hopefully, this bill will pass in this session of Congress.

Let me close by underscoring the need for a concerted effort by the public and private sectors to work together to enhance mutual interests. Over the last several years, I have been involved with the Africa, China, U.S. trilateral dialogue established to explore ways in which the United States and China can work in common effort in support of African’s development objectives. This unique initiative is the collaboration of the Leon H. Sullivan Foundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Brenthurst Foundation in South Africa, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing.

Last month in Liberia, we had the fourth meeting of the trilateral dialogue, and it focused on corporate social responsibility and economic development. Participants included President Sirleaf of Liberia, former President John Kufuor of Ghana, the U.S. Ambassadors to Liberia the United States and China, and representatives from Chevron, Coca-Cola, Marathon Oil, DeBeers, Fina Bank, the China-Africa Development Fund, the China Export-Import Bank, and the China-Henan International Group, which has infrastructure projects in eight African countries.

All participants agree that corporate social responsibility targets must be a clearly stated part of all contracts that governments negotiate. Moreover, it was apparent that companies contributing to health, education, and job creation need to be part of the national dialogue on development goals, and that it is up to government to monitor compliance. We feel that the trilateral dialogue has a great deal of potential to enhance U.S.-Chinese cooperation in Africa, and would encourage the Obama administration and the Chinese Government, in conjunction with the African Union, to establish a similar mechanism.

Mr. Chairman, thank you once again for holding this very important hearing and asking me to be part of it.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneidman follows:]
SCHNEIDMAN & ASSOCIATES
INTERNATIONAL

Testimony
Of
Dr. Witney W. Schneidman
President, Schneidman & Associates International
Before the House Foreign Relations Committee
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health
March 24, 2010

“U.S. Policy Towards Africa: An Initial Assessment”

Chairman Payne, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify at this important hearing on U.S. policy toward Africa. My remarks reflect more than 35 years of experience working on the continent including having served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Clinton Administration, having co-chaired the Africa Experts Group on the Obama Campaign, having worked on key African issues on the Presidential Transition Team and for nearly a decade having led a consulting group that works with American companies and NGOs active on the continent.

I also have the privilege of serving on the Trade Advisory Committee on Africa in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Sub-Saharan African Advisory Committee at the U.S. Export-Import Bank.

The Broad Trend

The most important issue on the African continent is the relative poverty of the 1 billion people who live there. It is critical to realize that while conditions in many of the 53 nations are simply unacceptable, vital progress is being made.

One of the most important trends is the slowing of the rate at which people are falling into absolute poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa.
From 1980 until 2000, an average of 10 million people annually fell below the poverty line, according to the World Bank. Between 2000 and the onset of the global economic recession in 2008, there was a virtual plateau in the number of people entering poverty in Africa.

In fact, there were 1.2 million fewer people living in poverty in 2005 than there were in 2002 which suggests that Africa is poised to enter a new era of growth, productivity and opportunity. This is especially true if the global economy continues its recovery and Africa achieves its projected growth rates of 4.5 percent or more this year.

This progress is explained by several factors. One is the commodity “super-cycle,” during which prices for African oil, minerals and other commodities reach unprecedented levels. While these prices, along with the region’s growth rate, collapsed during the global recession, they contributed significantly to economic growth on the continent in the first part of the 21st century.

More important than these prices, however, are the broad trends of economic and political reform that have become the norm, by and large, across the continent since the end of the Cold War. Accountability and transparency have increased dramatically, elections are the norm, critical conflicts have ended and fiscal and monetary policy making have fostered market-based growth.

At the same time, most countries on the continent are starting from a low base, some countries have done better at carrying out reforms than others and conflicts persist in critical areas. There is a need to accelerate and broaden economic growth on the continent as well as to strengthen democracy, transparency and accountability and the institutions and programs that underpin good governance.

It is against this backdrop that I applaud the Obama Administration’s early engagement with Africa. President Obama’s visit to Ghana underscored the importance of strengthening institutions on the continent and Secretary Clinton’s comprehensive seven nation visit laid out a broad U.S. agenda as it concerns economic development, conflict resolution and mitigation and trade and investment, among other issues.

Mr. Chairman, it is against this background that I would like to share several thoughts on how the Administration, U.S. companies and civil society might build on these important trends.

The African Growth and Opportunity Act

AGOA continues to be the essential framework for U.S.–African economic and commercial relations. Nevertheless, in the ten years since it was passed into law, its promise as a stimulus to the creation of light-industrial manufacturing and job creation remains to be fulfilled. For example, according to the Commerce Department, AGOA textiles and apparel imports declined by 10.4 percent between 2008 and 2009, while AGOA agricultural products declined by
7.9 percent during this same time frame. The good news is that U.S. exports increased by nearly
30 percent to $18.5 billion, driven by the growth in several sectors.

I would like to make a suggestion that would help to revitalize AGOA, strengthen the
position of the U.S. and American business on the continent and help to accelerate Africa’s
integration into the global economy. The proposal would be for Congress to provide an
exemption from US taxation for bona fide foreign direct investment income earned by a
registered subsidiary or branch of a U.S. company, outside of the extractive sectors, doing
manufacturing or service business in any AGOA-eligible country.

Not only would this be a stimulus for American investment in Africa by lowering the risk
and increasing the rate of return but it would also contribute to growth in the U.S. economy by
encouraging companies to repatriate capital to the U.S. Moreover, the cost to the U.S. would be
very small. It is estimated that for every dollar deferred under this arrangement there would be
an additional $5 dollars of African income produced.

Mr. Chairman, it is also important to highlight the Economic Partnership Agreements that
the EU is promoting in Africa. I share the concern of colleagues that these EPAs will
discriminate against US exports, divert African trade from more efficient and less costly
suppliers, impede regional integration and lead to significant tariff loss. I would urge
Ambassador Kirk and his colleagues at USTR to engage our partners in the EU and in Africa to
ensure that the terms of trade are not aligning against African and U.S. interests.

Bi-National Commissions

The Administration is to be congratulated for its efforts to create bi-national commissions
with Nigeria, South Africa and Angola. If structured correctly, these commissions can make a
genuine contribution to the deepening of relations and enhancing specific objectives.

In each commission, however, I would urge that there be a finance working group to
consist of representatives from Exim, OPIC, TDA, the U.S. private sector and appropriate
individuals from the host nations. Not only does this increase the “deliverable” that we can offer
our African hosts but it provides invaluable support to American companies seeking to enter or
expand in Africa’s most significant markets.

In the same vein, I value my participation on the Trade Advisory Committee on Africa at
USTR. The TACA includes a diverse and very experienced group of individuals, largely from
the private sector, who have tremendous experience in Africa. As USTR develops an increasing
number of Trade and Investment Framework Agreements in Africa, I believe that there would be
great benefit in encouraging host government to establish private sector advisory groups in the
same way that TACA advises USTR. In order to enhance Africa’s investment environment, we
need to ensure that the policy discussion on trade and investment takes place in the most
informed context as possible.
Regional Integration

Regional trade is critical to Africa’s economic development. Unfortunately the ratio of Africa’s regional trade to its global trade is far below any other region of the world. Nevertheless, regional integration is at the forefront of Africa’s development agenda and it should have more priority on our own agenda for the region. Given the need for sovereign guarantees, it is difficult for entities like the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the World Bank to develop projects that address regional infrastructure and market issues.

Nevertheless, we could structure a low cost mechanism that would position the U.S. to understand how we could contribute more directly to regional integration and how we can work to make the regional markets of East, Southern, Central and West Africa more of a reality for all stakeholders, including U.S. business. I would recommend, therefore, that the Assistant Secretaries at State for Africa and Business, Economics and Agriculture and the Assistant Administrator for Africa at USAID meet on an annual basis with the heads of SADC, COMESA, IGAD, ECOWAS and CEMAC, facilitated by the Economic Commission for Africa at the AU and to include the African Development Bank. Not only would such a mechanism be helpful to USAID’s Regional Programs but it would contribute more direction for U.S. support for regional economic integration and market development.

The Millennium Development Goals

Candidate Barack Obama was right to say during the campaign that his administration would make the Millennium Development Goals America’s development goals. Not only do they represent a global consensus on development priorities but they serve as important benchmarks for social and economic progress. In fact, the MDGs represent a historic framework for focus and accountability.

The reality for Sub-Saharan Africa, however, is that many of the MDGs will not be met. For one, there is a financing gap. Although development assistance rose to record levels in 2008, donors are falling short by $35 billion per year on the 2005 pledge on annual aid flows made by the Group of Eight in Gleneagles, and by $20 billion a year on aid to Africa, according to the 2009 Report of the MDG Gap Task Force.

At the same time, in Sub-Saharan Africa, progress on achieving the MDGs has been decidedly mixed. For example, the region has made significant improvements in child health and in primary school enrollment over the past two decades. Between 1999 and 2004, Sub-Saharan Africa achieved one of the largest ever reductions in deaths from measles worldwide.

Nevertheless, poverty and hunger remain stubbornly high. The target for full and decent employment for all will remain unfulfilled. Given the global recession, the ILO estimates that 28 million additional workers in Sub-Saharan Africa live with their families on less than $1.25 per day.
The point here is not to review the MDGs. The question for the Obama Administration is how will it respond in 2015 to those countries who do not meet the MDGs. Of course, we cannot wait until 2015 for the answer; we need to begin planning for the inevitable now. It is vital that the State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and the Strategic Development Review being drafted in the White House provide clear answers to this most important question.

**Education**

School enrollment in Africa is among the lowest in the world. Limited funds and a lack of adequate teachers, exacerbated in some countries by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and the lack of classrooms and learning materials adversely affect the educational environment throughout most of the continent. I applaud, therefore, the President’s Africa Education Initiative which is a $600-million multi-year program that focuses on increasing access to quality basic education in 39 Sub-Saharan countries through scholarships, textbooks and teacher training programs. It is expected that 80 million children will benefit from this initiative.

Mr. Chairman, as important as the AEI is, it is not enough, and we can and should do more. A quality education is something that every parent, be they in the United States, Africa or elsewhere, wants for their child. Enhanced education at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels is vital to Africa’s accelerated development.

For this reason, I support the African Higher Education Expansion and Improvement Act of 2009 that will provide Africa with long-term assistance to improve the capacity of its institutions of higher education through partnerships with institutions of higher education in the U.S.

Through a project that I helped to initiate at the Leon H. Sullivan Foundation in conjunction with the Children’s Radio Foundation in New York, we have utilized Audio Pen Pal technology to link students at Maitland High School in Cape Town with their counterparts at Phelps High School in Northwest Washington, D.C., to explore issues related to excellence in education, community violence and climate change. Working with the U.S. Embassy in South Africa, we will arrange for the students to “meet” each other through a two-hour digital video conference.

This low-cost, far-reaching format has great potential not only for linking classrooms and students in the U.S. and Africa to each other, but it can also be useful for linking teachers and mobilizing resources in the U.S. for education in Africa.

**Public-Private Partnerships**

Given the challenges facing many countries on the continent, there needs to be a concerted effort by the public and private sectors to work together to enhance mutual interests.
Over the last several years, I have been involved with the Africa-China-U.S. Trilateral Dialogue. This unique initiative is a collaboration of the Leon H. Sullivan Foundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Brethren Foundation in South Africa and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. This collaboration was initiated in 2006 to explore how the U.S. and China can work in common effort in support of Africa’s development objectives.

Last month in Liberia, we had the fourth meeting of the Trilateral Dialogue and it focused on corporate social responsibility and development. Participants included President Sirleaf, former President John Kufuor, the U.S. ambassadors to Liberia from the U.S. and China and representatives from Chevron, CocaCola, Marathon Oil, De Beers Botswana, Ltd., Fina Bank, the China-Africa Development Fund, the China Export-Import Bank and the China Henan International Cooperation Group (CHICO) which has infrastructure projects in 8 African countries.

All participants agreed that corporate social responsibility targets must be a clearly stated part of all contracts that governments negotiate. Moreover, it was apparent that companies contributing to health, education and job creation need to be part of the national dialogue on development goals, and that it is up to government to monitor compliance.

We feel that the Trilateral Dialogue has a great deal of potential to enhance U.S.-Chinese cooperation in Africa, and would encourage the Obama Administration and the Chinese Government, perhaps in conjunction with the African Union, to establish a similar mechanism at the official level.

Climate Change

Let me close by making a brief comment on one of the most important issues of our day, and one of the most important facing Africa, and that is climate change. During a recent visit to Africa, the IMF’s Managing Director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, announced that his organization was working on the development of a “Green Fund,” with the capacity to raise $100 billion a year by 2020. Much of this financing would be in the form of grants or highly concessional loans drawing on budgetary transfers from developed countries, scaled-up carbon taxes and expanded carbon trading mechanisms.

There is no question that Africa has contributed the least to climate change and could easily be impacted the most negatively of any region in the world. Working with our partners globally, we have to ensure that this does not occur.

Mr. Chairman, I urge you and your colleagues to explore ideas such as the one being developed by the IMF in order to deliver not only resources but the technical assistance to ensure that Africa truly becomes the continent of vast opportunity for which it has such abundant and apparent potential. Thank you.
Mr. PAYNE. Well, thank you very much for your contribution. Thank you, Mr. Simpkins.

STATEMENT OF MR. GREGORY B. SIMPKINS, VICE PRESIDENT, POLICY & PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT, THE LEON H. SULLIVAN FOUNDATION

Mr. SIMPKINS. I would like to thank subcommittee Chairman Payne and Ranking Member Smith for allowing me to testify today, and I appreciated my time working with you both and look forward to supporting your initiatives for Africa’s development.

The Leon H. Sullivan Foundation has had a longstanding interest in U.S. policy toward Africa. We led a civil society coalition in 2008 that issued a questionnaire on Africa policy to the Presidential candidates. I am happy to say that our current President and Vice President were the first to answer that questionnaire. And we presented a white paper on our Government’s Africa policy shortly after the election of President Obama in 2008, and we are about to launch a survey on the views of our stakeholders on American Africa policy that will be shared this September at our Africa Policy Forum at the Sullivan Global Reunion in Atlanta.

I also am policy committee chair of the African-American Unity Caucus, a coalition of dozens of organizations that focus on the various aspects of our policy toward Africa. Every September, during the Ronald H. Brown African Affairs series, our members present forums on important Africa issues facing our Government.

Certainly, we expect President Obama to continue the growing engagement with Africa that his immediate predecessors championed and take America’s relationship to Africa to a new level.

Unfortunately, this administration faces crises that distract from longer-term planning and implementation of development policy for Africa. There are countries in Africa with active violence, such as Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, or others with simmering tensions, including Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.

Meanwhile, there are long-term issues that also must figure into American policy. Good governance, enhancing agricultural production, food security, stemming the tide of disease, raising the level of education, stemming the impact of the brain drain, and many other issues pose a challenge in executing an effective Africa policy. In selecting policy options, the Leon H. Sullivan Foundation has developed recommendations for the administration and congressional actions that include, one, effective diplomacy in conjunction with regional African organizations to address warfare, lack of governance, and piracy involving Somalia, Guinea, and other troubled countries; two, multilevel strategies to identify and implement a lasting solution to the complex problems in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo and their longstanding warfare and violence, and in some cases genocide; three, American security assistance and U.S. Government and private sector support for more effective programs in communities in Nigeria, Angola, and other oil-producing African countries; four, diplomatic and programmatic attention to simmering crises in Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa, and other African countries facing internal turmoil before these ten-
sions overflow; five, consensus among African and African Diaspora leaders on dealing forthrightly with the regime in Zimbabwe.

And I would like to at this point acknowledge the chairman's intervention in Zimbabwe to support respect for democratic governance. It is much appreciated.

Sixth, U.S. Government assistance and American private sector investment in all forms of infrastructure in Africa in order to make AGOA more practically effective; seven, encouragement of business-to-business linkages between African and American small and medium enterprises for AGOA to be more broadly implemented; eight, effective rules for how to proceed in the fight against corruption in Africa, as well as a stepped-up U.S. effort to facilitate the return of stolen funds to repay debts and address unmet social needs; nine, elevation of the importance of U.S.-Africa agricultural trade, capacity building assistance for African producers, and encouragement for investment by Americans in African agriculture; ten, enhanced support for distance learning and student and teacher exchanges, as well as encouragement of the involvement of members of the African Diaspora in America in diminishing the impact of Africa's brain drain, especially in the health sector; eleven, stronger endorsement for effective corporate social responsibility practices as embodied in the Global Sullivan Principles for Corporate Social Responsibility, which is part of the trilateral dialogue that Mr. Schneidman talked about; and finally, continued empowerment of women and youth through African civil society organizations and the enhancement of the capacity of civil society organizations themselves.

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Simpkins follows:]
Raising the Level of Engagement Between America and Africa

Presented to the U.S. House Subcommittee
On Africa and Global Health
March 24, 2010

Gregory B. Simpkins
Vice President for Policy and Program Development
I’d like to thank Subcommittee Chairman Payne and Ranking Member Smith for allowing me to testify today on the issue of American foreign policy toward Africa. I have analyzed or participated in our country’s foreign policy for more than 30 years and have had the honor of working with this Subcommittee for part of that time. I now write a weekly blog on Africa issues (http://africarising2010.blogspot.com).

The Leon H. Sullivan Foundation presented a white paper on our government’s Africa policy shortly after the election of President Obama in 2008, which we shared with both this Subcommittee’s Chairman and Ranking Member and their counterparts in the Senate. It also was shared with Assistant Secretary of State Johnny Carson and others in the executive branch. We are about to launch a survey on the views of American Africa policy that will be shared this September at our Africa Policy Forum at the Sullivan Global Reunion in Atlanta.

I also am Policy Committee Chair of the African American Unity Caucus, a coalition of dozens of organizations that focus on the various aspects of our policy toward Africa. Every September, during the Ronald H. Brown African Affairs Series, our members present forums on important Africa issues facing our government. We also have forums at other points in the year, such as the one featuring Assistant Secretary Carson last year.

For many years, the United States had no Africa policy beyond that connected to policy involving the colonial powers – our European allies. During the period in which African nations were gaining their independence, American policy was guided by the policy of the European colonial power in question, except, for example, Liberia and South Africa. Then-Vice President Richard Nixon came to support U.S.-Africa trade as the result of his late 1950s visit to Africa for the Eisenhower Administration, but not much resulted from his suggested initiative. The end of colonialism provided an opening for more direct engagement with the new African governments, but that opportunity was not taken advantage of at the outset.

When President George H.W. Bush became president, few would have expected him to do anything much to benefit Africa despite his extensive foreign policy expertise. As it turned out, his Administration came to power at a point in history when the Cold War influence on U.S. policy toward Africa was about to end and colonialism was already finished. Now America could consider relationships with African nations that had nothing to do with European colonial powers or the former Soviet Union. Under the first Bush Administration, the United States fielded a large humanitarian operation in Somalia and created the Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund, which would make significant technical contributions to the wave of African elections and transitions to democratic systems in the 1990s.

Moreover, the Administration of the first President Bush issued National Security Review 30, a paper that outlined a broad policy of increased U.S. engagement with Africa. That policy initiative came too late in his Administration to be enacted, but fortunately, President Bill Clinton did enact it. Clinton had no Africa experience to speak of coming into the presidency, but building on the Bush plan, he produced a robust engagement of Africa that has set the tone for his successors. He signed into law the first African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which realized the increased U.S.-Africa trade Nixon had spoken of decades earlier. Many of his Cabinet secretaries visited Africa and involved their departments in Africa programming.
The second President George Bush came into office with no Africa experience as well, but he assembled a remarkable record of achievement on Africa policy, including his Administration’s greatly expanded contributions of funds to combat HIV-AIDS and malaria on the continent, his steadfast advocacy of AGOA, his support for African education (especially for girls) and his partnership with African governments on mutual security issues.

We expect President Obama to continue the growing engagement with Africa that his immediate predecessors championed and take America’s relationship with Africa to a new level. Unfortunately, like all Administrations, President Obama faces crises that distract from longer-term planning and implementation of development policy for Africa.

**Immediate Crises**

Because of the imminent loss of life, the new Administration and Congress have had to deal with issues of insecurity and conflict. The Bush Administration was focused on conflict issues in Africa and did achieve successes in ending conflicts, particularly in West Africa and the North-South civil war in Sudan. However, there remain conflicts in Africa that must be given priority treatment.

Somalia continues to pose a particularly important concern for a number of reasons. This East African nation has been a source of instability in the Horn of Africa since the fall of its last national government in 1991, with militias crossing into Kenya, weapons flowing into Uganda and UIIC support for Somali rebels in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region expanding that long-simmering conflict. Moreover, since the attacks of 9/11, the Pentagon and intelligence services have been focused on the potential for al-Qaeda to use the ungoverned spaces and non-existent border controls in Somalia to build a terrorist network. Consequently, the al-Qaeda-connected youth and military wing of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIIC) – al-Shabab – were placed on the list of foreign terrorist organizations. More recently, pirates operating from Somalia have seized ships (including a $100 million Saudi oil tanker) and hundreds of crewmen and pose an increasingly serious threat to maritime operations in the Gulf of Aden.

Of course, Sudan has been a perennial concern for U.S. policymakers in recent years. The Darfur conflict has not only consumed diplomatic efforts by the U.S. government, but also resources taken from other Africa projects. There are elements that make resolution of conflict in Sudan problematic. First, continuing violence in Darfur has claimed hundreds of lives, and the influx of weapons into southern Sudan threatens renewed conflict before or after the referendum on self-determination next January. Second, the upcoming elections in Sudan are not being broadly contested by the opposition parties, which the Khartoum government hopes will lend it legitimacy. Third, the International Criminal Court indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir – the first such case of charges brought against a sitting head of state – has made negotiations with Sudan more problematic. Given all the factors involved, further U.S. action on Sudan is inescapable, but this complex situation, which also involves Sudan’s impact on neighbors such as Chad and the Central African Republic, will continue to be a U.S. priority and a U.S. responsibility.

Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo is the one African issue President Obama addressed as Senator. Then-Senator Obama’s legislation – S. 2125 –
calls on the Congolese government to reform its behavior in order to qualify for reconstruction support. The five-year conflict that began in 1997 – sometimes referred to as “Africa’s world war” – eventually involved Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe on behalf of government forces, while Uganda and Rwanda backed the rebels. An estimated 5–4 million people lost their lives during that war. Renewed conflict in eastern Congo has claimed thousands more lives, while more than 250,000 Congolese remain displaced. A share of Congo’s vast mineral wealth, which includes vital supplies of diamonds, gold, cobalt, oil and rubies, has been an incentive for neighboring countries to engage in warfare in Congo. Conflict further has been driven by the ongoing ethnic element of Tutsis living in the East finding discord with Hutu refugees from Rwanda, as well as local Congolese ethnic groups such as the Mai-Mai.

There are tensions just below the surface in many other nations that could break out into armed conflict (and have in some cases). Global impacts already have been seen in oil producing nations such as Nigeria. Many Americans may not have been fully aware of how attacks on oil pipelines and the kidnapping of oil workers in Nigeria’s Delta region made significant contributions to the steady rise in oil prices in recent years. While Nigeria is one of the wealthiest African nations based on per capita income, there is tremendous poverty amongst the oil wealth, especially in some of Nigeria’s richest states. The current power struggle between Acting President Goodluck Jonathan and apparently incapacitated President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua is causing further instability. Nigeria accounts for 50% of West Africa’s gross domestic product, and its implosion would quickly cripple the regional economy, and significant oil supply interruptions would help send global oil prices higher in short order.

The contentious 2007 election in Kenya led to weeks of ethnic clashes that claimed the lives of an estimated 1,500 people. Some in the international community, apparently mostly here in Washington, were surprised at the level of violence sparked by the disputed elections, but Kenya has a troubled ethnic history dating back to colonial times. In the days since multi-party democracy in Kenya returned in 1992, there has been continuous wrangling among the dominant Kikuyus, the Luos, the Luyas and other ethnic groups and among the politicians who represent those groups. Moreover, the World Bank four years ago placed Kenya among 11 African countries described as being deficient in wealth creation efforts because of massive destruction and depletion of natural resources and high population growth. Given the important role Kenya has played in America’s Africa policy, the United States cannot fail to take note of ethnic unrest that could boil over into deadly clashes that threaten the stability of an ally.

The importance and relative wealth of an ally must not blind us to painful truths about instability. South Africa is arguably the most economically powerful African nation, certainly among the non-oil producers. South Africa was one of the G20 nations called together to consult on the global economic meltdown. Nevertheless, South Africa has fissures that threaten to erupt if not handled well. There is a widening economic cleavage between rich and poor black people in South Africa. The numbers of black South Africans living on less than $1 a day has risen from 1.8 million in 1996 to 4.2 million in 2005, according to the South African Institute for Race Relations, and this gap is not being significantly closed. A nation such as South Africa, which has critical minerals and gems such as diamonds, gold and platinum and world-class companies, such as South African Breweries (which owns Miller Beer Company in America), would create a global ripple if unrest were to cripple its economy in the post-majority rule era. South Africa is in reality two countries: one is a developed world nation with Western
infrastructure and the other is a poor African country with high crime and unemployment and inadequate social services and jobs.

Uganda survived the mass killings by the regimes of Milton Obote and Idi Amin to become one of the continent’s most admired countries under the leadership of Yoweri Museveni. The country’s major cloud has been in the form of the Lord’s Resistance Army, a rebel group attempting to establish rule according to the Bible’s 10 Commandments. Led by fanatical leader Joseph Kony, the LRA has plagued not only northern Uganda, but also southern Sudan and eastern Congo. More than 25,000 Ugandan children have been caught up in the northern Uganda war - either as child soldiers or concubines or as internal refugees nightly attempting to escape capture by rebels. Some children continue to fall, and two million Ugandans have been displaced. International aid agencies have had difficulty in delivering much-needed supplies to help those involved in a humanitarian crisis that rivals that of Darfur. Many of the rebels are kidnapped children, and their capture has been the goal. Their reintegration into Ugandan society, though, will not be easy. Local Ugandans fear the boys trained to be killers and often refuse to accept the girls who have reluctantly become mothers due to their nightmare experiences in the LRA.

The growing crisis in Zimbabwe was farmed out to the South African government by the Bush Administration, which had initiated a policy relatively early on to stop engaging with the regime of President Robert Mugabe. Then-South African President Thabo Mbeki was seen by Americans as the leader of a powerful African nation to whom the Zimbabweans owed much. "To Zimbabwe’s leader, however, Mbeki was a second-generation post-colonial leader and not his equal," wrote South Africa President Jacob Zuma was a liberation leader who served time in Robben Island Prison and has a strong labor base, which makes him less easy for Mugabe to ignore. Mugabe has successfully played the role of the victim of neo-colonial efforts to dominate his country and managed to portray the British reenging or promises to fund purchases of white farms as manipulation on their part rather than a reaction to cronyism in the allocation of farms. With President Zuma now in charge of negotiations, one expects this political shield wielded by Mugabe to become ineffective.

**Major Long-Term Issues**

When the Bush Administration created the Millennium Challenge Account, it installed a new formula for deciding which countries would be recipients of grants larger than those normally provided under foreign aid programs. Participating governments were required to create economic freedom, rule justly and invest in their people. Furthermore, they had to effectively control corruption and devise a business plan in conjunction with the business sector and civil society. This formula is critical to creating an environment in which good government can be established and maintained. Almost simultaneous with the American effort was an African process to achieve similar goals.

At a summit in Durban, South Africa in July 2002, the newly-created New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) successfully promoted a Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance that committed participating African governments to “just, honest, transparent, accountable and participatory government and probity in public life.” In order to fulfill that commitment, NEPAD presented the concept of an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to which governments voluntarily agree to be measured in terms of democracy and political
governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio-economic development.

The mechanism was hailed by the international community, but many donors neglected to acknowledge the term “voluntary” and insisted that the APRM was bogus so long as countries such as Zimbabwe were not assessed. Thus far, 29 African governments have signed onto the APRM, and as of November 2008, nine countries have undergone the review process: Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, South Africa, Algeria, Benin, Uganda, Burkina Faso and Nigeria.

U.S. and Africa policy dovetail on this matter, and there is ample ground for collaboration to make the MCA and APRM processes more effective. What would further enhance the common intent to promote good government would be the fulfillment of an often-discussed but little-implemented American plan to work with African governments to recover stolen funds – both from government revenues and from donor funds.

Approximately, 70% of Africans are believed to be involved in the agriculture sector. Nevertheless, while agriculture is the backbone of African economies, agricultural output in Africa has declined significantly from the 1960s, when many African countries were self-sufficient in food production. The UN Food and Agricultural Organization estimates that nearly 200 million Africans were undernourished in the year 2000 as opposed to only 133 million 20 years earlier.

There are many causes for this lack of agricultural production, including a diversion of attention to oil production, a lack of modern agricultural techniques, poor soil due to overuse, the diversion of crops to create alternative fuels and a dearth of investment in African agriculture. One major reason that has been suggested is the lack of markets for African agricultural products due to developed country sanitary/phytosanitary regulations that are not well understood by African agricultural producers. Oil and gas comprise nearly 90% of AGOA imports into the United States even though many of the 6,400 eligible items are agricultural products.

Africa has lost one-third of its human capital, according to the International Organization for Migration, and since 1990, an average of 20,000 skilled professionals leave the continent annually. IOM estimates that more than 300,000 skilled African professionals now live abroad. In a paper presented at AFRICAfest at the University of Pennsylvania in 2002, Dr. John Kwanuka Ssemakula, a Ugandan public health doctor living and working in the United States, stated that each skilled individual who leaves an Africa country costs approximately $184,000 in replacements costs, totaling $4 billion for about 100,000 foreign experts.

Once world-class African universities are suffering from a lack of resources and losing experienced professors at an alarming rate. Meanwhile, African countries have among the lowest rates of primary school enrollment in the world. At the beginning of this century, approximately 82 million young women and 51 million young men were illiterate, with another 130 million children not in school.

The image of African villagers carrying water, wood and even commercial goods by foot may be a quaint sight for tourists, but it is inconsistent with Africa’s transportation needs in the 21st century. The Financial Times did a series of articles in 2006 examining
the African infrastructure challenges as well as the successes that have been achieved. The publication reported that the paucity of transportation connections, particularly by road, has been a glaring obstacle to regional and even national integration. Few railway lines have been built since independence. At current rates, it is estimated that 50% of sub-Saharan Africans will lack electricity by 2020. While drought is the persistent image many have of Africa, there are available water resources, although only three percent of renewable water resources are managed, and nearly 40% of Africans still lack access to clean water.

Thanks to the entrepreneurial spirit and the presence of public-private partnerships, however, the infrastructure news is not all bad. The number of mobile telephone lines in Africa rose nearly 54% between 2000 and 2006, compared with 24% globally. In Nigeria, entrepreneurs have started private airlines to first compete with and then compensate for the collapse of Nigerian Airways. The U.S. Agency for International Development’s African Global Competitiveness Initiative has committed $200 million through 2010 for African economic development, and its infrastructure component seeks to leverage more than $41 billion in investments in energy and other infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa. American investment and expertise can help Africa leap into the 21st century in all forms of infrastructure as it has with telecommunications.

Other Important Issues

Environics International, a Canadian-based issues research and consulting firm, released a 20-country survey in 2006, which found that in wealthy countries, corporate social responsibility contributes more to corporate reputations than brand image and that companies that ignore this lesson risk market share. This lesson has been learned by companies operating in Africa, who are adopting CSR standards. Unilever in Ghana, Anglo-American in South Africa, Mozal Aluminum in Mozambique and Brookside Dairy in Kenya are among the growing number of companies operating in Africa with active CSR practices.

At the seventh Leon H. Sullivan Summit in Abuja, Nigeria, in July 2006, ten African heads of State signed a declaration endorsing the Global Sullivan Principles for Corporate Social Responsibility (GSP). Overall, there are more than 400 endorsers of GSP globally, including companies operating in Africa. GSP provides a framework by which socially responsible businesses, governments and organizations can be aligned. Implementing these principles can create a more favorable commercial environment in African countries, can safeguard the human rights and safety of employees and involve corporations in mutually beneficial relationships with the communities in which they operate. It is particularly useful as a guide for governments in the process of negotiating concessions with companies seeking to utilize natural resources.

Increasingly, civil society in Africa is being asked to facilitate an expanded role in society for both women and youth. Traditionally, the role of women has been limited in African countries and policies were routinely developed without significant female input, but that is changing. At the inception of NEPAD, women’s groups banded together to protest the lack of involvement of women in its creation, but by the time of the development of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme in 2003, NEPAD acknowledged that “special attention must be given to the vital food-procuring and entrepreneurial roles of women in rural and urban African communities.” An estimated two-thirds of African economies involve women entrepreneurs.
African youth have faced a troubling trend that threatens their future. According to the International Labour Organization, the number of young people aged 15 to 24 seeking jobs in sub-Saharan Africa continues to outpace the number of new jobs being created in the region. Too often, unemployed African youth, including educated youth, are falling into crime or being recruited into political party and government militias. The creativity of young people is not being properly applied to African development, and many young people are emigrating for opportunities abroad, further exacerbating Africa’s brain drain. African college graduates are not counted as professionals if they never work in their professions because of a lack of employment opportunities, but they represent an uncounted portion of the brain drain since they take what skills they have with them if they leave their home country. Therefore, the brain drain could be much worse than what is currently calculated.

African civil society organizations provide the early warning system for crises in African countries and are the nexus between donor programs and the grassroots. Continued empowerment of women and youth through African civil society organizations and the enhancement of the capacity of civil society organizations themselves are critical goals for the U.S. government.

**Recommendations**

As I have stated earlier, there are numerous challenges in executing an effective Africa policy in the areas of: insecurity and conflict, governance, food security/agriculture, human capital development, infrastructure/transportation, corporate social responsibility and civil society development. Here are my recommendations for addressing these issues:

In selecting policy options, the Leon H. Sullivan Foundation has developed recommendations for Administration and Congressional actions that include:

- Diplomacy in conjunction with regional African organizations to address warfare, lack of governance and piracy involving Somalia, Guinea and other troubled African countries;
- Multi-level strategies to identify and implement a lasting solution to the complex problems in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo;
- American security assistance and U.S. government and private sector support for more effective community programs in oil communities in Nigeria, Angola and other oil-producing African countries;
- Diplomatic and programmatic attention to simmering crises in Kenya, South Africa and other African countries facing internal turmoil;
- Consensus among African and African Diaspora leaders on dealing forthrightly with the regime in Zimbabwe;
- U.S. government assistance and American private sector investment in all forms of infrastructure in Africa;
• Effective rules for how to proceed in the fight against corruption in Africa, as well as a stepped-up U.S. effort to facilitate the return of stolen funds to repay debts and address unmet social needs;

• Elevation of the importance of U.S.-Africa agricultural trade, capacity building assistance for African producers and encouragement for investment in African agriculture;

• Enhanced support for distance learning and student and teacher exchanges, as well as encouragement of the involvement of members of the African Diaspora in America in diminishing the impact of Africa’s brain drain;

• Stronger endorsement for effective corporate social responsibility practices as embodied in the Global Sullivan Principles for Corporate Social Responsibility, and

• Continued empowerment of women and youth through African civil society organizations and the enhancement of the capacity of civil society organizations themselves.

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. And let me thank you all of you for your testimony. Let me begin with you, Ambassador Lyman. Since you were an Ambassador both to South Africa and Nigeria—of course, South Africa elections are over, but with Nigeria's coming up—in your opinion, how do you rate the democracy and civic involvement in both Nigeria and South Africa today as opposed to when you were Ambassador in those countries? In other words, do you feel that there has been progress overall when you look back, or would you say there has been a decline in those two very important, most important, countries on the continent?

Ambassador Lyman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start with Nigeria. I think the sad thing about Nigeria after the return to civilian rule in 1999, which gave everybody, especially the Nigerians, a great deal of hope—the elections got steadily worse. In 1999, it was no great shakes; in 2003, it was worse, and in 2007 worse than that. It is because the focus was more on amassing winning votes and less on improving the process. There is a fundamental problem in Nigeria that Nigerians identify, and that is loyalty is up, not down. That is, you get your job by the party picking you, and then you do whatever it takes to get elected. And then you don't have to collect taxes because your largesse comes from the center through the oil revenues, which are distributed, which you then use for patronage.

It is not a good system for solving these underlying problems of Nigeria, which I mentioned. I think that the remedies are very clear. They have had studies on what to do about electoral reform. They have had studies on how to develop the delta. I think everybody in Nigeria knows that the ethnic violence we have seen is also competition for land and resources, and it is also manipulated by political leaders.

Everybody, I think, knows where the solutions are. The question is how do you get the elite to act with much more foresight and long-term commitment to Nigeria? I think that is going to be a difficult thing to do. I think we can encourage it. Civil society, ironically, in Nigeria is very active, more active than when I was there for sure, and there are lots of institutions operating, but they haven't really had an impact. And the business community, ironically, doesn't—it presses for better economic policy, but it stays out of politics. It doesn't press for greater governance and democracy. And that, I think, is something we ought to engage the community on.

There is a lot of dynamism in Nigeria, as you well know, Mr. Chairman. But I think they are at a very critical stage, that as I suggested in my testimony, Nigeria could slip ever downward if they don't grasp these fundamental problems. They are going to have to start with electoral reform, and they don't have much time before the next election, and then they have got to move from there in many ways.

In South Africa, I think there has been a lot of progress in the sense that the institutions of democracy and the constitution have held up fairly well. The courts have been strong, particularly the constitutional court. Elections have been carried out reasonably well. There is freedom of the press, et cetera. What is disappointing is that because it is almost a one-party state, because the ANC is
so dominant, that the dynamism, the new ideas, and the ethics have to come from the ANC. And I think they have slipped on all three.

There is a good deal of corruption, and much of it is covered up. There is not cohesion on economic policy. There is not efficiency in the administration. These are worrisome trends. I don’t think it is in crisis mode, but I do think there is going to have to be some revitalization of commitment. Perhaps there is some serious, serious thinking within the ANC and outside of it as to how they get back to some of those exciting principles that we all felt in the 1990s.

Here again the United States can be very encouraging. We have a very dynamic team now in South Africa. But we have to engage a lot of people. We have to encourage a lot of discussion on these areas. Again, there is an active civil society. There is an outspoken opposition in the Parliament. But until the ANC starts to reform itself, there are going to be some serious problems.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Well, since you hit the big two, maybe you can just make a comment about Ethiopia and their upcoming election.

Ambassador LYMAN. Well, as I stated, it is a real conundrum. Here is a very important country, very important to our strategy in East Africa, very important in security matters, increasingly influential, other countries investing in the country, a very shrewd and smart leader. And on the other hand, as we heard already today, increasingly more oppression, more arresting of people, control of the press, nastiness toward American institutions like the VOA. Very disturbing. And the question is, what do we do in that kind of a situation? And as I suggested, the aid program doesn’t give you that kind of leverage.

This aid is lifesaving. It is wonderful. But 84 percent of it is keeping people alive. You can’t say, well, you are not having clean elections, we are going to cut back on ARV treatments for HIV/AIDS victims. You can’t do that. So we have to find another way to bring our influence to bear. But I think we have to recognize that we have limited influence under these circumstances. And I think it is a serious problem in our relations with Ethiopia.

I do think that voices have to come even from outside the administration because the administration is caught in this conundrum—they have got all these security and other issues—voices in Congress, voices from the press, et cetera, to say, as Ambassador Carson himself said, these things question Ethiopia’s reputation and its position in the world. I think those are the kinds of things that may help. But I suggest this is a serious, serious dilemma.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Let us see. Mr. Cyllah, we have seen that 50 years ago, there were a number of elections that were held—I don’t know, maybe 10 or 12, that will be celebrating 50 years this year. Absent the three that we have heard and mentioned, could you give me an assessment on the, say, two or three other elections that would be coming up this year, and how do you think their previous elections were, and how do you anticipate the upcoming 2010 elections.

Mr. CYLLAH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the things we have noticed is that, of course, we don’t have the 90 percent, 98 percent win anymore where the one party moves. So there is quite
an improvement in Africa. But a country like Burundi is an interesting one to look at this year, which in the past also having been a military, one-party dictatorial government is moving toward the democratic reign. Difficulties, yes, but do we stop support? I would say no because I think every little bitty step that they do toward democracy is important. We have seen Burundi evolve, a lot of women in the process, which changes a whole lot of things in that part of the world, so as in Rwanda.

But at the same time, we have to continue to hold these leaders accountable and ready to answer questions. As I would say, listen to them, but also verify as to what they are telling you because they want you to hear what they think you want to hear. Basically, that is how they will bring it to you.

Elections—of course, this has been mentioned quite a bit. Sudan is going to be having elections. So these are some of those elections that we need to pay close attention to. Once again, the important thing for us is that one of the difficulties we have had over the years, Mr. Chairman, is that support to elections have come right close to the elections. Support to election process is more so the event that we see, and failing to look at the whole process. There is an electoral cycle. Pre-election processes are just as important as Election Day. Post-election processes are just as important. I think it was one American leader who had said that preparations for the next elections begin the day after you announce the results of the last elections. We have not seen that happen in Africa in a consistent way. And I think that is what my recommendation had been, for us to look at elections as an election cycle rather than looking at elections as the event.

So a long-term process in those elections support I think will help. And again, there are so many other countries that we have on this list. It is maybe a little too late to provide that electoral cycle support, but for other elections upcoming, I would recommend that you as policymakers and the U.S. administration look at that very important.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Just one other quick question. There is a new phenomenon going on now, at least that started in several countries. I think Togo, Gabon, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are three countries that the children of the previous ruler have come in, although some are just recent, certainly Gabon. But do you see any potential for better governance with the second generation coming in? I know it is a U.S. phenomenon where families tend to get into politics, and the Middle East also, I guess, Morocco and some other. Egypt it seems like is in waiting. Syria has sons replacing their parents.

Have you seen any kind of improvement, or do you have optimism that the second generation may have learned from the previous generation? Is that a good trend? Of course, we have had the Roosevelts and the Kennedys and the Bushes in the U.S. So you can't say you can't have it. I just wonder what your opinion might be.

Mr. CYLLAH. Well, Mr. Chairman, that is a very good question. And the point for me and the point for our organization is whether the process went well and whether the people who are going to be ruled by these people accept those results. We see in Togo, for an
example, that there is not an acceptance, and following as indeed the son I think is going to be a little better than his father, from all the brutalities that his father committed. We see the opposition really critical of what those results have been, and there are still demonstrations, and that we have not seen the massive arrests that his father used to do when he saw an opposition.

Congo—it is a wait and see also. But the President, I think, is not going to be able to follow in his father’s footsteps because I think there is a lot of opposition. And people are pretty much talking to each other, and they see the results of those bad governments and what it has done to their citizens.

You did not mention one other country that is quite interest to us, and that is Senegal. There is also the talk that——

Mr. PAYNE. That is true.

Mr. CYLLAH [continuing]. That the President is also grooming his son to become President. Once again, the important thing is we follow the real process of having electoral democracy. If that is the case, and if the results show that, yes, they are winning, then, yes, I think we will accept that. But if they have the military and they are going around abusing people, I think it is a wrong step that they will be taking. And I doubt if they will be successful for a long time. It is never sustainable, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador LYMAN. I had a point on that, Congressman. I attended a conference up in Cambridge recently sponsored by the Africa Business Club of the Harvard Business School. I went up there thinking there would be about 50 or 60 young people to talk to. There were 900 people at that conference. I would say 70 to 80 percent were Diaspora Africans, mostly from Nigeria, but from everywhere. And these were young people studying in business schools, law schools, colleges all over, bright and sharp as anybody you have ever met, asking tough questions of business leaders, et cetera. It was very inspiring and moving. And the question is, are they going to have an opportunity to do the things they were talking about this conference, whether it was investment or changes, et cetera, in their home countries?

They wanted to do it. So that was the whole purpose of the conference. And if there is hope for change and positive change, it comes from that generation. It was a very, very impressive experience.

Mr. PAYNE. That is very interesting, and I did think in terms of Senegal, too. I guess for some of the countries, it may be a little easier than the others for the son to do better, you know. I will leave it at that.

Let me ask my final question, and then I will turn it over. Dr. Schneidman, what is your assessment of the administration’s Global Food Security Initiative? Do you feel that the impact for agricultural development in Africa is key? Or if a failure happens, what would the position be for famine or lack of adequate food security? Could you touch on that whole area of this initiative of the Obama administration?

Mr. SCHNEIDMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question, which is really quite a critical question. You know, this thing in talking with Ambassador Carson and others, one gets the impression that the Obama administration is looking at the Food Security
Initiative much like the Bush administration looked at PEPFAR, much like the Clinton administration looked at AGOA. We haven’t seen it—I haven’t seen it happen yet, and I am concerned about this. I am concerned, number one, that the leadership is in the Department of Agriculture. No aspersions against the Department of Agriculture whatsoever, but I think one knows that the way you drive policy is really from the White House, certainly the State Department, and I haven’t seen that interagency team emerge yet to give this initiative the definition that it requires.

Secondly, addressing the issue of food security is a multifaceted proposition. Not only are we talking about seeds and irrigation, but we are talking about trade. We are talking about farm to market. We are talking about roads, infrastructures. So I am concerned here in the early days that the initiative has not been defined well enough, and the leadership is not yet clear enough.

Mr. PAYNE. Yes, Mr. Simpkins.

Mr. SIMPKINS. The coalitions that I work with are focusing on the administration’s food security policy. As my colleague just said, it is very complex. As you recall, when the Secretary announced it, she talked about seven distinct parts. They are not all integrated with one another. We want to work with the administration to make this work because we know how important it is. It is just going to be very difficult, and we haven’t yet seen a real action plan for how to live this out.

And we are hoping that the Congress, particularly the House, will help with that because I think—no offense to my colleagues from the State Department—a lot of the policy comes from the Congress. And in this case, I think that the bills have been introduced—I think Ms. McCollum has a bill. In the Senate, they have bill. I think working with those, we have at least some starting point to make this happen.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Thank you very much. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our panel for your testimony and leadership, and to the long stayers in the audience who have been very patient as we have voted and asked our questions.

Just let me begin. Ambassador Lyman, you, like Ambassador Johnnie Carson, who talked about many believing that some African countries have reached a plateau—and he used the term a “democratic recession.” You talked about stalled and in some cases regressing democracy. And I am wondering if our other panelists first and foremost think that too is an apt description of, you know, the macro view of sub-Saharan Africa.

Secondly, on the issue of trafficking, back in 1998, I introduced the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. It took 2 years to get it passed. There was an enormous amount of indifference, not overt and outright opposition, but indifference to enacting the bill. When I would talk about trafficking, even domestically, I would talk to U.S. attorneys, and they would say, “Oh, you mean drug trafficking.” I mean, that was the immediate go-to concept that they had. They didn’t seem to understand that there was this explosion of human trafficking, sex and labor trafficking.

It took 2 years to get the bill passed. And then about a year or so for the Bush administration—and, Mr. Chairman, you might re-
call—because when it comes to human rights, there can't be any partisanship—I chaired a hearing in this room in which we held the Bush administration to account for its very slow and tardy designation of the TIP office and the naming of the countries. The Trafficking in Persons report, which is now, as it ought to be, an annual event, and even more frequently if there are countries that go on or off the Tier list. But there was this sense of indifference that greatly appalled me.

Well, we had some initial success among countries. There was a robust acceptance by some that, yeah, they needed to do something. I am happy to say that in this 2009 report, Nigeria is a Tier 1 country, as well as Mauritius. Nigeria more than doubled the number of trafficking offenders convicted and improved assistance to victims. Their NAPTIP office runs seven shelters. Two other shelters are run. I have visited some of those shelters in Abuja as well as in Lagos. They do a wonderful job on a shoestring budget. They are Tier 1.

The sad story is the number of countries that have slipped over these last several years. There are now seven African countries—and we will get a new report, as we all know, in June—seven African countries on Tier 3, a dozen and a half on what we call the Watch List. That is the bubble. They can easily slip into Tier 3. A particular situation occurred this year. When we had the Haitian earthquake, Niger, which has some 8,800 to 43,000 Nigerians living under conditions of judicial and hereditary slavery, according to the TIP report, has all kinds of problems with child prostitution. There are children being sold into sexual bondage. Money was taken out of the TIP work, Trafficking in Persons work, for Niger and put into the Haitian effort. And that was one of my questions that I meant to ask and will ask of the administration. When is it going back?

But it seems to me it is quickly deprioritized when it comes to African countries. Again, if you look at the list, look at the map, there is an awful lot of red, you know, the designation of Tier 3, egregious violators. I am worried that this is slipping.

I held hearings in this room on Mauritania. Mauritania still is a Tier 3 country due to slavery. Sudan is a slave country as well. I hope that all of you might speak to this festering sore of trafficking. Even when I was in Nigeria, a Tier 1 country, I learned to my shock and dismay that the Juju men put the fear of—and it is not God—into these women and young girls prior to their being trafficked into Europe, whether it be into Rome or anywhere else, for modern day slavery.

So if you can speak to the issue, I don't think we are doing enough. And I think as the transfer of funds of Niger clearly underscores, there are other spigots of money that could have been tapped, in my opinion, in order to help the Haitian catastrophe.

Secondly, or thirdly—and if you could answer these, I would really appreciate it—microcredit. Are we doing enough with regards to microcredit for Africa? Mr. Simpkins, I know you made a trip. It was on behalf of the committee. I couldn't join you because of votes in Zimbabwe. You spoke about Zimbabwe in your testimony. I remember you coming back with a devastating report about the scorched earth policy that Mugabe was following. And you also
spoke in your testimony in terms of action, stronger endorsement for effective corporate social responsibility practices as embodied in the Global Sullivan Principles. Could you give us an update where all of that is? I mean, are the Sullivan principles being taken seriously?

And finally—two finals—Paul Kagame, in the upcoming August elections—Mr. Cyllah, you might want to speak to this. Do you think the U.S. Government, especially with the deteriorating human rights situation there, is doing enough to make sure that that election truly is free and fair?

And finally, I asked our previous panel about this ART implementing partners letter from CDC, which I find very disturbing, that were freezing the antiretroviral drugs that will be provided to those who are HIV positive. The letter says since 2003—this is the one that went to Uganda, and we are trying to track down the ones that went to the other partners:

“Since 2003, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief has successfully provided chronic lifesaving treatment to more than 100,000 HIV-infected Ugandans. The U.S. Government recognizes that in the coming years, the number of patients in need of antiretroviral treatment will increase dramatically. While the U.S. Government is committed to continuing treatment for those already enrolled, funding for HIV programs is not expected to increase in the near future.”

In the next paragraph, they talk about, “Each partner should expect to have a flat line budget for ARV.” That to me will be a death sentence to huge numbers of people who will need this lifesaving drug. Your thoughts on that, because I think we need to push back on that one.

Ambassador LYMAN. Well, let me speak to a couple of the issues you raised, Congressman, very serious ones indeed. The trafficking in people is a terrible issue, and you can say it is part of poverty, et cetera, but it is really part of criminality. And some countries, as you point out, have made progress, when it is publicized, when people react to it and realize what is happening. Other governments are weak or don’t care enough. I think you in the Congress have put a spotlight on this, which makes a difference because it really is terrible exploitation.

My guess is, although I am no expert, that you are getting links between the various criminality groups, the groups that traffic people, the groups that traffic drugs contraband, et cetera. Building up capacity in Africa to deal with this I think is extremely important.

I would also point to one other thing that has not been emphasized strongly enough, and that is the role of the Africa Union in this regard and the sub-regional groups because these are cross-border problems. And you need to develop cooperation across borders among these groups. And I think that may need a lot more attention in order to get at this problem and to strengthen the cooperation amongst security services.

Mr. SMITH. If you could yield on that briefly. Also, on the protection side, the cooperation of faith-based organizations.

Ambassador LYMAN. Yes.
Mr. Smith. Which, if mobilized, can be a prevention tool and a——

Ambassador Lyman. Absolutely. I don’t know about these letters on that freezing, but it touches on a big issue that has to be faced, not only the United States but the world. We have made tremendous progress under PEPFAR in going from—what is it—100,000 people to 4 million people now worldwide on these drugs. The future, as you know, is that there are 40 million people in the world who are infected. Eventually, all of them will need treatment at some point. And therefore, that rising curve is something that we in the G8 and others have to think about. How do we do this? How do we carry this? Who will be responsible, as you say, for people’s lives every day? And I am not sure what is behind the letter, but I do think that we have to start to think about how we plan ahead, how we finance this, how it doesn’t eat up all of the other financing of things we need, but doesn’t run into the problems you mentioned.

I haven’t heard about that letter, and I will certainly want to look into it myself. But I think we are going to face this question more and more. As we get more successful, and then we say, well, now we have got to go to 6 million, 8 million, 10 million, et cetera—I think it is an issue worth watching very closely.

Mr. Schneidman. Congressman Smith, let me respond quickly to three of the issues that you raised. The first is the notion of a democratic recession in Africa. My first reaction to hearing my colleague, Mr. Cyllah, talk about 20 countries who are going to have elections this year in Africa doesn’t strike me as much of a recession. But I think more fundamentally, I think we have to be very careful about talking about Africa in broad brush strokes. With as many nations as there are on the continent, 53, some countries are doing better than others. Some countries do better at this election than they did the last one, or they will do better in the future. And I think the challenge to those of us who are partners with the continent, be it through civil society or government, is how to maximize the better outcome.

I think Ambassador Lyman has described quite graphically and accurately the decline in the quality of elections in Nigeria. Having said that, maybe in Zimbabwe, you know, elections there, which have not been strong elections at all, actually can play a role in alleviating this crisis in the coming months and years, if we can get those elections right. So I think we have to guard against broad-brush generalizations and really talk about specific countries and what are the natures of the democratic challenges.

Let me talk about trafficking in persons. I have had some experience. First, to applaud your initiative and your energy in bringing this to the forefront. In my work, I deal with American companies to help give them strategic advice in their investments in Africa. And I have dealt with some oil companies in Nigeria, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea, and in each one this has been a very important issue. And the companies take this very seriously. And the dynamic that happens is when the report comes or is about to come, the dialogue with the State Department increases quite dramatically, and with the embassy, and with the host governments. And it really helps to elevate the whole dialogue as it concerns the creation of
shelters, as it concerns radio advertising, as it concerns posters. And it is not perfect by any stretch, but it certainly has the attention, I think, of critical stakeholders. And I can only encourage you to sort of continue your efforts because it is taken seriously by some of the companies that I work with. And I think it does have an impact on the ground, certainly in the dialogue between our embassies and the host governments.

As for microcredit, I think a lot is going on there, and I think we have learned a lot, starting with the Gramene experience in Bangladesh and organizations like BRAC and others. And I think there is a consciousness about how to be effective with microcredit in Africa. We are seeing it not only in USAID, but a number of philanthropic initiatives as well.

My concern, where there is a lack, is in small and medium enterprise sector. I developed the Liberia Enterprise Development Fund with Mr. Bob Johnson, who put up $3 million. We were able to leverage $23 million from OPIC. And that fund is now giving out loans in the area of $30,000 and $40,000 and $50,000 and $100,000, and this helps to create companies that can employ 10 and 15, 20, 50 people and that have real growth potential.

My concern with the microcredit, as important as it is, it is really sustaining you for today. It is not really building for tomorrow. And I think we have to give better thought how the microcredit can link and grow into the SME level and how we address that SME level in a more systematic way across the continent because the appetite is so strong, and the environment is increasingly there for what I look at as enterprise-led development, where people want to start companies. They want to join companies, and they understand that the government is not an answer to their job search.

Mr. CYLLAH. Congressman, it is quite interesting the way you talk about the democracy plateau in Africa because I will say that looking at the organization I represent, we don't see a democracy plateau. We see a plateau in the support to the democratic process in the various African countries. And so I go to Dr. Schneidman. I think we have to take these countries one at a time and look at—if you look at Ghana for an example, before 1997, I mean, there was a leader who took all supreme court justices and shot them at the beach. But pressure mounted where he didn't change out of the goodness of his heart, but out of pressure.

And so I think he later on developed a process where he felt he really did hand over power to a civilian government, and we are beginning to see a process in Ghana moving toward real democracy. But I think again, as I said, elections are not just the event, and the habit from the West has been we look at these elections a few months before the elections; we send observers. After the elections, they say, oh, these elections are really good. I can give you a good example—and this is again Ghana. I went on a pre-election assessment to Ghana, where after the assessment, we had a press conference where we were asked as to what we saw. We all said, yes, we saw a peaceful transfer; we saw a peaceful process going on. And one of the reporters asked me directly, where are you from, and I told him. And he said, many are from Sierra Leone; how can you come and tell us that this place is peaceful. Do
you know the body language we use? Do you understand the language that we speak.

So exactly, we don’t. And I think we were just looking at the initial stages as we saw rather than looking at the process. If we had had the opportunity to be there long-term, we probably would have seen some of the violence or some of the undercurrents by the elections that maybe are upcoming. I think that is where we talk about having an election process being supported and an election cycle being supported rather than the election event.

Elections in Zimbabwe—well, we saw what happened after the elections were stolen. So again, that confirms to us that the people themselves who are going to be ruled were not accepting of those results. They went to the streets. And as I said earlier, if we had given support to Zimbabwe from the onset, we probably would not have seen this happen.

That brings me to the other question again as to are these leaders ready to change. My answer is no. So do you give them that kind of a support? My answer is not to be friends of people, but to be friends of the country and those people, not the leaders. You know, I have a good example when I wore a human rights hat some years back. I was invited to be part of a panel with one of your former colleagues, Congressman Bill Green, in Pennsylvania at one of the universities. And we were criticizing the policies of South Africa and Zaire then and now Congo. And we were talking even about Ethiopia again at that point.

One of the participants came directly at Congressman Green and said, why are you always criticizing friends of America or the U.S. Why don’t you look at the Soviet friends as well? Well, the congressman was talking about Ethiopia, criticizing Ethiopia. But then what it said to me was that we were supporting the leaders who were supporting friends, and we are not supporting the process and the people in those countries. I think that is what we need to look at, and those are the recommendations that we will make to you, to look at the electoral process in each of those countries, and think in long term, just like you think democracy in a long-term process. Thank you.

Mr. SIMPKINS. Well, in terms of the regression in democracy, I think there has been a sliding back because, as my colleague says, we look at the event of Election Day, and not the whole process. I do agree we come in too late. You can’t parachute into an election situation and really do a good job. I have seen the chairman on the campaign trail in a number of places, and you know that there are things that happen long before Election Day that determine whether you are going to win or not.

Back in 1992, I was part of the team that observed the 1992 elections in Kenya, and that election was manipulated months and months before when the electoral districts were apportioned. There were these huge districts for the opposition and these little tiny districts for the ruling party. So quite naturally, they have an advantage from the start.

The other thing is that on election commissions, we need to have permanent election commissions. You can’t do this on an ad hoc basis, which is what we are doing too often.
Thirdly, I think that we seem to be allergic to working with political parties. And when we look at countries like South Africa and Namibia and Equatorial Guinea even, part of the reason why you have these states dominated by one party, even Botswana, which is a democratic situation, is that the opposition is too weak to really compete. I observed the election in Equatorial Guinea just several months ago. And honestly, it is very difficult to say that that is a good election when you win by 97 percent of the vote. But the opposition is so terrible that even if the President didn’t campaign, he probably still would win, though not by 97 percent.

We need to put more effort and resources into working with these political parties so they are able to genuinely compete. Even in some cases where there is competition, it is competition between one person and another person. Both their parties are cults of personality and not real parties. That is why we have a problem with this whole succession of sons because if you had a real party, there would be people within that party who would be in line to be the next President.

Now in terms of trafficking, Mr. Smith, you know, you and I have traveled to countries in looking at that, and one of the things we saw was a lack of effective law enforcement, for one. You have situations in which families don't do due diligence on people who come by and say, well, look, I can take your daughter to the city; she will make money; she will send money back home. They have no idea if that is real or not, and often it isn’t real.

When we first started talking about this—I talked to some of my African friends, and they said, oh, you don’t understand us. We have cultural differences. People, cousins, come from the city, and they come to town, and they don't get paid, and they work in the house because at some point they are going to get an education. Well, that is not what we are talking about. We were in Sudan in Khartoum and talked that group CEAWAC. We were talking about slavery. They were talking about bride stealing. There is a big difference. But they didn't seem to grasp the difference in that.

So the other thing is a lot of these young women are sent to the West, to Italy—a lot of Nigerians are sent to Italy. A lot of them go throughout Europe, and a lot of them end up here. And it is very difficult for us to tell people how terribly they do in enforcing trafficking laws when we have raids here where for a long term there have been whole, you know, cabals of traffickers.

Now Zimbabwe, you are right, I went with—in fact, Dr. Pearl Alice Marsh, to take a look at the situation there. You know, I don't think I have ever seen in 30 years in looking at Africa a country devolve so much. There was a CODEL that Mr. Royce led back in 1997, and Zimbabwe was one of the countries we visited. And it was an oasis after being in Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo. You end up in Zimbabwe that had a really successful stock exchange and gas stations with what looked like 7-Elevens. Everything was good. The economy was going well. And then all of a sudden, the government took it into its mind to find this money, this foreign money, that was in the system, and the inflation rate went up so high that even the banks were going on the black market to get money.
But they told the businesses, the shopkeepers, you have to use the official rate that we have. So as a result, they went out of business because they were losing money with every transaction. Then they went after the commercial farmers. Now the commercial farmers admitted that they got this land as a result of it being taken from Africans. So it should have been transferred. That is not a question. The question is how it was done.

The black farmworkers were not given the land. Cronies were given the land, and they did not know how to deal with it. When their production went down, the manufacturing in Zimbabwe, which was dependent on commercial farming, also went down. Then they had the situation that we saw, which was they went after the traders looking for this foreign money in the system. They put all of them out of business, even ones who had licenses. Now you have the whole economy, formal and informal, that is out of business.

So it is ironic, though, that when we disallowed Zimbabwe from being in AGOA, they were still in the generalized system of preferences, and they still happened for a long time to be one of our leading trading partners. So that is an anomaly in the system that we need to look at.

Now you asked me about the Global Sullivan Principles. We have several hundred endorses from around the world in America and Europe, in Africa, in Asia, including I think a Chinese company or two, and in Latin America. And we think that it governs the way businesses deal with their employees, but also their communities. And we are looking at using it for a water program in Liberia, where we want to work with the companies that use water so that they clean the water and provide it to their employees so they don’t have to go looking for water for their families, and also to their communities.

Lastly, on the PEPFAR issues, theoretically, I would agree with the President’s view that at some point we need to transfer responsibility for paying for these treatments to African governments. My only concern, and my main concern, is that too many of these governments don’t have a working healthcare system. So if you do it too quickly, what you are doing is just ending the reality of treatment.

Mr. PAYNE. Well, let me thank you all very much. That was a very healthy exchange, and I really appreciate all as we could certainly go on. And I, first of all, appreciate your staying over the time. I am sure that you intended to stay, but this has been a very important hearing. We have been attempting to get the Assistant Secretary here for some time. And so you made history because you are here with him at this hearing before our subcommittee. And your information was great.

I just want to thank you, Dr. Schneidman, for mentioning the bill that I introduced, the Higher Education and Expansion Improvement Act. As you know, we have been pushing education for the girl child, elementary and secondary. And I would certainly like to once again request my great friend, the ranking member, to take a look at the bill again. We are trying to get a great co-sponsor to it. So we will confer the next day or two to see whether we can move that forward in a bipartisan way.
Let me also ask for unanimous consent to enter into the record a statement by the African Rights Monitor about human rights and humanitarian conditions in the Ogaden, and I will enter that without exception, without objection.

And finally, once again, thank you all for your attendance, and those of you who stayed to listen, it has been very instructive, and we will certainly glean a lot of important information as we move forward in our policies here in the United States Congress.

At this time I ask unanimous consent for members to have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks. And therefore, at this time, the hearing stands adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 8 o’clock p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live, via the WEBCAST link on the Committee website at http://www.hcfa.house.gov)

DATE: Wednesday, March 24, 2010

TIME: 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: An Overview of U.S. Policy in Africa

WITNESSES: Panel I

The Honorable Johnnie Carson
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of African Affairs
United States Department of State

Mr. Earl Gast
Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Africa
U.S. Agency for International Development

Panel II

The Honorable Princeton N. Lyman
Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies
Council on Foreign Relations
(Former United States Ambassador to South Africa and Nigeria)

Mr. Alainm Cyllah
Regional Director for Africa
International Foundation for Electoral Systems

Witney W. Schneider, Ph.D.
President
Schneider & Associates International

Mr. Gregory B. Simpkins
Vice President
Policy & Program Development
The Leon H. Sullivan Foundation
By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs needs to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-225-9012 at least five business days in advance of the event, whichever is earlier. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general, including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices, may be directed to the Committee.
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON Africa and Global Health MEETING

Day Tuesday Date 5/25/10 Room 2172 RHOB

Starting Time 10:09 a.m. Ending Time 12:21 p.m.

Recessed 6 a.m. to

Presiding Member(s) Chairman Donald M. Payne

CHECK ALL OF THE FOLLOWING THAT APPLY:

Open Session [✓]             Electronically Recorded (taped)[ ]
Executive (closed) Session [ ]   Stenographic Record[✓]
Television[✓]

TITLE OF HEARING or BILLS FOR MARKUP: (Include bill number(s) and title(s) of legislation.)

"The Great Lakes Region: Current Conditions and U.S. Policy"

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
Congresswoman Watson, Congresswoman Lee, Congressman Miller, Congresswoman Woolsey, Congressman Smith, Congressman Baucus, Congressman Flaxa

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: Mark with * if they are not Members of HFA.

Congressman Royce

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [✓] No [ ]
(If "No", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)

ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE MARKUP: (Attach copies of legislation and amendments.)

RECORDED VOTES TAKEN (FOR MARKUP): (Attach final vote tally sheet listing each member.)

Subject Year Nays Present Not Voting

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ________
or
TIME ADJOURNED 12:21p

Subcommittee Staff Director