

The seal of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction is a large, circular emblem in the background. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows. The eagle is positioned over a shield with vertical stripes. The seal is surrounded by text in both English and Arabic. The English text reads "INSPECTOR GENERAL" at the top and "RECONSTRUCTION" at the bottom. The Arabic text reads "مفتش العام" at the top and "إعادة إعمار" at the bottom.

**IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN
REPORTING STATUS OF
RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS TO
CHIEF OF MISSION**

**SIGIR-09-007
OCTOBER 29, 2008**



SIGIR

Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction

October 29, 2008

IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN REPORTING STATUS OF RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS TO CHIEF OF MISSION

Summary of Report: SIGIR-09-007

Why SIGIR Did This Study

In July 2008, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq—as Chief of Mission (COM)—asked SIGIR to examine the availability of management information needed for oversight of agency reconstruction projects, particularly as it related to the Falluja wastewater treatment project. The Ambassador had become concerned after belatedly being made aware of various issues impacting the successful completion of the project.

The “American Embassy Baghdad, Organization and Staffing Report”, dated May 23, 2007, formalized a number of changes designed to improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of organizations in support of operations in Iraq. The Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq (CETI) plays an important role in the new organizational alignment and reports directly to the COM. The COM coordinates U.S. policy on economic development in Iraq. Managing information flow is a key element of this responsibility.

SIGIR’s objectives were to identify and determine the adequacy of the processes used to provide the current status of reconstruction projects to COM.

What SIGIR Recommends

SIGIR makes two recommendations. One is for the U.S. Ambassador to establish policy and guidance to ensure uniform reporting on reconstruction projects, and the second is for CETI to establish a process to ensure that all projects, regardless of funding source or agency management, are accurately and adequately reported to the U.S. Ambassador.

The Deputy COM and others concurred with the report and the Deputy stated that implementation of the recommendations has already begun.

What SIGIR Found

The Department of State has various avenues for communicating information on Iraq reconstruction projects, but they fall short of ensuring that the COM receives information critical for making decisions on reconstruction projects. The existing process for reporting reconstruction status to the COM includes: (1) the Reconstruction Core Group, which meets weekly with representatives from key reconstruction organizations, is the COM’s primary source of project-related information; (2) the *Section 2207 Report*, a quarterly report to Congress, estimates the cost to complete individual projects funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF); and (3) the Iraq Reconstruction Management System provides aggregate data on Iraq reconstruction efforts funded by the U.S. government.

Despite these existing reporting mechanisms, there are no formalized policies or guidance to outline what, when, or how to report reconstruction project status to the COM, according to senior officials. In addition, there is no systematic process or criteria to analyze cost, schedule, performance or associated impact that automatically initiate reporting to the COM based on these criteria. Project reporting is left to the discretion of project managers, subject matter experts, and other senior leaders. For example, until recently, the COM was unaware of various issues impacting the successful completion of the Falluja wastewater project, the only wastewater system built from the “ground up.” Security concerns, inadequate design, poor contractor performance, and work stoppages for non-payment of contractor invoices caused repeated delays in the project. Without a formalized reporting process or established reporting criteria, projects with substantial delays, spiraling costs, security concerns, or other high risk issues may not be brought to the COM’s attention, potentially resulting in poor management decisions and wasted taxpayer dollars.

SIGIR’s Inspections Directorate recently completed a review of five projects that are part of the Falluja Wastewater Treatment System. The directorate reported the results of their reviews in “Falluja Waste Water Treatment System” (SIGIR-PA-08 144 to 148, October 27, 2008).



SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

October 29, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ
COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ
MINISTER FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS/COORDINATOR FOR
ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN IRAQ
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, U.S. AGENCY
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
COMMANDING GENERAL, GULF REGION DIVISION, U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS
COMMANDER, JOINT CONTRACTING COMMAND-
IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN
DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE

SUBJECT: Improvements Needed in Reporting Status of Reconstruction Projects to Chief of Mission (SIGIR-09-007)

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. The report discusses the State Department's process for reporting the status of reconstruction projects in Iraq to the Chief of Mission. We performed this audit in accordance with our statutory responsibilities contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended. This law provides for independent and objective audits of policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of programs and operations and to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. This audit was conducted as SIGIR project 8030.

We considered comments from the Deputy Chief of Mission, Multi-National Force-Iraq, and Gulf Region Division in finalizing this report. The comments are addressed in the report, where applicable, and a copy is included in the Management Comments section of this report.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. For additional information on this report, please contact Mr. Glenn Furbish (glenn.furbish@sigir.mil, 703-428-1058) or Ms. Nancee Needham (nancee.needham@iraq.centcom.mil, 703-343-9275).

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.
Inspector General

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	i
Introduction	1
Reporting Project Status to the Chief of Mission	7
Conclusions and Recommendations	14
Management Comments and Audit Response	15
Appendices	
A. Scope and Methodology	16
B. Key Program Review Meetings	17
C. Comprehensive List of Meetings	18
D. Acronyms	20
E. Audit Team Members	211
Management Comments	
U. S. Embassy – Iraq	22
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division	24



Improvements Needed in Reporting Status of Reconstruction Projects to Chief of Mission

SIGIR-09-007

October 29, 2008

Executive Summary

Introduction

In July 2008, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (Chief of Mission, or COM) raised questions about the availability of management information needed for oversight of agency reconstruction projects. At the COM's request, SIGIR initiated a review to identify and determine the adequacy of the processes used to provide the current status of reconstruction projects to the COM.

On May 23, 2007, the "American Embassy Baghdad, Organization and Staffing Report"¹ formalized a number of changes designed to improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of organizations in support of operations and ongoing efforts for the transition in Iraq. The report recommended scheduled meetings at the post level to allow greater coordination on cross-cutting issues and daily briefings to the COM.

The Economic Minister plays an important role in the new organizational alignment, serving as the Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq (CETI). The CETI coordinates U.S. government policy on economic development in Iraq, including coordinating all relevant elements of the U.S. Embassy to facilitate a smooth transition from U.S. government and other external assistance. Managing the flow of information is a key element of this responsibility. The CETI reports directly to the COM and Deputy Chief of Mission.

Results

The Department of State (DoS) has various avenues for communicating information on Iraq reconstruction projects, but they fall short of ensuring that the COM receives information critical for making decisions on reconstruction projects. The current process for reporting reconstruction status to the COM includes three sources of information:

¹ The report is commonly called the Kennedy Report.

- The Reconstruction Core Group, which meets weekly with representatives from key reconstruction organizations, is the COM’s primary source of project-related information.
- The *Section 2207 Report*, a quarterly report to Congress, estimates the cost to complete individual projects funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF).
- The Iraq Reconstruction Management System provides aggregate data on Iraq reconstruction efforts funded by the U.S. government.

Despite these reporting mechanisms, there are no formalized policies or guidance to outline what, when, or how to report reconstruction project status to the COM, according to senior officials. In addition, there is no systematic process or criteria to analyze the cost, schedule, performance, or associated impact that automatically initiate reporting to the COM based on these criteria. Project reporting is left to the discretion of project managers, subject matter experts, and other senior leaders. For example, until recently, the COM was unaware of various issues impacting the successful completion of the Falluja wastewater project, the only wastewater system built from the “ground up.” Security concerns, inadequate design, poor contractor performance, and work stoppages for non-payment of contractor invoices caused repeated delays in the project. Without a formalized reporting process or established reporting criteria, projects with substantial delays, spiraling costs, security concerns, or other high-risk issues may not be brought to the COM’s attention, potentially resulting in poor management decisions and wasted taxpayer dollars.

Recommendations

SIGIR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq take these actions:

1. Establish and publish policy and guidance to uniformly report the status of reconstruction projects to the U.S. Ambassador. The policy and guidance should consider stratifying and prioritizing projects to be reported to the U.S. Ambassador. Furthermore, the policy and guidance should establish a means of identifying key elements of a project—such as cost, schedule, and performance—to objectively provide the status of a project.
2. Direct the Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq to establish a process based on the new policy guidance to ensure that all reconstruction projects, regardless of funding source or agency management, are accurately and adequately reported to the U.S. Ambassador. If a project is delayed or terminated, the Coordinator should also consider the associated impact on quality of life and diplomatic relationships. Any project deviating from established criteria should trigger required notification to the Ambassador.

Management Comments and Audit Response

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Deputy COM and the Commanding General, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division (GRD), concurred with the report, and the Deputy COM stated that action to implement SIGIR's recommendations is underway. The Deputy Chief of Mission indicated that she had requested the Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq to design a process to report project status, with some measure of objectivity, for problem projects.

The Deputy COM suggested that for clarity's sake, the second recommendation involving "all projects, regardless of funding source or agency management" should be refined to read "all non-military projects, regardless of funding source or agency management," indicating that the COM does not have authority over projects funded by the U.S. military. SIGIR did not change the recommendation because the majority of remaining reconstruction projects are funded by DoD. Consequently, SIGIR believes the process being developed to provide the COM information should include reconstruction projects funded by DoD. Although SIGIR realizes that there is a division of responsibilities between the Embassy and MNF-I, that does not exclude the sharing of information of mutual interest. Moreover, National Security Presidential Directive dated May 11, 2004, states that "The Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance for Iraq." Consequently, SIGIR believes that the process being developed to provide the COM information should include reconstruction projects for the benefit of Iraq, funded by DoD. Including such information is consistent with the collaborative working relationship between the COM and the Commanding General, MNF-I. The extent and scope of the information would be decided as part of the ongoing process described in the Deputy COM's comments.

MNF-I and GRD provided additional comments, which for the most part, included suggestions for technical changes to the report. SIGIR considered these comments in preparing this final report and made changes considered appropriate.

Introduction

In July 2008, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (Chief of Mission) raised questions about the management information available to support oversight of agency reconstruction projects. This report discusses how the status of reconstruction projects is reported to the Chief of Mission and the adequacy of the reporting processes. SIGIR conducted this audit under its legislative mandate to (1) conduct audits relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Iraq and report to the Congress; (2) provide for the independent and objective leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of programs and operations and prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse; and (3) provide for an independent and objective means of keeping the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations and the necessity for and progress of corrective action.

Chief of Mission


The National Security Presidential Directive 36,² states that the Chief of Mission (COM)—on behalf of the President and under the guidance of the Secretary of State—is “responsible for the direction, coordination and supervision of all United States government employees, policies, and activities in country, except those under the command of an area military commander, and employees seconded to International Organizations.”

² National Security Presidential Directive 36 was signed by the President on May 11, 2004.

Organization

Figure 1 illustrates how the U.S. Mission-Iraq is currently aligned regarding reconstruction.

Figure 1: Primary Offices Involved in Reconstruction in the U.S. Mission-Iraq



Source: SIGIR extracted this chart from the “U.S. Mission Iraq” organization chart dated July 2007.

Resident in the U.S. Mission, but not under the COM, is the MNF-I Commander, and subordinate organizations such as the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A)³ and the Gulf Region Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which, as discussed later, provide acquisition and project management support to reconstruction activities in Iraq.

The key Department of State organizations responsible for the flow of information on project status and the Gulf Region Division’s (GRD) interaction in reporting information on reconstruction project status are discussed below.

Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO)

NSPD 36 addressed the transition of U.S. government operations in Iraq from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the U.S. Mission-Iraq. The directive also established a temporary

³ In October 2004, the U.S. Central Command designated the Army as the lead component for contracting in the Combined Joint Operations Area, Iraq and Afghanistan, and the JCC-I/A was established. JCC-I/A provides contracting support to both the Iraq reconstruction effort and to combatant commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan.

organization to facilitate the transition in Iraq performing duties like conducting sector reviews with the GRD, reviewing projects initiated and completed, and performing periodic financial reviews such as construction gap and cost-to-complete analysis. Initially that organization was known as the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office. However, on May 8, 2007, the President, by Executive Order 13431, created the Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO) as the successor organization to IRMO, and IRMO's functions were assumed by ITAO. The President established ITAO as a temporary organization within the Department of State "to perform the specific project of supporting executive departments and agencies in concluding remaining large infrastructure projects expeditiously in Iraq, in facilitating Iraq's transition to self-sufficiency, and in maintaining an effective diplomatic presence in Iraq."

Iraq Transition Assistance Office Senior Consultants

ITAO does not have direct authority over organizations conducting reconstruction activities; rather, ITAO coordinates reconstruction activities through senior consultants who can attend meetings with GRD and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. These meetings provide an opportunity for reconstruction project data to be openly discussed with senior consultants for water, electricity, and facilities.

ITAO senior consultants are granted tremendous autonomy and independence in the manner in which they carry out their responsibilities and are subject "only to administrative and policy direction concerning overall project priorities and objectives." Responsibilities include coordinating with reconstruction agencies as well as facilitating the planning, funding, and execution of comprehensive programs.

Senior consultants' responsibilities also include providing technical, reconstruction, policy, and regulatory advice to their respective Iraqi ministries; providing management consulting and logistical support; and monitoring and maintaining integrity of reconstruction program resources.

Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq

The *American Embassy Baghdad, Organization and Staffing Report*⁴, dated May 23, 2007, formalized a number of changes designed to improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of organizations in support of operations and ongoing efforts for the transition in Iraq. For example:

The report supported an organizational structure that significantly reduced the number of organizations and the number of activities reporting directly to the Deputy Chief of Mission. It also recommended scheduled meetings at the post level to allow greater coordination on

⁴ The report is commonly called the Kennedy Report.

crosscutting issues and daily briefings to the COM, presumably to address the most pressing issues of the day.


Furthermore, the report addressed closer cooperation between the Embassy and the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and proposed a realignment of resources and office space at the New Embassy Compound to allow a number of options.

The CETI, who reports directly to the COM and Deputy Chief of Mission, coordinates U.S. government policy on economic development in Iraq. This includes coordinating all relevant elements of the U.S. Embassy to bring about a smooth transition from U.S. Government and other external assistance. Managing the flow of information is a key element of this responsibility.

Gulf Region Division

NSPD 36 originally created a temporary organization, called the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), within the Department of Defense. The function of this office was to provide acquisition and project management support to reconstruction activities in Iraq, particularly to the COM. In early 2005, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) directed the merger of PCO and GRD because this was determined to be the most effective way to conduct business. In October 2006, GRD merged with the PCO and, as a result, GRD assumed more responsibility for project management. The GRD Programs Directorate supports the reconstruction efforts. Figure 2 shows how the GRD Programs Directorate is currently aligned.

Figure 2: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division, Programs Directorate ^a



Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division.

Notes:

^a GRD has stopped using the term “Sector” within the Programs Directorate and has begun using “Division” or “Branch,” which is more in line with how U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is aligned.

GRD contributes to the reconstruction mission along with the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Multi-National Force-Iraq. GRD’s goal is to assist in restoring infrastructure associated with essential services in the country. To execute projects, GRD has three subordinate districts—Gulf Region North, in Tikrit; Gulf Region Central, in Baghdad; and Gulf Region South, in Tallil. GRD is assigned to MNF-I, and reports to the Commander, MNF-I to provide engineering expertise in Iraq.

Funding

SIGIR has reported that the United States has appropriated more than \$50 billion from various funds for Iraq’s reconstruction. The major accounts supporting Iraq reconstruction are the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (\$20.86 billion), the Iraq Security Forces Fund (\$17.94 billion), the Economic Support Fund (\$3.74 billion), and the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (\$3.49 billion). While not all of these funds are under the direct control of the COM, each one supports an element for success in Iraq. Consequently, the COM should be aware of successes and challenges associated with all assistance efforts in Iraq. Without adequate knowledge of the successes and challenges, the COM is less able to take proactive rather than reactive actions to address pertinent issues.

Falluja Wastewater Treatment System

The Falluja Wastewater Treatment System (Falluja wastewater project) is a sewage collection and treatment project in the city of Falluja, Iraq. The \$98 million project—funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program and the Development Fund for Iraq—was designed to serve the city of Falluja. However, for several reasons, including the varied size of individual projects and an inability to mix funding sources, uncertainty regarding the project’s scope, and limitations on Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) funds, the project was divided into 45 contracts and will now serve only 9,300 homes—only 38% of the homes in Falluja. These contracts covered engineering design, construction, and procurement of equipment. Work started on this project in March 2005 and was ongoing as of September 2008.

Objective

The objective of this review was to identify and determine the adequacy of the processes used to provide the current status of reconstruction projects to COM.


Reporting Project Status to Chief of Mission

The Department of State has various avenues for communicating information on Iraq reconstruction projects; however, they fall short of ensuring that the Chief of Mission (COM) receives information critical for making decisions on reconstruction projects. Although there are periodic meetings to provide the COM with project status updates, the topics discussed are determined subjectively by officials involved in project management. In many cases, the data collected is not shared, not provided to senior management, stovepiped, incomplete, and not coordinated. This has occurred because COM lacks policy and guidance on reporting project status to the COM. In addition, there is not an adequate reporting process to ensure that projects with substantial delays, spiraling costs, security concerns, or other high impact factors like quality of life, diplomatic relationships, and other projects will be brought to the Chief of Mission's attention. As a result, without adequate project status reporting to the COM, permitting higher level review of problem issues, poor management decisions may result in wasted taxpayer dollars. For example, until recently, the COM was unaware of the various issues impacting the successful completion of the Falluja wastewater project. These issues caused repeated delays in the three year old project and include security concerns, inadequate design, poor contractor performance, and work stoppages for non-payment of contractor invoices.

Chief of Mission Sources of Information on Reconstruction Projects

The Reconstruction Core Group meeting is the primary source of reconstruction project information for the COM; however, projects discussed at this meeting are subjectively selected by senior ITAO staff. Other sources of project information are also available as requested. Figure 3 provides an overview of the "as is" process for informing the COM about ongoing reconstruction projects; however, information does not always flow as illustrated.

Figure 3: “As Is” Process for Providing the Chief of Mission Project Status Updates ^a



Source: SIGIR developed this figure based upon interviews and review of documentation.

Notes:

^a Figure 3 provides an overview of the existing process for informing the COM about ongoing reconstruction projects; however, information does not always flow as illustrated.

^b Discussion elsewhere in this report, states that the Section 2207 report is compiled by the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs-Iraq (NEA-I) with information provided by principal agencies involved in reconstruction. ITAO coordinates, compiles, and locally vets input for the 2207, which is reviewed by CETI and provided as input to NEA-I for further clearance of the 2207. The COM reviews the input provided to NEA-I.

The following paragraphs discuss meetings, reports, and other sources of reconstruction project data for the COM.

Gulf Region Division and Districts

Meetings of the Gulf Region Division (GRD) are not a direct means of providing information to the COM; rather, they are the source of most reconstruction project-related data. GRD conducts many meetings dealing with project management. Several of the meetings are attended by senior consultants and are key to communicating project status to the COM. The key meetings are the

Program Review Board, Cost-to-Complete and the Senior Executive Review Group (previously called the Critical Project Review).

- The Program Review Board meets monthly⁵ to provide project updates, including new awards, project starts, and completions and specific project updates.
- The Cost-to-Complete monthly meeting primarily deals with project cost and funding issues.
- The Senior Executive Review Group meets monthly to review potential project funding.

A list of key program review meetings is in Appendix B. A comprehensive list of reconstruction project meetings conducted by GRD is in Appendix C. The list includes the frequency, purpose, and primary attendees of each meeting.

Reconstruction (Recon) Core Group

The weekly Recon Core Group meeting is the primary source of reconstruction project information to the COM; however, the Embassy has not developed formal policy and guidance for reporting this information. Consequently, the presentations are ad hoc in nature. According to senior management, the meetings generally last less than an hour and have an agenda of three or four items. Attendees at the meetings sometime include, but are not limited to, the COM, the Deputy Chief of Mission, and representatives from the Office of the Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, the Iraq Transition Assistance Office, the Office of Provincial Affairs, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the GRD.

Potentially, all reconstruction projects can be discussed at this meeting, but there are no formal criteria to develop an agenda. We were told that senior leaders from ITAO try to ensure that projects from each sector are discussed at least once a month. We were also told that any of the key participants can request that a topic be included in an agenda, but without specific reporting criteria, critical projects may not be included for discussion.

Preceding the Recon Core Group meeting, a group of senior leaders meet to establish the agenda. The agenda is “scrubbed” the evening before the Recon Core Group meeting and sent to the Chief of Mission for prior review. According to senior management, if no topics have been submitted for discussion at the meeting, projects are subjectively selected and added to the agenda.

When we asked for copies of the minutes for the Recon Core Group meetings, we were told that minutes for the meetings were not documented. To determine what has been discussed at the

⁵ This was a biweekly meeting until April 2008.

prior meetings, we requested copies of the meeting agendas as far back as available. We were provided the agendas from February 12 through September 17, 2008.

Our review of the agendas showed that the Falluja Wastewater Treatment System project was first briefed to the COM on July 15, 2008, and has been included on every Recon Core Group meeting agenda through September 17, 2008.

Given the COM's interest in this project, we selected the Falluja Wastewater Treatment System for review to determine whether data was reported up the chain throughout the project's history. The Falluja Wastewater project, a basic need that will improve the lives and health of thousands of Iraqi citizens in the Falluja area, was started in March 2005 and has yet to be completed. This project was beset with problems from early 2005 through the date of this report, yet the COM just learned of the magnitude of these issues in July 2008, more than three years after the start of the project. Through our review of project-related documents and interviews with government personnel, we determined that information on the project's status was repeatedly prepared and forwarded from project management to the ITAO Senior Consultant for water and upward to ITAO management through joint weekly meetings. Yet the issues surrounding this project failed to make the Recon Core Group agenda until July 15, 2008. For example, from early on in this project through the date of this report, the payment of invoices for contracts funded by DFI has been an issue. Several contractors were not paid and have either stopped work or refused to deliver equipment. Because of the interdependency of segments of work on this project, other contractors have also been forced to suspend construction. Although multiple courses of action have been proposed and repeatedly presented by the ITAO Senior Consultant, a decision on those options had not been made for over two years.⁶

According to documents we obtained, including e-mails, memorandums, briefings, and listings, we determined that senior IRMO/ITAO officials received information on significant issues surrounding the Falluja Wastewater Treatment System project on at least 27 separate occasions—five times in 2006, 20 times in 2007 and twice in 2008.⁷ One e-mail we obtained, from April 2007, indicated that senior ITAO officials debated whether or not to discuss the Falluja DFI funding problem with the COM at the Recon Core Group meeting. However, since there are no

⁶ SIGIR's Inspections Directorate recently completed a review of five projects that are part of the Falluja Wastewater Treatment System. The directorate reported the results of their reviews in "Falluja Waste Water Treatment System (SIGIR-PA-08 144 to 148), issued in October 2008.

⁷ These figures on the communication of key issues related to the Falluja project exclude numerous briefing documents from 2005 through 2007 because these documents did not indicate the attendees at the briefings or the recipients of the information.

minutes from Recon Core Group meetings, we were unable to verify if this issue was ever discussed. We were able to identify documentation indicating that the commander of MNF-I was briefed on the Falluja DFI funding issue—once in 2007 and once in 2008.

The substantial amount of communication to senior IRMO/ITAO officials regarding significant Falluja Wastewater project issues, combined with a lack of communication to the COM on the same issues, indicates a serious management control weakness. This appears to be the result of the lack of standard performance/cost indicators as criteria for raising project issues to the COM.

Other issues that have contributed to delays in completing the Falluja wastewater project include a volatile security environment, an inadequate engineering design, and poor contractor performance. Security issues in Falluja have included the threatening, ambushing, and murdering of contractors, vandalism, material hijacking, and the murder of personal security staff.⁸ Problems with engineering design have included the need for significant re-engineering, problems identified during construction, and the absence of a final design that has yet to be completed. Contractors have had cash flow problems as well as numerous safety violations that contributed to four construction-related fatalities. Individually, these issues may not rise to the level of attention of the Recon Core Group, but combined, especially with the DFI payment issue, they should have been discussed. However, again, without standard policies and guidance on reporting, and the establishment of a formalized process for reporting on criteria-based standards, the COM was not informed.

Other Core Group Meetings

The COM attends other core group meetings: Economic, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Rule of Law, Public Affairs Office, and Political. While these core group meetings are not directly related to reconstruction, projects could be a topic of discussion. For example, the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, which is responsible for prison construction in Iraq, reports to the Rule of Law Coordinator rather than CETI as a result of realignment. Reconstruction issues should be reported at the Recon Core Group meeting; however, specific issues could be discussed during the Rule of Law Core Group meeting.

Other Available Project Information

In addition to the meetings discussed, other sources of reconstruction project status are available. Some of the primary sources are discussed below.

⁸ Security conditions have improved from mid- to late 2007.

Section 2207 Report

The Congress established a requirement in Section 2207 of Public Law 108-106, “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004,” to report quarterly estimates of costs to complete all projects funded by IRRF, listed on a project-by-project basis. This report, known as the Section 2207 Report, is currently compiled by the Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs from information provided by the principal agencies involved in Iraq relief and reconstruction—the U.S. Agency for International Development, GRD, and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (formerly through IRMO). The requirement for the Section 2207 Report expired on October 1, 2008, as set forth in Public Law 109-234, Section 1302 (a).

We reviewed the *Section 2207 Reports*, dated from January 2004 through July 2008, to determine what was reported on the Falluja Wastewater Treatment System project. We found that the Falluja project was included in the reports, which highlighted increased project funding, contracting with Iraqi firms, problems with security, and payment issues associated with contracts funded with Development Funds for Iraq. However, as written, the language included in these reports would not have alerted the reader to a significant problem with the Falluja project.

Iraq Reconstruction Management System

The Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS) is another source of reconstruction project data available to the COM. This system provides the only aggregate data on U.S. government-funded reconstruction efforts in Iraq and currently provides various reports. However, in July 2008, SIGIR reported that IRMS is becoming obsolete, its data is incomplete, and it provides only a limited common operating picture of Iraq reconstruction activities.⁹ To resolve system issues—such as program management accountability and data quality, SIGIR recommended that the COM and the Commander, MNF-I jointly establish an interagency planning process to address the future operation and use of IRMS. This recommendation highlights the need for documented policies and guidance to effectively track progress of reconstruction projects.

Issues with Reporting Process

Throughout our review, senior leaders told us there is no documented policy and guidance that outlines how, what, and when to report reconstruction project status to the Chief of Mission. No policy and guidance defines the information that the COM needs and criteria to base it on. In addition, the COM has no systematic process or baseline criterion for analyzing cost, schedule,

⁹ *Comprehensive Plan Needed to Guide the Future of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System* (SIGIR-08-021, July 26, 2008).

performance, or impact, and no criteria to automatically initiate reports to the COM based on those criteria. Project reporting is left to the discretion of project managers, subject matter experts, and other senior leaders.

Government Accountability Office Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and *Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123 Management Accountability and Control* state that the proper stewardship of government resources is an essential responsibility of agency managers and staff. Government employees must ensure that programs operate, and resources are used, efficiently and effectively to achieve desired objectives. To achieve these ends, management has a fundamental responsibility to develop and maintain effective internal control. Internal control alone does not guarantee the success of agency operations but is a means of managing the risk of waste, fraud, and mismanagement associated with government programs and operations.

Impact of Inadequate Controls

This report has outlined the limitations associated with the process the Department of State uses for reporting reconstruction project status to the Chief of Mission. It is unclear why important information on the status of the Falluja Wastewater Treatment System was not regularly presented to the COM. Nevertheless, this project suggests there are significant weaknesses in the system for keeping the COM informed regarding the status of such projects.

Without standardized baseline criteria—like cost, schedule, performance and their associated risks—responsible officials cannot objectively measure project deviations and report them to the COM and other senior leaders. Without such criteria, uninformed management decisions could result in delayed construction and wasted taxpayer dollars.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

While the Department of State has an informal process for reporting reconstruction project status to the COM, its ad hoc nature and lack of standard policies and guidance leaves the process vulnerable to the omission of important and timely information that should be brought to the COM's attention. No documented policies and guidance outline how and when to report deviations from established project baselines related to cost, schedule, and performance, and what specifically should be reported. Without a formal process, critical decisions on project issues may be delayed or based on incomplete information and result in inefficient and ineffective operations. Establishing measurable criteria that trigger automatic reporting is essential to timely, complete, and independent project reporting. Establishing such an effective process will require the cooperation of the various agencies represented in Iraq as well as senior-level commitment to the process. The formal process should apply to all reconstruction sectors (water, electric, health, transportation, law enforcement, and provincial reconstruction teams).

Recommendations

SIGIR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq take these actions:

1. Establish and publish policy and guidance to uniformly report the status of reconstruction projects to the U.S. Ambassador. The policy and guidance should consider stratifying and prioritizing projects to be reported to the U.S. Ambassador. Furthermore, the policy and guidance should establish a means of identifying key elements of a project—such as cost, schedule, and performance—to objectively provide the status of a project.
2. Direct the Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq to establish a process based on the new policy guidance to ensure that all reconstruction projects, regardless of funding source or agency management, are accurately and adequately reported to the U.S. Ambassador. If a project is delayed or terminated, the Coordinator should also consider the associated impact on quality of life and diplomatic relationships. Any project deviating from established criteria should trigger required notification to the Ambassador.

Management Comments and Audit Response

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Deputy COM and the Commanding General, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division (GRD), concurred with the report, and the Deputy COM stated that action to implement SIGIR's recommendations is underway. The Deputy Chief of Mission indicated that she had requested the Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq to design a process to report project status, with some measure of objectivity, for problem projects.

The Deputy COM suggested that for clarity's sake, the second recommendation involving "all projects, regardless of funding source or agency management" should be refined to read "all non-military projects, regardless of funding source or agency management," indicating that the COM does not have authority over projects funded by the U.S. military. SIGIR did not change the recommendation because the majority of remaining reconstruction projects are funded by DoD. SIGIR believes the process being developed to provide the COM information should include reconstruction projects funded by DoD. Although SIGIR realizes that there is a division of responsibilities between the Embassy and MNF-I, that does not exclude the sharing of information of mutual interest. Moreover, National Security Presidential Directive dated May 11, 2004, states that "The Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance for Iraq." Consequently, SIGIR believes that the process being developed to provide the COM information should include reconstruction projects for the benefit of Iraq, funded by DoD. Including such information is consistent with the collaborative working relationship between the COM and the Commanding General, MNF-I. The extent and scope of the information would be decided as part of the ongoing process described in the Deputy COM's comments.

MNF-I and GRD provided additional comments, which for the most part, included suggestions for technical changes to the report. SIGIR considered these comments in preparing this final report and made changes considered appropriate.

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology

SIGIR initiated this audit in August 2008 (Project 8030) in response to a request from the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq. In our discussions, the Ambassador raised questions about the management information available to support oversight of reconstruction projects. The Ambassador requested that SIGIR look into this issue. This report identifies the current process of reporting reconstruction project status to the Chief of Mission and the adequacy of project information for fulfilling oversight responsibilities.

To identify the current process for reporting the reconstruction project status to the Chief of Mission, we interviewed Chief of Mission staff and officials from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. For each of the agencies where officials were interviewed we requested copies of any written policies and guidance regarding the tracking and reporting of project status. We also requested sample copies of project status reports.

To determine the adequacy of project status reporting, we analyzed the flow of information as identified during interviews and examined sample copies of project status reports, meeting agendas, and briefing slides. We also selected a sample project, the Falluja Wastewater Treatment System, and reviewed project status reports to determine if there was a breakdown in communication and, if so, where it occurred.

We performed this audit under authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. We conducted this review between August and September 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

Internal Controls

We examined internal controls as it relates to policies and procedures in place to ensure the adequate flow of information to the COM.

Prior Coverage

There has been no prior audit coverage on project status reporting to the Chief of Mission.

Appendix B— Key Program Review Meetings

This appendix shows some of the key meetings in support of reconstruction efforts in Iraq and illustrates participation at various levels of the Gulf Region Division and the Department of State.

Meeting	Frequency	Minutes/ Slides/ Other Distributed	GRx ^a	GRD	GRD Senior Staff	Senior Consultants	DoS Executive Directors	COM/ DCM
GRx Project Review Board	Bi-weekly	Slides	X	X	X			
Program Review Board	Monthly ^b	Slides	X	X	X	X		
Cost-to-Complete Working Group	Monthly	Spread-sheet		X	X	X	X	
Sector Meeting^c	Weekly	Minutes/ Slides		X	X	X	X	
Senior Executive Review Group^d	Monthly	Slides		X	X	X	X	
Reconstruction Core Group	Weekly	Agenda			X	X	X	X

Source: SIGIR

Notes:

^a GRx denotes the Gulf Region Division districts—North, Central, and South

^b The Program Review Board meeting was a biweekly meeting until April 2008.

^c Collection of meetings that are sector dependant.

^d Previously called the Critical Project Review.

Appendix C—Comprehensive List of Meetings

Listed below are many of the meetings held in support of reconstruction efforts in Iraq.¹⁰ The frequency, purpose, and participation depicted indicate that opportunities for communicating information are available. The effectiveness of these meetings was not determined.

Meeting	Frequency	Purpose of Meeting	Participants/ Distribution
Executive Level			
Program Review Board (PgRB)	Monthly	Review program status, including specific information on completions, starts, and new awards	CG, Deputy, DP, Chief of Contracting, Senior Council, Sector Leads, District Commanders, and District DPs/staff via telecom, ITAO
Special Focus Program Review Board/Senior Executive Review Group or SERG ^a	Monthly	Provide detailed project and program-level review of an individual program or series of programs affecting a single customer.	GRD Staff, District Commander, Deputy Commander, DPM, Chief E&C, ITAO ^b
Twice to three times weekly meetings with the Minister of Electricity that involve Energy Sector Lead and ITAO	Weekly	Discuss Strategic Energy issues	CETI, ITAO, CG, Energy Sector Lead, EFC staff
CETI Meeting	Weekly	Discuss Strategic Energy issues	CETI, ITAO, CG, Energy Sector Lead, EFC staff
Cost to Complete Working Group	Monthly	Provide updates on overall program cost, ITAO, State Department, CG.	ITAO, State Department, CG
Program Level			
ITAO Water Sector Project Reviews	Weekly ^c	Provide updates on open IRRF and ESF funded projects. Focus recently has been on ensuring all FY07-08 IRRF funded projects are executed prior to end of the FY. Prior to this “Red Zone” focus, these meetings provided updates on all open projects in the water sector.	ITAO Senior Consultant for Water, Water Sector staff, RM funds managers
Energy Sector Weekly Meeting	Weekly	Discuss overall Energy Sector program status	Energy Sector Leads and staff, ITAO

¹⁰ The acronyms used in this appendix are defined on page 18.

General Generation Program Teleconference	Weekly	Discuss all Generation Projects including OMS	ITAO, Energy Sector Lead and Deputy, Generation PMs, Field PMs, OMS PMs
ISP Program Review	Weekly	Update key stakeholders on program progress.	ISP Program Manager, ITAO Senior Consultant, MNC-I C7, EFC
MoE Meeting	Weekly	Discuss ongoing projects, ministry coordination, and general liaison.	ITAO, Energy Sector Lead, DG, Deputy Minister
Basrah Children's Hospital Review	Weekly	Review status of BCH and all other projects/programs of interest to ITAO.	Director of Programs and staff, Director of ITAO and staff.
Project Level			
Falluja Waste Water Treatment Project Teleconference	Weekly ^d	Assign and track action items for Falluja contracts.	Water Sector Lead & staff, GRC PM and staff. ^e
Sadr City R3 Water Treatment Plant Project Update	Weekly	Discuss issues and planning for this project.	ITAO Senior Consultant for Water, Water Sector staff, JROC, GRC staff, contractor
NET Approval Meeting	As directed by ITAO	Approve validated PRDC projects.	PRDC Program Manager, ITAO Ops, ITAO Budget
Pre-NET Validation Meeting	As directed by ITAO	Review PRDC project submittals from the PRTs and PRDCs.	PRDC Program Manager, ITAO Ops, ITAO Budget

Notes:

^a Formally known as the Critical Project Review (CPR)

^b On a quarterly basis, the SERG is attended by Command and more senior-level GRD and DoS personnel.

^c Weekly since summer 2005.

^d Weekly since September 23, 2007.

^e In July 2008, senior leadership from GRD and GRC, JCCI, and ITAO began attending.

Acronyms Used in this Appendix

BCH	Basrah Children's Hospital	JCC-I	Joint Contracting Command-Iraq
CETI	Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq	JROC	Joint Reconstruction Operations Center
CG	Commanding General	MNC-I C7	Multi-National Corps-Iraq C7
CPR	Critical Project Review	MoE	Minister of Electricity
DG	Director General	NET	National Embassy Team
DoS	Department of State	OMS	Operations, Maintenance and Sustainment
DP	Deputy Programs	Ops	Operations
EFC	Energy Fusion Cell	PgRb	Program Review Board
FY	Fiscal Year	PM	Project Manager
GRC	Gulf Region Central	PMs	Project Managers
GRD	Gulf Region Division	PRDC	Provincial Reconstruction and Development Committees
IRRF	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
ISP	Infrastructure Security Plan	RM	Resource Manager
ITAO	Iraq Transition Assistance Office	SERG	Senior Executive Review Group

Appendix D—Acronyms

CETI	Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq
COM	Chief of Mission
DFI	Development Fund for Iraq
DoS	Department of State
GRD	Gulf Region Division
IRMO	Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
IRMS	Iraq Reconstruction Management System
IRRF	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
ITAO	Iraq Transition Assistance Office
MNF-I	Multi-National Force-Iraq
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
PCO	Project and Contracting Office
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

Appendix E—Audit Team Members

This report was prepared and the audit conducted under the direction of David R. Warren, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include:

W. Dan Haigler

Walt R. Keays

Richard R. Kusman

Waheed Nasser

Milton L. Naumann

Nancee K. Needham

Management Comments

U.S. Embassy - Iraq



Embassy of the United States of America

Baghdad, Iraq

October 14, 2008

Mr. Glenn D. Furbish
Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

Dear Mr. Furbish:

We appreciate the immense effort and research that has gone into SIGIR's efforts to review the process of determining what information reaches the Chief of Mission concerning IRRF reconstruction projects. We accept the recommendations and have already begun to implement them. The Ambassador has requested that a process be designed that will bring some measure of objectivity to flagging projects that should be brought to his attention either in written reports or to be briefed at the Reconstruction Core Group. Our Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq (CETI) is working with the Director of Iraq Transition Assistance (ITAO) to design a system that will produce this result.

We note that your report concludes that there were over 22 communications between U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division and our ITAO experts or senior staff on the subject of the difficulties facing the Fallujah Waste Water Treatment Plant, with no evidence that these were ever raised to the level of the COM. Most of these 22 communications concern challenges involved in obtaining payment to contractors of the money owed them by the government of Iraq under the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). There is, however, a break in the timeline that takes place in November 2007, after which there appear to be no reported communications on the subject of the problems at Fallujah.

There is a reason for this. There appeared to have been a breakthrough in October, in which ITAO managed to locate funding for most of the DFI contracts. ITAO therefore believed these were proceeding as agreed and funded. ITAO experts and others were unaware that new difficulties had arisen which had incurred major delays with the project.

ITAO senior staff was able to visit the site in July only because there was a break in the security situation. The project was already on their list of major projects to be inspected at the request of the Director following a scrub of remaining IRRF projects expected to reach completion on or after the expiration date for IRRF of September 30. It was only upon inspection of the site July 7 that they uncovered the major delays and unresolved DFI difficulties referred to in your report. This news was communicated to the COM at the next Reconstruction Core meeting on July 15.

GRD and ITAO Information/Issue Flow

1. Base Data is collected at the closest point of ground truth. Quality Control/Quality Assurance (QC/QA) data, including billing scheduling, manpower is collected at the Resident Office in the Resident Management System (RMS). RMS uploads into Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS) and Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS). RMS provides upward reporting of all project information including issues that need to be addressed at higher levels.
2. The first line of issue resolution is the Gulf Region Division's District (North, Central, South) Project Review Boards (PRB). These are held bi-weekly at the District level with attendance by the Division's District Support Team (DST) Leader. If a project has an issue that is beyond the resources of the District to solve or has external issues that require higher involvement, the DST Leader will bring the issue to the attention of GRD's Director of Programs. The District Commander can also raise a project issue to the Director directly. Issues can be raised and fleshed out at the weekly GRD/ITAO Sector Program Management meetings that individual Sectors and Subsectors hold with stakeholders. The Sector Lead can then raise the issue to the Director of Programs to be addressed. The Director with input from the various meetings and leadership maintains a critical projects list.
3. The Director of Programs and GRD Programs staff meet weekly, monthly, quarterly, and as required. The meetings are for program review and also review of special projects. Quarterly GRD and ITAO conduct Senior Executive Review Group which focuses on programmatic issues and projects that are hard to get done.
4. The hard to get done projects list, aka Commanders Critical Project Review (CCPR), is generated bottom up and is discussed at all the various meetings. This list encompasses ITAO's critical projects list. These projects are briefed and upward report to CETI.

Management Comments

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
GULF REGION DIVISION
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09348

CEGRD-CG

14 October 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, US Embassy Annex,
M-202, Old Presidential Palace, APO AE 09316

SUBJECT: Draft SIGIR Audit Report – Improvements Needed In Reporting Status of
Reconstruction Projects to the Chief of Mission (SIGIR-09-007)

1. This memorandum provides the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division response to the subject draft audit report.
2. The Gulf Region Division reviewed the subject draft report and generally agrees with the facts as presented in the report. GRD provides additional comments for clarity and accuracy in the enclosure.
3. Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report and provide our written comments for incorporation in the final report.
4. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert Donner at (540) 665-5022 or via email Robert.L.Donner@usace.army.mil.

Encl
as

Michael R. Eyre
MICHAEL R. EYRE
Major General, USA
Commanding

SIGIR's Mission	<p>Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and objective:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • oversight and review through comprehensive audits, inspections, and investigations • advice and recommendations on policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness • deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse • information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American people through Quarterly Reports
Obtaining Copies of SIGIR Reports and Testimonies	<p>To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to SIGIR's Web site (www.sigir.mil).</p>
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Programs	<p>Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html • Phone: 703-602-4063 • Toll Free: 866-301-2003
Congressional Affairs	<p>Hillel Weinberg Assistant Inspector General for Congressional Affairs Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 400 Army Navy Drive Arlington, VA 22202-4704 Phone: 703-604-0368 Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil</p>
Public Affairs	<p>Kristine Belisle Assistant Inspector General for Public Affairs Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 400 Army Navy Drive Arlington, VA 22202-4704 Phone: 703-428-1217 Fax: 703-428-0818 Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil</p>