CONFLICTING GOALS FOR A NATIONAL PARK

THE HISTORIC ARSENAL AT SPRINGFIELD, 1968-2008

SPRINGFIELD ARMORY NATIONAL HISTORIC SITE
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
Conflicting Goals for a National Park:
The Historic Arsenal at Springfield, 1968-2008

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ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

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PREPARED UNDER COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT WITH
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN HISTORIANS

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
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Frontispiece. Site plan of Armory Square prepared by the National Park Service in 1967 shows Armory Square and (at top) Federal Square at the height of their development, just before the Armory's closure. The future national park would be defined by the roughly rectangular dark outline below the arrows that traces the line of the nineteenth century cast iron fence (NPS Evaluation Report, 1967).

Cover Illustration: The Main Arsenal at Springfield Armory, constructed in 1850. The Arsenal building now holds the park's administrative offices, visitor center, and museum collections. Photograph ©James Langone, 2006
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Springfield Armory is not the biggest, oldest, or most famous national park. In fact, it is relatively small, new, and little known. Yet the Armory’s story illuminates themes of crucial importance to the national park system.

Springfield Armory was the first, and until its closure in 1968, the longest operating government armory, or weapons factory, in the United States, boasting historical connections to George Washington and the early republic. It was also the central node in Springfield’s economy, and its loss sent shock waves through this western Massachusetts city and its civic establishment. The 1970s were not a good time for American cities, beset as they were with economic decline, disinvestment, racial tension, and social turmoil. The initial plans to salvage jobs and civic pride from the wreckage of the Armory’s closure were not very successful, and it was out of this second collapse, rather than the initial closure, that the campaign for a national park arose. The history of that campaign provides a glimpse of an all-too-frequent dynamic in the creation of parks: the federal government as last resort. When local efforts to preserve a historic site (and in this case to operate a museum) fail, when the impossibility of such an operation ever breaking even has been fully demonstrated, then local leaders call on the National Park Service (NPS) to save a resource whose national significance makes its protection imperative for the nation’s future. In this case there was some poetic justice in thus turning to the federal government, since the Armory’s closure had been part of Defense Secretary MacNamara’s plan to privatize federal defense manufacturing. The government in Washington was not averse to helping troubled cities, and this undoubtedly added to Congress’s eagerness to set up a park in Springfield. Still, it was a fact that the operation the NPS was expected to take over was beset with problems. Nor were hopes for the incipient park’s economic contribution, based now on tourism rather than manufacturing jobs, ever really fulfilled.

Authorized by Congress in 1974 and established four years later, the Armory was one of a number of parks created in the 1960s and 1970s (Lowell National Historical Park and the National Seashores at Cape Cod and Fire Island come to mind) where Congress and the NPS included significant amounts of nonfederal property. These units were all to some degree experiments in park management, designed to allow the federal government to protect resources and provide public services without making large, expensive, and unpopular land purchases. At Springfield, roughly 35 of the park’s 55 acres belonged to the state of Massachusetts and had been given a few years earlier to a new community college, Springfield Technical Community College, for use as a campus. It seems clear that Congress never carefully thought through the question of how this two-headed monster would be managed. The legislation called for an agreement between the federal government and the state, and with great difficulty one was eventually signed. But neither the law nor the agreement was able to produce a smoothly operating park or to preserve all of its important
resources. The reasons why this proved to be the case shed valuable light on this phase in the history of the national park system.

One of first quandaries was triggered by college plans to demolish several historic buildings and construct massive new ones within the very core of the park. These plans emerged just as the park’s authorizing legislation was moving forward. This was in the early 1970s, which was also very shortly after the passage of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) of 1966, and of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. As the controversies over the campus (already a National Historic Landmark) escalated, the NPS was still sorting out how to implement some of NHPA’s basic provisions, like the National Register of Historic Sites. The Advisory Council for Historic Preservation, also created by the legislation, was still housed within NPS and had not yet become independent agency. Section 106, the Act’s preservation review process, was untested: the Springfield Armory case, substantively complex, bureaucratically subtle, and political fraught, became the agency’s first exercise in applying it. This phase of the park’s creation therefore offers a remarkable glimpse into a key moment in the history of federal preservation law.

Even after the controversies over the college’s new buildings had been settled, the campus continued to test the limits of preservation agreements as park management tools. The college at first was hostile to preservation and to federal interference; even later, when college leaders accepted the need for stewardship and even came to value the historic buildings, they never adopted preservation as end goal: they could not do so, for running a community college was their mission, and they were deeply dedicated to it. Thus as the condition of some historic campus buildings worsened, preservation projects continued to take second place to other college needs. To make matters worse, Springfield Technical Community College did not have final decision-making authority over its own campus: that belonged to the state, whose budget processes and priorities were far less sympathetic to preservation than college leaders. Indeed there is little evidence that the state legislature or governor’s office ever took seriously the legal commitment to preserve Armory Square which they had made by signing the cooperative agreement on which the park’s existence was predicated. Unfortunately, Springfield Armory came to offer an all too vivid example of what can happen to historic buildings when they are not maintained – in this case, historic buildings deemed sufficiently important to have been designated, even before the Armory’s closure, as a National Historic Landmark, and subsequently to be included in a national park, or National Historic Site as it was formally designated. The prospect of decaying buildings in the middle of a Congressionally designated historic site depressed and frustrated park administrators, and sometimes college leaders as well. Yet even today, important historic buildings within the park remain vacant and deteriorating, and there is a real possibility that one or more could be lost to arson, vandalism, or cumulative decay.

Apart from this melancholy spectacle, the dilemma of the college buildings raises an important question of how far federal authority extends over Congressionally authorized parkland. What does national park designation mean (and not mean) in relation to nonfederal land? Must the NPS sit by helplessly as designated park resources decay? The
Armory story shows that NPS officials have consistently viewed federal authority as weak and largely unenforceable. Yet even as college buildings were decaying, a series of Supreme Court and federal circuit court decisions were fortifying the basis for federal authority. In these cases the court held in favor of the federal government, based not on the Cession Clause – the traditional basis for NPS authority – but on the stronger though less familiar Property Clause. Though the courts did not relate the Property Clause power to the specific facts of Springfield Armory, they opened the door to doing so. The NPS has not yet accepted the invitation, perhaps because harnessing the power of the Property Clause on behalf of Springfield Armory would require not only legal reasoning but also political will. There is some irony in the situation, for the semblance of federal power unsupported by its exercise contributed to the plight of the National Historic Site. On the one hand, the NPS felt correctly that it was the state’s responsibility to maintain the campus; and in any case, the agency was prohibited from spending Congressional funds on nonfederal property. Yet on the other hand, the campus’s location within a national park gave state officials a convenient excuse for withholding funds: “let the feds worry about it,” as former college president Andrew M. Scibelli paraphrased their attitude. One way to break the deadlock would be for “the feds” to exercise the power they do have, which is the power of the Property Clause.

Managing historic buildings under these conditions would have been difficult enough for a national park. But the Armory also lacked control over its other main asset, its internationally renowned collection of firearms. That belonged to the U.S. Army, which started assembling the Benton Small Arms collection in 1862. The Army readily agreed to leave the collection in Springfield after the Armory’s closure, but it refused to give up ownership. Actually the Army did not own the guns: the federal government did. But they were nonetheless “Army property,” and so they would remain, even though housed, displayed, catalogued, and preserved by the staff and at the expense of the National Park Service: as recently as 1998, indeed, the Army seemed interested in reclaiming some of the guns, and it has never stopped sharing its views (sometimes presented as peremptory orders) on how to care for the collection.

NPS museum professionals recognized even before they signed the agreement with the Army that managing a collection on these terms would be challenging. But Army ownership was not the only difficulty they faced. The sheer size of the collection astounded agency officials, as did its disorder. While museums had been an integral part of the NPS since its earliest days, and some of the agency’s collections were large and important, they were always understood to be subsidiary to the sites themselves, and their care subsidiary to their display. The Armory challenged these understandings, not only because of the collection’s importance but also because of the local politics leading to the park’s creation, which emphasized the collection over the site. Moreover, the agency’s capacity to care for and manage collections was not so great then as it became later. The tasks of curation and conservation were being professionalized, but trained experts and well equipped facilities were in short supply. As the Armory entered the park system, then, it was not only park staff in Springfield but also the agency’s highest-ranking museum professionals who held that its
collections did not fit the norm, and that they justified exceptional levels of spending and care. Was Springfield unique or merely unusual? Could it be managed according to standard agency policies, or did it demand special standards? These questions resonated through the park’s history, frequently placing park and regional officials at loggerheads. How they were negotiated offers valuable insights into the strengths and limitations of NPS museum policies as well as the agency’s administrative structure, which spread decision-making among central and regional offices, parks, and special-purpose technical centers.

One area of park operation was initially considered rather straightforward, and that was interpretation. Yet this simplicity was deceptive. Interpretive plans stressed broad themes like industrial history or the Armory’s relationship to Springfield, yet this approach sat uneasily with a second premise, which was that the collection would be the main focus of interpretation. The collection consisted essentially of about 9,000 guns. Over the years these artifacts had attracted a loyal following of gun enthusiasts, collectors, and scholars who wanted nothing more than to be able to pore over the details of rare experimental firearms. While the park did its best to satisfy this constituency (and still does), it was obvious even before the NPS’s arrival that this approach would not interest the general public. The resulting tension was never entirely resolved. One reason is that it proved surprisingly difficult in practice to wrest the interpretive emphasis away from the guns. The permanent exhibit, which the agency completed with great care and professionalism in 1989, did less than some had hoped to demonstrate that the Armory was more than “just a gun museum.” The historic site, which might have supported broader narratives, was largely closed off to interpreters by the conditions of its ownership and use.

Another source of tension was the guns themselves. Firearms provoke strong feelings of distaste among much of the public. They are not the only museum artifacts to do so, but torture equipment and memorabilia from Nazi concentration camps are typically exhibited with strong messages of condemnation: they are emblems of suffering, talismans against hatred and inhumanity. But at the Armory, guns were presented mainly to be admired, whether as examples of technical skill, industrial innovation, or national defense. This approach alienated part of the public even when the Armory was operating. As long ago as 1843, indeed, a display of muskets at the Armory inspired the pacifist poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow to write his anti-war poem, “The Armory at Springfield.” More recently, park superintendents and interpreters have felt this dilemma keenly: they have never seen themselves as advocating for guns, but guns are what they had, and they have been eager to derive some public benefit of instruction or edification from them – and to attract more visitors to the park. Thus the Armory’s interpretive programs have repeatedly sought to divert attention from the underlying fact that guns are weapons designed to kill. Sometimes interpreters have stressed their mechanical ingenuity, at other times they have enticed the public with special events unrelated to the collection. These efforts have produced many interesting and successful programs, but they have not resolved the underlying contradiction. What no one has yet tried is to look head-on at the clash of feelings that guns provoke – not as an obstacle to interpretation but as its subject.
The Armory has faced many serious problems: a divided site, collapsing buildings, Army interference, controversies over collection care and conservation, and the difficulty of interpreting a gun collection to a sharply divided public in a decaying city. Given these challenges, the situation today could be a good deal worse than it is, for despite mistakes and mishaps, there have been notable successes. Above all, the collection and most of the historic buildings are still there. That should not be taken for granted: without the NPS it almost certainly would not be the case. Today, then, although the Armory continues to present difficult challenges, the options for its future remain remarkably open.
METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed in this study has consisted essentially of three parts: First, a thorough investigation of primary sources including official memoranda, letters, plans, and reports (and drafts thereof). The focus was on the documentary record produced and preserved by the National Park Service itself, mainly at Springfield Armory NHS, in the Washington office, and at the Northeast Museum Services Center in Charlestown, MA (a more complete accounting is included in the Annotated List of Sources and Repositories below, together with some discussion of the limitations of the documentary record). An effort was also made to review the archives of Springfield Technical Community College, but these proved to be extremely fragmentary. The second component was interviews, mostly recorded, with key figures in the park’s evolution. Again, the focus was on NPS officials, including four of the park’s six superintendents as well as current and former park staff and regional and Washington officials representing planning, museum services, cultural resources, and administration. A solicitor with the Department of the Interior was consulted on legal issues. Two long-serving officials of Springfield Technical Community College were also interviewed: one of them was former President Andrew M. Scibelli. Repeated efforts to interview staff at the Army’s Center for Military History, however, were rebuffed. (A list of interviewees will be found in the Annotated List of Sources and Repositories below.) The third component was direct study of the site and collections, pursued in numerous visits to the park and conversations with staff. Finally, in addition to these major research efforts, it should be noted that, as the product of a cooperative agreement, the study benefitted at many points from the input of agency reviewers, coordinated through the history program of the Boston Support Office, who elucidated many subtleties of agency policy and sometimes challenged the author’s interpretations.

An administrative history like this cannot be written without the active support of many agency officials, and thanks go first to the staff of Springfield Armory NHS, especially Supervisory Curator James D. Roberts and Superintendents Douglas Cuillard and Michael Quijano-West. At the Washington office I was helped especially by Chief Historian Robert K. Sutton, Janet McDonnell, Patty Henry, and Harry Butowsky; and at the Northeast Museum Services Center in Charlestown, MA, by Elizabeth Banks. Paul Weinbaum, History Program Manager for the Northeast Region, provided invaluable support throughout the process. Finally, all those who agreed to be interviewed deserve special thanks for their time and their trust: their names are given in the Annotated List of Sources and Repositories.
CHAPTER ONE

THE END OF THE ARMORY

ARMORY TO CLOSE BY 1968

Research Work Is Shifted
To Arsenal at Rock Island;
Huge Economic Blow to City
– Springfield Daily News, November 19, 1964

The news that confronted readers of the Springfield Daily News on the morning of November 19, 1964, was bad: the Department of Defense had decided to close Springfield Armory. For almost two hundred years, the Armory had stood at the very heart of this western Massachusetts city of 175,000, third largest in Massachusetts and northern terminus of the Connecticut River’s industrial corridor. The Armory’s picture was on the city seal. Its paychecks had seen the city through good times and, more importantly, through bad times. It was hard to imagine the city without the Armory’s $19.5 million payroll, its prestige, its bustling factories and forges, its dignified Victorian quadrangle rising proudly above downtown Springfield. The story of Springfield Armory as a National Park (or more precisely a National Historic Site) began as the citizens of Springfield contemplated that vision.

Though the word armory has become associated mainly with the large drill halls that were built across the country towards the end of the nineteenth century, Springfield Armory was a true armory: a place for designing, manufacturing, and storing guns. Also called arsenals, such places may be private or commercial as well as public, but Springfield Armory, having been founded by none other than George Washington, was for many years the pride of the U.S. Army. When its closing was announced in 1964, Springfield Armory was not only the oldest in the country, and the longest in continuous operation, but also “probably the longest continuously-operated industrial facility in the United States.”¹ Two centuries of history, then, were drawing to a close. Though Springfield residents worried more about the economic impacts of the Armory’s closure, the importance of its history was not lost on them, nor for that matter on the city, state, and national officials who would become involved in the Armory’s closure during the next few years: and in the end it was this history that would give a portion of the Armory a second life as a National Historic Site.

SPRINGFIELD ARMORY IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICA, AND OF SPRINGFIELD

The history of Springfield Armory begins in 1777, when General George Washington approved the choice of Springfield as a place to make and store guns and powder for the Continental Army. There were good reasons for choosing Springfield. The Revolutionary War had been raging for two years, and although the action had begun to the east, it shifted westward after the British abandoned Boston in 1776. When they captured New York City, at the mouth of the strategically important Hudson River, Washington responded by retreating upriver, and much of the action over the following year would center on the Hudson valley, as the colonials fought to prevent British troops in New York City and Canada from joining forces. By 1777, the action was moving further west and south, placing Springfield safely behind colonial lines: moreover, the smoothly flowing Connecticut River provided good transport to Long Island Sound and the Atlantic. Throughout the rest of the war, the site of the future armory would serve as a manufacturing, storage, and supply depot for the entire northeast.2

After the war, the Springfield Armory figured in an event that remains controversial over two centuries later. Shays’ Rebellion was an armed uprising of western Massachusetts farmers against punitively heavy taxes imposed to repay the state’s war debt. In January 1787 Shays led his followers to Springfield, where they were stopped by cannon fire from the Armory. The protests continued until finally, in the teeth of a deadly blizzard, Shays led a thousand men towards Boston, where a regular army defeated them.

It was Shays’ Rebellion that prompted Thomas Jefferson’s famous observation that “a little rebellion now and then is a good thing...a medicine necessary for the sound health of government....” Another response was increased public support for a strong national government. And that in turn led to the designation in 1794 of Springfield’s armory as one of two new permanent federal arsenals, the other being at Harpers Ferry in Virginia (now West Virginia). The first significant construction campaign there took place in 1807-11, as the country’s relationship with Great Britain was again deteriorating (Frontispiece, Figs. 1.1-2). The West Arsenal, known also as Building 11, is the sole survivor of this early period (Fig. 1.3). After 1815, the general outlines of Armory Square, the nucleus of the growing complex, were defined as additional red brick offices, workshops, residences, and storehouses were constructed around a spacious central green (Fig. 1.4-5, 2.4-5). Between 1841 and 1854 Major James W. Ripley, the Armory’s most famous commanding officer, added two of Armory Square’s defining features: the Main Arsenal (Building 13) and the Commanding Officer’s Quarters (Building 1)(Figs. 1.6-7, 1.22-23, 4.10). He also started construction of a cast iron fence around the perimeter of the entire complex (Fig. 1.8, 4.1-3). This was completed later in the nineteenth century, along with more residences and a vast storehouse (Building 19: also sometimes called the cavalry caserne), which stretched over seven hundred feet in length (Figs. 1.9-10, 4.13, 4.20-23). At the same time, the Armory was expanding

Figure 1.1. Armory Square, ca. 1830: from left to right, the North Shops, Office & South Shops, East Arsenal, and Middle Arsenal (NPS: Cultural Landscapes Inventory, Part 2a, 2004).

Figure 1.2. Armory Square in 1875: excerpt from a birds-eye view of Springfield (NPS: Cultural Landscapes Inventory, Part 2b, 2004).
beyond Armory Square, with the purchase of land and construction of a dam at the Upper Water Shops area in 1809 and the purchase of additional land in Federal Square, adjacent to Armory Square, in 1812. (Figs. 1.11-14)

During this period, Springfield Armory played a major role in the development of American manufacturing. Though the frequently heard claim that the Armory pioneered the technology of interchangeable parts may be exaggerated, the Armory was certainly responsible for significant “innovations in interchangeable manufacture of complex metal and wood products, and in organization of factory production.”

After Confederate troops captured and destroyed the other federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry, Springfield’s stature grew. It now became the federal government’s only producer of guns. Though a new arsenal in Rock Island, Illinois, began to make rifles in 1904, this did not immediately threaten Springfield’s dominance, and the Armory continued to expand with construction of a new Railhead area and the addition and enlargement of buildings at Federal Square, Armory Square, and the Water Shops. Springfield Armory remained the U.S. Army’s main center for research, development, testing, and manufacturing pilot weapons through World Wars, the Korean War, and well into the Vietnam War. Scholars credit it with the “design and production of the most important shoulder arms used by the United States Army from the 1790s to the 1960s.”

When the Armory’s closure was announced in 1964, Springfield residents were well aware of its illustrious history. They had been reminded of it no more than a year earlier when the Armory was designated a National Historic Landmark, a distinction reserved for buildings or places possessing “exceptional value as commemorating or illustrating the history of the United States.” The National Park Service had determined in 1959 that the Armory met this standard and, in 1961, after the agency had notified the Secretary of the Army as well as area senators and congressmen, the Army formally applied for NHL status. The designation was a red-letter day in Springfield. Army Secretary Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., asked for a bronze marker for the site; the NPS also provided a certificate. Congressman Edward P. Boland most particularly wished to participate in the dedication ceremony for the bronze plaque, which took place on April 2, 1963, the Armory’s 169th anniversary (Figs. 1.15-16). Armory employees were given administrative leave to listen to the brass band and the

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5 16 U.S.C. 462(b).


Figure 1.3. Building 11: West Arsenal (NPS Evaluation Report, 1967).

Figure 1.4. Armory Square’s central green, seen from the Main Arsenal in 2005 (photo: author).
Figure 1.5. Buildings 15-16 in 2005 (Photo: author).

Figure 1.6. Building 13: Main Arsenal (NPS Evaluation Report, 1967)
speeches by Springfield’s Mayor Charles V. Ryan, the Armory’s commanding officer, and others. The high point of the ceremony was the unveiling of the plaque by the legendary John Garand, designer of the Armory’s M1 rifle. Afterwards, “specially invited guests” toured the Armory, visiting the Main, West, and Middle Arsenals, the site associated with Shays’ Rebellion, the dam at Watershops Pond, and the Benton Small Arms Museum. Finally there was lunch at the Officers Club. “Television, radio, and newspaper coverage,” as NPS Regional Director Ronald commented, “was very complete.”

Notwithstanding the Armory’s national importance, it was its local significance that made its impending closure so alarming to Springfield residents in 1964. The Armory was central to Springfield’s economy and culture. During the nineteenth century the impetus it gave to weapons production had led other manufacturers to concentrate around Springfield and down the Connecticut Valley, making the region an important industrial center. The Armory itself, despite some ups and downs, had always been a substantial presence within

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Figure 1-8. Cast Iron Fence (NPS, Historic Structures Report).
Figure 1.9. Buildings 7, 8, and 9, survivors of the longer row of houses which once stood between Building 19 and the northwest side of the green (photo: author).

Figure 1.10. Building 19, the Long Storehouse or Caserne (NPS, Evaluation Report).
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Figure 1.11. Aerial views of Armory Square (NPS Evaluation Report, 1967).

Figure 1.12. Aerial views of Federal Square (NPS Evaluation Report, 1967).
Figure 1.13. Aerial views of Watershops (NPS Evaluation Report, 1967).

Figure 1.14. Aerial views of Railhead areas (NPS Evaluation Report, 1967).
the local economy. Just before the closure its annual payroll was reported at $19.5 million, its staff at 2,275 employees. Though far below the Armory’s all-time high of about 14,500 employees during World War II, this was still a significant figure. And Armory jobs were not ordinary jobs: they came with government benefits, job security, and prestige, and were not tied to regional or national economic cycles, so that when severe recessions shook the country after World War II, Armory jobs cushioned the impact on Springfield.

The Armory’s physical plant was as impressive as its payroll. A government study calculated that the Armory represented a federal investment of over $65 million: to replace it in 1960 would cost more than $128 million (or about $817 million in 2008 dollars). The huge capital plant represented by this investment was spread through four separate complexes of buildings distributed throughout the city’s urban core. Armory Square accounted for about thirty buildings on 55 acres of land. Across the street, Federal Square encompassed roughly another ten buildings on 18 acres, then there were the Watershops, the forge complex, and the railhead at Page Boulevard: in total, 68 buildings totaling almost 1.8 million square feet on 333.5 acres. In addition to land and buildings, there were rail spurs and utilities systems: phone lines, electric service, heating plants. There was Lake Massasoit, more familiarly known as Watershops Pond and the city’s largest body of water at 250-acres. Finally, there were the machines: lathes, milling and boring machines, vertical, horizontal, center-less, and cylindrical grinders, presses capable of handling up to 800 tons, drop hammers – not to mention “machine shops capable of fabricating and servicing all tools, dies, jigs, fixtures and gauges…,” a forge shop, precision casting laboratories, photo labs, metallography and plastics labs, and test firing ranges that could simulate temperatures as low as minus 70 or high as 200 degrees Fahrenheit at any specified humidity. If the Armory closed, not only would the paychecks stop: every building would be boarded up, every machine shut down. An enormous inventory of productive assets would suddenly become an overwhelming liability.

According to the Department of Defense, much of the Armory’s productive capacity was already sitting idle. Defense reckoned that only 56 percent of the Armory’s

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13 Ibid.
Figure 1.15. Dedication of NHL plaque, April, 1963. John Garand unveils the plaque as Murray Nelligan looks on. (NPS-WASO, NHL files).

Figure 1.16. Mayor Ryan stands by the plaque (NPS-WASO, NHL files).
manufacturing capacity was being used in 1962: by 1965, the percentage had declined to 37 percent. To Washington officials, these figures suggested the Armory might no longer be needed. But Springfield residents were used to fluctuations at the Armory: previous dips had always been followed by rebounds. So the decision to close the Armory came as a shock.

Under study since 1960, it had been kept secret up to the moment the Springfield Daily News revealed the announcement on November 19, 1964. The Defense Department offered several justifications. One was overcapacity. Springfield was now one of eight national armories, and others too were operating below capacity. Rock Island (IL), with 905 acres of land, almost 6.3 million square feet of buildings, and a replacement value of over $334 million in 1965 dollars, was operating at only 49 percent of productive capacity. Its unused assets could easily accommodate Springfield’s remaining functions. There were other reasons. Since 1960, Defense claimed, the existing arsenals had proven unable to “support the largest peacetime military force ever maintained by the United States.” Closing armories might seem counter-intuitive, but Defense argued that private industry could and should fill the gap: it was more inventive, more entrepreneurial, and more efficient than government.

**SPRINGFIELD RESPONDS TO THE CRISIS**

The news threw Springfield into turmoil. The day after the announcement, the Springfield Union published no less than five articles on the subject and an editorial; seven articles the next day. The story would dominate local headlines for well over a year, and an annual poll of Daily News editors and reporters taken at end of 1966 identified the Armory closure and the campaign against it as the “overwhelming choice for top story of the year.” Its prominence in local newspapers continued right up to the departure of the last employees in April, 1968.

Immediately after the announcement, intense discussion arose among the city’s business and political leaders over how to respond. Optimistically, City Council President Armando G. Dimauro told the press that the closing would release “choice land for industrial development” and recreation: he could “see a great deal to be gained” from it. But few agreed. “This is going to play hell with the city of Springfield,” said a labor union official. “We are worried to death about our future,” said the wife of an armory employee.

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16 *Ibid*.


18 The archives of Springfield Armory possess a remarkable collection of clippings which trace the unfolding of the closure as the city’s residents perceived it. All of the references to local press in the following account are drawn from this repository.

Two days after the announcement, the city’s leaders were said to be “divided” on how to respond, but within days, the Springfield Union’s editorial page reported a “Two-Front Armory Fight”: one to oppose the closure plan, the other to “roll with the punch and come back with a solid alternative.” Mayor Ryan was determined to fight on the first front, but the prospects for victory against an adversary as tough and experienced as Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara were poor, and so the paper urged “individuals and civic agencies” to “help prepare Springfield for the worst that can happen.”

The campaign to save the Armory got underway. The leaders scheduled a meeting with McNamara for February 27, 1965, and began to prepare their case. They worked under an intense glare of public interest: even their practice sessions were covered in the press. “Things are looking up!” crowed the Springfield Shopping News on Feb. 21: “The Armory may stay in Springfield after all.” But there was little evidence to back up its optimism.

The delegation that met with McNamara included the mayors of Springfield and neighboring Chicopee, Representatives Boland and Conte, Massachusetts governor John Volpe, Senators Leverett Saltonstall and Edward Kennedy (the latter recovering from a near-fatal plane crash). They brought an impressive stack of paper documenting their case. And they talked fluidly, persuasively, at length. They attacked the Department of Defense’s studies, disputed their assertion that the Armory’s facilities were in poor condition, protested the unfairness of asking Springfield – with one thousandth of the nation’s population – to absorb one tenth of the proposed civilian job cuts (and this on top of previous cuts). Representative Boland noted that the Defense Department’s cuts fell disproportionately on the northeast, and indeed the closure of the Brooklyn Army Terminal and the famed Brooklyn Navy Yard alone would cost the region no less than 12,900 jobs.

The delegates focused on an issue overlooked by Defense’s own studies: the closure’s impact on Springfield. “In Massachusetts,” explained Governor Volpe, we have a very severe problem economically.” The state was experiencing a “population explosion” and should have been adding 20,000 jobs per year, yet the opposite was happening: during the past two years, Massachusetts had lost 40,000 manufacturing jobs. The loss of the Armory’s payroll, coming on top of this, would be a “catastrophe,” creating poverty at the very time when the federal government was pouring billions of dollars into anti-poverty programs.

To cushion the blow, Defense offered to provide retraining programs and help transfer former employees to Rock Island. But the delegation of Armory defenders believed

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22 “Hon. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, meets with Massachusetts Congressional Delegation at the Pentagon Building, Washington, D.C., on Saturday, February 27, 1965” [transcript of meeting] (SPAR Archives).

23 Ibid., p. 29.
that few employees would uproot themselves and move to Illinois. Mayor Ryan explained: 1,600 employees were veterans; a further 200 were disabled veterans; 1,200 were over the age of 45. The last statistic particularly worried him, because the nation had not shown itself adept at placing older men in new careers. But old or young, hearty or disabled, the fundamental problem was the same: “Bad consequences follow, human tragedies occur when a community such as Springfield all of a sudden finds it has to find 2,000 jobs for 2,000 men to support 2,000 families.” “And so,” pleaded the Governor, “we’re desperately hopeful, Mr. Secretary....” 24 After the meeting, the group held a press conference. Secretary McNamara attended and told the press that of more than six hundred such cases he had reviewed, Springfield’s presentation had been the most thorough, the most persuasive. He would personally review the case.25

Back home, the mood was optimistic. “He Didn’t Say No,” exulted the Springfield Republican the next day. “Yields, Reconsiders,” proclaimed the Boston Globe. The “Pall of Gloom” had lifted, at least momentarily, according to the Springfield Daily News (March 1). Good news continued to roll in. In an unprecedented move, McNamara announced that he would retain the well-known consulting firm of Booz, Allen & Hamilton to carry out an impartial analysis. A few weeks later, the Secretary himself arrived in Springfield to tour the Armory, whose champions now presented a counter-proposal to keep 2,150 workers on the payroll while shrinking the physical plant to forty acres around Federal Square.26 “Springfield’s Hopes Boosted,” reported the Boston Globe on March 18. Developments far from Springfield were conspiring against McNamara. In December, 1964, a government plan to buy guns from Germany came to public attention. Memories of Nazi atrocities had not faded and the revelation, coming just as the Defense Department announced its plan to close American armories, provoked public indignation. Further investigation revealed that the German company, Rheinmetall, had strong Nazi ties; worse, unlike other German companies, it had refused to pay reparations after the war. And when it was further revealed that Rheinmetall had used Jewish slave labor during World War II, the Armory’s supporters found an unexpected ally in B’nai Brith. By December, critics were charging that the German gun was not only immoral but “substandard.”27 McNamara had other problems. By the end of 1965, many senators were angry at what they perceived as his high-handed way of making decisions. Opposition to the war in Vietnam, which McNamara fervently supported, was building. That hurt McNamara’s prestige; on the other hand it also undercut the Armory’s claim that the country needed its weapons.

The Armory’s backers were not making much headway. In mid-May, 1965, the Army Weapons Command headquarters at Rock Island confirmed that the “vast Army

24 Transcript of February 27, 1965, meeting p. 37.
25 Transcript of February 27, 1965, meeting, p. 72.
26 Springfield Daily News, March 1, 1965
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administrative machinery is continuing to grind along” according to the original phase-out schedule. And although Rep. Boland was able to kill a Congressional appropriation needed for the phase-out, even he admitted this was a mere skirmish. Meanwhile, Sen. Paul H. Douglas and his colleagues from Illinois were energetically promoting the interests of Rock Island.28

In October, Booz Allen turned in its analysis.29 The company had worked closely with advocates in Springfield and praised their thoroughness and professionalism. But the report sided with McNamara. While the consultants found that the cost savings to be gained by moving Springfield’s “residual in-house functions to Rock Island” were “distinctly marginal,” they warmly endorsed the department’s privatization policies. They found that private industry had “more overall experience in total small arms weapon system development” than the Armory. And as guns merged into “larger weapon system,” this was “an appropriate time to bring a fresh set of attitudes and approaches to the system task. Industry has demonstrated that it can do this.” “It is clear,” the consultants concluded, “that the Armory’s manufacturing capability and capacity are not needed and should not be retained.”30

As the Springfield Daily News put it late in 1964, “Save Armory Steps All Are Taken.”31 Early in 1966, advance men from the Department of Defense began arriving in Springfield to start transferring eligible employees. Yet the campaign was not quite over. Rep. Boland continued to make speeches in Congress, and at the end of April Senator Kennedy and Representatives Boland and Conte pleaded personally with the president to intervene. Johnson, however, would not override his secretary of defense. The best he would do was to detail a full-time representative of Defense’s Office of Economic Adjustment to help convert the Armory to private use. “President Johnson,” reported the Springfield Daily News, “has blown Taps on the Springfield Armory.”32 Mayor Ryan vowed to fight on, but by May even he had capitulated. The fight was over.

SPRINGFIELD PLANS FOR A FUTURE WITHOUT THE ARMORY

As early as November, 1964, the Springfield Union had called on city leaders to prepare for the worst: now, they turned to the second of the “two-front” campaign – planning for a future without the Armory. Springfield, the Union had written, must become better at “incubating new business, bringing in more from outside, and preserving what we have.” The paper favored industrial reuse for the Armory plant. If that failed, the School

30 Ibid., pp. iii-vi.
31 November 30, 1964.
Department could use it for an “education park,” a centrally located collection of schools. The city should also consider keeping and even expanding the Armory’s museum, the Benton Small Arms Collection. “Sentiment for the past,” it said, “is a minor factor now, but Springfield will need its reminders, and will need the tourist trade like never before.” These and other ideas now began to absorb public attention.

In some ways the prospects of life without the Armory had improved since the first dire predictions. By 1967 the Armory’s payroll had shrunk to 1,100. Though it was still the third largest employer in Springfield (after the City of Springfield and Monsanto), it accounted for only 2.5% of manufacturing jobs in the Lower Pioneer Valley region and a mere one half of one percent of all jobs in the metropolitan area. Moreover, unemployment was running at 3.7%, a record low. This represented a considerable improvement since 1961, when unemployment had reached a high of 8.4%, or even 1963, when a Springfield resident had described civilian unemployment as “rife in this area.”

Yet there were hints that the challenges ahead might be even more severe than anticipated, for the data hid a “pervasive deterioration” in the local economy that the Armory’s closure would only exacerbate. Jobs in Springfield were not keeping pace with regional population growth, and the only reason why the jobless rate was not much higher was that city residents were commuting to jobs elsewhere. As many as 10,000 people were commuting to Connecticut. The mix of jobs was changing too. Though industrial jobs accounted for somewhat more than one third of total employment in Springfield, much of the region’s industrial capacity now lay in the nearby cities of Chicopee and Holyoke. Relative to the total job market, manufacturing employment in Springfield was now about 25% less important than in New England as a whole. Service sector jobs, by contrast, were running about 20% above the national average, those in finance about 70% higher.

Like many American cities, in short, Springfield was undergoing a painful transition from a manufacturing to a finance and services economy. At the same time, the economic balance between city and region was shifting. Though the region’s population was growing, the city itself had lost 6.1 percent of its population between 1960 and 1970. As jobs and
residents migrated to the suburbs, Springfield – again like many American cities – was losing its regional dominance. One result was deteriorating middle- and working-class neighborhoods in the center of Springfield. In 1970, unemployment was reported at 6-10 percent around Armory Square, while the percentage of families on public assistance or welfare in Springfield’s core neighborhoods ran as high as 50 percent and was nowhere less than 10 percent. Downtown Springfield’s minority populations were large for the region: over 5 percent Spanish-speaking to the north of the Hillshops, over 25 percent black to the east. In some of these neighborhoods, over 75 percent of dwellings were rated substandard.\(^{39}\)

As a federal report summarized in 1978, the Hillshops were surrounded by “Hispanic and Black neighborhoods, both of which are economically depressed and have high unemployment rates.”\(^{40}\)

The Armory’s closure, then, hit at a city that was already losing its population, industrial stature, employment base, and prosperity. It was urgent to keep the installation’s vast assets in productive use, and with the Armory scheduled to close on April 30, 1968, time was short. If institutions or businesses did not step forward quickly to take over its assets, if local and state legislatures did not pass the necessary measures, if federal applications were not submitted, reviewed, and approved, the property could not be transferred to new owners and its future would be cast into severe doubt. There were compelling reasons to find a solution before the Armory closed, and this meant that the simplest solution would probably be the best.

Mayor Ryan’s first response, in the spring of 1966, was to ask the federal government to sell the Armory to its former employees so that they could continue to operate it as a private enterprise. The government agreed to consider the proposal, but Senator Saltonstall charged Ryan with thinking too narrowly and the Department of Defense’s economic advisor agreed. In any case, when the government announced, late in June, that it would not sell the Armory to the employees, Ryan was ready with another solution: “AIRCRAFT CO. BIDS TO BUY ARMORY,” announced a headline on June 21.\(^{41}\) The Aircraft Armament Company of Baltimore was prepared to retain the entire Armory workforce and even increase it to 8,000 by 1970. Yet this hope too was short-lived: by the end of August, the company had withdrawn its bid, effectively ending the hope of keeping the entire Armory in industrial production – and of solving the Armory problem in a single stroke.

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Yet optimism was growing in Springfield. “Armory Closing May Spur Boom,” enthused the Springfield Daily News in a headline on September 9: the closing was “shaping up as one of the greatest economic developments in the city’s history since its founding 172 years ago.” Surveying the effects of base closures throughout New England later that fall, the Federal Reserve Bank reported in more measured words that “Springfield may be able to make a satisfactory adjustment.” By the following summer, the Economic Development Administration was holding up Springfield as a national example for communities everywhere threatened by the loss of key industries. “All in all,” said Rep. Boland, “many of the dire predictions about Springfield’s future have evaporated.”

The new optimism had several sources. One was the appearance of General Electric as a suitor for one of the Armory’s major complexes. GE was the fourth largest corporation, the third largest employer and (in dollars) the second largest Defense contractor in the nation. The giant corporation proposed to take over Federal Square as an extension of its Missile and Armament Department, based in Burlington, Vt. It would use the complex to make parts for the Vulcan and Minigun, weapons systems used on high-speed jets and helicopters in Vietnam: they were “Gatling-gun type weapons which, by means of a rotating cluster of six barrels can deliver more than 60000 [sic] rounds of ammunition per minute.” GE was ready to start production almost immediately. Such was the enthusiasm for this scheme that the Springfield Daily News predicted enthusiastically that the Department of Defense might actually speed up the closure in order to accommodate General Electric. Meanwhile, the city devised a plan to lease Federal Square from the Army in advance of the closure, then re-lease it to General Electric: after the closure, the city planned to purchase the buildings and continue leasing them to GE.

By January, 1967, General Electric had fifty Federal Square employees on its payroll and was gearing up for full production: “Despair Yields to Promise After Battle Over Armory,” according to the Springfield Sunday Republican. The following month, the Department of Defense began to recruit Armory workers for relocation to Rock Island, but the Springfield Union reported that “they haven’t found many takers.” One reason was that GE was hiring. Kennedy and Boland soon announced that GE’s Springfield plant had won yet another contract, a $4.8 million order for machine guns. By midsummer, the economic development consultants were predicting that the re-use of the Armory’s industrial properties would eventually yield as many as 3,000 new jobs and would “far exceed” the Armory’s contribution to the local economy. Within a year of its arrival in Springfield, the company could announce that it had “pumped $4.4 million” into the local economy and grown to 816 employees. The following spring, GE announced it would expand by leasing

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the Armory’s testing laboratory on Page Boulevard.\textsuperscript{44}

Nor was GE the only industrial success story. In September, 1967, Ontario Corporation of Muncie, Ind., which manufactured forged metal parts for jet aircraft, announced an agreement to purchase the forge shop at Watershops Pond. And in March, the Philip Hano Co., Inc., of Holyoke, manufacturer of business forms, agreed to take over the bulk of the Page Boulevard property. Its operations were anticipated to reach 400-500 employees.\textsuperscript{45}

Other pieces of the Armory puzzle were also fitting into place. Watershops Pond was one. For many years Springfield College had used this good-sized lake for swimming, ice skating, “intensive camp training,” summer camps for children, zoology and conservation classes. The pond was a civic amenity as well as a part of the campus. So it was a relief when, on June 20, 1967, the \textit{Springfield Daily News} announced: “\text{CITY OFFERED WATERSHOPS POND: GSA Orders Use Of Area for Park.}” Important financial issues remained to be settled, since the government was prohibited from giving the pond away, and it was not until the following spring that Washington announced a deal whereby it was able to offer Watershops Pond to the city for $2,500, a cost that the General Services Administration called “little more than nominal.”\textsuperscript{46}

All in all, Springfield’s fears were proving to be baseless. In fact, so dramatically had the climate of opinion changed that when Defense Secretary stepped down at the end of 1968, the \textit{Springfield Herald} wrote that “it felt certain warmth” towards him. “The fight to save the Armory was a fierce one but it did work out for the best in the long run.”\textsuperscript{47}

Throughout this period, planning for Armory Square, the Armory’s oldest and most architecturally notable complex, proceeded on a separate course. Public attention began to focus on Armory Square in June 1966 with the announcement that the Armory’s closure might mean the loss of the Benton Collection of historic weapons, a fixture of the Armory since 1862 and currently displayed in Building 27 (Figs. 1.17-18). Mayor Ryan quickly launched an appeal to save the museum, but Armory Square was much bigger than the Benton Collection, and another issue soon claimed public attention. “\text{Portion of Armory Site Best Suited to College,}” suggested a letter to the \textit{Springfield Union} on June 7, the first public suggestion of what would become Springfield Technical Community College.\textsuperscript{48}

The outlines of a vision for Armory Square began to emerge later that summer when the mayor’s Armory Planning Committee of government officials and civic, business, and


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labor leaders announced that they would seek “total utilization” of the area, with pieces devoted to education, industry, and recreation. They did not define the pieces, and various proposals came forward. The city’s public school administration suggested an “educational park,” whose new schools would replace aging buildings elsewhere and provide “improved educational opportunities to nonwhite pupils.” The Board of Park Commissioners resolved to acquire whatever they could: and if industry and education efforts fell through, suggested park superintendent Baldwin B. Lee, Armory Square could become a “city-owned, permanent historical park.”

Mayor Ryan opposed the “educational park” idea, influenced perhaps by Edmond P. Garvey, a member of his planning committee and, since 1949, principal of Springfield’s Trade High School. Garvey had recently launched a new two-year vocational college, called Springfield Technical Institute, at the high school, and the Armory Planning Committee now began to consider converting part of Armory Square into a “state technical institute” to accommodate 3,000 post-high-school students, with a staff of 855. The idea captivated Ryan and a delegation, including Garvey, was quickly organized to present the case to the state Department of Education. The “main future of Greater Springfield,” Ryan explained, “lies in its ability to train skilled workers and technicians – a definite lure for business and industry...” Springfield, ran the argument, already boasted the state’s best Technical Institute yet was forced to turn away 600 out of every 1000 applicants for lack of room. Its facilities were “already hopelessly inadequate” and could not possibly support the kind of growth Ryan and Garvey now imagined.

The Committee’s “total utilization” plan had other components. It might include a new police headquarters. It would certainly include the Benton Collection – “the ‘best small arms museum in the world’” – and an idea was taking shape that the museum’s “scientific and technical areas” could be “expanded...to the point where it would draw tens of thousands of tourists and firearms experts annually.” But the technical institute became the centerpiece of planning for Armory Square. For Donald Bradford, director of the Department of Defense’s Office of Economic Adjustment, and an optimist about Springfield’s future, the technical institute proposal was the “clincher.”


Figure 1.17, 1.18. The Benton Collection in 1967 (The Springfield Armory Project: collection: S.T.C.C.).
TECHNICAL INSTITUTE IS BORN, AND THE QUESTION OF PRESERVATION IS INTRODUCED

Momentum grew behind the technical institute. The state’s Commissioner of Education declared that Springfield’s proposed educational complex, including an elementary school and one or more specialized high schools “could turn out to be the most unusual educational complex in America”: the key was the technical institute. In October, the Joint Civic Agencies surveyed industrial firms in Greater Springfield and found that 95% of respondents said there was an “extreme need” for such an institute. Some described it as the “number one need if Springfield is to have economic growth in the future.” “Plan All-Out Push For Tech Institute By Sept. of 1967,” announced the Springfield Daily News, and by the spring of that year both city and state governments, enthusiastically backed by the newspapers, were working at full steam to open a new campus at Armory Square: if possible, by that very fall.54

What role Armory Square’s historic buildings would play in the new technical school was anything but clear. State Rep. Anthony M. Scibelli thought converting the buildings would be easy: “The shops will just become classrooms,” he told the press. But others found the problems daunting. When five members of the School Committee toured Armory Square

in the fall of 1966, all came away “impressed by the historical grandeur of the grounds but divided on whether a technical institute can be put there by next September.” The old buildings offered many advantages: strong floors to support heavy machinery, big loading doors, and fine spaces for teaching subjects like automobile mechanics. The Armory’s ample office space could be “turned into classrooms overnight,” and the complex even featured impressive telephone connections. Yet Mrs. Mary M. Lynch had “mixed emotions.” Though “it would be tragic to destroy any of the historic value of the place,” she thought “some of the buildings will definitely have to be torn down.”55 Some School Committee members also worried that the technical institute would not leave room in the historic complex for a high school or junior high school. Well might they wonder: in his speeches, Garvey projected an enrollment of no less than 5,000 students.56

The likelihood that Armory Square’s historic buildings would be demolished increased in July of 1967, when a Pittsburgh-based consulting firm released the economic development report which the federal government had commissioned at the request of Rep. Boland and Senator Kennedy. The consultants recommended that “existing buildings be renovated only as an interim solution to facilities needs and that a scheduled program of razing and new construction be adopted.”57 They thought only three buildings out of the entire complex – Building 13, 16, and 20 – had any value at all. “The remaining buildings,” concluded the report, “are essentially single-purpose, antiquated structures which, while unusually well maintained, have little utility beyond their present uses.” In their place, the consultants offered up a master plan for “massive new construction”: over 1 million square feet to be built over a period of fifteen years. To accommodate this tremendous construction program, every building in Armory Square would have to be demolished except for the Main Arsenal, which could be converted into a museum.58

The recommendations provoked little controversy, perhaps because Springfield’s leaders continued to feel that desperate measures were needed to assure the city’s economic survival. Nor had Armory Square become the preeminent symbol of the Armory’s heritage that it is now: it was merely one piece of a complicated puzzle. And though Mayor Ryan might call the new Armory Square campus “the most exciting thing to happen in the Connecticut Valley in many years,” to the city’s Economic Development Administration the


56 For example, Springfield Daily News, June 10, 1967.


58 Ibid., pp. 57, 62.
forge shops, Federal Square, and Page Boulevard areas all seemed much more important: their availability for industrial re-use was nothing less than a “windfall to the city,” and it was Page Boulevard, not Armory Square, that “represented the ‘plum’ of all of the Armory property.”

Meanwhile the Planning Committee’s “total utilization” plan had evolved to include about fourteen acres for the city’s school system to use as a physical education area. Located behind the Main Arsenal, along Byers and Pearl Streets, this portion of Armory Square would be redesigned to contain playing fields. But acquiring the land raised its own difficulties. In fact, quite apart from the technical institute, the city found that its Armory Square plan required three separate federal applications: one for the school area, one for the streets, and one for use of the Benton Small Arms Museum. As for the technical institute, city and state officials were working at full tilt to clear away obstacles that seemed to multiply at each step. By March, it was clear that the institute would have to become a state-sponsored community college, for which state legislation was required. From Mayor Ryan’s perspective this was not a bad thing, since he hoped to shed the financial burden of running the institute beyond its first year. But the proposal’s route through state government held out the risk of delay, and it

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was only by dint of exceptional cooperation and acceleration of schedules that the legislation 
was adopted in time to meet strict federal deadlines.

Had the Armory’s closure been announced a year or so earlier, much of Armory 
Square might have been demolished, for the National Historic Landmark designation was 
voluntary and largely honorific. But on October 15, 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson had 
signed the National Historic Preservation Act, whose provisions would greatly affect the 
the National Park Service new preservation responsibilities, and in May, 1966, NPS Director 
George Hartzog assembled a committee to study them.\footnote{This and the following account are derived from Barry Mackintosh, The National Historic Preservation Act and the National Park Service: A History, National Park Service, History Division, 1986, pp. 1 ff.} It included Regional Director 
Ronald Lee, nearing the end of his long NPS career, and Ernest Allen Connally, who was 
destined to play an important role at the Armory. The committee began to flesh out new 
offices and divisions. To consolidate the agency’s key preservation functions, it 
recommended establishing an Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation (OAHP), and 
this Director Hartzog did early in 1967, placing Connally at its head. The office would have 
three branches, representing archeology, historic architecture, and history, and to head the 
latter Hartzog chose Robert M. Utley, a career officer known for combining “professional 
and bureaucratic skills to an uncommon degree.”\footnote{Mackintosh, National Historic Preservation Act, 1986, p. 4.}

In addition to the OAHP, two other new units were formed to carry out entirely new 
functions. The law directed the NPS to maintain a “national register” of places and objects 
“significant in American history, architecture, archeology, and culture,” and for this a 
National Register office was created. The law also directed the NPS to create an Advisory 
Council on Historic Preservation in order to provide expert and impartial commentary on 
federal actions affecting properties listed on the new register: the process was spelled out in 
Section 106. To head the National Register unit, Hartzog brought William J. Murtagh over 
from the National Trust for Historic Preservation. For the Advisory Council, Hartzog chose 
Robert R. Garvey, Jr., the Trust’s executive director (and no relation to Springfield’s Edmond 
Garvey).

A key question considered by NPS officials in fall 1966 was the shape of the new 
National Register. It was clear that the NHLs would be folded into the new list, but would 
they be placed on a pedestal or simply listed along with other properties? At first, the task 
force favored calling out a group of “inviolate properties of national significance.” A paper 
was prepared arguing that all properties should be ranked according to importance and 
tagged as “must preserve,” “should preserve,”” or “desirable to preserve.” Ronald Lee 
favored a less rigid classification into national, regional, and local significance. But Connally
feared that any such ranking would render the lower tiers effectively expendable. “Rather than prejudging whether particular sites ‘must’ or ‘should’ be preserved,” as NPS historian Barry Mackintosh explains, “he preferred to weigh the public benefit of their preservation in the context of actions affecting them, during the review process” spelled out by Section 106. Adopting Connally’s position early in 1967, the task force recommended that the new Register be presented as “an ungraded, uncategorized list of properties arranged alphabetically by States.”

If the review process of Section 106 provided the framework for weighing the benefits of preservation, it also gave listing on the National Register regulatory significance and made the question of criteria important. For unlike the NHL program, National Register listing was not entirely honorific: though it imposed no specific preservation requirements, it did trigger a federal review. Section 106 required federal agencies to “take into account” the “effect” of any action it carried out, funded, or licensed on any place or property that was eligible to be “included in the National Register.” It also required heads of agencies to “afford the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation...a reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to such undertaking.”

To understand the impact of NHPA on the Armory, it is important to note the differences between the law as enacted and the amended statute familiar to most readers. A key difference concerned the responsibilities of agency heads. Although properties “included” in the Register were subject to review, agencies were not yet obliged to survey their holdings for properties that might be eligible for inclusion, much less to nominate them. Instead, NPS staff looked to state liaison officers to identify any such buildings in the course of the surveys they were expected to carry out. It was not until 1971 that President Nixon’s Executive Order 11593 directed federal agencies to “locate, inventory, and nominate” properties under their jurisdiction that “appear to qualify for listing...” and not until 1976 that this requirement became part of the law itself. Other amendments made federal agencies affirmatively responsible for taking special care to “minimize harm” to National Historic Landmarks and directed the Secretary of the Interior to “review and approve” all federal property disposition plans to ensure that architectural and historical values would be “preserved or enhanced.” All of these changes would eventually sharpen the law’s regulatory teeth, but as the NPS confronted the Armory’s closure and the disposition of its property, they lay in the future.

In addition to these substantive amendments, there were other procedural changes. In the law as enacted, no time limits were specified for the review process: later these were

65 This account of Section 106 is drawn from Mackintosh, National Historic Preservation Act, 1986, pp. 79 ff.
66 Public Law 89-665, 89th Congress, S. 3035, October 15, 1966, Sec. 106.
67 Quoted from Mackintosh, National Historic Preservation Act, 1986, p. 38.
added. Another difference concerned the relationship between the Advisory Council and the NPS. Until 1976, the Council’s executive director was appointed by the director of the NPS, and his staff was drawn from the NPS. This meant that the entire process, from Register listing through Section 106 review, was carried out within the NPS.

That the National Historic Preservation Act would affect Springfield must have been clear. The disposition of surplus government property was a federal undertaking as defined by the act; the Armory was a National Historic Landmark and therefore automatically listed in the new National Register: therefore the impending disposition of Springfield Armory was subject to Section 106, and the Department of Defense would have to submit to some kind of preservation review. Yet the precise impact of the new law was not immediately clear. The NPS had been involved with the Army in a desultory discussion of the site’s future ever since November of 1964, when the Army sought guidance as to what if any responsibilities the National Historic Landmark designation imposed.69 The NPS’s answer suggested the Army had little to worry about, and the passage of NHPA almost two years later brought no immediate change. It was not until the following summer, when the state of Massachusetts submitted its formal application to receive most of Armory Square as a campus for the new Technical Institute that the law’s impacts began to be felt.

By then, the college and its consultants were elaborating their building and development plans, and in June, 1966, NPS officials learned that the Armory was at risk, “particularly the core historic area of Armory Square” which was earmarked for the Technical Institute. The discovery galvanized the NPS into action. Early the following month, Interior notified the General Services Administration, the agency responsible for most federal property dispositions, that “the historic buildings of the arsenal complex” were subject to NHPA. Interior also asked the GSA to impose conditions binding the new owners of the property to “preserve the historical and architectural integrity of the historic buildings,”70 but Administrator Lawson Knott replied that it was not the GSA but rather the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that was responsible for disposing of Armory Square. As for the remainder of the Armory, Knott flatly refused to impose preservation conditions: it was “…industrial property” whose users would “find it necessary to alter, demolish and rehabilitate some or all of the buildings,” and imposing preservation

69 J.O.L., Note for file, November 20, 1964; see also letter, William H. Cooney (Chief, Legal Office, Springfield Armory) to Murray H. Nelligan (Regional Chief of Interpretation), December 8, 1964; and memo, Regional Director, NE Region (Lee) to Director, December 24, 1964 (all Washington Office, NHL Program Files: fol. Springfield Armory).

requirements on them would “defeat the city’s efforts in strengthening the economy of the community.”

Early in August 1967 the NPS dispatched a team of experts to assess the Armory’s historic architecture and “determine its responsibilities” under NHPA. This meant principally deciding what should be listed on the new National Register and thereby made subject to Section 106. This should have been a simple matter of re-inscribing the National Historic Landmark designation of 1963, but that designation provided little guidance. In fact, the NHL boundaries themselves now required clarification: their vagueness, unimportant as long as the designation had been purely honorific, was becoming a serious problem.

The muddle had arisen in December 1964, less than a month after the announcement of the Armory’s closure, when its chief legal officer asked the NPS “how much of the Armory is considered historic under the Landmark designation.” Ronald Lee’s office informed him that, “of the several scattered installations embraced in the title ‘Springfield Armory,’ only the original tract [i.e. Armory Square] was so considered...”; and within it, only the Main, West, and Middle Arsenals (Buildings 13, 11, and 14), “plus those objects in the Armory museum which are directly associated with the history of the Armory.” More recently, in the summer of 1966, the director of Defense’s Office of Economic Adjustment had jotted down a list of historically significant buildings “located on Armory Square...” which must have reflected conversations with NPS officials: it included the Main Arsenal, Commanding Officer’s Quarters, Field Officers’ Quarters, and Company Officers’ Quarters from 1833 and 1836. This list was a good deal longer than Lee’s. Then in May 1967 the Armory’s executive officer asked the NPS what was to be done with the NHL certificate and plaque affixed to Building 16. “It would be of great historical value to retain the Landmark status,” he noted, asking whether the Main Arsenal could be designated as “the Landmark” and the tablet affixed to its entrance. On the face of it this was an unlikely proposition: the fact that, at the dedication ceremony, the plaque had been “affixed to the wall flanking the main entrance to the Administration Building” surely meant that Building 16 was part of the NHL. Yet the list provided by Lee’s office in 1964 had not included it, nor had the list compiled by Defense the previous summer.

In July 1967 Interior proposed more expansive boundaries. Notifying the GSA that it

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72 Memo, Regional Director, NE Region, to Director, December 24, 1964 (Washington Office, NHL Program Files: fol. Springfield Armory); see also “Springfield Armory: Evaluation,” 1967, p. I, which refers to this definition.


74 Letter, E.B. Gravel (Executive Officer, Armory) to Regional Director, May 12, 1967 (Lowenthal files: folder: Disposition of Army Museum).

75 Memo, Regional Director to Director, April 12, 1963 (Washington Office, NHL Program Files: fol. Springfield Armory).
would have to comply with NHPA, the department defined the “historic buildings of the arsenal complex” as “those dating from the 19th century” and claimed that all of them were subject to Section 106. Since the letter was written to assert jurisdiction within a fast-moving situation, it may be inferred that the department’s lawyers intended to stake out as broad a claim as possible. And it was against this background that the NPS team arrived in Springfield the following month. Their report concluded that as many as ten buildings, constituting the southeast, southwest, and northeast sides of the green or parade ground, plus the parade ground itself and the perimeter fence, possessed “national historical significance” and merited preservation as a matter “of the highest importance” (see Frontispiece). In addition, the report listed several other buildings as “worthy of preservation” and recommended that they “should be retained if possible.” A third level of significance included yet other buildings that possessed “architectural interest,” though the experts did not call for their preservation.

The change in the agency’s attitude went beyond simply listing more buildings; the NPS now saw Armory Square as an ensemble, a “harmonious totality in which the sum is greater than any single part.” The report attributed that totality to the buildings’ consistent style and “restrained, dignified” character, the central Parade Ground that brought them together into an ensemble, and the “magnificent site” with its “sweeping vistas” over downtown. Yet the three-tiered hierarchy looked less like the “ungraded, uncategorized list of properties” ultimately adopted for the National Register than the discarded proposal to rank properties as “must preserve,” “should preserve,” or “desirable to preserve.” In fact, although the report provided a justification for the agency’s claim, a month earlier, that all of Armory Square’s nineteenth century buildings were historically valuable, Interior assured the Department of Defense that only the top tier would be listed on the National Register and subject to Section 106; the second and third tiers merely expressed recommendations or wishes.

The agency had now staked out, refined, and backed up its claim to Armory Square. Yet this was but one piece of the vast property which the Department of Defense was deaccessioning, and the NPS evaluation report was vague about how the National Historic Preservation Act might apply to the rest. It is unclear how carefully the agency surveyed and evaluated the rest of the Armory. The July 3 letter, in which the NPS asserted jurisdiction, referred specifically to the “arsenal complex,” which most likely meant Armory Square, or

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79 Summarizing the report in a letter to Defense Secretary McNamara, Assistant Interior Secretary Cain said it recommended that the parade ground plus ten buildings and the fence were important enough to receive administrative and legal protection under the National Historic Preservation Act: i.e., the report’s top tier (letter, Stanley A. Cain to McNamara, August 31, 1967: Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).
perhaps even Lee’s earlier and narrower grouping of Main, West, and Middle Arsenals. It almost certainly did not mean the Armory as a whole. Yet GSA seems to have thought that it might, for Administrator Knott’s response was to refuse to apply preservation conditions to the rest of the Armory.80

Against the background of this controversy, the NPS’s evaluation report could be read in more than one ways. It was titled Springfield Armory – not Armory Square. It discussed the history and architecture of each area of the Armory,81 and Connally claimed later that the agency had evaluated the entire Armory.82 Yet outside Armory Square, it did not identify a single building as worthy of inclusion in any of its three tiers of significance. Did the rest of the Armory contain nothing worthy of listing on the National Register? Even taking into account how greatly the standards for evaluating industrial buildings such as those which dominated the Water Shops or Railhead areas have changed since then, this


82 The report “relates to the entire property and was prepared as a guide for proposed use of all buildings within the Springfield complex that were to be disposed of to various clients.” Memo, Chief, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation (Connally) to Assistant Director for State, Local and Private Programs, Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, January 23, 1968 (Washington Office, NHL Program Files: fol. Springfield Armory).
explanation seems unlikely. As the NPS report itself noted, Federal Square and Armory Square together comprised a single area known historically as the Hillshops. Federal Square’s history began as early as 1812, and its architecture continued and complemented the “restrained, dignified” ensemble of Armory Square. (Fig. 1-21; see also Frontispiece, Figs. 1.11-12.) It is hard to believe, then, that the complete exclusion of Federal Square from the evaluation report represented a considered judgment that nothing there was “worthy of preservation” or even possessed “architectural interest.”

Several explanations are possible. The NPS may have met the GSA’s challenge to its authority by insisting on the full exercise of its powers to survey and nominate properties, while ensuring that the substance of its recommendations would not provoke further conflict. Or the agency may have decided to stake its political capital where the immediate threat lay. Or finally, agency staff may have understood their assignment as simply to clarify the boundaries of an existing National Historic Landmark. This explanation gains some support from the history of the Register. Though the NHPA gave the NPS legal authority to carry out evaluations de novo, the agency had decided some months earlier not to do so: instead it would rely on state liaison officers to submit all Register listings other than those already listed as National Historic Landmarks or managed by the NPS as historical areas within the National Park system. The hoped-for external listings came in very slowly – only six in 1968 – so that the first publication of the Register in February 1969 contained little other than re-inscribed National Historic Landmarks and historical areas within the National Park system.83

The NPS report appeared at a critical moment in the history of the new technical institute: the college was on a fast track to open within a matter of weeks and all effort was directed to fitting up the existing buildings. In June the state had selected the Springfield firm of Caolo and Bieniek Associates Inc. to manage the project, and it was touch and go whether the buildings would be ready in time.84 In the event, the newly state-chartered community college opened its doors on September 6 to 800 students enrolled in fourteen technical programs. 600 of these students, in eight programs, were accommodated within three buildings in Armory Square.85 “Seeing students at the old Armory,” commented the Sunday Republican, “did our heart good: actually it’s a rather Ivy Leaguisch campus....”86 And in truth, the old parade ground gave the new technical institute a striking resemblance to the quadrangles of Yale or Harvard, New England’s pre-eminent educational institutions. Rehabilitation work continued during 1967-68, so that by the next fall the college could boast

86 Springfield Sunday Republican, September 17, 1967.
that “all the buildings in the Armory complex” had been refurbished and now housed a total of 22 career programs.\footnote{[Edmond Garvey], “President’s Message” in \textit{President’s Five Year Report}, S.T.C.C., [1972] (S.T.C.C.: President’s Office files).}

Despite this success, the college saw the old buildings as little more than a provisional solution: the earliest master plan, prepared by the city’s consultants, called for demolishing all of Armory Square (Fig. 1.22), while Garvey’s enrollment target of 5,000 students seemed to justify large-scale reconstruction. In the turmoil leading up to the college’s opening it is likely that the implications of the \textit{National Historic Preservation Act}, Section 106, and the National Park Service’s interest in Armory Square had not yet sunk in. Yet the implications were there. All but two of the features enumerated by the report (the Main Arsenal and the boundary fence) lay within the portion of Armory Square earmarked for the campus. The report thus emerged as an unanticipated barrier to the college’s dream of an entirely modern campus. Not that its authors were unsympathetic to the desire for new construction. In fact, the report identified a substantial area to the northwest of the parade ground as available for development, stipulating only that new construction there “should be kept in scale and design harmony with buildings on the other three sides.” The authors urged the college to hire an architectural firm to develop a campus master plan – one presumably that did not call for demolishing all or most of Armory Square.\footnote{“Evaluation,” p. 35. For the NPS’s findings and recommendations, see also “Summary of: ‘Springfield Armory: Evaluation under Provision of Historic Preservation Act, 1966,’ by Office of Archeology [sic] & Historic Preservation, August 17, 1967” (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Legislation).}

With General Electric operating in Federal Square and the technical institute open in Armory Square, key pieces of the Armory puzzle appeared to be in place. Yet as the college opened, the future of the Benton Collection, another essential component of the Armory Planning Committee’s “total utilization” plan, remained uncertain.\footnote{\textit{Springfield Daily News}, October 9, 1967.} And with the Armory’s closure just months away the pressure was mounting.

\section*{A Museum is Created and the Problem of Preservation Reconsidered}

The technical institute’s backers enjoyed significant advantages that the nascent museum lacked. Administratively, the rudiments of a technical institute already existed. Moreover, it boasted a strong and politically well connected leader, a ready-made mechanism for state adoption through the Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges, the promise of state funding, and even the potential for creating new sources of support, such as the $200 tuition fee which the school imposed in June, 1967.\footnote{\textit{Springfield Daily News}, June 24, 1967.} The museum’s creators enjoyed none of these advantages. Beyond their hopes of obtaining the
Figure 1.22. Proposed site plan for Springfield Technical Institute, prepared in 1967 by Countoris & Associates of Pittsburgh, PA, under contract to the city (The Springfield Armory Project: collection: S.T.C.C.).
collection and a building in which to display it, all they had was the good will of some federal officials who were reluctant to see the Benton Collection leave Springfield.

During the summer of 1966, Mayor Ryan pleaded with the Department of Defense to leave the collection. “Better than any other single part of our community life,” he argued, the museum could remind people of the “tradition and heritage of Springfield as the small arms arsenal of our country from George Washington to the present.” The newspapers agreed. But the Department of Defense promised only that, “if it is moved, it will be moved intact.” In theory, the Army had several options. It could transfer the museum to Rock Island with other Armory operations, give it to the Smithsonian Institution, turn over the building and management of the collection to another federal agency “such as the National Park Service,” or leave it in Springfield. These options were not equally attractive. Neither the National Park Service nor the Rock Island options were seriously considered. The Smithsonian was not very encouraging. The Army soon let it be known that it would look favorably on a proposal to care for the collection in Springfield.

Federal officials encouraged and assisted local interests in keeping the collection. The General Services Administration provided the necessary application forms for “Obtaining Property for Historic Monument Purposes”; the Armory’s commanding officer said he was certain the city’s request would be granted. But at the end of July the application had not been submitted. At the beginning of October it still had not been submitted. The Armory’s Colonel Sweeney let it be known that he had no choice but to develop a back-up plan to move it to another Army installation. The GSA pleaded with the city to submit the forms, for “nothing much will be done by anyone until we are in receipt of your formal application.”

The delay arose in part from Springfield politics. Notwithstanding the mayor’s strong desire to keep the collection in town, the legal authority to accept it lay with the City Council. Thus when Ryan assured the GSA, late in October, that a decision had been “finally made to go full speed ahead in an effort to keep the museum here,” he must have meant that he had struck a deal with Council leaders. If so, what turned the tide may have been the arrival of a

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consultant’s fundraising report which the Museum Committee had been expecting. The report confirmed what the committee had known for months: that “establishing a sufficiently large endowment” to care for a collection of more than 10,000 objects would be difficult at best, and that a “major fund drive” would be needed. It also confirmed the opinion of the Springfield Union’s editors that keeping the museum was “shaping up as a tough and expensive job.” Yet the report concluded that it could be done. A sum of $500,000 would be needed to rehabilitate the Main Arsenal, with “new heating and lighting systems, parking facilities, driveways, offices, display cases, rest rooms, and other items...” The committee thought it would be best to raise the target, for as committee chair Oliver Knodle put it, “$750,000 would be much better... You can never have too much money for this sort of thing.” Then there was the need to raise operating funds on a scale sufficient to carry the museum until it “becomes self-supporting, which might take as long as five years.”

In the end, the Museum Committee launched a fund drive with a target of $650,000, and this was apparently the step the City Council had been waiting for. In November, the mayor convened a special session for the Council to consider resolutions authorizing the city to accept land, buildings, and collections for the museum. From the Army’s perspective, this was the last chance to keep the collection in Springfield. The Council approved the plan. As Mayor Ryan wrote to the local GSA official in charge, “...we are all quite elated over this decision.”

The committee now focused on other pressing matters, such as completing the necessary incorporation papers and federal forms and creating a board of trustees for the new non-profit organization. Problems of space and facilities also had to be solved. The guns were stored and displayed in Building 27, at the north corner of the Parade Ground, but Knodle thought the structure was “too small and hasn’t enough facilities to properly display the collection.” Moreover, it was not certain that Building 27 would be available to the museum. Garvey denied published reports that he had staked a claim to the building, but museum planning proceeded on the assumption that it would belong to the college. Perhaps the museum was just as glad to claim the much grander Main Arsenal building. In any case,

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96 SWESP-DC, Disposition Form for Meeting, s. Mills (Lowenthal files: folder: Disposition of Army Museum).


101 See SWESP-DC, Disposition Form for Meeting, signed Mills.
the shift of venue entailed problems. For reasons of cost and collection care the GSA advised against moving the collections into the Main Arsenal before the renovations were complete, and Garvey promised that the Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges (MBRCC) would look after the collection if the new quarters were not ready on time. But the museum chose to move the collection in December, while federal staff and money were still available, and so in January, 1968, the museum – though still in care of the U.S. Army – reopened in the Main Arsenal building.

While surmounting many practical obstacles, museum boosters also succeeded in defining a public rationale for the museum. Whereas the school was intended to perpetuate Springfield’s industrial leadership, museum backers planned for a future of tourism. Boosters claimed the museum was “destined to become one of the major tourist attractions in the Northeast.” City Councilor Frank H. Freedman, who was running for mayor, predicted it would become “a symbol of our heritage” and, more importantly, “an important tourist attraction as we build up our tourist and convention trade.” Knode explained that “by establishing the gun museum...we will be retaining for the city the most significant symbol of its heritage....” Placing the new attraction within the old Armory would further “enhance its tourist appeal.” Moreover, noted the City Council, housing it in the Main Arsenal and Commanding Officer’s Quarters would give it “the most honored, treasured and recognized buildings at the Armory....”

Linking the museum with Springfield’s heritage helped define a positive relationship between the museum and its physical plant that was quite different from the technical institute’s. By praising the historical significance of their own buildings, museum backers did not mean to denigrate the rest of Armory Square, but their consultants – who also developed the college’s master plan – intended precisely this. While their report praised the two buildings earmarked for the museum as “rich in historic lore” and endowed with “unique architectural features” like the Main Arsenal’s spiral stairway (Fig. 1.23) it urged the technical institute to demolish the rest of Armory Square. The claim that the museum buildings were special seemed to support the argument that the others were expendable.

By the fall of 1967, many people were coming to see the museum as the preservation component of Armory Square. Though the NPS's evaluation report called strongly for preservation of at least eight campus buildings plus the parade ground and fence, museum backers' believe that their end of Armory Square would be the only portion to survive did not

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103 See SWESP-DC, Disposition Form for Meeting, signed Mills.
107 Realty Research, Springfield Armory Project, pp. 102, 103.
immediately change. Knode told Connally that reading the report made him wish for the preservation of the rest of Armory Square, “but,” he concluded, “I suppose that is too much to hope for.”¹⁰⁸ In any case, the report supported the decision of museum backers to preserve the Main Arsenal and Commanding Officers’ Quarters, and museum officials believed it would help them raise funds.¹⁰⁹

Despite their appreciation of the NPS report, the museum’s physical plan was not entirely in harmony with its recommendations. The Main Arsenal’s modest entrance doorway, located at the base of the central tower, faced the parade ground: the rear facade was quite unadorned (Fig. 1.24). But museum planners believed the museum needed a “major new entrance facing downtown Springfield,”¹¹⁰ and so the consultants designed an imposing new entrance feature, a six-column portico or “column facade” which they proposed to remove from Building 16 as soon as it was demolished. They also called for new stair towers on the ends of the buildings, to be ornamented with pilasters and built with “brick from razed buildings”¹¹¹ (Figs. 1.25-26).

¹⁰⁸ Letter, Oliver M. Knode, Jr., to Ernest Allen Connally, January 22, 1968 (Lowenthal files: folder: Disposition of Army Museum).


¹¹¹ Realty Research, op. cit., pp. 109, 108.
The consultants proposed other changes. To provide “mass appeal” and satisfy the “typical New England tourist,” they urged the new museum to broaden its scope, to demonstrate a “total former way of life.” It would be good to have a “pre-Civil War New England general store,” and towards this end they suggested moving one of Armory Square’s surplus buildings into the “museum complex.” “[S]ome kind of early New England living history demonstration” would also be attractive, “such as pottery or craft manufacture, candy making, bakery, or gun smithing.” The museum could sell the craft objects thus produced. To provide an appropriate shop, the museum could buy a historic building from elsewhere and move it onto the museum site.\textsuperscript{112} The city authorities earmarked $45,000 for doing so, and for other improvements including renovating the Commanding Officer’s Quarters “for public use” and equipping these or other buildings “as Revolutionary general store, craft shops, or gift shop”\textsuperscript{113} (Fig. 1.27)

These ideas came from Old Sturbridge Village, which the consultants of Realty Research had discovered was the region’s “single most important draw.” The consultants were captivated by this recreation of a typical New England village of 1790-1840, complete with 36 houses, shops, mills, and meetinghouses on a 200-acre site.\textsuperscript{114}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{112}] Realty Research, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 100-101.
\item[\textsuperscript{113}] “Draft of Resolution for Springfield City Council,” p. 10.
\item[\textsuperscript{114}] Realty Research, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 135.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Figure 1.25. The consultants’ proposal for the Armory Museum, with a new portico facing downtown: prepared in 1967 by Donald E. Nye, under contract to the city. The new S.T.C.C. buildings, imagined in steel and glass, can be seen in the background (from The Springfield Armory Project: collection S.T.C.C.).

offered a financial as well as a curatorial model, and the consultants stressed that its income from craft sales exceeded that from ticket receipts. In Springfield they imagined a miniature version of Old Sturbridge Village; and though it might contain no more than three or four buildings, on a mere five acres, it too would have the capacity to generate “substantial supplementary income” from craft demonstrations and sales.115

This plan came to the attention of the National Park Service in November 1967, two months after the agency had released its evaluation report, when the City of Springfield submitted its draft application for land and buildings to the General Services administration.116 The NPS’s response was diplomatic but firm. In conveying federal property for museum or historic monument purposes, Ernest Allen Connally told the Department of Defense, the “recipient is strictly bound to maintain the historic integrity of the property.” Adding a portico to the Main Arsenal would “seriously affect” that integrity. It would be best to leave the building alone; or if a new entrance were needed, to reconstruct its original one-story, four-column, portico. The fire towers should be incorporated within the

115 Realty Research, op. cit., p. 102.

116 The plan was presented to the Army at a meeting on November 13 but may not have reached the NPS until sometime after. (See SWESP-DC, Disposition Form for Meeting on Status of Museum, November 13, 1967, signed by Major Charles S. Mills, Jr. [Lowenthal files: folder: Disposition of Army Museum]).
Figures 1.26, 1.27. Elevations of Museum, showing proposed new portico and stair towers (above), and proposed plan of Museum complex (below) (from The Springfield Armory Project: collection S.T.C.C.).
building, so as to “avoid altering its distinct, authentic architectural mass.” As for the Sturbridge Village components, introducing “extraneous structures (historic though they may be) that never in fact existed on the site” would “constitute a serious impairment of the historic scene. A Revolutionary general store, gift shop, etc., would be especially repugnant.” These features, Connally told the Department of Defense (in what was surely a tactful understatement) “would cast some doubt on the prospect of a favorable report.”  

The disagreement never reached that stage. By the middle of December, Knode and his architect had abandoned all points of contention: “they wanted only a sales counter in the museum” and would use the Commanding Officer’s Quarters as a house museum, for which a ladies’ committee was seeking furnishings. They would import no buildings from elsewhere.

**DISPOSING OF FEDERAL PROPERTY, EXERCISING FEDERAL OVERSIGHT**

As 1968 opened, the major pieces of the “total utilization” plan for Armory Square were ready to fit into place. The technical institute, the museum, and the city’s school system all were ready to accept portions of the property as soon as the Department of Defense could transfer them. On the federal side too, important questions had been settled. While the General Services Administration would handle the disposition of property to the city, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare would transfer the college campus to the state. The Department of the Interior, acting through the National Park Service, would coordinate a review under the requirements of NHPA.

All that remained now was the actual transfer of property. Yet, that was no mere formality. The involvement of four federal agencies, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the city of Springfield, guaranteed some confusion. The law itself added further complexity. The museum’s rapid capitulation in the fall of 1967 was symptomatic. The museum needed Interior’s approval before it could formally apply for the land, buildings, and collection: it could not get that approval with the consultants’ plan. Yet it was not, as one might think, NHPA that gave Interior this power but rather the Federal Property and Administrative Procedures Act of 1949. This law spelled out the terms under which federal agencies could transfer property to city and state governments. One provision, concerning the transfer of real property for “school, classroom, or other educational use,” gave HEW authority to ensure that the instrument of transfer – the title deed – conformed with applicable laws, and to “determine and enforce compliance” with its terms. Another

117 Letter, Ernest Allen Connally (Chief, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation) to Donald F. Bradford (Director, Office of Economic Adjustment, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, December 8, 1967 (Lowenthal files: folder: City Acquisition of Site, 1967).

provision gave the Secretary of the Interior comparable authority over the transfer of real property for parks, recreation areas, or historic monuments.\footnote{40 U.S.C. 484(k)(2)(E)\text{i-iii}) and (k)(1)(A) and (2)(A) (1964 edition).}

Though NHPA applied to both transfers, the Federal Property and Administrative Procedures Act made it clear that the path to long-term preservation solutions was through the title deeds, the only legal instruments that could permanently subject the recipients of the property to conditions imposed by the federal government. The NPS would, therefore, focus on the title deeds. Yet at the same time, these provisions also ensured that the college and museum transfers would follow different paths, for the property transfer rules gave Interior an important role to play in the museum transfer, none at all in the college transfer.

Despite the preeminent important of the 1949 act, Interior officials felt there was much riding on the exercise of NHPA in Springfield. The Armory was one of the first significant federal properties to be transferred out of federal ownership following the act’s adoption, and an Assistant Secretary of Interior told Defense Secretary McNamara that the application of Section 106 in Springfield was “unusually important because in many respects it will serve as a precedent for future Federal property dispositions.”\footnote{Letter, Stanley A. Cain (Assistant Secretary, DoI) to Robert S. McNamara, August 31, 1967 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).} Moreover, the “complex character of the Springfield case” gave Interior officials special reason to focus on it.\footnote{Memo, Chief, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation (Connally) to Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, October 20, 1967 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).} Finally, the Armory’s historical connection with George Washington and with two centuries of American war-making gave it unusual symbolic stature.

Interior had begun to apply NHPA in July with its blunt assertion of jurisdiction, followed by the evaluation report. Formal discussions began at the end of August, and by October, Connally could report that both Defense and HEW were “accommodating to the intent of the Act,” their staffs “very cooperative.”\footnote{Memo, Chief, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation (Connally) to Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, October 20, 1967 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).} Nevertheless, Defense’s Donald Bradford, who had been helping Springfield officials prepare for the closure, put his finger on the weakness of Section 106 when he assured Interior officials at a meeting that Defense foresaw “no difficulties in meeting both the historical and educational objectives to an acceptable degree.” The reason this was easy to promise was that the law required very little of Defense: only that

\begin{quote}
no exterior change is made to the properties in Armory Square recommended for preservation without first obtaining the comment of the Department of the Interior and/or the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation.\footnote{Letter, Donald F. Bradford (DoD, Director, Economic Adjustment) to Stanley A. Cain, September 13, 1967 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).}
\end{quote}
Not everyone at Interior was willing to accept such a permissive reading of the law. “Is Bradford right about the legal aspect?” an upset Interior official asked Connally. “It isn’t enough that we have a chance to comment .... We need to enforce compliance.” Unfortunately, Bradford was right. As Connally explained, Interior had “no authority to enforce compliance beyond pointing out this provision of law,” which the agency was doing. Bradford’s deputy put it nicely in an internal memorandum:

...the commitment would be simply to pause and reflect before demolishing or altering a historic structure, seeking the advice of the Council during the period of reflection.

While Interior sought preservation gains, both Defense and HEW pursued their departmental interests, and those of the new college, with persistence. That meant resisting efforts to impose restrictions. “All were agreed,” summarized Defense’s official record of an August 29 meeting,

that preservation of the historical environment at Armory Square is desirable, to the extent that this can be accomplished within the educational criteria of DHEW and practical operating and monetary limitations which restrict the freedom of action of the Commonwealth and the Institute.

Though Bradford was willing to “urge” the state towards preservation, he reminded Connally that the “primary concern” was to allow the technical institute to open immediately in Armory Square without being tied down to specifics about the future. For its part, HEW readily agreed to “require” the Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges to “acknowledge...the historical significance” of the Armory, as well as Interior’s recommendations, in its property application. It also promised to require the state to submit any plans affecting the exterior historical and architectural integrity of the historic buildings and parade ground which are not in keeping with your determinations to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation for comment.

124 Memo, Assistant Secretary (Fish, Wildlife and Parks) to Connally, September 21, 1967 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).
125 Memo, Chief, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation (Ernest Connally) to Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks (Stanley Cain), October 20, 1967.
127 Nowlin, Memo for the Record, August 29, 1967.
129 Letter, Donald F. Simpson (Assistant Secretary for Administration, HEW) to Stanley A. Cain (Assistant Secretary, Fish, Wildlife and Parks), September 15, 1967 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).
Still, Assistant Secretary Simpson reminded the NPS that college enrollment might eventually exceed 5,000 and that, even at current levels, the campus’s acreage-to-student ratio was “far below recognized educational standards....” Simpson, like Bradford, was putting Interior on notice that HEW was unwilling to tie the state’s or the college’s hands with long-range commitments.

Connally nonetheless asked HEW to include in the property conveyance a “restriction requiring preservation” of the elements identified in the evaluation report.”¹³⁰ Given that HEW frequently prohibited recipients of federal buildings from altering them without its consent for up to twenty years,¹³¹ this was not an unreasonable request. But HEW said it was “not customary” for the department to place “such lengthy restrictions in deeds” as Interior requested: instead, HEW offered to incorporate the NPS report in the college’s official “use-plan,” which would be referenced in the title deed. Thus the NPS’s recommendations would be “acknowledged in the transfer.”¹³² Since by this time the college had already submitted its application, HEW asked the state to amend it, and the amendment was accordingly delivered in March, 1968:¹³³

AMENDMENT
TO
APPLICATION FOR ARMORY SQUARE SITE
SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS

The Board of Regional Community Colleges acknowledges the historical significance of the Springfield Armory property. We shall be happy to submit any plans affecting the historical and agricultural [sic] integrity of the historic buildings to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation for comment, as required by Sec. 106 of Public Law 89-665. We cannot, however, accept requirements which would limit good educational utilization of the property.

In the event of reconstruction of the exterior of any of the buildings or total demolishing of such buildings, we shall be happy to preserve such photographs, plaques and models as may be available.

It is our intent to maintain the iron fence as it now is. It is also our intention to preserve the parade ground as an open or recreational area to the fullest extent possible.

¹³⁰ Memo, Chief, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation (Connally) to Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife and Parks, October 20, 1967 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

¹³¹ Nowlin, Memo for the Record, August 29, 1967.

¹³² Memo, Chief, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation (Connally) to Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife and Parks, October 20, 1967 (Washington Office, Park History Files, folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

¹³³ “Amendment to Application for Armory Square Site, Springfield, Massachusetts, signed William G. Dwyer and dated March 26, 1968. See also cover letter of Dwyer to Edward G. Bradley (HEW), March 26, 1968 (Lowenthal Files: fol. Duplicate Land Records).
The amendment met the formal terms of HEW’s commitment. Yet as a preservation guarantee it was worth little or nothing. The Board made no commitment whatsoever to protect the buildings and, instead, once more asserted its unlimited right to do whatever it thought would promote “good educational utilization” of the property.

The state deed was signed in the spring of 1968. It bound the state, for a period of thirty years, to use the transferred property “continuously in the manner and for the educational purposes set forth in the approved program and plan” (i.e. the application and amendment), “and for no other purpose.” Though no penalty for breaching this condition was specified, the risk was implicit that the federal government might repossess the property.134

Interior had more sway over the museum deed. Signed in May, it provided substantial preservation assurances. It bound the city (and anyone providing services to it) to assure the property’s “continuous use” and, even more significant, its “maintenance” as a “historic monument”; conferred an affirmative obligation to “take and continue to take such action” as needed to assure this; and forbade the city from transferring the property to another entity unless Interior was satisfied that the new owner could continue to meet these terms. Unlike the college deed, these terms did not expire after thirty years but ran with the land forever.135

On April 30, 1968, the last employees left Springfield Armory. The forges, rail sidings, laboratories, firing ranges, storerooms, administrative offices, the officers’ quarters and the officers’ club, went silent. Over the next few months, the pieces of the Armory were formally conveyed to their new owners. The result looked like this:136

Armory Square:
- About 5 acres conveyed by Interior to Springfield for museum use.
- About 13 acres conveyed by HEW to Springfield for educational use by School Department.
- About 34 acres conveyed by HEW to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for establishment of Springfield Technical Community College.

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135 [Deed], 3339 page 236, signed and dated May 27, 1968 (Lowenthal Files: fol. Duplicate Land Records).
Federal Square:
- 17.88 acres sold by GSA to Springfield in September, 1968, and leased to General Electric.
Forge Shops:
- 3.71 acres sold by GSA to Springfield in May, 1968, to lease for industrial purposes.
- 3.8 acres dedicated by GSA for roadways and given to Springfield in September, 1968, for public streets.
Railhead:
Water Shops:
- 222 acres conveyed by Interior for park purposes in 1969.
- Two adjoining parcels conveyed to Springfield by GSA in December 1968 and April 1969.

POSTSCRIPT TO THE PROLOGUE

The mood in Springfield had lifted, in three and a half years, from despair and anger to optimism. An overwhelming problem had been solved, and the solution brought benefits to many groups. Industry would keep much of the Armory in productive use. Watershops Pond would continue to be a public amenity, the school system would gain new athletic fields, the city would gain a new and dynamic institution in Springfield Technical Community College, the museum would remain and even grow, and the Main Arsenal would continue to rise over downtown Springfield. The National Park Service had also demonstrated its ability to apply NHPA in an unusually demanding situation and with creditable results.

Nevertheless, this impressive solution contained the seeds of later problems. City fathers, economic development consultants, the General Services Administration, and the National Park Service ended by agreeing (though not necessarily for the same reasons) that Armory Square was in a class by itself, distinct even from the adjacent Federal Square. This perception was strengthened by the NPS’s evaluation report which, while doing much to save Armory Square, also supported the emerging notion that the rest of the Armory was not worth preserving and left uncontested the GSA’s claim that preservation controls would impede the industrial reuse of the other areas. Later events suggest that a more aggressive preservation posture might have been possible and even helpful, for the first effort at industrial reuse collapsed quickly, and without any help from preservation: later the buildings were rehabilitated as a technology incubator, and they have been better maintained than parts of the college campus. Yet details ranging from landscaping to window glazing might have been handled with more regard for history if Federal Square’s value had been acknowledged in 1967.

By validating the notion that Armory Square contained everything important to preserve in the Armory’s history, the NPS unintentionally diminished that history in another way. Armory Square represented only a fraction of the Armory’s history. The Armory’s work
was designing and making guns, and increasingly that work went on in huge factory buildings, ever more sophisticated and massive equipment. The sheer heft of the Armory's historical presence was perhaps better conveyed by the Water Shops, the railhead, or even the back half of Federal Square, than by the “Ivy Leaguish” and genteel Armory Square. So while Armory Square came to represent the Armory’s history, it also came in some ways to misrepresent it.

Even within Armory Square, problems were developing. One concerned the thirteen-acre hillside behind the Museum. Conveyed to the city for us by the school system, the area was partially filled and leveled in 1969 for athletic fields. Yet within a few years it would become apparent that the work had reactivated an old spring, causing drainage problems. Moreover, it prompted the removal of specimen trees, the destruction of much of Colonel Ripley’s terraced landscaping, and the removal of historic circulation routes, including part of the original entrance road from the Byers and Pearl Street gateway. These changes would prove substantial obstacles to later efforts to restore the historic landscape.137

Perhaps more serious was the divergence between the two major components of the mayor’s “total utilization” plan, the college and the museum. The college was a powerhouse, with dynamic leadership, state backing, prospects of significant funding, and expansive plans. The museum suffered from uncertain financial prospects, questionable public and official support, an untested organization, and plans of debatable realism.

The two institutions diverged just as markedly in their attitudes to the historic buildings given to them by the federal government. The museum was delighted to have them and was seen by many as the preservation component of Armory Square. Its short-lived “Old Sturbridge Village” proposal did not reflect hostility to the historic buildings so much as uncertainty about the institution’s mission. And in defeating it, the NPS probably saved the museum from a costly and embarrassing error, since it is hard to see how a scaled-down restoration village tucked away at the back of a college campus could ever have succeeded. Still, at the end of the scuffle, the thesis behind the theme park proposal – that the public would not flock to see a collection of guns pure and simple – remained uncontested. The museum now faced a challenge and an opportunity: it could expand its scope within the envelope of existing buildings, or it could accept the Benton Small Arms Collection for what it was and become simply a gun museum. The resolution of this dilemma would come later.

Unlike the museum, the college was hostile to the historic buildings from the outset, seeing them as nothing more than temporary lodgings, an institutional launching pad. The consultants called for their demolition, and only the NPS and its parent agency, the Department of the Interior, opposed this program. Once alert to the college threat, the NPS responded quickly. Yet the agency may have paid a price for waiting as long as it did. Completed on August 17, 1967, and distributed later that month, the report appeared at an

awkward moment. For as the college opened its doors on September 6, it can safely be assumed that few officials in Springfield had yet studied this list of “which buildings should be regarded as urgently requiring preservation and which, should it become necessary, might be regarded as expendable.”

The dangers implicit in this situation may not have been obvious. The federal government would not actually dispose of the property for many months. In the meantime, the school was merely a tenant. And as an HEW official assured the NPS, there was “no immediate question of altering the buildings” identified in the report. It would be “several years” before the college could adopt a new master plan, and since the implementation of any such plan would probably be assisted by federal funds (qualifying therefore as a federal undertaking) it would be subject to review by the NPS and the Advisory Council under Section 106. Still, none of this changed the fact that the school had effectively gained possession of Armory Square without feeling the weight of federal preservation regulation. Buoyed by strong public and official support, college leaders may have come to feel that the campus was truly theirs, free of federal oversight. Thus when oversight eventually came, it was perceived as interference, as in 1976, when college officials expressed their resentment of construction delays caused “by the intervention of historical groups and by the National Park Service.” The college’s attitude would lead to the demolition of several historic buildings and to a long legacy of distrust between the college and the NPS.

Still, the consequences of carrying out the evaluation report earlier could have been worse, for if it had not been prompted by the urgency of the college threat, it might have confirmed Ronald Lee’s judgment that the NHL was limited to three buildings. Once published, that judgment would have been very hard to retract. And without the evaluation report’s strong endorsement of Armory Square’s ten buildings, its parade, its perimeter fence, and above all its “harmonious totality,” it is conceivable that most, if not all, of the campus would eventually have been demolished.


139 Memo, Chief, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation (Connally) to Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife and Parks, October 20, 1967 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

CHAPTER TWO

THE CREATION OF THE PARK

If all had gone according to plan, the story would now be over: there would have been no national park. But things did not go according to plan. By 1970, major parts of the Armory solution had unraveled. General Electric was leaving. Federal Square was in collapse. The city’s new ballfields were a failure. And by 1970, museum President Larry Lewis was panicked: the museum’s fundraising campaign had failed and the museum was on its last legs. Only the college seemed to be successful: all too successful, if one cared about Armory Square. The cry was now for a new and radically different solution: enter the National Park Service.

The story that now unfolds is complex, for the process of establishing the new national park unit immediately became entangled with other threads. Authorizing legislation, introduced in 1970, required the NPS to negotiate agreements with the Army and with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and each of these negotiations involved its own complications. Negotiations with the state were further complicated by the fact that Springfield Technical Community College chose this moment to put its building plans in motion – plans that called for demolishing historic buildings and constructing large new ones in the heart of Armory Square. These plans triggered further governmental processes, such as the Section 106 review process spelled out by the recently adopted National Historic Preservation Act. This in turn caused further complications, since the review process turned on defining the boundaries of the National Historic Landmark, and this had never been done.

Spinning these intricate threads were three federal agencies, plus the U.S. Congress, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the City of Springfield. Yet, underneath the complexities lay a simple but uncomfortable fact: the federal government’s move to include the college campus within a new park came just as the college sought to initiate its ambitious building plans. Given the campus’s existing status as a National Historic Landmark, conflict was virtually inevitable. But, without the park, it would have been less complex and might have had a different outcome. The park proposal raised the stakes for both sides at the same time that it brought in Congress as an additional party. Making everything yet more fraught, each of the players was motivated by a sense of urgency. The City of Springfield desperately wished to keep the failing museum in Springfield; the college was implacably determined to build while the funds were available; as for the NPS, a complex web of motivations produced internal contradictions, for protecting a National Historic Landmark, establishing a park, capturing current appropriations, and satisfying Congress sometimes called for different approaches. It took seven years to resolve these conflicts.
The Creation of the Park

LEGISLATION IS INTRODUCED: 1970

Some NPS staffers claimed they had foreseen, as early as 1967, that the museum would someday collapse and the Service rescue it.¹ But the drive to create a park was launched by one man, museum President Larry Lewis. It was May of 1970 when Lewis approached Charles G. Carothers, III, deputy assistant secretary of the Interior, to discuss the museum’s “plight.”² Carothers replied that the museum might be eligible for one of the preservation grants that had become available under the National Historic Preservation Act, but that was not where Lewis was driving. “… [I]t would seem obvious at this point,” he wrote, “that we must begin the long process of becoming part of the National Park Service…”³

The Museum’s situation was dire. The fundraising campaign had scraped together no more than about $200,000 of the $500,000-$650,000 initially projected. “Wide-spread public feeling about guns in the wake of the events of the past few years” was blamed for the failure,⁴ and in truth it was not a good time to be raising money for a gun museum. Martin Luther King, Jr., was shot down in 1968, Robert F. Kennedy the same year, President John F. Kennedy, Malcolm X and any number of other Civil Rights campaigners before them. The cities were in flames. The Museum encountered other obstacles: the defense industry was sliding into recession,⁵ many companies had already committed their charitable dollars, and the Museum found itself competing for scarce dollars with “several Army museums on Army posts.”⁶ In addition to hurting the museum’s fundraising, Lewis felt that the assassinations were driving visitation down.⁷ Even during the summer tourist season, admission fees totaled no more than $1200 per month; income from the sale of souvenirs was inconsequential. And


² Letter, Larry D. Lewis to Charles G. Carothers (Deputy Assistant Secretary, DOI), May 19, 1970 (Washington Office, NHL Program Files: fol. Springfield Armory).


⁵ Memo, Assistant Director, Legislation (Richard K. Griswold) to Acting Chief, Division of Wilderness and New Areas, December 2, 1970 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75)


so, by the summer of 1970, the museum – with annual operating costs of about $60,000 – was running an operating deficit of $2,500-3,000 per month, which was rapidly consuming assets of no more than about $25,000. Quite apart from operating expenses, the museum needed some $750,000 to rehabilitate its two historic buildings. Lewis explained to Sarles and Connally of the NPS that the museum could carry on for a few years, but only “providing there were a prospect of long-term relief,” such as joining the National Park system. “...[S]uch a course,” they warned, “would be long, arduous, and possibly non-productive.”

Lewis was exploring other alternatives. The National Trust for Historic Preservation funded a study showing how to “keep the museum alive and the gun collection intact and in Springfield.” The author, an experienced museum professional, concluded that an NPS takeover would have “some merit and logic.” The key problem would be to prop up the museum’s finances long enough for it to survive the transition; then, its new proprietors would have to negotiate with the city for parking. Another solution seemed preferable: partnership with the college. This could take the form of “direct operation” by the college or shared tenancy of the Main Arsenal. As the report pointed out, many universities ran museums: this one’s emphasis on technology and local history made it a logical fit for Springfield Technical Community College. Besides, the proposal offered clear benefits to the museum world. Although Winterthur and other recently founded training programs were turning out high-level curators and administrators, Thomas thought the field really needed technicians with the “practical skills of carpentry, taxidermy, effective lighting, audio-visual techniques,” and so forth – and especially mechanics who understand the value of old machinery and knew how to fix things without throwing away the original parts. S.T.C.C. was perfectly suited to provide these.

Lewis was not interested in partnership with the college. He had already “started the necessary machinery” towards incorporating the Armory into the National Park System. He soon had promises of support from Representatives Boland and Conte, and by the end of the summer, the NPS had agreed to have its bill drafters create a piece of legislation for them

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9 Memo, Chief, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation (Ernest Allen Connally) to Deputy Assistant Secretary, Fish, Wildlife and Parks, June 22, 1970 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).


The Creation of the Park

to introduce at the earliest moment. That fall, Springfield’s newspapers carried headlines as worrisome as any seen since the early 1960s: “Armory Museum Doomed Without Federal Aid.” “What we have to do,” said Lewis, “is hold the fort here for the next two and a half to three years until legislation taking the museum into the Park Service is passed.” A takeover was “the only recourse.”

Boland introduced his bill to the House of Representatives in October, 1970, near the end of the legislative session, and again in January, 1971. Meanwhile, though “most anxious” to secure passage, Boland and the museum board discovered that Congress demanded a detailed planning study of the proposed new area before acting. The problem was that there was no money for it in the agency’s budget, so at Lewis’s suggestion it was agreed that the museum would pay for it. The outlines of the “master plan type study” emerged in discussions between the NPS Director’s Office, Congressman Boland’s staff, and the Army. Though the $12,500 cost proved more than Lewis had in mind, the museum’s board undertook to raise the funds, “urgently” asking the NPS to complete the study as quickly as possible. The museum now had about $50,000 in hand, enough to operate for no more than two years, even at a reduced budget of $2,000 per month. In January, at Lewis’s urging, Springfield’s City Council agreed to appropriate that sum on a monthly basis until the takeover was completed, which not only relieved the pressure but also gave the city government a strong interest in a federal takeover. The Eastern Service Center started work in March; a team of planners was on the ground in Springfield by end of April; the

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12 Memo, Frank B. Sarles (Staff Historian) to Chief Historian, August 14, 1970 (Washington Office, NHL Program Files: fol. Springfield Armory); letter, Hartzog (Director) to Boland, September 1, 1970 (Washington Office, NHL Program Files: fol. Springfield Armory).


14 H.R. 19574, A Bill to authorize the establishment of the Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Springfield, Massachusetts, and for other purposes, October 5, 1970 (SPAR: Lowenthal Files: folder: Pre-Establishment Planning, 1971), and H.R. 108, A Bill to authorize the establishment of the Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Massachusetts, and for other purposes, January 22, 1971 (92nd Congress) (SPAR: Lowenthal Files: folder: Legislative History).

15 Lewis suggested: memo, Assistant Director, Legislation (Richard K. Griswold) to Acting Chief, Division of Wilderness and New Areas, December 2, 1970 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR, Correspondence 1967-75); “master plan type study,” discussions: Memo, Joe Holt (for NPS Director) to Director, Northeast Region, February 18, 1971 (Washington Office, Park History Files, folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

“Draft Master Plan” was completed by June, 1971;\(^ {17} \) and in December, 1971, Senator Edward W. Brooke introduced Boland’s bill in the Senate.\(^ {18} \)

The bills of 1970 and 1971 gave the Interior Department three conditions for establishing the park. Reiterated in subsequent bills introduced through the end of 1973,\(^ {19} \) they shaped the agency’s work over the next few years. The first condition was to accept a donation of land sufficient to “constitute an administrable unit.” This was essentially a signal to the City of Springfield to donate the museum’s land and buildings to the federal government. The second was to reach agreement with the Secretary of the Army “concerning the retention or transfer of the arms collection and other museum objects at the Armory.” This was a signal to the Army to leave the collection in Springfield and, together with the first, amounted to a rescue plan for the museum. This was how Springfield newspapers characterized the legislation: “U.S. Parks Panel Studies Armory Museum Takeover,” announced one headline. Mayor Freedman told reporters that “there would be an unlimited amount of money to improve and renovate the museum.” The *Springfield Union* described the park plan as “taking over the gun museum.”\(^ {20} \)

The third condition, however, made it clear that the legislation was much more than this. It called on Interior to reach agreement with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts regarding the preservation of the “historic buildings and the physical setting” of the state’s portion of Armory Square. In requiring the state and the college to preserve the campus, the bill effectively elevated the historic site to equal status with the collection, and this intent, though largely ignored by the local press, was strongly and consistently endorsed in Washington. Throughout the supporting material compiled and submitted to Congress during the summer of 1971, then, the NPS emphasized the importance of protecting the site.\(^ {21} \) So did Congressman Boland, at the hearings of 1973. And so did the Senate

\(^{17}\) “Proposed Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Springfield, Massachusetts: A Draft Master Plan,” Office of Environmental Planning and Design, Eastern Service Center, June 1971 (Washington Office, Planning Files). The plan was signed as recommended by the Chief of the Office of Environmental Planning and Design on June 11, 1971, and as approved by Acting Director, Northeast Region, Nathan B. Golub, on June 14, 1971. However, a note facing the table of contents states that the plan was neither approved nor disapproved, administratively or congressionally, because it was a planning document for a new area proposal and was prepared for “information and discussion.”

\(^{18}\) S. 2977, A Bill to authorize the establishment of the Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Massachusetts, and for other purposes, December 9, 1971 (92\(^{nd}\) Congress) (SPAR: Lowenthal Files: folder: Legislative History).

\(^{19}\) S. 979, An Act to authorize the establishment of the Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Massachusetts, and for other purposes, December 5, 1973 (93\(^{rd}\) Congress) (SPAR: Lowenthal Files: folder: Legislative History).


\(^{21}\) See, for example, the agency’s “Statement of Proposal,” which listed four conditions for creating the park, three of them concerning preservation of the site. See also the draft environmental impact statement, which listed four reasons why the legislation was necessary: a) the museum faced a crisis
subcommittee report.\textsuperscript{22} In fact, the omnibus bill signed into law the following year dropped the requirement of the Army agreement, retaining only that for the protection of the site.

One reason for emphasizing the site may have been the NPS’s history of seeing itself as a site-management rather than a museum agency, an attitude which also colored the NPS’s reaction to the proposed Frederick Law Olmsted NHS in Brookline. In 1976, for example, the NPS told Congress it was reluctant to take on Olmsted because of the agency’s lack of experience with collections like the huge and important Olmsted archive of drawings and documents. Moreover, even though the Olmsted collection was widely recognized by 1979 as a key component of the proposed park, the authorizing legislation passed that year (like that for the Armory) did not require the NPS to acquire it. And although the agency did acquire the collection, it only reluctantly accepted the responsibility of managing it.\textsuperscript{23} Compounding the problem at both parks was the fact that NPS policy specifically discouraged the acquisition of “original archival material,”\textsuperscript{24} which formed a major part of both collections.

Still, uncertainty about the collections was not the only reason Congress, the NPS, and the park’s Springfield advocates insisted on giving equal weight to Armory Square. As the NPS’s legislative office put it in 1974, the legislative record “reflected deep concern on the

\begin{itemize}
\item a) the site’s conditions “are likely to imperil its existence within a short time”;
\item b) “protection of the integrity of the historic scene in non-Federally owned land within the Armory, specifically around the Parade, is not assured,” due to the lack of preservation conditions in the 1968 deed of transfer;
\item c) the college’s development plans “give rise to serious concern regarding the massing and character of the proposed structures”; and
\item d) visitor facilities are inadequate for presenting and interpreting the Armory story.
\end{itemize}

See, finally, the NPS’s “draft master plan,” which defined the purpose of the new area as “to preserve and protect, in scenic integrity, for the benefit and inspiration of the people of the United States the nationally significant portions of Springfield Armory” and listed two management objectives towards achieving this goal: visitor use and resource preservation, the latter meaning “preservation, through acquisition and/or cooperative action, of the historically significant components of Armory buildings, their settings and the arms collection.” (“Statement of Proposal” and Environment Impact Statement, contained in “Support Data, Proposed Springfield Armory National Historic Site,” June, 1971 [SPAR: Lowenthal Files: folder: Pre-Establishment Planning, 1971]. “Proposed Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Springfield, Massachusetts: A Draft Master Plan,” Office of Environmental Planning and Design, Eastern Service Center, June 1971, p. 31 [Washington Office, Planning Files]).


\textsuperscript{23} David Grayson Allen, \textit{The Olmsted National Historic Site and the Growth of Historic Landscape Preservation} (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2007), 26, 42, 64.

\textsuperscript{24} “The collection of historical materials pertinent to the park resources and interpretive theme and to the administrative history of the park is encouraged,” as long as such material is “confined to printed sources and notes and copies of printed or documentary sources.” National Park Service, \textit{Administrative Policies for the Historical Areas of the National Park System} (1973), 34, quoted in Allen, \textit{op. cit.}, 55. This policy remained essentially unchanged until the 1980s.
The Creation of the Park

part of both the Congress and the Service” over the protection of the site.25 Given the conflicts that were raging over the college’s building plans, that was hardly surprising.

AN UNUSUAL KIND OF PARK: THE PLAN IS ELABORATED, 1971-72

Though the bills introduced from 1970 through 1973 gave equal weight to protecting the college campus and the collection, they did not explicitly describe the campus as part of the National Historic Site. Instead, they called for an agreement with the college to protect it. But during the spring or summer of 1971, as the agency was outlining the desired agreement, it also produced a map which clearly showed the boundaries of the NHS drawn around the perimeter of Armory Square, so as to include the campus as well as the museum buildings. (Fig. 2.1-2) The NHS sketched by the planners was to encompass about 20 acres of federally owned land, which was to be acquired from the city of Springfield, plus an additional 35 acres of state-owned college campus, and it was the management of this jointly owned entity that was to be articulated through the agreement. It was an unusual concept: a park unit with two owners and managers, one federal, the other state.

The idea of including non-federal land within a national park was not in itself novel. Many large western parks included private holdings, which were often slated for eventual federal acquisition. But sometimes park agencies drew boundaries to include private land without any intention of acquiring it. An important precedent was the Adirondack Park, created by the State of New York in 1892 to encompass millions of acres of private land as well as state-owned Forest Preserve. Ninety years later a total of well over 4 million acres of nonfederal property had been included within the boundaries of national parks, preserves, and other areas.26 Some of these acres were privately owned, but 1.3 million acres were public land held by state and local governments, and these nonfederal public lands accounted for more than half of some park units: for example, Kalaupapa NAP (10,729 out of 10,902 acres), Santa Monica Mountains NRA (93,741 out of 150,000 acres), and Fire Island National Seashore (12,535 out of 19,518 acres).27

At the time of the Armory’s authorization in 1974, there were, within the northeastern seaboard, about 26 national park units which included some proportion of nonfederal land within their boundaries.28 Some were battlefields which had been

25 Memo, Acting Associate Director, Legislation (Robert Landau) to NAR Regional Director, July 18, 1974 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).
27 Ibid., p. 520 n. 261.
28 Simply for purposes of establishing a general context, I have selected an area stretching from Maryland to Maine and including the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
Figure 2.1. Boundary Map. Prepared by the NPS in 1973, these maps match others prepared to support legislation in 1971. (NPS: WASO).

Figure 2.2. Land Ownership Map. Prepared by the NPS in 1973, these maps match others prepared to support legislation in 1971. Dark area is state-owned land (NPS: WASO).

Drawing upon the National Park Service’s *The National Parks: Index 2005-2007* [n.d.], I have included all units listed as designated or authorized by 1974 within this eleven-state area.
transferred to the NPS from the War Department in 1933 or authorized shortly thereafter. Others were historic sites. Still others belonged to the recent crop of national seashores, rivers, trails, and recreation areas which, multiplying since the mid-1960s, were extending the range and variety of NPS units: areas like Gateway National Recreation Area, the Appalachian National Scenic Trail, or the Cape Cod and Fire Island National Seashores.

According to a recent tally of landownership, these pre-1974 park units contained in total about half a million acres within their authorized boundaries, of which a little less than 15 percent was not owned by the federal government. Within individual parks, amounts and percentages of nonfederal land varied widely: there was simply no normative condition. There were units with small amounts and low percentages of nonfederal land (Martin Van Buren NHS, with 1/4 acre nonfederal out of almost 40 total; or Allegheny Portage Railroad NHS, with 29 acres nonfederal out of almost 1,300 total); small amounts but high percentages (Adams National Historical Park, with about 14.5 acres nonfederal out of about 24 total); large amounts but low percentages (Gateway National Recreation Area, with 6,162 acres nonfederal out of over 26,000 total; or Appalachian National Scenic Trail, with about 57,000 nonfederal out of 227,000 total); and large amounts and high percentages (Assateague Island National Seashore, with about 22,000 nonfederal out of 40,000 total; or Fire Island NS, with about 13,300 nonfederal out of about 19,500 total).29

Just as varied were the motivations that led to the inclusion of nonfederal lands within the borders of these park units. Some of these situations evidently emerged by accident, or were intended to be eventually reversed. Some represented partnerships with state, local or not-for-profit conservation organizations. Yet others – the seashores and trails of the 1960s – evinced a desire to extend the reach of the agency’s land conservation efforts while avoiding the traumas of land condemnation and enduring bitterness that characterized earlier creations like Shenandoah National Park. Indeed the Congressional acts that established the rivers and trails systems in 1968 set up new management regimes that ruled out the large-scale land acquisition of the past.

By the early 1970s, then, the idea of including nonfederal land would not have been in itself surprising to agency officials or legislators: the system had always contained some units with mixed ownership, and the expansion of the 1960s had increased their numbers. That expansion continued in the 1970s, encompassing urban historical areas as well as rural landscapes. Two parks which displayed similarities to Springfield Armory were Boston National Historical Park, authorized on October 1, 1974, only weeks before the Armory, and Lowell National Historical Park, authorized in 1978. Boston was established to preserve historic structures associated with the American Revolution and the early history of the United States: its eight sites were divided among federal, state, city, and private ownership. The NPS described Lowell as a “large cooperatively managed historical urban park”: its resources, like Boston’s under federal, state, city, and private ownership, included the “canals, mills, residential, church, and public buildings of a 19th century industrial city.” They

were managed under a complex set of overlapping designations: local and National Register historic districts, a Heritage State Park, and of course the National Park. At both parks, agreements between the NPS and other owners and managers were important: a major partner at Lowell was the Lowell Historic Preservation Commission, a civilian body created and directed by the authorizing legislation to meet specified preservation planning objectives.30

Yet the Armory was distinctive if not unique. Here, the majority of land would be owned by a single landlord who did not share the NPS’s conservation mission, owed nothing to the park legislation, and could not really be penalized for noncompliance. Despite significant precedents, then, Springfield Armory was an experiment. Moreover, by the time the park was established in 1978, the political climate had changed significantly since the 1960s, when hybrid units like Cape Cod and Fire Island National Seashores were created. Then, the inclusion of nonfederal land within park boundaries could be seen as extending the reach of federal conservation programs. Now, Washington was becoming increasingly deferential to private landowners, state, and local governments, and the new reluctance to use federal powers aggressively was coloring every aspect of federal land acquisition and management.31

In the seven years during which Congress considered the Springfield legislation and the NPS struggled to meet its terms, no agency official ever wrote down the precise reasoning behind the idea of including the campus within the park. Nor did Congress ever discuss it. That was not necessarily surprising. The arguments for establishing the park were clear enough in a general way: protecting the site, keeping the collection in Springfield, honoring the site’s patriotic associations, and bringing funds to a declining city. Yet the more specific question of what exactly Congress and the NPS thought park designation would accomplish with regard to the state’s portion of the park lacked such a clear answer, and the ambiguity would hamper the agency’s efforts to establish the park and protect the site.

If the challenges of the site received little attention, the opposite was true of the collection. Agency officials emphasized them throughout the data and planning documents they compiled to support the legislation. For example, the “development schedule,” a list of expenses needed to bring the new park up to an acceptable standard, informed Congress that the NPS proposed to allocate almost $1 million to the interior of the Main Arsenal and a further $3,000,000 for exhibits.32 These numbers raised eyebrows at the regional office,33 and

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32 “Support Data, Proposed Springfield Armory National Historic Site,” June, 1971 (Lowenthal Files: folder: Pre-Establishment Planning, 1971). The actual figure for the interior was $989,000.
Nan Rickey, a specialist at the agency’s Harpers Ferry Center, stepped forward to “justify” the $3 million figure, arguing that the collection was “a national treasure of enormous cultural significance to the economic, technological and military history of this country...the largest collection of military small arms in the world....” It was also a “living collection,” still used for military research and development and for more academic research by scholars studying war and foreign policy. Its market value was “conservatively estimated” at “over $7,000,000.00.”

Of the $3 million investment, Rickey explained that $1,030,000 was needed for management, conservation, and cataloging: this did not include regular curatorial work. The remaining $1,970,000 was tagged for interpretation, including audiovisual productions, a large exhibit on Springfield weapons and the “manifestations of American technological genius responsible for their development at this Armory,” and the development of two floors of open storage for use by researchers and weapons experts. The seemingly “high estimate,” she explained, reflected the special security and display needs of guns, as well as the collection’s sheer size, “difficult to fully comprehend unless one has seen it.”

The director of the Harpers Ferry Center supported Rickey. Unlike many park collections, he noted, this one was “large, growing, and highly specialized.” The condition of objects and records was largely unknown: all estimates involved a fair amount of guesswork, but like Rickey, Marc Sagan felt the expenses were justified because the collection was “unique in the Park Service.” Likening the scope of its interpretive development to Philadelphia’s Independence Visitor Center or the Museum of Westward Expansion in St. Louis, he noted that it would “result in placing on display approximately half again as many objects as are presently displayed in all of the other museums (refurnished historic houses excepted) in the entire system.” Days later, Acting Regional Director George A. Palmer defended the number to the director in Washington: it was valid, “considering the immense size and great value of the museum collection and the enormous amount of work that will be required,” to manage it and to maintain it as an “active library of army development.”

Despite its impressive collection, the museum was operating with a staff of three and an annual budget of about $55,000, and the NPS planned to scale it up dramatically. By

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33 Memo, Deputy Director to Director, NE Region, December 23, 1971 [sic] (Lowenthal Files: folder: Pre-Establishment Planning, 1972).
35 Memo, Director, Harpers Ferry Center (Marc Sagan) to Director, NE Region January 17, 1972 (Lowenthal Files: folder: Pre-Establishment Planning, 1972).
36 Memo, Acting Director, NE Region (George A. Palmer) to Director, January 26, 1972 (Lowenthal Files: folder: Pre-Establishment Planning, 1972).
1973, plans called for fourteen full-time park staff, most of who would work in the museum, plus two seasonal workers, with a projected operating budget of $365,000 per annum, including building and grounds maintenance.  

The agency, finally, proposed an ambitious restoration plan for the federal portion of the park (Fig. 2.3), whose main components were as follows:

- **Main Arsenal:** Remodel, including improved first-floor exhibit and sales areas, new support spaces in the basement, and library, study space, open collection storage, and college classrooms upstairs. Restore original tower base and cupola windows, replace existing fire escapes with interior stairs. Restore original Doric portico if archaeological investigations produced enough information.

- **Building 1 (Commanding Officer’s Quarters):** Restore main floor, rehabilitate upper floor as staff apartments.

- **Buildings 10 and 17 (Figs. 2.4-5):** Move to original locations, to be ascertained through archeology, and restore. Use Building 10 for “meetings, classrooms, tour staging, and other special events,” Building 17 for administrative offices.

- **Landscape:** Remove loop drive, tennis court, and 1969 playing fields, recreate original contours of hillside behind Main Arsenal, and restore original terracing and roadways. Construct new parking lot for fifty cars and five buses behind Commanding Officer’s Quarters, on site of former garden.

**NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARMY AND THE STATE: 1971-72**

The authorizing bills called for agreements with the Army and the state. Negotiations for the two agreements took dramatically different courses. Reaching agreement with the Army was relatively easy. Even before legislation was introduced, Larry Lewis assured the NPS that he had a “clear understanding” from Defense officials that “there would be no difficulty in securing title to the arms collection.” Actually, Interior did not insist on

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38 Letter, Nathaniel [illegible], Assistant Secretary Interior, to Henry M. Jackson (Chairman, Interior and Insular Affairs), September 7, 1972 (Lowenthal Files: folder: Legislative History); letter, Acting Assistant Secretary Interior [illegible] to Chairman Henry M. Jackson, August 31, 1973 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Legislation).


obtaining title. “It is essential,” the department explained, “that the arms collection remain at Springfield and under the administration of the National Park Service.” Beyond that, the department was willing to negotiate “any conditions the Department of the Army may wish to include in a deed of transfer or a permanent loan.” In effect, Interior asked for only three things: 1) donation or loan of the collection; 2) the right to display the collection and to lend objects to other institutions; and 3) copies of the collection’s provenance records, showing how and when each item had been acquired. In exchange, the department offered to “adopt a program of maintenance and restoration of the collection,” make the collection and records available to the Army, and allow the Army to survey the collection at regular intervals. In May, 1972, the Army’s Under Secretary BeLieu replied that “the Army would be pleased to loan the collection to the National Park Service.”

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41 Letter, W. T. Pecora (Acting Secretary Interior) to Robert F. Froehlke (Secretary Army), April 7, 1972 (Lowenthal Files: folder: Pre-Establishment Planning, 1972).

42 “Benton Arms Collection: Terms of Acceptance Satisfactory to the Department of the Interior” (single sheet, no signature, no date, with yellow cover slip dated July 12, 1971, stating document has been provided to Solicitor’s Office for meeting with Army on July 17) (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

43 Letter, Kenneth E. BeLieu (Under Sec of the Army) to William T. Pecora (Under Secretary Interior), May 10, 1972 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence -75).
Well before Congress began to focus on the legislation, then, the NPS could demonstrate a satisfactory understanding with the Army. Though this understanding included neither donation nor permanent loan of the collection, it did encompass a ten-year loan, renewable automatically unless one partner notified the other that it had not complied with the agreement’s terms. The agreement ultimately signed in 1978 would not depart materially from these terms.44

Negotiations with the state were considerably more challenging. Indeed they nearly wrecked the park initiative on more than one occasion. The problem was that NPS and college officials looked at Armory Square in radically different ways. Concern over the college’s campus plans surfaced among some NPS officials as early as January, 1971, when Ernest Allen Connally encountered a drawing of the college master plan in its course catalog (Figs. 2.6-7). The plan called for six new buildings, three of them facing the Parade: a “humanics [sic], a science and biological science-business building....” Under the plan, the state would authorize about $10 million in the 1972 capital budget for the humanities and science buildings; a further $5 million would be appropriated the following year for the biological science and business building. These were not small buildings: the proposed science building would reach 6 stories and 180,000 square feet, including a small observatory on the roof. In addition, the college hoped “to develop the north side of the parade grounds as a quadrangle with covered walkways and grassy area between the buildings.”45

Even more than the construction plans, it was the college’s demolition plans which caught Connally’s attention. The plan has “given us some concern,” he wrote to President Garvey with careful understatement. The drawing seemed to “indicate some inconsistencies” with the recommendations of the 1967 evaluation report. Indeed it seemed to suggest that the college was planning to demolish Building 12, a structure classified as nationally significant, as well as Buildings 10, 17, and 27, identified as worthy of preservation. It also showed a “large ‘Physical Education’ building” situated immediately adjacent to the Commanding Officer’s Quarters; “Though we can form no clear opinion from this drawing alone,” Connally surmised, “we venture the thought that such a large structure in close proximity to the historic Commanding Officer’s Quarters would have a deleterious effect on the latter.”46

In response, Garvey assured Connally that Building 12 was safe. But, he added, “there was no question of preserving any of the buildings identified ... in the ‘worthy of

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Figure 2.4, Buildings 10 in 1967 (NPS Evaluation Report, 1967)

Figure 2.5, Buildings 17 in 1967 (NPS Evaluation Report, 1967).
preservation’ category.” It was “practically a physical impossibility,” he lectured Connally, “to plan a campus for 5000 day students and 5000 evening students without giving the architect some leeway. The architect is making every effort to preserve these buildings, but his main responsibility is to design facilities that will accommodate 5000 students.”

A few months later, the agency’s master planning team made its first visit to the Armory. Despite Connally’s earlier exchange with the college, the mood was optimistic. Led by team captain Meir Sofair from the agency’s Eastern Service Center in Denver, CO, the group included a landscape architect (Robert Chamberland), an interpretive planner (Nan Rickey), a historian (Frank B. Sarles) and the general superintendent of the Boston group of NPS sites (Benjamin J. Zerbey). The group examined the collections, library, archives, and photographs and met with Larry Lewis and Tom Wallace of the museum. They also met with the president and dean of admissions of the collection, Edmond Garvey and Nels H. Johnson. Sarles reported that “it was a cordial meeting, at which Mr. Garvey repeatedly expressed willingness to cooperate with the National Park Service in any way possible.” The college officials had reason to be pleased, for the planners had just discovered the original locations of Buildings 10 and 17, two small houses now located on the college campus but once flanking the Main Arsenal: the college planned to demolish these structures, but MBRCC vice-chair Putnam professed to be “much gratified” by the NPS’s interest in moving them onto federal property.

Among the tasks undertaken by the team in the course of developing the plan and compiling information to support the legislation was to sketch out a cooperative agreement. Sarles’s summary did not mention the two buildings, or for that matter the college master plan. Instead, it forbade exterior alterations to buildings on the east and south sides of the Parade, called for “height and design approval by NPS” of new structures north of the Parade, touched on day-to-day grounds maintenance issues, and alluded to the possibility of “mutual interpretive and educational programs” in the future. On the basis of this preliminary sketch – and without any formal response from the college as yet – the legislative process moved forward.

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48 Memo, Frank B. Sarles, Jr. (Staff Historian) to Chief Historian, May 4, 1971 (Washington Office, Park History File: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

**PROGRESS TOWARDS LEGISLATION: 1971-73**

The park initiative gained adherents. In the fall of 1971 the NPS's Advisory Board announced its support, as did Springfield’s mayor, city council, and chamber of commerce.\(^{50}\) Larry Lewis was doing everything he could to generate enthusiasm, urging museum backers to write to their senators\(^{51}\) and (recalling former President Dwight D. Eisenhower's role as honorary chair of the museum's 1966 fundraising drive) corresponding with Mamie Eisenhower, who passed his appeals on to Secretary of the Interior Rogers Morton. By the end of 1972, the bills had reached the Office of Management and Budget, whose approval was necessary for passage, and Lewis told the press he had reason to believe they had been “favorably viewed by President Nixon before Congress adjourned.”\(^{52}\)

This was particularly good news since Nixon had just won reelection in a landslide. But by next spring, Lewis's appeals were beginning to sound desperate. “The Springfield Armory Museum is going to close,” he told Senator Brooke, “unless someone takes some interest in this matter and gets the report to the Interior over to OMB and on to the Hill for hearings.”\(^{53}\) In addition to the local legislators, Lewis sought help from Elliott Richardson, known around Washington not only as Secretary of HEW (at the time legislation was introduced) but as a prominent Massachusetts native, indeed an archetypal Boston Brahmin. But his correspondence with Richardson now began to reflect the peculiar political developments that were convulsing the nation. In March, Judge John J. Sirica handed down harsh sentences for the Watergate burglars, the Republican operatives who had broken into the Democratic party offices before the previous election. Suspicions were growing that high administration officials, perhaps even the president, were involved in a cover-up, and the administration was paralyzed by accusations, resignations, and firings. Richardson had been appointed to head HEW in 1970, but in 1973 he was moved to Defense, whence he advised Interior Secretary Morton that the initiative to save the Armory would have to come from Interior.\(^{54}\) But Richardson was to move again: in May, 1973, Nixon had just nominated him

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to replace disgraced Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst, and so it was to the prospective Attorney General that Lewis pleaded: “While I know you have quite enough to do at the moment, the very mess you are trying to unravel has delayed the process of Government to the point this project may fail.” He asked Richardson to “give this matter a shove since everyone listens to you!” This was true: Richardson was highly regarded. But the fact was, the legislation was moving about as fast as could be expected. “They were filed too late,” said Lewis, referring to the bills introduced into Congress in 1972: they would have to be re-introduced in the next Congress.

Meanwhile, there was progress in Springfield. The first bill had been hurriedly drafted, and one clause, authorizing Interior to accept a donation of twenty or more acres from the city, had angered an important constituency. It was easy to deduce that the government had its eye on the hillside behind the Main Arsenal, including the school department’s new playing fields. School officials took umbrage, and Lewis complained to Connally at the NPS that they might have chosen words “less inflammatory to the local sensibilities of our School Committee.” The bills introduced in 1971 were careful not to mention any specific acreage, and by June the mayor could assure Lewis that “something could be worked out with the Park Service.” As Lewis commented, “they all now realize the importance of our venture.” But in point of fact, the fields had not been a great success and the schools were planning to leave them anyway: the remaining controversy, concerning interim facilities, had been solved by the end of the year, and Mayor Freedman was able to announce the city’s unqualified support for the park.

Meanwhile, another thorny land problem had arisen. NPS planners now believed that the NPS would have to acquire a narrow strip of state-owned land immediately in front of the Main Arsenal (Fig. 2.8). The problem was that this piece of land was an essential part of the college’s roadway network. While NPS planners were willing to rely heavily on easements and the cooperative agreement to guarantee access for park visitors and staff, they

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55 Letter, Larry D. Lewis to “General Richardson” (attorney general), May 7, 1973 (on Lewis’s personal stationery; emphasis in original; SPAR: Lowenthal Files: folder: Pre-Establishment Planning 1973).


Figure 2.6. An early version of the S.T.C.C. master plan showing three slab-like buildings facing the green and complete replacement of all buildings to the north (S.T.C.C.).
had concluded that federal ownership of this small segment was necessary to provide a scenic buffer. Also, it would enable the NPS to repave or otherwise improve it without seeking special authorization to spend federal funds on nonfederal lands.

**Controversy Over the Campus: 1971-73**

At the end of 1973, the Senate and House held hearings on the Armory legislation. Supporters painted a rosy picture of progress on the land donation and the cooperative agreement. But behind the scenes, the Armory’s future was mired in controversy, and some NPS officials had lost confidence in their ability to create a viable historic site. The proposed park was in crisis.

The problem stemmed from the college’s master plan, with its urgent call for new buildings and for the demolition of historic structures. Garvey’s response to Connally’s letter of 1971 had not been encouraging. It had simply restated the college’s resistance to interference with its expansive enrollment and construction goals. There the matter rested until the NPS’s master planners arrived in May, 1971, and discovered that Buildings 10 and 17 had originally flanked the Main Arsenal – “a most fortunate find,” as team member Frank Sarles put it, “since the College has already made plans for demolition of those two structures.” The planners’ proposal to move the buildings and use them for park administration and an orientation center obviously solved several problems at once. Larry Lewis “expressed delight” and urged the planners to bring it up as “an agreeable introductory topic” with the architect who had proposed their demolition. In fact, both the architect and
The MBRCC “expressed themselves as much gratified” to learn that the NPS wanted the two troublesome buildings.60

The new buildings presented a more difficult problem. Instead of blocking them, NPS planners recommended that the cooperative agreement provide for “height and design approval by NPS.”61 They may have discussed these ideas with the college’s architects, for the design of the proposed buildings appears to have changed at about this time. The earliest drawings, of 1967, had showed sleek steel and glass slabs facing the Parade. But the newspapers now reported that the college master plan “calls for red brick facing on the new buildings to blend with the historic Armory buildings”62 (Figs. 1.25, 2.9-11).

The reliance on design regulation embodied in these proposals was consistent with Connally’s earlier letter which, despite concerns about a new building next to the Commanding Officer’s Quarters, had not objected to those facing the Parade. In this spirit, then, the NPS’s draft master plan proposed to “regulate development” in order to “preserve and protect, in scenic integrity...the nationally significant portions of Springfield Armory.”

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60 Memo, Frank B. Sarles, Jr. (Staff Historian) to Chief Historian, May 4, 1971 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

61 Memo, Frank B. Sarles, Jr. (Staff Historian) to Chief Historian, May 4, 1971 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

The planners predicted that such regulation would have a “deterrent effect on the height of the structures to be erected.” Yet the environmental impact statement, prepared at the same time in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, was less optimistic: not only did the college’s development plans “give rise to serious concern regarding the massing and character of proposed structures,” but the buildings facing the Parade were “out of character with the overall existing scene and, consequently, will be incompatible with one of the basic requirements of this plan.”

These contradictions reflected the different functions of the documents in question, but they also revealed the emerging tension between the goals of preservation and park management. As a disclosure document, the environmental impact statement could be rather

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frank. By contrast, the plan was a management document: it suggested that the NPS was prepared to put its faith in a policy of design regulation despite the doubts that some officials may have had over its success.

The disclosures revealed in the environmental impact statement did not detract from general enthusiasm for the park proposal. “The major hurdles have been cleared,” reported the Springfield Sunday Republican early in June, 1971: the college’s master plan had been approved by the state’s Board of Higher Education and by committees of the state legislature. It still awaited final endorsement by the legislature and by Governor Sargent, but the prospects for funding were good. And in fact, Garvey said, preliminary design work had already begun with a preliminary state appropriation of $500,000. “The new buildings,” he added, “are desperately needed – we have been in temporary facilities for almost five years.”

This moment in the college’s building program provides a window into local politics, which differed from what agency officials in Washington presented to Congress and perhaps even from what they understood. Since discovering the single drawing in the course catalog, Connally had sought Larry Lewis’s aid in finding out more about the college’s master plan. Noting that the state had not yet approved the plan, Lewis replied that “we would be unwise” to ask for more information just then. “We are at least going to get a red brick facing,” he pointed out, adding that Garvey had promised not to interfere with the museum. Lewis agreed to move forward, but only when “the matter is finalized at the State level, and there would be no danger of the appropriation being lost. In other words, let’s just keep going as we are.” However worried Congress and the NPS might be about the impacts of construction on Armory Square, then, Lewis’s main goal was to assure that the construction went forward and did not compromise the museum.

Meanwhile, the fate of Building 17 hung in the balance. Later in the summer of 1971, the college received a bid for demolishing it, at a cost of $1,275, and some time thereafter, another for moving it, at a cost of $20,000. Garvey thought the one company that bid on the moving operation was “not interested” in doing it. There matters rested until March, 1972. Then, with less than two months until the college’s deadline for removing the building, Lewis told the NPS he was investigating the cost of moving it. A month later still he informed Garvey he had doubts about the building’s surviving a move and that the cost was in any case “beyond our means.” As the museum’s board of directors was “unable to handle this matter,”


The museum would accede to whatever the college decided. The college began demolishing the building that fall. Obviously saving it had been a low priority for all concerned.

Throughout this period, park plans appeared to be moving smoothly forward. The NPS had failed to follow Connally’s warning shot of January 1971 with any tough questioning and, despite the disclosures in the environmental impact statement, seemed resigned to the college’s construction and demolition plans. Yet that document did point up a related problem which would haunt the agency. Arnold Berke was a senior planner with the Lower Pioneer Valley Regional Planning Commission. Troubled by the NPS’s admission that it was “no longer clear just what structures and grounds in Armory Square are included in the landmark status,” he asked William Murtagh, Keeper of the National Register, to settle the issue. He warned Murtagh that the college’s expansion plans threatened Armory Square, adding that he was “skeptical” about the college’s willingness to accept the “architectural controls” proposed by the NPS. Understanding the precise limits of the NHL designation “and the use of their associated controls and regulations,” would at least “be helpful in our efforts to preserve the significant structures of Armory Square.”

Berke’s request touched a sore spot, for the passage of the National Historic Preservation Act in 1966 had given real importance to the boundary question, which had never been resolved: no longer merely honorific, the boundaries had become the trigger for applying the review process spelled out in Section 106. Following passage of the law, agency officials had assumed that the existing NHL designation would simply be translated into a National Register listing. But confusion over the boundaries frustrated this effort. Early in 1969, Robert Utley told the Massachusetts Historical Commission that the portions of the NHL identified in the 1967 evaluation report as having national significance constituted the National Register listing. Yet later that year, the Regional Director’s Office stated that the NHL designation was intended to cover only the Main, West, and Middle Arsenals. At the time Berke raised the question, then, there were still no agreed-upon or clearly documented National Register boundaries. Murtagh’s answer evidently relied on Utley: he told Berke that twelve properties in Armory Square had been determined to “possess national historical significance” and were included in the NHL designation, together with the Parade itself and


69 See memo, Utley to Assistant Director, Cooperative Activities, April 3, 1972, in which Utley declines to comment on the EIS (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence -75).

70 Letter, Arnold M. Berke (Senior Planner, Lower Pioneer Valley Regional Planning Commission) to William J. Murtagh (Keeper, National Register), July 20, 1972 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).


Figures 2.10, 2.11. Two undated perspectives of the S.T.C.C. master plan, showing the range of buildings on the northwest side of the green. The drawing below may be later, as it appears to show the brick facing added in mid-summer 1971 in response to NPS criticisms (S.T.C.C.).
the iron fence. He explained further that the boundaries included all of city’s property within
Armory Square plus that portion of state land “south of a line extending along the north
boundary of the Parade.”73 Apparently, then, the north side of the Parade lay outside the
National Register boundary. This was significant because all of the college’s construction and
demolition projects were slated to take place there: they could well be exempt from Section
106 review.

As the fall of 1972 wore on, the NPS’s regional office, seemingly unperturbed by its
plans, continued to treat the college with deference. On November 29, Regional Director
George A. Palmer alerted Washington that essential legislative support data would be as
much as two months late because the previous proposal had “overlooked the total needs of
the ground space requirements” for the college’s new buildings “as indicated in their Master
Plan.” Palmer explained that new boundary lines, drawn “to allow for this expansion,” were
awaiting the College’s concurrence.74

Meanwhile Albert Benjamin was approaching matters quite differently. He was
Palmer’s assistant and chief of the New England field office. He had noticed certain
developments that “either have or could potentially have adverse effects on National
Historic Landmark property.” The college was demolishing Building 17: the rear portion was
already gone, “but there might well be enough to save.” Also, the college was in the process of
building three “massive contemporary structures directly facing on the parade field”: one,
indeed, was almost finished (Figs. 2.12-16). In addition to these immediate threats, Benjamin
felt that others could arise if the college destroyed any more buildings “to make way for their
new campus, as indeed they intend to do.”75

Larry Lewis advised Benjamin that it was “to [sic] late to do anything” and asked him
“not to bring the subject up with Garvey.” Knowing that Lewis was a “close personal friend
of Congressman Boland,” Benjamin probably saw that Lewis was concerned not only about
the impacts of complaints on the college but also on the legislation to save the museum.
Nevertheless, he immediately phoned Murray Nelligan in Washington and put his concerns
in a memorandum to Regional Director Palmer. He pointed out that the agency’s draft
master plan called for moving Building 17 to its original position; that the college was fully
aware of the campus’s National Historic Landmark status and of its responsibilities under
Section 106; and that as federal funds were almost certainly being used in the college’s
building program that program was subject to Section 106 review. Benjamin also spelled out
the political ramifications of the situation. These went beyond the question of Boland’s
support for the legislation to the nature of the agency’s “future relationship with the college

73 Letter, William J. Murtagh to Arnold M. Berke, Senior Planner, Lower Pioneer Valley Regional
Planning Commission, August 10, 1972 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR
Correspondence 1967-75).

74 Memo, George A. Palmer to NPS Director, November 29, 1972 (Lowenthal Files: folder: Pre-

75 Memo, Assistant to Director, NE Region (Benjamin) to Director, NE Region, December 1, 1972
(Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).
which we must depend on for future protection of Armory Square as well as a fully integrated working relationship with the Park.” Whatever the long-term implications, Benjamin added that the NPS had a “minimum responsibility” to notify the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation: “as far as I can tell at this time,” he wrote, “no one has attempted to meet the legal obligation” of doing so.76

Someone had, however, notified HEW that the college might be breaking the law. And Donald Branum, an HEW official in Boston, had already ordered a stop to demolition. This was quickly rescinded when the agency’s lawyers decided it lacked legal authority, but HEW did take the opportunity to study its “responsibilities under the term [sic] of the original deed.” Meanwhile, at least one NPS official believed the Advisory Council already knew about the proposed demolition but was waiting for the NPS to request an investigation. And so, on December 14, Regional Director Palmer officially notified the Council that the college was demolishing Building 17 and that its building program would have a “possibly adverse effect” on the West, Middle, and Main Arsenals.77

Given the confusion surrounding the National Register listing, Palmer’s letter was carefully phrased. The 1967 evaluation report had accorded Building 17 “‘less than national significance,’” and descriptions of the NHL designation had omitted it. One NPS official concluded that the agency was “in a very weak position” to protest its demolition and recommended instead leaving it to the Advisory Council or HEW “to take the matter further, if they so desire.”78 Admitting that a National Register listing that included Building 17, if prepared now, would be “open to challenge,” Palmer therefore emphasized the impacts of adjacent construction on the three buildings which were indubitably listed on the National Register: the West, Middle, and Main Arsenals.

The college was undeterred. Five days later, the Massachusetts Board of Regional Colleges asked HEW for permission to “dispose of” Buildings 26 and 27, demolish Building 17, and move Building 10 at some unspecified future date. HEW granted permission the same day for all except Building 10.79

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76 Memo, Assistant to Director, NE Region (Benjamin) to Director, NE Region, December 1, 1972 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

77 Branum was Assistant Regional Director of HEW’s Boston Office of Surplus Property Utilization. Legal authority: memo, Landmark and National Register Specialist [no name] to Assistant Director, Cooperative Activities, n.d. [December 1, 1972]; study its responsibilities: memo, Assistant to Director, NE Region (Benjamin) to Director, NE Region, December 1, 1972; knew about the demolition: memo, Landmark and National Register Specialist [no name] to Assistant Director, Cooperative Activities, n.d. [December 1, 1972] (all: Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75); Palmer notified: letter, George A. Palmer, to Robert R. Garvey, Jr. (Executive Secretary, ACHP), December 14, 1972 (Lowenthal Files: folder: Pre-Establishment Planning, 1972).


79 In making this request, the board noted that the deed of transfer had stipulated that either Building 10 or 17 be retained: given the latter’s “questionable” condition, “obviously the choice of which to demolish and which to save was relatively easy.” Two letters, William G. Dwyer (President, Board of
Though HEW claimed it had complied with NHPA, the Advisory Council was not so sure, and early in January 1973, it asked HEW to review the performance of the college and its supervisory board with regard to its responsibilities under both Section 106 and the deed of transfer. Even though the humanities building was “almost completed,” the Council noted, “at no time have any of the plans of the Springfield Technical Community College been submitted...for review,” as required and agreed. 80 The Council appeared to be laying the...

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80 Letter, Ken Tapman (Compliance Officer, ACHP) to Caspar Weinberger (Secretary, HEW), January 12, 1973 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).
Figure 2.13. Building 17 (Putnam Hall), first of the college’s large new buildings (photo: author).

Figure 2-14. Buildings 13 and 17 (Deliso and Putnam Halls), built 1973-74 (photo: author).
groundwork for a full-scale review, but no such review took place, and it would be a full year before Section 106 was heard of again. By then, the humanities building was finished, Building 17 was demolished, and new issues had arisen.

Throughout this period the legislative process continued to move forward in Washington, but the events of November and December, 1972, raised deep concerns among those closer to the Armory. “It appears from this,” wrote one participant, “that Springfield Armory is a lost cause.” Another commented: “This speaks much about the quality of the college and its administration.” The episode persuaded Benjamin, who was simultaneously advancing the legislation and sounding the alarm over the college’s building plans, that the prospect of “having any control over the college building program as we had hoped in the master plan and as spelled out in the EIS seems very remote at this time.” The College’s actions, he thought, were “indicative of the limited commitment the college has to historical preservation.” Worse, they pointed to “potential difficulties we probably will face” in reaching an agreement with the college to preserve the rest of the parade ground. Benjamin thought it likely that the college would “cause future difficulties” relating to their Section 106 responsibilities. It probably did not help that, as Larry Lewis put it, the college’s architect was “a very difficult person to deal with and apparently unwilling to compromise his vision for the college” – a vision that now included an eight-story parking garage immediately north of the Commanding Officer’s Quarters. “We may well face a battle with the college,” warned Benjamin, not least over parking.

Though Benjamin realized it was “too late in the game to raise fundamental questions” about the park’s establishment, that is exactly what he did in a memo to Regional Director Palmer. He pointed out that the NPS could save Buildings 7, 8, and 9 from demolition by buying and relocating them. But his “personal view” of the park’s prospects was pessimistic. He questioned the “seemingly large staff and sizable amount of development funds” proposed for a park whose “primary feature” was an arms collection “visited by a relatively small number of people with specific interest in firearms.” Visitation would probably remain low. “Rather than a full scale staff with a large operating budget and multimillion dollar development,” Benjamin suggested the agency write a cooperative agreement that would leave the museum’s day-to-day management in the hands of Lewis and his “experienced staff.” Under such an agreement, the NPS could upgrade the site and provide “operating funds,” which might amount to about a quarter of the expenditure currently proposed. The agency would “get far more value for our money and avoid many potential problems.”

81 Note, “fbs” (?) to Dr. Mortensen, January 18, 1973 (covering enclosure of Palmer’s letter to ACHP), and handwritten annotation to same, initialed but illegibly (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

82 Memo, Chief, New England Field Office (Albert J. Benjamin) to Director, NE Region, December 11, 1972 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

83 Memo, Chief, New England Field Office (Albert J. Benjamin) to Director, NE Region, December 11, 1972 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).
Figure 2.15. Building 17 (Putnam Hall). The red brick is a close match to that of the historic buildings. The scale is monumental (photo: author).
Figure 2.16. Building 17 (Putnam Hall). The red brick is a close match to that of the historic buildings. The scale is monumental (photo: author).
The Creation of the Park

Benjamin’s concerns fell on deaf ears. The NPS continued assembling documents to support the legislation and, in March 1973, it fell to Benjamin to ask College President Garvey for a statement of the college’s position on the legislation. Garvey replied that the college “welcomes the establishment” of the park and “looks forward with pleasure to having Benton Small Arms Museum” and the Department of the Interior “as neighbors.” He assured the NPS that the college did not intend to alter the buildings on Main Street or along Federal Street from the corner northward to the Main Gate, and that it would maintain the parade ground “as it now exists and all of the buildings on the campus that have been designated as part of the National Historic Site.” He also noted that the college’s new buildings, then under construction, were “faced with brick in keeping with the Historical [sic] nature of this property.” But there was a caveat: “In summation, we welcome the establishment of this Historic Park as long as the property taken does not impose any restrictions on the future growth of the College or take any of the land previously deeded to the Commonwealth.”

Benjamin had deep misgivings about the letter. He worried that it left room for the college to pursue its plans for a “high rise parking garage.” And he pointed out that Garvey had conspicuously declined the opportunity to “comment specifically on an agreement.” But it was the conclusion that especially disturbed him. In light of the letter, he advised the regional director, “it will be extremely difficult to reach any meaningful agreement with the college in reference to the preservation of the parade field and the remaining buildings surrounding it”: the college and its supervisory board “will insist that the furtherance of educational needs will always take precedence over historic preservation.”

FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARDS LEGISLATION: 1973

Public hearings on the authorizing legislation, held by the Senate and House in November and December of 1973, provided an opportunity for legislators to wax eloquent on the Armory’s historical importance and patriotic value. Representative Roy A. Taylor of


86 Memo, Assistant to Director, Northeast Region (Albert J. Benjamin) to Director, NE Region, March 16, 1973 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

North Carolina called its historical significance “unquestionable.” Rep. Silvio O. Conte, one of the bill’s original sponsors, said it was “rich and glorious...deeply intertwined with the creation and growth of the nation,” with its defense and the “preservation of its ideals.” Boland thought the legislation would be a “fitting and relevant commemoration” of the Armory’s role in U.S. history, particularly welcome in light of the nation’s approaching bicentennial.

The National Park Service saw the Armory as “a heritage of government arms development and manufacture that is worthy of preservation”: the new historic site would “commemorate the important role of the Springfield Armory in the Nation’s military history.”

Questions arose about the status of the required agreement with the state. Chairing the Senate hearing, Senator Alan Bible asked Lewis whether it was correct that the negotiations with the state were “progressing very well and that they have negotiated out the agreements”; was it true that the conclusion of an agreement awaited only the passage of legislation? Lewis replied: “Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is a correct statement. There is a great spirit of cooperation.” Bible pressed the point: “So you can anticipate no problems there once this bill is signed. Is that what you are saying?” Again Lewis agreed. The questions followed a similar pattern in the House, prompting similar reassurances. Admittedly, the agreement had not yet been completed, “but,” Boland assured the chair, “we anticipate no problems with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.” Rep. Taylor asked whether he could safely assure the full committee and the House that “there is no problem there?” Boland: yes. Taylor understood that “maybe a couple of buildings have been torn down. And we want to be certain that others will not be destroyed and that incompatible structures will not be erected.” Boland: “I am sure we are in the process of getting that assurance”; in fact, “we will have it.” Speaking for Springfield’s Chamber of Commerce, Paul Greeley added that Lieutenant Governor Frye had assured him that “from a state point of view he saw no reason why this agreement couldn’t be worked out promptly.”

The National Park Service was a little more guarded. Though Director Ron Walker assured Bible that the state would donate the two-acre strip of land in front of the Main Arsenal, Benjamin, on the witness stand with him, had to admit the NPS lacked any written commitment from the state legislature or the governor. The best he could do was assure the Senators that the state had a “deep interest” in the proposal and, moreover, had received a “communication” on the subject from the college. This implied that the college, at least, supported the transfer. But would the state follow the college’s recommendation? Walker:


89 Senate hearing, p.72.

90 House hearing, pp. 7, 12-13, 55.
“Well, we would hope that they would....” Still, the two-acre donation was only one part of the agreement, and Walker admitted that the agency had not received any commitment to sign an agreement at all. “Mr. Benjamin,” he told the Senators, “has attempted on no less than 60 [sic!] occasions to do that as recently as within the last six weeks,” but without success. The college was apparently “waiting for the legislation to solidify before they would be willing to sit down and work out the specific terms of an agreement....” Bible was evidently surprised to hear this: had not Boland and Lewis “indicated all that was necessary before the donations of either the state land or the college land was the passage of this bill”? Walker: they “envisioned no problems in getting this agreement.”91 The pattern was repeated in the House, where Associate Director Stanley W. Hulett told legislators that the college had not responded to the draft which the NPS had sent. “We have had some difficulties in getting an agreement from them,” he admitted.92

By this time, agency officials must have been genuinely anxious about the agreement. Yet they used that very anxiety to reassure legislators: after all, they implied, did they not desire an agreement as ardently as the legislators? Referring to the demolition of two buildings and the ongoing transformation of the “entire northwest side of the parade,” they assured Congress that “as a condition of establishing the area, we would require a satisfactory agreement with the college whereby the remaining historic buildings, along the northeast and southeast sides of the parade will [sic] be retained, and the physical setting of the parade lands will not be impaired.” But Rep. Taylor pressed the point: had the college used the land “in a manner which shows that it appreciates the historic value?” Hulett admitted it had not: this was “one of the problems,” and indeed the very reason why we “feel so strongly” that the agreement “should be worked out prior to the legislation proceeding to the floor of the House....” Actually, Hewlett pointed out, the NHPA required the college to submit its plans to the Advisory Council, but “to date they have not submitted those plans in compliance with Section 106....” Taylor: did not the law require approval before demolishing a historic building? Hulett: yes.93

Together, Taylor and Hulett had placed on the Congressional record the fact that the college, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the HEW had broken the law. It was this behavior that had shaken Albert Benjamin’s confidence in the park proposal. Yet to Washington officials, the same facts simply underlined the need for a park and an agreement.

At the close of the Senate hearing, one NPS official described Senator Bible as “not outwardly enthused about the lack of a draft agreement with the college.”94 Nevertheless, on December 3, 1973, the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs reported favorably

91 Senate hearing, pp. 98-99.
92 House hearing, pp. 25, 28-29.
93 House hearing, pp. 25, 28-29.
94 Memo, New Areas Keyman, Northeast (signed Gary Bunney for Gerald W. Tays) to Associate Director, Legislation, November 15, 1973 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).
on the bill, and the Senate passed it the following day. By contrast, the chair of the House subcommittee told the press that there would be no action on the bill until the state had reached an agreement with HEW and Interior guaranteeing “all buildings on the Armory property will be maintained intact.” Things had reached an impasse, and tempers on both sides were running high. Among NPS officials, the belief had taken root that the college had acted in bad faith. But the college’s spokesman told the press he did not understand the objections raised during the hearing: Interior, he said, had “had several meetings with college officials and raised no objections in the past regarding planned development at the college.” The college, he pointed out, had “nowhere else to build new facilities.” “Settle Differences at Armory Square,” urged the *Springfield Daily News*: “This multi-million dollar project is too important to be lost, or even delayed....”

**DIFFICULTIES REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE STATE: 1973-74**

As the Congressional hearings got underway, work also began in earnest on the cooperative agreement because the authorizing legislation required its completion and approval by the state as a condition for establishing the park. In 1971 the master planning team had proposed a first sketch; now, in November, 1973, Robert Utley sent the regional director a more developed draft embodying the “basic provisions” to which the college “should subscribe.” It obligated Interior to provide technical assistance and advice regarding the preservation of the campus and to cooperate in fulfilling the purposes of the National Historic Site. It bound the college to “preserve in perpetuity the historical character” of the campus and, more specifically, to “undertake no construction, alterations, or repairs changing the character or appearance of the historic Springfield Armory parade ground or the external aspect of the historic buildings fronting upon it.” The draft offered similar restrictions on alterations or repairs to buildings north of the parade, plus the further provision that the college would undertake no new construction without the Secretary’s prior approval.

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98 Memo, Assistant Director, Park Historic Preservation (Robert M. Utley) to Northeast Region Regional Director, November 12, 1973 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

99 The exact language is: the college shall “undertake no alterations or repairs substantially changing the external character or appearance of the buildings or grounds in the remainder” of the area under administration, “and no new construction therein,” until plans have been “approved” by the Secretary or his representative. If Secretary did not act on such plans within 90 days, they would be deemed approved. “Draft Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of the Interior and [the
Utley said his draft was based on the agency’s cooperative agreement with Tuskegee Institute, soon to be authorized as part of the same omnibus park bill as the Armory. And indeed the clauses binding the college were drawn from a draft of that agreement. But the situations at the two parks were dramatically different. At Tuskegee, the NPS had a partner eager to “preserve in perpetuity the historical character” of its campus, which it treasured as a physical record of its historical connection to Booker T. Washington and George Washington Carver and thus of its distinction as an institution. In Springfield, by contrast, the college had no historical association with the Armory and regarded Armory Square as little more than deteriorated real estate.

In March 1974, agency officials, believing they were under an imminent deadline to show Congress a draft agreement, sent a new version to the regional solicitor with a request for expedited review. In it, the NPS promised to grant the college a right-of-way across the park, to limit visitor and business access to the park via the State/Byers entrance, to explore traffic control measures, to assume a fair share of the utility bills, and to work with the college to solve the parking problem, even countenancing “a possible parking garage.” These clauses addressed genuine concerns of the college. On the other hand, the new version bound the college yet more tightly to commitments it was not eager to make. In addition to definitely requiring the college to transfer the strip of land in front of the Main Arsenal to the NPS, and to preserve Building 10 “in its entirety,” it spelled out the standards according to which Interior would review college plans: such review was to insure “that no adverse effect is created upon the historic scene,” where adverse effect was defined (following Section 106) to include complete or partial destruction or alteration of a property, isolation from or alteration of its surroundings, or the introduction of visual, audible, or atmospheric elements out of character with it. The agreement also contained a new provision prohibiting the college from using the grounds in ways that were not “in keeping with the need to preserve
the historic resource and to maintain their [sic] visual integrity,” and it made all uses of the parade field subject to joint approval by MBRCC and Interior.102

Before being submitted to the MBRCC, the draft was further developed. Regarding the grounds, the new draft set the strip of land in front of the Main Arsenal at 1.97 acres, provided for an easement to allow the college to “maintain its normal traffic flow pattern,” required the college to permit the Parade’s use for special events in keeping with the site’s purpose and to allow park visitors to use it “so that they may gain a fuller appreciation of the entire site,” and allowed the federal government to reimburse the college for “certain maintenance services” on federal grounds, such as mowing and tree care. Regarding the college’s building plans, it bound the college to:

undertake no construction, alterations, changes, or repairs...changing in any way the appearance or character of the historic Springfield Armory parade ground, the external aspects of all the historic buildings fronting it, or the historic iron fence surrounding the property....The historic aspects of the parade field shall be carefully preserved. All uses of these grounds shall be in keeping with the need to preserve this historic resource and to maintain their visual integrity.

Throughout the rest of the campus, the college would “undertake no alterations or repairs substantially changing the external character or appearance of the buildings or grounds...and no new construction therein, except on those structures or facilities for which a contract has already been let...,” without first obtaining Interior’s approval.103

The March 1974 draft appears to have been the first to be formally presented to state officials. The Public Facilities Committee of the MBRCC reviewed it and in due course sent back a counter-proposal, but this was far from the “reaction and approval” that at least one NPS official had hoped for.104 Although the college agreed to grant the NPS an easement for access and to permit the use of the parade ground for park-related events, it stripped out all


of the provisions regarding construction and alteration. Without them, the promise to preserve the “historical character” of the campus was meaningless.  

A negotiating session was scheduled for July 1974, with Wagers and Benjamin representing the agency. By this time the Armory problem was attracting considerable attention in Washington. Because of Congress’s “deep concern,” as well as commitments that had been made, the NPS’s legislative office wanted to review all further drafts of the agreement. At a director’s meeting, NPS Director Ronald Walker and Deputy Director Russell Dickenson declared that the agreement was to be approved by “all of them.” A new draft was ready within days, representing the NPS’s sense of what would be “acceptable” to the college. The changes focused on the construction issues. The new draft proposed a single set of provisions covering the entire National Historic Site, though it called out the parade, the buildings facing it, and the iron fence as having “particular importance”: “their historic values need to be permanently preserved in all aspects.” Elsewhere, the previous provisions were replaced by a single stipulation that MBRCC “shall submit all plans at the earliest stage possible for review and comment by the Secretary or his duly authorized representatives which relate to any construction, alterations, changes, repairs, or uses which might affect the external character or appearance of the buildings or grounds within the National Historic Landmark boundary.” As for Building 10, the absolute requirement to preserve it was replaced with the looser stipulation that BRCC “make every reasonable and prudent effort” to do so. After five years, moreover, if the college needed to remove it (as indeed the master plan required), the MBRCC’s only obligation would be to give Interior a reasonable chance to move it before demolition.

Although the new draft seemed to represent progress towards an agreement, the central issue remained unresolved. On the one hand, Regional Director Galvin acknowledged that college officials “continue to state that it has always been their intention to preserve the parade field and the buildings which face it on two sides.” On the other, he

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106 Memo, Acting Associate Director, Legislation (Robert Landau) to NAR Regional Director, July 18, 1974 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

107 Follow-up slip, EAC to , July 29, 1974 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

108 Memo, NAR Acting Regional Director (Dennis P. Galvin) to Associate Director, Legislation, WASO, August 1, 1974 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

109 “Draft Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of the Interior and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges Concerning Preservation of the Historic Buildings, Grounds, and Environment of Springfield Armory within the National Historic Site,” no signature, no date, (attached to Galvin memo of August 1, 1974, as noted above) (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).
commented that they also “continue to be quite firm in their resistance to signing any agreement which would place any specific limitations or requirements on their development plans, or upon any actions which they would consider to be necessary for good educational utilization of the site....” Meanwhile Utley had rejected a crucial change which Wagers had already accepted in discussions with the college: the downgrading of Interior’s right to “review and approve” to one merely to “review and comment.” To Utley this represented a “fatal weakening of the agreement,” a capitulation to the college’s desire to have “no interference in its plans and programs.” Utley’s response reflected the growing distrust that many NPS officials had come to feel: “Nothing in our past relationship with the college,” he wrote, “suggests that its administration can be trusted.” He believed the agency should “nail the college to specific language” before the House acted on the legislation.

This was the advice Utley gave to Ernest Connally, who apparently took it to heart. If the college was going to resist government oversight, he argued, then the NPS must be “equally firm in insisting on effective safeguards against the kind of insensitive development that the college has carried out in the past and that has already seriously compromised the integrity of the property.” The administrators had been “unresponsive” to NPS concerns: there was no likelihood that this would change. Connally wanted to go back to the agency’s original draft. But he also suggested an alternative: to accept the latest draft but with the proviso that disputes over “adverse effect or proposed mitigation” would be submitted to the Advisory Council, whose determinations would be “definitive.”

**CONGRESS AUTHORIZES THE PARK: 1974**

By the time Connally dispatched his memo on August 20, 1974, the need to obtain an agreement had become urgent. Just six days earlier, the House committee had released its report urging approval of the legislation. On August 19, the House had passed it. According to the report, slightly over 20 acres of the 55-acre site were to be donated to the government, and the rest was “to be managed as a preservation control zone pursuant to the agreement between the Secretary of the Interior and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.” As to this agreement, the report made an arresting claim: “the Committee has been advised that a suitable cooperative agreement has been negotiated...to protect the historic values of the site....”

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110 Memo, NAR Acting Regional Director (Dennis P. Galvin) to Associate Director, Legislation, WASO, August 1, 1974 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).
111 Follow-up Slip, Robert M. Utley to Dr. Connally, July 17, 1974 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).
112 Memo, Associate Director, Professional Services (Connally) to Associate Director, Legislation, August 20, 1974 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).
It would have been more accurate to say that negotiations were about to encounter a new obstacle. The committee counsel agreed with Connally that the “simple review authority” offered by the college was insufficient. The NPS Associate Director for Legislation Richard C. Curry thought the legislative history was “quite clear” in requiring the “protection and preservation of the historic values” of the site, and the proposed agreement would not “meet this requirement.” Connally urged the regional office to tell the college the latest draft was simply “not sufficient to serve as a basis for establishment....”\(^{114}\) And so, just as the House committee was announcing the conclusion of an agreement, the NPS was in fact entering a new phase of negotiations.

On October 8, 1974, the Senate passed the omnibus bill authorizing the Armory. A week later the House concurred in various Senate amendments concerning other parks. On October 26, President Richard M. Nixon signed the omnibus bill into law. Since it made no mention of the Army agreement, only two conditions remained to be met before the Armory could become a national park: the city had to donate the land and the state had to sign an agreement. Referring to the latter condition, at least one Washington official anticipated a “long delay” in establishing the park.\(^{115}\) The urgency of concluding the agreement was now keenly felt in Springfield, as in Washington. Early in December, Mayor William C. Sullivan thanked Director Ron Walker for the legislation and pleaded for the “earliest and fastest transition” of the Armory to NHS status. Once again, the funds appropriated by the City Council to keep the museum afloat were “just about exhausted.” Connally reminded him of the two conditions.\(^{116}\)

**CAMPUS PLANS, THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT, AND SECTION 106: 1974-75**

Unfortunately, HEW chose this moment to sponsor the college’s next building venture, the construction of a new science building, Building 15 (eventually named Scibelli Hall), at the northwest corner of the Parade, on the site of Buildings 2 and 3 (Fig. 2.17). Having learned a lesson from its previous encounter with the Advisory Council, the department was careful this time to follow the Section 106 process. On August 30, two weeks before the House passed the authorizing legislation, the agency asked the State Historic Preservation Office to concur with its finding that the demolition of the two buildings, vacant

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\(^{114}\) Memo, Associate Director, Legislation (Richard C. Curry) to NAR Regional Director, September 5, 1974 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).


The Creation of the Park

and unused by the college, would not have a significant adverse effect on the National Historic Landmark.  

HEW based its case on two arguments: first, that the 1967 evaluation report had not identified the buildings in question as worthy of preservation; second, that they lay outside the NHL. SHPO Elizabeth Amadon would now have to confront the unresolved boundary question. For guidance, she had only William Murtagh’s letter of 1972, and that was hardly dispositive. She therefore told Donald Branum of HEW that the boundaries were “not really defined,” except as they included “specific buildings. The only problem,” she continued, “is the Iron Fence, which goes completely around all four sides of the Armory property. Obviously, William Murtagh did not intend that all the property within the fence should be included but just the Parade Grounds and the area to the west, south and east of the Parade.” That in fact was what Murtagh had said. The problem was that his designation of individual buildings did not comply with National Register standards for boundary descriptions. Amadon told Branum she was waiting for clarification from NHL program staff. Meanwhile she granted the concurrence he sought. HEW now asked the Advisory Council for clearance to permit demolition, which was scheduled to begin in about six weeks.  

By the fall of 1974, then, four distinct processes had become entwined at the Armory: the legislative movement toward park authorization, the Section 106 case, the working out of the National Register and NHL boundaries, and the negotiation over the cooperative agreement. The NPS played complicated and somewhat contradictory roles in these interlocked processes, and that made it harder for the agency to win. The reason was that the NPS was frequently struggling against itself. As guardian of the nation’s historic sites, the NPS would lose if it did not protect Armory Square, a National Historic Landmark. As steward of the park system, it would lose if it did not create the park mandated by Congress. The only way to create the park was to conclude an agreement with the college, and the best way to do that was to relax the standards protecting Armory Square. The agency was under great pressure to “save” the Armory. But while the NPS understand that to mean both the guns and the site, many people cared only about the guns. An agency official might easily conclude that the surest way to save the Armory was to allow the site to be harmed. The question was how much harm could be tolerated. The answer kept changing, and sometimes it depended on which branch of the agency was talking: the regional office, the professional staff in Washington, the legislative liaison office, or the director’s office.

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117 Letter, Donald Branum (Director, Surplus Property Utilization - Region I, HEW) to Ann Webster Smith (Dir, Office of Compliance, ACHP), August 30, 1974 [sic], countersigned by Elizabeth R. Amadon, SHPO, as concurring (Lowenthal Files: folder: Pre-Establishment Planning, 1972).


119 Ibid.
The political difficulties facing the NPS colored the process of defining the National Register boundaries. In a handwritten note to Polly Rettig of the National Register office in Washington, SHPO Amadon wrote, “This is one of those difficult ones that should be simple but may get very complicated! Help!” Rettig agreed: “in view of the College’s attitude,” she explained to Ben Levy, “the situation with regard to landmark boundaries for the Armory could become ‘supremely sticky’, [sic] at least in terms of P.R.” She wanted to believe the “implication” of the 1967 report and agency memos, that “the landmark designation applies to the whole of Armory Square..., with special attention to be given to the preservation of the twelve properties of national significance.” Barry McIntosh of the Division of History agreed: if the whole of Armory Square merited inclusion in a National Historic Site, then (in Rettig’s paraphrase) “the whole should certainly qualify for landmark status.” But Rettig “could find no direct statement to that effect.” Part of the problem was that the NHL file had disappeared. Rettig also pointed out that “the College has (unfortunately) been led to think in terms of twelve properties only (and has wanted to think of no more).” If the boundaries were now enlarged, the college might balk at “being subjected to retroactive control.” She feared too that taking a hard line in the upcoming Section 106 review would make the NPS a “prime target of the College’s wrath and make life difficult for other agencies in the bargain.”

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120 Handwritten note from “B” [Betty Amadon?] to Polly [Rettig], attached to letter, Amadon to Donald Branum (HEW), August 22, 1974 (Washington Office, NHL Program Files: fol. Springfield Armory).
She recommended putting the whole Armory business “on a back burner” until the missing file could be found. But Levy was “inclined not to delay.” Moreover, he wanted to include all of Armory Square: “I think you should have little difficulty in relating the buildings to the landmark,” he advised Rettig.121

On October 26, as President Nixon was signing the legislation, the Advisory Council formally objected to HEW’s finding of “no adverse effect.” Even though the NHL boundaries were “unclear” – and even if Buildings 2 and 3 turned out to lie outside them – they faced the Parade Ground and were in clear view of the Main Arsenal, both of which were unquestionably included within the landmark. Under Council regulations, therefore, their demolition would cause an adverse effect by introducing “visible, audible, or atmospheric elements that are out of character with the property or alter its setting.”122 The ruling not only blocked demolition, at least temporarily, but also took some of the political pressure off the NPS. The Council ordered HEW to prepare for a full-scale consultation and scheduled a hearing for February 1975.

Meanwhile, negotiation continued over the college’s building plans and the cooperative agreement. Although the college offered the NPS “limited review authority” over future college building plans, the agency told the MBRCC in September 1974, that the legislative record required full “approval authority” over construction.123 In November, the regional office said the same thing again: Congress required “full protection” of the historic site and that a “minimum requirement” was “approval authority” by Interior “over any plans which relate to any construction, alterations, changes, repairs, or uses which might have an adverse effect upon the historic values of the area.” The NPS called for an immediate resumption of negotiations.124

This letter may have been prompted by the agency’s Office of Legislation,125 which was eager to “contact Boland’s office to get the pressure off our backs and hopefully onto the college people.”126 But which party was reluctant to negotiate? The letter implies it was the


122 Letter, John D. McDermott (Director, Office of Review and Compliance, Council) to Custard [HEW], October 26, 1974 (Washington Office, NHL Program Files: fol. Springfield Armory). The letter cited criteria b and c of Section 800.9 of the Council’s regulations. If Buildings 2 and 3 proved to be within the NHL, the proposed action would also produce an adverse effect under criterion a.

123 Letter, David A. Richie (Acting Regional Director) to William G. Dwyer (President, BRCC), September 19, 1974 (SPAR, Lowenthal Files: Pre-Establishment Planning Relating to Co-Op Agreement, 1974).

124 Letter, Jerry D. Wagers (Regional Director) to William G. Dwyer (Pres, BRCC), November 4, 1974 (Lowenthal Files: Pre-Establishment Planning Relating to Co-Op Agreement, 1974).

125 According to memo, Federal & State Liaison, Cooperative Activities (Jack Benjamin) to Regional Director, November 4, 1974 (Lowenthal Files: Pre-Establishment Planning Relating to Co-Op Agreement, 1974). However, it is not absolutely clear that Wagers’s letter is the one to which the author refers.

126 Ibid.
college, and other evidence supports this. But at the end of December, faced with an angry delegation from HEW, it was the NPS that promised to “resume negotiations...at once.”

The about-face reveals the near collapse of the process around the end of 1974, as the negotiations over the cooperative agreement and the Section 106 process paralyzed one another.

In mid-November, the Advisory Council proposed a plan that would solve both problems: a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) “mitigating adverse effect.” The MOA gave the college pretty much everything wanted: permission to demolish Buildings 2 and 3, and later Buildings 7, 8, and 9; permission to construct Building 15 “as designed,” that is, without any further contextual modifications; and permission to move Building 10 onto NPS property whenever it was ready to build on the site. The quid pro quo that would mitigate the impacts of these steps on the National Register site, was that the college would record all of the buildings to be demolished in drawings suitable for filing with the Historic American Buildings Survey in Washington, DC. The Council also sought preservation guarantees in areas of lesser interest to the college, especially a commitment to restudy the master plan and “consider” retaining Building 19, the vast storehouse (also called a cavalry caserne). At the same time, the MOA directed the NPS to provide technical assistance in adaptively reusing the structure. And finally, it ensured that future actions affecting the building would be subject to Section 106 review, and it committed the college to “re-enter serious negotiations” towards a cooperate agreement “on the maintenance and preservation” of Buildings 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 29, and the Parade Ground.

Both HEW and the State Historic Preservation Office agreed to these terms. The NPS also signaled that it would sign the agreement, mainly in order to gain standing to shape it further and, if necessary, enforce it. At the same time, the NPS finally settled the boundary question, completing a National Register listing on December 2, 1974. The bulk of the nomination described individual features, relying on the list included in the 1967 evaluation report and omitting mention of the historic structures the college was seeking to demolish. Nevertheless, as Levy and McIntosh had urged, the boundaries did encompass all of Armory Square which, despite the intrusion of the college’s new buildings, constituted a “cohesive district in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.”

127 Memo, Assistant Director, Park Historic Preservation (Robert Utley) to Associate Director, Legislation, December 23, 1974 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

128 Letter, Robert R. Garvey, Jr. (ACHP) to Ronald Walker (Director), December 12, 1974 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

129 The features singled out for description were Buildings 1, 5/6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 27, the Parade, and the cast iron fence. National Register of Historic Places Inventory – Nomination Form, Armory Square/Springfield Armory, prepared by Polly M. Rettig (Historian, Landmark Review Project of NPS Historic Sites Survey, December 2, 1974 (Lowenthal Files: folder: National Register Nomination). The form states that the original form was prepared by Charles E. Shedd, Staff Historian, November 4, 1959: see also National Survey of Historic Sites and Buildings, Form 10-317: Springfield Armory, signed and dated, Charles E. Shedd, Jr., Historic Sites Historian, November 4, 1959 [1 p.] (Washington Office, NHL Program Files: fol. Springfield Armory).
The nomination, then, did not conflict with the Council’s proposed memorandum of agreement, or with the college’s plans. Yet Regional Director Wagers now objected to the MOA on the grounds that it would not allow the NPS to preserve the Armory to a standard consistent with the legislation. When Advisory Council Director Robert Garvey requested an explanation for this unexpected reversal, NPS Deputy Director Dickenson retorted that it was Congress, not the agency, that had changed course: the standard set by the 1967 evaluation for reviewing the college’s construction plan was based on the assumption that all of Armory Square would be adaptively reused for educational purposes, but “concessions to adaptive use allowable in a landmark become unacceptable in a property maintained solely for its historical value.” By authorizing the National Historic Site, Congress had invalidated earlier assumptions and called for a new standard. The Council, Dickenson remarked, was now dealing with “a full-fledged unit of the National Park System.”

Dickenson took a tough line on the boundary question. It “should have been clear from the first,” he lectured Council Director Garvey, that the landmark boundaries were identical to those of the Armory. Though some structures were more important than others, none was ever singled out as “nationally significant. It is the entire Armory Square that is nationally significant.” He chided everyone involved for their “preoccupation with individual buildings rather than with the historic district as a whole”: in planning for the adaptive use of complexes like this, “the impact of proposed developments on the whole is perhaps even more important than on individual buildings.” Turning to the core of the issue, Dickenson charged that the college had “compromised” the parade ground, the “heart of the authorized national historic site,” by building two large and “incompatible” structures. A third, plus the demolition of Buildings 2 and 3, would “magnify the existing intrusion to unacceptable dimensions” and “would so damage the integrity of the authorized national historic site as to raise serious doubt about whether it should be established....” An acceptable cooperative agreement would have to ensure not only “preservation and adaptive use” of Buildings 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, and 29 (and if possible also Building 19) but also “contain adequate safeguards against any development that will intrude on the historic setting of the national historic site....”

The letter produced a sensation. At a meeting the next day, HEW accused the NPS of being “arbitrary and unreasonable and inconsistent with previous positions.” In HEW’s view, the college had “acted in good faith” throughout a seven-year development process and should not be “further penalized” or subjected to the “monetary consequences” of NPS’s change of face. Utley conceded there was “some justice” to the charge of NPS inconsistency but insinuated that the NPS “did not wholly agree with HEW’s assessment of the purity of intent and action of the college officials.” More to the point, he emphasized again that the

130 Letter, Robert R. Garvey, Jr. (ACHP) to Ronald Walker (Director), December 12, 1974 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

authorizing legislation had changed everything: “compromises acceptable to facilitate adaptive use are not acceptable in a unit of the National Park System.” It was at this point that HEW, anxious not to compromise the college’s funding, pleaded with the NPS to resume negotiations on the cooperative agreement. Utley agreed. If negotiations led to a satisfactory agreement, he explained, the NPS would “offer to explore” with the college’s architect “whether a basis exists for a building whose scale and design would be acceptable” (though privately Utley thought it “doubtful that any building on this site can be made acceptable”). On the other hand, if the college proved unwilling to meet NPS’s “basic requirement for review and approval of all developments that may visually impact the national historic site,” then the NPS would inform Congress and the HEW it had abandoned its effort to create the park.

A week later, on New Year’s Eve, regional office staff met with MBRCC officials, one of whom described the discussion as “friendly” but “not very productive.” The college’s problem was money. It had already invested about $2 million in design work that, as an NPS official put it, “we might object to” if Interior gained approval authority over the master plan. In fact, about $700,000 of the total was invested in Building 15, the “visual intrusion” which some NPS officials believed could not be allowed. The college was willing to consider ceding “design approval,” but only if the federal government agreed to reimburse them for disapproved work. The financial problem went beyond funds already invested. The early 1970s saw severe inflation, spurred in part by the oil and gas shortage of 1973, and with construction costs rising rapidly, the college feared that further delays might leave it unable to finish the project.

The NPS official most deeply involved in the negotiations was Associate Regional Director F. Ross Holland, and in Holland’s view the college faced “real problems.” Yet the options he saw open to the agency were hardly more attractive, and he urged his colleagues to give them “meditative thought.” On the one hand, he believed that Building 15 would be a “serious intrusion upon the scene, virtually destroying” the park’s “visual integrity” (Fig. 2.18). The only way the NPS could accept it was by choosing to “think of the site as only a museum.” But this he thought would be inconsistent with the NPS’s mission. Conversely, if the NPS remained “adamant” and took a “hard line” on preservation, the college would suffer. All in all, Holland thought the NPS had an “obligation to the community to...make some resolution about Building # 15” or abandon the park idea. Only by accepting Building 15 “in all of its massiveness,” Holland thought, could the NPS obtain a cooperative agreement. He believed “the higher social good for the area would be to develop the area solely as a community college”: the NPS should cancel the park and let the college or some other entity run the museum.

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132 Memo, Assistant Director, Park Historic Preservation (Utley) to Associate Director, Legislation, December 23, 1974 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

133 Memo, F. Ross Holland, Jr., to Jerry Wagers, December 31, 1974 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).
The agency adopted Utley’s position. At a meeting in Washington with Deputy Director Dickenson, Utley, and others, Wagers was instructed to “immediately pursue a hard line negotiation” and to hold firm on “all the requirements in our original draft agreement, specifically review and approval of all future construction, integrity of the parade ground and facades of facing historic buildings, access and other items.” To contain the political problem caused by the agency’s obstructive posture, representatives would explain to Congressman Boland “the difficulties we have been having and are continuing to have with the college...,” and why the agency could not accept the intrusion of Building 15.134

The results of this policy soon became apparent: “the college,” Wagers informed the director, “is in a position of no retreat....[T]hey stand as firmly as we do on the essential points in their case...: further negotiation will not be fruitful unless we can yield to their concerns to some appreciable degree.” Beyond economic hardship, college officials now argued that the 1968 deed of transfer was “the instrument” that described their legal obligations to the federal government, and it said nothing about giving the NPS review authority. Given the college’s educational mission, they were simply “not in a position” to jeopardize the master plan.

134 Memo to file, Robert M. Utley, January 10, 1975 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR, Correspondence 1975-80). Also present at the meeting were Curry and Connally. Utley refers to having drafted the letter in memo, Assistant Director, Park Historic Preservation (Utley) to Associate Director, Legislation, December 23, 1974 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).
In sum, college officials held a radically different view of the negotiation process from that of the NPS. Whereas NPS officials viewed the college with deep distrust, college officials saw their relationship with the NPS as “one of continual erosion,” in which the college had repeatedly “modified their plans as best they could to accommodate various Federal interests” – by not building on the parade, by adapting rather than replacing the buildings on the northeast and southeast sides, by contributing to maintenance and utilities – only to be met with one demand after another. “They do not feel,” concluded Wagers, “that further accommodation will leave them with a viable educational institution.”

**SHIFTING POSITIONS IN THE BATTLE OVER THE CAMPUS: 1975**

Thus things stood on January 23, 1975. Yet within two weeks, Wagers was ready to “concede” on Building 15. He still believed the NPS should “hold a very firm position” on acquiring the segment of roadway known as Parcel B and on reviewing future construction. But in exchange, as Utley put, “we, in turn, will accept Building 15.”

What caused the sudden reversal? The NPS had grounded its claim to review authority on the legislative record. But college officials now claimed that the Senate report proved that Congress had never intended to let the NPS block its current plans. They were right. The report stated that “the buildings on the northwest side of the Parade, part of the modern college development, are already under construction and will be of a contemporary and massive scale,” and that the historic buildings there, if not relocated, would be “demolished during the construction of the modern campus of the Springfield Technical Community College.” It was true that the report spoke of “scenic and developmental control,” but that seemed to be limited to the Parade and the facades “on the northeast and southeast side.” The Senate had clearly acknowledged and accepted the replacement of the Parade’s northwest side with new buildings.

The NPS now discovered that its own testimony to the House was equally damaging:

In its construction program the college has already demolished one of two historic buildings which we had planned to relocate and is in the process of converting the entire northwest side of the parade to modern buildings. As a condition of establishing the area, we would require a satisfactory agreement with the college whereby the...

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remaining historic buildings, along the northeast and southeast sides of the parade will be retained, and the physical setting of the parade lands will not be impaired.\textsuperscript{138} As Utley remarked to Holland, “The entire testimony treats that portion of the campus as lost.”\textsuperscript{139}

The agency’s acceptance of this discovery was hesitant at first. The letters and memos of February 1975 conceded Building 15 yet made no explicit reference to the Congressional record. But as time passed, the agency’s belief that the Congressional record allowed acceptance of Building 15 gradually became a conviction that it compelled acceptance of it. In April, Director Gary Everhart had to explain why the NPS was now willing to accept Building 15 and the necessary demolitions, actions previously rejected by the Council and by the NPS and still judged “inappropriate to the level of integrity we desire in historic sites within the National Park Service”: he pointed to the Congressional record.\textsuperscript{140} At the end of May, Deputy Director Dickenson told HEW the authorizing legislation “was enacted on the premise that the new buildings on the north edge of the parade ground, both existing and proposed, would be regarded as acceptable.” In August, Holland remarked that “Congressional Hearings would not permit us to object to these massive buildings.” The agency was clearly trapped in an uncomfortable position: unable to oppose what it could not support, its spokespersons had to explain time and again that acquiescing was different from approving, and their reliance on the Congressional record for justification became steadily more assertive.

With Building 15 out of the way, the disposition of Parcel B still remained to be resolved. Wagers thought the Congressional record supported the agency’s insistence on acquiring the parcel: “That will preserve the view from the armory of the parade,” he argued, “and has other advantages as well.”\textsuperscript{141} Also, in exchange for capitulating on Building 15, the NPS wanted guarantees against future encroachments, including a pledge to “protect the historic scene on the parade ground” (including the remaining historic facades), height limits to prevent future construction on the north side of the campus from being visible from the parade, and review-and-approval authority over future projects. In short, the NPS explained to Congressman Boland, the agency had “reached the limit of our accommodation” and

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\textsuperscript{139} Memo, Robert F. Utley to Ross Holland, November 22, 1976 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1975-80).

\textsuperscript{140} Letter, NPS Director to Robert Garvey, n.d. [draft?], with attached follow-up slip from Marcella [Sherfy] to Utley, April 2, 1975 (Washington Office, Park History Files, folder: SPAR Correspondence 1975-80). It is not clear whether this letter was actually sent.

\textsuperscript{141} Follow-up Slip, EAC to Utley, February 7, 1975 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1975-80).
could concede nothing further: without the roadway and the preservation guarantees, “we cannot proceed with the establishment of the area.”

By late February, 1975, MBRCC representatives seemed willing to consider these terms, and Utley thought there was a real hope of reaching an agreement. At the end of March, NPS Director Everhart told the Council the agency had concluded that “the requirements of law can be served by the acceptance of Building 15 in return for the expected preservation commitment from the College,” and that a draft agreement would be forthcoming for review. But once again events (in Holland’s words) took “an unforeseen [sic] twist.” Everhart’s letter to the Council was literally on its way to the mailroom when a Council official called to ask the NPS to withdraw it: HEW now wanted the NPS “not to back down from its original position” on Building 15. The Council, explained one NPS official, “doesn’t want us to say anything that sounds at all accepting of Building 15, so that with HEW’s new interest we can take a hard line.” The NPS agreed to hold the letter back. Yet the agency had lost its stomach for the fight. One official told the Council “we might already be beyond that point in conversations with the College...” “Frankly,” wrote Holland, “my feeling is that we have hasseled [sic] around with these buildings long enough and that we have put the College Board through a considerable amount. In the end we are going to wind up with the buildings, and we’re going to have to live with the College people over there.” Holland, who was directly responsible for agreements and contracts, hoped the college would eventually assist the NPS with park maintenance, and he feared that “to cause the College further problems could result in an unfriendly relationship.” The NPS was simply ready to move on: “I don’t understand why HEW is getting so pious now,” complained Utley, “after playing the role of the devil for the last several years....”

In effect, the cooperative agreement, designed as the tool to preserve Armory Square, had become an obstacle to preservation. Yet despite the NPS’s urgent desire to conclude it, further delays had become almost inevitable. The Council had scheduled a hearing on Building 15 for February but, at HEW’s request, had already postponed it to May: the Council now granted HEW a further postponement until August. Meanwhile, HEW requested that the review be expanded from Building 15 to the college’s entire master plan, explaining that the department had always intended to “conduct a single review” of college building plans but had rushed on the demolition of Buildings 2 and 3 when the college’s financial position had made this “a matter of urgency.” Now, with the funding crisis over, the

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The department sought to review the entire master plan “as soon as possible” so that the college could develop its campus “on a clear basis.” It also wished to “force the Community College to redesign” Building 15, perhaps by shrinking it, while the master plan was still “in a ‘fluid state,’” an effort which the cooperative agreement would make “virtually impossible.”

The Council now asserted jurisdiction to review the cooperative agreement as a separate federal undertaking. From the NPS’s point of view this promised to speed things up, but Utley saw the danger at once. If the Council ruled that the master plan had an adverse effect on the historic site, then the agreement, by acquiescing in it, would also have an adverse effect. This would not block the agreement, but it would be embarrassing to the agency, since the agreement’s purpose was to protect the site from such effects.

There was confusion about the process to be followed. The Council believed the NPS had promised to set the agreement aside until HEW had discussed Building 15 with the college and the Council had ruled on the master plan. The NPS did not think so. In fact, Wagers did not wait a day before dispatching a new version of the agreement to the solicitor’s office, asking for an expedited review so that it could be presented to the college at the earliest opportunity. Not only did the new draft accept Building 15 without further review, it also allowed the college to demolish Building 10 at any time upon 180 days notice, and it settled for an easement in place of full federal ownership of Parcel B. On the other hand, it set height limits on future construction behind the new buildings and gave Interior review and approval authority over construction activities “changing in any way the appearance or character” of the parade ground, the historic facades on the northeast and southeast sides, and the iron fence.

By the end of May, Deputy Director Dickenson believed the college was “prepared to sign.” Yet a month and a half later there was still no agreement, and Representatives Boland and Conte were pushing the agency hard for “speedy action.” There were new reasons for

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145 “Single review,” “urgency,” “clear basis”: letter, Charles Custard (Director, Office of Environmental Affairs, HEW) to Robert Garvey, April 17, 1975 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1975-80); all other quotations, memo to file, Marcella Sherfy, April 11, 1975 [correction tape has been applied over name and date] (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder SPAR Legislation); and memo, Robert M. Utley to Associate Director, Professional Services, April 15, 1975 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1975-80).

146 Memo to file, Marcella Sherfy, April 11, 1975 [correction tape has been applied over name and date] (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Legislation); and memo, Robert M. Utley to Associate Director, Professional Services, April 15, 1975 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1975-80).

147 Memo, Regional Director, NARO (Jerry D. Wagers) to Regional Solicitor, April 8, 1975 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Legislation).

urgency: $242,000 had been included for the Armory in an amendment to the House Interior appropriations bill for fiscal year 1976—enough to fill seven staff positions and launch full operation of the park. The funds would go to waste if the park was not quickly established. In May the NPS, despite Dickenson’s optimism, had told Congress the agreement might not be signed until the following spring and had requested a reduced appropriation of only $47,100, enough to provide basic grounds maintenance, keep the museum building open, and establish an institutional presence during the remainder of the fiscal year. But at the end of July, 1975, the Appropriations Committee settled on $218,000.149 - The NPS was under pressure to conclude the agreement.

Once again, events took an unexpected turn. Claiming that “technical difficulties in obtaining information” on the college’s master plan had prevented the department from completing its environmental assessment, HEW now asked for a third postponement. The Council was furious. Accusing HEW of jeopardizing its ability to “negotiate...a coordinated Federal policy” for the site, it ordered HEW to comply without delay and demanded a full report on the department’s effort within a week.150

HEW completed its submission to the Council, or draft case report on August 1.151 It stressed Building 15’s “compatibility” with the parade, achieved despite its incongruous seven-story height through “materials and facade treatments.” While conceding that both demolition and construction would have “visual effects on Armory Square,” it also argued that these actions would not take place in, but rather “near,” the National Register property. This contradicted the NPS’s National Register nomination, which had included all of Armory Square within the boundaries, but the nomination had not yet been approved and would not be until December 1975. In August, then, faced with HEW’s case report, the NPS argued that the entire Armory was listed on the Register by virtue of its being authorized as a National Historic Site.152

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150 Letter, John D. McDermott (Director, Office of Review and Compliance) to Charles Custard (Director, Office of Environmental Affairs, HEW), July 24, 1975 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1975-80).


152 Letter, Holland (Associate Regional Director, Professional Services) to Donald Branum (Regional Environmental Officer, HEW, Boston), August 8, 1975 (SPAR - Lowenthal files: Pre-Establishment planning Relating to Cooperative Agreement, 1975).
Meanwhile negotiations on the cooperative agreement continued, so that by September, only the disposition of Parcel B remained unresolved. Though he had been willing to accept an easement in May, Wagers had now returned to his earlier position that the legislative history required for full ownership. He was adamant. So was the college.\textsuperscript{153} Wagers thought the reason was college officials’ belief that Washington was too lax with demonstrators. Recalling the anti-Vietnam War demonstrations in Lexington and Concord, these officials did not want to see the “potential unsightliness of tents and other camping accoutrement” on their campus, and they appeared to believe that as long as they owned Parcel B they could “halt all demonstrations.”\textsuperscript{154} Wagers found this view “rather naive,” but it may not have been the real reason. College officials had previously expressed their fear that the NPS would open the parade to “demonstrations, gatherings, or other forms of social expression,” but on those occasions they had assured the NPS that their only reservation about donating Parcel B was their concern that the government might widen the road for two-way traffic.\textsuperscript{155} Perhaps, believing Building 15 was finally nearing approval, college officials now had little further interest in the cooperative agreement.

Whatever the reason, the agency had “reached an impasse” and faced the prospect of returning to Congress empty-handed.\textsuperscript{156} At a public meeting in Springfield on September 30, Congressman Boland’s representative called for a speedy resolution, Mayor Sullivan called on the college to “give in on their position,” and even an MBRCC official admitted that the NPS had “gone the last mile” and promised to try to persuade the college to compromise.\textsuperscript{157} Yet still STCC President Garvey did nothing. Early in November, the NPS admitted defeat. Holland told the HEW the NPS no longer had plans for Springfield Armory. Wagers informed Boland, Sullivan, and Governor Michael S. Dukakis that the agency had no choice but to “recommend that Springfield Armory National Historic Site not be established.”\textsuperscript{158} The governor responded immediately, ordering the college to make “any concessions necessary to obtain a cooperative agreement.” Boland’s office also pressed the MBRCC and the college. The “breakthrough” came within days, as the board and college finally agreed to

\textsuperscript{153} Memo, Regional Director NAR (Wagers) to Director NPS, September 12, 1975 (SPAR - Lowenthal files: Pre-Establishment Planning Relating to Cooperative Agreement, 1975).

\textsuperscript{154} Memo, F. Ross Holland, Jr., to Jerry Wagers, December 31, 1974 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1967-75).

\textsuperscript{155} Memo, Regional Director (Wagers) to NPS Director, January 23, 1975 (Washington Office, NHL Program Files: fol. Springfield Armory).

\textsuperscript{156} Memos, Regional Director NAR (Wagers) to Director NPS, September 12, 1975 (SPAR - Lowenthal files: Pre-Establishment Planning Relating to Cooperative Agreement, 1975) and Regional Director (Wagers) to NPS Director, January 23, 1975 (Washington Office, NHL Program Files: fol. Springfield Armory).

\textsuperscript{157} Memo, Ross Holland to Jerry Wagers, October 6, 1975 (SPAR - Lowenthal Files: Pre-Establishment planning Relating to Cooperative Agreement, 1975).

The Creation of the Park

transfer Parcel B to the National Park Service, retaining only an easement for their own access. “[T]he log-jam has apparently been broken...,” reported Wagers: “We want the park established as soon as the agreement is approved.”

AGREEMENT IS REACHED AND THE PARK ESTABLISHED: 1975-78

The NPS owed a big debt to Governor Dukakis, who expected a rapid resolution. The city was just as eager, for its treasury was being drained. Congressman Boland’s office expected the NPS now to “move toward the final establishment of the Springfield Armory Museum.” But the Advisory Council had not completed its review, and with Parcel B out of the way, Building 15 again became a sticking point. No one was happy with the way it had been resolved. NPS officials keenly felt the difficulty of their position, explaining again and again that the agency’s lack of opposition to the mutilation of a National Historic Landmark and Historic Site was not the same as support for it. College officials were also dissatisfied. Non-opposition was not good enough for them: they wanted the agreement to show support.

The Advisory Council and HEW were equally unhappy, but for the opposite reason. Engaged in a last-ditch effort to block Building 15, they charged that the NPS had “condoned the destruction” of Buildings 2 and 3 and the erection of Building 15. The NPS responded to both sides with versions of the standard argument. To the college, Wagers explained that, as a “preservation agency,” the NPS could not “actively support’ the demolition of historic structures”: the best it could do was “not object.” To HEW and the Council, Utley and Holland explained that the agency did not “approve” the demolition but merely “acquiesced

159 Governor and “breakthrough”: Utley, Follow-Up Slip to Connally, November 12, 1975; agreement and Boland’s office: Letter, J. David Keaney (Administrative Assistant, U.S. House of Representatives) to Ross Holland (November 19, 1975) (both: Washington Office, Park History Files, folder: SPAR Correspondence 1975-80); Wagers: Memo, Regional Director, North Atlantic Region (Jerry D. Wagers) to Assistant Director, Park Historic Preservation, WASO, December 2, 1975 (Washington Office, Park History Files, folder: SPAR Correspondence 1975-80).


The Creation of the Park

in the endeavor.” Since “that side of the Parade had been given away in testimony there was nothing we could do about it,” despite the agency’s “well documented record” of opposition as preservationists.” But of course it was precisely the NPS’s standing as a preservation agency that most upset both the Council and HEW, because it gave the agency’s non-opposition a “special impact.” Moreover, HEW charged that the NPS’s unilateral negotiations with the college had “created difficulties,” condoning changes in Armory Square which HEW had not approved and the destruction of a building that was subject to a prior agreement with the SHPO.164 Behind the scenes, Holland assured the SHPO that he hoped HEW would succeed in modifying Building 15. But the legislative record prevented the agency from offering anything but “moral support.”165

When Congress approved the first Armory appropriation, NPS officials had told legislators the cooperative agreement would be concluded by spring of 1976, in time for the anticipated rush of Bicentennial visitors. But in May the Advisory Council brought forth not a cooperative agreement but a critique of its laxity. The Council called for more stringent rules for reconstructing buildings partially destroyed by acts of god, SHPO review of fire escapes and access ramps, archeological safeguards on underground work, and tighter regulation of temporary structures.166 The Council also wanted the NPS to draft a preservation covenant that could be added to the instrument of transfer – not to govern the college portion of the site but rather its own. And now the agency’s Regional Advisory Committee, a group of citizens and preservation professionals, also joined the chorus of critics. In a letter to committee chair Antoinette F. Downing, a subcommittee branded the entire Armory business as a “case history of flagrant disregard for the enforcement of National Historic Preservation laws.” Starting in 1967, the committee charged, the agency had condoned the “illegal destruction” of parts of a National Historic Landmark. The cooperative agreement capped a “long history of failure to enforce preservation law” with “official authority by an agency of the Federal government for continued demolition of a National Landmark.” At a time of “advanced respect for historic preservation,” it was “appalling” and, in fact, illegal.167

The NPS had little to say to these critics. It refused all of the Council’s requests.168 To

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164 Letter, Charles Custard (HEW) to Bruce Blanchard (Director, DoI Office of Environmental Project Review), April 6, 1976 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1975-80).


168 Letters, Custard to Robert Garvey (ACHP), April 7, 1976; Charles Custard (HEW) to Bruce Blanchard (Director, DoI Office of Environmental Project Review), April 6, 1976; Utley to John D.
the Regional Advisory Committee, Acting Regional Director Galvin wrote that it was “important that we get a cooperative agreement so that we can get on with halting deterioration of the buildings in the park and begin the preservation of the gun collection.” Even so, little happened during the next year. By the fall of 1977 the NPS was managing the park without an agreement, following an understanding with Congress, and had a staff of seven in place, including a superintendent, Mohammed Khan. Yet that fall the college brought forward an entirely new objection to the agreement. Though the NPS had already explained that it could not set a time limit on future Section 106 reviews, since it was unable to control the speed at which the Advisory Council worked, the college now insisted on exactly such a time limit. The NPS was out of patience. Absent an agreement by November 1, the agency told the MBRCC it would “seek the advice of Congress in steps necessary for deauthorization.” Five more months of amendments and negotiations followed. On March 27, 1978, the agreement was finally signed, removing the last hurdle to establishing the park.

The agreement was not complex. Its “intent and purpose” was to give the Board of Regional Community Colleges both “administrative jurisdiction” and responsibility for the “preservation of the historical integrity” of a 34.61 acre portion of the park, which it called the “Preservation Control Area.” To this end the Board bound itself to retain Building 10 until 1979 and to “preserve the appearance of the exterior of the historic structures” and the parade ground, with “historic structures” defined as Buildings 1, 5/6, 10, 11-16, 19, and the college’s portion of the cast iron perimeter fence. Apart from the new buildings already condoned by the legislative history, the agreement prohibited building construction that would alter the “historical integrity” of the Parade Ground and surroundings, or the exteriors of any other historic structures. It made all future projects subject to the concurrence of the NPS, following review of their impact on the parade ground, but guaranteed approval to any located behind the buildings on its northwest side provided they could not be seen from it. In addition, the Board agreed to donate Parcels A and B, prohibit uses of the Preservation Control Area inconsistent with its preservation or with public enjoyment, provide reasonable public access, respect the constitutional rights of visitors, and allow the NPS to inspect for compliance. In return, the NPS promised to give the college an access easement to Parcel B and technical advice on preservation, and to seek a “common solution” to the parking problem, “including consideration of a parking structure.”

McDermott (Director, Office of Review and Compliance, ACHP), June 9, 1976 (Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1975-80)


170 Letter, Denis P. Galvin (Acting Regional Director) to Costello, October 11, 1977 (SPAR: Cultural Resources Department Files: fol. 1978 Cooperative Agreement).

171 Agreement Between the United States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, signed and dated March 27, 1978. See Appendix B.
THE ARMY AGREEMENT: 1978

The Army agreement had been set aside unfinished in 1972. Though no longer required by the law, it began once more to occupy the attention of NPS officials as they assumed management responsibility for the collections in 1977. The terms they then considered were essentially those of 1972: the Army would loan the collection for ten years, after which the loan would be renewed automatically, unless either party terminated it by showing non-compliance by the other. The agreement gave the National Park Service the substantial burden of “curatorial responsibility” for the collection’s care and display, including a “program of maintenance, storage, restoration, and display,” yet allowed the Army to retain the right to inspect and inventory the collection at any time and to specify conservation measures consistent with its own practices. Other than a vague commitment to “improve the property” by adding (at its own discretion) to the collection, the Army offered no financial, technical, or management assistance with the maintenance and display of its thousands of muskets, rifles, pistols, shotguns, revolvers, semi-automatic and automatic weapons, trench guns, sabers, bayonets, flags, uniforms, machines, tools, and spare parts.172

NPS museum professionals were not happy with these arrangements. Arthur Allen called the agreement “woefully inadequate” and complained: “What possible benefit does NPS perceive in providing curatorial care (for 6,000 to 8,000 weapons not on public display) for objects we do not even own?” Better to own only part of the collection, he argued, than accept it all on loan. Given the strong political pressure to prevent the Army from taking the collection out of Springfield, he thought the NPS held a strong negotiating position and should remain “firm in purpose [sic] to have the guns completely in our control.”173

Allen and his colleagues explained their misgivings in the Collection Management Plan completed in March, 1977. The planning team urged the NPS to “immediately and actively seek the complete transfer” of all essential objects as identified in the scope of collections statement: nothing less than “full responsibility for and control over the collection” would do. By contrast, they predicted that the proposed loan would give the Army “every privilege of ownership without any of the responsibilities of managing such a large collection”: the NPS, they warned, would eventually find itself between a rock and a hard place, unable to justify “extensive and costly preservation treatment” for objects it did not own yet equally unable to withhold them from a collection “housed and exhibited at one of its historic sites.”174

While the agency never quite reached the point of crisis feared by Allen, his

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172 “Cooperative Agreement Between Department of the Army and Department of the Interior,” signed and dated October 26, 1978 (SPAR: Central Files: A 4415 Cooperative Agreements).


174 Division of Museum Services, Collection Management Plan, Springfield Armory, March, 1977, p. 15; and Allen, ibid.
misgivings were not unfounded. It fell far short of giving the NPS clear and undisputed custody over the collection, and during the 1990s (as described in Chapter 5) the park would have to face down a serious effort by the Army to regain control over some or all of the collection. In that situation, then-superintendent Steve Beatty found the agreement and the underlying legislation “very weak.” But in 1978 these concerns had no visible impact on decision makers. The agreement was signed by the Department of the Interior on October 26 and by the Army on December 15, 1978.

**POSTSCRIPT: THE CAMPUS AND THE QUESTION OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY**

Four years had elapsed from the Armory’s authorization to its establishment, seven from the day the agency’s planners had outlined the first draft of the cooperative agreement. The process prompted some soul-searching. Confronted in 1976 by the Regional Advisory Committee’s searing criticism, Robert Utley had conceded that internal communications were poor, the “lapses” that led to the agency’s testimony “embarrassing and in many ways inexcusable.” Yet he also pointed out that the Armory was the NPS’s first Section 106 case and that, all things considered, the agency might have done far worse. Once it had made the mistake of giving its damaging testimony to Congress, he argued, any attempt to undo or disown it would have been “unwise and defeating,” destroying “any rapport” that the agency had with the college as well as “the opportunity to insure or encourage preservation of the remaining historic resources.”

Reflecting on the “knotty problem” of the Armory, Acting Regional Director Denis P. Galvin agreed with Utley in blaming poor internal coordination for many of the agency’s mistakes. After the regional office had negotiated preservation concessions from the college in exchange for Building 15, the Washington office decided “it did not want Building 15 constructed under any circumstances,” causing an abrupt reversal. Then the Washington office realized its hard-line position violated the “understanding of Congress,” causing a second reversal. In the agency’s defense, Galvin stressed the difficulties the college faced in dealing with at least four federal agencies. He felt the regional office’s negotiations had sought to be “fair to the college and consistent in what we expect of them,” for “if we are to persuade others of the value of historic preservation, we must not constantly change our minds with every shift in the cast of characters about what we expect others to do in preserving the Nation’s historic sites and structures.” Moreover, he pointed out, putting new buildings in a historic setting was not in itself “inconsistent with current thinking by preservationists.”

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What did the hard-won agreement accomplish? Seeking to counter the Advisory Council’s view that it might constitute an adverse impact on the site, Director Everhart pointed to its positive impacts: it prevented inappropriate uses of the Parade Ground, protected the historical integrity of the Parade Ground and surrounding structures from impairment, and halted deterioration of the iron fence. Officials also explained that the agreement would produce a “method for devising a system of scenic controls” over the college’s portion of the Parade, and that the resulting “use restriction and design control” would “somewhat hampered the college’s building plans.” In fact, the agreement did somewhat more than this. It guaranteed public access to the entire historic site, an essential condition for managing a public park, and it contained an affirmative statement of the MBRCC’s responsibility for “preservation of the historical integrity” of the campus. Yet in general, as the agency’s explanations suggest, it was designed to prevent harm. It did nothing to support visitor services or encourage interpretation and left most aspects of day-to-day management coordination to be sorted out later through ad hoc agreements. Thus, it was not so much a joint management agreement for a public park as a compact for its physical preservation. That of course was exactly what the legislation called for, but at best it gave the NPS few clues on which to plan for the park as a whole: at worst, it discouraged such planning. Even in the area of building preservation, the agreement did not set basic maintenance standards, nor did it give the NPS any enforcement powers. The consequences of these decisions would soon become clear in aspects of park operation ranging from building maintenance through planning and cultural landscape management to visitor services.

The nature of the agreement reflected not only the political obstacles facing the NPS but also the agency’s thinking on the crucial underlying question of the nature and extent of federal authority over nonfederal land within authorized park boundaries. Galvin and Utley (like most agency officials) evidently thought they had very little authority. This assumption shaped the negotiation process on many levels. Stung by the Regional Advisory Committee’s charge that the agency had failed to prevent Building 15 and the associated demolitions, Galvin argued revealingly that there was “nothing we can do about them, since they are outside the National Park Service boundary.” He meant, of course, the boundary of federal landownership: they were inside the park boundary. But to Galvin, their location on nonfederal land apparently put them outside federal policy or regulation. Similarly, Utley

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argued that the authorizing legislation had “not significantly changed” the National Historic Preservation Act’s effect on the Armory. True, it had brought in the NPS as a second federal presence in Springfield, alongside the HEW, and it had directed the NPS to create a national historic site “in cooperation with the existing user of the site.” But these actions had no legal significance. As Galvin put it, the only federal agency “having any power over the college” was HEW.180

By the mid-1970s, at least some legal experts were ready to dispute this minimalist assessment of the agency’s authority. The problem of harms flowing from private lands both inside and adjacent to park boundaries was attracting increasing attention, in part because it was growing but also because of an important Supreme Court decision in 1976. Writing that year, legal scholar and public lands expert Joseph L. Sax argued that the broad protective mandate conferred by the NPS Organic Act demonstrated that “Congress does not intend to leave the parks wholly at the mercy of private landowners.” Yet what precisely Congress did intend, he conceded, was “uncertain.” Sax faulted both Congress and the NPS, the former for “passivity in the face of serious threats,” the latter for an “extremely restrained,” even “passive” response to those threats. All in all, Sax noted, there had been “very little regulation” of nonfederal landowners within the parks.181

The question of authority over nonfederal land hinged on the even more basic question of the federal government’s authority over its own lands, which were mostly located within states that enjoyed their own constitutional rights of sovereignty. Sax observed that the NPS habitually grounded federal authority in the Cession Clause of the U.S. constitution, which gave Congress the power to “exercise exclusive Legislation” over parcels of land ceded by states for the purpose of becoming seats of federal government, or purchased with state consent “for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Buildings.”182 This meant that the NPS generally relied on explicit cessions of jurisdiction from state to federal government.183 As an example, Sax pointed to an incident in 1966, when the agency asked the Interior Department’s solicitor to clarify the constitutionality of

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180 Memo, Robert F. Utley to Ross Holland, November 22, 1976; and letter, Denis P. Galvin (Acting Regional Director) to John P. Keith (Regional Plan Associates [sic] NY, October 27, 1976 (both Washington Office, Park History Files: folder: SPAR Correspondence 1975-80).


182 U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 17. The clause gives Congress the power to “exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of Particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Buildings.”

183 Sax, op. cit., 245. For an explanation of Congress’ power under the Cession Clause, see also Shepard, op. cit., 486 ff. and 515 ff.
applying federal zoning to private lands within a park boundary. Absent a cession of legislative jurisdiction, the solicitor responded, the federal government lacked authority to impose zoning. A similar incident occurred in 1971 when Interior’s lawyers refused, again citing lack of authority, to seek an injunction against a private entrepreneur who sought to build an observation tower adjacent to the Civil War battlefield at Gettysburg Military Park. Five years later still, stung by judicial criticism of its failure to protect Redwoods National Park from external logging, the NPS sought explicit Congressional authorization to regulate private activity around that park. But the White House’s Office of Management and Budget blocked the move, and the bill was never submitted to Congress.184

Absent an explicit cession of jurisdiction, then, reliance on the Cession Clause left the federal government largely helpless against nonfederal owners, even those within park boundaries. At the Armory there was some irony in this situation, since for most of its history Armory Square had been a federal enclave of just the sort described in the Cession Clause. But it had been given to the state in 1968, and there had been no cession of jurisdiction back to the federal government. That did not mean the NPS had no legitimate interest in the college campus: the Organic Act of 1916 directed the agency to “conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life” of parks without regard to the ownership of specific parcels, and to provide for their “enjoyment” so as to leave them “unimpaired” for that of future generations. Still, the Act did not make clear how to apply these directions in a case like that of Armory Square. As for the authorizing legislation, its only statement on this matter was to require a cooperative agreement “for preservation of historic buildings and the physical settings of lands not in Federal ownership....”185 As long as the NPS relied exclusively on the Cession Clause for authority to pursue its mandate, then, federal authority over the nonfederal land within the park boundary would remain weak. The cooperative agreement would be the manifestation of that authority, its terms their description, but those terms would necessarily be circumscribed.

The negotiations over the agreement exemplified the institutional caution that Joseph L. Sax noted in 1967. One reason it frustrated him was that it was no longer legally necessary: by 1976 the Cession Clause had ceased to be the only or even the strongest basis for federal authority. The Supreme Court’s decision earlier that year in Kleppe v. New Mexico put the Property Clause front and center as the basis for federal authority, at the same time placing federal power on a more secure footing. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals would extend this line of reasoning in important decisions handed down in 1977 and 1981. By 1983, one legal commentator could argue that the Cession Clause power had been superseded by

184 Sax, op. cit., 247-49.

185 U.S.C., title 16, sec. 1; “A Bill to Authorize the Establishment of the Springfield Armory National Historic Site...,” S. 2977, December 9, 1971, Sec. 2 (same text in other House and Senate bills, 1970-73). As actually enacted, the legislation described the required agreement in slightly different terms as one that “will assure the historical integrity of the site” (P.L. 93-486, October 26, 1974, Sec. 101 (a)(4).
that of the Property Clause.\textsuperscript{186} By 2006, a standard handbook on public land law remarked that reliance on the Cession Clause was virtually obsolete.\textsuperscript{187}

These developments lay in the future: their implications are discussed in Chapter 4. Meanwhile, the NPS had an agreement and a park to run. The agreement reflected the agency’s view that, notwithstanding the congressionally authorized park boundary, it had little authority over the college campus. The operation of the park was launched on that basis.

\textsuperscript{186} Shepard, \textit{op. cit.}, 515.

CHAPTER THREE

PLANNING THE ARMORY
1978-93

THE NATIONAL HISTORIC SITE IS LAUNCHED

Sometime in 1977 the NPS reached an understanding with Congress to manage Springfield Armory, and spend appropriated funds, on an interim basis. Certain needs were immediately clear as the NPS assumed management responsibility. Arthur C. Allen advised that the “absolute first priority” was to repair the fence, the second to upgrade the Main Arsenal. There was a long list of urgent management and operational needs. Everyone agreed the challenges presented by the collection were “absolutely staggering.”1 To launch the park, the NPS chose Mohammed A. Khan, a community relations specialist from the agency’s National Capitol Parks division. However, Khan was not transferred until the following year.2 Next the park detailed W. Douglas Lindsay, who also came from National Capitol Parks but had more experience, having managed the agency’s extensive Bicentennial programs during the summer of 1976. Lindsay became the park’s first truly influential superintendent, remaining at the Armory until 1990, an unusually long tenure by NPS standards. He oversaw the initiatives which, more than any others, defined the new park: the development of fundamental planning documents, the rehabilitation of the Main Arsenal, and the installation of permanent exhibits. These tasks were not quickly accomplished. The General Management Plan, begun in 1976, was not approved until 1986, while the revised cooperative agreement, an integral part of the planning effort, was only completed in 1993. As described in the next chapter, work on the Main Arsenal began in 1977, yet the rehabilitated building and the new exhibits were not opened to the public until 1989.

Before Lindsay arrived in Springfield, Regional Director Jack Stark had warned him of “extensive” problems.3 Associate Regional Director Galvin also gave him a “gloomy assessment,” as did Arthur Allen. Stark and Galvin handed him a six-page memo so negative Lindsay refused to keep a copy in his files. At Harpers Ferry, Art Allen extended the briefing. Once on site, though, Lindsay formed his own conclusions, and they differed at some points from what he had heard. His first priority would be to “disengage from the multitude of forces

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2 The reason concerned a complaint brought by a visitor to Congressman Boland. See Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009.
3 The following information comes from Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009.
that were acting on this beleaguered little unit.” The Harpers Ferry Center and the regional office were far more deeply invested in running the park than was normal: in his view, they were over-managing. There were valid reasons for their interest, including the unusual security risks presented by the guns. But there were also drawbacks. The key figures at the region – Stark, Galvin, and Administrative Director Gilbert C. Calhoun – had all come out of the big western parks. They were what Lindsay called “green and gray rangers”: “very hard, disciplined, and they had a real hard time with this park, because it wasn’t the way a national park should be.” Lindsay felt the Armory needed a new approach, a lighter hand, and he began cultivating relationships with the “soft side” of the regional office, specialists in cultural resources and historic preservation like Charles Clapper, Dwight Pitcaithley, and Francis McMenamon, who had deep substantive knowledge of the resources and the techniques for conserving them.

Lindsay’s challenges were not limited to the agency. He realized quickly that he would have to “make some kind of peace with the college’s “crusty” and “autocratic” president, Robert C. Geitz. Within the federal property line, maintenance needs were acute, yet the park lacked basic equipment. There were staff problems too. Some employees, inherited from the museum or the Army, did not understand the culture of the NPS or the craft of running a national park. Even veteran NPS staff was demoralized and directionless. Even as he was getting the regional office out of the park’s day-to-day affairs, then, he would need its help in building up the park’s capital stock of things like chain-saws and tractors. He would give the staff direction by organizing people into small, functional units. And eventually, after he had gotten the staff “settled down,” he would bring in new people with skills – people like historian Larry Lowenthal, who would become his second-in-command.

**Planning at the Armory: Process and Challenges**

Lindsay’s successor, Steve Beatty, thought Lindsay’s great achievement was to put the park’s physical resources in good order. Yet the sustained planning efforts of the park’s first decade were just as important in shaping its future. To understand the thrust of those efforts, it is helpful to review their chronology. The centerpiece of planning efforts was the creation of a master plan. Though the draft master plan prepared for Congress in 1971 had been unusually comprehensive, it became clear within a few years that many of its assumptions were “no longer valid.” In 1976 the regional office launched a new process to develop a general management plan.

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4 Steven Beatty: recorded interview with author, May 28, 2009.
6 Early history of planning process drawn from [Draft] Memo (ROD and FONSI), Superintendent to Regional Director, n.d. [April, 1986] (SPAR: Central Files: D18); memo, Jonathan Gray to Ross Holland, May 13, 1976 (SPAR: Lowenthal Files: fol. Pre-DCP Public Comment, 1976); and memo,
informational packages” to about forty individuals and organizations and by holding a public
involvement session. By the fall of 1976, the regional office had a comprehensive summary of
planning issues and options.\(^7\) In 1978, however, after the cooperative agreement was enacted,
the Denver Service Center was given responsibility for the park’s basic planning document,
perhaps as a result of overwork at the regional office.\(^8\) At the same time, the document was
redefined as a Development Concept Plan (DCP),\(^9\) which agency policy characterized as a type
of implementation plan, prepared alongside or after approval of a general management plan
(GMP) and typically used for elements like access and circulation systems or facilities for
visitor use and park management.\(^10\) Though the justification for short-cutting the preparation
of a full-scale general management plan has not survived, it probably reflected a judgment that,
as a small park, the Armory did not require the full apparatus of a GMP.

Following these shifts, internal meetings and reviews resumed, and a preliminary plan
and environmental assessment were ready for internal review by December 1979. Now,
however, there was a second change of course: for reasons to be discussed below, the plan was
set aside, and work did not resume until 1983, at which time the document was renamed a
General Management Plan/Development Concept Plan. Though the schedule called for approval
by November 1983,\(^11\) the draft plan was not released for public review until September 1984: it
was adopted in the spring of 1986.\(^12\)
The Master Plan was part of a broader campaign to give the park a full complement of planning and management documents, which included the following:

- *Collection Management Plan* and inventory (both prepared in 1977, and discussed further in Chapter 5);
- Statements for Management (drafted in 1978-79 and again in 1979 but not approved);
- *Historic Structure Report* (HSR) (“initial research document” containing historical data and a base map completed in 1978,\(^{13}\) architectural data section not approved until 1983);
- *Interpretive Prospectus* (drafted in 1979, approved in 1980, and discussed in Chapters 5-6);
- List of Classified Structures (those calling for special planning consideration because impacts would trigger Section 106 procedures: prepared by a student intern working for the regional office in summer 1981);\(^{14}\)
- *Land Protection Plan* (required by new Interior Department policies relating to the Land and Water Conservation Fund: completed in 1983); and
- “*Historic Resource Study* suitable for publication of the organization of and the manufacturing process at Springfield Armory”\(^{15}\) (contracted to Raber Associates in fall 1983 and completed in 1989).\(^{16}\)

Two of these documents call for comment. The List of Classified Structures (LCS) was an inventory tool devised in the early 1970s to compensate for the vagueness of many early National Register descriptions by providing a complete and authoritative inventory of structures included therein. Dwight Pitcaithley, who became regional historian in 1979, sought to ensure that every park in the region had such a list as a basis for evaluating planning decisions that could affect historic resources: the Armory’s list was completed by 1981. There was a complication, however: the LCS was not limited to structures named in the National Register documentation, on the theory that the Register documentation could later be amended to include items added to the inventory. Pitcaithley approached the task of list making in an expansive spirit, and at the Armory (as discussed in the next chapter), this led to

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\(^{14}\) Classified Structure Field Inventory Reports, all dated August 20, 1981, with cover memo, Associate Regional Director, Planning and Resource Preservation, NAR, to Superintendent, February 3, 1982 (SPAR Central Files: H3017).

\(^{15}\) Documents regarding contracting the Raber study, including "Request for Approval to Contract..." approved in August and September of 1983, describes needed study as “historic resource study suitable for publication of the organization of and the manufacturing process at Springfield Armory” (Charlestown: CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR: Resource Study - Pkg. 106 Historic Research).

formal recognition of cultural landscape elements that park managers did not find worthy of attention.

More serious problems developed around the second planning document, the *Historic Structure Report* (HSR). Like the *General Management Plan*, the HSR was affected by course changes and delays: its history suggests that the reasons were related. Working for the Denver Service Center, historical architect Robert L. Carper had prepared a synopsis of the architectural data section by the spring of 1978, and this was dispatched to the regional office as a guide to needed rehabilitation work. That summer, Carper completed measured drawings of four buildings and the fence, which the deputy manager of the Harpers Ferry Center complimented for their “excellent overall quality.” Later that year, however, Regional Director Jack Stark demanded the removal of various alternatives as not in the best interests of the structures. Within weeks, Carper was reassigned to a different region and the job of coordinating revisions handed to another architect, Richard Turk, whose report was not approved until 1983.

One reason for the delays and reversals suffered by both the GMP and HSR was the high level of uncertainty regarding many aspects of the historic site, which made it difficult to plan. Early GMP summaries showed many basic issues still undefined, with planners juggling not only multiple proposals for Building 1 and conflicting parking plans but also the undetermined future of television station broadcasting from Building 13. Similarly, Turk commented that Carper’s draft HSR had been “prepared at a time when no significant planning decisions, concerning future site development, had been made.” Another cause of delay for the GMP was the region’s dissatisfaction with the Denver Service Center: Acting Regional

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Director Calhoun found a 1980 draft “unacceptable,” badly organized, poorly edited, unresponsive to the region’s and the park’s views, its parking and access proposals “unworkable,” and moreover, behind schedule. A third cause was the Massachusetts Department of Education, which reviewed all documents involving cooperative agreements between the federal government and schools receiving federal funds: as the plan included a revised version of the cooperative agreement it “became lodged” there, wrote to a Denver official in 1986, and indeed had been “stalled” there since August, 1984 – despite the fact that the NPS had reached consensus with the college on the revised agreement.

It was the difficulty of renegotiating that agreement that led to the most protracted uncertainties and delays in planning. The three-year hiatus in the GMP process, starting at the beginning of 1980, was a direct result: uncertainty over the outcome of the negotiations simply brought planning to a standstill. Among unresolved issues was the question of parking and circulation. “It is unfortunate,” commented the region’s 1978 summary of issues, “to have to take an isolationist approach with regard to S.T.C.C.; but, at the moment, that appears to be the best strategy since cooperation cannot be ensured.” Under these conditions, park planners did their best to avoid making proposals that would preclude such cooperation but could not confidently advance their preferred solutions, which involved sharing facilities. At the beginning of 1980 regional officials asked the Denver planners to divide their planning alternatives according to whether the renegotiation efforts were successful or not – which was tantamount to admitting that crucial planning decisions could not be made until the question had been settled. Even after the planning process was restarted in 1983, delays in enacting the

23 Memo, Acting Regional Director, NAR (Gilbert W. Calhoun), to Assistant Manager, DSC, January 24, 1980 (Boston Support Office: Compliance Files: fol. L7617 SPAR DCP PKG 101 & 103).


27 Memo, Acting Regional Director, NAR (Gilbert W. Calhoun), to Assistant Manager, DSC, January 24, 1980: Review of Assessment of Alternatives for “DCP” (Boston Support Office: Compliance Files: fol. L7617 SPAR DCP PKG 101 & 103).
agreement – this time caused not only by the Massachusetts Department of Education but also by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare – continued to hamper planning efforts: In 1986, an NPS official recorded his decision to “cease birddogging” [sic]. HEW and alter the required Record of Decision so as to separate the cooperative agreement from the plan, “thus allowing the GMP to be completed....”

PLANNING AT THE ARMORY: CONCEPTS

Despite these obstacles, key aspects of the GMP had been settled before work stopped in 1980 and were consolidated during meetings on the Historic Structure Report the following year. “A lot of people have already decided what directions we should take at Springfield,” wrote Acting Regional Director Lewis in 1981. “It is a matter of formalizing and agreeing upon those decisions.” A basic decision was to limit most agency planning to the federal portion of the NHS. A second was to attempt to return the area’s historic buildings and landscape to their condition in 1968, just prior to the Armory’s closure in 1968, rather than simply preserving them as they were. A third was to place the collection over the historic site as a priority for planning, development, and interpretation.

The emerging orientation to the park’s twin resources of site and collection can be seen in a chart of planning alternatives prepared in spring 1980 and circulated for discussion the following year. Since the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act in 1970, agency planners had been required to evaluate the environmental impacts of their recommendations, as well as various alternatives to it. But aside from a required “No Action” alternative, they were free to choose the specific alternatives to be studied. At the Armory (despite the region’s request), the ones they presented in 1981 differed according to whether they emphasized the historic site or the gun collection.

In conceiving of the Armory’s options in this way the planners effectively pitted the park’s two resources, which Congress and the NPS had once been so careful to balance, against each other. In some areas (visitor use and interpretive core) they favored “Emphasis on Gun Collection and Arsenal,” in others (visitor access and parking) the “No Action” alternative. But nowhere did they recommend “Emphasis on Historic Site.”

28 The full quotation is: “Today I decided to cease birddogging P. Wieczorek [an HEW official] and alter ROD [Record of Decision] to treat MOA as an ancillary [sic] matter protecting the SPAR as an Historic Setting – thus allowing the GMP to be completed & the MOA revisions to enhance the GMP when it can be completed.” See handwritten memo, signed and dated [Dave Clarke], April 18, 1986, “SPAR - GMP/EA/ROD” (Boston Support Office: Compliance Files: fol. L7617 SPAR DCP PKG 101 & 103).

29 Memo, Acting Regional Director, NAR (Steven H. Lewis), Superintendent SPAR, May 13, 1981 (Boston Support Office: Compliance Files: fol. L7617 SPAR DCP PKG 101 & 103).
Table 3.1. Planning alternatives in 1981.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VISITOR USE/ INTERPRETIVE CORE</th>
<th>ALTERNATIVE 1 (NO ACTION)</th>
<th>ALTERNATIVE 2 (EMPHASIS ON GUN COLLECTION &amp; ARSENAL)</th>
<th>ALTERNATIVE 3 (EMPHASIS ON HISTORIC SITE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gun collection is dominant feature; no interpretation or use of the other features of the historic site.</td>
<td>Arsenal and gun collection dominant features; within minimum interpretation and use of the historic site administered by the NPS.</td>
<td>Same as Alt. 2; but with broad interpretation and use oriented toward all of the National Historic Site.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After work on the GMP resumed, presentations of alternatives deemphasized the stark choice presented here between site and collection. The draft and final plans of 1984 and 1986 presented only two options, “No Action” and “Selective Restoration and Development of Specific Cultural Resources,” and described the preferred course of action neutrally as a “minimum level of development while preserving and maintaining the historic character of the armory as it existed in 1968.” But the tendency to put the collections over the site could still be seen, as in the plan’s description of the arms collection as the Armory’s “primary resource.” True, the approved plan called on the museum to present the “history and significance of the site” in addition to the arms collection. It also promised that visitors would be “encouraged to tour the remainder of Armory Square...,” and perhaps even Federal Square, the Watershops, or the railhead. But uncertainty over the new cooperative agreement, on top of the agency’s caution in exercising federal authority beyond the property line, continued to hamper real planning for the historic site and to favor focusing on the collection.

The planners’ disengagement from the nonfederal portion of the site was manifested in several ways. One was the application of management zoning, a standard planning technique for applying specific policies to particular parts of a park. The plan divided the “historic zone” (the federal portion of the park) into four management subzones but simply hatched out the “College-administered area” on the accompanying map (Fig. 3.1). The GMP team did not initiate this tendency to ignore the nonfederal portion of the park but merely codified what

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31 Ibid. Same text in General Management Plan/Development Concept Plan, Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Massachusetts, National Park Service (prepared with the assistance of Springfield Technical College, Springfield, Massachusetts), approved July 29, 1986 (Herbert S. Cables, Jr., Regional Director, North Atlantic Region), p. 1.


was already becoming agency practice. In 1976 Regional Director Galvin had described the campus as lying “outside the National Park Service boundary,” and both the historical base map prepared for the *Historic Structure Report* in 1977 and the List of Classified Structures prepared in 1981 limited them to the federal sector of Armory Square.34

The impacts of this approach became clear wherever the GMP addressed issues that necessarily involved the entire site. One was the crucial problem of parking and circulation. As long ago as 1967, the *Evaluation Report* had urged rerouting the park’s circuitous circulation path. More recently the region’s planners had also favored opening up new routes leading from the historic gates, now closed, at the bottom of the hill. Yet, the 1984 draft plan hedged on the issue, pointing to the unresolved cooperative agreement. The approved plan made it clear that circulation and parking would remain unchanged.35

Interpretation was another area affected by the focus on federal property. Staff curator William L. Brown, III, saw the problem in 1977. Noting that the base map prepared for the *Historic Structure Report* omitted all of the buildings outside federal property, he commented that “it would be helpful to know to what use they are being put,” and he urged his colleagues to include the rest of Armory Square “in any interpretative planning.”36 The approved plan did make reference to the possibility of future wayside exhibits and walking tours outside the federal property line but devoted little attention to the resources there.

The planning approach represented by these decisions was undeniably pragmatic, but how faithfully it expressed agency policy was less clear. The 1978 policy on cultural resources called for Lists of Classified Structures “identifying all historic structures within the units of the National Park System that may meet the criteria of the National Register...or are elements of sites or districts that meet them”: it did not distinguish between federal and nonfederal land.37


36 Memo, William L. Brown, III (Staff Curator, Division of Interpretive. Planning) to Alan E. Kent (Chief, Division of Interpretive Planning), June 1, 1977 (SPAR: Lowenthal Files: fol. *Historic Structures Report*).

Figure 3.1. Management zoning (NPS: GMP/DCP, 1986).
Similarly the 1978 policy on park planning called for zoning “park lands,” without reference to ownership, to show where various management and use strategies would “best fulfill management objectives and achieve the purpose of the park”: GMPs were required to propose “management zoning for all lands and waters within parks.” The policy described four - “primary management zones” appropriate to most parks: the Historic Zone “includes all lands managed primarily to preserve cultural resources or to commemorate historical subjects”: moreover, all lands on or eligible for National Register listing would “in most cases be zoned historic,” and the policy made “any change in this designation” subject to compliance with the Advisory Council’s procedures. At Springfield Armory the GMP team zoned the entire federal area historic. But agency policy suggests that they could also have included the college campus within the park’s Historic Zone. 38

Why did they not? The applicability of the policies in question to nonfederal lands was never explicitly made clear and, given the agency’s cautious approach to the entire question of federal authority, agency culture may have suggested a narrower interpretation of the text. Nor was Springfield the only park where this happened. The General Management Plan for Fire Island National Seashore, approved in 1977, similarly refrained from applying management zoning to the park’s extensive private landholding: there it was assumed that local zoning ordinances would accomplish federal management objectives for the nonfederal parts of the park. One might have made a similar claim for the cooperative agreement at Springfield. Yet, at Lowell National Historical Park, which relied on both cooperative agreements and local zoning to carry out federal policy, planners applied management zoning, and specifically Historic Zone designation, to non-federal property. 39 Recalling the events at Springfield more than twenty years later, Charles Clapper, then associate regional director for Planning and Resource Preservation, believed it would have been possible to apply management zoning to the campus. But, he points out, “planning can be...a very political process.” 40

Though not perhaps as far-reaching as the decisions to emphasize the collections and de-emphasize the federal portion of the site, the decision to return the buildings and setting to their 1968 condition also pointed to important consequences for the park. These concerned especially the Main Arsenal, Building 10, and the overall appearance of the cultural landscape (Fig. 3.2). With regard to the last, it meant specifically re-creating the original contours of the hillside that had been altered after the Armory’s closure, yet without rebuilding the original century terraces, rose garden, and pool that had been swept away before that date. This course balanced pragmatism with preservation theory. The post-1968 regrading had caused erosion, poor drainage, and an accumulation of trash: reconstituting the original topography would alleviate these problems without incurring the additional expense of a full reconstruction, which agency policy strongly discouraged in any case.

Applied to Building 10, the 1968 datum meant simply leaving it where it was, yet this marked a dramatic reversal from earlier plans which, ever since the original site was discovered

40 Charles Clapper, recorded interview with author, March 24, 2009.
in 1971, had called for moving it. This was an assumption which virtually everyone shared. Relocating the house was part of the first cooperative agreement, and from 1976 through 1978 map searches and archeological surveys sought to locate the original foundations.\footnote{See, e.g., memo, Regional Director (Jack E. Stark), NAR, to Superintendent, May 18, 1978 (SPAR: Central Files: H3013 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.); and memo, Debora K. Bauxar, Staff Archeologist, HP Division, DSC, to Assistant. Manager, Mid-Atlantic/North Atlantic Team, DSC, August 27, 1976, and SPAR Superintendent Mohammed A. Khan to Files, March 22, 1978 (both Charlestown: CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR: Relocation Master Armorer's House).} The reason for moving the house was simple: if not, it would be “torn down by the Community College,” which was an “unacceptable alternative.”\footnote{Memos, Assistant Manager, Mid-Atlantic/North Atlantic Team, DSC (Robert L. Steenhagen) to Regional Director NAR, April 28, 1978, and Superintendent Mohammed A. Khan to file, March 22, 1978 (both SPAR: Lowenthal Files: fol. Master Armorer’s House).} But for the park’s first superintendent, Mohammed A. Khan, there was another consideration: once returned to its “proper location,” the house would “restore the historic scene of the 1870’s within the NHS.”\footnote{Memo, Supt. SPAR (Mohammed A. Khan) to Files, March 22, 1978 (Charlestown: CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR: Relocation Master Armorer's House).} The region’s GMP team had a somewhat different perspective: responding no doubt to the agency’s general aversion to moving historic structures they would have preferred to leave it where it was and negotiate a maintenance agreement. However, they conceded that it would be “justifiable” to move the house in order to save it.\footnote{Shary Page Berg (NAR), “Status Report on Springfield Armory Planning: Preliminary Identification of Issues and Options,” September, 1976, revised June, 1978, pp. 11-12 (SPAR: Lowenthal Files: fol. First Master Plan [CRBIB 406259]).} As for the park’s second superintendent, Doug Lindsay recalled that moving the house “made a lot of sense” when he arrived.\footnote{Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009.} But by 1978, even as the cooperative agreement was being signed, he and others were beginning to question the assumption. Lindsay changed his mind when cultural resource experts from the “soft side” of the regional office visited the park. Standing at the site, regional historical architect Blaine Cliver told Lindsay, “we can’t do that: it’s going to create a historic scene that never existed.” The problem was that when Building 10 had flanked one side of the Main Arsenal, Building 17 (the Paymaster’s House) had balanced it on the other. As recently as 1972 there had been talk of moving Building 17 as well,\footnote{Letters, Lewis to Meredith Ingham, February 22, 1972; and Sarles to Lewis, March 3, 1972 (Washington Office: NHL Program Files, fol. Springfield Armory). Lewis asks which side of the Main Arsenal to put Building 17 on; Sarles confirms southeast side.} but when the college demolished it later that year, the opportunity was lost, and with it the chance to restore the original configuration. Thus Cliver pulled the props out from under one of Khan’s arguments. Lindsay recalls another argument against replacing Building 10: the unconfirmed yet credible story that the house had been moved in the first place to deprive the laundry and other backyard annoyances from the privileged position they had occupied in the foreground of the view enjoyed by the Commanding Officer and his wife from their front windows.
Figure 3.2. Development Concept Plan (NPS: GMP/DCP, 1986).
The new outlook on Building 10 was being put into writing by the end of 1980. The amendments to the cooperative agreement proposed by Dwight Pitcaithley, the region’s cultural resources chief, required the college to “maintain Building 10...on its present site,” could “remain where it is.” The General Management Plan and, eventually, the amended cooperative agreement confirmed the new policy.

Like the new direction on the cultural landscape, the decision not to move Building 10 accorded well with NPS policy but also had a pragmatic dimension. As the new position was developed in 1978, the building was undergoing a demotion of sorts. In 1978 the region’s planners noted that most respondents to their questionnaire had not thought the building “of major importance.” Two years later, Pitcaithley wondered whether it deserved its status in the highest tier of significance or should be relegated to the second level, or perhaps allowed to “remain in the gray area between the two.” Lindsay recalls thinking that moving it would simply saddle the park with “another goddamn maintenance burden” without adding anything to interpretation. Meanwhile, the threat from the college was diminishing. By 1978 it had put up two large new buildings and gained approval for a third, completing the first round of proposed construction. Five years later, as Chapter Four will show, the college had accepted the fact that it would have to live with Armory Square. By the time the draft GMP was completed in 1984, the last of its new buildings was under construction, funding and enrollment were leveling off, and the likelihood that the college would ever need the site of Building 10 for new construction had become vanishingly remote. Neither side had any compelling reason to move Building 10 and no one opposed the change of policy.

The impact of the 1968 datum on the Ma in Arsenal was more controversial. It concerned the concrete loading dock which had been added to the main facade in 1941. This had once been considered an excrescence to be removed but, with the GMP, now became part of the historic scene to be retained (Fig. 3.3). Park staff told the planners they felt “very strongly that interpretive possibilities would be enhanced by removing the loading dock,” but the planners were unmoved. For them, the question was not one of mere correctness but also of character: the loading dock underlined the Armory’s industrial character, which was a key element of its authenticity. Besides, they noted, retaining the loading dock did not preclude its removal in the future, whereas the reverse was not true.

The philosophy of authenticity espoused here had already become an important


principle at the Armory. It had been tested in 1978 when an oversight committee in Washington, concerned with the impact of picnicking and lawn mowing at various NPS units, requested a report on NPS policies for maintaining the “integrity of the historic scene” at its historic areas. This prompted a Washington official to remind regional directors that it was NPS policy to protect cultural resources “in their historic form and appearance,” and to eschew all attempts to “beautify, ‘improve,’ ‘enhance,’ or otherwise alter the appearance of a historic scene, through decorative plantings, lawn seeding, watering, landscaping, adornment, repainting, or any other action that does not accurately reflect the historic character of the resources or the historic scene as a whole.” In response, Superintendent Lindsay pointed out that, at the Armory, “casual picnicking” should be acceptable because it was “consistent with practices of Armory employees....” As for mowing, the only difference was that in the nineteenth century “wool-bearing mowers” had been used instead of machines.

A more significant test arose in 1984 when Dwight Pitcaithley angrily rejected the Denver Service Center’s design for a new entrance stair, needed to accommodate visitors to the Main Arsenal. It was precisely because the design “was artfully and professionally executed,” with a “pleasant, campus-like quality,” that Pitcaithley called it “totally out of keeping with the historic setting, at odds with the formal military architecture of the Armory itself, and based, apparently, on the mistaken notion that the entrance of the Armory should be more humanistic and inviting.” Again and again, he complained, “we confront designers from Denver who seem oblivious to the fact that we are an agency involved in historic preservation and ignorant of the Service’s Management Policies and its underlying philosophy.” For Pitcaithley, it was not the designer who was at fault but rather the Denver Service Center, which failed to explain to new employees that the NPS was a “preservation agency,” or to introduce them to the “principles, policies, and philosophies on which NPS cultural resource management throughout the System is based.” Here Pitcaithley took his disagreement directly to the level of policy, and indeed his criticism was consistent with the GMP’s decision to leave the concrete loading dock in place, a decision which Pitcaithley himself helped shape.

51 Policies on V-24-25 of NPS Management Policies notebook, quoted in memo, Associate Director, Management & Operations, to all regional directors, October 12, 1978 (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.). The committee in question was the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.
52 Memo, Superintendent (Lindsay) to Acting Chief, Division of Cultural Resources, NAR, November 2, 1978 (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.).
53 Memo, Acting Chief, Cultural Resources, NARO (Dwight Pitcaithley) to Associate Regional Director, Planning & Resource Preservation, NARO, April 18, 1984 (Charlestown: CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR: Pkg. 103 - Adaptive Reuse of Armory Building).
Figure 3.3. Building 13 (Main Arsenal): main entrance with historic concrete loading dock and wooden stairs added for visitors (photo: author).

Figure 3.4. Site plan of park showing three levels of preservation controls (NPS: Northeast Museum Services Center, Charlestown, MA).
During the same period another issue of historical authenticity arose over
nomenclature. The 1967 evaluation report called the open space at the center of Armory
Square the parade or parade ground, a usage followed in the National Register nomination
and the 1978 cooperative agreement. Yet, Superintendent Lindsay’s 1979 Statement for
Management called it the Green: the reason was his discovery, early in his tenure at the
park, that the parade ground name was not historically accurate but had been “imported” by
the “military buffs” within the NPS: the Armory was a manufacturing site rather than a
military post, and the trees scattered across the open space would have made it impossible to
parade troops. In fact, nineteenth century plans called the open space the Green, and early
photographs show mature trees throughout the space. The change of name was officially
adopted by 1983.

Despite the park’s striving for authenticity in many areas, the GMP accepted a
revealing inconsistency. Within the federal area, or “Historic Zone,” the expensive landscape
modifications envisioned by the “Minimum Development and Preservation” plan would not
produce precise historical authenticity but only the “general appearance” of 1968. Outside
the federal area, more importantly, the 1968 datum was a dead letter. At least three historic
buildings had been demolished since 1968 and, by 1984, the third of the college’s massive
intrusions into the historic central space of Armory Square was under construction. The
illusion that the NPS could “maintain the armory as it was in 1968...” could be sustained
only by turning a blind eye to the changes that had taken place immediately across the invisible
boundary. If Armory Square was really, as the 1974 National Register nomination claimed, a
“cohesive district,” and if it was true, as Deputy Director Dickenson affirmed, that it was “the
entire Armory Square” that was “nationally significant,” then this was a significant
inconsistency.

Though the General Management Plan underwent numerous internal reviews (68 by
1984), it prompted little outside interest. Indeed the agency kept public involvement,

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54 Statement for Management, Springfield Armory National Historic Site, signed and dated Doug Lindsay
as preparer, August 27, 1979 (but line for approval unsigned) (SPAR Central Files: A6419: Statement for
Management).

55 Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009. For a plan of c. 1820-24 and photos
of c. 1880 and 1891, see NPS, Olmsted Center for Landscape Preservation, Cultural Landscape
Inventory, 2004, Part 2a p. 11 and Part 2b, pp. 8,9. Lindsay points out that the name “Caserne,” as
applied to Building 19, was also inaccurate, and for the same reason: it was historically used for storage
and was known as the Long Storehouse. But in this case, the error was not so quickly corrected:
Lindsay still used “caserne” in his 1979 Statement for Management, and subsequent planning
documents continued to use the inaccurate usage until quite recently.

56 Memo, Assistant Manager, Mid-Atlantic/North Atlantic Team, DSC (Gerald D. Patten) to NA
Regional Director, March 23, 1983 (Cultural Resources Department Files: fol. Revised Cooperative
Agreement).

57 General Management Plan/Development Concept Plan, Springfield Armory National Historic Site, 1986,
pp. 6 ff.

58 General Management Plan/Development Concept Plan, Springfield Armory National Historic Site, 1986,
p. 6

59 Memo, Superintendent to Regional Director, NAR, May 30, 1984 (SPAR Central Files: D18).
Planning the Armory

required by NEPA, to a minimum “due to the apparent lack of controversy.” The single public hearing was sparsely attended; only two letters were received, and agency officials characterized public response as “positive, if limited.” Yet the letters revealed disappointment with the “Minimum Development and Preservation” alternative chosen by the agency. The first, from the city’s commissioner for community development, was terse. It thanked the park for helping to “bring the Gun Museum into the mainstream of our visitor [sic] and convention activities” yet emphasized the city’s “wholehearted endorsement” of the rejected Alternative 3, the expansive, site-oriented alternative which the planners had described as offering “broad interpretation and use oriented toward all of the National Historic Site.” Springfield Central, describing itself as the “lead private sector agency responsible for the revitalization of downtown Springfield,” offered a sharper response. Director Carlo Marchetti pleaded for a “major development program” to enhance the Armory’s “economic development impact and its contribution to Springfield’s cultural community” – a program like that of the rejected Alternative 3 – and criticized the adopted plan for failing to “take full advantage of the Armory’s development potential.” Marchetti called not only for a new entrance to the park which would separate it from the college and highlight its identity but also for “restoration of the historic terraces, fountain and gardens,” and for moving Building 10. These steps Marchetti thought would bring to life the site’s “real story,” which was the “Grand National Armory” theme.” In the scenario he imagined, “the magnificence of this setting, then, visually underscores the Armory’s important role in industrial and military development.”

Though Superintendent Lindsay assured the regional office that the “principal interest” of those at the public hearing was to foster tourism, Marchetti’s remarks pointed to a substantive disagreement over how to develop and interpret the Armory. To Marchetti, the “real story of the site” was the “Grand National Armory’ theme,” not the “Gun Museum.” Some NPS interpretive planners appeared to be saying something similar when they tried to emphasize the importance of the Armory’s regional role. Marchetti’s claim that restoring the “magnificence” of the Armory’s setting would highlight its historical meaning was defensible on its merits.


61 Memo, Superintendent to Regional Director, October 19, 1984 (SPAR Central Files: D18).

62 Letter, John J. Benoit (Commissioner, Community Development, City of Springfield) to Lindsay, October 16, 1984 (SPAR Central Files: D18).

63 Letter, Carlo A. Marchetti, Executive Director, Springfield Central, to Lindsay, October 18, 1984 (SPAR Central Files: D18).

64 Memo, Superintendent to Regional Director, October 19, 1984 (SPAR Central Files: D18).
RENEGOTIATING THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

Though the planners might hatch out the campus on their maps, the federal and non-federal portions of the park were intricately linked. The park depended on the college for utility services, and on a combination of Springfield police and campus guards for security. Park staff and visitors threaded their way through the college en route to the Main Arsenal. These interdependencies created recurrent challenges for park managers: even the simple act of installing a new gas pipeline required a formal agreement, and although low visitation figures kept conflicts over access and parking to a minimum, that could change if park managers succeeded in raising the numbers. Circumstances thus ensured that, quite apart from contention over the maintenance of the college’s historic buildings (to be discussed further in the next chapter), campus issues would never be far from park managers’ attention.

The 1978 cooperative agreement provided some structure for this engagement but few operational guidelines. In retrospect, Lindsay called it an “entirely defective instrument,” observing that there was “no way that any rational person could have administered that cooperative agreement”: it had been written by too many people with too many agendas. In any case, its renegotiation, an essential step in park planning, was itself a major focus of park-college relations for a number of years: “I don’t ever remember not working on the cooperative agreement,” as Lindsay put it. The NPS had started drafting revisions to the 1978 agreement almost as soon as it was signed. Nevertheless, in 1980, they suspended work on the Development Concept Plan because of the continuing uncertainties. “This negotiation process will take time,” wrote the region’s acting director, in what turned out to be an understatement. What motivated both parties to persevere, according to a college official, was precisely the “operational difficulties” that both were experiencing; according to park managers, “the practical realities of operating the site” called for amendments to “reflect more clearly the responsibilities and obligations of the signatories.”

The problems with the 1978 agreement were numerous. According to Lindsay, “the college hated it because it restrained them: it put an undue burden on them, for example, requiring maintenance that they said they could not afford”: he recalls that a major goal for the

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65 See, e.g., “Agreement,” signed by Joseph Deliso (Chairman, Board of Trustees, S.T.C.C.) and Leonard J. Collamore (Interim President), September 14, 1981 (SPAR: Lowenthal Files: folder National Register Nomination).

66 Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009.


NPS in revising the agreement was to remove its most irritating provisions.70 From the agency’s perspective it contained other flaws. One was the provision to move Building 10: as Lindsay puts it, this was now “contrary to park service policy: we weren’t going to do it, and yet there it was in the cooperative agreement.” Other problems could not be fixed simply by writing a new agreement. Lindsay recalling Dwight Pitcaithley remarking that “cooperative agreements are all handshake agreements: as long as both parties are cooperative, they work great. But they don’t carry any sanctions....” The college was not a particularly willing cooperator, and its political power would have protected it from sanctions, even if any had been available.

Of “crucial concern” to NPS officials was Article IIb, which defined the college’s right to alter its buildings and grounds as well as the agency’s review role.71 They disagreed on how to amend it. While Regional Director Cables wished mainly to simplify the review process and limit the agency’s responsibilities, others wanted to tighten the standards. The original agreement divided the campus into two parts, setting a relatively strict standard of review for the parade ground and the buildings facing it and a looser standard for the area behind the front range of buildings on the northwest side. The agency now proposed “three levels of preservation control.” Level one, applying to the parade and the historic buildings defining its southeast and northeast sides, essentially prohibited any exterior alterations and required new plantings to be consistent in size and type with existing ones. Level two, applying to the historic houses behind the new college buildings (including Building 10) and to the long storehouse (Building 19), allowed “some exterior modification” to facilitate adaptive reuse as long as it did not “affect overall appearance in terms of qualities such as size, mass and spatial arrangement.” Level three, applying to everything else, permitted “more extensive exterior modifications” for adaptive reuse.72

With minor refinements these changes were eventually adopted73 (Fig. 3.4). More problematic was the revision of the Section 106 review process. Under the original agreement, the college initiated the process by submitting its plans to the NPS, which reviewed them according to a standard summarized by Francis McManamon, a regional official: “impacts to be avoided and not concurred in by NPS include actions which will change the historical integrity of the parade ground and exterior appearance of historic structures fronting on it or

70 Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009.
72 Specifically, level one applied to the parade plus Buildings 5/6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, the “remnant” of 27, and 29; level two to Buildings 7, 8, 9, and 19. Copy of 1978 Agreement with pages of “Proposed Amendments to Cooperative Agreement,” [nd] pasted to appropriate pages; and “Proposed Amendments to “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts” (March 27, 1978) (“Draft: D. Pitcaithley, December 19, 1980) (SPAR: Cultural Resources Department Files: fol. Revised Cooperative Agreement).
73 “Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,” MU-1600-3-9001, s by John Burchell for Regional Director, Kevin M. Smith, DCPO Commissioner, Judith B. McDonough, SHPO, and [illegible] for S.T.C.C. (Chairman, Board of Trustees), and dated March 1, 1993, Article II.b. In the final version, Building 29 was dropped from Level 1 and Building 10 added to Level 2.
the exterior appearance of other historic structures in the Preservation Control Area.” After concurring or not, the NPS prepared the required forms and submitted them to the Massachusetts State Historical Commission (the SHPO), which reviewed and ruled on them.

In 1979, McManamon proposed that the NPS take certain steps “to emphasize our cultural resource concerns to management and the College”: on the one hand, he called for more explicit preservation safeguards in the park’s Statement for Management; on the other, for a system by which the regional office could review college proposals. But a difficulty arose when officials noticed that the 1968 deed made HEW, rather than NPS, the concurring agency. The agreement would have to be rewritten to acknowledge HEW’s role without taking away the NPS’s “advisory/consultative function.” Yet, by 1982 HEW no longer existed, and although the new Department of Education had taken over its remaining Armory responsibilities, the Department rejected any additional responsibility for enforcing the state’s preservation obligations under the deed of transfer. Despite this reversal, the NPS still sought to give away its concurrence role. Dwight Pitcaithley recalls that the situation had become “very awkward.” The college needed extensive advice in architectural design and preservation, and the cooperative agreement bound the NPS to supply it, yet the region’s preservation office was “stretched thin” and simply could not afford to undertake the “lengthy negotiation” that so many buildings would eventually require. At Lowell NHP, by contrast, there was a dedicated staff person whose entire job was to resolve similar problems with owners inside the historic district. Lacking a similar capacity at the Armory, the NPS was unable to influence the college’s building projects in meaningful ways, yet was nonetheless forced to bring those projects forward to the SHPO. Not only was the paperwork burden substantial but the regional office found it compelled to “lobby” for projects it did not necessarily support and might even oppose. Motivated by a high level of “frustration” over this situation, the regional office sought to get “out of the middle” and let the college bring its own proposals directly to the SHPO.

Early in 1983, then, Regional Director Herbert Cables suggested giving the concurrence role to the SHPO, explaining that this would free the NPS to give the college technical assistance and “develop a spirit of cooperation and partnership with it in our

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74 Memo, Associate Regional Director Francis P. McMenamon, Planning and Resource Preservation to Chief, Division of Cultural Resources, NAR, October 2, 1979 (SPAR: Cultural Resources Department Files: fol. Revised Cooperative Agreement).

75 Memo, Associate Regional Director Francis P. McMenamon, Planning and Resource Preservation to Chief, Division of Cultural Resources, NA Region, October 2, 1979 (SPAR: Cultural Resources Department Files: fol. Revised Cooperative Agreement).


78 Dwight Pitcaithley: recorded interview with author, May 28, 2009.
common goal of preserving the Armory’s historic buildings.” Would it also diminish the agency’s ability to manage the park? On paper, the change forced greater reliance on the SHPO’s decisions, placing park officials in a position analogous to that of a neighboring property owner even where congressionally authorized parkland was concerned. Yet as Pitcaithley put it, “We never had that ability”: the management structure created by the legislation and the cooperative agreement “sounded good” but gave the NPS very little ability to affect developments within the campus. In reality, then, the regional office “wasn’t giving up as much as it was simply realizing the reality of the situation that we had.”

Cables had been meeting with college administrators, and whether or not this idea actually came from them, it accorded well with their views. In 1984, the dean of administration remarked that the cooperative agreement was not strictly necessary since, if it expired, the site would be managed under the terms of the National Historic Preservation Act. Since this was the time when the GMP had become “lodged” within the state education department, he may simply have been suggesting a way to dislodge it. But Superintendent Lindsay responded angrily: he was “more than puzzled,” by the college’s apparent belief that a cooperative agreement was “optional.” Obviously Congress had not thought so. In hindsight, one may also point out that, if the college had been right, then inclusion within a unit of the National Park system would literally have meant nothing, since it would have brought no change to the college’s existing responsibilities.

Behind the college’s suggestion lay a lingering hostility to federal intervention, dating from the time the NPS had arrived as an unwelcome guest at the college’s birth. By 1983, as the following chapter will show, college officials were beginning to accept their preservation obligations, but confusion over their relationship with the National Historic Site persisted. On the one hand, college officials could concede that the NPS was legally required to “ensure the historical integrity of the National Landmark,” yet on the other they could refer to the college’s “54-acre campus,” implying that the National Park was part of the college campus rather than the other way around. To confuse things further, they could describe the “westerly section of the campus” as a “National Historic Landmark and Park.” What both parties implicitly agreed on was that there would be day-to-day cooperation on operational issues but a minimum of coordinated planning for the National Historic Site as a whole.

The new Section 106 process was written into the new cooperative agreement, which made all college proposals “subject to the concurrence of the Massachusetts State Historic Preservation Office following its review of the impact on the Green....” The only role the NPS

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80 Dwight Pitcaithley: recorded interview with author, May 28, 2009.

81 Memo, Lindsay to Pitcaithley, May 4, 1984 (SPAR: Cultural Resources Department Files: fol. Revised Cooperative Agreement). The official at the Department of Education was Director Federal Property Assistance Peter A. Wieczorek, DOE, Boston.

would play in this process was to “provide technical and professional assistance to the College” and to “expedite legislative compliance mandates” by serving as a liaison between the college and the Massachusetts Historical Commission. Moreover, the standard of review which the SHPO was now directed to follow – “impact on the Green” – was exceedingly narrow, which partially negated the impact of the tightened preservation controls.

The revised review process was put into practice by 1986, but negotiations over the cooperative agreement dragged on. It was not always clear which party caused the delays. In 1989, Lindsay apologized for the time-consuming round of federal reviews and told President Andrew M. Scibelli he appreciated his “infinite patience in this matter.” Yet, the college often appeared uncooperative, as in March 1983, when the dean of administration arrived at a meeting with park officials a hour and a half late and without having read the draft agreement. Sometimes the college would appear to go along, then suddenly raise an objection. During the meeting at which Dean Baker arrived unprepared, he first read the agreement and then brought up a series of entirely new and potentially difficult issues. By June, the NPS had a draft which officials believed was “acceptable to all parties,” but at the end of that month Dean Baker responded to issues which college President Collamore had brought up internally three months earlier, raising more objections.

The fact was that the college had little to gain from renegotiating the agreement: more parking, perhaps more ball fields on the Green. It had more to lose from negotiating with an agency intent on tightening up its standards, and this was just as true after the changes adopted in 1986. If the existing agreement simply lapsed, the college believed that all federal interference apart from Section 106 would lapse with it. This may explain why, although Regional Director Cables asserted that both parties were dissatisfied with the existing agreement, it was always the NPS that went to the college with new drafts.

In the end, though, it was not the college that caused the longest delays. Two years after the U.S. Department of Education had declined to take any further interest in the agreement, Dean Baker submitted the latest draft to the department for review. Now the same official announced that the department had “several concerns...” and would not approve the amended

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83 “Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,” MU-1600-3-9001, signed by John Burchell for Regional Director Kevin M. Smith, DCPO Commissioner Judith B. McDonough, SHPO, and [illegible] for S.T.C.C. (Chairman, Board of Trustees), and dated March 1, 1993, Article II.b.


86 Memo from Associate Regional Director Charles P. Clapper, Planning and Resource Preservation, NAR Region, to SPAR Superintendent, June 16, 1983, covering draft agreement (with blanks made out for 1983); and memo, Dean William Baker (S.T.C.C.) to President Collamore, June 27, 1983 (SPAR: Cultural Resources Department Files: fol. Revised Cooperative Agreement).

agreement until it could “review the proposed revisions in detail.” He warned the college: “Please do not under any circumstances execute the revised agreement with the National Park Service...until you receive authorization in writing from the U.S. Department of Education.”

For two years the NPS tried to extricate the agreement from the Department of Education, which was also holding up the transfer of the 1.97-acre parcel of land relinquished by the state under the terms of the first cooperative agreement. In April, 1986, the department finally responded, saying there was no legal reason for it to be a party to the agreement since it did not affect the state’s obligations to DOE. This was exactly what Education officials had told the NPS in 1983. It had taken officials two years to reach the same conclusion.

By the end of 1986, the NPS and the college were ready to sign the new cooperative agreement. But, early in 1987, the college discovered that it needed approval from the state’s Division of Capital Planning and Operations. The document was forwarded to the deputy commissioner. More changes followed. In July, 1988, the NPS prepared a new draft. At this point, agency officials did not even dare to alter the margins, so anxious were they not to precipitate further delays. The state agencies completed their review in September, 1989. More minor changes were made. Lindsay was now confident that the document would finally be signed. Yet, two and a half years later, park officials reported that the college was “still making an effort to get the 1988 agreement signed.” They did not succeed until March, 1993. By then, the NPS was drafting a new amended agreement, to take effect in 1998.

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89 Letter, Cables to Bayard D. Waring (Secretary’s Regional Representative, DOE, Boston), February 19, 1985, and memo, Cables to Director, October 2, 1985 (SPAR: Cultural Resources Department Files: fol. Revised Cooperative Agreement). Sometime in 1985 or 1986, a letter was drafted from Interior Secretary Hodel asking Education Secretary Bennett to help end the delays. It is not clear whether it was sent. See letter, Donald P. Hodel, Secretary of Interior, to William J. Bennett, Sec Ed, n.d., n.s. (Boston Support Office: Compliance Files: fol. L7617 SPAR DCP PKG 101 & 103).

90 Letter, David A. Cox (Acting Administrator for Management Services, DOE) to P. Daniel Smith (Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks) April 10, 1986 (SPAR: Cultural Resources Department Files: fol. Revised Cooperative Agreement).

Figure 3.5. The museum as the main visitor experience and focus of interpretation: park historian Richard Colton anchors historical narratives to guns.
CHAPTER FOUR

REHABILITATING THE ARMORY

From the perspective of his successor, Steve Beatty, it was not so much Lindsay’s planning framework as his achievement in stabilizing and rehabilitating the Armory’s physical resources that really transformed the park.\(^1\) Certainly they left Beatty a markedly different park, and markedly different opportunities, than he had confronted. Lindsay carried out the first major rehabilitation of the cast iron perimeter fence. He also oversaw work on the Commanding Officer’s Quarters (Building 1). And he started a landscape maintenance program. But the project that above all transformed the park was the rehabilitation of the Main Arsenal (Building 13). And here, planning and building were most closely entwined. The Main Arsenal’s preponderant importance in the park’s development was due not only to its visual prominence but also to a series of planning decisions that made it the park’s dominant focus: decisions to emphasize the federal area, to highlight the museum, and to locate both the museum and the administrative offices in Building 13. The NPS began working on Building 13 soon after the park was established; a major renovation project was launched in 1982 and completed in 1989; afterwards, work did not end but tapered off into smaller projects that continue today.

The same decisions that made the Museum’s renovation both critically important and complex made the treatment of the other federal buildings correspondingly less so. Their management became largely a matter of ad hoc responses to problems, requiring little overall coordination. Had the historic landscape been treated according to the plans developed in the 1980s it would have been an exception to this pattern, for those plans called for major interventions: though the nineteenth century fountains and terraces would not be restored, the plan nonetheless involved reversing the substantial earthmoving which had been carried out after the Armory’s closure. But as little if anything was done to implement the plan’s ambitious goals, managing the landscape became similarly a matter of maintenance and minor changes, and this remained true even during the 1990s, when the agency and the region began to place greater emphasis on cultural landscape management.

The state-owned portion of the park presented an entirely different challenge. Relationships between park and college staffs were often cordial: each helped the other with security, lighting, signage, and other day-to-day matters. But when it came to preserving and rehabilitating the historic buildings, it was another story. At the end of the 1960s, what would become the park’s federal and state zones were in roughly equivalent condition, but over time they diverged more and more sharply. By the end of the 1980s the federal zone had been

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\(^1\)Steve Beatty, recorded interview with author, May 28, 2009.
placed in good to excellent condition. On the campus side, some buildings had been restored but others were declining towards the point of no return. The spectacle of fine nineteenth century buildings sealed off to pedestrians behind hazard tape in some cases, completely open to the elements in others, displaying rotting woodwork and missing columns – and all of this in the middle of a national park – troubled park visitors and reflected badly on the system. Worse, it portended – and continues to portend – the loss of historic buildings considered valuable enough to merit designation as a National Historic Landmark and inclusion within a congressionally authorized National Historic Site.

How the park’s physical components have been treated is the subject of this chapter. The first section considers each element of the federal zone, the second section the college campus.

**THE FEDERAL ZONE**

The Evaluation Report of 1967 identified the cast iron perimeter fence as a key element (Figs. 1.8, 4.1, others), and all subsequent planning and documentation reports confirmed this judgment. Preparing for the NPS to take over the park in 1977, Arthur Allen ranked it as the park’s “absolute first priority.” It was equally obvious to Allen that the Main Arsenal would need attention as soon as the fence was secured. Neither was in very good condition. An entire section of the fence was missing, and there were smaller gaps as well, not only detracting from the historic fabric but also creating security problems.2 The Main Arsenal represented a far more complex challenge. Allen recommended repairing the roof, sanding and sealing floors, removing ivy from exterior walls, replacing window glass and door locks, installing a new elevator, repairing the tower clock, and providing additional fire escapes. The building’s systems were all “in bad repair or ineffective and in need of replacement.” Though it seemed “dry and well ventilated,” humidity testing was needed, especially in the basement where most of the guns were stored. There were problems of space usage and planning as well. Someday, Allen envisioned a “large library room with numerous bookshelves and tables” and microfilm readers. Meanwhile, there was a “pressing need” for a workshop: also useful would be an area where museum visitors could “study the various weapons from the study collection.” There had been talk of an office for Congressman Boland. At the same time, there was a good deal of space with no clear purpose or use. A plan was obviously needed.3

The first few years of NPS stewardship were marked by ad hoc repairs and piecemeal

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upgrades. Temporary repairs were made to the fence in 1977, but on the night of November 25, 1979, a section of the fence on Byers St “broke loose and fell on an individual who sustained a broken leg.” The injured individual told the police he had been hanging on the fence while talking to a friend. The park made more temporary repairs by the next morning. But Superintendent Lindsay called for a more thorough rehabilitation. An inspection in 1980 revealed serious problems. The cast iron was fracturing, many of the columns were cracked, spikes and other ornaments were broken. The park had been repairing the damage by bolting steel bracing to lose elements: “This is good, works, and is far better than welding. No welding should be done to historical elements.” But it was obviously a temporary measure, funds were not available for more far-reaching repairs. (The college’s section of the fence, it might be noted, was in no better condition: the college was planning to repair it.)

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5 Memo, Superintendent to Acting Regional Director, NAR, November 26, 1979 (SPAR Central Files: D46 Fence).

The first interventions at Building 13 were equally discrete. Focused on systems, they had little impact on the building’s historic fabric. Lightning protection was installed in 1977, motion detectors in the second floor ceilings (where the collection had been moved) in 1978, new gas and electric services to Buildings 1 and 13 in 1980-81. In 1982, the park began to bring the building into compliance with fire codes and to secure the gun collection, installing interior storm windows, adapting certain windows for ventilation or emergency exits, installing emergency signage as well as panic hardware and alarms on exit doors, and upgrading a basement stairway. Small improvements continued through 1983 and 1984: repairing a deteriorated attic truss, upgrading the security system, installing smoke and heat detectors and sprinklers. Chief Curator Ann Hitchcock noted that “the Superintendent is particularly cognizant of security and fire protection systems and needs, and has given these matters top priority.” In 1985, about 180 panes of double-strength glass were replaced at a cost of a little less than $4,300.

None of these improvements called for a great deal of planning, but that began to change in the mid-1980s with coordinated programs for both the fence and the Main Arsenal. The former was thoroughly rehabilitated between 1984 and 1987. The work proceeded in sections. By the spring of 1984, the 1,300-foot stretch along Byers Street had been largely completed – “repaired, sandblasted, and given one coat of zinc paint,” and in

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8 “Assessment of Effect on Cultural Resources” (Form XXX, for expansion of security system), signed Regional Archeologist, Regional Historian, Regional Historical Architect (Cliver), approved by Regional Director Stark, dated January 4, 1978 (Charlestown: CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR - Security System, Armory Museum).


10 “Assessment of Actions Having an Effect on Cultural Resources” (Form XXX), signed Craig Cellar (for Doug Lindsay), March 1, 1982 (SPAR Central Files: H42 106 Review Windows/Sash); and invitation for bids, June 14, 1982 (SPAR: Lowenthal Files: Daily Log...Interior Rehab Building # 13); and documents relating to interior rehab of Building 13 (Lowenthal Files: Documents - SPAR Correspondence CX 1600-2-9004).


13 North Atlantic Region, “Completion Report: Replace Double-Strength Glass in the Main Arsenal and in the Commanding Officer’s Quarters,” August, 1985 (SPAR: Lowenthal Files: Completion Reports).
spots two or three coats – at a cost of about $121,000. Next, in 1984-85, came the 726-foot length along Pearl Street. This was more problematic, as the concrete base was badly deteriorated in places. Nevertheless, a contract was let in the fall of 1984 at $149,800. The following spring Park Historian Larry Lowenthal was awarded the Springfield Historical Commission’s Preservation Award for his management of the work. Last came the section along State Street, including the gates at the corners of Pearl and Byers Streets. This was largely finished by the fall of 1987: the total cost was about $180,000.

By the mid-1980s, the planning framework for the rehabilitation of the Main Arsenal was clear. The decision of the GMP to place the park’s administrative offices there provided one piece of the building’s program. The Interpretive Prospectus laid down another when it identified the exhibits as the park’s “prime interpretive experience.” The Collection Management Plan provided a third: reorganized and upgraded collection storage. Two other elements were also certain: the Blanchard lathe and the Organ of Muskets would continue to be the museum’s largest displays (Figs. 4.2-3). The Organ of Muskets was a towering double gun rack made in the 1830s to hold over a thousand flintlock muskets: it was what Longfellow invoked in the opening of his famous poem to peace, “The Arsenal at Springfield”:

This is the Arsenal. From floor to ceiling,
Like a huge organ, rise the burnished arms;

The lathe had been described as the “first pattern replicator enabling the mass production of gun stocks” and was a key piece of the Armory’s industrial history.

As certain as that these impressive objects would remain was that the rest of the old exhibits would be swept away. According to the NPS’s chief curator, Ann Hitchcock, they were “old and not in the best condition,” featuring “old dissimilar cases and displays offering little in the way of security and interpretation.” Essentially they were little more than “open

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14 Memo, Orville W. Carroll, (Project Coordinator, NAHPC) to Chief, Historic Preservation, NAR, May 7, 1984. See also memos Carroll to Nancy Tansino, May 31, 1984 (two memos of same date) (all SPAR Central Files: D46 Fence).


17 “Rehabilitation of Cast Iron Fence and Gates,” 2 sheets of drawings by O. W. Carroll, dated December 1984; memos, Orville W. Carroll to Sandra Ridley, Contracting– NARO, April 2, 1985; to Chief, Historic Preservation, NAR, January 3, 1986; and to Karen Klam, Contracting Officer, NARO, March 14, 1986; letter, Samuel H. Reck (Contracting Officer) to Anchor Industries, Fitzwilliam, NH, April 10, 1986; memo, Michael Fortin, Project Supervisor, to Contracting Officer, NARO, September 14, 1987 (all SPAR Central Files: D46 Fence).

on open pegboard” or “completely exposed” to dust, dirt, inappropriate handling, theft, excessive sunlight, and glaring fluorescent light. In sum, the exhibits were in urgent need of revision. They are old and faded, poorly designed, and many lack adequate labels. There is no unifying theme or organization. Many of the objects are improperly displayed from the standpoint of conservation and security.

Superintendent Lindsay assumed that, with the strong support of a Congressman as powerful as Boland, the rehabilitation and the new exhibits would be quickly funded and carried out. It did not happen that way. In June, 1982, the park approved a design concept presented by an exhibit design company in Alexandria, VA, including display cases, lighting, graphics, a “center demonstration platform, planked flooring, two special demonstration pedestal stands,” and “perimeter systems,” at a total construction and installation cost “in the $200,000 range.” Nothing further was heard from outside consultants, and six months later the chief of exhibit planning and design at the Harpers Ferry Center explained the Center’s process to Superintendent Lindsay. But almost within days the plan hit an obstacle: a “push-back of construction money to 1986 or 1987.” The Main Arsenal would not open on schedule. Worse, the park would “have to live with the present exhibit area for another 4 - 5 years.”

Reacting quickly, Lindsay instructed his staff to “make a concentrated effort to upgrade the exhibit area as best we can with local resources.” The result was a series of temporary exhibits which opened in January, 1986: virtually everything in them was done at the park, from the development of interpretation themes through the selection of objects to the production of labels, graphics, and case designs. To Chief Curator Hitchcock these stop-gap exhibits were “an improvement in terms of information content, but they lack the


21 Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009.

22 Letter, William C. Reed, VP, Design and Production Incorporated (Alexandria, VA), to Lindsay, June 25, 1982 (SPAR: Central Files: D6215 Planning, Preparation, Maintenance, and Preservation of Museum Exhibits); see also letter, Reed to Harvey Davies (Contracting Officer, NPS, Boston), May 24, 1982 (SPAR Central Files: D6215 Planning, Preparation, Maintenance, and Preservation of Museum Exhibits).

23 Memo, Chief, Division of Exhibit Planning and Design, HFC (Robert C. Johnsson [sic]) to Superintendent, December 10, 1982 (SPAR Central Files: D6215 Planning, Preparation, Maintenance, and Preservation of Museum Exhibits).


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quality of design and installation that HFC will be able to provide.” Lindsay saw them differently. What had begun as a “cure for the not-very-secure exhibits bequeathed to us by the U.S. Army” had matured into “entirely new interpretive exhibits which have added immeasurably to our ability to tell the Springfield Armory story.” The exhibits were “well received” by visitors at the opening, according to Lindsay, and the Sunday Republican dedicated a feature article to the event.27

Later in 1986, the rehabilitation project hit a new obstacle when the Denver Service Center announced that its Armory funding had been slashed by a million dollars. $573,000 was now cut from the $1,840,000 budget for exhibit-related construction. Other cuts came from the remainder of the $4,617,000 renovation budget: new foundation drains, sewers, and an elevator were eliminated, while various construction items in the basement and second floor were “deferred,” including a shop, office, storage and machine gun rooms, improvements to the library, perimeter insulation, and “HVAC distribution system” to the second floor.28

The cuts to the HVAC system were problematic. Apart from the exhibits, no aspect of Building 13 received more attention than its environmental systems. In the fall of 1984, following a life cycle cost analysis, the Denver Service Center had decided to air condition the collection storage, library, and conference room, not the remainder of the basement and second floor. The main floor, housing the exhibits, was more complicated. Experts identified three options: a fully air conditioned museum space; minimum air conditioning for the room plus individual control of temperature and humidity in the exhibit cases; and air-conditioning of part of the museum space, with sensitive specimens grouped there.29 Regional curator Edward Kallop preferred the second option, but the regional office asked for the addition of air filtration to the library. Options now proliferated, and the life cycle analyses became more complex. In March, the region asked Denver to consider a sixth option: air conditioning the entire first floor and half of the second, while relying on portable


27 Memo, Superintendent to Regional Director, NAR, January 8, 1986 (SPAR Central Files: D6215 Planning, Preparation, Maintenance, and Preservation of Museum Exhibits).


29 Memo, Assistant Manager, Northeast Team, DSC, to Regional Director, NAR, November 5, 1984 (Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR Pkg. 103 - Adaptive Reuse of Armory Building).
Figure 4.2. One of the Main Arsenal’s most important exhibits: the Organ of Muskets (photo: author).
Figure 4.3. Another of the Main Arsenal’s most important exhibits: the Blanchard lathe (photo: author).
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humidification-dehumidification units in the storage areas. All of this planning was interrupted by the budget cuts, and the systems were left incomplete.

The push-backs and cuts did not completely halt work on the Main Arsenal. The tower clocks were rehabilitated in 1987, Plexiglas installed on third-floor windows and new steam lines installed early in 1988. But major work did not resume until March 1988. The building was then closed to both public and staff. It reopened in September 1989.

Figure 4.4. Layout plan of exhibits in Main Arsenal, early 1990s (NPS: Northeast Museum Services Center, Charlestown, MA).

30 “Trip Report,” Staff Curator Ed Kallop, NARO, December 10, 1984; memo, Associate Regional Director Clapper to Assistant Manager, Northeast Team, DSC, December 12, 1984; memo, Assistant Manager, Northeast Team, DSC, to Regional Director, NAR, March 6, 1985; memo, Associate Regional Director Clapper to Regional Director, March 19, 1985 (all Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR Pkg. 103 - Adaptive Reuse of Armory Building).

31 Memo, Assistant Manager, Northeast Team, DSC, to Supervisory Architect, Williamsport Training Center, May 13, 1985 (SPAR: Lowenthal Files: fol. Tower Clock Restoration); memo (“Trip Report”), Kenneth Bennett (Project Architect, Historical Architecture Section, Branch of Design, Eastern Team) to Assistant Manager, Eastern Team, DSC, June 4, 1987 (Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder SPAR Pkg. 103 - Adaptive Reuse of Armory Building; Form XXX for removal and reconstruction of S[outh] clock face, signed and dated April 8, 1987 (SPAR: Lowenthal Files: fol. Tower Clock Restoration); memo, Associate Regional Director, Planning & Resource Preservation to Superintendent, April 8, 1987 (SPAR Central Files: H42 106 Review Windows/Sash); face Sheet for Completion Report, signed and dated April 7, 1988 (SPAR: Lowenthal Files: fol. PX1930-8-0011 Bay State Glass Co); face Sheet for Completion Report, signed and dated April 7, 1988 (SPAR: Lowenthal Files: fol. PX1930-8-0026 Bay State Boiler, Inc).
The new exhibits, whose evolution and content are discussed in the next chapter, were well received by the public. Their architectural setting, encompassing 12,000 square feet, was ambitious yet architecturally restrained (Figs. 4.4-5, 5.1), eschewing the contemporary look of “chrome and plastic” in order to “retain the historic character of the arsenal,” including its original flooring, pressed tin ceilings, slender cast iron columns, and above all the spacious openness of the first floor which conveyed “a feeling for the building’s historic use as a warehouse.” In fact, that openness was not so much preserved as restored, as recent corridor and office walls were removed. Security, preservation, and aesthetics also combined to make the display cases as transparent as possible. However, some practical compromises were necessary. Enclosures were carved out of the open main space for bathrooms and an audiovisual theater, while “operational efficiency” required construction of a centrally located information desk and sales counter. Still, the agency was “committed to saving as many of the structure’s interior architectural features as possible,” and apart from these spatial interventions, impacts on the historic fabric were limited to functional necessities like new doors, triple glazing on the windows, plumbing, air conditioning, and movement sensors.

The reopening of the Main Arsenal in 1989, after a two-year closure, marked a milestone in the Armory’s history, giving the park not only a refurbished architectural centerpiece but also an attractive and updated interpretive focus. Yet unmet needs kept Building 13 at the center of attention for many more years. In fact, a list of funded projects prepared in 1998 showed that maintaining the building and protecting its collections – tasks not always easily separated – accounted for $274,000 out of a cumulative total of $337,800 in project funding awarded to the park.

The problems were various. For example, repairs to the fire escapes, dropped from the rehabilitation because of the cost of disposing of hazardous waste, were carried out in 1991 at a cost of just under $35,000. Security was a major concern. During the summer of 1991, the firm of Dean, Tucker Shaw carried out a museum security analysis at seven NPS sites, including the Armory. That fall, hardware and software modifications were made to fix the “most glaring problems with the existing system.” The work apparently consisted of upgrading the video security system. But the system’s capacity was limited and some of the improvements would become obsolete as soon as a new system of “multiplex monitoring”

33 Form XXX, certified and dated by Regional Archeologist, Regional Historian Pitcaithley, Regional Historical Architect, June-July, 1987 (dated but not signed for Regional Director; with cover memo, Assistant Manager, Northeast Team, DSC, to Superintendent June 8, 1987 (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.).
34 “RMP, FY-98,” n.d. (SPAR Central Files: D18 FY 98 RMP).
was adopted. So the work was stopped.36 The following year, the region’s chief of resource protection and visitor management found that the two main threats to the collection continued to be “fire and theft/vandalism.” Even though the latter had been “partially addressed” by acquisition of a system for detecting intrusions, the system was monitored by a single receptionist who was also busy greeting visitors and handling sales. Moreover, to counter an attempted theft, the receptionist would have to dial up the city police on the telephone. Hand-held portable radios and a silent alarm system with a concealed switch by the reception desk could help.37 That year, the region put together a package of over $30,000 in regional and national funds to upgrade the security systems.38

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36 Security analysis: Modification of Contract, effective July 19, 1991; glaring errors: memo, Superintendent to Regional Director, September 4, 1991; see also requisition, signed Beatty, September 4, 1991, and memo, Superintendent to Regional Director, December 13, 1991; work stopped: memo, Superintendent to Chief, Design and Construction Branch Peter Woodbury (NAR) and Historical Architect Richard Crisson, NAR, October 20, 1992 (all SPAR Central Files: D3415 Buildings (Constr./Maint.)).

37 Memo, Chief, Division of Resource Protection and Visitor Management, NAR, to Regional Director, NAR, May 1, 1992 (Regional Curator Files: folder: SPAR CMP).

38 Memo, Associate Regional Director Robert W. McIntosh, Jr. to SPAR Superintendent, February 21, 1992 (Regional Curator Files: folder: Curatorial SPAR 1989 –).
Along with security concerns, environmental problems were especially persistent. One concerned light levels within the museum. During the rehabilitation, Lindsay had opposed dark shades for the exhibit spaces because, although he understood the effects of light on wood and textiles, he “hoped to keep ambient light levels up while reducing incidental and UV lights.” So while UV filtering Lexan was installed over the windows, “visible light remain[ed] unchecked.” Regional Curator Maounis agreed to visit the museum after it opened to see if this solution was working acceptably. In March, 1990, he found that light levels on the exhibits were within an acceptable range with the exception of one temporary exhibit case, for which he recommended installing a dark Mylar shade over the nearest window. By 1993 park staff had installed filters over some of the fluorescent tubes, reducing ultraviolet light, and cloth shades controlled sunlight in the library. “The object collection is fairly well protected...” commented Museum Technician John Kwiatkowski, yet the Collection Management Plan recommended installing solar shades. Kwiatkowski thought that additional shades and filters would also be helpful with the library and photo collections.

There were other environmental concerns. In 1990, the Landmark Facilities Group of East Norwalk studied the storerooms where, since the previous year, part of the drawings collection of the Olmsted NHS had been kept. They found conditions fairly stable but marred by humidity and summer heat. Plans were made to extend the first floor HVAC system up to the store room, and in 1992 money was budgeted to design a “super insulated storage facility” on the third floor. Yet the basic air conditioning system still presented major problems. The second floor system was simply “inoperable.” Lindsay made repeated requests for help. The Denver Service Center “finally agreed” to send a team to inspect and make recommendations. They arrived in the summer of 1991 and urged immediate repairs. But in 1993, poor humidity control was still identified as a major challenge, harming both the

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39 Memo, Chief, Division of Cultural Resource, NAR (John Maounis) to Regional Curator, NAR (“Trip Report”), June 16, 1989 (Charlestown, Regional Curator Files: folder: Curatorial SPAR 1989 –).
43 Memo, Associate Regional Director Robert W. McIntosh, Jr. to SPAR Superintendent, February 21, 1992 (Charlestown, Regional Curator Files: folder: Curatorial SPAR 1989 –).
44 Memo, David Price to John Guthrie, June 20, 1991 (Charlestown, Regional Curator Files: folder: Curatorial SPAR 1989 –).
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Armory and Olmsted collections. A Park Collections Profile completed that year or the following listed completing the HVAC system as one of three top priorities for the collection.

A separate environmental problem concerned the high-security area in the basement where machine guns, the “most dangerous portion of the collection,” were stored. To save money the dehumidifier programmed for the space had been eliminated, and by 1991 rust and mold were appearing on some weapons. The region’s mechanical engineer visited the site early the following summer and found relative humidity in the storage room hovering at about 85%, a very high level. A dehumidifier installed by the park had proved to be much too small. More seriously, deterioration in the brick foundations and poorly weather-stripped windows were allowing moisture to enter. He advised the park to dig a trench outside the foundation wall, pull off all of the interior wood paneling, and install vapor barriers and masonry sealants, but these were expensive repairs. Three years later the same engineer visited again to assess the same problem. He found similar conditions (although as it was October, the humidity was only 72%) and made the same recommendations, though he now added that, as an “absolute minimum,” four new dehumidifiers should be installed with drainage to the exterior.

Of all the issues left unresolved by the rehabilitation project, only one visibly affected the exterior of the building. The planning decision to establish 1968 as the reference point for restoration and maintenance meant accepting the 1941 concrete loading dock as a permanent feature of the building. It was not a convenient or welcoming entrance for visitors. In 1984, Dwight Pitcaithley had rejected the Denver Service Center’s efforts to make it more appealing in favor of historical authenticity. But still the entrance continued to challenge park managers. At some point, a wheelchair lift and wooden stairway were attached to the northwest face of the tower, but in 1995 these were shifted to the southeast side: the change would “improve and provide for a safer visitor flow” and would ensure that the lift, liable to freeze in the shade, remained usable throughout the winter.

45 Statement for Management. Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Springfield, Massachusetts [February, 1993], (copy lacks signatures on recommended (Superintendent) and approved (Regional Director) lines), p. 11 (SPAR Central Files: A6419: Statement for Management).

46 Memo, Superintendent Beatty to Chief, Engineering & Maintenance Division, NAR, April 17, 1991 (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.).

47 Memos, Chief, Division of Cultural Resource, NAR (John Maounis) to Regional Curator, NAR (Trip Report), June 16, 1989, and David Price to John Guthrie, June 20, 1991 (Charlestown, Regional Curator Files: folder: Curatorial SPAR 1989 –).

48 Memos, Superintendent Beatty to Chief, Engineering & Maintenance Division, NAR, April 17, 1991 (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.); and Regional Mechanical Engineer to Chief, Engineering and Maintenance, NAR, July 2, 1991 (SPAR Central Files: D3415 Buildings (Constr./Maint.)).

49 Memo, Regional Mechanical Engineer Frederick W. Bentley, NAR, to Chief, Division of Engineering, NAR, October 7, 1994 (SPAR Central Files: D46 Fence).

50 Letter (request for concurrence with determination of effect), Acting Regional Director Chrysandra L. Walter to MHC Executive Director Judith McDonough, March 15, 1995 (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.).
If the Main Arsenal continued to demand much of the park’s attention after 1989, other elements of the historic site also required continuing care. Though rehabilitated, the perimeter fence remained vulnerable not only to deterioration but also to injury, as in 1989, when a car crashed through the Byers Street fence, damaging two sections and a supporting column. The Building Conservation Branch of the CRC made repairs the following year, under the supervision of C. Thomas Ballos. Lowenthal, now acting superintendent, praised the BCB’s work, noting that it was “much more complex and intricate than might appear at first.”

Maintaining the perimeter was challenging in other ways. The sidewalks adjacent to the fence belonged to the city, but as is typically the case, local law required property owners to maintain them (Figs. 4.6-7). At the Armory, the fence was accompanied for much of its length by the original red brick pavements, and while they were beautiful and historic, they were also “generally in bad condition.” Yet as a matter of policy the Armory accepted “no responsibility for maintaining” them, and staff was instructed to do nothing beyond occasionally removing grass, weeds, and trash from the base of the fence, and this only to protect the fence. In 1992, the park’s position appeared to soften: describing “overgrown walks with waist high growth and woody plants...,” it sought funds from the region’s new Olmsted Center for Landscape Preservation to determine how best to control weeds, remove piles of sand and earth, and maintain small planting areas. However, it appears that the request was not granted, and the park was still followed established policy in 1995, when Superintendent Beatty recorded that “the only maintenance we currently do on the city owned property is occasional litter pickup and weed control,” undertaken once again simply “to protect NPS property.” It was not that the park was more selfish than other property owners: as a federal agency the NPS was not normally authorized to spend public funds on non-federal property.

The park’s failure to maintain the sidewalks blew up in 1995 when the city issued violations and sought to fine the park for hazardous sidewalks, dilapidated curbs, and piles of

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53 Two Requests for Technical Assistance from the Olmsted Center for Landscape Preservation, with cover memo, Superintendent to Regional Director, NAR, September 11, 1992 (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.)

54 Fax memorandum, Superintendent to Regional Solicitor, April 12, 1995, attached to notices of violation (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.).
litter and debris. The facts were not in dispute. “Sidewalk is hazardous,” conceded Beatty, “with loose bricks and potholes. Curbs are falling over and missing.” In fact, the deterioration of sidewalks and curbs was even “becoming an issue for the park”: if it reached the point of endangering the fence, it would compromise not only a major historic feature but also the park’s “primary security device.” Now the agency’s regional solicitor stepped in, reminding the city that the NPS was both unable to maintain the city-owned sidewalk and exempt from city fines.

That solved the immediate problem but did not fix the sidewalk. Beatty thought he had a solution: three years earlier, the city had been prepared to donate the historic sidewalks to the park, and there had been discussions about operational issues such as how to provide municipal police, fire, and emergency service to federal property. The transfer had not taken place: Beatty still wanted the sidewalks, though “not in current condition.”


55 Two notices of violation, Department of Code Enforcement, April 11, 1995 (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.).
56 Fax memorandum, Superintendent to Regional Solicitor, April 12, 1995, attached to notices of violation (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.).
57 Letter, Anthony R. Conte, Regional Solicitor, to Robert T. Troy, Deputy Director, Department of Code Enforcement, April 12, 1995 (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.).
58 Two Requests for Technical Assistance from the Olmsted Center for Landscape Preservation, with cover memo, Superintendent to Regional Director, NAR, September 11, 1992 (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.).
59 Fax memorandum, Superintendent to Regional Solicitor, April 12, 1995 (SPAR Central Files H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.).
The problem of the perimeter remained unsolved and indeed became more complicated. In 1998, Beatty was forced to ask the city’s director of water and sewer to reconnect the storm sewer lines at the corner of Byers and State Street, which had been disconnected when the city had made a grade change to State Street, the major traffic artery that climbs the hill from downtown: “Runoff from the Gatehouse road inside the park has caused erosion of sidewalks, and undermining of the concrete drive in front of the Armory gate.”

Building 1, the Commanding Officer’s Quarters, remained a puzzle for other reasons. In the park’s early years its treatment followed the same pattern of repairs and upgrades as the other structures: installation of lightning protection in 1977, upgraded utilities in 1981-82, replacement of asbestos pipe insulation with fiberglass in 1985, patching and painting of interiors, replacement of window glass, storm sashes, and new boilers in 1994. But in contrast to the fence or Building 13, no comprehensive treatment followed these minor interventions. The problem with Building 1 was that no one knew what to do with it (Fig. 4.8). During the early years there was talk of furnishing the first floor as a house museum and offering the second floor to civic or community organizations. The house museum idea soon faded away, but the idea of leasing the property continued to seem attractive, perhaps because of the 1980 amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act, which authorized the leasing of certain historic park buildings. Early in 1981, Superintendent Lindsay identified the Commanding Officer’s House and Building 10 as eligible for the new leasing program, and in 1983 the Historic Structures Report reported that it might be “leased to community groups or enterprises” once the park’s administrative offices had moved to the

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60 Memo, Superintendent Beatty to Director of Water and Sewer, City of Springfield, February 24, 1998 (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.).


62 Project Documents for Replacement of Gas-Fired Steam Heating Boilers at Springfield Armory National Historic Site, North Atlantic Regional Office, August 24, 1994 (SPAR Central Files: D5023 Heating and Cooling). The boiler replacement pointed to larger difficulties in upgrading mechanical systems. The “historic heating system” had been “partially replaced” by the Denver Service Center when “doing the new utility work in 1981-82.” But in 1987 park staff reported that the old radiation units, which had not been replaced, were beginning to cause “serious problems.” Meanwhile, regular and extensive repairs were gradually degrading the system: a boiler repair contractor estimated that replacing the system would cost over $10,000, and advised that it should be done before next heating season. The work was tentatively scheduled for that August but either did not take place or did not solve the problem. (See memos, Superintendent to Associate Regional Director, Management and Operations, February 20, 1987; and Chief, Engineering and Maintenance, NAR, to Superintendent March 2, 1987: SPAR Central Files: D5023 Heating and Cooling.)
Main Arsenal. By 1984, however, Lindsay had become convinced that neither structure was eligible for leasing. Why the Commandant’s House was taken off the list can only be surmised, but it may have been the leasing program’s restriction to buildings unrelated to the park’s main purpose.

With leasing off the table, Building 1’s future was more uncertain than ever, and the park planning of the 1980s did not really clarify it: indeed the draft GMP, completed about the time the leasing idea fell through, remarked only that the question needed a decision. The agency continued to invest in systems and finishes but did not make costly improvements like handicapped access that would have been needed to open the building to the public. Without a public purpose, or indeed any clear purpose, the building’s main value was as a reservoir of space for whatever needs arose. Thus in 1987, when the Main Arsenal closed for renovations, Lindsay moved the basement conservation laboratory to the old kitchen and firearms were treated there for the next two years. In 1989 Olmsted NHS, whose collection storage facilities were being rebuilt, reached an agreement with Lindsay and the region to set up a temporary processing lab on the second floor. These episodes, more fully discussed in Chapters Five and Six, were temporary and provisional in nature. The Olmsted processing lab was dismantled in 2006, and as of three years later the building was essentially unoccupied: the spacious double parlor was furnished with inexpensive conference tables, a few pieces of old office furniture were scattered about the upstairs rooms, and some plastic Christmas trees nestled under the attic stairs. The building remained in generally sound condition, but the corrosion of its elaborate iron gallery was beginning to present a significant conservation problem.

It was not lack of an agreed purpose that held back the intended restoration of the cultural landscape but lack of resources. The job of returning the landscape to its 1968 condition would have been enormous (Figs. 3.2, 4.9), and it was perfectly evident during Lindsay’s tenure that many other needs came first. That did not mean the landscape posed no challenges. Like other park elements the grounds were in poor condition, and the new park lacked basic maintenance equipment like chain saws and mowers. Obtaining these things and setting up a maintenance program were needs Lindsay addressed early on.

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64 Memos, Superintendent to Chief, Division of Cult Resources, NAR, February 11, 1981; and to Regional Director, NAR, October 15, 1984 (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.).


67 Memo, David Arnold to Doug Cuillard, September 22, 2004 (Cultural Resources Division files: fol.: Quarter One - SPAR).
The situation changed after about 1989. By then the *General Management Plan* was complete, the terms of the new cooperative agreement settled if not signed, and a rehabilitated Building 13 reopened to the public. The park could take on new priorities, and external factors encouraged managers to focus on the cultural landscape. By the mid-1980s the NPS was beginning to study the preservation of historically or culturally significant landscapes, developing new theoretical approaches as well as management tools, such as the cultural landscape report, a comprehensive study covering the identification, evaluation, and recommended treatment of historically significant landscapes. In 1990 the North Atlantic Region launched a Cultural Landscape Program and in 1991 founded the Olmsted Center for Landscape Preservation. The center began to offer financial and technical assistance to parks within the region. Proposals were assessed competitively, and parks had to meet three criteria: important landscape resources had to be at risk; rescue efforts had to require assistance in landscape maintenance or historic Olmsted

Figure 4.8. Early studies of reuse alternatives for main floor of Building 1 (NPS: Northeast Museum Services Center, Charlestown, MA).

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landscape preservation planning; and projects could demand no more than two weeks of work by staff.69

Springfield Armory responded promptly to the new opportunity. Of seven project statements developed by the Armory in 1991 and related to cultural resources, three focused on the landscape: a Cultural Landscape Report, a Treatment Plan, and Landscape Restoration. These proposals suggest that park staff sought to think comprehensively about the landscape, and in fact, Acting Superintendent Lowenthal was imagining a significant restoration. His preference was for a full restoration, but an alternative was to focus on the upper levels of the site, where both visitor attention and erosion were most intense; even this would cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.70 The focus on the cultural landscape continued. With all but the landscape returned to its 1968 condition, park managers explained in 1993, they now hoped to finish the job, restoring both the landscape’s appearance and its historic use, giving the community “an area in which to picnic, read, etc.... That year the park listed cultural landscape restoration as the first of five major issues facing the park.71 It also made a brief effort to raise $1.22 million for the historic landscape from a combination of federal, state, and private funds.72

A second call for proposals to the Olmsted Center went out in 1992, and within weeks the Armory responded with two, but they were for modest interventions: help in creating a plan for restorative pruning of the park’s shrubbery, which had received “only minimal pruning for several years and is out of control,” and for an annual pruning program to maintain the shrubbery after its restoration.73 The proposals were not funded,74 but the

69 Memo, Acting Regional Director (Marie Rust) to Superintendents, NAR, February 6, 1992 (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.).

70 “Resource Management Plan,” prepared by Larry Lowenthal, approved by Acting Regional Director, May 21, 1991 (SPAR Central Files: D18 (filed loose)). In 1984, according to the plan, the Denver Service Center had estimated the partial restoration proposal at $222,000.

71 Statement for Management. Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Springfield, Massachusetts [February, 1993], (copy lacks signatures on recommended (Superintendent) and approved (Regional Director) lines), p. 10 (SPAR Central Files: A6419: Statement for Management).


73 Cover memo, Superintendent to Acting Regional Director, NAR, March 5, 1992, attached to Request for Technical Assistance from the Olmsted Center for Landscape Preservation for Annual Landscape Maintenance Plan, and Request for Technical Assistance from the Olmsted Center for Landscape Preservation for Restore Landscape Maintenance Program (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.).

74 Not funded: Olmsted Center for Landscape Preservation, FY92 Technical Assistance Project List, with cover memo, Acting Regional Director to Superintendents, NAR, April 27, 1992; Olmsted’s assistance: Request for Technical Assistance from the Olmsted Center for Historic Landscape Assessment (with cover memo from Superintendent to Regional Director, September 11, 1992); Superintendent Beatty: Request for Technical Assistance from the Olmsted Center for Landscape Preservation for Annual Landscape Maintenance Plan, and Request for Technical Assistance from the Olmsted Center for Landscape Preservation for Restore Landscape Maintenance Program (all SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.).
Center evidently helped in some way, for later that year the Armory commented that Olmsted’s assistance had “started the park toward restoring a neat appearance and preparing a Landscape Maintenance Plan.” However, the Armory now pointed out that the result of carrying out the plan would be merely to perpetuate existing conditions, which were “only partially correct” in relation to the 1968 goal. Thus the park’s next step was to seek help preparing a Historic Landscape Assessment, essentially an intermediate step towards what Superintendent Beatty called a full historic landscape report and treatment plan. Again, the request was not funded. The park tried once more in 1995, this time for help pruning low-hanging or dead branches from the site’s old and historic trees – a practice consistent, the proposal emphasized, with the Armory’s historical practice of pruning for “visitor safety and effect.” The park proposed to augment its own maintenance crew with a bucket truck, chipper, and three to four maintenance employees borrowed from other parks, at a cost of $8,000. Again the request was not funded.

Figure 4.9. Fountain and pool between Commanding Officer’s Quarters (Building 1) and Main Arsenal (Building 13) ca. 1950 (NPS: Cultural Landscapes Inventory, Part 2b, 2004).

75 Memo, Regional Director NAR to Superintendents January 13, 1993 (SPAR Central Files: H3019 Special Studies (Hist.)).

While larger landscape ambitions remained out of reach, the Armory continued to carry out routine landscaping and maintenance work. In 1994-95, for example, “roads and walkways throughout the Park” (i.e. the federal portion of the park) were repaired and resurfaced and sprinklers near the Main Arsenal replaced, at a cost of a little over $145,000.77 Park managers also grappled with some of the more puzzling implications of the 1968 restoration goal. One concerned a disused tennis court, a concrete slab just west of the Main Arsenal. It had entered the List of Classified Structures by 1981, when an Inventory Report noted that it had been built about 1932 and was “one of the earliest work relief projects at the Armory.” As the report also noted, the tennis court was in poor condition.78 “This park,” wrote Superintendent Lindsay when he reviewed the list, “continues to be astounded by the official attention devoted by the Regional Office to this concrete slab....”79 For Regional Historian Dwight Pitcaithley it was a matter of principle, similar to the Main Arsenal’s concrete loading dock: “it was there during the historic period,” and he felt strongly that it should be recognized as part of the historic cultural landscape.80 When the list was updated in 1994, the tennis court was still on it, prompting Superintendent Beatty to ask the regional office to consider removing it, as it had “no real interpretive or historic value.”81 It not only remains on the updated LCS of 2006 but is listed there as belonging to the highest category of importance: “MUST BE PRESERVED AND MAINTAINED.”82

THE CAMPUS

The college campus comprised well over half of the National Historic Site, including all of the parade ground, the buildings on three sides, and the entire access route followed by visitors and staff. Everything that visitors surveyed from the entrance to the Main Arsenal belonged to the college. That included some of the park’s most badly deteriorated buildings as well as some of its most intractable management problems.

As already described, the relationship between the NPS and the college was grounded in the cooperative agreement, which in turn was based on the park’s authorizing legislation. In practice, decisions relating to the college campus turned out to demand almost constant attention from the park’s superintendent and staff, partly because of extensive

78 “Classified Structure Field Inventory Reports” for Tennis Court, August 20, 1981 (Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder H3017 - Springfield Armory).
79 Memo, SPAR Superintendent to Associate Regional Director, Planning and Resource Preservation, NAR, February 10, 1982 (Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder H30 Springfield Armory – Park General).
80 Dwight Pitcaithley: recorded interview with author, May 28, 2009.
81 Memo, Superintendent to NARO/CRM LCS Team, February 22, 1994 (SPAR Central Files: H3017)...
interconnections in areas like utilities and services, partly because of shortcomings in the cooperative agreement, and partly because of friction over the treatment of historic buildings. There was plenty of day-to-day cooperation. But former superintendents Lindsay and Beatty both recall having to be constantly alert for sudden, unannounced, and unauthorized college operations that could quickly damage historic buildings or landscape features. Sometimes the college simply did not think to obtain permission first: even when it did, it expected rapid approval.

The NPS’s ability to manage this complicated situation was circumscribed in several ways. The cooperative agreement ceded “administrative jurisdiction” over the campus to the college; moreover, the agency believed its underlying constitutional authority was weak. Even if the agency had not sought to cultivate a good relationship with the college, the politics of the situation would have discouraged blunt assertions of power. Superintendent Lindsay learned quickly about the college’s political power. Edmond Garvey, its founder, was an admired and influential figure. Edward P. Boland was one of the most powerful Congressmen in Washington. The college also had easy access to legislative leaders in Boston, like Ways and Means Chairman Anthony M. Scibelli, whose nephew became college president in 1983. The State Historic Preservation Office added another factor: an arm of the governor’s office, the SHPO was the arbiter of Section 106 reviews, including not only projects proposed by the college but also those of the park itself, so that in effect the NPS relied on the state for many important decisions. Yet the NPS’s regional office had a “tough relationship” with the SHPO, which tended to distrust the agency’s motives and to look askance at its proposals. Finally, the NPS’s complex internal structure may have added to the difficulty of pursuing a consistently assertive line with the college.

The difficulties of the situation were revealed in a stream of day-to-day decisions about the campus buildings. An early incident occurred in 1979. The college had just renovated Building 8 as an admissions office, and president Geitz now asked Superintendent Lindsay for permission to demolish the porch, noting that it was “badly deteriorated,” would be costly to repair or replace, and in any case was not part of the original building. Lindsay graciously offered to refer the request to the agency’s historic preservation office in Boston. Yet, he did not support the college: completing the required assessment of the proposal’s effect on cultural resources a few days later, he noted that “preservation of the historic appearance of these buildings was a key objective throughout the legislative history of the park,” and reminded state preservation officials that “the lengthy time needed to establish the park was in part due to the controversy of this control by the National Park service over

84 Dwight Pitcaithley: recorded interview with author, May 28, 2009.
85 Letter, Robert C. Geitz (President, S.T.C.C.) to Lindsay, June 28, 1979 (Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR - Springfield Com. College, removal of porch...).
86 Letter, Lindsay to Geitz (President, S.T.C.C.), July 3, 1979 (Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR - Springfield Community College, removal of porch...).
the college’s facilities.”87 Later that summer, Lindsay reported to the college that the NPS preferred “repair and restoration” to removal of the porch, but that it went “beyond our jurisdiction” to “formally review” its removal.88 The latter statement was incorrect, and a few months later the regional office told the college so: a closer look at the cooperative agreement had showed that the NPS could, in fact, “review and concur or not with proposed actions affecting the exterior appearance of Buildings 7, 8, and 9.” And in this case, the NPS did not concur: the porch was a “historic element of the structure and scene.” Instead of granting permission to tear it down, the agency would provide technical advice on repairing and restoring it.89

Apart from confusion on the agency’s part, the incident shows that the college was prepared to submit requests to the NPS and that the NPS was willing to deny them in favor of preservation. Yet by the early 1980s the agency’s review process was changing, as suggested by another incident in 1984. Construction of the new Biological Science Building was underway, and college officials realized the college would soon face a “very serious problem...the perennial one of inadequate parking facilities....” They turned to the park for help in “obtaining permission for the College to use a section of the Green” for construction parking. The college promised to fence the area and to “return it to its former condition.”90 This time, Lindsay did not offer to submit the request to the regional office but instead advised the college to apply directly to the SHPO, who would “coordinate the response” with the regional office.91 The college did so, but the application proved to be for construction staging rather than parking. It was only now that the NPS commented, finding the proposal acceptable on certain conditions.92 The SHPO approved the proposal.93

87 Form XXX, “Assessment of Effect on Cultural Resources, signed Lindsay, dated July 18, 1979 (Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR - Springfield Community College, removal of porch...).

88 According to letter, Acting Regional Director Gilbert W. Calhoun to S.T.C.C. President, Geitz February 11, 1980 (Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR - Springfield Community College, removal of porch...).

89 Letter, Acting Regional Director Gilbert W. Calhoun to S.T.C.C. President Geitz (February 11, 1980 (Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR - Springfield Community College, removal of porch...).

90 Letter, S.T.C.C. Acting Dean of Admin Services Robert J. Donoghue to Lindsay, August 13, 1984 (Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR - Parking).

91 Letter, Lindsay to Donoghue, August 24, 1984 (Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR - Parking).

92 Proposal: letter, Donoghue to Patricia Weslowski (SHPO), August 30, 1984; NPS comments: letter, Pitcaithley (title cut off page) to Joseph Orfant (MHC), September 19, 1984 (both: Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR - Parking). The NPS’s conditions were that the Green not be used for parking and that the college attractively fence off the construction site, and re-sod and re-landscape the area, within which as many as fifteen trees might be killed.

93 Letter, Executive Director and SHPO ValTalmage () to Donoghue, October 17, 1984 (Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR - Parking).
The ruling suggested the limitations of federal preservation law as a tool for park management. The state had pledged in the cooperative agreement not to sponsor or permit “any use of the Preservation Control Area that is inconsistent with...public visitation to and enjoyment of the area.”\textsuperscript{94} Obviously the construction activity would impair public visitation and enjoyment, yet the ruling did not address this point. The SHPO could have done so, as the procedures for Section 106 reviews included similar standards, yet the SHPO did not have to. The point is not that the decision was incorrect, or that the NPS would have made a different one, but simply that the agency had put itself in a role that was no more than advisory in matters that directly concerned the administration of a national park: in relying on the SHPO’s management of Section 106 it had diminished its own ability to manage the Armory and to ensure that the intent of the cooperative agreement was met.

The difficulties of management under these conditions can be further observed in two incidents that took place in 1986–87. Building 15 was now nearing completion, and the contractor was storing construction materials in or next to Building 10. Lindsay feared the building was being “mistreated,” so Regional Director Cables asked State Historic Preservation Officer Valerie Talmage to ask the state’s Division of Capital Planning and Operations to “exercise a bit more caution in allowing construction equipment and supplies in and around this historic structure.” In making this request Cables described Building 10 as “adjacent” to NPS property but did not mention that it was actually \textit{within} a unit of the National Park system.\textsuperscript{95} This was no mere oversight. Approving the college’s request to install lighting on the parade ground in 1987, the SHPO stated that “the project location is listed in the National and State Registers of Historic Places” but, like Cables, did not mention that it was located \textit{within} a unit of the National Park system.\textsuperscript{96} More troublingly, it appears that the NPS had not even been informed of the application, for a few months later, Regional Director Cables protested and asked the SHPO to notify the park of future college requests so that the comments of his staff could be “factored into” the SHPO’s determinations. He also took the opportunity to remind Talmage that the NPS, as “administrator” of the Main Arsenal “that borders the west end of the Parade Ground,” was “interested in changes to the college buildings and grounds that may affect the site’s historic character.” Stressing the need to protect “the site’s structural and spatial integrity” from adverse affects, he noted that the Armory was “not only listed in state and national historic registers, but was also designated a National Historic Landmark in 1960.”\textsuperscript{97} But, he did not mention its location within a national

\textsuperscript{94} “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,” signed and dated March 27, 1978, Art. II.c. Emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{95} Letter, Cables to MHC Executive Director Talmage, April 15, 1986 (Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR, Bldg. #10...).

\textsuperscript{96} Letter, MHC Executive Director Valerie A. Talmage to Scibelli, June 2, 1987 (Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR Parade Ground lighting S.T.C.C.).

\textsuperscript{97} Letter, Cables to MHC Executive Director Valerie A. Talmage, October 27, 1987 (Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR Parade Ground lighting S.T.C.C.).
Rehabilitating the Armory

Perhaps he believed it was irrelevant to a Section 106 review. Yet a 1980 Advisory Council decision in Lowell had noted not only adverse effect on a National Register district but also specifically on the national park.

In all of these incidents, the NPS had to balance the desire to cultivate the college’s good will with the need to uphold preservation standards. Lindsay’s maneuvering on the porch of Building 8 has already been mentioned. A similar issue arose in 1991, when the college asked for guidance on repairing the porch of Building 14, the Middle Arsenal: the sandstone-on-brick base was slumping and the college proposed to replace it with poured concrete. Rather than simply rejecting this as unacceptable, NPS historical architect Richard Crisson offered to provide “more definite plans and more detailed cost estimates.” It appeared the college would accept these, and Acting Superintendent Lowenthal thanked the Building Conservation Branch, remarking that “This is a good chance to have some input, keep channels of communication open, etc.”

Park superintendents liked to be helpful whenever they could, as in 1994, when the college asked for rapid approval to replace the roof and two doors on Building 35. Within two days, Beatty conferred with the region’s Cultural Resources Center, talked with the college’s director of facilities, and put the agency’s approval in writing. “It is a pleasure sharing the National Park Service Site with you,” the college’s director of facilities wrote to Superintendent Beatty on another occasion. A good personal relationship could help the superintendent dispose of the innumerable small matters, like fire hydrants and message boards that required his attention. At times the college may have taken advantage of the park’s goodwill. Sometimes haste and poor planning prompted requests to bend the rules. Thus in August, 1998, work on a utility trench was delayed due to backlogged material delivery and then “suddenly scheduled” for a date less than a week away. The college needed to have the work done almost instantly in order to have new heating and air-conditions ready by the start of classes, and the park now received an “urgent request” to prepare and submit Section 106 documentation. Though the college lacked “all information necessary to implement the 106,” the park nonetheless made and supported the request, arguing that the required archeological survey should be waived.

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99 Letter, S.T.C.C. Director of Engineering Services Michael J. Cichonski to Beatty, December 20, 1994 SPAR– Central Files: D3415 Buildings (Constr./Maint.).

100 The ruling was that the NPS would accept the new roofing because it was not visible to the public. Though the doors were in full public view, the Cultural Resources Center recommended approval “as long as the visual integrity is maintained.” Letter, Beatty to Cichonski, December 22, 1994 (SPAR Central Files: D3415 Buildings (Constr./Maint.).

because previous investigations suggested a low likelihood of encountering valuable remains. The request was granted.  

At other times, it seems that not only the college but also other state agencies forgot that the park was more than a mere neighbor: the 1987 incident, in which the college neglected to inform the park of its proposal for new lighting on the parade ground, was not an isolated incident. In 2003, Superintendent Cuillard became frustrated by the failure of the college or its consultants to provide the necessary Section 106 documentation for stabilizing and renovating Buildings 5/6 and 11. “Time is short,” he reminded the college’s facilities manager, and “in spite of numerous meetings between DCAM, STCC, OMR, MHC and HPS, Mr. Krabbendam and DCAM have apparently misunderstood that any Section 106 submission involving the buildings on the S.T.C.C. Campus must also be submitted to the park’s Section 106 Team.”

THE CONDITION OF THE CAMPUS

The overriding issue shaping the interactions of park and college was the condition of the college’s buildings. Their survival had long been a concern, and the NPS had made early but unsuccessful efforts to ensure their long-term maintenance. In 1978, when the college was seeking permission to demolish the two officers quarters and construct Building 15, the agency tried to add an amendment to the deed by which the property had been transferred to the state, requiring the college to maintain ten key buildings at a standard “sufficient to minimize the possibility of natural or man caused deterioration or destruction.” The amendments were not accepted. The following year, Lindsay recorded in his Statement for Management that NPS officials were worried that the college’s maintenance funding “may not be sufficient at all times to adequately preserve the historic resources on their portion of the site.” The Statement for Management was not approved.

At first, NPS officials worried more about outright demolition than protracted neglect, but as time went on, deterioration began to loom larger as a threat. A fundraising leaflet prepared in 1992 or 1993 spoke of “...propped-up porticos and crumbling steps,” of

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103 Email, Superintendent Cuillard to S.T.C.C. Facility Manager, Victor Focosi (February 5, 2003 (SPAR Central Files: A 44 Ad. Extorg S.T.C.C. - Never Destroy).


105 Statement for Management. Springfield Armory National Historic Site, signed and dated Doug Lindsay, August 27, 1979, as preparer (approved line unsigned) (SPAR Central Files: A6419: Statement for Management).
the “critical need for stabilization and renovation.” Many of the college buildings, it reported, had “fallen into extreme, almost hazardous disrepair.”¹⁰⁶ In 1997, Beatty castigated the college for the “deplorable and shameful neglect” of its historic buildings and even made addressing it a requirement for renewing the cooperative agreement.¹⁰⁷ Seeking funds in 2003, the college described Buildings 5/6 as “succumbing to progressive deterioration as a result of deferred maintenance.” No longer watertight, the structure had suffered severe water damage; animals, birds, and vandals had entered freely and exacerbated the damage. Without massive intervention, warned the college, the building’s survival was “questionable.”¹⁰⁸

Of more immediate concern to park officials than the buildings’ survival was the “negative image for visitors” their deteriorated condition created.¹⁰⁹ In 1999, Superintendent Beatty told state legislators that “the obvious exterior deterioration and safety hazards of this [Building 11] and adjacent historic structures cause constant public comment...,” forcing Beatty and his staff to respond almost daily to the criticisms of visitors who blamed the NPS for their condition.¹¹⁰ The deterioration was all too obvious. Visitors had to pass some of the worst buildings on their way to the museum, and even within Armory Square, it could hardly be hidden. Indeed the series of wayside exhibits installed in 1988 inadvertently called attention to the problem by including sign panels on Buildings 10 and 19, two important yet badly decayed structures: though located on walkways near the Main Arsenal, the panels offered “a good view” towards the buildings in question.¹¹¹

Though there was never any doubt that the college and the state were responsible for the campus’s deterioration, the buildings’ condition at the outset is no longer entirely clear. In 2003, President Scibelli actually insinuated that the Army was actually to blame for the condition of Buildings 5/6, claiming that during the “closing years” of the Armory’s existence

¹⁰⁷ Letter, Beatty to Scibelli, December 1, 1997 (SPAR Central Files: A-4415 MOU between the USA and Commonwealth of MA).
¹⁰⁹ Statement for Management. Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Springfield, Massachusetts [February, 1993], copy lacks signatures on recommended (Superintendent) and approved (Regional Director) lines (SPAR Central Files: A6419: Statement for Management).
¹¹⁰ Letter, Beatty to Thomas Finneran (Massachusetts State Senate), August 23, 1999 (identical letters to 4 other state senators and 13 members of Massachusetts House of Reps) (SPAR Central Files: A 44 Ad. Extorg S.T.C.C. - Never Destroy).
the “previously superb level of Army maintenance declined.”112 Contemporary evidence provides at best ambiguous support for this accusation. It is true that, in 1963, one Springfield resident cited “signs of long neglect” along the north side of Armory Square: “the litter and neglect of the grounds which were apparently not cleared of leaves et cetera last Fall, reflects carelessness in maintenance....At one time every portion of this property was well cared for and, indeed, was a show place in the heart of the city.”113 Yet NPS staff, checking on the condition of the National Historic Landmark in 1959, had found it in “excellent” condition.114 Later, in 1965, Massachusetts Governor John A. Volpe (who had once been a contractor) assured Defense Secretary McNamara that he had personally examined the Armory and that “the maintenance there has been really unbelievable.”115 Most interesting was the judgment of NPS staff making a routine inspection in 1969 that “nothing in the way of periodic maintenance appears to have been done yet by the college on either the Middle or West Arsenals and we feel their condition may be described as only fair.”116 They found the Main Arsenal, now in the care of the nonprofit museum, “in no better condition.” These statements cut both ways: on the one hand, the college’s lack of maintenance was flagged as a problem long before the park was established; on the other, if the condition of these buildings had been truly excellent in 1967, it is hard to see how two years of neglect would have reduced it to merely “fair.”

In sum, glowing reports of Armory Square’s condition at the end of the Army’s tenure should probably be taken with a grain of salt. Yet the evidence does not point to widespread neglect or deterioration before the college arrived in 1967. The West and Middle Arsenals were not in such poor condition that the college could not put them immediately to use, the former as a Student Union, the latter as classrooms and offices. It was after 1978, in any case, that the condition of the campus began to divert ever more dramatically from the federal sector. By 1989 the NPS had put substantial sums into restoring the Main Arsenal, the fence, and Building 1, while Victor Focosi, taking up his duties as college director of facilities at about that time, encountered a “tremendous, overwhelming challenge: crumbling exterior

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115 “Hon. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, meets with Massachusetts Congressional Delegation at the Pentagon Building, Washington, D.C., on Saturday, February 27, 1965” [transcript of meeting], p. 27 (SPAR Archives).

masonry in “just horrible” condition; buildings whose copper leaders had been stolen and never replaced, leaving water washing down the walls; a “mishmash” of “old factory wiring” and “antique” sprinkler systems; leaking roofs and rotting woodwork.117

Why did the college allow the campus to fall into such disrepair? According to Dwight Pitcaithley regional officials at the time were convinced that the “very significant” preservation problems of the campus were “well beyond the fiscal capabilities of the college.”118 In 1987 President Scibelli offered a similar explanation, blaming the state’s “awesome and often confusing” capital funding system and arguing that consistent maintenance funding would have prevented the deterioration.119 Five years later the college blamed the problem on “drastic cuts in state funding” that had “eliminated” its ability to provide “even a minimum level of stabilization.” These explanations had merit, and many years later both Scibelli and former Physical Plant Manager Victor Focosi continued to emphasize the difficulty of obtaining state funding. Yet the “drastic cuts” blamed in 1992-93 were recent: at worst, they exacerbated a longstanding problem, one moreover that had developed even as the college grew in size, prestige, and funding: by 1992, indeed, S.T.C.C. was the most comprehensive institution in the state’s community college system and one of the largest, with over 6,000 day and evening students, 41 different associate degree programs, and four 1-year certificate programs. Nor was the capital budgeting system, despite its shortcomings, entirely to blame. The college had been well funded: over the previous twenty-five years, the state had invested more than $50 million in its physical plant. The problem was that none of that funding had gone into the historic buildings. And that was no accident but the result of conscious decisions to spend money elsewhere. The college said as much:

It was the intent of the original Master Plan to remove all of the existing buildings on the site and replace them with new facilities. This decision led to a lack of funds for the maintenance of those buildings to be destroyed. The end result was serious deterioration in their physical condition, externally and internally.120

College officials maintained that it was not until the cooperative agreement was actually signed in 1978 that they realized “the initial master plan would have to be revised.” The result, as even they admitted, was that for the first eleven years of the college’s history not a penny was appropriated for the historic buildings, even for basic maintenance: the first repairs were not made until 1979.121

117 Victor Focosi, recorded interview with author, June 1, 2009.
118 Dwight Pitcaithley, recorded interview with author, May 28, 2009.
The change in attitude, when it finally came, was slow but real. In 1972, when President Geitz pointed to the “beautiful campus” as one reason for the college’s success, he meant the *Master Plan* and the new buildings: though the college had been “renovating all usable space on Armory Square for classrooms, laboratories, and offices,” these improvements were “only temporary.” In 1991 the college offered a very different assessment: now “the original Armory structures and grounds...enhanced and fostered the image of a bucolic college campus,” the Parade Ground provided “the aesthetics of a college quadrangle,” and “the brick construction of the original Armory buildings, complete with ivy, reflect the character of traditional New England academic buildings.” If the new appreciation did not translate directly into genuine stewardship, at least it was not inconsistent with it.

It was under President Collamore, around 1983, that the college first acknowledged the problem of the deteriorating campus. A *Capital Plan* prepared that year conceded that the parade ground had “deteriorated to the point where it is filled with weeds and other plantings not suitable for a proper Parade Ground” and that the college faced several hundred thousand dollars in emergency repairs simply on the exteriors of the historic buildings. Describing the NHL designation and the “joint occupancy” arrangement with the NPS and as a “mixed blessing,” the college’s five-year plan noted that the situation imposed “constraints” that had to be “clearly understood by all concerned if we are to avoid unnecessary delays in improving our facilities” to meet college goals. Though hardly a warm endorsement of the park, the plan at least acknowledged it, and it also explicitly rejected previous college policy, claiming that the failure to accept the “constraints” of the site had “jeopardized the College’s growth.” The new plan called for “renovation and restoration” of many existing Armory buildings. President Scibelli, Collamore’s successor, continued the new direction. He worked hard to improve relations with the NPS. And his concern for the historic campus was sincere. “It’s a shame what has happened to the older buildings on our campus,” he told the press in 1987. “This didn’t have to happen. If we had put out a few thousand dollars every year from the beginning, our campus would be in good shape today.”

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122 *President’s Five Year Report*, S.T.C.C., [1972] (S.T.C.C.: President’s Office files).


By 1983 college officials understood both the urgency and the magnitude of the maintenance challenge. As they explained to state funding authorities, “If the old buildings are allowed to deteriorate as they are now doing, the college will not be able to fulfill its original purpose and the land [and] buildings may be lost.” They embraced the new vision with enthusiasm, arguing that rehabilitation would be “cheaper than any new construction” and pointing to pilot projects which had shown “what can be done on [sic] refurbishing these historic buildings to meet our needs.” In sum, the college assured state officials, “We will be able to demonstrate that you can blend the old and the new and provide our graduates with the most dynamic and exciting campus in Massachusetts! – and all within a historic site”\(^\text{128}\)

Four items in the college’s new *Capital Plan* related to preservation. First were exterior repairs. Funding had already been secured to paint the trim on about 2,000 windows, and “emergency roof repairs” were underway. But in consultation with the NPS, the college had also accepted the need for about $350,000 worth of “emergency repairs” to Buildings 5/6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 19, and 27, covering both woodwork (“rotting”) and stone stairs and stoops (“crumbling and in dire need or [sic] repair”). The second item was the renovation and restoration of Buildings 15/16, at a cost of $1,780,000 –“minimal when you consider the cost of constructing brand new facilities to house these disciplines.” The third concerned the restoration and adaptive re-use of Building 19 at about the same cost: “It will be a perfect example of adapting these historic buildings for educational purposes.” The fourth was to repair the perimeter fence, which was in danger of collapsing and injuring passersby as a section of the NPS-maintained fence had recently done. The cost would be $579,000: by using the specifications already developed by NPS the college could save “a considerable amount of time, effort, and cost....”

Despite these ambitious proposals, the plan revealed that progress towards the college’s new preservation goals would be slow. Major utility improvements would have to be made before work could even begin. Moreover, construction had not yet started on the one “major new academic building” carried over from the original *Master Plan*, Building 15. The state board had made it the “number one priority”; the Board of Regents ranked all of the disciplines to be housed there as “high priority.”\(^\text{129}\)

In fact, the college’s commitment to preservation remained ambivalent at best, as the long list of priorities presented in the *Capital Plan* made clear. The first was Building 15, “vitally needed” to support the college’s “leadership role in Technical and Allied Health education.” Priorities 2 through 4 encompassed upgrading existing elevators throughout the campus, improving access to buildings in order to comply with federal requirements, improving utility distribution systems, upgrading energy conservation, acquiring land, and constructing a parking lot. Item 5, exterior repairs to historic buildings, was the first preservation project. Sixth came renovation of Building 27 as a Learning Resource Center.


\(^{129}\) Ibid., pp. 354-358.
Priorities 7 and 8 returned to preservation (renovation and restoration of Buildings 15/16 and 19), 9 and 10 focused on athletics (including more new construction), and 11 returned once more to preservation (repairs to the fence).\textsuperscript{130} Though argued with compelling urgency and enthusiasm then, preservation needs did not score very well in competition with other building priorities. They did slightly worse in the plan’s accompanying budget requests, which demoted “repair and restoration of exteriors of historic buildings” to Priority 6 (below Building 15, handicapped access modifications, secondary utility distribution, a new parking facility, and “Roof, Gutter and Downspout Maintaintence [sic]...”):\textsuperscript{131} the remaining preservation items scored lower still. To make matters still worse, investment of any kind in the physical plant was a low priority for the college by this time: a list of twelve college-wide goals compiled in 1991 included only one relating to the campus – “to maintain a modern physical plant” – and that scored dead last.\textsuperscript{132} With six power plant technicians, two carpenters, one painter, one electrician, and no plumber to look after a million square feet of space, Victor Focosi’s facilities department was distinctly understaffed.\textsuperscript{133}

The gap between rhetoric and actual spending revealed by policy statements is confirmed by the recollections of two key figures, Andrew Scibelli and Victor Focosi, who served as director of facilities from the late 1980s until 2008. Focosi, who was born and bred in Springfield during the Armory’s glory days, remembers feeling a “tremendous feeling of responsibility” for the Armory as a historic site, and his concern for the old buildings was real and constant. Yet Focosi’s main responsibility was maintaining and upgrading the campus “for the mission of the college” – not for historic preservation. He estimates that over a fifteen-year period about 10 to 15% of the facilities budget, or perhaps $4-4.5 million, was spent on upgrading the historic buildings. This was only slightly more than was spent about 1999 in removing lead and asbestos from Building 27. Even when the focus was on the historic buildings, the major concerns were “fire, health, and safety,” rather than protection of historic features.\textsuperscript{134} Basic infrastructure needs for items like updated wiring, sprinklers, and removal of asbestos were substantial. Scibelli’s account is similar. Increasingly frustrated by the buildings’ deterioration, he sought to excite the interest of state officials and legislators in the campus’s plight and reminded the state of its legal commitment to maintain the buildings. But like Focosi he never forgot where the college’s priorities lay. Given the scarcity of money, the “built-in conflict” between preservation and the college’s other needs


\textsuperscript{133} Victor Focosi, recorded interview with author, June 1, 2009.

\textsuperscript{134} Victor Focosi, recorded interview with author, June 1, 2009.
often forced him to “put the buildings in the background.” Indeed, he says, even if he could have taken the state funding for Building 15 and used it instead to rehabilitate all of the historic buildings he would not have done so: Building 15 was a “no-brainer.”

If the hypothetical choice between Building 15 and the historic campus never arose, others did. In spring 1987 President Scibelli rolled out plans for a $150,000 state-funded master plan study to guide the renovation of nineteen historic buildings, including a $14,000,000 “preservation project” to rehabilitate the eight buildings most in need of work (Fig. 4.10). One of those was Building 19. “It’s a slum,” he remarked, “especially in contrast to the new buildings behind it….I’d like to see the thing painted and sandblasted, at the very least.”

Little came of the preservation initiative. Yet just three days before the roll-out, STCC announced that it had spent $1.1 million to acquire a former motel building which had been in use as a dormitory and student dining space (Fig. 4.11). The building would now be demolished in order to “ease a parking crunch” by providing 320 new parking spaces for students. Unlike the preservation project, this effort was successful: in due course the motel was demolished and the parking spaces provided.

Reluctance to spend money on the historic buildings was not the only factor impeding their rehabilitation. Though the original Master Plan had been put aside, no clear plan for using the historic Armory Square had taken its place. Nor did the college need all of the space it could rehabilitate: in fact, it appeared to have overbuilt, so that by 1987 its ratio of space to students exceeded that permitted by the state. Rather than occupying the vacant buildings, NPS officials feared that the college might have to consolidate space, leading to a “push to abandon whatever historic buildings they are now using in favor of the new construction [i.e. Building 15].”

Certainly the college revealed considerable uncertainty about how to use the buildings. In 1987 Scibelli announced that Building 11, “now vacant and unusable,” would be rehabilitated for day care and early childhood education. Yet when it was eventually restored it was for college offices. This pattern was more pronounced at Building 19, the vast and dilapidated storehouse whose 765-foot-long arcaded facade and 100,000 square-foot bulk stretched behind the college’s new buildings to the north of the parade ground (Figs. 1.10, 4.12).

When Scibelli became president in 1983 he found Building 19 being used to stable the city police department’s horses. He also found “trouble brewing”: federal officials had objected that this was a misuse of property intended for educational purposes, and they threatened to take it back. The horses were gone by 1984 or 85, leaving the building once

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135 Andrew M. Scibelli, recorded interview with author, June 4, 2009.
138 Memo, Chief, Cultural Resources Harrison, NAR to SPAR Superintendent, November 9, 1987 (Boston Support Office, SPAR Planning File: fol. untitled).
again vacant.\textsuperscript{139} The 1983 \textit{Capital Plan} had announced big plans for it: “ideally suited for multi-purpose functions which are vitally needed on this campus,” its renovation would combine “the ‘Quincy Market Concept’ and a ‘Trombe Wall’ for energy savings” into “the most exciting Student Center in the nation!” The first floor was big enough to accommodate the entire student service operation, including admissions, registration, counseling and guidance, and financial aid, the second for administrative offices which would be moved from Building 16. Rehabilitating Building 19, in short, would meet critical space needs identified in the original \textit{Master Plan} while providing “a perfect example of adapting these historic buildings for educational purposes.”\textsuperscript{140} Yet within a few years, the student center had apparently been forgotten and “obsolete college equipment” was being stored there instead.\textsuperscript{141} Announcing the restoration study in 1987, Scibelli suggested the ground floor could be used for parking, upstairs perhaps for occupational education. The following year Congressman Boland sought Congressional funding for a feasibility study to assess the building’s potential for reuse. The college now sought to assess the building’s potential as an advanced technology training center. And President Scibelli was in a hurry.\textsuperscript{142}

Interior was not at first very supportive: the work had a “low priority within the Service,” in part because the building was neither owned nor used by the NPS. Under the circumstances, Interior pointed out, the funding request “runs counter to the President’s goal of reducing the large Federal deficit.”\textsuperscript{143} Nevertheless, Congress approved the measure,\textsuperscript{144} giving the NPS $100,000 for a joint NPS/college initiative in which the agency would produce a historic structure report and would recruit and manage an architectural/engineering firm to produce feasibility and suitability reports.\textsuperscript{145} By 1991 the

\textsuperscript{139} Andrew M. Scibelli: recorded interview with author, June 4, 2009. Scibelli recalls that it was the regional office of the NPS that objected. However, the nature of the objection and the threat make it more likely that it was the Department of Education, enforcing the terms of the 1968 deed of release.

\textsuperscript{140} Springfield Technical Community College, “Long Range Capital Plans and Budget Requests for Fiscal Year 1985,” October 3, 1983, pp. 11-12. (S.T.C.C.: President’s Office files). Though the plan explicitly acknowledged the need to preserve Building 19, it is unclear how a trombe wall would have been compatible with this goal, since the technology called for affixing large panels to the exterior of the building.


\textsuperscript{142} Letter, Andrew M. Scibelli to Cables, October 4, 1988, and Cables to Scibelli, November 9, 1988 (Charlestown, CRM Division Files: folder SPAR “Caserne” bldg....).

\textsuperscript{143} Department of the Interior, fact sheet on proposed amendment, “Provide planning funds for the rehabilitation of Building 19, Springfield, Massachusetts,” June 3, 1988 (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.).

\textsuperscript{144} Fiscal 1991 Budget Briefing Statement, SPAR, February 7, 1989 (SPAR Central Files: H3019 Special Studies (Hist.)).

\textsuperscript{145} Task Directive, CRM Division, NAR, for \textit{Historic Structures Report – Building 19 (Caserne)}, December 14, 1990. See also Notice of Award to Einhorn Yaffee Prescott, September 26, 1991 (both SPAR Central Files: H3019 Special Studies (Hist.)).
Historic Structure Report had established that the building was “...stable but deteriorated. Years of deferred maintenance and inattention to the building’s historic integrity” had led to water infiltration, pigeons, illegal dumping, harsh weathering, and vandalism. The building was suffering from a “severe case of rising dampness,” drainage was blocked by a “defunct gutter system,” cars and tracks carelessly parked on an asphalt apron extending right up to the walls had caused “trauma to the brick piers,” and so forth. The good news was that “most situations can be rectified,” and the experts gave the college a basic Maintenance Plan to prevent the existing damage from worsening past the point of reparability.146

By June 1992 the firm of Einhorn Yaffee Prescott of Albany, NY, responsible for the feasibility and suitability study,147 was able to present two options for the technology center, now called the Western Massachusetts Center for Advanced Technology, or WMCAT (Fig. 4.13). Both would fully occupy Building 19, but Option B would also annex Building 32 by fitting a circulation spine into the intervening notch, thereby gaining enough additional space to accommodate a small student center in Building 19.148 Although the NPS signed off on the work, the project ground to a halt when no response could be extracted from college officials for months.149 When they did finally respond, it was to change the program once more. The need for a student center was now “acute” and in fact had “evolved as the top priority for development”: the Western Massachusetts Center for Advanced Technology had been demoted to a “long term goal.” The reason for this sudden reversal, never explained at the time, was that in 1992 Scibelli had begun negotiations with Digital Equipment Corporation to take over Federal Square, the historic complex adjacent to Armory Square, as the S.T.C.C. Technology Park. The deal was concluded in 1996, and the Western Massachusetts Center for Advanced Technology was established in Federal Square as the Springfield Enterprise Center. For this expansion, which brought the college an additional 460,000 square feet of buildings plus additional, “desperately needed” parking, state funds were available: through a deal with the legislature Scibelli obtained a state commitment to pay one third of the Technology Park’s operating costs, or $1.2 million per year.150


147 Einhorn Yaffee Prescott (Albany), Feasibility Study (50% draft phase) for Building 19, Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Springfield, Massachusetts, June 15, 1992 (SPAR Central Files: H3019 Special Studies (Hist.)).

148 Contents of 50% report summarized in Einhorn Yaffee Prescott (Albany), Feasibility Study: Final Report, for Building 19, Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Springfield, Massachusetts, August, 1993, pp. 3 ff. (SPAR Central Files: H3019 Special Studies (Hist.)).

149 Letter, Richard C. Crisson (Historical Architect) to Larry Linder, Einhorn, Yaffee, Prescott, Albany, November 2, 1992 (SPAR Central Files: H3015 Hist. Sites Maint., Pres.).

150 Andrew M. Scibelli, recorded interview with author, June 4, 2009.
Meanwhile, the study of Building 19 was restarted. WMCAT was dropped, and the final report presented a new scheme for a student center to occupy almost half of the building, including a dining facility capable of serving 500-600 students, lounge and game room spaces, an art gallery, student services such as an information desk, ID office, equipment rental, lockers, copy facilities, and study areas, office space for the director of Student Activities, student government and the campus newspaper, meeting spaces for women’s groups and clubs, and a sales kiosk and space for off-campus vendors. Assuming that the remainder of the building, still earmarked for WMCAT, would remain indefinitely vacant the consultants presented two cost estimates for it, one calling for a fully restored exterior, the other for plywood panels to seal the blank windows of the empty half (Fig. 4.14).151

The study had set out to determine whether it was feasible to adapt and reuse Building 19 and had concluded that it was. For a little over $6.2 million, the college could have a magnificent student center within a fully stabilized building exterior; by economizing on the window treatments, the immediate cost could be reduced to $5.5 million. To the architects, the conclusion was clear: the student center reuse was “highly feasible, reasonable in cost, and readily suited to the unique character of this important historic structure.... The goals of historic preservation and appropriate reuse are served equally well by this proposed renovation.”152 The park too was “pleased and impressed” by the study, which combined “sensitivity to the historic value of the structure with an imaginative approach to its prospects.” Beatty did not care what use the college put the building to as long as it was “physically feasible” and did not “threaten historic resources.” Einhorn Yaffee Prescott’s plan met these conditions,153 and since it had been developed in response to the college’s programmatic directives, one might have anticipated some action. Yet in 2009 Building 19 remained vacant, deteriorating in the midst of a National Historic Site.

If the college’s investment priorities and lack of programmatic planning discouraged genuine preservation efforts, state budget cutbacks began by the late 1980s to make real improvement even more remote. Until about 1987 the state’s community college system enjoyed “dynamic growth” in funding, with Massachusetts ranking high among the states for educational spending. But during the next two years all spending other than mandatory salary increases dropped by 35 per cent. Building 15, completed in 1987, proved to be the state’s last major capital investment at S.T.C.C. After 1989, as the state’s economy slowed, appropriations declined yet further, to the point where the college had to increase student charges and even impose a Fiscal Crisis Surcharge Fee in the spring of 1990. In 1991 the college could stated that fiscal cutbacks had “severely limited the capital funds available for

151 Ibid., pp. 1, 3, 4, 12, 70, 71.
152 Ibid., pp. 2, 71.
153 Memo, Superintendent Beatty to Historical Architect Crisson, CRC, April 15, 1993 (SPAR Central Files: H3019 Special Studies (Hist.)).
Figures 4.10, 4.11. Two sides of the college’s building program. President Scibelli announces a rehabilitation effort (above) and the razing of a motel to create new student parking (below) (newspaper clippings, NPS: Boston Support Office).
Rehabilitating the Armory

campus renovations, repairs, and preventive maintenance. Other than relatively minor in-house renovations, no major construction projects have been funded since or are contemplated in the near future.\textsuperscript{154}

It was not only the quantity of state dollars but also the formulae for distributing them that were adverse to preservation. Until the late 1980s, funding was highly political, based on personal connections. This was a system that benefitted the well-connected Springfield college, and indeed Building 15 commemorated it: the name given to it in 1988, Scibelli Hall, referred not to president Andrew M. Scibelli but to his uncle Anthony M. Scibelli, who as chair of the House Ways and Means Committee had played a critical role in getting the college established (Deliso Hall commemorated another early political backer). As president, Andrew regularly enlisted his uncle in helping the college.\textsuperscript{155} The system began to be depoliticized with the creation of the Board of Regents of Higher Education in 1981, after which the state legislature no longer individually funded each school,\textsuperscript{156} but Scibelli dates real change to the end of the decade. Victor Focosi, who arrived as director of facilities at that time, recalls rigid state formulae that awarded funding according to educational need and square footage per student and that treated the physical plants of all colleges as equivalent, whether they were National Historic Landmarks or new cinderblock buildings. Under such a system Armory Square’s preservation needs could hardly be met, and Scibelli’s efforts to entice or shame Boston officials into carrying out their legal responsibilities for the campus met with little success. The irony was that, just as college leaders became genuinely interested in preservation, conditions in Boston blocked their efforts.

If the state would not fund restoration, the NPS was not above helping the college raise money. After initial reluctance, the agency supported Boland’s request for Congressional funding for Building 19. Whether in carrying out the \textit{Historic Structure Report} and managing the consultant studies, in working with state officials in 1987 to influence and contribute expertise to the state study, or in reviewing and providing technical assistance on any number of day-to-day building projects, the NPS also devoted substantial staff resources to helping the college meet its preservation needs. Later, the agency broadened its fundraising approach beyond Congress. In 1992 or 1993, anticipating the Armory’s upcoming bicentennial, the park collaborated with the college in rolling out a “Campaign for the Successful Restoration of the Arsenal of Freedom.” This sought to raise $9,765,000 from federal, state, and private funding. The NPS compiled a three-part list of rehabilitation needs covering both federal and college sectors of Armory Square. At over $4.4 million, the college projects amounted to the largest share and included $2 million for exterior repairs to


\textsuperscript{155} Andrew M. Scibelli, recorded interview with author.

Building 19, $560,000 for Building 11, and $650,000 for Building 14. The appeal also mentioned plans to adaptively reuse Building 19 (as a student center and WMCAT), as well as two other “currently non-usable buildings”: Building 5/6 (Center for Business/Industry Development) and Building 11 (day care and early childhood education). Projects to be jointly undertaken by the NPS and the college added a further $2,675,000 and included $1 million to repave roads and sidewalks and $1.6 million to complete the restoration of the iron fence.\(^{157}\)

Little if anything came of the campaign, and by 1997 the agency’s strategy had shifted again. Both the park and President Scibelli felt “grave concern” over the condition of Building 5/6 and 11. But while the park prepared an “appeal to the federal government through Congressman Neal,” Scibelli was working on an appeal to the state and, worried that state officials might refuse to help if they thought Washington was doing so, he asked the NPS for a support letter “forcefully stating their concern about the neglect of these buildings” yet not mentioning the simultaneous federal request.\(^{158}\) Together the park, college, and Friends of the Springfield Armory invited Congressman Neal, state legislators, and influential citizen to a tour designed to “heighten awareness” of the sorry state of Buildings 5/6, 11, and 19. Beatty’s Springfield Armory Museum invited Congressman Neal, state legislators, and influential citizen’s letter to one participant exemplified the new strategy, which was to “remind the Commonwealth of Massachusetts of its obligations to historic preservation.” No longer the guilty party, the college was now the deserving petitioner for state aid.\(^{159}\)

In 1999 an appropriation appeared on the state legislative agenda, and Beatty strongly supported it. But in the end the legislature cut the requested $1.4 million appropriation in half. It was an ironic outcome, noted Beatty, as the new cooperative agreement, signed just two days earlier by the state, accorded the highest preservation priority to the very buildings affected by the funding cut. “...[T]he neglect of the Commonwealth,” he concluded, “even to minimally maintain these structures in accordance with multiple agreements has been a disappointment.... [T]he Commonwealth has done little in 30 years to preserve these highly visible, historic properties on State Street.”\(^{160}\)


\(^{158}\) Letter, S.T.C.C. President Andrew M. Scibelli to Chief of Visitor Services Joanne Gangi, September 25, 1997 (SPAR: Cultural Resources Department Files: fol. MOU – S.T.C.C. Brain 03/05/98.

\(^{159}\) Letter, Beatty to Fran Gagnon (Springfield), August 18, 1998 (SPAR Central Files: A82 FY 99 Special Events).

\(^{160}\) Letters, Beatty to Gale D. Candaras (Mass House of Reps), April 22, 1999 (identical letters to 4 senators and 11 other representatives), and Beatty to Thomas Finneran (Massachusetts State Senate), August 23, 1999 (identical letters to 4 other state senators and 13 members of state House of Representatives) (SPAR Central Files: A 44 Ad. Extorg S.T.C.C. - Never Destroy).
Figure 4.12. Building 19: Existing elevation (Einhorn, Yafee, Prescott, Feasibility Study)
Figure 4.13. Building 19: plan of upper floor for reuse as Western Massachusetts Center for Advanced Technology (Einhorn, Yaffee, Prescott, Feasibility Study).
Figure 4.14. Building 19: plan of ground floor for reuse as Student Center (Einhorn, Yaffee, Prescott, Feasibility Study).
In more recent years, these fundraising efforts have achieved mixed results. In 2001, with the NPS’s support, the college obtained $5.7 million of state funding for “major Facility Manager repairs” to Buildings 5/6, a pair of officer’s quarters standing adjacent to the Main Arsenal on the right-hand side of the parade, and Building 11, the West Arsenal, which stands immediately beyond it. According to the college, Building 5/6 was “decrepit,” its survival “questionable”; Building 11 was not in much better shape. The funds allowed the Office of Michael Rosenfeld, Inc., to be retained to carry out a feasibility study, but this showed that the funding was insufficient to cover both buildings: the best that could be done was to stabilize Building 5/6, to have it “sealed and encased; in effect, mothballed.” By 2002, the college was trying to divert a substantial portion of the appropriated funds to Building 19, but a new non-profit group, the Friends of Springfield Armory, protested, calling the minimal stabilization plan for Building 5/6 “unacceptable” and noting that Building 5/6 stood “in a higher priority zone than 19.” The NPS also protested, calling for the preservation and full restoration of Building 11, as outlined in Rosenfeld’s proposal, and opposing the state’s minimal stabilization proposal for Building 5/6 as a “a ‘band aid’ approach” and a betrayal of previous commitments. The state’s Department of Capital Asset Management replied that only $714,000 of the total funding was firmly tied to Building 11, none tied to Buildings 5/6.

So matters stood until the following spring, when the college applied to the federal Save America’s Treasures program for a grant to make up the difference – $219,714 out of a total project cost of $556,499 – between the unpopular stabilization option and a full exterior restoration of Building 5/6. The proposal spoke vaguely about proposed uses for the building: an alumni relations or career services office, or perhaps residential space for visiting scholars or officials. The application was denied. As of 2007, Building 11 has been handsomely repaired and is occupied by college offices (Fig. 4.15). But Building 5/6 continues to deteriorate, its rotting porch sealed off behind hazard tape (Figs. 4.16-17).

Another Look at the Question of Federal Authority

As of 2008, the campus presented a mixed picture. In addition to the success with Building 11, Building 16 is fully occupied by college offices: following the launch of a campaign to repair its 570 wood windows in 2004, a consultant praised “the dedication of


Figure 4.15. A preservation success: the elegantly restored Building 11 in 2005 (photo: author).

STCC officials to preserving the wood windows in their historic buildings.” Yet, Building 10 (Fig. 4.18) is in hardly better condition than Building 5/6, while Building 19 portends disaster (Figs. 4.19-22). Open to the weather, pigeons, and vandals, its cavernous spaces continue to be filled with miscellaneous objects, many of them apparently junk and some probably flammable. Its brick piers continue to crumble. This decay, which if not arrested can lead to only one conclusion, is taking place within the congressionally authorized boundaries of a National Historic Site. It may then be appropriate to conclude this discussion by reviewing the question of federal authority over authorized parklands. With regard to Building 19, the NPS may be in a stronger position today than legislators or officials imagined when they projected the park and drafted the initial cooperative agreement in the 1970s.

NPS officials negotiated the first agreement on the assumption of limited federal authority over nonfederal land. Galvin and Utley believed the park’s authorization had little impact on the preservation of the campus; Galvin even said that HEW was the only federal agency with any power over the college. This view appeared to be confirmed in 1981 when the regional office asked the Interior Department’s regional solicitor to clarify the “nature of federal jurisdiction” at the Armory. On the basis of “information available to this office,” he

replied that “this property consists of approximately 5.3 acres of land which was transferred to the National Park Service by donation from the City of Springfield in 1978, after a deed of release was executed between the City and the United States....”164 Since there had been no cession of jurisdiction from state to federal government, the solicitor concluded that the agency had “proprietary jurisdiction only”: that is, the same authority that any owner enjoyed over his own property. The solicitor’s opinion did not address the status of the state-owned college campus, as its existence had not been acknowledged.

The cession question was cleared up in 1984 when Massachusetts enacted legislation ceding to the United States “concurrent jurisdiction” over NPS units within the state.165 This meant that the federal government now shared jurisdiction with the state over many aspects of individual behavior within the site and could both make and enforce regulations on

![Figure 4.16. Building 5-6 (photo: author).](image-url)

164 Memo, Regional Solicitor, Northeast Region (Department of the Interior) to Regional Director, NPS, February 25, 1981 (SPAR: Superintendent’s files: folder: Jurisdiction). Any correspondence or memos attempting to clear up the misunderstanding has not survived in either the files of the NPS or in those of the regional solicitor’s office; nor has the regional office’s initial letter requesting the information.

165 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, An Act Ceding to the United States of America Concurrent Jurisdiction over Units of the National Park Service in the Commonwealth, approved December 18, 1984 (copy in files of Department of Interior, Northeast Regional Solicitor’s Office). See also letter, Acting Director Mary Lou Grier to Governor Michael Dukakis, March 5, 1985 (SPAR: Superintendent’s files: folder: Jurisdiction).
driving, picnicking, theft or defacement of property, and so forth. Still, it did not directly address the most important question. Cessions of jurisdiction sometimes by implication covered nonfederal as well as federal land within national park units, but here the act, by specifically mentioning lands and buildings “provided and administered by the National Park Service,” appeared to exclude the campus, over which the NPS had already ceded “administration jurisdiction” to the state through the Cooperative Agreement. This was the opinion given by Interior’s regional solicitor when Superintendent Beatty raised the question in 1992: the campus, he advised, was not under the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal government but solely under that of the state.166

Had federal authority been based exclusively on such cessions, the question would now be answered: there was no such authority because there was no cession. But by 1984 a series of court cases had shown that cession was no longer the sole or even the primary basis for federal authority: the Constitution’s Property Clause provided a firmer foundation. The Property Clause states: “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States or of any particular State.”167 After the first of this series of cases, in 1976, public lands expert and legal scholar Joseph L. Sax commented that the NPS seemed uncertain about its authority under the property clause.”168 Twenty-five years later another legal scholar could still observe that Property Clause had “escaped widespread attention” and that, “curiously, the courts and commentators have paid little attention to the federal government’s power over its own property....”169 For park managers, the Property Clause had remained a sleeping giant. If it ever awoke, it would be a giant indeed. The Supreme Court observed in 1976 that “the power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.”170 Legal scholars have noted that the courts have interpreted the Property Clause power broadly on almost every occasion when it has been invoked. These cases conclude that the federal government possesses both proprietary and sovereign powers over its property, can regulate activities on privately owned lands that affects its lands, and exercises the equivalent of the police power in this area. The courts of appeals have further

166 Memo, Regional Solicitor Anthony R. Conte to Superintendent, April 2, 1992 (DOI, Regional Solicitor’s Office files)
167 U.S. Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 3, Cl. 2.
Figure 4.17. Columns are missing from the Victorian verandah of Buildings 5-6. Netting keeps visitors away from the rotten porch floor (photo: author).
extended the reach of the Property Clause to cover private activities that occur on state-owned lands.\footnote{Appel, op. cit.:4.}

Two major cases, in 1897 and 1927, laid the groundwork for modern views on the Property Clause and federal authority over nonfederal lands. In the first, \textit{Camfield v. United States},\footnote{167 U.S. 518 (1897).} private parties had erected fences which, because of the checkerboard arrangement of federal and private parcels in the vicinity, had the effect of closing off a substantial amount of public land. The individuals argued that because their fences were built entirely on private property they lay beyond the reach of federal action. The Court rejected this view and held that the fences violated the federal law prohibiting owners from blocking access to public land. The federal government, explained the Court, had both proprietary and sovereign powers over its lands. In its proprietary role, the federal power of the states: it could therefore legislate against fences because they interfered with congressional policy for the lands in question.\footnote{For a discussion of \textit{Camfield} and \textit{Alford}, see \textit{inter alia}, Appel, op. cit.: 63 ff.}

In \textit{United States v. Alford},\footnote{(274 U.S. 264 (1927).} the Supreme Court resolved what Blake Shepard called a “far easier question.”\footnote{Blake Shepard, Comment: “The Scope of Congress’ Constitutional Power Under the Property Clause: Regulating Non-Federal Property to Further the Purposes of National Parks and Wilderness Areas,” \textit{Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review} 11 (1983-84): 497.} After a campfire built by Alford on nonfederal lands set fire to a nearby national forest, the U.S. indicted him for violating a statute against building and failing to extinguish fires on or near federal lands. The Supreme Court held the statute constitutional. According to Justice Holmes, “Congress may prohibit the doing of acts upon privately owned lands that imperil the publicly owned forests.”\footnote{(274 U.S. 264 (1927) at 267, quoted in Appel, op. cit.: 66.} That is, the federal government could regulate activity not only on but also “near” federal land if it threatened to harm that land.

Together, wrote Joseph L. Sax in 1976, “the \textit{Alford} and \textit{Camfield} cases establish unambiguously that the property clause permits federal regulation of private land....”\footnote{Sax, op. cit.: 252.}

Writing in 2001, Peter A. Appel agreed: “the Court announced that the federal government had police power over activities that harm federal property even when the regulated activities occurred wholly on privately owned lands within states admitted to the Union.”\footnote{Appel, op. cit.: 66.} \textit{Alford} had established that the Property Clause could be invoked against actions on private land that threatened direct harm to federal property. \textit{Camfield} went beyond physical harm to establish that Congress could regulate conduct on nonfederal property that “frustrates a
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Figure 4.18. The elegant Grecian woodwork of Building 10 is rotting, a missing column base has been replaced by a stack of wooden boards, a sandstone step is overturned. There is nothing to protect the entrance porch from the impact of a carelessly driven car. These conditions, photographed in 2005, had not changed in 2009 (photo: author).
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congressional policy” for that land: “accurately read,” as Eugene R. Gaetke explained in 1981, “the property clause rationale of Camfield is that Congress may make those regulations ‘needful’ to effectuate its policies for the use of federal property, even if those regulations govern conduct on nonfederal property.”

Neither NPS officials nor constitutional scholars showed much interest in these distant cases, or in Property Clause jurisprudence, in the early 1970s. But growing threats to the parks were beginning to call attention to the Property Clause as a tool for regulating nonfederal land. Parks with significant nonfederal components (like the Armory itself) were proliferating: in response to an Interior Department directive concerning the Land and Water Conservation Fund, the NPS set out in 1982 to write a Land Protection Plan for all park units containing non-federal land. At the same time, external threats to parks were multiplying. Even some of the vast western parks, which had initially enjoyed substantial buffer areas of federal land, were threatened by activities outside their borders. As examples, Sax pointed in 1976 to a private entrepreneur’s plan to build a 300-foot-tall observation tower adjacent to the battlefield at Gettysburg Military Park, timbering near Redwoods National Park in California, a proposal for a theme park next to Manassas National Battlefield Park, demands of landowners to build utility lines across federal lands in Cape Hatteras National Seashore in order to power summer homes, plans for a major airport next to the Everglades, and a proposed nuclear power plant just outside the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore. The “State of the Parks” study submitted by the NPS to Congress in 1980 noted that more than half of all reported threats to parks stemmed from sources outside the parks themselves.

A second factor that triggered new interest in the Property Clause was a Supreme Court decision in 1976 reaffirming and expanding its power. Kleppe v. New Mexico addressed a constitutional challenge to the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1994, which protected these animals both on and off the public lands. After a rancher with a federal grazing permit complained of the federal government’s refusal to remove some of them from a water source on federal lands, the New Mexico livestock authorities removed and sold them. When the United States in turn complained, the state sued the federal government, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional. The Court upheld it. Although wild horses and burros were normally regulated by the state, the Court found that federal regulation superseded the state’s where it affected federal land. Even in the absence of a cession of jurisdiction, the Property Clause gave Congress the power to legislate respecting

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180 Sax, op. cit.: 240-241.


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Figure 4.19. Broken windows marred Building 19’s impressive facade in 2005 (photo: author).

Figure 4.20. At street level, Building 19’s brick piers were crumbling (photo: author).
Figure 4.21. In 2005, Building 19 (exterior photo) was open to weather, pigeons and vandals, its interior used for storage of miscellaneous objects. In 2009 the concrete barriers were gone, leaving the brick piers unprotected from cars and trucks (photos: author).

Figure 4.22. In 2005, Building 19 (interior photo) was open to weather, pigeons and vandals, its interior used for storage of miscellaneous objects. In 2009 the concrete barriers were gone, leaving the brick piers unprotected from cars and trucks (photos: author).
federal lands, and when it did so, the federal law “necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause.”183 While the Court, according to Shepard, “acknowledged that the Property Clause did not authorize an exercise of general federal control over state public policy, it nonetheless asserted that the Clause did permit ‘an exercise of the complete power which Congress has over particular public property entrusted to it.’”184

Just as important as this affirmation of federal authority over state regulation where federal land was affected was the Court’s finding that the Property Clause power was not limited to preventing physical damage to federal property: damage to federal land was a sufficient but not a necessary basis for Congressional regulation.185 Even where no damage was anticipated, Sax wrote, the Court showed that Congress could legislate for ecological balance.186 And while the facts of the case concerned actions on federal land, the Court itself, referring to Camfield, stated in dicta that “the power granted by the Property Clause is broad enough to reach beyond territorial limits.”187

According to Harry R. Bader, Kleppe “laid the foundation for modern Property Clause case law.”188 Now that the clause’s power had been clearly established, Sax wrote, “congressional passivity in the face of serious threats to the parks” would truly constitute an “abdication of a fundamental legislative responsibility” to protect lands held in trust for the citizenry.189 In the same spirit he called on the NPS to cease relying on the relatively ineffective Cession Clause for authority. At Fire Island, he took issue with the Interior Department, arguing that direct federal zoning of nonfederal land might stand on the basis of the Property Clause if the NPS determined it was an appropriate tool for protecting the area’s congressionally determined uses. Moreover, if Congress itself made that determination, he thought it highly unlikely that the Court would disagree. With respect to inholdings in general, Sax argued that Congress could and should give the NPS “authority to exercise the general police power to the full extent necessary to maintain the parks for the purposes for which Congress established them.”190

Two decisions of the Eight Circuit Court, in 1977 and 1981, soon expanded the Property Clause’s utility for regulating activities on nonfederal land. In United States v. Brown,191 a defendant was convicted for hunting ducks on the waters within Voyageurs National Park in Minnesota. Noting that Minnesota’s regulations permitted duck hunting,
and that the waters within the park were state rather than federal property, the hunter argued that the federal ban on hunting in national parks was unconstitutional as applied to these waters. Yet the court upheld the regulation, finding that there had been an implied cession of jurisdiction to the federal government, and that even absent such a cession, the Property Clause gave the U.S. the right to supersede state regulations.\textsuperscript{192} Relying on \textit{Camfield}, the decision held that “the Property Clause gives Congress authority to regulate the waters for the protection of the park lands and to prevent interference with the purpose for which the lands were acquired.”\textsuperscript{193}

The court reached a similar decision in \textit{State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block}.\textsuperscript{194} Here the State of Minnesota had challenged the constitutionality of the federal government’s restrictions on motorized travel across non-federal lands and waters within the Boundary Waters Canoe Area. This 1.1 million acre area had been designated by the Forest Service within the Superior National Forest in a series of actions during the 1920s and 1930s. With the passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964 it had been incorporated into the new system of federally designated wilderness areas, but with the special proviso that motorboats would continue to be allowed on the area’s roughly 160,000 acres of navigable lakes and streams. Relying on the Property Clause, the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Act of 1978 sought to resolve decades of controversy over this policy by prohibiting motorboats on most of the state-owned lakes wholly or partly within the boundaries, thereby superseding state regulation on state land. In \textit{Block}, the court upheld the measure’s constitutionality.\textsuperscript{195}

In \textit{Brown} and \textit{Block}, the Eighth Circuit Court referred to \textit{Kleppe} for “guidance” while acknowledging that the specific issue presented by both cases was one that the Supreme Court had expressly declined to address in \textit{Kleppe}. In \textit{Brown}, the court described that issue as “whether the Property Clause empowers the United States to enact regulatory legislation protecting federal lands from interference occurring on non-federal public lands or, in this instance, waters.”\textsuperscript{196} The \textit{Brown} court made it clear not only that the Property Clause did so but also that this power went beyond Congress’ authority to protect federal lands from direct physical harm: in light of Congress’ stated policy for the land, the court held, the regulations at issue were “valid prescriptions designed to promote the purposes of the federal lands within the National Park.”\textsuperscript{197} The \textit{Block} court, stressing its consistency with the earlier ruling, underlined this point, adding that the regulations in \textit{Brown} were “necessary to prevent significant interference with the use of the park and the purposes for which it had been established.”\textsuperscript{198} In Shepard’s words, the \textit{Block} court built on \textit{Brown}, \textit{Camfield}, and \textit{Kleppe} to

\textsuperscript{192} Gaetke, “Boundary Waters”: 178-179.

\textsuperscript{193} 552 F.2d 817 (8\textsuperscript{th} Cir. 1977): at 63, quoted in Gaetke, “Boundary Waters”: 179. For \textit{Brown}, see also Bader, \textit{op. cit.}: 196 ff.

\textsuperscript{194} 660 F.2d 1240 (8\textsuperscript{th} Cir. 1981).

\textsuperscript{195} Gaetke, “Boundary Waters”: 161 ff. For \textit{Block}, see also Bader, \textit{op. cit.}: 197 ff.

\textsuperscript{196} 552 F.2d 817 (8\textsuperscript{th} Cir. 1977): at 822, quoted in Shepard, \textit{op. cit.}: 505.

\textsuperscript{197} 552 F.2d 817 (8\textsuperscript{th} Cir. 1977): at 822-23, quoted in Shepard, \textit{op. cit.}: 506.

\textsuperscript{198} 660 F.2d 1240 (8\textsuperscript{th} Cir. 1981): at 1249, quoted in Shepard, \textit{op. cit.}: 511-512.
conclude that “Congress had the constitutional power to regulate conduct on non-federal land that interfered with the intended purposes of federal property.” Nor were those purposes limited to the area legislation: the decision also noted that “Congress, through the Act, has brought the regulation of the BWCAW in line with that of other wilderness areas, thus recognizing that historically the use of motor vehicles could not be reconciled with retaining a primitive wilderness area.” In other words, it was not merely Congress’s specific intentions with regard to the Boundary Waters but also its general policy for wilderness areas that had to be considered.

Writing immediately after Block, Eugene R. Gaetke stressed the Property Clause’s “enormous” potential for regulating conduct on nonfederal land in support of federal purposes or policies. Shepard thought that should particularly interest the NPS, and he took up Sax’s campaign for vigorous federal efforts to fulfill the NPS’s protective mandate. In contrast to the agency’s “extremely narrow” view of its constitutional authority to regulate nonfederal land, he suggested that Brown and Block “provide the Park Service with a constitutional basis for regulating activity on non-federal property when necessary to promote the purpose of the government lands under its domain,” and he argued for a “more aggressive federal policy regarding the protection of national parks and wilderness areas.” More recently, Harry R. Bader has urged the development of general rules to guide the regulation of state and private property under the Property Clause power. He suggests that this regulation should be focused on nonfederal land located within the boundaries of designated conservation units or entirely surrounded by federal lands: one advantage of such an “inholding rule,” he notes, would be to put potentially affected owners on notice, since “as an inholder, one would rationally expect possible federal regulation....”

Without the Property Clause, the NPS has been relatively powerless to protect the nonfederal portion of Armory Square from neglect and deterioration. The agency could criticize, cajole, argue, negotiate, encourage, flatter, inform, and assist. It has done these things. But it could not enforce or sanction. Property Clause jurisprudence gives the NPS authority to do more, should it wish to, because it suggests that Interior’s authority to ensure the protection of historic resources on the campus exists independent of and prior to the specific terms of the cooperative agreement. Looking at the Armory from the perspective of the Property Clause, it is clear that the deteriorated condition of Buildings 5/6, 10, and 19 not only threatens physical harm to adjacent federal property but also frustrates Congressional policy for the park. That policy, as set forth in the authorizing legislation, is to “assure the historical integrity of the site”; according to the NPS Organic Act, it is to conserve its “historic

199 Shepard, op. cit.: 512 (emphasis in original).
201 Gaetke, “Congressional Discretion”: 81-82, 390, and n. 52.
202 Shepard, op. cit.: 514.
203 Shepard, op. cit.: 514, 517.
204 Bader, op. cit.: 201, 203.
objects” and provide for their public enjoyment so as to “leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” The decay and possible destruction of Building 19 and other historic buildings – structures important enough to merit National Register and National Historic Landmark listing – is plainly incompatible with this policy. If it is found to be allowable under the cooperative agreement, then the agreement itself must fail to meet the statutory standard “to assure the historical integrity of the site” and thus must be incompatible with Congressional policy. But in fact, the decay of the historic buildings appears to violate the agreement as well as to frustrate Congressional policy. The agreement’s “intent and purpose” is to provide not only for “the Board’s administration of the Preservation Control Area” but also for “preservation of the historical integrity of that portion of the national historic site included therein.” It stipulates that the Board will “preserve the appearance of the exterior of the historic structures” within the Preservation Control Area. These are affirmative obligations. The severe deterioration of historic structures is incompatible with them. The Property Clause gives the NPS authority to ensure that these obligations are met.

At least in theory it does. Despite the “enormous” power – the power “without limitations” – of the Property Clause, there are many unresolved questions about how it might be applied in a case like the Armory. In Kleppe the Supreme Court observed that “the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved.” One important question concerns the limits of federal authority to regulate state activities conducted on state land. Although the Circuit Court decisions following Kleppe affirmed broad federal power with respect to nonfederal land, the court noted in Block that the restrictions it upheld regulated the activities of private individuals – rather than the state itself – on state property. Moreover, it noted that federal regulation of state land might require a different analysis than that of state water. Shepard and Bader have offered some guidance in exploring this territory. Shepard interpreted the Block decision to imply that “federal regulation of state land may, in some circumstances, constitute a regulation of the State as a State,” and he argued that the recent cases “cast doubt upon the power of a state even to resist a federal regulation of state activity.” In similar vein, Bader has written that “almost any state activity, even the most traditional of police power endeavors, fall before the Property Clause if the activity poses a significant impediment to federal land management objectives.” He cites a district court decision upholding the NPS’s refusal to permit the state of West Virginia to spray pesticides on state land within the New River Gorge National River without first obtaining an agency permit – even though less than ten percent of the area’s 63,000 acres is actually in federal ownership. He also notes that the perception of the federal government’s long extraterritorial reach has led some states to cooperate with the federal government in planning so as to avoid litigation later: as an example, Bader cites Alaska’s 1993 Wolf Predator

205 1978 Agreement, Article I, and 1993 Memorandum of Understanding, Article I.
207 Shepard, op. cit.: 529-531.
208 Shepard, op. cit.: 531-531 (emphasis in original).
Figure 4.23. Building 19: 2009 (photo: author).
Control Plan. The implication for the Armory is that, at a minimum, the mere threat of federal efforts to exercise the Property Clause power might encourage the State of Massachusetts to voluntary meet its preservation responsibilities.

A second problem concerns the distinction between natural and cultural resources. Previous Property Clause decisions have all concerned protection or access wild land and associated natural resources: the NPS has not yet employed it to protect cultural resources such as historic buildings, and its use at Springfield would be precedent-setting. As nothing in the Constitution, the decisions, or NPS policy explicitly limits the Property Clause power in this way, the reason may have more to do with agency culture, perhaps with a long-established habit of valuing the system’s natural resources more highly, or being willing to incur greater political risks to defend them. Yet historic resources need be regarded as step-children of the National Park Service. As early as 1889 Congress authorized the Department of the Interior to protect the ruins of Casa Grande. It authorized the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park to protect a Civil War battlefield the following year and through the Antiquities Act of 1907 gave the executive branch power to declare historic and prehistoric structures national monuments – all before the National Park Service was established in 1916. Reorganizing the executive branch in 1933, Congress gave the service all of the national monuments, battlefields, and war memorials, thereby creating the modern park system. With the Preservation of Historic Sites Act two year later, Congress gave the NPS full authority to survey, document, restore, reconstruct, rehabilitate, preserve, maintain, commemorate, operate, manage, and interpret historic and archaeological sites and buildings. If the Property Clause power applies to wilderness protection and access, then presumably it applies also to the historic buildings of Springfield Armory.

A third problem at Springfield is the difficulty of countering demolition by neglect. It is relatively easy to enjoin the destruction of a historic building when it is intentional and sudden, involving bulldozers and wrecking balls. It is much harder to prevent destruction when it results from the absence of maintenance, when the loss of historic materials and features takes place gradually, and when the final collapse or conflagration appears to be accidental. Yet even in this situation there may be remedies. The Property Clause suggests that the NPS’s authority to protect park assets and carry out park policy at the Armory may not be limited to the terms of the cooperative agreement: if the agreement is not achieving its purpose, the NPS could impose regulations containing maintenance standards or expressly prohibiting demolition by neglect. It could seek an injunction to compel the college to seal if not restore Building 19. If the college and state prove unwilling to safeguard it, and if they neither need nor can use it for the educational purposes for which it was transferred to state ownership, then the NPS could seek to transfer the asset (and the burden of restoring it) back to federal ownership. The federal government could then stabilize the building and, if and when the college needs it, lease it back to the state. At a minimum, a serious federal effort to adopt these measures might help initiate the kind of negotiations described by Bader, and that could mean the difference between saving and losing park resources.

\[^{209}\text{Bader, op. cit.: 198, 200.}\]
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One reason the “full extent of the Property Clause’s reach” has not yet been determined, points out Robert L. Glicksman, is that “the government has been reluctant to assert it.”210 Former Associate Regional Director Charles Clapper explains that the officials responsible for parks are, and must be, extremely sensitive to the authority contained in the authorizing legislation,211 and absent a clear signal from Interior’s lawyers, that authority does not appear to extend to a vigorous assertion of the Property Clause power. Regarding that power, an NPS planner explains further that “it is not an authority that we use routinely, particularly if there are other solutions to an issue available”: it is reserved for “very serious inside or adjacent to the boundary issues”; it is “the remedy of last resort.” Still, he adds that it has been

judiciously used by NPS in situations where there is a direct nexus between an action within the boundary or on adjacent lands with a resulting impact of real importance on the park, e.g., potential impairment of park resources or truly significant impacts affecting the visitor experience.212

Springfield Armory seems to meet this test. The campus lies within a congressionally authorized park boundary. There is a direct nexus between the decay of historic buildings and the impairment of park resources. Visitors have testified over the years to the effect of deteriorated buildings on their experience of the park. The problem is indubitably serious. Other remedies have not worked. While they might work in the future, for Building 19 especially, time is running out.

211 Charles Clapper, recorded interview with author, March 24, 2009.
212 Terrence D. Moore (Chief of Park Planning and Special Studies Northeast Region), email to Paul Weinbaum, April 21, 2009, shared with the author courtesy of the recipient.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE COLLECTIONS

The history of the Armory’s collections is the history of efforts, first, to grasp and describe them; second, to preserve them; and finally, to define their relationship to the Armory and the national park system as a whole. The difficulties stemmed in part from their sheer size and complexity. What did they contain? Should they grow? How should they be organized, exhibited, interpreted, and conserved? These challenges were heightened by several factors that made the Armory’s collections distinctive. Like many kinds of museum objects, the care and display of guns presented specific challenges, including the interchangeability of minute parts and the hidden damage from explosions and chemical residues. In addition, guns posed challenges that other museum objects did not, especially with regard to security, safety, and illicit copying. Guns also brought their own constituency, with its own expectations. The collections’ unusual history created further challenges: assembled by the Army for purposes quite different from those of a public museum, they brought traditions of connoisseurship and management which were quite different from those of the National Park Service. The resulting difficulties were exacerbated by the decade of relative neglect which preceded the park’s establishment. Further problems stemmed from the terms of the NPS’s agreement with the Army, which gave the Army continued ownership and influence without financial responsibility.

Finally, there were institutional challenges within the National Park Service itself. The NPS was not primarily a museum agency: though collections (some as important and challenging as the Armory’s) had played a prominent role at many parks since the agency’s earliest days, it was settled policy that they were subordinate to their sites and were to be managed accordingly, that is, with an eye toward supporting park goals rather than maximizing their own value. Until the 1980s official policy was especially discouraging toward the acquisition of large archives – a major component of the Armory’s collections – and although the service was making significant steps towards building up and professionalizing its museum capacity, the agency’s position as a collections manager was significantly different from that of private sector museums or of the Smithsonian Institution. The Armory’s collections challenged NPS thinking on many points. Though they were

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rooted in the site, park staff on occasions argued that the collections’ importance
transcended the Armory itself, that the park existed primarily for the sake of the museum
rather than vice versa, and that the agency’s goal should be to preserve and develop the
collection to its highest potential.

These questions have resonated through the Armory’s history as a national park. Did
the park have adequate curatorial control over its collections? Did agency officials or park
staff, conservators or gunsmiths, know best how to care for them? Should they be managed
according to NPS policies, Armory traditions, or the aspirations of private museums? When
should agency expertise override the expectations of U.S. Army?

GAINING CONTROL OVER THE COLLECTIONS

It was the sheer size of the collection that struck everyone first. The collection is “my
primary responsibility,” wrote Chief Curator Arthur C. Allen in 1977 after a week spent
“poking around and asking innumerable questions,” “...and it poses an absolutely staggering
problem stemming from its sheer bulk.”2 The Collection Management Plan written that year
said the same thing. Conserving the weapons would be a “monumental task,” wrote its
authors, who included Allen: “the sheer numbers are staggering...” The collection’s storage
and record-keeping needs were just as outsized. The effect on the park’s budget
requirements was immediate. Though as yet no one knew for certain the collection’s “size or
extent,” it was already clear that “the costs of curating the Springfield collection are going to
seem enormous” – “higher than usually encountered” at national parks, which (the planners
were careful to point out) the agency had made “abundantly clear” to Congress. The effect
on staffing was just as evident. So “formidable” were the Armory’s curatorial requirements,
wrote the planners, that “all parties must reconcile themselves that it will take many people to
do the job.” To reach a “minimum standard,” the park would need a chief curator at GS-12
level, a clerk/typist, a museum curator GS-9/11 and a museum specialist (conservator) at GS-
9/11 level, two museum technicians, a part-time museum aid, and an undetermined number
of museum interpretive staff.3

The Collection Management Plan written by the visiting experts in 1977 represented
the agency’s first formal effort to grasp the situation, but everyone involved knew it was not
enough. The planners recommended that a more detailed “Scope of Collection Statement”
be drafted describing the collection’s contents and laying out policies for acquiring or
deaccessioning objects. Like the Collection Management Plan itself, this recommendation
reflected both agency policy and conditions at the park. Pressure on parks to define the
scope of their collections had begun in the 1940s, motivated as much by a desire to control as

2 “Notes on Springfield Armory,” no signature, no date, [probably Arthur C. Allen, spring, 1977]

3 Division of Museum Services, Collection Management Plan, Springfield Armory, March, 1977
[prepared by Betsey Bradley, Barclay Rogers, Richard Rattenbury, Arthur C. Allen], pp. 4, 23, 42, 46.
to encourage their growth. In 1974 Arthur Allen, chief of the newly organized Division of Museum Services, called the regional curators into conference and obtained a consensus in favor of creating tighter statements of scope at every park. When this initiative met with bureaucratic resistance, the division began preparing collection management plans and using them to establish the scope of collections. In 1978, the preparation and approval of scope of collection statements was written into the agency’s management policies and in 1980, following Congressional scrutiny of the agency’s management of cultural resources, newly appointed Chief Curator Ann Hitchcock began to place high priority on the preparation of these statements. At the Armory, the need to define the collections was acute. The collection management plan team had admitted that “No one is certain of the size or extent of the weapon collection at Springfield Armory.” It might contain ten to twelve thousand weapons, at least 30,000 “major museum objects,” perhaps over 100,000 items in total. In addition to guns made at the Armory, the plan listed several thousand modified or experimental parts of weapons, crew served weapons, over 825 edged weapons, “flags, uniforms, documents, military hardware, historical photographs, books, and historic furniture,” 10,000 or so miniature figures, the famous Organ of Muskets, and the Blanchard lathe. Before defining the scope of what the collection should have, Allen pointed out the new park would have to find out what it already possessed. That meant carrying out a thorough inventory. Later, it could progress to a catalog and, finally, to a list of conservation priorities.

In museum practice, inventories and catalogs are quite different things. An inventory is a list of what is physically present within the museum, based on actual inspection. A catalog is a more detailed description of each object in the collection, including information on its history, design, manufacture, current condition and whereabouts, and how it came into the collection. Unlike a catalog, which may require years of patient research, an inventory is relatively straightforward. There were reasons; however, why creating an inventory at the Armory was both unusually challenging and unusually important. One was the lack of reliable existing documentation. In the view of the agency’s Division of Museum Services, the Army had “demonstrated a colossal lack of interest in these weapons collections since leaving the site in 1968. No inventories, no conservation work, no memoranda of concern....” Nor had the curatorial work performed by the Army before that date laid a strong foundation: the Army’s catalog was “incomplete,” its records “often incorrect...”

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7 Memo, Chief, Division of Museum Services (Arthur C. Allen) to Chief, Division of Reference Services, HFC, March 9, 1977 (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: fol. Curatorial SPAR through 1988).
NPS curator recalled some years later: “The Army cards are relatively useless.”\(^8\) As for the non-profit museum which took over in 1968, it had been completely unable to fill the gap in basic collection management.

As the NPS surveyed the scene in 1977, then, the most recent inventory remained the one carried out by the Army as it hurriedly prepared to depart almost a decade earlier. That inventory formed the basis of the Bailment Agreement itemizing the objects to be loaned to the non-profit museum. And this agreement remained the basic object list for the park as well as the “controlling property list” for the Army’s chief of military history.\(^9\) The agreement was not only flawed but outdated. And by 1977, Allen was virtually certain that at least fifty pieces listed therein had been lost, stolen, or misplaced.\(^10\) It was essential to find out exactly what was coming into the care of the National Park Service.

Other factors complicated the creation of an inventory. The second floor presented a “disorganized miscellany of weapons parts, exhibit materials, archival material, and furniture.”\(^11\) The Benton Collection was there, but so were smaller collections and individual pieces on loan, whose ownership was not in all cases clear. Upstairs there was even a “large collection of junk and broken furniture” which apparently belonged to nobody. Before an inventory could even be attempted, the entire second floor would have to be cleared out.

Later that year, a “hurried inventory” was carried out: it confirmed Allen’s suspicion that there were discrepancies with the Bailment Agreement.\(^12\) It also caused the first of several controversies over conservation that would roil the park. As Doug Lindsay recalled years later,\(^13\) Arthur Allen had persuaded the park’s first Superintendent Mohammed A. Khan to put each firearm in a sealed plastic bag as it was inventoried. Curator Bill Meuse objected strenuously, pointing out that the bags would create micro-environments in which moisture would build up and harm the objects. The disagreement ignited a “conflagration” in Boston: the regional office backed Meuse.

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\(^8\) Comments of Don McTernan on second draft of CMP, attached to memo, Superintendent to Staff Curator, CMP Program, NAR, April 6, 1993 (SPAR Central Files: H1415).

\(^9\) Memo, Lindsay to Ann Hitchcock, February 24, 1986 (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: fol. Curatorial SPAR through 1988).

\(^10\) Memo, Chief, Division of Museum Services (Arthur C. Allen) to Chief, Division of Reference Services, HFC, March 9, 1977 (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: fol. Curatorial SPAR Through 1988).


\(^13\) Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009.
“Words can hardly express the progress that has been made with the firearms collection since my last visit,” wrote Arthur Allen a year or so later. “No longer are all those fine rifles stacked in random piles in the dust and steam of a humid basement.” Except for the automatic weapons, the gun collection was “now in its rightful place, with good organization, on the second floor.” Books and archives were being organized in a library alcove on the second floor. The entire basement had been cleaned. Of course, much work still needed to be done “to continue with such an enormous collection: cataloguing, disassembly, cleaning, and restoration.” Now, however, reality began to impinge on planning, and in place of the logical sequence of steps which Allen had outlined, tasks began to be carried out simultaneously as need or opportunity dictated. Conservation work in particular was moved forward. By November, 1978, the park had almost completed a new preservation laboratory and waited only the signing of the interagency agreement with the Armory before beginning work on “cleaning, preservation and cataloguing.” Firearms were in fact being treated by the beginning of 1979, driven partly by the long-term needs of the collection as a whole but partly also by the short-term pressure of plans for new exhibits: the controversies over their treatment are discussed below.

While trying to establish curatorial control over the collection, the Armory was simultaneously expanding it. Doug Lindsay recalls that he came to the Armory in 1978 with the assumption, later modified, that “the park was all about the collection.” This had not yet been formally defined through a scope of collection statement, and there was a general understanding that it was a “live” collection – that is, it would grow through acquisitions. Lindsay talked with a Colonel Brophy about donating his rifle collection, one of the best in the world; even the National Rifle Association, strapped for funds in the wake of 1960s antagonism to guns and facing the possible closure of its museum, considered donating its collection to the Armory. One major accession was made. In 1979, the region agreed to accept the Victor A. Friend Collection as a gift from Tufts University: it had “special relevance to the history and development of firearms” as presented at the Armory, where indeed it had been stored on loan since before the NPS took over. Before approving the gift, the university’s trustees had to assure themselves that conditions imposed by the original donor would not be violated. An early version of the donation agreement gave the university

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14 Memo (“Trip Report”), Chief, Division of Museum Services, to Regional Director, NAR, August 7, 1978 (SPAR Central Files: D6215 Planning, Preparation, Maintenance, and Preservation of Museum Exhibits).

15 Memo, Superintendent (Lindsay) to Chief, Branch of Museum Services, HFC, November 2, 1978 (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: fol. Curatorial SPAR through 1988).


17 Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009.
the right to inspect the collection periodically, but the NPS (some of whose professional staff had unsuccessfully opposed a similar provision in the Army agreement) persuaded Tufts to drop this clause. The final agreement, in Regional Curator Edward Kallop’s words, gave a “slightly freer hand” to curatorial staff: in fact, it gave the NPS “complete responsibility” for the collection’s care and display while binding the agency to “maintain and preserve the collection in the best interests of the collection and of Springfield Armory National Historic Site,” and to maintain its catalog records in the Armory’s permanent file, “according to the standard museum records practice of the National Park Service.”

The park’s collecting activities were not universally supported. Conservator Edward McManus, who encountered the park during the summer of 1979, shortly before his arrival in the regional office, recalls that the collections were changing shape “haphazardly,” without a clear plan. On the one hand, they were growing through acquisitions of modern weapons that were not very selective, while the case could at least be made that the collection should be closed, or at least narrowly focused on weapons produced at the Armory. On the other hand, park staff wanted to get rid of some objects, like Japanese armor, that had long been part of the Armory’s collection. McManus regarded this lack of clear direction as one of the major problems related to the collection in the park’s early years.

Meanwhile, the need to establish basic curatorial control over the collections remained pressing. One complicating factor was the presence of numerous items that the Army had simply left behind. Though not part of the collection the NPS was not authorized to discard them because they still belonged to the Army. In 1983, the Army’s Historical Services Division made arrangements to have the Tennessee National Guard send a truck to pick up some of them. Others were transferred to the US Army Depot in Pueblo, CO, or allocated to other Army museums: to the Nebraska National Guard Historical Society, the Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor at Fort Knox, KY, the National Infantry Museum at Fort Benning, GA, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, OH, and so forth. Included were such items as 20mm. automatic guns, rifle mounts, a linker delinker, tripods, electric drives and feeders, sight mounts, instrument lights, several Russian guns, a German recoil assistor [sic], some French and Japanese armor, and a nose cannon for a World War I French airplane. A few items were marked for disposal, such as a screwdriver handle and a wooden target.

Despite these withdrawals, many of these items remained, and it was not until 2000 that a new interagency agreement gave the park “‘daily custodial care,’” of objects which the

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18 Letter, Kallop to Joseph J. Lambert (Overseer and Secretary to the Corporation, Tufts University), May 21, 1979; and (special relevance and agreement terms) [DRAFT] “Donation Agreement Between Board of Trustees Tufts University and National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior,” n.s., n.d., preamble and Secs. 3-6 (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: fol. Curatorial SPAR through 1988).
20 Letter, David L. Lemon (Colonel, MPC, Chief, Historical Services Division), to Lindsay, August 24, 1983 (SPAR Central Files: A4415 Interagency Agreement...Army).
Army had “‘abandoned on site.’” Even this did not end the confusion caused by non-collection objects: the following year, assuming the detritus stored on the third floor was part of the Armory museum, NPS Chief Conservator Sara Wolf criticized the park for neglecting its collection. The fact that the Armory by this time was also using the third floor to store collections of discarded objects for other parks only added to the confusion.

NPS policy required annual inventories of all museum collections, but the large number of firearms imposed a special burden at Springfield. For most collections, a statistically valid sample was considered sufficient, but not for firearms: as “controlled property,” these had to be fully inventoried every year. In addition, the interagency agreement gave the Army the right to demand a complete inventory of the Benton collection (now renamed Accession 2) anytime it wished. And it regularly exercised this right. When it did so in 1984 the park had difficulty responding: the processes of accessioning and cataloguing, as well as the actual records, were “somewhat scattered at present.”

Nonetheless, Lindsay recalls that the park had gained “control of the collection” by about that date. His major tool for doing so was computer cataloging. About 1982, the regional office invited three parks to take part in a pilot program in which, through a contract with a company called Data Point, each would receive a desktop computer and database software. Lindsay, who had a background in computer work, volunteered. He had a cataloging program designed and found a high school student to do the keypunching. He and Bill Meuse designed a computerized record card which would facilitate the immediate recording of each object’s essential registration data while postponing the remaining cataloging information until later.

Meanwhile, the NPS was taking important steps towards cataloging its collections. As early as the 1930s, the agency had begun seeking to standardize park museum records, introducing a service-wide record system in 1956, but it was not until 1977 that funds were authorized for a national catalog. Now in 1984, responding in part to Congressional pressure to demonstrate accountability in caring for cultural resources, the agency introduced new Service-wide cataloging standards. All parks would be required to adopt a new computerized catalog format: each park’s catalog would be entered into a national computer database known as the Automated National Catalog System, or ANCS. Initially,
this created new complications for the Armory, for although Lindsay had sat on the ANCS steering committee from about 1982, and Chief Curator Ann Hitchcock had approved of the park’s work, the Armory’s computerized catalog card did not match the new agency standard: it had been designed for compatibility with the Army Property Book and the Bailment Agreement. Moreover, by 1984 Meuse and his department had completed (and had filed at the Harpers Ferry Center) no fewer than 2,700 catalog cards in the Armory’s new format, corresponding to about one quarter of the weapons collection, and had entered another 3,000 records into the computer in the same format. The problem of converting the park’s catalog entries to the ANCS standard now arose: though Lindsay requested help in 1984, the work of conversion would extend over many years.26 In 1988, an updated version of ANCS was installed on a computer at the park,27 but as of 1991, about 2,500 objects were still catalogued in pre-ANCS format, while more than half of the collection remained entirely uncataloged. Warning that the situation might constitute a violation of legal requirements for collections responsibility, Acting Superintendent Lowenthal called for a “major project” to catalog the remainder and update the non-conforming records.28 Even so, only about 2,500 objects were cataloged in the current ANCS format as of 1999.29

Meanwhile, the need for regular inventories created its own problems. In October 1985, the park finished registering the objects in Accession 2 (the Benton Collection) but – as Allen had predicted – found discrepancies with the Bailment Agreement of 1968. In fact, five new discrepancies had appeared since the “hurried inventory” of 1977. Curator Stuart Vogt discussed the “accountability problem” with the Army’s chief curator and tried to work out a “complete and final resolution” of the discrepancies. In essence, the NPS wanted the Army to agree that its listing of accession 2 was “complete and accurate” and accept it as the “official property list,” replacing the obsolete Bailment Agreement. But the Army said it could do nothing before certain staff changes took place the following year.30 The problem remained unsolved and the inventory burden continued. In 1988-89, the staff took advantage of the museum’s temporary closure to carry out a “comprehensive inventory and reorganization of


27 Memo, Manager, Collections Accountability Project (Linda A. Towle) to Chief, Division of Cultural Resources, January 13, 1989 (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: folder: Curatorial SPAR 1989).

28 Resource Management Plan, prepared by Larry Lowenthal, approved by Acting Regional Director, May 21, 1991 (SPAR: Central Files: D18 (filed loose)). The plan does not state the number of objects cataloged in ANCS format.


30 Memo, Lindsay to Ann Hitchcock, February 24, 1986 (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: fol. Curatorial SPAR through 1988).
the collection... some 9000 items.” They made a big push to correct poorly maintained records for both the Army and the Tufts collections, the museum’s two major accessions. And in February, 1990, with new Curator Don McTernan now in charge, the effort concluded with the report that two weapons from the collection could not be accounted for: in addition, two reproductions, not technically part of the collection but stored with it, were missing.31

Given the size of the collections and the years of uncertainty surrounding its contents, this could be considered a successful outcome. Nevertheless, the inventory process had revealed new problems, some of which could not be blamed on the Army: the previous curator had made “many confusing and incomplete entries in the accession book” and had entered “incomplete documentation in the accession folder.” The park needed to upgrade its own techniques for receiving and recording accessions.32

After the 1991 inventory, Superintendent Beatty remarked to the regional director that the annual inventory constituted an “ongoing problem” for the park. The problem, of course, was the “inordinately high” number of controlled objects in the collection – 6,157 specimens, according to the 1993 inventory. In view of the Armory’s “minimal staff situation,” it was an understatement to say that the inventory was a “labor intensive exercise.”33 Beatty proposed to replace the annual complete inventory with monthly random-sample inventories carried out throughout the year. The region’s response was encouraging, and the last complete physical inventory of controlled property was carried out in 1993: it required two people working for three months. Monthly random inventories were started in 1995 and transferred to ANCS+, the updated version of the national catalog system, in 1997.34 Even then, however, the Army continued from time to time to demand item-by-item inventories of Accession 2 and sometimes insisted on their completion as a precondition for carrying out its own responsibilities, as in 1998, when it refused to renew the loan agreement until a new inventory had been carried out.35

The burden of updating the inventory has thus remained unusually onerous for the Armory, complicated both by the Army’s continued involvement and the special requirements imposed by guns. Yet by the 1990s park staff had attained a level of curatorial

31 Memo, Superintendent, SPAR, to Regional Director, NAR, March 23, 1990 (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: folder: Curatorial SPAR 1989 –).
32 Memo, Regional Curator (John Maounis) to Chief, Division of CRM, March 30, 1990 (“Trip Report, March 21, 1990”) (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: folder: Curatorial SPAR 1989 –).
33 Beatty: memo, Superintendent (Beatty) to Regional Director, NAR, October 1, 1992 (SPAR: Central Files: H1415); specimens: Inventory of Museum Property, with attached cover memo, Superintendent to Acting Regional Director NAR, October 28, 1993 (SPAR: Central Files: H1817 Acquisitions, Gifts, Loans (Accessions)); encouraging: memo, Regional Curator, NAR, to SPAR Superintendent, August 16, 1993 (SPAR: Regional Curator Files: folder: Curatorial SPAR 1989 –).
control over the collection far higher than that enjoyed at the park’s establishment. Even some lingering uncertainties have been resolved. One concerned outstanding loans to other institutions. In 1988, Larry Lowenthal wrote to request the return of objects which the Army had loaned to the Smithsonian years earlier. The inquiry was inconclusive, but by 2000 Washington officials had concluded that these objects should remain at the Smithsonian and that efforts to retrieve them should be dropped. More troubling than outstanding loans were stolen weapons. In 2003, the park announced proudly that the FBI had recovered an extremely rare and valuable 1839 Musketoon stolen from the Armory in 1958. This was the “first recovery of a number of antique weapons stolen from the Museum” that year: a park press release noted that “many other weapons” had been stolen during the collection’s history as an Army museum. Had the collection’s previous owner been a private collector or not-for-profit museum, the NPS might have been tempted to write off such losses. But there was no statute of limitations on the theft of property from the federal government, and so the list of stolen items was equivalent to a list of open cases. In 2003, the park announced that it was actively seeking a number of missing weapons, including 7 carbines, a derringer, a musket, two single-shot pistols, six semi-automatic pistols, five revolvers, a rifle-musket, a submachine gun, and a cavalry saber.

THE LIBRARY AND ARCHIVE

Though it was the gun collection that dazzled them, NPS staff recognized from the outset that the museum contained much more. The library and archive had “survived by chance,” in the sense that no specific provision for papers and books had been made when the Armory closed. By that time, the Army had already sent many of its historical records to the National Archives in Washington, DC. so that what remained in Springfield was “by no means complete or continuous.” It may have been material that was simply left behind, or it may have been material that was judged to be non-archival, that is, not scheduled for transfer to the National Archives. In any case, what the NPS encountered in 1971 was whatever had been “hastily gathered in by the museum curator when the Army left Springfield,” and it had hardly been arranged or cataloged due to the lack of staff time. Still, it was an important repository, containing a significant part of the Armory’s collection of maps and drawings, some technical reports, important manuscript collections including those of John C. Garand and John D. Pederson, a general reference library, a “sizable collection of army manuals,” a

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36 Letter, Larry Lowenthal to Edward Ezell (Curator, Military History, Smithsonian), October 27, 1988 (SPAR Central Files: H1415).

37 According to Sara Wolf (recorded interview of December 2, 2008), who cites this decision as an important element in the briefing she received in 2000 from Chief Curator Ann Hitchcock before undertaking the Armory’s new Collection Management Plan.

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“working photo collection,” and “technical movie films and oral history interviews, emphasizing former employees.”

The library and archive posed distinct challenges. On the one hand, encountering the park in 1977, Arthur Allen called the reference library “inadequate” and proposed a program to acquire essential publications. On the other, he believed that it was the “rather large collection of rare books and drawings stored upstairs” – and not the guns – that posed the museum’s most pressing maintenance and preservation priority.

Though it later became less uncommon, the presence of such a large archival collection in a park museum was still somewhat anomalous in 1977. “The Park Service as a rule approached the collection of archival and manuscript materials with cautious restraint,” notes Ralph H. Lewis in his study of NPS museums. The agency’s Museum Handbook, published in 1967, pointed out that the “special staffing and facilities” required by large archives went “beyond the proper functions of the Service.” As a result, large collections of papers, even when closely associated with sites, were frequently lodged at nearby libraries or historical societies. Lewis cites the examples of the Adams NHS (donated to the NPS in 1946), whose associated papers went to the Massachusetts Historical Society, the Saint-Gaudens Memorial (authorized in 1964), whose papers went to the Dartmouth College Libraries, and Hubbell Trading Post (authorized in 1965), whose papers were deposited on loan to the University of Arizona Library following their donation to the NPS in 1970. The Armory’s archive is not without parallel: the papers at Edison NHS (home designated in 1955, laboratory proclaimed in 1956) are even more extensive. Another parallel sometimes cited is the large collection of documents, drawings, and photographs associated with the Olmsted family of landscape designers and housed at Olmsted NHS. But this site was not authorized until 1979, five years after the Armory’s authorization and a year after its establishment: moreover, the NPS had expressed great reluctance to acquire the Olmsted archive. At the agency’s request, the legislation authorized it to turn the management of the archive over to an outside group, and the agency continued to seek one for a year before finally accepting the burden of running it. At the Armory, little attention appears to have been given to the archive ahead of authorization: although the planners used it for research, the draft master plan of 1971 did not discuss its care, nor was its ultimate disposition considered as part of the legislative debate.

Once it had captured their attention, the library and archive never left the minds of park staff or agency planners. By 1984, the staff was engaged in a three-year project to


inventory the photo collection and improve its storage. Four years later, Superintendent Lindsay could report that 24,492 individual items, or 70.5 linear feet of archival material, had been catalogued. In 1991, Larry Lowenthal noted the need for roughly $15,000 to conserve historic photographs. An agenda of “problems/issues SPAR would like to see addressed” by a new Collection Management Plan, prepared at roughly the same time, listed “library collection issues” alongside the park’s buildings as areas of special concern. In preparation for the Armory’s bicentennial, in fact, the park was planning to appeal to the community for documents, so that “this collection may increase dramatically....” In 1994, the top three priorities identified by Superintendent Beatty for regional Museum Collections Preservation and Protection Program (MCCP) project funding concerned the cataloging and preservation of the archive’s historic photographs, maps, and drawings. By 1999, the majority of the archival collection had at least been lot catalogued, at least apart from the photographs. In 2000, the Northeast Museum Services Center launched a Photograph Collection Documentation Project, coupling park funds with Backlog Cataloging Funds from Washington: this would involve processing and entering into the national computer database about 5,600 photographs produced between 1930 and 1968. It was the fourth and final phase of a multi-year project to catalog the photograph collection.

The high priority accorded the archival collections by park staff and agency officials had important consequences for the museum’s organization and management. In 1990 Steven Ourada, heading a collections accountability team, noted that the Armory differed from most parks “in that the research collection has grown apart from the museum collection and now stands alone.” The archive did indeed stand apart, with its own deed of gift and its

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43 Memo, Superintendent (Lindsay) to Regional Director, NAR, Year End Report for FY88 Cataloging Money, September 21, 1988; and (award) memo, Regional Director, NAR (Herbert S. Cables, Jr.) To Superintendent, February 16, 1988 (SPAR Central Files: H1415). It appears that a regional award of $2,500 to “Finish Cataloging Historic Collections” was used for this purpose.

44 “Problems/issues SPAR would like to see addressed during CMP visit,” n.d. (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: folder: SPAR CMP).

45 Memo, Supt to Regional Director NAR, May 26, 1994 (SPAR Central Files: H1817 Acquisitions, Gifts, Loans (Accessions)).


48 Memo, Archivist, Collections Accountability Team, NAR (Steve Ourada), to Regional Curator, NAR, April 25, 1990 (“Trip Report, April 12, 1990”) (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: folder: Curatorial SPAR 1989 –).
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own reporting line, for unlike the museum staff, who reported directly to the superintendent, the library reported to the park historian. A major staff reorganization in 1992 resolved this inconsistency, simultaneously expanding the Museum Services Division and splitting it into two sectors, a Collection Division and a smaller Library/Archive Division, both reporting to a new chief or museum curator.49

This change responded both to the library and archive’s importance within the park but also to a number of problems which Steven Ourada, now carrying out a regional initiative to evaluate archival holdings, listed that year. Some were internal: non-historic mingled with historic material, none of the library collections entered into ANCS, a general lack of indices and finding aids, no clear listing of archive and manuscript collections. Others were structural: the park’s governing documents did not adequately address the library, which lacked a mission statement, scope of collections statement, and policy documents controlling access, acquisitions, and deaccessions. Yet other problems were procedural: in the absence of clear, agency-compliant policies, accession decisions were made by discussion, with Historian Lowenthal having the final say. The problem was not the quality of the decisions, for the staff was highly knowledgeable: it was that, without clear guidelines, that quality could not be dependably replicated, nor could decisions be defended from an “appearance of subjectivity.” Moreover, noted Ourada, the current library system depended on the “accumulated knowledge of the staff,” a reservoir of intuitional memory which had never been codified in documents. “Clear, concise guidelines,” he urged, “composed and refined through discussion, [sic] and practice are basic elements of strong institutions whether they be museums, libraries, or archives. Additionally, these materials must be accounted for according to NPS policy.”50 Obviously the reorganization could not solve all of these problems, but it might at least foster better coordination with the other parts of the museum. Nevertheless, Lowenthal opposed the move. Seeing it mainly as an imposition of a new management layer, he argued for the “continued independence of the library”: what both branches needed, he urged, was “more technical help.”51

Though many challenges remained, great progress had been made by the mid-1990s towards gaining curatorial control of all the collections. In 1977, museum planners had confessed to uncertainty about what the collections contained. By 1993, a synopsis could list the contents with fair precision:

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50 Memo, Regional Archivist, NAR (Steven Ourada), to Acting Regional Curator, NAR, March 6, 1992 (concurred by Chief, Division of Cultural Resources and ART, Planning & Resource Preservation, March 19, 1992), pp. 4-5 (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: folder: SPAR CMP).
51 Memo, Regional Archivist, NAR (Steven Ourada), to Acting Regional Curator, NAR, March 6, 1992 (concurred by Chief, Division of Cultural Resources and Associate Regional Director, Planning & Resource Preservation, March 19, 1992), p. 6 (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: folder: SPAR CMP).
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- History collection: 10,850 objects;
- Archival collection: 2,350,000 items;
- Archeological collection: 3,768 items;
- Objects on display: 1,267. 52

While tabulations of the collection continued to vary,53 and archival cataloging continued to prompt some controversy, it seems safe to say that agency staff no longer felt broad uncertainty over the collection’s scope and contents.

Archeology at the Armory

The presence of an archeological collection at the Armory may come as a surprise. It did not arise from the Armory’s mission but rather from the need to comply with the National Historic Preservation Act, which required an archeological investigation to be carried out whenever federally permitted construction work disturbed the soil of a property listed on the National Register. In the case of national parks, whatever emerged from the trenches and test pits would be added to the park’s collection. Rather than being a consciously assembled collection, then, or the product of a campaign of archeological excavations carried out for research purposes, the Armory’s archeological holdings were the result of salvage archeology: material unearthed during a series of construction projects beginning in 1980.

In 1980-81, the NPS proposed to provide new gas service to Buildings 1 and 13, as the existing steam system was judged to be unreliable and possibly unsafe. The new line was to follow the exact route of the existing utility lines, so that little or no impact on archeological resources was anticipated. A few months later, however, the agency proposed installing new electrical lines to Buildings 1 and 13 as well. This time, though a “minimum of ground disturbance” was anticipated, 23 shovel test pits were dug along the proposed 650-foot route of the proposed line. The excavators looked for evidence of any structures, for example of the schoolhouse, ice house, greenhouses, or residences known to have existed at one time, but found none “except for utility-related pipes and drains.” Although they did retrieve cultural material from the pits, this proved to be a jumble of eighteenth and nineteenth century fragments, leading the excavators to conclude that the material had been brought onto the site along with topsoil used for fill. They concluded the utility trench would have no

53 For example, the NPS’s “Museum Centennial 1904-2004” website lists the Armory’s total collections at 530,416 items. The discrepancy is likely due to different methods of counting archival items. For the sake of consistency, this figure is used below for the purpose of comparison with other NPS collections, for which the same source is used. See www.nps.gov/history/museum/centennial/index (consulted 12/08).
significant impact on cultural resources. The State Historic Preservation Officer concurred with the agency’s determination.54

After the survey was completed, the excavated material was shipped to the Denver Service Center where it was analyzed and an Excavation Report published. The following year the fragments, now reconstituted as a “collection,” were returned to the Armory, where they entered museum storage as Accession No. 46. Meanwhile, regional mandates relating to archeology were growing stricter. In 1981, the region’s Division of Cultural Resources launched an Archeological Collections Management Project, intended to “catalog and reorganize archeological collections within the NPS system in a standardized and systematic manner.” And in 1985, as part of a region-wide collections accountability project, program staff undertook to determine the number of uncatalogued archeological collections held at each of the region’s parks. The Armory was judged to have one of the region’s “small and well documented collections” and was not regarded as a serious problem. Nevertheless, in May, 1988, the 641 artifacts excavated from the electric line survey were taken out of storage and shipped for further processing to the Eastern Archeological Field Laboratory at the Charlestown Navy Yard outside Boston. The result was a new report, written in 1990, which restated the conclusions of the 1982 report while correcting a few small errors.55

The park soon confronted a more serious archeological problem than any presented by the 1981 survey. In 1984, anticipating major construction on Building 13, the Denver Service Center retained American University, under an existing cooperative agreement, to carry out an archeological survey in order to locate and avoid disturbing any “remnants of physical development and activity areas....” Research, to include not only digging but also ground penetrating radar, maps, and secondary sources, was completed by August 1984. Eleven out of twelve test plots yielded “significant cultural deposits,” including evidence of two structures north of the Arsenal dating from c. 1820 and 1833. The researchers concluded that Colonel Ripley’s decision to import a good deal of fill had preserved cultural features by burying them. The placement of the Main Arsenal’s proposed new drainage system would “seriously impact” some of these features.56

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55 Louise M. DeCesare, Archeological Collections Management at the Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Massachusetts, ACMP Series No. 6, Division of Cultural Resources Management, North Atlantic Regional Office, 1990 (SPAR: Cultural Resources Reference Collection). The information on the ACMP is taken from p. [1].

56 Existing agreement: modification to Cooperative Agreement with American University, July 2, 1984 (Charlestown: CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR - Pkg. 103 Archeology...); intent and methods: “Agreement [sic] No. 9 to Cooperative Agreement CA-2000-4-0001 between National Park Service and
In compliance with the region’s Archeological Collections Management Program, an Excavation Report was drafted in 1987, as the Denver Service Center prepared to catalog the resulting collection, estimated at no less than 11,000 artifacts. But the program quickly unraveled. American University archeologists had estimated that only 2,000 artifacts would need curation, leading to a significant budget shortfall which the extra work imposed by the agency’s adoption of ANCS only compounded. There were far worse problems. The artifacts and records were stored in American University’s basement lab; the lab flooded; everything had to be moved, not once but twice. Some artifacts, a great many field records, and all of the photographs were destroyed. On top of that, the Denver Service Center accused the project archeologists of squabbling, exercising poor supervision, keeping inadequate field notes, and possibly committing errors in excavation. Project personnel kept changing. Finally, there were problems of analysis: American University’s archeologists insisted that certain small pieces of flint were rare and important Paleo-Indian artifacts, whereas the Denver Service Center’s experts believed they had positive evidence that they were nothing more than old gun flints. The find would be important if genuine; if not, an embarrassing blunder. When the university archeologists refused to back down, the DSC had to “forcibly remove” the assertions from the final report.

“It is obvious,” concluded Lindsay in 1989, “that this was a study incompetently performed and a contract incompetently administered.” He suggested leaving it in draft form, “not finalized or ‘approved.’” No copy was found during the research for this administrative history.

After this, archeology proceeded more uneventfully at the Armory, stirred only by the college’s last-minute requests for building permits. In 1991, an archeologist from the region’s Archeology Branch monitored the excavation of a 320-foot long gas main trench crossing both college and NPS property. She saw two historical features: steam pipes at the west end of the trench and a brick sewer capped with red stone at the east end. Only one artifact was found: “a heavily corroded, square-head, cut nail (1840-1885).” It was “not

American University”, signed and dated July 2, 1984 (SPAR Central Files: A 4415 Cooperative Agreements); findings: Richard R. Sacchi (Staff Archeologist, Department. of Anthropology, American University), Interim Report, Archeological Investigations, Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Package No. 103), August, 1984 (Charlestown: CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR - Pkg. 103 Archeology...).

57 Louise M. DeCesare, Archeological Collections Management at the Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Massachusetts, ACMP Series No. 6, Division of Cultural Resources Management, North Atlantic Regional Office, 1990, p. 2 (SPAR: Cultural Resources Reference Collection).


59 Memo, SPAR Superintendent Lindsay to Regional Director, NAR, August 7, 1989 (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: folder: Curatorial SPAR 1989 –).
In 2000, archeologists at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst conducted archeological testing for proposed utility lines and a playground on the campus and, on federal property, for proposed communication lines and repair work on the Byers Street gate. They found no native artifacts, no significant archeological deposits or features.61

DEFINING THE COLLECTION

The reorganization of the Armory’s collections clarified the management relationships among them. But the museum posed more fundamental questions. What were the nature and purpose of the collections? What was their relationship to the site? What public should they serve, and how?

Addressing these questions, the Collection Management Plan of 1977 used a striking term: “arms library.”62 This was a concept the NPS inherited from the museum that preceded it, and to the agency’s planners it mainly meant that the collection should be “broad in scope and encyclopedic in content.” Thus they warned against “dilution...into a typical war museum collection.”63 But when in 1981 Superintendent Lindsay posed a sharp choice – “Museum versus Library of Arms” – it became clear that what was at stake was more than the collection’s scope. Before the NPS took over, according to Lindsay,64 visitors often came to the museum with the express purpose of taking the guns apart in order to study them, sometimes even taking parts home with them. And the museum had supported this practice. “The Park position on this issue is quite clear,” added Lindsay: “The collection has been here at Springfield Armory for over a century, and during that entire time it has been used as a reference collection – a library of arms.” Visitors still came from all over world, wanting to use the collection “as a reference source,” and these visitors were a key part of the Armory’s public.

They come to look, to handle, to study, to disassemble, to photograph, to look for interior features or markings, to measure or to compare. They do not want to look at the pieces through glass – they want ‘hands on’. In essence, they wish to use the collection as it

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64 Memo, Lindsay to Kallop, September 2, 1981 (copy in Arnold, conservation binder, no. 32).
The Collections

has always been used – for reference. Adding that the Army required the collection to be available for study, he hinted that the NPS might not be able to restrict this traditional practice.65

At stake, then, was an idea of the collection which Lindsay believed the park had inherited along with the museum’s traditional public of gun enthusiasts. This idea differed in important ways from the norm within the National Park Service, or indeed among professionally accredited museums, few if any of which would have allowed their valuable objects to be handled this way. NPS museums shared the profession’s belief that assuring the preservation of valuable artifacts was a primary responsibility. But they also added some particular views on the role of museums within the parks. Since the 1920s, NPS policy had declared that collecting should be focused on the geographic area of the park and limited to objects needed to tell the park’s story, or to illuminate the features for which it had been established.66 To define the collection as a library of arms was simultaneously to subordinate the museum’s preservation function to its public service role and to detach it from the park’s interpretive or exhibition needs. This was what Lindsay seemed to be advocating.

The library idea, and the tinkering that went along with it, may have inspired Lindsay to make another proposal. Precisely because guns are delicate mechanical assemblages – and because those assemblages contain explosions which sometimes damage or destroy them – many valuable firearms were in lamentable condition. But tinkering could fix them. “... [W]e are badly in need of parts for the older weapons,” wrote Lindsay in 1978 – screws, sights, barrel bands, and so forth, with which to repair damaged or incomplete specimens. It was hard to find parts on the market, but Lindsay pointed out that many NPS units “have what are commonly known as ‘junkers’ in their study collections” – weapons too badly damaged to use or restore, good only for “canibalization [sic] of parts to restore other weapons of a like pattern.” Why not, he proposed, ask “all National Parks (not just military ones)” to transfer their junkers and surplus weapons to the Armory in order to help with the “restoration of vital pieces in our display collection”? The Armory could serve as a clearinghouse, which would have the added advantage of relieving the parks of a “curatorial burden.”67 In fact, Arthur Allen had made a similar proposal the previous year, when he suggested designating the Armory as a service-wide place for parks to send living-history weapons for annual repair, cleaning, and swapping of parts as necessary.68 Regional Curator Edward Kallop liked Lindsay’s proposal and, in November 1978, passed it along to the Division of Museum

65 Memo, Lindsay to Kallop, September 2, 1981 (copy in Arnold, conservation binder, no. 32).
Services at Harpers Ferry with his endorsement; receiving no response, he repeated his recommendation a month later.69

For an agency with well over a hundred museum collections, the idea of a clearinghouse had an obvious attraction. Yet the timing of the Armory proposal was unfortunate. The clearinghouse idea had first emerged within the NPS in 1940 with a proposal to circulate lists of natural specimens, either desired or excess, among the parks. It resurfaced in 1959 with a proposal to assign clearinghouse functions to the regional curators, who would match up the lists of wanted and excess objects and stimulate exchanges. This was what would now be called a virtual clearinghouse, in that it would never contain any objects: rather, the specimens would move directly from park to park. But the agency also had experience with physical storehouses for unwanted objects. Thus in 1937 the curator at Colonial National Historical Park, having skimmed off the few guns he wanted from a donated collection of over a hundred, sent the rest to the agency’s Eastern Museum Laboratory in Washington. This function was expanded and regularized in 1966, when the temporary move of central museum staff to offices in Springfield, Virginia, opened up new storage space. Parks soon began to send unusually large items there, and the repository became known as the Museum Clearing House. In 1978, it was moved to Harpers Ferry and placed under the Division of Museum Services. This was just the moment when Lindsay and Kallop made their proposal and early the following year the chief of Museum Services ruled against it, arguing that it would duplicate functions the division was already providing.70

Ironically Ann Hitchcock, the newly created chief curator, would halt the acceptance of surplus objects three years later, as a prelude to terminating the Clearing House’s role as a repository.71

By then, Lindsay’s view of the Armory collection was changing. He himself would reject the library of arms idea, concluding that “the less [physical] contact people had with that collection, the better off we were.”72 The reason was security. “The real problem with gun buffs,” Lindsay had learned, “is they love guns.” Specifically, Lindsay had discovered that one of the things that happened when gun lovers took weapons home with them was that they did not come back in the same condition – or at all. The same characteristic of guns that made a parts repository feasible was causing a recurrent and serious problem with the collection: the replacement of unique experimental parts – a key feature of the collection for scholars – with “plan vanilla” substitutes. Visitors even attempted to make switches within the museum. In fact, Lindsay now understood that the collection had been significantly damaged by the virtually “unfettered access” offered for a decade by the Springfield Armory

70 Memo, Chief, Division of Museum Services to Regional Director, NAR, February 22, 1979 (copy in Arnold, conservation binder, no. 21).
72 Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009.
Museum. Thus he began to clamp down on public access to the guns. When the new museum opened, he “made provision for one small room with a bare desk, no cabinets and no drawers; two chairs.” A staff member would bring in a single weapon at a time and would remain with the researcher.

By the late 1980s, written rules codified the new, restrictive access policies. They explicitly discouraged general reading in the library and archive and controlled research tightly as well. The rules required researchers to make appointments well in advance, to state precisely which weapon they wished to examine and why, and to estimate the time needed for their research. Museum staff would evaluate each request individually, and the outcome would depend on all of these factors, plus the fragility of the requested specimen. Once at the Armory, researchers would have to work at all times under the “direct supervision” of a professional staff member. To prevent damage to internal parts, disassembly was forbidden. Removing catalog tags for photography was forbidden. Taking detailed measurements of Class III weapons was forbidden. The implicit promise of open access, which Lindsay had found being practiced at the park and had initially accepted, thus gave way to the assumption that the objects had to be protected from visitors.

The rejection of the library of arms idea could also be seen in the park’s conservation programs, discussed below, and in the design of its permanent exhibition. The new exhibition was, first and foremost, a reaction against the old displays, with their “case after case of guns.” But because it took so much longer than anticipated, its development followed a double arc, first tracing the evolution of Lindsay’s thinking about guns, people, and the park, and then a devolution driven by cost cutting.

Arriving at the Armory, Lindsay recalls that his first impression was that “the park was all about the collection.... If we had designed that park the year I got there, it would have been wall-to-wall guns, trust me.” But after studying the Armory’s history and talking with Larry Lowenthal and others, he “realized that the important story...was actually the industrial side, and the role of a national armory in bringing the new nation into a local community.” And so by 1983, exhibit planners had decided to supplement the mandatory displays of guns with “interpretive exhibits,” custom-built U- or L-shaped structures presenting the armory’s history, relating the “manufacture of particular arms to military


75 Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009.
The exhibit designers did not forget the collection’s traditional public, the “gun buffs.” The point of the Freaks and Oddities display was to demonstrate “good gunmanship.” And in addition to the “interpretive exhibits” there would be “display exhibits” incorporating the historic gun racks (or perhaps replicas) and satisfying the enthusiasts who

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76 Memo, Chief, Division of Exhibit Planning and Design, HFC (Johnsson) to Superintendent, April 20, 1983 (SPAR Central Files: D6215 Planning, Preparation, Maintenance, and Preservation of Museum Exhibits).

77 Memo, Chief, Division of Exhibit Planning and Design, HFC (Johnsson) to Superintendent, April 20, 1983 (SPAR Central Files: D6215 Planning, Preparation, Maintenance, and Preservation of Museum Exhibits).
came to see “case after case of guns.” The information desk would have a “wood surface that will not damage the rare weapons shown to visitors,” while a “comfortable lounge area” adjacent to the desk would accommodate “those persons who accompany the gun buffs, but are not themselves interested in guns.”

Lindsay recalled the plan as a tripartite scheme: a “soft side” which “told the interesting stories about the institution and the people who worked in it;” a “hard side,” where a thousand or so weapons were displayed for the “gun nuts”; and, separating the two, a “lounge...for the poor wives and girlfriends who had to sit there for two hours while their buddies went to the gun nut section.”

In the end, budgetary pressures defeated Lindsay’s hopes for ambitious computer animations and videos: “the cost ran us into static, typical glass cases...,” he recalls, and the final installation came to look like a conventional museum display. In the end, the exhibits placed less emphasis on the site's industrial history than the 1983 plan proposed, and more on the evolution of weapons. On the other hand, some of the concessions to the gun enthusiasts were also dropped. The lounge area remained, but guns would not be presented to visitors on the wooden counter. And apart from the Organ of Muskets there would be no open gun racks. The exhibit had remained largely in the mold of a gun collection. But it was no longer a library of arms.

Twenty years after the museum’s reopening in 1989, Lindsay rated the exhibits “about as good as you could do under the circumstances.” At the time, he was “delighted to report that the reception has been entirely favorable....” The local papers were complimentary, as they had been of his makeshift temporary exhibits in 1986. “It is such a great relief,” continued Lindsay, “to know that we have succeeded in finding the appropriate level of interpretation for such a technical and potentially dry subject.”

Still, satisfaction was not universal: some arms enthusiasts complained that not all of the weapons were on display, and that the cases hid one side of the guns.

By the time of the reorganization in 1992, the museum/library of arms question had been effectively settled: the Armory’s collections would be treated according to museum standards. But the guns continued to present some special museological challenges. One was the danger they posed. Lindsay was surprised by the number of loaded guns he and his staff found in the collection: it was a “very scary” situation. “The very first thing to be done with an artifact is to MAKE SURE IT IS UNLOADED,” directed the park’s Artifact Preservation

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78 Memo, Chief, Division of Exhibit Planning and Design, HFC (Johnsson) to Superintendent, April 20, 1983 (SPAR Central Files: D6215 Planning, Preparation, Maintenance, and Preservation of Museum Exhibits).

79 Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009.

80 Memo, Superintendent to Manager, HFC, October 2, 1989 (SPAR Central Files: D6215 Planning, Preparation, Maintenance, and Preservation of Museum Exhibits).

81 Statement for Management. Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Springfield, Massachusetts [February, 1993], (copy lacks signatures on recommended (Superintendent) and approved (Regional Director) lines), p. 11(SPAR Central Files: A6419: Statement for Management).

82 Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009.
Even in 1992, after almost fifteen years of NPS stewardship, museum staff still called for a “systematic and complete search for loaded weapons in storage.” Loaded guns might also enter the museum from outside, since visitors sometimes brought their own weapons in order to compare them with a museum specimen or discuss them with a curator. The practice was forbidden, but given the nature of guns and their collectors, Management Officer Frank Seng concluded in 1998 that it was probably inevitable. A metal detector caught most guns at the entrance; panic buttons were installed at the front desk and in the research room in 1992. Still, given that it was probably impossible to keep all guns out of the building, Seng believed the real challenge was to distinguish potential troublemakers from harmless rule breakers.

The mechanical intricacy of guns, which both necessitated and allowed the swapping of parts, posed other curatorial challenges. The relative ease with which their working parts could be modified or even replaced made it especially important for curators to attend very closely to their details. This was particularly true of the Armory’s collection, which contained experimental or developmental weapons whose minute yet significant distinctions were nearly invisible. To the museum expert (or visitor) nourished on Impressionist paintings or baroque tapestries, guns were often difficult to distinguish from one another. But as one expert reported after examining the collection, “These weapons are highly individualized.” In order to reduce the confusion created by repairs made with available spare parts, Regional Curator Maounis recommended in 1990 that all gun parts be individually catalogued. Following standard NPS policy he also recommended cataloguing reproductions as museum property, not to elevate their value but simply to create an unequivocal record for future museum staff.

The practice of copying was another potent source of confusion. Art museums traditionally admitted copyists because copying the works of great artists was recognized as an essential part of artistic training, and it is extremely difficult to pass off a copy of a Rembrandt or a Renoir as a genuine work. Copying guns is different. One problem is that it may produce an illegal weapon, since with sufficient information a determined gunsmith can convert a gun copied from a legal semi-automatic into an illegal automatic weapon. To avoid complicity in such illegal conversions, the park moved its automatic weapons into the high-
security storage area in the basement and forbade visitors from drawing or measuring them. A second problem is that copying can lead to the proliferation of unauthorized reproductions or fakes. In 1989, Staff Curator Meuse asked for guidance about the growing number of requests for access “from people whose obvious intention is to create a fake of a valuable collector’s item.” He gave the example of a man who admitted that he wanted to measure a rare and valuable Trapdoor Marksman Rifle (worth $40,000) in order to upgrade his “normal run-of-the-mill” Trapdoor (worth $200) and sell it – without disclosing the weapon’s history – for a substantial profit.

The NPS recognized this problem as early as 1977, when Museum Services chief Arthur Allen noted that it was getting harder and harder to distinguish the authentic guns from the fakes. The problem had developed during the previous decade, when many companies began making reproductions. As a solution, Allen proposed to invite all manufacturers to “place one example of everything they make on deposit here at Springfield so that in essence we will have a ‘sealed pattern’ of each such specimen.” This would not only help future park curators to identify fakes but would also provide a “ready reference of reproduction military hardware” for other parks organizing “military living history programs.”

More than a decade later, however, Meuse proposed a different solution. “Just as we should have no complicity in the making of illegal automatic weapons,” he told John Maounis, “I feel that we should have no complicity in the production of faked weapons of great value.” Before the NPS arrived, Meuse noted, the measuring and copying of weapons had simply not been allowed (a statement that seems to conflict with Lindsay’s idea of the collection as a library of arms). Though he understood that a public museum could not restrict access in this way, what he really wanted was a basis on which to do so. Supervisory Curator Don McTernan agreed. But little could be done. Chief Curator Ann Hitchcock suggested requiring researchers to stamp their reproduction parts. Regional Curator John Maounis suggested requiring them to sign an agreement stating that they would not modify weapons based on their research at the Armory. The best that could be hoped for, in his view, was to discourage misuse: it could not be prevented.

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88 Memo, Regional Curator (John Maounis) to Chief, Division of CRM, March 30, 1990 (“Trip Report, March 21, 1990”) (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: folder: Curatorial SPAR 1989 –).

89 Memo, Staff Curator, SPAR (William E. Meuse), to Superintendent, SPAR, December 7, 1989 (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: folder: Curatorial SPAR 1989).


91 Memo, Staff Curator, SPAR (William E. Meuse), to Superintendent, SPAR, December 7, 1989, with annotation by McTernan (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: folder: Curatorial SPAR 1989).

92 Memo, Regional Curator (John Maounis) to Chief, Division of CRM, March 30, 1990 (“Trip Report, March 21, 1990”) (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: folder: Curatorial SPAR 1989 –).

CONSERVATION AT THE ARMORY

Of the many dimensions of the Armory’s museum work, conservation was perhaps the most strongly affected by the special requirements of guns. Twice during the Armory’s history within the NPS, its conservation programs became the subject of serious controversy. And on both occasions a central question was whether the conservation of guns should follow different standards than that of other museum objects.

From the beginning, conservation at the Armory was recognized as “a monumental task”: as the Collection Management Plan remarked in 1977, “The sheer numbers are staggering....” Two years later, Arthur Allen confirmed that the Armory had a “massive weapons conservation problem”: at least 15,000 objects “require constant conservation care.” Museum planners called for “individual” and “highly organized” treatments, including “special techniques” and controls to prevent the interchange of parts. They recommended a specific sequence of steps for each object: first, examine, photograph, and produce a condition report; second, disassemble and record hidden markings; third, remove corrosion, reassemble, and apply catalog number. At an average of two days per weapon, the planners estimated that to apply this minimal treatment – which did not include any allowance for serious conservation problems – to the entire weapons collection would require almost one hundred man-years of labor. Yet, many of the guns needed attention immediately in order to arrest deterioration. The “most logical approach to future conservation work,” they recommended, would be to “establish a preservation treatment laboratory on site.” Equipping one would cost almost $35,000.93

By 1978, as we have seen, the park had a laboratory, and conservation work was soon going forward under the direction of Curator William Meuse. This was not, however, a fully equipped, modern conservation lab. According to Lindsay, the first lab was little more than a rudimentary workspace on the first floor of the Main Arsenal, where visitors could observe the curators working.94 This was “not a good idea,” he recalls, largely because of security concerns, and so he had the shop moved to the basement. Even then, Conservator Ed McManus recalls that it “wasn’t a conservation lab” but rather a “collections maintenance facility.”95 That was well and good, but within a year the work being done there was sparking controversy, especially with Arthur Allen. Meuse and Allen strongly disliked each other personally.96 But Allen’s objections reflected the trend to professionalize conservation which

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94 Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009.

95 Edward McManus, recorded interview with author, March 25, 2009.

96 Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009.
was underway within the agency and with which Allen was closely associated. Influenced by developments at the Fogg Museum in Boston, the NPS had begun to adopt the new scientific methods of object conservation at the end of the 1940s and waged an internal campaign of professionalization throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The Division of Museums had set up centralized conservation laboratories at the Harpers Ferry Center in 1970, and the operation had enjoyed steady growth in staff and budget, by 1979 reaching eight professional conservators and two conservation technicians, plus support staff, operating in no less than seven specialized labs. That year, Allen recognized the enterprise’s importance by creating a Branch of Conservation Laboratories at Harpers Ferry. Meanwhile, professional conservation work was spreading throughout the agency, with the establishment of a conservation lab at the Western Archeological Center in 1977 and the appointment of metals conservator Edward McManus as objects conservator for the North Atlantic Region shortly afterwards. McManus arrived in Boston as an “advocate for conservation,” and an energetic one. He organized two-week training courses for park staff, called “The Critical Eye,” promulgated conservation standards, visited parks throughout the region, and helped those with the most critical needs complete conservation assessments of their collections.

For Allen, part of the problem in Springfield was that Meuse, though “an outstanding curator of firearms,” was neither trained nor titled as a conservator. The fact that he was treating objects represented a threat to the efforts he and McManus were making to professionalize the field. Given the collection’s “paramount importance,” Allen argued, “its care must not be relegated to someone who is not professionally trained.” Even the conservation lab should wait until a trained metal conservator was in place. McManus recalls that he too was disturbed by the situation: beyond the professional impropriety, he thought the park was placing too much emphasis on treating individual specimens – for example, every weapon in the Organ of Muskets – and not enough on gaining curatorial control and assuring high preservation standards for the collection as a whole. In addition, McManus was disturbed by the potential for conflicts of interest with Meuse’s personal activities as a gun collector, a situation he calls “ethically incorrect.” There was a further problem: according to Allen, the core responsibility of a curator was to create and maintain a catalog: giving the Armory’s imperative need to gain control over the collections, “nothing, repeat nothing, can be more important than cataloguing everything on hand...” In view of Meuse’s expertise, Allen was prepared to allow “some relaxation of the usual separation between curatorial and conservation duties,” yet he also had substantive concerns about Meuse’s

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99 Memo, Chief, Division of Museum Services, HFC (Arthur Allen), to Regional Director, NAR (atttn: Regional Curator), March 12, 1979 (SPAR Central Files: D6215 Planning, Preparation, Maintenance, and Preservation of Museum Exhibits).
100 Edward McManus, recorded interview with author, March 25, 2009. It is not clear whether the concerns McManus recalls arose in 1979 or somewhat later.
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conservation method. That method, as former Superintendent Doug Lindsay recalls, was to disassemble the weapon, wash down the metal parts in a soapy solution, and allow them to dry in a warm area. Meanwhile, Meuse would wipe down the wooden stocks with cleaning rags and a little alcohol.\(^{101}\) After reviewing Meuse’s work, Allen wrote, “I no longer can support such cleaning operations as I observed.” Though some recently cleaned muskets “look very good, there could be problems.” Unable to get a clear answer as to what the stocks had looked like when new, he suspected Meuse had over-cleaned them, removing their patina and drying out the wood. McManus recalls having the same concern. All in all, Allen believed the park was facing an emergency, and with Lindsay’s agreement, he proposed to re-describe an existing staff vacancy as a Metals Conservator/ Museum Specialist (GS 9/11), and to fill the position as quickly as possible.\(^{102}\)

Allen’s memo reverberated. Lindsay called it “snotty.” But Regional Curator Kallop was not so sure. He dispatched conservator Edward McManus (based for a few more months in Washington) to the Armory to report on conditions there.\(^{103}\) Meanwhile Meuse, opposed to hiring a new metals conservator, mounted a spirited defense of his own approach, consulting with other curators and informing Lindsay of their support for his position. Bob Fisch, curator at West Point, reportedly told him what the museum needed was not another chief but “more ‘Indians,...more bodies with just plain muscle for elbow grease and not too much in the brains department.” Emil Schnorr of the George Walter Vincent Smith Museum in Springfield reportedly told Meuse, “You are the Curator, and you make the decisions.”\(^{104}\) Later that fall, McManus reported to Kallop that he saw no evidence of over-cleaning, that “most of the metal appeared to be in excellent condition...,” that the cleaning treatments he observed were mild and “commendable in this circumstance,” and that the staff showed “sensitivity and appreciation for the collection.” McManus described Meuse’s work as “essentially a house keeping procedure. The fact that it is well planned and carefully executed also makes it excellent conservation.”\(^{105}\)

\(^{101}\) Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009.

\(^{102}\) Memo, Chief, Division of Museum Services, HFC (Arthur Allen), to Regional Director, NAR (attn: Regional Curator), March 12, 1979 (SPAR Central Files: D6215 Planning, Preparation, Maintenance, and Preservation of Museum Exhibits).

\(^{103}\) Memos, Supt (Lindsay) to Regional Curator, NAR, June 15, 1979 (SPAR: Regional Curator Files: fol. Curatorial SPAR through 1988), and Ed Kallop (NAR Curator) to Lindsay, June 12, 1979 (SPAR Central Files: D6215 Planning, Preparation, Maintenance, and Preservation of Museum Exhibits).

\(^{104}\) Memos, Curator, SPAR (W. E. Meuse) to Superintendent, June 15, 19, and 19, 1979 (SPAR Central Files: D6215 Planning, Preparation, Maintenance, and Preservation of Museum Exhibits). The other expert was Craddock Goigns, head of the Military History Section of the Smithsonian.

\(^{105}\) Memo, Edward McManus (conservator) to Edward Kallop, November 16, 1979 (SPAR Central Files: D6215 Planning, Preparation, Maintenance, and Preservation of Museum Exhibits). In an interview thirty years later, McManus did not recall this memorandum but did remember being concerned about “harsh treatment” of the weapons, including the use of sand-blasting equipment and the consequent damage to or removal of original coatings on metal surfaces. (Recorded interview with author, March 25, 2009).
From Superintendent Doug Lindsay’s perspective, it was also necessary conservation. He approved the work on the assumption that the new permanent exhibition would be installed much sooner than in fact proved to be the case, and in the belief that roughly a thousand guns – in addition to the roughly six hundred comprising the Organ of Muskets – would have to be cleaned and conserved very quickly. As the staff worked their way through the guns, they found severe problems: guns fired and never cleaned, guns suffering internal corrosion, guns still loaded. Meuse’s solution, essentially a simplified version of NPS practice, was designed to process a large number of guns quickly and safely. Meuse did not actually do most of the work himself: that was done by another curator, Joe Polcetti, who had been inherited from the Springfield Armory Museum, Inc., and by Rich Harkens, an instructor at the college who was adept with all things mechanical and whom Lindsay hired part time at the park. The work was done in the basement laboratory until the Main Arsenal was vacated for rehabilitation in 1987, at which time Lindsay had the kitchen of the Commanding Officer’s Quarters fitted up as a temporary workshop.

Many years later, Conservator David Arnold would conclude that Allen had been right about over-cleaning and drying of wood. Yet, in retrospect, Lindsay defended Meuse’s treatment: given that the stocks had mostly been treated with linseed oil, rubbing them down with a little alcohol “to take off the wax and dust residue” did not seem to be a big problem. Besides, there was the looming deadline of the new exhibition to consider. And no one – neither Harpers Ferry nor the regional office – was offering to take the burden off the park’s hands.

McManus’s positive assessment put the controversy to rest. But disagreement returned in 1981 when Lindsay proposed to advertise for a gunsmith. Again Kallop consulted with McManus, now working for the regional office. And he endorsed McManus’s position, which was that any action that significantly affected the condition of an object “in a museum collection” was, by definition, a form of “conservation,” and that conservation was practiced by professional conservators – not by gunsmiths. What made conservators preferable was not necessary better training or ability but rather their obedience to a professional code of ethics that stressed their “obligation towards the physical integrity of the object.” Meuse’s work also once again came under fire. Though the curator had written commendably of “‘minor repair or restoration work,’” Kallop had heard him talk of ‘cannibalizing’ which falls under ‘restoration’ but which in actuality, if I’m right, is taking a part from one weapon and adding it to another. This

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106 Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009.
107 Doug Lindsay, recorded interview with author, March 19, 2009.
procedure disturbs conservators since in the process the integrity of the first piece is sacrificed to create what then is no longer an ‘original’ artifact.108

Kallop urged the park to “concentrate on preservation maintenance,” which Allen’s Division of Museum Services also emphasized. But Lindsay replied heatedly, reminding Kallop of the chaotic way in which conservation and cataloging had evolved at the Armory. Given its history, Meuse was “providing basic weapons maintenance” to the collection. “The only time we have replaced missing parts or effected any repairs has been if such was absolutely necessary to insure the continued integrity of the piece” or to put together a complete specimen for display. As for cannibalizing, the museum had accumulated a vast number of “junkers,” given to the museum for no other purpose than to be taken apart for spare parts.109 It was in this context, significantly, that Lindsay argued for treating the collection as a library of arms: in support, Lindsay pointed to the special nature of guns, traditions of collecting, and the Armory’s history; on the other side, the agency responded with references to accepted museum practices and agency norms.

Given the controversies that surrounded conservation work at the Armory, it is reasonable to ask why the regional office did not help the park prepare a conservation assessment, the new tool that McManus was popularizing. The reason seems to be that many park collections were in far worse shape. McManus explains that he could carry out no more than one or two per year and that the priority was based on need.110 With many park collections in the care of rangers who had no training whatsoever and for whom collections management represented but one responsibility among many, the mere presence at the Armory of a recognized expert like Meuse immediately put the park in a higher bracket. Moreover, compared to some other park collections, the weapons at Springfield were in relatively good condition and despite concerns over cataloging and preparation of inventories, many parks enjoyed far less control over their collections.

After 1981, controversy again subsided. Subsequent assessments of the park’s conservation work were consistently complimentary. One was carried out in 1987, when McManus reported that the park’s staff was “very skilled and knowledgeable. Their equipment, materials and techniques meet professional standards” – an important point because most of the objects to be included in the planned new exhibits were scheduled to be treated at the Armory. A second assessment occurred in 1989, when Regional Curator John Maounis visited the Armory for the first time. “Bill Meuse has been stabilizing the weapons for some years,” he wrote. “His approach is very conservative, appropriately so. The treatments are well documented. His expertise should be made available to other curators in the region.” Maounis even suggested that the region should ask Meuse to teach a training.

108 Memo, Ed Kallop, NAR, to Doug Lindsay, August 5, 1981 (copy in Arnold, conservation binder, no. 31).
109 Memo, Lindsay to Kallop, September 2, 1981 (copy in Arnold, conservation binder, no. 32).
session as part of one of its training courses. “In any case, I will certainly call on him for advice with weapons collections.” A third assessment took place in 1992, as part of a four-year project to survey the condition of collections throughout the North Atlantic Region. After physically handling about two percent of the weapons and casually viewing about 80 percent of the remainder, museum official Bart Rogers had some criticisms: a “recurrence of dust, dirt, corrosion, oil and grit” in many objects, imperfect housekeeping, and minor lapses in storage conditions. But on the whole, Rogers concluded that the collection had “fared well since coming under the NPS umbrella.”

Meuse left the Armory about 1989. His conservation functions were not replaced. Upgrading storage conditions, an example of the kind of preservation maintenance favored by Allen and McManus, was the only conservation item included in the park’s 1993-94 list of major collection needs. Once a looming challenge, conservation appeared to have moved far down the official list of concerns. An assessment carried out six years later described the collection’s condition as generally “good,” despite humidity in the basement and the lack of air conditioning on the second floor. All 1,200 exhibited items had “received careful preservation treatments.” The remaining 7,000 guns were “clean, and most have internal preservation coatings.”

Despite this generally positive assessment, in 1992 Bart Rogers urged the region to carry out the recommendation of the 1977 Collection Management Plan by hiring a conservator to perform “continued cyclical maintenance....A collection of this magnitude needs a specialist devoted to caring for the collection.” And in the summer of 2000, David Arnold arrived at the park as its first professionally trained conservator. Arnold brought a new eye to old issues, including the conservation methods of the Meuse era. He described Meuse’s 1987 treatment recommendations as being “out-of-date as of 2001 review – especially cleaning.” He believed Arthur Allen had been right in 1979. In Arnold’s view, Meuse had ignored advice and “and as a result ‘skinned’ a large number of guns in the collection...” – that is, gone beyond cleaning off surface dirt to remove much of the patina of age, as well as original finish, from wooden gunstocks: “look for the pale guns in the Organ of Muskets,” he advised. Arnold also stigmatized the experts Meuse called in for his defense as

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113 Memo, Bart Rogers to Regional Curator, NAR, May 26, 1992 (SPAR Central Files: D6215 Planning, Preparation, Maintenance, and Preservation of Museum Exhibits).
“connoisseurs and not conservators,” lacking formal training and for the most part using even worse methods than the Armory: of one, Arnold remarked, he “learned his craft as an apprentice and had no formal training as a conservator and lacked having sufficient knowledge of material science to justify even his own practices.” Arnold’s judgment was severe: “Not hiring a conservator on the basis that Meuse knew enough to supervise gun treatment was a huge mistake. Documentation was poor, undocumented changes in the standard treatment occurred, and virtually all will have to be re-treated because of this cost-saving efficiency.”

**CURATORIAL RESPONSIBILITY, CUSTODY, AND OWNERSHIP**

Under the terms of the 1978 agreement with the Army, the NPS had “curatorial responsibility” for the Benton collection. Though this was sufficient for most day-to-day activities, it did not amount to a free hand with the collection, for the agreement also required the agency to meet Army standards: anything that did not meet those standards had to be negotiated. It also allowed the Army to inspect the collection or demand a complete inventory at any time. Sometimes these terms created confusion. In 1984, planning for the new Armory exhibitions, Regional Director Gerald Patten assured the Army’s chief curator: “Because the U.S. Army owns the small arms collection..., design work will be guided by military standards for collection conservation and for environmental performance.” He requested copies of all pertinent Army regulations. But a staff member in the Cultural Resources Division asked, “Must our design work be guided by military standards?” The answer was no: Patten had written in error, thinking he was merely carrying out Lindsay’s promise to solicit the Army’s input. Regional curator Kallop tactfully assured Lindsay that, in future, “our conservators will provide the ‘conservation standards’ desired....” The difficulties posed by the agency’s enforced relationship with the Army went beyond misunderstandings. The Army regularly exercised its right to demand inventories. This not only strained the Armory’s small staff but led to disagreements because the NPS was convinced that the Bailment Agreement of 1968 contained errors. Even if it had been accurate in 1968, weapons had gone missing during the ten years between the Army’s departure and the agency’s arrival. As long as the Bailment Agreement continued to be accepted as the baseline for inventories, it would be difficult if not impossible to resolve disagreements about the contents of the collections. In 1986, the park and the Washington office of museum services asked the Army to accept the park’s latest inventory as the “official

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115 Letter, Gerald Patten (Regional Director) to Michael L. Vice (Deputy Chief Curator, CMH), May 10, 1984; memo, Patten to Vice, May 10, 1984, with handwritten notes by [illegible]; and handwritten notes. Ed Kallop, n.d. (all Charlestown: CRM Division Files: folder: SPAR Pkg. 103 - Adaptive Reuse of Armory Building).
property list.”

But the problem remained unresolved. And even after 1993, when the park alleviated the controlled-property burden by moving to monthly random-sample inventories, the Army continued to demand item-by-item inventories of accession 2. Sometimes it put the completion of such inventories ahead of other necessary business, such as the renewal of the loan agreement. At times, relationships became strained, and it did not help that the Army’s manner could seem high-handed. “A member of my staff will contact you before June 1, 1998,” Army curator Bennett informed SPAR curator James Roberts in 1998, “and coordinate the inventory.... [T]he inventory must be completed no later than October 1, 1998.”

Within the National Park Service, colleagues did not talk this way with one another: even memos from superiors were generally more respectful. In part, the problem was simply the difference in institutional cultures. But NPS officials did not take orders from the Army, however politely phrased, a fact which these communications sometimes seemed to forget.

Because the Army had refused to transfer ownership to the NPS, or even loan the collection in perpetuity, NPS and city officials sometimes worried that it might leave town. This fear arose in 1992, as civic interests were preparing to celebrate the Armory’s bicentennial. Carlo Marchetti, director of Springfield Central, asked Congressman Neal for help in persuading the Army to transfer permanent ownership to the park. But though the Army’s chief curator assured Neal that “the U.S. Army has no plans to remove any of the Springfield Armory Collection...,” the Army still refused to transfer title: the collection was a “highly significant and important part of the Army’s heritage,” and the loan agreement provided “checks and balances” to ensure that it was well maintained.

At least, concluded Neal, it had been useful to get the Army on record. But the response did not put fears to rest. The park’s 1993 Statement for Management proposed full ownership of the collection as a “management option,” yet simultaneously worried that the Army might transfer the weapons back to Washington, D.C., where it was planning a new military museum. If this happened, the site would lose about three quarters of its collection.

Moreover, as Supervisory Museum Curator James A. Roberts noted in 1998,

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116 Memo, Lindsay to Ann Hitchcock, February 24, 1986 (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: fol. Curatorial SPAR through 1988).

117 Quoted in Memo, James D. Roberts to Jim Weiner (Solicitor, DoI), December 22, 1998 (SPAR Central Files: A 4415 – Interagency Agreement....Army).

118 Letters, Marchetti to Neal, Neal to Marilyn Merrill (Congressional Liaison Specialist, NPS) and Col. Jim Littig (Office of Army Liaison), Neal to Marchetti, and R. Cody Phillips (Acting Chief Curator) to Neal, all between March 4 and April 10, 1992; in Management Officer [Frank Seng], NPS, Washington, DC, Management Review of the Springfield Armory, June 25, 1998, Appendix 5.

119 Statement for Management. Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Springfield, Massachusetts [February, 1993], (copy lacks signatures on recommended (Superintendent) and approved (Regional Director) lines), p. 11 (SPAR Central Files: A6419: Statement for Management).
the possibility that the collection might be withdrawn threatened the agency’s ability to manage the site in compliance with Congress’s direction.120

These fears were not groundless. In 1998, Armory staff noted that the Army was taking “a renewed and serious interest in the management of their resource.”121 This time, indeed, the threat was real. In fact, from the Armory’s perspective it looked like the perfect storm.122 The Army had announced plans to develop a major new museum of its own at Fort Belvoir in Washington, D.C., and to populate its exhibits partly with objects taken from other Army museums – and also from NPS units including Springfield. At the same time, the interagency agreement with the Armory was due for renewal. In conversation, Army officials took the line that, as the Army never actually abandoned property, it could revoke the loan of 1978 any time it wished simply by showing up at the Armory with a convoy of trucks and carting away the collection. It was half in jest, yet Superintendent Beatty and Supervisory Museum Curator Roberts took the threat seriously. In fact, the Army told Roberts (in his words) it intended to “tighten the loan agreement...from 10 year renewal period to 2 year renewal, with the possibility of removing some of the collections.”

Confronted with these threats, park staff evidently decided the best defense of the loan agreement would be a good offense, and so, instead of settling for less, the agency asked for more. With the help of NPS Management Officer Frank Seng and Interior Department Solicitor Jim Weiner, a meeting was arranged with Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the last of the park’s original sponsors still in Congress and now one of Washington’s most influential figures. In July, Kennedy called on Army Secretary Louis Caldera to respect the wishes of Congress by “promptly executing a permanent loan....” Reminding him that he had helped pass the authorizing legislation, Kennedy told Caldera that the Army’s failure to give the NPS “permanent control” of the collection violated the promise of the 1978 cooperative agreement and was “directly contrary to our congressional intent, which is that the National Park Service will operate the site and serve as its federal custodian, accountable for its contents in perpetuity.”123

A few months later, having heard nothing further from the Army, Curator Roberts proposed that the park “act proactively to modify the agreement...”124 And so in September 1998, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt sent Caldera the signed text of a revised agreement,

\[120\] Memo, James D. Roberts to Jim Weiner (Solicitor, DOI), December 22, 1998 (SPAR Central Files: A 4415 – Interagency Agreement....Army).

\[121\] [Case for amending GMP], prepared by Joanne Gangi, May 4, 1998 (SPAR Central Files: D18 GMP Amendment 5/4/98).

\[122\] This account is based partly on the recorded interviews of former Superintendent Steve Beatty and Supervisory Museum Curator James D. Roberts on May 28 and May 29, 2009. Significant episodes are undocumented in the written record.


\[124\] Memo, James D. Roberts to Jim Weiner (Solicitor, DOI), December 22, 1998 (SPAR Central Files: A 4415 – Interagency Agreement....Army).
asking him to enact it by adding his signature. The new draft was much more favorable to the NPS. Instead of “curatorial responsibility,” it granted the NPS “exclusive custody, control and responsibility” for the collection. And in place of a ten-year term, it extended the agreement “for so long as its underlying authorization shall exist.” In other words, it could be amended only by the mutual consent of both parties, while nothing short of new legislation could nullify it.\(^{125}\)

Eighteen months later, the agreement still “languished in the Army – without action....” Three departments had reviewed and approved it, but it would still have to pass through four more layers of bureaucracy before it reached the desk of the Secretary. The agreement he signed on June 2, 2000, was strikingly close to the one Babbitt had sent him almost two years earlier. The Army deleted the word “control” from its grant of authority to the NPS and gave itself special rights to access the collection. But it also permitted the NPS to loan objects for up to two years without prior Army consent, which was more than the agency had asked for.\(^{126}\)

Why did the Army sign an agreement so favorable to the NPS and so contrary to its own wishes? Former Superintendent Beatty believes Frank Seng’s role was “critical,” citing not only his aggressive advocacy for the park but also the longstanding relationship with the Army which allowed him to “trade favors” with the Judge Advocate General’s office. He also credits a line of argument that Seng and Solicitor Jim Weiner introduced. They explained that the NPS could actually protect the collection more securely than the Army itself, because as a part of an NPS museum the weapons were subject to strict controls on treatment and disposal, whereas as Army property they were subject to nothing more stringent than the general rules covering government property. Finally, Beatty notes that Weiner slipped the crucial clause forbidding unilateral renegotiation into the agreement without fanfare and speculates that it may have passed unnoticed by the Army. Roberts agrees with this last point and goes farther, observing that staff at the Army’s Center for Military History were angry with Army Secretary Caldera for signing the agreement without consulting them: Roberts believes they still harbor designs on the collection. As for Weiner’s winning argument, Roberts thinks it was useful mainly for giving the Army an ex post facto justification for signing the agreement.

Whatever tipped the scales, Beatty believes the agreement was vitally important for protecting not only the Armory but also other NPS collections. At Springfield itself, Roberts credits it with easing the park’s difficult relationship with the Army and notes that in 2006 the Army for the first time made substantial contributions to the collection’s care, providing about $250,000 to help purchase new storage equipment which the park was having difficulty funding through the NPS.

\(^{125}\) Interagency Agreement Between Department of the Army and Department of the Interior, signed Bruce Babbitt and dated September 16, 1998, Secs. 2 and 12, with cover letter, Babbitt to Caldera, September 16, 1998 (SPAR: Central Files: A4415 – Interagency Agreement...Army).

\(^{126}\) Interagency Agreement Between Department of the Army and Department of the Interior, signed and dated June 27, 2000, Secs. 2, 4, and 5.
What the agreement evidently did not do was end the Army’s interest in the collection. In some ways, even while granting the NPS “exclusive custody and responsibility,” it sanctioned and formalized that interest through creation of a joint collection committee representing both the park and the Army’s Center of Military History. This new entity was tasked with addressing issues “such as, but not limited to, accession, loan, or de-accession actions requiring concurrence or approval by the parties and any Collection accounting adjustments.” The committee, not the NPS, would now determine whether any “Army-originated item” was “excess” to the collection and could be returned to the Army. According to Roberts, the measure was proposed by Chief Curator Ann Hitchcock as an “olive branch” to the Army, and he believes it streamlined decision-making. But obviously it had the potential for other outcomes, as the Army’s intervention in the park’s Collection Management Plan demonstrated.

THE 2005 COLLECTION MANAGEMENT PLAN AND THE QUESTION OF UNIQUENESS

Of the puzzles posed by the Armory’s collection, none was more basic than what position it, and the Armory itself, occupied within the national park system. “The National Park Service has never undertaken a project of this curatorial magnitude,” wrote the authors of the park’s first Collection Management Plan, who included Chief Curator Arthur Allen, in 1977. “The Park Service,” Regional Staff Curator Edward Kallop wrote two years later, “is not normally accustomed to owning a site where the object collections are more significant than the structures which house them. That Springfield Armory is an exception is obvious and we need to pursue the site’s development with this in mind.” Arthur Allen and the authors of the park’s first Collection Management Plan had said much the same thing three years earlier when they warned agency officials about the collection’s enormous budgetary needs.

It was one thing to point out that the Armory’s collection was unusually large and important, quite another to argue that it and it alone formed the core of the park, even its raison d’être. Nevertheless, by the 1980s this claim was increasingly heard. Springfield Armory was “essentially a museum,” wrote Historian Larry Lowenthal in 1987. “Being more of a museum than a regular National Park...,” began a memo from Curator Meuse in 1989. In 2001, Armory conservator David Arnold went farther. Describing the park’s efforts to

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127 “Interagency Agreement Between Department of the Army and Department of the Interior,” signed and dated June 27, 2000, Sec. 8.
129 Memos, Lowenthal to Cindy Kryston, NAR, November 9, 1987 (SPAR Central Files: fol. K1817: Long Range Interpretive Plan) and Staff Curator, SPAR (William E. Meuse), to Superintendent, SPAR, December 7, 1989 (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: folder: Curatorial SPAR 1989 –).
secure sufficient resources to “allow it to function as the museum that it really it [sic] is,” he charged that the agency had “yet to acknowledge in any significant way that SPAR is a MUSEUM with a large, world-class collection that is an important part of our nation’s heritage – and therefore worthy of being preserved in the same way collections have been treated within the Smithsonian group of museums in Washington, D.C.” Arnold argued that the collection made the Armory literally unique within the National Park Service: that no other unit within the entire national park system was analogous to the “SPAR museum”:

> SPAR is a full-blown museum, not a presidential birthplace with an attached gift shop or your average park wayside. It is not simply a historic site, and frankly I doubt anyone would bother coming here were it not for the Benton Small Arms Collection.  

The implication of these claims, that the Armory’s buildings and grounds were of secondary importance, conflicted with the legislative record, which revealed Congress, the Interior Department, and the NPS in agreement that the park’s two resources, site and collection, were equally valuable, their preservation equally important. Nevertheless, different branches of the agency had found it useful over the years to stress the collection’s importance. Early on, the agency’s museum staff and planners did so in order to justify unusually large budget requests to Congress. Allen and his staff may also have found that doing so supported their efforts to gain increased stature for collections management within the agency. In the 1980s, park staff used the argument to justify focusing more of the park’s effort on the collections, even at the expense of the site: thus the General Management Plan, which had emerged through a process of shifting attention from the site to collection, called it “the primary resource at the site.” Yet Arnold – along with other park staff – appeared to advance the claim of uniqueness for a different reason. The context was a heated controversy that erupted over the preparation of a new Collection Management Plan in 2001. Within that process he was not the first to claim that Springfield’s collections made it unique: Superintendent Cuillard had already done so at the very start of the planning process. He and Supervisory Curator Roberts continued to insist on the point long after both sides had staked out their positions, for it underpinned the park’s contention that it should be effectively exempt from agency policy in key areas of collections management.

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130 Email, Arnold to Wolf, March 9, 2001 (copy in Arnold, conservation binder, no. 58)
132 A page of notes on the meeting records: “Raises issue that this park is different because it is a museum. Get other examples of that within Region.” (“SPAR pre-CMP visit, November 30, 2000” [page of unsigned and undated notes] (Northeast Museum Services Center: SPAR CMP Project Files: fol. SPAR CMP - Correspondence 2001-)).
The park needed a new *Collection Management Plan* to replace the outdated one of 1993 and to provide a basis for a new General Management Plan which the park's new superintendent, Doug Cuillard, was preparing to begin. CMPs are written by teams of experts in the different branches of museum practice, and Louis Hutchins, Senior Curator/Historian at the Northeast Museum Services Center, was picked to lead the team.  

It was his first such assignment, and he turned to Gay Vietzke, Acting Director of the Northeast Museum Services Center, and John Maounis, Deputy Associate Regional Director for Cultural Resources, for guidance. The subject areas to be covered were typical of CMPs and included the collection's scope and acquisition policies, maintenance of records, public access policies, storage, fire and theft protection, staffing, exhibits, and conservation. Experts in all but one of these areas would be chosen from the region. But conservators in the region's Northeast Museum Services Center and also at the Harpers Ferry Center asked to be excused because of prior disagreements with Armory staff that might color their views, and so Hutchins and Vietzke recruited Sara Wolf, then chief conservator in the Washington office. Wolf had just joined that NPS: she sought counsel from Chief Curator Ann Hitchcock.

The process began in the normal way with a week-long site visit to the Armory in February, 2001. Unfortunately a severe snowstorm limited the time that the team was able to spend at the park to less than twenty hours, but phone calls and follow-up visits by individual team members helped make up for lost time. After the site visit, the team members disbanded to write their own chapters, which were then assembled and submitted to the park. In April, 2001, the team presented its findings and recommendations to park staff in a meeting at the Armory.

Had the process continued to unfold along the usual pattern, the planning team would then have produced a second draft, which would have included detailed recommendations, an action plan, and recommendations for funding. There would have been a second opportunity for park review, following which the team would have presented a final plan for the superintendent's signature. But at the April meeting, the draft met bruising criticism. The substance of the disagreements is discussed below, but the tone was important too: so severe and personal were the attacks that Hutchins blamed himself for not walking out with his entire team, and afterwards, when Superintendent Cuillard invited the team back for a second meeting, he declined. Communication continued between park staff and the CMP team, but it was not until April 2002, that Hutchins received a formal written response from Superintendent Cuillard.  

This amounted to a rejection of many key points

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133 The following account is based on recorded interviews with Louis Hutchins and Sara Wolf, conducted at the Northeast Museum Services Center on December 3, 2008, and on unrecorded conversations with James Roberts and Dave Arnold held at the park on numerous visits during 2006-2008. Specific references to one or the other (or to printed sources) are added only where the source of a particular statement might otherwise be unclear.

134 Memo, Superintendent SPAR to Louis Hutchins, April 23, 2002. Other formal responses from the park included a memo from Archivist Dru Bronson-Geoffroy (“*Collection Management Plan Draft March 2001*”) and a marked copy of the draft plan from Supervisory Curator James Roberts (all Northeast Museum Services Center: SPAR: CMP Project Files: memos, Fol. SPAR CMP -
in the draft and a request for substantial changes to its recommendations. By this point, Hutchins was convinced that the park would never implement the plan, no matter how many adjustments the team made: preparing the customary action plan and funding recommendations seemed pointless. Instead, as a courtesy to Superintendent Cuillard, now approaching retirement from the Service, the team made minor revisions to the draft and resubmitted it as a final plan, which the Superintendent approved in November 2005.135

Why did the process go wrong? Hutchins says it was an “issue of personalities.” To Wolf, the problems were “all personality driven.” Yet both also argue that deep disagreements over policy lay behind the personality differences. At the simplest level, the question was whether the Armory would emphasize a preservation maintenance approach to collections care (the region’s preference) or one more focused on treating individual objects (the park’s preference). Two chapters of the draft plan proved particularly controversial. One concerned the conservation of the weapons collection, the other the management of the archives.

The chapter on conservation was titled “Collections Preservation and Maintenance,” and the choice of words was significant. As the plan explained, NPS policy “specifies preventive conservation as the basis of collections care.” In other words, the preferred approach was to focus on “non-interventive actions” that could prevent damage from occurring. Such steps included managing the environment by controlling light levels, reducing ambient dust, ensuring optimum temperature and humidity, and guarding against abrasion or other damage in storage and handling.136 Treating objects to reverse or halt deterioration was a last resort. This was essentially the same policy direction that Regional Conservator Ed McManus recalls attempting to assert during the 1980s.137

Like McManus, the CMP team believed the park’s conservation program was not following this policy. The Armory’s new conservator, David Arnold, was disassembling and treating guns in a new conservation lab which the park had set up at considerable expense. Yet, the plan charged, the park had paid “insufficient attention” to “providing a basic level of collections care” in areas like environmental controls, storage conditions, pest management, and basic housekeeping. Moreover, the park’s conservation efforts were highly selective: for example, while a relatively small number of firearms received individual attention, hundreds of miniature military figurines languished “in generally poor condition,” “piled in file cabinets and cardboard boxes.” In short, while “sophisticated conservation” was “laudable,”

Correspondence 2001-). Curator David Arnold’s email correspondence with Sara Wolf was collected by Arnold in a binder in the park’s conservation department files.


137 Edward McManus, recorded interview with author, March 25, 2009.
the plan charged that the park lacked the “comprehensive preservation and conservation program” to justify it. Its recommendations were harsh: an immediate halt to the treatment of firearms and the expansion of the conservation lab and, over the longer term, the development of new conservation procedures “that meet NPS policies of minimal treatment.”

Calling Arnold an “exceptionally gifted conservator” who “garners high praise from within the profession,” Wolf emphasized that there was “nothing wrong with what Dave is doing” as such. The problem was that he was undertaking conservation treatments at all. This conflicted with the agency’s “preservation and maintenance” policy as Wolf understood it – and indeed as Ed McManus recalls understanding it more than twenty years earlier. For Wolf, the question had two aspects: what was best for the collection and also what was allowed under agency rules. At the April meeting, she explained that “the core of the issue is how you do basic collection care and preservation – we need to do what we are restricted to by the NPS.” In interpreting policy, consistency was important: explaining her opposition to the Armory’s conservation lab, she noted that it was the only one in the system and that the Service generally opposed them. Doing things in the proper order was important too. In an exchange with Superintendent Cuillard, she conceded that the issue was essentially one of timing, or what Cuillard called prioritization, and she agreed that the park could continue taking guns apart as long as it gave priority to “basic conservation.” As she explained much later, there was a proper “progression” to be followed. It began with a collection management plan, proceeded to a conservation survey, and concluded by treating individual objects as a “last resort.”

Arnold defended his position vigorously, backed by Roberts and Cuillard. One reason was that his assessment of the weapons’ overall condition was considerably more negative than Wolf’s: his criticisms of earlier treatments have already been noted, and he also worried about the impacts of a 1938 fire. Arnold also disputed the team’s assessment of the park’s efforts to improve storage and environmental conditions. Finally, he argued that disassembling guns did not conflict with the agency’s policy of preservation and maintenance. Indeed the nature of guns made this step essential, for the apparently well-preserved exterior of a firearm might conceal deadly corrosion or crystallization. “Please

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138 Ibid., pp. 57, 68-69.


understand – the practice of disassembling, cleaning and coating historic firearms is a STABILIZATION treatment, not a restoration,” he explained.141

In June 2001 – months after giving the NPS “exclusive custody, control and responsibility” for the collection – the U.S. Army joined the fray. That month, the chief conservator of the Army’s Center for Military History assessed the collection and announced that the Army contested both the plan’s assessment that the collection was in “stable condition” and its recommendation to suspend conservation work. Whatever NPS policy might dictate, the Center “interpret[ed] preservation in its broadest sense to include maintenance and above all, stabilization and conservation of the collection....Under the terms of the Interagency Agreement, the Army does not desire, but rather it expects Springfield Armory to accept curatorial responsibility to stabilize and conserve the Collection in accordance with its mandate....”142 The quarrel escalated. On April 18, 2002, Army Chief Curator Bennett ordered Superintendent Cuillard to submit hand receipts, as required “when historical artifacts are issued on loan to other Federal agencies.” The following month, relying on Army regulations, he appointed Cuillard “Artifact Responsible Officer to assume direct responsibility for all historical artifacts and works of art assigned to his custody, for the Springfield Armory.” He issued the Superintendent extraordinarily detailed instructions on how to fill out and return the required hand receipts, in effect treating him as if he were an Army employee. This put Cuillard in what must have been an awkward position. He strongly opposed the plan’s conservation recommendations – indeed on April 23 he had sent Hutchins his detailed and final list of objections – yet being treated this way was intolerable. He declined to accept the Army’s designation as Artifact Responsible Officer, pointing out that this would contravene not only the 2000 agreement but also the intent of Congress in authorizing the park. Moreover, he informed the Army that he could not sign anything presupposing that the collection was “‘on loan’ from the Army...” because the new agreement said nothing about loans but “clearly states that exclusive custodial responsibility for the collections resides with the National Park Service....” Behind the scenes, the regional office supported Cuillard’s contention that the Center for Military History was “wrong in its attempt to treat the SPAR collection as a subsidiary of the Army museum system....”143 Meanwhile, the CMP team declined to alter its initial findings.

The second area of controversy was the archival collection. Disagreement centered on what might seem an arcane disagreement over cataloging methods. Park staff had recently retrieved a large collection of so-called aperture cards – IBM punch cards bearing film

141 Email and written correspondence between Sara Wolf (NPS-WASO-CSD) and David Arnold, February 23 - March 9, 2001 (copies in Arnold, conservation binder, nos. 53-58).

142 Memo, Judson E. Bennett, Jr. (Chief Curator of the Army) to Cuillard, August 27, 2001 (SPAR Central Files: fol. A44 Memoranda of Understanding).

143 Letter, Judson E. Bennett, Jr. (Director of Army Museums) to Cuillard, April 18, 2002; memo, Bennett to Cuillard, May 9, 2002; instructions on hand receipts; letter, Cuillard to Bennett, June 14, 2002; all attached to memo, Cuillard to Maounis (Dpt. ARD CRM), September 30, 2002 (SPAR Central Files: A4415 Interagency Agreement...Army).
images of weapons parts – from a dumpster. The park had then bought expensive equipment and software to read and catalog the cards. Archive staff was now doing so. To the CMP team, this was yet another example of misplaced priorities. Confronted with evidence that 95 percent of the museum’s half-million-item collection (including much of the archive), was still uncataloged, the team argued that best practices as well as NPS policy called for cataloging at the series level before recording the details of individual items. Park staff retorted that items like the aperture cards were useless unless individually cataloged, but the CMP team also pointed to other unmet needs, such as improvements to archival storage conditions. In sum, the CMP urged park staff to defer time-consuming projects like cataloging the aperture cards and focus on basic collection needs.

Though apparently separate, the two controversies were clearly linked. In both areas, the CMP team’s critique reflected a consistent preference for preservation maintenance, planning, and centralized interpretation of agency policy. The park’s position was consistent too, in its preference for working directly with individual objects without waiting for preliminary planning and preventive maintenance to be completed, and for park-level decision-making on policy. This consistency was not surprising, given that both conservation and archives reported to a single head, the Supervisory Curator. Yet these preferences had already been noted during the park’s early days.

While some of the triggers for conflict related specifically to the Collection Management Plan, others had arisen as early as 1979. These conflicts, especially over conservation, were not only substantive and procedural in nature but also structural. In his study of museum curatorship in the NPS, Ralph Lewis notes that the agency had developed two distinct sets of curators, performing separate functions. One operated and maintained park museums, while the other – based in regional and central offices – focused on “museum policies, standards, and specialized skills necessary to meet Service goals and obligations.” A similar situation had arisen in conservation. Where parks could not afford their own professional staffs, the system brought obvious benefits, and indeed it was designed with just

144 The figure was based on the park’s 2000 Collections Management Report, which showed 22,311 objects catalogued out of a total of 524,408. Supervisory Curator Roberts points out these numbers were erroneous. The following year’s report showed 257,945 objects catalogued out of a total of 530,381. Collections Management Reports for 2000 and 2001 (SPAR: Cultural Resources Division files).

145 NPS, Northeast Museum Services Center, Collection Management Plan: Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Springfield, Massachusetts, Draft, March 2001, pp. 35-36 (Northeast Museum Services Center: SPAR: CMP Project Files). Footnoting the Armory’s 2001 Collection Management Report, the CMP recorded (p. 35) that 5% of the museum’s total collection, or 22,311 items, had been cataloged while 95% of its 502,097 items remained uncataloged. The cataloging backlog included items transferred from the U.S. Army to the NPS, such as furnishings; Armory records; the collection of miniature soldiers; memorabilia; archival material acquired in connection with the 1994 anniversary; the oral history collection; and the records of the National Historic Site. The last two categories had not yet been accessioned.

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these parks in mind. Even where there was a resident curator, the system could work well. Ideally, explains Charles Clapper, who served as Associate Regional Director for Planning and Resource Preservation from 1978 to 1990, the regional and park curators worked “hand in glove”: the park curator knew the collection best, while the regional curator, who was likely to be the more senior of the two, knew where to find funding and how to follow agency guidelines. But both McManus and Clapper acknowledge that the possibility of conflict arose wherever parks had professional staffs, and especially where these held strong opinions about how to manage their collections. Each park was a separate “fiefdom,” in McManus’s words, and so as Clapper puts it, relationships could easily devolve into a question of “who has the power” – would it reside at the regional level or within the park?

At the Armory these conflicts had become pronounced long before the 2005 CMP team began its work. Clapper recalls curator Bill Meuse as a man with “strongly held opinions” on how the collection should be cared for: these views became “classic situations for conflict between the regional office and the park.” It was not simply a question of whose views were stronger or would prevail: parks and regional offices saw the world from different perspectives and approached decision-making with different priorities. In Clapper’s view, the role of the regional office was to “take the broader perspective,” and at the Armory that frequently cast disagreements as conflicts between the interests of the agency and the collection. “These materials must be accounted for according to NPS policy,” wrote archivist Steven Ourada in 1992. Years earlier, Lindsay’s clearinghouse proposal had been turned down because agency officials deemed that it conflicted with other agency priorities; the park was also required to conform to the agency’s computer catalog standards and inventory policies. These dynamics could have been found at other parks, but some Armory staff felt they were exacerbated by the nature of the park’s collections. Steve Beatty, superintendent from 1990 through 1998, felt that many agency officials disparaged the Armory as a mere gun museum and felt a “very strong anti-gun influence” within the regional office. Though he did not think this affected the agency’s budgetary support for the park, it did translate into a lack of support for program initiatives like school educational programs.

Not all of the agency’s efforts to impose its will were marked by conflict, but Clapper and McManus, both of whom who knew the park from its earliest years, regarded relations between the Armory and the region as being unusually conflictive, and the conflicts tended to center on the management and care of collections. This was a history of which both Wolf and Hutchins were aware as they began their work on the new Collection Management Plan.

Given the history of tension with the regional office, it makes sense to review the balance of benefits and burdens that accrued to the park through the agency’s efforts to

147 Charles Clapper, recorded interview with author, March 24, 2009.
149 Memo, Regional Archivist, NAR (Steven Ourada), to Acting Regional Curator, NAR, March 6, 1992 (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: folder: SPAR CMP).
manage it as part of a regional or national system. There were many benefits to imposing agency standards, especially when backed up by money. The Armory’s permanent exhibits, designed by the Harpers Ferry Center, furnished a good example. On the one hand, the Armory wielded far less control over the project than an independent museum would have exercised – the limits of park influence were suggested by one official’s remark that the most important contribution park staff could make during the final review was to examine the “interpretive facts” for accuracy and conformity with accepted usage. On the other hand, for a museum burdened with antiquated exhibits, a poorly catalogued collection, a building in urgent need of renovation, a small staff, and a demonstrated inability to raise its own operating funds, this loss of control was surely a fair price to pay for professional-quality exhibits.

In other areas, the balance between park autonomy and agency policy was less clear, especially where it concerned the collection’s relationship to the historic site. It was a cornerstone of agency policy that park collections existed to support and explain the sites where they were located. Yet the argument that the Armory’s collections were unique implied also that the park should be considered an exception to this rule and that its collection deserved to be development independently from its site. The tensions this produced can be seen in the history of efforts to define the park’s collections. In 1977, Arthur Allen suggested considering whether the collection should be limited to “only those weapons manufactured at Springfield,” even though this would “reduce the collection’s significance” as “the ‘world’s largest collection of small arms’.” [sic] The question was not merely academic, for the curator of the non-profit Armory museum had advised the NPS that the gun collection had “nearly doubled in the past twenty-five years” and would probably continue to grow. The Collection Management Plan prepared at this time did consider the limitation proposed by Allen, and warned against “dilution of the important and historic firearms collection into a typical war museum collection.” The 1985 Scope of Collections Statement offered a clearer definition. The park’s “fundamental theme,” it stated, was the Armory’s role as “an industrial site devoted to the design and manufacture of military weaponry.” The collection would therefore “stress the military shoulder arms which were the primary ordnance mission of Springfield Armory.” The museum would place “lesser emphasis” on “handguns, automatic weapons, edged weapons and other weapons with

151 (Memo, Chief, Division of Exhibit Planning and Design, HFC (Robert C. Johnsson) to Superintendent, December 10, 1982 (SPAR Central Files: D6215 Planning, Preparation, Maintenance, and Preservation of Museum Exhibits).

152 Memo, Chief, Division of Services (Arthur C. Allen) to Chief, Division of Reference Services, HFC, March 9, 1977 (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: fol. Curatorial SPAR through 1988).


which Springfield Armory was only peripherally involved.” The exhibits would serve primarily to support the park’s interpretive themes, and secondarily to support scholarly research.

This was a good summary of agency policy. Yet it did not resolve the question, for other policy documents pointed in a different direction. The Interpretive Prospectus was little more than a museum plan, focusing almost exclusively on the museum and the content of the exhibits. Still other documents were simply unclear. The Draft Collection Management Plan of 1992 described the collection as consisting primarily of “weapons manufactured, developed, tested, and collected by the United States Army from 1794 to 1968” – a definition which was not untrue yet which failed to establish any connection to the site beyond the museum’s location there. The CMP cited the Interpretive Prospectus approvingly and called the collection the “primary basis for the park’s interpretive programs,” leaving it uncertain whether the collection would be a resource for interpreting the park or the subject of park interpretation.

Other aspects of park management revealed the same tension between the collection as adjunct or prime attraction. One was the long-standing practice by which agency planning was largely restricted to the federal portion of the park. Effectively this enhanced the museum’s importance, and the emphasis was heightened by the agency’s allocation of resources. The rehabilitation of Building 13 for use as a museum absorbed the agency’s entire effort for many years. Even a decade after it was completed, a list of 65 agency-funded projects revealed that $274,000 out of a total of $337,800, or over 80 percent of awarded funds, had gone to improving Building 13 and protecting the collections. These figures reflected agency decision-making as much as park priorities, for a list of 58 projects for which funding had been requested but denied revealed a much more balanced approach: only 46% of requested funds ($2,803,200 out of $6,010,700) were slated for Building 13 and the collections.

The unresolved tension over the museum’s role within the park formed the background for other policy differences. One concerned the crucial matter of conservation staffing and facilities. Although the 1977 CMP had called for an on-site conservator and Bart Rogers in 1992 had reiterated the recommendation, by the end of the 1990s the regional office was opposed to the idea. The park had demonstrated its independence by going ahead anyway and even attempted to define the region’s priorities for it, asserting the existence of an undocumented need for a regional or service-wide firearms lab which it proposed to serve

155 “Scope of Collections Statement,” prepared by Stuart Vogt (Curator, SPAR), dated November 18, 1985 (recommended by Superintendent Lindsay, Concurred by Regional Curator Kallop, Approved by Regional Director Lewis, all between November 1985 and February 28, 1986) (SPAR Central Files: H1415).


by expanding its new lab. By the time the CMP process got underway, then, the park was entrenched in opposition to the regional office. On the other side, the CMP team started with the presumption that the park had to be reined in. In Boston, John Maounis had briefed Hutchins and Wolf on the region’s opposition to the conservation lab and coached them to resist pressure from the park to address its merits in the CMP. In Washington, Ann Hitchcock had briefed Wolf on other policy transgressions committed or threatened by the Armory. Moreover, Wolf understood her charge as identifying the areas where the park was not in compliance with agency policy and correcting them: as she later explained, “My marching orders were policy,” and when it came to interpreting policy, she believed her boss was rather inflexible.

The stage was therefore set for a clash. And once the issues were joined, neither side backed down. The CMP team declined to return to Springfield for a second meeting; the park waited more than a year before submitting its formal comments, and when these arrived, in the form of a “statement of principle” from Superintendent Cuillard, they amounted to a line in the sand, reiterating the park’s position on all of the most contentious issues. On the other hand, the park did not produce the technical justification that Wolf had challenged Arnold to write, giving the CMP team justification for sticking to its original position. In any case, as Wolf explained, a planning team was under no compulsion to “change recommendations to suit a park’s agenda, particularly if that agenda is in conflict with NPS policies and priorities.” In the end, as we have seen, Hutchins decided to curtail the planning process, believing that the plan would never be implemented: by this time, as Wolf later explained, “we knew it was a doorstop.”

The CMP did not explicitly rebut the claim that the Armory was a unique park. But it did quash the Armory’s effort to set its own course, clearly signaling that the agency, rather than the park, would decide on policy. The park may have paid a price for its contumacy. Though both Wolf and Hutchins stressed that implementation of collection management plans was purely voluntary, and that the agency did not punish failure to do so, both believed that the park’s refusal to accept direction deprived it of support that the agency was eager to offer.

In the wake of the controversy, it may be useful to review the evidence both for and against the claim that the Armory’s collections were unique and that this fact made the Armory an exceptional park. Informally, regional officials have sought to rebut this argument

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158 According to Wolf and Hutchins (recorded interviews, December 3, 2008), Hitchcock’s concern was that the park might seek to recover weapons formerly in the Armory collection but ceded by agreement to other agencies.

159 Memo from Cuillard: memo, Superintendent SPAR to Louis Hutchins, April 23, 2002; under no compulsion: memo, Sara J. Wolf (Director, Northeast Museum Services Center) to Superintendent, SPAR, January 30, 2003, marked “DRAFT” (both Northeast Museum Services Center: SPAR: CMP Project Files: fol. SPAR CMP - Correspondence 2001-); curtail: recorded interviews with Hutchins and Wolf, December 3, 2008.

160 Recorded interviews, December 3, 2008.
in at least three ways. First, they contend that there is no such thing as a “typical” park: “every park is unique,” as Hutchins puts it. Second, they point out that other parks also have large and important collections, including some in the region, like the Frederick Law Olmsted and Longfellow National Historic Sites, both near Boston, the Edison NHS and Morristown National Historical Park in New Jersey, and St. Gaudens NHS in New Hampshire. Third, they argue (in Wolf’s words) that the Armory “both is and isn’t a museum.” A true museum is a multi-faceted institution that does much more than care for a collection, points out Paul Weinbaum, who served as Chief of the Museum Division at the Statue of Liberty National Monument from 1974 to 1981. Sara Wolf agrees, pointing out that in areas like rotating exhibits, public programs, research, and publications, the Armory has not risen markedly above other park museums: the park’s disappointing visitation figures, discussed in the following chapter, may support this contention. To Hutchins, the great frustration is that the Armory’s potential as a museum has “not been realized.” Rather than a fully formed museum, Wolf suggests, the Armory might better be understood as “pretty much just a collection of guns.”

How successful Springfield Armory has been in carrying out the multiple functions of a museum is to some extent a matter of opinion and can only be judged in relation to the obstacles the park has faced. Ironically, some of those obstacles have been created by the agency itself. Arriving at the Armory in 1990 with a mandate to build audiences, Superintendent Beatty was disappointed to discover that the new permanent exhibit was “basically static,” conceived in the manner of a park visitor center rather than a museum exhibit. “Most museums are not static,” he observes. On the contrary, “a museum has to operate” with temporary exhibits in order to retain the interest and loyalty of its public. Yet NPS policies not only gave the Armory a static exhibit but ensured that it would be many years, if not decades, before it could be replaced or even substantially modified.

In contrast to disagreements about the Armory’s overall success as a museum, the claim that its collections are unique is more straightforward. Factors like the size and importance of the collections, as well as the specific challenges they present to collections managers and conservators, can be measured and placed within the context of the agency’s history.

The National Park Service has had collections from the beginning. The agency’s first director, Stephen T. Mather, called in 1920 for museums to be established in every park. The earliest park museums focused on natural history and archeology, but from the 1930s historic sites began to increase in number, and some contained important collections. Meanwhile, museums were gaining importance in other ways. A Museum Department was created in

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161 Wolf and Hutchins, recorded interviews, December 3, 2008; Paul Weinbaum, conversation with author in 2008.

162 Steve Beatty, recorded interview, May 28, 2009.

163 The facts brought forward in the following paragraphs are drawn from the accounts of Ann Hitchcock, op. cit., and Ralph H. Lewis, op. cit.
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1935, and by 1939, 114 parks had museums. Further recognition came in 1956 with the launching of Mission 66, an ambitious ten-year program of capital improvements which included the construction of elaborate visitor centers, often designed around exhibit spaces. The establishment of the Service’s two system wide support facilities, the Harpers Ferry Center (1968) and Denver Service Center (1970), represented further acknowledgment of the agency’s museums.

Meanwhile, the collections were growing. A 1959 survey estimated that 135 parks maintained collections totaling over 2.3 million items; a 1976 survey documented over 9 million specimens; in 2004, Chief Curator Ann Hitchcock estimated that the system’s parks contained over 105 million museum objects, of which 65.1 million were archival and manuscript items, 34.5 million were archeological items, and 3.4 million were historical items including furnishings, costumes, fine arts, and firearms. (By way of comparison, the Smithsonian Institution in 2009 claimed to have something over 136 million objects distributed among 19 museums and 156 affiliate museums.164)

Park collections spanned a wide range. Among the largest and most important were the geological specimens at Grand Canyon, the 14,000 tree snails at Everglades (considered the largest and most complete collection in the world), and San Francisco’s National Maritime Museum, with 15,000-25,000 items, including historic ships and the largest maritime research library on the west coast. At Jamestown Colonial NHP, an archeological find in 1967 added about 250,000 specimens to the park’s already large collection. The natural specimens at Great Smoky Mountains National Park were important in their own right but became more so in 1976 when UNESCO’s designation of the park as a biosphere reserve made them part of an international baseline measure of environmental conditions. Historic house museums, of which there were about 200 by 1993, also frequently had large and important collections. Some came to the NPS with thousands of manuscripts, books, furnishings, paintings, sculptures, textiles, and small decorative objects: because of their associations with the sites and with important individuals, these collections had a value above and beyond that of the individual objects. Examples included Adams NHP (about 9,500 items associated with the family), the Home of Franklin D. Roosevelt NHS (7,700 items donated with the house), Theodore Roosevelt’s estate of Sagamore Hill (about 6,600 family-associated items), and the Carl Sandburg Home NHS (nearly 38,000 documents and furnishings belonging to the house). Other important NPS collections include the Frederick Law Olmsted NHS, with photographs, landscape plans, and drawings associated with the great landscape architect’s work; and the Edison NHS, which contains not only personal items used by the inventor and his family at home but also lab furnishings and equipment, prototypes of Edison products, notebooks, correspondence, blueprints for products, photographs, sound records on cylinders and discs, and library materials.

By the end of the twentieth century, then, NPS parks contained many important collections, and they presented a broad range of conservation and management challenges.

164 www.si.edu/about (consulted April 2009).
Given the differences in their contents (not to mention in the method and accuracy of inventories), comparisons of numbers are at best of limited value. Yet object counts do provide a rough yardstick. Those contained in the following table (Fig. 5.2) compare the Armory to other park collections mentioned by regional officials as well as some cited for their importance by Ralph H. Lewis. They are rounded to the nearest thousand: archives, measured in linear feet, to the nearest foot. These numbers suggest that the Armory’s collections, compared to other NPS museums, were large yet not exceptionally so.

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Figure 5.2. Size of Selected Park Collections in 2008

165 The figures, taken from the 2008 Collection Management Reports posted on the NPS intranet site, were supplied by Sara Wolf. Numbers compiled by the Museum Management Program and available on the public website at http://home.nps.gov/applications/museum/selectpark.cfm (consulted December, 2008) do not distinguish among types of collection, or between objects and archives.
As for the importance of the Armory’s collection, its preeminence among collections of American shoulder arms is generally conceded. But Ralph H. Lewis’s measured assessment hints at the difficulty of translating this into an agency context. Comparing the Armory collection to the Fuller Collection at Chickamauga Battlefield, which (he notes) Harold Peterson had called the “finest and most complete” in the world for documenting the history of American shoulder arms, Lewis described the Armory’s collection as “paralleling Fuller’s in scope and far exceeding it in size” and predicted that it would “doubtless assume first place in significance as well as size among park museum collections of this subcategory.” The key phrase is “collections of this subcategory.” The NPS manages other collections that are preeminent within their fields, including some that (like the Armory) transcend the level of mere park museums. In this context, again, the Armory appears to be highly important but not unique.

A third way of assessing the Armory’s collection is through the challenges they offered to curators and conservators. Certainly the weapons posed unusual problems as museum objects. The army’s ownership also created special difficulties. And the collection’s care had undeniably led to a high level of controversy. But seen within a regional context, the curatorial and conservation challenges presented by the collection do not seem to have been uniquely severe. This is at least was the perspective of Ed McManus, who was involved with the collection as regional objects curator from 1979 through 1989. Despite concerns about over cleaning and lack of curatorial control, he did not feel the Armory was among the parks most in need of assistance. The Statue of Liberty required a great deal of attention, mostly because of the centennial celebrations. At Roosevelt-Vanderbilt NHS, objects required special attention because of a fire at the park. Saint-Gaudens had an unusual collection of fine art objects. At Acadia there was no staff at all to take care of the collections. At Edison NHS, the conservation issues including not only the care of one-of-a-kind objects but also decisions about how to handle old bottles of chemicals: while these were historical objects in their own right, many of the chemicals had changed over time and some were now toxic and volatile. Within this context – at least by 1979 – the Armory’s collections appeared to be in fairly good condition: reasonably well catalogued, stored, conserved, and looked after. Advocates for the collection could argue that it deserved more attention, but not because its needs were unique: on the contrary, if the care it received was inadequate, that was not because its merits were unrecognized but because there were simply too many important collections looking for too few dollars.

While the uniqueness argument seems unconvincing today, it was not so easily dismissed when it was first brought forward in 1971. On the contrary, agency officials in both Harpers Ferry and Washington promoted it, and it is important to consider why. Several

166 Ralph H. Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 281-282. The Fuller collection had come to the NPS in 1954 and was housed at Chickamauga Battlefield NP. It included at least 320 shoulder arms plus about 50 bayonets, nearly 100 gun parts, cartridges, and other equipment, as well as Fuller’s comprehensive scholarly notes.

reasons suggest themselves. First, the big natural and archeological collections at the western parks were very far away, and their management traditions offered few useful precedents for the Armory: in general, expertise in caring for historical collections was much scarcer within the agency than for archeological or natural collections. Second, although the system contained many important historic structure museums, officials did not see the Armory’s collection in this frame: as noted in Chapter 2, they compared it instead to such recent initiatives as the Museum of Westward Expansion in St. Louis, or Philadelphia’s Independence Visitor Center. Seen thus, its size and management needs loomed large indeed. Third, some of the important collections cited by today’s regional officials were not yet part of the system in 1971: Saint-Gaudens NHS (authorized in 1964 but not established until 1977), Longfellow NHS (established 1972, authorized 1974), and Olmsted NHS (authorized 1979). The Armory’s collection not only seemed, but actually was, more exceptional in 1971 than thirty years later.

Finally, museum officials seem to have been deeply affected by their first impressions of the Armory. They found a collection in disarray: thousands of rifles stacked in a humid basement, irreplaceable specimens haphazardly displayed, rooms full of documents and books hastily salvaged from the Army’s departure, inadequate collection records. Uncertainty over the size and contents of the archives can only have increased the sense that this was a collection in desperate need of care.

If these factors were not sufficient justification, external considerations were also encouraging agency officials to stress the outsized challenges presented by the collection. One was the state of the agency’s museum programs at this time, for despite the important collections which it already held, the NPS was not well prepared to care for the Armory’s weapons and documents. Lewis points out that, despite major strides in museum management, the agency’s traditional emphasis on exhibits and interpretation had only begun to shift towards collection management during the late 1960s, and it was not until 1975 that the first collection management plan was prepared (at Hubbell Trading Post NHS in Arizona). In 1964, only twelve parks had full-time curatorial positions, and though by the 1980s more than forty professional curators worked at parks, concerns about qualifications and working conditions remained acute and indeed had reached a head during the late 1970s. Between 1964 and 1980, Lewis remarks, “the gap seemed to widen between Service museum standards and what park museums could actually achieve in consequence of both collections and visitation growing much faster than local staffing.”168 As for conservation, Ed Kallop recalls that when he left the private sector museum field and joined the NPS early in the 1970s he found that conservation was “strictly an interpretation function for the service, and any conservation that occurred was strictly to be exhibit-related”:169 a collection like the Armory’s would certainly challenge that model. Agency officials then were justified in

168 Ralph H. Lewis, op. cit, pp. 323, 325-327.
claiming that the Armory’s collections called for an exceptional level of support. A final factor in favor of this view was the political anxiety surrounding the entire Armory question, which put regional officials, the director, and key members of Congress repeatedly on edge. In light of strong political pressure towards acquiring the Armory, whatever management problems it might present, professionals on staff may have found it only prudent to alert top officials and legislators to the collection’s outsized needs.

The story of Olmsted NHS, sometimes adduced as an important example of a park brought into the system because of its collections, corroborates the sense that the emphasis placed on the challenges of the Armory’s collection during these years was both genuine and well-founded. The NPS’s reluctance to take on Olmsted has already been mentioned in Chapter 2. The reason was precisely the agency’s anxiety over the responsibility of managing the collection. That anxiety emerged in 1973 with the first House bill, which included a clause calling for the creation of an advisory committee to help the NPS in the unfamiliar area of “control, protection, and conservation” of drawings, prints, books, documents, and related technical equipment. As the park’s historian, David Grayson Allen, remarks, “concern over the collection and the issues it posed would frame the history of this legislation for years to come.” That concern emerged again with Congressional hearings in 1976, when the agency asked Congress to defer action: although Director Everhart admitted that the NPS had the necessary curatorial services, the agency afterwards claimed that its lack of experience with collections would make it difficult to add Olmsted to the system. That year, instead of acting, Congress directed the NPS to study (in Senator Edward Kennedy’s words) “the costs of preserving the documents.” Even after the study was completed in 1979, the NPS continued trying to give the archives to another federal agency, while some within the service, including regional curator Ed Kallop, thought the site should become part of a private-sector research center rather than a national park. Seen in light of the Olmsted story, then, the question is not why the NPS placed such a heavy emphasis on the Armory’s challenges but why the agency did not simply oppose its acquisition, as it initially did with Olmsted.

In sum, the claims advanced concerning the collection made sense in the context of the 1970s. Over time, the context changed. More parks with large and complex collections entered the system, including Olmsted NHS. And from the late 1970s the system itself made great strides towards developing its collection management and conservation capacity, as collection care was detached from its traditional subservience to interpretation and exhibits, professionals like Ed Kallop and Ed McManus built up strong regional programs in the

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northeast, and a centralized division of museum services was created in Washington. But instead of responding to these trends, the argument that the Armory’s collections made it unique simply gathered strength, to the point where it came into direct conflict with basic NPS policy, as with the suggestion that the collection transcended the site and deserved to be developed independently of it. Meanwhile, a pattern of controversy between the Armory and the region, focusing on collections management and conservation, was being established. A couple of decades after the Armory’s establishment it could be said that, if the agency still failed to provide the highest level of care that the Armory’s collections deserved, the failure did not reflect lack of caring or expertise but rather of resources, not only for the Armory but for all of the service’s many outstanding collections.

The 2005 Collection Management Plan effectively settled the disagreement over the Armory’s uniqueness. And in 2008, new Superintendent Michael Quijano-West closed the
The Collections

Armory’s conservation lab. The immediate reason was health and safety concerns arising from a combination of fumes and flammable chemicals in close proximity to both offices and collection storage areas. This was a situation which might be expected to concern Quijano-West, who was trained as a law enforcement ranger and performed this role at the Armory in addition to being Superintendent. The park’s conservation needs were not neglected: before closing the lab, Quijano-West received the regional office’s assurance that conservators in the private sector would be available to continue any necessary work on a contract basis; immediately afterwards, a better solution was found when the Harpers Ferry Center’s metals conservation laboratory expressed interest in having David Arnold work there.\(^{171}\) Whatever the reasons, the closure removed a major source of friction with the regional office and perhaps signaled a more collegial relationship.

Quijano-West’s new approach went further. “This site is not just a museum,” he said in 2009: in the past, the museum had “dominated everything in a manner that we don’t see in most national park units,”\(^ {172}\) and both the management of the historic site and the park’s relationship with the public had suffered as a result. Unlike some of his predecessors he rejected the exceptionalist argument and sought to move the Armory closer to NPS norms, not only by devoting more attention to the historic site but also by developing something like a typical NPS visitor center, where staff can orient visitors to the park’s offerings – including but not limited to the museum. Quijano-West understood that some museum professionals would view this as a demotion yet argued that his efforts to “open up the site” and better accommodate park visitors “were not taking away from the museum.” On the contrary, he hoped the new approach would attract more visitors to the park, and ultimately to the exhibits.

In the past, the Armory sought to focus effort and resources on the collection and in some ways the region tacitly supported this approach, even while rejecting some of its premises. The result has been to demote the historic site and, arguably, diminish the sense of the park as a coherent whole. Yet this strategy has not produced the great museum that its curators and conservators envisioned. The question now is whether park staff and agency officials can work together to sustain an important collection, develop an under-appreciated historic site to its full potential, and bind the two in a convincing relationship – all with inadequate resources.

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\(^{171}\) Michael Quijano-West, telephone interview with author, January 8, 2009.

\(^{172}\) Quijano-West, telephone interview with author, January 8, 2009.
CHAPTER SIX

INTERPRETING THE ARMORY AND SERVING ITS PUBLICS

National parks operate under a double mandate: to preserve irreplaceable resources and to make them available to the public for education and enjoyment. Interpreting the resources through exhibits and educational programs, and providing visitor services ranging from parking to informational leaflets, are some of the ways in which parks satisfy the second part of their mandate. The two parts – protection and public use – are not always in balance, and the NPS has often been accused of inadequately protecting, even damaging, resources in its zeal to serve the public. This has not been a problem at the Armory. Threats to the park’s resources have not come from public use but from the state’s neglect of the historic buildings it owns and from the NPS’s inability to fund the highest level of collection care. Moreover, while the park has often worked diligently to serve people – park visitors, gun collectors, school children, researchers, the civic community of Springfield, web browsers, and other national parks – at other times park priorities and agency policies have combined to produce an inward focus, relegating interpretation and visitor services to secondary importance. Thus the park has focused on caring for a collection of undoubted importance yet of limited interest to the broad public; has foreclosed management responsibility for most of the park’s acreage and historic buildings; and has conserved the rest in ways which occasionally frustrated the best hopes of park interpreters. The decisions that produced these results were not taken out of hostility to the public: rather, in many cases they sought to implement best practices in the management of historic resources, and their impacts on interpretation, visitor services, and public engagement were largely unintended. Thus a recently retired park employee could claim in all sincerity that the park’s most important consideration was its visitors; that as a unit of the National Park Service it could be no other was. ¹

DEFINING THE GOALS AND LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION

If both the collection and the historic site presented unusual challenges as the NPS took over the site at the end of the 1970s, interpretation seemed relatively straightforward. In hindsight, it is clear that the simplicity was deceptive: interpreting a collection of firearms housed on the edge of a college campus would prove to be anything but simple. Yet the park’s interpretive prospectus, completed in 1980, gave little hint of any difficulty in telling the Armory story. It explained that the park’s “fundamental theme” was the Armory’s role as

¹John McCabe, recorded interview, August 17, 2007.
an “industrial site devoted to the design and manufacture of military weaponry.”\(^2\) It put forth three major goals: to promote “understanding of the historic significance of the Springfield Armory and its products”; to use the collection to show the evolution of military small arms; and to “illustrate Springfield Armory’s role in industrial history.”\(^3\)

Outside the interpretive planning process itself, meanwhile, key decisions were being made which would circumscribe park interpretation in ways not visible in these pronouncements and which would ripple through the park’s relationships with the public. Foremost was the identification of the Main Arsenal and the collection as the park’s “Visitor Use/Interpretive Core.” As related in Chapter 3, this decision involved the rejection of at least two interpretive options which would have encompassed more of the site and presented a broader story. One was labeled by the planners “Emphasis on Historic Site.” The other, even more inclusive, would have cultivated a “much broader understanding of armory” by interpreting all of Armory Square.\(^4\)

Despite the decision to focus on the Main Arsenal and the weapons collection, these other options did not immediately disappear. Two years later, park planners considered the possibility of interpreting not only “several structures and the landscape on STCC property” but even the watershops, Federal Square, and “other off-site historic resources....”\(^5\) Yet again, the option finally chosen was “Emphasis on Gun Collection & Arsenal.”

According to the official record of decision, what had been rejected was “the full development of interpretive facilities both on the armory grounds and in the city.” William L. Brown, staff curator for interpretive planning, had glimpsed this trend as early as 1977 and regretted it, advising that the nonfederal buildings of Armory Square “should be included in any interpretive planning.” The Main Arsenal, he pointed out, was merely where weapons were stored: telling the Armory story required interpreting also the buildings where they were made.\(^6\) Yet in the end, not merely the non-federal portion of Armory Square but even the rest of the federal zone largely disappeared from interpretive planning. By 1998, the idea


\(^3\) *Interpretive Prospectus. Springfield Armory NHS, September, 1980*, p. 4


\(^6\) Memo, William L. Brown, III (Staff Curator, Division of Interp. Planning) to Alan E. Kent (Chief, Division of Interpretive Planning), June 1, 1977 (SPAR: Lowenthal Files: fol. Historic Structures Report).
of offering interpretation in the Commanding Officer’s House had been tacitly dropped.7 “Associated elements” of the site, such as the Master Armorer’s House, gatehouse, walks and paths, and fence would be “stabilized, maintained, and made available for interpretation as needed” – meaning that nothing would be done in the foreseeable future to interpret them.8

Other resource management decisions also tended to work against interpretation. Thus the decision to restore the park to its 1968 condition, based on historic preservation considerations, led to the retention of the Main Arsenal’s concrete loading dock over the objections of park staff, who told planners they felt “very strongly that interpretive possibilities would be enhanced” by removing it.9 The concrete-slab tennis court, which also contributed little to interpretation, likewise remained.

Park access was another area where key decisions did not support interpretation or visitor services. Interpreters recognized very early that the park’s unpleasant and poorly marked public access route presented a serious obstacle to serving the public. “Entry to the park is very confusing and very dangerous,” commented the Draft Interpretive Prospectus in 1979: the main gate was shared with STCC, and the circuitous route around the backs of the Parade Ground buildings produced both “visitor disorientation and safety hazards.”10 Yet the final prospectus (1980) omitted the entire topic. In a similar vein, the General Management Plan acknowledged the problem yet concluded that little or nothing would be done about it.

The problem of public access continued to vex both interpreters and civic stakeholders like Carlo Marchetti, executive director of Springfield Central, who argued in 1984 that a separate entrance to the park was “essential.”11 Yet sixteen years later, marketing consultant Marc A. Breslav – retained to help the park increase visitation – confronted the same confusions and the same hazards. Driving up to the Armory, Breslav had gotten the impression that the complex sat on top of a hill. But on arriving, “you don’t get that sense. Instead you drive through endless parking lots, confused as to where to go. You pass buildings in disrepair reflecting poorly on NPS even though they are not part of the site” (Figs. 6.1-4). Breslav reached the same conclusion as Marchetti: the park needed its own

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7 Management Officer Frank Seng: it is “on hold until funds are available to rehabilitate the structure interior to provide a safe and secure environment for staff, public, and museum objects” (Management Officer, NPS, Washington, DC, Management Review of the Springfield Armory, June 25, 1998, p. 4).
11 Letter, Carlo A. Marchetti, Executive Director, Springfield Central, to Lindsay, October 18, 1984 (SPAR Central Files: D18).
Figure 6.1. The public entrance to Springfield Armory NHS begins at this unwelcoming signpost, proceeds past a college security checkpoint and a lengthy series of parking lots and speed bumps before leading around a sharp corner into the open space of the parade ground (photo: author).
Figure 6.2. Visitors to the national park enter Armory Square in front of S.T.C.C.’s main building enjoying a view favored by the college as an emblem for official publications (photo: author).

Figure 6.3. If the park’s identity is reticent, that of the college is forthright (photo: S.T.C.C.).
entrance. He had a solution: “Open the Byers Street Gate Soon and with Fanfare.” Doing so would open the park up to the community and reconnect it to downtown.\(^{12}\)

In fact, park officials and agency planners had considered reopening the Byers Street gate on more than one occasion. But it was a difficult problem to safely siphon traffic out of the flow of State Street, into the narrow Byers Street, and then immediately through the gate and up the hill. It had not been done.\(^{13}\) 2001, the NPS actually repaired the Byers Street gate, but Superintendent Cuillard assured President Scibelli, who was anxious about campus security, that the NPS had “no intention” of opening it to the public.\(^{14}\) Rather than a tool for improving interpretation or visitor services, then, the Byers Street restoration appeared to be an act of pure resource conservation, and today the problem of visitor access remains unsolved.

Even though everyone agreed that the museum was the “prime interpretive experience,”\(^{15}\) the question had still to be settled whether the collection would primarily support the park’s interpretive themes (as the Interpretive Prospectus suggested) or, conversely, become the main focus of park interpretation (as the 1984 draft General Management Plan implied).\(^{16}\) Gradually, as the collection came to be seen as the site’s raison d’être, the question was settled in favor of the latter position. Though NPS policy treated interpretation as a distinct activity from either collection or resource management, at the Armory there was pressure to redefine it as an activity supporting the collection, as in most private sector museums. For much of the park’s early history most of its effort was focused on Building 13 and the museum, and although the new permanent exhibits represented a much broader outlook than the ones inherited by the NPS, the park’s broader interpretive themes remained distinctly secondary. The presentation of guns remained dominant, the Armory in its entirety was represented only by a single large model, its history as an industrial enterprise or a political organism was hardly explored, and its role in regional culture and economy was almost entirely absent.

The tendency of collection needs to take precedence over broader interpretive goals was further developed in the 1992 draft Collection Management Plan, which placed the collections at the center of, rather than in service to, the park’s interpretive programming. Responding to the draft, Chief of Visitor Services Joanne Gangi remarked that “Interpreters’ use of collection and archives is not really spelled out....” She asked the museum to grant

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12 [Marc A. Breslav], “Summary of Recommendations,” inscribed “Master Plan One” and dated June 1, 2000; and memo, Marc A. Breslav (Public Relations, Advertising and Marketing) to Joanne Gangi, September 26, 2001 (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: fol. Marketing Plan)

13 Recorded interviews with Doug Lindsay, Steve Beatty, and Charles Clapper.

14 Letter, Cuillard to Andrew Scibelli, (SPAR Central Files: fol. A44 Memoranda of Understanding). The rehabilitation work also included the brick pavers, concrete drive, and lighting.


16 [Draft] General Management Plan, Development Concept Plan, Environmental Assessment, Springfield Armory National Historic Site, August, 1984 [not approved] [CRBIB 405329], see e.g. p. 7 (SPAR: Lowenthal Files: fol. GMP/DCP Drafts & Final 1979-84).
interpretive staff access to collection materials in order to develop programs, giving them “priority over research that does not directly serve the park.”

The development of an ambitious interpretive program was further impeded by a technical decision. Though the museum had been identified as the focus of visitor interpretation, it had been designed to be “self-interpreting.” This meant that, unlike many house museums which could only be visited with a tour guide or docent, it required little staff to operate. Indeed the “minimum interpretive program,” a measure used administratively to provide a benchmark for program performance, consisted merely of providing enough staff to operate the information desk (which had a security as well as an interpretive function) during public hours. In 1990-91, this meant eight hours each day on all but three days

Figure 6.4. After passing Building 16, the entrance route to the National Park proceeds through a long series of college parking lots around the backside of the green (photo: author).

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17 Memo, Joanne to Steve, July 16, 1992 (SPAR Central Files: H1815).

of the year. An analysis carried out in 1992 showed that visitation patterns were consistent with the concept of a self-interpreting museum: 85% of park visitors used information-oriented and/or non-personal services only. That is, they walked through the exhibits or requested research assistance from the museum of library staff. Only 10% of visitors attended public programs that were personally conducted by a park staff member. A further 5% were categorized as non-program users, presumably including casual strollers or picnickers.

Designing the park’s interpretive core to be self-interpreting was a good way to economize on staff, but it also limited the park’s capacity to expand on what the exhibits had to offer. In 2000 the Long Range Interpretive Plan reaffirmed the museum’s status as the park’s “primary interpretive facility” yet also noted that “the exhibits do not function well interpretively”: without help from staff “basic park stories are hard to grasp....” In particular, themes like the “impact of firearms on society and the Armory on industrial history, on the lives of individual workers, and on the history of Springfield” were hard to tease out.

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19 Ibid.


Despite these limitations, some interpretive programs were developed and offered, and a few even took interpretation beyond the Arsenal. The 1980 Interpretive Prospectus called for interviews to document the Armory’s recent history, and in 1982 the park hired oral historian Barbara Higgins Aubrey to collect them. With Larry Lowenthal, Chief of Visitor Services and a professional historian, she circulated a questionnaire to former employees, asking about people’s period of employment at the Armory, the jobs they had held, unusual projects they had been involved in, interesting incidents, other family members who had worked at the Armory, and so forth. And in 1983 they began interviewing them, starting with the oldest. The program was designed to gather “a great deal of information on the ‘human’ side of the Armory – attitudes, work experience, personal recollections, perhaps some details about well-known individuals,” all of which Lowenthal believed was “vital to a fuller understanding of the Armory’s history.” As he put it, the park was “responsible for collecting and preserving the history of the entire Armory.” By 1989, as the program was winding down, Lowenthal had interviewed 77 people and generated 94 one-hour tapes. As of 1998, the collection held 110 interviews, most them transcribed, together with some associated papers.

Even after the program formally ended, efforts to maintain ties with former Armory workers continued a while longer. In 1991, Joanne Gangi-Wellman organized “Common Bonds,” an “Evening of Appreciation” co-sponsored with the Springfield Armory Historic Association. The association had been founded in 1967 as a vehicle for members to “keep in touch with former Armoryites” after the closure. Since 1986, the Association’s members had funded an annual John C. Garand award of $100 to a student from Roger L. Putnam Vocational High School who excelled in machine work. The program organized for “Common Bonds” included dinner and tours of the museum and library. The invitation list, drawn from Springfield and nearby towns, included people like Janet Nurczyk of Haydenville, secretary in procurement from 1941 to 1968; or Roger Turgeon of Chicopee, personnel director from 1940 to 1968. There were couples who had worked together at the Armory, like Harriet Atwood of Longmeadow, a draftsman during World War II, and her husband Irving, who had worked for 25 years as a design engineer; or William McGill of Holyoke, general foreman from 1940 to 1967, and his wife Olga, who had worked from 1942 to 1943 rifling pistol barrels; or Norman and Helen Smith of Springfield: “Norman 1940-66

shop boy to machine operation, precision tool and cutter, on to apprentice tool maker instructor. Met wife at SPAR. Helen 1943-44 Production Oper. [sic] M-1.” 23

The evening proved to be a swansong. At the July picnic the following year, Mary C. Beard, the association’s founder and still its secretary/treasurer, announced her resignation. No one was willing to take over: the organization held one last get-together in December, 1992, and disbanded. “Mary has kept us all together all that time,” reminisced the association’s last mailing.24

The second initiative was a series of interpretive sign panels, or (in NPS terminology) wayside exhibits (Figs. 6.5-6) These were intended to interpret the entire National Historic Site, and the project demonstrated both the agency’s effort to grapple with the entire site and the constraints imposed by its split ownership. The plan was developed by the Harpers Ferry Center’s Division of Wayside Exhibits and presented to the park for review at the end of

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24 “25th Annual and Final Christmas Party for Springfield Armory Historical Association” (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: Springfield Armory Historical Association) See also photograph of Joanne Gangi with unidentified man, inscribed on back, “Last meeting Sp Arm Hist Assoc 12/16/92” (as above).
1985. Of the ten proposed panels, five subjects were located outside the federal boundary: the parade ground, Middle Arsenal and Junior Officer’s Quarters, Building 16, caserne, and Master Armorer’s House. Yet only two of the panels were to be placed on college property, on the south side of the parade. Here the NPS planner was confident they “would not create a congestion problem” because they were “somewhat remote” from the main centers of campus activity. As a result, exhibits for the caserne or storehouse and Master Armorer’s House were placed far away from their subjects. Moreover, as the majority of signs were tightly clustered near the Arsenal, they did little to encourage visitors to explore the rest of the National Historic Site. Regional Director Cables hoped to see the plan expanded, “later to include other locations on the college portion of the Site,” though this would require an agreement with the college.25 It has not happened.

The NPS showed considerable deference to the college during the preparation of the signs. Officials including President Scibelli were invited to review the plan (or a 1987 version of it). In general they liked it, commenting that the signs were “basically well-designed” and promising that the college would “welcome this addition to the site.” Nevertheless, college officials asked the NPS to use information they had provided about the college “as it is presented”: they wanted college buildings called by name, the new campus buildings identified on the map, the college’s name placed on the sign panels at a size equal to that of the National Park Service. The agency acceded to all of these requests.26

The agency deferred to college sensibilities in matters of content as well. One panel displays an early view showing the Armorer’s House and its erstwhile twin, the Paymaster’s House, flanking the Main Arsenal. Yet explaining the absence of the latter, the panel says only that it “was demolished,” a statement whose blandness was perhaps suggested by a desire not to offend college officials.

SERVING OTHER PARKS

One of the constituencies served by the Armory was other parks in the northeast region. The Armory could offer them two valuable resources: surplus space and expertise in guns. Early in the 1980s the storage facilities at Frederick Law Olmsted NHS were temporarily taken out of service for upgrading, and by 1983 the Armory was storing archival collections for the other park. The Olmsted collection was sizable: in 1989, even after some number had been returned to the park, the material stored at the Armory was estimated at about 150,000

25 “Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Wayside Exhibit Proposals,” prepared by HFC, Division of Wayside Exhibits, written by Olin Nave, Wayside Exhibit Planner, signed by [illegible], Chief, Division of Wayside Exhibits, dated. December 27, 1985, attached to memo, Regional Director NAR (Cables) to Manager, HFC, March 26, 1986 (SPAR Central Files: D6215 Planning, Preparation, Maintenance, and Preservation of Museum Exhibits).

items. At first, the collection was housed on the second floor of the Main Arsenal. By 1989 it had been moved to the third floor, to a room recently upgraded “with walls.” Soon heating was added, which park staff hoped would reduce the humidity. That summer, the regional office asked Lindsay if there might be room as well for a processing lab that was to be at Salem Maritime NHS.” After discussions with Olmsted superintendent Rolf Diamant, it was decided to put the lab in the Commandant’s House rather than the arsenal; a formal agreement concluded in 1989 assured that drawings and plans would continue to be stored in the Main Arsenal, in space newly “rebuilt and upgraded” and soon to be connected to the building’s HVAC system. Up to $10,000 would be made available from congressionally appropriated ONPS (Operation of the National Park System) funds, Olmsted would pay for upgrading the second floor spaces in the Commandants House, and the Armory would pay for much of the work in the Main Arsenal, since this would improve its physical plant.

The Olmsted NHS was not the only unit to take advantage of the Armory’s surplus storage space. Perhaps as early as 1983, the Martin Van Buren NHS sent a large collection of material for storage, and at some point this “sizeable collection of surplus MAVA artifacts, primarily furniture” was also moved to the third floor of the Main Arsenal.

In 1990, Lindsay discussed the possibility of regularizing this storage function with Regional Curator John Maounis. Lindsay agreed to dedicate half of the third floor for storing other parks’ collections as soon as the library vacated the space: he warned, however, that the area lacked environmental controls as well as a freight elevator. Both park and region worked to ensure that the needs of the Olmsted collection continued to be met – as for example in 1992, when the region budgeted money to design and specify a “super insulated

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28 Memo, Chief, Division of Cultural Resource, NAR (John Maounis) to Regional Curator, NAR (“Trip Report”), June 16, 1989 (Charlestown, Regional Curator Files: folder Curatorial SPAR 1989 –).

29 Memo, Superintendent, SPAR to Superintendent, FRLA, March 28, 2001 SPAR Central Files: fol. A44 Memoranda of Understanding); “Memorandum of Understanding Between Springfield Armory National Historic Site and Frederick Law Olmsted National Historic Site,” signed (by Superintendents, and Regional Director) and dated September 10, October 27, and November 30, 1999 (SPAR Central Files: fol. - MOU - SPAR - FRLA Olmstead [sic]); memos, Associate Regional Director, NAR (Clapper) to Superintendents, SPAR and Olmsted, April 13, 1989, and Supt., Olmsted, Longfellow and Kennedy NHSs, to Acting Regional Director, NAR, July 7, 1989 (Charlestown, Regional Curator Files: folder Curatorial SPAR 1989 –). See also Draft MOU with FRLA, n.d. (but annotated in pen, 1989)] (SPAR Central Files: fol. A44 Memoranda of Understanding). Under the 1999 Memorandum of Agreement, Olmsted also paid for its share of services like rubbish carting and utilities: in 2001 this amounted to $10,820 per year.


storage facility.” The Van Buren material was less welcome. An attempt to dispose of it through the NPS Clearing House failed: “Prompted by emphatic recommendations in the SPAR Collection Management Plan,” wrote Superintendent Beatty in 1995, “we are actively clearing deteriorated, combustible materials from the third floor.” The park’s files contain no record of the removal, and in 2001 the jumble stored on the third floor – a mixture, according to Conservator David Arnold, of Army objects “abandoned on site” and material being stored for other parks – caused the park some embarrassment when NPS Chief Conservator Sara Wolf took its condition as evidence of the park’s “disregard” for its collections.

The second resource which the Armory had to offer was its ability to handle weapons, which included not only curatorial expertise but also security, accountability, and safety procedures. In February of 1997, the park signed a memorandum of understanding with the agency to provide a “centralized final disposition system for all NPS firearms” – that is, any gun that any unit of the National Park system decided it no longer wanted – ensuring that weapons or even parts of weapons that might have historic value were “preserved in an approved NPS museum collection.” This gave the Armory the chance to incorporate some of the better pieces into its collection, or at least to scavenge the screws or firing pins it needed to exhibit its own weapons. In this sense, the Firearms Disposition Center resembled the clearinghouse for "junkers" and surplus weapons which Lindsay had proposed in 1978. But its ultimate goal was quite different. Although Lindsay pointed out the “curatorial burden” which his clearinghouse would lift from the parks, his main intent was to support the restoration of his collection. The ultimate goal of the Firearms Disposition Center was to destroy unwanted weapons. This was an essential function for the system as a whole, but one which imposed a significant burden on whichever park assumed it. First, someone had to assess the “historic value” of each item and determine its “appropriate disposition,” an operational burden which the park believed entitled it to an increase in staff and funding. Second, the park had to assure that the unwanted guns were safely destroyed. In 1998, the

32 Memo, Associate Regional Director (Robert W. McIntosh, Jr.) to Superintendent, SPAR, February 21, 1992 (Regional Curator Files: folder: Curatorial SPAR 1989 –).
34 Emails, Arnold to Wolf, March 9, 2001, and Wolf to Arnold, March 1, 2001 (copies in Arnold, conservation binder, nos. 57, 58).
Interpreting the Armory and Serving Its Publics

FDC was transporting weapons for destruction to a smelter about eighty miles away. The smelter required the park to arrange in advance for all shipments, and even to specify the arrival time of its NPS weapons, all of which exposed agency staff to additional security risks. In 1998, Management Officer Frank Seng recommended finding a smelter nearer to hand. He also transmitted a suggestion from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, that before taking firearms to the smelter, the park carry out a process of “virtual destruction” so as to prevent their later retrieval and reassembly. He referred darkly to an unfortunate experience a few years ago.38

VISITOR SERVICES AFTER 1989: REORGANIZATION, GROWTH, AND THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCES

Within about eighteen months, between fall 1989 and spring 1992, a convergence of events reshaped life at the Armory and, for the first time, placed interpretation and visitor services at the center of the park agenda. The first was the reopening of the museum, which not only liberated park managers to focus on new priorities but also gave interpreters access to their primary resource after a two year hiatus. The timing was fortunate, for the Armory’s bicentennial would be celebrated in 1994, and by 1992 the impending occasion was already prompting new opportunities to tell the park’s story and to build civic partnerships. In the meantime, in 1991, Steve Beatty arrived as superintendent, initiating a tenure that would be almost as long-lasting as Doug Lindsay’s. Unlike Lindsay, Beatty did not arrive at the Armory forewarned of dire problems. His brief, transmitted by Regional Director Marie Rust, was simple: solve the personnel problems and “put the park on the map.”39 The first, she advised, would facilitate the second. Thus arose the first of Beatty’s signature initiatives, the 1992 staff reorganization that created a true visitor services division for the first time in the park’s history.

Beatty confronted several staff problems. There were underperforming employees as well as some potentially explosive “racial and bigotry issues” which held a potential for lawsuits. Beatty solved these issues through retirements and transfers. There was also, in his view, a high degree of disorganization. Everyone reported to the superintendent. Curator John McCabe recalled Lindsay often saying that the park had “one division – me.”40 As a result, Beatty felt the park lacked an organized personnel structure, clear divisional lines, or sufficient staff; “nearly every function is partially lead [sic] by every established division,” so that some employees confusingly reported to supervisors in different divisions; division chiefs were not involved in park planning and budgeting; there was a “general situation of no leadership below the Superintendent....In one word ‘disorganization.’” The park resembled

40 John McCabe, recorded interview, August 17, 2007.
“17 individuals with 17 agendas going in 17 directions. The total dependence on the Superintendent for all supervision and leadership is unacceptable.”

The reorganization, initiated by a 1991 Operations Evaluation and developed in 1991-92, addressed all of these problems. It created divisions. “Few positions,” it announced, “will remain unchanged....” It would provide enough staff to meet the park’s daily operating needs. And it would “improve the extremely poor confidence and moral [sic] of the staff.”

The reorganization sought to touch every aspect of the park. Support staff was to be shifted between the superintendent’s office and general administration. Maintenance would benefit as well. The operation of the museum and archive was evidently a major concern, which the plan addressed in part by increasing the staff size. But what bothered the administrators were not only the division’s shortcomings but also its divergence from agency norms. They wanted to produce some “semblance of a traditional park structure in a park where traditional structure is not possible”: after the reorganization, “divisions and functions will be more similar to other parks making identity and seeking assistance easier.... Professional requirements for operating a museum will be more evident....”

First among the plan’s objectives, however, was to create “a functioning Visitor Services Division.” It started with creation of a new position of Information Clerk, a seemingly small change which would “begin to establish a true Visitor Services Division with interpretation and law enforcement functions.” There was also a lack of trained law enforcement personnel as well as a deficit of interpretation beyond a limited education program. The plan aimed to correct both deficits and to provide “an education program meeting the demands of the community.”

Larry Lowenthal, an “excellent historian and park planner,” would be moved from Chief of Visitor Services, a position whose supervisory role did not suit him, to a position as historian, where he could be “in a more productive role” – a “critical move” toward establishing the division planners imagined. The plan for the following year contained yet further changes. A new Park Ranger LE GS-5 position – that is, a ranger trained and equipped to provide law enforcement – would “begin to meet law enforcement needs of the park.” A new Education Specialist GS-9 would take responsibility for the education program, allowing the park to begin meeting the unserved demand for programs and freeing up the time of other employees to manage visitor services. The position would “provide the beginning of a public interpretive program.” There were even more changes planned for Fiscal Year 1994.

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41 “Justification for Reorganization of Springfield Armory National Historic Site,” n.d., see esp. pp. 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10; attached to “Reorganization Plan for Springfield Armory National Historic Site,” n.d., with cover memo, Superintendent to Regional Director, April 13, 1992 (Charlestown, Regional Curator Files: folder: SPAR CMP).

The plan proposed to build the staff from an existing total of 14.1 full time equivalent staff positions (which exceeded the park’s authorized total) to a much larger 22.4 FTE. It would also shift resources among functions, especially between the museum services and visitor services divisions. On paper, museum services would grow from 3.3 to 9 FTE, but this was partly accomplished by moving existing library technician positions out of visitor services, where they did not really belong. Museum services would now be partitioned in two branches, one for the library and archive, the other for the collection. Visitor services would also grow, from 3.8 to 6 FTE, and here the growth was real, since the earlier number included the two library technicians as well as a supervisory ranger who was not only a historian by inclination but also an expert park planner, often detailed to other parks by the region. The park’s existing education coordinator would be promoted to head the reorganized department, managing two full-time education specialists as well as one full-time and two half-time park rangers with law enforcement duties, and, of course, the information clerk.43

From Beatty’s perspective, the reorganization met one of his most important goals, which was to create a framework within which some “very strong individuals” could begin to work well together. After about four years, in fact, he found that the four division chiefs – administration, museum services, visitor services, and maintenance – were basically managing the park.44 Realizing other goals depended on resources, and there success was more equivocal. It is true that from 1987 onwards the park’s Annual Interpretive Program Reports showed significant growth in spending on interpretation. In 1987, the park’s interpretive budget was $49,300, or 12% of its total ONPS (Operation of the National Park System) budget. In 1990, this grew to $73,765, or almost 16% of total ONPS. By 1991, the figure had ballooned to $121,228, or fully one fourth of the park’s ONPS spending. And during the remainder of the decade, annual interpretive budgets generally hovered in the range of $150,000-$200,000, or between 25% and 30% of the park’s ONPS spending. Starting in 1991, the regular interpretive budget was also supplemented by other funds: $1090 from the Volunteers in Parks program that year, $12,292 in 1995 from a combination of the VIP program and other donations.45 Another small funding source opened up when Eastern


44 Steve Beatty, recorded interview with author, May 28, 2009.

45 The Annual Interpretive Program Reports continue from 1987 through 1998 (with a gap for 1988 and 1989). They were replaced from 1999 with Park Service wide Interpretive Reports, which account for funds slightly differently and do not include percentages. The figures are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget (with percentages and additional funds)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>$49,300 (12%) $177,262 (31%: plus $6,660 in other funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$73,765 (16%) $166,284 (27%: plus $6,422 in other funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>$121,228 (25%: plus $1090 in other funds) $324,768 (49%: plus $2,742 in other funds)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>$149,629 (25%: plus $1988 in other funds) $200,640 (plus $2805 in Service wide Fee Funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>$116,978 (21%: plus $2682 in other funds) $171,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$163,833 (28%: plus $26,662 in other funds) $202,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>$169,983 (29%: plus $12,292 in other funds)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Interpreting the Armory and Serving Its Publics

National, a company specializing in running book and gift shops at National Parks, took over the Armory’s shop. A common feature of the concession contracts written with Eastern National was a clause specifying the payment of a small percentage of the proceeds into a park account, rather than directly to Washington. These accounts, technically classed as donations, gave superintendents a little discretionary spending money. In FY 1996, the Armory’s Eastern National fund yielded a total of $1,538 for the park’s interpretive division.46

Yet despite this growth, the reports also show that the Reorganization Plan’s targets were never met in the crucial area of staffing. In 1987, the park mustered the equivalent of 2.23 full-time staff members (FTE) for interpretation, or 15% of its total staffing. By 1991, the figure had peaked at 3.88 FTE, or 28% of staffing. This was the high point. During the remainder of the decade, volunteers contributed modestly to the staffing total, but the benefit was probably offset by the burden imposed on professional staff by the responsibility of managing large numbers of volunteers. The figures are suggestive: for example, in 1996 thirty-eight volunteers together contributed a total of a little more than half of the equivalent of a single full-time staff position; the following year, 121 volunteers produced an amount of work equivalent to 1.37 FTE. By this time, regular park staff for interpretation had declined to three FTE, far short of the 6 envisioned in the Reorganization Plan. It was not that resources had been shifted elsewhere: interpretation still represented a substantial 22% of park staffing, well above pre-1990 levels. But the overall expansion envisioned by the plan had not taken place.

The Armory was far from the only park with these problems, and so the agency and region sought during the 1990s to supplement funding for interpretation by participating in programs funded by outside organizations. One was the Teaching with Historic Places program, a collaboration among the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the National Council for Social Studies, and the agency’s own National Register program. Another new idea was a proposal in 1990 to establish Cooperative Park Education Units, based on the twenty-two existing Cooperative Park Study Units which established formal relationships with universities.47 A program from which the Armory benefitted was Parks as Classrooms, a grant program launched by the National Park Foundation and active by 1991. A regional official described it as “an opportunity for a park to develop a basic education program by
providing ‘seed money’ to get started with curriculum development, teacher workshops, etc.” The Armory used Parks as Classrooms support to produce “From Her Arms to His” in 1992-93. For the program, a professional writer and storyteller interviewed eight former employees, created and performed “an original Women Ordnance Worker story,” and developed a tape and teacher’s guide. Other successes came from Teaching with Historic Places, which over the years has produced a voluminous library of lesson plans and source materials. But grant programs and curriculum development projects could not lift the Armory’s interpretive programs to the level envisioned by the Reorganization Plan.

Compared with the need, the funds which the Parks as Classroom program could deliver were extremely small: in FY 1994, the program provided a total of $768,000 for distribution throughout the entire National Park system. Within the North Atlantic Region, managers adopted a “seed money” approach so as to “distribute the very limited funds to the largest number of deserving projects.” This meant that, during Fiscal Years 1991 and 1992, fourteen out of twenty-four parks in the North Atlantic Region received educational funding from the National Park Foundation: in 1991, $76,000 was shared by four parks; in 1992, $69,000 was split among eight.

Another political strategy to augment the interpretative program also failed. In 1993, a “multimillion-dollar jobs and infrastructure program” called Rebuild America was introduced to Congress. It was intended to restore funds cut from the previous year’s NPS programs, help the agency address known deficiencies, and repair the damage from a major storm that had hit the northeast the previous December. For the Northeast Region alone, Rebuild America promised to generate almost $16 million, and of the $65,000 proposed for the Armory, $15,000 was earmarked for interpretation. With “strong backing and oversight from the Department of the Interior,” the NPS prepared to take advantage of this substantial opportunity. Yet by April the Senate had defeated the program. Asked to assess the impact on the Armory, Joanne Gangi commented that “negative consequences will be felt by all divisions” – but especially by visitor services. The funds would have allowed the park to “finally start providing consistent, requested public programs for our visitors.” Instead, there

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48 Memo, Chief of Interpretation, NAR, to Chief Interpreters, Education Specialists, NAR, September 22, 1993 (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: fol. Parks as Classrooms Grant).

49 Draft material, related contract material, and cassette tape for From Her Arms to His (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: unlabelled folder filed under A & B).


51 Program intended: memo, Edie Shean-Hammond, Chief of Communications, to Supts., Directorate, Division Chiefs, April 22, 1993 (SPAR: Central Files: K2623 Interp. Reports (Situation). Strong backing, timetable, allocation of funds: memo, Regional Director, NAR, to Superintendents, Directorate, and Division Chiefs, NAR, March 8, 1993 (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: fol. PD - Economic Stimulus...).
would be cutbacks in interpretive programs, special events, temporary exhibits, and planning for the bicentennial.\textsuperscript{52}

Gangi’s assessment was pessimistic. It was not merely that this disappointment frustrated plans to expand. Rather, she felt, the park had failed to serve the public adequately at any time since the reopening of the museum. One reason was that promises made in the reorganization plan had not been fulfilled. For two years, Gangi explained, the Armory’s requests to hire the new staff called for in the plan had been denied. The visitor services division continued to make do with a single Interpreter/Education Coordinator who was responsible for developing and presenting all of the park’s school and public programs. The park had hoped to use the Rebuild America funding to hire two more interpreters, one (GS-9) to lead the development of new public programs, especially those focused on the upcoming Bicentennial, and the other (GS-5) to assist with interpretive services.\textsuperscript{53} As Gangi saw it, Rebuild America would have helped lift visitor services to a credible baseline level.

Inadequate funding and staffing were facts. Yet Gangi’s disappointment may also have reflected raised expectations. Eighteen months earlier, Congress had asked the agency for a “full overview” of the “status/erosion of interpretive services” since the nation’s bicentennial. Completing a questionnaire, Larry Lowenthal had stated that the Armory’s interpretive program had suffered no major setbacks and that the park was not operating “below a minimum level of interpretive services.”\textsuperscript{54} In 1993, with hopes raised by the agency’s efforts to create a “functioning Visitor Services Division,” then further raised by Rebuild America, Gangi’s disappointment must have been keen.

In general, these were not good times for building park budgets, and things soon got worse. In 1994, conservative Republicans took control of Congress, promising drastic cuts in the federal budget. By the following year there was concern that, if they succeeded, some parks would have to close. That fall the Republican Congress forced a showdown with Democratic President Bill Clinton. Rather than accept the Republicans’ severe budget cuts, he shut down the federal government, hoping that the public would direct its outrage at Congress rather than him. The strategy succeeded. The government went back to work and the deepest cuts were avoided. But the prospects for increased funds and staffing remained slim. In 1995, the Armory still had only one interpreter with a background in education or sufficient interpretive experience to create new school programs, while the new Organizational Plan required the chief to manage the division while continuing to present most of its programs. As a result, Gangi did not have the necessary time to build alliances

\textsuperscript{52} Memo, Gangi to Shean-Hammond, April 23, 1993 (SPAR Central Files: K2623 Interp. Reports (Situation)).

\textsuperscript{53} Memo, Gangi to Shean-Hammond, April 23, 1993 (SPAR Central Files: K2623 Interp. Reports (Situation)).

\textsuperscript{54} Memo, Chief of Interpretation, NAR, to Superintendents, October 22, 1991, with attached questionnaire filled out by Larry Lowenthal (SPAR Central Files: K2623 Interp. Reports (Situation)).
with school officials and teachers, or to attend meetings and curriculum development workshops. “We need an interpreter who can both plan school and public programs,” she summed up.55

NEW PROGRAMS, THE BICENTENNIAL, AND CIVIC COOPERATION

If budget shortfalls kept Visitor Services operating at a level below the envisioned expansion, Beatty and his staff nonetheless managed to develop important new programs and to lead a conceptual shift in the park’s interpretation. The problem was the Armory’s reputation (and to some extent its real condition) as little more than a gun museum. Guns provoked strong and conflicting emotions. On the one hand, Beatty felt some hostility to firearms, both in Congress and in the agency’s regional office, which translated into an aversion to educational programs focused on firearms. On the other hand, he found that the collection’s traditional constituency of gun collectors and enthusiasts had lost faith in the Armory. “They didn’t trust us,” he recalls, ironically because they thought the park was anti-gun. To mend fences with collectors while simultaneously building new constituencies would require carefully steering between these two poles. It was necessary to telegraph the message that the Armory was neither “pro-gun nor anti-gun.” The way the park solved the problem was essentially to shift the interpretive focus away from the guns themselves and towards broader social themes. “People, process, product” would be the new orientation, with the emphasis on the people and the process – that is, on the Armory’s workers and the industrial manufacturing techniques they pioneered, techniques that sometimes revolutionized all of American industry. “Make it more personal to everybody” was Beatty’s directive: if people disliked firearms, forge a connection through the manufacture of shoe lasts.56

Beatty credits much of the inspiration behind this shift to Chief of Visitor Services Joanne Gangi-Wellman, and specifically to her pioneering work with local schools. Schools represented one area where visitation could be increased, and where interpretative programs could help the park get beyond the limitations of a “self-interpreting” museum. The early 1990s were both a good and a bad time to be developing school programs. Massachusetts’ public schools were hit by severe budget cuts, increasing the demand for non-profit programming. Yet although the park’s programs were free, transporting students was expensive, and “creative efforts” were needed to solve the problem.57

Developing new school programs required much more than simply developing their content. Gangi started working on the fifth grade program as soon as the museum reopened in 1989. Inviting teachers to an open house at the museum, she launched a curriculum development project in which a few interested teachers worked with her to develop a pilot

55 “Overview of Visitor Services at SPAR 7/26/95” (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: fol. SFI FY 95).
56 Steve Beatty, recorded interview with author, May 28, 2009.
program for the spring. As the team worked together, the project took shape as “Track the Firearms over Time.” Regular communication with teachers and schools was needed, not only to develop the program but also to build interest in it; close attention to the state’s curriculum was also essential, for schools could not afford to offer programs that did not help them meet state requirements.

By the summer of 1990, the park was offering other new programs to fifth, eighth, and eleventh grade classes. A fifth grade program was called “Geniuses of Springfield,” one for the older grades “Right in Our Backyard: Our National Armory.” Essentially all of the programs consisted of a museum visit, including a screening of the armory’s film, a guided exploration of the exhibits, classroom activities that might help to link their content with the school curriculum, and sometimes a presentation on gun safety. By 1998 the park claimed that its school programs were serving 2,000 students per year. By 2000, the park could report that the annual number of school programs offered at the museum had increased to eight; that thirty-seven area schools were participating with a total of 1,921 students, and that off-site programming for schools had also increased, serving a total of 1,272 students.

The substantive challenges Gangi faced in designing school programs were the same ones that had often perplexed planners and interpreters, and that Beatty encountered on arriving at the Armory. A newspaper reporter summarized them:

How do you make the museum’s contents relevant to their [fifth graders’] lives and studies? And how do you focus a lesson plan on guns without seeming to glorify weapons of destruction?

58 Letter, Joanne M. Gangi (Education Coordinator) and James K. Tillotson (Director of Social Studies, Springfield Public Schools) to Dear Classroom Teacher, November 13, 1989 (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: fol. Dec 5th – Open House ...). See also material relating to curriculum development project (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: fol. “Curr Dev Proj”).

59 Memo, Acting Chief, Division of Interpretation and Recreation (region) to Chief of Interpretation (park), June 5, 1990 (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: fol. Edu. Programs – SPAR).

60 “National Park Service, School Programs Survey, Horace Albright Employee Development Fund Project 1988,” attached to memo, Acting Chief, Division of Interpretation and Recreation (region) to Chief of Interpretation (park), June 5, 1990 (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: fol. Edu. Programs – SPAR....). For a description of 1991 programs, covering fifth grade through high school, see: flyer included with information packet on Springfield Armory Museum for “Common Bonds, National Park Service and Springfield Armory Historic Association: An Evening of Appreciation, April 17, 1991” (SPAR Central Files: A82 Special Events FY 1991-1996): the fifth grade program was a social studies unit in which alternative programs on technology and creativity were offered.


63 Pat Cahill, “Students reopen the Book on a Storied Armory,” Union-News, November 7, 1990 (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: fol. Education – 5th grade S. S. Unit....).
Gangi’s solution was to use the weapons to open up or illustrate broader topics like “Technology” or “Creativity.” The latter unit, for example, started not with guns but with classroom exercises on “annoying problems of everyday life and how to solve them.”

School programs were not the only area where new initiatives sought to reshape the Armory’s relationship to the public. Studying the permanent exhibits, Beatty found the new themes of “people, process, and product” strikingly absent: in fact, the “basically static” permanent exhibits, which offered little incentive to repeat visitors, constricted rather than supported the park’s interpretive program. The solution was temporary exhibits that would change fairly rapidly, and Beatty challenged his division chiefs to propose ideas. His goal was to rotate exhibits every 90 days, but in fact James Roberts, who arrived as Supervisory Museum Curator in 1996, recalls that they changed roughly once a year. Roberts supported the new emphasis on communication and audience development and forged a strong working relationship with Gangi-Wellman, but he also sought to bring a higher standard of professional polish to the exhibit program. Thus he extended the rotation period to eighteen months, meanwhile learning the design and computer skills needed to produce exhibits entirely in-house, “on a shoestring” and without depending on regional support.

A third initiative was to reach out to Springfield’s increasingly diverse population, especially its African American and Latino residents, and to women. A key step was to broaden the narrative of the Armory’s history to recognize the role played by these groups. The picture presented by the park on Beatty’s arrival was “primarily white.” Yet the Armory’s history included workers of many races and ethnicities and had much to say about larger questions of race and gender relations. It “made a lot of sense” to draw out these strands, especially the Armory’s African American history. Again, Beatty credits Gangi-Wellman and her involvement with the racially diverse public school system with some of the inspiration for this shift. But the mayor was also pressing for a “broader history.”

The change of focus was conspicuous. In 1989, responding to a region-wide survey of black history topics in the parks, Larry Lowenthal had stated not only that no black history topics were included in the park’s interpretive programs but that no black history themes were associated with the Armory. Yet in 1993 the Interpretive Division could find enough material to devote its first temporary exhibit to the theme of African American workers at the Armory. Timed to coincide with Black History Month, it sought to reverse a disturbing drop in visitation, which staff attributed partly to the static nature of the exhibits. But it also sought to correct the underrepresentation of African American workers in the park’s oral history program, and to this end the interpreters sent out mailings and engaged African Americans visitors to the museum in discussion, all in an effort to generate dialogue with African

64 Ibid.

65 Steve Beatty, recorded interview with author, May 28, 2009.


67 Survey form attached to memo, Chief of Interpretation, NAR (Cynthia E. Kryston), to Chief Interpreters NAR, August 2, 1989 (SPAR Central Files: K2623 Interp. Reports (Situation).
Figure 6.7. To amplify the interpretive message of the permanent exhibits with social history themes, park staff have made space for and installed temporary exhibits (photo: author).
American workers. Scheduled for a month or two, the exhibit remained much longer, and Superintendent Beatty claimed that it generated more useful information on former African American workers than any previous activity. To build on its successes, three years later, the park launched an African-American Heritage Project, in cooperation with STCC.68

The new interest in diversity was not limited to African Americans: in 1993 the park also mounted an exhibit for Hispanic History Month. Women, who had made up over 45 percent of the Armory’s workforce during World War II, were another subject of interest, and that year the park also completed “From Her Arms to His,” the investigation of women Armory workers supported by the National Park Foundation’s Parks as Classrooms program, noted above. The park’s Annual Report called the production the park’s greatest single interpretive success69 (Fig. 6.7).

The new emphasis on race and gender themes was consistent with the trend among professional historians, and with developments within the region. These culminated in 1997 with the release of a region wide interpretive plan called The Road Ahead, spearheaded by regional director Marie Rust. The plan called on parks to “Discover the Untold Stories,” meaning the historical experiences of women, people of color, and working people who had been largely absent from historical narratives.70 Springfield Armory was already doing this.

Meanwhile, museum and library staff were developing the park’s interpretive offerings in other ways. A large part of their public had always consisted of scholars, enthusiasts, and gun collectors, and overcoming the “big animosity” that had built up among these traditional constituents was an important part of Beatty’s plan to build the park’s public.71 Arming the curator proved to be a “major turning point”: that is, training Curator John McCabe as a park law enforcement officer and giving him a gun to carry, changes that seemed to assure the collectors of both the park’s and the curator’s commitment to firearms. In fact McCabe, who had a military background, was popular with the scholars and collectors, and Beatty credits their willingness to work closely with him with bringing forth valuable new information about the collection. At the same time, Beatty found it possible to relax some of the tight access restrictions that Lindsay had imposed, making the collection


69 Hispanic History Month; best success: “Springfield Armory National Historic Site: Annual Narrative Report for Calendar year 1993” (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: fol. SFI 1993); press release: Draft material, related contract material, and cassette tape for From Her Arms to His (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: under A & B).

70 “The Road Ahead: A Strategy to Achieve Excellence in Interpretation and Education in the National Park Service Northeast Region,” October, 1997. To create the plan, Rust convened a working group including NPS chief historian Dwight Pitcaithley, Wilke Nelson of the National Park Foundation, and superintendents and interpreters from the region. The plan’s goals were summarized in the Armory’s “Long Range Interpretive Plan,” January, 2000, p. 15.

71 Steve Beatty, recorded interview with author, May 28, 2009.
more welcoming to researchers. The numbers of these researchers were never large: in 2000, museum and library staff estimated that they responded each year to about 300 inquiries and helped about fifty researchers. Yet the service was a valuable part of the park’s offerings, and the Long Range Interpretive Plan of 2000 reiterated the need to continue serving those “constituencies, particularly scholars of firearms,” who fell “outside traditional definitions of ‘visitors.’”

Another strategy was to take items from the collection to gun shows, simultaneously giving the collection more exposure and “making friends” there. Often these visits amounted to small traveling exhibitions: in 2000, for example, the park reported that site exhibits had traveled to a Baltimore gun show, Fort Necessity National Battlefield, and several conferences. A key group was the Garand Collectors Association: through their renewed participation, the park was able to reach out to international groups as well.

Yet another avenue for communication was offered by the internet. In 1997 the museum services division launched an “experimental curatorial website” which gave web surfers instant access to pictures and in-depth information on the collection. Management officer Frank Seng estimated less than a year later that the website was adding the equivalent of 1,000 researchers or visitors per year to the number of actual visitors. By 2000, it was receiving 1,200 hits per month for information on objects and 500 for archival information. To Seng, it represented a “cutting-edge approach to the Cyber Museum” which led both the NPS and Army in public access. It also helped the park meet another goal put forth by “The Road Ahead,” the region’s Interpretive Plan: to “get wired to the world.”

After 1989, special events presented other opportunities for attracting visitors, including those with no special interest in guns. Two such opportunities stand out in particular: the 75th anniversary of the National Park Service in 1991, and the two hundredth anniversary of the Armory in 1994.

The agency’s anniversary in 1991 had little impact on the park. Though the Washington office and the region and made some efforts to encourage commemorative activities at the parks, the Armory made no special exertion but simply called the Common Bonds dinner, described above, its anniversary event. Since the dinner was not open to the

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74 Steve Beatty, recorded interview with author, May 28, 2009.
75 “Long Range Interpretive Plan: Springfield Armory National Historic Site,” p. 27.
78 Various documents on “Common Bonds” (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: fol. Seventy Fifth Anniversary N.P.S.).
public, and the collaborating organization, the Springfield Armory Historic Association, folded shortly afterwards, the anniversary left little trace on the park.

The next anniversary called forth a much greater effort: here was an opportunity for celebrating, interpreting, marketing, planning, raising money and gaining attention. It was perhaps no more than a happy coincidence that planning for the bicentennial coincided with the park’s efforts to create a “true Visitor Services Division” and came at a time when the park was showing an increased interest in civic partnerships. This interest was expressed in planning documents during the 1990s. For example, in 1993-94, park staff listed as a key priority the need to develop relationships with local organizations in order to promote the site’s impact on tourism development.79 Explaining the need to amend the park’s General Management Plan in 1996, Gangi cited the existing plan’s failure to “address partnerships as a daily management tool and...to offer guidance in defining park priorities within the larger context of the community/region.” She believed the Armory was in the process of reestablishing its regional leadership role with regard to interpreting the Connecticut River Valley’s history and needed a plan to support those ambitions.80 The museum services division’s new website, launched the following year, represented a practical way of reaching out beyond the Armory’s walls.

Beginning about 1992, park staff used the upcoming bicentennial to justify many initiatives: to restore the cultural landscape, to restore the “Arsenal of Freedom” (i.e. the college campus), to enhance the interpretive programs. The civic community was perhaps even more eager to take advantage of the anniversary, for by 1992, civic and business groups in Springfield were in the midst of a vigorous campaign to market the city. Thus the bicentennial became a good vehicle not only for advancing favorite park projects but also for building the partnerships Gangi envisioned.

One leader of the civic campaign was Carlo Marchetti, whom we have already met in 1984 as the most articulate critic of the park’s restoration plans, and again in 1992 as advocate for keeping the Armory’s collection in Springfield. Marchetti was executive director of Springfield Central, which was created in 1978 when public and private interests came together to create a Master Plan for the city’s regeneration.81 It was from the perspective of economic and cultural development that Marchetti called on the park in 1984 to focus less on the gun collection and more on the site and the city it overlooked. His comments, however, suggested that civic leaders had changed their view of the park’s role in urban regeneration. During the campaign to establish the Armory, politicians and newspapers had routinely referred to the prospective park as the gun museum: efforts focused on keeping the


81 Letter, Carlo A. Marchetti, Executive Director, Springfield Central, to Lindsay, October 18, 1984 (SPAR Central Files: D18).
gun collection in Springfield, and civic interests saw the museum as the main tourist attraction. Even in 1984 (and sometimes indeed much later) civic leaders continued to call the site the gun museum. Yet Marchetti preferred to emphasize the site over the collection, the Armory’s “important role” in the region’s “industrial and military development” over its role as a collector or even as a maker of guns. In short, he favored a more outwardly oriented historical narrative, one that would support Springfield Central’s efforts to tie the Armory into the regeneration of downtown Springfield.

The civic development campaign advanced and indeed reached a crescendo around 1990-92, coincidentally at just the moment when changes inside the park were encouraging it to look outward. One wing of the campaign was organized by the Springfield Downtown Hospitality Council (later the Springfield Hospitality Council), a working group launched by Marchetti in the fall of 1990. The Council explained that its “main concern” was “to achieve uniformity of design and information in tourist related publications...,” but its scope was much broader, taking in almost anything that had to do with promotional material: maps, brochures, tote bags, event listings, sometimes the events themselves, and even neighborhood and downtown beautification campaigns. In the fall of 1992, the SHC’s programming committee divided itself into task groups: one set out to develop a computerized database for event listings and attractions, known as KIOSC, or Key Information Office Springfield Central. Initially the group planned to open a Downtown Informational Center, plus two satellites, in 1995, but the project was rushed forward so that the outlets could open in time for the Armory’s bicentennial in the spring of 1994. In the meantime, early in 1994, the Council launched a cross promotional program, requesting 5,000 copies of the Armory’s brochure with which to stock twenty new brochure display racks located downtown.

In the spring of 1991, Springfield Central and the city government launched a more ambitious venture, a three-year $900,000 marketing campaign to attract businesses to Springfield. Specifically, this meant luring them from Boston, Fairfield County, and metropolitan New York City. Modeled on a campaign run by the city of Providence (RI) from 1986 through 2000, this was to be “the most ambitious economic development campaign Springfield has ever launched.” It was introduced at a Springfield Economic

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83 Memo, Neta Bolozky to SHC members, August 18, 1992 (SPAR Central Files: A3825 Springfield Downtown Hospitality Council).


Interpreting the Armory and Serving Its Publics

Summit which attracted more than three hundred participants to discussions on hospitality and tourism, quality of life and the arts, education, economic development, and so forth. The campaign aimed to fill no less than 700,000 square feet of vacant office space in downtown Springfield, but in surveying regional business leaders the organizers had encountered an obstacle: negative perceptions of Springfield. To combat these perceptions, the campaign adopted as its “theme line” the slogan “Springfield. Greener Pastures.” This was intended to suggest better opportunities for business, a comfortable lifestyle, a friendly way of life, and an appealing environment. The city’s cultural institutions were well represented at the Summit, which featured speakers from the library and museums, the public television station, the symphony, the theater company and Springfield Technical Community College; the Armory, however, was absent.

Springfield Central’s new Heritage Development Program, however, put the Armory front and center. Like the Economic Development Marketing Program, the idea was borrowed, in this case from Quincy, MA. Congressman Neal proposed it to Springfield Central early in 1991: it was then delegated to the Amenities Committee of the Downtown Hospitality Council. The plan hinged on the grants being offered by the Department of the Interior to develop strategies (as the committee put it) “for amenities linking National Parks and historic sites.” Neal urged Springfield Central to seek funds for a planning study, but as the city already had an amenity plan the committee wanted dollars for design and implementation. The committee also balked at the requirement that the funds flow to the National Park Service: “Springfield,” argued the committee, “would like a measure of control over how the money is spent.” Yet a formal application “to provide technical assistance by the NATIONAL PARK SERVICE” was submitted later that year. Congressman Neal told a reporter this was “his first pet project” as a Congressman, and he requested the maximum amount available: $250,000

Neal said the goal was to “highlight the attractiveness of the gun museum....” But it was actually much broader: in fact, it was just the kind of partnership that Gangi had been hoping for, an ambitious initiative to develop an “education and improvement program linking the Springfield Armory and Springfield’s historic, cultural and recreational attractions to the city’s rich heritage of people and events.” The most important fact about that heritage, according to the organizers, was that it was “virtually unknown to Springfield visitors and residents”: the basketball, friction matches, postcards, the world’s first gasoline-powered motorcycle had all been invented in Springfield, yet how few people appreciated

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these facts, and how few visitors frequented the city’s historic districts! The “keystone” of the city’s underappreciated history was the Armory, and so it was critically important to connect it to the city’s other attractions.

For the project’s sponsors, a central goal was to increase tourism: a newspaper article promised it would “show how to get more people to visit the Springfield Armory and Museum.” But Springfield’s civic leaders were not interested simply in boosting the Armory. The same article noted that all of the city’s leading cultural institutions had written letters of support “because they hope what is good for the Armory will be good for them.” Larry Lowenthal, chairing the Amenities Committee, called the grant “a fantastic opportunity to fund Downtown amenities.” In fact, this was a period of general economic decline for Springfield, and many were hoping that tourism would help lift the entire downtown economy. As the former director of the Basketball Hall of Fame put it, the city hoped-for rebound “depends on a new commitment to the tourist industry.” Backers expected that growth in tourism would leverage private investment in visitor services and amenities, and that this would complement the revitalization of downtown Springfield, in which some $360 million had already been invested or pledged. The grant proposal adopted an ingenious line of argument: at Lowenthal’s suggestion, it contended that the failure of the NPS’s investment in the Arsenal to increase visitation offered a compelling reason to support other approaches that had a chance of success.

The project was to have three phases. First was a historic resource analysis intended to support the popular perception that the Armory had played a vital role in the region’s economic development. The study would also trace the Armory’s relationships with other sites and lay the groundwork for a unified historical interpretation. Second was an interpretive analysis, and third, implementation strategies to bring intellectual and graphic coordination to the city’s unplanned and “often disjointed” promotional efforts. The funds

89 “A Heritage Development Program for The Springfield Armory National Historic Site and Springfield Massachusetts,” n.d. [annotated 1991] (SPAR Central Files: A3825 Public Relations. (Springfield Central)).


93 Memo, Lowenthal (as Chairman, Amenities Committee) to members of DHC, April 9, 1991; and “A Heritage Development Program for The Springfield Armory National Historic Site and Springfield Massachusetts,” n.d. [annotated 1991] (SPAR Central Files: A3825 Public Relations. (Springfield Central)).

were awarded in 1993, nominally to the National Park Service, but in fact much of the money went to consultants. Some $12,000 also went to Springfield Central.95

The Armory was working closely with downtown interests in other ways as well. Yet there were limits to collaboration. When Marchetti asked Superintendent Beatty for a letter of support for the Heritage Development Program, Beatty responded with general expressions of enthusiasm but no specific commitments.96 What the park could give was staff time, and that it gave generously. Beatty was a member of Springfield Central’s Special Resource Study Core Committee in 1993, co-chair of the Springfield Hospitality Council’s marketing committee, and a member of its steering committee. Lowenthal participated, at Marchetti’s invitation, in discussions about launching the Hospitality Council and, two years later, on the future of the York Street jail; he also served as chair of the Council’s Visitor Services Committee and as chair, and later co-chair, of its Amenities Committee, where he enthusiastically endorsed Congressman Neal’s suggestion of a Heritage Development Program grant and helped craft the proposal. Memos and minutes suggest that both Beatty and Lowenthal took these activities seriously and worked hard at them.97 The park also became an institutional member and paid dues to the Greater Springfield Convention and Visitors Bureau.98

As the Armory’s bicentennial approached, then, civic and park interests were converging, the park seeking to reach out to local interests, civic advocates pushing for economic, cultural, and tourism development. The two sides saw the bicentennial as an opportunity to collaborate. However, concrete results were disappointing. In 1992 Marchetti tried to persuade the US Postal Service to issue a commemorative stamp for the bicentennial. Congressman Neal supported the effort, but the Postal Service turned down the request.99 The following year, Springfield Central joined with the Armory to promote a public mural commemorating the armory’s history. It was to adorn the sides of two buildings facing Columbus Avenue and the interstate highway downtown. At first, business leaders, city

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95 “A Heritage Development Program for The Springfield Armory National Historic Site and Springfield Massachusetts,” n.d. [annotated. 1991]; and (apportionment of funds) memo, Neta Bolozky (Springfield Central) to Special Resource Study Core Committee Members [Beatty is one of 5 members], March 31, 1993 (SPAR Central Files: A3825 Public Relations. (Springfield Central)).

96 Letter, Beatty to Carlo A. Marchetti (ex dir Springfield Central), May 17, 1991 (SPAR Central Files: A3825 Public Relations. (Springfield Central)).

97 Memo, Neta Bolozky (Spr Central) to Special Resource Study Core Committee Members; letter, Marchetti to Lowenthal, May 14, 1992 (SPAR Central Files: A3825 Public Relations. (Springfield Central)); Springfield Hospitality Council, untitled white paper, April 14, 1993; letter, Marchetti to Lowenthal, November 26, 1990; memo, Daphne Hall (Springfield Central) to Larry Lowenthal and Bob McCarroll (Co-Chairs, Amenities Committee) and Neta Bolozky (Springfield Central), September 1, 1992; Memo, Lowenthal (as Chairman, Amenities Committee) to members of DHC, April 9, 1991 (SPAR Central Files: A3825 Springfield Downtown Hospitality Council).

98 Letter, Jack O’Neill, Ex Dir, Greater Springfield Massachusetts Convention and Visitors Bureau, to Paulette Kraft, February 10, 1994 (SPAR Central Files: A3826 Public Relations (Greater Springfield Convention & Visitors Bureau)).

99 Documents in SPAR Central Files: A3825 Public Relations. (Springfield Central)).
officials, and the property owners supported the project enthusiastically, and the sponsors raised $5,000 from the Community Foundation of Western Massachusetts. But one of the building owners got into “political disputes” with the city over an outstanding tax debt and refused to allow his building to be used until they were resolved. Marchetti was forced to return the grant: “neither Springfield Central nor the Springfield Armory National Historic Site,” he wrote, “are willing to remain as pawns in this chess game.”

The Armory’s interest in promoting special events did not end with the passing of the bicentennial. The second half of the 1990s saw sustained efforts to develop quite large annual events at the park. One was an annual Civil War encampment, first produced in June 1997. This was a form of reenactment, accompanied by blank firing demonstrations. Because of the noise from the guns, the event called for special coordination with Springfield police. Even so, the event was not without problems. After the 1998 encampment, the park had to reprimand the 61st New York regiment for drinking and for aiming guns at the audience.

Another large event in which the park participated was the “Big E,” a regional fair which attracted about a million visitors to Springfield. In 2004, for example, the Armory joined eleven other parks in a National Parks of New England booth: just under 14,000 visitors were recorded at the booth.

While the Civil War encampment was loosely related to park themes, the connection to other special events (like the Big E) was more tenuous. Some built on the notion that the Armory was a good place to interest people in American history; or that the Armory was located in Springfield; or that it had served the Army. Some built on nothing more than the park’s attractive and commodious open space. By the end of the decade, the park was offering a wide range of special events: examples included lectures and book signings on Shays’s Rebellion and on the Spanish-American War, a lecture on “The Greening of Springfield,” a Civil War walking tour, film festivals exploring the ways in which Hollywood presented US history and Springfield-made firearms, firing demonstrations, big band concerts, an Open House and Ice Cream Social, an afternoon of competition shooting with Ruby Fox (“one of America’s foremost pistol shooters”), and “In the Midst of War Lies Our Faith – A Veterans’ Day Tribute from the Spiritual Community.” In 2000, the park estimated annual attendance at a total of twenty special events at over 2,700 visitors.

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100 Letter, Marchetti to Sandra Eagleton, President, Community Foundation of Western Mass, July 21, 1994 (SPAR Central Files: A3825 Public Relations. (Springfield Central)).

101 Letters, Cuillard to Chief of Police Paula Mara, May 21, 2000 (SPAR: Central Files: A82 FY 00 Special Event); and Beatty to Lee Gadd, Safety Officer, 61st Regiment, Puckerton, NJ [sic], February 8, 1999 (SPAR: Central Files: A82 FY 99 Special Events).


103 Various event posters, 1999 ff. (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: fols. untitled (filed under F) and Flyers).

THE PROBLEM OF VISITATION

Superintendent Beatty believed that Marie Rust’s directive to “put the park on the map” meant more than simply increasing its visitation totals. He also believed that increased visitation would naturally follow from improved interpretation and visitor services. Yet the perception that visitation was inappropriately low and that it both could and should be raised had characterized park management from the very beginning. Predictions of increased visitation were made from time to time but were not realized. For example, in 1978 agency staff predicted that the NPS takeover would boost visitation from 35,000 to 42,000 per year. Yet in fact, visitation in 1978 was only 13,815, and in 1979, after the takeover, it rose only to 15,607. There was always a reason for a disappointing total. For Larry Lewis in 1973, it was public revulsion against the assassinations of the late 1960s. For Superintendent Beatty in 1992, it was poor signage; the following year, exceptionally good summer weather plus, again, “the current media attention to ‘guns,’ ‘assault weapons,’ and firearms in general...” More striking than the actual numbers was how little impact even the biggest changes at the park seemed to make. The numbers did rise somewhat after the NPS takeover, peaking at a little over 18,000 in 1981, then retreating in 1982 to about 15,600. From 1979 (the first full calendar year of NPS operation) through 1986, visitation averaged 17,198 per year. Then, in the fall of 1987 the museum closed for renovation. Its reopening two years later – the second great event at the park – prompted a momentary spike, from a pre-closure October average of 1,288 (1979-86) to a monthly total of 2,481 in October, 1989. Then the numbers slid back into their habitual ranges. In fact, the annual average for the first five years after reopening was somewhat lower than for the same period before closure: 15,436 in 1990-1494, as compared to 17,122 in 1982-1986.

The slight decline of the early 1990s masks a sharp one-year dip in 1993, from 15,630 to 12,524. This may have been caused by a shift from a seven-day to a five-day week that Beatty was forced to impose for budgetary reasons about 1992. He had experience with a similar closure at Blue Ridge National Park, where he found that visitation actually rose, and he expected a similar result in Springfield. Whether or not the two-day closure, lasting about two years, depressed visitation, it had some positive impacts on interpretation, for it gave

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106 All visitation statistics are taken from the NPS’s web page for statistical reports, at http://www2.nature.nps.gov/NPstats/dspPark.cfm, consulted in August, 2007. See Appendix fill in for the complete series, from 1978 through 2006.


park staff the time to develop new exhibits and other programs, and at times to work with
objects more efficiently on a museum floor that was closed to the public.

In any case, the picture changed in 1995, when visitation suddenly jumped above
31,000. Indeed the average for 1995-2006 rose to 23,374 visitors per year, strikingly higher
than any previous period or even than any previous year. However, this was not due to
increased interest in the museum. Monthly totals for 1995 were in line with previous years, or
slightly lower, except for September, when the park recorded the extraordinary total of
18,011 visitors. Gangi recalls that this was when the Moving Wall, a half-size traveling replica
of the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, D.C., was temporarily displayed outside the
Armory, drawing “lots of attention and visitation.” Special events continued to draw larger
than average numbers: for example, June, 2000, when the fourth annual Civil War
encampment was held, saw a total of 4,506 park visitors, versus a pre-closure monthly
average of 1,999. It helped that visitation numbers were now being recorded somewhat
differently. On normal days, only visitors to the museum were counted; no effort was made
to count those strolling through the grounds. However, audiences for special outdoor events
were separately counted and added to visitation totals. Nevertheless, the totals for 2005
and 2006 dropped back into the accustomed range: 14,389 and 17,115, respectively.

Apart from special events with little relation to the park’s interpretive themes, then,
visitation numbers at SPAR remained strikingly flat. Neither major institutional
reorganizations nor programmatic initiatives did much to boost them. As the new century
opened, the park reviewed its interpretive programming in a Long Range Interpretive Plan.
The Main Arsenal contained exhibits and video programs, as called for in the 1980
Interpretive Prospectus. Over the years the staff had developed spaces for interactive
activities and changing exhibits. The park had a brochure in the standard NPS “unigrid”
format. Staff offered curriculum-based educational programs, teacher workshops, off-site
exhibits, and at least twelve special events per year plus firing demonstrations and the Civil
War encampment. The park hosted various community and college events. Students and
casual visitors enjoyed relaxing in the Armory grounds. In addition, there were the special
services offered to researchers and to internet visitors through the website.

There was no question that the park was doing many things right. Yet the Long Range
Interpretive Plan also identified some problems. One was that public awareness of the park
remained disappointingly low: in many ways the Armory seemed invisible. The Plan
proposed to promote the site through advertising, cross-promotional activities with partners,
new community-oriented special events, mailing lists and marketing, an improved classroom
space, better phone messaging, improved highway and informational signs, an information
kiosk in front of Main Arsenal, and a reopened Byers Street gate. A second problem was that
key interpretive themes were not being forcefully projected: the exhibits did as much to

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109 Email, Gangi to author, August 28, 2007.
110 Email, Gangi to author, August 28, 2007.
obscure as to present them, and the rest of the Armory remained an untapped asset. The Plan proposed to improve the Main Arsenal’s exhibits and supplement them with new ones in the Commanding Officer’s Quarters, focusing on “social aspects of the Armory as well as the commanders and their families.” The park would also with citizen groups to restore the adjacent gardens, and with STCC to install historic photographs at “heavily visited locations on the campus.” The walking tour brochure would be expanded to include the water shops, and the NPS would even install an entry kiosk and wayside exhibit there.\footnote{Long Range Interpretive Plan: Springfield Armory National Historic Site,” 2000, pp 30 ff.}

The next few years saw little visible progress towards expanding interpretation beyond the park boundaries. However, some more accessible goals were met. An information kiosk was installed outside the Main Arsenal (Fig. 6-8). Work was begun on the walking tour brochure and the historic photos for the campus. One goal that was met was to retain a consultant to prepare a \textit{Comprehensive Marketing Plan}. Marc A. Breslav was at work by the middle of 2000.\footnote{Letter, Cuillard to Mark A. Breslav (requesting a bid), February 11, 2000 (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: fol. Marketing Plan).} Much of his report, not surprisingly, was devoted to marketing: recommendations on how to keep better mailing lists, more effectively describe events, attract press coverage, and so forth.\footnote{[Marc A. Breslav], “Summary of Recommendations,” inscribed “Master Plan One” and dated June 1, 2000; and memo, Marc A. Breslav (Public Relations, Advertising and Marketing) to Joanne Gangi, September 26, 2001 (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: fol. Marketing Plan)} But Breslav also made substantive recommendations about the park’s programs and physical organization, and they constitute another perceptive look at the Armory as the twenty-first century opened. His critique summarized three decades of unsolved problems. “Open the Byers Street Gate Soon and with Fanfare,” he urged. Apart from the problems with the approach route, which he described, there were good reasons to open the gate. With a new federal courthouse under construction just down the hill on State Street (designed by Moshe Safdie, it was completed in 2008), downtown activity was set to expand almost to the gateway. An open gate, new paving, good signage, and some welcoming paths and picnic tables would certainly attract lunchtime crowds. It was “critical,” he argued, “not to conceive of the site narrowly, as only being appropriate for historic interpretation, collection and research, rather than providing simple recreational resources that will draw people in to the history and otherwise engender wider support.”

Breslav’s other ideas for expanding the Armory’s civic presence beyond the park also echoed past proposals, specifically those of Marchetti and Springfield Civic. He wanted the Armory to partner more closely with the civic community, by sponsoring events or interpretive programs with the potential to build tourism, support local commerce, or provide amenities for residents: “the focus should be on what can SPAR do for the City, not vice-versa.” In the interpretive area, he wanted to get away from the focus on the gun collection, with programs that would “tie the Armory in with the history of the area and show how prominent a role it played as the social and industrial center of the City.”

\footnote{Long Range Interpretive Plan: Springfield Armory National Historic Site,” 2000, pp 30 ff.}
“killer idea for community relations” was to “create a unified historic walking tour,” or a walking and driving tour: tourism products to link the Armory with some of the city’s attractive historic districts as well as with popular tourist sites like the Basketball Hall of Fame – not to mention the rest of the historic Armory, such as the old water shops site.

Finally, Breslav advised: reconsider the museum. It had a reputation for being static and of little interest to non-specialists. Some of the exhibits he thought quite good. But “as for the firearm side, generally, my view, put in street language, is that there are a lot of guns to say much less. In most cases, one could do with one or two of each firearm.... The history and evolution – the part that sells – remains hidden in the numbing vastness of collection [sic].... That is part of what gives the place a reputation for being ‘the gun museum’ Ultimately, one needs to change the product to change its image.” It was fine, Breslav argued, to offer displays for “collectors and enthusiasts, but not at the expense of a product for the masses.” Absent dramatic change to the museum, the public would continue calling it “the gun museum,” and visitation would remain correspondingly limited.115

Figure 6.8. The entrance to the Main Arsenal in 2008, after installation of a new wheelchair ramp and information kiosk (photo: author).

115 Memo, Marc A. Breslav (Public Relations, Advertising and Marketing) to Joanne Gangi, September 26, 2001, pp. 2-8; for the Byers Street gate, see also [Marc A. Breslav], “Summary of Recommendations,” inscribed “Master Plan One” and dated June 1, 2000, p. 17 (SPAR: Visitor Services Files: fol. Marketing Plan).
More dynamic exhibits, walking tours, picnic benches, interpretive programs that looked outward towards Springfield rather than inward toward the collection – these were all sensible ideas, and many had been advanced at one point or another not only by Marchetti but by NPS officials. Certainly they were of a very different caliber from those which Realty Associates had proposed in 1967. Those earlier consultants had supported the college’s plan to demolish much of Armory Square and, as if to replace the genuine historic ambience, had proposed assembling a restoration village on the slope behind the Main Arsenal. It was not a sensible idea, and it was dismissed. Yet the problem it had recognized was the same one which confronted Breslav more than thirty years later: what would induce the public to visit a gun museum? Or, as the park’s own Long Range Interpretive Plan put it, “How can interpretation send the message that the park is more than ‘just a gun museum.’”116 Over the years, the park had increasingly defined itself as such, and much of its effort – though still far less than some believed was necessary – went into caring for the objects rather than interpreting the park. In fact, the Armory had somehow turned itself into something oddly similar to what the Main Arsenal had originally been: a storehouse for weapons.

Today Springfield Armory NHS presents the National Park Service with significant challenges. It is a difficult park to manage, preserve, and interpret. Some challenges stem from the historical circumstances of its creation, especially the fact that it does not own the collection or most of the historic buildings that are its most important resources. Within the NPS, the park has been the focus of extended controversies over collections management and conservation. These problems have not been resolved, although the agency has scored notable successes. It has largely preserved the physical resources that lie on federal property, including the collection, the Arsenal, the Commanding Officer’s House, the cast iron fence, and the impressive hilltop site. Outside the federal property line, the Armory’s physical condition is also better than might have been predicted in 1974, when it seemed likely that much of Armory Square would be demolished. The future for interpretation remains wide open – especially considering that significant parts of the Armory, even beyond Armory Square itself, have also survived.

Several futures are possible for Springfield Armory. In one, the NPS concludes that the problems presented by the park are simply insuperable. In 1974, F. Ross Holland had doubted whether the NPS could ever make a genuine National Historic Site out of the Armory. If not, he advised, “Think of the site as only a museum” and let someone else run it. The NPS could take his advice and turn the park over to the Department of Defense: not only the collections, which the Army still apparently regards as its own, but also the federal portion of the site itself. In many ways this would be a logical solution. The Army has repeatedly declined to relinquish the collection: for thirty years it has watched as the NPS, a much smaller agency, shouldered the expense and trouble of housing, marketing, managing, conserving, cataloging, and displaying the Army’s assets, not to mention serving scholars and collectors and maintaining a website. Perhaps it is time for the Army to take responsibility for the collection. In contrast to the first transfer, in 1968, this could be a turnkey operation, delivering a fully functional museum equipped with buildings, grounds, and an expert staff. And with its vast inventory of building complexes, its museums, and its knowledge of firearms, the Army is fully capable of shouldering the responsibility. Moreover, its resources are much greater than those of the NPS: the President’s Budget for 2010 proposes $2.7 billion for the NPS but more than 52 times that, or $142 billion, for the US Army; it seeks $12 billion for Interior but more than 55 times that, or $664 billion, for the Department of Defense. It is at least possible that Defense could invest more heavily in the park than Interior. It certainly could manage the museum.
Futures for Springfield Armory

Other futures are possible. The 2000 Long Range Interpretive Plan points toward one. It envisions comprehensively upgrading the interpretation of Armory Square, with improved markers, an expanded walking tour booklet, and exhibits in the commanding officer’s quarters. The plan even looks beyond Armory Square, proposing tours, an entrance kiosk, and wayside exhibit at the Water Shops. Superintendent Quijano-West has adopted that outward-looking vision for the park, which involves both interpreting the entire historic site and engaging more actively with the surrounding city. These are positive developments, and they are supported by a much-improved relationship with Springfield Technical Community College. At the same time, there was hope by the end of 2008 for greater collaboration between the park and region.

Yet putting the park on a new footing may require nothing less than boldly grasping the nettle of the park’s most fundamental problems: a plethora of guns and a historic site marred by dying buildings. To solve the problem of the campus, an unyielding determination to save the buildings, backed by the full weight of federal authority, might succeed: at any rate it is the one approach that has not yet been tried. To solve the problem of the guns and redeem the park from the controversy that surrounds them, an approach at once less forceful and more imaginative, if equally untried, may be needed.

From the beginning, the Armory has recognized the existence of a special constituency of gun enthusiasts, people who are fascinated by guns, like to handle them, talk about them, admire them. The park set out to serve them on the sensible premise that their enthusiasm made them an important constituency. In the same way, art museums orient themselves towards connoisseurs of prints or eighteenth century French furniture. But there is a difference. Very few people are violently opposed to rococo furniture, whereas many people loath guns and instinctively reject anything, be it a museum exhibit, historic site, or interpretive program that seems to condone them. The problem that art museums must overcome in expanding their audiences is indifference. Gun museums too confront indifference, but unlike art museums they must also overcome distaste. At the Armory, they have had to do so without turning their backs on the collectors and connoisseurs.

More than one superintendent has arrived at the Armory expecting to find “just a gun museum” but has discovered, instead, a surprisingly rich and important story. Doug Lindsay has recounted how, had he designed the permanent exhibit right away, it would have been “wall-to-wall guns”; and how he gradually realized that “the important story... was actually the industrial side, and the role of a national armory in bringing the new nation into a local community”: that role included not only providing a symbol of national unity but also protecting the rights of minority groups, like Irish Catholics in nineteenth century Massachusetts. Steve Beatty made a similar discovery: for him, the important story proved to be the Armory’s impact on industrial manufacturing and on the many consumer goods which Americans (including park visitors) take for granted. For Michael Quijano-West, the discovery was not just the park’s history but also the social utility offered by its site and location: the chance to draw people to concerts and events, to serve the students of a
culturally diverse community college, and even to help propel some young people in an economically depressed city towards a college education.

Each superintendent has glimpsed something bigger and more interesting than the story conveyed by cases full of guns, and each has sought to elevate both the park’s historical significance and its value to society. The themes chosen for emphasis have had much in common. Most obviously, they all divert attention from the guns themselves. Each is a fine theme; each has produced many fine programs and deserves to be further developed. But it seems unlikely that efforts to distract attention from the Armory’s guns will ever rescue the park from them. Perhaps it is time to try another approach: to look squarely at the guns; to acknowledge the strong, complex, and contradictory feelings that people bring to them; to embrace rather than flee the controversies that neither repression nor distraction will end.

In writing this history, I spent many days working in a comfortable corner of the library in the Main Arsenal. I never became entirely accustomed to the presence of so many guns: guns on display, in storage, disassembled for conservation. In addition, almost every book in the library contained pictures of guns. These books raised an interesting question about how to interpret firearms. They almost never showed them in actual use. There were no pictures of the grim battlefields of World War II, of guns being turned on villagers in Viet Nam, of the massacres of My Lai or El Mozote, or for that matter of the French Resistance or the French Revolution. Two kinds of pictures were prevalent. First, technical illustrations which show the guns without any context at all, much as similar technical books illustrate the construction of a clarinet or the internal anatomy of an eye. Second, pictures of guns in the hands of soldiers, perhaps on parade, standing at attention, or posing in a foxhole or a frogman suit. These photographs are staged. Though they seem to show the guns in context, they never show anyone being hurt by them. They present the holder of the gun but not its target, the sender of the bullet but not its recipient.

The Armory’s exhibits present guns in much the same way. This was a conscious choice. A revealing incident occurred in 1990. The new exhibits included some manikins of soldiers holding real guns. The designers had been aware that children and indeed other visitors might tug on the manikins and damage them, but they had decided to include them anyway “as a kind of experiment.” The experiment was not working, and Acting Superintendent Lowenthal asked the region’s chief of interpretation for advice. Lowenthal did not want to withdraw the manikins entirely, for their whole purpose had been to display the weapons in context, which both Lowenthal and the chief interpreter understood to mean in the hands of someone firing them.

Today, the manikins survive, albeit behind Plexiglas (See Endpiece). One can watch a video that presents a continuous stream of images showing how various guns are fired. There are also animated diagrams showing the chain of events that connects the pulling of the trigger to the expulsion of the bullet. There are film clips of costumed marksmen loading and

firing the various guns. But there are no images showing where the bullet goes after it leaves the gun.

This approach imposes certain interpretive limits. To understand them, try the following thought experiment. Picture the soldier represented by the manikin and ask: will his life be more profoundly affected by the gun he is aiming or by the one his adversary is aiming at him? By the bullet he fires or by the bullet fired at him? The significance of the gun appears to increase when its context expands to include its target.

What is the context of a weapon? This question became famously controversial when the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum attempted to display the Enola Gay, the airplane which dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The museum at first planned to accompany the bomber with photographs and artifacts documenting the devastation it caused. Groups representing Air Force veterans protested and a heated public debate ensued. Though large questions about America’s role and image in the world were at stake, the debate turned on a much narrower one: what was the proper context in which to exhibit a weapon? Air Force groups did not deny the effects of the bomb, but they argued that the most important contexts were the goals, values, and sacrifices of the country that sent it, the technological achievements behind the plane that delivered it, and the lives of the pilots who escorted it. The exhibit designers wished to give greater weight to the impact caused by the weapon on its recipients.

In the end, the Smithsonian was forced to abandon its plan. In 1995 the Enola Gay went on display without anything to remind visitors of those impacts: Smithsonian Secretary I. Michael Heyman remarked that “the aircraft speaks for itself in this exhibit....” Of course it did no such thing: it spoke to people in different voices and different ways depending on the contexts which they had brought with them, through reading, watching television, or talking to family members.

If the Enola Gay controversy did not settle the context question, it did politicize it, making it much more difficult to propose alternatives to the user-only model. That is unfortunate, for it limits the significance of the weapons on display and diminishes the ability of museums to speak to the public about them.

The question of context – the Enola Gay question – was raised at Springfield Armory long before the Enola Gay even existed. It was the question the famous American poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow asked when he visited the Armory in 1843. The text of his poem, “The Arsenal at Springfield,” is displayed next to the famous organ of muskets, the subject of Longfellow’s opening stanza:

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This is the arsenal, from floor to ceiling,
Like a huge organ, rise the burnish’d arms;
But from their silent pipes no anthem pealing,
Startles the villages with strange alarms.

The verses convey wonder or awe at the Armory’s might. But later the tone darkens:

I hear even now the infinite fierce chorus,
The cries of agony, the endless groan....

Starting with the weapons themselves, the poem goes on to evoke the consequences of their use, the hellish din of war, the burning of villages, the horror of famine. By the end, the muskets have changed from organ pipes to “accursed instruments.” In closing, Longfellow invites the reader to imagine a different world, one in which war disappears, the Arsenal becomes obsolete, and

...no longer from its brazen portals
The blast of war’s great organ shakes the skies!

The sentiments Longfellow expressed in “The Arsenal at Springfield” were conventional. And that is exactly the point. In 1843 as today, while some observers see ingenuity and beauty in the Armory’s guns, others see human suffering and error. And in a world which continues to make and use weapons, while simultaneously producing pacifists and Nobel peace prizes, the debate over guns will not be silenced. At Springfield, it arises out of the Armory’s own history and lies at the core of the debate over how to interpret its story.

Is Springfield Armory an appropriate site for presenting conflicting views of guns and war? Is the National Park Service an appropriate agency to do so? One answer is that the NPS already manages sites which present all sides of the weapons question: weapons used for righteous rebellion (Revolutionary War battlefields), for national defense and Cold War paranoia (a Minuteman missile silo), to assassinate a great national leader (the Lorraine Motel), to slaughter unarmed Indians (Sand Creek Massacre NHS). The NPS is already immersed in the complexities of public feelings about weapons. The question remains is whether there could be a single site expressly dedicated to fostering public discussion and education – not in the abstract but in the presence of the artifacts themselves.

There could hardly be a better candidate for such a role than Springfield Armory. Longfellow’s poem anchors the human tendency to ask fundamental questions about war and peace, ingenuity and suffering, in the Armory’s own history. It is there in other ways as well. Many people know the Armory supplied the “good” side in the Revolutionary and Civil Wars. But did not the Armory also supply the soldiers who murdered sleeping Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians at Sand Creek? The Armory’s last major shipments of weapons went to the
Vietnam War, still one of the most controversial in US history. In fact, public protests against the war influenced the decision to close the Armory in 1968, while officials of the new gun museum credited popular revulsion against violence with the failure of their fundraising campaign. Moreover, park superintendents and collection managers continued to blame low visitation numbers and indifferent agency support on anti-gun sentiment. Not only is the issue rooted in Springfield’s history, it continues to mark it.

While park managers and interpreters have tried repeatedly (and continue to try) to rescue the Armory from conflicting emotions about guns by shifting attention to other themes – people and process, manufacturing techniques, race and gender issues, jazz festivals and picnics – the issue of weapons refuses to go away. It is the proverbial elephant in the room, never acknowledged yet always present.

Larger questions of guns and violence have occasionally intruded into the Armory’s interpretive discussions. In the workshops that preceded the interpretive plan of 2000, participants argued that interpretive programming at the Armory should acknowledge the role its firearms played in disreputable acts of aggression like the Spanish American War and the destruction of Native peoples. A decade earlier, Joanne Gangi had already grappled with the same problem in developing the park’s new educational programs: “How do you focus a lesson plan on guns,” a reporter paraphrased, “without seeming to glorify weapons of destruction?” Part of the answer seemed to lie in studying “the consequences of these inventions.” Yet the ensuing discussions stopped short of probing the deepest social questions of violence. Instead, students were asked to consider the advantages and disadvantages of various weapons. Though young visitors tended to admire automatic weapons because they are so powerful, educators pointed out the price of increased power was a loss of “control and accuracy” and wasted ammunition.

In other ways too, the park has shied away from confronting deeper questions of aggression and violence. The 2000 Long Range Interpretive Plan provides an example: even though workshop participants emphasized the need to address aggression, none of the plan’s six theme statements took it up. This was consistent with the park’s strategy for building audiences, which was to draw lessons from the guns that were pertinent to the daily lives of ordinary people. Gangi’s lesson plans were also consistent with this strategy, as were programs focusing on African American, Hispanic, and women workers. Rather than explore the moral dimensions of using firearms, the park has chosen to rescue them from their aura of violence and danger by making them as comfortable and familiar as domestic appliances. As of 2009, Superintendent Quijano-West has embarked on a new variant of this established strategy for solving the problem of being “just a gun museum.” “Even if you’re not a gun enthusiast,” he says, “or maybe you don’t like guns at all, there will still be plenty of reasons

331 Pat Cahill, “Students reopen the Book on a Storied Armory,” Union-News, November 7, 1990 (SPAR: Visitor Services Files, fol Education – 5th grade S. S. Unit....).
to enjoy a visit to the Armory.” One hopes he is right. But what if the elephant refuses to leave the room?

Could it be that the propensity of weapons to stir strong emotions is the solution, rather than the problem? Retired curator John McCabe believed that, rather than drawing audiences, the park’s “political correctness” was actually “boring the visitor.” He accused park interpreters of emphasizing the “footnotes” at the expense of the Armory’s main story. McCabe was clearly uncomfortable with multiculturalism, and obviously exhibits on African
Americans and women did not bore some visitors. But it was an important point. The Armory’s mission, he emphasized, was to “make guns to kill people.” By diverting attention from this simple and powerful fact, the park had perhaps diminished the power of its own story.332

What does it mean to make guns to kill people? The question could be endlessly debated. And that is the point. The question echoes from the Organ of Muskets, the manikins, the neat rows of revolvers and shotguns, the Blanchard lathe, from the very Armory itself. It could become the basis for an interpretive experience that touches visitors not merely through their everyday lives but through their identity as citizens. It is likely that strong forces would align themselves against efforts to create such an interpretation: veteran’s groups, armed forces groups, gun enthusiasts, the National Rifle Association, weapons manufacturers, and many politicians might oppose it. And the fate of the Enola Gay reminds us how effective such opposition can be. But the resolution of the Enola Gay controversy is not the only resolution possible, any more than the Smithsonian’s way of raising these questions was the only way to do so. At a forum organized by the NPS to consider the agency’s role in provoking civic reflection, Richard West, founding director of the Smithsonian’s National Museum of the American Indian, remarked that the Smithsonian’s biggest error had been in adopting the “idea of a singular truth,” something “with a capital T” which “various groups were arguing vehemently to gain control of....” West argued that both the Smithsonian and the NPS should be “safe places for unsafe ideas,” able to “incorporate this kind of discourse”333 without setting one of them up as the truth.

Perhaps the Armory could be an institution that provides such a safe place – a safe place not only for unsafe objects but also for unsafe ideas. The point is not to take sides in the debate over the larger meaning of guns but simply to emphasize how tirelessly absorbing it is, and how important. Springfield Armory’s setting and collections could make it an ideal place to foster and inform the debate. If so, the question is simply how to frame it, how to ground it historically, how to make it informative and interesting.

And finally, how to make it helpful to the Armory itself.

332 John McCabe, recorded interview with author, August 17, 2007.

APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION


IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 5, 1970

Mr. Boland (for himself and Mr. Conte) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

A BILL

To authorize the establishment of the Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Massachusetts, and for other purposes.

1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

2. That in order to preserve in public ownership for the benefit and inspiration of the people of the United States the property comprising the historically significant Springfield Armory, commissioned by President Washington in 1794 and, until deactivation in 1963, the oldest manufacturing arsenal in the United States, and the site of the defeat of insurgent farmers in Shays' Rebellion (1786-1787), the Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary") is authorized to accept a donation of not less than
twenty acres of real property, together with improvements
and personal property thereon, which constitute a part of the
historic Springfield Armory property, Springfield, Massachu-
setts, from the city of Springfield or any instrumentality
thereof, for establishment as the Springfield Armory National
Historic Site.

SEC. 2. The Secretary shall establish the Springfield
Armory National Historic Site by publication of a notice to
that effect in the Federal Register when (a) he has accepted
title to the real and personal property described in section 1
of this Act, (b) he has reached a satisfactory agreement
with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, or any agency or
instrumentality thereof, for preservation of historic buildings
and the physical setting of lands not in Federal ownership
which comprised part of the historic Springfield Armory, and
(c) he has reached a satisfactory agreement with the Secre-
tyary of the Army concerning the retention or transfer of the
arms collection and other museum objects at the Armory.
Prior to such establishment and thereafter, the property
acquired for the Springfield Armory National Historic Site
shall be administered by the Secretary in accordance with the

Sec. 3. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 5, 1973
Referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs

AN ACT

To authorize the establishment of the Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Massachusetts, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

That, in order to preserve in public ownership for the benefit and inspiration of the people of the United States the property comprising the historically significant Springfield Armory, commissioned by President Washington in 1794 and, until deactivation in 1968, the oldest manufacturing arsenal in the United States, and the site of the defeat of insurgent farmers in Shays’ Rebellion (1786–1787), the Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter referred to as the “Secretary”) is authorized to acquire by donation such
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real or personal property or interests therein which constitute a part of, or are located upon, the historic Springfield Armory property, Springfield, Massachusetts, as in his judgment will constitute an administrable unit, for establishment as the Springfield Armory National Historic Site.

Sec. 2. The Secretary shall establish the Springfield Armory National Historic Site by publication of a notice to that effect in the Federal Register when (a) he has accepted title to the real and personal property described in section 1 of this Act, (b) he has reached a satisfactory agreement with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, for preservation of historic buildings and the physical setting of lands not in Federal ownership which comprised part of the historic Springfield Armory, and (c) he has reached a satisfactory agreement with the Secretary of the Army concerning the retention or transfer of the arms collection and other museum objects at the Armory.

Prior to such establishment and thereafter, the property acquired for the Springfield Armory National Historic Site shall be administered by the Secretary in accordance with the Act of August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535; 16 U.S.C. 1, 2-4),
3

1 as amended and supplemented, and the Act of August 21,
2 1935 (49 Stat. 666; 16 U.S.C. 461 et seq.).

3 Sec. 3. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated
4 not to exceed $5,365,000 for development of the historic site.


Attest: FRANCIS R. VALEO,

Secretary.
Appendix A


Public Law 93-486
93rd Congress, H.R. 13157
October 26, 1974

An Act

To provide for the establishment of the Clara Barton National Historic Site, Maryland; John Day Fossil Beds National Monument, Oregon; Knife River Indian Villages National Historic Site, North Dakota; Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Massachusetts; Tuskegee Institute National Historic Site, Alabama; Martin Van Buren National Historic Site, New York; and Sewall-Belmont House National Historic Site, Washington, District of Columbia; and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE I

Sec. 101. (a) Unless otherwise provided hereafter, the Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter referred to as the “Secretary”) is authorized to acquire by purchase with donated or appropriated funds, donation, exchange, or by transfer from another Federal agency such lands and interests in lands as hereafter provided for establishment as units of the national park system, as follows:

(1) for establishment as the Clara Barton National Historic Site, Maryland, those lands depicted on the map entitled “Boundary Map, Clara Barton National Historic Site, Maryland”, numbered NHS-CLBA 90,001 and dated February 1974, which shall include the land and improvements occupied by Clara Barton, founder of the American Red Cross located at 5801 Oxford Road, Glen Echo, Maryland: Provided, That the above-mentioned land and improvements may be acquired only by donation: And provided further, That the donation of any privately owned lands within the historic site may not be accepted unless and until the property is vacant;

(2) for establishment as the John Day Fossil Beds National Monument, Oregon, those lands depicted on the map entitled “Boundary Map, John Day Fossil Beds National Monument”, numbered NM-JDFB-20,014-A and dated June 1971: Provided, That the national monument shall not be established unless and until the State of Oregon donates or agrees to donate the Thomas Condon-John Day Fossil Beds, Clarno, and Painted Hills State Parks: Provided further, That the Secretary shall not acquire a fee title interest to more than one thousand acres of privately owned lands except by donation or exchange: Provided further, That the Secretary shall designate the principal visitor center as the “Thomas Condon Visitor Center”;

(3) for establishment as the Knife River Indian Villages National Historic Site, North Dakota, those lands depicted on the map entitled “Boundary Map, Knife River Indian Villages National Historic Site, North Dakota”, numbered 468-30,012 and dated July 1970;

(4) for establishment as the Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Massachusetts, those lands depicted on the map entitled “Boundary Map, Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Massachusetts”, numbered NHS-SPAR-91,003 and dated January 1974, the oldest manufacturing arsenal in the United States: Provided, That the historic site shall not be established unless an agreement is executed which will assure the historical integrity of the site and until such lands as are needed for the historic site are donated for this purpose;
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Publication in the Federal Register.

Notices to congressional committees.

Administration.

Appropriation.

Tuskegee Institute National Historic Site, N. Y.
16 USC 461 note.

Tuskegee Institute National Historic Site, Ala.
16 USC 461 note.

(5) for establishment as the Tuskegee Institute National Historic Site, Alabama, those lands depicted on the map entitled "Boundary Map, Tuskegee Institute National Historic Site, Alabama" numbered NHS-TI 20,000-C and dated September 1973, which shall include the home of Booker T. Washington, the Carver Museum, and an ante-bellum property adjacent to the campus of Tuskegee Institute, known as Grey Columns; and

(8) for establishment as the Martin Van Buren National Historic Site, New York, those lands depicted on the map entitled "Boundary Map, Martin Van Buren National Historic Site, New York," numbered NHS-MAVA-91,001 and dated January 1974, which shall include the home of Martin Van Buren, eighth President of the United States.

(b) The Secretary may also acquire personal property associated with the areas referred to in subsection (a) of this section. Lands and interests therein owned by a State or any political subdivision thereof which are acquired for the purposes of subsection (a) of this section may be acquired only by donation.

Sec. 102. (a) When the Secretary determines that an adequate interest in lands has been acquired to constitute an administrable unit for each of the areas described in section 1 of this Act, he may, after notifying the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs of the United States Congress of his intention to do so at least fourteen days in advance, declare the establishment of such unit by publication of a notice to that effect in the Federal Register. Such notice shall contain a map or other description of the boundaries of the unit, together with an explanation of the interests acquired and the costs incident thereto.

The Secretary may refrain from acquiring property for establishment of any unit authorized by this Act where, in his judgment, satisfactory agreements or donations with respect to properties which are needed for the protection and administration of a particular unit have not been consummated with the owners of such properties.

(b) Pending the establishment of each unit and, thereafter, the Secretary shall administer the property acquired pursuant to this Act in accordance with the provisions of the Act of August 28, 1916 (39 Stat. 535), as amended and supplemented, and, to the extent applicable, the provisions of the Act of August 21, 1935 (49 Stat. 666), as amended.

Sec. 103. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary is authorized to construct roads on real property in non-Federal ownership within the boundaries of the Tuskegee Institute National Historic Site. Any roads so constructed shall be controlled and maintained by the owners of the real property.

Sec. 104. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act, not to exceed, however, the following:

(a) Clara Barton National Historic Site, $312,000 for acquisition of lands and interests in lands and for development;

(b) John Day Fossil Beds National Monument, $400,000 for the acquisition of lands and interests in lands and $4,433,200 for development;

(c) Knife River Indian Villages National Historic Site, $690,000 for the acquisition of lands and interests in lands and $2,265,000 for development;

(d) Springfield Armory National Historic Site, $3,200,000 for development;
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(e) Tuskegee Institute National Historic Site, $125,000 for the acquisition of lands and interests in lands and $2,722,000 for development; and
(f) Martin Van Buren National Historic Site, $213,000 for acquisition of lands and interests in lands and $2,737,000 for development.

TITLE II

Sec. 201. In order to preserve for the benefit and inspiration of the people of the United States as a national historic site, the Sewall-Belmont House within the District of Columbia, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to enter into a cooperative agreement to assist in the preservation and interpretation of such house.

Sec. 202. The property subject to cooperative agreement pursuant to section 101 of this Act is hereby designated as the “Sewall-Belmont House National Historic Site”.

Sec. 203. The cooperative agreement shall contain, but shall not be limited to, provisions that the Secretary, through the National Park Service, shall have right of access at all reasonable times to all public portions of the property covered by such agreement for the purpose of conducting visitors through such property and interpreting it to the public, that no changes or alterations shall be made in such property except by mutual agreement between the Secretary and the other parties to such agreement. The agreement may contain specific provisions which outline in detail the extent of the participation by the Secretary in the restoration, preservation, and maintenance of the historic site.

Sec. 204. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, but not to exceed $500,000.

Approved October 26, 1974.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

HOUSE REPORT No. 93-1285 (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs)
SENATE REPORT No. 93-1233 (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs)
Oct. 8, considered and passed Senate, amended.
Oct. 16, House concurred in Senate amendments.
APPENDIX B. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS AND MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING

1. AGREEMENT WITH MASSACHUSETTS: 1978

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 27th day of March, 1978, between the United States of America, acting by and through the Secretary of the Interior by the Regional Director, North Atlantic Region, National Park Service (hereinafter referred to as the "Service") and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, acting by and through the President, Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges (hereinafter referred to as the "Board").

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the Springfield Armory in Springfield, Massachusetts has played an important role in the military and industrial history of the Nation; and

WHEREAS, it is a national policy to preserve for public use historic sites, buildings and objects of national significance and benefit to the people of the United States; and

WHEREAS, in furtherance of that policy and pursuant to the provisions of the Act of October 26, 1974, 88 Stat. 1461, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to establish as a unit of the National Park System, the Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Massachusetts (hereinafter referred to as the "national historic site"); and

WHEREAS, a portion of the authorized national historic site is owned by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and administered by the Board through and as a part of the Springfield Technical Community College (hereinafter referred to as the "College"), and will remain in commonwealth ownership; and

WHEREAS, the Service recognizes the Board's interest in the continued use of its portion of the national historic site for educational purposes, and the Board recognizes the Service's interest in the preservation of the Springfield Armory, its parade ground and historic structures, for public benefit and inspiration, and both are endeavoring to balance and accommodate these interests; and

WHEREAS, the Act of October 26, 1974, supra, provides that the national historic site shall not be established unless an agreement is executed which will assure the historical integrity of the site and until such lands as are needed for the national historic site are donated for that purpose;

ARTICLE I. The Service and the Board mutually agree that the authorized national historic site comprises an area bounded on the north by Pearl Street, on the east by Federal Street, on the south by State Street and on the west by Byers Street, and contains 55 acres, more or less, as depicted on the map entitled "Boundary Map, Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Springfield, Massachusetts," which is attached to and made a part of this agreement as Attachment A. It is intended that the area comprising the national historic site shall consist of two parts, with one part under the administrative jurisdiction of the Service and the other part under the administrative jurisdiction of the Board. It is intended that the part to be under the Service's jurisdiction shall consist of 1) approximately 18.35 acres of land owned by the City of Springfield, which is to be conveyed and donated in fee by the City to the United States and 2) a strip of land containing approximately 1.97 acres designated as Parcel A and a strip of land of approximately the same acreage designated as Parcel B on the map attached hereto as Attachment B, owned by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and utilized in conjunction with the College, which are to be conveyed and donated to the United States in accordance with Article II, paragraph f, of this agreement. The part under the Board's jurisdiction shall consist of approximately 34.61 acres of land, which will remain in commonwealth ownership, and shall constitute a "Preservation Control Area," wherein the Board, in cooperation with the Service and other appropriate federal and commonwealth agencies, will preserve the appearance of the exterior of the historic structures and of the historic Springfield Armory parade ground (hereinafter referred to as the "parade ground"). Wherever it appears in this agreement, the term "historic structures" shall mean those structures identified on the National Register of Historic Places Nomination Form, completed 12/2/74, by the Service's Historic Site survey as "major elements in the Armory Square Complex" including, but not limited to, Building 27 identified therein. The Service and the Board agree that it is the intent and purpose of this agreement to provide for the Board's administration of the Preservation Control Area and preservation of the historical integrity of that portion of the national historic site included therein. The boundaries of the Preservation Control Area are those depicted on the map attached to and made a part of this agreement as Attachment C.

ARTICLE II. The Board for itself, its subsidiaries, its successors, and its assigns agrees:

a. That the Preservation Control Area will be open to the public in accordance with a time schedule mutually agreed upon by the Board and the Service.
b. That in accordance with the Act of October 26, 1974, supra, authorizing the establishment of the national historic site, and its legislative history, including and consistent with the exceptions expressed therein (See Hearings on H.R. 329 before the Subcomm. on National Parks and Recreation of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (1973), appended as Attachment D.), it will undertake 1) no construction, alteration, or repair that will change the historical integrity, including but not limited to the qualities of scale, mass, design, spacial arrangement, detail and character, of the parade ground or of the exterior of the historic structures that front upon it, and 2) no construction, alteration, or repair that will change the historic appearance of the exterior of any of the other historic structures within the Preservation Control Area. Any construction, alteration, or repair proposed by the Board within the Preservation Control Area will be subject to the concurrence of the Service following review of its impact on the parade ground and to the terms contained in, or as may hereinafter be added to or amended in, the deed between the United States of America acting by and through the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, acting by and through the President, Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges, executed April 26, 1968, conveying to the commonwealth the lands constituting the Preservation Control Area, supra, and the structures therein. As a part of this review process, the Service will base its concurrence in the construction or alteration of structures behind the buildings immediately fronting on the northwest side of the parade ground on an elevation that does not exceed, when viewed from any point within the parade ground and from the lands immediately adjacent to its southwestern side, the height of the buildings that front immediately on the northwest side. The Service shall have 45 days from the receipt of a proposal for construction, alteration, or repair in which to notify the Board of its concurrence or non-concurrence in such proposal or such additional time as is needed to complete any procedures required by 36 CFR, Part 800, the regulations implementing Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. If additional time is required the Service will notify the Board within the previously identified 45 days of the need for additional time. The Service shall use its best effort to complete any procedures which the Service is required to perform in complying with the requirements of 36 CFR Part 800. It is the intent of the parties to this agreement that the terms and promises contained in this paragraph shall apply only to the shaded area depicted on the map attached hereto as Attachment C.

c. That it will sponsor or permit no use of the Preservation Control Area that is inconsistent with the preservation of its historic structures and the parade ground and their setting and visual integrity, and with public visitation to and enjoyment of the area. Prior to sponsoring or permitting any major, unordinary, or novel use of the Preservation Control Area, the Board will give the Service 3 days notice.

d. That it will retain Building 10 (commonly known as the Master Armorer's Quarters) until July 1, 1979, in order to afford the Service the opportunity to remove and relocate the building to a site within the national historic site outside the Preservation Control Area. Thereafter, should the Board consider demolition
of Building 10 as necessary for its development program, the Board shall 1) give the Service advance notice of its intent to demolish the building as far in advance as possible, but at least 180 days before commencing demolition; and 2) fulfill any requirements in or hereinafter made by amendment in or addendum to the deed between the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, executed April 26, 1968, supra, prior to commencing demolition.

e. That it shall administer the area under its jurisdiction in such a manner as to ensure that all visitors to the national historic site shall be guaranteed the protection of all rights established under the Constitution of the United States.

f. That it shall, subject to a written release by the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare of the restrictions contained in the deed between the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, executed April 26, 1968, supra, which release shall be conditioned upon Parcels A and B, supra, being conveyed and donated by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to the United States for the purpose of the Act of October 26, 1974, supra, and the concurrence of any other appropriate federal agencies, and subject to the enactment and approval of any necessary commonwealth enabling legislation, convey and donate in fee simple to the United States acting by and through the Service, Parcel A and Parcel B, as described and depicted in Attachment B, for access purposes, as hereinafter more fully described in Article III, paragraph a, of this agreement. The Board will initiate immediate action to have the legislature of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts pass any legislation necessary to convey and donate Parcel A and Parcel B to the United States. This action will not hinder putting this agreement into effect.

g. That the duly authorized representatives of the United States Department of the Interior and the Service shall have access to the Preservation Control Area and the historic structures therein at all reasonable times for the purpose of inspecting to ensure compliance with the provisions of this agreement.

h. That it will cooperate with the Service and other appropriate agencies in fulfilling any requirements necessary for compliance with section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 917, 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1970), as those requirements apply to any structures, lands, or historic qualities within the Preservation Control Area.

ARTICLE III. The Service agrees, subject to the availability of appropriated funds, as follows:

a. That the donation of Parcel B for access purposes shall be subject to the condition that the road constructed on said Parcel B will be closed, in accordance with the provisions discussed below, to all vehicular traffic except administrative, maintenance and emergency vehicles of the Service and its contractors, and that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts may reserve in its deed of donation a perpetual easement and right-of-way to the Board for the use of its administrative, maintenance and emergency vehicles, and those of its contractors. The Service...
agrees to allow the road through Parcel B to remain open for use by the general public until December 31, 1980, so that the Board can study traffic circulation in the vicinity of the parade ground and devise another pattern of traffic flow. If the Board can accomplish a mutually acceptable revised traffic circulation system before December 31, 1980, the road may be closed for such public use at an earlier date to open the way for a more timely restoration of the historic scene. If the Board has not so revised the traffic and circulation system by December 31, 1980, the Service may provide advice and technical assistance to accomplish the above and may permit the road through Parcel B to remain open for use by the general public for such period as is necessary to revise such system, which period shall not exceed five calendar years.

b. That it will cooperate with the Board in the preservation of the Preservation Control Area by providing technical advice and assistance and will cooperate with the Board in all appropriate and mutually agreeable ways in accomplishing the purposes of the national historic site.

c. That it will join with the Board in seeking a common solution to the need for student, staff, and national historic site visitor parking, including consideration of a parking structure designed to conform with the requirements and intent of Article II, paragraph b, of this agreement.

d. That it will consider entering, subject to federal procurement statutes and regulations, into a supplemental agreement with the Board or the College relating to the payment by the Service of its fair share of the costs of utility service furnished by the Board or the College to those structures situated in the federally owned portion of the national historic site. Such fair share may include costs of maintenance and repair of that portion of the utility system situated within the federally owned portion of the national historic site.

e. That it will enter into discussions with the Board or the College regarding a mutually satisfactory agreement whereby the Service will purchase, subject to federal procurement statutes and regulations, from either the Board or the College maintenance service for the federally owned lands within the national historic site, including such services as seeding and mowing the lawn, trees, shrub and plant care, and snow removal.

ARTICLE IV. Subject to the availability of appropriated funds, the Service and the Board will be responsible for maintaining the historic iron fence within their respective portions of the national historic site and will determine cooperatively standards and guidelines appropriate for treatment of the historic fabric of the fence by which both will perform their maintenance.

ARTICLE V. No member of, or delegate to Congress or Resident Commissioner, shall be admitted to any share or part of this agreement or to any benefit that may arise therefrom, but this restriction will not be construed to extend to this agreement if made with a corporation or company for its general benefit.

ARTICLE VII. As the promises and obligations contained herein are peculiar and unique, and, further, are not susceptible to monetary valuation, the Service may, in the event by the Board of a breach of any of the terms and conditions herein, bring an action for specific performance thereof.

ARTICLE VIII. This agreement shall continue in force and in effect indefinitely unless terminated 1) by one year's written notice by either party or 2) by mutual consent. In the event of termination, both parties shall cooperate in fulfilling any requirements necessary for compliance with section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, supra.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, on the 21st day of February, 1978, the parties hereto have caused this agreement to be signed, sealed, and delivered by their duly authorized officers respectively.

Signed, sealed, and delivered in the presence of:

[Signature]

United States of America
Acting by and through the Secretary of the Interior

Regional Director
North Atlantic Region
National Park Service

Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Acting by and through the President, Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges

Attorney General
Commonwealth of Massachusetts

By [Signature]
2. **MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH MASSACHUSETTS: 1993**

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**MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING**

**BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

**AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS**

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THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 1st day of March, 1993, between the United States of America, acting by and through the Secretary of the Interior by the Regional Director, North Atlantic Region, National Park Service (hereinafter referred to as the "Service"), and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by its Division of Capital Planning and Operations, on behalf of Springfield Technical Community College, acting under authority granted by the Board of Regents of Higher Education (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") pursuant to Sections 4 and 5(k) of Chapter 15A of the general Laws, and the Executive Director Massachusetts Historical Commission (State Historic Preservation Officer).

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the Springfield Armory in Springfield, Massachusetts, has played an important role in the military and industrial history of the nation; and

WHEREAS, it is a national policy to preserve for public use historic sites, buildings, and objects of national significance and benefit to the people of the United States; and

WHEREAS, in furtherance of that policy and pursuant to the provisions of the Act of October 26, 1974, (88 Stat. 1461), the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to establish as a unit of the National Park System, the Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Massachusetts (hereinafter referred to as the "national historic site"); and

WHEREAS, a portion of the authorized national historic site is owned by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and administered by the Board through and as a part of the Springfield Technical Community College (hereinafter referred to as the "College"), and will remain in commonwealth ownership; and

WHEREAS, the Service recognizes the Board’s interest in the continued use of its portion of the national historic site for educational purposes, and the Board recognizes the Service’s interest in the preservation of the Springfield Armory, its Green (parade ground), and historic structures, for public benefit and inspiration, and both are endeavoring to balance and accommodate these interests;


ARTICLE I. The Service and The Board mutually agree that the authorized national historic site comprises an area bounded on the north by Pearl Street,
on the east by Federal Street, on the south by State Street, and on the west by Eyers Street, and contains 55 acres, more or less, as depicted on the map entitled "Boundary Map, Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Springfield, Massachusetts," which is attached to and made a part of this agreement as Attachment A. It is intended that the area comprising the national historic site shall consist of two parts, with one part under the administrative jurisdiction of the Service and the other part under the administrative jurisdiction of the Board. The part to be under the Service's jurisdiction shall consist of
1) approximately 18.35 acres of land presently owned by the United States, and
2) a strip of land containing approximately 1.97 acres designated as Tract 9101-02 on the map attached hereto as Attachment B, formerly owned by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and utilized in conjunction with the College, which has been conveyed and donated to the United States. The part under the Board's jurisdiction shall consist of approximately 34.61 acres of land, which will remain in commonwealth ownership, and shall constitute a "Preservation Control Area," wherein the Board, in cooperation with the Service and other appropriate federal and commonwealth agencies, will preserve the appearance of the exterior of the historic structures and of the historic Springfield Armory Green.

Wherever it appears in this agreement, the term "historic structures" shall mean those structures identified on the National Register of Historic Places Nomination Form, completed 12/02/74, by the Service's Historic Site survey as "major elements in the Armory Square Complex." The Service and the Board agree that it is the intent and purpose of this agreement to provide for the Board's administration of the Preservation Control Area and preservation of the historical integrity of that portion of the national historic site included therein. The boundaries of the Preservation Control Area are those depicted on the map attached to and made a part of this agreement as Attachment C.

ARTICLE II. The Board for itself, its subsidiaries, its successors, and its assigns agrees:

a. That the Preservation Control Area will be open to the public in accordance with the time schedule mutually agreed upon by the board and the Service.

b. That in accordance with the Act of October 26, 1976, supra, authorizing the establishment of the national historic site, and its legislative history, including and consistent with the exceptions expressed therein (See Hearings on H.R. 329 before the Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong. 1st Sess. (1973)), it recognizes three levels of building preservation.

Level 1. Building treatment under this category will be limited to preservation maintenance as defined by the Secretary of the Interior. Every effort will be made to stabilize and maintain the historic exterior appearance of those buildings within this category; NPS will provide advice and consultation on suitable materials and methods of repair and maintenance. Changes necessary for the adaptive use of these buildings will not affect their exterior appearance. Preservation extends to all facades of the buildings concerned. Buildings included in Level 1 are: 5 and 5, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, and the remnant of 27. The entire Green is also included in this category. It shall be the policy of the Board to maintain the present appearance of the Green. Specifically, this is interpreted as requiring the replacement of plantings as they die, not necessarily
in kind, but in general type; that is, deciduous for deciduous and evergreen for evergreen. NPS will provide advice and consultation.

**Level 2:** Building treatment under this category will allow limited exterior alterations but changes should not affect the overall appearance of the structure in terms of size, mass, and spatial arrangement. Changes necessitated by adaptive use may affect the exterior of these structures to a limited degree. Buildings included in this category include all remaining buildings on the National Register of Historic Places Nomination Form (December 2, 1974); specifically, Buildings 7, 8, 9, 10, 19.

**Level 3:** Building treatment under this category would permit more extensive exterior modifications as indicated by the adaptive use of the structure. Such alterations will, however, recognize the integrity of the historic scene. Buildings included in this category include all buildings in the Preservation Control Area not specifically listed in the National Register of Historic Places Nomination Form.

Any construction, alteration, or repair proposed by the Board within the Preservation Control Area will be subject to the concurrence of the Massachusetts State Historic Preservation Office following its review of the impact on the Green, to the Procedures of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (36 CFR Part 800), to the Procedures to Protect the Historic and Archeological Properties of the Commonwealth (950 CMR 71), and to the terms contained in, or as hereinafter be added to or amended in, the deed between the United States of America acting by and through the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, acting by and through the President, Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges, executed April 26, 1968, conveying to the commonwealth the lands constituting the Preservation Control Area, *supra*, and the structures therein. As a part of this review process, the Massachusetts State Historic Preservation Office will base its review of proposed new construction or alteration of structures behind the buildings immediately fronting on the northwest side of the Green on an elevation that does not exceed, when viewed from any point within the Green and from the lands immediately adjacent to its southwestern side, the height of the buildings that front immediately on the northwest side. The Massachusetts State Historic Preservation Office shall review any request for construction, alteration, or repair of structures within the Preservation Control Area within the time limits specified in 36 CFR Part 800. The Service shall provide technical and professional assistance to the College and shall expedite legislative compliance mandates by serving as liaison between the College and the Massachusetts State Historic Preservation Office. It is the intent of the parties to this agreement that the terms and promises contained in this paragraph shall apply only to the shaded area depicted on the map attached hereto as Attachment C.

c. That prior to sponsoring or permitting any major, unordinary, or novel use of the Preservation Control Area, it will give the Service three days’ notice so that the parking needs of site visitors can be anticipated.

d. That the duly authorized representatives of the United States Department of the Interior and the Service shall have access to the Preservation Control Area and the historic structures therein at all reasonable times for the purpose of inspecting to insure compliance with the provisions of this agreement.
Appendix B

4.

e. That it will cooperate with the U.S. Department of Education and the
Service and other appropriate agencies in fulfilling any requirements necessary
for compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966,
as amended, (80 Stat. 917, 16 U.S.C. § 470f, 1970), as those requirements apply to
any structures, lands, or historic qualities within the Preservation Control Area.

ARTICLE III. The Service agrees, subject to the availability of appropriated
funds, as follows:

a. The present system of access roadways shall be continued, and the right
of mutual access of both parties on those roadways shall be assured. The parties
shall provide mutual notification of any changes in the usual procedures of
opening or closing gates under their control which permit access to or egress from
the site.

b. That it will cooperate with the Board in the preservation of the
Preservation Control Area by providing technical advice and assistance and will
cooperate with the Board in all appropriate and mutually agreeable ways in
accomplishing the purposes of the national historic site.

c. The Service will share the site’s water distribution system and reimburse
the College at the annual minimum rate billed by the City of Springfield Water
Department for the 8-inch water meter vault on the State Street property.

ARTICLE IV: Subject to the availability of appropriated funds, the Service
and the Board will be responsible for maintaining the historic iron fence within
their respective portions of the national historic site and will determine
cooperatively standards and guidelines appropriate for treatment of the historic
fabric of the fence by which both will perform their maintenance. The Service
shall provide to the Board, at cost, replacement components manufactured for the
stabilization of the fence.

ARTICLE V. No member of, or delegate to, Congress or Resident Commissioner,
shall be admitted to any share or part of this agreement or to any benefit that
may arise therefrom, but this restriction will not be construed to extend to this
agreement if made with a corporation or company for its general benefit.

ARTICLE VI. The Board will comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
pursuant thereto, and Executive Order No. 11246, September 24, 1965, (30 F. R.
12319, as amended), and the regulations issued pursuant thereto.

ARTICLE VII. As the promises and obligations contained herein are peculiar
and unique, and further, are not susceptible to monetary valuation, the Service
may, in the event by the Board of a breach of any of the terms and conditions
herein, bring an action for specific performance thereof.

ARTICLE VIII. The agreement shall continue in force and in effect for a
period of five years unless terminated: 1) by one year’s written notice by either
party, or 2) by mutual consent. In the event of termination, both parties shall
cooperate in fulfilling any requirements necessary for compliance with Section 106
of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended, supra. The
agreement may be renewed for additional five-year periods five years from the
effective date of the agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, on the 1st day of March, 1993, at ________________, the parties hereto have caused this agreement to be signed, sealed, and delivered by their duly authorized officers respectively.

Witnessed by: United States of America
Acting by and through the Secretary of the Interior
By ________________
Regional Director
North Atlantic Region
National Park Service

Witnessed by: Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Division of Capital Planning and Operations
By ________________
Kevin A. Smith, Commissioner

Witnessed by: Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Acting by and through the Executive Director,
Massachusetts Historical Commission
State Historic Preservation Officer
By ________________
Judith B. McDonough

Witnessed by: Springfield Technical Community College
Acting by and through the Chairman,
Springfield Technical Community College Board of Trustees
By ________________

Approved as to form and authority by Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts

_________________________
Special Assistant Attorney General
3. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH MASSACHUSETTS: 1999

Effective

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 31st day of August, 1998,
between the United States of America, acting by and through the Secretary of the Interior by
the Regional Director, North Atlantic Region, National Park Service (hereinafter referred to as
the "Service"), and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by its Division of Capital Asset
Management and on behalf of Springfield Technical Community College, acting under
authority granted by the Board of Higher Education (hereinafter referred to as the "Board")
pursuant to Sections 4 and 5 (k) of Chapter 15A of the general Laws, and the Executive
Director Massachusetts Historical Commission (State Historic Preservation Officer).

WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the Springfield Armory in Springfield, Massachusetts, has played an
important role in the military and industrial history of the nation; and

WHEREAS, it is a national policy to preserve for public use historic sites, buildings,
and objects of national significance and benefit to the people of the United States; and

WHEREAS, in furtherance of that policy and pursuant to the provisions of the Act of
October 26, 1974, (88 Stat. 1461), the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to establish as a
unit of the National Park System, the Springfield Armory National Historic Site,
Massachusetts (hereinafter referred to as the "national historic site"); and

WHEREAS, a portion of the authorized national historic site is owned by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and administered by the Board through and as a part of the
Springfield Technical Community College (hereinafter referred to as the "College"), and will
remain in Commonwealth ownership and

WHEREAS, the Service recognizes the Board’s interest in the continued use of its
portion of the national historic site for educational purposes, and the Board recognizes the
Service’s interest in the preservation of the Springfield Armory, its Green (parade ground), and
historic structures, for public benefit and inspiration, and both are endeavoring to balance and
accommodate these interests;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of and pursuant to the provisions of section 101 (a) (4) of the Act of October 26, 1974; supra, the Historic Sites Act of 1935, (49 Stat. 666, 16 U.S.C. s 461-467, 1970), and section 2 of the Act of August 18, 1970, (84 Stat. 826), amending the Act of August 8, 1953, (67 Stat. 496, 16 U. S. C. s 1c, 1970), the Service and the Board do mutually covenant and agree as follows:

ARTICLE I. The Service and The Board mutually agree that the authorized national historic site comprises an area bounded on the north by Pearl Street, on the east by Federal Street, on the south by State Street, and on the west by Byers Street, and contains 55 acres, more or less, as depicted on the map entitled “Boundary Map, Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Springfield, Massachusetts,” which is attached to and made a part of this agreement as Attachment A. It is intended that the area comprising the national historic site shall consist of two parts, with one part under the administrative jurisdiction of the Service and the other part under the administrative jurisdiction of the Board. The part to be under the Service’s jurisdiction shall consist of

1) approximately 18.35 acres of land presently owned by the United States, and
2) a strip of land containing approximately 1.97 acres designated as Tract #101-02 on the map attached hereto as Attachment B, formerly owned by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and utilized in conjunction with the College, which has been conveyed and donated to the United States. The part under the Board’s jurisdiction shall consist of approximately 34.61 acres of land, which will remain in Commonwealth ownership, and shall constitute a “Preservation Control Area,” wherein the Board, in cooperation with the Service and other appropriate federal and commonwealth agencies, will preserve the appearance of the exterior of the historic structures and of the historic Springfield Armory Green.

Wherever it appears in this agreement, the term “historic structures” shall mean those structures identified on the National Register of Historic Places Nomination Form, completed 12/02/74, by the Service’s Historic Site survey as “major elements in the Armory Square Complex.” The Service and the Board agree that it is the intent and purpose of this agreement to provide for the Board’s administration of the Preservation Control Area and preservation of the historical integrity of that portion of the national historic site included therein. The boundaries of the Preservation Control Area are those depicted on the map attached to and made a part of this agreement as Attachment C.

ARTICLE II. The Board for itself, its subsidiaries, its successors, and its assigns agrees:

a. That the Preservation Control Area will be open to the public in accordance with the time schedule mutually agreed upon by the Board and the Service.

b. That in accordance with Act of October 26, 1974, supra, authorizing the establishment of the national historic site, and its legislative history, including and consistent with the exceptions expressed therein (See Hearings on H.R. 329 before the Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation of the House Committee on Interior and
Appendix B

Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong. 1st Sess. (1973), it recognizes three levels of building preservation.

Level 1: Building treatment under this category will be limited to preservation maintenance as defined by the Secretary of the Interior. Every effort will be made to stabilize and maintain the historic exterior appearance of those buildings within this category; NPS will provide advice and consultation on suitable materials and methods of repair and maintenance. Changes necessary for the adaptive use of these buildings will not affect their exterior appearance. Preservation extends to all facades of the buildings concerned. Buildings included in Level 1 are: 5 and 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, and the remnant of 27. The entire Green is also included in this category. It shall be the policy of the Board to maintain the present appearance of the Green. Specifically, this is interpreted as requiring the replacement of plantings as they die, not necessarily in kind, but in general type; that is, deciduous for deciduous and evergreen for evergreen. NPS will provide advice and consultation.

Level 2: Building treatment under this category will allow limited exterior alterations but changes should not affect the overall appearance of the structure in terms of size, mass, and spatial arrangement. Changes necessitated by adaptive use may affect the exterior of these structures to a limited degree. Buildings included in this category include all remaining buildings on the National Register of Historic Places Nomination Form (December 2, 1994); specifically, Buildings 7, 8, 9, 10, 19.

Level 3: Building treatment under this category would permit more extensive exterior modifications as indicated by the adaptive use of the structure. Such alterations will, however, recognize the integrity of the historic scene. Buildings included in this category include all buildings in the Preservation Control Area not specifically listed in the National register of Historic Places Nomination Form.

Any construction, alteration, or repair proposed by the Board within the Preservation Control Area will be subject to the concurrence of the Massachusetts State Historic Preservation Office following its review of the impact on the Green, to the Procedures of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (36 CFR Part 800), to the Procedures to Protect the Historic and Archeological Properties of the Commonwealth (950 CMR 71), and to the terms contained in, or as hereinafter be added to or amended in, the deed between the United States of America acting by and through the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, acting by and through the President, Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges, executed April 26, 1968, conveying to the commonwealth the lands constituting the Preservation Control Area, supra, and the structures therein. As a part of this review process, the Massachusetts State Historic Preservation Office will base its review of proposed new construction or alteration of structures behind the buildings immediately fronting on the northwest side of the Green on an elevation that does not exceed, when viewed from any point within the Green and from the lands immediately adjacent to its southwestern side, the height of the buildings that front immediately on the northwest side.
The Massachusetts State Historic Preservation Office shall review a request for construction, alteration, or repair of structures within the Preservation Control Area within the time limits specified in 36 CFR Part 800. The Service shall provide technical and professional assistance to the College and shall expedite legislative compliance mandates by serving as liaison between the College and the Massachusetts State Historic Preservation Office. It is the intent of the parties to this agreement that the terms and promises contained in this paragraph shall apply only to the shaded area depicted on the map attached hereto as Attachment C.

c. That prior to sponsoring or permitting any major, unordinary, or novel use of the Preservation Control Area, it will give the Service three days notice so that the parking needs of site visitors can be anticipated.

d. That the duly authorized representatives of the United States Department of the Interior and the Service shall have access to the Preservation Control Area and the historic structures therein at all reasonable times for the purpose of inspecting to insure compliance with the provisions of this agreement.

e. That it will cooperate with the U.S. Department of Education and the Service and other appropriate agencies in fulfilling any requirements necessary for compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended, (80 Stat. 917, 16 U.S.C. 8 470f, 1970), as those requirements apply to any structures lands, or historic qualities within the Preservation Control Area.

ARTICLE III. The Service agrees, subject to the availability of appropriated funds, as follows:

a. The present system of access roadways shall be continued, and the right of mutual access of both parties on those roadways shall be assured. The parties shall provide mutual notification of any changes in the usual procedures of opening or closing gates under their control which permit access to or egress from the site.

b. That it will cooperate with the Board in the preservation of the Preservation Control Area by providing technical advice and assistance and will cooperate with the Board in all appropriate and mutually agreeable ways in accomplishing the purposes of the national historic site.

c. The Service will share the site’s water distribution system and reimburse the College at the annual minimum rate billed by the City of Springfield Water Department for the 8-inch water meter vault on the State Street property.

ARTICLE IV: Subject to the availability of appropriated funds, the Service and the Board will be responsible for maintaining the historic iron fence within their respective portions of the national historic site and will determine cooperatively standards and guidelines appropriate for the treatment of the historic fabric of the fence by which
both will perform their maintenance. The Service shall provide to the Board, at cost, replacement components manufactured for the stabilization of the fence.

ARTICLE V. No member of, or delegate to, Congress or Resident Commissioner, shall be admitted to any share or part of this agreement or to any benefit that may arise therefrom, but this restriction will not be construed to extend to this agreement if made with a corporation or company for its general benefit.


ARTICLE VII. As the promises and obligations contained herein are peculiar and unique, and further, are not susceptible to monetary valuation, the Service may, in the event by the Board of a breach of any of the terms and conditions herein, bring an action for specific performance thereof.

ARTICLE VIII. The agreement shall contain in force and in effect for a period of five years unless terminated: 1) by one year’s written notice by either party, or 2) by mutual consent. In the event of termination, both parties shall cooperate in fulfilling any requirements necessary for compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended, supra. The agreement may be renewed for additional five-year periods five years from the effective date of the agreement.

ARTICLE IX. The Service and the Board agree that the Superintendent of the National Historic Site and the President of Springfield Technical Community College are empowered to resolve issues which may arise during the term of this agreement which are deemed by both the Superintendent and the President as not needing Service and Board action.

ARTICLE X. This agreement and the obligations of the parties hereunder shall be subject to the availability of funding and nothing contained herein shall be construed as binding the parties to expend in any one fiscal year any sum in excess of appropriations made by Congress or administratively allocated for the purpose of this agreement for the fiscal year, or to involve the parties in any contract or other obligation for the further expenditure of money in excess of such appropriations or allocations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, on the 21st day of August, 1998,
at __________, the parties hereto have caused this agreement to be signed,
sealed, and delivered by their duly authorized officers respectively.

Witnessed by: United States of America
Acting by and through the
Secretary of the Interior

By: [Signature]

Witnessed by: Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Division of Capital Asset
Management

By: [Signature]

Witnessed by: Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Acting by and through the
Executive Director,
Massachusetts Historical Commission
State Historic Preservation Officer

By: [Signature]

Witnessed by: Springfield Technical Community College
Acting by and through the Chairman,
Springfield Technical Community College
Board of Trustees

By: [Signature]

Approved as to form and authority
by Attorney General of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts

__________________________________
Appendix B

4. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT WITH ARMY: 1978

COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

Between

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

and

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

WHEREAS, P.L. 93-486, 88 Stat. 1461, authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to establish the Springfield Armory National Historic Site; and

WHEREAS, the Springfield Armory, commissioned by President Washington in 1794, was the site of Shays' Rebellion (1786-1787) and, until deactivated in 1968, the oldest manufacturing arsenal in the United States; and

WHEREAS, the Springfield Armory Collection which is owned by the United States and in the custody of the Department of the Army, has special relevance to the historical significance of the Springfield Armory; and

WHEREAS, the Department of the Army is authorized by P.L. 93-486, 88 Stat. 1461, and the Economy Act of June 30, 1932, 47 Stat. 417, 31 U.S.C. § 686 (1970) to utilize the services of the Department of the Interior in preserving and displaying the Springfield Armory Collection; and

WHEREAS, transfer on loan of the Springfield Armory Collection, which is deposited by the Department of the Army at the Springfield Armory Museum, for continued preservation and display at the Springfield Armory National Historic Site is in the best interest of military history, the Department of the Army and the Department of the Interior;

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises to be performed by the parties hereto and of the mutual agreement contained herein, it is agreed as follows:

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1. The effective date of this agreement is the signature date, Secretary of Army.

2. The Department of the Army (hereinafter the Army) agrees to lend to the Department of the Interior (hereinafter the Department) the Springfield Armory Collection, deposited at the Springfield Armory Museum, as jointly inventoried by the Army and the National Park Service and recorded in the Springfield Armory Museum Historical Properties Book, maintained at the Springfield Armory National Historic Site, and all provenience records and additional cataloguing information (hereinafter the property) for preservation and display at the Springfield Armory National Historic Site for a period of ten (10) years.

3. This agreement shall be renewed automatically at the end of ten (10) years for periods of like duration unless either party gives written notice, ninety days prior to expiration of each 10-year period, of the other party's non-compliance with the conditions of this agreement.

4. Ninety days prior to the expiration of each 10-year period, the Army and the Department may meet to consider modification of those specific terms of the agreement concerning the administration of the property.

5. The Army will from time to time improve the property by making additions to it that clearly conform to a defined scope of the collection to be agreed upon by both parties. Offers of specimens for this collection from other agencies, organizations, or individuals will be referred to the Army for approval. No items in the collection will be de-accessioned by the Department without prior approval of the Army.

6. The Army may make reasonable withdrawals of items from the property for purposes of temporary loan to Department of Defense installations,
private organizations and contractors. A reasonable withdrawal is a withdrawal which does not destroy the historical significance, integrity or unity of the Springfield Armory National Historic Site, nor pose an undue threat to the preservation of individual items. Prior to the withdrawal of any item of the property, the Army shall give the Department five days notice; except that in the case of the withdrawal of any item on permanent public display, the Army shall give the Department 30 days notice. The Department should be responsible for the packaging and shipping of items of the property withdrawn for purposes of temporary loan to Department of Defense installations and contractors. The Army will be responsible for packaging and shipping to return items withdrawn on temporary loan from Springfield.

7. The Department shall have curatorial responsibility for the care and display of the property and shall prepare a program of maintenance, storage, restoration, and display of the property.

8. The Department shall permit the on-site study of the property by students, scholars, and representatives of museums, colleges, governmental agencies, or other institutions and organizations under prescribed rules and regulations, which will be published in the Code of Federal Regulations.

9. The Department may lend an item of the property to any other agency of the Federal Government for up to six months without prior approval of the Army. The Department may lend any item of the property to any agency, organization, or individual outside the Federal Government only upon the prior approval of the Army.

10. It is the intent of the parties to this agreement that if the Department determines that an item of the property has specific historical relevance to a National Park System installation other than the Springfield Armory...
National Historic Site, the Department may transfer the item to that installation, providing the Army with a copy of the transfer document describing the item(s) transferred and location.

11. Copies of all provenience records and additional information appropriate for accessioning and cataloguing individual specimens will be maintained in a permanent records file, according to the standard museum records practice of the National Park Service.

12. The property shall be available for inspection and inventory by the Army at any reasonable time.

13. The Secretary of the Interior shall specify measures to be taken for the physical security of the property which are consistent with the standards prescribed by Army Regulation 190-18 (July 19, 1967) or established through negotiation as acceptable substitutions thereof.

Clifford L. Alexander, Jr.
Secretary of the Army

Cecil D. Andrus
Secretary of the Interior

(Date) 15 DEC 1978

(Date) OCT 26 1973
5. INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT WITH ARMY: 2000

INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT
Between
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
and
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

This Interagency Agreement ("Agreement") is entered into by and between the Department of the Army ("Army") and the Department of the Interior ("Interior"), to be effective as of the date set forth in Section 1 below.

WHEREAS, P.L. 93-486, 88 Stat. 1461, October 26, 1974, at § 101(a)(4), authorized the Secretary of the Interior to establish the Springfield Armory National Historic Site ("SPAR"), required that SPAR not be established unless there were agreements assuring the "historical integrity" of the site, and intended that the management and operation of SPAR fall within the exclusive responsibility of the National Park Service (NPS); and

WHEREAS, the framers of the authorizing legislation contemplated that the Springfield Armory Collection ("Collection"), which has special relevance to the historical significance of SPAR and to the Army, and would remain permanently at SPAR; and

WHEREAS, prior to passage of the authorizing legislation, the Army was in sole possession and control of the Collection and, therefore, has a vital and continuing interest in its proper maintenance and preservation; and

WHEREAS, NPS is charged with management and operation of SPAR and responsibility for the Collection and the Army by regulation (AR 870-20, Chapter 2) must maintain its own history and record system with respect to the Collection; and

WHEREAS, the buildings, the improvements, and the collection located at SPAR have significant historical value and interest for the people of the United States because, among other things, the Armory was commissioned by President Washington in 1794, was the site of Shay's Rebellion (1786-1787), engendered unique and unprecedented technological innovation in manufacturing processes in the 19th Century, and was, when deactivated in 1968, the oldest manufacturing arsenal in the United States;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants to be performed by the parties hereto and of the mutual agreements contained herein, it is agreed as follows:

1. The effective date of this Agreement shall be the date of execution by the Secretary of the Army.

2. The parties hereby agree that the Collection shall be and shall remain within the exclusive custody and responsibility of NPS. NPS shall have curatorial responsibility for the Collection which shall include, but not be limited to, management, preservation and exhibition of the Collection.

3. The Army may request loans of items from the Collection for purposes of temporary exhibits to the Army and other eligible borrowers. A “reasonable” loan request is for a loan which does not destroy the historical significance, integrity or unity of the Collection or any part thereof, nor pose an undue threat to the preservation of individual items. Whenever possible, the Army shall request a loan of any item of the Collection thirty (30) days prior to the proposed loan date. The NPS shall honor and expeditiously approve all reasonable requests from the Army for temporary loans. The Army shall be responsible for the packaging, shipping and safe return of items of the Collection loaned to eligible borrowers.

4. NPS shall, consistent with preservation of the integrity of the Collection and protection of individual items, permit the on-site study of the Collection by students, scholars and representatives of museums, colleges, governmental agencies, or other institutions, organizations and individuals under prescribed rules, regulations, or other procedures appropriate to the curatorial responsibility for the Collection. NPS will give representatives of the Army a high priority for access commensurate with available resources.

5. NPS may, under a “reasonable” loan as defined above, lend an item of the Collection to any eligible borrower for up to two (2) years without prior concurrence of the Army. If NPS loans an item of the Collection for longer than two (2) years, NPS shall first obtain the concurrence of the Army. The Army shall expeditiously review and act upon such requests from NPS.
6. All loans shall meet the requirements set forth in Department of the Interior regulations and policies.

7. The NPS will maintain copies of all provenance records and additional information appropriate for accessioning and cataloging individual Collection items in a permanent records file according to the standard museum records practice of NPS. The parties will coordinate and maintain a cross-indexing and cross-referencing capability that tracks and shares the parties' unique numbering and associated historic record systems with respect to the Collection items. The parties agree equitably to share the cost of developing and implementing such a capability.

8. As soon as practicable after the effective date of this Agreement, the parties shall designate a Collection Committee, which shall consist of at least one Curator each from the U.S. Army Center of Military History and from SPAR. The Committee shall, on an ongoing or on an as-needed basis, as appropriate, address issues such as, but not limited to, accession, loan, or de-accession actions requiring concurrence or approval by the parties and any Collection accounting adjustments. If the Committee determines an Army-originated item to be excess to the SPAR collections, it will be returned to the custody of the Army. The Collection Committee shall have a deadlock-breaking mechanism in place, which may include the reference of any unresolved items or questions to the principal contacts for each party identified in this Agreement.

9. Not more than ninety (90) days after the effective date of this Agreement, the parties shall agree upon a list or accounting of each item (a) presently in the Collection; (b) on loan from the Collection, which shall describe the location of such items and the terms of the loans; and (c) missing from the Collection, which list or accounting shall contain the best information regarding the condition, location and recovery strategy for such missing items. The parties may determine that the Collection Committee can address this task and make recommendations. Such accounting shall be made an Appendix to and a material part of this Agreement and shall bear the signatures of the persons listed as principal contacts herein. If there are any items about which the parties cannot agree within the stated time period or any extension thereof, such issues shall be resolved in due course within the spirit of this Agreement. The Appendix shall be updated or revised as appropriate throughout the term of this Agreement and, as appropriate, shall bear the signatures of the initial principal contacts or their successors.

10. The following persons shall be the initial principal contacts for each respective party:
A successor principal contact and address for such contact may be designated by a party to this Agreement by written notice to the other party. All notices required or permitted by this Agreement shall be delivered to the other party’s principal contact at the address specified in this section.

11. This Agreement shall supersede all prior agreements or understandings between the parties, including the “Cooperative Agreement Between the Department of the Army and Department of the Interior,” dated December 15, 1978, and all renewals thereof.

12. This Agreement shall continue for so long as its underlying authorization exists. It may be amended upon the mutual consent of the parties consistent with its purposes and legislative authorization. The parties shall attempt amicably and informally to resolve any differences that may arise between them with respect to this Agreement. If this Agreement shall terminate for any reason, in the absence of authority to the contrary, the Army will become the custodial agency for the Collection.

13. This Agreement and the obligations of the parties hereunder shall be subject to the availability of funding, and nothing contained herein shall be construed as binding the parties to expend in any one fiscal year any sum in excess of appropriations made by Congress or administratively allocated for the purpose of this Agreement for the fiscal year, or to involve the parties in any contract or other obligation for the further expenditure of money in excess of such appropriations or allocations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be executed by their duly authorized representatives the day and year hereinafter indicated.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

By

Secretary of the Army

Date 6/2/00

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

By

Secretary of the Interior

Date JUN 27 2000
6. FIREARMS DISPOSITION CENTER AGREEMENTS: 1997

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN
THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
AND
SPRINGFIELD ARMORY NATIONAL HISTORIC SITE

I agree to this Memorandum of Understanding, which sets forth conditions and responsibilities of each party in connection with the operation of a Firearms Disposition Center at the Springfield Armory National Historic Site to serve as the centralized facility for identifying all firearms that are of historic value and of which may be appropriate for the Springfield Armory NHS Museum Collection or another Park Collection; destroying all firearms without historic value or further use to the NPS in accordance with 41 CFR, Departmental Directives, and the NPS-44 Personal Property Handbook.

This agreement establishes and identifies such responsibilities in general terms only and does not attempt to address all specific actions associated with those responsibilities.

This agreement is for nationwide service.

Agreement to amendment 2/6/97

Marie Rust (signed copy on file) 02/07/97
Director, Northeast Field Area

Steven M. Beatty (signed copy on file) 02/07/97
Superintendent, Springfield Armory National Historic Site

Chris J. Andreas 2/13-97
NPS Chief, Ranger

Property Management Program Manager

Associate Director, Administration

NPS Chief, Curator, Museum Management Program

Associate Director, Park Operations & Education
ARTICLE I - BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

The National Park Service (NPS) has a centralized purchasing procedure for the procurement of firearms and desires a centralized procedure for the final disposition of firearms.

A large number of NPS Property firearms with significant historic value to Springfield Armory National Historic Site (SPAR) and other parks/units of the NPS have been destroyed through normal NPS property actions.

SPAR desires a centralized final disposition system for NPS firearms. SPAR will ensure that historic firearms and significant parts of historic value to SPAR, or any other park/unit of the NPS system are preserved.

SPAR offers to operate a Firearms Disposition Center (FDC) at SPAR to accomplish the interests of SPAR and the NPS.

Both NPS and SPAR agree that the best solution for the interests of both parties is to develop a FDC at SPAR.

The FDC shall be a centralized facility for:

- Transferring firearms for disposition from various parks/units and determining those that are of historic value.
- Advertising the availability of historic firearms to other parks/units (e.g., through the Curatorial Bulletin Board).
- Transferring historic firearms to requesting parks/units.
- Determining disposition of the remainder per property management requirements.

ARTICLE II - RESPONSIBILITIES

The NPS Property Management Program Manager shall be responsible for:

- establishing and maintaining guidelines and policies for the operation of the FDC.

Units of the NPS shall be responsible for:

- shipping/costs, handling, and packaging of arms for delivery to FDC, including getting approval to ship from FDC prior to actual shipment and covering the same costs in the case of historic firearms being shipped from FDC to the Parks.
- providing original or legal copy of court order giving
  NPS ownership of evidence arms or ordering their
  destruction with any transfer of evidence arms.

- transferring all arms of no further use to the FDC.

- notifying FDC of arms needed for park/units museum
  collections.

SPAR shall be responsible for:

- establishing standard operating procedures for the
  daily operation of the FDC.

- coordinating the shipping and receiving of firearms for
  the purpose of destruction from and to parks/units of
  the NPS to and from the FDC including keeping shipping
  instructions current and providing copies to
  parks/units requesting to ship arms.

- assuring that all property or court records for arms
  received and shipped are complete and correct.

- preparing reports of survey and performing all Boards
  of Survey for the destruction of firearms received at
  the FDC.

- identifying all firearms and parts of historic value.

- notifying parks/units of the availability of historic
  firearms.

- transferring historic firearms to parks where they
  meet the park’s Scope of Collection Statement.

- destroying all firearms and parts not of historic value
  or further use to the Service in accordance with 41
  CFR, Departmental Directives, and the NPS-44 Property
  Management Handbook.

- maintaining all records of arms received for
  destruction i.e., reports of survey documents as
  required by 41 CFR, Departmental Directives and the NPS
  Property Management Handbook.
ARTICLE III - TERM OF AGREEMENT

The term of this agreement shall be for five (5) years beginning October 1, 1996, and ending on September 30, 2001. It shall be renewable at the end of each five-year increment by written letter of agreement of both parties.

Amendments to this agreement may be initiated by either party. However, proposed amendments must be submitted to the other party no less than sixty (60) days prior to the desired implementation date and must be agreed to and approved by both parties. This agreement may be canceled by either party with sixty (60) days written notice to the other party.

ARTICLE IV - FUNDING

SPAR agrees to meet the responsibilities listed in ARTICLE II above with existing, funding, facilities and staff as of September 30, 1996, under existing policies, guidelines, and regulations as of the same date.

Units of the NPS shall be responsible for the packaging, handling, and shipping costs for arms transferred to or from the FDC.
Appendix B

7. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH SEABOARD FOUNDRY: 1997

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
Between
the
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
and
SEABOARD FOUNDRY

ARTICLE I - BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

The National Park Service (NPS) is required to destroy all firearms of no further value to its purposes.

Seaboard Foundry (Seaboard) operates a foundry which can melt and permanently destroy firearms.

The purpose of this agreement is to document the conditions under which Seaboard agrees to provide the free service of melting firearms for the NPS.

Non-personal service contracts are proper under general contracting authority, reference Federal Acquisition Regulations Part 37, Subpart 37.102 (e).

ARTICLE II - STATEMENT OF WORK/RESPONSIBILITIES

Upon advance approval Seaboard will melt firearms delivered by NPS, see Article III - APPROVALS, and allow two NPS representatives to observe the process until firearms are destroyed beyond use as firearms. Seaboard considers all firearms raw material only and accepts no responsibility for record keeping or legal issues concerning firearms. Seaboard accepts liability for the raw material only after it becomes sufficiently destroyed as to become unusable as a firearm.

The NPS is responsible for delivering firearms to the Seaboard foundry and observing their destruction. The NPS is solely responsible for providing security and record keeping as may be required by policy, guideline, or regulation. The NPS accepts all liability for firearms delivered to the foundry until they are sufficiently destroyed as to become unusable as firearms.
ARTICLE III - APPROVALS

Approval to deliver firearms for destruction at the Seaboard foundry is subject to the following:

- NPS must get approval by telephone the business day prior to delivery.
- Delivery days are restricted to Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.
- Deliveries may not exceed 100 firearms per day.
- Removal or alteration of any firearm part, metallic or non-metallic, prior to melting is not required.
- Conditions for approval may be changed for a specific day with notice given only at time of call for approval to deliver.
- Permanent changes to the conditions of approval will be agreed to in writing.

ARTICLE IV - TERM OF AGREEMENT

The term of this agreement will be five (5) years, beginning October 1, 1996 and ending September 30, 2001. It may be renewed for additional five-year periods upon written letter of agreement signed by both parties.

ARTICLE V - KEY OFFICIALS

For NPS: Steven M. Beatty, Superintendent
Springfield Armory National Historic Site
One Armory Square
Springfield, Massachusetts 01105-1299

Telephone: 413-734-6477
FAX: 413-747-8062

For Seaboard:

Bill Camara,
Seaboard Foundry
63 John St.
Johnston, RI 02919

Telephone: 401-942-2200
FAX: 401-944-3630

ARTICLE VI - TERMINATION CLAUSE

Either party may terminate this agreement upon 10 days written notice to the other party.
ARTICLE VII - STANDARD CLAUSES

1. Civil Rights
2. Officials Not to Benefit
3. Promotions
4. Public Information Releases

ARTICLE VIII - AUTHORIZATION SIGNATURES

Signed by [Signature]
Superintendent, Springfield Armory National Historic Site
Date: 7-15-97

[Signature]
Bill Camara, Seaboard Foundry Repr.
Date: 7-15-97
8. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH OLMSTED NHS: 1999

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN
SPRINGFIELD ARMORY NATIONAL HISTORIC SITE
AND
FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED NATIONAL HISTORIC SITE

I agree to this Memorandum of Understanding, which sets forth conditions and responsibilities of each party in connection with the operation of a permanent storage facility and a temporary and future permanent paper conservation lab by Frederick Law Olmsted National Historic Site (FRLA) using excess space in historic structures located within the boundary of Springfield Armory National Historic Site (SPAR).

This agreement establishes and identifies responsibilities in general terms only and except for identified funding issues does not attempt to address all specific actions associated with those responsibilities.

This agreement is limited to the operations of FRLA located within the boundaries of SPAR.

[Signatures and dates]

[Signatures and dates]

[Signatures and dates]
ARTICLE I – BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

In FY89 an informal agreement was reached between the Superintendents of FRLA and SPAR. This agreement allowed FRLA staff to establish a temporary Paper Lab and Storage Facility in unused space at SPAR. No specific time frames or sharing of expenses were identified. At that time, it was assumed the work would take about ten years to complete and FRLA operations at SPAR would cease once the work was complete.

Because FRLA agreed to make needed improvements within and maintain the spaces they occupied at SPAR and also to share expenses on projects of joint interest, no agreement was made regarding the sharing of day-to-day recurring, operational expenses. For a number of years this arrangement proved to be mutually beneficial.

In FY99, an evaluation has been made concerning the long-term needs of FRLA operations for off-site space and of the space available within the historic structures at SPAR to continue to serve these needs. The conclusions are:

1. The Temporary Paper Lab operated by FRLA and located in the Commandant’s House (Building 1) at SPAR will need approximately seven years to complete work that requires this space.
2. Space cannot be provided at FRLA for all of the site’s collection storage needs now or in the foreseeable future.
3. Within the foreseeable future SPAR will not need all the space available within its historic structures for SPAR-related operations.
4. The existing informal mutually beneficial agreement no longer serves the best interests of either party.
5. Both parties agree that it is time to create a more formal Memorandum of Understanding which addresses on a long-term basis the responsibilities, space needs and funding issues of both parties.
6. The most economic use of the excess space at SPAR for the National Park Service (NPS) would be to share the space with other NPS units on a reimbursable basis.
7. The most economic solution for FRLA’s Paper Lab and offsite collections storage is to occupy a portion of the unused space at SPAR.

Both parties, therefore, agree to the conditions in the following articles.

ARTICLE II – RESPONSIBILITIES

FRLA shall be responsible for:

- Supervision of all FRLA personnel and activities, including all volunteers, contract employees, or other persons working within the allotted space.
- Accepting supervisory responsibility for decisions on administrative closure of SPAR for weather or during emergencies in the absence of a SPAR Division Chief or employee of equal or higher grade than the senior FRLA employee on duty.
- All maintenance, cleaning, repair, modifications, or similar activities within the allotted space.
- Preparing and submitting through the SPAR Facility Manager all 106 clearance documents as appropriate to exclusively FRLA activities at SPAR.
- Paying, reimbursing, or offering in-kind services or material acceptable to SPAR for FRLA’s share of all work performed by SPAR in space shared or exclusively occupied by FRLA.
- Disaster planning and response for all objects and other items within space allotted to FRLA. SPAR retains responsibility for the structure.

SPAR shall be responsible for:

- Managing all work or other activities at SPAR in all areas not exclusively used by FRLA: including but not limited to, maintenance, administration (contracting, purchasing, property management), interpretation of grounds and structures, special uses, and parking.
- Full law enforcement responsibility of all areas within SPAR boundary including space exclusively occupied by FRLA. This includes maintaining and responding to breaches of security of all fire and security systems, including video, all types of detectors, locks and keyed access.
- In October of each year, providing FRLA an accounting of the actual utility, service contract, and rubbish removal costs for the prior year. Cost accounting will include actual figures for the entire park, as well as figures for the FRLA portion to be paid.

ARTICLE III – USAGE OF SPACE

Commandant’s House (Building 1): FRLA shall have exclusive use of the entire second floor for as long as there is a need for the full operation of the Paper Lab. Once the major work is completed and the Lab can be downsized into space on the third floor of the Main Arsenal within or adjacent to the FRLA collection storage space, SPAR will resume full responsibility for Commandant’s House (Building 1) and FRLA will only be responsible for its operations in the Main Arsenal.

Main Arsenal (Building 13): FRLA shall have exclusive use of the northern open space or approximately one-half of the third floor as mutually agreed to by both parties for as long as this agreement is in effect. See attached floor plan.

ARTICLE IV – FUNDING

FRLA agrees to contribute ONPS funds for use of space at SPAR within the first quarter of each fiscal year for the current fiscal year. The cost will be a sum equal to the percentage share of the prior year’s actual expenses as indicated below. The percentage share for electric and gas costs shall be based on the percentage of space occupied by FRLA in SPAR buildings. At the time this agreement is signed by all parties this is 1 of 2 floors in Building 1 which equals a 50% share, and approximately one-half floor of 4 floors in Building 13 which equals a 12.5% share. The percentage share for water, service contracts and rubbish service will be the agreed percentages below. The percentages will be adjusted appropriately if the space occupied by FRLA changes. As this agreement shall became effective in the second half of FY99, FY99 costs will be prorated at 50% of the actual FY98 costs. The percentage shares for FRLA costs are specified below.
• Electric and GAS

50% of actual costs for Building 1 for as long as the building is occupied by FRLA

and

12.5% of actual costs for Building 13

• Water

15% of Water bill regardless of space occupied.


15% of annual fees for contracts which apply to both Buildings 1 and 13.

or

12.5% of annual fees for contracts which apply to Building 13 only.

Labor, materials, and all other costs associated with service contracts which exceed the flat annual fee shall be treated as “project costs” and approved by both parties on a project-by-project basis. Shares and method(s) of payment or in-kind labor and/or materials shall be by mutual agreement for each of these projects. (See further discussion of “project costs” below.)

• Rubbish Service:

75% of recycle costs for as long as the space in Building 1 is occupied.

and

25% of trash removal costs.

Total of all funds above due to SPAR shall be rounded to nearest $100. An example of the breakdown of costs for FY99 and FT00 is attached in Addendum A.

In addition, SPAR will notify FRLA about all upcoming SPAR base-funded projects which affect the spaces occupied by FRLA, and which may provide direct benefit to FRLA. FRLA payment contributions to these projects will be decided on a project-by-project basis with FRLA transferring the agreed-upon funds during the year when the work is actually performed. Shares and method(s) of payment or in-kind labor and/or materials shall be by mutual agreement for each project. An example of such “Project Costs” shared in previous years is an upgrade to the telephone and voice mail system in Building 1 which was of direct benefit to the FRLA Lab staff stationed in the building.

This agreement and the obligations of the parties hereunder shall be subject to the availability of funding, and nothing contained herein shall be construed as binding the parties to expend in any one fiscal year any sum in excess of appropriations made by Congress or administratively allocated for the purpose of this agreement for the fiscal year, or to involve the parties in any contract or other obligation for the further expenditure of money in excess of such appropriations or allocations.
ARTICLE V – TERM OF AGREEMENT

The term of this agreement shall be for approximately (5) years beginning on the date the last signature is affixed and ending on September 30, 2004. It shall be renewable at the end of each five-year increment by written letter of agreement of both parties.

Amendments to this agreement may be initiated by either party. However, proposed amendments must be submitted to the other party no less than sixty (60) days prior to the desired implementation date and must be agreed to and approved by both parties. This agreement may be canceled by either party with sixty (60) days written notice to the other party.
APPENDIX C. DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE DISPOSITION OF FEDERAL PROPERTY

1. DEED OF TRANSFER FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

FROM ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA acting by and through the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare by the Regional Director of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Region I, under and pursuant to the powers and authorities contained in the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (56 Stat. 357), as amended, the Civil Rights Act of 1969, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Statement of Organization and Delegation of Authority, Part 2, section 2-355.30 D. L. e. (38 F.R. 1482) for and in consideration of the observances and performances by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts of the covenants, conditions, reservations, and restrictions hereinafter contained and for other valuable consideration grants to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its successors and assigns, subject to the covenants, conditions, reservations and restrictions hereinafter set forth, a certain parcel of land with the buildings thereon situated in the City of Springfield, County of Hampden, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, more particularly described as follows:

Beginning at a point, said point being the intersection of the northerly line of State Street, extended, and the easterly line of Byers Street, extended;

thence, along the easterly line of Byers Street by a bearing of N 46° 30' 30" W a distance of 31.00 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING;

thence along the easterly line of Byers Street by a bearing of N 46° 30' 30" W a distance of 50.00 feet to a point;

thence along land to be acquired by Springfield School Department and City of Springfield, Franklin School Area Parcels, by a bearing of S 40° 55' 32" E a distance of 375.79 feet to a point;

thence, continuing along land to be acquired by the City of Springfield by a curve to the left having a radius of 152.85 feet and a central angle of 76° 20' 10" an arc distance of 165.21 feet to a point;

thence, continuing along lands hereinabove described by a bearing of N 33° 30' 10" a distance of 1006.73 feet to a point;

thence, by a bearing of S 36° 29' 50" W a distance of 36.23 feet to a point;

thence, by a bearing of S 31° 59' 12" W a distance of 170.00 feet to a point, said point being in the easterly line of Court Street.
thence, along the southerly line of Pearl Street by a bearing of N 43° 11' 00" E a distance of 11.91 feet;

thence, continuing along the southerly line of Pearl Street by a bearing of N 59° 00' 23" E a distance of 1240.67 feet to a point;

thence, by a curve to the right whose radius is 33.65 feet and whose central angle is 91° 54' 20" an arc distance of 56.14 feet to a point, said point being in the westerly line of Federal Street;

thence, along the westerly line of Federal Street by a bearing of S 89° 05' 15" W a distance of 1259.13 feet to a point, said point being the intersection of the westerly line of Federal Street and the northerly line of State Street;

thence, along the northerly line of State Street by a bearing of S 59° 51' 55" W a distance of 528.89 feet to a point;

thence, continuing along the northerly line of State Street by a bearing of S 50° 36' 10" W a distance of 546.34 feet to a point;

thence, continuing along the northerly line of State Street by a bearing of S 48° 29' 15" W a distance of 429.36 feet to a point;

thence, by a curve to the left whose radius is 35.00 feet and whose central angle is 97° 59' 45" an arc distance of 59.86 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING, enclosing 36.576 acres of land, as shown on plan entitled, "Springfield, Mass., Department of Streets and Engineering Land of United States Government at Springfield Armory to be Acquired by Springfield Technical Institute Scale 1"=50", Date Aug. 1967, revised," on file in the Engineering Division of the Department of Streets and Engineering, City of Springfield, Mass.

The bereinabove described parcel is conveyed subject to an easement providing full rights of access and access to lands conveyed to the City of Springfield, within the following easement lines:

Beginning at the intersection of the northerly line of State Street, extended, and the easterly line of Byers Street extended;

thence, along the easterly line of Byers Street by a bearing of N 45° 30' 30" W a distance of 35.00 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING;

thence, along the easterly line of Byers Street by a bearing of N 40° 30' 30" W a distance of 50.00 feet to a point;

thence along lands to be acquired by Springfield School Department by a bearing of N 42° 55' 30" E a distance of 378.79 feet to a point.
thence, continuing along land to be acquired by Benton Small Arms Museum by a curve to the left whose radius is 123.85 feet and whose central angle is 76° 25' 40" an arc distance of 165.21 feet to a point;

thence, continuing along land hereinabove described by a bearing of N 33° 30' 10" W a distance of 683.75 feet to a point;

thence by a bearing of N 56° 29' 50" E a distance of 50.00 feet to a point;

thence, by a bearing of S 33° 30' 10" E a distance of 904.37 feet to a point, said point being in the northerly line of State Street;

thence, along the northerly line of State Street by a bearing of S 50° 36' 10" W a distance of 29.83 feet to a point;

thence, continuing along the northerly line of State Street by a bearing of S 43° 25' 15" W a distance of 429.36 feet to a point;

thence by a curve to the left whose radius is 35.00 feet and whose central angle is 97° 59' 45", an arc distance of 59.85 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING, as shown on plan entitled, "Springfield, Mass. Department of Streets and Engineering Land of United States Government at Springfield Armory to be Acquired by Benton Small Arms Museum. Scale 1" = 50' Date Aug. 1967," Revised, on file in the Engineering Division of the Department of Streets and Engineering, City of Springfield, Mass. Being the easement conveyed to the City of Springfield by deed of the United States of America, acting by and through the Administrator of General Services, dated March 28, 1965, and duly recorded.

There is included within this conveyance for the benefit of the grantees herein an easement of 10' on either side of centerlines as shown on plan entitled, "Springfield, Mass., Dept. of Sts. & Engs., Land of United States Government at Springfield Armory to be acquired by Springfield School Department. Scale: 1" = 50' feet, dated July, 1967, revised," for storm and sanitary sewer purposes, including but not limited to, use and reasonable access for maintenance, repair, replacement or removal of said sewer lines.

Said property conveyed hereby was declared surplus and was assigned to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for disposal for educational purposes pursuant to the provisions of the aforementioned Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 and of applicable rules, regulations and orders.
This Deed is executed and delivered to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its successors and assigns, without covenants or warranties by or on behalf of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA whatsoever, either express or implied.

AND this Deed is made and accepted upon each of the following conditions subsequent which shall be binding upon and enforceable against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its successors and assigns, and each of them, as follows:

1. That for a period of thirty (30) years from the date of this Deed the above described property herein conveyed shall be utilized continuously in the manner and for the educational purposes set forth in the approved program and plan contained in the application of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts dated June 23, 1957 and an amendment thereto dated March 26, 1958 signed by William G. Dyer, President of the Board of Regional Community Colleges, and for no other purpose.

2. That during the aforesaid period of thirty (30) years the Commonwealth of Massachusetts will recall, lease, mortgage or encumber or otherwise dispose of the above described property, or any part thereof or interest therein only as the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, or its successor in function, in accordance with its existing regulations, may authorize in writing.

3. That one year from the date of this Deed and annually thereafter for the aforesaid period of thirty (30) years unless the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, or its successor in function, otherwise directs, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts will file with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, or its successor in function, reports on the operation and maintenance of the above described property and will furnish as requested such other pertinent data evidencing such continuous use of the property herein conveyed for the purposes specified in the above identified application.

4. That for the period during which the above described property is used for a purpose for which the Federal financial assistance is extended by the Department or for another purpose involving the provision of similar services or benefits, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts hereby agrees that it
will comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-352) and all requirements imposed by or pursuant to the Regulation of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (45 CFR Part 80) issued pursuant to that title and as in effect on the date of this deed, to the end that, in accordance with Title VI of that Act and the Regulation, no person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimination under the program and plan referred to in condition 1 above or under any other program or activity of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its successors or assigns, to which such Act and Regulation apply by reason of this conveyance.

In the event of breach of any of the conditions set forth above, whether caused by the legal or other inability of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its successors or assigns, to perform any of the obligations herein set forth, all right, title and interest in and to the above described property shall, at its option revert to and become the property of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, which shall have an immediate right of entry thereon, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its successors and assigns, shall forfeit all right, title and interest in and to the above described property and in any and all tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances thereto belonging; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that the failure of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, or its successor in function, to insist in any one or more instances upon complete performance of any of said conditions shall not be construed as a waiver or a relinquishment of the future performance of any such conditions, but the obligations of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with respect to such future performance shall continue in full force and effect; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in the event the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA fails to exercise its option to re-enter the premises for any such breach of conditions subsequent numbered 1, 2, and 3 herein within 31 years from the date of this conveyance, conditions numbered 1, 2, and 3 herein together with all rights of the United States of America to re-enter as in this paragraph provided with respect to conditions numbered 1, 2, and 3 herein, shall, as of that date, terminate and be extinguished.
Provided further, that the expirations of conditions 1, 2, and 3, and the rights to re-enter shall not affect the obligation of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its successors and assigns with respect to condition numbered 4 herein or the right reserved to the United States of America to re-enter for breach of said condition.

In the event title to the above described premises is reverted to the United States of America for noncompliance or voluntarily reconveyed in lieu of reverter, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its successors and assigns, at the option of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, or its successor in function, shall be responsible and shall be required to reimburse the United States of America for the decreased value of the above described property not due to reasonable wear and tear, acts of God and alterations and conversions made by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to adapt the property to the educational use for which the property was acquired. The United States of America shall, in addition thereto, be reimbursed for such damages including such costs as may be incurred in recovering title to or possession of the above described property, as it may sustain as a result of the noncompliance.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts may secure abrogation of the conditions subsequent numbered 1, 2, and 3 herein by:

a. Obtaining the consent of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, or its successor in function; and

b. Payment to the United States of America in accordance with the following conditions:

(i) If abrogation is requested by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the purpose of making the property or a portion thereof available to serve the needs or purposes of a third party, payment shall be based upon the current fair value, as of the date of any such requested abrogation, of the property to be released from the conditions and restrictions, less amortized credit at the rate of 3-1/3% of the public benefit allowance granted on the original fair market value for each twelve (12) months during which the property has been utilized in accordance with the purpose specified in the above identified application.
(11) If abrogation is requested by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the purpose of making the property available as security for financing of new construction, for acquiring substitute or better facilities, or for relocating elsewhere, all for the purpose of further advancing or promoting the program specified in the above identified application, payment shall be based upon the public benefit allowance granted to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts of 100% from the fair value of two million five hundred thousand ($2,500,000) dollars as of the date of this instrument, less a credit at the rate of 3-1/3% of the public benefit allowance granted for each twelve (12) months during which the property has been utilized in accordance with the purpose specified in the above identified application; provided, however, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts shall execute such agreement, supported by surety bond or other security that may be deemed by the Department to be necessary or advisable, to assure that the proceeds of sale obtained by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in any disposal of any portion of the property for effectuating one or another of the aforesaid purposes for which abrogation is requested, will be devoted to the program use specified in the above identified application.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts by acceptance of this deed covenants and agrees for itself, its successors and assigns, and every successor in interest to the property herein conveyed or any part thereof — which covenant shall attach to and run with the land for so long as the property herein conveyed is used for a purpose for which the Federal financial assistance is extended by the Department or for another purpose involving the provision of similar services or benefits and which covenant shall in any event, and without regard to technical classification or designation, legal or otherwise, be binding to the fullest extent permitted by law and equity, for the benefit and in favor of and enforceable by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and its successors against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its successors and assigns, and every successor in interest to the property, or any part thereof — that it will comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-352) and all requirements imposed by or pursuant to the regulation of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (45 CFR Part 80) issued pursuant to that title and as in effect on the date of this deed, to the end that, in accordance with Title VI of that Act and the Regulation, no person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimination under the program and plan referred to in condition 1 above or under any other program or activity of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its successors or assigns, to which such Act and Regulation apply by reason of this conveyance.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts by the acceptance of this Deed, covenants and agrees for itself, its successors and assigns, that in the event the property hereby conveyed is sold, leased, mortgaged, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of, or is used for purposes other than those set forth in the above identified program and plan without the consent of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, all revenues or the reasonable value, as determined by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, of the benefits to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts deriving directly or indirectly from such sale, lease, mortgage, encumbrance, disposal, or use (or the reasonable value as determined by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare of any other unauthorized use) shall be considered to have been received and held in trust by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and shall be subject to the direction and control of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts by the acceptance of this Deed, further covenants and agrees, for itself, its successors and assigns, that if the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its successors or assigns, shall cause any of the buildings, structures or improvements on the premises hereby conveyed to be insured against loss, damage or destruction and any such loss, damage or destruction shall occur during the period the Commonwealth of Massachusetts holds title to said property subject to said conditions 1, 2, and 3 set forth above, said insurance and all moneys payable to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its successors or assigns, thereunder shall be held in trust by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its successors or assigns, and shall be promptly used by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its successors or assigns, for the purpose of repairing such buildings, structures or improvements and restoring the same to their former
condition, or, if not so used, shall be paid over to the Treasurer of the United States in an amount not exceeding the unamortized public benefit allowance of the buildings, structures or improvements lost, damaged, or destroyed.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, by the acceptance of this Deed, further covenants and agrees for itself, its successors and assigns, that the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA shall have the right during any period of emergency declared by the President of the United States or by the Congress of the United States to the full unrestricted possession, control, and use of the property hereby conveyed, or any portion thereof, including any additions or improvements thereto made subsequent to this conveyance. Prior to the expiration or termination of the 30-year period of restricted use by the transferee, such use by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA may be either exclusive or nonexclusive and shall not impose any obligations upon the Government to pay rent or any other fees or charges during the period of emergency, except that the Government shall (i) bear the entire cost of maintenance of such portion of the property used by it exclusively or over which it may have exclusive possession or control, (ii) pay the fair share, commensurate with the use, of the cost of maintenance of such of the property as it may use nonexclusively or over which it may have nonexclusive possession or control, (iii) pay a fair rental for the use of improvements or additions to the premises made by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts without Government aid and (iv) be responsible for any damage to the property caused by its use, reasonable wear and tear and acts of God and the common enemy excepted. Subsequent to the expiration or termination of the 30-year period of restricted use, the obligations of the Government shall be as set forth in the preceding sentence and in addition, the Government shall be obligated to pay a fair rental for all or any portion of the conveyed premises which it uses.

This instrument is intended to take effect as a sealed instrument.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA has cause these presents to be executed this 26th day of April, 1960.
Appendix C

United States of America
Acting by and through the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare

By:  

Walter W. node
Regional Director, Region I
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Witnesses:

Edward T. Bradley

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK

DATE:

Before me, a Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, then and there personally appeared Walter W. Mode duly empowered, authorized and delegated by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare pursuant to a Delegation of Authority, who signed the foregoing instrument in behalf of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and acknowledged the same to be his free act and deed in his said capacity and the free act and deed of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Lawrence E. Burstein
Notary Public

My Commission Expires December 4, 1949

My Commission Expires
Appendix C

ACCESSION

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts by the acceptance of this Deed

Without Warranty hereby accepts and agrees to all the terms, covenants,
conditions, reservations and restrictions contained in said deed.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Acting by and through the
Board of Regional Community Colleges,
by virtue of the authority conferred
upon said Board by Chapter 273 of the

BY: William C. Dyer,
President,
Board of Regional Community Colleges

duly authorized by a resolution of
said Board dated July 13, 1967.

WITNESSES:
Edward A. Bradley
Robert T. Thompson Jr.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
COUNTY OF Suffolk

DATE: MAY 31, 1968

Before me a Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
then and there personally appeared William C. Dyer, President of the Board of
Regional Community Colleges, duly empowered and authorized by a resolution of
said Board dated July 13, 1967, by virtue of the authority granted to said
Board by Chapter 273 of the Acts of Massachusetts, 1967, who signed the
foregoing instrument on behalf of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and
acknowledged the same to be his free act and deed in his said capacity and
the free act and deed of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Note: The document contains a signature by a Notary Public.

Notary Public

Commission Expires

By Commission Expires
Appendix C

Commonwealth of Massachusetts
County of Suffolk

Before me a Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
then and there personally appeared Walter W. Mode duly empowered, authorized
and delegated by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare pursuant to
a Delegation of Authority, who signed the foregoing instrument in behalf of
the United States of America and acknowledged the same to be his free act and
deed in his said capacity and the free act and deed of the United States of
America.

[Signature]
Notary Public

My Commission Expires

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Acting by and through the
Board of Regional Community Colleges,
by virtue of the authority conferred
upon said Board by Chapter 273 of the

By: [Signature]
William G. Dyer, President.

Board of Regional Community Colleges,
duly authorized by a resolution of
said Board dated July 13, 1967
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK

DATE: SEPTEMBER 7, 1969

Before me, a Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, then and there personally appeared William G. Dwyer, President of the Board of Regional Community Colleges, duly empowered and authorized by a resolution of said Board dated July 13, 1967, by virtue of the authority granted to said Board by Chapter 273 of the Acts of Massachusetts, 1967, who signed the foregoing instrument on behalf of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and acknowledged the same to be his free act and deed in his said capacity and the free act and deed of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.


LAWRENCE E. KURSTEIN
NOTARY PUBLIC
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES DECEMBER 4, 1969

My Commission Expires
2. **AMENDMENT TO APPLICATION FOR AMORY SQUARE PROPERTY**

**AMENDMENT**

**TO**

**APPLICATION FOR ARMORY SQUARE SITE**

SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS

The Board of Regional Community Colleges acknowledges the historical significance of the Springfield Armory property. We shall be happy to submit any plans affecting the historical and agricultural integrity of the historic buildings to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation for comment, as required by Sec. 106 of Public Law 89-665. We cannot, however, accept requirements which would limit good educational utilization of the property.

In the event of reconstruction of the exterior of any of the buildings or total demolishing of such buildings, we shall be happy to preserve such photographs, plaques and models as may be available.

It is our intent to maintain the iron fence as it now is.

It is also our intention to preserve the parade ground as an open or recreational area to the fullest extent possible.

[Signatures]

(Date)

William G. Daynes, President
Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges

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**ATTACHMENT B**
3. **DEED TO THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD FOR MUSEUM: 1968**

BEGINNING AT A POINT, SAID POINT BEING IN LAND NOW OR FORMERLY OWNED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND LOCATED AS FOLLOWS:

FROM THE INTERSECTION OF THE NORTHERLY LINE OF STATE STREET EXTENDED AND THE EASTERLY LINE OF BYERS STREET EXTENDED BY A BEARING OF N 49° 30' 30" W A DISTANCE OF 85.00 FEET TO A POINT IN THE EASTERLY LINE OF SAID BYERS STREET;

THENCE, NORTHEASTERLY BY A BEARING OF N 42° 55' 30" E ALONG LAND TO BE ACQUIRED BY THE SPRINGFIELD SCHOOL DEPARTMENT A DISTANCE OF 234.55 FEET TO THE BEGINNING POINT;

THENCE, NORTHERLY ALONG LAND TO BE ACQUIRED BY THE SPRINGFIELD SCHOOL DEPARTMENT BY A BEARING OF N 33° 30' 10" W A DISTANCE OF 498.01 FEET TO A POINT;

THENCE, CONTINUING ALONG LAND TO BE ACQUIRED BY THE SPRINGFIELD SCHOOL DEPARTMENT BY A BEARING OF S 56° 29' 50" W A DISTANCE OF 120.00 FEET TO A POINT;

THENCE, CONTINUING ALONG LAND TO BE ACQUIRED BY THE SPRINGFIELD SCHOOL DEPARTMENT BY A BEARING OF N 33° 30' 10" W A DISTANCE OF 340.00 FEET TO A POINT;

THENCE, CONTINUING ALONG LAND TO BE ACQUIRED BY THE SPRINGFIELD SCHOOL DEPARTMENT BY A BEARING OF N 56° 29' 50" E A DISTANCE OF 355.00 FEET TO A POINT;
thence, along land to be acquired by the Springfield Technical Institute by a bearing of S 33° 30' 10" E a distance of 683.75 feet to a point;

thence, continuing along land to be acquired by Springfield Technical Institute by a curve to the right whose radius is 123.85 feet and whose central angle is 76° 25' 40", an arc distance of 165.21 feet to a point;

thence, continuing along land to be acquired by Springfield Technical Institute by a bearing of S 42° 55' 30" W a distance of 144.24 feet to the point of beginning and enclosing an area of 5.262 acres of land as shown on plan entitled, "Springfield, Mass. Department of Streets and Engineering, Land of United States Government at Springfield Armory to be acquired by Benton Small Arms Museum, Scale 1" = 50', Date Aug. 1967" Revised on file in the Engineering Division of the Department of Streets and Engineering, City of Springfield, Mass.

Grantee herein shall have full right of access and egress in land to be acquired by Springfield Technical Institute within the following easement lines:

Beginning at the intersection of the northerly line of State Street, extended, and the easterly line of Byers Street extended;

thence, along the easterly line of Byers Street by a bearing of N 49° 30' 30" W a distance of 35.00 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING;

thence, along the easterly line of Byers Street by a bearing of N 49° 30' 30" W a distance of 50.00 feet to a point;

thence along lands to be acquired by Springfield School Department by a bearing of N 42° 55' 30" E a distance of 378.79 feet to a point;

thence, continuing along land to be acquired by Benton Small Arms Museum by a curve to the left whose radius is 123.85 feet and whose central angle is 76° 25' 40" an arc distance of 165.21 feet to a point;

thence, continuing along land hereinabove described by a bearing of N 33° 30' 10" W a distance of 683.75 feet to a point;

thence by a bearing of N 56° 29' 50" E a distance of 50.00 feet to a point;

thence, by a bearing of S 33° 30' 10" E a distance of 904.37 feet to a point, said point being in the northerly line of State Street;
thence, along the northerly line of State Street by a bearing of S 50°36'10" W a distance of 29.83 feet to a point;

thence, continuing along the northerly line of State Street by a bearing of S 48° 29' 15" W a distance of 429.36 feet to a point;

thence by a curve to the left whose radius is 35.00 feet and whose central angle is 97° 59' 45", an arc distance of 59.86 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING as shown on plan entitled "Springfield, Mass., Department of Streets and Engineering Land of United States Government at Springfield Armory to be Acquired by Benton Small Arms Museum, Scale 1" : 50' Date & Aug., 1967" Revised on file in the Engineering Division of the Department of Streets and Engineering, City of Springfield, Mass.

There is reserved from the foregoing conveyance all minerals in the said tract of land, together with the right of the United States, through its authorized agents, representatives, or lessees at any time to enter upon the lands and prospect for, mine, and remove such minerals, so far as such right does not interfere with the continuous use of the property as and for an historic monument, as determined by the Secretary of the Interior, or his successor in function.

Said property transferred hereby was duly determined to be surplus, and was assigned to the GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION for disposal pursuant to the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, and applicable rules, orders and regulations.

In the event there is a breach of any of the conditions and covenants herein contained by the party of the second part, its successors and assigns, whether caused by the legal inability of said party of the second part, its successors and assigns, to perform said conditions and covenants, or otherwise, all right, title and interest in and to the said premises shall revert to and become the property of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA at its option, and it shall have the immediate right of entry upon said premises and the
party of the second part, its successors and assigns, shall forfeit all right, title and interest in said premises and in any and all of the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that the failure of the Secretary of the Interior, or his successor in function, to require in any one or more instances complete performance of any of the conditions or covenants herein contained shall not be construed as a waiver or relinquishment of such future performance, but the obligation of the party of the second part, its successors and assigns, with respect to such future performance shall continue in full force and effect.

The said party of the second part does by the acceptance of this deed covenant and agree for itself, its successors and assigns, as follows:

1. The premises above-described shall be continuously used and maintained as and for an historic monument, for incidental purposes pertaining thereto, but for no other purpose.

2. The party of the second part, its successors and assigns, shall file biennial reports with the Secretary of the Interior, or his successor in function, setting forth the use of the property during the preceding two-year (2-year) period, and other pertinent data establishing its continuous use of the premises for the purposes set forth above.

3. The party of the second part will not sell, lease, assign, or otherwise dispose of any of the premises above-described except to another local governmental agency that the Secretary of the Interior, or his successor in function, is satisfied can assure the continued use and maintenance of the property for an historic monument.

4. The party of the first part shall have the right, during the existence of any National Emergency declared by the President of the United States of America, or the Congress thereof, including the presently existing National Emergency, to the full, unrestricted possession, control and use of the premises, or any part thereof, without charge EXCEPT THAT the party of the first part shall be responsible during the period of such use, for the entire cost of maintaining the premises, or any portion thereof, so used, and
shall pay a fair rental for the use of any installations or structures which have been added thereto without Federal aid.

5. a. The program for or in connection with which this deed is made will be conducted in compliance with, and the party of the second part, its successors and assigns, will comply with, and will require any and all other persons to comply with, all requirements imposed by or pursuant to the regulations of the General Services Administration as in effect on the date of this deed (41 CFR Subpart 101-6.2) issued under the provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;

b. This covenant shall be subject in all respects to the provisions of said regulations;

c. Party of the second part, its successors and assigns, will promptly take and continue to take such action as may be necessary to effectuate this covenant;

d. The United States shall have the right to seek judicial enforcement of this covenant and;

e. Party of the second part, its successors and assigns, will obtain from each other person who through contractual or other arrangements with said party of the second part, its successors or assigns, is authorized to provide services or benefits under said program, a written agreement pursuant to which such other person shall, with respect to the services or benefits which he is authorized to provide, undertake for himself the same obligations as those imposed upon the party of the second part by this covenant, and shall furnish the original of such agreement to the Secretary of the Interior or his successor upon his request therefor. This covenant shall run with the land hereby conveyed and shall in any event without regard to technical classification or designation, legal or otherwise, be binding to the fullest extent permitted by law and equity for the benefit of and
in favor of party of the first part and enforceable by said party against the party of the second part, its successors and assigns.

6. In the event of a breach of any condition or covenant herein imposed, the Secretary of the Interior, or his successor in function, may immediately enter and possess himself of title to the herein conveyed premises for and on behalf of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

7. In the event of a breach of any condition or covenant herein imposed, the party of the second part will, upon demand of the Secretary of the Interior, or his successor in function, take such action, including the prosecution of suit, or execute such instruments, as may be necessary or required to evidence transfer of title to the herein conveyed premises to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, acting by and through the ADMINISTRATOR of GENERAL SERVICES, has caused these presents to be executed in its name and behalf by the Regional Administrator, General Services Administration, Boston, Massachusetts, and the CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, acting by and through its Mayor, to evidence its accord with, acceptance of and agreement to be bound by the reservations, conditions, and covenants herein contained, has caused these presents to be executed in its name and behalf on this 28th day of March 1969.

[Signatures]
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK

In Boston, in said County and State, on this 28th day of March 1968, before me personally appeared PAUL IAZZARO, Regional Administrator, General Services Administration, Boston, Massachusetts, duly empowered and authorized and delegated by the Administrator of General Services (28 Federal Register 14472), to me known and known by me to be the party executing the foregoing instrument and acknowledged said instrument by him duly executed, to be the free act and deed of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, as his free act and deed individually, and in his capacity as Regional Administrator, General Services Administration, Boston, Massachusetts.

[Signature]

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
COUNTY OF HAMPDEN

In Springfield, in said County and State on this 27th day of March before me personally appeared Frank H. Freedman, Mayor of City of Springfield, duly empowered and authorized, who signed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged the same to be his free act and deed in his said capacity and the free act and deed of the CITY OF SPRINGFIELD.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day and year aforesaid.

[Signature]

RECEIVED My commission expires August 17, 1973
MAY 27 1958
M 24 5/27
REPROD FROM THE ORIGINAL

369
4. DEED TO CITY OF SPRINGFIELD FOR SCHOOL BOARD: 1968

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That the United States of America acting by and through the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare by the Regional Director of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Region I, under and pursuant to the powers and authorities contained in the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (63 Stat. 377), as amended, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Statement of Organization and Delegation of Authority, Part 2, section 2.595.30 D. 1. a. (32 F.R. 14526) for and in consideration of the observance and performance by the City of Springfield, a municipal corporation located in the County of Hampden, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, of the covenants, conditions, reservations, and restrictions hereinafter contained and for other valuable consideration grants to the said City of Springfield, its successors and assigns, subject to the covenants, conditions, reservations and restrictions hereinafter set forth, a certain parcel of land situated in the City of Springfield, County of Hampden, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, more particularly described as follows:

Beginning at the northerly corner of Byram Street and Pearl Street, said corner being the intersection of the easterly line of Byram Street extended and the southerly line of land leased to City of Springfield for Highway Purposes under Act of Congress, March 5, 1939 Public Law 546-69;

thence, along the previous mentioned lease line by a bearing of N 41° 11' 00" E a distance of 35.00 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING;

thence, continuing along said lease line by a bearing of N 41° 11' 00" E a distance of 702.71 feet to a point;

thence, by a bearing of S 31° 59' 15" E a distance of 170.00 feet to a point;

thence, by a bearing of N 56° 29' 50" E a distance of 96.23 feet to a point;

thence, by a bearing of S 33° 30' 10" E a distance of 325.00 feet to a point;

thence, by a bearing of S 56° 29' 50" E a distance of 355.00 feet to a point;

thence, by a bearing of S 33° 30' 10" E a distance of 340.00 feet to a point;

Confirmed Copy
thence, by a bearing of N 56° 22' 50" E a distance of 150.00 feet to a point;

thence, by a bearing of S 33° 30' 10" W a distance of 496.01 feet to a point;

thence, by a bearing of S 42° 55' 30" W a distance of 234.55 feet to a point, said point being in the northeasterly line of Ryers Street;

thence, northerly along the northeasterly line of Ryers Street by a bearing of N 49° 30' 30" W a distance of 1206.27 feet to a point;

thence, by a curve to the left whose radius is 35.00 feet and whose central angle is 89° 18' 30" an arc distance of 54.55 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING, enclosing an area of 13.085 acres, as shown on plan entitled, "Springfield, Mass. Dept. of Sts. & Engr., Land of United States Government at Springfield Armory to be acquired by Springfield School Department. Scale: 1"=50 feet, dated July 1957, revised," on file in the Engineering Division of the Department of Streets and Engineering, City of Springfield, Massachusetts.

Within conveyance is made subject to an easement of ten feet on either side of centerlines as shown on Plan above referred to, for storm and sanitary sewer purposes for the benefit of owners of adjacent premises as shown on said Plan, including, but not limited to, use of reasonable access for maintenance, repair, replacement or removal of said sewer lines.

Said property conveyed hereby was declared surplus and was assigned to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for disposal for educational purposes pursuant to the provisions of the aforementioned Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 and of applicable rules, regulations and orders.

This Deed is executed and delivered to the City of Springfield, its successors and assigns, without covenants or warranties by or on behalf of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA whatsoever, either express or implied.

AND this Deed is made and accepted upon each of the following conditions subsequent which shall be binding upon and enforceable against the City of Springfield, its successors and assigns, and each of them, as follows:

1. That for a period of thirty (30) years from the date of this Deed the above described property heretofore conveyed shall be utilized continuously in the manner and for the educational purposes set forth in the approved progress and plan contained in the application of the City of Springfield dated November 27, 1961, and for no other purpose.
2. That during the aforesaid period of thirty (30) years the City of Springfield will recall, lease, mortgage or encumber or otherwise dispose of the above described property, or any part thereof or interest therein only on the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, or its successor in function, in accordance with its existing regulations, any authority in writing.

3. That one year from the date of this deed and annually thereafter for the aforesaid period of thirty (30) years unless the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, or its successor in function, otherwise directs, the City of Springfield will file with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, or its successor in function, reports on the operation and maintenance of the above described property and will furnish as requested such other pertinent data evidencing such continuous use of the property herein conveyed for the purpose specified in the above identified application.

4. That for the period during which the above described property is used for a purpose for which the Federal financial assistance is extended by the Department or for another purpose involving the provision of similar services or benefits, the City of Springfield hereby agrees that it will comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-352) and all requirements imposed by or pursuant to the Regulation of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (45 CFR Part 80) issued pursuant to that title and as in effect on the date of this deed, to the end that, in accordance with Title VI of that Act and the Regulation, no person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimination under the program and plan referred to in condition 1 above or under any other program or activity of the City of Springfield, its successors or assigns, to which such Act and Regulation apply by reason of this conveyance.

In the event of breach of any of the conditions set forth above, whether caused by the legal or other inability of the City of Springfield, its successors or assigns, to perform any of the obligations herein set forth, all right, title and interest in and to the above described property shall, at its option revert
to and become the property of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, which shall have an immediate right of entry through, and the City of Springfield, its successors and assigns, shall forfei all right, title and interest in and to the above described property and all real estate, buildings, improvements, and appurtenances thereto belonging; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that the failure of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, or its successor in function, to insist in any one or more instances upon complete performance of any of said conditions shall not be construed as a waiver or a relinquishment of the future performance of any such conditions, but the obligations of the City of Springfield with respect to such future performance shall continue in full force and effect; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in the event the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA fails to exercise its option to re-enter the premises for any breach of conditions subsequent numbered 1, 2, and 3 herein within 31 years from the date of this conveyance, conditions numbered 1, 2, and 3 herein together with all rights of the United States of America to re-enter as in this paragraph provided with respect to conditions numbered 1, 2, and 3 herein shall, as of that date, terminate and be extinguished; PROVIDED FURTHER, that the expiration of conditions 1, 2, and 3, and the rights to re-enter, shall not affect the obligation of the City of Springfield, its successors and assigns with respect to condition numbered 4 herein or the right reserved to the United States of America to re-enter for breach of said condition.

In the event title to the above described premises is reverted to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA for noncompliance or voluntarily reconveyed in lieu of reverter, the City of Springfield, its successors and assigns, at the option of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, or its successor in function, shall be responsible and shall be required to reimburse the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA for the decreased value of the above described property not due to reasonable wear and tear, acts of God and alterations and conversions made by the City of Springfield to adapt the property to the educational use for which the property was acquired. The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA shall, in addition thereto, be reimbursed for such damages including such costs as may be incurred in recovering title to or possession of the above described property, as it may sustain as a result of the noncompliance.
The City of Springfield may secure abrogation of the conditions subsequent numbered 1, 2, and 3 herein by:

a. Obtaining the consent of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, or its successor in function; and

b. Payment to the United States of America in accordance with the following conditions:

(i) If abrogation is requested by the City of Springfield for the purpose of making the property or a portion thereof available to serve the needs or purposes of a third party, payment shall be based upon the current fair value, as of the date of any such requested abrogation, of the property to be released from the conditions and restrictions, less amortized credit at the rate of 3-1/3% of the public benefit allowance granted on the original fair market value for each twelve (12) months during which the property has been utilized in accordance with the purposes specified in the above identified application.

(ii) If abrogation is requested by the City of Springfield for the purpose of making the property available as security for financing of new construction, for acquiring substitute or better facilities, or for relocating elsewhere, all for the purpose of further advancing or promoting the program specified in the above identified application, payment shall be based upon the public benefit allowance granted to the City of Springfield, or 100% from the fair value of fifty-nine thousand ($59,000) dollars as of the date of this instrument, less a credit at the rate of 3-1/3% of the public benefit allowance granted for each twelve (12) months during which the property has been utilized in accordance with the purpose specified in the above identified application; provided, however, the City of Springfield shall execute such agreement, supported by surety bond or other security that may be deemed by the Department to be necessary or advisable, to assure that the proceeds of sale obtained by the City of Springfield in any
dispossession of any portion of the property for effectuating one or another of the aforesaid purposes for which dedication is requested, will be devoted to the purpose as specified in the above identified application.

The City of Springfield by acceptance of this deed covenants and agrees for itself, its successors and assigns, and every successor in interest to the property herein conveyed or any part thereof -- which covenant shall attach to and run with the land for so long as the property herein conveyed is used for a purpose for which the Federal financial assistance is extended by the Department or for another purpose involving the provision of similar services or benefits and which covenant shall in any event, and without regard to technical classification or designation, legal or otherwise, be binding to the fullest extent permitted by law and equity, for the benefit and in favor of and enforceable by the United States of America and its successors against the City of Springfield, its successors and assigns, and every successor in interest to the property, or any part thereof -- that it will comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-352) and all requirements imposed by or pursuant to the Regulation of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (45 CFR Part 80) issued pursuant to that title and as in effect on the date of this deed, to the end that, in accordance with Title VI of that Act and the Regulation, no person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimination under the program and plan referred to in condition 1 above or under any other program or activity of the City of Springfield, its successors or assigns, to which such Act and Regulation apply by reason of this conveyance.

The City of Springfield by the acceptance of this Deed, covenants and agrees for itself, its successors and assigns, that in the event the property hereby conveyed is sold, leased, mortgaged, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of, or is used for purposes other than those set forth in the above identified program and plan without the consent of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, all revenues or the reasonable value, as determined by the Department of Health,
Appendix C

Education, and Welfare, of benefits to the City of Springfield deriving directly or indirectly from such sale, lease, mortgage, encumbrance, disposal, or use (or the reasonable value as determined by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare of any other unauthorized use) shall be considered to have been received and held in trust by the City of Springfield for the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and shall be subject to the direction and control of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

The City of Springfield, by the acceptance of this Deed, further covenants and agrees for itself, its successors and assigns, that the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA shall have the right during any period of emergency declared by the President of the United States or by the Congress of the United States to the full unrestricted possession, control, and use of the property hereby conveyed, or any portion thereof, including any additions or improvements thereto made subsequent to this conveyance. Prior to the expiration or termination of the 30-year period of restricted use by the transferee, such use by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA may be either exclusive or nonexclusive and shall not impose any obligations upon the Government to pay rent or any other fees or charges during the period of emergency, except that the Government shall (i) bear the entire cost of maintenance of such portion of the property used by it exclusively or over which it may have exclusive possession or control, (ii) pay the fair share, commensurate with the use, of the cost of maintenance of such of the property as it may use nonexclusively or over which it may have nonexclusive possession or control, (iii) pay a fair rental for the use of improvements or additions to the premises made by the City of Springfield without Government aid and (iv) be responsible for any damage to the property caused by its use, reasonable wear and tear and acts of God and the common enemy excepted. Subsequent to the expiration or termination of the 30-year period of restricted use, the obligations of the Government shall be as set forth in the preceding sentence and in addition, the Government shall be obligated to pay a fair rental for all or any portion of the conveyed premises which it uses.
This instrument is intended to take effect as a sealed instrument.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA has caused these presents to be executed this 26th day of April, 1963.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Acting by and through the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare

WITNESSES:

Edward G. Bradley

By Walter W. Moos
WALTER W. MOOS
Regional Director, Region I
Department of Health, Education and Welfare

Martha R. Altman

ANNOUNCEMENT

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK

DATE: April 26, 1963

Before me a Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts then and there personally appeared Walter W. Moos duly empowered, authorized and delegated by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare pursuant to a Delegation of Authority, who signed the foregoing instrument in behalf of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and acknowledged the same to be his free act and deed in his said capacity and the free act and deed of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Lawrence E. Burstein
Notary Public

December 6, 1969
By CommissionExpires
APPENDIX D: CHRONOLOGY OF NPS INVOLVEMENT WITH SPRINGFIELD ARMORY (1975)

[Source: “Chronology of NPS Involvement with Springfield Armory,” ns, nd but apparently created and filed in January 1975 (Washington Office, Park History Collection, folder: SPAR, Correspondence 1975-80)]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 4, 1959</td>
<td>Springfield Armory recommended as a National Historic Landmark by the Historic Sites Survey of the National Park Service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 22, 1961</td>
<td>Secretary of the Army signed National Historic Landmark agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 22, 1963</td>
<td>Presentation of Landmark plaque and certificate to Army at Springfield.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Decision of Secretary of Defense to phase out Springfield Armory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1967</td>
<td>National Park Service consults with Army on:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- disposition of the Landmark plaque.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- identification of area included in Landmark designation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- possibility of NPS conducting a study of the site as a historic monument.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1967</td>
<td>NPS (George Mackenzie) participated in an interagency meeting at Springfield Armory, learned of the transfer of the site to Springfield Technical Institute, and learned that preservation of some historic buildings was not assured in the transfer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 3, 1967</td>
<td>Assist. Sec. of Interior Cain advised GSA Administrator that historic buildings of the Armory were subject to provisions of Section 106 of the Historic Preservation Act and expressed hope that the transfer of the site would be accompanied by conditions binding recipient to preserve the site's historical and architectural integrity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 6-17, 1967</td>
<td>At the request of Assist. Sec. of Interior Cain a special NPS team assessed the history and historic preservation needs of the Armory. The team included a historian and architectural historian. Dr. Connally and Russell Keune also inspected the site. Their assessment is written up in a 36-page report &quot;Springfield Armory, Massachusetts.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 25, 1967</td>
<td>Assist. Secretary of Interior Cain wrote both the Sec. of Defense and the Sec. of HEW describing the Park Service study and its recommendations and reiterating the need either for covenants in the property transfer binding the receiver to a policy of historic preservation or consideration of the transfer by the Advisory Council.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
December 14, 1967  Dr. Connally participated at Springfield in a meeting on Springfield's economic adjustment and had opportunity to express his concern for preservation of the historic structures and scene. He raised the possibility of the Armory being a National Historic Site. The members of the group rejected the idea at that time since legislation required would take too long.

March 26, 1968  William C. Deyer, Pres. Mass. Board of Regional Community Colleges, signed an amendment to the "Application for Armory Square Site" that agreed to basic 106 compliance procedures while stating that "We cannot, however, accept requirements which would limit good educational utilization of the property."

January 13, 1969  Utley (Saries) responded to a questions from Anne Wardwell, Mass. Historical Commission, on the Landmark boundaries at Springfield by referring her to the 1967 study and implying that historical significance lay in particular buildings.

Sept. 18, 1969  NERO's report of a biennial visit to the Armory as part of Park Service responsibility for Landmarks; the report comments on the specific buildings affected by the Landmark designation.

June 1970  Dr. Connally first conversed with members of the Springfield Museum Inc. on the possibility of a National Historic Site because of the Museum's financial situation.


Jan. & Feb. 1971  Correspondence between Pres. Garvey, Springfield Technical Community College and Dr. Connally. Dr. Connally initiated the exchange after seeing a 1970-72 catalog from STCC that included a rendering of buildings proposed for construction on the northwest side of the Parade. He objectied to the inconsistencies between the College Master Plan and the recommendations of the NPS 1967 study, both in demolition planned and size of buildings proposed. Pres. Garvey responded with no commitment to a change of course, but did give the date for an upcoming college master plan meeting.

May 4, 1971  Frank Sarlen's report of the NPS master planning trip to the Armory. This is the first time the NPS proposed that both Bidgs. 10 and 17 be kept and moved. At that time, recommendations for a cooperative agreement with the College included:
"b. No exterior changes to the structures along the east or south sides of the Parade.
c. Height and design approval by NPS of any structure built along the north side of the Parade and thence northward to the west end of present Building 19."

June 1971
NPS draft Master Plan completed.

June 15, 1971
Larry Lewis sent Dr. Connally a June 6 newspaper clipping from the Springfield Sunday Republican announcing the clearance of the College's building programs. The article describes in size and material the buildings to be built along the northwest side of the Parade. Lewis's letter notes "that we are at least going to get red brick facing."

August 1971
Two firms submitted bids for the demolition and/or moving of Bldg. 17 to the College. Copies of these bids are in our files as of March 1973.

October 1971
Approval of Springfield Armory NHS by the Advisory Board.

February 22, 1972
Larry Lewis wrote to Meredith Ingham (Sarsles) wanting to know the original location of Bldg. 17. College deadline for removal was supposedly May 1, 1972. He implied that either the College or Museum was planning to move the building.

April 11, 1972
Lewis wrote to Pres. Garvey saying that the Museum could not finance moving Bldg. 17, that he didn't think the building would stand the move, and that he did "not object to whatever steps must be taken by the College to proceed with its various programs."

May 15, 1972
Tom Wallace (Museum Curator) wrote to advise Utley that excavation of a new building was underway and that artifacts had been found.

August 10, 1972
William Murtagh responded to an inquiry about Landmark boundaries at Springfield Armory from the Lower Pioneer Valley Regional Planning Commission by saying that the boundaries "encompass all the property owned by the City of Springfield, plus that portion owned by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts south of a line extending along the north [northeast] boundary of the Parade." A map illustrating the description accompanied Murtagh's letter.

September 7, 1972
A Departmental letter to a Congressional committee referred to protecting facades all the way around the Parade.

December 1, 1972
College sent scaled map of proposed campus development to Dave Schmidt.
Appendix D

Dec. 1-11, 1972  Jack Benjamin wrote two memos to NERO, one directed to lands and one to history describing a late November visit to Springfield with Dave Schmidt. The memos are different, written to call into play the different responsibilities of the two offices. Benjamin reported finding Bldg. 17 in the process of being demolished, described the buildings to be built on the northwest side of the Parade, indicated that a reappraisal of the situation should occur before going ahead with legislation, and conceded that "The possibility of our having control over the college building program as we had hoped in the draft master plan and as spelled out in the Environmental Impact Statement seems very remote at this time."

Dec. 1972  A memo from the Landmark Specialist to the Assist. Director, Cooperative Activities, describes the situation with Bldg. 17 and gives reasons why NPS shouldn't make an issue of it.

Dec. 1972  Dave Schmidt returned to Larry Lewis our marked-up copies of the scale drawing of the College's proposed building plan.

Dec. 14, 1972  Palmer, NERO, relayed most of Benjamin's information to Bob Garvey, Advisory Council, and raised the issue of indefinite Landmark boundaries at Springfield.

Jan. 5, 1973  Bullitt wrote to Boland conceding NPS ability to determine building on the northwest side of the Parade. (?)

Jan. 12, 1973  Ken Tapman, Advisory Council, requested of Sec. of HEW Weinberger an HEW review of the performance of STCC activities affecting the protection of the Armory, specifically the demolition of Bldg. 17.

Jan. 15, 1973  Tapman wrote to thank NERO for bringing the problem to the Advisory Council's attention since no one else had done so.

Feb. 26, 1973  Sec. of HEW Weinberger responded to the Council by saying that the Mass. Historical Comm. had approved the demolition of Bldg. 17. He promised that a copy of the STCC Master Plan would soon be forwarded.

March 1, 1973  Benjamin wrote to Pres. Garvey asking for a written statement of the College's position on the National Historic Site and the proposals accompanying it.

March 16, 1973  Benjamin relayed the positions of the Commonwealth and Pres. Garvey to NERO and emphasized the difficulty he felt would be encountered in trying to negotiate the agreement on buildings around the Parade.
May 29, 1973

Robert Rettig, Executive Director, Mass. Historical Commission replied to Don Branum, Office of Surplus Property Utilization, HEW, on the advisability of demolishing Bldgs. 2 and 3 and on the construction of Bldg. 15. Rettig identified the core of the issue as being the compatibility of the new structure and urged Branum to take the case to the Advisory Council.

June 1973

WASO New Areas office receives artist's rendering of the northwest side of the Parade.

October 24, 1973

Newspaper clipping from the Springfield Daily News that quoted Gerald Tays saying "Our hope was to preserve the front facade all around the Parade, but it’s pretty much destroyed on the north side now. The demolition was unacceptable to us, but we had no control. It’s past history now."

Oct. 31, 1973

Memo of Charlotte Lyeth to Stan Hulett indicating that the Advisory Council still had not gotten the promised College Master Plan.

November 6, 1973

Senate subcommittee hearing on Springfield Armory NHS.

November 15, 1973

Gerry Tays described the sense of the Senate subcommittee hearing to Curry, making specific mention of agreement to protect two sides of the Parade.

December 7, 1973

Benjamin wrote to Dwyer reminding him of the need to present the proposed Memorandum of Agreement at the next full Board meeting.

December 7, 1973

Ann Smith, Advisory Council, Office of Compliance, wrote Sec. of HEW Weinberger again requesting review of STCC compliance with Section 106 procedures.

Dec. 10, 1973

House subcommittee hearings on Springfield Armory NHS.

Dec. 27, 1973

Custard, HEW, responded to Smith only by saying we will pay attention to what's happening.

Jan. 4, 1974

Branum, HEW, forwarded two pages of STCC master plan to Smith, Advisory Council.

Jan. 23, 1974

Branum reminded Dwyer of 1968 obligation to submit plans to the Advisory Council and suggested that STCC contact both the Council and the Mass. Historical Comm.
APPENDIX E. INVENTORIES, EVALUATIONS, AND NOMINATIONS OF HISTORIC STRUCTURES

1. NPS EVALUATION REPORT: 1967


Properties of National Historical Significance
   Commanding Officer's Quarters (Building No. 1)
   Assistant Officers’ Quarters (Building No. 5 and 6)
   West Arsenal (Building No. 11)
   Guard House (Building No. 12)
   Main Arsenal (Building No. 13)
   Middle Arsenal (Building No. 14)
   East Arsenal (Building No. 15)
   Administration Building and North and South Shops (Building No. 16)
   Parade
   Iron Fence

Other Buildings Worthy of Preservation
   Building No. 10
   Building No. 17
   Building 27 (partial)

Other Buildings of Architectural Interest
   Building No. 4
   Building No. 7
   Building No. 8
   Building No. 9
   Building No. 19
2. **NATIONAL REGISTER NOMINATION**

### National Register of Historic Places Inventory - Nomination Form

- **STATE:** Massachusetts
- **COUNTY:** Hampden

#### Location
- **Street and Number:** State, Federal, Pearl and Byers Streets
- **City or Town:** Springfield
- **Congressional District:** Second

#### Classification
- **Category:** Public
- **Ownership:** Public Acquisition
- **Status:** Protected
- **Accessible to the Public:** Yes

#### Owner of Property
- **Owner’s Name:** City of Springfield, Office of the Mayor

#### Location of Legal Description
- **Courthouse, Registry of Deeds, etc.:** Hampden County Registry of Deeds
- **City or Town:** Springfield
- **State:** Massachusetts

#### Representation in Existing Surveys
- **Title of Survey:** "Springfield Armory: Evaluation under Provision of the Historic Preservation Act of 1966" (special study)
- **Date of Survey:** August 1967
- **Repository for Survey Records:** Office of Archaeology and Historic Preservation, National Park Service

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**ATTACHMENT L**
<table>
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<th>Number all entries</th>
<th>4. Owner of Property: (1)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armory Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Board of Regional Community Colleges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141 Milk Street</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston 02109</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts 025</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E

Armory Square, bounded by State, Federal, Pearl and Byers Streets, is one of several units which comprised the full Springfield Armory complex in Springfield, Massachusetts. The others are Federal Square, located directly across Federal Street from Armory Square and with it known as the Hill Shops; the Water Shops, located a mile southwest of the Hill Shops at the intersection of Walnut Street with Mill River; and the Railhead Area, located on Page Boulevard one and three-quarters miles northeast of the Hill Shops.

Armory Square occupies a fifty-four acre hilltop site overlooking the original area of Springfield and several blocks northeast of the present City's central business district. The complex is notable for the spacious surroundings allotted to its buildings. Of the nearly thirty structures located here, half surround the 8.75 acre parade ground. Buildings 1 and 13, at the western end of the parade, overlook the approximately thirteen acres of sloping open land which constitutes the western portion of the Square. With three exceptions, the consistent scale and the restrained, functional style of the structures in Armory Square and the uniform use of sturdy brick construction, white trim and slate roofing create a cohesive district in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

The three intrusions noted above are one original Armory structure, Building 20, which has been altered for use by Springfield Technical Community College, and two new structures, the Humanities and Physical Science Buildings, recently constructed by the College (see accompanying sketch map). Building 20, an L-shaped structure at the northeast corner of Armory Square (intersection of Federal and Pearl Streets), has been raised two stories in height and remodeled in a contemporary style. The negative effect of the building on the Square is minimized by its location; set on sloping ground at a lower elevation than adjacent buildings and thus screened by them, it is fully visible only from a position outside the Square on Federal or Pearl Street.

A more serious intrusion is created by the Humanities and Physical Science Buildings, which face the parade ground on its north side (on the site of two original Armory buildings and a portion of a third). Three and six stories in height respectively, they are designed in a style most closely related to brutalism and conform to adjacent buildings only in the use of brick for their construction material. Though screened somewhat by mature trees on the parade ground, these buildings are still visible from most points in Armory Square. Despite the presence of these intrusive structures, however, Armory Square retains its essential character as the administrative center of a major military installation which experienced its greatest growth during the first half of the nineteenth century.

Descriptions of major elements in the Armory Square complex follow; their locations are indicated on the accompanying sketch map.
Appendix E

Building 1, the Commanding Officer's Quarters, was constructed in 1845-46. An excellent example of the Greek Revival style, it is a two-story brick house, fifty by forty-four feet in size, with a fifty-two by twenty-seven foot service ell parallel with the three-bay entrance facade. The hipped roof of the main block is broken by paired interior chimneys and surmounted by a brick cupola supported on the interior partitions, also of brick. Around 1870, the original distyle Doric entrance porch, west porch and ell porch were removed and the present cast-iron porches built; at the same time the wooden balustrade surrounding the roof was replaced with an iron snow rail. The rectangular transom of the main entrance was altered to an elliptical fanlight and the sidelights and the fanlight fitted with leaded glass about 1900.

Building 5 & 6, double officers' quarters in the Second Empire style, was built in 1870. The main block, brick with slate roof, is three stories in height; a one-story service ell extends to the rear. A wide balustraded porch with copper roof spans the three-bay entrance facade.

Building 10, a two-story Greek Revival structure with a three-bay pedimented front facade and gabled slate roof, was erected in 1833; a two-story service ell with wooden porches on its north side extends to the rear. Notable features of the building, which served as a hospital and later as officers' quarters, are the one-story Ionic entrance portico and the carved ball trim under the eaves. Building 7, built in 1833, and Buildings 8 and 9, built in 1836, are basically similar in style to Building 10 but altered somewhat by porches and other additions dating from the late nineteenth century.

Building 11, the West Arsenal, is the oldest extant building at the Armory; constructed in 1807-08, it was used as an arsenal, a barracks, and, after World War II, as the Officers' Club. The rectangular building, one hundred by thirty-four feet, was originally two stories in height; a third story was added during the Civil War. Two-foot-thick brick walls support a gabled slate roof; windows have stone lintels and trim. The one-story porches on the front and rear elevations are later additions not inharmonious with the original construction. A modern addition, eleven by fifteen feet, extends from the southwest end of the building.

Building 12 was built in 1880 as a guard house and later served as officers' quarters. A one-story brick building with slate roof, it has stepped gable ends with ornamental brick-work, and a small entrance porch. Although built late, the building is compatible with the general architectural character of the complex.

Building 13, the Main Arsenal, was begun in 1847 and completed three years later. Probably the best known of the Armory buildings, it appears on the official seal of the City of Springfield, adopted two years after the Arsenal was completed. The imposing scale of the building dominates the western end
7. **Description:**

of the parade; one hundred, ninety-nine by sixty-nine feet, it has a massive twenty-four by thirty foot tower facing the parade and a twelve by sixty-nine foot pedimented pavilion on the west elevation. The tower rises two full stories above the slate hipped roof and carries three clock faces; the fourth appears in the pediment of the pavilion. The two-and-a-half foot thick brick walls are articulated by first floor piers and, above a string course, two-story pilasters. A notable interior feature is the visually unsupported wooden staircase which spirals one hundred, thirty-one risers to the uppermost chamber of the tower. The only significant exterior alterations to the building have been the addition of a fire escape and two cement loading docks and the removal of a wooden tetrastyler Doric portico from the west pavilion.

Building 14, the Middle Arsenal, was constructed in 1830; it is three stories in height with two-foot-thick brick walls supporting a gabled slate roof. On the north facade, a one-story diastyle Doric portico covers the main entrance. Two cement loading docks with suspended metal canopies have been added to the south facade and an iron fire escape to the western end. Interior support for the building is provided by two rows of granite posts set eight-and-one-half feet on center in the basement and by cast-iron posts similarly positioned on the upper floors.

Building 15, the East Arsenal, when constructed in 1824 was two stories in height and fifteen bays long; it was later raised a story and, in 1941, eighteen bays were added to its western end. The brick walls of the older section are two feet thick, those of the new one foot; both sections are covered by a gabled slate roof above a brick cornice with "dog-tooth" corbelling.

Building 16 is comprised of three separate historic buildings: the Administration Building (1819) and the flanking North and South Shops (both 1824). During the Civil War, the three buildings were joined and a third story added to each; a five-story square tower was added to the west facade of the Administration Building and the five-columned Doric portico was installed on the east facade. As in the case of Building 15, the design of the various sections is carefully unified. In 1918, Building 16 was extended at its southern end and linked with Building 15, forming a single L-shaped entity.

Building 19, combined stables and barracks built in 1863, is perhaps the finest remaining example of an American cavalry caserne. A two-story structure with gabled slate roof, it is impressive for its fine brick construction and its great length, seven hundred, sixty-four feet. The long walls are broken on the first floor by wide segmental-arched openings with louvers and on the second by casement windows. Stalls were located on the first floor above a crypt into which they could be cleaned; barracks were located on the second floor.

(Continued)
Appendix E

7. Description (3)

The tree-dotted Parade, essentially defined by construction in Armory Square during the first third of the nineteenth century, covers approximately 8.75 acres. In addition to its historical significance as the heart of the Square, the Parade provides an appropriate setting for and reinforces the visual linkage of the surrounding buildings. Although the north side of the Parade has been disrupted by the Physical Science and Humanities Buildings discussed above, its former line and character are evident in Buildings 2 and 3 and in the remaining front portion of Building 27 (part of which was demolished to allow construction of the Physical Science Building). Buildings 2 and 3, constructed as officers' family housing, are brick, two-and-one-half stories high, with gabled roofs and one-story wooden porches; both appear to date from the second half of the nineteenth century and have been altered by the addition of garages. Their presence at the northwest corner of the Parade also reduces the impact of the Physical Science and Humanities Buildings on historic Buildings 1 and 13. Building 27, the oldest portion of which dates from 1863, stands at the northeast corner of the Parade. Like other original Armory buildings it is brick with a slate roof, but, unlike others of its size, has not been raised to three stories.

The iron fence surrounding Armory Square was erected between 1847 and 1861. Above a low sandstone base, halberd-headed posts some nine feet high support base and top rails into which palings are inserted. Two forms of palings, round with spear heads and slightly lobed with pike heads, alternate. The gates, supported on square sandstone posts, are more intricately patterned; here, oval center sections surrounded by lacy ironwork are superimposed on the vertical palings. The main gate is located on Federal Street almost opposite the porticoed entrance to Building 16.

Boundary

Beginning at the intersection of the midlines of State and Federal Streets; thence northwesterly by the midline of Federal Street, 1,270 feet more or less, to its intersection with the midline of Pearl Street; thence southwesterly by the midline of Pearl Street, in two sections of 1,250 and 745 feet more or less, to its intersection with the midline of Byers Street; thence southeasterly by the midline of Byers Street, 1,345 feet more or less to its intersection with the midline of State Street; thence northeasterly by the midline of State Street, in two sections of 985 and 515 feet more or less, to the point of beginning.

Note: In contrast to the other buildings discussed above, the Physical Science and Humanities Buildings constructed by Springfield Technical Community College do not contribute to the national significance of the landmark district.
When the Springfield Armory was formally established as a Federal arsenal by an act of Congress in 1794, it already had achieved an important place in American military and industrial history. During the American Revolution, the Armory was the site of important ordnance manufacturing and storage facilities, serving as a supply depot for the entire northeastern theatre of war. The Armory was also the site of the abortive attack by Captain Daniel Shays and his followers in the Massachusetts uprising of 1786-87 known as "Shays' Rebellion." Shays and his small force of disgruntled farmers attempted to raid the arsenal on January 25, 1787, but were repulsed by the defending garrison. This event, which generated increased public support for the creation of a stronger national government that could help curb such uprisings, contributed indirectly to the establishment of the Federal Constitution.

During the early nineteenth century, Springfield Armory played an important role in the development of the principle of interchangeability of parts, an essential concept in the modern assembly line techniques of American industry. In 1822, Thomas Blanchard, an Armory workman, devised a machine for turning gun stocks; though conceived for that specific purpose, his machine proved a forerunner of subsequently perfected machinery for making other standardized gun parts.

Together with the Harpers Ferry Armory, Springfield Armory supplied all the military small arms manufactured by the United States Government for nearly seventy years. With the destruction of the Harpers Ferry installation at the outbreak of the Civil War, Springfield became the sole such supplier, a distinction it held until 1904, when the Rock Island Arsenal began the small-scale manufacture of rifles. Throughout the military history of the United States the Springfield weapons have played a major role and have achieved a justified reputation for quality, accuracy, and dependability. In its last years as an active military post, the Armory served as the United States Army's principal research and development center and pilot manufacture for small arms. When phased out as a military installation in 1967-68, the Springfield Armory was the Federal Government's oldest manufacturing arsenal.

(Continued)
8. Statement of Significance: (2) Armory Square

Expansion of the Armory's physical facilities soon became necessary; the site selected was a militia training field on a hilltop just outside the town. In 1778, a magazine, barracks and accommodations for operation of the laboratory were erected, the first structures on the site of the present Armory Square.

When Shays' Rebellion erupted in western Massachusetts during 1786-87, Springfield Armory became the site of its climactic event. For several months, debt-ridden and disgruntled farmers had roamed Massachusetts, preventing the county courts from sitting and rendering judgements for debt. In late 1786, Shays and his followers gathered for an assault on the depot at Springfield where arms, ammunition, and other military supplies were stored. They attacked on January 25, 1786, but were repulsed by the defending garrison under Major General William Shepard; the rebel morale was so shattered that the outbreak soon collapsed. Public reaction to the Rebellion, particularly among large-scale property owners in eastern Massachusetts, resulted in increased support for the creation of a stronger national government that could control such uprisings and contributed to the movement which established the Federal Constitution.

The formal creation of the Springfield Armory came with an act of Congress in 1794, which authorized the establishment of two arsenals and magazines, one to be located in the South. For these, President Washington selected Harpers Ferry and Springfield. It was not until 1801, however, that the United States actually acquired the title to the land on which its Armory at Springfield was located. On August 24 of that year, the Government received title to 30.5 acres, the heart of the present Armory Square, at a cost of $509.

With the deterioration of relations between the United States and Great Britain that heralded the approach of the War of 1812, construction at Springfield Armory was accelerated. The first heavy outlay of funds for this purpose occurred in the years 1807-11. Because of several costly fires among the existing wooden structures in preceding years, brick was chosen as the material for future buildings. The only building surviving from this period, the oldest extant in the entire Armory complex, is the West Arsenal (Building 11). Completed in 1807 on the south side of the present parade ground, it was used for storing and packing arms.

On June 1, 1815, Lt. Col. Roswell Lee became Superintendent of the Springfield Armory. During his eighteen-year tenure, ended by his death on August 25, 1833, the parade area of Armory Square assumed much of its present-day appearance. One of Lee's first accomplishments was the construction of the administration building, conceived in 1815 and completed four years later. In 1824, the North and South Shops were erected flanking the administration building; during the Civil War, they were connected with it to form the present Building 16.

(Continued)
Appendix E

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8. Statement of Significance: (3) Armory Square

A second storehouse, known as the East Arsenal (Building 15), was also built during 1824. Located just south of the South Shop, its long east-west axis was aligned with that of the earlier West Arsenal. These buildings outlined two sides of the parade ground while the Superintendent's residence, built some years before approximately 1,000 feet west of the administration building, and several frame quarters, aligned with and 600 feet north of the arsenals, completed the quadrangle.

In 1830 a third storehouse was built between the earlier ones and, logically enough, was known as the Middle Arsenal (Building 14). New gun racks designed by William Wade of the Army Ordnance Office were first installed here. It was these racks, rising tier on tier, that thirteen years later inspired poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow to describe, in "The Arsenal at Springfield," how

... from floor to ceiling,
Like a huge organ, rise the burnished arms...  

With Lee's death in 1833, the Springfield Armory entered a period of eight years of comparative stagnation, which ended in 1841 with the appointment of Major James W. Ripley as Commanding Officer. During this period several brick quarters were built, four of which have survived (Buildings 7, 8, 9 and 10).

Though Ripley's thirteen-year tenure at Springfield is most vividly remembered for the violent controversies it aroused, the period witnessed significant progress in the physical development of the Armory. The old Superintendent's residence was razed in 1843 and during 1845-46 Ripley constructed a palatial new residence (Building 1) at an unprecedented cost of $24,900. On the site of the old Superintendent's residence, crowning the west end of the parade, Ripley built the imposing bulk of the Main Arsenal (Building 13). Begun in the 1847 fiscal year, the Main Arsenal was completed three years later at a cost of $86,066.

Another important project Ripley undertook was the permanent fencing of the Armory Square tract. In August, 1847, he leased a sandstone quarry to provide stone for foundations and posts. Approval of patterns for the iron pickets, to be cast by Cyrus Alger and Company of Boston, was delayed until May, 1852. By the end of the 1853 fiscal year, the State Street side of Armory Square had been fenced. Economic considerations postponed further work until 1855, when the project was resumed under Ripley's successor, James S. Whitney. Whitney awarded the ironwork contract to the Ames Manufacturing Company of Chicopee, which completed the Federal Street portion of the fence by mid-1856. Byers Street was done during the 1860 fiscal year and the project was completed during the first year of the Civil War with the fencing of the Pearl Street side of Armory Square.

(Continued)
8. Statement of Significance: (4) Armory Square

When the Harpers Ferry Armory was destroyed at the outbreak of the Civil War, Springfield Armory became the Federal Government's sole supplier of military small arms, a distinction it held until 1904 when the Rock Island Arsenal began to manufacture rifles on a small scale. Several buildings were added to the Armory Square complex during this period. The oldest portion of Building 27 dates from 1863. Building 19, also constructed in 1863, housed stables on its first floor and barracks on its second; impressive for its unusual length--58 bays; 764 feet--it is perhaps the best extant example of an American cavalry caserne. Building 5 & 6, a double officers' quarters, was built in 1870; its Second Empire design is the only departure from the restrained, functional architecture which characterizes Armory Square. Erected in 1880 as a guard house, Building 12 later served as officers' quarters.

Springfield Armory remained active during the current century and, until phased out as a military installation in 1967-68, was the United States Army's principal research and development center and pilot manufactory for small arms.

Since 1968, Armory Square has been owned by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the City of Springfield in parcels of approximately thirty-six and eighteen acres respectively. The state-owned portion of the complex, including the parade ground and the majority of the Armory buildings, is now occupied by Springfield Technical Community College. Of the property acquired by the City, some thirteen acres, consisting of open land at the western end of the complex, are held by the Springfield School Department and currently used as a recreation area. The remaining five acres, on which are located the Commanding Officer's Quarters and the Main Arsenal, have been leased to a non-profit foundation, the Springfield Armory Museum, Inc.

Housed in the Main Arsenal, the Museum exhibits the Benton Small Arms Collection of some 10,000 items, representing not only the history and products of the Springfield Armory but a fairly accurate history of the entire American small arms industry, with many foreign military weapons included as well. The collection originated with Col. J. C. Benton, commanding officer of the Armory from 1868 to 1881; as a result of his interest, the initial museum was started about 1871. Its greatest impetus in the early years came in 1876, when Benton applied for and received a collection of some 700 arms that had been exhibited at the Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia. Though a destructive fire in 1931 caused extensive damage and destroyed some irreplaceable items, the collection today is one of the more significant to be found anywhere in the world.
### Major Bibliographical References

- Army Ordnance (Springfield Armory Number), IX, No. 49 (July-August, 1928)
- Gluckman, Arcadi. United States Martial Pistols and Revolvers (Buffalo, 1939), United States Muskets, Rifles and Carbines (Buffalo, 1948).
- Taylor, Robert J. Western Massachusetts in the Revolution (Providence, 1954).

### Geographical Data

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Approximate acreage of nominated property: 54 acres

### List All States and Counties for Properties Overlapping State or County Boundaries

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### Form Prepared By

Name and Title: Polly M. Rettig, Historian, Landmark Review Project; original form prepared by Charles E. Shedd, Staff Historian, 11/4/59

Organizations:

- Historic Sites Survey, National Park Service
- 1100 L Street NW.
- Washington, D.C. 20240

### State Liaison Officer Certification

As the designated State Liaison Officer for the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (Public Law 89-655), I hereby nominate this property for inclusion in the National Register and certify that it has been evaluated according to the criteria and procedures set forth by the National Park Service. The recommended level of significance of this nomination is:

- National [ ] State [ ] Local [ ]

Name: N/A

National Historic Landmark

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2. **LIST OF CLASSIFIED STRUCTURES**

[Source: Memo, Manager, Historic Architecture Program and Coordinator, Northeast Region List of Classified Structures, to Superintendent, SPAR NHS, January, 2007, with attachments (Spar: Central Files H3017....)]

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LCS MANAGEMENT CATEGORIES CODES AND DEFINITIONS:

Category A - Structures that must be Preserved and Maintained
A structure meeting any of the following criteria must be classified in Category A:

- The structure’s preservation is specifically legislated;
- The structure is related to the park’s legislated significance;
- The structure is nationally significant as defined by National Historic Landmark criteria (Category of Significance 1a);
- The structure is less than nationally significant, but contributes to the park’s national significance (Category of Significance 1b);
- The structure is a prehistoric structure.

Category B - Structures that should be Preserved and Maintained
A structure must meet all of the following criteria individually in Category B (failure to meet any of the conditions moves it to a lower category):

- The structure may meet the National Register criteria individually or as contributing element of a site or district (Categories of Significance II or III);
- The structure is not compatible with the park’s legislated significance
- The structure has a continuing or potential use based upon design and location.

Category C - Structures that may be Preserved or Maintained
Either of the following conditions places a structure in Category C:

- The structure may meet the National Register criteria individually or as a contributing element of a site or district, but because of condition, location, or other factors does not qualify for Category B;
- The structure does not meet the National Register criteria, but a decision has been reached through the planning process to manage the structure as a cultural resource.

Category D - Structures that may be or have been disposed of; altered for some other management purpose; or have been destroyed by natural forces or by accident
A structure that meets any of the following criteria may be placed in Category D:

- The structure is an irreplaceable hazard to public health and safety; the structure has lost its historical integrity;
- The structure is a physical or visual intrusion on the park’s legislated significance;
- The structure has been disposed of by planned action or destroyed by natural forces, or accident. [If the structure has been disposed of, it should be included in the Shadow database and not in the LCS active database.]
APPENDIX F: SUPERINTENDENTS OF SPRINGFIELD ARMORY NHS

[Source: “Chronology of NPS Involvement with Springfield Armory,” ns, nd but apparently created and filed in January 1975 (Washington Office, Park History Collection, folder: SPAR, Correspondence 1975-80)]

1977-1978 Mohammed A. Khan
1978-1990 W. Douglas Lindsay, Jr.
1990 Larry Lowenthal (Acting Superintendent)
1990 Bruce Stewart
1990-1991 Larry Lowenthal (Acting Superintendent)
1991-1999 Steven M. Beatty
2000-2008 J. Douglas Cuillard
2008- Michael Quijano-West
**APPENDIX G. ANNUAL VISITATION STATISTICS, 1979-2004**

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[Note: figures are taken from the NPS's web page for statistical reports, at http://www2.nature.nps.gov/NPstats/dspPark.cfm (consulted August, 2007). Monthly totals are available from 1979 onwards. Where visitation figures have been found in park reports or other documents they either match those reported on the website or differ by insignificant amounts. See Chapter Six for an explanation of the spike in visitation between 2000 and 2004, which seems to reflect a combination of special events and a different method of counting visitors.]
APPENDIX H. SPAR ORGANIZATION CHARTS

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<td></td>
<td>Historian Tech.</td>
<td>GS-0102-05</td>
<td>1930-10020</td>
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<td>(3.8)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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Permanent: 11.6
Temporary: 2.5
Total: 14.1
1. TARGET OF 1992 REORGANIZATION PLAN
1. **AS EXISTING IN 1993**

April 20, 1993

H30

Memorandum

To: Acting Chief, Division of Cultural Resources Management, North Atlantic Region

From: Superintendent, Springfield Armory National Historic Site

Subject: FY 1994 Cultural Resources Professionalization Budget Initiative

Reply due: April 21, 1993

The following positions are authorized and will be filled in FY93 or are needed and are included on the approved Target Organization Chart.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized FY93</th>
<th>Needed Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Museum Curator GS-11</td>
<td>Museum Curator GS-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archivist GS-09</td>
<td>Museum Tech. Preservation Specialist GS-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Museum Tech. (LE) Registrar GS-07</td>
<td>Museum Tech. Preservation Specialist GS-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Museum Tech. Preservation Specialist GS-05</td>
<td>Museum Tech. Preservation Specialist GS-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historian Tech. Photo Archivist GS-05</td>
<td>Historian Tech. Researcher GS-0102-05/07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TODAY LOWENTHAL’S FILES REMAIN THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE AND BEST ORGANIZED SOURCE FOR SOME ASPECTS OF THE PARK’S HISTORY. IT IS HARD TO TELL WHETHER THEY HAVE BEEN FURTHER DIMINISHED, BUT THEY STILL LACK SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY AND HAVE NOT BEEN INCORPORATED INTO THE LIBRARY: INSTEAD, THEY SIT IN TWO OLD FILE CABINETS IN THE MAIN HALLWAY OF THE PARK OFFICES. THE PARK’S CENTRAL FILES CONTAIN SUBSTANTIAL GAPS, NOT ONLY BEFORE BUT ALSO AFTER OURADA’S VISIT. DEPARTMENTAL FILES, APART FROM COpIOUS CATALOG AND CONSERVATION INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUAL COLLECTION SPECIMENS, AND CONSIDERABLE INFORMATION ON VISITOR SERVICES PROGRAMS, SEEM STRONGER ON CURRENT, DAY-TO-DAY PARK MANAGEMENT THAN ON HISTORICAL INFORMATION.

IT MAY BE ADDED THAT THE HISTORICAL RECORDS PRESERVED BY SPRINGFIELD TECHNICAL COMMUNITY COLLEGE, LOCATED WITHIN THE PARK AND A MAJOR ACTOR IN THE PARK’S HISTORY, ARE EXTREMELY FRAGMENTARY.

1 Memo, Regional Archivist, NAR (Steven Ourada), to Acting Regional Curator, NAR, March 6, 1992 (concurred by Chief, Div of Cult Resources and ART, Planning & Resource Preservation, March 19, 1992) (Charlestown: Regional Curator Files: folder SPAR CMP).
SOURCE REPOSITORIES

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE REPOSITORIES

Springfield Armory NHS Central, Cultural Resources Department, Lowenthal (park history), Superintendent’s, Visitor Services Department Files, and Archive Northeast Region, Boston Support Office Compliance and Planning Files
Northeast Museum Services Center, Charlestown, MA
CMP Project, CRM Division, and Regional Curator Files Washington Office
NHL/NR Program, Park History, and Park Planning Files

OTHER REPOSITORIES

Department of Interior, Northeast Regional Solicitor’s Office
Springfield Technical Community College, Springfield, MA
President’s Office, Map Room, and Second Floor Storage Files

LIST OF SOURCES

PRIMARY SOURCES

Sources are listed chronologically within each category. Where essential, references to source repositories are provided in square brackets.

Authorizing Legislation, Legislative History, and Documents Related to Accession and Authorization of SPAR

H.R. 19574, 91st Cong., A Bill to authorize the establishment of the Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Springfield, Massachusetts, and for other purposes (8 October 1970).

H.R. 108, 92nd Cong., A Bill to authorize the establishment of the Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Massachusetts, and for other purposes (22 January 1971).

S. 2977, 92nd Cong., A Bill to authorize the establishment of the Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Massachusetts, and for other purposes (9 December 1971).

S. 979, 93rd Cong., An Act to authorize the establishment of the Springfield Armory National Historic Site, Massachusetts, and for other purposes (5 December 1973).


corrections, marked “Unrevised and Unedited, not for quotation or duplication in any form”]


Public Law 93-486, 93rd Cong. (26 October 1974), An Act to Provide for the Establishment of the Clara Barton National Historic Site...and for Other Purposes.

Major Plans, Reports, and NEPA/NHPA Compliance Documents on Springfield Armory National Historic Landmark and National Historic Site


**Cooperative Agreements, Memoranda of Understanding, and Interagency Agreements**


*Memorandum of Understanding Between the National Park Service and Springfield Armory National Historic Site*. Signed 7, 11, 12, 13, and 14 February 1997.


INTERVIEWS

Steven Beatty (recorded: May 28, 2009)
Charles Clapper (recorded: March 24, 2009)
Doug Cuillard (2007)
Victor Focosi (recorded: June 1, 2009)
Louis Hutchins (recorded: December 3, 2008)
Robin Lepore (January 8, 2009)
Douglas Lindsay (recorded: March 19, 2009)
John McCabe (recorded: August 17, 2007)
Edward McManus (recorded: March 25, 2009)
Dwight Pitcaithley (recorded: May 28, 2009)
Michael Quijano-West (January 8, 2009; June 2, 2009)
James R. Roberts (various dates, 2005-2009; recorded: May 29, 2009)
Andrew M. Scibelli (recorded: June 4, 2009)
Frank Seng (2006)
Richard Turk (recorded: June 2, 2009)
Paul Weinbaum (various dates, 2005-09)
Sara Wolf (recorded: December 3, 2008)

SECONDARY SOURCES


