Contemporary Security Challenges: Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches


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Joint Special Operations University and the Strategic Studies Department

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On the cover. A U.S. Special Forces soldier conducts Security Assistance Training for members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in March 2003, on the Zamboanga Peninsula of the Philippine Island of Mindanao. This training—to help Philippine forces refine their counterterrorism capabilities—was provided as part of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P). U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer First Class Edward G. Martens.
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The JSOU Press presents this collection of writings from five current and former practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. The writers delve into the concept of surrogate warfare, defined as a substitute force acting on behalf of the interests of another as well as its own interests. For many special operators, the concept of unconventional warfare provides the paradigm for working “through, with, or by” other forces to achieve strategic objectives. Here the authors expand the concept by exploring “surrogate warfare.” This volume provides insights into this aspect of modern warfare and should be considered by senior military leaders and policymakers. Drawing upon their recent experiences in the field, the authors provide practical lessons for their colleagues’ consideration.

The first offering in this collection was contributed by Mr. Richard Newton, a JSOU faculty member and a retired air commando. Mr. Newton outlines the increased use and ramifications of indirect approaches, made essential by the post-World War II rise of the two superpowers, the United States and the former Soviet Union. His account of three 20th century uses of the through, with, or by concept (Philippines, El Salvador, and Afghanistan) makes clear that this type of conflict is often strategically pragmatic and effective at achieving U.S. as well as host national objectives.

Major Travis Homiak, U.S. Marine Corps, defines the ideas of working through, with, or by surrogate forces to achieve national security objectives. He offers three historical examples to illustrate the added value of indirect approaches, including the nonpromotion of “hegemonic intent.” Major Homiak posits that the “through, with, or by” principles are critical to U.S. SOF, but applicable to conventional forces as well.

Major Kelly Smith, a U.S. Army Special Forces officer, provides an analysis of surrogate warfare, mandating changes in policy and doctrine to include “comprehensive guidance” from the U.S. government to develop and employ this capability. MAJ Smith outlines several advantages to the use of surrogates, including decreased demand on U.S. forces, gaining political legitimacy, and providing capabilities that U.S. forces lack. He also highlights the benefits of a “holistic approach,” including conventional forces’ linkage to surrogates as well as SOF. Smith offers finite methods to integrating these concepts into U.S. policy and doctrine.
Major Isaac Peltier, a U.S. Army Special Forces officer, examines in detail two recent historical operations, illustrating success in leveraging surrogate forces. His position is Army Special Forces-centric and concludes that cultural/regional expertise, not familiarity, was the single most important factor in these successes. MAJ Peltier also calls for improvements in the ability of U.S. SOF to establish and function as an operational-level joint headquarters in order to plan, execute, and support an unconventional warfare campaign.

Mr. D. Jonathan White, a retired Special Forces officer, discusses many salient points of surrogate warfare, including legitimacy of allied regimes, commonality of interests between the United States and host nations, and the effects of human rights considerations on the legitimacy of the relationships involved. The “cautionary notes” Mr. White examines in this essay must be analyzed by any prudent planner regarding surrogate warfare operations.

American military forces have served alongside host-nation forces throughout history and across the globe. The surrogate relationships forged are critical to the continued defense against modern threats, and the points put forth in this volume will contribute to operational and strategic successes in future campaigns. These writings all amplify the need for developing and refining expertise in the use of surrogate forces in modern warfare. I believe the military professional will benefit from reading and understanding the various opinions offered in this volume.

James D. Anderson, Director of Research
JSOU Strategic Studies Department
The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare

Richard D. Newton

The tenets of surrogate warfare as described in the following essays by Majors Peltier, Smith, and Homiak—advising, assisting, and training indigenous forces in order to achieve the sponsor’s goals—were developed, tested, and perfected during the U.S.-Soviet Union proxy wars of the Cold War. This essay examines three of those conflicts: Philippines from 1947–1952, El Salvador from 1977–1989, and Afghanistan from 1979–1989. They serve as examples of combat development laboratories where the principals of “through, with, or by” were perfected—principles that a new generation of SOF leaders would apply to surrogate warfare in the 21st century.

Introduction

In July of 1969, President Richard Nixon articulated a new approach to U.S. national security objectives. As a newly elected president who had inherited an unpopular war, President Nixon’s vision was to pursue American national security goals through partnership with friends and allies of the United States. That announcement, afterwards known as the Nixon Doctrine, affirmed to the world that the United States would keep all of its treaty commitments and in the case of aggression short of nuclear confrontation, the U.S. would furnish military and economic assistance but would look to the host nations to assume the primary responsibility for furnishing the manpower to defend themselves. The Nixon Doctrine, allowing advice and assistance, but eschewing direct military involvement, has been reaffirmed by every U.S. President since, albeit to differing degrees. More importantly for the purpose of this volume, however, Nixon’s 40-year-old pronouncement provided the policy basis for modern surrogate warfare.

Mr. Rick Newton retired from Air Force Special Operations Command in 1999 after 21 years as an air commando and combat rescue pilot. He is currently a faculty member of the Joint Special Operations University and serves as an adjunct faculty member at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies and the NATO School.
Throughout the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union used a collection of surrogates to further their political, and by extension their military, agendas around the world. In an era of mutual nuclear deterrence, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union chose to support surrogates in a series of proxy wars. Over 50 years of indirect confrontation between the superpowers manifested itself in scores of limited conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central America, and South America. The Soviets and the U.S. confronted each other for influence and access on the periphery of what both considered the main arena—the central plains of Europe. The unexpected (perhaps unintended) result of five decades of indirect superpower confrontation was that U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) developed the skills, attitude, and ethos they later needed for the very successful surrogate warfare campaigns waged in Afghanistan (2001) and northern Iraq (2003).

The seeds to modern surrogate warfare, at least in the U.S. version, go all the way back to before the Revolutionary War. The Special Forces’ philosophy of conducting operations “through, with, or by” indigenous populations has its origins in the beginning of the Republic. Both the British and the French enlisted native American surrogates in their frontier battles of the 17th and 18th centuries. During the westward expansion before and after the Civil War, the Army recruited or coerced Indians to fight against those Indians who opposed the settlers, ranchers, and miners moving west. In 1901, after the Spanish-American War, the U.S. Army organized friendly Filipinos into the Philippine Constabulary to fight and pacify the indigenous groups opposed to the U.S. occupation. Throughout World War II, the U.S. Army Office of Special Services, the forerunner to today’s Special Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency, used surrogates in Southeast Asia to fight against the Japanese and in Europe to fight against the Axis powers. It was only natural, then, for the U.S. to continue using native surrogates during the Cold War to counter Soviet aspirations.

After the Allied victory in World War II many former European colonies in Asia and Africa saw an opportunity to assert their native nationalism and gain independence from the colonial powers. The Soviet Union used these independence movements as opportunities to export the Communist form of socialism and to gain international supporters as a counter to the U.S. and its European allies. The U.S., flush with victory but tired after years of war, sought a low cost means of supporting its treaty commitments, assisting its
allies, and countering the spread of Communism. As the U.S. government provided equipment and funds, training indigenous forces and advising friendly foreign governments and their armed forces became the Special Forces *raison d’être*.

The U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force retained their organizational, training, procurement, and planning efforts to a near-exclusive focus on peer versus peer, conventional warfare.⁴ Both the Army and Air Force left the uncomfortable and often “messy” environment of limited warfare, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, counterrevolutionary warfare, and irregular warfare to their respective SOF.⁵,⁶

This division of labor was not necessarily a bad thing. While the “big green” Army and the “big blue” Air Force focused on what the national leadership perceived to be the most dangerous threat to the U.S. national survival—deterring direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, SOF conducted economy-of-force activities on the periphery of the main arena. For over five decades, the U.S. Army Special Forces, and to a lesser extent, the Air Commandos of the U.S. Air Force, quietly practiced and perfected the regional, cultural, diplomatic, and trainer skills so necessary for success in surrogate warfare. Their quiet efforts in the far-flung regions of the world bred a cadre of special operators comfortable with surrogate warfare, away from the comfortable and robust infrastructure of the conventional Army and Air Force based primarily in central Europe.

Although these “low intensity conflicts”? were the most prevalent form of conflict the United States engaged in during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, they were decidedly an economy-of-force effort. Small SOF teams would deploy for months at a time to remote locations; their focus was to train, assist, and advise the indigenous forces and governments that supported U.S. national goals. In addition to the small-unit tactical skills they employed and taught their hosts, Special Forces training included a healthy dose of regional familiarity, local languages, cultural acumen, and instructor development. A Special Forces soldier had to become part anthropologist, part diplomat, part organizational developer, and part cultural attaché as well as being an excellent soldier and trainer.

*Small SOF teams would deploy for months at a time to remote locations; their focus was to train, assist, and advise the indigenous forces and governments that supported U.S. national goals.*
Operating embedded with or alongside their native hosts around the world, the Special Forces became this nation’s principal tool to recruit, organize, train, and lead surrogate forces sympathetic to U.S. national interests.

The Special Forces operational methodology—embedding with their host-nation counterparts, speaking the hosts’ languages, and using the hosts’ equipment—proved to be relatively inexpensive for the United States to sustain, kept the American presence to a minimum in areas that may have political aversion to foreign involvement, and improved the ability of the host forces to provide for their nations’ defenses. In return, U.S. Special Forces gained tactical skills related to the native environment (e.g., jungle warfare or desert warfare) they were able to bring home and teach to their U.S. counterparts. The lessons learned in scores of anti-Communist campaigns around the world were applied with great success during the unconventional warfare campaigns in Afghanistan (2001) and in northern Iraq (2003). The seeds of 21st century surrogate warfare were sown during those five decades of anti-Soviet experiences and cultivated to maturity by the Special Forces core purpose and core values—accomplishing their assigned missions through, with, or by indigenous forces.

The Philippines, 1946–1954

By 1942, the Hukbalahap (People's Anti-Japanese Army in Tagalog, nicknamed the Huks)—the military arm of the Communist Philippines Party (PKP)—was actively attacking Japanese outposts and units in Luzon to gain weapons and supplies. Americans who had refused General MacArthur’s surrender order and took to the hills helped the Huks organize their units, set up training camps, and served as advisors to the tactical units fighting a guerrilla campaign against the Japanese. When MacArthur and the U.S. Sixth Army landed on Luzon, they met a large, highly organized indigenous military force led by U.S. advisors. The 20,000 Filipino guerrillas had effectively contained the Japanese to a series of coastal forts—thereby providing a safe and secure, anti-Japanese environment for the populace.

The PKP, meanwhile redistributed lands from absent large landowners to the peasants, set up schools, and formed local governments to manage the villages.

After the war, when the government of the Philippines returned from exile, it failed to address the single greatest issue plaguing Filipino
society—land reform. When the government, the wealthy landowners, and the industrialists returned after the war, they reasserted their historical claims to the land and returned to the 400-year-old plantation and tenant farming system that had been originally set up by the Spanish and maintained by the Americans and then the Filipino oligarchy. It was an unfair system that gave the PKP and the Huks the cause they needed, “land for the landless,” to oppose the government.

The Huks did not initially oppose the return of the popular and powerful American military. Also, the Truman Administration had committed to Filipino independence and was pumping reconstruction aid into the islands. This quiet period gave the PKP time to organize itself and gain control of the many disparate socialist and Communist groups throughout the Philippine archipelago. The PKP, with Chinese and Soviet assistance, reoriented itself against the pro-Western government of President Manuel Roxas and began a Maoist-style, protracted popular war to take over the country. From 1946 to 1949, the Philippine government’s “mailed fist” tactics and heavy handed anti-Huk policies failed to address the root causes of the insurgency and drove many disaffected peasants into the ranks of the insurgents. Philippine Army leaders and their American advisors fighting against the Huks noted the success of the Huks’ integrated civil-military programs, but their reports were ignored by conventional military leaders who had been trained to fight against other organized armies in Western staff schools and were focused exclusively on a military solution.

President Roxas was succeeded by President Elpidio Quirino. He recognized that a new strategy was needed to counter the Huks and in 1949 began a series of financial and land reforms. President Quirino appointed a new secretary for national defense in 1950, Ramon Magsaysay, a gifted and charismatic former guerrilla leader who had fought against the Japanese with the U.S. Army Forces Far East, to lead the security effort. Also in 1950, the U.S. recognized how close the Filipino government was to collapse. President Truman committed the United States to support the Philippines’ efforts against the Communist-supported Huks. The Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) Philippines was expanded, and aid and assistance began to flow. In addition to money, equipment, and training, American advisors helped the Philippine government develop a comprehensive assistance program to complement the military, political, and social reforms being instituted by Magsaysay.
Almost immediately after assuming his duties, Magsaysay began an intense effort to reform the Army of the Philippines, weeding out corrupt or inept senior leaders, demanding accountability for human rights abuses, and promoting officers who supported his views on winning the support of the populace. Magsaysay was tireless in his efforts to change the people’s perception of the Philippine Army and National Police, spurred in part by his close friend and advisor, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lansdale.

Lt Col Lansdale led the American program to assist Magsaysay. It is interesting to note that U.S. efforts in the Philippines were constrained by some very fortunate circumstances. First, the U.S. military was committed to the reconstruction of Europe and Japan, and also to the war in Korea. There were no conventional U.S. Army units available for a counterinsurgency effort in the Philippines. Second, all arms and materiel given to the Filipinos were taken from excess World War II stocks—the weapons were familiar to the Filipinos, the arms and ammunition were plentiful and were essentially free, and they were fairly easy to maintain. And third, Lansdale’s leadership style and close friendship with Ramon Magsaysay encouraged the Filipinos to take responsibility for the success or failure of their war against the Huks.

The American advisors in the Philippines, from the battalion level to President Magsaysay, advised their counterparts on counterguerrilla tactics and encouraged them to form local solutions. During an interview after he had retired from the Air Force, Lansdale noted that, “the Filipinos best knew the problems, best knew how to solve them, and they did it—with U.S. aid and advice, but without U.S. domination of their effort.” American advisors were instructed to take a back seat and give their Filipino counterparts credit for successes.

U.S. military trainers began teaching patrolling skills, especially night patrolling, squad and platoon tactics off the main lines of communications, and the same hit-and-run tactics used by the Huk guerrillas. More important than teaching tactics, U.S. trainers imparted Magsaysay’s passion for improving the Army’s treatment of the civilian population, and they helped reorganize the Army of the Philippines (AFP) into lighter and more mobile battalion combat teams. They also built a functioning logistics system to sustain the units and equipment. U.S. trainers were prohibited from accompanying AFP units as advisors and observers during combat
operations, however. The thought was that the Americans would take over or be thrust into a de facto leadership role at the tactical level and the Huks would turn the presence of the Americans against the government by advertising their cause as a fight to expel another foreign occupier. Despite the advisors’ desire to get into the field with their units, at the strategic level, this restriction proved to be sound.

In 1953, though, an important change took place in the U.S. philosophy—American military advisors were finally permitted to accompany and observe, but not actively participate in, AFP combat operations. Whenever advice was shared, it was given directly to the tactical Filipino leader who needed it, as low in the organization as possible, and given by an advisor who the recipient knew and trusted. In addition, the advisors/observers took note of the tactics employed, the effect military actions were having on the populace, and the how the U.S.-supplied equipment was used. When the advisors/observers returned to their base camps, these real-time lessons were used to update and improve training programs.

Even though the U.S. government provided most of the material, arms, and money to fund the AFP and provided advice when it was needed, it was Filipinos who fought the battles against the Communist-sponsored Huks and ran the social and economic programs. By 1954, Filipino police, military, and civilian officials, along with their American trainers and advisors, had successfully neutralized the Huks through a coordinated military and civilian campaign, addressed the peasants’ social, economic, and educational grievances, and restored the legitimacy of the government. The Filipinos, with the help of American advisors, had taken back their country from the Communist insurgents.19


In 1969, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, then the secretary-general of El Salvador’s Communist Party (PCES), recommended starting a Maoist-style protracted popular war to overthrow the most recent military junta governing El Salvador. This position was rejected by the PCES, and Cayetano Carpio was expelled from the Party. In 1971, though, Cayetano Carpio and a group of El Salvadoran Communists returned from years of training and indoctrination in Cuba and Vietnam to organize the country’s first guerrilla movement, the Farabundo Marti Popular Forces of Liberation.20 Through
the 1970s, competing dissident groups fought the successive corrupt, often incompetent, and repressive governments and each other, struggling for control of a nation racked by poverty, corruption, violence, and disease. Human rights abuses by both the rebels and the government forces were common. By 1979 at least five major insurgent groups were seeking to impose a Communist-style socialist government in El Salvador.

The government’s internal problems, its string of human rights abuses, and the failure to address the root causes of popular dissatisfaction—unemployment, lack of educational opportunities, desperately needed land reform, and rampant government arrogance—caused disaffected young men to flock to the rebels’ cause. Even priests in the normally noncommittal Roman Catholic Church began to defy their superiors’ counsel to remain neutral and took a more activist stance against the government. In 1979, the PCES finally accepted armed struggle as the only means of changing the government in El Salvador ... a position first recommended 10 years earlier by Cayetano Carpio.21

In December 1979, the five major Salvadoran revolutionary groups gathered in Havana, Cuba at Fidel Castro’s invitation to organize into a single, coordinated effort. Although the groups had disparate goals and backgrounds, the common theme was their desire to impose a Communist-style government in El Salvador to rectify the missteps and abuses of centuries of colonial, then military, rule. In 1980, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) asserted itself as the single revolutionary party in El Salvador. The FMLN was able to secure economic and military aid, financing, and training from the Soviet Union, Libya, Cuba, Nicaragua, and even radical groups in the United States to support its revolutionary goals.

Although purporting itself to be the single voice of revolutionary change in El Salvador, the FMLN was an inherently weak organization. The FMLN had tenuous control at best of the various rebel groups.22 More a loose confederation of local guerrilla organizations than a strong, united revolutionary front committed to new El Salvador, the FMLN was never able to reconcile the diverging and usually competing strategies employed by the different factions.23 For example, a Cuban-style “foco” model employed by an urban-based group often conflicted with the Maoist popular war strategy used by a rural group. The result was contradictory political, social, and military FMLN operations over the course of the war that gave the government much
needed time to adjust its own social and economic programs, change its military tactics, and address its internal deficiencies.

In January 1981, the FMLN called for a “final offensive,” a Maoist-style Stage 3 effort to defeat the government using conventional military force. The move was premature, however, and the army defeated the rebels and sent the insurgents into the mountains for sanctuary. The Carter Administration in the United States reacted to this FMLN/Communist threat by restoring $5 million in military aid. In 1982, the newly elected Reagan Administration committed the U.S. to political, economic, and military assistance in El Salvador to counter Soviet-sponsored Communist expansion in the Western hemisphere.24

Remembering the recent lessons of Vietnam, the size of the U.S. contingent was limited to 55 military advisors and trainers. The Americans set up training camps in El Salvador and in neighboring Honduras; they also sent two to three officers or NCOs to live and work with each of the six Salvadoran brigades. The mission of these assigned advisors was to reinforce the lessons taught in the training centers, provide assessments of the units’ effectiveness, and change the El Salvadoran Army’s historically terrible human rights record.

More like the American experience in the Philippines than in Vietnam, advisors were prohibited from engaging in combat operations in order to maintain the perception that this was an El Salvadoran war to be won or lost by the El Salvadorans. Another consequence of the small U.S. presence was the ease by which U.S. advisors and the accompanying aid package could be withdrawn from those units not actively correcting their human rights problems. The Army’s treatment of noncombatants, innocent civilians, and prisoners radically and quickly improved because of this “carrot and stick” approach to behavior modification.

Changing the El Salvadoran Army’s attitude towards its civilian population allowed the government to begin focusing on the root causes of the insurgency—land reform, the lack of educational opportunities, a sickly economy, and a corrupt electoral process. Basing U.S. military aid on demonstrated social and political improvements was beginning to pay off as
popular support for the FMLN began to swing to the government. But in 1983, FMLN guerrillas adjusted their tactics and sent small, highly trained teams of commandos to execute a series of successful raids against heavily defended El Salvadoran bases. U.S. advisors also adjusted quickly and reoriented the training and advisory programs to focus on small-unit tactics more appropriate to a counterguerrilla style of warfare. More importantly, however, the changes in tactics, attitudes, and treatment of civilians that resulted from the actions of U.S. trainers and advisors supported the larger, longer-term efforts of El Salvador’s multifaceted national campaign for defeating the FMLN.

As the El Salvadoran Army changed its tactics, its attitude, and its track record, the climate for political change improved too. In March 1984, José Napoleón Duarte—a previous mayor of the capital, San Salvador, a graduate of Notre Dame, and the president of El Salvador from 1980 to 1982—was reelected to the presidency on a platform of social and economic reforms, eliminating human rights abuses, and negotiation with the FMLN. Duarte’s election, El Salvador’s first free election in 50 years, was marred by the fact that El Salvador was in near full civil war. Over the next few years, Duarte was unable to institute most of his promised economic and social programs due to intransigence by both the insurgents and the hard-liners in his own administration. In 1989 Duarte’s Christian Democratic Party was defeated by Alfredo Christiani and the ARENA party, the first peaceful transfer of power to an opposition candidate in El Salvador’s history.

The Soviet Union’s troubles at home and abroad contributed to changing the FMLN’s reluctance to negotiate. The Soviets were trying to extricate themselves from Afghanistan, were dealing with nationalist independence movements among their client states in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and had a failing economy at home. In neighboring Nicaragua, the newly elected Violeta Chamorro government had decided to focus on internal problems; they also stopped supporting the FMLN insurgents. With the insurgents’ external military, economic, and financial support reduced to a trickle, and the U.S. Congress threatening decreased support to the government, both sides came to the negotiating table in 1990. By 1991, negotiations with the FMLN produced a truce that ended the war in 1992, created a new Constitution, established a civilian police force, and transformed the FMLN into a legal political party.
The government of El Salvador and its military and police forces—with the aid, advice, and assistance of the United States and the U.S. military advisors—had defeated the Communist-sponsored FMLN insurgency.

**Afghanistan, 1979–1989**

Afghanistan sits astride the crossroads of civilizations. For over two millennia, trade routes from China and India to Europe and Arabia have passed through this mountainous and often barren land. Great invading armies—from Alexander to the Mongols, the British, the Soviets, and now the U.S. and its European allies—have had to deal with the quandary that was and is Afghanistan.

Throughout its thousands of years of history, Afghanistan has maintained its traditional tribal and familial culture. When Islam arrived with Arab invaders in the 7th century, it provided a loose sense of pseudo-nationalism, giving the tribes a sense of culture, morality, and tradition that would normally have come from a shared development and common history. But when faced with stress or conflict, Afghans normally reverted to their families, clans, and tribes for security, safety, and comfort. The Soviets, during their 50 years of involvement with Afghanistan during the Cold War, failed to address this key trait of Afghan society and culture.

As early as 1919, just after the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union was funneling money, arms, and training to support Afghan rebels fighting the British in India (present day Pakistan). According to Dr. Stephen Blank at the U.S. Air Force Air University, “Soviet involvement had turned Afghanistan into a virtual client state.” By the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union was sending millions of dollars each year in economic, military, and political aid to Afghanistan. Soviet investment in Afghanistan guaranteed they held a strategic position between two U.S. allies in the region, Pakistan and Iran.

In 1973, Mohammed Daoud Khan became the first president of Afghanistan after overthrowing the monarchy of Zahir Shah in a bloodless coup. Daoud was a Pashtun who supported an independent Pashtunistan. This position ensured the U.S. would not look favorably on supporting Afghanistan against the Soviets, as an independent homeland for the Pashtuns would require the U.S. ally, Pakistan, to give up major portions of its territory. In an effort to secure his position in the region, faced with
a complex and unstable internal political situation, and recognizing that Afghanistan was one of the poorest, least educated, and backward societies in the world, Daoud continued Zahir Shah’s policies of accepting Soviet aid, advice, and assistance. In 1977, however, Daoud began to move away from the Soviet Union and the Cuban-led nonaligned movement. With U.S. support and concurrence, he requested and received training from Egypt and aid from both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Daoud began the process of shifting Afghanistan’s orientation towards the oil-rich and pro-Western nations of the Arabian Gulf.

In August 1978, a group of Soviet-trained Afghan officers and the pro-Soviet People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized control of the government and founded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. President Daoud was assassinated and a Marxist, Nur Taraki, was installed as president. Unfortunately, the PDPA was not ready to govern such a large and diverse country as Afghanistan. With its urban base, its Marxist-Leninist orientation, and with the concurrence of its Soviet advisors, the PDPA attempted to change Afghan traditions. The PDPA’s Marxist-Leninist antipathy towards both religion and the peasantry resulted in misguided policies regarding land reform, female emancipation, language, and religious observances. These unpopular changes were strongly resisted by the local political and religious leaders and resulted in open rebellion against the PDPA-led government.

With entire units defecting and the Afghan army down to half its strength, the Afghan government looked to the Soviet Union for help to quell the rebellion. In July 1979, the Soviets sent an airborne battalion to Bagram Air Base to protect President Taraki. Shortly thereafter, the Taraki government requested an additional two motorized rifle divisions and an airborne division be deployed to Afghanistan. While the Soviets were anxious to keep Afghanistan in their sphere of influence, they were not in a hurry to honor the Taraki government’s requests for a large commitment of troops and equipment, however.

By December 1979, the situation in Kabul had deteriorated to the point that the Soviet General Staff sent a group of specialized airborne and intelligence troops to help “liberate” Afghanistan. The Soviets installed Babrak Karmal into power. In the spring of 1980, Soviet ground troops deployed to Afghanistan and an airborne division deployed to Bagram Air Base. The Soviet incursion had the opposite of the desired effect—instead of calming
or controlling the rebellion, the Soviets’ presence incited an unexpected feeling of Afghan nationalism. It was as if the only thing the disparate tribes would agree on was that they did not want foreigners in their country.

From 1980 to 1985, the fight in Afghanistan devolved into a classic guerilla campaign. The Soviets and their Afghan clients occupied the cities and controlled the main transportation arteries, while 80 percent of the countryside was controlled by the opposing tribes.33 By 1985, over 110,000 Soviet troops were deployed to Afghanistan to combat approximately 100,000 mujahideen fighters—significantly short of the doctrinally recommended ratio of 10 soldiers for every guerrilla combatant.34

Almost as soon as the Soviets began their deployment to Afghanistan, the United States sought ways of countering the Soviet incursion. President Carter and then President Reagan both authorized intelligence and aid packages to assist the Afghan guerrillas. President Reagan increased the pressure on the Soviets by encouraging U.S. allies and regional partners to provide arms, money, and training to surrogates willing to challenge the Soviet’s growing influence and presence in South Asia.

U.S. support of the Afghans was intentionally low key. Although the Carter and Reagan administrations were keen to challenge Soviet expansion in South and Southwest Asia, they had to be mindful of national and cultural sensitivities in the region and of provoking the Soviets to expand the conflict by engaging their own proxies in the region—India, Iraq, and Syria. The U.S. supported Middle Eastern surrogates from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Iran to supply military, humanitarian, and financial aid to the mujahideen, through Pakistan.35 The external aid consisted of modern light infantry weapons, primarily from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and the training provided built upon the Afghans’ traditional fighting methods—ambushes and raids against the vulnerabilities inherent in the Soviet’s mechanized, conventional style of warfare. These were the same guerrilla techniques the Afghans’ forefathers had employed in the 19th century against British conventional battalions.

From sanctuaries outside of Afghanistan, primarily in Pakistan, advisors and trainers worked with the Afghan resistance on individual and small-unit skills. More importantly, though, they developed communications techniques and fostered coordinated operations between tactical/tribal units—an inherent deficiency in the Afghan’s clan-based and familial traditions. With a supply of familiar arms and ammunition assured from
external sources, the Afghans learned to integrate modern heavier weapons such as machine guns, wired-guided antiarmor missiles, and rocket-propelled grenades in a supporting role, yet still retaining their traditional fighting methods.

The Soviets countered improved Afghan guerrilla tactics with air mobility and aerial fire support to great effect. Mi-24 attack helicopters and Su-25 attack aircraft offset the Afghans’ inherent mobility, knowledge of the terrain, and improved weapons. In 1986, though, the U.S. changed the equation again in favor of their surrogates by providing Stinger antiaircraft missiles and training to the Afghans. The threat of the Stingers neutralized the Soviet’s heliborne advantage, and the war returned to its previous unpopular, costly, and near stalemate conditions.

When Mikhail Gorbachev became the prime minister of the Soviet Union in 1988, he promised to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan within the year. The first Soviet units began their withdrawal by the spring of 1988, and the entire Soviet Army had left Afghanistan by February 1989. The Soviet Union paid a terrible price for its adventure in Afghanistan—in lost confidence in the Communist ideology at home and among its client states, in tens of thousands of physical and psychological casualties, and in lost power and prestige worldwide. Though it was not one of the expected outcomes of U.S. actions in Afghanistan at the time, U.S. surrogates and their American advisors helped force the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

The war in Vietnam officially ended in April 1975 when North Vietnamese armored columns defeated the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam, although U.S. involvement had ended in 1973 with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords. In the aftermath of Vietnam, America’s officer corps reoriented itself away from those activities they perceived had failed to win in Vietnam. Among their frustrations was that despite years of military assistance, the South Vietnamese Army had been unable to eliminate Viet Cong insurgents in the South or to stem the invasion by North Vietnamese regular forces attacking from the north.

The Nixon Doctrine reflected the President’s frustration and the nation’s determination to not place large bodies of American soldiers in harm’s way again, defending another nation against an internal or an external aggressor.
Though the series of proxy wars over the next three decades was widespread and frequent, these politically uncertain, unconventional, irregular, and/or low intensity conflicts provided a persistent and unwanted distraction from the Department of State and Department of Defense’s main task of deterring direct conflict with the Soviet Union. Conventionally minded Defense leaders happily passed responsibility for the U.S. military’s response to the Soviets’ proxy wars to the nation’s SOF. That force evolved into a low cost and low footprint unconventional force—organized, trained, and equipped to advise, assist, and train U.S. surrogates in distant regions and to counter Soviet-sponsored aggression in the developing world.

Over the course of the Cold War’s proxy wars, the U.S. had to relearn that indigenous opposition groups were rarely unified. They, like constituent groups in every country, had personal agendas and specific goals. Successful U.S. advisors studied and learned as much as they could about their opponents’ objectives, ideologies, cultures, motivations, heritage, and traditions—this was the anthropologist, diplomat, and cultural attaché part of their advisory role. Special operations advisors exploited those differences and sensitivities when helping their hosts develop, implement, and adjust the social, economic, political, and security programs needed to counter insurgents around the world. Those young Special Forces officers held onto the lessons they learned during these surrogate/proxy conflicts around the world; and as they became senior leaders and mentors, they passed those lessons on to the next generations of special operations advisors.

The Philippines, El Salvador, and Afghanistan are three of the major instances where U.S. military advisors developed and refined the tactics, techniques, and procedures for successful surrogate warfare. The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations seemingly ignored the lessons learned in the Philippines, “Americanized” the South Vietnamese Army into a modern conventional force, and thus the U.S. and their South Vietnamese allies failed to defeat the Communist North Vietnamese. In El Salvador and against the Soviets in Afghanistan, political restrictions kept the U.S. presence small, but the U.S. took great advantage of SOF’s unconventional warfare skills in physically and politically risky environments. The indigenous surrogates, with the economic and military aid and the corresponding training originally promised by the Nixon Doctrine and implemented by Presidents Carter and Reagan, defeated the Soviets and Soviet-sponsored adversaries.
By the time U.S. and Afghan Northern Alliance forces had defeated the Taliban, the Soviet Union had died and the ideological motivation had changed. In the Philippines, El Salvador, and Afghanistan, U.S. advisors and trainers developed and perfected the principles of “through, with, or by” described in the essays by Majors Homiak, Peltier, and Smith. The doctrine and the integrated social, political, economic, and military tactics, techniques, and procedures for surrogate warfare these officers and their contemporaries applied as combat leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq are the product of five decades of uncomfortable, politically difficult, and often messy proxy wars between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Endnotes

   Also Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, Inc., 1990), 7.

2. After the end of the World War II, and once the Soviets gained nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver those weapons onto U.S. soil, the two superpowers engaged in over five decades of surrogate confrontation. In proxy wars from Vietnam to Angola, El Salvador, Afghanistan, and Yemen (and the list goes on), the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. armed, equipped, trained, and at times lead the soldiers and the guerrillas of “3rd World” nations, seeking to bring or retain those nations in their competing “camps” of democracy or communism.

3. COL Mark Boyatt, “Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We?” Special Warfare, Summer 1998, 36.


5. GEN John Galvin, as the commander of U.S. Southern Command, coined the term “Uncomfortable Wars” when referring to this environment in the winter 1986 edition of Parameters, the U.S. Army War College professional journal.


7. Low intensity conflict was a pseudonym used in the 1970s and 1980s to refer to the conflicts usually fought by guerrillas, most often revolutionaries and insurgents, seeking to change the political status quo. Unfortunately, the term is misleading,
as combat may have been contained to a particular country or region, or by the destructive capacity of the weapons involved, but it was rarely of low intensity.

8. Boyatt, 37. The Special Forces core purpose is to accomplish its missions through, with, or by indigenous populations, and their core values are unconventionalism, strength of character, doing what is right, and making a difference.


11. Asprey, 529.

12. Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 291–292. “Potentially, the Hiks had even greater peasant appeal than had either the Chinese or Vietnamese Communists; they had laid the broad foundations for it during the war on the dual count of fighting the invader and their insistence on a just redistribution of the land.”


17. Greenberg, 108. Luis Taruc, leader of the Hiks, noted that American aid and advice was causing the tide of battle to change as the Philippine government was changing its tactics and addressing the social and economic causes of the insurgency.


19. Ibid., 150.

20. Asprey, 1095–1097.

21. Ibid., 1097.

22. Ibid., 1098.


24. Ibid., 9.

25. Asprey, 1101.


28. Asprey, 1202.
29. Blank, 58.
32. Asprey, 1205.
33. Beckett, 211.
34. Joes, 177.
35. Grau, xviii.
37. Beckett, 211 and Clarke, 49-50. Clarke goes on to quote Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard Perle, as insisting that the U.S. Army advisors conduct all Stinger training from bases in Pakistan.
38. Clarke, 50.
Expanding the American Way of War: Working “Through, With, or By” Non-U.S. Actors

Travis L. Homiak

The indirect method of “through, with, or by” seeks to use relationships with non-U.S. actors and shared recognition of a common problem to produce mutually beneficial outcomes. This indirect approach supports achieving U.S. operational objectives without promoting perceptions of U.S. hegemony. Consequently, this method offers the combatant commander a viable alternative to traditional, direct applications of U.S. military power.

The U.S. is widely perceived as emphasising military power as a tool of foreign policy, at the expense of the complexities of diplomacy and other forms of ‘soft’ power.


Introduction

The United States has unparalleled national power and global reach. Logic dictates that such power should facilitate the United States achieving its national objectives. America’s national power has real limits in what it can achieve, however.

The United States currently has no peer competitors able to realistically challenge them in a conventional military conflict. As a result, the

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U.S. increasingly chooses direct applications of military power to achieve national security objectives. The direct use of military power (or the threat thereof) is one element of the nation’s “hard” power and constitutes a traditional approach to employing military force. The invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 are both examples of America’s traditional employment of hard power.

Yet, U.S. military power, applied traditionally in Iraq and Afghanistan, has proven incapable of achieving its intended policy goals. Particularly in the case of Iraq, one can argue that America’s decision to directly apply military power—notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. arguably acted unilaterally—has significantly hampered its ability to realize stated policy objectives. This example illustrates a concern upon which this paper is based—that the direct application of military power to achieve a policy objective, at the expense of less obtrusive military alternatives and balanced employment of national power, may retard rather than enable the realization of those objectives.

According to Robert Kagan, America’s preeminent military power spawns a proclivity for direct, unilateral action in pursuit of its policy goals. Kagan maintains that it is precisely America’s vast military power relative to the rest of the world that makes its direct use so difficult to sanction. Moreover, the direct, unbalanced employment of military power tends to paint the United States as a hegemon vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Consequently other nations, to include potential partners, feel threatened by America’s actions and tend to oppose them as a counterbalance.

If America’s preeminent military power makes direct applications of military power problematic—specifically, traditional applications of military power—the United States must develop an alternative approach. Such an alternative must include a less intrusive, indirect method that emphasizes nontraditional applications of military power. Unlike the oft ill-perceived direct approach, this indirect technique should focus on building mutually beneficial relationships with other agents or actors—namely, relationships that enhance our partners’ capacity and will to take actions that promote the realization of U.S. national security goals.
It is useful to consider unconventional warfare (UW), a facet of military operations that emphasizes indirect methods while seeking to define and develop an indirect alternative to the traditional, direct approach. A key component of UW focuses on working “through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source.” Working “through, with, or by” non-U.S. actors offers combatant commanders an indirect method for resolving dynamic, highly complex problems and achieving operational-level objectives—a method that, depending on circumstances, can be politically more palatable and practically feasible than employing a traditional, direct approach. This paper will explore “through, with, or by” as a methodology: defining the terms, discussing the methodology’s application at the operational level, and considering the associated implications at the combatant-command level.

What is Really Meant by the Phrase “Through, With, or By?”

The phrase “through, with, or by” can be explained by examining different relationships between two notional actors (i.e., Actor A and Actor B) and their relative capacities and will for undertaking action. In broad terms, working “through, with, or by” refers to the idea that Actor A directly or indirectly builds Actor B’s capacity and will to take action to address a given problem, the resolution of which benefits both parties. Within this construct, capacity refers to an actor’s ability to undertake action in a given situation, while will refers to an actor’s ability to decide his own actions. Will has three components: recognition of the problem, desire to take action, and determination to see that action through to completion. For clarity, the terms “through, with, or by” will be addressed from most to least visible with regard to the overt nature of underlying interactions, rather than defining them in the order in which they appear in the Joint UW definition.

“With” is the most overt association in the methodology, necessitating a physical presence and associated interaction between Actors A and B. “Accompanied by or accompanying” best defines the concept of working “with” another agent. In a relationship defined as working “with,” Actor A works alongside Actor B to address a given problem while providing Actor B with the capacity, will, or both required to act. In this relationship, Actor A
works side by side with Actor B, while facilitating the resolution of a mutual problem. Working “with” another actor is an on-the-scene activity where Actor A is physically present with Actor B—that is, sharing ideas, providing advice, and combining resources.

A special operations assistance mission whereby Actor A trains and equips (builds capacity) in Actor B and then fights alongside him (provides will) demonstrates working “with” in terms of a military task. An excellent historical example is provided by Special Operations Executive/Office of Strategic Services (SOE/OSS) operatives who equipped and fought alongside Tito’s partisans in Yugoslavia during World War II. SOE/OSS operatives built the partisans’ capacity for action through aerial-delivered equipment, bolstered their will through their presence as representatives of the Western Allies (at least initially), and fought side by side to defeat the Germans in the Balkans.

The second of the three relationships in order of observability is working “through” and refers to achieving an objective “by means of.” Working “through” implies a relationship in which Actor A works behind the scenes to provide Actor B with the capacity, will, or both to take action against a given problem, the resolution of which benefits both actors. The key component to working “through” is Actor A’s reduced level of direct involvement in efforts to address the shared problem. In a “through” relationship, Actor A employs Actor B as a surrogate, enabling actions intended to resolve a shared problem by precursor counsel, training, equipping, or combination thereof.

According to this definition of “through,” capacity building is not restricted to increasing physical capability, but can also apply to empowering the actions of other actors. If Actor B possesses the physical capability to take action but lacks the freedom to do so, and Actor A can sanction Actor B’s actions, then Actor A is working “through” Actor B by granting Actor B permission to act. Furthermore, in contrast to working “with,” working “through” necessitates sharing ideas and providing advice without overtly taking action against the common problem. While “through” demands cooperation between the actors, it has no requirement for combined action.

In terms of military tasks, “through” can best be illustrated by advising and training missions that fall under the aegis of foreign internal defense (FID). Since 2002, the U.S. has performed multiple FID missions, working
“through” several countries. Specifically, a low-visibility FID mission was conducted in Yemen in mid-2003, providing their security forces with enhanced capacity. In June of that same year, Yemen used its increased capacity to eliminate elements of the Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan (IAA), an Al Qaeda affiliate linked to the bombing of the USS Cole. Thus, by working “through” Yemen to eliminate a terrorist threat, the U.S. enhanced Yemen’s internal security while concurrently supporting the war on terrorism.

“By” is the third and final relationship of the indirect context, promoting achievement of a desired outcome “through the agency or instrumentality of” another. “By” assumes that an actor, who possesses the capacity and will sufficient to address a given problem, is going to engage that problem. The essence of “by” is that Actor B takes action to achieve an objective desired by Actor A, without Actor A necessarily prompting Actor B to do so. One can reasonably expect Actor B to address the problem, because Actor B recognizes the problem and has both the capacity and will to undertake action toward resolving it.

When the relationship of “by” is operative in a system composed of at least three actors, the system can be considered to be “self-regulating” because no input is required from Actor A to elicit action on the part of Actor B. What is required for “by” to function is that both actors recognize the problem and perceive that solving it will yield a beneficial outcome. “By” is the least obtrusive of the three relationships because it may not require any initiating action on the part of Actor A. Actor B simply acts because he recognizes the benefit. In Actor B’s mind, it may be merely coincidental that Actor A also benefits from B’s actions. On the other hand, a relationship characterized as “by” can be the result of having previously worked “through” and “with” an actor, building the capacity and will required for the future action. Thus, working “through” and “with” may be viewed as stepping stones to creating a self-regulating system in which actors take care of problems that affect the entire system without the prompting or direct involvement of others to do so.

The Iranian role in the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman (1962–1975) is an excellent example of the U.S. working “by” another actor. Beginning in 1959 and continuing into the late 1970s, the U.S. worked “through” Iran in an effort to contain the Soviet Union. During this period, America provided the Pahlavi monarchy with significant military assistance against external, notably communist, threats. In 1973, Iran used its increased military
capacity—without America prompting—to intervene in the Sultan of Oman’s ongoing counterinsurgency campaign against the communist People’s Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO). “Iran’s military and economic support made an indispensable contribution toward turning the tide in Oman.” This case demonstrates working “by” because the Shah of Iran independently took action against a mutual problem. In fact, America’s previous efforts to build Iranian capacity to counteract regional Soviet influence—activities conducted under a “through” relationship—enabled a subsequent “by” relationship in which Iran achieved U.S. objectives, while pursuing its own interests.

What Makes “Through, With, or By” a Compelling Alternative to Direct Action?

The strategy of “through, with, or by” relies on the proposition that an actor, possessing or provided with sufficient capacity and will to act upon a given problem, can be reasonably expected to address that problem. The actor’s motivation for action is the perceived beneficial outcome that will result from solving the problem. Perceived benefit is also the motivating factor in cases where Actor A supplies capacity or will to Actor B. In the latter case, both parties engage in a relationship that will yield an outcome perceived as being mutually beneficial. In other words, both actors cooperate with one another to achieve a better endstate than that achievable by acting alone.

At a minimum, three prerequisites must exist for a mutually beneficial exchange to occur between two actors: each actor must have information about the other, each must believe that the exchange will bring about an advantageous result, and each must be willing to enter into a relationship with the other. More directly stated, Actor A—whether an individual, organization, or nation state—must be aware of Actor B’s existence and have some idea of B’s capacity for action. Without both actors having information or awareness of the other, a relationship would have no basis to develop. Information about the other actor becomes particularly important at the international level or in cross-cultural exchanges. Cultural knowledge facilitates identifying points of commonality between different actors that, when exploited, might yield a mutually beneficial result.

Second, each participant in the exchange must believe, or have reasonable assurance, that the exchange will result in a beneficial outcome (i.e., the
actor will be better off in the end). This implies that each actor is rational and will choose the option that benefits him most from a range of possibilities. Understanding the other actor’s rationale, although desirable, is not required to achieve a mutually beneficial exchange. Indeed, many conflicts are the result of difficulties inherent in understanding the rationale of another nation or culture. Each actor must merely acknowledge that the other actor is making the best choice for himself and is, therefore, acting rationally. What really matters is that the two actors are aware of one another and have recognized that cooperation will result in a mutually beneficial exchange.

In order to cooperate, the two actors must enter into a relationship with one another. Therefore, the building and maintaining of relationships is another key component of generating a mutually beneficial outcome. To function effectively, these relationships must be based upon trust and reciprocity. Trust is a vital component in any relationship. Building trust is a straightforward concept at the interpersonal level; trust results when each actor’s expectation that the other will perform or act as expected is satisfied over time. However, trust is not so easily achieved across nation states and cultures, diverse entities with a myriad of conflicting interests and divergent viewpoints. Pre-existing relationships, interpersonal relationships between the actors’ representatives, and recurrent exchanges between actors are mechanisms for creating and maintaining the trust required to cooperate in such cases.

“Through, With, or By” at the Operational Level

How are the principles of “through, with, or by” applied at the operational level? Could combatant commanders employ “through, with, or by” to achieve operational-level goals? This section will address this question, illustrating the application of the methodology with three historical examples.

When applied at the operational level, “through, with, or by” is an indirect method by which the combatant commander can achieve desired endstate conditions or operational objectives that directly contribute to campaign goals. This indirect approach is not a panacea. Instead, it provides combatant commanders with an alternative method, diversifying the locus of possible employment options. “Through, with, or by” can serve as the
cornerstone method of a campaign’s operational design, or it can support another method that more directly applies U.S. military power.20

The indirect nature of “through, with, or by” emphasizes causal relationships (i.e., cause and effect), complementing the doctrinal idea that logical lines of operation (LOOs) link nodes and decisive points to achieve the desired endstate “when positional reference to the enemy has little relevance.”21 In its most basic form, the methodology is nothing more than a group of actors (i.e., nodes) that recognize a common problem and share a desire to resolve the problem (i.e., links). Under this approach, harnessing surrogate desires and resultant actions is essential to achieving the desired endstate. In fact, the ability to tie “through, with, or by” into a logical LOO will be determined primarily by the surrogate actors’ respective capacity and will, as well as the strength and depth of underlying relationships with those actors.

“Through, with, or by” has application not only as a primary or supporting method of a logical LOO but also within the concept of operational phasing as described in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning and illustrated in Figure 1.22 As depicted, the level of direct military effort varies

![Figure 1. Notional Operation Plan Phases vs. Level of Military Effort (Joint Publication 5-0)](image)
across operational phase, rising and falling in accordance with phase-dependent intermediate objectives and the associated logical LOO. Depending upon specific operational requirements (e.g., time horizons, acceptable risk, and asset availability/applicability), working “through, with, or by” other actors can have applicability in multiple operational planning phases and LOOs. For example, a FID mission with a regional partner in Phase 0 could contribute directly to deterrence goals in Phase I, raising a partner’s capacity and will to defend against the actions of a potentially hostile third party. Furthermore, surrogate assets, created via “through, with, or by” in Phases I and II to support Dominating Activities, could be employed in Phases IV and V to support both Stabilizing and Enabling Civil Authority Activities.

“Through, with, or by” can create significant value for operational planning when conducted during Phase 0 or Phase I operations. Local- and theater-shaping activities undertaken indirectly can produce effects that transcend Shaping Activity objectives, contributing directly to Deterrence and/or Dominating Activity goals. Additionally, employing “through, with, or by” approaches during Phase 0 could minimize the direct military effort required in subsequent operational phases, acting as a force multiplier while addressing targeted problems.

**Historical Examples of “Through, With, or By”**

As previously stated, America’s employment of military force is not traditionally associated with an indirect approach. The United States—for a variety of cultural, historical, and economic reasons—often chooses direct confrontation and relies on technologically advanced conventional forces to wage short, sharp conflicts to defeat opponents. However, in the past, the U.S. military has employed indirect approaches in support of more direct methods. In some instances, success has validated the use of the indirect approach. In other instances, the indirect approach was mistakenly applied and failed to produce the desired outcome.

During World War II, the Western Allies employed an indirect approach while working “with” Tito’s Partisans in Yugoslavia. Although the Western Allies successfully employed this approach in the Balkans in support of larger efforts to defeat Germany, indirect methods had the unintended consequence of frustrating their postwar position in Europe. Small OSS/SEO
teams parachuted into occupied Yugoslavia and worked “with” Partisan groups to achieve a dual purpose. Militarily, they tied down the maximum possible number of German units in the Balkans, hindering movements of German troops and assets to other fronts. Politically, these teams provided the Partisans and local population with tangible evidence of the Western Allies’ support for their cause, thereby building Yugoslav will.23

Franklin Lindsay, one such OSS operative, parachuted into Slovenia in May of 1944 and operated in Yugoslavia through the end of the war. His specific mission was to “cut German rail lines connecting Austria, Italy, and the Balkans.”24 To accomplish his task, Lindsay worked with a Partisan group in the Stajerska region, building their capacity for offensive action through regular airdrops of Allied weapons and supplies.25 The fact that the Germans launched a multi-division, anti-Partisan sweep through Stajerska in late 1944 illustrates Lindsay’s success in attaining the military purpose of the mission—to tie-up German units in the Balkans.26

On the surface, the Western Allies’ indirect approach in Yugoslavia appears to have been a success. However, the capacity for action provided by the Allies’ substantial airdrops produced unintended consequences even before the Germans’ defeat. Instead of directing all of his energy against the Germans, Tito used his newly acquired military capacity to eliminate Draža Mihailović’s Chetniks—the prime threat to a postwar Yugoslavia under communist rule.27 Likewise, Tito sparked the first Cold War clash in May 1945, when he tried to use his Allied-equipped forces to expand the borders of pre-war Yugoslavia by occupying Trieste and portions of Austria.28

This example provides several lessons. First, capacity for action, once supplied, has application beyond the scope of the problem it was furnished to solve. Furthermore, the Western Allies and Tito, despite a shared recognition of the necessity of defeating the Germans, had widely divergent motives for entering into a relationship with the other.29 Finally, the Western Allies would have done well to fully appreciate Tito’s long-term goals and underlying motives prior to equipping the Partisans.

The second historical example illustrates a successful application of working both “through” and “with” indigenous forces to achieve operational goals. From 1971 until 1973, the U.S. Army Vietnam Individual Training Group (UITG) undertook “one of the least known, but most effective FID missions conducted by U.S. Special Forces.”30 The mission’s purpose was to build the newly installed Khmer government’s military capability against
Operating under its initial mandate to train the Forces Armée National Khmer (FANK), U.S. Special Forces trained, equipped, and operated alongside 78 Cambodian battalions at facilities in South Vietnam. In May 1972, UITG’s mandate expanded to include retraining elements of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) after its near collapse during the 1972 Easter Offensive. Employing only 150 Special Forces trainers, the UITG retrained 64 ground maneuver battalions—40 percent of the ARVN’s ground force. “Although both South Vietnam and Cambodia were overrun by their enemies, Special Forces enabled the end to be significantly delayed.”

The UITG experiences offer multiple lessons. The most obvious is that by working “through” and “with” the Cambodians, the U.S. employed minimal manpower to create a large, relatively effective force to combat communist insurgency. Moreover, resulting Cambodian and South Vietnamese forces allowed the U.S., at least for a time, to retard the regional spread of communism. The UITG example also highlights the importance of personal relationships in working “through, with, or by” other actors. The Special Forces trainers created a strong rapport with their trainees by learning local languages and incorporating other culturally relevant means. While such grassroots actions may seem unimportant at the operational level, they are integral to overcoming cultural differences, building goodwill, and cementing relationships necessary for future cooperation between organizations, groups, and countries.

The final historical example deals with maritime security in the Strait of Malacca. This illustration highlights the negative response attendant to a perceived U.S. direct approach, thereby reinforcing the need for a viable alternative. One third of the world’s shipping and half of the world’s oil transits through the strait each year, making this choke point of vital interest to the United States and regional nations. Coupled with frequent acts of local piracy—325 attacks occurred in 2004—and the region’s known links to radical Islamic fundamentalists, it is no surprise that the U.S. was and remains concerned over the potential for terrorist attacks against commercial shipping in the strait.

In March 2004, the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) proposed the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) to address this problem. Admiral Thomas Fargo, the USPACOM commander, described RMSI as an initiative to work with regional partners against “transnational
threats like proliferation, terrorism, trafficking in humans or drugs, and piracy.” Unfortunately, when asked how he would resource RMSI, Admiral Fargo chose to emphasize U.S. actions over those of its regional partners. Specifically, during Congressional testimony, he stated that USPACOM was exploring “putting Special Operations Forces on high-speed vessels, putting, potentially, Marines on high-speed vessels… to conduct effective interdiction.”

The regional response to Admiral Fargo’s comments was both negative and immediate. Both Malaysia and Indonesia responded that “the security of the Malacca strait is for Indonesia and Malaysia to shoulder. Therefore, we will not accept any policies…that are inconsistent with this reality.” Although envisioned as an indirect approach to work “with” regional partners, RMSI was interpreted internationally as yet another instance of direct U.S. unilateral action. This example reinforces the perception abroad that the U.S. has a “pre-emptive unilateralist approach to conflict resolution.” Furthermore, it illustrates that working indirectly “through, with, or by” other actors can be a viable method of achieving otherwise unattainable objectives.

Considerations for the Indirect Approach

Cost is a chief consideration in deciding to employ an indirect approach such as “through, with, or by” in lieu of more traditional, direct approaches. At first glance, cost can be measured in terms of resources expended, estimated likelihood of success (i.e., expected value of gain), expenditures of goodwill required to initiate working relationships with other actors, and the longevity of support from the American public and key decision makers. Currently, the cost of employing an indirect versus a direct approach is high. Institutionally, the U.S. military has neither the mindset nor the organizational structure to effectively work “through, with, or by” other actors on a large scale. The U.S. military is not, however, devoid of leaders who understand and embrace the efficacy of indirect approaches. Unfortunately, such leaders are the exception, rather than the rule. Consequently, this methodology is not mainstream and is typically accomplished by a small specialized force—namely, regionally specific Special Forces Groups for whom the indirect approach is their raison d’être.
The U.S. military can lower the cost of the indirect approach by improving its ability to operate “through, with, or by” other actors. In practical terms, deployable personnel at all levels will require more cultural and language training to facilitate building relationships. Cultural training should focus less on simple customs and more on how other cultures view situations and interpret underlying issues. Such cultural appreciation is necessary in discerning points of commonality between actors, building effective relationships, and identifying mutually beneficial outcomes. As a corollary, tours of duty should be lengthened for individuals in billets having frequent contact with foreign governments and their militaries. Longer tours facilitate enhanced appreciation for a specific culture and, more importantly, build the personal relationships that underlie the “through, with, or by” concept.

Given the capacity to work “through, with, or by” others, the indirect approach has significant force multiplier implications for the U.S. military. Employing other actors to achieve our aims expands the locus of resources available to resolve a given situation. Moreover, building the capacity and will of other actors reduces tasks the U.S. would otherwise have to undertake with its own finite assets, thereby permitting employment of U.S.-unique capabilities in other applications.

Working “through, with, or by” others also reduces the likelihood of conflict for the United States. Building the capacity and will of other actors to solve mutual problems during Phase 0 (Shaping) and Phase I (Deterrence) may resolve problems early, reducing the potential of ensuing crisis and obviating the need for direct U.S. involvement. Ideally, the U.S. would use other actors to address problems before they metastasize. At worst, operating indirectly through relationships will build consensus for follow-on multilateral solutions, disarming Robert Kagan’s concern over the unilateral use of direct U.S. military power and its accompanying international opprobrium.

Regardless of results gained via the indirect approach, U.S. leaders must appreciate the primacy of the approach’s enabling relationships and the fundamental fact that “empowered” non-U.S. actors achieve desired results. Granting non-U.S. actors ownership of achieved results legitimizes their actions and resource expenditures, demonstrates “buy-in,” and strengthens relationships with the U.S. In so doing, the U.S. validates the actor’s decision.
to enter into a mutually beneficial relationship, increasing the likelihood of recurrent exchanges. Furthermore, by establishing and maintaining a tradition of reliable partnerships, U.S. leaders increase the value of our country’s “brand name,” strengthening existing relationships and expanding the locus of actors willing to work on our behalf. Consequently, when working “indirectly” with non-U.S. actors, U.S. leaders should eschew short-term gains that could jeopardize long-term relationships (e.g., misrepresenting the value and difficulty of projects to garner and exploit short-term participation).

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As with any method, the indirect approach has disadvantages. One disadvantage is that the U.S. will not have direct control over actions, making the assessment of the overall strategy performance and effectiveness much more difficult. Moreover, the need to depend on the actions of others can retard timely response, especially in flashpoint or crisis situations where requisite relationships do not exist. Additionally, unintended consequences from an actor’s increased capacity and will can be a thorny issue, as illustrated by Tito’s unforecasted offensive actions in Yugoslavia.

**Conclusion**

In a world in which America is increasingly perceived as “favoring policies of coercion rather than persuasion [and] … punitive sanctions over inducements,” the U.S. military must overcome its “psychological bias” toward direct rather than indirect solutions. The traditional, direct application of America’s military power in today’s globalized, international structure increasingly thwarts vice facilitates the realization of operational objectives. The U.S. military must expand its “institutional repertoire” and embrace other solutions. The indirect methodology of “through, with, or by” offers combatant commanders another option—an approach that focuses on mutually beneficial interactions and, as a result, does not promote perceptions of hegemonic intent.

Unlike direct applications of military power, this indirect methodology seeks to use relationships with other actors and shared recognition of a common problem to produce mutually beneficial outcomes. Such relationships provide a context in which combatant commanders furnish actors with the capacity and will to resolve mutual problems, directly supporting achievement of U.S. operational objectives. This method can be the basis for an entire campaign or support a more direct application of U.S. military
power. Hence, “through, with, or by” arms the combatant commander with a nontraditional, indirect alternative for realizing operational objectives in a global environment where the direct approach is increasingly counter-productive and costly.

Endnotes

1. In this context, the word “direct” connotes the manifest use (or threatened use) of American military power to achieve policy goals. For example, “boots on the ground”—troops committed overseas—in support of American policy objectives falls under the rubric of “direct” applications of military power.

2. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5. Joseph Nye breaks down a nation’s power into two broad categories: “hard” and “soft” power. Hard power is typically applied directly and “rests on inducements (‘carrots’) or threats (‘sticks’).” Typically, a nation’s hard power stems from its military, economy, or the influence thereof. Soft power, on the other hand, is defined by Nye as “the second face of power.” “It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”


   The strength of the United States versus the relative weakness of Europe—

   “American military strength has produced a propensity to use that strength.

   Europe’s military weakness has produced a perfectly understandable aversion to

   the exercise of military power.”

   A strong United States continues to deal with security challenges using traditional

   power politics, whereas “Europe has moved beyond the old system of power poli-

   tics and discovered a new system [which stresses] diplomacy, engagement, [and]

   inducements over sanctions…”

4. Nye, 26-27, 81. The French-led, anti-U.S. bloc in the run up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq is an example of counterbalancing perceived U.S. hegemony.


6. Mark Boyatt, “Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We?” Special Warfare (Summer 1998): 37; J. H. Crerar, “Special Forces Core Purpose: A Second Opinion,” Special Warfare (Winter 1999): 16. The concept of working “through, with, or by indigenous populations” is viewed by many within the Special Forces community as being a core purpose of Special Forces. However, neither the joint nor the Special Forces communities have a codified definition for “through, with, or by,” nor is the concept linked to tactical tasks in their respective doctrine. As a result, the concept of working “through, with, or by” means different things to different
people. Thus, defining “through, with, or by” has value in that it promotes development of a common understanding.

7. *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, 10th ed., s.v. “with.” Coming up with distinct dictionary definitions for “through,” “with,” and “by” is difficult because the terms tend to be used to define one another. If nothing else, this fact indicates the ambiguity between the terms and the need to identify their differences.

8. The concept of “with” also clearly applies to the relationship present between formal allies or coalition partners. However, in this paper the definition of “with” is confined to its applicability to working indirectly through surrogates and proxies.

9. Franklin Lindsay, *Beacons in the Night* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 11-12. Not only does the example of SOE/OSS operations with Tito’s Partisans superbly illustrate that mutually beneficial outcomes are integral to working “with” another actor, it also demonstrates that both sides’ motives do not necessarily need to be coincident to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome. The OSS operatives were operating alongside the partisans to ensure that the maximum number of German divisions were tied down in the Balkans and unavailable for commitment elsewhere. The Partisans, on the other hand, were fighting both to liberate Yugoslavia from the heel of German occupation and secure political power after the war.


11. This is not meant to imply that the relationships developed in working “through” another are fleeting or short-termed in nature. Two actors can conceivably develop a deep, long-term relationship with one another based purely on a relationship characterized as “through.”

12. This statement is based on the author’s experiences while commanding the detachment that conducted the FID mission.


Noteworthy is that America’s decision to work indirectly “through” Iran can be traced directly to the Nixon Doctrine—itself an indirect strategy, albeit at the strategic level. Jeffrey Kimball, author of “The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding,” identifies the key tenet of the doctrine as America’s reliance on its allies to shoulder the primary burden of defending themselves against communist encroachment, while America limited its involvement to providing military and economic assistance as well as advice.


18. Scott S. Gartner, Strategic Assessment in War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 13. Gartner describes the behavior of a rational actor as “not just intelligent behavior, but...behavior motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages, a calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value system.”

19. Rationality, in this case, relates more to beliefs and value systems than it does to logic. As long as the actor believes that he is acting in his best interest according to his belief system, then he is acting rationally. For example, a suicide bomber who chooses to kill himself in the belief that he will become a martyr and gain entry into paradise is acting rationally. He is choosing the best possible outcome, given his beliefs and values, from amongst a range of possibilities. Although the suicide bomber’s logic may appear flawed or uninformed from a Western perspective that places a premium on individual life, the individual is striving to obtain a desired outcome and, as a result, acting rationally.

20. U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1-0: Marine Corps Operations (Washington, DC: 27 September 2001), 6-3. The Marine Corps defines operational design as the “commander’s tool for translating the operational requirements of his superiors into the tactical guidance needed by his subordinate commanders and his staff.” The most current version of JP 5-0: Joint Operational Planning defines the same term as “the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution.”

21. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 17 September 2006), IV-13. The most current joint publication states that LOOs are used to “link multiple actions on nodes and/or decisive points with military objectives using the logic of purpose-cause and effect. Logical LOOs also help commanders visualize how military means can support nonmilitary instruments of national power.” LOOs are “used when positional reference to an enemy has little relevance.”


23. Lindsay, 11.

24. Ibid., 18.

25. Lindsay’s relationship vis-à-vis the Partisans, although best characterized as working “with” them, did not involve building the Partisans’ capacity or will through training. From the Partisan perspective, working “with” the OSS/SOE was beneficial only in as much as it built their military capacity.
26. Lindsay, 200-202. For the specific results of Lindsay’s mission to cut the rail lines through Stajerska, see pages 84-87.
27. Ibid., 26, 265-267.
28. Ibid., 291.
29. Whether or not the Western Allies had a realistic choice to not provide material support to the communist Partisan in Yugoslavia can be argued. Additionally, one could also effectively argue that the Western Allies, the British in particular, were aware of the communists’ postwar designs. However, the fact remains that by providing Tito with the capacity to take meaningful action against the Germans in the Balkans, he was also given the capacity to consolidate communist control in Yugoslavia and grab territory in the immediate aftermath of the war. The U.S. and U.K. worked “with” the Partisans to solve the immediate problem of defeating the Germans but thereby exacerbated a problem for themselves in the postwar world.
31. Ibid., 3. The Khmer government came to power by overthrowing the former regime under Prince Sihanouk who had broken diplomatic relations with the United States in 1963.
32. Ibid., 7. U.S. Special Forces were not permitted to train Cambodian forces in Cambodia due to the Cooper-Church Amendment (1970). It “prohibited the use of funds for the introduction of United States ground combat troops into Cambodia, or to provide United States advisors.”
33. Ibid., 15, 19. The UITG was redesignated as the FANK Field Training Command after the 1972 Easter Offensive.
34. Ibid., 26. Bowra cites Lieutenant General Phan Trong Chinh, chief of the ARVN Central Training Command, who attested to the effectiveness of the training program and its effect on the ARVN in the wake of the 1972 Easter Offensive. “If it had not been for the FANK Training Command, there would not be an I Corps today.”
35. Ibid., 10, 26. One of the rapport building measures undertaken by the UITG was their decision to wear the colors of the Khmer Republic on their beret flashes.


41. Permal, 3.

42. Patrick Goodenough, “Renewal of U.S.-Malaysia Pact a Sign of Improving Ties,” CNSNews.com, 9 May 2005; available from www.cnsnews.com/ForeignBureaus%5Carchive%5C200505%5CFOR20050509c.html (accessed 14 February 2007). Goodenough’s article describes a marked improvement in U.S.-Malaysian relations, despite Malaysia’s initial negative response to Admiral Fargo’s remarks and specifically mentions the U.S. desire to work “with” the regional partners within the context of RMSI. Furthermore, the article reports as follows: “Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore have established joint patrols in the Strait.”

43. Brian Harp, “Excluding Unconventional Warfare Solutions: Conventional Thinking in the Military’s Educational System,” Unpublished Monograph, Naval Postgraduate School, 1. Harp contends that the U.S. military, as a whole, does not understand UW operations and, by default, the indirect approaches such operations employ.

44. Boyatt, “Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We?” 37; Mark Boyatt, “Unconventional Operations Forces of Special Operations,” Special Warfare (October 1994): 11. Colonel Boyatt identifies the “core purpose of Special Forces [as]...accomplishing Special Forces missions through, with, or by indigenous populations.”

45. It is the author’s contention that “understanding” another culture is a misnomer. Unless one comes from that culture, the best that can be hoped for is an appreciation for how the culture makes decisions and views the world.

46. In this case, the economic term “brand name” is synonymous with Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft power.”

47. The issue of how other actors or agents employ their newly acquired capacity is a perennial problem. It relates directly to UW and the problem of disarming proxy forces in the aftermath of hostilities. At a minimum, a two-part solution exists for this problem at the operational level:

First, planners must identify the minimum capacity required to solve a given problem, enabling the development of tailored capabilities vice creating superfluous capacity.
Second, planners must appreciate the goals and motivating factors of partner actors. Such an appreciation guards against second- or third-order effects begetting unintended consequences.


The tendency to categorize warfare as regular versus irregular, or conventional versus unconventional, is of little value in developing guidance for U.S. military operations involving surrogate forces. Surrogate warfare provides a framework that encompasses all U.S. operations that involve non-U.S. forces. This framework also provides an analysis of the surrogate warfare environment to determine the appropriate role of both conventional and Special Operations Forces (SOF) in conducting surrogate warfare operations.

What do the Northern Alliance, the Pashtun tribal militias, the Kurdish Peshmerga fighter, and army and ministry of interior police units from the Republic of Georgia, Afghan National Army, Iraqi Army, and coalition forces have in common? They are not all unconventional warfare forces or the targets of foreign internal defense—the two operational frameworks available. They are also not all irregular forces. However, they are all foreign and involved in combating terrorism and counterinsurgency operations with the United States in pursuit of U.S. objectives. They are all fulfilling roles that the United States either does not have the capability or the will to do with U.S. forces. They are all surrogate forces.

Surrogate: An Updated Concept for a Contemporary World. The concept of using surrogates is not new to U.S. warfare. However, the guidance for how the U.S. incorporates surrogate forces into its military guidance is incomplete. Updating the concept of surrogate warfare and integrating it

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in a useful manner into U.S. strategy, policy, and doctrine will increase the effective options available to future military and national security planners. This enhanced concept of surrogate warfare will close the doctrinal gap that exists under the constructs of regular versus irregular and conventional versus unconventional warfare.

A *surrogate*, in its simplest sense, takes the place of something or someone. The surrogate is also a proxy for a particular function or set of functions. The word surrogate is not meant to be pejorative, but rather an expression that conveys substitution of one for another. Generally it implies that the surrogate is acting on behalf of the interests of another and is in some way distinct from the source of its authority to act. It is possible, in fact probable, that the surrogate will have interests of its own as well.

The United States use of surrogates has ranged from the employment of a few individuals with special skills to entire armies and from the founding of the nation to the most recent conflicts. The fight for independence from Great Britain was the baptism of the U.S. Army. This initial conflict included a heavy reliance on surrogates. The U.S. depended heavily on the French, both its forces in Canada and its navy, as it organized itself to repel the British Army. In the century after independence, the fledgling army supported the U.S. expansion to the west by fighting wars against Mexico and the native Americans. The use of surrogates was limited during these frontier clashes, but many instances occurred in which the U.S. Army relied upon guides and translators from sympathetic or coerced Indians.

In the brutal fighting against Filipino guerrillas during the Philippine War of 1899–1902, U.S. forces were continuously handicapped by their inability to penetrate ethnic tribal areas. One example of successful employment of surrogates was the creation of the Macabebe Scouts, an indigenous force that was opposed to the pro-independence guerrillas. The Macabebe Scouts took the place of U.S. Army forces that could not gain access to enemy strongholds.

During the turmoil in Nicaragua from 1926 to 1933, Nicaraguan guardsmen served as surrogate partners with U.S. Marines against the liberal rebel group, led by Augusto Sandino, in Nicaragua in 1927. The relationship between the Marines and the indigenous forces made certain that Sandino was seen as fighting his own countrymen instead of resisting an American occupation.
The allied forces in World War II sought out surrogate forces that could provide strategic challenges for the axis powers or conduct economy-of-force operations for the allies. The peak of U.S. surrogate warfare was during World War II. The Office of Strategic Service (OSS), the forerunner of modern Special Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency, was responsible for U.S. surrogate operations. OSS teams trained, advised, and assisted French resistance elements and also aided partisan forces in Yugoslavia in an organized effort against German forces. OSS Detachment 101 developed and employed surrogates against the Japanese in Burma by building a guerrilla army of native tribesmen.\(^5\)

Despite the historical significance of surrogate warfare, the current U.S. policy guidance on surrogates is decidedly lacking. The Department of Defense dictionary does not define the term surrogate or surrogate warfare. The term, surrogate, finds its way into current doctrine as an element within the definition of unconventional warfare. In this context, unconventional warfare is the use of either indigenous or surrogate forces. The Army’s manual on Special Forces Operations simply defines a surrogate as, “someone who takes the place of or acts for another.”\(^6\)

The best way to redefine surrogate, in terms of establishing a framework of warfare, is to take a more comprehensive approach that incorporates contemporary operational realities. A surrogate is an entity outside of the Department of Defense (i.e., indigenous to the location of the conflict, from a third country, partner nation, alliance, or from another U.S. organization) that performs specific functions that assist in the accomplishment of U.S. military objectives by taking the place of capabilities that the U.S. military either does not have or does not desire to employ. This new definition accounts for the wide range of forces and relationships that the United States may leverage in pursuit of national policy objectives. It also recognizes that in many cases entities outside of the U.S. military may exist that have superior capability in certain functions or are preferred because of political factors.

The use of a substitute force is the defining characteristic of surrogate warfare. There are a wide variety of reasons that the United States may
establish a partnership with a surrogate. Likewise, many types of surrogates exist. Also, surrogate warfare can be conducted against the entire spectrum of adversaries.

The use of surrogates may benefit the United States in a number of ways. Political legitimacy is one of the most fundamental reasons for seeking to include non-U.S. forces in operations. The involvement of external forces, which take the place of additional U.S. forces, establishes a broader base of political support for military intervention. The desire for legitimacy can range from the strengthening of existing alliances, as in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Kosovo, to the building of specific coalitions, as in Operation Desert Storm and the war on terrorism.

Another fundamental value of including surrogates is that it reduces the demand on U.S. forces. This aspect is especially true when including regular military forces from industrialized partners. The inclusion of NATO airplanes in the bombing campaign in Kosovo reduced the number of U.S. aircraft that needed to be used. Similarly, the contributions of coalition forces in Iraq lowered the requirement for U.S. forces, a critical benefit that allowed the United States to sustain the current level of operations.

An often overlooked reason to use surrogate forces is that they may provide capabilities that the United States lacks. The superiority of U.S. military forces is widely acknowledged and seems to contradict the notion that someone else has a capability that the United States does not. The most significant contribution of a surrogate may be their ethnicity, language, or culture. Conflict in the 21st Century is increasingly likely to involve ethnic or cultural disputes in regions of the world vastly different than the western culture of the United States. The ability to use surrogates to connect with the populations and gain their support, as well as provide a better understanding of the culture, is an important reason to consider surrogate warfare as a military option.

A surrogate is not inherently inferior to the sponsor. Surrogates can range from the most advanced military forces in the world to third-world tribal militias. It is also possible for the United States to be used as a surrogate force by others. The heavy reliance by many nations on U.S. intelligence and communications support, especially space-based systems, is an example. The frequent employment of U.S. strategic lift to move peacekeeping forces in support of the United Nations or the African Union is another. The concept of surrogate warfare is not contingent upon the quantitative or
qualitative value of the foreign force but rather on the relationship between the sponsor and the surrogate.

The concepts of irregular or unconventional warfare are overly focused on the tactics employed by the forces involved. Surrogate warfare is defined as being independent from the tactical approaches used by the surrogate force. Many of what are commonly considered irregular tactics—guerrilla warfare, support to insurgencies, sabotage and subversion, and intelligence activities—can be conducted under the umbrella of surrogate warfare. However, surrogate warfare can also include high technology precision strikes and combined arms maneuver warfare.

Surrogate warfare also avoids the trap of defining warfare based on the tactics of the enemy. The current interpretation of irregular warfare is based in large part on the adversary tactics. Specifically, if the enemy is using irregular tactics, then from a U.S. perspective it is irregular warfare. Given this framework, the launching of cruise missiles against Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, in response to the bombing of U.S. embassies in Africa, is irregular warfare. One can adopt this definitional framework but it is of little use for formulating U.S. policy or doctrine on the employment of non-U.S. forces. Additionally, an adaptive enemy is likely to change its tactics during a conflict, thus exacerbating the difficulties in understanding the operational environment. Surrogate warfare focuses on the elements of conflict that the U.S. can control, the inclusion of surrogate forces or not, and provides a solid foundation for the development of guidance for surrogate warfare against all types of adversary.

Perhaps the most valuable contribution of a new understanding of surrogate warfare is the impact of the concept of U.S. sponsor force involvement. The existing guidance generally portrays a continuum in which the more irregular a conflict the greater the reliance on SOF. U.S. SOF have critical roles to play when the United States conducts operations through, with, or by foreign forces. However, the U.S. can maximize the effectiveness of its surrogate warfare operations by including the extensive capabilities of conventional forces in an appropriate balance of forces.

Figure 1 illustrates that the concept of surrogate warfare provides a comprehensive framework that includes all the potential non-U.S. forces that may be employed in operations that support U.S. national interest. The level of involvement of U.S. conventional and SOF is no longer just a function of the type of operation. The graph across the top of Figure 1 illustrates that
there are requirements for special operations and conventional forces in all types of military operations. The level of effort required of each force needs to be determined not just on the type of operation but also by the characteristics of the surrogate environment.

**Right Force, Right Place, Right Time.** The concept of surrogate warfare expands the potential U.S. forces that will be associated with surrogate operations, beyond just SOF. This framework will provide a broader range of options to strategic planners. As a result, a model is required to evaluate options and make recommendations so that the right (i.e., most appropriate) U.S. force is employed based on the characteristics of the potential surrogate operations. Recognizing that the distinction between SOF and conventional forces has been an historic difference, criteria should be designed to inform the selection of the U.S. force to use. The factors most appropriate to making this decision are the nature of the potential surrogate, the types of operations the surrogate is expected to conduct, the austerity of the physical environment, the threat level of the operational environment, and the political sensitivities associated with the proposed operations.
Potential surrogates range from modern, allied armies to revolutionary, third-world individuals. Where on this continuum a surrogate, in a proposed operation, falls is critical for determining the ways the United States will use to integrate the surrogate effort. In particular, the nature of the surrogate will be one of the factors for selecting the appropriate U.S. force to conduct the surrogate operation. There are two key variables in describing a potential surrogate—the level of military organization and the level of control.

The requirements to conduct operations with a surrogate organized into a recognized military structure (e.g., companies, battalions, and support units) are clearly different than organizing and employing the elements of a resistance movement (i.e., guerillas, underground, and auxiliary). In general the greater the level of military organization of the surrogate, the greater the range of U.S. forces capable of executing the surrogate operation. However, if the surrogate does not resemble a conventional military force, it is likely that SOF will be the preferred force to leverage the surrogate capability.

In a similar vein, selecting the type of U.S. force to conduct surrogate warfare is informed by the level of control exercised over the surrogate. Control can be in the form of direct legal or political means or as a result of the degree of shared interests between the surrogate and the sponsor. Regardless of its source, a higher degree of control is desired in order for conventional forces, especially at the small unit level, to be able to operate by, with, and through a surrogate partner.

Another factor is the types of operations that the surrogate force either needs to be trained in or is expected to be able to execute with its existing level of training and readiness. U.S. forces are proficient in a wide range of skills. However, conventional and SOF each have their areas of expertise. Planners must be cognizant of the expected operational tasks to be executed by the surrogate force and any associated training requirements. U.S. surrogate warfare capacity is limited if the entire range of Department of Defense assets are not considered for employment. SOF are the preeminent trainers of foreign fighters. However, many military functions exist that could be more effectively trained and advised by non-SOF units. Brigade-level combined-arms operations, theater logistics, and peace support operations are but a few examples of surrogate operations that conventional units might conduct.
The physical environment is another factor for evaluating the assignment of forces to a surrogate warfare operation. Even as the U.S. military transforms into an expeditionary force, most units require the establishment of significant logistical infrastructure to sustain them. Tactical formations are designed to integrate into an echeloned system capable of providing everything from basic life support and maintenance to medical care. These logistical challenges can be reduced if sufficient infrastructure exists in the host nation, especially in noncombat surrogate operations. Austere environments without a robust local infrastructure require self-supportable units to conduct training or operations. The Special Forces A-team represents the SOF answer to operations in austere environments. The decision of whether to deploy an A-team or a company of instructors from a military training school depends in large measure on the level of support available either from the host nation or other U.S. military units in the area of operations.

The operational environment includes more than just physical elements. The threat situation has a direct and significant impact on surrogate operations. Force protection is a continuous concern for U.S. military forces working overseas. However, the requirements for protecting the force are not as significant for a unit conducting foreign internal defense (FID) in a permissive environment as for one organizing and employing a resistance force in a denied area or for the integration of a coalition battalion in major combat operations. The threats for these operations can differ in magnitude and kind.

The U.S. sponsor must be capable of addressing these threats. In some cases host-nation security forces can provide adequate security. In other cases the sponsor finds force protection with the surrogate itself or by operating in a clandestine manner. Another option is for the United States to deploy with enough combat power to deter hostile forces and if deterrence fails to defeat the threat. There is no singular answer as to which U.S. forces are best suited to a particular threat situation. However, SOF generally do not have the firepower to defeat large-scale threats—without relying on the surrogate force—but instead use stealth and cultural awareness to reduce vulnerabilities. Conversely, if large conventional formations have already been introduced to an area of operations, they can assist in protecting sponsor units.

Surrogate operations are susceptible to political influences. U.S., adversary, and international political interests, as well as the surrogate interests,
are all competing in the strategic environment. The sensitivity of this political environment is an important factor for considering the Department of Defense surrogate sponsor.

The wake of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq finds a potentially diminished political will, domestically and internationally for the commitment of significant U.S. military forces, for unilateral or surrogate operations. Additionally, a high operations tempo has limited the U.S. force pool available for extended operations. In such circumstances the lower signature of small SOF elements, which have established a long precedence of foreign deployments, may be a much more politically feasible option. The United States may prefer the use of larger, more visible options in cases where the demonstration of U.S. resolve or deterrence is the desired effect.

Conventional forces and SOF each have capabilities and limitations that make them better suited for certain surrogate warfare operations. Figure 2 depicts the relationship of these capabilities and limitations with respect to five significant elements of the surrogate warfare environment. The chart depicts the most suitable force to serve as a surrogate sponsor given the characteristics of a particular element.

![Figure 2. U.S. Force Employment Criteria](chart)

Figure 2. U.S. Force Employment Criteria
SOF provide the tailored capability for U.S. surrogate warfare when the surrogate force is a fledgling resistance organization or in a FID environment in which the organization and governmental control of the military is weak. It also takes SOF capabilities to train surrogates to do special operations or to operate for extended periods of time in denied territory. SOF have been manned, trained, and equipped in ways that allow them to sustain themselves and their operations without the assistance of host-nation or U.S. logistics. This capability makes them suitable to lead surrogate warfare operations in austere environments. The low visibility and clandestine capability of SOF also provides them with unique force protection options in high threat areas when U.S. combat power is limited or nonexistent. Finally, the same low visibility capability supports the employment of SOF if political sensitivities preclude the deployment of larger, more overt U.S. formations.

Conventional forces can lend their significant capabilities to surrogate warfare as well. The large numbers of conventional forces, relative to SOF, implies that there is a deep pool of potential surrogate trainers. Conventional forces are very capable of working with a surrogate force that is organized in a recognizable military fashion and is responsive to the control of the government. In many cases the surrogate training requirements can be met with conventional force trainers. Basic military training, small-unit tactics, stability operations, and staff functions are all well within the realm of conventional force expertise, and the United States should seek to leverage that expertise whenever possible. A limitation of conventional forces is their sustainment requirements. However, if the proposed surrogate warfare environment mitigates this limitation either through host-nation infrastructure and support or the existing or desired presence of U.S. logistical support, then conventional forces may serve as a surrogate sponsor.

In many areas of the world the threat to U.S. forces of any size is fairly low. In such cases conventional forces can operate freely in relatively small numbers to accomplish FID or other surrogate operations. Higher threat areas require either a commitment of host-nation security forces or perhaps U.S. combat forces to protect the conventional force sponsor. The idea that nothing sends a political message like the deployment of a Marine Expeditionary Unit speaks to the last element of the surrogate warfare environment. The U.S. interest may be best served by demonstrating resolve to an ally by using visible conventional forces to increase the interoperability
and enhance the surrogate’s capability. Conventional forces are more effective in these demonstration or deterrent political situations.

Seldom will all of the elements of a potential surrogate operation imply either a pure special operations or conventional force solution. The challenge for planners is to recognize that all of the elements must be considered and prioritized to determine the best mix of U.S. forces to conduct the surrogate warfare operation.

**Conclusion**

The U.S. military’s latest attempt to categorize conflict has emphasized the distinction between regular and irregular warfare. The United States distinguishes these two types of warfare based upon the participation of irregular forces or the utilization of irregular tactics by either belligerent. This framework permits the description of U.S. unilateral conventional operations as irregular on the basis of an irregularity of some enemy tactical choices. Such a model describes the inclusion of a third-party nation’s military forces in a coalition as regular warfare if the threat is operating as a conventional military force. The inadequacies of this approach are exacerbated because the preponderance of irregular warfare concept development and operations are relegated to SOF. U.S. SOF possess significant capabilities in waging irregular warfare, but U.S. conventional forces do also. The future will demand, perhaps unprecedented, U.S. reliance on the participation of indigenous forces in their military operations. The presence or absence of non-U.S. forces is a critical distinguishing characteristic that is not recognized in the regular versus irregular warfare model. This shortfall should be rectified in order for the United States to maximize the benefits of including foreign forces into military planning.

The U.S. military has endured the significant demands of the first 5 years of the war on terrorism. These operational requirements have strained the U.S. capacity to respond to strategic requirements beyond the near-term objectives of the war on terrorism. As a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. freedom of action has been constrained in the domestic and international political environment. Simultaneously, many countries in the world are either unwilling (lack the desire) or unable (lack the capability) to control their territory, thus providing the potential for terrorist sanctuary or the escalation of regional conflict. The enemies of the United States are fully
capable of recognizing and exploiting this strategic situation. The effective employment of surrogate forces can contribute significantly to the U.S. ability to counter these threats and accomplish its strategic objectives.

The ability to integrate foreign partners, of all types, into U.S. operations is not just a requirement for the future but is a present day reality. Relying on their professionalism and adaptability, U.S. forces are “figuring it out on the ground” when it comes to leveraging the strengths of surrogate forces and mitigating their weaknesses. The effectiveness of U.S. units would be greatly enhanced, and their efforts would produce greater strategic benefit, if the Department of Defense developed comprehensive guidance on surrogate warfare. The objectives of U.S. strategy and policy and a doctrinal methodology for conducting surrogate operations are not currently synchronized. The existing guidance is a convoluted set of terms and operations that alternate between a focus on the organization of the indigenous forces and their tactics.

A review of contemporary U.S. military operations illustrates the lack of a comprehensive approach to incorporating surrogates into the effort. The majority of the guidance for dealing with surrogate forces is found in the doctrine for unconventional warfare and FID. If the surrogate is a modern military power, joint doctrine addresses their integration into a coalition organization. FID, unconventional warfare, and coalition warfare are restricted to relatively narrow sets of circumstances, and they are viewed as distinct operations without a conceptual linkage between them. The reliance on SOF for the conduct of FID and unconventional warfare, combined with majority of the guidance on coalition warfare focused at the Joint Task Force level, reinforces the segregation of these operations. The totality of these circumstances results in an unfortunate limiting of U.S. options for using foreign forces.

The concept of surrogate warfare overcomes the incompleteness of irregular warfare, establishes a conceptual linkage between existing doctrinal operations, and provides a comprehensive range of options for strategic planners. It also facilitates the expansion of the discussion and the preparation of forces to employ surrogates beyond just SOF. The codification of surrogate warfare can be informed by the historical uses of foreign forces by the U.S. military and is consistent with that history as well as the predictions for future operations.
Surrogate warfare is the conduct of operations by, with, or through an entity outside of the U.S. military, performing specific functions that take the place of capabilities the U.S. military either does not have or does not desire to employ. The key to surrogate warfare is that it is defined by the inclusion of a force on behalf of the United States and not on the tactics or type of organization of one of the belligerents. Surrogate warfare is conceptually broad enough to provide guidance for the integration of any foreign entity, without being vulnerable to the wavering of enemy tactics.

A holistic approach to surrogate warfare will allow the United States to better reap the benefits of operating with proxies by ensuring the most effective allocation of U.S. force to maximize the advantages the surrogate offers. One of the most significant benefits is the increased likelihood of gaining political legitimacy for the operation itself. Another advantage is the practical savings in terms of U.S. lives, treasure, and operations tempo when partners are enlisted to share the burdens of warfare. The widely acknowledged importance of civilian populations in future conflicts alludes to another advantage of incorporating foreign forces into U.S. campaigns. Surrogate forces that are indigenous to the country or regions of conflict possess inherent cultural and language capabilities that the United States cannot replicate. This advantage leads to both increased operational effectiveness and increased potential for civilian support.

In order to gain these benefits, the paradigm of relegating surrogate operations to SOF must be reconsidered. A holistic approach to surrogate warfare seeks to leverage the advantages of conventional and SOF by applying them to the most appropriate surrogate operations. Instead of categorizing the operational environment as regular or irregular and employing conventional or SOF respectively, a surrogate warfare operation has several elements each of which contribute to determining the appropriate U.S. force to use for integrating the surrogate. These elements account for the level of organization and control of the proposed surrogate, the envisioned training and operational requirements of the surrogate, the infrastructure available to support the U.S. sponsor, the threat against U.S. forces, and the political sensitivity of the operation. The establishment of surrogate warfare guidance for the entire U.S. military permits the employment of both conventional
and SOF consistent with the demands of the environment while maintaining unity of effort.

Surrogate warfare is part of the history of the United States and will certainly be part of its future. The development of comprehensive guidance on the use of surrogates will allow the United States to realize the significant benefits of conducting operations by, with, and through our partners around the world. Embracing surrogate warfare does not prevent or degrade the United States from acting unilaterally. Rather, it may increase the ability to act unilaterally when required by preserving political capital and national resources. Surrogate warfare expands the options available for the United States in pursuit of its national interests.

Recommendations

The United States is not going to realize the benefits of surrogate warfare spontaneously. A deliberate, comprehensive implementation of surrogate warfare guidance is a necessary condition for changing the way that the U.S. military conducts operations by, with, and through surrogate forces. There are concurrent aspects of incorporating surrogate warfare into future U.S. military operations. The first is to recognize the uniqueness of a surrogate and establish joint definitions for these substitute forces and for surrogate warfare. The next is to establish a doctrinal foundation for surrogate warfare operations. This new joint doctrine needs to provide both a single reference to address the key elements of how to conduct surrogate warfare with the joint force and the integration of relevant surrogate warfare impacts on other joint operations. Third, the Department of Defense needs to establish policies that describe the use of surrogates. This need includes, but is not limited to, the sharing of information and technology, aspects of interagency coordination that are unique to working with foreign forces, assignment of proponents, and budgeting and programming guidance. Finally, security strategies at the national and defense levels need to refine the objectives and desired effects of employing surrogate forces in support of national objectives.

Planning for the future requires an understanding of potential adversaries and the tactics that they may use against the United States. However, guidance should be directed towards those elements of warfare that are within U.S. control. The Department of Defense must make the philosophical shift
from irregular warfare, as a framework for informing U.S. operations, to surrogate warfare, thereby directing those things that it can control while continuing to recognize the range of threats presented by future adversaries.

The best place to begin developing a U.S. surrogate warfare understanding is as one of Joint Staff’s Joint Operating Concepts. This level of integration will prevent surrogate warfare from being marginalized into a service or force specific concept. Also, the relationship between the Joint Operating Concepts and transformation planning will provide the degree of emphasis and visibility necessary for rapid implementation of surrogate warfare. The experimental and future focus of this family of concepts is appropriate for the development of new approaches to warfare.

Experimentation is another area that the U.S. military can investigate the challenges and opportunities of surrogate warfare. The Department of Defense experimentation, modeling, and exercise communities can provide valuable insight into the use of surrogates. An increased focus on the impact of surrogates on U.S. operations, force structures, and technological advancement, and vice versa, will assist the development of effective policy, strategy, and doctrine. Additionally, if leaders and units are forced to explore the role of surrogates in exercise scenarios, they will become more comfortable with the potential of surrogate warfare and more likely consider surrogate operations in real-world planning situations.

The dissemination of the surrogate warfare concept is critical in order to achieve the desired benefits. Carefully and thoughtfully crafted guidance is of no value if the interested parties are not aware of it. There are two critical audiences for the spread of U.S. surrogate warfare guidance:

a. The first and most obvious is the U.S. military force as a whole, which includes strategic planners that need to know the U.S. approach to surrogate warfare and incorporate it as one of the strategic options. Theater and operational level commanders need to continuously shape their environments to preserve and, as necessary, develop potential surrogate warfare options. Tactical units and force providers need to know the potential capabilities they will need in order to operate by, with, and through surrogate forces.

b. Another vital audience is the international community of potential surrogates. The United States wants to preserve the widest possible range of future surrogates. This preservation can only be accomplished
if foreign entities understand that being a surrogate is not a pejorative or inferior status. The United States must preserve, in the development of surrogate warfare guidance, the valuable contribution of surrogates and the shared interests and mutual benefits of conducting operations with the United States. Surrogates are not blind to the geo-political environment and can determine how their participation supports U.S. interests. Therefore, the United States must likewise remain sensitive to the interests of the surrogate and recognize the limitations that accompany the employment of the surrogate when these interests are not identical. The surest way to corrupt the value of surrogate warfare is for the United States to be perceived as abusing their surrogates.

Conflict in the 21st Century is likely to be fought for a more diverse set of reasons and in more diverse settings than at any time since the beginning of the Cold War. These two factors provide tremendous opportunity for the United States and imply unprecedented risks. The development of comprehensive, integrated surrogate warfare strategies and capabilities, and prudent dissemination of these to U.S. forces and their partners, can maximize the opportunities and mitigate the risks. The United States can win in the 21st Century by operating by, with, and through surrogate forces.

Endnotes
4. Ibid., 234-244.
6. FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations* (Department of the Army, 2001), 2-5.
Surrogate Warfare: The Role of U.S. Army SF

Isaac J. Peltier

Operations in Afghanistan and northern Iraq demonstrated the Army SF ability to successfully leverage a surrogate force to achieve U.S. objectives. The Northern Alliance and Kurdish Peshmerga functioned as surrogate armies in place of conventional forces, and they were controlled by U.S. Army SF. This monograph seeks to answer, What is required of U.S. Army SF to conduct surrogate warfare in the future? Analysis suggests that cultural awareness and regional expertise are critical and the ability to function as an operational-level joint headquarters capable of planning and supporting an unconventional warfare campaign.

Introduction

Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom saw the U.S. Army employ Special Forces (SF) on a scale not seen since the Vietnam War.¹ Since 11 September 2001, these Green Berets have experienced a renaissance with unconventional warfare (UW), the role for which SF was originally founded in June 1952.² In his 12 March 2002 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Charles R. Holland, commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, stated that the “long-standing SOF mission” of surrogate warfare was receiving deserved new attention.³ In fact, according to General Holland, U.S. strategic objectives in Afghanistan would not have been achieved if not for surrogate warfare.⁴ This raises the primary research question, What does SF need to do to prepare for future surrogate warfare? This monograph will argue that

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surrogate warfare is indeed a form of UW and that U.S. Army SF are clearly the force of choice because of their cultural and regional expertise.

The attacks of September 11th demanded a swift response. President Bush made it clear in his address to the nation that the U.S. would hunt down those responsible and hold them accountable. Intelligence suggested that Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were operating out of Afghanistan, which meant the military task fell to Central Command (CENTCOM) because it was in their geographic area of responsibility. In deciding how to respond militarily, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks were keenly aware of the failure of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, thus did not want to repeat that failure. They agreed that the force would have to be small, flexible and possess the capabilities to operate with precision and lethality. CENTCOM directed their Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) to begin planning. SOCCENT in turn notified the 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) to begin preparations for conducting UW in Afghanistan.

Operation Enduring Freedom saw SF take an unprecedented role as the main effort in the campaign to overthrow the Taliban and root out Al Qaeda. The unconventional war fought in Afghanistan involved working through, with, and by the Northern Alliance to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The Northern Alliance, under the advisement and direction of SF, served as a surrogate army in place of the large conventional U.S. force that Rumsfeld and Franks wanted to avoid using. The success of SF in Afghanistan would foreshadow what was to come a year later in Iraq.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, SF was employed on an even larger scale. When the 4th Infantry Division was not allowed to enter northern Iraq through Turkey, the 10th SFG was used to open up a second front with surrogate forces. Kurdish militia, which numbered approximately 70,000, was used by SF to disrupt 13 Iraqi divisions, preventing them from interfering with the Combined Forces Land Component Command’s march on Baghdad.

In both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Army SF demonstrated they could leverage a surrogate force to achieve U.S. objectives. The use of surrogates in Afghanistan allowed the Bush administration to achieve the quick response desired after the attacks of September 11th. The use of surrogates also reduced U.S. presence, gave the local population a stake in the coalition’s objectives, and bolstered the perception of
legitimacy for a U.S.-led coalition. In northern Iraq, the use of surrogates served to fill the large void created by Turkey’s refusal to allow U.S. forces to enter Iraq through their country and proved to be a suitable substitute for the large U.S. conventional force that was originally planned for the northern front.

**Importance and Relevance.** Since its inception in 1952, the SF niche has been UW with examples being Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Nevertheless, the UW campaigns SF conducted in Afghanistan and northern Iraq were unique. They were not guerilla warfare characterized by small units using hit-and-run tactics but rather positional warfare in which cities were taken, ground was held, and the enemy capitulated or defeated. The Northern Alliance and Kurdish Peshmerga functioned as surrogate armies in place of U.S. conventional forces, and they were controlled by U.S. Army SF. The success SF achieved in Afghanistan and northern Iraq has established a trademark for UW in the 21st century.

**Methodology.** In answering the primary research question, this monograph will examine history, theory, and doctrine. Analysis of the Office of Strategic Services Detachment 101’s use of Kachin tribesmen in Burma during World War II will demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of using surrogate forces. The theories of T. E. Lawrence will provide the importance of understanding culture and the value of the indirect approach to waging war. Analysis of current UW doctrine will offer insight to how surrogate warfare might fit into the overall UW framework.
This monograph will also examine two historical vignettes from the UW in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom:

a. Task Force Dagger in Afghanistan and the UW operations they conducted with Northern Alliance Forces

b. Task Force Viking in northern Iraq and the UW operations they conducted with Kurdish Peshmerga forces.

Table 1 shows the two criteria and their focus used to analyze and evaluate the vignettes.

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<thead>
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<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Focus</th>
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<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Cultural awareness and regional expertise required to conduct surrogate warfare. This paper will reveal the challenges SF faced in working with surrogates (and the steps taken to overcome these challenges) and demonstrate that Green Berets are indeed the force of choice for conducting surrogate warfare because they possess regional specialization and language capabilities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Ability of a SF Group to serve as an operational level headquarters capable of conducting an UW campaign. Described in this paper are the challenges both the 5th and 10th SFGs faced and the steps they took to overcome personnel, logistics, and planning issues.</td>
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Understanding Surrogate Warfare

**History.** Perhaps the organization that has contributed most to modern UW was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the operational predecessor of SF. The OSS is most famous for the Jedburgh teams that infiltrated into occupied France to organize the French resistance in preparation for D-Day. However, in the jungles of Burma the OSS also conducted UW, and it was there that they experimented with the art of working with indigenous surrogate forces.

Detachment 101 was formed on 14 April 1942 to conduct UW against the Japanese in China and Burma. Their tasks included espionage, sabotage, guerilla warfare, propaganda, and escape and evasion. American OSS operatives knew they could not pass themselves off as natives in Burma. This limitation severely restricted their ability to conduct operations deep behind enemy lines, as the Jedburghs had done in Europe. Additionally, no more than 120 Americans were in the field in Burma at a time. Consequently, Burmese nationals were recruited to perform these tasks, thereby becoming surrogates for the Americans.
When Detachment 101 was formed, the Army had no doctrine or guidance on recruiting, training, and employing native forces. The leaders in Detachment 101 learned as they went along. Members of the detachment also received training from the natives. The Kachin tribesmen were fierce fighters who lived in the hills, and they trained their American advisors how to survive and fight in the jungles. As Detachment 101 evolved and the surrogate army grew, they began to rely more and more on airborne operations. They began infiltration via parachute, rather than overland travel, and they learned how to conduct resupply operations by air in the jungle. They also began developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting rescue operations for downed aircrew. By the beginning of 1944, Detachment 101 had grown to 3,000 men and by 1945 they would be over 10,000 strong.

Detachment 101 and their Kachin tribesmen had many important roles in the war. They provided valuable intelligence to conventional American and allied forces, and they served as a vital economy-of-force effort in the theater. Detachment 101 was responsible for killing 5,428 Japanese soldiers, wounding an estimated 10,000 and capturing 78 prisoners. Detachment 101 losses were only 27 American and 338 natives killed. The American use of surrogates in Burma was a huge success and proved equally successful in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Theory. With respect to surrogate warfare, perhaps no military theorist proves more insightful than T. E. Lawrence. In The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence recounts his time spent as a British liaison officer from 1917–1918 in support of the Arab Revolt led by the Emir Feisal. Prior to becoming a liaison officer, Lawrence had been an intelligence officer in Cairo where he became an expert in the Arab nationalist movement. His knowledge of the Arabs and his empathy for the Arab struggle against Turkish imperial rule allowed him to gain the trust and confidence of Emir Feisal. Subsequently, he was able to influence the Arabs to conduct operations for helping British forces under the command of General Allenby to defeat the Turks.

Lawrence formed his theory of UW to address the unique circumstances of tribal Bedouins fighting against a modern army. Lawrence began by identifying the Arab aim of war as being geographical in nature. For Arabs, success was measured by how much land they controlled, not the number of enemy they killed. To achieve this aim, Lawrence realized that the Arabs would have to leverage their strengths against their enemy’s weaknesses.
Lawrence identified the Turkish Army’s weakness as a shortage of supplies. The Arabs, on the other hand, possessed mobility with their camels and could strike with impunity from the desert against Turkish lines of communication. Based on this awareness, Lawrence came to the conclusion that it was foolish for the Arabs to attack the Turkish Army, which outnumbered and outgunned them, but rather they should attack the railroads and bridges that the Turks depended upon so heavily for resupply.

It is essential to understand the importance of culture to understand Lawrence’s theory of UW. Lawrence was keenly aware of the importance of family in Arab culture, their allegiance to clan and tribe, and the role blood feud played in settling disputes. Unlike the Turks, the Arabs valued their people very much; a single death had significant impact on the whole. Thus, Lawrence developed a theory for fighting a war of detachment where the Arabs would avoid direct engagement with the Turkish Army and would concentrate instead on attacking their lines of communication. By doing this, Lawrence reasoned that he could exploit Turkish weakness while at the same time avoiding Arab casualties.

Lawrence capitalized on the strengths and weaknesses of the Arabs because he was intimately familiar with Arab culture. Similarly, U.S. Army SF attain similar success because they possess regional focus and language capabilities. Lawrence possessed immense knowledge of military history, theory, and doctrine. This knowledge helped him to develop his UW theories and to effectively leverage his Bedouin surrogates. U.S. Army SF have been described as “PhDs with guns.” Green Berets understand the importance of continually studying their region, language, and the culture of the people with whom they work. It is through a process of life-long learning that SF is able to achieve cross-cultural expertise, which allows them to achieve U.S. objectives through unconventional means.

**Doctrine.** To gain a better understanding of how surrogate warfare fits into the doctrinal framework of UW, it is useful to examine the seven phases of UW as put forth in current doctrine (Figure 1).\(^9\) Doctrine states that U.S.-sponsored UW efforts generally pass through the following seven distinct phases:

a. Preparation
b. Initial contact
c. Infiltration
d. Organization  
e. Buildup  
f. Employment  
g. Transition.

Figure 1. Seven Phases of UW Employment (FM 3-05.201)
Normally it takes months to plan and execute a UW campaign. However, the phases do not necessarily have to be conducted sequentially; some may be conducted concurrently or not at all, and not all phases are given the same level of effort. All UW campaigns are unique, as the Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom historical vignettes will show.

**Task Force Dagger, Afghanistan**

Once the decision was made to go to war with Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks were not going to occupy Afghanistan with a large army. The Soviets had occupied Afghanistan from 1979–1989, and their 625,000-man army became embroiled in a difficult and costly counterinsurgency.

While the Department of Defense was deciding how it was going to come up with a military response to 9/11, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had a plan to conduct a covert operation to overthrow the Taliban. Prior to 9/11 the CIA had been conducting operations in Afghanistan and had established contacts with various Afghan factions. The CIA’s plan was to insert paramilitary teams into Afghanistan, link up with anti-Taliban factions, and secure their allegiance with millions of dollars and the promise of technology and firepower forthcoming.

CENTCOM did not have an on-the-shelf plan for Afghanistan. Initial planning efforts indicated that a conventional military response would take months to implement. Rumsfeld was not satisfied and demanded an unconventional approach to solving the problem, and he wanted a plan fast. CENTCOM gave the mission to their SOCCENT, who in turn directed the 5th SFG to establish a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). The 5th SFG’s mission was to conduct UW for overthrowing the Taliban and destroying Al Qaeda forces. The UW campaign waged in Afghanistan would involve many elements of Army Special Operations Forces. This section of the monograph will focus on the Green Berets of the 5th SFG and the unconventional war they waged using surrogate forces.

**Standing Up a JSOTF.** Within two days of 9/11, the 5th SFG was directed to form JSOTF-North. The 5th SFG immediately began preparations for deployment and on 10 October 2001, less than a month after 9/11, the 5th SFG main body arrived at Karshi Kanabad, an old Soviet airbase in Uzbekistan.
The 5th SFG was preceded by elements of the U.S. Air Force’s 16th Special Operations Wing. This Wing had already established a JSOTF headquarters to plan and command and control combat search and rescue operations in support of the air campaign. Upon arrival, Colonel Mulholland, the 5th SFG commander, assumed command of the JSOTF, and the 16th Special Operations Wing commander became the deputy JSOTF commander. The JSOTF was renamed “Task Force Dagger,” which henceforth will be used to refer to JSOTF-North.

SFGs normally command and control their forces through a network of operational bases. When a SFG establishes a SF Operational Base, they are purely organic. An SFG may also serve as an Army Special Operations Task Force, where they direct and support only the Army Special Operations Forces assigned to a JSOTF. When properly augmented, a SFG may also serve as the nucleus for a JSOTF. To help 5th SFG stand up as a JSOTF, the Special Operations Command Joint Forces Command provided personnel to augment the Group staff, including the key positions of J2 (Intelligence), J3 (Operations), J4 (Logistics), J5 (Strategic Plans and Policy), and assistant J6 (Command, Control, and Communications).

Task Force Dagger was composed of many units. The following Army Special Operations Forces made up the task force: the 5th SFG, elements of the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, the 112th Signal Battalion, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the 4th Psychological Operations Group, and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. The task force was also composed of the following Air Force Special Operations Command units: the 16th Special Operations Wing, the 9th Special Operations Squadron, and 23rd Special Tactics Squadron teams. Finally, the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, provided base security at Karshi Kanabad. Despite the growing pains of standing up a JSOTF, Task Force Dagger successfully infiltrated two SF operational detachments into northern Afghanistan within two weeks of arriving at Karshi Kanabad.

**Initial Planning.** SOCCENT, with staff augmentation from the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, took the lead on planning the UW campaign for Afghanistan. Using the seven classic phases of UW (Figure 1) as a foundation, planners envisioned that SF would link-up with Northern Alliance forces, organize and train them through the winter, and begin combat operations in the spring. Planners thought it would take months for the UW campaign
to mature. Moreover, the UW campaign was viewed as a supporting effort to the decisive combat operations that would occur later with the introduction of conventional coalition ground forces. No one envisioned that the air campaign, in conjunction with a UW campaign, would achieve decisive victory over the Taliban. The “light speed” UW that occurred required Task Force Dagger to remain flexible and adaptive.22

The Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance was an anti-Taliban opposition group consisting of a loose conglomeration of several different ethnic tribes that included the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and the Hazaras. The southern Pashtun tribes, which represent the majority ethnic group in Afghanistan, were not a part of the Northern Alliance, but they also were opposed to the Taliban regime. The two indigenous leaders the 5th SFG had identified as potential partners in their UW campaign were Mohammed Fahim Khan and General Rashid Dostum. Khan had succeeded Ahmad Shah Massoud as the senior military leader of the Northern Alliance. Massoud, known as the “Lion of Panjshir,” had led the mujahideen fight against the Soviet Union. He was assassinated just two days prior to 9/11. General Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek, had served in the Soviet army and fought against the mujahideen until he switched sides and joined Massoud to fight against the communist puppet regime in Afghanistan. Dostum had formed his own militia, which was approximately 10,000 to 15,000 strong.

Many Northern Alliance members got their start as mujahideen fighting against the Soviets. During the Soviet’s ten-year occupation, the mujahideen ran an effective insurgency, but the Soviets adapted to the situation by effectively using air power to fight the insurgents. In the mid-1980s, however, the mujahideen regained the advantage when the CIA provided them with Stinger antiaircraft missiles, effectively neutralizing Soviet air power.23 The lesson learned from the Soviet’s experience in Afghanistan was that large conventional forces are ineffective in restrictive terrain against a determined enemy.

Infiltration and Link Up. On 20 October 2001, after several aborted attempts to infiltrate Operational Detachments-Alpha (ODA) into Afghanistan, the first two teams were successfully inserted into Afghanistan. The 12-man teams were sent to make contact with Fahim Khan and General Dostum. After successfully linking up with their respective warlords, they quickly
established rapport. Within 24 hours, at the request of their warlords, both ODAs—with their attached Air Force Special Tactics Squadron teams—found themselves directing air strikes on Taliban frontline positions. These air strikes impressed the Northern Alliance and further strengthened rapport with the teams.  

Initial assessment of the factions revealed they were ready and willing to begin combat operations. However, the UW campaign plan that SOCCENT envisioned did not involve immediate combat operations. The ODAs discovered that the classic approach to conducting UW would not work in Afghanistan. Like Lawrence with his Bedouin tribesmen in Arabia, SF in Afghanistan had to adapt their strategy to the people with whom they were working. The ODAs were not intimidated by this change in plans. They knew the necessary air assets were in place and were able to begin conducting combat operations immediately. Had the air assets not been in place, they would not have been able to achieve overmatching firepower and would not have been able to proceed as they did.

The Northern Alliance commanders took great care to protect their new American friends. For example, General Dostum had his personal bodyguards surround the SF team and initially did not let them get any closer than 8 kilometers to the fight. Dostum was well aware of American intolerance for casualties, and he was not going to risk America pulling out of Afghanistan because U.S. SF soldiers were killed.  

During their first two weeks on the ground the ODAs learned how to effectively support their assigned surrogate forces. They discovered that by splitting the 12-man SF detachment, often into three-man elements, they could cover a broader front and better track the positions of the Northern Alliance Forces. This tactic proved valuable in preventing fratricide. It also facilitated synchronization of operations because the Northern Alliance lacked the means to effectively communicate among units. Because each element of the SF team had communications equipment, they were able to compensate for the Afghans’ shortfall. The SF teams were also able to bring in critical supplies such as horse feed, blankets, and cold-weather equipment. Eventually, with the assistance of the CIA, the teams received the weapons and ammunition the surrogate forces needed to wage a sustained campaign against the Taliban.
Mazar-e Sharif. The second largest city in Afghanistan, Mazar-e Sharif, was of significant cultural, religious, and economic value to the Northern Alliance. The U.S. was also interested in Mazar-e Sharif, because of the airfields located there. If captured, the airfields would provide a critical airhead to bring in additional U.S. troops and supplies. In 1998 the Taliban pushed the Northern Alliance out of Mazar-e Sharif and forced them into the mountains. Now the Northern Alliance had American SF and U.S. air power to assist them. In preparation for major offensive operations, Task Force Dagger infiltrated elements of ODC 53—the equivalent of a battalion command post—on 2 November 2001 to provide high level liaison with General Dostum and the other faction leaders. On 4 November 2001 Task Force Dagger infiltrated another ODA to assist General Mohammed Atta and his faction.

The plan to liberate Mazar-e Sharif consisted of concurrent attacks by different factions through the two river valleys to the south of the city. The factions would link up and combine their forces where the two rivers joined and then together would make a final push to Mazar-e Sharif. On 5 November 2001 they began the offensive. To facilitate command and control and fire support, the ODAs split their teams to provide coverage across the Northern Alliance front. As the Northern Alliance advanced, SF and the Special Tactics Squadron continued to call in air strikes against the Taliban defenders in the river valley. Because the Taliban chose to maintain the integrity of their formations, they were easier targets for coalition air strikes. Had they dispersed and reverted to guerilla warfare tactics, they may have sustained less damage and prolonged the war.

While the SF teams were directing precision air strikes to reduce Taliban defensive positions, the Northern Alliance commanders were negotiating with Taliban commanders. This practice is common in Afghanistan; it is customary to switch sides and change allegiances. While some Taliban commanders took up the offer, others were determined to resist at all costs. Many of these die-hard fighters were foreigners and had ties to Al Qaeda. These non-Afghan forces tended to be better trained and equipped, and they fought the hardest against the Northern Alliance.

After several days of fighting, the Northern Alliance had pushed the Taliban out of the river valleys. The Taliban were now consolidating and reorganizing in defensive positions in the Tangi Gap, the only defensible terrain between the Northern Alliance and Mazar-e Sharif. As SF continued
to direct air strikes against the Taliban, the Northern Alliance forces massed and then launched an overwhelming assault on the gap, completely routing the enemy. The offensive maneuver consisted of Northern Alliance forces charging in on horseback while others moved in on foot or by truck, all the while being supported by precision-guided bombs dropped from coalition aircraft under the control of SF. As the Taliban retreated, coalition air power continued to interdict the fleeing forces. The way to Mazar-e Sharif was now open and the SF and the Northern Alliance flowed into the city where they were met by celebrating crowds.

The liberation of Mazar-e Sharif, on 10 November 2001, represented the first major victory for the Northern Alliance and their SF advisors and was significant as follows:

a. Boosted the confidence of the Northern Alliance forces
b. Started the collapse of the Taliban not only in the north but also throughout the country.  
c. Indicated the speed with which the UW campaign could be fought as evidenced by the fact that it was only three weeks from the time the first ODAs infiltrated until Mazar-e Sharif was liberated.
d. Demonstrated that SF could bring together multiple factions under one formation and coordinate a major offensive with surrogate Afghan forces.

**Analysis.** The first criterion used to analyze this vignette is training, focusing on several aspects of cultural awareness and regional expertise, which is essential to conducting surrogate warfare. One of the most important aspects of cultural awareness and regional expertise is language skills. All SF soldiers maintain proficiency in a foreign language. To facilitate language proficiency SFGs have language labs, which provide SF soldiers the necessary materials and instruction they need to maintain proficiency. Additionally, all SF soldiers are required to take the Defense Language Proficiency Test annually. However, because of the high operational tempo, most SF soldiers have little time to dedicate to their language training, although deployment offers ample on-the-job training.

In an interview with *Frontline,* Colonel Mulholland stated he was concerned about his Group’s “lack of precise cultural and tribal knowledge of Afghanistan.” 5th SFG’s language and cultural focus is on Arabic and the Middle East. The predominant languages in Afghanistan are Pashtun and
Moreover, Afghanistan was a new area for the 5th SFG; consequently, they had little institutional knowledge of the country. SF operational detachments were forced to improvise. For example, the detachment commander for the team assigned to General Dostum knew enough Russian that he could communicate on a very rudimentary basis until an Afghan translator was found who could speak better English than the commander’s Russian. The biggest limiting factor for language and cultural training is time. Because of the quick deployment to Afghanistan, time was scarce for gaining proficiency in the languages of the region. Despite having limited language and cultural experience with Afghanistan, SF teams were still very successful. The reason was because they were able to adapt cultural skills and experience developed during other training missions to the Middle East to the situation in Afghanistan.

Task Force Dagger was also sensitive to the implications of cultural awareness. For example, the task force recognized that rivalries existed between the various factions. Consequently, as more anti-Taliban groups were identified, the task force took care to ensure equitable distribution of ODAs among the various factions, thus preventing any perception of favoritism. This action is significant because it demonstrates an operational level of cultural awareness on the part of Task Force Dagger. The second criterion concerns the organization of a SFG and their ability to be an operational-level headquarters that plans, supports, and supervises the execution of a UW campaign. The problem was that 5th SFG was directed to establish a JSOTF, an operational-level joint headquarters, not a tactical-level Army SF Command or Army Special Operations Task Force. They lacked the personnel, communications equipment, and training to run a joint headquarters. In addition to serving as a joint headquarters, the JSOTF was also responsible for the isolation, infiltration, resupply, command, control and communications for their SF operational detachments, a mission that would normally have gone to a separate Army Special Operations Task Force or SF Operational Base.

The lack of training and personnel would manifest itself in a number of ways during the early days of the JSOTF. For example, within a JSOTF many important tasks exist that must be performed in order to effectively support a UW campaign and the operational detachments. Fire support and air operations are among these. Just as T. E. Lawrence was able to effectively combine British motorized forces with Arab horsemen, the SF ODAs brought
U.S. air power to bear on the Taliban. The SF ODAs depended upon air power to destroy Taliban forces and establish credibility with the Northern Alliance. Also, like Detachment 101 in Burma, SF depended upon air operations to infiltrate and exfiltrate the operational area as well as to logistically support themselves and the Northern Alliance. Therefore, personnel at the operational level needed to be able to effectively plan fire support and air operations. Recognizing the importance of these two missions and the lack of expertise to perform them, Colonel Mulholland drew upon various units assigned to the JSOTF to form an ad hoc Joint Fires Element and eventually was able to get the Joint Special Operations Aviation Component to co-locate with the JSOTF for planning all fixed- and rotary-wing operations.36

Although the 5th SFG experienced initial growing pains, they proved to be an adaptive learning organization. According to Peter M. Senge, author of The Fifth Discipline, “the organization that will truly excel … will be organizations that tap people’s commitment and capacity to learn at levels in an organization.”37 Because of the maturity, professionalism, and commitment of the soldiers in a SFG, they were able to adapt to a complex situation and achieve outstanding success.

**Task Force Viking, Northern Iraq**

Operation Iraqi Freedom saw many brave and bold actions enroute to toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime, but perhaps none was more daring than that of Task Force Viking in northern Iraq. Here in the northern fifth of the country, a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) and 70,000 Kurdish Peshmerga took on 13 Iraqi divisions. Task Force Viking’s mission was to conduct UW, and their key task was to disrupt Iraqi forces positioned along a 350-kilometer de facto boundary called the Green Line, preventing them from going south where they could interfere with the conventional coalition assault on Baghdad. The motto of the task force, “Concede Nothing,” captures the spirit in which they took on their mission. Not satisfied with just disrupting the Iraqi forces they faced, the task force took the fight to the enemy. When the dust settled, Task Force Viking had captured two of the largest cities in Iraq, secured key Iraqi oilfields and caused conventional Iraqi forces to either surrender or abandon their posts and melt away into the local population.
A Friendship is Formed. The idea of conducting UW with the Kurds was not a new one. During the Persian Gulf War, Brigadier General Richard Potter, commander of Special Operations Command Europe, deployed “pilot teams” to Turkey to assess the feasibility of organizing Kurds into resistance groups. General Carl Stiner, the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command at the time, proposed a UW plan to Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell that entailed attacking Sadam’s rear with Kurdish and Shiite rebels organized by Green Berets. According to Stiner, a UW campaign in Saddam’s rear area would cause him to divert forces, thus preventing him from invading Saudi Arabia and possibly causing him to pull out of Kuwait. Unfortunately, Special Operations Forces in the early 1990s were not viewed with the same enthusiasm they are today. As a result, Stiner’s ideas were met with resistance. Meanwhile, BG Potter laid the groundwork with the Turks and CENTCOM for possibly organizing the Kurds and positioned half of the 10th SFG in Turkey under the pretense of conducting combat search and rescue operations. The Turks were very concerned about the prospect of the U.S. conducting UW in their backyard. Specifically, they were against arming and training the Kurds, which they feared would lead to the unification and establishment of an independent Kurdish state. This same issue would resurface in Operation Iraqi Freedom when Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan said that Kurdish control of Kirkuk and Mosul would be grounds for a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq.

The positive relationship between the Kurds and the 10th SFG was cemented a decade before Operation Iraqi Freedom, when in early April 1991 the 1st Battalion, 10th SFG deployed to southeast Turkey and northern Iraq to provide humanitarian assistance to over a half a million Kurds. The humanitarian crisis was brought on when Saddam Hussein attacked the Kurds for rising up against his regime following operation Desert Storm. The Kurds, who were no match for the Iraqi Army, fled to the mountains along the southeast border of Turkey where they suffered from freezing temperatures and starvation. Over the next few weeks both the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 10th SFG also deployed to provide relief to the Kurds. This operation would mark the first time the Group would deploy as a whole. General Galvin, the commander of European Command, would remark, “The 10th SFG saved a half million Kurds from extinction.” The compassion 10th SFG showed the Kurds would not be forgotten, and in March 2003 the Kurds provided a warm reception when the 10th SFG returned.
The Kurds. The situation in northern Iraq had improved considerably since the Gulf War. Under the protection of Operation Northern Watch, the successor to Operation Provide Comfort II, the Kurds prospered. In 1998 the two main political parties, the KDP led by Massoud Barzani and the PUK led by Jalal Talabani, put aside their differences and agreed to share power. The KDP and PUK both possessed militias called the Peshmerga, which literally translated means “those who face death.” Although the Peshmerga primarily had small arms, what they lacked in firepower they made up for in ferocity. By the time Task Force Viking arrived in March 2003, approximately 70,000 Peshmerga were available to form a surrogate army for executing the UW campaign in the north.44

Task Force Viking. Task Force Viking was first formed on 26 July 2002 at Fort Carson, Colorado, home of the 10th SFG (Airborne). The 10th SFG, commanded by Colonel Charles Cleveland, formed the nucleus of this CJSOTF-North.45 The task force was composed of many units. At its core was the Group Headquarters, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 10th SFG, and the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd SFG. The task force also consisted of the following joint and coalition special operations units: 404th Civil Affairs Battalion, D Company/96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Task Force 7 Special Boat Squadron from the United Kingdom, and the 352nd Special Operations Group (U.S. Air Force). The following conventional army and joint forces also contributed to Task Force Viking: 2nd Battalion/14th Infantry from the 10th Mountain Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and elements of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit. At its peak, Task Force Viking consisted of approximately 5,200 personnel.46

Preparation for War. Task Force Viking planned to establish a base of operations in Turkey while the 4th Infantry Division was planning to offload from the Mediterranean, transit overland through Turkey, and enter Iraq from the north. While basing rights in Turkey did not seem promising, General Franks kept negotiations open with Turkey pending a vote in their Parliament.47 When no Turkish support became official, plans had to be changed. Because the 4th Infantry Division would not be entering Iraq from the north with their 60,000 troops, CENTCOM needed to do something to keep the 13 Iraqi divisions in place and prevent them from reinforcing Baghdad. Task Force Viking was ordered to open up a second front in northern Iraq.48
The Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA) that Task Force Viking estab-
lished in northern Iraq encompassed over 173,000 square kilometers and was bordered by Turkey to the north, Iran to the east, and to the south by the Green Line that separated Iraq proper from the Kurdish autonomous zone. The JSOA was further divided into two Special Operations Areas that represented the approximate territorial boundaries for the KDP and PUK. Opposing the task force along the Green Line were three Iraqi corps, consisting of 13 Iraqi divisions—2 of these being Republican Guard divisions, 2 mechanized, 1 armor, and 8 infantry divisions.49 Also located in the north along the Iranian border was a 700-man terrorist organization called Ansar Al Islam, which was believed to have ties to Al Qaeda.

The campaign plan Task Force Viking developed involved assigning a SF battalion to each of the major Kurdish factions, with a third SF battalion available to conduct other special operations. The PUK and the KDP would serve as a surrogate army in place of the conventional U.S. forces originally planned for in the north. The campaign plan consisted of three lines of operations:

a. Air interdiction in which targeting priorities were directed against the two Republican Guard divisions and one armored division, collectively comprising the Iraqi operational center of gravity
b. Ground operations in which key cities were defended, close air support and terminal guidance operations conducted, and dislocated civilians managed
c. Information operations, which sought to support the deception plan, facilitate capitulation and cease fires, prevent movement of Iraqi forces south, and limit oil infrastructure damage.

The end state was that Iraqi operational mobility was disrupted and operational success was exploited.

Infiltrating Northern Iraq. Turkey continued to confound the situation by refusing to allow the U.S. overflight rights. The initial infiltration into northern Iraq, dubbed “Ugly Baby,” took a circuitous route from Constanta, Romania; over the Mediterranean Sea; down to Jordan; then across the western desert of Iraq just below the Syrian border into Bashur airfield. U.S. Air Force Special Tactics Squadron teams had already established airheads at Bashur airfield and As-Sulaymaniyah in northern Iraq. On 22 March, the Special Operations Combat Talon MC-130s flew under Iraqi air defenses.
Still, they came under heavy fire, and several aircraft were damaged. One aircraft carrying an entire SF company was severely damaged and was forced to conduct an emergency landing in Turkey. Turkey granted overflight rights the next day.

Task Force Viking continued to infiltrate their forces via their MC-130s. Because of the distance from Romania, restrictions imposed by the Turks, and the remaining air defense threat, only one infiltration per night was feasible. This limitation required task force planners to modify the plan, balancing the infiltration of ODAs with supplies. Because of the limited lift capacity of the MC-130 and the lack of C-17 support, the buildup of combat power occurred slower than desired. Despite these challenges, the MC-130s of the task force performed admirably, successfully infiltrating all of Task Force Viking in a matter of weeks.

**Operation Viking Hammer.** The first order of business for Task Force Viking was to defeat Ansar Al Islam, camped in northeastern Iraq near the Iranian border. The Kurds had been battling Ansar Al Islam for several years prior to the arrival of the U.S. in March 2003. Ansar Al Islam’s terror campaign against the Kurds escalated in December 2002 when two PUK outposts were overrun, the bodies of the soldiers mutilated, and videotapes of the heinous act distributed in Sulaymaniyah. A belief was that Ansar’s terror camps were providing sanctuary to members of Al Qaeda, and the Kurds were adamant that Ansar be destroyed. Using the PUK Peshmerga as a surrogate force, the 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG under the command of LTC Kenneth Tovo planned Operation Viking Hammer to destroy Ansar Al Islam.

Operation Viking Hammer commenced on 28 March and ended on 30 March 2003. The operation was an impressive display of U.S. firepower, which included strikes by Tomahawk missiles, B-52s, F-14s, and F-18s. Perhaps the most impressive display came from the AC-130 gunships that were in direct support of the task force. Despite receiving antiaircraft fire, they loitered on target all night until they expended all their ammunition. The assault force consisted of approximately 7,000 Peshmerga and was conducted along several prongs with two SF soldiers per approximately 360 Peshmerga. Like Task Force Dagger with the Northern Alliance, Task Force Viking also successfully combined U.S. air power with surrogate forces to accomplish both U.S. and surrogate objectives.
Operation Viking Hammer was a huge success and accomplished several important tasks. It demonstrated U.S. commitment to the Kurds, just as T. E. Lawrence and the British Expeditionary Force had done with the Arabs in 1918 and Task Force Dagger had done with the Northern Alliance in 2001. The Peshmerga also proved themselves to their SF advisors by continually advancing under heavy fire. Routing Ansar Al Islam eliminated a significant rear area threat, which allowed Kurdish and U.S. forces to focus combat power against regular Iraqi forces positioned along the Green Line. In the operation, Task Force Viking and their Kurdish surrogates seized over 300 square kilometers of terrain and killed over 300 Ansar Al Islam fighters. Only three Kurds were killed and 23 were wounded, with no American casualties.

**Attacking the Green Line.** With the Kurds fully aboard, Task Force Viking turned south and commenced operations against Iraqi forces positioned along the Green Line. Operation Mountain Thunder was planned to be a series of aggressive attacks utilizing all of the task force’s U.S. and surrogate assets. In the southern portion of the JSOA, the 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG with their PUK forces attacked to seize Chamchamal, pushing Iraqi forces to the outskirts of Kirkuk. In the center, the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd SFG, along with elements of the 2nd Battalion, 10th SFG and their Kurdish Peshmerga, attacked an armor brigade and defeated several counterattacks. In the north the 2nd Battalion with KDP Peshmerga attacked towards Mosul. All along the Green Line, Iraqi units remained dug in and presented themselves as lucrative targets to coalition airpower.

In response to Turkish demands that Kirkuk and Mosul not fall into Kurdish hands, the task force ordered their ODAs to only advance beyond the Green Line with a maximum of 150 Peshmerga fighters. Because the ODAs depended upon their Kurdish surrogates as their only maneuver force, they had to use their interpersonal and cross-cultural communications skills to bridge the gap between policy objectives and military reality. As Lawrence discovered with the Arabs, the key to conducting warfare with surrogates rests in the ability to strike a balance between the goals of the surrogates with those of the sponsor.

Once Iraqi Forces had retreated past Kirkuk, the relationship between the task force and the Kurds would once again be tested with the securing of the oil fields and the occupation of the city. Because of the political danger
of Turkish intervention, the oil fields were initially secured with elements of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG and 2-14 Infantry. The U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade soon conducted a relief in place and assumed responsibility for securing the oil fields. After Kirkuk fell, SF ODAs began moving their Peshmerga forces back behind the Green Line and transitioned control of the city to the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

Meanwhile the battle for Mosul raged on. SF with their Kurdish Peshmerga were taking and giving ground with Iraqi forces in a series of battles. Whereas Kirkuk had a predominantly Kurdish population, Mosul was mostly Arab and strongly supported the Iraqi army. Resistance in the city was much more significant, and the arrival of Kurdish Peshmerga only served to aggravate the situation. However, a Kurdish population was also in the city, and the Kurd’s interest in reuniting with them was strong. The 2nd Battalion, 10th SFG, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Robert Waltemeyer, was in an awkward situation. While he needed the Kurds to fight the Iraqi forces, he did not want them advancing into Mosul, triggering a Turkish response. The 2nd Battalion would struggle to keep the Kurds out of the city. But a city of two million people is impossible for an SF battalion to secure alone. In order to balance the competing national goals, Task Force Viking developed a plan to introduce the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit for securing the city and satisfying U.S., Kurdish, and Turkish interests. The 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit would continue their efforts to secure Mosul until the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) arrived and assumed control of the city. Meanwhile the ODAs would continue to move their Peshmerga forces back behind the Green Line.

Analysis. Applying the criterion of training, focusing specifically on cultural awareness and regional expertise, insight can be gained into how Task Force Viking successfully conducted surrogate warfare in northern Iraq. For Task Force Viking, the ability to rapidly gain the trust and confidence of the Kurdish Peshmerga proved vital to their success. Operation Provide Comfort had paved the way for a positive relationship with the Kurds. For example, the commanders of both 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 10th SFG, participated in Provide Comfort as detachment commanders. This involvement went a long way in giving them credibility with senior KDP and PUK leadership. The experience was not limited to the battalion commanders, as many of the senior noncommissioned officers and warrant officers on the
ODAs had participated in Provide Comfort as junior noncommissioned officers. They also capitalized on this experience to establish rapport with the Peshmerga. The practice reinforces the value of employing SF in areas where they have previously operated. Institutional knowledge of the area of operations and interpersonal relationships formed during prior deployments allowed SF to quickly integrate and commence operations. This result also suggests that regional expertise and cultural awareness is not created overnight, but rather takes years to build.

Like the 5th SFG in Afghanistan, 10th SFG faced challenges with language. Part of the reason is because 10th SFG’s geographic area of responsibility is Europe, not the Middle East, and Arabic and Kurdish are not languages for which they typically focus. Recognizing this shortcoming and learning from the challenges the 5th SFG faced in Afghanistan, 10th SFG incorporated language training as part of their pre-mission training for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Because the 10th SFG had more time to prepare for operations in Iraq than 5th Group did for Afghanistan, their soldiers received accelerated language training in Turkish, Kurdish, and Arabic from the Group Language Institute. Although they learned only enough language to survive and communicate on a very primitive basis, even rudimentary language skills went a long way towards building rapport and establishing credibility with their Kurdish hosts.

In addition to receiving language training, 10th SFG soldiers also received cultural awareness training. Instructors from the Joint Special Operations University, located at Hurlburt in northwest Florida, traveled to Fort Carson to conduct a series of cultural awareness seminars over a three-day period. With respect to Muslim culture, 10th SFG soldiers already had a wealth of experience to draw upon from operations conducted in Bosnia and Kosovo. This foundation is significant because it demonstrates that the cultural skills and experience developed over years of deployments are easily transferable to other regions and cultures.

At the operational level, Task Force Viking planners were also cognizant of the importance of cultural awareness. They recognized the volatile dynamic that existed between the Turks, Kurds, and Iraqi Arabs. The task force maintained peace between the three ethnic groups by controlling the actions of the Kurds. They limited the number of Kurds that crossed the Green Line by directing each ODA to only take 150 Kurdish fighters with them. As soon as Kirkuk and Mosul were liberated, Task Force Viking
directed the ODAs to remove their Peshmerga from the two cities and back behind the Green Line. This direction was not always easy because tension existed between the different Kurdish factions. However, through interpersonal skills SF was able to maintain balance between the groups and leverage their surrogates to accomplish the mission. What follows are examples.

During a meeting between the task force commander, his battalion commanders, and the KDP and PUK leadership, the PUK contingent began celebrating about the fall of Kirkuk. The KDP leader, Barzani, left the meeting in anger. The KDP were concerned about the PUK making a grab for Kirkuk, a city both factions wanted. In response, the task force commander gathered up the PUK and KDP leaders and retired them to a private room, away from their lieutenants, where he proceeded to lay out the campaign plan. He explained how they each were contributing to the campaign and that if either of them wished to have a role in a post-Saddam Iraq, they must be careful how they conduct themselves. By taking the time to explain the significance of the campaign in the north, the task force commander was able to defuse the situation while at the same time enrolling them into his vision for the conduct of the campaign.

The second criterion concerns the organization of the SFG and their ability to serve as an operational-level headquarters that can plan, support, and execute a UW campaign. Like the 5th SFG, the 10th SFG was directed to form a JSOTF, an operational-level joint headquarters, not a tactical-level SF Operational Base or Army Special Operations Task Force. Although they initially lacked the personnel, communications equipment, and training to run a joint headquarters, the biggest difference between the experience of 10th SFG and 5th SFG was time.

Task Force Viking had significantly more time to prepare to become a JSOTF. In addition to having the 5th SFG lessons learned in Afghanistan, they had the opportunity to rehearse as a JSOTF. For example, in December 2002, Task Force Viking participated in CENTCOM’s Internal Look exercise, which focused on joint and coalition operations in support of the Operation Iraqi Freedom campaign plan. This exercise was essentially a dress rehearsal for the war, and although many growing pains occurred and mistakes made, the experience proved invaluable in helping Task Force Viking function as a JSOTF.

The recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq produced a wealth of institutional knowledge in the SFG with respect to running a JSOTF.
Additionally, much of the necessary equipment required to run a JSOTF has been acquired. However, a SFG still only forms the nucleus of a JSOTF and as such the SFG staff needs time to bring all of the other joint and combined participants together to train prior to deploying.

Another operational-level issue Task Force Viking faced was logistics. Because of a lack of strategic airlift, Task Force Viking was forced to rely solely on their MC-130s for infiltrating personnel and supplies. As Task Force Viking built combat power in northern Iraq, they had to constantly balance what supplies were pushed forward. For example, initial heavy fighting along the Green Line required the task force to push forward more .50-caliber ammunition and Javelin antitank missiles at the expense of food, water, and other requirements. To help alleviate the logistical strain, the task force relied on the Kurds for much of their initial logistical requirements. The Kurds were very helpful in providing everything from lodging, sustenance, and vehicles. In this regard, the Kurds proved to be more than just good fighters, but gracious hosts who provided critical life support to the task force as they built up combat power during the early days of the war.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

U.S. Army SF have played a critical role in prosecuting the war on terrorism. Their ability to wage unconventional war remains their trademark. Operations in Afghanistan and northern Iraq demonstrated SF’s ability to successfully leverage a surrogate force to achieve U.S. objectives. These UW campaigns were unique and suggest what future operations in the war on terrorism may resemble.

Although the use of surrogates in Afghanistan and northern Iraq was unique in many ways, the concept of using surrogates is not new. This monograph examined history, theory, and doctrine in arriving at an understanding of surrogate warfare. During World War II, Detachment 101 organized and trained Kachin tribesmen to fight the Japanese in China and Burma. They functioned as a surrogate army, performing a valuable economy-of-force mission in support of the allies in the China-Burma-India theater of operations.

T. E. Lawrence’s theory of UW further emphasizes the importance of understanding the culture of the indigenous force with which one works. His understanding of the importance of family in Arab culture, for example,
led him to develop a theory of fighting a war of detachment. His theory stressed maintaining offensive initiative and avoiding the defense. Both the Northern Alliance and Kurdish Peshmerga faced a numerically superior force, yet they took the fight to the enemy. With the help of SF and coalition air power they were able to maintain offensive initiative and ultimately defeated Taliban and conventional Iraqi forces.

The UW campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were unique in many ways. For example, they did not sequentially follow the seven phases of UW described in current doctrine, but rather went straight into the combat employment phase. These UW campaigns were also unique because SF advised large formations of surrogates in the conduct of large-scale conventional type operations as opposed to the classic small-unit hit-and-run tactics characterized by guerrilla warfare. It is in this context that surrogate warfare emerges as a unique form of UW.

This monograph presented two historical vignettes of UW operations conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq. It examined U.S. Army SF in Afghanistan and the role they played in leveraging the Northern Alliance as a surrogate army. The pace of operations with which Task Force Dagger waged their UW campaign was faster than anyone anticipated. Within 24 hours of linking up with Northern Alliance factions, SF operational detachments were calling in air strikes against the Taliban. Within three weeks the first major combat operation began to liberate Mazar e-Sharif.

Task Force Viking and the UW operations they conducted with the Kurds in northern Iraq were examined here. Together with 70,000 Kurdish Peshmerga, SF led the way in disrupting 13 Iraqi divisions along the Green Line. Although the 10th SFG focus is on the European Command area of responsibility, they successfully adapted to the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Operation Provide Comfort proved invaluable in helping to make this transition. Many 10th SFG soldiers, to include two of the battalion commanders, were veterans of Operation Provide Comfort, giving them instant credibility with their Kurdish counterparts.

The primary research question was, What does SF need to do to prepare for surrogate warfare in the future? The criterion of training, specifically cultural awareness and regional expertise, was used to analyze SF’s experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. Analysis revealed that while SF were successful in applying cross-cultural skills developed over years of deployments, they still had challenges. Although SF conducted “crash course” language
training in preparation for their UW operations, they still had to improvise to overcome language barriers by utilizing other nonnative language skills until translators could be found. Based on this result, the following conclusion is drawn: Although SF is capable of transferring cross-cultural and language skills, this means is not sufficient for future UW operations. Too often, SF relies on translators and rudimentary communications in third languages as a workaround. Investment needs to be made to increase SF’s language capability. Four to six months of initial language training is insufficient. Selected noncommissioned officers and officers should be sent for more comprehensive language training. Additionally, all SF soldiers should conduct immersion training to fully develop their language and cultural awareness skills. Finally, analysis of future threats should dictate what languages and cultures to invest in, rather than cycling SF soldiers through a group of core languages.

The second criterion, organization, was used to assess the ability of a SFG to function as an operational-level joint headquarters. Analysis of the experience of the 5th and 10th SFGs revealed that while they successfully accomplished their missions and established Joint Special Operations Task Forces, significant growing pains occurred. The primary reasons were a lack of equipment, personnel, and training. Much of the required equipment has now been acquired, and institutional knowledge within the SFGs has increased with respect to operating a JSOTF. However, a requirement will always exist to bring the army, joint, and combined personnel together in a timely manner for training as JSOTF prior to deploying.

The UW campaigns SF waged in Afghanistan and Iraq were unique and established a trademark for UW operations in the 21st century. Because of the cultural divide that currently exist between eastern and western cultures, the use of surrogates abroad may become increasingly more attractive. U.S. Army SF are clearly the force of choice to leverage surrogates to achieve U.S. objectives. In order to prepare for future surrogate warfare, SF must increase their cultural and regional expertise. SF must also be better able to function as an operational-level joint headquarters that can plan and support a UW campaign. 

*Investment needs to be made to increase SF’s language capability. Four to six months of initial language training is insufficient.*
Endnotes


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Legitimacy and Surrogate Warfare

D. Jonathan White

Legitimacy is a concept frequently mentioned in literature of both international affairs and counterinsurgency. This monograph explores the nature of legitimacy, the implications of legitimacy on surrogacy, and how surrogate warfare can turn the issues associated with legitimacy to the benefit of the sponsoring party. It concludes with some cautionary thoughts on how surrogate warfare can threaten the legitimacy of the sponsor.

Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.¹ — T. E. Lawrence

The preceding essays have explored the definition, underlying concepts, and history of surrogate warfare. This essay will pull these strands together and address the purposes of engaging in surrogate warfare and make a few points on the implications of surrogacy.

Neither U.S. Joint nor Army doctrine defines the terms surrogate and surrogate warfare. The definition offered by Kelly Smith is as judicious as it is useful. Smith defines a surrogate as “an entity outside of the Department of Defense (i.e., indigenous to the location of the conflict, from a third country, partner nation, alliance, or from another U.S. organization) that performs specific functions that assist in the accomplishment of U.S. military objectives by taking the place of capabilities that the U.S. military either does not have or does not desire to employ.”²

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One of the keys to understanding the utility of surrogate warfare is the concept of legitimacy. Legitimacy is a term much bandied about in the literature of counterinsurgency and international affairs.\textsuperscript{3} Legitimacy is, however, one of those concepts that is widely acknowledged as important, yet rarely defined in sufficient detail. In a lecture at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1998, Dr. Larry Cable defined the term and analyzed its implications. Legitimacy, according to Cable, is “the generally conceded right to exercise authority.”\textsuperscript{4} Cable then postulated two broad types of legitimacy, existential and functional. Existential legitimacy deals with how a regime came to wield power. Functional legitimacy deals with how the regime exercises its power, what it does for the people in whose eyes legitimacy is sought.

Frequently, in the eyes of the United States policy makers, existential legitimacy flows from holding free and fair elections. Not every culture shares the United States emphasis on elections, however. In some cases, a regime is legitimate despite not being elected through elections that adherents of western liberal ideology would consider free and fair. For example, the Emir of Kuwait is generally seen to be legitimate despite being a hereditary monarchy. Likewise, Fidel Castro’s regime is probably seen by most Cubans as legitimate despite never having submitted to elections meeting the standards of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.\textsuperscript{5}

There are limits to the existential legitimacy of a regime. A regime that possesses existential legitimacy yet fails to meet the functional needs of its population can find its authority challenged. The people of a nation-state expect their government to provide certain functions that range from respecting basic human rights and providing physical security to making the trains run on time. It is the people of a country who get to decide what constitutes functional legitimacy, not the government. People have a right to expect their government to behave legitimately. Stated negatively, a government that does not attempt to earn functional legitimacy in the eyes of its people should expect problems. Thus, while existential legitimacy holds a reservoir of goodwill on the part of the people, pushed to extremes, functional legitimacy can trump existential legitimacy and threaten the regime’s survival.

Given the history of the United States in some key regions of the world, the presence of United States forces in large numbers can have the
unintended consequence of bringing into question the existential legitimacy of an allied regime. If a government is seen to be unable to sustain itself without aid from outside, the people of the country will question the existential legitimacy of the government. Look, for example, at the propaganda the National Liberation Front (NLF) used against the Republic of Vietnam. NLF propaganda used the presence of U.S. forces as an excuse to belittle the Saigon government as a puppet of the U.S. The Chinese Communist Party echoed the phrase. A more recent and relevant example is the policy of the Philippine Islands toward U.S. military presence. Due to the legacy of imperialism and the U.S. counterinsurgency effort in the Philippine Insurrection of 1899–1902, a legacy that one historian labels “baggage,” the Philippine constitution places restrictions on foreign troops engaging in combat operations on Philippine soil.

Likewise, the perceived heavy-handedness of the United States in Latin America in the past means that local civilians may view a large, overt U.S. military presence in ways other than the U.S. policy makers intended. Locals in Latin American countries may see such a U.S. military presence as a reminder of former unpopular U.S. policies and perhaps as a continuation of such former policies. Most importantly, they may question the existential legitimacy of their own government.

The Muslim world also holds a view of U.S. policy that U.S. policy makers may not share, or intend. John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, working for the Gallup organization, have conducted surveys of Muslim opinions from around the world and compiled the results. It is enough to say here that the way many Muslims view U.S. policies, and U.S. forces enacting those policies, differs in substantive ways from how U.S. policy makers view them. Despite assurances from President Bush that the war on terror is not a war against Islam, many Muslims believe that the U.S. is inherently anti-Islamic. The United States special relationship with Israel also complicates the United States relationship with Muslim-majority nations.

In each of these cases, a large overt U.S. military presence may bring the existential legitimacy of host nation governments into question in the eyes of the people of those countries. Limiting the size and visibility of U.S.
military forces, and emphasizing surrogate forces, may achieve U.S. policy goals while at the same time mitigating or eliminating the adverse effects of direct U.S. military action. Given that, why would the U.S. pursue a policy of employing U.S. forces acting unilaterally, or primarily in such a country? Obviously, U.S. operational effectiveness is in many ways superior to those of surrogate forces. The level of training and responsiveness to U.S. military forces argue powerfully for their employment. U.S. military forces bring an incredibly high state of training to a problem. Also, the U.S. possesses distinct advantages over allied or surrogate forces in terms of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), command and control (C2), and equipment, to name a few areas.

The dilemma for the United States is how best to balance the operational effectiveness of U.S. military forces against the negative implications of an overt U.S. military presence. One obvious answer is the use of surrogate forces. While surrogate forces may not bring equal levels of training and equipment to the problem, they possess marked advantages of their own. For one thing, surrogate forces will frequently possess superior knowledge of the local culture, history, and language, a shortfall the Army and Marine Corps have attempted to rectify through predeployment language and cultural training. For example, in Iraq, some few U.S. forces possess limited Arabic language ability. This is offset, to a certain degree, by the U.S. use of interpreters. Yet, even this solution brings a new set of problems. Using an Arabic interpreter from Basra with a unit operating in Mosul may well limit his effectiveness if his accent and word choice give away his place of origin. Likewise, the agendas of interpreters—especially interpreters who are locally hired—may limit their effectiveness. Surrogate Iraqi forces, however, will speak Arabic fluently. Indeed, their knowledge of local dialect is frequently superior to U.S. contract interpreters who may speak Arabic just as well, but will speak it with a different accent, drawing attention to the fact that they are foreigners.

Likewise, local surrogate forces will bring, almost as a matter of course, superior knowledge of local culture, history, and customs to their operations. The United States has attempted to improve the cultural knowledge of U.S. forces conducting counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan by employing Human Terrain Teams (HTTs). HTTs consist of anthropologists, political scientists, or historians that possess or build knowledge of
the culture in which the U.S. forces operate. This knowledge is certainly important in conducting effective counterinsurgency operations, yet the importation of foreign HTT members into a culture provides maneuver commanders with a form of artificial knowledge of the culture in which U.S. forces are operating. This knowledge is artificial because it is exogenous and must be built over time by the HTTs.

Surrogate forces may come with detailed cultural knowledge superior to the “artificial” knowledge that HTTs build over time. For example, members of Iraqi forces, being born and raised in Iraqi society, probably already know how the various tribes of Iraq have interacted in the past, the various tribal rivalries and loyalties. They do not have to learn it. They have lived it.

Having addressed the advantages of employing surrogate forces over U.S. forces, how should surrogate forces be aided, advised, or controlled? Which type of U.S. forces should do the advising and controlling? Kelly Smith has explored that issue (in previous essay herein), and a brief summary of his considerations will suffice here.

In those areas in which the U.S. logistics support is robust, employing U.S. conventional forces in conjunction with surrogate forces may be advisable. General Purpose (GP) forces are trained, organized, and equipped to operate for long periods of time, but require a substantial logistics footprint. The messing, medical coverage, and maintenance support of a GP force, for example, frequently increase the total size of the U.S. force, due to the historically low “tooth-to-tail” ratio of U.S. GP forces. For example, as of August of 2005, Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA) had approximately 1,600 military personnel to support a small “maneuver force” of a Civil Affairs Company, one infantry company, and a U.S. Army well-digging detachment. 14

In those areas where the force protection threat is higher, employing U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) may be a better choice. One reason is that without the normal logistics train of GP forces, they can establish a smaller footprint, meaning less U.S. force to be protected. Secondly, SOF tend to have greater language capability and greater cultural expertise, which helps them identify force protection threats.

In those areas in which a low visibility profile is desirable for political reasons, U.S. SOF may be able to employ different uniform policies, or otherwise lower the profile of U.S. forces, and make advising or training surrogate
forces more acceptable to host-nation governments. The decision whether the employ GP forces or SOF will depend, in each case, on the situation into which the force will operate. Context is everything.

The key factor in the decision to use surrogate force is the existence of a commonality of interests between the United States and the surrogate force or nation. History of surrogate warfare is replete with examples in which a surrogate force shared a common goal, or common enemy, with the sponsoring power. The French government in 1778–1783 shared a common enemy with the nascent American states: the British. The Arabs of Hejaz shared with the British the common goal of defeating the Turks in Arabia. The United States and the Philippines shared a common goal of defeating the Abu Sayyaf Group in Basilan Island.

Some cautionary notes are in order, however, in relation to the employment of surrogate forces. First, the shared interests are unlikely to be entirely coincident. While the Hejaz Arabs shared a common enemy with the British, their strategic objectives were not uniform. The British sought to establish British hegemony in the Middle East, while the Arabs sought an independent Arabia. Both the United States government and the Philippines sought the defeat of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines. Achieving this goal, however, may see a separation between U.S. strategic objectives and those of the Philippines, and bring to the fore the traditional Philippine interest in having no foreign troops on Philippine soil. If the commonality of surrogate and sponsor is based on a common enemy, the defeat of that enemy is likely to see the evaporation of the unity between surrogate and sponsor.

Another factor that bears watching in the employment of surrogate forces is the respect for human rights and the impact of any violations by surrogate forces on the United States. As noted above, generally, U.S. forces bring with them a very high state of training and generally superior equipment, C2 systems, and logistics. Surrogate forces frequently bring with them superior language skills in the local language and greater cultural expertise and finesse. In the area of human rights and the strict subordination of military forces to civilian authority, however, the surrogate forces may not meet the standards of U.S. forces. Examples of this abound. In the 1980s, the record of Salvadoran force in respecting the human rights of civilians was sometimes quite bad. Likewise, the Northern Alliance’s record with the treatment of prisoners was a cause of concern early in the conflict in
Afghanistan. Given the very public and regrettable failure on this issue at the Abu Ghraib detention facility in 2004, the record of the United States has not been perfect in this regard either. The United States had systems in place to deal with violations of human rights, and employed them to detect violations when they occurred and punish the perpetrators. The issue at hand, however, is what happens if surrogate forces are prone to conduct themselves in such a manner as to violate the human rights of the population within their area of operations?

First, it is possible to argue that respect of human rights by surrogate forces are improved by the presence of U.S. forces. U.S. forces are required by law to respect human rights and refuse funding to nations and units that are believed to violate human rights, “unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken” to correct such abuses. Thus, merely having U.S. forces around surrogate forces causes surrogates to respect human rights or face the withdrawal of U.S. support.

Second, if U.S. forces operating with surrogate forces cannot prevent human rights abuses, the legitimacy of the relationship is at risk for two reasons:

a. First, the reaction from the U.S. populace and U.S. political figures might demand the severing of the relationship. This might be considered the loss of an attenuated form of existential legitimacy. This loss of existential legitimacy is attenuated because it threatens the existential legitimacy of neither the U.S. government nor the surrogate, but does threaten the relationship between the two.

b. Almost as important, human rights abuses by a surrogate force will likely undermine the functional legitimacy of the surrogate force among the affected population. Given the importance of legitimacy in irregular warfare, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of maintaining functional legitimacy in the eyes of the affected population.

One final point on surrogate warfare is in order. What happens after the relationship is terminated is worth considering. Once the strategic objectives are achieved, it is natural for the relationship to be terminated. If the power of the surrogate force depended in large measure on the continued provision of materiel support, or other forms of combat support such as fire support, then the severing of the relationship from the supporting power
would return the surrogate force to the status quo ante. If the power of the surrogate force is dependent on training provided by the sponsoring power, then the severing of the sponsor-surrogate relationship may not necessarily lead to a loss of power by the surrogate force. The strategic goals of the surrogate force may evolve in directions not in line with, and perhaps contradictory to, those of the sponsoring nation.  

Given the overall risks and benefits of surrogate warfare, the issue is well worth considering. Given the scope and duration of the long war, accessing surrogate forces is a key component of a strategy that will allow the United States and her allies to operate globally at many places simultaneously. There simply are not enough U.S. forces to go around, even if this were advisable. Further, the use of U.S. forces in many countries actually may undermine the existential legitimacy of the countries the U.S. is trying to help. Using surrogate forces allows the U.S. to maintain the existential legitimacy of our allies and will likely improve the functional legitimacy of the surrogate forces operating alongside U.S. forces and in support of U.S. strategic objectives.

Endnotes

4. Despite the controversy surrounding Dr. Cable’s career, his thoughts on counterinsurgency and the nature of legitimacy are both insightful and, from a military perspective, quite useful. Cable lecture, “Interventionary Operations,” CGSC C520 lecture, February, 1997.
5. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) publishes standards for the conduct of elections. Castro’s regime obviously does not allow its legitimacy to be tested through a free and fair election.
8. Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley, “A Century of Turmoil: America’s Relationship with the Philippines,” Special Warfare Magazine, September 2004, p. 11. See also, Philippines Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 25, which limits operations by foreign forces within the Philippines, except those covered by treaty.
9. Look at the base of the U.S. Marine Corps Memorial in Arlington, Virginia for just one indication of the extent to which the U.S. military has operated in Latin America in the past, particularly the early 20th century.


12. In the author’s personal experience in Haiti in 1994, knowing the local language proved to be extremely helpful. When a Haitian denounced his neighbor as a member of FRAP’H (the party of General Raoul Cedras), speaking to the alleged FRAP’H member established that he had won a court case against his neighbor the previous year, and the neighbor was hoping to use the cultural and linguistic ignorance of the Americans to inconvenience his neighbor by having him arrested. For problems of interpreters with agendas in current operations, see GAO Report to Congressional Committees, *Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-Standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces*, December 2006, 32.


14. Maneuver in this case is relative to the JTF’s mission, which in 2005 was largely Civic Action, specifically MEDCAPs, DENCAPs, and VETCAPs as well as drilling and refurbishing wells. See www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/cjtf-hoa.htm; accessed 16 October 2008.

15. Although, as will appear hereafter, the commonality of interest between the Hejaz Arabs and the British was on perfect. Substantial differences existed between the long-term Arab strategic objectives and those of the British.


18. See the 2001 Defense Appropriations Act (Sec. 8092 of P.L. 106-259), the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-208), and the Leahy Law in the 2001 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Sec. 563 of P.L. 106-429).

19. *The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept*, 11 September 2007, defines *irregular warfare* as a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.

20. As one battalion commander told one of his NCOs training with a foreign country’s forces, “Don’t train these guys too well. Next year, we might have to come back here and fight them.”