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On the cover. Chinese security guards run through their drill on a sidewalk in Beijing, 22 October 2004. The security business has boomed in China’s capital along with the rise in shopping malls and private apartment blocks. Reuters, used by permission from Newscom.
Private Security Infrastructure Abroad

Criminal-Terrorist Agendas and the Operational Environment

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-2765; FAX 850-884-4732.

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Graham Turbiville’s paper on private security organizations within today’s operational and security environment is important as we consider the current conflict as viewed through an irregular warfare prism. Within the irregular warfare framework, the population is the center of gravity and, consequently, security for the population is paramount to maintaining the population’s loyalty and support. To maintain this security, both government security organizations and private security firms operate within sovereign nations.

Worldwide private security organizations, ranging from unarmed security guards to “combat-capable” paramilitary groups, can act as a force multiplier to enhance security. A critical component of official and nonofficial security regimes is the role of government oversight in ensuring criminals and terrorists are unable to hijack private security organizations for their own objectives. A major problem is the ability of governments to manage or oversee these security elements, which varies significantly from country to country and region to region. In many countries, government control is almost nonexistent, creating an environment in which private security organizations are ripe for criminal or terrorist manipulation.

Consequently, the implications of potential abuse by these “wayward” security regimes are critical to conceptualizing support to partner nations in the long-term conflict. This issue shows another element of nontraditional or nonstate actors involved in the international security arena and further highlights the added complexity in addressing security challenges in the post 9/11 operational environment. As the United States and its allies combat terrorist networks, Dr. Turbiville’s work clearly shows the importance of managing private security organizations as a key element in mutually building capacity to defeat terrorists.

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About the Author

Dr. Graham Turbiville is a senior fellow with the JSOU Strategic Studies Department. His current research is centered on a range of regional and transnational threats to include insurgency, terrorism, the development of foreign Special Operations Forces (SOF), and foreign perspectives of the United States and allied capabilities and vulnerabilities. Dr. Turbiville also serves as a senior consultant and researcher for a Department of Defense/intelligence community program dealing with geographic and cultural intelligence in several areas of the world and producing history-based assessments of tribal/clan societies in contemporary war and conflict.

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Dr. Turbiville’s previous JSOU reports are Russian Special Forces (August 2005), Logistic Support and Insurgency (October 2005), and Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Operations (June 2007).
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Criminal-Terrorist Agendas and the Operational Environment

Introduction

Two decades of profound change in the global security environment have shaped the ways joint military and interagency security planners assess potential areas of crisis and the requirements they generate. New doctrinal and training approaches have been informed especially by the complexities of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations in the 1990s and subsequently as follows:

b. From less visible global counterterrorism operations
c. By a host of additional foreign support initiatives around the world.

This experience suggested approaches for more effectively supporting the defeat of military, terrorist, and insurgent adversaries. It also was a catalyst for a substantial expansion of what had been traditional military concerns. A central theme in this regard—codified in new military doctrine and interagency planning approaches—stresses the importance of being cognizant of, and productively interactive with, a host of civil and nongovernment entities present in actual and potential areas of conflict or crisis. This requirement has been long understood by Special Operations Forces and their Civil Affairs components, which traditionally worked closely with foreign forces and organizations.¹ In more recent years, however, it has gained importance throughout the joint military and interagency communities overall, including often detailed treatments in doctrinal literature and national strategy documents.²

The requirement for understanding civil and nongovernment organizations in an area of operations or potential crisis is a critically important concern of intelligence assessments at national, operational, and tactical levels as well. As with broader military and interagency concerns, the intelligence community in recent years has examined issues of information sharing with nontraditional organizations.
Intelligence organizations have especially been interested in ways of leveraging the on-the-ground knowledge and situational awareness that resides in civil and nongovernment organizations long-present in areas of operations.3

Similarly, military planners and intelligence specialists are aware that sometimes these organizations have interests that are contrary to the stability and governance of the states in which they are found. These organizations may also actively work on behalf of adversaries, criminal agendas, or other goals that undermine U.S. and allied interests. Judgments in the U.S. Army and Marines 2006 Counterinsurgency field manual—serving as a guide for ongoing efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere—underscore this concern.4 In addition, many specialists reporting on the role that nongovernment organizations and corrupted civil entities play in the support of terrorist, insurgent, and criminal agendas highlights the requirement for careful scrutiny and assessment.5

This paper focuses on a specific element from that larger context that has grown exponentially in recent years—the creation of private security firms around the world and their frequent role in criminal and terrorist activities. Private security in general has become an integral part of “public safety” in some states or national areas, and its effectiveness—or dysfunction—can substantially shape overall stability and the ability of institutions of all types to perform their missions and activities. Considerable past attention has been paid to the ways in which weakened government institutions and societal disarray contribute to rising levels of criminality and armed violence. As past and more recent events have underscored, when an old order dies, weakens, or loses legitimacy—and when war and ethnic or religious antagonisms become acute—organized crime, “banditry,” random violence, and the creation of environments suitable for the further growth of terrorism and insurgency appear in a variety of forms.6

The growth of private security firms has been demonstrated in parts of the Balkans, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. In these areas, U.S. forces or advisors have been present at varying levels, illustrated most prominently today by the presence of regular military units and numerous private security organizations in the operating environments of Iraq and Afghanistan. Many states around the world live with this phenomenon, which became especially visible in conflict areas of the early 1990s.7 Even when insurgencies have been
defeated or ended by negotiations and a measure of national reconciliation—for example, post-conflict El Salvador or Cote d’Ivoire—levels of violence and overall criminality remain as high or higher than in the war years and provide a continuing challenge for the reestablishment of law and order.\textsuperscript{8}

The last 15 years have also shown these same kinds of conditions spark the intensified growth and employment of private security (or military) organizations, businesses, and regimens in various forms.\textsuperscript{9} Whether formed to fill critical gaps (in a government’s inability to deal with dangerous or complex security environments) or to provide value-added services for government, large corporations, or other enterprises, they are businesses mainly formed to earn money and thereby operate accordingly. Around the world these businesses have been created with active government support and oversight for reasons that include:

a. Perceived value
b. With grudging governmental acquiescence because of pressing need and a lack of alternatives
c. With general government indifference because of preoccupation with other problems
d. Sometimes with strong but ineffective opposition from severely weakened regimes.

Private security organizations worldwide have been formed for a variety of sanctioned purposes that include public safety, national security, regional stability, and even international security missions and activities. Some areas of the world—for example, Africa—have long histories of private security solutions, while for other areas it is a relatively new phenomenon. As with nongovernment organizations generally, for which elaborate typologies have been developed, many names and working definitions-exist to distinguish the kinds of organizations or functions performed. The dilemma, however, follows:

a. Definitions and designations are far from perfect or consistent since some firms perform multiple functions.
b. Considerable overlap and ambiguity exists among the activities and functions the firms perform.
c. Definitions differ substantially from authority to authority and country to country.
Further, political and sectarian militias billing themselves as “private security” are commonplace in some environments. Since no universally sanctioned definitions are available, arguments over classification are sometimes tedious and heated among specialists. Generally, however, for convenience sake in considering these companies (or multiple functions within them), they may be differentiated in something approximating the following four categories:  

a. **Private military companies** with substantial forces and resources organized along military or paramilitary lines and intended to perform a range of training, combat support, combat service support, and direct combat roles.

b. **Private security companies**, which offer “risk management,” investigative, protection, or associated consultancy services that may include a focus on security advice or direct support like personal/resource protection for customers operating in higher risk or unstable environments. Traditional private detective or guard firms, whose names and purported roles often obscure a more active and diverse series of functions, are often included in this category, though some define it more narrowly.

c. **Private security intelligence companies**, which may perform a range of intelligence-gathering and assessment functions including sophisticated collection and analytical services that parallel functions performed by law enforcement or military intelligence. Large corporations operating abroad sometimes have security components that perform these functions and cooperate with law enforcement or national military organizations.

d. **Private economic intelligence companies**, which focus on gathering and/or evaluating economic, technological, financial, or other information including governmental for the competitive benefit of corporate, other commercial, and even government clients. The focus is on open source, public domain, or “gray area” materials including that available from individuals and networks of contacts.

These definitions are largely derived from Western models and do not take into account other forms of irregular—but more or less organized—private security groupings that are based on traditional
societal or tribal variants. These in effect form another category and include what may be regarded in some cases as vigilante reactions to crime and insecurity. Nevertheless, some of these have a measure of government recognition despite often having their form of auxiliary “community policing” compromised by misconduct. Control, oversight, and performance by government bodies set up to monitor private security activities (of the types noted above) have varied wildly in quality. Like the regular government police and security establishments themselves, shoddy performance, poor personnel selection criteria or vetting, criminality, and corruption have been a part of the record along with the provision of essential security services.

This assessment focuses not on those private security establishments that have strayed or fallen short, as many institutions do from time to time, but rather as follows:

a. Those that were either formed for the express purpose of criminality, terrorism, or factional agendas using the cover of legitimate security firms

b. Those that otherwise turned to criminal or extremist activities.

It also focuses principally on the many disparate private security businesses and enterprises abroad, rather than the larger, regularized, and generally well-regulated U.S. and Western firms that have been so extensively treated in the growing body of “privatized security” literature. These firms fall mainly into the “private security companies” category noted earlier, but include variants of the other categories as well.

As this examination shows, numerous and growing examples exist from around the world to illustrate the advantages that criminal, terrorist, or extremist groups see in using a “private security cover” and private security venues for their own purposes. In this regard, it is instructive to review the kinds of lawlessness and criminality that have become associated with foreign private security establishments around the world and address how private security establishments have sometimes facilitated—or have otherwise been linked with—terrorism and militant extremism abroad.
Private Security: Incentives for Penetration and Cover

The antecedents, legislation, and imperatives shaping the creation of private security and paramilitary enterprises in the first decade of the 21st century—including their intensified formation in the wake of the September 2001 attacks on the U.S. and other major terrorist events elsewhere—have been ably addressed in a number of instructive articles and books. A spectrum of public policy debates and views exist on the propriety of using nongovernment security and military establishments and the dangers this global development poses to everything from national sovereignty to economic health. In the West, at least, their roles are generally understood amidst the uneasiness. Internal and external oversight is present in varying levels of effectiveness and is subject to the most critical government and public examination when misconduct is alleged or demonstrated.

This relative operational stability is far from the case in other areas of the world, where the numbers and diversity of large and small security “enterprises” have rapidly expanded. Oversight is uneven, and the impact on local, national, and regional security and stability may be substantial. For criminals and groups with terrorist/extremist agendas, the advantages of a “private security firm cover” became quickly evident in many parts of the world. The perception was, as one frustrated Russian senior police general official put it in late 2002, why not “just call your ‘gang’ a private security firm, purchase a license for weapons, and provide ‘protection’ until your heart’s content?” This cynical view has been echoed in law enforcement and security establishments around the world. Criminal penetration of private security, while instructive and important itself, also illustrates the vulnerability of these businesses to a level of infiltration that present a more dangerous threat to national security and public safety—regional and international terrorism. An understanding and assessment of this widespread circumstance is clearly important to U.S. military and interagency planners and operators charged with advancing U.S. interests in many areas of the world.

In general, the pretense of operating a security firm provides a measure of legitimacy, even if a shallow one, and obscures or makes...
tacitly acceptable activities that might otherwise be suspect. The many benefits evident in actual experience include the following:

a. Plausible maintenance of a high level of privacy or secrecy
b. Frequent, unexplained comings and goings
c. Surveillance and other information acquisition
d. Firearms possession
e. Association with a broad spectrum of less-than-upright individuals ranging from the criminal to the terrorist.

Collaboration with police through bribery or other incentives has proven commonplace and safe for the police and the private firm. These efforts have included the use of police databases, communications, uniforms, credentials, and other resources as well as those of the military sometimes. And indeed, the targeted recruitment of ill-paid former and serving police, other government security, and sometimes military personnel is a common practice, with far higher compensation, even if criminal—a proven incentive for underpaid law enforcement personnel in many places. The practice by some regular law enforcement bodies of using private security organizations to carry out extra-legal “justice” operations has been far from infrequent in some countries.

Private security firms in many areas of the world are a primary vector for the legal or gray market acquisition of weapons—sometimes in huge quantities—and including far more than the side arms sometimes specified in private security oversight regulations. Criminal groups understand that the mere existence of an armed security group with seemingly legal status or protection serves as a means of coercion for a variety of shakedown and extortion rackets. Certainly, however, one of the major factors in the successful use of security firms by criminals or terrorists has been the sheer proliferation of such companies, which provides a near anonymous sea in which to swim:

a. Low threshold for establishing security companies in many countries
b. Subsequent weak and haphazard oversight so often exercised
c. Increased technological sophistication of even near-street thugs who are often inclined to create a more legitimate, visible face.
While the criminal and terrorist agendas and activities of private security organizations may sometimes intersect, it is nevertheless useful in this examination to separate these to the extent possible. The discussion below will first address private security’s *criminal dimension* in specific countries and areas, then the involvement and affiliation of private security organizations with *terrorism and violent factional agendas* in various regions.

**Criminal Conduct and Private Security in Specific Regions**

Looking at how specific criminal activities have become associated with private security companies in various countries and regions provides insight into what the aforementioned generalizations have meant in the real world. Those areas most affected correspond with the countries and regions that have been identified as most vulnerable to crime and terrorism in various studies. One notable example—worth review by military and law enforcement planners—was prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. It identified the following “domestic elements making a nation ‘hospitable’ to transnational crime and terrorism:”

- a. Official corruption
- b. Incomplete or weak legislation
- c. Poor enforcement of existing laws
- d. Nontransparent financial institutions
- e. Unfavorable economic conditions
- f. Lack of respect for the rule of law in society
- g. Poorly guarded national borders.

Identified factors are also those that herald vulnerabilities to insurgency or other crises, and they are widely present. They include countries or regions around the world. The examination below is not intended to provide a comprehensive survey of compromised private security in any or all of these areas. Rather, it is intended to underscore the diversity and commonality of private security problems and the relative ease that many of them have turned—or been turned—to illegality and crime in various forms. The easy vulnerability to penetration marks private security as a potential cover or vector of terrorism.

To begin with, there are few better examples than the states of the former Soviet Union and the former Communist regimes of Eastern
Europe—the latter now largely aligned with the West including NATO and other international organizations—where crime and other turmoil have led to remarkable growth in private security organizations. Russia constitutes the kind of example that gives insight into the many varieties of security-criminality linkage that have, or may be, replicated in other states and regions where the U.S. is directly engaged. It also constitutes an example pertinent to some post-conflict environments of how quickly weak security institutions can be further compromised.

By the mid-1990s, some 6,605 Russian “private security enterprises and security services” had been officially registered. About 26,000 individuals—many former military or security-service personnel—acquired private investigative licenses. This proliferation of security firms in the years following the USSR’s dissolution had by the eve of 2000 constituted in part, at least, a perceived, legitimate social requirement stemming from Russia’s “collapsed system of public security.” In November 1999, however, Russian officials and private citizens were still bemused by the spectacular, decade-long growth and activities of private security firms around the country. The existence of these security businesses—dubbed by the Russians as “private protection organizations” (chastnoye okhrannoye predpriyatiye, ChOP)—had, of course, been unknown in Soviet times when the state controlled all dimensions of public and national security. But by the end of 1999, the disarray in former Soviet law enforcement institutions and the rise of the most disparate, pernicious, and violent forms of organized crime had seen the establishment of various ChOP regimens. These security firms were intended to fill a law enforcement vacuum, buttress business agendas, and provide personal protection for those who needed and could afford it.

Legislation intended to oversee and monitor ChOP activity, promulgated in 1992, scarcely reflected the coming pace and diversity of development. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)—specifically the Main Directorate for the Maintenance of Public Order—estimated in late 1999 that about 11,000 ChOPs existed in Russia, employing more than 165,000 personnel and possessing about 71,000 weapons. Two years later, as one Russian observer put it, “somehow without
noticing it ourselves, we have created a well-armed and trained parallel army, whose numbers exceed those of the Federal Security Service and the Federal Border Service taken together.” Legislation and MVD oversight mechanisms that had been created in an effort to oversee their activities were universally recognized as ineffective or worse. The association of ChOPs with activities that challenged the bounds of legality, and not infrequently were judged blatantly criminal, had become part of the public safety environment.

By the fall of 2003, Russian specialists estimated that there were 16,000 registered firms employing about 350,000 people (up from 11,000 firms and 165,000 employees in 1999). By early 2005, the number of firms estimated had risen to 21,000 employing perhaps 500,000 security officers and other personnel. A number of these firms and individuals were deeply involved in organized criminal activity or had turned into small private armies for individuals or organizations whose goals by and large did not correspond with public interest. The sheer number of these companies is not always what it appears. In an innovation newly highlighted in May 2007, multiple private security firms are being formed by individual owners. In some cases, only one of several firms registered by an individual owner will be active, with the remaining ones only maintained as shells. There are estimated to be more than 2,500 registered, but inactive, firms. MVD analysts believe that one reason underlying this practice is the avoidance of damaging legal penalties. That is, if a firm or its employees are implicated in crime or other malfeasance threatening prosecution or dissolution, firm owners simply transfer personnel and security contracts to an inactive ChOP and continue business. In addition, MVD officials think that some shell firms are used by organized crime figures who hire themselves for the purpose of legally acquiring firearms.

Figure 1. MVD forces in Moscow arresting an armed criminal, focused on crimes connected with illegal purchasing, selling, possession-keeping, and smuggling arms and explosives. ITAR-TASS, used by permission from Newscom.
As noted above, Russians use the acronym ChOP as a catch-all to describe the spectrum of private protection organizations. Reflecting the practice in the West, they have also added the term “private military organization” (chastnaya voyennaya organizatsiya—ChVO). The term can refer to:

a. Well-organized and regulated Western style paramilitary companies
b. Private militias such as Moscow-allied Chechen prime minister Ramzan Kadyrov’s armed groups (“American uniforms, Russian weapons, Islamic beliefs and a Chechen spirit” as he characterized them)
c. A plethora of private protection organizations whose armament and focus became more militarized than earlier organizations.\(^\text{21}\)

Such groups, who might wear military-looking camouflage and be manned by former special police or military personnel, soon began to carry out what was described as “the combat application of ‘personal detachments’ for purposes that are by no means oriented on security.”\(^\text{22}\)

Racketeering, extortion and coercion, property crimes, the forced seizure of assets and even whole businesses, armed clashes, and assassinations are reported with some frequency. While private security weapons were supposed to be limited to side arms for protection, an array of Kalashnikov automatic weapons, assault shotguns, Dragunov sniper rifles, and other arms or explosives are among them. As early as 2002 in the Moscow Oblast’ (Region), more than 600 private security firms were possessing 4,300 known firearms. Criminals made a conscious effort to infiltrate these firms for the arms acquisition opportunities they provided. In a 1-month period, the MVD conducted a counterterrorist operation and stripped seven of these firms of their arms licenses for violations.\(^\text{23}\) Despite occasional crackdowns, some ChOPs are so wealthy that in return for mutual support and legal cover they “sponsor” government special units, buying them equipment and new materiel that they would otherwise be unable to afford.\(^\text{24}\) They are, in short, a source of revenue for some government law enforcement and security services, not to mention well-paid post-government employment.
Criminalized private security groups were perfectly aware of the need to have everything administratively in order regarding their legal status and activities. An excellent example of this was the notably murderous Orekhovo and Medvedkovo criminal groups in Moscow, personnel of which were convicted in the spring of 2004 after a trial whose phases went on for years. The two gangs were involved in a spectrum of often violent criminal activity and killed enumerable rivals as they pretended to conduct legitimate security business. The “paper” cover of their real activities was detailed in information revealed in their marathon trial:

They almost all had licenses to act as security guards. Private security enterprises were created so that they had the right to carry weapons legally and officially provide protection for companies—they set up security contracts with them openly and aboveboard. The visible part of the gangsters’ life was reflected in the private security enterprises’ documents: work records, route sheets, post numbers, who had which weapons, what establishments were being guarded—all the documents were in order, everything was perfect.25

Raiding and seizure of assets by armed security companies affiliated or hired by rival financial, manufacturing, and other corporate enterprises became an issue for the Russian corporate and financial world. Leonid Vedenov, the head of the MVD Directorate for the Protection of Public Order’s assessment and licensing component, indicated that from 2000-2005, some 1,000 businesses and enterprises had private security groups using physical force to seize assets, sometimes with unsanctioned police support.26 This kind of assertive and often illegal role of ChOPs in Russian business dealing also had an impact on the activities of police enforcement, including the employment of units in the family of “special designation” (spetsnaz and osnaz) police components. One type of unit—formerly designated as Rapid Reaction Militia Detachments (SOBR) and now called Militia Detachments of Special Designation (OMSN)—is a case in point. A senior Russian officer noted that:

Virtually no major operation is conducted without the involvement of spetsnaz personnel. Even routine searches of offices are frequently conducted with OMSN backup, because there
is a strong probability that the efforts of investigators and operatives will be opposed by security guards and private security services.\textsuperscript{27}

A situation analogous to that in Russia existed in Eastern Europe soon after the dissolution of Communist regimes and their police establishments. In the 1990s, for example, a burgeoning number of Bulgarian firms were notoriously known as “wrestler companies” because of their practice of hiring athletes for strong-arm work in extortion and racketeering.\textsuperscript{28} “Wrestler,” in fact, became a synonym for gangster. Similarly, Romanian firms carried out a range of intelligence gathering, bribery, and coercion on behalf of their clients, which appalled even the befuddled and reorganizing Romanian law enforcement establishment of the time. Illegal activities credited to Romanian private security include:

a. Conducting a range of illegal intelligence-gathering activities to include industrial espionage

b. Seizing property and extorting “taxes” through blackmail, coercion, and violence

c. Bribing, blackmailing, or otherwise subverting government officials

d. Creating intelligence and police style secret databases for private use (a practice facilitated by the security service background of the “detective” employees).\textsuperscript{29}
As in many other areas around the world, the number of firms in both countries has continued to grow in the 21st century. By the fall of 2005, Bulgaria had 130,000 private security personnel, while neighboring Romania had about 37,000 (more than double the number existing in 2001). Romania appeared to suffer more from private firms engaging in criminal and other illegal activity. While the same kinds of problems still surface—and a number of unregistered security firms remain active—problems generally are more limited than in the mid-1990s due to the increased association of these countries with European professional, legislative, and oversight regimens.

In June 2007, the affiliations of some Hungarian private security firms established over the previous two decades worried some observers. The extent to which Hungarian private security companies were controlled by security officers who had resigned or been fired remained considerable. Their alleged collusion with criminal organizations as well as with active state security elements was presented as a scandal because of the clear conflict of interest. The firms and security service collaborators were thought to have improperly used their influence to advance business interests of past security service employees. Recent reporting asserts that “the symbiosis between the official and private secret services has an extremely damaging effect on the performance of the official services,” a view that seems well supported. The potential for criminal and political mischief remains substantial.

As pointed out in a recent study, some concerns remain about other security businesses in southeastern Europe. The work considered private security businesses that in addition to Bulgaria and Romania, addressed Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro (as it then existed), and the territory of Kosovo. Specifically, these concerned the potential for mischief stemming from the affiliation of private security firms with other entities and their access to arms.

Regarding problematic affiliations—evident in some way in every country—the worries centered on links (sometimes multiple) to political parties, criminal groups, paramilitary groups, or ethnic groups. Regarding access to arms, every southeastern European country examined (except the Kosovo territory) allowed private firms to possess personal weapons and in the case of Albania, Serbia, and perhaps some other countries to have automatic arms. Loosely controlled armories and worrisome affiliations and linkages constituted a potential danger for
mise, and given the area’s volatility and background in smuggling of all types (including to terrorist groups), perhaps constituted a continuing, working mechanism for arms diversions or other misuse.

In Turkey (and elsewhere in parts of Europe), three factors have generated a wholesale increase in private security establishments: crime, the enduring terrorist potential of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), and the new specter of Al Qaeda and Islamic extremist groups. As of mid-2005, about 4,000 companies with various security missions were estimated to employ about 130,000 personnel. While many of these were ostensibly targeted against criminal activities (such as street crime, burglary, and other typical public safety threats), some were formed in response to a rise in “terrorist” bombing incidents. The immediate suspicion arose that some of these companies were perpetrating crimes themselves, perhaps in an effort to foster new business. These doubts were not allayed by the questionable background of some of the often-prominent ex-officials who set up security businesses.

The concern prompted increased calls in the Turkish Parliament for better regulation and oversight. They also highlighted the uncomfortable possibility that, despite legislation promulgated earlier that year, the Interior Ministry may not really know how many companies actually exist, how many were only paper entities, how many and what kind of people were actually employed, and what training and preparation they received. The concern was encapsulated by a Republican People’s Party deputy for Izmir, who echoed concerns heard elsewhere around the world, that unless “a sound structure is formed, it is inevitable that private security companies will first become gangs, then armies of looters and finally mafia organizations.”

Moving to the far different region of Latin America, private armed groups affiliated with wealthy landowners, political parties, and businesses have had a long history. However, this precedent has been dwarfed by the currently increasing number of private security establishments—indigenous, foreign national, and international—that operate on behalf of businesses, civil institutions, and individuals. As elsewhere, private security firm growth has been spurred by the pressing need to provide some measure of institutional and personal protection amidst the violent spillover or aftermath of wars and insurgency; the presence of uncontrolled weapons; soaring crime rates; random and political violence; corrupt and ineffective Latin American
police and justice establishments; and a host of political, ethnic, and criminal agendas. However, private security firms from Mexico to the tip of South America that were formed to address these problems have had at best spotty performances and been subject to criminalization, misconduct, and illegal activities in many forms. While government and human rights groups have documented innumerable anecdotal accounts of corrupted private security regimens, a few examples from several countries illustrate the kinds of issues in the region.

Mexico is a good case in point. The excellent scholar of Mexican history and conflict, Paul J. Vanderwood, devoted a chapter in his book *Disorder and Progress* to what he called “Bandits into Police—and Vice Versa.” He describes the sometimes effortless transition of late 19th and early 20th century Mexican bandits into law enforcement personnel, the ease with which that transition was reversed, and the difficulty sometimes in telling the difference. Mexican private security companies and personnel have certainly maintained that tradition in 21st century Mexico, which is much plagued by high rates of street and organized crime and policed by often corrupt law enforcement and judicial establishments.

High crime rates and unreliable police spurred the creation of Mexican private security businesses of various types and the migration of foreign security branches from the larger firms in the U.S. and elsewhere. Between 1998 and 1999 alone, private security companies reportedly increased by about 40 percent, resulting at the turn of the millennium to more than an estimated 10,000 ill-monitored private security firms, only 2,984 of which were registered with 153,885

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Figure 3. Mexican private security officer—one of many thousands—in front of the Oaxaca City Banorte bank following the detonation of an explosive device in 2006. Reuters Photo Archive, used by permission from Newscom.
personnel. From 1998 to the end of 2003, escalating Mexican crime rates and law enforcement ineptitude caused private security firms businesses to grow some 10-15 percent each year. In 2006, the total number of unregistered “security firms”—ranging from a few people to more developed endeavors—is variously estimated but simply not known.

As in most parts of the world, substantial numbers of private security personnel were former or moonlighting police officers. The competence and trustworthiness of such business have been problematic at best, illustrated by informed assessments from outside security specialists. In Guadalajara in 2006, for example, the U.S. Overseas Advisory Council—citing the Regional Security Office and most local Mexican officials—judged that all firms were mediocre at best and indicated that not a single outfit could be recommended. If possible, local companies performed security using their own employees rather than the poorly paid, trained, and mistrusted alternatives.

Kidnapping, robbery, extortion, and coercion on behalf of various criminal, economic, and political agendas have been associated with Mexican private security, just as they have been with the often-complicit serving federal, state, and local police officers. To cite some examples from a long, dreary, and continuing mosaic of corruption (and while numerous serving police were also arrested apace in 2005 for similar crimes), three private security officers operating in Ciudad Juarez (directly across the Rio Grande from El Paso, Texas) were arrested for kidnapping a businessman and demanding a ransom. These were determined to be employees of a Sinaloa-based company (“Private Alarms Protection”) that had a deployed component in Ciudad Juarez. At about the same time, three additional private guards were arrested on suspicion of murdering two women. In fact, among the most notorious crimes on the U.S.-Mexican border has been the murder of scores of young women, cases steeped in mystery, believed motivated by everything from drug-trafficking to kidnapping and devil-worship, and so far resulting in few plausible law enforcement successes. The countless private security and guard organizations located in Ciudad Juarez have been widely suspect in these murders along with the police, and the three arrested were said to be from the private firm “Border Eagles.” Such private security entities typically patrol the kind of residential and business areas where young women have been killed. While estimates vary, one source judged that 107 “known”
security businesses were operating in the border city, with a combined employee total (some 6,000) that exceeded the active police officers several fold. As elsewhere in Mexico, training for private officers is often negligible in the fly-by-night firms, the pay small, and benefits slight or nonexistent. Only half of the known firms were legally registered, though that requirement in reality seems to mean little.\textsuperscript{39}

Documented and undocumented immigrants play an important role in private security firm recruitment in some parts of Central America. In Costa Rica, a Dutch anthropologist and researcher indicated that “most” private security guards there were Nicaraguans and, furthermore, that private security was more evident than in some Colombian cities despite Costa Rica’s relative peacefulness. The influx of Nicaraguans began with the Sandinista, and civil war violence and has continued because of economic incentives.

With perhaps 10 percent of the Costa Rican population estimated to be from Nicaragua, a large base exists for low income jobs. Street-level private security falls into that category.\textsuperscript{40} According to a United Nations official stationed in Costa Rica, the number of private security personnel more than doubled from 2004 to 2005—that is, from 8,000 to 19,000, which includes only the personnel registered with the Ministerio de Gobernación, Policía y Seguridad Pública. However, the formal requirement for training, education, and emotional stability was totally lacking.\textsuperscript{41} While Costa Rica is a relatively well-off and stable country, some specialists are concerned that the new private security company growth—relying on poorly trained and undocumented personnel—may have the potential for future trouble.

Public impatience with violent criminals has generated formal local and neighborhood organizations and informal vigilante groups that have taken

Figure 4. A Nicaraguan police officer (left) and private security guard provide security outside Managua’s La Prensa newspaper office during a hostage situation. Nicaraguans serve in large numbers in Costa Rican private security firms as well. Agence France Presse, used by permission from Newscom.
police indifference or ineffectiveness into their own hands. These organizations have been active in Mexico as well as south into Central America. In Honduras, for example, the most recent U.S. State Department human rights report pointed to the proliferation of “unlicensed security guard services and vigilante groups” as well as so-called Citizen Security Councils and private security companies with ties to the police. While the ostensible purpose of these nongovernment groups is to prevent crime and violence, they have been widely accused of violent vigilantism and acting as death squads—with police acquiescence or encouragement—in so-called “social cleansing.” According to some reporting, said to be based on Honduran government sources from 1999-2005, nearly 1,000 suspected criminals, gang members, street children, and others were killed in extrajudicial actions perpetrated at least in part by security groups.42

In Guatemala, a similar phenomenon exists, where city, village, and other private protection organizations are suspected of extra-judicial killings, disappearances, and various forms of organized crime to include arms and drug trafficking. By 2000, the money spent nationally for private security exceeded the public security budget by about 20 percent. The rapidly increasing number of firms produced a range of estimates, the most authoritative indicating that by 2006, about 180 private security companies employed 80,000 people. This number compared to only 18,500 police, less than 25 percent of total private security manpower. With only eight police officers exercising oversight of private security firms, real monitoring was nonexistent.43 Salvadoran private security firms paralleled this disparity in private and public security—and effective oversight—where the presence of 158 companies with 18,244 “guards” in 2004 compared with a National Police

Figure 5. A gunfight between private security guards and bank robbers in Guatemala City left this man injured. In growth spurred by extraordinarily high crime rates, private security personnel now outnumber police by nearly 10 to 1. Reuters Photo Archive, used by permission from Newscom.
force that had only 5,000 of its 16,800 total police officers serving actively at any given time.44

Colombia’s decades of conflict and terrorism have made it one of the best known centers of autodefensas and other well-armed private militias, the most famous/notorious being the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia--AUC). Linked crime and conflict—and the presence of huge arms supplies and trained fighters—have generated professed private security organizations of all types, a number so well known for human rights abuses and criminal involvement that it need not be addressed in any detail here.45 Oversight of the countless formal and informal security entities is scarcely conceivable amidst the other problems. Nevertheless, the need—and government ineffectiveness—continue to generate attention as security firms’ involvement in “money laundering, drug trafficking, and paramilitarism” continue to function and grow.

One most recent example of government ineffectiveness generating attention is the 2006 capture and arrest of Emilse del Rosario Lopez Romero, known as La Gata (The Cat). Lopez had formed a security force of some 180 “bodyguards,” many armed with automatic weapons as well as the usual array of pistols and shotguns. Ostensibly a businesswoman, she claimed the need for private security to protect her lottery businesses and her son, a city mayor. However, she was soon discovered to be linked with criminal activities to include influencing elections and extorting business. Even her capture and arrest, however, did not change the status of her security force, which remained legal due to its association with a still functioning lottery business.46
By spring 2006 in Paraguay, the National Police authorities in Asuncion reported that 280 private security firms were operating throughout the country, employing a total of more than 13,000 officers and personnel. Only 30 of the companies were termed to be legal, leaving some 250 businesses (with 7,000 personnel) classified as “irregular.” No national legislation governing their activities existed, and there seemed to be no immediate prospect of getting it. As elsewhere in parts of Latin America, this total number of private security personnel exceeded the 25,000-officer National Police force.47 Further, the private companies were said in a number of cases to be better equipped, organized, trained, and paid than the government law enforcement establishment, contributing negatively to police retention.48 Criminal activity attributed to private firms was widely reported, ranging from extortion to property seizures, political intimidation, and murder.

In the latter two categories was the notorious ambush-assassination in Asuncion of Vice President Luis Maria Argana in March 1999. While Paraguay eventually judged political and army complicity in the murder, and while two individuals were convicted, reports at the time suspected the involvement of seven members of a “commando” style private security team that had attracted the attention of authorities with their paramilitary training, use of high powered and automatic weapons, and instruction in special tactics.49 At a minimum, the presence of unregulated companies and firearms made such suspicions plausible if difficult to prove.

Figure 7. Suspected political assassin Maximo Osorio (center)—who was an expert marksman, detective, and bodyguard—was arrested in 1999 for the murder of Paraguayan Vice President Argana. Alleged to be organized with some high level government complicity, the ambush assassination was thought to involve a private commando-like team of which Osario was a part. Agence France Presse, used by permission from Newscom.
In Brazil, control of weapons in the hands of the 2,800 private security firms is a major issue. In less than a decade, some 56,800 firearms “disappeared from the companies, and the Brazilian police are attempting to set up an electronic inventory system to track such weapons in the future.” In Sao Paulo—likely reflecting the situation nationwide—the “Sao Paulo State Private Security Companies' Union” estimated that 80 percent of the private security companies there are “clandestine” and in substantial measure both unauthorized and untrained for security work. Recognizing that the union has its own agenda in its desire to exercise control over professional standards (and collect dues), many unregistered companies clearly exist that by some estimates could be as high as 500,000 personnel in this area with a population in excess of 10 million people. Criminality involving some of these firms spanned the usual crimes against property and persons. They also included landowners using private armed security groups to eliminate landless squatters—often organized by the Landless Workers’ Movement—through coercion and sometimes fatal violence. Among the most notorious and continuing practice, going back at least a decade, is the social cleansing by death squads who execute vagrants, street youths, and beggars in Sao Paulo and Rio in particular. This elimination of groupings deemed socially undesirable involved police personnel and those moonlighting as private “security” in the employ of local businesses.

African private security growth has paralleled that in other areas of the world reviewed above, even in the recognition that privatized protection had long been a feature of many African countries. It has been characterized by the widespread creation of smaller indigenous companies, the establishment of larger businesses (some of which now export their business regionally), and the influx of foreign, mostly Western-owned firms offering an array of services in individual countries and regionally. Media reporting as well as instructive work by academics and research organizations in troubled parts of Africa has highlighted private security roles amidst public safety, political, economic, and conflict problems.

In Nigeria, the U.S. State Department estimates that “security” is the second largest money-maker, falling only behind oil and gas. Nigerian random and violent crime at the beginning of 2007 was characterized by the U.S. State Department as “endemic throughout the country.” It affected individuals, small business, and larger
corporations. Basic law-and-order requirements, the enormous security requirements generated by the oil and gas companies in particular, and often inadequate or corrupt government law enforcement (including the notorious “kill and go” Mobile Police) spurred rapid private security growth. In 2005, the estimated number of private security firms was 1,500-2000 with perhaps 100,000 employees. The presence of many unlicensed firms has been a continuing recognized problem.

Nigerian private security personnel for the most part have been prohibited from carrying weapons. The assignment of small, heavily armed “Mobile Police” elements to private companies, however, has provided private security with an armed presence.

This practice in effect privatizes parts of the public law enforcement sector and creates tense, ambiguous command and control issues. As noted, Mobile Police have had a less than sterling reputation. In addition, larger corporations provide illicit and some government-sanctioned arms to private security personnel in their employ. Private security personnel and firms have been charged with complicity, in worker persecutions at the behest of major corporations, as well as petty crimes of opportunity.

The Niger Delta provides an example. Oil and gas company operations there have created an especially complex security environment. Ethnic, economic, and political tensions exacerbated by resentments over uncompensated resource exploitation and environmental damage have posed a threat to oil and gas operations by various armed groups for some 15 years. The use of private security in support of government police and military forces in the Niger Delta has generated numerous
charges of complicity in excessive force and impropriety while protecting pipelines, equipment, and operations from militants. At the other end of the spectrum, criminality among poor communities has generated “private security in the form of vigilante groups and village or community volunteer police or guards who impose order as they judge appropriate.”

Of passing interest only—but reflecting the reputation for “gray market,” legally questionable, or downright illegal private security initiatives in some African states—was the frequent role unnamed private security firms played in the Nigerian get-rich-quick scams. Perpetrators very often asserted that the imaginary stolen money, gem stones, diamonds, valuable documents, or other high-value items resided safely with a private security firm.

Sierra Leone’s civil war—running from 1991-2002—claimed some 70,000 lives and left in its wake a perceived need for private security to supplement shortfalls in public safety measures provided by government. The area had been associated for many years with larger European-style private military companies (e.g., most famously the former Executive Outcomes) employed in combating militants, training government forces, and policing diamond smuggling among other tasks.

The post-conflict environment, however, has given rise to perhaps several dozen domestic national private security firms performing residential and commercial security functions. They provide an important contribution to overall policing and security. These compete in some ways with the larger international security firms that retain roles and responsibilities.
interests in providing protection services. The most egregious kinds of criminality associated with smaller private security firms in other countries have been largely absent. However, outside and internal observers point to the potential for problems due to limited oversight of firms, uncertainties regarding future arming of security firms, and concerns about a return of earlier civil war violence.

Kenya’s capital city Nairobi is often characterized as one of the most dangerous places on earth. Random and violent crime has resulted in “fear and insecurity” becoming “defining features of life” as one commentator put it. This environment has generated a growing private security establishment as similar circumstances have in so many places. Kenyan continuing poor economic performance and deep poverty have gone hand in hand with dysfunctional institutions and corruption. Longstanding concerns with criminal violence and the burgeoning crime against persons and property, engendered by these kinds of conditions, have been expanded further in Nairobi by the appearance of the violent Mungiki outlaw or bandit sect. While the sect began in the late 1980s, it became increasing visible as years went by and is now credited with many thousands of members by some counts.

The Mungiki group claims the lineage and legacy of the 1950s Mau Mau insurgency, is similarly based on Kikuyu tribal members, and asserts a muddled anti-Western and “back-to-African roots” ideology that calls for the overthrow of the corrupt Kenyan government. Mau Mau-like oath-taking indoctrinations involving human blood have been reported by police, and some involvement with radical Islam has been reported as well. They have frequently clashed with police as
well as Nairobi residents—usually poor—that reject their views. They have also become involved in political rivalries and coercive criminal enterprise that has branded them as criminal thugs as well as a threat to instability. Their brutal conduct has recently featured a spate of decapitations, inspired supposedly by jihadist videos from Iraq.64

This kind of environment has spurred the creation and expansion of local private security firms in Kenya, so far officially unarmed. The estimated 2,000 companies employ some 48,000 personnel as of 2005.65 Most individuals who can afford it have at least one security guard, and United Nations or nongovernment organization principals are said to typically receive benefits that provide for three contract guards.66 Mungiki violence specifically has even caused some Kenyan members of Parliament to hire private security protection if they judged police protection provided to be inadequate.67 Poorer citizens resort to volunteer neighborhood watches, patrols, and vigilante groups as is often the case elsewhere and none with any oversight.

As in so many areas, these private resources play critically important roles in visible and unnoticed ways. Of special note, a lone Kenyan private security guard—killed at the scene—prevented the explosive-filled Al Qaeda-driven truck from penetrating all the way into the basement of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi on 20 August 1998 where it would have killed many more people than it did. However, because of poor pay, inadequate licensing, indifferent state oversight, and interaction with corrupt and coercive government police, their vulnerability and alleged criminal collusion is regarded as a further danger to public safety and stability.68

South Africa sustained rapid privatized security increases in the 1990s. By the turn of the millennium, an estimated 3,200 security companies employed 200,000 personnel in the Republic of South Africa. Most of these employees were guards of various types and collectively outnumbered the South African Police Service. Criminal activity then and today has ranged from minor offenses to major crimes, despite efforts to exercise control with limited personnel and inadequate legislation—problems present in many African states as every survey makes clear.69

Among the unusual variants that private security regimens may take is one resident in Cote d'Ivoire. A conservative 2005 estimate judged that some 300 private security firms with more than 20,000 employees were present there. In addition to the large or better known
companies—said to include “Wackenhutt, Delta Assistance, BIP, BGSP, Omeifra, ASP,” and others—local security businesses are present in Cote d’Ivoire as well. One of the consequences of socio-political tensions there, following the civil war and unresolved issues of land reform and other problems, was a perceived effort to politicize or leverage existing or newly forming “private security groups” on behalf of one agenda or another. It is widely judged that a number of these firms have become, in effect, partisan intelligence-gathering entities, with at least the potential for direct action. They constitute essentially “militias with official seals” as one observer described them. The alignment of some companies, in terms of tribe or clan, adds additional complexity since at least 60 ethnic groups exist in Cote d’Ivoire. This diverse affiliation of companies contributes to undermining efforts to promote national cohesiveness, disarmament, and reconciliation while at the same time forming small or larger armed groups that can be mobilized in behalf of various agendas. One observer stated the perceived danger this way:

As in Iraq, private military companies are flourishing. Thanks to their carrying of weapons, they offer more “strong-arm” services, ranging from personal body-guarding to military training. They are made up of former soldiers, often French. According to the local leader of one of these groups, some Licorne soldiers [deployed French “Unicorn Force” peacekeepers], once their four-month commission is up, come knocking at their door. The state has entrusted the surveillance of several of its industrial sites to this company.... Should the situation get worse, these companies, which operate on the borderline of legality, could cross the narrow line separating them from mercenary activity and hire their services out to the highest bidder.

One notable security development concerns the presence of a strong Lebanese minority (estimated from 50,000 to over 100,000 people), part of the Lebanese diaspora that has seen Lebanese expatriates buying businesses and other properties from the French who departed amidst earlier violence. As public safety and larger security concerns have emerged in recent years, and when the aftermath of the 2004 civil war led to increased insecurity and crime, the Lebanese formed one of the most powerful private security establishments in...
Abidjan. Its strength is characterized in some reporting as more like a militia than a private security organization. Remaining French settlers—the “old Whites” as they are called, who were targeted in most intense 2004 violence by President Laurent Gbago’s rampaging “Young Patriots” thugs—have formed an alliance with the Lebanese. According to one of the several thousand remaining, uneasy French settlers, the Lebanese “are determined to stay here at any price” and “have the heavy materiel—grenades and rocket launchers” that promise an opportunity to do so and protect their substantial investments.72

Moreover, it was judged that members of the Lebanon-based terrorist group Hezbollah had been imported to buttress the Lebanese security establishment. This action was reported to include some veterans of urban combat in Beirut. Given Hezbollah’s establishment of cells in Europe, North and South America, Asia, and other parts of Africa, the reports are not implausible, and the U.S. warned about the potential for Hezbollah trouble-making in Cote d’Ivoire.73 More broadly, a parallel may be seen in remote locations like the Brazil-Argentina-Paraguay tri-border area or Iquique, Chile, where Lebanese and other Arab expatriates (including a strong Hezbollah presence) run all kinds of businesses (at least some with private security). On Hezbollah’s part, a variety of businesses and financial institutions there are used to launder money or raise revenues. This activity highlights the analogous value-added of a port like Cote d’Ivoire’s Abidjan (the source of much speculation along these lines).74 This is one of the kinds of issues that suggests the association of private security and terrorism deserves some attention.75

**Terrorism, Violent Factional Agendas, and Private Security in Specific Regions**

Private security firms have been held up as both a potential counter-terrorism asset and as a potential way for terrorists to disguise and facilitate their agendas in some of the same ways that organized criminals have used these security firms as umbrellas. Regarding counter-terrorism potential, by the mid-1990s Russian specialists were quick to seek some way of harnessing private security to the interests of the state and make a little money at the same time amidst the wreckage of the USSR and the burgeoning growth of commercial security companies. At a security conference in Moscow in 1997—where former
KGB and MVD “counterterrorists-turned-private operators” were well represented—Russian Interpol chief Yevgeniy V. Malyshenko suggested a role for Russian firms in infrastructure protection based on foreign experience.\textsuperscript{76} Such early efforts have been fine-tuned and introduced formally into Russian counterterrorism programs, apparently gaining some momentum in the wake of many spectacular Chechen attacks including the Beslan school massacre in September 2004. Particular interest was directed towards the protection of facilities and government and commercial infrastructure using private guard enterprises, but even most Moscow schools began to hire private security personnel, mostly unarmed, after the Beslan, North Ossetia terrorist attack in September 2004.\textsuperscript{77}

Specifically, for example, a 2006 proposal was advanced to protect and secure the Russian pipeline system of some 1 million kilometers (km) of energy pipelines (oil and gas) of various types. The vulnerability of the system is underscored by the fact that criminal elements illegally divert some 10,000 metric tons of fuel a year, not to mention committing acts of terrorism against gas pipelines in the north Caucasus. Too, as the chief of the Center for Military Forecasting at the Academy of Military Sciences indicated,

> Just as they did 30 years ago when there was a drop in pressure in one sector of a main pipeline, staffers of the Unified Gas Supply System—which has jurisdiction over 150,000 km of gas pipelines and 256 compressor stations—dispatched a breakdown team without knowing who and what will meet them at the scene of the incident.

What he proposed was the creation of special Russian private military organizations—the ChVOs noted earlier—to protect the “operational-strategic” pipeline network in a commercial-Federal-partnership.\textsuperscript{78}

Eighteen months later, in fact, the Russian energy giant Gazprom and the Transneft pipeline monopoly were on a fast track to receive official permission to set up its own armed security force. July 2007 legislation was passed in the lower house of Parliament for both companies to use firearms and antiriot materiel to counter pipeline attacks. Of note, the bill grants these private security bodies the same rules of engagement as Russian MVD police. The legislation goes to the upper body of Parliament, the Federation Council, and then to Russian President Vladimir Putin for approval. Opponents in Parliament
fear that other major enterprises will follow suit, citing the well-known dangers of “private armies.” Moreover, since pipelines run through many populated areas, it is thought that the Gazprom armed security forces may become involved in broader law enforcement activities. It is unclear just how much the official authorization will really change on the ground. According to Russian reporting, “Gazprom and its affiliates guard 91 percent of facilities, private security services guard 5.5 percent, and security services of a mixed type involving private security services guard 3.5 percent of facilities.” In that sense, the law may just “formalize the existing security system.”

This kind of development aimed at infrastructure and other metropolitan and national security protection initiatives for key assets has been advanced by a number of academic and government professionals as well as specialists in the West, particularly in the wake of 9/11 and other major terrorist attacks over the last half decade. Ongoing programs abound, with new initiatives in progress and on the horizon. In the U.S., popular and more scholarly critiques of these concepts are advanced as well, usually focusing on the uneven or poor screening, training, and competence of some security firm personnel juxtaposed with the critical homeland security functions they are being asked to perform. Relative risks, benefits, and overall value-added will in the West, at least, be worked out in the public policy debates centered on appropriate private security roles (and for that matter the analogous critiques and discussions of government and public institutional performance).

In addition to the potentially positive contributions that private security may make to combating terrorism, the real—and sometimes realized—potential exists for terrorist establishment, penetration, or other use of private security organizations. This potential parallels those efforts by criminal organizations to take advantage of the considerable cover provided by private security establishments.

As indicated earlier, Russian officials and private citizens were expressing growing concerns about some years of striking private security firm growth. Still, it was more than a surprise when the Russian newspaper *Moskovskiy Komsomolets* reported the surfacing of a ChOP that would be difficult to surpass as the ultimate “outlaw private security” enterprise. Its existence came to light through efforts to ensure some 1,500 personnel of a firm named “Islamic Order” (*Islamskiy Poryadok*). Islamic Order, it was reported, was duly registered,
held a license, had a bank account, and was listed at a street address in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. But it turned out to be a cover organization for the notorious, Chechen guerrilla and terrorist leader, Shamil Basayev; and its stated “liberation of hostages” mission at least suggested that the perpetrators of this deceit had a well-developed and dark sense of humor. According to Moskovskiy Komsomolets, the Chechen guerrilla employees and the now deceased Basayev himself were to be insured for $10,000 each, an amount totaling $15 million.\textsuperscript{83} The newspaper noted the differential between this amount and the $1 million that at the time was offered by the Russian military commander in Chechnya, General Gennady Troshin, for the elimination of Shamil Basayev.\textsuperscript{84}

This episode appears to have been confirmed in part, at least, by an MVD spokesman.\textsuperscript{85} Whatever its total accuracy, the information highlighted an issue that already was plaguing not only Russia but a number of states around the world—that is, the problem of regulating private security organizations and ensuring that criminality or terrorism was not a part—or the centerpiece—of their business model. The terrorist dimension of this issue has become even more acute in the post-9/11 period with the earlier “Islamic Order” model certainly not an isolated example.

The use of private security cover for a kind of state terrorism is widely alleged in Russia. According to widespread supporting and what seems to be compelling evidence at times, Russia’s state security services—the military’s Main Intelligence Directorate, the Federal Security Service (FSB), and MVD elements have been charged with extra-judicial killings and a range of “terrorist” provocations to include planting and detonating bombs in Russia itself. Individuals charged in these actions often are former (or serving) security service and representatives of private security organizations. The apparent linkage was highlighted recently with the November 2006 “Polonium-210 murder” of former KGB and FSB officer—and very visible Kremlin critic—Alexandr Litvinenko in London. Litvinenko had written a book called Blowing Up Russia in which he alleged FSB involvement in a series of fatal and destructive Russian bombings among other acts and plans. British authorities named former FSB officer and “private security” businessman Andrei Lugovoy as the perpetrator in
a model familiar to those who had followed other analogous killings in Russia. Russian reporting has for years alleged the existence of a hidden edifice of former state security officers using private security cover to commit crimes, assassinations, and various acts of terrorism. The charge is frequently made that these acts are carried out at the behest of the security services or political leadership, though that is denied by the Russian Government.\textsuperscript{86}

Surprising revelations about the jihadist penetration of the British Health Care system in the unsuccessful June 2007 bombing attempts in London and Glasgow underscored that all manner of organizations and institutions are considered by extremist for covering terrorist planning and activities.\textsuperscript{87} The use of private security to cover extremist agendas is a recognized and considered approach by extremist groups using terrorism. The penetration of private security firms by terrorists—an approach endorsed and recommended by Abu Bakr Naji in his Management of Savagery jihadist strategy and underscored by many criminally corrupted private security enterprises around the world. Some recent illustrations may highlight this special danger, which is especially notable when expatriate populations are involved.

For example, pointing to the existence of a defined current and future planning tenet, and as a suggestion of what has already transpired, is the advice offered in the recently translated 2005 Al Qaeda and “jihadi strategy” document by Abu Bakr Naji entitled Management of Savagery. The work among other things, describes how Al Qaeda may consider approaches for defeating the U.S. and its allies. Of note, the jihadi imperative set out to infiltrate institutions, over the course of a long struggle, and the theoretical framework for actions that not only Al Qaeda but also

Figure 11. Dr. Mohammed Jamil Abdelkader Asha, British health care worker from Jordan, was charged with conspiracy to cause explosions in the failed car bomb attacks in London and Glasgow in July 2007. He and his medical accomplices represented a form of infiltration that had apparently been little considered earlier. Agence France Presse, used by permission from Newscom.
various terrorist (and criminal) groups have undertaken. Specifically, Abu Bakr Naji indicates:

> Our battle is long and still in its beginning.... Its length provides an opportunity for infiltrating the adversaries and their fellow travelers and establishing a strong security apparatus that is more supportive of the security of the movement now, and later the state. [We] should infiltrate the police forces, the armies, the different political parties, the newspapers, the Islamic groups, the petroleum companies (as an employee or as an engineer), private security companies, sensitive civil institutions, etc. That actually began several decades ago, but we need to increase it in light of recent developments.88

These targets vary in their vulnerability and potential impact, and it may be that private security establishments offer some the greatest payoffs combined with effective cover and reduced risks.

In 2005-2006, Spanish security personnel charged with investigating potential Islamic terrorism became interested in a “significant” number of “Chechen Islamists” who had settled in Spain, mainly Madrid and Barcelona. They were thought to be hiding, resting, or organizing in Spain after undertaking combat action in Russia and possibly Europe as well. While the reasons for their presence in Spain were not clear, it was postulated that it could be related to funding future...
terrorist actions. The famous Costa del Sol and a few other Spanish areas had for some time been major organized crime centers for money laundering and other crime associated with Georgians, Russians, and other ex-Soviet citizens. The mechanisms for illegal financial activities in the wealthy tourist areas were well established. The focus of police and intelligence inquiries was on a “security” dimension of their activity, since it was suspected that the new Chechen immigrants had taken employment in the private security field. Since the Chechens did not have the requisite residency papers, this kind of employment would be illegal, but by no means unusual in the experience of much of the rest of the world.89

Chechen militants in Chechnya itself have been most successful in infiltrating or subverting private security organizations there, even those with official sanction and close association with the pro-Moscow Chechen Ministry of the Interior. Private security officers under the Chechen Interior Ministry have been arrested for directly aiding the armed resistance groups, including providing protection for leadership. Bribery of such personnel to secure their silence or cooperation has been extremely successful, whatever role clan and ideological imperatives may play. The frequency of this kind of unreliability has made Russian military and security forces loath to use their services, even as translators.90

In the Middle East, public safety concerns and widespread insecurity and uncertainty have spurred the expansion of private security firms. These are used for personal protection as well as securing and protecting all kinds of businesses, organizations, and structures. The goals and affiliations of these private firms are often cause for local suspicion and tension, even as they provide much needed services not available from overwhelmed, inefficient, or corrupt government law enforcement. Owing to its many well known and periodically acute security challenges, Lebanon in particular has seen substantial private security organization growth in 2006 and 2007.

In a familiar story worldwide, the estimated 25,000 private security personnel in Lebanon nearly equal government internal security forces. Private security solutions established themselves in the early 1980s in Beirut in particular, and the formal end to the civil war in 1989 gave them further impetus as then-unemployed militia and
factional fighters joined their ranks. Nevertheless, recent private security growth accompanying recent instability, war, bomb attacks and scares, assassination, and extreme uncertainty has been striking and understandable. It is not always clear who or what faction a private security company represents. As a consequence, they are regarded with suspicion by some and are suspected of affiliation with various political or sectarian causes.

This ambiguity was present in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in a February 2005 bombing in Beirut. His assassination has been widely judged to be of Syrian origin with the likely complicity of pro-Syrian Lebanese. While this topic is too complex for discussion here, it was clear that Mr. Hariri’s security was based almost totally on private security guards and officers. A United Nations’ fact-finding investigation concluded that the private security protection failed in at least the due-diligence preventive dimensions of their duties, and the Lebanese Government and security forces were criticized harshly as well for their lack of support, their disingenuous responses, and incompetence. Senior pro-Syrian Lebanese security force officers dismissed before the assassination were detained and questioned. While the United Nations drew no conclusions in this regard, the frequent complicity of personal security in assassinations in other areas of the world, the clear lack of focus and attention to protecting one of the most important political figures in Lebanon, serve to exacerbate already existing distrust of government and private security.

In South Asia, Pakistan is a major center of private security firms. While performing important public roles in infrastructure protection and even backing up security forces, they are looked at with considerable suspicion by government elements and portions of the population. One concern has been their potential penetration by jihadist groups and criminal acts committed to raise money for extremist goals. Karachi is a case in point, where in 2004 (the latest figures available) some 147 security firms with perhaps 25,000 personnel were estimated to be present. These private security personnel are also permitted to carry arms. While their collective size falls a little below authorized municipal police strength of 28,000, shortfalls in police manning means that the private security presence exceeds that of the police on any given day. Some firms are registered, but Pakistani sources estimate that there are “dozens” that are not.
Private security criminality aimed at financial institutions has been a particular concern with terrorist dimensions. It sparked an official campaign to better vet private security officers serving in banks, money-changing operations, and even automatic teller machines (ATMs). While customers worried about security personnel watching as they conducted ATM business, the greatest law enforcement concern was about armed bank robberies. The aptly named “Maverick Security Agency,” headed by a retired Pakistani Army colonel, was shut down following an armed robbery in which the colonel fled when the office was raided. Such robberies had led police to acknowledge that intelligence reporting and other indications of militants infiltrating private security forces suggest extremists were behind some thefts. They believe that large amounts of foreign currency stolen “may be used to fund subversive activities.”  

What is thought by Pakistani officials to be a deliberate effort to infiltrate or form private security agencies has led to the imposition of other administrative and oversight countermeasures. However, the substantial number of unlicensed firms—equipped with unauthorized weapons—constitutes a continuing danger to institutions and private Pakistani citizens.

The northeast Pakistan city of Lahore—the location of thousands of Afghan immigrants and storied location of Rudyard Kipling’s “Great Game” spy novel *Kim*—is the center of an effort by the Pakistani law enforcement Special Branch to compile a database of Afghans who are employed or have businesses in the city. In addition to developing a means for identifying Afghan refugees involved in a number of “robberies, kidnappings for ransom, killing for money, and smuggling weapons and narcotics crimes,” the police effort revealed some striking
information about the city’s private security companies surveyed. With the details these companies were asked to provide, the Special Branch determined that half of the Afghan employees were former *jihadists* who had fought in Afghanistan, albeit under unspecified circumstances.

Aside from whatever technical violations of Pakistani law such employment might mean for Afghan refugees, police concerns were mainly centered on the potential for terrorist/extremist mischief they have in the more than 5-million-person city. How well-founded such concerns might be is problematic—most of the 10,000 Afghan families remaining in Lahore have simply determined to rebuild their lives there and not return to the difficulties in Afghanistan. The discovery of so many former Afghan *jihadis* in potentially sensitive jobs will no doubt result in continued police attention. In any event, it underscores the magnet that private security represents for those who possess only skills of former police, soldiers, and guerrillas, whatever their intentions.98

In the recent past, Indonesia has seen a kind of private security manifestation that has traditional roots but which has been affiliated with contemporary political and religious issues. About a decade ago, the western and regional media featured many articles on the so-called “ninja” phenomenon in parts of Indonesia—referring to supposed highly trained Indonesian assassins whose shadowy violence was popularly likened to that of the legendary Japanese martial artists. They were asserted to be in league with the military and were targeted to kill “black magicians” feared for their power, dissidents, or other enemies. The extent to which this assertion reflected reality and
who the perpetrators actually were in any given case remains unclear, but people were brutally murdered and property destroyed. In at least some areas the violence served as an umbrella under which attacks on political or religious enemies were carried out by pseudo “ninjas.” This fostered, in turn, the creation of private security groups that also committed atrocities in the name of protecting their own communities and allies and eliminating suspected ninjas. In any event it highlighted an essentially tradition-based vigilante tradition that is scarcely private security in the usual understanding of the term, but which has had implications for current Indonesian practice.

More recently, the issue of “private security” and police reform in Indonesia received more serious attention in a less exotic context, but one rooted in tradition. Resulting actions included the “devolution of authority over some police functions to civilian auxiliaries and private security organizations” in parts of the country. One study that focused on the islands of Bali and Lombok on the eve of the 2004 Indonesian elections credits this development to the rising violence following the end of the regime of President Suharto in 1998 and vigilante and militia violence of the type noted above. Private security—auxiliary self-protection groups—was seen as a solution. It was given further impetus by decisions that gave local authorities more power and responsibilities than in the past. Finally, the 1999 separation of the police from the military left the police short-handed.

In Indonesia’s environment of turmoil and dysfunction, private support to law enforcement and justice fell to entities that earlier had exercised other responsibilities and were far from disinterested. These included the “pecalnag” ritual guards on Bali (affiliated with the late Suharto’s political party) and on Lombok the “pam swakarsa” private armed groups under the control of traditional religious leaders (called tuan guru) and the political factions they support. Not surprisingly, allowing these entities on Bali, Lomok, and elsewhere in Indonesia, including East Timor, to exercise security functions, resulted in high levels of well-documented violence, brutality, and criminality.

The affiliation of these private police auxiliaries with military, political, and religious and ethnically-based endorsers and controllers was complex. While internal Indonesian and international protests forced an end to official endorsement of some of these groups in some measure, the function lives on today in community auxiliary police variants whose affiliations remain a major source of controversy and impediment.
to effective, even-handed law enforcement. The ties of some former *pam swakarsa* members to Muslim extremist groups—and in fact the origin of some extremist groups from *pam swakarsa*—adds another consideration for outside planners and operators when assessing the nature of Indonesian private or irregular security groupings.\footnote{103}

On the other side of the world the erupting violence in France by youths and others, drawn largely from the marginalized Islamic population of France’s bigger cities, preoccupied French police, security, and intelligence organizations increasingly over the last year. The violence—beginning in the fall of 2005 and relieved subsequently by simmering unrest and tension among business and the populace—increased the importance of private security resources to supplement French local and national law enforcement. Many months before the worst of the riots broke out, however, French authorities in early 2005 discovered that a corrupt security firm with personnel recruited by a notorious jihadist was guarding many of the commercial businesses and entertainment facilities in the Paris area. The grave vulnerability such firms could pose resulted in security and guard service companies becoming the subject of particular attention and surveillance, with several suspected of being infiltrated by Islamic extremists.\footnote{104}

The firm that created this increased awareness was established in 2004 and overseen by an individual of Algerian extraction. The company was particularly active in subcontracting roles for larger companies. While the senior Algerian manager seemed perfectly ordinary at first, the deputy manager and personnel recruiter of the firm was readily
determined to have ties to the “Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat” (GSPC), which itself was associated with Al Qaeda. He had been active in the late 20th and early 21st century in conducting Islamic-oriented training around France, and at least two of the trainees had been killed fighting in Afghanistan. Recruits for the security company included individuals tied to support networks for the Algerian terrorist organization, Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Taxes were never paid and employees were never reported, generating additional revenues (500,000 euros or U.S. $600,000) that were evidently used to support unspecified jihadist agendas. While many questions remained, the Algerian and his deputy were indicted. The Paris newspaper *Le Monde* summed up the import of the case well in noting that “the affair poses the problem of infiltration of the private security sector by criminals or terrorists who find it a source of hidden revenue, an opening for secret networks, and a means of access to sensitive sites.”

**Conclusions**

Private security organizations of the diverse types and associations reviewed above are located throughout the world in large numbers. They are particularly active in areas where government institutions are weak, levels of crime high, and where political and sectarian violence are present or threatening. These characteristics in substantial measure define the regions to which U.S. military forces and interagency organizations and resources are likely to deploy. As with other non-government organizations, understanding and effectively managing contact or interaction with private security has become increasingly important. Such considerations are all the more imperative since these security companies are:

a. Closely involved with national and local police and security establishments
b. May deal directly or indirectly with criminal or hostile groups
c. Understand the local environment in much the same ways as official police and intelligence organizations understand it
d. Have weapons and sometimes powerful ones
e. May have affiliations and agendas hostile to U.S. and allied interests
f. May have the potential for furthering stabilization and public safety.
Private security is absolutely essential in many areas of the world where the capacity of public law enforcement and justice agencies—whether through lack of resources, expertise, or will—are unable to meet the basic and specialized needs of public safety and national security. Private security may be inequitable in application, may not be available to everyone who needs it, may be flawed in execution, and may have an almost crippling financial impact on national and local economies required to bear the costs. But in these areas, private security is sometimes the only functioning security, and “protection businesses” provide at least pockets of security for infrastructure, business, and individuals that would otherwise be nonexistent. In one of the several countries where the police anti-kidnapping squad may actually be carrying out the kidnappings themselves, a reliable bodyguard service is worth whatever can be afforded. In short, privatized security can mean the difference between a failed state and a faltering one and a means of buying time for the maintenance and strengthening of key institutions.

Where regulation and oversight are adequate—and where there is public policy consensus on appropriate roles, missions, and limits—private security can be a valuable and reliable government partner for enhancing public safety and increasingly important too in the fight against international terrorism. However, private security firms have shown themselves to be notably vulnerable to criminal and terrorist penetration when these conditions are not present and even sometimes when they are. The sheer numbers of these licensed and unlicensed firms in many countries—and the obscurity sometimes imposed by ethnic or clan silence and impenetrability—often means that even the most egregious kind of illegality remains invisible for thinly resourced government-oversight mechanisms. Concerns are not with petty theft and traditional kinds of crime—for example, the Japanese security guard caught stealing cash and beer coupons from the Ministry of Finance building. Rather, it is on the major kinds of ongoing abuses illustrated above, which have the potential for expanding and becoming so institutionalized that they are part of the fabric of a society. The potential and well-understood effects of criminal penetration on private security venues include:

a. Undermining citizen confidence in state institutions and the very legitimacy of the state and leadership, where robbery,
extortion, kidnapping, extrajudicial murder, and other crimes are perpetrated with government impotence or complicity

b. Facilitating the traffic in arms, drugs, and other contraband under legal or perceived legal cover

c. Weakening further public security organizations through corruption, coercion, and undermining dedication and morale

d. Providing powerful disincentives to local and national economic development by internal and external investors due to security concerns

e. Imposing even greater economic costs as individuals and institutions seek to overcome ineffective public and private protection venues

f. Discouraging alliances and international support in the face of enduring corruption and unreliability in portions of the security establishment.

While these kinds of problems may be addressed—and in some cases are being slowly addressed—with focused national and international programs aimed at strengthening government institutions and oversight, the vulnerability of private security businesses to terrorist penetration may prove just as challenging, even when strong regulation and oversight is present. The stated jihadist intent to infiltrate such institutions—and examples that provide models for how this might happen—underscore the need for law enforcement and intelligence attention to the recruiting, affiliations, and activities of private security companies charged with sensitive tasks. For American interests, private security requirements in the continental United States (CONUS) are clear enough, if certainly challenging. They are more complex for foreign security companies abroad, however, as even a cursory survey of how the nongovernment security picture has evolved over the last decade indicates. Beyond CONUS, U.S. facilities, deployed forces, citizens, and commercial or other interests may be compromised by foreign security regimens in which corrupted private security businesses constitute a real vulnerability. That will make understanding the “private” dimension of the operational environment all the more critical for analysts, planners, and operators.
Endnotes

1. This emphasis is evident throughout recent overview documents (as well as in numerous specialized field manuals and in planning materials):

2. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence played a pioneering role in introducing into Army doctrinal and training approaches new visions of the “Contemporary Operational Environment” and its diversity of players. This work provided the basis and impetus for developing a futures-oriented “Joint Operational Environment” with the USSOCOM and other conceptual efforts. (See Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Experimentation Transformation and Concepts Division, Washington, DC, August 2005.)
   Additional voluminous writings, official and conceptual, now address approaches for dealing with civil bodies and the wide spectrum of local, national, and international nongovernment organizations. Most recently for example, at the operational level, the 2006 Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency, Headquarters, Department of the Army and Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (FM 3-24 and MCWP 3-33.5 as designated respectively), Washington, DC, December 2006 addresses the need for recognizing and interaction with the spectrum of civil and nonstate organizations encountered in virtually every area of operation.
   Analogously, at the national level, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006, White House (Washington, DC, March 2006), p. 6, pointed to the need for “forming creative partnerships with nongovernmental organizations and other civil society voices to support and reinforce their work.”


4. For example, Counterinsurgency, pp. 1-16 highlights a number of organizations (e.g., religious schools and mosques, political parties, NGOs, businesses and financial institutions, and patriotic or service organizations) that may provide active or passive support to extremists.

Muslim NGOs and private institutions provide logistic, financial, and intelligence support to insurgents and terrorists to include the use of criminal means.

6. For example, historian E. J. Hobsbawm’s review of “social banditry” over the centuries in his still pertinent study *Bandits* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp.17-18, made this point well. While Hobsbawm focused principally on one form of banditry, his observations and arguments—together with those specialists who have agreed with or challenged his views—are extremely useful for assessing more modern forms of outlaw, guerrilla, or criminal activity.

7. For an early focused treatment of this phenomenon, see Colonel F. M. Lorenz, USMC, “Confronting Thievery in Somalia,” *Military Review*, 1994, pp. 46-55. For a broader examination of some of these areas around the world as they were developing in the early-mid 1990s, see Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., “The Organized Crime Dimension of Regional Conflict and Operations Other Than War,” in *Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for U.S. Policy and Army Roles and Missions*, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Richard H. Shultz (Washington, DC: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), pp. 125-146. It offers a broader examination of some of these areas around the world as they were developing in the early-mid 1990s.

8. In late 2006, El Salvador had a murder rate of about 55.5 persons per 100,000, which was twice the Latin American average. In addition, Guatemala (which also endured a long, violent war with insurgents) was also substantially above the Latin American national average with 37.5 murders per 100,000 people. See:

9. These groups range in character, size, and composition—as well as real or ostensible mission—from firms akin to the fictional No. 1 Ladies’ Detective Agency (see www.randomhouse.com/features/mccallsmith/books. html) to Colombian private militias; from a “Wheat Stalker” investigative firm in western Kansas (www.kapi.org/ --“Who knows what evil lurks in the heart of the Great Plains”) to the paramilitary Blackwater Security Consulting firm (www.blackwaterusa.com/securityconsulting/) the former Sandline International (www.sandline.com/site/index. html) closed in April 2004; or the Aegis Specialist Risk Management Corporation (www.aegisworld.com/) whose major intelligence activities in Iraq were profiled recently in Steve Fainaru and Alec Klein, “In Iraq, A Private Realm Of Intelligence-Gathering,” *Washington Post*, 1 July 2007; and many variants in between and on the periphery.
10. For a good, recent synopsis that was drawn upon here, see Paola Raffone, et al., “States without Security, Security without States,” Background Paper, Italian Center for International Perspectives (CIPI) and the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center (ESISC), Brussels, Belgium, 2007, pp. 5-6. See also trade organizations like Private Military.org at www.private-military.org/home.html and other works to include:

11. An earlier version of this assessment was published in part in the Taylor & Francis journal Global Crime, Volume 7, Issue 3, August 2006 and is used here in accordance with provisions for authors’ institutional uses. It is available in its original version through Taylor & Francis at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17440570601073301.

12. Five examples follow:

13. Most recently, allegations that Blackwater, USA fatally fired on Iraqi civilian bystanders in a 16 September 2007 incident has generated a number of additional oversight measures, as well as calls for their withdrawal from Iraq. See “Blackwater on the Way Out,” Associated Press, 18 October 2007, received via www.military.com.


17. Falaleyev, “To What Trenches?”


22. Falaleyev, “To What Trenches?”


24. Ibid.


33. Ibid.

34. See the Turkish newspaper recap in “Security or Mafia?” Nokta, 19 June 2005, pp. 44-45, translated in GMP2005061902200.


40. The Dutch anthropologist researcher was Marije Van Lidthe de Jeude.

See Kent Patterson, “Remittances Driving Central American Economies,” FNS Center for Latin American and Border Studies, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, New Mexico, 17 April 2006, archived at www.nmsu.edu/~frontera/.


For earlier estimates, see:


45. See David Spencer, *Colombia’s Paramilitaries: Criminals or Political Force?* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, December 2001).

46. See two references:
   
   


52. For examples, see:
   
   

53. In this regard, work by scholars at the University of Wales in a program focused on the “Globalisation of Private Security” has been notable for several areas. These studies provide context as well as specifics on the “industry” and serve as concise but valuable reference resources for military and security planners requiring an overview. The project and its work are highlighted at http://users.aber.ac.uk/rbh/privatesecurity/project.html.


55. Mobile Police are one of several special Nigerian Police components with national level responsibilities. They exist in addition to numerous regionally assigned police components and police logistic and support elements.


57. Ibid.

58. At the same time, however, private security has been credited with providing critically needed support to the police in guarding and protecting people and property. This dynamic is common in many countries where private security has a large footprint.


60. See the “Nigerian Scam Overview,” available from www.rickmcginnis.com/scam/overview.htm, one of many sites addressing the phenomenon.

61. Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, The Globalisation of Private Security—Country Report: Sierra Leone (Aberystwyth, Wales: Department of Internal Politics, University of Wales, January 2005), p. 5. The civil war involved the insurgent Revolutionary United Front (RUF) countered by the government and national military along with supporting regional and international allies to include private mercenary companies.


65. See two references:
   a. Isima, “Regulating the Private Security Sector,” p. 6

66. “Going Up or Down?” The Economist, 7 June 2007.
75. For two of many examples, see:
   a. Geslin: “Diamond Connection”
76. His translated remarks are found in his article:
77. See two references:
   a. ITAR-TASS, 2 February 2005
79. See two references:
81. For three of many examples, see:

82. Two examples of critiques follow:

83. Shamil Basayev died on 10 July 2006 in the explosion of a vehicle in Ingushetia. The circumstances surrounding the explosion are far from clear, but the large, possibly accidental blast killed Basayev and several fellow guerrillas. It is supposed that no insurance payment was forthcoming.

84. Aleksandr Khinshteyn, “15,000,000 $ dlya Basayeva” ($15,000,000 for Basayev), *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, 20 November 1991.

85. Luk’yanov and Kazanskaya, “What Kind of People.”


91. See three examples:


92. “Al-Manar Reports Increase.”

93. This fact-finding mission was known as the “Fitzgerald Report” and more formally as “Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Lebanon inquiring into the causes, circumstances, and consequences of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, 25 February-24 March 2005.” It is available from www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/lebanon/unhariri.htm and many other sites.


96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. Shahnawaz Khan, “Police cracks down on Afghan criminals; Intelligence agencies say illegal immigrants were involved in violent February 14 riots,” *Daily Times*, 23 February 2006, available from www.dailytimes.com.pk/. The group Jamaat-ul-Fuqra, with headquarters in Lahore and cells located primarily in North America, is reputed to have organized at least two private security firms in Brooklyn, New York to guard their communities known as jamaats. These firms are supposedly able to compete for commercial or even government security contracts. (Apparently appearing first in Christian M. Weber, “Examine Gunman’s Possible Ties to al Furqa,” *Soldiers for Truth*, 30 October 2002 and echoed in other media.) Jamaat-ul-Fuqra was formerly designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department in the 1990s and continues to find its way into some terrorist listings.


101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

