A Command Post at War

First Army Headquarters in Europe, 1943—1945

David W. Hogan, Jr.
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by

David W. Hogan, Jr.

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Foreword

World War II remains the defining experience for the U.S. Army in the twentieth century. It has had a lasting impact on the nation and its place in the world and on the Army and the way it organizes and fights. Although historians have written numerous volumes concerning this global conflict, some gaps in the literature remain. In particular, the subject of an American field army headquarters and its organization and role have attracted little attention. Studies on the personalities and styles of individual commanders exist, but the command posts themselves—the ways in which they were structured and operated and the functions they performed—have not been much explored.

With A Command Post at War: First Army Headquarters in Europe, 1943–1945, the Center of Military History attempts to redress this shortcoming. This study addresses the First Army headquarters in the European theater from its activation in October 1943 to V–E Day in May 1945. Under Generals Omar N. Bradley and Courtney H. Hodges, the First Army headquarters oversaw the American landings on D-Day, the breakout from the Normandy beachhead, the battle of the Hürtgen Forest along the German frontier, the defense of the northern shoulder during the Battle of the Bulge, and the crossing of the Rhine River at Remagen prior to the final American drive into central Germany. In examining the First Army headquarters' role, this volume shows the army headquarters of World War II as a complicated organization with functions ranging from the immediate supervision of tactical operations to long-range operational planning and the sustained support of frontline units. The commander and staff faced the problem of coordination with Allied counterparts as well as with headquarters and units from other services. Inadequate information and the limitations of technology added to their challenges. The human dimension was always important, and at times critical, in affecting the work of the headquarters under the stresses of a difficult campaign against an obstinate and resourceful foe.

Although times have changed and the modern Army focuses more on regional conflicts and contingencies than on global warfare, we can still learn much from the experience of the First Army headquarters. The Gulf War reemphasized the role of an army headquarters in a theater of operations as a pertinent issue for today's military professional. By examining
the experience of soldiers in past conflicts we gain the deeper perspectives and understandings necessary to meet the challenges facing the Army today and in the future.

Washington, D.C.
21 June 2000

JOHN S. BROWN
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History
The Author

David W. Hogan, Jr., is a historian in the Histories Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History. A native of Michigan, he graduated from Dartmouth College in 1980 and received his Ph.D. from Duke University in 1986. After teaching American military history at Elon College, he joined the Center of Military History in 1987. He is the author of Raiders or Elite Infantry? The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers From Dieppe to Grenada and U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II and has contributed to Theodore A. Wilson, ed., D Day, 1944, and Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. He has received grants from the Center of Military History, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, and the U.S. Military Academy. At the University of Maryland in College Park, he teaches an honors course on American attitudes toward warfare and the military, and he is currently preparing an article on that subject.
Preface

Since the early nineteenth century, the command structures for controlling armies in the field have become increasingly complex. Early military organizations could combine command functions in one individual as long as their forces remained small and occupied a limited area for a short period. With the emergence of the mass armies of the nation-state and of corps operating over broader fronts, however, commanders had to adopt more decentralized command structures and more specialized staffs if they wished to remain effective. As the size, complexity, mobility, and dispersion of military forces increased, the challenges of obtaining and disseminating information and of maintaining control increased as well. Expanded staffs, improved organization and procedures, and new technology—including the telegraph, telephone, radio, airplane, and automobile—could alleviate some of these difficulties, but they also created new problems for commanders to solve.

This study examines the response of the First U.S. Army headquarters to the challenge of command at the army level from its activation in England in October 1943 to the collapse of Nazi Germany in May 1945. It focuses on the role of the First Army headquarters at what current Army doctrine calls the “operational level of war,” the level between the grand strategy of nations and theaters and the tactical combat of corps and smaller units. More specifically, it analyzes the operations, intelligence, logistical, and administrative functions of an army-level headquarters, the procedures evolved to carry out those functions, and the impact of the personalities of the commander and staff chiefs on the inner workings and style of the organization. Although the U.S. Army has taken great pains over the years to ensure that final responsibility and authority rest with the commander, decisionmaking within military organizations has become increasingly complex and diffuse, and the lines of influence blurred, by the involvement of individuals other than the commander, who may not even be the dominant character in his own headquarters. A true command study, therefore, must go beyond doctrinal descriptions to take into account the interplay of personalities and style in the operation of a headquarters.

For all the vast literature on World War II, the perspective of an army headquarters has received little attention. Among the American army headquarters of that conflict, only General George S. Patton, Jr.’s Third U.S. Army has found much of a place in the literature, and studies of the Third Army tend to focus
more on the striking personality of Patton than on the operation of his command post. The subject of an army headquarters in World War II may seem archaic in an age of more limited wars and smaller military forces. Yet the issues of command at echelons above corps remain a subject of great interest in the current Army, especially given the intermittent need for an army-level ground component headquarters that can handle support, joint, combined, and, occasionally, operational functions in a theater of operations—as was the case in the Persian Gulf War. As an example of an army headquarters during World War II, the First Army is especially well suited. Perhaps no other American army of that war faced as many different conditions and challenges on as great a scale as the First Army.

In the course of preparing this work, the author accumulated numerous debts of gratitude. Five individuals in particular deserve special mention. Lt. Col. Roger Cirillo, USA (Ret.), brought to bear his extensive knowledge of World War II, his background as an instructor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and his familiarity with the terrain to go over several drafts of the manuscript and make countless invaluable suggestions on content and sources for further research. G. Patrick Murray of Valley Forge Military College generously shared materials, including many essential interviews that he had collected during his research for a biography of General Courtney H. Hodges. Ann L. Brownson, secretary of the First Army headquarters veterans association, helped me contact several First Army veterans whose recollections and support were indispensable for this project. Col. William T. Bowers, USA (Ret.), the chief of the Histories Division during most of the preparation of this work, and Graham A. Cosmas, my branch chief for most of the process, made numerous helpful suggestions and showed great patience with the travail encountered while simultaneously nudging the project along to completion.

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My deepest gratitude goes to my wife Page, who has gracefully tolerated my preoccupation with the First Army over the past several years.

The author alone is responsible for all interpretations and conclusions in the following work, as well as any errors that may appear.

Washington, D.C. 21 June 2000

DAVID W. HOGAN, JR.
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A Command Post at War

First Army Headquarters in Europe, 1943–1945
The American Army Headquarters, 1900–1944

Until 1900, the U.S. Army's experience with command echelons larger than a corps had been negligible. Surrounded by oceans and weak neighbors, the United States could afford to limit its Army to a constabulary of small garrisons scattered among isolated frontier posts. Armies had consisted of all the units within a particular geographic department, district, or division and rarely exceeded a few thousand men. Given such small forces, army commanders could continue the tradition of personal command, combining within themselves the functions of department head, field force commander, administrator, and troop leader. Many saw command less as a technique of scientific management than as an inspirational, largely intuitive art, in which some individuals naturally excelled and others did not. The commanders' small staffs had consisted of a few intimates, who served as aides, and of technical specialists, of whom the adjutant general usually served as the de facto chief of staff. The quality of staff personnel had improved over time with the advent of the U.S. Military Academy and post–Civil War trends toward greater professionalism, but instruction in command and staff work had been virtually nonexistent. The one notable exception to the Army's small-unit heritage, the Civil War, had left little enduring impact. Although commanders had adopted some informal specialization within their staffs and had used new technologies to direct the mass armies of that conflict, organization and doctrine for army-level staffs had deviated remarkably little from the established pattern.

With the turn of the century, the expanding responsibilities of the Army of an emerging world power, along with deficiencies exposed by the Spanish-American War, stimulated the most thorough reconsideration of doctrine for higher-level headquarters in the Army's history. To provide a corps-level echelon for supervising and supporting divisions operating independently in the rough American terrain, as well as to establish a basis for organizing Regular and reserve divisions, the War Department adopted the European concept of the field army, forming the First Field Army in 1910. Under the new organization, the old army-level echelon, according to the field service regulations of 1914, would concern itself only with broad missions, strategy, and military policy, leaving details of operations to the new field army headquarters, which took the place of the corps. The 1914 manual also provided for an army-level chief of staff, a role that had changed from a mere clerk to the commander's
leading adviser and executor. Under him was a staff divided along a general staff's functional lines of operations, intelligence, and administration, including supply. By 1917, influenced by operations along the Mexican border, Army doctrine abandoned its experiment with the new field army and returned to the corps structure, but the organization and functions of the traditional American army headquarters, to which the Army now reverted, remained unresolved. 3

To man the headquarters, whatever form they took, the Army expanded its educational system. The Spanish-American War had shown the need for systematic staff training of officers whose vision all too often was bounded by their particular branch or regiment. Although the new Army War College stressed strategic planning by the War Department General Staff, it increasingly covered tactical and logistical problems up to the corps level. 4 Meanwhile, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the General Service and Staff College devoted the second year of its two-year course to the instruction of a chosen few in strategy, the duties of a general staff, large-unit tactics, logistics, weapons, and military history. Shortly before the war with Spain, Maj. Arthur L. Wagner and Capt. Eben Swift, instructors at Leavenworth, had initiated a class on the preparation of standard five-paragraph orders, using the German form as a model. The school now incorporated this class into a curriculum of map problems, war games, and field exercises, emphasizing German general staff techniques. Under the strict supervision of Brig. Gen. John F. Morrison, such future staff officers as Hugh A. Drum and George C. Marshall solved map problems that, Marshall remembered, "contained a knockout if you failed to recognize the principle involved." 5 Despite its growing renown, the second year of the course, largely because of statutory limits on the size of the general staff corps, had produced only 400 graduates by April 1917, when the United States intervened in World War I. 6

World War I was a watershed for the U.S. Army's doctrine of higher-level command. The sheer size and increasing mechanization of Allied and German armies on the Western Front, the lengthy fronts over which they operated, and the limitations of primitive wire and wireless communications created enormous problems of command and control. The magnitude of the effort often forced commanding generals to seclude themselves and their staffs in command posts far to the rear and attempt to exercise control almost entirely through the telephone and telegraph lines that radiated to their subordinate units. 7

The Americans responded to this challenge by attempting to maintain a high degree of independence from European ways while simultaneously borrowing from the practices of their allies. Their inexperience with this type of warfare did not escape the notice of the British and French, who would have preferred that the new arrivals simply furnish raw manpower and leave command problems to their more seasoned generals and staffs. The Americans could not have accepted this arrangement, which would have transformed Maj. Gen. John J. Pershing's American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) into a massive replacement depot. Nevertheless, to form the theater-level staff of the AEF—with its large-scale strategic and support functions—as well as the corps, army, and other higher headquarters, they required a more mature doctrine and a far larger general staff corps than the tiny contingent of Leavenworth graduates.
At Langres in November 1917, with the help of several British and French instructors, the AEF established a three-month course that used twenty map problems to train staff officers in the principles of staff operations. Even with this accelerated schedule, however, it would take some time before the school could produce enough staff officers to meet the demand.\(^8\)

While the AEF struggled to expand its general staff corps, it also developed staff doctrine using French and British models. Shortly after Pershing’s arrival in France, the AEF commander sent officers to study French and British staffs with a view toward establishing similar organizations in the AEF. Simultaneously, the War Department sent a mission under Col. Chauncey B. Baker to France for the same purpose. Wary of two groups presenting dissimilar recommendations, Pershing asked the Baker mission to confer with the AEF staff before making its report. Having consulted with the AEF, Baker’s group visited both the British First Army and the French Second Army but, in its final report, seemed to favor the staff organization of the French. The French general staff or “G” system had a G–1, or personnel, section to handle personnel issues; a G–2, or intelligence, section to gather and circulate information on the enemy and the terrain; a G–3, or operations, section to plan and issue orders for movements and to handle liaison with adjacent armies; and a G–4, or supply, section to supervise the supply departments and technical services. In addition to these general staff sections, special staff officers handled specific administrative, technical, or service functions. Anticipating a closer working relationship with the French, in its general orders of February 1918 the AEF adopted a slightly modified version of the French system. It also translated many French command manuals and doctrinal pamphlets into English for the use of its staff officers.\(^9\)

Five more months would pass before the AEF could incorporate the new system into an army headquarters. It took time to assemble and train enough divisions in France to justify the creation of a corps, let alone a higher-level headquarters, and in the interim, General John J. Pershing had to resist repeated Allied attempts to divert the new American levies into British and French units. The process was delayed further in the spring of 1918 by a German offensive, which caused the American high command to throw its available divisions into the breach and to bring overseas more combat units at the expense of service troops. Nevertheless, by July 1918 Pershing was ready to begin the formation of the staff for an army, which he would command in addition to the AEF. On 4 July he selected Col. Hugh A. Drum as his army chief of staff and directed him to assemble the headquarters.

At Coulommiers and later at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre near Chateau-Thierry, Drum worked from dawn to dusk to select and organize the staff. While forming I Corps headquarters as part of its progressive process of assembling ever-higher command echelons, the AEF had begun separately to form an army artillery headquarters. Drum now added this headquarters to the emerging army staff. He also brought back the army G–4 section, which had been temporarily assigned as the I Corps’ G–4 section pending the formation of an army. Since Pershing was dividing his time between the army and AEF headquarters, he
allowed Drum considerable discretion in his task. On 10 July 1918, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the supreme Allied commander, gave his official approval for the formation of the First U.S. Army, which would report to AEF headquarters for administration and most of its supply and, at least initially, would come under the French commander in chief, General Henri Petain, for operations. Two weeks later Pershing announced activation of the First Army, effective 10 August.10

A general order in early August laid out the organization and duties of the First Army headquarters. The new command would carry out tactical, administrative, and logistical functions. A deputy chief of staff handled details of support, freeing the chief of staff to focus on tactical problems. To the four G sections, Drum added a G–5 section for training and a special staff consisting of an adjutant general, inspector general, judge advocate general, provost marshal, chief quartermaster, chief surgeon, chief engineer, chief signal officer, and chief ordnance officer and the chiefs of the air service, motor transport corps, chemical warfare service, and tank corps. The chief of artillery, who headed a separate headquarters, also served on the special staff. In practice, the First Army headquarters split into forward and rear echelons.11

The staff soon settled into a routine. Following the arrival of the corps evening reports about 2200, the G–3 section prepared a formal operations report and map, which it sent about midnight by courier to higher echelons, and it also drafted instructions for the following day. About 0730 the next morning the corps chiefs of staff reported to the army G–3 about the latest developments, and the G–3 met with his chief of staff to hear the army commander’s guidance. When the meeting concluded about 0830, the G–3 revised the draft field order according to a new form, more complex than the draft and based on the French model, and forwarded the draft order to the corps, enabling them to begin preparations to carry out the final order. At the morning meeting of staff section chiefs, the G–2 would outline the enemy situation, the G–3 would lay out the First Army’s status, and after a general discussion the group would receive the commander’s orders. To ensure coordination, the staff sections and chief of staff and their counterparts at lower levels conferred frequently and circulated memorandums, and the deputy chief of staff and assistant chiefs were authorized to issue orders in the name of the commander regarding all subjects within the scope of their sections. To handle its varied tasks, the headquarters staff, in the end, would require 600 officers and 1,500 enlisted men, a scale beyond the dreams of prewar American officers.12

The critical role that Drum, Lt. Col. George C. Marshall, and other Leavenworth graduates played on the staff was not always appreciated by subordinate commanders. Army doctrine was often contradictory regarding the proper sphere of the staff. The 1917 staff manual and numerous War Department directives had stressed the supremacy of the commander and the staff’s lack of authority over troops and departments. Nevertheless, field service regulations implied ample autonomy for the staff, and instructors at Leavenworth had even stated that the chief of staff could act in the place of his commander where immediate action was required.13 Through these contradictions and the Army’s inexperience
with a general staff system, misunderstandings frequently occurred. In their direct contacts with opposite numbers at lower levels during the Meuse-Argonne offensive, the First Army staff officers frequently issued orders to corps staffs without reference to Pershing or to the corps commanders. To make matters worse, brash, young Leavenworth graduates at different echelons often displayed an overbearing attitude in dealings with older subordinate commanders, a disdain reciprocated by the latter, who resented the intrusions, real and supposed, on their authority and often viewed experience as the only valid schooling for officers.14

In early August 1918 the forward echelon of the First Army headquarters moved to the key railroad center of Neufchâteau. There it began planning for the First Army's baptism of fire, the offensive against the St. Mihiel salient. The First Army G-4 section supervised the process of obtaining supplies from the Services of Supply through a regulating station in the army rear area and then pushing them forward directly to the division railheads. While the G-4 section supervised supply to the U.S. I, IV, and V Corps and, with the aid of a French liaison contingent, the French II Colonial Corps, the G-3 section prepared march tables, plans, and orders. In early September, however, the staff received a major new challenge when Foch changed the First Army's mission to a limited attack on the salient, followed by a major redeployment sixty miles to the north and an offensive in the Meuse-Argonne region. The move involved the transfer of 500,000 men, 2,000 guns, and 900,000 tons of supplies over three crowded roads within a two-week span. It would have been an imposing task for an experienced staff, let alone the green First Army headquarters. Following the successful conclusion of the St. Mihiel attack on 13 September, Col. George C. Marshall in the G-3 section coordinated the shift to the Meuse-Argonne, dividing men and vehicles between the three roads, adjusting march schedules on short notice, and working with a French liaison officer to avoid entanglements with adjacent French units. By the night of 25 September every First Army unit had reached its position for the attack the next day.15

Once the Meuse-Argonne offensive started, however, it encountered major problems. The rugged terrain, lack of good roads, incessant rains, chronic shortages of service units and transportation, and a stubborn enemy defense presented enormous obstacles, all of them compounded by the staff's inexperience. The initial attack order was confusing and set unreasonable goals for the first day's advance. Because of the large number of green troops, the army headquarters delineated corps and division boundaries and objectives in such detail that, when Pershing finally allowed more discretion, corps commanders had little idea how to use it.

Other difficulties plagued command in the First Army during the offensive. Inadequate communications were a constant bane. Portable radios were unavailable, signal wire was often cut by bombardments, and motor couriers were slowed by massive traffic jams on the few available roads. Unable to follow developments because of these glitches, the First Army headquarters relied heavily on the AEF's roving inspectors, who provided the G-3 with daily information on the situation at the front and the problems they encountered in return
for summaries of the next day’s orders. In the end, however, communications were so poor that the First Army headquarters resorted to dropping its daily order by plane. Frustrated by the slow pace of the advance, Pershing relieved the commanders of one corps, three divisions, and several brigades by the end of October, but the changes did little to spur the advance. The First Army suffered one final embarrassment when, within a week of the armistice, a careless order permitted the V Corps to send the 1st Infantry Division across the III Corps' front in an effort to win the race to Sedan. The First Army staff soon sorted out the resulting chaos, but the episode left red faces at both the AEF and First Army headquarters.\textsuperscript{16}

With the armistice, the Army entered a twenty-year period in which all of its army headquarters barely existed except on paper. During the first six months of 1919 the First Army headquarters and the Second U.S. Army staff, which had been organized during October 1918 and had joined the campaign at the end of the war, were demobilized. The new Third U.S. Army remained to administer the occupation of the west bank of the Rhine near Koblenz until it too was demobilized in July 1919. Under the 1920 amendment to the National Defense Act of 1916, the War Department provided for the establishment of three army headquarters to command the nine corps areas into which it had divided the continental United States, but it stipulated the assignment of commanders and staffs only as the need arose. Although mobilization plans as of 1923 called for six armies in the initial mobilized force, no army headquarters existed during the 1920s. In 1932 Army Chief of Staff General Douglas
MacArthur moved to consolidate the Army’s tactical units under four army headquarters. MacArthur was concerned that no army-level headquarters existed as a basis for planning and mobilization for even minor contingencies. In his concept, each army headquarters, under the senior corps area commander within the army area, would plan the defense of its particular area and supervise training and army-level maneuvers within that area, leaving most administrative tasks to its subordinate corps areas. Although the Army activated four armies in 1933, they existed only in theory. The First Army’s permanent staff in New York, for example, consisted of only two officers.17

Skeleton staffs and lack of realistic large-scale maneuvers left the still-immature American doctrine for the army headquarters in a largely theoretical state between the wars. Army leaders could, and did, draw some lessons on high command from their abbreviated experiences in World War I, notably through the report of a postwar committee established by the AEF under the chairmanship of Brig. Gen. William D. Connor to investigate the subject of general staff organization. The committee, which reported to the AEF’s Superior Board on Organization and Tactics, reemphasized the sole authority of the commander and dominance of the general staff over the special staff while leaving room for service chiefs to work directly with their counterparts in other command echelons through technical channels. Its conclusions contributed to the 1923 Field Service Regulations and the 1928 Staff Officers Field Manual, but these manuals still provided little guidance on the subject of echelons above the division level.18 The Army tried to redress this deficiency through the Manual for Commanders of Large Units, whose first volume on operations appeared in 1930 and whose second volume on organization and administration came out in 1935. In October 1939 revised field service regulations attempted to combine these two volumes in an update of the 1923 regulations, with mixed results.19

As the Army struggled to generate official doctrine on large-unit operations, it also sought to develop a broader base of expertise in high-level command and staff work through its schools. Because of its experience in World War I, the Army’s leadership was determined to avoid shortages of trained staff officers in any future mobilization. Consequently, the schools, particularly the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, which reopened in 1919 after a wartime hiatus, emphasized the education of a large number of competent staff officers schooled in a common approach to solving tactical problems. Although the main focus of instruction at Leavenworth remained the division and combined arms, the school devoted at least some attention to the army level in its map problems, exercises, conferences, and lectures.20 Especially after 1924, the Army War College was supposed to concentrate more on the theater and army level. In fact, the content of its curriculum oscillated between grand strategy and “preparation for war” on the one hand and, on the other, field command and staff work, communications, and tactics by an army operating either independently or as part of an army group. After 1935 the War College devoted greater attention to army-level command and control to meet the Army’s immediate need for staff officers in the field.21
What did the manuals and schools teach about an army headquarters? Although they drew some lessons from the positional warfare of World War I, they focused more on the role of an army in less controlled, more fluid "open warfare," especially on the American continent. Manuals and textbooks at first defined the army as the "unit of direction," an echelon having "territorial, strategic, and tactical functions," in contrast to the role of the corps as the unit of execution and maneuver. Later manuals showed a slight shift in emphasis from a strategic toward a more tactical role for the army. They stated that, "fundamentally, the army is the basic unit of maneuver, but, when the army is part of a group of armies, and usually after contact is obtained with the hostile forces, strategy becomes merged in tactics and the latter becomes the predominant factor."

Whatever their differences on the level of involvement of the army, both sets of manuals agreed on the basic tasks of the army headquarters. They defined that agency's role as planning and executing "broader phases of strategic and tactical operations necessary to carry out that part of a given strategical mission assigned to it by higher authority." The army commander gave to each corps a clear mission, assigning zones, specifying direction and objectives for an attack, and allotting divisions and other resources among the corps. He followed the battle closely, issuing clear and timely orders, coordinating corps movements, and committing his reserves of artillery, aviation, tanks, and other units where necessary.

One wartime precedent that the Army took great pains to exorcise, with limited success, was the specter of "staff command." Heeding the warnings of the Connor committee, manuals stressed the role of the commander as "the controlling head . . . the master mind," from whom flowed "the energy and impulse which are to animate all under him." Staff officers, as such, had no command authority; they only gave orders when authorized by the commander or "pursuant to routine established procedures." The chief of staff, the "chief adviser and personal representative of the commander," exercised some powers "coextensive" with his responsibilities for the staff and the control and coordination of troop operations, but he was only the instrument of the commander, acting under his orders or in his name when he was absent. The Army's postwar leaders were interested in emphasizing in the service schools command as an art separate from the skills of the staff officer, and the Army War College during the early 1920s treated command as such in its curriculum. By the end of the decade, however, the War College had rejoined Leavenworth in teaching command within a staff setting. In stressing teamwork, the instruction seemed, in some cases, to view the commander as little more than the highest-level staff officer or manager.

How could a commander extend his control and energy not just to the staff but throughout the command? School textbooks gave lengthy expositions on the subject, to the point of prescribing the number of visits a commander should make to his staff section chiefs and the specific procedure for staff conferences. Before a major operation, the manuals stated, a commander should always supplement his written orders with personal conferences with his staff
A class on the infantry division at the Command and General Staff School, February 1942

and subordinate commanders to ensure that they understood his plans and intent. Once the battle began, he should station himself where he could best control the action. His command post offered the advantage of good communications and control of the unit as a whole, but manuals underscored the importance of personal visits to inspire confidence and ensure that his orders were understood and being executed. Since the commander could not be everywhere at once, doctrine allowed for visits by staff officers to lower echelons and, increasingly, the use of liaison officers to clarify the commander’s intent to his subordinates and provide him with an independent source of information from the front.  

The question arose of how much control a commander should exercise. By 1923 Army doctrine had accepted considerable decentralization, but the tentative field service regulations of 1939 stated, “So long as the commander can exercise effective control, he does not decentralize.” Perhaps advances in communications, especially radio, led doctrinal planners to believe it possible to maintain central control, despite other technological trends which accelerated the pace and increased the dispersion of operations. Then again, the French Army, on which the Americans had modeled much of their high-level doctrine, was moving in the same direction.  

As for the headquarters itself, manuals and schools laid out in great detail the organization and duties of the general and special staffs, although they often lumped functions of staffs at the army, corps, division, and other levels
within an overall discussion of staff functions. The G sections of the general staff, an Army War College lecture noted in 1924, did not constitute an “operating agency,” but rather a body which prescribed policies and left execution of those policies to the technical, administrative, and supply chiefs of the special staff. The instructor compared the relationship to that between an architect and a builder. Among the Gs, considerable cooperation and coordination must exist, as each section had to keep informed of current plans and decisions to carry out its functions. Doctrine also emphasized the duty of each special staff chief to keep the commander and the general staff constantly aware of the condition and capabilities of his particular arm or service.

The July 1929 table of organization for an army headquarters underwent some minor changes. In it, the Army retained the World War I concept of forward and rear echelons, the deputy chief of staff, and the chief of the air service, who, in addition to his staff duties, would command the air units attached to the army by theater headquarters. The table dropped the G–5 for training and the chiefs of the tank corps and motor transport corps, while adding civil affairs and finance officers and a chaplain. Although the table stipulated 251 officers and 777 enlisted men in an army headquarters, the War Department quickly slashed the authorization to 128 officers and 466 enlisted men so as to keep large staffs to a minimum. As it turned out, the armies of the interwar period could not even come close to that level.

The outbreak of World War II caused the Army to take a new look at its army headquarters. In November 1939 the War Department acted to provide a minimal staff for each of these headquarters and directed army commanders to take charge of all activities directly relating to preparations for war, including field training for units larger than divisions, organization of coast defenses, and supervision of operational and administrative planning. Overall responsibility for training rested with General Headquarters (GHQ), which the War Department activated in July 1940 as a prospective command post for a theater of operations. Nevertheless, GHQ’s chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, wished to delegate the authority for training divisions to the various army headquarters. Toward that end, in October 1940 the War Department separated the command of corps areas from the army commands, designated army commanders and distinct army staffs, and left the responsibility for logistics, construction, and the training of service troops to the corps headquarters. This action effectively implemented MacArthur’s four-army concept of 1932 and helped bring army staffs to their highest level of readiness as prospective commands for future theaters of war.

Partly to train these staffs, the Army conducted unscripted maneuvers of army-size units during the autumn of 1941. Although some army staffs had carried out maneuvers before the war, they lacked the manpower and other resources to attempt much more than highly formalized command post exercises. As the new Army fighting divisions that had been mobilized in 1940 reached an advanced stage of training, GHQ decided to try larger, more realistic maneuvers to integrate these formations into the army and corps headquarters. Many of the lessons cited by GHQ from the Louisiana maneuvers in
September 1941 dealt with armor and air support, but the exercise also revealed ongoing defects in staff doctrine and practice, especially the use of excessive unit frontages and orders which were either too complex or vague. GHQ made many of the same criticisms of the First Army headquarters in the Carolina maneuvers later that fall, chiding Lt. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, Pershing’s former chief of staff and now the First Army commander, and his staff for their inadequate supply system, overly lengthy field orders, problems of communications, and location of their command post far to the rear. Both maneuvers showed that command and staff doctrine had not yet entirely shed the outmoded practices of World War I for the mobile war to come.

Only a week after the final phase of the Carolina maneuvers, Japanese planes attacked Pearl Harbor, and the United States became a full-fledged belligerent in the war. In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, army headquarters in the continental United States held no more maneuvers on the scale of those in Louisiana, focusing instead on lower-level unit and staff exercises. As Army units prepared to deploy overseas, Army Ground Forces, GHQ’s successor as the Army agency responsible for organization and training, tried to keep the size of staffs, including army staffs, to a minimum. It also abolished the old “type army” organization, which specified a standard set of formations as a model for army units, and instead gave to each army a mixture of units according to the particular conditions under which it would operate. In Army Ground Forces’ view, these steps would not only reduce administration but also make more efficient use of the limited number of available staff officers. During 1940 the Command and General Staff School had changed its program to a three-month course for reservists and a ten-week course for general staff officers, and the Army War College had suspended classes to free instructors and students for the field. Still, the Army never seemed to have enough qualified staff officers, especially those with actual headquarters experience.

While the Army rushed to organize and train staffs, it also tried to update its army doctrine. A new manual for large-unit operations, published in June 1942, stressed tactics, but it also further defined the role of the army as the “fundamental unit of strategic maneuver,” the unit which the theater commander or commander of field forces used as the basis for planning and executing operations. Focusing on long-term planning, the army would provide broad, overall guidance to the corps, but the corps would normally have great freedom of action in pursuing their missions. A revised staff officers field manual conceded that, to expedite the execution of his orders and promote teamwork, a commander might authorize his staff to contact staff officers of other echelons about details of orders and routine technical matters but confirmed that orders to subordinate units must pass between the commanders.

Drawing on the World War I model, Army doctrine also presented the army headquarters as the main administrative and logistical echelon in the combat zone, although, in practice, the army groups would eventually assume several support functions. Through a regulating officer, who would manage supply traffic and set priorities according to information provided by the army, the communications zone would deliver supplies to railheads, depots, or other installations in
the army zone. If the supported units were close to those army facilities, unit transport would pick up the supplies; where distances were too great, army transport would carry the supplies forward to the units.41 (Chart 1)

Official doctrine showed other adjustments. It initially said little about coordinating air and ground elements. Indeed, while adding personnel, the new tables of organization actually deleted the chief of the air service, perhaps because of the separation of Army Air Forces from Army Ground Forces under the War Department reorganization of March 1942. Later, of course, official doctrine would provide for centralized control by the airmen of the allocation of air sorties in support of ground forces and the establishment of air superiority as a prerequisite to close air support. Organizational tables did add an anti-aircraft officer in response to the threat from enemy aircraft, as well as a special service officer to advise on matters relating to morale.42 Reacting to the coordinated use by the Germans of aircraft, tanks, and mechanized forces in the so-called blitzkrieg, the Army provided greater mobility for mobile army headquarters, using improved radio links and rolling supply depots to cope with fast-moving mechanized warfare. Nevertheless, with its caution about open flanks and emphasis on concentration and artillery preparation to force breakthroughs, official doctrine still reflected the influence of World War I.43

Not surprisingly, doctrine for army-level command required further alterations when American armies applied it in the Mediterranean and Pacific in 1943. The rugged terrain and poor roads of Sicily and Italy, as well as the long seaborne communications, inadequate existing facilities, and underdeveloped transportation network of the Southwest Pacific, presented challenges unforeseen by prewar doctrine.44 Amphibious assaults highlighted joint operations, a subject inadequately treated in prewar doctrine. In Sicily, Italy, and the Pacific, army commanders complained of informal command arrangements which complicated provision of air and naval gunfire support, and their staffs added air support officers to the G–2 and G–3 sections in an attempt to ensure closer ties with supporting aviation commands.45 Nor did coalition warfare make matters any simpler. In the Southwest Pacific, MacArthur used the Sixth Army’s commander, staff, and troops to create a new “Alamo Force,” thereby circumventing his Australian ground commander, and the Fifth Army headquarters in Italy included separate national contingents to support Allied troops under its command. Despite Army Ground Forces’ efforts to hold the line, staffs expanded to meet the needs of their theaters. The Fifth Army staff added a G–5 section for civil affairs as well as special staff sections to handle amphibious issues, transportation, public affairs, and historical matters, while the Seventh Army’s headquarters added a deputy chief of staff for administration and a section for interpreting aerial photographs.46

The challenges posed by distances and highly mobile warfare forced a higher degree of decentralization than the Army had been prepared to accept during the interwar period. In the Southwest Pacific, Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger’s Sixth Army headquarters found not only its units but even its own echelons separated by hundreds of miles of ocean, forcing heavy reliance on liaison aircraft and radio. Although Krueger diligently visited forward commands by plane,
CHART 1—U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE TYPICAL ORGANIZATION OF A THEATER OF OPERATIONS, 1943

Advance Section

Intermediate Section

Base Section

Boundary Legend:

- xx Division
- xxx Corps
- xxxx Army
- o oo Section, Communications Zone
- o ooo Communications Zone

leaving his chief of staff in charge of his headquarters, he had to grant considerable leeway to relatively small task forces conducting the bulk of the Sixth Army’s operations. In Sicily, Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.’s Seventh Army carried out a mobile campaign in which he relied on general directives to subordinates, but he was not shy about intervening in battles, to the point of jumping the chain of command. A firm believer in personal command, he devoted much of his time to visiting command posts, leaving the details of running the Seventh Army to a staff which some saw as incompetent. In Italy, Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark of the Fifth Army benefited from the slower pace of operations, copious employment of liaison officers, and the use of operations instructions, rather than field orders, to exercise close control over his corps commanders while providing them with adequate support. Of these three army headquarters, the Fifth Army’s was the one to which the First Army headquarters would turn as a model.

Thus, by early 1944 the U.S. Army’s doctrine and organization for an army headquarters with logistical, administrative, joint, and broad tactical functions was maturing, but the Army was still relatively new at the business of army-level command. Except for the aberration of the Civil War, the Army had acquired no experience with the command and control of a mass army until World War I. Even in the Great War, the Second Army saw little action, and the First Army served for only three months before the armistice. Thus the Americans had little time to adjust, or even become accustomed, to an army doctrine borrowed substantially from the Allies. Determined at least to produce large numbers of competent staff officers for the next war, the interwar Army devoted considerable time to higher-level command and staff methods in its educational system. Nevertheless, doctrine remained largely theoretical, and officers acquired little practical experience, especially since army-level staffs during the 1920s and 1930s represented little more than paper organizations. Although the Army school system belatedly tried to address the new challenges and opportunities offered by the rapid advances in military technology, Army doctrine remained closely tied to the conventions of World War I. The successful organizations, procedures, and policies ultimately adopted by the Army in World War II were therefore the imperfect product of wartime experiences. They varied greatly from theater to theater and continually evolved as the circumstances facing each army changed over the course of time.
Notes


11 Genesis of the First Army, pp. 70–73.


AEF: Tell Lew "...!" Ago


"Open warfare" is from Smythe, Pershing, p. 72. "Unit of direction" is from U.S. Army, General Service Schools, School of the Line, General Tactical Functions of Larger Units (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: General Service Schools, 1922), p. 19. Last quote is from Field Service Regulations, 1923, p. 1.


27 FM 101–5, Staff Officers Field Manual, 1928, p. 3.

28 Field Service Regulations, 1923, p. 5.


32 Rpt, Duties of G–1 of Armies, Group of Armies, and GHQ, suppl. 2, p. 1, Rpt of Committee 11, G–1 Course 21, 23 Dec 24, Army War College files, USAMHI.


34 Table of Organization (TO) 202–W, Army Headquarters, Field Army, War Department, 1 July 1929, and TO 202–1–W, Army Headquarters, Field Army (Initial Organization), War Department, 1 October 1929, both in Organizational History Branch, CMH; Moenk, Command and Control, p. 10.


38 Moenk, A History of Large-Scale Army Maneuvers in the United States, pp. 72, 78.


42 War Department FM 100–20, Command and Employment of Air Power (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 1–2; TO 200–1, Headquarters. Field Army, War Department, 1 January 1941, Training and Doctrine Command Archives, Fort Monroe, Va.; TO 200–1, Headquarters. Army, War Department, 1 July 1942, Organizational History Branch, CMH.


Beginnings at Bristol

After Pearl Harbor brought the United States into World War II, American strategists pressed for a cross-Channel invasion of the German-held Continent as the surest, most direct path to victory. Despite British misgivings about launching such an ambitious effort before other operations had weakened German power, the Allies formed a combined staff under British Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Morgan in April 1943 to prepare an outline plan for the assault. This group, dubbed the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), examined prospective landing beaches and prepared plans and estimates of the required resources, notably landing craft. In August at Quebec the Combined Chiefs of Staff—the Anglo-American committee of service chiefs who conducted the war under the supervision of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill—approved COSSAC’s preliminary plan for two British divisions to land near Caen while an American division came ashore farther west. Building its strength to eighteen divisions by the fourteenth day of the invasion, this force would establish a lodgment roughly between the Seine and Loire Rivers and reorganize and accumulate supplies for a drive east across the Seine. COSSAC had served its purpose. The corps, armies, army groups, and supreme headquarters of the invasion force itself would draw up the more detailed plans for Overlord, the invasion of northwest Europe scheduled for 1944.1

Although by July 1943 the British had activated two army and one army group headquarters for the invasion, the Americans did not move to form parallel commands until late August. Responsibility for this task rested with the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA), the headquarters which had exercised planning and operational control over American forces in northwest Europe and logistical and administrative authority over Army elements there since mid-1942. As early as the spring of 1943 the ETOUSA commander, Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, had recommended establishment of an army headquarters, and after Andrews’ death in a plane crash in May, his successor, Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, also called for such an organization. Both proposals made little headway, largely because of a dispute within the coalition over command of the invasion. The small size of the assault force—three divisions—would normally have called for a corps headquarters. Given the interservice and inter-Allied considerations involved in the assault, however, COSSAC
wanted an army to direct the operation. Partly out of concern for the real problems of merging two nationalities under one command and partly from longstanding opposition to Americans going into battle under what would probably be a British army headquarters, Devers suggested that an American and a British corps conduct the assault under the direct control of the supreme commander. At Quebec in mid-August Allied leaders agreed in principle on COSSAC’s approach, but the details remained unsettled. In the interim, the War Department decided to form in Britain the American army staff that became the First U.S. Army.2

On 3 September Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, commander of the U.S. II Corps in Sicily, reported to the forward command post of Allied Force Headquarters in Catania, where he learned of his appointment to lead the First Army. Quiet, modest, and rather homely in his plain olive-drab uniform and glasses, the fifty-year-old Missourian had the look of a country schoolteacher, an appearance that belied his success in commanding a combat corps in North Africa and Sicily.3 A careful, thorough tactician, his plans reflected the strong influence of the Infantry School and the higher-level educational institutions of the interwar Army and would later be criticized, particularly by armor officers, for lacking boldness and imagination. Nevertheless, few could deny the strong character, keen sense for terrain, aptitude for numbers and logistics, appreciation of intelligence, and feeling for the enlisted soldier that led his West Point classmate, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, to describe him as “about the best rounded, well balanced, senior officer that we have in the service.”4 Calm, even in a crisis, Bradley projected an air of serene confidence and common sense that reassured superiors and subordinates alike.5

In his command style, Bradley provided a father figure: warm, understanding, considerate, but leaving no doubt who was in charge. He preferred dealing personally with subordinates, keeping in frequent touch with his commanders by phone or personal visits, and using large daily meetings to lay out concisely his decisions and plans to his staff.6 He left the staff to work out technical and administrative details but kept close watch over operations, often conducting his own planning and estimates. As he later explained, “G–2 existed to tell me what should be done on the basis of his information concerning the enemy. G–4 was to tell me what could be done in view of our limitations on supply. Then
once I made my decision, G–3 was to do it.” At times, he became bogged down in detail. Ever the infantry battalion commander, his fascination with small-unit tactics impressed subordinates like Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin but often involved him in issues more suitably handled by lower echelons. He did, however, permit subordinates substantial discretion. As commander of the II Corps, he issued only about twenty formal directives for the entire campaign in Tunisia, and when he did issue an order, he generally confined himself to one-page overlays that specified objectives and unit boundaries. As long as a subordinate performed well, Bradley usually left him alone, but he did not hesitate to interfere with or relieve an individual who failed to meet expectations. Behind the genial exterior lay a cool professionalism and toughness forged in Tunisia and Sicily.

Bradley brought with him to England about thirty seasoned officers from his II Corps staff in the Mediterranean. That autumn, few high-level American staffs could match the combat experience of these veterans. This group had originally deployed to Great Britain in June 1942 under Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark, who, as the corps commander at the time, had taken pains to ensure that his staff consisted of younger, and presumably more energetic, staff officers. In Britain, they participated in early planning for the cross-Channel invasion before their reassignment to Torch, the invasion of French Northwest Africa. Under Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall, who had returned to the command of the II Corps after Clark’s selection as deputy commander of the invasion force, the staff conducted the Torch landings in November with energy and determination, but this success inspired overconfidence.

The battle of Kasserine Pass gave a rude awakening to the II Corps staff. To be sure, many factors, including long lines of communications and a poor road and railroad network, lay outside its control. Nevertheless, Fredendall and his headquarters deserve criticism for scattering their units among too many different missions, for tolerating confused lines of command, for contributing to cool relations with allies, for establishing an often haphazard supply system, for neglecting contingency planning, and for issuing orders that invaded the proper spheres of subordinates. Fredendall himself rarely left his command post to visit units, quarreled with superiors and juniors alike, and traumatized his young staff. To outside observers, the II Corps headquarters seemed alternately aloof and harassed, unaware of events at the front, and bungling in its response to the German thrust.

It took the leadership of Patton and Bradley, then both major generals, to bring the II Corps out of the doldrums. Temporarily transferred from the I Armored Corps to replace Fredendall, Patton quickly caught the staff’s attention with his orders to close the breakfast mess at 0730, as well as his tighter uniform regulations. At first, the new commander thought little of the staff, stating that “with few exceptions, his [Fredendall’s] staff was worthless due to youth and lack of leadership.” But he soon changed his mind as he observed some of his more able staff officers, notably the G–2, Col. Benjamin A. “Monk” Dickson; the G–4, Col. Robert W. Wilson; the artillery officer, Col. Charles E. “Eddie the Cannon” Hart; and the corps quartermaster, Col. Andrew T.
McNamara. In the month and a half that Patton led the II Corps, he replaced only the chief of staff, who had already departed with Fredendall, and the G-3 among the main staff chiefs.\textsuperscript{11}

Bradley likewise made changes when he succeeded Patton, now a lieutenant general, in mid-April 1943 upon the latter's return to the I Armored Corps to begin planning for the invasion of Sicily. The new commander brought in Col. William B. Kean as his chief of staff; reduced the size of his forward echelon, opened his command meetings to more staff officers, and demanded the kind of careful, methodical staff work for which the II Corps staff would later be known. In its difficult shift across British lines of communications to the northern front in Tunisia, in the final assault on Bizerte, and in the invasion of Sicily, the staff showed a new confidence and an ability to learn from its early mistakes. As a staff for a reinforced corps, responsible for administration and supply as well as planning for two amphibious operations, II Corps officers acquired experience and a mutual trust that would serve them well in their future role with the First Army.

Even while gaining invaluable experience, however, the II Corps staff also acquired resentments that would linger for some time. Although the staff established warm relations with individual British officers, it bridled at the condescending views of others, especially the "so-called observers" who seemed to be everywhere after Kasserine. Nor did the staff's Anglophobia improve in Sicily, where the II Corps headquarters often clashed over boundaries with its counterpart at the British Eighth Army. In his tent, Bradley, now a lieutenant general, displayed a map of Sicily that contrasted the relatively meager gains of the Eighth Army in red with the huge blue areas taken by Patton's Seventh.

Patton himself became the target of much rancor. Whether due to the staff's reaction to his tough measures after Kasserine or to Bradley's instinctive dislike for Patton's style, the II Corps headquarters viewed the Seventh Army commander as a boorish, overbearing adolescent whose vulgarity, showmanship, inattention to detail, and tendency to jump the chain of command were inappropriate in a high-level commander. The II Corps commander and staff did not have a much higher regard for Patton's staff, "that great silence we call Army," which they accused of neglecting supply and communications with forward units. In Sicily, Bradley said, "We learned how not to behave from Patton's Seventh Army."\textsuperscript{12}
From Sicily, the II Corps personnel selected by Bradley and Kean journeyed in early October 1943 to England, where they were joined by another group from the former First Army headquarters at Governor’s Island, New York. In the hope that he would take the headquarters overseas, General Drum had taken great care in assembling his staff. As Dickson, the new army G–2, wryly noted, “If he [Drum] wanted a stenographer, he took a court stenographer. Where he wanted a draftsman, he acquired an architect. No sultan ever chose brides for his harem as carefully as Drum picked out his officers.” According to Bradley, the Governor’s Island contingent had expected to remain intact for the campaign in Europe and were crestfallen to learn that he was bringing personnel from his former corps, including his chief of staff, three of his four general staff chiefs, and nine of the eighteen heads of special staff sections. By necessity, the two groups accommodated each other, but some tensions that appeared later could be traced to these early divisions. In the end, of the 361 officers on the staff in June 1944, 38 came from the II Corps staff in Sicily, 37 came from Drum’s staff on Governor’s Island, 100 joined the Governor’s Island contingent just prior to its departure for Europe, and 186 joined in Britain.13

Reflecting Bradley’s own background and preference, the First Army staff was dominated by Regular infantrymen. Although the vast majority—over two hundred fifty—of the headquarters’ staff officers at the time of the invasion of Europe came from the Organized Reserves or National Guard, the 56 Regulars held the key positions, including the chief of staff, deputy chiefs, G–1, and G–3. On the special staff, only the ordnance officer, the headquarters commandant, and the chief of the publicity and psychological warfare section were reservists. Compared to the Army as a whole, the percentage of infantry officers, and indeed of combat officers generally, was higher. The First Army headquarters drew approximately 24 percent of its officers from the Infantry Branch, 12 percent from the Field Artillery, and 4 percent from the Cavalry, while the Army as a whole had an officer corps of about 12 percent Infantry, 5 percent Field Artillery, and 1 percent Cavalry as of 30 June 1944. Infantrymen clearly enjoyed the most influence in the headquarters. Of the eighty-seven infantry officers on the staff at the time of D-Day, thirty-two served in the general staff and the all-important command group, which consisted of the commander and deputy commander, chief of staff, his deputies, and their aides. Six of the infantrymen in the general staff served in the critical G–3 section. Infantrymen held the posts of deputy commander, chief of staff, G–1, and G–3. Field artillerymen held forty-four slots overall and fifteen positions in the command group and general staff, notably the G–4 and the executive officer of the G–3 section. The Corps of Engineers and Quartermaster Corps furnished sixty-two officers between them, but only a handful served on the command group and general staff. By contrast, the Cavalry, which included Armor, supplied only fourteen officers on the entire staff. When the First Army hit the beaches on D-Day, infantrymen would be running the show at the First Army headquarters.14

Of the First Army staff section chiefs in June 1944, most had attended at least one of the Army’s upper-level schools. The commanding general, deputy commander, chief of staff, deputy chief of staff for administration, G–1, army
surgeon, inspector general, and armored, amphibious, and chemical officers had all gone through the prewar Command and General Staff School. Many other section heads, including the deputy chief of staff for operations, G–2, G–3, G–4, adjutant general, and antiaircraft, artillery, signal, and special service officers, had attended the ten-week staff course established by the Command and General Staff School in 1940 to turn out large numbers of staff officers in a limited time. Only a handful of officers, including the commander and deputy commander, the deputy chief of staff for administration, and the amphibious and chemical officers, had attended the Army War College. In the First Army headquarters, as in so many other American command echelons, the Command and General Staff School would have a major influence on how staff officers conducted business.¹⁵

On 20 October 1943, the First Army headquarters officially opened its command post in the west England commercial town of Bristol and assumed the responsibility for administration and training of all American troops in the United Kingdom.¹⁶ For lodgings, the staff took over the V Corps' quarters at Clifton College, where an imposing stone wall enclosed a campus of old, Gothic buildings, well-trimmed lawns, and cricket fields. The main building, a threestory edifice, housed the staff sections, while officers stayed in the masters' houses lining the central field and the enlisted men bunched in the field house at the lower end of the campus. Bradley and his section chiefs stayed at a residence a mile from the college. At the college chapel, the First Army's commander welcomed the new arrivals, spoke briefly of the task ahead, directed them to show all due courtesy to their British hosts, and warned that those who presented disciplinary problems would soon find themselves in a frontline unit. Having received their leader's benediction, the assembled staff turned to the daunting enterprise before them.¹⁷

The initial step, organization of the headquarters, presented a major task. In this, the First Army leaders followed the general lines of the staff officers field manual and the July 1942 version of Table of Organization (TO) 200–1, which called for an army headquarters of 228 officers, 23 warrant officers, and 508 enlisted men. (See Appendix A.) This table had been prepared by Army Ground Forces without the benefit of recent field experience and thus required some revision. The First Army organizational orders of 23 October 1943 provided a chief of staff, two deputy chiefs, a secretary of the general staff, four general staff section chiefs, and fourteen special staff section heads. The special staff included an adjutant general, antiaircraft officer, artillery officer, chaplain, chemical officer, engineer officer, finance officer, inspector general, judge advocate general, ordnance officer, quartermaster, signal officer, special service officer, and surgeon. Four other officers were not provided by the table but received slots on the special staff: a headquarters commandant, a provost marshal, a civil affairs officer, and an accommodations officer. The inclusion of a civil affairs officer followed Allied policy of integrating civil affairs functions into field staffs, while another addition, the accommodations officer, had the task of helping British officials and theater headquarters billet the American troops flooding into Britain by the autumn of 1943.¹⁸
Following doctrine, the First Army moved to centralize logistical and administrative functions and thereby free subordinate corps headquarters to focus on their tactical combat role. According to a staff memorandum of 23 October, the army headquarters, both before and after the invasion of the Continent, would deal directly with the combat divisions on routine matters such as the circulation of all regulations and the submission of all reports. To reduce the areas that they would have to administer, the corps would keep their rear boundaries as close as possible to the rear boundaries of their divisions. Such procedures would relieve the corps of many onerous responsibilities, but the resulting flow of administrative detail into the First Army headquarters was massive. As a result, the First Army's leaders eventually adopted command practices and standard operating procedures that allowed staff sections to handle the bulk of the army's administrative requirements without reference to the general staff chiefs, the chief of staff, or the commander. Several months of field operations were necessary before the headquarters could clearly define the line between army-level tasks and those of the theater supply services or find the right balance between maintaining the commander's authority and delegating to the staff enough tasks to free the commander to focus on key issues.

Along with organization and procedures, personalities would greatly influence the operations of the First Army staff. Of the command group, Bradley's old friend and deputy commander, Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges, did not leave his prior position with the Third Army in Texas until late Janu-
For the immediate future, Hodges’ absence would not matter much. The deputy commander’s slot, not even listed on the Army’s organizational tables for an army headquarters, bore a rather supernumerary character, possessing only those duties that the commander chose to give it. Once Hodges moved up to the command of the First Army upon Bradley’s elevation to the command of an army group, the position of deputy commander would disappear, and the First Army chief of staff would, in effect, perform the role, although, as a staff officer, he did not formally have the power to command except when delegated by the commander to act in his name. Thus, the chief of staff would occupy a dominant position in the First Army hierarchy.

Bradley’s command group offered a mix of II Corps veterans and new arrivals from the United States, with the veterans holding the positions of real power. For his chief of staff, Bradley turned to Brig. Gen. William B. Kean, a stocky, round-faced, 46-year-old West Pointer with no combat experience as a line officer, but an extensive background commanding troops at various posts in the interwar Army. Kean had a quick, incisive mind and stern, no-nonsense manner. As chief of staff of the II Corps, he had established a reputation as both an efficient administrator and ruthless taskmaster; from rueful subordinates, he would earn the nickname of “Captain Bligh.” Under his direct supervision were a secretary of the general staff—who routed and followed up on communications, directives, and staff papers—and two deputy chiefs of staff. (Chart 2) The deputy chief of staff for administration was a bespectacled Regular engineer named Col. Charles F. Williams. He supervised and coordinated the
work of the inspector general, judge advocate general, special troops, and, through the G–1 section, the adjutant general, special service officer, chaplain, and, except in procurement cases, the finance officer. The other sections reported directly or through the G–2, G–3, and G–4 sections to the deputy chief of staff for operations, the 38-year-old Col. Samuel L. Myers, a cavalryman who had held the same post on the II Corps staff. For their personal staff, Bradley, Hodges, and Kean could call on several able aides, most notably Capt. Chester B. Hansen for Bradley, Maj. William C. Sylvan for Hodges, and WOJG Dempsey Allphin for Kean.

The four general staff sections constituted the collective brain of the staff. They assisted the commander, acted as his agents in coordinating the agencies under their supervision, prepared detailed instructions to implement his plans, and then supervised their execution. Of the general staff sections, the G–1 section formulated and supervised administration of policies regarding individual personnel, replacements, and prisoners of war. In the course of the campaign, the section handled such issues as officer promotions and reclassifications, replacements, leave and recreational services, and decorations. It also coordinated the work of the special sections on such issues as graves registration, postal services, disciplinary actions, and enemy war crimes. A small section, it contained ten officers, mostly reservists and National Guardsmen, at the time of D-Day. Heading the section was Col. Joseph J. “Red” O’Hare, the only general staff section chief who had not previously served with the II Corps. A big, hard-drinking, flamboyant Irishman with a fiery temper, Red O’Hare supposedly remarked, “People expect G–1 to be a sonuvabitch, and I’m just the guy to
CHART 2—HEADQUARTERS, FIRST U.S. ARMY, CHIEF OF STAFF SECTION, FUNCTIONS, 21 APRIL 1944

CHIEF OF STAFF (C/S)
Brig. Gen. W. B. Kean

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (DC/S) FOR ADMIN
Col. C. F. Williams

1. To degree delegated by C/S, general supervision and coordination of activities of:
   - G-1
   - AG
   - Spec Svc Ofr
   - Red Cross
   - Chaplain
   - (Provo Marshal-POWs)*
   - Finance (less procurement of funds)*

2. Supervision of all miscellaneous items of administration.
3. Member of Awards and Promotion Board.
4. Interview visitors whose business does not require decisions of Commanding General (CG) or C/S.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPNS
Col. S. L. Myers

1. To degree delegated by C/S, general supervision and coordination of activities of:
   - G-2 Air Intel
   - (Publicity & Psych War)*
   - (Engrs)*
   - (Signal)*
   - CWS
   - Armd
   - (Provo Marshal)*

2. Supervision of miscellaneous items of operational nature.
3. Selection of command posts.
4. Member of Awards and Promotion Board.
SECRETARY GENERAL STAFF
Maj. E. F. Pegram

1. Supervises operations of Headquarters Liaison Section.
2. Coordinates correspondence involving more than one section.
3. Receives and properly distributes all communications for CG, C/S, and DC/S.
4. Maintains office of temporary record for CG, C/S, and DC/S.
5. Establishes "follow-up" system to ensure prompt action on and return of papers.
6. Receives all visiting officials.
7. Collects statistical data for CG, C/S, and DC/S.
8. Supervises movement of section.
9. Responsible for organizing the clerical staff and the supervising of their work.

*Each special staff section reported primarily to a specific general staff section. However, depending on the subject, the special staff section might report to other general staff sections, as illustrated by the parentheses.

Source: Benjamin A. Dickson Papers, U.S. Military Academy Library, West Point, N.Y.
prove it to them." In the view of more than a few at First Army headquarters, he was quite successful in that endeavor. A former football teammate of Bradley's at West Point, his first task was to help his old friend sift the contingent from Governor's Island for those who would accompany the headquarters to France.26

One of those who would clash most frequently with O'Hare was the controversial G–2, Colonel Dickson. A West Pointer recalled to active duty in 1940, Dickson found his niche in a specialty that had suffered from low status and neglect in the interwar Army. With the II Corps in North Africa, where he had supposedly predicted the German attack at Kasserine Pass, he earned a reputation in some quarters as an alarmist and pessimist, but both Patton and Bradley had a high regard for his abilities. Diligent, mercurial, a bit insecure, but a fine storyteller with a keen sense of humor, the tall, mustachioed G–2 was an engaging conversationalist, although his lengthy monologues on a wide range of interests struck some as boorish. His grasp of several languages, including German, and intuitive sense for the German mind could lead to some brilliant insights, but they were often lost among other possibilities, largely due to the American system of estimates and Dickson's own tendency to hedge his conclusions.27

His deputy, the quiet, analytical Lt. Col. William R. Silvey—a World War I hero and former engineer at Bell Telephone—was the perfect complement to his often temperamental superior. The thirteen other officers and twenty-two enlisted men were chosen largely according to their competence in German and French. The G–2 organization varied, but Dickson usually divided his section into administrative, liaison, plans, combat intelligence, order of battle, counterintelligence, and photo interpretation subsections, as well as a miscellaneous subsection which gathered data for propaganda.28

Dickson's counterpart in the G–3 section, Col. Truman C. Thorson, could not have been more different from the intelligence chief, with whom he would quarrel frequently. Grim, nervous, a chain-smoker, and peanut-butter addict, the G–3 had a tall, lean frame that belied the nickname, "Tubby."29 A former regimental commander under Bradley in the 28th Infantry Division, he had served only briefly in Sicily as the II Corps G–3 before Bradley called him to England. He thus possessed little combat experience and, according to Myers, gave scant credit to those who did. The II Corps veterans believed two of their number to be more qualified to serve as the G–3: Col. Robert A. Hewitt, a
calm, balding artilleryman who had preceded Thorson as the II Corps G-3 and now served as his executive officer, and Col. Russell F. "Red" Akers, Jr., the stocky, red-haired G-3 operations chief, who was so influential that one British liaison officer thought that he, not the commanding general, actually ran the First Army. Hewitt, in particular, served as a soothing counterbalance to his chief's sporadic excitability. At the time of D-Day, six of the sixteen officers in the G-3 section were Regulars, the highest proportion among the four general staff sections.

The G-3 section started with subsections for administration, operations, troop movements and training, and organization. Interestingly, the G-3 staff did not have a plans subsection, although the combination of operations and plans in the same staff subunit was not uncommon in ETOUSA.

In Normandy Akers would divide his operations subsection into a planning group, consisting of himself and Lt. Col. John L. Throckmorton, and an operations group, which included two majors and a captain. The planning group would formulate detailed plans, prepare estimates and orders, and "maintain close contact with corps G-3 through frequent visits." The operations group would track tactical developments and maintain the situation map and other G-3 data in the section area, the conference tent, and the war room; prepare situation reports and the G-3 summary; and keep a 24-hour watch in the operations tent.

The mission of the G-4 staff section and its chief was to prepare policies for supply, evacuation, traffic, transportation, construction, and related administrative issues and supervise their implementation. Given the broad logistical responsibilities of an army headquarters, the First Army G-4 section also played a key role advising Bradley on operational matters and coordinating the service sections at theater, corps, and division levels. The G-4, Colonel Wilson, was a calm, taciturn, polite Philadelphian who had served with the artillery in World War I and then resigned to go into business. Called back into service as a reservist in June 1941, he had earned Bradley's admiration with his handling of several supply shortages during his tenure as the II Corps G-4 in North Africa. For his deputy, Wilson chose Col. Walter W. Wendt, a youthful former FBI agent, National Guardsman, and the G-4 of the 45th Infantry Division in Italy. From the United States came Lt. Col. Walter A. Huntsberry, a West Pointer who directed the operations subsection; Lt. Col. James R. Mullen, a former
trucking executive who headed the transportation subsection and its separate traffic section that allocated priorities of motor transportation; Maj. Charles R. Kearney, who took over the supply subsection; and Maj. Frederick C. Bold, Jr., who ran the administrative subsection. For the initial amphibious phase, the G–4 section would also include a water transportation subsection, which coordinated arrangements for the cross-Channel movement with the Navy.35

Under the supervision of these four general staff sections, and occasionally under the direct control of the chief of staff or his deputies, the eighteen special staff sections provided tactical and technical advice, handled technical details, and coordinated their work with the rest of the staff. Although these sections were supposed to keep the general staff informed of their work, they often were in greater daily contact with their counterparts at ETOUSA or the Services of Supply (SOS), the theater logistical organization. They submitted key policy decisions through the general staff to Kean for approval, but they passed routine matters through the appropriate general staff section to the adjutant general for dispatch. The duties of the purely administrative sections—the adjutant general, chaplain, finance officer, inspector general, judge advocate general, and special service officer—were largely routine in nature and had relatively little impact on command decisions. The antiaircraft officer, chemical warfare officer, provost marshal, surgeon, and headquarters commandant, while more visible, did not have a major voice beyond their technical specialties. Most influential were the artillery officer, Colonel Hart; the army quartermaster, Colonel McNamara; the chief engineer, Col. William A. Carter, Jr.; and, to a lesser extent, the ordnance officer, Col. John B. Medaris; and signal officer, Col. Grant A. Williams. Young and hard-driving, these five officers, all 11 Corps veterans, would make a mark both on the First Army staff and on their respective arms in the postwar Army.36

Although positions remained open and some command issues awaited resolution, the First Army staff had in place its basic organization and leading personnel by early January 1944. Its structure and procedures reflected existing doctrine modified in light of experience in the Mediterranean and the prospect of another major amphibious landing. Two other factors would influence the work of the headquarters. While most of the staff consisted of reservists, Regular infantry officers educated at Leavenworth occupied the key slots. It would
definitely be an infantryman’s headquarters, with an infantryman’s outlook and approach. Finally, the II Corps veterans—with their experience, strong personalities, and suspicions of outsiders—would dominate the headquarters. It would sometimes take Bradley’s personal touch to keep in line such touchy, assertive egos as those of Kean, O’Hare, Dickson, and Thorson. Nevertheless, the First Army headquarters had a solid, experienced staff for the mighty endeavor that lay ahead.
Notes


9 Bradley, *A Soldier’s Story*, p. 11; Clark, *Calculat Risk*, pp. 20–23.


15 Cir, HQ, First U.S. Army, 10 Jun 44, Officer Roster by Section; individual staff officers listed in War Department, Adjutant General’s Office, Official Army Register, 1 January 1944 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1944); graduating classes listed in U.S. Army, Command and General Staff School, Commandants, Staff, Faculty, and Graduates, 1881–1939 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and General Staff School Press, 1939); graduates listed in U.S. Army, Command and General Staff School, Graduates of the General Staff and Service Staff Classes, 1941–1944 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and General Staff School Press, 1944); Interv, author with Wendt, 29 Apr 91, pp. 7–8, 25, 33.


17 MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, pp. 97, 100; MS, Carter, Carter’s War, ch. 8, p. 1; Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 174–75.


20 Interv, G. Patrick Murray with Lt Gen Samuel L. Myers, USA (Ret.), 15 Apr 74, p. 7, DWH.


22 TO 200–1, Headquarters, Army, War Department, 1 July 1942; FM 101–5, Staff Officers Field Manual, 1940, p. 7.

23 Memo, Maj A. J. Boechichio, Asst Adj Gen, First Army, for Commanding General (CG), ETOUSA, 2 Mar 44, sub: Historical Data, 101–19, Biographical Sketches, box 1831, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; MS, Mrs. Kitty Bradley, Revised Transcription of Taped Interviews with General Omar N. Bradley, 1966, reel 1, pp. 65–66; Omar N. Bradley Papers, USMA Library; Telecon, author with WOJG Dempsey E. Allphin, AUS (Ret.), 9 Dec 93, DWH; Intervs, Murray with Dickson, 22 Sep 72, p. 8. Regarding the nickname “Captain Bligh,” see Intervs, G. Patrick Murray with Lt Col Adolph G. Rosengarten, Jr., NGUS (Ret.), 3 Mar 75, p. 34, DWH, and with Maj Gen Nelsion M. Lynde, Jr., USA (Ret.), p. 43, General Courtney H. Hodges Oral History Project, Senior Officers Oral History Program, USAMHI.


27 O'Hare quote from Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 177.

28 Ibid.; Cir, HQ, First U.S. Army, 10 Jun 44, Officer Roster by Section; Interv, Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, p. 2; Telecon, author with Col Chester B. Hansen, AUS (Ret.), 5 Mar 93, DWH.

29 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 33, 46–47; Interv, Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, pp. 102–03; MS, Bradley, Revised Transcription of Bradley Interviews, reel 1, p. 68. Intervs, Forrest C. Pogue with Col J. O. Curtis, 16 May 50, p. 2; with Brig Gen E. T. Williams, 30–31 May 47, p. 5; and with Col Benjamin A. Dickson, USA (Ret.), 22 Dec 47, pp. 1–2. All in Misc 314.82 Interviews—U.S. Army in WWII, The Supreme Command (hereafter cited as Pogue interviews), USAMHI Intervs, Murray with Myers, 15 Apr 74, pp. 7–8, and with Rosengarten, 3 Mar 75, p. 22; Telecon, author with Hansen, 5 Mar 93; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, pp. 40, 47; Blumenson, ed., The Patton Papers, 2:193; Charles B. MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge (New York: William Morrow, 1985), pp. 54–55. Regarding the low prewar status of intelligence, see Koch and Hays, G–2 Intelligence for Patton, pp. xii–xiii; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 32.

30 Rpts, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 October 1943–1 August 1944, 5:121–22, 132, and First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, p. 158; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, pp. 99–100; Ltr, Col Roger Ray, USA (Ret.), to author, 11 Jan 97, DWH.

31 Interv, Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, p. 100.


33 Cir, HQ, First U.S. Army, 10 Jun 44, Officer Roster by Section.


37 See relevant sections of Rpt, First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46. See also Cir, HQ, First U.S. Army, 21 Apr 44, Functional Chart, Chief of Staff Section; FM 101–5, Staff Officers Field Manual, 1940, pp. 16–17; MS, William A. Carter, Jr., Employment and Staff Procedures of Engineers with Division, Corps, and Army, 15 Mar 46, pp. 34–35; COE; MS, Carter, Carter's War, ch. 8, pp. 3–4, 8; Intervs, G. Patrick Murray with Lt Gen Charles E. Hart, USA (Ret.), 1973, p. 15. General Courtney H. Hodges Oral History Project, Senior Officers Oral History Program, USAMHI, and with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, pp. 8–10; Telecon, author with Hansen, 5 Mar 93; Hansen Diary, 9 and 19 Oct 44.
As Britons celebrated their fifth Christmas season of the war, Bradley called together his staff for three conferences to lay out COSSAC’s blueprint for the invasion. Little altered since the Quebec Conference, the plan called for a three-division assault on the Norman coastline in the Bayeux area and a gradual expansion of the beachhead twenty-three miles southwest to St. Lô and fifty-three miles northwest to the port of Cherbourg. The port lay at the tip of the Cotentin Peninsula and flanked the invasion beaches from the west. Bradley’s First Army headquarters would direct the operation under the command of the British 21 Army Group headquarters, which would assume overall command in France when enough British units had landed to form an independent British army. The 21 Army Group would continue in overall command until the buildup of American troops warranted the introduction of an American army group headquarters.1 By December 1943 Bradley’s staff had already devoted a month to preparing RANKIN, the proposed emergency landing on the Continent in the event of a German collapse. Even though the Allies never implemented RANKIN, formulation of the plan provided a valuable training exercise for planning OVERLORD.2

Having already participated in two amphibious landings, the II Corps veterans on the First Army staff had acquired strong views on the number of service units, supplies, and equipment they would require for the invasion. By December 1943 the various staff sections had already begun to prepare estimates of what they would need to support an army of 3 corps, 6 infantry divisions, and 2 armored divisions. At the instigation of the War Department, the theater headquarters had been working on estimates of the equipment required for OVERLORD since June 1943, and the theater technical service chiefs welcomed the input of Bradley’s veterans. Aware of the challenge of maintaining the supply flow across beaches with little initial help from railroads or ports, the army staff chiefs submitted estimates of units and equipment far beyond the old “type army” levels. Many staff sections wanted administrative group headquarters as intermediate command echelons between the army headquarters on the one hand and army supply installations and units on the other, providing direct supervision of the installations and units. The lengthy wish lists of the army staff experts caused their counterparts in Washington to cringe. Given OVERLORD’s high priority, however, they obtained most of what they asked for, including requests for equipment beyond that provided in tables.3
The number and types of army units that the First Army staff wanted for the invasion was truly staggering. McNamara's staff planned for 1 quartermaster group headquarters, 12 battalions, and 49 companies, including 23 truck companies. The plan that Carter's engineers prepared called for 12 engineer combat groups, 30 engineer combat battalions, 2 heavy ponton battalions, and 1 topographical battalion as well as 20 engineer companies of various types. Medaris and his ordnance officers envisioned 10 ordnance battalions, including 2 ammunition battalions, 8 bomb disposal squadrons, and 57 ordnance companies, including 13 ammunition companies. Meanwhile, Williams' signalmen laid plans for 1 operations, 2 construction, and 3 signal battalions, not including 3 additional signal companies and 12 photo company detachments. Col. John A. Rogers' medical staff planned for 3 medical groups, 11 medical battalions, 24 medical companies, and 1 convalescent and 9 evacuation hospitals. The antiaircraft units included 1 brigade headquarters, 5 group headquarters, 5 gun battalions, and 24 automatic weapons battalions, while Hart's artillery section planned for 1 brigade and 6 group headquarters, 2 observation battalions, 18 field artillery battalions, 3 tank destroyer group headquarters, and 12 tank destroyer battalions. The plan also stipulated 5 military police battalions, 3 cavalry groups and 6 cavalry reconnaissance squadrons, and 2 chemical battalions and 3 chemical companies, in addition to the 3 corps, 6 infantry divisions, and 2 armored divisions.

As the planning process continued, the First Army staff was more receptive to equipment innovations than many have believed. In the case of the ingenious specialized tanks developed by the British 79th Armoured Division, a board chaired by the First Army ordnance officer, Medaris, and including representatives from the G-3, G-4, artillery, engineer, and quartermaster sections, and the 2d Armored Division rejected the flail tanks for clearing paths through minefields. It stated that tests in North Africa demonstrated them to be slow, unreliable, overly sensitive to terrain, and not as effective as other means of clearing minefields and obstacles. On the other hand, the board did recommend adoption of the 79th's amphibious, flamethrower, and bulldozer tanks, and Bradley approved the recommendation. For some reason—perhaps the problem of fitting them on available ships, the difficulty in obtaining enough tanks for training prior to D-Day, or the different composition and gradients of the American and British beaches—American planners, in the end, turned against the 79th's devices, except for the amphibious tanks. Given the difficulties encountered by the V Corps in its assault on D-Day, the decision not to adopt most of the tanks offered by the British would be highly controversial.

The decision on specialized tanks was not the only ordnance action of these early months to inspire controversy later. Almost as soon as he had established the First Army headquarters in the autumn, Bradley had pressed the theater to establish new “unit of fire” and “basic load” ammunition estimates as a first step toward determining ammunition requirements for the coming campaign. Assisted by Medaris' ammunition officer, Lt. Col. John Ray, and by estimates that drew on Allied combat experience in the Mediterranean, Brig. Gen. Henry B. Sayler's ETOUSA ordnance office reviewed theater levels of ammunition as
authorized by the War Department and in January submitted estimates of its needs to Washington. Unfortunately, as Medaris recognized, such estimates were uncertain at best, especially given the early stage of planning. In early March, as the date for Overlord approached, War Department planners calculated, on the basis of the latest data from the Italian campaign and revised “activity factors” for artillery weapons, that ETOUSA’s estimates were too low. To complicate matters further, theater planners discovered that, despite the communication among the headquarters, the European theater and the field commands had been calculating requirements differently, with ETOUSA using an obsolete troop basis. Hurried meetings in May produced a revised set of estimates, but it would take time to make up the lost ground. Meanwhile, Medaris resisted ETOUSA’s efforts to have him adjust his estimates based on availability, rather than projected need. 7

The debate over ammunition estimates reflected some of the tension between the hard-driving special staff heads at the First Army headquarters and their technical chiefs at the theater level—tension resulting largely from an awkward command structure that the advent of an army-level headquarters had created in the British Isles. With the simultaneous activation of the First Army and 1st U.S. Army Group headquarters and the assumption by the two new staffs of planning and operational responsibilities, ETOUSA had quickly found its long-range planning tasks reduced to little more than that of its administrative and logistical component, the Services of Supply. The lines of authority among theater, army group, and army headquarters and the SOS became increasingly blurred. By the time Eisenhower arrived in mid-January to take command of COSSAC’s successor—Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF)—the American staffs had worked out an arrangement in which Eisenhower would command both SHAEF and a united ETOUSA-SOS theater organization. (Chart 3) ETOUSA-SOS would handle administration and supply for the American ground forces and leave the bulk of the planning and actual operations to the army group and army headquarters. Still, the lines of responsibility among SHAEF, ETOUSA-SOS, and army group and army headquarters remained fuzzy. The First Army special staff had the responsibility for ensuring that the First Army’s assigned and attached units had access to certain services, but ETOUSA-SOS enjoyed authority over army units in Britain and often ran army installations there.8

Fortunately, while the First Army special staff chiefs realized their basic responsibility to Bradley, they forged strong working relationships with their theater chiefs at ETOUSA-SOS, relying on them for guidance on technical matters. In this regard, the sentiments of Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, the chief surgeon of ETOUSA, regarding his relations with Colonel Rogers, the First Army surgeon, seem typical: “With all these new heresies of staff control that have suddenly burst upon our Army, it is refreshing to have a surgeon in a subordinate echelon who adheres to the old and tried doctrine of technical control through staff channels as distinct from command control through command channels.”9 Through consultation, the two groups worked out their differences, avoiding most confrontations.10
CHART 3—ETOUSA’S ORGANIZATION AFTER THE CONSOLIDATION OF 17 JANUARY 1944

Theater Commander = Supreme Commander, AEF

Deputy Theater Commander

Chief of Staff = Chief of Staff, AEF

Deputy Chief of Staff

G-1

- Judge Advocate
- Finance Department
- Provost Marshal
- Special Services
- Army Exchange Service

G-2

- Chief Chaplain
- Adjutant General
- Public Relations Office
- Inspector General

G-3

- American School Center
- Air Technical Section
- Field Force Replacement System

G-4

- Engineer Service
- Signal Service
- Medical Service

- Ordnance Service
- General Purchasing Agent
- Area Petroleum Service

- Chemical Warfare Service
- Quartermaster Service
- Transportation Service

PRINCIPAL COMMANDS

1st Army Group

Services of Supply

U.S. Strategic Air Forces

Thus, while ETOUSA-SOS handled most arrangements for feeding, clothing, equipping, and housing the units pouring into Britain, the First Army headquarters also played a role. By February ETOUSA-SOS had assumed the task of locating and readying billets, leaving the First Army accommodations officer with little better than a liaison role. On the other hand, the First Army staff often made suggestions on where its units should be stationed. Similarly, ETOUSA-SOS had the basic responsibility for equipping units as they arrived in the United Kingdom, but the First Army headquarters closely followed the process and set priorities for special or critical items. Medaris, for example, helped ETOUSA-SOS institute the process by which army ordnance units received their assigned equipment from SOS depots. He also made recommendations for extra equipment and such special items as beach packs and provided SOS with estimates on stockage of spare parts, based on his experience in the Mediterranean. The influx of American troops, who seemed to fill every cobblestone street and local pub in southern England, created the potential for friction with the local inhabitants and British troops, especially given the need to billet some American troops in private homes. Through participation in the inter-Allied Joint Army Committee and institution of exchange programs with British units, along with encouraging close relations with mayors and community outreach programs, the First Army headquarters helped reduce much of the tension.

Unfortunately for the First Army G–1 section, many arriving units needed personnel to reach full strength or to replace the unfit. In particular, the engineer special brigades, the provisional engineer special brigade group, and the teams that would adjust naval gunfire support were badly undermanned for their essential tasks. Several corps and division staffs required reshuffling after the relief of their commanders, and suspect qualifications of many subordinate officers led G–1 officers to grumble that several of them should have been removed before their departure from the United States. In response to these problems, the G–1 section set broad policies, but it left most details in the hands of the adjutant general section. When superiors deemed officers inadequate for their posts, the G–1 personnel subsection interviewed the officers concerned and often arranged for their reassignment to other units rather than inflict the stigma of official reclassification. In the end, reclassification procedures were initiated for 3 colonels, 5 lieutenant colonels, 5 majors, 14 captains, and 62 lieutenants prior to D-Day. Of these, 1 lieutenant colonel, 1 major, 3 captains, and 37 lieutenants received discharges. The First Army headquarters obtained replacement officers from stateside sources, from SOS units within the theater, from other units within the First Army, and from ETOUSA’s replacement system. To keep track of the many personnel moves during the preparatory period, the personnel subsection maintained a Kardex record file of each field grade officer and important company grade officer in the First Army.

While the First Army headquarters and ETOUSA-SOS made arrangements for the arriving troops, the main task of planning, involving the collaboration of several echelons, had begun in London. Even before the activation of SHAEE,
COSSAC had turned over planning for the land portion of the cross-Channel attack to its ground component, the British 21 Army Group. The 21 Army Group's commander, General Sir Bernard Paget, wanted his staff to work with the naval and air component staffs to produce an "executive plan" as a general framework within which lower-level headquarters would conduct their planning. As planning became more detailed, however, the First Army staff became more involved in the process.14

In mid-December Bradley brought members of his G–2, G–3, and G–4 sections to London. They joined their counterparts from the 21 Army Group on over twenty-five committees, or "syndicates," each of which was responsible for preparing a paragraph, annex, or some other portion of the plan. These committees discussed such topics as road and bridge construction, policies for reinforcement and replacement, the mounting plan, the buildup, and inter-Allied communications. Although many of the Americans possessed abundant combat staff experience in North Africa and Sicily, they lacked the background of their British opposite numbers in high-level combined planning. They wryly noted that each syndicate had a British officer as its senior member and that the British took care to draft minutes in advance of each meeting, used them as an agenda, and then published them almost verbatim as the official minutes of the meeting. The Americans countered the British practice with their own prepared versions. In the course of the discussions, it became clear that the Americans needed a larger contingent, and in mid-January Bradley broadened the "First Army Planning Group" to include representatives of all of his general and special staff sections, including most of the staff chiefs. Among the representatives was a contingent from the 1st U.S. Army Group.15

The 1st Army Group's leadership and exact role had been somewhat unclear in the early planning. Formed by ETOSA at the same time as the First Army headquarters, the 1st Army Group headquarters in December consisted of a skeleton staff in London under easygoing Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen, a former commandant of the Infantry School. Speculation ran rampant over who would finally assume command, with the names of Devers, McNair, and Patton achieving prominence. For the moment, Bradley held the post in addition to his duties with the First Army, although to skeptical army group staff officers, he seemed to be more a tourist than a commander in his first visits. In retrospect, he appears to have been auditioning for the job; if so, he quickly satisfied his superiors. At some point in midwinter, it became clear that he would eventually move up to the 1st Army Group and that Hodges would succeed him in command of the First Army, although this succession arrangement did not become official until 18 May. Hodges apparently believed that he should have assumed command of the First Army upon his arrival in Britain, allowing Bradley to move up to 1st Army Group, but he recognized the benefits of having a man of Bradley's experience in command of the actual assault. In any case, the promotion of Bradley to army group command over Patton without giving Bradley some experience in commanding an army would have been awkward.16

Bradley and Allen were breaking new ground at the 1st Army Group. The U.S. Army's experience with an army group headquarters was even scantier
than for an army headquarters, and the lack of a role in the initial phase of OVERLORD did not make the 1st Army Group’s search for an identity any easier. In theory at least, the First Army headquarters was to focus on the details of the assault and the initial buildup, while the 1st Army Group headquarters coordinated administrative and supply arrangements with the SOS for the phase beginning two weeks after D-Day and conducted strategic planning for the period after it became active on the Continent. In practice, the separation of labor was hardly that distinct.17

Along with officers from the two army groups, ETOUSA-SOS, and the British Second Army headquarters, the First Army Planning Group dealt with representatives from the other two services in the syndicates. With the Navy, relations were generally amiable, even if lower levels occasionally grumbled over what they saw as the tendency of their Navy counterparts to forgo detailed planning until the last minute.18 Fortunately, the Navy’s Western Task Force, which would support the First Army, was under Rear Adm. Alan G. Kirk, a 56-year-old veteran who had served as commander of the Atlantic Fleet’s amphibious forces and had directed support for the 45th Infantry Division’s landing in Sicily. He knew amphibious warfare and the British, and, best of all, he knew Bradley.19

In contrast, the First Army planners knew little about the two Army Air Forces generals with whom the First Army headquarters would have the most contact. Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton of the Ninth Air Force was a veteran who had been exposed to the Royal Air Force’s tactical air support organization and methods in Libya. In England, he was instrumental in the establishment of a useful series of orientation lectures for senior ground officers on tactical air support. Nevertheless, to some at the First Army headquarters, he seemed the archetypical airman, distant and overly enamored with the virtues of air power. The soldiers, however, quickly warmed to Maj. Gen. Elwood R. “Pete” Quesada, the affable, innovative Mediterranean theater veteran who commanded the Ninth Air Force’s IX Tactical Air Command. An old friend of O’Hare, Quesada was one of the few senior airmen involved in tactical air support with a genuine interest in close air support of ground troops and not just interdiction of enemy communications. To Bradley, he even offered to drill his pilots in artillery spotting, something that the strategic air enthusiasts would never have proposed in 1944. Quesada would form a close bond with the First Army commander in the coming months.20

Despite the efforts of all concerned, joint and combined planning could go only so far until the arrival of the permanent commander of the 21 Army Group, General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, on 2 January. Often cold, insensitive, and egotistical, Montgomery could be difficult, especially for his superiors. Nevertheless, his direct manner, willingness to listen, loyalty, and careful, systematic professionalism, honed by years of devoted study and experience, had earned the respect and gratitude of his subordinates. As a commander, Montgomery believed in strong, firm direction from the top and, in line with the British system, rigidly centralized control, exemplified by detailed orders and closely supervised execution. Recognizing the need to accommodate the American point of view
and the looser American concept of command, however, he told Bradley shortly after his arrival that he would closely direct British and Canadian troops but limit his directives to Bradley to suggestions for schemes of maneuver. As Bradley later recalled, Montgomery’s accession to the command of the 21 Army Group was not at all unwelcome at the First Army headquarters. Indeed, he and his staff recognized that Montgomery’s personal self-assurance and public stature as the victor of the Desert War provided the aura of success essential to Overlord.

To the 21 Army Group headquarters, Montgomery also brought from the British Eighth Army many experienced staff officers who were familiar to Bradley’s II Corps veterans. The able and genial Maj. Gen. Sir Francis de Guingand assumed the post of chief of staff; the brilliant Oxford don, Brigadier Edgar T. Williams, became the intelligence chief; and the handsome, young Maj. Gen. David Belchem took over as operations chief. The army group staff included only a few Americans, most of whom were on detail from 1st Army Group, to assist with planning, ensure smooth communication and liaison, and handle the separate American administrative system.

Armed with an authorization from Eisenhower to act on his behalf pending his arrival, Montgomery plunged into preparation of an “initial joint plan” for the operation. For security reasons, the Allies renamed the operation Neptune, although they continued to use Overlord to refer to the overall concept of an invasion of northwest Europe in 1944. Neptune sought “to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations could be developed.” Perceiving—as did Eisenhower and several others—that the three-division assault provided in the COSSAC plan was too weak and too narrow, Montgomery called for an assault by five divisions along a fifty-mile front. One of these divisions would land on the east coast of the Cotentin to bypass the marshes along the base of the peninsula and thus expedite the drive on Cherbourg. The expanded concept also called for an initial assault by two American corps under an American army and two British corps under a British army, all under the overall command of the 21 Army Group. Each corps would have its own sector on the beaches, thereby avoiding the complications that would result from passing through another’s zone. Two American airborne divisions would land in the Cotentin. One of these would land near Carentan, a town positioned at the head of an estuary between the invasion beach at the base of the Cotentin and the beaches farther east. Two British airborne brigades would descend east of the Orne River, the eastern boundary of the invasion beaches.

Through the syndicates and communication with Montgomery’s headquarters, Bradley’s staff participated in the formulation of the initial joint plan prior to its formal issue on 1 February. The initial joint plan set the boundary between the two Allied armies and established the D-Day objectives. These included Caen, Normandy’s major city, ten miles inland on the eastern end of the British beaches; Bayeux, seventeen miles west of Caen; Carentan; Isigny, a tiny port on an estuary six miles east of Carentan; and Ste. Mère-Eglise, a small Cotentin village which lay eight miles north of Carentan. The plan went over resources for supply across the beaches, laid out the air and naval support available to the two armies, and designated concentration and marshaling areas
in Great Britain for the assault and buildup. Most significantly, it clarified the overall First Army mission: the early capture of Cherbourg and expansion of the beachhead south toward St. Lô in conformity with the inland advance of the British Second Army. All preparations, the plan stated, were to be completed by 31 May, the target date of the operation.25

The First Army headquarters now needed to develop its own plan, covering the first fourteen to twenty days of the invasion.26 Lights burned late at the planning group’s offices at Bryanston Court, a row of ten redstone houses on a fashionable residential street in London’s West End. Next door, the 1st Army Group staff had established its lodgings, and many other important headquarters were nearby, including SHAEF at Bushy Park, the naval and air components at Norfolk House in St. James Square, and the 21 Army Group at St. Paul’s School in West Kensington. Activity in the First Army offices centered on an attractive, second-floor drawing room with fireplaces of Italian marble, ornate rococo ceilings, and a pleasant view of the block-long, tree-shaded square. Field desks and top secret maps had converted this idyllic setting into a war room. At one end, two sergeants from Tubby Thorson’s G–3 section were usually typing revised troop lists, while on the other side Monk Dickson’s G–2 analysts went over their data and estimates.27
Security was tight, as the First Army G–2 section worked with counterintelligence specialists and the British police to preserve the most closely guarded secret in Britain: the time and place of the invasion. As part of its security procedures, COSSAC had adopted a special procedure, known as Bigot, under which access to information on the time and location of the invasion was limited to a select group of officers and men. Military police kept a 24-hour vigil at the door to the war room, allowing entrance only to those with a Bigot classification. The consequences of a security breach could be severe for the delinquent. A major on a special mission for the antiaircraft officer, Col. Charles G. Patterson, was nearly court-martialed after leaving a pouch with plans for the invasion on a railroad station bench. Patterson was able to postpone the trial until after D-Day, when the officer served with distinction. No doubt, other First Army staff personnel experienced the kind of anxiety felt by one G–2 officer before a colleague at the British Theater Intelligence Service returned his missing stenographer’s notebook, full of sensitive information.

Despite its importance, counterintelligence at G–2 took a backseat to the preparation of estimates of the enemy situation. For sources, the G–2 section relied heavily on the British, who could call on the reconnaissance squadrons of the 2d Tactical Air Force as well as their extensive files on beaches, gradients, and tides. Through the winter and spring of 1944, Dickson and his G–2 officers poured over radio intercepts, French Resistance reports, interrogation summaries of German and escaped Allied prisoners, captured documents and materiel, and even snapshots taken by British families vacationing in prewar Normandy. Keenly aware of the value of aerial reconnaissance, Dickson developed close contacts with his artillery colleague, Hart, and Hart’s aerial observers; Quesada’s intelligence chief at IX Tactical Air Command; and the IX U.S. Reconnaissance and Photographic Squadron at Middle Wallop. To work with the reconnaissance squadron, Dickson organized a provisional photograph interpretation detachment, based on a briefing by a First Army engineer familiar with the Fifth Army’s system in Italy. Collocated at Middle Wallop with the reconnaissance squadron, the detachment obtained prints, still wet from the high-speed printing process used by the airmen, and sent the photos, via a primitive fax machine, to the G–2 section.

As the data accumulated, analysis of the information indicated that the German coastal defenses, while formidable, were not impregnable. The extensive batteries, minefields, wire, and obstacles that the Germans had erected were often incomplete and, in many cases, had already been damaged by Allied bombing. The G–2 planners estimated that two static, coastal divisions, consisting of a high proportion of foreigners of low morale, held the strongpoints in the area of the assault, with another, mobile division of higher morale near St. Lô. The Neptune plan called for more data on German naval and air power; on the nature of the beaches and their defenses; on the identity, strength, and morale of units manning those defenses and their reserves; and on enemy reaction plans. In the end, its appraisal proved fairly accurate. The big oversight, one shared by other Allied intelligence agencies, was the omission of the 352d Infantry Division’s movement to the coast three months before the invasion. At
the last moment, the G–2 section discovered the presence of the 352d and broke radio silence in an attempt to alert the V Corps, but the troops, sealed aboard their ships, never received the news. Although the V Corps could not have changed its plan at that late date, knowledge of the division’s presence might have eased the psychological shock experienced by the Americans who unexpectedly encountered the division on Omaha Beach.32

The failure to detect the 352d Infantry Division later became the subject of much controversy, especially after the disclosure in 1974 that the Allies, for most of the war, had been deciphering intercepts of German military radio communications. At the First Army headquarters, the data from these intercepts, code-named ULTRA, came to the desk of Lt. Col. Adolph G. Rosengarten, Jr., a Philadelphia lawyer and former National Guardsman who had joined the G–2 section on 15 May. Rosengarten held an enviable position on the First Army staff. Only the commanding general, Kean, Dickson, Thorson, and three or four others in the G–2 section knew of his actual mission, and his special status aroused suspicion among his less privileged colleagues. At first, Dickson chose to deliver personally all ULTRA material to the commanding general. Over time, however, Rosengarten persuaded his chief to at least permit him to sort and edit the raw data beforehand. Prior to D-Day, ULTRA helped the First Army headquarters evaluate agent reports and the effectiveness of the plan to convince the Germans that the invasion would come at the Pas de Calais. Nevertheless, ULTRA produced no data on the 352d Infantry Division, which relied minimally on radio, and dependence on special intelligence in this case may have misled the First Army planners.33

On the other side of the room at Bryanston Court, G–3 and G–4 planners were figuring shipment priorities that would ensure the right mix of combat and support troops to seize, defend, and expand the beachhead. The First Army staff wanted to build supply levels to ten days of rations by the eighteenth day, seven days of fuel by the fifteenth day, and ten units of fire of ammunition as soon as possible. The Navy provided data on the available lift, and the special staff sections applied whatever guidance the G–3 section could provide on the likely course of the campaign to estimate their requirements in tonnage. Using this data, Army doctrine, and their own experience in the Mediterranean, Thorson’s and Wilson’s planners allocated space for troops, materiel, and supplies among the ships, an endless task due to constant changes in the availability of this transport. Two or three times per day, Kean would bring problems to Bradley, receive his decisions, and coordinate staff planning around those decisions.34 The arduous, methodical process, with its focus on minutiae and the ever-present need to stretch scarce resources, often caused tempers to run short. To those complaining about the drastic cutbacks in all but the most essential transportation, Thorson sardonically responded, “If you find yourself short because you are stumped on trucks, just call for me and I’ll piggyback you to Paris.” Even the laconic Wilson, plagued by demands for scarce shipping space, would answer curtly that he would arrange for the items in question to land one day before the invasion, when they could have all the lift desired.35
Availability of lift was also central to the planning of the G–1 staff. Theater policy allowed assault units to maintain troop levels greater than those authorized by organizational tables, but the G–1 plan for Neptune reduced the strength of the assault and follow-up units to “the barest combat essentials.” Troops deemed surplus by this reduction, termed “residues,” would go to special SOS-designated camps, where they would remain until they rejoined their units on the Continent in accordance with the buildup schedule. These residues, upon their arrival, would help maintain unit strengths for the first five days of the invasion. After that, the First Army staff planned to rely on replacements furnished on the basis of advance requisitions prepared by units before the start of the invasion. Normal requisitions for most units would not begin until the ninth day, when, under the Neptune plan, the First Army replacement depot would arrive on the Continent. Prior to D-Day, each infantry division received an extra regimental commander and three surplus battalion commanders, carefully chosen through examinations of records and interviews to provide replacements for commanders lost in the early fighting. The G–1 plan also envisioned beginning postal delivery on the third day and establishing unit exchanges by the thirtieth day of the invasion.

The plans of the general staff were necessarily based on figures provided by the special staff after careful planning in frequent consultation with counterparts from other echelons and services. Using loss estimates provided by SHAEF’s medical officer, Rogers’ medical section selected those medical units that would take part in the assault, augmented some of them, and planned for the growth of the medical establishment during the buildup, always negotiating with others for shipping space. Under the section’s arrangements, all wounded except nontransportables were to be evacuated to the United Kingdom by sea and, as soon as possible, by air. As hospitals deployed to the beachhead, the First Army would gradually convert to a policy of evacuating only those who required hospitalization for over seven days. As the invasion progressed, the minimum for evacuation to Communications Zone (COMZ) facilities in England and on the Continent would increase to fifteen, and later to thirty, days.

While Rogers and his medical officers laid out evacuation policy, McNamara and his quartermasters were determining the food, equipment, and fuel that soldiers should bring ashore and laying out plans for the establishment of installations on the Continent. Remembering his Mediterranean experience, McNamara tried to keep the equipment allocations to a minimum, even recommending against shoeboxes with the approach of drier summer weather. Maintenance stocks of Class II and IV supplies (mainly clothing and equipment) would begin to arrive on the fourth day of the invasion—and reserve stocks ten days later—to establish a reserve of fourteen days by the forty-first day. Along with planning for ration reserves, the First Army chief quartermaster provided for a daily maintenance of 60 percent C rations, the basic GI light field ration, and 40 percent of the even lighter K rations through the third day, after which half of the rations arriving would be the composite 10-in-1 rations, each of which had enough food for ten men. As soon as facilities and transportation could handle them, he wanted to introduce full B rations, the normal bulk field
rations. Quartermaster plans also arranged for vehicles to carry extra fuel ashore with them and for shipments of bulk fuel to begin arriving after two weeks. 39

The other special staff sections were just as busy. In the ordnance section, Medaris and his officers carefully chose units to support the engineer special brigades in the early days on the beaches. To ease the problem of resupply, they arranged to have those units carry extra supplies ashore. At the same time, Ray requested SOS planners to obtain an exemption from British regulations to ship together different parts of the same ammunition round on the same vessel. 40 Simultaneously, Carter’s engineers made arrangements for engineer supply and worked out construction priorities, engineer troop lists, and map plans. Meanwhile, Williams’ signal section determined the wire and radio nets to be established on the Continent by its signal crews, notably the joint assault signal companies, which would install communications on the beaches. The new civil affairs section estimated the amount of supplies necessary to support the populace and thus prevent disorder that might impede operations. Whenever possible, these supplies would come from local resources. 41

In this phase too, much of the planning involved the Army Air Forces and the Navy. The air planners listed their priorities as establishment of the required degree of air superiority, prevention of the movement of enemy troops and supplies into the theater of operations, and “participation in a combined effort of the Air and Ground Forces, in the battle area, to gain objectives on the immediate front of the Ground Forces.” Within these priorities, they laid out a nine-phase plan that called for strikes against key coastal batteries in the NEPTUNE area and key roads and railroads in the days before the invasion. These phases would be followed by strikes by fighter-bombers against the beach defenses and by heavy bombers against the batteries and the road center of Carentan just prior to H-hour, and they would continue with fighter-bomber missions against the batteries, cable junctions, road centers, and Loire bridges after H-hour. The Ninth Air Force would also perform aerial reconnaissance and provide continuous fighter coverage over the beaches; each corps would have a squadron of fighter-bombers on call. To coordinate air support, the Ninth Air Force would place an air support party with each regiment on shore. As higher echelons came ashore, the support parties would station themselves with those echelons. 42

For naval gunfire support, naval planners envisioned a bombardment group of 3 battleships, 1 monitor, 4 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, and 37 destroyers. They put together a three-phase plan in which the naval bombardment force at each beach, led by two battleships at OMAHA and one battleship at UTAH, would begin counterbattery fire at first light. From H minus 20 to H-hour, close support destroyers and landing craft would direct “drenching fire” against selected beach defenses. After that, naval shore fire control parties, nine of which accompanied each assault division, would direct naval gunfire against targets on the beaches. 43

On 25 February the First Army headquarters submitted its plan for Operation NEPTUNE. As amended on 20 May, the plan called for a composite force of the 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions and two Ranger battalions, under the direc-
tion of the V Corps, to assault beaches in the Vierville area, code-
named OMAHA, and push forward to a line from Isigny to the Bayeux area
by the end of D-Day. At the same
time, the 4th Infantry Division of the
VII Corps would land to the west, on
the beaches code-named UTAH along
the eastern shore of the Cotentin Pen-
insula, and move inland to link up
with the 82d and 101st Airborne Di-
visions. Under the original plan, the
airborne troops would drop across the
southern Cotentin; after intelligence
found the 91st Infantry Division in
this area in late May, planners
changed the drop zones to areas more
directly behind UTAH Beach. (Map 1)
Once assault units had seized the
beaches, the 5th and 6th Engineer
Special Brigades on OMAHA and the
1st Engineer Special Brigade on UTAH
would organize the beaches for un-
loading and evacuation. In line with amphibious doctrine, Kirk would com-
mand both ground and naval forces, and under Kirk the senior commander in
each corps sector would command First Army units in that sector, until Bradley
had landed and established his headquarters ashore. Detailed and weighty, the
plan included annexes on everything from allocation of ships and the various
stages of the buildup to provisions for smoke to cover the landing. Indeed, it
may well have been too detailed. Among other things, it established definite
but inflexible beach sector boundaries that did not match the frontages to be
covered by the assault units.44

Despite its faults, Plan NEPTUNE, as approved by the 21 Army Group in late
February, did provide a foundation on which the corps planners could build. As
a first step, the First Army headquarters called its subordinate corps command-
ers to London, briefed them on the plan, and ordered them to prepare detailed
plans for their part in the invasion. The corps commanders, in turn, established
small planning groups of their own in London, where they could more easily
incorporate changes by higher echelons. The First Army staff also sent officers
to corps command posts to help with detailed planning. Because the First Army
headquarters was not scheduled to become operational on the Continent until
after D-Day, the corps would shoulder considerable responsibility in the initial
stages for a host of support functions that they did not normally handle. Each
corps needed to prepare for the First Army staff a list of targets for prearranged
naval and air support and a priority list of troops and supplies for the buildup;
on that basis, the First Army staff would yet again revise its own priority list.
The First Army headquarters took recommendations from its divisions and corps to the 21 Army Group, which usually gave oral approval to the changes and then incorporated those changes into formal orders. One important alteration in the original plan was the need, after the discovery of underwater obstacles on the Normandy beaches in February, for the corps to prepare plans for engineers and naval combat demolition units to clear them.45

Corps and division commanders were chosen mainly on the basis of combat experience, but politics also played a role. With the permission of General George C. Marshall and Eisenhower, Bradley sent some of his division commanders home but accepted most on the basis that they had trained their units and deserved a chance to lead them in battle. Selection of corps commanders fell to Marshall and Eisenhower, although Bradley had some influence. Despite a dearth of combat experience, Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, the courtly Virginian who led V Corps, kept his post, ostensibly because of his heavy involvement in early planning, but more likely due to his close friendship with Eisenhower and Bradley. The less fortunate Maj. Gen. Roscoe B. Woodruff of VII Corps and Maj. Gen. Willis D. Crittenden of XIX Corps received transfers to the Pacific and Mediterranean, respectively. Unable to obtain Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., who had distinguished himself in amphibious and conventional operations in the Mediterranean, the supreme commander settled for two Pacific veterans, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins and Maj. Gen. Charles H. Corlett. Young and aggressive, with boundless self-confidence, Collins had commanded the 25th Infantry Division in the South Pacific and would now take the VII Corps. The tough,
THE FINAL NEPTUNE PLAN

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D-Day Phase Line

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leathery Corlett, who had directed amphibious landings in the Aleutian and Gilbert Islands, was sent by Marshall to command the XIX Corps and lend his amphibious expertise to OVERLORD. But he did not arrive until mid-March, at which time planning was so far along that few wanted to listen to a newcomer from another theater.46

By March some of the lingering uncertainty over command organization for the invasion had begun to dissipate. A SHAEF directive in January had confirmed the British 21 Army Group’s overall control of ground operations until the 1st U.S. Army Group arrived in France. Not until March, however, did SHAEF give to the 21 Army Group overall command of supply and administration on the Continent, also until the 1st Army Group went into action. This authority included the initial development of the Communications Zone, SOS’ successor as the theater agency responsible for the logistical support of U.S. army groups and armies conducting combat operations on the Continent. To help the 21 Army Group carry out this task, the 1st Army Group was to furnish an administrative contingent—the Forward Echelon, COMZ—to Montgomery’s headquarters.47 (Charts 4 and 5)

In the early stages of the invasion, the First Army would enjoy an unusual amount of authority for an army headquarters. Under the direction of Montgomery’s 21 Army Group headquarters, the First Army headquarters would have full authority over planning, operations, administration, and supply in the U.S. zone for the first two weeks. After those two weeks, an Advance Section (ADSEC) of the COMZ would take control of logistics behind a rear boundary designated by the First Army headquarters, but the First Army headquarters would still generally supervise ADSEC’s activities. On the forty-first day of the invasion, COMZ’s forward headquarters echelon would move to France and assume control of ADSEC, while U.S. ground forces would come under the newly arrived 1st Army Group. About ninety days after the invasion, SHAEF and COMZ would move to the Continent and assume direct control. The exact sequence of introduction of higher-level headquarters from corps to theater would, of course, depend on the success of the assault and rate of expansion of the beachhead.48

Recognizing that harmonious joint relationships would be critical to the success of the operation, the staffs of the First Army and Western Task Force worked to define those relationships in greater detail. They worked within the framework of SHAEF’s operational memorandums, which laid out standardized procedures for training and operations by an allied force. The First Army’s Plan NEPTUNE provided for cooperative arrangements at the highest level, naval shore fire control parties to accompany the divisions, and naval gunfire liaison officers attached to the division artillery headquarters and each field artillery battalion directly supporting the assault. The joint agreement of 10 February assigned to Army planners such tasks as allocating units, vehicles, and supplies aboard ships and establishing priorities for the discharge of vessels and cargo, but it left to the Navy such matters as the timing of the discharge of the cargo and the release of ships. The commanders of the engineer special brigades, with their attached naval beach battalions, received the responsibility for organizing and clearing the
CHART 4—PLANNED COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR OVERLORD

EARLY PHASES

ETOUSA
SOS or COMZ

Supreme Commander

Forward Echelon COMZ
U.S. 1st Army Group

British 21 Army Group

British Administrative Staff

Augel Echelon

Allied Expeditionary Air Force

U.S. First Army
Advance Section

British Second Army
Base Subarea

War Office

Allied Naval Expeditionary Force

--- Administrative authority
CHART 5—PLANNED COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR OVERLORD

AFTER U.S. 1ST ARMY GROUP BECOMES OPERATIONAL

CG ETO
COMZ

Supreme Commander

Forward Echelon COMZ

U.S. 1st Army Group

British 21 Army Group

Allied Naval Expeditionary Force

Allied Expeditionary Air Force

Advance Section

First Army

British Second Army

Canadian First Army

Other Base Sections

Third Army

Line of Communications

= General Eisenhower was commander of both SHAEF and ETO.
beaches; under them, the Navy had the task of establishing installations seaward of the high-water mark, while the Army would do the same on the inland side. So complicated were the lines of control and responsibility laid out by the two services that both naval and ground officers contended after the operation that all joint issues, except for matters of policy, could have been handled simply through liaison between the agencies concerned.49

Air-ground command relationships took somewhat longer to clarify. Based on their experience in the Mediterranean, Army Air Forces planners wanted to centralize control over air support at a high level, thus avoiding the waste of resources they saw as endemic to control at lower echelons. Therefore, they gave responsibility for air-ground coordination to the Combined Control Center of the 21 Army Group and the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF), SHAEF’s headquarters for its tactical air component, at Uxbridge. Air support parties with armies, corps, divisions, and regimental combat teams would send requests for air support, bombline reports, and other air support communications directly—or, in the case of regiments, through the divisions—to this center, which would review and act on them. Air support parties at higher echelons would monitor the radio nets of subordinate units and notify Uxbridge of any requests that they disapproved. The Army Air Forces envisioned that most air support missions would be planned by the center on the evening before they were carried out. Under the First Army Neptune plan, however, one fighter-bomber squadron was to be on call over each corps beach, and air-ground planning also left some unallocated sorties in reserve to respond to calls for immediate support. So fixed were the air planners on the idea of centralized control that U.S. air support parties had strict orders not to contact planes overhead, even to stop attacks on friendly troops or the wrong targets, unless specifically authorized to do so. The key role of air support in the invasion caused the First Army headquarters to add more air liaison officers.50

The First Army staff was already undergoing a general expansion of personnel to perform tasks unforeseen by the War Department’s outdated organizational table. By army order, a headquarters commandant, provost marshal, and civil affairs officer had been present on the staff since October, and during the spring they were able to form special staff sections. Because of the presence of an armored section on other staffs, the special staff added an armored section on 4 March. The First Army headquarters also added a publicity and psychological warfare section on 26 March, and a two-man amphibious section on 24 April. Unlike other staffs, it did not, however, add a separate transportation officer, ostensibly because Bradley and McNamara did not want to entrust this important task to an inexperienced organization on the eve of Overlord. Meanwhile, the existing sections were adding subsections in response to new requirements, notably air support, passive air defense, and liaison subsections in the G-3 section; antitank and aerial observation subsections in the artillery section; and an enlarged casualty division under the adjutant general. Drawing on an ETOUSA authorization for 170 more spaces, the headquarters expanded to 361 officers, 25 warrant officers, and 596 enlisted men by June. Even this increase would soon prove inadequate.51
The augmentation of the First Army special staff sections would enable them to take advantage of the greater autonomy that Bradley and Kean were now prepared to allow them. On 18 March the First Army headquarters adopted the new policy of operational control by the special staff. (See Appendix B.) Under this policy, the commander retained only administrative functions and delegated to the chief of each special staff section the authority to direct, control, and coordinate the operations of army units within his specialty. Thus, a special section head could shift troops within the army zone, issue normal operations orders and training directives, and reallocate supplies without drawing on the personal authority of the commander or the general staff. Such personnel matters as promotions, decorations, and individual transfers still needed to go through the G–1 and adjutant general’s sections. The special staffs would, of course, have preferred even greater authority, but the new directive allowed considerable freedom of action, especially within technical channels.52

Obviously, the new policy strengthened the hand of staff officers vis-a-vis subordinate commanders, as in the case of the antiaircraft section. When the First Army headquarters initially came into existence, Patterson, a 35-year-old lieutenant colonel at the time, served as the executive officer to Col. Charles R. Finley, a classmate of Eisenhower and Bradley at West Point and a career coast artilleryman who had been the First Army antiaircraft officer under Drum. To obtain a brigadier general’s star for Finley and a colonel’s eagle for Patterson, Bradley and Kean brought in the 47th Antiaircraft Brigade as the headquarters for antiaircraft units in the First Army, placed Finley in command of it, and promoted Patterson to the post of antiaircraft officer. Soon after, the theater transferred the 47th from the First Army, replacing it with the 49th Antiaircraft Brigade under Brig. Gen. Edward W. Timberlake. Not surprisingly, Patterson and Timberlake squabbled frequently over who, in fact, commanded the antiaircraft units in the First Army. The combative Patterson, whose nickname at West Point had been “Stinky,” also clashed with the stateside antiaircraft establishment, which continually tried to replace him with a more senior officer from the United States. Backed by his commanders, Patterson won most of these battles, but his notoriety probably contributed to his inability to rise above colonel in the postwar Army.53

Apart from the operational control policy, the First Army headquarters made one other major organizational innovation. Based on their experience with the II Corps in Sicily and on their concern about the prospect of the various headquarters components being separated by the English Channel, Bradley and the other II Corps veterans rejected the doctrinal division of the staff into forward and rear echelons in favor of a division into command, supply, and base echelons. Corresponding closely to the former forward echelon, the command echelon, located near the corps’ rear boundary, would contain the chief of staff, chiefs of the G sections, and other staff required by the commanding general to prepare plans and supervise operations. The supply echelon would bring forward from the former rear echelon those representatives of army supply agencies—including the engineer, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, and medical sections—that the army needed in a more accessible location near the command
To Secure a Lodgement on the Continent

The base echelon would follow far to the rear with the bulkier records and those staff sections from the former rear echelon—primarily the G-1, judge advocate general, inspector general, chaplain, and adjutant general—that were concerned with army administration. While on the move, each echelon would maintain communications via a message center in a vehicle. The new system surely would help the staff conduct Neptune, but command post exercises and the final plan revealed a tendency to phase personnel forward, somewhat defeating the original purpose of separate echelons.

While the First Army headquarters supervised corps planning and reorganized its staff, it worked with Montgomery and the 21 Army Group staff to develop a plan for expanding the initial beachhead into a lodgment between the Seine and Loire. During February SHAEF supervised Overlord planning, focused on larger political and administrative issues, and prepared long-term plans for the campaign following Overlord. Simultaneously, Montgomery met several times with Bradley and Lt. Gen. Sir Miles Dempsey, commander of the British Second Army, to consider post-D-Day operations.

Over the next few months, Montgomery developed further his grand design for the Normandy campaign. Since the war, this plan has become the subject of intense debate, but, if the outline prepared by his plans officer in early May is any indication, he produced a flexible plan that stressed keeping the initiative and taking advantage of whatever opportunities the Germans presented. Under this concept, the Allies would launch an all-out attack on D-Day to secure a foothold and link all the invasion beaches as soon as possible. The British Second Army would then drive south to seize the Caen-Falaise plain, while the First U.S. Army advanced west and north into the Cotentin Peninsula to take the port of Cherbourg. Once the Allies had this lodgment, the First Army would drive south to Rennes at the base of the Brittany Peninsula, cutting off Brittany and clearing the way for the Third U.S. Army to enter the battle and dash west into the peninsula, seizing the key ports there. With Brittany secured, the Americans would pivot to the east toward Paris, achieving the goal of a lodgment between the Seine and the Loire by the ninetieth day of the invasion. Should the Germans mass against the First Army, Montgomery would advance the Second Army southeast, up the Seine Valley, threatening the enemy rear. Through alternate thrusts by the First U.S. and British Second Armies, he could force the Germans to disperse their strength, opening the way for a breakout. (Map 2) At Exercise Thunderclap in London on 7 April, Montgomery went over the plan with his top subordinates and tested their reactions to different contingencies. By the final briefings on 15 May, his generals apparently had a clear idea of their respective roles.

Despite the best efforts, the First Army’s planning for the expansion of the beachhead was marred by a major flaw. Whether because of the fuzzy delineation of responsibilities with the 1st Army Group or, more likely, the immense care and attention to detail involved in planning the beachhead assault, the First Army staff simply did not devote enough attention to the obstacle posed by the bocage region. Extending in a 25- to 50-mile-wide belt from Cherbourg in the northwest almost to Alençon in the southeast, the bocage was character-
ized by a lattice-like network of hedgerows—massive, irregularly square walls of earth, five feet high and topped by hedges.56 The chief of the British Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, who had passed through the region during the campaign of 1940, had communicated his concern to the COSSAC planners, who prominently mentioned it in their topographic estimate. Montgomery foresaw to some degree that the “difficult bocage country” could present a barrier; although the degree of his concern remains a matter of conjecture.57 Yet the First Army planners, although they knew of the existence of the bocage, were apparently too intent on the assault and rapid buildup of a force sufficient to hold the beachhead to devote much thought to the problem it posed. The topographic estimate in their February plan mentioned but gave little idea of the bocage’s real nature, and “essential elements of information” sought by the G–2 focused on the beaches. In fairness to the First Army headquarters, the corps, which were responsible for the tactical plans, bore at least some of the responsibility for the oversight.58

On 15 April, long before the final briefings for the OVERLORD plan, the First Army Planning Group finished its work in London and returned to Bristol, where the remainder of the staff had been devoting much of its time to supervising training. Almost every American unit in Britain had experienced combat or had undergone training in the United States up to and including maneuvers. Thus, the First Army’s training plan emphasized perfection of skills and the specific mission of an assault landing. From the operations subsection, the G–3 training subsection obtained the expected D-Day combat missions of each unit to determine the required special training. Its directives to subordinate echelons stressed the need for instruction in such areas as combined arms, mine detection, supply discipline, preventive maintenance, and reviews of basic small-unit training. Beyond setting general training objectives, however, the First Army headquarters left the actual conduct of instruction to subordinate units and confined itself mostly to overall supervision and, given the lack of time, to visits in lieu of more detailed inspections. The biggest training problems facing the First Army staff were a lack of suitable facilities in crowded England and shortages of instructional materials. Through careful scheduling, the use of SOS service facilities, and improvisation, the First Army headquarters managed to overcome such hurdles.59

The First Army’s efforts toward joint training met with mixed results. Training with the Navy generally went well, as engineer special brigades and the attached naval beach battalions achieved a high degree of mutual respect and cooperation, and Hart’s artillery staff worked with Kirk’s Western Task Force and the 11th Amphibious Force to train naval shore fire control parties and the crews of self-propelled guns that would provide close support from landing craft. The First Army headquarters responded slowly to the discovery in February of underwater obstacles off the beaches and to the Navy’s need for help in clearing those obstacles, but, by mid-April as joint planners worked out a demolition plan, engineer combat battalions were training to aid naval combat demolition units.60

Air-ground training proved more difficult to achieve. The Ninth Air Force did institute courses for the ground liaison officers who would brief air staffs
and crews on the ground situation and relay intelligence gained from air missions to ground headquarters. On Brereton’s list of priorities, however, joint training ranked below organizing and training air units newly arrived in Britain, achieving air superiority, and interdicting German communications in France. The Ninth Air Force was in the process of configuring and training fighters for dive-bombing and strafing, while contacting the Royal Air Force and Twelfth Air Force in Italy for data on close air support. Thus, it seldom participated in joint exercises, and poor weather restricted its role in other training events. In one of the few exercises in which airmen did take part, ground forces incorrectly marked their front lines, and communications were so bad that one observer recommended using pigeons in the future. During early May Brereton finally expanded the Ninth Air Force’s role in the First Army’s training maneuvers, but by then the First Army had almost finished its training and was beginning final preparations for Neptune. In fairness to the Ninth Air Force, the First Army headquarters, absorbed in its own priorities, apparently did not press overly hard for joint training with the airmen.

Even while supervising the training of subordinates, the First Army staff was conducting command post exercises of its own. Early exercises in December and January had already shown the need for a new arrangement of headquarters echelons to replace the forward-rear organization. During February a signal detachment tested communications equipment and procedures at the army level as part of Carefree, a British signals exercise in which both the Americans and Canadians participated. These procedures were tested further in Candle
during the first two weeks of April. CANDLE was intended to test both wire and radio procedures, but it omitted radio because the exercise area was too near the combined headquarters in Plymouth and would interfere with its important nets. Nevertheless, CANDLE provided numerous lessons, particularly regarding the integration of British and American communications. The First Army staff held a final command post exercise in late May. Titled BRASS HAT, the two-day exercise was designed to train the command and supply echelons in the orderly movement and reestablishment of the command post and its communications systems.63

On those rare moments when not busy with command post exercises, supervision of training, or other preparations, First Army personnel sought amusement whenever they could find it. Training visits provided one of the few diversions available to the staff in wartime Britain. Staff officers would long remember the journeys along narrow country roads, the stops at Channel ports, and the collections of old houses located on bays and inlets with neighboring hills sloping down almost perpendicular to the water.64 In Bristol they could watch movies, attend an occasional performance of Irving Berlin’s “This Is the Army” or the London Philharmonic Orchestra, or visit the city zoo, where some G-1 officers perceived an uncanny resemblance between a gorilla named “Alfred” and their chief, Red O’Hare. Those seeking more variety for the palate than the Army offered could find little other than fish, sausage, and tomatoes in the Bristol markets.65 On the other hand, Bristol provided more opportunities to mingle with the local population than had been the case in North Africa or Sicily. Staff officers and enlisted men made friends among local families and attended the “Strangers Club,” an organization of musicians, artists, and young professionals who met once a month in an old house in Bristol to drink, converse, and listen to musical performances by group members.66

For a population undergoing strict wartime rationing, the amount of creature comforts available to the Americans could seem overwhelming. One Englishwoman in Bristol, puzzled by a friend’s interest in a certain enlisted man, found that he worked in the First Army headquarters kitchens, where he had access to food unimaginable to most wartime Britons.67

The First Army headquarters’ time in Bristol was growing short. In late April and early May the headquarters supervised two final, full dress rehearsals at the army amphibious training center at Slapton Sands on the south coast of Devon. There, it sought to test the assault plan under the most realistic conditions possible. In Exercise TIGER for the VII Corps on 27–29 April and Exercise FABRUS for the V Corps on 3–8 May, assault troops rehearsed the entire cross-Channel assault. They shifted to assembly areas near the Channel, moved to forward areas and boarded craft, came ashore after a naval bombardment, reduced pillboxes and cut barbed wire, and, in the case of TIGER, advanced inshore to link up with airborne troops deployed by trucks in the absence of sufficient aircraft. Both exercises encountered some problems with traffic congestion in the embarkation phase, but, on the whole, they went well. Tragedy struck TIGER, however, when German torpedo boats penetrated the convoy’s protective screen and sank two LSTs (landing ships, tank). More soldiers died in the raid than would be killed in
the VII Corps' assault on D-Day. The episode not only caused the First Army staff to revise once again its shipment schedules to compensate for the loss of landing craft, but also aroused concerns over the chance that the encounter might have compromised the invasion.\textsuperscript{68}

Even while the rehearsals were taking place, the Allies had begun the massive, enormously complex task of positioning for shipment to the Continent the 130,000 soldiers scheduled to make the initial assault and the over one million troops slated to follow in the first ninety days. This huge operation, which would continue well beyond D-Day, involved three steps. First, the troops assembled at their concentration areas, normally their home stations, where units separated out surplus personnel and vehicles and waterproofed and packed equipment. Second, they moved to their marshaling stations, where they were briefed on the operation, received rations and other necessities, and formed into loads for the different craft. Third, they shifted to their embarkation points, usually only a few miles away. Responsibility for the operation rested with ETOUSA-SOS, but the First Army headquarters would play a key role, setting and, when necessary, changing priorities for troop movements, adjusting the loading of supplies to match those priorities, and helping to supervise the flow of units, supplies, and materiel across the Channel.\textsuperscript{69}

The First Army headquarters would have considerable input in the buildup process. To supervise that process, SHAEF created an Allied committee of representatives from the different services, including after 24 April the First Army G–1 and G–3 sections. This committee received the designation "Buildup Control (BUCO) (West)," with "West" added to conform with the efforts to deceive the Germans on the landing site. Changes in American buildup priorities, both before and after D-Day, would remain the responsibility of the First Army headquarters up to the activation of the 1st Army Group. From its headquarters at Fort Southwick near Portsmouth, BU CO (West) would implement those changes, coordinating movements of ships and craft and of units to their embarkation points. Under BU CO (West), Movement Control, an organization of Allied transport agencies, would write detailed orders for movement of troops from home stations to embarkation points, while Turn-Round Control, a naval agency, was to keep track of the status of ships carrying troops, supplies, and materiel across the Channel. For the First Army staff, the whole matter of establishing and altering priorities promised to be a consuming task, and on 29 May it created, initially within the G–3 section of the command echelon and later as a separate agency within the headquarters, "Little BU CO." Drawing representatives from the 1st Army Group, the Third Army, the Navy, and COMZ, this agency would screen requests for changes in priorities prior to dispatch to BU CO (West). It remained to be seen whether this complicated array of joint and combined committees could handle an extremely complex task, now only a week away.\textsuperscript{70}

Leaving behind the base echelon, the First Army headquarters left Bristol in early June. At Plymouth on 3 June Bradley, Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, Dickson, Thorson, Wilson, Maj. Chester B. Hansen, and a few journal clerks and draftsmen boarded the heavy cruiser \textit{Augusta}, where the Navy had established a war room with wall maps and a plotting table in a sheet metal shed on the afterdeck.
Hodges and representatives of the several staff sections boarded the converted cargo ship Achernar, ready to assume control if the command ship were sunk or incapacitated. Most of the headquarters split into three contingents, each of which had representatives from all the staff sections. The separate groups under Myers, Hewitt, and Grant Williams, respectively, then boarded three LSTs at three different ports. SHAEF had set D-Day for 5 June, but by the time the First Army staff awoke on the morning of 4 June, the weather had turned soupy and wet, with a lack of visibility. Shortly afterward, the command group on the Augusta learned of the 24-hour postponement. The staff spent a restless morning, pouring over recent aerial photographs of the German defenses while Bradley, in his cabin, read A Bell for Adano. In the afternoon, the commander and his staff conferred with Kirk and his officers on courses of action in the event of another postponement. The need for contingency plans soon became academic, for at midnight they received word of Eisenhower’s decision to proceed.

As the First Army headquarters watched the invasion armada cross the Channel, it could take pride in its first seven months as a staff. By its nature, an amphibious assault was a frontal attack with little room for maneuver, requiring the invading army to throw as much force ashore as possible before the enemy could react. The lack of ships made it all the more essential to plan the buildup with care and leave enough room for flexibility to respond to the tactical situation. In short, planning and preparation for the cross-Channel invasion demanded more attention to detail than usually fell to a World War II American army headquarters. It was the kind of careful, painstaking task for which the seasoned, methodical First Army staff was well suited. At times, the planners went too far, laying out beach sectors and other details that could have been left to the subordinate echelons, and the intelligence section, while it generally performed well, missed the movement of the 352d Infantry Division to OMAHA Beach. The biggest mistake made by the First Army headquarters, however, lay in its inattention to the obstacle posed by the hedgerows. Focused on the formidable mission of obtaining a foothold on the far shore and engrossed in the myriad details involved in that task, the First Army headquarters did not adequately recognize the problems involved in expanding the beachhead. But a headquarters less attentive to detail might never have reached that stage of OVERLORD.
Notes

4 Cir, HQ, First U.S. Army, an. 3a to First United States Army Operations Plan NEPTUNE, G–1 Plan, Troop List, 381 Decimal file, box 169, HQ, FUSA, Adjutant General Section, General Correspondence, 1940–1947, RG 338, WNRC.
6 Under the definition that ETOUSA adopted in December, unit of fire “is a yardstick or unit of measure used in the supply of ammunition during initial stages of combat and in specifying stock levels for Army depots. It is that amount of ammunition which may be expected to be expended in one day of intense combat or 2.5 days of average combat. It is expressed in rounds per type weapon.” (Incl, Lt Col Richard P. Fisk, Asst Adj Gen, ETOUSA, to Distribution, 10 Dec 43, sub: Unit of Fire, in Memo, Sayler for CG, ETOUSA, 29 Dec 43, sub: Recommended Ammunition Day of Supply, Ammunition file, box 598, U.S. Army, Records of OCMH, Records of Historical Services Division, Publications, Unpublished Manuscripts and Supporting Records, 1943–1977; 2–3.7 CP 3 The Technical Services: The Ordnance Dept., Ordnance Overseas, RG 319, NARA.) The basic load was “a prescribed allowance of ammunition, supplies, and equipment carried by a unit.” (War Department Technical Manual [TM] 20–205, Dictionary of United States Army Terms [Washington, D.C.: War Department, 1944], p. 39.)


McNamara, Quartermaster Activities, pp. 97–99; Lits, Medaris to Maj Gen Leven H. Campbell, Chief of Ordnance, War Department, 24 Nov 43, and Sayler to Campbell, 30 Nov 43, both in file 7, ETO, October 1943–May 1944, box 4, Henry B. Sayler Papers, Eisenhower Library; Ross and Romanus, Operations in the War Against Germany, p. 733.


Mins, Meeting of Joint Commanders in Chief at St. Paul’s, 7 December 1943.


On prewar army group doctrine, see Manual for Commanders of Large Units, 1930, 1:13–15.

Rpt, U.S. Army, Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group, Operation Report: NEPTUNE (report of the activities of the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group from 26 February 1944 to 26 June 1944), 30 Sep 44, p. 135, CMH Library.


24 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 5–6, 10–15; Mins, Minutes of Meeting Convened by Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, in Room 126, Norfolk House at 1030 Hours on Friday, 21st January 1944, SHAFF Minutes of Chief of Staff Meetings, box 1, Ray W. Barker Papers, Eisenhower Library, and Notes Taken on Meeting of Army Commanders and Their Chiefs of Staff at Headquarters, 21 Army Group, 7 January 1944, blank file. Pogue Interviews, USAMHI; Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 212–14, 218–20; D’Este, Decision in Normandy, pp. 57, 62–68.


27 Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 181, 222–23; Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 16.


29 Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 223–24; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, pp. 108–11; Interv, Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, pp. 67–70; Ltrs, Col Fred W. Jacks, USA (Ret.), to author, 11 Dec 96, DWH, and Lt. Col Robert A. Riesman, USAR (Ret.), to author, 4 Feb 97, DWH.


32 Interv, Pogue with Williams, 30–31 May 47, p. 3; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, p. 117; Interv, Pogue with Rosengarten, 22 Dec 47, p. 1; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 319f.


 Thorson quote from Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, p. 225.


40 Mayo, *On Beachhead and Battlefront*, pp. 233–35; Telecon, author with Col John Ray, USA (Ret.), 25 Nov 96, DWH.


42 Quote from Ibid., 4:68, and see also 4:49–56, 68–72.


Soldiers Caen


57 Quote from Intelligence Plan, in Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 October 1943-1 August 1944, 3:9, and see also 2:125, 3:10. Interv, Pogue with Dickson, 22 Dec 47, p. 2; Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, p. 234; Interv, Thomas F. Soapes with Brig Gen Henry J.
Matchett, USA (Ret.), 1976, p. 17; Eisenhower Library; Ltrs. Riesman to author; 4 Feb 97, and Brig Gen Robert M. Blanchard, Jr., USA (Ret.), to author, Jan 97, DWH; Interv. author with Wendl, 29 Apr 91, p. 40; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 13.


MS, Carter, Carter’s War, 8:14–17.

Ibid., 8:46; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, p. 106; Telecon, author with Maj Arthur Garson, USArab (Ret.), 14 Oct 92, p. 23, DWH; Hansen Diary, 12 Sep 43, USAMHI.

MS, Carter, Carter’s War, 8:18–19.

Reynolds, Rich Relations, p. 264.


Hansen Diary, 1–5 Jun 44; Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 250–65; Interv. Bevan with Hewitt, 1 Oct 81, pp. 143–44, 148; McNamara, Quartermaster Activities, pp. 120–21; Rpt,
First Test in Normandy

With the battle in the hands of subordinate echelons, the First Army headquarters could do little on 6 June 1944 but watch and hope. To the west, Collins’ VII Corps secured UTAH with relative ease and began its advance inland to link up with the paratroopers. To the east, however, Gerow’s V Corps was having a hard time on OMAHA. In an operations center on the Auchennar, the G–2 and G–3 sections monitored communications, charted the battle’s progress and enemy unit identifications, and sent the data by radio and visual signals to the small group on the Augusta. Throughout the morning, reports from the V Corps command ship were few, with most information coming from an engineer in an amphibious vehicle near the beach. From him and from intercepts of ship sinkings, heavy enemy fire, and chaos on the beaches, the First Army command group on the Augusta knew that the assault on OMAHA was not going well and that the 352d Division was present in force. As alarming reports continued to reach the bridge of the Augusta, the chief of staff, Kean, and the G–3, Thorson, could barely conceal their anxiety, and the G–4, Wilson, expressed concern over the impact of congestion off OMAHA on the buildup schedule. Bradley remained calm, but inwardly he was considering the diversion of follow-on units to UTAH and the British beaches. About 1300, good news finally arrived. Aided by naval vessels firing on targets of opportunity and urged on by their leaders, the assault troops were advancing up the heights. By midnight the V Corps had expanded its beachhead to an average depth of 2,000 yards, still not enough progress to remove the beach from observed enemy artillery fire.¹

For the First Army headquarters, a difficult day had been made even more tense by poor communications with the troops ashore, other command ships, and echelons in Britain. Congestion of craft offshore made the use of wire cable among the ships impractical, and the naval dispatch boat service, which was supposed to connect headquarters ships and the beaches, broke down completely due to the poor condition of the nine dispatch craft obtained from the British. As a result, the First Army headquarters had to rely heavily on radio and liaison officers shuttling between vessels and between ship and beach.²

To follow developments, the First Army staff adopted several expedients. It monitored the radio nets of the V Corps at OMAHA and the 4th Infantry Division on UTAH and listened to the periodic reports broadcast in the clear by the G–2 liaison with the IX Tactical Air Command’s aerial reconnaissance squad-
ron at Middle Wallop. It also installed a command radio net encompassing the corps headquarters, the Augusta and Achernar, and the base echelon through the signal center at Plymouth, and it established a separate net for air-ground coordination. With the air-ground Combined Control Center at Uxbridge, communications were relatively good, but procedures for the control of close air support took so much time that the Ninth Air Force headquarters finally arranged for several squadrons to be placed at the direct disposal of the senior air representative on the V Corps’ command ship. The First Army headquarters also entered the two radio nets of the British 21 Army Group headquarters’ tactical and main echelons to keep in touch with higher levels. Despite Montgomery’s lengthy report to SHAEF late on the evening of D-Day, Eisenhower later complained about the lack of information from the First Army headquarters, but Bradley’s staff officers had been forwarding all the data available to them. Heavy radio traffic, which slowed the decoding process at the army group level, appears to have been the culprit.

On the second day of the invasion Bradley was already exercising some of the independence which Montgomery would allow him as the senior American field commander. To the east, the British Second Army had joined two of its three beaches and advanced within three miles of Bayeux but was unable to capture Caen. Although the VII Corps had not reached its D-Day objectives in the northern sector of Utah, it could show fine gains to the south; in contrast, the V Corps held only a small foothold, leaving all of Omaha within range of enemy artillery. (Map 3) When Montgomery visited Bradley on the morning of 7 June, he decided to delay the dash for Cherbourg, and he directed the First Army to capture its D-Day objectives and connect its two beachheads prior to an advance across the Cotentin to isolate the port. Meanwhile, Dempsey’s British Second Army would capture Caen by envelopment and swing its western flank south across the Caen-Bayeux road. Bradley agreed with the need to link up Omaha and Utah, but he also did not want to allow the Cherbourg garrison time to improve its defenses. Thus, his oral orders to Collins allowed some discretion, although he repeated the priority of the linkup in his written directive of 9 June. By then, the V Corps had reached its D-Day objectives and contacted the British, but not until 10 June did the V and VII Corps meet north of Carentan. At a meeting that day, Montgomery and Dempsey expressed ea-
gerness for a V Corps advance to protect the British western flank. Bradley promised little, aware that the V Corps–VII Corps link was still tenuous and that the buildup on OMAHA was a day behind schedule.5

The reports reaching the G–4 section from the engineer special brigades indicated that the First Army’s carefully calculated plans for the buildup were already showing signs of breakdown. According to plan, the engineer brigades were supposed to organize a beach maintenance area by initially forming beach dumps about 1,000 yards inland and later establishing consolidated dumps up to five miles inland. On UTAH, the buildup was progressing nearly on schedule on 8 June, despite inadequate mechanisms for the control of shipping and the late arrival onshore of the naval officer responsible for the control of ferry craft and the berthing of vessels. On OMAHA, however, the First Army had fallen behind on D-Day and had never recovered. Wrecked landing craft, uncleared obstacles, turbulent weather, and shortages of ferry vessels, trucks, and service troops slowed the unloading process to such a degree that by 8 June, an enormous backlog of ships had gathered without any special effort to berth them according to priority of unloading. According to plan, the First Army headquarters was supposed to obtain departure times of vessels by radio from Turn-Round Control and manifests or cargo lists by launch and plane from the SOS’ Transportation Corps, enabling army logisticians to unload cargoes according to priorities. But manifests were delayed or misplaced, many going by mistake to the British beaches and not returning for two or three weeks, leaving the
THE DRIVE TO CHERBOURG
6-26 June 1944

- Front Line, 13 Jun
- Front Line, 18 Jun
- Front Line, 26 Jun
- BMA
- Beach Maintenance Area

ELEVATION IN METERS

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Miles

[Map of the area with symbols and labels indicating locations and front lines]
First Army staff, engineer special brigades, and naval officer in charge at OMAHA with no idea of what each of the waiting vessels contained. Navy officers and engineers were reduced to circulating through the fleet in small boats, asking the cargo of each ship.6

Under the strain of trying to catch up with their buildup targets, tempers soon flared between the two services. The First Army headquarters, anxious to push ammunition and other essential items ashore as soon as possible, insisted on selective unloading, while the Navy, more concerned about turnaround time, wanted to unload completely each vessel as it arrived. Underlying the dispute was the old Army suspicion that the Navy was too careful with its ships, while the Navy felt that the Army did not understand the requirements of operating and berthing a vessel.7

After several intense, often lively, conferences, Bradley, Kean, and Wilson worked out a solution with representatives from the V Corps, ETOUSA-SOS, and the Navy. On 10 June Bradley finally bowed to circumstances and agreed to unload each LST and landing craft, tank (LCT), and, later, to unload every ship without regard to cargo, at least until the backlog of ships offshore had eased. For its part, the Navy, freed at last from concern over shelling by the expansion of the beachhead, agreed to beach LSTs with the receding tide, enabling direct unloading onto the beaches. Within the next thirty-six hours, the discharge rate rose rapidly, and the backlog of ships began to clear, although total buildup figures through 12 June still fell short of those expected by that date. To compensate for
shortages, the First Army drew on giant ammunition-laden barges that it had beached on D-Day.\(^8\) It also called on supplemental shipments, including “Red Ball” cargoes of key 100-ton packages, emergency “Greenlight” shipments of ammunition and engineer construction materials, and air transportation of lighter but critical items, such as signal equipment and maps. The maps arrived by C-47 in response to an urgent radio call from Carter, the First Army engineer, to his superior at ETOUSA-SOS. To help meet the problem of inadequate information on cargoes, Water Transportation Control, largely consisting of personnel from the ADSEC transportation section, was formed within the First Army amphibious section to maintain complete data on the shipping of supplies to the Continent. Water Transportation Control stayed with the First Army staff until about 19 June, when the First Army headquarters attached the amphibious section to ADSEC to help ADSEC with the operation of the beach area.\(^9\)

Underlying the First Army’s race to build up troops and materiel was the ever-present threat of a major German counterattack. Lights burned late in the G-2 rooms on the Achernar, where Dickson and his subsections for planning and order of battle collated and analyzed data. Under the Neptune plan, G-2s of corps, separate divisions, and army units were supposed to submit, in addition to the normal periodic report, a summary to the First Army G-2 by 0100 each day. The section also drew on summaries and reports from higher levels, reports of prisoner interrogations, aerial and photographic data from the G-2 (Air) subsection in Britain, and radio intercepts from signal intelligence and Ultra. After providing little in the first few days, Ultra became increasingly valuable, especially as a source of information on the arrival of German reinforcements and as a confirmation of other order of battle data. Indeed, the G-2 section during this period might have relied too much on Ultra, to the point that it neglected other sources of radio intercept intelligence. Based on the data from Ultra and other sources, the G-2 section issued summaries to higher, lower, and adjacent echelons at 0900, 1800, and 2400 each day and a periodic daily report, which it wrote between midnight and 0900 each day. On occasion, Dickson would prepare a special estimate. To facilitate the collation of intelligence on artillery, air, and other significant targets and the transmission of these targets to the IX Tactical Air Command, the artillery, and the corps, the G-2 section formed a new target subsection, which it normally stationed with the G-2 (Air) at the IX Tactical Air Command.\(^10\)

Compared to other sources, intelligence provided by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) did not have as high a status in the First Army G-2 section. The OSS had stationed a detachment with the First Army G-3 section as a liaison agency with the French Resistance. Among other duties, it forwarded intelligence, including reports from French agents and partisans to the G-2 section. Based on his experiences in North Africa and Sicily, Dickson thought little of the contributions of the OSS operatives, who he believed did not cooperate with one another, operated outside the military chain of command, and produced little for all the effort and resources expended on them. Given the contributions of the Resistance to the survival of the beachhead, as well as the fact that ETOUSA and the stateside Army contributed most of the OSS resources, the G-2’s statement was a bit unfair, but, as an organization outside the usual
military structure, the OSS did require special arrangements, making it a nuisance to busy staff chiefs. Later in the campaign, Bradley ordered all OSS personnel, except for Capt. Stuyvesant Wainwright’s counterintelligence section, to leave the First Army area.11

As reports from the OSS and other sources arrived, the G–2 officers breathed easier. The Allied deception plan, which sought to induce the Germans to hold their troops in the Pas de Calais in anticipation of a landing there, was working beautifully. Allied bombing, sabotage, and guerrilla activities were reducing to a crawl the movement of those panzer divisions that were shifting to Normandy, and most of the enemy reserves appearing on the G–2 maps were massing against the British near Caen. The German infantry divisions facing the First Army could make only piecemeal attacks to contain the Americans.12

With the buildup proceeding more smoothly and concern over a counterattack easing, the First Army headquarters finally acted to establish its command post ashore. (For a list of command posts, see Appendix C.) Not wanting to tie up landing craft at such a critical time, Bradley waited to move his headquarters to the beach until after the Navy disembarked the follow-up force. The Neptune plan of 25 February had provided for the First Army’s initial continental command post to be located near the tiny port of Grandcamp-les-Bains, west of Omaha Beach. After a suitable reconnaissance, Bradley’s staff picked a site in an apple orchard surrounded by hedgerows and pastures east of Grandcamp and behind Pointe du Hoc, the dominating cliffs that the Rangers had stormed on D-Day. There, the First Army staff established a spartan tent city, devoid of amenities except for a portable, enclosed latrine for the use of the commanding general. By 10 June, when the contingent from the Augusta came ashore, teams of the 35th Signal Construction Battalion had installed cable communications with the V Corps and the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group on Omaha Beach. Until the V and VII Corps could meet near Carentan, the First Army headquarters would have to rely on radio and even carrier pigeons to maintain contact between the two beaches. Within three days, the First Army headquarters also installed reliable radio communications with its own base echelon in Great Britain and the 21 Army Group’s tactical headquarters on the beachhead.13

For all the postwar controversy surrounding Montgomery and the Americans, relations between the 21 Army Group and First Army headquarters in Normandy were generally cordial. As promised, Montgomery allowed Bradley considerably more discretion than he permitted Dempsey. Over the telephone or in conferences, the 21 Army Group commander would indicate to Bradley his general design and leave it to his American subordinate to work out a detailed plan, which Montgomery would then incorporate into his own orders. The process required a high degree of diplomacy on Montgomery’s part, more than many Americans were willing to admit.14

When he was not attending conferences with his army chiefs or visiting units in the field, Montgomery examined maps in a special van at his command post, heard reports from liaison officers, and read radio reports from British Phantom detachments. These small cells, stationed with corps and division headquarters in the British Second Army and occasionally in the First U.S.
Fir S I r es l ill No rmalld y

Army, periodically radioed up-to-date reports on the situation and state of morale in their areas to their PHANTOM squadron headquarters, usually stationed at the field army’s command post. Meanwhile, PHANTOM units at surrounding headquarters simultaneously monitored these transmissions and provided the data to the commanders at their host headquarters. By such means, high-level commanders could obtain information from the front more quickly than was normally possible via the chain of command.

The First Army staff, of course, had its own liaison group, but not as extensive as that of the 21 Army Group headquarters. In Britain, the First Army headquarters had acted late to obtain liaison officers, and when it did, it provided the officers with little guidance on their mission. Initially under the supervision of the secretary of the general staff, Maj. Earl F. Pegram, and later under the G–3 operations officer, Colonel Akers, ten liaison officers informed higher, lower, and adjacent echelons of the First Army’s situation and intentions and brought back similar information from those headquarters to the First Army. For example, Maj. Edward M. Dannemiller, the Regular cavalryman who served as the liaison officer to the British Second Army headquarters, would daily shuttle by jeep from the Second Army to the First Army command post. There, he would confer with Akers, and, briefly, with Bradley himself on the First Army’s situation and plans, bring the First Army staff up to date on the Second Army’s position and intentions, and then return to the Second Army to exchange information with Dempsey. At both ends of their commute, the American liaison officers provided information that signals communications could not convey. In addition to the ten ground liaison officers, the First Army headquarters also used air liaison personnel and, now and then, sent officers to visit frontline units in certain sectors. For the demands placed on it, a ten-man ground liaison corps was miniscule, but the First Army headquarters showed no sense, as yet, of a need for an increase.

As it settled into its command post and established liaison and communications links, the First Army headquarters followed the expansion of the beachhead. By the morning of 12 June Gerow’s V Corps to the east had made major gains, especially toward Caumont, near its boundary with the British Second Army. The British were encountering heavy resistance, fighting off German counterattacks, in their bid to encircle Caen with a pinces movement from the Orne bridgehead east of Caen and the Seulles River valley to the west. To the west and north of the V Corps, Collins’ VII Corps was making slow progress into the interior of the Cotentin, too slow for Bradley and his staff, but it had expanded the width of its beachhead. During the previous night, the 101st Airborne Division of the VII Corps had captured Carentan, strengthening the tenuous link between the V and VII Corps.

Despite these Allied successes, Dickson felt uneasy as the day progressed. Reports indicated that the stalled British advance and the major gains by the V Corps were exposing the corps’ flank. More threatening, reports and ULTRA intercepts indicated that the Germans were assembling armor west of St. Lô to retake Carentan and split the V and VII Corps. That evening, the First Army G–2 went to Bradley, who had spent a busy day hosting Eisenhower, Kirk, and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Bradley had already attached the 2d Armored
Division of the not-yet-arrived XIX Corps to the V Corps to guard the V Corps’ eastern flank, but on reflection, he decided the threat to Carentan was more urgent. Despite Gerow’s concern for his flank, he again intervened to divide the 2d Armored Division, telling the V Corps commander to send a battalion of tanks and a battalion of armored infantry from the division to the Carentan area. When the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division struck the next morning, the tankers helped the paratroopers repel the thrust.18

Having solidified its hold on Carentan, the First Army could now turn north to Cherbourg. Freed from concern about Carentan, Montgomery wanted the First Army, in addition to its advance on Cherbourg, to use Corlett’s XIX Corps, newly inserted between the V and VII Corps, to drive southwest on St. Lô and Coutances, sixteen miles west of St. Lô, bringing the First Army closer to a breakout into Brittany.19 But Bradley, not wishing to pursue two major thrusts simultaneously, demurred. Though catching up, the buildup still lagged behind schedule, especially in ammunition. After the British drive west of Caen stalled at Villers-Bocage, just east of the V Corps boundary and thirteen miles south of Bayeux, G–2 reports indicated two panzer divisions near the V Corps’ exposed flank. The 17th could strike again at Carentan, and Dickson was still looking for the 1st and 2d SS Panzer Divisions, which he expected to appear soon on the First Army front. In addition, the 29th Infantry Division had run into stiff opposition on the approach to St. Lô. Unconvinced of the value of St. Lô, Bradley conferred with Thorson. With Montgomery’s consent, he decided to concentrate on the original plan to cut the peninsula, establish an easily defensible line from Carentan west to the Biscay coast along the Douve River, and then turn toward Cherbourg. After beginning its drive west across the Cotentin on the morning of 14 June, the VII Corps reached the west coast of the Cotentin on 18 June.20

While it followed the drive across the Cotentin, the First Army headquarters also tightened its control over the supply process. During the first week of the invasion, the engineer special brigades had controlled beach operations, initially under the two corps headquarters and later under the First Army headquarters once it came ashore. By that time, the beachhead had expanded to such a degree that the brigades could move dumps inland and establish the beach maintenance area. On 12–13 June, as the inland dumps were starting to function, the First Army headquarters drew corps rear boundaries and assumed direct control over service troops and installations. The move freed the corps staffs from almost all supply responsibilities and limited the engineer brigades to the tasks of unloading cargoes and moving them to the army supply points inland. The engineer brigades protested that the shift in control created confusion and should have waited until the First Army headquarters was prepared to operate installations without brigade personnel and equipment. The First Army supply chiefs, however, remembered all too well the disarray that had resulted in Sicily, when the 1st Engineer Special Brigade had tried to run the buildup independently.21

Having taken direct control of the buildup, the First Army headquarters was reluctant to surrender it to COMZ. About the fourteenth day of the invasion,
under the Overlord plan, the First Army headquarters was supposed to draw an army rear boundary and transfer operations behind that line to COMZ's Advance Section, which would work under loose First Army supervision until the arrival of COMZ. In practice, although the Advance Section began operations on the Continent on 16 June, the First Army headquarters turned over operations on the beaches to that agency only gradually, without establishing an army rear boundary or yielding overall control. The added wait was understandable, given the desire of First Army headquarters to maintain control of its supply in an unexpectedly constrained lodgment. However, the delay in installing COMZ on the Continent would have repercussions later.22

In the meantime, the First Army's special staff chiefs moved quickly to establish facilities ashore. While in Normandy, McNamara's quartermasters usually allocated two Class I (rations) and two Class III (petroleum and lubricants) truckheads—unloading points for trucks—to each corps, with another of each class in the army rear area. The First Army headquarters also established two dumps for construction materials (Class II), clothing (Class IV), and other Class II and IV supplies, which began arriving in quantity on 12 June. Meanwhile, Medaris' ordnance section installed ammunition (Class V) supply points and positioned an ordnance battalion and a collecting point to provide forward support to each corps.23 When not investigating false alarms of poison gas attacks, Col. Joseph D. Coughlan's chemical warfare section oversaw the establishment of depots to support smoke generator units and chemical mortar battalions.24

Next door to the chemical section, Rogers and his medical staff supervised the installation of field, evacuation, and convalescent hospitals, all of which reported directly to the army surgeon, and arranged with the Ninth Air Force to use transport planes returning from the beach's airstrip for air evacuation. This airstrip, which the engineer special brigades completed on 8 June, was the first airfield available in the beachhead. So successful was evacuation by air that it all but supplanted the use of LSTs.25 Elsewhere, Carter's engineers installed their depots, including two map depots, and Patterson, using army rather than corps or division antiaircraft units to ensure continuous operation, landed enough units by 10 June to prevent heavy air strikes on the lodgment.26

By 19 June the special staffs had settled into a routine. Under the G-4 section, each special staff section had its own system. In the quartermaster
section, truckhead chiefs submitted a status report every evening to McNamara, who arranged to restock the truckheads with the following day's deliveries. Meanwhile, the engineer staff worked closely with corps engineers and engineer groups in the field, mapping current road conditions and requiring daily reports from subordinate units regarding changes in location, losses, intelligence, operations, bridging data, water supply, and equipment shortages. Armed with this data, it provided daily situation reports to the army group headquarters, with which it coordinated the allocation of army engineer units between the First Army and adjacent armies. Once a day the principal special staff chiefs of the First Army held a meeting, but otherwise they relied on phones and couriers, who delivered reports from the special staff sections every hour to the G-4 section. Every day, the G-4 staff also collected stock status and evacuation reports from the special staff.27

While staffs perfected their procedures, unloading was proceeding at a better rate. By the third week of the invasion total discharges of men and materiel across both beaches had reached 72.8 percent of tonnage planned, and on some days unloading exceeded pre-invasion targets. (See Appendixes D, E, and F.) As of 19 June the First Army had accumulated a reserve of 10 days of rations, 5½ days of fuel and lubricants, 2.9 units of fire for artillery ammunition, and 3.6 units of fire for small arms ammunition.28

Then came a near-disaster. On the morning of 19 June high winds, a gray sky, and cold rain heralded the approach of a major gale from the northeast. For three days, a storm, with four- to eight-foot waves, swamped ferry craft and amphibious vehicles, demolished the artificial port—dubbed Mulberry—that the Allies had constructed on Omaha, and brought unloading across the beaches to a standstill. When General Bradley visited the beaches on 22 June, he was appalled at the devastation. Hundreds of craft lay aground or washed ashore, partially blocking some beach exits. Colonel Carter later claimed that a pedestrian could have walked from one end of Omaha Beach to the other on the wrecks of vessels and concrete caissons littering the sand. As damaging as the destruction of equipment was to the operation, the loss of time was even more critical. By 23 June the First Army reserves had nearly vanished. Although beach operations recovered quickly, it would take weeks for logisticians to make up the time lost on the buildup schedule.29

The storm had devastated the already meager supply of ammunition, a problem which affected all units but especially the artillery formations. It originated in the low forecasts prepared by ETOUSA in cooperation with the First Army staff during the winter and was now exacerbated by the low tonnage beach crews could move across the beaches. Poor records management complicated the problem. Beach crews often could not locate stocks even when they had already been brought ashore by the Navy, and Ray, the army ammunition officer, and Lt. Col. Morgan Wing, Jr., the S-4 of the artillery section, had to work late into the night to check ammunition stocks in the beach dumps. On 15 June the First Army headquarters, for the first time, announced restrictions on the use of ammunition. Although emergency measures, including the beaching of ammunition coasters and prestowed barges and a rush shipment of 500 tons
of ammunition in one day by air, eased the shortage for a time, the storm caused the First Army to tighten restrictions and even for a time to return to the practice of selective unloading. A board of representatives from the G–3, G–4, artillery, and ordinance sections met in early July and, after an investigation, estimated for Bradley the predicted availability of ammunition and number of weapons in action for the next thirty days. On this basis, the First Army staff developed a new rationing system that allayed the problem but did not wholly solve it. Named by Bradley in mid-July as the most intractable problem facing his force, ammunition shortages would plague the First Army almost to the end of the war.30

Ammunition was not the only difficulty plaguing the First Army’s logistics in mid-June. As the buildup picked up speed, the First Army headquarters sought selective unloading of essential items. In the process, it drew a chiding from ETOUSA for permitting partially unloaded coasters to ride at anchor. Part of the fault lay with the old problem of manifests. On 25 June Bradley wrote to Eisenhower that the First Army headquarters still could not obtain more than half of the manifests from the ships in the transport area and that, when he and his staff complained to SOS, all they received were promises. Eisenhower vowed quick action, and within days the manifests arrived.31

The presence of the manifests helped, but it solved only part of the problem. As the First Army headquarters altered the planned buildup priorities in favor of more combat troops and fewer support and Army Air Forces units, the efficient unloading of essential supplies and service personnel became even more important. The shift in priorities caused a massive headache even with the presence of coordinating organizations like Buildup Control (West). When the time came to deploy to the Continent, many of the units that the First Army headquarters wanted had not received their movement orders, and others lacked equipment or supplies. Some had not even left the United States. As with manifests, the problem could be traced to a huge, complex system being forced to run as fast as possible while making frequent changes.32

The difficulties involved in using the beaches as ports, problems brought home by the storm, only intensified the desire to capture Cherbourg. The commanders and staffs of the First Army and VII Corps had originally planned an attack on the north Cotentin port by two infantry divisions with a third blocking the corridor along the west coast. When Bradley, Collins, and the VII Corps’ division commanders conferred on 18 June, however, they noted the German disorganization on the Cotentin, disregarded Dickson’s warnings of a possible counterattack toward Isigny or Bayeux, and decided to go for a quick kill by expanding the attack to three divisions, including the fresh 79th Infantry Division. The drive north to Cherbourg began on 19 June.33 Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton’s new VIII Corps formed two divisions in a line across the base of the Cotentin. Under Montgomery’s 18 June directive to advance south to Coutances as soon as possible, Bradley was also planning an attack south by the VIII Corps to a line running east from the village of Lessay, just off the Bay of Biscay and thirty miles south of Cherbourg. The storm changed that. On 21 June the First Army G–4 section announced that all corps and divisions, except
those attacking Cherbourg, were restricted to a third of a unit of fire per day. Taking Medaris’ advice, Bradley reluctantly postponed the VIII Corps drive until after the fall of Cherbourg.34

As the VII Corps penetrated the outer defenses of Cherbourg on 21 June, it sought naval and air support through the First Army headquarters. The Navy had provided gunfire support in the drive along the Cotentin coast, but when the First Army staff contacted the Navy for help in the attack on Cherbourg, the Navy could not help until 24 June due to the storm, which had dispersed its bombardment group. The First Army planners then turned to the Ninth Air Force. In consultation with planners from the British 2d Tactical Air Force and the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, the Ninth Air Force’s staff hastily drew up a plan for saturation bombing of the area despite the grave misgivings of many Army Air Forces planners about the suitability of fighter-bombers from their IX Bomber Command for the mission. No army representatives took part in the final preparation of the plan, and Ninth Air Force planners flew to France to present it to the ground commanders on the morning of 22 June. The attack later that day proved a disappointment. Despite provisions to withdraw units 1,200 feet from the bombline, some ground troops were hit by bombs falling short of their targets, and coordination of ground attacks and air strikes was faulty. Perhaps in response, Bradley took special care to delineate the conditions for the Navy’s bombardment of 25 June, stipulating that the Navy would fire only on targets designated by the ground forces and cleared by the VII Corps artillery liaison on board the flagship of the bombardment group. In the end, the VII Corps clearly valued the naval and air support it received in the attack on Cherbourg.35

The fall of Cherbourg on 26 June allowed the First Army to turn its full attention to the drive south. If anything, pressure for an early American offensive had increased. The British had made little progress since their setback at Villers-Bocage, and planners at several levels were pondering ways to break open the front in Normandy. While SHAEF was considering landings on the French Atlantic coast to clear the way into Brittany, the 21 Army Group staff, with apparently minimal First Army involvement, was drawing up an outline plan for LUCKY STRIKE, a blueprint that bore great resemblance to the eventual breakout. The original OVERLORD plan had provided for the First Army to launch its breakout from the St. Lô–Coutances line, but as early as 20 June Bradley informed Eisenhower that he would have to begin his offensive from positions farther north.36

The First Army supply situation was also improving. More ammunition was arriving. By mid-July a new pipeline from Port-en-Bessin to a 25,000-barrel storage tank in Balleroy was delivering 600,000 gallons of gasoline each day. A tank truck company which arrived on 26 June was also facilitating the flow of gasoline to the front. In addition to the fourteen truck companies assigned to the engineer special brigades, airborne divisions, and corps and army headquarters, by 1 July the First Army motor transport pool consisted of twenty-nine truck companies, with an average of forty-five trucks per company.37

As the VII Corps converged on Cherbourg, Bradley and his staff had rushed to draft a new plan that would enable the First Army to move to its next task
with the minimum delay. They rejected the marshy terrain south of Carentan and the route southwest to St. Lô, which they believed was the strongest sector of the German line, in favor of a drive south by the VIII Corps on the First Army's western flank, down the coastal road to Lessay and Coutances. On 26 June, after talks among Bradley, Hodges, Kean, and Thorson, the First Army headquarters directed the VIII Corps to attack on or after 1 July, with the other corps to follow on order. The First Army field order specified that the VIII Corps would make its main effort on its eastern flank, but the army headquarters otherwise allowed the corps to make their own dispositions for the attack. If all went well, the attack in the west would pinch out the XIX Corps—that is, cut across the XIX Corps front in such a way as to leave the XIX without a sector—and take the high ground near St. Lô. Bradley was imprecise about his goals, but he clearly hoped that the attack would open the way into Brittany.38

Within three days, Bradley reluctantly postponed the attack to 3 July. Not all of the VIII Corps' troops had arrived, nor had the VII Corps, slated to attack southwest on the VIII Corps' eastern flank, finished its work on the Cotentin. Dickson feared that the delay would permit the Germans to bring up reinforcements, notably the II SS Panzer Corps, and to improve their fortifications in what already was a strong defensive line. Bradley, on the other hand, figured that the British had drawn the German reserves, opening the door for a major breakthrough by the First Army. He wrote Eisenhower, "I am very anxious that when we hit the enemy this time, we will hit him with such power that we can keep going and cause him a major disaster."39 Bradley's delay disappointed Montgomery, who was concerned about the buildup of German armor against the British Second Army, but he would not stampede his American subordinate. His new order of 30 June incorporated the plan of the First Army headquarters, directing that the Second Army hold the enemy's main forces in the Caen area, while the First Army advanced south to the Caumont-Vire-Mortain-Fougères line and then southeast to the Le Mans–Alençon line, driving the enemy against the lower Seine and opening the door into Brittany. Over the next two days, the First Army headquarters completed its preparations, adjusting its boundary with the Second Army, allocating artillery, placing the fresh 3d Armored Division in reserve, and moving its command post to a more central location in an apple orchard east of Isigny.40

The First Army offensive opened on 3 July with high hopes, but it soon bogged down in the rain and the Norman hedgerows. (Map 4) Bradley watched the attack closely, arranging for air support and touring corps and division command posts to encourage field commanders. When the XIX Corps' attack on 7 July seized a foothold over the Vire River—the north-south stream which bisected the XIX Corps front at St. Lô—Bradley, largely on the basis of Hodges' reports from the front, thought he saw only a thin screen and committed the 3d Armored Division. Unwilling to restrict Corlett's discretion, he would only tell the XIX Corps commander to use the 3d in support of the 30th Infantry Division. Bradley's reluctance to interfere in corps operations was proper, but the inexperienced XIX Corps under an ill Corlett missed its chance, as vague corps orders, poor coordination, and congestion in the narrow bridgehead caused
entanglement of the two divisions. Looking for another way to speed the advance, Bradley took the suggestion of Hodges and Collins that he move the boundary between the VII and XIX Corps to the east and commit the 9th Infantry Division on the VII Corps’ eastern flank, east of the Taute River, which bisected the First Army front in that area. The division could then outflank the enemy defending Périers, fifteen miles northwest of St. Lô, and protect the XIX Corps’ western flank. The 9th had hardly entered the line when it was hit by a counterattack, which it halted only with difficulty. By 11 July both the VII and VIII Corps had stalled, and the XIX was unable to extend its foothold over the Vire.

The stalemate sent reverberations through the Allied chain of command. Chafing to join the battle with his Third Army, Patton raged in his diary, “Bradley and Hodges are such nothings... They try to push all along the front and have no power anywhere.” At the First Army headquarters, Bradley and his staff were disappointed over the performance of some units, but they believed that they had no option to the slugging match, given the terrain and the skillful German defense. They received some encouragement from Dickson’s reports, which stated that the attacks were forcing the enemy to commit his reserves and that heavy casualties and low morale were beginning to take a toll. Still, the Germans appeared to be shifting the 2d SS Panzer Division and the Panzer Lehr Division from the British sector to face the First Army, and many on the staff expressed irritation that the British were not doing more on their front. Although Montgomery wished that the Americans would not attack on such a broad front, he understood that difficult terrain, poor weather, and chronic ammunition shortages were hampering the First Army’s advance. The commander of the 21 Army Group knew that he needed to maintain the pressure on the British front to stop the flow of German reserves toward the First Army, and he was also under pressure from Eisenhower and Churchill to act. After failing in another attempt to outflank Caen from the west at the end of June, the British Second Army, with the support of heavy bombers, finally captured the city in a frontal attack on 8 July, but the Germans still held the high ground to the south.

For an offensive in which Middleton’s VIII Corps was supposed to have the main effort, Bradley’s plan and dispositions appear rather curious. On 3 July the VIII Corps had held about the same amount of front as the XIX and V Corps on the eastern flank of the First Army front and much more than the VII Corps next to it. Under the final field order for the drive, the V Corps included an armored division and two infantry divisions; the XIX Corps two infantry divisions; the VII Corps three infantry divisions; and the VIII Corps three infantry divisions and, for the initial stages, the 82d Airborne Division. Even more striking was the allocation of artillery, roughly the same for each of the four corps, although the army artillery headquarters—the 32d Field Artillery Brigade—was attached to the VIII Corps. Both the V and VII Corps had more antiaircraft battalions (five) than the VIII Corps (four) and the XIX Corps (three). Four chemical mortar battalions and nine tank battalions were evenly distributed among the four corps. Finally, the 3d Armored Division in the First
Army reserve was not stationed behind the VIII Corps, but in a more central location behind the XIX Corps front. Not surprisingly, analysts of the campaign in France and Germany in 1944–1945 have often criticized Bradley for not concentrating his attacking forces for the July offensive. [46]

Whether greater concentration would have enabled a breakthrough is problematic. The First Army planners were greatly limited in their options by the nature of the bocage region. In the XIX, VII, and part of the VIII Corps sectors, the First Army was making its way through marshes, swamps, ditches, and canals that channelled movement out of the Carentan area, about ten miles inland, into the hedgerows. These natural fortresses diverted attacking forces into sunken lanes and well-defined corridors easily covered by German mortars, machine guns, tanks, and antitank weapons. Infantry units that assaulted through a hedgerow ran into a withering crossfire from the embankments flanking the pasture inside the hedgerow. A successful attack on such positions demanded careful coordination of infantry, tanks, engineers, and artillery, coordination that would take some time to develop. Given the broken terrain and a stubborn defense, simply massing men and materiel might only have further inhibited mobility and made the attackers more vulnerable to enemy firepower. [47]

Poor tank–infantry coordination was only one of the problems facing Col. Peter C. Hains' armored section. A veteran tanker who had served in Tunisia, Hains saw his biggest job as educating commanders, from Bradley down the chain of command, on the need to use armor in mass to maximize its mobility and shock effect. Despite Hains' best efforts, Bradley, in need of reserves, occasionally broke up his armored divisions and parcelled combat commands and smaller units to other divisions. [48] Nor was the problem of misuse the end of Hains' challenges. When reports filtered back to the First Army command post of the inferiority of American Sherman tanks to German Tigers and Panthers, Bradley directed his armored officer and artillery officer to obtain a German tank and test various calibers of guns against it. Using tanks salvaged by Medaris' ordnance units, Hains and Hart found that even the updated 76-mm. gun on some Shermans could not match the Tiger tank's 88-mm. gun or penetrate its frontal armor. The First Army headquarters could only grit its teeth and work with SHAEUF to obtain a more powerful gun for the tanks from the United States, while American tankers developed tactics that took advantage of the Sherman's maneuverability and superior numbers. [49] To preserve those superior numbers, Hains devoted much of his time to instructing commanders on the need for proper maintenance and salvage of tanks. In cooperation with the Signal Corps, his section also experimented with phones, microphones, and radios on the back of tanks in an attempt to improve coordination with the infantry. [50]

With all the problems of tank–infantry coordination, the First Army relied heavily on the infantry–artillery team. Hart organized his artillery section roughly along general staff lines. It included an executive officer, an S–2 for intelligence, an S–3 for operations and training, an S–4 to handle supply and personnel, a chief clerk subsection, an air observation subsection, and an antitank subsection which came under the S–3 administratively but reported directly to Hart. The First Army artillery officer saw his function not only as
advising the commander on artillery matters, but also maintaining contact with the chief of staff, G–2, G–3, and G–4 to keep abreast of the situation and make these officers "artillery minded." In his view, an army artillery officer should also act as a trouble shooter, actively looking for problems through frequent visits by himself or his staff to corps artillery commanders and the divisions. Depending on the situation, he also exercised control, under the operational control policy, of the army artillery, the 32d Field Artillery Brigade. In general, the First Army's employment of the brigade's 240-mm. howitzers and 8-inch guns depended on the width of the corps fronts and the brigade's mission. If the corps fronts were narrow, the brigade controlled its own units in support of the corps artillery or in general support. If the fronts covered a greater distance, the First Army headquarters would attach at least some of the army artillery to the corps, especially if communications presented a problem.

In Normandy, shortages of artillery ammunition and poor fields of observation in the bocage presented challenges for the artillery section. As the S–4 worked with the army ammunition officer and G–4 section to obtain more artillery ammunition, Hart improvised by employing tank destroyers and other self-propelled guns in close support of the infantry. The nature of the terrain and operations left the First Army with little opportunity to employ the brigade as a concentrated force during the first two months of combat, and Hart, to ensure coverage of the whole front, attached the brigade's units, as they arrived, to the corps. To compensate for impediments to ground observation, he stationed a liaison officer at Dickson's G–2 section to obtain the latest data on possible targets and to forward them to corps fire direction centers.

Artillery in the First Army also relied greatly on aerial photography, observation, and adjustment of fire to overcome the challenge of the hedgerows. Hart could call on more than 200 aircraft belonging to the artillery battalions and artillery headquarters at different echelons of the First Army. He could also turn to visual and photographic observation by the planes of the IX Tactical Air Command. After the move of IX Tactical Air Command's advance headquarters and its First Army liaison section to the Continent on 10 June, he continued to detail an officer to maintain close contact with the G–2 section's liaison unit and the photo interpretation detachment, which remained at Middle Wallop until mid-June. These agencies processed requests for aerial reconnais-
sance from the corps, channeled them to the IX Tactical Air Command’s reconnaissance officer, and forwarded results to the rest of the staff by plane, radio, or fax. In the case of aerial photography, corps and separate army units submitted their requests for missions at 1800 each day to the army headquarters, where they were coordinated by the G–2 section. Army liaison aircraft or couriers would deliver the photographs to the G–2 of the corps originating the request, or the army G–2 for separate units. The process improved when, after experiments with different methods of aerial observation coverage of the army front, the IX Tactical Air Command adopted the First Army headquarters’ suggestion that tactical reconnaissance missions be suballotted to the corps for constant and simultaneous coverage of corps zones.

As important as artillery was to the First Army, shortages of artillery ammunition made close air support more critical than planners had anticipated. Having deployed an advance echelon to the Continent on 10 June, the IX Tactical Air Command headquarters on 17 June assumed effective control of close air support for the First Army, excepting only requests that exceeded the limits of its resources. Applying arrangements worked out prior to D-Day, Quesada set up his command post in a field adjacent to Bradley’s. The two commanders encouraged close cooperation between their operations and intelligence sections, to the point of placing the IX Tactical Air Command’s staff and the First Army’s air representatives under one roof. At a joint conference every evening, the G–3 (Air) subsection laid out the ground force’s requirements
for air support, based on requests from the corps, and the air operations officer allocated available squadrons. At the airfields, ground liaison officers briefed pilots on bombelines—lines drawn to provide safety margins between friendly and opposing forces—enemy antiaircraft concentrations, and other crucial information. Where an immediate need existed during the day, air-ground coordination parties at the division or corps level sent a request to the army G–3 (Air) subsection, which arranged with the IX Tactical Air Command headquarters for diversion of an air unit. (Chart 6) The system worked well, especially as aircraft relocated from English bases to Norman fields, some only 400 to 500 yards behind the front. In spite of rain and fog during much of July, the IX Tactical Air Command hit enemy communications and positions and established such a degree of air superiority that one American regiment halted its attack and complained to higher levels when it was strafed by two enemy planes.

Even with air support, the battle of the hedgerows had become a costly endeavor, as the First Army’s G–1 and adjutant general sections could testify. Most of the G–1 section was supposed to remain in Bristol with the army base echelon until well after D-Day, but problems with reclassification, unit awards, and a more complex daily estimated loss report caused the shift of additional G–1 personnel to France within days of the landing. For those who remained, the passage of each headquarters base echelon through the marshaling process upset the casualty reporting process and slowed the flow of reports. The army base echelon compensated to a degree by arranging for division casualty reports to bypass the corps base echelon while the corps deployed.

When the casualty division of the adjutant general section reached Normandy one month after D-Day, it found a huge backlog of battle casualty, hospital, and burial reports to check, reconcile, and process. Battle casualty reports, prepared by regimental and separate unit personnel officers on the basis of morning reports from their subordinate units, had passed through division and corps echelons to the First Army casualty division. Aided by a massive influx of personnel from the remainder of the adjutant general’s section, this division processed half of the 10,000 outstanding battle casualty reports within 48 hours. Nevertheless, it still faced the challenge of keeping up with casualty reports from a growing army that already boasted 4 corps, 16 divisions, and 190 separate units. To keep information as timely as possible, the casualty division used messengers to rush reports to the First Army headquarters, where they went directly to the casualty division. Even with such measures, however, it took time for battle casualty reports to reach the First Army headquarters. Daily estimated loss reports, arriving at the First Army command post from the corps about 0730 each day, usually provided the army commander by 1000 with a quick, fairly accurate picture of unit strengths as of the previous midnight.

After fewer losses than expected in June, casualties rose sharply, testing the replacement system. For two months after D-Day the First Army headquarters controlled its own enlisted replacement system, as the G–1 section and the adjutant general’s classification subsection processed unit requisitions and
1. Division air-ground coordination party (AGCP), staffed by tactical air party officer (TAPO) and division G–3 (Air), send direct support request to Army G–3 at Combined Operations Center (COC), also informing corps G–3 (Air) so corps AGCP can monitor or intervene as necessary.

2. Corps AGCP monitors communications net.

3. COC, consisting of Army G–2 and G–3 together with IX Tactical Air Command’s A–2 and A–3 (termed Combat Operations), consults with Army HQ and TAC HQ on request; then G–3 and A–3 each approve it.

4. A–3 at Combat Ops relays support request and recommended course of action to Tactical Control Center (TCC), also termed Fighter Control Center.

5. Forward director post (FDP), in constant communication with TCC, provides continuous updates on location of friendly and enemy air units using microwave early warning (MEW) radar tracking.

6. TCC relays strike request to airborne “on-call” fighter-bombers.

7. FDP, using SCR–584 radar, furnishes precise guidance and navigation information to strike flight en route to the target.

8. Division AGCP prepares for incoming strike flight by arranging for artillery fire to mark targets with colored smoke and to suppress enemy air defenses; AGCP will maintain communication with strike flight during attack.

shipped them to the three replacement battalions, each supporting a corps. Normally, units would receive fillers from these battalions within 24 to 48 hours of their requisitions or, if urgently needed, within 12 to 24 hours. Meanwhile, the army headquarters would prepare consolidated requisitions, based on the unit requisitions, for the theater's Ground Force Replacement System, which would then send 250-man detachments to replenish the replacement battalions. Even though the 14th Replacement Depot arrived on the Continent on 22 June, it did not begin work until 1 July and never became directly involved in requisition procedures before the breakout at the end of the month. During the early days of the invasion, the automatic flow of fillers provided by the Neptune plan proved ample, and the First Army did not begin requisitions by units until 18 June. By the end of the first week of July, however, the First Army could not find enough replacements on the Continent to replace losses, especially of infantry riflemen. Responding to urgent calls from the First Army staff, ETOUSA alerted 20,000 infantry fillers in England for shipment to the Continent. This rush shipment helped, but infantry riflemen remained a scarce commodity in the theater replacement pipeline during the campaign. Often, the G–3 section had to set priorities among units for available replacements.69

Replacement of officers likewise presented a problem. With the large number of new divisions and resulting demands on leadership, the First Army was taking heavy losses among officers and finding that others did not meet the test of combat. First Army policy authorized unit commanders to send any officer they recommended for reclassification to their corps headquarters via intermediate echelons. If these echelons did not reassign him, a recorder from ETOUSA's Reclassification Board interviewed the officer at corps headquarters and helped the unit commander prepare a file on the officer for his reclassification hearing. Many who seemed lacking in leadership were dumped by their commands in neuropsychiatric hospitals. The First Army inspector general investigated many incidents to separate genuine medical cases from those more suited to court-martial or reclassification. To replace lieutenants and captains, the First Army headquarters hoped mainly to rely on promotions within organizations, but it adopted a tough initial policy on battlefield promotions, approving only the most deserving cases. Later, it eased the policy to allow more second lieutenants in command positions to receive such elevations. Meanwhile, the practice of four extra regimental and battalion commanders with each division had worked quite well. As the initial allotment became exhausted, however, the divisions requested more field grade officers, rather than fill the gaps with veteran junior officers as the G–1 section had hoped. The section had to turn to its sources within the army or ETOUSA for more such officers.60

The search for suitable commanders extended to the highest levels. In general, Bradley and Eisenhower were satisfied with the First Army's corps commanders, especially Collins who was already emerging as the star of the group. They were quick, however, to axe division commanders whose units did not meet expectations. From 6 June to 1 August, nine general officers in the First Army were relieved, including the commander of the 8th Infantry Division and
two commanders of the 90th Infantry Division. Although Bradley hesitated to lay the entire blame for the poor initial performance of these units on their relieved commanders, he later stated that the first commander of the 90th Division, as an artilleryman, lacked a grasp of combined arms, and that his successor would not leave his command post and visit the front. Bradley's critics later charged that he used reliefs as quick fixes for tactical problems, that he relieved senior officers without taking into account the difficulties faced by inexperienced divisions, and that the rush to "cut heads" created a needlessly tense command climate. In this, the First Army presented a contrast to the British Second Army, which, according to Carlo D'Este, retained unsatisfactory commanders far beyond when they should have been relieved. 61

When one looks at specific cases, however, Bradley's actions appear justified. Although all three division commanders had been approved for combat service by Army Ground Forces in the United States and one—Maj. Gen. Eugene M. Landrum—had led a division in the Aleutians, all three in Normandy displayed major deficiencies in combat leadership. Given the fact that the U.S. Army in World War II was trying to form divisions—and find division commanders—for a mass force on the basis of the small prewar constabulary and officer corps, the inability of some division commanders to measure up to the challenge of combat should not have been surprising. Bradley perhaps could have done more to help these commanders work through their difficulties, but both he and Eisenhower felt that, at that point in the war, with so much at stake, they could not afford to tolerate mistakes by senior leaders, especially given the availability of officers who had shown potential for division command in combat. Their attitude, harking back at least to Pershing, was that a commander must take responsibility for the performance of his unit, imposing his will in person if necessary to accomplish his mission. While perhaps a bit harsh at times, the First Army relief policy was understandable given the circumstances. 62

Bradley's anxiety over high-level leadership reflected in part his concern for troop morale. In the early days of the beachhead, the First Army headquarters could do little for morale beyond sporadic command visits to the fighting troops. From the beginning, it placed all towns in the army area off limits for administrative and disciplinary reasons, and, despite the best efforts of First Army special services, it could not establish a rest area before the breakout at the end of July. Much of the early special services effort was haphazard, largely due to the confusion of unloading, the necessary emphasis on combat troops and supplies, and the lack of understanding of special services in the Army. Because of the difficulty of locating the newspapers on ships, distribution of the Stars and Stripes did not begin until 11 June, and daily circulation did not start until 21 June. As late as August exchange items were reaching troops in limited amounts, augmented only by American Red Cross supplies, including donuts and coffee dispensed by five clubmobile groups that began to arrive on the Continent in mid-July. To help the Red Cross support these and other activities, the First Army quartermaster section stored and issued Red Cross supplies in cooperation with a Red Cross official assigned to the First Army. Meanwhile, to meet the demand for entertainment, the Stars and Stripes de-
tachment showed movies to about 62,000 troops. Only in July were the five special service companies attached to the First Army able to enact a more permanent program, including United Service Organization (USO) shows, which began on 11 July.63

While the special service section struggled to establish morale-building activities, the publicity and psychological warfare section was undergoing its own growing pains. Having just joined the staff in March, the new section had to balance two ostensibly similar but separate tasks. In its relations with the press, the section benefited from the strong rapport between correspondents and Bradley, who took a straightforward approach to reporters at the suggestion of Hansen, his aide and a former journalism student. Dickson and Thorson, the G–2 and G–3, gave regular briefings, and Bradley himself would occasionally speak off the record on his plans. In part, the system worked because of the relatively uncritical nature of the 45-man First Army press corps, but Bradley's candor undoubtedly paid dividends in mutual trust. It did not, however, spare the First Army headquarters from the growing impatience of reporters who feared a stalemate, complaints about the initial separation of the press camp from the headquarters, and grumbling over the inadequate army signal installations for transmitting news copy from the beachhead. Already in a difficult position, the section chief, Col. David P. Page, Jr., was relieved in late July for releasing the news of the death of Bradley's friend, Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., before Roosevelt's wife could be notified. He was replaced by the army special service officer, Lt. Col. Flynn L. Andrew, who was succeeded in his former post by Col. William May.64

Along with maintaining a press camp, transport, and transmission facilities for newsman, the section also supported propaganda activities. It collected data, prepared leaflets and broadcasts for tactical propaganda, and arranged through SHAEF for leaflet drops from Britain. Although the First Army staff seemed to regard such warfare as a toy, it noted with relish the successful use of propaganda, notably at Cherbourg, where leaflets and broadcasts adorned with Strauss waltzes helped to induce surrenders.65

Propaganda, in the form of newspapers and broadcasts, also helped the First Army civil affairs personnel to maintain order among civilians in the rear areas. In these early weeks the task of the First Army civil affairs section was simplified by the absence of large urban areas with the sole exception of Cherbourg. The proximity of a rich farming area, the lack of refugees, and the presence of a capable French local administration also helped. To conduct civil affairs in rear areas, civil affairs detachments were attached to the First Army from the European Civil Affairs Division. Operating under the supervision of the First Army civil affairs section, they worked with French officials to keep order, detect agents and collaborators, transfer captured documents, and distribute relief supplies in the army area. In corps and division areas, these detachments operated under the supervision of corps and division civil affairs officers, but they could turn to the army civil affairs section for expertise in such areas as public health, public safety, labor, industry, agriculture, and finance. As the First Army advanced and rear boundaries moved forward, the
detachments stayed in place, passing from division to corps to army control. Despite prejudices against civil affairs among II Corps veterans, Bradley, in line with SHAPE’s policy of establishing civil affairs sections at the general staff level, raised Col. Damon M. Gunn’s section to the status of a general staff section (G-5) on 18 July.

Other First Army staff sections also maintained order in rear areas by rounding up stragglers, guarding enemy prisoners of war, and otherwise policing the area. Under the supervision of the disciplinary subsection of the provost marshal’s section, military police from 13 June to 1 August picked up 462 stragglers at traffic control points and brought them to collection centers. There they stayed, until their corps, notified by the First Army headquarters, called for them. The disciplinary section not only kept records on straggling, but also supervised enforcement of police regulations, operated the First Army interrogation center and stockade, and worked with the judge advocate general to try disciplinary cases, most of which involved looting and rape. Military police guards escorting stragglers back to their corps often passed German prisoners in division supply trucks on their way to enclosures that the First Army had established. At times, especially after the fall of Cherbourg, the influx of prisoners threatened to, but never quite did, overwhelm the system. In some disciplinary cases and questions involving prisoners, the provost marshal worked at different times with the judge advocate general, inspector general, civil affairs section, and G-2 counterintelligence subsection.

The First Army rear areas actually suffered more from congestion than from disorder. Excluding the Cotentin Peninsula, its beachhead was only ten to twenty miles deep. Within that area, army, corps, division, and ADSEC installations were crowded into seemingly every available space. Given the lack of usable rail transport, the First Army had to rely on trucks to shuttle troops and critical items on the few available roads, most of which were narrow gravel or dirt lanes bordered by the steep hedgerows. Traffic jams soon became common, especially at intersections along the main lateral route from Montebourg to Bayeux. The situation demanded close cooperation among the G-3 troop movements subsection, the G-4 traffic headquarters, the traffic subsection of the provost marshal section, the special staffs, and subordinate echelons. Stationed in adjacent tents at the supply echelon, the G-3 troop movements subsection and G-4 traffic headquarters prepared schedules, while the engineer section supervised construction of traffic circles and one-way bypasses through towns. Meanwhile, the provost marshal placed military police at every major and most minor intersections. By such means, the First Army headquarters gained some control of the situation, with problems centered around poor coordination and planning by the dispatching agencies.

For all of the staff’s efforts, the congestion could only become worse over time unless the Allies expanded their lodgment. By early July the First Army headquarters supervised 4 corps and 13 divisions, including 9 infantry, 2 armored, and 2 airborne divisions. During the rest of the month the First Army headquarters continued to emphasize the buildup of combat troops, to the point that by 25 July the command included 14 infantry, 6 armored, and 2 airborne
divisions. Although the two airborne divisions were returning to England for reorganization, the number of other divisions was becoming too unwieldy for a single army headquarters to handle.71 (See Appendix G.)

The buildup of supplies also contributed to the congestion. Despite the disruption of the storm, the buildup actually approached planned goals by late July. At that point, the First Army had assembled large stocks of rations and gasoline, although the depots still reported shortages of ammunition, signal equipment, and some small arms. Port facilities remained a major concern. Not until 16 July did Cherbourg become operational, and only a trickle of supplies came through the minor ports of Carentan, Grandcamp, Isigny, and St. Vaast. Most of the First Army’s supplies still arrived over the beach aboard LSTs or were borne ashore by lighters and various amphibious craft from offshore shipping. The entire Allied force needed both new ports and additional space in the lodgment.72

Following Montgomery’s overall design in his 30 June order, Bradley turned his attention about 8 July to a plan that would enable the First Army to clear the bocage and turn Middleton’s VIII Corps southwest into Brittany. Even before D-Day, he had considered the use of heavy bombers to blast a hole in the German line, and he now moved to translate that concept into reality. In his command truck and an adjacent tent where Hansen, his aide, had erected a huge map of the beachhead, he devoted two nights to examining terrain, comparing roadnets, laying out boundaries, and otherwise outlining options. Encouraged by intelligence data that indicated a lack of reserves behind German lines, Bradley drew up a plan for an offensive south. He would precede it with a massive air strike and use the St. Lô–Périers road—which cut across the First Army front from southeast to northwest—and not the St. Lô–Coutances route—an east-west route farther south—as his line of departure. Once Bradley had the basic design, he called in Hodges and then Kean, Thorson, and Dickson for a preliminary critique.73 Montgomery and Dempsey heard the plan at a meeting on 10 July, and Montgomery approved the concept while instructing Dempsey to continue to hold the Germans on his front. He also recommended to Bradley a greater concentration at the point of attack. About the same time, Bradley notified Collins, whose VII Corps would carry out the plan, and Collins suggested a three-mile sector along the St. Lô–Périers road near Marigny as the focal point. After the other corps commanders and Quesada critiqued the design at a 12 July conference, the First Army headquarters issued its outline plan, code-named COBRA.74

The deep involvement of the First Army commander and staff in the planning of COBRA was unusual for an army headquarters, but not inappropriate, given the importance of this operation, Bradley’s close relationship with Collins, and the VII Corps commander’s tactfulness in inserting his ideas into the design. The army outline plan of 13 July, with Collins’ input, went beyond the usual role of an army headquarters in laying out not only the general scheme and objectives, boundaries, and changes in division attachments for the attack, but also the specific area of attack and, on the overlay, the missions of the divisions. It allowed great freedom of action to the corps commanders during
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the third, or consolidation, phase, detailing no boundary between the VII and VIII Corps. Among the First Army planners, Hart wanted to rely more on his artillery to break the German line, but Bradley doubted that the First Army possessed enough ammunition and guns to provide the necessary intensity. For the most part, he and Collins allowed their staffs to handle details, while in daily conferences they worked out any major modifications. Intelligence reports remained encouraging, as the First Army G–2 estimate of 18 July indicated that the Germans lacked the troops and supplies to hold the St. Lô–Périers line and would likely fight a delaying action to cover a retreat south to a line near Coutances. 75

In drawing up his final plan, Collins made some changes to Bradley’s design. To ensure a penetration, he obtained an infantry division from the First Army reserve to add to the two infantry divisions already deployed for the initial attack. He also revised the exploitation of the penetration by two armored divisions and an infantry division, in effect weakening the exploitation to the south by shifting units to mass more power against Coutances to the west and possible enemy counterattacks from the east. This time, the First Army headquarters would supply plenty of artillery, including 9 of its 21 heavy battalions, 5 of its 19 medium battalions, and all 7 of its nondivisional light battalions, as well as support from adjacent corps artillery. In all, the VII Corps would have 258 artillery pieces, compared to an average of 102 for the other three corps. It would also have 6 of the 18 army tank destroyer battalions. Thanks to careful rationing by the First Army, the VII Corps could draw on relatively plentiful stocks of ammunition for these pieces. It also received several more quartermaster truck companies from the First Army motor pool. By 18 July the plan was complete, and Montgomery, who in the interim had consented to a preliminary offensive by the Second Army, approved it. The next day, Bradley and Quesada went to England to finalize arrangements for the preattack aerial bombardment. 76

In the meantime, the headquarters of the First Army and IX Tactical Air Command had arranged another form of air support. If Bradley’s memoirs are to be believed, he and Quesada conceived the idea of placing an air support party with a radio in the lead tank of every armored column to communicate with a flight of P–47 fighters overhead. Bradley arranged for the delivery of two tanks to the IX Tactical Air Command headquarters, although a First Army ordnance officer, suspecting a mistake, initially sent them to the 9th Infantry Division. Once the tanks finally arrived, the IX Tactical Air Command, in cooperation with the First Army armored and signal sections, tested the Army Air Forces’ very high frequency (VHF) radios in the tanks and found them workable. It then arranged with the First Army ordnance section and the IX Air Force Support Command to equip the lead tank of each armored column with the VHF set. 77

The First Army staff made one other major contribution to solving the tactical problems posed by the boîage. On 14 July Gerow invited Bradley, Hodges, Kean, Medaris, and Hains to a demonstration at the command post of the 2d Infantry Division. A sergeant in the 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron
had welded four steel prongs from a destroyed enemy obstacle to a Sherman tank, enabling the tank to ram into and through a hedgerow without rocking back on the embankment and exposing its underbelly to enemy fire. Impressed with the demonstration, Bradley ordered Medaris and Hains, his ordinance and armored officers, to install the device on a few tanks in every tank company. Medaris directed his able maintenance and supply chief, Col. Nelson M. Lynde, Jr., to redesign the device for mass production, and he put every ordnance company in the beachhead to work on its installation. From beach obstacles, the armor and ordnance sections obtained the necessary steel. Medaris also arranged for an overnight air shipment from England of acetylene cylinders for welding. By 25 July the First Army had produced about 500 hedgerow cutters, and tank units were calling for more. The advent of the “rhino” device was one of the few instances in which the First Army headquarters took an active role in adjusting equipment and tactics to the bocage. Although it distributed lessons learned through bulletins, it usually left tactical innovations to the combat divisions, which possessed the combat experience at the tactical level and could apply it to their own unique problems with the hedgerows.  

Thanks in part to these innovations, the First Army in mid-July slowly advanced to COBRA’s jumpoff line, the St. Lô–Périers road. Despite tenacious German resistance, on 14 July the VIII Corps reached the Ay and Sèves Rivers, just short of the road, and the next day the First Army headquarters halted its drive west of the Taute River. The focus now shifted east of the Taute, where the XIX Corps was advancing southwest on St. Lô. Bradley had apparently decided that he wanted St. Lô after all to guard COBRA’s eastern flank, although Corlett would later state that the First Army commander did not really expect the XIX Corps to take the city before the big push. The XIX Corps commander already showed some resentment of his superior’s tendency to favor Collins in the allocation of missions, troops, and resources. His temper was not improved by the limited supply of ammunition that the First Army headquarters, rationing for COBRA, was willing to allot to his advance, especially after having protested the ammunition estimates during the preparation for OVERLORD. To provide some substitute for artillery, Corlett obtained from the IX Tactical Air Command two dive bomber squadrons for armed reconnaissance. With this air support, the XIX Corps battled toward St. Lô, finally breaking into the city on 18 July. The July offensive was over. In sixteen days of bitter fighting, the First Army had gained only seven miles west of the Vire River and barely over half that to the east. The cost was high—40,000 casualties since the start of July.  

Although the First Army headquarters had originally planned to launch COBRA on 18 July, the slow advance to the desired starting line extended preparations, and after 19 July poor weather forced repeated postponements. Meanwhile, on 18 July the Second Army launched GOODWOOD, the preliminary offensive to COBRA. After two days of little progress, 6,000 casualties, and 400 lost tanks and no sign of COBRA, Montgomery canceled the drive. Still, GOODWOOD had drawn German attention back to the Caen flank, magnifying the chances for COBRA’s success.  

Waiting for the clouds to disperse, Bradley hosted Eisenhow, Brereton, and Lt. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, whose U.S. Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF)
in Europe would carry out the pre-COBRA bombardment. He frequently visited his corps commanders, notably Corlett who wanted his XIX Corps to have a larger role in the attack. He also conferred with Kean, Thorson, and Hodges, staying up late with Hodges to finalize arrangements for the impending transfer of command. On 19 July Bradley had notified Eisenhower that, once COBRA was finished, he planned to take command of the 1st Army Group, renamed the 12th Army Group to preserve the deception that the 1st Army Group was about to descend on the Pas de Calais. At that point, he would activate Patton’s Third Army, leaving Hodges in charge of the First Army. Until then, Bradley would have Patton and Hodges coordinate their respective future corps, while the First Army headquarters prepared to transfer units to the Third Army.

After a week of poor weather, COBRA finally opened but to an inauspicious beginning. Despite pessimistic weather reports, on the evening of 23 July the Allied Expeditionary Air Force determined that the attack should begin the next day. The following day dawned cloudy, but by the time the order for postponement reached the airfields in Britain, most of the 1,500 heavy and medium bombers had already departed. When they arrived at the target area, five miles by one mile, south of the St. Lô–Périers road, most found the visibility too poor to bomb. Nevertheless, about 300 dropped their loads. In one assault division, 25 soldiers were killed and 131 wounded when a faulty release mechanism caused the lead bomber of one formation to release its bombs prematurely. Appalled, Bradley and Quesada, who had watched the attack from Collins’ command post, called off the rest of the mission and attempted to institute more precautions for the next day. Yet on the morning of 25 July bombs falling short of their mark, caused by an inability to verify targets through the clouds, smoke, and dust, killed 111 more soldiers from the VII Corps. Shaken, infantrymen moved to the attack, where they encountered fierce resistance from dug-in Germans.

What had happened? Bradley and Quesada later stated that at the 19 July conference the Army Air Forces had agreed to an approach parallel to the St. Lô–Périers road and the American front. The Army Air Forces, on the other hand, claimed that no such understanding existed. The air forces generals, by their account, had warned Bradley that a parallel approach along the length of the rectangular target area, rather than across it, would create too much congestion over the area if the strike were limited to an hour’s length before the ground attack. Furthermore, they pointed out that the bombs that fell outside the target area lay within the normal margin of error. Miscommunication between the two services was obvious, but Bradley was probably asking the Army Air Forces for more than it could safely deliver, given time and space constraints. Even Quesada later admitted that the St. Lô–Périers road did not provide as clear a line of demarcation from the air as it appeared on a map, and drifting smoke and dust further obscured the highway to aircraft. While the First Army’s antiaircraft section stepped up its efforts to find materials, such as panels, searchlights, and balloons, which would identify friendly troops and vehicles from the air, Bradley and Eisenhower debated whether they would ever again use the heavy bombers in a tactical role.
Nevertheless, if the bombing had shocked and demoralized the VII Corps, it had done even more damage to the Germans. Dickson noted that the German prisoners collected by the VII Corps appeared deaf, tremulous, or in deep shock as a result of the bombing. Still, on the evening of 25 July frontline officers could see few signs of a breakthrough. Gambling that a penetration had occurred and that the Germans were not merely retreating to a second defensive line, Collins committed his exploitation force. By the evening of 27 July the VII Corps had driven almost twelve miles south into the German rear and was threatening Coutances to the west. Ultra intercepts showed the Germans’ desperation over the gaping hole in the line. Although the V and XIX Corps had made little headway, the VIII Corps was advancing toward Coutances. Exultation reigned in the apple orchard east of Isigny as corps commanders reported their progress, and Bradley wrote Eisenhower, “Things on our front really look good. . . . We believe we have the Germans out of the ditches and in complete demoralization and expect to take full advantage of them.” (See Map 5.)

The First Army headquarters moved quickly to turn the breakthrough into a breakout. At a conference with his corps commanders late on the afternoon of 27 July, Bradley went over his plans and gave out new objectives and corps boundaries. Determined to press the attack and prevent the Germans from forming a new line along the rivers to the south, Bradley directed Collins’ VII Corps to widen the breakthrough and drive southwest toward the coast to cut off the enemy facing Middleton’s VIII Corps. Once the VII Corps’ spearheads had contacted those of the VIII Corps near Coutances, the VII Corps would turn south and take the crossroads of Villedieu-les-Poëles, twenty-two miles south of the site of the breakthrough. The VIII Corps would keep up the pressure toward Coutances. At Corlett’s suggestion, Bradley transferred an infantry division and the XIX Corps front to Gerow’s V Corps. The XIX Corps would take three infantry divisions and part of an armored division and attack south along the west bank of the Vire River. It would thereby guard the VII Corps’ flank and capture Vire, a critical junction twenty miles south of St. Lô on the highest ground in Normandy. The V Corps would continue its attack, but without any specific objectives as yet. On a visit the next day, Montgomery approved Bradley’s design. He also arranged for the British Second Army to attack near Caumont on 30 July to guard the First U.S. Army’s east flank and contain German armored reserves on the British front.

As American troops raced south during the last days of July, the First Army headquarters unavoidably missed some opportunities in the fast-developing situation. (Map 6) Bradley, preparing to take over the 12th Army Group, left more of the direction of the First Army to Hodges, who devoted most of his time to touring corps command posts. Lacking a Phantom system like Montgomery’s, it was nearly impossible for anyone at the First Army headquarters to keep pace with events. Despite Bradley’s instructions to Collins at the 27 July conference, the First Army field order for 28 July directed the VII Corps to pursue both its drive southwest toward Coutances and its attack south at the same time, moving its boundary with the VIII Corps east from the coast.
only when it had linked up with the VIII Corps and when the VIII Corps was prepared to continue its attack south from Coutances. The resulting confusion and lack of coordination between the VII and VIII Corps probably permitted a good share of the Germans facing the VIII Corps to escape, although they left behind considerable equipment and vehicles.
The American high command might well have been more concerned about the situation to the east. By the morning of 28 July Dickson had noted a German panzer division apparently moving west from the British front to strike the flank of the penetration. Despite Hodges’ disapproval of Corlett’s desire to out-flank the German thrust, the XIX Corps managed to halt the counterattack and drive the Germans back across the Vire River, clearing the way for a U.S. advance farther south. By 31 July the VIII Corps had seized Avranches, the coastal town where Normandy and the Brittany Peninsula meet, breaking the line that the Germans were attempting to organize beyond the town and opening the way into Brittany.90

In its baptism of fire, a period in which it enjoyed great power and autonomy as the primary American headquarters on the Continent, the First Army headquarters displayed competence, though no special brilliance, as well as a willingness to assert its prerogatives. It performed its role in an assured manner, laying out clear and simple missions that rarely interfered in corps business, establishing installations and procedures, and keeping close track of operations, thanks to the generally excellent communications in the small, slowly expanding lodgment. One could argue that the headquarters needed to learn some lessons about concentrating forces, mishandled some aspects of the buildup, took too hard a line with its division commanders and the Navy, lacked coordination with higher air echelons, and did not allow ADSEC and COMZ to install themselves on the Continent. Yet many of the factors with which the First Army had to contend—rugged terrain, poor weather, lack of shipping, and an immensely complex buildup organization with inadequate channels of communication—were beyond its control. With the 21 Army Group, the corps, and particularly the IX Tactical Air Command headquarters, the First Army headquarters enjoyed good relations, due largely to Bradley’s interpersonal skills and easy rapport with the principals, and, even with the Navy, the First Army headquarters was able to work out its differences. Cobra showed that the First Army could concentrate combat power when conditions were right. Nevertheless, problems in command and communications in Cobra foreshadowed the difficulties that the First Army would face in the pursuit across France.
Notes


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38 First Army FO 1, 26 Jun 44, 101–3.9 Field Orders, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 317–19; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 37; War Department, Historical Division, St-Lo (7 July–19 July 1944), American Forces in Action Series (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, War Department, 1946), p. 2; Jnl, First Army G–2 Jnl, 27 Jun 44; Sylvan Diary, 26–28 Jun 44; Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, pp. 121–23.

39 Cirs, First Army G–2 Special Estimate 4, 29 Jun 44, and G–2 Estimate 7, 29 Jun 44. Quote from Ltr, Bradley to Eisenhower, 29 Jun 44, Omar N. Bradley, Bradley Correspondence with Eisenhower, v. 1, 1943–1945, box 5, Bradley Papers, USAMHI.

40 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 106–09; Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield, pp. 696–702; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 267–68; Interv, St. Louis with Bonesteel, 9 Nov 72, pp. 149–51; First Army FO 1, 1 Jul 44, 101–3.9 Field Orders, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Hansen Diary, 2 Jul 44; Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 327–28; St-Lo, p. 2.

41 Hansen Diary, 3–4 Jul 44; Sylvan Diary, 3–7 Jul 44; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pp. 101–03.

42 Sylvan Diary, 8 Jul 44; Corlett, Cowboy Pete, pp. 92–93; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 134; Msg, Bradley to Commanding Officers, V, VII, VIII, XIX Corps and Provisional Ranger Group, 8 Jul 44, 101–3.9 Field Orders, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC.

43 Patton quote from Blumenson, ed., The Patton Papers, 2:482.

44 Ltrs, Bradley to Eisenhower, 6 Jul 44, Bradley Correspondence with Eisenhower, v. 1, 1943–1945, box 5, Bradley Papers, USAMHI, and Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Jul 44, in Chandler, ed., Eisenhower Papers, 3:1971; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, p. 137; Rpts, First Army G–2 Periodic Rpts for 4–8 Jul 44. All G–2 Periodic Reports cited in this study are in 101–2.2 G–2 Journal, boxes 1837–1879, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC. Bennett, ULTRA in the West, pp. 98–100; Cir, First Army G–2 Estimate 9, 10 Jul 44.


48 Interv, author with Hains, 29 May 91, pp. 11, 23, 36, 45; Ltr, Col Peter C. Hains, USA (Ret.), to author, 10 Dec 96, DWH; Donald E. Houston, Hell on Wheels: The 2d Armored Division (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1977), pp. 200–207. See also Rpt, First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, pp. 50–51, on tank employment.

First Test in Normandy

50 Interv, author with Hains, 29 May 91, pp. 11, 14-17, 25, 36-39; Thompson and Harris, The Outcome, pp. 118-19; Williams, “First Army’s ETO Signal Operations,” p. 10.

51 Cir, First U.S. Army Artillery Information Service, Sep 44, 101–16.0 Special Artillery Reports, Report Memo #6, 1st Army, Sept. 44, box 2000, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC.

52 Cir, First U.S. Army Artillery Information Service, Telephone Numbers, Office of the Artillery Officer, First Army, Jul 44, 101–16.0 Special Artillery Reports, Staff Section Reports, Memo #5, 1st Army, July 44, and First U.S. Army, Office of the Artillery Officer, Operational Procedure: Organization and Functioning of the Army Artillery Section, First Army Artillery Information Service, Sep 44, pp. 6–7, 101–16.0 Special Artillery Reports, Staff Section Reports, Memo #6, 1st Army, Sept. 44, both in box 2000, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Ltr, Perry to author, 28 Jan 97.


61–73; Perret, There’s a War To Be Won, pp. 26, 72, 118; D’Este, Decision in Normandy, pp. 288–89.
58 Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 October 1943–1 August 1944, 7:209–12; MS, Bradley, Revised Transcription of Bradley Interviews, reel 1, pp. 81–84, 112; Rpt, First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, pp. 382–84; Hansen Diary, 3, 13 Jul 44; Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p. 335; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, p. 139; MS, Carter, Carter’s War, ch. 9, pp. 33–34.


Hansen Diary, 20–23 Jul 44; Sylvan Diary, 20–23 Jul 44; Jul, First Army G–3 Jul, 20 Jul 44; Corlett, *Cowboy Pete*, p. 95.


Rpts, First Army G–2 Periodic Rpts for 25–26 Jul 44; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, pp. 139–40. See also Intervs, Long and Stephenson with Quesada, sec. 5, 13 May 75, p. 8, and Burg with Quesada, 25 Aug 76, p. 195.

Lt, Bradley to Eisenhowern, 28 Jul 44, Bradley Correspondence with Eisenhower, v. 1, 1943–1945, box 5, Bradley Papers, USAMHI. See also Bennett, *ULTRA in the West*, pp. 102–
03; Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*, p. 246; Hansen Diary, 26–27 Jul 44; Sylvan Diary, 27 Jul 44.


90 Hansen Diary, 28–30 Jul 44; Sylvan Diary, 28–31 Jul 44; Ltr, Bradley to Eisenhower, 28 Jul 44; Cir, First Army G–2 Estimate 12, 28 Jul 44; Rpts, First Army G–2 Periodic Rpts for 28–30 Jul 44; Jnl, First Army G–4 Jnl, 28 Jul 44.
Hodges Steps Up the Pace

For such a momentous day in the annals of the First Army, 1 August 1944, passed with remarkably little fanfare. At 0900 Bradley bid farewell to the staff, and shortly afterward he and his two aides left for the 12th Army Group headquarters. Hodges waited until 1025 to sign General Orders 4, by which he took command of the First Army. The new commander spent the rest of the day and much of the evening in his war room tent, conferring with Kean, Thorson, and his corps commanders and watching the First Army continue its advance to the south.

Scholars over the years, and even many contemporaries, have found it hard to characterize Courtney Hodges. Their evaluations ranged from “one of the most skilled craftsmen of my entire command” and “the Robert E. Lee of World War II” to “less than mediocre” and “a moron.” While Hodges did not invite familiarity, he possessed many qualities that inspired respect. Every inch a gentleman, the soft-spoken, modest, 57-year-old Georgian counted Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, and Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson of the Ninth Army among his good friends. A man of undoubted tenacity, diligence, and physical courage, he earned an officer’s commission through a competitive examination after academic failure at West Point and won the Distinguished Service Cross as a battalion commander in World War I. He later earned a reputation as a superb trainer and expert on small-unit infantry tactics in the interwar Army. Yet he lacked the presence of Bradley or Patton. Extremely shy, he seemed distant and struck some as unassertive. While a man of character, he cannot be regarded as an original thinker. In his tactics, he preferred simple, direct solutions to complex maneuvers, arguing that “too many of these battalions and regiments of ours have tried to flank and skirt and never meet the enemy straight on.”

His command style likewise presents a study of contrasts. On the one hand, he delegated considerable authority to subordinates and staff. He possessed great confidence in Kean, whom he had known in the chief of infantry’s office before the war, and, in the absence of a deputy commander, he allowed his chief of staff so much latitude that many believed that it was Kean, not Hodges, who ran the First Army. On the other hand, he kept close watch over operations. A battalion-level tactician by inclination and experience, he spent hours at the situation map in his command post with his inner circle. This group
consisted of his chief of staff, Kean; the G–3, Thorson; and the artillery officer, Hart. Usually, but not always, it also included the G–4, Wilson; the commander of the IX Tactical Air Command, Quesada; the deputy chief of staff for operations, Myers; and the G–2, Dickson. With these officers, he worked out tactical problems with great care, methodically reading situation reports, examining roadnets, and sketching prospective boundaries. Unlike Bradley, the shy Hodges did not like to call large staff conferences to explain his intentions, preferring instead to rely on Kean and Thorson as middlemen. He also lacked Bradley’s personal touch with his corps commanders. At first, he made daily trips to corps, division, and, occasionally, lower-level headquarters, but such visits declined over time. Nevertheless, the corps commanders knew he was watching them closely, and Corlett in particular believed that he lacked the confidence of his chief. Indeed, Hodges’ reservations about his subordinates with the exception of Collins may well have led him to follow their moves more closely than would otherwise have been the case.

As for the First Army headquarters, it experienced more a change in tone than in substance. Other than aides, only O’Hare accompanied Bradley to the 12th Army Group headquarters. Bradley later stated that he left behind his old Tunisia comrades because he did not believe an army group headquarters, with its focus on strategic planning and minimal logistical responsibilities, would allow enough scope for their functional skills. More likely, he did not want to make the task more difficult for his old friend by taking all of the experienced personnel with him. Thus, Hodges inherited a veteran staff, set in its procedures and so meticulous and attentive to details that one corps G–3 remarked, only half jokingly, “When you did a situation report for Third Army you showed the positions of the regiments. When you did one for First Army, you had to show Platoons.”

Hodges’ self-effacing nature was largely responsible for the few changes that were made, such as the more limited access to the commander and the enhanced role of Kean, who effectively assumed the role of deputy commander despite the position’s disappearance from the headquarters organization. The stern First Army chief of staff eased some of the coordination problems caused by the narrowness of Hodges’ inner circle by summoning Carter, McNamara, Medaris, or others among the staff chiefs at the close of Hodges’ morning meet-
ing, informing them of the proceedings, and having them pass along key decisions. In Dickson’s view, Kean’s new status made him more domineering than ever, leading the G–2 to mutter that *Mutiny on the Bounty* was certainly the wrong movie for the little Kean boy to watch at an impressionable age. Under Kean’s forbidding gaze and without Bradley’s moderating influence, the First Army headquarters became a more tense workplace, and some of the personal friction that had been contained to that point erupted into the open, especially the tension between Thorson and Dickson. The G–2 felt especially aggrieved because the G–3 and G–4 received promotions to brigadier general, while he remained a colonel. The strained atmosphere spilled into relations with other echelons, earning the First Army headquarters a reputation as a touchy group, demanding of subordinates and jealous of its prerogatives with superiors.

The combative nature of the First Army headquarters reflected, at least in part, its transition from the senior American headquarters on the Continent to one of many armies, each with its own mission and logistical demands. The First Army headquarters never forgot its former status, and it viewed the new arrivals of the 12th Army Group staff as untested interlopers. Dickson, for one, had hoped to become the army group G–2, only to see the position go to an old rival, Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Sibert. Not surprisingly, relations between the two staffs were often cool, and Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith, SHAEF’s chief of staff, later recalled with amusement that the First Army staff officers would frequently bypass their counterparts at the 12th Army Group headquarters to contact their former chief. Bradley perhaps inadvertently encouraged the practice by using his senior army
group staff "probably less than any other important general in Europe," dealing
directly with army commanders through personal visits by liaison plane.14 He
and Hodges kept up their close relationship, often exchanging ideas on opera-
tions before Bradley issued his final orders.

The circumstances of the campaign gave to the 12th Army Group a greater
role in administrative and logistical matters than the Army had planned. During
August the 12th Army Group headquarters served as the leading American
ground echelon with supervisory responsibilities over American support agen-
cies on the Continent. Even after August the 12th Army Group headquarters,
although operating increasingly as a predominantly strategic body, would carry
out more administrative functions than Army doctrine envisioned. Still, the
First Army headquarters worked directly with ADSEC and COMZ on most day-
to-day administrative and supply issues except for allocations, an increasingly
important role by autumn.15

Once the First Army headquarters drew a rear boundary on 2 August, COMZ
assumed control of logistical agencies, facilities, and operations behind that
line, including ADSEC, which served as the direct supplier to the armies. To
process the First Army’s requisitions and arrange for the steady flow of sup-
plies, ADSEC placed the 25th Regulating Station in close proximity to the First
Army headquarters, with the regulating officer himself operating from within
the First Army G-4 section. On technical matters, the chain of command ran
directly from the theater technical service chiefs, who doubled as the special
staff chiefs for COMZ, to the field armies and their subordinate ordnance, quar-
ter-master, medical, and other service units, in the process bypassing SHAEF
and the 12th Army Group headquarters. In practice, the First Army quarter-
master and other special staff chiefs who focused on supply had much more
contact with their ETOUSA-COMZ chiefs and less with their army group su-
periors than others, such as the engineer, whose responsibilities were divided
more evenly between logistics and operations.16

The division of units between the First and Third Armies had already been
decided. Under a 27 July First Army memorandum, the First Army would re-
tain 3 corps, 7 infantry divisions, and 3 armored divisions. Army combat units,
in addition to several headquarters units, included 3 cavalry groups, 8 tank
battalions, 13 tank destroyer battalions, 3 field artillery observation battalions,
39 other field artillery battalions, 25 antiaircraft battalions, 3 chemical battal-
ions, 2 Ranger battalions, 1 separate infantry battalion, and 3 military police
battalions. For service units, the First Army could call on 12 engineer combat
groups, including 36 engineer battalions and 39 separate engineer companies;
11 evacuation and 5 field hospitals; 1 convalescent hospital; 37 medical com-
panies; 2 chemical companies; 3 signal battalions and 8 signal companies; a
signal air liaison squadron; 109 quartermaster companies, including 34 truck
companies; 82 ordnance companies; and an army band, again in addition to
numerous headquarters units. Among the units attached to the First Army
were 24 quartermaster companies, 4 machine records units, 27 army postal
units, 6 military police escort guard companies, and 12 finance and disburse-
ment sections.17
To supervise this organization, the First Army staff followed a strenuous schedule. The three officers in the G-3 operations group, for example, each worked an eight-hour tour in the operations tent, with the officers on the 0800 to 1600 and the 2400 to 0800 shifts preparing the 1200 and 2400 situation reports, respectively, before going off-duty. During the night, the general staff sections collated periodic reports, which arrived about 2400 from subordinate G-2s and G-3s, and the daily estimated battle loss reports, which came into the command post about 0600. Hodges and his inner circle awoke about 0630 and, after breakfast, held a meeting during which they heard briefings on the situation and discussed future plans. After the meeting disbanded about 0900, Hodges might confer with individual staff chiefs before giving his orders for the day to Kean. He then departed by jeep or plane to visit subordinate commands, or he spent the day in his war room, often meeting with Kean, Dickson, Thorson, and other leading staff officers. He seldom composed orders himself, leaving that to the different sections, which would submit a draft for approval. If visiting other echelons, he usually returned about 1500 and received a summary from Kean of the day’s events. Frequently, he also discussed the press briefing with his publicity officer. The staff ate dinner about 1830 and then continued its work, often until 2400, with Hodges and his inner circle often holding meetings. Hodges himself usually retired about 2200.

The staff’s routine changed somewhat with the reorganization of the staff echelons for mobile warfare. As the First Army’s units rapidly advanced in the aftermath of COBRA, it soon became clear that the existing staff organization could not maintain the pace. Even the command echelon had grown so large and burdened with assets that it needed five days’ notice for a change of location, and it could not move over a hundred miles at a time. On 5 August Hodges ordered the formation of a small tactical echelon to follow the fast-moving front and maintain control over corps and divisions. (Chart 7) The concept of a tactical echelon, operating in advance of the rest of the headquarters, was not a new idea, but Hodges’ directive represented its debut with the First Army. In the First Army, the tactical echelon consisted of Hodges, Kean, and key personnel from the G-2, G-3, artillery, engineer, and signal sections. Later, detachments from the G-4 section and the IX Tactical Air Command headquarters joined this group. The tactical echelon’s organic transportation—ten-ton, small arms repair vans in which the ordnance equipment had been removed and desks, maps, and signal equipment installed—functioned as rolling command posts when the echelon could not satisfy Hodges’ preference for indoor quarters. Hodges and the command group with the tactical echelon used two sturdier Army Air Forces trailers provided by the IX Tactical Air Command.

The rest of the First Army headquarters divided into main and base echelons. Under Myers, as deputy chief of staff for operations, the main echelon, often split into command and supply echelons, managed less critical operational tasks as well as administrative functions of enough importance that they could not be handled by the base echelon. It included those sections that reported to Myers, as well as a small group from the adjutant general’s section and a modest G-1 contingent under the new G-1, Col. George A. Miller. The
<table>
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<th>Enlisted Men</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
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<td>Commanding</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1—2 1/2 ton house trailer; 1—map van; 2—1/4 ton (jeep); 1—small arms repair (SAR) truck; 2—2 1/2 ton (truck)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2—1/4 ton (jeep); 1—SAR; 1—3/4 ton weapons carrier (w/c); 1—2 1/2 ton (truck); 1—2 1/2 ton house trailer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1—SAR; 2—1/4 ton (jeep)</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2—1/4 ton (jeep); 1—SAR; 1—1 1/2 ton (truck)</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>G-3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liaison (G-3)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1—SAR; 1—1/4 ton (jeep)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1—SAR; 3—1/4 ton (jeep); 1—office trailer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1—command and reconnaissance truck with trailer (1/2 ton)</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1—ambulance</td>
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<td>1—SAR; 1—1/4 ton (jeep)</td>
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G–2 (Air) and G–3 (Air) subsections worked nearby with the main IX Tactical Air Command headquarters. Under Charles Williams, the base echelon, often as far as a hundred miles to the rear, handled routine administration. The new system was an improvement, but over time it faced its own problems, notably inadequate communications, inefficiencies resulting from a separation of sections, a tendency to shift personnel forward, and a need for support troops in the tactical echelon disproportionate to the size of that group.

The First Army headquarters would soon need any improvement the new system could provide, for the whole front was beginning to move. While Gerow’s V Corps in the northeast sector of the First Army front and Corlett’s XIX Corps in the center converged on Vire, Collins’ VII Corps to the southwest had by 3 August reached Mortain, a key crossroads in the hilly country about thirty miles south of St. Lô and eighteen miles east of coastal Avranches. Farther west, the VIII and XV Corps of the Third Army were passing through Avranches and encountering little opposition in Brittany. To the east, on 30 July the British Second Army had launched BLUECOAT, a powerful attack southwest toward Vire, while the Canadian First Army was deploying into the Orne bridgehead preliminary to an offensive toward Falaise, twenty miles southeast of Caen and almost forty miles northeast of Mortain. Under orders from Montgomery, who exercised operational control over the 12th Army Group pending SHAEF’s movement to France, Bradley altered his plans, ordering Patton to seize Brittany with a minimum force while turning the rest of his Third Army east for the drive to the Seine. To prepare for the drive to the east, Hodges would pivot
counterclockwise toward a line from Domfront, fifteen miles east of Mortain, to Mayenne, thirty miles to the southeast of Mortain.\textsuperscript{24} (Map 7)

For the next three days, Hodges and his staff raced to keep up with events as their three corps pivoted eastward. In five days the First Army headquarters issued three field orders after requiring only two during the previous two months. The fluid situation raised numerous questions of boundaries, as the First Army staff worked with mixed success to prevent confusion among troops from the V Corps, XIX Corps, and British Second Army in the east and between the VII Corps and the Third Army in the west. Indeed, when the boundary between the two armies was established on 1 August, two of Collins’ divisions were placed in the position of having to fight their way eastward to regain the First Army side of the new boundary line. At the same time, the First Army headquarters pushed the army artillery forward to support the VII and XIX Corps, coordinated corps artillery, and shifted troops to strengthen the drive in the southwest. It sent two divisions to the VII Corps and, under orders from Bradley, two other divisions to the Third Army. By 6 August the number of troops flowing through the narrow bottleneck between Avranches and Mortain was causing traffic jams, and an exasperated Hodges intervened to clear some of the confusion. The general’s mood was not improved by the XIX Corps’ slow advance on Vire, to the point that he was ready to allow Collins to cross Corlett’s front.\textsuperscript{25}

Part of the reason for the XIX Corps’ delay became clear that night, as four German panzer divisions launched a massive counterattack at Mortain, the first real test for the First Army under Hodges. The attack did not come as a complete surprise. For almost a week, Bradley, Hodges, and Collins had been wary of a possible enemy attempt to cut the narrow corridor between Avranches and Mortain, and the First Army G–2 section had traced the movement of German divisions west from the British sector to its front. Still, Dickson had not located the point of the German thrust, and ULTRA alerted the Allies only about an hour before the attack began.\textsuperscript{26}

After some misleading initial reports, the First Army headquarters, which was still in the process of forming a tactical echelon, knew by dawn that the Germans were making a major effort. Hodges remained unconcerned. He was receiving reassuring reports from Collins, and both the army and army group headquarters had several divisions available in the threatened area. During the day, Hodges reinforced the VII Corps to seven divisions and increased the allocation of artillery ammunition to that sector, despite the concerns of his staff that such a move would exhaust the First Army’s low supply of artillery shells. Meanwhile, Hart coordinated corps artillery in support of the VII Corps and positioned the 32d Field Artillery Brigade to bring to bear the weight of the army’s heavy artillery.\textsuperscript{27} Elsewhere, the G–3 (Air) subsection and the G–4 section arranged with the IX Tactical Air Command headquarters for close air support and an air drop primarily of food, ammunition, and medical supplies to an isolated battalion on the outskirts of Mortain. Under SHAEF policy, the two sections had to consult with the IX Tactical Air Command and coordinate with the 12th and 21 Army Group and Ninth Air Force headquarters before bidding for available transport space from AEAF’s Combined Air Transport Operations
Room, which coordinated drops. An initial mission by twelve C-47 cargo planes on 10 August dropped about a day’s supply of food and ammunition to the beleaguered unit, but another drop on 11 August was less successful. As an alternative to the air drop, the medical section arranged with the ammunition officer to send badly needed syrettes into the position by artillery shell. 28

As the First Army battled to contain the German thrust, a major opportunity loomed for the Allied commanders. While the British Second Army had continued its drive south, the Canadian First Army on 7 August had launched its offensive south toward Falaise. The Canadian drive presented Bradley with the prospect of turning the enemy’s front with the Third Army’s XV Corps and of driving across the German rear to link up with the British and Canadians near Falaise. On the morning of 8 August he checked with Hodges to confirm that the First Army could hold for the forty-eight hours needed to close the trap. Intelligence from the First Army G-2 section indicated that the Germans intended to press their attack, but Hodges knew that the enemy had suffered heavily. Bolstered by assurances from Collins, he expressed confidence that his troops could stand firm. 29 With the approval of the visiting Eisenhower and, by phone, of Montgomery, Bradley ordered the Third Army to turn its advance from the area of Le Mans, about seventy miles southeast of Mortain, toward Argentan, fifty-five miles due north of Le Mans and fourteen miles southeast of Falaise. Meanwhile, the First Army would reduce the German salient, advance east to cover the Third Army’s flank, and prepare to move against the enemy flank and rear. 30

Although Bradley’s flanking movement would make possible a crushing victory, it caused the First Army headquarters some tense moments. The First Army field order of 9 August called for renewed attacks by the V and XIX Corps, supported by the army artillery, against the northern face of the enemy salient near Mortain. As the VII Corps was pinched out by the XIX Corps’ advance, it would shift south of Domfront for a drive northeast alongside the XV Corps’ flank. Far from recoiling in the face of the First Army’s counterattacks and the prospect of the Third Army’s spearheads in their rear, the Germans held firm and, indeed, maintained enough pressure to keep Hodges from reinforcing Patton, as Bradley desired. Nor could Hodges readily assemble the VII Corps south of Domfront, where only a thin screen from the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions covered the gap to the Third Army boundary. 31

Thus, some days would pass before the First Army could begin its attack. By the evening of 9 August Hodges believed that his troops had decisively blunted the German drive, but he was uncertain whether the enemy would now withdraw or regroup to resume the attack. Through the next day, Dickson and Thorson debated the conflicting intelligence data—Thorson arguing that the Germans would soon try to escape and Dickson pointing to identifications of enemy reinforcements, including some from Pas de Calais, to argue that the enemy was merely regrouping. Finally, on 11 August, the day the XV Corps captured Alençon, only twenty-four miles south of Argentan, the First Army saw signs of withdrawal along its front. On 12 August the VII Corps began moving to its attack positions, but another day would pass before it could start
its advance. Meanwhile, concerned about the XV Corps’ long, exposed western flank, Bradley halted the Third Army just short of Argentan on the night of 12–13 August. Twenty miles lay between Patton’s forces and the Canadians, whose advance toward Falaise had stalled.

Over the next three days, as Allied generals debated whether to close the exit from the “Falaise pocket” or try for a deeper envelopment to the Seine, the First Army attacked all along its front against the shrinking salient. To the north, the British Second Army was maintaining the pressure against the northern shoulder of the German salient, while the Canadians by 16 August were encircling Falaise. Meanwhile, most of the Third Army drove east to a north-south line from Dreux, which lay only forty miles west of Paris, to Orleans in the Loire Valley.

In this fluid situation, the First Army headquarters sought to close the trap without becoming entangled with troops from other armies. Given the pace of events, ULTRA intercepts often were obsolete by the time they reached the First Army headquarters, compounding the G–2 section’s problems in discerning the chaotic situation in the pocket. Although Dickson perceived the start of an enemy withdrawal by 15 August, he still saw a considerable body of enemy troops, including parts of nine panzer divisions, in the pocket. As the VII Corps began its attack against the southern face of the salient on 13 August, Hodges, at Collins’ instigation, asked Bradley to alter the army boundary to enable the VII Corps to drive northeast on Argentan and Falaise. Since the change would have caused the VII Corps to cut across the XV Corps’ front, Bradley demurred, but at a conference later in the day Montgomery approved the change. Subsequently, the VII Corps advanced so quickly that by 14 August most of its units had reached the east-west boundary between the 12th and 21 Army Groups and were in position to cover the XV Corps’ flank. Still, on 15 August the Allies had not yet closed the gap. By ordering part of the XV Corps to head east while the rest joined the VII Corps in closing the gap, Bradley showed that he was still undecided between completing the short hook and launching a long envelopment to the Seine. Faced with the prospect of a head-on collision with the 21 Army Group, the First Army headquarters halted the VII Corps on 16 August, just beyond the army group boundary and twelve miles short of Falaise.

Confusion reigned in Allied circles that 16 August, the same day the Germans finally decided to withdraw from the pocket. As the Anglo-Americans tried to realign their force for the drive to the Seine, Bradley decided to send all of the Third Army to the east and turn over the task of closing the gap to the First Army. Responding to Montgomery’s transfer of the junction point between his forces and the Canadians to Trun and Chambois, each about eight miles northeast of Argentan, Bradley visited the First Army tactical echelon that afternoon. In the absence of Hodges, who was touring division command posts, he, Kean, and Brig. Gen. Truman C. Thorson decided to take Gerow’s V Corps headquarters, whose drive had been pinched out by the British advance at the tip of the salient, and shift it to the Argentan sector to take over the three divisions left behind by the XV Corps. Anxious to maintain the pressure until Gerow arrived,
Bradley ordered Patton to form a provisional corps headquarters to direct a drive on Trun.\textsuperscript{36}

The 12th Army Group commander had overestimated the time necessary for Gerow to take command. That evening, the First Army headquarters called Gerow and a small group from the V Corps' staff to the First Army tactical echelon near Domfront. Due to poor communications and liaison with the Third Army, Hodges and Kean could provide little on the situation near Argentan, but, after a few hectic hours of working out the details of transferring the V Corps to that front, Gerow left for Alençon. He arrived early in the morning of 17 August to find Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey, Patton's chief of staff and commander of the provisional corps, completing his preparations to attack. Gerow could not confirm his authority with the 12th Army Group headquarters until midday, at which point he postponed the attack until the next day to prepare his own plan and to bring up corps artillery. Meanwhile, the British Second Army continued to reduce the pocket from the north, while the Canadian First Army, after capturing Falaise on 17 August, continued its drive toward a junction with the Americans. By the time the V Corps linked up with the Polish 1st Armored Division of the Canadian First Army at Chambois on 19 August, much of the \textit{Seventh Army} had escaped, although it left behind large quantities of vehicles and equipment.\textsuperscript{37}

Even before the junction at Falaise, the Allies had already shifted most of their attention to the deep envelopment to the Seine. On 16 August the British 1 Corps of the Canadian First Army had begun a general advance east toward the Seine. As the rest of the Canadian First and the British Second Armies finished mopping up the pocket, they also turned to the east. To the south, the Third Army raced to the Seine, establishing a bridgehead at Mantes-Gassicourt, thirty miles northwest of Paris, on 20 August and at Melun, twenty-five miles southeast of Paris, on 24 August. (Map 8)

While the Third Army drove toward the Seine, the First Army conducted one of its most impressive maneuvers of the campaign. On 17 August Hodges received orders to assume the 64-mile front from Argentan east to Dreux, preliminary to a possible advance northeast to Mantes-Gassicourt.\textsuperscript{38} To man that front, the First Army staff made the complex arrangements necessary to move Corlett's XIX Corps from the Domfront area, where it had been pinched out by the converging attacks on the pocket, on a ninety-mile march east, leapfrogging across the rear areas of the VII and V Corps to its new sector. To prepare for the XIX Corps shift, the First Army staff officers haggled with their Third Army colleagues over boundaries, provided six truck companies from the VII Corps, and arranged for the V Corps to use its trucks to move the 2d Armored Division east of Argentan, where the division would transfer from the V to the XIX Corps. On 19 August, while the XIX Corps was still moving into position, Hodges conferred with Montgomery, Bradley, and Dempsey and won approval of his plan to send the XIX Corps north, alongside the Third Army's XV Corps, on a drive to the Seine, cutting off the Germans fleeing eastward in front of the British advance. As Kean and Wilson completed supply arrangements with the 12th Army Group staff on 20 August, the XIX Corps began its attack. Five days
later, Corlett’s troops seized Elbeuf, a town on the Seine forty-one miles north of Dreux, and contacted the British Second Army.39

The First Army headquarters now faced the challenge of disentangling the two forces. Hodges had already conferred with Dempsey and a representative of the British 30 Corps and arranged for the two armies to alternate for two hours each on the use of critical roads until the redeployment was complete. This complex operation, which ended on 27 August, and the earlier ninety-mile shift of the XIX Corps received little of the popular attention given to the Third Army’s rapid drive to the south, but it demanded more coordination.40

For the First Army headquarters, August 1944 must indeed have seemed the best of times. Following the advance, the tactical echelon drove east through the French countryside, stopping for two or three nights at parks and chateaux. At one point, the headquarters occupied a thirty-bedroom mansion with red brocades and French art near Couterne.41

For all the good times, the frequent moves presented a challenge to the signalmen. So critical was the role of the signal officer in these relocations that Hodges remarked, “I never move anywhere until [Grant] Williams tells me I can.”42 Whenever the headquarters commandant went ahead to find a new location for the command post, he took along a signal officer, often Williams himself, to advise him. When establishing a new command post, crews of the 17th Signal Operation Battalion, which furnished eighty-eight personnel to the tactical echelon, initially laid wire to each of the First Army’s three corps, five wire lines to the rear, and a wire line directly to the 12th Army Group headquarters. Eventually, the time, materiel, and personnel needed to maintain wire communications caused the First Army headquarters to rely more on radio. At each new command post, signal crews would install two radio phone links and one radio teletype link to each corps and to the command echelon, as well as a radio command net to the corps, a radio station on the 12th Army Group’s command net, and a point-to-point radio circuit to the command echelon. To enable rapid movement, they placed the master switchboard in the ordnance vans, from which they ran lines to vans housing the different staff sections. In addition, the signal section provided four dismounted couriers, six motor messengers, air courier planes, and a locator service.43

Once the signalmen had established communications, the echelon would move forward by phases to the new command post. In the case of the move to Maillebois on 22 August, the headquarters commandant and his section departed first. They were followed at intervals by the headquarters reconnaissance platoon of the 125th Cavalry, the signal contingent, the chief of staff section, the commander’s group, G–3 personnel, G–2 personnel, the artillery contingent, and the engineers. The last contingent to leave closed down the former site.44

Despite the best efforts of Williams and his signal crews, it proved impossible to maintain consistent communications during the pursuit across France. Inevitably, lack of wire, and of personnel to lay wire, forced the headquarters to turn to radio. Although the SCR–399 radios used by the command net could in theory reach 100 miles—more than the distance to corps headquarters for nearly the whole campaign—available frequencies could not handle all of the traffic
generated by an army staff. In the end, the headquarters had to rely heavily on relays to ensure good communications. The IX Tactical Air Command detachment in particular ran into problems as the advance carried it farther from its bases; it coped by employing a variety of communications links and keeping its wings fully briefed in the event of loss of contact. For particularly important messages, the First Army headquarters used special flights of air couriers in addition to the five scheduled flights. Employing wire, radio—including the independent nets of the special staff—liaison planes, and the innovation of a special communications control center to diagnose problems in the circuits
quickly, the tactical echelon almost never lost contact with major subordinate units for extended periods of time. Nevertheless, brief delays and even major disruptions did occur. For example, the headquarters had no communications with the XIX Corps for three days during the corps' advance to Elbeuf, causing a frustrated Hodges to direct the use of liaison officers in continuous shifts until his staff had received enough information on the corps' situation.45

Mobile warfare caused the First Army headquarters to make adjustments in its process of issuing orders as well. Normally, Hodges received verbal orders from Bradley a few days before the written letter of instruction arrived. This
advance notice allowed Akers’ G-3 operations subsection, with written or oral guidance from Hodges, to begin the process of preparing its own orders; to furnish advance information on boundaries, missions, and available units to the other staff sections; to obtain supporting data from them; and to coordinate with the IX Tactical Air Command headquarters via G-3 (Air). Within a day or two of the army group’s instructions, the First Army headquarters would publish its own order. During June and July this took the form of a field order, laying out the enemy and Allied situations, the boundaries and available units, the missions, administrative arrangements, and the location of the army command post and axis of signal communication. As the pace quickened in early August the First Army headquarters dropped the more detailed field order in favor of letters of instructions, which, stated the staff officers field manual of 1940, “deal with the strategic phases of large units and regulate operations over a large area for a considerable length of time.”

This form had already been used by the Fifth Army staff in Italy. The First Army staff turned to even briefer directives for changes in mission and dispositions of the corps. After 9 August it never again issued a field order during the European campaign. Over time, however, its letters of instructions resembled field orders in organization and scope.

Akers’ operations planners were not the only ones who had to adjust to the rapid pace. Although the medical section found its task eased by lower casualties in the pursuit, it still had to deal with the long lines of evacuation and the problems associated with frequent repositioning. In response, Rogers reorganized the army evacuation system, positioning his three medical groups on an axis perpendicular to the front to provide more depth than breadth of coverage. Once the First Army passed the Seine, Rogers ordered the use of field hospitals, more mobile than the evacuation hospitals, as improvised evacuation units, leapfrogging them forward as the divisions that they supported advanced. He assembled his evacuation hospitals and other less mobile units near Senonches, fifty miles southwest of Paris, ready to move where most needed. To keep up with the advance, the First Army medical section soon moved its evacuation hospitals to La Capelle on the Franco-Belgian border, but by then even that area lay too far behind the lines for convenient use. The rapid advance put great strains on the section’s transportation resources, causing Rogers to pool

General Rogers
200 vehicles of his units into a provisional truck company to carry hospital supplies and the depot. This measure, along with airlift, the comparatively light weight of medical items, and captured German supplies, enabled the First Army medics to maintain their stocks.\(^48\)

The ordnance section also adopted some highly successful measures to meet the demands of mobile warfare. Anticipating the pursuit, Medaris had integrated supply and maintenance as far forward as possible, stationing behind each corps two ordnance battalions, one to perform maintenance and operate a collecting point, and the other for repair and major tank maintenance and the operation of a forward depot. These battalions came under an ordnance group reporting to Medaris, who also had ordnance groups to supervise ordnance operations in the army area, run the main army shop, and control the ammunition battalions. The First Army ordnance officer also developed a radio net reaching down to the ordnance battalions, a system that saved hours, even days, in forwarding requisitions and delivering essential supplies to combat units. Using five truck companies from the army pool, the section created a rolling ammunition supply point, which followed close behind the VII Corps in its attack on the Falaise pocket.\(^49\)

Still, Medaris and his section encountered several problems, many of which could be traced to the low rank of ordnance supplies, except ammunition, on the G-4 section’s list of priorities. Through August and September the ordnance depot received perhaps 2 percent of its line items and almost no replacement vehicles. This deficiency created an especially grave situation given the wear on tanks and other vehicles and the First Army’s depletion of the initial complement of 230 replacement tanks that it had brought ashore at Normandy. Of the 1,079 tanks—including 75- and 76-mm. gun and 105-mm. howitzer tanks—authorized for the First Army’s three armored divisions, nine separate tank battalions, and three cavalry groups, the 12th Army Group’s September figures showed 941 serviceable and 114 repairable tanks for the First Army. To repair or replace these vehicles, the ordnance section resorted to captured vehicles, local procurement, salvage, and cannibalization.\(^50\)

The pursuit created similar problems of control and supply for Carter’s engineer section. The engineers possessed their own radio net, enabling Carter at the tactical echelon to maintain contact with his executive officer, Col. Carlton P. Roberts, at the supply echelon, and with the army engineer groups supervising the army engineer units. Communications, however, were often so poor that Carter merely gave the groups broad assignments to close up and support the advance. Given the fleeing enemy’s inability to carry out systematic demolition, road repairs did not pose a major problem, nor did bridge construction, despite the numerous river barriers and destruction of many spans by Allied aircraft during the pre-D-Day period. Thanks largely to a mobile depot assembled by Roberts to follow the advance, the First Army engineer section ensured that corps and division engineers had enough resources to bridge rivers and meet other contingencies. A more pressing problem, along with the low level of engineer supplies in the First Army depots, was the difficulty in maintaining a proper stock of maps. The rapid advance rendered nearly useless the
detailed 1:25,000 maps that ETOUSA had drawn up for the campaign in France. In the end, the First Army engineer section left the task of tactical photomapping to corps topographic units and focused on producing a large-scale series covering the Rhine from Cologne to Koblenz.51

As much as the First Army headquarters wanted to continue its drive to the Rhine once it had reached the Seine, it could not avoid entanglement in the politics surrounding the liberation of Paris. The Allied high command had hoped to avoid the burden of occupying and, therefore, supplying Paris for as long as possible, but General Charles de Gaulle, head of the French provisional government, wanted to liberate the city for symbolic and political purposes. On 20 August Maj. Gen. Jacques P. Léclerc, commander of the French 2d Armored Division, which had just been shifted from the XV to the V Corps, went directly to Hodges to ask for permission to drive on Paris. Short, intense, and often stubborn, but a charismatic veteran of independent operations in North Africa, Léclerc could be condescending toward Americans. He had already clashed with Patton during the XV Corps’ drive to Argentan, and he made no more headway with Hodges. Unaccustomed to dealing with French sensitivities and absorbed in the XIX Corps’ drive on Elbeuf, Hodges brushed off his proposal. Undeterred, the French general sent a reconnaissance in force toward the capital, and, when his corps commander, Gerow, protested, Léclerc took his case to Bradley.52

By the time Léclerc reached the 12th Army Group command post on 22 August, Eisenhower and Bradley, acting on reports of an uprising in Paris, had decided to send a liberating force to the French capital. Bradley personally delivered the order to Hodges, who passed the word through Kean to Gerow and his V Corps staff. Lacking political guidance from above or information on Paris’ defenses, the two staffs hastily prepared a plan, which the French 2d Armored and 4th U.S. Infantry Divisions executed the next morning. After an advance slowed by both vigorous resistance and rejoicing civilians, the combined force finally occupied Paris on 25 August.53

The First Army headquarters had never been comfortable with civil affairs, and its conduct of the occupation of Paris reflected that fact. Anticipating near chaotic conditions, the First Army planners under Col. Elbridge Colby of the G-5 section anticipated airlifting three million rations to feed the city for ten days, after which the Americans hoped that Paris would steadily increase its reliance on the countryside.54 When the First Army civil affairs detachments arrived in Paris on 26 August, however, they found relatively stable conditions. The enemy had not carried out Hitler’s order to destroy the city, and many key facilities and services still operated. The Resistance had acted quickly to restore administration, and the populace seemed orderly and healthy, albeit low on food.55 The big problem lay in resolving questions of command, a problem aggravated not just by the too recent conclusion of a civil affairs agreement with de Gaulle but also by poor staff relations between Kean and Gunn, the conscientious but overly methodical First Army G-5. In keeping with Army civil affairs doctrine, Gunn believed in recognizing Gaullist General Pierre J. Koenig as the military governor of Paris and ordering civil affairs detachments...
to assist and not interfere with his government. Kean, however, regarded Gerow as the military governor of the city until the tactical situation permitted the transfer of command to Koenig, a view he communicated to Gerow. For days, the two sides clashed over jurisdictions with the First Army headquarters, intent on the military task at hand, often finding it hard to understand French emotions at the moment of liberation.

By the time the First Army headquarters transferred its authority in Paris to the French and COMZ on 28 August, its lead units had already advanced well beyond the capital. (Map 9) Under the original OVERLORD plan, the Allies were supposed to halt at the Seine and build up their logistics for the drive into Germany. Anxious not to give the enemy a respite, Eisenhower directed on 19 August that the drive continue beyond the Seine. Even before this decision, the debate had already started on the next step in the campaign. Montgomery wanted to combine the 21 and 12th Army Groups in a massive advance northeast into the Low Countries and thence eastward to the Ruhr, Germany’s enormous industrial center on the Rhine. Bradley, on the other hand, favored a secondary drive by the 21 Army Group and a main effort by the 12th Army Group, except for one corps, directed east on Metz, the old fortress city near the German border, and the Saar industrial region. Most of the now-famous debate took place at a level above the First Army headquarters, although Hodges did back Bradley’s strategy in a meeting with Montgomery, Bradley, and Dempsey on 19 August and in a discussion with Bradley and Kean on 21 August. In the meantime, Eisenhower’s apparent vacillation over the amount of strength to give to the northern thrust caused problems for the First Army planners. The engineer section, for one, had to place a hurried call to London for more maps when Eisenhower on 23 August tentatively decided to turn the First Army northeast alongside the 21 Army Group.

While Montgomery and Bradley debated strategy with the supreme commander, the First Army headquarters prepared for the next step. During the few days after the fall of Paris the First Army staff completed the withdrawal of the XIX and XV Corps, which Bradley had temporarily assigned to the First Army on 23 August, from the British zone northwest of Mantes-Gassicourt. In the process, it transferred the Seine bridgehead and divisions in the Mantes-Gassicourt sector from the XV to the XIX Corps, returned the XV Corps headquarters to the Third Army, and shifted the 5th Armored and 28th Infantry Divisions from the XIX to the V Corps. It also coordinated arrangements for ammunition supply points and communications and allocated two eight-inch howitzer battalions and a 240-mm. howitzer battalion to support the Mantes bridgehead, placing the rest of the army artillery in army reserve. Allocations of artillery otherwise remained fairly even among the corps.

By 29 August, the day the XV Corps returned to the Third Army, the First Army was well on the way to Soissons, 60 miles northeast of Paris, and the Belgian capital of Brussels, 110 miles farther to the northeast. The offensive picked up speed especially on the flanks, where armored spearheads of the XIX Corps’ 2d Armored Division to the northwest and the VII Corps’ 3d Armored Division to the southeast led the drive. To the south, the Third Army was
crossing old World War I battlefields on its way to the German border, while Devers' 6th Army Group, which had landed in southern France on 15 August, was rapidly driving northeast toward a linkup with the 12th Army Group. Meanwhile, by 31 August the 21 Army Group had used one corps to clear the Pas de Calais while thrusting the others northeast to the Somme, seventy miles north of Paris. The First Army's advance protected the 21 Army Group's southeastern flank but, at Bradley's insistence, remained under the command of the 12th Army Group. Only the remnants of German units withdrawing to the West Wall obstructed the path of the First Army, which found its advance slowed more by gasoline shortages than real resistance. Indeed, lack of contact with German troops and the speed of the drive frustrated the IX Tactical Air Command, which switched most of its missions from close air support to interdiction. By phone and visits to command posts, Hodges urged on his corps commanders but left them with more than the usual discretion to respond to the fluid situation. In part, Hodges' deference can be traced to poor communications, particularly with the XIX Corps to the northwest.61

Communications with the 21 Army Group headquarters also posed a problem, but only part of the difficulty was technical. Relations between the First Army and 21 Army Group headquarters had soured since their association in Normandy. Like many other Americans, the First Army staff officers blamed what they saw as British slowness and fastidiousness over boundaries for the failure to trap the Germans west of the Seine, and the 21 Army Group headquarters naturally took umbrage at the criticism.62 As the two forces raced northeast from the Seine, the First Army headquarters suspected that Montgomery had used his authority as temporary ground commander to allocate the sectors with the best roads to the British, forcing Hodges to go, hat in hand, to the 21 Army Group command post for relief. Given the less developed state of roads in the 21 Army Group zone, these complaints seem uncharitable, but relations between Montgomery's headquarters and its American neighbors were poor enough that from 22 August to 3 September Montgomery made no effort to see Bradley, even though for most of that period he was still the ground forces commander and, during the entire period, had the right to "effect the necessary operational coordination" between his army group and Bradley's northern wing.63 Meanwhile, the First Army headquarters failed to keep Corlett fully informed as he drove into Belgium, leaving him to coordinate most boundary issues directly with Lt. Gen. Sir Brian Horrocks of the Second Army's 30 Corps. Again, poor communications undoubtedly caused much of the problem. In any case, since Hodges' units stayed ahead of the British, the advancing Americans were often able to use the roadnet in the British zone for a day or two before their allies arrived on the scene.64

As August turned into September, the First Army was finding it increasingly difficult to avoid straying onto British territory. On 31 August Bradley, who had received reports of large bodies of enemy troops moving east across the First Army's front, ordered Hodges to turn due north and cut their escape routes. Hodges then sent his G-3, Thorson, in person to direct Corlett and the XIX Corps to drive north to Tournai, a critical crossroads forty-five miles west
of Brussels. By 2 September the XIX Corps had reached Tournai, which lay inside the British zone. When Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery protested the next morning that the XIX Corps had crossed the army group boundary and was blocking the road to Brussels, an amused Bradley called the G–3 duty officer at the First Army command post and told him to withdraw the XIX Corps from the city. Montgomery then drew a new army group boundary that fenced off the major road hub of Brussels from the First Army.\textsuperscript{65}

Bradley and Hodges could afford to be amused, for the First Army had just pulled off, almost by accident, one of the finest coups of the campaign. When Bradley ordered the First Army to swing north on 31 August, Hodges, perhaps because of the poor weather for aerial reconnaissance and the lack of contact with the retreating enemy formations, knew little of German movements. Indeed, he seems to have thought that Bradley had turned his army north largely to link up with a planned parachute drop near Tournai. Nevertheless, he directed Collins by phone to turn the VII Corps, the army’s easternmost corps, north to Mons, twenty-seven miles southeast of Tournai. When Collins asked who would fill the resulting gap between him and the Third Army, Hodges brusquely replied, “Joe, that’s your problem.”\textsuperscript{66} Detaching a reinforced cavalry group to cover its flank, the VII Corps drove north to Mons, arriving on the evening of 2 September. That night, a wild melee along the VII Corps’ western flank indicated the presence of several units of the German Seventh Army, trapped within the pocket formed by the First Army’s three corps. In the Mons pocket, the First Army captured 25,000 Germans, clearing its path to the German border.\textsuperscript{67}

The windfall might never have occurred with better communications. On 2 September Eisenhower, who had taken field command of the Allied forces the day before, had returned to more of a dual-thrust strategy that turned the First Army to the east. Passing the V Corps behind the VII Corps to take the southernmost flank, the First Army drove for the West Wall. A jubilant Hodges told his staff on 6 September that with ten more days of good weather, the war would be over.\textsuperscript{68}

Ever since its units had crossed the Seine, however, the First Army headquarters had become more acquainted with the tyranny of logistics. The daily supply, maintenance, and evacuation reports at 0830, and the daily stock status reports at 1800 presented an increasingly alarming picture. Stores of rations, especially field rations, had reached such a low level—almost no B and 10-in-1 rations and less than two days of C and K rations by 2 September—that McNamara occasionally turned to captured German foodstuffs. Clothing, engineer and signal equipment, and medical stores were in short supply, and Medaris reported shortages of replacement tanks and vehicle spare parts, which were sorely needed for maintenance at the end of August. Ammunition remained a concern, although not as pressing thanks to the lower demands of pursuit warfare. Lack of gasoline was the most critical problem. Between 5 and 19 August the First Army’s stocks of gasoline had dropped from 10.5 to 3.9 days, and by 2 September the First Army staff was reporting less than a half day’s supply of gasoline on hand. (Table 1) As stocks fell, the First Army increas-
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* According to the 1944 Dictionary of United States Army Terms, the day of supply is the "unit used in estimating the average expenditure of various items of supply per day in the field." Thus for rations, one day of supply represents the quantity of rations needed to feed every soldier in the First Army for 24 hours. For petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), it represents the quantity of POL required to move every vehicle in the Army 50 miles per day. For gasoline alone, the day of supply for August and September was probably about 500,000 gallons per day. In October the basis for the day of supply of gasoline changed from 500,000 to 550,000 gallons per day.

* Including La Loupe area

* All truckheads forward of La Loupe; rear army depot not reporting

* Recomputed tonnage

* Per physical inventory

* Does not include La and Loupe areas

* In long tons

* Gasoline only

* For 105-mm. howitzers, 155-mm. howitzers, and 155-mm. guns only

* For 18 August–3 September

* For 4 September–16 September

Hodges Steps Up the Pace

Ingly met its daily requirements on a hand-to-mouth basis. McNamara's quartermasters received continuous calls on where fuel could be procured, trucks waited in line at empty truckheads for new shipments, and vehicles traveled far to the rear in search of gasoline.69

As Bradley later remarked, the growing logistical crisis "had come not as the result of a breakdown in supply but as the inevitable consequence of an unexpectedly speedy advance."70 Between 1 August and 16 September the First Army's quartermaster depot moved six times, preventing the buildup of ample stocks at any point and stretching quartermaster personnel and resources to the limit. By early September the First Army depots and dumps lay in eastern France and Belgium, 200 to 300 miles from the beaches with few intermediate depots in between.71 Unfortunately, Allied transportation was proving sadly inadequate for the task of bringing up supplies from the beaches to the armies. West of the Seine, the French railroad system had been virtually destroyed by air raids and the Resistance, and reconstruction of the railroads was progressing slowly due to the lack of civilian labor and rolling stock. Then on 1 September the COMZ headquarters began its move forward to Paris, a journey that took several weeks to complete.

The COMZ commander, Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, later protested that Paris, as the administrative and transportation hub of France, was the natural location for COMZ, but critics complained of the impact of the diversion of precious motor and rail transport at a critical time in the pursuit. Meanwhile, as of 31 August the pipeline, critical to the delivery of gasoline and oil, had only reached Alençon, over 140 miles behind the XIX Corps' spearheads, and the Allies could deliver only negligible tonnage by air. They would have to rely heavily on trucks, of which they never had enough and which required large amounts of fuel to operate.72

Thus, the First Army's supply crisis was only part of a larger problem over which its headquarters, as one of many claimants for the few available resources, had little control. To plan, Hodges and his staff at least needed to know what supplies to expect and when to expect them. At most, in early September COMZ estimated that it could ship only 7,000 tons per day to the 12th Army Group. Bradley's staff accordingly adopted a system under which the First Army received initially 5,000 and later 3,500 tons of the available daily lift. Based on bids from special staff sections, Wilson's G–4 supply subsection allocated this

Colonel McNamara
portion and forwarded the approved requisitions to the 25th Regulating Station. The 25th shipped items available in ADSEC depots to the First Army and sent orders for out-of-stock items to COMZ, whose G-4 section would then allot its actual transportation on hand to ship the items. Unfortunately, the First Army G-4 section often did not check the tonnage of requisitioned items, with the result that COMZ would not ship many goods due to weight overages. Nor did COMZ always notify the First Army headquarters about the status of shipments. Through reports to the command echelon and to Hodges and Kean via the small G-4 contingent that Wilson established at the tactical echelon, the First Army headquarters managed to keep track of its own stocks, but until staff officers could physically locate supplies en route, the army supply planners could make only the most hazy logistical forecasts. Desperate, McNamara even borrowed a plane from Hart to locate convoys and trains that might be carrying fuel.73

As COMZ rushed construction on pipelines and railroads and established the Red Ball Express to truck supplies directly to the front, the First Army moved to supplement its transportation in the army area and beyond. On 27 August the 12th Army Group told its armies that, until the rail system could maintain the flow of supplies with ease, each army must stretch its communications to the maximum and use all available transportation to bring supplies forward. Hodges called in his staff, informed them that supplies took precedence over combat forces, and asked that, if necessary, they convert combat formations to logistical units. Patterson, the antiaircraft officer, offered 300 trucks, and Brig. Gen. Charles E. Hart immobilized much of his heavy artillery and reorganized eighteen field artillery battalions into provisional truck battalions. Under the overall supervision of Wilson and the G-4 transportation subsection, Hodges' staff ultimately found enough vehicles from assorted antiaircraft, artillery, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, and chemical warfare units to move the First Army's depots closer to the front and even return to the beaches to obtain gasoline. Nonetheless, transportation remained in such short supply that beginning 3 September Wilson required bids for available transport on a daily basis. For the trucks available, the First Army paid a price, not only in lost capabilities among combat and service units that had to donate vehicles, but also in deferred maintenance, the drain on an already dwindling supply of gasoline, and driver fatigue as supply hauls often approached three hundred miles.74

Increased traffic combined with the jumble of installations, prisoners, and stragglers to create congestion in rear areas. The First Army had established a road network for troop movements and supply, including bypasses, one-way streets, and temporary bridges at checkpoints such as St. Lô, Mortain, Domfront, and the Belgian industrial center of Liege, fifty-five miles southeast of Brussels. This approach worked well over time. Still, Col. William H. S. Wright's provost marshal office faced problems of coordination with ADSEC and COMZ over traffic regulation. By mid-August the section also faced the task of processing the torrent of prisoners flooding into its area, including 35,000 from the Falaise pocket. Barely had it achieved some control over that situation when the First Army received over 20,000 prisoners from the Mons pocket. To avoid
using precious manpower, gasoline, and supply vehicles to ship prisoners back to the army-maintained enclosures, or cages, units kept them at temporary collecting points in the vicinity of Mons until the First Army provost marshal office could transport them back to the army facilities. They remained in army cages until they proceeded on to ADSEC and COMZ facilities. Wright's section also carried out a crackdown on rampant black marketeering and straggling, which, with the rapid pursuit, had become a major problem. Fortunately, the expected threat from saboteurs and subversive organizations never did materialize, thanks to cooperative local populations and the disruption to enemy plans caused by the speed of the advance.

Although the First Army headquarters in the early days of September would not yet admit that the pursuit was nearly over, supply shortages were becoming an insuperable drag on operations. The British Second Army captured Antwerp on 4 September, but months would pass before the Allies could clear the banks of the estuary leading to that essential port and render it usable. By 10 September the 21 Army Group was encountering stiff opposition along Belgium's Albert Canal, while in the south the Third Army's advance toward Metz and Nancy had stalled.

Still, the First Army headquarters hoped to improvise enough supplies for its forward units to penetrate the German frontier in force before the enemy could organize a defense. With Eisenhower's decision to return to the dual-thrust strategy, Bradley had cut the First Army's tonnage share to 3,500 tons, 1,000 tons below the minimum the First Army staff saw as necessary to maintain a full-fledged drive. Hodges gave most of the available fuel to the VII and V Corps, hoping to seize the Meuse crossings, which were closer to those two corps than to the XIX Corps, before the Germans could form a line along the river. Beyond the Meuse, the Germans were preparing to make a stand along the frontier at the Siegfried Line, or West Wall. The First Army headquarters wanted to break through the barrier before the defenders could make the long-neglected works truly formidable. By 6 September, however, the First Army was receiving only 1,500 tons of supplies per day, and the next day the V Corps immobilized an armored division for lack of fuel. On 10 September a gloomy Wilson informed his commander that the First Army no longer possessed any substantial reserves, that he possessed no information on supplies arriving at the just-established railhead at Soissons, and that the G–4 section could barely scrape together enough stocks for daily issues. On the basis of Wilson's report, Hodges delayed the V Corps' drive to the West Wall until the First Army could gather enough artillery ammunition to support it.

Influenced by his favorite corps commander, however, Hodges changed his mind. On the afternoon of 11 September the buoyant Collins visited the new army command post at Huy, Belgium, fifteen miles southwest along the Meuse from Liege. Eager to grant no respite to the enemy, he recommended a reconnaissance in force the next day to penetrate German border defenses. He was aided in his case by Dickson's estimate that the Germans were desperately rushing in service units and worn-out combat formations to fill the gaps in their defenses created by the coup near Mons. Encouraged by the report, Hodges
approved Collins' request and directed Gerow's V Corps to carry out the same mission, but he instructed both corps commanders to halt their attacks if they ran into solid resistance. Unfortunately, Hodges had spread his troops over such a wide front that he could not concentrate enough forces in the XIX Corps zone facing the Aachen corridor, the best route into Germany. He did so partly because he wanted to move quickly and use his troops where they were situated and partly because he was trying to comply with Bradley's orders to protect simultaneously the flanks of Montgomery and Patton on either side of him while maintaining his own advance to the Rhine Valley cities of Cologne, Bonn, and Koblenz. The First Army could yet crack the West Wall, but only if the opposition was minimal.

In the end, German resistance, while feeble, proved enough, combined with foul weather, harsh terrain, and Allied logistical problems, to halt the First Army. South of the old medieval city of Aachen, just over the German border about twenty-five miles from Liege, Collins' VII Corps penetrated the outer works of the West Wall. Farther south, Gerow's V Corps found the defenses weak and undermanned. In the heavily wooded Ardennes on the southern sector of the V Corps front, one armored division made a clean break in the German line. The First Army headquarters, however, did not press its corps commanders to exploit their advantage and, indeed, cautioned them to consolidate any gains made against counterattacks. Poor weather and a severe cold kept Hodges at his head-
quarters, except for occasional trips to the 12th Army Group headquarters where he and Wilson were warned by Bradley about the growing crisis in supply. The First Army commander devoted much of his time to phone calls to hasten ADSEC’s pace of resupply and arrange for an emergency shipment of 3,000 tons of ammunition by air. In this situation, his instinct toward caution was abetted by a growing gap on his northern flank created by the 21 Army Group’s drive north into Holland and perhaps also by Dickson’s estimate on 15 September that the Germans, far from fighting a mere delaying action prior to a withdrawal to the Rhine, were throwing everything into a stand at the West Wall.

On 17 September Hodges halted the V Corps’ attack, which had been only a secondary effort, and five days later, after conferring with the three corps chiefs, he ordered an indefinite postponement of the entire offensive. Also on 17 September Montgomery launched MARKET-GARDEN, a risky airborne operation which sought to jump his 21 Army Group over the Rhine. For the field marshal, the abrupt end of the First Army offensive, which could have diverted enemy reserves away from his attack, must have been a keen disappointment.

The race across France was over. For most of the First Army, the drive began much later than for the Third Army, the First Army’s bumptious neighbor to the south. Nevertheless, over the last two weeks of August into the first week of September, Hodges and his staff had gained experience in mobile operations. With its unique challenges of command, control, and communications, mobile warfare must have proved a bit disconcerting for a headquarters that had grown accustomed to close surveillance of its units, and the First Army headquarters only adjusted to a degree. It allowed the corps more leeway than ever, adopted the tactical echelon, and made extensive use of liaison aircraft, but it did not develop the kind of liaison systems that Montgomery and Patton employed so well. In mobile as in static warfare, the First Army headquarters carried out its technical tasks quite well, performing superbly in shifting the V and XIX Corps across two corps rear areas to new sectors, and it improvised with skill to sustain at least a trickle of supplies to forward units. Yet, while these weeks were an exhilarating period for the First Army headquarters, August and September were also a difficult time. The First Army was no longer the leading American ground headquarters on the Continent, and the attitude of its veterans toward the relatively green 12th Army Group and Third Army staffs can well be imagined. Although Hodges performed competently enough in his first weeks as commander, he lacked the presence of his predecessor, nor could he offer Bradley’s moderating influence both inside and outside the headquarters. Already assertive personalities both within and, in the case of Collins, outside the headquarters were moving into the vacuum. For the moment, however, in the glow of victory, nearly everyone was pleased with the performance of the First Army headquarters under its new commander.
Notes

1 Sylvan Diary, 1 Aug 44; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 358–60.
2 First quote is by Bradley from Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 226. Second quote is by Patterson from Interv. Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, p. 2. Third quote is by General Bruce C. Clarke from Interv. Kish with Clarke, 23 Feb 82, p. 293. Fourth quote is by Patton from Blumenson, ed., The Patton Papers, 2:517.


5 Quote from Sylvan Diary, 30 Jul 44, and see also 19 Jun 44. Harmon with MacKay and MacKaye, Combat Commander, p. 208; Interv. Murray with Myers, 15 Apr 74, pp. 7, 22. For an alternative view, see Interv. Murray with Hart, 1973, p. 64.


7 Several entries in the Sylvan Diary show Hodges' command style. See also MS, Carter, Carter's War, ch. 10, pp. 11–12; Hottelet, "The Victor of Aachen," p. 49; Intervs. Murray with Hart, 1973, p. 68, and with Myers, 15 Apr 74, p. 36; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 358; Hodges notes under Order of Discussion, in CMH 314.7 Breakout and Pursuit, Author—Martin Blumenson 16–2, box 174, Background Notes to Breakout and Pursuit, by Martin Blumenson, RG 319, NARA.


9 See several entries in Sylvan Diary, on Hodges' command style. See also Interv. Murray with Myers, 15 Apr 74, pp. 21, 35–36; Corlett, Cowboy Pete, p. 97; Bolger, "Zero Defects," pp. 69–71.

10 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 359–60; MS, Carter, Carter's War, ch. 10, p. 10; Intervs. Murray with Myers, 15 Apr 74, p. 15; with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, p. 2; and with Lynde, p. 45.


12 MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, p. 150-A.

13 Ibid; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 180; Intervs. Murray with Myers, 15 Apr 74, pp. 8, 32–33, and Pogue with Rosengarten, 22 Dec 47, p. 1; Telecon, author with Hansen, 5 Mar 93, DWH; Interv. Murray with Dickson, 22 Sep 72, pp. 7–8; Hansen Diary, 2 Jun 44, 11–12 Feb 45; James M. Gavin Diary, 24 Jan 45, copy in author's personal files, DWH; Ingersoll, Top Secret, p. 309; Baldwin, Battles Lost and Won, pp. 361–62; D'Este, Bitter Victory, p. 272f.

14 Quote from Ingersoll, Top Secret, p. 311, and see also p. 169. Intervs. Pogue with Williams, 30–31 May 47, p. 5; with Rosengarten, 22 Dec 47, p. 1; and with Smith, 8 May 47, pp. 2–3; Telecon, author with Garson, 14 Oct 92, pp. 16–17; Interv. author with Hains, 29 May 91, p. 43; Telecon, author with Hansen, 10 Feb 97. For more on Bradley's reasons for leaving Dickson at the First Army headquarters, see D'Este, Bitter Victory, pp. 271–72f.
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29 Sylvan Diary, 8 Aug 44; Rpts. First Army G–2 Periodic Rpts for 7–8 Aug 44; Cir, First Army G–2 Estimate 14, 8 Aug 44.


33 Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 506.

34 Cir, First Army G–2 Estimate 15, 13 Aug 44, and Estimate 16, 15 Aug 44; Rpts, First Army G–2 Periodic Rpts for 12–16 Aug 44; Bennett, ULTRA in the West, pp. 120–24.

35 Sylvan Diary, 12–15 Aug 44; Ltr, Bradley to Army Commanders, 15 Aug 44, in 12th Army Group Directives, DWH; Hansen Diary, 14 Aug 44; Collins, Lightning Joe, p. 256.

36 Sylvan Diary, 16 Aug 44.


39 Sylvan Diary, 17–20, 23 Aug 44; Corlett, Cowboy Pete, p. 99; Ltr, Hodges to Corlett, 18 Aug 44, 101–3.9 Field Orders, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Hansen Diary, 20 Aug 44; Rpt, V Corps Operations in the ETO, pp. 186; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 577; Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 380–83. For intelligence during this movement, see Rpts, First Army G–2 Periodic Rpts for 17–26 Aug 44; Cir, First Army G–2 Estimate 17, 18 Aug 44; Estimate 18, 19 Aug 44; Estimate 19, 20 Aug 44; and Estimate 21, 25 Aug 44.

40 Sylvan Diary, 23–27 Aug 44; Ltr, Hodges to Corlett and Gerow, 24 Aug 44, 101–3.9 Field Orders, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 579; Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 381–83; Ltr, Bradley to Eisenhower, 10 Sep 44, Bradley Correspondence with Eisenhower, v. 1, 1943–1945, box 5, Bradley Papers, USAMHI; Intervs, Pogue with Dempsey, 12–13 Mar 47, pp. 1–2, and with Dickson, 22 Dec 47, p. 2.

41 Rosengarten, “With ULTRA From OMAHA Beach to Weimar, Germany,” p. 129; Sylvan Diary, 21 Aug 44; MS, Carter, Carter’s War, ch. 10, pp. 17–18.

42 Hodges quote from Thompson and Harris, The Outcome, p. 117.


46 FM 101–5, Staff Officers Field Manual, 1940, p. 48.
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Ibid.; Rpt, First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, p. 176; First U.S. Army FOs and LOIs, in 101–3.9 Field Orders, and 101–3.11 Letters of Instructions G–3 1st Army, box 1989, respectively, both in WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Cit, First U.S. Army LOIs in 300.6 Letters of Instructions, box 62, First Army, Adj Gen Section, General Correspondence, 1940–1947, RG 338, WNRC.


Rpt, First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, p. 246; Coles and Weinberg, Soldiers Become Governors, pp. 722, 738–41; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 387; Ltr, Lt Col George W. Crawford, USAR (Ret.), to author, 16 Apr 97, DWH.


For the atmosphere at First Army headquarters, see Telecon, author with Brig Gen William B. Kunzig, USA (Ret.), 12 Apr 92, DWH; Interv, author with Wendt, 29 Apr 91, p. 58.


MS, Carter, Carter's War, ch. 11, pp. 2–3.

Sylvan Diary, 26–29 Aug 44. Msgs, Hodges to Gerow, 25 Aug 44; Hodges to Collins, 25 Aug 44; and Hodges to Corlett and Haislip, 25 Aug 44. All in 101–3.9 Field Orders, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 672. Msgs, Akers to Corlett, 26 Aug 44; Akers to Maj Gen Wade H. Haislip, XV Corps, 26 Aug 44; Akers to Gerow, 26 Aug 44; and Hodges to Corps Commanders and Commander, 32d Field Arty Bde, 27 Aug 44. All in


64 Ibid.; Notes of Interv, Pogue with Hodges, 12 Jan 50, in Murray Papers, DWH; Sylvan Diary, 2 Sep 44; Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield, pp. 820, 829; Hamilton, Monty, p. 43; Corlett, Cowboy Pete, pp. 100–101; Msg, Lt Col John L. Throckmorton, G–3 Section, First Army, to Second Army, 30 Aug 44, 101–4.2 G–4 Journal and file, Tactical Echelon, First Army, box 1994, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC.

65 Sylvan Diary, 2 Sep 44; Hansen Diary, 3 Sep 44; Corlett, Cowboy Pete, p. 100; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 402–03; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pp. 679–80.

66 Hodges quote from Collins, Lightning Joe, p. 261.

67 Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pp. 676, 679–82; Sylvan Diary, 31 Aug–5 Sep 44; Collins, Lightning Joe, p. 261; Interv, Pogue with Dickson, 22 Dec 47, p. 2; Rosengarten, "With ULTRA From OMAHA Beach to Weimar, Germany," p. 129; Cir, First Army G–2 Estimate 23, 31 Aug 44; Rpts, First Army G–2 Periodic Rpts for 31 Aug, 1–3 Sep 44; McNamara, Quartermaster Activities, p. 144; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 407–08.

68 Sylvan Diary, 1–6 Sep 44; Rpts, First Army G–2 Periodic Rpts for 1–6 Sep 44; Corlett, Cowboy Pete, pp. 100–101; Rpt, V Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 224; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 407–08; Hansen Diary, 1–2 Sep 44.


70 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 403.


74 Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 1 August 1944–22 February 1945, 1:35–37, 2:103, 4:53; Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, pp. 492, 570; Interv, Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, pp. 7–9; Ross and Romanus, Operations in the War Against Germany,
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Sylvan Diary, 2–5 Sep 44; Msg, Eisenhower to Ramsay, Montgomery, Bradley, Leigh-Mallory, Breton, Spatz, and Harris, 4 Sep 44, in Chandler, ed., Eisenhower Papers, 4:2115–18; Rpts, First Army G-2 Periodic Rpts for 3–9 Sep 44; Cir, First Army G-2 Estimate 24, 3 Sep 44; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, pp. 156–57; Blumenson, ed., The Patton Papers, 2:537; Rpt, V Corps Operations in the ETO, pp. 226, 230.

Sylvan Diary, 6–10 Sep 44; Jnl, First Army G-4 Tac Jnl s, 6, 10 Sep 44, and First Army G-4 Jnl file, 7 Sep 44; Interv, G. Patrick Murray with Gen J. Lawton Collins, USA (Ret.), 15 Aug 73, p. 43, Senior Officers Oral History Program, Reflections on General Courtney Hodges, USAMHI; Ltr, Gerow to Maj Gen John H. Stikes, Jr., Chief of Military History, 16 Apr 56, CMH 314.7 Breakout and Pursuit, Author–Martin Blumenson, 16–2, box 174, Background Notes for Breakout and Pursuit, RG 319, NARA.

Sylvan Diary, 11 Sep 44; Collins, Lightning Joe, p. 267; Cir, First Army G-2 Estimate 26, 11 Sep 44; Jnl, First Army G-3 Jnl, 11 Sep 44; MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp. 37–38.


Sylvan Diary, 17, 22 Sep 44; Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 414–18; Rupprecht, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II, p. 12.
Frustration at the West Wall

As the First Army crossed the German frontier in the early days of the autumn of 1944, Courtney Hodges and his staff were flush with exhilaration. Contrasting the Hodges of mid-September with the Hodges of Bristol days, Major Hansen noted that the First Army’s commander appeared “more positive now [that] he has found himself with a command. . . . [He] asserts himself more readily in a more positive manner. . . . You can feel the ginger in everything he does.” Although the First Army’s initial attack on the enemy fortifications along the frontier had stalled, Hodges and his exultant staff remained certain that the Germans were beaten and that the end of the war lay within measurable distance. They were anxious to resume the drive to the Rhine as soon as logistics permitted.

While it assembled enough supplies to resume the offensive, the First Army headquarters could examine the terrain on its front. (Map 10) The best avenue of advance lay to the north. Once Corlett’s XIX Corps crossed the Würm River, it would enter an open plain, broken only by a few villages and the Roer and Erft Rivers, which flowed north parallel to the First Army front. The XIX Corps’ long, exposed northern flank, however, gave pause to planners. Opposite the First Army center, just south of the boundary between the XIX Corps and Collins’ VII Corps, lay Aachen, a metropolis with a prewar population of 165,000 and, as the seat of Charlemagne’s First Reich, a point of special significance to the Nazis. South and east of Aachen lay the Stolberg corridor, about fifteen miles long but less than six miles wide at one point and obstructed by urban areas, ridges, patches of timber, and three rivers. Beyond the corridor lay the grim, foreboding mass of the Hütten Forest, crossed by only an occasional road or path. A fifteen-mile corridor running northeast from the village of Monschau, fifteen miles south of Aachen, provided a narrow, village-studded passage along the southeast side of the forest. To the south, Gerow’s V Corps in the forested Ardennes of Belgium and Luxembourg faced the German Eifel, a densely wooded region with a limited roadnet, which provided few avenues for exploitation.

Along with the rugged terrain, the First Army would have to contend with the Siegfried Line, or West Wall. The pillboxes and “dragon’s teeth” of the West Wall, including a double band of fortifications south of Aachen, covered almost the entire front. Although these works presented an obvious barrier, initial esti-
Frustration at the West Wall

rates indicated that the line was not insurmountable. Reports of long-neglected works, inundated with seepage and lacking guns and barbed wire, showed that the Germans had not had enough time to prepare them for an assault.  

Any advance of the First Army front would have to take into account the threat that the dams near the headwaters of the Roer River posed to crossings downstream, a threat that the First Army headquarters was slow to perceive. While five of the seven dams lacked the capacity to affect the river’s flow very much, the Urft and Schwammenauel Dams, when opened, could have produced one to two weeks of flooding along the lower reaches of the Roer. The result would have been a near-impassable barrier that might have isolated Allied bridgeheads. The concrete, 170-foot-high Urft Dam near Gemünd could store 42,000 acre-feet of water, and the earthen, 180-foot-high Schwammenauel Dam, two miles downhill from the town of Schmidt, could hold another 81,000 acre-feet of water. Unfortunately for the Allies, intelligence officers at virtually every level from SHAEF on down either minimized the size of the floods that could be produced by the dams and their value to the enemy or assumed that the dams could be knocked out by air or captured in the natural course of the advance. Through September, terrain analyses, intelligence estimates, and field orders from SHAEF, the First Army, and VII Corps headquarters all failed to mention the threat.  

Instead of the dams, Dickson’s G–2 section focused on the Aachen sector. At the new First Army command post near Verviers, Belgium, about fifteen miles southwest of Aachen and twelve miles east of Liege, he and his intelli-
gence officers assembled and evaluated data from the usual sources and a few new ones, such as the well-organized Belgian Resistance and a Dutch underground telephone network that reached behind enemy lines. Drawing on these sources, Dickson perceived a golden opportunity for the First Army to destroy what remained of the enemy’s forces prior to reaching the Rhine. In the same estimate that forecast a German stand at the West Wall, the First Army G–2 pointed out that, although the enemy was rushing new troops into the line as soon as they became available, reports indicated that the fortifications were mostly manned by service units and fragments of formations that lacked artillery and tanks. As the days passed and Dickson watched the enemy buildup in the Aachen area, he moderated his optimism to a degree, noting in particular the arrival of the 183rd Infantry Division in the XIX Corps’ sector.

By 26 September, the day Dickson submitted his revised estimate, the First Army had received its new mission. Operation Market-Garden, Montgomery’s attempt to jump the Rhine, had fallen short, while Patton’s Third Army had run into bitter fighting around the old fortress city of Metz. Farther south, patrols of Devers’ 6th Army Group had contacted the Third Army near Dijon. At a SHAEF conference on 22 September, Eisenhower gave the main effort in the October offensive to Montgomery’s 21 Army Group. It would clear the water approaches to Antwerp and then advance on the Ruhr, while the First Army protected its southern flank. After a meeting with Hodges and Montgomery, Bradley directed Hodges on 25 September to clear a pocket of enemy troops west of the Meuse River between his army and the 21 Army Group and then drive to the west bank of the Rhine between Düsseldorf and Bonn. To help, he transferred the 7th Armored and 29th Infantry Divisions to the First Army and ordered Simpson’s Ninth Army, fresh from its campaign in Brittany, to take over the inactive Ardennes sector from the V Corps. At the same time, however, he shifted the First Army boundary with the 21 Army Group forty miles north to encompass the enemy’s Meuse pocket in the boggy lowlands of the Peel Marshes. Thus, Hodges’ delight over receiving the new divisions was tempered by the wider front he would have to cover. Recalling the problems from an overly dispersed front in mid-September, he sought and obtained Montgomery’s agreement to the old boundary for that part of the First Army east of the Meuse.

Relieved, Hodges conferred with his staff and corps commanders during the four days after Bradley’s 25 September directive to plan the First Army’s role in the offensive. His arrangements, however, belied the supposed status of the XIX Corps as the main effort. Under the new boundaries distributed by Thorson’s G–3 section on 26 September, the V Corps, once relieved by the Ninth Army’s VIII Corps in the Ardennes, would sidestep north to assume 15 miles of the VII Corps’ line near Monschau, thereby reducing the VII’s front from 35 to 20 miles. The XIX Corps’ 25-mile front remained unchanged except for the addition of the Peel Marshes, which formed a thumb-like, 40-mile appendage to its northern flank on the west bank of the Meuse. From these provisions, one could easily guess that the VII Corps, not the XIX Corps, had the main effort, a feature that did not escape the notice of Corlett. The XIX Corps commander already felt confirmed in his inferior status among the First
Army corps commanders as a result of an episode in mid-September. At a time when he was struggling to find enough troops to cover his front, guard his exposed northern flank, and still maintain a semblance of his advance, Hodges had come to his command post and asked, “Can’t you help Joe Collins?”

Corlett would later complain that the First Army orders laid out tactical details normally left to the subordinate commander. The directive issued by the First Army headquarters on 29 September seems innocuous enough in this respect. It directed the V Corps to prepare for an advance on Bonn, while the VII Corps drove around the south and east side of Aachen to contact the XIX Corps, isolating the city. Meanwhile, the XIX Corps would take steps to protect the 21 Army Group’s southern flank prior to a coordinated attack through the West Wall to its rendezvous with the VII Corps. Thereafter, the VII Corps, assisted by the XIX Corps on its flank, would seize a foothold on the Roer and then drive to the Rhine near Cologne. Corlett later stated that he wanted to drive to the Rhine at Cologne and allow a bypassed Aachen to fall of its own weight. As he recalled, however, his orders, perhaps additional verbal directives from army headquarters, explicitly stipulated that the XIX Corps’ 30th Infantry Division, upon cracking the West Wall, turn south to Würselen, about two miles northeast of Aachen, to meet the VII Corps, while the 2d U.S. Armored Division followed and protected the 30th’s flank and rear. Only after the linkup would the two corps drive to the east. If Corlett’s account is true, the First Army was not only misusing an armored division for a defensive mission, but also interfering with tactical decisions that were properly the responsibility of the XIX Corps commander and his staff, thereby violating Army doctrine and its own usual practice.

Even the allocation of army units for the offensive was equivocal in its concentration behind the main effort. The XIX Corps received two infantry divisions and two armored divisions, in contrast to the two infantry and one armored divisions of each of the other two corps, but the XIX would need to employ two of its divisions to reduce the Peel Marshes. Army artillery of the 32d Field Artillery Brigade, with the exception of a group headquarters and an eight-inch gun battalion attached to the VII Corps, would continue to reinforce the fires of both the XIX and VII Corps artillery from positions along the corps boundary. The First Army would also retain a cavalry troop and thirteen antiaircraft battalions under its direct control. Each corps received a cavalry group and three tank battalions. To the XIX Corps, the First Army also allotted 13 field artillery battalions, 5 tank destroyer battalions, and 6 antiaircraft battalions. The VII Corps received 13 field artillery battalions, 4 tank destroyer battalions, and 6 antiaircraft battalions. The V Corps, with an ostensibly secondary effort, retained 11 field artillery battalions, 5 tank destroyer battalions, and 5 antiaircraft battalions.

In a separate directive, the First Army headquarters ordered the VII Corps to drive through the Hürtgen Forest and secure high ground near the Monschau corridor. Military historians have long questioned the First Army headquarters’ decision to drive through, rather than bypass, the Hürtgen Forest. It is hard to imagine worse terrain for offensive action, or more ideal ground for a defen-
sive force, than these dense woods, cut by numerous, abrupt ridges and occasional paths or roads, with only a few villages at isolated clearings.\textsuperscript{16} Given the lack of evidence due to the collegial style of the First Army headquarters’ planning process, the original source of the idea of clearing the forest cannot be determined, but Hodges, Kean, and Collins, recalling the threat that the Argonne Forest presented to the AEF’s flank in World War I, were concerned about the danger that a German force, coming out of the woods, would pose to the southern flank of the VII Corps advance up the narrow Stolberg corridor. Kean later argued that the First Army lacked the strength to cordon and bypass such a major potential enemy strongpoint. He contended that the First Army had often bypassed other strongpoints in open country where large enemy formations could not hide.\textsuperscript{17} In truth, the First Army headquarters had almost no reserves on which to draw and did not know for sure, although it suspected, that the forest contained only a few German troops, in no position to mount an offensive. Still, Hodges and his planners failed to appreciate the advantage that the forest gave even these few defenders, nor did they fully investigate the possibilities of a converging attack to pinch out the Hürtgen.\textsuperscript{18}

As September turned to October, the First Army headquarters was less concerned about the Hürtgen Forest than about a supply crisis that had arrived in full force. At the start of October the First Army logisticians counted barely two days of rations in their stocks, and they were forwarding gasoline on a day-to-day basis. In the rush to forward these priority items, logisticians neglected other categories, leaving the First Army with severe shortages of everything from trucks, tanks, tank engines, and tank tracks to tires, signal equipment, and winter clothing. So serious was the shortage of operational tanks that in late September the First Army headquarters reduced the authorized number of medium tanks in its armored divisions and tank battalions to fifty per battalion, regardless of levels in the Army’s table of equipment. In October, at a time when its vehicles badly needed scheduled maintenance, the First Army headquarters reported its lowest level of spare parts for the campaign. The First Army also shared in the ammunition crisis that all but silenced American guns in October. Although a problem in almost all categories, the shortage especially affected 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers, and 155-mm. guns, the workhorses of American artillery. While lack of transportation remained the main culprit in supply shortages, the ammunition crisis resulted from a general shortage in the theater. This shortage, in turn, stemmed from inadequate port capacity and storage facilities in Normandy, as well as production shortfalls in the United States. More than any other factor, ammunition shortages would affect operations.\textsuperscript{19} (Table 2)

At least, the slowing advance had given First Army supply personnel a chance to bring forward installations that had fallen far to the rear. In early September the First Army was trucking supplies as far as 300 miles to Liege from the army depots in the La Loupe army service area, about sixty miles southwest of Paris. After consulting with Kean and the G–3 section, Wilson’s G–4 section selected a new army service area east of the Meuse, extending from Liege, where ADSEC established its headquarters, about twenty miles east to
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*According to the 1944 Dictionary of United States Army Terms, a day of supply is the "unit used in estimating the average expenditure of various items of supply per day in the field." Thus for rations, one day of supply represents the quantity of rations needed to feed every soldier in the First Army for 24 hours.

All quantities received are issued immediately. Units do not have prescribed loads and cannot therefore accumulate a reserve.

*In long tons
*Including La Loupe area
*For 105-mm. howitzers, 155-mm. howitzers, and 155-mm. guns only
*For 17 September–1 October
*For 2 October–14 October

Eupen and Herbesthal. Having obtained data on rail lines and sidings in the Eupen area from the G–4 transportation subsection, the G–4 operations subsection, in coordination with the G–3, G–5, and provost marshal sections, chose sites for facilities and set priorities for railroad reconstruction. The G–4 traffic headquarters then worked with the G–3 section, provost marshal personnel, and the engineers to draw up a traffic plan.

Once the railroad reached Liege on 18 September, the First Army opened railheads for different classes of supply in the new service area, and the special staff chiefs moved into their depots. McNamara had already closed the quartermaster depot at La Capelle, just over the French border about eighty miles southwest of Liege, and had established a depot for all classes of supply in the Eupen-Herbesthal area. Meanwhile, Rogers was shifting most of his medical facilities into Herbesthal and was assigning each of his three medical groups to support a corps. From the new service area, the First Army could ship supplies by truck and rail to forward distribution points in the corps zones, where they transferred them to the divisions. By October most facilities were in place, if not yet stocked.

In the race to build up supplies for the ten divisions now under its command, the First Army supply chiefs usually worked directly with their counterparts at ETOUSA, COMZ, and ADSEC within the framework set by the 12th Army Group’s allocations. McNamara, for one, kept in close touch with the dynamic chief quartermaster for ETOUSA and COMZ, Maj. Gen. Robert M. Littlejohn, who often visited his subordinates and established a system of jeep couriers to maintain contact with his far-flung empire. In addition to the actual requisitions he submitted to COMZ via the G–4 section, McNamara was also supposed to provide periodic estimates—every ten days for rations and every fifteen for clothing—of future needs to ETOUSA, set the tonnages for each item, and indicate the desired priority. Littlejohn’s office then used these forecasts to assemble loads for shipment to the front, although the actual allocation of transportation for these supplies, as with normal requisitions, was made by the G–4 section of COMZ. Fortunately, as COMZ’s transportation capacity rose, the First Army’s share of it, as allocated by the 12th Army Group, grew from 3,500 tons per day in September to 6,500 tons per day in early October.

The First Army supply buildup was not helped by the irritation felt by many at the First Army headquarters, especially in the G–4 section, toward COMZ. Part of this antagonism could be traced to the common resentment of combat echelons toward rear area personnel and a tendency to take the rear area personnel’s work for granted. Still, the First Army headquarters’ hostility went beyond the usual complaints largely because of its G–4. Although Wilson got along well enough with Brig. Gen. Raymond G. Moses, the 12th Army Group G–4, and Brig. Gen. Ewart G. Plank of ADSEC, he disliked and distrusted COMZ. His suspicions of autonomous supply organizations stemmed from his experience with the SOS in North Africa and Sicily. This attitude influenced those around him, including Hodges and Bradley, who had a high regard for Wilson as the dean of the army supply chiefs.
he could normally delegate to his staff presented an especially unwelcome distraction. After meeting Hodges during a trouble-shooting tour in December, one War Department observer wrote that “Hodges is a man intolerant of supply shortcomings who has not studied supply and does not intend to.” The innate suspicion of Hodges and his staff toward COMZ was further fed by rumors of black marketeering and by COMZ’s move to Paris. The move especially caused many First Army staff officers to wonder how much gasoline and ammunition could have been brought forward by the transportation used to shift Lee’s COMZ headquarters.

Thus, when the supply crunch of October arrived, the First Army headquarters showed little sympathy for COMZ’s difficult plight. First Army logisticians complained when the tonnage that they actually received from COMZ did not match that allocated to them by the army group. As might be expected, COMZ’s frequent practice, when requisitioned items were not available, of filling out loads with nonessential but easily accessible articles angered First Army supply officers. To speed the delivery of critical items, Rogers sent trucks directly to Paris, and Medaris even adopted the practice of sending ordnance officers to run down specific requisitions. Rumors of “100 bloodhounds” from the First Army ordnance section, roaming COMZ rear areas in “free-for-all attempts to secure supplies from unauthorized sources” drew an inquiry from Maj. Gen. Henry B. Sayler, ETOUSA’s ordnance chief. A pious Medaris reassured his chief that he believed in orderly procedures and that his men were only stationed in COMZ in an “official liaison capacity.” Whatever the real role of these “liaison” officers, COMZ and Bradley, with good reason, suspected the First Army of stealing supplies on their way to other armies. Meanwhile, COMZ also protested the First Army’s overrequisitioning and the tendency of First Army special staff chiefs, notably Carter, to requisition supplies through technical rather than command channels, in violation of established procedures.

Matters came to a head in early October. On 29 September the XIX Corps launched its attack into the Peel Marshes. Three days later, the First Army headquarters, fortified by assurances from the 12th Army Group staff of larger ammunition stocks in the near future, had the XIX Corps start its drive against Aachen. The next day, 3 October, an angry Colonel Ray, the First Army ammunition officer, phoned the 12th Army Group headquarters with word that COMZ had placed zeroes next to his requisitions for almost all ammunition. In short, the supplies that the 12th Army Group logisticians had promised for the offensive did not exist either in the First Army’s depots or in COMZ, and Ray believed that the 12th Army Group headquarters had no idea what supplies were available. In fact, Bradley’s G–4, Moses, had suspected all along that COMZ’s estimates were overoptimistic and was trying to call its bluff. To ascertain the true situation, Ray went to Paris to confer with Sayler’s ammunition officer, who insisted that no ammunition shortage existed in the theater. In Cherbourg, however, the First Army ammunition officer found offshore numerous ships full of ammunition, waiting to be unloaded. As Ray discovered, COMZ had included in its figures stocks that remained on ships offshore at the ports and invasion beaches. Largely due to higher priorities for troop debarkations and
the impact of autumn storms on the invasion beaches, COMZ had been unable to unload these supplies.31

SHAEB now entered the picture to arbitrate the clash between the armies and COMZ. On 9 October Kean, Wilson, and Medaris attended a conference with representatives from SHAEB, the 12th Army Group, COMZ, and the other armies. After three days the 12th Army Group sent a delegation to Paris to ask Lee to speed up the unloading of vessels. The 12th Army Group headquarters, which had reinstituted ammunition rationing on 2 October, also declared a moratorium on the further supply of ammunition to the armies until COMZ built up stocks at its depots in Liege, Verdun, and Soissons, a process that the planners determined would not be complete until 7 November. Finally, the 12th Army Group headquarters, acting on the armies' recommendation, arranged for COMZ to fill requisitions as submitted and, where items were unavailable, substitute food or gasoline. Under the new system, COMZ would also set up credits at forward depots and the armies would draw ammunition against these credits. Although a major improvement, the new system still did not meet the request of the armies for a mechanism that would give reliable estimates of future supplies as a basis for planning. That would come only in November, when 12th Army Group logistics installed a system of thirty-day ammunition forecasts, each divided into three ten-day periods. Estimates for the first period of the forecast consisted of firm figures, which the 12th Army Group staff divided among the three armies, while the figures for the next twenty days provided estimates for planning purposes only.32
As the 12th Army Group headquarters labored to speed up the supply flow from COMZ, the First Army staff improvised with what it had. Lacking artillery ammunition, the First Army used tanks, tank destroyers, and antiaircraft guns as artillery. In rear areas, army salvage companies gathered enemy material and throwaway items that the First Army could refurbish and use. With COMZ still lacking the facilities and base shops to overhaul engines, Medaris expanded his own maintenance system, rebuilding 783 major assemblies, including 304 engines in October alone despite the chronic shortage of spare parts. To expedite the arrival of replacement tanks and parts, Colonel Lynde, Medaris’ maintenance and supply chief, arranged for tank battalions en route to the front from Normandy to bring extra tanks with spare treads and extra ammunition and travel at twelve miles per hour to reduce wear. The trip took a week but the reward in new vehicles with minimum wear, the first to reach the First Army in months, was worth the delay.\textsuperscript{33} The First Army also continued to use airlift and provisional truck companies drawn largely from antiaircraft and artillery units. Trucks mostly forwarded supplies within the army area, but they occasionally went farther, as on 21 September when the G–4 section arranged for each corps to release two truck companies to return to the beaches for 105-mm. ammunition.\textsuperscript{34} The First Army also did well at less legitimate means of obtaining supplies, indeed becoming so adept at hoarding that Patton, seeing Wilson and Medaris, warned his chief of staff, “Look out for that pair. I know them both. They once worked for me.”\textsuperscript{35}

Along with other problems, the First Army logisticians had to worry about winterization. During October the engineer section completed its plans for winter shelter, providing for maximum use of billeting and construction of frame buildings for kitchens and mess halls. Although the forests of the region provided an ample supply of lumber, the First Army had to turn to local sawmills, in addition to its own, to provide the over nineteen million board feet that it required.\textsuperscript{36} McNamara’s quartermasters, meanwhile, could not begin to meet the demand for antifreeze, which ranked low on the Allied list of supply priorities. Winter clothing, with its multiple sizes and complicated handling procedures, also presented a special challenge. COMZ had canceled McNamara’s initial requisitions in August due to the higher priority of other items. Using the fifteen-day estimates, in early September Littlejohn arranged for shipments of winter clothing, but he and McNamara had to improvise transportation to deliver these items to the First Army. Amphibious vehicles en route to the front took along woolen overcoats and underwear, and some items came by air. By early October the First Army had obtained much of its winter clothing but still lacked sleeping bags, popular sizes of field jackets and wool sweaters, and arctic overshirts.\textsuperscript{37}

Lack of overshoes and shoepacs, the new lined winter boot, contributed to the trench foot crisis that struck First Army units in the autumn of 1944. This cold-weather injury, which cost some their feet and kept most of its victims from ever returning to combat, had plagued the Fifth Army in Italy the previous winter, but, despite admonitions from the War Department, few in ETOUSA grasped its seriousness or the need to take early preventive steps. Incredibly, after consulting with Thorson in the spring, McNamara had noti-
fied the ETOUSA quartermaster office that the First Army did not expect to operate in a "cold climate zone" where it would require special winter clothing, although he did ask ETOUSA to have overshoes ready in case the need arose. McNamara later admitted that his section, busy with the myriad other details involved in NEPUNE, never arranged to alter peacetime equipment tables, which authorized overshoes only for work parties. Apparently, the First Army headquarters also associated trench foot with snow, rather than long-term immersion in cold, wet conditions. Whatever the explanation, the need for winter footgear did not become apparent until the First Army's initial winterization program was well under way, leaving many soldiers without adequate protection for colder conditions. Since the poor quality of the Army's winter footgear often contributed to disease and injury, greater foresight on the part of McNamara might not have made a difference, but the First Army headquarters as well as other echelons could have shown much more awareness of the problem.28

In October, as the weather cooled for thousands of GIs immobilized in damp foxholes and unable to rotate out of the line due to lack of reserves, cases of trench foot began to appear, and they rapidly multiplied in November. Medics evacuated the worst cases to general hospitals and sent others to a gas treatment battalion, which experimented with ways to control the injury. As cases multiplied, the First Army headquarters issued warnings, stressing such preventive measures as rotation of troops in line, dry socks, and overshoes. Several Army Air Forces units in Britain sent their overshoes to the First Army, and quartermasters at every echelon improvised substitutes. Preventive measures eventually reduced the rate, but trench foot had already severely cut the strength of many line units.29

The October supply crisis, which contributed to the trench foot problem, also caused the First Army headquarters to expand its use of captured supplies and equipment. Until COBRA, the First Army had captured only a negligible amount of materiel. During the pursuit across France, however, the number of depots and warehouses that fell into its hands overwhelmed its salvage units, which received little guidance from ETOUSA on handling these stocks. On 8 September the 12th Army Group headquarters authorized the First Army to use captured supplies in its area, and enemy rations helped the First Army overcome its shortage of food in September. To organize the wealth of enemy stores that had fallen into its hands, on 1 October the First Army quartermaster section formed a special subsection in its supply division, a step that the other technical sections soon copied. Under army procedure, corps and divisions would collect and guard captured materiel in dumps in their areas and report the location through technical channels to the First Army staff. In the case of the quartermaster section, salvage companies sent teams to evaluate and inventory these stocks, which the subsection then distributed to other subsections that could use them. Any unused items went to COMZ or to civilians through the G-5 section. By December the First Army was using enemy artillery, ammunition, and even a few tanks in action with good results. Such equipment, however, represented too great a maintenance problem for widespread, sustained use.30
As part of its program of improvised supply, the First Army capitalized on its proximity to one of Europe’s major industrial areas. Local procurement normally came under Gunn’s G–5 section, but it also involved the technical services, especially ordnance. While trying to find an automotive dump in Paris, Lynde and Col. Floyd Hansen, Medaris’ executive officer, visited the Gnome-Rhone factory, which had built aircraft engines for the Germans. Reasoning that the plant could do just as fine a job of producing tank engines for the First Army, Lynde and Hansen contracted with Gnome-Rhone to overhaul 200 tank engines at $500 per engine. The financing of the deal caused some disputes between Lynde and the G–5 section, but it paid off handsomely for the First Army, which received its first order within two weeks. Encouraged, Medaris formed a much larger procurement network in Belgium, negotiating a contract for small arms with Fabrique Nationale des Armes de Guerre and arranging for Englebert and Company to repair and manufacture tires. Local sources also produced such badly needed items as batteries, wire, shells, automotive parts, and snow capes. In their efforts to meet First Army orders, firms were often plagued by political instability and lack of raw materials, shortages of electrical power, and the want of skilled labor. Still, by November the program was providing valuable items while also helping the G–5 section revive industries damaged by the war.  

Local procurement often expedited research and development by the First Army ordnance section. When troops complained about the accuracy of their 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars, a lieutenant on detail from COMZ investigated the problem, developed new prototypes, and tested them in the field, where they received a positive response. Lynde then contracted with Belgian mortar manufacturers in Liege and Charleroi to rehabilitate the First Army’s mortars, a project they completed by December. Meanwhile, First Army ordnance teams, examining German 155-mm. guns on the Maginot Line, found that synthetic rubber pads on the guns lasted much longer than asbestos pads on corresponding American models. The manager of Englebert and Company believed that he could duplicate the composition, and Lynde made arrangements for the firm to produce the pads. The ordnance section also replaced 75-mm. guns on M4 Sherman tanks with 76-mm. tubes and experimented with rockets as an inexpensive, easily manufactured alternative to the ammunition-poor artillery. With the approval of Thorson and Hart, army ordnance personnel equipped a 105-mm. howitzer battalion with 4.5-inch rocket launchers, but the project received less than rave reviews. Artillerymen criticized the weapon’s inaccuracy and vulnerability to counterbattery fire, and adjacent units complained when the unit drew enemy shelling on their positions. The First Army also equipped several artillery units with the new proximity fuze, although it delayed the new weapon’s employment due to security constraints.  

For all the First Army headquarters’ efforts to improvise, lack of resources emasculated its October offensive. Focused on the main drive, the First Army and XIX Corps headquarters had greatly underestimated the opposition that they would encounter in the Peel Marshes. As of 6 October the 7th Armored Division was still bogged down in the region. To the south, the rest of the XIX
Corps was making slow, if steady, headway in its attack on the West Wall north of Aachen. The First Army’s inability to clear its flank, as well as a negative report from Dempsey, the commander of the British Second Army, on the First Army’s supply of ammunition, influenced Montgomery’s decision on 7 October to postpone the 21 Army Group’s Ruhr drive to concentrate on clearing the approaches to Antwerp.  

At Eisenhower’s direction, Bradley ordered the First Army to turn over the Meuse salient, along with the 7th Armored Division and the Belgian 1st Brigade, to the Second Army, and he assigned Hodges a more limited mission to exploit his penetration of the West Wall and take Aachen as a foothold for a further advance. Hodges, not wanting to divert scarce units to surround a bypassed Aachen, had already ordered the capture of the city over the protests of Corlett and Collins, who wished to avoid prolonged street fighting and push on to the Roer River. Perhaps his caution was abetted by Dickson’s estimate that, “although four of the Pz or Pz Gr Divs of first quality have appeared on our front, it is believed he has available at least five more,” including the 9th, 9th SS, 10th SS, 2d SS, and 12th SS Panzer Divisions. These units actually were not in the Aachen area at the time, although the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions appeared later in the month on the 21 Army Group’s front. While the G–2 watched for a counte rattack, the XIX and VII Corps, against stiff resistance, closed the ring around the doomed city in two weeks of fierce fighting. In the Hürtgen, the 9th Infantry Division was making slow progress in its attempts to clear the forest and protect the VII Corps’ southern flank, while, to the south, the Third Army, low on artillery ammunition, had broken off its advance north and west of Metz.

The slow pace of the XIX Corps’ advance did not help the perennially cool relations between its headquarters and the First Army commander and staff. After almost daily visits to corps and division command posts early in the offensive, Hodges spent most of his time at his chateau near Verviers. There, in mid-October he reached a final impasse with Corlett. By his own admission, the XIX Corps commander, who had been battling an infection since July, was tired and irritable. He had never had the rapport with Hodges that he had enjoyed with Bradley, and his awareness of playing second fiddle to Collins was only exacerbated by Hodges’ shift of the main effort from the XIX to the VII Corps once the First Army reached the Roer, as well as the continuing priority of the VII Corps over the XIX Corps in the allocation of artillery ammunition. When Hodges, in Bradley’s presence, dressed down Corlett for exceeding his quota of artillery ammunition for the preassault bombardment on 2 October, Corlett unwisely replied in kind. Relations between the two only grew worse over the next two weeks, as the First Army headquarters pressed the XIX Corps to accelerate its advance. At one point, Corlett offered to take Kean and Thorson to the front and show them the situation. Corlett’s staff likewise regarded the First Army headquarters as overbearing, while the First Army commander and staff saw Corlett as a tired old man, overanxious about his flank and always calling for more troops and ammunition when none were available. On 18 October, three days before Aachen fell, Bradley, at Hodges’ insti-
Frustration at the West Wall 171

gation, relieved Corlett. While ill health was the reported reason, Hodges clearly was happy to see Corlett depart.50

Within days of Corlett’s relief and replacement by Maj. Gen. Raymond S. McLain, the 12th Army Group headquarters transferred the XIX Corps from the First Army to the Ninth Army. Almost as soon as the Ninth Army had taken over the Ardennes front in early October, Bradley had decided to shift it north to a sector between the First Army and 21 Army Group. He later stated that he wanted to prevent his most experienced and temperamental army staff from falling under British control in the event Montgomery persuaded SHAEF to give the 21 Army Group an American army. While the move made sense politically, it limited the First Army’s options by, in effect, shifting its front to the rugged terrain to the south. To avoid a complex physical transfer of troops and supplies, Bradley directed the two army headquarters simply to exchange corps, with the First Army receiving the VIII Corps and the Ninth Army obtaining the XIX Corps.51

Given the general shortage of supplies, the transfer took some negotiation between the two armies. After a conference of G-3s and G-4s from the two armies and two corps on 10 October, the Ninth Army traded the VIII Corps, its supporting service units, and anything left in the dumps supplying its units for the XIX Corps, the service units supporting it, and credits for the supplies that it had given to the First Army. Although the paper transfer took place on 22 October, the actual shift took some time, during which the First Army continued to supply the XIX Corps until COMZ built up enough supplies in the Ninth Army’s depots. At one point, a dispute arose when the First Army headquarters ordered the XIX Corps to transfer to the VIII Corps most of the equipment that the First Army had obtained prior to the invasion for special projects, such as construction, over and above that authorized by tables. In the end, the 12th Army Group headquarters arranged for the transferred divisions to keep their equipment while the Ninth Army compensated the First Army, but the case did little to diminish the First Army’s reputation for piracy.52

The exchange of corps also contributed to the decision to relocate the First Army headquarters. Hodges’ staff had long since earned a reputation for choosing the most uncomfortable sites for its command posts, and Verviers, with its drab chateau, officers mess in a stable, tents in muddy fields, and dirt roads had done little to dispel the image. As the days grew shorter and the rains colder, the staff chiefs had urged Hodges and Kean to move the command post, but they refused to make any move that might imply that the First Army headquarters had given up its hopes for a breakout and gone into winter quarters. Finally, with the close of the October offensive and the Ninth Army’s shift to the north, they relented. On 25 October the First Army headquarters began its move to Spa, an old resort city, about seventeen miles southeast of Liege in the hilly southeastern corner of Belgium near the Ardennes. In addition to a more central location behind the front, Spa offered the most elegant quarters yet occupied by the staff. Hodges, Kean, Quesada, and the general staff installed their offices in the stately Hotel Britannique, with Hodges taking a room once occupied by Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg in World War I. Meanwhile,
the special staff found quarters in other hotels, casinos, and nightclubs around the town. At Spa too, the entire headquarters, except for the rear echelon, reassembled for the first time since early August.\textsuperscript{53}

With the move to Spa, located in the middle of the Belgian communications network, the First Army headquarters would benefit from improved communications, which, unfortunately, also brought with them the illusion of complete control. The pursuit now over, Williams' signalmen could rely less on radio and more on wire, while also making extensive use of Belgian commercial facilities. After the First Army moved its command post to Spa, signal construction companies rehabilitated the communications network, including an exchange that the Germans had demolished. Next to this exchange, the First Army headquarters installed its switchboard. Wire links, including a direct line from Quesada to the IX Tactical Air Command's command post at Verviers, radiated out to lower-level headquarters and adjacent echelons. They also connected into the Continental Wire System, the unified main-line wire system that Williams, in conjunction with representatives from the 12th Army Group headquarters, COMZ, and the other army staffs, had helped design. The First Army signal crews also installed several radio nets, using relay stations to bypass terrain features obstructing transmission and reception. As the First Army drove into Germany, army signal battalions, rebuilding communications systems in Aachen and the surrounding area, took precautions against sabotage and the use of commercial cables by agents behind Allied lines. By the start of the Battle of the Bulge in December, the First Army headquarters at Spa stood at the center of a major communications network.\textsuperscript{54}
Within Spa, perhaps the liveliest places in town were the four hotels used by the journalists and the First Army’s press relations personnel. In general, media relations were as warm under Hodges as they had been under Bradley, despite the occasional disputes over censorship policy and Hodges’ lack of the common touch that Bradley brought to press conferences. Such reporters as Hanson Baldwin, Hal Denny, Drew Middleton, and Jack Thompson had become fixtures around the headquarters, and they generally gave the First Army favorable coverage. Although Hodges did not go out of his way to court the press, neither did he shun them. He held sporadic press conferences and, for a time during the early autumn, hosted at dinner numerous correspondents, many sent by SHAEF to divert to Hodges some of the publicity lavished on his flamboyant cohort at the Third Army. During the pursuit, the press camp had used captured vehicles and liaison planes provided by other sections to meet the need of reporters for transportation and communication, but now it could return to a more orderly routine in Spa. There, First Army staff personnel briefed the press every morning at 0900, allowed them fairly free rein to travel along the front during the day, and then briefed them again at 1700. By October the section had also corrected most of the communications difficulties that had plagued it in Normandy, arranging for each page of copy to be carried by a courier to a censor for clearance and then to the press wireless for dispatch.

In the competition for resources within the publicity and psychological warfare section, the psychological warriors came off second best. By October many of their functions had been assumed by their counterparts at the 12th Army Group.
headquarters and SHAEF, leaving the First Army with the tasks of tactical propaganda and "consolidation" propaganda in the liberated and occupied areas within the army rear area. In the case of consolidation propaganda, the section assisted the G-5 staff with public address equipment, newspapers, and other means of disseminating information among civilians. In the case of tactical propaganda, it arranged for loudspeaker broadcasts and distribution of leaflets to weaken morale and induce surrenders among frontline enemy troops. Responding to requests from division G-2 sections through section liaison officers, section personnel prepared leaflets and coordinated with the artillery section to fire them into enemy lines by shell, the normal mode of delivery. As was so often the case with a program dealing with intangibles, it proved difficult to determine the effectiveness of psychological warfare, although the First Army propagandists could cite some suggestive cases, such as the impact of civilian panic on the defense of Aachen when leaflets threatened the city's destruction.58

While wearing down the esprit of enemy soldiers, the First Army also had to maintain the spirits of its own. Even though morale clearly caused concern in the Allied high command that autumn, the First Army headquarters was slow to respond with a program. One of the reasons lay in the ongoing changes in organization for morale support in Army staffs after a War Department directive in late August to remove information and education, which went to the G-3 section, from the list of special service functions. Partly in response to that order, at the end of September the First Army special service section reorganized into four subsections: one for entertainment, another for rest areas, a third for supply, and a fourth for leaves, furloughs, and passes. Supply problems also contributed to the delay in establishing a comprehensive morale program. Given its low priority for COMZ transport and the problem of theft en route, May's special service section almost invariably had to bring forward its own supplies using army transportation that the G-4 section was willing to allot for the purpose.59 Furthermore, it appears that some First Army staff officers, most notably Kean, shared the old Army view that morale was a function of leadership, training, and discipline; that special activities were superfluous; and that special supplies were an unneeded luxury. The apathy in the First Army headquarters toward special services in the early autumn of 1944 probably also reflected a lingering hope that a breakout was imminent as well as the wish of security-minded counterintelligence officers to segregate the troops from civilians.60

With colder weather and a more stable front, however, the First Army headquarters took several steps to improve morale. Under May's special service section, a special service company with each corps and a separate company for army units provided concerts, live shows, and movies. The last proved especially popular despite the poor entertainment value of most available films and the shortage of projectors and spare parts. In mid-October the First Army headquarters relaxed its off-limits policy on towns to open three corps rest centers and, later, separate army centers. At Verviers, Eupen, and Arlon, sixty-five miles south of Liege, corps and division personnel on 48- or 72-hour passes from the combat zone could enjoy bars, dances, recreational halls, exchanges, swim-
ming pools, showers, movies, and live shows. The latter included USO shows, featuring such luminaries as Dinah Shore, Fred Astaire, and Marlene Dietrich, although some soldiers complained that the stars did not stay long enough to justify their advance publicity. In their efforts, First Army special service units received a big assist from the American Red Cross. Under a new section within the First Army headquarters, the Red Cross opened “donut dugouts” in corps rest areas, sponsored Christmas programs, distributed gum, cigarettes, stationery, and other desirable items, and divided its clubmobile groups into sections of four trucks each for greater coverage of the front.

Nor did the First Army headquarters neglect other means of maintaining morale. On 22 October the First Army headquarters authorized 48-hour passes to Paris for personnel from combat divisions, and in December it instituted a program of furloughs to the United States. Priorities for the latter favored those with the most wounds or decorations rather than the most time overseas. First Army units also made liberal use of awards and decorations; indeed, in November the 12th Army Group headquarters restricted the number of combat awards that the First Army and its subordinate units could distribute in a given week. In practice, however, the First Army was often able to exceed the quotas. The First Army G–1 section would later argue in favor of percentages as a guide to awards, rather than mandatory limits.

Training was also critical to the maintenance of morale. Although the shortage of divisions precluded lengthy breaks from the front for reorganizing and retraining most combat units, the G–3 training subsection supervised and coordinated such training and retraining programs as existed. The subsection prepared training memorandums, inspected unit training programs, supervised army schools, allocated spaces in those schools, and allotted training facilities and ammunition in conformity with policy set by Hodges and higher headquarters. The special staff sections likewise supervised training in their specialties. The armored section, for example, published combat experiences, collected training films, and improvised ranges near Spa where new tank units could test-fire their weapons before they went into combat. Having initiated training for the proposed crossing of the Rhine River, the engineer section delegated actual supervision of the training to its groups but conducted frequent inspections and coordinated demonstrations by units.

While the special service and G–3 sections attempted to maintain morale and training levels, the provost marshal section, in cooperation with the judge advocate general and inspector general sections, worked to maintain discipline within the First Army. During the pursuit across France, the number of cases involving insubordination and sexual offenses had dropped, and by early September cases of self-inflicted wounds had declined so far that Col. Rosser L. Hunter, the First Army inspector general, recommended they be turned over to the corps and division headquarters for handling. On the other hand, Wright’s provost marshal section noted a sharp rise in the number of absences without official leave (AWOLs) and smaller increases in larceny and pillaging. The First Army headquarters was also concerned about the amount of black marketeering in its rear areas. Although the headquarters issued stiff directives
against the practice, the provost marshal noted that the most effective deterrent was probably civilian awareness that they would be prosecuted for possession of Army property.65

Of even more concern than the black market was the rise in AWOLs, many of whom took vehicles at a time when the shortage of transportation was a major problem. The First Army headquarters allowed the corps and divisions to adopt their own policies, but, in a 6 October order to separate army units, it laid out severe countermeasures, including the provision that it would charge those absent over thirty days with desertion. The First Army headquarters divided the army rear area between two military police battalions, each of whom would operate straggler posts and send patrols through its area. To relieve subordinate units of responsibility for picking up apprehended stragglers, the two battalions, starting in September, returned them through prisoner channels to their outfits in the case of army units, or to corps collecting points if the offender’s unit was assigned or attached to a corps.66

Under the First Army command system, the provost marshal had the responsibility for rear area security, a source of increasing concern to the First Army headquarters in general and the G–2 section in particular. As the First Army entered Germany, the G–2 section was greatly concerned about the threat of guerrilla warfare and espionage by fanatical Nazis. In line with SHAEF directives, Hodges adopted a tough policy against fraternization—a policy that proved difficult to enforce—and authorized “the most stringent measures” against guerrillas.67 To gather intelligence on German organizations, the G–2 section formed a special “D” subsection. At the same time, the counterintelligence subsection, in cooperation with the provost marshal and inspector general sections, supervised the First Army interrogation center, next to the army prisoner enclosure. There, military intelligence teams and personnel from the other two sections questioned suspicious civilians and possible war criminals. After a 12th Army Group directive in late August formed a standing court of inquiry for violations of the Geneva Convention and laws of war, Hunter, having consulted with the G–1 and G–2, obtained Kean’s approval in Hodges’ name of a standard operating procedure for handling such cases.68

In November the First Army headquarters also adopted a system to defend key rear area installations and communications against small-scale attacks, guerrilla operations, and sabotage and to hold back large-scale attacks until combat troops could be moved to the threatened localities. This plan divided the zone between the army and corps rear boundaries into areas, each under a commander who, advised by a company grade officer with combat experience, would prepare plans and otherwise take responsibility for the defense of his area. Each of these commanders reported directly to the provost marshal, who served as army security commander with responsibility for coordinating and overseeing the defense of the whole. Because the provost marshal lacked the organization to carry out this mission in addition to his other duties, coordination of defense arrangements would actually be handled by the commander of the 23d Tank Destroyer Group, an army unit that possessed the necessary staff and communications. Under the provost marshal as security commander, the
23d Tank Destroyer Group headquarters became the Security Command Headquarters, First U.S. Army. The First Army headquarters also needed to take into account the threats to its rear areas from unconventional German weapons. Of these, the threat from chemical weapons did not overly concern the chemical warfare section. During the pursuit, intelligence teams that evaluated captured German stocks did not find the stores of chemical munitions that they had expected, and G–2 reports indicated that the Germans were not equipping new units with gas masks or instructing them in preventive measures.

On the other hand, the threat to the First Army rear from V-weapons had suddenly become real. Through October and November, V–1s, or “buzz bombs,” and V–2s rained on Allied rear areas, mostly on Antwerp, but also on Liege, Eupen, and Verviers, damaging railroads and other facilities. In response, Patterson’s antiaircraft section formed a special subsection for V-weapons and deployed detection devices to track missiles and collect data on their operation. At the same time, Medaris assigned an ordnance officer to gather information from trajectories, flight paths, and wreckage at the impact sites. Intelligence from these two sources, as well as from prisoner interrogation and from aerial reconnaissance reports by the IX Tactical Air Command, went to the G–2 section, where Capt. Roger Ray soon assembled a fairly complete picture of V-weapon deployment, capabilities, and supporting logistics. Using this intelligence, Patterson stationed a belt of 90-mm. gun and automatic weapon battalions about fifteen miles southeast of Spa near Camp Elsenborn to shoot
down the V-1s as they flew overhead, and he also more closely integrated his air warning system with the IX Tactical Air Command's organization. Under the new arrangement, the 149th Antiaircraft Operations Detachment reported directly to Patterson rather than the 49th Antiaircraft Brigade, the headquarters to which Patterson attached most antiaircraft units assigned to the First Army. From 24 November to the end of February 1945, 70 of the 350 V-1s entering the First Army's air space were destroyed by antiaircraft batteries. While the V-weapons exploding in the vicinity occasionally caused staff personnel to dive for cover, they never had a significant impact on operations.72

The rain of V-weapons on populations in rear areas made the task of the civil affairs section more difficult. In September, for the first time, the First Army stood on German soil, exercising military government over occupied territory. Unfortunately, Allied leaders once again had not given timely guidance, except for some general statements on the need for a stern approach, eliminating Nazism and limiting relief to those measures that would prevent disease and chaos.

At the time, the First Army headquarters still had not received the SHAEF handbook or the 12th Army Group directive for military government in occupied Germany. Furthermore, the G-5 section was dissatisfied with the quality of its military government detachments and assembled those not already in the field at its military government center in Verviers for a training program. In dealing with these detachments, Gunn jealously guarded his authority, ordering them to route all communications outside the center through his G-5 section, even though the detachments came under ETOUSA's European Civil Affairs Division for administration. Fortunately, the First Army staff had done some planning for the occupation as part of RANKIN and RANKIN's later version, TALISMAN.73 As the First Army drove into Germany, military government detachments posted proclamations; appointed officials; gathered weapons, explosives, and radios from the populace; and restricted the movements of the population. After all the concern, the inhabitants proved generally docile toward the invaders. It helped that the First Army occupied only a small slice of Germany and could focus its efforts on Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.74

In the Low Countries, whose exiled governments had reached preliminary agreements with the Allies, the First Army had an easier task than in Germany, but civil affairs in these countries could hardly be described as smooth. Initially, liaison with the Belgian government and military mission in Brussels was lacking, and even after it was instituted, the First Army headquarters complained that the Belgian government too often acted slowly in response to the First Army's needs. Among other problems, the First Army headquarters faced the complicated task of collecting old Belgian and Luxembourg notes and substituting new currency, a task supervised by the finance section. It also confronted the ticklish job of disarming factions of the Belgian Resistance, a situation it resolved by taking the stern line of arming the police and warning faction leaders that it would not tolerate unrest in its rear areas. Meanwhile, civil affairs officers used captured rations to meet food shortages, helped the Red Cross combat outbreaks of typhoid and diphtheria, made arrangements to guard art treasures, and established camps to house the large numbers of refugees.75
While the First Army G-5 section struggled through October and early November to bring order to rear areas, the supply crisis was finally starting to ease. (Table 3) Between 1 October and mid-November, Class I reserves, including rations, had increased from 1.4 to 13.4 days, and McNamara’s quartermasters could even serve Thanksgiving dinner to the troops. Class III stocks, including gasoline, had increased from .8 days on 1 October to 8.8 days by 20 October. The First Army still needed ammunition, but COMZ, by rushing forward ammunition stocks to ADSEC and the army depots without segregating them by type, had accumulated enough in forward areas for a reasonable expenditure in the next offensive. During October the First Army increased stocks of ammunition in its depots from 20,094 tons to 32,443 tons.76 Despite the good news, considerable tension remained between the First Army headquarters and COMZ. Justifiably skeptical of COMZ’s ability to deliver on its promises and determined to build up their stocks against any renewed supply crisis, the First Army logisticians naturally continued to requisition more than they needed. The practice infuriated COMZ, which wanted to develop its own intermediate and rear depots. For all the efforts of COMZ, ADSEC, and the armies, the supply situation would be a concern until February 1945.77

Although far from ideal, the supply situation had improved to the point that the First Army headquarters could seriously consider a major November offensive. As October came to a close, Dickson’s G-2 section prepared the necessary estimates and terrain analyses for a drive to the Rhine. Poor weather and fewer daylight hours, however, reduced aerial reconnaissance, causing the G-2 planners problems in acquiring data. German radio silence, cutting off the main source of ULTRA, also affected information gathering.78 The data that the G-2 section did possess showed the enemy’s astonishing powers of recuperation since September. The Germans had taken advantage of the Allies’ supply crisis to construct new field works, to bring new infantry divisions into the line, and to withdraw panzer divisions to rest and refit with the fruits of Germany’s expanded tank production. When the next Allied offensive began, it would encounter a much stronger defensive line, as Dickson noted.79 By the end of October he had backed off his estimate of nine panzer divisions available for commitment on the First Army front, but he still foresaw a strong possibility of a spoiling attack toward the Maas River by at least four panzer divisions. His concern was not shared by the VII Corps’ G-2 section, which estimated that it enjoyed a five-to-one edge over the Germans in its sector.80

During October the First Army headquarters was also finally becoming aware of the danger that the Roer dams posed to the Allied advance. The 9th Infantry Division’s G-2 had first warned of the threat on 2 October, but Dickson was initially inclined to minimize it. He estimated that opening the dams would, at most, cause only five to six days of local floods, although Carter, whose engineer section was conducting its own studies, believed that the flooding could be more widespread.81 In late October, after SHAEF and the corps engineers expressed their concern, Dickson and Carter took another look, consulting a civilian hydrographic engineer from Aachen, arranging for aerial reconnaissance of the dams, and otherwise making the area a priority for intelligence collection by their two
### Table 3—First Army Supply and Consumption Levels
20 October—19 November 1944

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Rations on Hand (days of supply)</th>
<th>Gas on Hand (gals.)</th>
<th>Ammunition on Hand (tons)</th>
<th>Rations Consumed (no.)</th>
<th>Gas Consumed (gals.)</th>
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*According to the 1944 Dictionary of United States Army Terms, the day of supply is the "unit used in estimating the average expenditure of various items of supply per day in the field." Thus for rations, one day of supply represents the quantity of rations needed to feed every soldier in the First Army for 24 hours.

*For 105-mm, howitzers, 155-mm. howitzers, and 155-mm. guns only.

*For 15 October–28 October.

*For 29 October–1 November.

sections. Still, the First Army leadership was slow to see the dams as a real menace. As late as 29 October Hodges told Bradley that storage reservoirs on the Roer were down to 30 to 50 percent capacity and that "present plans of this Army do not contemplate immediate capture of these dams." Not until 7 November, after the preliminary attack against Schmidt had already begun and at the same time that a First Army intelligence report noted German preparations to flood the Roer did Hodges finally order the V Corps headquarters to draw up a plan specifically to seize the dams. Even then, some time would pass before the First Army focused its attention on that objective.

Part of the reason for the First Army headquarters' slowness to perceive the importance of the dams lay in its focus on the Stolberg corridor, its best remaining avenue of advance after the Ninth Army's move to the north. On 18 October Eisenhower had decided to proceed with a November offensive, and he directed Bradley to make the main effort toward the Rhine south of Cologne, while also preparing to extend his northern flank to link up with Montgomery's drive from the MARKET-GARDEN salient. Montgomery would first open the approaches to Antwerp and then advance southeast from the MARKET-GARDEN salient to clear the area from the Meuse to the Rhine and link up with the northern flank of Bradley's thrust. Devers' 6th Army Group would resume its drive to the Rhine at Strasbourg. After meeting with his army commanders, on 21 October Bradley ordered the First Army to attack east on 5 November and, if possible, seize a bridgehead over the Rhine in the Cologne-Bonn area, on the southern edge of the Ruhr. If the First Army could not capture a bridge-
head, it would clear the west bank of the Rhine south to the Moselle. Meanwhile, the Ninth Army would protect the First Army’s northern flank to the Rhine and then advance north to link up with the 21 Army Group. The Third Army would protect the other flank of the First Army, advancing from the Metz area to the Rhine near Mainz.85

The First Army headquarters moved with alacrity to plan the attack. Even before Hodges received Bradley’s order, he had conferred with Collins, whose VII Corps would again have the main role. To help Collins, he moved the VII Corps—V Corps boundary northward, provided an extra regiment of infantry and a combat command of armor to join the VII Corps’ three infantry and one armored divisions, and arranged for thirty-two battalions of field artillery and 300 tanks and tank destroyers to support the VII Corps attack. Collins was to draft two attack plans, one for three divisions on 5 November and another for four divisions at some point between 10 and 15 November. Accompanied by Thorson, Hodges met with his other corps commanders and corps G–3s to lay out plans, realign forces, and set boundaries.86

While Hodges met with the principals, his staff handled the details of the plan. Hart’s artillery section asked the 12th Army Group artillery section what units and ammunition the 12th Army Group would allocate for the attack. It also coordinated with the G–3 section to get the general plan of attack, with the G–2 section to find the locations of enemy artillery, and with corps artillery officers to determine what they needed to achieve their missions. Based on this information, it drew up an artillery annex, allocating artillery to the corps, respective zones of fire for each corps, and the missions of the 32d Field Artillery Brigade, which would operate as army artillery in general support, reinforcing the fires of the V and VII Corps artillery. The section then issued drafts to interested parties, and, at a conference, received their comments prior to issuing the final annex as part of the overall plan. Simultaneously, Carter’s engineers brought up bridging equipment, negotiated through ETOUSA for a landing craft detachment from the Navy, located crossing sites, and otherwise laid plans for the Roer and Rhine crossings. On 26 October the First Army headquarters issued a field order for the drive.87 (Map II)

The First Army field order for the November offensive and the successive versions of that order left much to be desired. Aside from the tendency to micromanage that crept into some First Army orders that autumn, the main problem lay in the role assigned by the First Army headquarters to the V Corps. By capturing Schmidt—a key crossroads occupying high ground above the Roer headwaters on the southeastern fringes of the Hürtgen Forest—in a preliminary attack, the First Army headquarters hoped that the V Corps would gain maneuver room for the VII Corps and protect the VII’s southern flank while diverting enemy reserves from the main drive. To gain that objective, however, the First Army and V Corps headquarters eschewed an advance northeast to Schmidt up the narrow but open Monschau corridor, outflanking the Hürtgen Forest from the south, in favor of another attack through the woods, even after earlier probes had shown the great advantages the terrain gave a defender. Furthermore, the First Army directive gave the V Corps too few troops for all of its
GERMAN BORDER BATTLES
26 October - 15 December 1944

MAP 11
tasks. To carry out the preliminary attack, cover a 27-mile front, and prepare for an advance toward Bonn in support of the VII Corps, Gerow had four divisions, one of which was supposed to go to the VII Corps for the main attack. In the end, the V Corps could only spare the 28th Infantry Division for the Schmidt mission, and the attack plan, drawn up by the V Corps headquarters, relied on faulty reconnaissance, underestimated German opposition, and sent the division in several directions. Still, Hodges, when he saw the plan, pronounced it excellent.88

Then came the postponement of the main attack. Facing an enemy buildup on the VII Corps front, the First Army headquarters was banking heavily on the arrival of the 99th Infantry Division from Great Britain and the 104th Infantry Division from Antwerp, where it had been helping the British and Canadians clear the approaches to the port. The anticipated delay in the arrival of these units, along with the postponement of the 21 Army Group’s offensive to 14 November, caused Bradley on 1 November to set back the target date for the First Army’s offensive to 10 November.89 Anxious not to postpone the main offensive any longer than necessary, the First Army headquarters took every step to hasten the arrival of the 99th and 104th. While liaison officers from the G–3 and G–4 sections went to Great Britain to supervise the equipping and movement of the 99th Division, others accompanied six truck companies to the French port of Le Havre to speed the 99th’s trip to the front. The G–3 and G–4 sections also coordinated with COMZ and the British regarding the movement of the division through their zones, and with the provost marshal’s traffic subsection for the First Army zone. By 10 November the last troops of the two divisions were moving into line, the 104th on the VII Corps’ northern flank in the Stolberg corridor and the 99th on the V Corps’ front near Monschau.90

The order of battle for the November offensive contained some anomalies. As of 10 November the VII Corps included two infantry divisions, an attached infantry regiment, and one armored division in line and an infantry division, armored combat command, and cavalry group in reserve. The V Corps had two infantry divisions and a cavalry group; nominally, it also had attached to it most of an infantry division and an armored division, although these would be available as the army reserve. The VIII Corps had three infantry divisions, one armored division, and two cavalry groups. This list clearly indicated the VII Corps’ role as the main effort in the attack. Even with provisions for artillery support from surrounding units, however, the VII Corps, according to the 27 October order of battle, contained just sixteen field artillery battalions, four tank destroyer battalions, two tank battalions, a chemical mortar battalion, and six antiaircraft battalions. The V Corps could actually call on more tank destroyer and tank battalions—six and three—than the VII Corps, but only thirteen field artillery battalions and six antiaircraft battalions. The VIII Corps was left with thirteen field artillery battalions, four tank destroyer battalions, three tank battalions, five antiaircraft battalions, and a chemical mortar battalion. Army headquarters retained direct control of the field artillery brigade with seven battalions, a separate infantry battalion, and thirteen antiaircraft battalions. After having yielded priority on artillery ammunition to the V Corps
for the attack on Schmidt, the VII Corps regained a preponderant share for its own drive. 

Despite the postponement, the First Army headquarters did not halt the 28th's attack, thereby allowing the Germans to concentrate against it. On 2 November the 28th attacked and, for the first two days, seemed to make good progress, one battalion even forcing its way into Schmidt. The Germans, however, rushed in reserves and counterattacked on 4 November, driving the Americans from the town. While two battalions clung to a precarious position in neighboring Kommerscheidt, engineers struggled to keep open a narrow, muddy trail through a gorge, the only line of reinforcement and supply. Despite at least five calls per day between the First Army G-3 section and the V Corps headquarters, the First Army headquarters could learn little about the true situation, and on 5 November Hodges visited the division's command post, where he apparently vented his displeasure. As the 28th Division continued to struggle over the next few days with poor weather, rugged terrain, lack of reserves, and overwhelming German opposition, Hodges demonstrated his detachment from the situation. First, he criticized Maj. Gen. Norman D. Cota, commander of the division, for not deploying his troops properly to withstand artillery fire, and then he gave the battered 28th an unrealistic list of new tasks. When he visited the division again on 8 November, he dressed down Cota for not keeping track of his units and told Gerow to recommend any necessary reliefs. Although Cota had indeed lost touch with his units, he could hardly be blamed entirely for the predicament into which the V Corps and First Army headquarters had thrust his command.

While the 28th Division fought for its survival, the First Army headquarters, remembering COBRA, was working with its Army Air Forces colleagues to refine a plan for a massive air strike that would clear the way for the ground troops. Joint planning for the operation began at the IX Tactical Air Command headquarters on 30 October. It culminated in a meeting on 7 November of Hodges, his G-3, his artillery officer, and his antiaircraft officer with representatives of SHAEF, the 12th Army Group, the Ninth Air Force, and the Ninth Army and the IX and XXIX Tactical Air Commands. To allow for uncertainties of weather, the planners prepared three contingency plans. The preferred plan, set for any day from 11 to 16 November, called for 1,200 heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force to blast enemy troops and installations in the Eschweiler and Langerwehe areas, directly behind the German front facing the VII Corps. An equal number of British heavy bombers would bomb the Roer valley cities of Düren, Jülich, and Heinsberg, creating enough destruction to block roads leading through those cities. Meanwhile, medium bombers of the IX Bombardment Division would attack other troops and facilities in the German rear, while fighter-bombers of the IX Tactical Air Command would respond on call against targets of opportunity, cover the VII Corps' columns, and conduct armed reconnaissance.

Remembering COBRA, planners took elaborate precautions. They set a safety zone three times the size of that used for COBRA, and Patterson worked out an elaborate plan with the IX Tactical Air Command and Eighth Air Force for electronic signals, colored panels, barrage balloons, red antiaircraft bursts, and
searchlights to mark the First Army front. According to the plan, the Eighth Air Force, with Hodges’ approval, would determine the timing of the attack for the first three days of the target period, and Hodges would decide over the last three. The plan thus left the decision for the first three days to the echelon that best grasped the weather requirements of the heavy bombers, while reserving the decision over the last three days to the ground commander, who had the most at stake.96

In the end, poor weather did indeed push back the offensive from 10 to 16 November. While waiting for the weather to clear, Hodges and his staff made final preparations, listened with frustration to COMZ’s generalities on future supplies, and watched anxiously as the Germans built up their defenses. In this nervous atmosphere, Dickson warned of a highly probable German spoiling attack in the Ninth Army’s sector, making Hodges and his staff all the more eager to start the offensive. The German attack did not materialize, and late on the night of 15–16 November Hodges decided that the weather would clear enough to launch the offensive the next day.97

After all the painstaking preparation, the disappointingly slow start of the offensive again caused Hodges to make unrealistic judgments of his divisions. Thanks to the elaborate precautions, the air bombardment proved safer than COBRA’s but not as effective, as the bombers, hindered by clouds and haze, did minimal damage to the German front lines.98 At Spa, Hodges initially showed little concern over the lack of headway. Within a day, however, he criticized the 104th’s tactics and, on the VII Corps’ southern flank, the 4th Infantry Division’s tendency to drive its spearheads up the roads in the Hürtgen Forest. He wanted the 4th Division to advance in a line, an unrealistic stance given the unit’s excessively broad frontage in the woods. In four days the VII Corps advanced only two miles, although Dickson, relieved over the absence of a spoiling attack and the gains which the Allied attack had registered, believed that the increasing pressure would force the enemy to commit the Sixth Panzer Army piecemeal. Nevertheless, when Hodges and Quesada dined on the evening of 23 November, the First Army commander seemed to his colleague to be agitated, blaming the weather for precluding much of the fighter-bomber support he had anticipated. “He went on and on about how we might lose the war,” Quesada later remembered.99

Responding to the situation, Hodges seemed to have learned little from his experiences with the 28th Infantry Division. Searching for maneuver room and anxious to relieve pressure on the VII Corps, on 19 November Hodges ordered Gerow’s V Corps to proceed with its attack in the Hürtgen Forest. The drive into the woods by the VII Corps’ 4th Division had gone nowhere, and Hodges shortened the 4th’s front by moving northward the VII Corps’ boundary with the V Corps. He then gave the job of taking the key crossroads of Hürtgen, just inside the eastern edge of the forest, to the V Corps’ fresh 8th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Donald A. Stroh and supported by the attached Combat Command R of the 5th Armored Division. Rather than adjust the boundary to grant the V Corps a clear path to the Roer, however, Hodges let the boundary cut across the highway north of Hürtgen, an odd arrangement that indicated his
desire to allow the VII Corps to exploit any opening, as well as, in a roundabout fashion, his growing awareness of the significance of the Roer dams. Unfortunately, as was the case with the 28th, the 8th had so many tasks that it could devote only one regiment to the drive on Hürtgen. Nevertheless, Hodges pronounced himself pleased with Stroh’s plan. Indeed, he was so optimistic that he told Combat Command R to be ready to exploit on the second day.109

Again, Hodges would be disillusioned. Once more, the troops made slow headway through the dense woods, pillboxes, booby traps, and cold, damp weather. As in the Argonne twenty-six years before, command pressure grew on subordinate officers, who responded with overly optimistic reports of progress. Although Hodges, from visits to corps and division command posts, was somewhat aware of the conditions, he kept up the pressure on Stroh, un­justly perceiving the problem to be more a lack of will on the part of the 8th’s commander. Hürtgen fell on 28 November but too late to save the exhausted Stroh, relieved at his own request the day before.101

As the offensive continued and casualties mounted, the First Army’s replacement situation deteriorated. With the help of more personnel, the adjutant general’s casualty division cleared most battle casualty reports for ETOUSA’s Casualty Branch within ten days of the occurrence. In the interim, the daily estimated loss reports provided Hodges with a close enough accounting of losses and replacement requirements for planning purposes. As casualties mounted,
however, ETOUSA's ability to find enough replacements to fill the gaps in the ranks came into question. By December ETOUSA was experiencing such a theater-wide shortage of infantry and armor fillers, especially infantry riflemen, that Bradley, during a visit to Spa, raised the specter of American divisions fighting at half-strength, just like their adversaries. So short were units of riflemen, medics, and automatic rifle bearers that some resorted to hijacking replacement convoys and removing their fillers, even though the replacements they obtained did not possess the correct specialties. In response, the headquarters had to detail personnel to patrol the roads and stop the piracy.

By December the First Army G–1 section had already evolved a hearty dislike for the new replacement system that had gone into effect on 13 August. The new system placed the 3d Replacement Depot and its three battalions, each supporting a corps, under ETOUSA's Ground Force Replacement System, although the depot and battalions operated in the army area. Requisitions went from the combat units to the First Army headquarters, which merely audited and set priorities before sending them to the 3d Replacement Depot for action. In its monthly reports, the First Army G–1 replacement subsection complained that the system created an unnecessary lag between the submission of requisitions and delivery of fillers to units. The subsection also stated that the system did not allow the First Army to provide surplus personnel to units entering combat, and it created a drain on First Army facilities and transportation due to the inadequate resources of the depot and the oversupply of soldiers with unneeded specialties. To speed the flow of fillers, the subsection adopted the expedient of having units submit advance requisitions forty-eight hours before they went into action. It also submitted requisitions based on the daily loss estimates to the replacement depot even before the official requisitions arrived at the First Army headquarters from the combat units.

Other attempts by the First Army staff to address defects in the replacement system were lost in the snowballing replacement crisis. As a partial remedy to the demoralizing process by which individual fillers shuffled through successive depots on their way to the front, the G–1 section helped the 3d Replacement Depot institute combat orientation courses. In November the section also proposed that, in the future, ETOUSA furnish replacements already organized into battalions or companies, allowing regiments to use them intact and shift their remaining veterans to other units, but nothing came of the concept. As the November offensive continued and replacements grew scarce, the G–1 section kept close watch over the manpower situation on the front lines and allocated available replacements according to the tactical situation. With losses mounting, it canceled its policy of returning casualties to their original units. The First Army headquarters took this step to increase the flexibility and, thus, the responsiveness of the system, but the new policy backfired on morale, as many veterans went AWOL in an attempt to return to their former outfits. Reverting to its established practice, the G–1 section was still looking for other solutions in mid-December.

As during the Normandy campaign, the shortage of replacement officers posed a special problem. Battlefield appointments of noncommissioned offic-
ers (NCOs) to officer rank offered one possible alternative source. The G–1 section found that many candidates could not meet the Army General Classification Test (AGCT) score required for Army officers, but, believing that these soldiers had already demonstrated their fitness, it waived that standard. Even with lowered standards and a permissive theater policy, it soon became apparent that battlefield appointments would not meet all the needs for replacement officers. This problem had become clear especially during the autumn when the War Department announced that it was curtailing officer candidate programs in the United States and, later, that it could provide no infantry officer replacements for November and December. The War Department expected to deliver only 600 infantry and armor officers per month beginning in March. Although ETOUSA removed almost all limits on battlefield appointments, they could replace only a small percentage of officer casualties.

Even with the shortage of officer replacements, the First Army headquarters still sought to maintain the standards in its officer corps. When many units began to treat battlefield appointments as routine, the G–1 section issued a new policy that restricted them to those ineligible for a routine promotion, except for candidates who showed unusual leadership and courage while performing the duties of a higher rank. Reclassification of unsuitable officers remained a headache for the staff. In September the G–1 section recalled the reclassification recorders at the corps headquarters and authorized corps and separate unit commanders to send those they recommended for reclassification to the First Army command post bearing their complete file. If that headquarters approved the proceedings, the officer would continue on to the Reclassification Center, while his file went to the 12th Army Group headquarters. This procedure was modified by the G–1 section in November to provide that any commander seeking reclassification of an officer should report the case to his immediate superior, who would interview the officer in question and then prepare a brief report for the officer’s file. This change, the G–1 section believed, would ensure that the officer under consideration would be made aware of the reasons for the action. If any evidence of misconduct existed, the judge advocate general would be involved at an early stage. Still, the process did not confer the authority to relieve the officer before disposition of his case at higher levels, making it impossible to replace him in the interim.

Neuropsychiatric cases presented another complication. In December the First Army headquarters’ reclassification of two officers evacuated with neuropsychiatric symptoms was rejected by ETOUSA on grounds that the two men had displayed no mental indifference, inaptitude, or incompetence. ETOUSA later upheld the First Army’s appeal, but the two cases pointed to a real problem, since psychoneurotics, once safe in a rear area, often reacted so normally that medical officers returned them to combat through replacement channels. With the renewal of hard combat in November, the number of neuropsychiatric casualties again increased, as it had in July. In November, however, the First Army psychiatrists found that their patients were less likely to return to duty, due to a feeling of dislocation resulting from the rising number of replacements, the breakdown of some who had been previously wounded, and the high
degree of burnout among veterans. To treat more serious cases in an environment separate from other wounded soldiers, the First Army operated two exhaustion centers, where psychiatrists observed, treated, rehabilitated, and, if possible, returned patients to their units, usually via division clearing stations to avoid the delays of replacement channels.  

Fortunately, by late November the First Army medical organization was better prepared to meet more orthodox medical challenges. Truck runs direct from COMZ depots, local procurement, and the airlift of such critically needed items as penicillin had built up the First Army’s stocks of medical supplies, and more medical units had arrived from the beaches. Brig. Gen. John A. Rogers stationed his nondivisional units, except for the hospitals, under his three groups, each of which supported a corps, and he established a new medical base area at Eupen. He also created a system of liaison officers with the 12th Army Group headquarters and ADSEC, while keeping in touch with his own units by phone and courier. During the fall the medical section continued its role of policy maker and quality inspector, as its medical and surgical consultants supervised patient care and enforced the principles of the ETO Manual of Therapy. As the First Army launched its November offensive, losses increased but at a fairly steady and predictable rate, enabling the army surgeons to forecast supply and evacuation requirements at each stage. Because ambulances could not maneuver in the rugged terrain, the First Army had to rely more heavily on litter bearers, pressing even artillerymen and ADSEC personnel into service. The sheer volume of casualties caused the First Army medical staff to disregard its ten-day evacuation policy and evacuate more wounded directly to ADSEC and COMZ facilities, particularly the holding units and general hospitals at Liege. As the weather worsened, the railroad replaced airlift as the preferred method of evacuation.  

The poor weather, as well as rugged terrain and lack of ammunition, also presented challenges for the artillery section. After finding little opportunity to use massed artillery in the pursuit, the First Army headquarters employed army artillery in support of the attacks on the West Wall and Aachen. Usually, Hodges and Hart, who worked closely, retained the 32d Field Artillery Brigade, which was composed of an observation battalion, four battalions of 240-mm. howitzers, and two battalions of eight-inch guns. From a position roughly equidistant between the two corps bearing the main burden of the assault, the heavy guns of the brigade could give general support to either of the two corps upon receiving, first, broad, often verbal orders from Hart regarding their mission and, second, specific guidance from the supported corps via liaison officers. By November, however, poor weather hindered aerial reconnaissance, on which the artillery relied so heavily, and, in the Hürtgen, dense woods impeded the use of artillery in close support of advancing infantry. To destroy the enemy mortar nests that were causing so much grief to American units, Hodges and Hart worked out a plan for the artillery to start in the enemy’s rear area and work toward his front lines. For most close support, however, the infantry had to turn to self-propelled guns, tanks, and tank destroyers.  

As ever in the campaign, air support offered an alternative, but poor weather, rugged terrain, and the enemy’s fixed fortifications kept tactical air from
having the same impact it had achieved earlier in the year. By November the IX Tactical Air Command was mastering the supply problems that had plagued it as well as the ground troops earlier in the autumn. The move of its airfields to the Liege area, closer to the front, in late October also helped close air support, enabling planes to stay over the mission area for longer periods. Yet, due to inclement weather, the IX Tactical Air Command performed only two-thirds as many missions in October as in the previous month, and in November it carried out no sorties on nine days and fewer than two hundred on six others. By December, however, the number of fighter-bomber missions was rising again, largely due to the IX Tactical Air Command’s use of P-61 night fighters and experimentation with radio and radar to direct planes to their targets.

The First Army and IX Tactical Air Command were well accustomed to working with each other by the autumn of 1944. Although Quesada did not enjoy the rapport with Hodges that he had with Bradley, the mechanisms for close cooperation were already in place. The two headquarters continued their collocation of staffs in Spa, including a joint operations center established by Quesada and Patterson to control air defense. During the autumn the IX Tactical Air Command continued its program of increasing the number of air support parties. It kept the air support parties with their divisions even when those divisions transferred to another corps or army, and it gave them a more active role in directing close air support. Quesada also arranged for his pilots and staff officers to spend more time with ground units. Such measures, as well as the IX Tactical Air Command commander’s boasts that his planes would go wherever and whenever the infantrymen went, contributed to the confidence that ground troops felt in air support, at least on the days when the aircraft could get off the ground.

By December the Allies’ offensive had nearly stalled. After capturing Metz in a bitter fifteen-day struggle, the Third Army had to fight hard to reach the Saar region on the German frontier. The 6th Army Group to the south enjoyed better fortune, breaking through to the Rhine and taking Strasbourg. To the north, the 21 Army Group opened the port of Antwerp but made little progress toward the Rhine, and the Ninth Army reached the Roer only after a bitter struggle.

The First Army headquarters no longer had any doubt about the importance to the Allied offensive of taking the Roer dams. As the rains of early November filled the Roer reservoirs, amid further indications of German plans to blow up the dams, the First Army headquarters’ concern about them had grown exponentially. A First Army dispatch, dated 11 November, warned the corps not to go beyond the Roer except on army order. Later in the month, an increased number of photographic reconnaissance flights searched for evidence of demolitions and changes in water levels. Still, Hodges and his staff hesitated to switch the focal point of their drive from the Stolberg corridor to the dams, and Hodges expressed his hope that their destruction by air could spare the ground forces the trouble of taking the dams. The normally enthusiastic Quesada was skeptical. He noted the concentration of antiaircraft guns around the dams and judged that his tiny bombs could do little against such solid structures.
After considerable badgering from Hodges through Bradley and SHAEF, the Royal Air Force’s Bomber Command, which specialized in the low-level, precision bombing that the mission demanded, reluctantly agreed to try. After several cancellations due to poor weather, British bombers managed to conduct three strikes on the dams in the first half of December. None caused more than minimal damage.\(^{115}\)

Anticipating a possible failure by the Royal Air Force, the First Army headquarters was already preparing an attack on the dams. To strengthen the prospective drive by the V Corps, Bradley arranged for the First Army to receive two more infantry divisions. One would go to the V Corps, and one would relieve an experienced division on the inactive VIII Corps sector, enabling the division’s transfer to the V Corps. Meanwhile, Hodges rotated two exhausted veteran infantry divisions out of the VII Corps sector and replaced them with two rested divisions from quiet sectors of the First Army front. Given the lack of reserves, rotation of divisions between active and quiet sectors of the front was one of the few ways the First Army headquarters could rest divisions that had been in combat for some time. The plan that Hodges worked out with his corps commanders called for the VII Corps to continue to the Roer, where it would wait until the V Corps seized the Schwammenauel and Urft Dams. For this drive, the V Corps regained the major share of the allocation of artillery ammunition. The 32d Field Artillery Brigade, which was positioned to provide general support for the V and VII Corps, would conserve its ammunition for missions to hit critical long-range targets, such as bridges, factories, and V-weapon sites. A cautious scheme, the First Army plan reflected not only the headquarters’ concern about the dams, but also Dickson’s dire forecasts of a massive enemy counterattack that would hit the First Army as it lay astride the Roer.\(^{116}\)

The VII Corps attack on 10 December made good initial progress, but when the V Corps joined the offensive three days later, it encountered the rugged terrain of the German Eifel and a hailstorm of opposition. An irritated Hodges noted the V Corps headquarters’ ignorance of the location of its units, a cardinal sin in his eyes, and told Gerow in plain language to straighten out the situation. Neither Hodges’ nor Gerow’s curiosity was aroused by the identity of the hidden masses that had stopped the V Corps.\(^{117}\)

Hodges’ irritation reflected to some degree the fatigue pervading much of the First Army headquarters by mid-December. Many sections had long been overworked because the headquarters had based its organization on TO 200–1, the lean table issued in 1942 by Army Ground Forces for a field army staff. Since July ETOUSA had periodically authorized increases in personnel for the changes the First Army headquarters had made in its organization, notably for the G–5 section and a photographic interpretation special staff section. These increases, however, were only temporary augmentations. As the Army prepared to revise 200–1, it called on the armies for recommendations. Not surprisingly, the First Army sections almost invariably called for more people. The adjutant general’s section recommended a visitor’s bureau, the G–2 and G–3 sections wanted to add air subsections, the G–3 section suggested a passive air defense
subsection, and the G–4 section wanted to institutionalize its traffic control headquarters. But requests for more personnel received a cold shoulder from Army Ground Forces, which was trying to find ways to cut, not increase, support elements. The new table for a field army headquarters that appeared in late October authorized new armored, provost marshal, and press and psychological warfare sections, but only a net addition of 14 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 15 enlisted men.118

More personnel would have helped, but for the commanding general and many staff officers the stress of the almost daily fighting since June was beginning to show. Even the slower pace of operations and the move to more comfortable quarters in October could not remove the strain. Thorson, the First Army G–3, later recalled that Hodges at the time “was pretty slow making the big decisions. He would study them for a long time, and I would often have to press him before I got a decision.” Hodges’ fatigue resulted partly from a cold that plagued him periodically during the autumn, but mainly from his killing schedule. During the November offensive, he had worked two straight weeks of sixteen-hour days, and, during the Roer drive, he obtained only an hour of sleep per night.119 Driven by Kean, the staff was working long hours, and many, especially the Mediterranean veterans, were on the brink of exhaustion. As early as October Major Hansen noted that Dickson looked tired, and the G–2’s behavior in the late autumn, when he admittedly had much to concern him, indicated an acute case of nerves. As for Thorson, the visiting Bradley told Hodges that the exhausted G–3 should go on leave once the First Army reached the Rhine. Thorson noted Kean’s disapproving look and joked, “General, maybe you’d better put that order in writing.”120 Under the 12th Army Group’s new leave policy for senior officers and First Army policy, First Army staff personnel could use Hodges’ plane to go to London for seventy-two hours of rest, and many on the staff were availing themselves of the opportunity.121

For the First Army headquarters, it had been a frustrating autumn. At every step, the headquarters faced factors outside its control, including poor weather, difficult terrain, and shortages of divisions, replacements, artillery ammunition, and key supplies. In some ways, Hodges and his staff performed their role as an army headquarters with skill, particularly in their improvisation of supplies and unit rotation. Yet they created many problems for themselves, largely due to the fascination with detail which had served them so well in Neptune planning. Whether because of Hodges’ interest in lower-level tactics or lack of confidence in the corps commanders—or, more likely, both—the headquarters during the fall showed an occasional tendency toward micromanagement and a near obsessive need for information from the front. Ironically, the headquarters might have performed better in the pursuit than would otherwise have been the case because it could not indulge its penchant for detailed control. Even when Hodges and his staff stayed within their proper role, however, their conduct of the autumn offensives was often characterized by uninspired planning, questionable boundary placement, inadequate concentration of forces and other resources, an oft abnormal concern for flanks, and a tendency to press some attacks past the point of a reasonable goal. Finally, in its relations with other
echelons, the First Army headquarters frequently displayed a lack of patience. In the case of COMZ, such impatience and even hoarding was understandable but did little to help the overall task of building a theater-wide logistical structure. Many of these problems could be traced, to some extent, to the fatigue that gripped much of the First Army headquarters by mid-December. Fatigue came at a bad time, for that headquarters was about to embark on its greatest test.
Notes

1. Hansen Diary, 14 Sep 44.
2. Ibid.; Interv., author with Wendt, 29 Apr 91, p. 58; Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p. 410.
5. Ibid., 1:51–53; MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp. 30–35; Rpt, V Corps Operations in the ETO, pp. 250, 270; Beck et al., The War Against Germany, pp. 414–15; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, p. 156; Cir, First Army G–2 Estimate 28, 15 Sep 44. All G–2 Estimates cited in this study are in 101–2.15, G–2 Estimates, box 1956, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC. Rpt, First Army G–2 Periodic Rpt for 12 Sep 44. All G–2 Periodic Reports cited in this study are in 101–2.2 G–2 Journal and file, boxes 1837–1879, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC.
8. MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, pp. 155–56; Rpts, First Army G–2 Periodic Rpts for 13–14 Sep 44; Cir, First Army G–2 Estimate 28, 15 Sep 44.
10. Ltr, Eisenhower to Bradley, 23 Sep 44, Bradley Correspondence with Eisenhower, box 5, Bradley Papers, USAMHI; Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p. 423.
13. Hodges quote from Corlett, Cowboy Pete, p. 102.
16. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 323; MacDonald, Battle of the Huertgen Forest, pp. 61, 91; Cecil B. Currey, Follow Me and Die: The Destruction of an American Division


Interv. Forrest C. Pogue with Lt Gen Walter B. Smith, USA (Ret.), 13 May 47, pp. 1–2, Pogue interviews, USAMHI; Ruppenthal, *Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II*, p. 349; Telecom, author with Col Walter W. Wendt, USA (Ret.), 24 Apr 97, DWH.


Ltr, Medaris to Sayler, 15 Feb 45.


MacDonald, Battle of the Huertgen Forest, p. 86.

Sylvan Diary, 2–20 Oct 44. For a visit by King George VI to the First Army command post in October, see Hansen Diary, 14 Oct 44; Interv, Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, pp. 75–78.

Corlett, Cowboy Pete, pp. 102–06; Memos, artillery allocations, 101–3.3 G–3 Journal files, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Ltr, Corlett to Smith, 2 Sep 53, Replies from Participants–Siegfried Line Campaign, box 184, Background Materials from Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line. U.S. Army in World War II, RG 319, NARA; Interv, Lt Col Frank L. Henry, USA, with Lt Gen George I. Forsythe, USA (Ret.), 19 Feb 74, pp. 210–13, Senior Officers Oral History Program, USAMHI; Sylvan Diary, 14 Oct 44; Hansen Diary, 2 Nov 44; Intervs, Murray with Dickson, 22 Sep 72, p. 18, and Pogue with Hodges, 12 Jan 50; MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 303; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, pp. 358–62.

Hansen Diary, 19 Oct 44; Corlett, Cowboy Pete, pp. 104–06; MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 319; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, p. 363; Ltrs, Bradley to Eisenhower, 19 Oct 44, Bradley Correspondence with Eisenhower, box 5, Bradley Papers, USAMHI, and Eisenhower Papers, 4:2233–34.

Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 436–37; Interv, Pogue with Dickson, 22 Dec 47, p. 2; MS, Carter, Carter's War, ch. 11, pp. 23–24; MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp. 378–79.


Rosengarten, “With ULTRA From OMAHA Beach to Weimar, Germany,” p. 129; Hansen Diary, 14 Oct, 14 Nov 44; MS, Carter, Carter's War, ch. 11, pp. 14–16, 24–26; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 432, 439–40; McNamara, Quartermaster Activities, p. 149; MS, Dickson, From Algiers to the Elbe, p. 164; Interv, author with Wendi, 29 Apr 91, p. 72; Sylvan Diary, 10, 26 Oct 44; Cir, Bochicchio to Chiefs of Sections and Attached Units, 22 Oct 44, 101–1.15 SOPs, box 1829, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Jnl, First Army G–3 Jnl, 25 Oct 44.

Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 1 August 1944–22 February 1945, 3:174–78; Cir, Bochicchio to Chiefs of Sections and Attached Units, 22 Oct 44; Thompson and Harris, The Outcome, p. 133.

Interv, Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, p. 15; Hansen Diary, 14 Aug, 14, 22 Oct 44; MS, Carter, Carter's War, ch. 11, p. 45.


Prior to McMoms, HQ, 1st Equipment, First Army, 22 October 1944, box 1992, Algiers 113, 15 Oct 44, box 63, U.S. Army, Headquarters, First U.S. Army, Adj Gen Section, General Correspondence, 1940-1947, RG 407, WNRC, and Nourse to Corps, Division, and Separate Unit Commanders, 15 Nov 44, 101-3.22 G-3 Miscellaneous Memos, HQ 1st Army, Oct 44-Feb 45, box 1992, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Sylvan Diary, 21 Oct 44; AARs, First U.S. Army, for September through December 1944, 101-0.3 After Action Reports, boxes 1823-1824, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC.


Quote from Sylvan Diary, 17 Sep 44, and see also 23 Sep 44. Cirs, First Army G-2 Estimate 25, 11 Sep 44; Estimate 27, 12 Sep 44; and Estimate 31, 1 Oct 44. Hansen Diary, 13, 20 Sep 44.


Sylvan Diary, 23 Oct 44.

Sylvan Diary, 23 Oct 44.


Rosengarten, “With ULTRA From OMAHA Beach to Weimar, Germany,” p. 129.


Rpts, First Army G–2 Periodic Rpts for 10–29 Oct 44, and First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, pp. 169–70; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, p. 163; MS, Carter, Carter’s War, ch. 11, pp. 30–33; Interv, Murray with Dickson, 22 Sep 72, pp. 21–22; MS, Organization and Operation of an Army Headquarters in Combat, pp. 21–24.


MS, Organization and Operation of an Army Headquarters in Combat, pp. 24–30; MS, Carter, Carter’s War, ch. 11, pp. 42–44; Cir, LOI, First U.S. Army, 26 Oct 44, 300.6 Letters of Instructions, box 62, First Army, Adj Gen Section, General Correspondence, 1940–1947, RG 338, WNRC.


Sylvan Diary, 2–5 Nov 44; Jnl, First Army G–3 Jnl, 2–8 Nov 44; Currey, Follow Me and Die, p. 143.


MS, USAF Historical Division, Air University, Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944–8 May 1945, USAF Historical Study 70, p. 71, CMH Library; Memos, Planning Papers in Operation "Q" and Offensive by First and Ninth Armies, Narrative Report (Nov 16–30), box 7, Hodges Papers, Eisenhower Library.

MS, Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, USAF Historical Study 70, pp. 71–72; Memos, Planning Papers in Operation "Q" and Offensive by First and Ninth Armies; David G. Rempel, "Check at the Rhine," in Europe: ARGUMENT to VE Day, January 1944 to May 1945, ed. Craven and Cate, p. 631; MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp. 403–05; MacDonald, Battle of the Huertgen Forest, p. 124; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, p. 381; Hughes, OVERLORD, p. 266.


Sylvan Diary, 9–15 Nov 44; Cir, First Army G–2 Estimate 35, 12 Nov 44; Rpts, First Army G–2 Periodic Rpts for 1–15 Nov 44; Jnl, First Army G–3 Jnl, 10–11, 13–16 Nov 44; Hansen Diary, 10, 14–15 Nov 44; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 439–40.


Sylvan Diary, 16–18 Nov 44; Cir, First Army G–2 Estimate 36, 20 Nov 44; Rpts, First Army G–2 Periodic Rpts for 17–18 Nov 44; Hansen Diary, 16–20 Nov 44; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 440–41; MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 431. Quesada quote from Hughes, OVERLORD, p. 252, and see also p. 251.
Papers, G-3 1st Army, Dec 44, box 1992, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Rpts, First Army G-2 Periodic Rpts for 29–30 Nov, 1–9 Dec 44; Cir, First Army G-2 Estimate 37, 10 Dec 44; Memos, artillery allocations; Jnl, First Army G-3 Jnl, 4–6, 9 Dec 44, and First Army G-4 Jnl, 6 Dec 44; MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp. 598, 600; MacDonald, Battle of the Huertgen Forest, pp. 188–89; Rpt, V Corps Operations in the ETO, pp. 330–34; Hansen Diary, 9 Dec 44.

117 Sylvan Diary, 10–15 Dec 44; Rpts, First Army G-2 Periodic Rpts for 10–15 Dec 44; Jnl, First Army G-3 Jnl, 14 Dec 44.

118 Rpt, U.S. Army, ETO, General Board, Report on the Organization of the Army Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Study 24, pp. 1–2, CMH Library; Msgs, Dickson to Asst Chief of Staff, 12th Army Group, 19 Aug 44, 320.3 T/O Vol. I, box 126, and Maj E. H. Koremen, Asst Adj Gen, 12th Army Group, to Hodges, 31 Oct 44, 320.3 T/O Vol. IV, box 127, both in U.S. Army, HQ, 12th Army Group, Special Staff, Adj Gen Section, Administrative Branch, Decimal file, RG 331, NARA; Rpt, U.S. Army, ETO, General Board, Organization and Functions of G-1 Sections in Army Groups and Armies, Study 9, p. 11, CMH Library; Memos, for Army Commander and aides, HQ, FUSA, 4 Sep 44, and Dickson for G-1, 9 Sep 44, both in 320.3/415 Binder #2 Separate Folder, box 96, U.S. Army, HQ, First U.S. Army, Adj Gen Section, General Correspondence, 1940–1947, RG 338, WNRC; TOE 200–1, Headquarters, Army, War Department, 26 October 1944, Organizational History Branch, CMH.

119 Thorson quote from MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 619; Interv, Pogue with Hodges, 12 Jan 50; Sylvan Diary, 14 Sep, 20 Nov 44.

120 Hansen Diary, 9, 23 Oct, 7, 14–15 Nov 44; MS, Carter, Carter’s War, ch. 11, p. 44; Thorson quote from Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p. 440.

121 Interv. Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, pp. 95–96; MS, Carter, Carter’s War, ch. 11, p. 45; AAR, First U.S. Army, for November 1944; Rpt, U.S. Army, 12th Army Group, Report of Operations, 2:18–19; Ltr, Perry to author, 28 Jan 97.
As dawn approached on 16 December 1944, the First Army headquarters showed little awareness of the storm that was about to break. To the north, Collins’ VII Corps was waiting for Gerow’s V Corps in the First Army center to capture the Roer dams. In the south, all lay quiet on the sector held by Middleton’s VIII Corps. Its 75-mile length represented almost two-thirds of the First Army front and about three times the length of a normal corps front. To strengthen its advance along the Aachen-Cologne axis and to be ready to exploit any breakthrough to the Rhine, the First Army headquarters had concentrated most of its units in the V and VII Corps sectors and most of its service installations forward in the triangle between Spa, Verviers to the north, and Liege to the northwest. They thus lay directly behind the V Corps front. The quiet VIII Corps sector served as a place to acclimate green divisions and rest and refit worn-out veteran divisions in the absence of enough reserves to rotate units out of the line. In the rear areas behind and on the fringes of this thinly held front, the First Army staff had placed only a few major installations. Seven miles south of Spa lay the map depot at Stavelot. A truckhead was stationed near Butgenbach, fifteen miles east of the First Army command post. Just north of Butgenbach, near Elsenborn, was an engineer dump. One ammunition supply point was located near Waimes, twelve miles southeast of Spa, and another lay north of the VIII Corps headquarters at Bastogne, which was thirty-five miles south of the resort. Two dumps with a total of three million gallons of gasoline were stationed eight miles southeast of Spa, near Malmedy.1

At Spa itself, many of the staff section chiefs were taking advantage of the relative lull for a leave from the headquarters. The First Army G–3, G–4, and artillery, ordnance, and antiaircraft officers had all returned to England, while the G–2 took a few days of furlough in Paris. For a headquarters whose forces were actually in the process of an offensive, the number of staff chiefs absent at one time is striking. Undoubtedly, many of the staff heads wanted a rest prior to the offensive that they anticipated would follow the capture of the Roer dams.2

Of the First Army G–2 officers who would later claim to have predicted the Ardennes offensive, Dickson was the most visible, protesting to the end of his
life that he had foreseen the German attack and sounded the alarm.\(^3\) By his account, he began to have reservations about his optimistic 20 November estimate in early December. Prisoner interrogations at the time revealed the presence of four SS panzer divisions along the Rhine south of Düsseldorf; reconnaissance planes spotted intensified rail and vehicle traffic opposite the First Army front; and a captured enemy order disclosed that the Germans were forming English-speaking units to conduct raids and sabotage on American command posts. A request from the G–2 target subsection for bombing raids against enemy assembly areas was approved by Hodges and Quesada, but, Dickson stated, the Eighth Air Force turned down the mission as “unremunerative.”\(^4\) Nonetheless, on 10 December the First Army G–2 issued his controversial Estimate 37, in which he raised as a probable enemy strategy the exhaustion of the First Army’s Roer drive followed by an all-out counterattack as the First Army crossed the plain between the Roer and Erft Rivers. Over the next few days, Dickson later contended, he became certain that the focal point would be the Ardennes, and finally, on the evening of 14 December, he slapped the map and proclaimed his suspicions, a prediction that, he claimed, caused Hodges to request two divisions from Bradley for the VIII Corps sector. Dickson then left for Paris, stating later that he needed the rest and was confident that he had done all that he could.\(^5\)

The written record supports Dickson’s case to a point—but only to a point. His daily periodic reports for early December and Estimate 37 leave no doubt of his anxiety over the presence of a large, uncommitted enemy reserve. When Estimate 37 ventures to predict the time and place of the offensive, however, it repeatedly returns to a counterattack beyond the Roer in response to an Allied crossing of that river and refers to the VIII Corps front only as a “comparatively quiet sector” for seasoning new formations. For a document that Dickson would later flaunt as evidence of his foresight, Estimate 37 provides a rather shaky foundation on which to build a case.\(^6\)

While more clairvoyant, the periodic reports for 11 to 15 December also fall short of predicting the time, place, and scale of the offensive. Reports for 12 to 13 December show enemy divisions arriving in the rear area opposite the VIII Corps but also state that two divisions on that front should soon move north, indicating only a normal rotation of units. On the other hand, the 14 December report—composed by Dickson’s deputy, Col. William Silvey, after the G–2 had left for Paris—cites as “very interesting” reports from the interrogation by VIII Corps intelligence officers of a German woman who saw river-crossing equipment near Bitburg. Silvey noted that this indicated an offensive intent. Hours before the attack, the report for 15 December points to reinforcements in the V and VIII Corps sectors and quotes many prisoners speaking of an attack between 17 and 25 December and of the recapture of Aachen as a Christmas gift for Hitler. But it hedges, stating that “although the enemy is resorting to his attack propaganda to bolster the morale of the troops, it is possible that a limited scale offensive will be launched for the purpose of achieving a Christmas morale victory for civilian consumption.” None of the periodic reports from the issuance of Estimate 37 to the start of the battle change that
estimate's prognosis of German capabilities. Dickson and his assistants clearly sensed that the enemy was up to something, but the number of qualifications in the record undercuts the G-2's claim of predicting a major Ardennes counteroffensive on 16 December.7

Dickson, of course, could have presented specific verbal warnings to his commander in a way that a written estimate's listing of all enemy capabilities did not allow, but, if he did so, he clearly did not convince his superiors. Hodges did talk privately with his G-2 on 10 December after the release of Estimate 37. When Bradley visited Spa the next day, however, he saw no indication that the First Army expected an attack, and Hodges later heatedly denied his G-2's claim that the First Army commander had requested reinforcements for the Ardennes. Hodges' conclusion at the time seems to have been that any enemy attack would come after the First Army crossed the Roer and that the Germans were using the Ardennes front to rest old divisions, not an unreasonable view given the reports he was receiving from his G-2.8 His G-3, Thorson, ridiculed Estimate 37 and later denied that Dickson ever briefed Hodges on the threat to the Ardennes.9 The G-2's case for having foreseen the offensive is not aided by inconsistencies and errors of fact in his account, such as his recollections of the timing of his departure for Paris and his later statement that Estimate 37 predicted an attack in the Ardennes. Rosengarten, the First Army UTLRA officer and a Dickson intimate, later remembered that his chief believed that an enemy counterattack was coming, but not enough to "stick his neck out."10 When Dickson departed for Paris, Rosengarten recalled, he was worried enough to give Rosengarten specific instructions but not enough to stay home.11

Whatever Dickson's warnings, they were not well received by his superiors, perhaps because they were reminded of his dire prognostications before the November offensive. Sibert, the 12th Army Group G-2, followed Estimate 37 with his own optimistic estimate on 12 December.12 Although SHAEF's G-2, Maj. Gen. Kenneth W. D. Strong, had, at other times, warned his chief of staff, Smith, and Bradley of the buildup opposite the Ardennes and Strasbourg, he now informed Sibert that Dickson was falling into his old habit of listing divisions known to be on other fronts. He told the 12th Army Group G-2 to set the First Army G-2 straight, but Sibert could not contact Dickson before the attack. With some of these officers, Dickson's reputation as an alarmist, however exaggerated, came back to haunt him. Indeed, the G-2's hedging of his conclusions may have reflected a painful awareness of his image.13

Why was the First Army headquarters unable to predict the Ardennes counteroffensive? The argument that the more luxurious lifestyle in Spa made the staff less alert is debatable.14 Among the various echelons, one finds poor coordination among the G-2 sections, at least partly due to the animus between Dickson and Sibert. Dickson later complained bitterly that higher echelons did not share their data with his section, but the First Army G-2 periodic reports were not of much immediate help to lower echelons, not reaching division G-2s until two or three days after issue. For security reasons, the First Army headquarters was also reluctant to give out specific warnings based on ULTRA, since corps G-2s would demand the source of the information.15
Along with deficient organization, unenlightening sources and faulty analysis contributed to the lack of prescience. Of the data, summaries, and estimates from subordinate commands, neighboring armies, and higher echelons, few sounded any note of concern, and the signs that they noted were often qualified, as in the case of observations of a rise in traffic being dismissed as normal unit rotation. On German soil, Allied intelligence could not depend on civilian reports as much as in France, and poor weather curtailed air reconnaissance, especially in the low-priority VIII Corps area. Thus, the First Army G–2 section relied more than ever on prisoner interrogation reports, captured documents, and signals intelligence.16 Viewed with hindsight, Ultra gave some clues of the coming attack, despite Hitler’s orders for radio silence, but the indicators that it provided did not stand out enough from the other data to draw the attention of Allied intelligence, including the First Army G–2 section.17 Much has been made of the lack of OSS representation at the First Army headquarters, but the OSS could operate in the First Army sector under 12th Army Group auspices. The OSS operatives who did infiltrate German lines in the area seldom returned, and those who did often did not provide reliable data.18 Like other Allied intelligence agencies, Dickson’s section believed the conservative Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, rather than the risk-taking Hitler, was in charge. In addition, First Army intelligence officers occasionally saw what they wanted to see, an inclination that the enemy, using a skillful deception plan, did much to confirm.19

Thus the First Army headquarters was surprised when German infantry emerged out of the mists early on the morning of 16 December. (Map 13) The first hint of anything unusual came at 0615, when the 49th Antiaircraft Brigade reported several explosions in its area. Then, as the morning progressed, reports of attacks, especially on the VIII Corps’ front, began to reach Spa.20 Initially, the exact scale of the offensive remained obscure. A disruption of communications, especially between the VIII Corps at Bastogne and its forward units, kept Middleton from providing a clear picture to Hodges.21 Consequently, Hodges’ early responses to the situation were tentative. Following his frequent practice of splitting armored divisions among different tasks, he approved Middleton’s request for the return of Combat Command B of the 9th Armored Division. He also placed on alert two of the VII Corps’ divisions, the 1st Infantry Division and part of the 3d Armored Division. But when Gerow called about 1100 and asked for permission to halt the V Corps’ drive for the Roer dams, the First Army commander, still suspecting a German diversionary attack in the Ardennes, refused.22

Within the First Army staff, debate raged all day and into the evening between the G–2 and G–3 sections over the scope of the offensive. Silvey, still acting as the G–2 in Dickson’s absence, pointed to the alarming number of new divisions on the fronts of the V and VIII Corps and argued that von Rundstedt’s order of the day, a copy of which had been captured early in the afternoon by V Corps units, confirmed that an all-out offensive was under way. That order had informed the German troops that “Your great hour has arrived. . . . We gamble everything! You carry with you the holy obligation to give everything to achieve things beyond human possibilities for Our Father[land] and Our Fuhrer!”23
Nevertheless, the lack of initial progress by the Germans and encouraging reports from liaison officers returning to Spa late that afternoon indicated that the activity might have been no more than a spoiling attack. For most of the headquarters, any lingering doubts vanished the next day, 17 December. During the morning the First Army headquarters received reports that German armor, including the soon-to-be-notorious Kampfgruppe Peiper, had broken through the Losheim Gap, nine miles southeast of Butgenbach and just south of the boundary between the V and VIII Corps. Then, about 0930, word reached the G–2 section that the enemy had surrounded two regiments of the VIII Corps’ 106th Infantry Division on the Schnee Eifel, the wooded ridge running south from the Losheim Gap. As the day wore on, the G–2 situation map showed enemy spearheads nearing the critical road junction of St.-Vith, twelve miles southwest of Losheim, and major penetrations in the southern half of the VIII Corps sector. Rumors abounded of German tanks and saboteurs in rear areas, although anxiety over frantic reports of enemy paratroopers in the V Corps rear area eased during the day as the limited extent of the drop became clear. About 1730, however, a distraught military policeman arrived to report a massacre of American prisoners by Lt. Col. Joachim Peiper’s SS unit near Malmedy. Over time, the investigation of the massacre would involve every inspector on the First Army staff, collecting evidence at the site and interrogating 125 American soldiers, civilians, and enemy prisoners, some as far away as Paris and Normandy. Indeed, word of the massacre spread so quickly that Dickson wryly remarked that his interrogators could not find any German SS prisoners to question. For the moment, the First Army headquarters had enough with which to concern itself other than the Malmedy massacre. By midmorning, Hodges had sensed that his army was in deep trouble. While the availability of alternative radio nets in the special staff sections compensated to a degree for the disruptions to his communications, he still needed to send staff officers to the front to discern the situation. Early in the morning, he conferred with Quesada, Maj. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg of the Ninth Air Force, and Brig. Gen. Richard E. Nugent of the XXIX Tactical Air Command, which supported the Ninth Army, to arrange for air support. He had already attached a regiment of the 1st Infantry Division to the V Corps at midnight of 16–17 December, and at 0700 he gave Gerow a free hand to halt his drive and organize a defense of the Elsenborn
Ridge, northwest of the Losheim Gap. Beyond a few engineer units, the First Army had almost no reserves, but during the previous day Bradley, at Eisenhower's urging, had ordered the 7th and 10th Armored Divisions to the First Army. After repeated calls to the 12th Army Group command post in Luxembourg City, sixty miles due south of Spa, the First Army headquarters also received word, early in the evening of 17 December, that it would receive the SHAEF reserve, the XVIII Airborne Corps.

Despite the encouraging news that the XVIII Airborne Corps was on the way, the First Army headquarters' inner circle had to deal with another chilling development. Even before the battle, Hodges had shown signs of fatigue. On the night of 15–16 December, he had retired early with a cold, but the next day he seemed calm, his aide describing him as "neither optimistic nor pessimistic." On 17 December, however, something was wrong with Hodges. His aide would only say that he spent almost the entire morning in the G-3 section. Myers later said that Hodges was suffering from influenza and "feeling very badly because of what had happened" but was still providing "general overall guidance" and had his presence of mind, "except for very, very brief interludes." Kean, on the other hand, later told an interviewer that Hodges was confined to his bed, barely conscious with viral pneumonia.

Especially arresting is the account of WOJG Dempsey Allphin, Kean's military secretary and aide. On the morning of 17 December Allphin recalled,

General Hodges and General Kean came to the office at approximately the same time as usual—about 0830. General Hodges went through our office (General Kean's and mine) and into his office. The only entrance to his office was through this one. He left the door open. A little later General Kean told me to check and see if General Hodges was okay. He said that Hodges was not feeling good when they came in. I went to the door and into his office. General Hodges was sitting with his arms folded on his desk and his head in his arms. I went back out and told Kean. Kean then went into Hodges' office. When he came out just a few minutes later, he pulled the door closed and told me to give him all of Hodges' calls, and to let no one into his office. General Hodges spent the entire day there at his desk seeing no one and taking no calls. . . . For two days, General Hodges stayed in his office alone, not taking calls nor seeing visitors or staff.

Allphin's account obviously conflicts with those of Kean, Myers, and Sylvan, as well as that of Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, who remembered meeting Hodges, Kean, and Thorson on the morning of 18 December, but in many key respects, it has the ring of truth. General Hodges himself later recalled his lasting impression of the battle as being tired, needing sleep, and yet having to be active almost constantly. Whatever happened that 17 December, overwhelming evidence exists that the First Army commander was incapacitated for at least two days and that Kean, in effect, operated as the commander of the First Army. During that time, the chief of staff and Thorson, who had just returned from London, managed to wall off Hodges and minimize his contacts with visitors, not an overly difficult task given his long-established habit of working through a small group of intimates.
Under Kean’s direction, the G–3 and G–4 sections arranged to rush reinforcements to the threatened sector. In these first two days, larger units often moved to the scene in piecemeal fashion, perhaps due to a lack of truck companies or a lingering suspicion within the First Army G–3 section of a spoiling attack. Using six truck companies, the First Army headquarters moved the 1st Infantry Division’s 26th Infantry to Elsenborn during the night of 16–17 December, about the same time as the 7th Armored Division began its march to St.-Vith. In the confusion, the 7th arrived with little food, fuel, or ammunition and too late to conduct the counterattack planned by the VIII Corps headquarters. The division commander subsequently complained bitterly that the First Army headquarters provided no help or even information to his division about the attack under way in the VIII Corps area. At least one critic has charged that the First Army headquarters’ delay in arranging road clearances was responsible for the 7th’s late arrival in the battle area, but the responsibility for the division’s problems is hard to pinpoint from the existing records.

Through 17 December the First Army staff moved additional units to the threatened area. The rest of the 1st Infantry Division and the 47th Regiment of the 9th Infantry Division went to the V Corps, and the First Army also obtained the 30th Infantry Division from the Ninth Army. Without orders from Bradley, Simpson, the Ninth Army commander, had generously offered to his old friend Hodges the 30th Division and 2d Armored Division, and Thorson sent his deputy, Hewitt, to guide the 30th Division into position. To help with the move, the Ninth Army headquarters loaned four truck companies, which stayed with the First Army to the end of December. Meanwhile, Patton, while continuing the limited attacks on his front, made arrangements to transfer the 10th Armored Division to the VIII Corps. In addition to the XVIII Airborne Corps, the First Army staff had arranged for the movement of 60,000 troops and 10,000 vehicles—including two infantry divisions, two armored divisions, an infantry regiment, and one each of the separate infantry, field artillery, tank destroyer, and tank battalions—by midnight, 17–18 December.

The First Army needed all the vehicles that it could obtain from the Ninth Army because of the demands placed on its own transportation by the evacuation of supply facilities. Most of the First Army supply chiefs had been at Kasserine Pass in North Africa, and they sensed early that the German offensive was no spoiling attack. While staying in close touch with the G–2 and G–3 sections during the first day of the German attack, they prepared to evacuate their installations. McNamara, the quartermaster, canceled further shipments of gasoline and rations to the Butgenbach truckhead. Medaris placed his ordnance depots on a six-hour alert for movement, while his operations subsection prepared plans and his ammunition officers arranged for demolitions in their forward ammunition supply points. At 2200 Rogers, acting on the latest reports of enemy advances from the G–3 section, ordered the withdrawal of two evacuation hospitals near the front line of the VIII Corps’ southern sector.
By the next day, 17 December, the scale of the German offensive became more clear, and the supply and administrative chiefs acted. The G–I section made arrangements to cancel all leaves, passes, and furloughs, cut short most of its entertainment program, and recalled the Red Cross clubmobiles. At the same time, the G–4 section called on the 12th Army Group and ADSEC for service troops, truck companies, ammunition, and major ordnance items.

Simultaneously, the supply chiefs put their evacuation plans into operation. From the G–2 section, which had the captured German special operations plan by the end of the first day, McNamara knew that the Germans were relying on captured gasoline to maintain their offensive, and he acted accordingly. After directing the evacuation of the truckhead at Butgenbach, he ordered 600 trucks to the huge fuel dumps south of Malmedy and asked ADSEC to send railroad cars to three nearby railroad depots to remove fuel after the trucks had shuttled it there. Over three days, the First Army evacuated all but 124,000 gallons, which were ignited near Stavelot as a roadblock against German tanks. After moving these dumps, the First Army logisticians, using two semi-trailer companies from ADSEC, shifted 4,000 long tons of Class II and IV supplies from the army depot at Eupen and moved the rations depot from nearby Welkenraedt. As for Medaris' ordnance section, it was trying to keep its ordnance depots open as long as possible. Two ammunition supply points were overrun by the enemy, but ordnance troops evacuated a third under the noses of the German advance. From ADSEC, Medaris borrowed enough truck tractors to shift most of his main depot behind the Meuse by 22 December. Meanwhile, the medical section moved its evacuation hospitals from Malmedy to Verviers, while Carter's engineers evacuated bridging equipment from the engineer dump near Elsenborn but lost the map depot at Stavelot. In the end, the First Army headquarters saved the bulk—about 45,000 tons—of its supplies in the threatened area.

By 18 December the First Army headquarters was considering evacuation of its command post at Spa. After his return from Paris via the 12th Army Group command post the previous evening, Dickson had recommended moving the headquarters. It proved hard, however, to shift quickly a command post as established as the First Army's was in Spa, especially one that did not fully grasp the situation. Nevertheless, Kean took the precaution of ordering the head-
quarters commandant to reconnoiter for a new site at Chaudfontaine, almost eleven miles northwest of Spa and roughly the same distance southeast of Liege, and the supply echelon prepared for a move.\textsuperscript{44}

The move came suddenly. When Kean, Thorson, and a “weary” Hodges met on the morning of 18 December with Gavin, acting commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, they knew little of what was happening to the south and southwest. They did have enough indications of German armor near Stavelot that Kean told Gavin to position the 82d Airborne Division at Werbomont, eleven miles southwest of Spa, and the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne.\textsuperscript{45} About 1500, after the command group finished meeting with the commander of the 30th Infantry Division, word reached Spa of enemy tanks only six miles down the road, and most of the staff turned out to man the roadblocks. The report turned out to be false, but the command group decided that the time for evacuation had come. While most of the staff hurriedly loaded into trucks, Hodges, Kean, Thorson, and Hart waited in the Hotel Britannique for Gavin to return. When Gavin failed to appear, Hodges’ party departed at 2200.\textsuperscript{46} In the rush to evacuate, at least some of the staff left behind working phones, secret papers, and even situation maps. Both Montgomery and the commander of the 7th Armored Division would later claim that the First Army headquarters left Spa without informing other echelons of the transfer.\textsuperscript{47}

As the First Army commander and staff completed their move during the evening of 18 December, their gloomy mood was deepened by the loss en route of most of the G–4 traffic headquarters to a V–I missile. By midnight the supply echelon had withdrawn to Micheroux, six miles east of Liege, and the command echelon to Chaudfontaine. Set in a cleft in the hills on the main road to Liege, Chaudfontaine, formerly the site of the First Army base echelon, had been selected because of its location on the existing communications net, and by the next morning personnel of the 17th Signal Operation Battalion had augmented the existing installations and used its mobile facilities to establish both telephone and teletype service to all major units. As the staff was quick to note, however, the new command post’s position also exposed it to V–Is that fell short on their way to Liege.\textsuperscript{48}

When the staff settled into its new offices in the Hotel des Bains the next morning, it faced disorder in its rear area and lack of reliable information about the situation at the front. So many troops separated from their units were wandering in the First Army rear area that the provost marshal’s section, lacking enough transportation, arranged for the replacement depot and battalions to accept all stragglers except suspects of serious crimes and soldiers AWOL for long periods of time.\textsuperscript{49} Largely because the German offensive had cut off so many units from higher headquarters, the daily estimated loss reports coming into the casualty division grossly underestimated the First Army’s casualties for the first three days of the battle. The casualty division was already struggling to catch up with its work load after numerous unit reassignments, two moves, and emergency duty manning defensive positions within the previous two days.\textsuperscript{50}

Clouding all else, the First Army headquarters had little idea of the status of the battle. The staff knew that the VIII Corps held St.-Vith, Wiltz, and
Echternach, the latter two respectively thirteen miles east and thirty-four miles southeast of Bastogne, and it could locate the points of the enemy spearheads. The positions of American units between those spearheads, however, remained vague. Rumors circulated that the Germans had cut the Bastogne-Liege highway and captured Bastogne. In the G–2 section, officers were worried over the location of the II SS Panzer Corps, not having received an ULTRA intercept that located the corps near Wiltz, and a nervous Dickson figured that the Germans still had four SS panzer divisions and five other divisions in reserve. Yet the G–3 section continued to believe that the Germans had not penetrated the First Army's lines in force, even as the section broke up divisions to plug gaps and extend the northern shoulder of the evolving Bulge to the west. In its orders that day, the First Army headquarters exhorted its units to block and seal off the enemy forces and stabilize the line preparatory to resuming the offensive. Help was on the way. At Verdun that day, Eisenhower halted all Allied offensives and ordered Devers' 6th Army Group to extend its front northward to enable Bradley to launch a counterattack with Patton's Third Army against the southern shoulder of the enemy salient. Meanwhile, Montgomery's 21 Army Group would pay particular attention to securing the line of the Meuse.

In response to the numerous, deep enemy penetrations of the First Army front, many special staff chiefs took matters into their own hands. Using the operational control delegated by Bradley in March, they formed ad hoc task forces to hold key junctions and depots and delay, if not stop, the German onslaught. On the eve of the offensive, the First Army headquarters had approved the use of antiaircraft batteries for artillery and antitank roles as long as such use did not jeopardize their primary mission, and Patterson now took advantage of that permission. When the 49th Antiaircraft Brigade lost contact with its groups and batteries, Patterson assumed direct control of those units he could reach and positioned them to defend the approaches to Spa, Liege, and Huy pending the arrival of the 30th Infantry Division. Meanwhile, army engineer groups and battalions under Carter's supervision were preparing roadblocks, laying mines, and razing bridges to construct barrier zones along the northern shoulder. Hains had his armored officers and some headquarters troops patrol between the Germans and the gas dumps. At one point, he sent a separate tank battalion, which had arrived without tanks, to the ordnance depot to take whatever weapons were available and stop the threat to the depot. While Lynde distributed tanks among volunteer crews of replacements and helped position antiaircraft units, Medaris flew missions as an air spotter. The staff chiefs were proud of their private war, but the Security Command was less impressed, complaining that they were commandeering too many of its units for their task forces.

For all its real accomplishments, the rear area security system encountered problems beyond the commandeering of many of its units by the special staff chiefs. With the start of the offensive, the Security Command had brought its area and subarea security plans into operation. It provided a means of coordinating rear area defense against infiltrators and deep enemy penetrations, and its 99th Infantry Battalion and "T Force," consisting of an armored infantry battalion and a tank destroyer company, covered the Malmedy-Stavelot depot
area until the arrival of the 30th Infantry Division.\textsuperscript{58} Not surprisingly for such a young organization, however, it encountered problems. Its radio nets carried far too much conversation in the clear, much to the enemy’s delight, and its overzealous countermeasures against enemy infiltrators reduced the efficiency of the command system. Among other things, it forbade liaison officers to carry information between headquarters.\textsuperscript{59}

The Security Command’s directives represented the least of the liaison system’s problems. Prewar Army doctrine for liaison operations had sketched in vague terms the liaison officer’s duty to “further harmonious cooperation” between his own headquarters and the one he was visiting, and it emphasized his responsibility to ensure that the viewpoint and orders of his commander were understood by his host. It did not, however, sufficiently stress his duty to keep his commander informed in a timely manner about the situation of the unit and headquarters to which he was accredited. In practice, American liaison officers often were little more than messengers, “carrying sealed envelopes at least twenty-four hours old.”\textsuperscript{60} Although Akers, who supervised liaison work as the G-3 operations officer, had expanded liaison coverage to the divisions of the VII Corps during the November offensive, most First Army liaison officers still were assigned to corps, adjacent armies, the 12th Army Group headquarters, and the Army Air Forces. In addition, the First Army liaison officers apparently still operated under an archaic system by which they reported to Akers once in the afternoon, with no intervening reports. In contrast to the practice in other headquarters, Hodges attended only about half of these briefings. This system could not satisfy the thirst for information of an army command group grasping at any available source, including, by some accounts, truck drivers and 7th Armored Division enlisted men returning to Chaudfontaine for Christmas packages.\textsuperscript{61}

The order forbidding liaison officers to carry information between headquarters was just one demonstration of the impact of Lt. Col. Otto Skorzeny’s English-speaking infiltrators. From orders captured before the offensive and during the first day, the First Army G–2 section had constructed a good idea of Skorzeny’s mission when, on 18 December, an ordnance unit found three Germans in a truck bearing the markings of the 5th Armored Division. The three men claimed to be part of a 150-man group assigned to cut American communications, raid command posts, and watch the Meuse bridges. Interrogators relayed the word to the First Army headquarters, which ordered corps and divisions to establish checkpoints, and the headquarters even drew up questions on Americana with which to grill suspects. The Security Command now used its units and radio net to aid the First Army’s counterintelligence corps in the search for infiltrators. Search parties soon rounded up the few enemy jeep parties that had reached the First Army’s rear, as well as some Americans who had been AWOL for some time, but the German infiltrators had already caused much confusion, even terror, in rear areas. Indeed, information from one captured group of a plot to assassinate Eisenhower, dutifully forwarded to SHAEF by the First Army G–2 section, served to imprison the supreme commander in his own headquarters for several days.\textsuperscript{62}
The confusion of the battle’s first four days contributed to the failure to airdrop supplies to the two surrounded regiments of the 106th Infantry Division. Although the division headquarters at St.-Vith had asked the VIII Corps headquarters for an airdrop almost as soon as it received news of the encirclement on the morning of 17 December, the request did not reach the IX Troop Carrier Command in Britain until early the next morning. The air liaison officer at the VIII Corps headquarters later stated that someone in the First Army G-4 section delayed the request for twenty-four hours, ostensibly because it had not followed proper channels, but no evidence has been found to support or refute his account. When twenty-three transports with ammunition and medical supplies did arrive later on 18 December over the airfield in Belgium where they were supposed to receive their briefing, they found no ready information, fighter escort, or even permission to land, and had to fly to a base in France, where they waited until the cancellation of the mission on 22 December.63

Obviously, the process for arranging an airdrop had broken down at some point. In its report, the First Army headquarters claimed that it had responded promptly to the 106th’s request, and the division’s plight was clearly uppermost in the minds of Hodges and Kean on the morning of 18 December. Given lack of evidence, it is hard to fix responsibility for the mishap at the airfield, which seems to have resulted from poor coordination at several levels. Whether proper coordination would have ensured a successful drop is another matter. The weather conditions and terrain in the drop area on 18 December presented major obstacles, and good communications and information on the region were lacking. Still, the First Army headquarters might have decided to push for a drop if it had known the situation was desperate. Thinking that the two regiments could hold out, that headquarters apparently decided to postpone the drop until prospects improved. Before that happened, the two units surrendered on 19 December.64

Although by the evening of 19 December some at the First Army headquarters may have believed that they had the situation under control, SHAEF clearly thought otherwise. At the suggestion of SHAEF’s G-2 and its acting G-3, Smith recommended and General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower approved the transfer of the First and Ninth Armies to the operational control of Montgomery’s 21 Army Group and of the VIII Corps to Patton’s Third Army. The First and Ninth Armies remained under the 12th Army Group headquarters for logistical support and administration. Simultaneously, the IX and XXIX Tactical Air Commands came under the operational control of the British 2d Tactical Air Force, whose commander gave Quesada control over aviation in the battle area.65

The change in command drew a protest from Bradley, but the 12th Army Group commander did not have much of a case. While his staff technically had never lost contact with its northern armies, the communications network that carried the thousands of messages involved in command and control of the armies was tenuous at best. It would soon break down irreparably with the fall of Jemelle, the key radio relay and wire-cable station thirty-five miles southwest of Chaudfontaine. Even if liaison officers and a lengthy wire circuit around the Bulge had been able to bear the traffic, Bradley, in Luxembourg, was in a poor
position to provide the personal presence necessary in the crisis. While Bradley had often talked with Hodges and Kean by phone, he had not visited Hodges since the start of the battle and, aside from arranging for the First Army to obtain the XVIII Airborne Corps, had done little to make his old headquarters’ task easier. Bradley probably had such confidence in Hodges and Kean and was so slow to grasp the true dimensions of the German offensive that he believed they could handle the situation on their own, but to some on Hodges’ beleaguered staff, the 12th Army Group headquarters appeared remote, even uncaring.66

Although the First Army commander and staff did not relish the spectacle of their former commander’s humiliation and resented the notion that they needed special assistance from the British, many could see the benefits of the change. Aside from the disruption of signal communications, the First Army headquarters had encountered so many problems in supplying the VIII Corps that it had already directed that corps to turn to the Third Army for support.67 Then too, Montgomery quickly gave the First Army headquarters a degree of direction and support that it had not received from Luxembourg. Even before the Verdun conference, the field marshal, concerned about the threat to his southern flank, abandoned his plans to use the British 30 Corps in the Market-Garden salient to the north and instead directed the corps to assemble on the northern bank of the Meuse near Liege. He had also sent reconnaissance parties along the Meuse southwest of Liege to watch the bridges, the immediate objective of the German offensive.68

More was yet to come. At 1330 on 20 December, about an hour after the official change, Montgomery arrived at Chaudfontaine, calm and confident with the air, according to one of his staff officers, of “Christ come to cleanse the temple.” After Hodges outlined the situation, Montgomery laid out his response, calling for the reorganization of the front and the formation of a reserve corps for a counterattack. In the ensuing discussion, a clear difference in philosophy arose. The British wanted to realign the front and thus accumulate reserves in preparation for a single, massive counterblow once the enemy offensive had run its course. On the other hand, the Americans resisted surrendering ground and sought to regain the initiative at the earliest opportunity. For the moment, Montgomery agreed to the majority of the First Army’s dispositions as well as a planned drive to regain contact with the beleaguered 7th Armored Division at St.-Vith. Meanwhile, he requested that Collins assemble three divisions northwest of the key crossroads of Marche, thirty miles southwest of Chaudfontaine and eighteen miles east of the Meuse crossings. They would avoid involvement in the battle for the northern shoulder of the Bulge until the counterattack. To free Collins for this duty, he had the Ninth Army assume responsibility for the VII Corps sector north of the Bulge.69

British accounts of the atmosphere at the First Army command post varied. De Guingand, Montgomery’s chief of staff and a popular figure among Americans, later remarked that while the First Army staff appeared tired they remained cheerful and seemed to have the situation in hand by the time of Montgomery’s visit.70 In contrast, Montgomery and others of his entourage later
professed shock at what they saw on their visit to the First Army headquarters. Williams, the intelligence chief, remarked that Hodges looked as if he had been poleaxed, and Belchem, Montgomery's operations chief, stated that Hodges and his senior staff “looked as if they had all seen a ghost. . . . [They were] so tired and dispirited that it required the utmost tact and diplomacy to establish a friendly rapport.” 71 Montgomery perceived an atmosphere of great pessimism and lack of grip, and he later remarked that Hodges had seemed tired and “had been a bit shaken, tired, and in need of moral support, he seemed to be improving and would remain in command.” 74

Although Montgomery did not relieve Hodges, he exercised much closer supervision over the First Army headquarters than he had in the past. Both Collins of the VII Corps and Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway of the XVIII Airborne Corps found the field marshal's liaison organization to be an intrusion and thought his liaison officers to be prejudiced against American troops. Nevertheless, Phantom and Montgomery's personal liaison corps did keep him
aware of events at lower echelons in a way that the American system had not for Hodges. It also informed American corps commanders of the field marshal's intentions hours before written orders could pass down the chain of command.75 The commander of the 21 Army Group supplemented PHANTOM reports with visits to divisions and corps, especially Collins' VII Corps. For all practical purposes, Montgomery superseded Hodges, directing the VII Corps as his personal counterattack force and forbidding its commitment without his permission. Each day about 1300 he visited the First Army command post to talk over the situation and provide any necessary support.76 The command change notwithstanding, Bradley maintained frequent contact with Hodges for the duration of the battle and on at least one occasion, advocated a course of action contrary to Montgomery's announced strategy.77

In the meantime, the 21 Army Group and First Army staffs resumed old ties. Treading carefully to avoid stirring American resentment, Montgomery's staff chiefs, following British staff practice, called on the First Army staff to renew acquaintances and reestablish the working relationships of Normandy. Dannemiller, who had been serving as the First Army liaison officer with the Ninth Army, moved to the 21 Army Group command post, where he reported to de Guingand. To help the establishment of communications, signal personnel of the 21 Army Group supplied teletypewriter and radio equipment and troops and provided a messenger service direct to the First Army headquarters. In seven days First Army signalmen laid over 2,000 miles of new circuits to service the command change and installed three radio nets to the 21 Army Group and one to the British Second Army.78

Meanwhile, the First Army G-3 troop movements subsection was having its finest hour. During 17–26 December it arranged for the shift across the army area of about 238,000 troops and 40,500 vehicles. (See Appendix H.) These figures included seven infantry divisions, two airborne divisions, five armored divisions, eleven field artillery battalions, five engineer combat battalions, numerous corps troops, and other support units. The subsection coordinated that movement with the flow of supplies to the front and the evacuation of essential installations to the rear. For much of that time, it operated without much help from the G-4 traffic headquarters after the deadly V-I attack during the move from Spa to Chaudfontaine. To transfer the VII Corps quickly from the Aachen-Hürtgen sector to the area southwest of Liege, the subsection gave the corps almost unlimited use of three north-south routes for several days. During that time, the corps had to report every move so that the First Army staff could plan others along and across the three roads when they were not in use. At the same time, the area clearance section of the G-3 troop movements subsection located and reserved bivouac and assembly areas for VII Corps units as they arrived southwest of Liege. Given the scale of the operation, it is not surprising that traffic jams and disruptions to the supply flow occurred, but the First Army staff managed to keep these problems to a minimum.79

While the VII Corps moved near Marche, thirty miles south of Liege, the First Army headquarters spent an anxious three days. A SHAEF visitor to chaotic Chaudfontaine later recalled that the staff barely knew their own location,
let alone that of their units or those of the Germans. When the commander of one of the divisions gathering near Marche asked for information on friendly and enemy dispositions in the area, the First Army staff could tell him little.39 Actually, the enemy had penetrated farther west than the First Army headquarters thought, to the point that, when the division arrived in the Marche area, it had to commit one of its regiments to defend the assembly area. When the Germans cut off an armored task force, the staff, undoubtedly with the 106th Division in mind, spared no effort to arrange a pair of airdrops, neither of which was successful.81

Yet, as concerned as Hodges and his staff were about the threat to the Marche area, they were more worried about other sectors. They watched for an attack near Malmedy, or at the VII Corps–XVIII Airborne Corps boundary, toward Liege. At the First Army command post, Dickson, still concerned about the whereabouts of the II SS Panzer Corps, warned of a secondary attack toward Aachen and aroused alarm with his estimate of twenty uncommitted enemy divisions on the front of the 12th and 21 Army Groups. He did, however, allow that the Germans would run out of fuel if they did not capture a major depot over the next few days. The general concern was eased to a degree when Montgomery deployed a British brigade to defend the Meuse bridges west of Namur. Hodges and his staff were also cheered by the news on 22 December of the start of the Third Army’s counterattack to relieve besieged Bastogne and the arrival of clear skies for Allied aircraft after three days of nasty weather.82

Hampered by the lack of information and saddled with a commander only beginning to regain his vigor, the First Army headquarters struggled to maintain some control over the battle. It continued to move units into position on the northern shoulder and to set corps boundaries. The artillery section had already obtained permission to use the new proximity fuze, and the section also received a large enough allocation from the 12th Army Group staff to lift restrictions on artillery ammunition expenditures for all the corps.83 On 21 December the First Army headquarters issued new orders. The V Corps, holding the critical Elsenborn Ridge on the eastern end of the shoulder, received three infantry divisions, most of another infantry division, and an armored combat command. The XVIII Airborne Corps on the V Corps’ western flank would have an airborne division, an infantry division, and most of an armored division, as well as the remnants of the 106th Infantry and 7th Armored Divisions. The VII Corps, assembling near Marche, could call on two infantry divisions and an armored division. As of 25 December the V Corps could call on 14 artillery battalions, a chemical mortar battalion, 3 tank battalions, 5 destroyer battalions, and 12 antiaircraft battalions. The VII Corps had 13 artillery battalions, a chemical mortar battalion, 4 tank battalions, 7 tank destroyer battalions, and 8 antiaircraft battalions, while the lighter XVIII Airborne Corps had 7 artillery battalions, 2 tank battalions, 4 tank destroyer battalions, and 6 antiaircraft battalions. The army retained 6 artillery battalions, a tank battalion, a battalion of Belgian Fusiliers, and 19 antiaircraft battalions.84

Its imperfect knowledge of the situation notwithstanding, the First Army headquarters argued for the earliest possible counterattack. In its 21 December
orders the G–3 section claimed that the First Army had blunted the attack, that large enemy groups had been encircled and destroyed, and that the time had come to take the offensive. Akers wrote these orders without consulting Dickson, who remarked caustically that the only large groups encircled belonged to the First Army, but the G–2’s influence with Hodges and Kean had reached a new low. Hodges’ health and spirits were improving, especially after the command post moved on 22 December behind the Meuse to the former Belgian Army barracks at Tongres, about eleven miles north of Liege. He and Kean continued to resist Montgomery’s desire to wait and allow the German offensive to expend itself against the American defenses. At the field marshal’s insistence, they withdrew the 7th Armored Division from St.-Vith on 22 December. The division’s commanders returned full of gratitude for Montgomery, but with little complimentary to say about the distance they had felt from Hodges and the First Army headquarters during their ordeal. As the 7th withdrew, the First Army commander and staff were having a hard time keeping the VII Corps in reserve and above the fray as German tanks drove within four miles of the Meuse.

The crisis of the battle was at hand. On the morning of 24 December the 11 SS Panzer Corps finally attacked, capitalizing on the First Army headquarters’ faulty handling of the boundary between the VII and XVIII Airborne Corps to capture the important crossroads of Manhay, about twenty-five miles south of Liege. This action, as well as the 2d Panzer Division’s advance farther west near the Meuse, posed a grave threat to the First Army’s entire front, and, while making contingency plans for a retreat by the V Corps in the east, Hodges requested more troops from the 21 Army Group to backstop his line. Montgomery provided the 51st Highland Division, but the field marshal also directed the 82d Airborne Division, on the western flank of the XVIII Airborne Corps near Manhay, to retreat to a shorter, more defensible front. To guard against the 2d Panzer Division’s drive to the Meuse, he ordered that the VII Corps, “if forced,” swing back its western flank “to the Andenne-Hotton line,” Andenne and Hotton being, respectively, twenty-four miles southwest and twenty-six miles south of Liege. This line, he stated, “had to be held at all cost.”

The series of events that followed highlighted, once again, not only the differences in doctrine between the British and the Americans but also the First Army headquarters’ deference to the dynamic commander of the VII Corps. During a visit to Collins on 23 December, his first visit to a subordinate headquarters since the beginning of the battle, Hodges had discussed an attack by the 2d Armored Division against the 2d Panzer Division’s spearheads near the Meuse. Now, a day later, he was reluctant to rein in Collins, even though the orders that Montgomery had just given him indicated a defensive intent. Hodges, Kean, and Thorson decided to send Akers to the VII Corps command post to explain the field marshal’s wishes. In the meantime, Kean called the VII Corps headquarters. Since Collins was visiting his divisions, Kean, speaking in “guarded double talk” in case of a compromise of the line, told Collins’ artillery chief that Akers was on his way. He emphasized that the VII Corps headquarters had “unrestricted” use of all of its troops and authorized the VII Corps
to change its defensive front to a line between the two villages beginning with "A" and "H." After Kean hung up the phone, he remembered the exultant tone at the other end of the line and thought that the officer had misunderstood him. He called back, repeated his instructions, and said, "Now get this. I’m only going to say it once. Roll with the punch."90

Kean had judged correctly. The VII Corps artillery officer, who had received repeated pleas from the 2d Armored Division for authorization to attack, had assumed that "A" and "H" stood for the villages of Assesse and Hogne. A line between them would be parallel to, but about eight miles southwest of, the one Kean had in mind. From the viewpoint of the 2d Armored Division and the VII Corps headquarters, this was an encouraging interpretation, and the artillery officer had sent a dispatch to reach Collins once the latter arrived at the division’s command post. After Kean’s second call, the officer realized his error, sent a correction to the 2d Armored Division, and advised Collins to “come home.”91 By the time Akers reached the VII Corps command post after a long trek, Collins and his staff had discussed the tactical situation and the implications of Kean’s messages. The red-haired G–3 operations officer described the situation as seen from the First Army headquarters and interpreted Montgomery’s directive as releasing Collins from all offensive missions and granting the VII Corps commander considerable discretion to accomplish the objective of stabilizing the First Army’s western flank. Collins read these orders as granting authorization to attack, and he took the responsibility of directing the 2d Armored Division to do so. On Christmas Day, the 2d attacked and inflicted heavy losses on the 2d Panzer Division near Celles, just four miles east of the Meuse crossings at Dinant.92

Although Montgomery and Dickson still thought the Germans had another attack in them, Hodges and most of his staff believed after 25 December that the crisis had passed and they could transition to the offensive. As early as 19 December the First Army commander and staff had wanted a counterattack, but Montgomery refused to be rushed. He contended that the Allies must wait for the enemy main effort to expend itself before launching a full-scale counterstroke. On this point, the field marshal was backed by ULTRA intercepts of enemy intentions and Dickson’s estimate of seventeen uncommitted enemy divisions, eleven near Aachen and six facing the northern shoulder. Thorson,
however, dismissed the G–2’s prognosis, arguing that the Germans were so badly beaten that they must soon retreat, and his argument gained ground as the days passed without a major German attack. At a higher level, Montgomery was under pressure from Eisenhower and Bradley for a First Army attack that they could coordinate with the Third Army advance in the south. Already, on 26 December, Patton had relieved Bastogne, and on 30 December, he turned his attack toward Houffalize, in the middle of the German salient about eighteen miles southeast of Hotton and about ten miles north of Bastogne. Under these circumstances, Montgomery allowed the First Army and corps staffs to intensify planning for a counterattack.93 (Map 14)

One of the main reasons for the field marshal’s reluctance to take the offensive was a serious lack of infantry, especially riflemen, in the First Army’s divisions. During 16–31 December, the First Army obtained only 15,295 fillers to cover total losses of 41,166. On 23 December Montgomery warned that the V Corps’ four divisions were short 7,000 men, mostly infantrymen, and that the 5th Armored Division was operating at 60 percent strength. SHAEF responded by promising 17,474 emergency replacements, mostly noninfantrymen retrained by ETOUSA, to the 21 Army Group. When SHAEF transferred the First and Ninth Armies to the operational control of the 21 Army Group, it had given the latter authority to allot fillers between the two armies, an authority that headquarters now delegated to Miller, the First Army G–1.94 Otherwise, the First Army headquarters had little control over its replacement supply. During this time, ETOUSA was combing able-bodied men from COMZ, instituting conversion programs, and even breaking up existing units to obtain fillers. The First Army G–1 section, by contrast, could only tighten its procedures, provide veteran instructors to its combat orientation program, and use daily estimated loss reports, phone calls, and visits to determine proper allocations of the available fillers. Indeed, during the Ardennes battle, the daily estimated loss reports, which improved in accuracy after the first few days, provided Hodges with his only source of data on unit strengths. Unlike the Third and Seventh Armies, however, the First Army did not create its own conversion program.95

Before the First Army could attack, it would have to replace heavy losses in equipment as well. Beginning 24 December, the First Army’s service units refitted formations, such as the 7th Armored Division, that had borne the brunt of the battle so far, but they soon exhausted their stocks. The G–4 section submitted a survey of its needs to the COMZ and 12th Army Group staffs; it would take time, however, for those two agencies to respond. In the interim, the First Army staff turned to other sources. To meet the shortage of medium tanks, Medaris and Lynde, as early as 19 December, had turned to their counterparts at the 21 Army Group headquarters, many of whom they had known in North Africa. The British initially turned down the requests, citing their own needs. After the command switch, they changed their minds and provided 250 medium tanks. In a crash program during 31 December 1944–2 January 1945, Medaris’ tank maintenance companies worked with Williams’ signal radio teams, Belgian laborers, and volunteers from the Irish Guards to load the tanks with rations and ammunition and install new radios. The British also supplied enough
25-pounder guns and ammunition to equip four artillery battalions, as well as about thirty 6-pounder guns to replace American 57-mm. antitank guns lost in combat. The First Army logisticians also turned to the Ninth Army for trucks, signal items, and antitank mines, to COMZ for signal equipment, and to rear area units like the 29th Infantry for machine guns and bazookas.96

While the First Army special staff sections supervised the replacement of unit equipment, the evacuation process continued. On 20 December the First Army headquarters had ordered the evacuation of all but the most essential installations to the region behind the Meuse. The ordnance section established a service area in the square between Liege, Tongres, St.-Trond—twenty-two miles northwest of Liege—and Namur, which lay on the Meuse thirty-five miles southwest of Liege. Meanwhile, the quartermasters reinstalled most of their depots near Gembloux, about thirty-eight miles west of Liege. The transfer of the First Army prisoner enclosure to Huy, seventeen miles southwest of Liege, on 28 December permitted the evacuation of prisoners from the corps by rail as well as truck. As for the First Army hospitals, they moved to a concentration area near the quartermaster depots, but the lack of shelter was so acute that most evacuation hospitals remained inactive. As a result, Rogers had to send all but those men requiring immediate emergency surgery in the division field hospitals to COMZ facilities. This policy aggravated the First Army's replacement problem, for COMZ, eager to keep its own forward hospitals clear, sent many less serious cases too far to the rear for convenient return to duty. Elsewhere, the First Army G-5 section was coordinating the evacuation of thousands of civilians from threatened areas to the rear and making arrangements to feed, clothe, and house them.97

Although the evacuation of supply installations created major problems of congestion and shelter in rear areas, the proximity of the major depots to the front eased logistical preparations for the counterattack. Forward of the Meuse, the First Army logisticians positioned installations to be ready for a quick advance once the counterattack began. They stationed a rolling ammunition supply point of 500-ton capacity with the VII Corps and an ammunition supply point of 750-ton capacity to support the XVIII Airborne Corps. Rather than accumulate large stocks in forward depots, the First Army headquarters supplied its forward distribution points directly from COMZ depots. Ammunition reserves remained low, largely because the 12th Army Group headquarters had removed restrictions at the start of the battle, but most other supplies reached acceptable levels by the start of the offensive.98

Noting the progress of resupply and replacement in the First Army and eager to show himself the good subordinate after a command crisis with Eisenhower, Montgomery finally agreed to an offensive. Although he had ostensibly left the planning for a counterattack to the First Army and corps headquarters, he had kept a close watch on the process and, through daily visits, ensured that his views were known.99 Among the planners, general agreement existed that the roadnet at the base of the salient was too poor to permit an attack in that area. On 27 December Collins proposed a drive to St.-Vith, but Hodges, tired of two weeks of open flanks, chose a less risky and complex
thrust to Houffalize along the west bank of the Ourthe, which flowed southeast through the VII Corps front at Hotton. When Montgomery made available the 30 Corps to take over the VII Corps’ zone west of the Ourthe, Hodges shifted Collins’ attack east of the river.100

After Montgomery set 3 January as the date for the counterattack, Hodges, Kean, Thorson, Collins, and Ridgway met on 31 December to draw up a plan for an offensive. The VII Corps, with two armored and two infantry divisions, would drive to a linkup with the Third Army at Houffalize, while the XVIII Airborne Corps—with one infantry, one airborne, and two armored divisions and part of another infantry division—supported the VII Corps’ eastern flank with an advance on St.-Vith. By 2 January the First Army had positioned 15 field artillery battalions, a chemical mortar battalion, 4 tank battalions, 6 tank destroyer battalions, and 8 antiaircraft battalions to support the VII Corps drive. In addition, the VII Corps received the lion’s share of the allocation of available artillery ammunition. The First Army headquarters also gave the 32d Field Artillery Brigade to the XVIII Airborne Corps, which now boasted 14 artillery battalions, 2 tank battalions, 5 tank destroyer battalions, and 6 antiaircraft battalions. The V Corps was left with 14 artillery battalions, a chemical mortar battalion, a Ranger battalion, 3 tank battalions, 5 tank destroyer battalions, and 10 antiaircraft battalions. Eighteen antiaircraft battalions, a tank battalion, and a battalion of Belgian Fusiliers remained in army reserve. Meanwhile, Hodges met with the Army Air Forces generals to finalize air support. Some of the concern over uncommitted German reserves dissolved that New Year’s Day when the Germans launched Operation NORDWIND against the 6th Army Group in Alsace.101

When the VII Corps finally began its counterattack on the morning of 3 January, it made slow progress, even after the British 30 Corps to the west joined the attack the next day. The marshy plateau east of the Ourthe was crossed by numerous gorges and only a few major roads. Already miserable, the weather worsened over the next few days as snow flurries, interspersed with light rain, created three-foot drifts and covered roads with sheets of ice, causing vehicles to skid out of control. On only three days over the next two weeks could the IX Tactical Air Command provide even nominal air support. The enemy, identified by the G–2 section as portions of 1 SS panzer, 1 panzer, and 3 volksgrenadier divisions, was well fortified with tanks and antitank guns and prepared to fight for the few buildings that offered shelter from the arctic blasts. Hoping for a quick breakthrough to trap the Germans at the tip of the Bulge, Collins led with his two armored divisions, but the tankers had a hard time maneuvering off the roads, which were covered by antitank weapons. The First Army headquarters’ cautious use of phase lines to pace the advance of the 82d Airborne Division on the VII Corps’ eastern flank prevented the paratroopers from driving across the Salm River, which ran across their front, and cutting a key east-west highway. Plagued by a cold, Hodges remained at Tongres, received few visitors, and exercised little personal influence over the battle, which soon became a slugging match.102

Hodges played a larger role once the full XVIII Airborne Corps joined the attack. By 9 January his health had improved enough for him to visit Ridgway’s
headquarters and plan the drive on St.-Vith. As issued by the First Army headquarters after the field marshal’s approval the next day, the plan called for the XVIII Airborne Corps to advance southeast on 13 January to an initial phase line. On orders from the First Army headquarters and with the support of the V and VII Corps on its flanks, it would then take St.-Vith and secure the line from Houffalize northeast to St.-Vith. Shortly after the attack started on 13 January, however, Hodges, checking the situation reports coming into his headquarters, became dissatisfied with the progress of the XVIII Airborne Corps’ 30th and 75th Infantry Divisions. He refused the appeal of Ridgway’s G–3 to launch the attack of the V Corps’ 1st Infantry Division on the XVIII’s eastern flank until the 30th Division had reached its initial phase line. After Ridgway, during two visits by Hodges to the XVIII’s command post, told his superior that the 75th required new leadership, Hodges relieved the commander of that division on 20 January. In the meantime, he had received better news from the VII Corps headquarters, which had linked up with the Third Army at Houffalize on 16 January.

With the linkup at Houffalize, the First Army returned at midnight on 17 January to the operational control of the 12th Army Group. Earlier, on the afternoon of 16 January, Montgomery had stopped by the First Army headquarters for a farewell. For all the animosity that was already building between the field marshal and Bradley and would later color postwar memories among participants, Montgomery’s final visit to the First Army command post seems to have been a mutually and genuinely amiable parting. Many on the First Army staff, of course, found Montgomery’s mannerisms amusing and his actions and views irritating. Yet they respected his thorough professionalism and were grateful for his usual noninterference in their tactical decisions, as well as his encouragement and support for them during the Ardennes battle. No doubt they also appreciated the liberal number of British decorations that he had authorized for personnel of the First Army. In contrast, the First Army officers expressed much more resentment toward what they saw as self-glorification by the Third Army headquarters of its role in the battle. Nevertheless, Hodges and his staff clearly relished their return to Bradley’s command. Reunited with the 12th Army Group, the First Army continued its advance to the east, erasing the German salient with the capture of St.-Vith on 23 January.

The First Army headquarters had survived the greatest test of its campaign in Europe, but not without highlighting some of the deficiencies and strains that had plagued the staff for some time. These included the defects of the First Army information-gathering system, the antagonism between the G–2 and G–3, and the lack of vigorous leadership from the commanding general. Because of these factors, the First Army headquarters was not only surprised by the offensive but slow to react once it came. For much of the battle, the headquarters seemed out of touch with events at the front, giving unrealistic missions and providing little moral support to units desperately in need of it. Despite these problems as well as lack of support from one superior echelon and differences of philosophy and nationality with another, the First Army headquarters managed to get the job done. After a slow start, it rushed reinforce-
ments to those positions on the northern shoulder where they could best blunt the German drive. It saved the great bulk of its endangered supplies from capture and, with the help of the British, found enough replacement equipment to make an early counterattack possible. For these achievements, much credit should go to the chief of staff, who held the headquarters together and provided such direction as existed after the incapacitation of his commander. As Bradley's aide remarked, Kean had truly been a "Rock of Gibraltar" in the crisis. Thanks largely to his leadership, the First Army headquarters overcame an occasional case of bad nerves to find the necessary resilience to turn back the tide of Hitler's last great offensive.
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12 Cir. 12th Army Group G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary 18, 12 Dec 44, Battle of the Bulge folder, box 4, Dickson Papers, USMA Library.


14 Baldwin, Battles Lost and Won, p. 361.

15 Interv. Pogue with Rosengarten, 22 Dec 47, pp. 1-2; MS, Thompson, American Intelligence on the German Counteroffensive, 2:243-46; Interv. Murray with Dickson, 22 Sep 72, pp. 33-34; Interv. Pogue with Sibert, 11 May 51, and Ltr, Sibert to Baldwin, 2 Jan 47, both in Gen. Sibert, FUSA Intell. box 6. MacDonald Papers, USAMHI; Interv, Pogue with Dickson, 6 Feb 52, p. 2; Baldwin, Battles Lost and Won, pp. 362-63.


17 Interv. Murray with Rosengarten, 3 Mar 75, pp. 24-25; Bennett, ULTRA in the West, pp. 188-204; MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, pp. 40, 78.

18 Interv. Pogue with Dickson, 6 Feb 52, p. 1; MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, p. 56; Intervs. Pogue with Bradley, 6 Nov 46, p. 2, and with Curtis, 16 May 50, p. 2.

19 Interv. Murray with Rosengarten, 3 Mar 75, p. 49; MS, Carter, Carter's War, ch. 12, p. 2; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 460-61; Baldwin, Battles Lost and Won, pp. 360-61, 365; Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 361; Merriam, Dark December, pp. 98-99; Cole, The Ardennes, pp. 56-63.

20 Sylvan Diary, 16 Dec 44; Jnl. First Army G-3 Jnl for 16 Dec 44. All G-3 Journal entries cited in this chapter are in 101-32 G-3 Journal, boxes 1959-1963, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC. First Army G-3 Jnl Correspondence for 16 Dec 44, in 101-33 G-3 Journal file, G-3, 1st Army, 1-20 Dec 44, box 1971, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC. MS, Carter, Carter's War, ch. 12, p. 1; MS, Thompson, American Intelligence on the German Counteroffensive, 2:374; Ltr, Jacks to author, 11 Dec 96, DWH.


22 Sylvan Diary, 16 Dec 44; Interv. Toland with Hodges; Cole, The Ardennes, p. 331; MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, pp. 188-89; Toland, Battle, p. 30; Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, p. 583; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 347.

23 Quote from MS, Thompson, American Intelligence on the German Counteroffensive, 2:532. See also Jnl, First Army G-2 Jnl for 16 Dec 44; Rpt, First Army G-2 Periodic Rpt for 16 Dec 44; MS, Thompson, American Intelligence on the German Counteroffensive, 2:241, 374-77.

24 Sylvan Diary, 16 Dec 44; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, p. 176; MS, Dickson, The G-2 Battle of the Bulge, p. 21; Cosmas and Cowdrey, Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations, p. 404.

25 Sylvan Diary, 17 Dec 44; Jnl. First Army G-2 Jnl, 17 Dec 44.

27 Sylvan Diary, 17 Dec 44; Mayo, On Beachhead and Battlefront, p. 311; Toland, Battle, p. 54; Hamilton, Monty, p. 187; Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, p. 587.

28 Sylvan Diary, 17 Dec 44; Interv, Pogue with Curtis, 16 May 50, p. 2; Cole, The Ardennes, p. 104; MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, p. 261; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, p. 481; Hughes, OVERLORD, p. 274.

29 Sylvan Diary, 17 Dec 44; Intervs, Toland with Thorson; Murray with Kean, 25 Aug 73; and with Myers, 15 Apr 74, pp. 43–44; Cole, The Ardennes, p. 305; Toland, Battle, pp. 55, 86–87; MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, pp. 262–63; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, p. 481.

30 Quote from Sylvan Diary, 16 Dec 44, and see also 17 Dec 44.

31 Interv, Murray with Myers, 15 Apr 74, pp. 11–12, 45–46.

32 Interv, Murray with Kean, 25 Aug 73.

33 Ltr, Allphin to author, 8 Jan 97.

34 Intervs, Murray with Kean, 25 Aug 73; Toland with Hodges; and with Hains. Ltr, Allphin to author, 8 Jan 97; Hansen Diary, 11–12 Feb 45.


38 Incl, Brig Gen William B. Kunzig, USA (Ret.), to author, 10 Jun 95, DWH; Memo, Kunzig for Thorson, 3 Jan 45, DWH; Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 1 August 1944–22 February 1945, 1:105; Cole, The Ardennes, pp. 333–34.


41 Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 1 August 1944–22 February 1945, 4:66–73; AAR, First U.S. Army, for December 1944; Rpt, First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, pp. 170, 404; MS, Dickson, The G–2 Battle of the Bulge, p. 23; McNamara, Quartermaster Activities, pp. 152–55; AAR, First Army Quartermaster, for December 1944, 101–30.0 QM After Action Reports, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Ross and Romanus, Operations in the War Against...
3: Gen Thompson, AAR, First Army, with the Ninth Army, Merriam visited Spa not long after the First Army headquarters' departure. For contrary views, see Ltrs, Jacks to author, 11 Dec 46, and Perry to author, 28 Jan 97; MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, p. 419.


49 AAR, First U.S. Army, for December 1944.


51 Cir, LOI, First Army, 19 Dec 44, 300.6 Letters of Instructions, box 62, First Army, Adj Gen Section, General Correspondence, 1940-1947, RG 338, WNRC; Merriam, Dark December, p. 120.

52 Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 376-77.


54 Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 1 August 1944-22 February 1945, 3:105, 126-27; AAR, First U.S. Army, for December 1944; Interv, Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, pp. 130-31; MS, Carter, Carter's War, ch. 12, pp. 3-4, 7-10, 18-19; Beck et al., The War Against Germany, p. 483.

55 Intervs, Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, p. 131; author with Hains, 29 May 91, pp. 29-31; and Toland with Hains.
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53 Rpts, First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, p. 476; McNamara, Quartermaster Activities, p. 157; Intervs, Murray with Lynde, pp. 17–19, and with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, p. 131; Memos, First Army, Staff Memo 1, 2 Jan 45, and First Army, Operations Memo 7, 27 Mar 45, both in 101–1.15 SOP, G–1 1st Army, 1 May 44, box 1829, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC.


56 First quote from Staff Officers Field Manual, 1940, p. 33, and see also pp. 31–32, 34. Lt. Col. T. S. Bigland, liaison officer from the 21 Army Group to the 12th Army Group, quote from Hamilton, Monty, p. 307.


60 MS, Thompson, Air Supply to Isolated Units, Ardennes Campaign, pp. 2–6, 22–32; Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 1 August 1944–22 February 1945, 2:120–21; AAR, First U.S. Army, for December 1944; Gavin, On to Berlin, p. 205; Cole, The Ardennes, p. 172; MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, p. 347; Interv, Pogue with Hodges, 1 Apr 52; Telecon, author with Col Walter W. Wendt, USA (Ret.), 9 Mar 95, DWH; Ltr, Allphin to author, 8 Jan 97.


65 Quote from Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, p. 592, and see also p. 593. Sylvan Diary,
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De Guingand, Operation VICTORY, p. 429. See also Intervs, Burg with Simpson, 15 Mar 72 and 5 Nov 72, pp. 69, 100.

Belchem, All in the Day’s March, p. 248. See also Intervs, Pogue with Williams, 30–31 May 47, p. 7, and with Belchem, 20 Feb 47, p. 4.


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MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, p. 181; MS, Carter, Carter’s War, ch. 12, pp. 14–16; Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 1 August 1944–22 February 1945, 3:180; AAR, First U.S. Army, for December 1944; Thompson and Harris, The Outcome, p. 157; Telecon, author with Dannemiller, 6 Nov 92, pp. 102, 108–10.


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Cir, LOI, First Army, 21 Dec 44.

Sylvan Diary, 22–23 Dec 44; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, pp. 182, 184; Cole, The
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90 Kean quote from Baldwin, “Great Decision,” p. 17, and see also p. 16. Sylvan Diary, 23–24 Dec 44; Interv, Lt Col H. L. Hunter, Jr., USA, with Gen Williston Birkhimer Palmer, USA (Ret.), 12 Feb 72, pp. 73–74, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, USAMHI; Cole, The Ardennes, pp. 565–66; Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, p. 598; Toland, Battle, pp. 242–43.


94 AAR, First U.S. Army, for December 1944; Hamilton, Monty, pp. 232–33; Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, p. 570.


101 Sylvan Diary, 31 Dec 44–2 Jan 45; Intervs, Pogue with Hodges, 12 Jan 50, 1 Apr 52; Collins, Lightning Joe, pp. 292–93; Cir, LOI, First Army, 1 Jan 45, 300.6 Letters of Instructions, box 62, First Army, Adj Gen Section, General Correspondence, 1940–1947, RG 338, WNRC; Cole, The Ardenne, p. 612; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, pp. 546–47; Hughes, OVERLORD, p. 290; Cir, First U.S. Army Order of Battle, Combat Units, 2 January 1945, 101–3.14 Order of Battle, Sept 44–Feb 45, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Memo, artillery allocations, 101–3.2 G–3 Journal files, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC.


103 Sylvan Diary, 9–10, 13–17, 20 Jan 45; Cir, LOI, First Army, 10 Jan 45, 300.6 Letters of Instructions, box 62, First Army, Adj Gen Section, General Correspondence, 1940–1947, RG 338, WNRC; Hamilton, Monty, pp. 319–22.

104 Jnl, First Army G–3 Jnl, 16 Jan 45; Ltr, Montgomery to Hodges, 17 Jan 45, 1945 Appreciation and Congratulatory Letters, WWII, VIPs, box 8, Hodges Papers, Eisenhower Library; Sylvan Diary, 15–17 Jan 45; Gavin, On to Berlin, pp. 243–44. Intervs, Murray with Hart, 1973, p. 58; with Myers, 15 Apr 74, pp. 48–49; and Pogue with Hodges, 12 Jan 50, 1 Apr 52. AAR, First U.S. Army, for January 1945.

105 Hansen Diary, 19 Dec 44.
As service personnel labored to restore installations and activities disrupted by the Battle of the Bulge, the First Army headquarters returned to Spa on 18 January 1945. Williams' signal crews had already installed a new central station and radio linkups in the town, and within the next few weeks they would use underground cable systems and over 1,100 miles of wire to lay out a communications network even more extensive than had existed before the Bulge. The G–1 section had just reinstated passes to Paris and the United Kingdom and was preparing leave programs for Brussels and the French Riviera, while the special service section was reopening corps rest centers and preparing new retreats for aerial reconnaissance and separate army unit personnel. For some of the staff officers who returned to the old resort, however, Spa would never again be the same. At the Hotel Britannique, Carter, the First Army engineer, found the former officers mess in a state of disarray—furniture overturned and a Christmas tree, without ornaments, tilting "drunkenly" in one corner. Two inches of water flooded the former quarters of the G–3 operations subsection. When Hodges and his aide arrived early in the afternoon, they found his old office to be a shambles: no chairs, dust on the floor, water standing on the desk, and signs that the map board had been used for kindling. Still, the staff managed to restore some order by the time Bradley arrived, in the middle of the afternoon, to discuss future plans with Hodges.

Bradley was a man in a hurry. SHAEF wanted the 21 Army Group to have the main effort in the coming drive to the Rhine, but Bradley had prevailed on Eisenhower to allow him to follow the Germans retreating from the Bulge into the Eifel, an advance that he hoped would break through the rugged Eifel and the West Wall to the Rhine near Bonn, roughly forty miles to the east of Monschau. Although agreeable, Eisenhower was prepared to abort Bradley's offensive if no breakthrough was forthcoming.

After his superior's departure, Hodges closted himself with his chief of staff, Kean, and G–3, Thorson, to prepare a plan. The three men did not know how many divisions would be available, and many of those they did have were tired and in desperate need of infantry replacements. Also, the First Army's transportation organization had been disrupted by frequent troop movements
and depot shifts. On the other hand, in the coming offensive, the First Army would have the unique opportunity to concentrate two corps on a 25-mile front with one corps in reserve. If it achieved a breakthrough against what Dickson, the G-2, saw as a defense stripped of resources to reinforce the Eastern Front, the Germans would have few reserves available to stop the American onslaught short of the Rhine. 3

In his orders for the Eifel offensive, Hodges once again failed to concentrate his resources behind either of the two corps conducting the attack, although given the narrow army front this lack of concentration probably did not matter. Having met with his corps commanders and coordinated army boundaries with Bradley and the commanders of the two adjacent armies, Hodges issued an order on 25 January. The First Army plan called for successive attacks beginning 28 January by Ridgway’s XVIII Airborne Corps in the south and the V Corps, now under Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, in the north. The two corps would drive east through the rugged border country to Euskirchen, on the Erft some twenty-five miles east of Monschau. The XVIII Airborne Corps would employ an airborne and three infantry divisions, while the V Corps used one armored and three infantry divisions. Each corps could call on 14 artillery battalions, 5 tank destroyer battalions, a chemical mortar battalion, and 2 cavalry squadrons for the attack. Also allotted to the V Corps were three tank battalions and seven antiaircraft battalions, while the XVIII included four tank battalions and six antiaircraft battalions. The seven battalions of the 32d Field Artillery Brigade would provide support to both corps. A cavalry troop, tank destroyer battalion, tank battalion, chemical mortar battalion, Belgian Fusilier battalion, and fourteen antiaircraft battalions also remained under army control. Once again, Hodges had distributed divisions, army artillery, and other resources almost equally between the two corps. 4

After a fine start, the Eifel offensive bogged down, due more to winter weather and the mountainous, forested terrain than to anything the few remaining Germans in the area could do. Heavy snows left drifts over two feet high in places, and the few roads were jammed with artillery, armor, and service vehicles, creating numerous problems in pushing forward food and ammunition. To meet the ongoing shortage of special winter clothing, McNamara and his quartermasters rushed to the front such key items as mittens, ponchos, and

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General Huebner

(Photograph taken after the war.)
shoepacs and placed orders for scarce white camouflage capes from local manufacturers despite complaints from troops about the design. Meanwhile, to record casualties more efficiently, army machine records units replaced the old manual system with a new procedure of mechanically processing hospital admission and disposition reports onto locator cards before submitting them to the casualty division. At the Hotel Britannique, Hodges and Kean scanned the G-2 section’s reports of cracking German morale and sensed a breakthrough. Within a few days, however, anticipation turned to disappointment as the V Corps’ converging attack toward the critical Wahlerscheid crossroads, five miles beyond the jumpoff line, slowed to a crawl, and Ridgway’s XVIII Airborne Corps failed to crack the West Wall defenses in its sector. In four days, the XVIII Airborne Corps had driven eight to twelve miles, a respectable advance under the conditions but not the decisive breakthrough SHAEF wanted.² (Map 15)

On 1 February Thorson returned from the 12th Army Group headquarters with orders to halt the advance and to regroup. To the north, Montgomery’s 21 Army Group, having mopped up a salient between the Meuse and the Roer, prepared to clear the area between the Maas and the Rhine, while Simpson’s Ninth Army, which had remained under the 21 Army Group, fought along the old First Army front to reach the Roer near Monschau. Patton’s Third Army, to the south of the First Army, tried to penetrate the West Wall, while simultaneously it covered Hodges’ flank. Farther south, Devers’ 6th Army Group, having turned back NORDWIND, was clearing the Colmar Pocket from its front. According to Thorson, the First Army was supposed to extend its own front to the north and provide the Ninth Army with at least one, and probably five, divisions for its role in Montgomery’s offensive.³

For the First Army command group, cancellation of the Eifel offensive was a great blow. Although the First Army had not yet achieved a breakthrough, on 2 February Dickson estimated that only eight weak divisions held the West Wall and that the First Army must maintain the pressure and not allow the Germans a respite to build up their defenses. Indeed, Hodges had already alerted his staff sections to plan for an exploitation by the VII Corps to the Rhine. With the conclusion of the Eifel drive, however, Hodges’ staff officers were worried that the First Army would become a mere supplier of divisions to Montgomery and that, when the 21 Army Group attacked, the enemy would simply release the floodwaters of the Roer from the dams. Having ignored the problem posed by the dams during much of the autumn, the First Army headquarters now used the threat they posed to bolster its argument for a continued offensive in its sector.⁴

Bradley eased the First Army headquarters’ concern to some degree when, at a conference on 2 February with Hodges and Patton, he approved a continued advance by the First and Third Armies. The two armies could proceed as long as their losses and ammunition expenditures were not excessive and as long as they employed only formations available after they transferred to the 21 Army Group the units required for its offensive. Under Bradley’s design, the First Army would give two armored and three infantry divisions to the Ninth Army in exchange for one armored and two infantry divisions and most of the
ADVANCE TO THE RHINE RIVER
27 January–7 March 1945

Front Line, 27 Jan
Front Line, 9 Feb
Front Line, 1 Mar
Front Line, 7 Mar
Allied Movements
West Wall

ELEVATION IN METERS

0 200 400 600 800 and Above
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Miles
sector north of Monschau. The Ninth Army had assumed this sector in relief of
the First Army during the Battle of the Bulge.  

Despite Bradley’s plan, the First Army would still, for the moment, play
only a secondary role. Its revised mission called for the capture of the Roer
dams and a drive to a line from the Roer headwaters to the small crossroads
village of Frauenkron, about five miles east of its forward positions near
Losheim. This advance, in turn, would be followed by an attack about 10 Feb-
uary across the Roer to protect the southern flank of the Ninth Army’s of-
ensive. For the main effort, the Ninth Army would employ ten divisions over a
front of about thirty-five miles, while the First Army, in a supporting role,
would deploy eleven divisions over a front of about forty-five miles. Perhaps to
ensure that his two most experienced corps commanders would carry the main
burden of support for the Ninth Army and also to allow Huebner’s V Corps to
focus on its ongoing drive to the Roer-Frauenkron line, Hodges decided to move
the VII and XVIII Airborne Corps into position north of the V Corps on the
Ninth Army’s flank. As the V Corps continued its advance, the First Army be-
gan its largest troop shift since the Ardennes crisis to assume the sector from
Monschau north to the Aachen-Cologne highway.

In the midst of this massive troop shift, the First Army had to capture the
Roer dams before the start of the main effort, which was supposed to begin
within a few days. The dams should have been in Allied hands long ago, but
Allied commanders from Eisenhower on down had displayed a remarkable com-
placency toward them, probably believing they would fall as a byproduct of the
Eifel offensive. Although Eisenhower had told Bradley to use two or three divi-
sions for the capture of the dams, Bradley, Hodges, and Huebner, balancing
many tasks, apparently decided that they could spare only the reinforced 78th
Infantry Division, which had just transferred from the Ninth Army. A relatively
green formation, the 78th had started through the Monschau corridor toward
the dams as part of its mission of guarding the First Army’s northern flank
during the Eifel drive. Transferred to the First Army on 2 February, the divi-
sion, under Maj. Gen. Edwin P. Parker, Jr., prepared a plan for a two-phase
advance up the narrow corridor toward the familiar objective of Schmidt. The
First Army headquarters arranged to support the drive with forty battalions of
artillery, including artillery from the 32d Field Artillery Brigade, V Corps, and
7th Armored Division, and it allocated the reserve combat command of the 7th
Armored Division and an extra engineer combat battalion to the division. Nev-
evertheless, the 78th could expect only limited help from the XVIII Airborne
Corps, which was still moving into position to the north, and the rest of V
Corps, which was simultaneously trying to drive east to the Roer-Frauenkron
line and assume the XVIII Airborne Corps’ old sector.

In the end, the First Army accomplished its mission of capturing the dams
but only after considerable unnecessary strain for all concerned. The opera-
tion began auspiciously enough when patrols seized the Urft Dam against
negligible opposition on 4 February. Over the next twenty-four hours, the
78th Division’s attack penetrated within two miles of Schmidt. The V Corps
and 78th Division headquarters, however, mishandled the second phase of
the advance, and, when Hodges visited Parker and Huebner on 6 February, he found the drive bogged down in the woods short of Schmidt. The First Army commander faced a deadline, and an ailing back did not improve his disposition. Over the next two days, he told Huebner to take personal charge of the battle and later, in the presence of aides, pondered aloud why the V Corps and the 78th Division did not just blast a road to the dams with all of the massed artillery at their disposal. Even with support from two regiments of the 82d Airborne Division to the north and two more from the 9th Infantry Division to the south, it was not until late in the evening of 9 February that the 78th finally broke through to the Schwammenauel Dam. They found that the Germans had blown the discharge valves and released enough water to flood the Roer for days.¹¹

Before they could join the 21 Army Group’s offensive, which had already started with an attack in the far north by the Canadian First Army on 8 February, the First and Ninth Armies could only wait impatiently for the Roer floodwaters to subside. For Hodges and his staff, the delay was especially maddening, as Dickson’s estimates stated that the enemy was regrouping reserves and strengthening his defenses in the Cologne plain to the east. At first, Carter and his engineer colleagues calculated that it would take four days for the Roer to return to normal levels, but heavy rains forced repeated postponements. At a commanders conference on 17 February, Carter informed Hodges that he could expect the water to begin to recede on 23 February, provided no further rain fell in the interim. Accordingly, the assembled commanders set 23 February as the target date. In the meantime, the First and Ninth Armies watched the Canadians reach the Rhine at Emmerich on 13 February. To the south, the Third Army forced its way through the West Wall toward Prüm and cleared the triangle between the Saar and Moselle Rivers, while, farther south, the 6th Army Group mopped up the Colmar Pocket.¹²

As it waited, the First Army completed preparations for its supporting role in GRENADE, the Ninth Army’s drive northeast to the Rhine. At Eisenhower’s instigation, Bradley shifted Maj. Gen. John Millikin’s III Corps from the Third Army to the First Army to take over the sector of the XVIII Airborne Corps, which returned to SHAPE reserve. Along the First Army front, the VII Corps now held the northernmost sector, with the III Corps in the center, and the V Corps to the south.
Meanwhile, the First Army headquarters continued to adjust boundaries and move divisions and other formations into position. All three corps contained three infantry divisions, an armored division, two cavalry squadrons, and a chemical mortar battalion. Patterson retained four antiaircraft battalions at army level and allotted seven antiaircraft battalions to the III and VII Corps and eight to the V Corps. He acted ostensibly so that the corps could plan the early relief of division antiaircraft units but perhaps also to remove the units from the control of his nemesis, Timberlake. Of the artillery battalions, the First Army retained seven, while attaching twelve each to the III and V Corps and fourteen to the VII Corps. The III Corps also contained five tank destroyer battalions and three tank battalions, while the V Corps included four tank destroyer battalions, one tank battalion, and a Ranger battalion, and the VII Corps had five tank destroyer battalions, four tank battalions, and a battalion of Belgian Fusiliers. The army retained two tank battalions, two Belgian Fusilier battalions, and a tank destroyer battalion. Bradley, Simpson, and Hodges had already adjusted boundaries, granting both armies access to the transportation hub of Aachen by splitting the city between them and widening the Ninth Army’s front to include all of the Roer Valley city of Jüllich. With GRENADE set, Bradley, Hodges, and their staffs also laid plans for GRENADE’s successor operation, LUMBERJACK, during which the First Army would thrust southeast to take Cologne and clear the Rhine’s west bank once the Ninth Army had reached the river.13

As usual, the artillery-minded Hodges drew heavily in the planning process on the advice of Hart. In allocating his guns, the First Army artillery officer faced a dilemma. Collins’ VII Corps would have the army’s main effort and should thus receive as much support as possible. Yet Hart believed that Huebner’s V Corps, with its extended frontage and defensive mission, could not give up much of its artillery. In addition, Hart could locate only a few appropriate positions for artillery in the VII and III Corps areas. Thus, while he slightly favored the VII and III Corps in allocating artillery units, he avoided any major shift of artillery from the V Corps. From the army artillery, Hart attached a 240-mm. howitzer battalion and an eight-inch gun battalion to the VII Corps and one of each to the III Corps, but he allotted two-thirds of the 240-mm. howitzer ammunition to the VII Corps and a third to the III Corps. These units were to attack long-range targets on order from the army headquarters. While Hart believed in decentralized control for mobile operations and liked to push his guns as far to the front as possible, he preferred to keep more control over missions for army artillery in static warfare. As for ammunition, the First Army headquarters had returned to rationing with the January offensive, but it took advantage of slight increases in stocks to permit more liberal allocations.14

For the First Army logistics, the pace had hardly slackened since the repulse of the Ardennes counteroffensive. At the start of February the First Army staff began to move its supply facilities back across the Meuse to positions from which they could support a breakout to the Rhine. By late February the army supply chiefs had returned their depots to the Eupen-Herbesthal area,
established a forward fuel decanting point at Stolberg, and moved truckheads, railheads, and ammunition supply points forward to support the corps. The move placed heavy demands on the scarce supply of labor and transport. To maximize flexibility, the First Army headquarters allocated more service units on the basis of operational control rather than attachment, thereby relieving subordinate echelons of administrative responsibilities, and it kept other service units directly under the army service chiefs. The First Army, however, never seemed to have enough of these units, and civilian labor, while helpful, was hard to find. Fortunately, the railroad net had progressed to the point that ADSEC could often deliver supplies directly by rail to divisions and army rear area troops. This arrangement eased the strain on army motor transport, which was also in great demand for troop movements and road maintenance, and enabled a sizable buildup in army depots. By 21 February the First Army had increased supply levels to 4.5 days of rations, 6 days of fuel, and 45,549 tons of ammunition. Its depots of Class II and IV stores were well stocked, except for small stoves, wool gloves, spare engine parts, and some signal and engineer equipment.15

The First Army headquarters’ relations with COMZ, while hardly warm, were improving. During January General Lee, the COMZ commander and deputy commander of ETOUSA, had made two visits to Hodges’ command post to discuss items in critically short supply, and he impressed Hodges’ aide with his willingness to listen. At the end of the month the First Army headquarters received a full progress report from Lee, after which COMZ’s G-4 and chief of transportation visited Spa to review the situation. Through its “ABC Haul” truck network and “Toot Sweet” rail express, COMZ made a special effort to rush key items to the front.16 The COMZ headquarters also finally abandoned its daily allocation of transportation in favor of a monthly allotment of its available transport, to be coordinated by its chief of transportation. At a conference of the theater’s top ordnance officers in late February, the COMZ representatives agreed to help ease the general shortage of ordnance service troops by loaning some of COMZ’s own service units to the armies. Army logisticians still viewed with skepticism some of COMZ’s rosier forecasts, and COMZ officers still suspected that the armies were not accurately reporting their stocks and were storing too many supplies for easy movement. When Littlejohn, chief quartermaster of ETOUSA and COMZ, tried to reorganize his depot system and limit stocks in advance depots, however, army protests caused him to raise storage levels in those depots to seven days of rations, fuel, and lubricants and fifteen days of clothing and equipment.17

While the logisticians moved up supplies, the engineers completed their plans for a Rhine crossing. For months, the First Army engineers had been preparing for the mission of an opposed crossing of the Rhine. In September, when a Rhine crossing seemed imminent, army group and army engineers laid plans for bridge construction at several different points. Beginning in October, the First Army engineer section participated in planning sessions with their colleagues from ETOUSA, SHAEF, the Navy, the army groups, and the other armies. Drawing on guidelines prepared at these meetings, on data collected by
the S-2 subsection, and on consultations with the G-3 section about such factors as probable sites and dates, Carter's operations officers prepared plans for simultaneous crossings by two corps, using treadway, heavy ponton, and Bailey bridges. The logistics subsection then began to assemble the necessary materials at depots, and the operations subsection obtained more bridge units and initiated training programs. In the past, the First Army had been reluctant to use smoke, but for this task, the engineers obtained smoke generator units through the chemical warfare section. When SHAEF decided in favor of the northern thrust, however, it took several bridge units from the First Army. In theory, SHAEF's action left only enough equipment for three bridges, although Carter would later claim that he had worked out an arrangement with a captain in a regulating station to divert all bridging equipment to the First Army no matter what its assigned destination.

Busy as they were with Rhine planning, the First Army engineers in early February had to deal with another crisis. After a January of deep snow and ice, which caused units to turn to sleds and special tracked vehicles to move supplies, a sudden thaw and heavy rains caused even hardened macadam roads in the First Army area to disintegrate. Poor road conditions were the last straw for many of the First Army's aging vehicles. They frequently broke down under the strain, despite cannibalization and other efforts by forward ordnance maintenance battalions to keep as many as possible on the road. Notwithstanding strenuous efforts by the engineers, the road system had deteriorated to such a degree that on 14 February the First Army staff divided its roads into three groups: those open to unlimited use, those open only to essential traffic, and those, mostly in the V Corps sector, that the engineers deemed impassable and closed. Aided by troops of the 7th Armored and 99th Infantry Divisions and by local labor, the First Army engineers devoted all of their resources to keeping roads in the first two categories open, and the engineer section worked closely with G-4 traffic headquarters to direct convoys to open routes. Due to the difficulty of moving supplies forward, the First Army headquarters took the almost unprecedented step of authorizing the VII Corps' two assault divisions to accumulate five days of ammunition for the attack.

After a 45-minute barrage by 2,000 artillery pieces firing in support of the Ninth Army and the VII Corps, Collins' troops began their attack across the
Roer at 0330 on 23 February. Strong river currents and preregistered enemy artillery fire caused problems for the first waves, but by the next day Hodges was satisfied enough with the VII Corps’ progress to order Millikin’s III Corps across the Roer. To avoid successive assault crossings, the First Army headquarters cleverly directed each division to cross into the existing bridgehead of the division on its left and then slip to the right and uncover its own bridgehead sites. It thus cleared the way for the next division to repeat the process. While the III Corps crossed the Roer, the VII Corps’ armored spearheads plunged ahead on 27 February to the Erft near Elsdorf, about eight miles east of the Roer. At Spa, the First Army headquarters followed with great satisfaction the progress of the advance. Hains’ armored section in particular noted with pleasure the excellent performance at Elsdorf of one of the twenty new Pershing tanks that the 12th Army Group headquarters had assigned to the 3d Armored Division.

As the Ninth Army raced northeast to the Rhine, the First Army prepared to launch LUMBERJACK. Once Bradley eased Hodges’ anxiety about his southern flank by directing a converging attack by Patton’s Third Army, the First Army headquarters issued orders to its three corps on 28 February. In the first stage of LUMBERJACK, the VII Corps would continue to protect the Ninth Army’s southern flank, crossing the Erft and occupying the high ground northwest of Cologne, while the III Corps advanced nine miles east to the Erft and seized Euskirchen. In the second stage, the VII Corps would invest Cologne, while the III Corps turned to the southeast and linked up with the Third Army along the Ahr River, which flowed east into the Rhine fifteen miles southeast of Bonn and twice that distance southeast of Cologne. The two corps would then close to the west bank of the Rhine. During these stages, the V Corps would cover the III Corps’ flank and be ready to advance farther east.

LUMBERJACK proceeded almost without a hitch. By 4 March, the same day that the First Army headquarters reactivated the tactical echelon, the III Corps had captured Euskirchen, and the VII Corps’ advance had reached the Rhine eight miles north of Cologne. Two days later, the VII Corps occupied Cologne, while the III Corps raced toward the Ahr. For the First Army headquarters, the speed and clocklike precision of the drive were exhilarating. The pace, as well as the warmer weather, especially seemed to be a tonic for Hodges, who was devoting more time to visiting subordinate command posts than he had in months. At Collins’ request, he shifted the boundary between the VII and III Corps to allow the VII Corps to drive to the Rhine south of Cologne and cut the last German escape route, and he also adjusted the boundary between the III and V Corps to give the former more frontage on the Ahr.

In keeping with his orders from Bradley, Hodges was more intent on the approaching junction with the Third Army on the Ahr than seizing a Rhine bridge. Allied commanders expected that German engineers, as a matter of course, would demolish every threatened span. Moreover, SHAPE had shown little enthusiasm for a Rhine crossing on the First Army front. Steep riverbanks presented a major obstacle. The rough, wooded terrain and poor, easily blocked roads on the east bank of the Rhine between Bonn and the mouth of the Ahr
offered few openings for exploitation, and the limited roadnet on the west bank would make support of any crossing difficult. Consequently, SHAEF had planned primarily for a Rhine crossing to the north in the sector of the 21 Army Group, with possible secondary crossings to the south by the Third Army and the 6th Army Group, leaving the First Army nearly last in priority for bridging units and materials. Although the First Army headquarters and subordinate echelons more or less shared an understanding of the desirability of taking a bridge, Hodges and his staff tended to steer the III Corps toward the Ahr and away from the Rhine. Indeed, he and his staff actually wanted the Allied air forces to bomb bridges in its zone of advance and cut off the German retreat, although foggy, rainy weather in the first days of March had forced cancellation of most of those missions. Not until the evening of 6 March did the First Army commander, responding to the request of the III Corps G–3 through the First Army G–3 (Air), ask for the suspension of the strikes.25

About 1700 on 7 March, while Hodges was visiting the newly occupied city of Cologne, his tactical echelon at the Primm estate in Stolberg received startling news: Combat Command B (CCB) of the 9th Armored Division had captured intact the Ludendorff Bridge, the railroad span at Remagen, two miles north of the mouth of the Ahr and fifty miles east of Stolberg. In his chief’s absence, Kean approved the 9th Armored Division’s change of CCB’s mission from driving to the Ahr to reinforcing and exploiting the Remagen crossing. When Hodges returned at 1800, he confirmed these orders and told Kean that,
with due regard for responsibilities on the rest of the front, he wanted to send to the Remagen area every unit that it could hold as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{26}

For several hours, the First Army headquarters hummed with activity. Thorson made two calls to the III Corps headquarters, directing Millikin to secure the Ahr crossings but be prepared to turn them over to the V Corps so that the III Corps headquarters could concentrate on the bridgehead. He also informed the III Corps headquarters that it would receive the 7th Armored Division, which would enable the 9th Infantry Division to move to Remagen. Later, the First Army headquarters told its III Corps subordinates to transfer the 1st Infantry Division and the Bonn sector to the VII Corps, again to enable the III Corps to focus on the task at hand. Hodges, Kean, and Thorson discussed transportation and road priorities with Wendt, the G--4 executive officer who was acting for the ailing Brig. Gen. Robert W. Wilson. Simultaneously, Hart, Williams, Patterson, and Carter arranged for the immediate shift of their artillery, signal, antiaircraft, and engineer units to Remagen. In line with prior plans for a Rhine crossing, Thorson also asked the Navy to send landing craft. As the staff raced to realign the First Army, Hodges called Bradley and obtained his approval for the buildup of the bridgehead.\textsuperscript{27}

The First Army headquarters had reacted with commendable dispatch, but, in its haste, it generated an overkill of resources. Eager to consolidate their coup and aware from ULTRA intercepts that the Germans were frantically assembling forces to destroy the bridge and bridgehead, the staff chiefs in the
tactical echelon rushed forward bits and pieces of units. Since the G–3 troop movements subsection and G–4 traffic headquarters had remained at Spa with the command echelon, the staff at Stolberg relied on minimal, informal coordination. By the night of 7–8 March the two inadequate roads leading into Remagen from the west and south were already jammed with traffic, and the next day Hodges’ aide saw a nearly continuous line of amphibious trucks, bridging equipment, supply vehicles, antiaircraft batteries, and trailers with landing craft headed southeast from Euskirchen to Remagen, over twenty miles away. There, the convoys ran into the granddaddy of all bottlenecks. Although twenty-four hours passed before the Germans could offer much resistance, rugged terrain and lack of infantry slowed expansion of the bridgehead and enabled the Germans to bring observed artillery fire on the bridge and its approaches. To add to the First Army headquarters’ aggravation, SHAEF, despite prodding from the 12th Army Group headquarters, gave little indication what it wanted to do with the bridgehead. On 9 March Bradley finally told Hodges to hold the bridgehead but limit it to an area five divisions could defend. To disrupt enemy defenses, units on the perimeter could advance but were limited to 1,000 yards per day.

While SHAEF reconsidered its plans, the First Army engineer section did its best to expedite construction of more bridges in the Remagen area. Fortunately for the First Army, the III Corps engineer had shown enough foresight to include a roadway bridge company in the column behind the 9th Armored Division. He immediately put into effect the First Army contingency plan for constructing a roadway and a pontoon bridge while ferries moved men, supplies, and vehicles to the far bank. To perform these missions, however, the III Corps had to go beyond its available resources. The First Army headquarters responded with a heavy pontoon battalion to operate the ferries, and it later sent 2 engineer combat battalions, 2 roadway companies, and 2 heavy pontoon battalions to build the roadway and pontoon bridges.

The First Army engineer section soon became more intimately involved in the bridging operation. When Carter went to Remagen on the morning of 8 March, he found preparations for more bridges under way, although traffic jams and road priorities would delay arrival of the bridging units and the start of construction until the morning of 10 March. The First Army engineer checked the status of the captured bridge and called in a COMZ construction battalion to take over the repair of a blown girder. Meanwhile, his section at Stolberg raced to gather units and materials, coordinating with the G–4 section for transport and traffic clearances, with the provost marshal for traffic control, and with the antiaircraft section for bridge defenses. The section also obtained four truck companies from ADSEC to haul bridging equipment to the Remagen area. At Kean’s orders, Carter returned to the bridgehead several times over the next two weeks to ensure that work proceeded satisfactorily. By the time the captured railroad bridge collapsed on the afternoon of 17 March, engineers had constructed three temporary spans in the area and installed a vast ferrying operation of DUKWs, pontons, and twenty-four naval landing craft, vehicle and personnel (LCVP), under the overall supervision of Carter’s engineer section.
Like Carter, Patterson took seriously Hodges' instructions to push forward every unit that the bridgehead area could hold. Within a few days of the capture of the railroad bridge, the First Army headquarters had reinforced the antiaircraft defenses of the span to include nine automatic weapons battalions and four gun battalions, which took positions on both banks of the Rhine. An officer in Patterson's antiaircraft section later recalled that he had never seen so many antiaircraft units in one place. They were so numerous, he stated, that their rounds were landing on friendly troops and causing casualties.

Until the 49th Antiaircraft Brigade assumed from the corps the responsibility for the defense of the bridges on 25 March, the task demanded particularly close coordination among engineer, chemical warfare, antiaircraft, artillery, and armored personnel at all levels and the IX Tactical Air Command. To prevent friendly fire incidents, Patterson and Quesada, commander of the IX Tactical Air Command, worked out a "no-penetration zone" over the Ludendorff Bridge for Allied aircraft, giving the gunners a clear field of fire. Drawing on First Army experiments with protective river booms during the previous winter, engineers placed a log boom, an impact boom, and a large net upstream to stop floating objects and saboteurs. They also called on the First Army chemical warfare section for smoke generator companies. Not until 10 March, however, was the First Army headquarters able to release two such units from their other duties for the task, and not until 16 March could one leave for Remagen, too late to be of much help. The bridge defenses were further augmented by barrage balloons, searchlights, 155-mm. howitzers positioned along the banks, and depth charges dropped into the river at five-minute intervals to discourage swimmers. Despite the ad hoc nature of the defenses, they did their job. The Germans tried artillery, air strikes, floating mines, frogmen, and even V-2 missiles, but only the artillery did much damage to the bridges.

In the midst of the battle for the bridgehead, on 17 March Hodges relieved the III Corps commander, Millikin. For some time, it had become increasingly obvious that the First Army commander lacked confidence in Millikin, a tall cavalryman with abundant nervous energy. Whether this lack of confidence stemmed from the III Corps' past association with Patton's Third Army, old infantry-cavalry rivalries, or even the interwar animus between Pershing, the hero of AEF veterans like Hodges, and General Peyton C. March, the former chief of staff and Millikin's father-in-law, can only be left to conjecture. It is interesting to note, however, that Patton, another AEF veteran and a Pershing intimate, had come close to relieving Millikin, whom he regarded as amateurish compared to his other corps commanders. Although Hodges does not appear to have been aware of Patton's evaluation, he clearly was unhappy over Millikin's performance in Lumberjack. He later complained that the III Corps commander repeatedly disregarded his orders, resting the 78th Infantry Division instead of pushing all of his units forward, sending the 9th Infantry Division to take Bonn rather than bypass it, and not attaching enough infantry support to the 9th Armored Division, which was commanded by an old friend of Hodges.

As the battle for the Remagen bridgehead developed, Hodges' anxiety and irritation with Millikin had mounted. Aware of his G-2's 8 March estimate,
which showed a sizable German force massing to wipe out the bridgehead. Hodges voiced concern over the slow buildup, the corps headquarters’ apparent lack of control over the situation, and—always a sure way to draw his ire—the absence of timely, reliable reports from the corps. A trip to the III Corps command post and the Remagen bridgehead on 10 and 11 March, during which he encountered the traffic jams clogging the roads to Remagen, did little to improve his first impressions. He became especially vexed by what he perceived to be disobedience of his orders to drive north along the Rhine’s east bank and open a crossing for the VII Corps.

On their part, Millikin and his staff could blame misunderstandings with their superior headquarters, inadequate communications with the units on the east bank, and the lack of roads, bridges, and service troops to accommodate the flood of units that the First Army headquarters was pushing forward to them. Millikin’s biggest problem, however, was that he was not J. Lawton Collins, the man the First Army headquarters openly wished had received the windfall. On 15 March Hodges informed General Omar N. Bradley of his intent to make a change, and Bradley took the opportunity to name a favorite, Maj. Gen. James A. Van Fleet, to fill the vacancy.

The case of Millikin’s relief does not reflect well on the First Army headquarters, whatever the justification. Millikin’s leadership may well have been inadequate. William C. Westmoreland, then a colonel and the chief of staff of the 9th Infantry Division, later recalled that Millikin never visited the east bank and that Westmoreland had warned Hodges’ aide of the corps commander’s lack of resolution. If his communications with the bridgehead were inadequate, he could have improved them simply by moving his command post to the other side of the river. Yet the III Corps commander apparently believed that his presence on the west bank of the Rhine was necessary to deal with the confusion there. With regard to this confusion, the First Army headquarters could have been more helpful, assuming more of the responsibility for the rear areas so that the corps could concentrate on the battle. Millikin could claim with some justice that the First Army headquarters made little effort to understand his problems or to help him straighten out the chaos. Indeed, it might have actually hindered him by burdening his corps with more resources than it could handle.

By the time of Millikin’s relief, little doubt remained as to the security of the bridgehead, but the First Army commander and staff were still anxious about
their role in the coming offensive. The Allied armies had almost achieved Eisenhower’s more immediate goal of clearing the west bank of the Rhine. To the north, the Ninth Army, after reaching the Rhine on 2 March, had driven north to link up with the Canadian First Army the next day. While the 21 Army Group mopped up the region between the Maas and the Rhine, the Third Army reached the Rhine on 7 March and, after contacting the First Army near the Ahr, cleared its sector of the west bank. To the south, the 6th Army Group’s Seventh U.S. Army launched Operation Undertone on 15 March to break through the West Wall in its area and eliminate enemy resistance from the region between the Rhine, Moselle, and Lauter-Sarre Rivers.

In this context, the First Army continued to build up its bridgehead. On 15 March the VII Corps began to cross the Rhine to assume its position on the northern sector of the perimeter, while the 32d Field Artillery Brigade under the control of the First Army took up positions along the west bank to provide general support of the bridgehead. Gradually, the perimeter expanded to reach by 17 March over four miles north along the Rhine, six miles to the south, and about seven miles inland to the autobahn. Despite the progress, the First Army headquarters remained in the dark about its future role and feared that it might have to send several divisions to the 21 Army Group. Hodges and his staff had good reason to be concerned. The seizure of the Remagen bridgehead had intensified the debate over strategy, and at one point, Eisenhower directed Bradley to be prepared to employ at least ten divisions from the First Army to exploit the bridgehead that the 21 Army Group planned to establish north of the Ruhr industrial region.41

Finally, on 19 March the uncertainty ended. On that day Bradley told Hodges to build up his forces in the bridgehead to nine divisions and prepare for a breakout on 23 March. The next day Hodges assembled his corps commanders at his new command post in Euskirchen and went over plans for a two-phase offensive. At this point, the First Army could go almost anywhere it wanted, given the status of enemy reserves, fuel, ammunition, and morale. Since the Germans had massed most of their remaining strength north of the bridgehead, Hodges planned for the III Corps, which would be in the center once the V Corps entered the bridgehead, to advance southeast to Limburg, a road center on the Lahn River about forty miles southeast of Remagen. The VII Corps in the north would drive about the same distance east to the Dill River. After linking up with the Third Army at the Lahn River, the First Army would drive to Giessen, 30 miles northeast of Limburg, and then advance to Kassel, another 64 miles northeast of Giessen and 110 miles east of Cologne, thereby encircling the Ruhr from the south.42

Although the plan did not specify a main effort, Collins again received the largest share of the resources. His VII Corps would have one armored and five infantry divisions and priority for support from the army artillery. Van Fleet’s III Corps could call on one armored and two infantry divisions, and Huebner’s V Corps would contain one armored and three infantry divisions. The VII Corps, however, received a much larger sector than the other two corps. Under the initial plan, the V Corps, which began to cross into the southern sector of the
bridgehead on 21 March, was supposed to play only a minor role, but when probes showed the enemy’s weakness on the V Corps front, Hodges adjusted his plans to permit the III and V Corps to drive abreast to the Lahn.43

The First Army logisticians knew that the inevitable breakout would result in a mobile campaign similar in pace to the pursuit of the previous summer, but they were in a much better position to meet the challenge. Theater organization for logistics had come a long way, to the point that the 12th Army Group headquarters could provide the First Army with four additional quartermaster service companies, and COMZ could muster 75 percent of its truck transport in direct support of the drive beyond the Rhine. Under a plan worked out by COMZ, ADSEC, the 25th Regulating Station, and the First Army staff, COMZ pledged to make available up to thirteen ten-ton truck companies to support a First Army advance of up to 125 miles from a service area west of the Rhine. The First Army would also benefit from improved arrangements for air supply, under which each army submitted designated airfields and bids for supplies directly to the AEAF’s Combined Air Transport Operations Room. Since the First Army received most of its supplies from COMZ by rail, it was limited in its ability to move depots forward, due to the heavy damage to rail installations in the Rhineland. Still, it pushed its distribution points as far forward as possible, placing an ammunition dump at Rheinbach, eight miles southeast of Euskirchen, and a decanting point for fuel at Stadt Meckenheim, three miles farther southeast on the road to Remagen. While engineers hurriedly improved road and rail connections to these points, logisticians rushed to stock fuel and other supplies in preparation for a breakout.44

They did not have long to wait. On 22 March troops of the Third Army crossed the Rhine just south of Mainz near Oppenheim. (Map 16) The next day Montgomery launched his carefully prepared assault across the Rhine north of the Ruhr. After a delay of two days to allow the offensives by the 21 Army Group and Third Army to develop, the First Army struck all along the line on 25 March. The front soon gave way, opening the door to exploitation by armor. On 26 March, the same day that the Seventh Army in the south made its crossing of the Rhine, the V Corps advance reached Limburg, and, at Bradley’s instigation, Hodges directed a combat command from the V Corps’ 9th Armored Division into the rear of the Germans opposing the Third Army.45

Once again, the pace of the advance forced Hodges to trust in the discretion of his corps commanders. After the V Corps linked up with the Third Army on 28 March, Bradley decided to try for a shallower envelopment of the Ruhr, ordering the First Army to turn north and drive sixty miles to Paderborn, where it would meet the Ninth Army. As the First Army turned to the north, inadequate communications and frequent shifts of a tactical echelon enlarged to include personnel from the medical, armored, and antiaircraft sections limited the ability of its headquarters to follow and, when necessary, influence the battle. Aside from the G–4 section’s need to maintain the flow of supplies, Hodges and his staff could allow the corps to run the show. For all his confidence in Collins, however, Hodges still worried, this time with good reason, about the VII Corps’ long western flank. When reports on 30 March indicated an imminent enemy attempt to break out
from the Ruhr near Winterberg, about seventy miles east of Cologne, the First Army commander, without a request from Collins, shifted the 9th Infantry Division from the III Corps to reinforce the VII Corps' flank, and the division arrived in time to help repel the German foray.  

The action at Winterberg hardly slowed Collins, who had grown so accustomed to the discretion Hodges habitually granted him that he hardly blinked at bypassing the First Army commander to deal with a tactical contingency. When the VII Corps met unexpectedly fierce resistance at Paderborn, Collins went outside the normal command channels to contact Simpson of the Ninth Army directly and arrange a linkup eighteen miles west of Paderborn on 1 April. Given the situation, Hodges could hardly complain. The encirclement of the Ruhr brought considerable satisfaction to his headquarters, but also sadness at the news that Maj. Gen. Maurice Rose of the 3d Armored Division, one of the First Army headquarters' favorite tank commanders, had been killed in the fighting at Paderborn.

Having received acclaim from the supreme commander himself for its performance in the encirclement of the Ruhr, the First Army would now have a major role in the final drive into the heart of Germany. On 29 March Eisenhower announced that the 12th Army Group would make the main effort, driving 150 miles east along the Erfurt-Leipzig axis to the Elbe River and also clearing the Ruhr Pocket. As was often the case, Bradley waited to issue official orders until 4 April. In the interim, he notified Hodges of the First Army's mission to clear the Ruhr and also to prepare for an offensive that would contact the Soviets, exploit any opening for an Elbe bridgehead, and set the stage for an advance farther to the east. For help in reducing the Ruhr, the First Army would regain the XVIII Airborne Corps.

Although the German opposition to the final drive promised to be negligible, Hodges and his staff in the closing weeks of the war would have to contend with the most widely separated front they had faced in the entire campaign. Delighted to have Ridgway under his command once again, Hodges called his corps commanders to his new command post in a barracks at Marburg, seventy miles east of Bonn, on 2 April. There, he ordered the XVIII Airborne and III Corps, with support from the army artillery, to mop up the Ruhr, while the VII and V Corps regrouped for the drive to the Elbe. On the same day conferences from the First Army and the Ninth Army, which was returning to the 12th Army Group, set their boundary for the Ruhr operation along the Ruhr River, the westward flowing stream that bisected the Ruhr. When the First Army headquarters received the tentative boundaries for the Elbe drive the next day, however, Hodges and his staff groaned at the provisions that gave them not only the Harz Mountains and no autobahns in their area but also additional terrain north of the Ruhr River. Meeting with Bradley and Simpson on 4 April, Hodges recovered his former northern boundary with the Ninth Army at the Ruhr River and also received orders to seize a bridgehead over the Weser, ten to fifteen miles to the east, preparatory to a drive to the Elbe.

While the generals conferred, the XVIII Airborne Corps in the south and the III Corps to the east, in collaboration with the Ninth Army in the north,
had already begun to mop up the Ruhr Pocket. (Map 17) On the basis of Dickson’s estimates that the Germans had only 125,000 men in the Ruhr, and those mostly service troops, Bradley and Hodges clearly hoped for a quick reduction of the pocket so they could turn their full attention to the drive east. Actually, well over twice that number occupied the Ruhr, and, although surrounded, many were prepared for hard fighting. The hilly, forested terrain of the Sauerland on the south edge of the Ruhr and the inexperience of three green divisions in the XVIII Airborne Corps further slowed operations. Al-
though somewhat aware of the rugged ground facing his troops, an impatient Hodges kept up the pressure on his commanders. At a gathering of Allied generals, Hansen noted that Hodges "has lost the calmness of his days in England and seems to feel the urgency of these days of swift advances." When the III Corps achieved only moderate progress, Hodges berated Van Fleet over the phone, and he and Ridgway would have relieved the assistant commander of the 86th Infantry Division if Bradley had not intervened. Despite the pressure from Hodges, the First Army did not link up with the Ninth Army
inside the Ruhr until 14 April, and not until 18 April did the 317,000 remaining German troops capitulate.

As the battle for the Ruhr took place, the First Army's other two corps advanced to the Elbe and its tributary, the Mulde, which flowed parallel to, and about twenty miles west of, the Elbe. As the staff had noted, the army zone from the Weser to the Elbe contained few roads and the Harz Mountains, which extended across most of the VII Corps zone about halfway to the Elbe. Yet the rest of the zone consisted of open, rolling country for mobile warfare, and Dickson rated the defenders, the hastily constituted Eleventh Army, as mere
“confused rabble.” At first, Bradley limited the First Army’s advance to a bridgehead over the Leine River, two to four miles to the east. Under pressure from Hodges and Huebner, however, he removed restrictions on 10 April and set as the objective the Mulde-Elbe line, the farthest advance he thought that he could support without railroads.

With their armored divisions in the lead, the VII and V Corps raced east against sporadic resistance, ignoring flanks and taking risks unthinkable a few weeks before. The First Army headquarters’ major challenge, aside from logistics and administration, was staying clear of the advancing armies on either
flank, as units from all three armies often wandered into each other's zones. Despite several such entanglements, by 16 April both corps had reached the Mulde-Elbe line, and on 19 April Leipzig surrendered to the V Corps. To the north, Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, nervous about the threat to his northern flank from the Harz Mountains, pursued the Eleventh Army into its dense woods and caves in spite of General Courtney H. Hodges' orders to bypass the region. His commander's impatience notwithstanding, Collins took his time clearing the area to avoid imposing heavy losses on his troops so near the end of the war. Not until 20 April did the last enemy troops in the Harz region surrender.52

Collins' independence was largely due to the respect Hodges had for him, but uncertain communications over long distances in a fast-paced campaign undoubtedly contributed. Anticipating the problem, Grant Williams' signal section had devoted most of March to stocking wire and forming a mobile supply depot to follow the advance. When the III Corps proved unable to maintain contact with its divisions in the Remagen bridgehead, Williams detailed the 32d and 35th Signal Construction Battalions to lay two cables to the east bank. Even these measures proved inadequate as the First Army advanced beyond the Rhineland. Through late March, the First Army headquarters struggled with its communications. The low point came on 30 March, when the tactical echelon moved across the Rhine to a forest near Freilingen, twenty-five miles east of Remagen, only to find itself without communications until early the next morning because the signal vans were delayed by traffic. When the command post moved to Marburg two days later, signal crews laid over a hundred miles of cable and established numerous repeater stations to keep the First Army headquarters in touch with its far-flung units. Once again, that headquarters had to rely heavily on radio, notwithstanding the security risks and the resulting time lag involved in coding and decoding messages. Communications problems, as well as confusion in the command structure, may well have caused the delay in responding to the 9th Armored Division's urgent request for information on "Flak Alley," a belt of German antiaircraft batteries that was wreaking havoc on American tanks on the approach to Leipzig.53

During the last months of the war, the First Army headquarters took some long overdue steps to improve access to timely tactical information from the front. Thanks to Bradley's great interest in the British PHANTOM system, the 12th Army Group headquarters had obtained the services of a PHANTOM detachment during its earliest days on the Continent. The First Army headquarters received PHANTOM data through a detachment that was stationed at its command post. This unit received reports from its counterpart at the 12th Army Group headquarters and, via the Ninth Army's detachment, from the regimental headquarters at the 21 Army Group command post. Still, the time necessary for these reports to follow such a lengthy path minimized PHANTOM's value for the First Army, except where it could intercept reports of patrols in the field, and the attempts of Akers, the G-3 operations officer, to establish direct contact with the 21 Army Group headquarters made little headway.54 Meanwhile, ETOUSA, with the War Department's blessing, organized and trained Signal Information and Monitoring (SIAM) companies to perform PHANTOM-like mis-
visions for American field armies, as well as monitor radio networks for security. (Chart 9) The 3323d SIAM Company, which joined the First Army headquarters at Marburg in early April, attached its liaison platoons down to corps and divisions, where, in addition to their primary army missions, each would receive tasks from its host echelon's signal officer, under the supervision of that echelon's G–3.55

As was perhaps to be expected, the 3323d ran into problems too numerous and fundamental to work out in the few weeks left before V–E Day. The unit’s training and equipment left much to be desired. As 1st Lt. John S. D. Eisenhower, the general's son and an officer in the 3323d, remembered, division and corps G–3s were less than enthralled over receiving SIAM personnel, whom they suspected of being the spies of higher echelons. This distrust was allayed to a degree once they understood that the platoons were under strict orders to send no messages without the approval of the subordinate echelon's G–3 or a member of that section, but the platoons still were barely tolerated by their hosts. Finally, they lacked the capabilities to perform properly both the tactical information and signal monitoring missions. Too many officers believed they could handle both functions simply by monitoring frequencies, but data from this source often proved unreliable and incomplete. Faced with a choice between the two missions, the corps and division signal officers, lacking any genuine interest in the PHANTOM concept, tended to concentrate on the security mission, and SIAM commanders, also signal officers, did little to dissuade them. In any case, the war ended too early for a real test of the concept.56

Despite an unprecedented demand for food and gasoline, the First Army maintained sufficient stocks of supplies for most of April. By the time of the Rhine crossings, the First Army had accumulated more gasoline in its dumps than ever before, and the final drive never had to falter for lack of fuel even when issues reached the level of one million gallons in a day. Until late April the First Army also had plenty of all types of rations for its troops, although the quartermaster, McNamara, complained to the G–4 section, and later to the inspector general, that too many divisions were overrequicktioning rations. Toward the end of April reported ration stocks fell to such a low level that the 12th Army Group headquarters deemed the situation critical, but no American units suffered from lack of rations. Except for shortages of engines, salvaged jerricans, and some spare parts, such as tank bogie wheels and treads, the First Army logisticians also managed to keep up with the demand for Class II and IV supplies. Although reduction of the Ruhr Pocket required fairly high expenditures of artillery ammunition, mobile warfare elsewhere placed few demands on the First Army's ammunition stocks. Lack of ammunition was no longer a problem, and the 12th Army Group headquarters suspended allocations as of 1 April. After past shortages, however, the armies were always eager to get more ammunition, whatever the real status of their supply.57

The few problems of supply could be blamed not so much on actual stocks as on the hectic depot situation and the perennial lack of transport. Given the fluid nature of mobile warfare, the supply sections often found it difficult to position installations where they would be useful. When the main army axis
1. The army SIAM platoon station will be the Net Control Station (NCS) in each of the army SIAM nets.

2. The senior station in each of the division SIAM nets will be the NCS.

3. Code signs and frequencies for the above nets will be furnished by the Army signal officer in extract form for periods of one week. In the interest of security these code signs and frequencies will not appear in the Army Signal Operation Instructions.

4. The solid lines within the diagram show only the different stations involved in the radio net. They are not meant to depict exclusive communications channels between the various headquarters. Transmissions between headquarters within the net are monitored by other headquarters within the net.

shifted to the north, the ordnance section changed the status of its ammunition depot at Marburg to an ammunition supply point and redesignated as a depot the supply point at Warburg, fifty miles to the north, only to have the axis shift back to the south. Such a rapidly changing situation also led to misunderstandings. At one point, McNamara moved the rations depot to the west bank of the Rhine at Andernach, twelve miles upstream from Remagen, on the assurance that a ponton bridge would be laid across the river there, only to find that the nearest ponton bridge lay well to the north.\textsuperscript{58}

While moving its depots constantly, the First Army support services were sustaining four corps on a front that by 5 May stretched 247 miles from the Ruhr to the Elbe. Although the First Army had received additional service units from the 12th Army Group and could call on civilian labor and even prisoners, such a front was far too broad for the manpower available. Despite the best efforts of the engineers, the First Army began its breakout in late March with a main army service area, near Euskirchen, that had no intact rail connections to the east. With help from ADSEC trucks, the supply chiefs shifted their depots across the Rhine to the Marburg area in early April, but within a few days, the rapid advance compelled a further move to Warburg and, later in the month, to the Giessen-Kassel area. The rations depot moved to Andernach and later Hersfeld, the fuel decanting point across the Rhine to Giessen, and the ammunition depot to Marburg, Warburg, and back to Marburg, with a facility at Rheinbach to support the two corps in the Ruhr. West of the Rhine, the First Army progressively turned over sectors of its former area to Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow’s new Fifteenth Army, which assumed occupation duties for other armies as they advanced.\textsuperscript{59}

As in August lack of transport presented the major problem. Even with the First Army’s temporary bridges, the Rhine remained a formidable barrier. Once the Ludendorff Bridge collapsed into the river, it would take almost another month for COMZ to construct railroad bridges north of the Ruhr at Wesel and well to the south at Mainz in the Third Army zone. In the interim, through the ingenuity of some of its quartermasters and engineers, the First Army installed a pipeline across the Rhine, seven miles northwest of Remagen, on an infantry footbridge, enabling trucks and, later, rail tank cars to pump their cargoes across the Rhine to storage tanks.\textsuperscript{60} East of the Rhine, motor transport still carried the bulk of the load. Once again, supply officers faced the daunting problems of a poor roadnet, worn-out vehicles, and vast distances, but, with the drop in the use of artillery, they could call on antiaircraft and artillery trucks, replacement vehicles on their way to the front, 100 new trucks from COMZ, and 20 ten-ton truck companies from ADSEC.\textsuperscript{61} Thanks to the high priority that SHAEF had placed on air supply, they could rely on airlift much more than ever before. Divisions and corps reported to the First Army staff the locations of overrun airfields, which were examined by the IX Engineer Command. Once the engineers declared the fields ready, the First Army G–4 section took bids from the supply chiefs, set priorities, and contacted the Combined Air Transport Operations Room. During April planes delivered 15,000 tons of supplies, mostly gasoline and rations, directly to the front. In some cases, units blithely asked for delivery miles beyond their positions since the enemy opposition was so weak.\textsuperscript{62}
Aircraft also proved to be a godsend for medical evacuation given the absence of railroads east of the Rhine and scarcity of motor transport, including ambulances. After adopting a liberal evacuation policy during the German Ardennes counteroffensive, the First Army headquarters, faced with a lack of replacements, tried to keep more of its short-term patients through a policy of retaining all patients requiring ten days or less of treatment as long as the fighting continued. For those soldiers who had to be evacuated from the army area, Rogers, the army surgeon, relied heavily on air transportation. Small liaison planes and even gliders helped ambulances convey patients to airfields, where holding units processed the evacuees for shipment by C-47 back to COMZ, Great Britain, and, in some cases, the United States. Rogers’ medical section coordinated evacuation with the G-4 section, which arranged with the IX Troop Carrier Command staff for the use of planes. In the end, the aircraft greatly alleviated the evacuation problem, carrying 14,000 patients from nine fields during April.

Yet air evacuation was not a panacea. The problem in an increasingly fast-paced campaign, as in the pursuit across France, lay in the lack of mobility of the evacuation hospital, which, employing its own vehicles, could not even move itself in two stages. Once again, the First Army use of field hospitals as evacuation hospitals alleviated the problem. Of course, lower losses due to the transition to pursuit warfare greatly eased matters.

While the First Army’s medical section grappled with problems of evacuation, the G-5 section laid the groundwork for the military government of a defeated nation. In one form or another, the First Army headquarters had been planning for the occupation since its activation. Originally code-named RANKIN and later TALISMAN, the Allies’ Eclipse plan for military government concentrated more than its predecessors on the increasing likelihood of a long, drawn-out ending without a formal surrender, rather than a quick collapse. The overall design included a “carpet plan” for the deployment of military government units as Allied forces overran Germany and a “static plan” for realigning these detachments according to the occupation zones. At that time, the 6th Army Group, and probably the 12th Army Group, would dissolve. The American zone would then reorganize into military districts, each under an army headquarters that would establish control over its area, complete disarmament of enemy forces, guard captured materiel, arrange repatriation of Allied prisoners
and displaced persons, and initiate military government. One problem with this approach lay in the transition from tactical boundaries to areas based on the old German regional borders. The First Army also needed more manpower to carry out its plans. Hodges and Kean shifted personnel from the G-1, supply, and adjutant general sections to the G-5 section, which through its military government center drew on replacement depots to form fifty provisional detachments. Still short, the First Army even used spare field artillery units for military government.

Even with the extensive planning and additional detachments, the G-5 section faced an enormous task as the First Army advanced into Germany. Fortunately, the army area east of the Rhine, mainly agricultural except for the Ruhr and the Leipzig region, could produce its own food with help from outside labor, and most industries, banks, roads, and utilities could resume operations fairly quickly. Even in the desolate Rhineland, the First Army found enough food to support the remaining population. With the influx of displaced persons, however, food became enough of a problem that the G-5 section turned to McNamara for supplies. A typhus epidemic in Cologne highlighted the limited medical assets of Gunn’s G-5 section, and under SHAPE orders, Rogers assumed responsibility for public health in the army area.

Nor was this the end of the section’s troubles. As early as mid-March, a SHAPE G-5 survey found that its theory of military government, based on tactical command responsibility rather than separate military government, was breaking down. The field armies could not govern such large areas within their arbitrary unit boundaries. Despite the efforts to form provisional units, the advance spread the carpet of detachments too thin, especially as it continued into the future Soviet zone.

Then there was the problem of denazification. Even in April 1945 it was clear that existing Allied policy, calling for a conqueror’s peace and elimination of Nazism, would be hard to carry out, especially as it faced the shortage of qualified non-Nazi officials, the military need to maintain order in rear areas, and the lack of comprehension of the nonfraternization policy among GIs who interacted daily with the populace. As events turned out, the First Army headquarters would not have much time to tackle these problems before it departed ETO USA in mid-May.

The rapid pace, vast spaces, and lack of manpower threatened to overwhelm personnel charged to oversee captured materiel. SHAPE had intended that COMZ handle the bulk of these stocks, but, since COMZ was not supposed to have an area in Germany, the armies received the mission by default. On 20 March the First Army headquarters called on its corps and divisions for information on the locations, general nature, and security of enemy supply dumps in their areas. To aid corps with the enormous quantities of enemy materiel falling into their hands, it expanded its subsections for captured materiel and arranged for Belgian troops, surplus artillery battalions, and infantry regiments not needed on the front line to augment guard details of the services and the Security Command. The First Army could also call on “T Forces”—special intelligence teams from ETO USA’s technical services and special groups—to
search for materials used for rockets and Germany’s nuclear program, although these teams, with their separate chain of command back to ETOSA, could be an irritant.\textsuperscript{71} Despite these steps, the number of overrun depots soon grew beyond even the First Army’s resources. During April its subordinate commands reported 1,246 enemy installations, and army teams could only tour these facilities on a priority basis.\textsuperscript{72}

Like other observers, the First Army headquarters was stunned when it overran the concentration camps. At Nordhausen, Buchenwald, and other sites, the First Army staff personnel saw firsthand the decaying corpses, pestilential conditions, and other features of what Dickson termed the “shocking depravity” of the concentration camps. The G–5 personnel from the First Army and lower echelons tried to alleviate the misery, locating or bringing up supplies, working with medics to treat the sick, and compelling German civilians to clean the compounds and bury the dead.\textsuperscript{73}

Compounds for Allied prisoners of war were characterized by only slightly better conditions. Near Limburg, the First Army found a camp of over 3,000 prisoners, mostly Russian, suffering from poor sanitation, disease, and malnourishment. The First Army headquarters had established procedures calling on divisions to notify their corps and army headquarters as soon as possible on the location and size of overrun prisoner camps. The corps headquarters would then dispatch a team provided by SHAEF to coordinate administration of the camps and supervise evacuation according to procedures laid out by the First Army headquarters. In practice, the task proved far too large for these small teams to handle, and the First Army headquarters had to divert spare combat units to help. In the case of prisoner compounds as well as concentration camps, the undermanned inspector general section gathered evidence of atrocities, sorted through caches of valuables stolen from inmates by the Nazis, and prepared lists of suspected war criminals with the help of an investigative team from the 12th Army Group. Under an ETOSA directive, the judge advocate general assumed the responsibility in mid-April for war crimes investigations.\textsuperscript{74}

Among the legacies that the fallen Reich left to the First Army, the plight of displaced persons, or “DPs,” was especially heart-rending. SHAEF directives for military government ordered field commands to take responsibility for the welfare of these unfortunate, mostly impressed laborers liberated by the Allied advance but lacking food or means of return to their homes. The dimensions of the DP crisis did not come as a total surprise. In SHAEF-sponsored discussions of the ECLIPSE plan on 19 March, it was noted that the care and feeding of DPs and Allied prisoners “may assume considerable proportions” and the First Army staff recommended that emergency supplies of food and clothing be made available from “imported” supplies for the DPs.\textsuperscript{75} The planners, however, underestimated the problem. Although the First Army dealt to a degree with DPs in the Rhineland, caring for them at a center near Aachen, the dam really broke in the second week of April, when the retreating Germans ran out of space to move their slave labor. Despite Allied “standfast” orders, the DPs wandered through the countryside, clogging important routes. The First Army coped by establishing barriers at the Rhine to restrict traffic, directing
corps and divisions to assemble DPs at collection points, and installing checkpoints in the army area to round up DPs and send them to the nearest town, or a DP camp if one existed nearby. From these assembly points, they moved to transit areas for registration, screening, medical exams, and disinfection and then proceeded on to the main camps.  

By May the First Army camps contained 281,000 DPs and refugees. Those from Western Europe usually wanted to go home, and the First Army facilitated that as much as possible, using captured trucks, while holding East Europeans until repatriation was arranged. The East Europeans provided a good source of labor, but they drew so heavily on the local resources and captured supplies that were supposed to be their only subsistence that McNamara estimated that he would not be able to feed them after 20 May. The Russians in particular presented a problem, since inter-Allied agreements, strictly interpreted, stipulated that Russian DPs would receive the same rations as American troops.  

Along with the DPs, the First Army had to handle the hordes of German prisoners inundating its lines in the war’s last weeks. Wright’s provost marshal section had anticipated the problem of mass surrenders in the February edition of the staff administrative instructions, but even with advance planning, the system was overwhelmed by sheer numbers. During April alone, the First Army took over 435,000 prisoners into its enclosures, which it stationed next to the army depot to enable the employment of ration trucks for evacuation. By the second week of April the flood reached such proportions that the First Army headquarters assigned antiaircraft battalions and fillers to guard duty and delegated responsibility for operating overrun German military hospitals to the German medical staff captured in the Ruhr. It also converted some corps cages into enclosures where prisoners could wait until their evacuation to ADSEC. Rations proved to be a major headache. Under SHAEF orders, ration issues to prisoners and DPs were supposed to be limited to local supplies and captured stocks, and SHAEF, aware of the relatively low level of troop rations toward the end of April, kept close watch on rations issued to prisoners. Thus German prisoners often went without food for days, causing severe hardship to those whose health was already poor. As with so many other problems associated with the chaos of a defeated Germany, the First Army headquarters only began to grapple with the problem of caring for German prisoners before its early departure from the theater.  

While several First Army sections struggled with the problem of caring for prisoners, the publicity and psychological warfare section had recovered from a bombing raid that killed its chief and a few reporters and guests during the Battle of the Bulge. Aided by an information control officer from the 12th Army Group staff, psychological warfare personnel sought, with mixed success, to help the denazification program and fill the void of information in the First Army rear by issuing newspapers in Aachen, Cologne, and other newly occupied areas; distributing posters; and using loudspeakers to announce occupation policies. While busy with psychological warfare, the section, during the drive to the Mulde-Elbe, divided media activities into a forward group with one of the corps and a rear contingent with the army command echelon.
Almost all reporters traveled with the corps, sending their copy by plane to the command echelon, from which the section forwarded it by teletype to London. The First Army press section did suffer an embarrassment when army censors blocked mention of the location of units at Remagen, only to see its Ninth Army counterpart release the story and penalize the First Army's press corps. The episode must have been especially mortifying to the First Army staff, which had just hosted White House press secretary Stephen Early as part of his efforts to find ways of loosening censorship and improving publicity of the Army's achievements. Still, the First Army reporters remained loyal enough that Bradley felt compelled to form his own press camp to counter what he viewed as a parochial outlook of the army-based media.

By mid-April speculation in the First Army press corps centered on when and where the First Army would contact the Soviets. On 21 April, while his troops mopped up the west bank of the Mulde and Elbe, Hodges contacted the 12th Army Group headquarters about the procedures for meeting the Soviet Red Army and, according to his aide, received only meek advice to "treat them nicely." Actually, SHAPE had been working on the problem for some time but had made little progress with the secretive Soviet high command. On the day after Hodges called the 12th Army Group headquarters, Bradley passed on SHAPE's agreement with the Soviets on recognition signals and a halt by the two forces at the point of contact, after which senior local commanders would work out the boundaries between their forces. At the First Army command post, the anticipation heightened as aircraft reported sightings of Soviet troops east of the Elbe, but Hodges remained nervous about a possible accidental clash with the Red Army. Unknown to Hodges, the Soviets had decided to stop at the Elbe. A Red Army request on 24 April that the First Army withdraw its bridgeheads over the Mulde left the intervening area as a no-man's land. In this area the next day, two patrols from the 69th Infantry Division contacted Soviet troops. Representatives of the two armies set up a meeting on 30 April at a nearby chateau, where Hodges presented his Soviet counterpart with a First Army flag and a jeep.

For Hodges and his staff, the rest of the war could only be anticlimactic. Pleased with Hodges' performance, Bradley briefly considered moving the First Army across the Third Army's rear for an offensive southeast into Czechoslovakia, cutting off the Alpine redoubt where many Allied intelligence officers, including Dickson, thought the Nazis would try to make their last stand. In the end, however, he decided that such a transfer would involve an overly extensive redeployment of supply facilities, and he gave the mission to Patton. He left to Hodges the task of holding the Mulde-Elbe line and taking over part of the Third Army's front to the south. On 16 April Hodges and Thorson went to the 12th Army Group headquarters to discuss the major troop movements involved. Under the resulting arrangements, the Third Army would receive the III Corps and most of the divisions from the Ruhr, the VIII Corps would return to the First Army, the XVIII Airborne Corps would return to SHAPE reserve, and the Fifteenth Army would take over much of the First Army's rear area east of the Rhine. With the transition from combat to occupation, the new army boundaries followed province lines.
For the next two weeks, the First Army headquarters shifted units, supervised suppression of remaining resistance, had its subordinates turn back refugees from the Soviet zone in accord with Allied policy, and speculated on its next mission. Eclipse plans called for the headquarters, upon contact with the Red Army, to be prepared to withdraw from the prospective Soviet zone and then occupy and govern Hesse and two other German provinces until relieved by other American armies. The headquarters would then, under this design, proceed to France and await orders for its redeployment. Elsewhere, the war moved to a conclusion. As April turned to May, the Third Army drove into Czechoslovakia and Austria, while the 6th Army Group advanced into the Bavarian Alps, searching for signs of the National Redoubt. To the north, the Ninth Army had also completed offensive operations, while Montgomery's 21 Army Group was driving toward the Baltic coast at Lübeck.

At the resort of Bad Wildungen, halfway between Marburg and Kassel, and then at the university city of Weimar, ninety-six miles east of Bad Wildungen and fifty miles southwest of Leipzig, the First Army headquarters reunited to focus on unfinished business. For Miller's G–I section, these last weeks before V–E Day were especially busy. With its planning and supervision in such areas as war crimes, detention of enemy civilians, nonfraternization, and disbandment of enemy forces, the G–I section was involved in many areas not in-
cluded in the prewar staff manual, and the line between G–1 and G–5 functions in these areas was not always clear. With the large number of division transfers, the G–1 section also faced a major challenge in keeping records in order. Fortunately, the replacement crisis that had bedeviled the section during the winter and early spring had passed, as converted specialists from COMZ and the Army Air Forces, including thirty-three provisional rifle platoons of black enlisted men assigned by ETOUSA to the First Army’s divisions, filled the gaps. Hodges and his staff kept close watch on the performance of the black platoons and were gratified at the excellent reports from the divisions. Perhaps because of the rise in available replacements, the G–1 section adopted a tougher policy on battlefield appointments, restricting them to combat units, except where a noncombat formation had lost officers to military government duties, or where an individual had clearly shown his capabilities under fire.

The G–1 section also modified its policy on officer reclassification. Until April the First Army had held to a policy that no officer who had shown a lack of leadership and efficiency be permitted a less hazardous assignment, but rather that he should be returned to the United States and dismissed from the service. By April, however, the G–1 section concluded that too many officers were returning to the United States for reasons other than reclassification, thereby reducing the stigma, and it advised that no officer be recommended for dismissal while he could still perform another useful service. With combat declining in frequency, the First Army headquarters believed that it could adopt the new policy without too much harm to morale.
Nevertheless, morale remained a major concern, as the end of the war in Europe left several combat units with time on their hands. As the First Army swept across Germany in the final drive, the G–I section noted a sharp increase in black marketeering, looting, larceny, AWOLs, murder, and rape. To cut down on black marketeering, the finance section carried out SHAEF policy by supervising the collection and conversion of Belgian and French francs into Allied military marks, the official exchange for all Allied troops. Such measures and stricter discipline, however, represented only part of the answer to maintaining morale. The new 12th Army Group awards policy, which removed limits on awards in favor of issuing percentages as a weekly guide, met with the approval of the G–I miscellaneous subsection. As combat decreased, the demand from units for movies and live shows increased, and the special service section also continued its program of rest centers and furloughs, substituting Belgian shows for the all too infrequent USO performances. It also instituted train service for troops with 72-hour passes to Paris. “Jeep shows,” three-to-eight-man mobile teams of entertainers who visited the front lines, had proved popular since their introduction in January.

In March the First Army morale officers began real planning for post-V–E Day activities. The new First Army athletic officer developed a design for an athletics school and program, but those plans became obsolete with the First Army’s rapid departure from the theater. To help deal with the nonfraternization policy, the First Army headquarters even requested that the Red Cross bring more women into the army area. As it became obvious that the First Army would need an extensive postwar morale program, the special service section finally began to obtain some of the additional personnel that it had needed for some time.

The increase in special service personnel was only part of the reorganization of the First Army staff in the spring of 1945. On 14 March the 12th Army Group had directed its armies to reorganize their staffs according to the new table of organization issued by the War Department in October 1944 and modified in January 1945. The new table authorized 50 more officers, 2 additional warrant officers, and 100 more enlisted men than the 1942 version. It eliminated the antiaircraft section and formed an air-ground coordination center to replace the old G–2 (Air) and G–3 (Air) subsections. Pending authority from the War Department to activate a new headquarters battery to command the army antiaircraft units, the 12th Army Group permitted the armies to retain temporarily their antiaircraft sections, and it also authorized additional spaces for civil affairs, war crimes investigations, and the photo interpretation section. By this means, the First Army headquarters managed to retain its antiaircraft section to the end of the war. The changes left army headquarters in the 12th Army Group with an authorized strength of 330 officers, 28 warrant officers, and 712 enlisted men, including the authorized augmentations, as the war came to a close. Even with the new tables, noted a postwar study, army headquarters in Europe always seemed to require more people, due to their multiple echelons and “the volume and variety of duties performed during combat and occupational operations ... [being] greater than had been anticipated initially.”
As April came to a close, the uncertainty over the next mission for the First Army headquarters finally lifted. On 26 April Hodges learned that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur had accepted Marshall’s offer of the First Army headquarters for the invasion of Japan. Exhilarated over the First Army’s spring triumphs and the linkup with the Soviets the day before, Hodges was pleased with the idea of going to the Pacific. His staff, when they heard the news a few days later, was more ambivalent. While many officers were proud of the chance to participate in the closing act in both theaters, most were exhausted after eleven months of nearly constant campaigning. Enthusiasm rose, however, when Hodges obtained a promise of leave in the United States prior to the staff’s departure for the Pacific. On 3 May the First Army headquarters canceled all furloughs, and, after receiving official orders the following day, the staff began to prepare for redeployment. Under the 12th Army Group headquarters’ orders, the V Corps joined the Third Army’s drive into Czechoslovakia, while most of the rest of the First Army went to the Ninth Army, which also inherited the problem of caring for the prisoners and DPs. Meanwhile, staff chiefs labored to persuade key personnel with enough overseas time for a discharge to stay with the First Army staff for one more campaign. On 7 May, eight days before the scheduled departure for the United States, Hodges received a pre-dawn call from Bradley, informing him of Germany’s surrender.

Hodges and his staff would remember with pride their final offensive, in which they were the “first to reach the Rhine River and cross it [and] the first to meet the Russians.” They liked to think the campaign showed they could handle mobile warfare as well as the more publicized Third Army, and they had some reason for this view, although the lack of real opposition after late March made the issue somewhat academic. Aided by the maturity of the theater logistical structure, the supply sections handled the crucial transportation problem with skill, improvising a pipeline across the Rhine and making maximum use of supply by air. On the whole, the conduct by the First Army headquarters of GRENADE and LUMBERJACK was masterly, and its method of river crossings, particularly the technique of crossing one corps over another’s bridges, most effective in outflanking opposition. Yet the First Army headquarters’ mastery of mobile warfare fell short in some areas, mainly due to the limitations of technology. The tactical echelon could maintain only a tenuous control through radio, and Hodges and Kean were slow to take measures to improve liaison and communications. Despite the best efforts of the supply sections, the First Army was running low of certain stocks by the end of April. The commander and staff had reacted quickly when fortune knocked at Remagen, but the ad hoc, inadequately coordinated response of a split First Army headquarters that had not planned sufficiently for such a windfall was mostly responsible for the chaos that cost Millikin his command. Despite the First Army headquarters’ many abilities and insistence that it could crack the whip just as effectively as Patton, Hodges and his staff clearly felt more comfortable with methodically prepared and controlled offensives than the fast-moving, largely instinctive nature of mobile warfare.
Notes


3 Sylvan Diary, 19, 22 Jan 45; AAR, First U.S. Army, for January 1945; Cir, First Army G–2 Estimate 64, 21 Jan 45. All G–2 Estimates cited in this study are in 101–2.15, G–2 Estimates, box 1956, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC. Bennett, ULTRA in the West, pp. 222–23; MacDonald, The Last Offensive, pp. 60, 63.


6 Sylvan Diary, 1 Feb 45.

7 Sylvan Diary, 1–2 Feb 45; Hansen Diary, 16 Feb 45; Cir, First Army G–2 Estimate 66, 2 Feb 45; Rpt, Rosengarten to Taylor, 21 May 45, sub: Report on ULTRA Intelligence at First U.S. Army; Memo, Hodges for First Army Chiefs of Sections, 31 Jan 45, AG 381 Preparations and Preparedness for War, box 182, First Army, Adj Gen Section, General Correspondence, 1940–1947, RG 338, WNRC; Blair, Ridgway’s Paratroopers, p. 429; Blumenson, ed., The Patton Papers, 2:633.


11 Sylvan Diary, 4–9 Feb 45; Rpt, V Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 374–80; MacDonald, The Last Offensive, pp. 78, 80–81; Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, pp. 601–03; Blair, Ridgway’s Paratroopers, p. 431.

12 Sylvan Diary, 10–23 Feb 45; Cir, First Army G–2 Estimate 67, 10 Feb 45, and Estimate 68, 16 Feb 45; Bennett, ULTRA in the West, pp. 236–37; Cir, Akers to Corps Commanders, 10 Feb 45, in 101–3.3 G–3 Journal file, G–3 1st Army, Feb 45, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Memos, Carter for Kean, 15 Feb 45, and Carter for Kean, 22 Feb 45, both in 101–3.3 G–3 Journal, First Army, 12–23 Feb 45, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; MS, Carter, Carter’s War, ch. 13, pp. 3–5; Ingersoll, Top Secret, p. 308; Hansen Diary, 11–13, 16–17, 23 Feb
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146; MacDonald, The Last Offensive, pp. 97, 185; Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, pp. 673-74,
689; Blair, Ridgway's Paratroopers, p. 436; Rpt, V Corps Operations in the ETO, pp. 385-88.
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45 Sylvan Diary, 25–26 Mar 45; Weigle, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, p. 672.


49 Rpt, First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, p. 5; Sylvan Diary, 31 Mar–4 Apr 45; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, pp. 209, 215; Cir, First Army G–2 Estimate 78, 5 Apr 45; Ninth Army, Conquer, p. 270; Cir, LOI, First Army, 5 Apr 45, 300.6 Letters of Instructions, box 62, First Army, Adj Gen Section, General Correspondence, 1940–1947, RG 338, WNRC; MacDonald, The Last Offensive, p. 362.


51 Cir, First Army G–2 Estimate 78, 5 Apr 45.


56 Eisenhower, “The Army Tactical Information Services,” pp. 35–36; LtR, Eisenhower to author, 4 May 95, DWH; Hansen Diary, 14 Feb 45; Gary B. Griffin, The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element of Effective Command (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute,


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61 Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 23 February–8 May 1945, 2:65, 3:45, 49, 54; AARs, First U.S. Army, for March and April 1945; McNamara, Quartermaster Activities, pp. 160–63; Rpts, 12th Army Group G–4, for April 1945; MFR, 10 Mar 45. Msgs, Moses to Crawford, 14 Mar 45; Moses to Plank, 30 Mar 45; and TWXs to army G–4s, 20–30 Mar 45. MFR, 5 Apr 45; Ross and Romanus, Operations in the War Against Germany, p. 435; Mayo, On Beachhead and Battlefront, p. 344.

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Sylvan Diary, 15, 24 Apr 45; AARs, First U.S. Army, for March, April, and May 1945; Cir, Senior to Separate Unit Commanders, 16 Mar 45, box 1, First Army, Reports and Messages: Ammunition #2 Through Correspondence, RG 338, WNRC; Rpt, U.S. Army, ETO, General Board, Organization and Functions of G–1 Sections in Army Groups and Armies, Study 9, pp. 12–13, 19–20.

“First To Reach the Rhine . . . First To Meet the Russians” 283


Sylvan Diary, 1 May 45; Ltrs, Eisenhower to Marshall, 26 Apr 45, and Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 May 45, both in Chandler, ed., Eisenhower Papers, 4:2647–48, 2667; Hansen Diary, 8 May 45; MS, Carter, Carter’s War, ch. 13, p. 49; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, p. 219; Interv, author with Wendt, 29 Apr 91, pp. 75–76.

Sylvan Diary, 3–7 May 45; Cir, LOI 22, 12th Army Group, 4 May 45, in Rpt, U.S. Army, 12th Army Group, Report of Operations, 5:143–46; MS, Carter, Carter’s War, ch. 13, pp. 49–50, ch. 14, pp. 1–4; AAR, First U.S. Army, for May 1945; McNamara, Quartermaster Activities, p. 168; Ninth Army, Conquer, pp. 332–34; MacDonald, The Last Offensive, p. 466; Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p. 554; Mayo, On Beachhead and Battlefront, p. 350.

Interv, Murray with Myers, 15 Apr 74, p. 18.
Conclusion

According to contemporary Army doctrine, the American field army of World War II was not only the “fundamental unit of strategic maneuver, . . . the unit which the theater commander or commander of the field forces uses as a basis for planning and executing strategic and tactical operations,” but also “the largest self-contained unit” and “a flexible combat force capable of independent operations.” Under the overall design of the theater or army group, the army engaged in long-term planning and provided general objectives to its corps, established boundaries, and allocated units, artillery, and other resources. It then supervised the corps as they fought the battles, shifting formations and reserves where necessary. The army also handled administration and provided the logistical link between the communications zone and the distribution points within the divisions. Finally, the army staff was responsible for coordination with the Army Air Forces and, when necessary, the Navy. In sum, the field army of World War II was expected to serve as a logistical, administrative, and, in modern terms, operational headquarters.

Any evaluation of an American army headquarters in World War II must consider the legacy of World War I and interwar doctrine. Aside from the too-distant Civil War, World War I provided the Army’s only real experience with army-level command, and the four months of combat prior to the armistice furnished little time in which to learn. Veterans of the American Expeditionary Forces would long recall the controversy over staff officers arbitrarily issuing commands, the chaotic communications, overly detailed and confusing orders, Pershing’s tough relief policy, and the dispute over boundaries near Sedan. Consequently, Army doctrine and the schools that future First Army commanders and staff officers attended during the 1920s and 1930s emphasized well-drawn boundaries, clear orders, and the sole authority of the commander. Yet the schools also blurred the concepts of command and control and taught command in such a way as to dilute the principle of the all-powerful commander. Army doctrine and schools also provided mixed messages on the role of the army headquarters. They stressed open warfare with an army echelon that approached operations from a broader perspective. At the same time, the emphasis on methodical planning, continuous fronts, simplicity, firepower and the central role of the artillery officer, a complex supply structure based on railroads, the principle of pushing forward sup-
plies, and, on occasion, centralized control was reminiscent of the slow pace of 1918.

Not surprisingly, the legacy of World War I in prewar doctrine, as well as the Army’s inexperience with higher-level command, hampered the First Army headquarters’ adjustment to a new war. The First Army commanders were only a few years removed from field grade rank, and the staff officers, if they could boast any background in staff work, drew their expertise either from the more tactically oriented corps headquarters or from rush courses at staff colleges. Thus, they often tended toward centralization and an overconcentration on tactics, sometimes micromanaging in orders and, in general, focusing too closely on details more properly the province of lower-level commanders. On the whole, the principle of the commander as sole authority proved sound, but the headquarters still faced the reality that the commander could not do everything. Even before the campaign proper began, Bradley found it necessary to delegate much of his authority over army units to special staff chiefs. Although the practice usually worked well for the First Army, it resulted in some anomalous situations, as in the case of the antiaircraft officer and the 49th Antiaircraft Brigade’s commander, and it occasionally created confusion in the command structure, notably during the Battle of the Bulge. One major fault of prewar doctrine lay in the inadequate information-gathering capabilities it gave the army commander. In particular, the First Army headquarters never devised an efficient liaison system similar to Montgomery’s PHANTOM system and Patton’s 6th Cavalry Group.

Certainly the limitations of military communications in the 1940s complicated the task of information gathering. Although the signal section and construction units of the army headquarters did a fine job under difficult circumstances, the commander and staff, both on D-Day and during the pursuit, were often unable to provide proper supervision to the corps simply because they did not possess adequate communications with them. During the pursuit, wire construction units lacked the manpower, equipment, and transportation to keep up with the pace, forcing the First Army headquarters to rely mostly on radio. Yet radio—susceptible to interference, overloading, delays in coding and decoding, and jamming and interception by enemy signals intelligence—hardly furnished a panacea. The situation improved only when the advance slowed and signal crews could lay wire to other echelons and take advantage of existing communications systems in urban areas.

In general though, the First Army’s organization and procedures functioned well, not surprising for an outfit led by veterans accustomed to working with each other in a reinforced corps in the Mediterranean theater. The army organization did not fully anticipate the need for truck companies, signal units, and civil affairs detachments or the popularity of the chemical mortar battalions, but it usually met the demands placed on it. With some relatively minor changes, the general and special staff organizations proved adaptable enough to the different challenges they encountered in northwest Europe. Admittedly, the First Army staff would probably have found useful a plans subsection within the G–3 section. The presence of such an agency might have enabled the First Army
commander and staff to focus less on the day-to-day details of operations and more on the army headquarters' long-range planning function, perhaps anticipating the problems posed by the bocage and the Roer dams. Bradley and Kean also decided not to include a separate transportation section within their special staff at a time when transportation was playing an increasingly critical role in operations. Nevertheless, the lack of a transportation section seemed to matter little, especially given the coordination within and between the general and special staffs.

Despite Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair’s earnest efforts to keep the Army’s various field headquarters as lean as possible, the First Army staff shared the usual tendency of organizations to grow beyond authorized strengths. To some degree, the headquarters’ penchant for detail created an unnecessarily great work load and demand for additional personnel, but almost all of the new sections responded to real requirements stemming from the increasing specialization and complexity of warfare, especially the need for closer air-ground coordination. Still, the cumulative effect of the expansion was a need for more men than the tables of organization for an army provided. ETOUSA only met the need in part, with the result that, despite exchanges of manpower within and between sections, the First Army staff agencies were often undermanned and their personnel overworked. In the end, some existing requirements, such as the need for a plans subsection or more liaison personnel, went unfulfilled.

Nor did the organizational strains from these changes stem only from manpower constraints. As agencies came into existence or reorganized, doctrinal confusion often followed, as occurred in the separation of special service functions from those of information and education. In the case of the publicity and psychological warfare section, the First Army headquarters combined two largely incompatible tasks at a time when other staffs in the theater were separating the two. Jurisdictional clashes also created turbulence within the staff. When the new armored officer encountered suspicion from the ordnance officer over whether the armored officer intended to encroach on the other’s domain, the potential dispute was settled quickly and amicably, largely because of the status of the armored officer as a distinguished tanker well known to the II Corps veterans on the staff. The place of the civil affairs section proved more difficult to resolve. Formed at the instigation of higher headquarters, the G–5 section, like the publicity and psychological warfare section and the special service section, was often viewed with condescension by more conventional personnel. It always seemed to lack enough personnel, sometimes drew heavily on the resources of the other sections, and also found itself in jurisdictional fights with the G–1 and ordnance sections at various times.

Most of the tensions that existed on the staff, however, resulted less from organization than from personality conflicts. Too much can be made of this friction, as the overall mutual confidence among most of the staff chiefs, bonds forged in the Mediterranean campaigns, cannot be overemphasized. The First Army staff would never have achieved half of what it did without the close ties among Dickson, Wilson, Akers, Carter, McNamara, Medaris, Patterson, Grant Williams, and other staff chiefs. Nevertheless, tensions did exist and if, as Myers
later remarked, personalities had a “tremendous effect” on the functioning of the First Army staff, then these tensions must have left a major impact. Between the hard-driving Tunisia veterans and those officers newly arrived from the United States existed a coolness, as exemplified by the strain between Thorson and several North African veterans, who resented his displacement of Hewitt as the G–3. Such feelings inevitably dissipated over time as the staff became more integrated and some of its more contentious members, notably O’Hare, moved on to other duties. In contrast, friction between the G–2 and G–3 sections intensified. Mostly a personality clash between the flamboyant Dickson and the dour Thorson, it contributed to an increasing lack of dialogue between the two sections and was largely responsible for the G–2’s declining stature within the army cabinet. The lack of dialogue between the G–2 and G–3 was especially damaging during the Battle of the Bulge.

As long as Omar Bradley commanded the First Army, these quarrels did not reach major proportions. Bradley’s stature with the II Corps veterans who had served with him in North Africa and Sicily and his calm but commanding presence, communicating assurance, served him well in keeping in line the numerous egos within the First Army headquarters. Modest and gregarious in manner, he communicated well with people. As the First Army commander, he liked to maintain personal contact with subordinate commanders through phone calls and frequent personal visits, and with his staff through large meetings where he could hear several different points of view and explain his intentions to a broad audience. His orders, beyond setting general objectives, almost invariably left his subordinates with considerable freedom of action. Yet, although generally a good delegator, he liked involving himself in the details of G–3 work, including some aspects that properly belonged to the corps. Behind the genial exterior lay a calm, tough professional. Careful, balanced, and organized, he demanded and received good work from his First Army staff. Whatever his alleged lack of originality as a battlefield commander, his frequent inability to concentrate his forces, and his interest in tactical details at the occasional expense of the larger picture, he knew how to run a headquarters.

Although Courtney Hodges was likewise a calm, diligent man of character, he lacked Bradley’s ability to impress his persona on his staff or his army. The retiring Hodges preferred to work through a small inner circle; to those outside that circle, he was a remote figure. Lacking much imagination, having little confidence in most of his corps commanders, and inclined by interest and background toward smaller-unit tactics, the methodical Hodges often encountered problems in maintaining the broader perspective of an army commander. When healthy, however, he could make a decision. He was at his best in the first month and a half of his command, when the First Army raced across France to the German border, conducting the large-scale flanking movements that trapped thousands of Germans at the Seine and in the Mons Pocket. His performance declined during the fall and winter, largely due to fatigue and illness. Increasingly tied to his command post, uninspired in his tactics, alternately distant and impatient with subordinates, he mishandled successive attacks on the West Wall and reacted slowly to the German counteroffensive. If not for consider-
ations of coalition politics and concerns for the impact his dismissal might have at a critical moment of the battle, he probably would have—and should have—been relieved during the Battle of the Bulge. By the time of the spring campaign, Hodges had recovered much of his energy, but, during what should have been his finest hour, he seemed irritable and tendentious, hardly the type of manner to inspire confidence in those around him.

Under such an unassertive commander, Kean became the dominant personality in the First Army headquarters. In many ways, the stocky infantryman typified the American chief of staff of World War II. Like Eisenhower’s Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith and MacArthur’s Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, Kean played the hatchet man, allowing his superior to remain serenely above the fray. Within his command post, officers either admired him, feared him, or hated him with a passion. Able, perceptive, and clear thinking, he was also a hard taskmaster, efficient, but with little of the human touch. Once Hodges assumed the command of the First Army, Kean often performed, in effect, as deputy commander but without the doctrinal authority a true deputy would have enjoyed. For a time during the Ardennes battle, when Hodges was practically incapacitated, Kean held the staff together, issuing in Hodges’ name the orders necessary to construct the critical north shoulder of the Bulge. He could do little, however, to ease the jitters that appear to have infected much of the headquarters in the midst of the German onslaught. In many ways, Kean was an ideal chief of staff, especially for a Bradley, but he lacked the calming influence that only a true commander could provide.

As custodians of one of the central functions of an army headquarters, the support sections of the First Army headquarters deserve much credit for their performance. Like other American logisticians in the theater, First Army supply personnel had to meet the demands of a highly complex mechanized force manned by troops accustomed to the American standard of living. While they could not claim immunity from blunders, they often demonstrated their resourcefulness in overcoming scarcities, whether through pooling transportation, improvising pipelines, using captured food and equipment, calling on airdrops of supplies, or capitalizing on local procurement. Although they could be prickly in their relations with other support echelons, they frequently showed perceptiveness and flexibility in their response to operational needs, notably in their timely response to the Ardennes counteroffensive. Under the capable, experienced Wilson, the First Army G-4 section quietly, but efficiently, coordinated a supply effort that reached gigantic proportions by V-E Day.

Unfortunately, the staff’s operations officers did not show the same imagination. They often performed well such complicated technical tasks as the massive troop shifts during the Battle of the Bulge and could be innovative, as in their river-crossing techniques during GRENADE. All too frequently, however, the planning and operations of the First Army headquarters tended toward conservatism, an excessive concern for flanks, piecemeal employment of armor, and an inability to concentrate available forces. Admittedly, doctrine, terrain, and the shortage of fresh divisions until early 1945 must be taken into account in any evaluation of the First Army’s operations. Such episodes as the bungled
attack on Schmidt and the ongoing effort to plow straight through the Hürtgen Forest, however, are hard to justify. At times, the First Army staff’s long-range planning was deficient, and corps boundaries, especially in the fall campaign and the Battle of the Bulge, were often uninspired and reflected a dismaying lack of knowledge of the ground. Although the staff’s careful attention to detail served it well on several occasions, it also created problems when it micromanaged or became too engrossed in lower-level tactics. The gulf between Thorson and much of the rest of his G-3 section, whose abilities he did not regard highly, certainly did not improve the situation.

Any evaluation of the G-2 section must begin with its controversial head. In many ways, Dickson was a fine intelligence officer, a dedicated, careful craftsman in an Army that valued his field all too lightly. A cautious man, he tended toward pessimism in his estimates of enemy capabilities and would occasionally list absent divisions and predict counterattacks that never took place, but his reputation as an alarmist seems exaggerated. That perception, however, stuck after his false warnings of a November offensive by the Germans, and this image, as well as a volatile personality and reputation in some quarters as a drinker, contributed to his low stature with Hodges. His strong prejudices—against the OSS, the 12th Army Group G-2, Thorson, and Kean, to name a few—further limited his value. Relying on intuition and his feel for the German mind, he could be quite perceptive of enemy intentions, though not as clairvoyant as he later claimed. While he failed to see the move of the 352d Infantry Division to Omaha Beach and the importance of the Roer dams, oversights he shared with several others, he spotted the German buildup during the late autumn of 1944, and he generally did well on the enemy order of battle, admittedly aided by ULTRA. In Normandy, ULTRA proved invaluable to the First Army headquarters, but after the breakout, its importance declined to the status of one of the many sources consulted by Dickson and his highly competent section. Among these other sources, Dickson was quick to see the value of aerial reconnaissance, and he worked closely with Hart’s artillery section and the IX Tactical Air Command to exploit this capability.

Dickson’s cooperation with the IX Tactical Air Command was only one of the many beneficial relationships that the First Army headquarters established with the other services during the campaign. Many of the difficulties that the headquarters encountered, such as misunderstandings, poor communications, ignorance of another service’s technical limitations, and the low priority placed on joint operations by the different services at different times would sound familiar to practitioners of joint operations from Nicas to Schwarzkopf. In its demands on the Navy and the Army Air Forces, tactical and strategic, the First Army headquarters could be unrealistic, as in its insistence on priority unloading of transports following D-Day and in its concept for the parallel approach by the Army Air Forces bombers preceding COBRA. The main factor that made the situation work was Bradley’s relationships with Kirk and Quesada, both of whom showed an ability to accommodate the Army’s needs. Although the Army Air Forces in particular preferred centralized control and careful allocation of support for ground operations, it came to accept a system under which lower
levels could bypass echelons to request immediate air support. Over time, the air and ground echelons also improved their procedures for supply by air and emergency airdrops, contributing immensely to the final drive across Germany. As in other wars, the services, for all their differences, made joint operations work—fortunately for the First Army, for without naval and air support, its achievements would have been impossible. (See Appendix I.)

Likewise, relations with allies proved manageable, despite the potential for crippling disagreements and tensions. Seeing themselves as straightforward field soldiers, the First Army staff officers looked down on politics, but they could not easily avoid the subject in a coalition war. During the effort to close the Falaise Pocket, the First Army headquarters faced outright insubordination from a French armored division eager to advance on Paris. Its irritation was only exacerbated by disputes with French authorities after the liberation of Paris. With the British, the First Army headquarters nourished a curious love-hate relationship, dating back among many veterans to the campaign in Tunisia when several British officers adopted a condescending attitude toward the inexperienced Americans. Cultural and philosophical differences and American anglophobia did not help ease relations. Throughout the campaign, one could hear grumbling at the First Army command post over its boundaries with the 21 Army Group and the apparent British inability to keep up with the American drive. Yet, when the First Army headquarters had to serve under the 21 Army Group headquarters, the arrangement worked well. In part, the good relations were due to Montgomery’s tact and forbearance, and, in part, because the First Army commander and staff, for all of their complaints about the field marshal’s caution, genuinely respected his professionalism.

In many ways, the First Army headquarters’ relations with the 21 Army Group commander and staff were better than those with the 12th Army Group headquarters. The First Army’s staff officers, especially the Tunisia campaign veterans, showed more respect for the 21 Army Group staff, which included many familiar faces from North Africa. In addition, Montgomery and his staff allowed the First Army headquarters considerable freedom to plan and carry out operations, although Montgomery, who possessed less confidence in Hodges than in Bradley, regularly bypassed Hodges and dealt directly with corps commanders during the Battle of the Bulge. In contrast, the First Army veterans saw the 12th Army Group staff as interlopers in assuming their role as the main American field headquarters on the Continent. According to Bedell Smith, some of the First Army staff officers did not hesitate to bypass their army group counterparts to deal directly with Bradley. If the U.S. Army had little experience with army-level headquarters, it had even less with army groups, and, in many areas, questions existed over the responsibilities of the 12th Army Group headquarters. Since that echelon’s major role lay in operations, the First Army supply chiefs had relatively little contact with their army group counterparts, except for the role of the army group supply chiefs in allocating tonnage. Still, for all its apparent disdain for the 12th Army Group staff and the lack of support from that echelon during the Battle of the Bulge, the First Army headquarters left no doubt of its wish to return to the jurisdiction of its former commander.
The First Army headquarters’ relations with the theater support echelons were even more ambivalent. The staff enjoyed a smooth working partnership with ADSEC and the 25th Regulating Station. With the theater chiefs, relations were often warm and characterized by mutual respect. For COMZ as a whole, however, the First Army headquarters, especially Hodges, Kean, Wilson, and the ordnance officer, Medaris, voiced much disdain. Some of the animus represented the usual rancor of combat zone soldiers for rear echelons, but it was aggravated by a theater organization that left COMZ and the field forces as separate entities, each responsible only to the theater commander. COMZ’s inability to give figures for available supplies, deliver supplies as asked, or give realistic estimates on when they would be available seriously hampered the First Army headquarters in its planning. The First Army headquarters’ irritation was only intensified when it heard rumors of rampant black marketeering and COMZ’s use of scarce transport to move to Paris. In fairness, the First Army headquarters allowed COMZ little time to establish a depot system in Normandy before the breakout. Then too, the First Army won few friends at COMZ or other echelons for hoarding and even outright thievery to build up its stocks. Such practices may have been understandable, given scarcities and the widespread occurrence of such chicanery, but they only confirmed the First Army headquarters image as a prima donna organization and did little to help the development of an efficient theater logistical structure.

With adjacent armies, the First Army headquarters exchanged liaison officers but naturally left most of the coordination of movements to the army group headquarters. Relations with Dempsey’s British Second Army headquarters, especially after Normandy, were cordial but distant, as the two forces, for the most part, moved independently of each other, conferring only periodically to sort out their boundary problems. Relations with the Ninth Army headquarters after its arrival on the First Army’s northern flank in October were much warmer. The friendship between Simpson and Hodges ensured a close cooperation that paid major dividends in the Battle of the Bulge, when the two headquarters worked out troop movements with an incredible degree of informality. With Patton’s Third Army headquarters, the relationship was more tempestuous if somewhat removed. Many on the First Army staff had served with Patton in Tunisia and, by and large, dismissed him as a glory-hunting adolescent, an impression that his exploits and the publicity surrounding them during the summer of 1944 only seemed to confirm. Then came the Bulge, when the First Army appeared to have been rescued by Patton. Not surprisingly, Hodges and his staff felt that they had a point to prove in the spring campaign.

In its supervision of the corps, the First Army headquarters evolved one type of relationship with the VII and XVIII Airborne Corps and another with its brother corps. Under the aggressive, magnetic Collins, the VII Corps became the favored son, receiving the finest divisions and the best terrain avenues. Through his enormous influence with both Bradley and Hodges, Collins revised COBRA to his own design, induced Hodges to continue the September offensive and drive into the Hürtgen Forest, and bypassed the First Army headquarters to arrange the link-up near Paderborn with the Ninth Army. Given his success, the First Army
commander and staff pretty much let the VII Corps headquarters do as it wished, seldom asking questions. Hodges kept closer watch over Ridgway's XVIII Airborne Corps, but his high regard for Ridgway, a fellow infantryman and Marshall protege, was such that he tended to blame any problems on the division commanders. The commanders of the III, V, and XIX Corps were not as fortunate. Hodges possessed little confidence in Millikin, Gerow, or Corlett, an attitude expressed in repeated requests for detailed reports, occasional micromanagement, and pressure to speed up their advances, despite the First Army commander's nearly complete absence from the front during the crucial months from September through February. When pressure did not produce the desired progress, dark hints of impending relief soon followed.

Perhaps no part of the First Army headquarters' story has been more controversial than its policy on reliefs. Bradley and Hodges have come under heavy fire from historians Russell Weigley, Daniel Bolger, and others who argue that the First Army commander and staff acted too quickly to fire corps and division commanders, thereby instilling overcaution in the remainder. The First Army commanders do appear to have been quicker than most to relieve subordinates who were not making desired progress, and the reliefs do seem to have had a chilling effect on at least some lower-level echelons in the conduct of operations. Nevertheless, many of the reliefs seem justified. General William E. DePuy and other veterans of the 90th Infantry Division later admitted that their unit, victim of two early reliefs, badly needed a shakeup. As for the reliefs of Corlett and Millikin, a good case can be made for either side, but most military analysts would agree that a commander should have subordinates in whom he has confidence, a quality absent in Hodges' relations with both generals. Quick reliefs were by no means uncommon in an Army that believed in the supreme importance of the commander's will and took as a model Pershing's wholesale reliefs in the Meuse-Argonne offensive during World War I. Whether the reliefs really improved unit performance is an issue that can be resolved only on a case-by-case basis.5

In the course of the campaign in France and Germany, the difficulty and variety of the operational conditions and challenges faced by the First Army headquarters compare with those of any other American army echelon in the war. For the massive amphibious operation on D-Day, the headquarters' methodical planning style was admirably suited, even if the staff placed too much faith in a super-complex priority system and neglected plans for the post-Neptune phase. Positional warfare in Normandy and along the German frontier rendered relatively easy the problem of control and communications, but the supply crisis also demanded improvisation. Mobile warfare did not come as naturally to the First Army headquarters. In the pursuit, it had to overcome the need to know and control every detail, allow subordinate echelons more discretion, and become used to making quick, instinctive decisions on the basis of incomplete information. The use of radio and liaison planes and the innovation of a tactical echelon helped, but the First Army headquarters faced a constant struggle to maintain the proper balance in the tactical echelon between the need for more people and the need for a small, mobile command post. The
Ardennes counteroffensive highlighted the headquarters’ strengths and weaknesses. It showed the staff’s resilience, its technical skills in moving troops, and the resourcefulness of its logistical organization, but it also showcased the inadequacies of the information-gathering system, the tensions within the general staff, and the lack of vigorous leadership from the commander.

Whatever problems the First Army and other army headquarters encountered, the Army, by and large, regarded experience as having confirmed its doctrine for army echelons. The First Army headquarters left Europe before the theater’s General Board began its analysis of lessons learned, but the board still drew heavily on the First Army’s extensive after action reports. In the years after the war, First Army staff chiefs published extensively on the work of their sections—Carter and Patterson writing lengthy reports, McNamara publishing his memoirs through the Quartermaster School, and Hart, Medaris, and Grant Williams producing articles in branch journals. When the Army’s new doctrinal manuals on army echelons and staff work appeared in the late 1940s, they elaborated on the oft sketchy form of the prewar large-unit manuals, stressing the need for an army commander to engage in long-range planning but altering little the basic role of the field army. The principle of the sole authority of the commander again received heavy emphasis. The use of technical channels by staff officers was limited to routine technical reports and “technical instructions not involving variation from command policies and directives.” Doctrine for such functions as forward and rear echelons and the role of a liaison officer showed little change. Despite the recommendations of the General Board, the table of organization that appeared in March 1947 provided only a bare bones headquarters structure, cutting civil affairs, the armored section, and photo interpretation but adding a transportation section and a light aviation section.

By 1947, of course, most of the First Army headquarters of World War II had moved on to other duties. One who did not, General Hodges, would remain the First Army commander until his retirement in 1949. His old friend and predecessor, General Bradley, served as Army chief of staff and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the turbulent years of defense unification and the Korean War. In Korea, Kean, the good staff officer, became a division commander, and he later commanded the Fifth Army prior to his retirement as a lieutenant general in 1954. Myers likewise reached three-star rank, serving as deputy chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in South Vietnam in the late 1950s. Dickson, still a colonel, retired in 1945 on physical disability. He devoted the rest of his life to his warehouse business and his argument that he had sounded the alarm in the Ardennes. His old nemesis, Thorson, stayed in the Army and became the inspector general of European Command. For many of the young special staff heads, their service with the First Army headquarters launched them to distinguished careers. Hart rose to lieutenant general and commander of the Second Army. McNamara served as Army quartermaster general and the first director of the Defense Supply Agency. Medaris enjoyed a high profile as director of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in the post-Sputnik years, while Carter was governor of the Panama Canal Zone. From the G–3 section, John L. Throckmorton
served as General Westmoreland’s deputy in Vietnam and led troops sent to quell the Detroit riots. And a lawyer in the G–5 section, J. Strom Thurmond, became a governor, senator, and presidential candidate.\(^\text{10}\)

On balance, the First Army emerges as a solid, competent—if not especially brilliant—headquarters. At the First Army command post, the U.S. Army’s European theater had its most seasoned high-level staff, much of which had served in the Army’s earliest actions in the theater. Proud of their status, the veterans of the First Army staff could be sensitive of their prerogatives, and echelons above, adjacent, and below often found the staff aloof and a bit touchy. The strength of the First Army headquarters lay in the technical expertise of the special staff, which, time and again, demonstrated flexibility and ingenuity in getting resources to the battlefield. The commanders and operators on the general staff seldom displayed the same originality in planning and in allocating those resources, although critiques of the First Army headquarters often underestimate the doctrinal constraints and the missions, terrain, and means given it by other echelons. Notwithstanding its quirks and occasional blunders, however, few staffs could match the First Army’s for diligence and conscientious attention to detail. That work paid dividends, in the success of D-Day, in the breakout from Normandy, in the envelopment to the Seine, in the repulse of the last great German counteroffensive on the Western Front, and in the seizure of the Remagen bridge and the final race across the German plain. Of all the American army headquarters in Europe, only the First Army’s served continuously from Omaha Beach to the Elbe in the final campaign to overthrow Hitler’s Germany.
Notes

2 Griffin, The Directed Telescope, p. 27.
4 Interv, Murray with Myers, 15 Apr 74, p. 7. For more on the cooperation of the “Forty Thieves,” as Bradley dubbed the First Army special staff chiefs, see Interv, Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, p. 18.
9 Rpt, U.S. Army, ETO, General Board, Report on the Organization of the Army Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Study 24, pp. 2–12; TOE 200–1T, Headquarters, Army (Field, ZI), War Department, 1 March 1947, Organizational History Branch, CMH.
Appendixes
# Appendix A

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**HEADQUARTERS, ARMY**

Designation: Headquarters, Army

**WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, July 1, 1942**

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**Remarks**

- Insert number of army.
- A representative will be at the forward echelon.
- General staff officers; others, branch invitation.
- Army surgeon.
- Dental.
- Executive officer, medical inspector, medical and surgical ininsular, army dental surgeon, army veterinarians.
- Ate.
- Assistant G-4 (automotive).
- Classification and assignment officer.
- Sanitary Corps.
- Hospitalization, evacuation, and WOlogical and medical officers.
- Assistant to medical inspector; ophthalmic and neuropsychiatric consultants.
- Assistant to medical inspector; ophthalmic and neuropsychiatric consultants.
- Medical intelligence, others, branch invitation.
- Postal officer.
- Personal liaison, medical supply.
- Statistical officers and assistants to other medical sections.
- Medical Administrative Corps.
- Assistants G-4 (automotive), general staff section; others clerical, general.
- Clerical, machine records, adjutant general's section.
- Fiscal, finance section; clerical, auditing and accounting, inspector general's section.
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[A. G. 320.2 (6-29-42).]  
**Official:**  
J. A. Ulloa,  
Major General.  
The Adjutant General.  

G. C. Marshall  
Chief of Staff.
Appendix B

FIRST U.S. ARMY
STAFF MEMORANDUM 24
18 MARCH 1944

COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL

1. In order to clarify the subject of “Command” insofar as it relates to the relationship between special staff section chiefs of this headquarters and the troops of their branch, the policy of the Commanding General is herewith set forth.

2. “Command” insofar as it pertains to the First Army can be defined in two categories:

   a. Complete command, which entails all the prerogatives of a Commander as described by Army Regulation 600-20. This may well be exemplified as that relationship which normally exists between a regimental or separate battalion commander and his subordinates.

   b. Operational control, which entails those prerogatives of a Commander delegated to an individual to enable him to direct, control, and coordinate the activities of a large number of units, and at the same time relieving him from the maximum of administrative responsibilities.

3. This operational control, as indicated in 2b above, is that authority which the Commanding General desires to delegate to the special staff section chiefs of this headquarters. Some of the more important responsibilities and limitations are as follows:

   a. Those functions which are delegated to special staff section chiefs to exercise over the troops of their branch are as follows:

      (1) Transfer of personnel between subordinate Army units to the extent that recommendations will be made to the Adjutant General for transfers of Officers of company grade and enlisted personnel, and to the G-1 for field grade Officers. These recommendations will be concurred in and orders issued automatically, except in unusual cases, when the matter of transfer may be placed before the Chief of Staff for decision.

      (2) Issuance direct to subordinate Army units in the name of the Army Commander of normal operating orders and instructions necessary to the accomplishment of the mission.
(3) Preparation, publication, and supervision of execution of technical training directives, memoranda, orders, and other similar publications of a technical nature which pertain to subordinate Army units, in the name of the Army Commander.

(4) The reallocation of supplies within subordinate Army units wherever necessary to accomplish the most satisfactory results.

(5) Remark or recommendation on efficiency reports and on recommendations for the promotion, decoration, and reclassification of personnel of subordinate Army units. For this purpose, all documents of this nature will be routed to G–1, who will note them and immediately circulate them to the special staff section concerned prior to general staff or command action.

(6) The issuance of necessary orders in combat to move Army service troops within the Army zone of operation wherever such moves are indicated to best accomplish the mission. All such moves will be coordinated with other interested sections of the headquarters.

4. All other elements of command will be retained by the Army Commander.

# Appendix C

## LOCATIONS OF FIRST ARMY COMMAND POSTS

### Locations of the Tactical Echelon

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<tr>
<td>Le Tilleul</td>
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<td>Domfront</td>
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<td>Couterne</td>
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### Locations of the Command Echelon

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<td>Jul 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haute Chemin (near Vouilly)</td>
<td>Jul 2</td>
<td>Aug 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canisy</td>
<td>Aug 2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Aug 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haleine</td>
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<td>Aug 27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blevy</td>
<td>Aug 27</td>
<td>Sep 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Versailles</td>
<td>Sep 2</td>
<td>Sep 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villequier-Aumont</td>
<td>Sep 6</td>
<td>Sep 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ham-sur-Heure</td>
<td>Sep 10</td>
<td>Sep 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les Communes (near Huy)</td>
<td>Sep 14</td>
<td>Sep 19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fays (near Verviers)</td>
<td>Sep 19</td>
<td>Oct 25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spa</td>
<td>Oct 25</td>
<td>Dec 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaudfontaine</td>
<td>Dec 18</td>
<td>Dec 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongres (absorbed Supply Echelon)</td>
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<td>Jan 18</td>
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<td>Spa</td>
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<td>Mar 9</td>
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### Locations of the Supply Echelon

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<td>Aug 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canisy</td>
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<td>Aug 13</td>
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<td>St. Pois</td>
<td>Aug 13</td>
<td>Aug 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couterne</td>
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<td>Aug 27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blevy</td>
<td>Aug 27</td>
<td>Sep 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Versailles</td>
<td>Sep 2</td>
<td>Sep 6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Sep 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ham-sur-Heure</td>
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<td>Sep 14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Les Communes (near Huy)</td>
<td>Sep 14</td>
<td>Sep 19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fays (near Verviers)</td>
<td>Sep 19</td>
<td>Oct 25</td>
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<td>Dec 18</td>
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<td>Micheroux</td>
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<td>Tongres</td>
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*Supply Echelon merger with Command Echelon

### Locations of the Rear Echelon

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<td>St. Lo</td>
<td>Aug 6</td>
<td>Aug 21</td>
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<td>Fourgeroulles du Plessis (SW of Teilleul)</td>
<td>Aug 21</td>
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<td>La Perray (near Rambouillet)</td>
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<td>Charleroi</td>
<td>Sep 12</td>
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<td>Soumagne</td>
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<td>Nov 30</td>
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<td>Chaudfontaine</td>
<td>Nov 30</td>
<td>Dec 21</td>
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<td>St. Trond</td>
<td>Dec 21</td>
<td>Feb 6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Chaudfontaine</td>
<td>Feb 6</td>
<td>Mar 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duren</td>
<td>Mar 20</td>
<td>May 2</td>
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<td>Weimar</td>
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*Rejoined Command Echelon

### Appendix D

**TROOP BUILDUP OVER THE NORMANDY BEACHES, 6–30 JUNE 1944**

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<th>Utah</th>
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<td>Actual</td>
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<tr>
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<td>26,492&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>21,238&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>D+24....</td>
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<sup>a</sup> Forces O and U
<sup>b</sup> Forces B or followup
<sup>c</sup> Preloaded buildup
<sup>d</sup> Includes 21,734 troops in preloaded buildup
Includes 3,581 planned arrivals at Cherbourg
Includes 5,284 planned arrivals at Cherbourg
*Data not readily available

## Appendix E

SUPPLY BUILDUP OVER THE NORMANDY BEACHES, 6–30 JUNE 1944

[In long tons]

<table>
<thead>
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<th>UTAH</th>
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*No record

### Appendix F

**VEHICLE BUILDUP OVER THE NORMANDY BEACHES, 6–30 JUNE 1944**

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*Forces O and U
*Forces B or followup
*Preloaded buildup
*Includes 3,242 vehicles in preloaded buildup
*Data not readily available

Appendix G

DIVISION BUILDUP, 6 JUNE-25 JULY 1944

<table>
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<th>Actual Arrival</th>
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<td>D Day 6 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Infantry Division</td>
<td>D Day</td>
<td>D Day 6 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Infantry Division</td>
<td>D Day</td>
<td>D Day 6 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Airborne Division*</td>
<td>D Day</td>
<td>D Day 6 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82d Airborne Division*</td>
<td>D Day</td>
<td>D Day 6 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Infantry Division</td>
<td>D+2</td>
<td>8 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th Infantry Division</td>
<td>D+2</td>
<td>8 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Armored Division</td>
<td>D+4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Infantry Division</td>
<td>D+7</td>
<td>13 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th Infantry Division</td>
<td>D+7</td>
<td>13 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79th Infantry Division</td>
<td>D+8</td>
<td>14 June</td>
</tr>
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<td>17 June</td>
</tr>
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<td>83d Infantry Division</td>
<td>D+24</td>
<td>30 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Infantry Division</td>
<td>D+29</td>
<td>5 July</td>
</tr>
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<td>35th Infantry Division</td>
<td>D+32</td>
<td>8 July</td>
</tr>
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<td>D+34</td>
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<td>D+36</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Armored Division</td>
<td>D+96</td>
<td>10 September</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Both airborne divisions had been withdrawn to the United Kingdom for refitting by 25 July.

Appendix H

TACTICAL TROOP MOVEMENTS, FIRST U.S. ARMY
17-26 DECEMBER 1944

From Memo, Lt Col William B. Kunzig, Assistant G-3, First Army, for Brig Gen Truman C. Thorson, G-3, First Army, 3 Jan 45, DWH. These figures do not include the movement of vehicles carrying supplies or the shifting of service units and installations.

17 December 1944
1st Inf Div
58th Armored FA Bn (105 How)
30th Inf Div
HQ & Btry B, 285th FA Obsn Bn
823d TD Bn (SP)
743d Tank Bn
531st AAA AW Bn (M)
7th Armored Div
285th FA Obsn Bn (- Btries A and B)
10th Armored Div
47th RCT
T Force, 12th Army Gp
99th Inf Bn
Total: 59,620 troops
9,868 vehicles

18 December 1944
58th Armored FA Bn (105 How)
Btry C, 563d AAA AW Bn (M)
143d AAA Gun Bn (M)
290th FA Obsn Bn (- Btry A)
755th FA Bn (155 How)
254th FA Bn (155 How)
82d Airborne Div
101st Airborne Div
705th TD Bn (SP)
Total: 28,107 troops
2,859 vehicles

19 December 1944
9th Inf Div (- 60th & 47th RCTs)
776th FA Bn (155 How)
CC B, 3d Armored Div
3d Armored Div (- CCS A & B)
991st FA Bn, 1 Btry (155 Gun SP)
2 Btries, 991st FA Bn (155 Gun SP)
Total: 17,241 troops
3,829 vehicles

20 December 1944
141st AAA Gun Bn (M)
788th AAA AW Bn (SP)
789th AAA AW Bn (SP)
Rcn Plt & Co B, 703d TD Bn (SP)
507th Engr L Pon Co
One RCT, 84th Inf Div
552d AAA AW Bn (M)
1st Bn, 551st Para Inf Regt
Total: 8,489 troops
1,135 vehicles

21 December 1944
84th Inf Div (- 1 RCT)
187th FA Bn (155 How)
CC A, 3d Armored Div
517th Para Inf Regt
CC R, 5th Armored Div
289th RCT, 75th Inf Div
2d Armored Div
290th RCT, 75th Inf Div
Total: 47,026 troops
8,501 vehicles

22 December 1944
509th Para Inf Bn
643d TD Bn
VII Corps HQ & Corps Troops
207th Engr C Bn
1106th Engr C Gp
237th Engr C Bn
238th Engr C Bn
994th Engr TB Co
291st RCT, 75th Inf Div
148th Engr C Bn
164th Engr C Bn
60th RCT, 9th Inf Div
Total: 23,220 troops
3,839 vehicles
### Appendixes

#### 23 December 1944
- VII Corps Troops
- 60th RCT
- 738th Tank Bn (M)(SP)(Mine
  - Exploder)
- Co B, 644th TD Bn (SP)
- 1110th Engr C Gp
- 87th Cml Bn (Mtz)
- 211th Gp, HQ
  
  Total: 11,852 troops
  2,102 vehicles

#### 24 December 1944
- VII Corps Troops
- 240th FA Bn (155 Gun)
- 628th TD Bn (SP) (- Co C)
- 5th Armored Div (- CC R)
- Co C, 628th TD Bn (SP)
- 76th FA Bn (105 How)
- 508th Engr L Pon Co
- 505th Engr L Pon Co
- 18th FA Bn (105 How)
  
  Total: 13,669 troops
  2,854 vehicles

#### 25 December 1944
- Btry A, 290th FA Obsn Bn
- CC B, 3d Armored Div
- 703d TD Bn (- Cos B and C)
- 51st Highland Div (Br)
- 179th FA Gp
- Co B, 86th Cml Bn
- Co A, 86th Cml Bn
  
  Total: 22,493 troops
  4,350 vehicles

#### 26 December 1944
- 259th FA Bn (4.5 Gun)
- 83d Inf Div
- 551st FA Bn (240 How)
- 141st AAA Gun Bn (M)
  
  Total: 18,193 troops
  2,672 vehicles

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**Legend**

- AAA: Anti-aircraft Artillery
- AW: Automatic Weapons
- Bn: Battalion
- Br: British
- Btry: Battery
- C: Combat
- CC: Combat Command
- Cml: Chemical
- Co: Company
- Div: Division
- Engr: Engineer
- FA: Field Artillery
- Gp: Group
- How: Howitzer
- HQ: Headquarters
- Inf: Infantry
- L: Light
- M: Mobile
- Mtz: Motorized
- Obsn: Observation
- Para: Parachute
- Plat: Platoon
- Pon: Ponton
- Ren: Reconnaissance
- RCT: Regimental Combat Team
- Regt: Regiment
- SP: Self-Propelled
- TB: Treadway Bridge
- TD: Tank Destroyer
## Appendix I

IX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND'S SUPPORT OF THE FIRST ARMY
6 JUNE 1944-8 MAY 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft (in air)</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft (on ground)</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
<td>1,779</td>
<td>691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored vehicles</td>
<td>2,641</td>
<td>1,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor transport</td>
<td>19,716</td>
<td>10,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse-drawn vehicles</td>
<td>2,576</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumps</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop concentrations</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barges</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad cars</td>
<td>15,298</td>
<td>15,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad cuts</td>
<td>3,291</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bibliographical Note

Undoubtedly, one of the primary reasons for the small number of serious historical studies on the organization and operation of military field headquarters is the lack of documentation on their activities. This statement might elicit an incredulous response from those familiar with the enormous amounts of paperwork generated by modern staffs. Nevertheless, while existing records may contain reports, intelligence, and other information entering the command post and the orders and policy memorandums emanating from it, the interactions within the command post—the arguments in meetings, the conversations over telephones, the discussions across desks—all too often are lost to the historian. As Russell Weigley has pointed out, developments in transportation and communication have made it much easier for principals to talk over the telephone or travel by car or plane for a face-to-face conference, often without leaving any record of their conversation. The problem of documenting the decision-making process is all the more critical for historians, since command in World War II was much less personal and influences on decisions much more diffuse than had been the case in earlier wars.

Fortunately, even though it was usually difficult many years after the fact to pinpoint the specific steps and considerations leading to an action within the First Army headquarters, the record contained much to illumine the way in which that organization conducted its business. The headquarters reports and diaries were essential. Although they contained sizable gaps, headquarters records provided some pieces to the puzzle. Personal papers of participants often included memorandums, letters, and other revealing materials. Despite the biases of the authors and the effect on memory of the passage of time, memoirs were among the most fruitful sources. Oral histories lacked reliability on specifics but supplied an overall picture and mood absent from the documents. Official Army publications provided the doctrine on which the headquarters based its organization and procedures. Finally, unpublished manuscripts, official histories, dissertations, and other secondary sources furnished essential background for the story.

Bibliographies

The most helpful of the specialized bibliographies consulted for this work was Gary L. Bounds, Larger Units: Theater Army–Army Group–Field Army, Combat Studies Institute Historiographical Bibliography 4 (Fort Leavenworth,


Also examined were indexes of *Military Affairs, National Guardsman, Ordnance*, and *Quartermaster Review* from 1945 to the present.

**Military Records**

**National Archives and Records Administration**

Since research for this volume was conducted, almost all of the World War II records at the National Archives and Records Administration have been moved from the National Archives' main branch in Washington, D.C., and the Washington National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland, to the new Archives II branch in College Park, Maryland. When the author researched this study, the records were in Record Groups (RG) 407 (Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1917–) and 338 (Records of United States Army Commands, 1942–). An index was available to guide the researcher through the documents in both record groups. RG 407 contained the monthly after action reports and drafts of final reports in 101–0.3, some planning documents for Neptune in 101–0.8, and a handful of conference minutes in 101–0.5. The G–1 records in RG 407 contained plans for Neptune and Overlord, including arrangements for air support, in 101–1.5; staff rosters in 101–1.8; administrative SOPs, including headquarters security, in 101–1.15; casualty figures in 101–1.16; and buildup tables in 101–1.17. The G–2 records included the journals and files in 101–2.2
and 101–2.3 and the G–2 estimates in 101–2.15. In the G–3 records were journals and files in 101–3.2 and 101–3.3; some plans, particularly for the earlier period, in 101–3.5; field orders in 101–3.9 and letters of instructions in 101–3.11; and a valuable memorandum file in 101–3.22. The G–4 files contained periodic reports in 101–4.1 and journals and supporting material in 101–4.2 and 101–4.3. Among the special staff section reports in RG 407, reports of the artillery section appeared in 101–16.0; reports and notes of the engineer section, including a report of the Rhine River crossing, in 101–20.0; quartermaster reports in 101–30.0; medical reports in 101–26.0; ordnance reports in 101–27.0; and signal reports in 101–31.0.

In RG 338 were several files not incorporated into RG 407. The enormous First Army adjutant general decimal file can be searched using the War Department decimal system. Of special interest were the 300.6 file, containing letters of instructions not in RG 407; the 310 records of SOPs; the 320.3/415 folder regarding headquarters reorganization; the 353 training file; and the 381 file, containing more plans documents. In the G–3 files were journal files for the winter and spring of 1945, as well as memorandums on ammunition allocation, planning papers for Neptune and Eclipse, minutes of conferences in April 1945, and a lengthy report of observations of the Fifth Army headquarters. The two boxes of signal section files contained that section’s correspondence and a host of other material, while the nine boxes of quartermaster correspondence included records on everything from graves registration to local procurement.

This work drew on several other collections at the National Archives. In the 12th Army Group records in RG 331 (Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II), now located at Archives II, the 320.2 and 320.3 decimal files of the administrative branch, adjutant general section, provided valuable data on headquarters organization. In the records of the SHAEF G–5, Information Branch, Historical Section (RG 331), the 17.11 Historical Reports in the numeric subject operations file contributed several valuable First Army reports on G–5 activities during the campaign. Within RG 332 (Records of U.S. Theaters of War, World War II), the administrative file of ETOUSA’s Historical Division had background material on the origins of the First Army headquarters, while the miscellaneous list series held several interesting items on First Army operations and logistics in the spring of 1945. For the story of the First Army headquarters during the Battle of the Bulge, the records of the 7th Armored Division, 607–3 and 607–3.2, as well as the combat interviews in folders 286–287, both in RG 407, were helpful. Also moved to Archives II, the file, SRH–023, pt. 1, in RG 457 (Records of the National Security Agency), in which the First Army Ultra report was located, provided Colonel Rosengarten’s important report. At the main branch of the National Archives in downtown Washington, the author viewed the comments on the First Army versus IV Corps maneuvers in November 1941, located in GHQ General Correspondence, 1940–42, 354.2 (First Army), RG 337 (Records of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces), and the Dickman Board reports in box 2199 of RG 120 (Records of the American Expeditionary Forces,
World War I). These records, presumably, remain at the main branch.

U.S. Army Center of Military History

In the archives and library of the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) in Washington, D.C., unpublished unit reports and histories were the most important sources of information on the story of the First Army headquarters. Especially indispensable was the First U.S. Army report of operations, fifteen large, blue-bound volumes prepared by the First Army staff in three installments over the course of the campaign. Each installment includes the main body of the report, emphasizing operations and lessons learned, and annexes for most of the general and special staff sections. The first, in seven volumes, covers the period from 20 October 1943 to 1 August 1944 and includes the First Army's NEPTUNE plan. The second, in four volumes, continues the story from 1 August 1944 to 22 February 1945; the third, in three volumes, goes on to V-E Day. These reports are often available at military installation libraries as well as at CMH.

One of the most valuable features of this report is the extensive graphics coverage of the campaign. The NEPTUNE plan annex contains troop lists, buildup schedules, allocation of ships and craft, and a headquarters planning schedule for the invasion. The staff section annexes also provide a plethora of pertinent graphs and charts, including those on casualties, replacement specialties, battlefield appointments, and awards and decorations in the G-1 annexes; figures on transportation, losses of equipment at the Battle of the Bulge, and displaced persons in the G-4 annexes; tables on the effectiveness of First Army antiaircraft fire in the antiaircraft annexes; charts on the number of operative tanks and tank losses for the various divisions in the armored annexes; statistics on road construction and a list of bridges across the Rhine in the engineer annexes; radio net diagrams, including one that shows the communications nets among headquarters ships on D-Day, in the signal annexes; figures on the flow of prisoners of war in the provost marshal annexes; and in the medical annexes a vast array of charts, covering admission to army hospitals by week, type of wound, or disease, and the incidence of neuropsychiatric and venereal disease casualties.

The final volume of the report is the essential First Army Combat Operations Data. It provides a compendium of information on the First Army's operations and on the organization and activities of the headquarters. Most of its statistical tables—dealing with such subjects as corps frontages, artillery expenditures, and air support—cover the entire campaign rather than the individual phases. The volume also has several charts showing the organization of the different First Army staff sections at the end of the war, and it supplies other charts showing coordination and other standard operating procedures within the headquarters.

The CMH library and archives contain other information of interest to the researcher and instructor. This includes the fourteen-volume 12th Army Group report of operations, the administrative history of the 21 Army Group, the provisional engineer special brigade group's report of NEPTUNE, the V Corps report of operations in ETUSA, the nine-volume report of the Fifth Army's
operations in North Africa and Italy, the Seventh Army’s report of operations in the invasion of Sicily, and the Third Army’s two-volume after action report of the campaign in northwest Europe. The report of the provisional engineer special brigade group, in particular, contains plentiful graphic material on Neptune, including a helpful chart showing functions and communications links of agencies handling the arrival, allocation, and berthing of ships.

Of special importance among CMH’s collections were the reports of ETOUSA’s General Board, which met after the war to evaluate the strategy, tactics, and administration employed by American forces in the theater. These studies contain considerable background data as well as organizational and other charts collected as part of the board’s work. Essential for this project was Study 24, Report on the Organization of the Army Headquarters and Headquarters Company. Other significant studies for this work included those cited below.

1. Strategy of the Campaign in Western Europe, 1944-1945
9. Organization and Functions of G-1 Sections in Army Groups and Armies
18. The Army Tactical Information Service
22. Control of Troops Build-up in Cross-Channel Amphibious Operation
25. Organization, Functions, and Operations of G-3 Sections in Theater Headquarters, Army Groups, Armies, Corps, and Divisions
26. Study of Supply and Evacuation by Air
29. Study of Administrative Functions of the Army Group Headquarters
58. Ammunition Supply for Field Artillery
113. Special Services Organization
129. Mounting the Operation OVERLORD
131. Psychological Warfare in the European Theater of Operations

The CMH archives and library contained several other unpublished manuscripts and documents pertaining to the First Army and its operations. Of these, the unpublished manuscripts, prepared by the CMH staff to support the official histories of World War II, were especially revealing. The archives contained several by Royce L. Thompson, including those sources cited below.

Air Supply to Isolated Units, Ardennes Campaign, 16 December 1944–27 January 1945. 1951.
American Intelligence on the German Counteroffensive, 1 November–15 December 1944. 2 vols. 1949.
Overrunning of Installations, the Ardennes Campaign. 1953.

In the CMH library, research revealed an unpublished manuscript on the history of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, 1881–1963; a study by the U.S. Army Armored School, Research and Evaluation Division, on the Remagen bridgehead, 7–17 March 1945; and several unpublished Air Force manuscripts, including those cited below.


In the author’s files was Timothy K. Nenninger’s unpublished manuscript on John J. Pershing and command in the American Expeditionary Forces, 1917–1918. Also valuable for the World War I period was Joseph W. A. Whitehorne’s unpublished manuscript on the inspectors general of the U.S. Army, 1900–1939 (1993); and two contemporary accounts of staff functions by AEF staff officers: Avery D. Andrews, A Brief Summary of the Organization and Operation of First Section (G–1), General Staff; and George Van Horn Moseley, A Brief Summary of the Organization and Operation of Fourth Section (G–4), General Staff. Among the documentation for Edgar F. Raines, Jr.’s forthcoming work on Army aviation were a roster and a lecture on First Army organization from the papers of Col. Delbert L. Bristol, the artillery air officer on the First Army staff.

Given the numerous gaps in the record, oral histories often proved the most enlightening sources on the inner workings of the First Army headquarters. The author conducted several interviews, corresponded with First Army veterans as part of the manuscript review process, and obtained access to interview tapes and transcripts. Although time constraints did not permit a comprehensive survey of First Army veterans, the author did interview, by phone or in person, Dempsey E. Allphin, William A. Carter, Edward M. Dannemiller, Arthur Garson, Peter C. Hains III, Chester B. Hansen, William B. Kunzig, John Ray, Roger Ray, J. Strom Thurmond, and Walter W. Wendt. He also interviewed William C. Westmoreland regarding Millikin’s relief at Remagen. As a result of the review process, the author obtained valuable comments, by letter or cassette tape, from Dempsey E. Allphin; Robert M. Blanchard, Jr.; George W. Crawford; Edward M. Dannemiller; Peter C. Hains; Fred W. Jacks; William B. Kunzig; Miller O. Perry; Roger Ray; and Robert A. Riesman. In addition, G. Patrick Murray generously furnished untranscribed tapes and notes from his interviews with associates of Hodges not included in the Courtney Hodges Oral History Project at MHI. These included taped interviews with Benjamin A. Dickson, Samuel L. Myers, and Adolph G. Rosengarten, Jr., which CMH later transcribed, and notes of conversations with William B. Kean, Nelson M. Lynde, Jr., and William R. Silvey. Also significant was an October 1966 interview of Field Marshal Montgomery by John S. D. Eisenhower as part of the latter’s research for *The Bitter Woods*. This proved a valuable source for the discussion

U.S. Army Military History Institute

The archives of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, contained several collections of personal papers essential for this project. Foremost among these papers were the headquarters diaries prepared by the aides to the two commanding generals, Lt. Col. Chester B. Hansen and Maj. William C. Sylvan. Most of the World War II papers of General of the Army Omar N. Bradley were located at MHI. A thorough index helped the author through the Bradley Papers. In the archives too, the author found background files to Forrest C. Pogue’s The Supreme Command. Other collections pertaining to the First Army headquarters included the Clay Blair and Charles B. MacDonald collections of research materials. Pogue’s interview with Edwin L. Sibert was located in the MacDonald Papers. The diary and personal papers of Raymond G. Moses and the interwar files of the Army War College, which contained extensive lecture notes and course materials, also appeared in the MHI archives.

The MHI archives also held one of the largest collections of oral histories on American military history in the country. The Pogue interviews conducted as part of Pogue’s research for The Supreme Command have long provided a critical source of information for World War II researchers. Especially useful for this study were Pogue’s interviews with David Belech; Charles H. Bonesteel III; Omar N. Bradley; Robert W. Crawford; J. O. Curtis; Miles Dempsey; Benjamin A. Dickson; Courtney H. Hodges; Albert W. Kenner; Alan G. Kirk; Adolph G. Rosengarten, Jr.; Walter Bedell Smith; Kenneth W. D. Strong; and E. T. Williams. The collections at MHI also included the Courtney H. Hodges Oral History Project, consisting of interviews conducted as part of G. Patrick Murray’s research for a biography of Hodges. Although Murray never finished his biography, the project, with interviews of J. Lawton Collins, Charles E. Hart, Hodges family members, Nelson M. Lynde, and Charles G. Patterson, is essential for any serious research on Hodges and the First Army. Also indispensable was the Senior Officers Debriefing Program (later known as the Senior Officers Oral History Program), which are interviews of leading Army figures by students at the Army War College. For the First Army project, the interviews consulted were those with Charles H. Bonesteel III, Bruce C. Clarke, J. Lawton Collins, George I. Forsythe, Barksdale Hamlett, Robert A. Hewitt, William M. Hoge, Williston B. Palmer, Elwood R. Quesada, and John L. Throckmorton. In addition, the George
H. Decker and Clyde D. Eddleman interviews provided a basis for comparison with another American army headquarters staff.

**Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library**

The Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, contained numerous collections of personal papers of great value to the World War II scholar. While not as extensive as the Bradley Papers, the Courtney H. Hodges Papers provided revealing information on Hodges’ background and tenure as commander of the First Army. Also valuable for this study were the papers of Ray W. Barker, Harold R. Bull, J. Lawton Collins, Elwood R. Quesada, and Henry B. Sayler. The library also included a collection of papers from the First Army headquarters, many of which were also at the National Archives.

During the 1970s, the Eisenhower Library amassed its own collection of oral histories pertaining to World War II. Conducted by Maclyn P. Burg, these included several of significance to the scholar of First Army operations, most notably those of John W. Leonard, Elwood R. Quesada, William H. Simpson, and Roscoe B. Woodruff. Thomas F. Soapes interviewed Henry J. Matchett. A separate interview with Quesada by John L. Luter, part of Columbia University’s oral history collection, was also among the Eisenhower Library’s interviews.

**Other Document Repositories**

Several other repositories contained materials that proved invaluable for this project. The Special Collections Branch of the U.S. Military Academy Library held a substantial number of Bradley’s World War II papers that were not at Carlisle, and it also had the Benjamin A. Dickson Papers, which included an often idiosyncratic but valuable memoir by the First Army G–2 officer. The history office of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Alexandria, Virginia, had the memoirs of William A. Carter, Jr., the First Army engineer, as well as Employment and Staff Procedures of Engineers with Division, Corps, and Army, a doctrinal statement produced by Carter’s engineer section after the war. At the Library of Congress, the John Toland Papers contained interview notes for his book on the Battle of the Bulge. The archives of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, held materials on field army doctrine from interwar courses.

**Published Document Collections**

Memoirs and Firsthand Accounts

Given the shortage of thorough studies of the development of field headquarters in the U.S. Army, the background research for this analysis rested more than usual on memoirs. The most important for the pre–World War II period are cited below.

Bullard, Robert L. *Personalities and Reminiscences of the War*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1925. (See pages 283–303 for information on the Second U.S. Army.)


Humphreys, Andrew A. *The Virginia Campaign of ’64 and ’65*. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1883.


Of the published memoirs for World War II, Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier’s Story* (New York: Holt, 1951), was by far the most helpful for the First Army. The manuscript was ghostwritten by Bradley’s aide, Colonel Hansen, and was largely based on the Hansen diaries, which the author found at MHI. By contrast, Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General’s Life* (New York: Simon and


Two valuable unit histories by veterans were John Colby, *War From the Ground Up: The 90th Division in World War II* (Austin, Tex.: Nortex Press, 1991), and Donald E. Houston, *Hell on Wheels: The 2d Armored Division* (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1977).

Several First Army veterans wrote accounts in professional journals of their experiences with the First Army headquarters and First Army operations. These included those cited below.


Williams, Grant A. “First Army’s ETO Signal Operations.” *Signals* 2 (March–April 1948): 5–11.


**Official Publications**

The development of American doctrine on field armies has been traced in the first chapter. The relevant manuals can generally be obtained through either the CMH or MHI libraries. Many of these manuals provide charts showing doctrinal organization and procedures, such as the diagram of command and staff procedure in War Department Field Manual (FM) 101–5, *Staff Officers Field Manual: The Staff and Combat Orders* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940). Some of the most significant manuals on this subject include those cited below.

Technical manuals provided background material on relevant specialties. The most significant manuals used for this study are those cited below.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FM</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Edition</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4–100</td>
<td><em>Organization and Tactics of Antiaircraft Artillery</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government Printing Office</td>
<td>1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–5</td>
<td><em>Engineer Field Manual: Engineer Troops</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government Printing Office</td>
<td>1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–6</td>
<td><em>Engineer Field Manual: Operations of Engineer Field Units</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government Printing Office</td>
<td>1943</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In a study of an Army organization, tables of organization (TOs) are central. At the Center of Military History, TO 200–1, Headquarters, Army, War Department, 1 July 1942; TO 202–W, Army Headquarters, Field Army, War Department, 1 July 1929; and TO 202–1–W, Army Headquarters, Field Army (Initial Organization), War Department, 1 October 1929, were located in the Organizational History Branch. TO 200–1, Headquarters, Field Army, War Department, 1 January 1941, was located in the archives of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, Virginia.

Several other official publications contributed to this study. In the CMH library, War Department, General Orders and Bulletins, 1920 (Washington, D.C.: War Department, 1921), had material on the National Defense Act. Also there were U.S. Army, Army War College, Notes on Liaison in Modern Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917); U.S. Army, First U.S. Army, Report of the First Army, American Expeditionary Forces: Organization and Operations (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: General Service Schools Press, 1923), an invaluable source on the First Army headquarters in World War I; U.S. Army, General Service Schools, School of the Line, General Tactical Functions of Larger Units (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: General Service

During the years following World War II, the U.S. Army and other services published official histories of their role in that conflict. Prepared by professional historians, these studies have been an essential starting point for scholars of that conflict. The U.S. Army in World War II series, the so-called Green Books, contains a considerable amount of material on American army headquarters in combat, both in the operational and the technical volumes. Much of the information contained in this work but not cited in the notes came from these volumes. For the discussion of operations in North Africa and Sicily, see the volumes from the subseries on the Mediterranean Theater of Operations cited below.


In the subseries on the European Theater of Operations and the Special Studies subseries, the volumes used for this study included those cited below.


Coles, Harry L., and Weinberg, Albert K. *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Gov-
Among the Technical Services volumes of the Army series, the most helpful are cited below.


The background files of the U.S. Army in World War II series varied. Some authors retired a large body of records to the National Archives, while the retired documentation from others amounted to little beyond old manuscript drafts. Unfortunately, most of the volumes in the subseries on the European theater fell into the latter category, but these files still contained valuable items. They can be found in RG 319 at Archives II in College Park, Maryland.


Some of the most helpful official histories for this project came from the Combat Studies Institute at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Published as part of CSI’s ongoing mission to conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the doctrinal concerns of the Army and to integrate historical materials into the Army’s educational system, CSI publications examine a variety of subjects. For this study, Robert H. Berlin, *U.S. Army World War II Corps Commanders: A Composite Biography* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: CSI, 1989); Michael D. Doubler, *Busting the Bocage: American Combined Arms Operations in France, 6 June–31 July 1944* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: CSI, 1988); and Gary B. Griffin, *The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element of Effective Command* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: CSI, 1981), were especially valuable.
Dissertations and Theses

Although army-level headquarters organization and doctrine has not generally been a fruitful field for dissertations any more than for published sources, some dissertations and theses did shed light on the subject. For the development of doctrine prior to Pearl Harbor, see those cited below.


Other Secondary Sources

When the author began his research, the secondary literature on the development of army-level doctrine in the U.S. Army was rather sparse. Listed below are the main secondary works consulted on this subject for the period prior to World War II.


Bibliographical Note


For the discussion on the II Corps headquarters in North Africa and Sicily, consult the secondary works cited below for material not mentioned in the notes.


For the campaign in northwest Europe, sources of material not mentioned in the notes include those cited below.


Bibliographical Note

Other sources for this study included those cited below.


Military Map Symbols

Military Units—Identification

- Airborne Infantry
- Armor
- Infantry

Size Symbols

- Division
- Corps
- Army
- Army Group
- Communications Zone

Examples

- Boundary between 21 and 12th Army Groups
- Command Post, First Army
- II Parachute Corps
- Canadian 3d Infantry Division
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