Battlefield Atlas of Price’s Missouri Expedition of 1864

By
Charles D. Collins, Jr.

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Foreword

The genesis for the publication of *Battlefield Atlas of Price’s Missouri Expedition of 1864* goes back to 1985. Dr. Jerold E. Brown first developed the Battle of Westport as a staff ride for the Combat Studies Institute’s (CSI) curriculum at the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The study of the Battle of Westport, Missouri, provided the college with the opportunity to visit a nearby Civil War battlefield. Dr. Brown also used the Westport staff ride as a “train the trainer” exercise in what later became the Military History Instruction Course (MHIC) to teach staff ride methodology. Subsequent CSI instructors expanded Dr. Brown’s original work into a full-length staff ride. Most notable were Dr. Curtis S. King and Mr. Gary W. Linhart, both CSI Historians. They formalized the instructor notes into a standardized staff ride walk book (instructor guide) and widened the scope of both the preliminary study and the field study portions. The new preliminary study provided an overview of all of Price’s Missouri Expedition of 1864 (7 September 1864 to 28 November 1864) and the revised field study focused on the three-day battle of Westport (21-23 October 1864). Over time, the Westport staff ride became very popular with ROTC programs, Reserve Component units, and the Active duty Army from the surrounding region.

In 2006, Dr. King developed a staff ride for the Battle of Mine Creek, Kansas. Dr. King’s new staff ride basically told “the rest of the story” of the Price Raid, focusing on the Confederate retreat from the Westport area (23-25 October 1864) and the Union pursuit, the field study phase of the staff ride concluding at the site of the stunning Union victory at Mine Creek, Kansas (25 October 1864). The new staff ride proved to be as popular as the Westport staff ride among Army organizations.

In 2013, the Westport and Mine Creek staff rides received renewed attention as Mr. Charles D. Collins, CSI Historian, combined and expanded the two staff rides into a US Army Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) elective culminating with a two-day staff ride on both battlefields. Concurrently, Mr. Collins also modified the elective into a two-day staff ride for CGSC’s Art of War Scholars Program with an increased emphasis on the operational level of war.

Hundreds of students from ROTC programs in addition to Army Reserve and Active Component units have used the study of Price’s Missouri Expedition of 1864, and the two staff rides associated with the campaign, as leader development tools for their leaders. This atlas is intended to serve as an educational reference to further enhance the Westport and Mine Creek staff ride experience. The atlas provides a heavy dose of tactical detail but also directs significant focus on the operational level of war. Therefore, the staff rides associated with the 1864 Missouri Expedition are appropriate for Army leader development education and training at nearly all levels. The campaign provides a host of issues to be examined: campaign planning, deception, intelligence, leadership, logistics, reconnaissance (or lack thereof), soldier initiative, and many other areas relevant to the modern military professional. Additional issues, somewhat unique to Missouri in the American Civil War, are guerilla and counter-guerilla operations, operations in support of civil authorities, challenging local and state political considerations, and a resource constrained environment. Each of these issues is as relevant to us today as it was 150 years ago. In short, modern military professionals, for whom this atlas was written, will find a great deal to ponder and analyze when studying this campaign. CSI – The Past is Prologue!
Acknowledgments

I wish to acknowledge the many people who made the publication of this work possible and thank them for their efforts. First, I would like to thank the historians who have researched and published great works on the events associated with Price’s Missouri Expedition of 1864. Without their efforts, the story of this less than well-known Civil War campaign may have been totally overlooked and forgotten. Additionally, without their detailed studies, my own efforts to provide an atlas for the campaign would not have been possible. The atlas’ bibliography shows the many publications used in my research. However, I would be remiss if I did not note some of the outstanding works I most especially depended upon. First, there was Mark Lause’s Price’s Lost Campaign. His study provides a detailed look at the beginning of the campaign, the Battle of Pilot Knob and the fight for Jefferson City. Howard Monnet’s Action Before Westport continues the story from Jefferson City to the environs of Kansas City. Mr. Monnet’s book, published in 1964, remains the best book on the three days of battle fought near Kansas City known collectively as the Battle of Westport. Mr. Lumir Buresh’s The Battle of Mine Creek looks at the retreat from Westport and has a thorough description and analysis of the six battles fought on 25 October 1864. The true heart of the atlas is “The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,” commonly referred to as “the Official Records.” It was a highly mobile campaign and most of the commanders waited until after the conclusion of the expedition to write their reports. Unfortunately, some commanders failed to submit their reports or they were lost to history. Many of the reports are lofty and exaggerate disproportionately any silver lining that can be found. Nevertheless, most of the reports are rich in detail and priceless to those researching the campaign.

Second, I would also like to thank my colleagues at the Combat Studies Institute and the US Army Command and General Staff College. The institute’s leadership provided me with the opportunity to visit and walk all the battlefields noted in the atlas. LTC Matt Dale and Dr. Curtis King walked the grounds with me at Pilot Knob, Jefferson City, and Glasgow. Dr. King and Gary Linhart accompanied me many times to Westport and Mine Creek. A well-deserved thank you to Florian Waitl for graciously allowing me to make a six-hour detour to visit the grounds at Osage River, Charlot Farm, and Newtonia. I greatly value the ideas and insights they provided on these research trips. Without doubt, their contributions were extremely helpful. A special thanks to Dr. King, Mr. Ken Gott, and LTC Dale who served as my dependable sounding boards. Without their help, I could not have completed this project. Curt King patiently listened to my ramblings and then pointed me back in the right direction. Ken Gott, a true expert on the campaign, was an invaluable source of information, ideas, and sources. LTC Dale loves to study history and has a great interest in the Civil War campaigns fought west of the Mississippi River. He consistently offered good advice and, on more than one occasion, reeled me back from some tangents that exceeded the scope of the planned atlas. Additionally, recognition and appreciation goes to Mr. Kurt Ebaugh for his valuable help in analyzing the campaign at the operational level of war. I also express thanks to Mr. Kevin Kennedy, the Staff Ride Team Chief, for allocating the time to finish the project and gently nudging me along to get it done. Dr. Dean Nowowiejski, Director of CGSC’s Art of War Program, and his students provided numerous insights during the course of several Price’s Expedition Staff Rides. Additionally, Major David Lovett, CGSC Class of 2016, provided invaluable help based upon his research for his Masters thesis Leadership Study on the Battle of Little Blue, 21 October 1864.

Unfortunately, over the two years I intermittently worked on this project, I failed to record all the names of others who assisted me and sincerely beg their forgiveness. One notable oversight included the countless people of the Midwest whose friendliness warmed and highlighted my time spent researching their region. In one particular instance, while researching the battle fought at Charlot Farm, I struggled to learn the location of a particular historical wayside marker near the battlefield. Later in my studies, I discovered the location of the historical marker. It was in a truck stop parking lot in Deerfield, Missouri. I called the truck stop and a waitress took a picture of the marker and sent it to me. Thanks to the kindness of the waitress, the information on the historical marker proved to be very helpful.

Third, with much appreciation, I acknowledge my editors. LTC Dale served as my first reader. He made the careful initial edit of my very rough first drafts and continually encouraged clarification and other needed improvements. Second, my wife Judy, helped me with the acknowledgments, the foreword, and the introduction. Third, Dr. Terry Beckenbaugh of the Department of Military History at the Command and General Staff College served as my second reader. He provided invaluable assistance in clarifying historical terms and additional grammatical corrections. Finally, Dr. Donald Wright, the Deputy Director of the Army Press, and Jennifer Fike, Combat Studies Institute editor, both diligently refined the final draft into a professional package for publication.
Last, on a personal note, I offer my heartfelt thanks to my family for always supporting me through my many staff rides and research trips, not only to the Missouri Expedition battlefields, but to many other historical sites across our nation. Such great opportunities and experiences are hard for me to think of as “work.”

Charles D. Collins, Jr.
Historian, Combat Studies Institute
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Introduction

_Battlefield Atlas of Price’s Missouri Expedition of 1864_ is intended to serve as an educational reference for the Westport and Mine Creek staff rides. The Atlas is divided into seven parts. Part I, Missouri’s Divided Loyalties, and Part II, Missouri’s Five Seasons, provide an overview of Missouri’s history from the initial settlement of the Louisiana Purchase Territories through the opening years of the American Civil War. The remaining parts cover the Confederate plan, the Confederate movement into Missouri and the Union reaction, the Confederate retreat and Union pursuit into Kansas, and the final Confederate escape back into Arkansas. The atlas has a standard format with the map to left and the narrative to the right. Each narrative closes with two or more primary source vignettes. These vignettes provide an overview of the events shown on the map and discussed in the narrative from the perspective of persons who participated in the events. In most cases there are two vignettes with the first from a person loyal to the Union and the second from a person who supported the Southern cause. A few narratives have two or more vignettes from only the Union side. This was done to emphasize disagreements and struggles among senior leaders to establish a common course of action. Map 25, Decision at the Little Blue River, is a good example and the three vignettes emphasize the disagreement between Maj. Gen. Samuel Curtis and his subordinate, Maj. Gen. James Blunt on where to locate the Union defensive line.

_The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies_ provides a standardized list of abbreviations for military rank in the American Civil War.

These Civil War era abbreviations are used throughout the atlas.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gov.</td>
<td>Governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen.</td>
<td>Senator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Gen.</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Col.</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.</td>
<td>Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieut.</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergt.</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

There were no standardized abbreviations for units in the American Civil War. However, Mark Boatner listed the most common abbreviations used in official correspondence in his _The Civil War Dictionary_ (New York, NY: David McKay Company, 1959), xv-xvi.

_Echelons_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sec.</td>
<td>Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co.</td>
<td>Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry.</td>
<td>Battery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bn.</td>
<td>Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regt.</td>
<td>Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig.</td>
<td>Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div.</td>
<td>Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dist.</td>
<td>District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept.</td>
<td>Department</td>
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</table>

*These abbreviations are noted as an introduction to each major campaign within the records. Examples can be found in Series I, Volume III: Wilson Creek, pages 53-54; Lexington, page 171. Also in Series I, Volume VIII: Pea Ridge, pages 189-190; and Series I, Volume XLI, Part I: Price’s Missouri Expedition, pages 304-306.
Other abbreviations common to the campaigns in Missouri:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.S.A.</td>
<td>Confederate States of American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSM</td>
<td>Kansas State Militia (Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSG</td>
<td>Missouri State Guard (Supported the Confederacy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSM</td>
<td>Missouri State Militia (Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMM</td>
<td>Enrolled Missouri Militia (Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEMM</td>
<td>Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia (Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty.</td>
<td>Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cav.</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dsmtd.</td>
<td>Dismounted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engr(s).</td>
<td>Engineer, Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft.</td>
<td>Fort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf.</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lgt.</td>
<td>Light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtd.</td>
<td>Mounted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtn. How.</td>
<td>Mountain Howitzer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol (s).</td>
<td>Volunteer, Volunteers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The atlas has two Map Keys. Map Key 1 shows terrain features. Most of these features should be easily recognized but are noted on the map key as a reference. Map Key 2 provides a guide for the units symbols represented on the maps.
Map Key 1
(Terrain)

WATERWAYS
- Intermittent Stream or Creek (Tactical Map)
- River or Steam or Creek (Operational Map) (Tactical Map)
- Major Water Course (All Maps)

INFRASTRUCTURE
- Osceola Town (Operational Map)
- Jefferson City State Capital (Operational Map)
- Court House Town (Tactical Map)
- Railroad (All Maps)
- Fort (All Maps)
- Road (All Maps)
- Abatis (All Maps)
- Camp or Bivouac (All Maps)
- Stone Fence (Tactical Map)
- Rail Fence (Tactical Map)

Note: Watercourses and towns are represented differently on operational maps and tactical maps. These differences between operational maps and tactical maps are not just for artistic purposes, but also represent the scale of the feature in relationship to the scale of the map.

UNIT MANEUVERS (All Maps)
- Confederate Advance
- Confederate Retreat
- Union Advance
- Union Retreat
- Battle
- Confederate Attack
- Union Attack

TERRAIN (All Maps)
- Anderson Mtn (1450')
- Terrain Contour Line (Height in Feet)
- Trees or Brush
Map Key 2
(Units)

OPPOSING FORCES and ARM

- Union Formation
- Confederate Formation
- Cavalry
- Infantry

UNIT ECHELONS

- Company (Co.)
- Battalion (Bn.)
- Regiment (Regt.)
- Brigade (Brig.)
- Division (Div.)
- Corps
- Army

UNIT TYPES

KS, IA, MO, etc. (Union - State Volunteer Units) Mo, Ar, Tx, etc. (Confederate - State Volunteer Units)
MSM (Missouri State Militia - Union) EEM (Enrolled Missouri Militia - Union) PEMM (Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia - Union) KSM (Kansas State Militia - Union) MSG (Missouri State Guard - Supported the Confederacy)

SPECIFIC UNITS

- Trapeze: Confederate Wagon Train
- Triangle: Security or Piquet outpost
- Circle: Skirmishers or Piquet's
- Parallel Lines: Artillery (represents 1 to 2 guns)
- Crossed Lines: Southern Refugees
- Square: Curtis
- Key Leader or Headquarters

* Most times the artillery will show a unit designation such as Collins Btry (Battery), Tx Btry (Texas Battery) or H/2 MO (H Battery, Second Missouri Artillery)

FORMATIONS

- Union unit in a line formation (10th Missouri Cavalry)
- Confederate unit in a line formation (10th Missouri Cavalry)
- Union unit in a column formation (Benteen's Cavalry Brigade)
- Confederate unit in a column formation (Clark's Cavalry Brigade)

Note
On the tactical 'battle' maps the rectangle for battalions, regiments, and brigades represents approximate size of the unit and the estimated frontage.
Division symbols only represent the general location of the formation.
The unit symbols clearly identify cavalry, infantry, and artillery units. Therefore, the Cavalry (Cav.) or Infantry (Inf.) are not shown with the unit symbol or in the narrative.
Part I
Missouri’s Divided Loyalties

1803-1862
Map 1.

1803 - 1861

- 1803: The Louisiana Purchase included the future state of Missouri.
- 1818: Missouri territorial legislature adopted a request for statehood as a slave state.
- 1820: Missouri Compromise allowed Missouri’s entry to the Union as a slave state.
- 1830: Slave population of 18%.
- 1854: Kansas – Nebraska Act.
- 1854-1861: “Bleeding Kansas” or “Border War” period.
- 1860: Abraham Lincoln elected 16th President of the United States.
- 1860: South Carolina voted to leave the Union.
- 1861:
  - Missouri population 75% “Southern Heritage.” (slave population of 10%)
  - Kansas entered the Union as a free state.
1. Little Dixie

The people of Missouri experienced turbulent times long before Maj. Gen. Sterling Price’s 1864 Missouri Expedition. Missouri was one of the four Border States (others being Delaware, Kentucky, and Maryland) in the secession crisis of the 1860s. The term border means that it was a Slave State but shared borders with Free States. The designation of Border State also implies that the state’s loyalty was unevenly divided between the North and the South. In Missouri, a significant majority of the state’s population traced their roots back to the Slave States of the South but its major cities had significant concentrations of people who had recently emigrated from Europe or from the Free States of the North. Additionally the major cities were economically tied to the North through the rivers and railroads. In turn, the “Southerners” of the rural population were tied economically to the cities. In the American Civil War, the state’s divided loyalty generated a bitter guerrilla war within the larger war between the Union and the Confederacy. The guerrilla war and the immense animosity between the opposing sides in Missouri impacted how the war was fought in Missouri and directly contributed to why Price conducted his 1864 expedition into Missouri. The origins of guerrilla war can be traced back to the state’s early history. After the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, southern farmers and planters migrated into the region that later became Missouri. With them was the South’s “peculiar institution” of slavery. In less than 20 years, the territory met the conditions for statehood and in December 1818 the Missouri territorial legislature submitted a formal request for statehood. The request threatened the delicate balance within the Union between Slave and Free States. Then in 1820, the United States Congress passed legislation, known as the Missouri Compromise, which allowed Missouri’s admittance as a Slave State and balanced the Union with the entrance of Maine as a Free State. During the Antebellum period, a flood of southern immigrants transplanted the slave dependent economy onto the rich farmlands bordering the Missouri River. The area became known as “Little Dixie” and it was a microcosm of the South’s plantation society. In 1860, 75 percent of the state’s population had roots from Slave States. Nevertheless, the slave population peaked in 1830 at 18 percent and eventually dropped to less than 10 percent in 1860. Most of these slaves were concentrated in the rural areas of “Little Dixie.” Ironically, most Missouri farmers owned no slaves. However, that did not mean they opposed the institution of slavery. Many felt freeing the slaves was an economic threat to rural Missouri. Up until the 1850s, the emigrant southerners of “Little Dixie” were the political and economic elites of the state. In Price’s 1864 Missouri Expedition, Maj. Gen. Price and two of his three division commander’s owned plantations in “Little Dixie” and were prominent slave holders in the state. The region also figured prominently in Price’s expedition. Many of the soldiers came from the small towns and rural farms in the region. So for Price’s Army, the expedition was the opportunity to go home.

In 1861, Price targeted “Little Dixie” in his strike against Lexington, Missouri. Thousands of recruits from the area joined his Army during the operations around Lexington. In 1864, he again hoped that the people of “Little Dixie” would welcome his men as liberators and flock to the “Southern Cause.” His objectives shifted over the course of the 1864 expedition but at one point, he hoped to occupy the state capital of Jefferson City which was a major town within “Little Dixie.” There, he planned to hold elections for a new Confederate State government. His movement into the region also resulted in several battles. Most of the expedition’s significant fights occurred within the boundaries of “Little Dixie.” The battles and skirmishes fought in “Little Dixie” include the following: Jefferson City, Glasgow, Lexington, Little Blue, Independence, Byram’s Ford, Bloody Hill, and Westport.

Beginning in the 1840s, “Little Dixie” began to lose its political monopoly over the control of the state. Increasing migration from Europe and northern states changed the political landscape of the state. The overwhelming majority of the newcomers were opposed to the expansion of slavery. The uncompromising differences between the pro-slavery and the anti-slavery population contributed greatly to the question of organizing more territories west of Missouri. The Missouri Compromise of 1820 set Missouri’s southern border as the dividing line for slavery in the United States. All future states north of the Parallel 36°30' north, except Missouri, would be Free States and all new states south of the line would permit slavery. However, later Congressional legislation, specifically the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, nullified the Missouri Compromise. Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas introduced the legislation as part of the organization of the Kansas and Nebraska territories in order to open up new farmlands and make way for a transcontinental railroad.

Additions to Douglas’ act allowed the residents of the new territories to decide whether or not to allow slavery – popular sovereignty. The Missourians occupied a peninsula of slavery surrounded on two sides by states opposed slavery. Missourians saw the rich river valley land in Kansas along the Missouri and Kansas Rivers as natural extensions for slave dependent farming, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act set the conditions for the possible extension of slavery into Kansas. Along
the Missouri-Kansas border, anti-slavery “Free-Staters” or “Jay Hawkers” battled against pro-slavery “Border Ruffians” or “Bushwhackers” to decide the question of whether Kansas would enter the Union as a free or slave state.

In the 1854 election of the Kansas Territorial delegates, less than half of the voters were Kansas residents, most were “Border Ruffians” who crossed over the border to participate in the election. In 1855, the pro-slavery element won the vote again when they dominated the election of the territorial legislature. In 1855, Kansas Territory had only 1,500 registered voters, nevertheless over 6,000 ballots were cast. Tragically, violence between the opposing groups was also common and the period between 1854 and 1861 came to be known by many names like Bleeding Kansas, Bloody Kansas, or the Border War. Many of the combatants in the 1864 expedition, both north and south, were active participants in the “Bleeding Kansas” period. Sterling Price, future Confederate Army commander, served as the governor of Missouri from 1853 to 1854. He offered no official recognition or support to the “Border Ruffians;” however, he took no actions to control the violence along the border. Joseph Shelby, a Confederate division commander in the expedition, was a leader among the “Border Ruffians” and led several raids into Kansas. James Lane, the US, senator of Kansas in 1864 was a prominent abolitionist and leader of the “Jay Hawkers.”

Charles Jennison, a Union brigade commander at Westport, was a hero to the “Free-State” faction. The pro-slavery supporters considered him the most brutal of the “Jayhawkers.” Kansas eventually entered the Union as a free state in January of 1861, just a few months before the opening shots fired on Fort Sumter by the Confederacy. The enmity the “Border War” period between the pro-slavery and the anti-slavery population of Missouri significantly influenced the behavior of partisan groups that fought to control the state during the American Civil War. By late 1860, the question of whether slavery would be allowed to expand into the territories was a major issue in upcoming presidential election and threatened to push the country to the brink of war. Missourians were divided into three distinct groups. First, there were the “Secessionists” who believed that Missouri belonged in the Confederacy. Among the “Secessionists” were the majority of the state’s social elite and political leaders of the state. The second group consisted of the “Unconditional Unionists.” They tended to have anti-slavery sentiments and believed secession was treason against the country. The “Unconditional Unionists” believed the United States should use any means necessary to preserve the Union. The business elites of the major cities along with the European and northern immigrants made up the majority of its followers. The overwhelming majority of Missourians were considered “Conditional Unionists.” They either supported the right to own slaves or were ambivalent to the issue. The “Conditional Unionists” wanted Missouri to remain in the Union because they were economically tied to the north by the railroads and river traffic. However, they did not support the use of force in preventing states from leaving the Union. They hoped for either a compromise to avoid war or to remain neutral if there was war. Most would not have participated in the war if given the choice. The nature of the fight in Missouri would force all to choose sides. Missouri was deeply divided before the first shot at Fort Sumter and the war itself would inflame those divisions into a chronic wound.

Brig. Gen. Harney. As a citizen of Missouri, owing allegiance to the United States, and having interests in common with you, I feel it my duty as well as privilege to extend a warning voice to my fellow-citizens against the common dangers that threaten us, and to appeal to your patriotism and sense of justice to exert all your moral power to avert them... There are obligations and duties resting upon the people of Missouri under the Constitution and laws of the United States which are paramount, and which I trust you will carefully consider and weigh well before you will allow yourselves to be carried out of the Union under the form of yielding obedience to this military bill, which is clearly in violation of your duties as citizens of the United States. It must be apparent to every one who has taken a proper and unbiased view of the subject that, whatever may be the termination of the unfortunate condition of things in respect to the so-called Cotton States, Missouri must share the destiny of the Union. Her geographical position, her soil, productions, and, in short, all her material interests, point to this result. We cannot shut our eyes against this controlling fact. It is seen and its force is felt throughout the nation. So important is this regarded to the great interests of the country, that I venture to express the opinion that the whole power of the Government of the United States, if necessary, will be exerted to maintain Missouri in her present position in the Union.

Governor Jackson: I can only promise to bring to the post assigned to me an honest devotion to my State, the Constitution of the United States, and to that Union which the Constitution was designed to perpetuate... Missouri will not be found to shrink from the duty which her position upon the border imposes; her honor, her interests, and her sympathies point alike in one direction, and determine her to stand by the South. [A] State Convention should... be called immediately. Missouri is entitled to a voice in the settlement of the questions now pending in the country, and her position on these questions should be known... In this way the whole subject will be brought directly before the people at large, who will determine for themselves what is to be the ultimate action of the State.
Map 2.

1861

- 3 Jan: Gov. Jackson took office as the 15th Governor of Missouri.
- Jan-Mar: Missouri Constitutional Convention voted to remain in the Union (89 to 1).
- 4 Mar: Abraham Lincoln inaugurated as President.
- 12 Apr: Confederate forces fired on Fort Sumter.
- 15 Apr: Pres. Lincoln issued a proclamation calling up 75,000 militia for three months service.
- 17 Apr: Gov. Jackson condemned President’s call for volunteers and refused to comply.
- 20 Apr: Pro-Southern militia seized the US Arsenal in Liberty, MO.
- 4 May: Pro-Southern militia seized the US ordnance stores in Kansas City, MO.
- 6 May: Pro-southern Missouri militia established Camp Jackson in St. Louis.
- 8 May: Artillery and other arms provided by the Confederate government arrived at Camp Jackson.
- 10 May: Capt. Lyon forced the surrender of the pro-southern militia forces at Camp Jackson. Civilian mob attacked Union militia and the militia fired on civilians.
St. Louis in 1861

St. Louis was the largest city in Missouri and one of the largest cities west of the Mississippi. The city also sat astride two national lines of communication. First was the Mississippi River. Equally important was the Missouri River, the gateway to the American west. Col. Franz Sigel, an important Union leader in 1861 Missouri said, “Saint Louis, [is] the key to the Southwest.” In 1861, Claiborne Jackson, an ardent secessionist, became the Governor of Missouri. He called for a state constitutional convention to vote on secession. The convention representatives voted overwhelming (89 to one) to remain in the Union. Nevertheless, Jackson continued to lobby for Missouri to join the Confederacy. In April, he condemned President Lincoln’s call for volunteers and refused to comply. Then in late April, pro-Confederate elements seized the US Arsenal at Liberty, Missouri, and in early May they seized the US ordnance stores located in Kansas City area. Jackson also directed 700 militiamen to establish Camp Jackson in St. Louis. Federal authorities saw the camp as a threat to the St. Louis Arsenal. The arsenal contained 38,000 muskets, 45 tons of powder, and 11 cannons. This was more than enough supplies to equip an army. Unconditional Unionists, led by US Congressman Francis Blair and US Army Capt. Nathaniel Lyon, countered the governor’s moves and took action to keep Missouri in the Union. They raised 10,000 volunteers, mostly German Americans, and secretly transferred the majority of the arsenal’s ordnance to Illinois. On 10 May, Capt. Lyon assembled 6,000 volunteers and captured Camp Jackson. Angry civilian mobs hindered the volunteers’ attempt to march the prisoners back to the arsenal. The motivations of the mob were complex. Many were “secessionist,” some were “conditional unionist” who opposed the use of force, and others just distrusted the mostly German volunteers. Unfortunately, someone in the crowd fired on the volunteers and killed a German officer. The volunteers then fired into the crowd killing 28 people and wounding another 50. The next day, the mobs again attacked another volunteer unit. Lyon restored the peace by moving his German volunteers out of the city. He then used his few US Regulars to enforce a declaration of martial law. The two days of armed action and violence forced many of the “conditional unionists” who had hoped for compromise or neutrality to choose sides. The decision of whether Missouri would remain a state in the Union or join the Confederacy was still in doubt.

President Lincoln: Whereas the laws of the United States have been for some time past and now are opposed and the execution thereof obstructed in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings or by the powers vested in the marshals by law. Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution and the laws, have thought fit to call forth, and hereby do call forth, the militia of the several States of the Union, to the aggregate number of 75,000, in order to suppress [the rebellion] and to cause the laws to be duly executed.

Governor Jackson: Sir: Your dispatch of the 15th instant, making a call on Missouri for four regiments of men for immediate service, has been received. There can be, I apprehend, no doubt but the men are intended to form a part of the President’s army to make war upon the people of the seceded States. Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its object, inhuman and diabolical, and cannot be complied with. Not one man will the State of Missouri furnish to carry on any such unholy crusade.
The Missouri State Guard (MSG) was a pro-secessionist state militia. The MSG was not a formal part of the Confederate Army. They did fight in support of the Southern cause and at times fought alongside Confederate troops.

1. 17 Jun: Battle of Boonville. Union (1,600 and 6 guns) Vs. MSG (500 and no guns). MSG retreated to SW Missouri.
2. 5 Jul: Battle of Carthage. Union (1,100 and 8 guns) Vs. MSG (6,000 and 7 guns). Union Army retreated to Springfield.
5. 23 Sep: Pro-Union raiders looted and burned Osceola.

1862

3. The Fight for Missouri

Following the Camp Jackson Affair, the next nine months of the Civil War in Missouri were characterized by small field armies contending for the control of the state. Missouri was not officially part of the Confederacy and therefore had to take steps to create an army. The Missouri State General Assembly created the Missouri State Guard (MSG) as a pro-secessionist force to resist a Federal invasion and to suppress the rebellion of the Unionists enrolled into Federal service. They also appointed Sterling Price as Maj. Gen. and commander of the MSG. Ironically, Price was previously a vocal “Conditional Unionist” and had voted against secession. However, he did not believe the Federals had the right to force Missouri to remain in the Union. Capt. Lyon’s actions in St. Louis pushed Price into the secessionist camp to defend the State of Missouri from “Unionist” aggression. Many of the same soldiers and officers of the MSG of 1861 who hoped to see Missouri as part of the Confederacy would still be with Price in the 1864 Missouri Expedition. Governor Jackson and Maj. Gen. Price recognized they needed time to organize and train the State Guard, and after some fruitless negotiations in St. Louis, they moved their forces to Jefferson City. Meanwhile, Congressman Blair and the newly promoted Brig. Gen. Nathaniel Lyon made plans to secure the remainder of the state for the Union. Lyon moved troops and artillery up the Missouri river toward Jefferson City by steamboat and another column of troops toward Springfield. Jackson decided not to defend the pro-Union Jefferson City (a high percentage being of German immigrants) and retreated up the Missouri River. On 17 June, Lyon attacked and defeated an MSG detachment at Boonville. In the fight Col. John Marmaduke, a future division commander in the 1864 expedition, commanded the MSG forces. Mr. Joseph (Jo) Shelby, another future division commander in the 1864 expedition, missed the fight because he was home recruiting a company of cavalry. That company would form the nucleus of his famous Iron Brigade at the Battle of Westport. The fight at Boonville, although no more than a large skirmish, was a significant engagement. Lyon’s victory secured St. Louis, Jefferson City, and the Missouri River for the “Unionist” cause. Lyon’s actions also isolated the resources of “Little Dixie,” denying it to the pro-southern forces, and forced them to retreat into the southwestern portion of the state.

At the same time that Brig. Gen. Lyon was moving toward Boonville, a second Union column commanded by Brig. Gen. Thomas Sweeny moved toward Springfield. Lyon directed Sweeny to secure Springfield, another pro-Union town, and to block the retreat of secessionist forces from central Missouri. After Boonville, Governor Jackson’s MSG retreated into the southwest corner of the state. Jackson’s forces received substantial reinforcements from the rural counties of Missouri during the retreat. The small farming counties contained few slaves but they tended to be sympathetic to the Confederacy in the secession crisis. On 5 July, Jackson’s 6,000 poorly trained and equipped MSG troops clashed with the advance elements of Sweeny’s column near Carthage. Col. Franz Sigel commanded 1,100 well drilled and equipped troops of the Union Army vanguard. Nevertheless, Jackson’s MSG with a significant numerical advantage defeated the small Union Army and forced it to retreat to Springfield. Two significant 1864 expedition participants fought at Carthage: Capt. Jo Shelby fought as a company commander in the MSG, and Brig. Gen. John Clark commanded a MSG brigade. After the fight at Carthage, Sigel retreated to Springfield where Brig. Gen. Lyon in the coming weeks concentrated 5,600 Union troops. He learned that a large Rebel force was assembling at Cassville and decided to attack in the hope of catching the Confederates before they were fully consolidated.

Meanwhile, Price consolidated his recruits and Jackson’s force at Cowskin Prairie and prepared to join with the Confederate States Army located across the state line in northwestern Arkansas. The Confederate government had placed Brig. Gen Ben McCulloch in command of northwest Arkansas. He had pieced together a small army with regiments from Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. On 31 August, Price and McCulloch combined their forces, a total of 10,175 men, and initiated an advance on Springfield. The advance guards of the opposing armies clashed at Dug Springs. The MSG detachment at the head of the combined force ran away from the fight in the skirmish. The MSG’s embarrassing performance drove an emotional wedge between the Missourians and the Confederate troops. Maj. Gen. Price, with only a state commission from the governor of Missouri, yielded command to Brig. Gen. McCulloch to assure Confederate support. By 6 August, the Rebels were camped at Wilson’s Creek and planning an attack on Springfield. In Springfield, Lyon decided his best course of action was a surprise attack. Early morning on 10 August, the Union Army attacked the enemy encampment with two converging columns. Lyon’s bold attack nearly routed the southern forces. Nonetheless, the southern commanders rallied the troops and stabilized their positions. The Rebel counterattacks failed to break the Union line on Bloody Hill. However, on the northern flank, the southerners routed Sigel’s column and then concentrated their full force against Bloody Hill. Lyon was killed in the ongoing struggle for the hill and Maj. Samuel Sturgis took command of the Union Army. At about 1100, the Rebels withdrew to regroup and prepare another attack. Sturgis realized his men and ammunition were nearly exhausted and ordered a retreat to Springfield. McCulloch’s army was too disorganized to pursue.
Springfield area.

Union reinforcements maneuvered against Price. He recognized his army was in danger and decided to fall back to the

or supply the new recruits and had to send many of them back home. Soon after the Rebel victory at Lexington, significant

Guard but it did not incite a popular uprising against the Federal authorities in Missouri. Furthermore, Price could not equip

victory disheartened the Missouri “Unionists” and bolstered the “Secessionists” by providing Price with temporary control

stands of infantry arms and ammunition, 750 horses, and $100,000 worth of commissary stores. Additionally, Price recovered

disturbing foretaste of the bitter guerilla war that would engulf Missouri in the months to come.

On 20 September, Price’s MSG captured the 3,500 soldier garrison of Lexington. The victor’s spoils included 3,000

stands of infantry arms and ammunition, 750 horses, and $100,000 worth of commissary stores. Additionally, Price recovered

money that the Union forces had confiscated from the banks, $15,000 of which had disappeared sometime during the siege,

for a total of $885,000. Price returned the money to the Lexington banks. He then demanded that the banks provide the

MSG with $37,000, the amount deposited by the Missouri Legislators at the start of the war to pay for the defense of the

state.14 The Union situation, already in disarray after the loss at Wilson’s Creek, was now on the verge of panic. The Rebel

victory disheartened the Missouri “Unionists” and bolstered the “Secessionists” by providing Price with temporary control

of a portion of the Missouri River Valley. Price’s success did encourage a large numbers of volunteers to join with the State

Guard but it did not incite a popular uprising against the Federal authorities in Missouri. Furthermore, Price could not equip

or supply the new recruits and had to send many of them back home. Soon after the Rebel victory at Lexington, significant

Union reinforcements maneuvered against Price. He recognized his army was in danger and decided to fall back to the

Springfield area.

On Christmas Day of 1861, Brig. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis assumed command of the Union Army of the Southwest.15 His superiors ordered him to drive Price’s Missouri State Guard from the state and then protect Missouri from a potential Confederate invasion originating from Arkansas. Curtis advanced into southwestern Missouri and maneuvered Price’s army out of the state and into northwestern Arkansas. Price retreated into the Boston Mountains and joined with Brig. Gen. McCulloch’s Confederates near Fayetteville, Arkansas. On 4 March 1862, Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn assumed command of the combined Rebel force numbering 16,000 men and designated it as the Army of the West. Van Dorn led this army north, determined to invade Missouri and capture St Louis. Curtis, with only 10,500 Federal troops on hand, established a strong defensive position along Little Sugar Creek, blocking Van Dorn’s path into Missouri. On 7 March, Van Dorn recognized the
strength of Curtis’ defensive line and boldly maneuvered around the Union western flank and attacked into the rear of the Federal line at Pea Ridge, Arkansas.

Curtis expected a frontal attack but hedged his bets by having one of his subordinates fell trees and set up other obstacles to slow any Confederate flanking maneuver on the Bentonville Detour. It surprised Curtis when Van Dorn attempted to reach the Federal rear via the detour. At Pea Ridge Curtis reoriented his forces 180 degrees from south to north to effectively meet the Confederate advance. It was an uncannily similar situation to his failure to consider a potentially similar Confederate maneuver at Westport just 31 months later where Curtis reoriented his defensive line 90 degrees to counter a Confederate flank attack. On the second day of fighting at Pea Ridge, Curtis again foreshadowed the artillery tactics he would employ at Westport. On the morning of 8 March, Curtis massed his artillery and heavily suppressed the Confederate line with a two-hour artillery barrage. Union infantry attacks then broke the Confederate line and forced Van Dorn’s army to retreat. The Union victory at Pea Ridge changed the character of the fight to control Missouri. A Confederate Army would not threaten Missouri again until 1864. For the first nine months of the war, opposing field armies fought to control Missouri. In the next phase of the fight for Missouri, pro-southern forces would rely primarily on irregular forces and cavalry raids plunging the state into a bitter guerilla war.

**Lieut. Voelkner:** I had never believed that artillery was capable of such havoc... The sight was awful... I pray God may never have occasion to behold such another. Cannon balls and unexploded shells were lying thick over the ground. The trees were cut and splintered and torn in every direction. Everything gave ample proof of the horrors of war.

**Sergt. Watson:** It was clear enough that there had been a shameful piece of bungling and mismanagement, and the discontent and clamor became general, and everyone was disgusted.
Notes

1. For additional information on James Lane see William E. Connelly, *James Henry Lane: The “Grim Chieftain” of Kansas*. (Topeka, KS: Crane & Company, 1970), and John Speer, *Life of General James H. Lane* (Garden City, KS: John Speer, Printer, 1897).


3. Brig. Gen. William S. Harney commanded the Army’s Department of the West at Jefferson Barracks in St. Louis in 1861. He was a southerner by birth but remained with the Union when his home state left the Union.


5. Gov. Claiborne Fox Jackson, an ardent secessionist, was the 15th Governor of Missouri.


9. Maj. William Bell, a Southerner, had secretly agreed to surrender the arsenal to the state. Sen. Blair had the war department replace Bell. However, the loyalty of the replacement, Maj. Peter Hagner, was also suspect. Blair then had Capt. Nathaniel Lyon, an outspoken abolitionist, placed in charge of the arsenal’s defense.


15. The Department of Missouri divided its Field Armies into the Army of Southwest Missouri and the Army of Southeast Missouri.

16. Lieut. Henry Voelkner served with the 1st Missouri Flying Battery (Union).


Part II

Missouri’s Five Seasons

Spring, Summer, Fall, Price’s Raid, and Winter

1862-1863
1862
1. 6 Apr: Van Dorn’s army moved into Mississippi (1/2 transferred east of the river)
2. 12 Jul: Curtis’ Army arrived in Helena (1000) Vs. Confederate & Guerillas (2500).
6. 30 Sep: Battle of Newtonia. Union (1500) Vs. Confederate (1500+).
7. 7 Nov: Battle of Clark’s Mill. Union (113) Vs. Confederate & Guerillas (1000).
8. 7 Dec: Battle of Prairie Grove. Union (9,200 and 30 guns) Vs. Confederate (11,000 and 22 guns).

Map 4.
4. Confederate Recruiters and Partisan Rangers

Historian Paul Burrill Jenkins stated in his 1906 book, *The Battle of Westport*, that a common joke of the day was that in Missouri there were five seasons in the year, “spring, summer, fall, Price’s raid, and winter.”

The joke may not be historically correct; Price is really only associated with the final and largest raid into Missouri, Price’s 1864 Missouri Expedition. However, it does accurately reflect the war in Missouri following the big battles of 1861 and early 1862. The season of “Price’s raid” shows the important role that Sterling Price played throughout the war in rallying support for the southern cause in Missouri. Those who fought in Missouri, whether they supported the Union or the Confederacy, associated the name of Sterling Price with all the large cavalry raids into Missouri whether he participated in the raid or not. The “five seasons” also show the pattern of conflict in Missouri. In the spring, summer, and fall, partisan Rangers along with robbers and murderers masquerading as pro-Union or pro-Confederate raiders fought a bitter guerilla war throughout Missouri. Beginning in late 1862, the Confederacy sent raids into Missouri to demonstrate a presence and keep the hope of a Confederate Missouri alive. In the winter, both sides significantly reduced the tempo of active operations and prepared for the next campaign season that following spring. The reality was that the Confederate commanders in Arkansas lacked the resources to recapture Missouri and their only means of continuing the fight for Missouri was through the conduct of cavalry raids. After the Union victory at Pea Ridge, the Confederate command transferred Maj. Gen. Van Dorn’s Army of the West across the Mississippi River to bolster their forces fighting in Tennessee. The transfer included Maj. Gen. Price’s Missouri troops. The Confederate government officially enrolled Price and the Missouri State Guard into the Confederate Army. Some of the Missouri soldiers refused to enlist and elements of the MSG continued to serve in Arkansas and Missouri. Others deserted and returned to Missouri. Some of those gave up the fight and others joined with the various guerilla groups forming throughout the state to fight against what they saw as a Union occupation of their home. The decision to transfer Van Dorn’s army left Arkansas almost defenseless and virtually abandoned Missouri to the Union. Ironically, the Union command also shifted its priorities away from Missouri and Arkansas.

About one half of Brig. Gen. Samuel Curtis’ Army of the Southwest moved to eastern Arkansas. The Union command transferred the other half east of the Mississippi River to support the Union offense into the Tennessee and the Mississippi River Valleys. Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, the senior Union commander in the west (which included responsibility for Missouri) wanted to focus on the conquest of Arkansas, Tennessee, and Mississippi. He believed the fight for Missouri was all but over. He stated in his second general order, “It is believed that the time will soon come when the rebellion in Missouri may be considered as terminated, and when even the partial and temporary military restraint which has been exercised in particular places may be entirely withdrawn.” However, the new Confederate commander in Arkansas, Maj. Gen. Thomas Hindman, was determined not only to defend Arkansas but to take the war back into Missouri. He wanted to divert Union resources away from Arkansas and back into Missouri. Hindman also wanted to maintain Confederate control of the war effort in Missouri. To accomplish his goal, he sent recruiters into Missouri to form partisan bands and reform units of the Missouri State Guard. The Union reaction was to label the guerrillas as robbers and murderers and subject to hanging if captured. The Confederate Congress attempted to protect the irregulars from summary execution with the passage of the Partisan Ranger Act (April 1862) which designated guerrilla formations as members of the Confederate Army. The Partisan Ranger Act did help with the recruiting effort but it did not protect the partisans from execution if captured. Federal authorities continued to view the guerrillas as criminals and over time, the irregular bands recognized no authority other than themselves.

In the spring and summer of 1862, the Confederate recruiters in Missouri experienced significant success. Many times the recruiters created small armies that contested pro-Union forces for control of Missouri counties. With no significant Union forces in the state, Missouri had to look to its own defense. In early 1862, the state created the Missouri State Militia (MSM), a federally-funded state volunteer force. The MSM was a full-time force. It was composed primarily of cavalry regiments whose troops were uniformed and well-trained. Its initial purpose was to conduct offensive operations against the forces of the Confederate recruiters. Later they fought against guerrillas and opposed the large Confederate cavalry raids coming from Arkansas. The Missouri state government also established the Enrolled Missouri Militia (EMM) to serve as garrison forces for key locations throughout the state and allow the MSM to conduct offensive operations. The EMM was a part-time force which lacked uniforms and were only called to duty in times of emergency. The loyalties of the EMM were suspect at times. Therefore, the state also created the Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia (PEMM). Authorities only enrolled reliable “Unionists” into the PEMM. It was a full-time force with the soldiers paid by the state but the Federal government outfitted and supplied the PEMM.
By the time of Price’s 1864 raid, the MSM and PEMM were seasoned veterans experienced in combating local guerrillas and Confederate cavalry raids, although they lacked experience in operating as large formations and fighting in major battles. Nevertheless, their regiments constituted three brigades of Maj. Gen. Pleasonton’s Provisional Cavalry Division and they fought well against Price’s Army in 1864.

Through the summer of 1862, the Union militias battled the Confederate recruiters for control of the state. Some of the more successful Confederate recruiters were MSG Col. Jeremiah Cockrell, who raised a large force in the Jackson County area, and MSG Brig. Gen. Jeff Thompson, who commanded a brigade-size force in southeast Missouri. His Union opponents called Thompson the Missouri Swamp Fox. In 1864, Thompson commanded Jo Shelby’s Iron Brigade at the Battle of Westport. Some of the fighting with the recruiters reached the level of small battles with several hundred participants on each side. In August, pro-southern forces almost achieved control of Jackson County at the battles of Independence and Lone Jack. That same month, Union forces finally secured northeastern Missouri with the defeat of a Rebel brigade that numbered more than 2,000 men at Kirksville but in the fall of 1862, Rebel victories at Newtonia and Clark’s Mill threatened Union control of southwest Missouri. Maj. Gen. Hindman was encouraged by these victories and decided to conduct an offense with his small Confederate Army.

His initial objective was to defeat each of the widely separated Union forces in Northwest Arkansas. However, the Federal commanders managed to unite their forces and defeat Hindman at the battle of Prairie Grove, Arkansas. At Prairie Grove, Federal Brig. Gen. James Blunt demonstrated the same aggressive nature and willingness to accept risk that he later demonstrated against Price in 1864. At Prairie Grove, his force was significantly outnumbered, yet he chose to attack rather than remain on the defense, just as he would at the fights at Little Blue and Brush Creek near Westport. By the end of December 1862, Union forces had defeated the Rebel recruiters and driven them from the state and the only remaining pro-Confederate forces in Missouri were the small guerrilla bands. In 1862, the Rebel leaders in Arkansas had maintained command and control over the recruiter forces serving in Missouri. However, they had little to no control over the guerrilla bands that continued to operate in Missouri. These bands had started forming soon after the start of the war. In 1863, they were the only remaining pro-southern forces still operating in Missouri. The guerrillas provided some support to the Confederate war effort by disrupting Union supply lines and threatening exposed Union garrisons and patrols. At times they served as scouts for large Confederate cavalry raids. In 1864, Price tried with little success to coordinate their activities to support his raid into Missouri. However, most of the guerrilla activities were characterized by ambushes and raids on individuals or families in rural areas. Much of the violence was of a vigilante nature and civilians, no matter which side they supported, faced beatings, looting, and murder. For many, the war was only an excuse to settle personal grudges. Ironically, the Union’s formation of the MSM, EEM, and PEMM, despite their successes, also contributed to the formation of the guerrilla groups. Missouri enrollment laws did not require Confederate sympathizers to enroll in the militia, but they did have to declare their sympathies, which subjected them to reprisals from Union sympathizers. Many with Southern loyalties who may have chosen to sit the war out instead joined with the guerrilla bands when they saw it was no longer possible to remain neutral. In 1863, the level of guerrilla activity dramatically increased. Nonetheless, their activities did little to support the overall war effort and it could be debated that their activities actually hurt the wider efforts of the Confederacy. In turn, the Confederate Leaders would turn to large cavalry raids into Missouri as their only means of forcing the Union to divert resources to the fight for Missouri.

**Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck:** Evidence has been received at these headquarters that Major General Sterling Price has issued commissions or licenses to certain bandits in this State, authorizing them to raise “guerrilla forces,” for the purpose of plunder and marauding. General Price ought to know that such a course is contrary to the rules of civilized warfare, and that every man who enlists in such an organization forfeits his life and becomes an outlaw. All persons are hereby warned that if they join any guerrilla band they will not, if captured, be treated as ordinary prisoners of war, but will be hung as robbers and murderers. Their lives shall atone for the barbarity of their general.

**Confederate War Department:** An ACT to organize bands of partisan rangers.

**SECTION 1.** The Congress of the Confederate States of America do enact, That the President be, and is hereby, authorized to commission such officers as he may deem proper with authority to form bands of partisan rangers, in companies, battalions or regiments, either as infantry or cavalry, the companies, battalions, or regiments to be composed each of such numbers as the President may approve.

**SECTION 2.** Be it further enacted, That such partisan rangers, after being regularly received into service, shall be entitled to the same rations and quarters during their term of service, and be subject to the same regulations as other soldiers.
SECTION 3. Be it further, enacted, That for any arms and munitions of war captured from the enemy by any body of partisan rangers and delivered to any quartermaster at such places as may be designated by a commanding general, the rangers shall be paid their full value in such manner as the Secretary of War may prescribe.
1862
1. 31 Dec: First Raid - Marmaduke departed Lewisburg.

1863
2. 8 Jan: Battle of Springfield. Union (2,000) Vs. Confederate (1,870).
4. 25 Jan: Marmaduke arrived in Batesville, AR.
5. 17 Apr 1863: Second Raid - Marmaduke departed Pocahontas, AR.
6. 26 Apr 1863: Battle of Cape Girardeau. Union (4,000) Vs. Confederate (5,000).
7. 1-2 May 1863: Battle of Chalk Bluff. Union (5,000+) Vs. Confederate (5,000).
8. 2 May 1863: Marmaduke moved back into AR.

9. 9-11 Jan: Battle of Arkansas Post
11. 29 Apr: Grant Crosses the Mississippi.
12. 1 May: Battle of Port Gibson.

Map 5.
5. Marmaduke’s Raids (1862-1863)

Maj. Gen. Hindman’s defeat at Prairie Grove and the demoralization of his army seriously threatened his ability to defend Arkansas. He was concerned that the Union Army would advance towards Little Rock. To disrupt Union resources, he directed Brig. Gen. John Marmaduke to conduct a large cavalry raid into Missouri. On 31 December 1862, Marmaduke commenced his raid. He divided his 2,600 men into two columns for effective foraging and to confuse the Union forces as to his true objectives. His goal was to disrupt the key Union supply line between Rolla and Springfield. Marmaduke believed Springfield was more lightly defended than was actually the case, and decided to disregard his orders to avoid a major engagement. He failed to capture the town but did force the Union command to divert forces to Springfield. Meanwhile, his second column seized Hartville. Marmaduke reunited his forces at Marshfield and, after another skirmish at Hartville, decided to retreat back into Arkansas. Maj. Gen. Kirby Smith, the new Confederate commander of Trans-Mississippi Theater (all forces west of the Mississippi), then directed a second Missouri raid in the spring of 1863. His goal was to divert Union resources on both sides of the Mississippi River from their operations against Little Rock, Arkansas and Vicksburg, Mississippi. Marmaduke initiated his second raid on 18 April 1863. It was a large raid with a force of 5,000 men and eight guns. He planned to attack the Union garrison at Bloomfield, Missouri. However, the large Confederate wagon train of supplies slowed their advance and allowed the Federals to retreat to the heavily fortified Cape Girardeau before Rebel columns closed in on the town. Marmaduke decided to advance against Cape Girardeau but made no serious effort to attack the entrenchments and forts surrounding the town. He then retreated back to Arkansas.

The raids were not spectacularly successful but they did divert some Union forces away from their offense into Arkansas. The raids also initiated a massive building program of additional Union fortifications in Missouri to protect strategic points from future raids which was a serious draw against valuable war resources. The most important lesson for both sides was the realization of how vulnerable Missouri was to a large-scale raid.

Brig. Gen. Samuel Curtis: Dispatch of the 11th, via Sedalia, received. Your gallant and successful defense of Springfield has added to the glory of the 8th January. The troops and people of Springfield who participated in your efforts have given imperishable proof of their loyal devotion to our cause and country, and the State of Missouri will cherish your memory.

Brig. Gen. John Marmaduke: I have the honor to submit the following report of the expedition under my command into Missouri, made in obedience to General Hindman’s order to move, if possible, rapidly, and strike the enemy in rear or flank, in order to withdraw the heavy masses (infantry, cavalry, and artillery), under Blunt, then moving toward the Arkansas River; back into Missouri… In conclusion, I think I may safely state that the object of the expedition was fully accomplished, and more. Blunt’s Army of the Frontier countermarched rapidly to save Springfield; a long chain of forts, strong in themselves, built at great expense and labor, which overawed and kept in subjection the country, were razed to the ground, and the heart of the people revived again at the presence of Confederate troops.
1861
1. 29 Sept: Quantrill resigned/deserted from the MSG and returned to his home in Blue Springs. His band consisted of 10 to 15 men.

1862
2. 7 Mar: Quantrill (40 men) raided Aubry, KS., (killed 5 civilians). His band increased to 100+ men, despite MG Halleck’s proclamation to treat guerrillas as criminals.
3. 11 Aug: Quantrill band participated in the raid on Independence.
4. 6 Sep: Quantrill (140 men) sacked Olathe, KS., (killed 10+ civilians).
6. 5 Nov: Quantrill (150 men) participated in the Rebel attack against Lamar, Mo. His band stayed the winter in AR.

1863
7. 10 Aug: Quantrill held a council in Blue Springs with other guerilla leaders to plan the raid on Lawrence.
8. 21 Aug: The raid on Lawrence, (killed 150+ civilians).
9. 25 Aug: General Order #11 (depopulated and burned the rural areas and small towns of 4 counties).
10. 6 Oct: The attack against Fort Blair and the Baxter Springs Massacre. His band stayed the winter in TX.

Map 6.
6. Bushwhackers and General Order No. 11

Maj. Samuel Byers stated that, “Missouri was neither North or South; she was simply hell, for her people were cutting one another’s throat, and neighboring farmers killed each other and burned each other’s home.” His statement accurately reflects the situation following the defeat of the recruiters. The Confederacy had no organized force in the state. Instead, dozens of pro-Confederate guerrilla groups, known as “bushwhackers,” operated throughout Missouri. Most were little more than squads of young men who attacked pro-Union supporters both in Kansas and Missouri. Many were motivated by the “Jayhawker” raids into Missouri early in the war and their actions were little more than revenge for past grievances. One of the most prominent guerrilla chieftains in 1863 Missouri was William Quantrill. His actions in Jackson County and the surrounding counties typified many of the other guerrilla leaders in other parts of Missouri. The Confederacy attempted to legitimize his operations with a formal army commission to the rank of Capt. The Confederate government even tried at times to issue official written orders in an attempt to coordinate his activities, but for the most part Quantrill and other bushwhackers operated well outside of a formal chain of command. Their actions did little to promote the war aims of the Confederacy other than to fix significant Federal resources in attempts to curtail their activities. Capt. Quantrill’s raid on Lawrence, Kansas was the Bushwhackers’ most infamous act in the war. His force of approximately 400 fighters burned the town and may have executed as many as 150 to 180 men and boys. Quantrill was also responsible for the massacre near Baxter Springs, Kansas. There, he defeated a detachment escorting Maj. Gen. Blunt. Quantrill’s men killed most of the detachment (80 of about 100 personnel), including the military band, and Maj. Henry Curtis (son of Maj. Gen. Samuel Curtis). Many of the Union soldiers were executed after surrendering. Maj. Gen. Blunt was one of the few that managed to escape. The “Unionist” forces struggled throughout the war to find an effective policy for combating the guerrillas. One of their most tarnished acts was Brig. Gen. Thomas Ewing’s General Order No. 11. Soon after the raid on Lawrence, Ewing accused rural Missourians of supporting the “bushwhackers.” His order resulted in the forced expulsion of all rural residents in Jackson, Cass, Bates, and Vernon counties. Union forces then burned the homesteads to deny their use to Rebel guerrillas. The unpopular order provided some protection to eastern Kansas but the guerrillas in Missouri just moved their operations away from the “Burnt District.” The actions of a few hundred guerrillas may of also given a false sense of hope to some Confederate leaders that Missouri was ripe for a popular uprising against Union forces in the state.

Maj. Gen. John Schofield: The border of Kansas and Missouri has been the scene of the most revolting hostilities... On the 19th of August, the brigades secretly assembled to the number of about 300, near the border of Kansas, marched rapidly upon the town of Lawrence, and attacked it at dawn of day... No resistance whatever was offered. The town was robbed and burned, and the unarmed people murdered in the most fiendish manner.

Missouri Ballad: Come all you bold robbers and open your ears, Of Quantrill the Lion heart you quickly shall hear. With his band of bold raiders in double quick time, He came to lay Lawrence low, over the line.
Map 7.

1. 22 Sep: Shelby departed Arkadelphia.
2. 27 Sep: Crossed Arkansas River into Federal occupied territory.
3. 4 Oct: Captured the Union supply depot at Neosho.
4. 5-6 Oct: Scattered Union garrisons at Greenfield, Stockton, and Humansville.
5. 7 Oct: Forced a crossing over the Osage R. at Warsaw.
6. 11-12 Oct: Fought rearguard action at Boonville against Union pursuit.
8. 19 Oct: Fought rearguard action at Carthage against Union pursuit.
9. 26 Oct: Fought rearguard action at Clarkesville against Union pursuit.
10. 3 Nov: Shelby arrived in Washington.
7. Jo Shelby’s Raid (1863)

In the fall of 1863, the Confederate situation in the Trans-Mississippi was bleak. The Confederate defeat at Gettysburg and, more importantly, the surrender of Vicksburg ended any hope of direct assistance from the eastern half of the Confederacy. Union forces had captured Little Rock and then pushed the few remaining Confederate forces into southern Arkansas. Additionally, the raid on Lawrence emboldened the Union forces to track down and disperse most of the rebel partisan units operating in Missouri. Only a few die-hard groups continued to fight. Nevertheless, Col. Joseph Shelby proposed another raid into Missouri. Maj. Gen. Kirby Smith supported the concept and wanted Shelby to keep Union troops in Missouri occupied and unable to support further operations against Arkansas. He also wanted to encourage Confederate sympathizers in northern Arkansas and Missouri and hopefully raise recruits to replenish the depleted Rebel ranks. On 22 September, Shelby departed Arkadelphia, Arkansas, with 750 handpicked men and two cannons. In Missouri, 400 recruits joined his column. He captured a Union supply depot at Neosho, Missouri and then continued north. Next, he captured the small Union garrison at Greenfield and forced other garrisons at Stockton, Humansville, and Warsaw to disperse. Meanwhile, Union forces mobilized to track down and destroy Shelby’s raiders. Brig. Gen. Egbert Brown’s Union forces forced Shelby into a rearguard action at Boonville and then almost trapped him at Marshall, Missouri. However, Shelby’s raiders successfully broke contact and then retreated back to Arkansas. Shelby’s raid may have caused as much as $800,000 in damages and in recognition of his success the Confederacy promoted the daring Col. to Brig. Gen. The success of the raid did little to improve the Confederacy’s deteriorating situation in the Trans-Mississippi, however. Nevertheless, Shelby’s report confirmed the Confederate military leadership’s belief that the large-scale raids diverted Union resources away from other threatened areas of the Confederacy. Shelby’s report also encouraged the Missouri Confederate government in exile that there was hope an invasion or large raid would be greeted by the people of Missouri, who they now believed to be, “as a mass, true to the South.”

Brig. Gen. Egbert Brown: The pursuit and fighting has been done by the Missouri State Militia and Enrolled Missouri Militia. I can only point to the result of their efforts as the best commentary on their gallantry and endurance. For the past three days they have followed and engaged the enemy night and day, in the rain, without subsistence, except that gathered by the wayside, or protection, from the storm... To the citizens of Sedalia and the country generally, and to the Enrolled Missouri Militia, who readily obeyed the call “to arms,” the State is in part indebted for the unsuccessful issue of the raid.

Col. Joseph Shelby: I have arrived safely with my entire command, increased about 600. I have fought five battles; had daily skirmishes; traveled 1,500 miles; captured and paroled 500 prisoners; destroyed 6 railroad bridges; torn up 30 miles of track; entered Boonville; marched to Marshall; met Generals Brown and Ewing there with 8,000 men; fought them six hours; lost 125 men; expended all my ammunition, and retreated in splendid order... I have traveled 1,500 miles, and found the people of Missouri, as a mass, true to the South and her institutions, yet needing the strong presence of a Confederate army to make them volunteer. The southern, southwestern, and some of the middle counties of Missouri are completely desolated. In many places for 40 miles not a single habitation is to be found.
Notes


3. For additional information on Van Dorn see Robert G. Hartje, *Van Dorn - The Life and Times of a Confederate General* (Norman, OK: Vanderbilt University Press, 1994).


5. For additional information on Jeff Thompson see M. Jeff Thompson, *Civil War Reminiscences of General M. Jeff Thompson* (New York: Morningside Bookshop, 1988).


13. The actual number of those executed is greatly debated and could have been significantly less.


Part III

The Road to Saint Louis

March to 3 October 1864
The Red River Campaign (March to May 1864) may have been the last significant Confederate victory of the war. In the campaign, Lieut. Gen. Kirby Smith’s forces defeated the Union attempt to capture Shreveport, Louisiana.\(^4\)

The Confederate success in the Red River Campaign created strategic challenges for the Confederacy. The victory freed forces for future operations, but the Trans-Mississippi lacked the resources to transition to the offense in the west and the defensive stance of the Union forces created the question of what to do with the limited resources available. Additionally, the Confederate failure to pursue and destroy the Union Army at the close of the Red River Campaign led to bitter enmity between Kirby Smith and Lieut. Gen. Richard Taylor (the Confederate tactical commander in the Red River Campaign). Taylor was Smith’s best field commander, and his reassignment to the east created the need for a new field commander for Confederate operations in the Trans-Mississippi. The Confederate victory in the Red River Campaign did not alter the desperate strategic situation the South faced in 1864. The year 1863 and the opening months of 1864 were hard times for the Confederacy. The fledging nation was unable to protect its borders. The Union Army occupied four of its eleven state capitals (seven of 14 if counting Missouri, Kentucky, and Arizona Territory). The Confederacy’s two most significant field armies were on the doorstep of defeat. The Army of Northern Virginia was fixed in the trenches surrounding Petersburg and Richmond in Virginia. The Army of Tennessee was locked into a fight to retain Atlanta, Georgia. In July 1864, Gen. Braxton Bragg, military advisor to President Jefferson Davis, recognized the seriousness of the situation and wanted to focus the South’s resources toward Virginia and Georgia. He believed any major operation west of the Mississippi was “too much for our limited means” to be successful.\(^3\) Bragg believed, as did James Seddon, the Confederate Secretary of War, that “the best use for the troops in the Trans-Mississippi Department, if practicable, would be to operate (so far as to be spared) on this side [east] the river.”\(^4\)

Therefore, Bragg directed Kirby Smith to transfer his infantry to the eastern departments. Braxton Bragg was realistic in his assessment of the situation. However, the directive to transfer the troops was wholly impractical and nearly impossible to implement. It was impractical because of the individualist nature of the western troops. The Trans-Mississippi Confederate soldier had no sense of national loyalty. Their concerns were close to home, and they did not feel a responsibility to fight in Georgia and Virginia. The political leaders in Arkansas, Louisiana, and the exiled Missouri government supported and encouraged these views. Senator Augustus Garland of Confederate Arkansas stated, “Our troops here will not go. They will throw down their arms first.”\(^5\) Regardless, the directive was almost impossible to execute because of the Union control of the Mississippi River. Federal gunboats patrolled the river and the Union Army controlled all the crossing points. It was possible for small units to steal across the river, but a crossing of major units was not viable and the Trans-Mississippi lacked the resources to force a crossing against Union opposition.

Many different levels of political and military leadership generated the concept of a large expedition into Missouri as an alternative to the troop transfer to the east. Paramount were the aspirations of the exiled Confederate Missouri politicians who were “impatient for an advance into Missouri.”\(^6\) In 1863, the Trans-Mississippi Confederates executed three major cavalry raids into Missouri. The Confederacy conducted no raids during the first half of 1864 and the political leadership was concerned the pro-Southern supporters in Missouri would lose hope without a raid in 1864. Thomas Reynolds, Missouri’s Confederate governor-in-exile, suggested another raid into the state. He hoped for a general uprising against what he saw as a Union military occupation of his home state. However, he justified the raid with a more attainable goal of pulling Union resources away from Georgia and Virginia.\(^7\) Lieut. Gen. Kirby Smith, the Confederate commander of Trans-Mississippi Theater, also supported the concept of an expedition into Missouri. As early as May 1864 and soon after the victory in the Red River Campaign, he contemplated how next to employ his limited resources. Attacks against New Orleans, Baton Rouge, or Vicksburg were all impractical due to the Federal Navy’s control of the Mississippi River. He considered an attack to regain control of Little Rock. However, even that goal was beyond the reach of the forces available. Smith considered complying with the directive to send his infantry divisions east across the Mississippi but quickly determined it could not be done. Consequently, he decided the only viable contribution he could make to the Southern war effort was a raid into northeastern Arkansas against the Federal supply lines or a larger expedition into Missouri. Smith reasoned that if he could not transfer resources east of the Mississippi River, then he would force the Union Army to transfer resources west of the river.

Maj. Gen. Price encouraged Smith to go forward with the expedition into Missouri. Price claimed “that the Federals have but few reliable forces in the State, their garrisons being manned almost entirely with their State militia.”\(^8\) Price was in fact partially correct. Federal authorities had moved most of the volunteer troops in Missouri to the east and the state now depended mostly on the militia for defense. However, he failed to appreciate that the Missouri State Militia, or MSM, were
seasoned veterans. Price also assured Kirby Smith “the Confederate flag floats over nearly all the principal towns of North Missouri and large guerrilla parties are formed and operating in the southern portion of the State.” These claims proved to be overly optimistic. Guerrilla activity was rampant throughout much of the state, but a significant portion of Missouri’s population no longer supported the guerilla activity. The population just wanted to be left alone for the most part and they were not willing to rise up in revolt against Federal authorities and few openly flew the Confederate flag. Nevertheless, the Order of American Knights (OAK), a pro-Confederate organization in Missouri, convinced Price that thousands of loyal southerners would rally to the flag if he entered the state with a large army. Price estimated “not less than 30,000” men would join with his army when he returned to Missouri. Eventually, Kirby Smith received tepid support for the expedition from Richmond. Most, with the exceptions of Confederate Missouri political and military leaders, believed it was “larger in its aims than our resources may suffice to compass.” It appeared to be the only option worthy of consideration, however. There was also a belief that not only would the expedition pull Federal resources back into Missouri but it could possibly influence the upcoming national elections in the north.

Confederate leaders calculated that even a temporary occupation of St. Louis would help presidential candidate George McClellan (the Democratic Party’s Peace Candidate) unseat Lincoln and possibly improve the South’s hopes to negotiate a peace. Therefore, Kirby Smith moved forward with his plans to execute a major operation into Missouri. He initially wanted Lieut. Gen. Richard Taylor to plan and command the operation, but Taylor had transferred out of the department and was no longer available for the assignment. Reluctantly, Smith turned to Maj. Gen. Sterling Price. Price was a logical choice. He was popular with both the Missouri troops and the Southern sympathizers that remained in Missouri. His past performance as a division level commander, although not spectacular, did demonstrate a certain level of competence. However, Smith did not have good personal relationship with Price. He personally embraced little confidence in Price’s skills as senior commander and had stated, “he is good for nothing.”

This Vignette has two Southern accounts.

**Captain and Aide-de-Camp Thomas Butler:** By direction of General Bragg I forward to you from this point orders herewith inclosed, and in his name earnestly urge you to their prompt execution. I am also directed by the general to give you briefly a summary of the military situation on this side in order that you may yourself see the pressing necessity for the movement of your troops across the Mississippi River. At Petersburg General Lee has a formidable army in his front and in a position whence it can at all times seriously interrupt his communications south. Early, with his corps in the Valley, is meeting resistance, and his whole command is required there to protect and get out the grain and prevent an advance from that quarter: No troops can possibly be spared from Virginia for other points; and the sea-board is well nigh stripped, a few troops, hardly sufficient for its protection, remaining at Charleston. General Hood’s army (formerly Johnston’s) has retired to the immediate vicinity of Atlanta, and Sherman is threatening that place with an army superior in numbers and in fine condition. The Federal cavalry has cut the Atlanta and August and Atlanta and Montgomery Railroads, rendering the latter road inoperative for more than a month. Every available man in General Hood’s department has been sent to the front, including the operatives in the Government shops. Still more troops are urgently needed. By the withdrawal of our army across the Chattahoochee River all the territory west of that stream, including the whole State of Alabama, is left open to the inroads of the enemy. There is no force for its protection. In North Mississippi the enemy has retired, but his intentions are not yet developed. If he is re-enforced, as it is now supposed he will be, by troops from Arkansas he will be enabled to move forward and defeat our cavalry in his front; or he may send re-enforcements around to Sherman. Either event would tend greatly to increase the difficulties of our situation.

**Lieut. Gov. Thomas Reynolds:** When here in March last you expressed the opinion that the recovery of the Arkansas Valley ought to precede an advance to reoccupy our State. But could not a powerful diversion be made by cavalry alone without awaiting the recovery of Little Rock! Even if compelled to return, it might gain time for us in Georgia or avert an attack on Mobile by compelling the enemy to send large forces to Missouri. If successful in maintaining itself the cavalry might be re-enforced by infantry from Arkansas and by recruiting within our State. But the main point of view from which I suggest such an expedition is that it may take off some of the pressure on us in Virginia and Georgia.
The Union Command in the West

Confederate Controlled Territory in July 1864

The Union Division of West Mississippi (Maj. Gen. Edward Canby)
  The Department of the Gulf (Maj. Gen. Stephen Hurlbut)
  The Department of Arkansas (Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele)
  The Department of the Missouri (Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans)

The Department of Kansas (Maj. Gen. Samuel Curtis)
9. The Union Command in the West

The Confederate victory in the Red River Campaign also had significant operational consequences for the Union war effort in Missouri and Kansas. Lieut. Gen. Ulysses Grant, the new commanding general of all Union Armies, decided upon a strategy that focused the war effort against the two remaining Confederate field armies in the east (Gen. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia and Gen. Joseph Johnston’s Army of Tennessee). He adopted a “let-alone policy” concerning the Trans-Mississippi. Grant saw the “vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas” as isolated and of no noteworthy threat to the Union war effort. He believed the western Confederates lacked the resources for effective offensive operations and wanted the Union forces west of the Mississippi to remain on the defense. Grant stated that over time “little more than one-half” of the Confederate soldiers in the Trans-Mississippi would be available to threaten the Union’s control of Missouri and northern Arkansas.17 In other words, Grant assumed most of the western Rebels, with no perceived capability of executing an offensive campaign and no Union invasions to oppose, would just quit the war and go home. Unfortunately for the citizens of Missouri and Kansas loyal to the Union, his assumptions proved to be incorrect. The War Department, in response to the Union failure in the Red River Campaign, reorganized the Union command structure west of the Mississippi. The reorganization provided for better coordination between different departmental commands.

Maj. Gen. Edward Canby assumed command of the newly created Military Division of Western Mississippi. The geographical division included the Departments of the Missouri, the Department of Arkansas (Arkansas and the Indian Territory), and the Department of the Gulf. The Department of the Gulf included the coastal regions along the Gulf of Mexico from Texas to Florida. Canby understood the impact of Grant’s policy on his command and recognized he must accomplish multiple missions with limited resources. Canby’s primary mission was the security of the Mississippi and Arkansas Rivers. Additionally, he was responsible for reintegrating Union-controlled territory back into the Union. A major challenge was the guerilla activity against river traffic on the Mississippi River and in Northern Arkansas. Additionally, there was the epidemic of guerilla war in Missouri. Canby also dealt with the constant threat of large Confederate raids crossing over the Arkansas River into Northern Arkansas or possibly continuing north into Missouri. Grant’s decision “to concentrate all the force possible against the Confederate armies in the field” (the east) meant that Missouri must look to its own defense and rely primarily on the state militia.18 The War Department also continued to pull resources from the west to support operations in the east. The most significant loss of forces occurred on 1 June 1864. The War Department renamed “The Detachment of the Army of the Tennessee” to “The Right Wing of the Sixteenth Corps” and ordered its transfer from Louisiana to report to the Department of Tennessee. It was a major loss of available veteran field forces for the Division of West Mississippi. Another major command west of the Mississippi was Maj. Gen. Samuel Curtis’ Department of Kansas.19 His command included Kansas, as well as Colorado and Nebraska Territories. Curtis, like Canby, reported directly to the War Department. President Lincoln had voiced his understanding of Grant’s strategy when he stated, “If a man can’t skin he must hold a leg while somebody else does.”20

Curtis recognized that his backcountry command would “hold a leg” with only minimal resources while major Union Armies east of the Mississippi won the war. Nevertheless, Curtis faced three simultaneous wars. They were the conflicts against the Plains Indians, the Border War, and the greater American Civil War. Curtis’s main priority was the ongoing fight with the Cheyenne Nation and other Plains Indian tribes. The Cheyenne posed a significant threat to the overland trails connecting the far west to Kansas and points further east. Recently, the conflicts between the Cheyenne and the United States Government had exploded into the Cheyenne War of 1864. Curtis’ second conflict was the festering “Border War” with the pro-Confederate guerillas raiding into to Kansas. The threat of guerilla raids had peaked in mid-1863 and had since declined. However, the guerillas still posed a threat and required Curtis to allocate resources to protect the Kansas border. The third war was the American Civil War and ironically it was Curtis’ lowest priority. In December of 1862, Union forces, which included a Kansas Division, defeated Maj. Gen. Thomas Hindman’s Confederate Army at the Battle of Prairie Grove. By September of 1863, Union forces had captured Fort Smith and Little Rock in Arkansas and the boundary between the Union and the Confederacy had moved south to the Arkansas River. In 1863, the Confederacy sent three large cavalry raids into Missouri (see Part II of this Atlas) but none of these threatened Kansas. Kansas provided a significant number of volunteers to support the Union War effort throughout the war. By mid-1863, however, the War Department had transferred most of the volunteer regiments in Kansas to other areas. Unlike Canby’s Division of West Mississippi, the Department of Kansas contained no brigade, division, or corps formations the War Department could transfer to the east, and Curtis managed to hold on to the few volunteer regiments still serving in his command. Kansas was still loyal to President Lincoln and the war effort, but the state’s political leadership believed the Confederate threat to Kansas was minimal and had begun to refocus.
their efforts toward western expansion. The Union high command had regulated the Division of West Mississippi and the Department of Kansas into low priority areas of operations.

Gen. Grant expected the commanders in the West to retain the territory currently occupied with minimal forces. The primary threat was believed to be guerillas and Indians operating against key infrastructure and lines of communication (LOC). There was the possibility of a Confederate cavalry raid but even this seemed less likely when the Confederates failed to execute any major raids in the first half of 1864. Grant’s “let-alone policy” may have had the unintended consequences of lulling the western Union commanders into believing the big war in the west was over. Maj. Gen. Canby’s key subordinates were thus potentially unprepared for a major Confederate offensive in the west. Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele, commander of the Department of Arkansas, positioned his forces to secure the Arkansas River as a LOC against Rebel guerillas and Confederate raids. He was not prepared to stop a major Confederate thrust across the river. Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans positioned his extremely limited resources in an effort to contain the rampant guerilla activity in Missouri and was unprepared to stop a Confederate drive into the state. In Kansas, Maj. Gen. Samuel Curtis was decisively engaged against the Indian threat to the Overland Trails and lacked the resources to protect Kansas from a major Confederate raid. In the fall of 1864, the senior Union commanders west of the Mississippi found themselves in a situation that required them to adjust their understanding of “let-alone policy.” Additionally, they would have to reevaluate the effort and resources required to “hold a leg” and allocate their forces to counter the impending threat.

Both Vignettes are from the Northern Perspective

**Maj. Gen. Rosecrans:** A dispatch from “H.W. Halleck, major-general,” came through the Commercial office last night, ordering me to send the two regiments of 100-days’ men to Chicago. One of these regiments is at Rolla, guarding that important depot for two districts, while all our available cavalry is protecting the heavy trains, of 900 wagons, running from thence to Springfield. The other is distributed at Pilot Knob and the most important bridges on the important military railroad. I have no troops with which to replace them. All my cavalry force is operating against the numerous bands of rebels which have come up from Price’s army, and are now plundering, murdering, and robbing, as opportunity offers, through the southern, central, and northern part of the State, while the rebel forces occupy Arkansas, between us and General Steele, and there are such dangerous elements at work in our midst that those bridges and depots must be guarded to secure them. I sent these regiments out, and called on the Governor for two regiments of militia, to guard our depots and prisons here. In this condition, as we must replace the troops by some force, and as I see none available but militia, would it not be best to leave these troops here and order out militia at Chicago? Please carefully consider this and instruct me.

**Lieut. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant:** My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against the Confederate armies in the field. There were but two such, as we have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the south bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac; the second, under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to Sherman who was still at Chattanooga. Beside these main armies the Confederates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmond to Tennessee. [Nathan Bedford] Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the West with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold what we had gained in Middle and West Tennessee. We could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the Northern States open to invasion.

Note: “The line held by the enemy” includes the Arkansas River that was the dividing line between the Union control of northern Arkansas and the Confederate control of southern Arkansas.
Price’s Political Objective
Control a significant Missouri City and hold elections for a Confederate State Government.

Maj. Gen. Kirby Smith’s Order
1. Move into Missouri with three cavalry divisions
2. Avoid all wanton acts of destruction and devastation.
3. Rally the loyal men of Missouri.
4. Make Saint Louis the objective point and collect supplies and military stores.
5. If compelled to withdraw from the State, make your retreat through Kansas and the Indian Territory, sweeping that country of its mules, horses, cattle, and military supplies of all kinds
On 4 August 1864, Lieut. Gen. Kirby Smith issued orders for Price to gather all the cavalry in the District of Arkansas and to move into Missouri. Smith established two primary objectives for the expedition into Missouri. The first was to rally the loyal men of Missouri to the Confederate cause and enlist new recruits. Smith desperately needed men to fill out the depleted units in the resource-constrained Trans-Mississippi Department. The second objective was to capture St. Louis. Smith believed the capture of the city would encourage recruitment, provide valuable military supplies, and force the Union to commit significant resources to retake the city. There were also additional political objectives.

The Confederate lieutenant governor of Missouri, Thomas Reynolds, planned to accompany the expedition. The elected but exiled governor of Missouri, Claiborne Jackson, died of cancer in late 1862 leaving Reynolds as the senior elected official for Missouri. Reynolds planned to hold elections in St. Louis. He recognized Price’s potential for rallying Missourians to the Southern cause. However, he had little confidence in his capacity to command. Reynolds also personally distrusted Price and believed him to be “devious, insincere, petulant, and arrogant.”

Kirby Smith recognized that Price would not be able to hold St. Louis for an extended time and thus directed a return route through Kansas and the Indian Territory. He wanted Price to sweep the country for military supplies of all kinds and destroy infrastructure valuable to the Union War effort. Smith was concerned, however, about the discipline of the Missourians, who were hardened by three years of guerrilla warfare. Smith, within the body of the order, reiterated to Price that the goal was to rally Missouri to the cause and not alienate them from the southern cause and he directed Price to restrain his men and avoid wanton acts of destruction.

Maj. Gen. Rosecrans: From early in the spring it was known through the lodges of the O.A.K.’s and other rebel sources that Price intended a great invasion of this State, in which he expected the co-operation of that order and of rebels generally, and by which he hoped to obtain important military and political results... This department having been depleted of troops permission was obtained to raise volunteers to meet the exigencies of our situation.

Lieut. Gen. Kirby Smith: You will make immediate arrangements for a movement into Missouri, with the entire cavalry force of your district. General Shelby should be instructed to have his command in Northeast Arkansas ready to move by the 20th instant... General Fagan will command the division composed of Cabell’s and Crawford’s brigades. These skeleton organizations are best adapted for an expedition in which a large addition to your force is expected. These weak brigades should be filled by the regiments raised in Missouri... You will scrupulously avoid all wanton acts of destruction and devastation, restrain your men, and impress upon them that their aim should be to secure success in a just and holy cause and not to gratify personal feeling and revenge. Rally the loyal men of Missouri, and remember that our great want is men, and that your object should be, if you cannot maintain yourself in that country, to bring as large an accession as possible to our force... Make Saint Louis the objective point of your movement, which, if rapidly made, will put you in possession of that place, its supplies, and military stores, and which will do more toward rallying Missouri to your standard than the possession of any other point. Should you be compelled to withdraw from the State, make your retreat through Kansas and the Indian Territory, sweeping that country of its mules, horses, cattle, and military supplies of all kinds.
28 August – 19 September 1864

1. 28 Aug: Price departed Camden.
2. 3 Sep: Maj. Gen. Rosecrans (Department of Missouri) requested the XVI Corps for employment in MO.
3. 3 Sep: Maj. Gen. Canby (Military Division of West Mississippi) ordered the 2d Division, XIX Corps (station in LA) to reinforce the Department of Arkansas.
4. 7 Sep: Price crossed over the Arkansas River.
5. 12 Sep: Maj. Gen. Mower’s 1st Division, XVI Corps and Col. Winslow’s Cavalry Bde arrived at Brownsville, Ar.
6. 13 Sep: 3d Division, XVI Corps arrived at Jefferson Barracks.
7. 17 Sep: Price rendezvous with Shelby’s Division at Pocahontas.
8. 17 Sep: Mower and Winslow departed Brownsville and pursued Price’s Army of Missouri.
9. 19 Sep: Price’s Army of Missouri crossed into Missouri.
11. The Invasion of Missouri

In late August 1864, Kirby Smith directed his infantry to conduct a feint toward Little Rock and Brig. Gen. Shelby’s cavalry was directed to disrupt Union supply lines in northeast Arkansas. This provided a sufficient diversion for Price to slip his force across the Arkansas River and avoid Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele’s Arkansas Army defensive line. On 17 September, Price rendezvoused with Shelby’s force at Pocahontas, Arkansas. Then on the 19th, the army crossed into Missouri in three division columns and moved north. It had been more than two years and a half years since Price walked upon the soil of his adopted state.

Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Rosecrans prepared the Department of Missouri to meet the threat. On 3 September, he requested the use of Maj. Gen. Andrew Smith’s detachment of the XVI Corps, which was moving from Memphis to Tennessee. In turn, Federal authorities moved one of Smith’s divisions up river toward Cape Girardeau and eventually into the St. Louis area. At the same time, they moved Maj. Gen. Joseph Mower’s division and a brigade of cavalry into Arkansas to prevent a potential rendezvous between Price’s and Shelby’s forces. Additionally, Maj. Gen. Edward Canby, the commander of the Military Division of West Mississippi, shifted a division of the XIX Corps from Louisiana to the mouth of the White River to reinforce the Department of Arkansas. Unfortunately for the North, all the reinforcements arrived too late to prevent the Confederate concentration at Pocahontas.

Maj. Gen. Steele: General Price has crossed the Arkansas at Dardanelle with a large cavalry force, variously estimated from 5,000 to 10,000... It was my opinion that he intended to join Shelby, who has about 5,000 armed, and operate on my communications... But Price’s soldiers all say they are going to Missouri... I cannot understand how they can subsist on the march to Missouri... I have just received re-enforcements from Memphis, and shall do all I can to keep Price out of Missouri. If troops had reached me sooner I could easily have defeated Price’s Missouri movements, if such are his plans. I have not cavalry enough to cope with him, and it is very doubtful if infantry can catch him.

Maj. Gen. Price: Having determined to invade Missouri in three columns, Major-General Fagan, with his division, was ordered to march to Fredericktown, Mo., by the way of Martinsburg, Reeves’ Station, and Greenville. Major-General Marmaduke, with his division, was ordered to march to the vicinity of Fredericktown, to the right of the route to be followed by Fagan’s division, as above designated, varying from it from ten to thirty miles, or as nearly within those limits as might be practicable on account of roads and forage. Brigadier-General Shelby, with his command, was to march to the vicinity of Fredericktown by a route to the left of General Fagan’s, varying from it from ten to twenty miles as nearly as practicable on account of roads and forage. The headquarters to march with the center column... A map of the route to be followed was furnished each of the division commanders. The most stringent orders were issued against straggling and pillaging under the severest penalties, and the division commanders earnestly enjoined to use their utmost endeavors to have the order carried into effect in every particular and without delay.
19 - 22 September 1864
1. 19 Sep: Price's Army of Missouri crossed into Missouri.
2. 19-22 Sep: The Army of Missouri moved north in three division columns.
3. 22 Sep: Shelby's Division moved quickly toward Patterson.
4. 22 Sep: Union commanders consolidated scattered garrisons at (a) Pilot Knob, (b) New Madrid, and (c) Cape Girardeau.

Map 12.
Maj. Gen Price, in accordance with his orders, organized his army into three divisions under the command of Maj. Generals James Fagan, John Marmaduke, and Brig Gen. Joseph Shelby. Fagan’s division was the largest in the army with four brigades of Arkansas troops and two artillery batteries. Brig. Gen. William Cabell commanded the division’s one brigade of veteran troops. Marmaduke’s division contained only two brigades. However, one of his brigades was John Clark’s veteran Missouri troops along with two artillery batteries. Joseph Shelby, the junior division commander, had three brigades and one artillery battery split into two sections. Shelby’s men were all Missouri troops and included the best unit in the Army, the highly respected “Iron Brigade.” The Army consisted of approximately 13,000 mounted men, 14 artillery pieces, and a large wagon train of supplies. Nevertheless, the newly designated Army of Missouri was something of a paper tiger. About one quarter of his force was composed of untrained recruits forcibly drafted into Confederate service. Many lacked such basic equipment as canteens and cartridge boxes. Price also lacked sufficient military issue weapons for all his men and many later claimed that nearly 4,000 were unarmed. However, a better description for these men would be indifferently armed. The artillery was composed of all light-caliber guns. These were necessary for a fast moving cavalry column but lacking the power necessary against the fortifications protecting St. Louis and other key locations in Missouri.

Maj. Gen. Washburn: I have just received advices from two different sources, both of which I deem reliable, that a big raid is on foot for Missouri, led by Price and Shelby. An escaped citizen from near Batesville, who left five days ago, says that they were preparing ten days’ rations there for 12,000 men when he left, and it was understood that Price, with Marmaduke and other forces, had crossed the Arkansas River, and were moving toward Missouri, and would be joined at Batesville by Shelby’s forces, about 4,000 strong. The other citizen, well known to me, was in Shelby’s camp ten days ago, just before he raided on the railroad, and he informs me that there is no doubt about the intention to invade Missouri at once. I shall send A.J. Smith’s division up river just as soon as transports arrive to carry him, which I hope will be in a day or two. He goes to Sherman, unless some emergency should require him elsewhere. He will have 6,000 men.

Maj. Gen. Price: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF MISSOURI…Upon arriving at Pocahontas I immediately proceeded to organize the army, which was completed on the 18th, as follows: Fagan’s division, commanded by Major General J.F. Fagan, was composed of Brigadier General W. L. Cabell’s brigade, Colonel Slemons’ brigade, Colonel McCray’s brigade, Colonel Dobbin’s brigade, Colonels Lyles’ and Rogan’s commands, and Captain Anderson’s battalion. Marmaduke’s division, commanded by Major General J.S. Marmaduke, was composed of Brigadier General John B. Clark, Jr.’s, brigade, Colonel Freeman’s brigade, Colonel Kitchen’s regiment, and Lieutenant Colonel R. C. Wood’s battalion. Shelby’s division, commanded by Brigadier General J.O. Shelby, consisted of Colonel Shanks’ brigade, Colonel Jackman’s brigade, and Colonel Coleman’s command… I entered Missouri with nearly 12,000 men, of whom 8,000 were armed, and fourteen pieces of artillery.
Map 13.
The Department of Missouri was unprepared for a major Confederate incursion into the state. Maj. Gen. Rosecrans had fewer than 10,000 troops available and these were dispersed throughout the state to guard against guerrilla activity and to counter the seasonal cavalry raids. Rosecrans was aware that Price planned to move north but was unsure of his objective. As late as 22 September, he was unaware that a Confederate Army was moving toward St. Louis. His correspondence with Maj. Gen. Samuel Curtis, the commander of the Department of Kansas stated, “Our information does not yet warrant much southward movement to meet Price, whose line of movement is not yet developed.” Rosecrans organized the defense of the state into five districts. The District of St. Louis, which was the objective of Price’s expedition, was divided into three sub-districts. Each sub-district contained garrisons responsible for key infrastructure and major population centers. The St. Louis District, commanded by Brig. Gen. Ewing (under Federal authority), had approximately 3,000 troops to guard and patrol its area of responsibility. Most of these troops were Missouri State Militia (MSM), well-trained and disciplined veterans. However, the MSM experience was primarily in conducting counter-guerilla operations and lacked more conventional “big-battle” experience.

Brig. Gen. Edward Pike (under State Authority) commanded another 550 Enrolled Missouri Militia (EMM) deployed throughout the area in small garrisons. These troops were part-time soldiers and lacked formal training, equipment, and experience but were well suited to counter-guerrilla operations. The other four districts in Missouri had similar organizations and contained smaller garrisons than the St. Louis District. In the path of the Confederate invasion, Maj. James Wilson commanded the 3d Sub-District of Saint Louis. He was responsible for securing the lead mines at Pilot Knob. His poor situational awareness of Price’s location and direction of movement was probably indicative of most of the Union commanders in Missouri at the time. Neither the department commander nor any of his subordinates had yet determined where to concentrate forces to halt Price. Maj. Wilson was unaware of the large force descending upon his small garrison of only 150 men. Brig. Gen. Shelby’s division had passed through Patterson on the 22d, and was currently less than 30 miles south of Fredericktown.

Maj. Wilson: (23 Sept.) Citizens report Shelby, with 8,000 men, on the Whitewater, twenty miles from Fredericktown, yesterday. I cannot believe the report to be true.

Brig. Gen. Ewing: What scouting parties have you out and where?

Maj. Wilson: I have small scouting parties on all the roads leading from this place.

Brig. Gen. Shelby: I reached Patterson early to-day [22 Sept] and found about seventy-five Federal cavalry in the place who were charged by Colonel Elliott; 14 killed and several wounded... I only traveled ten miles to-day, consequent upon my being so much in advance of the main body. I would respectfully ask permission to make a forced march to-morrow upon Fredericktown to prevent the removal of the stores there. If this should be granted you will please inform me by courier; otherwise I will not reach that town until day after to-morrow. The Federals from Patterson went in that direction. I shall burn the fort here, with all the barracks and stables, together with a large number of tents left standing. They have evidently heard of our approach. I captured the telegraph apparatus at this post, and have secured the battery, magnets, and every-thing necessary to open communication at any point. Let me know where you will camp tomorrow night.
27 September (Morning)
5. Confederates attacked at dawn and forced the Union troops back to the high ground.
6. Confederates continued the attack (late morning) and forced their way over Shepherd Mountain.
7. Confederate attacks failed to secure the summit of Pilot Knob.
8. Confederates advanced into the gap, but heavy artillery fire from Fort Davidson forced them to retire.

26 September (Afternoon)
1. Fagan’s advance troops dashed through the Shut-In Gap and attacked Wilson’s pickets at Ironton.
2. Ewing reinforced Wilson and pushed the Confederates back to Shut-In Gap.
3. Fagan reinforced his advance guard and forced the Union troops back to Arcadia.
4. Union forces retired to Ironton under the cover of a rain storm.
On 24 September, Price’s Army approached Fredericktown, and Maj. Gen. Rosecrans finally accepted there was a clear threat to St. Louis. Rosecrans ordered Brig. Gen. Ewing to concentrate his forces at Pilot Knob and Cape Girardeau. Ewing took one brigade of the newly arrived XVI Corps and moved south along the Iron Mountain Railroad and posted the troops to strengthen garrisons along the route. On the 25th, Ewing continued south to Pilot Knob with a portion of one regiment. Maj. Wilson had collected all the available troops in his sub-district and now had slightly fewer than 1,500 men. By the 25th, Price had concentrated most of his Army at Fredericktown. At this point, he was less than 90 miles south of St. Louis. However, he received word that “Federal General A.J. Smith was encamped about 10 miles from Saint Louis with his corps, composed of about 8,000 infantry, on the Saint Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad.”

Price now started having doubts about the possibility of success in attacking Missouri’s largest city. Shelby’s scouts also reported that the Union garrison at Pilot Knob numbered approximately 1,500. Shelby recommended the Army of Missouri push on to St. Louis. Maj. Gen. Fagan recommended the neutralizing the threat to the Confederate flank before moving to the north. Price accepted Fagan’s advice and decided to attack the enemy forces in the vicinity of Pilot Knob. He was reluctant to leave a sizeable enemy garrison to his rear. His reasoning was probably much more complex. He probably hoped for an easy victory to boost the men’s morale and encourage recruitment. The next morning, Price directed Shelby to move north and cut the Iron Mountain Railroad, Ewing’s line of communication to St. Louis. He then moved his other divisions toward Arcadia. Fagan’s advance guard skirmished with Wilson’s Union troops at Shut-In Gap, a little more than four miles from Pilot Knob. The Confederates seized the gap and pushed on to Arcadia. Ewing reinforced Wilson’s detachment and forced the Rebels to fall back. Fagan, now supported by Marmaduke, counterattacked and drove the Federals back to Arcadia. On the 27th, the Confederates renewed the fight and pushed Wilson’s detachment back and captured the gap between Pilot Knob and Shepherd’s Mountain.

**Brig. Gen. Ewing:** Our pickets and scouts driven in here one hour ago on the Fredericktown road by a rebel force certainly 200 or 300 strong. I have re-enforced with one piece of artillery, and a desultory firing is going on a mile east of this and two and a half miles from the fort. I do not wish to bring on a general engagement out there if the whole rebel force is really at hand, because it is certainly 3,000 to 5,000 strong... I think I can hold the fort against 5,000 cavalry, and shall stand fast until I learn more as to Price.

**Maj. Gen. Price:** On the morning of the 26th, being rejoined by Major-General Marmaduke’s division, I proceeded at an early hour with Fagan’s and Marmaduke’s divisions in the direction of Ironton and Pilot Knob, at the same time sending forward a portion of Fagan’s division to take and hold a difficult pass in that direction between two mountains within three or four miles of Ironton. This was effected rapidly and with success... That evening Major-General Fagan drove in the Federal pickets at Arcadia and took position before the town for the night. The next morning he drove the enemy from Arcadia, where they abandoned a very strong position, through Ironton, where he also took a strong fort in the most gallant and brilliant manner. The enemy took refuge behind their fortifications at Pilot Knob.
27 September (Afternoon)

1. Union counter battery fire (12+ guns) forced the Confederate artillery (4 guns) deployed on Shepherd Mountain to withdraw. 
2. Union detachments defending the high ground forced to retreat by the Confederate advance.
3. Union fire defeated Clark’s attack and forced the Confederates to seek cover in the creek bed.
4. McCray’s and Slemon’s Brigades forced their way over Pilot Knob Mountain and attack the fort. Union fire halted their advance and pushed them back to the creek bed.

27 September (Afternoon)

5. Elements of Freeman’s BDE and Stayback’s detachment threatened the rear of the fort, but forced to retreat by fire from the rifle pits north of the fort.
6. Cabell’s BDE charged through the gap and reached the fort’s moat before being forced to retreat.
7. Sometime after midnight, Brig. Gen. Ewing evacuated the fort and retreated.

Map 15.
On 27 September, Price planned a simultaneous assault from several directions to overrun Fort Davidson. However, Price’s failure to properly coordinate the attacks allowed the guns of Fort Davidson to mass against each assault individually. Clark’s brigade out of Marmaduke’s Division, attacked over Shepherd Mountain. Meanwhile, Fagan’s brigades failed to advance simultaneously. One brigade crossed over the summit of Pilot Knob while another skirted around the north side of the knob and Cabell’s Brigade attacked through a valley. A hail of cannon and musket fire from the fort stopped most of the attacks. Only a few of the attackers managed to get into the moat, only to find the earthworks were too steep to climb. Price, not finding the easy victory he anticipated, called off the assaults and prepared to renew the attack the next day. Ewing held a council that night and planned an escape. Sometime after midnight, the Union soldiers evacuated the fort and slipped undetected through the Confederate lines. A rearguard exploded the powder magazine and later joined the retreat. The Confederates occupied the fort on the morning of the 28th. It was a hollow victory and a serious setback for Price. Ewing had delayed Price’s advance toward St. Louis for several days and inflicted serious losses on the attacking brigades. Exact Confederate casualties are unknown but it is believed to have been approximately 1,000 dead and wounded. Union casualties were about 200.

Brig. Gen. Ewing: The division on Shepherd’s Mountain was Marmaduke’s... moved rapidly down to the assault his line greatly broken by the rugged and steep descent, and by our fire, which told with marked effect upon them. On reaching the plain the most of the assaulting force took cover in the deep bed of the creek, from which they opened and kept up an incessant fire. About 100 ventured on to the assault but fell or were driven back before they reached the ditch. Almost simultaneously with the movement of Marmaduke’s division, that of General Fagan moved over Pilot Knob in stronger force, and less disturbed by our fire sweeping back in disorder or cutting off our companies which held the town and part of the mountain sides. His lines were greatly broken by the houses and fences of the skirt of the town, but were hastily reformed by him and by General Cabell, who led the assault, and swept upon the plain in handsome style, yelling and on the double-quick. We opened on them when at 600 yards from the fort with musketry from the ramparts and from the long line of the north rifle-pits, and with canister from seven pieces of artillery. They rushed on most gallantly, but were broken, confused, and swept down by our rapid and well-directed fire until the advance reached the ditch, when the attacking forces fled in dismay, leaving apparently almost half their comrades dead or wounded on the plain.

Maj. Gen. Price: About 2 p.m., when a charge was ordered and made in the most gallant manner, officers and men vying with each other in both divisions of unsurpassed bravery, charging up nearly to the muzzles of the enemy’s cannon. Where all acted as heroes it seems almost invidious to make any exception, but I must be allowed to call attention to the courage and gallantry of Brigadier-General Cabell in leading his men to the assault, having his horse killed under him within forty yards of the fort. But the information I had received in regard to the strength of the fortifications proved totally incorrect. Our troops were repulsed, and it being too late to renew the assault they were withdrawn beyond the reach of the enemy’s guns and preparations were made for a renewal of the assault on the next day.
28 September – 3 October 1864

1. 28-29 Sep: Ewing retreated towards Rolla.
2. 28-29 Sep: Marmaduke and Shelby pursued Ewing.
3. 29 Sep: Price (w/Fagan) moved north. Detachments burned the RR depots at De Soto and near Franklin (Today’s Pacific).
4. 29 Sep: Marmaduke and Shelby rejoined Price.
5. 29 Sep: Sanborn reinforced Rolla with troops from the District of Southwest Missouri.
6. 1 Oct: Confederate reconnaissance occupied Franklin – less than 40 miles St. Louis.
7. 1 Oct: Brown concentrated District of Central Missouri troops at Jefferson City
8. 2 Oct: Sanborn marched to relieve Ewing
9. 3 Oct: Union scouts reported Price’s Army moving toward Jefferson City

Map 16.
On 28 September, Brig. Gen. Ewing continued the retreat toward Rolla. Price was slow to organize the pursuit and Marmaduke and Shelby did not pursue until about noon. Ewing’s troops, mostly infantry supported by light artillery, fought a skillful delay action along the narrow valleys and did not allow the faster moving Confederate cavalry to get past them. At about sundown on the 29th, Ewing arrived in Leasburg. He halted his exhausted command and constructed earthworks. The next morning, Marmaduke and Shelby appraised the entrenchments and decided against an attack. They then turned their commands to the north to rejoin Price’s advance toward St. Louis. Meanwhile, Price moved Fagan’s division toward St. Louis. On the 29th, a detachment burned railroad depots at De Soto and near Franklin.

By the next day, Price had his entire Army within striking distance of St. Louis. On 1 October, the army briefly occupied Franklin, which was less than 40 miles from the center of St. Louis. However, it appears that Price had already decided not to test the city’s defenses. Ironically, St. Louis was not the formidable fortress Price imagined. Rosecrans had one division of Smith’s XVI Corps defending along the Meramec River and maybe another 1,500 troops in the city. Most of the city troops were Enrolled Missouri Militia. The city had not experienced any significant threat since 1862. Its militia rolls were woefully out of date and the militia were lacking any kind of combat experience. Nevertheless, Price recognized, based upon his Pilot Knob experience, that the defenses were possibly more than his Army could handle. On the 1st, The Confederates occupied the town of Washington on the Missouri River. The river blocked the Confederates from any further movement to the north. Price now had three choices: turn to the east and attack St. Louis, retrace his route and return to Arkansas, or turn to the west and capture the Missouri Capital at Jefferson City. The capital did not have the rich supplies of war material that were available in St. Louis, but it did offer the opportunity to accomplish the political goal of holding an election in a major Missouri city. By 3 October, Union scouts were reporting, “he is undoubtedly gone toward Jefferson City.” Meanwhile, Rosecrans moved troops to oppose the Confederate incursion into Missouri. Brig. Gen. John Sanborn reinforced the important railroad town of Rolla with troops from the District of Southwest Missouri and Brig. Gen. John Brown started to concentrate his District of Central Missouri troops at the state capital.

**Maj. Gen. Curtis:** As the enemy at Washington, on the Missouri, had reached the turning point of his northern movement (crossing the Missouri not being rational), leaving most of our Federal forces in his rear and right flank, his movement westward toward my department seemed inevitable. General Rosecrans was re-enforced by troops under General Mower, General Smith, and 100-days’ regiments from Illinois, but all these being on the other side of Price the greater the number the more certain and expeditious would be the movement toward my department. The crisis as to the direction of the enemy’s movement occurred about the 2nd of October.

**Maj. Gen. Price:** …receiving information that the Federal force in Saint Louis far exceeded my own two to one, and knowing the city to be strongly fortified, I determined to move as fast as possible on Jefferson City, destroying the railroad as I went, with a hope to be able to capture that city with its troops and munitions of war.


19. Also in the west were the Departments of New Mexico, the Pacific, and the Northwest. These Departments play no significant role in the 1864 Missouri Expedition.


22. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, part II, 60.


30. Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele commanded the Union Department of Arkansas.


33. Map and discussion based on information from Lause, Price’s Lost Campaign.

34. Prior to his promotion to division commander, Shelby had commanded the Iron Brigade.

35. Maj. Gen. C. C. Washburn commanded the District of West Tennessee and was located at Memphis.


38. Map and discussion based on information from Lause, Price’s Lost Campaign; Welcher, The Union Army, 1861-1865.


By 26 September, Ewing had approximately 1447 soldiers and volunteer citizens at Pilot Knob from the following commands: the 14th Iowa Infantry (142), the 47th Missouri Infantry (500), Company F of the 50th Missouri Infantry (80), Battery H of the 2d Missouri Light Artillery (134--6 guns), the 3d Missouri State Militia Cavalry (347), Company L of the 2d Missouri State Militia Cavalry (44), Company G of the 1st Missouri State Militia Infantry, (serving as artillery, 58--7 guns) plus a number of white and black civilian volunteers.

47. Map and discussion based on information from Lause, Price’s Lost Campaign; Busch, Fort Davidson and the Battle of Pilot Knob; Sallee, “Missouri One Last Time.”

48. Fort Davidson was a hexagonal earth work surrounded by a dry moat. The fort had a rifle pit extending north (190 yards) and another to the south (150 yards) accessed by sally ports (tunnels). The fort sat in a valley between three mountains: Pilot Knob (east), Shepherd (south), and Cedar Hill (north). The fort contained a significant amount of artillery: four 32 pound siege guns, three 24 pound howitzers and six 3-inch ordnance rifles. In the center of the fort was a buried powder magazine.

49. Confederates at Pilot Knob. Fagan’s Division (1,700+) was composed of Cabell’s Brigade of 6 Arkansas Regiments, Slemon’s Brigade of 4 Arkansas Regiments, Dobbin’s Brigade of 3 Arkansas Regiments, McCray’s Brigade of 2 Arkansas Regiments and the 15th Missouri Cavalry, and 3 unattached Arkansas Regiments totaling 300 men. Marmaduke’s Division (3700+) was composed of Clark’s Brigade of 7 Missouri Regiments, Freeman’s Brigade of 2 Arkansas and 1 Missouri Regiments, and Slayback’s Detachment of Missouri Cavalry.

52. Map and discussion based on information from: Lause, Price’s Lost Campaign; Busch, Fort Davidson and the Battle of Pilot Knob; Sallee, “Missouri One Last Time.”
Part IV
Saint Louis to Lexington

3 to 19 October 1864
3 October

1. Shelby moved through Mount Sterling
2. Marmaduke skirmished with the EMM and captured Hermann.
3. Fisk arrived at Jefferson City and ordered District of Northern Missouri troops to concentrate at the capital.

4 October

5. Shelby captured Linn.
6. Marmaduke's advance guard arrived at the Gasconade River
7. McNeil decided to reinforce Jefferson City, and concentrated Districts of Rolla and Southwest Missouri troops at Vienna.

Map 17.
After turning away from St. Louis, the Army of Missouri moved at a leisurely pace toward the state capital. Price seemed to let the cumbersome wagon train dictate his rate of march. The train, originally about 300 wagons, grew to over 500 wagons. Most were filled with the fruits of the Army’s foraging and pillaging. Officially, Price tried to control rampant looting of his soldiers. However, the Army had no line of supply and needed to forage in order to survive. The end result was that most of the towns the Confederates “liberated” along the road to Jefferson City were sacked and pillaged to supply his army. Federal authorities ordered the local militias to concentrate at Jefferson City. Therefore, most of the towns along the Rebel line of advance surrendered without a fight. Some, like the small town of Hermann, offered token resistance. Tragically, the Rebels also executed several Missouri citizens. Some were known to be prominent “Union men,” others were German immigrants (hated by some Rebels), and at least one man was murdered because he wore blue pants. The Confederates also executed Maj. James Wilson and five other soldiers captured at Pilot Knob.

Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Rosecrans concentrated his forces at Kirkwood. He remained unconvinced that Price was moving on Jefferson City. He worried that the Confederates might still move against St. Louis or more likely, turn south toward Rolla. As late as 4 October, his indecision left Brig. Generals Clinton Fisk and John Brown with fewer than 5,000 men to defend the capital and half of these were the untrained and ill-equipped Enrolled Missouri Militia (EMM). Nevertheless, Fisk and Brown put their men to work and prepared the city to withstand an assault or siege. Fortunately for the Union Cause, Brig. Gen. John McNeil at Rolla believed Price was “pushing for Jefferson City.” Rosecrans had ordered him to defend Rolla before the Confederates cut the telegraph line. On his own accord, McNeil decided to move his and Brig. Gen. John Sanborn’s troops to Rolla. McNeil’s decision put almost 3,000 good troops along with six field guns on the road to Jefferson City. The question remained to be answered on whether they would arrive in time to save the capital.

**Brig. Gen. McNeil:** On the evening of the 3d I became convinced that General Price was pushing for Jefferson City. All communication with Saint Louis being cut off, I was compelled to act in the premises without consultation with headquarters. It also became known to me that one prominent object of the raid on the part of the enemy was the capture of the political capital of the State and the installation of Thomas C. Reynolds as the constitutional Governor of Missouri, and the inauguration of a civil government, that, with the assistance of this rebel army of occupation, would be enabled to arouse the latent spirit of rebellion which still unfortunately existed in the minds of many citizens of Missouri. Determined if in my power to foil this rebel scheme, I marched from Rolla for Jefferson City on the morning of the 4th of October, 1864... I had previously directed General Sanborn, then in camp at Cuba, to join me at Vienna and proceed with me to the rescue of Jefferson City.

**Brig. Gen. Shelby:** I moved with my division on through Saint Clair, Union, Mount Sterling, and Linn... Through this and other sections of the country traversed by the army the wise and just policy of General Price was fruitful of the most happy results. The German element, largely preponderating, had been taught that Confederate soldiers killed, burned, and destroyed with vengeance swift as it was merciless, sparing neither age nor sex, and exacting a dark retribution of blood from the citizens and non-combatants.
Map 18.

1. Marmaduke's advance elements destroyed the Gasconade RR Bridge (abandoned by 34th EMM the night before).
2. Marmaduke's advance elements skirmished with Union forces at the Osage RR Bridge.

5 October

3. McNeil and Sanborn's Brigades arrived in Jefferson City and moved east to defend the Osage River.
4. Shelby forced a crossing over the Osage River and pushed the Union defenders back into Jefferson City [See expanded view below].

6 October

6 October (1000 to 1900)

   • Col. Philips' Brigade defended the lower Osage River.
   • Brig. Gen Sanborn defended the upper Osage River.
   • Brig. Gen. McNeil and EMM detachments defended the Moreau River and the City.
B. Shelby feinted against the Union defenders at Prince's Shoal.
C. Shelby pushed forces over the river at Castle Rock and Bolton's Shoal.
D. Philips moved to reinforce the threaten points, but arrived too late to reinforce the defense of the river line.
E. Sanborn and Philips retreated back to the Moreau River.
The experience of the 34th Enrolled Missouri Militia (EMM) responsible for the Gasconade River railroad (RR) Bridge, highlights the confusion within the Department of Missouri and the numerous small and isolated detachments of militiamen guarding various towns and key infrastructure. Capt. Charles Eitzen along with two small companies had no clear orders on what was expected of his 150 men. He was not sure if he was to secure the bridge intact or burn it to deny use by the enemy. On 4 October, Eitzen’s militia abandoned the bridge and melted away when thousands of Confederates closed in on the small detachment. Ironically, the Confederate advance elements arrived early the next morning and burned the bridge as the main Rebel Army planned to cross the river further to the south. That same day, the Confederates skirmished with EMM units at the Osage River RR Bridge. On the 6th, the Union reinforcements from Rolla arrived in Jefferson City and immediately advanced east to defend the Osage River crossings.

Brig. Gen. McNeil deployed his and Sanborn’s brigade along an eight mile front to defend several crossing sites. Shelby’s division fixed the Union defenders at Prince’s and Bolton’s Ford and then made the main attack across at Castle Rock Ford. McNeil and Sanborn fought a stubborn rearguard fight back to Moreau Creek. In the fighting, Union fire mortally wounded Col. David Shanks, who was the commander of Shelby’s Iron Brigade. That night, the Confederates camped within a few miles of the state capital. The defenders of the Gasconade and Osage Rivers had hoped in vain that the Union forces in the St. Louis area would march to the rescue. However, there was very little westward movement from these units. Maj. Gen. Rosecrans had concentrated one division of the XVI Corps and elements of the St. Louis EMM at Kirksville. However, Maj. Gen. Smith, commander of the XVI Corps, was reluctant to begin the pursuit without his other division. Brig. Gen Mower’s division had just recently arrived at Cape Girardeau after having completed a difficult march from the Arkansas River and it would take time for them to come forward.

**Maj. Mullins:** I sent word to Colonel Philips advising him of the situation [He was defending Bolton’s Ford on the Osage River]; that the enemy seemed to be bringing up a large force and was also swinging around to flank us, and consequently asked for immediate support, I maintained this position from fifteen to twenty-five minutes, a brisk skirmish being kept up all the while, when the enemy moved up in overwhelming numbers, attacking in front and on both flanks. No support having arrived and being unable to resist the attack my command was compelled to fall back.6

**Brig. Gen. Shelby:** I reconnoitered the ford warily, showing no force whatever, and found about one regiment drawn up to dispute farther progress, while movements in the rear told that more were coming up. I dismounted Shanks’ and Smith’s regiments, deployed them along the bank, sheltered by heavy timber; held Elliott and Williams well in hand for a dash, and stationed my battery at splendid range. When all these arrangements were completed, a terrible fire of infantry and artillery swept the other bank, swept the opposing squadrons, swept the face of the bluff beyond, and drove everything for shelter to the woods. Now Elliott and Williams dashed away at the charge; the infantry waded after. The swift and beautiful water was torn into foam-flakes that hurried and danced away to the sea, while the ringing shout of a thousand voices told that the ford was won.7
Defense of Jefferson City
7 to 8 October 1864

Brig. Gen. Egbert Brown
45th MO Inf. (Bn)
3d MSM Cav. (Det.)
1st MSM (Det.)
4th MSM (Det.)
7th MSM (Det.)
28th EMM
34th EMM
43d EMM

Maj. Gen. Clinton Fisk
1st IA Cav. (Det.)
17th IL Cav. (Det.)
39th MO (Det.)
43d MO (Det.)
49th MO (Det.)
C, 2d MO Light Arty.

17th IL Cav. (Det.)
5th MSM
9th MSM (Det.)
B, 2d MO Light Arty.

Brig. Gen. John Sanborn
2d AR (Det.)
6th MSM (Det.)
8th MSM (Det.)
6th EMM (Bn)
7th EMM (Bn)
3d MSM (Det.)
L, 2d MO Light Arty.

Map 19.
19. Jefferson City

On 7 October, the Confederates moved onto the heights overlooking Jefferson City and its fortifications. Brig. Gen. Brown, commanding the District of Central Missouri and the ad hoc city garrison, had “repaired the two partially constructed forts, built three substantial new ones” and constructed “nearly three miles of entrenchments, palisades, rifle-pits, [and] chevaux-de-frise [obstacles].” Price’s forces examined the fortifications and exchanged some fire with the garrison but then withdrew from the front of the city into a bivouac. Price’s spies informed him that there were 15,000 troops defending the city. The Federals actually numbered only about 7,000, many of them being green militia and citizen volunteers. Price remembered the Pilot Knob setback and was reluctant to order an assault. He consulted his division commanders and decided to bypass the city and move toward Boonville.

Price decided that the capture of a major city and holding of elections were no longer possible. The invasion of Missouri had failed. Price now altered the objectives of the expedition to that of a large-scale raid. His objective was now Kansas and he planned, in accordance with Smith’s orders, to make his “retreat through Kansas and the Indian Territory, sweeping that country of its mules, horses, cattle, and military supplies of all kinds.” He also hoped to recruit more men in the pro-Confederate region of “Little Dixie.” He ordered Shelby to assume the lead and move as soon as possible. On 8 October, the Army of Missouri formed in full view of the city as if to attack but then withdrew and departed to the west.

Brig. Gen. Fisk: The major-general commanding telegraphed me on the 6th to assume command of the combined forces at Jefferson City. I immediately organized the force into four brigades, under General Brown, McNeil, and Sanborn, and Colonel Franklin W. Hickox, Enrolled Missouri Militia. The effective strength of the fragments of commands thus hastily thrown together from different districts of the department, including Enrolled Missouri Militia and loyal citizens, was, of officers and men, 7,200. Generals McNeil and Sanborn, who had for many days been in immediate proximity to the enemy, informed me that Price’s army numbered not less than 20,000 men, and that he could put 15,000 well appointed veterans and more than twenty pieces of artillery into action... At daylight on the morning of the 8th he appeared in force in front of McNeil, but withdrew before advancing near our earth-works. As the enemy retired and a reconnaissance to the Moreau revealed the fact that his entire army had passed to our right, the mounted troops of Sanborn’s brigade were thrown upon his rear, killing many and capturing a large number of men and arms. At 8 a.m. all the mounted troops of the command were ordered in pursuit of the enemy with five days’ field rations in their haversacks and 140 rounds of ammunition. The capital of the State had been saved...

Maj. Gen. Price: I had received positive information that the enemy were 12,000 strong in the city, and that 3,000 more had arrived on the opposite bank of the river by the North Missouri Railroad before I withdrew my troops to the encampment selected, whereupon I gave immediate instructions to Brigadier-General Shelby to send a sufficient force to burn the bridges and destroy the railroad on the west of Jefferson City in the direction of California, the county seat of Montiteau County, and after consultation with my general officers I determined not to attack the enemy’s intrenchments [sic], as they outnumbered me nearly two to one and were strongly fortified but to move my command in the direction of Kansas, as instructed in my original orders, hoping to be able to capture a sufficient number of arms to arm my unarmed men at Boonville, Sedalia, Lexington, and Independence...
**Bloody Bill Anderson’s Operations (23 July to 9 October)**

A. 23 Jul: Raided Renick and Allen, then defeated pursuing cavalry detachment.
C. 28 Aug. – 8 Sep: Operated from the Rocheport area and attacked steamboats on the Missouri River. On 8 Sep., received official orders to harass the Union LOC and support of Price's Expedition.
D. 23 Sep: Six of Anderson’s men captured near Rocheport executed by the Union militia.
E. 24 Sep: Several guerilla chieftains (Anderson, Todd, Quantrill, & Poole) combined forces (about 400 men) and attacked Fayette. The attack failed and combined guerilla force dispersed.
F. 25 Sep: Disrupted telegraph lines Hudson to Renick.
G. 27 Sep: Murdered 22 Union prisoners at Centrailia, then ambushed and killed 123 of 155 men in the pursuing militia company.
H. 3 Oct: Union militia burned Rocheport in retaliation for their perceived support of Anderson.
I. 9 Oct: Moved to Boonville to meet with Price.

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**8 October**

1. Early in the morning, Shelby’s advanced guard departed Jefferson City and moved toward Boonville. The remainder of the Confederate Army followed later in the day.
2. Pleasonton arrived in Jefferson City and assumed command of all Union forces in the city. He directed Sanborn to pursue the Confederate Army with the mounted forces and Fisk to take an Infantry detachment by steamboat to Lexington.

**9 October**

3. Shelby’s advance guard arrived in Boonville.
4. Sanborn skirmished with Price’s rear-guard at Russellville.
5. Fisk stopped at Rocheport because the Confederates control the river at Boonville.

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Map 20.
To the east and west, Union forces mobilized against Price. On 8 October, Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton arrived in Jefferson City and assumed command of all forces at Jefferson City. He immediately organized a pursuit against Price. That day, Brig. Gen. Sanborn followed after the Confederates with the cavalry and the following day harassed the Confederate rearguard near Russellville. Simultaneously, Maj. Gen. Fisk moved an infantry force up the Missouri River on steamboats in an effort to reinforce Lexington. About 100 miles to the east, Rosecrans finally ordered Maj. Gen. Smith to move the XVI Corps and his cavalry brigade to Jefferson City to join in the pursuit.

In Kansas, Maj. Gen. Samuel Curtis (Commander of the Department of Kansas) continued to urge Governor Thomas Carney to mobilize the Kansas State Militia (KSM) for the defense of the state. On 9 October, Brig. Gen Shelby and the Confederate advance guard moved into Boonville. The small town was the heart of the strong pro-slavery region of “Little Dixie.” The next day, the citizens of Boonville provided a warm welcome to a full parade by the Confederate Army. Recruiters added over 1,200 new men to the Army’s rolls from the region over the next several days. Among the new recruits was Capt. William Anderson, known as “Bloody Bill Anderson,” and his guerrilla band. Recently, Anderson’s guerrilla’s had been very active in northern Missouri and had all but shut down traffic along the Missouri River and northern Missouri railroads. Price sent the notorious “Bushwhacker” north to operate against the Northern Missouri Railroad and detailed other guerrilla bands to act as scouts.

Maj. Gen. Curtis: I request that you issue the call. Let the militia turn out. If not needed they will, of course, be discharged. Their call and collection would enable us at least to give an impetus to Price’s departure. In your prompt responses to my requests heretofore I am sure we have saved the State from desolation; let us do it now... they seem moving steadily westward. Delay is ruinous.14

Maj. Gen. Price: The next day I accordingly took up my line of march in the direction of Kansas, and upon leaving Jefferson City was followed by General McNeil, who made an attack upon my rear guard (Fagan’s division), but was easily repulsed. Brigadier-General Shelby, who with his division constituted my advance, reached California on the 8th... Pushing rapidly on to Boonville... I followed on with the divisions of Major-General Fagan and Marmaduke, and encamped on the night of the 8th fourteen miles from Jefferson City, and on the 9th marched through and beyond California, making twenty-six miles. On the 10th I arrived at Boonville with the rest of the command. My reception was enthusiastic in the extreme. Old and young, men, women, and children, vied in their salutations and in ministering to the wants and comforts of my wearied and war-worn soldiers... Captain Anderson, who reported to me that day with a company of about 100 men, was immediately sent to destroy the North Missouri Railroad. At the same time Quantrill was sent with the men under his command to destroy the Hannibal and Saint Joseph Railroad, to prevent the enemy, if possible, from throwing their forces in my front from Saint Louis.15
Kansas Politics

Radical Republicans
- Strongly opposed slavery – supported freedmen rights
- Wanted a more aggressive prosecution of the war.
- Planned for a harsh reconstruction of the south.

Moderate Republicans
- First priority in the war was preservation of the Union.
- Wanted an eventual end to slavery – did not support freedmen rights.
- Planned for a quick integration of the South back into the Union.

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9 October
1. Gov. Carney issued a call for the Kansas militia to mobilize.
2. Sanborn followed the Confederate rearguard and skirmished with the Confederate rearguard at California.

10 October
3. Price’s Army occupied Boonville and recruited volunteers.
4. Fisk remained at Rocheport.
5. 3 Division, XVI Corps passed over the Gasconade River.
6. 1 Division, XVI Corps and Winslow’s Cavalry Brigade in the St. Louis area with orders to move to Jefferson City.
7. Kansas State Militia (KSM) ordered to assemble at Shawnee Town.
8. Blunt assumed command of the District of South Kansas and began to gather available forces.
21. Mobilizing the Kansas Militia

Governor Thomas Carney was slow to recognize Price’s threat against Kansas. Since 1862, the closest big battles occurred far to the south in Arkansas. The sack of Lawrence happened in August 1863 and the infamous Order No. 11 had pushed the guerrilla war away from the Kansas border. The Indians in central Kansas posed some threat to the state but only to those living on the frontier. Many Kansans saw no need for involvement in Missouri’s problem with Price or the bigger issue of the American Civil War. Carney, a Republican, was far more concerned with the upcoming election against Samuel Crawford, a Radical Republican. Crawford had the backing of Senator James Lane, another Radical Republican, and Carney’s reelection was not assured. Also, Maj. Gen. Curtis was a Lane supporter, and Carney believed the militia mobilization was a political ploy to influence the election. Therefore, the governor paid little heed to Maj. Gen. Curtis’ initial calls for mobilization of the militia in mid-September.

Nevertheless, Price’s westward movement in the first week of October made the threat to Kansas apparent to all. Gen. Curtis had about 7,000 volunteer troops scattered across Kansas, the Territories of Colorado and Nebraska, and the Indian Territories. His department was currently involved in the Cheyenne War of 1864 and only a fraction of his troops could be spared to fight the Confederates. Curtis needed the Kansas State Militia (KSM) in order to mount a credible defense of the state and continued to pressure the state for help. In early October, Carney’s fears of political mischief intensified when Curtis recalled Maj. Gen. James Blunt from operations against the Cheyenne and placed him in command of the District of South Kansas. Blunt was an outspoken supporter of the Lane faction. Carney believed it was a maneuver to place Blunt in command of the KSM. On 9 October, Governor Carney finally relented and agreed to the mobilization with the condition that most of the militia would assume garrison duties to free up the volunteers for operations against the Confederates and Maj. Gen. George Deitzler would command the militia. On the next day, Deitzler established his headquarters in Olathe, KS and directed the KSM to assemble at Shawnee Town, KS.

Maj. Gen. Curtis: The rebel forces under General Price have made a farther advance westward, crossing the Gasconade, and are now at the railroad bridge on the Osage, about fifteen miles below Jefferson City. Large Federal forces about Saint Louis and below tend to drive him toward Kansas. Other motives also will induce his fiendish followers to seek spoils and vengeance in this State. To prevent this and join in efforts to expel these invaders from the country I desire that you will call out the entire militia force.

Gov. Carney: Kansans, rally! You will do so, as you have always promptly done when your soil has been invaded. The call this time will come to you louder and stronger because you know the foe will seek to glut his vengeance upon you. Meet him, then, at the threshold and strike boldly; strike as one man against him. Let all business be suspended. The work to be done now is to protect the State against marauder and murderer. Until this is accomplished we must lead a soldier’s life and do a soldier’s duty. Men of Kansas, rally! One blow, one earnest, united blow will foil the invader and save you. Who will falter? Who is not ready to meet the peril? Who will not defend his home and the State? To arms then! To arms, and the tended field until the rebel foe shall be baffled and beaten back.
11 October
1. 43d MO IN arrived in Brunswick (On 5 Oct, the 43d MO departed Saint Joseph with orders to reinforce Jefferson City)
2. Sanborn advanced toward Boonville and skirmished with Confederate rearguard.
4. Sanborn returned to California to rest and resupply his command.
5. Price departed Chouteau Springs.
6. 43d MO in arrived in Glasgow and ordered to defend the town against Rebel Guerillas.
7. Pleasonton ordered Fisk to return to Jefferson City.
8. Curtis, in Shawnee Town, KS (70 miles west of Waverly) designated his assembling force the Army of the Border
9. Sanborn moved to Georgetown.
14 October
11. Sanborn advanced to Cook's Store (near today's Concordia).
12. Thompson captured Sedalia.
13. Clark captured Glasgow.
14. Rosecrans and the lead elements of 1st Division, XVI Corps, along with Winslow's Cavalry Brigade arrived in Jefferson City.

Map 22.
22. Sedalia and Glasgow \textsuperscript{22}

On 13 October, Maj. Gen. Curtis designated the assembling Kansas forces as the Army of the Border. He appointed Maj. Gen. Deitzler’s Kansas State Militia (KSM) as the left wing and Maj. Gen. Blunt’s force as the right wing. To the east, Gen. Sanborn, after several days of continuous action against the Confederate rearguard, decided to rest his forces at California, MO. On 14 October, Sanborn resumed the pursuit. The next day, Rosecrans moved 1st Div. of the XVI Corps and Winslow’s cavalry by boat to Jefferson City to join with the 3d Div. of the XVI Corps. Between the two Union forces, Price recognized the threat of the gathering Kansas forces and decided to resume the westward movement toward Kansas. The needs of Confederate Army far outweighed the resources of the small town of Boonville and the departure was probably as welcome to the town’s citizens as its arrival a few days earlier.

That night Price obtained information that a large cache of weapons and other military supplies were stored in Glasgow. On 14 October, Price decided to send Brig. Gen. John Clark to capture the town and the supplies stored there. Simultaneously, Price sent Brig. Gen. M. Jeff Thompson against Sedalia. Thompson had assumed command of the “Iron Brigade” after the death of Col. Shanks. The next day, Thompson captured the small garrison at Sedalia after a brief fight. He paroled the prisoners and then plundered the town for supplies. Thompson, then in accordance with his orders, moved to rejoin the main army as it moved toward Marshal. Sixty miles to the north, Brig. Gen. John Clark fought a pitched battle to capture the town of Glasgow.

\textbf{Brig. Gen. Sanborn:} Hence all my movements after the enemy left Boonville were made with the view of holding the enemy in or near Saline County until the Kansas troops were organized and on the border, and Winslow’s brigade of cavalry and General A. J. Smith’s command of infantry and artillery should be within striking distance. I therefore moved my command, with the exception of a small force under Captain Turley, which was ordered to follow the enemy’s trail by Nebo Church, through Georgetown up the Georgetown and Lexington road to Cook’s Store, arriving at this point at 3 p. m. on the 15th day of October, with the view of resisting the advance of the enemy, and attacking his flanks if he should advance immediately.\textsuperscript{23}

\textbf{Maj. Gen. Price:} I moved that evening [12 October] from Boonville to Chouteau Springs on my proposed route, a distance of eleven miles, having recruited at Boonville between 1,200 and 1,500 men, mostly unarmed. That night receiving information that there was a large number of arms (amounting to 5,000 stored in the City Hall at Glasgow, I sent Brigadier-General Clark, of Marmaduke’s division, with his own brigade and 500 of Jackman’s brigade, with orders to cross the river at Arrow Rock and attack the place the next morning at daylight and capture it...[Also] ordered Brigadier General M. Jeff. Thompson, then commanding Shelby’s old brigade, to take with him a force of not less than 800 or 1,000 men and one section of artillery by Longwood, and from thence to Sedalia, to attack the Federal force at that place if he should deem it advisable and prudent. This order was promptly and completely carried out by Brigadier-General Thompson. The place, though strongly fortified and well garrisoned, was carried by a bold and daring assault and fell into our hands with over 200 prisoners, who were paroled, several hundred stand of arms, many pistols, and several wagon loads of goods suitable to soldiers.\textsuperscript{24}
21 October
1. 0500, Shelby’s artillery opened fire on Glasgow.
2. 0050 – 0700, Clark crossed over the Missouri River.
3. 0700 – 1330, Confederate forces attacked and pushed the defenders back to the center of the town.
4. 1330, Union forces surrendered the town.

Map 23.
23. The Battle of Glasgow

On 15 October, two Confederate brigades crossed the Missouri River and moved toward Glasgow. Just before dawn, Shelby’s artillery opened fire from the west side of the Missouri River. The plans for a coordinated attack fell into disarray when troops under General Clark experienced difficulty getting over the river. After a two-hour delay, Clark’s force of 1,800 men advanced on Glasgow. The 800 defenders fought valiantly and grudgingly gave up ground but were gradually forced back into the center of the town. At approximately 1330 and with no hope of victory, Col. Chester Harding, the Union Commander, made the decision to surrender. The Rebel victory at Glasgow provided Price with 1,200 badly needed rifles and a large shipment of military overcoats. The victory was also a significant boost to the Army’s morale after the costly defeat at Pilot Knob.

Col. Chester Harding. At 5 o’clock on the morning of the 15th the enemy opened upon the town with two pieces... from the opposite bank of the river. At the same time a scout came in and reported 900 men advancing from Keytesville... The enemy deployed on the slope facing the creek south of the town under and in front of two field pieces which were placed in position on the crest of the heights. I sent Major B.K. Davis, of the Forty-third Missouri Volunteers, with three companies of that regiment, to hold the bank of the creek from the bridge on the Fayette road down toward Captain Mayo... Captain Steinmetz, with a citizen company was ordered to take ground between Davis and Mayo... The troops along the creek resisted the passage of it manfully, but soon had to be ordered back, as the enemy’s force was so great that he was enabled not only to pass around both flanks, but to pour through the long intervals which necessarily existed in the line... The line of defense, to which we fell back from the creek, had for its right an elevation in town, around the crest of which some slight rifle-pits, had been constructed and for its left a brick school-house... The retreat to this line was very slow, every possible opportunity being taken to retard the enemy’s progress... Every available shelter was taken by the enemy, and he cautiously and slowly but constantly, advanced his skirmishers to points nearer to us, and when he had established them at any position closed upon them until he had a heavy force within from thirty to fifty yards of us all along our line and partly around our right. By noon I had become convinced that I could not hold the place if the enemy chose to make an assault... At 1.30 o’clock I surrendered on the terms that the garrison should march out with its arms and colors; officers to retain their horses, side-arms, and private property; the men to retain what private property they had belonging to them; persons and private of citizens to be respected.

Brig. Gen. John B. Clark, Jr. After several shots from Pratt’s artillery... both commands advanced to the attack in a spirited manner and soon drove the enemy within his works, which were constructed upon a commanding hill in the heart of the town, from which the poured a destructive fire of small-arms in our ranks; but nothing daunted, they advanced under cover of houses, fences, and other obstructions to within a short distance of his works, preferring to force his surrender by a continuous fire from sharpshooters rather than take him by assault. After a fire on small-arms and artillery for two hours Colonel Harding, commanding Federal forces, sent out a flag desiring to know what terms would be granted to him in case he surrendered.
Map 24.

15 October
1. Blunt moved forward to Hickman Mills and organized his units into 3 brigades. The 1st and 2d Brigades are composed of primarily volunteer units and the 3d brigade is mostly Kansas State Militia (KSM).
2. Price camped near Marshall and waits for Thompson’s and Clark’s commands to rejoin the column.

16 October
4. Curtis moved the bulk of the KSM to Kansas City. Gov. Carney refused to allow the KSM to move any further east than the Big Blue River.

17 October
5. Blunt moved the 1st and 2d Brigades to Pleasant Hill and then on to Holden. He believed Price was advancing on Warrensburg. At Holden received word that Price is advancing on Lexington (no direct communication with Sanborn available).
6. 3d Brigade (Col. Blair) moved to Kansas City to finish outfitting.
7. Sanborn believed Price would move on Warrensburg and moved to Blackwater.

18 October
9. Price moved to Waverly

19 Oct:
11. Blunt delayed Confederate advance at the Battle of Lexington, and then at sundown withdrew toward Independence. The Confederates camped in and around Lexington.
12. Lead elements of the XVI Corps near Sedalia.
24. The Battle of Lexington

Maj. Gen. Blunt organized his command as the Provisional Cavalry Division of the Army of the Border and pushed forward into Missouri. Some of his militia mutinied and tried to return to Kansas. Blunt arrested the officers involved in the mutiny and marched the militia back to Hickman Mills, MO. Blunt hoped to cooperate with Brig. Gen. Sanborn and trap the Confederates between their forces. On 16 October, he moved forward to Pleasant Hill and then on to Holden, MO on the 17th. By the 18th, he had occupied Lexington and received word that Price was only 20 miles to the east at Waverly. He also learned that Sanborn was near Crook’s Store, too far to the southeast to cooperate against Price (Sanborn was actually much farther to the south at Blackwater). Equally disappointing was a dispatch received from Maj. Gen. Curtis informing him, “that in consequence of the embarrassments thrown in his way by the Governor of Kansas and others relative to moving the militia out of the State, no re-enforcements could be sent to me.”

Nevertheless, Blunt chose to delay Price at Lexington as long as possible and buy time for the Department of Missouri forces to close the distance. On 15 October, the Confederates passed through Marshall and then halted two days to wait for Clark’s and Thompson’s Brigades to rejoin the army. Price now recognized the danger of being caught between the two forces. He believed Sanborn’s pursuit force was at the town of Crook’s Store and received word that Kansas troops were moving east to block his advance. Price made the decision to move quickly toward Waverly and then on to Lexington. On the 19th, the Army of Missouri moved toward Lexington in three division columns. At about 1400, Shelby’s Division struck the Union picket line approximately one mile east of Lexington. Blunt, with only 2,000 men and eight small mountain howitzers, was drastically outnumbered. Nonetheless, the Federals made a strong stand and only fell back when Price committed Fagan and Marmaduke to the fight. Blunt continued to hold firm until early evening and then withdrew having accomplished his objective, “to develop his [Price’s] force and movements and accomplish the object of a reconnaissance.”

Col. Moonlight: ... it fell to the lot of the Second Brigade to picket the road leading south, and on which Price was advancing. Captain Green, Company B, Eleventh commanded the picket on the Warrensburg road, composed of his own company and Company A, Sixteenth. Captain Palmer, Company A, Eleventh, commanded the picket on the Dover road, composed of his own company and Company F, Eleventh. I am particular in mentioning these facts, because much credit is due these companies for maintaining their position and holding the rebel advance in check as long as they did. When, at the battle of Lexington, on the 19th, a retreat was ordered, the Second Brigade was in the advance and a portion of it dismounted, so that it fell to our lot to cover the retreat.

Maj. Gen. Price: At daybreak on the morning of the 19th I moved from Waverly in the direction of Lexington, Brigadier-General Shelby’s division in the advance, and having received information that General Blunt, Lane, and Jennison, with between 3,000 and 4,000 Federals..., were at Lexington, and fearing that they might make a junction with McNeil and A. J. Smith, who were at Sedalia and Salt Fork, I made a flank movement to the left after crossing the Tabo, so as to intercept their line of march. The advance, under Shelby, met them about 2 p.m., and a battle immediately ensued. For a time the Federals fought well and resisted strenuously, but finally giving way, they were pressed by our troops, driven well past Lexington, and pursued on the road to Independence until night put an end to the combat.
Notes


2. Brig. Gen. John McNeil commanded the District of Rolla. His field force was designated the 2d Brigade of the Provisional Cavalry Division, Department of Missouri.


5. Map and discussion based on information from Lause, *Price’s Lost Campaign;* Sallee, “Missouri One Last Time.”


8. Map and discussion based on information from Lause, *Price’s Lost Campaign;* Sallee, “Missouri One Last Time.”


19. During Price’s Expedition, Deitzler commanded 10,000 Kansas State Militia units in the Army of the Border.


26. *O.R.*, Series I, Volume XLI, Part I, Capt. Holloway Report, 430. The force at Glasgow consisted of six companies of 43d Missouri Infantry, detachment of Companies B and M, 9th Cavalry (MSM); detachment of 13th Missouri Cavalry: detachment Fourth Provisional Regiment Enrolled Missouri Militia, and two companies of citizen militia, numbering in the aggregate about 550, indifferently armed, and under the command of Colonel Chester Harding, Jr., 43d Missouri Infantry (most other sources indicate approximately 800 defenders). The St. Louis Missouri Democrat, Nov. 2, 1864, p. 2 col. 5 gives details on Hunter’s command which consisted of 40 men of company M, 9th MSM, 42 men of company M, 2d MSM, and several men on the 17th Illinois cavalry, and was ably assisted by Lieut. Eldridge, 17th Illinois cavalry, Lieutenants Wilcox, Decker, and Berkahills, 8th MSM cavalry.


Part V
The Battle of Westport

20 to 23 October 1864
20 October

1. 0200: Blunt’s Division rested east of the Little Blue River.
2. 0430: Curtis informed Rosecrans of his decision to defend on the Big Blue River.
3. 0800: Blunt arrived at the Little Blue River.
5. Early afternoon: Curtis ordered Blunt to fall back to the Big Blue River.
6. 2200: Blunt recommended the Little Blue was “the place to make the fight.”
7. 2200+: Blunt moved to Independence.
8. Pleasonton assumed command of the Provisional Cavalry Division and moved toward Lexington. His lead elements bivouacked 10 miles from Lexington.
9. XVI Corps marched 17 miles that day and camped 23 miles from Lexington.

Map 25.
25. Decision at the Little Blue River

Maj. Gen. Blunt delayed the Confederate advance a full day at Lexington and then withdrew before being overwhelmed by growing numbers of Rebel troops. He moved west on the Independence Road with Col. Moonlight’s brigade covering the movement. Moonlight conducted a fighting withdrawal to the west and did not break contact with the enemy until dusk. Fortunately for Moonlight, the Confederates paused their pursuit at dark and went into camp to rest their forces. Blunt continued the retreat until approximately 0200 on the 20th and halted his division east of the Little Blue River. He intended to fight again and asked that ammunition and reinforcements be sent forward toward the Little Blue. However, Maj. Gen. Curtis hurried a message forward ordering Blunt to continue the retreat to Independence and leave only a rearguard at the Little Blue. That evening, Blunt again recommended the Little Blue River as “the place to make the fight” and urged Curtis to personally come forward and make his own assessment. Even so, Curtis was forced to overrule his subordinate because of ongoing problems with the governor of Kansas. Governor Carney refused to allow the Kansas State Militia (KSM) to move any further east into Missouri than the Big Blue River. Curtis directed Blunt to leave a small rearguard at the Little Blue River and fall back with the remainder of his force. Blunt decided to leave elements of Col. Moonlight’s brigade, directing them to resist the Confederate advance as long as possible.

All vignettes here are from the Northern perspective.

**Maj. Gen. Blunt:** I shall fall back west of the Little Blue and halt at the first good position that I can find forage, and wait orders. Subsistence and ammunition must be sent forward to me without delay... Much depends now on our prompt action and concentration with Rosecrans' forces. There can be no necessity for troops north of the Kansas River. Leavenworth is in no danger, unless Price advances on this line... I consider it of the highest importance that we mass our forces on a line south of Price’s position, and then it matters little whether he (Price) moves east or west, we can cut him up; while, on the other hand if our forces are divided, and with the kind of forces we have on the border, we cannot successfully resist his columns unless Rosecrans attacks him vigorously in the rear, and he will make his retreat through Kansas. I make these suggestions for your consideration.²

**Maj. Gen. Curtis:** GENERAL: I have no time to explain. Your forces must take position here, ... The militia will not go farther forward, and the Big Blue must be our main line for battle... Leave two howitzers, and, say, 400 men at the Little Blue, and come back yourself with the remainder. Probably Moonlight better be left in command of that point, not to fight a battle, but to delay the rebel approach and fall back to our main force. I will now be able to bring forward to Kansas City a respectable force. We must pick our battle line, where we can have united councils as well as a strong position. This we are securing at the Big Blue and elsewhere...³

**Maj. Gen. Blunt:** My command is in camp on west side of the [Little] Blue, in a strong position-that I can defend this line against a largely superior force... This is the place to make the fight, if the enemy advance in force on this line. I would suggest that you come down and examine this position if you have time.⁴
21 October

1. 0700: The Confederate advance guard skirmished with Moonlight’s skirmish line.
2. 0700 to 0900: Clark reinforced the advance guard and pushed the Union skirmish line back to the river.
3. 0900 to 1000: Maj. Anderson defeated the Confederate attack and burned the bridge.
4. 0900 to 1000: Clark shifted units north and south to find alternate crossing sites.
5. 0900 to 1000: Col. Lawther (10 Mo.) reported the lower crossing clear and Clark shifted his brigade to that crossing.
26. The Little Blue River Bridge

Col. Moonlight’s men constructed hasty field works and abattis along the roads and fords. By the morning of 21 October, Moonlight was prepared to fight on the Little Blue River. His small force consisted of only the 11th Kansas and a mountain howitzer battery. He placed Maj. Martin Anderson with two companies and the mountain howitzer battery near the covered bridge on the Lexington-Independence Road. Capt. James Greer’s I Company watched the ford one mile north of the bridge and Capt. Joel Huntoon’s H Company was responsible for the ford south of the bridge. A small skirmish line was placed a mile to the front and the remaining companies were held in reserve on the high ground to the west. On the night of 19 October, the Army of Missouri remained at Lexington and advanced to Fire Prairie Creek on the next day. On 21 October, Brig. Gen. Clark’s Brigade of Marmaduke’s Division led the advance. At approximately 0700, Clark’s advance guard ran into the Union skirmish line a mile east of the Little Blue River and forced them back to the river. Clark committed additional forces and pressed forward to capture the bridge. He also dispatched units to the north and south in search of alternate crossing sites. The 11th Kansas, armed with 15-shot Henry Rifles, poured a heavy fire into the attacking rebels and stalled Clark’s attack. Maj. Anderson, with his skirmishers safely back on the west side of the river, directed his troops to push a wagonload of burning hay onto the bridge to deny its capture. To the north, Col. Robert Lawther (10th Missouri-CSA) reported the lower (downstream) crossing clear and Gen. Clark shifted the entire brigade to the north crossing. Moonlight recognized the threat to his flanks and directed most units to withdraw and establish a new defensive line on the ridge overlooking the lower crossing.

Capt. Palmer: October 20th, was spent by our command in abattis work, felling trees, trying to block the road, hoping to delay the enemy as long as possible at the Little Blue. About nine A.M., October 21st, the enemy appeared. I had been a wake for a few minutes and was trying to sew up a big rent in my pants, which I got riding through the brush. I had to jump for my horse and see that my men were promptly in line of battle – had no time to put on my pants – threw them across my saddle and went into the fight. It was a sorry fight. They kept us busy for an hour or so, trying to prevent their crossing of the Little Blue River. Under a sharp fire, we ran a wagon load of hay onto the bridge and set it on fire. All to no particular effect, so far as stopping the enemy. We soon felt the enemy on our right and the sting of their bullets. We had to hustle to the rear, which we did in good order.

Col.Clark: My brigade being in advance, Captain Stallard’s escort (Marmaduke’s advance guard), came upon the enemy’s pickets one mile from the bridge on Little Blue on the Lexington and Independence road. Stallard soon drove them across the bridge, which they burned to prevent a rapid pursuit. Under instructions from General Marmaduke I sent Burbridge’s regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Preston in command) to secure the ford one mile above the bridge, and Colonel Lawther with his regiment to secure the ford one-half mile below, who soon reported the lower crossing clear, the enemy retiring toward Independence.
21 October

1. 1000+: Moonlight repositioned to the high ground near the Lawson Moore House.
2. 1000+: Moonlight counterattacked and pushed the 10th Mo. back toward the river.
3. 1000+ to 1100: Moonlight stalled the Confederate advance.
4. 1100: Clark advanced his brigade over the river and pressed the Union troops back to the high ground.
5. 1100: Moonlight observed the lead elements of Shelby’s Division moving forward to support Marmaduke.
6. 1100: Blunt’s Division moved onto the battlefield.
27. The Lower Ford

At about 1000, Col. Moonlight established a new defensive line near the Lawson Moore House. The house was located on the high ground overlooking the lower ford. Moonlight observed the 10th Missouri (C.S.A.) advancing forward unsupported and decided to counterattack. His aggressive action threatened the Confederate bridgehead and may have influenced Col. Clark to commit his units in a piecemeal manner in an attempt to regain the initiative. Clark deployed his regiments into the fight from the march and the resulting fight seesawed back and forth from the lower ford to the house on the high ground. Fresh Confederate regiments would attack up the slope until the Union artillery stalled their attack. The Kansas troopers then counterattacked and drove them back down the slope. As soon as Clark passed another regiment over the ford, the attack-retreat pattern would repeat itself. Private James Campbell (14th Missouri, Clark’s Brigade) stated, “The Union boys had dismounted and were fighting on foot and came out from their well concealed positions and fought us on the blue grass ridges with but little protection and came within 30 yards of our line where both sides fought like demons.” Maj. Gen. Marmaduke was in the thick of the battle and in the course of the fight had two horses shot out from under him. He recognized the need for help and sent word to Maj. Gen. Price asking for Shelby’s Division to come forward in support. Price concurred and committed Brig. Gen. Shelby to the fight. Sometime around 1100, Moonlight observed Shelby’s division moving to support Clark’s Brigade. He also saw the remainder of Blunt’s division coming up from Independence. Moonlight decided he could not hold his position against the Confederate reinforcements and that he had fulfilled his mission to delay the Confederates on the Little Blue. He ordered his unit to fall back and link up with Blunt’s Division at the Little Blue Church.

Col. Moonlight: We slowly began to drive the enemy back over the ground again, dismounting every man for the purpose of shelter behind some walls, fences, and houses, some of which were then held by the enemy, who, after a vigorous assault, were dislodged, thus affording us an advantage which accounts for the few killed and wounded on our side, compared with the enemy, who suffered terribly. The Eleventh Regiment here behaved like old veterans, and gave renewed proof of their fighting qualities, driving an enemy greatly their superior in numbers to the very ground occupied in the morning.

Col. Clark: [I] found that Colonel Lawther had indiscreetly attacked a very heavy force of the enemy posted behind some stone fencing which ran at right angles to the road and afforded complete protection against small-arms. He was driven back and in his turn assailed by the enemy, when I arrived with Greene’s regiment... Owing to the difficulties of crossing at the ford Greene’s regiment fought at great odds unsupported, but they contested every inch of ground with stubbornness until the arrival of Wood’s battalion, when the enemy gave way, but receiving re-enforcements drove us again to our original position. We were almost out of ammunition and the day seemed lost, but Kitchen’s regiment, including Davies’ battalion (Davies’ absence from his regiment not accounted for), came up at this moment in as gallant style as veteran infantry and turned the tide of success, the enemy breaking and falling back toward his first position. A part of Shelby’s division (Gordon’s regiment, I believe) joined on the left of Kitchen and pushed hotly after the enemy, who, taking position behind the rock fencing spoken of, stubbornly contested the advance of Marmaduke’s and Shelby’s divisions...
21 October

1. 1100+: Moonlight repositioned to the high ground near Salem Church.
2. 1100+ to 1200: Blunt’s Division attacked and pressed Thompson back to the river.
3. 1200+: Blunt’ repositioned to the high ground near Salem Church.
4. 1200+ to 1300: Union artillery fire defeated Shelby’s attack.
5. 1200+ to 1300: Jackman failed to advance and support Thompson.
6. 1300: Marmaduke continued to regroup near the lower crossing.
28. Blunt’s Attack

Maj. Gen. Blunt spent the previous night in Independence, urging Maj. Gen. Curtis to defend on the Little Blue River. However, Curtis was still constrained by the Kansas Militia’s refusal to move east of the Big Blue River. Sometime earlier that morning, Curtis relented and allowed Blunt to move back to the Little Blue River with his volunteer units. At about 0900, Blunt departed Independence and joined with Moonlight near the Salem Church. By 1100, Blunt had formed his division along the ridge line overlooking the Little Blue River valley. He saw Shelby’s Division coming up behind Marmaduke’s Division. Blunt observed an opportunity to attack Shelby’s lead brigade before Price could coordinate the movement of the two divisions. He ordered the attack and forced Shelby back about a half mile. It appears that Marmaduke’s division, weary from the morning fight and out of ammunition, allowed Shelby to bear the brunt of the fight. Shelby continued to push units across the river and eventually his large division started to overlap both Union flanks. Blunt had approximately 2,800 men fighting as dismounted cavalry with every fourth man holding a horse and about 2,100 on the firing line. Shelby had approximately 3,000 mounted infantry fighting dismounted. He may have had as many as 2,800 men on the firing line with only a few hundred guards remaining with the horses on the east side of the river. Additionally, several hundred of Marmaduke’s men may have supported the attack. Sometime after 1200, the Union attack culminated and Blunt slowly pulled back to the ridge. He established his line near the church. The Confederates continued to test the Union defensive line. Blunt’s small division had the advantage of holding the high ground and equally important had 15 artillery pieces, whereas Shelby had only four guns. The heavy Union artillery fire momentarily halted the Southern advance.

**Maj. Gen. Blunt:** Early on the morning of the 21st, I was directed to move with all the volunteer force back to the Little Blue, and just as the command had commenced to move I received a dispatch from Colonel Moonlight informing me that the enemy were advancing in force; that he had burned the bridge, and was engaging their advance. The command was now pressed forward as rapidly as possible, but on arriving upon the field I found that the small force under Colonel Moonlight, although making a stubborn resistance, had been forced back by superior numbers, and we had lost the strong position on the west side of the Little Blue, before alluded to, and where I had hoped to have held Price in check until General Rosecrans’ forces came up on his rear, had circumstances have permitted me to remain there, as I had suggested the day previous. As soon as the troops could be got into position, a gallant attempt was made to push back the enemy and retake the ground we had lost, when their line was driven back nearly a mile, but the vastly superior numbers of the enemy enabling them to push forward heavy flanking columns on my right and left, compelled me to fall back.13

**Brig. Gen. Thompson:** On the 21st we moved in the center of the column, Marmaduke’s division in front. On approaching the Little Blue River the enemy was found in position to dispute our passage. We were ordered to the left of Marmaduke’s division, and having dismounted we soon forced the crossing in our front, and following the enemy from position to position, several of which were very strong and well defended, we drove him toward the town of Independence. I met General Marmaduke several times during this day’s fighting, but his troops were so far to our right that I made no movement in immediate co-operation with them.14
21 October

1. 1300 to 1400: Thompson advanced up the hill.
2. 1300 to 1400: Jackman advanced Nichols’ Regt. to support Thompson’s attack.
3. 1300 to 1400: Curtis redeployed McLain’s Artillery Btry. to oppose the Confederate flanking maneuver and then committed more artillery to stabilize the Union north flank.
4. 1300-1400: The reduction of Union artillery fire from the main line allowed Shelby to renew his attack in the center.
5. 1400+: Curtis and Blunt made the decision to withdraw to Independence. In the confusion of the movement, McLain’s Btry. is left unsupported. Moonlight ordered a local counter-attack to save the guns.
6. 1400+: Blunt conducted a delay back to Independence.

Map 29.
29. Shelby’s Attack

Blunt established his defensive line near the church. On the Confederate side, Price left the tactical control of the fighting to Shelby. Shelby advanced Thompson’s veteran brigade up the slope toward the church but Union artillery fire stalled the attack. Shelby extended his line to the north with Col. Jackman’s Brigade. Jackman’s men were mostly recent recruits and failed to aggressively advance against the Union line. However, Jackman did send one mounted regiment west on the lower ford road attempting to outflank the Union line. At about 1300, Maj. Gen. Curtis arrived on the battlefield. He noted the Confederate move around the Union flank and shifted McLain’s Battery, plus two mountain howitzers, to protect the flank. The artillery slowed the Confederate flanking maneuver. However, the reduced artillery fire against the main Confederate attack, allowed Shelby to push more units forward in the center and on both flanks. In time, the Confederates occupied the ground around the Lawson Moore House and brought effective fire against McLain’s Battery. Maj. Robert Hunt, Blunt’s artillery chief, shifted two more howitzers from the 11th Kansas Battery to support McLain’s Battery. The additional guns stabilized the situation on the Union north flank but again lessened the fire against the Confederate main attack in the center. Shelby exploited the opportunity and pressed the main attack forward. He also maneuvered units to threaten the Union southern flank. Sometime after 1400, Curtis and Blunt made the mutual decision to withdraw. In the confusion, the Kansas cavalry on the northern flank left McLain’s Battery unsupported and the Confederates threatened to capture the battery. Moonlight’s 11th Kansas, which had started withdrawing, turned and launched a mounted charge against the Confederates and bought time for the guns to withdraw. During the withdrawal towards Independence, Blunt twice ordered the men to dismount and delay the Confederate advance. By 1600, the Union troops were back in Independence.

Captain Palmer: The rebel advance was within 400 or 500 yards of the battery. Quick work must be done to save the guns, worth a thousand men to us. Colonel Moonlight. . . came galloping down the line to my company. . . . He ordered me to countermarch and charge the enemy with my eighty-eight men in a column of eight front. We charged down the road, passing the Little Blue church... I saw ahead of me a brick house, just where the road turned from a northerly course straight east, a stone fence dead ahead of us... The rebel cavalry fell back, but a line of infantry occupied the house and were down behind the fence. . . As we reached the brow of the hill, a thought flashed through my mind that the first line, in which I was riding, with seven soldiers to my left, would be shot as soon as we came in sight. I clutched the pommel of my saddle and threw myself almost flat on the horse. The volley of bullets came as I expected. I felt my horse going down, swung my feet clear of the stirrups, and fell on my horse's neck, unhurt.

Brig. Gen. Shelby: I dismounted my entire command, except Lieutenant-Colonel Nichols’ regiment, of Jackman’s brigade, and crossed Little Blue by wading... I threw forward Thompson’s brigade swiftly on the left, Jackman’s supporting, and the fight opened fast and furious. The enemy held a strong position behind hastily constructed works of logs and earth, stone fences, and deep hollows and ravines. My division fought splendidly. From stand to stand the Federals were driven... Sending the cavalry regiment of Lieutenant-Colonel Nichols upon their left flank, which made a brilliant and desperate charge, and pressing forward immediately in front, the enemy was driven clearly from the field.
Price's Plan (The Confederate Army of Missouri)

1. Feint attack against Curtis' main defenses blocking the Independence to Kansas City Road.
2. Main attack over lightly defended crossings south of Brush Creek to outflank the Union line.
3. A series of delaying actions to hold Pleasonton's Cavalry Division away from the wagon train.
4. Simultaneously, move the wagon train over the Big Blue River to the center of the Army's new position on the west side of the Big Blue River.

- Possible Intent #1: Hold Pleasonton east of the Big Blue River and Curtis north of Brush Creek to buy time for the Army to retreat into Kansas.

- Possible Intent #2: Use interior lines of operation to defeat Curtis's Army of the Border while holding Pleasonton’s Cavalry at bay along the Big Blue River. Turn the full force of the Army against Pleasonton and then continue the retreat before the Union XVI Corps enters the fight.

- Possible Intent #3: Decide upon a course of action based upon how the situation develops.
The night of 21 October, Maj. Gen. Price’s Army of the Missouri camped in and around Independence. The Confederates were in a precarious position. Maj. Gen. Curtis’ Army of the Border was heavily entrenched on the west bank of the Big Blue River and blocked the main roads leading into Kansas City. The Kansas troops had fought hard at Lexington, again at the Little Blue River and would most likely fight hard to hold the line at the Big Blue River. Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton’s Provisional Cavalry Division, the Army of the Department of Missouri, was closing in on the rear of the Confederate Army. To date, Pleasonton’s cavalrymen had executed a cautious pursuit and not demonstrated an overly aggressive willingness to close with the Confederates. Maj. Gen. A.J. Smith’s XVI Corps was well behind the Union cavalry and presented no immediate danger. Price may have viewed the Missouri troops as a manageable threat and concentrated his efforts against the Union troops blocking his move into Kansas. Price had no intention of advancing down the Kansas City Road into Curtis’ entrenchments but instead was “determined to advance on the Santa Fe road.” He ordered Shelby to feint against the main crossing and then force a crossing south of the Kansas City Road. Fagan’s Division escorted the wagon train with orders to advance toward Little Santa Fe. Finally, Marmaduke’s Division constituted the rear guard with orders to delay Maj. Gen. Pleasonton’s Division. Historians can only speculate at Price’s intent for the plan of attack. Price probably intended to turn southwest toward Kansas with Shelby penetrating Curtis’ defensive line. After creating a hole in the Union line, Marmaduke would delay the Union pursuit while Shelby held the northern shoulder of the penetration. Simultaneously, Fagan and the wagon train would move to the southwest and continue the retreat. On the other hand, he might have envisioned the opportunity to achieve a larger goal. Price may have planned to take advantage of interior lines of operation to hold Pleasonton at the Big Blue River while maneuvering against the outflanked Army of the Border. A defeat of Curtis’ Army would have allowed Price to turn his full force against Pleasonton before XVI Corps arrived on the field. A Confederate victory would have provided the opportunity to continue the retreat into an almost defenseless Kansas. He could have then fulfilled a portion of his orders to “make your retreat through Kansas... sweeping that country of its mules, horses, cattle, and military supplies of all kinds.” Albert Castel, Price’s biographer, provided another possible explanation. He stated, “quite likely he [Price] had not yet made up his mind on the matter but was waiting for developments to clarify the situation.”

Senator Lane: We learned from prisoners and other sources that Price with his entire army, estimated at 35,000 men, was upon us, intent upon the capture of Kansas City and Leavenworth, and the devastation of our State.

Maj. Gen. Price: I encamped that night in Independence, having marched twenty-six miles, the troops being engaged with the enemy most of the time and driving them before them... On the morning of the 22nd I left Independence. The enemy had fallen back to Big Blue, on the Kansas City road, to a position strong by nature and strengthened by fortifications, upon which all their art had been exhausted, and where they had been joined by General Curtis and his forces, thus increasing Blunt’s army to between 6,000 and 8,000 men. Receiving this information I determined to advance on the Santa Fe road which had been obstructed by felling trees.
21 October (Night):

1. Curtis established his main defense in the north.
2. Price’s Army bivouacked near Independence, and he ordered the Army to move at daylight.

22 October (Morning):

3. 0700-0900: Blunt’s brigades moved into position to guard Curtis’ flank. Ford, Moonlight, and Jennison moved scouts to the east side of the river to develop the situation.
4. 0900: Jackman feinted toward Kansas City and pressed Blair’s forward security force back toward the Big Blue River.
5. 0900: Thompson moved southwest to find an alternate crossing.
6. 0900+: Curtis decided Jackman’s attack was nothing more than a feint and ordered Grant to send out scouts to see if Price was moving against the Union flank.
7. 1100: Shelby and Thompson decided to force a crossing at Byram’s Ford.

Map 31.
On the night of 21 October, Maj. Gen. Blunt left a small security force in contact with the Rebels and withdrew the majority of his forces to the defensive line on the Big Blue River. Maj. Gen. Curtis positioned the Army of the Border along the river and occupied every known ford from its mouth to the vicinity of Hickman’s Mill, a distance of about 15 miles. His intent was to trap and destroy the Confederate Army between his Army and Pleasonton’s pursuing forces. He expected the Confederates to continue their advance along the Kansas City road. Curtis established his main defensive position blocking the Kansas City Road with the majority of Maj. Gen. Deitzler’s Kansas State Militia (KSM) and Col. Blair’s 3d Brigade of Blunt’s Division. Curtis obstructed the crossing site and heavily fortified the high ground overlooking the crossing. Curtis sent Blunt’s Provisional Cavalry Division south to guard the other known crossing sites and prevent a Confederate flanking movement. Blunt’s units did not get into position until the morning of the 22d. Far to the south at Russell’s Ford, Brig. Gen. Melvin Grant commanded a detachment of the KSM guarding the Army’s right flank. About 0900, Brig. Gen. Shelby initiated his attack on Curtis’ line. Col. Jackman’s Brigade cautiously advanced against the Union skirmish line, which was covering the approaches to the main crossings. Curtis quickly realized Jackman’s attack was nothing more than a feint and soon after 0900 sent a message to Brig. Gen. Grant at Russell’s Ford, “Price is making very feeble demonstrations in front. Look out for your position. Send scouts on road to Pleasant Hill and also toward Independence, to see if Price is moving toward my flank. Send me reports every 30 minutes.” Simultaneously, Shelby probed to the south with Thompson’s Brigade searching for an alternate crossing. Around 1100, he made the decision to force a crossing at Byram’s Ford.

**Maj. Gen. Curtis:** At the close of the contest of the 21st, near Independence, I ordered all of General Blunt’s and detached troops to move back and join the forces at the Big Blue... I divided the forces, distributing them so as to form a line more or less continuous, according to danger from the Missouri River, to the crossing of the Blue, near Hickman Mills, a distance of fifteen or sixteen miles. Roads on the west side were convenient for concentrating these forces, and with the immense display of abatis and other field-works... I was ready to receive the enemy on the 22d. I assigned General Blunt to the command of the right wing, including all south of the road, and to General Deitzler the left wing, which includes all north of it. Militia, volunteers, artillery... amounting, altogether, to about 15,000, were thus arranged, resolved to check or defeat the long continued progress of Price’s army of 30,000... On my arrival at the Big Blue I telegraphed you as to my conflict at the Little Blue and my designs for the 22d, and also telegraphed General Rosecrans as follows:... I am confident I can stop Price at this crossing, and hope you will come up in his rear and left... He cannot get out by Hickman Mills. If you can get that position we will bag Price, if I succeed, as I hope to do. My losses have been considerable, but my troops are in good order, and ready to make a stand at this place.

**Brig. Gen. Shelby:** I ordered Colonel Jackman on the morning of the 22d to move out on the Kansas City road and engage the enemy skirmishing with my pickets; then crossing the Big Blue and facing the enemy on the right, engaged them to cover the crossing and passing of the train. Sending General Thompson with his entire brigade, expect Gordon’s regiment, to force the Federals back to Westport.
On the night of 21 Oct: The 4 KSM prepared abatis at the ford and along the river.

2. 0900: Jennison arrived at the ford and deployed one section of Barker’s Artillery forward along the river with “a strong skirmish line.”

3. 0900: The majority of the Jennison’s Brigade deployed on the high ground west of the ford.

4. 1100 – 1400: Thompson attempted to capture the ford. Jackman feinted against the Kansas City Road crossing (about 7 miles north).

5. 1400: Shelby and Thompson sent units north and south to seek an alternate crossing site.

6. 1500: Jennison, threatened by the Confederate flanking moves, abandoned the position and retreated toward Westport.

7. 1500+: Moonlight arrived too late to assist in the defense and retreated toward Westport.
On the morning of 22 October, Col. Jennison’s reinforced brigade defended the Byram’s Ford crossing of the Big Blue River. The night before, the 4th KSM (part of Brig. Gen. Melvin Grant’s detachment) blocked the ford with felled trees and obstructions along the banks. Jennison’s brigade arrived at about 0900 and immediately went to work to challenge any Confederate passage over river. He sent a mounted detachment to the east side of the river to provide early warning and then arrayed his brigade in depth to defend the crossing. Jennison positioned one section of mountain howitzers at the ford along with strong skirmish line of dismounted cavalrmen and placed the balance of the brigade on the high ground to the west. At about 1100, his screen line on the east side of the river identified the oncoming Confederates and the Union troops braced for the attack. Over a period of three hours, Thompson’s Brigade made repeated unsuccessful attacks to force a crossing. At about 1500, the Confederates finally forced Jennison to fall back when they outflanked the Union defenses by crossing a unit over nearby Hinkle’s Ford, a local farmer’s crossing. The Union commanders had not known about Hinkle’s Ford and had not defended the crossing. During the fight, Maj. Gen. Blunt rushed Moonlight’s brigade to the area to support Jennison. However, Moonlight failed to arrive in time to support the defense. Blunt withdrew both brigades towards Westport to establish a new defensive line. Shelby sent Thompson’s brigade to pursue the retreating Union forces and to protect the north flank of the Confederate penetration.

**Col. Charles Jennison:** On the morning of the 22d I was ordered with the brigade to Byram’s Crossing of the Big Blue, some eight miles from its encampment of the night previous. Arriving there we were joined by a detachment of Kansas State Militia, of Colonel [McLain’s?] command, which rendered valuable assistance in obstructing the ford of the river by felling timber, &c. About 11 a.m. the enemy’s advance made its appearance at the ford, attacking our outposts and attempting to force a crossing. The ford was so effectually obstructed, however, and in its condition wholly impassable for artillery, that for some hours little progress was made, the attacking party being repulsed each time it appeared in the front, which was defended by a strong skirmish line, securely posted, and one section of howitzer battery... At this point the First Brigade held the enemy effectually in check, notwithstanding his great superiority of numbers, until about 3 p.m., when it became evident that he had succeeded in crossing considerable bodies, both above and below, and was rapidly flanking us both on the right and left. Upon this intelligence it was determined to retire in the direction of Westport or Kansas City, toward which it was evident the efforts of the enemy were directed. Our lines at the ford having been forced back, the rebels succeeded in crossing a considerable force of dismounted cavalry, a portion of which was employed in removing obstructions in the river, while the others were deployed on either side of the road, and advanced toward us.31

**Brig. Gen. M. Jeff Thompson:** We soon reached the point indicated and found that the enemy had obstructed the crossing by felling trees, and were disposed to dispute our passage. A portion of the brigade were dismounted, and in the face of the enemy waded the stream and made a lodgment upon the west bank. Others soon followed, and we drove the enemy so fast that the axes they had used to fell the trees were left by them, and they were speedily put to use in opening a road for our artillery and the train to cross.32
22 October – Early Afternoon
1. Grant tried to regroup at Russell's Ford.
2. Jackman abandoned the feint and moved to rejoin Shelby.

22 October – Late Afternoon
3. Grant learned of Jennison's defeat at Byram Ford and ordered his brigade to retreat to Westport.
4. Jennison and Moonlight halted Thompson's advance toward Westport.
5. Jackman crossed over Byran Ford and moved south to clear the road toward Russell's Ford.
6. Jackman defeated Grant at Mockbee Farm.
7. The wagon train, escorted by Marmaduke, exited Independence and continued to south toward Byram's Ford. Fagan assumed responsibility for the rear-guard.

Map 33.
South of Byram’s Ford, Brig. Gen. Melvin Grant, commanding the KSM brigade at Russell’s Ford, acted in accordance with his orders and sent scouting parties out to determine Price’s intentions. Unfortunately, he dispersed and lost control of his command in the execution of those orders. Later in the day, he learned of the heavy fighting at Byram’s Ford and tried to send units to support Jennison’s Brigade. Regrettably for Grant, Brig. Gen. Thompson had sent Col. Frank Gordon’s 5th Missouri (C.S.A.) to guard the Confederate left flank and to scout for a river crossing between Byram’s and Russell’s Fords. This unit scattered Grant’s piecemeal efforts to reinforce Byram’s Ford. Over time, Grant recognized that his command was in danger of being cut off from other Union forces to the north. Therefore, he decided there was insufficient time to concentrate his scattered brigade and sent orders for all units to independently move toward Westport. Sometime after 1500, Col. Jackman’s Brigade rejoined Shelby’s Division at Byram’s Ford. Shelby was unaware of the disorganized state of Grant’s command and assumed a large Union force blocked the route to Little Santa Fe. He believed Grant’s force posed a significant threat to the Confederate wagon train and ordered Jackman’s Brigade south to secure the southern flank of the bridgehead and open the road to the south. Shelby also ordered Thompson to fall back from Westport and reinforce the attack to the south. Jackman’s Brigade and Grant’s forces collided at Mockbee’s Farm.

**Maj. Gen. Deitzler:** He (Jennison) was re-enforced by a portion of the militia which had become detached from General Grant’s command at Hickman Mills. A strong detachment of the enemy moved up the Blue under cover of the timber and attacked General Grant, throwing his command into some confusion.33

**Brig. Gen. Shelby:** I held Gordon to watch the left, now being demonstrated upon, until Jackman came up… Gordon also soon became engaged with forces outnumbering him three to one but fought them manfully until Jackman came up… I sent orders to Thompson to hurry to my assistance.34
Battle of Mockbee Farm
1. The 2 KSM forced the 5 Mo (Thompson's Brigade) out of the Locust Grove.
2. 2d KSM defeated the 5th Mo attempts to reopen the road.
3. Jackman arrived on the field and charged the Union line.
4. The Confederate charge defeated the 2 KSM. Grant’s Brigade scattered and retreated toward Olathe, Kansas.
Grant’s force consisted of several Kansas Militia regiments including one howitzer of the Topeka Battery. However, Grant’s brigade moved back to Westport as individual regiments and not as a cohesive brigade. It was the 2d Kansas State Militia Regiment and the lone artillery piece that found Col. Gordon’s 5th Missouri (C.S.A.) blocking the road at Mockbee Farm. Several other Kansas militia detachments appear to have been in the area but they did not participate in the fighting. The 2d KSM, about 300 men, formed a line blocking the road. The Kansas militia fought hard, defeating two attacks from Gordon’s regiment and the lead elements of Jackman’s Brigade. Quartermaster Samuel Reader stated the fighting was, “Hot enough for anybody.” Nevertheless, the Confederate brigade regrouped and Quartermaster Reader saw, “the rebels, coming in a long line, yelling.” The third Confederate charge overran the Kansas regiment. Union losses were 30 killed, 50 wounded, 102 captured and the loss of the lone howitzer. Among the captured was Samuel Reader. Grant’s remaining Kansas militia forces retreated toward Olathe, Kansas. The Confederates had broken Curtis’s defensive line and opened the road to Little Santa Fe.

**First Sergt. Bonebrake:** We waited until about noon and no sign of Price’s train (the unit’s morning recon to Hickman’s Mill). We started on our return to Hickman Mills Crossing, where we met an order to return to Westport. We were hardly on the move when we met a messenger on a foaming horse, saying Shelby had crossed at a lower ford and would cut us off unless we hastened. We remounted and put our horses in a gallop. When we passed from the valley to the highland, we saw coming from the northeast a long line of cavalry, which proved to be Shelby’s men. We were completely cut off from Westport. We halted opposite the farmhouse. On our right was an open field. We formed in line of battle in the field, with the cannon in the public road. The long line of the enemy marched up to our front and formed in line. The contest was about to commence between a brigade of soldiers, Shelby’s men, the flower of the Confederate Western Army, and about 300 Militia, composed of lawyers, doctors, preachers, farmers, and others, some of whom had never fired a gun… The musketry fire was opened all along the line. Shelby attempted to flank our position by sending a body of troops to our left. This maneuver was checked by a free discharge of canister shot. After the battle had been on about a half an hour, we noticed by the formation and the bugle calls that the enemy were preparing to charge. Up to this there was but little damage. With the usual “Rebel yell,” the charge came, and the enemy rode right over us. At the opening of the fight we were dismounted and our horses were held in the rear. We scattered like sheep, every man for himself, each running for his horse.

**Col. Jackman:** Soon after crossing over the Big Blue I overtook and reported to General Shelby. I was directed by the general to move forward rapidly to the assistance of Colonel Gordon, who was being pressed by the enemy. I moved briskly across the prairie and soon came in sight of this force... The enemy having fallen back to the cover of some small timber and in the rear their artillery, which was playing upon us, I ordered a charge and the whole command swept forward in gallant style, driving the Federals, utterly routed and demoralized, from their shelter. Our losses during the day was slight... Lieut. Col. Nichols and Schnable had their horses killed. My horse was severely wounded.
22 October
1. 1500: with McNeil (Pleasanton's Division) forced Fagan to the eastern outskirts of Independence.
2. Late Afternoon: McNeil and Sanborn charged into the streets of Independence and routed Cabell's Brigade. The Union captured 2 guns and 300 men.
3. Sunset: Marmaduke assumed the rearguard mission and slowed the Union advance.
4. Sunset: Fagan rallied behind Marmaduke and herded the wagon train toward the Big Blue River.
5. Early Evening: Pleasanton ordered Brown to continue the pursuit. Marmaduke continued to slow the Union pursuit and bought time for the trains to get to the west side of the Big Blue.
6. 2000: Pleasanton reported heavy fighting and that he had "Heard nothing from Curtis." He requested Rosecrans order the XVI Corps to change its objective from Hickman Mills to Independence.
7. Late Evening: Pleasanton ordered Winslow to assume the lead. The pursuit continued until 2230 and stopped within a few miles of the Big Blue River.
8. Late Evening: Price established his headquarters at the "Boston" Adam's House west of Byram's Ford. Shelby regrouped south of the house. He left one regt. in the north to observe Union forces in the Westport area.
9. Late Evening: Curtis established his headquarters at the Gillis House in Kansas City and directed the KSM to concentrate within the field works surrounding Kansas City to replenish supplies and ordered Blunt to regroup near Westport. Also received word that Pleasanton at Independence.
35. The Battle of Independence

On 20 October, Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton assumed command of the Provisional Cavalry Division near Dunksburg, Missouri. Prior to the 20th, the division tentatively pursued the Confederates. Earlier, Brig. Gen. Sanborn (acting division commander) had decided not to pressure the slow moving Rebels. He recognized that Curtis needed time to mobilize the Kansas Militia and the XVI Corps needed the opportunity to catch up. However, the situation changed after the Battle of Lexington. Pleasonton identified the need to rapidly close on the Confederates and cooperate with Curtis who was entrenched along the Big Blue River. The next day, the division passed through Lexington and then crossed over the Little Blue River on the 22d. Brig. Gen. John McNeil’s brigade was in the lead as it approached Independence. Maj. Gen. Fagan was unprepared for the rapid advance of the Union cavalry. McNeil’s men charged into the town and mauled a brigade of Fagan’s division. Pleasonton committed Sanborn’s Brigade to support McNeil and by late afternoon, the Union troops had pushed through Independence. The Union drive slowed when it came up against Marmaduke’s Division on the west side of the town. Marmaduke’s mission was to hold Pleasonton until the Confederate Army pushed aside Curtis’s forces and the wagon train moved out of harm’s way. Pleasonton committed Brig. Gen. Egbert Brown’s and Col. Edward Winslow’s Brigades into the pursuit. Brown pushed the Confederates southwest until dark and then Winslow’s veteran brigade passed through and continued the pursuit until 2230. One of Marmaduke’s brigade commanders stated it was “a long and never to be forgotten night” and that “our loss was heavy.”

Maj. Gen. Pleasonton: On the 22d of October my advance came up with the enemy’s rear guard at the little blue. The bridge was destroyed over that stream, but by means of a temporary bridge, hastily constructed, and a ford..., the command was soon crossed. McNeil’s brigade had the advance, and soon engaged the enemy, followed by Sanborn’s brigade, and this force soon pressed them back upon Independence, and beyond that town, where by a vigorous charge... two guns were captured from the enemy. The pursuit was continued, and Brown’s and Winslow’s brigades coming up they were thrown to the front... [I] determined to push them all night.

Brig. Gen. Cabell: Early on the morning of the 22d, I was ordered to move back and attack the enemy, who had driven in our pickets. I drove him back, and left him in full retreat. I returned to Independence and had a heavy skirmish with a column of the enemy... I repulsed them and moved my command at once, in order to get through the city before another attack could be made on me. Just as I was coming out of the city the enemy struck me in the flank, charging down several streets, and cut off 200 or 300 of my men and captured two pieces of artillery. I escaped by jumping over a piece of artillery and running through the passage of a double log cabin and jumping the yard fence... I rode to my command, which was then in the road, faced them to the rear, checked and drove the enemy, enabling my scattered men to rejoin their regiments.
23 October

1. 0001: Sometime during the night of the 22d or early on the 23d Curtis decided against defending Kansas City/Westport and made plans to attack at daylight.
2. 0100: McNeil departed Independence and moved toward Hickman Mills.
3. 0200: Marmaduke broke contact with the Union pursuit and moved to the west side of the Big Blue River.

4. 0300: Curtis ordered the army to concentrate at Westport and attack at daylight.
5. 0400: McNeil’s scouts identified a large Confederate Camp on the west side of the Big Blue in the vicinity of Byram’s Ford.
6. 0500: Sanborn departed Independence and moved forward to support Winslow and Brown.
7. XVI Corps prepared to march at daylight for Independence.

Map 36.
On 21 October, Price may have held some hope of seizing Kansas City. However, he probably reassessed his options after the heavy fighting on the 22nd. Curtis’ Army of the Border had not collapsed after the Confederates turned the Union flank at Byram’s Ford and Pleasonton’s Division had shown a level of aggressiveness previously unseen. Fagan’s best brigade had sustained heavy casualties in the fighting, and the wagon train barely escaped to the west side of the Big Blue River. Therefore, Price decided his primary goal was the safety of his wagon train currently camped in the vicinity of Byram’s Ford. He ordered the train to move at daylight toward Hickman Mills and then on to Little Santa Fe. Two full brigades escorted the train. It was a clear indication that the Army would move southwest into Kansas and not northwest toward Fort Leavenworth. Price positioned Marmaduke at Byram’s Ford with orders to delay Pleasonton’s advance. He directed Shelby and Fagan, camped near Mockbee Farm, to move their divisions toward Westport at dawn and attack Curtis. Again, historians can only speculate at Price’s intent for the attack. Most of Fagan’s division moved to protect Marmaduke’s north flank and Shelby’s small division lacked the combat power to defeat Curtis’s Army. More than likely it was nothing more than a spoiling attack to protect Marmaduke’s rear and cover the move of the wagon train to the south. To the north, Curtis also reassessed the developing situation. His initial orders focused on establishing a new defensive line. However, sometime during the night he decided to attack at dawn. He ordered Blunt’s division to take position along Brush Creek and throughout the night, his staff worked to reposition Deitzler’s Kansas militia to support a Federal attack. To the east, Pleasonton was unsure of Curtis’ situation but was determined to renew the pursuit at daylight. Pleasonton recognized that the diversion of the XVI Corps to Independence, left the Confederate escape to the south uncovered. Therefore, he ordered McNeil to move south through the night and take position at Hickman Mills to block any attempt by the Confederates to move south.

**Maj. Gen. Curtis:** Night closing the battle..., I ordered my troops under cover of the darkness to concentrate within the lines of fieldworks that inclosed Kansas City... I replenished exhausted stores and secured my weary soldiers a few hours’ repose... But in view of to-morrow my officers were put to a new test of their powers of endurance. The enemy had halted south of Westport..., where he could either turn my new right flank, which rested on Turkey Creek, or attack in front at his leisure. I therefore determined to renew the offensive on his own grounds with my main force... [A] scout from his cavalry advance reported General Pleasonton at Independence... I directed Generals Blunt and Deitzler to personally supervise preparations and have the troops to commence moving at 3 o’clock in the morning, and all of my staff not then engaged locating the troops for the night were also directed to assist in notifying and replenishing the militia for the proposed attack of the enemy at daylight the next morning... The officers all heartily united and labored most of the night in efforts to have everything ready for a united, powerful attack on the rebel camp at daylight.44

**Maj. Gen. Price:** On the morning of the 23d I took up my line of march, and in a short time discovered the enemy in position on the prairie. The train had been sent forward on the Fort Scott road. I had instructed Major-General Marmaduke to resist the advance of the enemy, who was in his rear... Brigadier-General Shelby immediately attacked the enemy, assisted by Major-General Fagan with two brigades of Arkansas troops.45
23 October

1. 0700: Price's wagon train moved south toward Russell's Ford.
2. 0700+: Brown failed to execute the planned daylight attack.
3. 0700+: Blunt moved south out of Westport and formed his division on-line atop the bluff south of Brush Creek – then advanced south.
4. 0730: Curtis arrived in Westport and established his headquarters at the Harris House.
5. 0800: Shelby moved north to cover the movement of the wagon train and Marmaduke's rear and flank.
6. 0800+: Blair arrived in Westport and he sent units south to support Blunt's attack.
7. 0800+: Blunt's and Shelby's lead units clashed in the vicinity of the Wornall House.
8. 0900+: Fagan's Division (-) moved north to support Shelby.
9. 0900: Pleasonton attacked to seize Byram's Ford (2 hours late - details on next map).
10. 0930+: Shelby pushed Blunt back to the north, and Blunt established a defensive line north of Brush Creek.
11. 0930+: Shelby's attack stalled on the south side of Brush Creek and paused to wait for ammunition to be brought forward.
12. 0930+: Deitzler's KSM continued to concentrate at Westport.
13. 0930+: McNeil camped east of Russell's Ford. He heard firing to the north and resumed his movement toward Hickman Mills.
Daylight at Westport

Daylight found the three armies only partially prepared for battle. Most of Maj. Gen. Curtis’ Army of the Border was still on the road to Westport and only Blunt’s cavalry division was prepared to attack. To the east, Maj. Gen. Pleasonton’s cavalry division was the only element of the Army of the Department of Missouri available for the fight. The XVI Infantry Corps would not reach the Big Blue River until that evening. His own plan to attack at daylight failed to materialize. Additionally, his bold attempt to cut off the Confederate escape to the south was in jeopardy when McNeil stopped to rest his brigade several miles short of his planned objective. Price’s Army of Missouri also struggled to meet the order to attack at daylight. Marmaduke’s Division at Byram’s Ford was ready for battle. However, Shelby was slow and did not depart his camp until “about 8 o’clock” and Fagan’s Division did not move until after 0900. Blunt decided not to wait for the Union Army to concentrate. Instead, he opted for a spoiling attack to buy time for the Kansas troops to get into position. Sometime after daylight, his units crossed over Brush Creek and moved up the bluff. He then formed a line of battle on the plateau and advanced south toward the Wornall House and the opening shots of the day occurred somewhere north of the house. Shelby and Fagan steadily pushed Blunt’s small Union division back toward Westport. Shelby reported that he’d forced the Union troops back, “Inch by inch and foot by foot, they gave way before my steady onset. Regiment met regiment and opposing batteries draped the scene in clouds of dense and sable smoke.” Blunt made one final stand at the timber line on the south side of Brush Creek. The fighting lasted a little more than an hour and by 0930 Blunt had pulled back to the north side of Brush Creek. There he joined with the arriving Kansas Militia. Shelby was unable to follow up on his success due to a lack of ammunition and took up defensive positions along the stone fence at the top of the bluff. Col. Thompson, his lead brigade commander, was disappointed and stated, “[if I had not] had to wait for more ammunition, I believe that I could have taken Westport.” Meanwhile to the east, at Byram’s Ford, Pleasonton initiated his attack at about 0900.

Col. Jackman: The morning of the 23d... my command, by direction of Brigadier-General Shelby, was moved out in line of battle in concert with General Thompson’s to meet the enemy advancing from Westport. A severe fight soon ensued, which resulted in a temporary success to him. Our forces, however, soon rallied, and turning drove him from the field.

Maj. Gen. Blunt: All of the night of the 22d was occupied in getting ammunition and subsistence to my command, with the view of commencing the attack upon the enemy at daylight... Daylight on the morning of the 23rd revealed the enemy in force on the open prairie directly south of Westport and about two miles distant. [At]daylight my whole command was in motion, moving in column through Westport and across Brush Creek, and soon after sunrise the First, Second, and Fourth Brigades were deployed into line of battle on the south side of the timber skirting Brush Creek, where Shelby’s division, of Price’s army, was advancing upon my line. Skirmishers were thrown forward and the engagement with small-arms and artillery soon became general. My advance line being hard pressed I ordered Colonel C. W. Blair to advance with the Sixth and Tenth Regiments State Militia, to support the right of my line and guard my right flank, which order was executed with great promptness. Time being required to get the militia arriving from Kansas City dismounted and in position, and the consent in front being severe and unequal, I directed my advance line to fall back to the north side of Brush Creek.
Map 38.

The alignment of Freeman's three regiments is not known.

23 October

1. 0700+: Winslow deployed forward and skirmished with the Confederates.
2. 0815: Brown moved to the front and prepared to attack.
3. 0830: Pleasanton arrested Brown for failing to attack at daylight. Placed Philips in command of the brigade.
4. 0900: Union artillery opened fire and Philips sent the 7 MSM forward to seize the crossing. The attack failed and fell back from the river.
5. 0900+: Dee's Bn (4th |A) forded the river north of the ford and flanked the Confederate position.
6. 0900+: Philip attacked again and forced its way over the river.
7. 0900+: Freeman retreated and reformed behind Clark.
8. Both sides heard the cannon fire to the west.
38. The Second Fight at Byram’s Ford

Maj. Gen. Marmaduke defended the ford with Freeman’s Brigade forward on the river’s west bank, and Clark’s Brigade deployed on the high ground, known as Potato Hill, to the west of the ford. The division had not pulled back to the west side of the river until 0200 that morning and had little time to prepare defenses. However, the Confederates did extend and improve the abattis at the ford and along the banks. They also erected hasty fortifications with “piles of rails.” Maj. Gen. Pleasonton had three of his cavalry brigades available for the attack. His intent was to force a crossing as quickly as possible so that he could unite with Curtis’ force near Westport. The night of 22 October, Pleasonton ordered Brig. Gen. Brown’s Brigade to pass through Winslow’s Brigade and to execute an assault on Byram’s Ford “at daybreak.” However, Brown had difficulty throughout the night in replenishing his ammunition and the narrow road made it difficult to pass Winslow. Consequently, it was approximately 0815 before Brown was ready to initiate the attack. Pleasonton rode forward and was furious that no attack had been made. He arrested Brown and put Col. John Philips in charge of the brigade. He then directed Winslow to take tactical control of the crossing with his and Philips’ Brigade. Pleasonton and most of the artillery and the division reserve (Sanborn’s Brigade) remained on the high ground east of the ford. Around 0900, the artillery opened fire on the Confederate artillery and on the dismounted cavalry defending on the riverbank. Philips dismounted the 7th Missouri State Militia and advanced toward the river to the south of the ford. Winslow’s Brigade supported the attack with a heavy skirmish line north of the ford. Initially, Confederate fire stopped both brigades from pushing over the river. At about 300 yards north of the ford, a battalion of the 4th Iowa Cavalry found a covered route down a ravine and crossed to the west bank. The Iowa troopers poured an enfilading fire into Freeman’s Brigade. The success north of the ford presented Philips with the opportunity to renew the attack south of the ford. He reformed his brigade and its second attack cleared the Confederates from the west bank. Marmaduke ordered his forward brigade to withdraw and reform behind the Confederate line on Potato Hill. The Federals had a foothold but they still needed to sweep the Southerners from the hill in order to move to the aid of Curtis’ Army of the Border.

Maj. Gen. Pleasonton: The Brigadier General E.B. Brown was ordered to move his brigade forward and attack the enemy at daybreak and keep pressing him vigorously, as we would be supported. Not finding any attack being made I went to the front and found Brown’s brigade on the road in no proper condition for attacking, nor were any preparations being made to do so, as far as I could perceive. Colonel Philips, of the Seventh Missouri State Militia, was therefore placed in command of the brigade, and this brigade, with Winslow’s, were ordered immediately into action, with Sanborn’s brigade supporting.

Capt. Johnson: I was ordered to form the regiment at sunrise on the bank of Big Blue River as infantry. After being in position about half an hour the enemy appeared in sight and opened fire on us from small-arms, compelling us, owing to the formation of the creek, to leave our position, they being enabled to fire on us from the right flank and rear. We fell back one mile and a half in good order to a skirt of timber at the edge of a small prairie.
Map 39.

23 October (0930 - 1000)

1. Winslow’s skirmishers attacked over the river and engaged in a long range firefight with the Confederate line along the rocky escarpment.
2. The 1 MSM charged the hill twice, but failed to break the Confederate line.
3. Winslow moved the remainder of his brigade over the river and dismounted them along the brush line bordering the river.
4. Pleasanton moved Sanborn and additional artillery forward to support the attack.
5. Freeman formed a mounted battle line to the rear of Clark.
6. Both sides heard heavy cannon fire to the northwest.
39. Philips’ Charge

Philips’ Brigade crossed over the river and formed a strong skirmish line south of the road. Pleasonton had seized the west bank but still faced the formidable task of taking Potato Hill. On the range of hills was Marmaduke’s second brigade commanded by Brig. Gen. John Clark. Clark’s Brigade was larger than Freeman’s and composed of veteran troops. He formed the brigade with a reinforced skirmish line along a rocky escarpment and positioned the main line on top of the ridge line. On the ridge line, Clark placed a battery on the south end of the line and another near the center of the line. Just below the top of the ridge and along the road, there was a log house occupied by Rebel sharp shooters. Col. Winslow needed time to bring his brigade online with Philip’s men. He ordered Philips to mount his brigade and charge the hill. The hasty attack might not break the Confederate line but at a minimum, it would cover the deployment of Winslow’s Brigade over the ford. Philips reasoned, “The situation of the ground was such as to confine the movements of the cavalry to the road, which rendered the immediate execution of this order, in any other formation than that of column of fours, an impossibility.” Philips kept most of his brigade dismounted to provide covering fire while the 1st MSM conducted a mounted charge up the road in a column of fours. The cavalry charged up the road twice but each time, according to the Official Record, “A storm of bullets and shell” defeated their efforts. During the attacks, Winslow moved his brigade over the river and formed a dismounted line north of the road and decided a coordinated attack by both brigades was needed to break the Confederate line.


Brig. Gen. Clark: Freeman’s brigade, met him first, my brigade being formed in his rear 500 yards. He contended manfully for the crossing of the Big Blue, but was forced back after having repulsed the enemy several times. Falling back through my brigade the enemy came upon me in the full enthusiasm of pursuit.
23 October (1000-1100)

1. Winslow and Philip attacked forward in a dense skirmish line.
2. The Union attack stalled at the rocky escarpment and retreated back to the east side of the open meadow.
3. The Union artillery supported the attack and dueled with the Confederate artillery.
4. Both sides heard heavy cannon fire to the Northwest.
At about 1100, Col. Winslow renewed the Federal attack. Philips’ Brigade was on the left and Winslow’s Brigade was on the right. The cavalry troopers in both brigades fought in a dismounted skirmish line with every fourth man holding the horses to the rear. The battle line may have extended slightly more than half of a mile along the open ground leading up to the rocky escarpment and the hill above. The Confederates held the high ground with good fields of fire and had a significant terrain advantage. However, the Union had a considerable numerical advantage. Winslow’s two brigades contained six regiments and a battalion with approximately 2,800 men. Clark’s Confederates had six regiments and one battalion with perhaps 1,300 men altogether. A few of Freeman’s Brigade, numbering about 1,000 men, may have been in the battle line but most appear to have formed a mounted battle line behind Clark’s brigade. The Union advantage in numbers was further multiplied by better weapons resulting in a significant firepower advantage. Most of the Union soldiers had either repeating carbines or breech loading weapons. The Confederates may have had some breech loaders, but they had very few repeating weapons and most still had the slower firing muzzle-loading weapons. The two sides were evenly matched in quality. Winslow’s troops were experienced and battle-hardened volunteers. Philips’ Missouri State Militia troops were also steady and dependable troops with years of experience fighting guerillas. Likewise, Clark’s soldiers were some of the best in Price’s Army. The Union engaged in an intense firefight with the Confederates along the rocky escarpment and those on the hill. Then both Union brigades surged forward toward the escarpment. The Union line closed on the rocks and attempted to scamper up the 12 to 20 foot ledge against severe fire. However, the assault failed and the Union line fell back to the meadow. During the fighting, Pleasonton brought Sanborn’s relatively fresh brigade forward to support the attack if needed.

**Col. Winslow:** I advanced upon the main position of the enemy. Their line was formed in the edge of a long piece of timber, just on the brow of the rising ground, while in front was a fine open stretch of clearing descending gradually to the river. When within 400 yards of the enemy I directed the line to advance rapidly and drive them from the timber. This was well commenced only, when the whole line gave way under the fire of the enemy and retreated in disorder to the reserve.

**Brig. Gen. Clark:** My brigade contended nobly with the foe for two hours and strewed the open field in our front with his dead...
Map 41.

23 October (1100 – 1200)

1. Winslow and Philips reformed and attacked again.
2. Dee’s Bn (4 IA) maneuvered around the Confederate north flank.
3. Philips maneuvered against the Confederate south flank.
4. Marmaduke ordered his artillery back to the reserve line.
5. The withdrawal of the Confederate artillery emboldened the Union soldiers and the attack pushed up the hill.
6. Marmaduke ordered Clark’s line to fall back behind the reserve line.
7. Pleasonton ordered Sanborn and the artillery forward to support the attack.
8. Both sides heard the cannon fire to the West.
9. Confederate reserve line failed to hold its position and routed to the rear.
41. Bloody Hill Taken

Winslow and Philips rallied their men and charged again. The second assault displaced the Confederate skirmish line from off the rocky escarpment and continued the advance up the hill. Marmaduke ordered his two artillery batteries to withdraw and reposition with Freeman’s reserve line. The sight of the artillery pulling back emboldened the Union soldiers and they continued to press forward. About this time, Rebel fire wounded Col. Winslow in the leg and his brigade attack hesitated briefly. However, Lieut. Col. Frederick Benteen, commanding the 10th Missouri (U.S.), rallied the men and continued up the hill. Several Union units claimed credit for breaking the Confederate line. Both the 10th Missouri (U.S.) and 4th Iowa claimed to have broken the line with their determined frontal assaults. It is more likely that the threat of Capt. Dee’s battalion of the 4th Iowa assaulting around the northern flank of the Confederate line and elements of Philips’ Brigade pushing up a wooded ravine on the Confederate southern flank, encouraged the Confederates to withdraw. At the top of hill, the Union brigades stopped to reform and bring forward their mounts. Meanwhile, Pleasonton brought forward the artillery and Brig. Gen. John Sanborn’s Brigade. Marmaduke made another brief stand with Freeman’s Brigade. However, the sight of fresh Union troops and artillery coming forward convinced him it was time to retreat. Pleasonton ordered Sanborn’s Brigade into a pursuit and chased the Confederates down the Harrisonville Road. By noon, Pleasonton had opened the way for the Army of the Department of Missouri to join forces with Curtis’ Army of the Border. All the participants, both north and south, agreed that it had been a fierce fight. Several of the Confederate regimental commanders stated so in their reports. Lieut. Col. J. F. Davies, Davies Missouri BN, recalled, “We had a short and bloody fight and were compelled to fall back.” Col. Robert Lawther, 10th Missouri (C.S.A.), remembered, “[We] fought them stubbornly.” Capt. Johnson of the 3d Missouri (C.S.A.) wrote, “We remained in our position until every gun was discharged and every cartridge expended.” The Union commander that day, Maj. Gen. Pleasonton, concurred with his opponents and insisted it was, “a very obstinate battle.” The slopes of Potato Hill and the meadow below it were strewn with Union dead and wounded. Philips’ and Winslow’s Brigades suffered approximately 200 casualties in the fight. Confederate casualties were probably about the same. In time, historians would change the name of the peacefully named Potato Hill to the more warlike Bloody Hill.

**Col. Winslow:** I succeeded in reforming the broken detachment. I again ordered an advance with the Third and Fourth Iowa Regiments closely supporting. This time we reached the woods, and after a short, spirited resistance from the enemy drove them out of position with some loss.

**Brig. Gen. Clark:** Our ammunition exhausted, we were forced to leave the field again to the enemy, our dead in his hands. The booming of Fagan’s and Shelby’s guns were heard all time in the direction of Westport heavily engaging the enemy.
23 October

1. 0930+: Curtis, Blunt, and Deitzler planned an Army general attack to the south.
2. 1000-1100: Union artillery (30 guns) bombarded the Confederate line.
3. 1000-1100: Union line skirmished against the Confederate line. Ford’s Brigade is notably aggressive against the ford and along Wornall Lane.
4. Shelby’s main defensive line is positioned behind a stone wall along today’s 51st Street.
5. 1100: Curtis sent word for the divisions to attack on order. Blair concerned about aggressive skirmish action against his right flank and ordered a brigade attack to force the skirmishers away. His attack desynchronized the Army attack.
6. 1100+: Curtis sent word for all units to advance. The attack failed and falls back to the north side of Brush Creek.
7. Both sides heard heavy fighting to the Southeast.

Map 42.
Less than three miles to the west, at the same time as Pleasonton’s Division battled against Marmaduke’s Division for control of Bloody Hill, an equally severe fight raged between the other wing of Price’s Army and Curtis’ Army of the Border. Around 0730, Maj. Gen. Curtis arrived in Westport and soon after that met with Blunt to plan the next attack. As the morning went by, Maj. Gen. Dietzler’s KSM regiments and batteries arrived in the Westport area. At first, the militia units were absorbed into Blunt’s brigades but as time went by, they formed a separate command in the vicinity of Blair’s Brigade. Curtis, Blunt, and Dietzler spent the next couple of hours organizing the attack. Curtis also had the artillery keep up a constant bombardment of the Confederate line atop the bluff. Additionally, the Union Army skirmished aggressively to the front. Col. Ford, on the Army’s left flank, was notably insistent on applying pressure to the Confederate line. He reported, “I sent part of the Second Colorado Cavalry, on foot, as skirmishers through the woods. The 12th Kansas State Militia were also sent into the woods on foot, doing good service.” At about 1100, Curtis decided that with most of the KSM now available, the conditions were present for a coordinated attack. He sent out the orders and moved forward to personally lead the advance. On the Army’s west flank, Col. Blair believed, “the enemy was attempting to flank our position on the right” and he ordered his brigade to advance in order to force the Confederates back up the hill. Curtis acted to support Blair’s maneuver and immediately sent word for a general advance. Maj. Gen. Blunt controlled the left wing and Maj. Gen. Dietzler commanded the right wing. The somewhat disjointed Army attack passed over the creek but was unable to push all the way to the top of the high ground south of Brush Creek. On the high ground, Shelby’s Confederate line was firmly positioned behind a stone fence at the top of bluff. A major challenge for the Union Army was that the attack masked their own supporting artillery that was firing from the north side of Brush Creek. Furthermore, the guns were unable to advance through the timber bordering Brush Creek to support the attack. Most of the Union units fell back to the north side of the creek to regroup. However, some units may have remained on the south side of the creek and skirmished with the Confederates. Meanwhile, Curtis struggled to find a way to re-energize the attack and seize the high ground.

**Maj. Gen. Curtis:** McLain’s battery was on the brow of the north bank of Brush Creek and near the road. Dodge’s (Ninth Wisconsin) battery to his right. We also had about twenty other pieces of artillery, mostly mountain howitzers, with cavalry, taking position as their supporting squadrons came into line. Meantime continued firing was kept up by skirmishers and artillery on both sides, with but little damage to either. After taking the positions named on opposite sides of Brush Creek, about 11 o’clock I went myself to the right of our lines, and led the militia forward as skirmishers. I tried to get through the timber with Dodge’s battery and two little howitzers of my escort, but the roads were not favorable and I left the farther movement of the right to Colonel Blair.

**Maj. Gen. Price:** …they resisted most stubbornly and contested every point of the approach.
Fagan’s screen line extends two miles to the east toward the Big Blue River and connects with Marmaduke’s
north flank.

Bloody Hill
(4+ Miles Southeast)

23 October (1100+)
1. Curtis talked with farmer Thoman and ordered another
general advance.
2. Curtis moved with Blair and leads Dodge’s Btry. along the
path of Swan Creek (Thoman with Curtis).
3. Blair and Curtis’ escort seized the Bent House after a
heavy fight with Jackman. Curtis positioned Dodge’s
guns and fired into the flank Thompson’s Brigade.
4. Thompson retreated and Blunt seized the top of the bluff.
5. Shelby formed a new defensive line near the south
portion of today’s Loose Park.
6. Both sides heard heavy fighting to the Southeast.
43. George Thoman’s Path

George Thoman, a local farmer, provided the solution to seizing the high ground south of Brush Creek. Mr. Thoman was angry with the Confederates because they had stolen a horse and food from his nearby farm. He had gone into the Union lines to get help in regaining his stolen property. In his meeting with Curtis, he informed the Union commander of a pathway that was not only suitable for artillery but also provided a route around the Confederate flank. Curtis sent word for the Army to resume the attack along the entire front. Again, the Army’s artillery supported the attack from the north side of Brush Creek. In the attack, Curtis took two guns from Blair’s artillery and he took Capt. Dodge’s 9th Wisconsin Battery up the slope behind Blair’s Brigade. Farmer Thoman served as the guide and led the way. Curtis stated in his report, “I was directed by an old man, a Missouri patriot of seventy five years, through a narrow defile to Brush Creek with Dodge’s battery and other forces.” The route initially followed the wooded defile cut by Swan Creek (today’s Rockwell Lane) where it flowed into Brush Creek and then skirted to the southwest along a local farm path (today’s Sunset Drive). Shelby lacked the troops to cover all the approaches. His best troops, Clark’s Brigade, blocked Wornall Lane and elements of Fagan’s division extended the line to the east. The aggressive skirmishing of Ford’s Brigade earlier in the day may have led Shelby to believe the main Union threat was oriented along the Wornall Lane approach. In the west, Shelby positioned Jackman’s Brigade to extend the line around to the Bent House. Jackman’s line was little more than a thin skirmish line. It was those skirmishers that opposed Blair’s advance. Blair stated, “A heavy fire was here opened on us from a cornfield which stretched from our right front, and which seemed filled with skirmishers, and from a large brick house in an orchard just beyond in which a party of sharpshooters was stationed.” Nevertheless, Blair’s men along with Curtis’ escort company (G, 11th Kansas Cavalry) soon “drove the enemy from the cornfield and house.” Curtis positioned the guns near the Bent House and brought fire upon the left and rear of Shelby’s main line. Shelby threatened by Blunt’s Brigades advancing up the hill and Blair’s brigade on his flank, ordered his line back to the next ridge line.

Capt. Hinton: Colonel Blair... moved into the dense timber to the right, twice the length of his line, and pushed it steadily forward. The 19th Regiment, which had been formed and dismounted to the rear of the main force, was moved by a road further to the right, and as the militia emerged from the timber, formed on Colonel Blair’s right. General Curtis himself joined this movement, encouraging the militia by his presence. Dodge’s Battery with two howitzers were piloted through a narrow defile to a point where the guns could be admirably placed, by a venerable patriot of seventy five, who was upon the field ready to do his humble share of the work. The right of the line commenced immediate demonstrations upon the enemy who were posted along the forces [fences] to their front. Skirmishers filled the field, poured a destructive fire from the fences and from a large brick house in the orchard just beyond. The right of the brigade was sent forward to clear the house.

Col. Jackman: About 12 o’clock I received an order from General Shelby to fall back across the prairie to the point where the gun was captured the evening before and report to General Fagan, who was in pressing need.
23 October (1100 - 1200)

1. Curtis massed his artillery and overwhelmed the Confederate artillery.
2. The entire Union line advanced and forced the Confederates south.
3. KSM units moved forward as individual regiments to strengthen the three lead brigades.
4. Col. McGhee (Dobbin's Brigade) perceived a weakness in the Union advance and charged to overrun a McLain's Colorado Battery. Jennison's countercharge defeated the Confederate attack.
5. Fagan moved two of his brigades east to support Marmaduke at Byram's Ford.
6. Shelby retreated and established a new line near the Wornall House.
7. Marmaduke's defense of Byram's Ford collapsed at 1200.

Map 44.
44. McGhee’s Charge

Blunt moved forward quickly and occupied the heights abandoned by the Confederates. Curtis and Blunt halted the brigades at the edge of the plateau and quickly joined together the right and left wings of the Army. They brought forward the volunteer artillery along with several militia batteries and positioned about 30 guns along the line. The concentrated fire of the Union guns quickly overwhelmed the Confederate artillery of less than eight guns. Blunt stated, “the artillery of my division being served with excellent effect, punishing the enemy severely.” Curtis could hear the fight raging at Byram’s Ford and was anxious to continue the advance to join with Pleasonton. He ordered the line to advance. McLain’s Colorado Battery maneuvered forward along Wornall Lane and brought effective fire onto the Confederate line. Lieut. Caleb Bursal stated, “We were doing such execution that they made a desperate charge on us.” The battery may have outpaced the Union line and Col. James McGhee, who was from from Dobbin’s Brigade of Fagan’s Division, saw the opportunity to either capture the battery or put it out of action. Col. Jennison observed the threat as McGhee’s Arkansas Cavalry charged the guns and ordered Company E of the 15th Kansas Cavalry to counterattack. Company E and the battery’s escort defeated the attacking Confederates in a swirling cavalry melee. McGhee was wounded in the hand-to-hand fighting and his regiment suffered devastating losses of 25 killed and wounded and around 100 prisoners. The Union line continued to advance and pushed the Confederates back to the vicinity of the Wornall House. Curtis stated in his report that, “the enemy was soon overpowered, and after a violent and desperate struggle fell back to another elevation on the broad prairie and operated their artillery and cavalry to their utmost ability in a vain attempt to check our general movement.” Shelby was desperate to delay the Union advance and buy time for the Confederate Army to escape the closing pincers of Curtis from the north and Pleasonton from the east. At the Wornall House, he positioned his two brigades and Dobbins’ Brigade from Fagan’s Division along a line of east-west stone fences to make another stand.

Col. Jennison: …soon the order was received for a general advance along the entire line, which was obeyed with the utmost alacrity. The First Brigade, with a detachment of the Second Colorado and McLain’s (Colorado) battery, took position on the right of the road, commencing an impetuous attack upon the rebels, who were rallying for a charge upon the battery, one section of which was posted directly in the road. Hardly had we taken position when the enemy charged in column upon the guns the road, which were supported by the Second Colorado, the First Brigade being to the right in front as they advanced, Company E, Fifteenth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, forming the left of the brigade line and deployed as skirmishers. Seeing that a desperate effort was required to save the battery I immediately rallied Company E and led in person a charge upon the flank of the rebel column, a movement which was entirely successful, though a desperate hand-to-hand contest ensued, after maintaining which for a short time the enemy withdrew in disorder toward his main lines southward. In this action special praise is due to officers and men engaged and more particularly to Captain Curtis Johnson, commanding Company E, Fifteenth, which was alone in the charge… we succeeded in killing and wounding a large number of the rebels, and taking nearly 100 prisoners.

Brig. Gen. Thompson: About this time that gallant charge in column down the road was made by McGhee’s regiment of Arkansas troops which resulted so disastrously to the brave men who made it.
23 October (1200+ -1300)

1. Price received word that the wagon train was threatened. He moved south with Jackman to assess the situation and ordered Shelby to hold as long as possible. Soon after this, Shelby received word that Marmaduke’s defense of Byram Ford had collapsed. He redirected Jackman to the east to support Fagan’s Division and protect his right flank.

2. Curtis continued his advance. He ordered Jennison to charge and break the Shelby’s line.

3. Pleasonton defeated Fagan and Jackman’s reinforcements and advanced to the west. His lead brigade occupied Hinkle’s Grove and delivered flanking fire into Shelby’s line.

4. Shelby’s line collapsed and routed to the rear.

Map 45.
45. Shelby’s Stand at Wornall House

Maj. Gen. Price had remained with Shelby throughout the morning. Sometime before noon, he received word that the wagon train was in danger and he moved south to personally look to its safety. At his departure, he left orders for Shelby, Fagan, and Marmaduke to hold the enemy at bay as long as possible and then to fall back onto the wagon train. Shelby’s position at the Wornall House was precarious and his stand was short-lived. Fagan had already moved two of his brigades east to support Marmaduke. Soon after their departure, Shelby received word that Marmaduke was defeated and falling back. He immediately sent Jackman south to find and protect the wagon train. This left Shelby with only Thompson’s and Dobbin’s brigades to hold the Wornall House line. The situation worsened when Shelby received word that Fagan was in danger of being overrun and the prairie “was dark with Federals.” Shelby diverted Jackman, along with what little artillery he had remaining, to Fagan’s assistance. Jackman and Fagan made a valiant effort but were soon pushed aside by Pleasonton’s victorious Union cavalry. Meanwhile, Curtis continued to advance toward the Wornall House. He was determined to trap Shelby between his army and Pleasonton’s division. Fortuitously, Jennison’s brigade charged the Confederate line just as Pleasonton maneuvered Sanborn’s brigade artillery against Shelby’s flank. Thompson’s normally rock-steady “Iron Brigade” collapsed and he stated, “The stampede seemed to become contagious and soon the whole command was in wild disorder with the enemy charging at our heels.” Thompson went on to say, “It was impossible to rally the men as a body.”

As the Confederates fled to the south, Shelby tried desperately to rally his command and slow the Union pursuit.

**Maj. Gen. Blunt:** At 12 o’clock the center of their line gave way, and what then commenced as a retreat of the rebel forces soon became a complete rout, their broken lines flying in disorder, with my cavalry and artillery in rapid pursuit. After the rout and pursuit had continued for nearly two miles, I came in sight of the forces of General Pleasonton on my left, with his lines formed at right angle with mine, and a portion of Price’s command, which he had been engaging during the day, was still confronting him. When within about 800 yards of the left of the rebel line, and when they were about to charge General Pleasonton’s line, twenty pieces of artillery of my command poured a raking fire into their flank, which threw them into confusion and stampeded them, with the main column of the retreating enemy.

**Maj. Gen. Price:** Major-General Marmaduke, who was to my right and rear, being attacked with great fierceness by an overwhelming force of the enemy after a most strenuous resistance, his ammunition being exhausted, had to fall back before the foe. Being at that time near Westport, and in full view of Generals Fagan and Shelby and their commands, I received information that my train, which was in front and on the right of the Fort Scott road, was threatened by the enemy, some 2,000 or 2,500 strong, who were moving on a line parallel to the Fort Scott road. I immediately sent the information to Major-General Fagan and Brigadier-General Shelby, and directed them to fall back to the train as soon as they could do so with safety, which I would attempt to defend until they arrived... Brigadier General Shelby in attempting to obey my instructions was attacked in the flank and his command thrown into some confusion.
23 October
1. 1200+: McNeil shadowed the wagon train.
2. 1300: Price defeated McNeil’s attempt to engage the wagon train.
3. 1300+: Shelby delayed the Union pursuit.
4. 1300+: Fagan and Marmaduke escaped to the south.
5. 1400: The head of the wagon train entered Little Santa Fe and turned south.
6. 1430: Union commanders collected at the Thomas House.
7. 1500: Shelby’s rearguard passed through Little Santa Fe.

Map 46.
46. The Escape of the Wagon Train

A mile south of the Wornall House, Shelby rallied his shaken division and set up another defensive line. Shelby’s final stand against the combined forces of Curtis and Pleasonton was not enough to stop the Union pursuit but the stand did delay the Union troops for a bit and allowed Fagan’s and Marmaduke’s shattered commands to escape. Shelby then broke contact and moved south to rejoin the retreating Army. In the south, Brig. Gen. McNeil failed to block the retreat of the wagon train. His orders required him to be in Hickman Mills by daylight. However, he did not arrive until late morning. South of Russell’s Ford, McNeil had discovered Price’s wagon train moving south. He cautiously skirmished with the train’s escort throughout the morning. He recognized he was significantly outnumbered by the train’s escort but he drastically overestimated the combat power of the Confederate units guarding the wagon train. More than half of the wagon train’s escort was indifferently armed recruits and unarmed refugees. At about 1300, McNeil decided to advance against the train. It was too late by that time. Price had arrived to organize the defense of the wagon train and move it to safety. Price deployed Cabell’s brigade as skirmishers and supported them with Tyler’s brigade of mostly indifferently armed recruits. Additionally, the Confederates fired the prairie grass to cover their withdrawal and mask the true state of their force. McNeil failed to recognize the ruse and allowed the wagon train to escape. At about 1430, the Union commanders met at the Thomas Farm to congratulate each other and Curtis stated, “Our success is glorious.” Both sides were exhausted after several days of continuous fighting. Soon after the meeting started, the Union pursuit ground to a halt. The Union had won a significant victory. Private John Hart of the 11th Kansas succinctly summed up the day’s fight in his memoirs: “Whipped by the Johnnies in the morning and in turn they were whipped by us to a showdown and were on the retreat.” Nevertheless they allowed Price’s Army to escape. The official casualty reports for the three days of fighting (both North and South) totaled 240 killed, 868 wounded, and 437 captured for a grand casualty total of 1,545. However, many units failed to report their losses. Historian Howard Monnett estimates the total casualties for the three days are closer to 3,500 killed, wounded, and missing.

Brig. Gen. McNeil: At daybreak a heavy firing commenced on my right and in the direction of Westport. I moved on toward Hickman Mills, expecting to be able to strike Price’s flank, moving cautiously about four miles, firing having ceased for some time, when suddenly I found myself in contact with the entire force of the enemy. I at once formed my brigade in line, advanced my skirmishers, and opened on their column with a section of Captain Montgomery’s battery... The enemy had formed their line of three lines deep and actually surrounded me on three sides. My skirmishers...most gallantly pressed up to the main line of the enemy’s center. In the meantime he had placed batteries in three different locations and opened a well-directed cross-fire upon Montgomery; I was consequently compelled to move him some 400 yards to the left, recall my skirmish line, and occupy the new position. I determined to hold this position at all hazards, in hopes that the remaining brigades would come up. Toward night the enemy retired.

Maj. Gen. Price: I immediately pushed forward to the front of the train with my escort and there formed in line of battle the unarmed men, which were present to the number of several thousand, throwing my escort and the whole number of armed men of Tyler’s brigade, formed as skirmishers..., to the front of the enemy, and directing Brigadier-General Cabell, who arrived soon after, to hold the crossing of the creek on my left, sending forward at the same time for a portion of Colonel McCray’s brigade, which was in advance of the train, and on his approach forming him in line of battle on the left flank of the enemy, which caused the enemy to fall back a considerable distance on the prairie.
Notes

5. Map and discussion based on information from the unit positions and actions based upon the reports in the O.R. I based the location of the river bridge and the details of the lower ford road on the research of Major David Lovett (CGSC Class of 2016). He and Mr. Mike Calvert (a Battle of Little Blue historian) located a collection of sketches that accompany a late 1800s survey of roads in Jackson County. Major Lovett is working on a Master’s thesis entitled, “Leadership Study on the Battle of Little Blue, 21 October 1864.”
9. The Lawson Moore House still stands today and is a key landmark in the Battle of the Little Blue. Lawson Moore, a prosperous slave owner, built this antebellum home in 1856. In 1863, the infamous Order Number 11 forced Lawson out of his home. Moonlight’s men used the stone fences of the Moore plantation during their fight with Clark’s brigade. Latter in the fight Shelby’s Confederates used the stone fences as cover in their fight with Blunt’s division. The Confederates used the house as a field hospital after the fight.
15. Captain W.D. McLain’s Independent Colorado Battery consisted of six rifled field-pieces and was the best artillery unit in Curtis’s small army. The two mountain howitzers were part of Curtis’ personal escort.
16. Monnett, Action Before Westport, 63-64.
18. Map and discussion based on information from the O.R. Atlas, Map Plate 66.
22. The Honorable James H. Lane was a United States Senator from the state of Kansas. He served as a volunteer aide-de-camp on Maj. Gen. Curtis’s staff.
25. Map and discussion based on information from a USGS map of the area.
26. Brig. Gen. Melvin S. Grant was a civilian shop-keeper from Leavenworth, Kansas. He had little to no field experience and the upcoming fight was his baptism of fire as a Brig. Gen. and brigade commander.
27. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 4, 192. Correspondence Curtis to Grant.
37. Reader, Civil War Diary, 11.
38. P. I. Bonebrake was the First Sergeant of Company G, Second Regiment, Kansas State Militia.


51. Map and discussion based on information from unit reports in the O.R.

52. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 33441. Maj. Benjamin Jones Report. Maj. Jones, commander of the Third Iowa Cavalry stated: “My command was dismounted and formed line on the right and in front of the enemy, who were posted across an open field behind piles of rails in the woods.”


54. Captain Benjamin Johnson commanded Greene’s Regiment of Freeman’s Brigade. (Greene was wounded at the Battle of Little Blue).


59. Col. John F. Philips was the commander of the 7th Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and acting commander of the 1st Brigade, of Maj. Gen. Pleasonton’s Provisional Cavalry Division.


62. Map and discussion based on information from the O.R. Atlas, Map Plate 66; Smith, Interpretive and Development Plan for Byram’s Ford Big Blue Battlefield; Battle of Westport Visitor Center, Self-Guided Tour Guide; Monnett, Action Before Westport.


76. Curtis’ escort also contained 2x Mountain Howitzers. He may have had as many as 9-10 guns.

77. O.R., Series I, Volume XLI, Part 1, 486. Maj. Gen. Curtis Report. Thoman was only 45 at the time. Curtis either mistook his age or possibly thought the old man story sounded better. Lee, Gettysburg of the West, 63.


80. Richard Hinton was a captain in the 2d Kansas Volunteers (Colored) and served as an Aide-de-Camps on Maj. Gen. Curtis’s staff.


85. Many of the long serving Confederate units from Arkansas and Missouri did not have numerical designations, but were instead known by their original commanding officers name.


Part VI

The Battle of Mine Creek

24 to 25 October 1864
23 October

1. 1430: Meeting at the Thomas House.
2. 1500: Shelby’s rearguard at the Big Blue River.
3. 1700+: Decision made to resume pursuit at daylight.
4. 1700+: Jennison’s Brigade skirmished with Confederate rearguard.
5. Dusk: Moonlight at Aubrey, KS.
7. Night: Fagan’s and Marmaduke’s divisions bivouacked north of the wagon train.
8. Late Night: Shelby retreated south and closed with the wagon train.

Thomas House Meeting

- Maj. Gen Blunt – concurred with Curtis recommendation, but recommended an immediate pursuit.
- Senator Lane – concurred with Curtis (political motivation is battlefield victory to secure reelection).
- Gov. Carney – recommended the volunteers conduct the pursuit and the release of the KSM (Political motivation is to get the troops home in time for the election).
- Maj. Gen Pleasonton and Brig. Gen. Sanborn – recommended the KS troops conduct the pursuit and the MO troops return to their districts. When overruled recommended the MO troops shadow the Confederate east flank and protect MO (again overruled).
At the Thomas farmhouse, the Union commanders switched their discussion from one of congratulations for the hard fought victory to the need to pursue the enemy. Maj. Gen. Curtis stated, “A vigorous pursuit was necessary,” to protect Kansas and prevent the capture of the Army supply depot at Fort Scott. However, other leaders’ arguments for and against the pursuit were numerous and varied. Nevertheless, the commanders reached a decision late in the afternoon and Curtis sent a telegram to Maj. Gen. Halleck in Washington stating, “The pursuit will be renewed at daylight.” Curtis suspended martial law for the Kansas counties north of the Kansas River and sent most the Kansas State Militia home. He retained the militia from counties still threatened by the Confederates. Maj. Gen. Rosecrans remained in Independence and relinquished responsibility for the pursuit to Curtis. He also allowed Curtis to assume tactical control of Maj. Gen. Pleasonton’s Cavalry Division. Curtis, therefore, reorganized the Army of the Border into two cavalry divisions; Maj. Gen. Blunt commanded the 1st Division and Maj. Gen. Pleasonton commanded the 2d Division. Curtis ordered the divisions to regroup in the vicinity of Little Santa Fe and to be prepared to march at daylight. Col. Jennison’s Brigade was already near Little Santa Fe. Jennison had pressed the Confederate rearguard until sunset and the 2d Colorado (attached to Jennison’s Brigade) was in contact with the Confederates where the Line Road crossed the Big Blue River. Most of the other brigades assembled near the small town that evening. The only exception was Col. Moonlight’s Brigade. Curtis ordered Moonlight to find a position on the Rebel flank and screen the Kansas border. The Army’s orders directed Blunt to resume the pursuit at daylight and for Pleasonton to follow in support. Blunt’s brigades had slightly fewer days of continuous operations than Pleasonton’s Missouri troops and Pleasonton’s men and horses desperately needed the few extra hours of rest. Additionally, Blunt’s troops were highly motivated to get on the move because many of their homes and families were in the path of Price’s retreat. To the south, Maj. Gen. Price’s Army of Missouri was exhausted and demoralized. Brig. Gen. Shelby organized a rearguard at the Big Blue River with elements of all three divisions to check Jennison’s aggressive pursuit. Sometime after sunset, Shelby moved the rearguard south to join the wagon train. About 20 miles south of Little Santa Fe, the wagon train and its escort straggled into a camp on the middle fork of the Grand River. The disorganized elements of Fagan’s and Marmaduke’s Divisions rested and regrouped all along the route. Price was in a desperate situation and the only hope of saving his command was to continue the retreat. He ordered the army to resume the retreat at daylight.

**Maj. Gen. Curtis:** The enemy is in full retreat and much demoralized. He moves directly south on and near the Line road. General Pleasonton united his forces with mine at 2 o’clock. Our losses are inconsiderable. We lost one gun yesterday and took one to-day. The pursuit will be renewed at daylight. After four days’ obstinate fighting the men and horses are much exhausted and must have a little rest.

**Maj. Gen. Price:** Brigadier-General Shelby in attempting to obey my instructions was attacked in the flank and his command thrown into some confusion, but rallied, repulsed the enemy, and rejoined me that evening, as did also Major-General Fagan. I encamped that night on the Middle Fork of Grand River, having marched twenty-four miles and the troops having been engaged with the enemy nearly all day.
24 October

1. Dawn: Moonlight moved south to screen the Kansas border.
2. 0800: Blunt initiated the pursuit.
3. 0800+: Pleasonton followed Blunt.
4. 0900: Confederate Army retreated to the south.
5. Late morning: The 4 KSM joined with Moonlight and the command skirmished with the Confederates at Coldwater Creek.
6. Afternoon: The Confederates crossed into Kansas and plundered farms along the route.
8. 1800: Blunt camped at West Point.
48. Retreat and Pursuit

On the morning of 24 October, the Confederate commanders regrouped their exhausted and disorganized units. Price wanted to be on the move by daylight. It was probably closer to 0900 before the Army marched south on the Military Road. Brig. Gen. Thompson stated, “On the morning of the 24th, we lost several hours in getting the train untangled in forming the brigades for in the confusion of the night before, men and wagons, artillery and refugees, were so mixed that it was nearly impossible to untangle them.” Some of the Confederate senior leaders and most of the men had “a feeling of personal hostility” toward “the enormous and useless wagon train which had been the principal cause of their discomfort and losses.” They wanted to make a swift retreat and recommended abandoning most of the wagons. Price was reluctant to heed their advice. The wagons hauled supplies captured during the expedition. These supplies were the “fruits of their labor” and represented one of the few tangible successes achieved by the Confederates. Therefore, the Army plodded south at the rate of an oxen hauled wagon. The Union commanders also failed to move at daylight. Blunt reported he moved out at 0600 but it may have been closer to 0800. The Union troopers found the trail easy to follow. The Rebels littered the route with discarded equipment. To the east, Maj. Gen. Rosecrans sent the footsore XVI Corps southwest from Independence towards Little Santa Fe to support the pursuit. To the west, Moonlight shadowed the Confederates, and near Coldwater Grove, saw the opportunity to harass the Confederate column. A long range skirmish produced no casualties but did highlight the predicament the Confederates faced. They were moving through the infamous “burnt district.” The open prairie, abandoned fields, and burned homesteads offered no opportunity for foraging. The Confederate command faced a significant dilemma. The force needed to disperse and forage but the aggressive Union pursuit imposed a need to concentrate in order to safeguard the force. At about dusk, Blunt’s Division halted for the evening at the abandoned town of West Point, Missouri. He had moved about 45 miles. The Confederates managed only about 35 miles that day. Late in the day, they crossed over into Kansas and looted supplies from the nearby homesteads. Shelby’s adjutant stated, “Haystacks, houses, barns, produce, crops, and farming implements were consumed before the march of his squadrons and what the flames spared, the bullet finished,” and that the Rebels soothed, “the wounds of Missouri by stabbing the breast of Kansas.” The Army bivouacked near Trading Post, Kansas with units on both sides of the Marais des Cygnes River.

Col. Ford: The morning of the 24th, I started on the Line road in the pursuit of the rebel army… Reached West Point at dark, where a halt was made… I was ordered to wait until Major-General Pleasonton’s division passed to the front.

Maj. Edwards: Under his [Price] unmilitary management, numerous wagons which the soldiers believed to contain untold wealth of plunder by staff officers and dead-heads, had dangerously augmented his train, so that it numbered over five hundred vehicles, and, shockingly controlled and conducted, often stretched out eight or ten miles in length. Marched in the center of the army, flanked, preceded or followed by a rabble of dead-heads, stragglers and stolen negroes on stolen horses, leading broken down chargers, it gave to the army the appearance of a Calmuck horde. The real fighting soldiers... scarcely disguised their apprehension that the odious train would occasion disaster to the army, and they were plainly reluctant to shed their blood to save the plunder it convey.
21 October
(Evening – Council of War)

1. Maj. Gen Blunt - First Recommendation:
4. Meanwhile, Moonlight moved to the Paola Road and planned to push throughout the night to Mound City.
49. War Council at West Point

At the Federal camp at West Point, the Union commanders gathered to discuss the situation and decide upon a course of action. Blunt’s advance guard, a battalion of the 2d Colorado, was miles to the front and in contact with the Confederate rearguard near Trading Post, Kansas. Maj. Gen. Blunt wanted to move that night around the Confederate western flank and cut off Price’s Army from the south while Pleasonton attacked from the north. Curtis rejected Blunt’s proposal. He was reluctant to separate his forces and was concerned that Blunt’s small division lacked the combat power to block the entire Confederate Army. Blunt next suggested that the entire army make the turning movement. Curtis recognized the difficulty of a night movement and river crossing and again rejected the plan. Brig. Gen. Sanborn recommended the pursuit be continued through the night. Curtis decided upon a frontal advance toward Trading Post. He directed Pleasonton’s Division to take the lead and attack immediately. Pleasonton, exhausted and sick from the day’s march, ordered Brig. Gen. Sanborn to assume tactical command of the division and resume the advance. Supposedly, Blunt having been rebuffed twice and now placed in a supporting role, withdrew in a sullen mood. To the east, Col. Moonlight recognized that the Rebels were closing on Trading Post and from there could threaten Mound City. He decided to march through the night towards the Paola road and then south to Mound City. At West Point, Pleasonton’s brigades passed through the town and moved toward Trading Post. Lieut. Col. Philips recounted, “Marched all day on old military road without halting. Men almost exhausted with fatigue. Passed through Finneysville and West Point, towns only that were. Overtook Pleasonton and Curtis at a branch in the night, enjoying a sumptuous supper. It made my hungry palate dilate but got nothing to eat.”

All vignettes here are from the Northern perspective.

**Maj. Gen. Blunt:** I proposed that we should leave a few squadrons of cavalry to make a feint on their rear, while, with the main column, we should pass to the right, cross the Osage river four miles above trading post, pass entirely around their flank, and before daylight in the morning have our line of battle formed in their front, our right resting on the Osage below them, and our left on the same stream above them, while the enemy would be in the sack formed by the course or bend of the river. Understanding well the topography of the country, I felt assured that this movement could be made with complete safety and success, and would result in the capture of Price’s entire army with but little loss to us. General Pleasonton seconded this proposition ... but General Curtis disagreed with me, and decided that we should follow up and attack their rear.

**Maj. Gen. Curtis:** We halted to kill some of these near West Point when night overtook us. After about two hours’ rest and refreshment, mainly on fresh beef without salt or bread, I ordered the march resumed, General Pleasonton’s division alternating in taking the advance, and at 8 o’clock it moved on cautiously, the night being very dark and rainy. About 1 a.m. of the 25th General Sanborn, in the extreme advance, halted, sending back intelligence of his arrival near the Marais des Cygnes (pronounced in the country Mary de Zene), where the enemy was in great force.
24 October

1. 2000: 2 CO (Detachment) skirmished with the Confederate rearguard.
2. 2000+: Sanborn arrived in the vicinity of the Mounds and attacked the Confederate rearguard.
3. 2200: Sanborn suspended the attack and withdrew approximately ½ mile.
4. 2200+: Fagan reported the fighting and recommended the Army immediately continue the retreat.
5. 2400: Lead elements of Price’s Army resumed the retreat.
50. First Skirmish at the Mounds

After the war council, Brig. Gen. Sanborn moved his brigade and the 4th Iowa toward Trading Post. The rest of Pleasonton’s Division followed behind them. Near Trading Post, Sanborn deployed units just to the north of where the road passed between two large mounds. The 4th Iowa was to the right of the road and two of Sanborn’s regiments to the left. The 4th Iowa was not aware of the 2d Colorado’s forward position and briefly fired upon them. Fortunately, the 2d Colorado quickly identified themselves as friends and the firing stopped. Sanborn then advanced his line and skirmished with the Confederate skirmishers deployed at the base of the mounds. Maj. Gen. Fagan’s Division served as the Confederate rearguard at the mounds and was positioned to protect the Confederate camp at Trading Post. Fagan posted elements of Col. William Slemons’ Brigade on the west mound and Brig. Gen. William Cabell’s Brigade on the east mound. Two small guns in the gap supported the defense. A heavy rain, with thunder and lightning, discouraged the Union troops from pressing the attack and both sides suffered only minor casualties. Sanborn remained uncertain of the enemy strength. Additionally, fatigue, darkness, and rain tested the general’s determination to continue the attack. Sometime after 2200, he made the decision to cancel the night attack and resume the attack at first light. Sanborn withdrew most of his troops about a half mile to the north. Maj. William Plumb’s 6th MSM remained in contact with the Confederates and “skirmished with them until day.”

In the Confederate camp, Brig. Gen. Cabell reported the action with the enemy and recommended an immediate withdrawal over the river.

Brig. Gen. Sanborn: My advanced reached this point a little after midnight [probably much earlier] and immediately commenced skirmishing with the enemy. The road leading to the Trading Post, on the Marais des cygnes, passes through a gap between two high mounds about half a mile from the river, each from one-half to a mile in length. Colonel J. J. Gravely, Eighth Cavalry Missouri State Militia with his own regiment and the Sixth Cavalry Missouri State Militia, Major William Plumb commanding, was ordered to advance until the position of the enemy should be fully developed. The night was dark and it was raining heavily. Colonel Gravely advanced gallantly with his command and the enemy opened musketry fire from the gap. The line was deployed as skirmishers and advanced gallantly with his command and the enemy opened musketry fire from the gap. The line was deployed as skirmishers and advanced toward the base of the mounds. The enemy opened a line of fire from the foot, sides, and summits of the mounds and the intervening gap, and in an instant the clamor and noise of many voices indicated that we were near the position of the enemy. My ignorance of the topography of the country, the impenetrable darkness and incessant rain, induced me to postpone a general attack until 4 o’clock in the morning.

Brig. Gen. Cabell: ...we camped near the Marais de Cygne, after marching over twenty-four miles. I was in the rear and whole brigade in line of battle at the gap of the Bald Prairie hills and on top of the hills during the night. The enemy made several attempts to drive my men from the top of the mountains and break my lines. After making several attempts to break through, and failing in every attempt... fighting until 2 o’clock.
Curtis’ Decision

1. Daylight frontal attack.
2. Army pursues the Confederates to, “complete the breaking down of his forces from exhaustion.”
3. Moonlight continues to advance on the flank to protect key locations.

Price’s Estimate of the Situation

1. No significant threat to the rear.
2. Union Army planned to pass around the Confederate Army and block the road to Fort Scott.
3. Price decided on an early morning retreat to get ahead of the Union flanking attempt.

Maps 51A and 51B.
At West Point, Maj. Gen. Curtis learned of Sanborn’s decision to delay the attack at about 0100 the next morning. Cols. Blair and Crawford urged Curtis not to wait for daylight. They wanted Curtis to adopt Blunt’s earlier idea for a turning movement. Blair’s troops were from the area and they were anxious to get into the fight and protect their homes. Crawford may also have wanted more Kansas participation in the upcoming battle to support his campaign for the governor. Curtis recognized that it was only a few hours until daylight and decided against a difficult night movement around the Confederate flank. He was determined to stay with the original plan of a frontal attack down the Military Road. At 0300, he sent orders for Sanborn to attack no later than first light and that the rest of the Army would follow in support. Unfortunately for the Confederates, Maj. Gen. Price misread the enemy situation at the mounds and the earlier action at Coldwater Grove. His scouts failed to identify the large Union encampment at West Point, and overestimated the size of Moonlight’s Brigade operating on the flank. Most of the fighting at the mounds was little more than desultory skirmishing, and despite Cabell’s reports, Price believed there was no significant enemy force to his rear. He decided that the fighting at the mounds was little more than harassment and reasoned that the Union force threatening Cabell was intended to draw his attention away from the Union main effort against his western flank. Price decided the urgent need was to pass the Army over the Marais des Cygnes River and move south before the Union forces blocked the road to Fort Scott. Ironically, his faulty estimate of the Union plan was the course of action suggested by Maj. Gen. Blunt and rejected by the Union Army commander.

Capt. Hinton:\(^{21}\) General Curtis, whose object was to press the foe, at least to keep him aroused and in a state of activity, so as to complete the breaking down of his forces from exhaustion.\(^{22}\)

Maj. Gen. Price: During the night I received information from Major-General Marmaduke, who was placed in charge of the approaches in front, that the enemy were threatening his pickets, and upon consultation with Major-General Marmaduke we were both of opinion that the enemy were marching upon our right by Mound City on a road parallel to the one on which we were. We were strengthened in that belief by a dispatch which had been captured from the commanding Federal officer at that place to his scouts, stationed near our then encampment, stating that he would be largely re-enforced that night, and that he wanted a sharp lookout [kept] for my army, and to give him the earliest information of the route on which I would travel and the direction. I also received at a late hour at night information from some new recruits who joined me, and who had traveled fifteen miles on the route I had traveled, that there was no enemy in my rear. On the morning of the 25th I resumed my march in the same direction as before, and I considered from the information I had received the night before, and I considered from the information I had received the night before that if I should encounter the enemy it would be in my front or on my right flank. Brigadier-General Shelby’s division composed the advance, Major-General Fagan and Marmaduke’s divisions composed the rear guard.\(^{23}\)
25 October

1. 0001: Shelby moved to the south.
2. 0200+: Fagan abandoned the mounds and joined with the trains.
3. 0200+: Marmaduke assumed the rear guard mission.
4. 0300: 2 CO (Mounted Detachment) attacked and then withdrew to the north.
5. 0300+: Sanborn dispatched a unit to guard a ford 3 miles upstream.
6. 0400: Sanborn’s artillery (H & L, 2d MO, 6x 3” Ordnance Rifles) opened fire.
7. 0400+: 6 & 8 MSM (dismounted) attacked the east mound.
8. 0400+: Confederate picket line retreated.
9. 0500: Sanborn committed his reserve in a mounted pursuit.
52. The Battle of the Mounds

Early on the morning of the 25th, Price issued orders and organized the divisions to protect the force. He directed Shelby, with his best division, to take the lead toward Fort Scott. Price was confident in Shelby’s ability to push forward rapidly and capture the needed supplies at Fort Scott or, if necessary, break through a Union blocking force. Fagan’s large division would fall back from the mounds and move south with the trains. Fagan’s mission was to protect the Army’s western flank, and, if needed, support the rearguard. Marmaduke’s small division was responsible for the rearguard. Price and Marmaduke decided not to defend the mounds and positioned the rearguard on the south side of the Marais des Cygnes River. As the sun rose, the majority of the Army was over the river and only stragglers remained at Trading Post. At daylight, Maj. Gen. Marmaduke assumed responsibility for the rearguard south of the Marais des Cygnes River. The Confederates also left a weak skirmish line on the mounds to screen the last of the units in the move south. To the north, Sanborn brought forward two batteries of artillery and issued orders for his daylight attack. He also sent a battalion from Benteen’s Brigade to guard a ford upstream. The Union commanders examined the terrain and were understandably concerned about assaulting the high ground. Nevertheless, they prepared their units for a dismounted assault. The 2d Colorado attacked before daylight and drove back the thin Rebel skirmish line. A few of the Coloradans may have reached the Marais des Cygnes River before falling back. The main attack advanced at daylight. The 4th Iowa exploited the success of the 2d Colorado and easily captured the west mound. The 6th and 8th MSM experienced more difficulty against the east mound, probably slowed more by the difficult terrain than the ineffective fire of the few remaining Confederates. Sanborn, elated by his success, committed the 2d Arkansas (U.S.), and the 3d Iowa and 10th Missouri (U.S.) from Benteen’s Brigade to a mounted pursuit of the retreating Confederates.

Brig. Gen. Sanborn: Colonel Gravely was ordered to advance and occupy the summits of the two mounds and the intervening gap without delay, and Captains Thurber and Montgomery were ordered to open fire with all their guns at 16 degrees elevation, bearing across the right end of the mound on our left through the gap, the mound and gap being now just visible through the receding darkness. The Fourth Iowa Cavalry gained the mound on our right without serious opposition, but Colonel Gravely met with strong resistance in his advance toward the crest of the mound on our left. The enemy’s line extended the entire length of this mound, and as our line advanced it opened a rapid but ill-directed fire. The line formed by the Sixth and Eighth Cavalry Missouri State Militia, almost crawling upon the ground by reason of the abrupt assent, moved steadily forward until within a few yards of the enemy, when a loud cheer from our line, followed by one or two sharp volleys of musketry, proclaimed the position gained… General Pleasonton was now upon the ground and ordered me to advance my line to the Marais des Cygnes and cross the river as soon as possible.24

Brig. Gen. Cabell: Being in the rear the previous day, and in line of battle all night, facing the enemy, and fighting until 2 o’clock, General Marmaduke was ordered to relieve me with his division... He made an opening and I marched my command through and left him to bring up the rear.25
25 October (0500 to 0600+)

1. Confederate skirmish line along the river and abatis at the ford.
2. Confederate trains visible miles to the south.
3. Sanborn ordered his brigade to pursue. The 2 CO supported the advance.
4. 2 AR (U.S.) led the advance and captured numerous stragglers and the two abandoned Woodruff guns.
5. The 2 AR (U.S.) engaged the Rebel skirmish line at the ford.
6. The 8 PEMM (dismounted) crossed over the river and attacked the Confederate flank.
7. Clark ordered the skirmish line to withdraw.
The river and its fords are significant to the next phase of the fighting. The Fort Scott/Military Road passed through the small town of Trading Post and then continued south. The old ford crossed the river at the town and provided access to a secondary road to Mound City. However, the main road crossed at a new ford located one mile south of town. Within about an hour after daylight, the 2d Arkansas (U.S.) led the mounted pursuit and pressed forward to the main ford over the Marais des Cygnes River. The Union cavalry passed through the abandoned Confederate camp, capturing about 100 stragglers, numerous abandoned animals, and about 30 derelict wagons. Later, McNeil’s and Blunt’s men hung some of the prisoners in retaliation for the wanton destruction upon Kansas farms and alleged violations against the female residents of Trading Post. The 2d Arkansas (U.S.) moved quickly and seized two small guns abandoned by the Confederates in their retreat.26

Their pursuit stalled when they found, “the ford of the stream, interrupted by an abatis on the opposite bank” and “the ford occupied” by Marmaduke’s men.27 The Confederates had positioned a significant skirmish line amid the trees and bushes on the opposite bank to slow the Union pursuit. From the top of the eastern mound, Sanborn observed the stalled pursuit and developed a plan to re-energize the attack. He directed the 2d Arkansas (U.S.) to fix Confederate attention on the ford, and for the 7th PEMM to outflank the Confederate defense. The 7th PEMM dismounted about 400 yards above the ford and crossed over the river. Unfortunately, Sanborn and the militiamen were unaware of the old ford located at Trading Post. Nonetheless, the 7th PEMM crossed over the river. The militia’s commander stated, “We were then thrown out as skirmishers on the right of the brigade, driving the enemy from the creek bottom.”28 The flank attack was a success and the Confederates at the ford abandoned their position and withdrew.

**Brig. Gen. Sanborn:** General Pleasonton was now upon the ground and ordered me to advance my line to the Marais des Cygnes and cross the river as soon as possible. Their order was immediately executed, and in a few moments my command occupied the ground just abandoned by the enemy, who left one piece of artillery and many wagons, horses, mules cattle, sheep, cooking utensils, &c. Colonel Phelps, Second Arkansas Cavalry, was directed to take the advanced and move forward as rapidly as possible. He soon reached the river and found the enemy busily engaged felling trees across the road on the opposite side. The Seventh Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia was at once dismounted and thrown across the river, about 400 yards above the ford, and ordered to advance as skirmishes down the river till it should reach the ford. Colonel Phelps at the same time advanced, under a heavy musketry fire, and the enemy was driven from his position opposite the ford, where he had felled but two trees of moderate size across the road.29

**Brig. Gen. Clark:** Before I had gone a mile from the encampment (on the Marais des Cygnes) of the night before, I received an order from General Marmaduke to form my brigade in line of battle, as the enemy had again appeared in our rear.30
25 October (0600 to 0700+)

1. Sanborn delayed at the ford by the obstacles and muddy roads.
2. Pleasonton moved Benteen and Philips forward to support the attack.
3. The 2 AR (U.S.) forced the Rebel skirmish line back, but failed to close with the main Confederate battle line.
4. The 6 and 8 PEMM (dismounted) provided supporting fire.
5. The 2 CO forded the river, but does not move forward in time to support the 2 AR (U.S.).
6. Clark engaged the Union forces with artillery.
The 2d Arkansas (U.S.), followed by the battalion of the 2d Colorado, crossed over the ford on their mounts and resumed the pursuit. At about a half mile beyond the ford, Confederate skirmishers hiding in the tall grass briefly delayed the pursuit. Col. John Phelps, the commanding officer of the 2d Arkansas (U.S.), ordered a charge and forced the skirmishers back to their main line. Brig. Gen. Clark had formed the Confederate defensive line approximately one mile from the ford. Capt. Hinton stated that the line was “facing to north, and strengthened by three guns, two rifled and one small smooth-bore, its right resting on a timbered ravine, running from the main stream.” He further detailed, “The left rested upon a small knoll on the summit of which was a log cabin.” This line consisted of four units with a reserve line of two units further to the south. Hynson’s Texas Battery, with two Parrot rifles and a 6-pounder field gun, supported Clark’s forward line. Phelps’ small regiment, only 200 men strong, charged the Confederate brigade. The dismounted PEMM units tried to support the charge with fire but were too far back to provide effective support. The battalion of the 2d Colorado, possibly delayed by the muddy roads, failed to come forward and support the hasty attack. It was a brave attempt, but Clark’s heavy defensive fire forced the 2d Arkansas (U.S.) to fall back. Generals Curtis, Pleasonton, and Sanborn observed the charge and sent word for the forward units to halt while additional forces moved forward to support the attack. The Union commanders wanted to get artillery forward to support the attack. Unfortunately, the rains and the retreat of thousands of Confederate cavalrymen and hundreds of wagons had turned the roads into an almost impassable quagmire. Over the next hour, Pleasonton and Sanborn struggled to get units into position and organize a deliberate attack against the Confederate line. Clark’s Brigade bought the valuable time needed by the Rebel wagon train to escape.

Col. Phelps: The enemy in front formed in line of battle. The regiment, at most 200 strong, moved up and formed immediately; the Second Colorado having crossed the creek shortly afterward came up also and formed on the left and to the rear of the Second Arkansas, who galloped immediately to the charge. The line of skirmishers of the enemy were sent flying to their line of battle, when the artillery, opening upon the Second Arkansas with fury, checked their advance and compelled them to reform their line, which they did under fire, while the Second Colorado, unmoved and behind cover, never pretended to offer a support, which might have won for that regiment glorious results, and which the skirmishers of Gravely, though dismounted, attempted to give, but it was too late. Two hundred men alone could not do what an hour afterward, at the crossing of the Osage, three brigades succeeded in accomplishing and these won laurels and elicited praise for their gallantry. They earned it nobly.

Lieut. Col. Davies: 25th, this day the enemy attacked us about 9 o’clock, but Pratt’s [Hynson’s] battery did such good execution that the enemy were compelled to fall back.
25 October (0700 to 1000)

1. Pleasanton moved Benteen’s and Phillips’ Brigades, and the artillery forward to support the attack.
2. Frustrated with the delay (0700 to 0900), Curtis ordered Sandborn to attack.
3. Sanborn forced Clark to retire.
4. Clark reformed behind his reserve line.
5. Pleasanton deployed one section of artillery and attacked Clark’s new line with two brigades.
7. Phillips’ Brigade threatened the Confederate left flank.
8. Clark ordered a withdrawal.
Sometime around 0900, Curtis sent word for the lead brigade to attack. Pleasonton asked for a delay to get his division and supporting artillery into position. However, Curtis was frustrated with the delay, and he directed Sanborn to attack with his brigade. The 2d Arkansas (U.S.) and the 2d Colorado conducted a mounted charge toward the Confederate line. The units on both flanks supported with dismounted fire. Sanborn stated his brigade, “charged the enemy’s position and had forced them to yield.”

On the Confederate line, one of Clark’s regimental commanders stated, “He again attacked us in force. After a short engagement the command on our right, being flanked by the enemy, gave way.” Clark ordered the withdrawal before his units became heavily engaged. They were fighting mounted, which made reloading the muzzle-loaded weapons difficult. Additionally, Clark could see the rest of Pleasonton’s division deploying to support the attack and probably wanted to form the entire brigade again before making another attempt at delaying the pursuit. In the retreat, Hynson’s Texas Battery, because of a lack of ammunition, abandoned the 6-pounder field gun. Clark reformed his forward units behind the reserve line. He recognized there was little he could do against a full division but he maintained a bold front and hoped to buy time for the Rebel wagon train to escape to the south. He kept his units mounted and had no intention of becoming decisively engaged. To the north, Maj. Gen. Pleasonton finally managed to deploy his division and had one section of artillery forward to support his attack. Lieut. Col. Frederick Benteen’s Brigade arrived on the field and took position in the center of the line. Brig. Gen. Sanborn’s Brigade was on the left. Sanborn’s Brigade had done “most of the work” that morning and was probably nearing exhaustion.

Col. John Philips’ Brigade moved into position on the Union right. Pleasonton issued discretionary orders to both Benteen and Philips as they came onto the field to charge the enemy if the opportunity presented itself. The Union had approximately 3,500 troopers with two or three rifled guns in support. Brig. Gen. Clark had maybe 1,200 Confederate troopers with two rifled guns. Clark was not only significantly outnumbered, his left flank was also overlapped by the much longer Union line. Pleasonton recognized the Confederate weak flank and committed Philip’s Brigade against their left. Clark recognized the risk of remaining in his position and ordered the brigade to retire. It was close to 1000 and the Confederate rearguard had held the Union pursuit on the Marais des Cygnes River for about five hours.

**Col. Philips:** Sanborn’s and Benteen’s brigades were in advance of mine, the former already skirmishing with the enemy, driving him through Trading Post to the Marais des Cygnes, where he resisted stubbornly. At this point I was ordered to take the advance and charge the enemy then formed in open prairie. Passing the two brigades in advance of me I soon came in view of the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Lazear, holding the advance of the brigade, was ordered forward with instructions to attack fiercely. The remainder of my command was advanced in squadron columns, supporting Lazear. The enemy withdrew on our approach. We pursued them at the gallop for three miles, pressing him so closely as to compel him to form.

**Lieut. Bennett:** General Clark formed his brigade into a line of battle... As soon as General Fagan retired to the rear the Federals came charging and seemed determined to break our lines. Our artillery opened on them and caused them to break their lines. We fell back and formed a new line. New lines were formed and abandoned as the Federals advanced upon us.
25 October
1. 0200: Moonlight reinforced Mound City.
2. Shortly after dawn: Moonlight defeated a Confederate attack against Mound City.
3. Dawn to 0930: The Confederates delayed the Union pursuit at the Mounds and the Marais des Cygnes River.
4. 0930+: Moonlight moved to reinforce Forts Lincoln and Scott.
5. 0930+: Mound City garrison defeated a second Confederate attack.
6. 0930+: Marmaduke withdrew to the south and delayed the Union pursuit.
7. 0930+: Sanborn stopped to rest and feed his brigade.
8. 0930+: Phillips pursued to the south along the Fort Scott Road. Benteen followed behind Phillips and veered to the east along the Branch Road.
9. 0930+: McNeil stalled at the Marais des Cygnes River Crossing, and Blunt Division held up behind them.
10. 1030: Shelby’s Division paused at the Little Osage River.
11. 1030: Confederate wagon train stalled at Mine Creek.
After the fight at the Marais des Cygnes River, Pleasonton ordered his brigades to continue the pursuit. The trail of the large Confederate wagon train remained easy to follow and the Union brigades moved out in close pursuit of the Rebel rearguard. Generals Curtis and Pleasonton did not accompany the lead brigades. Price’s wagon train had a head start of several hours, and the Union generals probably did not anticipate a general engagement in the next few hours. Brig. Gen. Sanborn also dropped out of the pursuit. He stated in his report, “My brigade having been on duty all night and engaged all the morning without anything for horses or men to eat, by permission of the general commanding I fell to the rear to feed for a few moments.”

Philips’ Brigade now led the pursuit and Benteen followed. Several miles to the south, the road forked to the west, south, and east. The western fork was the road to Mound City, to the south there were two parallel roads leading to Fort Scott, and the old Military Road or Wire Road, angled east before turning south to Fort Scott. Philips took the Main Fort Scott Road and followed after the retreating Confederates. He was only about 800 yards behind Col. Colton Greene’s 3d Missouri (C.S.A.), the Rebel rearguard. Greene stated in his report he was, “followed by the enemy, who seemed to take his gait from ours but never came in gunshot range.” Benteen turned onto the Fort Scott Branch Road. The branch road rejoined the main road about a mile before Mine Creek. Several miles south, Price’s advance guard paused to rest at the Little Osage River. The trail of the Confederate main column experienced a delay crossing over Mine Creek and part of the wagon train remained north of the creek. Price was unaware of the close pursuit and still believed the major threat was to the west. The fighting at the Mounds and Marais des Cygnes River was not the only fighting the morning of 25 October. Moonlight’s Brigade maneuvered along the western flank of the Union pursuit and screened against a deeper Confederate incursion into Kansas. At about 0200, Moonlight arrived in Mound City after marching all night. His brigade of about 1,000 men and five mountain howitzers, reinforced the town’s small garrison just in time to save the town from a Confederate attack. Shortly after dawn, Moonlight’s 1,300 men easily defeated an attack by approximately 600 Confederates. Soon after the skirmish, another 300 Kansas militiamen arrived from Paola to reinforce Mound City. Moonlight left 550 men at Mound City and moved south toward Fort Scott with his brigade. Later in the morning, the Confederate cavalry made another attempt to capture the town but were again defeated by the Union garrison. These engagements supported Price’s belief that the bulk of the Union Army was on his west flank, not to his rear in close pursuit.

Col. Moonlight: Seeing from the route the enemy was taking he must necessarily camp about the Trading Post and that Mound City was danger of being destroyed I pushed on, marching all night, a distance of sixty-five miles; arrived there at 2 a. m. on the 25th. Early in the morning the enemy made his appearance but was quickly driven back and the town saved. About this time I received an order from General Blunt to make for Fort Scott and hold it at all hazards, so that no time was lost, after procuring some rations for my starving command, in striking for that place.

Maj. Gen. Price: On reaching Little Osage River I sent forward a direction to Brigadier-General Shelby to fall back to my position in rear of Jackman’s brigade for the purpose of attacking and capturing Fort Scott.
25 October (1030)

1. Marmaduke arrived at Mine Creek.
2. Marmaduke observed the host of units north of the creek.
3. Fagan’s Division and most of the wagon train across the creek.
4. Marmaduke ordered Freeman to position his brigade to protect the crossing site.

Map 57.
57. Marmaduke’s Dilemma

At about 1030, just minutes ahead of his rearguard brigade, Maj. Gen. Marmaduke arrived on the low ridge overlooking Mine Creek. He planned to establish a strong defensive position on the south side of the creek to delay the Union pursuit. Instead, he found the crossing blocked by a host of units waiting to cross over the creek. Most of the Army and the wagon train had already crossed at the main ford. The ford had a solid rock bottom and was initially an adequate crossing site. However, the crossing of thousands of horses and hundreds of wagons had destroyed the main ford’s outlet and also the secondary fords. The roads leading out of the creek valley were hopelessly muddy and each wagon had to be pushed up the southern bank and the slope on the south side of the creek. Marmaduke observed that most of Maj. Gen. Fagan’s division was across the creek but that Fagan’s largest and best unit, Cabell’s Brigade, and some of the division artillery remained north of the ford. Additionally, there were hundreds of wagons belonging to the refugees following behind the Army and awaiting their turn to cross. Marmaduke had only minutes to make a decision. The Army was obligated to defend the refugees but most important was the preservation of the division’s and Fagan’s artillery and their ammunition wagons. Marmaduke ordered Col. Thomas Freeman to position his brigade astride the main road to protect the ford and cover the crossing of the ammunition wagons. He sent word to Brig. Gen. Clark that upon his arrival he was to extend the division line to the east. He sent a request to Fagan asking for Cabell’s Brigade to deploy on Freeman’s left. Marmaduke then made the decision to keep his units mounted. The majority of the Rebel soldiers were armed with muzzle-loading weapons that were difficult to fire and reload from horseback. Nevertheless, Marmaduke had observed his subordinate’s delaying action at the Marais des Cygnes River. In the delay, Clark’s units remained mounted and still forced a delay of several hours upon the Union forces. Clark’s imposing lines of Confederate cavalrmen at the Marais des Cygnes River encouraged Pleasonton to deploy his full division to force the Confederate withdrawal. Maj. Gen. Marmaduke reasoned that the sight of a full Confederate division would force the Union commander to pause again. Additionally, Marmaduke recognized the threat to the Confederate Army had radically changed. Earlier in the day, both he and Price believed the main threat to the Confederate Army would come from the west. The fighting at the Marais des Cygnes River and the current situation confirmed that the most dangerous threat was to the rear. Therefore, Marmaduke sent a message to Price informing him of the changed situation and requested assistance.

Capt. Hinton: In the meanwhile the advance brigades moved rapidly across the open prairie. Soon the timber of Mine Creek, about five miles south-east of Mound City, came in sight.

Pvt. Darr: We then came to a stream in our front that was entirely blocked, at every point where it was possible to cross, by wagons and teams belonging to refugees who were noncombatants, fleeing from the Federals.
25 October (1030+)

1. Clark’s last delay position.
2. Clark withdrew and extended the Confederate line to the east.
3. Cabell deployed to extend the Confederate western flank.
4. Philips moved onto the high ground.
5. The 2 KS battalion formed to the right of Philips’ line.

6. Fagan extended the Confederate left flank.
7. Confederates deployed skirmishers to the Mound City Road.
8. Philips deployed skirmishers to drive back the Confederate skirmish line.
9. The 4 MSM deployed one squadron in extended formation on the Union right.
10. The last of the wagon train and the refugees retreated to the south.
58. Extending the Lines

Within minutes, several more brigades moved into position on the north bank of Mine Creek. The first was Brig. Gen. Clark’s Brigade of veteran Confederates. Clark galloped onto the field from the north. He fought briefly from the ridge north Mine Creek and then fell back toward the creek. Col. Colton Green stated that the Confederate line, “formed some 300 yards north of Mine Creek.” At the main defensive line, Clark hastily deployed his men to the right of Freeman’s Brigade with skirmishers deployed forward along the Mound City road. Just minutes behind Clark, Philips’ Union brigade crossed over the low ridge north of the Confederate line. Philips was surprised to see thousands of Rebel cavalrmen with supporting artillery deployed in line and additional forces coming forward to support them. Philips reacted by pausing just as Marmaduke hoped. For the moment, Marmaduke’s gamble had succeeded and prompted the Union forces to rein in the pursuit. Almost simultaneously, Cabell’s Brigade galloped into position to extend the Confederate left. The majority of Fagan’s division crossed over the creek and moved forward to further lengthen the line to the west. Cabell stated in his report, “I went to General Marmaduke’s assistance as rapidly as I could, forming regiments into action as fast as I could… firing as I came up.” On the Union front, Philips observed Benteen’s Brigade coming up behind him, so he deployed his small brigade west of the Fort Scott Road. His decision not only left room for Benteen on the east of road, it also positioned his brigade to contest the Confederate reinforcements coming forward on the west end of the line. Philips then pushed skirmishers forward to drive back the Rebel skirmishers and a messenger north to inform Pleasonton that he and Benteen would need immediate reinforcements. Philips feared the Confederates would turn his west flank so he ordered the 4th MSM to deploy one of its squadrons in extended order to protect the flank.

Col. Philips: He took position on the open prairie with Mine Creek, a tributary of the Osage, in his immediate rear. Lazear’s command was well up and in position. The remainder of the brigade, advancing in parallel columns, was easily and quickly fractured into line. The enemy was formed at 600 yards distance in treble lines and in overwhelming force. My ground was high and commanding. Here the whole rebel army and train were in full view… The scene was grand; the work before us of fearful import. An aide was sent to inform the major-general commanding that Price’s army was in my immediate front and that I confronted him with my little command in line of battle. The enemy’s vastly superior numbers enabled him to outflank me, which he evidently intended to do, by his movements. To meet this I was compelled to extend my line to the right by opening files and swinging off one squadron some sixty yards. I had no reserve force; the enemy had eight guns in position, which he now began to use. As yet no artillery had come to my assistance, it having been delayed at the Marais des Cygnes by obstructions placed there by the enemy.

Brig. Gen. Clark: We came suddenly upon the trains halted, the delay occasioned by a deep ravine, the enemy not more than 500 yards in our rear. There was no time to make any but the most rapid dispositions for battle. To attempt to dismount and send the horses to the rear was inevitable destruction, as the enemy in the confusion would have been upon us. There was no alternative but to abandon the train or to fight on horseback. In the hurried consultation between Generals Fagan and Marmaduke I understood this to be the view taken of the emergency. It was determined not to dismount, which met with my approbation.
25 October (1100)

1. Philips’ Brigade skirmished with the Confederate line.
2. Benteen’s Brigade crested the ridge and charged into the valley.
3. Philips’ charged in support of Benteen.
Both sides paused to dress their lines and decide upon their next action. To the north, Col. Philips deployed about 1,400 men west of the Fort Scott Road. Lieut. Col. Benteen was coming up fast on the east side of the road with another 1,200 men. At this point there wasn’t any Union artillery on the battlefield. In the Confederate line, Generals Marmaduke and Fagan deployed approximately 6,400 men north of the creek, supported by eight artillery pieces. Marmaduke’s Division was astride the Fort Scott Road and extended the line to the east. Fagan’s Division was behind Marmaduke’s left and extended the line to the west. Fagan left another 750 men south of the creek in a reserve line. Unfortunately for the Confederates, all the units deployed hastily and “There was no time to make any but the most rapid dispositions for battle.” The brigade formations lacked uniformity. Some were deployed with the regiments on line with three ranks and others with the troops in lines six deep. Cabell wanted to charge the Union line and deployed the brigade with his regiments in squadron columns. These units may have been as many as 10 lines deep. Marmaduke was aware that another force was coming up fast to strengthen the Union line. He was also concerned that the balance of the Union Army would soon arrive on the field. During the brief pause, both sides engaged in a furious long-range firefight. The Confederate artillery opened fire on Philips’ line. With no artillery to counter the fire, Philips men held their position with “good discipline and great gallantry.” Col. Chas. Blair, one of Maj. Gen. Curtis’ staff officers, was forward with Philips’ Brigade. He stated, “The enemy’s artillery was playing on this line with fearful effect and we had nothing but musketry to reply but the men were steady and self-possessed and perfectly easy under the fire.” It was not a one-sided firefight. A soldier in Cabell’s Brigade noted, “The enemy poured a continued and deadly fire into our hastily formed ranks.” Brig. Gen. Cabell also noted the intensity of the firefight and reported, “As fast as our lines were formed, the enemy, armed with Henry rifles, forming in front of Marmaduke’s and my brigades, poured a rapid and scathing fire into our commands, which far exceeded any firing we could do from my muzzle-loading Enfield rifles.” Cabell canceled his plan to charge. He based his decision upon both the sight of additional Union forces coming onto the field and the scathing Union fire. The firefight lasted less than 30 minutes but for those on the field, “it seemed a long time.”

At about 1100, Lieut. Col. Benteen’s Brigade of veteran troops crested the northern ridge above Mine Creek. Numerous Army and division staff officers were forward with Philips’ Brigade. Col. Blair recollected, “I passed along the whole line and met your gallant staff officers everywhere, counseling, encouraging, exhorting, and commanding, and the tenor of the whole was, charge!” He went on to state, “It was evident that our only safety was in a successful charge by which we might capture the guns.” Capt. Hinton, another staff officer, claimed it was staff officers who “galloped to the left to inform Colonel Benteen of the position of affairs on the right, and desire him to press forward with a view to charge.” Therefore, Benteen was well informed on the situation. Nevertheless, it still must have been an intimidating sight when he looked down into the valley and observed thousands of Confederate Cavalrymen deployed in the valley. His brigade moved onto the battlefield in a column of regiments. Maj. Gen. Marmaduke had gambled that the imposing sight of the two divisions would force the Union commanders to pause and take the time needed to deploy and then bring their units forward for a deliberate attack. At the Marais des Cygnes River, Marmaduke observed the Union generals’ methodical deployment against rear guard brigade. The Confederate commander probably expected to see the Union commanders again take the time needed to deploy for a division attack. Unfortunately for Marmaduke, neither Generals Pleasonton nor Curtis were forward on the battlefield to impose the measured approach seen earlier in the day. Benteen lacked experience above the regimental level. He had been a brigade commander for only a few days since the wounding of Col. Winslow. To date, all of his experience as a brigade commander was to attack, and the Rebels retreated. He had seen the enemy retreat at Bloody Hill, Westport, and the Marais des Cygnes River. In the pursuit he saw the discarded and abandoned equipment of a demoralized and defeated army. Just an hour earlier, Benteen observed the Confederate rearguard turn and run before his unit could get into action, and the last order he had received was “to charge the enemy whenever the opportunity offered.” The overabundance of division and Army staff officers on the field offered advice and recommendations, but Benteen was the commander and only he could make the decision. In a matter of moments, he saw an opportunity and chose to attack. He focused on the brigade fight and he gave little thought to the need to plan, organize and execute a division attack, and his only attempt at coordination was a message to Col. Philips asking him to “charge with me, for God’s sake.” Additionally, Benteen may have believed his division and Army commander were nearby and organizing support. It will never be known how much deliberate thought Benteen put into his decision. He may have considered the charge was necessary before the enemy could improve upon their poor deployment or before they themselves charged the heavily outnumbered Union line. Benteen may have reasoned that only the front rank of the densely packed Confederates could fire and then not be able to reload their clumsy weapons while mounted. On the other hand, his decision could have been nothing more than the observation of the
enemy’s “fatal blunder” in the positioning of their artillery. The guns were less than 1,000 yards to the front and would only have the opportunity to fire one or two shots before his cavalrymen closed with them. The cavalryman’s desire to capture enemy guns may have been the primary motive. Whatever the reason, Benteen was responsible for making the decision, and he did not hesitate. It was more happenstance than planning that placed Benteen’s Brigade at Mine Creek. Nonetheless, it was the best unit for the “work” of “fearful import” that needed to be done.67 The brigade’s regiments had served together for months and had considerable battle experience in Mississippi and Tennessee. The regiments had fought together in both the Vicksburg Campaign and the Tupelo Campaign. The troopers were well armed with sabers, and revolvers. Additionally, the regiments were armed with first-class carbines. Both the 4th Iowa and the 10th Missouri (U.S.) had the seven-shot Spencer repeating carbines.68 The other regiments were armed with various types of breech loading carbines. The brigade’s firepower far exceeded that of Clark’s Confederate brigade, deployed to their front. All of Benteen’s regimental commanders were aggressive and competent. In short, it was a veteran unit, and they were anxious to take the fight to the enemy. Benteen formed the brigade, positioned behind a low ridge, into a column of regiments with each regiment in line. The brigade was eight ranks deep and lead regiment had a frontage of about 200 yards. It was a textbook cavalry formation with Lieut. Col Benteen on the front right of the first line. At about 300 yards from the Confederate line, Benteen ordered the charge sounded and the brigade surged forward at the gallop. To the west, Philips recalled his dismounted skirmish line and charged forward to support Benteen. Lieut. Col. Bazel Lazear, one of Philips’ regimental commanders, recalled, “In a very few minutes the force on my left came up at a charge, and as soon as their lines, or as I think two columns of squadrons, was in line with me, I ordered the charge and advanced under a heavy fire of artillery and small-arms to within 200 to 300 yards.”69 Benteen’s and Philips’ 2,600 Union troopers moved down the gentle slope against approximately 6,300 Confederates cavalrymen. Benteen initiated the charge in accordance with the cavalry manual. At first, the brigade moved down the hill at a walk. He yelled out the commands: draw sabers, attention to charge, forward, and march! Each command was relayed to the regiments by more than 50 buglers. A short distance down the ridge, Benteen ordered the brigade into trot and then quickly signaled the charge.

**Lieut. Col. Benteen:** Three short miles were scarcely accomplished when one of the advanced skirmishers galloped back and reported that the enemy was only a few hundred yards ahead in line of battle, in large force, and with eight pieces of artillery. About the same time Major Hunt, of General Curtis’ staff, came up and told me the enemy’s exact position, stating that there was a brigade already in position in his front, but too weak to begin the attack. I at once determined to form on the left of this brigade, especially as a few more paces brought us in view of the line of rebels; seeing the position in which he had his artillery, I immediately surmised that the rebel commander had committed a fatal blunder, and resolved to capture it. I sent an officer to the commanding officer of the brigade on my right with the information that I was going to charge, and a request for him to charge with me, for God’s sake, and at the same time formed my command in column of regiments in the same manner I had formed them for marching, and immediately sounded the charge.70

**Brig. Gen. Clark:** Skirmishing had already begun, the artillery in action, when the Federal force (I should judge 6,000 or 7,000) made a furious charge on the right and left flank.71
25 October (1100+)

1. The 10 MO (U.S.) halted and refused to charge forward.
2. The 1 MSM halted on-line with the 10 MO (U.S.) and deployed dismounted skirmishers forward.
3. The 4 IA's two right most companies charged past the stalled 10 MO (U.S.) and then decided not to charge into the Confederate line and retreated out of the fight.
4. The 4 IA moved past the flank of the 10 MO (U.S.) and reformed into a line – then charged.

5. The 4 IA's two right most companies rejoined the fight and swung around the Confederate flank.
6. The 3 IA angled to the west and charged past the 10 MO (U.S.). The combined companies of the 4 MO (U.S.) and 7 IN followed behind the 3 IA.

Note: Only three of the units in Clark’s Brigade identified their positions in the battle line. The specific location of the other Confederate regiments and battalions are not known.

Map 60.
At approximately 200 yards from the enemy line, Benteen’s charge abruptly halted when the 10th Missouri (U.S.) refused to close with the enemy. Perhaps they expected the Rebels to break and run, or maybe the enemy artillery and rifle fire unnerved them. Benteen stated in his report, “The fire of the enemy was now so hot that for a moment a moment it staggered even my own gallant regiment.” Needless to say, the 115 men in the first rank of 10th Missouri (U.S) had second thoughts about charging into thousands of Confederates. The other regiments in the column crowded forward and there was considerable confusion and disorganization in the brigade. Benteen rode to the front of the regiment, brandishing his saber and cursing at the troopers, but the regiment refused to advance. Maj. Abial Pierce, commanding the 4th Iowa, feared, “a perfect rout of our line appeared to be almost certain.” On the western flank, Col. Philips, seeing the halt of Benteen’s Brigade, ordered his brigade to halt as well and deployed dismounted skirmishers to front. The hesitation of the Union charge, which could have resulted in disaster, lasted only a few minutes. In that time the Federals were vulnerable to a counterattack, but the Confederate leaders failed to seize the initiative. The Union attack had unsettled the Rebel cavalrymen. The “fatal blunder” was not just the artillery with limited fields of fire; it was also the organization of Confederate line. There were more than 6,000 men north of Mine Creek, but their haphazard deployment resulted in less than 2,000 horsemen on the front line. The front rank troopers could clearly see the breathtaking sight of 2,500 Union cavalry bearing down on them with sabers and pistols. Most of the Rebels were armed with clumsy muzzle loaders and had little chance of reloading their weapons. The Confederate leadership estimated the Union attack at 6,000 or more men. Private Darr, one of Cabell’s soldiers, believed the enemy numbered about 18,000. It was Maj. Abial R. Pierce, the acting commander of the 4th Iowa, who saved the Union attack. Most of the 4th Iowa’s companies had stalled behind the shaken 10th Missouri (U.S.). Pierce immediately moved to the left flank of his regiment and ordered the unit to form a column of fours to the left. He then swung them around the left flank of the 10th Missouri (U.S.). As soon as he cleared the left flank of the 10th Missouri (U.S.), Pierce charged into the Confederate line. The three rightmost companies of the 4th Iowa seem to have actually passed through the 10th Missouri and charged in a column of fours just to Pierce’s right. The two left companies overlapped the 10th Missouri’s line and did not get caught up in the stalled attack. They charged ahead of the rest of the regiment and quickly came to the realization that they were charging the Confederate line alone. The two companies of about 90 men swung to the east away from the fight, but then saw Pierce’s maneuver and swung back to the south to rejoin the regiment. The 3d Iowa angled to the brigade’s right and also pushed through the stationary 10th Missouri with the combined 4th Missouri (U.S.)/7th Indiana following behind them. Finally, the 10th Missouri, emboldened by the other units, reformed and charged forward.

Sergt. Maj. Scott: Major Pierce… resolved upon an extraordinary step. He left the right and galloped to the left of the regiment, which projected beyond the left of the line of the Tenth Missouri, perhaps as much as the length of two companies, which were therefore immediately in front of the enemy’s right. He instantly ordered a charge of his own regiment, and led it himself in a dash at the enemy’s right.76

Brig. Gen. Clark: The Federal force (I should judge 6,000 or 7,000) made a furious charge.77
25 October (1130)

1. Benteen slammed into the front and flank of Confederate right flank and captured two Rebel guns.
2. Clark’s Brigade collapsed and retreated toward the creek.
3. The 1 MSM charged into Freeman’s Brigade.
4. Freeman’s Brigade panicked and routed to the rear.
5. Cabell’s right flank disorganized by Freeman’s retreat.
6. The 4 and 7 MSM charged into Cabell’s disorganized line.
7. Cabell’s Brigade collapsed and retreated toward the creek.
8. Dobbin’s and Slemmon’s Brigades (off the map to the west) demoralized by the defeat of Cabell’s Brigade retreat south toward the Creek. Lieut. Zimmerman’s artillery delayed the Union pursuit of the retreating Confederates.
61. The Confederate Line Breaks

Benteen’s Brigade slammed into Clark’s Confederates. The 4th Iowa hit the 4th Missouri (C.S.A.) almost simultaneously from the front and flank. A Confederate regimental commander stated, “My men were armed with long infantry rifles which were unable to load on horseback and consequently were unable to oppose successfully the Federal charge, but broke and fled in the wildest confusion.” The 3d Iowa and 10th Missouri (U.S.) struck the front of Clark’s line, while the 4th Iowa turned into the Confederate right flank. The commander of the 4th Iowa stated, “We pressed them so close that I cut eight rebels from their horses with my own saber.” In a matter of moments, Clark’s line collapsed and the men “gave way in hopeless confusion.”

In a matter of moments, Clark’s line collapsed and the men “gave way in hopeless confusion.” Brig. Gen. Clark went on to say, “Every effort was made by appeals and threats to retrieve the rout, but it swept in an irresistible mass ungovernable.” On the Union right flank, Col. Philips conformed to the maneuver of Benteen’s Brigade. As soon as he observed Benteen’s units going forward he ordered his units to mount, and the brigade resumed its charge. His dismounted firing had already severely disrupted the Confederate line. The 1st MSM charged toward Freeman’s Brigade with pistols firing. Most of Freeman’s men were new recruits and pardoned deserters, and who broke before the charge struck home. Their panicky retreat swept up the right three regiments in Cabell’s line deployed behind Freeman. Harris’ battery was left exposed and lost two guns while crews pulled two other guns back toward the creek.

In turn, the 7th and 4th MSM charged into the Cabell’s left most units and drove them back. Col. Philips briefly summarized the success of his brigade in his report: “With pistol we dashed into his disorganized ranks and the scene of death was as terrible as the victory was speedy and glorious.”

The total collapse of the Confederate right and center demoralized the Confederate left flank. The brigades of Slemmons and Dobbins do not appear to have been heavily engaged, but were caught up in the general panic and quickly retreated toward the creek. One exception was a section of artillery commanded by Lieut. J. Zimmerman who kept his guns in the fight. He covered the withdrawal of the Confederate left until he was forced to abandon the guns join in the retreat.

Lieut. Col Lazear: After a sharp action of some minutes the enemy began to give way on their extreme left; at the same time a move from their right, which I supposed was to support their left, but in a moment I noticed one of their battle-flags, which was immediately in my front, begin to move to the rear. I ordered my command to get ready to move forward, the most of them being dismounted on account of being armed with long guns. In the meantime the Fourth and Seventh Regiments Cavalry Missouri State Militia, on my right, were pressing down on the enemy, and in advance of my line; the force on my left had rallied and were bearing down on the left. A general charge was made, resulting in the capture of a number of guns, a large lot of horses and prisoners.

Col. Greene: The enemy was seen to deploy from behind the left of his line in heavy column of attack, completely turning our right. Suddenly the first and second lines gave way, and rushing in great disorder ran over and broke the eight right companies of my regiment. The same wild panic seemed to seize everything. I wheeled my remaining company (B) to the right and opened on the flank of the enemy’s column until two of Williams’ guns were borne to the rear, when after every exertion, seeing the impossibility of staying this panic-stricken mob, I ordered Captain Polk (Company B) to withdraw as best he could be done.
25 October (1130+)
1. The Union brigades secured the fords and captured hundreds of Confederates.
2. A section of H/2 MO Light Artillery arrived and fired from the ridge north of the Mound City road, then moved forward to engage targets south of the creek. During the fight, the artillery mistakenly engaged elements of the 4 IA on the Union left flank.
3. Most of the Confederate artillery abandoned on the north bank and the remnants of the Confederate divisions fled to the south.
4. Generals Curtis, Pleasonton, and Sanborn arrived on the field to observe the end of the fight.
The Union forces pushed through the disorganized Confederates and captured the main ford. The fight, from the beginning of Benteen’s charge to the cheers of victory, spanned merely 15 or 20 minutes. The Union cheers heightened the panic of the Rebels trapped on the north side of the creek. Thousands of Confederates attempted to cross at the fords behind Fagan’s line. A large number of the frantic Southerners facilitated their escape by throwing away their guns. Col. Greene stated, “Over two-thirds of the arms were lost in the rout.”87 Private Darr recalled, “The stream was everywhere full of men and horses… trying to make their escape and the Federals trying just as hard to capture or kill them.”88 Marmaduke and Cabell tried desperately to rally their shaken soldiers. They did manage to rally a few companies, but could not restore the situation. In the confusion, Marmaduke tried to correct the actions of a 3d Iowa trooper and was promptly taken prisoner. Cabell rallied a few men around him and tried to break through to the south, but he was captured by an officer of the 7th MSM when his attempt to jump his horse over the creek failed. Then in the chaos, Cabell managed to escape twice before his final capture by a sergeant from the 3d Iowa. In addition to the two generals, Philips’ and Benteen’s men captured three colonels and numerous other field grade officers. Meanwhile the fighting continued along the creek banks and spilled over onto the slopes south of Mine Creek. A few additional forces arrived to reinforce Benteen’s and Philips’ Brigades, including a section of artillery. The artillery commander stated, “We opened fire with the entire battery, breaking their lines first on the right, then on the left, then right center, when they formed column and retreated.”89 Unfortunately, some of the artillery fire fell onto friendly forces during the chaos of the fight, with Major Pierce later reporting, “We advanced so far into the enemy’s ranks that Major-General Pleasonton ordered our own battery to shell us, thinking we were the retreating enemy, and my men were obliged to scatter to avoid being cut to pieces by our own shells.”90 Fortunately, Brig. Gen. Sanborn arrived on the field and ordered the artillery to cease fire.

Col. Philips: Major-General Marmaduke, Brigadier-General Cabell, some colonels, several line officers, four guns, one stand of colors, and a large number of prisoners were captured by this brigade. The ground in our front was strewn with the enemy’s dead, dying, and wounded. Every gun the enemy pointed at us fell into our hands. Our advantage was followed up as energetically as possible, making the rout complete. This successful charge produced great consternation and demoralization among the enemy, as evidenced by his rapid flight, the destruction of much of his train, the disgorging and scattering of his ill-gotten plunder.91

Brig. Gen. Cabell: I had but thirty men left of my brigade, and my artillery captured. The flag bearer of Gordon’s Arkansas Regiment stood up on his horse, at my command, and waved his regimental flag in defiance. I then told these thirty men to follow me, and we charged through the enemy’s lines..., hoping that we could cross the creek below... The enemy seemed to know our purpose, and a small squad followed several of us... A lieutenant of the 7th Missouri Cavalry, with three men followed me. I attempted to jump the creek, which had high banks. In jumping, my horse got his forefeet on the opposite bank and his hind feet in the creek, and then fell over me. I was soon up and lieutenant and three men demanded my surrender, and ordered me to go to the rear.92
1. Curtis and Pleasonton ordered Benteen and Philips to pursue.
2. Fagan rallied a small number of Rebels along the high ground south of the creek.
3. The demoralized Confederate Army retreated to the south.
4. Benteen’s Brigade pushed Fagan’s delay line to the south.
5. Fagan reformed remnants of the two shattered Confederate divisions to defend the high ridge south of Mine Creek.
6. Philips moved forward to support Benteen.
7. Fagan’s rearguard retreated to the south before Benteen and Philips could attack.
8. Pleasonton ordered Benteen and Philips to halt in place until additional forces could be brought forward.
9. Sanborn moved south to support Benteen and Philips.
63. The Final Shots at Mine Creek

During the fight, Generals Curtis and Pleasonton arrived on the battlefield. They immediately sent messengers to the rear to hasten additional forces forward and directed Benteen and Philips to cross over the creek and resume the pursuit. South of the creek, Maj. Gen. Fagan tried to reorganize Confederate forces fleeing the battlefield and delay the Union pursuit. In short order, Benteen and Philips moved their brigades over the creek and pursued the retreating Rebels. About a mile south of the main ford, a Confederate skirmish line delayed Benteen’s forward units along a small tree line. Benteen ordered the 4th Iowa to dismount and push the Rebels up the ridge. Near the McAuley Farm, Fagan organized another defensive line along the top of the ridge. Philips moved his brigade into position to attack Fagan’s line. The Confederates’ morale was broken and Fagan could not rally them for another fight. As Philips moved forward the Rebels quickly withdrew to the south. Benteen and Philips again reorganized their brigades and planned to resume the pursuit, but Maj. Gen. Pleasonton sent orders for them to hold their position. Pleasonton wanted to bring additional forces to the front to continue the fight. Regrettably, those additional forces were slow to arrive. Brig. Gen. Sanborn’s exhausted troops arrived as the fighting came to a close; they had been in the fight since 0300 with only one short break after the fighting at the Marais de Cygnes. Pleasonton wanted to get Brig. Gen. McNeil Brigade into the fight and sent several messengers to encourage the tardy brigade to hurry along. Nonetheless, McNeil failed to get his brigade over the Marais des Cygnes River in a timely manner and Maj. Gen. Blunt also failed to move his division forward. Blunt claimed that McNeil’s Brigade blocked all the roads and crossings over the river. The end result was that the fighting died away and the Union pause granted the defeated Confederates valuable time to escape to the south. In the immediate area of the battlefield the Confederate losses were staggering. Historian Lumir Buresh estimated the Confederate dead at 260. He estimated another 300 as wounded and Union records show 600 captured. In addition the two divisions lost eight field guns and hundreds of firearms. Union records are more accurate and they showed far fewer casualties; Benteen and Philips had eight killed, 80 wounded, and two missing. Sadly, some of the Confederate dead were the result of battlefield executions. Some of the Union troops shot Rebels caught with any portion of a Union uniform; it was the legacy of a bitter border war that had raged across Missouri and Kansas for more than three years.

Col. Philips: A number of prisoners taken in this fight were dressed in our uniform, and in obedience to existing orders from department headquarters, and the usages of war, they were executed instantly, while those taken in Confederate uniform were recognized and treated as prisoners of war. The number of prisoners exceeded 400.

Col. Lawther: The Federals attacked our rear guard..., and a general engagement was the result, which resulted unfavorable to us. I lost in the engagement four officers wounded and seven captured by the enemy, nine men killed, 17 wounded, and 58 captured.
25 October
1. 1130: Marmaduke and Fagan routed at the Battle of Mine Creek.
2. 1200: Pleasanton pursued the retreating Confederates.
3. 1200: Confederate flank guard force captured Fort Lincoln.
4. 1200+: Thompson reinforced the flank guard at Fort Lincoln.
5. 1200+: Moonlight moved toward Fort Lincoln and skirmished with the Confederates.
6. 1200+: Blunt followed Pleasanton to the south.
7. 1230: Moonlight decided to bypass Fort Lincoln and reinforce Fort Scott.
8. 1300: Price ordered Thompson to delay the Union pursuit at the Little Osage River crossing.

Map 64.
Eight miles to the south of Mine Creek, Maj. Gen. Price rested at the crossing of the Little Osage River with elements of Brig. Gen. Shelby’s Division and the wagon train. He was unaware of the disaster at Mine Creek. He planned to send Shelby south to the capture Fort Scott and its valuable supplies. However, events to the west and news of the fight at Mine Creek forced a change to the plan. Just before noon, the flank guard of the Shelby’s division captured and pillaged the small town of Fort Lincoln moments before Col. Moonlight’s Union Brigade arrived in the area. Capt. A. McCoy, commanding the small Confederate flank guard of 150 men, immediately sent word of the large Union force moving against the flank of the Rebel Army and asked for reinforcements. Price canceled the planned attack against Fort Scott and sent Thompson’s Brigade to reinforce McCoy and to protect the Army’s flank. At Fort Lincoln, Moonlight cautiously skirmished with McCoy’s detachment but withdrew when he saw the Rebel reinforcements coming up at about 1230. Moonlight decided that his priority was to reinforce the Fort Scott garrison and pulled back from Fort Lincoln. He then detoured to the west and resumed his march toward Fort Scott. Meanwhile, Price had received word on the engagement at Mine Creek and sent word to Shelby to send all available units north to help Marmaduke and Fagan. Price himself moved north to assess the situation and soon discovered the magnitude of the disaster that had befallen his Army. Price redirected Shelby to defend the road crossing over the Little Osage River. Thompson moved his brigade to the Little Osage River where he learned “of the disasters of the past few hours,” and saw the remnants of the Confederate rearguard retreating pell-mell to the south. He recognized that the Union pursuit would soon be upon him and began making arrangements to defend the crossing.

**Col. Moonlight:** About this time I received an order from General Blunt to make for Fort Scott and hold it at all hazards, so that no time was lost, after procuring some rations for my starving command, in striking for that place. At Fort Lincoln the enemy had possession and disputed our passage. After vainly trying to dislodge him I moved off by the right flank, leaving a battalion to engage his attention until the command crossed the stream above.

**Maj. Gen. Price:** I immediately mounted my horse and rode back at a gallop, and after passing the rear of the train I met the divisions of Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke retreating in utter and indescribable confusion, many of them having thrown away their arms. They were deaf to all entreaties or commands, and in vain were all efforts to rally them. From them I received the information that Major-General Marmaduke, Brigadier-General Cabell, and Colonel Slemons, commanding brigade, had been captured, with 300 or 400 of their men and all their artillery... Major-General Fagan and several of his officers, who had there joined me, assisted me in trying to rally the armed men, without success. I then ordered Brigadier-General Shelby to hold the enemy, who were pressing their success hotly and fiercely, in check if possible at the crossing of the Osage until the train could be placed in safety.
1. Sanborn’s 2d AR (U.S.) and 2 KS pushed the Confederate skirmish line back.
2. Phillips’ charge stalled against the Little Osage River.
3. McNeil’s Brigade charged over the ford in column formation.
4. Thompson ordered his first line to withdraw

Map 65.
65. The Union Attack at the Little Osage River

At about 1300, Thompson arrived at the Little Osage River. Shelby and Thompson positioned the units in three lines just to the south of the river. The two Confederate generals ordered their units to fight mounted. They did not intend to retain the river crossing very long; their only goal was to delay the Union pursuit. All told, Thompson had his brigade plus Williams’ Missouri Cavalry of Jackman’s Brigade, about 2,000 troops with no artillery support. Sometime before 1400, Marmaduke’s and Fagan’s panic-stricken troops passed through the lines and hurried to the south. Thompson must have worried that the disorderly retreat of the other brigades would demoralize his men. Also, because of the lay of the ground, being mostly a prairie country the troops of both armies were in full view. The lone Confederate brigade was able to observe with some trepidation the movement of a full Union Division toward their position. Despite the “great panorama,” Pleasonton’s Division was almost as disorganized as the retreating units of Marmaduke and Fagan. Pleasonton halted the division and formed a line of battle on the slopes leading down into the river valley. Philips’ Brigade was on the right, the 2d Kansas Battalion (Maj. Gen. Curtis’ Escort) was in the center, Sanborn’s small brigade was on the left, and McNeil’s Brigade was coming up fast on the far left. Pleasonton ordered Benteen’s Brigade, which was resting near Mine Creek, to come forward as soon as possible. Pleasonton had about 3,200 men. Like the Confederates, the Union forces had no artillery on the battlefield. Sometime before 1400, Pleasonton ordered the division to advance. The 2d Arkansas (U.S.) and the 2d Kansas moved ahead as an advanced guard and pushed the Rebel skirmish line back from the timber along the river. Pleasonton then ordered the division to charge and all the units surged ahead the best they could. Philips’ and Sanborn’s Brigades stalled at the steep banks of river line. McNeil’s Brigade charged over the ford in column formation. The 5th MSM dismounted on the far side of the river and pressed forward on foot. The dismounted skirmishers forced back Thompson’s first line and dismantled the rail fence surrounding a corn field to allow other units to pass through. The remainder of McNeil’s Brigade charged forward on their mounts through the holes in the fence and along the road. At that point Thompson ordered his lead units to fall back behind the second line.

Brig. Gen. McNeil: *I got engaged with the enemy, directly after crossing the Marmiton [Little Osage], who were strongly posted in a large corn-field and in the edge of the timber skirting the prairie. The Fifth Missouri State Militia dismounted and most gallantly charged, throwing down the fence in the face of a severe fire, while the balance of the brigade charged on horseback. The enemy were completely routed, scattering in disorder, throwing away their arms and leaving many of their killed and wounded.*

Brig. Gen. Thompson: *We were ordered to dispute the passage of the enemy and delay his approach. The dispositions were made under your direction, and we quietly awaited him. The party left at the ford were flanked on both sides and retired without firing a shot, and soon the enemy appeared on the south side of the stream. Our first line, composed of Elliott’s and Williams’ regiments, coolly witnessed the formations and advance of the enemy, and when within range commenced firing. The impossibility of loading Enfield rifles on horseback now became apparent again, for after one discharge the horses became excited, and when the enemy charged, which they soon did, there was nothing to do but retreat.*
25 October (1420 - 1500)

1. McNeil and Sanborn pressed hard against Thompson's first line as it retreated back through the Second line.
2. Thompson's second line panicked and fired early and then followed after the retreating first line.
3. Thompson third line held the Union attack for 15 to 20 minutes.
4. Thompson rallied a portion of his brigade and formed a fourth line.
5. Philips and Benteen passed over the river and threatened the Confederate flank.
6. The remnants of Thompson’s Brigade fired one volley and then retreated.

Map 66.
Thompson planned for the second line to reserve their fire and let the first line pass back through them. McNeil’s charge pressed closely upon the withdrawing soldiers of the first line and Thompson’s second line fired before the passage was complete. The Confederates in the second line then panicked and joined with the first line in a hasty dash back through the third line. McNeil’s Brigade, now supported by the lead elements of Sanborn’s Brigade, reformed and charged again. Thompson managed to steady his third line despite the disorganized withdrawal of the forward lines. Additionally, the third line was in a good defensive position along a small creek. This time, the Confederates fought well and delayed McNeil and Sanborn’s Brigades for some fifteen or twenty minutes. Philips’ and Benteen’s Brigades crossed the river and threatened to turn Thompson left flank which finally forced Thompson’s withdrawal. Shelby and Thompson rallied a remnant of the brigade and formed a fourth line. They positioned the soldiers on a small hill about a half mile south of their previous position. McNeil and Sanborn charge again. However, the Union horses were exhausted. McNeil’s troopers had galloped ten miles just to get into the fight. The Union cavalry brigades could barely coax their tired steeds above a walk. It was the fatigue of the Union force that eventually saved the Confederate Brigade from annihilation; McNeil and Sanborn could not close fast enough to force the Confederates into close combat. Thompson fired a volley at the oncoming Union line and then withdrew again. By this time, Thompson’s Brigade had lost all unit organization and the officers could only rally small groups of soldiers into making brief defensive stands. The fighting lasted a little more than an hour. Both sides reported only minor casualties.

Brig. Gen. Sanborn: The brigade charged the enemy concealed in the timber in the most gallant manner; drove him across the Little Osage and through the timber, where we halted and reformed the line. Three full lines of the enemy were visible within rifle-range, and the command became so eager for the fray that it seemed impossible to restrain them, and the entire brigade charged the enemy again, without any orders, and drove him fully four miles, killed and wounding many, capturing a number of prisoners.104

Brig. Gen. Thompson: The men held their horses well in hand and could have been controlled, but upon approaching our second line it commenced firing before we reached it and broke before we passed through. There was a third line formed by Erwin’s regiment that had the advantage of a ditch, which covered the road, and had it not been for the check that he gave the enemy very many of the brigade would have been killed or captured. We soon passed out of immediate danger, and the men formed again very readily, although all regimental organization was lost... I watched the manner closely that I may hereafter, should necessity require it, know how to control men in a stampede. All ran, yet none were frightened, and as there was no discipline I found a quiet voice and ordinary remark attracted more attention than the vehement language and orders that some use. Our lines were formed and broken several times this day, but our loss was small. Each colonel retained a part of his command about him, but the brigade was not formed together after the first line was broken. I was with one line and then with another, and came off field with Colonel Elliott after night had set in.105
25 October (1500+ Late afternoon)

1. Moonlight reinforced the Fort Scott garrison
2. Price turned away from Fort Scott and headed toward Douglas Ford.
3. The Confederate wagon train stalled at the crossing site.
4. Price directed Shelby to take command of the remnants of the Army and delay the Union pursuit.
5. Pleasonton pursued the retreating Confederates.

Map 67.
While Thompson’s Brigade slowed the Union pursuit at the Little Osage, Price’s Army continued its retreat to the south. Several miles north of Fort Scott, Price abandoned his hope of capturing the Union supply depot and turned the column to the southeast, along secondary roads leading to Douglas Ford on the Marmaton River about ten miles east of Fort Scott. At the ford, the river was about hundred feet wide, but the crossing had a good rocky bottom. However, both the approach and exit banks were steep, and it was a difficult crossing for heavy wagons. For the third time this day the long wagon train stalled the retreat at a water crossing, and Price’s Confederates were again forced to make a stand to save the burdensome wagons. Price ordered Brig. Gen. Shelby to take command of the remnants of the Army and delay the Union pursuit until the wagons could cross over the river. Shelby deployed his first line about six miles northwest of the ford. The line was comprised of elements of all three divisions. He posted Thompson’s Brigade (Shelby’s own Division) on the left, Dobbin’s Brigade (Fagan’s Division) in the center, and Clark’s Brigade (Marmaduke’s Division) was on the right. Col. Greene commanded the remaining 400 men of Clark’s decimated brigade. On the far right in the woods, Shelby concealed a detachment of Tyler’s Brigade (Unattached). The second line consisted of remainder of Marmaduke’s division, now commanded by Col. Clark, and the balance of Fagan’s Division and Tyler’s Brigade. Jackman’s Brigade (Shelby’s Division) remained with the wagons and herded them over the river. Shelby supposedly had 8,000 men on the field. However, because of the shattered state of Fagan’s and Marmaduke’s Division, the actual number was probably considerably less. Additionally, most of the men were demoralized and Tyler’s large brigade was indifferently armed. Shelby elected to have his men remain mounted. He probably had little choice in the decision. It had been a hard day for the Confederate Army, and most of the soldiers were unwilling to separate themselves from their horses. Most of the Rebel soldiers were primarily concerned with escaping the Union pursuit, not fighting a pitched battle. Meanwhile, the Union pursuit followed haphazardly in the wake of the retreating Confederates. Pleasonton and his division were exhausted by a full day of pursuit and fighting. He failed to keep the brigades within supporting distance of each other, and Philips and Sanborn’s Brigades fell behind. McNeil’s and Benteen’s weary soldiers remained in the chase as best as they could and sometime after 1530 found Shelby’s first defensive line. McNeil deployed approximately 800 yards from the Confederates. His brigade had about 1,500 men and was desperately outnumbered. Nevertheless, McNeil’s troops were highly motivated by their success at the Little Osage and he believed the Confederates were on the verge of collapsing. He sent messengers to the rear asking for support and ordered the brigade to advance.

**Brig. Gen. McNeil:** I continued the pursuit through the prairie for several miles, and finally about 3:30 brought their entire force to bay near Shiloh Creek.

**Brig. Gen. Shelby:** the advancing Federals, flushed with success and clamorous for more victims. I knew from the beginning that I could do nothing but resist their advance, delay them as much as possible, and depend on energy and night for the rest.
25 October (Late day to early evening)
1. McNeil advanced against Shelby.
2. Tyler’s detachment counter-attacked and halted McNeil’s advance.
3. Benteen arrived and deployed to support McNeil.
4. McNeil ordered both brigades forward.
5. Shelby delayed the Union attack with a series of feints.
6. Jackman arrived to reinforce the Confederate line.
8. Maj. Pierce, 4 Iowa, observed Thompson’s line faltering and attacked to break the Confederate line.
9. Jackman counterattacked and forced the 4 Iowa back. Shelby ordered the first line to retire and both sides separated for the night.
McNeil’s Brigade advanced at a slow pace; it was all the tired horses could manage. Nonetheless, the sight of the determined Union advance shook the morale of the Confederates and many of the Rebel units were on the verge of melting away to the rear. Shelby ordered Tyler’s Brigade to charge the Union flank to delay the Union attack. Tyler’s troops had yet to be seriously engaged in the day’s fighting and were enthusiastic to get into battle. McNeil’s men defeated the charge with small arms fire and forced Tyler to withdraw, but in turn McNeil’s advance was stalled. At this time, Benteen’s Brigade and a section each of 12-pounder mountain howitzers and 3-inch rifled guns arrived. McNeil ordered both brigades forward and Shelby again slowed the Union advance with a series of aggressive feints. The Union regiments responded to each feint with dismounted carbine fire to defeat the Confederate charges. McNeil’s hesitant advance ground to halt 300 yards from the enemy and the troops dismounted to bring long-range fire upon the Confederate line. On the Confederate left, most of Thompson’s men, demoralized by the heavy fighting at the Osage River, retreated out of the fight. Maj. Pierce, commanding the 4th Iowa, sensed the opportunity to break the Confederate line and attempted to charge, but the exhausted horses refused to gallop. Shelby saw the threat and ordered Jackman’s Brigade forward to stiffen the Confederate line. Jackman’s Brigade passed through Thompson’s retreating brigade, and forced the Iowans to withdraw. Both sides then contended themselves with a long-range firefight. At dusk, Shelby ordered the first line to pull back behind his reserve line. McNeil’s and Benteen’s Brigades were too exhausted to follow the Confederate withdrawal and the fight sputtered to a halt. The Union casualties were light. Confederate casualties were more substantial and totaled 25 men killed and approximately 50 wounded. The 25th of October had been a day of difficult movements and hard fighting beginning at about 0300, and both sides were relieved to see the fighting come to end.

**Brig. Gen. McNeil:** I formed both brigades into a double line of battle. Price’s entire army formed and resolved themselves into a quadruple line, about 800 yards in front, and notwithstanding their line was made four deep, they outflanked me both to the right and to the left. I endeavored to charge and was gallantly supported in the effort by Colonel Benteen, but the utmost exertions of officers and men could not move the horses to a trot or a gallop. I steadily advanced in line at a walk toward the enemy, who continued to retire.

**Brig. Gen. Shelby:** Slowly, slowly my old brigade was melting away... All that men could do had been done. For five days and nights Thompson’s and Slayback’s commands had fought and marched and marched and fought, and now, under concentrated and accumulated fire of heavy odds, the left of General Thompson’s brigade reeled back over the prairie, the Federals following with furious yells; but the right, under Colonel Elliott, met the advancing wave and broke their front line in every direction by charging furiously the rear of the enemy pressing hard after the left of Thompson’s brigade. Now Colonel Jackman, who had done his duty well in another part of the field, came rushing up to avenge his fallen comrades. Going into line at a gallop, and opening ranks to let the retreating brigade through, he charged down upon the rushing enemy like a thunderbolt, driving them back and scattering their front line badly. This charge saved us, and the day’s work done. The Federals halted, reformed their lines, brought up artillery, and fired away at long range. Very slowly the army moved away without molestation.
Notes

1. Map and discussion based on information from several maps in O.R. Atlas, Plates 66 - 1 & 2 and Plate 161.
8. Dr. Dean Nowowiejski, the Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair for the Art of War, coined the phrase the “fruits of their labor” during the execution of a Price’s Raid staff ride for the Art of War scholars.
12. Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 471.
14. Buříš, The Battle of Mine Creek, 67. Finneyville was a small farming community about 10 miles north of West Point.
17. Map and discussion based on information from a current USCGS map and the O.R. The road network is based upon O.R. Map plates 66 and 161. I used a 1906 Map of Linn County for the additional secondary roads (map in the CSI files).
21. Richard Hinton was a captain in the 2d Kansas Volunteers (Colored) and served as an Aides-de-Camp on Maj. Gen. Curtis’ staff.
26. These guns were the two-pounder Woodruff guns captured by the Confederates at Pilot Knob. The two-pounder guns were not very effective field guns. The average field gun in both armies fired shot weighing 10 to 12 pounds. It appears that one gun was captured near the mounds and the other near the ford. Maj. Gen. Rosecrans later awarded one of the guns to the 2d AR as a trophy. However, there is no record of either of the guns being used by the Union forces in their continued pursuit of Price.
31. Hinton, Rebel Invasion of Missouri and Kansas, 203.
32. Col. John Phelps commanded the 2d Arkansas Cavalry (Union).
34. Lieut. Col. Davies commanded the 7th Missouri Cavalry in Clark’s Brigade.
40. Lieutenant John Bennett serve in Company D, 8th Missouri Cavalry Regiment, Clark’s Brigade.
42. Map and discussion based on information from the Mine Creek Battlefield Foundation multi-fold historical pamphlet (Mine Creek Visitor Center).


49. John C. Darr, Private, Company E, Gordon’s Regiment Arkansas Cavalry, Cabell’s Brigade


56. The Confederate artillery consisted of: On the right, Hyynson’s Texas Battery (2x 10pd Parrott guns); in the center, Harris’ Missouri Battery (2x 10pd Parrott guns and 1x 6pd smoothbore); also in the center was 1 gun from Hughey’s Arkansas Battery; and on the left was one section of Blocker’s Arkansas Battery under Lt. J.V. Zimmerman (likely 2x 6pd smoothbores).


75. William Forse Scott was the 4th Iowa’s regimental sergeant major.


82. One on the lost guns was from Hughey’s Arkansas Btry which was fighting with Harris’ Btry.


84. Lieut. Col. Lazear commanded the 1st MSM at Mine Creek.


93. Map and discussion based on information from a USGS map of the area and in sketch in Buresh, *The Battle of Mine Creek*, 139.


95. Col. Robert Lawther commanded the 10th Missouri Cavalry, Clark’s Brigade, Marmaduke’s Division.


97. Map and discussion based on information from a USGS map of the area and the *O.R.*


101. Map and discussion based on information from a 1906 Linn County map and the sketch in the official records (Platte 66 -8). The Fort Scott Road and farm fields are my best estimate on their likely locations. I based the unit positions on the O.R. reports and the narrative in Buresh, *The Battle of Mine Creek*.


106. Map and discussion based on a USGS map for the base map and then based the roads on *O.R.* Map Plate 161. The location actual location of Douglas Ford is known. It was identified by a local Fort Scott historian and documented in the Nevada Daily Mail Paper (11 April 1996). The location of the battlefield has not been specifically identified. Most sources say it was approximately 6 miles NW of the ford and 6 miles east of Fort Scott. The area I have chosen is my best guess based on the descriptions of the creeks and hills on the battlefield.


109. Map and discussion based on a USGS map for the base map. I based the unit locations and actions on the reports in the O.R., and Plate 66 in the O.R. maps.


Part VII

The Second Battle of Newtonia and the Retreat

25 October 1864 to 2 June 1865
25 – 26 October (Night)

1. Pleasanton moved half of his division to Fort Scott to rest and resupply.
2. Blunt followed Pleasanton to Fort Scott (He did not receive or did not understand Curtis’ message to bivouac on the battlefield).
4. Price’s Army struggled throughout the night to cross the wagon train and the remainder of the Army over the Marmaton River. Sometime after midnight, the Confederates burned most of the wagon train.

Map 69.
On 25 October, the fighting at Charlot’s Farm ended at sundown. Maj. Gen. Curtis wanted to continue the fight or at least set the conditions for an early morning pursuit but he failed to impose his will upon his exhausted Army. Maj. Gen. Pleasonton believed Fort Scott was only two miles to the west. He decided, despite Curtis’ protests, to move Philips’ and Sanborn’s Brigades there to replenish supplies and rest. Maj. Gen. Blunt’s Division arrived about this time and he fell in behind Pleasonton on the road to Fort Scott. A fatigued Curtis failed to coordinate a night attack with Blunt’s relatively fresh division or position them for an early morning pursuit. McNeil’s and Benteen’s tired soldiers collapsed on the ground where the day’s fighting ended and hoped that Pleasonton would send provisions from Fort Scott. Price’s Confederates were equally weary. They were in a desperate situation with about half the Army on the north bank of the river waiting for the wagons to cross over the ford. The last of the wagons did not complete the crossing until about midnight. Sometime that night, Price reached the conclusion that the “enormous and useless” wagon train was “the principal cause of their discomfiture and losses.” He recognized the Army needed to make a rapid retreat the next morning and finally decided to abandon and burn most of the wagons. He then ordered the Army to be ready to continue the retreat at 0200.

**Maj. Gen. Curtis:** General Pleasonton told me that his troops were exhausted, and he was going to Fort Scott to rest and secure supplies. He was told, in my presence, it was only two or two miles and a half to Fort Scott, whereas in point of fact it must have been six. I protested against leaving McNeil and against any loss of distance in the march. I insisted on lying down on the grass and the advance to the right, and such was the cravings of hunger and the desire for rest, it seemed impossible to stop this movement to a place where both could be supplied. I sent word to General Blunt to hurry forward his division to support McNeil, but night soon came on, the battle ceased, and the lights of the burning prairie and the enemy’s burning wagon train near the timber of the Marmiton was all that appeared of the two contending armies.

**Maj. Gen. Price:** The army will march to-morrow at 2 a.m. in the following order: First, Major-General Fagan’s division; second, army and ordnance train; third, Major-General Marmaduke’s division; fourth, Brigadier-General Shelby’s division. Major-General Fagan will detach a brigade to march on the right flank of the train. Colonel Tyler’s brigade will march on the right flank of the train in rear of the brigade of Major-General Fagan’s division. The army train, with the following exceptions, will be parked under directions of division commanders and burnt before leaving camp: First, one-half the army headquarters wagons; second, there is allowed to each division headquarters one wagon, with ambulance for commanding officer; third, one wagon for brigade headquarters; fourth, one wagon for each brigade; fifth, one medical wagon for each division; sixth, all the ordnance wagons absolutely required; seventh, all the ambulances and carriages (except buggies, which are to be burnt) will be turned over to the division quartermaster for the use of the division quartermaster for the use of the division surgeon, to be used only for conveying the sick and wounded; eighth, all the serviceable stock to be retained by the division and brigade quartermasters for use as may be required; ninth, no enlisted man under any circumstances to have a led horse.
26 Oct:
1. Price retreated and bivouacked at Carthage.
2. Curtis pursued and camped near Shanghai.

27 Oct:
3. Price continued the retreat and halted on Shoal Creek.
4. Curtis pursued and bivouacked at Carthage.

28 Oct:
5. Price passed through Newtonia and camped just south of the town.
6. Curtis’ advance guard spotted the Confederate rearguard near Shoal Creek and pressed on toward Newtonia.
7. Pleasonton departed Fort Scott with Philips’ Brigade (and the Mine Creek prisoners) and moved toward Warrensburg.
At 0200 on 26 October, Price retreated south toward Carthage, Missouri, where he planned to obtain supplies. That night, the Confederates arrived at Carthage and Price allowed his men to rest. Late the next morning, the Army marched about 20 miles and camped on Shoal Creek. On the 28th, the Army passed through Newtonia and chased a small Union garrison out of town. Newtonia had a flour mill and was a good place to camp. Price decided to rest and refit his Army there for a couple of days. His rearguard reported no contact with Union forces on the 26th, 27th, or 28th, and Price concluded that the Union Army had abandoned the pursuit. The Union Army was slow to resume the pursuit. A major factor in the delay was the fatigue of the Union Army. However, the senior Union generals also had different understanding of Grant’s “let-alone policy.” Pleasonton wired Maj. Gen. Rosecrans, “Price’s Army is routed.” Pleasonton also informed Rosecrans, “I shall pursue no further.” He wanted the Missouri Brigades returned to their home districts. Maj. Gen. Curtis remained determined to pursue and destroy Price’s Army. In short, Curtis had no intention of returning to the “let-alone policy” until he destroyed the offensive capability of the Confederate forces in the Trans-Mississippi and removed all future threats to Kansas. Pleasonton reluctantly acquiesced with the caveat that he personally was too ill to continue and that Brig. Gen. Sanborn would assume command of the division and remain in the pursuit. Maj. Gen. Blunt’s Division departed Fort Scott at noon on 26 October. McNeil’s Brigade fell in behind Blunt and Sanborn followed later that afternoon. Benteen’s Brigade did not depart Fort Scott until the next morning. The night of the 26th, the Union Army camped near Shanghai, Missouri. Early the next morning, Blunt resumed the pursuit and arrived in Carthage at about 1330. Col. Ford’s Brigade led the march the next morning and about 1,000 observed Price’s rearguard departing their Shoal Creek camp site. Col. Ford hastened his march and about 1,400 crested the ridge north of Newtonia. Back at Fort Scott, Pleasonton retained control of Col. Philips’ Brigade to watch over the Confederate prisoners from Mine Creek. On 28 October, Pleasonton along with Philips’ Brigade and the prisoners, departed Fort Scott and moved toward Warrensburg, Missouri. They had no further participation in the pursuit.

**Maj. Gen. Curtis:** Although our joint commands are much broken and weary, after a few hours’ sleep and a careful reflection I feel still more duty and obligation I expressed to you last night of continuing the pursuit and assaults upon Price and his forces until we destroy him or get him beyond the Arkansas River and our command stationed at Fort Gibson and Fort Smith, [both garrisons in the Dept. of AR] which are liable to be overwhelmed by his numbers, are relieved and secure from his forces.8

**Maj. Gen. Price:** We marched over beautiful prairie roads, a distance of fifty-six miles, and encamped at Carthage, on Spring River... On the next morning at 9 o’clock, after giving the men and animals time to rest and feed, I resumed my line of march and encamped on Shoal Creek, a distance of twenty-two miles... No enemy having appeared the morale of the troops had considerably improved. On the morning of the 28th I resumed my line of march in the direction of Newtonia, Brigadier-General Shelby in advance, Major-Generals Fagan’s and Marmaduke’s divisions (the latter now commanded by Brigadier-General Clark) in the rear. On approaching Newtonia the advance of our forces was discovered by the Federal garrison, who commenced a retreat.9
28 October (1400)

1. Blunt’s Division (-) crested the ridge Northwest of Newtonia and chased the small Confederate skirmish line toward Indian Creek Woods.
2. Price ordered Shelby to delay the Union pursuit.
3. The balance of the Confederate Army resumed the retreat to the south.

Map 71.
71. Opening Shots at the Second Battle of Newtonia

At about 1400, the Confederate rearguard formed near a cornfield to contest the Union attack. On the Union side, Ford positioned McLain’s battery on the ridge and opened fire on the Rebels. As he prepared the brigade to advance against the enemy, Brig. Gen. Blunt moved to the front and ordered a charge. The Union forces, “under the cover of the fire of the First Colorado Battery, posted upon the bluff… swept across the plain at a gallop until within musket-range of the enemy’s line.” Blunt had seized the initiative but he had drastically underestimated the size of the enemy force on the field. Blunt believed his attack only faced the Confederate rearguard and was “convinced of their intention to avoid a fight, if possible.” He also mistakenly believed the balance of Curtis’ Army was coming up behind him to support the charge. Nevertheless, Ford’s Brigade easily cleared the Rebel rearguard to the south toward the Confederate Camp. Fortunately for Blunt, Col. Jennison’s Brigade, temporarily commanded by Lieut. Col. Hoyt, moved up to support Blunt’s attack and brought with them a section of mountain howitzers. Blunt’s force then consisted of two small brigades and numbered approximately 1,000 men. In the Confederate camp, Thompson’s Brigade had only recently returned to their camp after a hesitant response to a false alarm. The thunder of the Union artillery fire and the rearguard’s hasty retreat dispelled any thoughts of another false alarm. The aggressive Union attack had caught the Confederates by surprise and they had no time to collect and saddle the horses. However, Shelby ordered his division to form a dismounted battle line. The Southerners emerged from the camp and saw the Union brigades charging to the south. Both sides raced across the prairie to take up positions along the rail fences bordering the fields of Thomas McLain’s Farm.

Col. Ford: I then pressed rapidly forward, and, upon reaching Granby, ascertained that they had just passed through and that Price’s whole army was doubtless at Newtonia, distant five miles. The advance soon reported that the enemy’s train was in sight and but few men visible. I hurried forward at a gallop, and when within two miles of the town saw the rear of the rebel train entering the woods beyond town on the Cassville road. The battery was immediately planted on the bluffs and commenced throwing shell, while the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry and Second Colorado Cavalry were formed in two lines and ordered to charge down toward the enemy’s train, the charge being led by the major-general commanding First Division in person. We advanced at a gallop, with skirmishers in front, until we came upon the main body of the enemy, who was formed three lines deep and the front line dismounted.

Brig. Gen. Thompson: We had been in camp but a few hours when our scouts reported that the main body of the enemy were approaching on the same road we had come. I was ordered to form the brigade on foot and proceed to meet them. I did so, and advanced into the prairie to a fence we were directed to form on; but soon we were notified that it was a false alarm and returned to our camps. We had scarcely commenced the ordinary duties of camp when we were again ordered out, and proceeding to the same place found the enemy drawn up before us on the opposite side of the small field.
28 October (1430)
1. Blunt formed a dismounted battle line on the north side of McClain’s field.
2. Shelby formed a dismounted battle line on the south side of McClain’s field.
3. The opposing artillery dueled across McClain’s Farm field.

Map 72.
72. The Artillery Duel

At Thomas McLain’s farm, enclosed farm fields that were about 500 yards wide, separated the two forces. On the Union side, Blunt ordered McLain’s Battery of four 3-inch ordnance rifles off the hill to a position behind the center of the Union line. Hoyt positioned a mountain howitzer section of two guns at the rail fence. Shelby also brought artillery forward and positioned Collins’ Missouri Battery of two 10-pound Parrott Rifles on the Confederate right. The *Leavenworth Daily Conservative* stated, “The Battery which had been left with the 2d Brigade had remained on the hill, was now pressed forward. The battle opened fierce and furious. The enemy [Confederates] opened with three [two] guns. Their range was better than ours and the shells exploded in most dangerous proximity.” Initially, the two Confederate guns dominated the duel against the six Union guns. Blunt had positioned Capt. McLain’s battery behind the Union line and the Coloradans failed to find the range to the Rebel guns. They fired over the Confederate line and most of the shots went into Price’s camp. It was the small mountain howitzers that actually contested the Confederate guns. Col. Jennison later proudly reported that his mountain howitzers, “commencing a spirited and determined fire at a range of about 500 yards, the howitzers, under Sergeant Patterson, doing more efficient execution than at any previous action during the campaign.” Nevertheless, Shelby’s accurate artillery fire disrupted the Union line. A Colorado trooper noted soon after the fight, “the rebels had planted a battery in their rear that was throwing shell with considerable precision into the midst of our troops but notwithstanding the fierce storm of leaden hail from the enemy’s guns, that thinned our ranks and stilled the pulsations of many a noble heart—they stood, firm and undaunted.” Despite the success of his artillery, Shelby recognized that the numerically superior Union guns would eventually overwhelm his small battery. Therefore, Shelby decided to take advantage of his superior numbers and attack. His battle line, Thompson’s and Jackman’s Brigades, overlapped the Union flanks. The actual strength of Shelby’s force is not known. Blunt estimated the Confederate strength at about 2,000. At Westport the two Confederate brigades fielded approximately 3,000 soldiers. However, at Newtonia, the remnants of the once proud division probably numbered between 1,500 and 2,000. In this fight, the majority Confederates fought dismounted, although, Shelby did maintain two small detachments of mounted troopers on each flank.

**Maj. Gen. Blunt:** I now ordered forward the First Colorado Battery, which, with a section of howitzers attached to the Fifteenth Kansas Cavalry, poured a destructive fire into the enemy’s ranks. It soon became evident that I was engaging all the available force of Price’s army, which outnumbered me.18

**Brig. Gen. Shelby:** Dismounting every man of my division, I formed my line of battle just in time to meet the onset. Jackman held the right and protected two pieces of Collins’ artillery, which opened immediately with good effect. Thompson and Slayback were on the left, and I sent a good detachment under Major Gordon to watch well my extreme left flank.19
**28 October (1430-1630)**

1. Shelby attacked and pressed the Union battle line back from McClain’s field.
2. Shelby moved his artillery forward to support the attack and ordered Jackman to detach two regiments to protect the guns.
3. Blunt ordered McClain’s Bty onto the ridge line north of the corn field. Their hurried withdrawal almost panicked the Union line.
4. Blunt reformed his line near Ritchey Corn field.
5. Patterson’s howitzers defeated a Confederate attempt to flank the Union right flank.
6. A Confederate mounted detachment threatened the Union left flank and Blunt considered ordering a general withdrawal.

Map 73.
73. The Confederate Charge

Shelby ordered Thompson and Jackman to charge across the field. The Confederates charged “forward with a loud and ringing cheer.” The Confederate Brigade, with assistance from Jackman, gradually drove the Union line back and soon crossed over the fence on the northern edge of the field. Thompson continued the advance and used his mounted detachments to threaten the Union flanks. The fire of Patterson’s small mountain howitzers checked the Rebel advance against the Union right flank. One Union officer noted that, “the integrity of our line was as much ensured by the skill and energy of Sergeant Patterson and his light artillery.” However, the Rebel cavalry on Thompson’s right swung around the Union left flank. Blunt ordered the entire Union line to fall back and reform near Ritchey’s cornfield. McLain’s Battery quickly limbered and moved to the rear. The sight of the Union artillery retiring caused a near panic in the Union line and a few men in 15th and 16th Kansas fled to the rear. The Confederates, emboldened by the perceived Union retreat, pressed forward with renewed determination. The Leavenworth Daily Conservative stated, “The enemy’s small arms fire was reserved as they pressed forward, which they did steadily until it told with serious effect. Our line fell back twice, fighting desperately.” Blunt reformed his line near Richey’s Cornfield and the renewed Union fire temporarily stopped the Confederate advance. A Union trooper noted, “When the order to fire was given, the long line of curling smoke, the rattling, cracking, crashing of the carbines in the hands of our men, that hurled leaden messengers of death into the ranks of the foe, and the deep thunder tones of our batteries, that belched forth shot and shell-spoke fall many traitor’s doom, and served to check their impetuous advance, and cause them to fall back in confusion but only to return to the charge with increased numbers and greater determination.”

Shelby reorganized the Confederate line and advanced forward again to turn the Union left. Blunt worried that many of his units were running low on ammunition and was concerned he could not stop another attack. He ordered McLain's Battery to reposition itself on the ridge northwest of Newtonia, and was about to order a general withdrawal when General Sanborn arrived to reinforce the hard-pressed Union line.

Maj. Gen. Blunt: A large force compelled me to fall back about 500 yards from my first line, which was done in good order, and the line reformed in the face of a terrific fire. The enemy pressed forward their center, but were promptly checked by the canister from the First Colorado Battery. It was now near sundown, and my command had been engaged near two hours and their ammunition nearly exhausted, while a large force of the enemy were pressing under cover of a corn-field around my left flank, and my force being too small to extend my line in that direction, I was about to direct my line to fall back and take position on the bluff, when very unexpectedly the brigade of General Sanborn, of General Pleasonton’s command, came up.

Brig. Gen. Thompson: The firing commenced immediately, and in a few minutes our line bravely crossed the fence and advanced upon the enemy, crossing the field under a hot fire of artillery and small-arms, and drove the enemy into the open prairie. Not stopping at this second fence an instant, we advanced into the prairie and continued to drive the enemy, never letting them form to charge, which they endeavored to do. There was some mounted men on our right, but no supports near our rear, and I halted the line after we had advanced so far that we were exposed to flanking... While crossing the second fence in the advance the brave Colonel Smith leaped upon it to cheer his men on, and he was wounded in three places at the instant.
28 October (1630-1700)
1. Sanborn arrived on the field and Blunt ordered him to attack into the cornfield to secure the Union east flank.
2. Curtis rallied McClain’s Artillery and positioned H / 2 Missouri Artillery to support the fight.
3. Blunt ordered a general advance.
4. Shelby ordered the Confederates to retreat.
5. A detachment from Fagan’s Division arrived too late to influence the battle.

Estimated Casualties
- Union: 18 KIA, 95 WIA, 1 MIA (114)
- Confederates: Less than 200 total casualties

Map 74.
Near sundown, Maj. Gen. Curtis arrived on the battlefield with Brig. Gen. Sanborn’s Brigade and a section of artillery. Curtis helped to rally the Union line and later reported, “McLain’s battery, badly cut up, was falling back for safety under orders and some stragglers also, for the first time in this campaign, were ordered to face about and return to the support of our comrades.” Meanwhile, Blunt ordered Sanborn’s Brigade to occupy the left of the line and directed them to attack through the cornfield. Sanborn advanced his brigade forward “as fast as they could dismount and form.” His brigade crossed over the stone wall and into the field. The arrival of the reinforcements and Sanborn’s determined attack encouraged the entire Union line to renew the attack. The entire line surged forward and, “a triumphant cheer from the line announced that the enemy had turned and was falling back.” Shelby then recognized the futility of continuing the battle. The Union artillery now had eight guns on the field against two Confederate guns. They also had a fresh brigade in the fight and potentially more brigades approaching. Therefore, Shelby ordered a general withdrawal. About that time, a detachment of troops from Fagan’s division arrived, but it was too little and too late and the Rebels withdrew back into the Indian Creek woods. The opposing forces were exhausted and welcomed nightfall. Curtis and Blunt mutually agreed to resume the pursuit at daylight, and did not interfere with the Confederates retreat. Overtime, the participants greatly exaggerated the casualties sustained in the small battle and some reports show the Union losses at 400 killed or wounded with the total Confederate casualties at 250. However, the 5 November 1864 issue of the *Leavenworth Daily Conservative* accounted for only 18 killed and 95 wounded in the Union force and the total Confederate casualties at less than 200. Both sides claimed victory at this second battle of Newtonia. Curtis described the battle as a “brilliant affair” where the enemy was “conquered and routed.” Blunt reported that the Rebels “abandoned the field and retreated rapidly under cover of the night.” On the other hand, Price stated, “Blunt was repulsed and driven across the prairie three miles with heavy loss.” Shelby’s report claimed, “Another beautiful victory had crowned the Confederate arms.” Shelby had fought a successful delaying action and at least temporarily saved the disintegrating Confederate Army from the Union pursuit. However, his tactical success did nothing to improve Maj. Gen. Price’s deteriorating situation. At best, the Second Battle of Newtonia was a draw. It proved to be the last battle in the campaign.

**Col. Phelps:** The brigade arrived at Newtonia, unexpected but most welcome. Blunt had there engaged the enemy, and was being signally defeated; his forces badly cut up and without ammunition were giving way, while the enemy, pouring in reinforcements, were determined to pursue their advantage and reap it as [fast as] possible. But the arrival of the Third Brigade changed the aspect of affairs. In a moment the regiments were dismounted and thrown in line toward the most threatened point. Steadily they kept advancing; at their approach the enemy’s artillery was withdrawn and soon after their cavalry, heedless of the bugle that called to the charge, filed off by platoons, and left the historical field of Newtonia in Federal hands. The brigade remained in line until 9 p.m., amid the darkness. Thus in thirty-six hours they marched 104 miles and by their unexpected appearance turned a defeat into a victory.

**Maj. Gen. Price:** This was the last we saw of the enemy.
18 October
1. Most of Curtis' Army camped at Newtonia.
2. Benteen's Brigade recuperated at Carthage.
3. Price's Army bivouacked about 7 miles south of Newtonia.

29 October
4. Price's Army moved south and camped near Pineville.
5. Sanborn and McNeil received Pleasonton's order to return to their home districts (Springfield and Rolla). Sanborn marched 30 miles and camped on a tributary of the Spring River. McNeil marched about 20 miles.
6. Curtis moved Blunt's Division to Neosho and prepared to return to Kansas.
7. Benteen remained at Carthage and prepared to move to Springfield and then on to Memphis.

30 October
8. At midnight (29 Oct), Curtis received word from Maj. Gen. Halleck to resume the pursuit. He immediately dispatched orders to Benteen, McNeil, and Sanborn to rejoin the pursuit and rendezvous at Cassville. Curtis believed the Confederates had retreated toward Cassville. Blunt moved back to Newtonia.
10. Benteen remained in Carthage and prepared to join Curtis.
11. Price's Army moved south and camped near Maysville.

Map 75.
After the fight at Newtonia, Maj. Gen. Curtis wanted to resume the pursuit the next day. He ordered the divisions to be prepared to move out at 0300 on the 29th but there was “An honest difference of opinion” between Curtis and the senior leadership of the Missouri formations on the necessity of continuing the pursuit. Furthermore, Curtis stated that he occupied, “a debatable position as to my authority over troops.” He was constantly challenged by “General Rosecrans’ commanders” that they had “ever since we formed a junction, expressed a conviction that they had done enough.” Curtis shared with Maj. Gen. Halleck (Grant’s Chief of Staff) that he used, “argument, expostulation, and… the prerogatives of my rank” to hold the troops together and maintain the pursuit. These troublesome military relations between Curtis’ Department of Kansas and Maj. Gen. Rosecrans’ Department of Missouri continued to delay the pursuit. A full month of active campaigning had considerably worn down Rosecrans’ cavalry brigades. Rosecrans believed Price’s Army was completely defeated and no longer posed a threat to Missouri. He and his senior commanders assumed, “Price will be pursued by general starvation across the river, a most formidable enemy to him.” Rosecrans’ further thought that Price’s Army would disintegrate from desertions if left alone to its retreat. He, along with Maj. Gen. Pleasonton, saw no need to continue the pursuit and wanted the Missouri State Militia troops returned to their home districts. Additionally, Rosecrans received a telegram on 27 October from General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant directing, “What troops are not actually in pursuit of Price, or required to guard public stores in Missouri, should be brought to Saint Louis and prepared to assist General Thomas in West Tennessee.” Further complicating the situation, Maj. Gen. Canby, commander of The Division of West Mississippi and Rosecrans’ immediate superior, ordered Rosecrans, “to pursue with all his available force to the Arkansas River, or at least till Price encounters Steele and Reynolds.” Rosecrans decided that his orders to send troops to reinforce Maj. Gen. Thomas in Tennessee superseded Canby’s instructions to pursue Price. Therefore, he decided to end the Department of Missouri’s participation in the pursuit and recalled the Missouri Brigades. He sent instructions to Pleasonton to return Generals Sanborn’s and McNeil’s brigades of militia to their home districts and set the conditions for transferring the “Volunteers” troops to Tennessee. Rosecrans then directed Col. Benteen’s “Volunteer” brigade to remain with Maj. Gen. Curtis’ Army of the Border and continue in the pursuit of Price. On the morning of 29 October, Generals Sanborn and McNeil received a dispatch from Pleasonton instructing them of Rosecrans’ orders to return to their home districts. They informed Curtis and immediately departed for Springfield and Rolla. A disappointed and frustrated Curtis decided to cancel the pursuit. He informed Maj. Gen. Halleck that his one remaining division was insufficient force to continue the pursuit and that he would return his units to their home districts in Kansas.

At about midnight on the 29th, Curtis received word from Halleck to continue the pursuit. He interpreted that the “dispatch clearly overruled General Rosecrans’ order of the 27th… and justified… immediate exertions to recall the troops of General Rosecrans to the pursuit.” At 0100 on 30 October, Curtis recalled the Missouri brigades and ordered all units to concentrate at Cassville, Missouri. That same morning, Curtis wired Maj. Gen. Halleck of his determination to pursue and destroy Price’s Army. In the telegram, he stated, “The necessity of pushing Price’s forces beyond the Arkansas is so obvious, I have not hesitated to disregard department lines and act only in view of results which seem to involve the safety of our little garrisons in front, and the future peace of the inhabitants of Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas.” Unfortunately for Curtis, the exhausted and worn out Missouri brigades had marched at a prompt pace toward their home districts and it would take time for them to receive the new orders and additional time to rejoin the pursuit. Price was unaware of the confusion in the Union command. Nevertheless, it was an almost miraculous reprieve for the already desperate Confederates. The Union command had inadvertently allowed Price a two-day head start to escape the pursuit. Accordingly, Price force-marched his Army toward the safety of the Arkansas River while the Union command decided on a course of action.

All vignettes here are from the Northern perspective.

**Lieut. Gen. Grant (27 Oct 1864):** Now that Price is on the retreat without the probability of his bringing up again, Rosecrans should forward all the troops he can to General Thomas. This ought to be done without delay. He has 6,000 or 8,000 troops around Saint Louis, and within a few hours travel of it, that can start at once.

**Maj. Gen. Rosecrans (27 Oct 1864):** Send Generals Sanborn and McNeil to the headquarters of their respective districts – the first to Springfield and the second to Rolla.

**Maj. Gen. Pleasonton (27 Oct 1864):** Major-General Rosecrans has just telegraphed me instructions from Warrensburg to send Generals Sanborn’s and McNeil’s brigades to their respective districts at Springfield and Rolla, and to conduct the
remaining brigades with the captured prisoners and property of their commands to Warrensburg. I shall therefore start to-morrow morning to execute these orders.\textsuperscript{48}

\textbf{Maj. Gen. Halleck (28 Oct 1864):} General Grant thinks you [Rosecrans] can and ought to send troops to assist General Thomas. The latter wishes that any you can spare should go up the Tennessee River, if possible, as far as Eastport, under convoy of gun-boats. Communicate with him at Nashville.\textsuperscript{49}

\textbf{Maj. Gen. Curtis (29 Oct 1864):} After our victory last night I started the troops at 3 o’clock this a. m. in farther pursuit of Price, General McNeil in advance, when orders from General Rosecrans, through General Pleasonton, were received, taking General McNeil to Rolla and General Sanborn to Springfield... I am left with only the fragment of my own regular volunteers, not exceeding 1,000 fit for duty, and deeming it improper to continue a pursuit in another department, suspended by its proper commander, I shall return by slow marches to my own department command.\textsuperscript{50}

\textbf{Col. Benteen (29 Oct 1864):} I have learned from couriers that you [Maj. Gen. Curtis] had left there and en route for Newtonia; that the commands of Generals McNeil and Sanborn had gone toward Springfield. My command is nearly worn down; can scarcely get many of the horses along. I wish to know in writing whether I shall join you, as directed by orderly yesterday, or whether I shall return, via Springfield, to Saint Louis, thence to Memphis, where the brigade I have the honor to command belongs.\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{Maj. Gen. Halleck (29 Oct 1864):} Lieutenant-General Grant desires that Price be pursued to the Arkansas River, or at least until he encounters General Steele or General Reynolds.\textsuperscript{52}

\textbf{Maj. Gen. Curtis (30 Oct 1864):} Dispatches just received from Lieutenant-General Grant require me to continue the pursuit of Price to the Arkansas River. You [Sanborn, McNeil, and Philips] will therefore proceed forthwith to Cassville, by the nearest and best route, reporting to me at that place. This countermands all orders received by you from Generals Rosecrans and Pleasonton, concerning a retrograde movement.\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{Maj. Gen. Curtis (30 Oct 1864):} “Dispatches just received from Lieutenant-General Grant require me to continue the pursuit of Price to the Arkansas River. You [Lieut. Col. Benteen] will, therefore, proceed forthwith to Cassville by the nearest and best route, reporting to me with your command at that place. As long as horses can stand on their feet they must be considered fit for duty.”\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{Brig. Gen. Sanborn (30 Oct 1864):} General Curtis has just dispatched that he is directed by Lieutenant-General Grant to pursue the enemy to the Arkansas, and orders me to send my force to Cassville at once. I do not think General Curtis’s order is legitimate under the circumstances. What is your desire or orders in the case? I am getting prisoners fast here and I think doing more than I can possibly do in the pursuit. Most of the stock sent farther in pursuit will be a total loss to the Government. Price will be pursued by General Starvation across the river - a most formidable enemy to him.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{Maj. Gen. Halleck (31 Oct 1864):} “The orders of General Grant and General Canby are that the pursuit must be continued to the Arkansas River, or until you [Rosecrans] meet the forces of Generals Steele and Reynolds. These orders must be obeyed.”\textsuperscript{56}

\textbf{Maj. Gen. Rosecrans (31 Oct 1864):} “Your dispatch says that you repeat the orders. The commanding general can be assured that it is not necessary to repeat orders to me in order to have them obeyed. The preliminary order was given immediately on the receipt of your first orders and the details arranged yesterday.”\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{Maj. Bond (31 Oct 1864):} “The general commanding [Rosecrans] directs that you [Sanborn] move at once with your command to Cassville and open communications with General Curtis.”\textsuperscript{58}
31 October – 1 November
1. Curtis ordered Blunt and Benteen to Keetsville.
2. Price moved to Cane Hill.

2 – 3 November
4. Curtis moved on to Pea Ridge and then Cross Hollow (slow marches to allow Sanborn and McNeil to rejoin the pursuit).
5. Price rested his force at Cane Hill. He ordered a detachment commanded by Fagan to attack the Union garrison at Fayetteville. Price also furloughed Freeman's, McCrays', and Dobbins' Brigades.
6. Sanborn's Provisional Division departed Springfield (3 Nov).

4-5 November
7. Curtis relieved the besieged Union garrison at Fayetteville and then moved on to Prairie Grove.
8. Sanborn moved to Cassville.
9. Price moved into the Indian Territory.

6 – 7 November
10. Price marched south and crossed over the Arkansas River (7 Nov).
11. Curtis followed Price into the Indian Territory.

8 November
13. Price moved south toward Texas.
14. Curtis arrived at the Arkansas River and abandoned the pursuit.

Map 76.
On 30 October, Curtis resumed the pursuit. He initially moved slowly to allow time for the Missouri brigades to rejoin the effort. On 1 November, Benteen joined with Curtis near Keetsville (today’s Washburn). However, the other Missouri Brigades responded with less alacrity and never managed to rejoin the pursuit. Meanwhile, Price struggled to hold his exhausted and demoralized Army together. He contended with rough terrain, bad weather, and a lack of resources. On 1 November, the Confederate army limped into Cane Hill, Arkansas and acquired a modest resupply of food. Fagan asked permission to assist Rebel guerillas in an attack against the Union garrison at Fayetteville. Along with a detachment of Shelby’s men, Fagan moved to Fayetteville but failed to capture the Union entrenchments. On 3 November, Fagan learned of the approach of Curtis’ Army and abandoned the half-hearted effort against Fayetteville. Price rested his men at Cane Hill for several days. However, the failure at Fayetteville and the word that Union Army had resumed the pursuit all but destroyed what remained of the Confederate morale. Most of the Arkansas conscripts deserted and Price disbanded the brigades of Freeman, Dobbin, and McCray. He also released Jackman’s Brigade and Slayback’s Battalion on a temporary furlough. Price learned that the Union garrisons at Little Rock and Fort Smith had been heavily reinforced. He decided to avoid the Union garrisons by moving through the Indian Territory. He wanted to cross the Arkansas River west of Fort Smith. Curtis doggedly followed behind the retreating Confederates, capturing and paroling (with the promise that they will not take up arms again against the captors) hundreds of Rebel stragglers along his route. On 3 November, Halleck clarified Curtis’ authority and stated in an official order, “The Secretary of War directs that you assume command of all troops belonging to the Department of the Missouri and now serving on the western border of that State and pursue Price toward the Arkansas River.” Unfortunately, the order did not reach the appropriate senior commanders in time to influence the operation. On 7 November, the pitiful remnants Price’s Army, only five seriously understrength brigades, remained and crossed the Arkansas River at Pheasant Ford. The next morning, Curtis arrived at the crossing site and acknowledged that Price had escaped into Confederate Territory. He decided to abandon the pursuit and send his units back to their home districts.

**Maj. Gen. Curtis:** …resumed the march early on the 8th… Colonel Harrison [Department of Arkansas Troops] now had the advance and pushed forward with great vigor to the timber; far in our advance, which proved to be the timber skirting the Arkansas River. A few of the rebel rear guard were driven beyond the stream, and bringing up McLain’s battery, we shelled the timber on the south side. Some of our troops crossed over and exchanged a few shots as they supposed with the last of Price’s army. Our work was accomplished, and the shout that went up from the Army of the Border and the roar of our cannon resounded through the gloomy forests of the Arkansas, carrying to the camp of the starving enemy beyond our parting farewell.

**Brig. Gen. Shelby:** Our retreat was continued to Cane Hill unmolested and undisturbed. At Cane Hill, in the midst of a pelting snow-storm, I furnished a detail of 500 men, under Colonel Elliott, and Collins’ battery, to report to General Fagan for an attack upon Fayetteville. He complimented them for their gallantry and courage, and they rejoined me the next day after making the fight. With as much rapidity and comfort as possible the march was continued to the Arkansas River.
Map 77.

**Confederate States of America (CSA)**

1861

Dec 1864

November to December 1864

1. 7 Nov: Price crossed over the Arkansas River and moved toward Texas.
2. 8 Nov: Curtis arrived at the Arkansas River and abandoned the pursuit. Union forces returned to their home districts.
3. 15 Nov: Sherman departed Atlanta (captured on 2 Sept. 1864) and began his march to the sea.
4. 28 Nov: Remnants of Price’s Army arrived in Clarksville, TX.
5. 2 Dec: Price shifted his headquarters to Layesport, LA. and the expedition official ended.
7. 21 Dec: Sherman captured Savannah.

**The End of the American Civil War (January to August 1865)**

- 4 Mar: President Abraham Lincoln inaugurated for his second term as president.
- 3 Apr: Union troops occupied Richmond and Petersburg.
- 12 Apr: Mobile, Alabama surrendered.
- 21 Apr: Court of Inquiry convened to examine Price’s conduct in the Missouri Expedition.
- 3 May: Kirby Smith order Price’s Court of Inquiry to adjourn (Because of the termination of the war it will not reconvene and release no judgment).
77. The End of the Campaign

After crossing the Arkansas River, Price’s Army retreated south through Indian Territory. In the territory, Maj. John Edwards stated, “the horrors of defeat, hunger, and the pestilence” consumed the Army. Col. Colton Greene recalled, “the severest privations and sufferings during the march through the Indian Territory.” He also remembered, “for twenty-five days our animals were without forage,” and “the loss in animals was very heavy.” On 10 November, Price furloughed Cabell’s and slenderarrd’s brigades to return to their home districts. The next day, he released the remnants of Thompson’s Brigade to recuperate on the Canadian River. On 15 November, Price ordered Maj. Gen. Fagan to establish a headquarters at Washington, Arkansas and reconstitute his disbanded division. Thirteen days later, Shelby and Thompson rejoined what remained of the once proud Army of Missouri at Clarksville, Texas. Price’s remaining force numbered less than 3,000 and consisted primarily of Shelby’s old brigade (Thompson), Clark’s Brigade, and Tyler’s Brigade. Then, on 2 December, Price shifted his headquarters to Laynesport, Arkansas, and the expedition officially ended. In his official report, Maj. Gen. Price claimed the results of “my operations in Missouri are of the most gratifying character.” His commander, General Kirby Smith, stated in his report, “The movement of General Price accomplished all the objects for which it was inaugurated by me.” Both Price and Smith were excessively optimistic in their reports. Price failed to capture either St. Louis or Jefferson City. The people of Missouri staged no popular uprising against “the mercenary hordes of the North” and held no elections to inaugurate a new Confederate Governor. Price claimed, “Missouri property to the amount of $10,000,000 in value” was destroyed by his men. However, the vast capabilities of the Union quickly rebuilt the destroyed railroads and bridges. Price did bring back into Confederate Arkansas at least 5,000 new recruits. However, most were untrained and unarmed, and they were poor compensation for the almost irreparable damage done to Cabell’s, Thompson’s, and Clark’s veteran cavalry brigades. Maj. Gen. John Magruder, commander of the Confederate District of Arkansas, stated, “General Price’s army is totally demoralized” and was practically unarmed “with fewer arms by 5,000 or 6,000 stand than he took with him.” Price acknowledged Magruder’s assessment and reported his command was, “much exhausted, not one-half of them mounted, nor over a third armed.” At the strategic level, Price’s operation accomplished little in an effort to alter the desperate strategic situation of the Confederacy. Most of the Union forces that participated in the campaign came from Missouri and Kansas, and they were not slated for reassignment to the east. Union authorities did divert two infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade of the XVI Corps away from operations in Tennessee to reinforce Missouri. However, the temporary diversion of assets had little impact on the large Union armies fighting in Tennessee, Georgia, and Virginia. Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman captured Atlanta in early September a few weeks before Price moved into Missouri. Operations in Missouri may have slightly delayed Sherman’s decision to march to the sea. He wanted Maj. Gen. Andrew Smith’s hard marching XVI Corps to reinforce Maj. Gen. George Thomas’ forces in Tennessee before he departed. Nevertheless, he departed for Savannah on 15 November 1864, and the XVI Corps arrived in time to participate the battles around Nashville (15-16 December, 1864). In Louisiana, Maj. Gen. Edward Canby’s decision to reinforce Arkansas with the 2d Division, XIX Corps may have contributed to the delayed capture of Mobile, Alabama by a few months. The eastern newspapers barely mentioned Price’s Expedition and the operation had no effect on the Federal National elections. The electorate overwhelmingly voted for the reelection of Abraham Lincoln and ended any hope the Confederacy had for a negotiated settlement. Ironically, the Confederate operation significantly influenced the local elections in Missouri and Kansas against those with Southern sympathies. The Radical Republicans in both states took control of the state governments. Those same pro-Union sympathies worked against the Rebel guerrillas in Missouri, who recognized that most Missouri citizens now supported the Union. The guerrillas lost hope in a Confederate Missouri and their activities greatly diminished. After Price’s failure, the citizens of Missouri and Kansas primarily read about the war being fought in Georgia and Virginia. The war had moved away from their homes.

However, the fruits of victory were not kind to the senior Union commanders in the campaign. Lieut. Gen. Grant transferred Maj. Gen. Steele, the commander of the Department of Arkansas, to Texas. He blamed Steele for allowing the Confederates to cross over the Arkansas River into Missouri, and again for allowing the Rebels to escape back over the Arkansas River to safety. Grant relieved Maj. Gen. Rosecrans, the commander of the Department of Missouri, for supposedly allowing a Confederate Army to rampage through Missouri and then escape into Arkansas. Grant’s personal dislike of Rosecrans probably influenced the decision. Even Maj. Gen. Curtis failed to see any honors from the campaign. Curtis, more than his peers, campaigned against Price to ensure the “future peace of the inhabitants of Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas.” His determination contributed greatly to the destruction of the offensive capability of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi and did
brings peace to Missouri and Kansas. Nevertheless, Grant reorganized the commands west of the Mississippi and transferred Curtis to the Department of the Northwest.

Generals Kirby Smith’s and Sterling Price’s goals for the Missouri Expedition proved to be “larger in its aims than our resources may suffice to compass.” Price’s bold invasion of Missouri, his “just and holy cause,” stalled very early in its course at the walls of Fort Davidson—the Battle of Pilot Knob. There, the Union defenders bought the time needed to save St. Louis. Price’s costly and hollow victory at Pilot Knob convinced him to turn away from St. Louis. Price then failed to move rapidly against Jefferson City and his almost lethargic movement to the west doomed any hope of taking the Missouri capital. His decision to bypass Jefferson City transformed the invasion into a raid. The Confederates’ hope of a successful raid into Kansas died at Westport. Maj. Edwards, Shelby’s Adjutant, stated, “Westport was the turning point in the expedi-

tion… up to this time nothing of consequence had been accomplished, after it were the horrors of defeat.” After Westport, the raid transitioned into a retreat with the limited goal of returning to Arkansas with immense wagon train of captured and pillaged supplies. The Union victory at Mine Creek destroyed even the limited goal of returning to Arkansas with the “fruits of their labor.” After the Confederate disaster at Mine Creek, the retreat transitioned into little more than a rout. Curtis had the opportunity to completely destroy Price’s Army of Missouri at Charlot’s Farm and again at Newtonia. However, “An honest difference of opinion,” between Curtis and “General Rosecrans’ commanders” prevented the Union from achieving a decisive battlefield victory and the destruction of Price’s Army. Curtis’ failure to destroy Price’s Army in one last climactic battle destined the “short but eventful campaign” to quickly fade from the public view in 1864 and to be almost lost from history of the American Civil War.

**Maj. Gen. Curtis:** The object of this organization and campaign is accomplished. The rebel army under General Sterling Price has been confronted, beaten in several conflicts, pursued and driven over 350 miles, from the Missouri to the Arkan-
sas. This has been the work of fourteen days. Your marches have been incessant, sometimes for days and nights, in rain and snow, and generally on short rations, gathered from the herds lost by the enemy. Your privations, toil, and gallantry deserve the highest commendation, and the success of the campaign in which you have so gloriously participated, most of you from the beginning to the end, must entitle you to the thanks of your Government and the gratitude of the loyal people of our country. Your losses are considerable, but nothing in comparison with those of the enemy, who admits of a loss in killed, wounded, and missing of 8,000 or 10,000. All his cannon, too, a large portion of his small-arms, his vast wagon train loaded with spoils, and herds of cattle and horses, have been left, burned, and scattered, in the way of your pursuit. His army of 20,000 or 30,000 is converted into an unarmed, disorganized mob, destitute of everything, starving with hunger and far from supplies. Their condition is indeed so desperate as to excite pity rather than exultation. But the greatest achievement of this campaign is the driving a desperate class of vagrant associates of rebels so far from your homes and the State you defend. Besides this your stern resistance and close pursuit saved the towns and garrisons of Kansas City, Olathe, Paola, Fort Scott, Fayetteville, Fort Gibson, and Fort Smith, and the valuable public stores of those places, besides checking ulterior purposes of slaughter and desolation contemplated by the invasion of Kansas. But it would tarnish the brilliancy of your achievements to claim this for yourselves alone without acknowledging with gratitude the share borne in the brunt of the contest by the troops of Missouri and the militia of Kansas, who shared our dangers, and because of their greater numbers, especially deserve more of the honors due to the conflicts of the 24th, 25th, and 28th of October. But to you, including the brigade of Colonel Benteen, who have shared in most of these battles and continued throughout the long weary pursuit to the dark and turbid waters of the Arkansas, where your guns thundered in the rear of the starving, terrified enemy, must be accorded the special commendation of the commanding general and the generous approval of your country... The pursuit of Price in 1864, and the battles of Lexington, Little Blue, Big Blue, Westport, Marais des Cygnes, Osage, Charlot, and Newtonia will be borne on the banners of regiments who shared in them, and the States of Missouri, Iowa, Kansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Arkansas may glory in the achievements of their sons in this short but eventful campaign.

**Maj. Gen. Price:** In conclusion, permit me to add that in my opinion the results flowing from my operations in Missouri are of the most gratifying character. I marched 1,434 miles; fought forty-three battles and skirmishes; captured and paroled over 3,000 Federal officers and men; captured 18 pieces of artillery, 3,000 stand of small-arms, 16 stand of colors that were brought out by me (besides many others that were captured and afterward destroyed by our troops who took them), at least 3,000 overcoats, large quantities of blankets, shoes, and ready-made clothing for soldiers, a great many wagons and teams, large numbers of horses, great quantities of subsistence and ordnance stores. I destroyed miles upon miles of railroad, burning the depots and bridges; and taking this into calculation, I do not think I go beyond the truth when I state that I destroyed in the late expedition to Missouri property to the amount of $10,000,000 in value. On the other hand, I lost 10 pieces of artillery, 2 stand of colors, 1,000 small-arms, while I do not think I lost 1,000 prisoners, including the wounded left in their hands and others than recruits on their way to join me, some of whom may have been captured by the enemy. I brought with me at least 5,000 new recruits, and they are still arriving in large numbers daily within our lines, who bring
the cheering intelligence that there are more on their way to the army. After I passed the German settlements in Missouri my march was an ovation. The people thronged around us and welcomed us with open hearts and hands. Recruits flocked to our flag in such numbers as to threaten to become a burden instead of a benefit, as they were mostly unarmed. In some counties the question was not who should go to the army, but who should stay at home. I am satisfied that could I have remained in Missouri this winter the army would have been increased 50,000 men."
Notes

29. The First Battle of Newtonia was fought on 30 September 1862. In the small battle, the 1st Brigade of the Department of Kansas fought against a Confederate Indian Brigade. The battle was a Confederate victory.
36. Map and discussion based on information from: the O.R; Wood, *The Two Civil War Battles of Newtonia*.

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73. Edwards, *Shelby and His Men*, 465, 482-484.


Appendix A
Organization of the Army of Missouri
(Confederate States of America)
Maj. Gen. Sterling Price

1st Missouri Division (Marmaduke’s Division)
Maj. Gen. John S. Marmaduke (captured)

Escort
Company D, 5th Missouri Cavalry: Capt. D. R. Stallard
Advance (Scouting Company): Capt. Page

  3d Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. Colton Greene
  4th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. John Q. Burbridge
  7th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. Solomon Kitchen
  8th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. William L. Jeffers
  10th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. Robert R. Lawther
  14th Missouri Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. Robert C. Wood
  Davies’ (Missouri) Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. J. F. Davies

Freeman’s Brigade: Col. Thomas R. Freeman
  Freeman’s (Missouri) Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. Col. Joseph R. Love
  Fristoe’s (Missouri) Cavalry Regiment: Col. Edward T. Fristoe
  Ford’s (Arkansas) Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. Barney Ford

Hynson’s (Texas) Battery: Capt. H. C. Hynson – three guns
Harris’ (Missouri) Battery: Lieut. T. J. Williams – two guns
Engineer Company, Capt. James T. Rogane
3d Missouri Division (Shelby’s Division)
Brig. Gen. Joseph O. Shelby

Advance (Scouts): Capt. A. C. McCoy

Shelby’s Iron Brigade / Thompson’s Brigade: Col. David Shanks (KIA) / Brigadier Gen. M. Jeff Thompson
  5th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. B. Frank Gordon
  11th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. Moses W. Smith
  12th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. Col. W. H. Erwin
  Elliott’s (Missouri) Cavalry Regiment (also called 1st): Col. Benjamin Elliott
  Slayback’s (Missouri) Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. Alonzo W. Slayback
  Johnson’s Cavalry Battalion: Maj. Rector Johnson
  Crisp’s Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. John T. Crisp
  Collin’s (2d Missouri) Battery (one section): Capt. Richard A. Collins – two guns

Jackman’s Brigade: Col. Sidney D. Jackman
  Jackman’s (Missouri) Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. Col. C. H. Nichols
  Hunter’s (Missouri) Cavalry Regiment: Col. DeWitt C. Hunter
  William’s (Missouri) Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. D. A. Williams
  Schnable’s (Missouri) Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. John A. Schnable
  Collin’s (2d Missouri) Battery (one section): Lieut. Jacob D. Connor

Tyler’s Brigade: Col. Charles H. Tyler
  Coffee’s (Missouri) Cavalry Regiment: Col. John T. Coffee
  Perkin’s (Missouri) Cavalry Regiment: Col. Caleb Perkins
  Searcy’s (Missouri) Cavalry Regiment: Col. James J. Searcy

Unattached
  46th Arkansas Infantry Regiment (mounted): Col. W. O. Coleman
  Capt. William’s Regiment of Armed Recruits: Capt. Williams

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1st Arkansas Division (Fagan’s Division)

1st Arkansas Brigade (Cabell’s Brigade): Brigadier Gen. William L. Cabell (captured); Lieut. Col. A. V. Reiff
   Monroe’s (1st Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Col. James C. Monroe
   Morgan’s (2d Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Col. Thomas J. Morgan
   Gordon’s (4th Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Col. Anderson Gordon
   Hill’s (7th Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Col. John F. Hill / Maj. J. L. Adams
   Gunter’s (Arkansas) Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. Thomas M. Gunter
   Harrell’s (17th Arkansas) Cavalry Battalion: Lieut. Col. John M. Harrell
   Witherspoon’s (13th Arkansas) Cavalry Battalion: Maj. J. L. Witherspoon
   Hughey’s (Arkansas) Battery: Capt. W. M. Hughey – two guns

2d Arkansas Brigade (Slemmons’ Brigade): Col. W. F. Slemmons (captured); Col. William A. Crawford
   Crawford’s (10th Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Col. William A. Crawford
   Carlton’s (Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. Col. R. H. Thompson
   Wright’s (12th Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Col. John C. Wright

Dobbin’s Brigade: Col. Archibald S. Dobbin
   Dobbin’s (Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Maj. Samuel Corley
   Witt’s (10th Arkansas) Cavalry V: Col. A. R. Witt
   Blocher’s (Arkansas) Battery (one section): Lieut. J. V. Zimmerman – two guns

McCray’s Brigade: Col. Thomas H. McCray
   45th Arkansas Infantry Regiment (mounted): Col. Milton D. Baber (captured)
   47th Arkansas Infantry Regiment (mounted): Col. Lee Crandell
   45th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. Timothy Reves

Unattached
   Lyles’ (23d Arkansas) Cavalry Regiment: Col. Oliver P. Lyles
   Rogan’s (30th Arkansas) Mounted Infantry Regiment: Col. James W. Rogan
   Anderson’s (Arkansas) Cavalry Battalion: Capt. William L. Anderson
Notes

1. The order of battle was derived from the *Official Records* and several secondary sources (primarily Buresh, Gott, and Monnett). A comprehensive order of battle chart is extremely difficult to make for Sterling Price’s Missouri Expedition. Record keeping for the Confederates was spotty at best and the personnel returns for the period are either nonexistent or rather haphazardly done. Additionally, the influx of the thousands of Confederate recruits and their subsequent losses are nearly impossible to calculate.

2. Unit formed the summer of 1864.
3. Unit formed the summer of 1864.
4. Unit formed the summer of 1864.
5. Unit formed the summer of 1864.
6. Partisan unit.
7. Unit formed the summer of 1864
8. Unit formed the summer of 1864.
9. Unit formed the fall of 1864.
10. Unit formed the summer of 1864.
11. Unit formed the summer of 1864.
12. Unit formed the summer of 1864.
13. Unit formed the fall of 1864.
14. Unit formed the summer of 1864.
15. Unit formed the summer of 1864.
Appendix B
Organization of the Army of the Department of Missouri
(United States of America)

Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans

Provisional Cavalry Division (Pleasonton’s Division)
Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton
Col. Nelson Cole (Chief of Artillery)

First Brigade: Brigadier Gen. Egbert Brown
1st Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. Bazel F. Lazear
4th Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Maj. George W. Kelly
7th Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. T. T. Crittenden
1st Iowa Cavalry: Maj. John McDermott

2d Missouri Cavalry Regiment (detachment): Capt. George M. Houston
13th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. E. C. Catherwood
7th Kansas Cavalry Regiment: Maj. F. M. Malone
17th Illinois Cavalry Regiment: Col. John L. Beveridge
3d Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. H. M. Matthews
5th Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. J. A. Epstein
9th Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. D. M. Draper
Battery B, 2d Missouri Light Artillery – two guns
5th Missouri State Militia Battery - four guns (Mountain howitzers)

Third Brigade: Brigadier Gen. John B. Sanborn
2d Arkansas Cavalry Regiment: Col. John E. Phelps
6th Missouri State Militia (mounted): Maj. William Plumb
8th Missouri State Militia (mounted): Col. J. J. Gravely
6th Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia: Col. John F. McMahon
7th Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia: Maj. W. B. Mitchell
Battery H, 2d Missouri Light Artillery: Capt. William C. F. Montgomery – two guns
Battery L, 2d Missouri Light Artillery: Capt. Charles H. Thurber – four guns

Fourth Brigade: Col. E. F. Winslow (WIA) / Lieut. Col. Frederick F. Benteen
3d Iowa Cavalry Regiment: Maj. Benjamin F. Jones
4th Iowa Cavalry Regiment: Maj. Abiel R. Pierce
10th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. Col. Frederick F. Benteen / Maj. William H. Lusk
7th Indiana Cavalry Regiment and 4th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: combined detachment under Maj. S.E.W. Simonson

Unassigned:
2d New Jersey Cavalry Regiment (detachment): Capt. Michael Gallagher
19th Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment (detachment): unknown
16th Army Corps (Detachment)
Maj. Gen. A.J. Smith

1st Division
Col. Joseph J. Woods

First Brigade: Col. Lucius F. Hubbard
   12th Iowa Infantry Regiment
   47th Illinois Infantry Regiment
   5th Minnesota Infantry Regiment
   7th Minnesota Infantry Regiment
   9th Minnesota Infantry Regiment
   10th Minnesota Infantry Regiment
   8th Wisconsin Infantry Regiment

Third Brigade: Col. Sylvester G. Hill
   35th Iowa Infantry Regiment
   33d Missouri Infantry Regiment

Battery G, 2d Illinois Light Artillery

2d Division
Col. David Moore

First Brigade: Col. T. J. Kinney
   58th Illinois Infantry Regiment
   119th Illinois Infantry Regiment
   89th Indiana Infantry Regiment

Second Brigade: Col. James I. Gilbert
   14th Iowa Infantry Regiment:
   27th Iowa Infantry Regiment
   32d Iowa Infantry Regiment
   24th Missouri Infantry Regiment

Third Brigade: Col. Edward H. Wolfe
   49th Illinois Infantry Regiment: Col. P. Pease
   52d Indiana Infantry Regiment: Capt. Eli Mattocks
   178th New York Infantry Regiment: Capt. John B. Gandolfo

Battery, 3d Indiana Light Artillery
Battery, 9th Indiana Light Artillery
Notes

1. The order of battle was derived from the *Official Records* and several secondary source (primarily Gott and Monnett). A comprehensive order of battle chart is extremely difficult to make for Sterling Price’s Missouri Expedition. For the Union it is difficult due to the constant detaching and attaching of units.

2. Brigadier General John B. Sanborn served as acting commander of the division several times during the course of the campaign.

3. Colonel John F. Philips served as the acting field commander for the actions around Jefferson City and assumed command on 23 October 1864 when Brown was relieved of command and arrested.

4. Sometime before the action at Byram’s Ford the 1st Iowa was reassigned as the escort unit for Major General Rosecrans.
Appendix C
Organization of the Army of the Border
10-23 October 1864
(United States of America)

Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis

Escort
Company G, 11th Kansas Cavalry Regiment: Capt. C. L. Gove
Company H, 15th Kansas Cavalry
Battery: Lieut. Edward Gill – 2 mountain howitzers
2d Kansas Cavalry Battalion: Maj. Henry Hopkins

First Provisional Cavalry Division (Blunt’s Division)
Maj. Gen. James G. Blunt

Escort
Company E, 14th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. William B. Clark

First Brigade: Col. Charles R. Jennison
15th Kansas Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. Col. George H. Hoyt
3d Wisconsin Cavalry Regiment (five companies): Capt. Carpenter
Foster’s Battalion, Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia: Capt. George Grover
15th Kansas Mountain Howitzer Battery: Second Lieut. H. L. Barker – 5 guns

Second Brigade: Col. Thomas Moonlight
11th Kansas Cavalry Regiment (nine companies): Lieut. Col. P. B. Plumb
5th Kansas Cavalry Regiment (Companies L and M): Capt. James H. Young
16th Kansas Cavalry Regiment (Companies A and D): Lieut. Col. Sam Walker
11th Kansas Mountain Howitzer Battery – four guns

Third Brigade: Col. Charles W. Blair
4th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted): Col. W.D. McCain
19th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted): Col. A.C. Hogan
24th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted - detachment): Lieut. Col. George Eaves
Right Section, 2d Kansas State Militia (Douglas Battery) Artillery:
Lieut. Patrick H. Minor – two guns
Battery, 9th Wisconsin Light Artillery: Capt. J. H. Dodge – 6 guns

Fourth Brigade: Col. James H. Ford
16th Kansas Cavalry Regiment (detachment): Maj. James Ketner
McLain’s Independent Colorado Battery: Capt. W. D. McLain’s – 6 guns
Kansas State Militia (Deitzler’s Division)

Maj. Gen. George W. Deitzler

Olathe District Brigade: Brigadier Gen. Melvin Grant
   15th Kansas Militia (BN): Maj. Laing
   21st Kansas Militia: Col. Sandy Lowe
   2d Kansas Militia (mounted): Col. George W. Veale
   Topeka Battery (2d Kansas Militia): Capt. Ross Burnes – one gun

Paola District Brigade: Brigadier Gen. W. H. M. Fishback
   5th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted): Col. G. A. Colton
   6th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted): Col. James Montgomery
   10th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted): Col. William Pennock

Brigade assignment unknown:
   1st Kansas Militia: Col. Charles H. Robison
   2d Kansas Militia (Colored): Capt. James L. Rafferty
   7th Kansas Militia: Col. Peter McFarland
   9th Kansas Militia: Col. Frank M. Tracy
   12th Kansas Militia: Col. L. S. Treat
   13th Kansas Militia: Col. Alexander S. Johnson
   14th Kansas Militia: Col. William Gordon
   18th Kansas Militia: Col. Matthew Quigg
   20th Kansas Militia: Col. J. B. Hubbell
   22d Kansas Militia: Col William Weer

Independent Colored (Douglas) Battery: Capt. H. Ford Douglas – four guns
Zesch’s Battery, Kansas Militia Light Artillery: Capt. Gustavus Zesch – two guns

Unattached
   Kansas City Home Guards: Col. Kersey Coates
Notes

1. The order of battle was derived from the *Official Records* and several secondary source (primarily Gott and Monnett). A comprehensive order of battle chart is extremely difficult to make for Sterling Price’s Missouri Expedition. For the Union it is difficult due to the constant detaching and attaching of units.

2. Scouts and liaison unit.

3. This unit at times under the control of Brigadier General Fishback’s Militia Brigade.

4. Unfortunately the O.R. provides very little detail on the brigade organization of the KSM. The organization show below is my best estimate of their order of battle.

5. These units at times were under the control of Colonel Charles W. Blair (3d Brigade, Blunt’s Division). Brig. Gen. Fishback refers to two guns supporting his brigade. It is not clear if this was Lieutenant Minor’s right section or another section of guns.

6. Two other districts mobilized brigades. The Atchison district under Brigadier General Byron Sherry and the Mound City district under Brigadier General S. N. Wood.

7. Two additional guns are with Lieutenant Minor’s right section. The remainder of the battery (4 guns) under Captain Douglas may not have been deployed with the Army of the Border.
Appendix D
Organization of the Army of the Border
24 October – 7 November 1864
(United States of America)

Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis

Escort

Company G, 11th Kansas Cavalry Regiment: Capt. C. L. Gove
Company H, 15th Kansas Cavalry
Battery: Lieut. Edward Gill – two mountain howitzers
2d Kansas Cavalry Battalion: Maj. Henry Hopkins

First Provisional Cavalry Division (Blunt’s Division)
Maj. Gen. James G. Blunt

Escort

Company E, 14th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. William B. Clark

First Brigade: Col. Charles R. Jennison
15th Kansas Cavalry Regiment: Lieut. Col. George H. Hoyt
3d Wisconsin Cavalry Regiment (five companies): Lieut. J. B. Pond
Foster’s Battalion, Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia: Capt. George Grover
15th Kansas Mountain Howitzer Battery: Second Lieut. H. L. Barker – 5 guns

Second Brigade: Col. Thomas Moonlight
11th Kansas Cavalry Regiment (nine companies): Lieut. Col. P. B. Plumb
5th Kansas Cavalry Regiment (Companies L and M): Capt. James H. Young
16th Kansas Cavalry Regiment (Companies A and D): Lieut. Col. Sam Walker
11th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted): Col. A. J. Mitchell
11th Kansas Mountain Howitzer Battery – four guns

Third Brigade: Col. Charles W. Blair
6th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted): Col. James Montgomery
24th Kansas Militia Cavalry Regiment (mounted - detachment): Lieut. Col. George Eaves
Right Section, 2d Kansas State Militia (Douglas Battery) Artillery:
Lieut. Patrick H. Minor – two guns
Battery, 9th Wisconsin Light Artillery: Capt. J. H. Dodge – six guns

Fourth Brigade: Col. James H. Ford
2d Colorado Cavalry Regiment: Maj. J. A. Pritchard
16th Kansas Cavalry Regiment (detachment): Maj. James Ketner
McLain’s Independent Colorado Battery: Capt. W. D. McLain’s – six guns
Second Provisional Cavalry Division (Pleasonton’s Division)
Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton
Col. Nelson Cole (Chief of Artillery)

Escort
Company A, 11th Kansas Cavalry Regiment: Capt. Henry E. Palmer

First Brigade: Col. John F. Philips
1st Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. Bazel F. Lazear
4th Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Maj. George W. Kelly
7th Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. T. T. Crittenden

2d Missouri Cavalry Regiment (detachment): Capt. George M. Houston
13th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Col. E. C. Catherwood
7th Kansas Cavalry Regiment: Maj. F. M. Malone
17th Illinois Cavalry Regiment: Col. John L. Beveridge
3d Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. H. M. Matthews
5th Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. J. A. Epstein
9th Missouri State Militia Regiment (mounted): Lieut. Col. D. M. Draper
Battery B, 2d Missouri Light Artillery – two guns
5th Missouri State Militia Battery - four guns (Mountain howitzers)

Third Brigade: Brigadier Gen. John B. Sanborn
2d Arkansas Cavalry Regiment: Col. John E. Phelps
6th Missouri State Militia (mounted): Maj. William Plumb
8th Missouri State Militia (mounted): Col. J. J. Gravely
6th Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia: Col. John F. McMahon
7th Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia: Maj. W. B. Mitchell
Battery H, 2d Missouri Light Artillery: Capt. William C. F. Montgomery – 2 guns
Battery L, 2d Missouri Light Artillery: Capt. Charles H. Thurber – 4 guns

Fourth Brigade: Lieut. Col. Frederick F. Benteen
3d Iowa Cavalry Regiment: Maj. Benjamin F. Jones
4th Iowa Cavalry Regiment: Maj. Abiel R. Pierce
10th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: Maj. William H. Lusk
7th Indiana Cavalry Regiment and 4th Missouri Cavalry Regiment: combined detachment under Maj. S.E.W. Simonson

Unassigned:
2d New Jersey Cavalry Regiment (detachment): Capt. Michael Gallagher
Notes

1. The order of battle was derived from the *Official Records* and several secondary source (primarily Gott and Monnett). A comprehensive order of battle chart is extremely difficult to make for Sterling Price’s Missouri Expedition. For the Union it is difficult due to the constant detaching and attaching of units.

2. Scouts and liaison unit.

3. This unit may have been released back to its home district after the Battle of Westport.

4. Brigadier General John B. Sanborn served as acting commander of the division several times during the course of the campaign.

5. This unit may have joined with the 4th Brigade after the Battle of Mine Creek.
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Mr. Charles D. Collins, Jr. is an assistant professor of history at the Combat Studies Institute. He is the author of numerous courses including: The Sioux Wars and Cheyenne Wars courses, Operation Anaconda Virtual Staff Ride, and the Price’s 1864 Missouri Expedition Staff Ride. He received a B.A. in History from Southwest Missouri State University and a master’s of military arts and sciences (MMAS) in History from the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. While on active duty, Mr. Collins served in various armor and cavalry assignments. He retired from the Army in 1996. Mr. Collins’ published works include: *The Corps of Discovery: Staff Ride Handbook for the Lewis and Clark Expedition; The Atlas of the Sioux Wars, 2d Edition; The Cheyenne Wars Atlas; The Staff Ride Handbook and Atlas, Battle of White Bird Canyon, 17 June 1877*; and numerous articles on a wide variety of military topics.