ADAPTING TO A CHANGING: ENVIRONMENT

Defense Intelligence Agency in the 1990s

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Introduction

As the decade of the 1980s drew to a close, the structure of Defense intelligence was coming under increasing scrutiny. For decades Defense intelligence and the national intelligence community (IC) had spent much of their time and resources responding to threats emanating from the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, the U.S. faced a new array of security threats and potential conflicts. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had to quickly retool and do this in the midst of declining resources, a process not without some pain. At the same time with Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM DIA's role in support of operating forces was growing.

The early 1990s then proved to be a pivotal period for Defense intelligence and for DIA. In a period marked by reform, consolidation, and streamlining in Defense intelligence, DIA undertook one of the most profound and extensive internal reorganizations in its history. Budget constraints, organizational change, and consolidation brought both challenges and opportunities to DIA. While the resource cuts made it increasingly difficult for the agency to meet its requirements and accomplish its missions, they also provided its leadership with an opportunity to re-conceptualize and re-configure the agency bureaucracy. In 1993 DIA's director, Air Force Lieutenant General James R. Clapper, launched a major reorganization of the agency, built around the creation of three new functional centers. The changes in DIA's organizational structure resulting from this reorganization had mixed results, but other reforms and initiatives from this period, such as the establishment of Joint Intelligence Centers and the consolidation of human intelligence (HUMINT) in the Defense HUMINT Service, prompted positive change both within DIA and in Defense intelligence. The agency's role within Defense intelligence and within the national Intelligence Community grew with Clapper's retooling of the Military Intelligence Board and other efforts designed to increase the level of support to the military forces.

The experiences and challenges of the 1990s continue to resonate. The importance of approaching potential resource cuts with careful consideration of agency missions, context, the national security environment, and changes in strategic thinking becomes clear. While the implementation of the internal DIA reorganization revealed flaws, Clapper's broader concept for DIA and for Defense intelligence provided a framework for some positive change. Under his leadership DIA assumed a stronger leadership role within the Defense intelligence community. The legacy of the Defense intelligence reforms and reorganizations of the early 1990s remains strong, and the lessons from that time take on new relevance in the current political and economic environment.
Adapting to a Changing Environment

The first half of the 1990s proved to be a pivotal period for Defense intelligence, and for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in particular. Some of the challenges that the agency faced are similar to those it faces today, and there remains much to be learned from the agency’s response to those challenges. Placing the changes occurring in DIA recounted here in the context of broader reforms within Defense intelligence is critical. In a period marked by consolidation and streamlining in Defense intelligence, DIA experienced some of the most extensive and profound internal reorganization in its history. Much like the rest of the intelligence community (IC), the agency lost resources and experienced reduced capabilities. Budget constraints, organizational change, and consolidation brought both challenges and opportunities to DIA. While the resource cuts made it increasingly difficult for DIA to meet its requirements and accomplish its missions, they also provided its leadership with an opportunity to re-conceptualize and re-configure the agency bureaucracy. As we will see, the changes in DIA’s organizational structure resulting from this effort had mixed results, but there were other reforms and initiatives from this period that prompted positive change both within DIA and in the broader Defense intelligence community. The importance of approaching potential resource cuts with careful consideration of agency missions, context, the national security environment, and changes in strategic thinking becomes clear.

As the decade of the 1980s drew to a close, the Defense intelligence structure was coming under increasing scrutiny. For decades the intelligence community had spent much of its time and resources responding to threats emanating from the Soviet Union. Although the Cold War was ending, the threat was not completely gone. The breakup of the Warsaw Pact brought its own challenges and the U.S. faced a new array of security threats and potential conflicts. The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe prompted DIA to refine its role as a military intelligence organization. Army Lieutenant General Harry E. Soyster, DIA director from 1988 to 1991, observed that the major focus of intelligence during the Cold War had been containing the Soviet Union and as that major effort declined it was not clear “who the enemy was going to be.” DIA would end up going into parts of the world such as the Balkans where it did not have the same level of expertise. “We had trained our analysts, Soviet and East European analysts, with the mindset about the strength, character, and purpose of the Soviet Union,” he explained, “and we had to change.” DIA had a number of analysts who knew the Soviets well and linguists who specialized in Russian, Czech, or Bulgarian languages, but these numbers would be greatly reduced in the early 1990s. Refocusing the agency, Soyster added, was “a very great challenge.”

Two major themes or trends dominated Defense intelligence in the early 1990s: increasing pressure to cut resources and the need to respond to a radically changed national security
environment. DIA in particular was called upon to respond to ongoing and emerging global challenges in the midst of downsizing and reshaping itself for the future. Since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the agency had functioned as a combat support agency and as a major producer and management element in the Defense intelligence community, providing both operational forces and defense decision makers with comprehensive intelligence data. By the early 1990s, the focus of Defense intelligence was shifting from supporting decision makers and military planning to supporting operational forces. The 1991 Persian Gulf War demonstrated to Congress and to those throughout DoD the critical importance of intelligence to operational forces on the ground. At the same time it exposed shortfalls in the intelligence community’s and the military’s ability to support modern air campaigns. After the conflict, the White House, Congress, and the Pentagon resolved that battlefield commanders should have better intelligence support in the future.  

For Defense intelligence then, and particularly for DIA, the period was one not only of declining resources but also of increasing requirements. As noted, there was mounting pressure to reduce resources and downsize. At the same time, since becoming a combat support agency, more functions had been gradually coming to the agency. DIA responded to the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe by refining its role as a military intelligence organization. This reassessment, along with lessons from Operation DESERT STORM, led to one of the most profound reorganizations its history.

The broader national intelligence community was confronting similar challenges. In 1992 Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Robert Gates, who would later become secretary of defense, told a Joint Committee of Congress that there was the impression that the intelligence community had been focused entirely on the Soviet Union “and with its demise we are now searching for new missions to occupy ourselves.” Rather, he said, in 1980, at the high point of the U.S. commitment of resources to the Cold War, only 58 percent of the intelligence community’s resources were dedicated against the Soviet Union. The rest, over 40 percent, were focused on a range of issues that remained significant, such as developments in the Third World, international arms sales, proliferation, terrorism, international economic issues, and international strategic resources. In short, the IC was never wholly preoccupied with the Soviet Union and had been dealing with other issues during the past decade. Gates also addressed the misperception that the IC had been sized to address the Cold War and must be significantly downsized and restructured. He pointed to the period 1967-1980 in which the IC lost 40 percent of its people and 50 percent of its funding. By the late 1970s
Congress concluded that the cuts had been too severe and started rebuilding U.S. intelligence capabilities. Since 1980, he added, the IC had focused even more on non-Soviet issues.

Some senior officials in Defense intelligence expressed their own concern about the growing pressure for resource cuts. DIA's Deputy Director for Resources Michael Munson advocated a more cautious approach to the anticipated resource drawdowns. He maintained that their impact on DIA remained unclear. DIA senior Martin Hurwitz, who headed the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) staff in the Pentagon as the 1990s began, called for caution in planning and executing the cuts. Like Gates, he took issue with the prevailing view that the Soviet threat went away with the fall of the Berlin Wall, so intelligence programs could take large cuts. While dramatic changes had made a major Soviet-U.S. war unlikely, he conceded, the intelligence problem in Europe had become even more difficult for a variety of reasons. First, the Soviet strategic capability continued to grow stronger and ethnic and national hostilities ran deep in Eastern Europe, the Soviet republics, and in Western Europe. In addition, the loss of a common enemy could weaken the NATO alliance and undermine the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and Defense intelligence would lose its database on most Soviet air and ground forces. Officials had good intelligence on the Soviets because it had been watching them for over forty years. Under the treaty, the Soviets were reorganizing, relocating and restructuring their units. Defense intelligence, Hurwitz noted, would need new databases for the several thousand installations affected by this redeployment and would have to rebuild its ground and air order of battle.

Hurwitz and others pointed out that the Soviet Union had been the only country with the capability to destroy the U.S. “While DoD did not ignore other threats,” he explained, “it did not need to talk about them to justify its budget.” However, the problems in the early 1990s were less about Europe and more about conflict among Third World nations. Drug lords threatened the sovereignty of our neighbors in South America, insurgencies continued in Southeast Asia, Central America, Chad, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Defense intelligence centers were feeding information to U.S. ground forces in Saudi Arabia. “We should be strengthening Defense intelligence programs to deal with instability and compensate for withdrawal,” Hurwitz wrote. He pointed back to the 1970s when the department made across-the-board intelligence reductions without considering their impact. These reductions, he explained, protected expensive “vacuum cleaner” collection systems but “cut the people needed to use what they collected.” It gutted everything not focused on the Soviet Union. Now as Defense intelligence faced another drawdown, he said, there was a need for context to make better decisions. He acknowledged that the choices ahead for Defense intelligence were difficult. They involved more than choosing which low pay off systems to cut. “We have to choose also the necessary capabilities we will give up,” he explained, “so that we will be able to pay for essential capabilities.”

It had taken the intelligence community more than a decade to recover most of the human source and analytical capabilities lost as a result of the drawdown of the 1970s. Events of the early 1990s demonstrated that the collapse of the Soviet Union had made the analytical database problems more difficult. The National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) analytical manpower base gave the Pentagon scientific and technical (S&T) analysis for making prudent decisions about weapons acquisition; underpinned political and strategic decisions to commit
forces; provided indications of hostilities and warning of crises; was the primary basis for
tactical decisions about force deployments; and was the essential basis for turning a massive
volume of data collected each year into intelligence. Only the NFIP analytical database,
Hurwitz emphasized, could give commanders the quality and quantity of information they
needed to defeat the enemy. With a smaller force and fewer weapons than during the Cold
War, forces would need an adequate NFIP to defeat “an increasing arsenal of technically
sophisticated weapons in Third World hands.” Hurwitz concluded with a strong warning, “It
would be imprudent to repeat blindly the mistakes of the 1970s.” DIA’s deputy director (1990-
1991), Rear Admiral Edward D. Sheafer, Jr., also cautioned against cutting too deeply. He
emphasized the value of intelligence on the battlefield and pointed out that as the operational
force structure shrinks, intelligence becomes even more important to the field commander.7

Defense Intelligence Reorganization—1991

Closely related to the pressure for resource reduction was the call for reform in Defense
intelligence. Even before the Gulf War concluded, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney
had begun moving aggressively to reorganize Defense intelligence to address the rapidly
changing nature of the worldwide military threat as well as the certainty of future DoD-wide
budget cuts. In June 1989 the secretary submitted a report to president George W. Bush
called Defense Management: Report to the President setting forth the plan that the president
had requested for implementing the recommendations of the president’s 1986 Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management. The commission, headed by former Deputy Secretary
of Defense David Packard, had focused on improving the management of the department
and defense resources. Cheney assured the president that his department was prepared
to begin implementing the plan immediately. Although the report did not deal specifically
with the Defense intelligence function, it outlined fundamental changes underway within the
department that would have a huge impact on Defense intelligence.8

In December 1989, Secretary Cheney directed his assistant secretary of defense for
command, control, communications, and intelligence (ASD(C3I)), Duane Andrews, to conduct
a review of Defense intelligence with a particular emphasis on restructuring. The goal of the
restructuring would be to accommodate the changing world situation and modifications
in the structure of the Armed Forces, improve management of intelligence resources, and
eliminate duplicative intelligence activities. The review was also designed to alter the existing
Cold War mindset. The secretary gave Andrews overall authority to oversee the changes
resulting from the review. The assistant secretary’s main tasks were to identify and eliminate
unnecessary functions and management layers and to consolidate those related functions
where consolidation would promote greater effectiveness and efficiency. The deputy
secretary of defense later provided additional guidance, directing Andrews to focus on
efficiency, responsiveness, and effectiveness of Defense intelligence management activities in
accordance with the 1989 Defense Management report. The ASD(C3I) completed his review,
referred to as “Defense intelligence in the 1990s,” with the assistance of military service, agency, unified and specified (U&S) command intelligence officials, and presented the results to the secretary, deputy secretary, and other senior Defense officials between September and December of 1990.9

Some of the ASD(C3I)’s initial conclusions were addressed in a 27 November 1990 memorandum from the deputy secretary of defense that strengthened the role of the ASD(C3I) by specifying that he would report directly to the secretary and deputy secretary and by assigning the ASD responsibility for the exercise of “authority, direction and control” over DIA and the GDIP staff.10 Also a 14 December 1990 memorandum from the deputy secretary, “Strengthening Defense Intelligence Functions,” directed the ASD(C3I) to submit an implementation plan identifying other actions required to strengthen Defense intelligence.11

Meanwhile, Secretary Cheney pushed forward with intelligence reform, issuing a 15 March 1991 memo titled “Strengthening Defense Intelligence: The Plan for Restructuring Defense Intelligence.” The secretary outlined specific areas for strengthening DoD’s performance of intelligence functions and centralizing management in response to a changing world environment and modifications in the structure of the Armed Forces. He directed the department to take the following steps: (1) strengthen intelligence support to the combatant commands (COCOMs) and enhance “jointness” through consolidation of existing command intelligence resources into Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs); (2) strengthen the role and performance of DIA as a combat support agency; and (3) increase efficiency in Defense intelligence by consolidating and streamlining functions and organizations to eliminate unnecessary duplication through the reduction of management overhead and unnecessary operating locations and intelligence units operating overseas.12

At the same time, Assistant Secretary Andrews published his Plan for Restructuring Defense Intelligence providing detailed guidance on the reorganization of Defense intelligence. To save money, increase efficiency, and improve support to military operations, he explained, the secretary had ordered a significant reorganization of Defense intelligence activities. Specifically, he directed the military services to consolidate their various intelligence organizations into a single command within each service, tasked the unified commands to create joint intelligence centers, ordered DIA to reorganize and streamline its operations, and called for DoD to reduce its overseas intelligence operating locations.13

Andrews went on to explain that by the end of the 1980s U.S. fiscal realities had reduced the growth of the intelligence budget and he expected this downward trend to continue throughout the 1990s. He also pointed to the “astonishing changes” in the global security environment in recent years. The recognition that the Soviet Union faced serious and potentially destabilizing internal pressures had replaced the initial euphoria generated by the end of the Cold War. Although the threat of a global war had diminished, he explained, Soviet strategic force modernization was likely to continue and remained a primary strategic threat
to the U.S. The threat of regional and Third World conflict continued. Even more instability was due to the proliferation of high technology weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. With the continued fiscal constraints in this period of rapid change, he added, the department needed to focus on improving its resource management and strengthening planning activities.14

Andrews explained that to strengthen intelligence support to the combatant commanders and to help bring costs down, Defense officials were combining analysis centers of the U&S commands and their components into joint intelligence centers under the control of designated U&S commanders. Under DIA leadership, intelligence production would be coordinated and integrated on a global scale. DIA would set quality standards for production and do quality assessments. DIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) also faced declining budgets and had to bring down costs by reducing overhead, cutting excess infrastructure and redundancy, and consolidating many common functions. They needed to reduce duplication in intelligence collection and production. At the same time the reorganization was designed to strengthen DIA's role. It would also strengthen the DIA element dedicated to supporting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). To ensure more effective support, the office of the secretary of defense (OSD) would establish within DIA a dedicated Policy Issues Office with primary responsibility for supporting OSD and for focused responses to OSD-generated intelligence questions and issues. DIA would remain responsible within DoD for production management and oversight of basic database intelligence and distributed production. In addition, DIA would oversee defense collection, analytical, and production requirements and ensure that Defense intelligence products were accurate, timely, and responsive to customer needs. In coordination with the DCI and appropriate IC interagency groups, the assistant secretary added, the department would formally reorder Defense intelligence priorities to emphasize quality analysis and reporting of strategically important intelligence on a worldwide basis.15

The ASD(C3I)'s plan included the following major recommendations: increase efficiency in Defense intelligence by reducing management overhead; reduce overseas operating locations; consolidate the various intelligence commands, agencies, and elements into a single command/agency within each service; establish single joint commands at signal intelligence field stations; strengthen DIA's role and performance as a combat support agency; and improve the quality of Defense intelligence by streamlining and reconfiguring DIA.16

More specifically, the study recommended that the department:

(1) Ensure the quality, relevance, and timeliness of Defense intelligence support to national and international security policies, plans and programs by establishing a Defense Intelligence Policy Council to assist the ASD(C3I) and the intelligence community.

(2) Strengthen intelligence support to the combatant commanders and enhance “jointness” by consolidating existing U&S command and component intelligence processing, analysis, and production activities into regional JICs, reshape combatant command and service component staffs into small, high quality groups that could
provide focused intelligence evaluations to combatant commanders; establish a dedicated element within DIA to serve as the focal point for all intelligence activities supporting OSD and the CJCS.

(3) Increase efficiency in Defense intelligence by consolidating, streamlining, and reducing management overhead, reducing operating locations, and consolidating various intelligence commands, agencies and elements into a single intelligence command or agency within each service.

(4) Strengthen the role of DIA as a combat support agency and improve the quality of Defense intelligence products by streamlining and reconfiguring DIA and emphasizing quality analysis and reporting of strategically important intelligence; and strengthen DIA management of intelligence production and management.

(5) Ensure independent intelligence input into the acquisition process by establishing within DIA a capability to validate threat information and the procedures the service component intelligence commands or agencies will use in preparing system threat reports for acquisition programs.

(6) Strengthen DoD counterintelligence functions by consolidating counterintelligence and security activities with existing ASD(C3I) intelligence, security countermeasures, and telecommunications and information systems security activities.

It called for improving the department’s central management and integration of national and tactical intelligence by focusing ASD(C3I) staff responsibility for planning, policy development, congressional relations, functional management and budgeting, and centralizing Defense-wide intelligence policy and resource management. To consolidate the review of national and tactical programs and provide OSD staff with technical and program assistance, Andrews would establish an Intelligence Program Support Group (IPSG), through consolidation of existing DIA, GDIP, and ASD(C3I) staff elements. Michael Munson would head the new organization and later become DIA deputy director.17

As part of the 1991 Defense intelligence reorganization, Pentagon officials directed DIA leaders to “streamline and reconfigure” the agency to strengthen management and emphasize quality analysis, production, and reporting of “strategically important intelligence.” They called for a reduction of management overhead within DIA and an internal reconfiguration to minimize the number of deputy directors. At the same time, the agency received additional responsibilities for managing DoD-wide intelligence activities, principally in the areas of production, scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence, weapons, acquisition, and human intelligence (HUMINT).

DoD directed DIA to manage all Defense intelligence production worldwide, to operate a centralized current intelligence reporting system, to oversee a global indications and warning (I&W) system, and to develop standards for Defense intelligence automated data processing (ADP) and communications systems. Recall that these expanded responsibilities came at a time of increased fiscal constraint and would prompt DIA to shift assets into intelligence program management areas. Meanwhile, DIA’s executive director at the time, Dennis Nagy, cautioned that “these new responsibilities will strain DIA’s efforts to preserve the Agency’s traditional, primary focus on intelligence production.” To accommodate the changing environment, he said, DIA anticipated distributing more operational-level intelligence tasks to the new JICs at the unified and specified commands—for example, tasks associated with maintaining order of battle and facility databases and performing capabilities assessments of foreign military forces.18
As part of the 1991 Defense intelligence reorganization, the secretary directed that more intelligence management responsibilities be transferred to DIA. Cheney’s reorganization guidance gave DIA added responsibilities for managing DoD-wide intelligence activities, principally in production, S&T intelligence, weapons acquisition support, imagery activities, and HUMINT. DIA assumed responsibility for managing all Defense intelligence production worldwide, operating a centralized current intelligence reporting system, and overseeing a global I&W system. DIA began shifting its assets into intelligence management areas. In 1992 measures were underway to distribute increasing numbers of operational-level intelligence production tasks to the new JICs and U&S commands. Even as DIA increased its oversight in this area, it continued to sharpen its focus on production of strategic-level assessments in support of national policy formulation and operational-level planning. DIA also began to assume an enhanced role in managing production at service-affiliated S&T centers and strengthened its support to the weapons acquisition process.19

As a first step in anticipation of the new tasks and responsibilities associated with the assistant secretary’s plan, Soyster and his staff conducted a top-to-bottom review of the agency’s mission, functions, and structure. This led directly to an internal reorganization.20 The primary objectives for DIA’s reorganization, Nagy explained, were to protect its workforce to the greatest extent possible; ensure continued high quality production; and maintain flexibility while assuming greater management responsibilities within Defense intelligence. Andrews approved Soyster’s reorganization plan on 19 July 1991. This reorganization would convert the deputy director position, which had always been a military billet, into a civilian position, eliminate the executive director position, create a new civilian command element position for a chief of staff, reduce the number of directorates from eight to six, and rename three directorates. (The DIA chief of staff position had been a military position from 1961 until 1985 when it was replaced by the executive director position.) The agency broke new ground with the appointment of Nagy as its first civilian deputy director on 29 July 1991. At the same time, the executive director position was eliminated and Nagy was appointed deputy director, the deputy director’s two-star authorization was transferred to what at that time was called the deputy director for current intelligence, Joint Staff and command support (JS), a director of DIA staff who provided support to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and essentially served as the J2. Under Soyster, DIA also reduced the overall number of individual directorates by disestablishing the external relations directorate and transferring many of its functions to the new chief of staff’s office, and by folding many of the functions of the deputy director for command support and plans (CS) into the J2. One argument for this change was that CS programs in support of the combatant commanders could be run more efficiently by the J2, which had greater involvement in the on-going intelligence support to the combatant commanders. By the fall of 1991 DIA was in the final stages of its internal reorganization.21

Soyster later explained that Assistant Secretary Andrews wanted to civilianize the three-star DIA director position to ensure that the director would be a career intelligence professional. Andrews was concerned about the lack of intelligence expertise at the most senior level of the agency. The director resisted the assistant secretary’s plan but tried to address his concerns by transferring DIA’s deputy director two-star billet to the J2. Soyster was anxious to strengthen the J2 position. He could see the advantages of increasing the J2 from a one-star to a two-star billet and having an experienced intelligence officer dealing with the other three and four-stars on the Joint Staff. He also realized that transferring the two-star deputy billet to the Joint Staff would give him the opportunity to fill the deputy position with a civilian who was an experienced intelligence professional. This, he believed, would benefit the agency in two ways. It would
give the DIA director a substantive intelligence officer as his deputy and at the same time give DIA civilian employees a more senior promotion opportunity.22

The decision to make the deputy position a civilian position was related to several other issues as well. First, DIA was under some pressure to reduce flag and general officer billets. Yet, it also wanted to increase the rank of the military billet in the J2 to ensure the selection of the best talent. John M. (Mike) McConnell, who was heading DIA’s J2 office in the Pentagon at the time, was a frocked Rear Admiral, a very junior officer in comparison to the other seniors on the Joint Staff, so making him a two-star would give him greater authority. With strong backing from both Soyster and Nagy, McConnell was able to strengthen DIA’s support to the Joint Staff and established a close working relationship with Secretary Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, USA.23 As for the deputy director position, the military services had been reluctant to provide a professional intelligence officer to be DIA’s deputy. In addition, there was a belief that the deputy director needed to be a long-time DIA person who could provide continuity given that most directors had little or no experience in DIA. That continuity concept, however, fell away when Mike Munson’s tenure as deputy director ended in 1996. Since that time, a number of DIA directors have had more experience with the agency than their deputies.24

When DIA was created in 1961, the secretary of defense had given the DIA director the responsibility to function as the J2 for the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a three-star officer. But as DIA grew and the agency director’s responsibilities expanded, it became more difficult for him to perform that role. Navy Rear Admiral Edward D. Sheafer, Jr., who had served as the deputy director for JCS support from 1988 to 1990 and then as DIA deputy director from 1990 to 1991, found that the J2 function had become a 24-hour-a-day job. At one point Chairman Powell told Sheafer that he needed a flag officer to serve as the J2. However, as noted earlier, they had to find a way to do this without creating a new flag billet at DIA - a very difficult thing to do. Powell orchestrated moving the two-star billet that Sheafer was occupying as deputy director. Sheafer had already recommended to Powell that the DIA deputy director be a civilian with 20 years or more of experience in DIA. Then the two-star billet could shift to the J2.25

McConnell recommended that someone be identified to serve as J2 and let that person function using DIA assets, while the DIA director, as head of DIA and director of military intelligence, focused on the broader issues. The idea was not widely popular but General Powell liked the idea and designated McConnell as the J2. As the J2, McConnell found it easier to reach beyond DIA to the combatant commanders.26 By July 1992 the deputy director for JCS support (JS) had become the deputy director for current intelligence, joint staff and command support and then a year later, the deputy director for intelligence (J2).

In a broader context, transferring the two-star billet to the Joint Staff served as a recognition of the increasingly important role that Defense intelligence and DIA specifically played and would continue to play in supporting military commanders and operations. The redesignation of the Joint Staff’s intelligence support staff as the J2 was one of the most important changes of the 1990s. The Gulf War had highlighted the importance of DIA elements located in the Pentagon functioning as the intelligence conduit for support to U.S. forces, and the designation of the J2 served as an acknowledgement of that fact.27

With Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait starting in August 1990 DIA leadership and resources were focused on the Persian Gulf War well into 1991. This pushed any thoughts of a more significant reorganization, more than the measures just described, to the background.28 This would have to wait for the next director.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE (DIC)

COUNTERNARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT OFFICE (CN)

SECRETARIAT
CENTRAL ACTIONS OFFICE (CAO)
EXECUTIVE SUPPORT OFFICE (ESO)

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE (DIC)

COMPTROLLER (OC)

DIRECTORATE FOR SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (OSC)

ADVISORY BOARD OFFICE (AB)

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR COLLECTION AND IMAGERY ACTIVITIES (CA)

ASSISTANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR NATIONAL SYSTEMS (DN)

ASSISTANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR IMAGERY MANAGEMENT (DM)

ASSISTANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR IMAGERY EXPLOITATION (DX)

ASSISTANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR COLLECTION (DC)

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS (DS)

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR RESOURCES (RS)

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS (DI)

COMMAND ELEMENT
DIRECTOR (DR)
LTG Gen. Harry E. Strayer, USA
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (DD)
RADM Edward D. Sheafer, Jr. USN
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (ED)
Dennis M. Nagy
COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR (CSM)

In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, Congress became more deeply involved in Defense department efforts to reform Defense intelligence. Hearings on the war convinced Congress that, despite better support to tactical operations by national intelligence assets than at any other time in our history, there was room for improvement. The Gulf War had revealed a lack of dedicated tactical reconnaissance assets, and severe problems disseminating information that made it difficult or impossible for tactical commanders to obtain critical intelligence. As Pentagon officials began implementing Secretary Cheney’s plan for restructuring Defense intelligence, Congress drafted legislation that provided a strong mandate for change in Defense intelligence and would expand DIA’s responsibilities. In December 1991 President Bush signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which acknowledged DIA’s role as “the nation’s preeminent producer of military intelligence.”

At the initiative of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 directed the secretary of defense together with the director of central intelligence to conduct a joint review of intelligence and intelligence-related activities in order to eliminate redundancy, strengthen joint intelligence support to combatant commanders, improve threat assessments for acquisition programs, ensure that intelligence priorities reflected the changed security environment, and improve the responsiveness and utility of national intelligence systems and organizations to the needs of combatant commanders. The act also mandated an overall unallocated 25 percent manpower reduction in the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) programs from 1992 to 1996. TIARA programs were those funded by a single military service that provided timely intelligence support primarily to the tactical operations of U.S. military forces. TIARA projects were those designed, built, and operated by the services.

Echoing this sentiment, the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), Senator David L. Boren, observed, “Our current intelligence structure was developed to respond to the challenges of a Cold War world that no longer exists. It is time to redefine the mission of intelligence and to change the structure of the intelligence community to enable it to meet the new challenges we face.” His counterpart, the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Congressman David McCurdy (D-OK), also noted, “while there may not be agreement on all of the elements of an intelligence restructuring plan, there is a general consensus that some reorganization is necessary.”

While the Senate Armed Services Committee supported most of the Pentagon’s 1991 intelligence reorganization plan, it strongly disagreed with the provisions concerning DIA’s role as a Defense agency and as a member of the NFIP. The intelligence management structure proposed in the current DoD plan, the committee noted, essentially made DIA a staff element of ASD(C3I). The premise for giving the assistant secretary more authority over DIA was that the various Defense intelligence agencies would have a harder time resisting direction from the assistant secretary than from the DIA director. However, the committee believed this approach was “unwise” and could ultimately harm both Defense intelligence and national intelligence. It worried that this element of the plan risked politicizing DIA intelligence support by placing it under the direct control of political appointees and could lead to poor management of DIA when the appointee in charge had little experience in intelligence. Moreover, it did nothing to solve DIA’s real
problem—“a lack of authority to manage Defense intelligence”—something the committee had stressed in the earlier Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991. Finally, the SASC observed, the provision conflicted with the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act, which had exempted DIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) from the normal oversight process for Defense agencies.32

The department, the committee said, was “best served by giving DIA the authority necessary to manage certain aspects of Defense intelligence.” Intelligence had to be managed by intelligence professionals, people who had a working knowledge of the day-to-day problems facing Defense intelligence. Section 911 of the proposed legislation would enhance the authority of the DIA director to ensure effective intelligence support to senior Defense officials, combatant commanders, and the DCI. It would codify in law the individuals the DIA director reported to and would ensure that he had access to and was responsible to the secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the DCI. The committee acknowledged that ASD(C3I) had certain DoD-wide intelligence management functions primarily dealing with acquisition of collection systems and OSD guidance, oversight, and policy for intelligence matters. It endorsed the assistant secretary’s creation of an Intelligence Program Support Group (IPSG) to provide expertise in these areas. However, it also emphasized that the DIA director “should report directly to the most senior officials within the defense and intelligence establishments,” and retain his day-to-day management authority. Except for the IPSG, the ASD(C3I) would oversee DIA operations, the SASC added, “but shall not have direction, control, and authority.”33

The SASC went on to clarify the relationship between ASD(C3I) and the DIA director. The assistant secretary, it said, should not exercise ongoing operational authority or have a role in conducting analysis, disseminating analysis, or in DIA civilian and military personnel actions. Rather its role should be to issue guidance and policy guidelines, audit DIA and the GDIP for problems, and review the GDIP budget to insure that it was properly integrated with TIARA.34 The committee concluded that Andrews had given himself too much authority over Defense intelligence operations and sought to take away some of that power.

Specifically, the committee said that the Pentagon’s March 1991 plan to restructure Defense intelligence operations gave Andrews, a political appointee, control over DIA, which raised the risk of politicizing DIA intelligence support. To counter this, it put language in its version of the 1992/1993 Defense authorization legislation stating that the DIA director would remain in control of DIA and continue to report directly to the secretary, CJCS, and DCI. Section 921 of the final Defense authorization act (P.L. 102-190) enacted in December of 1991 assigned the assistant secretary supervision of DIA but excluded him from day-to-day operational control. The DIA director would remain subject to the “authority, direction, and control” of the secretary. The law also directed an important change, specifically in the management of the GDIP. In Section 921 Congress restored management of this program to the DIA director. SASC members noted that until recently the DIA director had managed development of the GDIP budget but even then “his authority has never extended beyond recommending a budget to the DCI.” The DIA director had no program execution authority over the GDIP, though he was technically responsible for managing that program.35

Section 921 also strengthened the role of all DIA functional managers in providing management assistance to the DIA director. The legislation required the director to ensure that those functional managers had a “significant role” in the preparation, review, approval, and supervision of the overall execution of GDIP budgets and programs within their areas of responsibility. This meant that instead of
organizing the GDIP along purely service and Defense agency lines as in the past, programs would be developed along functional lines.\textsuperscript{36}

The GDIP restructuring process resulted in the functional manager concept with a functional manager for collection and infrastructure, and with a smaller, less powerful GDIP staff than in the past. Air Force Lieutenant General James R. Clapper, Jr., Soyster’s successor, was concerned that the GDIP staff director had become a very influential voice separate from the intelligence community—even separate from the DIA director who was in title at least the GDIP program manager. He wanted to restore the role of the director as the program manager.\textsuperscript{37}

The defense authorization act enhanced DIA’s management responsibility for imagery exploitation, analysis, and dissemination on behalf of the Defense department. Finally, DIA received authority to consolidate the Washington, DC area military intelligence centers into a JIC that DIA would manage in its role supporting the JCS staff. Pursuant to the March 1991 restructuring and the Defense authorization act for fiscal years 1992 and 1993, early in 1992 Andrews announced that DIA and the military service current intelligence and indications and warning production had been consolidated into a single, jointly manned center (with representatives from NSA and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) within the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC). To more accurately reflect the center’s enhanced capabilities it would be referred to as a National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) effective 1 March 1992.\textsuperscript{38}

The legislation also significantly expanded DIA’s role in Defense science and technology matters. Specifically, Congress directed that the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), now the National Center for Medical Intelligence, and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) become DIA field production activities by 1 January 1992. Placing these organizations under DIA greatly increased its scope of responsibilities.\textsuperscript{39} MSIC, at the Redstone Arsenal near Huntsville, Alabama, had been associated with the Army for more than 40 years. Its mission was to provide all-source intelligence analysis of air defense missiles, theater ballistic missiles, anti-tank missiles and ground-based anti-satellite weapons. AFMIC, associated with the Army for over 20 years, was located at Fort Detrick, Maryland, and maintained operations support personnel to provide timely finished medical intelligence in response to direct requests from consumers at the national, departmental or operational level. It produced finished, all-source medical intelligence in support of the department and its components, national policy officials, and other federal agencies. DIA’s enhanced management role contributed to the continuing effort to consolidate intelligence production and make it more efficient.
DIA responsibilities increased even more as it became responsible for directing measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) for the entire community. In 1992 as part of this general process of consolidation within Defense intelligence and the intelligence community, DIA was designated as the executive agent for the Central MASINT Office within the U.S. intelligence community. It became responsible for validating collection requirements, overseeing the development and acquisition of MASINT sensors, and defining the framework for tasking, collecting, and disseminating MASINT-derived information. The Central MASINT Office evaluated all MASINT collection requirements, processing and analysis, and tasking and operations. It also coordinated the community’s MASINT research and development to prevent duplication.

Finally, Congress included language in the authorization act that reinforced DIA’s role as a combat support agency and conferred upon it a clear charter for leadership in Defense intelligence. Fulfilling this Congressional mandate while meeting the guidelines for reorganization in the secretary’s directive, said Clapper, “become the centerpiece of my agenda my first year at DIA.” He added that in many ways the legislation was a “Goldwater-Nichols” for intelligence. Most important, it restated DIA’s charter to provide intelligence and intelligence support to the secretary, CJCS, combatant commanders, and DCI.

DIA Reorganization—1993

Because of Congress’s decision to delay Air Force general officer promotions, General Clapper, Soyster’s designated successor, would have to wait longer than anticipated to receive his third star and become DIA director, the secretary approved the appointment of Deputy Director Dennis Nagy as acting director. Nagy was the first and still is the only civilian ever in that role. Clapper had been observing DIA for some time, particularly from his current position of Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence for the U.S. Air Force, and would come to the job with a great deal of experience and some thoughts about DIA. He knew DIA well from his work as director of intelligence for three major warfighting commands, U.S. Forces, Korea; U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and the Strategic Air Command (STRATCOM). Still, the waiting period of several months between the time Clapper was nominated and the time he was confirmed proved very useful. Clapper used the time to visit many DIA elements, talk to the workforce, and receive detailed orientation tours and briefings. DIA leaders had a welcomed opportunity to acquaint him with the agency’s operations and staff. These tours, briefings, meetings, and discussions made a lasting impression on him and, he believed, broadened his understanding of the agency’s capabilities. He came away from the experience with a greater appreciation for the many functions that DIA performed.
Lieutenant General Clapper formally began his tenure as DIA director on 18 November 1991, determined to continue and expand the reorganization that Soyster had begun. From Clapper’s perspective, both the assistant secretary’s plan and the legislation explicitly gave DIA a significantly expanded role in the management and oversight of key Defense intelligence activities. Soon after taking office he told the workforce that DIA faced the challenges inherent in the ongoing reorganization of Defense intelligence, as well as the prospect of serious manpower and budget reductions. He noted that DIA’s organization was already different from the one that Soyster had taken over in 1988 and cautioned them that it was about to change even more. Without what had become the almost routine annual budget increases, Defense intelligence would now have to address the need for greater centralization in the management of intelligence functions, as directed in the 1991 Defense intelligence restructuring plan. For DIA, he explained, this meant shifting even more resources from intelligence production to program management, which would significantly affect the way DIA functioned in the future.

Clapper viewed the secretary’s Defense intelligence plan and the Defense authorization legislation described earlier as a mandate for change, and he emphasized the importance of the agency’s continued intelligence support to the secretary, the CJCS, combatant command commanders, and the DCI. He explained to the workforce that DIA would have program management responsibility for the GDIP and would assign functional managers additional roles and authorities to guarantee their participation, review, approval, and supervision of GDIP budgets and programs in their functional areas. It would assume control of AFMIC and MSIC, making them DIA field operating activities and improve management of imagery exploitation, analysis and dissemination on behalf of DoD. Finally, it would consolidate existing single-service, Washington area, current intelligence centers into a DIA managed joint intelligence center.

The director explained that with the end of the Cold War and more recently the conclusion of the Gulf War, the military was under widespread pressure to reduce defense spending. The scope of reductions in DoD prompted a shift in focus from maintaining a large force to establishing a capability for rapid reconstitution when necessary. This approach relied heavily on military intelligence to identify and monitor emerging threats and placed a premium on reliable, timely forecasting. Yet the fundamental mission of military intelligence remained unchanged. “We should not be deluded, for even with these course adjustments for Defense intelligence, the task of providing support for force application is neither easier nor simpler than it was during the Cold War,” he explained. “In fact it is probably more difficult.” Defense intelligence faced a broad spectrum of global geopolitical changes that required supporting new and increasingly complex missions.

Clapper saw his tenure as a transitional period for the agency. He immediately felt the pressure to reap what he and others had been calling the “peace dividend” — the resource savings expected with the end of the Cold War. He also understood that the world was moving from a single security threat to more diverse regional concerns. “The U.S.,” he explained, “now faces an international security environment marked by diverse regional crises and contingencies, many of which were being inflamed by nationalism, ethnicity, ideology and resource scarcity.” Much like the rest of the national intelligence community, DIA was directed to reduce its workforce by over 20 percent. The director and his senior staff wanted
to avoid laying off individual employees, so they offered early retirements, buy-outs, and other mechanisms to reduce the size of the workforce. The goal of agency leaders was to reduce the workforce as much as possible through attrition. Years later Clapper observed, “We had to do a lot of what at the time was kind of painful but necessary things in order to accommodate the new reality of becoming smaller.” In such a turbulent environment, Clapper made maintaining a dialogue with the DIA workforce one of his highest priorities. Early on he initiated two management/employee communications programs: town hall meetings and director’s dialogue programs.

As he reflected on how best to shape the next phase of reorganization, Clapper’s priorities were clear. He maintained that the ultimate purpose of intelligence was to reduce uncertainty for decision makers, whether that was the president or a soldier in the field, so agency leaders first needed to identify the functions required to perform that mission. Clapper believed the functions were collection, production, and a body to run the enterprise that he called “Infrastructure.” Next, leaders must identify the best structure to support those functions and ultimately the mission itself. The director concluded that DIA’s current organizational structure was not particularly well suited to support those functions. So he advocated what he referred to as radical restructuring. As director of intelligence for three major commands, Clapper explained, he had marveled at the different perspectives provided by the various DIA elements such as the directorates for estimates (DE), scientific & technical intelligence (DT), or research (DB), but as a director faced with declining resources, he knew this was not sustainable. DIA would have to consolidate.

DIA’s senior staff were also keenly aware of the pressure for change. In 1991, Assistant Deputy Director for Research (DB) Patrick Duecy observed that there was a sense in Congress that the Soviet problem had gone away and that those resources should be shifted to Third World issues or functional areas such as counternarcotics. The staff and resources devoted to the Cold War were viewed as a peace dividend that could enable DIA to turn its attention to other things. Early on Duecy met with managers and analysts to let them know that DIA was in the midst of a series of resource reductions and there would be no increases to address the new missions. “The name of the game,” he explained, “was going to be responsiveness and flexibility.” He pointed to the 1991 Defense intelligence reorganization initiative currently underway that would affect DIA. It was in this climate, Duecy noted, that DIA was trying “to balance efficiency and effectiveness.” Duecy concluded that DIA could still remain highly effective by compressing its production organization.

At an off-site meeting in late 1992, Clapper put his senior leaders to the task of developing a plan for reorganizing. Duecy, by now vice deputy director for general military intelligence (DI), Deputy Director for Scientific and Technical Intelligence (DT) John Berbrich, and Deputy Director for Current Intelligence, Joint Staff, and Command Support (DJ2) Brigadier General Chuck Thomas provided the director with their concept and Duecy offered to brief him on a plan for a National Military Intelligence Production Center (NMIPC). Clapper acknowledged their work, stating that it had helped him clarify in his own mind “that production consolidation is exactly where I want to go.” The only aspect of consolidating production that Clapper remained unsure about was how to integrate scientific and technical intelligence
into the NMIPC. He asked Berbrich to determine those functions and personnel who were responsible for managing the S&T intelligence community production process.52

The director was less satisfied with the response from other senior staff members — Deputy Director for Collection and Imagery Activities (DC) Jeff Langsam, Deputy Director for Attachés and Operations (DO) Major General Jack Leide, and Director of the Central MASINT Office (CMO) Dewey Lopes, who proposed the creation of a board as an alternative to consolidation. After reviewing their response, he responded, “I don’t find a compelling argument not to consolidate.” He went on to explain, “I want an integrated collection structure that accommodates our distinct collection missions — operating a collection system like the [Defense Attaché Service] DAS, executing DIA’s collection requirements management responsibilities on behalf of all DoD, and functionally managing the GDIP HUMINT and technical collection programs and their overlap with other programs.” Clapper asked the three leaders, Langsam, Leide, and Lopes, to come up with an implementation concept that showed how DIA could integrate collection requirements and operations management into one organization and gave General Leide the lead for this.53

As DIA continued to seek ways to strengthen its management of intelligence production and analysis and improve the quality of its products, its leaders developed a draft strategy in November 1993. The strategy called for the functional integration of all military intelligence activities along the lines of collection, production, and infrastructure. However, the focus of the strategy was limited in that it defined military intelligence activities as “DIA, the intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the intelligence elements of the combatant commands.” It failed to address some important aspects of Defense intelligence, including the operations of the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office. Later, a 1995 General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office) study would criticize the draft strategy, referring to it as the “Director of Military Intelligence Strategy” prepared by the DIA director in his self-appointed role of Director of Military Intelligence (DMI). GAO pointed out that neither the plan nor the role of DMI had been approved by the secretary of defense.54

The final concept for restructuring resulted in large part from Clapper’s years of experience in Defense intelligence, his view of DIA, his understanding of the current budget environment, and his vision for the future of both. He tasked the heads of the directorates involved with the implementation of his plan and tasked his chief of staff, A. Denis Clift, with overseeing that implementation. Clapper characterized the reorganization effort as going “back to basics.” “We conceived at the top but built from the bottom,” he explained, a new organization based on traditional intelligence pillars of construction of collection, production, and infrastructure. In what he called the most profound reorganization in the DIA’s thirty year history, the director sought to push authority down the management chain to the lowest level and shifted DIA’s previous analytic orientation from a regional to a functional basis. He recognized that many of his new military intelligence support concepts involved “the exploration of uncharted waters.”55

Thus in 1993 DIA went through a sweeping reorganization, streamlining production and management in order to meet expanding requirements with fewer resources. Clapper
formed a team of talented senior officials to translate his broad concepts into a blueprint for reorganization but, as one senior pointed out, there was no one to challenge those concepts or evaluate the soundness of the structures the team devised, or to project unintended consequences. The restructuring cut the number of supervisors by roughly 30 percent and reduced the organizational layering. The agency also reduced its high grade structure. DIA’s senior executive corps would shrink by 17.5 percent, GG-15s by 20 percent, and GG-14s by 17 percent. Also 45 percent of DIA’s senior officials shifted to new jobs. DIA would lose 25 percent of its uniformed force due to recent military service reductions. The restructuring was designed to help DIA absorb the impact of those cuts. The cuts would also prompt the agency to rely more on the military services’ production organizations and the JICs for substantial military intelligence production.56

At the core of the reorganization, the director consolidated five of DIA’s previous nine directorate-sized elements plus several other subordinate offices into three centers: the National Military Intelligence Collection Center (NMICC), the National Military Intelligence Production Center (NMIPC), and the National Military Intelligence Systems Center (NMISC). Replacing directorates with “centers” reflected Clapper’s desire to reduce the layers of management and drive decision-making authority to the lowest level feasible. He saw the projected manpower cuts as an opportunity to streamline DIA bureaucracy.57 Also reflecting the broader mandate to promote consolidation in Defense intelligence, these centers would manage efforts related to the various intelligence functions throughout the military intelligence community. The reorganization also included the creation of the Joint Military Attaché School. The department of Attaché Training was separated from the Defense Intelligence College and subordinated to the NMICC.

The NMIPC, headed by John Berbrich, produced or managed the production of military intelligence for DoD and non-DoD agencies and prepared all-source finished intelligence concerning transnational military threats, regional defense, combat support issues, weaponry, and other issues. AFMIC and MSIC, which had recently come under DIA, were part of this center. It directed, analyzed, and produced all DoD military intelligence activities for the secretary, JCS, unified commands, the services and department, and the National Command Authority. The NMIPC would integrate all peacetime, crisis, contingency, and combat intelligence production within the recently established DoD Intelligence Production Program (DoDIPP). DIA was in the forefront in exploring the challenges of irregular warfare and established an irregular warfare cell within the NMIPC.58

The NMISC, initially under Martin Hurwitz, served as the computer and automated data processing (ADP) center for DIA. Hurwitz quickly set about reorganizing the directorate for information systems (DS) into the NMISC, bringing in Barbara Sanderson to direct all infrastructure program and budget activities. He formed an informal DS reorganization team with well respected, but not necessarily senior, representatives from each major DS element to design the new functional center. Hurwitz directed the team to cut out two layers of management, just as Clapper had directed for the agency, and to identify ways to improve efficiency. The DS team reviewed, evaluated, and commented on every change proposed by those leading the broader DIA reorganization. Though Hurwitz conceded this occasionally
caused some conflict, the Systems Center ultimately ended up with a structure essentially designed by its own members and supported by many, though not all, DS seniors.\textsuperscript{59}

The center provided information services and related support to DIA and other agencies in the national intelligence community, including ADP support, information systems security, imagery and photo processing and publication of intelligence reference products. It led the Defense intelligence community in establishing standards for and implementation of information systems, intelligence processing and application of commercial technology. It established the architecture, communication, and information technology standards, operated JWICS, and established standards for printing, publishing and disseminating intelligence.\textsuperscript{60}

NMICC would manage DIA’s collection resources, as well as the military service intelligence collectors. Initially led by General Leide, NMICC managed all-source intelligence collection for DoD. It acquired and applied collection resources to satisfy DoD requirements; managed the Defense department’s HUMINT and MASINT programs, and controlled the Defense Attaché System. The Collection Center had a Functional Management Office, an Operations and Administrative Support Office, and two directorates—Defense HUMINT (which provided HUMINT information and support to the National Command Authority, secretary of defense, CJCS, U&S commands, military services, other federal agencies, and national-level decision-makers) and Defense Collection (which coordinated and validated collection requirements, developed collection strategies, policies and procedures, evaluated collection activities, and developed and maintained collection requirements databases and associated management systems).

The NMIPC included three directorates: Military Assessments, Operations, and Combat Support. Among other functions, the Military Assessments directorate managed the production of all-source, finished military intelligence assessments, basic intelligence, current intelligence, force projections, estimates, and scientific and technical intelligence products on the world’s missiles and aircraft systems, maritime forces, and foreign ground forces. The Combat Support directorate provided finished all-source intelligence information to the headquarters and operational forces of the services, U&S commands and in support of U.S. government policymakers. This support included intelligence information on transnational issues such as counterterrorism, counterintelligence, low-intensity conflict, and counternarcotics.

The NMISC had four directorates: Functional Management, Operations, Systems, and Services. It established and published DoD’s standards for intelligence imagery processing, handling and identification, provided centralized imagery processing and reproduction, managed the department’s GDIP intelligence dissemination program, established the DoD Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS) information processing standards, provided automated information services, and performed other functions.

The implementation of reorganization proved challenging and sometimes flawed. This is perhaps best illustrated with the establishment of the NMIPC, the first center to be organized. The two other center heads, Hurwitz and Leide, would have the benefit of the Production Center’s experience and as a result encounter fewer problems. Production was reorganized to change the structure from regional to functional, a concept that many could support, but other factors came into play. The NMIPC reorganization team looked only at the organizational
structure and either ignored or did not fully understand the informal relationships required to get things done. The architecture the team devised disrupted those relationships and in effect hampered collaboration. Also the Production Center implemented the team’s architecture without advise from the senior staff, many of whom had little faith in the feasibility of a functional production structure and thus little interest in making it work. Finally, the NMIPC was not given enough time to succeed. As Hurwitz pointed out, it takes several years after a major reorganization for the changes to settle in and the new relationships to be institutionalized. The Production Center would go through another reorganization before the first one had enough time to take shape. Although the other two centers also faced the same challenge of having enough time, the negative impact of the reorganization was greatest on the Production Center because it faced the most dramatic changes.61

Joint Intelligence Center (JIC)/Joint Analysis Center (JAC)

DIA’s internal reorganization occurred within the context of broader changes in the way the Defense intelligence community was organized and functioned and was affected by those changes. One of the successful initiatives coming out of the Gulf War was the establishment of a forward-based Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) that operated as a clearinghouse for intelligence requirements and as a collection manager for theater-based intelligence assets. In 1990 DIA had established a JIC at CENTCOM to integrate Defense intelligence produced by various collocated intelligence community assets to support the command’s warfighting requirements. Its mission was to provide all-source intelligence for the National Command Authority, CENTCOM, and the supporting U&S commands. It combined tactically oriented analysts from the military services with strategically oriented analysts with area and tactical skills from DIA and NSA. As noted earlier, with the March 1991 Defense intelligence reorganization Secretary Cheney ordered all the combatant commands to create JICs similar to the one in CENTCOM recognizing the military’s ongoing need for intelligence support at the theater or operational level.

The 1991 plan directed the unified commands to consolidate their intelligence assets into JICs, based on the PACOM model. The purpose of the consolidation was to provide primary intelligence support for operating forces and allow those forces to rely on the JIC as a single point of entry into the DoD intelligence structure. Centralizing intelligence support on a theater basis was expected to eliminate duplication and reduce the size of intelligence staffs of the unified commands and the military departments.62 The JIC prototype at PACOM in Hawaii would be adopted at the other military commands. Similar to this prototype was the CENTCOM JIC referenced earlier, which was already active in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The PACOM experiment saw the merger of Navy and Air Force operations and Joint Services into a single organization. This resulted in a reported 30 to 40 percent cut in command personnel and the elimination of duplication in communications centers, data processing offices, and photo labs.63

OSD and the Joint Staff directed DIA to study and recommend the reallocation and distribution of command billets among the JICs. DIA was to determine which billets could be transferred from one command to another to improve their intelligence capabilities. In essence, DIA was to determine which billets in the “have” commands could be redistributed to the “have not”
Chairman Powell recognized the difficulty of DIA's task and supported the recommendations for redistributing U&S command billets that DIA had briefed to a conference of combatant commanders at the National Defense College in Washington.

As part of its efforts to reduce funding for the Defense department and the intelligence community, in 1991 Congress directed the disestablishment of what had been the GDIP staff. At one time it had 50 people; now it was to be reduced to no more than 20 and the billets would be redistributed. This occurred just as DIA was struggling to identify the cuts that the office of the secretary of defense had mandated. Clapper had to determine how best to distribute these cuts equitably across the community and how to carry out his GDIP program manager responsibilities without a supporting staff and organization. Roughly 25 percent of the GDIP resources were located in the nine U&S commands and carried under the category of production resources. In 1992 representatives of all the Defense intelligence GDIP resources were summoned to DIA to see if they could reach consensus on which command and activities needed to give up resources and which needed more. They reached no consensus.

DIA thus led what was described as the “groundbreaking” 1992 study called “Intelligence Support to Warfighters: Responding to a Changing Environment,” commonly referred to as the “JIC/JAC study,” on restructuring most of the service intelligence organizations supporting the unified commands and services into Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs). As part of this study, it issued two reports. The first report coming out of the study, Intelligence Support to Warfighters: Responding to a Changing Environment, Phase 1: Assessment of Joint Intelligence Center Functions, 20 July 1992, identified the nature of the intelligence support that the JICs and the military department intelligence organizations provided. It also identified the specific intelligence shortfalls and deficiencies in resources and capabilities of the various intelligence organizations. The second report, Intelligence Support to Warfighters: Responding to a Changing Environment, Phase 2: Building the Military Intelligence Base Force, October 1992, recommended consolidating and reallocating JIC resources to remedy shortfalls in intelligence requirements among the unified commands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred with the report recommendation to reallocate JIC resources among the unified commands.

DIA’s JIC/JAC study referred to the Joint Intelligence Centers as the “central node for providing intelligence support to military operations.” The JICs were formed from various service component organizations in order to streamline and downsize intelligence force structure and provide for the first time a framework for joint intelligence support to the combatant commanders. Many organic service intelligence functions and organizations were absorbed into the JICs with the understanding that the JICs would continue to provide the needed support to theater components. In the first few years there were only small scale adjustments to the initial allocation of manpower resources made in 1992, but world events and mission changes would affect individual JICs and the function of the JICs overall.

Command and U.S. Transportation Command were scheduled to be operational by 1997. One anticipated benefit from establishing the JICs was to allow reductions in Defense intelligence billets commensurate with reductions in the supported forces. According to the Congressional Budget Justification Books for Fiscal Year 1994 and Fiscal Year 1995, these reductions did in fact occur. A DoD Inspector General (IG) audit of the JICs in 1995 found a net decrease of 18 percent in intelligence billet authorizations for the GDIP since Fiscal Year 1992.65

The 1995 DoD IG audit concluded that the unified commands were generally satisfied with the support these centers provided and that the number of intelligence billets had been successfully reduced after the establishment of the JICs. The JIC concept, it explained, was still in its early phase and there remained some issues that needed to be addressed. DIA, it said, had allocated additional staff to those JICs that were not fully operational to correct staffing inequities among the JICs. The DoD IG report also referenced the fact that DIA had issued the capstone document for the DoD Intelligence Production Program to identify intelligence products and producers. These actions would help customers determine available intelligence products and minimize duplication among intelligence producers. However, the report noted, DIA had not correlated JIC staffing to JIC missions or established an optimum mix of military and civilian personnel in the JICs.66

General Clapper took issue with some of the DoD IG’s findings, particularly with its conclusion that the JICs were not equitably staffed and that the JIC staffing was not adequately correlated to JIC missions. He called the establishment of the JICs at the commands “one of the most important steps in the development of theater intelligence capabilities and the integration of the military intelligence community.” Though the IG report was a generally positive appraisal, the director worried that the report could be used “to disrupt a highly successful and effective program.” He went on to provide a detailed account of DIA’s responses to specific IG comments and specific actions it was taking to address them. DIA took issue with the recommendation for an 18 percent cut in GDIP billets. General Clapper countered that GDIP billets at the J2/JICs had been protected since the implementation of the JIC study and the only reductions to them had been those programmed during the implementation of the JIC study and those mandated by Congress and by the JCS. The latter two reductions had, in many instances, been backfilled to ensure that the authorized JIC levels remained constant. The JIC study, he argued, reduced the overall GDIP billets by a modest 5 percent through the year 1997, not the 18 percent recommended in the report.67

DoD Intelligence Production Program (DoDIPP)

The Joint Intelligence Centers were responsible not only for providing intelligence support to the combatant commanders and deployed forces in theater, but also for producing basic intelligence on their area of operations as part of the DoD Intelligence Production Program (DoDIPP). DIA established DoDIPP as a management tool to make the intelligence production community more efficient and responsive to the needs of all DoD consumers. Before DoDIPP, the Defense department had more than 67 intelligence production elements, and there was heavy dependence on closed-loop data bases and slow, cumbersome communications. The ASD(C3I) 1991 memo “Strengthening Defense Intelligence” and the Defense drawdown
in the past Cold War era were an impetus for change, as was the 1992 JIC/JAC Study. The DoDIIPP, established 1 June 1993, became fully operational on 1 January 1995. The goal was to integrate General Military Intelligence (GMI) and scientific and technical intelligence analysis and make the “expert” available to the DoD intelligence community and to minimize duplication in production. The idea was to centralize management of intelligence and decentralize execution. The principal members of DoDIIPP included DIA, the unified command JICs/JAC, Service Production Centers, and Commonwealth Allies (Australia, Canada, and Great Britain). Over time, participation in the DoDIIPP expanded to include non-traditional producers such as the CIA and the State Department.68

DIA’s responsibility for coordinating and managing the department’s intelligence production became increasingly important in the early 1990s. To better meet this requirement, DIA and other Defense intelligence community members together developed a DoDIIPP-based process for shared production responsibilities. Procedures for entering and processing formal intelligence requirements within DoD were codified in the DoDIIPP. Validating the needs and requirements of the services, the military command, and DIA ensured that the requesting organization had a legitimate need and that no production was currently scheduled or available that could meet those needs. The DoDIIPP ultimately proved to be an efficient process that required minimal management and oversight.69

The DoDIIPP covered intelligence production that DoD components used for planning purposes and became a critical mechanism for intelligence production within DoD that established policies, procedures, and relationships for the DoD intelligence production community to ensure the best quality intelligence support to the warfighter in the most complete, responsive, and effective manner. DoDIIPP also required that all production plans and products be reported to the Defense intelligence production functional manager. It was designed to keep the intelligence community informed of intelligence producers and products and to minimize duplication of intelligence data among the producers. The DoDIIPP would make the components aware of available JIC products.70

In a broader sense, DIA’s implementation of the DoDIIPP represented all the “Reinvention” themes laid out in the September 1996 National Performance Review Report on the Department of Defense, specifically the themes of sponsoring a corporate atmosphere, linking new policies with technological advances, focusing on the customer, cutting red tape, getting back to the basics, and empowering individual analysts and production elements. The National Performance Review noted that DoDIIPP empowered individual intelligence analysts and production centers to interact directly with the consumers of their reports. Also quality control procedures eliminated layered management reviews of intelligence products. Based on the individual center’s ability to provide unique intelligence production on the topic, each production center was designated the primary or collaborative producer for specific intelligence analytic functional or substantive areas. The DoD intelligence community was able to permit each unified command, military service, and DIA staff to directly assign validated intelligence requests. They were allowed to take action without other bureaucratic or administrative overhead.71

The DoDIIPP initiative systematically revised Defense intelligence production by leveraging the
analytic strengths and unique expertise of seventeen production organizations (nine unified command joint intelligence centers, four military intelligence centers, and four DIA production centers) to create a “corporate” atmosphere and process. It would move beyond the original seventeen to encompass new centers of expertise.

One of the DoDIPP program’s major accomplishments was the introduction of Community On-Line Intelligence System for End Users and Managers (COLISEUM), a community intelligence requirements management system that allows users to enhance, oversee, and manage intelligence production requirements. COLISEUM became fully operational in July 1995. COLISEUM was the DoDIPP program’s single automated production management tool. It provided the automated mechanism for assigning production requirements, scheduling, deconflicting, assigning production, tracking and managing overall production activities. Praised by the DCI, it provided a readily accessible automated capability to track and manage overall production activities. DoDIPP became more customer focused by producing tailored reporting responding to documented requests for specific intelligence rather than intelligence generated by individual production element interests. This greatly decreased unnecessary production. It reduced red tape by establishing “single stop shopping” for intelligence customers, clarifying and streamlining the production processes, and eliminating several layers of bureaucratic review. It provided centralized oversight and decentralized execution of the requirement and production processes. As a result, the number of policy and procedures directives and publications dropped by more than 50 percent. DIA also pursued Intelink, an internet link that became operational in the mid 1990s, as the strategic direction for disseminating intelligence. Intelink used public domain internet technology to “publish” classified multimedia intelligence products and allowed users to access data as needed. Operational and national planners and consumers would have access to COLISEUM through Intelink and thus have immediate access to information on the status of production requests and the resulting intelligence products. By 1996 DoDIPP was moving toward a virtual production environment to improve battlespace awareness and timely tailored products for warfighting.

Consolidation of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

Just as the various elements of Defense intelligence organization, production, and dissemination underwent consolidation and change, so did the human intelligence function. The planning for a centralized defense HUMINT organization in the early 1990s took place in the context of a broader effort to reorganize Defense intelligence. A key theme of Assistant Secretary Duane Andrews’ review of Defense intelligence in 1989 was the need to improve the department’s joint approach and its support to the combatant commanders. He recognized that DIA and the other Defense intelligence agencies were faced with declining budgets and needed to bring down costs. In early 1991, Andrews instructed General Soyster to develop a plan to further centralize the DoD HUMINT system. The move toward the consolidation of defense HUMINT, underway since the 1980s, suddenly intensified.

During Soyster’s tenure, DIA conducted a study of defense HUMINT to bring more HUMINT control into DIA. The Services resisted, fearing that they would lose some of their HUMINT responsibilities and resources. The study eventually led to consolidation and the establishment
of the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS). HUMINT was one of the more difficult intelligence disciplines to refocus after the Cold War because the new environment and new threats required individuals with different backgrounds, language skills, and cultural knowledge. In the early 1990s defense HUMINT was divided between DIA and the services. There was discussion and Congressional concern about duplication of effort and inefficiencies.

In June 1991, Soyster sent a memo to Andrews referencing the assistant secretary’s March 1991 plan and presented his own concept for restructuring and centralizing DoD HUMINT management. The cornerstone of the director’s plan was a stronger role for a DoD HUMINT central manager in DIA. Although the services were reluctant to release a portion of their control to DIA, they ultimately concurred with DIA’s concept. Intrigued by Soyster’s concept plan, on 6 August 1991, Andrews returned it to the DIA director and asked him to submit a complete implementation plan, following specific guidelines. DIA delivered its final plan to the assistant secretary on 18 September 1991. This plan was then forwarded to the service secretaries for concurrence.

DIA and the services eventually agreed to new rules related to defense HUMINT, which were codified in DoD Directive 5200.37, “Centralized Management of DoD Human Intelligence Operations,” issued on 18 December 1992. This directive created a centralized decision-making process under the DoD HUMINT manager, introduced the concept of HUMINT Support Elements at the combatant commands, authorized the establishment of operating bases, and required the consolidation of HUMINT support services. It formed the outline of the plan that would later come to be known as the Defense HUMINT System.

When Clapper succeeded Soyster, he would play a key role in the consolidation effort in his role as DoD HUMINT manager. On 11 June 1993, he presented a proposal for the creation of a Defense HUMINT Service at an annual Joint Review of Intelligence Programs, once again highlighting plans for a consolidated DoD HUMINT program. This Joint Review of Intelligence Programs by Deputy Secretary William J. Perry and Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey made it clear that DoD HUMINT would not be spared the anticipated force reductions and budget cuts. Soon after, Perry directed Assistant Secretary Andrews to prepare a proposal for the creation of a Defense HUMINT Service, consolidating the GDIP HUMINT resources of DIA and the military services into a single field activity under the supervision of the DoD HUMINT manager.

In response the assistant secretary asked the DIA director, as the DoD HUMINT manager, to provide him with detailed recommendations concerning the creation of a consolidated HUMINT joint field operating activity. The result was a proposal called “Plan for Consolidation of Defense HUMINT,” which planners believed would allow DoD to preserve its ability to manage HUMINT effectively in the face of declining resources. Perry approved the “Plan for Consolidation of Defense HUMINT” on 2 November 1993. The service secretaries, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs, and the DCI all concurred in the 1993 “Plan for Consolidation of Defense HUMINT,” commonly referred to as the Perry Plan, which would create a DIA joint field operating activity named the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS). Acceptance of the plan represented the culmination of three decades of working toward
greater centralization in DoD’s human intelligence activities. It was the result of lessons learned, budget cuts, and the reality of ongoing and changing threats in the world. Though full implementation of the plan would take several years, its impact was immediate.

As with the larger DIA reorganization, the goal of the plan was to replace the separate management entities of the Services and DIA with a single organizational structure, thus producing savings in management overhead. The consolidation was intended to preserve the department’s ability to manage HUMINT effectively within the constraints of diminishing resources and to more rapidly and efficiently focus defense HUMINT elements on high priority targets around the world. It was designed to reduce the cost of maintaining four separate service HUMINT organizations and to improve coordination. The plan replaced separate service and DIA management structures with a single organization, which advocates argued would allow significant cuts in management overhead, while at the same time preserving field collection capabilities. General Leide, the head of DIA’s National Military Intelligence Collection Center, became the first director of the new Defense HUMINT Service.  

The plan for the Defense HUMINT Service would be implemented in several phases over a two-year period by a transition team composed of service, DIA, and other intelligence community personnel. The formal process of forming the Defense HUMINT service began with the establishment of the DHS Transition Team on 1 December 1993. As DIA and the services began to consolidate their collection assets under the new DHS, some contentious issues had to be resolved. Some officials in DIA, in the services, and at the CIA remained skeptical. There were early challenges to the DHS concept from some within the intelligence community who were concerned about the ability of the new organization to execute its clandestine mission.

The HUMINT Service achieved its initial operating capability on 1 October 1995 when most civilian strategic HUMINT collectors became DIA employees and the appropriate military authorizations were transferred from their respective military services’ HUMINT activities to DIA. All individuals assigned to GDIP HUMINT billets would become DIA employees and subject to DIA regulations. DHS served as a field operating activity of DIA and encompassed all service GDIP HUMINT activities. DHS consolidated and DIA GDIP HUMINT resources into a single DHS budget.

By October 1995, the Defense HUMINT Service had over 2,000 personnel stationed at more than one hundred locations. The young organization supported the unified commands, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, the military services, and national policymakers. DHS had deployed HUMINT Support Elements (HSE) with headquarters of the commanders of each unified command and sub-unified command. These support elements helped the commands develop and process their HUMINT collection requirements and facilitated planning and coordination of DoD HUMINT support to operational commands. DHS also managed the Defense Attaché System worldwide. The transition process culminated in DHS reaching full operating capability on 1 October 1996, the original deadline set by the Perry Plan.
Military Intelligence Board (MIB)/Director of Military Intelligence (DMI)

In the midst of the budget cuts and reorganization in the early to mid 1990s, both Soyster and Clapper sought to transform the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) to enhance its role as a decisionmaking body for warfighter support. The MIB, established in 1961 and chaired by the DIA director with service representatives, was originally conceived to help the DIA director establish his agency and on occasion act as his advisory body. The MIB served as a committee to address DoD-wide intelligence issues with the primary function of reviewing national intelligence estimates. In the decades since the MIB’s establishment, oversight and management of military intelligence activities became increasingly complex. Pentagon officials now found that the continued downsizing of the intelligence community, both in budget and personnel, and the uncertain international security environment had prompted increased interaction among Defense intelligence components and required a greater role for the DIA director.

With Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in the Persian Gulf, DIA’s role in supporting military operations grew significantly in scale and complexity and the role of the board became increasingly important. During his tenure, Soyster made a concerted effort to reenergize the MIB with some success. He added representation from NSA Director Vice Admiral William O. Studeman, NRO, and non-voting representatives from the J6 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Support Program Office. Soyster frequently turned to the board to help resolve problems associated with supporting current operations, to include improving support to the Joint Intelligence Center that had been set up in the CENTCOM area of operations. Under Soyster’s leadership, the MIB became a strong decisionmaking body and played an important role in coordinating the deployment of personnel, equipment and systems to the Persian Gulf, addressing shortfalls in theater, and other tasks. From his vantage point as deputy director for JCS support (J2) under both Soyster and Clapper, Vice Admiral McConnell observed that the MIB “came of age” during this period and became a more dynamic, coordinated group.

Much like Soyster, one of Clapper’s goals was also to strengthen the MIB. As Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Clapper had been a regular member of the MIB and had closely observed its operations. He viewed it as a collegial problem solving body and once he became director planned to continue this role, but he also viewed it as an instrument to help him carry out his responsibilities as director of military intelligence. The director wanted to use the MIB as a joint board of directors to integrate collection, production and infrastructure throughout DoD. He quickly had to deal with controversy related to the extent of DIA’s responsibilities and authorities and an attempt to define both the official role and ex officio roles that the DIA director played. Clapper for example served as GDIP manager, chairman of the MIB, and ex officio Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), a position examined below. Clapper made significant changes in the role of the MIB. Prior to Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the MIB had been used largely as an information sharing and coordination body, particularly for intelligence estimates and major intelligence papers. Clapper began using the board as a decisionmaking body and as an action arm of DIA. The service intelligence chiefs and other senior officials began...
to attend the MIB meetings. The DCI began sending a representative and the J2 became an
active participant. At Clapper’s direction, the MIB assumed a larger role in directing intelligence
activities in support of military operations. The MIB became what one former senior Defense
intelligence official called “a very successful instrument.”

The director was not alone in his goals for the MIB. Some senior Pentagon officials also sought
to strengthen the role of the MIB, give it added responsibilities, and formalize the role of the DIA
director as MIB chairman. Clapper would find the MIB to be “invaluable” during his internal
restructuring efforts and in enhancing his role within the Defense intelligence community. It was
at the first MIB meeting that he chaired after becoming director that Clapper advocated the
concept of a “director of military intelligence” (DMI) and suggested trying it as an experiment for
six months. He indicated that as DMI he would step back and try to separate himself from DIA
so that he could remain objective. He would seek to do what was best for the community as a
whole and leave the DIA deputy director to represent DIA’s interests. As DMI, Clapper envisioned
empowering military service intelligence chiefs as deputy DMIs and authorizing them to assist in
managing military intelligence as an integrated community. The recent reorganization initiatives,
his explained, were aimed at “improving the flow of intelligence to the community’s customers,
particularly the warfighting commands.” The MIB operated this way for six months, with Clapper
using the title Director of Military Intelligence unofficially. The MIB provided the organizational
structure and, he believed the title allowed him to distinguish between his role chairing the MIB
and his role as director of DIA. He enlisted the deputy director of the GDIP staff, Joan Dempsey,
to direct the DMI staff.

Clapper sought to formalize the title Director of Military Intelligence, adding it to his designation
as DIA director. As head of DIA, he found himself charged with a number of DoD-wide
responsibilities that went beyond managing DIA. He saw that role as analogous to the role of
the director of central intelligence within the intelligence community. Clapper began using the
title director of military intelligence in fulfilling these responsibilities and continued to argue that
he could function more effectively if the designation were formalized. In a memorandum to the
deputy secretary, he argued that the various intelligence related problems in the department
would get greater visibility and “would be attacked more coherently and systematically” by
formally instituting a senior military officer as the department’s DMI.

However, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence questioned Clapper’s use of the title at
least until the secretary approved it. The committee argued that civilian DoD leaders should
determine, possibly with the help of Congress, the proper designations of positions and
responsibilities for senior DoD intelligence officials. To satisfy that concern, in the summer of
1993 the office of the ASD(C3I) drafted several memorandums to secure formal approval of
the new title. Pentagon officials argued that this was needed to better address the ongoing
need to improve coordination and cooperation among the various DoD intelligence entities.
They did admit that the title was not necessary and promised that the existing authorities of the
military service secretaries and the DCI would not be compromised. The ASD(C3I) envisioned
23 responsibilities coming under the new DMI title, the principal ones being development of the
GDIP, advising senior OSD and JCS officials, and chairmanship of the Military Intelligence Board.
ASD(C3I) officials did not believe the title challenged the ASD(C3I)’s authority. Nor did they
propose elevating the rank of the officer appointed DMI.
Clapper met with DCI Woolsey to discuss the issue and secure his support, but Woolsey's opposition remained strong. Woolsey did not object to Clapper's current role in the Defense intelligence community but objected to the DMI title. Woolsey saw the formal title as a potential challenge to his own role within the intelligence community and raised his concerns with Deputy Secretary Perry. However, Woolsey reportedly indicated to Perry that he might be willing to go along with a different title, such as “Director of Military Service Intelligence.” The ASD(C3I) position was that the DMI title would not give Clapper any additional authorities beyond those already delegated to him by the secretary and, in intelligence community matters, by the DCI. The matter was internal to DoD and did not infringe on the prerogatives of the DCI. In September 1993, ASD(C3I) Paige asked the service secretaries, CJCS, OSD GC, and OSD Director for Administration and Management to review his plan to establish DMI as an added title for the director of DIA. Ultimately, DoD did not adopt the new title. Senior OSD officials saw little to gain from the proposal particularly when faced with strong objections from the DCI. The issue was fundamentally symbolic but it related to the broader issue of concern in the early 1990s—how to improve intelligence support to military operations.91

Thus, despite repeated efforts during the mid 1990s, neither the deputy nor secretary formally approved the title “Director of Military Intelligence.” The formal DMI designation, wrote one DIA member, was “more a political vice operational issue.”92 Efforts to come up with an official charter for the MIB and to get the secretary's formal approval of the title director of military intelligence ultimately failed. When a revised DIA charter was issued in 1997 it referenced the DIA director’s role as chair of the MIB, but did not designate him (or even reference) “Director of Military Intelligence.”93

Shrinking Resources

Throughout the 1990s, most intelligence agencies and organizations faced significant cuts in military intelligence manpower, reductions in civilian intelligence billets, and constrained hiring to meet the Congressionally-mandated personnel reductions. Since so much of the annual budgets of these agencies was tied up in personnel, the reductions left less money for modernization, development of new capabilities, or infrastructure improvement.94

In the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Congress mandated a 17.5 percent reduction in the number of civilian personnel in three agencies within the National Foreign Intelligence Program: DIA, NSA, and CIA. It directed that the agencies achieve the mandated reductions by the end of Fiscal Year 1997. These reductions reflected a change of perspective in the intelligence community and in the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on the mix of personnel skills needed to address what the committee called “a radically different threat.” The committee also expressed hope that these cuts would make funds available for critically needed capital investment and permit the hiring of “fresh talent.” Congress authorized the use of voluntary separation incentives to meet this goal.95

The Congressional Budget Justification Book for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 showed a reduction of 905 GDIP billets in the unified commands, reflecting a drop from 4,998 billets in 1992 to 4,093 in 1995. The reductions represented an 18 percent decrease in intelligence
billet authorizations for the GDIP since Fiscal Year 1992. At DIA, the personnel cuts were accomplished as much as possible through attrition mechanisms, such as buy-outs and retirements. But Defense intelligence agencies also froze recruitment. This increased the average grade of the workforce while cutting the intelligence community off from a critical source of innovation. It created what a 2011 report would call a “youth gap.” Youth, the report explained, was critical for innovation and their quick grasp and acceptance of new technologies.

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With the budget and personnel cuts of the early and mid 1990s, the agency lost a great deal of experience and expertise in its workforce. Some argue that the attrition of the 1990s would not really end until the September 11th attacks. Some contend there was a significant degradation of its intelligence capability. As Michael Munson explained, “The brain drain of the community in the 1990s was so severe that there were just less people, but more important less people that had been around a long time to actually do the job.” He made a direct link between the drawdown and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) failure a decade later. The technical fields, such as science and technology and research and development, were among the most affected. They took disproportionate cuts in relation to their importance, resulting in a significant decline in DIA's S&T capability.

In addition, the dramatic and sweeping reorganization had a highly disruptive and unsettling effect on the workforce. As one former DIA senior explained, Clapper “turned over the tea service.” By one estimate 80 percent of the analysts—approximately 2,000 people—had to physically move within the DIA headquarters building in a relatively short period of time. A. Denis Clift, who as DIA chief of staff at the time was responsible for implementing the reorganization, conceded that there were “a lot of unhappy and uncomfortable campers.” But he quickly noted that there is often resistance to change in the status quo in any bureaucracy.

For all of the turmoil and disruption, Clapper's tenure marked a significant milestone in the agency's history. For some more important than the reorganization was Clapper's strong emphasis on the fact that DIA was part of a larger intelligence community. As we have seen, Clapper commissioned a JIC/JAC study, designated himself as the Director of Military intelligence, and implemented the DoDIIP—a concept revolutionary in its time, which remains valid. During Clapper’s era, JICs were established in the commands and Clapper led a broader Defense intelligence community in his role as GDIP manager. “It was really the beginning of a new era for DIA,” a former DIA chief of staff observed. Clapper, he added, changed DIA in some profound ways.

Clapper was proud of the new organization he and his team had built based on the traditional intelligence constructions of collection, production, and infrastructure. He maintained that the reorganization, along with a “rethinking” of the way Defense intelligence did business, fit well with the emerging military environment of regional contingencies. He had created functional stovepipes where analysts were organized by their specialties, replacing the geographical approach. Martin Hurwitz supported the concept of centers organized by function and gave
Clapper credit for his vision and his desire to strengthen DIA’s position within the national intelligence community and internationally. Others complained that some of the functional alignments made little sense. The organizational “boxes” were moved around but the same people were left in charge. The functional approach, some argue, was less than successful. A number of veteran country and regional experts left the agency. Some contend that the changes hampered DIA’s ability to conduct regional/country analysis. Critics point out that the way Clapper organized the agency in 1993 did not correspond to the way other Defense intelligence agencies were organized. This meant that DIA sometimes had to send more than one representative to meetings with its counterparts. Some contend that while that approach might have been beneficial for the warfighter, it did not help DIA’s primary day-to-day customer—the office of the secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Not long after Clapper’s departure, the agency would reestablish regional offices and go back to a quasi-regional structure.101

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell pointed to the significant reforms in Defense intelligence in his February 1993 Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces. Looking back, he observed that despite the overall intelligence success in the Gulf War some theater and tactical level commanders had complained about the lack of coordination and timeliness in dissemination of intelligence collected at the national level. However, a major intelligence success, he continued, was the creation of a forward based JIC and explained that as a result of the secretary’s 1991 Defense intelligence reorganization it was currently being institutionalized for all the combatant commands. Another advance was the creation of the NMJIC in the Pentagon to coordinate current intelligence resources in the Washington area. In a letter to Clapper at the end of his DIA tenure, General Powell wrote, “You’ve engineered a true revolution in the joint intelligence business that, frankly, no one else could have pulled off.”102

As we have seen, in the midst of the downsizing and restructuring, DIA continued to respond to immediate global challenges. It continued to provide operational forces, defense leaders, and the U.S. weapons development community with comprehensive intelligence data. As DIA moved toward institutionalizing the process underlying the reorganization, it became clear that the restructuring had already improved the level of integration among DIA, the military services, and the COCOMs. Despite the declining resources, the agency supported contingency crises in Somalia, operations in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, UN inspections and monitoring in Iraq, and peacekeeping in Haiti. In 1994 the secretary of defense would present DIA with its third Joint Meritorious Unit Award for its support to the department and the nation in responding to a number of crises between 1992 and 1994. The agency provided timely intelligence information on enemy capabilities and intentions for the planning and conduct of military operations under U.S., NATO, and UN auspices.103

In 1996, the Commission on the Roles and Responsibilities of the United States Intelligence Community (known as the Aspin-Brown Commission) concluded that DIA had made “substantial progress” toward reducing duplication in military analysis and production, which had long been considered a major problem. Its National Military Intelligence Production Center, the report noted, assigned responsibility for analysis to the analytical components in the military services and the JICs and then monitored production to prevent overlap. “Yet
problems in military analysis and production remain,” the report added. The commission was concerned about the large size of the service intelligence elements and their apparent tendency to exceed their core missions. “The dividing line between DIA’s analytical responsibilities and those of the military departments,” it explained, “remains blurred despite the agreed-on production process.” The commission found that some analytical elements in the commands were collecting and analyzing information on political and economic topics that appeared beyond the scope of their missions. Dissemination systems were not fully adequate to support deployed forces.104

Air Force Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan succeeded Clapper in September 1995. He found what he called “the intelligence apparatus” in “a substantial downturn.” The agency was having difficulty supporting policymakers because of limited resources. His predecessors had focused on preserving the workforce and to a great extent had succeeded in doing this, Minihan explained, but because of the financial constraints they did not have enough resources left to build critical systems and infrastructure. This left the agency unprepared to robustly support combat operations in places like Bosnia when they occurred in 1995 and 1996. He estimated that the national intelligence capability had been reduced by a third in the early to mid 1990s, just as the terrorist threat was growing and new technologies were evolving. He bluntly concluded, “…the nation wanted something for nothing and it was getting what it paid for.”105

Minihan was only at DIA for a few months before taking over as director of the National Security Agency. Army Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, who succeeded Minihan as DIA director in February 1996, had been closely watching the changes unfold at DIA from his vantage point as the J2. When Hughes became director he pulled back from Clapper’s ambitious organizational change. He found the morale of the workforce at its “nadir” and that there were not enough people to fully support the agency’s mission and operations. Within days of taking office, Hughes called a meeting in his conference room in the Pentagon with his principal staff. He asked the group to name the one thing that he should not do. His staff uniformly told him not to reorganize and Hughes promised he would not do so. His senior civilians told him that they had been through six to eight years of major organizational change, some of it damaging, and pleaded for a halt to unnecessary change. Specialists were in the wrong place organizationally due to the Clapper reorganization, they said. In response, Hughes decided to give the agency a period of stability and only make changes when he deemed them absolutely necessary. He and his deputy Jeremy Clark decided to give the agency more time to adapt to the Clapper reorganization—though they did shift some resources. Some missions would shift or be transferred to other places such as the imagery analysis mission going to NIMA (now the National
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Geospatial-Intelligence Agency), which helped with the manpower shortage by freeing up some employees.106

In May 1996, Hughes directed what he stressed as a “realignment” not a “reorganization” of several DIA elements, perhaps sensing that the workforce was weary of reorganization. The new structure, he explained, would better reflect the “way we do business in DIA,” consolidate liaison with the command element, and provide a separate Directorate for Counterintelligence (DC). It provided for a deputy director for intelligence production (DI), paralleling similar organizations in the CIA and NSA. Also, the change eliminated what he called the “confusion” of having “Centers” report to “Centers.” Except for the new DC, he assured the workforce, elements and functions would not change, people would not move, and in many instances organization title and symbols would remain the same. He concluded simply by saying “Internal adjustment is minimal.” Hughes set 10 June 1996 as the target for implementation. Thus, by mid 1996 the organizational structure consisting of three national military intelligence centers focused on function was gone. The functional centers had been replaced by four major directorates: Policy Support (DP), Intelligence Operations (DO), Intelligence Production (DI), and Intelligence, Joint Staff (J2). 107

As DIA leaders grappled with the aftermath of the early 1990s reorganizations, in 1995 Pentagon officials reported on the ongoing need for and the growing importance of DIA. They referenced the previous five years of steady downsizing that was expected to continue through Fiscal Year 1999. They also noted that the absorption by the analysis and production corps of nearly half of all Defense intelligence personnel reductions had forced the Defense intelligence community “to make hard choices between maintaining proven programs that are essential to supporting an increasingly active military around the globe and investing in new capabilities that will allow future reductions of personnel and structure.” Recent successes with joint warfighting and communications interoperability had altered the structure that military intelligence had to support. Pentagon officials reported that budget and personnel reductions continued to force the Defense intelligence community to find efficiencies in order to maintain capabilities. One of the chief ways of doing this was to manage resources centrally to maximize effectiveness and minimize duplication. “DIA,” they concluded, “occupies that unique position that can best coordinate and manage the intelligence resources of the department while ensuring the military intelligence perspective is presented to the national levels of Government.”108

There is no doubt that the 1990s marked a milestone in DIA’s history. Dempsey, who as noted earlier headed the DMI staff under General Clapper, called his reorganization “a watershed event for DIA.” With the end of the Cold War and beginning of the post-Cold War period, DIA had to quickly retool and do this in the midst of declining resources, a process not without some pain. During that period, 17 percent of the overall national intelligence capability was cut. With the end of the Cold War there was no longer a common, unified view of the geopolitical world. In the 1980s DIA had been to a large extent focused on military planning, with the services providing the tactical intelligence support. Operation DESERT SHIELD/ DESERT STORM changed all this. DIA came to the forefront in supporting the operating forces. The agency’s role within Defense intelligence and within the national intelligence
community grew with Clapper’s retooling of the MIB, the establishment of the JICs, and other efforts promoted support to the military forces. In many ways DIA’s operational support role can be traced to the end of the Cold War and introduction of a new post-Cold War era.\textsuperscript{109}

The experiences and challenges of the 1990s for DIA and for Defense intelligence continue to resonate. Clapper, now Director of National Intelligence, occasionally references the challenges of the 1990s and acknowledges his effort to profit from that experience in laying out a strategy for dealing with the current budget environment. In recent testimony on Capitol Hill, he referred to the profound cuts in the intelligence community in the early 1990s and conceded that he and others “didn’t do it very well.”\textsuperscript{110} While the implementation of the internal DIA reorganization had flaws, Clapper’s broader concept for DIA and for Defense intelligence also promoted positive change. Under his leadership DIA assume a stronger role within Defense intelligence. The legacy of the Defense intelligence reforms and reorganizations of the early 1990s remain strong, and the lessons from that time take on new relevance in the current political and economic environment.
The author would like to thank all those who provided supporting documentation for this study, particularly Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, USA (Ret.), Dennis Nagy, and Martin Hurwitz for their invaluable contributions to this history. Unless otherwise noted, all references can be found in the office files of the DIA Historical Research Division.


3 Robert Gates, “Statement on Changes in the Intelligence Community” before the Joint Committee Hearing, Intelligence Committees, Congress, 1 Apr 1992.


5 Hurwitz., “Perspectives for the 1990’s,” 2.

6 Ibid., 4.


10 Duane Andrews transferred responsibility for managing the GDIP to DIA effective 16 December 1991. The Principal Deputy for Intelligence, working through the Intelligence Program Support Group, would provide oversight and supervision as he did for all other Defense intelligence programs and would assist as necessary in the transfer of the program management function. (ASD(C3I)) Duane P. Andrews, Memorandum for the Director, DIA, subj: GDIP Management, 13 Dec 1991). The GDIP had been established in 1970 with the DIA director as the “functional manager.” In the 1970s, GDIP management went back and forth between DIA and OSD. DoD directive 3305.5, “General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) Management,” 9 May 1986, formally designated the DIA director as program manager of the GDIP and established a GDIP staff to support him. This directive superseded a 1977 memo that had placed the GDIP under the ASD(C3I).


15 Ibid., 6-7.

16 Inside the Pentagon, “Cheney Approves Plan to Restructure DoD’s Intelligence Apparatus,” 28 Mar 1991, OSD Historical Office Files, V.F.


20 Ibid.


22 McDonnell, Soyster interview, 67, 75.

23 John M. (Mike) McConnell was a captain (promotable) when he assumed his position as JS just days before the invasion of Kuwait. He had made the promotion list to rear admiral but had to wait for his sequence number to be reached before he could be formally promoted. He was “frocked” to one-star rank soon after the invasion. This meant he could wear the rank he had been promoted to, but still received the pay and privileges of a captain. Within nine months he would go from a one-star to a three-star rank. See Oral history interview with Vice Admiral John McConnell, USN, 26 Sep 1995, 1-5.


26 Oral history interview with Vice Admiral John M. McConnell, USN, 26 Sep 1995, 1.

27 Nagy written comments, 12 Jan 2012, 1.

28 Ibid.


33 Ibid., 17.
Ibid., 18.


According to one source the SASC had some grievances against the U.S. Air Force at the time and in response temporarily froze all Air Force general officer promotions. (See Judith Bellafaire, Oral history interview with A. Denis Clift, 5 May 2011, 77).


DIA, Interview with Lieutenant General James Clapper, USA, (Ret.), 2011, 1-3, 4.


Clapper interview, 8-9.


Note, LTG James R. Clapper, Jr., to Pat Duecy, DI, John T. Berbrich, DT, and Brigadier General Chuck Thomas, DJ2, 29 Dec 1992, Clapper papers. Emphasis in original.


Email, Martin Hurwitz to McDonnell, 30 Mar 2012; Clapper, “Reorganization of DIA and Defense Intelligence Activities,” 14.


Email, Hurwitz to McDonnell, 30 Mar 2012.


Email, Hurwitz to McDonnell, 30 Mar 2012.


Signal, Jun 1991, 76.

Scanlon, 218, 221.


Ibid., 8-9.

Ibid., Enclosure #4, 22-23.


McDonnell, Soyster interview, 39, 41.


78 DoD Directive 5200.37, “Centralized Management of the Department of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Operations,” 18 Dec 1992. Service HUMINT resources were essentially left under the control of the parent Services, but DIA assumed greater operational control. See Scanlon, 236.


81 Scanlon, 237.


83 Emmett Paige, Jr., ASD(C3I), Executive Summary, Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense, n.d.

84 Deputy SECDEF, Memorandum for Secretaries of Military Departments, et. Al., subj: Establishment of a Revised Military Intelligence Board Charter and creation of the Chairman MIB Position, n.d.

85 McDonnell, Soyster interview, 27-28; Nagy written comments, 2; Oral history interview with Vice Admiral J.M. McConnell, 26 Sep 1995, 3, 8.


87 DIA, Dempsey interview, 2011; email, Hurwitz to McDonnell, 30 Mar 2012.

88 Jeremy C. Clark, Principal Deputy Director ASD(C3I), letter for Admiral William O. Studeman, USN, DD, CIA, 17 Nov 1994.

89 Clapper interview, n.d., 4-5; Clapper, “Reorganization of DIA and Defense Intelligence Activities,” 15.


92 “Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).” 22 Mar 1996, Hughes files, GDIP folder. When a revised DIA charter was issued in 1997 it referenced the DIA Director’s role as chair of the MIB but did not designate him (or even reference) “Director of Military Intelligence.” (DODD 5105.21, “Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 18 Feb 1997).


94 Intelligence and National Security Alliance, Smart Change Task Force, *Smart Change*, May 2011, 6; DoDD 5105.21, 18 Feb 1997.


96 GAO Audit JIC/JAC, 8.

97 Janet McDonnell, phone interview with Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, USA, (Ret.), 6 Feb 2012; *Smart Change*, 8.
98 DIA, Interview with Michael Munson and Margaret Munson, 2011, 46, 57, 58; Smart Change, 9, 16; Scanlon, 218; DIA, Dempsey interview.


100 Andre interview, 2007, 25.


106 McDonnell, phone interview with Hughes; DIA, Interview with Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, USA, (Ret.), 2011, 26; DIA, Interview with Jeffrey Clark, 2011, 23.


109 Dempsey interview.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Automated Data Processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFMIC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD(C3I)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
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<td>COLISEUM</td>
<td>Community On-Line Intelligence System for End Users and Managers</td>
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<td>DAS</td>
<td>Defense Attaché System</td>
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Janet A. McDonnell is a senior historian with the DIA Historical Research Division. She holds a Ph.D. from Marquette University and served first as a historian with the headquarters of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and later as the Bureau Historian for the National Park Service. Her publications include a number of scholarly articles and reports, as well as books on a variety of historical subjects to include Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks; After Desert Storm: the U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait; Supporting the Troops: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Persian Gulf War; and The Dispossession of the American Indian: Indian Land Policy, 1887-1934.

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ADAPTING TO A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

Defense Intelligence Agency in the 1990s

Janet A. McDonnell
DIA Historical Research Division

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