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COMMUNITY AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES
TO THE YOUTH GANG PROBLEM

Case Studies Based on Field Visits and Other
Materials

by

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FIGURE

5-1 Mean Number of Homicides El Monte, CA

INTRODUCTION

No one person, discipline, agency, or community
has the answer to dealing with the youth gang
problem. In fact, we are not entirely clear that
there is a single phenomenon identifiable as a

youth gang problem. Problems of youth gang-related violence, criminality, drug trafficking, and drug use come in many shapes, sizes, and stages. The notions of gang and gang incident are not clearly defined or consistent across agencies, communities, or even in the same community over time. Yet, it is quite clear that the phenomena of youth gangs exist, are spreading across communities, and growing more serious. The gang problem has assumed catastrophic proportions in certain chronic problem cities and is now present in suburban areas that do not have a history of gang problems.

The following six case studies of five cities or urban areas, and one correctional institution, represent in varying degrees success stories. The youth gang problem does not necessarily have to get worse. While we do not understand all aspects of this complex and evolving social problem, specific strategies and tactics of programs seem to make a positive difference. While little "hard" evaluation exists of the effectiveness of agency or community responses, there do seem to be promising, but not as yet "sure" ways for controlling and reducing the problem.

The six case studies address youth gang problems as distinct from youth group or individual youth delinquency problems. Youth gangs have special communal and organizational characteristics, and usually persist over time. They are distinct from other types of youth deviancy structures and problems. They are present in certain impoverished and/or disorganized communities or social contexts where opportunity and control systems have broken down, and family, school, employment and community organizations have failed to meet the social needs of youth and young adults. The youth gang is a residual institution which has come to supply many of the resources and controls that the legitimate (or even illegitimate) institutions no longer provide.

The six studies originally were intended to be reports of field visits to Evanston, Illinois; Fort Wayne, Indiana; Columbus, Ohio; El Monte and East Los Angeles in California; and Draper Cottage, Ethan Allen School for Boys, Wisconsin. These sites were selected as among the most "promising" based on data and perceptions of improvement in the problem between 1980 and 1987 and related agency or interagency effectiveness in dealing with it. A survey of 45 cities and 6 institutional sites was conducted in 1988 and 1989 to determine the extent and nature of the youth gang problem and the pattern of organized response to it. The six sites were then selected based on computed scores of (1) multiple agency perceptions of a reduced gang problem (later verified with additional police and available data), (2)

perception of agency effectiveness, and (3) perception of interagency or community effectiveness. Several sites with higher scores were not visited either because of lack of varied approaches or agency informants, or because of excessive travel distance and expense that would have been incurred.

The six case studies constitute the third phase of the first Assessment stage of a Research and Development process "The National Youth Gang Suppression and Intervention Program," in cooperation with the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Justice Department. The Assessment stage has comprised a Review of the Literature, Survey of Cities and Institutional Sites, and Field Visits to "promising" sites. The second stage requires the development of general city or countrywide and specific agency models for dealing with the problem. The third stage will be the development of Technical Assistance materials and Training, to be followed by a fourth Prototype testing stage.

The case studies were planned originally as brief reports of visits to verify the findings of the survey. The visits, which lasted from two to six days, developed their own dynamic, and involved considerably more preparation and follow-up than expected. More local organizations and community agencies were contacted than planned. A variety of program documents, studies, and evaluation materials were examined bearing on issues of agency and community response and effectiveness with regard to the problem. Initial drafts of the case studies were submitted to all key participants for comments, additions, and revisions. Most of the suggested changes are incorporated in the present versions. The individual studies should be considered reliable and valid.

The cases, with the exception of the Ethan Allen School study, are organized into the following subcategories. Background, the Youth Gang Problem, Community Response, Individual Agency Roles, Assessment, and Conclusion. The perceptions and roles of individual participants are considered and analyzed. Police reports on gang crime, where they exist, are cited. Our purpose in these reports is to provide a relatively succinct, balanced and usable report of the program structures and processes of criminal justice, community-based agencies, and schools in dealing with the youth gang problem in its various forms and stages.

Some of the cities, areas, or institutions studied had chronic gang problems and programs, dating from the 1960s and 1970s or earlier (El Monte and East Los Angeles); others dealt with emerging gang

problems, dating mainly from the early 1980s (Evanston, Fort Wayne, Columbus, and Ethan Allen School). The cities or communities selected varied in population from about 70,000 to 500,000. Each of the sites was an urban area and contained a heterogeneous population. However, the youth gang problems in these cities and in the correctional institution selected were mainly African-American and/or Mexican-American. Our studies do not represent, therefore, the full range of youth gang problems in the country, including other Hispanic gangs, Asian and White gangs. Nevertheless, the studies probably represent the efforts of agencies and communities in dealing with the most prevalent and typical youth gangs and their problems, based on the findings of our survey.

The youth gang problem was regarded as a community problem by all informants during our field visits, requiring a complex, community-wide, as well as individual agency, approach. Police and youth agencies roles are represented in each of the five city or area cases. Other justice system, school, church, planning agency, and political roles are also described where they were developed. Our survey revealed four or five dominant strategies for dealing with the youth gang problem across the 45 cities and 6 institutional sites: community mobilization, social intervention, suppression, social opportunities, and organizational development or modification. Each of these strategies is represented to some degree in the six case studies.

We should add that the survey analysis revealed that community mobilization and social opportunity strategies were the best predictors of positive outcome or perception of reduced youth gang problems. Common definition of the youth gang problem and cooperative, proactive efforts for dealing with it were extremely important in chronic and emerging gang problem areas. The social opportunities approach which we defined as including mainly educational, training, and job placement efforts, was more prevalent in chronic youth gang problem cities where the problem had been reduced or perceived as reduced. We believe the role of the schools and employers in dealing with the youth gang problem has not yet been adequately developed in most of the areas visited, and this is reflected in the only occasional references to program efforts of this type.

We hope that these case histories will be helpful to a variety of policy and program leaders throughout the country in understanding the nature of the youth gang problem, describing the range of organizational responses to it, and suggesting what local communities, public and nonprofit, and sectarian agencies, and correctional institutions can do to "successfully" deal with the problem.

These are not "quick fix" approaches. Dedicated, sustained, and wise leadership is required to control and prevent youth gang problems. The present cases have provided a basis for our further efforts to develop general city-wide prototype and specific agency designs necessary for dealing with youth gang problems.

If our six case studies succeed in providing guidance to policymakers and practitioners, then perhaps we will have made a significant contribution. As one of our respondent prosecutors said, "If you are successful, lives will be saved and communities de-terrorized."

CASE STUDY 1

Evanston, Illinois

Background

Evanston is a diverse community of 73,000 on the northern border of Chicago. It is part of a pattern of independent, well established, and often wealthy suburbs. The first black families settled in Evanston more than 100 years ago, usually as domestics in the large homes of middle and upper class whites. In more recent decades, its western and southern sections have been populated by low- and middle-income black families escaping Chicago's more urgent and complex urban problems. At least 20 percent of the population is estimated to be black. Public school student populations are 40 percent black. A smaller lower middle class Hispanic population has also begun to settle in the city.

Evanston remains, nevertheless, a predominantly stable white, high status community with a relative wealth of social, educational, cultural, and economic resources. It is a growing high tech area. It is the site of the main campus of a world famous university, Northwestern. It has a very high standard, well respected public school system. It is a well organized progressive city with a concerned citizenry, alert to local, regional, as well as national and international problems and developments, proud of its distinctive qualities and accomplishments.

The Youth Gang Problem

Evanston has had a history of gang problems dating back to at least 1971 when "kids were hanging on street corners," engaged in minor acts of vandalism and graffiti writing. Two white groups, the Main Street Bums and the Noyes Street Raiders, developed unsavory reputations, but are not well remembered today. In 1973, a mixed white and black youth group came to the attention of the police

for their involvement in petty crime. Some youth wore "hairnets" to school. Gang graffiti was found in school books and on the walls of some of the schools. There was some debate as to whether these were nuisance groups or gangs. These youth groups or gangs were referred to as "pseudo-gangs" and "pre-gangs" by the former Chief of Police, who retired in 1987.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was apparently an attempt by some Chicago gangs to recruit members from Evanston. The development of a Chicago oriented gang, comprising Evanston residents, stimulated the development of a local gang, The Sconny Hoods. More and more youth, mainly low-income black youth, were reported to be hanging out with gangs. Evanston's first gang-related murder was reported in 1976. Two additional gang homicides occurred in 1983.

The distinction between Evanston and Chicago gangs is a source of some confusion, since most of the Evanston gangs now have the same names as Chicago gangs. Many of the members of the gangs come from families which reside in Evanston, but who may have come originally from Chicago. Rosenbaum and Grant, in their study of Evanston gangs (1983), reported that two local gangs existed but that three others were "satellites" or branches of major Chicago gangs in this period. These researchers insist that the so-called satellite gangs comprised largely Evanston residents and "in a very real sense are Evanston groups." The local gangs contained somewhat younger youths, 13 to 29 years; members of the Chicago-connected gangs were in their 20s. One social agency executive claims that the age range of gang members is currently 11 to 55 years.

Community Response

The community perceived a rise in the level of gang violence and the seriousness of gang crime beginning in the late 1970s. Young men were engaged in assaults and shooting at each other. Complaints of drug-dealing and involvement in prostitution by gang members were made by some local citizens. The violence produced an "increasing fear of crime . . . forcing community reaction to the problem" (Rosenbaum and Grant 1983, p. 21). Residents on the west side, in whose area the violent gang activity was occurring, were largely to be credited with the impetus for a series of public hearings which took place. They pressured the City Council and the city administration. The Evanston Human Relations Commission played a key role in getting Evanston to recognize the problem by organizing the public meetings as well as facilitating definition of the problem and an initial response to it (Rosenbaum and Grant 1983, p. 51). In 1978, the Bishop-

Freeman Ad Hoc Committee was formed to address the problem of drug selling and gambling in the Bishop-Freeman parking lot. The Executive Director of the Human Relations Commission was chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee which included representatives of the police department, other public and nonprofit agencies, as well as neighborhood groups and residents.

No significant city or community action apparently was taken until another public hearing on street gang activity was held in March 1981, after the shooting death of a recreation leader. In June of the following year, 1982, the Evanston Youth Commission and the Mental Health Association co-sponsored a conference on youth problems at which the workshop on gangs drew a large audience. A series of meetings sponsored by the Human Relations Commission followed later that year. Its subcommittee on gangs formulated a series of recommendations as to what the city should do about the problem. One of the recommendations forwarded to the City Council and approved was the funding of a study by Northwestern University's Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research (Rosenbaum and Grant 1983).

The university study was completed in a few months, carried out with minimal city, and supplemented by university funds. It described the youth gang problem, its genesis and various efforts to deal with it, and made policy recommendations. The study emphasized that two factors above all characterized Evanston's response to the gang problem. "First, there was a strong denial for quite a long time that a problem even existed at all. Second, once the problem was recognized, responsibility for the problem shifted regularly. . . . For many city officials and residents, there was no perceived gang problem. For others, the problem did not seem serious at all" (Rosenbaum and Grant 1983, pp. 82-83). Reasons for denial were related to concerns about the city's reputation and real estate values.

No agency stepped forward immediately to assume responsibility for doing something about the problem, whether prevention or intervention. The law enforcement or suppression approach did not show impressive results initially. Key gang members were arrested. However, in the first six months of 1983, only 21 of the first 187 gang-related incidents resulted in arrest. A program by the police to identify juvenile gang members, contact their parents, and involve them in counseling or parent meetings was viewed by at least one informant as not successful. Only six mothers participated in the parent group which met eight times in September and October 1982. Attendance was very low at the meetings. Four of the parents were already involved in a Victim-

Witness Outreach program (see also, Rosenbaum and Grant 1983, p. 47).

According to the Northwestern report, very few youth officers were assigned to work with juvenile gang members during this early period. The Youth Bureau and Organized Crime Bureau of the department seemed to operate separate programs dealing with gang youth. Community and gang member perceptions were that the police were not eager to deal with the problem in this period (Ibid., p. 48). The schools, youth agencies, and businesses believed that the problem was not especially one they should address. It was regarded essentially as a problem about which the police should take major responsibility.

The Northwestern study concluded with a comprehensive series of recommendations for general and specific community, police, agency, city administration and school improvement and long-term change. Special attention appeared to be directed to issues of providing an adequate education for minority youth from low income families and interagency coordination and program development in respect to the youth gang problem. Meanwhile, law enforcement strategy shifted with the appointment of a new police chief. The increased level of violence and drug activity was a deciding factor in crystallizing police and a certain degree of community reaction.

Police

New perceptions of the gang problem and how to deal with it evolved with the appointment of a new police chief and departmental reorganization between 1983 and 1984. The police emerged as the lead or dominant agency in the city's response to the youth gang problem. According to police reports, eight gangs were operating in Evanston in March 1984. The combined Evanston membership of the gangs was 410. Older gang leaders were perceived as role models, providing organization and leadership. Gang activity reached an all time high. The new Police Chief Logan prepared a plan of action for the entire department. The number one priority was "to increase the response to gangs."

A four-part approach was established:

1. Gather and analyze intelligence regarding gangs and gang leaders.
2. Strictly enforce all laws violated by gang members.
3. Diffuse [break up] gangs in the community.
4. Educate the community about the problem.

A new Gang Crimes Bureau was created with sole responsibility for "investigating and aggressively pursuing gang members and their activities." It was staffed with a sergeant and five officers. Liaisons were established with the Youth, Vice and Narcotics, and Crime Prevention Bureaus, as well as Patrol. Internal communication resulted in improved overall departmental coordination in respect to gangs. The Department's Vice and Narcotics Bureau established an aggressive enforcement posture regarding gang member involvement with drugs and worked closely with the Gang Crimes Bureau. Special interest in training developed; 37 officers attended a gang crimes training seminar at the Chicago Police Academy. Gang Crimes investigators in Evanston were now called on to give presentations at roll calls.

Interagency contacts and community participation were enhanced. The Gang Crimes Bureau established a working relationship with the Special Prosecution Gang Crimes Unit of the Cook County State's Attorney's office. A neighborhood foot patrol program was initiated to increase police visibility and promote "neighborhood cohesiveness and problem solving." The four areas of the city with gang activity were targeted.

The Police Department took a proactive stance in educating all segments of the community about the nature and extent of gang activity and how citizens and police could work together to solve problems. Numerous presentations were made to civic, school, and community groups about gang problems. Various units of the police department, including Gang Crimes, as well as the police chief were directly involved. The presentations included information on gangs suspected of operating in Evanston, their symbols and slogans, their activities, how they operate and recruit, as well as how parents can identify children who may be involved in a gang. More recently, certain officers of the department have joined with personnel of the city's recreation department to identify youth-at-risk of gang membership and sponsor them in summer camp.

The role of then Police Chief Logan -- now in charge of security at the Evanston Public Schools -- was pervasive. He made certain that all units recognized and fully implemented their responsibilities. If police officers avoided or shunted their responsibility especially in cooperation with other units on gang-related matters, he took disciplinary action. He got around to all parts of the department and clearly communicated his philosophy of "zero-based" tolerance for gang members. Officers of the department went to the Chief Judge and his associates to request that gang-affiliated youth

not be given I-bonds (release on their own recognizance) or minimum sentences. Police officials met with the States Attorney and arranged for one prosecutor to deal with all gang cases coming out of Evanston.

The Chief encouraged police officer communication with all elements of the Population, including gang leaders. He knew some of the leaders personally, met with them as a group, and informed them of the consequences of breaking the law. Gang members, in turn, said they had "nothing to do and no place to go. They needed jobs." The Police Chief urged his gang crime unit to assist some of the gang members to obtain jobs. The meeting by Chief Logan with the gang leaders was viewed as controversial in some quarters, as possibly recognizing the gang structure, but the Chief felt that the meeting was not harmful to the interests of the community.

In 1984, the Gang Crime Unit sergeant addressed a memo to Chief Logan in which he stated that the emphasis of the unit was also, when possible, to redirect or refer gang members into constructive pursuits, or to social agencies who were equipped to counsel or help them. "We enforced the law regularly and made numerous arrests during the critical period, but we also functioned to help the kids and present alternatives to gang membership."

Law enforcement tactics included: identifying and monitoring gang leaders and hard-core members; prosecuting all offenses, even minor ones, by gang members to the full extent of the law; encouraging gang members to sign complaints against rival gang members. While this latter tactic helped diffuse potentially violent situations, certain gang members also attempted to use the procedure to file false complaints against rival gang members. Special attention was directed to getting gang members into the criminal justice system under some kind of supervision. In turn, the police worked closely with parole authorities to monitor gang members when they were later released from prison.

Gang Crime personnel were carefully selected. They had to meet a variety of criteria: ability to establish rapport with gang members, diffuse gang situations without backing down, a capacity not to be intimidated, and on the other hand, not abuse gang youth. Additionally, gang crime officers had to be able to collaborate with community groups and agencies in dealing with the gang problem. The police collaborated closely with and aided COEPops and Moms, a grass roots group based in the gang neighborhood.

COEPops/Moms

The Council of Elders (COE) Pops and Moms began in 1983 as a response primarily of black parents to a gang-related slaying of a youth in 1983. They perceived that officials and local citizens were either frustrated and or indifferent to the gang problem. They believed that strong involvement of local parents was necessary. The group established a "network of neighborhood adults who would watch for potential misconduct by youth on the streets." As "community elders," they were to forestall violence and redirect gang behavior. Local adults volunteered their time. The organization's budget was about \$1,500 per year, of which \$1,000.00 was provided by the City's Recreation Department; the rest was raised privately. Use of volunteers was emphasized.

The Council's first activities were weekend night time foot and car patrols in collaboration with the police. While citizen patrollers did not replace or interfere with normal police enforcement functions, the regular presence of COEPops on foot or in mobile units, equipped with city radios, on neighborhood streets and at youth gatherings, made it difficult for gang elements to operate openly or effectively. The police helped to organize the group and provided technical assistance to some members in operating and maintaining their communications equipment.

According to a key COEPops/Moms leader, Don Colleton, the Council's efforts should be viewed as independent of those of the police. Some members of the Council had mixed feelings about the police, although generally good relations were established with police officials. If a shooting or fight occurred, Council members would call in the police, but the focus of their patrols was not police work. It was to provide an adult presence to neutralize the effect of negative youth peer pressure, for example, at dances. Council member involvement was "deeper than that of the criminal justice system." It was to "enter the lives of the kids and have a positive impact on them."

In due course, COEPops and Moms became involved in a variety of remedial and preventive activities. They established two drop-in centers which provided recreation in a safe environment where parents, not gangs, set the controlling values. Activities such as break dancing, tumbling, and double-dutch were used to build relationships and promote the values of education. The Council volunteers also chaperoned dances and parties at the YMCA, the Evanston Township High School (ETHS), local churches and homes. By their presence, Council members claimed they diffused attitudes and pressures which could spawn violence and substance abuse. Certain neighborhood dances were not scheduled unless the Council agreed to

attend.

The Council has become increasingly engaged in preventive activities with a deepening focus on education and educational opportunity. It organized a conference on the "learning gap" in Evanston, the phenomenon in which black school children as a group have significantly lower tests scores than their white counterparts. It has for five years co-sponsored and supplied the coaching staff for a large basketball league which it uses as a vehicle to teach high school males -- even those hostile toward each other or toward demanding adults -- discipline and respect and guide them toward productive post high school endeavors. It has established a scholarship at Evanston Township High School. Students who receive the scholarships are asked to assist in the work of the Council and to serve as convincing examples of the accessibility of opportunity for advancement and escape from gang involvement. At the same time, the Council of Elders has devoted more and more time to younger children "because their attitudes have not yet hardened." COEPops and Moms appear to participate less and less in crisis intervention activities with hard-core gang members. In part, this may be due to fewer crisis or gang-related activities that now occur on Evanston streets.

Other Grassroots Groups

Former Police Chief, Bill Logan, notes several other community groups that were valuable in the community's response to the gang problem, particularly in their assistance to the police. Children Adult Network Unlimited (CAN U) was committed to working with police in the Fleetwood Jordain area, one of the primary areas of gang activity. They shared information with the police and engaged in various youth diversion activities. COMMUNITY AID was a grassroots group of local citizens who became the eyes and ears of the police, and performed community watch functions. Nichols Neighbors, at an early point in the development of the gang problem, also monitored the streets and called the police.

Youth Organizations Umbrella (YOU)

A number of social agencies or youth organizations have been peripherally connected to the youth gang problem, although they had long-term concerns with other youth problems and working relations with police. A youth agency, YOU, as well as the police, were solicited by community leaders in 1984 and 1985 to develop a social intervention program for gang youth. A plan was formulated by the organization to target fringe or peripheral, but not highly active or hard-core, gang youth. Peripheral gang youth or those vulnerable to

membership were to be provided with jobs, sports, or social activities to pull them away from gangs and to counter gang recruitment efforts. However, the plan and YOU's involvement became a source of controversy. YOU was a white-staffed agency and a black community organization objected. A variety of issues surfaced: racial distrust, competition for funds, and questions of program strategy. YOU has originated a program for street youth, mainly status offenders or runaways, a few of whom may have a gang connection. The service mix developed includes home visits, counseling, and recreational activities. Nevertheless, the youth service system did not develop a substantive program directed to the problem of gang youth.

Other Agencies

Several agencies sensitive to the youth gang problem have developed programs and activities which may have some secondary or indirect influence on the problem. Neighbors at Work is geared to low income families and provides emergency food and shelter. Family Focus is a program that may serve gang youth families in its program, but does not specifically target them. It states that it does not have the resources to directly deal with the problem. General counseling and recreation activity, and assistance with academic problems, are provided to a range of youth. Youth outreach programs, such as the Youth Alternatives Project (YAP) do exist in Evanston and youth advocates are stationed at YOU, Family Focus, and Evanston Hospital to deal with a variety of dysfunctional or multi-problem youth, including school and family problems, but gang youth has not been a primary focus.

Schools

Public schools have occasionally confronted the gang problem, but have developed no concentrated sustained approach. At one time a special police officer liaison program with the schools existed which apparently failed to target gang problems. Bill Logan, the former Police Chief, observes that the city cut back on school-related programs, such as Officer Friendly and School Officer Liaison, at a time when the youth gang problem was emerging. The police department recommended that the school district and the city each pick up half of the bill to reestablish these programs, but the request was denied.

School security officers presently attempt to control and forbid gang symbolism, gang graffiti, and recruitment. Flashing gang signs and the wearing of hats and colors still occur at schools. According to one informant, gang-related fights have broken out recently at a local junior high school. However, schools presently do not identify

the youth gang problem as serious and requiring special attention. Teachers have received only limited gang-awareness training.

Evanston schools are primarily concerned with maintaining high academic standards but still attend to the needs of less academically-oriented students. Special programs are provided to youth with academic, social, and psychological problems. The presence of the gang problem or gang youth in the schools tends to be framed in more general academic failure and racial terms. A majority of students who score in the lowest quartile of academic achievement are low-income black youth. Estimates are that two-thirds of the students in special-track educational programs are black. The schools seem uncertain whether to label many of these youths as possessing or being prone to behavior problems or involved in gang activity. Expectations for low-income minority youth, including gang youth, appear to be lower than for white youth (Rosenbaum and Grant 1983). Some informants claim that alternative education for gang youth outside the established school system is a preferred option.

Assessment

The gang problem, especially its violent component, has apparently been reduced in Evanston in recent years, based on community perceptions and police statistical data. Reduction of the problem has been attributed to the pro-active efforts of the Evanston police department and some limited mobilization of community interest and effort. The reduction of overt violent gang activity, however, has also been accompanied by a less visible drug-related and more sophisticated criminal involvement by older and, to a lesser extent, younger gang youth.

The Evanston Police Department has developed an operational reporting and tracking system which facilitates the statistical assessment of the youth gang problem. The police defined a gang as a "group of individuals with some degree of organization and symbolism that is involved in criminal activity" (Rosenbaum and Grant 1983, p. 8). A gang is of "concern" to the authorities if it has "considerable membership and is regularly involved in criminal activity" (Ibid., 13.) More recently the Police Department has developed a complex two-part system for identifying incidents which serve both to identify and track specific gang-based problems as well as general criminal activities of gang youth. "Gang-related" incidents refer to acts related to gang functions, especially when they grow out of conflict or threat of conflict between two gangs. "Gang member crimes" are simply those committed by gang members.

Statistics and Perceptions. Evidence exists for the decline of gang-related incidents between 1984 and 1988. The police report a decline in gang-related incidents between 1986 and 1988 from 474 to an estimated 345. Arrests of individuals in these gang-related incidents were also down from 344 to an estimated 268; charges were down from 457 to an estimated 325; and use of weapons, specifically shots fired declined from 71 to an estimated 41. Data were not available for an earlier period or for more broadly defined gang member crime incidents.

The reduction of the explicit gang problem is even more impressive when the units of reporting by the Evanston Police are numbers of gangs and gang members between 1984 and 1988. The number of gang members declined from 440 to 138, hard-core gang membership from 155 to 77. However, there was an increase in marginal or peripheral gang members from 20 to 58 in the same period. There is general agreement that the pattern of change was due to police targeting hard-core older gang members but paying less attention to peripheral younger gang members. The current Gang Crimes Commander observes that many of the older youth "are pulling back from the hard-core gang philosophy in order to stay out of trouble and avoid incarceration. They are more concerned now with individualism -- selling drugs and keeping their share of the drug market. They cannot accomplish that if they are constantly in conflict with other gang members or law enforcement."

Chief Logan, head of school security since 1987, claims that "overt gang banging in Evanston has stopped." He agrees that drug trafficking by gang members has probably increased. He cites an instance of a gang member whose home was seized in a drug trafficking prosecution. According to another police official, some gang members have been able to post high bonds in a variety of criminal cases and that this may be evidence of involvement in cocaine trafficking and generally increased drug sales in the community. The incidence of burglaries has slightly increased, suggesting a greater need to support drug habits, including those of gang youths.

According to the present Chief of Police, Ernest A. Jacobi gang-related drug trafficking may have leveled off, at least relatively speaking. He cites a sting investigation in 1987 in which thirty-five (35) gang members were arrested for drug violations. In a similar street-level sting investigation in 1989, the same number were arrested, but the majority were not gang members.

Observers are generally not sanguine that the gang problem has been solved or that it will disappear

in Evanston. Gang activity per se is less visible, although one or two gangs remain quite active. One social agency observer claims there is recently increased gang activity by youth in one of the city's junior high schools. The drug problem has worsened. Some older gang members involved in the drug market are now believed to be recruiting and using younger gang members in drug operations. Of concern also is that some of the older gang leaders who once were opposed to each other may now be cooperating in order to share in the drug trade.

Conclusions

The Evanston approach to dealing with the gang problem has been based on a strong deterrent and community-oriented strategy, directed and largely implemented by the Police Department, entailing close surveillance and monitoring and occasionally harassment, but also open communication and support of community groups concerned with the problem. Of special value was intrapolice agency, as well as inter-justice agency, cooperation. Within the Police department, intelligence and investigative functions among all units in the patrol, special operations, and criminal investigations divisions were closely coordinated, although some question remains about the level of cooperation and exchange of information between the Juvenile and Gang Crime units. A detailed set of procedures was carefully and successfully implemented, regarding case assignment, intelligence gathering, screening of all police reports, classifying gang-related information, appraisal of data placed in intelligence files, and regular purging of data. Selection and training of police personnel in the Gang Crimes Bureau was carefully conducted.

Collaboration with other criminal justice personnel and education of the community about the problem were also important elements. The Evanston Police Department worked closely with the State's Attorney's office, to some extent the county judges, and also Parole in the development of special procedures to deal with the Evanston gang problem.

The police department, especially Chief Logan, took leadership in obtaining community cooperation and information which aided in the development of a successful enforcement policy and the incarceration of significant numbers of gang youth. The fact that Evanston is a small and relatively stable community where people know each other and information is readily communicated assisted in the development of the relatively effective approach. However, it should be emphasized that while gang-related violence was reduced in the 1984-1988 period, the level of

other crimes committed by older gang members, mainly drug trafficking and possibly burglary, probably rose.

Certain limitations of the Evanston approach should be noted. A strategy and program of prevention and social intervention has not yet been developed for a complex set of reasons. Basic institutions of education and perhaps training and job opportunities have not yet been adequately mobilized to specifically address the problem. A sustained commitment by key public and non-profit agencies and actors did not take place. Denial of the scope and serious nature of the problem as well as considerable uncertainty as to how to address it in light of underlying racial issues and tensions may have impeded a strong collective effort.

It is likely that the successful targeting of older gang youth utilizing mainly a deterrent and community-oriented strategy has in the short term contributed to reduction of gang-related violence by these youth and young adults. Relative inattention to fringe gang youth and those specifically ripe for membership may have allowed for a new round of membership and gang development. Simple incarceration of older gang youth and their subsequent involvement in drug trafficking may have lead to their increased criminalization and may be associated with recent recruitment of a new youth to gangs.

Nevertheless, Evanston may be an example of an effective short-term, community-oriented deterrent approach by a sophisticated and well-coordinated police department, addressed primarily to the issue of gang violence in a city without apparent long-term gang problems. While it is not an example of a broad scale, balanced approach to the problem, it should be regarded as probably successful in reducing the overt gang violence problem over the past few years. A comprehensive approach, as suggested by Rosenbaum and Grant in their Northwestern study is probably required for long-term effective change.

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CASE STUDY 2
Fort Wayne, Indiana

Background

Fort Wayne, located in Allen county, is the second largest city in Indiana, located in the northeastern part of the state on main roads connecting Chicago and Detroit as well as other large cities such as Toledo and Cleveland in Ohio and Ypsilanti in Michigan. Fort Wayne is a city of 190,000 population in a metropolitan area of 300,000. African-Americans comprise 17 percent of the population, with its lower income groups confined to certain sections of the inner city. Fort Wayne also has a small Mexican-American population of less than 5 percent.

Fort Wayne is in many respects a stable, prosperous city with a diverse economy based in large measure on light industry. Magnavox is the largest employer. The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company is headquartered in the city. Business and industry are enlightened and contribute significantly to social and youth welfare development. The city does not suffer from the effects of high-rise public housing, although low-income project areas have a black population with high rates of social problems.

Fort Wayne is a conservative but concerned community. It has become aware in recent years of growing social and youth problems. Representatives of various agencies believe that gang and drug problems were introduced and in part developed by persons from such cities as Detroit, Chicago, and Ypsilanti. Fort Wayne is currently regarded as the "crack capital" of Indiana. The city prides itself on being a law-abiding and socially pro-active community, but is aware of an increase in family breakdown, rising illiteracy rate, and the isolation of its low-income black population, which has not shared commensurately in the city's prosperity.

The Youth Gang Problem

Fort Wayne agency informants state that its youth gang problem is relatively recent. Law-violating youth groups were only occasionally a problem. The beginning of a youth gang problem was identified about 1982 or 1983. Several older teenagers or young adults from such large cities as Los Angeles, Chicago, and Detroit were said to have introduced signs, symbols, and youth-gang criminal behavior patterns.

Some observers state, however, there was a readiness by local youth with "little to do" after school to be influenced by outsiders. Significant numbers of black youth did poorly at school, could not find jobs, and began to hang on the streets. Youth groups or gangs were engaged in assaults upon each other and property crimes, including burglary, and theft. They were involved in relatively little drug-related activity initially,

although alcohol use was an on-going problem among teenagers.

The captain of the Juvenile Aid Division of the Fort Wayne Police Department attributes the rise of the formal youth gang problem to a particular 22-year-old member of a Chicago street gang who with his family commuted between Chicago and Fort Wayne. He recruited several other older teenagers and formed a unit of the Disciples. The group eventually split, and one faction became identified with another opposing gang that mimicked a Chicago gang, the Vice Lords. Turf conflicts, shootings, beatings, and car thefts ensued. Another older youth, with gang experience, and his family moved from Los Angeles to Fort Wayne. This youth also recruited and introduced youth to gang patterns. Graffiti and weapons started to appear. " . . . [F]actions developed, confrontations and fights occurred." At first guns were fired into the air for amusement and then drive-by shootings followed.

The police detected an emerging gang problem in 1982, but were unsure what to do about it. They called in an expert(s) from the Chicago police gang unit to assess the situation. The expert(s) concluded that Fort Wayne had a "mild" gang problem. The gang groups or factions were small and amorphous. Graffiti and symbols were not clearly developed. Because of this assessment, according to several informants, the police and others in the community preferred to first clarify the situation and did not take quick action.

The gang problem was recognized as serious in the summer of 1985 during several youth festivals, when gangs were disorderly and clashed with each other. Shootings and serious injuries occurred. Eight distinct gangs and between 400 and 500 gang members were estimated to be present in the city, particularly in the low income black areas. A small Hispanic and white gang member population, also present, was not regarded as a significant problem. Two or three gangs appeared to be at the core of the problem. The so-called Disciples and possibly the Vice Lords were both composed of older youth. The Renegades formed to protect themselves from the Disciples and the MCJs formed out of the Renegades. The Smurfs and its girls' affiliate group, the Smurfettes, were also identified. None of the gangs were well-organized and the lines of membership among all of the groups were not clear.

Turf issues were not strong since busing brought youth from the different neighborhoods to the same high schools where the gang problem was further developed. Gang assaults began in and around schools. Some youths and street groups that did not have gang or delinquent traditions were drawn

into the gangs. To what extent the variety of crimes by youth groups in this period, such as criminal mischief, car thefts and burglaries, were strictly gang-related or motivated is unclear. The problems of drug use, possession, and trafficking were not regarded as serious or gang-related in this period.

Community Response

A significant response to the problem came from specific agency personnel and community leaders. A unique and productive set of collaborative interagency relations was developed to deal with the problem. The initial reaction of the police, business, and real-estate interests to play down the problem was no longer adequate. In hindsight, the assessment by the Chicago police expert(s) was not viewed as energizing the police into a proactive stance. One police informant, however, stated that the police department's initial reaction was a way of not recognizing or giving gangs publicity and thereby alarming the public.

Juvenile Probation and several social agency and community leaders called a press conference in 1982 to voice concern with rising problems among children and youth, including youth gangs. After a period of negotiation, the Coalition for Youth Services (CYS) was established under the aegis of the YMCA. Various affiliated or component action groups were formed. One of them dealt with youth gangs. An agency network strategy evolved both informally and formally. Representatives from the police, probation, schools, the YMCA, prosecution, and other agencies initially comprised the gang action group. David Brittenham, the CYS coordinator, was influential in the development of the Gang Prevention Action Group (GPAG), which produced a networking strategy and a systematic way of dealing with the gang problem.

Police

Despite the delay by the police in formally recognizing or publicizing the presence of gangs, they had in fact already begun to target gang leaders and core gang members. A broad scale attack was initiated with the advent of the Coalition for Youth Services. The strategy developed as follows:

Identification of Gang Members. Patrol division officers developed a list of 200 probable gang members and associates, in conjunction with the prosecuting attorney, deans at the local high schools, and the Juvenile Probation Department. CYS personnel served to facilitate this process of interagency communication and cooperation. Categories of gang members were identified. These included gang leaders, core members, fringe

members, and even family members who might also be gang affiliated. Other youth admitted their gang membership. Some of the youth were identified by the dress or gang colors they wore. The police began to check and track gang incidents on the basis of the lists developed by GPAG agencies and police field cards. The members of the Gang Prevention Action Group (GPAG) used the lists to monitor alleged gang youth. A special public meeting of the parents of these identified youth was called by the Juvenile Probation Department, which stirred parental consternation and anger (see Probation below).

Intelligence Gathering. Information on the gang problem flowed to the police from many quarters. The YMCA outreach worker, who had established rapport with gang leaders and members, transmitted information about gang structure and impending criminal gang activities. He was able to persuade some of the gang leaders to provide useful information during gang crises. School officials who heard of an impending gang "rumble" immediately called the police who would send an unmarked car to verify the impending threat, deter the action and sometimes make arrests. The police in turn, if they had information, would notify Brittenham or his associate, Frazier, the outreach worker, about impending gang battles. A CYS crisis team, usually consisting mainly of Frazier, sometimes Brittenham, and a community resident, would cruise the streets looking for kids who were facing each other down and prevent conflict. The CYS staff, because of "good relations" with the gang, was able to pull the "power" persons aside and get them to assist in resolving the gang fracas before it started.

Enforcement. A special gang enforcement (or investigative) unit was not established by the police to focus specifically on youth gangs. The Juvenile Aid Division continued to carry out its general juvenile work and in addition investigated, as well as monitored, gang activity. However, a task force of foot patrol officers, comprised of volunteers, was assigned to deal with gang activity in the affected area. They operated mainly during the night shift from 5:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. The officers were "screened as to toughness, good mediators, and public relations men." No black police officers volunteered for the unit. The task force conducted sweeps, searched youth for weapons, and made photos and video tapes of youth. Gang leaders and members were identified and targeted. The police actions at times bordered on harassment. About 50 guns were collected and 400 arrests were made during the year 1985-86, when the gang problem was at its height. Twelve to fourteen hard-core youth were also incarcerated for periods of 6 months or more on charges such as aggravated assault, strong arm robbery, and

vehicle theft. The fact that the arrested youth were gang members or "involved in gang-like illegal activity," e.g., burglary, was communicated to the judge who "enhanced" their sentences.

There is a difference of view among police informants as to how effective some of these suppression activities were. One informant observes that the curfew sweeps were a "waste of time and manpower." Youth were quickly released to parents and police had to provide a taxi cab service to return youth home. Then, "they were right back on the street." However, the situation began to change over time. By the middle of the summer of 1986, gang youth were no longer carrying weapons. In September of that year, with the start of school, gangs began to dissipate. The benefits of a suppression approach seemed to outweigh its costs, at least over the short term. The police also about this time assisted the community in the development of the Pontiac Youth Center (see below).

Schools

The schools, as well as probation, recognized early the importance of a pro-active approach to the youth gang problem. The schools, a participant in the Gang Prevention Action Group (GPAG), took a strong stance and emphasized the importance of good early warning and information systems. A key school official believed that effective exchange of information about youth gang activity was important and that the targeting of gang leadership for incarceration or jobs was crucial in the attack on the problem. A justice system official notes, however, the mixed motivations of school officials in the use of "gang lists." Some school deans, who were mainly concerned with school security, wanted only to identify gang kids and "kick them out of school." Other school officials realized the complexity of the problem, the general community's responsibility, and were genuinely interested in helping problem youth.

Cooperation by the schools with the police was emphasized. The police supplied the names of youth who were suspected of gang activity to a key school planning official who ran the list through the school's computer system. School officials were then able to determine where gang youth were located and monitor them more or less closely depending on their concentration in certain schools and classes. Information as to which gang youths were at which schools and where they were living was supplied to the police who were able to monitor the youth outside of school hours. Identification of these youths, including names, birth dates, schools, and residence, was also given to Juvenile Probation (See Probation below).

All deans and assistant deans were continually made aware of pertinent gang-related information relayed by electronic mail. In turn, they quickly transferred pertinent information on these youth to key school liaison, usually for transmittal to the police.

School officials took a "hard line" against gang youth and gang activities, even harder than probation which often advocated "alternative school programs" for youth who were suspended or expelled. Suspensions for gang activity were increased during this early period, from 6 to 12 months. No form of gang activity was permitted on campus. School officials believed that some older students sought to transfer to the high schools from out of town, mainly to sell drugs. To prevent this, the presence of a parent and records from their previous school of enrollment were required before the transfer was completed. A "hard line" was also taken on drug and alcohol use. "If kids were caught with drugs or alcohol, they were 'busted' out."

Probation

The Allen County Court Family Relations Department, and specifically its Juvenile Probation Field Division, has received national recognition for its innovative and comprehensive programming with problem youth. It has an intensive probation unit, uses urine testing to monitor possible drug abuse, and employs electronic monitoring devices in lieu of incarceration. The Probation Department emphasizes community-based treatment as well as close supervision.

The Field Division has five juvenile "drop-in" centers around the city furnished with offices and also recreational areas with pool tables, ping pong and weight machines. They sponsor soccer and basketball teams for inner city youth, age 8-14 years. These neighborhood centers provide education, job-readiness training, and work-related opportunities. A wilderness site has been created with the aid of the Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, where youth can fish and camp. Group rap sessions led by trained graduate social workers are also available.

Duane Hinshaw, Supervisor of Field Services of Juvenile Probation, claims that the Probation Department was one of the early leaders to recognize the gang problem and do something about it. Probation officers in neighborhood centers located in the gang neighborhoods became especially sensitive to the emergence of the problem, since probationers often had difficulty getting to the centers and were occasionally assaulted. In response, juvenile probation

officers began to escort youth through these areas.

The Probation Department urged and strongly supported the development of the Coalition for Youth Services and the Gang Prevention Action Group. The Department was especially concerned about the lack of trust among agencies. Hinshaw notes that even after the formation of CYS, it took close to a year before effective working relationships were created. The Probation Department, however, was very proactive in its concern with the gang problem.

In one instance, the Field Division utilized the list of gang members compiled by the schools and police under the aegis of the GPAG to "summon" parents of alleged gang youth to a town meeting. The letter to parents stated that their child was possibly involved in gang activity and asked them to come to the Court House to a town meeting discussion. The meeting was chaired by Ken Watson, the Chief Probation officer. The County Coroner was also present and provided information on gunshot and stab wounds. Many of the parents became extremely upset. They denied their children were gang members. They wanted to know why their children were suspected of being gang members.

The mood of the parents was very hostile until one of the most vocal parents used the meeting as an opportunity to urge the development of an after-school recreational facility for youth, since many youth claimed they did not have enough to do. This discussion led to the idea for the creation of the Pontiac Youth Center. The parents agreed to volunteer their time. An advisory committee was formed. Members of the police foot patrol unit assisted parents in the furnishing and renovation of a building for the Youth Center.

YMCA/CYS/GPAG. The United Way, influenced by key business and community leaders concerned with the rise of social children and youth problems in the city, established a citywide task force to consider means to deal with them. The YMCA, particularly Dave Brittenham, was involved and influential in these formative discussions in 1982 and 1983 which resulted in a three-year youth services program. A key objective of the program was interagency coalition building and the solicitation of funding for projects developed by agencies in the coalition to deal with the problems. Agency resources were expected to be better interrelated and used more efficiently.

Two key problems had to be overcome for the successful building of the interagency coalition: [1] a history of competition, distrust, and inertia in interagency endeavors; and, [2] underlying tension and distrust between the black

and white community particularly in regard to recognizing and addressing problems largely of low-income black, disadvantaged inner city community residents.

Dave Brittenham, a social worker, had extensive experience as a YMCA director in Detroit, Chicago, and St. Louis and was an astute, non-threatening, innovative administrator. He was able to establish the Coalition for Youth Services (CYS) as an umbrella organization under the aegis of the YMCA. Its component action groups, comprised members who were operational persons from key agencies concerned with the different children and youth problems. With the assistance of his associate, Mel Frazier, he carefully played a series of roles in regard to the development of the Gang Prevention Action Group (GPAG), including interagency communicator, program facilitator, crisis manager, and at times outreach worker. A key activity of the group was the "fast sharing of information" with key operational persons during gang crises and the avoidance of formal bureaucratic procedures or political considerations.

An executive committee of GPAG was set up comprising key actors from the police, schools, and probation, as well as the YMCA. The interagency group operated with some secrecy. Its decisions and operational procedures were not widely communicated outside of the group. Trust developed largely due to the skillful, self-effacing efforts of Brittenham. The Chief of Police became more cooperative when he realized that the schools wanted swift action and that Dave Brittenham was not running for mayor. Brittenham was especially concerned about maintaining the group's unity and confidentiality of its decision-making process.

Brittenham was also somewhat sensitive to the interests and concerns of the black community. He was aware that when it came to certain social problems, blacks and whites tended to go their separate ways. He believed that "what you had to do was find creative ways to make blacks and whites partners in a collective effort." He was able to partially do this through employment of Melvin Frazier, a black associate coordinator, who not only had special responsibility as an outreach worker to black gang youth but who was able to relate both to the grassroots black community and the authoritative or established white institutions, especially the police. Frazier had to demonstrate his credibility with adults in the disadvantaged neighborhoods as well as not threaten key city officials.

Frazier proved to be admirably suited for the job. He was "resilient to the ups and downs of outreach

work, and committed to work around the clock." He came to be seen as a positive presence by the police department. He did not criticize police strategy or activity. He let youth know up front that he would pass on certain types of information to the police, when it was in the best interests of youth. At the same time, he went out of his way to assist youth and their families when they were in crises, gang-related and otherwise. He counseled and referred them for various services, particularly jobs. The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company established a special program of employing youth at risk, as well as hard-core gang youth. Part-time after-school jobs, along with arrests, seemed to be a useful strategy.

The CYS eventually evolved into a networking and planning agency, comprising a coalition of job-training programs, a ministerial group, hospitals, child-care agencies, grassroots groups, and community action organizations. A drug prevention action group has recently been organized. Representatives of over 50 agencies participate. Key organizations, black and white, are involved in various aspects of the interagency coalition program. To what extent the coalition, particularly its gang action group, has been able to directly reach out and obtain cooperation of residents of the disadvantaged black community is unclear. Many of the agency representatives contacted agree that parents of gang youth -- many of them single parents -- were not successfully involved, except for the development of the Pontiac Youth Center. The schools, police, or youth agencies were generally not able to mobilize local grassroots groups to support their efforts.

CYS was able, however, to organize "8 to 10 merchants at the corner of Pontiac and Anthony into an association . . . to work with the police" to keep the area clear of gangs. The area was cleaned up in about five months. . . . Gang activity was displaced to other areas." There was also some effort expended by GPAG in meetings with residents at apartment complexes. Police, prosecutors, and social agency staff made presentations. Residents were informed about who they could call in an emergency. They were also made aware of educational and social programs available for youth.

The basis for the Coalition for Youth Services (CYS) and the principles of its operation are articulated as follows:

"A smaller city will have a greater chance of effectively addressing a developing gang problem if it is confronted during its early stages. It is also important for a community to realize that gang development is a symptom of deeper causes which must be addressed . . . gang development is

a community problem which cries out for a collaborative community response" (Coalition for Youth Services, U.D., p. 4).

Principles of community collaboration include (1) The development and acceptance by agencies of certain "facilitating leadership" . . . Someone must have the vision and be willing and capable of providing organization and coordinating roles. This facilitating role is necessary to get the process started, to get the right individuals together at the right time to address the right issue; (2) Significant "key" participants/ organizations must be part of the process; (3) Issues must be identified, accepted, and (there must be) commitment to follow through by the key individuals/ organizations; (4) Procedures and organizational mechanisms, whether simple or complex, must also exist to facilitate collaboration.

The underlying basis for these principles was: (1) Willingness of participating parties/organizations to give up a degree of recognition and control of end results because of the greater value recognized through the results of collaborative efforts; (2) The facilitating leadership and organization needed to be non-threatening, held in high esteem, and have a reputation for operational competence; (3) Trust between participating parties (especially key individuals and organizations) is necessary in order to bridge any past, present, or future negative dynamics; (4) Significant support is necessary from the power base of participating organization(s) and/or government(s); (5) The more comprehensive the collaborative effort, the greater the need for broad-based power support; and (6) Sustained "intentional connectedness" would result from effectively working toward a common purpose (Ibid., pp. 6-10).

Assessment

The emerging youth gang problem is perceived as eliminated or reduced in Fort Wayne since about 1986. It is not clear, however, that crime by youth gang or former youth gang members has abated. The major problem(s) of current concern to key agency persons is drug trafficking and drug use. There is a difference of view as to whether "former" gang members are involved in drug trafficking, although there is general agreement that drug use by juveniles, including younger gang members, is not a serious problem. There is also a difference of opinion as to whether the disappearance of the gang problem or its quiescence is directly associated with an increase of drug trafficking. However, CYS and its Gang Prevention Action Group (GPAG) believe that the reduction of the gang phenomena, in its visible,

congregate, assaultive form, resulted largely from its collaborative efforts.

Statistical evidence is not available or at least not accessible to test any of these propositions. A key data problem may be the lack of consensus on what constitutes a gang or gang incident and to what extent all crime committed by gang members should be considered gang-related. The distinction between the activity of law-violating youth groups and youth gangs also seems unclear. Definitions of the problem by key actors appear to be variable. However, it is likely that the close working relationships of key actors and their common understanding of who gang kids were and what the gang problem was in specific situations overcame differences in articulation or conceptualization of the problem.

According to a school official, a gang-related incident is a situation involving two or more identified gang members resulting in a hostile or illegal situation. "Most incidents were gang fighting." According to Dave Brittenham, "we have a loose definition -- any behavior which is actual or potential of a violent or socially unacceptable nature involving youth known to be members of, or associated with, an identified gang." Duane Hinshaw of the Probation Department, however, indicates that a gang incident or gang-related offense is difficult to identify. Activity such as drug behavior, vehicle thefts, and burglaries by suspected gang members should not necessarily be regarded as gang motivated or related.

The focal definition of the Coalition for Youth Services is very broad. A gang-related incident is "youth activity and/or behavior which is unlawful, harmful, and/or excessively antisocial which needs to be addressed in its own right as well as being or potentially being associated with gang activity. The activities include, but are not necessarily limited to, breaking and entering, burglary, theft, drug use and dealing, auto theft, and robbery, etc."

It is possible that law or norm violating behavior by youth groups was made equivalent to youth gang behavior. Youth gang behavior may also have been viewed as more characteristic of or attributed to black than to white youth. This is not to deny that logos, graffiti, colors, gang fights, or drive-bys are clearly gang-related behaviors and also occurred. Further, it is possible that in a city with an emerging gang problem, law violating youth groups and youth gangs and their respective behaviors are difficult to distinguish.

There is more consistency in reports about the appearance and disappearance of gangs, mainly traditional gangs. There was no noticeable gang

problem in 1980, although there were possibly some youth groups engaged in law or norm violating behavior at the time. The gang problem in its visible form started around 1982 or 1983. It reached a peak in 1985 or 1986, when three to five significant gangs were identified, with average memberships of 50 to 60 members each. By 1987 or 1988, there was no longer a set of youth gangs committing typical or traditional youth gang problems. Sergeant Roach of the Juvenile Aid Division recently reports that a series of video surveillance activities at traditional youth hangouts, carried out in relation to a series of vehicle thefts and armed robberies, revealed that no new gang activity was occurring.

While there is agreement that the reduction of traditional youth gang activity paralleled a significant increase in drug dealing activity, there are different views about the connection between these two trends. Chief of Police Moore states there has been a "significant increase in the number of crack houses in the city." He believes that the decrease in traditional gang activity is linked to the involvement of older gang members or former gang members in the drug trade. He states there is less overt traditional gang activity because "it could hurt their drug profits. Recent investigations of the crack dealers in the city have turned up the names of former gang members." There is some agreement that a major reason for the crack trade is the movement of dealers from Detroit into Fort Wayne. Juveniles are often reported to be street suppliers and runners.

Duane Hinshaw of the Probation Department is less sure that the reduction of gang activity and the rise of the drug problem, at least as it is related to juveniles, are linked. He states that a few of the former gang leaders are now "strung-out on crack," but many juvenile gang members have not been involved in selling or using crack. He adds there was at least a year separating the decline of gang activity and the rise of the drug problem. Most juveniles are still into use of alcohol and marijuana. Another police informant suggests that while the influx of crack may not have had an impact on reducing traditional gang activity, it could still be a factor in preventing the re-emergence of traditional gang activity. In other words, the efforts of CYS, GPAG, and the key response agencies individually and collectively could still have been significantly responsible for the reduction of the gang problem.

Duane Hinshaw and other justice system officials also state that criminal offenses by juveniles "have not gone down" in recent years. Total offenses for youth and adults have consistently gone up while the population has remained

relatively stable. Burglaries, robberies and homicides are up. It is possible that some former gang members using drugs are now into more burglaries and auto thefts to support drug habits, although they may not be heavily into drug trafficking. According to Hinshaw, the rise of the drug problem and other criminal offenses may not be related to the lack of jobs. There is currently full employment in Fort Wayne. "Employment of kids has gone up." The key problem is the lack of basic academic skills of many street youths and therefore their failure to be employed.

Captain Greer of the Juvenile Aid Division agrees that few juveniles have been involved in drug trafficking. Only three cases were reported during the past year. He indicates further that he has no reports of youth gang members arrested as part of crack house raids, although older "former" gang members have been involved. About 50 of 100 crack houses have been closed down. No major drug problems have been identified in the schools. "We had a police informant positioned in the schools for some time, but he was unable to buy anything." He adds "There are not a lot of kids in drug treatment."

A school official and Dave Brittenham suggest, however, that there may be heavy involvement by youth in drug selling and using, although it is not clear how many of them are gang members. The school official states that "kids in the middle school are becoming involved with crack house operations and most of the youths are from Fort Wayne." Dave Brittenham claims that drug use is widespread in the black and white adult and youth populations. Furthermore, "younger kids are being used as lookouts and runners. Kids are making fast bucks. There is minimal competition between drug factions, but this is beginning to change."

Brittenham suggests that the drug problem is more complex and elusive than the traditional youth gang problem and that the city and CYS have not yet been as successful in dealing with it. "Whereas in our previous gang situation we knew who our players were, this is not the case now. Our network approach on this issue has not clicked yet." The city administration and police department, although they have moved somewhat forcefully, have also not been as effective in dealing with the problem, as they were with the traditional gang problem. Furthermore, the low number of juvenile drug cases may be the result of reporting procedures. The drug cases, juvenile or adult, are handled by the narcotics division, but they may not have specifically identified the juvenile cases.

Finally, Sergeant Roach of the Juvenile Division, Police Department, observes that CYS recently

sponsored a reunion of former gang members. "The purpose was to see what was happening with the gang situation in Fort Wayne. It was a big success. Over 300 people turned out. Some of the former gang members were now in school. Some had jobs. They didn't seem to be interested in gangs anymore. This led us to believe that gang activity is at a standstill."

Conclusion

Our knowledge of the changing or disappearing gang problem in Fort Wayne is handicapped by insufficiency of data and lack of consistency in definition and reporting. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that there was an emerging gang problem in the city in the early 1980s and that a process of collaboration among schools, police, and agencies was effective in its control or reduction. The reduction of traditional gang activity occurred also within a context of an emerging, larger scale and more complex drug problem that probably involved some gang youth and older gang or former gang members.

The collaboration of key persons or organizations dealing with the gang problem was mainly at the interagency level and employed a primary deterrent strategy by a variety of actors, supplemented by social intervention. It is not clear that significant preventive or community mobilization efforts were employed, e.g., parenting classes, use of special curricula, remedial education; police based-sponsored community education about the gang problem; or that efforts to mobilize concerned parent or other direct citizen involvement were significantly developed.

Some of the comments of informants regarding the causes and response to the problem include concern that there is social isolation of significant sections of the black community and xenophobia or racism by key elements of the white population. One informant notes that all of the juvenile gang members institutionalized on battery charges were blacks. "If these kids would have been white middle class, they probably wouldn't have been sent away."

Another informant indicates there may have been some violations of confidentiality of information and youth privacy. The identification of juveniles as gang members and their subsequent placement on gang lists that were circulated and used as a basis for the actions of various agencies were based both on suspicion or hearsay as well as some good evidence. Better criteria and procedures were needed to establish and verify gang membership.

The remarks of the Fort Wayne informants were extremely open and honest, reflecting deep concern

with the welfare and social development of Fort Wayne youth as well as the safety and protection of the broader community. Yet, Frazier, the YMCA (CYS) associate coordinator and outreach worker, perceives the current situation pessimistically: "The streets are now more dangerous than before and drug dealers have been able to more easily penetrate communities because of the worsening economic situation." On the other hand, Duane Hinshaw of Juvenile Probation emphasizes that at least one aspect of the gang situation, probably as narrowly defined, has improved: "The number of youths involved in shootings or caught with weapons has actually gone down in recent times." Despite some of these different perceptions, Fort Wayne represents one of the best examples of a tight networking approach spanning criminal justice and non-criminal justice agencies of all the cities examined in our survey (n=45). Community agencies were mobilized and a generally consistent approach, mainly suppression but also social intervention, was established and successfully implemented.

References

Young Mens Christian Association (YMCA). undated. "Coalition for Youth Services." Fort Wayne, Indiana.

CASE STUDY 3

Draper Cottage
 Ethan Allen School for Boys
 Bureau of Juvenile Services
 Division of Corrections
 Department of Health and Social Services
 Wisconsin

Background

(Quotations, unless otherwise identified are from oral written remarks by Draper Cottage staff or Superintendent Oscar Shade.)

The Draper Cottage of the Ethan Allen School for Boys is located in Wales, Wisconsin, a relatively short distance from Chicago. It is one of the very few programs in the country which attempts to deal with the distinctive problems of gang youth in a residential or institutional context. This institutional program may be unique in its focus on gang youth, its variety of activities, and its intentions and plans to evaluate the effectiveness of its correctional and rehabilitative efforts.

It is difficult to include corrections along with other components of the justice system in a site visit to a city, since correctional institutions are often isolated from or not significantly

related to community programs. However, since gang youth tend to be at higher risk than other kinds of delinquents of being sent to a correctional or residential facility, it seemed important to specifically visit and describe such a program.

The Ethan Allen School for Boys is one of two medium security youth corrections institutions for the most serious and difficult to manage juvenile offenders in Wisconsin. It is 125 miles northwest of the Chicago Loop, located between Milwaukee and Madison in a rich farm and resort area. The institution contains two types of structures set on a campus surrounded by a wooded area. The large buildings were constructed early in the 20th century as part of a tuberculosis hospital complex. Other well constructed cottages date from the 1960's. The School is visibly separated from its environment by a high, 14-foot fence topped with a 3-foot roll of barbed wire. Entrance to the institution is through two sets of electronically operated security doors. Once past security, the School appears to be an attractive campus with relatively free and open access for residents and staff, albeit within the secure enclosure.

The institution has a recent history of relatively liberal and humanistic administration. The School was established in its present location in 1959. The first administrator developed a cottage system which provided youth with a considerable degree of privacy and personal freedom. Each youth had his own room and was permitted to wear his own clothes and keep personal belongings. An approach which emphasized education and personal change, in addition to discipline, was inaugurated during the 26-year tenure of the first superintendent.

Dr. Oscar Shade is a 58-year-old African-American with a Ph.D. in Education who has been the superintendent since 1984. He has continued and further developed the humanistic approach of the School. His chief innovations thus far have been a democratic, decentralized administration and a specialized set of programs. Considerable responsibility resides in program managers and social service staff for different programs and operation of the cottage complex. Special programs and cottages have been established for the following kinds of problem youth: drug and alcohol abusers, sex offenders, serious delinquents, older offenders, younger offenders, those requiring intensive treatment, as well as hard-core gang offenders. Vilas Hall, known to the youth residents as the "hole," is the "discipline" cottage. Dr. Shade's aim is to optimize communication between different types of staff as well as with the youth offenders for purposes of improved rehabilitation and preventive work.

The Ethan Allen School for Boys emphasizes

education and preparation of youth for future learning. More specifically, its purposes are to prepare youth for return to the community with changed attitudes and values that emphasize legitimate behavioral career goals. Less explicitly, its mission, of course, is to protect the community from serious juvenile offenders. The means to achieve these social educational purposes include the provision of opportunities for basic remedial, developmental, and exceptional education, as well as industrial arts and recreation. Social and psychological services, psychiatric consultation as well as security arrangements are present. A qualified and certified staff is available to operate the program.

Three hundred twenty-two (322) youths were residents at The Ethan Allen School for Boys in May 1989. The average age of offenders was 16-1/2 years; 60.5 percent are black, 31.7 percent are white, and 7.1 percent are Hispanic. The age of offenders and the proportion of minority youth have been going up in recent years. The majority of youth in the institution have a history of 4 or 5 prior placements for offenses. Youth are referred to Ethan Allen School mainly for property crimes (e.g., burglary, robbery) but also for sexual assaults and batteries. Four or five have been sent to the institution for homicides. There is a reported increase in gang affiliated youth in recent years. The average stay of offenders is 8 to 10 months, although there appear to be pressures from legislators (for economic reasons) and community reformers to reduce time spent at the institution. Upon discharge, approximately 70 percent of the youth are released to alternative placements in the community, the remainder are sent home.

It should be noted that the institution does not determine length of stay of inmates. A juvenile review board establishes the disposition based on the needs of the particular youth within a philosophy of least restrictive placement, but also with due regard for community safety and protection.

The Draper Cottage assigned for designated hard-core or committed gang youth presently contains 27 residents. The average age of Draper Cottage youth is about 17-1/2 years. A recent analysis indicates that 84.8 percent are black; 10.3 percent Hispanic, and 1 youth, 3.3 percent are white. In other words, the cottage contains relatively older, more minority and fewer white youth than the institution as a whole. Draper Cottage youth are also more serious offenders, with longer histories of assaultive crime. The pattern of offenses for which gang youth are referred to the institution and placed in Draper Cottage has

changed in recent years, with more involvement in drug offenses and participation in organized criminal behavior. Twenty-two of 30 youth most recently resident in Draper have been charged with drug trafficking. Draper Cottage Youth generally stay longer than those in the institution-at-large.

Two hundred sixty-two (262) staff are assigned to deal with Ethan Allen's youth population, as follows: 143 youth counseling staff, including supervisory personnel, 50 teachers, 14 social workers, 10 food service workers, 20 maintenance staff, and the remainder administration and supervisory personnel. Each cottage houses 20 to 30 boys. Staffing is staggered so that on the first and third shifts, when the boys are either at school or asleep, one counselor is on duty at each cottage. Two counselors work during the afternoon and evening hours.

The cost of the Ethan Allen School for Boys program is \$33,000.00 to \$35,000.00 a year per youth. Reliable data on recidivism are not available at this time. Estimates vary from 50 percent to 70 percent. "In a four year study about 50 percent entered the adult system on either probation or incarceration. While a significant percent of the youth released from Ethan Allen School do return and thereby recidivate, a significant percentage of these are returned for rules violations rather than new violations of the law."

The apparent high recidivism rate, however computed, may be due in large measure to selection factors. The worst or most serious juvenile offenders in the state are present in Ethan Allen. Community pressure is also building to close one of the two youth correctional institutions in favor of less costly and perhaps more effective programs, including intensive probation supervision, more youth employment programs, and more front end preventive programs, including court orders for youth to remain in school in the community.

Draper Cottage

The creation of the Draper Cottage for gang youth (i.e., a specialized correctional gang unit) may be traced to several factors: more and more youth were arriving, especially from Milwaukee, whose crimes seemed to be gang-related or inspired; the Milwaukee Police Department had formed a gang unit and thereby influenced the development of a specialized unit in the institution; the specialized program pattern by the institution of assigning youth with similar problems to the same cottage; and the Superintendent's belief that the school had a special responsibility to teach and

assist minority youth, especially gang youth, to modify their behavior and pursue a more productive course.

Between 1984 and 1986, an institutional study committee was organized to learn "about the issues of youth gangs" and to discover what was occurring in the field to deal with the issues. Several adult and juvenile institutions were visited or contacted by mail. Nothing was published or available that could be used as a guide. "Most agencies were dealing with the phenomena by simple suppression of the behavior." According to Dr. Shade, "Our own experience, the behavior of the residents as well as what they were telling us, made it abundantly clear that the issues were far more significant than could be dealt with by suppression alone."

A staff work group decided to develop a "gang program" that would work not with gang-affiliated youth but those who had assumed positions of street-gang leadership, who had a history of aggressive-assaultive behavior, and who "to the best of our intelligence gathering, had a connection between their delinquent acts and their gangism." The decision was made to "provide a broader educational and social-psychological rehabilitation" program within the institution for those "residents who posed the greatest risk to the community."

Ethan Allen School invested "a great deal of time and resources in the training of staff" in the use of relevant psychological approaches for dealing with criminally oriented youth, e.g., "Behavioral Errors in Thinking." A special consulting psychologist, Dr. Dave Smith, was hired to teach the model and its implementation. The counseling model is a cognitive approach to rectifying poor decision-making and is based upon the work of Stanton Samenow and Samuel Yechelson. Nevertheless, it is not clear that staff have received adequate training specifically relevant to youth gang phenomenon, particularly its group and community-related aspects.

Some staff turnover has been experienced in the Draper Cottage program, but this is no more serious than in any other program operated by the institution. Turnover is not specifically related to the type of program being developed at Draper. The management and control problems of youth in the Cottage are typical of those generally encountered in most institutional settings. A recent report observed, however, that "although the residents still require a great deal of monitoring and control, they respond to the permanent staff and generally have few problems in the Cottage; however, when relief staff work in the Cottage without a permanent counselor, it is

not uncommon to experience behavioral problems -- particularly with youth recently assigned to the Cottage (A Program and Operations Review 1988, p. 111)."

The Ethan Allen School approaches the problem of rehabilitation of gang youth emphasizing social education as well as a community-based strategy of suppression and control. Primary contacts are made with law enforcement departments in Kenosha, Racine, Beloit, and Madison, as well as Milwaukee, to obtain gang-related information prior to arrival to the school, as a basis for diagnosis and cottage placement, as well as for monitoring the youth's progress when he goes on furlough and determining whether he remains out of the gang after his release from the Draper Program. A relationship has also been established with the Midwest Gang Crime Investigators Association for staff training and policy guidance purposes.

Specific procedures have been formulated to carry out monitoring and supervisory objectives. The Draper Cottage Program depends on the correct identification of youth who are gang members, the nature and severity of their gang-related offenses, and whether gang youth return to gang affiliation and gang-motivated offenses upon release. Law enforcement information and cooperation is essential to the effective implementation of these facets of the School program. The Ethan Allen School relies heavily on police-level information to determine the eligibility of the youth offender for the Draper Program. In turn, the police are notified when a Draper Cottage youth returns to the community. A questionnaire is also directed to the police department to determine whether the youth continues to associate with gang members and whether the criminal acts he may commit are gang-related. The designation of a former Draper Cottage youth as gang-affiliated is made if the youth is seen by the police department (in Milwaukee), with other gang members on five or more occasions.

In addition, there is some interaction by the School with community-based aftercare programs. The Career Youth Development Agency in Milwaukee has established ties with the institution to offer a variety of services to youth upon their discharge (See below). Major aftercare linkage, however, is carried out through field parole units and contracted group homes and half-way houses. Ethan Allen staff also exchange information on gang-related matters with other adult and juvenile correctional institutions in the state, for gang management and control purposes.

Cottage Selection Criteria and Special Youth Characteristics

The Draper Cottage Program addresses the problems of gang youth in terms of not only their distinctive personal and social needs but in relation to their potential influence in the Ethan Allen School at large. Only 20 to 30 gang youth are selected for admission to the Draper Program, but in fact 150 or almost half of all resident youth are estimated to be gang-affiliated. Only the most serious gang-affiliated youth (i.e., highly aggressive, core or leadership gang youth) are selected for the program. Broader programs that involve peripheral gang youth or youth at risk of gang membership in the institution have not been yet developed.

The purpose of the Draper Cottage Program is to address the problem of "gangism" and how it may affect the gang member's delinquency "in an effort to diminish both." "Gangism," however, is not specifically defined or described. Group and contextual factors are at least partially addressed. Distinction is made between gang-instituted crime, which grows out of gang structure, interests, and processes, and other types of more individually related crime. It is assumed by program staff that the immediate genesis of gang behavior is in the needs of youth for adolescent peer affiliation and for social and recreational purposes.

However, distinctive cultural, economic, and social structural factors are viewed as accounting for the different kinds of gang youth and their behaviors which the program must confront. It is assumed that black gang youth are more committed to criminal organization and economic interests, that Hispanic gang youth are more identified with collective group interests and turf traditions, and that white gang youth, in their gang-equivalent Satanic cults, are not only often committed to racist ideology but have more disturbed personalities than blacks or Hispanics. Nevertheless, most gang youth come from dysfunctional and/or single-parent families, or in some cases homes where parents and other family members have been gang members or have criminal histories.

The specific characteristics of youth which become a basis for program intervention include the poor educational preparation of gang members. They tend to be high-school dropouts, although there is no evidence that they are more in need of one kind of special education than another. They tend to be highly aggressive with low self-esteem. A number of them are substance abusers. Some are fathers and in need of parenting information. Staff are continually struggling to understand distinctive but changing gang linguistic and behavioral forms to make their interventions meaningful. Youth

apparently do not want staff "to understand their linguistic and behavior forms." This poses special challenges for staff.

Program Elements

The basic aim of the Draper Cottage Program is to "contain gang-related behavior in all activities . . . and try to teach them to use their skills to move beyond negative gang behavior and work toward becoming a better person and citizen, . . . to be successful without being dependent on gang activity." The primary model of intervention is directed at the development of "cognitive skills of decision-making and the use of rational thinking rather than emotional response as a means for determining action and response." A behavioral framework, including positive reward and negative consequences, as well as an educational and recreational resource approach, are also utilized. The following program opportunities are provided:

- Behavioral Errors in Thinking Counseling (BE-IT)
- Perception and Communications Training (PACT)
- Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse (AODA) Counseling, Individual and Group
- Anger Reduction Training
- Association with Career Youth Development Inc. (CYD) for Community Alternatives
- A Reward System at the Cottage Level for Treatment Progress
- Primary Counselors Providing Direct Counseling Service
- Post-Ethan Allen School Evaluation

The primary counseling method is the application of the Behavioral Errors in Thinking (BE-IT), modified in order to find a "shared language" with gang youth and to facilitate discussion of gang-related behavior. These primary errors in thinking are the basis for encouraging change on an individual as well as on a group basis: "Victim Stance"; "Lack of Concern for Others"; "Fears of Being Put Down"; "Refuses a Trust or Obligation"; "Shows Weak and False Pride"; "Using Anger in a Wrong Way"; and "Poor Planning and Decision-Making." The Cottage residents are required to log daily behaviors that are a result of errors in thinking, identify the specific error in thinking, and develop in its place a strategy that would have been successful. Residents also receive daily instruction around the errors model.

A second set of activities of the program

emphasizes Perception and Communications Training (PACT). The mini-course of 12 sessions focuses on how people communicate with each other, what is successful communication, and values clarification. The Cottage also offers Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse (AODA) counseling through programs presented by Career Youth Development in Milwaukee, as well as through the Waukesha Council on Alcoholism. Anger Reduction Training utilizes a group process to teach youth skills to control their anger reaction to various stimuli. The Career Youth Development Agency provides counseling mainly on an aftercare basis. Youth are also encouraged to seek out the agency after release to complete their G.E.D.

Affiliation with a specific gang is deliberately not a criterion for residence in the Cottage program or participation in its activities. Members of rival gangs are not only housed together, but participate in the same activities. The mixing of opposing gangs "does generate some management challenges," but the design is justified since it "keeps the gang behavior from going underground and undetected," and provides opportunities for staff "to challenge gang values and participation." Whether staff are fully or adequately aware of the consequences of mixing members of different gangs and are able to confront such behavior is discussed below.

Various gang behaviors are proscribed and different demerits or punishments are meted out for different degrees of gang behaviors. Apparently the way the institution views certain gang behaviors has changed over time. For example, "signing is no longer regarded as a major violation of the rules," particularly when other more serious gang-related behaviors occur. Youth are also randomly tested to see if they have used drugs during weekend furloughs from the institution.

Assessment

The program has been in existence in its present form for less than two years. It is too early to assess the success of the program, which is still undergoing significant change and development. Staff are aware they are engaged in an extremely difficult and challenging enterprise. They are not sure that they have been successful. They believe they are doing some things "right" and that the program may prove worthwhile in the long term. While it is not possible to assess the program in terms of recidivism rates, varying aspects of program implementation may be considered.

Staff regard the Be-It activities as a particularly important effort to change behavior and achieve overall program goals. One staff

person believes that youth who complete the Be-It program recidivate less. A cursory review of statistical information reveals, however, that only about a third of the Cottage residents appear to have attended 10 sessions or more, and another third have attended zero or one session. PACT sessions seem to have been poorly attended, with the majority of youth not attending any sessions and others attending between four and seven sessions. These statistics, however, may not take into consideration that youth who don't accept the re-education process may be "resistive" and are then subject to the "discipline process" and a stay in the so-called discipline cottage, after which they must start group sessions over again. The Superintendent estimates that "most youth upon departure" [from Ethan Allen School] have attended a range of 24 to 30 sessions.

AODA sessions were also poorly attended. The majority of youth presently in Draper Cottage attended two or fewer AODA sessions. However, the intent of these sessions is to bring youth into contact with community agencies, as they are being prepared to leave the institution. In any case, this program has been recently restructured, providing more intensive treatment and education. It now incorporates youth from the entire institution.

The relationship between frequency of attendance at these activities and behavioral adjustment within the institution is also not clear. For example, there does not appear to be a statistical relationship between frequency of attendance at Be-It sessions and the number of days spent in Level IV, the maximum security for serious rule violation.

This is not to deny that some youth in Draper Cottage are making optimal use of program opportunities, are currently doing well in terms of conformity to Cottage rules, and have incorporated -- or at least express -- "desired" values. Some youth indicate they have profited from the Draper Cottage activities. We note that in a recent non-random survey of gang youth in six different programs, mainly community based, the youth at Draper Cottage reported the most varied participation in services and that they were most often helped by them. To what extent this acknowledgement is translated into positive community adaptation is not yet known. On the other hand, it is possible that a sizable group of Cottage youth is "playing it cool" and "lying low." Some may already be committed to organized criminal careers, particularly in the drug trade. Drug use within the institution has admittedly occurred. Its nature is not known or at least revealed. Some gang recruitment occasionally takes place. There have been other serious rule

violations by individuals.

Staffing a pioneer demonstration effort such as the Draper Cottage Program is difficult and challenging. Better specifically trained gang work staff is admittedly required. Only one staff member is a minority group member and from an inner-city community. Selection of appropriate and sufficient staff is limited by civil service requirements. There has been some problem with staff turnover. It is not clear that staff are trained to understand the complexities of the youth gang problem and to develop appropriate strategies and procedures of intervention in an institutional context. Expertise to remedy this deficiency seems not to be readily available.

A staff "wish list" reveals uncertainty about the value of the program and its prospects. There is a general sense that the program needs to be strengthened. Group therapy opportunities should be expanded. "Criminal thinking behavior" needs to be better monitored with "immediate constructive feedback and consequences as appropriate." Staff is unclear whether there are too few "program resources" or "too many luxuries" presented to youth. One staff member was looking for a "quick fix" to solve the gang problem; for example, a special procedure, event, or ceremony to "initiate youth out of the gang." The integration of both support and control or supervision activities in regard to gang youth while in the institution and after release needs to be better conceptualized.

Additionally, the staff seems unclear as the Draper Cottage Program needs to be further developed and encapsulated or whether there is a need to develop a broader, institution-wide approach. The gang problem appears to be pervasive in the institution, at different levels of severity. Many non-Draper staff at Ethan Allen School are not aware of gang-related behavior by youth residents and may not respond appropriately, creating an inconsistent, or at least not a generally informed, approach. The response to gang-related behavior is generally well recognized and consistently addressed within Draper Cottage. Staff in the Draper Cottage are impressed with the seriousness of the gang problem and the difficulties of dealing with it. Some would like a more isolated, longer term, concentrated, and restrictive program for seriously committed gang youth. Other staff favor an earlier, more preventive approach. "Get the kids at a younger age," 13 or 14 years at the time of their second or third offense. Older adolescent gang youth may be too far gone for a rehabilitative program.

Staff believe that they have worked very hard and have accomplished a good deal, but are clearly uncertain how effective their efforts have been.

There is a sense that a variety of factors over which they have no control, such as general institutional policy, legislative, criminal justice system, and community pressures will significantly influence the future of the program.

We remain unsure about the extent of the gang problem in Ethan Allen School. However, the Superintendent estimates that based on police reports, 50 percent to 60 percent of youth generally at the institution may be regarded as gang-affiliated at some level. Draper Cottage addresses only about 20 percent of the most serious gang offenders. To what extent the problems that staff have to contend with in regard to Draper Cottage youth reflect problems of institutionalization or problems of gang affiliation, or both, remain unclear. The Superintendent, nevertheless, declares that the institutional "gang problem is in better control and management today than at any other time in recent history."

Conclusion

The Ethan Allen School for Boys has recognized that a youth gang problem exists both in the institution as well as in the community and has attempted to deal with the problem in its various manifestations in meaningful ways. A dedicated professional staff and administration are confronting the problem in a humanistic manner consistent with community interests and values. There are few, if any, guidelines for staff to follow in this challenging effort. It is not clear that an appropriate overall design to deal with the problem has yet been developed or that certain elements may prove effective. At this time, the program seems to be in a state of clarification and further development. The institution is commendably committed to an evaluation of the effectiveness of its program. To what extent the program has sufficient external support and consistency of internal direction and staff has the knowledge to mount an effective program remain to be determined. There are apparently a number of obstacles to creation of a special institutional program geared to the youth gang problem. Research results on this unique and remarkable program are expected to be forthcoming in 1990.

References

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Columbus, Ohio

Background

Columbus, a city of over half a million, situated in Franklin County, is located in the center of the state with major roads to other large cities in Ohio as well as to Detroit and Chicago. Columbus has been expanding into the county for almost forty years. It now contains an area of about 200 square miles, with an increasingly diverse population. Blacks comprise 22 percent of the population, a sizable number of whom are poor, congregated in low-rise, low-income public housing on the near east side of the central city.

Columbus is the capital of Ohio with a thriving, well-balanced economy. A major high-tech industry has grown up over the years, partly around Ohio State University, including a world renown research center, Battelle Memorial Institute. A well-trained, highly educated work force is associated with state government, industry, and the university. Columbus has a relatively low unemployment rate of 6 percent compared to other large cities in the Midwest. Still this is an increase from 3.8 percent in 1970. Columbus has fewer manufacturing jobs than in an earlier period. The available jobs now require higher levels of education and training than many members of the black population, particularly its youth, possess. The drop-out rate for black youth is 50 percent or more, with estimates for gang youth of 90 to 100 percent. Nevertheless, Columbus continues to have a reputation as a typical American city, with a stable middle class population, conservative politically but with a rich tradition of innovation in education and social service fields.

The Gang Problem

Columbus recently identified a youth gang and youth violence problem. While the youth gang problem was mainly a black inner-city problem, it also affected Franklin County, including predominately white suburban communities, such as Washington and Ground View. The problem was different in different communities. For example, some youth gang members were mainly disruptive at football games and shopping malls. However, 90 percent of the youth gangs are estimated to be black (Huff 1989, p. 526).

A youth gang problem emerged between 1983 and 1984 and peaked around 1987. Huff observes that between April 1986 and May 1988, there were 20 "separately named gangs," but "the number of truly separate, viable gangs at present is approximately fifteen" (Huff 1989, p. 526). Since then a "crack" problem has developed, resulting, according to many

sources in the city, from "outside penetration by older gang members from Detroit and Los Angeles." The "crack" problem has also been associated with rising rates of robbery, theft, and burglary as well as individual-level violence. The youth gang problem apparently began when several street groups engaged in break dancing or "rapping" evolved into youth gangs. Members of street groups engaged in property crime, auto theft, shoplifting, and burglary before they developed gang names, symbols, colors and engaged in gang conflict. Some of the gangs in the early period were white, however, most are now black, or at least the problem is recognized and defined as black. A United Way source indicates that a youth gang problem, in fact, exists in several white suburban communities, but police, schools, and parents in these communities state they "do not have a problem." The current coordinator of the Youth Outreach Program adds that the "drug problem is not exclusively a black problem as evidenced by the recent arrest of suburban whites and other ethnic group members."

A variety of reasons have been presented for the development of traditional -- although not necessarily turf-based -- gangs and their later transformation to drug dealing groups or cliques: the busing of students from opposing gang neighborhoods to the same high school; the presence of a family with gang-wise youth recently moved from Los Angeles; the splintering and spread of gangs; the expansion of the narcotics trade from Detroit to Columbus; and deteriorating economic opportunities for mainly poor, relatively unskilled, and isolated black youth; although the current unemployment situation may be beginning to affect some white youths as well.

Youth gangs are viewed as aggressive and coercive, engaging in a broad range of criminal behaviors. One source indicated that two to three killings could be attributed to gang activity in the early period. However, much of the youth gang activity occurred in and around roller rinks, recreation centers, shopping centers and buses. Students at some of the schools began to wear colors, signify, i.e., "throw gang handsigns," and engage in recruitment activities in the early period. Although some gang altercations occurred at school football games, no substantial evidence of drug use or trafficking was reported on school grounds.

Youth gang structure and activities have changed in the past three years. The number of gangs has declined from an estimated 15 or more gangs with a membership of 800 in the mid-1980s to an estimated 5 to 8 gangs with a total membership between 50 and 400, currently. Youth gangs have become smaller, better organized, less visible and more closely related to older youth and young adults

engaged in drug trafficking. However, it is not clear that gangs per se have gone into the drug trafficking business. It is more likely that gang or former gang members are involved in the drug trade on an individual or small clique basis.

One justice system source claims that youth 12 years and possibly younger are now used as lookouts and runners; those 13 to 16 years are employed as street dealers and runners; 17 to 19 year olds may be used as the drug holders, and those who are older play significant roles in running the crack houses. The youth are mainly from poor, single-parent families, dropouts with little prospect of obtaining well paying legitimate jobs. However, a number of middle class clean-cut black youth, some who do well at school, are said to have recently become involved in the drug trade. But it is not clear that these youths are also youth gang members. Some black youth do not see "themselves having a stake in the future through legitimate channels." However, only two of the gangs are reported with a primary commitment to drug dealing. Drug use and trafficking play a secondary role to traditional youth gang activities for the majority of youth gangs. Companionship, status, protection, intimidation, and partying remain primary gang activity.

Community Response

Certain events may have precipitated the community's awareness of a gang problem and the need for agencies to do something about it. The media paid a great deal of attention to two instances of gang attack on youth in Columbus in 1985 and 1986. The Governor's daughter and the Mayor's son were attacked in separate gang incidents. A gang leader who was interviewed on T.V. and made threats against another gang was killed in a drive-by shooting a few days later. A school superintendent, caught in the middle of a gang altercation at a school football game, "jumped out front" in getting the community to do something about the problem. The Mayor also met with a group of gang youth who informed him of their lack of training and consequent inability to find job opportunities.

A group of community and agency leaders, including representatives of local city government, the Metropolitan Human Services commission, and service agencies began to meet in 1985 (Foult 1987). The group focused on law enforcement, coordination of existing youth agencies, and the development of a special program entity, the Youth Outreach Project (YOP), to both divert core-gang members into the "mainstream" and also to provide youth at the "fringe" of gangs with alternatives to gang activity (Ibid., p. 1).

Responsibility for funding YOP and/or providing in-kind services was undertaken mainly by the United Way of Franklin County, the City of Columbus, the Columbus Board of Education, and the Columbus Foundation. The project was administered over the first two years by United Way. The schools provided the first and later the second project coordinator. In each case, school administrators were released for the special assignment. The Franklin County Youth Coordinating Committee provided general oversight and evaluation of the project. It comprised senior officials and administrators from the Franklin County Juvenile Court, Franklin County Children Services, United Way, Suburban Police Department(s), and the Metropolitan Human Services Commission. They had the power to make decisions and obligate funds. Operational guidance and assistance in the development of the intervention models was lodged in the Franklin County Coordinating Task Group comprising executive directors of agencies actually involved in the project as well as representatives of the Columbus City Schools, Columbus Police Department, and the Franklin County Juvenile Court. The task force group was responsible for the details of program administration.

The YOP program was planned so that all community participants would have a stake in the success of the project. There was also an effort to establish flexibility of goals so that the program could be refocused with changing problems and needs. The United Way was able to play facilitator and coordinator roles, they "were able to get key funders involved directly with providers [and] reach into various communities and municipalities to get resources together."

The project commenced activity in the spring of 1985 and its goals were to: 1) draw upon the natural strengths of families and communities; 2) provide for better coordination of information and services; and 3) explore several different models for interacting with youth. The first year's objectives were development of information about the scope of the problem and establishing initial relationships with youth and the agencies to which youth would be referred. The second year's objectives focused more specifically on reduction "of the incidence of youth violence" as perceived by a wide range of officials and agencies' staff; and improvement of the "behavior of target youth by way of direct intervention and linkages to appropriate social service programs."

The project structure plan included a coordinator, assistant coordinator, 8 to 10 outreach workers based in three "magnet" youth serving agencies -- under dual supervision of the coordinator and the particular magnet agency, a crisis intervention

mobile team, a neighborhood Advisory Council -- which apparently was not established -- a part-time suburban worker, and a community youth liaison worker. The outreach effort was modelled in part after the Chicago YMCA outreach worker program developed in the 1960's. Workers were sent out to the gangs in the streets to establish relationships, to obtain information to be shared with police and schools, and most importantly to refer youths, particularly from the schools, to youth-serving and other agencies for needed services.

The major goal of the Youth Outreach Program was the development of a network of information for purposes of monitoring the gang problem, assisting other agencies to deal with the problem, and helping youth mainly through referrals. This set of purposes required that youth agencies, community organizations, and components of the juvenile justice system, especially the police, collaborate with each other. Turf issues and gaps in communication among agencies were to be overcome.

Earlier separate efforts to deal with the youth gang problem by the Columbus Police, Columbus schools, and various agencies had apparently not proved sufficient. The police developed a Juvenile Task Force which did not have sufficient manpower to deal with large congregations of disorderly or antisocial youth groups. The Columbus schools outlawed "colors" and tightened disciplinary standards, as did the city's recreation centers. The YOP was to be an important step in the direction of a comprehensive community approach to the problem, including not only deterrent objectives, i.e., more organized and greater police involvement to reduce the incidence of gang violence in Franklin County; but social intervention objectives, i.e., improving the behavior of targeted youth through appropriate social service programs and provision of "effective and targeted prevention effort"; as well as community development objectives, i.e., increasing the responsiveness of the local community to the needs of targeted youth; and also research evaluation, i.e., determining the project's impact on the youth it served and the current magnitude and severity of youth violence and related problems in Franklin County.

Youth Outreach Project

Based on reports of actual activity over the past two or more years, the project has focused on its second priority, social intervention for a range of youth, including not only core and teenage gang members, but youth at risk and non-gang members. Its current practices and procedures (Youth Opportunities Project, 1988) were stated as

follows:

"A. Case Review

A review of the youth is conducted routinely to determine if the youth is achieving the set goals and objectives that were developed prior to any in-depth involvement by the outreach worker.

The primary objective is to relegate the dependent youth to independent status . . .

The Outreach Workers, the Assistant Coordinator and Community Liaison Person meet twice a month to discuss the status of each youth . . .

B. Pilot of Prevention

. . . The Project is consistently engaged in `agency networking . . .' I the workers are assigned hot spots (i.e., skating rinks, athletic events, parties, etc. (Workers) assist youth in

- 1) conflict resolution
- 2) employment skills
- 3) drug/alcohol education
- 4) behavioral modification programs . . .

C. Explore Employment Services

. . . this project has taken the following steps to assist youth seeking employment.

1. The referral process for employment has been revised in order to centralize contact for participating employers.
2. Work readiness workshops are held . . .
3. A referral procedure is utilized in placing youth with agencies whose primary function is to provide employment for youths.

D. Inventory Local Prevention Services

E. Summarize Use of Referral Information

F. At-Risk Data Base

. . . As the Project begins its third year, changes in the activities of targeted youth have facilitated an emphasis on individuals rather than groups or gangs . . .

These 'individual at-risk youth' will include youth:

1. referred by the school system as having unruly behavior, truant, suspended, expelled (for various reason) and in need of outreach intervention as a means of prevention.

2. referred by the courts due to criminal acts, on probation or need of intervention to curtail future problems . . . "

Youth who are referred to the project do not necessarily fall within specific problem criteria in order to receive assistance.

"Cooperation, with the agencies and programs has `open[ed] the door' for the Outreach Project to direct youth to the proper agencies that can provide more adequate services . . . The project has taken the responsibility to guide 'troubled youth' in the direction where assistance is available."

Two research reports were commissioned to "evaluate" the project, but in fact provide mainly a description or some sense of what the activities of the project have been in 1987 and 1988. Very little funding was allocated to the research effort. The findings indicate that core-gang members did not comprise a large proportion of youth served. The percent of core-gang member and gang leadership served was 15.9 percent and the percent of non-gang and fringe youth served was 47.7 percent in 1987. Those percentages include adult contacts as well. In the second report of 1988, 64.6 percent of youth served were "at risk," non-gang, and other youth, while 32.2 percent are gang leaders and core-gang youth. There was apparently some greater attention paid to gang youth in the second year, nevertheless the primary target of service remained non-gang core or leadership youth. The age range of youth served was between 14 and 19 years, although most of the youth contacted were between 14 and 17 years.

The pattern of service to these youth appeared to shift between the first and second year. Much time and effort apparently was taken in the first year to get to know youth on streets, to identify their problems, and establish relationships. There was much general discussion but little crisis intervention (3.3 percent), job search (2.5 percent) or school-related counseling (3.3 percent). In the second year, project efforts seem to be more focussed and directed to job search (39.6 percent) and school-related activities (31.1 percent). Those latter percentages have to be reduced by about a third since the proportions of services provided add to considerably more than 100 percent. Unfortunately, no specific data is provided as to which kinds of youth were referred, what the nature of school-related problems were, how many youth were referred to how many jobs, and how long the youth stayed on them.

According to the reports, a variety of problems or issues were identified in the conduct of the

program over the first two years. The agency operators believed that expansion of the program and more funding were required. Dual supervision for outreach workers at the magnet centers created some problems. A need was expressed for better or expanded clinical case review involving social workers with youth outreach workers. Referral was clearly regarded as "an essential method," and the evaluators found that consistent community contact across agencies on behalf of YOP youth served had been achieved.

Police

The Columbus Police Department has been a major, if not the primary, player in the city's efforts to cope with the gang problem. Huff notes that the Youth Violence/Crime Section is unique "in its centralization of all four major gang control functions (intelligence, prevention, enforcement, and investigation) in one police unit (Huff 1989, p. 532). In recent years, however, the gang problem has evolved and has been more and more defined in individual violence and drug trafficking terms. The police have taken an increasingly broad community approach. Huff comments that the police now take a "balanced approach," having realized that "a total suppression strategy" is not the solution. At the same time, the commanding officer of the Youth Violence/Crime Section states that the unit is "geared to high visibility enforcement" and this strategy has contributed to a reduction of the youth gang problem in Columbus.

In light of the purposes and structure of the Youth Outreach Program, the police and YOP should have a close interdependent relationship. This does not seem to be substantially the case, however, even with some sharing of information on the gang problem, the provision of some training by the police at YOP seminars, and the participation by representatives of the police in the YOP Franklin County Coordinating Task Group. The director of YOP notes that "the police and our project work hand-in-hand, but stay independent in our activities. We don't want youth to associate us with the police." The police are also quite cautious in their relations with YOP staff. This was so particularly during the first year of the program.

Questions were raised initially by the police about the quality of outreach workers, their possible over-identification with gang members, their occasional "interference" with law enforcement operations. The fact that some of the YOP workers had criminal arrest records was troubling to the police. YOP no longer requests the assistance of the police in criminal history screening of all new YOP staff candidates, since

they are of a higher caliber. Almost all YOP staff now have some college education.

A manual of Procedure of the Columbus Police Department, dated October 1988 and revised February 1989, states that the mission of the Youth Violence/Crime Section is "to reduce or prevent violent acts and crimes committed by and against the youths of the City of Columbus. This mission will be pursued by using strict enforcement of the law against those individuals who are active members of violent groups, gangs, and by following up on those crimes committed to a successful prosecution in courts. The mission will also be pursued by steering youths to agencies that may help them, counsel them, and giving presentations on the negative aspect of gangs and drugs."

The mission of the Youth Violence/Crime Section is implemented by its Investigative and Enforcement Units and through its Juvenile Narcotics/School Liaison Unit. The latter unit works with the schools through investigative and enforcement activities as well as presentations to school youth on the negative aspects of drug use and trafficking. Police officers in the unit concerned with gang activities are expected to "identify gang members . . . write intelligence reports . . . use aggressive enforcement against gang members and others involved in youth violence problems . . . keep photographs and information on these people . . . talk with witnesses, victims, suspects, other officers, and citizens about their knowledge of the gang members who cause youth violence. . . use free time to patrol the areas known as gang hang-outs. . . Transit Authority buses, and school activities for gang problems -- devote some time to talking with younger teens . . . become aware of various city services that can help those people. . . "

According to one source, the Youth Violence/Crime Section "was designed" to play a community-wide coordinative role in respect to the gang problem. To what extent this coordinative role conflicts or complements the coordinative role of YOP is not clear.

The Youth Violence/Crime Section is staffed by a lieutenant, 3 sergeants, and 15 officers. It developed its approach after a visit by an officer to the police gang program in Los Angeles city and a seminar presented by the Chicago Police Department's Gang Crime Unit. Explicit criteria for identifying gang members and gang incidents have been developed. The Youth Violence/Crime Section maintains a gang file which is updated continually and purged every two years. An information system is in process of automation, however, only police officers from the department

have access to gang files. At the same time, the department does not keep statistics on gang-related crime per se. "However, information is shared with other agencies on a need-to-know basis."

Police and school security have worked together closely. The police have requested the schools keep an information file on suspected gang members to include the gang member's name, a short biography, and the parents' address. School principals have formulated these lists and given them to the director of school security. The Youth Violence/Crime Section provides information to the media, makes presentations to judges, and civic groups. However, as with YOP, there is some question about how closely related the Youth Violence/Crime Section is to the Probation Department's program in the Sullivant housing project.

The Youth Violence/Crime Section pays special attention to the connection between gangs and drug trafficking, but a special unit has also been established in response to community pressure to deal with the drug trafficking problem -- the Street Crime Attack Team (SCAT). This may result from the fact that gang membership is no longer as clearly visible as it used to be. Gang members may have been driven "underground" because of effective police pressure. The commander of the Youth Violence/Crime Section indicates that "it's tough to get good intelligence", on gangs currently, because "they don't talk."

Schools

There is a general recognition by sources in Columbus that the police and the Youth Outreach Project are the key components and the key coordinating units of the city's approach to the youth gang problem. At the same time, it is possible that the schools may provide effective functional linkage between these two "coordinating" agencies as well as a significant contribution to the city's mobilization of efforts. The School Board saw an incipient gang problem developing in 1985. It was concerned with the safety of students at school and sporting events. Its strategy was first to maintain order in the schools, then to support community efforts for dealing with the problem, and then finally to move from a reactive to a preventive mode.

Schools have been at the heart of both the gang problem and efforts to deal with it. One source reports that "busing caused gangs to spread like wildfire." The stability of neighborhood schools was destroyed as opposing gangs from the different neighborhoods confronted each other at the same high schools. At the same time, while gang

tensions and some problems were manifest at schools, major gang fights and drug dealing have not been regarded as a significant problem on school grounds. First, the schools attempted to "tighten up its academic and behavioral standards." Teachers were encouraged to exercise greater control in the classroom. Marginal students were reportedly "pushed out." At the present time, youth, especially more violent youth, are "expelled to the Youth Outreach Program and then referred to Urban League and community center programs for remedial education, recreation, counseling, and job placement."

The schools exercised leadership, not simply participating in the creation of the YOP but supporting it materially. A principal was released and assigned to coordinate the project. Housing was provided. Procedures were developed for referral of youth from schools who needed special services. However, it is not clear that YOP workers were in turn able to refer youth back to school and assist with better learning arrangements for them.

The schools have been able to manage the gang problem mainly through the efforts of its Safety and Security Department. Sufficient knowledge and relationship with gang youth have been established so that gang leaders are identified and influence is exercised to "cool" gang conflict or potential conflict situations. The department has assisted in the development of training sessions to sensitize teachers to the gang problem. School Security has been responsive to police efforts to identify gang signs and symbols and to their suggestions about handling the youth gang problem. The police were also permitted to serve warrants for gang youth on school property. More recently the school policy of summary suspension of youth for gang-related behavior has been replaced with a less stringent policy of more in-school suspension and alternative programs for youth who do not fit into regular class routines.

Probation

The Probation Department of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations/Juvenile Branch has recently created an outreach program in the Sullivant Gardens low-income housing project which focuses to some extent on the youth gang problem. The project, supported by a grant from the Governor's Office of Criminal Justice Services, was initiated in 1988 to provide alternatives to a gang and criminal lifestyle. The program serves primarily as a resource for probation workers, with little direct contact with police and YOP.

The specific programs appear to be built around

the influence, interest, and personality of a particular probation officer, Harvey Halliburton, with long-time roots and contacts in the Sullivant Gardens project whose population is mainly low-income black in single-parent households. The program focuses on early intervention for youth, 6 to 12 years old, and employment referral, education, and job training for older youth. Grassroots relationship as well as an individual services strategy is emphasized. The program operates out of an apartment provided by the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority and also uses the facilities of the Sullivant Gardens Recreation Center, the PAL Center, and the Southwest Community Center. Counseling sessions are also conducted in the Youth Detention Center and psychological treatment services are provided by the Community Mental Health Center.

There are two major components to the program of which Mr. Halliburton is the director, assisted by two former gang members who work part-time as project consultants. First, the Youth Leadership program focuses on youth 12 to 17 years of age who are on probation or who have some type of court contact. The caseload is expected to be 200, although only 12 are gang-affiliated probationers. Some difficulty was encountered initially with the program in overcoming resistance from some of the local delinquent youth or gang leaders. This situation was resolved after several of the youth, presumably on probation, were arrested. The second program targets high-risk youth 6 to 20 years, delinquent and non-delinquent, through positive youth development activities. The objective is to enhance self-esteem and create legitimate norms and values. "Good kids" are used as role models. "Bad kids" are linked with them in a series of athletic, recreational, and cultural activities, including a basketball league, art classes, and visits outside the ghetto area. Mr. Halliburton indicated that this program serves or will serve 1,000 youth of all kinds in the community.

The program aims to influence the environment of youth and has a community development emphasis. However, the extent to which community groups and other agencies are involved in the project appears to be limited. Adult volunteers and local community groups are apparently not involved in service delivery or advisory capacities. The program maintains a certain distance from the police who are perceived as too distant from the local community. Mr. Halliburton is concerned that too close or overt a linkage with the police would threaten his rapport with or even his safety in the community. He states he is able to violate probationers if they fail to comply with terms of probation. There is apparently little or no contact with YOP. Mr. Halliburton believes YOP is concerned primarily with short-term monitoring of

youth gang activity and diffusing violence through rumor control and information sharing with police and other agencies. He has adopted a long-term rather than a short-term crisis intervention strategy. For example, "his program is starting to develop vocational training and job opportunities for youth" (e.g., fast food service).

Assessment

A good deal of information is available on the effects of the various programs which have been mounted to deal with the youth gang problem in Columbus. There is little "hard" data, however, on the effectiveness of these efforts. Three studies provide data on various aspects of the gang situation, the structures and programs developed. One is a study of gang problems and programs in several Ohio cities, including Columbus (Huff 1989). The other two are evaluations of the Youth Outreach Program, published through the United Way (Fouk and Associates 1987, 1988). It is extremely difficult to estimate the impact of the programs on gang crime in Columbus despite the conclusions of these reports.

The statement that the Columbus approach is "as well-balanced and well-coordinated as any in the nation" (Huff 1989, p. 532) is questionable. The "effectiveness" claimed for the Columbus "approach" is not supported by data or the opinions of local agency sources. While it does appear that a "traditional" type gang problem has considerably "dissipated," and probably has been transformed into a "crack" drug problem, there is no clear evidence that either problem has been influenced by any of the programs established. It is possible that the "effectiveness" of police efforts may have "driven gangs underground." The "crack" problem may have been the key change factor.

Fouk and Associates report in their 1987 evaluation of the Youth Opportunities Program that "If the project needed to be successful in the development of an extensive network involving a wide variety of organizations and actors which worked in concerted action to impact youth, then the project is yet to accomplish this objective . . ." (p. 42). Fouk and Associates in their 1988 evaluation conclude that YOP has more than exceeded its objective of serving a targeted number of youth -- n=120 -- but there is no evidence that these youth were "hard-core" gang members as project objectives required. Referral relationships were clearly established. Finally, "gang activity has decreased. However, the proportion of the decrease that is directly attributable to the project is debatable" (Fouk and Associates 1988, p. 33).

A good deal of descriptive data, mainly at an anecdotal level, is available on the effects or output but not on the effectiveness or outcome of the city's programs established to confront the youth gang problem in its changing manifestations. Little hard statistical data is available. Impressionistic or anecdotal reports indicate there has not been a full or substantial sharing of data and substantial coordination of programs among agencies dealing with gang youth and youth violence. It is not clear that agencies such as the police, YOP, and probation fully share information on these problems or have developed joint operations to cope with them. Not all youth agencies have been accessible and willing to provide services to gang youths.

To what extent there has been or will be a de-emphasis of services to core-gang youth and a greater emphasis on preventive services to fringe, at-risk, and non-gang members is not clear. What the shift, if it occurs, will imply for control or prevention of gang and violence related problems has not been conceptualized. What the idea of prevention means in operational terms is currently a source of debate in Columbus, e.g., at what age should what program be initiated for what types of youth. Huff observes that Columbus has a two-pronged approach to the gang problem: (1) active and aggressive enforcement against gang leaders and hard-core gang members via the Youth Violence Crime Section . . . and (2) prevention directed at marginal gang members and would-be members via the Youth Outreach Project . . . " (Huff 1989, p. 531).

Reports indicate that certain educational and job-related programs for gang youth are not working. G.E.D. activities are not at all successful. Gang youth are signed up for classes but do not show up. Their academic skills are too low, they cannot catch up. Job referrals are generally not successful. Youth do not know how to present themselves adequately for job interviews. There is apparently a good deal of "red-tape" involved in job referrals and YOP youth often do not follow-through. If jobs are offered for which youths qualify, usually at minimum wage, they often refuse. They reportedly claim they can make more through illegitimate endeavors, such as drug-dealing. A Youth Enterprise project which involved youth painting dumpsters was deemed at least partially successful. Youth learned to take certain job-related responsibilities. But the project was not "picked-up" by YOP or some other agency.

In regard to the level of crime, the commander of the Youth Violence/Crime Section indicates that all figures are up, however. The relation of general crime to youth gang crime patterns is less

clearly delineated. The realization of gang activity came in 1983-84. A special police approach to deal with it developed in 1986. There was little traditional-type gang activity reported in 1988 but organized criminal activity, particularly in the drug trade is up and presumably involves significant numbers of former and current gang youth. How many or what proportion of youth arrested in narcotics charges are gang members, we do not know.

A school source, formerly with YOP, states that gang activity began to decline in the second year of the YOP and Police Task Force Operations. But this coincided with the increase of "crack houses" to 150. While there was a decrease in group-related assaults, there was an increase in robberies and thefts. The source adds that there are currently 300 to 400 crack houses in Columbus. Early in 1989, the Probation Department reported that of 100 youth with full project assessments in their project, only three had further contact with the court. However, we do not know what the risk period or program exposure time of these youths were, what services they received for how long, what the characteristics of youth were, and how these factors are related to the reported success rate.

Conclusions

The Columbus approach to dealing with gang youth is in process of development. A number of gang- and non-gang youth are now receiving services, who probably were not before. A higher level of sophisticated surveillance of gang activities is being conducted in a variety of places where youth congregate. Agencies are in process of learning to cooperate. The police, schools, and youth agencies are apparently in closer and more extensive contact with each other than in an earlier period. The gang violence problem appears to have subsided, but serious drug trafficking has arisen in its place which involves youth who formerly were or still presently are gang members. It is not clear that a well-coordinated or a comprehensive approach to the youth gang problem -- including attention to basic causal problems, such as insufficient educational and job opportunities for "at-risk" youth in isolated segments of Columbus -- has yet to be articulated and satisfactorily implemented.

To a large extent the availability of a considerable amount of information -- albeit of an anecdotal or reportorial nature -- suggests that while the Columbus approach shows promise, more program elaboration and "hard data" testing are necessary to determine validity and success. Nevertheless, Columbus is a relatively large and complex city. It has moved rapidly and with vigor

to deal with its changing youth group violence and drug-related problems which has confronted the city in a very substantial way.

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CASE STUDY 5

El Monte, California

Background

El Monte, a suburban community of 100,000, is located 15 miles east of downtown Los Angeles, in east central Los Angeles County. It consists of a 10-square mile area with a small airport, 8 parks, 28 elementary schools and 5 high schools. About one third of El Monte's area comprises industry and retail stores. It has a fairly strong industrial base of light industry and factories requiring ample numbers of semi-skilled and unskilled labor. The community has undergone considerable cultural and economic change from an 85-percent white population living in mainly owner-occupied single dwellings to a more than 62-percent Hispanic population living mainly in large apartment complexes and rental dwellings.

El Monte has experienced continuing population mobility and expansion. In the early 1970's, it had a population of 70,000. Growth has come mainly from low-income Mexican-American families, often dispossessed from properties and communities partially demolished because of the expansion of the Freeway system east of Los Angeles. There has been an average population influx of a 1,000 persons per year during the past three years. Yet there is a sense that the community's population and way of life have stabilized. The population seems older.

In some respects, the growth and development of El Monte, particularly its gang problem, has been influenced by its adjoining community, a separate

jurisdiction of South El Monte, listed in a recent census report as the 15th poorest suburban community in the country. The South El Monte community was regarded as the most gang- and crime-ridden of the greater El Monte area. Heroin trafficking and gangs, especially gang graffiti, were listed as the top crime concerns in police and school surveys of the mid-1970's.

The Youth Gang Problem

The youth gang problem in El Monte was preceded by "hot rod" clubs in the early 1960's. The El Monte Flores (EMF) gang was formed in the city with an influx of youth, particularly from South El Monte, in 1968-69. Soon counter gangs formed. The delinquent groups or gangs were not well-developed, with symbols, colors, and other gang identifications. Some of the youth were arrested for crimes against property and sentenced to probation camps, where their identification with gangs solidified. EMF especially became better organized. By the mid-1970's, their numbers had increased from 600 to 1,500 members in El Monte, according to several informants.

The problem grew very serious in this period. Seven gang-related homicides were identified by the El Monte Police in 1975. "Violence, shootings, stabbings were common," according to the principal of Mountain View High School, one of five high schools that students from the area attended. Gang activity, including student harassment and forced recruitment, was at its height. In addition to EMF, there were varying estimates of 4 to 13 other gangs, ranging in size from 10 to hundreds of members. The most active of the gangs, other than EMF, had no more than 100 members, however.

Community Response

The Boys' Clubs and the police department were the key agencies in a long struggle to deal with the youth gang problem. In 1975, a meeting took place between members of the police department and the local chapter of the Boys' Clubs. "The El Monte Plan" was formulated to attack the problem. Prior to the meeting, the police concentrated on a suppression approach, and according to Clay Hollopeter, Executive of the Boys' Club of San Gabriel Valley, the strategy was "not successful in stemming gang violence." Police wore helmets and had the appearance of storm troopers. Hollopeter stated publicly that "this approach was not right." However, he also approached the police chief, M. L. Matthews (who retired August 1978) and Deputy Chief Wayne C. Clayton (who succeeded Matthews and is currently Chief of Police), to develop an alternative, more comprehensive effort that would include the Boys' Club, local businesses, and other agencies.

Hollopeter's strategy was for the El Monte Police Department and the San Gabriel Valley Boys' Club to join resources and locate "jobs for identifiable leaders of the gangs. The older youth, 18 to 21, would be placed on evening shifts, and the younger youth would be placed in part-time jobs, with commitments to remain in school." The underlying idea was to remove "leadership from the gangs by introducing them to economic dependency and family responsibility." The strategy was not so much to obtain jobs for youth as to divert them from criminal activity during a vulnerable adolescent maturational period. The employment was to be the basis for a "long-range solution to our revolving-door delinquency problem."

Officer Ken Weldon, in charge of the community relations unit of the police department in the mid-1970's, was assigned to work with Hollopeter. A division of responsibility between the Boys' Clubs and the police department was established. The police continued to operate on the assumption that if they eliminated the "hard-core" of the gang, the gang problem would subside considerably. However, suppression would not be the answer alone. The police department could not afford "a special project such as the Sheriff's Office or L.A.P.D. did, and decided that the amount of work necessary to put the large number of 'hard-core' members in jail was a very difficult goal to attain. In addition, the average jail sentences for even the most violent of crimes then committed by young adults was not sufficient to ensure peace on the streets for any extended period of time" (Poirier 1979, p. 23-29).

A two-pronged attack was formed. "First, assist those gang members who showed any desire whatever to go straight with whatever was necessary to accomplish this goal, and second, to concentrate enforcement efforts on those who would not try to conform to normal social behavior, (Ibid.). Control and reduction of gang violence as well as removal of graffiti were key. Gang leaders were the first to be targeted. Eventually, a wider range of youth and young adults were targeted to receive services, including females, youth and young adults at risk, as well as delinquents generally from the community. Excluded from the program were gang members who used heroin.

Jobs

Jobs were to be the heart of the program. Jobs had multiple values for dealing with the gang problem. According to Hollopeter, it gets "rid of the leaders." The lifestyle of the gang leader is changed in "an adult direction." It not only takes him off the street for a large portion of the day

but also fulfills his need to assert his manhood by being able to support his family. It helps to breakdown gang affiliation. It is an acceptable excuse for "not hanging around with the boys." Ideally, the employment should be located outside of the neighborhood. Alternatives to jobs include the Armed Services, Job Corps, and the California Conservation Corps.

The police, mainly the Community Relations Unit, handle all applicants over 18 years. "Two full-time Community Relations Officers administered the program with the assistance of several part-time volunteers. The services included all phases of securing a job: 1) obtaining job leads; 2) contacting gang members and raising the issue of prospective employment; 3) familiarizing gang members with application procedures and . . . the job interview situation; 4) arranging transportation, if necessary, to assure that the interview appointment was kept and that the client arrived on time for the first day of work . . . ; 5) encouraging applicants to discuss work adjustment problems with Community Relations personnel" (Willman and Snortum, 1982).

The Boys' Club was expected to handle all of the job applicants under 18 years of age. Their role included: 1) "recruiting" youth through an "outreach" process to see if the youth was able and willing to assume the responsibilities of the job; 2) providing counseling in regard to work adjustment skills since many of the youth were handicapped by inadequate values, attitudes, and expectations about a job; 3) matching the right youth "with the right job"; 4) individualized "follow-up counseling" to keep him on the job "long enough to see that he can master needed skills and overcome any frustrations and difficulties"; 5) ongoing "support services and referral" so youth can solve their other personal problems.

At one time, before a gang member was sent on a job interview, he was also given a 12-hour course developed by The Boys' Clubs of America and the U.S. Labor Department. The number of hours of instruction was then increased for younger youth to between 20 and 30 hours and reduced for older youth to between 6 and 7 hours. The course was conducted by two of the Community Relations Officers and covered essentials such as how to fill out a job application and how to act in a job interview. The gang member was sent to the interview alone so that he could "feel proud that he got the job on his own if he is hired." Providing employment shows the youth that he does not have to "continue to be a gang member." It should be noted that some employers attempted to determine the youth's interests in order to place him in a job he would like.

Suitable jobs were found in various ways. The Chief of Police and his staff used their acquaintances in the private business sector to explain the program and gather commitments to hire gang members. The director of the Boys' Club did the same: positions were sought that required no specialized training, and the businessmen were informed that follow-up would be provided, in case problems developed. The businessmen were requested to place the gang members on night and weekend shifts, prime time for gang activity. Since gang members were used to night living with late morning or early afternoon rising, it was also thought they would adjust to night shifts more readily. Special care was given to placing gang members in businesses or places of employment on their own or neutral turf to avoid contact with rival gang members and thereby minimizing problems of commuting to and from work (Poirier, pp. 29-30).

Graffiti

A graffiti analysis and removal program was initiated by the Boys' Club in close cooperation with the El Monte Police Department, and with the assistance of a great many businesses and citizens. The graffiti analysis and removal program was extremely important, but not simply for cleanup or aesthetic purposes. It was a source of intelligence information intimately connected to the control and prevention of gang activities. It was estimated that gang-related vandalism and graffiti were costing the San Gabriel Valley communities, mainly El Monte, over a half million dollars per year. Graffiti was the prime concern of all area citizen groups. It was indicative of greater crime-related problems.

The program involved a team and a truck operated by Boys' Club staff 40 hours per week. The team included painters, either from C.E.T.A., employees of the Club, or youth or adults assigned by the local municipal court to work in lieu of fines or other punishment. The team painted over any graffiti that was visible from the streets and alleys (with the owner's permission). City, county and state paint crews were notified as soon as graffiti appeared on public structures, such as on freeways, sidewalks, and roadways, particularly when sandblasting was required. Paint for the Boys Club's graffiti removal operation came from donations by large businesses as well as from monies provided by the city.

A special graffiti day removal project was held. The El Monte Police Department Community Relations officers played a major role, speaking at civic organizations, including Rotary and Kiwanis clubs, and soliciting funds for paint, brushes, rollers, refreshments, and gasoline. Requests for

volunteers were widely advertised; scouting and explorer groups, school clubs, and concerned citizens responded. A month of planning was required to identify the worst areas, divide the city into manageable units, and make appropriate team assignments. Within a ten- to twelve-hour period "graffiti was completely removed from a community that was covered from one end to the other." The Boys' Club team was then able to continue on a maintenance basis. A "Graffiti Hotline" at the Boys' Club was established; stickers were placed throughout the community which indicated that a call to the Boys' Club would result in a same-day response. In addition, police patrol officers made written notations of all graffiti on their beats and gave them to the Community Relations Officers who in turn transmitted them to the Boys' Club for removal. Schools and parks have continued to make graffiti reports on a regular basis.

Just as important, if not more so for purposes of police intelligence, the paint crew carefully copied the graffiti onto paper, before removal. Nicknames, monikers, and gang names as well as locations were analyzed by police officers and the director of the Boys' Club. Information was thereby obtained on the scope and changing nature of the gang problem, particularly the state of relations between certain gangs and those individuals active in precipitating gang hostilities. The top writers became the targets of efforts by the Boys' Club staff and the police department. Identification of the graffiti writer and the location of the graffiti permitted the police to know when a new graffiti writer or a new gang was in town. The police and the Boys' Club representatives then visited the home of the youth and informed him and his parents about steps that would be taken should gang activity continue.

The Boys' Club and Police Community Relations staffs notified probation and parole agencies if the need for increased supervision of or special attention to the youth existed. This information was sometimes submitted by probation or parole reports to the court for consideration in sentencing. Job assistance for a graffiti writer might be contingent on graffiti removal. The Boys' Club staff also contacted parents who often were not aware that a son was an active member of a gang. Letters were sent to parents with bills for the cost incurred in graffiti removal, not so much to collect damages as to make parents aware of violations by their son of the penal code and the civil liabilities involved if their son was caught.

Other values of the program included removal or even prevention of graffiti before rival gang members became aware. This avoided gang

confrontations "ranging from name calling and fist fighting to stabbings and shootings." If the rival gang did not see the graffiti, the temptation or need to retaliate was often removed (Poirier 1979, pp. 34-38).

Project Return

The third of the major collaborative projects undertaken by the Boys' Club and the police department was called Project Return. It was first undertaken in 1977 when Gus Collingsworth, the California Youth Authority Parole Officer in the El Monte area, Clay Hollopeter, and the two Police Community Relations Officers began monthly visits to the CYA Training School in Chino, California. The program is currently largely underwritten by the County Justice System Subvention Program and is designed to help incarcerated youth returning to the San Gabriel Valley. All the youth are on probation at the time of intake and many are gang members.

The police are advised by CYA when a youth is coming out of the probation camp. One of the strategies is to single out "gang leaders, get them a job, and keep them occupied so as to remove them socially from the gang." Contact is also made with parents to assist in adjusting to their son's return. The Boys' Club provides "aftercare support services and counseling to a youth returning from Probation Department detention [camps]. Services include pre-release screening and assessment, development of individualized case plans, school re-enrollment, and/or employment assistance, social adjustment counseling and other supportive interventions deemed advisable. Intensive Services are offered during the first month" (Application for Funding, County Justice System Subvention Program 1988).

Normally the youth remains in the program for six months after release from a camp. The critical time, and the point when the program is most active, occurs when the youth first returns home. The El Monte Day Center School, operated by the LA County Office of Education in the agency's El Monte facility, permits a ready transition from the probation camp's school without loss of academic credits. It provides Boys' Club staff an opportunity, especially in the first transitional months, to maintain close contact with the youth and deal with possible family crises, individual, and other problems.

Non-camp youth may also be referred to the program by probation officers and/or the Juvenile Court. The program does not perform any probation functions such as monitoring and/or enforcement of court orders.

Networking

Respondents in El Monte believe that the key to their distinctive approaches to the gang problem has been its networking or collaborative character. Despite formal contracts with the county and city for funding purposes, all collaborative or coordinated arrangements have been informal without regular official meetings. No formal task force has been developed. Close relationships have existed among principal actors, particularly the Chief, Deputy Chief, the Coordinator of Community Relations of the Police Department, the Director of the Boys' Club, the high school principal, the probation and parole officer liaisons in the area, and key business persons. All have been deeply committed to the same philosophy, perspectives, and set of strategies.

At the heart of these informal networking relationships is the rapport developed between Clay Hollopeter, the Boys' Club director, and Ken Weldon, the Police Community Relations officer. The trust and openness developed between those two actors apparently has been a catalyst or context for the development of open lines of confidential communication about gangs, gang youths, and related problems with a great variety of other actors: from obtaining information about homicide suspects, locations of weapons, tips on jobs to special arrangements, or "breaks" for youth in court. This rapport or positive relationship has apparently been transferred to gang youth themselves, who have established a surprising amount of trust with various officials and community actors, including the police.

Agency Leader Roles

A long-term, complex, and comprehensive approach of a communal nature, developed to deal with the gang problem, is part of an articulated, rational philosophy of delinquency prevention and control. The key organizations, the Boys' Club and the police department, have evolved a set of complementary strategies and programs, along with those of schools, probation, and community businesses for affecting the problem. The character, basic assumptions, and perspectives of the leaders of these organizations need to be examined.

Boys' Clubs

Hollopeter is a charismatic, deeply committed advocate on behalf of the interests and needs of gang youth. He perceives the gang problem as a very complex one. On the one hand, he describes gang youth as normal, with leadership potential and other qualities that can be transferred to the

role of effective employee. On the other, he reports that a typical gang member is from a broken home or a large family without supervision, has no male authority figure to provide strong parental discipline, has a poor self-image, and is an underachiever (Barker, 1980).

Hollopeter states that gang leaders "have the ability to assume leadership roles in a job." They have a strong sense of loyalty which can be transferred to the job. "We're not trying to destroy the gang to reduce the gang's influence on the kids. Gangs are not necessarily bad. They provide needed security and brotherhood. I tell the kids to stop doing stupid things. I don't tell them to give up their friends" (Keynote Magazine, 1977).

Hollopeter reportedly makes a distinction "between gang activity and delinquent criminal activity," although he states that "by and large, all of the gang leaders are delinquent criminal types" (Barker, Ibid.). He makes an interesting distinction between the gang member in his gang role and in his individual delinquent role. He is reported to have said that "individual members may steal cars, rob houses or take dope, but this activity is independent and incidental to gang membership." The gang presumably connotes something positive and traditional for the social development of barrio youth (Baker, 1980). These are complex, and not always clear, or consistent perspectives, but they do permit Hollopeter and his Boys' Club staff -- some of whom were gang members themselves at one time -- to manage relationships with gangs and gang members and at the same time to facilitate the transition of gang youth to more conventionally acceptable patterns.

Hollopeter has articulated a three-pronged approach to helping gang youth: 1) Individualization -- "It is necessary to offer each youth an individualized program of service needed to normalize his life"; 2) Networking -- "A network of supportive service providers, agencies and referral has to be developed that can provide long term aid and assistance . . . Other agencies must . . . work with our youth and to provide them the quality and quantity of service that they would otherwise offer their other clients. The Club becomes the conductor of an orchestration of varied services . . . "; 3) Advocacy -- "Advocacy on behalf of the youth and an effort to bring about corrective changes in the community. . . . Sometimes you must take a firm, hard, strong stand on critical youth services and risk offending policemen, social workers, probation officers, teachers, principals and other so-called youth workers when you defend your position as a youth advocate and ombudsman." Hollopeter advises that "at risk" youth be mainstreamed rather than put

into special "gang" programs "existing programs and procedures must be modified so that they 'fit the youth' rather than expecting the youth to 'fit the program.'" There must be faith that the youth will turn out okay, the agency or worker is only speeding up the inevitable. To achieve these objectives, Hollopeter indicates that the Boys' Club program provides a variety of camping, recreational, job referral/placement, crisis intervention, mediation, collaborative agency and advocacy programs (Hollopeter 1985).

Police Department

The police department approach, especially under the leadership of Ken Weldon, Community Relations Unit, is a unique example of community involvement and innovative community policing. The blend of social worker, community organizer, and police officer in Ken Weldon is unusual. He believes a key reason for "El Monte's success has been because his unit has been able to transcend its traditional law enforcement role. His unit is physically separated from the police station and thereby provides a setting in which people feel comfortable."

Weldon says his unit's role is the development of "school programs, sporting and camping activities, counseling, employment, tutoring, and assistance with any social problems." His prevention objectives at the present time are "intervening with family and psychological problems, employment, and school problems." Weldon's staff also engages in crisis intervention and mediation of gang conflict. However, a basic function of his unit is also to provide intelligence and guidance on gang-related matters to patrol officers and other units of the police department. Weldon and his staff generally are not involved directly in arrests of gang youth and related court proceedings.

The community relation unit's officers have "intimate knowledge of the maneuverings of the local gangs and have been instrumental in solving numerous cases, all the way from thefts and fights to murder." Weldon and his staff are closely acquainted with families and girl friends "who would not normally talk to police officers and will tell them many things that are going to happen, and of things that have already happened" (Poirier, p. 40).

Weldon believes that there are two levels of gang affiliation: gang members who are "criminals first, and secondarily members of the gang . . . who are aggressive and give leadership in gang activities, but the rest of the time are involved in heavy-weight crimes of personal gain." The remainder of the gang members do not necessarily

condone these non-gang criminal activities. The criminal leaders are the target of the unit's and the police department's attention. These assumptions are not fundamentally different from those of Hollopeter. The reality of the gang and certain behaviors of the gang are accepted, but criminal behavior is not.

Illustrative of his techniques of crisis intervention and mediation is the following: In a graffiti battle between two gangs that was escalating to the point of physical violence, he identified the key players in each gang and told them they would have to come together and resolve their issues or the police would step in and make life miserable for them, e.g., high visibility patrol, strict enforcement, and various search procedures. The gangs quickly responded and were able to come to terms on their own. If someone is shot or stabbed in an incident involving gang members, either as victim and suspect, the Community Relations Unit visits the victim as soon as possible, investigates the details of the incident, and focuses on getting the combatants together to make peace. They deliberately encourage gang youth to be aware of and prevent retaliations or the spread of violence.

Weldon goes to great lengths to sensitize police officers to the interests and needs of gang youth. For example, he points out that both like excitement and adventure; both wear uniforms. He describes an incident in which gang members were allowed to ride along with police officers, in order to improve mutual understanding and relationship. On one occasion he involved police and gang youth in a role playing session in which gang members arrested police officers. One of the gang members was particularly rough during the mock shakedown process. Tempers flared. Weldon asked the gang member why he was being so rough. The youth gang member replied that recently he had been shaken down by the same officer in the same manner and humiliated in front of his friends -- for no apparent reason. He said this angered him so much at the time that he went out and vandalized some property to let off steam.

Weldon handpicks his staff. They must be "firm and fair, willing to work long hours, comfortable in gang neighborhoods, non-aggressive." Police officers rotate through his unit when they first join the police department and periodically thereafter when police transfer (or get promoted out of his unit). As a result, "they have a much more balanced perspective on gang and problem youth."

Other activities and programs of the Community Relations Unit include: mental health counseling of problem youth. "Operation Increased Attendance"

involves Community Relations officers in picking up truant youth and transporting them back to school for "needed counseling." The officers visit schools to conduct drug education and crime prevention activities. They have developed recreational activities for "youth-at-risk"; for example, forming a sports team consisting of truants and dropouts. They work closely with probation officers in a variety of related diversion activities.

The Community Relations Unit is responsible for an extraordinary range of activities. They include: "Adopt-a-Cop," "Bicycle Safety," "Camping with Cops," and a "Citizen Ride Along" in which local citizens (14 years of age or older) can ride with a police officer on a regular shift for a period of three hours. Community Relations officers make home visits to juveniles who are detained for misdemeanor charges to determine if any problems exist in the family and to then make appropriate referrals to community services. The unit supervises a law enforcement Explorer Scout troop. During summer months, Community Relations officers are assigned to foot patrol in the community parks. Other programs, directly and indirectly related to gang youth, include neighborhood watch, child abuse, runaway, and the development of volunteer activities.

Schools

A key actor in the development of a community approach for dealing with gangs was Fernando Le Desma, Principal of Mountain View High School, one of two high schools where core youth gang members attended. Now principal of the El Monte Adult School, he shares many of the values of Hollopeter and Weldon and worked closely with them in the various programs developed over the years to deal with the gang problem. He believes his success with gang youth was due to "showing that we cared." Clear rules for behavior were also established. When a student stepped over the line, he was certain that "consequences would be enforced."

The principal was strongly identified with youth interests and community culture. "We would go to the funerals of gang youth. We got them part-time jobs and employed them on campus. As long as the kids were not creating major problems, we kept them in school. If they were failing, we tried to employ them as groundskeepers. We made them part of staff. Graffiti eased or almost stopped, since they would inform us who was responsible. We went to court with the kids and would advocate for them. We went the extra step and even patrolled the community during crises."

He states that he targeted the most difficult kids

to show that the school could succeed with them. When youth succeeded, he made sure that the community knew about it. He told troublemakers "they were not bad." He emphasized that they could help make the school a better place and that they "were all Latinos and should work together." He utilized the influence of a former student who was a gang leader to get students to behave. He tried to get school staff to accept and care for gang youth. He rewarded administrative staff with promotions for pursuing this approach. He also did not permit teachers to lock classroom doors and encouraged teachers to resolve problems with gang youth through discussions.

The principal helped Clay Hollopeter and Ken Weldon in carrying out special programs for gang youth. Special recognition was directly and indirectly provided to certain youth to build up their esteem. Their successes at school were well-publicized. Gang youth were hired to coach teams in the various sports leagues established at school.

Probation

There is a tradition of collaboration by probation with police and the Boys' Club in a variety of programs: job development and job referral; the use of the Boys' Club and the Special Community Day Center to supervise youth from probation camps; notification of Community Relations Unit personnel when youth are about to be released from detention; and referral of youth on probation generally both to the Boys' Club and police for special attention and activity.

Since 1988, a probation officer of the Los Angeles County Probation Gang Alternatives Prevention Program (GAPP) has been located in the Community Relations Unit of the police department. This is a pre-probation program to divert youth from the criminal justice system. Focus is on youth in grades 5 to 8, aged 10 to 14 years. The youth referred by teachers and the police must meet some of the following criteria: 1) the youth associates with gang members; 2) wears gang dress; 3) there is a gang member in the family; and 4) there is evidence of drug use by the youth. Parents are contacted and requested to sign a release and/or waiver form for GAPP to work with these identified youth. A variety of services are offered in this program: remedial tutoring, parenting classes, and referral to other agencies.

Assessment

The El Monte experience with gangs since the mid-1970's is noteworthy and promising, if not exemplary. A variety of agencies, particularly the Boys' Club and the police, as well as probation

and schools, with the cooperation of the business community and other public and non-profit organizations have formed a sustained, innovative, and collaborative set of programs to reduce gang violence and crime. To what extent local community grassroots organizations, churches, and parent groups were involved is not clear. Special emphasis was on the provision of jobs, removal of graffiti, involvement of youth in social and personal development activities, and ultimately the reduction of gang violence and crime. A combination of approaches was used: social intervention, opportunity provision at school, and on the job, targeted suppression, and a community development approach, involving organizational change and innovation.

What have been the effects and effectiveness of the El Monte experience? The effects of the program appear to be reasonably clear. A considerable amount of anecdotal and media material and some limited statistical information is available to assess the program. The results or effects of the El Monte program, particularly the more tangible job development and placement efforts, the graffiti removal program, Project Return, and the less tangible collaborative social and community climate change efforts are fairly well documented.

Effects. Since the mid-1970's, more than a thousand jobs reportedly have been provided to gang members, delinquents, and others through the efforts of the Community Relations Unit and the Boys' Club, with the collaboration of local business and other community organizations. More than 100 businesses have participated in the jobs program. A variety of jobs for youth have been developed or tailor-made that otherwise would not be available without the program. Gang youth have learned a variety of vocational skills. Many have gone on to become skilled, loyal workers at good wages. Some have entered junior college. Youth hired for part-time or summer positions have in some cases stayed on for a year or more (20 percent stayed on at one firm).

Some employers have come to depend on the pool of gang youth. They call Ken Weldon and Clay Hollopeter when openings arise for unskilled workers. Most of the jobs are very repetitive and employers report a high turnover rate is common when not using gang members (Poirier 1979, p. 31). Open communication, respect, and understanding have developed between employers and gang youth or former gang youth. In the process, the police have come to be accepted as job developers and counselors and have developed positive relations with gang youths, useful for a variety of law enforcement purposes including information about gang and other crime activities. Also according to

Weldon, many employers who had previously experienced problems with graffiti and occasional fights between employees because they had unknowingly hired rival gang members, no longer have this problem.

A cautionary note or reservation, however, must be added. One of the key employers in the program could not distinguish between the gang youth and non-gang youth he hired in the summer programs. Some of the referring sources, schools and police, claimed that the youth they referred for jobs were not yet gang members or delinquents and that the purpose of the program was prevention of deviant behavior. Some of the youth referred by probation were not gang members or delinquents. It is not clear whether delinquent gang members, non-gang delinquents, and non-delinquent gang members were regarded as essentially the same kinds or equivalent youth. The extent to which non-gang youth are referred to the program is also not known.

It would seem important to determine what proportion of youth in the program fit these various categories. Ken Weldon states the criteria for selecting persons who needed employment was "basically in the following order:

- 1) Active gang members with a crisis,
- 2) Other at risk youth or young adults with a crisis,
- 3) Family or friends of the above,
- 4) Other troubled or homeless persons in our community."

The effects of the graffiti removal program are less easy to document, although the police chief announced shortly after the initiation of the jobs and graffiti removal activities that arrests were down. The sense of aesthetic pleasure or relief was undoubtedly heightened for community residents at the sight of cleaner, relatively unmarked buildings and institutions. "It takes a little hard work, but costs only time. The program to cover or remove graffiti also did not cost the community any money because all paint was donated. Salaries of the Community Relations officers who coordinate these efforts were a part of the regular city budget" (J. D. Franz Research Report, 1975, p. 386).

Project Return is regarded as a successful program. It has received funding for seven or eight years under the Justice System Subvention Program for Los Angeles County. El Monte was selected by the Boys' Clubs of America to receive the "Honor Award for Excellence" in the area of

Delinquency Prevention. Project Return achieved its goal of keeping two thirds of its clients arrest-free in the six-month period following release from camp between 1984 and 1987.

A newer Gang Alternatives Prevention Program, established by the Los Angeles Probation Department within the last year or so and based in the Community Relations Unit of the El Monte Program has not yet shown significantly positive results. Parents of gang youth in the middle grades referred by schools are not apparently responding to counseling and referral efforts. "Parents usually go into denial and the program has had few successes so far." According to the probation officer in charge, the program is expected to be more successful over time.

The State of California Commission on Crime Control and Violence Prevention has viewed the "El Monte Plan as being a noteworthy program because it is a unique and demonstrably effective approach to prevention of gang violence" (J. D. Franz Research, circa 1978, p. 386). The program has received high marks from community businesses and the police. The community, including gang youth, now look upon these institutions more positively and even as a source of help.

The El Monte Plan, or parts of it, have become a model for other cities or areas in California, including Stockton, Hayward, and East Los Angeles. A report, titled "The El Monte Plan - Hire a Gang Leader!" (Boys Club of San Gabriel Valley, 1983), summarizes many of the positive effects and possibly indicates the effectiveness of the program:

"Another benefit resulting from the program ranges from the obvious, (i.e., with formerly unemployable juvenile off the streets and productively occupied for eight hours a day, crimes committed by those juveniles had dropped). Often their relatives are taken off the welfare roles and less directly obvious, their incomes are generating taxes. Perhaps, the least expected spin-off benefit has been the almost complete elimination of graffiti in the community, partly because of the boys placed into jobs. A commitment has been made to stop writing graffiti. . . . "

Effectiveness. What is lacking in the above appraisal is statistical data or findings based on adequate research design. One evaluation of the jobs program published in 1982 based on 1975, 1976, and 1977 program data indicates that of "198 gang members placed: 104 were still working, 27 were unemployed, 18 were in jail, 2 were facing pending court action, 15 had gone back to school, 3 were in the service, 2 were in the job corps, and 27 had left the area or were otherwise

unaccounted for." This appears to be a positive outcome.

However, a group of program youths were matched with 100 companions or control subjects on age, sex, ethnicity, and gang membership. All subjects were gang members and each group contained 93 Hispanic Americans and 7 Anglo-Americans. The outcome variable was post-intervention period detentions on a quarterly basis for "All Crimes" and for "Crimes Against Persons." The pre-intervention rate of detention was similar and generally flat for the two youth groups in the seven quarterly periods before intervention.

But there was a "clear decline for both groups during the post-intervention period. Thus while the experimental subjects seemed to be successfully diverted from illegal activities over successive months, the parallel effects for control subjects suggest the credit for this decline cannot be assigned to the employment program. The data for crimes against persons showed less decline over time than did 'all' crime." (Willman and Snortum 1982, pp. 211-212.) The authors attribute the positive change in both groups to the aging process itself -- the tendency to "mature out" of delinquent activities.

An earlier report in 1977 of the Planning and Research Unit of the El Monte Police Department covering a similar period, 1976 and 1977, compares arrests for which the suspects are 16 to 22 years of age and victims 16 to 22 years of age. While this is a crude measure it is estimated to cover 90 percent of gang members in El Monte. The specific comparison is between a gang territory (Flores) served by the El Monte jobs project and a set of gangs not served by the project. The territory receiving the most concerted attention from the Boys' Club and the Police Community Relations office was the Flores territory. Another special program focused to a limited extent on gangs in the other areas. "One set of findings indicates that violent crime increased by 16 percent in the gang area served by the project, and decreased 18 percent in the area not served by the project. In other words, the gang territory "receiving the most concerted focus . . . shows the least improvement, and in fact indicates an augmentation of the problem" (Willman circa 1978, p. 4).

There are methodological flaws in both studies, not the least of which is the lack of clear specification of who is a gang member, level of gang member commitment to the gang, and explicit criteria for what constitutes a gang incident in contrast to a non-gang incident by a gang member. Yet the pattern of findings suggest little if any positive effect on gang or non-gang crime

reduction by the Boys' Club and Community Relations El Monte Project in the study period 1976-1977.

Also revealing is a comparison of gang-related, non-gang-related, and total homicides in El Monte for an 18-1/2-year period from 1971 through part of 1989. Figure 1 reveals a remarkable stability in the total amount of homicides in the community over the 18-1/2-year period. Given the fact that the population increase for the area over the period was approximately 43 percent, from approximately 70,000 to 100,000, and assuming that demographic and socioeconomic patterns were basically the same, its likely that the homicide rate in fact declined. It is possible to extrapolate to the general crime situation which may have also fallen in this period. We must recall that the perception of key informants is that gang crime and perhaps crime generally has fallen in the area.

The data reveal, however, that patterns for gang and non-gang homicides show striking variations over the years, particularly for the periods between 1971 and 1980, and 1981 until the present. Gang homicides account for 35.1 percent of total homicides in the period (1971-1975) essentially prior to project effect in El Monte and for 36.1 percent of total homicides in the period (1976-1980) a time of very heavy project emphasis. In other words, there seemed to be little change in the relative homicide rate for the two periods, although it is likely there was an absolute decline in homicide rate, given the likely population increase.

However, in the period 1981 and afterward, while total homicides remain constant, or in fact the rate is probably declining, there is sharp variation in patterns of gang and non-gang related homicide. The mean number of total homicides remains fairly constant over the 18-1/2 year period. The number of gang homicides does not decline during the first five years of program operation. However, a sharp decline sets in during the second five years of operation (see Figure 1). It is difficult to understand what accounts for this radical change. It is hard to believe that the effect of the El Monte Plan took at least five years to have a significant effect, and then a radical decline set in. We would have anticipated a decline not long after the program started. Furthermore, we cannot clearly account for the relatively sharp rise in non-gang homicides. Our key informants indicate that this was due to an increase in newcomer violent Hispanic population.

We cannot explain this pattern of change and cannot attribute it entirely to program affects. Ken Weldon indicates that their "definition of

gang-related crimes has never changed." However, he also states that the police department "has never kept gang-related statistics, except for homicides." We may speculate, nevertheless, that one or more of the following may have also occurred: there may be recent difficulty in distinguishing gang-related and law violating youth group activity; certain demographic or age effects may have occurred; or socioeconomic conditions may have improved. Gang deviancy patterns may also have been changing. Drive-by gang shootings have declined. There is indication that the number of gangs has contracted, although the number of gang members has not changed significantly. Smaller gangs may have been incorporated into fewer but larger gangs. What is possible is that gang member interest in intergang violence has now shifted to increased drug use and selling, although several of our informants suggest there was little change in the youth gang drug problem over the years. Emphasis has continued to be on recreational use of marijuana but very little PCP. Sales by gang members were quite limited and primarily within the gang; however, estimates by informants of the percent of youth involved in sales of drugs vary from 10 percent to 75 percent. Most recently, Ken Weldon estimates that the percentage is less than 10 percent.

The findings of drug trafficking in El Monte by the Los Angeles County Probation Department (Specialized Gang Supervision Program), in their 1987 Progress Report differ from several of the other key informants. A marked increase in sales of marijuana and large-scale heroin sales is reported:

"The `Street Boys' . . . are heavily involved in the sales of marijuana in a local park. The Bonward/Klingerman area of El Monte continues to be a boom area in drug sales. There were 43 arrests in February of 1987 compared to 0 in the same month of 1986 for drug sales. In March there were over 60 arrests but large-scale heroin sales continued. It was rumored that the Mexican Mafia (EME) was using a local gang, El Monte Flores (EMF), to intimidate Mexican national drug dealers so EME could take over drug sales in the area. . . . Many speculate that a movement toward profitable drug dealing may be equally responsible for decreased warfare. Gang violence is there in the form of drug-related robberies" (Duran 1987, pp. 15-16).

The full accuracy of this report, however, has been challenged by several of the informants. Hollopeter states that "The `Street Boys' was a transitional clique and no longer exists. There was no Mexican Mafia use of the gang to expand drug trafficking." Weldon adds that when the

Street Boys were active, they were "responsible for a very small percentage of marijuana sales." Duran, the author of the report, has since stated that these data were not verified. However, most of the informants believe that drug use is present in the gang and that some increase in drug trafficking by gang and non-gang adults has occurred. Gang members, when they are also active gang members, are generally responsible for a small percentage of drug sales.

Conclusion

In many respects, the El Monte Program is a model of comprehensive, balanced approaches, highly effective and sustained leadership, a great deal of interagency collaboration, and broad community-based support, particularly by business and government agencies. Exemplary employment, graffiti removal, detention/ correction aftercare programs, and supportive services were developed. A large low-income minority population migrated to the community, however, unskilled and semi-skilled jobs were apparently plentiful. Violent and criminal behavior by gangs was entrenched for a period of years.

The El Monte programs were innovative and apparently skillfully carried out. Many youth, gang and non-gang, were probably reached and served. Many jobs were obtained for these youth. The graffiti problem largely abated. The problem of gangs, according to reports, is largely resolved or stabilized. The data on gang violence is somewhat supportive, although the relatively sharp drop in gang-related violence and the escalation of non-gang related violence, particularly homicide, is not adequately explained. The Project's effect on this changing pattern is not clear.

Nevertheless, the likelihood remains that the large-scale efforts of community agencies to deal with the general gang and delinquency problem in El Monte have been effective to a substantial degree. The El Monte Program may have had a long-term positive preventive effect on crime and delinquency generally. This is not to deny that increased drug use and trafficking opportunities may also be a significant cause of changing gang deviancy patterns.

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CASE STUDY 6
East Los Angeles

Background

East Los Angeles had until the late 1970's the worst or most serious gang problem in the county, if not the country. East Los Angeles is located on the eastern border and outside of the city of Los Angeles. Extreme gang violence was traditional or endemic in the community until the mid-1970's. While a large number of youth gangs and gang members are still present, the community's gang homicide rate has declined markedly. Between the late 1970's and early in 1989, the situation in East Los Angeles was in contrast to the growing gang problem in other parts of the city and county. South Central Los Angeles, in 1988 and through the middle of 1989, for example, in many respects was the current version of the East Los Angeles gang community of 10 to 15 years ago, particularly in respect to the gang violence, but not necessarily the drug problem.

The success of East Los Angeles in reducing the level of gang violence during the period identified may have been a result largely of cooperative community and agency efforts, positive county policy efforts targeted to the area, improved socioeconomic status of the community, as well as changes in youth gang and deviancy

patterns. All the key factors and their relative weights are not clearly known to us, however. Community mobilization and interagency coordination, in particular, stands in sharp contrast to the fragmentation and lack of collaborative approaches in other communities of the city of Los Angeles. What occurred in East Los Angeles at a certain period may serve tentatively as one model for dealing with the chronic gang problem in large urban areas.

The general street gang problem in the county was described in a recent report of the County Wide Criminal Justice Coordinating Committee Interagency Gang Task Force (1989) as follows:

"The gang homicide rate was up 25.4%, attempted murder up 47.9%, felonious assaults up 13% and batteries on police officers up 84.4%. Within the areas policed by the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, the [gang] homicide rate is up 21%, attempted murders up 4.7%, felonious assaults up 4.7%, and batteries on police officers up 6%.

In 1988 there were 452 gang-related homicides in Los Angeles County, a 16.8% increase over the previous year. In five years the County has experienced a 113% increase in gang murders and unless the present level of gang violence is abated, the number of gang-related homicides may rise to 515 in 1989 . . . In the city of Los Angeles gang homicides accounted for over a third of the total number of homicides in 1988 . . . In 1989 there was a dramatic rise and spread of gang crime in areas of the county which at one time reported little or no gang activity. . . "

Los Angeles street gangs may have become one of the nation's leading "youth" gang-related sources of rock cocaine distribution with confirmed law enforcement arrests and/or contacts in 46 cities across the nation. It should be emphasized, however, that in most communities, even in Los Angeles County, youth gangs per se are responsible for a small part of the drug problem.

Lorne Kramer, commander of a special gang drug unit of the Los Angeles Police Department provides additional estimates describing the growing scope of the problem in a recent interview: "With the penetration of crack into the Los Angeles area four to five years ago, the percentage of gang homicides has risen. Last year this percentage was 35 percent. For 1989 this figure is running about 40 percent."

Richard Alatorre, a member of the Los Angeles City Council, observes:

There are a myriad of influences confronting young people in our city today -- including economic,

social, and structural processes on the family, growing ethnic and language diversion, the threats of child abuse, substance abuse, and peer pressure. Children confront these challenges in an environment of declining funds, services, and support structures from all levels of government and the community. Most government agencies work chiefly alone, as do churches, synagogues, and community-based organizations. There are fights over money and turf-fights which sometimes mirror the animosity of gang altercations.

Councilman Alatorre adds:

I am not naive enough to believe that the turf battles between the gangs or politicians or community organizations can be easily set aside. . . . Segments of the Los Angeles community are not used to working together, including that of the Los Angeles Unified School District and the County, and sometimes each of us in the City Council define problems as our own or someone else's.

The varied reactions to the youth gang problem are indicated by the different patterns of response of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD) and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). The LASD response appears to be relatively centralized and better coordinated. The Sheriff's gang unit, Operation Safe Streets (OSS), more often targets specific gangs with a record of violent activity, rather than all gangs in an area. The LAPD approach appears to be more decentralized, yet not as well anchored in relationships with agencies and community groups for dealing with the problem. Structures or strategies for dealing with the youth gang problem appear to be different, with "sweeps" emphasized more by LAPD.

The perception of the LAPD and LASD in regard to involvement with community agencies appears to be quite different. The LAPD has tried to remain aloof from community groups. "Some are here today and gone tomorrow." Also, the LAPD apparently does not want to alienate community groups by being perceived as more favorable to one and not to others. "Our role is primarily enforcement. The only program that we have outside of an enforcement role is DARE." LASD, at least its gang unit, makes every effort to attend community meetings and respond to the interests and concerns of the great variety of community agencies and groups.

Despite the seriousness of the gang problem and the diversity of approaches, there is evidence that some of the most innovative and relatively most successful approaches in the country are to be found in Los Angeles County. However, a cautionary note is required. None of the

approaches has been adequately evaluated. Our description and assessment of the youth gang problem in East Los Angeles and the response to it for the period from the late 1970's through early 1989 must be regarded as largely impressionistic, based primarily on informant observations.

Hard data on the East Los Angeles community and its gang problem are not easy to come by. The community is not clearly or consistently defined geographically or in terms of jurisdictional responsibility. The Los Angeles County Probation Department defines the community as including parts of Los Angeles City as well as the County. The Los Angeles Unified School District and its East Los Angeles Skills Center obtains students from both county and city. The Los Angeles County Police Department claims jurisdiction of a city area called East Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Sheriff's Department has jurisdiction mainly in the county, which includes an East Los Angeles sector, but LASD also deals with gang problems in a public housing project on the border of East Los Angeles, both in the county and the city. The Los Angeles County Department of Regional Planning officially classifies East Los Angeles as located in the county outside of the city, containing the communities of City Terrace (Census Tract 11.21), Belvedere Gardens (Census Tract 11.22), and Eastmont (Census Tract 32.82). This area encompasses 13 neighborhoods, according to one East Los Angeles youth agency director.

The population in East Los Angeles appears to be both stable and changing. Population size in the three census tracts was estimated to be 111,652 in 1988, a decrease from 116,280 in 1984, but a slight increase from the 1980 census of 110,017, which in turn was a small increase over the 1970 census of 104,881. Despite the slight changes in population size over about a 20 year period, there have been significant changes in population composition, according to agency informants, although the character of the population remains Hispanic, predominantly Mexican-American or Chicano. Some upwardly mobile families have moved to the suburbs, while a substantial population has moved into the area from Mexico, including legal and undocumented immigrants. Newcomers also include persons from Guatemala, San Salvador, Nicaragua, Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. About 10 percent of the population are non-Hispanic blacks, whites, and Asians. The gang and drug problems are particularly serious in certain sectors of the community, especially in the previously mentioned low-income housing project, which contains a mixed population and a variety of gangs in a very small area.

The East Los Angeles community, nevertheless, is reported to have been upgraded socially,

economically, and physically in the past decade or more. The area's population, agencies, organizations, and churches have developed a strong sense of self-identity and community. Urban redevelopment has served to improve the community, affecting an area of about 10,000 persons. A thriving and stable business and industrial base exists. Yet the community must still be regarded as an inner city community, with significant sectors of the population poor.

The Youth Gang Problem

The nature of gang activity has changed in East Los Angeles. In the time period identified, there has been a shift from traditional turf-based violence to Stoner gang phenomena. Stoners are often youth from lower middle-class, 2nd and 3rd generation families. They are distinguished by their long hair, commitment to rock music, drug abuse, but only occasional involvement (until very recently) in serious violent activities. Stoners are reported from time to time to be engaged in vandalism, satanic activities, and desecration of church property. Some Stoner groups, nevertheless, have had close ties with the more traditional turf-based and violent gangs. There may also be a growing alignment in the border neighborhoods between Hispanics and blacks in groups identified as CRIPS and BLOODS, increasingly engaged in drug dealing. There are many strands and complex interconnections among the different aspects of the youth gang problem in this community.

Youth gangs have been present in East Los Angeles for more than 60 years. The traditional groups vary in size from five or six to 200 or more members. They are organized in age groups from Tiny Loco, or peewees, to Veteranos or old men claiming identification with a particular group. Approximately 6 percent of the total gang population are hard-core gang members, according to one local agency director's estimate. Some of the youth gangs spend much time talking about defending turf often in response to pressure from and expectations of older gang members who now may be, however, primarily engaged in heavy drug use. Because of the substantial period in which some gangs have not engaged in violence, a lack of continuity may also exist between veteranos and new or aspiring youth gang leaders. Despite the reduction in extreme gang violence, members still fight and engage in a range of criminal activities. Drug use and sales, mainly of marijuana cocaine, and heroin, are prevalent. Drug trafficking in East Los Angeles is not as well organized as in some of the low-income gang problem black communities. But this situation may be changing, particularly with the introduction of new drug patterns, e.g., use and distribution of "ice."

Community Response

Community groups, agencies, and even youth gangs in East Los Angeles during our defined period may have developed both a deep concern over youth gang violence and an uncommon pattern of mutual interaction and cooperation in dealing with the problem over the years. Community efforts seem to have been highly coordinated at formal and informal levels, with overlapping social agency, criminal justice, and grassroots group concern and membership resulting in an unusually well-integrated set of community strategies and programs.

A history of organized response to the gang problem dates back at least to the 1960's (and probably to World War II and earlier). Civil rights protests, Chicano empowerment, and local community development movements contributed to the formation of various efforts, including the Federation of Youth Gangs or Barrios, in the early 1970's to control gang violence, to "break the hold" that certain gang leaders had on the community, and to engage in community improvement programs. The Federation represented an effort by certain youth gang leaders, Leo Cortez, Charles Pineda, and others to control youth gang violence. An organization of youth gang presidents was created who directed their energies and those of certain gangs and gang members to community betterment. Their activities included park and security patrols, and collaboration with local merchants to control graffiti. Jobs were obtained for some of the youth. A parents group was initiated. The Federation became later, in part, a model for the development of the Gang Violence Reduction Project of the California Youth Authority. Close links were established with the Los Angeles Probation Department and with a variety of other agencies, including the Sheriff's Department, and other community-based agencies. Michael Duran and later Brother Modesto Leon and others were highly important to these early collaborative efforts.

In due course the East Los Angeles Interagency Committee was organized which involved all key agencies and community groups in a series of formal and informal meetings to develop cooperative suppression measures and social development programs to deal with the problem. Representatives of parent groups, churches, Sheriff's Department, Probation, District Attorney's Office, judges, the California Youth Authority, community-based organizations, such as Cleveland House, Boys' Club, YMCA, Neighborhood Watch, United Neighborhood Organizations, Victory Outreach, and others began to meet every third Tuesday of the month. A pattern of interdependence

and networking among organizations became ingrained. Of special importance over time has been the interest, responsiveness, and political support of County Supervisor, Ed Edeleman, in the development of various community projects and especially the provision of resources and sanction to support them.

A Youth Task Force continues to meet, now on a weekly basis, to share information about gang problems. No single person or agency "runs the show." Members of this group have not only influenced the response to the local gang problem but also the development of city- and county-wide approaches, including that of the county-wide Community Youth Gang Services (CYGS) Project, which has been closely involved in these local East Los Angeles efforts as well since 1980. CYGS is headquartered in the facility of the Probation Department in East Los Angeles.

The East Los Angeles response to gangs appears to be guided by certain principles: (1) Insiders take key, front-line responsibility for addressing the problem in terms that make sense to local community culture; (2) Whatever is done must emphasize concern with the general welfare and development of youth; (3) Activities and contacts with gang youth must be characterized by respect for them; (4) At the same time, close supervision of gang youth and appropriate punishment for criminal behavior are appropriate to "force social reality" on targeted youth gangs and their members. While it is assumed, based on the community's tradition, that most youths will be or continue to be gang members, an increasing amount of energy is directed not only to the control and limitation of gang violence, but to prevention of young people from joining gangs.

Community mobilization with respect to the youth gang problem is carried out through agency and community group coalitions. The Concerned Parents Group is closely associated with Brother Modesto and the Catholic Church, and also with the Gang Violence Reduction Project (GVRP) of the California Youth Authority (CYA) and the Community Youth Gang Services (CYGS). The Concerned Parents Group works closely with probation officers around supervision of gang youth, many of whom are their own children. The East Los Angeles Adult Skills Center calls in staff of GVRP, CYGS, and Probation to deal with gang problems which break out or are threatened in the school. This Center works closely with local business and industry to assist students (including gang members) to learn skills and good work habits. GVRP and CYGS have somewhat overlapping functions, yet manage to work in a reasonably cooperative way, with little friction.

Both the Gang Violence Reduction Project and the

Community Youth Gang Services have different scope and emphases but rely to varying degrees on gang consultants or crisis workers, sometimes ex-offenders with extensive contacts with youth gangs, to monitor, control, and mediate gang behavior and intergang conflicts. Both Agencies have close relationships with the Sheriff's Department. When community influentials decide to control gang outbreaks at a local school, a variety of agencies, including GVRP and/or CYGS, Probation, and Concerned Parents Group members are at school on a daily basis working with school staff to control gang violence.

The Catholic Church and the Concerned Parents Group have been especially closely allied in the exercise of influence over gang youth. Gang youth, agency representatives, law enforcement, as well as church and parents group representatives, are sometimes involved together in helping to resolve intergang conflicts. Most recently the Concerned Parents Group of East Los Angeles attempted to influence neighborhood parents not to accept "drug" money from their gang youth who are selling drugs.

A key community advocate and facilitative force recently has been the Catholic Church, mainly through the efforts of Brother Modesto and Spirit House. Brother Modesto has played a primary role in bringing agencies and community together. He has raised his voice, marched, and brought pressures to bear on public agencies to develop more effective outreach programs of services for gang youth as well as to exercise more control of gang youth behavior, including drug trafficking in the low-income housing projects.

The pattern of interagency coordination and community mobilization in East Los Angeles appeared for a long period of time to contrast with a less active and fragmented approach in other parts of the county and Los Angeles City. Agencies in the city have been apparently slower to respond to the gang problem, although recent efforts by the County Wide Criminal Justice Coordination Committee Interagency Gang Task Force, the city's Criminal Justice Planning Agency, and certain community organizations may be in process of more effectively mobilizing local citizen interest and coordinating agency efforts. However, it is still not clear that the city and a number of agencies are prepared to deal in a sustained and comprehensive way with the more serious aspects of the youth gang problem.

Informants indicate that key city decision makers were slow to recognize the scope and seriousness of the gang problem until it was almost too late. There was too much concern with business flight and loss of tourism and too little influence by

local community groups representing poor minority interests in city decisions. There was a tendency to meet a variety of agency interests through distribution of limited funds for nominal programs which may have had only very minimal impact on the gang problem. Coordination itself was a significant issue with various task forces and coordinating groups often in competition with each other for funds and influence. The degree to which city government, local agencies, and grassroots groups collaborate with each other to meaningfully target various aspects of the problem remains a question.

Some communities, such as South Central, are in considerable disarray, with massive turnovers of population and little community identification. Local public and voluntary agency and grassroots efforts appear at times to reflect an "us against them (youth)" approach, in contrast to the sense of East Los Angeles community identification with its youth. Interestingly, there is at present a movement by some East Los Angeles community agencies, grassroots groups, and leaders into South Central to try their hand at community mobilization and control of the gang problem, which is not only a black but a growing Hispanic problem.

It is important therefore for various reasons to examine closely the specific contributions of each of the key organizations and community groups, as well as of their leaders to the reduction of serious gang violence which has taken place in East Los Angeles, at least until recently. The patterns developed there are now being tested or being considered for adaptation in other communities in Los Angeles and elsewhere. To some extent, they are also being reinvigorated in East Los Angeles.

Soledad Enrichment Action (SEA), Concerned Parents Group, and Brother Modesto

Brother Modesto Leon of the Claretian Order was initially assigned to the Our Lady of Soledad Parish in East Los Angeles in 1972. He immediately demonstrated special interest in dealing with the gang problem. He stimulated the development of a series of projects. Soledad Enrichment Action (SEA) was begun by Brother Modesto as an alternative school staffed by nuns, priests, and lay Catholics to reach gang youth who were not "making it" in the regular public school.

"SEA strives to prepare problem youths with learning disabilities to reenter the public education system and to prepare them to pass their high school equivalency examination (G.E.D.). The program assists minority youth 12 to 19 years old and their families with educational services, in-

service training programs, parenting skills, workshops, and counseling to program participants."

The SEA program is funded by the East Los Angeles Unified School District, Project Pay, and the Catholic Archdiocese of Los Angeles. A primary purpose of the program is to enable students -- usually gang members to come together despite different gang affiliations, to learn to better accept each other as well as resolve their academic deficiencies. After a period in the SEA students return to their home schools to successfully complete their education.

Another program further developed by Brother Modesto, now also connected with SEA, has been the Concerned Parents Group. It started as a support group for the parents of "young men who had been killed in gang violence." Brother Modesto encouraged the group to move beyond its mutual support function, to become proactive and contact and communicate with each other across gang turfs to deal with impending gang fights and better control their own children. The Concerned Parents Group learned to trust the authorities, to call the police when necessary to prevent or stop fights, and to work closely with probation officers both to assist in the control and protection of their own children. They came to believe that it was all right and beneficial to keep children off the streets and even in jail to protect them. Much of this was due to the strong identification which agency leaders had with the community and their extra outreach efforts to work with the Concerned Parents Group.

The Concerned Parents Group can call crisis meetings at SEA on which occasions representatives of other agencies, churches, as well as gang youth are present. Members of different gangs, and their parents talk about the "foolishness" of gang fighting and what can be done to avoid such conflict. Mediation meetings are often conducted after a gang killing. Parents have patrolled the streets to prevent both gang violence and drug dealing activities. Some of the members of the Concerned Parents Group are closely involved as board, advisory group or staff members in the activities of the Community Youth Gang Services and Gang Violence Reduction Project.

The Concerned Parents Group has also expanded its efforts to include youth in correctional institutions. They periodically visit the Nellis Correctional School, part of the California Youth Authority, to counsel gang youths and work with the parents of these youth back in their various communities throughout Los Angeles. The Concerned Parents Group are said to be uniquely persuasive because many have had their own children killed,

seriously injured, or imprisoned. Some of the parents of youth at the Nellis Correctional School have now joined the Concerned Parents Group.

The interests and efforts of Brother Modesto, SEA, and the Concerned Parents Group have spread beyond East Los Angeles to Pomona and South Central. Alternative schools have been established under Catholic Church auspices. Nuns, priests, and lay Catholics are actively encouraging parents, youth, and other agencies to deal collectively with the youth gang problem. Brother Modesto, along with Michael Duran and more recently Steve Valdivia of CYGS, has been significant as a catalyst in the mobilization of bureaucratic and political interests in dealing directly with the youth gang problem.

Gang Violence Reduction Program (GVRP)

The Gang Violence Reduction Program (GVRP) was a partial outgrowth of the Federation of Young Gangs or Barrios in 1976. It is a unique project of the California Youth Authority, established to control gang violence using gang leaders or gang influentials as consultants or workers. Its specific mission is "to mitigate gang feuds and to provide positive activities in which the neighborhoods [barrios or gangs] can become involved." The parole department of the California Youth Authority funds and operates the program. Professional, experienced parole agents administer and supervise the program which relies on consultants, some former gang members from East Los Angeles gangs now settled down, as well as individuals identified as "movers and shakers" in the community, to provide crisis counseling, engage in community resource development, and most recently drug and youth gang prevention activities in elementary schools of the community. However, it is possible that the emphasis on prevention may have to some extent shifted attention from already gang-affiliated junior high and high school youths.

The staff consists of one supervising parole agent, four parole officers -- two males and two females -- and nineteen gang consultants (including six females). The consultants, ex-gang offenders and neighborhood workers, are paid \$5.50 per hour with no benefits. About one third of the consultants have served prison time and may be on parole. These particular consultants are under pressure from two worlds -- peers in the community and parole agents representing the "straight" world. Close supervision and special training maximize the potential of the consultants for effectively carrying out their assignments.

GVRP is a highly indigenous approach, dependent on close identification of workers with the positive

interests and needs of gang youth and the local community. The activities of the workers range from planning trips, ball games and arranging handball tournaments to graffiti removal projects. Major objectives of workers are to identify trouble spots, resolve intergang tensions, and exercise influence in the control of gang conflict. Workers gather information on impending fights, share information about individual gang youth and gang activities with police, probation, schools, and Concerned Parents Group. GVRP has increasingly turned attention to dealing with problems of drug abuse and preventing elementary school youth from joining gangs in the first place. Special student curricula, brochures, and presentations have been developed for these purposes.

The Gang Reduction Violence Program has worked out collaborative relationships with the Community Youth Gang Services (CYGS), a somewhat similar gang crisis intervention and prevention project with greater scope in terms of jurisdiction and purpose. Executive leadership style and agency contexts are quite different, nevertheless, line staff from both agencies sometimes move from one project to the other. However, while GVRP workers are anchored in and identified with specific neighborhoods, CYGS workers are more mobile. GVRP workers concentrate in certain neighborhoods and are closely identified with certain gangs, neighborhoods and local business groups. Both agencies employ former gang members who have at times been involved in illegal or questionable practices and "busted."

GVRP has been the subject of some controversy, particularly in an earlier period, when claims were made that workers were overidentified with gangs and tensions existed with law enforcement. Smoother relationships have been developed over time. Extensive research (Torres 1980, 1985) has been conducted on the effectiveness of the program. Evidence exists of a reduction in gang homicides in the areas served by GVRP, but to what extent the declines can be attributed specifically to project efforts is not entirely clear. Currently the East Los Angeles Adult Skills Center and the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department appear to have a very high regard for the crisis intervention skills and accomplishments of the GVRP in keeping gang violence at a low level.

Community Youth Gang Services

Community Youth Gang Services (CYGS) is a comprehensive crisis intervention, prevention, youth development, and community mobilization project established in 1982 to deal with a rising gang crisis in Los Angeles City and Los Angeles County. The project is funded mainly by the county

and the city and is a partial adaptation of a crisis-intervention, probation-related, and community mobilization effort in Philadelphia that was associated with a sharp reduction in gang violence. Some informants state the Philadelphia Crisis Intervention Services Network (CIN) was itself originally modelled in the early and middle 1970s after the work of the Federation of Youth Gangs.

CYGS has undergone reorganization and leadership change in its history. Its third and present director, Steve Valdivia, was formerly a youth gang member and later became director of a local community-based agency. He, therefore, has strong roots in both youth gangs and the agency world. His efforts at dealing with youth gang problems date from the days of the Federation of Youth Gangs.

CYGS has changed the primary focus of its program from crisis intervention to prevention and community involvement, with increased targeting of specific areas in the county and the city and closer collaboration with law enforcement and schools. CYGS is headquartered in East Los Angeles and retains a strong commitment to the East Los Angeles community, although it reduced staff for a period of time when other areas demonstrated more serious gang problems.

The current plan, entitled the Reduction of Street Violence Program (RSVP) includes child care, after school, employment readiness and other human service activities. Emphasis is on working with elementary school youth, family counseling of marginal gang youth, and the mobilization of the community to provide extra supervision and control of youth as well as protection of community property. The approach is also integrated into the plans and objectives of the county-wide Los Angeles Inter-Agency Task Force.

CYGS with a staff of more than 70 workers is presently located in four key areas of the county and the city and sponsors or participates in the following:

1. Operation Stay in School (OSIS). This program is coordinated with law enforcement and the schools. After a police officer picks up a truant and drops him off at an OSIS Center where he is counseled by school personnel, a CYGS worker makes a home visit and assists parents to become more "responsible for [the] youth."

2. Safe Harbors. CYGS worker, in cooperation with law enforcement and park rangers, has targeted certain schools and parks which have become centers of gang activity. The workers engage in positive relationship interactions with youth and

assist them and their groups to develop more constructive activities.

3. Career Paths. CYGS workers are now more involved in preventive educational efforts in elementary schools. They teach a 15-week curriculum consisting of classes -- 45 minutes in duration -- in order to "inform, stimulate and steer the child to a life of formal educational and honest hard work, and away from the street life of crime, drugs and death." Parents are urged to attend child development workshops and teachers and administrators at school receive in-service training to reinforce efforts initiated by CYGS.

4. Community Mobilization Program - 100 Men Plus. This program is designed to involve parents and adult community members in the "suppression of gangs, gang activity, and recruitment." Apparently this is to be a community mobilization effort around men of the community willing to serve as catalysts for "non-violent direct action for neighborhood groups, churches, and other organizations willing to engage in positive strategies to reclaim and maintain control of their neighborhoods." Certain community recreational and developmental activities have resulted thus far.

5. Graffiti Removal Project. This is a continuation of a program to clean up and beautify targeted communities as well as to provide on-the-job training to youth gang members. Ex-gang members, parents, and others are also involved in graffiti removal efforts. Under the old graffiti reduction program, free services were provided to certain communities for graffiti removal. In one community, wet sandblasting and graffiti paint-out services were provided at no charge. A variety of services were also offered to meet the "needs of private, commercial industries, and municipal entities . . ." for profit.

CYGS conducts or participates collaboratively with other agencies in a variety of programs, including court ordered restitution through provision of community service opportunities to youth, a gang jeopardy program in which younger youth are picked up by the police if they hang around with gang members, and counseled by CYGS workers. Crisis intervention and mediation is still conducted by CYGS, although apparently not with as high priority as earlier. More networking with a variety of agencies and community organizations is also now carried out. It is not clear how many of the above described programs will be established in East Los Angeles and with what priority. CYGS is highly responsive to gang crises, community and political pressures at city and county levels.

Los Angeles County Probation

The Los Angeles County Probation Department has been concerned with the youth gang problems and has established programs of intervention and supervision of gang members since World War II. Its Group Guidance Program in the 1960's used outreach probation officers to work with gangs. It developed special individual and group activities to prevent and control gang violence in the 1960's. Many of the ideas of this early program evolved in the East Los Angeles area. Michael Duran has been a leader at the street, agency, East Los Angeles community and county levels in the development of gang control and prevention efforts for three decades. He is currently Director of all special gang programs of the Probation Department.

The Specialized Gang Supervision Program was established in 1980 to reduce the rate of homicides and violent acts by gang probationers, and to significantly improve Probation control and surveillance of gang-oriented probationers by ensuring compliance with all conditions of Probation and promptly handling violators by returning them to court for short juvenile hall sentences and correctional institutions or prisons when necessary. Deputy Probation Officers were expected to provide extended supervision, including evenings and weekends, through ride-alongs with law enforcement officers, and provide surveillance of youth directly in the community.

Probation has adopted a strong suppression strategy, a shift from its earlier counseling and social support approach. It focuses not only on more serious gang offenders but utilizes the various powers of Probation to "violate" youth or lock them up, for example, for three days without court action -- a power even the police do not have. The Probation Department is making use of an old law that gives Probation special arrest powers. It allows Probation Officers to pick up gang youth and "violate" them immediately if they are not in compliance with their Probation conditions, however, arbitrary use of this power is discouraged. "Front-line" suppression is emphasized in all five units of the Specialized Gang Supervision Program. The administrative officer of each of the units in addition, may determine whether the unit's gang probation officers will wear bullet proof vests in potentially dangerous situations. Probation officers are not allowed to be armed.

The East Los Angeles Probation Unit covers an area larger than the more narrowly defined East Los Angeles area in the county. Its 8 officers are expected to carry 400 gang probationers, most of whom are felony offenders for sale of drugs, or sentenced for possession of weapons, assaults with

deadly weapons, attempted murder, "drive-by" shootings, burglary, and car thefts. Ninety-nine percent of the caseload comprises male offenders, mainly Mexican-American or Chicano. The program serves gang juveniles as well as gang adults. The current age range of probationers is from 14 to 45 years of age, however, the most active offenders ranges between 15 and 22 years. Approximately 80 percent of the probationers served in this unit are under 18 years.

A key objective of the program is the provision of "intensive" supervision, which consists of a minimum of twice monthly face-to-face contacts, with two additional phone contacts and several collateral contacts with parents, schools, and agencies, mainly by phone, during the month. Good collaborative relationship with other agencies is emphasized. Information on gang youth is readily shared with other agencies. Special attention has been paid in recent years to the improvement of relationships with law enforcement and the courts. The program's general goal of gang homicide reduction was reported to have been achieved by 1987. However, a recent increase in violence rates is apparently a result of increased drug activities, including crack sales, as well as a return to greater traditional gang-related activity by Stoner gangs.

Christine Wong, Supervisor of the East Los Angeles Unit, observes that a highly intense monitoring of gang probationers is required, but since Probation Officers are mandated by law to "process a lot of paper work," only about 50 percent of the time is spent on "suppression and rehabilitation." The unit experiences a 50 percent turnover in caseloads of 50 probationers every three months. With 50 youth on a caseload and 22 working days per month, this means a minimum of 5 required contacts per day. "Add the time we spend on ride-alongs and collateral contacts with other agencies, we are under tremendous pressure."

Other programs of the Probation Department directed to control and prevention of the gang problem, which impact the East Los Angeles community include the Gang Drug Pusher Program (GDPP) to reduce drug-related gang violence through the use of intensive monitoring and electronic surveillance of gang members/drug pushers. GDPP is viewed as a cost effective solution to controlling drug pushers when there "is no room for them in a correctional institution." The Gang Alternatives and Prevention Program (GAPP) was established to supplement current efforts to "combat gang violence and drug use." The objectives of GAPP are early intervention, education and supervision in order to deter youth from joining gangs, and using and selling illicit drugs. Services provided include

individual and group counseling to beginning offenders, bicultural and bilingual services, tutoring, parent effectiveness training, job training, and narcotics testing. Intensive supervision is supplied to youth on various school campuses. Christine Wong believes that the risks of labelling youths not known to the justice system are outweighed by the benefits of preventing vulnerable youths from joining youth gangs.

The Los Angeles County Probation Department is a major program, policy, and political force dealing with the youth gang problem county-wide. It has established close facilitative relationships with a great many agencies and community groups. Many of its ideas continue to be tested in East Los Angeles. The Specialized Gang Probation Unit retains major links with all key groups concerned with the gang problem in East Los Angeles.

East Los Angeles Adult Skills Center

The East Los Angeles Adult Skills Center, located in the East Los Angeles community, operates under the direction of the Los Angeles Unified School District and appears to have a special mission with regard to gang youth. The center provides job training, counseling, basic education, and job placement to approximately 1,200 students from 14 years and up. The bulk of the students (70 percent) are in the 16 through 21 year old age range. The Skills Center serves the eastern, southern, and northwestern areas of Los Angeles County including various school districts in Los Angeles County. The program is based upon open enrollment; there is no set training period, although the cycle of vocational training in a given class usually runs about 20 to 26 weeks. Classes are available to prepare students for G.E.D. certification and for a variety of business and industrial jobs. Requirements for the Alternative Education Work Center (AWAC) dropout program are that a person will have been out of school for 45 days or more.

Courses are planned to meet the special interests and needs of both students and business and industry in the area. Curriculum is based on recommendations and input from business and industry, advisory councils, and the mandates of a state licensing agent. Transportation to and from the Center is available to concurrently enrolled high-school-age students. Emphasis is on training for jobs that have a future career potential. Students normally attend vocational and remedial education courses six hours a day, five days a week.

The school operates similarly to private employment. Students are expected to sign a

contract as part of their training, which includes expected student behavior: regular attendance, avoidance of tardiness, and no use of chemical substances, i.e., drugs and alcohol. Any person suspected of use, possession, or being under the influence of improper substances is immediately terminated from the program. However, terminated youth can be afforded a second chance. A dress code, which includes proper grooming, is enforced. The following are not allowed at school: headbands, hair nets, gang shirts, sweaters, jackets, earrings, beepers. Certain types of athletic sportswear which designates gang affiliation, e.g., a specific brand (Puma) or a specific team (the Oakland Raiders football team) are also prohibited. I.D. cards are mandatory. The Center claims a placement rate of over 90 percent even during periods of high unemployment.

An estimated 10 to 15 percent of the student body are gang members, many from the immediate East Los Angeles community. The principal of the school is especially identified with the interests and needs of the community, with close relationships to the City Terrace Community Council as well as the larger Mothers Group of the greater East Los Angeles area, Brother Modesto and the Catholic Church, the Probation Department, CYGS and GVRP. Workers of the latter three organizations are called in periodically to assist with actual or potential gang problems on the premises.

The Principal, Pete Fernandez, calls in the representatives of the various agencies as appropriate. CYGS and GVRP workers may each have special rapport and be able to control particular gangs or gang youths. For example, Probation was called in recently when two of the students who were involved in a "drive-by" shooting came to school. CYGS has given special presentations at school. GVRP counselors had especially close relations with the school and have even "taken some of the kids to church." Mr. Fernandez's approach in the school district is fairly unique.

Principal Fernandez observed that the basis for their considerable degree of success in dealing with gang youth at the Skills Center has been:

1. Genuine care and concern for these kids, and treating them with respect.
2. A no-nonsense approach: no tolerance of gang signs, colors, and sports team jackets.
3. Use of talented, handpicked counselors.
4. Development of a close relationship with parents, calling on them when necessary, and holding parents responsible for certain behaviors of youth.

5. Development of mechanisms and procedures to involve parents, including a parent support group, parent group meetings, bringing parents of rival gang members together.

6. Development of a close relationship with employers.

7. Placement of youth in part-time jobs while at school, on condition and arrangement with employers that such jobs are contingent upon regular school attendance.

The Center attempts to provide a "normalized" yet sensitive and supervised learning environment for gang youth. There are many adult and non-gang adolescent students in attendance. Teachers and counselors are trained to integrate youth into normal, adult-oriented programs, but with opportunity for extra support and in-depth counseling to gang youth as necessary. The essence of the approach is a highly supportive and well supervised environment that involves not only youth and adults at the center but parents, agency, and community group representation in a highly visible fashion. School personnel are especially responsible for establishing relationships with youth to forestall gang activity and disruptive behavior and for using whatever outside influence is necessary to deal with actual or potential problems.

A major objective of counseling gang youth at the Center is to help them realize that they are productive individuals who "do not need to belong to gangs to be someone." Nevertheless, school staff believe that more needs to be done to alleviate use of weapons and drug possession by hard-core gang members in the program. The principal believes also that more needs to be done by staff in his school, and especially in other schools, to assist gang members with a variety of problems of adjustment they face not only at school but in the community.

The philosophy of the Skills Center is not to eliminate gang members from the program but to communicate to them the serious negative consequences of gang membership. There is an awareness and understanding that gangs have been an important and traditional source of identification for male youth in the process of growing up in the community. Focus is on certain behaviors, such as violence, drug use, sale, and possession, as well as other criminal activities, that will not be tolerated in the Center and should be eliminated generally by students.

Los Angeles Sheriff's Department

The Sheriff's Department has played a major role in the development of effective efforts to deal with the youth gang problem in East Los Angeles. Several of the department's officers have been assigned to the gang problem in the community for many years. They know the gangs, agencies, and community groups, and communicate closely with them. They have targeted particular gangs for surveillance and control, and participate regularly with agencies and community groups in efforts to deal with gang problems.

The department's police functions, i.e., investigating gang crime, identifying gang members, locating witnesses, follow-up investigation and case filing, patrol and arrest appear to be well organized and conducted in a manner responsive to community interests and needs. The department's Juvenile Operations Bureau, primarily responsible for gang crime arrest and investigation -- adult as well as juvenile -- regularly exchanges information with local agencies regarding gangs and gang members. The department's gang information system, under the leadership of Sergeant Wes McBride, is one of the best in the country. The department also relates closely to other law enforcement and criminal justice agencies in prevention, arrest of parole and probation violators and executing search and arrest warrants.

The Juvenile Operations Bureau is divided into Operation Safe Street (OSS) concerned primarily with investigation and intelligence matters and the Gang Enforcement Teams (GET). The OSS officers are non-uniformed; GET officers are uniformed and constitute the "trouble shooting," patrol component. Despite its title, the Juvenile Operations Bureau deals with all gang-related offenses and problems and coordinates its efforts with those of narcotics, homicide, and other units around gang-related matters. It is usual for Sheriff's officers to respond to any community concern with the gang problem.

The Los Angeles Sheriff's Department believes that its success in working with gangs is due to emphasis on use of trained, experienced gang investigation and patrol personnel, targeting the most seriously active gangs (14 gangs are targeted in East Los Angeles), centralization of effort, i.e., gang personnel working under one commander, strong commitment to interagency cooperation and an increasingly efficient community-oriented system to teach about gangs. Criteria for the selection of OSS officers include an interest in youth gangs, an even temper ("no hotheads"), and "an ability to talk with kids."

East Los Angeles District Attorney's Office

A significant and somewhat unique role was played by Jerry Haney, a Deputy-in-Charge of the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, located in East Los Angeles between 1982 and 1985. He worked closely with Michael Duran, Los Angeles Probation Department and Captain Lynn Poos, Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, as well as Brother Modesto in reaching out to the community to assist with a variety of gang-related problems.

The District Attorney observed that the most effective way to address the gang problem was to utilize all key elements of the community, with law enforcement spearheading the attack using traditional crime prevention and suppression methods, to diffuse the most active gangs. Law enforcement should also provide some focus and direction to the community groups concerned with these belligerent groups. Haney, Poos and Duran attended a great variety of community meetings together to address various aspects of the problem.

The Probation Department, Sheriff's Office and the District Attorney worked out a system with the courts to deal with the community's graffiti problem. A variety of approaches were used. The District Attorney wrote letters to all of the property owners and tenants whose buildings had been defaced by graffiti, urging them to remove the graffiti promptly, indicating that assistance would be available from the Sheriff's Department, if necessary. The judges and Probation then assigned probationers to remove the graffiti under supervision of Sheriff's deputies.

The authorities established direct communication with gang leaders to enlist their participation in the removal of the graffiti. They also focused community attention on particular "hot spots" in the area (usually nightclubs), effectively addressed the negative aspects of the late-night weekend "cruising problem," initiated contacts with local politicians and school authorities, and secured substantial support for a variety of community programs.

District Attorney Haney, now Head Deputy of the Norwalk Office, is convinced that the extraordinary degree of cooperation among East Los Angeles agencies and community in dealing with the gang problem was primarily responsible for the remarkable reduction in gang homicides.

Assessment

There appears to be general agreement that gangs and gang problems continue to be present in East Los Angeles, but that the level of violence was significantly reduced, at least until about the summer of 1989. The number of gang homicides

declined from an average of 21 per year in the late 1970's, an average of 14 in the early 1980's, to 2 gang murders in 1987 and zero homicides in 1988. Two homicides, however, were recorded during the first half and an additional 7 homicides into December of 1989. A sharp rise in youth gang homicides has suddenly occurred in East Los Angeles in recent months. Several knowledgeable informants, including a Sheriff's Department officer and a school administrator, agree on an estimate that there were about 30 traditional turf gangs and between 4,000 and 5,000 gang members in 1980; and 39 traditional gangs with about the same number of members in 1987. Noteworthy, however, is the estimate that there has been an additional 25 to 30 Stoner gangs with a membership of more than 500 youth in the current period. This set of Stoner gangs apparently has constituted the core of the recent renewal of youth gang violence in East Los Angeles. According to Sergeant Bob Jackson, LAPD, there were 91 Stoner gang-related incidents in 1987 in East Los Angeles, part of the city's jurisdiction, 88 in 1988 and 167 in 1989 (up to December), but he could not speculate about the reasons for the increase.

Thus, there was no evidence of a decline in the presence of gangs, or gang members, but evidence existed of a decline in serious gang-related violence in East Los Angeles at least until about the Summer of 1989. We cannot clearly or entirely account for these changing patterns. The reduction in gang violence may have been due at least in part to effective community mobilization and law enforcement activity, and changing youth gang patterns, especially a shift to non-violent Stoner gang phenomenon, at least until very recently, as well as increased drug use and trafficking. Some informants claim that second and third generation Hispanic males were from somewhat higher socioeconomic status families and were for a long period more constrained or have changed the pattern of their rebellious behavior.

Other reasons offered to explain the decline in gang homicides include the following: the community had been educated to the nature of gang violence and how to deal with it; more witnesses came forward to testify against gang offenders; a special police unit was more efficient in solving gang crimes, arresting and incarcerating shooters; parents were more involved in the problem; crisis intervention and mediation efforts of the Gang Violence Reduction and the Community Youth Gang Services programs; improvement in medical treatment of assault cases by hospital emergency teams; the catalytic efforts of Brother Modesto in mobilizing greater involvement by agencies; the charisma, special talents, and commitment of Leo Cortez, one of the original organizers of the Federation of Youth Gangs and still active in

dealing with youth gang violence problems; and extremely important, the commitment, sustained interest, and provision of resources by Los Angeles County Supervisor, Ed Edeleman.

One relatively objective observer, no longer connected with East Los Angeles, emphasizes the importance of individual leadership in the development of programs which were associated with the decline of the youth gang violence problem during the mid-seventies and much of the eighties. "Mr. Duran was the single most important individual in making the East Los Angeles programs work. No one else was a close second. . . . He provided leadership; he bridged the gap between the authorities and the community groups. No other agency came close to rivalling the Sheriff's in their expenditure of time and resources, and in overall effectiveness. Specific individuals who were most active were Captain Lynn Poos, then-Lieutenant Elmer Omohundro, and then-Sergeant Bob Malone . . . there is a need for law enforcement to interact with the community on a sensitive, humane and people-oriented plane was exceptional [sic]."

There are also a variety of reasons to explain the recent sharp rise in youth gang killings. They include: the shift of certain agency programs out of the area to other parts of the city and county and a consequent loss of focus or intensity of coverage on the youth gang problem in East Los Angeles; the presence of new youth gangs from newcomer families or immigrants who are attempting to develop their own turfs by challenging existing gangs; the recent release of several veterans of a particular gang from prison who are recruiting and organizing younger gang members; and perhaps most important, the shift of Stoner group behavior from a non-violent to a violent gang-related pattern. Possibly all of these factors and others, including a weakening of the economy, are interrelated and cumulative in their contribution to a suddenly escalated gang problem.

Agency leaders indicate that Stoner groups were largely overlooked in recent years as the community focused on controlling and preventing youth gang violence, and to some extent drug use and trafficking. Perhaps, the lessons to be learned are that gang violence control and emphasis on stopping gang recruitment or any deviant act are insufficient per se, unless accompanied by a sustained effort to develop social opportunities for growth and achievement by all youth who are at risk or vulnerable to various forms of deviance at different stages of their social development.

Conclusion

While there seems to have been no progress in the elimination of gangs or gang activity in East Los Angeles, a remarkable reduction in homicides, the most serious form of violent gang crime, occurred between the late 1970's and the summer of 1989, about a ten-year period. This is still a noteworthy achievement in light of the fact that gang violence generally escalated in other parts of Los Angeles city and county since at least 1980. The factors accounting for the changes in the community's gang patterns, however, are not entirely clear, nor do we know with much confidence, why the problem of severe gang violence has again arisen in East Los Angeles.

It is possible that the mobilization of community leadership, the coordinated involvement of public, nonprofit, and sectarian agencies, as well as the participation of gang youth in the development of common gang control objectives have been effective. These long-term collaborative efforts of various elements of the community over a ten-year period appear to differ sharply from the more fragmented efforts of other communities in the Los Angeles County area and the country in general. The efforts of task forces, public and nonprofit agencies, joined with those of grassroots groups in East Los Angeles apparently made a significant difference.

Part of the remarkable mobilization and coordination of long-term efforts was the concern of community agency and grassroots supported and respected in their positive activities as well as supervised closely and punished for their criminal activities. Community response and strategy were consistent. There was no major division of view as to what to do or how to deal with gang youth. There appeared to be a minimum of competition among agencies and community groups for resources. In part, this may have been due to the high degree of common participation by staff and community members in a great many programs and activities over time and the development of proactive, sensitive, and sustained leadership at gang, local community, agency, and county policy levels. A cohesive, caring and well-structured community was created and effectively minimized the youth gang problem for the period of time when characteristics of a mobilized community were present.

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SUMMARY

Our analysis has provided us with overviews of organizational and community responses to youth gang activity in six sites located throughout the country. The responses reflect a complex and dynamic process of interaction among policymakers and practitioners with key elements of the community within the context of economic and social change as well as changing gang patterns. Nevertheless, common as well as distinctive themes emerge which may be viewed as associated with promise of success in reduction of the problem. This summary highlights and interprets findings derived from the case studies based mainly on brief field visits and use of additional materials. We attempt to identify those principles which may be useful in the development of an effective approach.

The Youth Gang Problem

Similarities may be observed in the emergence of youth gang activity in some of our sites, at least in the cities where the youth gang problem has emerged since the beginning of 1980, e.g. Evanston, IL; Fort Wayne, IN; Columbus, OH. The beginning of the problem is characterized by youth congregating or "hanging out" at certain locations within low-income communities. These groups are small and amorphous; lines of membership are unclear; distinctive features of the traditional youth gang -- gang names, colors, signs, symbols, graffiti, turf, and particular criminal patterns, e.g. intimidation, gang assaults, drive-by shootings -- are not well developed. The distinction between an ad hoc delinquent group and a relatively better organized gang is not easily made at this time.

With the passage of time, sometimes a relatively brief period, characteristic youth gang behavior more clearly occurs. This behavior includes clashes between groups of youth, and property crime, especially vandalism and graffiti, both in and around schools and at "hang-outs." Certain types of crime, e.g. burglary, car theft, narcotics use, become more clearly associated with particular individuals or cliques. Tensions between youth groups result in increased recruitment of members. Assaults are more frequent

at popular youth spots, including shopping and recreation centers, and sporting events. Some of the violence assumes serious proportions: stabbings, shootings, and homicides. Fear and concern permeate certain sectors of the community and are reflected in an increase in media attention. The youth gang problem assumes crisis proportions and responsive action by police, politicians, schools and other agencies and groups is called for and usually taken.

The causes cited by informants for emergence of the problem are varied. In general, they center on population movements and changes, a failure of basic institutions, such as family and school to properly do their jobs, or system/structural factors, such as poverty and unemployment which make it very difficult for youth, especially males, to meet basic needs for personal and social development by conventional standards of the larger society.

A number of respondents at the sites assert that the youth gang problem was "imported" from "outside," from other specific chronic gang problem communities or cities. This importation of the problem, however, usually resulted from the movement families searching for improved housing or employment opportunities and a better way of life for their children. Youth in these families may have been gang members or at least prone to gang membership. Seeking status and sometimes protection in the new community and often at school, they introduce or stimulate the development of youth gang problems.

Other respondents comment that local youth, with or without the presence of "outsiders," were ready to form or participate in gangs. They were from homes with little parental supervision; they were failing at school; and they had nothing to do but "hangout" on the streets because employment and recreational opportunities or alternative activities were not available. A final, or at least most recent stage of the development of the youth gang problem in these emerging problem cities was the arrival of a serious drug trade, usually involving "crack." The participation of gang youth in more organized narcotic trafficking and other criminal activities is less clear and more difficult to detect, control, or prevent.

The situation is more complex in the chronic youth gang problem cities, e.g., El Monte and East Los Angeles. Problems of youth gang violence, turf protection, gang signs, symbols, recruitment, and gang organization have been well established over decades. However, cycles of organized gang activity, particularly violence, including retaliatory killings, are followed by periods of relative tranquility as the older, more serious

offenders are imprisoned. In time they return to their gang communities and some resume patterns of gang violence or stimulate gang organization and the development of these patterns among younger elements. Different generations of youth may be attuned to different patterns of deviance. Stoner activity, e.g., drug use, vandalism, and satanism, may be popular, but in due course may be transformed into traditional forms of gang violence. Drug trafficking and other criminal adult groups develop in these chronic poverty areas and indirectly reinforce established youth gang patterns, which serve as a base for recruitment of new personnel for their criminal enterprises.

The causes of the chronic youth gang problem are largely the same as those in the emerging problem areas. However the problems of deficient social and economic opportunities, the lack of strong institutions and concerned local community organizations are more serious and pervasive. The youth gang culture has been institutionalized. It's difficult, if not impossible, to deal with issues of prevention and early intervention without control and attention to the influence of older youth and criminal systems in these communities. The cumulative failure of such institutions as family, schools, and neighborhood organizations and the lack of jobs create a deep sense of alienation, isolation, and despair among almost all segments of the communities.

Community Response

In some of our emerging gang problem cities, organizational and community denial of the presence of a youth gang problem hinders or prevents the development of an appropriate response. Reasons for the "denial syndrome" that are cited include political interests of government officials, desires by certain institutional representatives to save face and avoid responsibility, commercial concerns to protect city reputations and property values, and simply lack of resources by certain community agencies to do anything about the problem. Also reported was initial hesitation by police and media to avoid public alarm and generate greater youth interest in gangs or strengthen existing gang identities. Noted was the weakness of community organizations and the inability of poor communities to influence central city interest in their gang problem and to allocate more resources to deal with it. A simplistic or singular strategy, e.g., suppression by a law enforcement agency, also at times impeded the development of community-wide broad scale strategies to confront the youth gang problem.

Crisis events of serious youth gang violence often

played a major precipitating role in the mobilization of a significant community response and the development of a well-articulated plan for dealing with the problem: the shooting death of a recreation leader and a gang-related slaying in Evanston; separate instances of gang assault on the mayor's son and the governor's daughter in Columbus; a mounting death toll and a failure of a unilateral suppression strategy in El Monte and East Los Angeles.

A central element of a "promising" system-wide response to the youth gang issue was proactive and sustained leadership by one or several agency representatives. The superintendent at the Ethan Allen school for Boys in Wales, Wisconsin, was the primary force in a pioneering effort to create a special youth gang cottage program. Hard-core gang youth were targeted to receive close supervision, remedial education and therapeutic (cognitive) interventions in order to change gang member attitudes, thinking, and behaviors. The executive director of the local Boys Club and a community relations police officer in El Monte developed a sustained comprehensive community approach to gang-affiliated and gang-prone youth that emphasized the mobilization of employment opportunities as well as remedial education, crisis intervention, mediation of gang disputes, social services, and other special programs, including a city-wide graffiti-expunging campaign. The local police chief in Evanston directed his department to make gang-busting and support for community grassroots efforts to monitor and control gang youth in their neighborhoods a top priority. A broad-based coalition of community actors in East Los Angeles led by key people from police, church, and probation met on a regular basis for years to develop and maintain a variety of gang control and prevention efforts. Key police and youth agency officials, and also probation and the school representatives, in Columbus and Fort Wayne were important in the creation of a multi-disciplinary, coordinated approach for dealing with the problem.

Integral to effective collaboration by key community actors was mutual trust, similar perceptions about the nature and definition of the youth gang problem, and a common philosophy about the importance of complementary agency strategies. In Fort Wayne, similar perspectives coupled with mutual trust and commitment allowed representatives of key institutions to share information quickly in order to prevent and mediate outbreaks of gang violence. In Evanston, the police and neighborhood groups joined together initially to target and monitor hard-core gang members for suppression and then to provide youth-at-risk with social development opportunities. In East Los Angeles, representatives of criminal

justice, community-based organizations, and parent groups joined together with youth gang and former youth gang leaders in crisis intervention, mediation, and community development activities.

The mix of strategies to address a youth gang problem seemed to vary by whether a city or area had an emerging or chronic youth gang problem. While strategies of suppression were common in all of our case examples, emerging gang problem cities, such as Evanston, Fort Wayne, and Columbus were more likely to emphasize suppression along with community organization and social intervention approaches. Chronic youth gang problem cities, such as El Monte and East Los Angeles emphasized social opportunities and community mobilization, along with suppression and social intervention.

Finally, we observed that in a number of cities, the perceived and actual reduction of youth gang activities was confounded by the emergence of a drug trafficking problem, mainly "crack" in which at least some youth gang members and older, usually former, gang members were involved. In both Fort Wayne and Columbus, the burgeoning "crack" trade seemed to be accompanied by a decline in gang violence, but a rise in other criminal activities. In Evanston, the police observed that drug trafficking and other gang-connected criminal activities are now more covert and sophisticated, possibly because of a strong suppression approach in which the more usual traditional forms of gang activity, especially violence, were sharply reduced. Former rival gang leaders were viewed as cooperating in the drug trade and sometimes recruiting youths for low-level tasks, although these recruits were not necessarily younger gang members.

These findings suggest certain promising directions that policy and strategy should take in dealing with the youth gang problem. The following advice is offered to policymakers and practitioners:

- clear and forthright, if not early, recognition of a youth gang problem;
- proactive leadership by representatives of significant criminal justice and community-based agencies in the mobilization of political and community interests and resources to confront the problem;
- formation of a sustaining formal and informal network of criminal justice and non-criminal justice actors operationally involved with the problem;
- consensus by the principal actors on a

definition of the problem, specific targets of agency and interagency effort, and on the reciprocal strategies to be employed;

- development of a multi-disciplinary approach which involves strategies of suppression, social intervention, and organizational development, but which particularly emphasizes social opportunities and community mobilization;

- finally, the approach to the youth gang problem should be guided, not only by a concern for protecting and safeguarding the community against youth gang depredations but by providing support to as well as supervision of potential and actual gang members in a manner which contributes to their personal and social development.