
by Edgar F. Raines, Jr. and Major David R. Campbell
THE ARMY AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:
EVOLUTION OF ARMY IDEAS ON THE COMMAND,
CONTROL, AND COORDINATION OF THE
U.S. ARMED FORCES, 1942-1985

by

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This paper, the fourth publication in the Historical Analysis Series, treats a significant topic—the Army's initiation of and reaction to proposals for reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Originally established during World War II to foster cooperation with the British high command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have proved a perennial focus for contention. Issues of civilian control of the military, national strategy, and the division of the budget among the services have intermingled with more technical questions concerning command, control, and coordination. The current proposals for reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff occasioned the publication of this study, but the history of similar debates over forty years suggests that the study will remain pertinent.

Questions regarding what policy is and what it should be are central to discussion. Part of the intellectual process of formulating answers is a careful consideration of past experience. The Army's historical community provides pertinent, objective research on questions of interest. In the present essay, the Center of Military History offers current and future policy makers a detailed treatment of this major issue in U.S. military affairs.

Washington, D.C. 19 April 1986

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Edgar F. Raines, Jr., was born in Murphysboro, Illinois. He received his B.A. in history from Southern Illinois University in 1966 and his M.A., also in history, from the same school two years later. During the 1971-72 academic year, he was one of the first two dissertation year fellows in military history at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. In 1976 he obtained his Ph.D. in history from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He has been a historian at the center since November 1980.

Major David R. Campbell, a native of Chicago, Illinois, received his B.A. in history from De Paul University in 1969 and was commissioned in the Regular Army in the field artillery. He has served in Vietnam, West Germany, Saudi Arabia and the United States. He completed his M.A. in history at Iowa State University in 1980.
On 27 March 1985 Senator William V. Roth of Delaware wrote Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger and advocated the establishment of a Blue Ribbon Panel to examine the defense procurement system. Senator Roth observed in the course of his remarks that interservice cooperation needed improvement and specifically called for a review of proposals to strengthen the role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified and specified commands. In so doing he became only the latest of the congressional advocates of reform of command and control of the U.S. armed forces—a tradition that stretches back to the immediate aftermath of World War I.

Effective coordination between the armed services, however, had to await the next great armed conflict. The World War II Joint Chiefs of Staff proved but the harbinger of postwar reforms that included the creation of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 1947, the establishment of a Department of Defense and the position of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff two years later, and the gradual strengthening of the powers of the secretary and the chairman in subsequent reforms. While these events have attracted the attention of many commentators, no one has yet discussed them in a comprehensive fashion from the perspective of one of the services. This essay seeks to describe the Army's official positions on the various proposals to reform the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 1942 and 1985, to identify continuities and discontinuities, and to provide some explanation for them. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, although in many respects a historical accident in that it was created to provide a parallel organization to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, was also shaped by specifically American circumstances. The independent air power debate of the years between 1918 and 1941, the development of the Joint Army and Navy Board after 1903, and the evolution of the general staff concept and the changing role of the chief of staff provided

the intellectual and institutional context of the Army's initial response to the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. The degree of influence exercised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, once established, depended not only on its formal statutory basis but also upon the health and vigor of other institutions, such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense (after 1947), the service secretaries, and the unified and specified commands. Of equal importance were the personalities of the men involved, particularly the president and his view of institutional relationships. The authors have addressed these issues to provide some understanding of the human realities that underlay the calls for institutional reform.

The origins of this study date back to the late summer of 1981 when the U.S. Army Center of Military History provided the Army Staff with a study of Joint Chiefs of Staff reform proposals since 1942. Some thought was given at the time to preparing an account of the Army's positions on these proposals, but the impulse was defeated by the dearth of secondary literature on the subject and the lack of time for extensive primary research. In July 1984 the then chief of military history, Brig. Gen. Douglas Kinnard, decided to commit the resources at the center needed to support extensive primary research on the project. Dr. Edgar F. Raines, Jr., was assigned to it in September and Maj. David R. Campbell in October, when he reported to the center. Dr. Raines had primary responsibility for researching and writing chapters one through six; Major Campbell chapters seven through nine. Both writers are responsible for the conclusion.

The charts which illustrate the various proposals for Joint Chiefs of Staff reform require a little explanation. While some of the proposals included charts to illustrate recommended changes, others did not. Where charts were lacking, we constructed them. Unfortunately, the existing charts do not follow a uniform format. In the interest of minimizing our own and the readers' confusion, we have supplied a uniform format throughout. Any modification of the original charts was based on a close reading of the original sources and considerable discussion by the two authors.

All historians contract numerous obligations in the course of their research and writing. This is particularly true of historians who are working under tight deadlines. Without the assistance of Mr. Edward J. Reese, Mr. Wilbert B.
Mahoney, Ms. Teresa Hammet, and Ms. Angela Fernandes of the Modern Military Headquarters Branch of the National Archives, this study could not have been written. We are also indebted to Dr. Archie Barrett of the staff of the House Armed Services Committee; Dr. Richard J. Sommers and Mr. David A. Keough of the U.S. Army Military History Institute; Mr. Steven M. Eldridge, Ms. Edie M. Miley, and Mr. Thomas A. Gaskins of The Adjutant General's Office; Mr. Willard J. Webb of the Historical Division, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Dr. Roger R. Trask of the Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense; and the following current and former members of the Army Staff: Col. Harold Lee Ladehoff, Lt. Col. Robert H. Scales, and Lt. Col. James M. Stefan. Retired Generals Maxwell D. Taylor, William E. DePuy, John H. Cushman, Bruce Palmer, Jr., and David S. Parker, and former Secretaries of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Melvin R. Laird answered our queries about points that were obscure to us.

This study would not have been completed without the active support of successive chiefs of military history at the U.S. Army Center of Military History--General Kinnard and Brig. Gen. William A. Stofft--and Col. Patrick J. Holland who served as acting Chief of Military History in the interim between General Kinnard's departure and General Stofft's appointment. Dr. David F. Trask, the chief historian at the center, has provided insightful comments that much improved the manuscript. We are also indebted to Lt. Col. Robert Frank, chief of the Research and Analysis Division, and Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, chief of the Analysis Branch, for their guidance and encouragement. Friends and colleagues in and outside the center have commented constructively on portions of the manuscript in its various stages. They include Dr. Paul J. Scheips, Mr. Karl E. Cocke, Ms. Rebecca C. Robbins, Ms. Romana M. Danysh, Mr. Wayne M. Dzwonchyk, Mr. Steven E. Everett, Mr. Douglas Clanin, Maj. Lawrence Greenberg, and Maj. Francis T. Julia, Jr. We are deeply indebted to our outside readers--Professor Daniel R. Beaver of the University of Cincinnati and the current holder of the Research Chair in Military History at the center; Professor John Y. Simon of Southern Illinois University; Professor Edward M. Coffman of The University of Wisconsin; Mr. Herman Wolk, Dr. George Watson, and Dr. Walton H. Moody of the Office of Air Force History; Dr. Roger R. Trask at the Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Mr.
Willard J. Webb and Mrs. Helen M. Bailey at the Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Dr. Roger Spiller, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Dr. Raines had the good fortune to serve on the U.S. Army Special Review Committee on Department of Defense Organization in the fall of 1985. He thanks his fellow committee members, Col. Powell Hutton, Col. Al Baker, Lt. Col. Daniel Kaufman, Lt. Col. James M. Stefan, Lt. Col. Jack Wood, Maj. Rob Holland, and Mr. J. B. Hudson, for the insights that they gave him on the joint system. Mr. Terrence J. Gough at the center unselfishly shared with us his knowledge of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Ms. Elizabeth McCormick served as a research assistant on the project during its closing stages. Ms. Bernice Harper and Ms. Barbara Cork provided indispensable typing support. The librarians at the center, Ms. Carol Anderson and Ms. Mary Sawyer, relentlessly tracked obscure volumes and secured them on interlibrary loan. Ms. Hannah M. Zeidlik and Ms. Geraldine K. Judkins gave us the archival support we have come to expect at the center. Staff Sergeant Marshall Williams and Ms. Linda M. Cajka provided graphics support, while Mr. Lenwood Y. Brown, our editor, saw the manuscript through to publication. Dr. James E. Hewes, Jr., retired from the center before the inception of this study but his work on the history of the Army Staff serves as a model for all those who attempt to understand military administration at the highest levels. We are in the debt of all these people whose collective efforts account for many of the strengths of this study. The authors are fully accountable for any errors of fact or interpretation.
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THE ARMY AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:
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CHAPTER I

Intellectual and Institutional Roots of Reform, 1903-1941

The initial Army proposals to reform the Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II grew out of prewar arrangements within the War Department for command and control of the field forces and efforts to reform the Joint Army and Navy Board, a joint planning agency that the secretaries of war and the Navy established in 1903. That same year Secretary of War Elihu Root secured legislation creating a War Department General Staff headed by a chief of staff. The event was to prove of incalculable importance in conditioning Army views toward the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The General Staff provided soldiers with, in their view, a model of how all military staffs ought to be organized and operate. Any divergence in the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the General Staff became almost automatically a weakness requiring correction. When problems surfaced during World War II, Army officers thus possessed both a diagnosis and a solution for them derived from the Army's prewar experiences. The war became the occasion rather than the cause for Army advocacy of Joint Chiefs of Staff reform.

The chief of staff in Root's formulation coordinated the activities of the technical bureaus that had developed during the nineteenth century, such as the Adjutant General's Department, the Quartermaster Department, and the Corps of Engineers, and advised the secretary of war on departmental policy. The chief of staff commanded only the General Staff; he lacked such authority over the technical bureaus and the troops in the field. He issued all directions to them "by order of the Secretary of War." Over the years an informal political alliance developed between the secretary and the chief of staff. The secretary supported the chief of staff when the bureau chiefs resisted his attempts to coordinate their activities; the chief of staff supported the secretary of war during appearances before Congress. Working together, they established much firmer executive control over the Army and in the process largely excluded congressional influence over the appointment and assignment of officers, one of the distinctive characteristics of American civil-military relations during the preceding century.¹
During World War I, the chief of staff, General Peyton C. March, succeeded in establishing his primacy over the bureau chiefs but not over the field forces deployed outside the continental United States. The commander of the most important field force operating overseas, General John J. Pershing, believed that he was the commanding general of the U.S. Army and that his relationship to March was similar to that which had existed between Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, when he was commanding general of the U.S. Army, and Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, the chief of staff of the Army. During 1864 and 1865 Grant had accompanied the primary Union field army in the campaign against Richmond, while Halleck remained in Washington to coordinate, under Grant's direction, administrative and logistic support for all the Union armies. March refused to accept the subordination for the chief of staff that this implied—although at least two of his predecessors had done so. He succeeded in maintaining his independence from Pershing just as Pershing maintained his independence from March.2

When Pershing succeeded March as chief of staff in 1921, he largely accepted March's interpretation of the role of the chief of staff in peace. Army Regulation 10-15 issued in November 1921 stated that "as the agent and in the name of the Secretary of War" the chief of staff issued "such orders as will ensure that the plans of the War Department are harmoniously executed by all branches and agencies of the Military Establishment...."3

Pershing's view of the wartime role of the chief of staff was somewhat different. The same year that saw the publication of Army Regulation 10-15 also witnessed the report of a board of General Staff officers charged with enunciating the lessons of the World War. Presided over by Pershing's alter ego, Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, the board recommended that in the event of war the War Department establish a General Headquarters made up of officers selected from the General Staff to direct the American Army in the primary theater of operations. The board members assumed that the chief of staff would take command of these forces and that the deputy chief of staff would become the chief of staff of the Army. The wartime role of the chief of staff would be to provide administrative and logistic support for the field armies. With the theater commander acting as chief strategist while the chief of staff acted as chief logistician, this recommendation clearly left the chief of staff in
an inferior position. It also mirrored the relationship that Pershing believed should have prevailed between himself and General March in 1918.4

The General Headquarters concept permeated all Army war planning during the interwar period. In 1936 a revision of Army Regulation 10-15, apparently framed with the intent of giving effect to these plans, gave the chief of staff command of Army field forces in peace and also in war until such time as the president "specifically designated" a commanding general for those forces. It was under the auspices of this regulation for which, as one scholar has observed, "the precise legal authority...is not quotable," that the chief of staff commanded the Army at the beginning of World War II.5

Following the March 1942 reorganization of the War Department General Staff in response to the deficiencies revealed by Pearl Harbor, the War Department issued a revised Army Regulation 10-15 that redefined once more the relationship of the chief of staff to the president, the secretary of war, and the Army. The chief of staff lost his title of commanding general of Army field forces. He became instead "the executive through whom the President of the United States, as Commander-in-Chief, exercises his functions in relation to strategy, tactics, and operations." At the same time the chief of staff acted as "the immediate advisor" to the secretary of war who delegated to him responsibility for "the planning, development, and execution of the military program"—that is, the budget. Finally, the chief of staff exercised "general supervision" over the Army.

Legally, the revised regulation represented a diminution of the powers of the chief of staff, and certainly his authority as described in 1942 comported more nearly with the General Staff Act of 1903 than the 1936 edition. As a practical matter, however, the revision did not diminish his power. By emphasizing his direct relationship to the president, bypassing the secretary of war with respect to strategy, tactics, and operations, the 1942 regulation actually enlarged the scope of the chief of staff's authority.6

The Joint Army and Navy Board also changed after 1918. Prior to World War I the board had coordinated war planning by the War and Navy Departments. The departments allowed the board to fall into inactivity during World War I, but in 1919 they agreed to upgrade and revitalize it. Heretofore they had detailed officers to the board by name; the members had included the
professional heads of the services and usually the chief planners. After 1919
the departments detailed members by position and in the process regularized
the prewar membership. The board now consisted of six members, three Army
and three Navy. Army members included the chief of staff of the Army, the
chief of the War Plans Division, and the chief of the Operations Division
(dropped in 1923 at General Pershing's request in favor of the deputy chief of
staff). The naval representatives consisted of the chief of naval operations, the
deputy chief of naval operations, and the director of the Plans Division, Naval
Operations. To assist the board, the two departments created a Joint Planning
Committee headed by the chief planners of both services. As with the board,
all the members of the committee were "dual hatted," that is, each held a
position on the staff of his respective service in addition to a joint position.
The composition and function of these joint agencies remained stable until
1941.7

The Joint Board throughout this period was advisory only. It had no
executive function. It lacked any means of supervising the execution of its
plans and did not receive reports. The board, concluded the closest student of
its activities, was "a planning and deliberative body rather than a center of
executive authority."8

As the office of the chief of staff and the Joint Board slowly evolved,
some Army officers called for an even more wide-ranging reform of the defense
establishment. During the debate over the reorganization of the Army in 1919
and 1920, some officers advocated the creation of a department of national
defense and an independent air force. The first comprehensive plan for a single
department, however, dated from 1921. Col. John M. Palmer, a personal aide
to General Pershing, proposed to Secretary of War John W. Weeks the creation
of a ministry of defense to fix the missions and budgets of the two services but
not to interfere in either their command or administration. Palmer's
recommendation failed to secure Weeks' support, and the following year Col.
Briant H. Wells, the assistant chief of staff, War Plans Division, enunciated
what became the War Department's position until the eve of World War II:
maintenance of the two-department system, opposition to the creation of an
independent air force, and support of a reformed Joint Board to coordinate
planning between the services.9

4
The establishment of a single department of defense became entwined during the interwar period with the air power controversy. In 1924 Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, the foremost advocate of an independent air force, called for a "Department of National Defense" and continued to advocate it until his death in 1936. Unification provided a retort to critics who argued that "triplification" created insurmountable problems of coordination at the departmental level. The commingling of the independence and unification issues helped prevent a consideration of unification on its own merits by Mitchell's opponents, including most of the high ranking officers of the Army and Navy between 1919 and 1941.10

By the summer of 1939, with war imminent in Europe, the Army in the midst of a limited mobilization and the Navy undergoing even larger increases, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an executive order that required the Joint Army and Navy Board to operate "under the direction and supervision" of the president in his role as commander-in-chief as well as the service secretaries. The order took the members of the Joint Board by surprise. The chief of naval operations, Admiral William D. Leahy, spoke to the president the next day. Roosevelt said that he wanted the board to continue to function as it had in the past. The order was designed to ensure that he was kept informed of the board's recommendations. Its reports would go through the secretaries to the president for final decision.11

In the months that followed, the Joint Board did not increase its responsibilities but the chief of staff and the chief of naval operations did. They dealt directly with the president without going through the service secretaries. This arrangement foreshadowed what became the organizational reality of World War II in Washington. The president became an active commander-in-chief with the chief of staff of the Army and the chief of naval operations reporting directly to him on issues of national strategy and operations. The service secretaries became responsible for administrative and logistical support. Henry L. Stimson, who became secretary of war in 1940, initially resisted the diminished role of his office, but the pressures of mobilization and his personal respect for the chief of staff, General George C. Marshall, led him to accept the current arrangements as a necessary expedient.12

5
Stimson's view of the proper chain of command in the Army derived from his youthful experience as a protege of Elihu Root and his service as secretary of war in the administration of William Howard Taft. For Stimson command was vested in the president. When the chief of staff spoke, he spoke with the authority of the president, not in his own right. In the War Department Stimson championed the pure Root reforms.

The perspective of Army officers on the General Staff differed somewhat from that of the secretary of war. They, after all, lacked the institutional memory of Stimson. For them the wartime organization of the War Department, the Root reform as modified by Pershing and Roosevelt, represented a model to which they instinctively turned when they sought a structure to encompass both the Army and the Navy.13

The first major initiative for reform, however, came from the Navy and not the Army. In the summer of 1941 as the Army and Navy struggled to mobilize combat power, the General Board of the Navy proposed the creation of a joint general staff headed by a chief directly responsible to the president. The joint general staff, in the board's view, should prepare general military plans and issue directives to implement them. General Marshall and his closest advisers received the General Board's proposal with considerable enthusiasm but realized that it could succeed only if the Navy and President Roosevelt wholeheartedly supported the concept. In February 1942 the Navy Department backed away from the reform and the War Department, in the interest of a vigorous prosecution of the war, did not pursue the issue. Although nothing substantive immediately ensued, the incident provided the occasion for the General Staff to significantly modify its position on unification for the first time since 1922.14

As mobilization continued the joint committee system became more elaborate. In May 1941 the Joint Board restricted the membership of the Joint Planning Committee to the war plans chiefs only. A Joint Strategic Committee, subordinate to the planning committee and consisting of planning officers of both services, became responsible for the preparation of joint war plans and joint operations plans. The planning committee could detail other joint studies to ad hoc groups of action officers, drawn when needed from the planning staffs of the two services. By September 1941, the Joint Board
recommended and the service secretaries approved the creation of a Joint Intelligence Committee, but it did not begin operation until four days before the attack on Pearl Harbor.\textsuperscript{15}

The Joint Board itself underwent one final change in composition before World War II. In July 1941 the service secretaries approved adding the Army's deputy chief of staff for air and the Navy's chief of the bureau of aeronautics to the board, raising its total membership to eight with only two—General Marshall, the chief of staff of the Army, and Admiral Harold L. Stark, Leahy's successor as the chief of naval operations—having command responsibilities. All the other members were subordinate staff officers. This membership made a great deal of sense given the primary responsibility of the Joint Board, the oversight of the preparation of joint plans. The arrangement, however, was not well adapted to the coordination of joint operations, an inescapable function once the war came. The members without operational responsibilities contributed to lengthy discussions useful in a leisurely consideration of plans, but their presence did not hasten decision making and probably retarded it. As war approached the Army and Navy members of the Joint Board spent more of their time informally exchanging information during meetings than following the stated agenda. In this manner the services attempted to coordinate their activities—inadequately, perhaps, but this was the best that the charter of the Joint Board allowed. This deficiency in organization for a wartime environment helps explain why the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization superseded the old Joint Board with little acrimony almost as soon as the war began.\textsuperscript{16}

The Root reform and its subsequent modifications sought to deal with three complex and interrelated issues: how to maintain civilian control of the military, how to ensure that civilian leaders received prompt and accurate military advice, and how to best translate civilian intentions into successful military operations. The system that Root created operated adequately in the years before World War I but suffered from the deficiency that all issues had to rise to the top for decision. Successful prosecution of major wars in the twentieth century, as the American experience in World War I demonstrated, demanded decentralization of authority for efficient execution of plans. In the interwar period Army officers tended toward the view that the best method of accomplishing this goal was to give the chief of staff the attributes of a
commander with Army Regulation 10-15 of 1936 actually proclaiming him one. He could then easily delegate his responsibilities to subordinates. In adopting this position, Army officers did not seek in any way to question civilian control; they simply sought to enhance military effectiveness in carrying out policy as established by the president and the secretary of war.

The strategic situation the United States faced from 1939 until the attack on Pearl Harbor raised the possibility of American participation in more than one theater. Such a prospect not only implicitly called into question Pershing's concept that the chief of staff would deploy to the primary theater of operations and act as commander of U.S. forces there but also made the issues of grand strategy and interservice cooperation much more important than they had been during World War I. Of course, the Joint Army and Navy Board dated from 1903 and its existence testified to a certain degree of service awareness about the need to coordinate the war planning of the Army and the Navy. Despite the increased vitality of the board after World War I, it is fair to say that it had nowhere near the impact on the thinking of Army officers that the General Staff did prior to 1941. Roosevelt's order making the board report directly to the president indicated that both he and the board would play a large role in establishing grand strategy, a much more important function than the board had heretofore possessed. Unlike World War I when the Navy's primary duty was to act as an administrative transport service for the Army, the kind of war that Americans faced in 1940 and 1941, involving as it did the reconquest of Europe and island hopping in the Pacific, placed a premium on cooperation between the Army and the Navy. The approach of war also meant that operational control became an issue of much greater importance than it had assumed over the past two decades.

All these considerations—the tendency in Army thinking to vest the chief of staff with the powers of a commander, the strategic problems posed by a multi-front war, the need to closely coordinate naval, ground, and air operations, and the imminence of war itself—underlay Marshall's decision to accept the Navy's proposal to establish a single chief of staff. While this move proved abortive, Marshall's attitude did constitute a reversal of the War Department position of twenty years on unification, i.e., that the Joint Board would suffice, and demonstrated that he was not wedded to existing organizational arrangements.
From the Army's perspective, the conditions by late November 1941 were ripe for major institutional change—and the change followed shortly thereafter with the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But this reform came about in a way that General Marshall could not have anticipated before Pearl Harbor and used another country's experience with the higher direction of armed forces as a guide.
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER I


2. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, pp. 32-46. Edward M. Coffman, in his *The Hilt of the Sword: The Career of Peyton C. March* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), pp. 104-118, argues that the "feud" between March and Pershing was more a product of the battle of the postwar memoirs than a reflection of the degree of their differences at the time. For a discussion of civil-military and command relations during the Civil War the most up-to-date synthesis is Herman Hattaway's and Archer Jones' *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), but T. Harry Williams' *Americans at War: The Development of the American Military System* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960) is still valuable because he attempts to discuss command relations throughout American military history.


11. Cline, Washington Command Post, p. 45; Davis, The Origin of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, pp. 63-64.


CHAPTER II

The Creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and First Attempts at Reform, 1941-1943

The Joint Chiefs of Staff grew out of the ARCADIA Conference during December 1941 and January 1942 between Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and President Roosevelt and concomitant technical discussions by the respective heads of the armed services of the two nations. The American position was largely shaped by General Marshall who advocated genuine unity of command in the theaters of operation based on his own experience during World War I and his postwar service as Pershing's aide. Unity of command overseas implied the need for some sort of coordinating group to issue directives to the theater commanders. The British Chiefs of Staff Committee and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed that this group would be called the Combined Chiefs of Staff and would consist of "the British Chiefs of Staff (or in their absence from Washington, their duly accredited representatives), and the United States opposite numbers of the British Chiefs of Staff." The heads of the British Joint Staff Mission became the representatives of the British chiefs.¹

Because the British had three independent services, Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, the deputy chief of staff for air and soon to become commanding general, Army Air Forces, became the American counterpart to the Royal Air Force representative. The conferees also agreed that the adjective "combined" would apply to those organizations, plans, and operations involving the services of more than one nation; "joint" would apply to situations involving two or more services of the same nation.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff held their first meeting in Washington on 23 January 1942. The American members were Generals Marshall and Arnold, Admiral Stark, and Admiral Ernest J. King, who Roosevelt had called to Washington in the wake of Pearl Harbor to serve as commander-in-chief, U.S. Fleet. Eight days after the meeting, King wrote Marshall and Stark that the existence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the context of the ARCADIA agreements appeared to imply the existence of a U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Marshall agreed and commented that given the membership there was no reason to retain the Joint Board. The board maintained a paper existence until 1947, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally received a legal charter in the National
The Joint Chiefs of Staff possessed a major weakness as an operating agency from the very beginning: It lacked the power of decision. At one of the early meetings General Marshall attempted to secure agreement on majority rule for points of dispute, but Admiral King refused to accept this solution. The Joint Chiefs sometimes used "vote" when describing their meetings, but the word referred to members having complete freedom to express their views on the issues before them rather than a formal and binding ballot. The result, observed Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., the assistant deputy chief of staff of the Army from 1943 until 1945, was to foster compromise, procrastination, and straddling. When compromise was a correct solution, of course, this predisposition was a strength of the organization rather than a flaw. However, the Joint Chiefs "were not equipped or organized to handle a situation where there were sharply divergent views, either of which was preferable from an objective viewpoint to any solution that tried to scramble irreconcilables." In wartime the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to settle the difficult problems, but in peacetime, he predicted, the chiefs would leave the hard questions unanswered.

The Joint Chiefs simply took over the Joint Board's network of supporting staff committees. As the war continued the committee structure became more elaborate. By late in the war the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization included some thirteen joint committees and two joint boards. In 1943 the Joint Chiefs, for the first time, even assigned a few staff officers to joint planning duties full time.

The committee system in the joint organization differed considerably from General Staff theory and practice. In the General Staff the top planning and coordinating was "done by men who had time to think" and who were not burdened "with time-consuming operating and administrative duties." Even after 1943 most members of the joint committees and boards had heavy operational responsibilities. General Nelson conceded that this system possessed advantages--the men at the planning level were completely aware of current problems because of their operational responsibilities, while their direct involvement in planning meant that the joint organization could be more streamlined with fewer staff layers than otherwise would have been the case.
He believed, nevertheless, that the disadvantages offset the advantages. These included a proclivity for the planners "to be narrow and partisan in their viewpoint" and a lack of time for them to perform adequately their planning duties. This latter characteristic meant that the joint planners either delayed their work or reached hasty and ill-advised recommendations. Moreover, the nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization meant that the chiefs could not delegate authority downward as General Marshall did in the General Staff. At the same time informal methods had little scope. Everything had to be reduced to writing. General Staff officers regarded the joint organization as a "paper factory."

Relations between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the theater commanders received their definition during ARCADIA and in the months immediately following. At the conference the British and Americans agreed to establish one unified command, the Australian-British-Dutch-American Command, encompassing ground, air, and naval forces in the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, the Malay Peninsula, and Burma. The supreme commander, General Sir Archibald Wavell, reported directly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

The Australian-British-Dutch-American Command established the principle of unity of command in the field, but the allied governments lacked sufficient forces to mount a successful defense against the well conceived and executed Japanese assault on the region. With the allied defenses crumbling—Singapore fell on 15 February 1942—the allies had to consider command arrangements once the Japanese completed the conquest of the territories included in the command. Three days after the fall of Singapore, President Roosevelt suggested to Prime Minister Churchill that, given the probable loss of Java, the United States should undertake to reinforce the right flank of the command, making Australia the base for future American operations. Simultaneously, Britain would build up forces on the left flank based on India. The president expanded on this idea on 7 March when he proposed dividing the world into three general areas for the prosecution of the war: the Pacific Ocean Area, a U.S. responsibility; the Indian Ocean and Middle East Area, a British responsibility; and the European-Atlantic Ocean Area, a combined responsibility of both countries.
Roosevelt's conception implied a more complex chain of command than had existed for the Australian-British-Dutch-American Command, which the Combined Chiefs dissolved in late February. In a conversation with General Marshall on 8 March, the president spelled out his view of the desirable chain of command. The Combined Chiefs of Staff would "direct grand strategy, being directly responsible to him and the Prime Minister." For the European area of operations, the chain of command would run from the Combined Chiefs directly to the supreme commander, the same arrangement that had existed for Wavell's command. Although the Americans would run the Pacific and the British the Indian Ocean, the Combined Chiefs, by their control of grand strategy, would coordinate operations against Japan.  

A paper prepared by Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, chief of the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff, amplified the president's ideas. In the Pacific the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under "the general jurisdiction" of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, would "exercise jurisdiction over all matters of minor strategy and operations." The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff would have the responsibility for establishing subarea commands in the Pacific, the British in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East, the Combined Chiefs in Europe and the Atlantic. The Joint Chiefs accepted Eisenhower's paper as the statement of the American position on 9 March. In the same meeting Admiral King proposed that the supreme commander for the Southwest Pacific Subarea, a command that the Joint Chiefs envisioned as a successor to Wavell's organization, be an officer of the U.S. Army. It was a foregone conclusion that a naval officer would command in the central Pacific.

While Roosevelt secured Churchill's agreement on the division of the world into strategic areas, the Joint Chiefs wrestled with defining the boundaries of the Southwest Pacific Subarea and the Pacific Ocean Subarea, and the Joint Planners prepared orders for the prospective commanders. In the process the term "theater" replaced the phrase "strategic area" while "area" replaced "subarea." The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the draft orders and sent them to the president, who accepted them the next day. The War and Navy Departments transmitted the orders to the designated commanders, General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, on 3 April. The orders restated the American position on the chain of command. The Combined
Chiefs of Staff would "exercise general jurisdiction over grand strategic policy...including allocation of forces and war materiel." The Joint Chiefs of Staff would "exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operational strategy" with the Chief of Staff of the Army acting as "the Executive Agency" for the Joint Chiefs for the Southwest Pacific Area. "All instructions to you," read the order to General MacArthur, "will be issued by or through him." The order to Admiral Nimitz contained the same instructions, different only in that the commander-in-chief U.S. Fleet acted as the "Executive Agency." 10

In these orders the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an entity implicitly exercised powers delegated by the president as commander-in-chief and therefore took on some of the attributes of a commander. Because the power of a commander is all embracing and the Joint Chiefs exercised operational but not administrative responsibilities, the agency could not be said to have exercised command in its own right during the war (or for that matter at any subsequent time in its history). At the same time the operational channel of communication passed through the Joint Chiefs. It took the directions of the president and converted them into precise military orders to the area commanders. The function was not simply mechanical. Depending on the explicitness of the directions, the chiefs might exercise discretion in drafting the orders. Because the chiefs had no command authority, they were not "in" the chain of command. They were simply the medium "through" which orders passed. Over the next forty years the difference between these two prepositions in the context of American command arrangements at the highest levels would cause commentators no end of confusion. The source of the perplexity lay in the difference between the legal definition of "command" and a naturalistic description of how orders were actually prepared and issued. 11

The orders of 3 April 1942 mark the beginning of what became known in the postwar period as the executive agent system. The service chiefs (after 1953, the military departments) received the authority to direct operations in the name of some higher authority. The legal basis of the authority exercised by the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff was, to say the least, ambiguous. President Roosevelt never issued an executive order clearly delineating the organization's functions as he certainly had the power to do under the First War
Powers Act.12 The orders of 3 April, in defining the relation of the Joint Chiefs to the theater commanders, gave in passing a description of the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs and thus provided some patina of legality for the organization.

The executive agent system neatly sidestepped the informal manner of the Joint Chiefs' creation. The legal basis of orders issued by the service chiefs through their operations divisions was not subject to question. A more important rationale for the executive agent system, probably the decisive one, was that while the Joint Chiefs had responsibility for the oversight of operations, the organization lacked the machinery to give effect to the decisions of the chiefs. The services had that machinery in their operations divisions. The executive agent system thus represented nothing more than the least disruptive method of grafting the Joint Chiefs of Staff onto the existing organizational structure.

While the executive agent system, once established, remained unchanged for the duration of the war, the same could not be said for the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves. The one major change occurred early in the conflict. In March 1942 King replaced Stark as chief of naval operations and Marshall, to preserve service balance, convinced Roosevelt to create the post of chief of staff to the president and to appoint Admiral Leahy, the former chief of naval operations then serving as ambassador to Vichy France, to the office. Marshall conceived of the chief of staff to the president primarily as an impartial presiding officer for the Joint Chiefs and only secondarily as liaison with the White House. Given the lack of a mechanism for the Joint Chiefs to reach and enforce a decision when the services had irreconcilable differences, Leahy's role became that of a wise counselor in the discussions of the chiefs. He facilitated the creation of consensus and conveyed and interpreted that consensus to the president. Throughout the war Leahy was a full participant in the meetings of the chiefs that he attended. He had, observed General Marshall, "a vote, so far as votes were ever counted." By the summer of 1942 when Leahy took up his appointment, the essential outline of the wartime and immediate postwar organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken shape. (See Chart 1.)13

One significant change in Leahy's role occurred during the course of the
war. Roosevelt, as an administrator, favored multiple sources of information, ill-defined and overlapping agency responsibilities, and competing bureaucracies. All this ensured that the president knew what the issues were and that they had to go to him for decision. (Aside from the fact that it placed such a heavy workload on the president that it probably contributed to his death in office, it was an effective style.) Roosevelt disdained formal staff work because he feared homogenized staff papers and the "canned" solution. Such attitudes coupled with the inexperience of the American service staffs in alliance politics meant that at the end of each of the first great wartime conferences the Americans ratified the British position, or so it seemed to a very unhappy General Marshall. Marshall demanded and obtained a marked increase in the quality of both Army and Joint Staff work. He also acquiesced in the transformation of Leahy's role from a presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs to a "witness to power," to quote Leahy's biographer. Leahy became the man at the president's elbow, well placed to remind his chief of the American position at the critical moment and to keep the Joint Chiefs constantly informed about the president's thinking. This necessarily meant that Leahy had less time to spend working with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By 1945 he simply attended fewer meetings of the Joint Chiefs because of the press of his other obligations.14

Beginning in early 1943 widespread dissatisfaction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization became manifest at the action officer level of the War Department General Staff. In the view of these officers, the War and Navy Departments perfectly approximated the administrative ideal of the president: competing, often hostile, bureaucracies with overlapping responsibilities and poor communication with one another. The result, they argued, was duplication of effort and considerable unnecessary confusion and working at cross purposes, ultimately retarding the war effort with an incalculable increase in casualties and destruction. These officers, the most important of whom was Col. (later Brig. Gen.) William W. Bessell, saw unification as the solution. A number of officers prepared plans to reorganize the Joint Chiefs system. Their plans had two common characteristics: They sought unified command, usually with a civilian of cabinet rank in charge supported by a single chief of staff and a joint general staff, and they usually included a provision abolishing the Joint Chiefs
Chart 1 - World War II Channels of Command and Direct Responsibility, 1943

President

Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Secretary of War

Secretary of the Navy

Chief of Staff

Commander in Chief

Joint Strategic Survey Committee

Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet & Chief of Naval Operations

Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff

Joint Staff Planners

Naval Staff

Naval Forces

War Department General Staff

Theater Commanders

Forces

Chain of Command
of Staff. Two plans called for the creation of a Joint General Staff Corps whose members would be permanently separated from their services. One contemplated the abolition of service departments and possibly service staffs. Most recommended the creation of a separate air force. Quite often they included some centralized supply and procurement agency. All suffered from the fact that given the pressure of the war, they were more outlines of concepts than elaborately argued proposals. This meant that the authors had not thought through all the implications of their arguments. A plan prepared by Bessell and two other officers--Lt. Cols. Paul W. Caraway and Devere P. Armstrong--in February 1943, on their own initiative and in their off-duty hours, illustrates this phase of the unification fight in the War Department. (See Chart 2.)

The Bessell proposal outlined a "progressive development from the existing War and Navy Department organization to the predetermined objective of unified command." The authors did not expend any effort on explaining why the United States should adopt such a reform, it was self-evident: "All of our war experiences (from Pearl Harbor to the present date) point to the necessity for unity of command at all levels." The first step was the establishment of a United States General Staff to support the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It would consist of an equal number of air, naval, and ground officers drawn directly from the Army and Navy. The United States General Staff would be a separate staff corps; the members would wear a distinctive uniform to emphasize that the officers were serving as members of a joint organization and not as representatives of their services. Theater commanders and their staffs would also be members of the United States General Staff.

In the final stage of organizational evolution, Bessell and his collaborators saw the "channel of command and direct responsibility," a formulation that permitted them to describe how the system would actually operate and avoid the complications inherent in the phrase "chain of command," running from the president to a secretary for national defense and then to the chief of the United States General Staff. The staff would assist him in exercising his responsibilities, which the authors did not bother to define. Presumably they conceived of the office as having the same powers in relation to the armed forces that the chief of staff of the Army exercised in relation to the Army--
which during World War II were very great indeed. On it he had two deputies: the deputy chief of staff for plans and operations and the deputy chief of staff for requirements. Five assistant chiefs reported to them: the assistant chief of staff for plans, the assistant chief of staff for intelligence, and the assistant chief of staff for operations reported to the deputy chief of staff for plans and operations. The assistant chief of staff for personnel and the assistant chief of staff for logistics reported to the deputy chief of staff for requirements.

The Office of Strategic Services, the wartime predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the services, represented by a commanding general, U.S. Army, and the commander-in-chief, U.S. Navy, would report directly to the chief of the United States General Staff. The service heads would be assisted by their existing staffs, the War Department General Staff and the naval staff in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The mission of the services after the adoption of the reform would be to raise, equip, and train personnel and units in naval, air, and ground warfare. Theater and joint task force commanders, reporting directly to the chief of the United States General Staff, would actually command those entities in operations.

Nothing in the plan, argued the three officers, precluded the establishment of a separate air force at any stage of the evolution of their project. Ultimately the department of national defense would establish "common services"--medical, subsistence, finance, transportation, signal--for the three services but independent of them. The common services would report directly to the chief of staff of the United States General Staff. Interestingly, the chart that illustrated the common services, "the ultimate in logical development" according to the authors, included no service staffs. The text remained silent on that score.

The authors urged speedy adoption of their plan "because it would hasten victory" by "bringing the fully-coordinated weight of the ground, naval, and air forces of the United States to bear against our enemies." They estimated that its adoption would permit the reduction of the number of Army and Navy officers "presently engaged in war planning" by one-half. Once all parties accepted "the basic principle" involved, the government could implement the reorganization "with a minimum of delay."

In this plan, Bessell and his associates clearly identified—and avoided—
what can be called the "purple paucity problem": the tendency for joint staff officers to become advocates for the positions of their services rather than assessing each problem objectively on its merits without emotion in the General Staff tradition. The solution, they thought, was simple. The government should create in effect a fourth service, the joint staff corps. At the same time, they were also aware that the same sort of institutional pressures influence the service chiefs. As heads of their services they needed to defend service positions, but as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff they needed to assume a joint or national perspective. Again, the authors opted for a "purple" solution—this time a single chief of staff of the armed forces no longer the member of any service—instead of direction by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Bessell, Caraway, and Armstrong admitted that their plan was only a sketch; they left as many questions unanswered as they answered. They did not make any provision for rotating the post of chief of the U.S. General Staff between the services, or even suggest that any possibility existed for single service domination. Nor did they address the issue of whether a member of the U.S. General Staff could ever become its chief, or, conversely, if only a member could aspire to that position. The authors' purpose in writing the paper was to initiate a discussion, not to provide definitive answers or even to identify all the important issues raised by their proposal. In this limited objective they succeeded.

Colonel Bessell became the dominant figure during this period because of his energetic and persistent advocacy of unification. Of the three authors, only he remained in Washington until the end of the war. By late 1943, however, he was no longer the central figure. The issue had attracted the attention of the leaders of the War Department, including General Marshall. In the process, the rationale for reform changed from winning the war more efficiently to incorporating the lessons of the war into the postwar military establishment.

The years between 1941 and 1943 were important because during those years action officers such as Colonel Bessell helped place the issue of reform on the War Department's agenda. In so doing, they identified certain problems with the new Joint Chiefs of Staff organization—problems that have endured until the present. They also advanced tentative solutions that would influence the formulation of the public War Department positions on unification between
1943 and 1947. Winning the war, however, took priority over organizational reform for Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, and other leaders of the War Department.
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER II


4. Legere, Unification of the Armed Forces, pp. 248-254. The joint committees and boards were: Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Joint Staff Planners Committee, Joint Production Survey Committee, Joint War Plans Committee, Joint Logistics Committee, Joint Administrative Committee, Munitions Assignment Board, Joint Military Transportation Committee, Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment, Joint Communications Committee, Joint Meteorological Committee, Army-Navy Petroleum Board, Joint Security Control Committee, Joint


6. Memo, JCCS-8, annex 2, 5 Jan 42, sub: Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area and Rpt, JCCS-8, annex 1, 10 Jan 42, sub: Directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area, U.S. Department of State, Conferences at Washington and Casablanca, pp. 311, 313-316. Wavell was to inform the British Chiefs of Staff Committee in London of any proposals at the same time that he communicated them to Washington. After consulting with the Dutch staff, the British Chiefs would telegraph their representatives in Washington as to whether they wanted to formally present their opinions on the issues involved.


10. Memo, sub: Directive to the Supreme Commander in the Southwest Pacific Area; Memo, sub: Directive to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Area; Memo, Marshall and King for Roosevelt, 30 Mar 42; Memo, (OPD for Marshall), 30 Mar 42, sub: Summary of Strategic Responsibility, 30 Mar 42, ABC 323.31, Pacific Ocean Area, Sec. 1-B; Memo, W. B. Smith for Marshall and King, 1 Apr 42; Msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 3 Apr 42, WD No. 1065, ABC 323.31, Pacific Ocean Area, Sec. 2, Operations Division, ABC Decimal File, 1942-1948, RG 319 (Army Staff), NA; Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, pp. 168-173.


12. PL 354, 77th Cong., 18 Dec 41. The act served as the basis of the Marshall reorganization of the War Department in 1942.


CHAPTER III

The Creation of a Single Military Establishment, 1943-1947

As early as April 1943, General Marshall decided that the Army, not yet fully mobilized, should begin planning for demobilization. He delegated responsibility for preparing preliminary studies to Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, the commanding general of Army Service Forces. Somervell, in turn, established a Special Projects Division, headed by Brig. Gen. William F. Tompkins, to study the problem. In June 1943, Tompkins reported that demobilization planning depended upon designs for the postwar military establishment, including the creation of a single department of national defense.¹

The following month, the War Department created the Special Planning Division of the War Department General Staff and charged it with planning for postwar military and industrial mobilization. Tompkins became the new director. As soon as Tompkins reported to the General Staff, Colonel Bessell sought him out, briefed him on the work already done on unification in the staff, and gave him a copy of the Bessell Plan of February 1942. It became the starting point for the Special Planning Division, or Tompkins, proposal that General Marshall advocated as the War Department position before the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1943.

Tompkins advocated the creation of a single Department of War headed by a secretary of war and four under secretaries organized into four major divisions: Ground Forces, Air Forces, Naval Forces, and a Supply Department that "would provide centralized control of procurement, supply, and service functions for the three combat forces." The using agencies would procure certain types of special equipment. Thus, the Naval Forces would continue to procure ships; the Air Forces would procure aircraft.²

A chief of staff to the president would "serve the President in exercising his functions as constitutional Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces." The chief of staff would serve as the channel of communications from the president to the Department of War "on matters relating to strategy, tactics and operations, the preparation and presentation of the Joint Military Budget," and other matters considered pertinent by the president. The secretary of war would transmit all other orders from the president.
Tompkins proposed to continue the Joint Chiefs of Staff—consisting of the chief of staff to the president, the chiefs of staff of the armed forces, and the chief of staff of supply—but renamed the U.S. General Staff (Joint). Tompkins did not specifically detail the kind of staff that would support the chiefs, only noting that "advantage should be taken of the experience of the present U.S. Chiefs of Staff in the present war." He further provided that the armed forces would retain small general staffs.

The Tompkins Plan drew heavily upon the Bessell, Caraway, and Armstrong proposal, but there were some interesting differences. The first variance concerned the channels of command. Tompkins continued the dual channels of command that Roosevelt created during the war with the secretary of war responsible for logistics and administration and the military chiefs providing the channel for operations orders and serving as the president's primary advisers on national strategy. Bessell, Caraway, and Armstrong saw such a solution as only an intermediate step to a single chain of command and responsibility with the secretary of national defense responsible for all aspects of the mission of his department—operations as well as administration. Second, the earlier plan left the future status of the Army Air Forces undecided. The Tompkins Plan committed the War Department to an independent air force. Third, Tompkins proposed a common supply department, a subject that Bessell and his associates broached under the heading of common services, but they had left the organization to implement the idea undefined. Finally, Tompkins spent little time discussing the organization of the U.S. General Staff (Joint) and did not suggest separating the officers in the staff from their parent services, an issue on which Colonel Bessell, in particular, attached great importance. Bessell believed that only this measure would ensure that the chief of staff received objective recommendations, unclouded by service bias, from his staff.3

At the request of Admiral King the Joint Strategic Survey Committee examined the Tompkins Plan. It concluded that a single military department clearly provided a more adequate solution than the current dual department system. "The outstanding lesson of this war is that modern warfare is made up of operations called 'joint' or 'combined' operations, which could better be described as 'unified' operations—since all military elements should be so closely interlocked and interrelated that the concept of one whole is preferable
to articulated units." The committee recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff accept the principle of "three services within one military organization" and appoint a special committee to study the question.⁴

Admirals Leahy and King, however, declined to accept the principle of a single military department in advance of the report by the special committee. Leahy argued that this would "deprive the committee of any latitude." As a consequence, the instructions to the committee, chaired by Admiral James O. Richardson and consisting of two Army and two Navy officers (Tompkins was one of the Army representatives), allowed it to recommend one department, two departments, or three departments as the optimal postwar organization.⁵

General Marshall assented to this change, but he was not happy about it. He knew that a select committee of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Post-War Military Policy, was preparing to hold hearings that would include examination of the concept of a single military department. He feared that if the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not act quickly it might lose its ability to influence the final outcome. While he could not convince Admirals Leahy and King of the need for speed, he did not propose to allow the Army to similarly abdicate its influence on the question. At the same time he did not want to damage his good working relations with Admiral King over an issue about which the admiral obviously possessed reservations. Consequently, while Marshall declined to testify at the hearings held by the committee, the War Department sent witnesses. Marshall's deputy, Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, presented a modified version of the Tompkins Plan to the select committee on 24 April 1944. The press named it the McNarney Plan.⁶

The McNarney Plan differed from the Tompkins plan in that it renamed the new organization the Department of the Armed Forces and abolished the post of under secretary for supply. McNarney renamed the chief of staff for supply the director of common supply. The change in title represented a downgrading in status. The director would now be subordinate to the service chiefs, although he would remain a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (McNarney dropped the Special Planning Division title "U.S. Chiefs of Staff (Joint)."⁷) The Joint Chiefs "would have the sole duty of submitting recommendations to the president concerning matters involving military strategy and the general determination of budgetary needs and allocation" between the armed forces and
the supply department. Once the president had adopted a budget figure, the Joint Chiefs would recommend "the general budget breakdown and allocation" between the services and common supply. McNarney gained precision about the duties of the Joint Chiefs at the cost of obfuscating the duties of the chief of staff to the president, something the Special Planning Division had been very clear about.

McNarney only hinted at the powers of the chief of staff to the president. In a discussion of the preparation of war plans during peacetime, he observed that great economies would ensue if someone determined "the respective roles and degree of participation of air, ground, and sea elements...." In this field he expected the Joint Chiefs "and especially the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief" to "perform invaluable service to the nation." He also anticipated that the chief of staff to the president would "play a very important role" in determining what constituted an acceptable peacetime level of readiness for the armed forces given the condition of international relations and would present his conclusions to the president. Even on this point McNarney did not clearly differentiate between the functions of the chief of staff to the president and the Joint Chiefs as a collective body because he attributed the same responsibility to them as well. He did say that the proposed reform would permit "intelligent decision" to replace "compromise." At the very least McNarney's remarks implied that the Joint Chiefs would no longer make decisions by unanimity.

The chart accompanying his testimony removed the chief of staff to the president from the chain of command and appeared to make him an adviser only. However, nothing in McNarney's remarks precluded giving the chief of staff to the president command-like authority over the armed forces as the executive for the president in military affairs. In such a situation, after all, the chief of staff to the president would only emulate General Marshall's direction of the Army during World War II. If that was the intent of the War Department proposal, McNarney did not spell out the implication. Across the whole, he cast a veil of ambiguity. In other respects he retained the provisions of the Tompkins Plan. The secretary for the armed forces, the civilian head of the proposed department, played a severely restricted role in formulating the budget of his own department.
The select committee was not a legislative committee. Its hearings were designed to provide a forum for the public discussion of postwar issues and to gather information for use by the military and naval affairs committees when they did draft legislation. It recommended that Congress defer any attempt to reform the two department system until the Richardson Committee had an opportunity to make its report and the war ended. 8

On 11 April 1945 the Richardson Committee submitted its report. While Admiral Richardson favored continuation of the two department system, the other three members supported a single department very similar to the Tompkins Plan, although there were differences in detail. The majority report did not include a common service of supply as Tompkins had done. It did, however, create in wartime a separate position of commander of the armed forces reporting through the secretary of the armed forces to the president. It also incorporated the secretary of the armed forces as a full member of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff "to facilitate complete coordination within the Department and to maintain the Secretary's position with regard to the political and economic aspects of military matters." The committee had considered and rejected the scheme of coordinate control with responsibilities divided between the civilian secretary and the chief of staff. Finally, in the majority report, the under secretaries had functional rather than service responsibilities as in the McNarney Plan. (The Tompkins Plan had provided four under secretaries but had not specified whether their responsibilities would be service or functional.) 9

The Joint Chiefs of Staff could not agree on the report. Admirals Leahy and King supported the two department system while Generals Marshall and Arnold favored a single department. Their disagreement ended the last opportunity to keep postwar organization noncontroversial. The war ended in Europe less than one month later; another four months passed and Japan surrendered. Conforming to the schedule recommended by the House select committee the previous year, the Senate Military Affairs Committee began hearings on postwar organization in October 1945.

In the fall of 1945 General Marshall handpicked Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, the handsome and articulate chief of staff of Army Ground Forces, to act as the War Department spokesman on unification in testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Committee. The plan he presented became the Collins
Plan in the newspapers. Although it and the other plans bore the names of other officers, General Marshall had a much greater impact on content than they did.¹⁰

Events outside the narrow confines of staff discussions ultimately had a greater impact on the viability of the War Department proposal than specific details of the plans. As the war wound down so did the Roosevelt administration. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox had expressed interest in some kind of postwar unification. His attitude had encouraged Secretary of War Stimson, who believed strongly that nothing he said should damage wartime cooperation with the Navy, to take a public stand in favor of unification. Stimson testified before the House select committee on 25 April 1944. A few days later Knox suddenly died.¹¹

Knox's successor, James V. Forrestal, did not share Knox's point of view. His entry into office contributed to a general hardening of naval opinion on the issue. Unification was still entwined with the question of a separate air force—a reform that found few friends in the Navy Department. Advocates of an independent air force, such as Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle and, more cautiously, Gen. Carl Spaatz, Arnold's successor as commanding general, Army Air Forces, continued to call for the separation of naval aviation from the Navy and its incorporation into the new service. Unification also provided a rationale for some Army officers to recommend a substantial reduction in the size of the postwar Marine Corps. These issues and the emotions they engendered helped make opposition to unification a test of institutional loyalty for many Navy and Marine officers.¹²

Secretary Knox's passing from the scene, important though it was, had only a minimal effect compared to that of the president's. On 12 April 1945, the day after the Richardson Committee presented its final report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Franklin Delano Roosevelt died of a cerebral hemorrhage at Warm Springs, Georgia. He was only sixty-three. Service as assistant secretary of the Navy during World War I had given him a fondness for the Navy balanced by a healthy respect for its tenacity in clinging to tradition. Some admirals had consoled themselves during the war with the thought that Roosevelt would never force unification on the Navy. How the habits and predilections of this superb politician would have affected the outcome of the fight over unification...
must always remain moot. What was clear, even at the time, was that his successor, Vice President Harry S. Truman, was an altogether different kind of man.  

Truman's service experiences before World War II were exclusively in the Army. Truman had served as a captain of field artillery in the 35th Division, a National Guard division, in World War I. After the war he had continued in the Organized Reserves, attaining the rank of colonel. He was also active in the American Legion, which provided one of the bases of his power in Missouri politics. He played a major role in convincing the Legion to declare publicly in favor of a department of defense. His experiences as chairman of the Senate "watchdog" committee on rearmament during World War II reinforced his stance on the issue. As the Democratic vice presidential candidate, he strongly advocated a single department in an article that he wrote for Collier's Magazine in August 1944:

Proof that a divine Providence watches over the United States is furnished by the fact that we have managed to escape disaster even though our scrambled professional military set-up has been an open invitation to catastrophe. The bitter lessons of the past few years, however, make it plain that we can rely no longer upon chance and luck. The Nation's safety must have a more solid foundation.  

In short, Truman entered office with his mind already made up on the general issue of unification, although he remained very flexible on details. General Collins' presentation of the War Department position thus found a receptive audience in the White House.

The Collins Plan of 1945 (See Chart 3.) in many ways represented the culmination of the Army's thoughts on how best to fight a global war with conventional arms. A department of defense headed by a secretary of the armed forces and assisted by a civilian under secretary, three functional assistant secretaries, a chief of staff of the armed forces, and a Joint Staff provided unification for policymaking. The chief of staff of the armed forces acted as the executive for the secretary and as his chief military adviser. Marshall wanted the large operating staffs to remain in the service departments, expanded to three in the plan by the creation of an independent
air force, and the plan reflected his view. It retained the Joint Chiefs of Staff, renamed the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, but the functions of the U.S. Chiefs were restricted to making recommendations on military policy, strategy, budget, and requirements, rather than actually preparing war plans.16

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff retained the four members of the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff and added a fifth—the chief of staff of the armed forces. The Yalta Conference of February 1945, where Leahy had spent his entire time attending the meetings of the heads of government rather than the meetings of the Joint Chiefs with their British and Soviet counterparts, convinced Marshall that the chief of staff to the president needed to devote his full time to liaison. In the Collins Plan, the chief of staff of the armed forces would preside over the meetings of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. The plan proposed a military director of common supply reporting directly to one of the functional assistant secretaries and a single military intelligence agency reporting to the chief of the armed services.

The plan devoted considerable attention to the budget, because General Marshall knew that in peacetime the budget drove the force structure rather than the reverse. Collins outlined the budget process in some detail in his testimony before the Committee on Military Affairs: The service departments would develop budget proposals as normal and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff would comment on them and submit their comments through the secretary of the armed forces to the president. In this manner Marshall hoped to ensure that the president was aware of the implications of budget decisions on national strategy and force levels.

This revision in the Collins Plan of the budget process sketched out by General McNarney in 1944 sought to leave the civilian secretary in total control of his department while at the same time permitting military views to reach the president without political adulteration. Marshall remembered vividly that after World War I Secretary of War Weeks had prevented General Pershing from protesting to the president budget cuts that gravely restricted the Army's ability to mobilize. Marshall knew that political considerations would always override military calculations in peacetime. He appears to have had a shrewd suspicion, however, that the Army would fare better in the postwar budgets in a single department than in a two department system. At the same time his
Chart 3 - The Collins Plan, 1945

- President
- Secretary Armed Forces
- Under Secretary
- Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
- U.S. Army
- U.S. Air Forces
- U.S. Navy
- Director Common Supply & Hospitalization
- Theater & Area Commanders
- Assistant Secretaries

Recommend Only
postwar budgetary goals were modest. He did not desire a large standing army. He simply wanted enough men to permit a relatively rapid mobilization in the event of a crisis.17

The differences between the Tompkins, McNarney, and Collins Plans indicated that the War Department was not wedded to details. At the same time the continuities in the plans suggest what the leaders of the department considered the most important. Most obviously important was the concept of a single department--whether called war or national defense--headed by a civilian secretary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, under different names, appeared in all the plans as did a single chief of staff, also under different titles. Beginning with the McNarney Plan, the War Department proposals paid close attention to the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in formulating budget proposals, an issue of particular concern to General Marshall.

Even amid these continuities there were changes of emphasis. The civilian secretary gained considerable power between the Tompkins and Collins Plans. By October 1945 the War Department viewed him as totally in charge of his department. Even the revised budget procedure recognized the primacy of the secretary. While the secretary gained power within the department, the chief of staff lost it. These changes were designed, at least in part, to make the proposals more palatable to the Navy. The War Department succeeded to a degree. One Navy member of the Richardson Committee, Rear Admiral M. F. Schoeffel, did join the majority in recommending a single department.

The Navy's views on unification were complex. Generally naval officers accepted that the war had demonstrated the value of unity of command in the theaters. They also believed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proven its utility during the war and desired that it receive a statutory basis in the postwar reorganization. Most naval officers, however, did not want to go further. Several factors were involved. First, the Navy Department had an entirely different organization than the War Department. The bureau chiefs reported directly to the secretary of the Navy rather than through the chief of naval operations. The unitary command line in Army organizational charts easily gave the incorrect impression to men without practical experience in the War Department that the secretary of war depended on the chief of staff for all his information about the service. To naval officers it appeared as if the chief

40
of staff controlled the civilian secretary by controlling his sources of information rather than the secretary controlling the military. Second, the Navy was engaged in positioning itself for the postwar battle of the budget with the Army Air Forces, a battle that involved the issue of which service would constitute the nation's "first line of defense" after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Finally, the Navy's skepticism of Army intentions about the future of naval aviation and the Marine Corps made the Navy Department very chary about any Army proposals for postwar reorganization.

Secretary of the Navy Forrestal realized that simple obstructionism, however, would not suffice. In his testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in the fall of 1945, he presented a counter proposal—the Eberstadt Plan. (See Chart 4.) Forrestal had commissioned his long time friend Ferdinand Eberstadt, the former chairman of the Army-Navy Munitions Board and a former vice chairman of the War Production Board, to study unification "letting the chips fall where they may." The study group Eberstadt put together consisted primarily of naval officers. Their report called for retention of independent service departments headed by civilian secretaries with cabinet rank and the creation of a national security council to coordinate foreign and military policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff received a statutory basis but no explicit role in formulating the budget. (The action of the Navy Department in June 1945 in seeking to secure legislation increasing the size of the permanent Navy and Marine Corps without referring the proposed bill to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment already had suggested to Marshall that Secretary Forrestal and his advisers did not envision any role for that organization in the budget process.) The Eberstadt Plan also called for the establishment of a Joint Staff, headed by a chief of the Joint Staff, to support the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was the first mention of the position that came to be called the director of the Joint Staff. The plan did not specify the size of the Joint Staff.

Clearly, the major difference between the two plans rested on where in the organizational structure they sought to coordinate the activities of the armed forces. The Navy Department wanted coordination by a cabinet level committee that would also try to keep U.S. military and naval policies aligned with the government's foreign policy. General Collins and other War Department spokesmen in rebuttal conceded the utility of a national security
Chart 4 - The Eberstadt Plan, 1945

President

National Security Council

National Security Resources Board

Chairman National Security Council

Secretary of State

Secretary of War

Secretary of the Navy

Chairman Military Munitions Board

Military Munitions Board

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Central Intelligence Agency

National Policies

Chain of Command

Communication

Coordination
council but argued that it did not remove the need for coordination of military policy below the level of the cabinet. A department of national defense headed by a civilian secretary and supported by a chief of staff of the armed forces satisfied that need.20

The National Military Establishment, the organization that evolved out of the clash of philosophies represented by the Collins and Eberstadt Plans, inclined more toward the Navy's approach than the Army's. (See Chart 5.) The National Security Act of 1947, the law that gave birth to the organization, did establish the principle that the services were part of a single entity, although not a cabinet department, headed by a civilian secretary. The secretary of defense was a cabinet officer and member of the National Security Council—an agency also established by this act. The three service secretaries lost their cabinet rank but received seats on the National Security Council. (The law also created an independent air force.) The secretary of defense, assisted by three civilian special assistants, had something less than full control over the military departments, which had to be "administered separately." This particular section of the statute was sufficiently vague to permit the first two secretaries of defense to take diametrically opposite views of their powers—the first restricted, the second expansionist.21

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the three service chiefs and the chief of staff to the president, obtained a Joint Staff limited to 100 officers and headed by a director. Collectively, the Joint Chiefs became the principal military advisers to the president and the secretary of defense. As in the Eberstadt Plan, the law did not give the Joint Chiefs a role in the budget process. Instead the service secretaries received the right to appeal to the president any adverse decisions on the budget made by the secretary of defense. The act did require the Joint Chiefs "to review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces." It made the Joint Chiefs responsible for "formulating policies" for both the joint training of the military forces and the coordination of officer education by the services. The act also created a War Council (subsequently renamed the Armed Forces Policy Council), consisting of the secretary of defense, the service secretaries, and the service chiefs. The War Council was to advise the secretary of defense on the policies of the National Military Establishment.

43
The act defined the relationship between the Joint Chiefs and the field forces, giving the force of law to relationships that had evolved during and immediately after the war. In 1944 General Arnold had created the Twentieth Air Force to conduct the strategic bombardment of Japan. In order to prevent the theater commanders in the Pacific and Far East from diverting the Twentieth's high-performance B-29s to other missions (the Twentieth was the only numbered air force equipped with these planes), he had proposed to retain direct command of the air force, acting as the executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Navy had wanted to leave direction to the theater commanders. The question had gone to President Roosevelt for a decision in February 1944. He had favored Arnold's approach. The Twentieth Air Force—which dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—became the model in the postwar period for both the Air Force's Strategic Air Command and, more generally, for specified commands, commands with "a broad and continuing mission...normally composed of forces from but one Service."22

The end of the war meant the dismantling of the unified commands with the forces dividing along national lines, although the Combined Chiefs of Staff remained in existence until 1949. All the services agreed that unity of command was necessary in wartime operations. The only question about establishing postwar unified commands was not whether but when. Two issues—command arrangements in the Pacific and the exact status of the Army Air Forces' new Strategic Air Command—delayed agreement on postwar plans until 12 December 1946, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the first Unified Command Plan.23

The plan established seven unified commands—the Far East Command, the Pacific Command, the Alaskan Command, the Northeast Command, the Atlantic Fleet (later Atlantic Command), the Caribbean Command and the European Command—"under the Joint Chiefs of Staff." They were commands with "broad continuing mission[s] under a single commander and composed of significant components of two or more Services."24 In addition the plan made the Strategic Air Command "responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff" in the same manner as the unified commands. It consisted of "strategic air forces not otherwise assigned."
Chart 5 - The National Security Act of 1947

President

National Security Council

Secretary of Defense

Central Intelligence Agency

National Security Resources Board

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Research and Development Board

Department of Defense

Munitions Board

Department of the Army

War Council

Department of the Navy

Joint Staff

Department of the Air Force

Chain of Command
As in the orders setting up the Southwest Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas, the Unified Command Plan defined the relation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the unified commands (and the Strategic Air Command). While the language changed, the substance did not. The plan spelled out more clearly relationships between the services, the Joint Chiefs, and the commands, clearly benefiting from the practical experience gained during World War II: The Joint Chiefs would determine "the assignment of forces and significant changes therein." They would "exercise strategic direction over all elements of the armed forces" and prescribe "the missions and tasks of all independent commands." The services retained responsibility for training and for administrative and logistic support of the commands and the operational control of all forces not assigned to them. "However, all action of strategic significance will be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The plan also continued the World War II executive agent system with the commanding general, Army Air Forces identified as a possible executive agent along with the chief of staff, U.S. Army and the chief of naval operations.25

The National Security Act took cognizance of these relationships by giving the Joint Chiefs of Staff the responsibility, in addition to preparing strategic and logistic plans, of "providing for the strategic direction of the military forces." In addition the Joint Chiefs assigned "logistic responsibilities" to the services in order to carry out the strategic and logistic plans approved by the Joint Chiefs. Finally, the act gave the Joint Chiefs the task of establishing unified commands when such commands "were in the interest of national security."26

The major differences between the Eberstadt Plan and the National Security Act of 1947 lay in the creation of the National Military Establishment headed by a secretary of defense and the simultaneous reduction of the service secretaries to subcabinet level. General Marshall's successor as chief of staff, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, officially announced the passage of the National Security Act in a message to all Army commands. He defended the compromise involved; it was not a defeat for the War Department. "Fundamentally, the one thing we have is a man at the top to whom we are all responsible." To achieve this result, he admitted, he had given up "some of the specific things I...believed should be done." Within months, others discerned the
need to reexamine some of those "specific things" General Eisenhower had desired. 27

The period from late 1943 until 1947 had four distinguishing characteristics insofar as the Army was concerned. First, the issue of reform, heretofore confined to the lower levels of the General Staff, became a primary concern of policy makers in the highest levels of the War Department. The key figures became General Marshall and, following his retirement, General Eisenhower. Second, whereas before there were many plans prepared by Army officers, now there was one War Department position. Third, ground forces officers rather than aviators took the lead in urging reform, just the reverse of conditions prior to 1941. When Army Air Forces officers became involved, it was because they held responsible positions on the War Department General Staff rather than because of their connection with the Army Air Forces. Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad, for example, handled the detailed negotiations with the Navy Department which produced the compromise that led to passage of the National Security Act because he was the director of the Plans and Operations Division of the War Department General Staff, not because he was an aviator. Finally, the rationale for reform shifted from improving the efficiency of the war effort to adapting postwar organization to the "lessons" of the war. In effect this was the necessary condition for any public advocacy of unification by the War Department. As long as the war lasted, the need for good day-to-day relations with the Navy overrode any long-term policy considerations. Only after Japan surrendered did Marshall personally espouse reform before Congress. From the very beginning of the conflict over unification, the Army's position consisted of a mixture of expediency and principle with the relative proportions often determined by conditions outside the Army's control. 28

Between 1943 and 1947 the War Department's efforts to secure reform went through two distinct stages. The first consisted of the development of a gradually more elaborate Army position, modified to meet criticisms. The Special Planning Division Proposal of 1943 (for which Bessell served as the intellectual midwife), the McNarney Plan of 1944, and the Collins Plan of 1945 were simply successive drafts of the same plan. This stage culminated with hearings before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in the fall and early winter of 1945 during which General Collins presented the War Department's
position. The second phase involved a series of compromises with the Navy Department to achieve at least a limited degree of unification, which finally produced the National Security Act of 1947.

These compromises proved short-lived in practice because the organizational arrangements created by the act were unworkable. Although it took almost two years to amend the law, the inherent problems were clear to the new secretary of defense within less than three months of his taking office on 17 September 1947.
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER III


2. Memo, JCS 560, 2 Nov 43, CCS 040 (11-2-43), sec. 1, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, NA.

3. For Bessell's subsequent amplification of this theme, see Legere, Unification of the Armed Forces, pp. 252-253.

4. Rpt, Joint Strategic Survey Committee to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 Mar 44, sub: Reorganization of National Defense, CCS 040 (11-2-43), sec. 1, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, NA.


7. Testimony, McNarney before Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy, 24 Apr 44, U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Post-War
Military Policy, A Bill to Establish a Single Department of Armed Forces: Hearings..., 78th Cong., 2d sess., 1944, pp. 33-45 (hereafter cited as Single Department of Armed Forces).


9. Rpt, Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 Apr 45, CCS 040 (11-2-43), B.P. 1, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, NA.


20. Testimony, Collins before Committee on Military Affairs, 30 Oct 45 and Testimony, John J. McCloy before Committee on Military Affairs, 23 Nov 45, U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Department of Armed Forces..., pp. 170-180, 441-465. McCloy was a particularly effective witness.


26. PL 253, 80th Cong., 26 Apr 47.

27. Msg, Eisenhower to all members of the Army, 26 Jul 47, CS 320, Chief of Staff Army Decimal File, 1947, RG 165, NA.

Creating a Department of Defense, 1947-1950

Following the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, initiative for further reform passed from the Department of the Army, the new name for the War Department in the 1947 legislation, to the first secretary of defense, James Forrestal. He quickly found himself in the midst of a public debate between the leaders of the Air Force and the Navy over the nature of the next war, the national defense strategy to pursue, and the forces needed to wage the conflict. Given this circumstance, Forrestal came to depend heavily on the advice of Army officers, one of whom was Lt. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, the director of Service, Supply, and Procurement on the Army Staff. (During the war, Lutes had served as Somervell's chief planner.) At the same time as the roles and missions debate, the new secretary became frustrated by his lack of power within the National Military Establishment. Despite his role as the principal architect of the 1947 act, Forrestal in December 1947 asked Lutes to recommend how to reorganize the National Military Establishment "to assist the Secretary of Defense." 1

Many of the resulting proposals, as befitted a logistician, dealt with supply. Lutes, however, also called for legislation to create a chief of staff of the armed forces or, if this was politically not feasible, the appointment of a high ranking military aide to the secretary who would act as his personal adviser and liaison with subordinate agencies. (See Chart 6.) Forrestal implemented most of Lutes' proposals, with only slight variation, in stages over the next year. In December 1948 Forrestal convinced General Eisenhower, in retirement serving as the president of Columbia University, to act as his part-time adviser and chair the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Eisenhower, continuing as president of Columbia, presided intermittently over the Joint Chiefs of Staff from January to June 1949.2

The Lutes Plan as implemented by Forrestal became a stopgap to provide administrative remedies within the framework of the 1947 act. At the same time the secretary of defense sought to alter that framework. In the spring of 1948 he played a large behind-the-scenes role in creating the First Hoover Commission, which examined the organization of the various agencies of the federal government.3 In the summer of 1948, Forrestal also formally requested
Chart 6 - The Lutes Plan, 1947
the views of the service secretaries and service chiefs on the need to reform
the National Military Establishment. Discerning the Army position on what
became the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 is difficult
because the Chief of Staff, General Omar N. Bradley; his deputy, General
Collins; and Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, took different positions.
For simplicity this paper discusses Bradley's views, because they appear to
represent the consensus of the Army Staff.4

In his testimony to the commission's task force looking into the National
Military Establishment, General Bradley called once more for the creation of a
chief of staff of the armed forces, assisted by a military staff, to advise the
secretary of defense when the Joint Chiefs split on issues. (See Chart 7.) The
chief of staff of the armed forces would replace the chief of staff to the
president as a member of the Joint Chiefs. Bradley suggested, but did not
strongly advocate, restricting the Joint Chiefs to planning only and referring all
other questions to "the Secretary's military staff."5

Bradley modified this stance somewhat when he responded to Forrestal's
questions in September 1948. He favored a senior military adviser, not a
member of the Joint Chiefs but one who did sit on the National Security
Council. He could attend meetings of the Joint Chiefs only as an observer. The
senior military adviser rather than the Joint Chiefs would deal with budget
recommendations. He headed an Armed Forces Staff, consisting of both
military officers and civilian employees of the National Military Establishment,
that would assist him in acting as "military advisor to the President and
Secretary of Defense with respect to matters pertaining to the armed forces."
Bradley restricted the Joint Chiefs to military plans and renamed the Joint
Staff the Joint Strategic Planning Staff. He did not address the issue of the
size of the staff. One of the supporting documents for the Bradley proposal
mentioned in passing that the Joint Strategic Planning Staff could be "relatively
small." Otherwise they ignored the question.

Bradley proposed to make the service secretaries under secretaries
reporting directly to the secretary of defense. He also wanted an under
secretary of defense without administrative responsibilities for a specific
service and six functional assistant secretaries. Bradley struck out limitations
on the secretary's authority contained in the 1947 act and provided that he
Chart 7 - The Bradley Proposal, 1948

- President
- Secretary of Defense
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (Plans Only)
- Armed Forces Staff
- Joint Strategic Planning Staff
- U.S. Army
- U.S. Air Force
- U.S. Navy
- Director Common Supply & Hospitalization
- Assistant Secretaries
- Under Secretary of Defense
- Chief of Staff (Senior Military Advisor)
would "exercise direction, authority, and control" over the service departments rather than "supervise and coordinate" them. He retained the National Military Establishment, however, and did not establish a cabinet level department for defense.  

Congress amended the National Security Act twice in 1949. On 2 April it created the post of under secretary of defense. Even more important legislation followed on 10 August. (See Chart 8.) The August legislation abolished the National Military Establishment and replaced it with a Department of Defense, something Bradley and Collins desired but did not advocate, apparently because they believed the proposal politically infeasible. The Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body became the senior military adviser to the National Security Council in addition to serving as such to the president and the secretary of defense as prescribed in the 1947 legislation. The service secretaries lost their seats on the National Security Council although Forrestal's successor, Louis A. Johnson, requested that they continue to attend the meetings. The practice lapsed in July 1950 when President Truman restricted attendance to statutory members and officials designated by the president.

The secretary of defense received expanded powers over the services in 1949, but not as extensive as Bradley desired. He also gained three assistant secretaries. Title II left the duties of two of the assistant secretaries to the discretion of the secretary of defense. Title IV specified that the remaining assistant secretary would be the comptroller. The legislation redesignated the under secretary as the deputy secretary of defense. The Joint Staff increased to 210 officers. Finally, Congress created the post of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but denied him "a vote." Since the Joint Chiefs did not hold formal ballots on issues, the provision was something of a non sequitur, but it did indicate congressional opposition to any centralization of military control in the Department of Defense.  

The 1949 amendments gave the Army something more of what it had desired in 1945. The creation of a cabinet level department met one of the recommendations of the Collins Plan. The position of the secretary of defense, while much stronger than in the original act, still lacked some of the powers originally vested in the office by the 1945 War Department proposal. (The new
legislation, while removing some restrictions on the secretary's authority, imposed others.) The April and August amendments also provided the secretary with higher level assistants than the 1947 act had made available. He obtained a deputy secretary (originally an under secretary) and three assistant secretaries, the number advocated by Collins in 1945. Although the Army did not always address the issue of the size of the Joint Staff between 1943 and 1949, when it did it consistently opposed imposition by Congress of an artificial ceiling on the size of the staff. While the ceiling remained in the 1949 amendments, Congress at least increased its size. The result represented some small movement toward the Army's position.

The greatest disappointment for the Army view, measured by its position in 1945, was, of course, the failure to obtain a chief of staff of the armed forces. By acting as the executive in dealing with the services, the chief of staff would have permitted the secretary to develop to the fullest extent his control over the armed forces. The creation of a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did provide a measure of centralization, but General Bradley, who became the first chairman, did not take an expansive view of the powers of his post. He saw his role as that of "an honest broker" in the tradition of Admiral Leahy. He participated in discussions with the Joint Chiefs and presented their views to the president and the secretary of defense. Only if the president or the secretary asked, did he state his own opinion. 8

Bradley's proposal to give the military a role in the deliberations of the National Security Council received legislative sanction in the 1949 amendments. The difference between his proposal and the law was that, while in his conception the senior military adviser spoke for himself in the amendments, the military officer attending the council meetings—the chairman or in his absence the acting chairman—was bound to present the collective views of the Joint Chiefs. Of course, a member of the council could ask the chairman to state his personal views on an issue as distinct from the views of the Joint Chiefs. Given General Bradley's conception of the duties of his office, the question definitely had to be asked.

Secretary of Defense Johnson, by way of contrast, proved a very different kind of administrator than his predecessor. Even before the passage of the 1949 amendments, he adopted a direct, no-nonsense approach and controlled the
Chart 8 - The 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947

- President
  - Central Intelligence Agency
  - National Security Council
  - Secretary of Defense
  - National Security Resources Board
    - Chairman
      - Joint Chiefs of Staff
        - Joint Staff
          - Department of the Army
          - Department of the Navy
          - Department of the Air Force
          - Unified & Specified Commands

Chain of Command
department "by fiat and directive," so much so that his critics in their kinder moments called him a dictator. Johnson conducted a running feud with Dean Acheson, who succeeded General Marshall as secretary of state on 21 January 1949. Acheson considered Johnson "mentally ill." Many observers thought that he wanted the Democratic Party's nomination for president in 1952. Certainly, he had a flair for publicity and great energy. He shared the president's desire for a balanced budget and a reduction of the large size of the Department of Defense expenditures when judged by pre-World War II standards. He entered office believing that the atomic bomb had rendered all prior military experience suspect. He was thus an early advocate of the primacy of strategic bombardment forces and the value of nuclear deterrence. In policy terms, these beliefs led him to impose cuts in the defense budget and to leave the Air Force a proportionately larger share of what remained than the other services.

On 23 April 1949, after receiving a split decision from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the importance of the "supercarrier" U.S.S. United States and securing approval from the president, Johnson canceled the contract for the ship's construction. The manner in which he reached the decision infuriated Navy leaders perhaps as much as the decision itself. Johnson did not wait until he received a detailed analysis of the question nor did he give the Navy an opportunity to present its case to him. The secretary of the Navy and the chief of naval operations learned of his decision only when he announced it publicly. Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan immediately resigned in protest. Senior uniformed personnel in the Department of the Navy refused to accept the decision and began a publicity campaign to rescind it. The result was a congressional investigation, the replacement of Admiral Louis E. Denfield, the chief of naval operations (technically his appointment expired and the administration chose not to renew it), by Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, and much unfortunate public acrimony between the Air Force and the Navy.

In terms of organizational history the "revolt of the admirals" was important because of the style of decision making that Johnson exhibited. He did not involve the service secretary in the policy debate; Johnson simply expected him to execute the decision of the secretary of defense. Despite the continued attendance of service secretaries at the National Security Council meetings, the role Johnson envisioned for them was the role he imposed on
Sullivan—a role that the 1949 amendments suggested if they did not quite mandate. His conduct of the office, not Forrestal's, defined the relationship between the secretary of defense and the service secretaries that has been followed by most succeeding secretaries of defense.11

Johnson's style may have irritated the civilians and officers in the service departments, but his policies were those of the president. Initially, at least, he enjoyed the full support of the president and the public. By February 1950 Truman, however, had begun to harbor doubts about Johnson, but by then the secretary of defense had acquired something of an independent political base. It rested upon his personal popularity, derived from the public perception of him as an effective manager who cut "waste" from the defense budget and eliminated inefficiencies in the services. The outbreak of the Korean War undercut the assumption on which Truman based his policy—that a conventional war was unlikely—while the initial disasters suffered by the Eighth Army converted Johnson into a political liability. On 21 September 1950 Truman replaced Johnson with General Marshall, who gave up his retirement to take up public office for the third time. Robert Lovett became deputy secretary of defense and succeeded Marshall when he retired from government service for the fourth and final time in September 1951.12

One further reform, although internal to the Army, affected the operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1946 War Department Circular 138 went much further than previous regulations in giving the chief of staff command of all the components of the Army rather than just the field forces as in 1936. This proved the apogee of his powers. During 1948 and 1949, a comprehensive examination of the organization of the Army by the Office of the Comptroller of the Army and the Judge Advocate General's Office produced a challenge to this tendency. In December 1948 Lt. Col. George Baya of the comptroller's office completed a compendium of all the acts of Congress governing the Army since the enactment of the National Defense Act of 1916 that were still in force. Using this study and examining even earlier legislation, Lt. Col. Archibald King of the Judge Advocate General's Corps prepared a paper focused solely on the command of the Army. King concluded that there was no legal or constitutional justification for the command prerogatives granted to the chief of staff by Circular 138.13
King's view became law in the Army Organization Act of 1950 that resulted from the investigations by the two offices. It eliminated all references to a "command" function by the chief of staff. He was to supervise the Department of the Army and the field Army and preside over the Army Staff, all the while performing these duties "under the direction of the Secretary of the Army " unless otherwise directed by law.

The exception covered by the "otherwise directed" phrase referred to his participation as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In that capacity he continued to act as an executive agent for the Joint Chiefs for certain unified commands including European Command and Far East Command. The 1950 act also made the chief of staff of the Army "directly responsible to the Secretary of the Army for the efficiency of the Army, its state of preparations for military operations, and plans therefor." This section, not a part of the original legislation submitted by the Department of the Army, developed out of congressional concern about the asymmetry of defense relationships in which the chief of naval operations commanded the Navy, the chief of staff of the Air Force commanded the Air Force, and the chief of staff of the Army was an adviser.

Special Regulation 10-5-1, based on the work of Baya and King, went into force even before the passage of the act. It used traditional language to make clear the reality of civilian control of the Army: "Command of the Army and all components thereof is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army, who directly represent him; and as the personal representatives of the President, their acts are the President's acts, and their direction and orders are the President's directions and orders." Consequently, after 1950 the chief of staff could exercise strategic direction and control of operations only for those units--Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines--deployed overseas in unified commands for which he was the executive agent. He possessed responsibility but no independent authority for the readiness of Army units worldwide, including Army units that were part of unified commands for which the other services acted as executive agents. The Army Organization Act of 1950 upheld civilian authority but in the process tangled the question of accountability.

Four characteristics of the period from September 1947 to April 1949 are
worth noting. First, the initiative for reform came from outside the Department of the Army. Second, the Army leaders, in contrast to 1945, asked for what they thought was politically feasible rather than what they thought they needed. Third, the public disarray between Army leaders over what kind of reforms were required helped weaken the Army's impact on the legislation that eventually emerged. Finally, during this period, the Army view of the role of the chief of staff of the Army became much more modest and the position lost the command-like authority that it had enjoyed since World War I. The Army Organization Act of 1950 codified this shift in opinions. Given institutional momentum and the good relations that existed between the secretary of the Army and the chief of staff of the Army, the change apparently remained confined to the lawbooks during this period. It is difficult to discern any differences in procedure resulting from the act, at least in the short term. The long term consequence, although many more factors came into play, was quite different. Thirty years later the chief of staff as an institution exercised a much less dominant influence within the Army than it had under Pershing or Marshall.

The imposition of more centralized control over the Department of Defense, a product of both the 1949 amendments and the appointment of Secretary Johnson, intensified rather than lessened interservice rivalries. Less than a year after the passage of the legislation, the outbreak of war in Korea subjected the joint system to a test more rigorous than internal conflict.
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER IV


4. Memo, Forrestal for Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of the Air Force, 4 Aug 48; Paper, Collins, "Written Statement of Views of General J. Lawton Collins, Deputy Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Prepared for the Committee Security Organization (Eberstadt Committee)," 1 Sep 48; Memo, Bradley for Forrestal, 1 Sep 48, sub: Recommendations for Changes in the National Security Act of 1947; Memo, Royall for Forrestal, 15 Sep 48, sub: Changes in the National Security Act, CS 040, National Military Establishment (20 Aug 48), RG 165, NA.

5. Testimony, Bradley before Committee on National Security Organization, 29 Jun 48, CS 040, National Military Establishment (27 Oct 48), RG 165, NA.


9. Johnson was, perhaps, the most controversial of all secretaries of defense. Historians have divided about him just as his contemporaries did. Rearden, The Formative Years, pp. 47-50, attempts a balanced view. Robert J. Donovan in his Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1949-1953 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), pp. 61-65 (hereafter cited as Tumultuous Years), also strives for objectivity but discusses events from the president's vantage point. Lawrence J. Korb finds much to praise in The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-five Years (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), pp. 99-102. Three contemporaries were more hostile: Bradley and Blair, A General's Life,


15. Special Regulation 10-5-1, 11 Apr 50 (hereafter cited as SR 10-5-1). For an extended analysis of the legal issues, see Hewes, From Root to McNamara, pp. 212-215.
Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953

Korea, which started out as a war of movement, became after the first year a war of position. As the Truman administration came to accept the view that the status quo ante bellum was an acceptable definition of victory, public frustration with the war grew. The seemingly interminable little war in northeast Asia helped General Eisenhower become President-elect Eisenhower in November 1952, the first Republican elected to the presidency since 1928. President Truman, conscious of how unprepared he had been when he assumed office following President Roosevelt's death in April 1945, directed the first orderly transition between administrations in American history. It was in this context that in November 1952 the outgoing Secretary of Defense, Robert Lovett, prepared a memorandum outlining the deficiencies in defense organization revealed by the limited war in Korea.

One of Lovett's major concerns was to establish the unquestioned primacy of the secretary of defense within his department. Lovett believed that the solution was quite simple, and he used as his model the reforms proposed by the Hoover Commission in the other cabinet level departments. He proposed to transfer all the functions of the offices, agencies, and employees defined by law in the Department of Defense to the secretary of defense. He could then delegate portions of his authority to these subordinate offices and employees. Lovett indicated that there could be "exceptions, if necessary," but the whole tenor of his discussion seemed to indicate that none were needed. One consequence of this proposal, of course, would be to remove any statutory basis for the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Lovett argued that in peacetime the Department of Defense should be ready to go to war without massive changes in its organization: "We should not deliberately maintain a Department of Defense organization which in its several parts would require a drastic reorganization to fight a war." He proposed to confine the Joint Chiefs of Staff "exclusively to planning functions and the review of war plans in the light of new weapons and new techniques." The Joint Staff would become simply a planning staff. A joint military-civilian staff would support the secretary and assume "the balance of the military staff functions" heretofore performed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs
as a separate institution might "operate" and "command" in time of war but only "by the direction of the Secretary of Defense," who in Lovett's view was the deputy commander-in-chief directly responsible to the president. The secretary should establish unified commands with the advice of the service secretaries and the Joint Chiefs, and determine which military department would serve as the executive agent for each unified command.

At the same time that he appeared to remove the Joint Chiefs from the "channel of command and responsibility," to borrow Bessell's phrase, Lovett wanted to give the chairman a "vote." Lovett knew full well that the Joint Chiefs did not decide questions by formal ballots. He simply wanted to remove the imputation in the 1949 amendments that the chairman did not enjoy in full all the powers and prerogatives of the other chiefs in the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. He wanted the chairman to participate fully and unreservedly in discussions with the other chiefs.

Lovett believed that the chairman should seek "unanimity of opinion on a course of action," but, failing to obtain agreement, he had to identify the points of disagreement very precisely and, at the same time, state his own view to the secretary of defense. Only then could the secretary make an informed decision. The chairman, noted Lovett, was "the military officer to whom the President and the Secretary of Defense must look for the organization and evaluation of military judgment."

Lovett decried the practice of Joint Staff officers becoming advocates of the positions taken by their services. To avoid this, he proposed to reserve the preparation of efficiency reports of officers working for the Joint Staff exclusively to their immediate superiors for their period of joint service.

In an organizational sense, Lovett's proposal was very close to what General Bradley had advocated in 1949. Bradley also had proposed to restrict the Joint Chiefs of Staff to planning and to provide the secretary of defense with a military-civilian staff separate from the Joint Staff. The differences were that, perhaps out of respect for the Navy's often expressed views on the subject, Lovett did not recommend the creation of the post of senior military adviser and that he wanted to designate the secretary the deputy commander-in-chief. The second innovation may have followed from the first. If Lovett had regarded the senior military adviser as simply the chief of staff of the
armed services under another name, and by chief of staff he had in mind the powers wielded by General Marshall during World War II, then exclusion of this officer may have required, in Lovett's view, some increase in the prestige and power of the secretary.

Lovett's assertion that the secretary of defense should be the deputy commander-in-chief appeared both the logical extension of the provisions of the 1949 amendments and, at the same time, rather controversial. Section 202 of the 1949 amendments proclaimed: "The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. Under the direction of the President, and subject to the provisions of this Act, he shall have direction, authority, and control over the Department of Defense." General Bradley as chief of staff of the Army had advocated just such a strengthening of the role of the secretary. At no time, however, did he or the statute use the verb "command."

Neither General Bradley nor his successor, General Collins, spelled out his view of the difference between "direction" and "command," and to reconstruct their positions it is necessary to have recourse to the meanings attached by the military to the terms at the time. The 1948 Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage gave two definitions for "command" applicable in the context of the responsibilities of the secretary of defense: "1. The authority that an individual exercises over his subordinates because of his rank and assignment. 2. An order given by a commander; that is the will of the commander expressed in a definite form for the purpose of bringing about a particular action in a specific way." The 1950 edition eliminated the first definition but retained the second. The 1953 edition returned to the 1948 formulation.

None of the editions defined "direction." In common usage, of course, the word could be used as a synonym for "command," but it also had a broader meaning of "guidance" or "management." "Directive," which did make the Dictionary of United States Military Terms, conformed to this common usage in all three editions. It also had two applicable definitions: "1. A military communication in which a policy is established or a specific order is issued....3. Broadly speaking, any communication which initiates or governs action, conduct, or procedure." The evidence thus suggests that for Bradley and Collins
"to command" had a much narrower and more specific meaning than "to direct," which could encompass but was not limited to the former. Their views, of course, were greatly influenced as well by the experience of their organization. Historically, the secretary of war had always exercised considerable discretion in the purely administrative side of his department. In this sense the World War II experience only carried to a logical conclusion trends long present in the agency. During other conflicts, the secretary's discretion in operations had usually been much more limited than in administration. In operations he had acted as the faithful executive for the president, ensuring that the War Department carried out the directives of the commander-in-chief. While Roosevelt had excluded his service secretaries from operations somewhat more than most wartime presidents, no secretary of war had aspired to the role claimed by Lovett since John Armstrong, Jr., during the War of 1812. The burning of Washington in 1814 not only ended Armstrong's public career but also dissuaded his successors from emulating his example.

Bradley's purpose in 1949 in arguing that the secretary of defense should have "direction, authority, and control" over the military establishment was to ensure that the secretary had the same power to manage his agency as the other cabinet members possessed in their departments. Eight years later, in a brilliant examination of American defense policy in a comparative perspective, Professor Samuel P. Huntington argued that the most effective method of maintaining civilian control of the military lay in establishing what he called a "balanced type" of civil-military relations in the executive branch. On the one hand the civilians, the president and the secretary of defense, established broad policy guidance. On the other, the military with their technical competence derived from a professional education and long experience, drafted and issued the orders necessary to implement that policy. The civilians directed, and the military commanded.

While elements of Huntington's argument are implied by Bradley's 1949 proposal, Bradley's thought and that of his successor remained ambiguous on the issue of the secretary of defense as the deputy commander-in-chief. Huntington's analysis might have helped them clarify their position, but it was not available to them, and to attribute such an argument to them would be
historical. In 1949 there was no reason to explore the question because no one attributed to the secretary the degree of independent authority that such a title implied. The secretary was a political appointee whose length of tenure depended upon the continued support of the president. He was an agent of the commander-in-chief.

There was little more reason to respond to the issue when raised by Lovett in 1952, because his rhetoric overstated his intent. He argued that the proper role of the secretary was to establish general policies for the Department of Defense within the guidelines laid down by the president. He neither wanted civilians to direct operations nor the military to establish policy. Making the secretary of defense the deputy commander-in-chief simply served as a device to get the services to treat with respect the policies established by the secretary.

Unfortunately, Lovett's position contained certain inherent contradictions. Removing the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the channel of command and responsibility in peacetime and possibly placing them back in the channel during wartime violated the general principle he sought to establish—no major reorganizations of the Department of Defense when it shifted from peace to war. Moreover, if he retained the idea that the military directed operations and the Joint Chiefs remained outside the channel of command, then the responsibility for the conduct of operations would fall to the chiefs of staff in their role as the professional heads of their respective services. The chain of command would run from the president to the secretary of defense to the service secretaries and through the chiefs, who would act as the executives for the service secretaries: The chiefs would issue orders to the unified and specified commands using the authority derived from the service secretaries. (The chief of naval operations and the chief of staff of the Air Force would continue, of course, to command combat forces of their services not assigned to the unified and specified commands.) The implication in Lovett's argument was that the service departments should become the executive agents for the unified commands rather than the individual service chiefs in their role as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But this would in turn enhance the power and prestige of the services, which Lovett sought to counteract by making the secretary the deputy commander-in-chief.

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Lovett's proposal cannot be understood without some reference to the conditions of his service in the Department of Defense—one year as deputy secretary of defense under Marshall and fifteen months as head of the department. The limited war in Korea elicited only a limited commitment from the American public, which hampered the efforts of the Truman administration to achieve even the partial mobilization of industry that it desired to support the war effort. Lovett's job within the department became one of "allocating scarcities" among the services. It was a thankless and frustrating task that left him emotionally and physically exhausted. (His first act on leaving office was to check himself into the hospital.) Privately he thought his department was unmanageable.7

The incoming administration headed by President Eisenhower embraced Lovett's proposal and created an opportunity for the Army to once more air its views on defense organization. At Eisenhower's behest, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson appointed a committee headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller, on which Lovett was a member, to examine the Department of Defense organization. General Collins, Army Chief of Staff since 1949, testified before the committee and presented the Army's position. As in 1949, his remarks reflected what the Army leadership thought it could obtain rather than what it thought desirable--specifically a chief of staff of the armed forces. 8

In contrast to Lovett, Collins defended current command and control arrangements. (See Chart 9.) He recommended leaving the Joint Chiefs in the channel of command and thought "dual hatting" necessary. In his judgment, the chiefs brought a wealth of knowledge about their own services to the Joint Chiefs' meetings as a consequence of their service responsibilities. The vice chiefs, he argued, should run the services on a day-to-day basis in conformity to policies established by the Joint Chiefs. The power of the chairman needed to be strengthened. Specifically, he should be required to present his own views to the secretary in the event of a split decision in the Joint Chiefs.9

Collins called for the establishment of a joint intelligence agency, reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs, to replace the three service intelligence directorates in Washington. He also wanted to strengthen the Office of the Secretary of Defense by giving the secretary four functional assistant secretaries. Collins saw the service secretaries as the chief executors of
Chart 9 - The Collins Proposal, 1953

- President
- Secretary of Defense
- National Security Council
- Central Intelligence Agency
- National Security Resources Board
- The Military Executive
- Joint Staff
- Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Chairman Joint Intelligence Agency
- Joint Intelligence
- Department of the Army
- Department of the Navy
- Department of the Air Force
- Unified & Specified Commands
- Armed Forces Planning Council
policies in the Department of Defense rather than as policy formulators. To strengthen decision making in the office of the secretary and to relieve the Joint Chiefs of routine paperwork, he suggested creating a military executive in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to advise the secretary on such matters and to head the largely civilian staff in the office.

Collins also outlined how he thought the budget process should operate. The National Security Council would provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff with "approved strategic guidelines." The Joint Chiefs would develop force levels and forward them to the secretary of defense. Once the secretary approved the force levels, the deputy secretary with the aid of the assistant secretaries would prepare budget guidelines. The deputy secretary would then forward these documents to the service departments which would prepare detailed budget guidelines. The chief of staff could appeal an adverse decision on the budget to the president, but only if the secretary of defense or the secretary of the Army gave his consent—the procedure that Marshall had hoped to reform in 1945.10

Reorganization Plan No. 6, the administration-backed plan based on the report of the Rockefeller Committee, became law on 30 June 1953. (See Chart 10.) It transferred to the secretary of defense all the functions performed by the subordinate offices, agencies, and employees of the Department of Defense except those performed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the armed services. Simultaneously, President Eisenhower directed Secretary Wilson to remove the Joint Chiefs from the channel of command and gave the secretary of defense the authority to create unified commands and appoint the military departments to serve as executive agents for the unified commands. However, the plan did not provide the military staff in the secretary's office that both Lovett and Collins advocated.11

Whereas in the 1947 legislation the Joint Chiefs simply appointed the director of the Joint Staff, the 1953 reform provided that the appointment and tenure of the director was "subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense." While decreasing the power of the Joint Chiefs as a collective entity, the plan increased the power of the chairman. The Joint Chiefs continued to select officers for service on the Joint Staff, but now their selections needed the approval of the chairman. In this one area the chairman
received a veto from which the service chiefs had no appeal. The plan transferred the responsibility of providing guidance to the director and managing the Joint Staff from the Joint Chiefs to the chairman. The reform provided many of the safeguards against outside influence on Joint Staff officers that Collins had recommended in 1949. It also gave the secretary of defense six additional assistant secretaries; all of the assistant secretaries—old as well as new—received functional responsibilities defined by law for the first time. This change conformed to Collins' proposal in 1945, except that it gave the Department of Defense three times the number of assistant secretaries that Collins had requested then.

In March 1954 Secretary Wilson issued a Department of Defense Directive designed to implement Reorganization Plan No. 6. The directive provided that the secretary of defense would designate one of the military departments to serve "as the executive agency" for each of the unified commands. Wilson, however, left the responsibility for establishing unified commands with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While the first provision reflected Lovett's view, the second did not.

Under the new arrangement, "the channel of responsibility" would run from the secretary of defense to the secretary of the department designated as executive agent. The service secretary, in turn, would authorize the military chief of his department to receive and transmit orders and act for the department as the executive agent in certain situations. These included strategic direction in peace and war of the unified commands assigned to the department and operational direction of the commands in war or emergencies. The service chief issued all orders by command of the secretary of defense. At the same time the chief had to keep the secretary of defense, his service secretary, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed of his actions.

The major organizational change, the altered role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Department of Defense, represented a step back from the increased centralization of the channels of command advocated by the Collins Plan of 1945. As in World War II, the service chiefs provided operational direction of the combatant forces, but now it was solely by virtue of their role as heads of their services rather than because of their membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this narrow respect, the 1953 reorganization provided even less
Chart 10 - Reorganization Plan No. 6, 1953

President

National Security Council

Secretary of Defense

National Security Resources Board

Central Intelligence Agency

Armed Forces Planning Council

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Department of the Air Force

Unified & Specified Commands

Chain of Command
centralization than the World War II system. The chairman, representing a solely joint perspective, now played no role in operations other than as an adviser. This loss, however, was at least partially offset by the increased role of the chairman within the Joint Chiefs. Events of the next four years would demonstrate, however, that a powerful chairman was not an unalloyed benefit from the Army's perspective.

The Collins recommendations in 1953 are significant in the history of the Army position on Joint Chiefs of Staff reform for three reasons. For the first time the Army did not publicly espouse a single chief of staff for the armed forces even though the high command continued to prefer that solution in private. Moreover, the Army continued to advocate a budget process as far removed as possible from politics--where reason rather than emotion would prevail. Finally, the Army largely succeeded in achieving its 1945 objectives insofar as the Office of the Secretary of Defense was concerned. The remainder of its goals were, however, a long way from fruition.

The Collins Plan of 1953 was a response to the needs of the moment without compromising the Army's long-range objectives. Changing conditions after 1953 elicited a markedly different response when the next major effort for reform occurred.
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. For the transition out of office, see Donovan, Tumultuous Years, pp. 402-403. Ltr, Lovett to Truman, 18 Nov 52, CS 040, Department of Defense, Chief of Staff Army Decimal File, 1951-52, RG 319, NA.


10. In a memoir written sixteen years later, Collins stated that he had become convinced that the Joint Chiefs of Staff system as amended in 1958 with a strong chairman was preferable to the single chief of staff that he had advocated in 1945. J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), pp. 372-374.


The 1958 Amendments

The next reorganization of the Department of Defense, the 1958 amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, occurred in a context of intense interservice rivalry between the Army and the Air Force. The leaders of the two services had totally different conceptions of the nature of future general war, the desired national strategy, and the mix of forces needed to carry the strategy into effect.

Army spokesmen, such as Generals Matthew B. Ridgway, Maxwell D. Taylor and James M. Gavin, advocated a strategy of flexible response. For them, the lesson of Korea was that limited wars were possible. America had possessed a near monopoly of atomic weapons in June 1950, and this had not deterred the North Koreans. The Army, consequently, needed to prepare to fight such conflicts. Never again could it afford to be as unprepared for combat as in the summer of 1950. The drama of defeat and retreat in that terrible season had etched itself indelibly in the memories of the members of the Army Staff.

Air Force leaders, including Generals Nathan F. Twining, Thomas D. White, and Curtis E. LeMay, defended the massive retaliation strategy just as vigorously. For them the lesson of Korea was somewhat different. Deterrence could not work unless the Air Force's Strategic Air Command possessed the means to deliver nuclear weapons to all parts of the Soviet Union, a capability that it had lacked in June 1950. Only if the country made a massive investment in technology, procurement, and training could it produce a force ready to strike back at the Soviets within a few hours of an attack anywhere on the periphery of their empire. Air Force demands for the funds to increase the capabilities and readiness of the Strategic Air Command dominated the budget battles of the mid and late 1950s. The widespread belief in the United States during the 1950s about the "monolithic nature of Communism" made massive retaliation a plausible strategy to deter limited wars.

President Eisenhower entered office convinced that the United States was engaged in a long term struggle with the Soviet Union. To survive "the long haul," America could not afford to tie up too large a proportion of its productive resources in supporting a massive military organization. Determined
to avoid spending the country into defeat, Eisenhower accepted massive retaliation as the optimal national strategy for the United States. For the president, like the Army, the lesson of Korea was "never again," but in his case it was never again fight a limited war where the enemy had the advantage in manpower.3

Eisenhower intended to act as his own chief strategist. He appointed a management specialist, Charles E. Wilson—the president of General Motors—to succeed Lovett as secretary of defense. General Bradley’s successor as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, became the president’s principal adviser on strategy in fact if not in law. Wilson and Radford complemented one another. Wilson was blunt and direct; traits that sometimes caused him problems when speaking in public. He was a strong advocate of unanimity within the Joint Chiefs on questions of policy and strategy. (General Ridgway called it browbeating.) Wilson regarded the service secretaries as middle management. He used the Armed Forces Policy Council as Secretary of Defense Johnson had—to announce decisions already arrived at. In the Wilson Pentagon, the service secretaries received their instructions from the assistant secretaries of defense when they received any at all. Quite often the assistant secretaries bypassed the service secretaries and went directly to the services. Radford, a brilliant, self-assured staff officer with a background in naval aviation, was a skilled bureaucratic infighter who, like Wilson, sought consensus—not the gradual working out of areas of agreement between men of dissimilar background but the unanimous acceptance of a predetermined national strategy. Whereas Admiral Leahy and General Bradley mediated disagreements, Radford was an advocate of the Eisenhower "New Look," with its emphasis on strategic bombardment.4

The result of these changes in leadership style and departmental procedure was that General Ridgway, Army chief of staff from 1953 to 1955, and his successor, General Taylor, who held the post from 1955 until 1959, felt isolated. Not only did the secretary and the chairman not act on Army objections but they also gave every indication of not paying much attention to Army recommendations. The frustrations inherent in the situation soon became evident to the other members of the Army Staff as well. For the Army, once the war ended in Korea, the 1950s proved to be the worst of times. An
institution with the primary mission in war of closing with and attacking the enemy found itself, under the new doctrine, relegated to the role of defending strategic air bases. The "New Look" caused a crisis of confidence within the Army, much the same as the Navy faced at the end of World War II. Because massive retaliation was the policy of the Eisenhower administration, the Air Force became the dominant service in the Department of Defense once the Korean War ended. It received a larger share of the budget than the other two services.

Army leaders continued to advocate unity of command in principle during the 1950s, but feared that if legislation created a single chief of staff of the armed forces, the president would appoint an Air Force officer to the post and he would use it to inflict his strategic views on the other services. Fear that the Air Force intended to advocate a single chief of staff led Army leaders to adopt a position on Department of Defense reform in November 1957 that attempted to combine unity of command with public opposition to a single chief of staff. During the preparation of the Army position, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, observed that the ultimate Army objective remained a chief of staff of the armed forces but that it was impolitic to admit it. The solution, in Eddleman's view a desirable first step toward the ultimate goal, was the creation of the four-star post of director of joint military operations who would report to the Joint Chiefs and assume all their responsibilities concerning the planning, conduct, and requirements for military operations. (See Chart 11.) At the same time the plan abolished the executive agent system. The chain of command became the president, the secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of joint military operations, and the commanders of the unified and specified commands. To assist him, the director received two deputies and a Joint Staff modeled after the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff during World War II.

The Army plan reduced the Joint Chiefs to the three service chiefs and, when the Joint Chiefs discussed a policy affecting the Marines, the commandant of the Marine Corps. Without a separate officer holding the office of chairman, the post rotated each quarter between the three full-time members. A reduced Joint Staff continued to support the Joint Chiefs. The
proposal left open, subject to further study, the amount of the reduction. It would correspond to the much diminished mission of the Joint Staff—to review for the Joint Chiefs plans and policy proposals recommended by the director of joint military operations and provide the necessary staff support to answer questions referred to the Joint Chiefs by the secretary of defense.

In the budget process, the director of joint military operations prepared a statement of requirements for the unified and specified commands, based on input from their commanders. The services prepared requirements only for undeployed forces in the United States and the training and mobilization bases. The plan also called for reform, long advocated by General Taylor, in the development of a functional budget—a joint budget with funds divided by task, such as limited war, rather than by service.

The proposed creation of a director of military operations combined with the abolition of the separate chairman constituted a very shrewd blow at the threat that a chairman like Admiral Radford posed for the Army. The director of joint military operations, given his location in the chain of command, could direct the unified and specified commands, but he would be subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unlike a single chief of staff, or even a strong chairman, the director of joint operations would not be well placed to influence the services.

Admiral Radford, while chairman, may not have handled the chief of staff of the Army always in the most tactful fashion, but the solution that the Army Staff proposed appears, in retrospect, as a considerable overreaction. While the admiral was most certainly an enthusiastic advocate of the New Look, he was not its author. That individual resided at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. No organizational change short of a veritable constitutional revolution would have permitted the Army to have obtained adoption of flexible response as a national strategy in the 1950s. In this sense the solution the Army proposed was rather pointless in that it did not address the real problem that the service faced. In another sense using the post of chairman as a scapegoat was healthy because it allowed the Army to vent its frustrations. The episode clearly demonstrated that General Taylor and his associates thoroughly accepted the concept of civilian control of the military. Despite the wrenching pressures on the Army, no one ever questioned the right of the president to make the decisions that he
The 1957 Army position on Joint Chiefs of Staff reform had no appreciable effect on the legislation that Congress enacted the following year. Its primary historical significance is the insight that it provides into attitudes of members of the Army Staff. The plan was so soon overtaken by events because, when the effort to reform the Department of Defense developed, the initiative came not from the Air Force as the Army Staff feared, but from the president himself. Eisenhower believed that the 1953 reforms had not gone far enough. His concern stemmed from his appreciation of the changes that World War II had wrought in the conduct of war.

First, separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it with all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service. The accomplishment of this result is the basic function of the Secretary of Defense, advised and assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and operating under the supervision of the Commander in Chief.

To this line of argument—so reminiscent of the position that he had taken as chief of staff of the Army during the unification debates from 1945 until 1947—Eisenhower added a second concern derived from the interservice rivalries over weapons development during the 1950s. The secretary of defense needed clear, direct, and flexible authority to manage funds appropriated to his department, "especially in respect to the development of new weapons...."8

The president had six specific objectives designed to put these two principles into effect. He urged that U.S. fighting forces needed to be organized "into operational commands that are truly unified, each assigned a mission in full accord with our over-all "military objectives." These unified commands, a category for Eisenhower that included specified commands as well as multiservice commands, would be established in the Department of Defense by the direction of the president with missions and force levels that conformed "to national objectives." They would be separate from the military
departments. All legal restrictions on the powers of a unified commander over his component commanders, the president told Congress, should be removed. It followed logically from this prescription that to achieve unity of command among the forces in the field as defined by the president, the military departments would have to be removed from the chain of command. Eisenhower's second objective was in fact to "clear command channels so that orders will proceed directly to the unified commanders from the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense." The president considered the chain of command established in the wake of the 1953 reorganization "cumbersome and unreliable in time of peace and not usable in time of war." He had already directed Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy to discontinue the use of military departments as executive agents. Eisenhower asked Congress to facilitate this process by repealing the statutory authority giving the chief of staff of the Air Force command of major units of the Air Force and the chief of naval operations command of naval operating forces.

Eisenhower had considered and rejected complete unification through the creation of a single service. While desirable, he believed the proposition politically infeasible in 1958.9 Instead, his third objective called for strengthening "the military staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense" to provide the president and the secretary with the needed "professional assistance" for the preparation of strategic plans and the "operational direction of the unified commands." The concept of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower argued, was "essentially sound," and therefore he sought no legislative changes in their functions. However, to support the shift in operational channels, he directed that in the future the Joint Chiefs would "serve as staff assisting the Secretary of Defense in his exercise of direction over unified commands." They would not have any independent command authority; they would issue commands only "under the authority and in the name of the Secretary of Defense." This formula for ensuring civilian control of the military while interjecting military advice and expertise at the tip of the chain of command through the agency of a chief of staff, although in this instance a committee, conformed exactly to the method followed in the War Department between 1903 and 1941. The plan confirmed that Eisenhower had spent his prepresidential career in the Army, not the Navy.

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Given the changes that Eisenhower had mandated with regard to the unified commands and the chain of command, he needed to strengthen the Joint Staff so that it could perform the tasks previously assigned to the operations staffs of the services. He hoped that the changes he directed Secretary McElroy to make—abolishing the committee system in the Joint Staff and adding an "integrated operations division"—would also increase the speed of decision-making and make the Joint Staff less of an arena for interservice rivalry. In his view members of the Joint Staff committees regarded themselves as representatives of their services rather than as staff officers with a national perspective. "Had I allowed my interservice and interallied staff to be similarly organized in the theaters I commanded in World War II, the delays and resulting indecisiveness would have been unacceptable to my superiors."

The president asked Congress to assist his reorganization of the Joint Staff "by raising or removing the statutory limit on the size of the Joint Staff." Only then could the Joint Staff form an operations division of the size required. He asked that Congress authorize the chairman to assign duties to members of the Joint Staff and to appoint its director. He also asked for a revision of the law to remove any ambiguity over the power of the service chiefs to delegate the day-to-day operation of their services to their vice chiefs. Eisenhower wanted the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to devote most of their time and attention to their joint as opposed to their service responsibilities. Finally, he asked that Congress remove the prohibition on "voting" by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the meetings of the Joint Chiefs. Eisenhower wanted the chairman on an equal footing with the other chiefs.

The specifics of Eisenhower's last two objectives, reorganizing the research and development function in the Department of Defense and removing all doubts about the authority of the secretary of defense within his own department, were only marginally related to the Joint Chiefs. Under the heading of the second objective, the president announced that he had informed Secretary McElroy that he would consider for advancement beyond the two-star level only those officers recommended to him by the secretary after discussion with the service secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The president planned to follow the same procedure when assigning or reassigning senior
officers "to high command, staff, and departmental positions." By this method Eisenhower hoped to ensure that such officers possessed the ability to deal "objectively--without extreme service partisanship--with matters of the broadest significance to our national security."

In the 1958 amendments to the National Security Act (See Chart 12.), the president secured virtually all that he requested. The new legislation and the directive that Secretary McElroy issued in December 1958 putting it into effect gave the Army much more than it had requested in 1953, rather less than it desired in 1957, and considerably less than it had contemplated in 1945. The act continued to centralize authority in the Department of Defense. It loosened but did not entirely remove, as Eisenhower desired, the curbs on the secretary of defense's power to shift functions within his own department. The secretary no longer had to administer the service departments separately; the amendments simply provided that they would be "organized separately."

The legislation reiterated that the Joint Staff could "have no executive authority," that is, command authority. While the Joint Staff could "not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff," it could "be organized and operate along conventional staff lines." In conformity with Eisenhower's proposal, the act increased the size of the Joint Staff to 400 officers.

Secretary McElroy's directive defined the relationship between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the chain of command. The Joint Chiefs would "serve as advisers and as military staff in the chain of operational command" to the unified and specified commands and thus were not in the chain of command. The directive emphasized that the Joint Chiefs lacked the power of command. Instead they provided "a channel of communications from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified commands...." In effect, the Joint Chiefs as a collective entity became the chief of staff to the president and the secretary of defense with respect to the unified and specified commands, a reversion to the pre-1953 state of affairs. The president and the secretary could delegate whatever powers they might wish for the Joint Chiefs to exercise in their name just as a division commander might do with respect to his chief of staff.

Placing the chiefs in the channel of communications also meant that the
Chart 12 - The 1958 Amendment

- President
- Secretary of Defense
- Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The Joint Secretaries
- Armed Forces Policy Council
- Joint Staff (400)
- Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Unified & Specified Commands
- Department of the Army
- Department of the Navy
- Department of the Air Force

Chain of Command
Channel of Command
chiefs would be kept informed of the latest developments in the fighting commands. Reports from the unified and specified commands would pass in most instances through the Joint Chiefs en route to the secretary of defense. Any advice that the chiefs might give to the secretary, consequently, would rest upon the very latest information.

At the same time the chiefs served as the channel of communication for all directions that the secretary might issue to the unified and specified commanders. While the secretary might give an order directly to one of the unified and specified commanders and simply inform the Joint Chiefs afterwards as a matter of courtesy, in most instances the secretary would indicate what he wanted done and the Joint Chiefs, sitting as a committee, would actually draft the order. Because this committee made decisions only by unanimity, disagreements on phrasing could pose significant delays in composing and transmitting orders.

The 1958 act produced a net increase in the powers of the chairman. The 1949 prohibition against the chairman having a "vote" disappeared as Eisenhower requested. The chairman likewise received responsibility for selecting the director of the Joint Staff, a function heretofore performed by the Joint Chiefs as a whole. Previously, the Joint Staff had performed such duties as the Joint Chiefs of Staff prescribed. The 1958 legislation, again in line with Eisenhower's wishes, provided that in the future either the chairman or the Joint Chiefs could determine the duties of the staff. The one diminution of his authority occurred with respect to his management of both the director of the Joint Staff and the Joint Staff itself, a function given him without qualification in Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953. The 1958 statute provided that the chairman discharged these responsibilities "on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

The overall increase in the power of the chairman aside, the 1958 reorganization changed the debate over centralization of authority in the Department of Defense in a subtle yet very significant manner. When General Collins advocated a single chief in 1945, that officer would have acted as the executive for the secretary of the armed forces in dealings with the services as well as the overseas commands. Removing the services from the chain of command to the unified commands and placing the Joint Chiefs of Staff in that
chain, increased the chairman's influence regarding the unified commands but did not change it toward the services. Barring a basic change in the organizational relationships established by the 1958 legislation, future proposals to strengthen the powers of the chairman would only increase his authority relative to the unified commands. The 1958 amendments fundamentally changed the terms of debate over Joint Chiefs of Staff reform.

In line with the Army's concern about the status of the service secretaries, the act provided that assistant secretaries of defense could not issue orders to the military departments unless the secretary of defense delegated the responsibility to them in writing and that all orders that the secretary of defense, deputy secretary of defense, or assistant secretaries of defense issued to the military departments had to pass through the service secretaries. The Army did not secure in the 1958 reforms the director of joint military operations that it had deemed necessary, but it did obtain an operations division on the Joint Staff. While official Army proposals had not addressed the composition of the Joint Staff (the 1943 plan of Bessell, Caraway, and Armstrong had never become the official position of the War Department), the reconstitution of the Joint Staff along the lines of the Army Staff pleased the Army leadership.

The most striking feature of the Army position prior to the 1958 reforms was that, given all the pressure generated by interservice rivalries, the Army did not abandon unity of command as an ultimate objective. Expediency in the sense of the calculation of what would or would not secure presidential or congressional approval had certainly entered into the development of earlier Army positions, but this was the first time that the Army leadership had thought that the Army's institutional future was at stake. While expediency dictated some reversion from the degree of unity of command advocated by Collins in 1945, the Army position of December 1957 in fact called for greater unity of command than the 1958 amendments provided. Under the circumstances, this action testified both to the depth of commitment of General Taylor and his staff to the principle involved and to their intellectual integrity. They did not jettison unity of command simply to save the strategy of flexible response.
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER VI


3. Eisenhower described the rationale for the "New Look" in his Mandate for Change, pp. 445-458. The quotation is from page 445. See also Kinnard, President Eisenhower, pp. 1-36; Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, pp. 65-69. For a good discussion of defense issues generally, see Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, pp. 508-530.

4. Geelhood, Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon, 34-39, 100-120; Radford, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam, 317-330; Ridgway and Martin, Soldier, 266-273; Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 88-130. In his memoirs (p. 329), Radford conceded that he had perhaps pushed consensus too far. In doing so he was but following the desires of the president who wanted everyone on "the team."

5. Ridgway and Martin, Soldier, pp. 311-316; Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, pp.


The 1958 amendment to the National Defense Act of 1947 did not stifle all the critics of the defense establishment. Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri based his campaign for the Democratic nomination for president in 1960 on his expertise in defense and the alleged shortcomings of the Eisenhower reorganization. Symington's interest in defense issues stemmed from his service as assistant secretary of war for air from 1946 until 1947, when he managed the legislation that became the National Security Act of 1947, and his subsequent service as the first secretary of the Air Force from 1947 until 1950. Symington did not win the nomination, but he did secure a plank in his party's platform that called for "a complete examination of the organization of our Armed Forces as a first order of business of the next administration." During the campaign, the Democratic nominee for president, Senator John F. Kennedy, established a committee headed by Symington to examine the Department of Defense.¹

In December 1960, after the election, the Symington Committee made its report. It recommended abolishing the service secretaries and replacing them with two functional under secretaries. (See Chart 13.) The committee wanted to abolish the Joint Chiefs of Staff, restricting the service chiefs to their roles as heads of their services. In place of the Joint Chiefs organization the committee substituted the military advisory council, a group consisting of one senior officer drawn from each service and presided over by the chairman of the Joint Staff, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a new title but with the same functions. The members of the military advisory council would have no current duties or responsibilities with their services and could not return to them once their tours ended, thus solving the dual-hatting problem.²

The committee sought to reorganize the unified and specified commands into four unified commands—the strategic, tactical, defense, and reserve commands—a proposal that reflected current Air Force thinking. They would report to the chairman of the Joint Staff who would become a full-fledged member of the chain of command. Finally, the committee recommended a
Chart 13 - The Symington Committee Proposal, 1960

- President
- Secretary of Defense
- Chairman of the Joint Staff
- Joint Staff
- Military Advisory Council
- Specified Commands
- Unified Commands
- U.S. Navy
- U.S. Army
- U.S. Air Force
- Service Chiefs
change in budget procedures. Prior to the presentation of the budget, the secretary of defense would present a detailed statement of military requirements to congressional appropriations committees. Congress, in turn, would appropriate money to the Department of Defense rather than to the services. Sputnik and the alleged missile gap on which Kennedy had campaigned (but which, in fact, did not exist) made the committee very sensitive about questions concerning research and development. It recommended that Congress place research and development projects requiring a long lead time on a multiyear funding cycle. 3

The calls for reform of the Department of Defense produced three Army papers on the issue but in the end no agreement on the Army position. Even before the Symington Committee completed its work, Lt. Col. John H. Cushman, an officer in the Coordination Group in the Office of the Chief of Staff, "a little 'ideas' enclave...originally organized in the mid-1950s by General Taylor to help fight the Army's battles in the Congress and the Executive Branch with some new ideas..." prepared a paper on Department of Defense reform. Cushman wrote on his own initiative. The record reveals no single event that triggered the paper, and after the passage of over twenty years the author cannot recall his precise motivation. "I think that I must have believed the paper might be useful input as the Army reacted to whatever the new administration would start doing." 4

Efficient use of the armed forces, Cushman argued, rested upon centralization of authority and decentralization of execution. He favored retention of services and service secretaries. (See Chart 14.) Current problems between the services stemmed from improper definition of roles and missions, which needed to revolve around environment—maritime, land, and aerospace. The practical consequence of Cushman's approach would be to give the Army control of close air support and tactical airlift in order to better fight ground wars. 5

Cushman also called for giving combatant commands greater voice in decisions affecting their own force structure. In the area of command and control, he supported the current structure of the Joint Chiefs and the policy of dual-hatting. He emphasized the need to reform the Joint Staff by making its advice more timely and by improving the quality of its work. He advocated
three major changes: developing genuine joint doctrine by making the joint schools responsible for it; clarifying the chain of command within the Joint Staff by making the staff responsible to one person, the chairman, rather than to a corporate body, the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and, finally, having the secretary of defense make it very clear that he regarded the members of the Joint Staff as "his" staff officers and would protect them from anyone who tried to influence the content of their advice.

Just how the Army Staff reacted to the Cushman paper is unclear. No written comments have survived, and the author is not certain that any were ever made. The study did impress Cyrus Vance, who the new secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara, named to head the Office of Organization and Management in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Vance had Cushman assigned to his office. The paper helped justify a directive signed by Secretary McNamara in March 1961 that gave the Air Force greater responsibilities in space, a consequence that did not please everyone on the Army Staff but did not produce a major outcry either.

The Chief of Staff, General George H. Decker, was certainly interested in the issue of Department of Defense reform, but there is no evidence he ever saw Cushman's paper. Shortly after the publication of the Symington Committee's report, Decker personally requested comment on it by Maj. Gen. William O. Reeder, a retired officer who had served in the early 1950s as deputy assistant chief of staff for logistics on the Army Staff when Decker was comptroller of the Army. Reeder had enjoyed a reputation in the service as a brilliant manager and was then teaching business administration at Syracuse University.

Reeder did not regard the committee's proposals as significant in themselves, but he believed that the existence of the committee signaled the beginning of a long overdue reorganization of the Department of Defense. "Many influential persons are aware that the Department of Defense, to include the military departments, is so ill-organized as to imperil the actual defense of the nation." Reeder was particularly critical of the interlayering of administrative staffs in the Department of Defense:

Three successive staffs, Defense, Department Secretarial, and Service Military, lie successively between the symbol of ultimate authority, the Secretary

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of Defense and the first operator of any sort. No other organization in the world makes use of such a cumbersome arrangement. No student of organization can so define the interlocking responsibilities and authorities as to produce a smoothly working operation.

Abolishing the service secretariats as the committee proposed was a step in the right direction in Reeder's view. (See Chart 15.) He did think, in contrast to the committee, that it would be useful to have assistant secretaries of defense without portfolios replace the service secretaries. Removed from the chain of command, the assistant secretaries could represent the services in the higher reaches of the department. Large civilian companies, such as Du Pont, he noted, found it prudent "to have the field represented in the group of top management." 8

Reeder had little respect for the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an institution. His service on the Army Staff made him realize that service interests determined positions in the meetings of the Joint Chiefs. "Anyone who has followed briefings prior to [a] JCS meeting should easily recognize that these were more a preparation for battle than for agreement on the best course for Defense as a whole." But this was only to be expected. "The head of any organization must always strive to aggrandize the organization in one way or another; to do else is to betray the trust placed in him by his personnel." No service chief could accept easily a compromise on a question of vital concern to his service. The position taken by the chairman on a disputed issue was "as close to military objectivity as the JCS can reach in important matters."

Reeder was inclined to favor some sort of military council in which the members had severed all ties to their services. He could not understand how any service could object to a body made up of military men honestly attempting to serve their country. He regarded the fear that a strong chairman would prove biased toward his own service as a weak objection. "A basic fact of management is that responsibility sobers. To impute bias to an officer of thirty years' service is to confess that one is not oneself capable of acting objectively." He observed that the reorganization of the unified commands recommended by the committee would produce more confusion than it solved. He did not comment on whether the chairman of the Joint Staff should be in the
Chart 15 - The Reeder Proposal, 1961

President

Secretary of Defense

Chairman of the Joint Staff

Joint Staff

Military Advisory Council

Chain of Command
chain of command. Discussion of the budget process he considered premature until the organizational arrangements were complete.

Rather than forwarding the study for the Army Staff as Decker planned ("I doubt that anything very useful can arise from that comment..."), Reeder suggested that he send it to the Army Comptroller's Office, a suggestion the chief of staff followed within the week. Decker told Mr. Leonard W. Hoelscher, the deputy comptroller of the Army, to personally review the report and make any recommendation he thought necessary to obtain a more effective defense organization. Hoelscher was not to show the paper to anyone. It was to be entirely his own effort. Decker wanted an "objective and constructive" study. Under no circumstances was Hoelscher to attempt to develop "an Army position."9

Hoelscher completed a very detailed report on 1 February 1961. (See Chart 16.) He was not enthusiastic about abolishing the service secretaries and proposed waiting until missions of the unified commands were well defined before proceeding with that reform. He did not consider a military advisory council an acceptable replacement for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Instead, Hoelscher wanted to make organizational and procedural changes, with the latter in his view more important. He wanted to give the chairman responsibility for formulating and presenting all policy recommendations to the secretary of defense with the proviso that he had to include all minority views. He also recommended modeling the Joint Staff on General Marshall's World War II reorganization of the War Department General Staff with staff sections J-1 through J-4 and a separate operations division to act as a genuine command post for the secretary of defense.10

Hoelscher's discussion of procedural changes was much more detailed. He thought the Joint Chiefs should participate as a group in solving problems; each chief should not be required "to propose and defend an independent solution." Hoelscher wanted to shift responsibility for threat estimate and the development of related policies and plans from the service staffs to the Joint Staff and other elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs, acting as a corporate body, would determine the means to deal most effectively with the threat, and recommend courses of action. Hoelscher thus sought to achieve genuine joint command and control by creating "purple"
procedures rather than a "purple" organization. Like his contemporaries in uniform, he continued to look to the organization of the War Department in World War II as a model of how to direct military operations.

General Decker never required the Army Staff to develop an Army position because shortly after taking office Secretary McNamara indicated to President Kennedy that he preferred to develop to the fullest extent the powers conferred on his office by existing legislation before seeking a further amendment to the National Security Act. Decker had a full agenda of reforms he wished to implement within the Army, including abolishing the technical bureaus, replacing the pentomic division with what became the ROAD division, and increasing the number of helicopters in the Army; he did not immediately pursue Department of Defense reform on his own. He served only two years as chief of staff. What he might have attempted or accomplished had he served the four years usually accorded Army chiefs of staff must remain a matter of speculation.

The one substantial organizational change of the Kennedy years—the creation of the post of military representative of the president—was unrelated to the Symington Committee Report and proved ephemeral. The Bay of Pigs left Kennedy dissatisfied with the advice he had received. He had read and liked General Taylor's book on the defense polices followed by the Eisenhower administration, *The Uncertain Trumpet,* which included a critique of the failings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Kennedy asked Taylor, then living in retirement in New York City, to head a study group to determine the causes of the Cuban disaster. After some discussion on whether or not to revive Admiral Leahy's old post of chief of staff to the president (the decision was negative because the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff now presided over the meetings of the Joint Chiefs), Kennedy created the post of military representative of the president and asked Taylor to accept the appointment shortly after the completion of the report on the Bay of Pigs operation.

There is no indication that the Army was given an opportunity to comment on the proposed post. General Taylor's account of the reform suggests that the discussion did not go beyond the confines of the White House Staff. The president originally wanted Taylor to succeed Allen Dulles as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Only after Taylor declined did
Chart 16 - The Hoelscher Proposal, 1961

- President
- Secretary of Defense
- Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Unified & Specified Commands
- Department of the Army
- Department of the Navy
- Department of the Air Force
- Armed Forces Policy Council
- Director Joint Staff
  - Plans
  - Operations
- Chain of Command
- Channel of Command
Kennedy create the position of military representative. Kennedy, as Taylor had remarked, did not think in terms of organization; he thought in terms of people. The evidence suggests that Kennedy wanted Taylor as an adviser and invented the position to make a place for the general rather than establishing it as the result of a systematic critique of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization.

Taylor reported for duty at the Executive Office Building as military representative on 1 July 1961. His staff consisted of seven members drawn from the armed forces and the Central Intelligence Agency. He realized that the possibility for friction between his office and the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization was quite high. Fortunately the chairman, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, had been a West Point classmate and a friend in the years since, and he and Taylor agreed very early to a number of procedures to minimize conflict between the two organizations.

Taylor was generally impressed by the quality of the staff work produced by the Joint Staff during this period. His only complaint, but it was crucial, was that the Joint Staff was too slow--its papers invariably arrived after the president had made his decision. Despite the advantage of timeliness enjoyed by the Office of the Military Representative of the President--an advantage conferred by proximity to the White House, small size, and greater control over its own agenda--Taylor did not seek to perpetuate the office when he succeeded Lemnitzer as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 1962. Taylor had been "convinced from the start that it was an unsound position." The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "should be the No. 1 military office of the Armed Forces in the eyes of the President, the Sec. Def., and most, if not all, of Congress." In Taylor's view, if the president was unhappy with his chairman he needed a new officer, not a new position. Thus, when President Kennedy informed Taylor of the decision to make him chairman, Kennedy asked who should succeed as military representative. Taylor "promptly replied 'nobody'..." and the president agreed at once. At the same time, General Earle G. Wheeler succeeded General Decker as chief of staff. General Decker retired, yet another casualty of the Bay of Pigs.13

The demise of the military representative revealed that General Taylor did not want another military officer at the White House in a position to second-guess his actions as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The same
implicit institutional conflict had existed between the secretary of defense and the military representative, although relations between Taylor and McNamara had remained cordial. While McNamara's role in the appointment of Taylor as chairman remains obscure, the results must have pleased the secretary of defense. General Lemnitzer, who had never received the entire confidence of the administration but who enjoyed a high reputation with the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, became Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Taylor, who the administration trusted, became the chairman and successfully opposed continuation of the military representative of the president, an officer who could second-guess the secretary as easily as he could second guess the chairman.14

The "active-management" philosophy of Secretary McNamara had a greater impact on the Joint Chiefs of Staff than did the creation of the post of the military representative of the president. McNamara defined his role as "questioning, suggesting alternatives, proposing objectives, and stimulating progress." He averred that decisions should be made on "the lowest level in the organization that has the ability and information available to apply approved policy." The management tools that McNamara put in place—the Planning Programming Budgeting System and Systems Analysis—ensured that the necessary information was available only at the level of secretary and deputy secretary. (He used the deputy secretary as his alter ego.) The consequence was a centralization of decision making in the department.15

In effect, McNamara created the armed forces general staff advocated by Collins in 1945 and manned it with civilians. The secretary of defense in the McNamara system functioned as a deputy commander-in-chief, and as his own chief of staff of the armed forces. McNamara not only set policy as envisioned by Lovett but he also made operational decisions, at times overruling his professional military advisers. McNamara demonstrated the utility of what Hoelscher proposed in February 1961, leaving structure alone and concentrating on procedure, but the results were not what Hoelscher anticipated. McNamara created a functional budget such as the one that General Taylor advocated in 1957, but civilians largely determined the alternatives proposed and used cost benefits analysis, substituting efficiency for effectiveness, to select among those alternatives. Judgment played a large role in the assumptions upon which
the analysis was based, but these assumptions were rarely, if ever, made explicit. McNamara's commitment to rational and scientific decision making did not ease the tension within the Pentagon between the military and civilians. He asserted that these ideals guided his stewardship of defense, which led him to downplay the role of assumptions in the process.16

Two practical consequences flowed from the McNamara procedural revolution. The emphasis on civilians and civilian skills by implication, if not always in fact, rendered military officers and military judgment superfluous. The effect was to question the utility of military professionalism itself and to produce a sense of disquiet among serving officers. Secondly, it concomitantly eroded the sense of trust between the secretary and the chiefs that was needed for the most effective functioning of the department.

General Taylor was probably the most favorably disposed of all the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 1961 and 1968 toward Secretary McNamara. Taylor regarded him quite simply as "one of the ablest and most energetic administrators ever to come to Washington." Before accepting the appointment as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, Taylor called upon the secretary to discover his attitude toward Taylor's selection. As McNamara "seemed genuinely pleased," Taylor raised some specific problems about the relations between the secretary and the Joint Chiefs that troubled him. He believed that the Joint Chiefs had been swamped with requests for information from the bright, young civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the "whiz kids" as they were irreverently known. The Joint Staff was overloaded to the point that its effectiveness was impaired. McNamara agreed that the chairman would have the final decision over demands placed on the Joint Staff except when the request came from the secretary or the deputy secretary.17

Taylor--with his own frustrations while Army chief of staff firmly in mind--addressed the issue of dissent in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He told McNamara "that I respected the individual views of the Chiefs and felt that any dissent should be reported to the Secretary or even to the President without trying to circumvent the issue by noncommittal or ambiguous statements." The secretary said he agreed and indicated that split papers that outlined the strengths and weaknesses of the contending positions were much more valuable.
in aiding him to reach a decision than papers that obscured the issues.

Taylor then discussed the rumors current in Washington that the "whiz kids" had taken over the advisory role given by statute to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that the Joint Chiefs were regularly ignored in developing Department of Defense policy. He recognized that the secretary could ask advice of anyone he chose--from "his barber or his chauffeur" if he desired--but asked McNamara's help to ensure that the Joint Chiefs were given full opportunity to discharge their legal obligation: "They could not and did not expect that their advice would always be accepted but it should always be heard." To this also McNamara assented. Taylor recollected in his memoirs that these agreements governed his relations with the secretary throughout his tenure as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Taylor usually represented the Joint Chiefs in meetings with the president. His successor as chairman, General Earle G. Wheeler, continued this tradition. During a meeting of all the Joint Chiefs with President Lyndon B. Johnson and McNamara in 1965, the Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Wallace M. Green, Jr., disagreed about strategy. McNamara told Wheeler that he never wanted to have a meeting like that again. Thereafter Wheeler represented the Joint Chiefs.18

On the surface McNamara's instructions to General Wheeler appeared to reverse what McNamara had told General Taylor three years earlier about airing differences. Perhaps the key factor distinguishing the two incidents is that in the first case the disagreements went to the secretary of defense while in the second the president was an observer. The first situation allowed the secretary to weigh all the factors and render a verdict--sometimes in the form of a decision and other times in the form of a carefully worded recommendation to the president. In the second the president made the decision. The most that the secretary could do was advise him.

If Secretary McNamara no longer wanted the Joint Chiefs to air their differences, at least in front of the president, the latter felt the same way. The Joint Chiefs believed that the secretary had exploited their splits to their disadvantage while Taylor was chairman. Under Wheeler they made a concerted effort not to send papers containing minority views to the secretary.
Perhaps as a consequence, Wheeler enjoyed the confidence of the service chiefs who had regarded Taylor as almost a member of the administration. The Joint Chiefs began keeping their disagreements to themselves just as the United States escalated its involvement in Southeast Asia. The war in Vietnam consumed high level attention for the next five years. Only a change in administrations produced the resolve to reexamine the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The McNamara years were not, however, entirely devoid of organizational innovations. McNamara created the Defense Intelligence Agency that reported to the secretary through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He also set up the Defense Supply Agency and the Defense Contract Audit Agency that reported directly to the secretary of defense. The last two represented efforts to consolidate technical functions previously distributed throughout the services under a single manager and, as such, put into practice the philosophy of the "common services" approach enunciated by the Collins Plan in 1945. The Defense Intelligence Agency did not, however, replace the intelligence directorates to the service staffs, and thus represented something less than what the War Department had sought. These reforms owed no intellectual debt to the Symington Committee Report. In the 1960s, attempts at Joint Chiefs of Staff reform often produced little result. They proved to be harbingers of the future.
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER VII


4. Ltr, Cushman to Raines, 18 Aug 85, JCS Reform project file, CMH. Cushman rose to lieutenant general before he retired.

5. Rpt, Cushman, 1 Nov 60, sub: The Question of Defense Organization, DAMO-SSP, action officer file, 1984, JCS Reform project file, CMH.


7. Ltr, Reeder to Decker, CS 320 (1 Feb 61), Chief of Staff Army, General Correspondence, Security Classified, 1955-1962, RG 319, NA. For a discussion of Reeder's career, see George W. Cullum, et al., Biographical Register of the Officers & Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy..., 9 vols. (West Point: Association of Graduates of the U.S. Military


9. Ltr, Reeder to Decker, 10 Jan 61; Memo, Hoelscher for Decker, 1 Feb 61, sub: Report to Senator Kennedy from the Committee on the Defense Establishment (Symington Committee), both in CS 320 (1 Feb 61), Chief of Staff, Army, General Correspondence, Security Classified, 1955-1962, RG 319, NA.

10. Rpt, Hoelscher to Decker, 1 Feb 61, "Comments on Report of Committee on Defense (1 Feb 61)," Chief of Staff, Army, General Correspondence, Security Classified, 1955-1962, RG 319, NA.


13. Taylor, "Reflections on the American Military Establishment," pp. 178-203; Ltr, Taylor to Raines, 10 Jul 83, JCS Reform project file, CMH.


15. Trewhitt, McNamara, pp. 83-85; Roherty, Decisions of Robert S.
McNamara, pp. 67-71; Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough?, pp. 31-32; Kinnard, Secretary of Defense, p. 79.


18. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises, pp. 8-9; Kinnard, Secretary of Defense, pp. 81-82. Former Secretary of Defense McNamara had no recollection of this meeting (Int, McNamara by Raines, 5 Dec 85, JCS Reform project file, CMH).

On 11 December 1968 President-elect Richard M. Nixon announced his selection for secretary of defense--Representative Melvin R. Laird. A forty-six-year-old, eight-term congressman from Wisconsin, Laird was the third-ranking Republican on the House Appropriations Committee and the second-ranking minority member on its Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. Laird had made a special study of defense organization while a member of the House--an interest that he thought helped make him qualified to take up his new post. The press focused more on his reputation as being the most knowledgeable member of his party in the House on defense spending. Secretary McNamara was reputed to regard him as "his most formidable Congressional adversary and his toughest interrogator in hearings." Many of the policies that Laird inaugurated as secretary of defense contained an implicit criticism of the McNamara regime.

The theme of change permeated Laird's first press conference in December 1968 when he was still a secretary of defense designate. He announced that he intended to reappraise the "defense establishment and defense policy, and the organization of the Department of Defense." In making this statement Laird was but redeeming a pledge made by the president-elect during the campaign, one urged on him by Laird and Robert F. Froehlke, who became the assistant secretary of defense for administration under Laird. In July, with President Nixon's approval, Laird established the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, also known as the Fitzhugh Panel. The composition of the panel was unlike that of any of the commissions which preceded it. Only Wilfred J. McNeil, a retired rear admiral who served as assistant secretary of defense (comptroller) from 1949 until 1959, had any firsthand experience with defense organization. The chairman, Gilbert Fitzhugh, was the chairman of the board of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. He had never served in the armed forces. He, rather than McNeil, served as the model for the remaining members. "The members were chosen," Laird noted, "because we did not want people with a narrow Defense Department viewpoint...." The administration wanted "people who had broad experience in business, labor, and civic affairs."

The membership testified to the secretary of defense's well-developed
political skills. By 1969 the war in Vietnam was highly unpopular with the American public. The conflict in turn brought the institutions charged with its conduct into disrepute. The prestige and trust the public previously gave to the men connected with founding the Department of Defense, men such as Senator Symington, largely vanished. The failure of the assumptions behind containment to adequately explain conditions in Vietnam suggested to some critics of the policy that there was a need to address the broader issue of containment as a way of conducting foreign relations with the Soviet Union. Academic revisionists on the origins of the Cold War suggested that the United States was at least equally to blame with the Soviet Union for starting the Cold War. The policymakers who enjoyed expert status on questions of defense organization were also members, in the view of their critics, of the somewhat sinister "elite" that had given America the Cold War and Vietnam.³

In these circumstances, Secretary Laird's appointment of a committee expert in almost every area but defense constituted, perhaps, the only method of ensuring that the public perceived the effort as genuine and not self-serving. Because Laird achieved his own well-deserved status as a defense expert only after years of hard work, his selections for the panel raised the issue of what he expected to come out of its deliberations. Did he expect to obtain a series of recommendations that he could implement, or did he perhaps simply hope to reassure the public that he would identify and correct problems in his department? What little evidence that exists suggests that he hoped for both. That Laird saw a panel composed largely of businessmen as competent to address the issue of defense organization also suggests that he, like McNamara and Wilson, saw the problem as one of management rather than command. In this, at least, the new secretary was much closer to his predecessor than his much publicized criticisms of McNamara suggested.

While the Fitzhugh Panel deliberated, Secretary Laird introduced what he called "participatory management." He relied on the Joint Chiefs to design the force structure. Laird, unlike McNamara, provided the Joint Chiefs with detailed budgetary guidance so that its proposals were realistic. Civilian systems analysts evaluated military requests, but they no longer developed independent proposals as they had done under McNamara. Laird's successor, Elliott L. Richardson, eventually downgraded the rank of the head of the
systems analysis office from assistant secretary to director. Then in 1974 Richardson's successor, James R. Schlesinger, restored the rank of assistant secretary to the post. It has been up and down in status ever since. At no time, however, has the office wielded the power that it did in the McNamara Pentagon.4

The result of Laird's budgetary innovations was that, on the average, Laird only reduced military requests by 4 percent before he submitted the department's budget request to Congress; the comparable figure for McNamara was almost 22 percent. When Laird did overrule a request by the military, he did it on the basis of what he called a "net assessment"--a combination of political, fiscal, and military rationales. In contrast, McNamara had never hesitated to overrule the Joint Chiefs on strictly military grounds--setting his military judgment against their judgment. Laird also encouraged the services to appeal his decisions so long as they argued cases on their merits and did not do so at the expense of another service. McNamara had discouraged such efforts.5

"Participatory management" significantly decreased the level of tension that existed between the civilians in the Pentagon and the military; but other events related to Vietnam created other kinds of strains in the department. Secretary Laird was much more aware of the lack of popular support for the war than either President Nixon or his National Security Adviser, Dr. Henry Kissinger. On this basis, Laird opposed the operations into Cambodia and Laos and supported rapid "Vietnamization." On at least two occasions the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, and his successor, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, received instructions from the White House with the admonition not to inform the secretary of defense. Whether because the secretary of defense did not know of the president's decisions or because he did not agree with them, Laird often issued orders to the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, General Creighton W. Abrams, that contradicted orders coming directly from the White House (often from Dr. Kissinger speaking in the president's name). Kissinger, by dint of his skill at bureaucratic in-fighting, became, in the view of the Army vice chief of staff, the de facto chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Laird failed to appreciate this poaching in his domain; the two men remained rivals until Laird
retired by prearrangement after President Nixon's reelection in 1972. The upshot was that Abrams had to cope with three sources of direction: the White House, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the normal Joint Chiefs of Staff chain of command. The possibilities in such a situation for confusion and working at cross purposes is so evident as to require no further comment.6

This was the organizational context in which the Fitzhugh Panel submitted its report to President Nixon on 1 July 1970. The panel received a broad charter to study the organization and management of the Department of Defense and to prepare a report enumerating recommended changes. It made 113 recommendations on a wide range of subjects. Only four dealt specifically with the reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while a few others decisively influenced the institutional environment in which the Joint Chiefs operated. The most important of the recommendations dealing with institutional environment proposed to divide the functions of the Department of Defense into three major groupings: management of personnel and material resources; evaluation, including financial controls, weapons testing, and cost effectiveness analysis; and military operations, including operational command, intelligence, and communications. (See Chart 17.) Each grouping, said the panel, should report to the secretary of defense through its own deputy secretary, one of whom should act as the principal assistant to the secretary, outranking all other members of the department except the secretary himself.7

In the first grouping, resources management, the deputy secretary of defense for management of resources would oversee the military departments, which would "continue under the immediate supervision of their Secretaries"; the Defense Supply Agency; the Advanced Research Projects Agency; and three functional areas. The panel grouped research and advanced technology, engineering development, installations, and procurement in one functional area. Manpower and reserve affairs constituted the second, while health and environmental affairs made up the third. The panel recommended that an assistant secretary of defense head each functional area.

In the second grouping, evaluation, the deputy secretary of defense for evaluation received responsibility for the comptroller function, including internal audit and inspection services, program and force analysis (a modification of the existing systems analysis unit under the assistant secretary
Chart 17 - The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Proposal, 1970

President ----> Secretary of Defense ----> Joint Chiefs of Staff

Secretary of Defense ----> Deputy Secretary of Defense for Operations

Joint Staff ----> Chief Military Operations

Operations Staff

Unified Commands

Specified Commands

Chain of Command

Channel of Command

The third grouping, operations, was the most important in terms of the future role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the panel's opinion, the secretary of defense should delegate to the deputy secretary of defense for military operations the responsibility for unified commands, operational requirements, intelligence, telecommunications (to include computers), international security affairs, and two agencies--the Defense Communications Agency and the Civil Defense Agency. The panel wanted to remove the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the operational channel of command and replace it with a chief of military operations assisted by a staff.

In another Joint Chiefs of Staff-related recommendation, the panel proposed to establish three new unified commands--Strategic Command, Tactical Command, and Logistics Command. The Strategic Command would consist of the Strategic Air Command, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, the Continental Air Defense Command (enlarged by abolishing the Alaskan Command and receiving its strategic defense forces and missions), and Fleet Ballistic Missile Operations. The Tactical Command would consist of all general purpose forces assigned to combatant commands. It would have three subcommands--European Command, Pacific Command (enlarged by receiving general purpose forces and missions from Alaskan Command), and an unnamed command formed by merging Atlantic Command, Strike Command, and Southern Command. The Logistics Command would be a unified services of supply for the military. Although much more detailed, the panel's proposal to reorganize unified commands along functional as opposed to the existing geographic lines was very similar to a recommendation by the Symington Committee in 1960. The major divergence lay in the panel's proposal for a logistics command in place of the committee's Reserve Command.

In still another Joint Chiefs of Staff-related recommendation, the panel proposed to increase the influence and responsibility of unified commanders concerning resource allocations by giving them "express responsibility and capability for making recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Operations." Finally, the panel urged the reduction of the Joint Staff from 400 to 250 officers and the transfer of the 150 staff officers previously with the
Joint Staff to the office of the deputy for military operations.

The panel's most significant recommendation was to formally remove the Joint Chiefs from the operational channel of command and replace it with a chief of military operations. The chief of military operations, supported by an operations staff drawn from the joint and service staffs, would report directly to a proposed deputy secretary of defense for operations. The operational channel of command would then run from the president to the secretary of defense, to the deputy secretary of defense for operations, to the chief of military operations, to the unified and specified commands. The panel argued that the Joint Chiefs of Staff's "committee" system of decision making would never be responsive enough during an international crisis. This suggestion was similar to the Army position in November 1957 that proposed a director of joint military operations but left the Joint Chiefs in the channel of command and responsibility. Fitzhugh was not certain who should fill the chief of military operations position. He mentioned that it could be the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or another officer selected by the president and the secretary of defense.

No detailed statement of the Army position on the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Panel survives, although General Bruce Palmer, Jr., the Army vice chief of staff from 1968 until 1973, remembers that the Army Staff prepared a detailed response to the Fitzhugh report. The Army Staff rejected the suggestion for the establishment of three new unified commands as unnecessary. It simply represented an additional headquarters layer between Washington and the field. The staff also opposed creation of a chief of military operations. Instead it favored strengthening the position of the chairman, as did Palmer. The only major internal difference in the Army arose over the question of establishing the post of deputy secretary of defense for operations. Palmer and Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor disagreed. Resor rather liked the idea of a civilian deputy secretary of defense for operations. Palmer objected that there were already too many civilians in the chain of command. He would have preferred to have the chairman deal directly with the president ---a reversion to the World War II command structure. 8

The war in Vietnam also placed a check on reform impulses in the Army Staff. General Palmer described the situation succinctly in a memorandum for
the Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, in early September 1970: "Certainly much can be said for the argument that the changing threat, unsettled conditions in many areas of the world such as SE Asia, ME and Latin America, reductions in our own forces world-wide, and the evolving implications of the Nixon doctrine all combine to make this an inopportune time to be changing our command structure."

On 1 September 1970 Acting Secretary of the Army Thaddeus R. Beal made the Army's official response to the secretary of defense on the report of the Blue Ribbon Panel. Beal informed Laird that the report did not provide "a persuasive rationale" for the extensive reform of the command structure that it proposed. The Army, therefore, opposed the recommendation. Beal also told the secretary of defense that he did not believe that the unified commands could adequately influence force structure and force modernization as proposed by the Fitzhugh Panel. "The operational planning horizon for a unified command is about eighteen months away. The unified command can look that far ahead, but they cannot look seven to ten years ahead as required for defining requirements for new weapons systems," he warned. In Beal's view, to do so would require extensive and costly increases in the staffs of the unified commands and would not be cost effective.

Even though all the services opposed the organizational reforms advocated by the Fitzhugh Panel, Secretary Laird established a Blue Ribbon Action Committee to implement decisions by the secretary of defense on the recommendations of the Fitzhugh report. Lt. Gen. William E. Depuy, the assistant vice chief of staff, represented the Army on the committee until mid-September when Maj. Gen. David S. Parker, the chairman of the Special Review Panel in the Office of the Chief of Staff looking into the organization of the Department of the Army, succeeded him. Froehlke, the assistant secretary of defense for administration and later secretary of the Army, chaired the action committee.

Very early the committee's function changed from that of oversight of implementation to serving as "a sounding board on which to bounce off recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel." Froehlke, speaking for the secretary, asked the committee members to give their personal opinions as distinguished from the positions of their services. The committee members
made it perfectly clear that in most cases their opinion would be that of their parent Service." In the committee meeting of 24 September, General Parker vigorously opposed the establishment of a chief of military operations as a separate entity from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as did the other three service representatives. Froehlke noted that Secretary Laird intended to "dual hat" Admiral Moorer into the position of chief of military operations, but the secretary of defense did not want to bind future secretaries of defense to a dual-hat solution. All the service representatives thought that a separate chief of military operations would cause "considerably more staffing and a far less efficient operation."12

Secretary of Defense Laird announced at a press conference in the fall of 1970 that he would remove the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the operational channel of command and designate the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the "sole link" between himself and the unified combat commanders. (See Chart 18.) Laird did not think that legislation was necessary on this issue: "We feel if we move forward that we can effectively administer the department within the present provisions of the law, and we are not going to Congress at this time for a change in the law."13

When the Department of Defense finally issued the promised directive in December 1971, the changes proved much more modest than those so confidently announced by Secretary Laird over a year earlier. The directive defined the chain of command as running "from the President to the Secretary of Defense and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands." In executing nuclear war plans and other operations requiring a quick reaction time, the channel of communication would run from the National Command Authority, that is, from those individuals authorized to initiate nuclear operations (the president and the secretary of defense "or their duly deputized alternates or successors"), through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, representing the Joint Chiefs, to the commanders of the unified and specified commands.14

The recommendation to reduce the Joint Staff from 400 to 250 officers died when Secretary Laird decided not to implement the recommendation for a chief of military operations with an operations staff. He also took no action on the establishment of the three new unified commands recommended by
Fitzhugh or in augmenting the staffs in those commands. The proposal to create three deputy secretaries of defense also never went beyond the proposal stage although Laird obtained a second deputy secretary, duties unspecified, in 1972.15

The changes in the channel of command announced by Laird in the fall of 1970 promised to give the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibilities independent of his position on the Joint Chiefs. However, the directive issued in 1971 did no such thing. It further defined the role of the chairman in a crisis, but his prerogatives remained dependent upon his membership in the Joint Chiefs. The result was an incremental increase in the formal power of the chairman, but the fact that the Department of Defense directive simply authorized a procedure that the chiefs had followed since 1961 made the change more cosmetic than substantive. The reform that Laird proposed in 1970 probably merited the comment that it was a major step toward creating a single chief of staff of the armed forces. Laird's proposal would have made the chairman the de facto chief of staff to the secretary of defense for the unified and specified commands, the role played since 1958 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a collective entity. The 1971 directive, in contrast, was decidedly not revolutionary. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Blue Ribbon Panel's report had absolutely no impact on the channel of command.16

The paucity of evidence surrounding the Army's response to the Blue Ribbon Panel's proposal makes most speculation about motives profitless. The Army's position on the unified commands proposed by the group is entirely consistent with the skepticism and sometimes outright opposition by the authors of the studies that critiqued the similar proposal by the Symington Committee in 1960. Concerning the issue of unified command and control, however, there is a break in continuity between the Army's 1970 position and earlier Army positions. In 1957 the Army proposed a director of joint military operations, but in 1970, when the Fitzhugh Panel proposed much the same position under a different name, the Army opposed it. The context in which the two proposals were made, however, differed significantly. The late 1950s was a time of intense interservice rivalry. In 1970 the principal cleavage was not between the services as in the Eisenhower administration or between the civilians and the military as under Secretary McNamara but between civilians--Secretary Laird
and Dr. Kissinger and their staffs--over the control of U.S. policy toward Vietnam. In this bureaucratic battle the Joint Chiefs and General Abrams often found themselves in the middle. From this politically explosive reality the Fitzhugh Panel was shielded--either by design or by its members' own general lack of experience in government. The panel's conclusions, consequently, simply ignored the most pressing organizational issues that the Joint Chiefs faced--the need for consistent, unambiguous political guidance from the secretary of defense and the president, and a certain modicum of respect by those officials for the chain of command. The panel's report was simply superfluous and Generals Westmoreland and Palmer treated it that way. There was, after all, a war in progress.

While on the surface there was a certain inconsistency between the Army's position in 1957 and its position in 1970, there was a deeper consistency between 1945 and 1970. In 1957 the Army opted for a director of joint military operations at the same time that it sought to emasculate the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1970 the Army Staff opposed a chief of military operations but advocated a stronger chairman. Even the channel of command suggested by Secretary Laird in 1970 would have been much closer to the one proposed by General Collins in 1945 than the one envisioned in the Army's 1957 position. In the end, of course, the report of the Blue Ribbon Panel produced few changes.

The next major reform proposal surfaced eight years later. The long hiatus can be explained by the importance that the civilian and military leaders accorded to other issues, the transient nature of their tenures, and the personal interests of the men involved. The Army spent the next few years concerned with disengaging from Vietnam, making the transition from a largely conscript to an all volunteer force, and adjusting its doctrine to focus once more on a major war in Europe. Once General Westmoreland retired, none of the Joint Chiefs served a full four years until the very end of the decade. General Palmer served briefly as acting chief of staff while General Abrams' confirmation was pending in the Senate. Abrams died after only two years in office. His successor, General Frederick C. Weyand, retired from the service after two years. General Bernard W. Rogers, who followed Weyand, became Supreme Allied Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1979 after
three years as chief of staff. All these men, but particularly General Abrams who tended to ignore the "joint arena," concentrated on internal Army issues.

Winding down the war, the vocal public opposition to the strategy of disengagement pursued by the Nixon administration, detente, and Watergate consumed the attention of President Nixon. Dr. Kissinger became secretary of state in the second Nixon administration and the true vicar of American foreign policy as Watergate took up more of the president's attention and eventually led to his resignation and replacement by Gerald R. Ford, a vice president who had not even been on the Republican ticket in 1972. Ford's own strengths lay in domestic politics and he depended heavily upon the secretary of state for advice. Even if Kissinger had desired to advocate reform of the Joint Chiefs, his attempt to hold all the policy threads in his own hands kept him shuttling from crisis to crisis. There was likewise little job security for secretaries of defense once Laird departed: Richardson held the post for only six months before becoming attorney general; Schlesinger served less than two and a half years; and Donald H. Rumsfeld, who succeeded him, remained in office approximately only fourteen months. Schlesinger, who served the longest, was primarily a strategist and had little interest in reorganization. The advent of a new administration changed these conditions and reopened the debate on reform.17
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER VIII


4. Korb, Fall and Rise of the Pentagon, pp. 85-92; Cole et al., Department of Defense, pp. 239-240; Ltr, Alfred Goldberg to Lt. Col. Robert Frank, 16 Sep 85, JCS Reform project files, CMH.


8. Int, Palmer by Raines, 20 Sep 85, JCS Reform project files, CMH.

9. Memo, Palmer for Westmoreland, 4 Sep 70, sub: Highlights of 4 Sep JCS Meeting, Bruce Palmer, Jr., Mss, MHI.

10. Memo, Beal for Laird, 1 Sep 70, sub: Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report, JCS Reform project files, CMH.


13. L. Edgar Prina, "Toward a Single Chief of Staff," Navy Magazine, XIII (Oct 1970): 37. Prina uses the phrase "chain of command" in the article, but the context clearly indicates that he meant "channel of command."


President Carter and the 1978 Department of Defense Reorganization Attempts

President Jimmy Carter attained the White House in 1976 by denying that he was a politician and running against the government he sought to lead. Reorganization of the government—to include the Department of Defense—was one of the items on his reform agenda. On 20 September 1977, he directed Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to devise plans to study three major areas in his department: defense management structure, the national military command structure, and defense resource management.1

Brown established three study groups, one for each area, headed by Paul Ignatius, Richard Steadman, and Donald B. Rice, respectively. Unlike Laird, Brown turned to men who had first-hand experience with the Department of Defense. Like Brown himself, the study group leaders were all veterans of the McNamara management team at defense. Ignatius, the president of the Air Traffic Association, had served as assistant secretary of the Army, 1961-1963; under secretary of the Army, 1964; assistant secretary of defense, 1964-1967; and secretary of the Navy, 1967-1969. Steadman, a partner in J. H. Whitney and Company of New York, had held the post of deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia and Pacific affairs, 1966-1969. Rice, the president of the RAND Corporation, had been the director of Cost Analysis, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1967-1969, and deputy assistant secretary of defense for resource analysis, 1969-1970.2

The Ignatius Study Group finished its report, "The Defense Management Structure Study," in the summer of 1978. Although not focused on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it did make three recommendations that had a minor impact on that organization. First, the study proposed the establishment of a long range planning office that emphasized coordination between the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the under secretary of defense for policy. Secretary Brown had only the year before convinced Congress to establish this position and that of the under secretary of defense for research and engineering in place of the second deputy secretary of defense position that Secretary Laird had secured. The under secretaries ranked between the remaining deputy secretary of
defense and the various assistant secretaries. While the under secretary of defense for research and engineering handled hardware problems, the under secretary of defense for policy dealt with the non-hardware issues related to international affairs. Both the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs and the director of net assessment, the official that prepared estimates of the relative strengths of foreign and American forces, reported to the under secretary of defense for policy. The study group believed that the need to coordinate the under secretary's efforts and the preparation of plans by the Joint Chiefs was clearly evident.

The group also suggested use of the Armed Forces Policy Council as originally chartered to provide the secretary of defense with regular advice toward the formulation of defense policy. Recently council meetings had included up to forty people and were used to pass information rather than to establish policy. Ignatius thought the meetings should be limited to the secretary of defense and his nine principal subordinates. Finally, the study group advocated continued reduction of headquarters staffs by greater dependence on subordinate commands.

On 13 July 1978 the administrative assistant to the secretary of the Army, John G. Connell, Jr., asked the members of the Army Secretariat and the Army Staff to review the recommendations of the Ignatius Study Group. The differences between the two groups on issues related to the organization of the Joint Chiefs proved inconsequential. Connell's office forwarded the comments to Secretary of the Army Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., in August and then began work on a consolidated Army position on each issue. Secretary Alexander, after personally reviewing these comments, prepared the Army's final position. He considered the establishment of a long range planning office to have "merit." He warned, however, that the emphasis should be placed on policy rather than planning. Coordination between the under secretary for policy and the director of the Joint Staff was more appropriate than with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Alexander also concurred with the recommendation about the Armed Forces Policy Council but mentioned that it should also be used by the service secretaries and Joint Chiefs to present service issues to the secretary of defense for discussion and decision. Alexander believed that this suggestion was worthy of immediate implementation. He did not agree with
further Army Staff reductions and requested that the subject be dropped.⁴

The first two recommendations were significant because they represented an attempt to increase the participation of the military departments in defense policy making, an effort to reverse a trend that dated back to Secretary of Defense Wilson in the 1950s. They remained, however, only attempts. Secretary Brown took no action on the three recommendations.

The Steadman Study Group (See Chart 19) completed its report, "The National Military Command Structure Study," at the same time as the Ignatius group finished its report. The group saw its goal as "improving the professional military advice to the National Command Authority and insuring that their voice is more adequately heard in decisions of important national security issues." The report grouped recommendations into two categories: "Organization for War Fighting" and "Policy, Plans, and Advice." The first area divided naturally into three components: the relation between the unified and specified commands and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs, and the secretary of defense; command and control; and rearranging the existing unified and specified commands.⁵

In the first subcategory, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the secretary of defense, argued the study group, should review the Unified Command Plan—the plan setting forth the boundaries and missions of the unified commands—every two years. The Joint Chiefs should recommend and the secretary of defense should select commanders for the unified commands from the best qualified officers considering the missions and forces assigned the commands rather than solely on the basis of service affiliation of the officer. In particular the group urged that the secretary and Joint Chiefs take into account the "political-diplomatic" role of the unified commanders when making the selections to fill these positions. The unified commanders needed to have a greater voice in determining the requirements of the forces under their commands. The secretary of defense should designate the chairman of the Joint Chiefs to serve as his agent for supervising the activities of the unified and specified commanders and transmit all orders to them through the chairman, who would consult with the Joint Chiefs if time permitted. (The Joint Chiefs would still continue to act as the immediate military staff for the secretary). At the same time, the Steadman group recommended that the secretary give the chairman,
as the representative of the unified commanders within the Department of Defense headquarters, a formal role in resource allocation planning and decisions. It called attention to the need for an improved readiness reporting procedure. It advocated that the Office of the Secretary of Defense, working in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs and the services, conduct a review of the current system and design a new one that would provide the secretary "with detailed, thorough, and well articulated information on readiness and force deficiency correction."

Turning to the second section--command and control--the Steadman group concentrated on wartime crisis management. It argued that the chain of command "should be clearly enunciated at the outset" without indicating whether the secretary of defense or the president should do the "enunciating." All bypassed elements should be kept informed of the situation. "There should be no confusion as to the proper flow of communications and the locus of responsibility." Concurrently, National Command Authority decisions, opined the group, should always be followed up in writing. (The group's fondness for the passive voice obscured to whom the responsibility would fall.) It recommended, in addition, the establishment of a feedback mechanism to ensure that decision makers knew the implementation status. It further advocated a series of command post exercises to test the ability of the National Military Command System to function during crises. Senior-level policymakers, it thought, should be encouraged to attend.

The group addressed the existing unified and specified commands in the third subcomponent of the "organization for war fighting" section of its report. It accepted the general efficacy of the system and concentrated mainly on details, although it made the general observation that there was no need for unified commands to cover all the areas of the world. It urged that the Department of Defense conduct a special study to identify redundancies in the functions and personnel of the component commands in unified commands. Excesses should be eliminated. The Steadman group believed that the Middle East should remain a responsibility of the European Command. It should continue to plan for and be prepared to execute contingency operations in that region or to support a unified command especially set up for a crisis that would report either directly to Washington or to the European Command. Further, the
Chiefs should consider the advantages of establishing a permanent subunified command for the Middle East. Subsahara Africa, however, should not be assigned to the European Command.

The group recommended no changes in the presently assigned areas and responsibilities of the U.S. Atlantic Command, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the U.S. Southern Command, but did recommend that the Joint Chiefs review the command arrangements of U.S. maritime forces in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean to determine if they were adequate. It did not believe that the Army component command for the U.S. Pacific Command should be revived (it had been disestablished in the reduction of the Army following the Vietnam War) "unless a convincing argument is made that this would be demonstrably more effective than present arrangements." The group also called for a review of "planning, practices, and attitudes regarding crisis/wartime command arrangements" with respect to U.S. Forces, Korea. It espoused the principle of flexibility—that nothing should be done with respect to command arrangements that would prevent either continuation of the current system in a crisis or direct control from Washington.

The group recommended the most striking changes with regard to the U.S. Readiness Command. It proposed that the secretary of defense designate the Readiness Command as the focal point for day-to-day coordination of mobilization and deployment planning for all the unified and specified commands. The command should have greater Navy and Marine participation on its staff and in joint exercises. The Department of Defense, in the judgment of the group, should give the command a greater role in the development of joint doctrine.

Next, the report turned to the recommendations that it collected under the heading "policy, plans, and advice." Whereas the previous section had dealt—in broad terms—with policy implementation through the chain of command, this section considered policy formulation in Washington. As in "Organizing for War Fighting," the recommendations in this section fell into three subcategories: policy direction; the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff; and the role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The study group attached a discussion of National Military Advisers at the end of the report.

Policy direction focused on the interaction between the secretariat in the
Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Steadman group—still maintaining the imprecision inherent in the passive voice—proposed that "specific national security policy guidance, which sets objectives our forces should be capable of attaining, should be provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff but without undue detail about how they are to be attained." It called for the secretary of defense, his deputy, and a few key assistants to review current military plans on a regular basis. Like the Ignatius group, Steadman and his associates addressed the relationship between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the under secretary for policy. They sought the same end by making the under secretary responsible for "ensuring" that contingency plans prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff reflected "national security policy and objectives."

The second subcategory focused on the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff. The study group urged that the Joint Chiefs revise the procedures by which contingency plans were prepared "to make the Joint Staff alone responsible for the authorship of JCS papers." Studies by the Joint Staff should present, when appropriate, a "comprehensive analysis" of alternatives. The group wanted to encourage the "expression of differing views" inside the Department of Defense. The Joint Chiefs should provide high-level guidance to the Joint Staff at the beginning of the planning process. Given the importance of the work of the Joint Staff, the group recommended that the service chiefs select for it "their most outstanding and highly qualified officers." It further recommended that the secretary should give the chairman the power to obtain the assignment to the Joint Staff of any desired officer.

The third subsection focused on the powers of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which the study group wanted to increase. It called upon the secretary of defense to make the chairman "responsible for providing military advice from a national viewpoint on program and budget issues" and a voting member of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council. The chairman, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the under secretary for policy, should manage "an annual study, analysis, and gaming program" to clarify and resolve major issues, in the areas of joint military strategy, force planning, and resource allocation. The study group called for the chairman to receive sufficient Joint Staff support "to make broad program and budget judgments."
Finally, the study group considered the establishment of a group of national military advisers. It recommended that the president "consider" establishment of such an entity if either the Department of Defense failed to implement the recommendations or, once implemented, the recommendations proved inadequate in improving the quality of military advice or increasing the military's role in decision making.

The Army followed the same procedure in replying to the Steadman report as it used in responding to the Ignatius report. In fact, Secretary of the Army Alexander used the same memorandum to Secretary of Defense Brown to present the Army position on both. Most of his substantive comments dealt with the Ignatius group's report; the accompanying digest of Army views prepared by Connell's office carried the argument on the Steadman report.6

The Connell digest recorded considerable agreement between the Army and the Steadman Study Group on the relations between the unified and specified commands and the secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Disagreements and qualified agreements centered on three of the group's seven recommendations in the subsection: the selection of the best qualified officers to command unified commands, the role of the commanders in determining the requirement for their commands, and the part played by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in resource allocation planning. The Army argued that flexibility already existed in selecting the most qualified commanders for unified commands and that, when the Department of Defense gave consideration to the mission and force structure of the commands as the Steadman group recommended, the same individuals would be selected. Consequently, the Army, while agreeing with the group's objective, saw no need to alter the existing system. The Connell digest argued that the commanders of the unified and specified commands had "a voice" in determining their requirements through their quarterly reports to the secretary of defense. The only area in which the Army supported an expanded role for the commanders was in decisions that affected the readiness of their forces. As a consequence the Army envisioned no role for the commanders in long range planning or research and development. Reflecting the Army's attitude on the role of the commanders, its position on the chairman's "formal role in resource allocation and planning" stressed the limitations on that role while agreeing "in principle"
with the study groups. The Army argued that his role should consist of identifying "key areas of risk" in the ability of current and projected forces to carry out national military strategy; determining "the degree and relative importance of those key areas of risk"; and recommending a distribution of resources in the light of this analysis. The Army emphasized that it did not want to enhance the role of the chairman at the expense of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Any formalization of the Chairman's role should ensure the preservation of the ability of the JCS (including the Chairman) to carry out their statutory responsibility for providing military advice--responsible but unfettered."

The discussion of command and control resulted in virtually complete agreement. In one case, the Army amplified rather than qualified a Steadman group proposal. The Army not only accepted the need for a clear chain of command in a crisis but requested that, in particular, any reform "clearly define" the role of the U.S. ambassador to the country at the center of the crisis.

The group's long and detailed discussion of existing unified and specified commands also met with general approbation from the Army. It qualified its agreement or deferred taking a position on five of fifteen recommendations in this area. The Army agreed with the need to eliminate redundancy at component command headquarters but steadfastly opposed any changes that would cause "a loss of operational capability for planning, command and control, equipping, supporting, or transitioning forces from peace to war." With respect to specific commands, the Army regarded making the Middle East an area of responsibility for the European Command as an acceptable solution, not an optimal one, as the Steadman group did. The Army preferred to restrict the European Command's area of responsibility to the territory of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the same limits that applied to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The group's insistence on "flexibility" for wartime command arrangements for both the Middle East and Korea worried the Army. While not opposed to flexibility in principle, it wanted command arrangements planned for and exercised in peacetime, not developed on the spur of the moment once war began. On the remaining two proposals the Army remained publicly noncommittal. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans proposed that the Army oppose the recommendation to not
reestablish the U.S. Army Pacific, but the position developed within the Army secretariat prevailed: "The re-establishment of the Army Component Command is being intensively studied and will be commented upon separately." The Army also called for "a full review of current joint doctrine responsibilities" before giving the Readiness Command "a broader, more active role" in developing joint doctrine.

In the policy direction portion of "Policy, Plans, and Advice," the Army agreed that the secretary of defense, the deputy secretary, and "selected key assistants" should regularly review current military operational planning, but only in broad terms. They would have to exercise care to avoid becoming involved "in detailed planning and execution." To maintain operational security, the Army wanted to limit the review to the minimum number with the "need to know." The Army wanted the phrase "key assistants" defined precisely before the Department of Defense acted on the recommendation. The Army also agreed with the study group that there was a "potential for positive interaction" between the under secretary for policy and the Joint Staff but called for a more detailed study of the issue than the group had conducted. The Army took the same position with regard to the under secretary's role in intelligence matters.

Regarding the Steadman group's proposals concerning relations of the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff, the Army took a more negative view. It argued that the current system of preparing Joint Staff papers made the Joint Staff responsible for authorship and saw no need for changes to encourage greater diversity of views. "Alternatives can be prepared under the current system...." The Army strongly opposed the idea that the Joint Staff alone should prepare joint papers or, in any manner, decrease service participation in the development of papers: "The Services must retain a strong voice in the joint decision process." The Army, while supporting the objective of securing highly qualified officers for the Joint Staff, disagreed with the method proposed by the study group: the service chiefs should send their most highly qualified staff officers to the Joint Staff. The Army thought the chairman should discuss the problem informally with the service chiefs and, if possible, secure their agreement to move outstanding officers from the service staffs to the Joint Staff. The Army did not want the chairman to get involved with "the business of the assignment of individual officers" and disagreed that the secretary of
defense should empower the chairman to obtain the assignment of any officer to the Joint Staff. In the Army's view, the assignment of staff officers to the Joint Staff should remain the exclusive prerogative of the service chiefs.

The recommendations in the final subsection on "Policy, Plans, and Advice"--the role of the chairman--received more qualified approval from the Army than the subsection on the Joint Chiefs and Joint Staff. The Army approved making the chairman more influential in high-level decisions "that affect the readiness and fighting capabilities of the armed forces" but not in other program and budget issues. In particular it did not want the chairman engaged "in routine program and budget management." For this reason it opposed making the chairman a voting member of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council. Over involvement in issues below the level of the secretary of defense, thought the Army, would diminish rather than expand the chairman's influence. Besides, the individual programs were "Service oriented." Given two provisions, the Army supported the idea that the Joint Staff should give the chairman "appropriate" support to enable him "to make broad program and budget judgments." First, the Joint Staff should provide this support out of its existing resources. Second, "continuing detailed input from the services" would remain "an essential part" in the growth of "a national viewpoint" on these issues. The same concern about service privileges cropped up in the recommendations about "an annual study, analysis, and gaming program." The chairman in conjunction with the under secretary for policy could provide "a loosely structured coordination of current study programs" provided that "care" was taken "to not inhibit Service oriented inquiry."

The Army quite agreed with the Steadman group about national military advisers. The Department of Defense should not even consider such an organization until it had carefully evaluated all the suggestions of the Ignatius and Steadman Study Groups. Secretary of the Army Alexander cautioned Secretary of Defense Brown that he should await the Rice report before implementing any of the recommendations in the two reports already finished.

The Rice Study Group completed its report in the spring of 1979. The only significant Joint Chiefs of Staff-related suggestion in the report was that the chairman become an "ex officio" member of a defense resources board that the group wanted established. The intent was to increase the chairman's and
perhaps the Joint Chiefs of Staff's participation in the resource allocation process. The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded formally to the Rice report, the Army apparently did not. It had already stated that the chairman should not be involved with routine programs and budget management.7

General David C. Jones, the chief of staff of the Air Force from July 1974 until June 1978, had only recently become the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time that the Ignatius and Steadman Study Groups made their reports. In a cover letter forwarding the Joint Chiefs' reaction, presented separately from the service position papers, Jones observed that there was nothing revolutionary in the reports: "As Dick Steadman points out, there are a number of things we can do to improve the institutional product of the joint system. I firmly believe, however, that the fundamental organizational structure is sound. I agree with Dick that there is no present need for dramatic change...."

Whereas Jones saw no need for dramatic change, Secretary Brown saw no need for almost any change. The secretary, reported the Armed Forces Journal International, regarded the three studies as demonstrating "that the Department works well...and that sufficient changes occurred in the Department prior to the commencement of the formal reorganization studies, and the Administration should take credit for these changes." While the White House was less than enthusiastic about the Ignatius and Rice reports, considerable support did exist for the Steadman report. White House Staff members regarded it as realistic and straight-forward; it identified genuine problems in their view and proposed practical solutions. In the end, however, the secretary of defense's attitude prevailed.8

Secretary Brown did agree with the recommendation to place the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council and tried to draw him into more resource allocation decisions. On 7 April 1979 Secretary Brown created the Defense Resources Board recommended by the Rice group. The board, chaired by the deputy secretary of defense, would "direct and supervise" the review in the Office of the Secretary of Defense of the service budget submissions and their Program Objective Memoranda, statements prepared by the services of their requirements and priorities for equipping, manning, training, and maintaining their respective
forces. (Program Objective Memoranda had been key documents in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System since its establishment by Secretary McNamara in the early 1960s.) The board was to examine "major issues raised in those reviews" and make its recommendations to the secretary of defense. The chairman or his designated representative, as in the recommendations of the Rice group, would serve as an ex officio member of the board. The secretary also followed the Steadman group's suggestions concerning the role of the under secretary for policy. In the main, however, very few changes resulted from the three studies. The seven million dollar Department of Defense reorganization effort directed by President Carter produced no legislative changes in the Joint Chiefs of Staff system.

General Jones' characterization of the Steadman report was more accurate than Secretary Brown's. The number of detailed proposals made by Steadman and his associates indicates that they accepted in broad terms the existing system. That their reforms were not revolutionary does not also indicate that they were trivial. The sections on the chairman and the Joint Staff, in particular, would have made significant changes in that position's power with regard to the services and how the staff operated. Steadman took seriously the charge that his group received to study ways in which to increase the influence of the military in decision making, although he clearly favored a certain kind of military perspective over others--joint opposed to service. Ignatius and Rice, to the extent that they touched on organizational issues, reinforced this tendency in the Steadman report. Three products of the McNamara Pentagon thus repudiated one of the major managerial innovations of their former leader. Unfortunately for the advocates of reform, a fourth alumnus of those years--the secretary of defense--did not.

The Army position in 1978 is interesting both in terms of how it was formulated and its content. Previously, the Army chief of staff and vice chief of staff played major roles in defining the Army position. The existing evidence--and this conclusion cannot be considered definitive because so much of the historical record did not survive--suggests that neither General Rogers nor the vice chief of staff, General Walter T. Kerwin, was much involved. Secretary of the Army Alexander played a much more important role than they, perhaps in part because the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a separate institution
developed its own position on reform.

Given the same qualifications about the evidence, a second generalization emerges. Previously, because of the timely guidance of its uniformed leaders, the Army Staff almost always went into reform debates with a logically consistent and well-developed Army position. The Army position in 1978 represented a compendium of the opinions of the Army Staff agencies and the Office of the Secretary of the Army, prepared as a reaction to an existing proposal—with all the strengths and weaknesses inherent in such a document. It lacked the broad view. The major thrust of the paper was a concern for preserving the prerogatives of the services, and particularly the Army, within the existing organizational frameworks. It was not true of all Army positions, only most of them. As such, it constituted the most clear-cut reversal by the Army of its position on unification since 1941. It did not seek to dismantle what had already been achieved; it simply declined to go forward.

As the Carter administration entered into its second half, inflation, fuel rationing, Afghanistan, and Iran came to consume the attention of policymakers. Joint Chiefs of Staff reform became less than an urgent interest. Only the arrival of a new administration revived its potency.
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER IX


Joint Chiefs of Staff Reform in the 1980s

Joint Chiefs of Staff reform proposals in the early 1980s came from two prominent military leaders. General Jones, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1978 until 1982, and General Edward C. Meyer, the chief of staff of the Army from 1979 until 1983, became the first active duty officers to initiate Joint Chiefs of Staff reform since General Collins introduced the War Department plan in 1945. In 1982 the two generals saw the moment as propitious to reconsider American command and control arrangements. The Reagan administration had entered into office the preceding year committed to rebuilding the nation's defenses. Reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff appeared to them as but another facet of a more general reform movement.

General Jones became convinced during 1980 that the joint system was "badly flawed" and in need of substantial reform. He took his concerns to Secretary of Defense Brown, who was "very supportive." After the election General Jones talked to the secretary of defense designate, Caspar W. Weinberger, who expressed interest in Jones' views and said that he looked forward to receiving his recommendations. Jones commissioned a study group headed by General Kerwin, now retired, to examine the joint organization and recommend any needed changes.

The Chairman's Special Study Group reported back to General Jones in April 1982. Numerous critics, observed the group, had identified the same basic problems in the joint system throughout its existence, but no one had succeeded in producing any fundamental changes since 1947. "It is evident that the JCS organization must be improved. The real questions are: How will it be changed? And by whom?" Generally, the study group recommended changes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could implement, provided the chiefs had the complete support of the president and the secretary of defense, without any additional legislation.

The Kerwin group's first proposal, to establish the position of vice chairman, did require congressional action. The vice chairman would chair the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, attend meetings of the Defense Resources Board, and act for the chairman "in all other ways" during his absence. Heretofore the acting chairmanship had fallen to the senior member...
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff present in Washington (or in the absence of the service chiefs their vice chiefs or operations deputies in that order). During one of General Jones' trips to Korea, as many as eleven officers served as acting chairman. The study group envisioned that either the chairman or the vice chairman would remain in Washington at all times.

The study group argued that the service chiefs lacked the time to adequately perform their service and their joint responsibilities. It proposed to lessen the service chiefs’ involvement in joint issues by eliminating from corporate consideration those that were of less importance—routine matters, questions that involved "intense conflict of interest problems for the Service Chiefs" (allocation issues), and problems of concern to only one or two services. The Joint Chiefs should permit the chairman to decide routine matters and those on which there was majority agreement within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When only one or two services were involved, the chairman should work directly with the chiefs of the services involved rather than bringing the issue up in a general meeting. In order to facilitate the candid exchange of views, the chairman should call more meetings in which only the principals, the service chiefs, or in their absence the service vice chiefs, were involved. Such an atmosphere would be more conducive to eventual compromise than the sorts of semipublic confrontations that characterized Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings in which action officers were present. The chairman and the service chiefs should report independently to the secretary of defense on all matters involving resource distribution. The Joint Chiefs should propose to the secretary of defense for his approval a method of identifying issues requiring the attention of the corporate body. The chairman would "then restrict JCS agendas to priority topics...." General Kerwin and his associates saw two benefits flowing from their proposal: Service chiefs could devote more time to service matters, and, when they did address joint issues, they would have the time to focus on them and make a substantial contribution.

Traditionally, the service chiefs relied on the service staffs when they dealt with joint issues. The service staffs even briefed their chiefs on joint issues prior to meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The study group proposed to "require the Joint Staff to brief, interact with, and prepare the Service Chiefs for JCS meetings, and to support the Chiefs generally in the resolution
of the Joint issues they address." To further this goal the group wanted the Joint Staff to author all joint papers rather than allowing service staffs to do so. The present procedure allowed service representatives to frame an issue under discussion in such a manner as to give their own service a decided advantage in the ensuing joint decision-making process. "Joint papers should be organized to present alternatives, and as a general rule, Service staff involvement should be to provide information and advice on issues, at the request of the Joint Staff." The study group suggested that the Joint Chiefs, as a transitional step, might establish four Service Chief Support Groups in the Joint Staff and assign one to each service chief. A "flag-rank" officer would head each study group. The groups would brief the chiefs in their preparations for Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings. Kerwin and his associates envisioned that the support groups would decrease the number of officers needed on the service staffs. The total number of officers dealing with joint matters would not increase, but their distribution would change. The service staffs would lose officers to the Joint Staff.

In a closely related issue, the study group proposed that the Joint Chiefs radically change the "practices and policies" of the Joint Staff that led to an overemphasis on building consensus and an underemphasis on sharply delineating the questions at issue and the differences between the services. "Concurrence as an overriding goal, particularly when applied to the multiple levels of staff in a large bureaucracy, more often than not will stifle good ideas." The chiefs should strive for unanimity only on exceptional issues.

While the Kerwin group acknowledged that many exceptional individuals served on the Joint Staff, the study group found that most members were not well prepared for their assignment. Consequently, it proposed to "improve the preparation and experience levels of Service officers assigned to the Joint Staff and other Joint activities such as the Unified Command headquarters" by creating a joint-duty career specialty open to officers with the rank of major in the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps and lieutenant commander in the Navy. The service chiefs would nominate and the chairman would approve officers for this specialty and their subsequent joint-duty assignments. They would attend joint schools--the Armed Forces Staff College, the National War College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces--and "serve primarily in Joint-duty
The study group suggested that about half of the positions on the Joint Staff and in other joint headquarters ought to be filled by officers with a joint-duty career specialty. Such a provision would allow a healthy mix of officers with a background in command to serve on joint staffs and ensure that no general staff on the Prussian model, isolated from conditions in the field, ever developed. Congress should remove the provisions of the United States Code that put limits on the number of times that an officer might serve on the Joint Staff and the duration of those tours. To prevent the services from discriminating against officers in a joint-duty career specialty, representatives of the Joint Staff and other major joint headquarters would sit on all service promotion boards selecting officers for promotion to lieutenant colonel in the Army, Air Force, and Marines and commander in the Navy and all higher grades. The boards would receive written guidance "that states explicitly that the selection process should (1) de-emphasize the advancement of the best officers in all specialties, including those in the Joint specialty, and (2) recognize the importance and value of Joint-duty experience and accomplishments." The study group recommended that the Joint Chiefs establish a program "for increasing the frequency of cross-Service assignments" so as to increase awareness in each service of "the characteristics, traditions, capabilities, and problems of the other Services." Finally, the Joint Chiefs ought to consider appointing a limited number of civilians to joint-duty positions "as a way to strengthen continuity and to provide expertise that may not be readily available within the career officer corps."

Turning to the unified and specified commands, the study group proposed that the Joint Chiefs include the commanders of those commands and their staffs in Joint Staff activities. Specifically, the Joint Chiefs should "establish regular working meetings" between themselves and the commanders of the unified and specified commands "to review draft DoD guidance regarding the programming and budgeting process, to review draft OSD and JCS policy guidance concerning military operation plans, and to review and assess the military operation plans (and their underlying military assumptions)" developed by the major combatant commands. The Kerwin group expected this greater interaction would enable the Joint Staff to better support the commanders of
the unified and specified commands. In the process the commanders would gain a clearer understanding of the intent and rationale for defense guidance. Informal give and take between the commanders and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would ensure "their thorough personal involvement" in the development of operational plans. Such meetings would also "forge a stronger link between the military planning process that identifies weaknesses in force capabilities and the DoD resource allocation process that should be aimed at correcting them." The study group noted parenthetically that one of the important advantages derived from creating the position of vice chairman was that it would allow the chairman or the vice chairman acting as his representative to visit the field often "and to participate extensively" with the commanders of the unified and specified commands "in operational planning and exercise activities."

Kerwin and his associates concluded that the Joint Staff itself needed "an organizational realignment" in order to better distribute the workload among the staff directorates and ensure that all functional areas received "proper coverage and integration." They identified the problem but did not propose any specific solutions.

Finally, the study group strongly endorsed a proposal made by the Board of Visitors of the National Defense University. The university should establish a resident course on joint matters that the secretary of defense should require "all newly selected general and flag officers of the line" to attend. The course would "increase their sensitivity to and knowledge of Joint matters," an objective that the study group considered important "regardless of their future assignments." Furthermore, the course would help build "lasting personal relationships" across service lines among a group of officers from whom would come future service chiefs and unified and specified commanders.

Once Congress, the secretary of defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted these reforms, the study group recommended that the Joint Chiefs commission two further studies: a review of the curricular objectives of the three colleges within the National Defense University to determine whether they were "consistent with the needs of the Joint community" and an analysis of the Unified Command concept to determine what changes were needed to strengthen the role of the commander "both in planning and operations." The
study group believed that the latter should focus on "the relationships between the Unified Command headquarters and the Component command headquarters, and between the Unified Command headquarters and the JCS, including particularly the Joint Staff."

The recommendations of the Kerwin group were similar in approach, if not in content, to Hoelscher's proposal in 1961. Like Hoelscher, the study group accepted the framework established by the 1958 legislation. It concentrated on changing procedures rather than structure. Such an approach proved something of an anomaly in 1982. While General Jones accepted many of the study group's procedural reforms, he put more emphasis on structure.

General Jones followed the deliberations of the study group closely. He made his ideas about Joint Chiefs of Staff reform public even before Kerwin and his associates submitted their final report to him. Jones first presented his views to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who, as he expected, could not agree on the subject. He then prepared an article, published in the March 1982 issue of the Armed Forces Journal International, setting forth his personal conclusions on the matter.6

General Jones, quoting liberally from previous studies, argued that the most serious deficiencies in the joint system derived from four major problems. First, responsibility and authority were diffused both in Washington and the field.7 In the field the commanders of the major commands, particularly the unified commands, had great authority in wartime, but in peacetime they had little authority or influence. "The MacArthurs and the Eisenhowers and the Nimitzs of tomorrow have little say as to what goes on."8 All the elements of influence for the component commands of the unified commands--men, machines, money, and promotions--flowed from their service chiefs in Washington rather than from their unified commanders. In Washington the problem derived from the attempt to run things with committees, a task at which committees were "notoriously poor."

Second, Jones argued that in contrast to the oral face-to-face advice that the Joint Chiefs provided to the president and the secretary of defense, their corporate written advice, the formal statements prepared by the Joint Staff, was "not crisp, timely, very useful, or very influential."9 This kind of advice was often crafted with the primary objective of obtaining unanimity so that
recommendations were "watered down" and issues were "papered over." As a consequence, the president and the secretary of defense often looked elsewhere for recommendations that ought to have come from the military.¹⁰

Third, "individual service interests" often dominated the recommendations and actions of the Joint Chiefs "at the expense of broader national interests."¹¹ This was "the spokesman-statesman" dilemma that faced service chiefs as a result of the "dual hatted" nature of their job; they were the representatives of their services and at the same time charged with giving advice from a broad national perspective. While service chiefs did disregard their staffs on specific issues, to do so on a regular basis or on fundamental issues "was to risk losing the support essential for carrying out service responsibilities." Jones illustrated the problem with an anecdote:

One former Chief relates that during a joint meeting, a Service action officer (a major) handed him a note which said, "General, under no condition can you agree to the third paragraph." This incident is representative of a phenomenon which has often been called "the tyranny of the action officer." However, that phrase tends to obscure a significant point: The major was expressing the viewpoint of a large and unforgiving bureaucracy.¹²

Distribution issues—whether of resources or missions—heightened the tendency of the chiefs to advocate service positions. The same tendency could be found at every level of the joint system and in the unified commands.

Finally, Jones argued that the service chief, in addition to the built-in conflict of interest in his position, simply lacked the time to adequately perform his joint and service duties. While President Eisenhower in 1958 had intended that the chiefs would delegate most of the business involved in running the services to the vice chiefs, the plan had not worked in practice. "It is human nature that you are the leader of the service, that you are turned to by your people. You are expected to come before this committee and other committees and talk about that service primarily and to be its leader." Consequently, the service chiefs lacked the time to immerse themselves in joint issues. They entered meetings of the Joint Chiefs depending on oral briefings by subordinates to delineate the issues.¹³

General Jones recommended five reforms to meet these problems. (See Chart 20.) First, he proposed that the chairman, rather than the Joint Chiefs of
Staff as a corporate body, become the principal military adviser to the president, the secretary of defense, and the National Security Council. The chairman would receive the views of the service chiefs and the commanders of the unified and specified commands, but the advice he gave would be his own based on his broad national perspective and responsibilities. In this manner Jones hoped to avoid the worst aspects of dual hatting. The chairman, operating from the joint perspective, would make the final recommendations. The Jones Plan gave the chairman "oversight" over the unified and specified commands. General Jones proposed to amend the National Security Act so that the channel of command would run from the president to the secretary of defense through the chairman (as opposed to the Joint Chiefs as a whole) to the unified and specified commands. This was the same channel of command that Secretary of Defense Laird had proposed to establish by Department of Defense directive in 1970.14

Jones' second and third proposals flowed directly from the first: The president or the secretary of defense could request the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any issue and, conversely, a service chief could submit his views on any joint issue about which he felt strongly to the secretary of defense or, when appropriate, the president. These propositions would ensure that the chairman would not become too powerful. He would have to give the views of the service chiefs serious consideration before he forwarded his own to the secretary of defense, but the chairman would not be bound by them.

The last two changes were organizational. General Jones proposed to create a deputy chairman with four-star rank who would serve as acting chairman in the absence of the chairman from Washington and generally assist him in the performance of his duties. (This was the Kerwin group's proposal for a vice chairman with only a change in terminology.) Finally, the Joint Staff would report to the chairman, as it did from 1953 until 1958, rather than to the Joint Chiefs as a body. Ancillary to this last point, Jones proposed to improve the quality of Joint Staff officers through several reforms that owed much to the Kerwin group: first, requiring all brigadier general selectees for the Joint Staff to attend a "capstone" course at the National Defense University; second, assigning more graduates of the senior service colleges to the Joint Staff; and, third, removing tenure and reassignment restrictions on Joint Staff officers.
Chart 20 - General Jones' Proposal, 1982

Joint Staff

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Unified Commands

Specified Commands

Depuy Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Secretary of Defense

President

Chairman

Joint Staff
(then limited by statute to three years with reassignment possible only after another three-year tour in their respective services) while encouraging assignments to the staff through rewards and incentives. "An assignment to the Joint Staff or to a Unified Command headquarters should be part of an upward mobility pattern, rather than a diversion or end of a career, as has been the case so often in the past." General Jones wanted to lessen service parochialism by abolishing the current system of staffing issues which, he charged, allowed each service a veto at every stage of the routine staffing process.

General Meyer made his proposal one month after General Jones. (See Chart 21.) The Meyer Plan first appeared in the April 1982 issue of the Armed Forces Journal International. Meyer accepted Jones' diagnosis of the situation without reservation, but he argued that Jones' recommendations did not go far enough. If enacted, they would not solve three major problems: the divided loyalty of the service chiefs inherent in dual hatting; the transition from peacetime to wartime, when strategic planning was likely to consume all of the Joint Chiefs' time; and the need to involve the commanders of the unified and specified commands more fully in the defense decision-making process. Meyer thought that Jones' proposal, requiring the chairman to consult with them as well as with the service chiefs before making his recommendations to the secretary of defense, was a step in the right direction, but it was only one step.

The centerpiece of Meyer's proposal was "the creation of a body of full-time military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense" to end dual hatting. Meyer called this group the National Military Advisory Council, borrowing the name from the Symington Committee. It would consist of four-star officers, "who would never return to their respective Services." General Meyer envisioned these officers as men with thirty to thirty-five years' experience and extensive knowledge of joint issues. He mentioned former unified commanders and service chiefs and vice chiefs of staff as the kind of men who might sit as members of the council. They would function much like a judicial organ, "its members sitting as an experienced body of military professionals to decide matters of joint military importance." The atmosphere of interservice rivalry and contention which surrounded issues in the Joint
Chart 21 - General Meyer's Proposal, 1982

- President
- Secretary of Defense
- Chairman of the National Military Advisory Council
- Joint Staff
- National Military Advisory Council
- Specified Commands
- Unified Commands
- Advisory Council

Chain of Command
Channel of Command
Communication
Chiefs of Staff would disappear:

The authenticity and credibility of their judgments would be based not only on decades of firsthand experience, but also by the continuous opportunity to review requirements of the unified commands and their reported readiness. The Councilors would be able to arrive at recommendations in a reflective atmosphere, focused on how best to flesh out the means to achieve the national objectives. Opinions would be freely given by all members and presented as majority and minority views. The recommendations would be timely and objective, and as the developers of the prime military input to the President and the Secretary of Defense, their views would be hard to dismiss.17

General Meyer argued that the primary benefit flowing from his recommendation was that civilian leaders would actively seek the opinions of the members of the National Military Advisory Council rather than turning to civilian agencies as they had in the past. The president and the secretary of defense would receive several logical, well-developed alternative strategies that would clearly delineate areas of disagreement. Because the members of the council would not have service responsibilities, they would not be under pressure to "logroll." The elimination of the built-in conflict of interest present in the Joint Chiefs of Staff would result in crisper military advice, advice that civilian leaders would find both usable and timely. In this manner, argued General Meyer, the National Military Advisory Council would reverse the long decline since World War II in the value placed on military advice in the highest circles of the United States government. His argument implied that the chief danger in the national security decision-making process was not that one service's views would exert undue influence, but that ad hoc groups of civilian advisers would dominate discussions of and decisions about even questions of exclusive military concern.

General Meyer, like General Jones, sought to strengthen the power and influence of the chairman. In the Meyer Plan the chairman presided over the council just as he presided over the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the chairman would no longer be simply the first among equals. He, rather than the council, would direct planning and operations. At the same time, General Meyer proposed to relieve the chairman of the legal obligation to speak for the
corporate body. The chairman would need only to give his own views. The other members of the council could present their own views to the civilian leaders if their opinions differed from those of the chairman. In this manner, to use General Meyer's expressive phrase, the chairman would gain "his own voice." At the same time, Meyer expected these changes would end "the obsession with unanimity" in the joint system and its concomitant vices of obscuring differences through the deliberate use of vague language and the complete avoidance of certain issues, such as roles and missions, considered "too divisive." Meyer saw the council as a forum for discovering differences and examining the reasons for those differences rather than deliberately covering them up as, he argued, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tended to do. To provide institutional support for such a process, he proposed to have the director of the Joint Staff report to the chairman rather than to the National Military Advisory Council as a whole. The chairman would determine what issues the Joint Staff would study and would initiate staff actions. His priorities would, of course, reflect his intimate relationship with the council and his obligation to respond to its needs.

The council, led by the chairman, would be responsible for translating policy decisions of the president and the secretary of defense "into strategic and cross-Service programming direction to the Services." General Meyer argued that the council would provide the most benefit to the secretary of defense if it provided cost and risk analyses of various strategies. The council would recommend budget allocations for the services and the distribution of forces among the major commands.

To operate effectively, the council would have to maintain close relations with the service chiefs and the service staffs. They would provide the closely reasoned "service perspective" on the issues before it. General Meyer even envisioned the service chiefs meeting periodically as "a board of directors" to comment upon and critique proposals by the council before their submission to the secretary of defense. To keep council members fully informed about the latest developments, the service chiefs would sponsor visits by the council to the unified and specified commands. The chiefs would also update the council on doctrinal changes, new weapons, and force readiness in each of the services. "Indeed," declared General Meyer, contrasting his situation as a member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to that of a member of the National Military Advisory Council, "it ought to be easier for a four-star to learn about the joint system and study in depth developments taking place in other Services once he is freed from the daily pressures of a high-level Service assignment."

General Meyer envisioned many benefits flowing from this new organization. It would take the service chiefs out of the wrangling involved in allocation decisions and permit them to focus full-time on service issues. It would streamline the way the United States planned for war by permitting decentralized war planning at the level of the unified and specified commands and provide an opportunity to engage in a dialogue with Washington "so essential for solid contingency planning." Finally, the council would aid Congress by providing the strategic context in which to make funding decisions. Too often the current system compelled Congress to consider individual weapons systems in isolation with little regard for wider issues.

While General Meyer did not minimize the problems involved in instituting a radical reform of the joint system, he clearly believed that the benefits far outweighed the risks:

Reform of the mechanism which provides military advice and counsel to our civilian leadership is long overdue. Tinkering with the mechanisms will not suffice. Only by addressing the issues which have been considered to be too tough to cope with in the past do we have a chance of instituting the reforms necessary to develop the smooth-running machinery required to see our nation through to the 21st Century with our freedoms and national values intact. 18

The Meyer proposal, while different from the Collins Plan of 1945 in detail, had the same broad objective: to develop a sound mechanism for providing military advice from a joint perspective to the civilian leaders of the government. The chief institutional difference lay in General Meyer's support for a National Military Advisory Council. Although Meyer discussed how it would relate to other agencies in the Department of Defense at some length, and as a consequence provided the most sophisticated argument in its favor of all those who had advocated such a body, his proposal contained some problems. He argued quite rightly that the council would have to operate very closely with the services. Because its members would no longer hold service positions, the
council would have to depend on the service staffs for information to keep current on all matters of concern. The quality of that information would affect the quality of the advice that the council provided to the secretary of defense and the president. High quality, disinterested, professional advice on issues of contention between the services provided the ultimate rationale for creating the council. Lacking independent sources for most of the information that the services provided (information from the unified and specified commands would be useful only in certain areas), the council would place its fate in the hands of agencies with vital interests at stake in the council's deliberations. The assumption behind General Meyer's proposal was that the service staffs would cooperate out of a shared sense of national interest. Service staffs (and bureaucracies generally), however, have enjoyed a reputation historically of not discerning any differences between the higher common good and their own institutional survival and self-aggrandizement. The connection between the council and the service staffs was thus a critical nexus in the Meyer proposal where information might be shared, partially shared, or withheld altogether.

Another potential danger lay in the impact of the council on interservice rivalries. For all its imperfections, the joint system as it existed in 1982 provided a collective responsibility for recommendations and the translation of policy decisions into military orders. Removing the service chiefs from the joint arena freed them to concentrate on service problems—and service interests. A convergence of many factors would be required to produce in the future the bitter rivalries that have sometimes characterized service relations in the past. The point is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been one of the institutional arrangements that mitigated against and dampened that rivalry, and General Meyer did not provide any means to do the same in his proposed reform.

Furthermore, in the existing joint system the chiefs were not only advisers to the secretary of defense but also advisers to their service secretaries. As such, the chiefs formed a vital connecting link between the logistics chain and the operations chain. General Reeder—who had supported the creation of a National Military Advisory Council in 1961—had pointed out the danger of having the operational and logistic chains widely separated during war. The Meyer proposal, by removing the chiefs from close contact with joint
affairs, increased the distance between the chains.

The Jones and Meyer proposals sparked congressional interest and ignited a debate about Joint Chiefs of Staff reform between 1982 and 1984 that culminated in the passage of the first Joint Chiefs of Staff legislation in twenty-six years. Secretary Weinberger asked General John W. Vessey, Jr., General Jones' successor as chairman and previously the vice chief of staff of the Army, to work with the chiefs and make all the improvements that they could in the joint system without changing the existing law. The secretary also asked General Vessey to act as the spokesman for the unified and specified commands, not only for operations but also in any boards that addressed resource allocations, in particular, the Defense Resources Board. (Since March 1981 the chairman had served as a permanent rather than an ex officio member of the board.) General Vessey, in the hope of strengthening the joint perspective of all the chiefs, asked them to incorporate visits to joint exercises and joint commands when they traveled outside of Washington on service business. He and the chiefs agreed that they would rotate the acting chairmanship among the chiefs for three-month periods in order to provide continuity when the chairman was out of town. In addition, Vessey initiated several studies to improve the quality of the Joint Staff's work. Both President Reagan and Secretary Weinberger told Vessey that they expected "good military advice which is timely." They did not expect unanimity among the chiefs.19

General Vessey convinced the chiefs, including General Meyer, to support limited reforms during the course of considering the Jones and Meyer proposals. The Army thus retreated from the position that General Meyer advocated in 1982 and returned once more to a policy of gradualism. General John A. Wickham, Jr., Meyer's successor as chief of staff, continued this incremental approach. By 1984 the Army favored three changes to existing law: first, an amendment to the National Security Act that would place the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the chain of command; second, a provision removing the existing 400 officer limit on the size of the Joint Staff; and third, an increase in the current three-year limit on Joint Staff service to four years and permission to reassign an officer to the Joint Staff after two years instead of three.20

The "Department of Defense Authorization Bill, Fiscal Year 1985" that became law on 19 October 1984 contained a rider dealing with the organization
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It provided for six changes. The act made the chairmain the spokesman for the commanders of the unified and specified commands. Second, it allowed the chairman to establish the agenda for Joint Chiefs meetings. Third, it provided that the chairman would select Joint Staff officers from among the most outstanding service officers. Fourth, the law removed the existing limitation that a director of the Joint Staff could only serve three years and not be reappointed to the Joint Staff in peacetime. Fifth, it required the secretary of defense to ensure that the military promotion, assignment, and retention policies of the services gave appropriate consideration to the performance of an officer as a member of the Joint Staff. Finally, it increased the current three-year limit on Joint Staff service to four years and allowed the reassignment of officers to the Joint Staff after two years instead of three. The Army favored this proposal alone among the six enacted into law. On the other five its official position was "no comment." The effect of these changes was to increase the power of the chairman incrementally and to lessen the ties between the services and the Joint Staff in about the same degree.21

The changes enacted in October 1984 did not exhaust congressional interest in the subject of Joint Chiefs of Staff reform, although whether the proponents of reform will make a major effort to obtain additional legislation this session remained problematic as of July 1985. The policy of the Reagan administration was to oppose any major legislative changes in the existing system.22
1. Scholarly analysis of the Reagan administration has hardly begun. Lou Cannon, Reagan (New York: Putnam, 1982), written by a journalist who has followed the president's career for years, provides a good starting point.

2. Testimony, Jones before Investigations Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, 21 Apr 82, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Hearings..., 97th Cong., 2d sess. 1982, pp. 76-78 (hereafter cited as Reorganization Proposals). The members of the study group in addition to General Kerwin were: General Walter V. McBride, USAF Retired, a former vice chief of staff, U. S. Air Force; General Samuel Jaskilka, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, a former assistant commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; Admiral Frederick H. Michaelis, U.S. Navy, Retired, a former chief of Naval Material; Lt. Gen. Charles A. Corcoran, U.S. Army, Retired, a former chief of staff, U.S. Pacific Command; and Mr. William K. Brehm, a former assistant secretary of defense.

3. Rpt, Kerwin et al. to Jones, Apr 82, "The Organization and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," JCS Reform project file, CMH.


5. Rpt, Kerwin et al. to Jones, Apr 82, "The Organization and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," JCS Reform project file, CMH.

6. Testimony, Jones before Investigations Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, 21 Apr 82; Testimony, McBride, Michaelis, Jaskilka, Corcoran, Brehm before Investigations Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, 17 Jun 82, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on
Armed Services, Reorganization Proposals, pp. 76-78, 770.


8. Testimony, Jones before Investigations Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, 21 Apr 82, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Reorganization Proposals, p. 47.


15. Jones, "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change," p. 69. See also Statement, Jones to Investigations Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, 21 Apr 82, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Reorganization Proposals, p. 59.

16. There are three major sources for Meyer's views: Edward C. Meyer, "The JCS--How Much Reform Is Needed?" Armed Forces Journal International 119 (Apr 1982): 82-90; Testimony, Meyer before Investigations Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, 21 Apr 82; Statement, Meyer to House Armed Services Committee, 21 Apr 82, U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Reorganization Proposals, pp. 3-42. Of these, the article is by far the most important.


18. Ibid., p. 90.


20. The debate over Joint Chiefs of Staff reform and the attendant congressional maneuvering is involved. The following articles provide a good introduction to the issue: David C. Martin and Michael A. Lerner, "Why the Generals Can't Command," Newsweek 101 (14 Feb 83): 22-24; Deborah M. Kyle, "House OK's Defense Spending Bill: '83 Budget Not


22. As of July 1985 four different reform bills were pending in the House: H.R. 2165, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 22 Apr 85; H.R. 2265, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 29 Apr 85; H.R. 2311, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1 May 85; H.R. 2710,
Conclusion

Four questions concerning the development of the Army's position on Joint Chiefs of Staff reform between 1942 and 1985 commend themselves for further reflection and analysis. The first concerns the initiation of reform: Why did the Army take the lead in proposing reforms at certain periods and not at others? A related issue concerns the Army's objectives: How did they change? The third issue, the budget, is a component of the previous question, but the topic is so complex that it deserves separate treatment: What continuities and discontinuities exist and why? Finally, the stated aim of the Army reformers during World War II--centralized command and control of the armed forces and its recurrence as a theme in Army positions on unification since 1945--merits extended discussion: Why the persistence?

The impetus for reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has gone through a cyclical pattern and is now in its second cycle. The first cycle began with the military taking the lead in advocating reform between 1943 and 1947. First, action officers such as Colonel Bessell and, later, senior soldiers such as General Marshall urged unification, although their views were supported, often eloquently, by the civilian leaders of the War Department after 1944. By late 1947, civilians dominated the reform process, and they continued to do so until 1982 when, with the Jones and Meyer proposals, the military once more took the initiative. Since 1983 the pattern of civilian initiative and service reaction has reasserted itself. Several factors are involved.

The action officers who first proposed Joint Chiefs of Staff reform had a very clear goal in mind--to win the war more quickly. By late 1943 the goal had shifted to planning for the postwar defense establishment. Once Joint Chiefs of Staff reform moved from the cloister of staff discussions into the public arena of the congressional committee hearing room and the front page, it proved terribly divisive. The Army found itself accused of making a grab for power and advocating a "man on horseback" during the period 1945 to 1947. In these circumstances it made a great deal of sense for military officers to leave future initiatives to civilians, particularly if the civilians intended to advocate reforms that the Army supported. Many of the civilians who figured prominently in the debates over unification through 1960--such as Lovett and
Symington--had served in the War Department during or immediately after World War II. Their shared experience gave them some shared assumptions, in many cases similar to those held by Army officers. Informal contacts and exchanges of information between some civilian reformers and the senior soldiers in the Department of the Army also helped orchestrate reform efforts.

Four other factors were also operating to keep Army leaders reacting to reform proposals rather than introducing them: problems internal to the Army, interservice rivalry, the calculation by Army leaders of the receptiveness of Congress and the president to reform, and the international situation. These elements were probably present to some degree in all the instances since 1947 when the initiative for reform came from civilians, but sometimes one element predominated. In 1949 General Bradley was preoccupied with trying to rebuild the Army as an effective fighting force, although the perceptions of political realities also greatly influenced his conduct and that of the Secretary of the Army on this issue. Political realities and the possible divisive consequences of an interservice fight over Joint Chiefs of Staff organization during the Korean War affected General Collins' proposals in 1953. General Taylor feared the possibility of the Air Force using the creation of the post of armed forces chief of staff to consolidate a position of dominance within the Department of Defense and with it the doctrine of massive retaliation. General Decker entered office in 1960 with a full agenda of internal reforms he hoped to achieve. By 1970 the idea that the Army reacted to Joint Chiefs of Staff reform proposals had become traditional, although by that date the civilians who had dominated the policy-initiating process had largely disappeared from the political scene. The continuing war in Vietnam and the need for interservice cooperation probably played a role in the Army's position in 1970, although the second assertion must remain speculative in the absence of most of the records. What evidence remains pertaining to the 1978 Army position provides no insight into motivation. It is clear, however, that the Army required a chief of staff like General Meyer who regarded Joint Chiefs of Staff reform as uniquely important to break the mold and begin the cycle over again.

As the sources of the reform impulse shifted so did the Army's agenda for reform. How its goals shifted is the second major subject requiring examination. The Collins Plan of 1945 was the product of over two years of
debate within the War Department and represented the General Staff's efforts to institutionalize the lessons learned from World War II about command and control at the highest levels, that is, the relations between the president, the service secretaries, the service chiefs and their staffs, and the forces in the field. Over the next thirteen years the War Department and its successor agency, the Department of the Army, achieved some goals completely, some partially, and some not at all.

Perhaps their crowning achievement lay in creating a strong military department under a strong civilian secretary. It was a success achieved in stages. The first step lay in the creation in 1947 of a single umbrella entity, the National Military Establishment, to encompass the three services. It was headed by a civilian secretary of cabinet rank, although his power was much less than the Army desired. Two years later the National Military Establishment became the Department of Defense, a cabinet-level department much like the one that Collins had argued for in 1945. The civilian secretary received substantial enhancements to his power in 1949, 1953, and 1958. In the end the Army obtained the strong secretary and, with the addition of a deputy and assistant secretaries, the strong secretariat that Collins had also advocated.

The Army was less successful in other areas. In 1945 Collins proposed the creation of a chief of staff of the armed forces. The Army never obtained such a degree of unity of command, settling in 1949 for a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subsequent legislation, however, increased his authority. Army proposals to create joint agencies in intelligence and logistics in place of service agencies fared the worst. In most instances such joint agencies, when created, became simply another layer of bureaucracy while the service agencies remained.

As the Army attained some of its goals, or experience caused it to reevaluate a position, its priorities shifted. In the fall of 1945 General Marshall discerned a unique opportunity for major reform. The war had ended, but the president, Congress, and the public at large remained sensitive to the importance of military issues. The effort fell far short of achieving what Marshall advocated, and in 1949 and 1953 Generals Bradley and Collins sought the politically possible. In 1957 the Army adopted a more visionary stance,
while both strains, the tendency to accommodate the needs of the moment and
the tendency to pursue long term goals, were present in the internal discussion
of the Symington Committee report in 1960. In 1970, and particularly in 1978,
the Army reverted to a pronounced incrementalism.

The change between 1960 and the 1970s is most striking, but very difficult
to evaluate because of the absence of supporting staff papers for 1970 and
1978. The Army had advocated minimal change before the 1970s, most notably
in 1953, but as the rationale for the course of action adopted in 1953 made
clear, this was not the optimal solution in the view of the Army leaders, only
the most feasible one under the circumstances. Similar considerations appear
to have motivated the Army in 1970. The war and the conviction that the kind
of centralization proposed by the Blue Ribbon Panel was inappropriate—rather
than the idea of centralization itself—accounted for the Army’s position. Lack
of evidence makes it impossible to determine whether the public position taken
by the Army leaders in 1978 similarly represented what they thought feasible or
was what they actually desired.

General Meyer’s proposals in 1982 represented a reversion to the Marshall
tradition, but the step-by-step approach adopted in 1983 and 1984 had
impeccable antecedents too in Bradley and Collins. The Army thus pursued
changing objectives between 1943 and 1985 using at least two different
strategies, one emphasizing the rapid attainment of all objectives, the other
focusing on intermediate steps.

The third major area concerns the Army’s position on the budget. Included in all the discussions on Joint Chiefs of Staff reform was some
calculation about the division of funds between the services. Budget
considerations, while always important, were not always the most important
factor in determining the Army’s stance. Thus, General Marshall in 1945 held a
strong commitment to the budget procedure that Collins advocated. But in
1947, in order to obtain a single secretary of defense, the Army was willing to
sacrifice the procedure.

The Army’s positions on budget reform have passed through the same
cyclical pattern as its views on the larger question of Joint Chiefs reform,
although there has been much variation in detail. Between 1945 and 1960 Army
positions were united by two themes: the need for objective factors rather than
political influence to shape the budget and an emphasis on the joint nature of
the budget process—the idea that service budgets had to be considered
together, not in isolation. Marshall in 1945, Bradley in 1949, and Collins in 1953
emphasized a joint process that, in the end, produced service budgets. General
Taylor in 1957, by way of contrast, called for a functional budget—itself a joint
document.

During Secretary of Defense McNamara's incumbency, functional budgets
became synonymous with the pervasive civilian control that extended into areas
traditionally considered inside the sphere of professional military competence.
Thus the Army associated functional budgets with the sense of impotence that
afflicted all three services during the 1960s. It is hardly surprising that when
the budget issue surfaced again in 1978 the Army supported the service budget
approach. General Meyer's proposal, while not confronting the question
directly, returned to the earlier Army stance by calling for an increase in the
size of the Joint Staff to provide programming and budgeting support for the
chairman and the National Military Advisory Council. The recent Georgetown
University study has also called for a joint approach to the budget. As yet, the
Army has not taken a position on the study.

The idea undergirding General Marshall's thought on the budget process—that
all components of the military establishment should have their budget
requests reviewed by the same authorities at the same time—appeared almost
revolutionary in its implication to his critics in 1945. By 1985 the notion was so
well accepted as to be a cliche. In the 1970s the Army showed some
repugnance for its other major budget proposal, the functional budget. While
the Army often failed to secure the specific budget procedures that it
advocated, it enjoyed remarkable success in achieving the budget philosophy it
espoused. The sober second thoughts of the 1970s indicated that some Army
leaders thought that their predecessors had been altogether too successful.

The most dominant and consistent Army position on Joint Chiefs of Staff
reform has been support for centralized command and control. Again, the
degree of centralization the Army advocated has varied greatly, from a chief of
staff of the armed forces in 1945 to placing the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in the chain of command in 1984. Still, the positions demonstrated a
remarkable degree of consistency despite the fact that many officers perceived
that unified command and control might have a negative impact on the Army's interests as a service. This was particularly true in 1945 and again in 1957. Simply put, General Marshall and his successors have placed a higher value on the national interest in military efficiency than a narrow service self-interest.

Altruism might explain the motivation of a single remarkable man, and General Marshall was certainly remarkable, but it hardly accounts for the advocacy of centralized command and control by Army leaders through 1961 and, in a less striking fashion, until today. The solution to this conundrum lies in the shared ideas of the men who rose to high command during World War II and continued to dominate the Army until 1962. Perhaps the single most salient feature of their thought was the need to concentrate combat power to obtain victory. In their view, success in battle came not through the action of a single arm acting in isolation but through the coordinated interaction of all arms.

The combined arms movement has an ancient heritage in the United States Army and can be traced back at least as far as the combined arms brigades of the Continental Army. Its modern phase began in 1881 with the establishment of the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the forerunner of the modern Command and General Staff College. By the early twentieth century the concept was a vital part of the intellectual baggage of Army officers, because it underlay the Army's doctrinal manuals. World War I validated the concept, and World War II expanded it even further.

Victory in World War II demanded more than simply the concentration of the power of infantry, artillery, and armor on the battle front. It required the intimate cooperation of all three services. The Navy needed to win command of the seas, to launch and supply an invasion force against a hostile shore, and to maintain a supply line across thousands of miles of ocean. The proto-service, the Army Air Forces, needed to attack the enemy's sources of supply, to interdict his lines of communication, and to provide close air support using tactical air or, on occasion, heavy strategic bombers. The Army, of course, needed to do what its combined arms doctrine dictated: coordinate the actions of all three arms on the battle line. The Army entered World War II with combined arms doctrine and emerged with a joint service concept. (The joint doctrine the Army sought has proven elusive.) It was this vision that influenced
the Army's position on Joint Chiefs of Staff reform until 1961 and continues to do so today in attenuated form.

The attenuation results in large part because of the shared experiences of another generation of Army officers—the war in Vietnam. Vietnam was, in the jargon of the time, a "low intensity conflict." Tactical victory on the battlefield did not require the same degree of massed combat power needed in World War II. A regular North Vietnamese infantry division, for all its sometimes excellent attributes, was not to be compared as an adversary with a German infantry division, let alone a panzer division. Moreover, armed and transport helicopters gave the Army forces in Vietnam an organic mobility and close air support capability that the World War II triangular divisions simply lacked. Greater self-sufficiency in combat and a weaker adversary influenced the context of Joint Chiefs of Staff reform, causing a greater willingness during the 1970s to approach the issue from the perspective of narrow service self-interest. Vietnam greatly increased the Army's parochialism, but the effect was to mute, but not destroy, the older strain, as both the Meyer proposal in 1982 and the 1984 Army positions demonstrate. Because of its own experiences in the past, the Army still places high value on unity of command.

In some ways the situation facing the U.S. military establishment today is analogous to the position that the U.S. Army faced in the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth. Then a collection of technical bureaus, often isolated from and uninterested in the realities that faced the troops in the field, dominated the War Department. The Commanding General of the Army, the representative of the combat arms in Washington, occupied a position that possessed a resounding title but no real power. Today the services dominate the joint decision-making process. Until very recently the commanders of the unified commands have had little voice in those decisions about force structure and resource allocation that determine whether their commands can accomplish their missions. The nineteenth century dilemma, at least, provided the impetus for the U.S. Army's most important contribution to the development of military staffs. In 1903 Secretary of War Elihu Root created the War Department General Staff. In advancing the cause of Joint Chiefs of Staff reform since 1943, the Army has but followed the dictates of its own history.
The manuscript sources listed below in the National Archives and the Records Center portion of the Washington National Records Center at Suitland, Maryland were absolutely essential to determine the Army's position on various Joint Chiefs of Staff reform proposals. Generally, the earliest records are the most complete in the period covered by this study. Certain materials are most accessible in the JCS Reform project file collected by the authors. Currently located at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, the file will be retired in due course to the National Archives. Researchers wishing to use these materials should call the Historical Records Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History to determine their exact location.

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