

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

**The Joint Chiefs of Staff
and National Policy
1955 - 1956**

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff in March 1956. Left to right: Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, USN; General Nathan E. Twining, Chief of Staff, USAF; Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN, Chairman, JCS; General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, USA; General Randolph McC. Pate, Commandant, USMC.

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Volume VI

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1955 – 1956

Kenneth W. Condit



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Foreword

Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued in existence after the war. As military advisers and planners, they have played a significant role in the development of national security policy. Knowledge of their relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to understanding their work. Moreover, an account of JCS activities in times of peace as well as crisis and war contributes an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written. Its value for instructional purposes at the joint and Service schools, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the Joint Staff, and as a source of background information for staff studies will be readily recognized.

The series, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, treats the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Volumes I through IV of the series covering the years 1945–1952 and the Korean War were declassified earlier. At that time no funds were available for publication, and the volumes were distributed in unclassified form within the Department of Defense with copies deposited with the National Archives and Records Administration. Subsequently, a private concern reproduced and published the volumes. In 1986 the JCS Historical Division published Volume V, covering the years 1953–1954, through the Government Printing Office.

This volume, the sixth in the series, covers the years 1955 and 1956. It follows closely the pattern of Volume V in format and content. It traces the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the formulation of basic national security policy, in strategy development and force planning, in arms control negotiations, and in dealing with the issues of continental defense and military assistance. A series of regional chapters describes JCS participation in planning and operations involving NATO, the Middle East and the Suez crisis, Southeast Asia, the Far East, and Korea.

Volume VI was completed and issued in classified version in 1971. It appears here basically as completed in 1971 with minor editorial revisions and a few deletions required by security considerations. Material from recently published volumes in the State Department's series, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, also has been added.

Foreword

Kenneth W. Condit, the author of the volume, earned bachelor's and master's degrees in history from Princeton University. He joined the JCS Historical Division in 1961 and served as the Chief of the Histories Branch from 1977 until his retirement in 1983. He is also the author of *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. II, 1947-1949.

The volume was reviewed for declassification by appropriate US Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. Although the text has been declassified, some cited sources remain classified. The volume is an official publication of the Joint Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Chairman, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Chairman on any subject.

Washington, DC
November 1991

Willard J. Webb
Chief, Historical Office
Joint Staff

Preface

When this Volume first saw the light of day some 20 years ago, the United States and the Soviet Union were frozen in one of the most frigid antagonisms of the cold war. Each country was making every effort to develop and deploy the new weapons of mass destruction, to strengthen its own bloc of allies, and to expand its influence and control around the world.

To deal with this potent potential enemy, the Eisenhower administration had redirected its strategy and force planning to emphasize strategic retaliatory striking power. Nuclear weapons delivered by ballistic missiles were the essential components of the New Look, as the policy came to be called. Robert J. Watson has described the JCS role in the creation of the New Look in Volume V of this series.

This Volume VI is primarily concerned with the way the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought to "fine tune" the New Look through strategic plans, the force levels to support them, and allocation of responsibility among the military services for developing and operating the new weapons systems. This turned out to be a contentious process owing to interservice disagreement. Other important matters involving the Joint Chiefs of Staff included the strengthening of NATO, extension of collective security to the Middle and Far East through CENTO and SEATO, commenting on arms control proposals, and helping prepare the military assistance program. Organizational matters, which are the subject of other publications by the Historical Office, are omitted.

On two occasions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were called upon to participate in the Eisenhower administration's responses to actions by the communist bloc. One arose from the Soviet suppression of an uprising in Hungary, the other from attacks by the Chinese communists on islands constituting the outer defenses of Formosa.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves in an international crisis of a very different sort in the Middle East. Here, the Eisenhower administration felt compelled to overturn the seizure of the Suez Canal and the Sinai peninsula by Britain and France, its major European allies, and Israel, its strongest supporter in the region.

Readers familiar with the present-day organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be aware that JCS procedures in 1955 and 1956 were different from those now in effect. The Joint Staff, which served the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was appreciably smaller than at present and consisted primarily of Joint Strategic Plans, Intelligence, and Logistics Plans Groups. At a higher organizational level were three joint committees, composed of Service representatives, with similar titles over-

Preface

seeing the work of the three groups. The Joint Chiefs of Staff normally assigned a task to one of these committees, which in turn called on its corresponding Joint Staff Group for a report. The resulting paper passed to the joint committee for review, amendment and approval before being submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This system continued in effect until 1958, when the present Joint Staff with its integrated planning and operations sections was established.

I am happy to acknowledge the many debts I incurred in writing this volume. The original version was prepared under the general supervision of Wilber W. Hoare, the Chief of the Historical Division. He followed its creation with interest and support and gave final approval to the printed manuscript. Fellow historians in the Division, particularly Robert J. Watson and Byron Fairchild, were generous with their advice and reviewed numerous chapter drafts. As Chief, Histories Branch, Vernon E. Davis exercised his editorial skills in reviewing and editing the manuscript. Anna M. Siney directed its preparation in printed form for use by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I owe a particular debt to two individuals for the present version. Willard J. Webb, Chief, Historical Office, Joint Staff, first proposed publication, obtained approval for it, and saw the manuscript through the endless declassification process and supervised the entire production. Walter S. Poole prepared necessary additions and revisions for open publication. I am also indebted to Penny Norman for editing the manuscript and to Helen Mondich for assisting in preparing it for printing. Finally, I owe a special debt to my wife, Doris E. Condit, an accomplished military historian in her own right, for her understanding, support, and wise advice at all stages.

Washington, D.C.
November 1991

KENNETH W. CONDIT

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History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

**The Joint Chiefs of Staff
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Basic National Security Policy

During 1955 and 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were engaged in the further implementation of the principles and concepts of national security introduced by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his administration, which were commonly spoken of as constituting the "New Look." Fulfillment of the President's objective of providing forces and weaponry adequate to the nation's security needs at a cost that could be sustained over an extended period had been greatly facilitated by the cessation of hostilities in Korea. With the return of the military forces to substantially a peacetime basis, military budgets and force levels shrank, allowing the Joint Chiefs of Staff less leeway in the choices made regarding the allocation of resources and the deployments and strategies to be pursued. The Joint Chiefs of Staff developed their recommendations on these matters with an awareness that Soviet military capabilities were increasing at a faster pace than estimated in earlier intelligence assessments and in the face of changing Soviet tactics on the world scene.

As 1955 began, the incumbent Joint Chiefs of Staff were the group of officers President Eisenhower had appointed during his first year in office, under the stated purpose of providing Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson with an entirely new team that would be capable of taking "a new approach . . . without any real chains fastening to the past."¹ Admiral Arthur W. Radford as Chairman, General Matthew B. Ridgway as Chief of Staff, Army, Admiral Robert B. Carney as Chief of Naval Operations, and General Nathan F. Twining as Chief of Staff, Air Force, had formulated the initial military policy of the New Look period, in JCS 2101/113, and had contributed their thought to the development of NSC 162/2, the first basic national security policy statement of the Eisenhower administration.²

By mid-1955 the two-year terms of these JCS members were nearing completion. Two were reappointed; two were not. The President chose to retain Admiral Radford and General Twining for a further two years. Although Radford, as Vice Chief of Naval Operations in 1948-1949, had expressed strong doubts about a strategy based on atomic bombing, had helped make the Navy's case against the B-36, and had aligned himself with the critics of unification, he had, as Chair-

man, enthusiastically endorsed not only unification but also the New Look strategy with emphasis on massive nuclear retaliation. General Twining, too, had proved a strong supporter of the New Look and the administration.

The President did not reappoint General Ridgway or Admiral Carney. The former considered massive retaliation an inadequate strategy and vehemently—but vainly—opposed the resulting cuts in Army strength. Evidently both he and the President felt his usefulness had become impaired, and General Ridgway retired on 30 June 1955. His successor, General Maxwell D. Taylor, had commanded the 101st Airborne Division during 1944–1945 and the Eighth Army during the final months of the Korean War. When General Taylor took office, Admiral Carney told him, “You’re one of the good new Chiefs now but you’ll be surprised how quickly you will become one of the bad old Chiefs.” Like General Ridgway, Taylor proved a severe critic of massive retaliation. As Taylor wrote afterwards, his tenure was marked by “well-nigh continuous conflict” with his JCS colleagues and the Secretary of Defense as well as “increasing coolness” in his relations with the President.³

Admiral Carney, who had referred to himself as one of the bad old Chiefs, had earned the displeasure of the Secretary of the Navy, Charles S. Thomas. Carney, the Secretary said privately, had excluded him from key decisions, failed to keep him fully abreast of day-to-day developments, and relied too much upon old friends who seemed to lack vigor and imagination.⁴ Early in August, just before he retired, Admiral Carney sent the President eight pages of parting thoughts. He strongly recommended lengthening the two-year terms of the Service chiefs because “I find my own major plans . . . only just beginning to be felt as my appointment expires.” Also, Carney argued, his JCS responsibilities interfered with the effective discharge of his Navy duties:

Insistence on the presence of the Chief at virtually every JCS, [Armed Forces] Policy Council, and NSC meeting . . . tie up every week from Tuesday to Friday inclusive, leaving little or no opportunity to acquire first-hand knowledge of the operating forces or to exercise personal leadership which is a legal responsibility, as well as an absolute essential in a military structure.

Instead, Carney suggested, either his Vice Chief or his JCS Deputy could handle “a generous percentage” of interservice problems. Finally, Carney voiced apprehension about civilian intrusion into “virtually every operation of the Navy Department.” What appeared true of the Navy Department, he concluded, appeared to be also true of the Department of Defense.⁵

The new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, stood eightieth in seniority at the time of his appointment. Moreover, as Admiral Carney reminded the President, “no officer occupying a position of top responsibility in the naval establishment, nor in the Navy command system” was consulted about the selection. Even so, Admiral Burke brought with him a good reputation. In the South Pacific, during 1943, he had become known as “31-knot Burke” while commanding a destroyer squadron. Next, he served as Chief of Staff to the Commander, Fast Carrier Task Force 58. In 1951, at Panmunjom in Korea, he was a mem-

ber of the United Nations Truce Delegation. During 1952–1954, he served in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations as Director, Strategic Plans Division, and then in January 1955, he assumed command of the Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet. On 17 August 1955, Admiral Burke began the first of what would become an unprecedented three terms as Chief of Naval Operations.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, who was not a legal JCS member, had begun meeting with the Joint Chiefs in June 1952. The Commandant in 1955, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., served a statutory term of four years and had not been affected by the turnover in JCS membership during 1953. He was relieved in normal rotation by General Randolph McC. Pate, effective 1 January 1956.

In 1955 the civilian leaders remained unchanged. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had entered the White House in 1953 with unrivalled experience in national security affairs, continued to oversee foreign and military affairs carefully. Naturally, therefore, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson—“Engine Charlie,” the former president of General Motors—found himself overshadowed by the Chief Executive. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had proved a forceful figure, who had provoked much partisan criticism, but retained President Eisenhower’s full confidence.

The National Security Council under President Eisenhower

Designated in the National Security Act as the principal military advisers to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a definite role in the formulation of national policy in the Eisenhower administration. The central entity of the policymaking machinery was the National Security Council, on which President Eisenhower depended for recommendations on virtually all matters of policy. To many observers, the President’s disposition to rely on the formalized procedures of the National Security Council reflected the influence of his long career as a military commander and staff officer. By 1955 the Council had become a smoothly operating agency for policy formulation, with clear lines of authority and systemized staff work.

The Council consisted of five members designated by statute: the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. It was fully within the discretion of the President, however, to invite any other official or expert to take part in the NSC deliberations. Notable among the persons who regularly attended in this status during 1955 and 1956 were the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also sat regularly at the NSC meetings. Officially, Admiral Radford was present as an adviser to the Council. In practice, he was a virtual participant in the action on any subject of defense interest, since the Council functioned without taking a formal vote.⁶

The National Security Council had two subordinate agencies, the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board. Under chairmanship of the Presi-

dent's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Planning Board consisted of officials at the Assistant Secretary level representing the departments and agencies holding NSC membership. Advisers from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff also participated in the Board's business, the latter being an officer designated as the Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for NSC Affairs. As working-level support there was a staff of Board Assistants consisting of officials detailed by the members of and advisers to the Planning Board. Those representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff were drawn from the office of the Special Assistant for NSC Affairs.

The function of the Planning Board was to prepare papers for consideration by the Council on any subject arising within the NSC system. Initial drafts were produced by the member agencies having primary interest and were refined by the Board Assistants working with others in their own departments. Submitted to the Planning Board, the resulting draft received further consideration until an agreed paper, or one in which divergencies were identified for resolution, was produced for submission to the Council. At the time the paper was distributed to the Council members, usually with notice of its scheduled discussion at a future NSC meeting, it went also to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, forwarded through the Secretary of Defense, were then circulated to the Council members by the NSC Secretariat.

The National Security Council discussed and amended the paper in the light of member and adviser comments and submissions, including those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Upon reaching agreement the Council "adopted" the paper and recommended to the President that he approve the policy statement it contained. Although the President normally participated in the discussion, he usually deferred the announcement of his decision for a few days. This practice was to some extent symbolic, emphasizing the fact that the decision was the prerogative solely of the President. It also allowed time for a final circulation of the formal record of NSC action among the members.

The President's approval of a policy statement included direction that it be implemented "by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government." The Operations Coordinating Board then had the responsibility for integrating the activities of the departments toward this purpose. Headed by the Under Secretary of State, the Board included the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Directors of Central Intelligence and of the United States Information Agency, and several others, but had no JCS representation. The Operations Coordinating Board rendered periodic progress reports on the measures being taken to implement the policy, the results achieved, and changes in the world situation that affected the assumptions on which the policy was based, sometimes with a recommendation that its revision be considered.⁷

Thus the NSC system as it operated under President Eisenhower provided channels for presentation of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at various stages in the process, including the initial drafting of the policy papers. Within the Planning Board and its supporting Board Assistants no practical distinction was maintained between the participants who represented NSC members and those representing NSC advisers such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The views of

each representative were recorded, whether joined in agreement or expressed in majority and minority positions. Amendments recommended by the JCS representative on the Planning Board were identified as such and did not necessarily conform to the stand taken by the Department of Defense representative.

The policy papers developed through the NSC system fell into three broad categories. First were the comprehensive statements of overall policy, taking into account the political, military, economic, and psychological aspects. Second were the papers dealing with geographic regions of the world or single countries. Finally there were papers dealing with specific functional areas such as disarmament, internal security, and trade policies.

Throughout the Eisenhower administration the central overall policy paper was titled "Basic National Security Policy." It was normally reviewed and revised annually. Papers in the other two categories expanded and developed specific policies set forth in their fundamentals in the basic national security policy. The substance of the paragraph on arms control, for instance, would receive detailed treatment in a paper devoted exclusively to that subject. Thus emerged an interlocking set of policy papers, defining national objectives and methods and measures for achieving them, which became the guide to action for all government agencies. The discussions of most critical importance surrounded the formulation of the basic national security policy, and this was the NSC paper with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were most concerned.

A New Statement of National Security Policy: NSC 5501

As 1955 opened, the Eisenhower administration had just completed a review of its basic national security policy, and publication of NSC 5501 soon followed.⁸ The policy issued on 7 January 1955 was necessarily designed to meet the situation imposed by the basic Soviet hostility toward the noncommunist world. This fundamental antagonism had given rise to the cold war, which, since the end of World War II, had gradually frozen the major powers into two hostile camps. As a result, Europe was divided by the iron curtain into the communist East and the free West. Most significant was the division of Germany. Attempts by the victors of World War II to write a German peace treaty had failed, with the result that the rival great powers had established rival German states in their respective zones. By the beginning of 1955, the Western powers had negotiated the rearmament and entry into NATO of West Germany, an agreement that had only to be ratified by the several governments to enter into effect.

The rulers of Communist China also remained avowedly hostile to the United States, and the National Security Council believed they could be expected to seek expansion of their area of control while trying to expel US power and influence from the Far East. By the beginning of 1955, the Chinese communists were exerting military pressure on the Nationalist-held offshore islands scattered along the South China coast. These actions, if successful, were considered to be preliminaries to a possible assault on Taiwan. In Indochina, where the Chinese-supported Viet Minh

had scored an impressive victory over the French in 1954, it appeared doubtful that a viable anticommunist regime could maintain itself in South Vietnam. As a countermove to communist advances in Southeast Asia, the United States had taken a leading role in forming the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). At the start of 1955, the first SEATO Council meeting was about to take place.

The basic threat to US security identified in NSC 5501 was that "posed by the hostile policies and power, including growing nuclear power, of the Soviet-Communist bloc, with its international Communist apparatus." The basic problem confronting the United States was "how, without undermining fundamental U.S. values and institutions or seriously weakening the U.S. economy, to meet and ultimately to diminish this threat to U.S. security."

The rapidly growing air-atomic capabilities of the Soviet Union were of major concern to the President and his advisers. "Already," read NSC 5501, "the USSR has the capacity to inflict widespread devastation on major free world countries allied to the U.S. and serious damage to the U.S. itself. Over approximately the next five years the USSR will almost certainly develop the *net* capability to strike a crippling blow at the United States." Beyond that was an even more ominous prospect. By 1963, and perhaps as early as 1960, the USSR was expected to possess operational intercontinental missiles, against which there was no known defense. The US program for intercontinental ballistic missiles "should approximate this timetable," and it was estimated that in the early 1960s the United States would still be capable of inflicting equal or greater damage on the Soviet Union in a nuclear exchange.

The probable result, in the Council's view, would be a situation of mutual deterrence, "in which each side would be strongly inhibited from deliberately initiating general war or taking actions which it regarded as materially increasing the risk of general war." War might occur, nevertheless, as the result of miscalculation or a major technological breakthrough by the Soviet Union, and it had to be recognized that "general war might occur as the climax of a series of actions and counteractions which neither side originally intended to lead to that result."

Thus a deliberate resort to war by the Soviet Union was held unlikely in either the current situation of US nuclear superiority or the future one of mutual deterrence. Instead, the communist nations were expected to continue strenuous efforts to weaken and disrupt the strength and unity of the free world and to expand the area of their control, principally by subversion and the support of insurrection, "while avoiding involvement of the main sources of Communist power." After attaining atomic plenty, the communist nations would probably increase the pace of their attempts at local expansion, with a bolder use of force or the threat of force. In the years immediately ahead, also, the Soviet Union would continue to take a conciliatory tone in foreign relations, speaking of peaceful coexistence and dangling before the world the hope of a relaxation of tensions. This was a refinement in Soviet diplomacy that had developed under Georgi M. Malenkov, who had succeeded to the Soviet premiership upon the death of Stalin in 1953.

The effect of this apparently conciliatory approach on allies of the United States was of particular concern to the National Security Council:

Whenever the Soviet "soft" line is dominant, our allies will be eager to explore it seriously, and will probably wish, in seeking a basis of "coexistence," to go to further lengths than the U.S. will find prudent. Even if the USSR offers no real concessions, these tendencies will probably persist, supported by large segments of public opinion. It will be a major task, therefore, to maintain the necessary unity and resolution in the free world coalition whenever and wherever the Soviets press their "peace offensive."

The lessening of allied cohesion had already become evident in 1954, when the United States had been unable to rally its allies to some form of united emergency action to prevent French military defeat in Indochina.

According to NSC 5501, preventive war as a means of stopping the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities was an unacceptable course for the United States and its allies. Instead, "U.S. policies must be designed to affect the conduct of the Communist regimes . . . and to encourage tendencies that lead them to abandon expansionist policies." To this end the United States should seek to deter communist aggression while avoiding total war, maintain and develop the necessary will, strength, and stability in the free world to face the communist threat, and take other actions designed to "foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet-Communist bloc regimes." Among other things, "the U.S. should be ready to negotiate with the USSR whenever it clearly appears that U.S. security interests will be served thereby."

Resolutely pursued, such a policy offered "the best hope of bringing about at least a prolonged period of armed truce, and ultimately a peaceful resolution of the Soviet bloc-free world conflict and a peaceful and orderly world environment." But failure to pursue it resolutely "could, within a relatively short span of years, place the U.S. in great jeopardy."

To carry out this general policy would require a flexible combination of military, political, economic, propaganda, and covert actions to enable the full exercise of US initiative. Moreover, programs to be applied "between now and the time when the USSR has greatly increased nuclear power should be developed as a matter of urgency."

The military element of this flexible combination must be capable both of deterring general war and of dealing with other forms of overt communist aggression. Within its military forces the United States must develop and maintain effective "nuclear-air retaliatory power," secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise, while also continuing accelerated programs for continental defense.

The United States must also have other ready forces, which, together with those of its allies, must be sufficient (a) to help deter any resort to local aggression, or (b) to punish swiftly and severely any such local aggression, in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid the hostilities broadening into total nuclear war. Such ready forces must be properly balanced, sufficiently versatile, suitably deployed, highly mobile, and equipped as appropriate with atomic capability, to perform these tasks; and must also, along with those assigned to NATO, be capable of discharging initial tasks in the event of general war.

The circumstances under which the atomic capability included in the ready forces might be used were treated in another important paragraph of NSC 5501.

The ability to apply force selectively and flexibly will become increasingly important in maintaining the morale and will of the free world to resist aggression. As the fear of nuclear war grows, the United States and its allies must never allow themselves to get into the position where they must choose between (a) not responding to local aggression and (b) applying force in a way which our own people or our allies would consider entails undue risk of nuclear devastation. However, the United States cannot afford to preclude itself from using nuclear weapons even in a local situation, if such use will bring the aggression to a swift and positive cessation, and if, on a balance of political and military consideration, such use will best advance U.S. security interests. In the last analysis, if confronted by a choice of (a) acquiescing in Communist aggression or (b) taking measures risking either general war or loss of allied support, the United States must be prepared to take these risks if necessary for its security.

In all but the extreme circumstances just mentioned, however, US policy must be predicated upon the support and cooperation of major allies and certain other free world countries, who were expected to furnish military bases and provide their share of military forces. The United States should, therefore, continue to provide military and other assistance to dependable allied nations where necessary to enable them to contribute to the collective military power of the free world. "The basic strategy and policy of the U.S. must be believed by our appropriate major allies generally to serve their security as well as ours."

Further essential elements of the US basic national security policy included internal security and civil defense programs, an informed public, an adequate mobilization base, and an effective intelligence system. Finally, reflecting the basic economic philosophy of the Eisenhower administration, NSC 5501 contained a caution that "the level of expenditures for national security programs must take into full account the danger to the U.S. and its allies resulting from impairment, through inflation or the undermining of incentives, of the basic soundness of the U.S. economy." The Federal Government should continue its determined effort to achieve a balanced budget while recognizing, nevertheless, that the United States must continue to meet the necessary costs of the programs essential for its security.

The comments submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the development of NSC 5501 showed them to be less than satisfied with the new policy statement. They believed that while it contained a realistic appraisal of the gravity of the Soviet-communist threat, the paper failed to state in clear, simple terms, the major objectives US policy was designed to attain. The prime objective, in the JCS view, should be "to create, prior to the achievement of mutual atomic plenty, conditions under which the United States and the free world coalition are prepared to meet the Soviet-communist threat with resolution and to negotiate for its alleviation under proper safeguards." Instead, they found, the policy paper sought a solution to the problem of US security mainly by attempting to bring about a reorientation of the communist regimes through persuasion leading to mutually acceptable settlements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed it must be recognized

that, "until the Communist Regimes are convinced that their aggressive and expansionist policies will be met by countermeasures which inherently will threaten the continued existence of their regimes, it will not be feasible to induce a change in their basic attitude or bring about the abandonment of their present objectives." Moreover, "the desired conviction in Communist minds can be brought about only through positive, dynamic, and timely action by the United States."⁹

The military policies enunciated in NSC 5501 when approved on 7 January 1955 could be recognized as conforming broadly to the general principles of the New Look, but with certain differences of emphasis that were to generate discussion in the following months. President Eisenhower, indeed, had just supplied a restatement of those principles in a letter to the Secretary of Defense on 5 January, which was released to the public.¹⁰ A basic consideration underlying the policy, the President explained, was that the security of the United States was inextricably bound up with the security of the free world; thus it became essential to "do everything possible to promote unity of understanding and action among the free nations."

Considerations applying specifically to US military preparations were these: first, there was no "single critical danger date and no single form of enemy action to which we could soundly gear all our defense preparations"; second, "true security . . . must be founded on a strong and expanding economy, readily convertible to the tasks of war"; third, "we should base our security upon military formations which make maximum use of science and technology in order to minimize numbers of men"; and fourth, the increasing efficiency of long-range bombing aircraft and the destructiveness of modern weapons gave the United States reason, for the first time in its history, to be deeply concerned over the serious effects which a sudden attack could conceivably inflict upon its territory.

Our first objective must therefore be to maintain the capability to deter an enemy from attack and to blunt that attack if it comes—by a combination of effective retaliatory power and a continental defense system of steadily increasing effectiveness. These two tasks logically demand priority in all planning.

Other essential tasks during the initial period of a possible future war would require the Navy to clear the ocean lanes, and the Army to do its part in meeting critical land situations.

The President noted that to meet "lesser hostile action—such as local aggression not broadened by the intervention of a major aggressor's forces—growing reliance can be placed upon the forces now being built and strengthened in many areas of the free world." But because that reliance could not be complete, and US vital interests or pledged commitments might be involved, there remained certain contingencies for which the United States should be ready with mobile forces to help indigenous troops deter local aggression, direct or indirect. Even when meeting such requirements, however, the New Look program contemplated reductions in the overall size of the armed forces. Given the practical considerations limiting the rapid deployment of large military forces from the continental United States immediately on the outbreak of war, the President believed the number of troops maintained on active duty could be correspondingly cut. Reserve forces, the

mobilization base, and the stockpile of critical materials could be relied on to provide the remainder of the requirements for full-scale war operations.

The most notable difference in emphasis between the President's pronouncements of 5 January 1955 and the basic national security policy paper concerned the relative importance of nuclear retaliatory forces as against other elements of US military power. In the wording of NSC 5501 there was little to suggest any substantial difference in priority between the nuclear delivery forces and continental defense programs designed to deter or meet a major attack and the ready mobile forces to deter or deal with local aggression. In his letter to Secretary Wilson, however, the President made the maintenance of effective retaliatory power and the improvement of continental defense a first charge on the military planners. His statement regarding ready mobile forces could be read as suggesting that the need was a residual and possibly even a decreasing one. Subsequent consideration of US defense requirements by the Joint Chiefs of Staff tended to turn on the interpretation of the paragraphs in the basic national security policy, whereas Secretary Wilson, in reaching decisions or preparing recommendations on such specific matters as force levels and budget allocations, clearly took his principal guidance from the President's letter.

During the first half of 1955 the argument against preponderant US emphasis on nuclear air retaliatory power was carried almost exclusively by the Army Chief of Staff, General Matthew B. Ridgway. On 27 June 1955, a few days before his retirement, General Ridgway recapitulated the views he had been advocating in a letter to the Secretary of Defense. It was to be noted that the factors and requirements he stressed were for the most part already included in NSC 5501; the Army Chief of Staff was arguing not for a change in the basic national security policy but for redirection of its implementation.

General Ridgway believed that "the present United States military forces are inadequate in strength and improperly proportioned" to meet the full dimensions of the Soviet threat and the commitments the United States had assumed throughout the world:

The Soviet Communist Bloc has created and is prosecuting a continuous state of conflict as a matter of national policy. They have shown the intention and capability to capitalize on subversion or on local war for military and political advantage in China, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Malaya, Korea, Indochina, and other places, in spite of the superior United States strength in long-range air forces, although this superiority has been obvious to the world since World War II. As the point in time approaches, possibly between 1958 and 1962, when Soviet nuclear weapon and delivery developments will give the Communist Bloc the capability of inflicting critical damage on the United States war-making potential, coupled with a concurrent improvement of Soviet air defense capability, the United States nuclear-air superiority will have lost most of its present significance.

Yet in the face of this prospect, "the present United States preoccupation with preparations for general war has limited the military means available for cold war to those which are essentially by-products or leftovers."

While a "mobile ready force" element is provided for in published policy statements, the actual development of a mobile ready force must compete with increasingly emphasized continental defense, and with, in my opinion, overemphasized nuclear-air requirements; all of which are requirements related primarily to general war.

It was General Ridgway's conclusion that the commitments which the United States had pledged created a positive requirement for an immediately available mobile joint military force of hard-hitting character. The military power of the United States "must be real and apparent to all concerned, and it must be capable of being applied promptly, selectively and with the degree of violence appropriate to the occasion."¹¹

The Killian Report

By the spring of 1955 the National Security Council had concluded that new intelligence estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions called for a reappraisal of the basic national security policy.¹² The most influential of these studies was one submitted to the President on 14 February 1955 by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee to the Office of Defense Mobilization and entitled "Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack." Known as the "Killian Report," after the panel chairman, Dr. James B. Killian of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, it contained a timetable showing the relative military strengths of the United States and the Soviet Union and how they would change in the future. Currently, the appraisal read, the United States possessed an offensive advantage over the Soviet Union but was vulnerable to surprise attack. By the start of 1956 and extending to 1958 and perhaps a few years beyond, the United States would have improved its defenses and offensive striking power so as to have a very great advantage over the Soviet Union. During this period, the United States, though severely damaged, would emerge a battered victor in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. By as early as mid-1958, however, the Soviet offensive capability might have improved to the point where an attack by either side would result in mutual destruction. The Killian panel recommended, therefore, that, after the timetable had been reviewed by the President and the National Security Council, an intensive study be undertaken to determine the political and diplomatic advantages that could be realized during the two or more years of the period of greatest US superiority that would start in 1956.¹³

Anticipating a review of the Killian Report by the National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of Defense requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Replying on 18 April, they agreed it was desirable to make the study but cautioned against basing it on a firm assumption that "the USSR CANNOT mount a decisive attack on the United States during the period 1956-1957 and ending 1958-1960." The latest intelligence estimates of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile and delivery capability, combined with the uncertainty as to what level of

damage would be decisive, made such an assumption dangerous.¹⁴ The JCS views were not forwarded to the National Security Council, however, since the Council had already referred the Killian panel's recommendations directly to the Planning Board. Further instructions to the Planning Board were forthcoming on 4 August when the National Security Council directed it to combine the study of the Killian Report with a general review of key aspects of the basic national security policy.¹⁵

Toward A Revised National Security Policy

The Planning Board, on 1 September 1955, agreed on the following procedure for the review: each Planning Board member would submit recommendations for changes in NSC 5501; a subcommittee of the Planning Board or the Board Assistants would bring up to date the "Estimate of the Situation" in NSC 5501; on the basis of these recommendations and revisions, the Planning Board would draft a revision of NSC 5501 for submission to the Council.¹⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff chose not to make formal recommendations for the revision of NSC 5501. Rather, their views were presented informally by Major General F. W. Farrell, their Special Assistant for NSC Affairs, to Brigadier General C. H. Bonesteel, the Defense member of the Planning Board, who prepared consolidated comments for the Department of Defense.¹⁷ When presented to the Planning Board on 24 September, General Bonesteel's comments described NSC 5501 as an appropriate statement of national security policy, subject to updating and some differing emphasis. The indicated changes in emphasis, while generally compatible with views the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already expressed, fell short of encompassing the full extent of their previous objections to the policy in NSC 5501.¹⁸

The recommendations submitted by other agencies represented on the Planning Board also concluded that NSC 5501 remained generally valid. None of the agencies proposed any political or diplomatic actions to take advantage of the US nuclear superiority during 1956–1958, as recommended in the Killian Report. In fact, one respondent, the Central Intelligence Agency, observed that "we have found it difficult to envisage methods to support more effective or aggressive U.S. policies" during that period.

It was not surprising, then, that the draft revision of the basic national security policy, produced by the Planning Board on 8 February 1956 as NSC 5602, contained no recommendations for extraordinary political or diplomatic action during the next few years. All that remained of the idea was a slightly reworded repetition of the statement in NSC 5501 that programs for carrying out the general US strategy should be developed and conducted as a matter of urgency, with special emphasis in the period before the Soviets achieve nuclear parity.

The basic thrust of the policy was unchanged. Ruling out preventive war, the United States must seek to affect the conduct and objectives of the communist regimes in ways that furthered US security interests, fostering tendencies that

would lead them to abandon expansionist policies. The program of negotiation and influence should proceed under the cover of a powerful military deterrent designed to prevent further communist expansion until the persuasive policies could take effect. The revision of NSC 5501 that NSC 5602 represented lay mainly in the strengthening of some statements, the expansion of others, and the addition of new paragraphs. The text of the proposed revision was at least one quarter longer than NSC 5501.

In part the expansion of the text resulted from an attempt to spell out more fully, though still largely in general terms, the political strategy to be used in attempting to influence the communist bloc and the means of placing "more stress than heretofore on building the strength and cohesion of the free world," both of which had been called for in the previous policy paper. An addition under the latter heading was the statement that the United States should provide new weapons (non-nuclear) and advanced technology to allies capable of using them effectively and should seek relaxation of the atomic energy legislation to permit the progressive integration of nuclear weapons into NATO defenses, "at least to the extent of enabling selected allies to be able to use them upon the outbreak of war." In NSC 5602 there was also an increased emphasis on dynamic research and development for military application, since unless there was greater effort in this field, "U.S. weaponry may in the future fall qualitatively behind that of the USSR." The new paper repeated without change the portion of NSC 5501 that cautioned against excessive governmental expenditures that might undermine the US economy.

NSC 5602 was circulated to the Council members on 8 February 1956, with notice that it would be considered at an NSC meeting late in the month.¹⁹ The Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared their comments for submission through the Secretary of Defense. They proposed substantive changes in five of the paragraphs.

In its military section, NSC 5602 retained the following text from NSC 5501:

As part of its military forces, the United States must develop and maintain its effective nuclear retaliatory power, and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise. The United States must also continue accelerated military and non-military programs for continental defense.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended adding at this point, "Other essential tasks during the initial period following a possible future attack would require the Navy to clear the ocean lanes, and the Army to do its part in meeting critical land situations." The paragraph had continued with the statement that "so long as the Soviets are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them deliberately to initiate general war." The Joint Chiefs of Staff would add a second element of Soviet uncertainty, regarding their ability "to isolate the United States from the rest of the allied world."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that their changes, while retaining appropriate emphasis on the requirement to maintain effective nuclear retaliatory power, would add other military tasks important to the objectives of the US military

program and would produce a statement more suitably geared to existing collective defense arrangements. Moreover, it was in consonance with the President's letter of 5 January 1955 to the Secretary of Defense. In fact, it was a direct quotation from the letter. The proposal reflected the current strategic doctrine for general war favored by the Army and Navy, which the spokesmen of these two Services were also championing in deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on strategic plans.

In NSC 5602 the previous short statement on US willingness to enter into negotiations had been considerably expanded, to the following:

The United States should continue its readiness to negotiate with the USSR whenever it clearly appears that U.S. security interests will be served thereby. Such negotiations have additional importance in maintaining free world initiative and cohesion and are desirable in order to probe the intentions and expose the meaning of Soviet policies. The United States and its major allies should be prepared to sponsor genuinely reciprocal concessions between the free world and the Communist Bloc which would leave unimpaired the net security position of the free world and which would contribute to the ultimate peaceful resolution of the communist threat.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended substituting the following text, which they thought justified by the history of communist behavior in and following negotiations:

The United States should be ready to negotiate with the USSR whenever it clearly appears that the U.S. security interests will be served thereby. The United States should not, however, make concessions in advance of similar action by the Soviets, in the hope of inspiring Soviet concessions. Until the USSR evidences a modification of its basic hostility toward the non-Communist world through concrete actions, agreements should be dependent upon a balance of advantages to the non-Communist world and not upon implied good will or trust in written agreements.

A new statement appearing in NSC 5602 was an explicit commitment to the goal of disarmament: "The United States in its own interest should . . . actively seek a comprehensive, phased and safeguarded international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments." The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered it essential that the following sentence be added:

The acceptability and character of any international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments depends primarily on the scope and effectiveness of the safeguards against violations and evasions, and especially the inspection system.

In drafting the statement on the mobilization base in NSC 5602, the Planning Board had divided into majority and minority positions, the latter held by the representatives of the Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget. They favored "a mobilization base adequate to maintain military readiness and to provide the basis for successful prosecution of general war," with allowance for estimated

bomb damage and meeting the material requirements of allies. "Emphasis in mobilization planning should be given to the protection of existing critical supplies and facilities from destruction during the initial phases of a nuclear war." The majority offered a broader statement that would encompass these purposes but would also support the prosecution of the succeeding phases of general war and would provide for prompt replenishment of materials that might be expended in military operations below the general war level.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed a revision of the majority's paragraph that would avoid any implication that mobilization base planning could be compartmented into initial phases on the one hand and succeeding stages on the other and that would also tighten the statement by removing certain factors that should more appropriately be treated in war plans. The JCS emphasis on flexibility was clear in the proposed first sentence:

Inasmuch as no one can foresee with certainty the nature and extent of future conflicts in which the United States may become involved, the national mobilization base must be so constituted as to maintain military readiness to enter combat, ranging from local to general war, and to provide the capability of meeting expeditiously the needs of our national effort to bring hostilities to an early and successful conclusion.

The final specific recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the text of NSC 5602 affected one part of the several paragraphs on the critical matter of the use of nuclear weapons and other special capabilities. Here again the draft revision represented an expansion of the NSC 5501 text, leading off with the following new paragraphs:

It is the policy of the United States to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States. Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President.

To the extent that the military effectiveness of the armed forces will be enhanced by their use, the United States will be prepared to use chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons in general war. The decision as to their use will be made by the President.

That nuclear weapons would be integrated in the US arsenal and would be used in general war had been well understood but not previously stated in the basic national security policy paper. When treating the use of nuclear weapons in lesser conflicts, NSC 5501 had included a sentence on the balance of military and political considerations that must be weighed before deciding to employ them. NSC 5602 read, simply, "nuclear weapons will be used . . . in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President," and its description of the forces to be kept ready for such contingencies placed somewhat greater stress than before on the need for a conventional warfare capability. It was notable, too, that the revised passage no longer called for the ready mobile forces to be sufficient "to punish swiftly and severely any such local aggression." It read as follows:

Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, would be adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat or hold, in conjunction with indigenous forces, any such local aggression, pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to suppress quickly the local aggression in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid the hostilities broadening into general war. Such ready forces must be sufficiently versatile to use both conventional and nuclear weapons. They must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. Such forces must not become so dependent on tactical nuclear capabilities that any decision to intervene against local aggression would probably be tantamount to a decision to use nuclear weapons. However, these forces must also have a flexible and selective nuclear capability, since the United States will not preclude itself from using nuclear weapons even in a local situation.

In a further paragraph it was noted that "the apprehensions of U.S. allies as to using nuclear weapons to counter local aggression can be lessened if the U.S. deterrent force is not solely dependent on such weapons." However, if the deterrent failed and local aggression actually occurred, "the United States should, if necessary, make its own decision as to the use of nuclear weapons."

To all the above the Joint Chiefs of Staff offered a single amendment. It was designed to provide somewhat clearer guidance on the circumstances in which nuclear weapons would be employed against localized aggression and was similar to some of the language of NSC 5501 that had been dropped:

Nuclear weapons will be used in general war, and will be used in military operations short of general war when the effectiveness of the operations and capabilities of the U.S. forces employed will be enhanced thereby. For such operations, the decision as to specific uses will be made by the President.

The five proposed amendments to NSC 5602 were for the most part adopted from a report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC).²⁰ But the Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected the JSSC draft of a covering memorandum, which closed with a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense that he concur in the adoption of NSC 5602, subject to the changes, as an acceptable statement of basic national security policy to supersede NSC 5501. Using a forwarding memorandum of their own composition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent their proposed changes to Secretary Wilson on 24 February 1956 with notice that they were more concerned with the overall aspects of NSC 5602, which they judged to be essentially a restatement of the policy contained in NSC 5501:

They feel strongly that there has been a marked deterioration of the Free World position in the past year, due mainly to a new and more flexible approach on the part of the Communist Bloc (USSR). Unless U.S. policy is realistically revised to meet the new Soviet tactics, U.S. leadership of the Free World will be jeopardized.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a complete restudy of basic national security policy as a matter of urgency, regardless of the action taken by the Council on NSC 5602.²¹

Secretary Wilson forwarded the JCS comments to the National Security Council with a strong endorsement. He wrote that the Armed Forces Policy Council had reached the unanimous view that, "while NSC 5602 is some small improvement in detail over NSC 5501, . . . it does not represent the incisive and clear statement of the basic U.S. security policies which we believe is needed to meet the challenge of new Soviet moves." Since the approval of NSC 5501, he continued, Soviet military strength had grown rapidly to the point where the Soviets could be confident of their ability to protect the security of their regime and hold together the communist bloc. As a consequence, Soviet leaders were now moving with "far greater flexibility and assurance to isolate the U.S. from the rest of the free world and to create doubts in the minds of our allies as to U.S. intentions."

In the face of this considerably changed situation, Secretary Wilson strongly recommended "that a number of very fundamental problems confronting us should be thrashed out by a small group meeting with the President," leading to a much shorter, positive and affirmative statement of US policy to meet the challenge of the new Soviet cold war offensive.²²

Neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the Secretary of Defense had felt it necessary to identify the elements of the new Soviet approach in detail. That the Soviet Union had introduced a greater flexibility and a more conciliatory tone into the conduct of its foreign policy since the beginning of 1955 was readily apparent to any informed observer. Already coming into evidence in 1954, the changed attitude had been highlighted by Soviet Premier Georgi M. Malenkov in a rare response to questions from a foreign press representative, which the Soviet news organs published on 1 January 1955. He declared that peace between his country and the United States could best be maintained by basing their relations on recognition of "the possibility and necessity of peaceful coexistence with one another and on consideration for their legal mutual interests." While he did not forego the opportunity to condemn US leadership in the rearmament of West Germany, Malenkov said that the Soviet Union was ready to settle existing differences, bearing in mind that such readiness also should be shown on the part of the United States.²³

Premier Malenkov had made this statement barely a month before taking the unprecedented step of resigning his office. To replace him, the Supreme Soviet named Nikolai A. Bulganin, but the real political power was believed to be in the hands of Nikita S. Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party, who had opposed Malenkov's emphasis on consumer goods production and advocated instead a concentration on building up heavy industry.²⁴

Judging by his position on domestic affairs, Khrushchev might have been expected to revert to a Stalinist hard line in foreign policy, but such was not the case. In the ensuing months, he appeared to be carrying on the relaxation of tensions initiated by Malenkov. On 15 May, the Soviet Government signed the Austrian peace treaty, which had been under negotiation among the victors of World War II since 1946, and in July 1955 the Soviet leaders participated in a summit conference with the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Although no agreements were reached, the occasion raised hopes that the direct communication among the leaders of the world's most

important governments had evoked a spirit of Geneva that would be conducive to the settlement of East-West differences in ensuing negotiations at lower levels.²⁵

The professed devotion to peaceful coexistence had also been manifest in a number of lesser Soviet actions. In June, Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Belgrade, where they took the extraordinary step of confessing Soviet guilt for the rift between their country and Yugoslavia that had persisted since 1948. The Soviet Government also relinquished its bases at Porkalla, Finland, and Port Arthur, China; returned a number of ships received from the United States under Lend-Lease during World War II; and announced a 640,000-man reduction in its armed forces. This last action, according to the Soviet statement, was taken "with a view to promoting the relaxation of international tension and establishing confidence among the nations."²⁶

While these developments in Soviet foreign policy were either of direct advantage to the West or might conceivably develop in that direction, there was another aspect of the new flexibility that had the opposite effect. The Soviet Government had now apparently decided to play down the use or threat of military force and to place greater emphasis on economic moves and other forms of enticement. These efforts seemed particularly successful in the uncommitted lands of Asia and Africa, where the memories of European colonial domination were still fresh. Bulganin and Khrushchev toured India, Burma, and Afghanistan, stressing alleged identity of interest between these countries and the Soviet Union and offering economic and technical aid. Following up on these offers, the Soviet Government negotiated agreements to build a steel mill in India, to pave the streets of Kabul, Afghanistan, and to buy or barter for large quantities of Burmese rice. Of far greater significance than these economic penetrations was the Soviet intrusion into the military balance of power in the Middle East. This intrusion was accomplished by means of a barter agreement reached in September 1955, under which Czechoslovakia was to accept Egyptian cotton in exchange for Soviet bloc military equipment.²⁷

As 1956 began, President Eisenhower in his State of the Union message took note that after the hopeful beginning at the Geneva summit conference the previous July, a further meeting of the foreign ministers in October had demonstrated conclusively that the Soviet leaders were not yet willing to create the indispensable conditions for a secure and lasting peace. Nevertheless, he said, it was clear that the East-West conflict had taken on a new complexion. "Communist tactics against the free nations have shifted in emphasis from reliance on violence and the threat of violence to reliance on division, enticement and duplicity." While maintaining its deterrent military power against possible attack, the United States must also take measures to meet the current Soviet tactics, which posed a dangerous though less obvious threat.²⁸

A Revised National Security Policy: NSC 5602/1

Against this background the National Security Council took up the consideration of NSC 5602 at two meetings on 27 February and 1 March 1956. During

these meetings the recommendation of Secretary Wilson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a much shorter and more positive statement was not pursued. The Council turned its attention instead to the text of NSC 5602 and the proposed amendments to it. Of the five substantive changes suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council readily accepted their version of the mobilization base paragraph and added to the arms control statement the sentence stressing the vital importance of effective inspection procedures. The Council adopted the JCS caution against making concessions in advance or placing trust in Soviet faithfulness to written agreements, but this was entered as an addition to the negotiation paragraph, rather than a substitution for its text as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had wished. The JCS attempt to include specific mention of the missions of the Army and Navy in the initial stages of general war was rejected.

A decision on the final JCS proposal, regarding the use of nuclear weapons in operations short of general war, was deferred after lengthy discussion. In its support, Admiral Radford had explained that nuclear weapons were rapidly being integrated into the armed forces, so that maintaining a distinction between circumstances in which they would or would not be used was becoming steadily more difficult. To this President Eisenhower replied that he agreed from a strictly military point of view, but political realities, namely the opposition of US allies to the use of nuclear weapons, could not be ignored.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles agreed with the President, stressing that a virtually automatic recourse to nuclear weapons when countering local aggression would forfeit the support of allies. But Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey took another view on grounds of cost. Maintaining different kinds of forces for different kinds of wars was too expensive; the United States should use nuclear weapons in all types of warfare. After hearing these views the President ordered the matter held in abeyance. The Council members did not return to it at their further meeting on 1 March, where they reached agreement on all other parts of NSC 5602.

On 15 March 1956 President Eisenhower approved the amended version of the paper, which was issued as NSC 5602/1. The key statement on nuclear weapons had received a slight extension but was otherwise unchanged:

Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President. Such authorization as may be given in advance will be determined by the President.

The parallel passage regarding use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in general war remained, but with radiological weapons omitted, it having been observed that the state of their development made it premature to mention them in the policy. Sponsored by the Department of State, the following paragraph had been added:

If time permits and an attack on the United States or U.S. forces is not involved, the United States should consult appropriate allies before any decision to use nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons is made by the President.²⁹

JCS Reaction to the New National Security Policy

For the remainder of the period covered by this volume, NSC 5602/1 was the formal statement of basic national security policy. In the area of military policy, the new paper, like NSC 5501 before it, fell short of providing the clear guidance the Joint Chiefs of Staff would require to translate basic policy into specific plans and programs. Critical aspects of the policy remained open to interpretation, as would be apparent when it came to apportioning limited resources between the forces to deter or counter a major attack and the forces to oppose other forms of aggression. The new policy simply named both types as essential elements of the US security forces, leaving it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to argue out their differing views on the proper balance to be struck between them.

Similarly, the degree of reliance to be placed on nuclear weapons was not precisely delineated. The policy provided for the use of nuclear weapons in general war and at least contemplated employing them in other military operations. In the future consideration of this matter, some would be impelled toward a greater degree of reliance by the inherent momentum of the increasing availability of nuclear weapons and their integration in the armed forces in numbers that seemed to justify regarding them as conventional armament. The principles of the New Look, which had now shaped the military policy of the United States and the structure of its armed forces for three years, logically pointed toward greater rather than less dependence on nuclear arms. But others would find reason to question a preponderant emphasis on nuclear weapons in those portions of NSC 5602/1 that sketched an approaching state of mutual deterrence and stressed considerations of allied unity, which seemed to make it increasingly less likely that use of the weapons would be found appropriate in most circumstances.

These features of NSC 5602/1, together with the general terms in which most of its provisions were cast, made it possible, as one Chief of the period later pointed out, "to find language in the Basic National Security Policy to support almost any military program."³⁰

The more immediate reaction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was, once again, to the overall aspects of the policy. On 12 March 1956, after the National Security Council had completed its deliberations but three days before the President approved NSC 5602/1, the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed a memorandum on "Military and Other Requirements for Our National Security" to the Secretary of Defense. Closely limited in distribution, the memorandum expressed a grave concern that the manner of implementing US policy did not match the requirements of the peril and urgency cited both in NSC 5501 and in the revised policy statement that was shortly to supersede it.

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in agreement that the military elements of the present national strategy have been generally adequate, they are of the opinion that in spite of our military posture, the free world situation is gradually deteriorating. Unless adequate steps are taken to change this trend, the United States will, in a span of a relatively short number of years, be placed in great jeopardy. Our basic national security objectives remain valid to the extent that they are feasible, but require vigorous new actions if they are to be attained....

The deterioration of the free world position leads the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the conclusion that either the programs for general strategy have not been resolutely implemented or that the general strategy is inadequate to cope with the situation now confronting the United States as the leader of the free world.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were convinced that the problems of the United States in its leadership role were primarily in the political, social, and psychological fields. Specifically, they believed that there was a feeling throughout the world that the United States lacked the essential determination to act in time:

Slowness of reaction time can be a critical weakness in the implementation of any national policy. Decisiveness is endangered by the need to obtain concurrences of our allies and by the requirements of our constitutional processes.

While disclaiming any particular competence in this largely political field, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested three measures that might help restore the confidence of the free world in US national determination: the Congress should grant the President, on request, the authority to take quick action in times of crisis, to include the use of armed forces; the Congress should also grant much broader authority than previously existed to expend funds or deliver equipment without delay for military and economic aid projects; finally, national policy must not include the requirement that major allies always concur in a US determination to oppose aggression. On the last point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that "if there has been any single tendency in the execution of our national security policy which has operated against our national interest in the past few years, it has been an over-concern for the acquiescence of allies in major crises."³¹

The JCS memorandum, to which there is no recorded reply, reflected the same disquiet over a perceived deterioration in the free world position that had earlier led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend a complete restudy of the basic national security policy as a matter of urgency. Even though endorsed by the Secretary of Defense, this course had not been taken by the National Security Council.

Dissatisfaction with the new policy continued within the Department of Defense. Before the paper was two months old, the Under Secretary of the Navy recommended to Secretary Wilson that the Joint Chiefs of Staff undertake an extensive draft revision of NSC 5602/1, to produce a Defense version of the basic national security policy.³² This suggestion was not followed. Instead, many of the critical aspects of the policy were argued out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the course of preparing the joint strategic plans to implement it. As will be recounted in the next chapter, the JCS deliberations more clearly defined the issues and led to further decisions and interpretations by the President and the Secretary of Defense, supplementing the policy in NSC 5602/1.

Strategic Planning

In the National Security Act of 1947 the first listed duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was "to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces." During the first five years following enactment of the basic legislation the Joint Chiefs of Staff discharged their planning responsibility in a rather unsystematic manner. Plans were drawn to meet particular contingencies, but they were not prepared or revised on a regular schedule. The plans were not interrelated in a comprehensive system, nor were they scheduled to provide timely guidance for the necessary annual decisions concerning budgets, force levels, deployments, and mobilization.¹

The JCS Program for Planning

Until late in 1949 the unsystematic approach to planning resulted from the relatively small size of the Joint Staff. The National Security Act Amendments of that year authorized enlarging the Joint Staff to 210 officers, more than doubling the number previously assigned, but not many months later the outbreak of the conflict in Korea imposed new requirements on the JCS supporting organization. Thus, although the Director, Joint Staff, had submitted recommendations for placing JCS planning on a systematic basis as early as December 1949, a formal JCS "Program for Planning" was not adopted until mid-1952.

On 14 July 1952 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued JCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 84, which called for the preparation each year of joint strategic plans for the long, mid, and short range. The Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE) would treat the five-year period starting on 1 July approximately five years after approval of the estimate by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was designed to translate US national policy into long-range supporting military strategy and objectives and also provide guidance for research by identifying desirable objectives for technical development.

The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), the mid-range plan, would apply to the four-year period beginning 1 July three years after approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition to providing strategic guidance for the mid-range period, this plan would provide specific guidance for the pre-D-day development of the forces needed to support it and for the preparation of Service budget requests for the fiscal year beginning two years after the plan was approved. It would also provide guidance for mobilization planning by the Services and the Munitions Board. The plan would have three sections. The first would provide guidance for the preparation of the part of the annual budget dealing with the development of the US and allied military forces needed during peacetime and in military conflict short of total war. The second would guide preparation of the part of the annual budget devoted to supporting the US and allied forces necessary to conduct combat operations during the initial phase of general war. The third would guide preparation of the part of the annual budget addressed to developing the additional forces and resources needed prior to D-day for the mobilization base and to meeting mobilization requirements during 48 months of general war. To assure the orderly implementation, the JSOP was to be ready for JCS consideration by 1 May each year, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to give their final approval by 30 June.

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the short-range plan, assumed that D-day would occur on 1 July following JCS approval. It would guide the employment of available US and allied military forces under conditions of peace, in limited military conflict, and during the initial phase of general war. It would also guide the expansion of US and allied forces during the first 48 months of general war. The JSCP would be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by 1 November each year; they would complete action on it by 31 December.²

From the first, this planning system failed to operate as anticipated. Under the schedule established by Policy Memorandum 84, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have completed the following plans by the end of 1954: two Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimates, covering the period from 1 July 1958 through 30 June 1964; two Joint Strategic Objectives Plans, for D-days of 1 July 1956 and 1 July 1957; and three Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans for fiscal years 1954, 1955, and 1956. But the planning tasks had proved more exacting and the problems of coordination more extensive than expected, and progress had been hindered even more by the fundamental disagreements among the Services over strategic concepts that the effort revealed. As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had completed only one plan, the JSCP for FY 1955, and this was finished more than three months behind schedule. Two plans were in progress at the end of 1954: the next JSCP, for FY 1956, and a Joint Mid-Range War Plan (JMRWP) for a D-day of 1 July 1957. No JLRSE existed even in draft form and none was in sight within the near future. To complete the two plans under preparation became the first order of business for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the field of strategic planning during the period covered by this volume.

The Joint Mid-Range War Plan

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed preparation of the JMRWP as a substitute for JSOP-57, whose preparation had been suspended because of disagreements among the Services over strategy. A plan of somewhat lesser scope than the JSOP, the JMRWP dealt primarily with a general war that might begin on 1 July 1957. It was being prepared to provide the guidance for mobilization and other planning for a general war situation that otherwise would have flowed from the JSOP.

Again, disagreements delayed completion of the plan. In the draft JMRWP it was assumed that general war would probably start with a Soviet atomic onslaught with little or no warning and that the hostilities would fall into two phases: a comparatively short initial phase and a subsequent phase of indeterminate length. This broad conception was accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but they were divided concerning the size and nature of the forces to be mobilized for operations under it. Consideration of these aspects received further impetus from a report in which the Joint Logistics Plans Committee (JLPC) concluded that the force levels in the draft could not be fully supported logistically.³

In the ensuing discussion, the Air Force maintained that the increasing quantity and destructiveness of the nuclear weapons available to both sides made the initial atomic phase of a future war "the primary consideration in all military planning." Air Force spokesmen accepted that there would be a subsequent phase of indeterminate length, but they thought it "unlikely that large-scale military operations in the general pattern of World War II could follow the initial atomic phase of a future war." Accordingly they held that the mobilization base should be designed primarily to sustain the peacetime combat-ready forces-in-being, without contemplating a further major force buildup similar to that accomplished in World War II.

The Army-Navy-Marine Corps view was that the mobilization base should be designed to support a buildup of forces at the maximum rate possible after D-day. This course would afford the United States the flexibility to implement whatever strategy the post-D-day situation might dictate, even to meet the force requirements of the worst conceivable circumstances under the plan.

In views submitted separately, Admiral Radford took a position close to that of the Air Force, though he did accept the possibility that extensive military operations, ultimately employing substantial forces, might be required in the stage subsequent to the initial nuclear exchange. The Chairman's argument turned essentially on the current unpredictability of the outcome of the opening atomic assaults. That stage of the hostilities might be very violent but of short duration, followed by a period of indefinite length during which forces of the Western powers were projected to establish control over the Soviet Union. On the other hand, "each may be so devastated and stunned by an initial exchange of atomic blows as to be incapable of immediate operations to extend control over the other, and the first side to recover would be the ultimate victor."

Certainly a great premium in any event must be placed upon the readiness of our forces in being and those that can quickly be brought to effectiveness by the mobilization of our reserve components. It is essential to the security interests of the United States that adequate measures be taken for the sustained operations of these ready forces regardless of what may be the developments and requirements of combat operations as the war unfolds.

Believing that emphasis should be placed on the forces best suited to ensure survival and subsequent recuperation, the Chairman recommended that the mobilization base "be predicated upon those forces which the individual Services state . . . they can generate within six months after M-day" (or D-day, the two being recognized as identical in the JMRWP). Larger forces might ultimately be required, but those existing or made ready during the first six months were the forces needed "to absorb the initial shock, to deliver our own atomic offensive, and to form the nucleus for such expanded offensives as may be then plainly necessary."

Submitting a full exposition of the divergencies that were delaying completion of the JMRWP, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested guidance from the Secretary of Defense. On 1 November 1954 Mr. Wilson handed down a decision in substantial agreement with the recommendations of the Chairman.⁴ The Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) resumed work on the plan.

Completion of the JMRWP was held up further while awaiting final determination of the overall Service personnel strengths and force levels for FY 1957, on which the force tabulations in the plan must be based. President Eisenhower approved the overall strength figures in early January, and the JSPC submitted the finished plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the end of March. On 15 April 1955, the Joint Mid-Range War Plan for 1 July 1957 received formal JCS approval.⁵

During the initial phase of hostilities, according to the plan, each side would rain nuclear blows on the other. At the same time, Soviet forces would probably try to overrun the strategically important land areas of Europe, the Middle East, the Far East, and Southeast Asia. The United States and its allies would oppose these attacks by conducting strategic defensives while preparing to take the strategic offensive.

The subsequent phase would consist of a period of readjustment and follow-up leading to a conclusion of the war. The duration and nature would depend upon "the relative strategic advantage achieved in the initial phase and our ability to continue to supply our forces overseas." During this phase, the United States and its allies would conduct operations necessary to establish and maintain control of vital areas in the Soviet-communist bloc by launching offensives in Europe while maintaining a strategic defense in other parts of the world.

The estimate of the forces required to carry out the strategy in the plan, to be mobilized over a period of 36 months, was as follows:

Army	85 divisions
Navy	2,745 combatant ships
Air Force	149 wings
Marines	4 divisions and 4 air wings

The Services anticipated that their D-day strengths would be as follows: Army, 19 divisions; Navy, 634 combatant ships; Air Force, 137 wings; and Marine Corps, three divisions and three air wings. To meet the strategic requirements of the plan, 66 Army divisions, 2,111 Navy combatant ships, 11 Air Force wings, and one Marine division would have to be mobilized. In accordance with the instructions by the Secretary of Defense implementing his decision of 2 November 1954, the Services, in their peacetime mobilization preparations, could use only the forces listed in the plan through D+6 months as the basis for appropriations requests. The remaining force mobilization shown in the plan would be the basis for mobilization production planning and for raw materials and stockpiling requirements.⁶

The JMRWP, as originally submitted and approved, contained an estimate of "the type and number of units which nations allied with the United States might be expected to deploy in areas vital to the prosecution of general war in 1957," but the plan did not explain the extent to which the strategy in it depended upon these allied forces. Tabulations of the numbers of allied troops necessary to support the plan would be supplied later.⁷

The fundamental Service disagreements came to the surface once again when the JSPC attempted to supply these tabulations. The Air Force member repeated the arguments of his Service for placing emphasis on ready forces and forces that could become effective by immediate mobilization. He recommended allied force tabs that were considered to be sufficient to "withstand the initial Soviet attacks, deliver the atomic offensive, and form the basis for any additional offensive that might be necessary to achieve U.S. objectives."

The Army and Navy members argued that it was US policy to place maximum reliance on the indigenous forces of allies, particularly ground forces, in any war in which the United States became involved in the near future. Hence they recommended an allied force buildup roughly paralleling that of US forces. Both these force buildups, said the Army and Navy members, were necessary to carry out operations in such strategic areas as Central Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East in light of the Soviet capabilities and expected courses of action. As a result, the JSPC submitted a split recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on allied ground force buildup in numbers of divisions, as follows:⁸

D-day		D+6		D+36	
A-N	AF	A-N	AF	A-N	AF
156½	122½	226½	181½	282½	211½

Early in the JCS consideration of this report, Admiral Radford moved to resolve the split. He suggested to his colleagues on 1 September that the disagreement arose from a misunderstanding of what the Joint Chiefs of Staff expected the JMRWP to accomplish. This misunderstanding was evident, it seemed to him, in an unfortunate statement in the JMRWP to the effect that a list of allied forces necessary to attain US military objectives would be furnished as a basis for computing foreign allied aid. The Chairman believed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not intended the JMRWP to serve as a force requirements or

force objectives plan. They had intended, rather, that it "estimate realistically the allied forces which might be in existence on D-day together with the estimated build-up of those forces through an appropriate period for subsequent computation of requirements for foreign allied aid." In determining the basis for this computation, the forces to be supported should be consistent with, and complementary to, US forces as depicted in the JMRWP. The computation, however, should be kept within reasonable bounds and not permitted to result in astronomical requirements which would tend to discourage the entire effort.

Admiral Radford recommended a solution that paralleled the one he had offered in the fall of 1954 to resolve a similar disagreement over the levels of US forces: the forces to be mobilized by D+6 and to be sustained at that level through D+36 should be used by the Services in computing the requirements for foreign military aid; the further buildup through D+36 should be used in mobilization planning and for determining raw material stockpile requirements. The differing Service recommendations on D+6 force levels should be resolved in favor of the Army and Navy, whose figures, except for Yugoslavia, were generally consistent with the JCS-approved Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) force objectives for the end of calendar years 1956 and 1957. The approved force level for Yugoslavia should be substituted for the Army-Navy figure.⁹

On 7 September 1955 the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted Admiral Radford's view that allied force tabs in the JMRWP should reflect available rather than necessary forces. They also accepted his conception of how these force tabs should be used but approved a different method of recomputing them. Rather than adopt the Army-Navy D+6 figures, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that figures then being developed by the Ad Hoc Committee for Reappraisal of World-Wide MDAP, when approved, would be used for D-day forces. Based on these forces, reasonable and realistic D+1 through D+36 forces would be determined. The Joint Chiefs of Staff returned the report to the JSPC for revision in accordance with these instructions.¹⁰

On 31 January 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the revised tabs containing estimates of the allied forces to be available as possible supplements to US forces in implementing the JMRWP strategy. On the D-day of 1 July 1957 the allied nations would have about 200 divisions of ground troops, 525 squadrons of aircraft, and 2,200 naval vessels. By D+6, these countries were expected to increase their ground forces to about 245 divisions and their sea forces to around 2,685 ships, without enlarging their air forces. By D+36, there would be a further increase in ground strength to approximately 275 divisions. Except at D+36, the approved figures for ground forces were larger than those originally recommended by the Army and Navy members of JSPC.¹¹

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 1956

According to the schedule set by Policy Memorandum 84, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have approved the JSCP for the period 1 July 1955–30 June 1956 by 31 December 1954. At that date, however, the plan was still in preparation,

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had just finished resolving several divergencies that had been preventing the JSPC from completing it.

Contention over three points, in particular, had delayed the planners. The first concerned the way in which a general war would start. The Army member of JSPC sought acknowledgement in the plan that general war might begin not only with a sudden Soviet nuclear onslaught but also through expansion of the fighting set off by a local aggression, in which nuclear weapons were not used at first. The spokesmen of the other Services opposed this, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently resolved the matter in their favor. The effect was to leave unchanged from previous plans the assumption regarding the manner in which general war might start. A similar disposition was made of the second question, having to do with the length of a general war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the view of the JSPC majority, that after the initial exchange of atomic assaults a subsequent period of ground, sea, and air operations of indeterminate length would be required to achieve victory. Thus they rejected the conception argued for by the Air Force JSPC member, that such a war would end quickly in favor of the side that inflicted the greater damage on the other in an exchange of nuclear blows.

The third point at issue was a derivative of the second and had to do with the length of time for which force tabs should be projected. In keeping with its concept of a short war, the Air Force maintained that the projection should extend only through D+12 months, while the other Services thought it should run through D+48, as provided by Policy Memorandum 84. The Joint Chiefs of Staff set it at D+30.¹²

By the beginning of 1955, all these disagreements had been resolved. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee was now able to produce an agreed draft JSCP, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved it on 30 March, three months behind schedule.

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan dealt with situations of general war, military operations short of general war, and cold war. In assessing the dangers confronting the United States during fiscal year 1956, the JSCP concluded that the Soviet Union probably would not precipitate general war because of the nuclear damage it would suffer as a result. The Soviets were more likely to use their growing atomic strength "as a means of waging intensified political warfare while attempting to gain their objectives through local military actions in areas where the fundamental strengths of the USSR would not be exposed."

In a section dealing with the threat from this level of Soviet activity, the JSCP reiterated the policy laid down in NSC 5501, the current basic national security policy: the US purpose should be to deter local aggression or punish it severely and swiftly should it occur. The JSCP, in addition, listed certain specific commitments under conditions other than general war. These included: defending Taiwan, the Philippines, Korea, and Japan; preparing plans to defend Iran and Southeast Asia against communist internal subversion or overt aggression; and joining with other countries in hemisphere defense under the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. To deal with contingencies short of general war, the plan listed the following forces expected to be available on 1 July 1955: Army, 17 divisions; Navy, 398 combatant ships; Air Force, 121 wings; Marine Corps, three divisions and three air wings.

In the unlikely event that general war should occur during the year of the plan, the JSCP concluded that the Soviet Union would attempt to protect its own people and territory from nuclear devastation by air defense measures and by an initial attack aimed at neutralizing or destroying the weapons of the United States and its allies. The Soviet Union would then pursue its ultimate goal of world domination by seeking to: overrun all of Europe, including the British Isles; capture strategic areas in the Middle East, Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, and Macao; and gain communist control over Southeast Asia and Indonesia. The United States and its allies would resist these attacks by striking at the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons and by land, naval, and air operations designed initially to halt the Soviet invasions and ultimately to occupy key areas of the Soviet Union.

A general war would consist of two phases: (1) a comparatively short initial phase consisting of an intensive exchange of nuclear blows and the beginning of air, sea and ground operations and deployments designed to achieve strategic advantage; (2) a subsequent phase of indeterminate length consisting of followup operations to achieve victory and attain the war objectives of the allied powers.

In the first phase, the United States would exploit its nuclear superiority to the full in order to inflict such losses on the enemy that he would capitulate, or, at the least, to provide a margin of strategic advantage to the United States and its allies that would enable them to gain a victory during the subsequent phase. The Western powers would also retain as much territory as possible. In Europe, the initial defense would be along the Rhine-Ijssel line, with a final line of defense on the Pyrennees and the Alps. The minimum areas to be held were the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, parts of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, and strong points in Norway. In the Middle East, the allies would retain control of the Suez-Aden-Cairo area. In the Far East, they would hold the line running along the Kra Isthmus-South China Sea-Japan Sea-Bering Sea-Bering Straits.

Operations in the subsequent phase, to be determined by results achieved during the initial phase, would aim at defeating and destroying the remaining communist forces and seizing vital areas of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The general pattern of operations would probably be to launch a strategic offensive in Europe and maintain a strategic defensive in other areas. The offensive in Europe could consist either of a main drive through the North German-Polish plain, supported by a secondary effort in Southeastern Europe, or a main effort in Southeast Europe and a secondary operation in Central Europe.

The JSCP estimated the forces available to support this strategy through D+30 months as follows:

	D-Day	D+6	D+30
Army (divisions)	17	28	82
Navy (combatant ships)	326	357	518
Air Force (wings)	121	124	142
Marine Corps (division/wings)	3	4	4

The mobilization estimates, however, were of doubtful validity because they took no account of the effects of Soviet nuclear attacks, an omission caused by the absence of approved bomb damage factors.¹³

Revision of the Program for Planning

By the summer of 1955 it was apparent that the program for planning adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1952 needed refinement. A revision of Memorandum of Policy 84 was accordingly prepared and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 July.

It made two significant changes affecting the JSOP. The first had to do with the nature of budgetary guidance to be provided by the plan. It was now to furnish one of the bases for the annual JCS statement of military requirements for the Secretary of Defense, to be used by him in developing his annual budgetary guidelines for the fiscal year beginning two years after the scheduled date of approval of the plan. Further, instead of providing the elaborate three-part guidance to the Services called for by the original program, the JSOP would simply stand as one of the bases for preparation of the departmental budget requests for the fiscal year two years after the scheduled approval of the plan. The second change was a revision of the timetable, so that the plan now would cover a period of 36 months beginning on 1 July four years after approval, rather than three years. The reason for this change was that the original three-year interval had been found to allow insufficient time to procure the equipment necessary to fulfill the requirements of the plan.

The program also introduced a change in the time period of the JSCP. Under the terms of the new directive, the period the JSCP would be in effect was extended from one to three years until 1 November 1956, when the effective period would be reduced to two years and continue thereafter.¹⁴

Issues in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for 1957

Preparation of the JSCP for the period 1 July 1956–30 June 1957 began in July 1955. But basic disagreements over strategy delayed submission of an approved report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee until 13 March 1956.¹⁵ Agreement in the Joint Strategic Plans Committee had finally been achieved as the result of two concessions by the Air Force at the Operations Deputies level.

The first was the admission that general war might result from a "series of actions and counteractions between the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the United States and its Allies which neither side originally intended to lead to general war," as well as from a Soviet atomic onslaught with little or no warning. The second was that, in the event of a general war growing out of a low-level confrontation, both sides might possibly seek to postpone or avoid large-scale use of atomic weapons

and that a condition of general war was possible without an all-out atomic exchange. All the Operations Deputies agreed, however, that such a condition would be unlikely to exist for long. Its end would probably come whenever the Soviets attempted to use their superior conventional forces to overrun allied strategic areas. In those circumstances the United States and its allies would be compelled to use nuclear weapons to conduct an effective defense, resulting in an all-out nuclear exchange.¹⁶

The first of these changes in the JSCP concept conformed to a statement in the then-current basic national security policy paper, NSC 5501. The second change had no such antecedent, and it drew a strong reaction from Admiral Radford. In a memorandum to the other JCS members on 28 March 1956, he declared that inclusion in the plan of the possibility that atomic weapons would not be used from the outset of general war was a radical departure from the present approved policy. Not only did approved national policy provide for employment of atomic weapons in general war, he wrote, it clearly stated that they would be used in hostilities short of general war as authorized by the President. "It is on the basis of this policy that the United States has developed its forces and force objectives and its over-all defense program. It should follow, therefore, that the strategic concept would support this policy and utilize these approved forces." Moreover, he wrote, the policy was firmly set. It had recently been reaffirmed in detail by the approval of NSC 5602/1. Therefore the Chairman wished to bring his statement to the attention of the planners at all levels, so that there could be no question as to the concept which should be used in revision of current plans and the development of new ones.¹⁷

On 3 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff met in executive session in Admiral Radford's office to discuss the strategic concept for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. At the conclusion of the meeting they approved the following as guidance for the Joint Staff:

- a.* Atomic weapons will be used against the USSR when USSR forces attack the United States or U.S. forces.
- b.* Atomic weapons will be used not only in a war with the USSR, but in other military operations when it is to the advantage of the United States to do so and as authorized by the President.¹⁸

The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1960

Two days later Admiral Radford directed that this guidance be issued as applying to all joint strategic planning, an action that was, in his opinion, in accord with the consensus of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed at the 3 April meeting. The plan primarily affected by this directive was JSOP-60, which had been under preparation by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee since August 1955.¹⁹

General Taylor found himself in disagreement with Admiral Radford's action in extending the guidelines to the JSOP. In a memorandum on 12 April he pointed out that it was acceptable to plan on atomic retaliation to even the small-

est Soviet attack during the period of JSCP-56 through JSCP-57 because the United States would still possess a preponderance of atomic weapons. But by 1960, the beginning of the applicable period of the JSOP, the Soviet Union would have achieved atomic parity with the United States. In those circumstances, to continue to follow the concept that the United States would initiate all-out atomic warfare in response to any Soviet attack of whatever size or nature would be to risk national survival in every instance. Moreover, the shaping of US forces to fulfill such a strategy, within overall budget limitations, would probably result in a decreasing capability to deal with situations short of general atomic warfare.

This deficiency would be a most serious one since there is every indication that the USSR, recognizing the unprofitable character of general nuclear war, will seek to achieve its ends through subversion, infiltration and local aggression in situations to which general atomic warfare, with its attendant risks, is not an appropriate response. Such erosive activities might take place anywhere about the Communist periphery, to include the NATO area where the satellites offer a useful cover to Soviet manipulators.

General Taylor believed that guidance more compatible with the anticipated conditions of 1960 was necessary for JSOP planning, for otherwise "we could become so dependent on atomic weapons that our only response to Communist provocation would be submission or the staking of our survival on the gamble of general atomic war." To avoid commitment to "any such form of dead-end military policy," he recommended that the chief point in the guidance be stated as follows:

Atomic weapons will be used in general war as authorized by the President. It may be anticipated that such authorization will be granted immediately if USSR forces attack the continental United States or attack U.S. forces overseas in such force as to threaten their survival.

In calculating the forces to support the strategy of JSOP-60, the planners should provide for both "an ample deterrent nuclear capability" and "ample forces of all services with the capability of waging limited war with conventional weapons or tactical atomic weapons."²⁰

On 17 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted substantially the wording recommended by General Taylor concerning the use of nuclear weapons in general war. They rejected his amplifying guidance on the development of US forces, adopting language that more nearly suggested the objectives he had cited were already being taken into account. The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the following guidance for preparation of both JSOP-60 and JSCP-57:

- a. Atomic weapons will be used when USSR forces attack the United States or attack U.S. military forces overseas in a manner which threatens their survival.
- b. Atomic weapons will be used not only in a war with the USSR, but in other military operations when it is to the advantage of the United States to do so and as authorized by the President.

c. Insofar as active force requirements are concerned, our present force structure is in general adequate to cover the military contingencies we might face in the planning period to be covered at this time in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.²¹

The apparent agreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the employment of nuclear weapons proved to be of short duration. Navy and Air Force members envisaged an intensive nuclear exchange, which would prove decisive. Army and Marine Corps members, however, believed the superpowers might confine themselves to conventional weapons. Even if a nuclear exchange ensued, they felt, subsequent operations still might prove sizeable.²²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff met with the Secretary of Defense in his office on 21 May to discuss the divergencies, and on the following day the Secretary and Admiral Radford discussed them with President Eisenhower.²³ After the White House meeting Secretary Wilson informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he concurred in the draft submitted by the Chairman, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff, Air Force, and he directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to proceed with planning in accordance with it.²⁴ Thus the Secretary, with the evident approval of the President, endorsed a paper that included the following statements:

In a general war, regardless of the manner of initiation, atomic weapons will be used from the outset.

In military operations short of general war, atomic weapons will be used when required in order to achieve military objectives.

This was a significant extension of the wording in NSC 5602/1, the basic national security policy paper adopted barely two months earlier, which read, simply, "Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President."

With the disagreement on these aspects of the concept resolved by higher authority, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee now completed a draft of JSOP-60 and submitted it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 May. To deal with limited conflicts, the draft JSOP-60 called for a policy similar to but more specific than the one enunciated in the JSCP for FY 1956. Whereas the earlier plan had merely called for maintaining forces capable of deterring local aggression or punishing it severely should it occur, JSOP-60 specified that forces should be positioned near potential trouble spots. In the unlikely event of general war, the JSOP specified the strategy approved by the Secretary of Defense on 22 May: general war, which would probably begin with a sudden all-out Soviet nuclear attack but might possibly grow out of a limited conflict, would consist of an initial phase of nuclear exchanges, followed by a subsequent phase of undeterminable nature in which the United States and its allies would follow up the advantage gained in the initial phase and achieve final victory.

To implement this strategy, the draft JSOP-60 contained the following force buildup figures supplied individually by the Services: Army, from 19 divisions on D-day to 40 by D+6 and 85 by D+36; Navy, from 647 combatant ships on D-day to 1,616 on D+6 and 2,717 on D+36; Air Force, from 132 wings on D-day to

129 on D+6 and 100 on D+36. This decline in air strength reflected the Air Force view that enemy atomic attacks would make a large-scale mobilization impossible and that general war would be fought with the forces on hand on D-day. The force tabs of the other Services took no account of the effects of enemy atomic attacks, but in a separate annex dealing with the subject the draft JSOP noted that damage from atomic attacks would severely impair the national capability to maintain the projected mobilization schedule. It was concluded, however, that the concepts and forces in the plan provided an acceptable basis for proceeding with the mobilization planning cycle.

This apparent agreement on force tabs, however, concealed interservice differences similar to those that had plagued strategic planning throughout the period. In the draft plan, they were not presented as split views but as comments by each Service member on the force tabs of the others. Although there were many specific criticisms levelled by each Service, an old dispute again arose. The Air Force member saw no need for planning beyond the initial phase of a general war. That approach, Army and Navy members objected, would favor Air Force objectives unduly.²⁵

Before the Joint Chiefs of Staff took up the proposed JSOP-60, their Operations Deputies succeeded in resolving the disagreement over the length of the mobilization projections. On 11 June, they approved use of the formula that had appeared in JMRWP-57: force tabs would show mobilization schedules from D-day to D+6 months and would be the basis for Service mobilization planning and peacetime appropriations requests.²⁶

Neither the Operations Deputies nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff were able to resolve the disagreement over the numbers of B-52s, however, and this matter was finally referred to the Secretary of Defense for decision.²⁷ Meanwhile a more serious difference of opinion had arisen, which was soon to lead to a temporary abandonment of the effort to produce a JSOP. Upon reviewing the force tabs accompanying the JSOP, Admiral Radford had concluded that the forces listed were not reasonably attainable under any realistic assumptions regarding future budgets. He noted that the combined estimates of the individual Services regarding the cost of supporting and modernizing the D-day forces amounted to \$47.1 billion for FY 1958, \$47.9 billion for FY 1959, and \$47.8 billion for FY 1960. When military assistance and Atomic Energy Commission fund commitments were added, a total annual national defense expenditure of some \$51 to \$52 billion would result. These were figures that could hardly be considered practicable over the long pull even for a country with the resources of the United States. Not only were the force tabs prohibitively expensive in the Chairman's opinion, he did not believe that they adequately reflected the strategy contained in the plan.

As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense on 20 June 1956 about their split over the number of B-52s as well as the Chairman's dissenting position on the cost and appropriateness of the force tabs as a whole. The Service members recommended that the Secretary approve the JSOP after settling the B-52 issue. Admiral Radford recommended that he return the plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for further study, with certain understandings. These included that "there are general fiscal limitations if our national economy is to

remain sound over the long pull," and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff might properly comment upon and recommend changes to any aspect of national policy where this would permit a reduction in the force requirements.²⁸

The Secretary of Defense, stating that he concurred with the Chairman's views, returned JSOP-60 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for restudy the same day. In making their reappraisal the Joint Chiefs of Staff were authorized to use for planning purposes both in obligations and expenditures for the Department of Defense military programs, exclusive of military aid programs, the following amounts: "Fiscal Year 1958, \$38 billion; Fiscal Year 1959, \$39 billion; Fiscal Year 1960, \$40 billion." These figures, commented the Secretary, were the ones the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed him, as recently as 12 March 1956, would be adequate to maintain present force levels and deployments.²⁹

Before this review had progressed very far, the Chairman explained more fully the rationale of his belief that the force tabs in JSOP-60 failed to reflect the strategic concept in the plan. On 5 July he gave each of his colleagues a copy of a memorandum recommending drastic revisions in current US military policy, by the application of certain fundamental considerations: force tabs should be designed primarily to deal with the greatest danger, which the Chairman considered to be a general war starting with an all-out surprise atomic attack, but should also provide a capability to conduct operations short of general war; the continued economic strength of the United States should be considered "significant and important"; deployments of military forces abroad should be reduced as much as practicable in order to attain greater flexibility in military planning; and the United States should make unmistakably clear to the rest of the world that, in the event of Soviet or communist-inspired aggression, the United States would instantly support its allies by the use of atomic weapons to the fullest extent required.

Application of these considerations, in the Chairman's view, called for a reduction of Army forces overseas to small atomic-armed task forces, employment of Army forces in the Continental United States in civil defense missions, assignment to a reduced but atomic-armed Marine Corps of responsibility for limited war operations, drastic reduction of tactical air forces and air and sealift, retention and modernization of SAC and Navy ASW and strategic striking forces at existing levels, and limitation of the mobilization base to support of D-day forces only.³⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff took up the Chairman's proposals in executive session on 9 July. General Taylor attacked them as constituting an unacceptable military program for the United States. He found that the Radford proposals gave foremost importance to the forces for what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already agreed in the JSOP was a highly improbable form of war. The forces in question were, particularly, those of the Strategic Air Command, continental air defense, and ASW. These would become sterile assets in operations short of general war—the type of conflict named in JSOP-60 as the most likely during the period under consideration.

At the same time, in General Taylor's opinion, the forces capable of conducting limited war operations to be provided under the Chairman's plan were inadequate. Such forces should consist of mobile, ready ground and tactical air forces

suitably deployed in forward locations, backed up by other mobile forces in the Continental United States. "The small atomic task forces . . . cannot substitute for forces able to seize and hold ground." Even the forces required for the strategic defensive in Europe, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed in JSOP-60 should be conducted during the initial phase of general war operations, would be abolished under the Chairman's plan.

Admiral Radford's proposals, continued the Army Chief of Staff, would also have serious political repercussions. By placing such great reliance on atomic weapons, they would have a grave effect on the attitude of powers allied to the United States. Since general atomic warfare would threaten the continued existence of all the participants, allied nations would doubt that the United States would resort to it except where its own survival was concerned. They would doubt that the United States would use atomic weapons against local Soviet aggression and would be reluctant to contemplate having their territories, if occupied, liberated by atomic operations. General Taylor believed that the unilateral reduction of US deployments implied in the Chairman's proposals would shake the foundation of the NATO alliance.³¹

As General Taylor later recalled, his presentation was greeted by silence from the other members. The meeting ended without any agreement having been reached.³²

The JCS consideration was not resumed, however, owing to the fact that a few days later the *New York Times* printed the substance of the Radford proposals. Also included in this front-page story on 13 July was a statement that Admiral Radford had recommended reducing the armed forces by about 800,000 men in 1960. Actually, no personnel figures of any kind were included in the Radford paper; a figure approximating 800,000 did appear in a draft Chairman's memorandum prepared by the Chairman's Staff Group but never distributed. Where the *New York Times* got the figure, as well as its other information, was never discovered.³³

The disclosure, however, aroused sharp protests. At home, Representative Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said an 800,000-man cut would be dangerous and that national security could not tolerate it. Senator Stuart Symington said a revision of US foreign policy might be necessary if the Radford plan was adopted.³⁴

Abroad there were reactions of alarm among the NATO countries over the implications of a major cutback in US forces. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany was particularly concerned and dispatched a high military official, Lieutenant General Adolf Heusinger, to Washington for consultations. Meeting on 26 July with General Taylor, who was representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Heusinger explained the adverse effect any US or British troop withdrawal from Germany would have on the German rearmament then just beginning. He asked for, and received, assurances that the United States did not contemplate any such withdrawal.³⁵

In these circumstances Secretary Wilson ordered an indefinite suspension of the preparation of JSOP-60. Ultimately the suspension extended for six months, and JSOP planning was resumed early in 1957.³⁶

Completion of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for 1957

The Joint Chiefs of Staff now turned their attention to the draft of JSCP-57, which the Joint Strategic Plans Committee had submitted on 20 June 1956. The strategic concept in the plan was similar to that in JSOP-60 with regard to both general war and operations short of general war. In keeping with the instructions in Policy Memorandum 84, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee included force tabs showing not only D-day forces but the expansion of forces through D+36 months.³⁷

When considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, these force buildup projections encountered the same objections that similar data had raised in the JSOP. Admiral Radford and General Twining opposed projecting the force tabs to D+36 and recommended limiting them to D+6, as had been done in JSOP-60. Admiral Burke objected even to the inclusion of the D+6 projection in its current form. He pointed out, first, that the projection was unrealistic because it took no account of atomic bomb damage, and second, that the plan did not contain force tabs to show forces that might reasonably be mobilized prior to D-day in a situation where general war grew out of lesser hostilities. He proposed, as a solution, to relabel the D+6 force tabs M+6 and to delete projections beyond that date. General Taylor, while conceding that mobilization capabilities beyond D-day could not be accurately predicted, objected to this cutoff on the ground that it prejudged the length of a future war. Such action, he maintained, could lead to serious personnel and materiel shortages. As a compromise, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to modify Admiral Burke's proposal to provide that the M+6 force levels would be maintained and supported for the duration of hostilities. They returned the plan to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee for appropriate revisions.³⁸

By the time the Joint Chiefs of Staff had resolved this matter, it was 10 October. Since the plan was to have taken effect on the preceding 1 July, they revised the effective period to be from date of issue until 30 June 1958. They had already, on 26 June, continued JSCP-55 through JSCP-56 in effect pending distribution of JSCP-57.³⁹

On 17 December, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee submitted the revised JSCP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who approved it four days later. Except for its updated force tabs and conformance to the change made in other plans during 1956 to recognize the possibility that general war might arise out of local conflict, the new JSCP was substantially the same as its predecessor. It contained a statement on atomic damage to the United States in general war that was the same as the one incorporated in JSOP-60, and, as in that plan, the assessment had not been taken into account in the force tabulations. These tabulations showed M-day forces of 19 Army divisions, 608 Navy combatant ships, and 133 $\frac{1}{3}$ Air Force wings. The M+6 forces were 31 Army divisions, 1,354 Navy combatant ships, and 170 $\frac{2}{3}$ Air Force wings.⁴⁰

Progress in Planning, 1955–1956

In terms of meeting the schedule of the joint program for planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff achieved little if any improvement during 1955 and 1956 over their performance during the preceding period. According to Policy Memorandum 84, they should have completed during these two years: two Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimates, two Joint Strategic Objectives Plans, and two Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans. By 31 December 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had completed only one of these scheduled plans, a JSCP originally intended for fiscal year 1957 but extended because of time lag through fiscal year 1958. They had also taken final action on two plans, JMRWP-57 and JSCP-56, that should have been finished by the end of 1954.

Basic disagreements among the Services over strategic concepts had contributed in large measure to these shortcomings in planning. In existence at the beginning of 1955, the disagreements were, if anything, more intense by the end of 1956. Although it was now accepted that general war might grow out of a series of minor clashes as well as result from a sudden Soviet nuclear onslaught, the Service differences over the nature of general war and the forces necessary to wage it remained.

With regard to the type and size of forces needed for limited war situations, the differing opinions of some of the spokesmen had been further delineated. General Taylor called for developing forces of all Services with the capability of waging limited war with conventional weapons or tactical atomic weapons, but in numbers sufficient to allow conventional warfare to remain an available alternative, and indeed the preferred one. In contrast, Admiral Radford wanted a reduction in total numbers and favored waging conflicts of this type with small nuclear-armed task forces. General Taylor strongly opposed this concept, and for other reasons the Chairman's proposal was not pursued to a decision, but it appears doubtful that any of the other JCS members were prepared to endorse it fully in mid-1956.

Yet Admiral Radford's conception was readily defensible in the light of the pronouncements the Secretary of Defense had made on 23 May 1956, after consulting the President. If the United States were to rely on nuclear weapons to the degree suggested in the Secretary's guidance, then the Chairman's proposals represented a logical reordering of the US forces in conformance with it. General Taylor's opposition, in turn, was based on considerations that he judged would increasingly inhibit a decision to resort to nuclear arms. Although these considerations had already received some mention in the basic national security policy, in his opinion their implications were not yet being given due weight.

General Ridgway, in a final letter to the Secretary of Defense in June 1955, had looked to an approaching situation in which mutual deterrence might be expressed "in terms of mutually limited use; or, finally in common refusal to use nuclear weapons at all." In the light of this major possibility for the future, he wrote, "it is at least debatable whether the United States really has the freedom to rely preponderantly on nuclear weapons to exert its military power."⁴¹

By mid-1956 the debate General Ridgway had anticipated was in its opening stages, with his successor as Army Chief of Staff assuming a principal role. Looking forward to a period of substantial nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, which was already coming within the range of JSOP planning, General Taylor had begun to stress the growing unlikelihood of full atomic warfare, the declining credibility of massive nuclear response as a deterrent to other types of Soviet incursions, and, hence, the need for greater emphasis within the US defense establishment on the development of forces capable of dealing with the local aggressions and communist-supported insurrections that seemed the most likely type of conflict in the future. This line of thought and the world conditions to which it related would pose an increasing challenge to some of the well established precepts of the New Look, and debate on these issues would carry on well into the years beyond 1956.

Force Levels for the Budget

The broad statements of basic national policy and the strategic plans drawn up to support them were, by themselves, merely statements of intent. Until Congress had appropriated the necessary funds and the military establishment had converted the funds into forces, none of these policies or strategies could be carried out. The formulation of the military budget was, therefore, a critical operation in determining military policy, but it was one in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff played only a secondary role. They did not participate directly in preparing the money requests, a function assigned under the National Security Act of 1947 to the three military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The sole listed function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this area was to "prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for information and consideration in connection with the preparation of budgets, statements of military requirements based upon United States strategic considerations, current national security policy, and strategic war plans."¹

The Secretary of Defense, on the basis of such a JCS statement and in the light of political and economic considerations expressed by the President and the Bureau of the Budget, transmitted guidance to the military departments, which then prepared the budget estimates. These estimates were reviewed and refined by the Department of Defense Comptroller, working closely with the Bureau of the Budget, and then sent forward as the Department of Defense Budget for presentation by the President to Congress.

New Look Force Levels

The Eisenhower administration, when it entered office in January 1953, inherited armed forces that had been built up to meet the demands of the Korean conflict. These forces, and the major combat units into which they were organized, were as follows:²

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	<i>Personnel</i>	<i>Units</i>
Army	1,523,152	20 divisions
Navy	802,453	1,116 ships
Marine Corps	229,245	3 divisions 3 wings
Air Force	957,603	98 wings
Total	3,512,453	

President Eisenhower and his leading advisers believed these forces to be excessive in size and cost to peacetime needs. In the New Look at military policy taken during 1953, one result was NSC approval in December of JCS recommendations for scaling down the armed forces. These recommendations, contained in JCS 2101/113, called both for an overall reduction in personnel and for a reapportionment of Service strengths to reflect the New Look emphasis on nuclear airpower. The result would be a gain for the Air Force in both personnel and major combat units while the other Services declined. The new personnel ceilings and force composition, to be achieved by 30 June 1957, were as follows:³

	<i>Personnel</i>	<i>Units</i>
Army	1,000,000	14 divisions
Navy	650,000	1,030 ships
Marine Corps	190,000	3 divisions 3 wings
Air Force	975,000	137 wings
Total	2,815,000	

A gradual reduction toward these force goals was scheduled to begin in the military program for FY 1955. By mid-1954, however, French reverses in Indochina caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conclude that the phasedown of military strength toward the objectives of JCS 2101/113 should be abandoned or at least suspended. They recommended, and Secretary Wilson approved, force levels for FY 1956 that permitted the Air Force to complete its planned expansion two years early, while the other Services continued without change from 1955. The personnel figures, to apply to both the beginning and end of FY 1956, and the major units they would support were as follows:⁴

	<i>Personnel</i>	<i>Units</i>
Army	1,173,000	19 divisions
Navy	682,000	1,131 ships
Marine Corps	215,000	3 divisions 3 wings
Air Force	975,000	130 wings
Total	3,045,000	

This program, however, was never put into effect. On 9 December 1954, President Eisenhower announced a figure of 2,815,000 men for the Services for the end

of FY 1956. This was, of course, the JCS 2101/113 force level, but now it was to be reached a year earlier than originally planned. At the same time, the President announced revised personnel ceilings for end FY 1955 of 2,940,000, to be distributed as follows: 1,100,000 to the Army; 870,000 to the Navy and Marine Corps; and 970,000 to the Air Force.⁵

General Ridgway opposed the full planned reduction in Army forces and, with some support from Admiral Carney and General Shepherd, carried his appeal to the President. At a meeting with Secretary Wilson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President agreed to raise the ceiling for all Services by 35,000 men, to be allocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 6 January 1955, Secretary Wilson approved a JCS recommendation that the additional manpower be distributed among the Services as follows:⁶

	<i>Increase</i>	<i>New End Strength FY 1956</i>
Army	25,000	1,025,000
Navy	7,000	657,000
Marine Corps	3,000	193,000
Air Force		975,000
Total	35,000	2,850,000

Implementing Accelerated Reduction: Revised Force Structure for FY 1955 and 1956

President Eisenhower's decision to speed up the achievement of the New Look force goals made necessary a reduction of the force structure already approved for fiscal years 1955 and 1956. This process had been begun by Secretary Wilson on 9 December 1954, immediately after President Eisenhower's original announcement of the force reduction, with a request for JCS views on changes in FY 1955 and 1956 forces necessitated by the reductions and on the forces to be maintained during FY 1957.⁷

On 22 December the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a revised list of major units to the Secretary, but a week later Mr. Wilson sought fuller information. He requested recommendations on the deployment of US forces, as well as a "detailed analysis of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to the composition of those forces, reserve as well as active, supporting as well as combat."⁸ To meet the Secretary's deadline of 10 January 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted an interim report listing the force composition that they believed represented the optimum combat effectiveness that could be achieved within the approved personnel programs for each Service.

To meet the cuts in manpower, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called for reductions in the forces they had recommended in August 1954 for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps and no change in those planned for the Air Force. The Army would suffer a greater loss of effective combat units than any other Service. The

19 combat-ready, or mobile, divisions the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended earlier were to drop to 15 by 30 June 1955 and to 13 by 30 June 1956, continuing at that level thereafter. The total number of divisions listed was larger than this, however. Beginning in 1955, the roster would show several static and training divisions, created by grouping certain Army units in the United States in divisional organizations. For 30 June 1955, two static and three training divisions, plus the 15 mobile divisions, would yield a total of 20. Reduction by two mobile divisions by 30 June 1956 would make the total figure 18, and deletion of one static division during the following year would lower the total Army divisions to 17 by 30 June 1957.

Under the JCS recommendations, the Marine Corps was still to maintain three ground divisions, three air wings, and combat support forces consisting of artillery, tank, and engineer units. The losses in personnel were to be applied to these supporting units, whose manning levels would drop to 58 percent by 30 June 1957. The divisions and wings would be maintained at full war strength. The effect, as General Shepherd explained to the Senate Appropriations Committee, was that the Marine Corps would not have the combat and logistic support necessary for its three divisions and wings in sustained combat.⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended for the Navy a decrease in ships from the 1,131 previously recommended to 1,066 to be achieved by 30 June 1955. By the end of the next fiscal year the number of ships would decline to 1,001. By 30 June 1957 the figure would have risen slightly, with the Navy attaining a strength of 1,010 ships, of which 414 were to be major combatant types. Without waiting for the detailed report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Wilson gave general approval to their interim recommendations on 18 January.¹⁰ The JCS recommendations for and the Secretary of Defense decision on the force structure for FY 1955 as well as for the successive three fiscal years are shown in Table 1.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 March 1955 submitted their detailed recommendations, which reaffirmed their earlier estimates. In this submission they pointed out that certain of the reductions in the Navy and Air Force involved calculated risks. The Navy's amphibious capabilities had been reduced by about one-third in order to maintain strength in antisubmarine and offensive strike forces. In the case of the Air Force, troop carrier wings were to be reduced from 16 in existence on 20 June 1954 to 11 by 30 June 1957, in order to apply available resources primarily to forces needed to counter the threat of Soviet atomic attack.

The Army and Marine Corps found these calculated risks unacceptable. During the development of the JCS recommendations, both Services objected to the limited amphibious lift planned by the Navy. The Army also opposed the reduction in the amount of airlift to be provided. With regard to amphibious lift, the Army contended the Navy plans were inadequate to meet the requirements of NSC policy, international agreements, and war plans for the Army to deploy and support 73 divisions by D+24 months of a general war. The Marine Corps, while not mentioning a specific number of divisions requiring support, contended that amphibious forces as planned by the Navy would restrict the surface forces largely to protected and undamaged port destinations, thereby imposing a serious restriction on the overall strategic capability of US and Allied forces. As for

Table 1—Force Structure Recommendations, FYs 1955–1958

Service	1955		1956		1957		1958	
	JCS Rec ^a	Exec Br Dec ^b	JCS Rec ^a	Exec Br Dec ^c	JCS Rec ^d	Exec Br Dec ^e	JCS Rec ^f	Exec Br Dec ^g
Army								
Division	20	20	18	18	19	19	19	17
(Mobile)	(15)	(15)	(13)	(13)	(15)			
(Static)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(1)			
(Training)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)			
Regt/RCT	10	10	10	11	10	10	10	9
AA BNS	126	126	129	136	143	144	144	126
Atomic Spt Cmds							6	
Navy								
Ships	1,066	1,066	1,001	1,000	1,005	1,005	1,005	980
(Major Combat)	(406)	(406)	(405)	(405)	(412)	(411)	(411)	(422)
[CVA]	[15]	[15]	[15]	[15]	[15]	[15]	[15]	
[Other]	[391]	[391]	[390]	[390]	[397]	[396]	[396]	
(Support and Minor Combat)	(660)	(660)	(596)	(595)	(593)	(594)	(594)	
Marines								
Divisions	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Wings	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Air Force								
Wings	121	121	130	131	137	137	137	128
(Strategic)	(46)	(46)	(52)		(51)	(51)	(51)	(45)
(Air Defense)	(29)	(29)	(32)		(34)	(32)	(32)	(32)
(Tactical)	(33)	(33)	(35)		(41)	(41)	(41)	(51)
(Troop Carrier)	(13)	(13)	(11)		(11)	(13)	(13)	*

* Included in "Tactical" figure.

Sources:

^a App A, B, and C to JCS 1800/234, 11 Jan 55.

^b N/H of JCS 1800/234, 19 Jan 55.

^c Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956, Defense Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong, 1st sess, 1955, pp. 7–8.

^d App A, B, and C to JCS 1800/241, 13 Sep 55.

^e Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957, Defense Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong, 2d sess, 1956, pp. 4, 762. Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958, Defense Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 85th Cong, 1st sess, 1957, p. 904.

^f Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military and Other Requirements for our National Security," 12 Mar 56.

^g Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958, Defense Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 85th Cong, 1st sess, 1957, p. 7.

the planned airlift capabilities, General Ridgway claimed they would not meet Army requirements in general war, which he stated to be tactical airlift for three divisions in airborne assault during the initial phase.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, however, to defer consideration of these disagreements and to submit to the Secretary the figures supplied by each Service. The recommendations submitted on 18 March did not include the specific Army and Marine Corps dissents but merely informed the Secretary that the two areas of airlift and amphibious lift were ones over which the Army Chief of Staff and Marine Corps Commandant had expressed concern and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff intended to reexamine these areas in the near future.¹¹

On 18 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff resolved the disagreement over amphibious lift by approving a proposal worked out by Admiral Carney and General Shepherd. The Marine Corps accepted the Navy's conclusion that an increase in amphibious shipping was not feasible and agreed to a substantial reduction in its assault troop list by deleting certain tank, engineer, and artillery units usually included. General Shepherd's acceptance was conditioned on there being adequate follow-up shipping available and was given on the understanding that the reduced troop list would not be applicable in situations requiring optimum combat reinforcing units. With the austere troop list in effect, the Navy would be able to lift the assault elements of two Marine division/wing teams. The same lift would accommodate the assault elements of at least two Army divisions since their requirements were less.¹²

The disagreement over airlift, however, was one the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unable to resolve. After having it under consideration for about nine months, they submitted divergent views to the Secretary of Defense on 9 December 1955. The Army position was that the Air Force should expand a currently inadequate airlift so as to be able to conduct peacetime training for three Army airborne divisions, be prepared for possible emergencies short of general war, and maintain a capability for D-day airborne operations by the assault echelons of one airborne division and one airborne regimental combat team. The other three Service members considered that the airlift planned by the Air Force—scheduled to reach the D-day capability desired by the Army by the end of FY 1960—was generally adequate for current strategy.

The Chairman disagreed in a more fundamental way, since he did not consider that there was a valid requirement for airlift of Army forces in the early stages of a general war. Admiral Radford believed it "unlikely that conditions would exist on D-day or for sometime thereafter in which the situation in the air or . . . on the ground would allow for airborne operations," and he did not read the current JSCP as calling for such operations. He recognized that deployment of airborne units might be required in emergencies short of general war but foresaw no need for simultaneous airlift movement of Army units in excess of one division. Accordingly, the Chairman held that the current Air Force program provided more than adequate airborne lift. Almost a year later, on 26 November 1956, the Secretary of Defense indicated his general concurrence with the views of the Chairman.¹³

Congressional Action on the FY 1956 Military Budget

The budget recommendations for FY 1956 that the President submitted to Congress translated Secretary Wilson's general personnel ceilings and his approval of the JCS force structure into specific requests for the necessary funds. The figure requested was \$32,204,815,000: \$7,573,980,000 for the Army; \$9,152,157,000 for the Navy; \$14,783,678,000 for the Air Force; \$12,750,000 for OSD; and \$682,250,000 for interservice activities.¹⁴

These recommendations, President Eisenhower informed Congress, were intended to implement the new military policy that had been under development for the past two years. The main elements of the new policy were restated in a letter from the President to the Secretary of Defense, which Mr. Wilson read into the record during his appearance before the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations. The President's letter expounded the basic aims and principles of what had come to be known as the New Look.¹⁵

In Congress the basic principles of the New Look military policy were not challenged, but there were members who questioned the force levels proposed by the President for carrying them out. The congressional misgivings centered on the adequacy of the proposed reduced ground forces, Army and Marine, to carry out their assigned missions. General Ridgway, under close questioning by members of the Senate Appropriations Committee, admitted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed substantially higher figures than had finally been approved by President Eisenhower and his civilian advisers. Pressed further, General Ridgway and General Shepherd stated that they would prefer strengths of about 1,173,000 and 215,000 in their respective Services—the figures originally proposed for FY 1956 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Congress took no action to increase Army manpower but did appropriate funds in excess of President Eisenhower's request for the specific purpose of providing a Marine Corps of 215,000 men. The total appropriated for the Department of Defense for FY 1956 was \$31,893,233,626, including \$46,000,000 for the additional Marines. The Secretary of Defense declined to spend the full amount but did approve a temporary increase in Marine Corps authorized strength to 205,000. He intended that this figure would be subjected to review during the deliberations on personnel strengths and force levels for fiscal year 1957, which were just beginning.¹⁶

Force Structure and Personnel Strengths for FY 1957

When preparation of the military budget for FY 1957 began in the summer of 1955, it was apparent that the Eisenhower administration was not contemplating any upward revisions in the military force levels. The disposition to hold the line was evident in Secretary Wilson's request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 August for their views on force structure and personnel strengths for FY 1957. In making their recommendations, the Secretary instructed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to take into account improvements in weapons design and availability,

together with known strategic requirements. Any considerable degree of variation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff from currently approved force levels should be supported by a statement of their reasons for the change.¹⁷

On 13 September the Joint Strategic Plans Committee submitted a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff containing force structures and personnel strengths prepared independently by the Services. All except the Air Force requested personnel increases over the levels provided for in FY 1956 in order to improve combat capability, to staff new functions, and to deal with technological innovations.

The Army requested a personnel increase of 20,750 over the FY 1956 figure, for a total of 1,045,750. Of this increase, 16,812 were to train an estimated 50,000 reservists under the Reserve Forces Training Act of 1955; the remaining 3,938 were to support the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line project, which was a vital component of the continental defense system.

The Navy requested an additional 15,000 personnel, for a total of 672,000, in order to restore partially the combat readiness of operating forces. Fleet units had been reduced to unacceptably low manning levels because of the unanticipated continuing deployment of major carrier task forces to the Western Pacific in response to the Taiwan Straits crisis and a variety of other manpower requirements. The latter included: 12,000 to support the antisubmarine sound surveillance, distant early warning, and contiguous radar systems; 3,000 to conduct an Antarctic expedition; 12,000 to provide for increasingly complex naval aircraft, weapon systems, and propulsion plants; and 3,000 to expand overseas naval bases.

The Marine Corps requested 12,735 additional personnel, for a total of 205,735: 12,000 to maintain combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps and to offset a high personnel turnover in FYs 1956 and 1957; 735 to train reservists under the Reserve Forces Training Act of 1955.

In this JSPC report of September 1955, the force structures recommended by the Services differed only slightly from their recommendations of January, the main exception being the Army, which now estimated that a 19-division structure would be supportable if the personnel increases were approved. The two divisions additional to the 17 recommended in January would be mobile divisions.

The JSPC was unable to agree on the action to be taken on the Service submissions. A majority consisting of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps members favored a JCS recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to accept the Service submissions. The Air Force member, however, maintained that there should be no increases in the strength or composition of the Services over those approved for FY 1956. In taking this position, he conceded that the Soviet Union had increased its armed might both in quantity and quality. But he held that these gains had been offset by the progress made by the United States and its allies in the development and production of atomic weapons and weapon systems.¹⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, when they took up the JSPC report, also expressed divergent views. There was agreement that, because of the growing communist threat in the Far East and the failure of Germany and Japan to build up military forces to expected levels, the United States should not reduce the present major forces of the Services through FY 1957. Further, the combat effectiveness of these forces should be preserved at all times through provision for adequate numbers

of trained personnel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff could not agree, however, on specific steps for maintaining these adequate numbers. Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, who had replaced Admiral Carney as Chief of Naval Operations on 17 August 1955, was the only member to support all the increases proposed by the other Services. General Twining favored the Marine Corps and Navy increases but opposed the Army expansion to support the DEW Line. General Maxwell D. Taylor, who had succeeded General Ridgway as Army Chief of Staff on 30 June 1955, agreed to the Navy proposals but opposed the Marine Corps plan to add 12,000 men to maintain combat effectiveness. General Shepherd sided with General Twining in opposing Army expansion to support the DEW Line; he favored the Navy and Air Force proposals.

Admiral Radford opposed all the Service recommendations for additional personnel. He concurred in the view of the communist danger expressed by his colleagues and conceded that there might be valid military reasons for modest personnel increases. But he maintained that the proposed increases were so small as to have a negligible effect on US national security and therefore recommended against seeking them at that time. Because of the unsettled state of affairs in the Far East, however, he believed that a final decision should be deferred for a few months. Meanwhile, the currently approved personnel strengths of the Services should be used for developing the initial budget estimates for FY 1957. Secretary Wilson accepted Admiral Radford's recommendation and, on 7 October, authorized the Services to use currently approved end strengths for FY 1956 as the end strengths for FY 1957 in initial budget planning.¹⁹

President Eisenhower made the final decision on force levels for FY 1957 on 5 December 1955. He approved as "authorized personnel ceilings" the original request of the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps and made a modest increase in the figure originally requested by the Army. This increase resulted from the shift of an airfield construction function from the Air Force to the Army, along with the 7,500 spaces needed to support it, without making a corresponding cut in the Air Force personnel authorization. Accordingly, the authorized personnel ceilings for FY 1957 were as follows:

Army	1,053,250
Navy	672,000
Air Force	975,000
Marine Corps	205,735
Total	2,905,985

These figures were only ceiling authorizations. Any actual increase over the personnel programs approved for FY 1956 was still to be justified in detail and approved by the Secretary of Defense. The reason for this double set of personnel ceilings, as explained by President Eisenhower in his budget message to Congress, was to permit flexibility in planning and operations. The force structure to be supported, however, was the one recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²⁰

Congressional Action on the FY 1957 Program

The military budget for FY 1957 recommended to Congress by President Eisenhower listed a total of \$34,147,850,000 in new obligational authority, an increase of about \$2,250,000,000 over the amount appropriated by Congress for FY 1956. In requesting this appropriation, the President made clearer his intentions regarding military manpower. The funds requested were to provide for a 30 June 1957 strength of 1,045,300 Army; 678,200 Navy; 936,000 Air Force; 205,735 Marine Corps. As compared to the previously announced ceiling authorization for FY 1957, this was notably less for the Army and Air Force, somewhat higher for the Navy, and unchanged for the Marine Corps. The Service figures totaled 2,865,258, which was slightly below the 2,881,000 personnel congressional appropriations for FY 1956 had been designed to support. (See Table 2.)

Congress appropriated \$34,698,523,000—an amount about \$550,600,000 in excess of the funds requested. In making this appropriation, Congress provided specifically for the requested FY 1957 end personnel strengths and also \$800,000,000 in excess of the executive branch request for the production of B-52 aircraft. As in the previous year, this extra military funding resulted from the testimony of a military witness. Under questioning before the Senate Appropriations Committee, General Curtis LeMay, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, had stated that his original appropriation request for this item had been reduced by Air Force authorities in Washington. He testified that he continued to believe his original request was necessary, particularly in light of the latest intelligence indicating an unanticipated increase in Soviet strategic capabilities. The resulting congressional action that increased the funding of a military program above the amount requested by the executive branch differed from the similar action on the FY 1956 budget in one notable respect. For FY 1956, Congress had restored a force goal originally requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For FY 1957, Congress accelerated a program desired by a subordinate commander but not endorsed by the Chief of Staff, Air Force, and hence not supported, even initially, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²¹

Force Levels for FY 1958

In preparing the Defense Department budget estimates for FY 1958, Secretary Wilson adopted a different procedure from the one used to produce the budget requests for 1956 and 1957. For the two earlier years, he had asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend personnel ceilings and force structures for all Services in detail. But for 1958 he asked merely for a JCS guidance statement that could serve as the basis for the determination of the size, nature, composition, and deployment of US military forces. Detailed recommendations came from the separate Services and were coordinated in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary made his request as part of the broader requirement he had placed on the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 January 1956 for a general review of US

Table 2—Military Personnel Ceilings, FYs 1956–1958

Service	FY 1956			FY 1957			FY 1958*
	JCS Rec ^a	Exec Br Dec ^b	Cong Appr ^c	JCS Rec ^d	Exec Br Dec ^e	Cong Appr ^f	Exec Br Dec ^g
Army	1,173,000	1,025,000	1,027,000	1,045,750	1,045,300	1,045,300	1,000,000
Navy	682,000	657,000	664,000	672,000	678,223	678,200	675,000
Air Force	975,000	975,000	975,000	975,000	936,000	936,000	925,000
Marines	215,000	193,000	215,000	205,735	205,735	205,700	200,000
Total	3,045,000	2,850,000	2,881,000	2,898,485	2,865,258	2,865,200	2,800,000

* The JCS recommended only that "force levels not be decreased from present programs."

Sources:

^aMemo, JCS to SecDef, "Forces and Manning Levels for FY 1956," 19 Aug 54.

^bMemo, SecDef to SecArmy, SecNav, and SecAF, "Approved End Strengths for Fiscal Year 1956," 6 Jan 55.

^c"Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957," Report of H. Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong, 2d sess, 1956, p. 8.

^dJCS 1800/241, 13 Sep 55.

^eHearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957, Defense Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong, 2d sess, 1956, pp. 3, 420, 643, 838.

^f"Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958," Report of H. Com on Appropriations, 85th Cong, 1st sess, p. 11.

^gMemo, SecDef to SecArmy, SecNav, and SecAF, "Personnel Strengths FY 1957 and FY 1958," 16 Nov 56.

military programs. The intent was to extend the original New Look the Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken, in 1953, for the period 1954–1957; the new exercise would cover fiscal years 1958 and 1959. In making this review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to take account of certain factors that the Secretary indicated would remain valid during this period: "a sound U.S. economy continues to be a necessary part of the fundamental values and institutions we seek to protect"; US military forces would employ atomic weapons from the outset of general war and whenever it was of military advantage to do so in hostilities of lesser scope. The Secretary requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare an outline military strategy, in addition to furnishing guidance on the size and composition of US forces.²²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared their answer at a conference at Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico, held during the early part of March. On 12 March they informed Secretary Wilson that they had reviewed current military strategy and posture and concluded that "our basic military programs remain generally valid and . . . will, so far as can be forecast at this time, continue to be valid through the period 1958–1960." Current military programs would continue to represent the minimum US military forces required for national security. To maintain these forces, however, would become increasingly expensive because of the stepped-up missile program, the increased cost of new equipment and weapon systems, and the probable requirement to procure both more rapidly. The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated annual military expenditure during the period 1958–1960 at about

\$38 to 40 billion, an increase of some \$3 to 5 billion over the current annual expenditure level of about \$35.5 billion.²³

Secretary Wilson made no formal reply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning these recommendations, nor did he mention them when presenting the military budget to the NSC on 22 March 1956. It is probable, however, that he recognized the unlikelihood of holding Defense Department expenditures within the amounts spent in the previous two years. It seemed inescapable that the increasing costs of new weapons and research and development would require larger funds than in the past.

By early summer, the prospective increase in defense costs appeared to be far in excess of the \$3 billion or so anticipated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in March. In June 1956, during the preparation of JSOP-60, a tabulation of the separate Service estimates of the modernized D-day forces to be supported revealed the total cost would amount to \$47.1 billion in FY 1958, \$47.9 billion in FY 1959, and \$47.8 billion in FY 1960. Expenditures of this magnitude were unacceptable to the Eisenhower administration, and the Secretary of Defense immediately returned the plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for revision within specific dollar ceilings. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were to use for planning purposes both in obligations and expenditures for the Department of Defense Military programs, the following amounts: FY 1958, \$38 billion; FY 1959, \$39 billion; FY 1960, \$40 billion. These figures, the Secretary of Defense pointed out, were the ones the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed him as recently as March would be adequate to maintain current force levels and deployments.²⁴

Secretary Wilson did not make any further formal request for the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on force levels for FY 1958. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, reaffirmed their position of 12 March when they informed the Secretary in a memorandum on 15 November 1956 that, in light of the current international situation, military programs should continue to be based upon essentially the current force levels and personnel strengths as far as the preparation of the FY 1958 budget was concerned. The Joint Chiefs of Staff added that any marked deterioration of the world situation might make increases necessary in certain programs.²⁵

The Secretary's answer came the next day in the form of an information copy of a memorandum to the Service Secretaries advising them that beginning and end strengths for FY 1958 would be 2,795,000 men. This represented a reduction of about 70,000 from the authorization for FY 1957.²⁶

On 2 December 1956, Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford, the Service Secretaries, and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Comptroller) and (ISA) made an oral presentation of the US military program for FY 1958 to the National Security Council. After discussion, the NSC agreed that the program was consistent with national security policy objectives. The FY 1958 military budget, as presented to Congress, called for appropriations of \$36,128,000,000—a figure that fell somewhat below the guideline established by the Secretary of Defense in June but exceeded the appropriation for FY 1957 by nearly \$1,500,000,000.²⁷

With this sum, the administration planned to support armed forces totaling 2,800,000 men—a number that exceeded the 2,795,000 announced by the Secretary of Defense on 16 November because of a 5,000-man addition to the Air

Force. The figures for each Service, compared to those for the previous year, were as follows:

	<i>FY 1957</i>	<i>FY 1958</i>	<i>Change</i>
Army	1,045,300	1,000,000	-45,300
Navy	678,200	675,000	- 3,200
Air Force	936,000	925,000	-11,000
Marine Corps	205,735	200,000	- 5,735
Total	2,865,235	2,800,000	-65,235

In terms of force structure, the Air Force and Army, which would absorb virtually the entire personnel reduction, were also to suffer a cutback in major combat units. The Navy, while reducing the total number of ships in commission, would maintain a greater number of combatant ships. The Marine Corps force structure remained unchanged.

	<i>FY 1957</i>	<i>FY 1958</i>	<i>Change</i>
<i>Army</i>			
Divisions	19	17	- 2
Regiments	10	9	- 1
Atomic support commands		6	+ 6
<i>Navy</i>			
Ships	1,005	980	-25
(Combatant)	(411)	(422)	(+11)
(Support)	(594)	(558)	(-36)
<i>Air Force</i>			
Wings	144	126	-18
<i>Marine Corps</i>			
Division	3	3	
Wings	3	3	

In defense of this program, Secretary Wilson explained to Congress that the reduction in manpower and units would be offset by the fact that the new and more costly weapons had a much greater combat capability than the ones they were replacing. A B-52 carrying the latest types of nuclear weapons, for instance, had vastly greater combat power than a B-36 armed with the older types. The reduction in Air Force wings would result partly from the elimination of fighter wings from the Strategic Air Command, the Secretary said. The range and speed of the newer jet bombers were to be employed for penetrating to enemy targets in tactics that did not involve escort operations.²⁸

Results of the Force Planning, 1955–1956

While the successive force projections for coming fiscal years were being resolved, the actual strength of the armed forces declined at an accelerated pace substantially the same as the one the President had set for them in December 1954. By 30 June 1956 the military personnel goals he had announced for that date had largely been met. The force structure to be supported by this manpower, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense for the end of FY 1956, had also nearly been realized. In all Services, the combat units in being corresponded very closely to the approved figures. The following figures contrast the actual strength and force levels of 30 June 1956 with the figures approved for that date on 6 January 1955:²⁹

	<i>Approved</i>	<i>Actual</i>
<i>Army</i>		
Manpower	1,025,000	1,025,778
Divisions	18	18
(Mobile)	(13)	(15)
(Static)	(2)	
(Training)	(3)	(3)
<i>Navy</i>		
Manpower	657,000	669,925
Ships	1,000	973
(Major Combatant)	(405)	(404)
<i>Air Force</i>		
Manpower	975,000	909,958
Wings	131	131
<i>Marine Corps</i>		
Manpower	193,000	200,780
Divisions	3	3
Wings	3	3
Total Manpower	2,850,000	2,806,441

By the end of 1956, the Eisenhower administration's objective of reducing the size of the armed forces had clearly been achieved. From a figure of just over 3,500,000 at the beginning of 1953, the total of men under arms had been lowered to about 2,800,000. The cost of maintaining military forces, however, had gradually risen while the forces themselves were being reduced. Appropriations, which had totalled \$28,766,070,486 for FY 1955, had grown to \$34,698,523,000 for 1957. This upward trend, while undesirable in terms of the emphasis in the New Look on avoiding overburdening the economy, had still not reached a level that was considered to be unacceptable. The rising costs of new weapons encountered in preparing the FY 1958 budget, however, was a foretaste of the cost-squeeze that would develop in subsequent years. These declining force levels and rising appropriations are summarized in Tables 3, 4, and 5.

During this period the Joint Chiefs of Staff enjoyed indifferent success in obtaining approval for their inputs into military budgets. All of their recommended manpower levels were lowered by the administration. Their recommended force structures, however, were all accepted with only minor changes. A factor contributing to the rejection of their advice was the frequent inability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree on the forces or manpower levels to be recommended. The final recommendations for the FY 1956 budget were delayed for three months by disagreements over the proper level of amphibious lift and airlift forces. No agreement was found possible on airlift forces, and the question had to be resolved by the Secretary of Defense. For the FY 1957 budget, each of the Service members, except the Chief of Naval Operations, objected to the manpower increase proposals of one or more of his colleagues, and the Chairman opposed all of them. Once again, the Secretary of Defense was obliged to make the decision.

It was notable that in resolving disagreements of this sort the Secretary of Defense almost invariably endorsed the recommendation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A strong bond of confidence and a close working relationship existed between Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford, based on their mutual dedication to fulfilling the principles and concepts of military policy the President had enunciated. More than the Service members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who understandably gave weight to other considerations, the Chairman prepared his recommendations with the singleminded intent of giving practical effect to such pronouncements as the President had included in his letter to the Secretary of Defense on 5 January 1955. Admiral Radford, like Secretary Wilson, took constant guidance from President Eisenhower's statement that "we should base our security upon military formations which make maximum use of science and technology in order to minimize numbers of men."

Table 3—US Military Strength, 1954–1957

<i>Year*</i>	<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>	<i>Marines</i>	<i>Total</i>
1954	1,404,598	725,720	947,918	223,868	3,302,104
1955	1,109,296	660,695	959,946	205,170	2,935,107
1956	1,025,778	669,925	909,958	200,780	2,806,441
1957	997,994	667,108	919,835	200,861	2,795,798

* As of 30 June.

Source: "United States Defense Policies Since World War II," H. Doc 100, 85th Cong, 1957, 1st sess, p. 78.

Table 4—Major Forces in Being, 1954–1957*

Service	1954 ^a	1955 ^b	1956 ^c	1957 ^d
Army				
Divisions	19	20	18	18 (3 reduced strength)
(Mobile)	(19)	(15)	(15)	
(Static)		(2)		
(Training)		(3)	(3)	
Regts/RCTs	17	12	10	9
AA Bns	114	122	133	
Navy				
Ships	1,113	1,030	973	967
(Major Combat)	(405)	(402)	(404)	(409)
[CVA]	[14]	[15]	[15]	[14]
[Other]	[391]	[387]	[389]	[395]
(Support and Minor Combat)	(708)	(628)	(569)	(558)
Marine Corps				
Divisions	3	3	3	3
Wings	3	3	3	3
Air Force				
Wings	115 $\frac{1}{3}$	121	131	137
(Strategic)	(44)	(46)	(51)	(50)
(Air Defense)	(28)	(29)	(32)	(32)
(Tactical)	(27 $\frac{1}{3}$)	(33)	(35)	(55)
(Troop Carrier)	(16)	(13)	(13)	**

* As of 30 June.

** Included in "Tactical" figure

Sources:

^aJCS 1800/234, 11 Jan 55; JCS 1800/235, 22 Jan 55.

^bJSPC 851/162, 9 Sep 55.

^cOSD, "Department of Defense Military Functions Fiscal Year 1958 Budget Highlights," pp. 29, 50, 75.

^dJCS 1800/261, 31 Oct 57.

Table 5—Budget Requests and Appropriations for the Department of Defense, FYs 1955–1958

Service or Organization	FY 1955		FY 1956		FY 1957		FY 1958
	Requested ^a	Enacted ^b	Requested ^b	Enacted ^c	Requested ^c	Enacted ^d	Requested ^d
OSD	13,500,000	12,750,000	12,750,000	13,466,500	14,950,000	14,950,000	17,175,000
Interservice Activities	547,500,000	527,500,000	682,250,000	682,291,400	657,375,000	643,875,000	687,825,000
Army	8,211,000,000	7,619,066,986	7,573,980,000	7,329,953,000	7,761,425,000	7,572,280,000	8,465,000,000
Navy	9,915,000,000	9,678,823,500	9,152,157,000	9,127,759,556	10,047,600,000	9,989,793,000	10,487,000,000
Air Force	11,200,000,000	10,927,930,000	14,783,678,000	14,739,763,170	15,666,500,000	16,477,625,000	16,471,000,000
National Security Training Commission	55,000						
Total	29,887,055,000	28,766,070,486	32,204,815,000	31,983,233,626	34,147,850,000	34,698,523,000	36,128,000,000

Sources:

^a "Department of Defense Appropriations for 1955," Report of H. Com on Appropriations, 26 Apr 54, 83d Cong, 2d sess, p. 2.

^b Congressional Record, vol. 101, pt 7, 30 Jun 55, pp. 9543–9544.

^c *Ibid.*, vol. 102, pt 8, 29 Jun 56, p. 11335.

^d *Ibid.*, vol. 103, pt 10, 1 Aug 57, pp. 13261–13262.

The Weapons Revolution and Service Functions

An essential element in all the military policies, plans, and programs of the 1955–1956 period was the revolution in weapon systems represented by the nuclear explosive and the rocket-propelled missile which would deliver it. To an increasing extent, the missile armed with a nuclear warhead was being adopted by all the Services for a variety of functions. In most instances, a Service attempted to adapt missiles to its own tradition and generally recognized missions. The Air Force and Navy sought air-to-air missiles as a substitute for aircraft cannon and machine guns, the Army and Navy sought missiles that would replace or supplement conventional shipboard, field, and antiaircraft artillery, and the Air Force aspired to missiles that could assume the roles of manned interceptors and strategic bombardment aircraft.

The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The development of the new weapons was primarily a responsibility of the military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, although the Joint Chiefs of Staff did submit a basic statement of military requirements that had a major bearing on the decisions made. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were more deeply and directly involved with the new weapons when called upon to recommend a resolution of conflicting claims among the Services for jurisdiction over the development of a given missile or for authorization to deploy and use it. This sort of question came before the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a translation into specific detail of their broader responsibility set forth in the National Security Act of 1947:

To recommend to the Secretary of Defense the assignment of primary responsibility for any functions of the Armed Forces requiring such determination.

The same paragraph appeared in DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," which the Secretary of Defense issued on 16 March 1954. This document gave the current definitions of Service roles and missions and modified those originally formulated in the Key West Agreement of 1948.¹ The basic criterion applied was an environmental one: the Army operated on the ground, the Air Force in the air, and the Navy on the sea. When questions arose regarding the weapons to be employed by each Service, however, the environmental division of functions often did not provide ready answers. This difficulty had frequently been encountered when dealing with the more conventional weapon systems, consisting of guns and aircraft; the introduction of missiles further complicated the matter. Guns and planes were obviously different weapons and could not conceivably be mistaken for one another, but it was not always clear whether a given missile was performing as a gun or a plane. When did a ground-to-ground missile cease to be an artillery weapon and assume the function of a bombardment aircraft? When did a surface-to-air missile change identity from anti-aircraft artillery round to interceptor aircraft?

During 1955 and 1956, these problems became acute, largely because of rapidly advancing technology. Weapon systems that had existed on the drawing boards when earlier decisions on roles and missions were made were now entering or approaching operational status. And as the ultimate characteristics of the various weapon systems could not be accurately predicted at the time when roles and missions were originally assigned to the Services, some adjustment to operational reality became necessary. Three major categories were involved: surface-to-air missiles, intermediate range surface-to-surface missiles, and short range surface-to-surface missiles. A fourth area of dispute between the Services over roles and missions during this period was less a matter of technological development than of conflicting Army and Air Force tactical strategic concepts. It had to do with the role, and therefore the characteristics, of Army aviation.

Although the questions at issue arose separately, Secretary Wilson regarded them as linked to one another because they all involved the allocation of roles and missions to the Services. He therefore handed down his decisions on all of them in a single memorandum for the Armed Forces Policy Council, dated 26 November 1956 and having the title "Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense." In this memorandum, Secretary Wilson stressed the fact that he considered the existing basic roles and missions of the Services to be still valid. He was, he said, merely making a clarification and clearer interpretation of these roles and missions, necessitated by the "development of new weapons and of new strategic concepts, together with nine years of operating experience. . . ." Secretary Wilson also took pains to point out that these clarifications and interpretations did not in themselves determine the weapons to be used by each Service, nor did the development of a weapon by a particular Service predetermine which Service would ultimately employ it. These decisions, he said, would be made by the Secretary of Defense after considering the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²

Surface-to-Air Missiles

The problem of assigning responsibility for development and deployment of the new weapons was particularly acute in the field of air defense, where missiles were sought by the Army as a replacement for antiaircraft artillery, by the Air Force for employment as interceptor aircraft, and by the Navy to perform both functions in the defense of ships against air attack. Since the end of World War II, all three Services had engaged in the development of antiaircraft missiles. The Air Force had concentrated on Bomarc, a winged long-range air-breathing guided missile, which was in effect a pilotless interceptor. Originally scheduled to become operational in 1956, it encountered design difficulties and was not placed in the hands of operational units during the period of this volume. The Army, in extension of its traditional employment of antiaircraft artillery, concentrated on Nike Ajax, a rocket-propelled guided missile of 25-mile range, which became operational in 1953. Nike Hercules, an improved version with a range of 75 miles, was under development during 1955 and 1956. For air defense of ships at sea, the Navy developed short-range air-breathing missiles. The first to become operational, Terrier, went into service with the fleet in 1956. Talos, an improved version, originally designed to have a range of 65 miles but later extended to 100 miles, was under development during 1955 and 1956.³

These missile programs reflected an assignment of responsibility to the Services by the Armed Forces Policy Council on 6 December 1949. Acting on a recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Council had ruled that antiaircraft missiles that supplemented or replaced antiaircraft artillery would be an Army responsibility; missiles that supplemented or replaced interceptor aircraft would be the responsibility of the Air Force; missiles to protect the fleet against air attack would be a Navy responsibility.⁴

Nearly two years later, in October 1951, the Chief of Staff, Air Force, sought to reopen the question by proposing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Air Force be assigned responsibility for all air defense missiles. The Army Chief of Staff countered by claiming the total responsibility for his Service. These opposed views were not resolved until 13 November 1954, when Secretary Wilson approved a JCS recommendation that responsibility for point defense of cities and vital installations be assigned to the Army and responsibility for distant defense to the Air Force. To this end, the Secretary approved the JCS recommendation that the Army employ missiles with a range of 50 miles or less against enemy aircraft in the immediate vicinity of the target, while the Air Force would use missiles with a range of more than 50 miles in order to intercept attacking aircraft as far from the target as possible.⁵

Early in the following year, however, the debate was reopened, the question being whether application of the 50-mile rule should take precedence over claims to control of a missile derived from the basic functions assigned to a Service. The discussion arose from an Air Force proposal to procure the land-based version of the Navy's Talos. Development of the land-based version had been approved by the interservice Research and Development Coordinating Committee on Guided Missiles on 21 May 1954. Under the terms of this committee action, the Army

was to arrange the financing of the land-based Talos and the Navy would continue technical development, assisted by the Army and Air Force. During the ensuing months, the Navy evolved a program for developing the land-based version employing an improved missile with a range up to 100 miles.

The Air Force Bomarc program, meanwhile, had encountered technical difficulties that were expected to delay attainment of an operational capability. The Air Force, on 18 January 1955, informed the Research and Development Coordination Committee on Guided Missiles that it now had a firm requirement to employ the improved land-based Talos to defend the United States against air attack and planned to procure it as soon as progress of the development program permitted. On 11 February, the Army informed the committee that it, too, had an operational requirement for land-based Talos.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D) then proposed to the military departments that primary responsibility for financing and general administration of the program to develop the weapon be transferred from the Army to the Air Force. On 16 March the Army protested this proposal, claiming that land-based Talos was an antiaircraft weapon rather than an interceptor. As such it should remain with the Army and not be transferred to the Air Force. The 50-mile range limitation, said the Army, was "purely a short-term development approach and . . . range extension is an Army plan at all times" so that defenses could get adjusted to increasing range and speed of attacking aircraft. Further, the 50-mile decision was not irrevocable but was "a matter of determination *at the time* and subject to review and . . . such a review may be required at this time."

Faced with conflicting Service views, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D) withheld action on transfer of land-based Talos to the Air Force and requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to advise whether or not the current roles and missions responsibilities were being revised in a way that would affect this case.⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, unable to resolve the differences between the Air Force and the Army, submitted divergent views to the Secretary of Defense on 13 April 1955. Admirals Radford and Carney aligned themselves with General Twining. Their view was that the antiaircraft defense roles and missions decision of 13 November 1954 was still valid and fully supported transfer from the Army to the Air Force of responsibility for financing and general administration of the land-based Talos system.

General Ridgway opposed the transfer. He saw it as a direct intrusion into the Army function of providing antiaircraft forces. In making this argument, he acknowledged that the Air Force had been assigned overall responsibility for the air defense of the United States, a function discharged by providing interceptor and early-warning forces. Land-based Talos, General Ridgway maintained, was an antiaircraft system and not an interceptor even though its range might now be extended to 100 miles. Range, he argued, was not a valid criterion for distinguishing between antiaircraft and interceptor-type missiles. Accordingly, he recommended abandoning the 50-mile rule established by the Secretary of Defense in 1954 and returning to the previous standard that had been established in 1949: missiles intended to replace antiaircraft artillery were the responsibility of the Army; missiles intended to replace interceptor aircraft were the responsibility of

the Air Force. In general, Army missiles should defend specified geographical areas, cities, or vital installations, and Air Force missiles should provide blanket defense over wide areas for the interception of enemy aircraft and missiles enroute to attack important areas.⁷

Secretary Wilson accepted the majority recommendation, and on 7 June 1955, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he had transferred responsibility for general administration and financing of land-based Talos from the Army to the Air Force. In addition to reassigning the specific weapon, Secretary Wilson's action also had the effect of reaffirming his roles and missions decision of 13 November 1954.⁸

Differences over the employment of surface-to-air missiles by the Services continued, however. During the spring of 1956, the Army reopened the matter by challenging the assignment of Talos to the Air Force. The new challenge was in reaction to the Air Force announcement of plans to deploy the missile in point defense of SAC bases. Such an action, General Taylor informed a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, constituted an encroachment on the Army role in air defense.⁹

The interservice conflict became more intense some two months later when a classified Air Force study appeared in the press. This document condemned the Army's Nike as unsuitable for the antiaircraft defense of the United States. It was claimed that Nike had never been adequately tested, could probably not intercept current high-speed bombers before they dropped their bombs, and was ineffective against aircraft firing air-to-ground missiles at distances greater than 50 miles from the target. Continental air defense, the Air Force maintained, should be supplied by a combination of early warning systems, long-range interceptor aircraft, Bomarc, and Talos.¹⁰

Secretary Wilson, aroused by this public display of interservice squabbling, called an extraordinary press conference the next day to put a damper on it. Flanked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of two Services, and the Under Secretary of the third, the Secretary of Defense deplored the leaking of classified staff papers advancing Service positions on roles and missions to the press. "Honest differences and reasonable competition between military Services are healthy and will result in a stronger defense establishment," he said. "It is not good, however, to have differences . . . aired on the basis of Service partisanship without giving the proper responsible officials the opportunity to weigh all the factors involved." Current roles and missions, the Secretary continued, had been determined by the Secretary of Defense upon the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They had the matter continually under review, and any changes in roles and missions would be based on what was in the best interest of the country and must not be adversely influenced by the promotional activities of partisan Service representatives.

Taking their lead from Secretary Wilson, Generals Twining and Taylor denied that the Air Force and Army were at odds over surface-to-air missiles. General Twining praised Nike as the best weapon currently available. "It far exceeds anything we had in the standard antiaircraft artillery. . . . We welcome it." And General Taylor maintained that his criticism of Talos had been based on the fact that the

current version did not have interceptor characteristics. He now understood that the Air Force expected to develop these characteristics in an improved version.¹¹

In spite of this apparent interservice harmony, the continuing evolution of surface-to-air missiles still called for a reappraisal of Army and Air Force responsibilities in the area. The initiative for such an adjustment came from the Secretary of the Air Force. On 14 August, he submitted a memorandum to Secretary Wilson proposing his own solutions to a number of matters in dispute between the Army and the Air Force, which he said were not to be considered as reflecting the views of the Chief of Staff, Air Force. His proposal on air defense was to modify the existing assignment of responsibilities by extending the range of missiles to be developed and employed by the Army from 50 to 100 miles. On 17 August, Secretary Wilson requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this recommendation.¹²

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee was unable to agree on a criterion for assigning responsibility for ground-to-air missiles to the Services. On 29 August 1956 the Committee sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report that was split three ways.

The Committee had agreed, however, that an arbitrary range limitation could not be a satisfactory permanent solution. A weapon designed to reach the maximum allowable distance would almost certainly be able to go farther when ultimately developed to its full potential. It would be unreasonable to deprive the developing Service of the right to employ a weapon merely because it reached farther than the allowable distance, but, if the range-limitation policy stood, to legalize the weapon would require either amending the policy or granting an exception to it.

But each member had his own solution to be applied instead of a range limitation. The Army member proposed that all land-based surface-to-air missiles be assigned to his Service because its stated functions made air defense weapons mandatory as organic elements of defense of its areas, installations, and forces, because "more and more of the air defense burden will be borne by surface-to-air missiles," because the manned interceptor was not capable of defending against ballistic missiles, and because rapid developments were being made in the missile field.

The Air Force member agreed that a single Service should be assigned responsibility for land-based surface-to-air missiles, but could not agree that the Army should have it. Claiming the assignment for the Air Force, he contended that surface-to-air missiles must be intermeshed with an elaborate air defense system, including detection devices and manned aircraft that were inherently of primary concern to the Air Force. Further, air defense was an essential element in the defeat of hostile air forces, which was also a matter of primary Air Force concern.

The Navy member disagreed with both his colleagues. He maintained that it was neither feasible nor desirable to assign responsibility for all air defense of land areas to one Service. Instead he proposed that the Army be made responsible for missiles replacing antiaircraft guns while the Air Force was given responsibility for missiles replacing manned aircraft. This was the policy that had been in effect from 1949 until replaced by Secretary Wilson's directive of 13 November 1954.¹³

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff took up the JSPC report on 9 October, Admiral Radford disagreed with all these views and maintained that range should be the criterion for assigning responsibility for surface-to-air missiles to the Army and Air Force. The Army, in order to discharge its responsibilities for point defense, should employ missiles limited in range in the order of 100 miles, while the Air Force should employ missiles suitable for area defense. Unable to reconcile these conflicting opinions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their individual views to Secretary Wilson in mid-November. On 26 November, the Secretary, as part of his overall resolution of roles and missions disputes, approved the recommendations of the Chairman.¹⁴

Army Surface-to-Surface Missiles

The assignment of ground-to-ground missiles to the Army and Air Force also became a matter for adjudication by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Viewing rocket-powered missiles as an extension of field artillery, the Army had pushed ahead with the development of a family of such weapons. Relying heavily on a team of German rocket scientists under the leadership of Dr. Wernher von Braun, the Army by the beginning of 1955 had deployed to the field the Corporal, a mobile bombardment missile of 75–100 mile range, and it was developing a larger bombardment weapon called the Redstone, with a range of about 200 miles.¹⁵

By the provisions of Secretary Wilson's decision of 13 November 1954, Army surface-to-surface missiles were not specifically limited as to range but were to be designed for use against tactical targets within the zone of Army combat operations that were the responsibility of the ground force commander, as differentiated from strategic targets.¹⁶ Nearly two years later, the question was reopened by Secretary of the Air Force Donald A. Quarles in a memorandum of 14 August 1956 to Secretary Wilson on disagreements between the Air Force and the Army. Among other recommendations was one to limit Army surface-to-surface missiles to a range of 200 miles. The purpose, said the Secretary of the Air Force, was to permit the missiles to be emplaced a suitable distance behind front lines and still strike targets 100 miles beyond those lines.¹⁷

Secretary Wilson referred the Quarles memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 August with a request for their views.¹⁸ In a JSPC report submitted later in the month, the Army and Navy members opposed the imposition of arbitrary range limitations on Army surface-to-surface missiles. They maintained that ground combat operations of the future would require weapons systems of considerably greater range than those now available, which, because of superior accuracy and dependability, should be guided missiles under Army control rather than Air Force fighter-bombers.

The Air Force member echoed the Air Force Secretary's proposal for a 200-mile range limitation on Army surface-to-surface missiles. He argued that, because the assignment of responsibility made by the Secretary of Defense in November 1954 was in general terms and subject to varying interpretations, a specific range limit

was needed to prevent costly duplication of effort. This limit should be 200 miles, said the Air Force member, because any missile explosion more than 100 miles beyond the front could not be readily exploited by ground forces. At that range it should be classed as interdiction, a function assigned to the Air Force by DOD Directive 5100.1, rather than the Army function of close support.¹⁹

Before this JSPC report reached the JCS agenda, the Navy changed its position, moving to the Air Force view except for a slight variation over the range figure. The Navy now considered that Army missiles should be limited to a range of about 200–250 miles.²⁰

During the subsequent JCS discussion, Admiral Radford sided with the Air Force in proposing a 200-mile range, but he drafted a separate presentation of his views. The resulting submission to Secretary Wilson on 25 October was a memorandum containing four individual statements, two of which recommended the 200-mile limit while a third recommended a 200–250 mile limit. Only the Army opposed the imposition of a range limitation.²¹

In his decision of 26 November 1956 the Secretary of Defense approved the recommendation of the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Chairman. Accordingly, the development of Army surface-to-surface missiles was to be governed by the following limitation:

... such missiles ... (were to) be designed and programmed for use against tactical targets within the zone of operations, defined as extending not more than 100 miles beyond the front lines. As such missiles would presumably be deployed within the combat zone normally extending back of the front lines about 100 miles, this places a range limitation of about 200 miles on the design criteria for such weapons.²²

Intercontinental and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (ICBM and IRBM)

Important as the various short-range ground-to-ground and ground-to-air missiles were, they paled in significance when compared to the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Described as the ultimate weapon, it was expected to make accurate delivery of a devastating nuclear warhead at distances of 5,000 or more miles at a speed that would defy interception. Research and development for such a weapon were begun by the Convair Corporation in 1947 under contract to the Air Force. The effort to develop the ICBM proceeded on a quite limited basis, in the face of the priority currently being given to long-range manned bombers and a shortage of funds resulting from the economy measures of the Truman administration. In 1948, work on the ICBM was suspended altogether, not to be resumed until 1951, after the Korean War had begun and the Soviets had detonated their first nuclear device. Development of the Atlas, as the ICBM was now known, resumed at Convair, but the pace was still deliberate and the funding conservative.

A series of developments beginning in late 1952 changed this cautious approach. On 1 November, the United States detonated its first thermonuclear device, but it was much too heavy for a missile payload. Scientific reports in 1953, however, indicated that it would soon be possible to build much smaller and more powerful thermonuclear warheads, thereby simplifying the task of designing an effective ICBM. To build an ICBM was now feasible. Events in the Soviet Union made the development of such a weapon a matter of urgency. The Soviet Union detonated a thermonuclear device in 1953 and, according to US intelligence estimates, was expected to have an ICBM in production by 1963.²³

As 1955 began, further impetus was given to US long-range missile programs by a panel of consulting scientists under the leadership of Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. On 14 February, the Killian group, which was officially designated the Technological Capabilities Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee, submitted a wide-ranging report entitled "Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack." The Killian panel stressed the importance to the United States of achieving an ICBM capability before the Soviet Union. It recommended that the National Security Council recognize the Atlas program as a nationally supported effort of the highest priority.

The panel noted, however, that there were formidable technical obstacles to be overcome before the Atlas became operational. A medium-range missile, with a range of about 1,500 nautical miles, could be placed in operation by both the Soviet Union and the United States sooner than an ICBM. With the shorter-range missile, the Soviet Union could strike targets anywhere in Europe, Alaska, Japan, and the Philippines from launching sites in its own territory. From ships, these missiles could cover most of the United States. The United States could hit targets in a significant part of European Russia with a 1,500-mile missile launched from advanced land bases, and in a significantly greater part of the Soviet Union with such weapons fired from ships. Concluding that it was important to begin work on weapons to increase the probability the United States would achieve a ballistic missile capability before the Soviet Union, the Killian panel recommended that "there be developed a ballistic missile (with about 1,500 nautical mile range and megaton warhead) for strategic bombardment; both land-basing and ship-basing should be considered."²⁴

On 17 March 1955, the National Security Council discussed the Killian Report and referred its recommendations to departments and agencies of the executive branch for study and recommendation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in comments forwarded to the Secretary of Defense at his request for use in preparing the Defense Department response, concurred in the Killian panel's recommendation to accord the ICBM program the highest national priority. This weapon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, "would not only markedly add to our deterrent capability in that a potential enemy would realize that we could retaliate in minutes, but, if achieved before the USSR is able to develop an . . . ICBM it would add significantly to our relative military strength." The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended, however, that the granting of highest priority to the ICBM be subject to constant re-evaluation to ensure against jeopardizing other high-priority research and development programs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also concurred in the Killian

group's recommendation for developing a 1,500-mile missile—a weapon that might provide the United States with a ballistic missile capability before the Soviets were successful, and might also point the way to solution of the ICBM problem.²⁵

The Secretary of Defense accepted these JCS views and incorporated them in the Defense Department assessment of the Killian Report, submitted to the NSC on 2 June 1955. On 8 September the NSC recommended to the President that he direct the Secretary of Defense to develop the ICBM as fast as possible. The President approved, and the Secretary of Defense instructed the Secretary of the Air Force to carry out the actual development.²⁶

Once responsibility for the ICBM was firmly delegated to the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not called upon to formulate views concerning it for the remainder of the period covered by this volume. But such was not the case of the 1,500-mile missile (which became known as an intermediate range missile, or IRBM). On 4 August 1955 the Secretary of Defense had undertaken to report to the NSC by 1 December which of five IRBM development plans would be pursued: (1) a by-product of Atlas; (2) a separate Air Force project; (3) US participation in a British program; (4) a Navy ship-based project; or (5) the Navy Triton as an interim program.²⁷ In furtherance of this agreement, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D) to prepare a report on the five possible programs in collaboration with the military departments.²⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff first became officially involved in this exercise on 20 October 1955, when Secretary Wilson requested them to recommend which Service or Services should employ the new weapon when it became operational. Their reply, said the Secretary, "would be of assistance . . . in determining a program for the development of this type missile."²⁹

In drafting the JCS response the Joint Strategic Plans Committee did not confine itself to the Secretary's question on employment of the IRBM but also addressed the question of which Service should develop the weapon. On the first question the Committee divided two ways. The Army and Navy maintained that all three Services would have a use for IRBMs in light of the primary functions assigned them by DOD Directive 5100.1. The Air Force member claimed that his Service, because of its functions assigned by the same directive, should have primary responsibility for employing the IRBM. The Navy, however, should be permitted to operate a sea-based version in support of the Air Force in the accomplishment of its primary mission. On the second question the Committee was even more divided. Each member believed his Service was the proper one to develop the IRBM because of its claimed experience with the development of ballistic missiles: the Army with Redstone; the Navy with Viking, a high-altitude research rocket; and the Air Force with Atlas.³⁰

During JCS consideration of the JSPC report late in October, Admiral Radford took a position generally similar to that of the Air Force. The Chairman proposed that the IRBM in land- and sea-based versions be assigned for operations to the Air Force and Navy, that it be developed by those two Services under the overall management of the Air Force Western Development Division, and that it be given equal priority with the ICBM. At a further JCS meeting on 1 November General Twining agreed with the Chairman's views on assignment of the IRBM

to the Air Force and Navy for operations but disagreed with granting equivalent priorities to the IRBM and ICBM. He believed that the highest priority for the ICBM, which had been established by President Eisenhower, was sound and should not be changed. The Air Force Chief of Staff also opposed assignment of overall management of both versions of the IRBM to the Western Development Division, which was already heavily occupied with the ICBM.³¹ At this point Admiral Burke swung over to support the general position now taken by the Chief of Staff, Air Force, and the Chairman, but the Army Chief of Staff maintained his original stand.

Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded divergent views to the Secretary of Defense. The majority position was that the Air Force and Navy had a valid requirement for IRBMs in the light of currently assigned roles and missions, whereas neither the existing nor the foreseeable assigned missions of the Army justified such a claim. The Western Development Division of the Air Force, which was at work on the ICBM, was considered the logical agency to develop the land-based version of the IRBM, which was expected to fall out of the ICBM program. With regard to the sea-based version, the majority adopted the Air Force view that the Navy should undertake full responsibility for it, with such assistance as the Air Force could furnish without impeding its own ballistic missile programs. The majority position on the priority to be assigned the various ballistic missile projects was the one advocated by the Chairman. Equal priority should be given the ICBM and the two IRBMs; if conflicting claims for facilities and materials arose, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could recommend the order of priority.

General Taylor, in presenting the Army case, contended that all three Services had a requirement for IRBMs in the light of their assigned missions and that all three had current ballistic missile programs that could be expanded into IRBM development programs. He held that missiles developed by any Service should be available to all on the basis of need and that, therefore, roles and missions should not be the determining factor in assigning development responsibility to a Service. In what might be considered a departure from this line of argument, he then recommended that "in view of the Army requirement and development capability . . . and in view of the Navy capability to use the IRBM . . . , the 1500-mile IRBM should be assigned jointly to the Army and Navy."³²

Secretary Wilson, in his decision announced on 8 November 1955, accepted some of the elements of both sets of recommendations. The Department of Defense, he said, would pursue two IRBM development programs. IRBM #1, a land-based weapon, would be developed by the Air Force at the Western Development Division as a by-product of the ICBM program. IRBM #2 would be a joint Army-Navy effort designed to produce a missile that would be both an alternative to IRBM #1 and a shipboard weapon. The two Services would divide responsibility so that the Army, employing the Redstone Arsenal, would develop the missile and the land-launch system, and the Navy would develop the sea-launch system. To give overall supervision to the ballistic missile program, including the ICBM as well as IRBMs #1 and #2, Secretary Wilson directed the establishment of an OSD ballistic missiles committee under the chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Similar committees were to be orga-

nized by the Services. In the Air Force, a committee under the Secretary of the Air Force would manage the ICBM and IRBM #1. To manage IRBM #2, a joint committee with the Secretary of the Navy as chairman and the Secretary of the Army as vice chairman was to be established.

With regard to priorities, the Secretary of Defense accepted the recommendation of the JCS majority and established the IRBM programs on equal priority with the ICBM pending further clarification of the matter by the NSC. On 1 December, the NSC recommended that President Eisenhower approve this disposition. After further discussion with Secretary Wilson, the President approved the granting of equal priorities but directed that serious conflicts between IRBM and ICBM programs be referred to him.³³

All three Services now pressed ahead to achieve an IRBM capability as rapidly as possible. The Army effort was assigned to the newly activated Army Ballistic Missile Agency located at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, which then designed the Jupiter. Already in hand was the proven Redstone 200-mile missile. The Jupiter was to be developed initially by equipping specially modified Redstones with Jupiter components. The first such missile, designated Jupiter-A, underwent successful tests in September 1956.³⁴

The Navy's Special Projects Office meanwhile pushed development of the sea-launch system for Jupiter. The technical difficulties involved in launching a liquid-fueled rocket the size of Jupiter (58 feet long) from a ship at sea led the Navy to investigate the feasibility of a smaller and simpler, but equally effective, missile. The Navy was examining the feasibility of a solid-fuel rocket about the size of Jupiter, when, in the summer of 1956, nuclear experts predicted that a much smaller warhead would be available by the time the missile became operational. Acting on this prediction, Navy scientists conceived Polaris, a relatively small submarine-launched solid-fuel missile equal in range and destructive power to the liquid-fuel missiles under development by the Army and Air Force. From September on, the Navy was debating whether to continue with the Army in the Jupiter program, or place entire reliance on Polaris.³⁵

The Air Force assigned responsibility for its IRBM program to the Western Development Division, which was engaged in developing the Atlas ICBM. Contracts for Thor, a derivative of Atlas, were let in December 1955. The first tests of the missile were scheduled for late 1955 or early 1956; the weapon was expected to become operational in late 1958.³⁶

Interservice contention over responsibility for the development and ultimate employment of the IRBM appeared once again in the fall of 1956. As with several other aspects of the missile programs, it was the memorandum by Air Force Secretary Quarles, dated 17 August 1956, that opened the matter to discussion. He suggested that a missile of 200-mile range was adequate for Army purposes; therefore, the Army should discontinue development of all missiles capable of shooting greater distances, except to the extent that the Navy placed a requirement on the Army for ship-launched missiles. Addressing the argument that the Army should continue IRBM development as a back-up for the Air Force missile, Secretary Quarles maintained that the Air Force was now clearly ahead in the

race to produce an IRBM, and that, in the interest of economy, the Army program should now be dropped.³⁷

On the basis of actual tests or firings, at least, the Air Force could offer no evidence to support this claim. No Thor had yet been static-tested or fired. The Army, on the other hand, while it had not completed a Jupiter IRBM, was about to begin tests of components in Jupiter-A.³⁸

Secretary Wilson referred the Quarles memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 August with a request for their views on its recommendations. Unable to agree, they returned four individual views on 25 October. There was, however, one point of agreement. None of the JCS members believed that the time had come to discontinue development of either IRBM #1 or #2. They all thought that both programs should continue in order to perfect a weapon as soon as possible. But they could not agree on the nature of these development programs. Admiral Radford and General Twining maintained that IRBM #2 should now be limited to shipboard use. Admiral Burke and General Taylor argued that the #1 and #2 programs should continue on their present basis until one or the other had been perfected. Admiral Burke, however, maintained that the purpose of these development programs should be merely to make a propaganda demonstration of US capability in the IRBM field at the earliest possible time. Then both #1 and #2 should be dropped in favor of an IRBM system designed specifically for use at sea, which could be made available to the Army or Air Force for use on land. In support of his proposal the Chief of Naval Operations said that neither of the liquid-fueled giants was suited to shipborne use, whereas a weapon designed primarily for use at sea was readily convertible to use on land. Although he did not identify the shipborne weapon to which he was referring, Admiral Burke apparently had the Polaris in mind.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were even more deeply divided over the employment of the IRBM than over the conduct of the programs required to develop it. Admiral Radford and General Twining, adhering to the opinion expressed nearly a year earlier, said that only the Air Force and Navy required the IRBM to carry out assigned roles and missions. General Taylor, who had previously held that all Services needed the IRBM, now maintained that only the Army and Navy should employ it. He readily conceded the Navy requirement for a ship-based missile, but he opposed Air Force employment of a missile based on land. His argument was that, to be secure against enemy attack, IRBMs should be mobile and widely dispersed in rough terrain. Only the Army had the capability to make such deployments, General Taylor asserted.

Admiral Burke, who had previously agreed with Admiral Radford and General Twining, now maintained that while the Army and Air Force might ultimately require an IRBM, the emphasis should be placed on a ship-based version designed primarily for naval use. He believed that such a weapon best fulfilled the national requirement for a nuclear striking force reasonably invulnerable to surprise attack and able to penetrate enemy defense without unacceptable losses.³⁹

On 26 November 1956, Secretary Wilson announced his decision in a memorandum to the Armed Forces Policy Council, ruling that operational employment of land- and sea-based IRBMs would be the sole responsibility of the Air Force

and the Navy respectively. The Army was not to plan operational employment of any missile with a range greater than 200 miles.⁴⁰

Secretary Wilson's decision paper did not affect the equal priority currently given to the ICBM and IRBM development programs, and it made no change in the dual (Thor-Jupiter) approach to attainment of an IRBM capability. A few weeks later, however, the Navy received the Secretary's permission to withdraw from the Jupiter program and concentrate on Polaris. Both Jupiter and Thor continued under development, both were tested successfully in 1957, and both entered into production and were turned over to the Strategic Air Command for operational use in 1958.⁴¹

Controversy Over the Place of Army Aviation

The establishment of the US Air Force as a separate Service in 1947 had been accomplished by withdrawing most of the existing Army Air Forces from the Army. The National Security Act of 1947 prescribed that the Army "shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation . . . as may be organic therein." The forces of the Army, including its aviation resources, would be "organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land." Thus a new area of jurisdictional consideration was opened, since it was necessary to preserve a clear distinction between the functions to be performed by Army aviation and the roles of the Air Force.

The functions of aviation organic to the Army were spelled out five years later in a memorandum of understanding between Secretary of the Army Frank Pace and Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter. By the terms of the Pace-Finletter agreement, signed on 4 November 1952, the Army would employ aircraft to perform the following functions: aerial observation; control of Army forces; command, liaison, and courier missions; aerial wire-laying; transportation of Army supplies, equipment, personnel, and small units; aeromedical evacuation; and artillery and topographic survey. The combat zone in which Army aircraft was to operate was defined as being "normally . . . from 50 to 100 miles in depth," to the rear of the point of contact between friendly and enemy ground forces. The agreement did not specify how far forward into enemy territory from this point of contact the combat zone would extend.

The Army aircraft to perform these missions were to be either rotary-wing helicopters or fixed-wing airplanes. No restriction was placed on the physical characteristics of Army helicopters, but the airplanes were not to exceed an empty weight of 5,000 pounds. This weight limitation, however, could be adjusted by the Secretary of Defense in the light of technological developments and assigned missions upon request by the Secretary of the Army or Air Force.⁴²

The question of the role of Army aviation was reopened during the spring of 1955. The reappraisal resulted from an Army proposal, made at an Armed Forces Policy Council meeting on 10 May, to procure a number of T-37 jet trainers for reconnaissance purposes. Secretary of the Air Force Harold E. Talbott objected

and recommend disapproval of the proposed procurement. Secretary Talbott contended that procurement by the Army of T-37s would be an infringement on the Air Force function, assigned by DOD Directive 5100.1, of providing tactical aerial reconnaissance for the Army. Secretary Wilson on 8 July ordered the Army to suspend all procurement of T-37s and referred the Talbott memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with a request that they examine not only the question of the T-37s but also review the entire Army aviation program in light of DOD Directive 5100.1.⁴³

Addressing the narrow question of Army procurement of T-37s first, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were able to find an answer with relatively little difficulty, although the initial JSPC report contained split views. There the Navy and Air Force members substantially endorsed the recommended prohibition of Army procurement of the aircraft. The Army JSPC member was content merely to state that the use of jet aircraft for aerial observation, as distinct from aerial reconnaissance, was within the scope of the functions assigned to the Army.⁴⁴

On 12 August the Army Chief of Staff elaborated this sketchy statement. In a memorandum supplying Army views to be substituted for the ones in the JSPC report, General Taylor explained that the Army had no intention of encroaching on the aerial reconnaissance function performed by the Air Force but needed a modern jet-powered aircraft to perform the accepted Army observation mission against greatly improved air defenses of a potential enemy. He pointed out that the Army did not consider the T-37 to be adequate for the task but wished to procure a number of them for test purposes.⁴⁵

Thereupon the Air Force Chief of Staff offered to loan T-37 aircraft to the Army for tests. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this proposal and concluded, therefore, that Army purchase of T-37s would not be necessary. They notified Secretary Wilson of their conclusions on 26 August.⁴⁶

The review of the entire Army aviation program raised more difficult issues. After more than a year's consideration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to reach agreement and forwarded four individual views to the Secretary of Defense.

From the very beginning of the review of the Army aviation program, the Services were in disagreement. On 22 September 1955 General Taylor submitted a document entitled "The Army Aircraft Program" to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the recommendation that they advise Secretary Wilson that it was in consonance with DOD Directive 5100.1. This document described each Army aircraft model and listed the number on hand as of 30 June 1955 and programmed for delivery through FY 1958, but it did not describe the roles and functions of Army aviation.⁴⁷

After several weeks of consideration, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee submitted a split report in early December. The Navy and Army members concluded that the Army program was in consonance with DOD Directive 5100.1. The Air Force member, while conceding that the program conformed to the directive so far as it went, claimed that the Army submission did not lend itself to objective analysis because it did not include aircraft in the development stage or a concept for controlling Army aircraft in the combat zone. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 26 January 1956, accepted the Air Force position and returned the report to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee for revision based on the entire Army aviation program.⁴⁸

General Taylor submitted the requested detailed program, entitled "Army Aviation Functional Guidelines, FY 56-60," on 2 April 1956. He emphasized two points regarding it and the Army Aircraft Program previously submitted, which together constituted the aviation program under review. First, said General Taylor, the program represented the considered estimate of the Army staff, after more than a year of study, as to the organic aviation the Army would need in order to discharge its statutory mission, which should be the overriding consideration in any examination of the program. Second, the Army's authority to implement the program was explicit in three statutes. These were, in addition to the National Security Act of 1947, the Army and Air Force Authorization Act of 1949, and the Army Organization Act of 1950. The 1949 Act made the Secretary of the Army responsible for the conduct of all affairs of the Army establishment. The 1950 Act authorized the Secretary to procure the materials and facilities needed to maintain and support the Army. DOD Directive 5100.1 was the executive instrument implementing the three acts of Congress and constituted executive authority for the Army Aviation Program. General Taylor accordingly recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after reviewing the program, inform Secretary Wilson that they considered it to be in consonance with the Army's statutory mission and with the functions and responsibilities covered by Department of Defense Directive 5100.1.

As presented in the two documents submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army aviation program provided for the performance of six functions: observation; airlift for troop movement in the combat zone; rapid movement of critical supplies in the combat zone; air mobility for land reconnaissance; command, liaison, and communications; and battlefield casualty evacuation. In performing these functions, Army aircraft were intended to supplement, rather than replace Air Force efforts; in no instance, said the Army, was there an encroachment on assigned Air Force missions.

To perform these functions, the Army had on hand as of 30 June 1955, 3,931 aircraft of which 2,619 were airplanes and 1,312 were helicopters. By the end of FY 1958 the Army expected to take delivery of an additional 1,583 aircraft. The Army planned to distribute the observation, command, and liaison aircraft among major troop units and to organize the cargo and transport types into aviation companies. By the end of FY 1959 the Army expected to have 36 such companies of helicopters and 3 of fixed-wing aircraft.

As for Army aviation research and development, the program listed 13 projects currently approved and funded by the Department of Defense. In the opinion of the Army staff, all but one of these projects could be carried out within the limits of existing legislation, executive instructions, and interservice agreements. The exception was a four-ton fixed-wing transport, which could not be designed to weigh less than 5,000 pounds empty.⁴⁹

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee once again failed to agree. In a report on 6 June 1956 the Navy member sided with his Army colleague in concluding that the Army aviation program was in consonance with DOD Directive 5100.1. The Air Force member, on the other hand, held the view that the program was excessive to the Army's needs and should be completely restudied. He calculated that

the procurement cost of the Army aircraft on hand and programmed for delivery through FY 1958 would be \$456,298,600. In addition, the 36 cargo helicopter companies scheduled for activation by the end of FY 1959 would provide all the normal airlift requirements for at least 40 divisions, or more than twice the number authorized. So far as DOD Directive 5100.1 was concerned, the Air Force member agreed the Army program was in consonance with it except for the portion on air cargo, a function reserved for the Air Force. But the Air Force member did not object to the Army's developing an organic rotary-wing airlift capability so long as it was used for purposes other than air assault. The Air Force, in fact, was willing to be relieved by the Army of the obligation to supply rotary-wing airlift. The Air Force member also objected that the Pace-Finletter agreement was a bilateral instrument lacking common authority and was subject to varying interpretations. He recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff request the Secretary of Defense to issue a new directive clearly defining Army organic aviation and Air Force functions in support of the Army.⁵⁰

On 11 July, General Taylor submitted a revised statement of Army views in which he rejected the Air Force proposal for a new DOD directive spelling out the Army aviation functions and programs in support of them. He believed that any differences between the Army and Air Force should be resolved by them in accordance with the Pace-Finletter agreement; any new DOD directive should deal with the full range of roles and missions of all Services. General Taylor emphasized two points: the Army aviation program was in consonance with the National Security Act of 1947 and DOD Directive 5100.1; the Department of the Army was best able to determine the Army's organic aviation requirements and the necessary programs to support them.

After three months had been consumed in fruitless negotiation between the Air Force and the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations proposed a compromise. Under Admiral Burke's plan the Army would procure and employ helicopters according to its needs but would limit assault operations to company size and would not carry them out farther forward than 25 miles ahead of the area of enemy contact; Army fixed-wing aircraft would not exceed an empty weight of 8,000 pounds; the Army would reduce its planned aircraft buildup, to be achieved by FY 1962, from 7,980 to 5,100; and the Army would not maintain a research and development organization beyond that needed to develop requirements.⁵¹

General Twining, in a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 September, accepted the CNO proposal on Army research and development and rotary-wing assault lift but rejected the proposals on weight limitation for fixed-wing aircraft and the total number of Army aircraft. The Air Force Chief of Staff reiterated his position in favor of retaining the 5,000 pound limit. But as a concession to advancing technology, he expressed a willingness to have specific exceptions to the limit approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He favored a substantial cut in the number of aircraft programmed by the Army but proposed to delay specifying the precise number to be eliminated until after completion of a thorough study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁵²

General Taylor's acceptance of the Burke compromise proposal, though not indicated in the available records, was presumably also something less than complete. On 19 September, Admiral Burke addressed the Joint Chiefs of Staff once again:

Having been advised that JCS 1478/76 has not received the acclaim anticipated, . . . I graciously relinquish my role as arbitrator, and withdraw to my position on the sidelines as an interested and concerned spectator with the expectation that the controversy, unsettled by the responsible Service heads, will be of no profit to the participating gladiators.

The paper was withdrawn from consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Admiral Burke's request on 20 September. The proposals made in it, however, became the official position of the Navy, which now disassociated itself from the Army position.⁵³

Following the collapse of Admiral Burke's mediation efforts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded on 9 October 1956 that further discussion was useless and agreed to refer the separate Service views, to which Admiral Radford now added his own, to the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman took the position that the Secretary should issue a new directive assigning the Army the same aviation functions as in the Pace-Finletter agreement, but setting a boundary 100 miles forward of the front lines for the combat zone where Army aircraft would operate, limiting the size of Army helicopters to an empty weight of 10,000 pounds and fixed-wing aircraft to 5,000 pounds, and forbidding the Army to maintain an aircraft research and development organization.⁵⁴

On 26 November, Secretary Wilson informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff of his decision. He reaffirmed both the general functions of Army aviation as defined in the Pace-Finletter agreement and the 5,000-pound limit for fixed-wing aircraft and established a 20,000-pound empty weight limit for helicopters. The Secretary adopted Admiral Radford's proposal setting the forward limit of the Army's combat zone at 100 miles beyond the front lines and approved the recommendation by the Chief of Staff, Air Force, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chairman that the Army not maintain a separate aviation research and development facility. No mention was made of the Navy and Air Force proposals to limit the numbers of Army aircraft. Subsequently, DOD Directive 5160.22, incorporating all these points, appeared on 18 March 1957.⁵⁵

Appraisal of the JCS Role

The record of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in recommending to the Secretary of Defense the assignment of responsibilities to the Services was one of almost total disagreement. Of the eight matters referred to them by the Secretary, only two were returned with unanimous recommendations, and one of these was a

minor matter involving the use by the Army of T-37 aircraft for tests. The six remaining replies all contained divergent views.

As in the areas of strategic planning and force levels for the budget, the Joint Chiefs of Staff frequently failed to offer single unified military advice to their civilian superiors, but in the realm of Service roles and missions it was unrealistic to expect any other outcome. The nature of the questions posed virtually compelled each JCS member except the Chairman to appear as the advocate of the interests of his Service. Any exhortation to take a higher view and decide the issues in the light of the overall national interest would have been largely beside the point. Each Service Chief could argue that, within the context of the national military establishment as organized in 1955-1956, he was effectively serving the national interest when he strove for assurance that his Service would advance into the coming years properly equipped and prepared to discharge its responsibilities.

Underlying the inability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree was the determination of all the Services to acquire the weapons produced by the new technology, not only—as press reports tended to represent it—to obtain a full share of appropriations but, more importantly, to assure readiness to perform assigned missions. The claims of all the Services to an IRBM capability and of the Army and Air Force to surface-to-air missiles were manifestations of this determination. Also, there was an understandable disinclination on the part of any Service to rely on the others for support, leading to efforts to possess, or at least control, as many as possible of the weapons and forces needed to discharge assigned missions. The Army's attempt to expand its aviation establishment was a case in point.

In resolving the several issues the Secretary of Defense relied heavily on the advice of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. In four out of his six decisions, Secretary Wilson approved Admiral Radford's recommendations. Wilson's resolution in the other two instances accepted the Chairman's views in part but represented compromises among the conflicting opinions before him. The fact that of the JCS members only Admiral Radford was not currently the professional head of a Service made it possible to regard him as the spokesman for a broader interest, but the outcome probably owed more to the particular confidence the Secretary reposed in the Chairman and to the effective comprehension of the principles and purposes of the Eisenhower administration that informed Admiral Radford's thought.

An unfortunate secondary result of the controversies over Service roles and missions was that the public often received the impression that the time of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was taken up with contention over petty and parochial interests. Secretary Wilson made some attempt to lessen that impression in his decision paper of 26 November 1956, which he directed be provided to the Congress and released to the press. "Important changes in organization and in roles and missions are not easily decided upon or effected," he wrote. No theoretically perfect set of arrangements could be created afresh, since assignments of responsibility must continue to recognize the precedents of the past and the availability of men and facilities to carry out assigned missions:

Problems of this nature would be easier to solve if there were always complete unanimity of opinion among all responsible executives of the Defense Department, both military and civilian. The very nature of the problems, however, and the varying background and experience of the individuals serving in responsible positions make some differences of opinion normal and to be expected.⁵⁶

Disarmament: The Fresh Approach

A commitment to disarmament as an ultimate goal had been avowed by virtually every nation of the world in the decade following World War II. No international question had been the subject of more extensive negotiation and discussion. No other extended negotiations had shown so little progress, yet continued in spite of it. Persistence in this seemingly hopeless cause reflected the widespread fear of the terrible new weapons resulting from the splitting of the atom, which now placed in the hands of men the means to destroy human civilization. Governments might not always have believed that armaments could be effectively limited or that limitations served their national interests, but public demand for control of armaments was so great that no government could afford to disregard it.¹

Earlier Failed Attempts

The United States played a leading role in these efforts, and, in fact, initiated post-World War II arms control negotiations with the introduction of the "Baruch Plan" at the United Nations on 14 June 1946. Under this plan, the United States offered to give up the military advantage represented by sole possession of atomic weapons, to surrender its stockpile of bombs, and to cease manufacture of additional ones on condition that the United Nations provide an effective control authority and agree to punish violators by procedures not subject to the veto.²

The Soviet Union chose not to accept the Baruch Plan but proposed instead an international convention binding the signatories not to use atomic weapons and to destroy all completed weapons and fissionable material within three months under the supervision of an international control commission empowered to make periodic inspections of declared plants. Punishment of violators would be the responsibility of the UN Security Council and therefore subject to veto. Because of the inadequate provisions for inspection and control, the Soviet pro-

posals were totally unacceptable to the United States and its allies. Futile attempts to reconcile the conflicting positions of the two sides dominated negotiations on nuclear arms control for the remainder of the decade.

Negotiations between the two hostile power blocs on the reduction of the level of conventional armaments proved equally unsuccessful. The Soviets, in 1948, had called for across-the-board cuts of one-third by all permanent members of the Security Council, under the supervision of an international control body with vaguely defined powers. The plan was unacceptable to the United States, Great Britain, and France because it would perpetuate the existing Soviet preponderance in such forces. The Western allies countered by proposing a phased reduction of conventional forces to ceilings of 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 for the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China, and 700,000 to 750,000 for Great Britain and France, with the armed forces of other countries fixed in relation to those of the great powers. This proposal was unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

In an effort to break the deadlock over both nuclear and nonnuclear arms reduction, Great Britain and France introduced a compromise in the United Nations on 11 June 1954. This Anglo-French plan called for a disarmament treaty binding the signatories to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons except in self-defense. Controlled reduction of armaments, as long advocated by the Western powers, would follow. Once an effective control organization had been created, armaments and armed forces would be reduced by stages, with each stage beginning only after the control organ announced it was ready to enforce it. In the first phase, overall military manpower would be limited to the levels existing on 31 December 1953, and military spending would be limited to the amount spent in calendar year 1953. In the second phase, one-half of the agreed reductions of conventional forces would be carried out, to be followed by cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In the third and final phase, the remaining agreed reductions in conventional forces would be imposed, followed by the elimination of all nuclear weapons and the application of all nuclear materials to peaceful purposes.

The immediate response of the two superpowers to this plan was favorable. The US delegate to the UN Disarmament Commission, while not endorsing every detail, termed it a distinct advance in the direction of a workable disarmament program, and the Soviet foreign minister announced that his government would accept it as the basis for discussion and negotiation.

A Review of US Arms Control Policy

For the United States, this apparent major shift in Soviet arms control policy indicated a need to review its own policies and bring them up to date. Existing US arms control policy was stated in NSC 112, a paper approved by President Truman on 19 July 1951 and not revised since. It had been adopted at a time when the US and Soviet positions were so far apart that any agreement to make a significant reduction in armaments and military forces seemed remote. But now

that some form of agreement seemed possible, a review of basic US arms control policy, which was long overdue in any case, took on a new urgency.

NSC 112 established as the goal of US disarmament programs the lowering of the level of armaments to the point where an initial aggression would be unlikely to succeed, thereby discouraging states from resorting to armed aggression as a means of achieving national objectives and making possible a peaceful resolution of differences between the US and Soviet blocs. The policy paper did not specify the level to which armaments would have to be reduced to achieve the desired results. But it did specify that international control of nuclear weapons must be considered to be inseparably related to the international regulation of all other types of armaments and must be based on the Baruch Plan or some equally effective procedure. Turning to the tactics by which arms reduction could be achieved, NSC 112 offered no such comprehensive plan as the one later proposed by the British and French. It merely recommended an initial move consisting of step-by-step disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, progressing from the least to the most sensitive information.³

At the time of the Soviet announcement, the US Government had made very little progress toward a new disarmament policy. Attempts to revise NSC 112, as ordered by the NSC on 9 September 1953, had run afoul of irreconcilable disagreements among the members of the special committee, consisting of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, appointed for the purpose. The result was that each member was preparing a statement of his position for submission to the NSC.⁴

The Defense Department position paper had been developed from a draft completed by Major General Herbert B. Loper, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, on 27 August 1954. After revision to incorporate the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the Services, the Defense position paper was submitted to the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission on 25 January 1955.

The Department of Defense believed that to continue current armament trends constituted less of a risk to the security of the United States than any currently attainable disarmament agreement. In view of continuing communist ambitions for world domination and the methods being employed to attain it, any disarmament scheme not including effective regulation and control machinery would be disastrous for the free world. Effective control, which would have to include inspection and supervision extending into the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, would be totally unacceptable to the USSR. Even if the Soviet Union accepted unlimited inspection, no conceivable system could ensure the elimination of nuclear weapons from the armaments of countries that had previously produced them. It was technically feasible, however, to control additional production of nuclear weapons, if the political obstacles to effective inspection could be overcome.

A step-by-step plan, beginning with disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments and progressing through phased reductions, was also unacceptable to the Defense Department. Disclosure and verification would give a great advantage to a potential aggressor by revealing the other country's hid-

den and most important military assets without accomplishing any real reductions or providing adequately for control. It was feared that entering into a step-by-step agreement would also create a false sense of security in the free world and weaken the resolution of the Western alliance.

In spite of the liabilities in an attainable disarmament scheme, the Defense Department favored the continuation of disarmament negotiations for two basic reasons: to expose to US allies and the neutralist nations the true nature of the Soviet position in international relations; and to retain the leadership of the free world in negotiations that would continue in any event because of the universal fear of nuclear warfare. By exercising such leadership the United States might prevent other free nations from succumbing to blandishments designed to entrap them into disarmament agreements based on promises or ineffectual control schemes.⁵

The State Department position, as expressed in a paper forwarded to the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission on 7 February 1955, was that adequately safeguarded disarmament was preferable to a continuation of current armament trends. If unchecked by some form of disarmament agreement, the Soviet Union would achieve a nuclear capability to damage the United States so severely that it could not hope to achieve any rational political end from a war in which nuclear weapons were employed. The capability of each side to destroy the other could not be counted on to ensure a durable peace or continued security. An aggressor might launch a nuclear strike owing to misjudgment of his chances for success or to fear that he was himself about to become the victim of such an attack. In addition, the increasing reliance by both sides on nuclear weapons would enlarge the likelihood that any armed conflict might develop into nuclear war. Under these conditions, the United States might hesitate to protect areas not considered to be absolutely vital, with the result that the free world might suffer piecemeal reduction.

The State Department acknowledged that a disarmament plan could not be based solely on mutual trust and that therefore an effective system of inspection and verification was necessary. The Department's paper did not, however, attempt to assess the chances for achieving an effective inspection agreement with the Soviet Union, although it did concede that there was no way to tell in advance how well an inspection plan would actually function.

To put a disarmament plan into effect, the State Department recommended a step-by-step rather than a comprehensive approach. Such a plan would have the advantage that each succeeding step would be taken only after the preceding one was operating successfully. To negotiate a comprehensive plan, on the other hand, would take a long time at best because all issues would have to be settled in advance. Failure during years of negotiation with the Soviet Union to make any progress toward a comprehensive agreement indicated that achievement of such a disarmament pact was highly improbable.

A first step could be, for example, a ban on the production of nuclear fuels, since this measure would preserve the existing US superiority in nuclear weapons. But the State Department recommended further study and review before adopting changes in disarmament policy. This effort should proceed

under the direction of a person with outstanding qualifications, who had no other responsibilities.⁶

The National Security Council took up the conflicting views of the Departments of State and Defense on 10 February 1955. Unable to resolve the substantive issues, the Council adopted the State Department's procedural proposal and recommended to the President that he designate an individual of outstanding qualifications as his special representative to conduct on a full-time basis a further review of US policy on control of armaments, reporting his findings and recommendations to the National Security Council. To assist him in the task, the special assistant would have one qualified adviser each from the Departments of State and Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, and a panel of three or more consultants from outside the government. President Eisenhower approved the recommendation and, on 19 March 1955, named Harold E. Stassen his Special Assistant for Disarmament.⁷

The Soviet Proposal of 10 May 1955

Before Mr. Stassen could complete his review, the Soviet Union made a new proposal, which coincided on many points with the Anglo-French plan of 11 June 1954. The plan that the Soviets introduced in the UN Disarmament Subcommittee on 10 May 1955 called for a step-by-step reduction of conventional forces and elimination of nuclear weapons and for an immediate freeze on the size of armed forces and military expenditures. It provided for a reduction of armaments in two stages, with 50 percent of the reduction of armed forces taking place in the first phase.

Although these points substantially duplicated provisions of the Anglo-French plan, there were differences as well. The Soviet plan provided a specific timetable for the completion of arms reduction and control measures—the first stage to be completed in 1956 and the second stage in 1957. Also, the Soviet plan set specific ceilings on the armed forces of the signatories: 1 million to 1.5 million for the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China; 650,000 for Britain and France. And most important, the Soviet plan offered nothing resembling the control organ with adequate powers desired by the West; it still called for enforcement by the UN Security Council. However, the Soviets did make an important concession regarding the inspection machinery and procedures. To their earlier proposals for fixed inspection posts at major ports, railway junctions, airfields, and highways, the Soviets now added a provision that control officials would carry out inspections on a continuing basis, to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the disarmament plan and would have unimpeded access at all times to all objects of control.

The Soviet Union also included in its proposal of 10 May a provision for the withdrawal of Soviet, US, British, and French troops from Germany to within their national frontiers. This proposal was obviously unacceptable to the Western powers.⁸

For the United States and its allies, the Soviet proposal, which apparently accepted many of the positions taken by the Western powers, posed a serious question. Was the Soviet Union merely engaging in a propaganda exercise or was it attempting to open serious negotiations?

The First Stassen Report

Harold Stassen, in his first report to the National Security Council on 26 May, made no attempt to answer this question but merely stated the two possibilities. In either case, he found the Soviet proposal to be clearly unacceptable in its initial form. Although it had the appearance of adopting some positions previously taken by the Western countries, it still proposed grossly inadequate control procedures.

As the first phase of the US arms control plan, Mr. Stassen proposed a leveling off at existing arms levels through an international agreement binding the signatories to disclose all their existing armaments and cease all production and testing of nuclear weapons under the close control of an international armaments commission having unrestricted rights of inspection. He based his plan on two assumptions: (1) complete discovery of all existing nuclear weapons was impossible and therefore total nuclear disarmament could never be verified; and (2) if present armament trends continued, the Soviet Union would develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems capable of destroying the United States. Under these assumptions, freezing of nuclear armaments at existing levels appeared the most satisfactory means of arresting the growth of Soviet nuclear weapons capability.

In addition to these advantages of his plan to the United States, Mr. Stassen contended that it would also appeal to the Soviet Union because it would prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to Germany, Japan, and Communist China; reduce the economic burden of maintaining armaments; stop the increase in the number of US bases surrounding the Soviet Union; and reduce the danger of a nuclear war that would be as disastrous to the Soviet Union as to the United States.⁹

The National Security Council discussed the Stassen report on 26 May and agreed to refer it to participating departments and agencies for study. The Council directed Mr. Stassen to submit a report revised in the light of department and agency comments by 1 July.¹⁰ As part of the study process the Secretary of Defense asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit their views on the Stassen proposal, with special attention to its military feasibility and military effects.¹¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, replying on 16 June, objected to the plan because it provided only the first step of an arms control agreement and made no provision for subsequent stages or for concurrent resolution of outstanding political issues. Rather than a first-phase plan, they favored, in principle, a comprehensive and carefully phased program for international control of atomic energy and for limitation, reduction, and regulation of all armed forces and armaments, if implemented subsequent to or in conjunction with the settlement of other vital international problems.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that Mr. Stassen had overvalued his plan as a safeguard against surprise attack and had given insufficient attention to the dangers of cold and limited war and to the inhibiting effect of world opinion on renunciation by the United States of an arms agreement even in the event of serious violations. Further, they objected to his making the leveling off of armaments a prerequisite to rather than a consequence of the resolution of fundamental political differences, to his assumption that the Soviet Union would accept military inferiority to the United States, and to his failure to include Communist China or to provide special consideration for Germany and Japan, neither of which would have reached programmed military goals by 1957.¹²

On 23 June, Mr. Stassen submitted a report to the NSC enclosing a revised plan taking into account the comments received from participating departments and agencies. In this report he claimed that the policy he had originally proposed was generally considered by the participating departments and agencies to be preferable to existing policy and to be a suitable basis for a new one. The revised plan clarified a number of points in order to meet objections that had been raised. It specified that leveling off of armaments would include limitation of production of conventional weapons to the amounts needed to replace existing items, as well as a freeze on foreign bases, forces stationed in foreign countries, armaments budgets, production facilities, and paramilitary forces. These restrictions were in addition to the limitation on manufacture of nuclear weapons stated in the original plan. The revised plan also called for establishing force levels to which Germany and Japan would be permitted to build and provided that any party to the disarmament agreement might take counter-balancing steps to maintain its relative position in the event of a serious violation of the agreement.

There were, however, a number of departmental objections that had not been resolved in the revision. The Defense Department still maintained that a continuation of current armament trends was preferable to any disarmament agreement likely to be attained but that the US plan, if proposed, should include Communist China. The Department of State continued to believe that there should be some reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons in the first phase of a disarmament plan and that some hope of eventual elimination of nuclear weapons should be held out. Both State and Defense urged that some features be added to the plan to make it more attractive to the Soviet Union. In spite of these remaining disagreements, Mr. Stassen recommended that the plan be given limited approval for use in consultations without commitment with Great Britain, France, and Canada.¹³

The Secretary of Defense, in preparation for the Council discussion, requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They replied on 27 June, stating that their general objections to the original plan were also applicable to the revision and taking particular exception to Mr. Stassen's statement that there was general agreement that the proposed policy was preferable to the existing one. This statement, they said, did not accurately reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, some of their specific recommendations had been incorporated in the revision. These included: special provision for German and Japanese forces; amplification of the phrase "leveling off of armaments"; provision for unilateral

action in the event of a violation of agreements; and an indication of what might be included in succeeding steps of a disarmament agreement. But these changes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, did not meet the basic objection to the Stassen plan, which was that "an armaments control arrangement, to be negotiated and implemented under the given condition of Soviet bad faith, leaving other major issues for subsequent and independent negotiation, holds inherent risks to United States security interests . . . and is therefore not suitable as a United States proposal for control of armaments or as a basis for the United States position in international discussions on this subject." The following day, 28 June 1955, the Secretary of Defense sent a memorandum to President Eisenhower in which he endorsed the JCS views.¹⁴

Two days later the NSC took up the revised Stassen plan along with the comments of Secretary Wilson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At this meeting President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles expressed their disagreement with the position taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The President said that he did not wish to minimize the difficulties, but a leveling-off proposal could serve as the basis for negotiations and from this it could be determined whether the Soviets had revised their position on inspection. Secretary Dulles asserted that the United States must now make some new progress or risk the loss of allies and the ability to maintain bases overseas. The United States could not stand still until various policy issues were settled, and both disarmament and outstanding political differences must be tackled simultaneously. Secretary Dulles believed that the Soviet Union was having serious internal difficulties, which made the Soviet leaders desire some degree of arms reduction. The Stassen proposal was designed to respond to this situation and at the same time effectively freeze the US atomic superiority.

Secretary Wilson replied that he did not mean all political issues had to be settled before seeking a disarmament agreement but that some real progress must be made toward solutions. Turning to inspection, Mr. Wilson said he was not at all impressed by the inspection system carried out by the United Nations in Korea. Admiral Radford added that an effective inspection system would mean vast policing and spying systems on both sides.

Confronted by conflicting views from his principal advisers, President Eisenhower withheld a decision on the Stassen plan and directed instead a further study of inspection in order to develop an acceptable system. The study was to be made by Mr. Stassen in consultation with interested departments and agencies. The President also directed him to incorporate into his disarmament scheme a plan for an international pool of atomic energy for peaceful uses, along the line of the atoms for peace proposal made by the President on 8 December 1953.¹⁵

The Open Skies Proposal

Before the studies of inspection systems could be completed, President Eisenhower took a new initiative in disarmament negotiations with the Soviet

Union by offering a plan designed to prevent a surprise attack without relying upon detailed inspection on the ground. This plan, which became known as "Open Skies," was proposed to the Soviet Union at the summit meeting at Geneva on 21 July 1955. Addressing the delegates, President Eisenhower explained that since World War II the United States had found it necessary to rearm and enter into military alliances in order to safeguard peace and maintain its own security, but a better way to attain these objectives would be through a "mutually dependable system for less armament on the part of all nations." The United States had concluded that there could be no such system without thorough and effective inspection. As yet the efforts to develop technically feasible means of performing such tasks as making certain that all nuclear weapons had been destroyed had not been successful. The United States was continuing its study of these problems, the President said, but meanwhile there was a practical first step that could be taken immediately by the United States and Soviet Union. To the Soviet leaders he proposed the following:

To give each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments. . . .

Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country. . . and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension.¹⁶

In an account written eight years later, Mr. Eisenhower explained that the idea for Open Skies had originated with Presidential Assistant Nelson Rockefeller, who had been directed to study the question of surprise attack in the weeks before their departure for Geneva. Mr. Rockefeller had held intensive discussions on it with Mr. Stassen, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert B. Anderson, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Gordon Gray, and Admiral Radford in Paris on 18 and 19 July. He and Mr. Stassen then proceeded to Geneva at the President's direction to place the plan in final form.¹⁷

While Admiral Radford attended the planning conferences in Paris on 18 and 19 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not formally consulted on Open Skies until after the President had introduced it at Geneva on 21 July. They first became involved on 29 July 1955, when Secretary Wilson asked them to prepare a practical outline to implement the broad concept presented by President Eisenhower. In preparing it the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to keep in mind the central purpose of protecting the United States from surprise attack and the possibility of obtaining other information of great intelligence value. On 10 August the Secretary requested that they add to their report a detailed definition of the term "complete blueprint of our military establishments."¹⁸

In a plan submitted on 19 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff defined a blueprint of military establishments as "the complete order of battle of all major land, sea, and air forces, and a complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations with their locations." This information, in the JCS plan, would be exchanged in progressive steps according to an agreed schedule and would be verified by observers stationed at key locations and by unrestricted but monitored aerial reconnaissance of each country by the other. Verification of information

exchanged at each phase would be completed before proceeding to the next phase. The plan did not detail the information to be exchanged at each phase or specify how many phases there would be. It described only the initial procedures, which included the following: preparation of schedules for time-phasing the exchange of information on items on the lists; and consummation of an agreement on the posts to be occupied by on-the-spot observers, on the facilities to be provided to support aerial reconnaissance, and on the necessary logistic, administrative, and communications arrangements.¹⁹

On 23 August, Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben B. Robertson, Jr.,²⁰ forwarded the JCS plan to Mr. Stassen, whom he informed that a US proposal based on it would demonstrate convincingly to the world the absolute sincerity of the President's Geneva proposal and the genuine desire that it be implemented as an initial step toward world peace.²¹ The JCS plan, with minor modifications, was submitted to the UN Disarmament Committee on 30 August as the "United States Outline Plan for Implementation of the 21 July 1955 Presidential Proposal at Geneva Regarding Disarmament."²²

The Soviet reaction to Open Skies came on 19 September 1955 in a letter from Premier Bulganin to President Eisenhower. Although professing to accept the idea in principle, Bulganin objected that it did not go far enough and should be broadened to include allied states on both sides. Even if so broadened, Bulganin maintained, Open Skies did not address the essential question, which was how to stop the arms race and prevent a new war. This problem could be solved by adopting the proposals the Soviet Union had offered on 10 May 1955.²³

On 26 September, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a military analysis of Bulganin's letter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their analysis on 30 September, pointing out that Bulganin was attempting to substitute for Open Skies the Soviet proposal of 10 May, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already found unacceptable. As a reply to Bulganin, they recommended that the President reiterate the purpose of his Open Skies proposal and press the Soviet Union to accept it. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also wanted the President to make clear that the United States still considered an effective system of inspection and control a prerequisite to general disarmament. On 22 October, Secretary Wilson forwarded the JCS views, with his concurrence, to Secretary of State Dulles.²⁴

President Eisenhower had, meanwhile, acknowledged receipt of Bulganin's letter. Writing to the Soviet Premier on 11 October, Mr. Eisenhower said the US Government was engaged in the detailed studies necessary for a full reply to the many questions raised by Bulganin. The President agreed, in order to create a better spirit between the two countries, to accept the Soviet proposal, contained in the plan of 10 May, for stationing inspection teams at key points on the territory of participating states. This was an integral part of the US Outline Plan for implementing Open Skies, recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and already submitted to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee.²⁵

The JCS Inspection Plan

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were now engaged in expanding their outline into a detailed plan. This inspection effort was being prepared in conjunction with the one the President had directed to support Mr. Stassen's overall disarmament plan on 30 June. Secretary Wilson, on 27 August, had requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate appropriate studies and make recommendations that would enable the Department of Defense to discharge its responsibility for developing the military aspects of the comprehensive inspection plan directed by the President on 30 June. In making this request, the Secretary referred to a letter he had received from Mr. Stassen on 19 August announcing the appointment of special task groups of private citizens to prepare a comprehensive inspection system and requesting recommendations from the Department of Defense on the military portions of it.²⁶

On 19 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their recommendations for the military aspects of a comprehensive inspection plan, along with their detailed recommendations for implementing President Eisenhower's Open Skies proposal. The recommendations were in the form of a single plan containing three steps: the initial step covering Open Skies; the comprehensive step providing for as thorough an inspection system as feasible, covering primarily the United States and the Soviet Union but possibly other nations; and the multilateral step, in which additional nations would join but which was not spelled out in detail.

The initial step was to be put into effect in two phases. The first, or trial inspection phase, was intended to test the mechanics of the inspection and reporting system before introducing large numbers of inspectors into each country. During this phase, each side would establish an armaments inspection organization to be located on the territory of the other country and would furnish the name and geographical location of one of its own major long-range bomber bases and of a ground support air base, submarine base, naval base, army division, and army supply base. Each would also supply details of units and organizations stationed at these bases. Upon receipt of this information, inspectors would make on-the-spot inspections of the facilities, supplemented by aerial reconnaissance of the same facilities on a monitored basis. During the course of these inspections, ground observers and air crews would test the communications and reporting system by forwarding reports to their national inspection headquarters in the host country, where the reports would be compared with the data submitted by the inspected nation.

Upon satisfactory completion of the first phase, the second, or full implementation, phase would begin. It would be implemented in three successive stages covering first combat units, then installations, and finally special weapons. The installations would not include those associated with nuclear weapons; the special weapons would include only nuclear weapons storage sites. All three stages would begin with exchange of information, followed by on-the-spot observation and aerial reconnaissance. Ground observers, however, would limit their inspections at nuclear weapons storage sites to the external verification of the sites.

Upon successful completion of the initial step, the comprehensive step would begin. Its purpose would be to establish and operate a comprehensive inspection system within the United States and the Soviet Union. Operations during this step would entail a more detailed coverage of the information previously exchanged, to go into effect in phases progressing from the least to the most sensitive information. During the first phase there would be extensive inspection of armed forces units and their bases and supporting installations. During the second phase there would be disclosure and verification of certain information on the following: exteriors of military research and development centers; distribution of nuclear weapons from storage sites to operational units; and chemical, biological, and radiological weapons.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated staffing requirements for the ground inspection system during the comprehensive step at 35,738 military personnel: 11,307 Army; 6,754 Navy; and 17,677 Air Force. In addition, four Air Force wings and four Navy squadrons would be needed for aerial surveillance. On 27 October the Deputy Secretary of Defense forwarded the JCS plan, with his concurrence, to Mr. Stassen.²⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had hardly submitted their inspection plan when they began to have doubts about its feasibility. They were concerned that the estimated 35,738 inspection personnel might be considered excessive. After studying a critical report of this aspect of the plan, prepared by Vice Admiral Leslie C. Stevens, USN (Ret.), at the request of Admiral Radford, they returned their inspection plan to the Joint Staff on 3 November with instructions to reduce the inspection force.²⁸

The Revised Stassen Plan

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had just ordered this revision of their inspection plan when they were requested by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) to review a new version of the Stassen plan. Completed on 1 November, the new paper consisted of a brief and generalized inspection plan based on the recommendations of the special consultant committees, a reassertion of basic principles stated in earlier versions of the plan, and a recommended US disarmament policy. The JCS views on an inspection system, provided to Mr. Stassen as a "working paper" on 21 October, had been taken into consideration in preparing the new paper.

The inspection system, to be installed by stages, included aerial surveillance from four bases outside the Soviet Union and ground inspection by observers at 280 posts within the country. To operate this system would require from 20,000 to 30,000 inspectors, 8 to 10 squadrons of airplanes, 3 to 4 squadrons of helicopters, 4,000 to 5,000 vehicles, 30 to 40 radio stations, and other facilities, all at an annual cost of \$600 to \$700 million.

This system, when put into effect, would serve "certain limited but very important objectives of the United States." It would open up the Soviet Union

and other communist-controlled territory to effective inspection. It would account for the movement of armed forces, especially those capable of atomic attack. It would facilitate agreements to prevent, retard, or minimize both the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not having them and the attainment of a substantial intercontinental missile capability and an expanded nuclear weapons capability by the Soviet Union.

To achieve these objectives, Mr. Stassen recommended that the United States adopt the following policy: continue to press for the adoption of Open Skies; accept modest reductions in conventional armed forces as part of Open Skies; seek to divert all future nuclear production and all intercontinental and space rockets to peaceful purposes under international control; agree to an inspection system as described in the report; once it was installed, contemplate gradual and reciprocal reductions of nuclear and conventional forces, each specific reduction to be approved by the NSC; indicate willingness to extend the agreement to other states having substantial military potential; agree to inspection of US overseas bases; and agree to a cessation on national nuclear tests as part of a comprehensive agreement.²⁹

In commenting to the Secretary of Defense on 18 November regarding Mr. Stassen's paper, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reserved judgment on the inspection plan pending completion of the revision of their own plan on the subject. As for Mr. Stassen's proposed disarmament policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Wilson that they found it so vaguely and imprecisely written as to leave in doubt whether or not it was a departure from the concept of proceeding step-by-step from Open Skies to comprehensive disarmament. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also objected strongly to accepting a reduction in conventional forces tied to Open Skies. To do so, they stated, would be a radical change in that proposal, which had called for reductions only after a proven inspection system was in operation. The cessation of nuclear weapons tests was also termed unacceptable by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³⁰

Secretary Wilson, on 7 December 1955, transmitted the JCS views to Mr. Stassen and stated he concurred in them fully as part of the position of the Department of Defense. He emphasized four points that he considered to be of primary importance in assessing the Stassen proposals. First, the key point was that each step in arms control should enhance the security of the United States. Second, since fear of surprise attack was the major cause of international tension, the implementation of Open Skies should continue to be the first and central objective of US disarmament policy. Third, the latest Stassen plan was so ambiguous as to require considerable clarification and elaboration before its suitability as a new US policy could be determined, and fourth, the Defense Department withheld comment on Mr. Stassen's inspection system pending completion of the restudy of the problem then in progress within the Department.³¹

After revising his study to take account of some of the specific criticisms of the departments and agencies, Mr. Stassen recommended that all but two of its policy statements now be approved by the NSC. The two items for deferral were cessation of nuclear tests, to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and AEC had objected, and internationalization of intercontinental and space rockets, which

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others opposed. Thus the JCS view on two major points was sustained, but their third major objection, to modest reductions in conventional forces to accompany Open Skies, was rejected by Mr. Stassen on the ground that it was needed to counter the Soviet claim that acceptance of Open Skies might accelerate the arms race.

Early approval was now urgent, Mr. Stassen maintained, because of recent and impending actions in the United Nations. The Security Council had just passed a resolution urging the Disarmament Subcommittee to seek early agreement on "such confidence-building measures as the plan of Mr. Eisenhower... for exchange of military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection, and the plan of Mr. Bulganin... for establishing control posts at strategic centers," and "all such measures of adequately safeguarded early disarmament as are now feasible." The Disarmament Subcommittee was expected to meet in February 1956 pursuant to this resolution.³²

Approval of all but two of the policy recommendations in his paper was also appropriate, Mr. Stassen said, because the reviewing departments and agencies had not offered any fundamental dissent or divergence from them but had merely suggested clarifying rewording and requested an opportunity to pass on detailed implementation of proposals generally agreed to before giving final approval. The Executive Secretary, NSC, placed the Stassen report on the agenda for the NSC meeting of 22 December 1955, but he listed it as an item "to note for information only, unless advice is received prior to that meeting that the responsible departments and agencies have reached agreement on the recommendations contained in the report."³³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, commenting to the Secretary of Defense on 19 December, recommended against so informing the Executive Secretary. If the NSC decided to act on the report, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended against approving the conventional forces item they had previously opposed. The Deputy Secretary of Defense forwarded the JCS comments to the Executive Secretary on 21 December, along with his concurrence in them, and advised against approval of Mr. Stassen's recommendations until there had been an opportunity to study the detailed inspection and control plan still being prepared.³⁴

On 22 December the NSC considered the Stassen report, along with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as endorsed by the Deputy Secretary. Mr. Stassen, in briefing the Council on his report, claimed that it did not call for action on their part, although the report specifically recommended approval of all but two of the policy statements contained in it. Mr. Stassen had also now changed his mind about the validity of his proposed inspection system. In the report he had recommended that the United States agree to reciprocal inspection generally along the lines proposed in this report. He now stated he was convinced that the inspection system was undesirable for the United States because the 20,000 or more inspectors it called for would be virtual hostages of the Soviet Union. Further, he doubted that the USSR would agree to any such number of foreign inspectors on its territory.

President Eisenhower was surprised at the number of inspectors contemplated and doubted that the United States could seriously propose such a figure.

The proper disarmament policy for the United States, the President apparently believed, would be a step-by-step pragmatic approach seeking agreement in specific areas, rather than a proposal for an elaborate system of inspection that would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union. The Council accordingly agreed that Mr. Stassen should submit a further revision in the light of the discussion and after further consultation with the responsible departments and agencies.³⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were quick to react to the President's ideas on disarmament. On 22 December the Joint Staff submitted their revised inspection plan, scaled down from three steps to two (initial and comprehensive) and with the number of inspectors reduced by 36 percent. On the recommendation of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff returned the plan to the staff on 5 January 1956 for further reduction to the initial step alone and a maximum of 1,000 inspectors.³⁶

Mr. Stassen, however, merely resubmitted his proposal, buttressed with some additional argumentation on the controversial points. He had also added a suggestion that the new US policy, after consultation with Great Britain, France, and Canada, be presented directly to Soviet Premier Bulganin through a letter from President Eisenhower.

An attached draft of this letter called for establishment of Open Skies as a first step, followed, once Open Skies was functioning, by diversion of future production of nuclear material to peaceful uses and by reduction of Soviet and US forces to 2,500,000 within the first year Open Skies was in effect. As initial steps, designed to refine procedures and demonstrate to the world mutual determination to reach agreement, the draft proposed a preliminary test inspection of a small area in each country and an exchange of technical panels. Preliminary test inspection, although not previously mentioned by Mr. Stassen, had been a part of the JCS plan of 19 October. Technical panel exchanges had been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff the previous August, at which time they had raised no objection in principle so long as the panels were not exchanged until after the Soviet Union had agreed to Open Skies.³⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after reviewing this latest effort, found no reason to change their previously expressed views on Mr. Stassen's policy proposals. They accordingly recommended to Secretary Wilson that he hold the line in upcoming discussions in the NSC by sticking to his position of 7 December. Turning to the draft letter by which Mr. Stassen proposed to implement his policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed that certain of its proposals were unacceptable from the military point of view and that they expected to be given a further opportunity to comment if a decision was made to send such a letter.³⁸

Not content to rest their case merely on adverse criticism of the Stassen draft, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also submitted to Secretary Wilson for presentation in the NSC a brief summation of their views on disarmament. Their purpose was to present a more positive approach than had been possible in commenting on drafts prepared by others and to dispel any confusion concerning their views that might have resulted from piecemeal comment. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US policy on disarmament should be as follows:

1. Actively seek an international system for the regulation and reduction of ALL armaments and armed forces, taking into account the President's proposal for an international pool of atomic materials for "peaceful use," under an adequately safeguarded and comprehensive plan.

2. Concurrently make intensive efforts to resolve other major international issues.

3. Meanwhile, continue the steady development of strength in the United States and the Free World coalition required for United States security.

4. Continue to press for the implementation of the President's Geneva Proposal as a first priority objective of United States disarmament policy.

5. Avoid the regulation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or tests, except as a part of the final phase of a comprehensive disarmament arrangement.

6. Recognize that the acceptability and character of any international plan for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments depends primarily on the scope and effectiveness of the safeguards against violations and evasions, and especially the inspection system.

7. Emphasize that "The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspection and reporting AND WHEN THAT SYSTEM IS PROVED, THEN to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results."

8. Accelerate United States efforts to elicit favorable world opinion as regards the sincerity, soundness, and objectivity of our disarmament proposals derived from United States policy.³⁹

The NSC considered the Stassen report, along with the two memorandums by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 26 January. Agreement was not achieved on the points at issue, but President Eisenhower did authorize Mr. Stassen to test the acceptability of his plan through a speech by an administration spokesman and private consultations with the British. Mr. Stassen was also to refine and improve the draft letter to Bulganin with the understanding that decisions on its form and substance, and even on the desirability of sending it, would be made at a later date.⁴⁰

In a move that appeared to depart considerably from these instructions, Mr. Stassen one week later submitted to the NSC members a slightly revised version of the letter to Bulganin, along with a draft speech for President Eisenhower to deliver to the American people and a draft statement for him to make to Congress explaining the letter to Bulganin.⁴¹ The Joint Chiefs of Staff commented adversely on this draft letter, and the Acting Secretary of Defense passed their views to Mr. Stassen with his endorsement on 7 February 1956. At an NSC meeting that same day, however, the President decided against using any of the drafts, thus effectively killing the Stassen proposal.⁴²

A Compromise Policy

The disarmament question itself was far from dead, however, and President Eisenhower directed actions to be taken to deal with it in both the short and long terms. The immediate problem was to develop a position for use in the UN Disarmament Subcommittee meetings scheduled to start on 19 March. To this

end, the President directed the preparation of proposals for advance notification of movement of armed units through international air or water or over foreign soil and for exchange of test inspection teams. Mr. Eisenhower also directed the development of two other proposals that were not specifically intended for use at the Subcommittee meeting but were ultimately introduced there. They dealt with test inspection and armaments reduction in cases where inspection was shown to be effective.⁴³

Mr. Stassen had already initiated studies of test inspection areas to support the proposal for such areas in his draft letter to Bulganin. He had tentatively selected five areas that would meet the criteria set forth in that draft—to include some military forces and armaments, one port, one rail junction, and one air complex. On 19 January he had submitted his preliminary plan for comment to the Secretary of Defense. It was passed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 30 January with a request for their views—too late for them to comment on it in connection with the JCS review of the draft letter to Bulganin.⁴⁴ On 7 February 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the Secretary of Defense that they could not approve the Stassen test inspection area proposal in its current form because it was not linked to prior acceptance by the Soviet Union of Open Skies and because it was not based on mutually acceptable criteria for military establishments within the test areas.⁴⁵

President Eisenhower's action on the same day authorizing Mr. Stassen to go ahead with developing the test inspection area scheme led the Secretary of Defense to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to define the desirable characteristics of a test area and provide specific criteria for choosing the military installations it should include.⁴⁶ The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 21 February. In terms of geographical and meteorological requirements, the test area should be a continuous strip containing at least 20,000 square miles of land area and having yearly average flying conditions that allowed daylight aerial photography at least 25 percent of the time. Mr. Stassen's fourth area, a rectangular strip running from southwest to northeast, from Mobile, Alabama, nearly to Atlanta, Georgia, was judged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be acceptable from the military point of view.

As criteria for military installations to be included in the test inspection area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the following: an army installation currently housing a combat unit with a minimum actual strength of at least 10,000; an army supply installation containing at least 500,000 feet of covered storage space, of which at least half was currently in use; a naval installation containing pier facilities for ships of 20,000 tons, a complement of at least 5,000 naval personnel, and a harbor free of ice at least six months a year; an air base that was the permanent station of one flying unit of 50 or more aircraft of 25,000 pounds gross weight or larger; a major air supply installation containing at least 1.5 million gross square feet of covered storage space; and a flying training facility with at least 300 students and using at least 100 modern jet training aircraft.

Aerial inspection of all parts of the test area would be permitted. On the ground, inspectors would be excluded from installations, or portions thereof, containing activities or equipment related to research and development, air defense, missiles, nuclear weapons, and biological and chemical warfare. Estab-

lishment of these criteria was not, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sufficient to assure an acceptable exchange of information. They recommended adoption of the methods and procedures for gathering information contained in their comprehensive inspection plan of 19 October 1955.⁴⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were addressing the question of force reductions during the same period in which they were preparing recommendations on test inspection areas. On 31 January the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) had passed to them a request by Mr. Stassen for studies of the effects on US security of reductions in forces by the United States and the Soviet Union to several levels ranging from 3,000,000 down to 1,000,000. For the purpose of these studies, the President's Special Assistant for Disarmament stated as assumptions that an effective inspection and control system would be in effect before any reductions took place, that development and manufacture of ballistic missiles would not be restricted, and that reductions would take place in stages under continuing control and would be simultaneously carried out by the United States and the communist states.⁴⁸

In their reply, made to the Secretary of Defense on 24 February 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned that force reductions could not be appraised in isolation from broader considerations, particularly the objective of the Soviet Union to achieve world domination. Soviet disarmament proposals should be viewed as means of attaining that objective, with skillful exploitation of the effect on the free world of propaganda derived from negotiations, and agreement by the Soviets to specific force reductions must be assumed to be designed to enhance their relative power position. For example, any reduction of US forces in Asia or Europe following a disarmament agreement would result in at least partial achievement by the Soviet Union of its goal of reducing US influence in Eurasia.

Strategic interests of the United States, however, dictated the continued stationing of substantial forces overseas because no US ally or group of allies was strong enough to repulse a Soviet attack without help from the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff held that to expect the Soviet Union to redress this imbalance by a disarmament agreement was unrealistic. Consequently, a disarmament agreement would not lessen the need to station sizable US forces overseas.

Turning to the assumptions Mr. Stassen had suggested as a basis for the study of force reduction, the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed that the problems which must be solved prior to actual force reductions had been largely assumed away, and that fulfillment of the majority of these assumptions was basically contingent upon good faith among the parties to the agreement. In view of the total lack of demonstrated good faith on the part of the Soviet Union, it was highly unrealistic to jump ahead to the final stages of a disarmament agreement. Already, continued the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "experience has indicated that the discussion of final force figures, even for purely illustrative purposes, . . . has tended to precommit the United States to a definite position on relative force levels and to minimize or assume away the importance of those essential preliminary steps required to establish adequate safeguards. The futility of discussing disarmament in terms of pure numbers without first having established adequate and proved safeguards," they added, "must be equally obvious to the Soviets, and evidences of U.S. will-

ingness to negotiate under such conditions could only reinforce the Soviet aim of using such negotiations to further policies inimical to the United States."

Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that only the setting of US, Soviet, and Communist Chinese force levels at 3,000,000—the highest figure Mr. Stassen had listed—would be in the interest of the United States, since US forces were currently below this level. Reduction below existing levels was not justified because those levels were considered to be the minimum required to meet current commitments. Because of the virtual impossibility of furnishing a meaningful estimate of the impact of force reductions on US national security without knowledge of the conditions existing at the time and because of the many complex problems which must be solved before such reductions could be implemented, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended strongly that the Department of Defense insist that certain preconditions must be met before commitments on specific force reductions were even discussed.⁴⁹

This submission of JCS views came at a time when a strong disposition to take some positive step toward negotiation of troop reductions was in evidence at higher levels of the US Government. Four days later, on 28 February 1956, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson discussed with the Secretary of State the possibility of proposing or acceding to overall force reductions by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China to 2,500,000 men. Secretary Robertson, at the President's direction, then reviewed the whole question of force levels and their relationship to basic national security with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He emerged from this consultation accepting substantially the conclusions set forth in the JCS memorandum of 24 February. The Deputy Secretary advised Mr. Dulles on 1 March that "our basic national security policy is sound and cannot be supported by a lower level of armed forces than that which we now maintain in the absence of resolution of the outstanding issues between the Free World and the communist bloc. . . . For these reasons, the Department of Defense opposes Harold's [Stassen] proposed change for the position of the U.S. Delegate to the Subcommittee meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission."⁵⁰

A compromise was reached late in the day at another meeting, attended by the President, the Secretary and Under Secretary of State, the Acting Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It preserved the intention to take a positive stand but added qualifications that deferred to a considerable degree to the JCS and Defense views. The President approved the following:

If the Eisenhower aerial inspection and blueprint exchange proposal, with accompanying ground inspection, is accepted and if such a system is proven to the U.S. to be satisfactorily installed and operating, and assuming the political situation is reasonably stable, the United States, with other nations concerned, would be prepared to begin a gradual reciprocal, safeguarded reduction of armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures. For illustrative purposes, in the forthcoming session of the United Nations Subcommittee, the United States Representative is authorized to indicate that such reductions would presuppose, as a basis for measurement and in a specific manner to be mutually agreed, force levels of 2.5 million men for the U.S., USSR and China; corresponding appropriate levels for the UK and France and others to be determined after consultation with the representatives of these states.⁵¹

Arms Control Negotiations in 1956

When the UN Disarmament Subcommittee reconvened in London in late March, the US delegate followed through on President Eisenhower's policy directives by introducing, as preliminary steps to facilitate later disarmament agreement, proposals for exchange of technical missions by the United States and the Soviet Union and for the establishment by those states of demonstration test areas. The first proposal called for a six-month exchange of technical personnel, who would not have access to sensitive information the host countries were unwilling to reveal. The second proposal embodied the plan recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff—opening up each country to inspection by the other of an area of 20,000 square miles containing representative military installations.⁵²

While the United States limited its initial proposals in the UN Subcommittee to these two confidence-building measures, other member states offered comprehensive disarmament plans. On 19 March, the British and French put forward a revised version of the plan they had originally submitted in June 1954. The revision added the Eisenhower Open Skies and Bulganin fixed-post inspection plans to the first of its three stages. The revision also added, to the third stage, a prohibition of nuclear tests.⁵³

The Soviet Union presented a less ambitious plan. Abandoning a policy linking nuclear and nonnuclear weapons, to which they had rigidly adhered for 10 years, the Soviets now proposed an agreement limited to conventional armaments. Their plan called for reductions of military manpower within three years to the following: United States, Soviet Union, and China, 1 to 1.5 million men; Great Britain and France, 650,000. Supervision over and verification of the reductions would be in the hands of an international control organ, which would maintain fixed control posts and inspectors having unimpeded access to all objects of control. As in previous Soviet plans, violations would be referred to the UN Security Council, making further action subject to the veto, but the Soviets did now agree that the control machinery should be ready to function before arms reductions began. Tied to this plan was a proposal for creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.⁵⁴

The United States had not originally intended to propose anything more than the two confidence-building measures, but dissatisfaction with the Anglo-French draft because of its ban on nuclear weapons and nuclear tests in the third stage led the United States to introduce a proposal covering the first stage of a general disarmament plan. This plan called for the following measures, all to be undertaken under effective international inspection and control: reduction of conventional forces to 2,500,000 by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China and to 750,000 by Great Britain and France; cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military uses; and limitation of nuclear weapons tests.⁵⁵

The Soviet and Western positions had now grown closer together than ever before. They grew closer still when the Soviets, on 12 July, announced a willingness to accept the Western figures for force levels in the first stage. Unbridgeable differences remained, however, owing particularly to Soviet insistence that corrective action by control officials must be subject to Security Council decision,

and to Western determination that successive stages of arms reduction take place only after successful control over preceding stages had been achieved.⁵⁶

The Stassen Plan Further Revised

While these unsuccessful efforts to negotiate a limited arms control agreement were being made, Mr. Stassen continued work on a broad new arms control policy. On 29 June 1956, after consulting with his eight private study groups, holding preliminary discussions with individual members of the NSC, and conducting a discussion session with the NSC Planning Board and the President's Interdepartmental Committee on Disarmament Policy, Mr. Stassen circulated a draft policy paper to the members of the NSC with the suggestion that they be prepared to discuss it with the President.

In the revised and expanded policy, Mr. Stassen concentrated on reducing the dangers arising from nuclear weapons and the future development of intercontinental missiles. He first proposed to freeze existing levels of nuclear armament by an international agreement and to subject all production of fissionable material to international inspection, effective 1 July 1957, with all production after that date being used for non-weapons purposes. Nuclear weapons tests would end on the same date. The inspection system would be ready to function before 1 July 1957. To follow implementation of the freeze, Mr. Stassen proposed reduction of existing nuclear stockpiles by means of an agreement among states possessing nuclear weapons to turn some of them over for supervised peaceful purposes. To prevent any state from developing long-range military missiles, he proposed an international agreement, under effective inspection, providing that all research and development activity designed to send an object through space be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes and be open to international participation on a reciprocal basis. In addition, Mr. Stassen called for special measures to assure Great Britain a reasonable posture of nuclear weapons prior to 1 July 1957 and for a provision in any disarmament agreement allowing any party thereto to withdraw on one year's written notice.

Further, Mr. Stassen proposed that the United States indicate willingness to join with Great Britain and the USSR in providing the United Nations with a small force equipped with nuclear weapons (such as one squadron each) and to maintain such force under the United Nations flag at United Nations bases; this nuclear force would be responsive to the Security Council or to actions passed by the UN General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950. A somewhat similar idea offered by Mr. Stassen was that the United States should consult with the other NATO nations regarding the establishment of a small elite NATO force equipped with nuclear weapons, consisting of volunteer personnel from all NATO members, supported by financial contributions from all members, and functioning under the direct command of SHAPE.

The President's Special Assistant for Disarmament indicated that while these various measures were being negotiated the United States should continue to

seek protection against great surprise attack by negotiating for a system that would combine Open Skies aerial surveillance and the Soviet fixed-ground inspection posts scheme. The United States should also be willing to consider progressive development of a partial system.⁵⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, replying to Secretary Wilson's request on 7 July for review of the latest Stassen paper, took strong exception to it. Noting that the current basic national security policy, as set forth in NSC 5602/1, committed the United States to strive for a comprehensive, phased and safeguarded international system for the regulation of armaments, they again declared that the safeguards must take the form of a proven procedure for inspection and verification, whose establishment must be a prerequisite to any international agreement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff cited President Eisenhower's letter of 1 March 1956 to Bulganin as a reaffirmation of this concept, and they charged that the courses of action recommended by Mr. Stassen represented a departure from it. They found that "the Stassen recommendations could materially limit our nuclear weapons stockpile, and our freedom of employment of this most important weapon in our arsenal," without imposing the foolproof inspection system necessary to make such limitations acceptable. Accordingly, implementation of Mr. Stassen's courses of action would jeopardize the security of the United States.

Objections along similar lines were voiced to the proposed nuclear forces under the United Nations and within NATO and to the measures for restricting development of medium- and long-range missiles and space vehicles to peaceful and scientific purposes. With regard to the latter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that "in the absence of a comprehensive and effective inspection system rather than one devised to meet this isolated purpose, 'peaceful and scientific' activities in this sphere could readily be adapted to the clandestine production of weapons."

In the JCS view, Mr. Stassen's provision for withdrawal from a disarmament agreement on one year's written notice should be reworded to permit immediate withdrawal, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that even this provision could not guarantee the freedom of the United States to withdraw unilaterally because of concern over the adverse effects such an action might have on world opinion. They cited the inhibitions felt by the United States in reacting to the known communist violations of the Korean armistice agreement as an example. Returning to their main theme, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said they did not consider that abrogation or withdrawal provisions in a disarmament agreement would lessen the need for a proven and tested system of inspection and control which would verify compliance.

With regard to the proposed cessation of testing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff affirmed that, "as long as nuclear weapons stockpiles exist, nuclear and thermonuclear tests are essential to insure the development and maintenance of our nuclear weapons capability."⁵⁸

On 12 July Secretary Wilson forwarded the JCS views to the National Security Council. He indicated that he was in general accord with them and expressed his own feeling that the proposed courses of action submerged the requirements for an adequate control and inspection system to the desirability of reaching early agreement.⁵⁹

Upon receipt of these views, Mr. Stassen wrote the Secretary of Defense requesting a reconsideration on the ground that the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were based either on a misconception or a "preconceived negative view without any substantive basis for the negation." Every step under his recommended policy, Mr. Stassen claimed, would be subject to effective and adequate inspection satisfactory to the United States, under an inspection system that would be installed before any reductions were made.⁶⁰ To this letter both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense replied by denying that they had acted under a misconception or from a negative preconception. The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that in elaborating on his proposal of 29 June 1956, Mr. Stassen had added conclusions heretofore not expressed and interpretations not previously apparent:

It is considered that any document which proposes changes in United States policy, as Mr. Stassen's 29 June memorandum does, should be so worded as to be, in itself, unmistakably clear as to the policy recommended. This is of particular importance when the document is intended to be used as a basis for the United States position in negotiations with the Communists, considering their devious and distortional tactics.⁶¹

Nuclear Test Ban Becomes an Issue

During the ensuing months, pressures for limitations on armaments mounted. In the US presidential election campaign, the Democratic candidate, Adlai Stevenson, called for a unilateral cessation of hydrogen bomb tests. He asserted that further testing was unnecessary to preserve US supremacy in strategic weapons and that the cessation of such testing would be a step toward world peace. Premier Bulganin, writing to President Eisenhower on 17 October, endorsed the Stevenson proposal and suggested an immediate agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States to discontinue nuclear weapons tests.⁶²

The Eisenhower administration, of course, took a different view. It believed that a cessation of nuclear weapons tests could be acceptable only as part of a comprehensive international arms control agreement. A proposal along these lines had already been made by the US delegate in the UN Disarmament Subcommittee the previous spring, and the comprehensive Stassen plan currently under development also provided for a halt to nuclear testing.

In the face of calls for an end to nuclear weapons tests, President Eisenhower felt compelled to restate and defend his policies. In a statement issued on 23 October, he pointed out that his administration had always favored a cessation of nuclear weapons tests as part of an effective comprehensive arms control plan but that the Soviet Union had consistently opposed such a plan. He defended the continuation of H-bomb tests, pending effective international agreements to end them, on the grounds of a necessity to perfect strategic weapons essential to the national defense. And he denied that they were hazardous to the health of humanity. He also rejected the notion, advanced by Mr. Stevenson, that an agreement to stop tests could be self-enforcing. Technology had not yet advanced to

the point where it was possible to detect all Soviet tests. These facts, the President said, dictated two conclusions:

First. We must continue—until properly safeguarded international agreements can be reached—to develop our strength in the most advanced weapons. . . .
Second. We must . . . continue to strive ceaselessly to achieve, not the illusion, but the reality of world disarmament. Illusion in this case . . . can mean a reliance upon agreements without safeguards. Or it can be the suggestion that simple suspension of our nuclear tests, without sure knowledge of the actions of others, signifies progress—rather than peril.⁶³

The President's statement was followed, within a few weeks, by a new Soviet proposal for a comprehensive disarmament agreement. The new proposal took the form of a declaration enclosed in a letter sent by Premier Bulganin to President Eisenhower on 17 November. The occasion for the new Soviet offer, Bulganin wrote, was the serious aggravation of the international situation brought about by the British, French, and Israeli attacks on Egypt.⁶⁴ These attacks, Bulganin claimed, had resulted in a serious weakening of all military forces of the North Atlantic bloc on the European continent because of troop deployments to the Middle East. As a consequence, the strategic situation in Western Europe was advantageous to the armed forces of the Soviet Union to an even greater degree than that obtaining at the end of the Second World War, when the mobilized and armed Soviet Army could have become consolidated in all of Western Europe if the Soviet Union had pursued such an aim. This was not done, however, because the Soviet Government "did not and does not have any other aims than the preservation and strengthening of peace."

Bulganin proposed a comprehensive arms reduction scheme that contained many of the elements of the previous Soviet proposals of 10 May 1955 and 27 March 1956. The new plan called for an immediate cessation of nuclear weapons testing. It also provided for destruction of all nuclear weapons and reduction of armed forces of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China to 1–1.5 million within two years. British and French forces would be reduced to 650,000 each during the same period. Control over these disarmament measures would be exercised by an international body with undefined powers. To prevent surprise attack, control posts would be established at major ports, airports, and rail junctions of each state by the other.

All these points had been made before in some form by the Soviet Union, but there were also two new proposals. These were a willingness to permit aerial inspection of an area in Central Europe extending 500 kilometers on each side of the Iron Curtain and a call for a summit conference of the heads of governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and India. The purpose of the conference would be to assist achievement of agreements on questions dealing with the problem of disarmament.⁶⁵

President Eisenhower answered this latest Soviet communication on the last day of 1956. He rejected the summit meeting as unsuitable for dealing with the highly complicated matter of disarmament. The President welcomed the Soviet mention of aerial inspection but noted with regret that the scheme fell far short of

fulfilling the Open Skies concept. He announced that the US Government was prepared to discuss the Soviet plan, and further US proposals, at forthcoming meetings of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee.⁶⁶

US Disarmament Policy Determined

In preparation for such UN discussions, the US Government had now agreed to a comprehensive disarmament policy. The differences that had plagued the efforts to produce such a plan the previous summer were at last resolved. The final decisions were made by President Eisenhower on 21 November 1956 after consultation with Admiral Radford, Secretary Wilson, Acting Secretary of State Hoover, Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis L. Strauss, and Mr. Stassen.⁶⁷ The end result was a considerably amended version of the Stassen plan, issued as an annex to NSC Action No. 1553, which contained the following points:

1. On 31 December 1957, or as soon as possible thereafter, and within one month after the establishment of a satisfactorily functioning inspection system, all future production of fissionable materials should be subject to effective international inspection and used or stockpiled for nonweapons purposes under international supervision.

2. Upon implementation of the foregoing measure, possessors of nuclear weapons would begin to transfer previously produced fissionable materials, in "agreed, equitable, proportionate," and successive increments, to nonweapons purposes, including stockpiles, under international inspection and supervision, but only at a transfer rate that would leave the United States with a very substantial nuclear weapons capability in the early stages of the process.

3. The preceding measures having been implemented, the United States would be willing to agree "to limit or to eliminate" nuclear and thermonuclear test explosions, and in the interim such tests should be conducted after advance notice and under limited international observation.

4. The effect on the British nuclear weapons posture of UK participation in these proposals should be considered by the United States, but any commitment on further nuclear aid would depend upon presidential approval of specific details and, when appropriate, on legislative action.

5. With the goal of assuring that "the sending of objects into outer space shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes," the United States would seek to include this field of activity in the armaments control system. It would seek agreements prohibiting "the production of objects designed for travel in or projection through outer space for military purposes" and providing for international inspection of and participation in tests of outer space objects.

6. Negotiations for President Eisenhower's Open Skies plan for mutual aerial reconnaissance and an exchange of military blueprints in combination with the Bulganin proposal for ground observation posts should be continued.

7. All agreements should permit a signatory to withdraw, with advance notice, in the event of a major violation and should be subject to suspension in the event of lesser violation.

8. As a safeguard against a great surprise attack an inspection and control system with air and ground components should be progressively developed and installed. To promote the opening of the Soviet Union to such inspection, the

United States would be willing to begin minor mutual reductions of conventional armament and armed forces concurrently with the installation of the inspection system, down to a first-stage force level of 2,500,000 men.

9. And finally, the principal foregoing measures, if accepted by the Soviet Government, should be applied to Communist China to the appropriate extent when, and as, the political situation permitted. The United States, however, would reserve the right to withdraw from any commitment if it proved infeasible to apply the agreement to "communist China or other USSR satellites" having a significant military potential.⁶⁸

Now, after two years of effort, the United States Government had evolved a comprehensive disarmament policy. Its main features included the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, reduction of existing stocks of nuclear armaments, minor reductions in conventional forces, and measures to forestall surprise attack—all under strict international inspection and control. During the development of this policy the Joint Chiefs of Staff had often objected to specific elements proposed for it. But this was a role that followed inevitably from their basic responsibilities. Charged with maintaining the military security of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not endorse the adoption of any disarmament provision that would, in their judgment, weaken the United States in relation to the Soviet Union. In particular, they consistently opposed any measure whose successful application depended on Soviet professions of good faith. The Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted that no disarmament agreement could be viewed as acceptable that did not place in operation a proven procedure for inspection, verification, and detection of violations.

On 12 January 1957, the United States formally proposed to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly the essential points of the policy in the annex to NSC Action No. 1553. The General Assembly took no action, however, other than to request the Disarmament Commission to reconvene its Subcommittee in the near future to consider all the various proposals offered to date. When the Subcommittee met in London on 18 March 1957, the United States offered its proposal of 12 January, which then became the subject of lengthy and serious negotiations.⁶⁹

Thaw and Freeze in Europe

Nowhere were the vital interests of the Western and communist blocs more directly in conflict than on the continent of Europe. It was here that the Soviet Union had first extended its domination over neighboring states after World War II. It was here that the United States had committed its resources both military and economic and exercised its diplomacy to contain the Soviet encroachments. The result was a freezing of Europe into two hostile camps divided by the Iron Curtain. To the east of that barrier lay the Soviet satellite empire of subservient communist states; to the west lay the democratic nations, most of whom were linked to each other and to the United States by the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The power blocs of East and West waged a constant cold war of propaganda, economic pressure, clandestine activities, and diplomatic maneuvering, each side attempting to improve its position relative to the other.

The death of Josef Stalin in March 1953 removed the leader identified in Western minds with aggressive Soviet expansionism and raised hopes that some of the frozen positions of the cold war might thaw. Early in his tenure the new Soviet Premier, Georgi Malenkov, reasserted that part of the Leninist-Stalinist doctrine that spoke of the advantages of periods of peaceful coexistence between the capitalist and communist systems, though without discarding the more familiar concept of an inevitable ultimate conflict between them. While Soviet actions on the international scene continued for the most part to belie any devotion to conciliation, Malenkov was to issue a new call for peaceful coexistence and mutual consideration of each other's legitimate interests during an interview with an American newsman early in 1955.¹

The Austrian State Treaty

The first evidence in deeds, rather than words, that Soviet policies of the post-Stalin era might permit a thaw in the cold war in Europe came during April

1955 when the Soviet Government indicated a willingness to complete the treaty that would restore full sovereignty and independence to Austria. The subject of intensive and exhausting negotiations among the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the USSR since 1947, the Austrian State Treaty had been all but ready for signature on two separate occasions, only to be set back by some new instance of Soviet intransigence.²

Austria, which had been incorporated into Hitler's Greater German Reich in 1938, had been occupied by the victorious allied armies advancing from the east and west in 1945. The full fruits of peace were denied to the Austrians, however, because of conflicting interests of the Soviet Union and Western democracies. Soviet objectives, perhaps because of the presence of Western forces in Austria and the weakness of the Austrian Communist Party, did not include the absorption of Austria into the Soviet satellite empire but consisted primarily of extracting as much wealth as possible from the country. To justify their raids on the economy of their zone of Austria, the Soviets cited an ambiguous clause in the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 that allowed them to meet their reparation claims against Germany in part from appropriate German external assets but did not define what those assets were.³

Secondary objectives were to support the claims of Yugoslavia to territorial and monetary reparations, and to justify the continued stationing of the Red Army in Hungary and Rumania, ostensibly to protect Soviet military communications with Austria. To facilitate the attainment of their objectives, the Soviets found it convenient to perpetuate their occupation of eastern Austria by delaying the conclusion of a treaty.

These Soviet purposes conflicted at every point with those of the three Western powers. Their objective was to restore Austria as a fully independent state that would not only act as a force for stability in Central Europe but might also be brought into the system of Western collective defense represented by NATO and WEU. Austrian general elections since 1945 had returned center and moderate socialist governments to power and had resulted in crushing defeats for the Austrian Communist Party. As a result, the Western democracies had little reason to fear that an independent Austria would join the Soviet bloc. It was in their interest, therefore, to conclude a treaty restoring Austria to full sovereignty as soon as possible.

Four-power treaty negotiations had begun in 1947 and the conferees quickly reached agreement on such basic matters as reestablishment of a sovereign and independent Austria, prohibition of any form of economic or political union between Austria and Germany, liquidation of Nazi laws and institutions, and limitation of the Austrian armed forces to 50,000 men and 90 aircraft. But it was not until 1949 that the two remaining major issues—the definition of German assets and reparations for Yugoslavia—were finally resolved. Changing international relationships had at last hastened the disposal of the latter issue. By this time Marshal Tito had split with Moscow, and the Soviet Government ceased to support the Yugoslav claims, which were then resolved by limiting Yugoslav reparations to Austrian property in Yugoslavia. After arduous bargaining, the economic issues were finally settled by agreement that the Soviet Union would

receive, in full settlement of its claims, 30-year concessions of 60 percent of the oil fields and refineries, all the assets of the Danube shipping company, and \$150 million in freely convertible currency to be paid by Austria in six years. With all the major issues resolved, the completion of the treaty was confidently expected, but the Soviet Union suddenly refused to agree to the remaining minor articles.

No further movement on the Austrian treaty occurred until the Big Four foreign ministers met five years later, in 1954. At this conference, held in Berlin during January and February, V. M. Molotov proposed that a group of deputies complete the draft of the treaty within three months but with a new article added whereby Austria would assume obligations: (1) not to join any alliance or coalition aimed against any of the World War II allies; and (2) not to permit foreign military bases on its soil or employ foreign military instructors or military specialists. In addition, Molotov proposed that the occupation forces remain in their respective zones in Austria until the signing of a German peace treaty.⁴

The new article would effectively bar Austria from membership in NATO, and Molotov's further suggestion appeared likely to keep Soviet troops in that country for some time to come. For these reasons the three Western foreign ministers found the terms unacceptable. They offered, instead, to agree to the Soviet versions of all the other disputed articles in the existing draft treaty. Molotov refused to accept this alternative, and the conference adjourned with the disagreement over the Austrian treaty still unresolved.

Somewhat unexpectedly, this impasse broke a year later when the Soviet Union offered to make major concessions on the disputed issues. Following negotiations between delegations headed by Austrian Chancellor Julius Raab and Molotov in Moscow, the two issued a memorandum on 15 April stating that the Soviet Government was now willing to agree to evacuation of all occupation forces by 31 December 1955 and to soften its economic demands by substituting annual oil shipments of 1,000,000 tons for 10 years and a lump sum payment of \$2,000,000 for the oil and shipping assets that were to have been delivered to the Soviet Union under the draft treaty. In return, the Austrian Government agreed to make a declaration of its intention not to join any military alliance nor to permit foreign military bases on Austrian territory and to maintain a permanent neutrality similar to that of Switzerland. The Soviet Union, for its part, agreed to participate with the other three major powers in guaranteeing this state of neutrality and Austria's territorial integrity.⁵

Four days later, on 19 April, the Soviet Government sent identical notes to the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and France pointing out that, in the light of Austrian-Soviet conversations, completion of the Austrian State Treaty should now be possible. The Soviets proposed a conference of the four occupying powers for that purpose at the earliest possible date.

In view of these developments, the State Department concluded that early new negotiations on the Austrian State Treaty were now a probable necessity. In a paper prepared on 20 April for submission to the NSC, the Department proposed that the Secretary of State be authorized to negotiate and conclude the treaty. In these negotiations he was to agree to the Soviet proposals on Austrian neutrality, including abstention from military alliances and prohibition of foreign

military bases on Austrian soil. But these provisions should not preclude Austria from obtaining military equipment for its security forces from the Western powers. It was recommended that the Secretary of State also agree to the Soviet proposal for a four-power guarantee of Austrian neutrality and territorial integrity, so long as it could not be construed as giving a legal basis for unilateral Soviet action against Austria. The State Department was particularly concerned that the guarantee not provide a basis for Soviet reoccupation.⁶

Department of Defense officials learned that the Secretary of State expected to raise the subject of Austria in the National Security Council the following day, 21 April. In informing the Joint Chiefs of Staff of this development on 20 April, an OSD official characterized the Secretary of State's intention as that of requesting what was in effect "blank check" authority to conclude an Austrian Treaty on the most favorable terms that could be obtained. Secretary Dulles was said to consider it of paramount importance that the United States not stand in the way of a settlement of this long-outstanding issue on terms that were acceptable to the other powers.

A quick response was requested from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military implications of such a treaty, particularly with regard to covert military planning. Because of the shortness of time, no formal JCS views were requested, but Admiral Carney, the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked to be prepared to consult with the Deputy Secretary of Defense and to discuss the issue in the National Security Council should the occasion arise.⁷

When the Council met, Deputy Secretary Robert B. Anderson explained that while the Department of Defense had no basic disagreement with the State Department position, he felt the whole matter was being rushed through without adequate interdepartmental discussion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, he pointed out, had not even had an opportunity to discuss the problem formally. He proposed a delay of one week in reaching decisions; during that time a high-level State-Defense group could give careful consideration to the problem. The Under Secretary of State, however, emphasized the urgent nature of the matter, and stressed that Secretary Dulles needed authority to act. President Eisenhower agreed.

At the conclusion of the meeting the Council recommended and the President approved granting authority to the Secretary of State to proceed with the negotiation of the Austrian State Treaty on the basis of the existing draft but with authority to depart from it if necessary to avoid placing the United States in the position of blocking a treaty. In recognition of the fact that the views of the Defense Department had not been adequately considered, the Council suggested an exchange of views between the Departments of State and Defense on the military aspects of the treaty and agreed to consider the matter further on 28 April.⁸

In preparation for the further NSC meeting the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their comments on the military aspects of the Austrian treaty to the Secretary of Defense on 22 April. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that they had previously expressed the view that US military objectives could be achieved only if the occupation of Austria was terminated under conditions that would (1) enable the Austrian Government to thwart incorporation of Austria into the communist bloc by subversive means, (2) permit training and equipping of adequate Aus-

trian internal security forces, and (3) enable Austria to make a substantial contribution to her own defense.

Although believing that some of these objectives could still be attained under current circumstances, the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged that others might have to be sacrificed in order to obtain the advantages that would result from the withdrawal of Soviet forces and influence from Austrian territory. The new Soviet economic proposals, by removing Soviet managerial personnel who were operating Austrian oil and shipping properties, would eliminate a potential means for influencing and subverting the Austrian Government. On the other hand, it was essential that Austrian security forces become effective before the withdrawal of occupation forces. For this purpose at least six months would be required. The Department of State proposal that Austria be allowed to receive equipment for internal security forces from the Western powers was essential to Western security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared, and the three Western powers should agree, prior to signing the treaty, that deliveries of the equipment scheduled for Austrian forces would begin on the day the treaty was signed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff conceded that covert defense planning with Austria was not feasible in the current circumstances and should not be attempted. They opposed US participation in a four-power guarantee of Austrian neutrality and territorial integrity but suggested that acceptable arrangements might be made within the framework of the United Nations. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered it of the utmost importance not to link the Austrian treaty in any way with any future German settlement.⁹

On 25 April the Secretary of Defense forwarded the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the National Security Council, with a statement that he fully supported them. In addition, he cautioned against Soviet attempts to use negotiations for an Austrian treaty as a means to weaken the growing defense of Western Europe generally, and, in particular, to slow down or frustrate West German rearmament.¹⁰

When the National Security Council took up the matter of the Austrian treaty on 28 April, the only extended discussion concerned the length of time to be allowed for withdrawing occupation forces. General Ridgway, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, anticipated no difficulty in the physical withdrawal of US forces in 90 days but advocated a six-month period so that Austrian security forces could be adequately prepared to take over before the occupation forces departed.

President Eisenhower pointed out that, since the draft treaty already specified a 90-day period, the Austrians might object to an extension, and Secretary of State Dulles added that getting rid of the occupation troops was the one big issue to the Austrians. As a compromise, Secretary Dulles offered to explain to the Austrians the advantages of a six-month period for troop training and to seek to change the treaty accordingly if they so desired. The Secretary of Defense then concluded that the point was not of sufficient importance to justify such an effort. He agreed to deletion of all reference to a six-month period from the negotiating instructions for Secretary Dulles.

With this matter resolved, the Council quickly agreed to the remaining instructions for Secretary Dulles, empowering him to negotiate an Austrian treaty on the basis of the existing draft, but with authority to depart from it

within certain limits. He would not agree to provisions that would preclude Austria's association with the economic community of Western Europe, prevent the Austrians from maintaining internal order, or deny the Western powers the right to provide Austria with financial or material aid for purposes of internal security and economic viability. He might commit the United States to recognize and respect a declaration of neutrality by the Austrian Government but not to any guarantee of Austrian territory or neutrality except through the United Nations. The Council also recommended taking all necessary steps to assure prompt delivery of US military aid to Austria once the treaty was in force.¹¹

The President subsequently approved these instructions, and meanwhile Secretary Dulles had advanced through the preliminary stages of negotiation on the basis of the general authorization given him on 21 April. After consulting the British and French, he had proposed preliminary talks in Vienna at the ambassadorial level beginning on 2 May to complete the treaty draft preparatory to signature by the foreign ministers. The Soviet Union accepted the proposal on 27 April.¹²

When the ambassadors met as scheduled, the Soviet envoy proposed a revision of the article on withdrawal of occupation forces to specify departure by 31 December 1955 rather than 90 days after the coming into force of the treaty. In Washington, the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were all quick to object that this condition could not be met if the Senate were to adjourn for the year without consenting to the treaty. The United States then made a new proposal, to which the other parties agreed, specifying withdrawal on 31 December 1955 or three months after the coming into effect of the treaty, whichever was later.¹³

With regard to the remainder of the treaty, the ambassadors quickly agreed to delete military articles limiting Austrian armed forces in such a manner as to have made the defense of a neutral Austria difficult. The Soviets, however, refused to revise the article on economic reparations, although they had previously agreed to do so in the discussions with the Austrians in Moscow. It was not until Secretary of State Dulles refused to come to Vienna to sign the treaty in its existing form that the Soviets relented and agreed to incorporate the Moscow economic agreement with Austria in the treaty.¹⁴

With this hurdle cleared, the Austrian State Treaty was signed in Vienna on 15 May 1955 by the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, and Austria. It went into effect on 27 July 1955, the date when the last ratification, that of France, was deposited with the Soviet Union.¹⁵

In addition to the provisions for reparations and withdrawal of occupation forces that have already been described, the treaty reestablished Austria as an independent nation with the frontiers existing on 1 January 1938. It prohibited any political or economic union with Germany and barred Austria from possessing atomic weapons, guided missiles, chemical and biological weapons, and certain other types of armament. The four powers undertook to respect the territorial integrity and independence of Austria, without entering into a formal guarantee. The neutralization of Austria was not included in the treaty, but the Austrian Parliament adopted a constitutional law declaring the perpetual neutrality of Austria, backed by a policy of abstention from military alliances and

prohibition of foreign military bases. On 6 December 1955 the Big Four powers publicly announced their recognition of Austrian neutrality as defined in the constitutional law.¹⁶

Withdrawal of US Forces from Austria

Planning for evacuation of US forces from Austria began before the treaty was signed. Responding to a request from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 24 May, submitted a 90-day phase-out plan and recommended that the troops withdrawn from Austria be organized into a special weapons task force to be stationed in Italy. The new unit would have a strength of about 5,000 men and be armed with Corporal missiles and Honest John rockets. Its mission would be defense of the vital approaches to Italy in the Villach-Ljubljana area. The unit would be assigned to USCINCEUR and earmarked for assignment to NATO for operational control on M-day, except that authority over nuclear weapons would remain with the United States.¹⁷ On 3 June, the Secretary of Defense approved the JCS recommendations and requested the Secretary of State to arrange with the Italian Government for appropriate amendments of existing base agreements.¹⁸ Withdrawal of occupation forces began soon after the treaty was ratified and was completed on 25 October 1955, the end of the prescribed 90-day withdrawal period.

The coming into force of the Austrian State Treaty and the subsequent withdrawal of occupation forces were major changes that rendered the existing statement of US policy toward Austria obsolete. To replace NSC 164/1, the NSC Planning Board prepared a new policy statement and circulated it on 23 March 1956. Designated NSC 5603, it stated the objective of US policy to be the maintenance of an independent and stable Austria, encouragement of its continued pro-Western orientation, and resistance to communist pressures and subversion. Among the courses of action proposed were such military measures as the granting of military assistance to Austria and encouraging Austria to raise armed forces adequate to maintain internal order. In addition the proposed policy called for encouraging Austria to maintain close political and economic ties with the West.¹⁹

On 30 March the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that they found 5603 acceptable from the military point of view. On 5 April 1956 the NSC adopted the statement of policy, and President Eisenhower approved it two days later.²⁰

Ascent to the Summit

The successful settlement of the Austrian question was widely hailed as evidence of a shift in Soviet policies toward accommodation with the West. It raised hopes throughout the world that a relaxation of the tensions of the cold war might now be possible. Influential voices on both sides of the Atlantic began

calling for an early meeting of the heads of government of the four great powers in anticipation that they might be able to lessen tensions and prepare the way for settlement of outstanding differences. Sentiment for such a meeting found expression in France during the debate over the ratification of the Paris Accords, which provided for the admission of West Germany into NATO and the Western European Union. It was also expressed by the British Labor Party during the election campaign in the spring of 1955. In Washington, Senator Walter F. George, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, proposed that the United States take the initiative in arranging a Big Four conference.²¹

The leaders of the Western nations had to weigh this sentiment against the experience of the past. Winston Churchill had first suggested in May 1953 a meeting at the summit at which heads of government would sit down without a fixed agenda and attempt to evolve the rudiments of a settlement of the world's major problems. The meeting of the foreign ministers at Berlin in the winter of 1954, however, had demonstrated that the Soviet Union was determined to block adherence to NATO by West Germany and was not prepared at that time to sign the Austrian treaty. The Western governments had therefore concluded that a summit meeting would not be productive until there was evidence of a change in Soviet policy. Even more to the point, the United States and Britain wished to postpone a conference until agreement had been reached in the West on rearming West Germany and admitting her to NATO. This condition was fulfilled with the final ratification of the Paris Accords, which took place early in May 1955. British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden now added his voice to those urging a meeting at the summit.²²

President Eisenhower, though still skeptical regarding the value of such a conference, agreed to move ahead. As he later explained, he did not wish to "appear senselessly stubborn in my attitude toward a summit meeting so hopefully desired by so many."²³

Consultations among the three Western powers followed, leading to the delivery of a tripartite note to the Soviet Government on 10 May inviting participation in a meeting of heads of government. The purpose of this meeting would be to explore the sources of conflict between the Soviet Union and the West and to lay the basis for later detailed negotiation on specific issues. On 26 May, the Soviet Government accepted. Arrangements were then completed for a meeting of heads of government accompanied by foreign ministers, to convene in Geneva on 18 July 1955.²⁴

The United States moved to develop positions on all major topics expected to come up at the summit conference and to coordinate them with the British and French Governments. On President Eisenhower's instructions, the NSC Planning Board undertook to draft policy recommendations for consideration by the NSC. Secretary Dulles had already assigned Douglas MacArthur II, the Counselor of the Department, to supervise the preparation of the State Department position. The President directed Secretary Wilson to name an official in the Defense Department to perform a similar role, aided by military advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The policy recommendations to be prepared by the Planning Board were to include the following:

(1) The general US attitude toward the purposes of the meeting and the objectives which the US would seek to achieve, taking into account: British and French objectives; estimated Soviet objectives, immediate and long term; existing or anticipated Soviet proposals and possible US proposals which might be introduced at such a meeting.

(2) Maintenance of a US posture of strength and confidence, before, during and after such a meeting.

(3) Disarmament.

(4) European security including the US position toward Germany; a neutral belt of European states and its impact on trade with the Soviet bloc; the status of satellite countries; and the activities of the international Communist movement.

(5) The US position on Far Eastern issues which might be raised, including the basis for US opposition to a Five Power meeting.²⁵

Various studies had already been undertaken beginning in April in anticipation of a four-power conference, when progress toward an Austrian settlement made it apparent that such a meeting might occur. On 20 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff had received for comment six State Department position papers on European security arrangements and German reunification. They set out the general course to be followed by the Department's representatives at forthcoming working-level talks in London with the British and French. The State Department considered that the Western powers would probably have to adopt more advanced positions on German and European security than the ones adhered to at the 1954 conference of foreign ministers. In doing so, however, they should avoid any plan that would undermine NATO or prevent implementation of the Paris Accords.

The more advanced position on German reunification would be a modification of the Eden plan for all-German elections combined with a peace treaty reestablishing an independent and free Germany. Occupation forces would be withdrawn within six months after the treaty went into effect. The level of German armaments would not be specified in the treaty but would be dealt with under the general European security arrangement. As the basis for such arrangements, the State Department proposed adapting the arms limitation provisions of the Western European Union and extending them to Eastern Europe. Broadly stated, the WEU system involved setting limits on the forces and armaments of the signatory countries within a specified geographic area, with adherence to the limitations to be monitored by a system of international inspection and with enforcement by sanctions that would not require unanimity to be applied.²⁶

On 22 April 1955 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that they had serious reservations concerning the State Department proposals. The suggested European security arrangement appeared to disregard the reasons for establishing NATO in the first place, namely that the threat to peace and security in Europe stemmed wholly from the aggressive military posture and political activities of the Soviet bloc, a danger that could only be met by a pooling of strength and resources by the threatened countries. To introduce the State Department's proposal for a European security arrangement, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff maintained, would create a false conception that a military alliance of non-communist nations was no longer necessary, thereby undermining NATO at the very time it was beginning to acquire real strength. In addition, the State Department plan, by largely exempting the territory of the Soviet Union from its arms control provisions, would overlook the major source of danger to Western Europe. And finally, the State Department was, in effect, proposing a regional disarmament plan. In the absence of any general disarmament agreement, this would be unsound and hazardous.

The proposal for German reunification, while generally acceptable, contained a provision for withdrawal of occupation forces within six months after the coming into force of the treaty. On the assumption that a united Germany would align with NATO, the six-month provision would be acceptable only if it did not result in a power vacuum in Germany that would impair the defense of the West.²⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were given a further opportunity to examine the implications of the withdrawal of Western forces from Germany on 4 May, when Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson requested their views on the subject for use in further preparation of the US position on the reunification of Germany. Their analysis should include, but not be limited to, the following:

- a. The possibility of repositioning US forces now in Western Europe within Continental European NATO nations, by country locations, in response to withdrawal of Soviet Forces from East Germany to Poland and Czechoslovakia, or to within the borders of the USSR;
- b. Necessary and feasible adjustments to MC 48;
- c. The degree of acceptability of the resultant Allied military posture in Western Europe; and
- d. Minimum and optimum strength of German forces, under a limited German rearmament, required for Germany on the withdrawal of US, Allied, and Soviet forces from Germany assuming that a united Germany (1) becomes a member of NATO, or (2) elects to remain outside NATO.²⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 27 May that it would not be acceptable from the military point of view to adopt a policy calling for withdrawal of allied forces from Germany unless there was certainty that the facilities to receive them in other Western European countries would be available at the time of withdrawal. This was necessary because it was invalid to assume that there could be an effective NATO defense without US and British troops on the continent.

If these practical problems could be solved, the most desirable repositioning of NATO forces would be as follows: forces of continental Europe countries would return home; British forces would move to Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and northern France; US forces would relocate in southern Belgium, Luxembourg, east central and south central France, and northern Italy.

In the event of such a relocation, Germany as a member of NATO would have to maintain 12 divisions if Soviet forces returned home and 16 divisions if the Soviets withdrew only to Poland. If Germany were not a member of NATO, these force levels would have to be 16 and 26 divisions respectively. Under any of these conditions, the NATO forward strategy called for in MC 48 would probably have to be abandoned.²⁹

Secretary Wilson, in communicating the Defense Department position on these matters to Secretary Dulles, adopted the JCS views on the size of German forces, but he took a stronger stand than his military advisers on the question of redeploying allied troops from Germany to other locations on the continent. Whereas the Joint Chiefs of Staff had held that no policy based on redeployment should be adopted until the practical arrangements for it had been made, Secretary Wilson believed that the obstacles in the way of making such arrangements were so great as to make redeployment of allied forces from Germany to other continental countries impracticable. Since he agreed with the JCS view that an effective defense of Western Europe would be impossible without US and British forces on the continent, the Secretary maintained that the United States should not adopt any policy requiring withdrawal of allied troops from Germany.³⁰

The extent to which the Department of State was prepared to accept these views was revealed during the drafting by the Planning Board of the policy recommendations requested by President Eisenhower. As circulated on 27 June, the Planning Board's report, designated NSC 5524, contained a split between the State Department on the one hand and the Defense and Treasury Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament on the other over the proposal to extend the WEU system of arms control to Eastern Europe. The State Department still favored it—a view to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department had objected in commenting on the earlier State Department position papers of 20 April. The majority supported the position taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on that occasion. On the other hand, the State Department accepted the JCS views on conditions for withdrawal of occupation forces from Germany and on the need for continued deployment of US and British troops on the continent.³¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in reviewing NSC 5524 prior to action on it by the Council, upheld the position taken by their representative in the Planning Board draft. They also opposed establishment of a demilitarized zone limited to East Germany, a proposal included in the draft as one that might be acceptable to the United States. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not satisfied that the Planning Board draft gave sufficient recognition to the continuing Soviet determination to expand its power and influence over additional areas, which they believed would persist in spite of Soviet professions of interest in a relaxation of tensions.³²

On 11 July, the NSC adopted the policy statement in NSC 5524 after incorporating the changes recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President approved it the same day. Published as NSC 5524/1, the approved statement concluded that the estimate of Soviet intentions and the definition of US policy in NSC 5501, the current statement of Basic National Security Policy, remained valid. In approaching the forthcoming four-power talks, the US Government should keep firmly in mind that the Soviet Union, in spite of recent talk of coexistence, still intended to expand the area under its control and to weaken and disrupt the countries of the free world. Therefore, the United States should not relax its efforts to prevent the Soviets from attaining their goals and to bring about an ultimate change in communist policies by peaceful means.

Immediate goals to be sought at Geneva in support of the basic policy set forth in NSC 5501 were: the retraction of Soviet power from Central and Eastern Europe, beginning with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Rumania; the reunification of Germany by free elections, as provided in the Eden plan, and its alignment with NATO; a contribution by Germany of forces for defense of the West; and the continued stationing of US and allied forces in Germany so long as needed to assure an effective defense of Western Europe.

As the means to persuade the Soviet Union to accept these Western objectives, NSC 5524/1 proposed that the United States be prepared to offer what amounted to very limited inducements: some form of regional security arrangement; a demilitarized zone that did not prevent German rearmament; some form of arms limitation, including extension to Germany of the WEU system or any general system that might be agreed upon.

An immediate danger to avoid, according to NSC 5524/1, was a withdrawal of Western troops from Germany as a consequence of agreement to the evacuation of all foreign forces from that country. The United States should not make any proposal including such an action and should accept one advanced by others only if it was desired by all the major European allies, including West Germany. If forced to consider such a proposal, the US negotiators should bear in mind the desirability of obtaining the following: relocation of allied forces in NATO countries bordering Germany; withdrawal of Soviet forces to the Soviet Union without an increase in garrisons in Poland or the stationing of forces in Czechoslovakia; delay of the withdrawal until German replacements for the Western allied units were available.³³

Two days after President Eisenhower approved NSC 5524/1, Secretary Dulles left for Paris to concert Western policies with British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan and French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay. As the basis for their deliberations, the three foreign ministers had available position papers prepared by a working party consisting of officials of the US, British, and French Governments, with participation by a representative of the Federal Republic of Germany when German interests were involved.³⁴

President Eisenhower left for Geneva on 15 July 1955, after delivering a radio and television address to the American people. Three days later the meeting at the summit opened in the *Palais des Nations*. The first day's sessions were taken up by lengthy general policy statements, which revealed a wide divergence of views between the three Western democracies and the Soviet Union. The Western heads of government—President Eisenhower, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, and French Premier Edgar Faure—stressed the need for reunifying Germany by free elections, under adequate safeguards to prevent the reemergence of an aggressive and rearmed Nazi-type Germany. Premier Bulganin, on the other hand, stressed the need for achieving security by means of a Europe-wide collective security organization such as had been proposed by the Soviet Union in February 1954.

On the next day a four-point agenda was drawn up: (1) reunification of Germany; (2) European security; (3) disarmament; and (4) development of contacts

between East and West. On the first point, Sir Anthony Eden presented the Western position by proposing once again his plan for reunification by free elections. Once again, it was rejected by the Soviet Union, in spite of provisions added by Eden to meet Soviet apprehensions over the prospect of a rearmed, reunified, and aggressive Germany. His addendum offered a three-way choice: either a collective security pact among the four powers plus Germany, a demilitarized buffer zone of unspecified extent between the Soviet Union and Germany, or limitations on military forces in Germany. The Soviet Government showed no interest and instead proposed the creation of a Europe-wide collective security organization similar to the one it had advocated in 1954. Under this scheme, nations would agree to settle disputes peacefully and to refrain from increasing their armed forces. With the coming into operation of a general collective security system the signatories would abandon membership in NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and Western European Union. On the fourth agenda point, having to do with improving relations between East and West, the conferees were content to exchange general statements concerning the desirability of improving communications and the exchange of goods.

It was on the third point, disarmament, that President Eisenhower furnished the only moment of surprise and drama during the conference. Turning to the Soviet delegation, he vowed that the United States would never take part in an aggressive war. He then offered what became known as the Open Skies proposal: both parties might exchange complete blueprints of their military establishments and allow aerial photo-reconnaissance of their national territories by the other.³⁵

When the heads of government left Geneva they had not reached agreement on any of the outstanding issues that divided them. The avowed purpose of the conference, however, had been to delineate problems rather than to solve them. Hard bargaining on specifics would be undertaken later at lower levels. To this end, the heads of government issued a directive to their foreign ministers instructing them to meet at Geneva in October to continue the discussion and to propose effective means for the solution of the following problems:

1. *European Security and Germany . . . :*

A security pact for Europe or for part of Europe, including provisions for the assumption by member nations of an obligation not to resort to force and to deny assistance to any aggressor; limitation, control, and inspection in regard to armed forces and armaments; establishment between East and West of a zone in which the disposition of armed forces will be subject to mutual agreement; and also to consider other possible proposals . . . the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security

2. *Disarmament:*

The Four Heads of Government . . . agreed to work together through the subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission . . . , to instruct the Foreign Ministers to take note of the proceedings in the Disarmament Commission, to take account of the views and proposals advanced by the Heads of Government at this Conference, and to consider whether the four Governments can take any further useful initiative in the field of disarmament.

3. *Development of Contacts between East and West . . . :*

By means of experts study measures . . . which could (a) bring about a progressive elimination of barriers which interfere with free communications and peaceful trade between people and (b) bring about such freer contacts and exchanges as are to the mutual advantage of the countries and peoples concerned.³⁶

There had been other accomplishments of a less tangible sort at Geneva. Direct communication had been established between the heads of the world's most important governments. The new Soviet leaders, Premier Bulganin and Party Chief Nikita Khrushchev, had ventured out for the first time into the milieu of the democratic and capitalist West, and it might be hoped that their outlook had been broadened as a result. They had been subjected as well to the impact of President Eisenhower's personality and to his earnest profession of dedication to peaceful solutions. In the realm of world public opinion a feeling arose that the meetings had evoked a spirit of Geneva that was conducive to the settlement of East-West differences. It was sensed that a tacit understanding now existed among the big powers that the cold war had gone on long enough and that new initiatives were imperative. Just how far this spirit of Geneva would carry the powers toward more explicit agreements would first be tested at the scheduled meeting of foreign ministers in October.³⁷

A Failed Foreign Ministers' Meeting

The Joint Chiefs of Staff soon became involved in the preparations for those meetings when the Secretary of Defense, on 10 August, asked for their comments on the proceedings at Geneva, including a reappraisal of their previous views in the light of what had transpired there.³⁸ In their reply on 8 September the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary that the Eden proposals for the reunification of Germany seemed generally acceptable but were not sufficiently detailed for a precise analysis. They found the Soviet proposal for a Europe-wide security pact to contain "many features to which no objection could be taken," but its obvious purpose was "the dissolution of NATO and other Allied collective arrangements." For that reason it was clearly unacceptable.

As for the positions they had taken prior to the summit conference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Wilson that "the adoption of NSC 5524/1 . . . establishes United States policy on this subject, and that, in general, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been adequately reflected therein."³⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were also asked to comment on the military aspects of proposals on German unity and European security being readied for presentation at the forthcoming meeting of foreign ministers. The first of these requests concerned a European security treaty. The draft of such a treaty, forwarded by the State Department, was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) on 22 August.⁴⁰

The State Department draft treaty provided that the signatories agree not to use force or the threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other signatory state. In the event of a violation, the other signatories would withhold all economic and military assistance to the offending state. In the event of an armed attack against any of the signatories within the treaty area—defined as the territory of the signatories within continental Europe south of a line drawn along the southern boundary of Denmark, thence to Memel and Moscow, and west of a line drawn from Moscow to Sevastopol—the signatories would act to meet the common danger according to their constitutional processes.

To lessen the likelihood of hostilities, the draft treaty provided that each party to it would refrain from maintaining armed forces in the territory of any other state within the treaty area without its consent. It provided further that the parties to the treaty who were also parties to the Brussels Treaty as modified by the Paris Protocol of 23 October 1954 would not increase their forces in the treaty area above the levels in effect thereunder without prior notice. Parties to the treaty not limited by the Brussels Treaty would agree to a similar limitation as specified in a schedule, to be supplied later. In fulfillment of the President's Open Skies proposal, within 30 days of the coming into effect of the treaty, each party would notify all the others of its military establishments, land, sea and air, located on or based upon the treaty area. To verify this information and to detect changes, a system of aerial reconnaissance of the treaty area would be established.

On 24 August 1955 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that, subject to clarification of two points and a substantive change in a third, they were of the opinion that the draft treaty should not prove prejudicial to the security interest of the West. As clarifications they recommended: (1) that the boundaries of the treaty area be made to conform to readily identifiable political and geographic features so selected as to include the Baltic states; and (2) that the military information to be exchanged be defined more precisely. The substantive addition was to provide for ground observers stationed at key locations in each country as a supplement to aerial inspection. This corresponded to a proposal that had been offered by the Soviet Union on 10 May 1955. It had not yet formally become a part of the US position but was destined to be adopted by President Eisenhower on 11 October.

In the past the Joint Chiefs of Staff had opposed various schemes for a European security pact. The apparent change of view indicated by their general approval of the State Department's draft treaty they explained by pointing out that the current text avoided two features they had found objectionable in previous proposals: inclusion of elements of a regional disarmament plan and a requirement to withdraw allied forces from Germany.⁴¹

On 25 August the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), in a letter to Secretary of State Dulles, endorsed the JCS views as those of the Department of Defense. The State Department incorporated two of the JCS proposals in a revision of the draft treaty—those having to do with ground inspection and the more precise definition of the military forces to be reported.⁴²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff received a further inquiry concerning the draft treaty on 7 September, when the Assistant Secretary of Defense requested their views

on questions raised by the State Department. Would the United States withdraw nuclear weapons from the treaty area, the State Department wanted to know, if such weapons were included among those to be covered under the disclosure and verification provisions of the treaty? If the United States were to withdraw these weapons, how would NATO strength be affected? Rather than reveal or withdraw them, would it be preferable to exclude nuclear weapons from the provisions of the treaty?⁴³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their reply on 16 September, explained that they did not plan to withdraw atomic components voluntarily from the proposed treaty area. Any reporting and inspection of atomic weapons, they said, should be of a very general nature, limited perhaps to the location of storage sites. If the reporting was held to this level, there was no need to exclude nuclear weapons from the treaty's coverage. Should later circumstances require a choice between release of sensitive data on atomic weapons or their withdrawal from the area, the decision should be made in the light of the conditions prevailing at the time. As for the effect of withdrawing nuclear weapons from the treaty area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed such a move would weaken NATO even after taking account of concurrent withdrawal of Soviet troops at least into Poland and the rearming of a reunified Germany allied with the West.⁴⁴

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not objected to the draft European security treaty except in minor details, they found the State Department's timetable for placing it into effect to be militarily unacceptable. The timetable, referred to them for comment on 10 October 1955, provided for two phases. In the first, beginning when a reunified Germany adhered to the treaty, all clauses of the treaty would go into effect except the one calling for appropriate action by the signatories in the event of armed attack by one party on another. This provision would become effective in phase two, which would begin when a reunified Germany joined NATO and WEU.⁴⁵

Replying on 12 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that their earlier approval of the State Department's draft treaty was premised upon the prior accession of a reunified Germany to NATO and WEU and the withdrawal of Soviet forces (and not Allied) from her territory. If these assumptions were altered it would appear necessary to change radically the military provisions of such a treaty.⁴⁶

They realized, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued, that it would not be practical to obtain, in advance, agreements which would be binding upon a reunified and sovereign Germany. This made it imperative that Phase I of the proposed security arrangement should contain no provisions which might serve to weaken in any way the ties of Germany with the West and influence her to adopt an independent role. Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would find "militarily unacceptable the inclusion of any agreement in Phase I to: withdraw forces upon the request of the host country; accept provisions designed to stabilize forces within a specified area; and accept provisions for inspection and verification within that area." The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were adopted as the Department of Defense position, and the Department of State was so informed on 12 October.⁴⁷

In London, meanwhile, the British Government had also been engaged in preparations for the meeting of foreign ministers. An indication of the approach the British were taking came on 18 August when their ambassador gave the State Department three Foreign Office papers on European security arrangements, which were offered as working papers without commitment. The State Department requested comments on them from the Department of Defense, and on 1 September the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked to take under advisement the military implications of these documents and furnish their comment to the Secretary of Defense.⁴⁸

The three British papers dealt with European security treaties, demilitarized zones, arms limitation, and inspection. The paper on security treaties discussed several types of pacts without recommending any one of them. Some of the pacts would go into effect after Germany had been reunified; others might be concluded in advance of that event. The paper on demilitarized zones and arms limitation discussed, again without a recommendation, a three-zone scheme consisting of western and eastern zones in which armaments would be limited, with a demilitarized zone interposed between them. The zones were not precisely defined: the western zone was described as including all or part of Germany and possibly Denmark; the eastern zone was described as comprising parts of Poland and Czechoslovakia; the demilitarized zone might or might not be confined to German territory. The armaments limitation, while not precisely defined, would conform to certain general rules: the ceilings on each side need not be identical so long as they resulted in a reasonable balance of forces between the two sides; initial ceilings must be high enough to maintain current levels of US, British, and Canadian forces in Germany and to allow the Germans to attain planned military strengths; and initial ceilings might be lowered progressively to conform to figures in a general disarmament plan. The paper on inspection proposed a pilot scheme limited to a strip running through the middle of Germany and extending 100 miles in either direction from the existing zonal boundary.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their reply to the Secretary of Defense on 8 September, pointed out that the British papers contained proposals that they had already found to be unacceptable, namely the conclusion of a European security treaty before Germany had been reunified, a demilitarized zone confined to German territory, and a force reduction scheme that would constitute regional disarmament.⁴⁹

The three Western powers unveiled their proposal on German reunification at the foreign ministers' meeting in Geneva on 27 October 1955. The Western delegations offered once again the reunification of Germany under the Eden plan, but coupled it this time with a measure intended to make it more palatable to the Soviet Union. Noting that the Soviet Government appeared to "fear that a unified Germany, established by free elections and free to choose its associates in collective defense would constitute a threat to the security of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," the three Western powers offered to conclude a security treaty concurrently with agreement to reunify Germany under the Eden plan. Under the treaty's terms, parties thereto would renounce the use of force as a means to

settle international disputes, would withhold economic and military assistance from aggressors, and would limit military forces and armaments in a zone comprising areas of comparable size, depth, and importance on both sides of the line of demarcation between a reunified Germany and the Eastern European countries. The limitation would be set at a level calculated to establish a military balance which would contribute to European security and help relieve the burden of armaments and which would be regulated by the provision by each country of information on its armed forces in the zone, verified by a system of inspection. Included in this system would be a radar net operated in the western area of the zone by the Soviet Union and in the eastern area by parties to the treaty who were also members of NATO. The treaty would come into effect progressively at stages to be agreed.⁵⁰

The tripartite plan, as presented, deliberately left many details vague. It was, in fact, entitled an "Outline of Terms of Treaty of Assurance" and was in no sense a full text of a treaty that could be implemented. As a result, it is not possible to determine precisely whether it met all the conditions recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In particular, the article calling for progressive implementation might or might not meet the JCS view that German adherence to NATO must take place *before* the placing into effect of a treaty. The proposal for a zone of limited armament, however, by specifying equal areas on both sides of the eastern border of a reunited Germany, clearly conformed to JCS views.

The Soviet Union refused the new Western offer in spite of the guarantees it included against aggression by Germany. Acting perhaps out of a realization that their East German puppet regime could not survive free elections, the Soviets fell back on their stock contention that the prime issue before the conference was not Germany but European security. They offered once again their scheme for an all-European security pact, a proposal that the West had already rejected on several occasions.

On other issues as well the conference rapidly became deadlocked, although the meetings dragged on until 16 November. So complete was the impasse that when the conference finally adjourned, the foreign ministers did not even attempt to preserve appearances by the usual device of referring questions in dispute to working groups or special committees for further study. The summertime spirit of Geneva, which had raised hopes that the great powers might be able to resolve their differences, had not survived the autumn frosts.

Hungary and Poland—Revolt in the Satellites

The death of Stalin raised hope not only among the noncommunist nations but among the peoples of the Soviet empire as well. Just as the citizens of the noncommunist countries looked for some modification of the communist drive for conquest, so the residents of the satellite countries hoped for a relaxation of the tyranny of the secret police and for economic reforms that would lead to a higher

standard of living. But it was not until early in 1955 that there were any signs that the police regime frozen on Eastern Europe might be beginning to thaw.

In May, the Soviet leaders Bulganin and Khrushchev visited Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia for the express purpose of winning him back into the communist fold, from which he had been expelled in 1949. After making a confession of error on behalf of certain Soviet officials (now dead) for the original break between the two countries, the new Soviet leadership offered to normalize relations between the two states and to refrain from interference in the internal affairs not only of Yugoslavia but of other nations.

A more dramatic repudiation of the Stalinist reign of terror came early in 1956 when Khrushchev, addressing the Soviet Communist Party's Twentieth Congress, attacked the dead dictator for violating the true principles of Marxism-Leninism by indulging in a cult of personality thereby presuming superhuman qualities of omniscience and omnipotence. Stalin was condemned as a leader who had abused his power by falsely accusing and unjustly convicting thousands of innocent and loyal party members.

During the first half of 1956 the US Government, in formulating its policies toward the Eastern European satellites, recognized that there had been significant changes as a result of Soviet introduction of collective leadership, acceptance of Titoism and "many roads to socialism," and denigration of Stalin. These changes, although they varied from country to country, involved certain developments common to all, such as a reduction in the role of the secret police, some open questioning of the policies of the communist regimes, and the emergence of identifiable nationalist elements within the satellite communist parties that might ultimately be disposed to challenge Soviet control over their countries.

Nevertheless, US policymakers concluded that Soviet control could not be seriously challenged and that successful internal revolution was highly improbable. Since to resort to war to eliminate Soviet domination of the satellites was judged not to be in the national interest, all that remained was for the United States to encourage "evolutionary change resulting in the weakening of Soviet controls and the attainment of national independence by the countries concerned, even though there may be no immediate change in their internal political structure." A policy statement to this effect, NSC 5608/1, was approved by President Eisenhower on 18 July 1956. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had found it to be acceptable from the military point of view prior to its approval by the President.⁵¹

This evolutionary change seemed to be taking place in Poland during the months surrounding President Eisenhower's approval of the new statement of policy, although encouragement by the United States had had little or nothing to do with it. As in other Eastern European satellites, the end of the Stalin era had encouraged a resistance to domination by Moscow on the part of the government and a greater freedom of expression by the Polish people. There was, in addition, a rising expectation that the standard of living would be improved. When these expectations were not realized, workers in Poznan rioted during June. Troops of the local Polish garrison refused to fire on the rioters who were suppressed only when contingents of the Inner Army of special security troops chosen for their loyalty to the regime were employed. In spite of threats of severe punishment of

those involved, only a handful were tried, and they were given light sentences. Far from suppressing opposition to the regime, the trials stimulated an even greater agitation for reforms and in particular for a better life.

This ferment extended all the way to the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, which became divided into liberal and conservative factions. The former, headed by Wladyslaw Gomulka, who had been First Secretary until ousted in 1949 as a Titoist, called for economic reforms such as an end to enforced collectivization of the peasants and better wages and working conditions in industry. He also advocated an end to Soviet interference in internal Polish affairs and Polish solutions to Polish problems. He was, however, a thorough communist; at no time did Gomulka advocate abandonment of communism or adoption of a foreign policy independent of that laid down for the communist bloc by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders became alarmed that the Polish reform movement might get out of hand. They accordingly backed the Polish conservatives.

The showdown came on 19 October 1956, the day on which the Polish Central Committee was scheduled to elect new members. The Soviet leaders, determined to retain their control over the Polish party, announced they were coming to Warsaw to attend the Central Committee meeting. A majority of the committee members turned to Gomulka as the only man who could stand up to the Soviets, hastily naming him First Secretary. When the visitors arrived, led by Khrushchev, they were met by Gomulka, who refused to admit them to the meeting of the Polish Central Committee or to agree to retain on it the members supported by Moscow. Even Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky, who was the commander of the Polish armed forces, must go, Gomulka insisted. On Soviet orders, the Soviet-commanded Polish armored forces surrounded Warsaw and Red Army units stationed in Poland advanced toward the city, but Gomulka refused to submit. It was Khrushchev who backed down, and at the end of the day he and the other Soviet officials returned to Moscow having gained nothing except Gomulka's assurance that Poland would support the Warsaw Pact and Soviet foreign policy.⁵²

Events in Poland encouraged Hungarian dissidents also to seek changes in the communist regime of their country. On 23 October a mass meeting took place in Budapest to demonstrate in support of a list of reforms drawn up by university students. But whereas the Polish situation and been kept under control by strong-willed leaders, events in Hungary rapidly got out of hand. What had started as a peaceful demonstration quickly developed into a pitched battle in the streets, as an accumulation of frustrations and resentment against the secret police and security forces of the regime boiled to the surface. Regular Hungarian troops, and even the Soviet garrison forces that entered the city, proved unwilling to suppress what was by now an insurrection. The reactionary Stalinist Erno Gero fell from power on 24 October, to be replaced by the more liberal and nationalist Imre Nagy, but the insurrection continued to spread and the demands voiced in the streets took on a definite anti-communist and particularly anti-Soviet tone.⁵³

In Washington the first public reaction to the Hungarian revolt occurred on 25 October, when President Eisenhower made a statement deploring the interven-

tion by Soviet military forces he said should have been withdrawn under terms of the treaty ending World War II. He characterized the uprising as a renewed expression of the intense desire for freedom long held by the Hungarian people.⁵⁴

The following day President Eisenhower discussed the Hungarian developments with the NSC in regular session. The consensus was that they had important policy implications for the United States. The President, however, rejected a suggestion for a special meeting of the Council and instead directed the Planning Board to prepare a comprehensive analysis of the developments in Hungary and Poland, and possible courses of action which the United States should consider.⁵⁵

On the following day, 27 October, the US Delegate to the UN Security Council, in conjunction with his British and French colleagues, requested inclusion on the agenda of an item entitled: "The Situation in Hungary." The Security Council approved by a vote of 9 to 1, with the Soviet Union opposed.⁵⁶

The Planning Board circulated a draft of its analysis and proposed courses of action on Hungary and Poland on 31 October. In this draft, designated NSC 5616, the Planning Board stated that the US policy objectives formulated in July in NSC 5608/1 remained valid but that certain conclusions could now be drawn and courses of action chosen in the light of recent events. The Polish example indicated that the leaders in Moscow were willing to accept a nationalist communist regime if it remained communist and continued to support Soviet foreign policies. So long as Soviet troops were stationed in the satellite countries, the Soviet Government would employ them to prevent a noncommunist government from coming to power and pursuing an anti-Soviet policy. The necessity to use troops to maintain control in the satellites had been a serious defeat for Soviet policy, however, and might cause the Soviet Government to reappraise the value of continuing its control through the presence of its forces in the light of the increasing costs of such a policy. Actions by the United States and other friendly governments should be aimed at encouraging liberalizing influences in the satellites without provoking Soviet counteraction that would suppress them.

The Planning Board proposed three specific US actions concerning Poland: (1) agree to a Polish request of 8 October for discussions of all problems affecting US-Polish relations; (2) try to reorient Polish trade toward the West; (3) prepare to accept a Polish request for moderate amounts of economic and technical assistance sufficient to give Poland an alternative to complete dependence on the Soviet Union.

Prescribing precise courses of action for the still-fluid Hungarian situation proved more difficult. All the Planning Board was able to agree to was to "mobilize all appropriate measures, including UN action," and to seek a neutralized Hungary on the Austrian model in order to prevent harsh Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt. The Planning Board proposed to "use whatever capabilities we may possess" to encourage the new Hungarian leaders to carry out reforms and try to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Also, the United States should offer immediate disaster relief to the Hungarian people. In the event a government came into power at least as independent as that in Poland, the United States should be prepared to offer economic aid on similar terms.

The Planning Board's report included two items on which unanimity had not been achieved. One, opposed only by the JCS and Defense Department representatives, was a proposal to give the Soviet Union assurances that the United States did not look upon Hungary or other satellite states as potential allies. The other, sponsored by the President's Disarmament Adviser, proposed consideration of the withdrawal of some US units from Western Europe in return for withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Hungary.⁵⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom the Planning Board report was referred on 31 October, replied to the Secretary of Defense later in the day. The draft was acceptable from the military point of view except for the two courses of action over which the Planning Board had split. The assurance to the Soviet Union that the United States did not look upon the satellites as potential military allies would "tend to undermine such influence as the United States may have on the government which is established in Hungary, and could in the future operate to our military disadvantage." The proposal for a partial withdrawal of US forces from Western Europe in return for similar action by the Soviet Union in Hungary could invite the Soviet Union to expand the proposal with the view to obtaining complete withdrawal of US forces from Europe, an action detrimental to the best interests of the United States and its European allies.⁵⁸

The JCS views, though promptly produced, were not distributed to the members of the NSC until 6 November. By that time, conditions in Hungary had changed drastically from those existing when NSC 5616 was drafted. The liberal communist leader Nagy had been able to end the hostilities on 29 October and to arrange for the withdrawal of Soviet troops two days later. But the pressures on him from his own people were so great that he felt impelled to end the one-party rule of the communists and to bring into the government representatives of three traditional parties, besides indicating that Hungary would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. These moves were unacceptable to the Soviet Government. Beginning on 1 November, Soviet troops reentered Hungary in strength and restored communist rule by force of arms. By 7 November the fighting in Budapest was over, although mopping up operations continued for a few more days. Nagy was subsequently executed, and Janos Kadar, a new leader subservient to Moscow, was installed.⁵⁹

The Soviet military operation, President Eisenhower recalled in his memoirs, "almost automatically had posed . . . the question of employing force" to oppose it, but geographic and political factors made a military response impracticable. Hungary was a landlocked state that could be reached only by crossing the territory of neutral Austria, Titoist Yugoslavia, or communist Czechoslovakia. Any such operation was unthinkable without the support of the major European allies. Britain and France, because of their involvement in Egypt over the Suez Canal, could not possibly have joined the United States in a move into Hungary, and to conduct such an operation with the support of West German or Italian forces was out of the question. Thus, at the critical point when the Soviet operations were getting under way, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not asked even to consider the question of employing military force to aid the Hungarian revolutionaries.⁶⁰

The US Government limited its response to political measures. On 3 November, the US Delegate introduced a resolution in the UN Security Council calling on the Soviet Union to cease interfering in the internal affairs of Hungary and to withdraw its military forces. After the expected Soviet veto of the resolution on 4 November, the United States introduced it in the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace procedure, where it passed by 50 to 8, 15 nations abstaining.⁶¹

The US course of action during the critical state of the Hungarian insurrection was in consonance with the current national security policy. At the time, there were some public expressions of dissatisfaction with the failure to provide more active US support to the Hungarian "freedom fighters," voiced not only by US citizens of Hungarian extraction but by others who considered the President's restraint to be a denial of purposes previously avowed by his administration. It was true that during the presidential campaign of 1952 some of Mr. Eisenhower's supporters had spoken boldly of rolling back the Iron Curtain, but the Eisenhower administration, shortly after taking office, had considered a policy of aggressively seeking to detach the satellite nations from Soviet control and had rejected it. This decision of 1953 had been maintained in all subsequent policy papers.⁶² In the public discussions during 1956 the principal spokesman of the opposition Democratic Party took a similar view. Adlai Stevenson, campaigning for the presidency at the time the Hungarian revolt broke out, contended that the administration's foreign policy had contributed to bringing on the crisis. But he limited his proposals for action to a call for the dispatch of UN observers to Hungary and other Eastern European satellites.⁶³

On 13 November the Planning Board circulated a new version of its policy paper, revised to meet the changed situation brought about by the Soviet restoration of communist rule in Hungary. This revision, NSC 5616/1, spelled out more precisely than had NSC 5616 what it meant by appropriate pressures, as follows:

- a. Maintain constant pressure in the UN and elsewhere on the USSR for compliance with the UN resolution of November 4, 1956.
- b. Initiate or support UN action designed to achieve free elections in Hungary under UN auspices, as soon as law and order has been restored.
- c. In the event of continued Soviet defiance of UN Resolution, consider:
 - (1) Initiating or supporting UN action for an embargo by member nations on all trade with the USSR.
 - (2) Initiating UN action or action with other nations outside the UN or unilateral action to sever diplomatic relations with the USSR.⁶⁴

Once again, the Joint Chiefs of Staff acted with dispatch to submit their views on the proposed policies. They received NSC 5616/1 on 13 November; on 14 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that the newly proposed courses of action were acceptable from a military point of view though they reiterated their objections to other portions of the paper.⁶⁵

The Council took up NSC 5616/1 on 15 November. It rejected the proposal for reciprocal troop withdrawals from Western Europe and Hungary, which had been advanced by the office of the President's Disarmament Adviser. Secretary Wilson pointed out that it was now too late for such an offer to have any effect on

the Hungarian situation, and the President saw other defects in the proposal. The idea of giving assurances to the Soviets about US intentions toward the satellites, broached in the earlier Planning Board report and opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, apparently received no further consideration. President Eisenhower did direct further study of the question of whether the United States would be prepared to support the use of force under UN auspices to prevent Soviet repression of the Gomulka regime in Poland. As amended during the NSC discussion, but with its provisions for favorable economic actions toward Poland intact, the policy statement was approved by the President and issued on 19 November as NSC 5616/2.⁶⁶

Implementation of President Eisenhower's order to study whether the United States should support the United Nations in using force to prevent the Soviets from repressing the Gomulka regime was assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 November. Five days later the Joint Strategic Plans Committee submitted a report concluding that a successful UN intervention would require forces of such magnitude that general war would probably result. The United States should not adopt such a policy, the JSPC recommended, unless risking a general war over Poland was judged to be in the national interest.⁶⁷

Admiral Burke found this conclusion valid under the assumptions on which the study was based, but he thought a more realistic set of assumptions would yield a different recommendation. The study had been largely confined to potential action in Poland alone, he noted. Among other things it had not taken account of the possibility that determined UN military action would trigger revolts in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and a renewal of the Hungarian insurrection, all of which would create major problems for the Soviets while facilitating access to Poland by UN forces. Nor was there sufficient consideration of the possibility that the USSR would itself prove reluctant to become engaged in general war over the issue and would retreat when faced with evidence of UN and US determination. Further, the Chief of Naval Operations pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by approving NSC 5616/1, had already placed themselves on record as favoring US support of the use of force by the United Nations in Poland to preserve the Gomulka regime. For these reasons he recommended returning the JSPC report for revision.⁶⁸

A new version presented by Admiral Radford a few days later received JCS approval. Though still observing the original set of assumptions, its recommended response was more positive in tone. On 3 December 1956 the Secretary of Defense was informed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered:

- a.* It is feasible for the United Nations to intervene by military action in Poland.
- b.* The United States should participate to the extent necessary to achieve the U.N. objective, initially employing air action alone by forces presently available in Western Europe, but prepared to counter Soviet reaction by attacking Soviet lines of communication and the sources of Soviet air power.
- c.* There is a risk of general war if the United States adopts this course of action.⁶⁹

In the subsequent NSC consideration it was concluded on 25 February 1957 that a decision on US action could not be made in advance.⁷⁰

As 1956 drew to a close, the high hopes for a relaxation of tensions and thaw in the cold war in Europe had largely been dashed. The ascent to the summit in mid-1955 had been followed by a descent, in subsidiary negotiations, to the same levels of deadlock between East and West on European questions that had existed before. The following year had seen stirrings of dissent within the satellite empire, culminating in Hungary in ruthless suppression by the Soviets. Under the circumstances, the only prudent course for the United States and its allies was to look to their defenses as embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NATO: Implementing the Nuclear Strategy

During 1955 and 1956 the United States remained firmly committed to fulfilling its obligations as a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty, and participation in the treaty's affairs continued to provide a primary means of expressing the US policy toward Europe. In January 1955 the other members of the defensive alliance were the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey. The first five of these powers were also linked in the Western European Union, created by the Brussels Treaty of 1948.

It remained to add the Federal Republic of Germany to complete the roster of nations adhering to the North Atlantic Treaty as it existed during 1955 and 1956. To consider rearming a former enemy so soon after Germany's defeat was a step the treaty members had not taken lightly, but it was obvious to most of them that effective defense of their territories could not be conducted without the help of German manpower. After intensive negotiations, during which French misgivings and reservations were the chief obstacle, a formula was found to encompass the rearmament of the Federal Republic and the incorporation of German forces in the defense of Western Europe. By agreements signed in Paris on 23 October 1954 and ratified by the governments by May 1955, West Germany was permitted to adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty and was admitted to a Western European Union modified to integrate it into the treaty's framework.¹

By the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, the signatories committed themselves not only to mutual defense but also to the establishment of permanent international machinery that would enable them to meet this obligation—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).² By the end of 1954, NATO had made substantial progress in providing for common defense. It had created a military organization consisting of institutions similar to those of individual nations. At the top was the North Atlantic Council, which functioned roughly as an international ministry of defense. It gave political guidance to the military authorities and attempted to provide the manpower and logistic support required to defend the NATO area.

Advising the Council on military matters in the manner of a national chiefs of staff committee was the Military Committee consisting of the chiefs of staff, or their designated representatives, of all the member countries. Because meetings of the Military Committee took place infrequently, day-to-day work was entrusted to a three-member executive agency called the Standing Group. It was composed of representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, supported by a small planning staff drawn from the same nations. To keep the countries not represented on the Standing Group informed of its actions, a permanent group called the Military Representatives Committee was established. It consisted of the members of the Standing Group and one member from each of the other countries.

Receiving the orders of the Military Committee were three supreme Allied Commanders in Chief who were roughly comparable to national theater commanders. Each presided over one of the three major NATO commands: Allied Command Europe; Atlantic Command; and Channel Command. Allied Command Europe and the Atlantic Command were, in turn, subdivided: the former into Northern, Central, Southern, and Mediterranean Commands; and the latter into Western and Eastern Atlantic Commands. A third division of the Atlantic Command, the Iberian Atlantic Command, had been planned but had not yet been established pending settlement of differences over the nationality of the commander.

Like the governments of many of its member nations, NATO conducted its business on an annual cycle. At the heart of the NATO cycle was the annual review, which was the process for arriving at goals for the buildup of forces that were within the political and economic capabilities of the member governments and that they would accept as national commitments. The annual review was prepared by the NATO staff on the basis of replies to questionnaires sent to member governments and was given final approval by the North Atlantic Council, meeting in ministerial session in December. At the same session, the council approved military policy papers submitted to it by the Military Committee and the annual portion, or slice, of the NATO Common Infrastructure Program for the construction of logistic support facilities.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff participated in the work of NATO in two general ways. First, they supplied the answers to the questions on US military force levels in the Annual Review Questionnaire. Second, they gave guidance to the US representative on the Standing Group on all significant matters coming before that body. Of primary concern to NATO during 1955 and 1956, and therefore to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in dealing with NATO affairs, was the implementation of the nuclear strategy adopted by the Alliance at the end of 1954.

A Nuclear Strategy for NATO: MC 48

At its meeting in December 1954, the North Atlantic Council, by approving MC 48, had adopted a strategy that placed primary reliance on nuclear weapons and combat-ready forces in being. By this action the Council endorsed

the results of a new approach to NATO's strategic problems, instituted during 1954 and broadly similar in purpose to the New Look planning pursued by the Eisenhower administration in the United States.³ Under the new strategy, NATO's standing purpose remained the same: to deter Soviet aggression or, if deterrence failed, to defend in Europe from forward positions well to the east of the Rhine-Ijssel River line and ultimately to defeat the Soviet Union.

Any prospect that the strategy called for by MC 48 would make possible an overall reduction in the forces to defend NATO Europe was quickly dispelled when the military authorities of the alliance presented their estimate of the required force levels: 58 $\frac{2}{3}$ ground divisions; 8,810 aircraft; and 1,197 naval vessels at M-day and a total at full mobilization of 126 divisions; 8,810 aircraft; and 2,724 vessels. To attain these figures, NATO military authorities assumed a German contribution of 12 divisions, 1,326 aircraft, and 164 naval vessels, not expected to be available before the end of 1956. Of these forces 64 $\frac{1}{3}$ divisions and 7,043 aircraft were allocated to the vital central front, with all the aircraft and 30 $\frac{2}{3}$ of the divisions to be available at the beginning of hostilities.⁴

At the time MC 48 was approved, the NATO countries were not willing to furnish forces of this magnitude. By approving the 1954 annual review, the NATO powers committed themselves only to attain the following level of forces by the end of 1955:

	<i>M-day</i>	<i>Total</i>
Army Divisions	44	116
Aircraft	6,924	6,924
Naval Vessels	1,054	2,187

These goals failed to meet MC 48 M-day levels by 14 $\frac{2}{3}$ divisions, 1,886 aircraft, and 143 naval vessels. The shortfall consisted of the complete German contribution (not to be available until later years) and three divisions and 590 aircraft attributable to the remaining NATO countries. After mobilization had been completed, under the commitments made for 1955, the shortage would be 10 divisions, 1,886 aircraft, and 517 ships.⁵

The task facing the NATO countries at the beginning of 1955 was greater than these figures suggest because a substantial portion of the forces actually available were not fully ready for combat. At the end of 1954, SACEUR had reported that more than one third of the M-day ground units and over half the air force units were not fully combat-effective.⁶

1955 Annual Review: MC 48 Goals Not Met

As the member countries submitted their force plans for 1956 to the NATO staff in response to the 1955 Annual Review Questionnaire, it became apparent that not only were the MC 48 goals not going to be met by the end of the year,

but there would be a slight decrease in air forces from the total mobilization level agreed to for 1955 and in all categories at the beginning of hostilities:

	1955	1956	Difference
<i>Army Divisions</i>			
M-day	44	41½	- 2⅔
Total	116	115½	- ⅔
<i>Aircraft</i>			
	6,924	6,846	- 78
<i>Naval Vessels</i>			
D-day	1,054	1,035	- 19
Total	2,187	2,403	+216

A hopeful sign for the future was the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany for the first time in a NATO annual review. A member only since May 1955, the Federal Republic did not begin its military buildup until 1 January 1956 and as a result made a commitment only to furnish 84 escort-type naval vessels in 1956, most of which were to be supplied by the United States. German army and air force units were not expected to be available until 1957.⁷

In addition to these quantitative inadequacies, serious deficiencies continued in the quality of the NATO forces. There had been, as the annual review stated, "only little improvement since a year ago" in the proportion of M-day units that were fully ready for combat.

Even the United States, by far the strongest member of the alliance, encountered some difficulty in maintaining the quality of the forces it committed to NATO and in meeting the force goals of previous years. That there would be inadequacies became apparent at the very beginning of the 1955 annual review. In the recommended reply to the 1955 Annual Review Questionnaire, submitted by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 June, all members agreed that the Army, because of budgetary and manpower cuts, would fall short of D+180-day goals agreed to in the 1954 annual review by five divisions. The Army and Air Force members recommended reporting to NATO that the US Army planned, as of 31 December 1955, a NATO force consisting of 12⅓ divisions rather than the 17⅓ divisions available the previous year. The Navy member recommended maintaining the appearance of a 17-division force by D+180 by including five divisions that would not be available until D+270.

Additional shortfalls were unanimously predicted in naval and amphibious forces. At D-day only two Marine divisions/wings, rather than two and two-thirds, would be available; the previous D+180 goal of three Marine divisions/wings would not be reached until D+270 because of the continuing tension in the Pacific. In naval forces, elimination of two light carriers and a number of minesweepers and coastal patrol craft was planned.

There was no slippage in Air Force goals for 1955 as compared to 1954: 75 squadrons consisting of 1,630 aircraft. Failure of other countries to complete the necessary airfields, however, placed limits on the rotation program. Only two

wings, rather than six, would be able to rotate squadrons between Europe and the United States by the end of 1955.⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff first considered the JSPC report on 6 July, and the Army Chief of Staff offered to amend the position of his Service. He now proposed to list five National Guard divisions in order to meet the goal of 17½ divisions by D+180, with an explanation that they would require six to nine months training after M-day to become combat ready.⁹

Immediate agreement was not possible because Admiral Radford, who was not present, wished to pursue the matter further. At a JCS meeting later in the month, the Chairman strongly opposed the initial Army and Air Force view that the United States should report a shortfall in Army D+180 force levels as compared to previous years. To do so, Admiral Radford maintained, would produce unacceptable military and political repercussions among our NATO allies and would imply a decreased interest on the part of the United States in meeting its NATO force goals. To avoid these consequences without being misleading, the Chairman proposed to delete all qualifications and reservations regarding the Army force goals and to insert a series of general qualifications on the availability of US forces to NATO, as follows:

It is the intention of the United States to place units at the disposal of a NATO Commander for employment in his area as reflected in this submission subject to:

- a. The receipt of adequate warning prior to D-Day;
- b. Availability of military appropriations necessary to achieve the major force levels;
- c. Availability of trained-filler replacements necessary to achieve the major force levels;
- d. The circumstances of any given emergency.¹⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff completed their consideration of the reply to the 1955 Annual Review Questionnaire on 29 July. They agreed to include Admiral Radford's general statement, to delete all references to Army shortfalls in the text, and to insert a footnote to the Army force table to the effect that five of the 17 divisions listed were National Guard units requiring six months additional training to be fully combat effective.¹¹

The NATO military authorities responded to the US reply by a study recommending that the reported shortfalls, except those in amphibious forces, be rectified.¹² Acting in response to a request from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied to these recommendations on 2 December. They reiterated that the Air Force was prepared to deploy to Europe the units scheduled to base on the uncompleted airfields, stated that nothing could be done about shortages in naval vessels, and announced that training of Army National Guard divisions was being improved with the ultimate goal of making them available for combat on D+180. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense that their comments be used in formulating the US position for the NATO ministerial meeting scheduled for December.¹³

Under the NATO procedures, the United States along with all other member nations was given an opportunity to review the force proposals of all countries

prior to final action on them by the North Atlantic Council meeting in December. Within the Department of Defense, the initial review was performed by the Office of Defense Affairs of the US Mission to NATO and European Regional Organizations (USRO). It took the form of a White Book. This document contained a summary of the draft annual review statement along with proposed US positions on its recommendations. The White Book was reviewed by the appropriate agencies of the Defense Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a final position to be taken by the Secretary of Defense at the ministerial meeting was then formulated.

The 1955 White Book commented critically on the 1956 force levels proposed by six of the NATO countries. Three of these countries, Belgium, France, and Great Britain, were planning to maintain forces considered to be inadequate; three countries, Greece, Turkey, and Italy, were believed to be attempting to raise forces they could not support. The French Government, the White Book recommended, should be urged to restore cuts in its goals for fighter-bombers, and the British Government should similarly be pressed not to reduce the level of its defense expenditures. The White Book proposed suggesting to the Belgian Government that some of its military manpower shortages could be remedied by employing civilians. Turning to the three countries whose force goals were considered unrealistic, the White Book recommended advising the governments concerned to improve the quality of existing forces before activating additional units.¹⁴

The Joint Chiefs of Staff furnished their views on the White Book to the Secretary of Defense at his request on 7 December. They found it, subject to certain changes, to be suitable as the basis for the US position on the 1955 Annual Review Report, to be used at the December Ministers' meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The comments, in addition to a number of technical points, included a recommendation that the British Government be advised that its proposed cuts in naval forces were not warranted by the nature of the Soviet naval threat. The JCS recommendations were approved by the Defense Department task force on the annual review and incorporated in the White Book.¹⁵

French Deployments to North Africa: MC 48 Goals Recede

Of far greater concern to NATO than the projected shortfalls in meeting MC 48 goals was the deployment to Algeria of substantial French forces allocated to the alliance. Beginning this movement in the summer of 1954, the French, by June of 1955, had shifted the equivalent of approximately two and one-half divisions of their forces assigned to NATO. Initially, there had been little reason to expect that the deployment would reach such proportions. When the first movement was undertaken in mid-1954, SACEUR, acting on orders of the Standing Group, had informed the French Ministry of Defense he had no objection to the transfer.

When, in early November 1954, the French proposed to move an additional four battalions, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) asked the Joint Chiefs of

Staff how many French troops could be shifted without severely jeopardizing the military posture of NATO in Europe.¹⁶ On 12 November 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that the French withdrawals had had a serious effect on NATO defense capabilities and that the French should be pressed to take immediate action to restore the effectiveness of their NATO-assigned forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also instructed the US representative on the Standing Group to seek action by that body for new guidance to SACEUR. Under the proposed guidance, SACEUR would inform the French Ministry of Defense that, on Standing Group instructions, he must "object militarily to any... further reductions of French NATO-committed forces."¹⁷

These instructions were first put into effect on 26 May 1955, when Major General Karl Truesdell, the deputy US representative on the Standing Group, persuaded his French and British colleagues that a proposed French deployment of about 20,000 troops to North Africa could not be countenanced under the "no objection" formula. The Standing Group was not willing to instruct SACEUR to object, however. Instead, they directed him to note the French action and regret the consequences to NATO defense. The Standing Group's purpose was to avoid any implication of approval, even though it was not willing to make a formal objection.¹⁸

In defense of their actions, the French readily agreed to the prime importance of the Central Europe sector but maintained that the decision to shift forces to North Africa and its implications should be examined within the broader context of a world struggle that set the communist powers against the Atlantic alliance. Writing to Admiral Radford on 13 June 1955, General Jean Valluy, the French representative on the Standing Group, declared that the insurrection in Algeria was being exploited by the Soviet Union as a means of undermining the stability of the NATO nations and of gaining control of an area of vital strategic importance to the alliance. To lose North Africa, General Valluy maintained, would be to expose the southern flank of NATO and necessitate a reconsideration of the entire problem of Atlantic defense. The redeployment of French forces from Central Europe to North Africa became, therefore, a strategic necessity for NATO. It could not be construed as a neglect by France of her obligations to NATO defense in order to serve her own national interests in North Africa.¹⁹

Not convinced by the French arguments, the North Atlantic Council asked the Standing Group to report on the military consequences of the redeployments of French forces to North Africa. In connection with this report, General Truesdell requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review their current guidance to the US representative to determine whether there were "added implications from the U.S. point of view which should be made known through the medium of the Standing Group report to the North Atlantic Council."²⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 5 August 1955, reaffirmed their existing guidance to the US representative and instructed him further to seek to persuade the Standing Group to urge the North Atlantic Council to press the French to reconstitute their forces in Central Europe. Prior to receiving this instruction, however, General J. Lawton Collins, the US representative on the Standing Group, had felt obliged to concur in an urgent interim report, which he believed conformed to his current guidance.²¹

By early August 1955 the French Government had announced its intention to redeploy additional forces, consisting of one motorized light infantry division, one infantry regiment, three infantry battalions, and seven tank squadrons, to North Africa. In conformance with Standing Group instructions, SACEUR noted these deployments with regret.²²

Additional pressure on France to restore its forces on the Central Front came during the 1955 annual review. The NATO military authorities, in recommendations annexed to the NATO Country Study on France, recommended that the French Government give restoration first priority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently endorsed this position during their review of the White Book.²³

In early March 1956, the French informed the NATO military authorities they were redeploying still more forces from Central Europe to Algeria. Evidently concerned over the possible reaction of the other members of the alliance, the French Government sought formal approval of the redeployments by the NATO military authorities. To this end, General Valluy proposed that the Standing Group forward a report to the North Atlantic Council conceding that the redeployments had weakened the direct defense of Central Europe but stressing the strategic importance of North Africa to the alliance and placing the Standing Group on record as approving the French actions. "The Standing Group considers that the priority given by France to its effort in North Africa," General Valluy's draft read, "will greatly contribute to ensure the requirements for an effective defense of NATO and estimates it as a safety factor for the Alliance."²⁴

General Collins could not concur in so unreserved an endorsement of the French government's priorities as the Valluy proposal contained. He accordingly obtained agreement of the Standing Group to a substitute text, which also had the approval of Admiral Radford. Even so, the report dispatched to the North Atlantic Council on 17 March was hardly a condemnation of the French troop deployment:

Although the Standing Group is aware of the fact that the forces transferred, drawn from the forces assigned to SACEUR, have, doubtless, weakened the direct defenses of Central Europe, it also wishes to note that the situation in North Africa is of great concern for the whole of NATO. The strategic importance of North West Africa for NATO in the event of a direct aggression by the Soviets has already been stressed in the Strategic Guidance (MC 14/1). The SGN wishes to reiterate the strategic importance of North West Africa and recognizes from a military viewpoint, that in light of France's responsibilities for its own internal security and as a safety factor for the Alliance, it was necessary for France to reinforce its military forces in Algeria.²⁵

The Standing Group also intended, after receiving the complete French redeployment plan, to report to the North Atlantic Council on the military effects of the French troop movements. On 9 April, General Collins informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he intended to follow existing guidance, stressing the serious deterioration of NATO forces in the Central Sector and urging the Standing Group to recommend to the Council that France be pressed to replace her forces as soon as possible. He also requested to be informed of any changes in the US position.²⁶

On 20 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised General Collins that they had no basis for further guidance to him, pending response by the Secretary of Defense to their request for a statement of the current US position on the matter.²⁷ The shifting of French NATO forces from the Central Region to North Africa continued until, by August, only two of the six French M-day divisions remained in position, and they were at two-thirds strength.²⁸

1956 Annual Review: MC 48 Goals Still Not Met

Even assuming a replacement of French forces deployed to North Africa, the prospects for an early attainment of the MC 48 force goals were not bright as 1956 drew to a close. The 1956 annual review, as approved by the Council at the ministerial meeting in December, revealed that these goals would not be met by the end of 1957. In fact, the goals in air and naval forces would be even farther from attainment than at the end of 1956. Only in ground forces was there an increase in firm force commitments over those agreed to the year before.

	1956	1957	Difference
<i>Army Divisions</i>			
M-day	41 $\frac{1}{3}$	48	+ 6 $\frac{2}{3}$
Total	115 $\frac{1}{3}$	116 $\frac{1}{3}$	+ 1
<i>Aircraft</i>	6,846	6,626	-220
<i>Naval Vessels</i>			
D-day	1,035	990	- 45
Total	2,403	2,163	-240

All the gain in total ground forces and all but a fraction of the gain in M-day forces took place in units assigned to the critical Central Region. This was a reflection of the addition to NATO forces of the first German contingent, consisting of 5 $\frac{2}{3}$ divisions. As a result, at M-day the NATO countries were committed to have available 23 $\frac{1}{3}$ divisions for the Central Region, only 7 $\frac{2}{3}$ divisions short of the MC 48 goal of 31. After mobilization had been completed, under 1957 force goals, there would be 54 $\frac{1}{3}$ divisions, a shortfall of 12 from the 66 $\frac{1}{3}$ called for by MC 48. In air forces, by contrast, the majority of losses were in aircraft assigned to the Central Region, where, in spite of the addition of the first 323 German aircraft, major reductions by Britain and France led to an overall reduction from 1956 goals of 238 aircraft.²⁹

The United States once again made a commitment to provide NATO with air and ground forces that substantially met the goals of MC 48. Naval forces, once again, were slightly below the MC 48 level at D-day. The figures, which had been prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved without change by the Secretary of Defense, were as follows:

	<i>MC 48</i>	<i>Firm 1957</i>
<i>Army Divisions</i>		
M-day	5 $\frac{2}{3}$	5 $\frac{1}{3}$
Total	18	17 $\frac{1}{3}$
<i>Aircraft</i>	1,628	1,630
<i>Naval Vessels</i>		
D-day	426	386
Total	735	749

The shortfall in naval vessels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained in responding to the 1956 Annual Review Questionnaire on 14 June, resulted from the high costs of new and sophisticated weapons and equipment. To remain within national budgetary and manpower ceilings some forces had to be reduced, but the loss in numbers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, was more than offset by qualitative improvements resulting from the new technological developments.

Since the 1955 annual review, the Army had taken steps to improve the readiness of the National Guard divisions in the M+180 forces and, by a reorganization of the Regular Army, had cut the total number in this category from seven to five. In spite of these measures, the five National Guard divisions would still require six months of training to become fully combat effective. The Air Force, while meeting NATO standards in other respects, was still unable to meet the rotational requirements because the necessary airfields were not yet ready.³⁰

A summary of the NATO force goals from the adoption of MC 48 through the consideration of commitments for 1957 is contained in Tables 6, 7, and 8.

Air Defense of NATO Europe

In describing the forces necessary to implement the nuclear strategy, MC 48 stressed the need for an adequate air defense. At the beginning of 1955, this was one of the weakest elements of the NATO system. Not only was there no overall command and coordination of all NATO air defenses, but the components of air defense, particularly early warning and rapid communications systems, were seriously deficient.³¹

No one was more aware of this deficiency than the SACEUR, General Alfred M. Gruenther, USA, who submitted a proposal to the Standing Group on 26 August 1955 for an overall system of command and control of the air defenses of NATO Europe. In developing his plan, General Gruenther had recognized that a single allied air defense command would be the ideal solution, but he also realized that his ideal solution could not be achieved in the near future because the larger European nations were not willing to surrender control over all their air defenses to a NATO command.

Table 6—NATO Ground Force Goals
(divisions)

Command/ Country	Forces assumed a basic for MC 48*		Firm Goals 1955		Firm Goals 1956		Firm Goals 1957	
	M-day	Total	M-day	Total	M-day	Total	M-day	Total
Central Command								
Belgium	2	6	3	6	2	5	2	4
Canada	1/3	1	1/3	1	1/3	1	1	1
France	5	14	5	16	6 2/3	16 2/3	4	14
Germany	12	12	5 2/3	5 2/3				
Luxembourg	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3				
Netherlands	1	5 1/3	1	5 1/3	1	5 1/3	1	4 2/3
Portugal	1	1	1	1				
United Kingdom	4 2/3	6 2/3	4	6 1/3	4	6 1/3	4 1/3	6 1/3
United States	5 2/3	18	5 2/3	17 1/3	5 1/3	17 2/3	5 1/3	17 1/3
Total	30 2/3	64 1/3	19	53 1/3	19 1/3	53 1/3	23 1/3	54 1/3
Northern Command								
Denmark	2/3	4	2/3	4 2/3	2/3	4	4	4
Norway	2/3	3 2/3	2/3	3 2/3	2/3	3 2/3	2/3	3 2/3
Total	1 1/3	7 2/3	1 1/3	8 1/3	1 1/3	7 2/3	2/3	7 2/3
Southern Command								
Italy	9	15 1/3	6	15 1/3	4	15 1/3	7	15 1/3
Greece	5	16	5	16 1/3	4	16 1/3	4 1/3	16 1/3
Turkey	12 2/3	22 2/3	12 2/3	22 2/3	12 2/3	22 2/3	12 2/3	22 2/3
Total	26 2/3	54	23 2/3	54 1/3	20 2/3	54 1/3	24	54 1/3
Total NATO	58 2/3	126	44	116	41 1/3	115 1/3	48	116 1/3

*Figures are 1956 force goals developed during 1953 annual review plus, for Germany, force goals accepted in a secret protocol to the EDC Treaty.
Sources: USRO 1953, 1954, 1955, and 1956 Blue Books.

**Table 7—NATO Air Force Goals
(aircraft)**

Country	<i>Forces assumed a basic for MC 48*</i>	<i>Firm Goals 1955</i>	<i>Firm Goals 1956</i>	<i>Firm Goals 1957</i>
Belgium	531	441	392	408
Canada	300	300	293	272
Denmark	221	191	199	199
France	1,032	867	1,034	811
Germany	1,326			32
Greece	287	275	275	275
Italy	527	459	434	84
Netherlands	376	376	376	392
Norway	216	191	228	228
Portugal	177	127	102	129
Turkey	516	441	441	459
United Kingdom	1,673	1,626	1,442	1,307
United States	1,628	1,630	1,630	1,630
Total	8,810	6,924	6,846	6,626

*Figures are 1956 force goals developed during 1953 annual review plus, for Germany, force goals accepted in a secret protocol to the EDC Treaty.

Sources: USRO 1953, 1954, 1955, and 1956 Blue Books.

General Gruenther, accordingly, proposed a system for integrating the air defense efforts of the national authorities. His plan called for the designation of SACEUR by the North Atlantic Council as the person responsible for coordinating the air defense of NATO Europe, with authority to develop a system generally as follows: (1) establish four air defense regions, three of them corresponding to the existing North, Central, and Southern Commands, and the fourth consisting of Great Britain; (2) charge the regional air defense commanders with improving air defense capabilities of their regions by coordination with national air defense agencies; and (3) establish an overall air defense committee at SHAPE to assist in coordinating the four regions and the various areas of national responsibility. On 16 September, General Collins recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they approve SACEUR's proposal as providing the best currently attainable coordination of the air defenses of NATO Europe.³²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while approving the concept in principle, were concerned over the apparent bypassing of the regional commanders in chief in the proposed command relationships. They accordingly withheld concurrence in the detailed proposals and approved only the designation of SACEUR as the coordinator of the air defense of NATO Europe, with responsibility for "developing an effective system of air defense . . . in consultation with appropriate national authorities."³³

General Gruenther, on 17 October, submitted a revision of his plan that made clear the regional commanders in chief would not be cut out of the chain of command but would be responsible for coordinating air defense within their respective

Table 8—NATO Naval Force Goals
(*naval vessels*)

Country	Forces assumed <i>a</i> basic for MC 48*		Firm Goals 1955		Firm Goals 1956		Firm Goals 1957	
	D-day	D+180	D-day	D+180	D-day	D+180	D-day	D+180
Belgium	21	62	18	38	15	34	15	42
Canada	31	93	31	91	31	91	49	91
Denmark	44	108	35	78	36	79	41	73
France	82	238	78	205	81	261	91	183
Germany	164	164			84	84	1	1
Greece	33	55	19	55	23	55	11	32
Italy	70	217	175	197	70	200	84	218
Netherlands	41	101	36	104	38	110	34	102
Norway	27	77	21	81	27	95	34	94
Portugal	16	45	16	33	16	37	18	38
Turkey	72	73	56	56	70	70	69	70
United Kingdom	170	756	141	496	155	539	157	470
United States	426	735	428	753	389	748	386	749
Total	1,197	2,724	1,054	2,187	1,035	2,403	990	2,163

* Figures are 1956 force goals developed during 1953 annual review plus, for Germany, force goals accepted in a secret protocol to the EDC Treaty.
Sources: USRO 1953, 1954, 1955, and 1956 Blue Books.

regions.³⁴ On the basis of this revision, the Standing Group drafted MC 54, a recommendation from the Military Committee to the North Atlantic Council. Since, in his opinion, MC 54 conformed to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Collins approved it in the Standing Group and supported its transmission by the Military Committee to the North Atlantic Council for approval. The Military Committee took this action, and the North Atlantic Council approved the recommendations in MC 54 on 15 December, thereby designating SACEUR as the coordinator of air defense for NATO Europe and assigning him responsibility for developing an appropriate system of coordinating its air defense on the basis of four air defense regions as described by SACEUR in his revised plan.³⁵

As a first step toward an effective system of air defense for NATO Europe, SACEUR in his new role proposed the construction of early warning and communications systems. To be installed by phases, the early warning radar system would, when finished, provide complete and integrated radar coverage of the vulnerable approaches to NATO Europe from the northern tip of Norway to the eastern extremity of Turkey. The precise design of the early warning system would be determined largely by the NATO Air Defense Technical Center. The communications system was to be of the tropospheric and ionospheric forward scatter type and would consist of the minimum number of circuits needed to provide for the "timely and successful accomplishment of early warnings, alert, command and implementation of Allied Command Europe atomic strike plans." General Gruenther did not stipulate exactly who would own and control the early warning radars. The communications system, on the other hand, was to be owned and controlled completely by Allied Command Europe. To finance the early warning and communications systems, estimated to cost about \$110 million, General Gruenther recommended that funds in this amount be included in the common infrastructure program subsequent to the seventh slice (1956).³⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the proposal on 2 February 1956. They authorized General Collins to support in the Standing Group construction of the early warning and communications systems.³⁷

Control of Nuclear Weapons

A cardinal tenet of the strategy contained in MC 48 was that nuclear weapons would be integrated into NATO forces. But before NATO forces with nuclear armament could become effective in combat, it was necessary not only to equip and train units with the new weapons but to decide how and by whom the decision to employ nuclear weapons would be made. In approving MC 48, the member governments had made clear that, while they were approving the document "as a basis for defense planning and preparation by the NATO military authorities," this approval did not involve the delegation of the responsibility of governments for putting plans into action in the event of hostilities.³⁸

During the NATO ministerial meetings in Paris in December 1954, French Premier Pierre Mendes-France had proposed to British Foreign Secretary Anthony

Eden and Secretary of State Dulles that representatives of their three countries make a secret study of machinery for political consultation prior to the use of nuclear weapons. On the suggestion of Mr. Eden, Canada was added as having special atomic interests.

Secretary Dulles accepted the French proposal, subject to obtaining the views of US military authorities. In writing to the Secretary of Defense on 8 February he stated that while it would be preferable to avoid holding such discussions, this course was "politically impracticable and would open the possibility of a major disagreement with our allies which might weaken the political unity and the deterrent strength of NATO." Secretary Dulles suggested, therefore, the following as initial terms of reference for the US representative in any preliminary talks: (1) the United States did not believe it possible to anticipate all circumstances under which nuclear weapons might be employed; (2) the United States recognized, however, that procedures would be needed for two general situations—an emergency so immediate that political consultation prior to using the weapons would have to be omitted, and other circumstances when prior political consultation would be the normal practice; (3) any arrangement should be so worded as to avoid the appearance of hesitancy that would vitiate the deterrent to Soviet aggression; and (4) any consultation in advance of entering into hostilities should be without prejudice to the right of each NATO nation to take whatever subsequent action it deemed necessary.³⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the Secretary of Defense on 2 May that they had no objection to the proposed quadripartite discussions but that the US position in the talks should be the same as the one recommended by them on 11 June 1954:

All clearances and authorities not obtainable in peacetime, for the employment of atomic weapons in war, for the unrestricted wartime use of United States bases on foreign territory for atomic overflights, for movements and operations of tactical units, etc., will be encompassed in and granted by the single decision by which each NATO government commits its armed forces to action under Article 5 of the NATO treaty.

This policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, would accord with the fact that commitment of forces to action under Article 5 was a decision reserved by national governments to be taken under conditions pertaining at the time. They recommended, accordingly, that the United States not agree to establishment of separate machinery or procedures for consultations regarding the use of nuclear weapons. At a propitious time the United States could seek agreement from the NATO allies to incorporate all necessary authorizations in the single decision by which these nations committed their forces to action.⁴⁰

On 5 May the Secretary of Defense forwarded the JCS views to Secretary Dulles, with a statement that the Department of Defense endorsed them. Mr. Wilson also forwarded a draft position paper on the subject prepared by representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and formally approved by the latter. This paper was intended for use by the Secretary of State at the forthcoming

NATO ministerial meeting should the subject of authority to employ atomic weapons come up for discussion.⁴¹

Secretary Wilson did not address the Joint Chiefs of Staff again on the granting of authority to use nuclear weapons until nearly a year later, on 24 March 1956. By this time the question had become more urgent because the first IRBMs were now expected to be in production by 1958. Prior experience in arranging for base rights in foreign countries indicated that as much as two years might be spent around the negotiating table before construction could begin. Secretary Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the control procedures they had recommended to him on 2 May 1955; in addition, they were to estimate the general size of the military requirement for deployment of IRBMs to foreign bases and indicate some of the countries where sites would probably be needed.⁴²

On 2 May 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that they saw no reason to change their recommendations of the previous year concerning control of nuclear weapons. As for the requirements for deployments of IRBMs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declined to estimate the numbers needed because of technological imponderables and gave two lists of locations to be considered as possible sites for the new weapons. Considered most desirable were Turkey, Norway, the United Kingdom, Japan, Okinawa, and France. Listed as desirable were Pakistan, Greece, Crete, Iran, Taiwan, Denmark, West Germany, the Philippines, Spain, Italy, and Libya.⁴³

Late in 1955 SACEUR had requested the Standing Group to approve his statement of requirements for ground atomic delivery forces for Allied Forces, Southern Europe, and to take measures to fulfill them. Intended to decrease the disparity between NATO and Soviet bloc forces, the units to be added included 12 atomic demolition teams, 12 Honest John rocket batteries, four Corporal guided missile battalions, and supporting ordnance units. One of the Honest John batteries, General Gruenther indicated, might be attached to the Marine battalion assigned to the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.⁴⁴

The provision of guidance to General Collins on this matter required several months of study. On 31 July 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed him to support approval of SACEUR's listing of requirements for atomic ground delivery forces. They added a stipulation that US advocacy of approval must not be regarded as a US undertaking to provide the required forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that the United States had already met a portion of SACEUR's requirements by furnishing one Honest John rocket battery and three atomic demolition teams to the Southern European Task Force and that two Corporal guided missile battalions would soon be added. A few weeks later the Chief of Naval Operations agreed to reinforce the Sixth Fleet Marine battalion with a composite Honest John battery.⁴⁵

NATO Logistics: The Common Infrastructure

Besides affecting the NATO force structure, the nuclear strategy called for by MC 48 required a reappraisal in the logistic field. The NATO logistics pro-

gram, which bore the title of "common infrastructure," had begun in 1950 under a cost-sharing scheme that spread the expense equitably among the members of the alliance. Construction of facilities of common infrastructure was programmed in annual increments called slices. In the first four slices, approved during 1950–1953, new airfields, signal communications projects, and jet fuel pipelines accounted for nearly all the costs. Cost sharing of the initial four slices was negotiated anew for each slice, but beginning with the fifth slice the member countries agreed to a formula covering the next three slices. Preparation of an infrastructure slice began in the NATO military commands. Each year, the NATO military commanders submitted their facilities requests to the Infrastructure Committee of the North Atlantic Council for technical and financial review and to the Standing Group for a determination of military necessity and urgency. The final reports of these two bodies were then placed before the Council for final action.

The JCS role in the infrastructure process consisted of giving guidance to the US representative on the Standing Group. During 1955 and 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were called upon to give guidance on changed standards for airfield construction to provide the dispersal made necessary by the nuclear strategy in MC 48. In addition, they furnished guidance on the final slice (7th) of the three-year infrastructure program covering the years 1954–1956, and on a new four-year program extending through 1960.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were drawn into the question of revising the airfield program on 11 January 1955, when General Truesdell requested guidance on proposals being developed by General Gruenther to disperse his air units so that only one squadron, rather than three (a wing), occupied each field. General Truesdell pointed out that SACEUR had not yet formally requested approval of the Standing Group for the new policy of dispersal but had asked only that the Group approve two related actions. These were to suspend certain construction on already approved airfields and to grant authority to SACEUR to assign to specific nations the use of all alternate airfields in peacetime. The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 8 March, approving the two actions recommended by General Gruenther.⁴⁶

The Standing Group approved SACEUR's specific proposals on 17 March. General Gruenther then directed his subordinate commanders to determine, with host nations, how presently authorized but uncompleted airfields could be modified for a one-squadron layout. Where savings could be accomplished by such changes, the commanders were directed to take steps to initiate construction to the changed standards within the limits of these savings. He requested the Standing Group to approve these measures.⁴⁷

On 28 June 1955 the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that SACEUR's proposals were reasonable, realistic, and in general consonance with US unilateral dispersal plans in Europe. They accordingly directed the US representative to the Standing Group to support them. Subsequently, during August, they received and forwarded to General Collins the OSD opinion that there were no "limiting political and financial implications in SACEUR's proposal which would detract from the military advisability of supporting the dispersal plan as you have recommended."⁴⁸

Later in the year, SACEUR submitted criteria for the conversion of the NATO airfield infrastructure in accordance with the new squadron deployment policy. In December the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed General Collins to support approval of these criteria in the Standing Group.⁴⁹

The 1956 Infrastructure Program (7th Slice), consisting of separate submissions by SACEUR and SACLANT, was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by General Collins with a request for guidance on 8 September 1955. The recommendations for SHAPE were based on requirements to support realistic estimates of forces to be available at the end of 1957 as indicated by the 1954 annual review and other data. The submission also reflected revisions in logistic installations made necessary by the new approach in NATO planning that could be completed in time for inclusion in the 1956 program. The logistic consequences of the air defense study currently under way at SHAPE and the airfield program for Germany fell outside this category and were therefore not included.

Estimated to cost \$133.5 million, SACEUR's submission provided the following: 20 squadron airfields; seven air-to-ground gunnery and bombing ranges; three tank ranges; eight naval base installations; 987 kilometers of pipelines; 133,750 cubic meters of POL storage; 10 radar installations; 11 radio navigational installations; 63 communications installations; and five war headquarters.⁵⁰

The SACLANT program would cost an estimated \$54.3 million. It would provide an advanced fleet anchorage in the Clyde, fleet facilities in Iceland, war headquarters for several of his subordinate commands, and miscellaneous communications and POL storage projects.⁵¹

With a few minor exceptions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in general with the military necessity for the facilities in the submissions of SACEUR and SACLANT. The exceptions in the SACEUR submission consisted of a submarine base in Turkey judged to be too vulnerable and four communications projects for which the justification was inadequate. In the SACLANT submission, all the items were approved, subject to certain stipulations regarding two of the communications projects.⁵²

SACEUR submitted his recommendations for airfields in Germany to the Standing Group on 3 December. He called for 25 airfields to support 25 German squadrons programmed for activation by 30 June 1958, with all the airfields to be included in the 1956 infrastructure program so that they would be completed on time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General Collins on 31 January that they concurred in the military requirement for the 25 recommended airfields.⁵³

Even before action had been completed on the 1956 infrastructure program, which was the last portion of the three-year program that had begun in 1954, the Standing Group had concluded that further infrastructure development would be essential. On 19 April the Standing Group requested the Supreme Commanders to send representatives to a conference to determine the general order of magnitude of the requirement for further infrastructure, the optimum method for submitting the requirement, and whether any further studies were required. As a result of this conference, the Supreme Commanders recommended developing infrastructure programs for a three-year period starting in 1957. The Standing Group concluded that a three-year program costing in the order of \$1 billion was

needed and that the Supreme Commanders should be directed to submit their detailed requirements under such a program.⁵⁴

Upon receipt of programs from the Supreme Commanders, the logistics and materiel planners of the Standing Group staff prepared a draft paper stating to the North Atlantic Council the infrastructure requirements foreseen by the NATO commanders for the three-year period 1957–1959. The logistic requirements were described as having been generated by the concept of war set out in MC 48, the dispersal of air force units, the accession of Germany to NATO, and the air defense study conducted by SACEUR. In presenting these logistic requirements, the planners had deliberately stated them in broad terms so as to avoid the difficulties encountered in the previous program, where member countries had exerted great pressure to obtain expenditure of specific sums within their borders as stated in the original forecasts, without regard for changes that might have occurred in the military situation.⁵⁵

On 10 April 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the US representative that they approved the draft report, provided any new three-year program was sufficiently flexible to accommodate new weapons installations such as guided missile sites and provided the tropospheric and ionospheric scatter system of communications proposed by SACEUR accorded with the stipulations previously made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These were that the system be designed and built by a single prime contractor to ensure compatibility and uniformity throughout and that it be financed under a special provision of NATO funds so that title to the system remained with SACEUR.⁵⁶

On 27 April, the Military Committee approved and forwarded to the North Atlantic Council MC 32/6, a three-year infrastructure program at a broadly estimated cost of \$910 million. It had the objective of satisfying requirements for the following: the buildup of German forces; improvement of the posture of NATO air and naval forces; an integrated early warning system; forward detection of enemy submarines; support of the forward strategy; and improvement and extension of previously authorized infrastructure complexes. The North Atlantic Council, however, decided against an infrastructure program of this magnitude. On 14 August, it approved expenditure of only \$710 million and provided that the program be stretched out over a four-year period.⁵⁷

Accomplishments of NATO, 1955–1956

As 1956 drew to a close, the NATO military authorities could foresee no early attainment of the force requirements of MC 48. A severe blow to the hopes of achieving the necessary force levels had been the redeployment of French forces from the NATO central sector to North Africa. By the end of 1956, only two of the six French M-day divisions remained in position in Europe, and they were at two-thirds strength. In view of the worsening situation in Algeria, the prospect of a speedy return of these divisions was not bright. The deployment of German forces, of which five divisions were scheduled for 1957, would offset the loss of

the French units. This deployment would not, however, make possible the attainment of the MC force goals since those goals were predicated on the full French contribution as well as a German contribution of 12 divisions. There was no prospect that the other members of the alliance would increase the forces assigned. To the contrary, there had been minor slippages in meeting the commitments already made by some of the member countries.

Various other problems arising from a nuclear strategy, such as the dispersal of forces, the provision of coordinated air defenses, and the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons, had been addressed during 1955–1956, but little progress had been made toward solving any of them. They would pose a major concern to the military authorities of NATO in the years ahead.

Search for a Collective Defense of the Middle East

The Middle East, consisting of the lands extending from the western border of Egypt to the eastern border of West Pakistan and from the southern shore of the Black Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the southern border of the Sudan, continued during the mid-1950s to be an area of great strategic, political, and economic importance to the free world.¹ It contained the largest petroleum resources in the world, the Suez Canal, and locations for military bases of high importance in the event of a general war with the Soviet Union.

Since the end of World War II, Western influence in the Middle East had dwindled, concurrently with the rise of a conscious Arab nationalism. The coming to power of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt in 1954 gave new impetus to the development of Arab nationalism. Nasser soon made it apparent that he aspired to be the leader not merely of Egypt but of the entire Arab world, and by 1955 his political machinations and propaganda broadcasts were contributing significantly to the political and social ferment in the area.

Another element in the decline of Western influence was growing communist penetration of the Middle East. Since the death of Stalin in 1953, the Soviet Union had turned increasingly toward peaceful penetration of the Arab states through economic aid and professions of political support. Serving further to alienate the Moslem countries from the West was the establishment in 1948 of the state of Israel as a Jewish national homeland, a development in which the United States and the United Kingdom had taken a prominent part.²

As a result, the Western interests in the oil resources, communication lines, and military base rights of the region were endangered. In seeking to preserve these interests, at a time when the power and prestige of Great Britain in the area were declining, the United States had been obliged to become actively concerned with the Middle East.

Origins of Collective Defense

At the beginning of 1955 US policy toward the Middle East was contained in NSC 5428, which President Eisenhower had approved on 23 July 1954.³ The NSC paper acknowledged the strategic, political, and economic significance of the area and concluded that the security interests of the United States would be critically endangered should the Middle East fall under Soviet influence or control. Hence the policy objective must be to keep available to the United States and its allies the resources, strategic positions, and passage rights of the area while denying them to the Soviet bloc. In NSC 5428 the current danger to these security interests was seen to arise less from the possibility of direct Soviet attack than from increasing Soviet peaceful penetration, combined with rising Arab nationalism and declining Western influence in the Arab countries.

To attain the policy objective, NSC 5428 called chiefly for political and economic measures, designed to persuade the Arab states that the United States was in sympathy with their legitimate aspirations, to support Arab governments friendly to the West, and to employ increased economic and technical aid in the area. As military measures, NSC 5428 listed the creation of a collective defense system involving Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan and the preparation of plans for military operations to deter or terminate any large-scale hostilities between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

The interest of the United States in collective defense of the Middle East dated from the outbreak of the Korean conflict, an event that had served notice the Soviet Union was prepared to support open aggression to achieve its goals. Recognizing the vulnerability of the Middle East to Soviet attack, the United States had joined with Great Britain in an attempt to enlist the states of the area in a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO). Major Arab states such as Egypt and Syria had shown no interest in MEDO, and by 1953 it was clear that the proposal had scant prospect of success.

The United States then turned to the northern tier countries—Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan—which because of their proximity to the Soviet Union were more sensitive to Soviet expansionist ambitions than their neighbors to the south and west. Following a trip to the area in the spring of 1953, Secretary of State Dulles had concluded that the defense of the Middle East could best be organized around these northern states.⁴ His consultations with leaders of these countries had convinced the Secretary, however, that completion of such a defensive arrangement was not imminent; the United States should retain it as an objective but await a stronger expression of interest on the part of the states concerned. This view found acceptance in the Eisenhower administration and became official policy by its inclusion in NSC 5428.

As early as mid-November 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had advised Secretary Wilson that the time might be propitious for encouraging a defensive association among the four northern nations. In June 1954 they began informal consultations with the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington about possible coordination of Middle East defense planning. With the approval of NSC 5428 a month later, the matter was pursued more energetically, culminating

in agreement that military representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and Turkey would meet in London in January 1955 for staff talks on operational planning for Middle East defense.⁵

Tripartite Staff Talks

The military representatives who convened in London were Admiral John H. Cassady, CINCNELM, for the United States; Air Chief Marshal P. Ivelaw-Chapman, Vice Chief of the United Kingdom Air Staff, for Great Britain; and Lieutenant General R. Erdelun, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, for Turkey. In guidance for Admiral Cassady, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had cited their decision of 6 April 1954 that US interests in the Middle East would be secured by holding Turkey and the Zagros Mountains stretching along the western border of Iran and the territory west and south thereof, which contained the major oil reserves, communication lines, and military base sites. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CINCNELM that they did not contemplate stationing or committing any significant US forces in defense of the Middle East at that time.⁶

The planners in London agreed to the following agenda: develop a concept for the defense of the area along the line of the Zagros Mountains; determine the forces required for such a defense and the rate of buildup; and recommend means of making up deficits in forces and materiel.

In a report, issued on 22 February 1955, the tripartite military representatives concluded that the Middle East countries were capable of providing the ground forces needed to defend the Zagros line but would require outside assistance to bring them up to the necessary state of readiness. Air and naval forces would have to be provided from sources outside the area, presumably the United States and Great Britain. Rapid movement into position would be necessary to a successful defense, making advance logistical arrangements for the movements essential.

In reaching these conclusions, the planners assumed that the Soviets would attack as part of a general war in which NATO was engaged and would use only the forces immediately available south of the Caucasus and in Turkestan—some 24 divisions and 1,285 aircraft. They assumed further that the Soviet Union would be hit by a general nuclear strategic air offensive and that additional nuclear weapons and means of delivery would be made available within the Middle East theater. Nuclear attacks, they estimated, would reduce the combat effectiveness of Soviet forces reaching the passes by 15–25 percent, would cut the rate of advance of follow-up forces by 50 percent, and would seriously reduce resupply. Nuclear air strikes against Soviet air forces at H-hour on D-day would be essential to attaining a favorable air situation. In view of the fact that US policy required storage of nuclear weapons in US custody, studies of employment of nuclear weapons were made under two separate assumptions—availability at H-hour, and availability at H+18 days.

Based on these assumptions and estimates, the planners concluded that a force of 7½ divisions (or 9½ in the Turkish view) could hold the Zagros passes.

In the air and on the sea, effective defense along the Zagros line would require 528 aircraft (or 593 according to the United States), and 106 ships. The planners found that only $5\frac{1}{3}$ divisions—1 British, 3 Iraqi, and $1\frac{1}{3}$ Jordanian—were available within the theater, leaving a deficit that might be made up from among other existing forces, including 3 Turkish, 1 Iranian, and 1 Pakistani divisions. In the air and at sea the deficits amounted to 422 aircraft (487 in the US view) and 73 ships and could only be made up from outside the theater.⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the Secretary of Defense on 14 April 1955 that the tripartite study was acceptable as a point of departure for further consideration of Middle East defense, subject to certain comments: there should be a common yardstick by which to measure the capabilities of units of different nations; Iranian forces were not given sufficient consideration as a source for making up deficiencies; and the availability of Turkish, Pakistani, Jordanian, and Iraqi units was exaggerated.⁸

The Baghdad Pact and US Reaction

Just two days after the US, British, and Turkish military planners had submitted their report, Turkey and Iraq took a far-reaching step toward establishing an organization for collective defense of the Middle East under the northern tier concept. On 24 February 1955 the two countries signed a mutual defense treaty at Baghdad. This "Baghdad Pact" committed each of the contracting parties to cooperate for their defense consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The detailed means of cooperation were left to be worked out later. The pact was open to accession by any interested state and provided for establishment of a permanent council at ministerial level when at least four powers had become members. The first power to respond to the open invitation to membership was Great Britain, which formally adhered to the Baghdad Pact on 5 April.⁹

Three days later the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out to the Secretary of Defense that the United States might soon be under pressure to join in any combined defense organization that might result. A review of current policy on the question was therefore in order, particularly to determine the proper scope and level of US participation. Following resolution of basic policy questions, the United States should prepare to enter either formal or informal multilateral politico-military talks with Great Britain, Turkey, and other appropriate powers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the early formation of a State-Defense working group to conduct the proposed policy review.¹⁰

A working group of the type recommended was established by Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., and Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson to survey the political, economic, and military problems involved in planning a defense of the Middle East. Two of the four Defense members were officers of the Joint Staff.¹¹

The working group, reporting on 6 June 1955, concluded that participation by the United States, Great Britain, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Jordan would be required for an effective military defense arrangement for the Middle East. Eventual cooperation of Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt would also be required to provide the nec-

essary bases and lines of communication. Cooperation of Pakistan would be desirable militarily for defense of the Zagros line and would be important politically to complete the northern tier and thereby contribute to the developing regional defense consciousness of the states in the area.

To form a Middle East defense organization composed of these states should be politically feasible, the working group concluded. The northern tier could be completed in the near future by adherence of Pakistan and Iran to the Turkish-Iraqi defense pact, but because of the Arab-Israeli dispute, obtaining cooperation from other Arab states would be difficult but not impossible. Significant improvement in Arab-Israeli relations in the next six to eight months would largely solve the problem. If such an improvement failed to occur, it should still be possible to offer sufficient inducement to Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt to get them either to join the pact or to agree to some other form of cooperation on defense. The military strategy to be employed, together with the estimate of forces needed to implement it and the sources to be drawn on, were taken directly from the report of the US-British-Turkish staff talks.

With regard to US participation, the working group concluded that formal membership in the Middle East organization would be politically necessary in order to be in a position to influence defense planning and preparations. The US move to join the pact should be timed to follow the adherence of Pakistan and Iran and should be keyed to the status of the Arab-Israeli dispute. If prospects for settlement of the latter were good, the United States should delay joining until the settlement had been reached. If there were no such prospects, the United States should adhere "probably within a year at most" in order to maintain momentum in the regional defense buildup.

The working group recommended that Secretaries Hoover and Anderson: (1) approve the report, after obtaining the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a basis for informal, preliminary discussions with the British in order to obtain assurances of their cooperation; (2) submit the report, as amended after these discussions, to the National Security Council in order to obtain agreement to US participation in a Middle East defense organization.¹²

Anticipating a request for JCS comment from the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff late in May had directed the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to prepare an "affirmative U.S. military position on defense of the Middle East." A formal request for JCS views on the working group report was received on 6 June.¹³

A week later the JSSC recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States, having encouraged a northern tier military pact, should adhere to such a pact if one were consummated and showed real promise of viability. The form of adherence, however, should be on the most general basis possible and should not obligate specific US forces to defense of the area or imply any commitment of financial or material support. The JSSC favored encouragement by the United States of completion of the northern tier pact among Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan; it opposed as premature any effort by the United States to promote a comprehensive Middle East defense arrangement involving combined planning and command arrangements of the NATO type.

Turning to the military assessments in the working group's report, the JSSC noted that the estimated force requirements were not definitive. Moreover, the estimate of availabilities to meet these requirements and the proposals for making up force deficiencies represented solutions that would be possible only if the United States and Britain underwrote the necessary programs and if the political aspirations of the Middle East countries concerned could be brought into harmony. The working group, said the JSSC, had also underestimated the potential contribution of Iran, which should be realized by increasing US material support to Iranian forces. On 16 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made one amendment to this report, and then forwarded it to Secretary Wilson.¹⁴

United States adherence to the Baghdad Pact, as recommended by the working group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was not accepted at the higher levels of the Departments of State and Defense. On 11 July 1955, Under Secretary of State Hoover, with the concurrence of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Admiral Radford, recommended to President Eisenhower against adherence at present to the Baghdad Pact, "particularly because this would adversely affect our influence in bringing about a reduction in Arab-Israeli tensions." However, US support and encouragement of the emerging military alliance elicited a more favorable response. Secretary Hoover recommended that the United States establish close liaison with the pact organization in order to coordinate US plans and aid programs with those of the member states. He recommended also that the United States encourage Iran to join by offering increased US military assistance.¹⁵

The President approved these recommendations, and on 14 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to define the precise form of liaison to be established by the Department of Defense with the Baghdad Pact.¹⁶ On 30 September 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the US Army Attache, Iraq, be designated as the US military observer with the Baghdad Pact organization. To establish any more elaborate form of liaison, they believed, would be incompatible with the current US policy of abstaining from formal association with the Baghdad Pact. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) approved this recommendation on 27 October.¹⁷

A few days earlier, in a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Casady had recommended US membership in the Baghdad Pact. He believed consideration of the matter was timely, since Pakistan had formally adhered to the pact on 23 September, and Iran had announced her intention to do so, thus bringing geographical completion of the northern tier in sight. Moreover, the Soviet Union had recently scored a successful penetration into the Middle East by arranging for Czechoslovakia to barter arms for Egyptian cotton.

In the light of these events, and assuming a governmental decision that "the retention, by the West, of the Middle East area is essential to the United States in a cold war period or in a general war," Admiral Casady believed it was time for the United States to join the Baghdad Pact. He was convinced that the defensive alliance "will never be effective without United States participation." Moreover, CINCNELM thought that for the United States to make this positive move toward support of the regional defense organization would contribute to improving rather than worsening Egyptian-Israeli relations, might lead other countries to join, and could well offset the rising Soviet influence in the area.¹⁸

On 18 November 1955 the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to forward the text of Admiral Cassady's letter to the Secretary of Defense. Without endorsing CINCNELM's reasoning in detail, they concurred in the broader proposition that "there are military advantages to early United States adherence to the Northern Tier Pact," while noting that US membership would imply a willingness to provide substantially increased military and economic aid to support the pact's defense objectives. A JCS request that Mr. Wilson advise the Secretary of State of their views was complied with early in December.¹⁹

The Baghdad Pact Begins to Function

Military planning by the Baghdad Pact organization began at the meeting of the signatories in Baghdad on 21–22 November 1955, at which the pact organization was formally established. The member states set up a permanent council at ministerial level with permanent deputies of ambassadorial rank. The Baghdad Pact Council would meet at least once a year in ministerial session; the permanent deputies would meet at any time to discuss matters of political, economic, and military interest. To support the Council, a permanent secretariat and economic and military committees were established.²⁰

The Military Committee met concurrently with the Council. It established a secretariat and a security subcommittee and approved a schedule for convening a planning group in Baghdad to produce, by 15 March 1956, agreed papers on the following subjects: estimate of the threat to the Middle East area; appreciation of the military situation in the area; concept of operations for its defense; and ways and means to improve the mutual defense efforts of the signatory states.

Admiral Cassady attended the Military Committee meeting as a special US military observer but was not satisfied with this arrangement. He found his observer status inadequate to protect US interests. He reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that attendance at the meeting had deepened his conviction that US membership in the Baghdad Pact was essential. "Almost every individual with whom I talked went at great length to express his hopes for, and the urgency of, early U.S. adherence to the Pact."²¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded Admiral Cassady's report to the Secretary of Defense on 4 January 1956, with a recommendation that he advise Secretary Dulles of its contents. With reference to CINCNELM's call for an early US move toward joining the Baghdad Pact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated their opinion that there were military advantages to such a course, which would, however, have to be weighed against its implied commitment to increase US military and economic aid.²²

The Military Deputies met between 21 and 28 January in Baghdad, agreed in general terms on the threat to the pact area and on the defense concept, and prepared terms of reference for the planning group. The defense concept called for holding the mountain barrier made up of the Elburz and Hindu Kush ranges extending across northern Iran from Turkey to Afghanistan—a line that would

provide maximum security to the region by containing the potential enemy within his own territory and denying him access to allied air bases, oil areas, and lines of communication.²³

Pursuant to the instructions of the Military Deputies, the planners began their sessions shortly afterward and by mid-March had drafted initial military studies on the "Threat to the Baghdad Pact Area in Global War up to 1960," "Appreciation of the Military Situation in the Area," "Concept of Operations (Outline Plan)," "Measures to Increase the Effectiveness of Defense Efforts of Signatory States," and an "Interim Plan." These studies carried the designation BP/MIDMIL/MP/56/1.

The threat paper assumed that the enemy, in a global war, would attempt to seize as much as possible of the Middle East in order to gain control of the vital communications, oil resources, and warm water ports of the region; to extend the radius of offensive air action and increase the depth of Soviet air defense; to reduce the allied air threat to important Soviet industrial and military targets; and to prevent the buildup of hostile forces in the area. The enemy strategy for the attainment of these aims was considered to be first to attempt disruption of the countries to be attacked by internal subversion, then to launch both conventional and nuclear air attacks against targets vital to allied operations in the area, and finally to break out as rapidly as possible with ground forces into the pact countries. Concurrently Soviet aircraft, submarines, and surface raiders would attack allied shipping.

The appreciation paper was drafted to substantiate the decision, already taken by the Military Deputies, to base the defense of the pact area on the Elburz Mountains. As now developed by the planners, the concept became to support the main defenses in these mountains with secondary positions in the Zagros range. In the outline paper, this concept of operations was spelled out in more detail and a preliminary estimate of force requirements made.

The interim plan paper outlined a plan for defense of the pact area under existing circumstances. Since no political arrangements existed for stationing forces of one country on the territory of another, the planners based their paper on indigenous land and air forces immediately available within their own national borders. No attempt was made to enumerate the forces actually available.²⁴ On 16 March 1956, the Military Deputies met, noted BP/MIDMIL/MP/56/1, and directed that it be forwarded to national authorities for comment.

Even before this first phase of Baghdad Pact military planning had been completed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff became concerned over the adequacy of the US observer relationship in the Baghdad Pact agencies as a means to protect US interests in the Middle East. Their attention was drawn to the matter by the report of the US Army Attache, Colonel Henry P. Tucker, who served as the military observer. Reporting on the Military Deputies' meetings of 21-28 January 1956 he warned that approval of the Elburz concept had committed the Baghdad Pact countries to a defense far in excess of what they could pay for. The result would be a tremendous bill, which could ultimately result in excessive requirements for US military aid. Further, the Iranians, Iraqi, and Turks were exceedingly disappointed at the failure of the United States to assume leadership.

Colonel Tucker believed that "the US must participate in Baghdad Pact military planning in more than merely... observer status if the defense plans produced are to be of any value, and if we are to maintain the faith Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan have in the US. Early US adherence to the pact is the only truly adequate solution." If US membership had to be delayed, he recommended as interim steps: (1) that the United States make formal its position on Middle East defense plans and prepare for secret but active participation should there be another round of planning conferences after the formal Military Committee meeting in May; and (2) that the Joint Chiefs of Staff comment on the studies currently being produced.²⁵

The Joint Middle East Planning Committee (JMEPC), having been directed to prepare guidance that would permit appropriate US liaison with the Baghdad Pact organization, recommended approval of one of the means Colonel Tucker had proposed for bringing JCS views to bear on the pact's planning. The JMEPC suggested that the US observer be instructed to say that, if requested by the Baghdad Pact Military Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would comment informally on the studies it prepared.²⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this recommendation on 2 March 1956 and dispatched the appropriate instructions the following day, after obtaining the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. On 8 March the US observer reported that the Baghdad military planners had received the JCS offer to provide comments with enthusiasm. The Military Committee formally accepted it at their meeting in Tehran on 16 April.²⁷

JCS Recommendations for Adherence to the Pact

Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reopened the question of formal US relations with the Baghdad Pact. In a report on 19 March, Colonel Tucker had renewed his advocacy of US membership. He believed that unless the United States joined the pact and participated in the planning, an effective defense of the Middle East could not be developed.²⁸ Two days later, Admiral Radford suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff go beyond their past comments on the military advantages of US membership and "positively express their views."²⁹

On 23 March 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense that, in view of the critical situation in the Middle East and the rapid progress in military planning by the pact organization, the United States should adhere to the Baghdad Pact without delay. They asked that the Secretary of State be advised of their views.³⁰

The Secretary of Defense gave full support to this JCS initiative. A copy of the JCS recommendations having already been forwarded to the Department of State, Mr. Wilson on 5 April wrote Secretary Dulles that he considered "early adherence to the Baghdad Pact, or a least an indication of our intention to do so, may well be necessary to avoid disintegration of the Pact Organization." Action should be undertaken at the earliest feasible time, he wrote, and in a parallel

move Secretary Wilson transmitted the JCS views to the National Security Council, recommending consideration on an urgent basis. With the approval of President Eisenhower, the matter was referred to the NSC Planning Board for preparation of a report.³¹

The question was not to come before the NSC during the spring of 1956, however. On 23 April the Secretary of State replied to Mr. Wilson's letter, opposing US membership in the Baghdad Pact at that time. Secretary Dulles believed that the pact had aroused such political feeling within the Arab world that US adherence would be widely interpreted in the Middle East as a move against Arab unity. At home, action looking toward joining the Baghdad Pact might generate almost irresistible pressures to extend Israel a security guarantee, and the Secretary doubted that the Senate was currently disposed to consent to US membership in any event.³²

Upon receipt of the Dulles letter, Secretary Wilson recommended that NSC consideration be deferred until the latter part of 1956 and then be resumed with a view to determining the desirability of announcing US adherence during the January 1957 meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council. On 24 May, the President approved Secretary Wilson's recommendation.³³

Although consideration of formal US membership was postponed, the United States continued to take lesser steps toward a closer association with the Baghdad Pact. During April 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the establishment of a small US military liaison office headed by an officer of flag or general rank. This proposal originated with Admiral Burke, who included it in a draft guidance message to Admiral Cassady covering his attendance at the Military Committee meeting scheduled for 16–19 April. Admiral Burke asked that CINCNELM be authorized to investigate informally the desirability and feasibility of establishing such an office, which would supersede the US Army Attache in Baghdad as the agency for day-to-day liaison. With the approval of both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatched the guidance on 11 April. The Baghdad Pact Military Committee accepted the suggestion of establishing a US military liaison office on 16 April.³⁴

Another step recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to increase US participation in military affairs of the Baghdad Pact was to authorize the US military observer to express US views on Middle East defense matters on an informal basis. After approval by higher authority, the Joint Chiefs of Staff added this feature to the terms of reference of the US observer on 24 May. In effect, it supplemented the provision already made for supplying JCS comments on the plans and studies produced by the Military Committee.³⁵ In the nonmilitary area, the United States agreed, at the Baghdad Pact Council meeting on 16 April 1956, to join the Economic and Counter-Subversion Committees that the pact members established at that time.³⁶

JCS Review of Pact Planning

The step of greatest significance in expanding the US relationship with the Baghdad Pact organization during 1956 was implementation of the agreement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would furnish comments on the pact's military plans. The first JCS action in this new phase was review of BP/MIDMIL/MP/56/1, the military plans prepared by the Baghdad Pact planners during the winter of 1956 and referred by the Military Deputies to national military authorities on 16 March.³⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their comments to the US observer on 26 April. They considered that BP/MIDMIL/MP/56/1 was a constructive effort to develop a defense of the area using local resources. The concept of defense along the Elburz Mountains was "sound as a goal on which to base long-range Pact planning." The Joint Chiefs of Staff assumed, however, that the Baghdad Pact military planners would now prepare plans based on current capabilities and resources. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also pointed out the need for removing the political obstacles to stationing forces of one pact country on the territory of another. The treatment of the effects of strategic air operations was found to be generally satisfactory, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that the Baghdad Pact military planners advise the United States more specifically of their requirements by providing a list of targets. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the danger of Soviet air attack on allied oil installations and the magnitude of attacks on Pakistan had been exaggerated in the pact's plans, while the Soviet capability for airborne operations had been underestimated.³⁸

One of the JCS recommendations had already been accepted by the time it was transmitted to Baghdad on 26 April. Ten days before, Admiral Cassady, attending the Military Committee meeting in Tehran as US observer, had succeeded in persuading the committee to prepare a capabilities plan.³⁹ Subsequently on 17 July, the Military Deputies approved an amended version of BP/MIDMIL/MP/56/1, incorporating some of the specific changes recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning Soviet capabilities and referring the remainder to the planners for reconsideration. In spite of urging by the US observer, however, the Military Deputies did not order further study of the stationing of forces of one member state on the territory of another.⁴⁰

After these revisions of BP/MIDMIL/MP/56/1 were completed, the Military Deputies directed the planning staff to embark on a second round of more detailed planning studies, using the approved paper as a basis. By the end of October 1956 the planners had completed, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had commented on, ten studies: Naval Study; Logistic Appreciation from the Enemy Point of View; Air Study; Nuclear Study; a revision of the Global War Threat Study; a revision of the Outline Plan; Command Systems; Interim Capabilities Plan; and two papers on communist-inspired threats to West Pakistan.

Two of the new studies were revisions of earlier planning efforts and incorporated comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the national military authorities of the Baghdad Pact nations. Of these, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found the "Threat to the Baghdad Pact Area in Global War" to be in general agreement with their

own views on the subject. The "Outline Plan," however, they found still to call for unrealistically large forces.⁴¹

In attempting to draft a realistic capabilities plan, the planning staff encountered a continuing insistence by the Iranian representatives on defending all their national territory. As a result, the Interim Capabilities Plan of 15 October 1956 set forth a concept of defense along the line of mountains in eastern Turkey, the Elburz range, and the northwest boundary of West Pakistan.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the comments supplied in April, had endorsed the concept of a defense along the Elburz as a long-range goal, but they recognized that such a defense could only be effective if adequate preparations for manning it were made in advance. They accordingly once again advised the Baghdad Pact authorities that "if the defense on the Elburz is to be effective, it is considered necessary to remove the political obstacles to the stationing of forces of one pact country in another pact country prior to D-Day In this connection, it would be highly desirable to permit peacetime prestocking of air fields and ground supply points, and preparation of defensive positions."⁴²

The problems of command relations also continued to be of concern. In their paper on the subject, the planning staff recommended immediate establishment of a Baghdad Pact command, consisting of a supreme commander, subordinate air, ground, and navy commanders, a chief of staff, and a five-member steering committee of colonel/brigadier rank to function under the chief of staff. The several commanders would be designated but would not be permanently stationed in Baghdad at present; the chief of staff and the steering committee would be on full-time duty in Baghdad.⁴³

In forwarding the Command Systems Study to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US observer gave his opinion that appointment of a capable chief of staff would be desirable to improve planning, which was currently handicapped by an incompetent secretariat and a committee system that lacked effective leadership. The observer was opposed to designation of a pact commander because of the political complications involved.⁴⁴ The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in general with the US observer's opinions and requested him to inform the pact planning staff that they favored establishment of a small nucleus headquarters under a chief of staff.⁴⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found generally acceptable the three pact studies on air, naval, and logistic problems in defending against a Soviet attack across the Iranian border, subject to a number of technical comments.⁴⁶ Under Pakistani urging, the planning staff had also produced a study of the "Communist Inspired Threat to West Pakistan in Conditions Short of Global War" and a "Limited War Plan to Deal with Communist Inspired and Aided Aggression by Afghanistan Against Pakistan." In comments on these two papers during November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the opinion that the first reflected an adequate appreciation of the problem and that the second, while lacking in specific military measures and objectives, properly reflected the need for Pact support of Pakistan in combatting communist inspired and aided aggression by Afghanistan.⁴⁷

Earlier, at midyear, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had produced their own estimate of the defense requirements of the Baghdad Pact area for general war, in response to a request from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA). They developed the

listing of necessary forces solely on the basis of requirements, without regard to whether the units would be drawn entirely from indigenous sources or supplied in part by the United States or other allied nations. On 12 July 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the Secretary of Defense as follows:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the defense of the area must be as far forward as militarily practicable and that . . . the concept for defense along the Elburz Mountains is sound as a goal on which to base long-range Pact planning and broad force requirements. A defense along the Elburz line would be the most remunerative, if successful, and is the only defensive concept which is acceptable to the Iranian Government. If the Elburz line could be held, the allied and Baghdad Pact military objectives in that area would be attained.⁴⁸

Further JCS Recommendations for Adherence to the Pact

In accordance with the presidential decision of 24 May 1956, a review of the question of US adherence to the Baghdad Pact was undertaken during the fall of 1956. While in progress, the abortive attempt by France and Great Britain to overturn Gamel Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal altered the power relationships in the Middle East and gave a new urgency to the review of US policy regarding the Baghdad Pact.⁴⁹

The policy review began routinely on 22 October when the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested JCS views on the subject for use in formulating the Defense Department position in the National Security Council.⁵⁰ Israel invaded Egypt on 29 October, and the Anglo-French attack on that country occurred two days later. Reacting to these events, Secretary Wilson wrote to Secretary Dulles and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on 14 November that circumstances in the Middle East called for NSC consideration of US adherence to the Baghdad Pact on an urgent basis "if the vacuum created by recent developments is to be effectively filled."⁵¹ Though he did not refer to it specifically, the Secretary undoubtedly had in mind the recent collapse of British prestige and influence in the Middle East. A possibility foreseen by some was that the Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact might now wish to disassociate themselves from the United Kingdom and British leadership.⁵²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 30 November, strongly reaffirmed their position favoring immediate US adherence to the Baghdad Pact. "As of now, the continued effective existence of the Baghdad Pact is at stake," they wrote.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that continuation of the Baghdad Pact as a regional defense organization against Soviet aggression in the Middle East is vital to the security of this area and to the attainment of U.S. military objectives in this area. The collapse of the Baghdad Pact organization will be an irretrievable loss to the best interests of the United States in the Middle East.

The US military position in that area was in a dangerous condition because of a growing alliance of Egypt, Syria and Jordan against Israel, which the Soviet

Union was apparently supporting with the expectation of controlling it. "The United States and the Western World have no effective defense arrangement which would counteract such an alliance," the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out. Joining the Baghdad Pact would provide an opportunity to establish a military position in the area, if it should later prove desirable. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also maintained that US membership would serve to check, and ultimately to reverse, the growing power of Nasser. Conversely, "without tangible evidence of U.S. strength in the Middle East, it is a certainty that Nasser will end up with greater prestige than before and that Soviet penetration in the area will become an accomplished fact."⁵³

Emergence of the Eisenhower Doctrine

The urgent recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense proved unacceptable to President Eisenhower. He recognized the gravity of the situation in the Middle East but preferred other measures for meeting it than adherence to the Baghdad Pact. His approach which became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, was presented to the Congress on 5 January 1957, in the form of a request for a joint resolution authorizing him to offer military aid to any country in the Middle East requesting it, with the objective of helping those countries maintain their independence from communist domination. He also requested authority to use the armed forces of the United States as he deemed necessary to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any Middle Eastern state requesting help when faced with overt armed aggression from a country controlled by international communism. The Congress subsequently granted the President's request and Eisenhower signed the resulting joint resolution on 9 March 1957.⁵⁴

Secretary Wilson recognized that his request for early NSC consideration of US membership in the Baghdad Pact had been superseded by President Eisenhower's proposal to the Congress. At his recommendation, and with the President's approval, the item was removed from the NSC agenda.⁵⁵

Now the search for a policy to safeguard US interests in the Middle East had been concluded. But the policy finally proposed and adopted, in the span of a few weeks, was different in both form and scope from what had been under consideration for nearly five years. During those years the United States had sought to enlist various Middle East states in a united resistance to Soviet aggression by developing collective military defense arrangements such as MEDO and the Baghdad Pact. The Eisenhower Doctrine, however, was a unilateral offer of US military assistance to countries coming under attack not only by the Soviet Union but by any state controlled by international communism.

The Arab-Israeli Dispute

A major obstacle to the erection of a common defense of the Middle East against communist expansion was the continuing antagonism between the Arab states and Israel. Ever since the establishment of Israel in 1948 as a Jewish national homeland, Arabs everywhere had regarded the new state as an alien intruder, whose policy of welcoming Jewish immigration threatened a further territorial expansion at Arab expense. The armed forces of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon had attacked Israel shortly after its founding, in hostilities that were ended by the Armistice of 1949, which included the drawing of a new boundary line. Thereafter, the Israelis, claiming to be threatened by vastly superior numbers of Arabs, reacted strongly whenever they perceived any possible threat to their security. As a result, there was continuing violence along the armistice line as Arabs and Israelis engaged in raids and counterraid.

This situation was not favorable to the establishment of a system of common defense against communism. To Arabs, the existence of Israel was the central issue, and it relegated the danger of communist aggression to the background. Also, resentment over the prominent role the United States and the United Kingdom had played in the creation of Israel contributed strongly to the Arab aversion to joining a defense arrangement under the leadership of the Western powers. Israel might have been willing to join a Western-sponsored defense pact, but her inclusion would have completed the alienation of the Arab states.

To resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute became a major long-range policy objective of the United States and its allies. To deter or prevent hostilities between Israel and her Arab neighbors became an immediate goal. To this end, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had issued a tripartite declaration on 25 May 1950, stating that they would "immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations," to prevent the use of force or threat of force between any of the countries in the area. Also, the three powers would try to prevent an arms race between the Arab states and Israel by requiring each recipient to renounce aggression against any other state before being supplied with arms.¹

To spell out what was meant by "immediately take action," President Eisenhower on 23 July 1954 approved a "Supplementary Statement of Policy on the

Arab-Israeli Problems." This statement, issued as part of NSC 5428, the basic Middle East policy document, called for economic reprisals by the United States against the party it judged to be the perpetrator of an armed attack. The reprisals listed were discontinuance of US aid, an embargo of US trade, and a blockage of the transfer of funds from any source in the United States to the aggressor. In the event economic reprisals failed to end the hostilities, the Supplementary Statement called for the United States to consult with the United Kingdom and other powers on whether to impose a blockade on the aggressor or, further, to "use military forces to compel the attacking state to relinquish any territory seized and to withdraw within its own borders." To support these measures, the policy contemplated the preparation of military plans in collaboration with the United Kingdom, and to the extent desirable and feasible with France and Turkey. In pursuing these courses of action, the United States was to seek UN sanction and support but would act promptly without it if timely UN action appeared unlikely.²

Revising US Policy on the Arab-Israeli Conflict

During 1955, continued violence along the Israeli-Arab borders raised the possibility that the actions listed in NSC 5428 might be carried out. Except for a few brief respites, the year was characterized by a series of border violations, bombings, and commando raids as both sides engaged in acts of provocation and reprisal.

Even more alarming to the United States than this continued violence was the conclusion in September of a barter deal between Czechoslovakia and Egypt whereby Egyptian cotton would be exchanged for an undisclosed amount of heavy military equipment and munitions. This agreement might endanger the military balance between Israel and the Arab states, the preservation of which had become a major policy objective of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as stated in the 1950 tripartite declaration.

The National Security Council considered the impact of the arms deal on US policy on 7 October 1955, at a time when there was some concern that Israel might feel so threatened as to launch a preventive war. The NSC directed the Planning Board to undertake an urgent review of NSC 5428 "with particular reference to U.S. courses of action in the contingency of hostilities between Israel and the Arab states."³ The Planning Board immediately assigned to a State-Defense-JCS-CIA Working Group the task of preparing a draft report reviewing the validity of the courses of action in the "Supplementary Statement of Policy on the Arab-Israeli Problem" contained in NSC 5428.

On 13 October the Working Group submitted a report approving the existing provision for economic sanctions but recommending that the determination of the aggressor be made, if possible, by the United Nations rather than by the United States alone, as provided in the existing paper. As for the military courses of action to be taken if economic measures failed, the Working Group recommended amending the existing provision for consultation on possible establish-

ment of a blockade to read, simply, "establish a blockade." The group could not agree on further military measures, however, and reported split views to the Planning Board. The State and CIA members favored prompt and direct military intervention by the United States and the United Kingdom against troop concentrations to check a major armed conflict "before it was fairly launched." The JCS and Defense members opposed any military action other than a blockade, believing that such actions would result in a maldeployment of US forces by committing them against noncommunists, would alienate the Arab states or Israel, could encourage other nations to call on the United States to guarantee boundaries, and would turn world opinion against the United States.⁴

The Planning Board was unable to resolve these divergent opinions and, in fact, elaborated upon them in reporting to the NSC on 17 October. On the subject of military measures beyond a blockade there was now a three-way division: JCS, Defense, and Budget representatives opposed any recommendations for such measures; Treasury and Disarmament representatives recommended that the United States consider providing military forces with congressional authority to respond to a UN resolution or a request from a victim of aggression; and the State representative would have the United States be prepared to provide military forces under these circumstances.⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made their first formal comments on revision of the Supplementary Statement when they reviewed the Planning Board draft on 19 October. They supported the positions taken by their representatives on the Planning Board and Working Group. On the blockade question, the Joint Chiefs of Staff held that the policy should be clear with respect to whether a blockade would or would not be imposed. Supporting the position not to include reference to other military measures in the policy paper, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that forces engaged in a major conflict between Israel and the Arab states could number as many as 500,000. For the United States to intervene successfully in an operation of this magnitude under existing force levels would require large-scale withdrawal of forces from other commitments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not rule out military intervention under all circumstances, but they were of the opinion that a decision should be made in light of conditions at the time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommended adding to the provision for combined military planning a requirement for US unilateral planning as well.⁶

The National Security Council took up the Planning Board report and the JCS comments on 20 October but was unable to resolve the divergent views. The Council members were in general agreement that a blockade would be desirable but were not prepared to endorse further military actions. Accordingly, the report was returned to the Planning Board for "revision in light of the JCS views and NSC discussion in the meeting."⁷

The Planning Board incorporated the JCS proposal for unilateral planning but was still unable to agree on the military actions to be taken and again submitted split views to the NSC. The JCS and Defense representatives stood by their previous proposals, but the State representative had modified his position. He now proposed merely to "study the desirability and feasibility of taking military action, including a blockade."⁸

In commenting on the revised report the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to support their previously expressed views. In opposing the new State position, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that a study undertaken at that time with respect to military actions other than a blockade would necessarily be based not only upon many imponderables but also upon assumptions the validity of which would be open to question.⁹

The National Security Council considered the revised Planning Board paper and approved the State Department recommendation. As finally recommended by the NSC on 27 October 1955 and approved by the President on 2 November, the revision of NSC 5428 read as follows:

COURSES OF ACTION

10. *a.* In the event of major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states, the U.S. should be prepared to take the following action against the state or states which are determined by a UN finding or, if necessary, by the U.S., to be responsible for the conflict or which refuse to withdraw their forces behind the Palestine Armistice line of 1950:

(1) Discontinue U.S. Government aid.

(2) Embargo U.S. trade.

(3) Prevent the direct or indirect transfer of funds or other assets subject to U.S. control.

b. Because the actions in paragraph 10-*a* above may not be sufficient to end the hostilities promptly, study the desirability and feasibility of taking military action, including a blockade.

c. Take the following actions either before or concurrent with measures outlined in paragraph 10-*a*:

(1) Urge other countries, as appropriate, to take action similar to that of the United States.

(2) Make every effort to secure United Nations sanction and support for all such actions.

11. *a.* In collaboration with the United Kingdom, and to the extent desirable and feasible with France and Turkey, develop plans to support the measures in paragraph 10-*a* above.

b. Make the studies regarding military action referred to in paragraph 10-*b* above unilaterally. At such time later as it may be indicated that combined military action will be taken, be prepared to collaborate in such planning with the United Kingdom and to the extent desirable with other nations.¹⁰

After three weeks of urgent review, the NSC had produced a revision of the Supplementary Statement in which the courses of action were no more explicit than in the original. The Council had left the economic actions unchanged and, lacking agreement on specific military measures, had merely provided for study of the desirability and feasibility of employing force. It had passed the buck back down to the staff level by directing the preparation of studies regarding the military action referred to in the Supplementary Statement.

Unilateral US Contingency Planning

The buck came to rest with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 October, when Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., requested them to initiate, as soon as possible, such studies and planning as were required to implement the NSC action of the previous day.¹¹ Nearly nine months later, on 21 July 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a broad plan providing for a variety of military actions and forwarded it to CINCNELM with a directive to prepare implementing operations plans. The JCS plan had six parts, one of which dealt with deterrent measures while the others provided various combinations of actions to be taken after hostilities between the Arab states and Israel had broken out.

As deterrent actions to prevent hostilities, the plan called for a show of force of ascending order of magnitude in successive stages, through four numbered phases. In Phase I, air and sea forces would be alerted for movement. In Phase II, the Sixth Fleet would deploy to the Eastern Mediterranean and Air Force units would deploy from US Air Forces, Europe, (USAFE) to the Middle East. In Phase III, these air forces would fly over Arab and Israeli territory and naval units would cruise near the Egyptian and Israeli coasts. In Phase IV, Army forces would be alerted for movement to the Middle East; Air Force and Navy forces would continue operations of Phase III. The plan provided that all deterrent actions would be applied equally to Israel and the Arab states.

The maritime blockade contemplated in the plan might be applied against any or all of the countries on a list that included Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen, using naval forces operating in the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Seas and the Persian Gulf. Initially, the blockade would be a pacific blockade as sanctioned in international law by the 1887 Declaration of the Institute of International Law. Such a blockade was defined as one applying only to the ships of the blockaded and blockading powers. If directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it could broaden to a blockade which would deny access to blockaded ports to all contraband-carrying ships, of whatever registry. Article I of the Treaty of Constantinople, providing for free use of the Suez Canal in time of war as well as peace, would be observed but would not be construed to prohibit a blockade of Port Said and the Red Sea ports and straits.

The air intervention section of the plan involved action by USAFE, SAC, and Sixth Fleet aircraft operating from bases in Turkey, Cyprus, French North Africa, and carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean. These forces would first gain control of the air, then warn both sides to ground their remaining aircraft and withdraw ground forces behind the armistice line of 1949. If the warning was not heeded, air attacks against the aggressor would be launched, first against his air forces, then against ground and naval forces. Air Force units available would be: one air division headquarters, one fighter/bomber wing, one tactical reconnaissance squadron, and one tactical bombardment squadron, all supplied by USAFE; one SAC medium bomber wing stationed in French North Africa. Navy forces would consist of a fast carrier task force and an underway replenishment group, both from the Sixth Fleet.

The ground intervention part of the plan called for a buildup of Army and Marine troops in the Middle East, seizure of a beachhead by Navy and Marine forces, and the landing of Army forces within the beachhead, prepared to launch operations in execution of the missions assigned. However, the plan did not specify what these missions would be. Forces available would include, in addition to those specified for the air intervention plan, an Army corps of two divisions and on one regimental combat team (RCT), a Marine air-ground task force consisting of one ground division and one air wing, and the necessary Navy amphibious forces.

The two remaining sections, combining elements of the other sections of the plan, were for a maritime blockade-air operation and a maritime blockade with both air and ground action. The forces allocated were the same as those made available for the other sections of the plan. A progressive application was called for, beginning with a maritime blockade and moving on to air and then ground operations if necessary.¹²

Since any extensive military operations against Middle East countries would endanger the lives and property of nationals of the Western allies living there, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed the Joint Middle East Planning Committee in March 1956 to prepare plans "for military measures to minimize repercussions of the action taken by the Tripartite Powers with respect to the Arab-Israeli hostilities, especially with regard to local action against Tripartite nationals and interests in the area."¹³ As finally approved, the plan provided the basis for detailed Service planning for the deployment of US forces to the Middle East to protect nationals of the three powers from hostile action by the inhabitants of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Israel, or to evacuate these nationals if necessary. On 27 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded the plan to CINCNELM with instructions to be prepared to carry out the mission it set forth, assuming operational control of the allocated forces upon their arrival in his area.¹⁴

In response to the JCS directives of 27 April and 21 July, CINCNELM prepared the necessary implementing plan and submitted it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in installments during the period 5 July-23 September. Because it was based on very detailed JCS guidance, the plan did not add significantly to the concepts or tactical maneuvers already specified. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan, subject to a number of minor modifications, on 9 November.¹⁵

Combined US-British Planning

While these unilateral US planning efforts were in progress during 1956, combined planning for action under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 was also under way as the result of a decision by the US and British Governments. The impetus for combined planning derived from the visit to Washington of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd in January 1956.

In the ensuing meetings, Prime Minister Eden, Foreign Minister Lloyd, President Eisenhower, and Secretary Dulles considered the Arab-Israeli problem.

Eden urged a military alliance, designed to enforce an arms embargo against Egypt. Neither Eisenhower nor Dulles liked that proposal. Next, Eden suggested formal US entry into the Baghdad Pact. That, too, proved unacceptable to the Americans. A joint statement, issued on 1 February 1956, described a much more modest undertaking:

The Tripartite Declaration of May 25th, 1950 provides for action both inside and outside the United Nations in the event of the use of force or threat of the use of force or of preparations to violate the frontier or armistice lines. We are bound to recognize that there is now increased danger of these contingencies arising. Accordingly, we have made arrangements for joint discussions as to the nature of the action which we should take in such an event. The French government is being invited to participate in these discussions.¹⁶

The two governments had agreed to joint discussions, but a misunderstanding arose as to the exact intention. On 13 February, the British Joint Services Mission delivered to Admiral Radford's office a paper by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, entitled "Military Problems Involved in Action Under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950." The British paper stated that as a result of the Washington talks, the United Kingdom and United States Governments had agreed as a first step to undertake some measure of combined planning. United States officials, however, had not understood the phrase joint discussions to mean that combined military planning by the United States and the United Kingdom was to take place.¹⁷

On 17 February, Rear Admiral Truman J. Hedding of Admiral Radford's staff group discussed the British paper with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William M. Rountree and the Counselor of the Department of State, Mr. Douglas MacArthur, II. Admiral Hedding pointed out the need for a decision whether or not combined planning would proceed. The State representatives agreed to refer the matter to Secretary Dulles, and on 21 February they sent word that the Department of State opposed combined planning because, as Admiral Hedding reported it, "of many uncertainties in the present situation and because of the possibility of a leak."¹⁸

Admiral Radford, however, felt strongly that combined planning with the British should be undertaken. He discussed the matter with Secretary Dulles on 23 February and obtained agreement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would undertake some measures of combined planning with the British.

In subsequent discussions between Admiral Hedding and Secretary Rountree, the latter indicated that the Department of State was even more concerned that security leaks would occur if the French participated in the combined planning. Inclusion of the French in the discussions in some manner seemed inescapable, however, given the statement made by the President and Prime Minister in their joint communique of 1 February.

In a memorandum to Secretary Dulles on 1 March, Admiral Radford summarized his understanding of the State Department view. Renewing his urging that US-British planning against the possibility of Arab-Israeli hostilities was essential, the Chairman suggested the following actions in the order listed: (1) com-

plete the revision, already in progress, of the British military paper and submit it to the US and British Chiefs of Staff for comment; (2) shortly afterward, initiate detailed combined planning with the British; and (3) conduct general military discussions with the French and British within the framework of the 1950 tripartite declaration and the Eden-Eisenhower communique. The last of these steps would be delayed as long as feasible, and when the tripartite discussions did occur, the intention would be to confine them to broader aspects of the military actions that might be required under the declaration. Admiral Radford doubted, however, that the existence of a more intensive US-British planning effort could long be kept secret from French officials, and he expected that they would insist on taking part. But the Chairman advised Secretary Dulles that progress in detailed US-British planning was so important that the embarrassments that might arise from ultimate French participation should be accepted.¹⁹

On 6 March Acting Secretary of State Hoover gave his concurrence to Admiral Radford's proposal.²⁰ Two weeks later its first step had been completed. The British paper, as revised by Admiral Hedding and an officer of the British Joint Services Mission, was before the US and British Chiefs of Staff for comment. The paper had as its purpose to examine the scope of the military problems involved in combined military action under the tripartite declaration. It pointed out that an Arab-Israeli war would have most serious consequences for the Western powers and therefore the primary aim must be to prevent its outbreak. Such military operations as naval and air demonstrations in the area would reduce the risk of war, but greater certainty of preventing hostilities depended on impressing a potential aggressor with the unmistakable will and capacity of the tripartite powers to use overwhelming force. The paper recommended preparation of contingency plans to cover all conceivable forms of tripartite military action, with the mission of deterring hostilities between Israel and the Arab states or of localizing and terminating the fighting if it should occur, at the same time protecting tripartite nationals and property against attacks by local inhabitants. It was assumed that, however the hostilities started, the major conflict would be between Israel and Egypt.²¹

The British Chiefs of Staff completed their review of the paper first and on 26 March informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they were in general agreement with its substance.²² Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also gave general approval to the basic paper.²³ In the meantime, on 30 March the British Chiefs of Staff had put forward a new proposal for speeding up the planning process. They suggested that each side prepare staff papers on the same subjects, which would then be used as the basis for combined planning by representatives of the US and British Chiefs of Staff meeting in Washington beginning about 21 April. The proposed staff papers would cover: military action to prevent hostilities; concepts of operations to counter aggression by either side against the other; hostilities in which the aggressor could not readily be determined; force availabilities; and command structure.²⁴

On 6 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the British planning schedule and directed preparation of US position papers on the subjects proposed. They also

designated the Joint Middle East Planning Committee (JMEPC) chairman as their representative in the combined planning talks.²⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 20 April, approved the US position papers drafted by the JMEPC and issued terms of reference to its chairman to guide his efforts in combined planning sessions. The position papers were essentially the unilateral US plans, recast to fit the format proposed by the British. The terms of reference included two further instructions: first, make no specific commitment of US forces but limit treatment of this subject to an indication of the general magnitude of the forces expected to be available; second, propose as the command relationship a system of close coordination of independent national commanders rather than a single combined command under an overall commander.²⁶

British and US staff officers met in Washington during the period 25 April-3 May and agreed on concepts of operations to deter hostilities between Israel and the Arab states and for military intervention in the event hostilities broke out. In either case, they stipulated, "military action undertaken would preferably be under United Nations sanction."

The deterrence paper called for such overt measures as increasing the strength of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization, obtaining additional base rights, reinforcing naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, conducting air and sea patrols in the area, and carrying out well-publicized amphibious exercises. The intervention plan hypothesized three situations: Case I, Arab aggression against Israel; Case II, Israeli aggression against the Arab states; and Case III, a confused state of hostilities wherein the aggressor could not be determined.²⁷

Review of the combined planning papers by the US and British Chiefs of Staff then proceeded on opposite sides of the Atlantic. On 4 June 1956 General Sir John Whiteley, Representative of the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington, informed Admiral Radford that his superiors in London had found the planning papers generally acceptable, subject to certain comments, the most critical of which had to do with the disputed question of command. The British Chiefs of Staff now sought US agreement to the principle that combined command should apply at all levels of the undertaking. They pointed out that experience had shown that operations involving all three services of two nations could not be commanded efficiently except by a combined command organization under a supreme commander. The British Chiefs of Staff considered combined command arrangements essential and were prepared to recommend to their government that the supreme commander be an American.²⁸

Two months elapsed before the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied. On 8 August they informed the British that they were adhering to their original position that, in general, military operations in the Middle East area should be carried out on the basis of close coordination between commanders of UK and US forces rather than by combined command. They suggested that further detailed planning be undertaken in Washington after an agreement had been reached on the command structure. However, no further exchanges occurred during 1956.²⁹

Breakdown in Combined Planning

Thus the effort to plan for military action to deter or terminate hostilities between the Arab states and Israel was largely unsuccessful. After a promising beginning, combined planning with the British had finally to be suspended. The US unilateral planning, while carried to completion, was not finished until 12 days after Israel invaded Egypt in October, thus precipitating a crisis of the sort the plans were intended to meet.³⁰

The nature of the conflict that actually occurred in the Middle East made combined tripartite military action impossible, in any event. The British and French, far from acting impartially to preserve the status quo in the area, attacked Egypt in collusion with Israel. And the United States could hardly have put its own unilateral plans into effect to resolve a conflict involving not only Israel and the Arab states but also Britain and France.

The Suez Canal Crisis

The long-expected renewal of hostilities in the Middle East began on 29 October 1956, when Israeli troops invaded Egypt. The invasion, however, was only a part of a much larger crisis that had begun on 26 July 1956 when the Egyptian Government nationalized the Suez Canal. Since 1869, the canal had been operated by the *Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez*, or Suez Canal Company. In 1875, the British Government purchased Egypt's shares in the company and thereby gained a controlling interest. Since 1888, the international status of the canal had been regulated by the Constantinople Convention signed in that year by France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia and Turkey (Egypt being part of what was then the Ottoman Empire). This Convention decreed that the canal must remain open to vessels of all nations in time of war as well as peace. In practice, however, Britain had exercised actual control over the Suez Canal and had closed it to shipping of her enemies during both World War I and World War II. Since 1948, Egypt had restricted the passage of goods bound for Israel.

Egyptian Seizure of the Canal

The immediate cause of Egyptian seizure of the canal was the withdrawal on 19 July of a US offer to help finance a new high dam on the Nile near Aswan. One of the most cherished objectives of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Aswan Dam would increase the cultivable area of Egypt by 30 percent and provide all necessary electric power to the Nile delta. To build such a dam would cost an estimated \$1.4 billion—a sum far exceeding Egyptian resources and therefore necessitating outside assistance. The Western powers, perhaps influenced by a Soviet expression of willingness to consider giving aid to Egypt for construction of the dam, made Egypt a specific offer of financial assistance. The United States proposed to lend Egypt \$56 million; Britain followed suit with an offer of \$14 million and the World Bank with \$200 million. These offers were made with a stipula-

tion that Egypt would set aside counterpart funds for the construction of the dam, would give it priority over other projects, and would not accept Soviet aid.

Displeased by these conditions, President Nasser delayed acceptance, probably in the expectation of a more favorable offer from Moscow. Meanwhile, the controlled Egyptian press carried on a vituperative campaign against the Western nations for their sponsorship of the Baghdad Pact and for their alleged partiality to Israel and hostility to Arab national aspirations. As if to accentuate his defiant attitude, Nasser recognized Communist China on 16 May 1956.

Nasser's delay in accepting the Western offer was disturbing to US leaders because of the impression he gave that he was playing off East against West. President Eisenhower, in his memoirs, recalled that this threat of blackmail appeared certain to make congressional approval of the US contribution extremely difficult to obtain. Influential members of the administration were also beginning to doubt the wisdom of financing the Aswan Dam on other grounds. Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey was of the opinion that the Egyptian Government would be unable to repay the loans because of the drain on its resources resulting from the extensive arms purchases it was negotiating. Secretary of State Dulles feared that, because of the burdens the construction of the dam would impose on the Egyptian people, any outside nation associated with the Aswan Dam project would garner only unpopularity among the Egyptians.

The United States nevertheless still felt obligated to help finance construction of the dam. On 20 June 1956, Mr. Eugene Black, President of the World Bank, went to Cairo to brief Nasser on a final Western offer. Nasser countered with proposals that were unacceptable to the United States, Great Britain, and the World Bank.

President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles interpreted Nasser's action to mean that he was no longer interested in working out an agreement with the West, and they concluded that rumors of a substantial Soviet offer were probably true. They considered the matter dead for all practical purposes.¹

Congressional opposition, meanwhile, was stiffening. The Senate Appropriations Committee passed a resolution directing that there should be no support for the Aswan Dam without the approval of the Committee. Secretary of State Dulles, while he doubted the constitutionality of the action, nevertheless believed it indicated a congressional attitude that would make financing of the dam by the United States impossible.²

On 13 July, Secretary Dulles informed the President that he had warned the Egyptians that congressional opposition would make the consummation of a loan agreement impossible at that time. He also advised them that the United States had altered its views on the merits of financing the dam. In spite of this warning, the Egyptian Ambassador called at the State Department on 19 July and made a new request for a huge commitment over a period of ten years. The Secretary replied that the Western powers had long since interpreted Egypt's delay in responding to their offer and its unacceptable counterproposals as indicating a lack of interest. The Western powers considered the offer withdrawn.³

Nasser's reaction was swift and drastic. On 26 July he proclaimed the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and announced that the canal revenues would be used to build the Aswan Dam.

In subsequent US public discussion of the Suez crisis it was often charged that withdrawal of the offer had been abrupt, unexpected, and unnecessarily wounding to Egyptian sensibilities. The State Department itself contributed to this widely-held impression by the statement it released on 19 July 1956, which revealed only some of the lesser reasons for the US action. In advising the President, Secretary Dulles held that the Egyptian leader could have been in no doubt that the US reply would be negative. Taking note of later remarks by Nasser that he had planned for some time to nationalize the Suez Canal Company but had been waiting for favorable circumstances, the Secretary wrote, "Nevertheless, he pressed for a definitive answer, and I suspect did so in order to create the 'occasion' for which he said he was looking."⁴

The Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Company produced a profound shock in the capitals of Great Britain, France, and the United States and set off a flurry of diplomatic activity among the leaders of those countries. British and French leaders were convinced that strong measures were necessary to protect their vital interests. The British reaction was summed up by Prime Minister Anthony Eden in a telegram to President Eisenhower on 27 July. Eden said that the members of the British Government were:

all agreed that we cannot allow Nasser to seize control of the Canal in this way, in defiance of international agreements. If we take a firm stand now we shall have the support of all the maritime powers. If we do not, our influence and yours throughout the Middle East will, we are all convinced, be finally destroyed. . . . As we see it, we are unlikely to attain our objectives by economic measures alone. . . . We ought in the first instance to bring the maximum political pressure to bear on Egypt. For this, apart from our own action, we should invoke the support of all the interested powers. My colleagues and I believe we must be ready, in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his senses. For our part, we are prepared to do so. I have this morning instructed our Chiefs of Staff to prepare a military plan accordingly.⁵

The attitude of the French was given by Foreign Minister Christian Pineau to US Ambassador Douglas Dillon in Paris the same day. Pineau said his government took a most serious view of the situation and likened it to Hitler's seizure of the Rhineland. The Foreign Minister believed that failure to act in opposition to Nasser's move would make likely the seizure of all pipelines in the Middle East within three months, which would place Europe's economy at the mercy of the Arab states. French military staffs were joining the British staffs in studying the problems involved in reoccupying the Canal Zone.⁶

In a statement in Washington on 29 July, Secretary Dulles said that Nasser's action had struck "a grievous blow at international confidence" and might jeopardize the effective operation of the canal, but he stressed the desirability of finding a political solution. In a letter to Prime Minister Eden two days later, the President said the United States recognized the "transcendent worth" of the canal to the free world and the possibility that the situation might deteriorate to the point where the use of force became necessary to protect international rights. But President Eisenhower made very clear his belief that it could be demonstrated to world opinion that every peaceful means of resolving the difficulty had previously been exhausted.⁷

In pursuit of this policy, the President sent the Secretary of State to London on 1 August to consult with British and French officials. Secretary Dulles persuaded the British and French to agree to an international conference of 24 nations, including Egypt, to meet in London on 16 August and produce a plan for international operation of the canal.⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Suez Planning

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, meanwhile, had reacted immediately to Nasser's nationalization of the canal company. On 27 July, they directed the preparation of a study setting forth the arguments for and against the following courses of action: (1) participation by US forces with British forces in direct military action to seize control of the Suez Canal; (2) US support of British military action without direct participation by US forces; and (3) US support of British military action limited to diplomatic and economic measures.

In a study submitted the next day, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee concluded that US support of the British should be limited to the types of action specified in the third course. The first and second courses of action were considered undesirable because they would alienate the Arab states.⁹ The staff opinion was rejected by Admiral Burke, General Twining, and General Taylor, who all held that Egyptian seizure of the canal was militarily unacceptable to the United States. They called for a presentation of JCS views to that effect to the National Security Council.¹⁰

In a memorandum on 31 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that they considered the Egyptian nationalization of the canal company to be so seriously detrimental to the United States and its allies from the military point of view as to require action by them that could "reasonably be expected to result in placing the Suez Canal under a friendly and responsible authority at the earliest practicable date." If actions short of the use of military force could not reasonably be expected to achieve this result, they said, the United States should consider the desirability of taking military action in support of Britain, France and others as appropriate.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommended that the Secretary request the National Security Council to take up the Suez Canal question in order to determine whether the Western world could "expect to obtain the necessary results without recourse to military action by any western power." They wished the National Security Council to "appraise the desirability of a U.S. guarantee to give political and economic support to military action by the U.K. . . ., of a prompt military commitment to prompt direct military participation by U.S. forces in the event that third parties intervene militarily on behalf of the Egyptians."¹¹

On 31 July, during a NSC meeting, Admiral Burke said "the JCS are of the view that Nasser must be broken." Therefore, if the British resorted to force, "we should declare ourselves in support of their action." President Eisenhower, however, felt that Nasser "embodies the emotional demands of the people of the area

for independence and for 'slapping the white man down.'" Consequently, joining with the British, he believed, might well array the world from Dakar to the Philippines against the United States.¹²

In order to be prepared to implement their recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the JSPC to undertake further studies on the following: the implications of the Suez situation to the United States from the military point of view; the extent and nature of measures required to support British, or British and French, military action without committing US forces; the forces required if the United States participated directly in combined military action; and the forces needed if the United States was required to take unilateral military action to protect its nationals.¹³

The Deputy Secretary of Defense forwarded the JCS memorandum of 31 July to the National Security Council on 2 August. In a covering memorandum the Deputy Secretary concurred fully with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the gravity of the situation. He believed that the points raised by them merited the most careful consideration of the NSC but that all feasible political and economic measures should be tried before resorting to military force.¹⁴

The next day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense that elaborated their views. At the initiative of Admiral Burke, the Joint Chiefs of Staff enumerated the ways in which they believed Nasser's action in nationalizing the canal company jeopardized US military, political, and economic interests throughout the world. Nasser could now become so strong a spokesman for Arab nationalism that he would be able to unite the entire Arab world. In this position of leadership he could exert an influence inimical to US interests in all Moslem countries and in neutralist and under-developed countries throughout the world and would be in an improved position to play off the West against the USSR. In addition, other countries would be encouraged by Nasser's example to expropriate US and Western enterprises such as the pipelines through Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan and the oil fields and refineries in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf and Trucial Coast states. The decrease in Western prestige resulting from these developments could lead to the loss of US bases in the Middle East and North Africa and ultimately in other areas such as Iceland, the Philippine Republic, Spain and the Azores. On 7 August 1956, the Secretary of Defense forwarded a copy of the JCS memorandum to the National Security Council.¹⁵

When the NSC met on 9 August, Admiral Radford supported the JCS position and said that Nasser was "trying to be another Hitler." But no commitment to a particular policy emerged from these deliberations. Rather, the President directed the Departments of State and Defense to study jointly all possible contingencies that might arise from the present crisis in Egypt, US courses of action under each contingency, and the military and diplomatic implications of each such course.¹⁶ To meet this requirement the Departments of State and Defense established a joint Middle East Policy Planning Group (MEPPG). Lieutenant General Alonzo P. Fox, Military Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), was named Defense Department representative.¹⁷

The MEPPG had in hand the two memorandums the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already submitted, and it subsequently received copies of the studies resulting from the JCS instructions of 31 July. The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded these papers through Secretary Wilson in installments during August. The first was an interim appraisal of the problem. It set out the JCS position that control of the Suez Canal by a hostile power would be militarily unacceptable because of the danger that the canal might be closed to shipments of oil and other raw materials and because of the loss of Western prestige, influence, and vital bases and oil facilities that would result if Nasser emerged as the apparent victor in a contest with the West. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that, to forestall these unfavorable consequences, the United States could support British and French military actions by such measures short of committing US forces as giving public endorsement to the British and French operation, supplying economic aid, providing military supplies and equipment, and cutting off economic aid to Egypt and freezing Egyptian assets. In the event that the United States participated in military action, forces might be about as follows, assuming no intervention by third parties: Army—one reinforced division; Navy—one fast carrier task force and one amphibious task group including a Marine RCT; and Air Force—one air division headquarters, one fighter-bomber wing, one tactical reconnaissance squadron and necessary airlift.¹⁸

The second installment was a study of various military courses of action open to the United States in the event that political and economic measures failed to place the canal under friendly control. It stated the mission of the United States to be to place the Suez Canal under a friendly and responsible authority and to assure unrestricted passage. The study was based on an assumption that the British and French could seize the canal without direct US participation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also surveyed eight possible courses of action and recommended the following as the most desirable from the military point of view:

Endorse publicly and support politically, economically, and logistically, UK and French military action without direct participation by U.S. forces and guarantee publicly that the United States, in order to localize the conflict, will take appropriate action, including direct military action by U.S. forces as necessary, in the event of significant military intervention by third parties, when such intervention constitutes a threat of expanding the conflict either with respect to the area or the issue involved.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also viewed as acceptable three other actions. Two of these were, in effect, the two major elements of the preferred course, divided and classified separately. They were: (1) to make the specified guarantees against intervention by a third party; (2) to provide the political, economic, and logistic support specified in the preferred course. The third was to participate in military action with the British and French from the outset. Either the preferred course or any one of the three acceptable ones, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed, would result in placing the Suez Canal under a friendly and responsible authority and assure the unrestricted use of the Suez Canal.

The remaining four courses of action in the JCS study were not favored. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that it would be militarily unacceptable, because of the adverse effects on US relations with Britain and France and on NATO, to abstain from providing any form of support to military action by the British and French, or to limit such support to a public endorsement. Should the United Kingdom and France take no military action, it would be intolerable for the United States to do nothing since the canal would remain in hostile hands. Yet unilateral military action by the United States was also listed as unacceptable. While it would assuredly gain control of the canal, this course would probably result in undesirable world-wide reaction, including the weakening of regional defense organizations.¹⁹

As will be recounted more fully, the London Conference of 22 nations had convened in mid-August, and a majority of the countries represented had endorsed a plan for entrusting the operation of the Suez Canal to an international board. The conference had just adjourned when, on 24 August, the State-Defense MEPPG completed its first two contingency papers. Contingency Paper Number One dealt with the situation in the event the Egyptian Government rejected the majority proposal. In that situation the group advised against using force to gain Egyptian acceptance of the majority proposal and recommended continuing negotiations until it became apparent that Egypt was intransigent. At this point negotiations should be terminated and Egypt publicly charged with refusal to give serious consideration to the majority proposal. A new contingency situation would then exist.²⁰

Contingency Paper Number Two dealt with this new situation, in which it was recommended that the Western powers adopt measures, still short of the use of military force, to bring the Government of Egypt to an acceptance of the basic principles of the London Conference majority statement as a basis for negotiating a new arrangement for the Suez Canal. These measures would include imposing punitive economic sanctions on Egypt and cutting off all aid, conducting a diplomatic offensive, and using covert means to keep the Egyptian Government and people apprehensive of Western military action and create doubts as to the extent and effectiveness of Soviet support of the Egyptian position. The arguments listed against a resort to force were: (1) it would weaken NATO by diverting British forces to a commitment of indeterminate duration; (2) it would antagonize most of the nations of the world, many of whom "would condemn the UK and France as aggressors, and the resulting crisis might well destroy the UN"; (3) it would allow the Soviet Union to pose as the champion of peace and the protector of small nations.²¹

By mid-September the MEPPG had completed three further contingency papers. One dealt with possible referral of the Suez question to the UN Security Council, while another surveyed potential Soviet moves in the Middle East. Contingency Paper Number Four treated the following situation: "The UK and France Initiate Military Action Against Egypt Despite US Objections." The State-Defense group concluded, as had the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the optimum course in that event was for the United States to provide political and logistic

support to Britain and France and to pledge US military assistance to counter any third party intervention.²²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not formally review any of these contingency papers, but the Chairman was invited to give his views informally to the Defense representatives on the study group as a preliminary to Department of Defense concurrence. From the limited evidence available it appears probable that Admiral Radford concurred in the last three papers and offered only minor objections to the first two.²³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to this point, had been successful in obtaining acceptance for their views. The President had directed thorough planning for all contingencies, as they had recommended on 31 July. In the resulting plans, the courses of action recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 August were accepted by the MEPPG. But thereafter the JCS influence on policy decisions was negligible. The National Security Council never reviewed any of the contingency plans they had ordered prepared, and, as will become apparent, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles pursued a policy very different from that recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Military Preparations

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, besides making recommendations on some of the larger aspects of the Suez problem, took a number of precautionary actions against the possibility that fighting might break out. These included preparations for the protection or evacuation of US citizens in endangered areas and a forward deployment of naval forces in the Mediterranean.

On 28 July 1956, the Chief of Naval Operations directed CINCNELM to be prepared to "execute Egyptian evacuation plans on short notice." Admiral Burke said he did not expect "concerted (presumably British and French) military action for at least several days, but there is always a possibility with existing tense situation and emotional people that an incident may occur in Egypt which will require prompt action to protect U.S. Nationals." He accordingly ordered the Sixth Fleet placed in readiness to sail to the eastern Mediterranean on 24 hours notice.²⁴

On 15 August CINCNELM received a second directive in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed concern over the consequences should the London Conference, to convene the next day, end in failure. They directed him to do "all practicable to insure optimum readiness to undertake on short notice tasks related to protection of United States interests and evacuation measures from Egypt and other Arab countries in the Middle East." It might be necessary, they said, to commit US ground forces up to one RCT to protect oil fields and installations at Dhahran. CINCNELM directed the Sixth Fleet to cancel scheduled visits to western Mediterranean ports and remain within 48 hours steaming distance of the Egyptian coast.²⁵

At the end of August, after consulting CINCNELM, the Director, Joint Staff, advised Admiral Radford that the responsible commander was prepared to carry

out evacuations from the Arab states on short notice under CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-56. He would also be fully ready to protect the Dhahran oil fields when certain planning then in progress was completed.²⁶

Diplomatic Marathon

The diplomats, meanwhile, were busy attempting to negotiate a peaceful solution. During the period 16-23 August, the international conference agreed to by Britain and France at the urging of Secretary Dulles met in London and attempted unsuccessfully to work out an international system of control over the Suez Canal. Egypt refused to participate, and the 22 nations that accepted the conference invitation failed to agree on a single plan for international control over the canal. Instead, the conference produced two plans: a majority proposal introduced by the United States and supported by 18 Western-oriented nations, and a minority plan originated by India and supported by the Soviet Union, Indonesia, and Ceylon. The majority plan proposed to take the operation of the canal out of the hands of Egypt and entrust it to an internationally responsible Suez Canal board consisting of Egypt and other states chosen in a manner agreed to by the parties to the Convention of 1888. The Indian plan would leave Egypt in control of the canal and establish a purely advisory body of user interests.²⁷

To present its proposal to the Egyptian Government, the London Conference majority appointed a five-member committee headed by Australian Prime Minister R.G. Menzies and including Loy W. Henderson as US representative. The committee began discussions with the Egyptians on 3 September but abandoned its efforts a week later in the face of Nasser's adamant refusal to accept the majority proposal, which he termed an infringement of Egyptian sovereignty.²⁸

With Nasser's rejection of the London Conference majority proposal, the initial effort by the United States to achieve a negotiated solution of the Suez Crisis had failed. The question now was what to do next. One course would have been to resort to some form of military action. President Eisenhower decided against such measures at that time on the ground that all peaceful approaches to a solution had not yet been explored. A few days earlier he had expressed this thought to Prime Minister Eden, cautioning particularly against any Anglo-French military expedition against Egypt under current circumstances. In reviewing the unfavorable consequences that might follow, the President foresaw that "it might cause a serious misunderstanding between our two countries because I must say frankly that there is as yet no public opinion in this country... to support such a move." But he closed by assuring the Prime Minister that "we are not blind to the fact that eventually there may be no escape from the use of force." At his press conference on 11 September the President did not rule out some form of US support for military action by Britain and France if, "after all peaceful means are exhausted, there is some kind of aggression on the part of Egypt against a peaceful use of the Canal."²⁹

Another possible course of action would be to impose sanctions against Egypt, as proposed by the State-Defense study group. This measure was not taken. In fact, no program of economic sanctions was even placed before President Eisenhower at this time.³⁰

The President chose instead to make further efforts toward a political solution. To this end he accepted a proposal that Secretary Dulles now advanced for a Suez Canal users' association, a voluntary association of nations whose ships used the canal. It would employ pilots, collect tolls, compensate Egypt for facilities provided, and in general undertake responsibility for coordination of traffic through the canal.³¹

President Nasser, on 15 September, refused to deal with the proposed users' association, stating it was merely a device to rob Egypt of control of the canal and of her rightful revenues. The 18 nations that had endorsed the London Conference majority plan nevertheless agreed to attend a second conference to discuss a users' association. Meeting in London from 19–21 September, their representatives were able to agree only on a broad declaration of purposes and organizational principles that did not provide for piloting of vessels through the canal or require payment of dues to the association.³² A third conference in London actually set up a users' association effective 1 October, with a membership of 15 nations but without any provision for enforcing its decisions. In this form the users' association was hardly designed to remove the Suez Canal from Nasser's control. Consequently to the British and French it seemed of little worth.

Meantime, on 14 September, British pilots quit their jobs at the canal. But, within a few days, Egyptian pilots brought through 254 ships without mishap. As President Eisenhower wrote afterwards, "The assumption upon which the Users' Association was largely based proved groundless." Egyptian performance made "any thought of using force . . . almost ridiculous." The British, he believed, should now accept Nasser's offer of compensation for their 44 percent interest in the Suez Canal Company.³³

The British and French were becoming convinced that the United States did not accept their view of the seriousness of the dispute. Where London and Paris looked upon the seizure of the canal company as a breach of international obligation and a direct threat to the security of the free world, Washington seemed to them to be too ready to treat the matter as a conflict between colonial and anti-colonial interests. It was possible to read a confirmation of this opinion in a press conference statement in which Secretary Dulles had defined the US position on the colonial question as one of aiding the process of decolonization without siding entirely with either the colonies or the colonizing powers.

The deflation of a users' association left an appeal to the UN Security Council as virtually the only remaining hope for a peaceful solution. In their approach to the Security Council, the Western powers displayed the distrust and divergence of purpose that had been building up since Nasser nationalized the canal. The British and French took the issue to the Security Council without first consulting the United States; the United States refused initially to support their proposal, presented to the Council on 5 October, that the Security Council endorse the London Conference majority plan and call on Egypt to negotiate a system of opera-

tion on that basis. Egypt, backed by the Soviet Union, denounced this plan and offered to establish a system of cooperation between the Egyptian Government and the canal users. The United States, on 9 October, took a middle position, endorsing the Anglo-French resolution but announcing at the same time that only the provision to insulate the Suez Canal from the politics of any nation was really vital. By announcing this reservation, the United States seemed to have abandoned the principle of international control of the canal. In ensuing private meetings in the office of the UN Secretary-General, the Egyptians agreed to six broad principles as the basis for a settlement, including the insulation principle but omitting any provision for effective international control. The British and French accepted the six principles but insisted on adding their proposal for endorsement by the Council of the London Conference majority plan. On 13 October, the Security Council took up an Anglo-French resolution to that effect and approved unanimously the first part containing the six principles; the second part containing endorsement of the London Conference plan was rejected as the result of a Soviet veto.

Britain, France, and Israel Resort to Force

By this time, three nations secretly had worked out a joint plan to invade Egypt. The British and French Governments wanted to topple Nasser—the British largely because he might threaten their use of the Suez Canal, the French mainly because he was funneling arms to insurgents in North Africa. The Israelis, worried about an influx of Soviet bloc arms into an actively hostile Egypt, saw an opportunity to reduce the danger of Egyptian attack by obtaining better borders while they still enjoyed military superiority over their neighbors. Early in September, the French approached Israeli officials, who became willing collaborators. During mid-October, these three governments put into final form an elaborate scenario for attacking Egypt.³⁴

By 28 October, the United States was aware that something was up. Not only had its normal contacts with London and Paris virtually ceased, but there was evidence of large-scale Israeli mobilization. The Intelligence Advisory Committee, after examining the latest evidence, concluded that Israel had mobilized sufficient forces to occupy Jordan west of the Jordan River, invade Syria as far as Damascus, and penetrate Egypt as far as the Suez Canal and hold parts of Sinai for a lengthy period. In view of the existing British-Jordanian defense treaty and the provocative Egyptian actions, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concluded that Israel would attack Egypt, rather than Jordan, in the very near future. The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded this intelligence report to all commanders of unified and specified commands late on 28 October.³⁵

The following day at about 0900 Washington time the anticipated attack came when Israeli forces drove across the Egyptian border. In an official communique, the Israeli Government indicated its forces had attacked *Fedayeen* bases in the Kuntilla and Ras el Naqueb areas and had taken up positions about 60 miles

inside Egypt and toward the Suez Canal. At about 1500, this communication was received in Washington by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other government agencies from the AP Wire Service.³⁶

Shortly thereafter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met and decided on a number of actions, some of which required the approval of higher authority. They determined to order the deployment of the Sixth Fleet Carrier Strike Force to positions east and southeast of Cyprus and within six hours sailing distance of that island, to reinforce the Sixth Fleet with one ASW hunter-killer group then at Rotterdam, and to direct CINCNELM to establish his command headquarters in USS POCONO in the eastern Mediterranean. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also intended to alert one Army RCT, one Marine BLT, and one Air Force C-124 Wing in the Continental United States, and one Army RCT in Europe, for possible movement to the Middle East. Further, they agreed to dispatch a message to all unified and specified command headquarters describing the situation in the Middle East and US military actions being taken.³⁷

Action by the United Nations

President Eisenhower, who had been campaigning in the South, returned to Washington at 1900 and immediately went into conference with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, CIA Director Allen Dulles, Secretary of Defense Wilson, and Admiral Radford. In Admiral Radford's opinion, Israeli forces would reach the Suez Canal within three days, and that would end the whole affair. Secretary Dulles, however, argued that the situation was extremely serious. The canal and the pipelines carrying oil from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean were likely to be disrupted, in which case the French and the British could be expected to intervene. In fact, they appeared to be ready to do so and might even have concerted their action with the Israelis. The President said, and Admiral Radford agreed, that the US Government would have to oppose Anglo-French intervention as a matter of principle. The consensus, however, was that action must be taken fast to put out the fire before it could spread, and also that the United States must redeem its pledge, given in the tripartite declaration of 1950, to support the victim of aggression. The President, therefore, authorized release of a statement that the United States would honor its pledge under the declaration and intended to take the situation to the UN Security Council in the morning.³⁸

Accordingly, the United States requested a meeting of the UN Security Council and drafted a resolution calling on Israel to withdraw its armed forces from Egypt and enjoining all UN members to refrain from the improper use or threat of force and to deny assistance to Israel. The British and French, when consulted about the resolution, did not offer to support it and asked for a delay in starting proceedings in the Security Council. In line with its conclusion that speed was essential in halting the Israeli aggression, the United States disregarded the wishes of its major allies and pushed ahead with action in the United Nations. On the morning of 30 October, US Delegate Henry Cabot Lodge announced to

the Security Council the intention of his government to introduce the resolution calling for Israel to withdraw. Before the resolution was formally submitted, the British and French Governments changed the situation radically by delivering ultimatums to Egypt and Israel to cease military operations and withdraw 10 miles from the Suez Canal and to permit Anglo-French forces to occupy key positions at Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez. Failure to comply would lead to intervention by French and British forces in whatever strength was necessary to secure compliance. The United States, however, made no adjustments in its policy and introduced its resolution without change. This resolution gained seven affirmative votes, including that of the Soviet Union, but was vetoed by the United Kingdom and France.³⁹

In an effort to dissuade the British and French from carrying out their ultimatum, President Eisenhower sent a personal message to Prime Minister Eden and Premier Guy Mollet urging them to refrain from military action and permit the United Nations to secure a peaceful solution, but the plea was to no avail.⁴⁰ On 31 October, British and French aircraft began attacks on targets in Egypt.

In the eastern Mediterranean, meanwhile, US forces had been engaged in evacuating Americans from Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Syria. The operations began on 29 October when CINCNELM, acting on the request of the Rome Liaison Group, directed the Commander of the Sixth Fleet to execute his OPLAN 100-56.⁴¹ By 3 November, when evacuation operations were completed, Navy ships and Air Force transport aircraft under operational control of the Commander, Sixth Fleet, had evacuated 2,086 persons.⁴²

The US efforts to forestall an Anglo-French attack on Egypt, pursued since the Israeli attack on 29 October, had ended in failure. To consider what to do now, President Eisenhower met with the National Security Council on the morning of 1 November. Admiral Radford gave a briefing on the military situation. Secretary of State Dulles, after reviewing the events of recent weeks, advocated continuation of the policy of seeking a cessation of hostilities and a return to the status quo ante through action in the United Nations. As a means to this end, he proposed action by the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace procedure, a course that won the approval of President Eisenhower. This decision was a trying one for President Eisenhower and his advisers, since it had to be made on a day when there were reports that the Hungarian revolutionaries appeared to be succeeding in their defiance of communist rule. "It is nothing less than tragic," Secretary Dulles remarked in recommending action in the UN Assembly against France and Britain, "that at this very time, when we are on the point of winning an immense and long-hoped for victory over Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe, we should be forced to choose between following in the footsteps of Anglo-French colonialism in Asia and Africa, or splitting our course away from their course."⁴³

That evening Secretary Dulles offered a resolution in the General Assembly calling for an immediate withdrawal of all forces behind the 1949 armistice lines, the cessation of hostilities, and a halt to all movements of forces into the area. Early on 2 November the resolution was passed 64 to 5, with 6 abstentions. Voting against it were the United Kingdom, France, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand. On 4 November the General Assembly passed a Canadian resolution

calling for creation of a United Nations Emergency Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.⁴⁴

The Egyptian Government, on 4 November, announced its acceptance of the UN resolutions for a cease-fire and establishment of a UN Emergency Force.⁴⁵ The Israeli Government, however made no immediate reply. Israeli forces continued to drive into Egyptian territory and, by the end of 4 November, had occupied nearly all of the Sinai Peninsula, all the Gaza Strip, and two islands in the Gulf of Aquaba used by Egypt to blockade the Israeli port of Elath. The British and French invasion force from Cyprus, meanwhile, steamed toward the Egyptian coast. On 5 November, British and French paratroopers dropped on Port Said.

A Threat of Soviet Intervention

The Suez crisis took an ominous turn the following day, when Premier Nikolai Bulganin of the USSR sent a letter to President Eisenhower suggesting combined US-Soviet military operations in support of Egypt, the victim of aggression, in order to end that aggression and thereby avoid the danger of a third world war. Bulganin also sent messages to the Governments of Israel, France, and the United Kingdom announcing the Soviet determination to "apply force in order to crush the aggressors and to restore peace in the Middle East by using force." The next day, the Soviets began to sponsor the enlistment of volunteers.⁴⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had long been aware of the danger of Soviet military interference in the Suez crisis. In their paper of 23 August, they had recommended a specific course of action to deal with it. They had favored public announcement of a guarantee that "the United States, in order to localize the conflict, will take appropriate action, including direct military action by U.S. forces as necessary in the event of significant military intervention by third parties, when such intervention constitutes a threat of expanding the conflict."⁴⁷

After the fighting started, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 2 November, directed the JMEPC and JSPC to study possible actions that might be taken by the USSR to influence the Middle East situation.⁴⁸ In a report submitted the following day the JMEPC described the Soviet purpose in the Middle East as being to prolong and expand the conflict in order to advance its long-range objective of eliminating Western influence from the area and achieving ultimate domination by subverting individual governments and making them Soviet puppets. As a means to this end, the USSR was capable of direct military intervention in the Middle East and indirect military intervention by means of volunteers. However, neither regular Soviet forces nor volunteers could arrive in the area in time to affect the outcome of the current hostilities. Introduction of regular forces, moreover, would incur for the Soviets unacceptable risks of general war. The JMEPC concluded, therefore, that it was unlikely the Soviets would take any military action that would significantly affect developments in the current Middle East crisis.⁴⁹ The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), however, after reviewing the JMEPC study, concluded on 6 November that Soviet air forces could be quickly and effectively

employed in the Middle East, and the Soviet Union would probably undertake limited indirect military intervention by means of volunteer air crews and aircraft.⁵⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff never resolved these differing interpretations of Soviet capabilities and intentions. They merely referred both staff papers on 6 November to the JMEPC with instructions to undertake a continuing estimate of Soviet capabilities and possible courses of action in the Middle East.⁵¹

Concurrently, a Special National Intelligence Estimate stated that the USSR evidently wished to avoid general war. The Soviets, according to the Estimate, would not use nuclear-armed guided missiles in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict and probably would not employ their forces on a large scale in the eastern Mediterranean. They might, however, make small-scale air or submarine attacks against Anglo-French forces in that area.⁵²

The Soviet threats and actions of 5 and 6 November did, however, indicate the need to place US military forces in an improved state of readiness. On the morning of 6 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to recommend the following list of nine specific readiness measures to the President: recall all military personnel from regular leave; improve the readiness of the Continental Air Defense Command by increasing the number of interceptor aircraft on advanced state of alert and five-minute alert; improve the readiness of SAC by deploying tanker squadrons to US bases and to Alaska, Goose Bay, Thule, and Harmon; and prepare to reinforce the Sixth Fleet by sailing the carriers *Forrestal* and *Franklin D. Roosevelt*, a cruiser, and the three destroyer divisions toward the Azores. Other measures included: improve the readiness of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets by augmenting picket ships on the DEW Line extensions and sending all anti-submarine warfare units to sea; deploy submarines to reconnaissance stations; reinforce the Seventh Fleet in the Far East with two CVAs, one CA, and one destroyer squadron, and prepare other fleet units to sail; improve the readiness of the Tactical Air Command by alerting all heavy troop carrier wings in the Zone of Interior and suspending all training and routine operations; improve US military readiness in the Persian Gulf area by sailing a Marine BLT, accompanied by two CVAs, one cruiser, and one destroyer squadron from Yokusuka to the Persian Gulf; send a general warning message to all US commands; and obtain authority to station an air task force from Europe at Adana, Turkey.⁵³

Shortly after noon, President Eisenhower met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretary of State Hoover, and other high officials at the White House. Admiral Radford presented the list of measures recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President approved all the alert and deployment moves except the alerting of SAC, though he rejected the recall of personnel from leave. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then directed that the specific alert and deployment actions be carried out, and they informed the commanders of all unified and specified commands of the measures being taken.⁵⁴

The Crisis Defused

The danger of immediate Soviet intervention receded somewhat on 6 November when Israel, the United Kingdom, and France agreed to a cease-fire as proposed by the UN General Assembly in its resolution of 2 November. Prime Minister Eden made the crucial decision to halt, and there can be no doubt that pressure from Washington played a major part in the decision. A heavy run on the pound sterling had occurred, fuelled by rumors of US economic sanctions. The cease-fire became effective at midnight on 6 November. By this time, French and British troops had seized the canal as far south as El Cap, a distance of about 20 miles from the northern terminus at Port Said. But they had been unable to prevent Egyptians from carrying out a carefully planned blockage of the canal. Prepositioned ships were sunk at strategic locations, so completely blocking the waterway that it remained closed to navigation until the following April.

The Assembly resolution of 2 November had called for withdrawal of the invading forces from Egypt as well as a cease-fire. The British, French, and Israelis were reluctant to withdraw, however, until they had wrung the maximum practical advantages from their occupation of Egyptian territory. Rapid introduction of the prospective UN Emergency Force became desirable as a means to speed the departure of the invading forces.

Even before the UN General Assembly decided to organize an Emergency Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had anticipated a requirement for US forces to transport UN troops to Egypt. On 5 November, they agreed that the Chief of Staff, Air Force, should be prepared to provide airlift for four of five battalions in the event that the United Nations established an international force in the Suez area.⁵⁵ On 9 November Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Gordon Gray informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States had offered assistance in transporting and supplying the UN Emergency Force. He authorized them to direct appropriate commanders to make available the initial air and sealift to move advance elements of the force to Egypt, and to direct the Chief of Staff, Air Force, to coordinate the initial movements and to maintain direct liaison with the US delegation of the United Nations. Assistant Secretary Gray also requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend a military department to serve as executive agent for assistance provided to the United Nations after the movement of the advance elements.⁵⁶ The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied the same day, informing the Secretary of Defense that the Chief of Staff, Air Force, had been appropriately directed and also recommending the Department of the Navy as executive agent. On 12 November, the Secretary of Defense approved this recommendation.⁵⁷

The United Nations, meanwhile, was busy organizing the Emergency Force, which eventually came to number about 6,000 men, made up of contingents from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, Finland, Colombia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia under the command of Canadian Lieutenant General E.L.M. Burns. To make good on the US offer to help support the force, the Secretary of Defense, on 23 November, directed the Secretary of the Air Force to honor a UN request to lift the Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, Finnish, Colombian, and Indian contingents to Naples. Meantime, the advance parties had already begun arriv-

ing in Naples where they transferred to Swissair planes for movement to Egypt. The first Emergency Force units arrived at Abu Suweir, Egypt, on 15 November. To fulfill the offer of logistic assistance, CINCNELM negotiated an agreement with the UN authorities under which supplies were furnished the Emergency Force through the US Navy Support Activity Command in Naples.⁵⁸

The introduction of the UN Emergency Force did not, however, lead to a speedy withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from Egypt. The three powers still attempted to gain such advantage as they could from their adventure, with the result that there were protracted negotiations before they finally began force withdrawals. This situation was aggravated by the Soviet Union, which had announced on 10 November that, if Britain, France, and Israel did not withdraw their forces in compliance with UN decisions, Soviet authorities would not "hinder the departure of Soviet citizen volunteers who wish to take part in the struggle of the Egyptian people for their independence."⁵⁹ In response, the United States protested strongly in the United Nations. Addressing the General Assembly on 16 November, Acting Secretary of State Hoover said that the United States would fully support action by the United Nations in resisting introduction of external forces into the Suez area.

The United States also took an additional military preparedness measure at this time. On 14 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a decision cleared with the Secretary of Defense, directed the Chief of Staff, Air Force, to place SAC in a state of increased readiness and to deploy tanker aircraft to Labrador, Newfoundland, and Greenland.⁶⁰

Under intensive pressure from all sides, the British and French Governments announced on 3 December that they would withdraw their forces from Egypt without delay. Soon thereafter it was announced in Moscow that the departure of Soviet volunteers for Egypt was no longer in prospect.⁶¹

In view of this relaxation of tensions in the Middle East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff now gradually returned US armed forces to normal status. On 7 December, TAC and SAC reverted to normal conditions of readiness; on 13 December, CINCNELM returned his flag to London and the Sixth Fleet resumed normal operations; on 21 December, the alert status of the RCT in Europe was cancelled. The situation remained volatile. Admiral Radford told a State Department official that he was desperately concerned that the Middle East situation was going "to bog down and disintegrate and that if it did so, the military had to be in a position to act if hostilities spread." President Nasser, he worried, would "start to do all kinds of things after the British and French withdrawal when there were no longer any strings on him."⁶²

Many months were to pass before the settlement of the Middle East war was completed, but the conflict had passed the crisis stage once Britain, France, and Israel agreed to withdraw their troops from Egyptian territory. But even though the immediate crisis was resolved, the power relationships in the area were drastically altered. Great Britain, a dominant power there since the end of World War I, now found its influence reduced to insignificance. Within a few months Jordan, a state created by the British after World War I, abrogated its treaty with Great

Britain and entered into agreements with Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia to replace the British subsidies lost as a result. A power vacuum developed in the Middle East, and the Soviet Union, which had already gained a foothold by supplying arms and moral support to Egypt, was eager to fill it.

For the United States, the Suez crisis had posed difficult questions of how best to secure its vital interests. Should the United States support its major allies, Britain and France, in their attempt to maintain control by force of arms? Or should it seek the favor of the Arab states and oppose the colonialist imperialism of Britain and France? For a number of reasons President Eisenhower chose the latter course, and at his direction the United States had actually taken the lead in gaining passage of a resolution in the UN General Assembly calling on the aggressors to withdraw their force from Egyptian territory.

During the period before the Israeli drive into Egypt began, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken the opposite view on military grounds. They had advocated giving logistical, political, and economic support to Britain and France, basing their recommendation on the belief that Nasser, if unchecked, would unite the Arab world and use his newfound power to threaten vital oil supplies and military bases of the United States and its allies. Though the established procedures for policy determination centered around the NSC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been given an opportunity shortly after Nasser nationalized the canal to express their views through the Secretary of Defense and before the NSC. Again, in keeping with established procedures, the NSC directed further study by a State-Defense committee, which reached the same conclusion as the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

But the established policymaking procedures, employed immediately after the Egyptian seizure of the canal, were abandoned as the crisis intensified. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were no longer called upon to express formal views. Instead, Secretary of State Dulles launched a series of diplomatic moves, initiated by himself and approved by President Eisenhower. The ultimate decision to condemn Britain, France, and Israel as aggressors was debated by the NSC. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, though not formally consulted, were represented at the critical meetings by Admiral Radford. In any event, the final resolution of the Suez crisis, resulting as it had in the liquidation of British power in the Middle East and in an increase in the influence of the Soviet Union in the area, posed new problems for the makers of US foreign policy in the years ahead.

Containment in the Far East: Taiwan and the Offshore Islands

At the beginning of 1955 a revised statement of US policy toward the Far East, NSC 5429/5, had just been approved. The containment of Communist China continued as its central theme. "The primary problem of U.S. policy in the Far East is to cope with the serious threat to U.S. security interests which has resulted from the spread of hostile communist power on the continent of Asia over all of Mainland China, North Korea, and . . . the northern part of Vietnam." NSC 5429/5 defined the US objective in Asia as being to preserve the territorial and political integrity of the noncommunist countries in the area against further communist expansion or subversion, while taking measures to strengthen these countries economically, politically, and militarily. At the same time, the United States would seek to reduce Chinese communist power and prestige and to disrupt the Sino-Soviet alliance.

The Unique Problem of Taiwan and the Offshore Islands

The countries and territories to be preserved from communism included South Korea, Japan and the Ryukyus, Taiwan (Formosa) and the Pescadores, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, and the portions of Southeast Asia covered by the SEATO treaty. Of these areas, Taiwan and the Pescadores were most directly threatened by communist aggression in 1955 and 1956.¹

Of all the Asian land areas described in NSC 5429/5 as having strategic importance to the United States, Taiwan was unique in that it had special value also to Communist China. To the United States, Taiwan was a major link in the island security chain on the approaches to the Asian mainland. It was also of special political importance as the seat of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government, whose existence kept alive the claims and entitlement of a noncommunist China. To Mao Tse-tung, the continuation of Chiang's rival government on Taiwan was a potential source of military and political danger and an embodiment

of the fact that the communist revolution was still incomplete since it had not yet brought all Chinese territories under its control. The public expressions of the communist rulers of mainland China allowed no doubt that seizure of Taiwan and elimination of the Nationalist Government were among their foremost objectives.

Complicating the formulation and exercise of US policy toward Taiwan were considerations arising from the existence of the offshore islands, the small Nationalist-held positions scattered along, and in very close proximity to, the coast of mainland China. From north to south, these islands and island groups were the Yushans, Ichiang, the Tachens, Penshan, Nanchi, the Matsus, Haitan, and the Quemoy. Of scant military value in themselves and difficult to defend against a determined attack, these islands were highly valued by Chiang Kai-shek for political and psychological reasons, and they served as bases for guerilla raids against the mainland and as sites for radar stations.

With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 the United States had declared unilaterally its intention to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores against attacks from the mainland, but it had not extended this guarantee to cover the offshore islands. The possibility of expanding the US defense commitment came under debate in Washington during 1954 as a result of the communist shelling of Quemoy that began on 3 September. In these discussions the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted divergent views, since the Army Chief of Staff, General Ridgway, dissented from the recommendation of his colleagues that US forces be employed in the defense of the offshore islands.

The course that ultimately won President Eisenhower's approval was proposed by Secretary Dulles, who suggested that the offshore islands be neutralized under the United Nations. To gain Chiang Kai-shek's assent, the United States should enter into a mutual defense pact with Nationalist China that would supersede the previous unilateral US declaration. By the beginning of 1955 the two nations had signed a defensive treaty, which still awaited consent by the Senate, and the United States had readied a proposal for the neutralization of the offshore islands, to be introduced in the United Nations by New Zealand at an appropriate time.

NSC 5429/5 had been written with the purpose of bringing national policy into consonance with these developments. As approved by the President in December 1954, it set forth the following tasks and intentions:

Ratify the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China covering Formosa and the Pescadores, and jointly agree upon appropriate safeguards against Chinese Nationalist offensive action. Pending the ratification of such a Treaty, continue the existing unilateral arrangement to defend Formosa and the Pescadores (excluding the Nationalist held off-shore islands). For the present, seek to preserve, through United Nations action, the status quo of the Nationalist-held off-shore islands; and, without committing U.S. forces except as militarily desirable in the event of Chinese Communist attack on Formosa and the Pescadores, provide to the Chinese Nationalist forces military equipment and training to assist them to defend such off-shore islands, using Formosa as a base. However, refrain from assisting or encouraging offensive actions against Communist China, and restrain the Chinese Nationalists from such actions, except in response to Chinese Communist provocation judged adequate in each case by the President.²

One section of the paper had been in a deferred status at the time of its adoption. The question of the defensive measures US forces might take if subjected to unprovoked communist attack in the Taiwan area had become a matter of contention between the Departments of State and Defense during consideration of the original draft of NSC 5429/5. The Department of State had objected to authorizing US commanders to take punitive action in case of attack. The proper course, its representatives believed, was to authorize protective action, to occur outside communist territory. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand, had endorsed the stronger wording in the original Planning Board version. Agreement was finally reached by the two departments, and on 5 January 1955 the NSC adopted a statement that the United States would:

(1) Issue a directive to its armed forces that, in the event of unprovoked Communist armed attack against U.S. military or non-military personnel, aircraft, or vessels outside Communist territory, U.S. forces in the area will take against the Communist attacking force during the course of the attack immediate and aggressive protective measures, including if necessary and feasible hot pursuit of the Communist attacking force into hostile airspace or waters.

(2) In addition . . . , and as constitutionally authorized and specifically approved by the President, take such additional punitive action as may be necessary and appropriate.³

Communist Attack of the Tachens

One aspect of the stated US policy toward Taiwan and the offshore islands was almost immediately brought to the test, and a modification of its terms resulted. On 10 January 1955, Chinese communist aircraft struck the Tachen Islands in force, inflicting heavy damage on Nationalist vessels in the harbor. The Nationalists proposed retaliation in the form of air attacks against communist shipping in Foochow, Amoy, and Swatow harbors and in Sanmen Bay, where the anticipated losses were judged to be unacceptable.⁴

For a time during 1954, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Felix B. Stump, had been empowered to concur in such strikes, provided they could be initiated fast enough to leave no doubt that they were in retaliation for a specific communist attack and had, in his judgment, a reasonable chance of success. By approving NSC 5429/5, however, President Eisenhower had reserved to himself the power to sanction retaliatory strikes by the Chinese Nationalists.⁵

Concerned because the time required to obtain in each instance a Presidential judgment on the adequacy of Chinese communist provocation would prove to be a bar to timely Nationalist reaction, Admiral Carney addressed a memorandum on 11 January to Mr. Robert Cutler, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. He requested guidance on "how the current policy affecting ChiNat retaliatory action is to be applied." The Chief of Naval Operations at the same time proposed to his JCS colleagues that they recommend an amendment to NSC 5429/5 eliminating the need for presidential authorization for each

Nationalist retaliation and returning to the policy that had been in effect in 1954. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted Admiral Carney's proposal and so recommended to Secretary Wilson on 12 January.⁶

Mr. Cutler, meanwhile, had discussed the matter with President Eisenhower. According to Cutler, the President "was inclined to feel that perhaps CINCPAC should be authorized to permit retaliation in the case of any ChiCom attack on ChiNat-held offshore islands deemed by CINCPAC to be significant, and to meet criteria established by CINCPAC for feasibility and likelihood of success."⁷

On 13 January the NSC adopted an amendment to NSC 5429/5. While it did not eliminate the need for presidential approval of Chinese Nationalist offensive actions against the mainland, the new wording permitted agreement at a lower level to Nationalist actions that were prompt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Communist attack. To be acceptable, the retaliatory actions would have to be "against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Chinese Communist reaction against Formosa and the Pescadores."⁸

Authority to make the determinations listed in the amended NSC 5429/5 was delegated to CINCPAC on the following day, 14 January. The message, dispatched by Admiral Carney with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also advised CINCPAC that the proposed retaliatory air strikes against communist shipping at Swatow, Amoy, and Foochow were considered to be within the revised NSC policy and therefore an approved type of operations. So much time had elapsed, however, that the operation should not be conducted now but should be held in abeyance until after the next Chinese communist aggression that met the criteria with regard to Nationalist retaliation.⁹

Within a few days, Admiral Stump had an opportunity to exercise his new authority. On 18 January, the Chinese communists assaulted the island of Ichiang, located about eight miles northwest of the Tachens and defended by a force of Nationalist guerrillas. By afternoon the communists had succeeded in putting ashore a reinforced regiment. The Nationalist authorities on Taiwan requested US concurrence in air strikes similar to those proposed in retaliation for the earlier raids. Admiral Stump immediately signaled his approval.¹⁰ Within a few days, however, the communists had gained full control of the island.

Decision to Evacuate the Tachens

The attack on Ichiang set in motion a reappraisal of US policy regarding the offshore islands. As stated in NSC 5429/5, the existing policy was to provide military equipment and training to the Nationalists as assistance toward their defense of the offshore islands, without committing US forces except in the event of Chinese communist attack on Taiwan. At the same time, the United States would seek to preserve, through United Nations action, the status quo of the Nationalist-held offshore islands. With the communists passing from bombing

attacks to an actual assault, doubts were growing in Washington that contributions of training and equipment would be sufficient to prevent a successive conquest of the offshore islands. Although opinions continued to differ regarding the strictly military importance of these positions to the defense of Taiwan, the adverse political and psychological impact that a series of losses would have had to be considered.

"The time had come," President Eisenhower recalled in his memoirs, "to draw the line." On the morning of 19 January the President met with his advisers. Secretary Dulles argued that it was unlikely that any of the offshore islands could be defended successfully without US assistance:

But we all agree that we cannot permit the Communists to seize *all* the offshore islands. Therefore, I believe we must modify our policy: we should assist in the evacuation of the Tachens, but as we do so we should declare that we will assist in holding Quemoy and possibly the Matsus, as long as the Chinese Communists profess their intention to attack Formosa.

The President, after remarking on the serious psychological effects that an abandonment of Quemoy and Matsu would have, ordered a start in implementing this modified policy.¹¹

First steps were taken by Secretary Dulles that afternoon when he asked the British Ambassador and the Nationalist Chinese Foreign Minister, who was in Washington, to relay requests to their governments to support the proposed policy. The next day, Ambassador Sir Roger Makins reported that members of the British cabinet were greatly disturbed by the proposed US guarantee of Quemoy, a measure that they thought would heighten Chinese communist hostility and end any hope of communist cooperation in neutralizing the offshore islands under UN auspices. The British preferred a continued effort to obtain communist acceptance of the independence of Taiwan from the mainland in return for Nationalist abandonment of the offshore islands. Secretary Dulles replied that the US attitude was "solid in maintaining the position necessary to thwart a Communist effort to seize Formosa," but he agreed to consider overnight whether or not the United States could shape its plans to accommodate the British views. The National Security Council, he said, would discuss the matter the next morning.¹²

Taiwan Straits Resolution

Whatever the degree to which the British attitude may have contributed to the outcome, US policy regarding the offshore islands was restated in terms that more definitely contemplated the possibility of US military action in support of the Nationalists, but without any publicly announced commitment to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. The final policy decision was taken by President Eisenhower at the NSC meeting on the morning of 21 January. It called for a presidential request for congressional authority "to use U.S. armed forces if necessary for the purpose of securing Formosa and the Pescadores against armed

attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions now in friendly hands, and the taking of such other measures as the President might judge to be appropriate for the security and defense of Formosa and the Pescadores." The President also called for a reaffirmation of US support for UN action to end hostilities in the Taiwan area. Pending either "evidence of de facto acquiescence by the Chinese Communists in the U.S. position regarding Formosa and the Pescadores or action by the United Nations restoring peace and security in the general area," the United States would use its armed forces as appropriate to assist the Nationalists to evacuate the Tachens and to defend Quemoy and Matsu from Chinese communist attack "so long as such attacks are presumptively . . . a prelude to attack upon Formosa and the Pescadores."¹³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave advice to the President at a meeting later that afternoon, attended also by Secretaries Dulles and Wilson and Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson. Speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Carney opposed evacuation of the Tachens as both unwise and difficult. There were 30,000 troops and civilians on the islands, he pointed out. A ship had been sunk in the harbor entrance, and all equipment would have to be carried out by lighter. To defend the islands, therefore, would be easier than to evacuate them, although the Nationalists could not do so alone. Unswayed by these arguments, President Eisenhower reaffirmed the course of action he had decided to follow.¹⁴

Chiang Kai-shek reluctantly accepted the plan on 23 January, but he protested the proposal to seek a ceasefire in the Taiwan Strait because it would compound the bad effect of evacuating the Tachens and raise doubts whether Nationalist China would ever fight again. Furthermore, he charged that the communists would exploit a ceasefire for their own purposes. For these reasons, Chiang stated his government would oppose UN action as a matter of principle.¹⁵

Once Chiang's reluctant acceptance had been received, President Eisenhower requested authority of the Congress to use the armed forces of the United States if necessary to assure the security of Taiwan and the Pescadores. Actions by US forces, in addition to a defense against direct attack on those main positions, might include: assistance in "redeployment and consolidation" of Nationalist forces scattered throughout the offshore islands; taking of "appropriate military actions" against communist troops obviously concentrating to attack Taiwan; and defense of "closely related localities . . . in situations which are recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries to, an attack against the main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores." Conspicuously absent from the President's request was any specific identification of these "closely associated areas," such as Quemoy.¹⁶

The requested resolution was briefly debated in Congress. Although a few Senators feared that it amounted to a predated declaration of war, the overwhelming majority of both houses hastened to demonstrate that the Congress of the United States backed the President's determination to keep Taiwan and the Pescadores out of communist hands. The House passed the resolution on 25 January by a vote of 409 to 3, and the Senate three days later by 85 to 3. The President affixed his signature on 29 January 1955.¹⁷

The resolution read:

That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by actions of the United Nations, or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.¹⁸

Evacuation of the Tachens

Efforts to obtain the desired state of peace and security through UN action were quickly begun but proved totally unproductive. On 28 January, Sir Leslie Monro, New Zealand's representative, requested a Security Council meeting to consider the situation "in the area of certain islands off the coast of mainland China . . . , the continuation of which is likely to endanger international peace and security." He also offered a resolution requesting Communist China to send a representative to join in the discussions.

The prospects for effective action by the United Nations quickly dimmed when the Soviet Union countered with a resolution condemning "acts of aggression by the United States of America against the People's Republic of China." On 31 January the Security Council approved the New Zealand resolution, but the contemptuous refusal of Chou En-lai to accept the invitation to appear effectively ended the Security Council's attempts to obtain a cease-fire.¹⁹

Preparations for evacuation of the Tachens, meanwhile, were well under way. Vice Admiral Alfred M. Pride, Commander, Seventh Fleet, arrived on Taiwan on 23 January and reported the next day that all was in readiness to cover the evacuation of noncombatants and supplies. The beginning of operations was delayed, however, pending completion of the overall operation plan and its acceptance by the President.

The plan was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 January and approved by them five days later without change. Since serious consequences might result from a clash between US and communist forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested specific approval from Secretary Wilson for one portion of the plan. It called for attack by US forces on the source or base of any communist attacking force if such action was deemed essential to the success of the Tachen evacuation operation.²⁰

The next day, Admiral Radford discussed the operation plan with President Eisenhower, who insisted upon a change in the sensitive passage on defensive action. As Admiral Radford understood the President's objection and transmitted it to CINCPAC on 29 January, the authority to strike at the bases of attacking

forces would apply only if such action were "necessary to the safety of own forces engaged in the operation," rather than the original language, "if indicated as essential to success."²¹

The President's memorandum of the agreement, received later the same day, specified that there would be no attack on the Chinese mainland in response to an initial sortie by the communists. A reaction would take place only if they persisted in their attacks. Fearing the consequences of an initial attack in such strength as to jeopardize the US forces, Admiral Radford reopened the matter with the President on 31 January and secured his approval to the instructions that had been dispatched to CINCPAC two days earlier.²²

Meanwhile, an impressive US naval armada had been gathering in Taiwan waters. By the beginning of February, Task Force 77, consisting of five attack carriers, three cruisers, and five destroyer divisions, was cruising about 100 miles north of Taiwan. Slightly to the south of this force was a task group consisting of an attack carrier and a destroyer division. At anchor off Okinawa lay Task Force 76, composed of 22 transport, cargo, and landing vessels to be employed as the lift for the evacuation.²³

Also available to CINCPAC as cover for the evacuation were 54 F-86s of the USAF 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing. The actions leading to the stationing of these aircraft on Taiwan had originated as a response to the communist bombardment of Quemoy in September 1954. In order to have airpower available for emergency situations that might result from the communist shelling, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 5 November 1954, had directed the Chief of Staff, Air Force, to designate a fighter-bomber wing of the Far East Air Force for movement to Taiwan on short notice.²⁴

To facilitate deployment, should it become necessary, the Air Force Chief of Staff recommended seeking the approval of the Secretaries of Defense and State to a plan to rotate one squadron at a time to Taiwan for training purposes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the proposal on 4 January 1955 and made the appropriate recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Following receipt of State Department concurrence, the Secretary approved the rotation on 24 January. But in view of the impending Tachen operation, Admiral Radford proposed, and Secretary Wilson accepted, stationing the entire wing on Taiwan as a temporary measure.²⁵

Although the necessary forces were now in place, evacuation of the Tachens was delayed by an attempt by Chiang Kai-shek to induce the United States to make a public declaration that it would defend Quemoy and Matsu. At a White House meeting on 30 January attended by Admiral Radford, Acting Secretary of State Hoover, Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge, and other State Department officials, the President indicated his continuing unwillingness to make a public commitment but he directed that a cordial and reassuring message be sent to Chiang. As subsequently cleared by President Eisenhower and dispatched on 31 January, the message instructed Ambassador Karl L. Rankin to

inform Chiang Kai-shek of the following US position, while firmly enjoining him that it must be kept secret:

Under present circumstances it is the purpose of the President to assist in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu against armed attack if he judges such attack is of a character which shows that it is in fact in aid of and in preparation for an armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores and dangerous to their defense. An attack by the communists at this time on Quemoy or Matsu which seriously threatened their loss would be deemed by the President to be of this character.²⁶

On 4 February 1955 the Government of the Republic of China formally requested US assistance in evacuating the Tachens. Between 7 and 12 February, 14,000 troops, 14,500 civilians, and 4,000 tons of equipment were successfully removed from the Tachens and nearby Tushan and Penshan. During the operation, communist forces refrained from intervening, but within 24 hours after the last US ship had departed, Peking radio announced that the first Red Chinese troops had gone ashore in the Tachens.²⁷

Nanchi Chan Abandoned

The northernmost Nationalist territory was now the island of Nanchi Chan, which lay about 150 miles north of Taiwan and 22 miles from the mainland. In the opinion of US commanders in the Pacific, it had a value as a delaying position, but on 17 February the Chief, MAAG, on Taiwan advised CINCPAC that, unless the United States was willing to give direct support, the Nationalists should not be encouraged to defend Nanchi. It would be better, he said, to withdraw now than at a later date under communist pressure. Admiral Stump, in commenting to Admiral Carney in Washington, conceded that under current policy US forces could not be committed to the defense of Nanchi and therefore the United States should encourage the Nationalist to evacuate. Admiral Stump made no secret of his disesteem for this course: "This will be another Communist victory over the Free World, another retreat on our part, and I strongly feel that some time, some place, we have got to stop retreating and the sooner the better."²⁸

President Eisenhower decided, in effect, that Nanchi was not the place to "stop retreating." Following a briefing by Admiral Radford on 17 February, the NSC discussed the Nanchi situation. All members agreed the United States should not aid in defending the island, even though they recognized the Chinese Nationalists could not defend it alone. The President concluded that the proper course was to leave the decision whether to evacuate or defend to Chiang Kai-shek.

In view of President Eisenhower's decision, the Chief of Naval Operations informed CINCPAC on 21 February: "US forces will not be employed in defense of Nanchi; from a purely military point of view, it is probably desirable for Chi-

Nats to withdraw from Nanchi but this decision is entirely the responsibility of GRC." The Nationalists evacuated their garrison from the island three days later.²⁹

Proposals to Deter Communist Attack

The successful withdrawal of Chiang Kai-shek's troops from untenable positions of limited strategic importance did little to resolve the crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese communists continued their military buildup on the mainland facing Taiwan, while Chiang repeatedly affirmed his determination to hold Quemoy and Matsu.

In devising a policy to meet the evident threat to the offshore islands, the Eisenhower administration faced divided opinion at home. Long-standing advocates of full US support of Chiang Kai-shek, such as Senator William F. Knowland of California, were convinced that any further retreat would amount to a "Far East Munich." They demanded all-out defense of Quemoy and Matsu, even at the risk of general war. Other Senators, however, held that purely US interests did not justify so hazardous a course, so long as Taiwan itself was not menaced.

In a public address on 19 February 1955, Secretary of State Dulles continued the policy of avoiding any announced US commitment to join in defending the offshore islands, while holding open the possibility of a presidential decision to do so if the circumstances dictated. He reviewed the fact that the mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China covered only Taiwan and the Pescadores, but that the congressional resolution had further authorized the President to take such action to secure "related positions and territories" as he judged necessary to fulfill that commitment. Secretary Dulles continued:

The United States has no commitment and no purpose to defend the coastal positions as such. The basic purpose is to assure that Formosa and the Pescadores will not be forcibly taken over by the Chinese Communists.

The more distant islands that the United States had assisted the Nationalists in evacuating were virtually unrelated to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. But Secretary Dulles noted that Chinese communist spokesmen had themselves linked seizure of the remaining offshore islands to their declared intention of conquering Taiwan by force. Accordingly, he doubted that surrender of any of the remaining island positions to the communists would serve either the cause of peace or the cause of freedom.³⁰

Admiral Radford emerged as the most bellicose of President Eisenhower's advisers. For example, he had told the NSC on 27 January that, "for the life of him, he could not understand why, in the event of a general war between the United States and Communist China, all the worst difficulties would not be on the Chinese rather than the US side." The great problem of the Chinese in such a war, he said, was to "get at us if we don't choose to be got." He believed that the Chinese communists would have very little offensive military capability against

the United States which could not be countered with the exercise of comparatively little military power. Consequently, Admiral Radford believed "that Russia and China were bluffing, and that we would succeed in calling their bluff if we proceeded along the lines of the recent decision respecting the defense of Formosa and certain of the offshore islands."³¹

Abroad, major European allies sought means of avoiding an outbreak of hostilities over the offshore islands. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, on 4 March, urged both the Nationalists and communists to renounce force, as a step toward negotiating a settlement. Five days later, he proposed a resolution of the Taiwan issue by mutual concessions—the Nationalists to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu in return for agreement by the communists not to attack Taiwan or the Pescadores. On 31 March, French Premier Edgar Faure urged the great powers to intervene to prevent war over Taiwan and the offshore islands. Such Asian allies as South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and of course Nationalist China, on the other hand, generally supported US moves to engage and reduce Chinese communist power.³²

An immediate concern for the administration in dealings with the European allies was avoidance of any action that might endanger the pending ratification of the Paris agreements providing for the rearmament of West Germany and her admission to NATO. To discuss the offshore islands problem in this context President Eisenhower summoned the Secretary of State, Admiral Radford, Admiral Carney, General Twining, and the Director of Central Intelligence to the White House on 11 March. The President said that while the United States should do everything practicable to help the Nationalists in defending Quemoy and Matsu, he saw a danger that any direct US involvement during the next sensitive weeks would have a highly unfavorable impact on the progress of the Paris agreements toward ratification. The President would prefer to avoid direct US intervention for the present, to limit such intervention as much as possible if it became necessary, and to employ atomic weapons only in extremity, after advising US allies. Admiral Radford assured him that these considerations were well understood at CINCPAC headquarters. Moreover, the consensus of the three JCS members present was that, because the communist preparations were believed to be far from complete, lesser measures of US support to the Nationalists should be sufficient "to defer an effective ChiCom attack during the next two months."³³

Five days later, the National Intelligence Board provided a more alarming view of Chinese communist capabilities. In a National Intelligence Estimate issued on 16 March, it was stated that the communists had amassed a force of approximately 227,000 ground troops, supported by a navy capable of lifting 100,000 men in initial assault on Taiwan and an air force totaling 1,600 aircraft but handicapped by a lack of operational fields within easy range of the island. The intelligence experts rated an attack on Taiwan as unlikely, however, in view of the US commitment to its defense, but they believed the Chinese communists would probably employ their forces against Quemoy and Matsu. They concluded that the enemy had the capability of seizing those islands if defended by the

Nationalists alone. Moreover, "timely warning might not be available that final preparations for an assault on either Matsu or Quemoy had been completed."³⁴

On 26 March, with tensions rising rapidly, Admiral Radford advised Secretaries Dulles and Wilson that "we should tell the Chinese Communists that if they did not cease the build-up [of airfields within range of Taiwan], we would consider the build-up an active preparation for war and would be forced to act accordingly." At this point, Admiral Radford did not believe that the situation could be stabilized in the Far East without hostilities and without the Chinese communists getting "a bloody nose." Concurrently, Admiral Carney told reporters that he expected fighting to start by 15 April, and that the President was considering action to destroy Chinese communist military potential. An angry Chief Executive, who did not believe war was imminent, told his press secretary that statements like Carney's were "a great disservice to the United States."³⁵

Acting on the assumption that the Chinese communists would soon have sufficient military strength in the area to take Quemoy or Matsu unless the United States came to the aid of the Nationalists, the Secretary of Defense asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider as a matter of urgency what measures the United States might take to deter or repulse an attack on the islands. Their recommendations were to include measures to strengthen the Nationalists militarily, deployments of US forces that might serve to deter or defeat an attack, and moves that would assure that the Chinese communists were not misled regarding US intentions.³⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff could not agree on their response to Secretary Wilson. Replying on 27 March, they presented the positions of Admirals Radford and Carney and Generals Twining and Shepherd on the one hand and of General Ridgway on the other. The majority held that "certain simple actions *might* have a deterrent effect" and should be taken before "any more extensive and expensive military moves on our part." The actions were three in number: privately advise Communist China and the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels that the United States would join the Chinese Nationalists in the defense of the offshore islands with all means available; announce publicly that the scheduled reduction in US military forces was suspended indefinitely because of the situation in the Far East; direct the Joint Chiefs of Staff publicly to take all steps necessary to protect Formosa.

General Ridgway was unwilling to endorse the three simple actions proposed by his colleagues. Claiming that none of the offshore islands was vital to the military defense of Taiwan, he maintained that the decision to defend Quemoy and Matsu was essentially political and should therefore be made by the President. If the decision was affirmative, the Army Chief of Staff said, then a public announcement should be made at the earliest practicable date of the intention to use US armed forces in defense of the islands. Concurrently, there should be a public announcement that further reductions of US armed forces would be suspended immediately and indefinitely.

As for additional deployments of US forces that would "help convince the Chinese Communists that the U.S. really means to intervene if the loss of Quemoy or the Matsus is threatened," the JCS majority recommended none, but General Ridgway favored deployment of an additional Army corps of three divisions

to the Far East-Western Pacific area, excluding Formosa. The same deployment of ground forces, he believed, would be of possible immediate value in the event the United States did become involved in war with the Chinese communists. For that contingency the majority recommended only an additional SAC bomber wing in the Western Pacific and minor augmentations of the Seventh Fleet.

These differing recommendations on deployment stemmed from a more fundamental disagreement concerning the use of nuclear weapons. The majority pointed out that all their views were predicated on the assumption that US forces engaged in combat would be authorized to use atomic weapons as necessary against military targets. General Ridgway, on the other hand, advised that the defense of Chinese Nationalist territory could be "executed with, or without, nuclear weapons, though execution with non-atomic weapons would require a much greater force build-up and greater time, and it might be that time would not be available."³⁷

On 26 March, the day before its formal submission, the JCS memorandum in draft form had been discussed by Secretaries Wilson and Dulles, Under Secretary of State Hoover, Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson, and Admiral Radford at a meeting in Mr. Wilson's office. Secretary Dulles favored the second and third points put forward by the JCS majority—public announcements that reductions of forces had been suspended and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been directed to take all steps necessary to defend Taiwan. The Secretary of State doubted that the President would accept the first point, the recommended diplomatic warning to the Chinese communists. In exercising the powers granted him under the congressional resolution, the President would not want to commit himself in advance to a specific course.

Admiral Radford contended that failure to take any action to halt the communist buildup opposite Taiwan would subject the administration to great criticism if hostilities broke out and US forces suffered severe initial losses. Secretary Wilson, however, was of the opinion that substantial moves might have the effect of heating up the situation rather than cooling it off. He wanted serious consideration given to a 60-day moratorium on US actions to see whether the Chinese communists intended to resort to anything more than threats and propaganda. However, he agreed with Secretary Dulles that the second and third points of the JCS majority were worth considering, and after the meeting he asked the Defense Department Comptroller to estimate the cost of freezing force levels at the 1 April level for the remainder of FY 1955 and FY 1956.³⁸

The views of the JCS majority were presented to the National Security Council by Admiral Radford as part of a briefing on the Taiwan situation. They were not, however, identified as such but were put forward as the individual views of the Chairman.

Admiral Radford also sketched in broad outline the military operations the United States could and should undertake in defense of the Quemoy and Matsu island groups against imminent communist attack. Air attacks employing atomic weapons, he said, should be launched against Chinese communist airfields and POL storage sites, including those at Shanghai and Canton. If, in spite of efforts to "limit and confine operations by restricting attacks to the immediate area of

operations and to those military targets that support the Communist attacks," the Chinese communists broadened the scope of hostilities beyond the Taiwan area, the United States would have to take additional military measures, such as expanded air attacks, naval blockade, and offensive mining. Limited operations could be carried out with forces currently available in the Far East plus an additional SAC bomber wing. Broadened operations would require augmentation of forces in the Far East-Western Pacific area, increased personnel ceilings and force levels, and increased production of critical items.³⁹

Robertson-Radford Mission

On 1 April, President Eisenhower conferred with Secretaries Dulles and Wilson, Admiral Radford, and other senior advisers on the Quemoy-Matsu situation. Radford proposed putting 10,000 US military personnel, primarily Air Force, on Taiwan. The President, however, wanted the Nationalists voluntarily either to evacuate the offshore islands or reduce their garrisons there. As an inducement, President Eisenhower was willing to station one US Marine division on Taiwan, together with additional Air Force units. Some time later, the President approved another inducement for Nationalist evacuation of Quemoy and Matsu—joint interdiction with the Nationalists of the sea lanes along a 400-mile stretch of Chinese coastline from Wenchow to Swatow.⁴⁰

At the President's direction, Admiral Radford and Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson went to Taipei on 20 April for talks with Chiang Kai-shek. According to their somewhat ambiguous instructions, Chiang was to be induced into suggesting that Quemoy and Matsu garrisons be cut back to "outpost" strength. But this stratagem failed; what Chiang wanted was a US commitment to defend the offshore islands. Moreover, Radford and Robertson urged Chiang to abandon Quemoy and Matsu. Thus they went beyond what the President was seeking—a partial withdrawal, proposed by Chiang himself. President Eisenhower subsequently told Secretary Dulles that "it is, of course, possible that no presentation could have brought Chiang to recognize the wisdom of some arrangement as this. . . . But it is clear that as long as Radford and Robertson themselves could not grasp the concept, we simply were not going to get anywhere. . . ."⁴¹

Taiwan Air Defenses

Meanwhile the buildup of communist air forces on the mainland opposite Taiwan had continued. On 8 April 1955, Major General William C. Chase, Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group on Taiwan, reported to CINCPAC that the Nationalists had detected airfield construction near the coastal cities of Swatow and Foochow and had sighted substantial numbers of MiG aircraft at Siang Tan and Luchow, farther inland but still in range of Taiwan. Fearing the loss

of control of the Taiwan Strait, the Nationalists requested US concurrence in air attacks on these fields. Pointing out that the build-up across the Straits was real and becoming more and more threatening, General Chase recommended approval of the request, an action with which CINCPAC agreed. Admiral Stump recommended to Washington the next day that he be authorized to permit Nationalist air attacks on the communist airfields at Luchow, Foochow, and Swatow.⁴²

On 15 April, Admiral Carney informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff of these developments but concluded that Nationalist attacks against the three airfields would not be advisable at present for two reasons: the uncompleted airfields were not lucrative targets; the operational field, while a suitable target, could not be attacked without unacceptable losses to the attacking forces and to installations on Taiwan from communist counterattacks, for which the Nationalist air defenses were unprepared. Pointing out that only the President could give US concurrence in the Nationalist request, which contemplated preventive rather than retaliatory attacks, the Chief of Naval Operations recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff merely note his conclusions and inform the Secretary of Defense of the situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted this recommendation on 21 April 1955.⁴³

The growing communist air power within range of Taiwan served to emphasize a serious weakness in the island's air defenses that had already caused concern to US military authorities. CINCPAC OPLAN 51-53, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved on 28 January 1955, provided for stationing 2½ US Air Force wings on Taiwan but made no provision for Army units to furnish anti-aircraft defense. Seeking to remedy this deficiency, CINCPAC advised the Chief of Naval Operations on 2 February that there was a requirement for a US Army AAA brigade to defend the three Taiwanese airfields on which the Air Force wing would base. On 30 March, CINCPAC expanded on his initial recommendation by calling for a general increase in military assistance to the Chinese Nationalists in order to bring their own anti-aircraft defenses up to an acceptable level, so that the proposed US Army AAA brigade could ultimately be withdrawn.⁴⁴

Admiral Carney, though concerned about the inadequacies of the Taiwan air defense, did not accept all the recommendations of CINCPAC. Addressing the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 April, the Chief of Naval Operations recommended increases in military assistance but made no reference to employing US anti-aircraft units. General Ridgway, however, pointed out that the only effective means to assure the air defense of Taiwan quickly was to deploy US anti-aircraft units. He accordingly endorsed CINCPAC's original recommendation.⁴⁵

General Twining at first considered that the planned deployment of Air Force wings to the island should be reduced until an improved air defense could be provided, but he subsequently supported the recommendation of the Chief of Naval Operations. Since General Ridgway remained convinced that US anti-aircraft forces should be sent to Taiwan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted divergent views to the Secretary of Defense. Secretary Wilson accepted the recommendation of the Navy and Air Force members, that military assistance to Nationalist China be increased and that a US Army AAA brigade not be deployed to Taiwan.⁴⁶

The Crisis Ends

The decision not to make a speedy reinforcement of the air defenses of Taiwan proved to be an acceptable risk, since the Chinese communists chose not to press forward under the conditions obtaining in the spring of 1955. They continued to build up their airfields and other military installations along the coast facing Taiwan but did not engage in large-scale attacks against Nationalist positions during the following months. In tune with this temporary restraint in military activity was a statement by Chou En-lai on 17 May 1955 that Communist China would seek the "liberation" of Taiwan by "peaceful means." A few days later he remarked that his country urgently needed peace to develop its economy and improve its living standards. Secretary of State Dulles soon concluded that the crisis had eased. In a statement on 8 June, he observed that an informal cease-fire was in effect and the danger of war had lessened.⁴⁷

This temporary lull in hostilities in the Taiwan Strait did not slow the Nationalist defensive buildup in the offshore islands. In mid-June, Chiang Kai-shek ordered an additional division to Quemoy. General Chase, with the concurrence of the US Ambassador, opposed the move on the ground that it would raise the offshore island garrisons to 40 percent of total Nationalist strength and would create severe logistical problems. The garrison of Quemoy, he maintained, was already adequate. The Generalissimo, however, announced his intention of overruling General Chase, stating that the reinforcement was necessary not only to strengthen the defenses militarily but to boost the morale of the defenders.⁴⁸

Both General Chase and the Ambassador had apparently taken the view that the deployment, though objectionable, was "up to the Chinese." The State Department, however, believed that under existing agreements with the Nationalist Government the United States could veto the move if it was considered to diminish substantially the defensibility of Taiwan and the Pescadores. Not wishing to judge the question without military advice, Assistant Secretary of State Robertson, on 11 July, asked the Defense Department for an authoritative military judgment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁴⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 29 July that the Nationalist forces on Taiwan were excessive merely to defend that main island and were being maintained partly as a reserve for possible offensive action elsewhere in the Far East. Under these circumstances, the movement of one additional division to Quemoy would not substantially diminish the effectiveness of the defense of Taiwan. In communicating the JCS views to the State Department a few days later, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) observed that, in the light of the JCS opinion and of the fact that movement of the division to Quemoy was already under way, "there appears to be no military basis for further representations to Chiang Kai-shek."⁵⁰

The deployment of an additional Nationalist division to Quemoy was part of a continuing military buildup by both sides in the Taiwan Straits area. By April 1956, the offshore island garrisons totaled about 100,000 men and were armed with more than a third of the major items of military equipment available to the Nationalist ground forces. The communists, by the same date, had significantly increased completion of six primary airfields on the mainland facing Taiwan.

Despite this buildup, there had been little action in the Taiwan Straits since the evacuation of the Tachens.⁵¹

To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this course of events seemed to justify the policy of withholding any declaration of specific US intentions with regard to the offshore islands. A paper prepared for JCS action during May 1956 included the statement that, "thus far, the apparent effect of this policy has served United States interest." The Joint Chiefs of Staff amended it by adding, "Therefore, no change in U.S. policy as to defense of the off-shore islands is recommended at this time," but then decided merely to note the paper rather than forwarding its substance to the Secretary of Defense.⁵²

Early in July, in view of the quiescence of the Western Pacific area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended, and Secretary Wilson approved, a reduction of the naval forces deployed there by one attack carrier and one hunter/killer group. At the time, this was scheduled to be a temporary withdrawal for the period 1 October 1956-1 April 1957, during which weather conditions would be least favorable to overt communist military action. On 29 November 1956, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a proposal by the Chief of Naval Operations that virtually all the naval forces deployed to meet the crisis in the Taiwan Straits be returned to their normal assignment.⁵³

As 1956 closed, the congressional resolution authorizing the President to use US forces to secure Taiwan and the Pescadores against attack remained in effect, and with it the specific policies and rules of engagement that had been developed during the period of tension in 1955. They would meet their next serious test in 1958.

Korea and the Problems of the Armistice

Although the greatest danger to the system of alliances and military bases by which the United States sought to contain Communist China occurred in the Taiwan Straits, conditions in Korea were also a cause for concern. As 1955 began, the military armistice terminating hostilities in Korea had been in effect for nearly a year and a half. Prospects for a permanent political settlement of the fate of that divided country were, however, exceedingly dim. A conference in Geneva between the belligerents in the Korean war plus the Soviet Union, held in the spring of 1954, had ended in deadlock when the communist powers rejected a proposal for reunification of Korea by free elections supervised by the United Nations.

Status of the Armistice

Of particular concern to the United States in view of the failure to achieve a political settlement in Korea was the fact that the communists had proceeded with a major buildup and modernization of their forces there, in violation of the Armistice Agreement. Articles 13 *c* and *d* of that document provided that commanders of the two sides would "cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel" and of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition. Permitted actions included the rotation of personnel, so long as no overall increase resulted, and the replacement of destroyed, damaged, or worn out equipment, "piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type."

The primary agency that had been established to supervise the implementation of the Armistice Agreement was the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), consisting of five officers representing the United Nations Command (UNC) and five from the communist side. Further, there was a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), charged with investigating alleged violations of the armistice provisions. The NNSC was composed of four senior officers, two of them appointed by neutral nations nominated by the UNC, namely, Sweden and

Switzerland, and two appointed "by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, Poland and Czechoslovakia." Subordinate to it were 20 Neutral Nations Inspection Teams (NNITs) of similar composition to the NNSC. The duty of the NNITs was to inspect personnel and materiel entering or leaving Korea through 10 designated points of entry (five for each side) and to make spot inspections anywhere in Korea as requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either side of the MAC.¹

From the first, the communists disregarded the armistice terms and introduced increasing numbers of modern weapons and aircraft into North Korea. By the end of 1954, the North Korean Air Force, according to US intelligence estimates, had been built up from approximately 340 aircraft operating entirely from Manchuria to 450 aircraft, including 220 jets, all stationed in North Korea. In ground force equipment, the North Koreans had added some 10,000 artillery pieces and mortar tubes.²

The NNSC had proved totally incapable of detecting, much less preventing, this buildup in violation of the Armistice terms. Meaningful inspections in North Korea were either hampered by the Poles and Czechs on the Commission or blocked by the North Korean authorities. Only one mobile inspection team had been dispatched to North Korea by the end of 1954, and it was allowed to see only what the communists wanted it to see. Five subsequent requests for investigations by UN Command members of the MAC were refused by the NNSC. At the same time, the armistice was applied to the letter in South Korea. The NNSC insisted that replacement equipment for the UN forces be of the same type and subseries as the equipment replaced.³

Elimination of these inequities in the armistice procedures became the concern both of US military authorities and of the noncommunist members of the NNSC. On 14 April 1954, the Swiss and Swedish Governments addressed aides memoire to the United States, expressing dissatisfaction with the inability of the NNSC to function effectively. The two countries observed that if a peace settlement was not quickly achieved, they would have to reconsider their further participation in the supervisory effort. On 12 May and again on 26 August, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a plan for eliminating the inequities by abolishing the NNSC altogether. According to this scheme, the UNC member of the MAC would introduce a resolution in that body to dissolve the NNSC and revoke Articles 13 *c* and 13 *d* of the Armistice Agreement. If the communists in the MAC rejected the proposal or failed to give a definitive reply in a reasonable time, the UNC would declare the proposed actions in effect unilaterally.⁴

While the course favored by CINCUNC was not taken at that time, the conviction was becoming general that a way must be found to end the disadvantages being suffered owing to the malfunctioning of the supervisory machinery. In the fall of 1954, representatives of the 16 nations that had fought on the United Nations side during the Korean conflict met in Washington, agreed that the NNSC had become ineffective because of communist obstruction, and proposed

that the United States, Great Britain, and France seek to persuade the Swiss and the Swedes to withdraw from the NNSC.⁵

Korean Policy Revised: NSC 5514

To bring national policy into line with these realities the United States revised its official statement on Korea. The new policy paper, NSC 5514, received the President's approval on 12 March 1955. It called for giving wide publicity to the fact that the communists, with the connivance of the communist members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, had violated the provisions of the Armistice Agreement from the beginning. The United States would continue to observe the armistice terms, except in actions found necessary to counter communist violations that placed the UN Command at a significant disadvantage. In considering what measures to employ in the face of communist violations, the United States would weigh the improved position to be gained against the military and political disadvantages that might accrue, including possible disagreements with its allies. Prior agreement of the other nations contributing to the UN Command would be sought, but they should not be given a veto on US actions.

In other significant respects, NSC 5514 was similar to NSC 170/1 of 20 November 1953, the paper it superseded. Both papers stated that the long-range objective of the United States was to bring about the unification of Korea as an economically self-supporting, democratic state friendly to the United States, with its political and territorial integrity assured by international agreement and with armed forces sufficient to maintain internal security and to repulse attacks by any but a major power. Both papers described the current US objective as to assist South Korea so that it could make a substantial contribution to free world strength in the Pacific area, to prevent any further communist advance in Korea by either subversion or aggression, and to develop the South Korean armed forces.⁶

In its passage through the machinery of the executive branch, NSC 5514 had encountered no major objections. On 4 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had advised the Secretary of Defense that it was acceptable from a military point of view, and they recommended his concurrence in its adoption. After a brief discussion on 10 March the National Security Council approved the draft unchanged.⁷

Meeting of the Sixteen UN Allies

Even before the new policy had been adopted, there was another appeal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff from General Lemnitzer for revision of the armistice terms. On 31 January 1955 he again recommended measures to dissolve the NNSC and revoke the pertinent articles of the Armistice Agreement. He suggested that the new aides memoire that the Swiss and Swedish Governments had forwarded on 27 January created "a political atmosphere for positive action" along those lines.⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in General Lemnitzer's proposal and on 2 February recommended to Secretary Wilson that he submit it for NSC consideration. The next day, the National Security Council discussed the matter without reaching a conclusion, and President Eisenhower directed further study by the Departments of State and Defense.⁹

Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department met the following day and found themselves in initial disagreement. The State Department opposed the course of action recommended by CINCUNC and endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on legal and political grounds. To change the Armistice Agreement, the State Department representatives observed, would require the same process of formal consultation among numerous governments by which the armistice had originally been negotiated and concluded.

As an alternative, the State Department representatives proposed a meeting of the 16 nations that had fought in Korea under the United Nations to seek support of the following plan: propose in the MAC that the NNSC be dissolved with its functions assumed by the MAC; if the communists refused, propose to them a reduction in inspection teams to two, both stationed in the Demilitarized Zone and available for spot inspections; at the same time, seek to persuade the Swiss and Swedes to withdraw from the NNSC. This proposal was accepted, and General Lemnitzer was requested to forward his comments for use by the Department of State.¹⁰

In an immediate reply, General Lemnitzer opposed introducing any proposal in the MAC for reducing the strength of the NNSC, since he considered that this "in itself would amount to an acceptance by the UNC of the Communist refusal to abide by the Armistice Agreement." He favored an effort to get the Swiss and Swedes to withdraw from the NNSC but recommended postponing any move in the MAC until the 16 UN powers were agreed on a phased course of action that had the objective of eliminating the NNSC in its entirety.¹¹

Representatives of the 16 UN powers met in Washington on 24 February 1955. After hearing a briefing by Admiral Radford on the military problems posed by communist violations of Article 13 *d*, they agreed to give first priority to modification of the NNSC while building a strong public case as the basis for later action on Article 13 *d*. With regard to the NNSC, the 16 powers agreed that the United States, in its reply to the Swiss and Swedish aides memoire of 27 January, should urge the two neutral nations to seek agreement within a specified time with the Czechs and Poles to reduce the NNSC to a nominal group stationed in the Demilitarized Zone. If this attempt failed, the United States should strongly urge the Swiss and Swedes to withdraw entirely from the NNSC.¹²

The United States expressed this position to the Swiss and Swedish Ambassadors on 2 March. Replying before the end of the month, the Swiss Government agreed to seek a reduction in the personnel of the NNSC's inspection teams, but it was unwilling to advocate withdrawal of the NNSC into the Demilitarized Zone. In the Swiss view, such a move would imply a modification of the Armistice Agreement itself and hence should be taken by the parties thereto.¹³

Search for a Policy

Leading urgency to the efforts to resolve the problems created by the ineffectiveness of the NNSC was the increasing hostility of President Syngman Rhee and the Republic of Korea (ROK) toward the armistice regime. With spokesmen for the ROK charging that the inspection team visits were merely a cloak for communist spying, General Lemnitzer had been compelled to restrict the freedom of movement of NNITs in South Korea in order to protect them from mob violence. On 28 February, however, he concluded that he would have to accede to a communist request for inspection of six locations in South Korea. By strenuous diplomatic efforts, US representatives persuaded President Rhee not to obstruct the NNITs performing this mission. Afterward, General Lemnitzer commented that "we barely got by without disastrous conflict; it is highly problematic that we can be so fortunate again." He foresaw the possibility of a situation when his responsibilities as CINCUNC might require him to use "military means upon Pres Rhee." To avoid this, General Lemnitzer requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff for authority to refuse permission for NNITs to visit ROK installations without Rhee's consent.¹⁴ The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed. Having obtained Secretary Wilson's approval, they issued appropriate instructions to CINCUNC on 8 March 1955.¹⁵

In General Lemnitzer's view, however, this action was merely a stopgap to avoid confrontation with Syngman Rhee. Dissolution of the NNSC, he still believed, was the only definitive solution, and he saw an opportunity to effect it during forthcoming sessions of the MAC. To that body, on 3 May, the NNSC had recommended that four NNITs be withdrawn from ports of entry with the remaining teams reduced to two members each. In reporting this development to the Joint Chiefs of Staff three days later, General Lemnitzer suggested a counterproposal that would go considerably farther, along the lines of his previous recommendations. Within the MAC it might be moved that the NNSC be dissolved and Articles 13 *c* and *d* of the Armistice Agreement be revoked. If agreement was not reached on this motion, the UNC should unilaterally declare the two articles and all passages of the agreement pertaining to the NNSC null and void and then require removal of all NNITs from South Korea to the Demilitarized Zone.¹⁶

General Lemnitzer's proposal passed to higher levels of consideration without formal JCS action. Intensive discussions occurred between officials of the State and Defense Departments, in which Admiral Radford participated. They culminated in a meeting at the White House on 11 May. Here, in addition to the President and Admiral Radford, were Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson, Under Secretary of State Hoover, and the Legal Adviser to the Department of State. Mr. Hoover believed that unilateral action of the type proposed by CINCUNC would be opposed by the other UN allies and might even lead to dissolution of the UN Military Command. Secretary Anderson, rather than supporting the Lemnitzer proposal for outright revocation, suggested the CINCUNC be authorized to "suspend provisionally" the unworkable clauses of the Armistice Agreement relating to the NNSC and its inspection teams.¹⁷

President Eisenhower expressed his conviction that some way should be found out of a situation where the communists violated the armistice while the United States continued to observe it. He directed Secretary Dulles to seek the support of Britain and France for Secretary Anderson's proposal.¹⁸

Secretary Dulles was unsuccessful. The State Department then offered a new plan. On 27 May 1955, it called for: (1) the UNC representative in the MAC to accept the NNSC recommendation that the NNITs be reduced in number and strength, on a provisional basis pending a satisfactory solution to the problem; (2) the Swiss and Swedes again to be urged to find a more satisfactory solution; (3) when plans for introducing new weapons into Korea were ready, the support of the UN allies for openly suspending Article 13 *d* to be vigorously sought.¹⁹

Admiral Radford, acting at Mr. Anderson's request, pointed out to Secretary Dulles that for the UNC to accept any proposal to reduce the size of the NNSC would be "tantamount to a tacit agreement with the Communists that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has in fact fulfilled its prescribed mission" and would effectively bar any subsequent action to eliminate that body. For these reasons he favored continuing the effort to obtain British and other allied support for the course President Eisenhower had endorsed on 12 May.²⁰

On 3 June Admiral Radford discussed the matter further with Secretaries Dulles and Hoover and other State Department officials. The Chairman went over in detail the contents of a recent message from General Lemnitzer listing the harmful effects that would follow from continued observance of Article 13 *d* by the UNC. General Lemnitzer had pointed out that, although the communists had reduced their troop strength in North Korea, they had increased their air power significantly and the ground forces withdrawn to Manchuria could easily be reintroduced. To overcome the disadvantage at which the UNC was operating would require replacement of all US aircraft with modern types by June 1957. Introduction of modern antitank and antiaircraft weapons to replace obsolescent equipment would also be required. Secretary Dulles then set forth his conclusion—the needed equipment should be introduced into Korea and the action subsequently reported to the NNSC as necessary to replace obsolete material. Controversy over elements of the Armistice Agreement, the Secretary said, was unnecessary and should be avoided.²¹

To implement Secretary Dulles' solution, the State Department in the ensuing two weeks drafted a report to the United Nations and a joint State-Defense directive to CINCUNC. On 30 June 1955, however, General Lemnitzer expressed his opposition to the course being planned, on the ground that to introduce new equipment without first eliminating inspection by the NNSC would expose the UNC to charges of violating the armistice. Accepting CINCUNC's views, Deputy Secretary Anderson wrote Mr. Dulles on 3 July objecting to his proposed course of action and again recommending adoption of the Defense Department position: first, provisional suspension of the portions of the Armistice Agreement relating to the NNSC; then, removal of NNITs to the Demilitarized Zone; finally, introduction of new equipment into Korea.²²

A further discussion between State and Defense Department representatives took place on 29 July. Each side reiterated the position previously taken, leading

Admiral Radford to suggest that the matter be submitted to President Eisenhower.²³ Agreement was finally attained a month later, on 25 August, when Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Gordon Gray concurred in the following courses of action, proposed by the State Department: (1) instruct the UNC to agree, as a temporary measure, to the reduction in the NNSC recommended by the body on 3 May, but with the understanding that communist obstruction and frustration of the Commission made its abolition necessary; (2) ask the Swiss and Swedes what measures they planned to take before 15 October to bring about the dissolution of the NNSC; and (3) if reasonable assurances were not received on this point, instruct the UNC to terminate NNSC activities in South Korea.²⁴

Hopes for a speedy resolution of the problems arising from the Korean armistice were not to be realized, however. By mutual agreement the Departments of State and Defense extended the 15 October deadline, on the understanding that the Swiss and Swedes, while not prepared to act by that date, were still determined to bring about the dissolution of the NNSC.²⁵ By the end of the year, however, the two governments had still not acted. General Lemnitzer then recommended as the preferred course of action: unilateral dissolution of the NNSC and provisional suspension of Articles 13 *c* and *d*; or, if the national authorities could not approve this course, removal of the NNITs from South Korea and replacement of combat equipment at his discretion with items of the same general type although "not necessarily identical in combat effectiveness." Such action was necessary, CINCUNC maintained, to counteract the progressive deterioration of UNC combat capability resulting from strict compliance with Article 13 *d* and to end the friction between the UNC and the ROK Government arising from the "active and prolonged opposition of President Rhee . . . to the presence of NNITs within South Korea."²⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 4 January 1956, recommended that Secretary Wilson seek State Department concurrence in General Lemnitzer's proposals.²⁷ The JCS position, however, did not find favor at higher levels of the administration. Following consultations between the State and Defense Departments, Assistant Secretary of Defense Gray sent a message to General Lemnitzer explaining that the Swiss and Swedes were now actively engaged in diplomatic efforts to gain Polish and Czech agreement to withdraw the NNITs to the Demilitarized Zone. The Swiss Counselor in Washington had advised the State Department that his government had indications of a satisfactory arrangement with the Poles and Czechs before the end of January. The Swedish Ambassador had said his government would withdraw from the NNSC if the Czechs and Poles rejected the proposal. However, if no favorable action resulted by the end of January, Mr. Gray assured General Lemnitzer, urgent consideration would be given to his recommendations.²⁸

By the end of January, Swiss and Swedish diplomacy had still not produced any measurable results, leading CINCUNC to recommend to Assistant Secretary Gray the imposition of a deadline of 15 February. If the Swiss and Swedes had achieved no satisfactory arrangement by then, the UNC should proceed to dissolve the NNSC and suspend Articles 13 *c* and 13 *d*.²⁹ On 20 March, since diplomatic efforts had still been unproductive, the Secretary of the Army urged Secretary Wilson to deal personally with the Secretary of State to obtain prompt agreement on a spe-

cific date for unilateral action by the United Nations commander. Mr. Wilson wrote Secretary Dulles on 26 April 1956, recommending a deadline of 15 May.³⁰

By this time the State Department had been persuaded by recent actions of the Chinese communist government that further diplomatic efforts would be useless. Two weeks earlier the Chinese communists had responded to the Swiss and Swedish proposals for withdrawing the NNITs into the Demilitarized Zone by stating that the NNSC problem could be solved only after the fundamental questions of Korean reunification and withdrawal of foreign troops had been resolved. The Chinese proposed an international conference to discuss these questions.

In the light of this development, the State Department agreed to proceed with independent action by the UN allies. With the agreement of the other 15 nations, the Chinese communist proposal was rejected. On 31 May 1956, the UNC announced in the MAC that, because of repeated communist violations of the Armistice Agreement, it was provisionally suspending the portions of the agreement providing for the functioning of the NNSC and its inspection teams in South Korea. On 5 June, the NNSC proposed an immediate withdrawal of all its teams from both North and South Korea. The UNC agreed on 7 June, but the communists in the MAC attached conditions to their acceptance, including a provision that the NNSC would have the right to reintroduce its teams into the two zones. On 8 June, the NNSC ordered its teams to withdraw from South Korea, an action that was carried out on the two following days.³¹

JCS Proposals for Introducing New Weapons

The removal of the NNITs from South Korea to the Demilitarized Zone, the Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped, would open the way for a modernization of the UNC forces. On 15 June 1956, General Twining advised his JCS colleagues that it was now incumbent upon them to determine the action necessary to restore US capabilities in Korea.³² Before the Joint Staff could complete a study of this question, the Departments of State and Defense agreed to press ahead with the introduction of new weapons. On 27 June, OSD officials agreed to supply the Department of State with general information on the types, amounts, and order of priority of introduction of new weapons into Korea. On the same day, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) advised Admiral Radford that well defined procedures would be established to govern the replacement and modernization of weapons in Korea and that "until such time as these procedures are promulgated, it is requested that no action be taken with regard to the actual introduction of these weapons into Korea."³³ As a result, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, while concluding that previous JCS recommendations on modernization of forces and equipment in Korea were still valid, recommended against further JCS action on the subject at that time.³⁴

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, did not agree. At their meeting on 29 August they decided that "positive action should be taken to obtain authorization for the modernization of forces in Korea." On 11 September, in a memoran-

dum originated by General Taylor, they pointed out that the promised definition of procedures had still not occurred. As a result, no actual modernization of forces in Korea had yet been authorized, even though the NNITs had been absent from South Korea for three months. The need for modernization remained urgent because of the communist buildup in North Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged Secretary Wilson to obtain the concurrence of the State Department to suspend Articles 13 *c* and *d* of the Armistice Agreement and to authorize CINCUNC to begin modernizing his materiel in Korea by introducing items, approved by the Department of Defense, that he deemed necessary.

As items sanctioned by the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the following aircraft: 25 F-86 all-weather fighters as well as B-57s, RF84-Fs, F-100s, F-102s, and C-130s in quantities desired by CINCUNC. As for Army equipment, they wanted: one battalion each of 280mm and 155mm artillery; 18 75mm and 64 twin 40mm antiaircraft guns; one battery of Honest John rockets; one battalion of Nike antiaircraft missiles, and other miscellaneous items.

In making their proposals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically recommended that an atomic capability be included in the modernization program. They based their recommendation on the logical assumption that communist aircraft possessed such a capability, or that the enemy could deploy atomic-capable units to North Korea on short notice.³⁵

State Department Opposition to Nuclear Weapons

The JCS recommendations were discussed by Secretaries Gray and Robertson, Admiral Radford, and legal advisers of the State and Defense Departments on 11 September 1956. It quickly became apparent that the State Department was not prepared to accept the JCS views on introduction of weapons with an atomic capability or on suspending Article 13 *d*. State preferred to limit the new weapons introduced to types consistent with a liberal interpretation of that article, while leaving it in force. The conferees decided to refer the JCS list of equipment to legal experts of the two departments for such a determination.

Agreement was quickly reached by the lawyers on all the listed items except Honest John, the 280mm gun, and Nike. The first two of these weapons possessed an atomic capability, and the State Department spokesman took the position that their introduction could not be justified except possibly on a showing that the communists themselves had introduced such weapons. Mr. Gray asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 September for any evidence of such action. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reported on 19 October that they could not substantiate the presence of communist atomic warheads or atomic ground delivery systems in North Korea. Nevertheless, they continued to maintain that the presence of communist aircraft with an atomic delivery capability in North Korea, coupled with the ability to introduce additional atomic delivery systems, fully justified supplying atomic weapons to CINCUNC.³⁶

Repetition of this JCS opinion did not appreciably strengthen the Defense Department's case, but in subsequent conferences the area of disagreement over what could properly be introduced into Korea without suspending Article 13 *d* was narrowed somewhat farther. By 29 November 1956 the two departments had agreed to the entire JCS list of new weapons and equipment except for the two weapons with atomic capability—the 280mm gun and the Honest John. The Defense Department position, as expressed by the General Counsel, was that introduction of the two weapons without nuclear components and solely as replacements for conventional weapons was legally justified under Article 13 *d*. The State Department's legal adviser maintained that the Honest John and the 280mm gun should not be introduced because they were atomic weapons in the eyes of the world. This, he admitted, was a political rather than a legal question and should be decided by the President. Accordingly, Assistant Secretaries Gray and Robertson and Admiral Radford met with Secretary of Defense Wilson on 29 November and recommended that he take up the question of new weapons and equipment with President Eisenhower.³⁷

The question of introducing new weapons and equipment into Korea was not to be resolved before the end of 1956. In fact, it was not until 13 June 1957 that introduction of the conventional weapons on the JCS list received presidential approval.

Containment in Southeast Asia

The years 1955 and 1956 saw continuing efforts by the United States to seal the breach in the wall containing communist expansion that had resulted from the Viet Minh victory in Indochina. In the Indochina war, which had been concluded on 20 July 1954 at the Geneva Conference, the communists had scored major gains. Not only had they brought all of Vietnam north of the 17th Parallel under their direct control, but they had removed all effective noncommunist military power from Laos and Cambodia as well. From the salient they had gained in North Vietnam, the communists were in a position to bring pressure to bear on the other weak and unstable countries of the area.

Communist domination of Southeast Asia, the United States believed at the beginning of 1955, "would endanger in the short term and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security interests. It could lead to alignment with Communism by India and the Middle East, with serious consequences to the stability and security of Europe." It would also, if combined with communist domination of Indonesia, "threaten the U.S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain" and "could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to Communism."¹

To counter this threat to its national interests, the United States planned forceful action, including the use of its military power. "In the event of Communist overt armed attack in the area covered by the Manila Pact prior to the entering into effect of the Pact," read NSC 5429/5, the definitive policy statement on the Far East, the United States should "take actions necessary to meet the situation, including a request to Congress to use U.S. armed forces, if appropriate and feasible. When the Pact is in effect, be prepared to oppose any communist attack in the treaty area with U.S. armed forces, if necessary and feasible, consulting Congress in advance if the emergency permits."²

The US Military Commitment to SEATO

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (or Manila Pact) had been signed on 8 September 1954 by representatives of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Following ratification, it entered into force on 19 February 1955. Under its terms the parties agreed to respond to armed attack on any one of them "in accordance with . . . [their] constitutional processes" and to meet threats other than by armed attack by means to be agreed in mutual consultations. Attached to the Manila Pact was a protocol designating Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam as additional areas where the occurrence of armed aggression would be recognized as a threat calling for action under the treaty.

Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty did not provide for elaborate international machinery or for a permanent standing military organization. It merely established a SEATO Council, composed of political representatives of the signatories. Among other duties, the Council was to "provide for consultation with regard to military planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require." The area covered by the treaty included not only the territories of the Asian member states but also the general areas of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific up to the northernmost point of the Philippines.³

Although the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty did not provide for an extensive organizational structure of the NATO type, interest in developing such an arrangement was strong among most of the parties except the United States. Such a structure would bind the military plans of the smaller members to those of the United States and was likely to obligate the United States to pursue specific courses of action and to make specific military force commitments in support of them. This was precisely what the United States sought to avoid. With multiple commitments elsewhere in the Far East and around the globe and with limited forces available to meet them, the United States preferred a flexible strategy based on ready, mobile forces available for use as the need arose but not committed to a specific area beforehand. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had strongly endorsed this policy. In fact, they felt that the nonapplicability of the treaty to Nationalist China, Japan and Korea, with whom the United States had bilateral arrangements, made it imperative that the United States not be restricted by force commitments in the SEATO area.⁴

Up to the end of 1954, however, the United States had not decided just how its forces would be applied if the Manila Pact were invoked. Since the foreign ministers of the SEATO nations were scheduled to convene in Bangkok in February, the need to define the US concept more clearly was becoming urgent.

On 6 January 1955, Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson, to meet a request from the Secretary of State, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to furnish a concept for application of US military power under the Manila Pact. This concept should create a deterrent to overt aggression by Communist China or other communist nations against Southeast Asian countries, using US forces with at least token participation by the other treaty members. The concept should also provide, in

the event deterrence failed, for defeat of the aggressors by US military power, aided by the SEATO forces. The military actions contemplated should be designed to avoid expansion into general war unless the aggressor state chose to widen the area of conflict. Mr. Anderson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop the concept under alternative assumptions that nuclear weapons would and would not be used. He also asked for broad outline plans based on the concept and for a statement of the readiness of US forces in the next few years to conduct operations in implementation of the treaty.⁵

The first attempt of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) to prepare a reply disclosed a fundamental disagreement over the nature of the operations required, and hence the type of forces to be employed, when responding to aggression under the terms of the Manila Pact. The result was a split report by the JSPC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25 January, in which the Army advocated balanced forces of air, ground, and sea units while the other Services maintained that only naval and air forces should be used.

In his exposition, the Army member pointed out that communist aggression against the SEATO area might take the form either of an overt attack by Communist China or the type of operations executed in Indochina by the Viet Minh, with Chinese Communist support and assistance. In either case, the Army member maintained, the communists must be defeated on the ground and in the area of attack. Extensive land operations, supported by air and naval actions in the area of operations and against military targets in Communist China, would therefore be necessary. As to the magnitude of the forces required, the Army member estimated that to defeat a Communist Chinese attack would call for the equivalent of 20 US divisions. Of these he hoped that the United States would have to supply only $3\frac{1}{3}$ divisions; the remaining $16\frac{2}{3}$ divisions would come from the other treaty members. To deal with an armed attack by indigenous forces without overt Chinese participation, the Army member did not indicate an order of magnitude for the defensive forces, but he maintained that the United States should be prepared to make up any deficiencies in the ground forces committed by the other SEATO countries.

Turning to the question of deterrence, the Army member contended that there was no effective existing deterrent to communist aggression. To create one, he continued, would require a US commitment to contribute forces, including ground forces, to the defense of Southeast Asia and the deployment of a balanced mobile striking force to the immediate area. Included in this force would be an Army corps of two divisions to be stationed in the Philippines. The Army member concluded, finally, that his proposals were valid whether or not atomic weapons were used.

The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps members of the JSPC took issue with their Army colleague. They maintained that immediate and direct counteraction by US naval and air forces would be sufficient to defeat the aggressor. Such counteraction would consist, in the case of overt aggression by Communist China, of "attacking promptly and effectively [by air] and with unmistakable intent as to purpose those selected targets on mainland China which are used to support the

aggressor forces." Supplementing these air operations would be a naval blockade of selected ports of the aggressor.

The majority view was predicated on the use of atomic weapons, in which case operations could be carried out by US forces "presently planned for the next few years." If atomic weapons were not used, "the time to defeat the aggressor would be indefinitely extended." Specifically, the US forces to be supplied would consist of "a fast carrier task group . . . ; USAF tactical air force units, including fighter, interceptor, and light bomber aircraft . . . ; and SAC forces as required." The deterrent effect would derive from: the acquisition of bases in the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaya, through which US and allied forces would be rotated for training and familiarization; the holding of combined air and naval maneuvers in the Southeast Asia area; and public announcements stressing the determination of the United States and its SEATO allies to resist aggression.

The majority also opposed the Army position on making specific commitments of forces to Southeast Asia. Reiterating the views expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 October 1954, they declared that US commitments to Formosa, Japan, and Korea made it imperative that the United States not be restricted by force commitments in the Manila Pact area.⁶

Before this split report reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff for formal action, the Commandant of the Marine Corps indicated that he could not concur in either of the conflicting views. General Shepherd pointed out that recent deployments had made available two mobile divisions for amphibious and other remunerative operations, which should be employed for missions appropriate to the superior strategic and tactical mobility of US formations.⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff returned the JSPC report on 28 January 1955 with instructions to the Committee to submit a new document, incorporating the proposal made by General Shepherd and also the following three points: (1) the JCS objections to specific force commitments stated on 8 October 1954 remained valid; (2) the United States should not engage in combined military planning for the defense of the SEATO area; and (3) the United States should not reveal the details of its unilateral plans to other parties to the SEATO treaty.⁸

The JSPC was somewhat more successful in resolving interservice differences in its second attempt than in its original submission. The Army member still insisted that US ground forces would be required, but he now accepted that they should be used for those missions appropriate to the superior strategic and tactical mobility of US formations. The other Services were willing to concede that US ground forces should be employed in the generalized manner described by the Army but insisted that appropriate missions did not include employment as part of any ground defense of the immediate area of aggression.⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 4 February chose not to attempt the resolution of these shades of difference and disposed of the matter in a more generalized statement. They now directed the JSPC to prepare a new paper that would describe the strategic concept as "to deter or counter aggression by being prepared to retaliate promptly with attacks by the most effective combination of US armed forces against the military power of the aggressor."¹⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reached agreement on the basis of the resulting report and forwarded a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on 11 February that addressed the questions originated by Deputy Secretary Anderson. In addition to stating the retaliation by the most effective combination of forces formula, the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained that the retaliatory strikes would be limited to military targets within the aggressor country that were involved in direct support of the aggressor action.

The concept was feasible, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, whether or not nuclear weapons were used. Without them, however, the most effective employment of US armed forces would not be possible and consequently might require greater forces than the United States would be justified in providing from the overall point of view. Omitted from their report was any specific deterrent plan or estimate of US forces required, although these matters had been treated in the early drafts.¹¹

The ambiguity in the phrase "to retaliate promptly with attacks by the most effective combination of US armed forces against the military power of the aggressor" was dispelled by Admiral Radford in a briefing for Secretary of State Dulles on 15 February. In the event of a Chinese attack on Southeast Asia, the Chairman said, US forces would launch nuclear strikes. Other operations might also be launched, such as an invasion of the mainland opposite Taiwan by Chinese Nationalist forces, with US air and naval support, or the opening of a second front in Korea. Thus, the Chinese Communists would be so tied down on fronts closer to home that their effort in Southeast Asia would be seriously weakened. The same strategy of air and naval action against enemy logistics installations would be equally valid if the Viet Minh rather than the Chinese launched an invasion. When Secretary Dulles pointed out the political obstacles to nuclear attacks, Admiral Radford rejoined that the concept depended upon selective use of atomic weapons. Without them, the United States could probably not act effectively with available forces.¹²

The Treaty Organization Takes Shape

The foreign ministers of the signatory powers reached agreement on the organizational structure of SEATO at meetings in Bangkok beginning on 23 February 1955. The supreme body, as specified by the Treaty, was the Council consisting of the foreign ministers of the parties, or their representatives. As the Council would normally meet only once a year, the foreign ministers established the Council Representatives and a supporting Secretariat with headquarters in Bangkok to provide continuous coordination. Directly subordinate to the Council Representatives were three ad hoc subcommittees to deal with economic affairs, countersubversion, and information, culture, and labor.¹³

The basic form of military organization for SEATO had been tentatively decided before the Bangkok meeting began. The issue had been joined in an international working group of representatives of the signatories meeting in Washington in early January to perform the necessary preliminary work for the

forthcoming conference. The Asian members, led by the Philippine representative, had sought to involve the United States in military planning through the agency of a standing military committee of the NATO type. The US representative had opposed this course and had persuaded the other delegates to adopt the procedure employed by the United States, Australia, and New Zealand under the ANZUS treaty—periodic meetings of a body of military advisers to the members of the Council. The respective governments approved this procedure.

When the Bangkok Conference convened, the Defense Department member of the US Delegation sensed that the Asian representatives were preparing to reopen the issue by bringing pressure upon the United States to make a specific commitment of forces to the alliance and to accept a military organization of the NATO type. To forestall such pressure, the Defense Department representative persuaded Secretary Dulles to take the initiative in proposing a meeting of the military advisers during the Bangkok sessions and to schedule a detailed briefing on the mobile US forces available for employment in the treaty area. This briefing evidently had the desired effect. The delegates made no attempt to raise the question of a permanent NATO-type structure but turned their attention instead to the military organization needed to support the body of military advisers. The delegates agreed to the establishment of a group of staff planners, whose function would be to prepare the agenda for the semiannual meetings of the military advisers, and a Military Liaison Group, which would serve as the point of contact between the military advisers and the Council. Sitting in Bangkok, the Military Liaison Group would consist of military officers on the staffs of the Council Representatives. The Council also approved a separate meeting of the military advisers during the Bangkok Conference.

The military advisers first met on 24 February, with CINCPAC, Admiral Felix Stump, representing the United States. Organizational matters occupied most of the session. The Philippine adviser attempted to raise the question of a permanent planning group, but he was persuaded that this matter could be handled more appropriately by the staff planners at their first meeting, scheduled for April. The Philippine Government accepted responsibility for drafting a paper on the subject.¹⁴

When the military staff planners met at Baguio in the Philippines in late April and early May to prepare recommendations for action by the military advisers, the Philippine delegation did present a proposal for a permanent combined military staff headed by a chairman, to be organized immediately. The US delegation, in line with current policy, opposed the Philippine plan, but, recognizing the need for some action on the subject, backed an alternative proposal to create a small permanent secretariat. Admiral Stump recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they authorize him to approve it in the military advisers' meeting. In making this recommendation, CINCPAC conceded there was "not immediately, a valid requirement" for a permanent secretariat, but he pointed out that it was vitally necessary to lend substance to the military advisers' endeavors by forming some type of permanent group. Without this recognition, Admiral Stump maintained, it was evident that a serious split would develop. Approval of the permanent secretariat would definitely forestall "for the foreseeable future any

determined insistence for either a permanent staff planners organization, a standing group, or a combined staff." ¹⁵

The Chief of Naval Operations on 23 May recommended JCS approval of CINCPAC's proposal. The Army Chief of Staff cautioned against the formation of a permanent secretariat on the ground that the "establishment of any type permanent organization . . . portends the development of a larger and more authoritative military organization." Subsequently, however, he joined in approving the formation of the secretariat, with the proviso that Admiral Stump should be informed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not agree to its evolution into a standing group. With the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed CINCPAC accordingly on 14 June. The military advisers, meeting at Bangkok in July, approved the formation of a small permanent secretariat functioning under the Military Liaison Group. ¹⁶

A Permanent SEATO Military Staff

In spite of CINCPAC's prediction that the interest of Asian members in a permanent combined staff had been forestalled for the foreseeable future, it became increasingly evident that the United States would have to make further concessions. During a meeting of the Council Representatives in August, the US representative detected a "perceptible anxiety and frustration . . . concerning the future . . . effectiveness of SEA[TO] unless substantial progress in Treaty activities can be achieved." In November, the US Embassy in Bangkok warned that any reduction in US support of SEATO would encourage neutralist tendencies in the Thai Government. The Pakistan Government, dissatisfied with the ad hoc arrangements for conducting SEATO business, expressed a desire for a large centralized SEATO organization at least for nonmilitary matters. ¹⁷

On 23 November 1955, Admiral Stump acknowledged that the question of permanent SEATO staff organization, far from being settled, was still an active concern of the Asian members. At the meeting of the Military Staff Planners held at Pearl Harbor from 1 to 15 November, the US representatives had concluded that their present position was fast becoming untenable and that the erection of a formal staff organization might be inevitable. Admiral Stump observed that the United States "may find it necessary to yield on this point or find itself in no position to refute 'paper tiger' charges." Under these circumstances, he reasoned, "it may be more realistic to take the initiative . . . [in forming a permanent staff] so as to be in a better position to influence the size and shape of the end product." ¹⁸

Concerned over these developments, the Departments of Defense and State began a reappraisal of the US position with a view to proposing a permanent SEATO staff at the next meeting of the Council, scheduled for 6 March 1956 in Karachi, Pakistan. To this end, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested the Chief of Naval Operations to ascertain Admiral Stump's detailed views on the subject for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in developing a Defense Department position. ¹⁹

On 5 January, Admiral Stump supplied his views on a permanent SEATO staff organization. Receding somewhat from the opinion he had expressed on 23 November, the Admiral said: "I am not convinced that establishment of a permanent SEATO Council and military staff should be undertaken at this time." However, if political reasons dictated the acceptance of a permanent SEATO organization, it should consist of an executive group and military advisers, both immediately responsible to the Council. The executive group, to consist of one representative from each member nation, would direct all nonmilitary activities. The present military advisers, assisted by a small secretariat and still operating on an ad hoc basis, would direct and approve SEATO military planning. To assist the military advisers, the existing staff planners could also continue to function on an ad hoc basis.²⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, although they still perceived no military justification for a change in existing SEATO staff arrangements, now recognized that the desire of the Asian members for a more formal organization made some action necessary for political and psychological reasons. They accordingly recommended to the Secretary of Defense, on 21 February 1956, that CINCPAC's proposal be approved. These views were favorably received at higher levels, since it had already been agreed in consultations between the Departments of State and Defense to take action along the lines now proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²¹

With US objections now removed, the SEATO Council proceeded to approve a permanent staff organization.²² Following adjournment of the Council meetings, the military advisers convened and concluded that a permanent military staff would soon be required to carry out detailed planning after the military advisers approved the strategic concepts then under preparation by the staff planners and scheduled for completion in June 1956. The staff would have two main sections, for operational and logistic planning, and should be a small completely integrated staff under a chief of staff, with a Philippine major general tentatively indicated for that post. Implementing a decision of the military advisers that each member would seek approval of the proposed staff from his national authorities, CINCPAC recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) that the United States formally approve the establishment of the staff as proposed by the military advisers.²³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom CINCPAC's recommendations were referred, recommended approval to the Secretary of Defense on 4 April. He concurred and issued the appropriate instructions to CINCPAC on 17 May. The military advisers, at their meeting in Baguio in September, approved establishment of the SEATO Military Planning Staff in Bangkok by 15 January 1957. The location and date were concurred in by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense during October. The Planning Staff began operations in Bangkok on 1 March 1957.²⁴

Policy Decisions and Military Plans for South Vietnam

As 1955 began, the danger of Southeast Asian territorial acquisitions by the communists was most pronounced in Vietnam. That unhappy country, after eight years of guerrilla warfare between the communist Viet Minh and the French, had been partitioned at the Geneva Conference along the 17th Parallel into communist and noncommunist zones pending elections to unify the country under a government of popular choice. In North Vietnam, a typical centralized, totalitarian communist state quickly emerged. South of the 17th Parallel, the noncommunist portion of Vietnam was beset by seemingly insuperable problems. Refugees were streaming down from the North, the Viet Minh remained illegally in control of many areas, the Binh Xuyen gang controlled criminal activities as well as many legitimate businesses and the police in Saigon, while two religious sects, the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, maintained private armies that controlled many areas of the countryside.²⁵

In these far from promising circumstances Ngo Dinh Diem became Premier of South Vietnam in June 1954. With strong US backing but with less than enthusiastic support from the French, Premier Diem made little progress in coping with the many problems during his first few months in office. Conditions bordering on anarchy made it questionable that a noncommunist Vietnam could long survive. President Eisenhower responded to this situation by dispatching General J. Lawton Collins to Saigon on 3 November 1954 as Special United States Representative, to "assist in stabilizing and strengthening the legal government of Vietnam under the premiership of Ngo Dinh Diem."²⁶

General Collins arrived in Saigon on 11 November. In little more than a month he became convinced that "Diem does not have the capacity to unify divided factions in Vietnam and that unless some action is taken . . . this country will be lost to Communism." Reporting to Secretary of State Dulles on 17 December, he recommended that the United States continue supporting Diem for a "short while longer" but without entering into any commitments to specific aid programs. If, however, there was not "substantial progressive action" soon, the United States should consider supporting the prompt return from France to Vietnam of the Chief of State, Bao Dai, since in General Collins' opinion he was the "only Vietnamese who might be able to galvanize the country into unified action." If the return of Bao Dai proved unacceptable to the United States, General Collins recommended "reevaluation of our plans for assisting Southeast Asia."²⁷

To Secretary of Defense Wilson, General Collins' communication "indicated a delicate and unstable situation within South Vietnam" calling for the Department of Defense to examine all possible courses of action in order to be prepared for any eventuality. He accordingly requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the ability of Vietnamese armed forces to maintain internal security without US aid. He also asked them to survey the military implications of the loss of South Vietnam to the communists, the nature of assistance to be given to other states in the area in such circumstances, and the effects of these revised programs on the ability of the United States to discharge its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.²⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their reply on 21 January 1955, listed four courses of action available to the United States in South Vietnam: continue aid as currently planned, with the cooperation of the French and South Vietnamese; institute a unilateral aid program excluding the French; deploy US forces to South Vietnam either unilaterally or as part of a SEATO force; or withdraw all US support from South Vietnam and concentrate on saving the remainder of Southeast Asia. A choice among these alternatives should not be made until the United States had reached a firm policy decision on the "men, money, materials" it was prepared to commit to prevent South Vietnam from falling to the communists and had considered the "acceptance of additional war risks" that would be involved. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reminded the Secretary that they had previously recommended against a static defense of the area and in favor of offensive action against the military power of the aggressor.

Turning to Secretary Wilson's specific questions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that, without US aid, South Vietnam would probably fall to the Viet Minh and that loss of Cambodia and Laos could follow. A friendly government could be maintained in Thailand, they believed, but only if supplied with greatly increased US assistance.²⁹

The question of US policy toward South Vietnam was resolved by the National Security Council at a meeting on 27 January 1955, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff attended. The decision, subsequently approved by the President, was to continue to support the Diem government, to seek reaffirmation by the Manila Pact powers of their determination to react in accordance with the treaty if hostilities were renewed in Indochina, and to press the French to continue support to South Vietnam under their existing understandings with the United States.³⁰

In making this decision the NSC followed the recommendations of General Collins, given in a written report dated 20 January and an oral briefing at the meeting. General Collins now found conditions in South Vietnam to have improved to the point where the Diem government, given firm US support and active French cooperation, had a reasonable prospect of success. He recommended that in view of the importance of Vietnam to all Southeast Asia, the United States "should expend the funds, materiel and effort required to strengthen the country and help it retain its independence."³¹

Matters came to a head during March and April. General Collins now reported that Diem was "almost entirely isolated" and should be replaced. Reluctantly, Secretary Dulles began moving toward the same conclusion. But the unexpected happened. Diem, backed by the army and helped by the CIA, precipitated a show down with Binh Xuyen. In a series of effective moves, Diem crushed the sects and the Binh Xuyen gangsters and generated a political drive that would ultimately lead to the dismissal of Bao Dai and the expulsion of the French. Diem's successful consolidation of power won him the solid support of the United States, but his Francophobia naturally aroused the opposite reaction in France.³²

It was the differing views of the French and US Governments that involved the Joint Chiefs of Staff in questions of US policy toward Vietnam once again. The issue came to a head early in May 1955 during the meetings of the British, French, and US foreign ministers and the French premier in Paris. Premier Edgar Faure pro-

posed that, in view of the sharp differences of opinion between the French and US Governments and the former's inability to continue supporting the anti-French Diem regime, the French should withdraw totally from Vietnam. In that event, he asked, would the United States be able to protect French lives and property?

Secretary Dulles replied that Vietnam was not worth a quarrel between the United States and France. The two powers could not afford to pursue rival policies there, and if they could not agree, one should withdraw. The United States, he said, would be willing to do so. The Secretary thought the course of simply acceding to the French desire to back some other governmental arrangement in South Vietnam was barred, since there seemed little hope that the Congress would appropriate the funds necessary to continue a program in Vietnam if the United States withdrew support from Diem.³³

Secretary Dulles had asked for time for deliberation, and he immediately sent an account of the meeting to Washington, commenting "My guess is that the French are not bluffing." State Department officials discussed the message with Admiral Radford, and the following day, 9 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their views to the Secretary of Defense on the military aspects of the Dulles-Faure exchange. They concluded that neither alternative—US or French withdrawal—would preserve South Vietnam from communism. Precipitate withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps would leave South Vietnam in great danger because the Vietnamese forces were not yet ready to fill the vacuum that would result, and the United States was prevented from providing forces by the Geneva Agreement. For the latter reason, also, the United States could not give assurances regarding the protection of French lives and property. On the other hand, because of their strong anti-French sentiments, the Vietnamese were unlikely to accept French leadership and material support to the extent necessary to establish a stable government. The United States, therefore, could not withdraw, for without its moral and material support, the Vietnamese could not develop forces capable of resisting the communists.³⁴

General Collins, whose views had been requested by Secretary Dulles, also expressed strong opposition to the withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps. It was responsible, said General Collins, for the defense of Indochina under the aegis of the Manila Pact. It was also needed to help train Vietnamese forces and was a stabilizing influence in the strife-ridden politics of the country.³⁵

Premier Faure and Secretary Dulles met again on 11 May and worked out a compromise under which both powers would support a broadened government under Diem until elections could be held for a national assembly, which would decide the ultimate political structure of South Vietnam.³⁶

Subsequent events in South Vietnam did not, however, follow precisely the pattern agreed to by Mr. Dulles and M. Faure. After his victories over the sects, Diem consolidated his power over the army and seemed to enhance his popularity among the people. From this position of strength, he conducted a plebiscite on 23 October 1955 in which a large majority voted to depose Bao Dai and name Diem Chief of State with a mandate to reorganize the government. The following day, Diem declared South Vietnam a republic and himself its president. Withdrawal from the French Union quickly followed, completing the process of making South Vietnam

an independent state. In conformity with this independent status, the South Vietnamese Government negotiated with France the removal of all French forces from South Vietnam. By the end of April 1956, the last French soldier had departed.

Elimination of French military power from South Vietnam increased the burden on the United States for the defense of the newly independent nation. Early in 1955, it had been possible to assume the employment of up to four French divisions in SEATO forces defending the area. A year later, however, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed the question of defending South Vietnam against overt attack by North Vietnam, they made no specific reference to French forces. They did expect troop contributions from SEATO members, but noted that these would probably be of a token variety and would not affect military operations significantly during the opening stages.³⁷

On 11 July 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided guidance to CINCPAC for the preparation of contingency plans to cope with overt invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnam in the new situation created by the departure of the French. The guidance consisted of a broad outline plan, which had been presented to the NSC by Admiral Radford on 7 June as an illustration of the capability of US tactical forces to deal with local aggression.³⁸

According to this outline plan, the primary burden of defense would be borne by the South Vietnamese armed forces, supported by nuclear-armed US air and naval forces, which would attack enemy troops and supporting installations, and by three US ground units of RCT-size, which would defend three key base areas. It was expected that the Southeast Asia Defense Treaty would be invoked and that some of the parties to it would furnish at least token forces.³⁹

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff expected only a modest amount of military support from the members of SEATO, they nevertheless stressed the importance of invoking the treaty in the event of communist aggression in Southeast Asia. They explained their position on 25 May 1955 in commenting on an NSC Planning Board draft in which this was a subsidiary issue. In the draft the Planning Board had proposed that if the communists renewed hostilities in Vietnam, the United States should be prepared to oppose any communist attack "with U.S. armed forces, if necessary and feasible—consulting the Congress in advance if the emergency permits—preferably in concert with the Manila Pact allies of the U.S., but if necessary alone." The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to this proposal for unilateral action. They pointed out that much time and effort had been expended to develop the Manila Pact and its supporting military machinery, and that it should be used to counter any renewal of communist aggression. They accordingly recommended that the Planning Board draft be changed to read that the United States would oppose a communist attack "by immediately invoking the Manila Pact and taking vigorous action thereunder to repel the Communist military aggression."⁴⁰

The NSC chose not to accept this JCS recommendation. When it dealt with the Planning Board paper on 9 June 1955 the Council on this particular point simply noted that, in the event of renewed communist attacks in Vietnam, US action would be governed by the policy already established in NSC 5429/5. But that document did not call specifically for invoking the Manila Treaty. It merely

stated: "When the Pact is in effect, be prepared to oppose any Communist attack in the treaty area with U.S. armed forces, if necessary and feasible, consulting Congress in advance if the emergency permits."⁴¹

Revised US Policy on Southeast Asia: NSC 5612/1

By 1956, developments in Southeast Asia had substantially altered the situation that the existing US policy statement on the area, NSC 5405, was designed to meet. Since the adoption on 16 January 1954, French colonial rule in Indochina had ended, SEATO had come into existence, and Vietnam had become divided into communist and noncommunist states. The NSC accordingly directed the Planning Board, on 8 March, to prepare a revised statement of policy for Southeast Asia, "bringing existing policies up to date on both a regional and country basis."⁴²

The Planning Board completed its draft, designated NSC 5612, on 15 August 1956. In spite of the altered circumstances since January 1954, the Planning Board found the underlying conditions in Southeast Asia to be substantially the same. As in January 1954, it was concluded that communist domination of mainland Southeast Asia would endanger the security interests of the United States because it would lead to the submission to or alignment with the communist bloc not only of the Southeast Asian states but of Japan and India as well. However, the extent of this falling domino effect was not considered to be as far-reaching as it had been in early 1954. NSC 5612, unlike NSC 5405, did not find that the alignment of Asia with communism would "seriously endanger the stability and security of Europe."

With regard to the form communist aggression might take, the Planning Board analysis in NSC 5612 was similar to that in NSC 5405. The Planning Board recognized that, so long as large Chinese and North Vietnamese forces were in existence, there would be a danger of overt military attack. Both papers concluded, however, that communist aggression was more likely to take the form of subversion and armed rebellion.

The Planning Board concluded that the broad objective of the United States in these circumstances should continue to be as it had been stated in 1954:

to prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into or becoming economically dependent upon the Communist bloc; to persuade them that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the free world; and to assist them to develop toward stable, free, representative governments with the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without, and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.⁴³

It was in the specific courses of action proposed to achieve this broad objective that the Planning Board, in NSC 5612, offered procedures not included in NSC 5405. Both papers called for encouraging nations of the area to build strong societies and resist communism, and for the United States to join in regional mili-

tary cooperation, with NSC 5612 adding a specific mention of SEATO. Beyond these broad areas of similarity, NSC 5612 included certain specifics not found in the earlier paper. Most significant was the statement of conditions under which the United States would take military action to resist overt communist aggression:

invoke the UN Charter or the SEATO Treaty, or both as applicable, and subject to local request for assistance take necessary military and any other action to assist any Mainland Southeast Asian state or dependent territory willing to resist Communist resort to force: provided that the taking of military action shall be subject to prior submission to and approval by the Congress unless the emergency is so great that immediate action is necessary to save a vital interest of the United States.⁴⁴

There was one point of disagreement within the Planning Board regarding the new policy for Southeast Asia. At issue was whether, in giving military and economic assistance, the United States should favor countries willing to join free world collective security arrangements. The Defense and Treasury representatives favored such preferential treatment; the State representative was opposed.

The end result of all these actions, the Planning Board believed, would be an "equipoise of power in Asia," presumably balancing the forces of the free and communist worlds. No such concept of equipoise had appeared in NSC 5405 or any other approved national policy on the Far East or Southeast Asia.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense on 24 August that, except for three points, they approved the statement of policy in NSC 5612. "Establishing an equipoise of power in Asia" was not a suitable objective for US policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained. Prior delegation of authority should be obtained from Congress to employ US military forces against communist aggression in Southeast Asia rather than waiting until an act of aggression had taken place. And, finally, the Defense-Treasury position giving preferential treatment in the granting of military and economic aid to states joining free world collective defense arrangements should be adopted.⁴⁵

The NSC, on 30 August 1956, accepted the first and third of these recommendations. It also made two significant changes in the statement of conditions under which the United States would take military action to resist overt communist aggression: it limited the application of US intervention by specifying that the states and territories to be aided must be not only in Southeast Asia but also in the treaty area; it specifically noted that the President would determine whether a threat to the national interest was so great as to justify military action without congressional approval. In this form, the NSC adopted NSC 5612. On 5 September, President Eisenhower approved the revised paper, which was then issued as NSC 5612/1.⁴⁶

Southeast Asia Policy in Retrospect

By the end of 1956, the United States had enjoyed some modest success in implementing its policy of containment in Southeast Asia. Most encouraging

was the emergence of what appeared to be a stable noncommunist regime in South Vietnam, a development that offered the United States an opportunity to build up an indigenous barrier to further communist expansion in at least one part of Southeast Asia. A modest beginning had also been made toward establishing a collective defense of the area. A number, but by no means all, of the noncommunist powers of the region had joined with the United States, Great Britain, and France in SEATO. By the second anniversary of the signing of the pact, the SEATO military machinery was organized and beginning to function.

In character, the system of part-time committees that had been set up represented the type of SEATO organization favored by the US Government and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Creation of an elaborate combined military command and staff had been successfully resisted, making it unlikely that the signatories would be called upon in the near future to assign specific national forces to SEATO control. This left the United States free to employ its mobile striking forces in the strategy favored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the general concept of the New Look. In Southeast Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw this New Look strategy as one of selective nuclear air attacks on centers of aggressor military strength. They conceived only a very limited role for ground forces.

Military Assistance

The strategy of the United States for general and limited war assigned a key role to forces of countries linked to the United States by mutual defense treaties. Since many of these allies could not afford to maintain the forces needed to play their assigned roles, the United States extended subsidies to them through a program of military aid. The furnishing of military assistance to friendly nations had begun in 1947 with the granting of assistance to Greece and Turkey pursuant to the Truman Doctrine. These initial programs were crash efforts designed to meet immediate communist pressures, both internal and external.

In 1948, following the ratification of the Brussels Treaty, the character of US military aid shifted from a stopgap response to immediate crises to a longer range effort to build up the forces of the major Western powers. The intention was to build a position of strength from which to deter Soviet aggression or to mount counterblows in the event of Soviet attack. During the same period, and increasingly after the outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950, military assistance programs were extended to free world countries in Asia. Military aid, usually provided in conjunction with collective security agreements, was a primary measure in support of the US policy of containing communist aggression.

The Program at the Beginning of 1955

At the beginning of 1955 the United States was furnishing military assistance to 37 countries, of which 30 were linked to the United States by mutual defense treaties. Western Europe was still the primary recipient, accounting for more than 70 percent of the total expended during FY 1954. The recipient countries were the following:¹

Rio Pact

Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Honduras
Nicaragua
Peru
Uruguay

SEATO

Cambodia (Protocol)
Pakistan
Philippines
Thailand
Vietnam (Protocol)

Bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties

Republic of China
Korea

NATO

Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Turkey
United Kingdom

No Treaty

Austria
Ethiopia
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Spain
Yugoslavia

Although the tendency had been toward extension of military assistance programs to additional countries, prospects for the future of the programs were not entirely bright at the beginning of 1955. There had been a downward trend in appropriations since a high point in FY 1952, when Congress had responded to a request for \$6.303 billion by appropriating \$5.744 billion. By FY 1954, administration requests and congressional responses had declined from this high by approximately 30 percent, and a much more drastic cut in military assistance funds had occurred in the program for FY 1955. For that year the administration requested only \$1.778 billion and Congress appropriated \$1.193 billion. This was a reduction of nearly 60 percent from the \$4.275 billion requested for FY 1954, and a still greater decline from the \$3.230 billion appropriated for that year. (See Table 9.) The Joint Chiefs of Staff had protested the reduction, pointing out to the Secretary of Defense at the time the administration program was being drawn up that the amount proposed for FY 1955 was inadequate to military needs.²

Table 9—MDAP Authorizations and Appropriations
(\$ millions)

FISCAL YEAR	AUTHORIZATION		APPROPRIATION	
	<i>Executive Branch Request</i>	<i>Authorization</i>	<i>Executive Branch Request</i>	<i>Authorization</i>
1950	\$1,400.0	\$1,314.0	\$1,314.0	\$1,314.0
1951*	5,222.5	5,225.5	5,178.0	5,222.5
1952	6,303.0	5,997.6	5,997.7	5,744.0
1953	5,425.0	4,598.4	4,598.4	4,219.8
1954	4,274.5	3,681.5	3,648.6	3,230.0
1955	1,778.3	1,591.0	1,580.0	1,192.7
1956	1,595.2	1,450.2	1,442.2	1,022.2
1957	2,925.0	2,225.0	3,000.0	2,017.5
1958	1,900.0	1,600.0	1,600.0	1,340.0

* Represents sum of two separate Executive Branch requests and congressional actions.

Source: Eval Div, Dir of Mil Asst, DCofS S&L, Hq USAF, *Information and Guidance on Military Assistance* (10th ed., 1966), p. 125.

Responsibilities and Procedures

The basic authority for the military assistance program at the beginning of 1955 was the Mutual Security Act of 1954. The most recent of the successive laws enacted since 1949, it authorized "measures in the common defense, including the furnishing of military assistance to friendly nations and international organizations."

Congress assigned broad authority to the President to administer the act, with the power to extend military assistance to "any nation whose increased ability to defend itself the President shall have determined to be important to the security of the United States." But Congress also laid down certain conditions. Assistance to any nation of the Near East, Africa, and South Asia could be furnished only in cases where the President found such aid was necessary to permit the recipient to play an important role in defensive plans and arrangements. In furnishing military aid in the Far East and Pacific areas, the President was directed to give the fullest assistance to the SEATO countries, including Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam; in Europe, military assistance to signatories of the European Defense Community Treaty was limited to nations that had actually ratified the treaty. Latin American nations could receive military assistance only in accordance with approved plans for Western Hemisphere defense.

In appropriating the money Congress set the total of military assistance and also exercised a degree of control over its allocation. Of the sum authorized for FY 1955, Congress specified that not more than \$617.5 million be allocated to Europe, \$181.2 million to the Near East (including Greece and Turkey), Africa, and South Asia, \$583.6 million to the Far East and Pacific, and \$13 million to Latin America.

In the same legislation Congress provided for termination of the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) by 30 June 1955. The FOA had been established in 1953 as an agency responsible to the President, charged with providing continuous supervision and coordination to all US foreign assistance operations. The congressional action could be viewed as an acceptance that aid programs to develop the economic and military strength of free world countries were a continuing rather than a temporary feature of US policy, since with the disestablishment of FOA its functions would be absorbed by permanent departments of the government. In this connection the Congress had prescribed that the Secretary of Defense would assume responsibility for the administration of military aid programs.³

President Eisenhower made this assignment of responsibility to the Secretary of Defense by an Executive Order on 6 November 1954. In a subsequent order he established the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) as a semiautonomous unit within the Department of State, to continue the FOA functions in the area of economic assistance. The President assigned responsibility to the Secretary of State for coordinating all mutual security programs, including the military aid programs administered by the Secretary of Defense.⁴

The Secretary of Defense, in defining military assistance responsibilities within his department, retained for himself the functions of determining broad policy and approving overall plans and programs. All other aspects of program management were delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), who was authorized to coordinate with other departments and agencies and to issue necessary directives and instructions to the Department of Defense components regarding their assigned duties and responsibilities. The military departments were responsible for preparing and executing programs, including the actual procurement of material. Assigned duties of unified commands and Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) included recommending fiscal year military assistance programs for their respective areas and the execution of the programs as finally approved.

The responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to provide military advice and recommendations, "including the continuous correlation of the Mutual Defense Assistance Programs with military programs designed to fulfill U.S. plans and objectives on a world-wide basis." Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would help in developing annual Mutual Defense Assistance Programs (MDAPs) by furnishing military objectives, force bases, and criteria for program development. They would also aid in refining the program as necessary to fit within the limits imposed by congressional appropriations and advise on allocation of appropriations among US military departments and recipient nations. Further they would recommend priorities to govern allocation of military end items among recipient nations and between them and the US armed forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would also influence military assistance policy through representation on the Mutual Defense Assistance Management Council, consisting of Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ISA), (Comptroller), and (Supply and Logistics), the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Logistics and Research and Development), the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Procurement) and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Materiel).

These assignments of responsibility were set forth in DOD Directive 5132.3, issued 24 November 1954, in which the Secretary of Defense also prescribed the general way in which the military aid programs would be developed each year. He directed the preparation of an international security plan to cover the "military, political, economic objectives, criteria, and proposed actions" with respect to the military assistance program, the military training program, infrastructure, facilities assistance, special weapons, base rights, and other subjects as necessary to discharge his responsibilities under the Mutual Security Act of 1954. Development of the plan would begin with preparation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of general planning criteria, security objectives, annual guidelines and force objectives. Upon approval by the Secretary of Defense, this material would be sent to commanders of unified commands as guidance in the preparation of recommended specific programs for their respective areas. The MAAGs would furnish plans for their respective countries for use in preparation of area plans by the unified commands. Upon receipt of the recommended plans, the Secretary of Defense would refer them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments for comment. Taking into account their responses, the Secretary would then prepare an intergraded overall international security plan.⁵

The preparation of annual military aid programs at the Washington level was an extended process. From the initiation of planning in the executive branch until final refinement to reduce the program to the amount actually funded by Congress, the activity consumed from 20 to 24 months. As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other agencies were involved in some stage of preparation of two annual military aid programs at all times. As 1955 began, President Eisenhower was about to present the FY 1956 program to Congress, and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson was soon to begin preparation of the program for FY 1957.

The FY 1956 Program

By the beginning of 1955, the Eisenhower administration had completed for presentation to Congress a military assistance program for FY 1956 that totaled \$1.4 billion. Of this sum, \$337.6 million was reserved for fixed charges and other prior commitments, leaving about \$1.1 billion for materiel and training. In addition, it appeared likely that some \$500 million would be available from unexpended appropriations of previous years, in large part owing to the cease-fire in Indochina. In January 1955, in order to permit the military departments to continue planning for FY 1956 and to support the forthcoming presentation to Congress, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) H. Struve Hensel requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend the allocation, by military department and by geographical area, of \$1.1 billion from expected FY 1956 appropriations and of a possible \$500 million from other sources.⁶

On 16 February the Joint Chiefs of Staff supplied the requested allocations, as follows:

Funds from FY 1956 Appropriations
(millions)

	<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>	<i>Total</i>
Europe	\$132.5	\$151.1	\$287.4	\$571.0
Near East	131.0	13.3	42.8	187.1
Far East	202.4	57.9	60.9	321.2
Western Hemisphere	2.2	8.1	10.4	20.7
Total	\$468.1	\$230.4	\$401.5	\$1,100.0

From Other Possible Funds
(millions)

	<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>	<i>Total</i>
Europe	\$ 20.0	\$ 33.6	\$132.1	\$185.7
Near East	80.0	13.9	32.3	126.2
Far East	37.0	40.1	103.5	180.6
Western Hemisphere	1.5	6.0	—	7.5
Total	\$138.5	\$93.6	\$267.9	\$500.0

In presenting these allocations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed concern that "the limited funds to be requested from Congress will not permit satisfactory progress toward the accomplishment of the FY 1956 MDAP objectives." According to estimates furnished the Secretary of Defense by the military departments, \$4.3 billion would be required to provide the materiel necessary for the FY 1956 approved force bases. Reduction of military assistance funds to the \$1.4 billion proposed by the administration would, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prevent satisfactory progress toward the accomplishment of the following essential military objectives:

- a. Creation of adequate defense forces in Japan.
- b. Conversion of aircraft and ground communications from VHF to UHF, and provision of necessary tactical air navigation and identification equipment.
- c. Provision for anticipated attrition including losses from current operations in the area of Formosa.
- d. Augmentation of equipment for forces in Turkey, Pakistan, Iran in accordance with planned programs.
- e. Completion of essential unit equipment and modernization requirements for existing forces for all services worldwide.
- f. Buildup of 90 days combat reserves of ammunition and equipment.⁷

By the time President Eisenhower submitted the FY 1956 Mutual Security Program to Congress on 20 April 1955, the total request for military assistance had been raised to \$1.595 billion. In early August, Congress appropriated \$1.022 billion—roughly one third less than the President had asked.⁸ A refinement of the administration's program, therefore, became necessary to bring it into line with the actual appropriations. On 31 August the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

directed the military departments to submit refined programs, and on 7 November he referred the Air Force and Navy responses to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review.⁹

The program submitted by the Air Force called for a total expenditure of \$266.4 million, divided as follows: for fixed program requirements such as training and accessorial charges, \$145.9 million; for offshore procurement of aircraft for the RAF, \$30.5 million; for fighter aircraft for West Germany, \$90 million. If this last item was not approved, the Air Force requested that some or all of a list of additional requirements be considered for subsequent programming during FY 1956. Included in this list were aircraft to replace losses by attrition and obsolescence in the air forces of NATO countries, Latin American countries, and Japan. Total cost of all items on this subsidiary list was \$225 million.

The Navy submission called for an expenditure of \$250.4 million divided among the following: refunding of projects authorized in previous years, \$166.5 million; shipbuilding and other materiel projects, \$56.8 million; training requirements, \$14.6 million; and packing, crating and transportation costs, \$12.5 million. The Navy also submitted a list of high priority projects that could not be included under the monetary ceiling but should receive first consideration under any supplemental programs that might be requested later in the fiscal year. This list, which included aircraft, ships, and various support items for Japan, Thailand, Greece, Germany, Turkey, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Brazil, and Haiti, carried a total price tag of \$50.9 million.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the refined Army programs on 23 November. At the same time, however, he informed them that due to the pressure of time, all the refined programs of the military departments had already been forwarded to the Director, International Cooperation Administration, for coordination with the Department of State and approval of the dollar value of the country programs. These programs accounted for all the FY 1956 MDAP except \$123.1 million still to be allocated.¹⁰

On 1 March 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the approved programs be carried out and then turned their attention to the \$123.1 million remaining to be allocated. They recommended the following distribution:¹¹

				<i>Army</i>
<i>Priority</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Project</i>	<i>Cost</i> <i>(millions)</i>	
1	Korea	Spare parts, training ammo	\$22.9	
2	Taiwan	Unit equip, training aids, ammo	10.0	
3	CINCPAC, CINCFE	Rebuild unserviceable vehicles	15.2	
4	Japan	Equipment for new AA units	<u>2.7</u>	
Total—Army			\$50.8	
				<i>Navy</i>
<i>Priority</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Project</i>	<i>Cost</i> <i>(millions)</i>	
1	Japan	8 P2V-7's	\$11.3	
2	Japan	20 S2F	15.0	
3	Brazil	2 SS	<u>3.2</u>	
Total—Navy			\$29.5	
				<i>Air Force</i>
<i>Priority</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Project</i>	<i>Cost</i> <i>(millions)</i>	
1	United Kingdom	OFC 84 Javelin	\$30.5	
2	Japan	Aircraft assembly project	10.7	
3	Turkey	Vehicles	<u>1.6</u>	
Total—Air Force			\$42.8	
Total—Overall			\$123.1	

The FY 1957 Program

Preparation of the MDAP for FY 1957, meanwhile, had been under way since February 1955. The first program to be developed under the new DOD Directive 5132.3, it began with the preparation of the International Security Plan called for by the directive. On 1 February the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide, as a basic framework for the Plan, a delineation of the major military objectives for the period through 30 June 1959 necessary to support the following general objectives: "developing and maintaining the US power position for a prolonged period of tension and cold war in consonance with the current Basic National Security Policy; averting general nuclear war; preventing the outbreak of local hostilities, . . . communist seizure or control of non-communist areas; and placing the United States in the best selective position should general or local hostilities occur." The military objectives were to be presented in order of priority and broken down by regions and countries.

Preparation of the International Security Plan would be guided by certain assumptions: that mutual nuclear deterrence made general war unlikely; that the Soviet Union and Communist China would seek to attain their objectives by all means short of engaging the United States and its allies in general war; that the United States would seek to deter local communist aggression by measures that would not lead to general war; that local military resources, together with US political and economic measures and possibly military resources in some areas, would be required to combat communist subversion; and that the US military resources available during the period of the plan would be about the same as proposed for FY 1956.¹²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, replying on 1 March 1955, took exception to one of the general objectives and one of the assumptions stated by the Deputy Secretary. Averting the general war, they felt, was not a desirable objective in all circumstances and should be sought only "insofar as is compatible with US security." The assumption that mutual nuclear deterrence would minimize the possibility of general war the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarded as an overstatement. They preferred to say that nuclear balance could create conditions of mutual deterrence to general war.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not indicate how the strategic objectives they submitted at the same time were affected by the general objective and assumption they had questioned. Their strategic objectives were stated in broad and general terms. The Joint Chiefs of Staff called for keeping Western Europe free of communist domination and armed at a level sufficient to deter Soviet aggression. These objectives would be attained by expanding and strengthening the NATO system, including exploitation of atomic capabilities within the alliance. For Northwest Africa, the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw the primary military objectives as the retention of military resources, strategic positions, and passage and base rights within the area. In the Middle East and remainder of Africa, they attached primary importance to similar objectives and also sought, on a selective basis, to develop indigenous military forces and encourage a regional defense arrangement. In the Far East and Pacific areas, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought to maintain the security of the island chain consisting of Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand; to build up the military establishments of noncommunist countries; and to encourage broadened collective security arrangements. In the Western Hemisphere the military objectives were to maintain the security of vital centers, particularly those of the United States and Canada, and to assist other nations to develop military forces capable of aiding in hemisphere defense and maintaining internal security.¹³

The process of tailoring a military assistance program to fit within the overall concept of the International Security Plan had begun even before the Joint Chiefs of Staff supplied the military objectives for the plan. On 17 February 1955 the Secretary of Defense requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to furnish military guidance for the initiation of planning for the FY 1957 MDAP, using the same premises and assumptions employed in preparing the military objectives for the International Security Plan. Their submission was to be the basis for guidance provided to the unified commands and military departments in developing their portions of the FY 1957 MDAP.¹⁴

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in submitting the requested military guidance on 17 March, expressed concern over the Secretary's assumption that annual military aid appropriations in the next four fiscal years would be no larger than the amount the administration was proposing for FY 1956. Reiterating their view on the FY 1956 program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Wilson they doubted that "satisfactory progress can be made toward the accomplishment of essential military objectives within the limited resources expected to be made available." This was particularly serious, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, because training and maintenance requirements could be expected to grow as deliveries of equipment increased. They therefore strongly recommended that all government agencies refrain from committing MDAP resources until the Joint Chiefs of Staff could express their views on the military necessity of such commitments and could assess the impact of each commitment on the MDAP as a whole.

The military guidance submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff consisted of two parts: force objectives and general planning criteria to be used by MAAGs and unified commands in preparing military aid programs for their respective areas. They noted that force objectives listed under each calendar year represented desired end positions, gauged to further the development of "a time-phased MDA Program as a corollary to the proposed International Security Plan." The force objectives for selected countries recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are shown in Table 10.

In making this submission the Joint Chiefs of Staff also sought to dispel some of the confusion that they believed had surrounded the meaning of certain military aid terms. The "force objectives" were goals—a set of ultimate figures defined as that portion of the forces needed to support US war plans and world-wide military objectives that the recipient countries were capable of raising and maintaining. "Force bases," on the other hand, they defined as that portion of the force objectives that should be funded under a given FY MDAP.

Under these definitions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider themselves to be the United States agency best qualified to determine force objectives because they also have the responsibility of developing global war plans and over-all U.S. military strategy. . . . It should be the function of the MAAGs and unified commanders to recommend force bases and appropriate revisions to force objectives with all such recommendations being referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for final determination.¹⁵

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been unanimous in recommending this programming guidance for FY 1957, the Chief of Staff, Air Force, had serious doubts of its feasibility. Addressing his colleagues on 31 March, General Nathan F. Twining expressed concern that the guidance "contains major combat force objectives which are not realistic and are not supportable with the MDA funds expected to be available over the next few years." He thought it incumbent upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to undertake a study that would result in "reasonable plans on a world-wide basis wherein there is a close correlation of the major combat force objectives to the MDA funds expected to be available." The study

Table 10—FY 1957 MDAP Force Objectives Recommendations
(selected countries)

Country	CY 1956	Original JCS CY 1957	CY 1958	MAAG**	Unified** Commands	Ad Hoc** Comm	Rev. JCS**
W. Germany							
Army	12 div	12 div	12 div	12 div, 7 brig	10 div, 7 brig	10 div	12 div
Navy	66 ships, 20 acft	225 ships, 50 acft	225 ships, 60 acft	194 ships, 58 acft	194 ships, 15 acft	129 ships, 15 acft	129 ships, 15 acft
Air Force	45 sq	48 sq	60 sq	65 sq	65 sq	60 sq	60 sq
United Kingdom							
Army	4½ div	4½ div	4½ div	4½ div	4½ div	4½ div	4½ div
Navy	639 ships	697 ships	732 ships	728 ships	732 ships	554 ships	579 ships
Air Force	128 sq	131 sq	131 sq	137 sq	137 sq	131 sq	131 sq
Iran							
Army	12 div	12 div	12 div	13 div	12 div	12 div	12 div
Navy	5 brig	5 brig	5 brig	5 brig	5 brig	5 brig	5 brig
Air Force	7 ships	7 ships	7 ships	16 ships	7 ships	7 ships	7 ships
Air Force	5 sq	5 sq	5 sq	7 sq	5 sq	5 sq	5 sq
Pakistan							
Army	5½ div	5½ div	5½ div	9 div	5½ div	5½ div	5½ div
Navy	14 ships	14 ships	14 ships	29 ships	29 ships	14 ships	14 ships
Air Force	6 sq	6 sq	6 sq	11 sq	6 sq	6 sq	6 sq
China							
Army	21 div	21 div	21 div	32 div	24 div	15 div	30 div
Navy	6 armcd gp	6 armcd gp	6 armcd gp	1 RCT	1 RCT	85 ships	85 ships
Air Force	82 ships	82 ships	82 ships	87 ships	87 ships	1 mar brig	1 mar brig
Air Force	3 mar brig	3 mar brig	3 mar brig	2 mar brig	2 mar brig	24 sq	24 sq
Air Force	26 sq	26 sq	26 sq	25 sq	25 sq	29 AAA bn,	29 AAA bn,
Air Force	6 AAA regt,	6 AAA regt,	6 AAA regt,	29 AAA bn	29 AAA bn	1 SL regt	1 SL regt
Air Force	1 SL regt	1 SL regt	1 SL regt				
Korea							
Army	30 div	30 div	30 div	30 div***	30 div***	30 div***	30 div***
Navy	67 ships,	67 ships,	67 ships,	62 ships,	62 ships,	61 ships,	61 ships,
Air Force	1 mar div	1 mar div	1 mar div	1 mar div	1 mar div	1 mar div	1 mar div
Air Force	4 sq	4 sq	4 sq	2 sq	2 sq	4 sq	4 sq
Vietnam							
Army	6 div	6 div	6 div	8 div	8 div	8 div	8 div
Navy	16 ships	16 ships	16 ships	12 ships	12 ships	12 ships	12 ships
Air Force	5 sq	5 sq	5 sq	5 sq	5 sq	5 sq	5 sq
Brazil							
Army	1 RCT	5 bn	5 bn	2 RCT	1 RCT	1 RCT	1 RCT
Navy	25 ships	25 ships	25 ships	4 bn	5 bn	5 bn	5 bn
Air Force	8 sq	8 sq	8 sq	27 ships	27 ships	27 ships	27 ships
Air Force				7 sq	7 sq	8 sq	8 sq

* JCS 2099/466, 14 Mar 55, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) BP 7.

** App to Encl B, JCS 2099/517, 13 Sep 55, same file, BP 5A.

*** N/H of JCS 2099/466, 4 Jan 56, same file, BP 7.

**** Includes reserve divisions.

should tabulate forces by area and by country into categories for which MDAP support was essential, desirable but not essential, or non-essential. It should also estimate costs of projected programs. General Twining recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff establish an ad hoc committee consisting of a general or flag officer from each Service to reappraise the military aid program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this suggestion on 11 May.¹⁶

When appointed, the ad hoc committee drew back from making the evaluation on as broad a basis as General Twining had suggested. In submitting proposed terms of reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 May, the committee recommended that its reappraisal of the MDAP be "based primarily on military considerations, modified as appropriate by the economic and political circumstances of the areas concerned." This was, in effect, the conventional system already employed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in determining force objectives. The committee did not, as General Twining had proposed, plan to make a "close correlation of the major combat force objectives to the MDA funds expected to be available over the next few years." It did expect to arrange the recipient countries in order of priority within their respective areas. In determining priority, the committee planned to consider military potential, economic capabilities and resources, and the political atmosphere of the various countries, but not the MDA funds expected to be available. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the proposed terms of reference on 3 June with only minor changes in phrasing.¹⁷

The ad hoc committee reported its findings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 13 September 1955 under the general title, "Reappraisal of Worldwide MDAP." The committee recommended force objectives that represented reductions in naval and air force categories but left the total of ground force units previously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the same. In the naval category, the committee suggested a reduction of 283 in the total of 2,616 ships recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the air power category, the committee recommended a reduction of 7 squadrons in the total of 550 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had listed.

The committee explained that these force objectives did not commit the United States to a specific or even a general amount of dollar aid, since no attempt had been made to list the forces that should actually be supported by the MDAP; that is, the force bases. The committee had arranged recipient countries within four geographic areas in relative order of priority for military assistance but had not attempted to establish priorities among the different areas themselves. The four geographic areas comprised Western Europe, the Middle East, the Far East, and Latin America. Of first priority in Europe were West Germany, Turkey, and the United Kingdom; in the Middle East, Iran; in the Far East, Japan; and in Latin America, Brazil.

As a further guide for the preparation of MDAP, the committee furnished a list of functional priorities, by geographical area. Of primary importance in all areas was maintenance of equipment already furnished. For Western Europe, the development of German forces ranked next in importance, followed by improvement of the air defense of Europe; after that came the general effectiveness of NATO forces, the capability of the United States to supply forces overseas, and the effectiveness of forces of non-NATO countries such as Spain. In the

Middle East, the strengthening of internal security in Iran ranked first; the improvement of forces to defend the Zagros Mountain line ranked second. In the Far East, the strengthening of internal security in the countries of Southeast Asia was first in priority, while the development of Japanese forces and defenses of the island chain extending from Japan to New Zealand ranked second and third. In Latin America, the strengthening of internal security was given first priority; hemisphere defense ranked second.¹⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the ad hoc committee's report on 21 October 1955 but only after revising the order of priorities among countries in the Far East and restoring some of the proposed cuts in force objectives. The changes placed Japan, Nationalist China, Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia all in first and equal priority. Admiral Radford had originated the proposal to place the last four countries in first priority because of the need to maintain local armed strength to counter growing communist threats to the area. Japan was elevated to first priority at the insistence of General Twining and General Taylor.¹⁹

On 8 November 1955 the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded the main body of the study to the Secretary of Defense for his information. On 4 January 1956 they submitted to him the resulting revised force objectives, as a modification of their previously submitted programming guidance for FY 1957.²⁰

While the Joint Chiefs of Staff were engaged during 1955 in this "Reappraisal of Worldwide MDAP" study, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) was seeking information from the commanders in the field, on a somewhat different basis than in the past, for use in developing the FY 1957 MDA Program. In the spring of 1955 Assistant Secretary Hensel arranged the dispatch of memorandums signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, CINCFE, the Secretary of the Army as executive agent for the Middle East and Latin America, and the Secretary of the Air Force as executive agent for Spain. The Deputy Secretary asked each addressee for "your frank and detailed analysis of the practicability of seeking to attain the JCS force objectives in the specified years." Each was asked to submit his estimate of the total forces likely to be available in his area of responsibility and of "those forces you think we should support in FY's 57, 58 and 59, under prior programs and under the FY 57 MDA Program." The responses should be completely realistic and should take particular account of each country's intent and ability to raise and maintain the forces that might otherwise be considered desirable.²¹

Budget Reductions and the FY 1957 Program

When the field responses were received and costed in early September, it was discovered that the field agencies were recommending projects that would require a total commitment of over \$7 billion in FY 1957. By this time the Bureau of the Budget had indicated its intention to reduce greatly the FY 1957 MDA budget from the levels in effect in previous years. As the \$7 billion figure was obviously unattainable and as there was not time for another round of responses

from the unified commands, Assistant Secretary Gordon Gray, who had replaced Mr. Hensel in July 1955, turned for help to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²²

On 12 September 1955, Mr. Gray requested them to recommend the priorities of projects by Service and recipient country to be funded in the MDAP for FY 1957. They were to base their recommendations on a review of existing programs and on the submissions of the unified commands, MAAGs, and military departments. They were also to be guided by the apparent intention of the Bureau of the Budget to lower FY 1957 MDA budget ceilings considerably from those of previous years and by the Department of Defense objective of presenting to the President "a sound FY 57 budget request reflecting realistic requirements which can be readily justified in the light of military considerations."²³

The dimensions of this realistic budget request were revealed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in further guidance from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) on 21 October. He advised them that the MDAP budget ceiling for FY 1957 would be \$2 billion, of which \$871 million would be required to fund fixed charges and previous commitments, leaving only \$1.13 billion for other materiel and training programs. In recognition of the stringency of this budgetary limitation, the Assistant Secretary requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit recommendations for the expenditure of an additional \$500 million and to indicate the effect on US national security objectives of a failure either to fund the additional amount or to fulfill the materiel and training requirements that had been validated by the military departments.²⁴

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found the amounts indicated in these budgetary guidelines inadequate to support the necessary military assistance programs. On 4 November they informed the Secretary of Defense that the "limited funds indicated as a ceiling . . . will not permit satisfactory progress toward the accomplishment of FY 1957 MDAP objectives." Projects computed by the MAAGs and refined by the unified commands and military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, confirmed requirements of \$7.137 billion in order to achieve national security objectives in accordance with current national policy.

In view of this discrepancy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not hold to the budgetary guidelines furnished by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA). They presented a materiel and training program totaling \$2.717 billion exclusive of fixed charges. This figure exceeded the guideline of \$1.629 billion by \$1.088 billion. But it was, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, austere to the point where any major diversion would seriously impair minimum essential programs in countries where reductions were imposed. It would also restrict buildup in areas of potential danger from communist aggression. Under the \$2.717 billion program, deficiencies would still remain in attaining the following objectives: provision of equipment for forces in being in Pakistan and Iran; maintenance of forces in being, to include attrition replacements; provision of equipment for air defense of Europe and Japan; replacement of overage ships and aircraft; provision of adequate war reserves of ammunition and equipment; completion of the equipping of units in existing forces; and provision of sufficient training ammunition to prevent depletion of already inadequate war reserves.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also detailed the measures that would be needed to reduce their proposed \$2.717 billion program excluding fixed charges to an "imposed level of \$2,000,000,000" including \$435.5 million for fixed charges. The overall effect on Army programs of these reductions would be to eliminate replacement of equipment lost through peacetime attrition, further reduce training ammunition; reduce the supply of essential spare parts, and eliminate all maintenance support for Yugoslavia and the NATO countries except Greece and Turkey. Navy programs would suffer from the elimination of most of the modernization of antisubmarine warfare, electronics, ordnance, and minesweeping capabilities, from further reduction of an already inadequate German program, and from elimination of programs for harbor defense. Air Force programs would be affected by elimination of spare parts support for Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany, and a 46 percent reduction of aircraft spare parts and training ammunition in all countries.²⁵

On 2 December the Department of Defense submitted its 1957 MDAP budget estimate to the Director, International Cooperation Administration. It called for the appropriation of \$3.025 billion, of which \$2.482 billion was for materiel and equipment. The remainder was for fixed charges and for direct forces support. This last category, which provided expendable supplies and services to other nations, had been carried as a separate budget item in previous years.²⁶

Thus the Department of Defense request had been revised upward, as urged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but it was \$234.7 million below what they had recommended. The lesser figure had been arrived at in part by total deletion of grant aid funds for materiel for the United Kingdom and West Germany, on the ground that both countries were now economically able to provide for their own defense.

In the preparation of the FY 1957 MDAP request, more attention had been given than in the past to the earmarking of funds specifically for the provision of advanced weapons to US allies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had first become involved in this aspect of the military aid program on 2 September 1955, when the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) asked them to furnish a list of new weapons and related equipment that could be programmed for NATO forces in FY 1957.²⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff furnished the requested information on 30 September. The modern weapons chosen were those "in inventory or in sufficient production," so that they might conceivably be programmed for NATO" in FY 1957. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the Secretary of Defense, however, that addition to MDAP of major items from the list would increase the funding requirements considerably because of their high unit cost. It might also result in fewer items being produced and delivered. As the means of providing more modern weapons to allies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred release of weapons by US forces as they were replaced by still more advanced types.²⁸

The idea of dealing specifically with the provision of new weapons to allies in the MDAP presentation received new impetus from one passage in the President's budget message on 16 January 1956. President Eisenhower informed the Congress that "my recommendations will enable us to provide our NATO partners with the modern defense weapons and equipment which we are furnishing

in increasing numbers to our own NATO forces in Europe." To make sure that the forthcoming MDAP presentation to Congress would "fully reflect to the maximum extent possible the President's policy and support his budget message," Secretary Wilson convened an ad hoc committee consisting of representatives of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, SACEUR, USCINCEUR, and the military departments. As a matter of urgency, the committee was to develop studies on providing new weapons to the allied command in Europe. It based its preliminary study on a priority listing for the equipping of NATO forces submitted by SHAPE. The military departments then indicated the weapons on the list that could be provided in the period 1958-1960 if funds could be made available in the FY 1957 MDAP. The information was then referred to SHAPE, which returned the following priority list drawn from the military department lists and tailored to varying availabilities of funding support:²⁹

If \$450 million were available:

F84-F atomic delivery kits	\$ 7.0 million
Early Warning Equipment	48.0
SAMs	240.0
Air-to-air missiles	48.0
AWX	45.0
Matador	12.5
Honest John	50.0

If \$500 million were available, add:

Matador	\$ 25.0 million
Naval aircraft missiles	.9
ASW	19.7

If \$600 million were available, add:

F-100	\$100.0 million
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On 10 February 1956 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend the extent to which SACEUR's proposals could be implemented, assuming appropriations of from \$450 to \$600 million in FY 1957.³⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, replying on 17 February, expressed doubt regarding the actual availability of the funds indicated in the Assistant Secretary's assumptions, unless they were to be procured by a downward adjustment of other MDAP goals that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would find unacceptable. They accordingly recommended that only \$140 million be considered for NATO modernization at present. This was the amount USCINCEUR had advised could be made available through reprogramming of the FY 1957 NATO MDA Program without serious adverse effect on the fulfillment of other requirements.

The list of weapons and equipment that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided the Secretary, however, was drawn up on the given assumption that up to \$600 million of MDAP funds could be made available for FY 1957. It was similar to the list submitted by SACEUR except in the allocation for surface-to-air missiles, cut from \$240 million to \$192 million.³¹

Ten days later, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the FY 1957 program, after further study and readjustment, now included \$420 million for new weapons. Included in the \$420 million was \$85 million available for allocation to NATO. The difference between \$85 million and the earlier JCS figure of \$140 million represented commitments already made regarding new weapons for Europe, mainly the recent decision to substitute F-100 aircraft for older types. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their advice on the "most strategic deployment" of the \$420 million worth of new weapons.³²

Before the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied, the Mutual Security Program for FY 1957 was presented to Congress in March. It included a definition of advanced weapons that appeared somewhat broader than the previous JCS submissions on the subject would suggest. They were described as "weapons developed subsequent to World War II," excluding fissionable materials. In the memorandum they forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 16 May 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that under this definition at least \$553 million of the aid program currently before Congress was for advanced weapons. They recognized that within this figure, the \$420 million on which JCS advice was requested consisted of \$85 million designated for substitution of new weapons for older types in NATO forces and \$335 million for advanced weapons as yet unallocated by area or country.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff observed that requirements for new weapons, properly related to a specific agreed strategy, were currently available only from the NATO area. Yet they could foresee that "in the near future requirements will exist for similar types of weapons in other areas, notably in the Far East." The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that sound recommendations on the most favorable deployment of new weapons to be purchased with the prospective \$420 million in MDAP funds could not be developed until certain steps had been taken: provision of information on available new weapons to MAAGs and unified commands; development by them of requirements for these weapons; determination of the capabilities of various allies to use the weapons; review and approval of these requirements at the Washington level; and final decision to release and program specific weapons to specific countries.³³

Acting to meet one of these requirements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a memorandum to USCINCEUR that reviewed developments to date on the provision of new weapons to allies under MDAP. They requested him to submit his plans for air defense of the NATO area; his requirements and justifications for selected new weapons to include, but not to be limited to, those involved in air defense; and his recommendations as to the most favorable strategic deployment of new weapons that would also stimulate allied and collective defense efforts.³⁴

In reply on 2 August, General Alfred M. Gruenther explained that requirements for new weapons in Allied Command Europe were not yet fully developed but that ground atomic support plans were being prepared by the major subordinate commands as the basis for further air defense studies. His recommendations on the allocation of new weapons recommended to Congress for the FY 1957

MDAP, assuming funding in the amount of \$201 million, included 13 Honest John batteries, F-84-F conversion kits for 800 aircraft, and an AWX squadron.³⁵

Assistant Secretary Gray, to whom USCINCEUR had forwarded the same recommendations on 4 July, requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review them. He also asked for recommendations regarding any new weapons that might be made available through MDAP to both NATO and non-NATO countries.³⁶

Refinement of the FY 1957 Program

The final disposition of the matter of new weapons became merged with the refinement of the FY 1957 MDAP. On 19 March 1956 the administration had presented to Congress its request for military assistance funds for FY 1957, totaling \$3 billion. Congress, as in past years, did not approve the full figure. After passing an authorization of \$2.225 billion in late July, it appropriated \$2.018 billion, a reduction of the President's request by nearly one third.³⁷ As a result, the administration was obliged to refine the program to bring it into line with available funds.

New refinement procedures had been worked out within the Department of Defense some five months previously. On 28 February the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) had proposed a procedure with a minimum number of steps, designed to meet a need cited by the NSC for refinement techniques that would reduce the time lag between congressional approval of the appropriation bill and clearance of the first items for shipment. The Assistant Secretary's plan called for the military departments to prepare refined programs within the limit of the appropriations. The revisions would then be reviewed jointly and finally by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ISA) and (Comptroller). The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed a modification in this procedure to allow them to reappraise MDAP requirements and recommend any necessary redistribution of funds among the military departments on a country-by-country basis. This reappraisal was necessary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, because of the time that would have elapsed since they submitted their recommended FY 1957 MDAP in November 1955.³⁸

In line with this recommendation, Assistant Secretary Gray on 20 August requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit a refined FY 1957 MDAP for materiel under a ceiling of \$2 billion—a figure that included current appropriations and funds available from prior years. They were also to incorporate the recommendations they were already preparing on the provision of modern weapons. In formulating this part of their response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were enjoined to bear in mind that the subject had become "extremely vital from both the foreign policy and congressional relations point of view, as contrasted from the military standpoint," because of "representations, implied commitments and assurances that have been made publicly to NATO, and in the presentation of the FY 1957 Military Assistance Program to Congress." The President and other administra-

tion officials had provided heavy justification that there was overriding necessity for inclusion in future programs of a significant new weapons component.

Further, Secretary Gray directed the inclusion within the \$2 billion figure of a number of programs dictated by US political commitments: \$25 million for Iran to meet a pledge made in July 1955; \$5 million for Ethiopia; \$183 million for Turkey; \$23.6 million for aircraft to meet commitments made to Portugal during base rights negotiations; and \$2.7 million to fulfill a new commitment to Libya.³⁹

A request for military aid had first been made by the Libyan Prime Minister during base rights negotiations in July 1954. Although receiving the request sympathetically, the United States took no action on it until November 1955, when Egypt offered to supply Libya's arms needs from stocks received from the Soviet bloc. To prevent an extension of Soviet influence to an Arab country aligned with the West, the Department of State proposed and the Department of Defense agreed to a grant of \$1.12 million to Libya. This was a combined US-British program paid for entirely by the United States.⁴⁰

Assistant Secretary Gray, looking to further steps in the program, had asked for JCS views on the advisability of granting aid of up to \$6.5 million, the overall amount the Libyans had estimated they needed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 7 March 1956, concluded that an expansion of the Libyan Army was desirable and recommended the dispatch of a military survey team to ascertain the Libyan requirements more precisely. The survey team recommended expenditure of \$2.7 million in US military aid for Libya during the period FY 1957-1959. This was the basis for Secretary Gray's instruction to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject.⁴¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their recommended refinement of the FY 1957 MDAP to the Secretary of Defense on 9 October 1956. It totaled \$1.986 billion, divided as follows among the geographical areas: Europe, \$791.1 million; Middle East, \$226.2 million; Far East, \$923.9 million; Latin America, \$29.1 million; worldwide, \$15.3 million. (Table 11 contains a detailed presentation.) It was notable that here, for the first time, the recommended allocation for the Far East exceeded that for Europe. In part, this situation reflected the fact that, in accordance with the guidance received from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), the JCS proposal included no funds for materiel for the United Kingdom or Germany.

In their forwarding memorandum the Joint Chiefs of Staff said they welcomed the transition of the United Kingdom and Germany from grant-aid to self-sustaining status.

In this connection, it would appear that Belgium and perhaps other European NATO countries may also be able to provide completely for their own military needs in the near future. Belgium has such an industrial capacity and favorable foreign exchange position that she might be able to make the transition from grant-aid status at the end of FY 1957.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were including aid for Belgium in their MDAP planning for FY 1958, but they recommended that the Department of State be asked to analyze the economic and political considerations and, if appropriate, open negotiations for termination of grant military assistance to Belgium after FY 1957. The

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) passed this recommendation to the Department of State with his endorsement on 12 December 1956. He suggested that, if it appeared impracticable to terminate grant aid completely, it might be desirable to offer modern weapons on a grant basis in return for a Belgian commitment to "assume all further financing of build-up and maintenance requirements for conventional forces."⁴²

Of the \$791.9 million recommended for Europe in the refined FY 1957 MDAP, \$197.9 million, or about one fourth, was earmarked for advanced weapons. Included were 12 Honest John battalions, two Matador squadrons, Nike missiles for 11 battalions whose basic equipment had previously been funded, and certain antisubmarine warfare equipment. Outside the European allotment there was \$19.8 million for naval aircraft for Japan, raising the total for new weapons worldwide to \$217.7 million.

Earlier in 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had forwarded to Secretary Wilson a recommended statement of policy on providing new weapons and weapon systems to allied forces under the MDA program. They noted that it was both in consonance with national policy and desirable from the military point of view to equip selected allied forces with such weapons, including those with an atomic capability. Under existing legislation, however, atomic weapons could not be released to the custody of allied forces.

The policy statement recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for issuance within the Department of Defense emphasized the principle of selectivity. "The advisability and practicability of the release of a weapon or weapons system to Allied forces should constitute a separate problem in each case," with security, budgetary, and strategic factors all being considered. Also, the provision of new weapons under MDAP should be coordinated with, and contribute to, the continuing modernization of US forces:

As more advanced weapons, systems and equipment become available for operational use by U.S. forces, the less modern counterparts should be released to appropriate Allies, especially in those areas where such release would improve over-all Allied readiness. This, however, does not preclude the release of the newest types when appropriate.

The last sentence was intended to bring the statement into conformance with a presentation the Secretary of Defense had made before the North Atlantic Council in December 1955. There he had stressed the US intention of supplying recently developed weapons to NATO allies who had the capability of maintaining and using them effectively. In many instances, Secretary Wilson said, new equipment was already being delivered to NATO allies concurrently with its assignment to US forces.⁴³

Final disposition of the policy statement recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 March 1956 was not made until late in the year. The action followed a submission by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November in which they advised the Secretary of Defense that they were concerned about some aspects of the way the provision of new weapons to allies had been handled during development of the

**Table 11—Joint Chiefs of Staff FY 1957
Refined Mutual Defense Assistance Program**

Area/Country	Army	Navy	Air Force	Totals
Europe				
Belgium	3,324,144	104,672	25,641,000	29,069,816
Denmark	189,945	341,737	14,735,000	15,266,682
France	19,102,393	15,742,906	16,128,000	50,973,299
Germany	—	—	—	—
Greece	27,490,683	12,719,155	85,692,550	125,902,388
Italy	13,248,430	12,655,862	26,618,000	52,522,292
Luxembourg	468,640	—	—	468,640
Netherlands	2,349,874	9,232,488	11,973,000	23,555,362
Norway	1,276,106	8,222,259	29,200,000	38,698,365
Portugal	1,999,576	911,040	26,578,000	29,488,616
Spain	28,194,314	21,482,280	6,163,000	55,839,594
Turkey	122,000,000	29,602,062	51,820,000	203,422,062
Yugoslavia	9,276,655	752,880	2,952,000	12,981,535
New Weapons	122,000,000	—	29,500,000	151,500,000
OSP—Ammunition	1,400,000	—	—	1,400,000
Total—Europe	\$352,320,760	\$111,767,341	\$327,000,550	\$791,088,651
Middle East				
Ethiopia	3,588,449	587,080	—	4,175,529
Iran	44,612,716	4,354,913	9,685,000	58,652,629
Iraq	16,752,092	—	—	16,752,092
Libya	1,671,272	—	—	1,671,272
Pakistan	113,696,265	20,540,875	10,690,000	144,927,140
Total—Middle East	\$180,320,794	\$25,482,868	\$20,375,000	\$226,178,662
Far East				
Cambodia	8,779,626	1,085,699	558,000	10,423,325
Japan	19,349,385	59,892,393	64,115,391	143,357,169
Korea	421,081,051	3,051,834	53,322,809	477,455,694
Laos	9,046,630	—	592,000	9,638,630
Philippines	4,039,484	2,102,390	8,339,753	14,481,627
Taiwan	88,891,710	35,306,115	43,353,420	167,551,245
Thailand	6,116,730	4,446,281	3,367,000	13,930,011
Vietnam	71,917,224	3,631,833	4,340,000	79,889,057
Vehicle Rebuild	7,168,000	—	—	7,168,000
Total—Far East	\$636,389,840	\$109,516,545	\$177,988,373	\$923,894,758
Latin America				
Brazil	1,244,090	2,535,481	9,863,000	13,642,571
Chile	326,089	1,636,569	1,323,000	3,285,658
Colombia	83,736	35,000	1,494,000	1,612,736
Cuba	16,015	1,381,833	1,750,000	3,147,848
Dominican Republic	—	162,600	1,025,000	1,187,600
Ecuador	90,225	355,693	1,209,000	1,654,918
Guatemala	50,974	—	—	50,974
Haiti	—	14,760	—	14,760
Honduras	33,103	—	—	33,103
Nicaragua	—	—	—	—
Peru	251,692	316,576	2,394,000	2,962,268
Uruguay	—	226,209	1,296,000	1,522,209
Total—Latin America	\$2,095,924	\$6,664,721	\$20,354,000	\$29,114,645
Worldwide—Class V Mod	—	—	15,300,000	15,300,000
Totals	\$1,171,127,318	\$253,431,475	\$561,017,923	\$1,985,576,716

Source: JCS 2099/665, 6 Oct 56, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) BP 13.

FY 1957 MDAP. They noted that in the early years of the military assistance program the United States had of necessity drawn on World War II stocks to equip allied forces. Some criticism had been heard that obsolete materiel was being dumped, or that the United States was modernizing its own forces without making equal provision for its allies. "The current situation, however, is entirely different," the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote. "Military assistance programs are, in the main, drawing on military stocks for equipment in current use by U.S. forces."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that this fact had been obscured by the particular attention given in recent months to certain new weapons; there had emerged a concept of "new" or "advanced" weapons, generally regarded as those which have been developed and produced since the Korean War.

This has resulted in specific listings of a few particular weapons or items of equipment, and their identification with some philosophy of advanced warfare. There is also a tacit intimation that all other items in military assistance programs belong to a strategy now being superseded. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the record should be set straight. The small list of items so far identified as "new weapons" is in no way illustrative of the vastly larger amounts of truly modern equipment being programmed for our allies.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that all weapons in use by US forces or listed on current inventories be considered as modern weapons for the purpose of MDA programming. The terms new weapons and advanced weapons should be dropped, and "modernization" should be used instead. When it was necessary to distinguish the armaments having an atomic delivery capability, they should be referred to as atomic delivery weapons.⁴⁴

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) repounded to these recommendations on 8 December 1956. He agreed that it was highly desirable to avoid the implication that weapons not tabbed as new or advanced were outmoded, but Secretary Gray considered that titles to distinguish among various categories of equipment were necessary for effective MAP planning and administration. Admittedly, some of the terms had come into use "because of the distinctions that have been made in presenting the 1957 program to the Congress, or because of the statements made to our NATO partners," but he saw a need for other and perhaps additional terms. Nomenclature that distinguished materiel drawn from Service stocks from that taken from current production, for instance, would facilitate the computation of costs and lead-times. It should be possible, he wrote, to find classifications that "do not necessarily imply that all weapons in other categories are of a lower usefulness." Secretary Gray undertook to treat the matter of terminology more fully during the next round of military assistance programming guidance. He believed the statement of policy recommended earlier by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was now unnecessary, though he took the occasion to reaffirm its central thought: "We will look to the military departments . . . to take the required action within military assistance programming to strengthen allied forces by the introduction of more modern weapons and weapons systems for allied forces on a selective basis."⁴⁵

NSC Review of Military Assistance Policies

During the long span of months in which the FY 1957 MDAP was being prepared, the administration had also been conducting an overall reappraisal of US military assistance policies. This review, ordered by President Eisenhower in October 1954 on the recommendation of the National Security Council, resulted more than a year later in a proposal by the Planning Board for a major revision in the manner of providing aid. Reporting on 29 November 1955, the Board recommended that more flexibility to meet unprogrammed emergency requirements be attained by placing a substantial portion of the annual military and economic aid funds in a presidential contingency fund, rather than allocating all funds to specific countries and programs as was the current practice. Although all members of the Board agreed in principle to the establishment of a contingency fund, the Treasury Department and Bureau of the Budget members believed that it should be incorporated in the FY 1957 program, whereas the majority proposed no specific date for establishing such a fund.

With the JCS adviser dissenting, the Planning Board also recommended a review of the aid programs for Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Korea on the ground that "in each of these countries the armed forces (1) do not represent total military requirements, (2) cannot be supported by the local economy now or in the foreseeable future, and (3) require US subsidies at an annual cost ranging from \$100 million to \$800 million each."⁴⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after reviewing the Planning Board report, recommended against both of its proposals. The contingency fund, they agreed, would permit reaction to international emergencies without raiding funds earmarked for specific country programs. But they feared that earmarking a portion of the limited FY 1957 funds for emergency use would jeopardize the funding of programs necessary for an orderly buildup toward approved worldwide force objectives. They, therefore, recommended that the contingency fund not be established unless the administration sought from Congress the full \$2.7 billion for FY 1957 MDAP that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended on 9 November.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also opposed a review of the aid programs for Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Korea. They held that individual country programs should be developed, not in isolation, but in the light of worldwide military requirements and the total resources available. This process, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, had just been completed in their own "Reappraisal of Worldwide MDAP" study, which had provided the basis for revised force objectives shortly to be submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for use in preparing the FY 1957 MDAP.⁴⁷

The NSC took up the Planning Board proposals and the JCS views on 8 December. It took no action to introduce the contingency fund into the FY 1957 program but ordered further study of this and other means of attaining greater flexibility in the administration of foreign assistance. The NSC did direct a review for the six individual country programs listed by the Planning Board, to be conducted by a committee representing the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury and the International Cooperation Administration.⁴⁸

In January 1956 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to supply, for use in the interdepartmental committee's study, the JCS force objectives for each country and a statement of the current status of existing forces, including their general capabilities and annual maintenance costs. While the study was in progress, he requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to supply similar information on Thailand and Spain, which were not on the original list.⁴⁹

In its report in August 1956 the interdepartmental committee discussed various courses of action and the factors to be considered in evaluating them, but it made no specific recommendations.⁵⁰ On 26 October President Eisenhower discussed the report with the NSC and decided to order further studies. He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare reports for the NSC stating the minimum level of forces that it would be in the interest of the United States to support in Pakistan, Taiwan, Turkey, and Iran over the next two years. The Planning Board was directed to review the scope and allocation of US aid to the same four countries, plus Korea, with a view to recommending revisions in the policy.⁵¹

In submissions made during November 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff affirmed that the existing force levels for Pakistan were the effective minimum. With a more extensive supporting discussion, they presented substantially the same conclusion with respect to the force levels for Taiwan, Turkey, and Iran, and also Iraq. These JCS memorandums were passed to the Planning Board for use in its directed study; the resulting report, submitted in 1957, had its impact on the preparation of aid programs in the years beyond the scope of this volume.⁵²

The FY 1958 Program

Because of the built-in overlap in the system for developing military assistance programs, preparation of the FY 1958 MDAP began at about the same time that President Eisenhower presented the program for FY 1957 to Congress. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this process began on 15 March 1956 when Assistant Secretary Gray asked them to provide programming guidance for use in the development of the FY 1958 MDA program.⁵³

On 13 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted the requested program guidance, consisting of the JCS force objectives accompanied by instructions and planning criteria for use by the MAAGs and the commanders of unified commands. In all but a few instances the newly recommended force objectives were the same as those the Joint Chiefs of Staff had listed the previous year. The changes in total numbers of aircraft squadrons, naval vessels, and ground units were as follows:⁵⁴

Country	Squadrons	Ships	Marines
Norway	-2		
Portugal	+1	+2	
Ethiopia		+7	
Iran		+4	
Pakistan		+3	
Korea	+5		+2 bns and 1 co

In another move to gather information on which to base the FY 1958 MDAP, the Secretary of Defense late in March requested the commanders of the unified commands to prepare lists of "accomplishments expected of the MDA program based on operational missions and tasks assigned to those forces for which military assistance is to be programmed." Lists were to be arranged in order of priority.⁵⁵ To facilitate their preparation, OSD officials convened a conference in Washington during April, attended by representatives of the unified commands, the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Following this conference, the unified commands completed and submitted the desired lists.

On 4 May, Assistant Secretary Gray requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the lists because a preliminary review indicated possible discrepancies between them and the programming guidance recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 13 April. Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked to determine if the forces recommended by the unified commands were consistent with the JCS force objectives, determine if the tasks and missions listed for MDA-supported forces were consistent with JCS plans for employing those forces in limited or general war, and recommend any changes in FY 1958 programming guidance resulting from the review. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were also asked to integrate the area lists into a world-wide order of importance to serve as a basis for MDA programming, recommending any changes necessary to assure that only the minimum essential forces and levels of support were placed in the higher priority categories.⁵⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, replying on 31 May 1956, pointed out that a response in the exact terms of the request was not feasible because the unified commands had listed so many country forces in the first priority that it alone would far exceed in cost any reasonable expectation for MDAP funds in a single fiscal year. An inflexible statement of worldwide MDAP priorities the Joint Chiefs of Staff found to be undesirable in any event. In establishing MDAP force objectives for friendly countries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained, they did not expect that all forces would be organized and totally equipped in a short period of time. Growth of these units depended upon many factors beyond the control of the United States, and the unified commands should be in a position to respond to those varying conditions in administering the MDAP.

The essential programming problem, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed, was "how best to spend the limited MDAP funds in view of great world-wide requirements." From this problem derived the question of how best to instruct unified commands so that the military aid programs they submitted were prop-

erly related to the strategic concept, were designed to achieve the most judicious allocation of resources within a reasonable fund limitation, and were open to direct comparison with those of other areas by virtue of being based on specific criteria.

As an answer to this question, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the forwarding to the unified commands of a list of accomplishments desired of the MDA Program that included such items as maintenance of equipment, training of forces, provision of new weapons to selected allies, supply of equipment to remedy deficiencies in selected units, and improvement of base facilities. The commanders of unified commands would be asked to prepare country sheets showing high, medium, and low priority forces, the primary mission envisioned for them, and the maintenance and training to be furnished. The commanders should also be advised that in preparing FY 1958 MDAP requests they should observe a monetary ceiling of one and one-half times the amount requested of the Congress for their areas in the FY 1957 program.⁵⁷

The purpose of this last recommendation, according to one of the officers responsible for drafting it, was to avoid repetition of the situation that had arisen during preparation of the FY 1957 program, when computation of requirements in the field without a stated fund limitation had yielded figures so large as to be of little use in preparing a program within the limits of reasonable fund expectations. To avoid a "useless spinning of wheels through billions of dollars of meaningless requisitions," it was proposed that a fund limitation be "clamped on right from the start."⁵⁸

The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were favorably received in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA). On 11 June, Assistant Secretary Gray proposed to Admiral Radford certain changes in the guidance recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman upheld the JCS position but offered no objection to the matter being referred to Secretary Wilson for resolution. Mr. Gray then prepared a memorandum to Admiral Radford for Secretary Wilson's signature. It rejected the imposition of a budget ceiling on the unified commands and military departments because such action would tend to freeze the present ratio of distribution of funds among Services and unified command area. The proposed memo would also prevent determination of valid military requirements and would provide no guidance as to future aid levels needed to complete buildups then in process or to maintain existing forces.

The memorandum also stated an objection to the top priority assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to maintenance of existing equipment and forces. This could be interpreted as "authorizing high priority accomplishments such as the provision of new weapons, modernization, attrition replacement, etc., only after maintenance of equipment and training for existing MDAP-supported forces had been provided." Secretary Wilson signed the memorandum on 13 June, apparently on the understanding that it had Admiral Radford's concurrence. Copies were handed to representatives of the unified commands by OSD officials at a Washington conference the next day.⁵⁹ No change was made thereafter, although Admiral Radford again presented the Joint Chiefs of Staff position during a meeting with Secretary Wilson, and he later forwarded a detailed written defense of their stand to the Secretary.⁶⁰

On 20 August the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a budget estimate for the FY 1958 Military Assistance Program under a ceiling of \$2.9 billion. The ceiling figure would cover new obligational authority to be requested of Congress for equipment and supplies, training, Mutual Weapons Development Programs, and Facilities Assistance Programs, but would not include costs of fixed charges and special programs. In programming this \$2.9 billion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were instructed to include a number of specific allocations: \$183 million for Turkey; \$120 million for Pakistan to complete the US commitments made as a result of decisions reached in Washington in March 1956; \$1 million for Libya; \$25 million for Iran to ensure fulfillment of the US commitment made on 19 July 1955. These programs, designed to meet US political commitments, would be continuations of the ones included in the refined FY 1957 MDAP.⁶¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their budget estimate for FY 1958 MDAP to the Secretary of Defense on 9 October 1956. They recommended that the Congress be asked to appropriate \$2.998 billion for materiel programs for FY 1958. In contrast to the proportions in the JCS refined MDAP for FY 1957, the budget estimate for FY 1958 once again gave first place to Europe, with 54 percent of the total, whereas the Far East would receive 34 percent. (See Table 12.) The provision of new weapons again received attention, with \$738 million recommended for the purpose. Nearly all of this sum was earmarked for NATO, to provide members of the alliance with 14 Nike battalions, 14 Honest John battalions, 13 F-100D squadrons, and 26 naval aircraft. The remaining funds were intended to provide Japan with a Matador squadron and Cuba with four naval aircraft.⁶²

Since the time available for completing the FY 1958 MDAP was now growing short, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Perkins McGuire, the official directly responsible for the preparation of the program, convened a series of meetings of representatives from all interested Department of Defense agencies. Attending were representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Comptroller) and (Supply and Logistics). The purpose was to achieve simultaneous consideration by all these agencies, rather than soliciting their views individually. The paper prepared by the OASD(ISA) staff following these consultations amounted to a drastic downward revision of the JCS recommendations. The new figure, circulated to the interested parties on 22 October, represented a cut of about 40 percent—from \$2.998 to \$1.773 billion.⁶³

The following day, Admiral Radford informed Secretary Wilson that he considered that "reductions in the magnitude proposed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) . . . are militarily unsound and cannot be supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." If cuts of this size were necessary, the Chairman continued, "a new ceiling should be given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to permit the development of alternate programs."⁶⁴

Further meetings then took place among the agency representatives under the leadership of Secretary McGuire, at which it was explained that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) had concluded that Congress could not be expected to appropriate more than \$2.5 billion for the entire FY 1958 military assistance pro-

**Table 12—Joint Chiefs of Staff FY 1958 Mutual
Defense Assistance Program Budget Estimate (materiel)**

<i>Area/Country</i>	<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>	<i>Totals</i>
Europe				
Belgium	16,954,702	13,359,859	104,393,473	134,708,034
Denmark	6,798,147	12,970,187	19,174,070	38,942,404
France	101,244,398	50,734,095	187,719,281	339,697,774
Germany	—	—	—	—
Greece	78,740,512	19,332,179	22,060,621	120,133,312
Italy	97,666,551	29,882,787	87,732,133	215,281,471
Luxembourg	307,358	—	—	307,358
Netherlands	21,791,405	615,851	109,211,876	131,619,132
Norway	1,721,105	9,074,630	28,848,777	39,644,512
Portugal	3,104,935	4,571,463	4,885,635	12,562,033
Spain	33,824,846	11,338,079	9,666,828	54,829,753
Turkey	120,000,000	27,221,046	48,142,927	195,363,973
Yugoslavia	6,520,502	638,440	8,253,647	15,412,569
New Weapons	306,127,720	—	—	306,127,720
Total—Europe	\$794,802,181	\$179,738,616	\$630,089,268	\$1,604,630,065
Middle East				
Ethiopia	3,785,720	636,777	—	4,422,497
Iran	91,619,833	8,679,109	3,122,131	103,421,073
Iraq	38,749,539	—	—	38,749,539
Libya	471,000	—	—	471,000
Pakistan	119,338,040	11,491,241	9,983,846	140,813,127
Total—Middle East	\$253,964,132	\$20,807,127	\$13,105,977	\$287,877,136
Far East				
Cambodia	4,282,844	1,119,525	345,310	5,747,679
Japan	26,616,947	73,231,525	145,470,275	245,318,747
Korea	351,526,029	10,794,616	14,009,531	376,330,177
Laos	7,956,407	—	538,498	8,494,905
Philippines	11,913,521	2,260,250	6,054,113	20,227,884
Taiwan	97,965,700	37,764,646	47,294,560	183,024,906
Thailand	8,401,573	9,703,092	5,123,801	23,228,466
Vietnam	43,629,865	4,402,472	1,919,796	49,952,133
Vehicle Program	111,325,431	—	—	111,325,431
Total—Far East	\$663,618,317	\$139,276,126	\$220,755,885	\$1,023,650,328
Latin America				
Brazil	1,277,925	9,357,857	1,842,153	12,477,935
Chile	180,900	2,156,245	2,541,460	4,878,605
Colombia	286,492	122,900	1,217,497	1,626,889
Cuba	62,706	3,555,600	947,418	4,565,724
Dominican Republic	—	747,489	149,372	896,861
Ecuador	149,586	228,234	243,638	621,458
Guatemala	—	—	—	—
Haiti	—	64,760	—	64,760
Honduras	42,021	—	—	42,021
Nicaragua	—	—	—	—
Peru	457,415	470,700	1,801,210	2,729,325
Uruguay	—	514,558	247,190	761,748
Total—Latin America	\$2,457,045	\$17,218,343	\$ 8,989,938	\$28,665,326
Worldwide				
Class V Mod	—	—	15,300,000	15,300,000
Support Equip	—	—	38,008,100	38,008,100
Total—Worldwide			53,308,100	53,308,100
Totals	\$1,714,841,675	\$357,040,212	\$926,249,168	\$2,998,131,055

Source: JCS 2099/665, 6 Oct 56, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) BP 13.

gram. The figure recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for materiel alone would therefore have to be reduced by \$1 billion. Because of the pressure of time, this reduction was carried out in the meetings of the representatives. Major General Robert M. Cannon, USA, the JCS Special Assistant for Mutual Defense Assistance Affairs, reported to Admiral Radford that the meetings were conducted in an objective, fair and completely reasonable manner. The final revision worked out there was a program of \$1.989 billion. General Cannon had concurred informally in this figure, and he recommended that Admiral Radford "support the program as proposed by ISA." Perhaps because of the shortage of time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff received no formal request for their views on the revised program.⁶⁵

The total program figure had shrunk still more—to \$1.900 billion—by the time President Eisenhower made his request to Congress for funds to support the FY 1958 MDAP. Congress cut this total to \$1.340 billion, a sum that represented a reduction of about 30 percent in the President's request and about 66 percent in the amount originally recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The period 1955–1956 thus ended with a resumption of the downward trend in appropriations for military assistance, which had been briefly reversed by Congress when it appropriated slightly more than \$2 billion for FY 1957. The period nevertheless ended with appropriations at a somewhat higher level than at its beginning: \$1.340 billion for FY 1958 as against \$1.022 billion for FY 1956. (See Table 9.)

Continental Defense

Two weapons developed during World War II, the long-range bomber and the nuclear bomb, had given rise to a new form of threat to the United States—that of a direct attack upon the continental homeland. No longer could the nation's security be assured by a Navy powerful enough to prevent an enemy troop landing. It now became necessary to construct a coordinated air defense system, combining interceptors, anti-aircraft guns and missiles, early warning radars, and data processing facilities, that would be capable of blunting a Soviet air attack employing nuclear weapons.

The need for effective air defenses had been perceived by US military leaders at the end of World War II, but efforts to establish them were hindered by the difficulty of finding sufficient funds within the limited defense budgets of the early postwar period. In large part the relatively low level of defense expenditures reflected the general sense of security engendered by the US nuclear monopoly, which was looked on by many as a deterrent to war. This monopoly ended in August 1949, when the Soviets exploded an atomic bomb. Less than a year later, communist forces under Soviet sponsorship attacked the Republic of Korea, demonstrating a willingness to engage in direct aggression that set off a major military buildup by the United States. The continuing US rearmament program received a further stimulus when the Soviets detonated a thermonuclear device in August 1953.

Policy and Progress in Early 1955

Air defense forces and their supporting warning and control systems were greatly strengthened as part of the US rearmament effort. To guide the buildup of these defenses, President Eisenhower, on 24 February 1954, had approved as basic policy the statement adopted by the National Security Council under the designation NSC 5408. In this paper, the National Security Council had pointed out that a continental defense was a "necessary element of our defenses," along with offensive striking forces, peripheral defense (allies and bases overseas),

and a strong mobilization base. The continental defenses, the National Security Council concluded, were now clearly inadequate, particularly in the light of the recently demonstrated Soviet thermonuclear capabilities. Accordingly, plans for improving the defense of vital installations within the United States should proceed in a rapid and orderly fashion.

The objective was to achieve, in collaboration with Canada, a continental defense readiness and capability. Such a capability should give reasonable assurance of preventing a devastating Soviet attack that might threaten the survival of the United States, minimizing the effects of any Soviet attack actually launched, and preventing the threat of atomic destruction from discouraging US freedom of action or weakening national morale. To achieve these objectives, the National Security Council recommended specific military programs in two categories of priority. Major elements to be developed to "a high state of readiness with all practicable speed" included the fighter-interceptor and antiaircraft forces, the seaward extension of the basic system of fixed radars covering most of the United States and southern and eastern Canada, and the mid-Canada early warning radar line together with its seaward extensions. Major elements to be developed to a high state of readiness by the beginning of 1957 included the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line and an air defense control system employing semiautomatic control centers.¹

By the beginning of 1955, some progress had been made toward attaining these objectives. The fighter-interceptor force then consisted of 67 squadrons out of a total of 82 programmed for activation by June 1957. Antiaircraft forces consisted of 48 gun and 19 missile battalions. When ongoing programs were completed in 1956, antiaircraft battalions would total 100, but the mix would show an increase in missile-equipped units, which would then total 61 battalions while gun battalions would decline to 39.

At the beginning of 1955, the radar warning systems consisted of 83 permanent radars in the United States, 33 permanent radars of the Pine Tree system in Canada, 12 permanent radars in Alaska, and six shipborne radars stationed off the east coast of the United States. These stations combined to give contiguous coverage of most of the important industrial regions and heavily populated areas of the United States and Canada. By 1957, this detection system was scheduled to be improved and extended to cover virtually all of the United States by means of 78 additional fixed radar sites. Coverage of contiguous Atlantic and Pacific coastal waters was to be extended by the addition of 36 radar ships and six squadrons of radar-equipped aircraft. To detect enemy aircraft approaching at altitudes too low for detection by the permanent radar net, a system of gap-filler radars was planned. It consisted of 423 stations scheduled for completion in 1959. None of the stations had been constructed at the beginning of 1955. (See Table 13.)

These radars, when completed, would give thorough close-in coverage of the United States and the heavily populated areas of southern Canada, but there was the further need to detect approaching bombers at the greatest possible range. The President's approval of NSC 5408 included a decision to press the construction of two early warning systems. The mid-Canada system, a line of radars along the 55th Parallel, had been recommended by a joint Canadian-US military study group in 1953, and the Canadian Government had decided in June 1954 to

build it. The United States had already decided, in September 1953, to extend the line into the Atlantic from Argentia, Newfoundland, to the Azores by means of radar picket ships and Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. At the beginning of 1955, site surveys were in progress but construction had not begun. The seaward extension had not yet been manned because of a shortage of radar-equipped ships and aircraft. The DEW Line, to be constructed along the northern edge of North America, had been approved by the United States as part of the decision on NSC 5408. By the end of 1954, Canada had agreed to participate in building the line, and contracts had been let to the General Electric Company for its construction.

Table 13—Growth of Continental Defense Forces

Service	31 December 1954		30 June 1956		30 June 1957	
	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned
ARMY						
AA Bns (arty)	48	42	50	39	26	
AA Bns (missile)	19	52	46	61	58	
NAVY						
Radar picket patrol vessels	6	24	18	30	30	
Ocean radar station ships	—	8	8	12	12	
AEW/ASW barrier acft sq	—	3	3	5	6	
Contiguous barrier lighter than air sq (dirigible)	—	1	1	1	1	
AIR FORCE						
Interceptor sq	67	78	78	82	78	
Radars						
Fixed CONUS	83	129	101	161	119	
Fixed Canada						
Pine Tree	33	36	33	42	33	
Fixed Alaska	12	13	12	20	18	
Fixed Greenland	3	3	3	3	1	
Fixed Iceland	1	2	2	4	2	
Gap-filler low altitude	—	120	—	225	29	
Early warning radars						
DEW Line	—	50	—	*	**	
Mid-Canada Line	—	20	—	*	99	
Control centers	18	23	23	23	23	

*Figures not available.

**While no early warning radars are shown on the DEW Line as of 30 Jun 57, the Line became operational shortly afterward, on 13 Aug 57.

Source: "DOD Progress Rpt on Status of Military Continental U.S. Defense Programs as of 15 April 1955," 3 Jun 55, NSC 5408 Progress Rpts; and NSC Rpt, Status of National Security Programs on 30 Jun 57, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) BP 14A.

Effective employment of these weapons and warning radars required an adequate system of command and control. To this end, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had established the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) on 1 September 1954 as a unified command including all elements of continental defense. To facilitate CONAD's job of absorbing data from warning radars and feeding the appropriate instructions to interceptor and antiaircraft forces, the Air Force had sponsored the development of the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system by the Lincoln Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The SAGE system was adopted but was not to become operational until January 1959.

The continental defense system was judged to be far from adequate at the beginning of 1955. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an opinion with which the Secretary of Defense concurred, maintained that "the continental U.S. air defense system cannot be expected to counter effectively an all-out attack of the magnitude which the Soviet Union is capable of launching against the continental United States." And completion of the programs called for by NSC 5408 would not make the United States fully secure from attack. While their completion would "materially improve our position versus the USSR in the defensive-offensive context," the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned, "this improvement should not be construed as an indication of a potential capability to prevent an attack which could cause grave damage to our ability to fight and win a war."²

The Sprague Report

The conclusion of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the inadequacies of the continental defenses was shared by private consultants. Their reports, submitted to the President and the National Security Council during the first half of 1955, led to a reappraisal of continental defense policies. The first of these studies to be addressed by the National Security Council was submitted on 16 June by Mr. Robert C. Sprague, an electronics manufacturer, who had been serving as a consultant to the Council since May 1954. Mr. Sprague pointed to recent Soviet advances in weaponry that in his view "enormously increase the threat to our national survival in the event of a Soviet surprise attack against the continental United States." The latest intelligence estimates indicated that the Soviet Union would very probably test its first modern multimegaton weapon during 1955, a weapon that would substantially increase the casualty rate over that attainable with existing ones in the kiloton range. In addition to providing this unsettling information concerning nuclear bombs, intelligence agencies also had recently revised their estimates of Soviet bomber strength, showing a force of 1,000 modern bombers by mid-1957. This was an upward revision from estimates supplied in November 1954, which had indicated a Soviet bomber fleet of only 700 by mid-1957. Together, these two developments enormously increased the threat to national survival posed by a Soviet surprise attack against the continental United States.

In view of these greatly increased Soviet capabilities, Mr. Sprague recommended an acceleration of continental defense programs to overcome what he considered to be the most glaring weaknesses: insufficient defenses against very high and very low altitude attacks and an inadequate kill probability for interceptor aircraft. At a minimum, Mr. Sprague suggested, early consideration should be given to further acceleration of the following specific programs needed to achieve an adequate defense against high and low altitude attacks of modern Soviet bombers by mid-1957:

- a. Modify our fixed and semi-mobile ground radars to achieve high altitude coverage up to 60,000 feet (AN/GPA-27 modification already underway).
- b. Complete all phases of gap-filler radar program for low altitude surveillance (program underway in four phases).
- c. Modify existing manual aircraft control and warning system so that it will have the capacity to handle a mass raid by completing installation of interim equipment (AN/GPS-T2 and AN/GPA-37).
- d. Complete at an earlier date than presently planned the Hawaiian end of the seaward extension of the early warning system from Kodiak to Hawaii, to prevent an end-run around the Alaskan sector of the barrier now planned for completion in 1957.
- e. Modify airborne search and intercept radars to achieve low altitude coverage down to 500 to 1,000 feet (possibilities include use of lower frequencies, improved antennas, and MTI).
- f. Modify interceptors and/or associated armament to achieve a high altitude weapons capability up to 55,000 feet (possibilities include "snap-up" technique and rocket assist).
- g. Modify armament of F-86Ds to increase kill probability to 50 percent (possibilities include much larger number of smaller diameter rockets and rocket employing a new variable time fuzed fragmenting warhead, Bird Dog).
- h. Equip our interceptors and our antiaircraft with weapons having atomic warhead to vastly increase kill probabilities (Ding Dong air-to-air rocket and nuclear warhead for Nike).
- i. Double fire power of Nike by completing program for "double-siting" (double firepower for about 15 percent added cost).
- j. Complete development of antiaircraft weapon with a high kill probability at very low altitudes (possibilities include modification of Nike control system, also Hawk and Porcupine developments).³

The National Security Council considered Mr. Sprague's report on 16 June 1955 and agreed to the desirability of achieving a state of readiness adequate to counter the increased capability for strategic nuclear attacks that the Soviet Union was expected to achieve by July 1957. The specific proposals were referred to the Department of Defense for consideration. Secretary Wilson, on 27 June, directed the Services, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine the programs for which they were responsible and give Mr. Sprague's suggestions prompt additional consideration, where they differed in substantial degree from what was already planned. Under this directive, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were made responsible, along with the Air Force and the Navy, only for item d, early completion of the Hawaiian end of the planned seaward extension of the early warning system. As will be recounted, a

subsequent decision to shift the terminus of the seaward extension from Hawaii to Midway rendered this directive obsolete.⁴

The Killian Panel

A much more ambitious review of continental defense was being undertaken concurrently by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization. This study had originated in a proposal made on 9 July 1954 by the Science Committee Chairman, Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, for a study of the threat of surprise attack. The Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission recommended to the President that the study be undertaken, and on 26 July he asked Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to direct it. Dr. Killian accepted, and the Science Advisory Committee formed the Technological Capabilities Panel, made up of scientists from government agencies and private institutions, to carry out the study program. On 14 February 1955, the Panel submitted its report to the President.

The Panel, in its report, reviewed the familiar ground concerning the nature of the danger of Soviet atomic attack on the United States and the measures already taken or planned for countering it. The Panel endorsed the already planned programs such as the DEW Line and additions of long-range and gap-filler radars to the US and Canadian radar nets. It also recommended extensions or modifications to existing programs. Nuclear weapons, the Panel recommended, should be adopted as the major armament for air defense forces. Defense against high- and low-level attacks, as in the Sprague report, was recognized as an area requiring major improvement. Measures recommended to this end included development of weapons, radar systems, fire control and guidance equipment for combat at low altitude, and equipment and techniques to counter jamming. Until the continental radar nets were completed, Nike batteries were to be maintained in alert status and free to fire on aircraft above a predetermined altitude.

In addition to urging these modifications to existing programs, the Killian Panel also made a number of recommendations requiring new action. The warning and surveillance system needed expansion. The DEW Line should be extended from Greenland across the Atlantic by way of Iceland and the Faroes, and its planned Pacific extension should ultimately be moved north from the line Alaska-Hawaii to the line Aleutians-Midway. To exploit the full potentialities of defense in depth and protect cities near the borders and coasts, radar coverage should be extended outward by expanding contiguous coverage about 300 miles beyond programmed extensions in the Atlantic and Pacific and prime radar coverage and gap-fillers to a distance well beyond the heavily populated areas of Canada. The effectiveness of interceptors at very high altitudes should be improved by drastic revision of their function and traditional form. The interceptors must now become air-to-air missile launching platforms having adequate radar and the range and mobility needed to

marshal forces against a concentrated attack.

Finally, the Panel turned its attention to what was to become the most serious threat to the security of the United States—the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). At the time, little was known about the Soviet program in this field, but according to the latest National Intelligence Estimate, the Soviets were believed to be concentrating on the development of ICBMs. Effective defense against such weapons would require a greatly improved technology, the Panel conceded, but their findings were “sufficiently encouraging . . . to obviate the generally prevailing feeling of hopelessness in the face of the ICBM threat.” The Panel accordingly recommended, as a general approach to the problem, a “strong balanced program of theoretical and experimental investigation of the basic problems of detection, interception and destruction,” to be organized by a full-time technical group operating under the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. One important element of defense against ICBM attack—warning in minutes—the Panel believed to be attainable with existing technology. It therefore recommended “immediate initiation of component development, engineering design and planning for the installation of a radar detection system to provide the maximum practicable warning on the approach of ballistic missiles to the United States from likely launching sites.”⁵

The Killian Panel report underwent a thorough review within the government before President Eisenhower directed action to be taken on its findings. Anticipating the formal request for review, the Acting Secretary of Defense, on 1 March, directed the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to analyze the findings and submit detailed comments and recommendations on the portions falling within their cognizance. He named Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D) Donald R. Quarles to coordinate the responses and prepare a Defense Department report.⁶

On 11 March 1955, Assistant Secretary Quarles assigned specific responsibility for reporting on each Killian Panel recommendation “as to its validity; the feasibility from a technical or production viewpoint; and the estimated cost and manpower including time phasing of proposed implementation.” To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Quarles gave responsibility for commenting on: early installation of the DEW Line; the operational aspects of adoption of nuclear warheads to air defense weapons; placing Nike batteries on alert status and free to fire on aircraft above a predetermined altitude; coordination of continental defense activities of CINCONAD, CINCLANT, and CINCPAC; operational aspects of all the proposals for further development of the warning and surveillance system; operational aspects of all the proposals for exploiting the full potentialities of defense in depth; and development of a radar system to detect ICBMs.⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their reply on 18 April, found most of the actions recommended by the Killian Panel to be desirable. Their main reservations concerned the extensions of the DEW Line into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. With regard to the Atlantic extension, which the Killian Panel had recommended follow the route Greenland-Iceland-Faroes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff withheld judgment on the ground that they had the matter under study. For the Pacific extension, which the Panel wanted to shift northward from the line Kodiak-Hawaii to the line Aleutians-Midway, the Joint Chiefs of Staff offered specific objections.

They pointed out that, while the proposed line would increase initial warning time and would reduce the length of the overwater link, it could more easily be subjected to an end run than the Hawaii-Kodiak line. A further objection was that limited land areas on Midway would make it necessary to perform major aircraft overhaul and repair at Hawaii, thus increasing the time when aircraft would not be available for duty on the barrier line. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, however, that the Panel's proposal should be studied so long as it did not hold up the construction of the Kodiak-Hawaii line.

In addition to commenting on the recommendations specifically assigned to them, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also volunteered views on a number of the other recommendations of the Killian group. These were the ones intended to create effective defenses against attack at low and very high altitudes, only one of which had been assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for action. All of these additional recommendations the Joint Chiefs of Staff found to be acceptable with one exception—the one calling for the evolution of a radar net to meet the capabilities of the SAGE system. This recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff objected, would limit the evolution of the radar net to the capabilities of only one system, which ultimately might not be adopted. The radar net, they maintained, must be compatible with CONAD's needs and capabilities.⁸

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were incorporated into the Defense Department report on the Killian Panel recommendations. In it, the Secretary of Defense pointed out that most of the programs called for by the Panel were familiar to or under consideration by the Department of Defense, but that additional effort or change in emphasis was called for in some instances in the light of the Killian Panel's findings. There were also some operational and technical problems raised in the report that the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were considering in greater detail. To carry out all the recommendations, the Secretary said, would cost many billions of dollars, but the exact additional amounts over current appropriations had yet to be determined. He therefore proposed to keep all the recommendations under continuing study and evaluation and to seek only the additional funding flexibility required to meet individual situations as they developed in the first half of FY 1956. To attain the necessary flexibility, the Secretary of Defense proposed to ask Congress to increase the emergency Defense Department research and development funds and to give him limited authority to transfer funds from one appropriation to another. If during the next six months these steps proved inadequate, the Secretary would then seek presidential approval to ask Congress for supplementary funds for FY 1956. In like manner, the Defense Department's FY 1957 budget proposals would be reviewed before final submission to see if additional funding was required to meet the situation highlighted in the Killian Panel report.⁹

The National Security Council noted the reports of the Defense Department and of other executive departments and agencies on 4 August 1955 and agreed that implementation of the various programs should be guided by the strategy contained in the Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5501). Final determination on budget requests would be made by the President after normal budget review. On 8 September, the Secretary of Defense directed each military department to

implement the applicable programs as indicated in the Defense Department report, "within the context of funds, technical skills, and other resources available to the Departments where possible; and when developments so indicate, to submit requirements for additional funding beyond those currently contemplated for FY 1956 and FY 1957 to the Secretary of Defense." ¹⁰

DEW Line Extension

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the only action item to emerge from the reappraisal of continental defenses occasioned by the Sprague and Killian Reports had to do with the extension of the DEW Line into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.¹¹ In the case of the Atlantic extension, the Killian Panel had recommended a northerly route extending from Greenland via Iceland and the Faroes to join the NATO air defense system at some point recommended by SHAPE. As the matter was under active consideration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reserved judgment regarding the actual route.

On 14 January 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the location of the DEW Line across North America, as recommended by a combined US-Canadian Location Study Group. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee gave its approval on 8 March. The Study Group had been unable to agree on a location for the Atlantic extension, however, and had recommended further study.¹²

Even before final approval of the continental portion of the DEW Line had been obtained, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had turned their attention to the extension of the Line into the Atlantic. On 7 October 1954, they had directed the Chief of Staff, Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations to study the feasibility of such an extension and to develop a US position thereon. A Joint Air Force-Navy Feasibility Study Group submitted its report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25 March 1955.

The Joint Feasibility Study Group had examined various Atlantic routes in terms of operational suitability, political implications, meteorological and hydrographic conditions, facilities required, manpower requirements, and estimated costs. It had agreed to an extension from Cape Dyer on Baffin Island to Holsteinborg on the west coast of Greenland, but the Group had split along Service lines over the remainder of the route.

The Navy members favored a route across the Greenland ice cap to the Kangerdlussuag area on the east coast, thence to Iceland, to the Faroes, and to the United Kingdom. This route, the Navy members maintained, was the cheapest, most reliable, gave the longest periods of warning, and could be easily integrated with an antisubmarine line along the same route; it tied in with European warning systems and therefore would not be open to an end run.

The Air Force members favored a line running southward along the west coast of Greenland to the Cape Farewell area and thence to the Azores. Disputing the Navy contention that the Greenland-Iceland-Faroes line would provide the greatest warning of approaching hostile aircraft, the Air Force members pointed out that attackers following the most direct routes (a great circle route from Mur-

mask to New York, for instance) would be detected with about the same warning time by a Cape Farewell-Azores line. The Air Force members conceded that the Navy proposal would be less expensive, but they pointed out the technical problems and logistic difficulties in maintaining radar stations on the Greenland ice cap. Other objections to the Navy route were the ease with which Soviet aircraft could "spoof" this line because of its proximity to Soviet bases, and the fact that Soviet penetrations at the eastern extremity would not give a reliable indication of a Soviet intention to attack the continental United States. The Cape Farewell-Azores line would avoid both these problems. As a means to reduce the unfavorable cost factor of their line, the Air Force members proposed to drop the Navy-programmed extension of the mid-Canada line from Argentia to the Azores, which they considered would not give a sufficiently timely warning of Soviet air attack, and shift the AEW aircraft and radar picket ships programmed for it to the Cape Farewell-Azores line.¹³

During JCS consideration of the report the Chief of Staff, Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations supported the positions taken by their respective representatives on the Joint Feasibility Study Group. Admiral Carney, however, recognized that the Air Force contentions might have some merit. He accordingly initiated studies to determine the feasibility of using the forces programmed for the seaward extension of the mid-Canada line to establish a monitor line from Cape Farewell to the Azores and to provide area surveillance of the approaches to the northeastern United States. At the suggestion of General Twining, the Joint Chiefs of Staff postponed consideration of the DEW Line extension into the Atlantic until these studies were completed. They directed the Chief of Naval Operations to expand his studies to include consideration of concurrent development of a land- and ship-based system between Greenland and Norway.¹⁴

On 4 June 1955, the Chief of Naval Operations recommended against the Greenland-Norway line and reiterated his support for the route terminating in the United Kingdom. Ending the line in Norway, Admiral Carney maintained, was objectionable on several counts: there was no NATO air defense system into which a line terminating in Norway could be integrated; even if such a system was in existence, the North American air defenses should not be complicated by involvement in the NATO air defense system at that time; the line extended to the United Kingdom could be more easily adapted to eventual exclusive employment of land-based radars than the longer line ending in Norway; and the extension to the United Kingdom paralleled "sound surveillance coverage being planned on a tripartite basis between Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States."¹⁵

After hearing briefings by CINCONAD and CINCLANT on the Atlantic extension of the DEW Line, the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred the matter to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee for further study. This Committee proved unable to resolve the divergent views of the Air Force and Navy. Its report, in which the Army member espoused the Air Force view, restated the arguments already offered. It was broadly accepted that the Navy-sponsored line to the United Kingdom would provide "the earliest practicable detection" of enemy aircraft while the Greenland-Azores line favored by the Army and Air Force would pro-

vide the most unequivocal indication that the aircraft were bound for North America. To meet CINCONAD's need for definite warning on which to base operational decisions, without sacrificing the early detection feature, the Navy member had suggested adding a back-up line to the Navy-sponsored line. It would use the picket ships and AEW aircraft already programmed for the Argentina-Azores extension of the mid-Canada line, operating somewhat farther offshore than originally planned.¹⁶

The Chief of Naval Operations on 29 August submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff an estimate of the forces required to implement an effective Greenland-Azores barrier. On the basis of a continuous operation giving an 80 percent average probability of detection, the force required would be 18 ships, 57 aircraft, and 14 shore radar stations. These force requirements, the Chief of Naval Operations concluded, were unrealistically high. Consequently, he reaffirmed his previous position that "the Greenland-Iceland-UK route . . . should be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that the problem of providing CINCONAD an 'action line' should be given further study by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee."¹⁷

The Air Force did not respond until 16 January 1956, but the reply represented an acceptance of the main elements of the Navy position. General Twining proposed JCS acceptance of the Greenland-Iceland-Faroes-United Kingdom line, backed up by an airborne and seaborne "action line" from Greenland to the Azores. His change of view, he explained, resulted from several developments: appreciation of the limitations of radar coverage by ships and aircraft, particularly in conditions of rough seas, high winds, and sea ice; the demonstrated feasibility of locating radar stations on the Greenland ice cap; and the improvement in communications resulting from new tropospheric and ionospheric scatter equipment.

The primary radar warning line, as recommended by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, would consist of a high-powered radar site at Holsteinborg on the west coast of Greenland, two radar stations evenly spaced on the ice cap, a high-powered radar at Ikateq on the east coast, and another such radar farther north along the east coast at Kap Raun. This last site would provide radar coverage across the Denmark Strait to overlap an already programmed site on Iceland. A high-powered radar site on the Faroes would complete the chain of fixed radars. Picket ships stationed between Iceland and the Faroes and in the final span of ocean from the Faroes to Scotland would complete the system to the United Kingdom. There would, however, be low-altitude gaps at a point midway between Greenland and Iceland, between Iceland and the Faroes, and the Faroes and Scotland. These gaps would be closed by AEW aircraft. A detachment of five US aircraft would close the gap in the Denmark Strait. Coverage of the other gaps and the operation of the Faroes station and the picket ships would be a responsibility of the United Kingdom. To provide an action line for CINCONAD, the Air Force Chief of Staff proposed a high-powered radar site at Cape Farewell in southeastern Greenland and employment of the picket ships and AEW aircraft already programmed for the extension of the mid-Canada line to provide continuous high-level coverage between Cape Farewell and the Azores.¹⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the proposal on 31 January and directed the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, Air Force, to conduct detailed

site surveys, prepare data to be used in base rights negotiations, and perform other necessary explorations in order to submit a detailed breakdown of costs as soon as possible. The goal was to begin budgeting for the extension of the DEW Line in FY 1958. The Joint Chiefs of Staff at the same time asked the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee to concur.¹⁹

The Canadian Chiefs of Staff gave their approval on 17 April 1956. And on 31 August the Danish Government gave its consent to initial surveys of radar sites on Greenland, with the understanding that it reserved its position as to actual location, construction, and operation of the facilities.²⁰

Approaches to obtain approval for terminating the DEW Line extension on British territory were then undertaken on the recommendation of the Canada-United States Military Study Group. On 21 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the British Chiefs of Staff of the action taken by the United States and Canada, offered to share the information obtained with the British, pointed out the desirability of terminating the DEW Line at an established radar station in the northern United Kingdom, and asked their views on the subject. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not, however, suggest to the British that they operate the radar stations in the Faroes or provide picket ships and AEW aircraft for that portion of the early warning line east of Iceland.

On 1 October, the British Chiefs of Staff agreed to terminate the Atlantic extension of the DEW Line in the United Kingdom but made clear that they were not committing themselves to provide AEW aircraft or radar picket ships.²¹

At this stage in the proceedings, it became necessary to consider the future course of diplomatic negotiations for the base rights necessary to complete the Atlantic extension of the DEW Line. Already the Department of State had expressed its concern over the matter. Writing to Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Gordon Gray on 10 September, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs C. Burke Elbrick noted the formal approach made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the British Chiefs of Staff and requested interdepartmental consultations before any further military-level negotiations were undertaken with the United Kingdom or other nations concerned. The sensitive nature of this project, involving several NATO nations, Secretary Elbrick said, made such consultations desirable. Important factors to be taken into account included the Danish sensitivity regarding base rights in the Faroes and Greenland, the political situation in Iceland, where two communists held cabinet portfolios, and the delicate status of negotiations with Portugal for continuation of US military facilities in the Azores. Noting also that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had referred to the possible construction of a site in the Faroes as part of the SHAPE early warning chain, Assistant Secretary Elbrick asked how this chain would relate to the North American early warning system.²²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff supplied information for the reply on 21 November. They considered the approach to the British Chiefs of Staff an "exploratory action" to determine the military feasibility of terminating the DEW Line extension in the United Kingdom, which did not require formal consultation with the Department of State. With regard to the inclusion of a radar site in the Faroes in the SHAPE air defenses, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that SACEUR had submit-

ted a detailed plan for an early warning system for NATO Europe to the Standing Group for approval. This plan called for inclusion of the British radar installation in the Shetlands and construction of another in the Faroes. Funding of this last facility had been recommended by SACEUR in his proposed 1957 NATO common infrastructure program, and he had initiated negotiations for it with Denmark.

Formal base rights negotiations with the various governments concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained, were not called for at present but should be undertaken, either bilaterally or through NATO channels, when certain conditions had been fulfilled. These were: completion of site surveys on Greenland; stabilization of the political situation in Iceland; submission of cost estimates for the Atlantic extension of the DEW Line to the Secretary of Defense; and completion of SACEUR's negotiations with Denmark for a radar site in the Faroes. None of these conditions had been met by the end of 1956.²³

Pacific Extension of the DEW Line

At the time the Killian Panel made its report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee had already agreed on the siting of the Pacific extension of the DEW Line. In decisions reached in January and February 1955, they had approved recommendations made the previous November by the Canada-US Location Study Group. This group recommended, without suggesting alternatives, a line from Kodiak, Alaska, to Hawaii, which would employ radar picket ships and AEW aircraft.²⁴

The Killian Panel, it will be recalled, had recommended the shifting of this extension northward to an Adak-Midway line, with a connection by fixed radars along the Aleutians to the already-programmed Alaska warning system. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had raised certain objections to the Panel's proposal but had agreed to study it. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed a joint study. Upon its completion they concluded that the Aleutians-Midway line was technically feasible and would cost approximately \$9.3 million less and require about 2,429 fewer personnel than the Kodiak-Hawaii line, but they felt that the views of the commanders of the unified commands involved should be ascertained before a final decision was made. An early decision was necessary, they pointed out, in order to take the necessary budget actions in the FY 1957 military construction program. They accordingly recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff solicit the views of CINCPAC, CINCONAD, and CINCAL and refer the replies, along with the joint Navy-Air Force study, to the Joint Staff for review in the light of overall air defense problems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved these recommendations on 2 November 1955.²⁵

In his reply on 15 November, CINCAL enthusiastically endorsed the shifting of the Pacific extension from Kodiak-Hawaii to Adak-Midway. The latter, he said, was clearly superior because of lower cost and longer warning for Alaskan bases. The former line "adds nothing to our warning system here in Alaska." Furthermore, Kodiak was of doubtful value as an anchor to a warning line because it

was highly vulnerable to enemy attack. CINCPAC also endorsed the proposed shift. He concurred in CINCAL's observation as a "masterly truthful presentation of the fundamental facts" and added a further justification for the change—the need to protect Hawaii from air attack.²⁶

On the other hand CINCONAD was not so enthusiastic. He pointed out the disadvantages of placing an action line too far from the shores of North America and the attendant danger of enemy "spoofing," which could trigger the air defenses unnecessarily. He also stressed the need to complete the early warning system as soon as possible, an objective that would not be attained by a shift of the Pacific extension to a line where the land-based radars had been neither programmed nor budgeted. If the disadvantages he had outlined were found acceptable in Washington, however, CINCONAD would not oppose the shift to the Adak-Midway line.²⁷

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee, after reviewing these messages and the joint Navy-Air Force study, recommended that the Pacific extension of the DEW Line be relocated from the line Kodiak-Hawaii to the line Adak-Midway and an extension of contiguous radar coverage be considered as a means to provide CINCONAD with "timely and positive indications of hostile intent against the continental United States." The Joint Strategic Plans Committee also recommended a study of further extension of the line beyond Midway for the purpose of detecting end runs by the latest Soviet long-range turbo-prop bombers, which had the necessary range to circle south of Midway and Hawaii en route from bases in the Maritime Provinces to targets in the continental United States. The Chief of Staff, Air Force, while in agreement with the recommendation to relocate the Pacific extension, opposed consideration of extending the contiguous radar coverage because of the excessive cost—\$980 million initial capital investment for a 1,000-mile extension of the currently planned coverage.²⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff amended the JSPC report to accommodate General Twining's objection and to add an acknowledgment and acceptance of "the degree of equivocality of warning inherent in placing the line further from the Continental United States." With these revisions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the report on 16 December 1955. In recommending the change in the location of the line to the Secretary of Defense, they advised him that in addition to the operational advantages, relocation of the Pacific extension would result in net initial savings to the Department of Defense of approximately \$80 million. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also requested the Canadian Chiefs of Staff to concur in the relocation. They did so on 12 January 1956.²⁹

Four days later, however, the Secretary of Defense returned the matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with an indication that their justification for the change provided an insufficient basis for decision. He requested them to supply cost and effectiveness data adequate to permit an evaluation of the current and proposed locations of the Pacific extension and to indicate the relationship of the proposed extension to the other sections of the DEW Line. Because of "uncertainties in the present proposal," the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be prepared to make a detailed presentation to the Armed Forces Policy Council and the National Security Council.³⁰

On 10 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense announcing their readiness to present the briefing and giving additional justification for the recommended shift in the Pacific extension. Besides elaborating on the obvious advantages of the Adak-Midway line, such as longer warning and greater use of land-based radars, they presented in greater detail the problem of spoofing and supplied fuller and more up-to-date cost data. Admittedly, the Adak-Midway line, being closer to Soviet bases than the Kodiak-Hawaii line, was more susceptible to spoofing, but to be effective the Soviet maneuver would have to be carried out by raid-size numbers of aircraft. During a cold war period, responsible commanders and appropriate governmental authorities would be able to weigh indications from all sources to determine whether a penetration of the warning system might develop into an actual attack. The longer warning time provided by the relocated line would assist in this process. In a period when international relations were in a critical state and the possibility of hostilities great, a potential enemy would be discouraged from spoofing by the knowledge that it might trigger US retaliation. The cost data, covering capital and operating costs of both the Kodiak-Hawaii and Adak-Midway lines, showed that adoption of the latter would result in savings of \$280.4 million.³¹

On 14 March 1956, following a joint Navy-Air Force presentation of the various cost and effectiveness factors before the Armed Forces Policy Council, the Secretary of Defense approved the relocation of the Pacific extension of the DEW Line to the line Adak-Midway.³²

To deal with the problem of end runs of the newly oriented Pacific extension of the DEW Line, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to study extending the line beyond Midway. The Committee, after considering eight alternative extensions, concluded that the most feasible was to employ two PG-3W airships operating on a route from Palmyra Island to Johnson Island to Midway and return to Palmyra, then south about 1,000 miles and return to Palmyra. On 19 June 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded this study to CINCONAD and CINCPAC, requesting the two commanders to submit recommendations on the subject. They replied during February 1957 that the further extension of the DEW Line in the Pacific was of lower priority than the improvement and extension of existing air defense systems on the North American continent and its seaward approaches. None of the limited funds available for continental air defense, the two commanders recommended, should be diverted to extend the Pacific extension of the DEW Line south of Midway. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 11 April 1957, dropped consideration of the matter.³³

Continental Defense at the End of 1956

By the end of 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed on the locations of the two seaward extensions of the DEW Line and had initiated some of the actions necessary to bring them into being. Other continental defense programs also showed some modest progress. Antiaircraft and interceptor forces

approached planned levels and also showed substantial qualitative improvement as the result of the introduction of new types of aircraft and increasing numbers of Nike missiles. The fixed radar systems were also nearing their objectives, and the DEW and mid-Canada early warning systems were destined to become operational by mid-1957. (See Table 13.)

While noting these improvements, the Department of Defense cautioned the NSC that Soviet offensive capabilities had also improved. The result, in the opinion of the Defense Department, was that the United States seemed little more safe from Soviet attack than at the beginning of 1955.³⁴

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAA	Antiaircraft artillery
AEW	Airborne early warning
AFPC	Armed Forces Policy Council
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, and the United States
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASW	Antisubmarine warfare
AWX	All weather aircraft
BLT	Battalion landing team
BNSP	Basic National Security Policy
CA	Aircraft carrier
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCFE	Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCLANT	Commander in Chief, Atlantic
CINCNELM	Commander in Chief, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCONAD	Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCSPECOMME	Commander in Chief, US Specified Command, Middle East
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CINCUSAREUR	Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMC	Commandant, US Marine Corps
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CONAD	Continental Air Defense Command
CSA	Chief of Staff, US Army
CSAF	Chief of Staff, US Air Force
CVA	Attack aircraft carrier
DEW	Distant early warning
DOD	Department of Defense
DUSM	Deputy US Representative (NATO) Memorandum

List of Abbreviations

EDC	European Defense Community
EO	Executive Order
EW	Electronic warfare
FOA	Foreign Operations Administration
ICA	International Cooperation Administration
ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile
IRBM	Intermediate-range ballistic missile
ISA	International Security Affairs (Assistant Secretary of Defense for)
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JLPC	Joint Logistics Plans Committee
JLRSE	Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate
JMEPC	Joint Middle East Planning Committee
JMRWP	Joint Mid-Range War Plan
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JSPC	Joint Strategic Plans Committee
JSSC	Joint Strategic Survey Committee
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC	Military Armistice Commission
MC	Military Committee (NATO)
MDA	Mutual Defense Assistance
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MEDO	Middle East Defense Organization
MEPPG	Middle East Policy Planning Group
MOP	Memorandum of Policy
MTI	Missile training installation
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEA	Near Eastern Affairs (Assistant Secretary of State for)
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NNIT	Neutral Nations Inspection Teams
NNSC	Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command
NSC	National Security Council
OCB	Operations Coordinating Board
PL	Public Law

RCT	Regimental combat team
R&D	Research and development
ROK	Republic of Korea
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO)
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (NATO)
SAGE	Semi-automatic ground environment
SAM	Surface-to-air missile
SAMDAA	Special Assistant for Mutual Defense Assistance Affairs (JCS)
SEACDT	Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (NATO)
SM	Secretary's (JCS) Memorandum
SNIE	Special National Intelligence Estimate
TAC	Tactical Air Command
UN	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Command
USAFE	United States Air Forces, Europe
USCINCEUR	Commander in Chief, United States European Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USRO	United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organization
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union

List of Principal Military and Civilian Officers

<i>President and Commander in Chief</i> Dwight D. Eisenhower	20 Jan 53–20 Jan 61
<i>Secretary of State</i> John Foster Dulles	21 Jan 53–18 Apr 59
<i>Secretary of Defense</i> Charles E. Wilson	28 Jan 53–08 Oct 57
<i>Deputy Secretary of Defense</i> Robert B. Anderson Reuben B. Robertson, Jr.	03 May 54–04 Aug 55 05 Aug 55–22 Apr 57
<i>Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)</i> H. Struve Hensel Gordon Gray	05 Mar 54–30 Jun 55 14 Jul 55–27 Feb 57
<i>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</i> Admiral Arthur W. Radford	15 Aug 53–15 Aug 57
<i>Chief of Staff, US Army</i> General Matthew B. Ridgway General Maxwell D. Taylor	15 Aug 53–30 Jun 55 30 Jun 55–01 Jul 59
<i>Chief of Naval Operations</i> Admiral Robert B. Carney Admiral Arleigh Burke	17 Aug 53–17 Aug 55 17 Aug 55–01 Aug 61
<i>Chief of Staff, US Air Force</i> General Nathan F. Twining	30 Jun 53–30 Jun 57
<i>Commandant, US Marine Corps</i> General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. General Randolph McC. Pate, Jr.	01 Jan 52–31 Dec 55 01 Jan 56–31 Dec 59

Principal Military and Civilian Officers

Director, Joint Staff

Lieutenant General Lemuel Mathewson, USA 19 Mar 54–14 Mar 56
Vice Admiral Bernard L. Austin 15 Mar 56–31 Mar 58

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

Admiral Jerauld Wright 12 Apr 54–29 Feb 60

Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command

General Benjamin W. Chidlaw, USAF 01 Sep 54–01 Jul 55
General Earle E. Partridge, USAF 01 Jul 55–01 Aug 59

Commander in Chief, US European Command

General Alfred M. Gruenther, USA 11 Jul 53–20 Nov 56
General Lauris Norstad, USAF 20 Nov 56–01 Nov 62

Commander in Chief, Far East

General John E. Hull, USA 05 Oct 53–01 Apr 55
General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA 01 Apr 55–05 Jun 55
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA 05 Jun 55–01 Jul 57
(Far East Command was disestablished on 1 Jul 57)

*Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces,
Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean*

Admiral John H. Cassady 19 May 54–01 May 56
Admiral Walter F. Boone 01 May 56–21 Feb 58

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Admiral Felix B. Stump 10 Jul 53–31 Jul 58

Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

General Curtis E. LeMay 19 Oct 48–01 Jul 57

Notes

Chapter 1. Basic National Security Policy

1. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953* (1960), pp. 293–294 (hereafter *Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1953*).
2. The appointment of the original “New Look Chiefs” and development of the two papers mentioned are treated in Robert J. Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954*, Chapter 1.
3. Maxwell D. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares* (1972), pp. 170–171.
4. David A. Rosenberg, “Arleigh Albert Burke,” pp. 263–264 in Robert A. Love (ed.), *The Chiefs of Naval Operations* (1980). Admiral Carney, however, attributed his departure to a clash with Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson. Carney maintained, and Wilson denied, that he could bypass the Secretary and go directly to the President on some issues. At a White House meeting in December 1954, President Eisenhower agreed with Carney. Afterwards, Carney told his family that this victory would cost him reappointment. Paul R. Schratz, “Robert Bostwick Carney,” pp. 257–258, *Ibid.*
5. Ltr, ADM Carney to President, n.d., Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
6. Interv, Kenneth W. Condit with S. Everett Gleason, former DepExecSecy, NSC, 2 Mar 70.
7. Stanley L. Falk, *The National Security Structure* (1967), pp. 42–48.
8. NSC 5501, 7 Jan 55, JCS 2101/185, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 50. For development of NSC 5501, see Watson, *Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954*, pp. 49–55.
9. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Basic National Security Policy–NSC 5440,” 17 Dec 54, JCS 2101/180, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 49. Printed in Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1952–1954*, vol. II, *National Security Affairs* (1984), pp. 828–832. Since virtually all the discussion of successive drafts leading to the production of NSC 5501 occurred during 1954, its development is fully treated in Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954*, pp. 48–55.
10. *Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 2–6.
11. Ltr, CSA to SecDef, 27 Jun 55; text in Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier* (1956), pp. 323–332.
12. Memo for Record, Samuel A. Tucker, “Interview with Colonel M. R. Lemon, USAF, Office of SpecAsst to JCS for NSC Affairs,” 21 Mar 56, JCS Hist Div files.
13. Rpt, Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Com, “Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack,” vol. I, pp. 10–13. Other recommendations of the Killian Report are treated in Chapters 4 and 15.
14. Memo, ActgSecDef to SecArmy et al., “Technological Capabilities Panel Report,” 1 Mar 55, JCS 1899/192; Memo, ASD(R&D) to SecArmy et al., same subj, 11 Mar 55, JCS 1899/194; CCS 040 (11–2–43) sec 16. Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 18 Apr 55, JCS 1899/200, same file, sec 17 pt 1.
15. NSC Action No. 1355, 17 Mar 55. Presumably the JCS views were presented to the Planning Board during its deliberations on the Killian Report, but the available records contain no indication of such action. NSC Action No. 1430, 4 Aug 55.
16. Memo, ActgExecSecy, NSC to NSC PB, “Review of Key Aspects of Basic National Security Policy,” 2 Sep 55, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 57.
17. Memo for Record, Samuel A. Tucker, “Interview with Colonel M. R. Lemon, USAF, Office of SpecAsst to JCS for NSC Affairs,” 21 Mar 56, JCS Hist Div files.
18. “Department of Defense Comments on NSC 5501,” 24 Sep 55, Encl to Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC Planning Board, “Review of Key Aspects of Basic National Security Policy,” 21 Sep 55, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 57.
19. NSC 5602, 8 Feb 56, JCS 2101/218, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) BP pt 12.
20. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee, which dated from World War II, was composed of a senior two-star officer from each Service and advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters of broad policy and strategy.
21. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Review of Basic National Security Policy, NSC 5602,” 24 Feb 56, JCS 2101/221, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 61.
22. Memo, SecDef to ExecSecy, NSC, “NSC 5602,” 24 Feb 56, JCS 2101/223, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 61.

23. *NY Times*, 1 Jan 55, pp. 1–2.
24. Hollis W. Barber, *The United States in World Affairs, 1955* (1957), pp. 24–26.
25. These events are treated more fully in Chapter 6.
26. Dept of State, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959* (1960), vol. I, pp. 496–497.
27. The impact on US policy of the Czech-Egyptian barter agreement is discussed in Chapter 9.
28. *Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1956*, pp. 4–5.
29. NSC 5602/1, 15 Mar 56, JCS 2101/224, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 61.
30. Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (1959), p. 115.
31. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Military and Other Requirements for Our National Security,” 12 Mar 56; Dec On JCS 2101/225, 12 Mar 56; CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 61. The JCS views on military requirements are treated in Chapter 3.
32. Memo, SpecAsst to JCS for NSC Affairs to CJCS, 20 Apr 56, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 62.

Chapter 2. Strategic Planning

1. JCS 2089/3, 6 Jun 52, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 3.
2. JCS MOP 84, 14 Jul 52, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 3.
3. JSPC 887/30, 10 Sep 54; N/H of JSPC 887/30, 23 Sep 54; CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 16.
4. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Joint Mid-Range War Plan for 1 Jul 1957,” 25 Oct 54, JCS 2143/31; Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., same subj, 2 Nov 54, JCS 2143/33; CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 17.
5. JCS 2143/35, 30 Mar 55; Dec On JCS 2143/35, 15 Apr 55; CCS 381 (11–29–49), BP pt 8A. For the discussion of overall force levels, see Chapter 3.
6. Memos, SecDef to SecArmy et al., “Additional Guidance on Joint Mid-Range War Plan for 1 July 1957,” and “Explanatory Notes for and Procedure in Connection with the Joint Mid-Range War Plan . . .,” 9 Dec 54, JCS 2143/34, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 18.
7. JCS 2143/35, 30 Mar 55, CCS 381 (11–29–49) BP pt 8A.
8. JCS 2143/45, 12 Aug 55, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 25. There was no disagreement over air forces and differences regarding naval forces were slight.
9. JCS 2143/47, 1 Sep 55, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 26.
10. N/H of JCS 2143/45, 12 Sep 55, CCS 381 (11–29–49), sec 25. For the work of the Ad Hoc Committee for Reappraisal of World-Wide MDAP, see Chapter 14.
11. Dec On JCS 2143/55, 1 Feb 56, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 29.
12. JCS 1844/172, 12 Oct 54; Dec On JCS 1844/172, 14 Oct 54; CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 16. Memo, DJS to CJCS, “Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 1 July 1955–1 July 1956, Status Report,” 26 Oct 54, same file, sec 17. Dec On JCS 1844/173, 21 Dec 54, same file, sec 18.
13. JCS 1844/178, 2 Mar 55, CCS 381 (11–29–49) BP pt 8.
14. JCS MOP 84, 27 Jul 55, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 24.
15. JSPC 877/283D, 5 Jul 55, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 23. JSPC 877/287, 13 Sep 55 [forwarded to JCS, 13 Mar 56], same file, BP pt 12.
16. JSPC 877/285, 13 Aug 55; Memo, DCSOPS, USAF to OpsDepts, “Strategic Concepts for the Joint Capabilities Plan . . . (JSPC 877/285),” 20 Aug 55; CCS 381 (11–29–49), sec 26.
17. CM–264–56 to JCS, 28 Mar 56, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 29.
18. SM–271–56 to JSPC, JLPC, and JIC, 3 Apr 56, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 30. Prior to the meeting each of the Service members had submitted preliminary views, which were reproduced in SM–264–56 to JCS, 2 Apr 56, same file.
19. SM–275–56 to JSPC, JLPC, JIC, “Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 1 July 1956–30 June 1957,” 5 Apr 56; Memo for Record, Secy JCS, “Revision of Directive in SM–271–56 relative to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 1 July 1956–30 June 1957,” 5 Apr 56; CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 30. JSPC/46/D, 22 Aug 55, same file, sec 26.
20. JCS 2143/56, 12 Apr 56, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 30.
21. Dec On JCS 2143/56, 17 Apr 56, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 30.
22. Memo, Secy JCS to Control Section, “Strategic Concepts for Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1 July 1960,” 11 Jun 56, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 30.
23. Memo for Record, Secy JCS, “Resolution of Divergent Views in the Strategic Concepts for the JSOP, 1 July 1960,” 22 May 56, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 30.
24. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 22 May 56, Encl to SM–424–56 to JCS, 23 May 56; SM–423–56 to JSPC, JLPC, and JIC, 23 May 56; CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 30.
25. JCS 2143/58, 29 May 56, CCS 381 (11–29–49) BP pt 13A.

26. SM-481-56 to OpsDepts, 11 Jun 56, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 30.
27. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1 July 1960," 20 Jun 56, JCS 2143/58, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 31.
28. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1 July 1960," 20 Jun 56, JCS 2143/58, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 31.
29. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1 July 1960," 20 Jun 56, JCS 2143/60, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 31. The budget estimates are taken up in Chapter 3.
30. Memo, no originator or addressee, "JSOP Military Strategy and Force Structure," 3 Jul 56, CJCS File, JSOP Military Strategy and Force Structure, 1956. Distribution indicated by typed note at the bottom: "on 5 July 1956, Admiral Radford gave two copies to: Gen Taylor, Gen White, Adm Burke, Gen Pate."
31. Memo, CSA to CJCS, "Comments on the Memorandum by the Chairman, JCS, 3 July 1956, pertaining to JSOP Military Strategy and Force Structure," 9 Jul 56, CJCS File, JSOP Military Strategy and Force Structure, 1956.
32. Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (1959), pp. 39-41.
33. *NY Times*, 13 Jul 56, p. 1. Memo, RADM Truman Hedding to COL L. H. Watson, OCJCS, "Current Status of Important Projects," 26 Jul 56, CJCS File, JSOP Military Strategy and Force Structure, 1956.
34. *NY Times*, 14 Jul 56, p. 34.
35. Memo for Record, AsstSecy, General Staff, DA, "Official Call of General Heusinger, Chairman of the German Military Command Council on the Chief of Staff, United States Army, at 1600 Hours, 26 July 1956," 27 Jul 56, CJCS File 091 Germany, 1953-1957. *NY Times*, 21 Jul 56, p. 4.
36. Memo, RADM Truman Hedding to COL L. H. Watson, OCJCS, "Current Status of Important Projects," 26 Jul 56, CJCS File, JSOP Military Strategy and Force Structure, 1956.
37. JCS 1844/198, 20 Jun 56, CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt 14.
38. JCS 1844/199, 26 Jun 56; JCS 1844/203, 7 Sep 56; JCS 1844/204, 13 Sep 56; JCS 1844/106, 3 Oct 56; CSAM-197-56 to JCS, 5 Oct 56; Dec On JCS 1844/206, 10 Oct 56; CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 32.
39. Msg, JCS 905424 to CSA et al., 26 Jun 56, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 32.
40. JCS 1844/210, 17 Dec 56; Dec On JCS 1844/210, 21 Dec 56; CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt 16D.
41. Ridgway, *Soldier*, p. 324.

Chapter 3. Force Levels for the Budget

1. DOD Directive 5100.1, 16 Mar 54, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 45.
2. These figures are as of 31 Dec 52. NSC 142 (Sec 1, pp. 41-42), n.d. [Mar 53], CCS 381 US (1-31-50) BP pt 8. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1954* (1953), p. 563.
3. JCS 2101/113, 10 Dec 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 32.
4. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Recommended Basis for Guidelines for the Preparation of Service Budgets for FY 1956," 1 Jul 54, JCS 1800/222; N/H of JCS 1800/222, 15 Jul 54; CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 46. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Forces and Manning Levels for FY 1956," 19 Aug 54, JCS 1849/125; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, same subj, 17 Sep 54, JCS 1849/127; CCS 320.2 (5-1-45) sec 21.
5. NSC Action No. 1286, 9 Dec 54.
6. Memo for Record, Secy JCS, "Forces and Manning Levels for Fiscal Year 1956," 5 Jan 55; Memo, SecDef to SecArmy, SecNav, and SecAF, "Approved End Strengths for Fiscal Year 1956," 6 Jan 55, JCS 1800/232; CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 48.
7. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Forces and Manning Levels for Fiscal Years 1955, 1956 and 1957," 9 Dec 54, JCS 1800/228, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 47.
8. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Command and Organizational Structure of U.S. Forces; Forces and Manning Levels," 29 Dec 54, JCS 1800/230, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 48.
9. Hrgs, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956*, S. Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong, 1st sess, 1955, p. 125.
10. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Command and Organizational Structure of U.S. Forces; Forces and Manning Levels," 11 Jan 55, JCS 1800/234; N/H of JCS 1800/234, 19 Jan 55; CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 49.
11. JCS 1800/235, 22 Jan 55; SM-72-55 to JSPC, 31 Jan 55; CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 50. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Command and Organizational Structure of U.S. Forces; Forces and Manning Levels," 18 Mar 55, JCS 1800/235 and 1800/237, same file, sec 51.
12. JCS 1800/238, 27 Jun 55, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 51. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Command and Organizational Structure of U.S. Forces; Forces and Manning Levels," 18 Jul 55, JCS 1800/238, same file, sec 52.

13. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Command and Organizational Structure of U.S. Forces; Forces and Manning Levels," 9 Dec 55, JCS 2016/26; N/H of JCS 2016/26, 27 Nov 56; CCS 580 (5–4–49) sec 6.

14. *Congressional Record*, vol. 101, pt 7, 30 Jun 55, pp. 9543–9544.

15. The contents of this letter are more fully described in Chapter 1.

16. Hrgs, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956*, Defense Subcom of S. Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong, 1st sess, 1955, pp. 212–219. Hrgs, *Department of the Army Appropriations for 1956*, Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong, 1st sess, 1955, pp. 17, 37. Hrgs, *Department of the Navy Appropriations for 1956*, Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong, 1st sess, 1955, pp. 33–34. *Congressional Record*, vol. 102, pt 8, 29 Jun 56, p. 10316. Memo, SecDef to SecNav, "Personnel Strength of the Marine Corps for Fiscal Year 1956," 26 Aug 55, JCS 1800/240, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 52.

17. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Force Levels and Personnel Strengths for Fiscal Year 1957," 18 Aug 55, JCS 1800/239, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 52.

18. JCS 1800/241, 13 Sep 55, CCS 370 (8–19–45) BP pt 6.

19. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Force Levels and Personnel Strengths for Fiscal Year 1957," 6 Oct 55, JCS 1800/241, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 53; N/H of JCS 1800/241, 11 Oct 55, same file, BP pt 6.

20. N/H of JCS 1800/241, 7 Dec 55, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 52. Hrgs, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957*, Defense Subcom of S. Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong, 2d sess, 1956, pp. 67, 109. Hrgs, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957*, Defense Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong, 2d sess, 1956, pp. 4, 72. Hrgs, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958*, Defense Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 85th Cong, 1st sess, 1957, p. 904. *The Budget of the United States for the Fiscal Year Ending 30 June 1957* (1956), p. M 23.

21. Hrgs, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957*, Defense Subcom of S. Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong, 2d sess, 1956, p. 1236. "Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957," Report by S. Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong, 2d sess, 1956, p. 5. *Congressional Record*, vol. 103, pt 10, 1 Aug 57, pp. 13261–13262.

22. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Military Strategy and Posture," 27 Jan 56, JCS 2101/225, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 61.

23. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military and Other Requirements for Our National Security," 12 Mar 56, CCS 381 (1–31–50) sec 61. Actual expenditures for FY 1955 were \$35,532,000,000; anticipated expenditures for FY 1956 were \$35,700,000,000.

24. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1 July 1960," 20 Jun 56, JCS 2143/58; Memo, SecDef to JCS, same subj, 20 Jun 56, JCS 2143/60; CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 31. JSOP–60 is discussed in Chapter 2.

25. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Force Levels and Personnel Strengths to be used as the Basis for Preparation of the FY 1958 Budget," 15 Nov 56, JCS 1800/247, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 57. The mention of the current international situation presumably referred to the Suez and Hungarian crises.

26. Memo, SecDef to SecArmy, SecNav, and SecAF, "Personnel Strengths FY 1957 and FY 1958," 16 Nov 56, JCS 1800/248, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 58.

27. NSC Action No. 1643, 2 Dec 56. *Congressional Record*, vol. 103, pt 10, 1 Aug 57, pp. 13261–13262.

28. Hrgs, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958*, Defense Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 85th Cong, 1st sess, 1957, pp. 1–8, 242.

29. Memo, SecDef to SecArmy, SecNav, and SecAF, "Approved End Strengths for Fiscal Year 1956," 6 Jan 55, JCS 1800/232, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 48. Department of Defense statistics quoted in "United States Defense Policies Since World War II," H. Doc 100, 85th Cong, 1st sess, 1957, p. 78. OSD, "Department of Defense Military Functions Fiscal Year 1958 Budget Highlights," pp. 29, 50, 75.

Chapter 4. The Weapons Revolution and Service Functions

1. DOD Directive 5100.1, 16 Mar 54.

2. Memo, SecDef to AFPC, "Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense," 26 Nov 56, JCS 1478/81, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 58.

3. *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 Jan–30 Jun 55, and 1 Jan–30 Jun 56. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1958–1959* (1958), pp. 408–429.

4. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Assignment of Responsibility for Guided Missiles," 17 Nov 49, JCS 1629/12, CCS 334 GMC (1–16–45) sec 3. Memo, Secy AFPC to AFPC, "Significant Actions of the Armed Forces Policy Council at Its Meeting of 6 December," 6 Dec 49, CCS 334 AFPC (12–2–47) sec 5.

5. JCS 1620/42, 30 Oct 51; JCS 1620/44, 13 Nov 51; CCS 334 GMC (1–16–45) sec 7. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Assignment of Responsibilities for Guided Missiles," 9 Sep 54, JCS 1620/95; N/H of JCS 1620/95, 18 Nov 54; same file, sec 12.

6. Memo, ASD(R&D) to CJCS, "Proposed Transfer of Responsibility for Developing a Land-Based TALOS System," 16 Mar 55, JCS 1620/105, CCS 334 GMC (1-16-45) sec 13.
7. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Transfer of Responsibility for Developing a Land-Based TALOS System," 13 Apr 55, JCS 1620/106, CCS 334 GMC (1-16-45) sec 13.
8. N/H of JCS 1620/106, 9 Jun 55, CCS GMC (1-16-45) sec 13.
9. Hrgs, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957*, Defense Subcom of S. Com on Appropriations, 84th Cong, 2d sess, 1956, pp. 86-87.
10. *NY Times*, 21 May 56, p. 1.
11. *NY Times*, 22 May 56, pp. 1, 14-15.
12. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 17 Aug 56, and Memo, SecAF to SecDef, "Adjustment of Army/Air Force 'Differences,'" 14 Aug 56, JCS 1478/67, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 55.
13. JCS 1478/69, 29 Aug 56, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 56.
14. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Adjustment of Army/Air Force 'Differences'; Air Defense," 14 Nov 56, JCS 1478/69, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 57. N/H of JCS 1478/69, 27 Nov 56, same file, sec 56.
15. MG John B. Medaris, *Countdown for Decision* (1960), pp. 83-85; Wernher von Braun, "The Redstone, Jupiter, and Juno," in Eugene Emme, ed., *The History of Rocket Technology* (1964), pp. 108-109.
16. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Assignment of Responsibility for Guided Missiles," 9 Sep 54, JCS 1620/95; N/H of JCS 1620/95, 13 Nov 54; CCS 334 GMC (1-16-45) sec 12.
17. Memo, SecAF to SecDef, "Adjustment of Army/Air Force 'Differences,'" 14 Aug 56, JCS 1478/67, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 55.
18. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 17 Aug 56, JCS 1478/67, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 55.
19. JCS 1478/70, 29 Aug 56, CCS 370 (8-19-45) BP pt 7.
20. N/H of JCS 1478/70, 6 Oct 56, CCS 370 (8-19-45) BP pt 7.
21. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Adjustment of Army/Air Force 'Differences': Air Force Tactical Support of the Army," 25 Oct 56, JCS 1478/70, CCS 370 (8-19-45) BP pt 7.
22. N/H of JCS 1478/70, 27 Nov 56, CCS (8-19-45) BP pt 7.
23. Nels A. Parson, Jr., *Missiles and the Revolution in Warfare* (1962), pp. 33-40; Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James Grimwood, Charles C. Alexander, *This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury* (1966), pp. 18-27. JCS Hist Div, *Chronology of Significant Events and Decisions Relating to the U.S. Missile and Earth Satellite Development Programs* (1957).
24. Rpt, Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Com, "Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack," 14 Feb 55, CJCS files.
25. NSC Action No. 1355, 17 Mar 55. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Technological Capabilities Panel Report," 18 Apr 55, JCS 1899/200, CCS 040 (11-2-43) sec 17.
26. "Department of Defense Statement in Regard to the Report of the Technological Capabilities Panel," 1 Jun 55, CCS 040 (11-2-43) sec 17. Memo, DepSecDef to SecArmy et al., "Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Program," 17 Sep 55, JCS 1899/234, same file, sec 18. NSC Action No. 1433, 8 Sep 55.
27. NSC Action No. 1430, 4 Aug 55.
28. Memo, DepSecDef to SecArmy et al., "1500-Mile Ballistic Missile," 6 Sep 55, JCS 1899/231, CCS 040 (11-2-43) sec 18.
29. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Definition of Mission Requirements of the Military Services for the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile," 20 Oct 55, JCS 1620/113, CCS 334 GMC (1-16-45) sec 14.
30. JCS 1620/114, 25 Oct 55, CCS 334 GMC (1-16-45) sec 14.
31. Corrig to CSAFM-300-55, n.d. [1 Nov 55], CCS 334 GMC (1-16-45) sec 14.
32. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Definition of Mission Requirements of the Military Services for the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile," 2 Nov 55, JCS 1620/115, CCS 334 GMC (1-16-45) sec 14.
33. Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., "Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Programs," 8 Nov 55, JCS 1620/116, CCS 334 GMC (1-16-45) sec 15. NSC Action No. 1484, 1 Dec 55 (approved by President, 21 Dec 55).
34. Medaris, *Countdown for Decision*, pp. 118-128; von Braun, "The Redstone, Jupiter and Juno," in Emme, *The History of Rocket Technology*.
35. Wyndham D. Miles, "The Polaris," in Emme, *The History of Rocket Technology*.
36. Robert L. Perry, "The Atlas, Thor, Titan, and Minuteman," in Emme, *The History of Rocket Technology*. Statement of GEN Twining before the Defense Subcom of the H. Com on Appropriations, 9 Feb 56, CJCS file, Twining Statements, 1954-1956.
37. Memo, SecAF to SecDef, "Adjustment of Army/Air Force 'Differences,'" 14 Aug 56, JCS 1478/67, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 55.
38. Perry, "The Atlas, Thor, Titan, and Minuteman," and von Braun, "The Redstone, Jupiter, and Juno," in Emme, *The History of Rocket Technology*.
39. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Adjustment of Army/Air Force 'Differences'; Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles," 25 Oct 56, JCS 1478/71, CCS 370 (8-19-45) BP pt 7.

40. Memo, SecDef to AFPC, "Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense," 26 Nov 56, JCS 1478/81, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 58. N/H of JCS 1478/71, 27 Nov 56, same file, BP pt 7.
41. JCS Hist Div, *Chronology of Significant Events and Decisions Relating to the U.S. Missile and Earth Satellite Development Programs (1957)*, p. 76 and passim. *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 Jan–30 Jun 58*, pp. 283–284.
42. SecArmy, SecAF, CSA, and CSAF, "Memorandum of Understanding Relating to Army Organic Aviation," 4 Nov 52, published jointly as AR 95–400–5 and AFL 55–5, 19 Nov 52.
43. Memo, SecDef to JCS, 8 Jul 55, JCS 1478/54, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 52.
44. JCS 1478/55, 3 Aug 55, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 52.
45. JCS 1478/56, 12 Aug 55, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 52.
46. JCS 1478/57, 26 Aug 56; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Use of Aircraft by the United States Army," 26 Aug 56, JCS 1478/57; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 52.
47. JCS 1478/58, 22 Sep 55, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 52.
48. JCS 1478/60, 5 Dec 55; N/H of JCS 1478/60, 27 Jan 57; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 53.
49. JCS 1478/65, 4 Apr 56, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 54.
50. JCS 1478/66, 6 Jun 56, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 55.
51. JCS 1478/76, 11 Sep 56, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 56.
52. JCS 1478/77, 14 Sep 56, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 57.
53. JCS 1478/78, 19 Sep 56, CCS (8–19–45) sec 57. N/H of JCS 1478/76, 20 Sep 56, same file, sec 56.
54. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Use of Aircraft by the U.S. Army," 15 Nov 56, JCS 1478/66, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 57.
55. N/H of JCS 1478/66, 28 Nov 56, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 55. DOD Directive 5160.22, 18 Mar 57, same file, sec 58.
56. Memo, SecDef to AFPC, "Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense," 26 Nov 56, JCS 1478/81, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 58.

Chapter 5. Disarmament: The Fresh Approach

1. Unless otherwise cited, this discussion of disarmament from 1945 through 1954 is based on the following: Dept of State, *Disarmament, the Intensified Effort, 1955–1958* (1958), pp. 1–4; Great Britain, Central Office of Information, *The Disarmament Question, 1945 to 1956* (London, 1957), pp. 1–5; William R. Frye, "The Quest for Disarmament Since World War II," in Louis Henkin, ed., *Arms Control, Issues for the Public* (1961).
2. Dept of State, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I (1960), pp. 7–17 (hereafter *Documents on Disarmament*).
3. NSC 112, 6 Jul 51, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 35.
4. NSC Action No. 899, 9 Sep 53.
5. Defense Position Paper, Draft Memo to ExecSecy, NSC, "Review of NSC 112," 25 Jan 55, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 50. Memo, Asst to SecDef(AE) to SecArmy et al., same subj, 24 Feb 55, JCS 1731/115, same file, sec 51. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Review of the United States Policy on the Regulation, Limitation, and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments," 26 Nov 54, JCS 1731/108, same file, sec 49.
6. State Draft, "Report to the National Security Council," 7 Feb 55, Encl to Memo, Asst to SecDef(AE) to SecArmy et al., "Review of NSC 112," 24 Feb 55, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 50.
7. NSC Action No. 1328, 10 Feb 55.
8. *Documents on Disarmament*, pp. 456–467.
9. Special Staff Study for the President, "Progress Report, Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament," vols. I–III, 26 May 55, CJCS File 383.3, 26 May 55, Stassen Report.
10. NSC Action No. 1411, 26 May 55.
11. Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., "Progress Report on the Control of Armaments made . . . on 26 May 1955," 2 Jun 55, JCS 1731/117, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 51.
12. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Progress Report on the Control of Armaments Made . . . on 26 May 1955," 16 Jun 55, JCS 1731/118, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 51.
13. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "U.S. Policy on the Control of Armaments," 23 Jun 55, CCS 092 (4–14–45) BP pt 5A.
14. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 27 Jun 55, JCS 1731/119, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 51. JCS Hist Div, "Extended Chronology of Significant Events Relating to Disarmament (Revised Version)" (1961), pp. 25–26.

15. NSC Action No. 1419, 30 Jun 55. For President Eisenhower's atoms for peace proposal, see Watson, *Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954*, p. 190.

16. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 1 Aug 55, pp. 173-174.

17. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, pp. 619-620. See also *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955-1957*, vol. V, Summit Meeting (1988), pp. 428-429.

18. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 29 Jul 55, JCS 1731/124, 1 Aug 55, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 52. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Disarmament Policy Planning," 10 Aug 55, JCS 1731/126, same file, sec 53.

19. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament," 19 Aug 55, JCS 1731/129, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 53.

20. Robertson succeeded Robert B. Anderson as Deputy Secretary of Defense on 5 August 1955.

21. N/H of JCS 1731/129, 24 Aug 55, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 53.

22. *Documents on Disarmament*, pp. 501-502.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 516-521.

24. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament Planning," 30 Sep 55, JCS 1731/140; N/H of JCS 1731/140, 25 Oct 55; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 55.

25. *Documents on Disarmament*, pp. 528-529.

26. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Disarmament Planning," 27 Aug 55, JCS 1731/134, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 54.

27. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament Planning," 19 Oct 55, JCS 1731/144, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 56. N/H of JCS 1731/144, 31 Oct 55, same file, BP pt 4.

28. JCS 1731/145, 28 Oct 55; SM-891-55 to JSFC, 3 Nov 55; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 56.

29. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, "Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament (NSC Action 1419)," 4 Nov 55, JCS 1731/146, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 56 pt 1. SpecAsst to Pres for Disarmament, Draft "Progress Report on Proposed Policy . . .," vol. V, 1 Nov 55, pp. 1-12, reproduced as Annex to JCS 1731/146, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 56 pt 1; full text in same file, BP pt 4.

30. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament (NSC Action 1419)," 18 Nov 55, JCS 1731/149, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 57.

31. N/H of JCS 1731/149, 9 Dec 55, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 57.

32. *Documents on Disarmament*, pp. 583-586.

33. Rpt, SpecAsst to Pres for Disarmament to NSC, "Proposed Policy of the U.S. on the Question of Disarmament (NSC Action 1419)," n.d., Encl to Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 16 Dec 55, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 57.

34. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament (NSC Action 1419)," 20 Dec 55, JCS 1731/155; N/H of JCS 1731/155, 27 Dec 55; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 57.

35. NSC Action No. 1496, 22 Dec 55.

36. JCS 1731/156, 22 Dec 55; Dec On JCS 1731/156, 5 Jan 56; CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 5. Memo, CNO to JCS, 4 Jan 56, same file, sec 58.

37. Rpt, SpecAsst to Pres for Disarmament to NSC, "Proposed Policy of the U.S. on the Question of Disarmament (NSC Action 1419)," n.d., Encl to Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 13 Jan 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 58 pt 1.

38. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament (NSC Action 1419)," 20 Jan 56, JCS 1731/160, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 58.

39. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament," 25 Jan 56, JCS 1731/163, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 58.

40. NSC Action No. 1510, 26 Jan 56.

41. Memo, SpecAsst to Pres for Disarmament to VPres et al., "Public Statement on U.S. Position on 'Disarmament,'" 2 Feb 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 58 pt 1.

42. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Public Statement on U.S. Position on 'Disarmament,'" 6 Feb 56, JCS 1731/169, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 59. Ltr, ActgSecDef to SpecAsst to Pres for Disarmament, 7 Feb 56, JCS 1731/174, same file, sec 58 pt 1. NSC Action No. 1513, 7 Feb 56.

43. NSC Action No. 1513, 7 Feb 56.

44. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, "Preliminary Test Area for Aerial Inspection," 30 Jan 56, JCS 1731/166, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 59.

45. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Preliminary Test Area for Armament Inspection," 7 Feb 56, JCS 1731/168, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 59.

46. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, "Preliminary Test Area for Armament Inspection," 17 Feb 56, JCS 1731/178, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 60.

47. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Preliminary Test Area for Armament Inspection," 21 Feb 56, JCS 1731/179, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 60.

48. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, "Study of Force Levels of Major Nations in Connection with . . . Disarmament," 31 Jan 56, JCS 1731/170, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 59.

49. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Study of Force Levels of Major Nations in Connection with . . . Disarmament," 24 Feb 56, JCS 1731/177, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 60.
50. Ltr, ActgSecDef to SecState, 1 Mar 56, JCS 1731/182, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 61.
51. Supplementary Statement to NSC Action No. 1513, 1 Mar 56.
52. *Documents on Disarmament*, pp. 599–601.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 595–598.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 603–607.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 608–613.
56. Dept of State, *Disarmament, the Intensified Effort, 1955–1958* (1958), pp. 25–27.
57. Memo, SpecAsst to Pres for Disarmament to NSC, 29 Jun 56, JCS 1731/197, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 63.
58. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament Policy," 7 Jul 56, JCS 1731/199, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 64.
59. N/H of JCS 1731/199, 13 Jul 56, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 64.
60. Ltr, SpecAsst to Pres for Disarmament to SecDef, 14 Jul 56, JCS 1731/202, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 64.
61. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament Policy," 3 Aug 56, JCS 1731/203; Ltr, DepSecDef to Amb Amos J. Peaslee, 21 Aug 56, JCS 1731/205; CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 65.
62. *NY Times*, 21 Sep 56, p. 1; 30 Sep 56, p. 1; 13 Oct 56, p. 1. *Documents on Disarmament*, pp. 694–696.
63. *Documents on Disarmament*, pp. 698–702.
64. For coverage of the Suez Crisis of 1956, see Chapter 10.
65. *Documents on Disarmament*, pp. 720–729.
66. *Ibid.*, pp. 729–730.
67. Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 18 Dec 56, JCS 1731/214, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 66.
68. Annex to NSC Action No. 1553, 21 Nov 56, JCS 1731/214, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec 66.
69. Dept of State, *Disarmament, the Intensified Effort, 1955–1958* (1958), pp. 29–34.

Chapter 6. Thaw and Freeze in Europe

1. Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1953* (1955), p. 116. *United States in World Affairs, 1955* (1957), p. 18.
2. For a general discussion of the Austrian problem, see Hollis W. Barber, *The United States in World Affairs, 1955* (1957), pp. 41–50.
3. *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference of Berlin, 1945*, vol. II (1960), p. 1485.
4. Peter Curl, ed., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954* (1955), pp. 210–212.
5. Paul Zinner, ed., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955* (1956), pp. 121–125.
6. Dept of State Paper, "NSC Action on the Austrian Treaty," 20 Apr 55, JCS 1685/78, CCS 388.1 Austria (6–8–46) sec 14.
7. Memo, DepASD(ISA) to JCS, "U.S. Objectives and Policies With Respect to Austria (NSC 164/1)," 20 Apr 55, JCS 1685/78, CCS 388.1 (6–8–48) sec 14. The JSSC prepared comments for ADM Carney's use on the same day (Encl B to JCS 1685/78), but available records do not reveal whether or not any discussion occurred with DepSecDef Anderson before the NSC meeting on 21 Apr 55.
8. NSC Action No. 1383, 21 Apr 55.
9. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "NSC Action on the Austrian Treaty," 22 Apr 55, JCS 1685/79, CCS 388.1 Austria (6–8–46) sec 15.
10. N/H of JCS 1685/79, 27 Apr 55, CCS 388.1 Austria (6–8–46) sec 15.
11. NSC Action No. 1388, 28 Apr 55; approved by President, 8 May 55.
12. *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955*, p. 126.
13. JCS 1685/83, 6 May 55, CCS 388.1 Austria (6–8–46) sec 15.
14. *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955*, pp. 156–158.
15. Article 38 of the Treaty required ratifications to be deposited with the Soviet Government. Ratifications by other governments were deposited as follows: Austria, 14 June; USSR, 5 July; US, 9 July; UK, 19 July 1955.
16. *The United States in World Affairs, 1955*, pp. 41–50. The text of the Austrian State Treaty is in *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955*, pp. 127–156.
17. Memo, DepASD(ISA) to JCS, "U.S. Planning Regarding Implementation of the Proposed Austrian State Treaty," 4 May 55, JCS 1685/81; Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 24 May 55, JCS 1685/85; CCS 388.1 Austria (6–8–46) sec 15.

18. N/H of JCS 1685/85, 4 Jun 55, same file.
19. NSC 5603, 23 Mar 56, CCS 388.1 Austria (6–8–46) sec 17.
20. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy Toward Austria–NSC 5603," 30 Mar 56, JCS 1685/95; Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "U.S. Policy Toward Austria," 7 Apr 56; CCS 388.1 Austria (6–8–46) sec 17.
21. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. X, pp. 14189, 14191. The admission of West Germany to NATO and WEU is treated more fully in Chapter 7.
22. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. X, p. 14191. For general accounts of the events leading up to the summit meeting, see Dept of State, *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18–23, 1955* (1955), pp. 1–5. *United States in World Affairs, 1955*, pp. 59–60.
23. *Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 351–352, 431–432; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953–1956* (1963), p. 603.
24. Dept of State, *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government*, pp. 6–10.
25. NSC Action No. 1406, 19 May 55. The fifth power was Communist China.
26. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, "Tripartite Working Group Discussions in London on Subjects Other Than Austria," 20 Apr 55, JCS 2124/158, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 12.
27. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Tripartite Working Group Discussions . . .," 22 Apr 55, JCS 2124/159, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 12.
28. Memo, DepSecDef to JCS, "German Unification and European Security," 4 May 55, JCS 2124/160, CCS 092 Germany (5–4–49) sec 30. MC 48 was NATO's basic strategic plan; it is described in Chapter 7.
29. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "German Unification and European Security," 27 May 55, JCS 2124/161, CCS 092 Germany (5–9–49) sec 31.
30. N/H of JCS 2124/161, 8 Jun 55, CCS 092 Germany (5–9–49) sec 31.
31. NSC 5524, 27 Jun 55, CCS 337 (4–19–50) BP pt 4.
32. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Basic US Policy in Relation to Four-Power Negotiations (NSC 5524)," 2 Jul 55, JCS 2249/1, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 13.
33. NSC 5524/1, 11 Jul 55, JCS 2249/3, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 14.
34. Dept of State, *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government*, p. 4.
35. For detailed treatment of the Open Skies Plan and other aspects of arms control, see Chapter 5.
36. Dept of State, *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government*, pp. 67–68.
37. *United States in World Affairs, 1955*, p. 65.
38. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Preparation for October Foreign Ministers' Meeting at Geneva," 10 Aug 55, JCS 2249/4, CCS 337 (4–19–50) BP pt 5.
39. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Preparation for October Foreign Ministers' Meeting at Geneva," 8 Sep 55, JCS 2249/7, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 15.
40. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, "Outline for European Security Pact," 22 Aug 55, JCS 2249/5, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 15.
41. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Outline for European Security Pact," 24 Aug 55, JCS 2249/6, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 15.
42. N/H of JCS 2249/6, 26 Aug 55, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 15. For the treaty text as revised, see App B to JCS 2249/10, 9 Sep 55, same file, sec 16.
43. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, "Effect of U.S. Draft Treaty (POM D–1/1) on U.S. Nuclear Rights," 7 Sep 55, JCS 2249/10, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 16.
44. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Effect of U.S. Draft Security Treaty (POM D–1/1) on U.S. Nuclear Rights," 16 Sep 55, JCS 2249/11, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 15.
45. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, "Outline of Terms of Security Agreements in Connection with the Reunification of Germany," 10 Oct 55, JCS 2249/13, CCS 092 Germany (5–4–49) sec 31.
46. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Outline of Terms of Security Treaty in Conjunction with the Reunification of Germany," 12 Oct 55, JCS 2249/15, CCS 092 Germany (5–4–49) sec 31.
47. N/H of JCS 2249/15, 14 Oct 55, CCS 092 Germany (5–4–49) sec 31.
48. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, "U.K. Proposals for European Security," 1 Sep 55, JCS 2249/8, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 15.
49. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.K. Proposals for European Security," 8 Sep 55, JCS 2249/9, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 16.
50. Dept of State, *The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27–November 16, 1955* (1955), pp. 27–33. *United States in World Affairs, 1955*, pp. 74–77.
51. NSC 5608/1, 18 Jul 56, JCS 2066/15, CCS 092 (9–14–49) sec 9. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe," 10 Jul 56, JCS 2066/14, same file, sec 8.
52. Flora Lewis, *A Case History of Hope, The Story of Poland's Peaceful Revolutions* (1959), pp. 187–227.

53. Doris M. Condit et al., *Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict*, vol. II, *The Experience in Europe and the Middle East* (1967), Chapter 18.
54. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 5 Nov 56, p. 700.
55. NSC Action No. 1623b, 26 Oct 56.
56. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 12 Nov 56, p. 757. Available evidence does not reveal the origins of the US decision to take the Hungarian situation to the UN; such a move may have been discussed by the NSC on 26 Oct 56, but no decision was recorded.
57. NSC 5616, 31 Oct 56, JCS 2066/16, CCS 092 (9–14–49) sec 9.
58. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Policy Toward Developments in Poland and Hungary (NSC 5616)," 31 Oct 56, JCS 2066/17, CCS 092 (9–14–49) sec 9.
59. Doris M. Condit et al., *Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict*, vol. II, Ch. 18.
60. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace, 1956–1961* (1965), pp. 88–89.
61. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 12 Nov 56, p. 763; 19 Nov 56, p. 803.
62. A liberation policy was one of the alternatives during Project Solarium; see Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954*, pp. 11–14.
63. *NY Times*, 5 Nov 56, p. 26; 6 Nov 56, p. 39.
64. NSC 5616/1, 13 Nov 56, JCS 2066/18, CCS 092 (9–14–49) sec 10.
65. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Interim US Policy on Developments in Poland and Hungary (NSC 5616/1)," 14 Nov 56, JCS 2066/19, CCS 092 (9–14–49) sec 10.
66. NSC Action No. 1633, 15 Nov 56. NSC 5616/2, 19 Nov 56, JCS 2066/20, 21 Nov 56, CCS 092 (9–14–49) sec 10.
67. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS and ASD(ISA), "U.S. Policy Toward Developments in Poland," 23 Nov 56, JCS 2066/21; JCS 2066/22, 28 Nov 56; CCS 092 (9–14–49) sec 10.
68. Memo, CNO to JCS, "U. S. Policy Toward Developments in Poland," 30 Nov 56, CCS 092 (9–14–49) sec 10.
69. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Policy Toward Developments in Poland," 3 Dec 56, JCS 2066/23, CCS 092 (9–14–49) sec 10.
70. NSC 5705/1, 25 Feb 57, JCS 2066/30, CCS 092 (9–14–49) sec 11.

Chapter 7. NATO: Implementing the Nuclear Strategy

1. These complex negotiations and their outcome are treated in more detail in Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954*, Chapter 14.
2. The text of the North Atlantic Treaty may be found in Dept of State *Bulletin*, 20 Mar 49, pp. 339–342.
3. NATO's new approach and the development of MC 48 are described in Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954*, Chapter 14.
4. These figures are based on the 1956 goals from the 1953 Annual Review plus the German force goals agreed to in a secret protocol to the EDC treaty. USRO, "The 1955 White Book: Recommended U.S. Defense Position, 1955 Annual Review" (Pt II, Ann A), Nov 55, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) BP pt 6 (hereafter *1955 White Book*). USRO, "Report on NATO 1953 Annual Review and Resulting Problems Affecting the 1954 Annual Review (The Blue Book)," 15 Feb 54, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) BP pt 9.
5. USRO, "Report on the NATO 1954 Annual Review Plus Factors and Problems Affecting the 1955 Annual Review (The 1954 Blue Book)," 2 Jan 55, OSD Subregistry.
6. *1955 White Book*; Pt II, Ann A, contains an extract from CM(55) 101, "The 1955 Annual Review," 23 Nov 55, which in turn cites SACEUR's Combat Effectiveness Report, which was not available to the author. Also, comparable information on naval forces was not available.
7. USRO, *1955 Blue Book*, Jan 56, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) BP pt 9.
8. JCS 2073/1063, 8 Jun 55, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) BP pt 3.
9. Army Purple, "Reply to the NATO Annual Review Questionnaire for 1955," n.d. [6 Jul 55], CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec 24.
10. Draft Memo, CJCS to SecDef, n.d. (penciled "7–27–55" on margin), CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec 24.
11. Dec On JCS 2073/1063, 30 Jul 55, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) BP pt 3.
12. AR (55) United States (Study) D/1, 2 Nov 55, US Central Registry.
13. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Recommendations, Country Study on the United States, Annual Review 1955," 2 Dec 55, JCS 2073/1186, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec 42.

14. 1955 *White Book*.
15. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Defense Position on the 1955 Annual Review," 7 Dec 55, JCS 2073/1190, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 43. 1955 *White Book*, Corrig 3, 19 Dec 55. The available evidence does not reveal whether or not US representatives at the ministerial meetings made the points recommended in the *White Book*.
16. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, 6 Nov 54, JCS 2073/943, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 310.
17. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Movement of French Forces to North Africa," 12 Nov 54, JCS 2073/945; Dec On JCS 2073/945, 12 Nov 54; CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 311.
18. DUSM-129-55 to JCS, 31 May 55, JCS 2073/1060, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 18.
19. DFM(55)48 to CJCS, 13 Jun 55, JCS 2073/1072, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 20.
20. DUSM-159-55 to JCS, 15 Jun 55, JCS 2073/1076, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 20.
21. SM-641-55 to US Rep SG, NAMC, 5 Aug 55, JCS 2073/1098, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 24. USM-8-55 to JCS, 7 Jul 55, JCS 2073/1086, same file, sec 23.
22. DUSM-214-55 to JCS, 11 Aug 55, JCS 2073/1114, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 28. USM-29-55 to JCS, 30 Aug 55, JCS 2073/1125, same file, sec 31. USM-41-55 to JCS, 9 Sep 55, JCS 2073/1138, same file, sec 32.
23. 1955 *White Book*, Pt III-D, Ann A. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Defense Position on the 1955 Annual Review," 7 Dec 55, JCS 2073/1190, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 43.
24. "French Draft," 15 Mar 56, JCS 2073/1243, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 53.
25. USM-27-56 to JCS, 19 Mar 56, JCS 2073/1243, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 53. Msg, STAND 1464 to SGLO, 17 Mar 56, quoted in Encl C to JCS 2073/1254, same file, sec 56.
26. USM-34-56 to JCS, 9 Apr 56, JCS 2073/1251, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 55.
27. SM-321-56 to US Rep NAMC, 20 Apr 56, JCS 2073/1254, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 56.
28. Memo, DepDir for Int to CJCS, "Withdrawal of French Army Forces from NATO," 14 Aug 56, CJCS 092 NATO, 1956.
29. USRO, 1956 *Blue Book*, Jan 57, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) BP pt 12.
30. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Reply to the NATO Questionnaire for the Annual Review, 1956," 14 Jun 56, JCS 2073/1270, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) BP pt 11. There was no *White Book* in 1956, and evidence in the files available to the author did not permit a fuller description of the development of the US position and its presentation at the ministerial meeting of that year.
31. 1955 *White Book*, Pt I, Ann A.
32. USM-45-55 to JCS, 16 Sep 55, JCS 2073/1145, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 33.
33. SM-794-55 to US Rep SG, NAMC, 29 Sep 55, JCS 2073/1151, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 34.
34. Ltr, SACEUR to SG, AG 1250 AD (revised), 17 Oct 55, US Central Registry.
35. N/H of JCS 2073/1151, 28 Oct 55, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 34. USRO, "The 1955 *Blue Book*: Report on the 1955 Annual Review" (Pt III-D), Jan 56, same file, BP pt 9.
36. The SHAPE documents containing SACEUR's proposal were not available to the author, but their contents are described in USM-93-55 to JCS, 28 Dec 55, JCS 2073/1211, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 47; further description is in JCS 2073/1228, 1 Feb 56, same file, sec 50.
37. SM-88-56 to US Rep SG, NAMC, 2 Feb 56, JCS 2073/1228, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 50.
38. Msg, USRO DEFTO 363 to SecDef and JCS, 17 Dec 54, DA IN 105876, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 319.
39. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 8 Feb 55, JCS 2201/10, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 10.
40. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Machinery for Political Consultation Prior to the Use of Atomic Weapons," 2 May 55, JCS 2201/11, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 14. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Use of Atomic Weapons," 11 Jun 54, JCS 2073/823, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 285.
41. N/H of JCS 2201/11, 10 May 55, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 14. Available sources do not indicate whether or not the authority to employ nuclear weapons was discussed at the ministerial meeting, which was held in Paris on 9-11 May 55.
42. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Base Rights and Megaton Missiles," 24 Mar 56, JCS 2201/12, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 54. See Chapter 4 for discussion of the development of the IRBM.
43. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Base Rights and Megaton Missiles," 2 May 56, JCS 2201/13, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 57.
44. Ltr, SHAPE/456/55 AG 1451 PPO to SG, NAMC, 3 Dec 55, US Central Registry.
45. SM-629-56 to US Rep SG, NAMC, 31 Jul 56, JCS 2073/1281, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 61. JCS 2073/1388, 17 Aug 56, same file, sec 62.
46. DUSM-6-55 to JCS, 11 Jan 55, JCS 2073/996, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 3. SM-174-55 to US Rep SG, NAMC, 8 Mar 55, JCS 2073/1013, same file, sec 7.

47. The Standing Group's approval was transmitted by Msgs, STAND 1032 and 1033 to SACEUR, both 17 Mar 55; SACEUR's directives were Msgs, SHAPTO 903 and 904, both 18 Mar 55. None of these documents were available to the author, but were summarized in DUSM– 68–55 to JCS, 28 Mar 55, JCS 2073/1033, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec 10.

48. SM–510–55 to US Rep SG, NAMC, 28 Jun 55, and Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Conversion of NATO Tactical Airfield Infrastructure to Atomic Posture," 28 Jun 55, JCS 2073/1066; N/H of JCS 2073/1066, 17 Aug 55; CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec 19. SM–665–55 to US Rep SG, NAMC, 17 Aug 55, same file, sec 28.

49. USM–66–55 to JCS, 27 Oct 55, JCS 2073/1174, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec 39. SM–980–55 to US Rep SG, NAMC, 6 Dec 55, JCS 2073/1181, same file, sec 42.

50. Ltr, SHAPE AG 6100/7/E–300/55 LOG to SG, NAMC, 22 Aug 55, US Central Registry.

51. Ltr, SACLANT Ser 1048 to SG, NAMC, 27 Aug 55, JCS Subregistry.

52. SM–97–55 to US Rep SG, NAMC, 6 Dec 55, JCS 2073/1179, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec 41.

53. SACEUR's recommendation was in Msg, SHAPTO 1086 to SG, NAMC, 3 Dec 55, not available to the author but briefed in JCS 2073/1221, 18 Jan 56, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec 48. DUSM–317–55 to JCS, 8 Dec 55, JCS 2073/1203, same file, sec 45. SM–74–56 to US Rep SG, NAMC, 31 Jan 56, JCS 2073/1221, same file, sec 49. In the absence of indication to the contrary, it is presumed that the infrastructure program was endorsed in some form by the Standing Group and approved successively by the Military Committee and the NAC. However, the action subsequent to the submission of JCS views in SM–74–56 cannot be determined from the records available.

54. The relevant NATO documents being unavailable, this section is based on JCS 2073/1246 (Encl B), 27 Mar 56, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec 54.

55. LMP 21/277 (Draft), as briefed in JCS 2073/1233, 21 Feb 56, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec 51.

56. SM–289–56 to US Rep SG, NAMC, 10 Apr 56, JCS 2073/1246, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec 54.

57. These actions are described in JCS 2073/1306, 1 Oct 56, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec 65. The NATO documents were not available.

Chapter 8. Search for a Collective Defense of the Middle East

1. These geographical boundaries contained all the countries listed as Near East states in NSC 5428, 23 Jul 54, CCS 092 Palestine (5–3–46) BP pt 1. The term Near East, used in that document, was synonymous with Middle East as employed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. The consequences of US support for the creation of Israel and the policy measures adopted to deal with them are treated in Chapter 9.

3. NSC 5428, 23 Jul 54, CCS 092 Palestine (5–3–46) BP pt 1. Printed in Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1952–1954*, vol. IX, *Near and Middle East* (1986), pp. 525–536.

4. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 15 Jun 53, pp. 831–835.

5. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Security Arrangements for the Middle East," 14 Nov 54, JCS 1887/73, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 17. SM–571–54 to RBCOS, 21 Jun 54, JCS 1887/80, same file, sec 18. Msg, CINCNELM to CNO, 281631Z Dec 54, same file, sec 19. These developments are treated more fully in Watson, *Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954*, pp. 326–347.

6. JCS 1887/75, 18 Mar 54, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 18. SM–997–54 to CINCNELM, 17 Nov 54, JCS 1887/93, same file, sec 19.

7. Rpt, Dep Chief of Turkish Staff, Vice Chief of UK Air Staff, and CINCNELM, "Combined Turkey-UK-US Middle East Defense Study," 22 Feb 55, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) BP pt 2. The inclusion of Jordanian forces, not specifically explained, presumably resulted from the preponderant British influence over them.

8. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Review of Turkish-U.K.-U.S. Middle East Defense Studies . . .," 8 Apr 55, JCS 1887/99, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 20.

9. *United States in World Affairs, 1955*, p. 155. Paul E. Zinner, ed., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955* (1956), pp. 342–344.

10. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Review of Turkish-U.K.-U.S. Middle East Defense Studies . . .," 8 Apr 55, JCS 1887/99, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 20.

11. N/H of JCS 1887/99, 10 May 55, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 20.

12. Memo, State-Def Working Gp on Middle East Defense, "U.S. Position Regarding Middle East Defense," 6 Jun 55, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) BP pt 2.

13. SM-423-55 to JSSC, 27 May 55; Memo, DepSecDef to JCS, "U.S. Position Regarding Middle East Defense," 6 Jun 55, JCS 1887/103; CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 20.
14. JCS 1887/104, 13 Jun 55; CSAFM 169-55 to JCS, 15 Jun 55; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Position Regarding Middle East Defense," 16 Jun 55, JCS 1887/104; CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 21.
15. Memo, USecState to Pres, "Defense of the Middle East," 11 Jul 55, JCS 1887/108, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 22.
16. Memo, DepASD(ISA) to JCS, "Arrangements Regarding Middle East Defense," 14 Jul 55, JCS 1887/108, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 22.
17. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Arrangements Regarding Middle East Defense," 30 Sep 55, JCS 1887/117; N/H of JCS 1887/117, 2 Nov 55; CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 23.
18. Ltr, CINCNELM to CNO, 18 Oct 55, JCS 1887/127, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 24.
19. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Middle East Defense," 18 Nov 55, JCS 1887/127; N/H of JCS 1887/127, 7 Dec 55; CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 24.
20. "Communiqué, Baghdad Pact Council Meeting, Baghdad, November 22, 1955," in Zinner, *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955*, pp. 345-347.
21. Ltr, CINCNELM to CNO, 30 Nov 55, JCS 1887/135, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 25.
22. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "CINCNELM Report on Baghdad Pact Council Meetings, 21-22 November 1955," 4 Jan 56, JCS 1887/135, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 25.
23. Army Attache, Iraq, "Observations and Impressions of the First Meeting, Council of the Baghdad Pact Military Deputies' Committee, 21-28 January 1956," 6 Feb 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 27.
24. BP/MIDMIL/MP/56/1, 19 Mar 56.
25. Msg, USARMA Baghdad to DA, 30 Jan 56, DA IN 197246, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 26.
26. Dec On JCS 1887/148, 17 Feb 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 26. JCS 1887/149, 1 Mar 56, same file, sec 27.
27. Dec On JCS 1887/149, 3 Mar 56; Msg, JCS 998294 to USARMA Baghdad, 3 Mar 56, JCS 1887/149; Msg, USARMA Baghdad to DA, 8 Mar 56, DA IN 206026; CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 27. Msg, USARMA Tehran to JCS, 19 Apr 56, DA IN 217267, same file, sec 32.
28. Ltr, USARMA Baghdad to JCS, 19 Mar 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 28.
29. Draft CM to CSAF et al., Att to Memo, DJS to CJCS, "The Position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Reference to U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact," 21 Mar 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 28.
30. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact," 23 Mar 56, JCS 1887/156, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 28.
31. N/Hs of JCS 1887/156, 5 Apr 56 and 9 Apr 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 28. Memo, SecDef to ExecSecy, NSC, "U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact," 5 Apr 56, and Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, same subj, 9 Apr 56, JCS 1887/170, same file, sec 30.
32. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 23 Apr 56, JCS 1887/197, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 35.
33. Memo, SecDef to ExecSecy, NSC, "U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact," 15 May 56, and Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "U.S. Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East," 24 May 56, JCS 1887/204, CCS 092 Palestine (5-3-46) sec 21.
34. JCS 1887/167, 5 Apr 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 29. Memo, JCS to ADM John H. Cassidy, "Terms of Reference for the Senior Observer at the Baghdad Meeting... on 16 April 1956," 11 Apr 56, JCS 1887/167, same file, sec 30. Ltr, CINCNELM to CNO, 27 Apr 56, JCS 1887/200, same file, sec 35.
35. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Liaison with the Baghdad Pact," 11 May 56 and SM-428-56 to USARMA Iraq, 24 May 56, JCS 1887/184; N/H of JCS 1887/184, 28 May 56; CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 34.
36. *United States in World Affairs, 1956*, pp. 94-95.
37. See above, p. 158.
38. Msg, JCS 901932 to USARMA Baghdad, 27 Apr 56, JCS 1887/183, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 33.
39. Msg, CNO to CINCNELM, 110051Z Apr 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 30. Ltr, CINCNELM to CNO, "Baghdad Pact Council Meeting," 27 Apr 56, same file, sec 35.
40. Report of U.S. Observer on Third Meeting of Baghdad Pact Military Deputies' Committee, 27 Jul 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 39. BP/MIDMIL/MDC/3/R1 and R2, 15 and 17 Jul 56.
41. Msg, JCS 912996 to USARMA Baghdad, 7 Nov 56, JCS 1887/292; Msg, JCS 913686 to USARMA Baghdad, 19 Nov 56, JCS 1887/304; CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 48.
42. Msg, JCS 913910 to USARMA Baghdad, 22 Nov 56, JCS 1887/309, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 49.

43. Memo, COL J.A. Isbell to CJCS, "Report of the Military Observer at the Baghdad Pact Military Committee Working Level Meeting on the Command Systems Study, 16–19 September 1956," 11 Oct 56, JCS 1887/284, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 46.

44. Memo, USARMA Baghdad to JCS, 2 Oct 56, JCS 1887/284, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 45.

45. Msg, JCS 913266 to Ch, Baghdad Pact Military Liaison Group, 10 Nov 56, JCS 1887/291, 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 46.

46. Msg, JCS 912785 to USARMA Baghdad, 2 Nov 56, JCS 1887/290, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 47. Msg, JCS 913909 to USARMA Baghdad, 22 Nov 56, JCS 1887/308, same file, sec 49. JCS 1887/247, 20 Aug 56, same file, sec 41. Dec On JCS 1887/247, 11 Sep 56, same file, sec 43. Msg, JCS 912088 to USARMA Baghdad, 23 Oct 56, JCS 1887/274, same file, sec 46.

47. Msg, JCS 913509 to USARMA Baghdad, 15 Nov 56, JCS 1887/320; Msg, JCS 913845 to USARMA Baghdad, 21 Nov 56, JCS 1887/305; CCS 381 (11–19–47) sec 49.

48. JCS 1887/189, 10 May 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 34. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Force Requirements for Defense of the Baghdad Pact Area," 12 Jul 56, JCS 1887/220, same file, sec 39.

49. The Suez Canal crisis is treated in Chapter 10.

50. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, "U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact," 22 Oct 56, JCS 1887/289, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 46.

51. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 14 Nov 56, JCS 1887/310, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 49.

52. JCS 1887/313, 26 Nov 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 49.

53. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact," 30 Nov 56, JCS 1887/313, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 51.

54. *Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1957*, pp. 6–30.

55. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact," 17 Jan 57, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 54. N/H of JCS 1887/310, 22 Jan 57, same file, sec 49.

Chapter 9. The Arab-Israeli Dispute

1. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 5 Jun 50, p. 886.

2. NSC 5428, 23 Jul 54, CCS 092 Palestine (5–3–46) BP pt 1. Printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1952–1954*, vol. IX, *Near and Middle East* (1986), pp. 525–536.

3. NSC Action No. 1447, 6 Oct 55.

4. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC PB, "U.S. Policy in the Near East," 15 Oct 55, CCS 092 Palestine (5–3–46) sec 18.

5. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "Deterrence of Major Armed Conflict between Israel and Egypt or Other Arab States," 17 Oct 55, JCS 1887/121, CCS 092 Palestine (5–3–46) sec 18.

6. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Deterrence of Major Armed Conflict between Israel and Egypt or Other Arab States," 19 Oct 55, JCS 1887/122, CCS 092 Palestine (5–3–46) sec 18.

7. NSC Action No. 1460, 20 Oct 55.

8. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "Deterrence of Major Armed Conflict between Israel and Egypt or Other Arab States," 24 Oct 55, JCS 1887/123, CCS 092 Palestine (5–3–46) sec 18.

9. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Deterrence of Armed Conflict between Israel and Egypt or Other Arab States," 26 Oct 55, JCS 1887/124, CCS 092 Palestine (5–3–46) sec 19.

10. NSC 5428, as revised 2 Nov 55, CCS 092 Palestine (5–3–46) BP pt 1.

11. Memo, DepSecDef to SecArmy et al., "U.S. Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East (NSC 5428)," 28 Oct 55, JCS 1887/126, CCS 092 Palestine (5–3–46) sec 19.

12. JCS 1887/224, 10 Jul 56, CCS 092 Palestine (5–3–46) BP pt 3. SM–610–56 to CINCNELM, 21 Jul 56, JCS 1887/224, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 39.

13. SM–239–56 to JMEPC, 23 Mar 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 28.

14. JCS 1887/176, 18 Apr 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 32. Dec On JCS 1887/161, 27 Apr 56, same file, BP pt 4. SM–338–56 to CINCNELM, 27 Apr 56, JCS 1887/161, same file, sec 33.

15. CINCSPCOMME OPLAN 215–56, 5 Jul 56, with Change 2, 31 Aug 56, and Change 4, 23 Sep 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) BP pt 5. Msg, CINCNELM to CNO, 111657Z Sep 56, same file, sec 43. Dec On JCS 1887/297, 9 Nov 56, same file, sec 47. During this period CINCNELM was both the naval component commander of the US European Command and the head of a specified command with certain planning and operational responsibilities with respect to the Middle East. When functioning in the latter capacity he used the title Commander in Chief, US Specified Command, Middle East (CINC-SPECOMME), although all his actions emanated, in fact, from a single CINCNELM headquarters.

16. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President* (1984), pp. 315–316. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 13 Feb 56, pp. 232–233.

17. Memo RAC–13–56, RADM R. A. Currie, BJSM, to RADM T. J. Hedding, OCJCS, "Tripartite

Declaration of 1950," 13 Feb 56; Memo, RADM T. J. Hedding to DepAsstSecState (NEA), "British Report on the Military Problems Involved in Action under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950," 16 Feb 56; CJCS File 091 Palestine (Jan-May 56).

18. Memo for Record, RADM T. J. Hedding, "Discussion Held with Mr. Douglas MacArthur . . . and Mr. William Rountree . . ." 17 Feb 56; Memo for Record, RADM T. J. Hedding, 23 Feb 56; CJCS File 091 Palestine (Jan-May 56).

19. CM-253-56 to SecState, 1 Mar 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 27.

20. Memo, ActgSecState to CJCS, 6 Mar 56, CJCS File 091 Palestine (Jan-May 56).

21. BCOS Paper, "The Military Problems Involved in Action under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950," 13 Feb 56, CJCS File 091 Palestine (Jan-May 56). US-UK revised version, "Analysis of the Military Problems Involved in Action under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950," n.d., JCS 1887/152, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 28.

22. Memo, BJSM to Secy JCS, "Military Problems involved in Action under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950," 26 Mar 56, JCS 1887/158, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 28.

23. Dec On JCS 1887/163, 9 Apr 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 29.

24. Memo RAC-44-56, RADM R. A. Currie to RADM T. J. Hedding, 30 Mar 56, CCS 092 Palestine (5-3-46) sec 19.

25. DM-15-56 to JCS, 5 Apr 56; SM-279-56 to RBCOS, 6 Apr 56, JCS 1887/163; SM-281-56 to JSPC, 6 Apr 56; CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 29. SM-280-56 to Chairman, JMEPC, 9 Apr 56, same file, sec 30.

26. Dec On JCS 1887/173, 20 Apr 56, CCS 092 Palestine (5-3-46) BP pt 2. SM-313-56 to Chairman, JMEPC, 18 Apr 56, JCS 1887/174, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 32.

27. Rpt, JMEPC to JCS, "Combined U.K.-U.S. Planning Pursuant to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950," 7 May 56, JCS 1887/187, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 34.

28. Memo, Rep of BCOS to CJCS, "Combined United States-United Kingdom Action in the Event of an Arab-Israel War," 4 Jun 56, JCS 1887/208, CCS 092 Palestine (5-3-46) sec 21. See also *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955-1957*, vol. XV, *Arab-Israeli Dispute* (1989), p. 642.

29. JCS 1887/226, 13 Jul 56; SM-659-56 to Rep of BCOS, 8 Aug 56, JCS 1887/226; CCS 092 Palestine (5-3-46) sec 22. Among the materials used by the JSPC in drafting the US reply was a much more fully developed set of arguments against accepting combined command, submitted by CINCNELM. Msg, CINCNELM to JCS, 172031Z Jun 56; SM-505-56 to JSPC, 18 Jun 56; same file, sec 21.

30. The Suez Crisis is treated in the following chapter.

Chapter 10. The Suez Canal Crisis

1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace, 1956-1961* (1965), pp. 30-32.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33. Robert D. Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (1964), pp. 376-377. Dept of State, MemCon, 19 Jul 56, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955-1957*, vol. XV, *Arab-Israeli Dispute* (1989), pp. 867-873.

4. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 30 Jul 56, p. 188. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, p. 34.

5. Msg, PM Eden to Pres Eisenhower, 27 Jul 56, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955-1957*, vol. XVI, *Suez Crisis* (1990), pp. 9-11.

6. Msg, Paris 469 to State, 27 Jul 56, CCS 092 Egypt (7-28-56) sec 1. Also printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955-1957*, vol. XVI, *Suez Crisis*, pp. 7-9.

7. Dept of State, *The Suez Canal Problem, July 26-September 22, 1956* (1956), p. 34 (hereafter *Suez Canal Problem*). Ltr, Pres Eisenhower to PM Eden, 31 Jul 56, printed in *Foreign Relation of the United States: 1955-1957*, vol. XVI, *Suez Crisis*, pp. 69-71.

8. *Suez Canal Problem* pp. 34-35.

9. DM-33-56 to JCS, 28 Jul 56, CCS 092 Egypt (7-28-56) sec 1. The study contained no recommendations.

10. CSAFM 236-56 to JCS, 29 Jul 56; Memo, CNO to JCS, "DM-33-56 (Nationalization of the Suez Maritime Canal Company by the Egyptian Government)," 30 Jul 56; Memo, CSA to JCS, "Nationalization of the Suez Maritime Company by the Egyptian Government," 30 Jul 56; CCS 092 Egypt (7-28-56) sec 1.

11. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Nationalization of the Suez Maritime Canal Company by the Egyptian Government," 31 Jul 56, JCS 2105/38, CCS 092 Egypt (7-28-56) sec 1. Admiral Radford did not participate in this action.

12. Conference Memo, White House Mtg, 31 Jul 56, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955-1957*, vol. XVI, *Suez Crisis*, pp. 62-68.

13. SM-630-56 to JSPC, 31 Jul 56, JCS 2105/38, CCS 092 Egypt (7-28-56) sec 1.

14. Memo, DepSecDef to ExecSecy, NSC, "Nationalization of the Suez Maritime Canal Company by the Egyptian Government," 2 Aug 56, CCS 092 Egypt (7–28–56) sec 1.

15. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Nationalization of the Suez Canal; Consequences and Possible Related Reactions," 3 Aug 56; Memo, SecDef to ExecSecy, NSC, same subj, 7 Aug 56, JCS 2105/39, CCS 092 Egypt (7–28–56) sec 1. Again, Admiral Radford did not participate. See also *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. XVI, *Suez Crisis*, p. 154, fn. 4.

16. NSC Action No. 1593, 9 Aug 56. *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. XVI, *Suez Crisis*, pp. 165–176.

17. Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., "The Suez Canal Situation," 14 Aug 56, CCS 092 Egypt (7–28–56) sec 2.

18. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Expropriation of the Suez Maritime Canal Company by the Egyptian Government," 8 Aug 56, JCS 2105/40, CCS 092 Egypt (7–28–56) sec 1.

19. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Expropriation of the Suez Canal; Analysis of Possible Military Courses of Action and Their Consequences," 23 Aug 56, JCS 2105/45, CCS 092 Egypt (7–28–56) BP.

20. State-Def MEPPG, Contingency Paper No. 1 Pursuant to NSC Action No. 1593-b, 24 Aug 56, CJCS File 091 Egypt (1954-Aug 56).

21. State-Def MEPPG, Contingency Paper No. 2 Pursuant to NSC Action No. 1593-b, 24 Aug 56, CJCS File 091 Egypt (1954–Aug 56).

22. These three contingency papers produced by the State-Def MEPPG were numbered 3, 4, and 6; no copies of these papers were found in JCS records, and no reference to a paper No. 5 was discovered. Information concerning the subject and content of the three papers was derived from the comments on each contained in Memo, CJCS Staff Group to RADM C. D. Griffin, "Contingency Papers Pursuant to NSC Action 1593-b," 18 Sep 56, CJCS File 091 Egypt (Sep 56-).

23. This was the advice the Chairman received from his staff. Memo, CJCS Staff Group to RADM C. D. Griffin, 28 Aug 56, CJCS File 091 Egypt (1954-Aug 56). Memo, CJCS Staff Group to RADM C. D. Griffin, "Contingency Papers Pursuant to NSC Action 1593-b," 18 Sep 56, CJCS File 091 Egypt (Sep 56-). The latter memo bears CJCS notation "OK. R."

24. Msg, CNO to CINCNELM, 280045Z Jul 56, CCS 092 Egypt (7–28–56) sec 1.

25. Msg, JCS 908488 to CINCNELM, 15 Aug 56; Msg, CINCNELM to CNO, 171632Z Aug 56; CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 41. Rpt, CINCNELM to CNO, "Report of Operations and Condition of Command, 1 July 1956–1 July 1957," 8 Nov 57, Naval Historical Ctr files.

26. DM–61–56 to CJCS, 30 Aug 56, CJCS File 091 Palestine (Jun 56–Dec 56). For an account of Middle East contingency planning, see Chapter 9. It should be noted, however, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not yet approved CINCSPCOMME OPLAN 215–56.

27. Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1956* (1957), pp. 262–263. *Suez Canal Problem*, pp. 288–290.

28. *Suez Canal Problem*, pp. 317–326. *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. XVI, *Suez Crisis*, pp. 34–127.

29. Ltr, Pres Eisenhower to PM Eden, 8 Sep 56, printed in Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, pp. 669–671. *Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1956*, p. 757.

30. *Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1956*, p. 761.

31. *Suez Canal Problem*, pp. 333–344.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 365.

33. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President* (1984), pp. 339–340.

34. Donald Neff, *Warriors at Suez* (1981), pp. 309–310, 323–326, 335–338, 342–346, 348.

35. Intelligence Advisory Com, Special Watch Report 325A, 28 Oct 56, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. XVI, *Suez Crisis*, pp. 798–799. Msg, JCS 912389 to CINCAL et al., 290133Z Oct 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 47.

36. Herbert Finer, *Dulles Over Suez* (1964), p. 353. AP Wire Service item, 29 Oct 56, rec'd JCS 292001Z Oct 56, cited in JCS Hist Div, "Chronology of Significant Events Relating to the Current World Crisis," Second Installment: 23–31 Oct 56, p. 42.

37. Memo, Secy JCS to CJCS, "JCS Actions with Respect to the Middle East Situation Agreed Upon at JCS Meeting 29 October 1956," 29 Oct 56, CJCS File 091 Palestine (Jun–Dec 56). Also printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. XVI, *Suez Crisis*, pp. 826–827.

38. Conference Memo, White House Mtg, 29 Oct 56, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. XVI, *Suez Crisis*, pp. 833–839. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, pp. 72–73. Text of press release is in Dept of State, *United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956–June 1957* (hereafter cited as *US Policy in the Middle East*) (1957), p. 137.

39. Council on Foreign Relations, *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1956* (1957), p. 346.

40. Msg, Pres Eisenhower to PM Eden, 30 Oct 56, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. XVI, *Suez Crisis*, p. 866.

41. Msg, CINCNELM to COMSIXTHFLT, 300331Z Oct 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 47.
42. Rpt, CINCNELM to CNO, "Report of Operations and Condition of Command, 1 July 1956–1 July 1957," 8 Nov 57, Naval Historical Ctr files.
43. NSC Action No. 1627, 1 Nov 56. Memo of Discussion, NSC Mtg, 1 Nov 56, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. XVI, *Suez Crisis*, pp. 901–916. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, pp. 82–83. During the following days, the Soviets committed heavy new forces and crushed the Hungarian uprising. See Chapter 6.
44. *US Policy in the Middle East*, pp. 157–158, 160.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 180–188.
47. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Expropriation of the Suez Canal; Analysis of Possible Military Courses of Action and Their Consequences," 23 Aug 56, JCS 2105/45, CCS 092 Egypt (7–28–56) BP.
48. Memo, Secy JCS, to CJCS, "JCS Actions with respect to the Middle East Situation agreed upon at JCS Meeting on 2 November 1956," 2 Nov 56, CJCS File 091 Palestine (Jun-Dec 56).
49. JCS 1887/298, 3 Nov 56, CCS EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 47.
50. JCS 1887/300, 6 Nov 56, CCS EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 47.
51. N/H of JCS 1887/298, 8 Nov 56, CCS EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 47.
52. SNIE 11–9–56, 6 Nov 56, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. XVI, *Suez Crisis*, pp. 1018–1020. The Deputy Director, Joint Staff, concurred in this estimate.
53. Memo, Secy JCS to CJCS, "JCS Actions with Respect to the Middle East Situation Agreed upon at the JCS Meeting on 6 November 1956," 6 Nov 56, CJCS File 091 Palestine (Jun-Dec 56).
54. Msg, JCS 912988 to CINCAL et al., 7 Nov 56, CJCS File 091 Palestine (Jun-Dec 56).
55. Memo, Secy JCS to CJCS, "JCS Actions with respect to the Middle East Situation agreed upon at JCS Meeting on 5 November 1956," 5 Nov 56, CJCS File 091 Palestine (Jun-Dec 56).
56. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, "Department of Defense Assistance to the United Nations Forces in Egypt," 9 Nov 56, JCS 1887/307, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 48.
57. CM–401–56 to SecDef, 9 Nov 56, JCS 1887/307; N/H of JCS 1887/307, 14 Nov 56; CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 48.
58. Memo, SecDef to SecAF, "Airlift of United Nations Emergency Force Units," 23 Nov 56, JCS 1887/314, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 49. LTG E.L.M. Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli* (1962), pp. 186–218. *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1956 (1957), pp. 40–41. *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1957 (1958), pp. 48–52.
59. *US Policy in the Middle East*, pp. 214–216.
60. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Alert Status of U.S. Military Forces," 3 Dec 56, JCS 1887/323, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 51.
61. Statement in the British House of Commons by Foreign Secretary Lloyd, 3 Dec 56, and Tass release, 8 Dec 56; texts in *US Policy in the Middle East*, pp. 240–246.
62. Memo, Secy JCS to DJS, "Alert of U.S. Military Forces," 27 Dec 56, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 52. Memo of TelCon, CJCS with Counselor, State Dept, 29 Nov 56, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. XVI, *Suez Crisis*, pp. 1209–1210.

Chapter 11. Containment in the Far East: Taiwan and the Offshore Islands

1. NSC 5429/5, 22 Dec 54, CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) sec 90. Also printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1952–1954*, vol. XII, *East Asia and the Pacific* (1984), pp. 1062–1072. For text of the SEATO treaty, see Council on Foreign Relations, *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954* (1955), pp. 319–323.
2. NSC 5429/5, 22 Dec 54, CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) sec 90. On 15 Jan 55 the President approved NSC 5503, a separate statement of the US policy toward Taiwan and the Government of Nationalist China; its chief provisions were derived from NSC 5429/5. NSC 5503, 15 Jan 55, JCS 1966/94, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 17. Also printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. II, *China* (1986), pp. 30–34.
3. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far East," 6 Jan 55, CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48)(2) sec 1.
4. Msg, CINCPAC to CNO, 130039Z Jan 55, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 17.
5. Msg, CNO to CINCPAC, 031925Z Nov 54, CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) sec 86. Also printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1952–1954*, vol. XIV, *China and Japan* (1985), pp. 854–855.
6. Memo, CNO to SpecAsst to Pres for NSAff, "NSC 5429/5–Current Policy Toward the Far East as Relating to ChiNat Held Off-shore Islands," 11 Jan 55, JCS 1992/437; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "NSC

- 5429/5, 'U.S. Policy Toward the Far East,'" 12 Jan 55, JCS 1992/437; CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48)(2) sec 1. The former is printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. II, *China*, pp. 10–11.
7. Memo, SpecAsst to Pres for NSC to SecState, 11 Jan 55, CJCS File, NSC 5429.
 8. NSC Action No. 1302, 13 Jan 55.
 9. Msg, CNO to CINCPAC, 142155Z Jan 55, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 17.
 10. Msg, CINCPAC to CHMAAG Formosa, 181251Z Jan 55, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 17.
 11. Quoted in Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, pp. 555–556.
 12. Memos of Conversation, SecState with Amb Makins, 19 Jan 55; SecState with ForMin Yeh, 19 Jan 55; SecState with Amb Makins, 20 Jan 55; CJCS File 091 China (Jan 55).
 13. NSC Action No. 1312, 21 Jan 55. Memo of Conversation, State Dept., 20 Jan 55; Memo of Discussion, NSC Mtg, 21 Jan 55; printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. II, *China*, pp. 86–96. Admiral Radford attended the NSC meeting.
 14. Memo of conversation, White House, 21 Jan 55 (1600), printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. II, *China*, pp. 104–105. All the JCS members were present except GEN Ridgway, who was represented by the Army Vice Chief of Staff.
 15. Msg, Taipei 476 to State, 23 Jan 55.
 16. *Public Papers, Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 207–211.
 17. *Congressional Record*, vol. 101, 25 Jan 55, p. D23; 28 Jan 55, p. D31.
 18. PL 84–4, 29 Jan 55.
 19. *United States in World Affairs, 1955*, pp. 91–92. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 14 Feb 55, pp. 251–254.
 20. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Evacuation of Chinese Nationalist Forces from the Tachen Islands," 28 Jan 55, JCS 2054/87, CCS 381 (4–16–49) sec 7.
 21. Memo, CJCS to SecDef, "Evacuation of Chinese Nationalist Forces from the Tachen Islands," 31 Jan 55, JCS 2054/87, CJCS 381 (4–16–49) sec 7. Msg, JCS 975067 to CINCPAC, 29 Jan 55.
 22. Memos for Record by Pres, 29 and 31 Jan 55; Memo, CJCS to Pres, 31 Jan 55; CJCS File 091 China (Jan 55).
 23. JCS Hist Div, *History of the Formosa Situation (1955)*, pp. 296–297.
 24. JCS 2147/114, 18 Oct 54, CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 23.
 25. JCS 2147/120, 21 Dec 54; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Rotation of FEAF Jet Squadrons into Formosa," 4 Jan 55, JCS 2147/120; N/H of JCS 2147/120, 25 Jan 55; CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 24.
 26. COL A. J. Goodpaster, "Memorandum of Conference with the President, 1930, 30 January 1955," 31 Jan 55; Memo, Dir, ExecSecy, Dept of State to CJCS, 31 Jan 55; CJCS File 091 China (Jan 55). Msg, State 421 to Taipei, 31 Jan 55.
 27. *History of the Formosa Situation*, pp. 298–304.
 28. Msg, CHMAAG Formosa to CINCPAC, 170902Z Feb 55; Msg, CINCPAC to CNO, 190125Z Feb 55; CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 19.
 29. Memo of Discussion, NSC Mtg, 17 Feb 55, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. II, *China*, pp. 279–286. Msg, CNO to CINCPAC, 211759Z Feb 55, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 19. JCS Hist Div, *Chronology of Significant Events Concerning Formosa (1956)*, p. 59.
 30. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 28 Feb 55, pp. 329–330.
 31. Memo of Discussion, NSC Mtg, 15 Jan 55, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. II, *China*, pp. 135–140.
 32. *Chronology of Significant Events Concerning Formosa*, pp. 60–63. *United States in World Affairs, 1955*, pp. 96–99. NIE–100–4–55, 16 Mar 55, p. 13, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. II, *China*, pp. 376–380.
 33. Memo for Record, SpecAsst to Pres for NSA, 11 Mar 55, CJCS File 091 China (Feb-Mar 55).
 34. NIE 100–4–55, 16 Mar 55, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. II, *China*, pp. 376–380.
 35. Memo of Conversation, State Dept., 26 Mar 55; Editorial Note; printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. II, *China*, pp. 400–404, 408–409.
 36. Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Improvement of Military Situation in the Far East . . . Now Existing in Formosa Area," 22 Mar 55, JCS 1966/97, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 20.
 37. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Improvement of the Military Situation in the Far East in the Light of the Situation Now Existing in the Formosa Area," 27 Mar 55, JCS 1966/100, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 20.
 38. Memo for Record, "Conversation . . . Office of Secretary of Defense . . . March 26, 1955," 26 Mar 55, CJCS File 091 China (Feb-Mar 55). The draft JCS memo discussed at this meeting was revised before submission on 27 March by adding to the majority's first point a provision for diplomatic warning to the USSR as well as Communist China.
 39. "US Military Courses of Action to Meet a Chinese Communist Attack Against the Quemoy or Matsu Island Groups," n.d., CJCS File 091 China (Feb-Mar 55).

40. Memo, USecState to SecState, "White House Meeting, April 1, 1955," 1 Apr 55; State Dept. Draft Policy Statement, "Formosa," 8 Apr 55; Memo of Conversation, Pres and SecState, 17 Apr 55; printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. II, *China*, pp. 439–441, 455–463, 491–495.
41. Memo of Conversation, Pres and SecState, 17 Apr 55; Memo of Conversation with Pres, 22 Apr 55; Msg, ActgSecState to Robertson and CJCS, 22 Apr 55; Msg, CNO to CJCS, 22 Apr 55; Msg, Dep-SecDef to CJCS, 22 Apr 55; Msg, Robertson to SecState, 25 Apr 55; Ltr, Pres to SecState, 26 Apr 55; printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957*, vol. II, *China*, pp. 491–495, 501–506, 510–517, 522–523.
42. Msg, CHMAAG Formosa to CINCPAC, 080814Z Apr 55, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 21. Msg, CINCPAC to CNO, 092255Z Apr 55, same file, sec 22.
43. JCS 1966/102, 15 Apr 55; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Build-up of Chinese Communist Air Strength Sufficient to Challenge Control of the Formosa Straits Area," 21 Apr 55, JCS 1966/102; CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 22.
44. Msgs, CINCPAC to CNO, 022202Z Feb 55 and 302155Z Mar 55.
45. JCS 2147/139, 19 Apr 55; JCS 2147/140, 22 Apr 55; CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 27.
46. JCS 2147/141, 22 Apr 55; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Support for the Air Defense of Formosa," 22 Apr 55, JCS 2147/142; N/H of JCS 2147/142, 9 May 55; CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 27.
47. *Chronology of Significant Events Concerning Formosa*, pp. 68–69. *United States in World Affairs*, 1955, p. 99.
48. Msg, CHMAAG Formosa to CINCPAC, 150730Z Jun 55, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 27.
49. Ltr, AsstSecState(FE) to DepASD(ISA), 11 Jul 55, JCS 2118/83, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 28.
50. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Transfer of an Additional GRC Division to Quemoy," 29 Jul 55, JCS 2118/84; N/H of JCS 2118/84, 1 Aug 55; N/H of JCS 2118/84, 9 Aug 55; CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 28.
51. JCS 2118/90, 7 May 56, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 32.
52. Dec On JCS 2118/90, 23 May 56, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 32.
53. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Temporary Reduction of Deployments in the Western Pacific Area," 6 Jul 56, JCS 2147/157; N/H of JCS 2147/157, 13 Jul 56; Dec On JCS 2147/161, 29 Nov 56; CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 29.

Chapter 12. Korea and the Problems of the Armistice

1. United Nations Command, *Armistice Agreement*, vol. I, *Text of Agreement*.
2. Memo, DepASD(ISA) to CJCS, "Department of Defense Presentation for Ambassadors to Fifteen U.S. Allies in Korea," 24 Feb, CJCS File 091 Korea (1955).
3. Msg, CINCUNC to JCS, 24 Jan 55, DA IN 113335, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2) sec 1.
4. Msgs, CINCUNC to JCS, 12 May 54, DA IN 57615, and 26 Aug 54, DA IN 80914, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 156.
5. Draft Msg, USecState to SecState, 11 May 55, CJCS File 091 Korea (1955).
6. NSC 5514, 25 Feb 55, JCS 1776/517; Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea," 12 Mar 55, N/H of JCS 1776/517, 16 Mar 55; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2) sec 2.
7. JCS 1776/517, 28 Feb 55; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Draft Statement of Policy on . . . Korea–NSC 5514," 4 Mar 55, JCS 1776/518; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2) sec 2. NSC Action No. 1352, 10 Mar 55.
8. Msg, CINCUNC to JCS, 21 Jan 55, DA IN 115020, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2) sec 1. Texts of the Swiss and Swedish notes were not available to the author.
9. JCS 1776/515, 2 Feb 55, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2) sec 1. NSC Action No. 1322, 3 Feb 55.
10. State/Def Msg, DA 975505 to CINCUNC, 5 Feb 55, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2) sec 1.
11. Msg, CINCUNC to JCS, 7 Feb 55, DA IN 116727, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2) sec 1.
12. Msg, State 544 to Seoul, 25 Feb 55, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2) sec 2.
13. Dept of State translation, "Swiss Reply to U.S. Notes of March 2, 1955 on NNSC," 25 Mar 55, CJCS File 091 Korea (1955).
14. Msg, CINCUNC to US Amb Seoul, 28 Feb 55, DA IN 121448; Msg, DEPACOM–ARMYEIGHT to DEPTAR, State, and CINCUNC, 28 Feb 55, DA IN 121495; Msgs, CINCUNC to JCS, 2 Mar 55, DA IN 121962, and 3 Mar 55, DA IN 122318; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2) sec 2.
15. Dec On JCS 1776/521, 7 Mar 55; Msg, JCS 977312 to CINCUNC, 8 Mar 55; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2) sec 2.
16. Msg, CINCUNC to JCS, 6 May 55, DA IN 138029, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2) sec 4.
17. Draft Msg, State to Paris for SecState, 11 May 55; Msg, DEF 981270 to CINCUNC, 12 May 55; CJCS File 091 Korea (1955).

18. NSC Action No. 1399, 12 May 55.
19. Memo, AsstSecState(FE) to USecState, "Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)," 27 May 55, CJCS File 091 Korea (1955).
20. CM-155-55 to SecState, 2 Jun 55, CJCS File 091 Korea (1955).
21. CM-156-55 to DepSecDef, 6 Jun 55, CJCS File 091 Korea (1955). Msg, CINCUNC to JCS, 1 Jun 55, DA IN 143736, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec 4.
22. State/Def Msg, DEF 983878 to CINCUNC, 24 Jun 55; Msg, CINCUNC to OSD, 30 Jun 55, DA IN 150234; CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec 4. Memo, A. E. Way, OASD(ISA), to DepASD(ISA), "Status of NNSC Action Papers," 23 Jun 55; Ltr, DepSecDef to SecState, 5 Jul 55; CJCS File 091 Korea (1955).
23. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to DepSecDef, "State-JCS Discussion of the Korean NNSC," 29 Jul 55, CJCS File 091 Korea (1955). Available records do not reveal whether or not a meeting with President Eisenhower took place.
24. Memo for Record, DepASD(ISA), "Department of State Proposal for Resolution of the NNSC Problem," 25 Aug 55, JCS 1776/540; Msg, DEF 987536 to CINCUNC, 26 Aug 55; CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec 5.
25. Memo for Record, OASD(ISA), "Resolution of the NNSC Problem," 11 Oct 55, CJCS File 091 Korea (1955).
26. Msg, CINCUNC to JCS, 31 Dec 55, DA IN 190875, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec 6.
27. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Abolition of Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and Suspension of Paragraphs 13c and 13d of the Korean Armistice Agreement," 4 Jan 56, JCS 1776/548, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec 6.
28. Msg, DEF 995198 to CINCUNC, 11 Jan 56, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec 7.
29. Msg, CINCUNC to ASD(ISA), 30 Jan 56, DA IN 197259, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec 7.
30. Ltr, SecArmy to SecDef, 20 Mar 56, JCS 1776/551; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 26 Apr 56, JCS 1776/552; CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec 7.
31. OCB Rpt, "Detailed Development of Major Actions Relating to Korea from November 19, 1955 through June 21, 1956," 28 Jun 56, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec 8.
32. JCS 1776/555, 21 Jun 56, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec 8.
33. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to SecArmy et al., "Modernization of United States Forces in Korea," 27 Jun 56, JCS 1776/556, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec 8.
34. JCS 1776/557, 16 Aug 56, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec 8.
35. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Modernization of Forces and Equipment in Korea," 1 Sep 56, JCS 1776/558, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec 8.
36. Memo, SecDef [forwarded unsigned, by ASD(ISA)] to CJCS, "Modernization of Forces and Equipment in Korea," n.d., JCS 1776/559, 25 Sep 56, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec 8. Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 19 Oct 56, JCS 1776/562, same file, sec 9. Memo, CPT W. C. Mott, OCJCS, to CJCS, same subj, 11 Sep 56, CJCS File 091 Korea (1955).
37. Memo, CPT W. C. Mott, OCJCS, to COL C. A. Randall, OSD, 30 Nov 56, CJCS File 091 Korea (1955). The records available to the author contain no indication of further action on this matter during 1956.

Chapter 13. Containment in Southeast Asia

1. NSC 5405, 15 Jan 54, JCS 1992/272, CCS 092 Far East (6-25-48) sec 55. Printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1952-1954*, vol. XIII, *Indochina* (1982), pp. 971-976.
2. NSC 5429/5, 22 Dec 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 90. Printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1952-1954*, vol. XIII, *Indochina*, pp. 2412-2413.
3. Peter V. Curl, ed., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954* (1955), pp. 319-323.
4. JCS 1992/400, 6 Oct 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 84.
5. Memo, DepSecDef to JCS, 6 Jan 55, JCS 1992/433, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 1.
6. JCS 1992/442, 25 Jan 55, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 3.
7. Memo, CMC to JCS, "Concept and Plans for Implementation, if Necessary, of Article IV, 1, of the Manila Pact," 27 Jan 55, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 3.
8. SM-73-55 to JSPC, 31 Jan 55, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 3.
9. JCS 1992/446, 3 Feb 55, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 4.
10. SM-99-55 to JSPC, 7 Feb 55, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 4.
11. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Concept and Plans for the Implementation, if Necessary, of Article IV, 1, of the Manila Pact," 11 Feb 55, JCS 1992/448, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 4.
12. Memo for Record, RADMG. W. Anderson, Jr., "Concept and Plans for the Implementation . . . of the Manila Pact," 15 Feb 55, CJCS File 092.2 SEATO (1954).

13. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 7 Mar 55, pp. 371-374.
14. Msg, Bangkok SECTO 15 to State, 24 Feb 55; Msg, Bangkok SECTO 29 to State, 24 Feb 55, DA IN 121333; CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 5. Memo, DepASD(ISA) to SecArmy et al., "Department of Defense Contribution to and Participation in the Bangkok Conference," 29 Mar 55, same file, sec 6.
15. Msg, CINCPAC to CNO, 150001Z May 55, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 8.
16. JCS 1992/464, 24 May 55; Memo, CSA to JCS, "Military Staff Planners Conference, SEACDT—April-May 1955," 1 Jun 55; Msg, JCS 983169 to CINCPAC, 14 Jun 55, JCS 1991/464; CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 9. "Record of Procedures and Decisions Reached at the Military Advisors Meeting at Bangkok on 6-8 July 1955," same file, BP pt 3.
17. Msg, Bangkok 116 to State, 31 Aug 55, CJCS File 092.2 SEATO (1954). Msg, Bangkok 1284 to State, 4 Nov 55; Msg, Bangkok 2057 to State, 19 Jan 56, DA IN 195109.
18. Msg, CINCPAC to CNO, 230211Z Nov 55.
19. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CNO, 11 Dec 55, JCS 1992/509, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 17.
20. Msg, CINCPAC to CNO, 052218Z Jan 56, JCS 1992/519, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 19.
21. Dec On JCS 1992/525, 9 Feb 56; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) Staff Organization," 21 Feb 56, JCS 1992/528; N/H of JCS 1992/528, 29 Feb 56; Msg, DEF 997520 to CINCPAC, 20 Feb 56; CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 20.
22. Paul E. Zinner, ed., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1956* (1957), pp. 384-388.
23. Msg, CINCPAC to ASD(ISA) 212208Z Mar 56, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 21.
24. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) Staff Organization," 4 Apr 56, JCS 1992/534, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 22. N/H of JCS 1992/534, 25 May 56, same file, sec 21. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "SEATO Military Planning Staff," 10 Oct 56, JCS 1992/571; N/H of JCS 1992/571, 24 Oct 56; same file, sec 27.
25. A detailed account of the US involvement in Vietnam during 1955-1956 is given in JCS Hist Div, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1954-1959*. This chapter, therefore, is limited to the major policy deliberations in Washington, other than those relating to the Military Assistance Program, which are treated in Chapter 14. See also Ronald H. Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960* (1983).
26. Ltr, Pres to GEN J. Lawton Collins, 3 Nov 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 88.
27. Msg, Saigon 2303 to State, 16 Dec 54, DA IN 105690, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 89.
28. Memo, SecDef to JCS, 5 Jan 55, JCS 1992/431, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 1.
29. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Reconsideration of U.S. Military Programs in Southeast Asia," 21 Jan 55, JCS 1992/438, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 2. Available evidence does not reveal whether SecDef forwarded this memo to the NSC, President, or SecState.
30. NSC Action No. 1316, 27 Jan 55. Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., "Report on Vietnam for the National Security Council," 3 Feb 55, JCS 1992/447, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 4.
31. Rpt, Spec US Rep in Vietnam to SecState, "Report on Vietnam for the National Security Council," 20 Jan 55, Encl to Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, same subj, 24 Jan 55, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 3.
32. Msg, Collins 4263 to State, 31 Mar 55; Msg, SecState 4330 to Collins, 4 Apr 55; Msg, Collins 4399 to State, 7 Apr 55; Ltr, SecState to Collins, 20 Apr 55; Memo of Discussion, NSC Mtg, 28 Apr 55, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol I, *Vietnam*, pp 168-171, 196-197, 218-221, 270-272, 307-312. Spector, *Advice and Support*, pp. 248-249.
33. Msg, Paris SECTO 8 to State, 8 May 55, excerpt in JCS 1992/469, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 8.
34. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Indochina (Vietnam)," 9 May 55, JCS 1992/460, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 8.
35. Msg, Saigon 5154 to State, 9 May 55. At this early date in its existence, SEATO had not completed any military plans. General Collins was evidently referring to current US Joint Staff studies, which called for the employment of French forces to defend Vietnam.
36. Msgs, Paris SECTO 26 to State, 11 May 55, and SECTO 42 to State, 12 May 55.
37. JCS 1992/442, 25 Jan 55, CCS 092 (6-25-48)(2) sec 3. JCS 1992/547, 25 Jun 56, same file, sec 23.
38. JCS 2101/233, 9 Jun 56, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 63.
39. SM-582-56 to CINCPAC, 11 Jul 56, JCS 1992/547, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 23.
40. NSC 5329, 17 May 55, Encl to JCS 1992/462, 18 May 55; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Policy on All-Vietnam Elections," 25 May 55, JCS 1992/463; CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec 8.
41. NSC Action No. 1415, 9 Jun 55. NSC 5429/5, 22 Dec 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 90.
42. NSC Action No. 1526-b, 8 Mar 56.
43. This is the language of NSC 5612, which differs only slightly and nonsubstantively from NSC 5405.
44. NSC 5612, 15 Aug 56, JCS 1992/560, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) BP pt 6.

45. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "United States Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia," 24 Aug 56, JCS 1992/562, CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) (2) sec 25.

46. NSC 5612/1, 5 Sep 56, JCS 1992/565, CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) (2) sec 26.

Chapter 14. Military Assistance

1. Eval Div, Dir of MilAsst, DCofS S&L, Hq USAF, *Information and Guidance on Military Assistance* (10th ed., 1966), pp. 80–120.

2. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Mutual Defense Assistance Program for Fiscal Year 1955," 5 Mar 54, JCS 2099/359, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 108.

3. PL 83–665, 26 Aug 54.

4. EO 10575, 6 Nov 54; EO 10610, 9 May 55.

5. DOD Dir 5132.3, 24 Nov 54.

6. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, 21 Jan 55, JCS 2099/453, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 1.

7. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "MDAP for FY 1956," 16 Feb 56, JCS 2099/457, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 3.

8. PL 84–208, 2 Aug 55.

9. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 7 Nov 55, JCS 2099/536, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 19.

10. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 23 Nov 55, JCS 2099/542, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 20.

11. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "FY 1956 Mutual Defense Assistance Programs," 1 Mar 56, JCS 2099/568, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 25.

12. Memo, DepSecDef to JCS, 29 Jan 55, JCS 2101/188, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 51.

13. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Objectives for the Department of Defense International Security Plan," 25 Feb 55 [not forwarded until 1 Mar 55], JCS 2101/189, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 51.

14. Memo, SecDef to JCS, 17 Feb 55, JCS 2099/461, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 3.

15. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1957," 17 Mar 55, JCS 2099/466, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 5.

16. JCS 1099/472, 5 Apr 55, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 7. JCS 2099/484, 11 May 55, same file, sec 9.

17. JCS 2099/489, 26 May 55; Dec On JCS 2099/489, 3 Jun 55; CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 10.

18. JCS 2099/517, 13 Sep 55, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) BP pt 5A.

19. Dec On JCS 2099/517, 8 Nov 55; JCS 2099/530, 20 Oct 55; CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) BP pt 5A. JCS 2099/521, 22 Sep 55, same file, sec 17. JCS 2099/528, 14 Oct 55; JCS 2099/529, 20 Oct 55; same file, sec 18.

20. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Reappraisal of Worldwide MDAP," 8 Nov 55, JCS 2099/517, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 19. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Modification of MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1957," 4 Jan 56, JCS 2099/551, same file, sec 22.

21. Memo, DepSecDef to USCINCEUR, "Development of Time-Phased FY 57 Mutual Defense Assistance Program . . ." 13 Apr 55 [similar memos addressed to CINCPAC and CINCFE]; Memos, DepSecDef to SecArmy and SecAF, same subj., 15 Apr 55; CJCS File 400.3295 (1953–1955).

22. For an exposition of the view that the JCS had had to "rescue" ASD(ISA) by preparing a "reasonable" FY 1957 MDAP, see SAMDAA–113–56 to CJCS, 28 Jun 56, CJCS File 400.3295 (1956).

23. Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecArmy et al., "FY 57 MDA Materiel and Training Requirements Reports," 12 Sep 55, JCS 2099/519, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 17.

24. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 21 Oct 55, JCS 2099/531, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 18.

25. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "FY MDA Materiel and Training Requirements," 9 Nov 55, JCS 2099/534, CCS (8–22–46)(2) sec 19.

26. Information derived from Encl B to JCS 2099/665, 6 Oct 56, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) BP 13. "Mutual Security Act of 1956," Report by H. Com on Foreign Affairs, 84th Cong, 2d sess, p. 6.

27. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, 2 Sep 55, JCS 2099/516, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 16.

28. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Strategic Requirements of Allied Forces for New Weapons . . .," 30 Sep 55, JCS 2099/522, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 17.

29. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, 10 Feb 56, JCS 2099/570, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 24. Ltr, SHAPE to USCINCEUR, "Guidance on MDAP Priorities . . .," n.d., with 1st Ind, Hq USEUCOM to SecDef, 7 Jan 56, same file, sec 22. Msg, USNMIR ALO 207 to SecDef, 31 Jan 56, DA IN 197659, same file, sec 23.

30. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 10 Feb 56, JCS 2099/570, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 24.

31. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Provision of New Weapons for NATO under MDAP," 17 Feb 56, JCS 2099/571, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 25.

32. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 27 Feb 56, JCS 2099/579, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 25. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 30 Apr 56, JCS 2099/618, same file, sec 28.

33. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Provision of New Weapons Under MDAP," 16 May 56, JCS 2099/624, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 29.

34. SM–415–56 to USCINCEUR, 22 May 56, JCS 2099/627, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec 30.

35. Ltr, USCINCEUR to JCS, 2 Aug 56, JCS 2099/650, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 33. These weapons were estimated to cost \$65.5 million. USCINCEUR also recommended allotting \$87.5 million for Nike and \$48 million for EW equipment but was not prepared to recommend allocation by country.
36. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 6 Aug 56, JCS 2099/652, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 33. Msg, USCINCEUR to SecDef, 4 Jul 56, DA IN 23544, same file, sec 31.
37. PL 84-726, 18 Jul 56, and PL 84-853, 31 Jul 56. "Mutual Security Act of 1956," Report by H. Com on Foreign Affairs, 84th Cong, 2d sess, 1956.
38. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 Feb 56, JCS 2099/581, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 25. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Review of the 1957 MDA Program," 18 Apr 56, JCS 2099/599, same file, sec 27.
39. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 20 Aug 56, JCS 2099/651, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 33.
40. JCS 2099/562, 26 Jan 56, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 23. JCS 2099/541, 18 Nov 55, same file, sec 20.
41. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 18 Jan 56, JCS 2099/562, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 23. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Aid to Libya," 8 Mar 56, JCS 2099/582, same file, sec 25. JCS 2099/665, 6 Oct 56, same file, BP 13.
42. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Assistance Program for Fiscal Years 1957 and 1958," 9 Oct 56, JCS 2099/665; N/H of JCS 2099/665, 14 Dec 56; CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) BP pt 13. The JCS refined FY 1957 MDAP covered materiel only. Training programs were submitted separately by the military departments.
43. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Draft Statement of Policy on New Weapons," 2 Mar 56, JCS 2099/548, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 25. N/H of JCS 2099/548, 27 Jan 56, same file, sec 21. "Remarks as Delivered by the Secretary of Defense before the North Atlantic Council of Ministers, Paris, France, December 15, 1955," JCS 2073/1212, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec 47.
44. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "New Weapons," 15 Nov 56, JCS 2099/672, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 36.
45. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, "New Weapons," 8 Dec 56, JCS 2099/689, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 37.
46. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 29 Nov 55, JCS 2099/544, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 20.
47. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Review of Military Assistance and Supporting Programs," 6 Dec 55, JCS 2099/546, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 21.
48. NSC Action No. 1486, 8 Dec 55.
49. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, 24 Jan 56, JCS 2099/565, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 23. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, 12 Apr 56, JCS 2099/607, same file, sec 27.
50. NSC 5610, 3 Aug 56, JCS 2099/649, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) BP pt 10.
51. NSC Action No. 1624, 26 Oct 56. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 7 Nov 56, JCS 2099/676, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 36.
52. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Air Programs," 16 Nov 56, JCS 2099/677, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 36. Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 30 Nov 56, JCS 2099/687; Memo, ActgExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs," 5 Dec 56; same file, sec 37. The JCS apparently included data on Iraq on their own initiative, because of the close relationship of that country's defense needs to those of Turkey and Iran.
53. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 Mar 56, JCS 2099/594, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 26.
54. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "FY 1958 Programming Guidance," 13 Apr 56, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) BP 9.
55. Msg, DEF 999961 to USCINCEUR et al., 28 Mar 56, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 27.
56. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 4 May 56, JCS 2099/620, CCS (8-22-46)(2) sec 29.
57. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "MDA Programming Guidance," 31 May 56, JCS 2099/628, CCS (8-22-46)(2) sec 30.
58. SAMDAA-113-56 to CJCS, 28 Jun 56, CJCS File 400.3295 (1956).
59. Memo, ASD(ISA) to COL Carey A. Randall, MilAsst to SecDef, 12 Jun 56; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "MDA Programming Guidance," 13 Jun 56; SAMDAA-113-56 to CJCS, 28 Jun 56; CJCS File 400.3295 (1956).
60. CM-341-56 to SecDef, 9 Jul 56; Note signed "R" attached to SAMDAA-113-56 to CJCS, 28 Jun 56; CJCS File 400.3295 (1956). No indication of a reply to CM-341-56 was found in the available records.
61. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 20 Aug 56, JCS 2099/651, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 33. The figure for Turkey had been arrived at by a group known as the Prochnow Committee.
62. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Assistance Programs for Fiscal Years 1957 and 1958," 9 Oct 56, from JCS 2099/665, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec 35. The recapitulation in Table 12 shows a single line item of \$306 million for new weapons, allotted to the European region. The overall figure of \$738 million used by the JCS included funds from other items and also was affected by the fact that assignments of new weapons to Germany and the United Kingdom were to be on a reimbursable basis.
63. Memo, DepASD(ISA) to AsstSecArmy(LOG) et al., "Alternatives to Initial Draft of FY 1957-1958 MAP," 22 Oct 56, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) BP 14.
64. CM-390-56 to SecDef, 23 Oct 56, CJCS File 400.3295 (1956).
65. Memo, SAMDAA-182-56 to CJCS, 19 Dec 56, CJCS File 400.3295 (1956). ADM Radford initialled the memo but did not write any opinion or action on it.

Chapter 15. Continental Defense

1. NSC 5408, 24 Feb 54, CCS 381 US (5–23–46) sec 37.
2. "DOD Progress Rpt on Status of Military Continental U.S. Defense Programs as of 15 April 1955," 3 Jun 55, NSC 5408 Progress Reports. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Continental Defense (NSC 5408)," 27 Apr 55, JCS 1899/203, CCS 381 US (5–23–46) sec 55. NORAD, *Fifteen Years of Air Defense*, Hist Ref Paper No. 3, 1 Dec 60.
3. Rpt, Robert C. Sprague to NSC, "Continental Defense," 16 Jun 55.
4. NSC Action No. 1417, 16 Jun 55. Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., 27 Jun 55, JCS 1899/220, CCS 381 US (5–23–46) sec 60.
5. Rpt, Technological Capabilities (Killian) Panel of Science Advisory Committee to the President, "Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack," 14 Feb 55, CCS 040 (11–2–43) BP 6A.
6. Memo, ActgSecDef to SecArmy et al., 1 Mar 55, JCS 1899/192, CCS 040 (11–2–43) sec 16.
7. Memo, ASD(R&D) to SecArmy et al., 11 Mar 55, JCS 1899/194, CCS 040 (11–2–43) sec 16.
8. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Technological Capabilities Panel Report," 18 Apr 55, JCS 1899/200, CCS 040 (11–2–43) sec 17, pt 1.
9. "Department of Defense Statement in Regard to the Report of the Technological Capabilities Panel," 1 Jun 55, CCS 040 (11–2–43) sec 17.
10. NSC Action No. 1430, 4 Aug 55. Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., 8 Sep 55, JCS 1899/233, CCS 040 (11–2–43) sec 18.
11. The JCS, of course, continued to recommend force levels for anti-aircraft and interceptor forces to be supported by the defense budget. This activity is treated in Chapter 3.
12. Dec On JCS 1899/179, 14 Jan 55; N/H of JCS 1899/179, 8 Mar 55; CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 10.
13. JCS 1899/198, 1 Apr 55, CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 10.
14. JCS 1899/202, 22 Apr 55, CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 10. JCS 1899/204, 29 Apr 55; JCS 1899/205, 6 May 55; Dec On JCS 1899/205, 9 May 55; same file, sec 11.
15. JCS 1899/216, 7 Jun 55, CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 11.
16. JCS 1899/221, 9 Jul 55, CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) BP pt 2.
17. JCS 1899/227, 29 Aug 55, CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 11.
18. JCS 1899/246, 16 Jan 56, CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) BP pt 2.
19. Dec On JCS 1899/246, 1 Feb 56, CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) BP pt 2. SM-77–56 to CSA and CNO, 1 Feb 56; SM-78–56 to Canadian CofS Com, 1 Feb 56; same file, sec 13.
20. N/H of JCS 1899/246, 19 Apr 56, CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) BP pt 2. Msg, Copenhagen 155 to State, 31 Aug 56, same file, sec 15.
21. SM-606–56 to RBCOS, 21 Jul 56, JCS 1899/277, CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 14. Memo, Secy, BJSMS to Secy JCS, 1 Oct 56, JCS 1899/289, same file, sec 15.
22. Ltr, AsstSecState (EUR) to ASD(ISA), 10 Sep 56, JCS 1899/288, CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 14.
23. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Department of State Comments on Termination of the North Atlantic Extension of the Distant Early Warning Line," 21 Nov 56, JCS 1899/296, CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 14.
24. First Report of Location Study Group, Distant Early Warning Group, 12 Nov 54, JCS 1899/179; Dec On JCS 1899/179, 14 Jan 55; N/H of JCS 1899/179, 8 Mar 55; CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 10.
25. JCS 1899/239, 24 Oct 55; Dec On JCS 1899/239, 2 Nov 55; CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 11.
26. Msg, CINCAL to CSAF for JCS, 15 Nov 55, CAF IN 80461; Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 292328Z Nov 55; CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 12.
27. Msg, Cdr ADC to CSAF, 23 Nov 55, CAF IN 82079; SM-953–55 to JSPC, 25 Nov 55; CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 12.
28. JCS 1899/244, 13 Dec 55; CSAFM-351–55 to JCS, 16 Dec 55; CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 12.
29. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Relocation of Pacific Extension to the Distant Early Warning Line," 16 Dec 55, JCS 1899/244; SM-1013–55 to Chm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff Com, 16 Dec 55, JCS 1899/244; N/H of JCS 1899/244, 17 Jan 56; CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 12.
30. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Jan 56, JCS 1899/247, CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 13.
31. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The Pacific Extension to the Distant Early Warning Line," 10 Feb 56, JCS 1899/253, CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 13.
32. N/H of JCS 1899/253, 21 Mar 56, CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 13. No text of the briefing was available to the author. Presumably it was closely similar to the memorandum derived from JCS 1899/253.
33. JCS 1899/269, 1 Jun 56; SM-511–56 to CINCONAD and CINCPAC, 19 Jan 56, JCS 1899/269; CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 14. JCS 1899/312, 7 Feb 56; JCS 1899/316, 5 Mar 56; Dec On JCS 1899/321, 11 Apr 57; same file, sec 16.
34. NSC Rpts, Status of National Security Programs on 30 June 1956 and 30 June 1957, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) BP 12A and 14A.

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