History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff
and
National Policy
1961–1964
The Joint Chiefs of Staff in session, September 1961. Left to right: Lieutenant General Barksdale Hamlett, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, US Army (back to camera); General Clyde D. Eddleman, Vice Chief of Staff, US Army; Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations; General David M. Shoup, Commandant, US Marine Corps; Major General Frederick L. Wieseman, Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans), US Marine Corps; Major General John W. Carpenter II, Deputy Director of Plans, US Air Force; General Curtis M. LeMay, Chief of Staff, US Air Force; General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Lieutenant General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Major General J. M. Reynolds, USAF, Deputy Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff; (top of head visible): Rear Admiral Francis J. Blouin, USN, Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Colonel Michael J. Ingelido, USAF, Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Department of Defense Photo (MSgt Frank Hall, USA)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff in session, November 1962. Left to right (clockwise): Lieutenant General T. W. Parker, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, US Army; General Earle G. Wheeler, Chief of Staff, US Army; Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations; Vice Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Programs); Mr. Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs); General David M. Shoup, Commandant, US Marine Corps; Major General C. H. Hayes, Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs), US Marine Corps; Lieutenant General D. A. Burchinal, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, US Air Force; General Curtis E. LeMay, Chief of Staff, US Air Force; Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Vice Admiral H. D. Riley, USN, Director, Joint Staff; Brigadier General M. J. Ingelido, USAF, Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Colonel R. C. Forbes, USA, Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy

Volume VIII
1961-1964

Walter S. Poole

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Foreword

Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization and as a source of information for staff studies, will be readily recognized.

The series, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, treats the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the volumes of the series were originally prepared in classified form. Classification designations in the footnotes are those that appeared in the original classified volume.

Volume VIII describes JCS activities during the period 1961-1964 except for activities related to Indochina which are covered in a separate series. Originally, this volume was planned to cover the years 1961–1963. In accord with that plan, during 1967–1971, Mrs. Anna C. Webb and Mr. Donald J. Boyle wrote preliminary drafts for portions of what became Chapters 1, 2, and 3; Dr. Robert J. Watson prepared a draft for what became Chapter 5; Ms. Judith A. Walters prepared a preliminary draft of Chapter 16; Dr. Ronald H. Spector prepared a draft of Chapter 17 and Ms. Kathleen S. Paasch prepared a draft for Chapter 18. Then, in 1973, the volume was expanded to cover 1964 and assigned to Dr. Walter Poole. He developed a new outline and wrote completely new chapters. These were reviewed by Mr. Kenneth W. Condit and Dr. Robert J. Watson. Ultimately, Dr. Poole assumed full responsibility for the volume.

During 2008 and 2009, Dr. Poole reworked the classified manuscript to prepare it for publication in its unclassified form. In addition to reorganizing it to conform to the structure of earlier volumes in *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy* series, Dr. Poole took advantage of the great amount of material that had become available as well as the perspective afforded by thirty years. Ms. Susan Carroll prepared the index, and Ms. Penny Norman prepared the manuscript for publication.

This volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official
publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.

Washington, DC  JOHN F. SHORTAL
January 2011  Director for Joint History
Preface

Throughout the early 1960s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff confronted a series of crises that touched nearly every part of the globe. Cuba, Berlin, the Congo, Saudi Arabia, India, Indonesia, Laos, and South Vietnam all became areas of confrontation. The worldwide scope of these challenges created, among US policymakers, a mindset in which failure anywhere would have repercussions everywhere.

What most concerned the JCS was an apparent erosion of US credibility that emboldened communist leaders to pursue more adventurous policies. President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara pursued what they conceived as more flexible approaches to strategy and crisis management. The JCS, however, worried that civilian leaders might lack the determination to do whatever became necessary to achieve success. McNamara’s managerial reforms, which centralized decision-making in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, added to the friction in civil-military relations.

During 1961–1962, relations between the JCS and their civilian superiors were often awkward and even confrontational. A failure in communications contributed to the Bay of Pigs debacle. The appointment of General Maxwell D. Taylor as Chairman, in October 1962, ameliorated the situation. Taylor expressed deep regard for McNamara, which the Secretary reciprocated. From the civilians’ perspective, Taylor’s main achievements lay in controlling the Service Chiefs during the missile crisis and securing their support for the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Yet that improvement proved temporary and personal, not institutional and permanent.

This volume is the first in this series to have benefitted from meetings between the author and some of the Chiefs whom he describes. These took place during the middle and later 1970s. Interviews with Admirals Arleigh Burke and George Anderson exposed me to very strong personalities. General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman during 1960-1962, had an office close to the JCS Historical Division, and I spent a fair number of Friday afternoons listening to his recollections. Lemnitzer blended command with congeniality, showing why he fit comfortably into joint and international postings. I interviewed General Taylor several times at his apartment on Connecticut Avenue in the District of Columbia. He was more reserved, choosing words carefully, yet unfailingly concise and articulate. These officers deserve credit for helping to illuminate and interpret the events described in this volume. They must not, however, be held accountable for what appears in the final text. For any errors or misconstructions, the author alone bears full responsibility.

Walter S. Poole
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Entering the New Frontier: Men and Methods

The Young Men Meet the Old

On 20 January 1961, John F. Kennedy delivered an inaugural address that was as notable for its ambition as for its eloquence:

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty....

We dare not tempt [our adversaries] with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed....

In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility—I welcome it....

And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.1

The nation’s new leader was 43 years old, the youngest man yet elected to the presidency. Kennedy’s governmental experience, however, consisted of six years as a congressman and eight as a senator. The Cold War dominated international relations; Kennedy came to office convinced that the Free World had been losing and the communist world gaining ground. A confluence of crises—Cuba, Laos, the Congo, West Berlin—convinced him that fresh, more forceful policies must be found. During the campaign, he had invoked the image of a “new frontier” and pledged to “get America moving again.” In the first weeks, according to one
admirer, “There was the excitement which comes from the injection of new men and new ideas. . . . Not since the New Deal . . . had there been such an invasion of bright young men . . . and a President who so plainly delighted in innovation and leadership.”  

The new Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, carried impressive credentials: Rhodes scholar; college dean; staff colonel in World War II; Deputy Under Secretary of State, 1949–50; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1950–51; president of the Rockefeller Foundation, 1952–60. But Rusk was a relatively reserved and introspective man. Under his leadership, the State Department never truly took charge of foreign policy, as President Kennedy originally hoped that it would. 

The new Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, at the age of 44 had just become president of the Ford Motor Company when he accepted this appointment. His military experience came from World War II when, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel, he had been deeply involved in logistical planning for the B–29 campaign against Japan. McNamara was determined to be an activist, a prober, an originator of ideas and programs. He brought a group of like-minded civilians, many drawn from the RAND Corporation, to the Pentagon. Such men as Charles Hitch and Alain Enthoven made “cost effectiveness” and “systems analysis” part of the Defense Department’s vocabulary. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found that they had little in common with their Commander in Chief. They were considerably older and set great store upon orderly procedures, thorough planning, and judgments born of experience. Civilian leaders apparently looked upon them as tradition-bound and wedded to careful pacing at a time when rapid innovation was imperative. Kennedy wanted, and McNamara fully supported, an increased defense budget. Yet that situation did not translate into harmonious relations between the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). 

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, who had been Chairman of the JCS since October 1960, possessed particularly broad experience in the traditional sense. In 1942, he had been Plans and Operations Officer for the North African invasion. Then in the Mediterranean theater he acted as Deputy Chief of Staff to General Harold Alexander, a British officer whom he much admired. Subsequently, Lemnitzer directed the Military Assistance Program (1949–50) and commanded the 7th Infantry Division in the Korean War (1951–52). He advanced to be Commander in Chief, Far East (1955), Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (1957), Chief of Staff (1959), and finally Chairman. Lemnitzer's working methods closely paralleled those of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a former General of the Army, but did not mesh nearly so well with the more free-wheeling approach of the Kennedy administration. 

Admiral Arleigh Burke was completing his sixth year as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). He had earned a high reputation leading destroyers in South Pacific battles and later serving as chief of staff to the commander of a fast carrier task force. During 1950–51, Burke commanded a cruiser division in Korean waters and
then became a member of the United Nations truce delegation. In 1955, while still a
rear admiral, he was appointed CNO. In JCS deliberations, Burke was always well
informed, articulate, and ready to defend Navy prerogatives.

General George H. Decker, USA, who became Chief of Staff on 1 October 1960,
had spent 1944–45 in the Pacific as Chief of Staff, Sixth Army. Thereafter, his major
assignments included Comptroller of the Army (1952–55), Commander in Chief,
United Nations Command, Korea (1957–59), and Vice Chief of Staff (1959–60). Gen-
eral Thomas D. White, USAF, had served continuously in Pentagon assignments
from 1948 until his selection as Chief of Staff in 1957. An acerbic wit enlivened his
contributions to JCS discussions. General David M. Shoup, Commandant of the
Marine Corps since 1959, had won the Medal of Honor at Tarawa in World War II.
His postwar duties, for the most part, involved budgeting and training assignments.
At the JCS level, judging from a number of transcripts of discussions, the intric-
cacies of policy and strategy were not his forte.

Between January 1961 and October 1962, JCS membership underwent an
almost complete turnover. The law then provided for two-year terms which were
renewable indefinitely. General White retired on 30 June 1961; the Vice Chief of
Staff, General Curtis E. LeMay, succeeded him. LeMay carried a reputation unique
among his military contemporaries. He had been a driving force behind the fire-
bombing of Japanese cities in 1945 and the 1948 Berlin airlift. Subsequently, his
nine-year tenure as Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, made him a
popular symbol of American power and preparedness. Blunt and outspoken as an
operational commander, he continued that practice in JCS deliberations where it
served his purposes less well.

Admiral Burke retired on 31 July 1961. The next CNO, Admiral George W. Ander-
son, had done a tour as executive assistant to the Chairman of the JCS, who at the
time was Admiral Arthur Radford. Spending much of his career in naval aviation,
Anderson most recently had commanded the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea.

The most critical changes occurred on 1 October 1962. President Kennedy
selected a new Chairman. The Bay of Pigs fiasco had tainted all the Chiefs in Ken-
ney's mind, and Lemnitzer did not share Kennedy's conviction about the great
importance of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. Accordingly, Lem-
mitzer became Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), a post for which he
was eminently qualified and in which traditional military problems were still para-
mount. He retired and was immediately recalled to active duty.

Kennedy's choice for Chairman, General Maxwell D. Taylor, had led the 101st
Airborne Division across Western Europe during 1944–45, commanded Eighth
Army in the Korean War's closing months, and served as Army Chief of Staff from
1955 to 1959. After retiring, Taylor published The Uncertain Trumpet in which he
criticized the Eisenhower administration's reliance on nuclear weapons and so pro-
vided material for Senator Kennedy's presidential campaign. In June 1961, after the
Bay of Pigs, Kennedy called Taylor to the White House as "Military Representative
of the President.” Here, he won the Chief Executive’s confidence to such a degree that Kennedy decided to break the pattern of service rotation pursued by President Eisenhower. The downside of Kennedy’s great confidence, which McNamara came to share, was that service chiefs tended to regard Taylor as representing the civilian leadership to the Chiefs rather than the Chiefs to the civilians.

The administration wanted new leadership for the Army. General Decker, whom civilians evidently judged insufficiently dynamic and innovative, retired on 1 October 1962. President Kennedy took a hand in choosing his successor, instead of waiting (as was customary) to be presented with three names. Early in 1962, Kennedy asked his Military Aide, Brigadier General Chester V. Clifton, USA, to propose candidates. Clifton, in turn, approached the JCS; Army and Navy members recommended General Earle G. Wheeler, who recently had completed a well-regarded tour as Director, Joint Staff. Wheeler was relatively young at 53. He was going to Europe where he hoped to succeed General Lauris Norstad, USAF, as SACEUR. President Kennedy let him go but passed word that he “should not unpack.”3 Soon afterward, the President chose him to be Chief of Staff. Since Wheeler succeeded Taylor as Chairman in 1964 and stayed on until 1970, this was the pivotal JCS appointment of Kennedy’s presidency.

Admiral Anderson and General LeMay found themselves increasingly out of step with civilian leaders. LeMay clashed repeatedly with Secretary McNamara and struck civilians as being too bellicose in times of crisis. Anderson apparently ran afoul of McNamara during the Cuban missile crisis and irritated the Secretary by giving critical public testimony about the F–111 aircraft that McNamara prized as an example of joint development. Kennedy considered replacing both men but McNamara advised him that was one too many. Accordingly, on 6 May 1963 the White House announced (1) that Admiral David L. McDonald, who was commanding the Sixth Fleet, would succeed Anderson on 1 August and (2) that LeMay’s term would be extended for one year only. Anderson left his post embittered but did accept the ambassadorship to Portugal.

A sudden, tragic transition took place on 22 November 1963. The JCS were in the Pentagon conferring with their West German counterparts. General Taylor was taking a post-lunch nap when an aide awoke him to say that President Kennedy, who was in Dallas, had been shot and seriously wounded. The JCS assembled around 1400 in Taylor’s office, where Secretary McNamara soon joined them. They discussed what to do and finally instructed worldwide commands that “this is the time to be especially on the alert.” Then the JCS rejoined the Germans. After telling them what he knew, Taylor insisted that they resume their talks. Not long afterward, Taylor received a note stating that the President was dead; he circulated this paper to his JCS colleagues surreptitiously without interrupting the discussion. The Germans may have been puzzled as, one by one, the Chiefs excused themselves for a time and returned. Finally, late that afternoon, Taylor gave the grim news to the Germans. “I have rarely seen such ashen faces,” he relates, “or heard such words of spontaneous grief.”4
The new President, Lyndon B. Johnson, met the JCS on 29 November. He told them of his firm and long-standing belief in a strong military establishment, and assured each officer that he was needed and wanted. Each Service Chief advised the President that his service was stronger and in better shape that at any time since the Korean War. Johnson then asked each man to give him an inscribed picture to hang in his study “because he would be looking at them quite often in the future.”

On New Year’s Day 1964, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., became Commandant of the Marine Corps. Greene kept a diary that portrays him as disgruntled with his colleagues, and particularly with senior civilians—more so, possibly, than was actually the case. The Chief Executive extended General LeMay’s term until 1 February 1965. Critics said that Johnson wished to keep LeMay in uniform, and thus silent, until the presidential election was past.

Unexpectedly, on 23 June 1964, General Taylor accepted appointment as ambassador to the embattled Republic of Vietnam. The best explanation is that President Johnson believed Taylor’s reputation would protect his Vietnam policy from partisan attacks during the election campaign. Whether Taylor was aware of this motive is unclear.

General Wheeler by then had been a JCS member longer than any of the Service Chiefs except LeMay, who obviously was not in the running for Chairman. So Wheeler took Taylor’s position. To be Army Chief of Staff, the President named Lieutenant General Harold K. Johnson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and 44th in seniority. General Johnson’s career path was unusual. During World War II, he survived the Bataan death march and spent three hard years as a prisoner of war. Subsequently, he saw combat service as a regimental commander in Korea and thereafter earned rapid advancement. After a tour as Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, he became Deputy Chief of Staff. General Barksdale Hamlett, who was Vice Chief of Staff and Johnson’s superior, probably would have succeeded Wheeler. However, Hamlett suffered a major heart attack and had to retire; thus, Johnson’s elevation to Chief of Staff was accelerated by four years.

New Methods: At the White House

President Kennedy promptly dismantled much of the National Security Council (NSC) structure inherited from his predecessor. During the Eisenhower years, a Planning Board prepared studies, policy recommendation, and basic drafts for consideration by the NSC. The Planning Board included a JCS representative, and JCS comments usually accompanied each paper that went to the NSC. Not so with the Operations Coordinating Board, which worked at a higher level. Its members included the Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence. While the Board did not make policies, it coordinated their execution and could initiate proposals that fell within the framework of existing
JCS and National Policy 1961–1964

policies. President Kennedy abolished both the Planning and Operations Coordinating Boards, largely because a Senate subcommittee chaired by Senator Henry M. Jackson (D, Wash.) concluded that Eisenhower’s organization had served to “blur the edges and destroy the coherence” of specific proposals to the point where “they do the President a disservice.”

McGeorge Bundy left the deanship at Harvard to become Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Under him, the NSC staff began extending its reach into day-to-day operations as ad hoc groups were created to deal with specific problems. Sometimes, notably during the early months, informality only exacerbated inexperience. According to an Army officer detailed to White House duty, the NSC staff “really seems to be an agglomeration of six to a dozen hearty individuals picking up balls and running with them ad libitum as the President or McGeorge Bundy directs. This is . . . manifestly 180 degrees removed from the tightly, perhaps over-rigidly, organized system of the Eisenhower administration.” At times, for officers accustomed to disciplined staff procedures, policy-making had the look of “a helter-skelter intellectual parlor game.” Formal meetings of the NSC became less frequent. A statement of Basic National Security Policy, which integrated military, diplomatic, economic, political and psychological factions and was crucial throughout the Eisenhower administration, never won NSC approval.

But the ad hoc approach could count successes, particularly in the performance of an NSC “Executive Committee” that was created in October 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis. The JCS Chairman, General Taylor, was a member. Six months later, however, Bundy judged the ExComm “not so good for lesser matters of coordination, and . . . not . . . effective at all . . . in the process of forward planning.” Accordingly, a Standing Committee of the NSC was created in March 1963. With Bundy presiding and the Chairman of the JCS as a member, it was intended to “be alert to planning problems that are a little less ripe than today’s required decisions: like Cuba a year from now—or China in 1965.” The Standing Group also was supposed to serve, among other things, “as a ready medium for review of ongoing programs with strongly interdepartmental aspects.” Of the Group’s fourteen meetings between April and September 1963, however, ten concerned Cuba in whole or in part. Hindsight shows that, during those months, Vietnam should have been the Group’s primary concern. The ExComm did hold a few discussions about Vietnam, but ad hoc meetings were the rule and these failed to formulate a successful approach.

New Methods: At the Pentagon

Robert McNamara set about transforming the role of the Secretary of Defense. Even before taking office, he asked the JCS—individually, not collectively—to tell him what force levels they wanted without regard to the fiscal ceilings that
President Eisenhower imposed. They each replied by reinserting precisely those items that Eisenhower had deleted from the FY 1962 budget. Such responses may seem reasonable and predictable, but McNamara wanted a completely fresh beginning. Accordingly, he determined to make a deeper, independent investigation.\footnote{11}

On 24 January 1961 Secretary McNamara commissioned four task forces, each chaired by a civilian, to study (1) strategic retaliatory and continental defense forces, (2) limited war needs, (3) research and development, and (4) base and installation requirements. A month later, he forwarded four finished studies to the White House. President Kennedy accepted practically all the proposals in them and, on 28 March, sent Congress a FY 1962 supplemental request. But this, he advised Congress, dealt only with “the most urgent and obvious problems.” Already, on 8 March, Secretary McNamara had issued 96 queries—soon dubbed the “96 trombones”—that covered practically every defense program and policy.\footnote{12}

Rejecting President Eisenhower’s emphasis upon fiscal ceilings, President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara perceived a pressing need to improve the way in which requirements were determined. During Eisenhower’s last year, the Bureau of the Budget had broken the DOD budget into functional categories—strategic retaliatory, continental defense, ground and sea, support—so that it could detect any duplicative or overlapping programs. Briefing the NSC on 1 February, Budget Director David Bell criticized existing procedures. First, a lack of correlation between the military’s plans and the civilians’ budget limits often resulted in ambitious schemes that exceeded fiscal capabilities. Second, an absence of common assumptions among the services created differing strategic doctrines and intelligence appraisals. Third, presenting the budget by departments and inputs (personnel, procurement, etc.) rather than by outputs (strategic deterrent, limited war capability, and the like) made it difficult to determine exactly what results were being achieved. Fourth, budget perspectives usually addressed short-term problems instead of focusing upon long-range goals.\footnote{13}

On 3 April, after winning Secretary McNamara’s enthusiastic support, Comptroller Charles Hitch revealed how he intended to avoid the errors listed above. Basically, for FY 1963, Hitch set about spanning the gap between planning and budgeting by introducing a new “programming” function. He directed the creation of “program packages,” each comprised of those forces that contributed to the same strategic purpose. The techniques of economic analysis or cost effectiveness would then be applied to discover the best and cheapest force mix that could accomplish each function.

As Hitch saw matters, military planners thought five years or more ahead, dealing with forces, weapon systems, missions, and the like. Civilian budgeteers, by contrast, were concerned with appropriations categories (procurement, construction, etc.) and confined themselves to fairly short time periods. He intended to bridge this gap through “a continuous and dynamic process, not geared to a budget cycle, but immediately responsive to changing circumstances and alternatives.”\footnote{14}
On 17 April, Hitch briefed McNamara, the service secretaries, and the JCS about his intended reforms. A month later, he described to the services exactly how his planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) would work. He divided the FY 1963 process into three phases: estimating requirements during May and June; determining the contents of program packages in July and August; and preparing the budget thereafter. Secretary McNamara’s 96 questions were intended to elicit requirements. Hitch anticipated (wrongly, as it turned out) that a statement of Basic National Security Policy soon would win approval. Then, using this and other guidance supplied by Secretary McNamara, the Services would prepare program packages and forward them to the Comptroller for costing and analysis. Ten such packages, each combining personnel, equipment facilities, and supplies, were to be prepared. The Joint Staff, the Services, and OSD would collaborate in preparing precise definitions of each one: Strategic Retaliatory Forces; Continental Defense Forces; General Purpose Forces; Airlift and Sealift; Reserve and National Guard Forces; Research and Development; Service-Wide Support; Military Assistance Program; Classified Projects; and Department of Defense (e.g., retired pay, Defense Agencies). This constituted the “planning” phase of the PPBS.

By then, the JCS had formulated a response. Lieutenant General Wheeler, who was then Director of the Joint Staff, proposed (1) developing procedures for a prompt, effective JCS review of the program packages and (2) having the Service Chiefs exchange budget and force planning data early in June. But General White, believing that OSD was making a “radical departure” from past practice, rejected this as inadequate. He wanted the JCS, instead, to agree upon a FY 1963 force structure against which the program packages could be measured. Adopting White’s approach, the JCS agreed on 10 May that each Service would submit a force structure for FYs 1961–70, which General Wheeler would combine into an overall tabulation. They also reminded Secretary McNamara of an “understanding” that OSD would consult them before making tentative decisions about program levels. They further advised him that they intended to examine program packages “from the standpoint of overall military posture.”

The service plans, collated by General Wheeler, appeared in July. Comptroller Hitch’s office analyzed them from the viewpoint of how they fit into program packages. This was the innovative “programming” phase. On 11 September, McNamara gave the JCS and the services a timetable for finalizing the FY 1963 budget, suggesting strongly that trimming was in order. Eleven days later, he circulated tentative decisions that cut the total obligational authority proposed by the services by about one-fifth.

Meantime, trying to project five years ahead, McNamara worked with Hitch’s people to write Draft Presidential Memorandums (DPMs) that described and justified the force levels and funding for each program package. The JCS had been unable to reach agreement about the sizing of strategic retaliatory forces, so McNamara’s analysts employed cost-effectiveness comparisons to select levels for vari-
ous weapon systems. Expanding in length and numbers over the next few years, these DPMs would come to serve as the central, culminating feature of the PPBS.

On 6 October, McNamara sent President Kennedy his tentative recommendations about the FY 1963 budget as well as a program for 1963-67. On 23 October, the services submitted their formal FY 1963 proposals, triggering a final round of budget reviews and decisions. All told, McNamara held eighteen meetings with the JCS about the FY 1963 budget. But OSD set the pace based on the JCS contributions.

Early in December 1961, McNamara presented a final budget to President Kennedy. The JCS customarily made what was wryly called a “blood statement.” McNamara asked them to say that this budget would “greatly increase our combat effectiveness and provide forces far stronger than those of any other nation.” They settled on milder wording that “this budget will further increase our combat effectiveness and provide forces in a high state of readiness.” General LeMay added that he retained certain reservations, “particularly as regards the program for Strategic Forces.”

On 3 January 1962 at Palm Beach, President Kennedy presided over a budget review at which he polled each JCS member. Only the Air Force spokesman harbored serious reservations, and those concerned the strategic nuclear balance after 1965. General Shoup, in fact, said that this budget was better prepared than any he had witnessed during the past seven years.

Adjusting the JCS Program for Planning

Each year, according to their Program for Planning, the JCS were supposed to approve a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), a Joint Long-Range Strategic Study (JLRSS), and a Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). The JSCP, a short-range “fight plan,” translated national policies into military tasks consonant with actual capabilities and gave general—but not detailed operational—guidance to commanders of unified and specified commands for their conduct of cold, limited, and general war operations. JSCPs, being the truly indispensable documents in the Program for Planning, regularly appeared on schedule around the end of each calendar year. JSCP-63, for example, was approved in December 1961; it applied to the period between 1 July 1962 and 30 June 1963.

The JLRSS provided planning guidance running eight to twelve years ahead, helping to shape DOD’s research and engineering program. JLRSS–71 was published in July 1962, JLRSS–72 in August 1963. Evidently, though, the JLRSS made only a modest impact upon the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. When civilians reviewed a draft of JLRSS–73, early in 1964, they rated it “a great improvement” over its predecessor but still harbored misgivings about its purpose and utility. They deemed it “practically impossible to prepare a meaningful projection” because the discovery of a new scientific principle might “drastically change a large portion of the technology” or a radical engineering
development could change an uneconomical application into an efficient one. They wanted some indication of priorities, too, since “the entire technological community” could not attack more than “a small fraction” of the needs outlined in the draft. Moreover, they detected a tendency to fasten upon and exaggerate the potential of well-publicized technological advances (e.g., masers and lasers). Joint Staff officers responded that OSD had not decided exactly what sort of advice it wanted from the military. Until that occurred, “it will be difficult... to propose meaningful comments or improvements.” Nonetheless, in July 1964, JLRSS–73 appeared on schedule.23

The JSOP, an instrument for mid-range planning, was defined in the Program for Planning as “beginning on 1 July of the fiscal year five years subsequent to the fiscal year in which the plan is scheduled for approval, and extending for three years thereafter.” Thus JSOP–67, which was approved in 1962, applied to Fiscal Years 1967 through 1969; JSOP–68 in 1963 covered FYs 1968–70; JSOP–69 in 1964, FYs 1969–71. That was about the time it then took to develop and field a weapon system. Parts I through V of the JSOP included a broad strategic appraisal, a statement of basic US objectives, and a strategic concept. Part VI, containing force-level recommendations or “force tabs,” was the heart of the document. The JSOP absorbed far more of the Chiefs’ attention than the other two documents. Part VI in particular provided an arena for displaying, more often than for settling, inter-service differences.

Completion of the Kennedy era’s first JSOP had to be postponed repeatedly. JSOP–66 had been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense in September 1960, but because its force tabs contained inter-service splits about crucial issues—the size and mix of the strategic retaliatory force, the number of attack carriers, and the rate of Army and Navy modernization—the JCS agreed to reconsider JSOP–66 after the new administration had reviewed the FY 1962 budget.

According to the Joint Program for Planning, JSOP–67 should have been completed by 31 May 1961. Instead, FY 1962 budget addendums that were put before Congress in March, May, and July required revisions of JSOP–66, and Secretary McNamara was not able to issue preliminary FY 1963 guidelines until summer. A looming confrontation over West Berlin took first place on the policymakers’ agenda. Not until 20 September 1961 were the JCS able to give Joint Staff officers guidance about preparing JSOP–67. On 14 November, the Chiefs approved statements of the strategic concept, objectives, and basic undertakings. But, as soon as the Joint Staff began drawing up force tabs for JSOP–67, the same inter-service splits that had plagued JSOP–66 reappeared. In February 1962, with agreement no nearer, the JCS suspended work and asked the Chairman, General Lemnitzer, to suggest solutions.24

Meanwhile, Secretary McNamara opened the FY 1964 cycle by issuing 62 requirements studies, similar to the “96 trombones” of 1961. His request for an examination of general purpose forces, promising to prove particularly broad and complex, prompted Lemnitzer to establish his own Special Studies Group in June
1962. The Director, J–5, chaired this Group, which was large enough to undertake three studies simultaneously. The Special Studies Group played an increasingly important part in helping to define JCS positions, but its influence never came close to matching that of the systems analysts in OSD.

During the spring of 1962, Secretary McNamara made notable refinements to the PPBS. He established, as the official DOD position, a “Five-Year Defense Program” (FYDP) derived from FY 1963 budget decisions and from service submissions made to Comptroller Hitch’s office during February and March 1962. He also instituted a device of “Program Change Proposals” (PCPs), through which the FYDP might be amended at any time. PCPs could be submitted by the JCS, the Military Departments, and OSD agencies; they would be reviewed by all concerned DOD components and then presented to the Secretary for a decision. McNamara wanted decision-making to be spread more evenly over the calendar year, so that important issues need not be settled amid the rush of finalizing the budget. He therefore decided that the FYDP, as it stood on 15 August 1962, would serve as the basis for budget submissions.

General LeMay worried that the FYDP, together with guidance from Comptroller Hitch’s office, might become a substitute for what he termed “mature military judgment.” He urged, accordingly, that action upon JSOP-67’s force tabs be accelerated. General Lemnitzer finally secured agreement that postponed decisions about force levels in the later or “out” years. At last, on 27 August 1962, the JCS sent Secretary McNamara force tabs that generally, although not completely, accorded with those in the FYDP. But, by then, Secretary McNamara’s 15 August deadline had passed. Moreover, JSOP–67’s force tabs were neither arranged according to the program package format nor accompanied by supporting rationales. This failure to speak the Secretary’s language considerably lessened JSOP–67’s impact.

When General Taylor became Chairman, he was well aware of complaints that civilian “whiz kids” in OSD were wont to adopt positions without seeking military advice. He also remembered how a former Chairman, Admiral Arthur Radford, had tried to eliminate splits in JCS papers by pressuring the Service Chiefs to change positions—and sometimes, in Taylor’s judgment, made matters worse. So, before accepting the Chairmanship, Taylor won McNamara’s agreement (1) that the JCS would always have their “day in court” with him and (2) that the Chairman never would be asked to try to compel unanimity.

Introducing PCPs proved a two-edged sword, as the services “flooded” Comptroller Hitch’s office with them and thus threw back deadlines for the FY 1964 cycle. Early in autumn 1962, through DPMs, Secretary McNamara circulated tentative budget and force-level decisions. The JCS critiqued each of them. For about three weeks, from mid-October until early November, the Cuban missile crisis completely absorbed the attention of senior officials. On 29 November, Secretary McNamara issued his final decisions. On all the contentious issues—levels of Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles, deploying ballistic missile defenses,
moving ahead with a new manned bomber, numbers of Army divisions, tactical fighter wings, and airlift—he rejected service reclamas and held to his original recommendations. It is noteworthy that the JCS were split over these issues, mostly along service lines. LeMay, for example, wanted more missiles and a new bomber but opposed the Army's plan for missile defenses.30

Secretary McNamara proposed a “blood statement” saying that “although the force structure does not contain all the forces recommended by each of the Services,” the JCS agreed that it would “further increase our combat effectiveness and provide powerful forces in a high state of readiness.” Anderson, Shoup, and Wheeler concurred. LeMay did not, because of what he deemed “serious deficiencies.” On 3 December, they informed McNamara that—subject to two alterations—the statement was acceptable. First, the program “does not include all the forces recommended by each of the Services or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff collectively.” Second, Anderson, LeMay, and Shoup “retain certain reservations, particularly as regards the rate of modernization and growth in combat effectiveness of certain US forces in relation to the Sino-Soviet threat.”31

On 27 December 1962, again at Palm Beach, Secretary McNamara and the JCS had their wrap-up conference with President Kennedy. Service reservations were aired fully. But General LeMay, who had the deepest differences with McNamara, began his presentation by stating that “in his five years of budget planning this had been the best, with the greatest amount of agreement among the Chiefs and the best feeling of support from their civilian superiors, including the President, that the Joint Chiefs had ever had.” He hinted at deeper misgivings about JCS-OSD relations by telling the President that “war is not efficient,” and its needs and plans could not be run by computer efficiency measurements.”32

For the FY 1965 cycle, the Chiefs’ main concern was integrating their JSOP more effectively into the PPBS. Secretary McNamara, in fact, asked them to propose a method for correlating JSOP planning with development of his Five Year Program, “so that the JSOP would become a primary vehicle for obtaining the decisions on force structure necessary for validating the ensuing budget year of the five-year cycle.” The JSOP, therefore, must contain justifications of its force tabs, based upon an analysis of the requirements for contingency and general war plans. Unified commanders, previously limited to commenting upon recommendations by their component commanders, now were directed to submit their own estimates and justifications as inputs to the JSOP—another step in enlarging their roles.33

On 4 December 1962, after getting General Taylor’s concurrence, Secretary McNamara circulated an FY 1965 timetable that pushed the programming phase forward by several months. On 1 March 1963 (changed at General Taylor’s request to 12 April), the JCS would send him the force tabs and rationales of JSOP–68. Between April and June, the services would submit force structures, cost estimates, and PCPs. By 15 August, the Secretary of Defense would complete his
review and establish firm program guidelines. On 1 October, the services would send in their submissions, along with five-year plans that adhered to the guidance of 15 August.\textsuperscript{34}

In January 1963, General Taylor told Joint Staff officers assigned to drafting the JSOP that producing an agreed and effective rationale was “imperative,” no matter how difficult that task might prove. This time, too, the JSOP’s force tabs had to be presented in the program package format.\textsuperscript{35}

The resulting JSOP–68 contained an analysis of missions, objectives, and operational requirements that, Taylor assured McNamara, was “the most thorough of any JSOP within my experience.” The Joint Staff even copied the McNamara-Hitch methodology to the point of preparing and assessing alternative packages for each program. Nonetheless, the JCS split over some of the most important force tabs (e.g., Minuteman, Army division, and tactical fighter aircraft levels). Taylor attributed these splits “to the wide range of major uncertainties inherent in the task as well as [to] the existence of a number of hard issues of major and basic importance.” The “major uncertainties,” he said, included different estimates of US and Soviet missile reliability, the Soviets’ capability to refire from missile silos and harden their missile sites, the impact of possible Soviet ballistic missile defenses, and the possibility of new weapon systems. Among the “hard issues” listed by Taylor were the efficacy of retaliating against “counterforce” targets in nuclear war, the reliance of general purpose forces upon reserve components, the role of attack carriers, and manpower levels for each service.\textsuperscript{36} These were matters that went to the heart of each service’s force structure. Very likely, as far as OSD was concerned, such serious splits more than offset the advantages of adopting program package formats.

On 6 December, after receiving Secretary McNamara’s final decisions, the JCS agreed upon a “blood statement” practically identical to that of the previous year. On 30 December, McNamara and the JCS briefed President Johnson at his LBJ Ranch. General Taylor described the FY 1965 budget as “over-all, a good one.” He said that, unlike 1955–59 when he was Army Chief of Staff, “the Joint Chiefs now spend a great deal of time on the overall defense budget and the force structure it supports; their consideration goes beyond the parochial views of their Services.” They had, he added, taken part in 104 discussions of budget matters, force structures, or PCPs.\textsuperscript{37} Judging by JSOP–68, however, a broader span of consideration was not in itself enough to transcend parochialism.

For FY 1966, at Hitch’s urging, Secretary McNamara proposed moving tentative decisions about force changes and logistics guidance forward three months, from August to May, thereby allowing more time for review and discussion. The JCS urged pushing back, by two weeks each, the deadlines for service force changes, the JCS and service reclamas to OSD’s tentative force guidance, and the presentation of PCPs. Conversely, they wanted the period for OSD’s review of service PCPs to be shortened by two weeks. McNamara did agree to some changes. JSOP–69 would be submitted on 1 March 1964, followed on 1 April by dollar and
manpower requests from the services which did not exceed JSOP–69’s force tabs. That sequence, he hoped, would permit a broader examination than was possible through examinations of individual PCPs. By 15 June, the JCS and the services would assess OSD’s tentative decisions and the services would submit all their PCPs based upon them. By 15 August, McNamara would render his decisions about the PCPs. All DOD components would complete their budget submissions by 1 October.38

In 1964, according to General Taylor, the JCS made a major effort to improve their JSOP. Basically, they decided to buttress supporting rationales of the sort used in JSOP–68 with “situational analyses,” in which the Joint Staff and the services employed war gaming techniques to decide what forces would be needed during the early stages of hypothetical crises. The final product, in Taylor’s judgment, was better than its predecessors but not vastly so. The Joint Staff found that situational analyses were more useful “as a technique for testing force levels than as a method of deriving force objectives.” The Service Chiefs harbored “many reservations concerning the assumptions, factors, concepts of employment and conclusions of these analyses.” And JSOP–69, encumbered by these situational analyses, grew to a truly formidable length. Still, Taylor felt that this approach had proven to be of considerable value in rebutting some of OSD’s cost-effectiveness calculations.39

In November 1964, as the FY 1966 cycle neared completion, the JCS advised McNamara that the timetable had required them to submit JSOP–69 before the requirements studies commissioned by OSD had been completed. They also asked that the time allotted to the services for reviewing tentative guidance and preparing PCPs rise from 30 to 60 days. In his FY 1967 schedule, Secretary McNamara did lengthen the reviewing period to 75 days.40

Early in December, Secretary McNamara circulated final force and budget decisions that, he believed, reflected “in major respects . . . the views of the majority of the Chiefs.” The JCS signed another “blood statement” virtually identical to those of the past two years. On 22 December, at the LBJ Ranch, McNamara told President Johnson that he and the JCS “agreed on about 95 percent of the items” and believed that the FY 1966 budget would improve and strengthen US defenses. The President asked General Wheeler, who was now Chairman, whether every JCS member agreed; Wheeler replied that they did.41 In retrospect, with a war in Southeast Asia looming, what seems remarkable about these procedures and discussions is their appearance of peacetime routine. During 1965, escalation in Vietnam would disrupt force and budget planning, exposing major JCS-OSD differences.

By December 1964, Draft Presidential Memorandums had emerged as the most important documents in the budget and force-planning process. This occurred as much from default as from design. After expending nearly two years of work, civilian leaders decided that a formal statement of Basic National Security Policy was unnecessary. The State Department produced country and regional guideline papers, but the White House accorded these little weight.42 In 1964 the State
Department started publishing National Policy Papers which fared no better. The JCS wanted JSOPs to shape the content of PPBS cycles and devoted considerable efforts toward that end. Essentially, they failed. Civilian analysts may have been predisposed to find fault with JSOPs, and they had no difficulty doing so. Persistent splits over force tabs and lowest-common-denominator language about strategic concepts more than offset any benefits from the preparation of alternative program packages or the war gaming of situational analyses. Thus it was Secretary McNamara’s DPMs that articulated “assured destruction” for waging nuclear war as well as a “two-war” capability for conventional conflicts. These, in turn, were the foundations for OSD’s statistically-based justifications of force levels.
Strategic Priorities Undergo Major Changes

Conventional Capability Emphasized; Basic National Security Policy Aborted

None of President Eisenhower’s national security policies attracted more criticism than his emphasis upon meeting aggression with nuclear retaliation. He believed that any conflict with the Soviet Union, no matter where or how it occurred, would escalate rapidly into a general war involving an exchange of blows by strategic nuclear forces as well as a global struggle by ground, sea and air forces, probably employing tactical nuclear weapons. Eisenhower did allow for the possibility of limited wars in which the USSR was not involved. His yardstick for sizing US conventional forces was that of waging a renewed war in Korea. But general war requirements held priority, because limited wars might well escalate into general ones.

The Kennedy administration came to power convinced that Eisenhower’s approach was outdated and ineffective. President Kennedy inherited a statement of Basic National Security Policy (BNSP), which was a comprehensive document integrating military, diplomatic, economic, political, and psychological factors. President Eisenhower’s last BNSP was NSC 5906/1, approved in August 1959, which placed “main, but not sole, reliance” on nuclear weapons. On 4 February 1961, Secretary of State Dean Rusk gave Secretary McNamara his view that “raising the threshold” for nuclear response struck him as a matter of “the greatest importance.” He further stated that our general war deterrent must be “effective, invulnerable, and reliable.” But he also believed that “a mobile, substantial, and flexible capability for operations
short of general war is essential.” Forces of that kind should be deployed in forward areas of the western Pacific. In Europe, Rusk argued, NATO needed enough conventional strength to enforce a pause long enough to allow the Soviets time to appraise the wider risks they faced and provide an opportunity for negotiations.1

The J–5, a bit surprisingly, judged Rusk's paper to be “generally consistent” with NSC 5906/1. General Decker, however, believed that the emphasis upon conventional capability required “significant” revisions to it. On 11 March, in an evident compromise, the JCS informed Secretary McNamara that they generally agreed with Rusk's views and believed that NSC 5906/1 was broadly phrased enough to fall within their compass. They noted that implementing Rusk's intent would require budget increases and, in Europe, modernization of US forces along with a considerably expanded allied contribution. They added, though, that NATO “must not flinch” from employing nuclear weapons if necessary and endorsed the judgment of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe that selective use of atomic firepower need not result in all-out war.2

On 28 March 1961, Secretary McNamara advised the President that “the primary mission of our overseas forces should be made non-nuclear warfare.” Eight days later, President Kennedy informed Congress that “our objective now is to increase our ability to confine our response to non-nuclear weapons.” On 21 April, he approved a directive that assigned “highest priority” to creating a conventional capability “for halting Soviet forces now in or rapidly deployable to central Europe for a sufficient period to allow the Soviets to appreciate the wider risk of the course on which they are embarked.” The JCS had wanted “highest priority” softened to simply “priority” because they did not see a limited conflict in Europe as being any more likely than a general war.3

It is noteworthy that Kennedy directed such a major change so quickly, with nothing comparable to the Eisenhower administration's Project Solarium4 and its follow-ups that consumed much of 1953. Civilian leaders may not have fully appreciated the ramifications of this change. NATO's strategic concept, MC 14/2, stated that the alliance would respond with nuclear weapons, regardless of whether the Soviets did so, in all situations except incursion, infiltration, or local hostile action. European allies looked upon the threat of nuclear reprisal as the surest deterrent and proved resistant to any other approach. The US Air Force had spent the 1950s equipping itself for nuclear warfare. Thus the F–105 Thunderchief, a mainstay of the Tactical Air Command, was designed for low-level delivery of tactical nuclear weapons. Many of the Air Force’s senior officers came from the Strategic Air Command and were reluctant to reorient their service’s priorities. The upshot was that changes promulgated swiftly in principle, spent much of the 1960s being worked out in practice.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ISA), made the first attempt to write a new BNSP. On 19 May 1961, ISA circulated a draft calling for a capability “to respond to local aggression locally, wherever it
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may occur and whatever form it may take.” That meant placing “main but not sole reliance on non-nuclear weapons.” Undoubtedly, these words were intended to reverse NSC 5906/1.

On 5 July, the JCS completed their own draft of BNSP. It stated that US and allied strength should be sufficient to “provide for the military superiority of the Free World and afford an adequate basis for essential operations to defeat aggressive communism at all levels.” Limited war forces should be deployed so as to retard aggressors long enough to allow the arrival of reinforcements, keeping the conflict at a non-nuclear level wherever possible. Thus they were not willing to go quite as far in emphasizing conventional capabilities. The Chiefs worried that, if their draft went forward through normal channels, it might be rejected by ISA and never reach McNamara and Kennedy in its original form. Accordingly, they took the unusual step of deciding that General Lemnitzer would personally deliver their paper to McNamara and Deputy Secretary Roswell Gilpatric. Also, Lemnitzer would say that the JCS wanted to discuss BNSP with them and the President at an early date.

Late in July, ISA circulated a revised draft stating that US strength should be adequate to “meet any military situation discriminately with sufficient, but not excessive measures.” After reviewing it, the JCS rejected a recommendation by their Joint Strategic Survey Council (JSSC) that they simply stand on their 5 July paper. Instead, they directed the JSSC to specify the reasons for dissatisfaction with ISA’s latest effort. Early in August, the JSSC submitted a talking paper that characterized ISA’s draft as “negative and inhibiting in nature,” tending to “over-emphasize control of military forces, avoidance of casualties and damage, defense, survival, without comparable concern for combat effectiveness, the offensive, or the will to succeed.” ISA appeared to be emphasizing conventional weapons even more than NSC 5906/1 had emphasized nuclear ones. Indeed, “[a]n overly inhibited BNSP could permeate the whole structure of a people and government to the point where the all-important will to win disappears.” While military operations had to be controlled by “constituted authority,” such control “should be covered broadly and succinctly in BNSP with specific details left to technical plans and policies.”

The JSSC’s criticisms could be seen as foreshadowing the deep JCS-OSD differences that developed over waging the Vietnam War. Actually, in 1961, what they mainly reflected was military unease over civilians’ intrusion into the details of contingency planning for West Berlin, and with civilians’ insistence that any escalation of effort there be carefully graduated and controlled. Some civilians in OSD likened war to a violent form of bargaining, in which military actions should send an opponent messages about controlling and resolving the conflict. On 7 August, the JCS met with McNamara but he decided to defer work on BNSP because the Berlin confrontation and the FY 1963 budget deserved higher priority. An eight-month hiatus followed.
On 26 March 1962, Walt Rostow (Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff) circulated a long, elegantly phrased BNSP draft that opened with quotations from Winston Churchill and Alexis de Tocqueville. It stated that conventional forces should be substantial enough to contain anything short of an all-out Soviet or Chinese attack and mobile enough to deal with two simultaneous crises in distant parts of the world. If a balance had to be struck in training and equipping forces, that balance should favor non-nuclear over nuclear combat. Thus conventional forces should be “so organized, trained, and equipped as not to be dependent on nuclear weapons for their effectiveness in sustained combat.” If nuclear weapons had to be used, the primary purpose of firing a small number of them “would be political, rather than military,” signaling US intent to widen the war if necessary.9

The JCS found this draft acceptable, subject to changes such as adding provisions for controlling vital sea lanes, protecting maritime commerce, and supporting overseas forces. State did so but, in a 7 May draft, added “tentative guidelines” for tactical nuclear weapons. The tactical nuclear arsenal, State said, should be sufficient (1) to allow employment selectively and profitably (notably at sea and in the air) with little risk of escalation and (2) to permit very limited use against military targets, primarily to demonstrate US determination. And until firm guidelines were established, commitments to either produce tactical nuclear weapons or provide them to non-NATO allies should be avoided.10

These “tentative guidelines” created a good deal of controversy. The JCS opposed any prohibition upon production. McNamara, however, had very little faith in the efficacy of tactical nuclear warfare. The difficulty of centralized control, the pressure to respond in kind, the great flexibility and enormous firepower of nuclear weapon systems, the ease and accuracy with which such weapons could be fired from distant bases—all these suggested to him that “local nuclear war would be a transient but highly destructive phenomenon.” Whether the military possessed a viable doctrine for employing tactical nuclear weapons became another bone of contention. McNamara believed there was none and should be one. General Lemnitzer, however, held that a war of movement would not permit the sort of detailed planning and target selection embodied in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for strategic nuclear warfare. He argued that a doctrine existed and proper training had been provided—but the scope and location of targets could not be provided beforehand.11 To the JCS, conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic nuclear capabilities were elements in a continuum of warfare. By contrast, McNamara wanted to build a firebreak because he grew certain that any escalation above the conventional level would escalate rapidly into all-out exchanges.

In July 1962, thirty-one “BNSP Planning Tasks” were identified for further study and probable referral in final form to the President. These, however, included such critical topics as “initiation of nuclear warfare” and “scale and role of conventional forces.” In mid-August, General LeMay told JCS colleagues that he was worried about their apparent exclusion from this exercise. The nuclear warfare problem, for
example, had been assigned solely to Deputy Assistant Secretary Henry Rowen in ISA; there was not even a JCS contact point. At the weekly meetings where BNSP drafting efforts were coordinated, military personnel attended only as observers and lacked authority to present and defend JCS positions. Since Rowen shared McNamara's skepticism about the utility of tactical nuclear weapons, the military were naturally apprehensive. On 20 August, the JCS communicated their concern to McNamara, who promised that no final action would be taken without there first being a JCS review.12

Meantime, the State Department prepared a “short” version that extracted policy statements from previous drafts and omitted the supporting rationales. At a State-JCS meeting on 5 October, General Taylor (who had just become Chairman) said that the JCS had not seen the latest draft and wanted to do so. Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson proposed giving only the military portions to the Chiefs. General Wheeler replied that “this would be like having the Book of Revelation without ever having seen Genesis.” Taylor remarked that BNSP should be like the British constitution—unwritten. He repeated what he had said in The Uncertain Trumpet about BNSPs of the Eisenhower era: “any document which gains the acceptance of everyone must of necessity be so compromised that it will be used by everyone to further his own ends.” Subsequently, the Service Chiefs advised McNamara that fragmentation and piecemeal submission “might well lead to a dilution of the essential inter-relationship of the various elements of national policy—political, economic, and military.” Therefore, “a completely balanced version of BNSP rather than a series of compartmented excerpts is urgently needed.” Writing separately, Taylor offered contrary advice. Another lengthy debate, he thought, would precede presidential approval. The immediate need, Taylor counseled, was a base on which the Chiefs could build their next JSOP. McNamara could provide that simply by noting or approving the draft BNSP. But apart from that, Taylor concluded, “I doubt the wisdom of pressing for higher action . . . at this time.”13

Suddenly, the BNSP exercise ended. On 17 January 1963, President Kennedy formally rescinded NSC 5906/1 which for all practical purposes had become a dead letter on the day he took office. He directed that guidance be drawn from “existing major policy statements of the President and Cabinet Officers, both classified and unclassified.” Deputy Secretary Gilpatric told General Taylor that he was “not overly concerned” by failure to finalize a BNSP, because statements by senior officials “constitute pragmatic policy guidance which can serve as a basis for military planning.” In June, ISA circulated such a compilation of speeches and statements.14

The JCS tried to salvage something from the BNSP’s demise. In March 1963, General Taylor ordered the JSSC to propose guidance for developing the “basic family” of JCS plans. Early in June, the JSSC identified 21 areas in which policy guidance appeared deficient and argued for a “comprehensive” BNSP. The JCS discussed this three times and finally decided to defer action. At the last of these
meetings, General Taylor tabled a list of six questions covering matters on which higher guidance should be sought.15

The JCS met with McNamara on 22 July and argued for a “State-Defense-approved BNSP.” After “some discussion,” they agreed to submit a list of questions and—if McNamara approved them—to supply suggested answers. McNamara was willing to transmit those questions and answers to State and say that they constituted DOD’s planning guidance. The list would be General Taylor’s six questions, each of which addressed a critical issue:

1. What should be the target-hitting capability of strategic retaliatory forces?
2. How many contingencies should conventional or general purpose forces be able to handle, and what should be their speed of reaction?
3. What should be NATO’s capability for enforcing a non-nuclear pause upon an aggressor?
4. What provision should be made for supporting a revolt in the Eastern European satellites?
5. What level of military activity could the United States conduct between Suez and Thailand? Was this adequate?
6. Should planners assume that the United States would not conduct large-scale ground operations on the Asian mainland?

The JCS tasked J–5 and the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group with drafting answers but decided against sending the six questions to Secretary McNamara. When answers were submitted late in August, the JCS simply “noted” them. Perhaps they did so because, as General LeMay observed, preparing the next JSOP would require them to consider “many, if not all, of the subjects represented by the proposed questions. . . . Crucial policy considerations addressed in any less complete context seem likely to impinge adversely on our ability to satisfy the total requirements of national security.”16

The shift from massive retaliation to flexible response did find its way into the JCS family of plans. JSCP–63, circulated in January 1962, discarded NSC 5906/1 by foreseeing engagements between US and Soviet forces “which, in themselves, are not of such a nature as to constitute sufficient cause for the United States to implement general war plans. The circumstances, location, and world climate under which an engagement occurs would be major factors in determining what our national response might be.” According to JSOP–68, issued late that same year, general purpose forces should be able to “frustrate, without using nuclear weapons, major non-nuclear assault by Sino-Soviet forces where vital US interests are involved . . . long enough to convince the communists of the risks involved . . . , thereby affording diplomacy a chance to end the conflict.” Specifically, they should be “sufficiently mobile to respond promptly and simultaneously in needed numbers to two substantial threats . . . , notably in Europe and Southeast Asia.” JSOP–69, which appeared in September 1963, read that “general purpose forces should be
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sufficient . . . to meet the early reinforcement requirements of NATO and . . . the estimated requirements of any one of the most likely contingency plans of the commanders of the unified and specified commands.” Thus a two-war capability became the benchmark for planning conventional force levels.

For BNSP, the last gasp came in February 1965. A majority of the Chiefs advised Secretary McNamara that, while compilation of a BNSP was desirable in principle, the JCS “do not lack policy guidance for the preparation of military plans.” The Air Force Chief of Staff and the Commandant of the Marine Corps did recommend developing a BNSP and reactivating the NSC Planning Board. McNamara replied: “I am inclined to the view that there is no pressing need for a BNSP in single document form and, at the moment, am not persuaded that the NSC Planning Board should be reactivated.”

Hindsight strongly suggests that lack of a BNSP created problems more serious than civilian leaders—and General Taylor—acknowledged. Critical issues were raised but not resolved, as Taylor’s six questions showed. To take an outstanding example: Eisenhower BNSPs at least helped to identify what were vital US interests. If a country was not worth defending with nuclear weapons, it was not of vital importance and therefore not worth waging a large-scale conventional war. Switching the emphasis to conventional capabilities blurred that threshold. In May 1961, McNamara sent President Kennedy his assumption that a commitment of more than 250–300,000 American troops would reach the nuclear threshold. A month later, Dr. Carl Kaysen of the NSC Staff put the transition point at 300–350,000 and suggested that the ceiling might go higher. In 1963 the threshold issue, still unsettled, was implicit in several of General Taylor’s questions. Subsequently, what Gilpatric had characterized as “pragmatic policy guidance” did not prevent an incremental buildup in Vietnam. By 1968, 549,000 US troops were committed there.

Focusing on Counterinsurgency

By the late 1950s, the Cold War had spread into the “Third World” where communists exploited wide discontent among the poor and oppressed of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. On 6 January 1961, Nikita Khrushchev extolled what he called “wars of national liberation.” Citing Cuba, Algeria, and Vietnam as examples of successful “popular uprisings,” he pledged to support such wars “wholeheartedly and without reservation.” President Kennedy took Khrushchev’s speech as an authoritative exposition of Soviet intentions.

In January 1961 Army Special Forces totaled only 1,800 personnel, trained for guerrilla operations in communist-controlled areas. President Kennedy promptly ordered an expansion and reorientation. At an NSC meeting on 1 February, he asked McNamara to examine ways of emphasizing counter-guerrilla capabilities. On 6 and 23 February, Kennedy met the JCS and asked for detailed rundowns of
what was being done in Latin America and Southeast Asia. “Obviously,” he told them, there was going to be “more guerrillas and counter-guerrilla activity in Africa and Asia in the near future.” Early in March, the JCS informed Secretary McNamara of the steps being taken to improve training and instruction. They also recommended clarifying interdepartmental responsibilities in developing counterinsurgency plans for threatened countries, with Defense taking charge of training the police and internal security personnel. McNamara directed that JCS proposals be put into effect “with all possible vigor.” On 11 April, the services and unified commands were told to submit quarterly progress reports. High presidential interest meant that the Joint Staff had to keep McNamara fully abreast of these matters.21

On 25 April, just after the Bay of Pigs debacle, the JCS were asked to prepare “proposals designed to increase influence and control in threatened areas through pre-emption of communist infiltration.” This was quite a challenge, and the steps they recommended were modest. General White, in fact, was alarmed by what he deemed a lack of any real capability to deal with subversion and indirect aggression. He recommended “a master plan to marshal and organize US and Free World resources into a tough hit-below-the-belt course of action.” White stood alone among JCS members in pressing this view. But on 28 June, through NSAM 55, President Kennedy ordered the JCS to assume a role in Cold War operations similar to that which they bore for conventional hostilities, and to provide “dynamic and imaginative leadership in contributing to the success of the military and paramilitary aspects of Cold War operations.” He regarded the Chiefs as “more than military men” and expected them to help fit military requirements “into the over-all context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in Government is to combine all assets in a unified, effective pattern.”22

In December 1961, an NSC task force concluded that, while there was a clear consensus about the magnitude and urgency of the problem, “no single high-level locus of authority and responsibility” existed to coordinate interagency resources. General Taylor, who was then working in the White House, asked for General Lemnitzer’s views about creating a “Special Group (Counter-Insurgency).” Lemnitzer concurred, with two caveats. First, confining the Group’s responsibilities to places where the communists already had a “running start” would preclude a fair test of its capabilities and prevent it from concentrating on areas of the most strategic significance. Second, Group members would be senior officials whose time already was fully occupied; they could do no more than review thoroughly staffed recommendations. Therefore, the Group needed a small, highly qualified staff to draft proposals and monitor their implementation. His first suggestion was accepted but not his second. State, OSD, Central Intelligence, and the Agency for International Development (AID) did not consider a staff necessary, and none was provided.23

On 18 January 1962, President Kennedy established the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency (CI)) which would hold two-hour weekly meetings. Its main missions included (1) insuring government-wide recognition that insurgency was “a major
form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare,” (2) reviewing the adequacy of resources for coping with “actual or potential situations of insurgency or indirect aggression,” and (3) insuring the adequacy of programs in countries and regions assigned to the Group by the President. The Group’s members were: General Taylor, Chairman; Attorney General Robert Kennedy; Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson; Deputy Secretary Cyrus R. Vance; General Lemnitzer; Director of Central Intelligence John McCon; and AID Administrator Fowler Hamilton. Initially, the President assigned South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand to its cognizance. By September 1962, he had added seven more countries.24

President Kennedy still did not believe that the Defense Department, and particularly the Army, was devoting enough attention and effort to counterinsurgency.25 Accordingly, in January 1962, he ordered that the Army select one general officer to act as its focal point for counterinsurgency efforts. The choice fell on Major General-designate William B. Rossen, who later held four-star rank. Major General Victor H. Krulak, USMC, became Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, assigned to the Joint Staff. When these officers met the President on 5 March, Kennedy told them that counterinsurgency was “the most pressing war either at hand or in prospect.”26

Lacking a BNSP, policy guidance existed in piecemeal, fragmentary form. Accordingly, in April 1962 the JCS sent a draft of “Joint Counterinsurgency Concept and Doctrinal Guidance” to Secretary McNamara and asked that he consider conveying it to the President. The draft divided programs into two broad categories: first, “nation-building entailing military contributions through civic actions”; second, “programs for military counter-insurgency support during military operations.” Within the second category, they identified three “general phases of intensity.” During Phase I, problem spots would be identified and a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), a military training mission, or a tailored counterinsurgency force introduced. In Phase II, if the insurgency grew to more serious proportions, increased aid would be accompanied by military personnel providing “operational assistance.” A new command, directly subordinate to the unified commander concerned, could be created. Activated in February 1962, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), was directly subordinate to Pacific Command. Guerrilla sanctuaries outside the threatened country might have to be attacked. Phase III could see a combat commitment of tactical forces. The JCS then enumerated “principles governing counterinsurgency operations.” The most important of these were: seeking complete integration and coordination of effort through unity of command and centralized control; making maximum use of indigenous forces; and fitting employment of US forces to local conditions, avoiding commitment of large combat units.27 A critical issue, of course, was whether indigenous capabilities were equal to the test. When the Defense Department appraised eleven countries, only Pakistan’s paramilitary assets were rated as good. The others varied between fair and poor. The Special Group (CI) suggested, and the President approved, several corrective steps. With one or two
exceptions, there were no plans to unify and orchestrate internal defense plans for threatened countries. The State Department would supervise the preparation of such plans, and they would be submitted to the Special Group (CI).\textsuperscript{28}

Meantime, the State Department drafted a “National Counter-Insurgency Doctrine” which the Special Group (CI) asked interested agencies to review. In July 1962, an interdepartmental working group circulated “US Overseas Internal Defense Policy Guidelines” which described three phases quite similar to those in the JCS guidance: Phase I ranged from an incipient threat to frequent incidents occurring in an organized pattern; Phase II involved the initiation of organized guerrilla warfare; and Phase III was “primarily a war of movement between organized forces.” The State Department would bear responsibility for “providing overall policy and coordinating internal defense programs.” The Special Group (CI) should assure a coordinated and unified approach, verify progress in implementing programs, and render decisions about inter-departmental issues. The JCS concurred with these guidelines, and President Kennedy approved them on 24 August 1962.\textsuperscript{29}

As 1962 ended, the Army had almost 8,000 men organized into area-oriented Special Forces. The Air Force had been authorized 184 aircraft and 2,167 personnel. In the Navy, fourteen Seabee Technical Assistance Teams had completed or were undergoing specialized training. In the Military Assistance Program for FY 1962, $45.3 million had been allocated to counterinsurgency training and materiel. The FY 1963 figure rose to $146.9 million; another $33.2 million was allocated for civic action programs in seventeen countries.\textsuperscript{30}

Should the services’ growing counterinsurgency assets be placed under centralized control? In August 1962, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric suggested that Strike Command (STRICOM) play a coordinating role in evaluating requirements, selecting and integrating forces, and developing joint tactics and doctrines. The JCS disagreed; each service should continue developing its own doctrine, tactics, procedures, and equipment. They argued, in justification, that unified commanders developed requirements and directed forces within their areas of responsibility; assigning overall cognizance to STRICOM would conflict with those responsibilities. Army Special Forces Groups, for example, were area-oriented, and STRICOM bore no area responsibilities. All they were willing to support was creating a STRICOM Joint Special Warfare Coordinating Group. That was done. Gilpatric asked the Group to assess the advisability of co-locating the Army and Air Force Special Warfare Centers. Early in 1963, STRICOM recommended against doing so and the JCS agreed. This time, however, General LeMay recommended that STRICOM be given operational control of all US-based Special Forces. Lemnitzer, Wheeler, and Anderson would go no further than having such forces “made available” to the maximum extent feasible. On 30 March 1963, the JCS advised Secretary McNamara that service, JCS, and unified commanders’ responsibilities were “properly defined.” Assets were being made available to STRICOM “as necessary” to conduct training and accomplish assigned tasks. As Special Forces expanded, the JCS
would review the desirability of giving STRICOM “operational control of a working force of Army and Air Force Special Warfare Units.” So ended the first round of a debate that would run for many years.

During 1961–62, South Vietnam became a veritable laboratory for applying counterinsurgency doctrines. In June 1962, the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Station Chief in Saigon submitted a report stating that regular military forces would play only a secondary role in subversive warfare. General Lemnitzer emphatically disagreed; he sent rebuttals to OSD and the White House rejecting it as “grossly erroneous.” In his judgment, CIA’s mismanagement of the failed Cuban invasion in 1961 was proof of its unfitness for a leading role.33 Historically, Lemnitzer argued, regular forces had played a “cardinal part” in defeating insurgency. They had done so in Greece and Malaya, and he saw “every reason” to suppose that they would do the same in South Vietnam. There, in setting up and safeguarding strategic hamlets, South Vietnamese regulars were playing the “decisive military role.” In sum, said Lemnitzer, regular and paramilitary forces were equally essential to successful counterinsurgency operations.34

In South Vietnam, however, nothing proceeded according to doctrine and guidelines. During the critical months of August–October 1963, integration and coordination of effort were conspicuously lacking. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and General Paul D. Harkins were at loggerheads about what course to pursue. Their differences were replicated in Washington, with General Taylor supporting Harkins. After President Ngo Dinh Diem was killed in a military coup, the Saigon government remained unstable and counterinsurgency efforts in the countryside faltered badly. In the spring of 1963, a battalion of the North Vietnamese army moved into the South. One year later, a second battalion and a division headquarters followed.35 By 1965, a faltering Army of the Republic of Vietnam faced Viet Cong guerrillas and organized units as well as North Vietnamese regulars. Simultaneously, therefore, the United States and its weak ally had to conduct counterinsurgency and conventional operations.

The SIOP: Striving for a Controlled Response

The advent of long-range ballistic missiles created major problems and possibilities in planning for strategic nuclear war. In 1959, under the leadership of Lieutenant General Thomas F. Hickey, USA, the NSC’s Net Evaluation Subcommittee examined how a nuclear war in 1963 might be waged. Its tasks were to determine (1) what targets must be destroyed or neutralized and (2) what retaliatory forces would be required. Air Force planners favored a “counterforce” strategy which, while targeting government, industrial, military, and communications control centers, awarded priority to strikes against Soviet nuclear delivery capabilities. Army planners, however, held that governmental, industrial, and communications centers
should be the primary targets, with any additional effort allocated against military targets. This was the “countercity” or “critical control targets” strategy. Naturally, counterforce required greater resources because every addition to Soviet capabilities had to be matched by a corresponding US increase. Countercity targets, by contrast, remained relatively constant. The Hickey Subcommittee compromised. Study No. 2009 recommended a mix of military and industrial targets and enough weapons carriers to achieve a 75 to 90 percent assurance of striking them. In February 1960, President Eisenhower approved this “optimum mix” along with a 75 percent assurance of delivering weapons.

In August 1960, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates ordered that a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and a Single Integrated Operational Plan be promulgated and maintained. General Thomas S. Power, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, became the Director of Strategic Target Planning. In that capacity, he organized and supervised a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) at Omaha, Nebraska. The Staff’s first plan, SIOP–62, was produced posthaste during the Eisenhower administration’s final months. The JCS announced that SIOP–62 would become effective on 2 April 1961. General Lemnitzer considered production of a SIOP to be among the most important achievements of this era. No military man, he believed, was truly unhappy with the Plan; its existence created a whole new aura of confidence.

Dr. George Kistiakowsky, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, faulted SIOP–62 for (among other things) redundancy in weapons deliveries and damage criteria that ignored the effects of heat and fallout. Secretary Gates, on his last day in office, asked the JCS to assess Kistiakowsky’s critique.

The McNamara team reacted to initial briefings by characterizing SIOP-62 as a “spasm” war plan, its greatest weakness being the lack of flexibility in its execution. Early in March 1961, Secretary McNamara asked the JCS to draft a doctrine that would permit controlled responses and negotiating pauses. Answering on 18 April, they advised him that these innovations were infeasible before the mid-1960s. Immediate implementation would be premature and “could gravely weaken the current deterrent posture.” Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union possessed the essential prerequisites: adequate missile warning and defense systems; protected command and control facilities; and a secure retaliatory force capable of conducting second strikes or controlled responses. But Lemnitzer believed, and Secretary McNamara readily agreed, that the problem was important enough to warrant further study.

On 5 May, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric circulated a BNSP draft that delineated a strategy for controlled, discriminating response. The JCS replied by setting out their reservations more fully. By its very nature, they said, planning for nuclear war militated against a plethora of options. Since a nuclear attack would cause massive disruption, there was an overwhelming need for simplicity of response. US forces labored under the liabilities of scarce intelligence and relegation to a
second-strike role. Effective retaliation depended upon the utmost exploitation of military initiative, adroit timing, and effective targeting. The more complicated a plan became, the longer would be the time required for its execution. Consequently, “until our forces are endowed with sufficient invulnerability to permit holding a portion in secure reserve, any limitations imposed upon striking all elements of the enemy’s war potential must be responsive to military necessity.” In the near term, a sparing of urban-industrial, population, and governmental control centers was impossible. Military targets intermingled with nonmilitary resources, and nuclear weapons lacked the necessary selectivity. In sum, political flexibility was tightly constricted by military technology.

Nonetheless, the JCS agreed that some improvements were feasible. Currently, strikes could be withheld by every element except the alert force—which, however, comprised about two-thirds of all retaliatory strength. In the future, the JCS would make certain (1) that all aspects of flexibility and selectivity became “more clearly and specifically identified” and (2) that detailed procedures for exercising more precise control were vigorously pursued. Also, they would try to see that a reserve force could be either retained or quickly reconstituted.39

The JCS, meantime, had started critiquing SIOP–62. Generals White and Power made no major criticisms. General Decker noted that target systems and priorities could not be altered to take account of whether conditions were retaliatory or pre-emptive. As target priorities stood, particularly for the Alert Force, they struck him as optimal for neither setting. General Shoup was disappointed that SIOP–62 supplied a single list of targets for the entire Sino-Soviet bloc. Admiral Burke observed that multiple deliveries of weapons upon Designated Ground Zeros would raise damage levels further. He suggested a sliding scale of damage criteria, based upon a targets’ relative worth. To him, the fact that a small 17-kiloton had devastated Hiroshima revealed “the extremes to which we have gone in the past 15 years.” He and General Decker recommended a refinement that would avoid so many multiple deliveries.40

On 7 April 1961, the JCS initiated the preparation of SIOP-63 and asked General Power to re-examine methodology, flexibility, damage and assurance criteria, and target valuation. He responded with three studies. The first proposed, and the JCS approved, a target weighting system that contained a few refinements but no significant changes. The second set out damage criteria that did not differ significantly from those in SIOP-62. The third, on the methodology of target selection, amounted to a refutation of Kistiakowsky’s criticisms. But Atlantic and Pacific Commands’ representatives on the JSTPS agreed with Kistiakowsky that requirements had been overstated. They held that it would be a “serious mistake” to continue using a plan “which in all ways inflates and exaggerates the size of the target system which needs to be attacked . . . , which unduly stresses destruction of targets instead of neutralization . . . , and which also maximizes estimates of enemy
capabilities at the same time that it assumes minimum probabilities of success of our own delivery forces.”

These dissensions reappeared in the views about SIOP–63 guidance that the JCS sent to Secretary McNamara on 18 August. A sharp division developed over damage and expectancy criteria. Admiral Anderson and Generals Decker, Lemnitzer, and Shoup supported the counter-city strategy. General LeMay, on the other hand, supported the counterforce approach and argued for stringent standards: “Inadequate guidance can mean more than just an inadequate plan; it could mean the difference between a credibly deterrent strategic posture, or should deterrence fail, the difference between the destruction of the US and its survival as a viable entity.” Two months later, Secretary McNamara and the JCS finalized SIOP–63 guidance, which then was disseminated to appropriate commanders.

The NSC’s Net Evaluation Subcommittee assessed long-range weapons requirements. Lieutenant General Hickey, who was still its director, reported in December 1961 that a controlled response could not be implemented until the late 1960s and incompletely even then. For it to be feasible, capabilities not yet available would have to exist. These included: first, highly survivable, reliable, flexible, and accurate weapon systems; second, a national command and control system that would continue to function during nuclear war; third, effective intelligence before and during a nuclear exchange; fourth, rapid and accurate damage assessment; and fifth, active and passive defense sufficient to assure the nation’s survival. In 1962, the Subcommittee calculated, a retaliatory strike launched under conditions of no warning would be handicapped by a sizable deficiency in weapons carriers—the equivalent of 156 B–52s. This deficit would become twice as large in 1963 because the weight of Soviet attack would grow heavier and 68 more missile sites would have to be attacked. By 1964, however, enough weapons carriers would be available to satisfy all targeting requirements and to assemble a substantial reserve.

After a review, the JCS advised the Secretary that “the force available in the early years lacks sufficient flexibility to provide for controlled response.” They urged “intensive research and development” of advanced systems that would speed the coming of controlled response. Their specific recommendations included:

- Deploying a mix of delivery systems as insurance against the appearance of unforeseen Soviet capabilities.
- Accelerating research and development of advanced strategic systems. Fielding an Advanced ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] would accelerate the coming of controlled response.
- Improving the availability of warning time by investigating alternative conditions, determining effects, and instituting corrective procedures.
- Integrating the actual or potential contributions of aircraft carriers, theater air forces, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles, and allied forces.
- Neutralizing rather than destroying enemy capabilities “may be an alternative to the programming of an inordinately large number of weapons to
achieve a high theoretical probability of destruction.”

Establishing a survivable command and control system, with rapid reconnaissance capability, appeared to be the “absolute pre-requisite” for controlled response and selective, discriminating attacks.44

Assistant Secretary Hitch and his analysts reviewed the Subcommittee’s report but reached very different conclusions. In their judgment, it underestimated the feasibility of a controlled response and exaggerated its requirements. In fact, they judged that controlled response could be attainable as early as mid-1963. By reanalyzing and recomputing requirements for 1963, they created a surplus instead of a deficit in weapons carriers with only 10 to 15 percent less damage inflicted upon urban-industrial areas. They reached this outcome by assigning many urban-industrial targets to protected missiles rather than to the more vulnerable bombers, as the Subcommittee had done.45 The Subcommittee had assigned missiles to military targets because it considered enemy military capabilities to have the highest priority, thus requiring the weapons that reach them most rapidly.

By June 1962, the JSTPS had finished drafting SIOP–63. On 18–19 June, the JCS flew to Omaha and heard a briefing by General Power. They promptly approved SIOP–63, fixing 1 August as its effective date. SIOP–63 was built around three tasks, with options for executing combinations of those tasks. General Lemnitzer congratulated General Power upon “outstanding work,” which permitted “a much higher degree of flexibility and responsiveness than was possible in previous plans.”46 As of June 1962, only liquid-fuel Atlas and Titan ICBMs were operational, and they had to be programmed for fast reaction against nuclear-related targets. By September 1963, solid fuel Minuteman ICBMs in hardened underground silos as well as Polaris SLBMs—could qualify for a protected reserve.

In November 1962, the JCS issued guidance for preparing SIOP–64 that restated the basic philosophy expressed in SIOP–63. The three tasks were unchanged but the options underwent some changes. When SIOP–64 took effect on 1 January 1964 its damage expectancies were lower, largely because testing and experience had resulted in reduced reliability factors for missiles.47

Of course, if controlled response was to become viable, both sides would have to adopt it. On 16 June 1962, speaking at Ann Arbor to the University of Michigan’s graduating class, Secretary McNamara appealed for Soviet reciprocity. The United States, he said, had concluded that strategy for general war “should be approached in much the same way that more conventional operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives…should be the destruction of the enemy’s military forces, not of his civilian population.” It had become possible to retain a reserve sufficient “to destroy an enemy society if driven to it. In other words, we are giving a possible opponent the strongest imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our own cities.”48 But that was not the view from Moscow. At a Presidium meeting on 1 July, Nikita Khrushchev dismissed Secretary McNamara’s argument: “Not targeting cities—how aggressive!
What is their aim? To get the population used to the idea that nuclear war will take place." McNamara, the Soviet leader suspected, was trying to lay the groundwork for a rapid increase in the US arsenal: "How many bombs do they need?" In fact, during the Cuban missile crisis, the United States perhaps unavoidably departed from a "spare the cities" strategy by dispersing some bombers to civilian airfields that lay quite close to major American urban centers.

The year 1963 marked a milestone in the evolution of US strategic thinking. On 31 August, through a draft presidential memorandum, Secretary McNamara articulated the concept of deterrence through "assured destruction." He defined "assured destruction" as the ability to absorb a well planned and executed Soviet attack and still be able to inflict unacceptable losses on the attacker. The alternative, a "damage-limiting" force large enough to destroy some Soviet delivery vehicles and disrupt coordination of the rest, would require twice as many Minuteman ICBMs but save relatively few American lives. Consequently, McNamara decided to use "assured destruction" as his yardstick for sizing strategic retaliatory forces.

General LeMay, alone among JCS members, voiced "serious reservations" about what he called this "apparent shift in basic US military strategy." Assured destruction impressed him as "only half a strategy" because it failed to stress the fundamental necessity of limiting damage to the United States. LeMay still favored counterforce targeting, basing force requirements upon the more stringent criteria for damage limitation.

Interestingly, when Secretary McNamara presented his program to Congress in January 1964, he testified that "a 'damage-limiting' strategy appears to be the most practical and effective course for us to follow... [Such a force] should be large enough to ensure the destruction... of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the Communist satellites... and, in addition, to destroy their warmaking capability so as to limit, to the extent practicable, damage to this country and to our allies." Perhaps the Secretary spoke about damage limitation rather than assured destruction in order to make his program more palatable politically. In any case, his testimony triggered—or perhaps provided the pretext for—another JCS debate over counterforce versus countercity targeting. Early in 1964, during the drafting of JSCP-65, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps planners argued that inflicting urban/industrial damage should be the priority objective. General LeMay insisted, instead, that damage limitation should be the major mission. Strategic retaliatory forces could not carry out both tasks, and he saw no reason why "the basic military principle of priority application of force against enemy force should be reversed." Both he and the service planners maintained that Secretary McNamara's statements supported their opposing positions. General Taylor offered a compromise which, after some amendment, won JCS acceptance. JSCP–65, approved on 24 February and applicable between 1 July 1964 and 30 June 1965, stated that US forces:

1. Will defend the United States and assist its allies against enemy attack.
2. While providing the ability to accomplish (3) below, will, when directed,
destroy or neutralize, on a selective basis if required, the military capabilities of the enemy, as necessary to limit damage to the United States and its allies to the maximum extent practicable.

3. Will maintain an assured capability, under all conditions, \ldots [to] destroy on a selective basis, the war supporting and urban/industrial resources of the enemy. When directed, this undertaking may be carried out concurrently, or separately with (2), above.53

**Summation**

The redirection of strategic thinking and priorities created rifts between the JCS and the civilian leadership. General Lemnitzer, and General Decker even more, thought that President Kennedy was overdoing counterinsurgency. General LeMay strongly opposed replacing a capability for damage limitation with assured destruction. An undercurrent of unease, which all the Chiefs shared to some degree, was best expressed by the JSSC in 1961: New approaches tended to “over-emphasize control of military forces, avoidance of casualties, defense, survival, without comparable concern for combat effectiveness, the offensive, or the will to succeed.”
Strategic Nuclear Forces: “Superiority” versus “Assured Destruction”

The “Missile Gap” Is Reversed

The Kennedy administration took office on the cusp of a major change in how the strategic nuclear balance was perceived. In August 1957, the Soviet Union successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile. Two months later, the Soviets’ orbiting of the first man-made satellite—Sputnik—astonished the world. Those achievements, as yet unmatched by the United States, seemed to demonstrate a commanding Soviet lead in missilery. In 1958, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) described mid-1961 as a time of maximum danger. Talk of a “missile gap” dominated public discourse. By 1960, however, American progress and evidence of Soviet difficulties had greatly eased the worries of knowledgeable officials. Nikita Khrushchev boasted of missiles being turned out “like sausages,” but their few ICBMs on launch pads were really laboratory models. The first generation of US ICBMs, Atlas and Titan, were liquid-fuelled, took hours to prepare for launching, and were not very reliable. Late in 1960, however, two fleet ballistic missile submarines each carrying sixteen Polaris missiles joined the fleet. The Soviets had nothing comparable. President Eisenhower, in his last budget message, stated that “the ‘bomber gap’ of several years ago was always a fiction, and the ‘missile gap’ shows every sign of being the same.” On 1 February 1961, a Minuteman ICBM
underwent a fully successful flight test. This was crucial because Minuteman was solid-fuelled and therefore much easier to maintain in alert status, to disperse, and to place in hardened underground silos. Minuteman ICBMs could, in fact, be turned out almost “like sausages.”

During the 1960 presidential race, the missile gap was a staple of Democratic campaign oratory. Late in January 1961, just after President Kennedy took office, General Lemnitzer laid widely-spread estimates of Soviet missile strength before the House Appropriations Committee: 50 to 200 in mid-1961, 125 to 450 in mid-1962, and 200 to 700 in mid-1963. Lemnitzer said that he was inclined to accept the mean figures, showing that the missile gap actually could favor the United States. Under Eisenhower’s program, which Kennedy was about to expand and accelerate, there would be 132 in mid-1961, 310 by mid-1962, and 579 by mid-1963. The Committee chairman, Representative George Mahon (D., Texas), was outraged. After the hearing ended, Lemnitzer learned, Mahon telephoned Secretary McNamara to say that the Chairman of the JCS had made President Kennedy and the Democratic Party look like liars!3

McNamara, however, sided with Lemnitzer. On 5–6 February, the Secretary visited Strategic Air Command headquarters at Omaha. On the evening of 6 February, he gave reporters an off-the-record briefing in which he stated several times that there was “no destruction gap” and “no deterrent gap.” Furthermore, he saw no signs of a Soviet “crash program” to produce ICBMs. Around mid-year, the missile gap was officially interred when a National Intelligence Estimate indicated that the United States could look forward to growing superiority during the early 1960s. As the JCS advised Secretary McNamara, “Our strengths are adequate to deter enemy deliberate and rational resort to general war and, if general war eventuates, to permit the United States to survive as a nation despite serious losses, and ultimately to prevail and resume progress toward its national objectives.”4

Force Planning in 1961

McNamara promptly charged a task force led by Assistant Secretary (Controller) Charles Hitch with reviewing strategic retaliatory and continental defense programs.5 Hitch’s work with the RAND Corporation had made him familiar with these problems, and the task force drew upon a report recently completed by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG). A draft completed in mid-February 1961 recommended accelerating both solid-fuel Minuteman and Polaris programs. Solid-fuel missiles were much easier to maintain in alert status, to disperse, and to place in hardened silos. Polaris, while more costly and less accurate than Minuteman, seemed virtually invulnerable and could form a post-attack reserve, for long periods if necessary, threatening strikes against surviving urban centers. Minuteman’s lower cost made it the weapon of choice for rapid deployment during the
early years of the missile race. On 16–17 February, the JCS discussed the report with McNamara and apparently found no disagreements.

The findings of a Research and Development (R&D) task force, chaired by OSD’s Director of Defense Research and Engineering, did lay groundwork for some controversy. It recommended restoring the funds that had been cut from Skybolt, a bomber-launched missile; but it also concluded that a B–70 bomber, being developed as the B–52’s successor and designed to fly 2,000 miles per hour at 70,000 feet, failed the test of cost-effectiveness when measured against the Minuteman. Therefore, B–70 appropriations should be reduced by one-third, tooling to meet a firm date discontinued, development of subsystems slowed, and aircraft purchases cut from twelve to six.

Secretary McNamara approved virtually all these recommendations and forwarded them to the President, who did the same. Through a special message to Congress on 28 March, President Kennedy requested an additional $1.945 billion in new obligational authority for FY 1962. He would increase the Polaris force from 19 to 29 submarines but cut B–70 funding by $138 million. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 4 April, McNamara explained his objections to the B–70. Considering how surface-to-air missiles had improved, its speed and altitude no longer offered an important advantage. The B–70 could not carry Skybolt missiles and would have to deliver low-level attacks at subsonic speeds. The bomber also would be more vulnerable when grounded than hardened ICBMs and did not lend itself to airborne alert measures.

General White, testifying several days later, explained why Air Force felt so strongly about the B–70: “To abolish the use of the manned bomber, you have to abolish aircraft.” The B–70 could be recalled or retargeted; it could detect and destroy mobile or imprecisely located objectives; and it could perform pre- and post-strike reconnaissance. White found much support among members of Congress, who would not allow the manned bomber to die. In fact, for the planning of strategic retaliatory forces, this was the most contentious issue of the early 1960s.

Thus far, the administration had been making quick fixes. When the planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) began functioning, the JCS tried to produce a single view—and failed. In fact, the memorandum that they sent Secretary McNamara on 3 August contained splits over every strategic retaliatory program. A major difference, which would persist over years, was whether the deterrent should be primarily land-based or sea-based. At the Secretary’s urging, they reconsidered—and, on 15 August, advised that each JCS member had reaffirmed his position. Here, it seems clear, they lost an important opportunity to impress OSD by showing that they could rise above service parochialism.

Secretary McNamara relied upon his own programmers and systems analysts, who prepared a paper on “Recommended Long-Range Delivery Forces, 1963–1967.” After reviewing it, the J–5 could not find common ground between the Secretary, the Chairman, and the Service Chiefs on any major program element. But J–5 also noted
that JCS-OSD differences dealt mainly with force levels in later years. Most of OSD’s proposals for FY 1963 would reduce lead time if production was authorized later. In fact, only the proposals for Titan ICBMs and B–52s would “foreclose the question of final levels by denying further procurement.” So, Titan excepted, the J–5 recommended concurring with all OSD’s procurement proposals for FY 1963.10

The JCS did not accept J–5’s advice. This time, apparently by agreeing that the Air Force and the Navy each should have the force levels they wanted, the JCS were able to form a common front. On 11 September, they sent Secretary McNamara a recommendation about FY 1963 procurement that called for more submarines, bombers, and missiles than OSD was proposing.11 Ten days later, they explained why. Broadly, the JCS invoked “the deepening world crisis and increasing evidence of overt Soviet military preparations.” The Chiefs pointed to “the degree of confidence in their relative military position which the Soviets have demonstrated in their deliberate provocation of the current Berlin crisis.” Consequently, the funds allotted to strategic nuclear delivery forces had to be higher than in previous years. Specifically, producing more bombers would be the quickest way to improve the retaliatory force. Replacing B–52Bs with B–52Hs, which had a much greater attack radius and penetrative ability, would “materially” increase flexibility and credibility, “particularly in the critical period until missiles have proven their reliability.” Titan ICBMs with large warheads could reach and destroy deep, hardened targets that soon might be shielded by ballistic missile defenses. Since the Soviet missile force appeared to be superior in total warhead yield, the programmed number of Minuteman ICBMs in hardened and dispersed silos should increase. Funding another eight Polaris boats in FY 1963, raising the total to 37, would contribute to “the best mix of missiles” and make possible “a continued orderly production program.”12

The JCS justifications probably came too late, because only forty-eight hours later, on 23 September, Secretary McNamara circulated his proposed five-year program. The bomber force, by 30 June 1967, would consist of 630 B–52s with 1,150 Skybolts; B-47s would be phased out by mid-1965, B–58s by mid-1966. (The B–70 did not appear because, even if the Air Force got full funding, the first two squadrons would not become operational until FY 1968.) The ICBM arsenal, on 30 June 1967, would comprise 117 Atlas, 114 Titan, 900 Minuteman (Hardened and Dispersed (H&D)) and 100 Mobile Minuteman launchers. There would be 41 Polaris submarines carrying 656 missiles. Procurement for FY 1963 would include 92 Skybolts, 100 H&D and 50 Mobile Minuteman ICBMs, and six fleet ballistic missile submarines.

In justification, Secretary McNamara said that he was steering between the extremes of “minimum deterrence,” meaning the ability to destroy most Soviet cities, and “full first strike capability,” which he defined as the power to reduce Soviet retaliatory forces so greatly that US population and industry would not suffer severe damage. He had chosen force levels sufficient to (1) retaliate against and reduce Soviet follow-on forces and (2) provide a protected reserve
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capable of destroying urban centers in a controlled and deliberate manner. Estimates of Soviet missile strength in mid-1964 ranged from 200–400 (CIA) to 850 (Air Force). Even at the highest level, US missile strength would equal that of the Soviets, with a “substantial superiority” in other types of delivery systems. If the “most likely” estimate proved correct, US forces should possess “a substantial military superiority over the Soviets even after they have attacked us.”

Secretary McNamara opposed procuring any more B–52s because the alert force already could carry 1,500 bombs and 1,000 air-launched missiles, and because most targets (and all those with highest priority) were best attacked by ICBMs, and because bombers were vulnerable and expensive. He accepted Skybolt on grounds that it would enable bombers to overcome “almost any” defense, but he wanted no more Titans, because that missile was four times more expensive than Minuteman. As for Minuteman, McNamara agreed that a Hardened and Dispersed mode was “clearly the preferred way to buy more ICBMs.” He saw no justification, however, for spending $2.75 billion to buy 600 missiles in FY 1963 as the Air Force wished; 100 in the H&D mode were quite enough. He was willing to hold Mobile Minuteman as a hedge against Soviet advances; it might later be cancelled. (Several months afterward, the Air Force did decide to drop Mobile Minuteman on grounds that costs were high, logistical problems numerous, and attractive alternatives available.) McNamara recognized that Polaris possessed the highest potential for survival of any delivery system. Yet, since the force already programmed appeared adequate, he would start six hulls rather than eight.

Secretary McNamara’s analysts had computed the degrees of destruction that US forces could inflict when retaliating under optimistic, median, and pessimistic circumstances. The “great weight of likelihood,” they believed, fell between the optimistic and median cases. Their findings led McNamara to conclude that “the extra capability provided by the individual Service proposals runs up against strongly diminishing returns and yields very little by way of extra target destruction.” Under the median case in FY 1965, for example, the percentage of “expected kill” against urban-industrial floor space was 80 percent for both OSD and Service programs. Against hardened ICBM sites, the percentages were 16 for OSD and 19 for Service programs.

The B–70 was a special case. For FY 1962, the administration had asked for $220 million and Congress appropriated $400 million. The White House asked for service appraisals of the airplane; these were provided on 12 September. General Decker believed that scarce funds might better be spent elsewhere, with B–70 development limited to demonstrating feasibility of the aircraft and of its bombing and navigation subsystems. Admiral Anderson judged the B–70’s efficiency uncertain but believed that technological benefits might prove useful to other programs. He wanted a weapons mix maintained “until the efficacy of the missile is an accomplished fact.” General Shoup bluntly characterized the B–70 as giving “every indication of being an obsolete weapon by the time it can
be expected to be in the operational arsenal.” He favored continuing development for the benefits that might flow to commercial aviation. Thus, General LeMay stood alone in arguing that the B–70 provided unique capabilities and, during the late 1960s, “may represent our most effective means of demonstrating our national strength and determination to our allies as well as to our enemies.” Deploying even one B–70 wing, he claimed, would compel the Soviets to spend $20–40 billion on air defense. Full development, LeMay argued, would be quicker, smoother, and ultimately cheaper than continuing a partial prototype program. In his opinion, “failure to follow through means that we will forfeit our lead in aeronautics—and possibly in air power itself—to some other power, probably the Soviet Union.”

On 5 October, shortly after President Kennedy was briefed on the SIOP, the JCS provided him with a comparison of US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces. In ICBMs, the American lead as of 1 October was thought to be 42 versus 10 to 25; two years hence, it would be 382 versus 75 to 125. General LeMay recorded some reservations, putting the Soviet figures at 65 in October 1961 and 250 by October 1963. Despite General LeMay’s reservations, nonetheless, the JCS advised the President that “the US enjoys a military superiority over the USSR in both 1961 and 1963.” Thanks to the accelerated construction of hardened missile sites slated to start late in 1961, that margin would be relatively greater in 1963 than in 1961. During “the critical period of decision between [now] and mid-1962, the decisive superiority of US nuclear delivery capability [should] strongly influence the Soviet Union not to deliberately initiate general war.” Khrushchev, in fact, gradually eased away from a confrontation over West Berlin.

On 9 October, Secretary McNamara circulated tentative recommendations that repeated his earlier proposals and asked the JCS to advise him of any changes that they considered “absolutely essential.” Not long afterward, he announced that the administration would not spend additional funds voted by Congress to continue B–52 production and expand the B–70 program.

On 30 October, the JCS tried to decide what changes were “absolutely essential.” Before Secretary McNamara entered the JCS “tank,” they debated at length without agreeing. When McNamara arrived, General Lemnitzer told him that JCS comments would be “pretty close” to the positions stated on 11 and 21 September, but he added that the impoundment of B–52 appropriations had complicated matters. McNamara asked whether the Chiefs had assessed his memo on “Long Range Nuclear Delivery Forces,” and especially the assumptions upon which optimistic, median, and pessimistic cases had been framed. There followed “a great difference of opinion” between McNamara and LeMay over whether the Secretary’s recommendations would raise or lower strategic capability over the long term. Lemnitzer promised that the Chiefs would reexamine the question posed by McNamara and provide comments.

On 17 November, the JCS advised the Secretary that they found generally valid the target system and the survivability, reliability, and penetration factors from
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which his force-level recommendations flowed. There was, however, “one essential point of difference”: “While your analysis estimates that the situation at the outset of war would [fall] . . . between the optimistic and median cases, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the median case more likely.” Applying the median factor to 1965 force levels, for example, would produce a requirement for another 125 weapons. The question, then, was whether increased costs mattered more than reduced risks. Subsequently, Secretary McNamara raised his Minuteman goal from 750 to 800 for FY 1965 and from 1,000 to 1,100 for FY 1967.

On 3 January 1962, President Kennedy presided over a final budget review. General Frederick H. Smith, representing LeMay, argued that McNamara’s program would dangerously reduce US superiority after 1965. He wanted, in FY 1963, another 100 Minuteman ICBMs and full-scale development of the B–70. President Kennedy replied that he would be happy to hear an Air Force presentation but warned that it would have to show exactly how more forces would improve the overall US military posture vis-à-vis the USSR. He and Secretary McNamara stressed that their decisions were not being dictated by fiscal constraints.

Force Planning in 1962

Early in 1962, Secretary McNamara asked General Lemnitzer to outline the factors that contributed to nuclear superiority. In reply, Lemnitzer characterized nuclear superiority as the ability, regardless of an adversary’s actions, to disarm enemy nuclear forces, conclude the conflict on favorable terms, and prevail as a viable nation. So far, he said, the USSR had shrunk from initiating general war primarily because the United States possessed a “clear capability” to accomplish those things. Thus the United States currently enjoyed a strategic advantage and would, by 1963, be assured of a “decisive retaliatory capability.” Yet, in their recent atmospheric tests, the Soviets had registered advances in nuclear technology “well beyond that commonly anticipated.” They would exploit this progress “to the fullest extent.” Therefore, any relaxation of US efforts to maintain its superiority eventually would culminate in “irreparable damage.”

In 1962, the Joint Chiefs’ first effort at formulating force-level recommendations was through JSOP–67, which proved a very difficult beginning. In February, the J–5 submitted Service splits for resolution by the JCS. Unable to resolve those splits, they extended the tabulations through FY 1967 and asked the Services to try again for an accommodation. In June, with differences still unresolved, General Lemnitzer proposed his own solution. General LeMay argued that Lemnitzer had cut the Air Force’s Minuteman program much more drastically than some equally controversial Army and Navy programs. Minuteman, he insisted, “provides more surviving missiles (and greater targeting effectiveness) per dollar invested than does Polaris.” On 2 August, Lemnitzer offered a new compromise.
First, add an FY 1966 acceleration package for Minuteman and delay a decision about FY 1967 until the FY 1965 budget took final shape. Second, procure enough long lead-time items so that the hulls of Polaris submarines 42 through 44 could be completed during FY 1967, rendering a final decision during the FY 1964 budget cycle.21

On 27 August, the Joint Chiefs finally submitted an agreed JSOP–67. Twelve days earlier, Secretary McNamara had circulated his own proposals for a five-year program covering FYs 1964–68. General LeMay apparently anticipated that JSOP–67 would reach the Secretary's desk too late. Accordingly on 27 July the Air Force submitted a Program Change Proposal raising the levels programmed for Minuteman, its justification being that extensive counterforce targeting would limit damage to the United States. If LeMay was attempting an end run, he failed. On 18 August the JCS advised McNamara that, while there was an “identifiable military requirement” for more missiles, they had not yet analyzed additional needs. McNamara ruled against additional Minuteman procurement “at this time” but promised a review prior to completing the FY 1964 budget.22

Meanwhile, Secretary McNamara requested a study of the requirements for strategic nuclear weapons. This task fell to the Chairman's Special Studies Group. It set about assessing OSD and Service proposals for 1968, matching them against “high” and “median” Soviet postures. In the median case, with tactical warning, the Group concluded that OSD forces would furnish good coverage for everything except hardened targets. The United States would emerge with a four-to-one advantage in delivery vehicles and 40 percent more deliverable yields. Without adequate warning, however, coverage would be inadequate. Against the high case, moreover, OSD forces would be inadequate with or without timely warning. The United States would gain no clear strategic advantage, possess no adequate reserve, and sustain greater losses than the Soviets. Service forces, in the Group's judgment, would offer “major improvement.” Retaliating with warning against median or high Soviet forces, the United States would emerge with “a sustainable... advantage” in nuclear strength and national viability. Even without tactical warning, there would be enough residual strength to deter attacks against urban-industrial targets. And Service forces, unlike OSD forces, allowed a comfortable margin for error if important assumptions (e.g., missile defenses, missile accuracy, target intelligence) proved wrong.23

The Service Chiefs advised Secretary McNamara that these findings reinforced their JSOP-67 recommendations, which aimed at maintaining “a clear margin of superiority over potential adversaries.” General Taylor, who was now Chairman, voiced “general agreement” but criticized the Special Studies Group for underestimating US capabilities (by excluding theater nuclear forces) and overrating those of the Soviets (by using high estimates, notably in the area of available megatonnage). He also criticized as “artificial” the Group’s decision to calculate adequacy by a combination of post-attack megatonnage, population
loss, and industrial damage. “Like any living organism,” he argued, “a human society will die if too many of its members are destroyed—but the necessary level of destruction to assure death is beyond proof.” He believed that “a population loss of much over 10 percent” would destroy a nation’s will to resist; more destruction would be “meaningless.” (His choice is interesting, since about 10 percent of the Soviet population was killed or wounded in World War II.) Taylor concluded that in a retaliatory situation, there would be “great risk” in attacking only military targets. Counterforce targeting struck him as feasible only in a preemptive strike.24

The manned bomber remained highly controversial. Early in 1962 Representative Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, pushed for legislation “directing” the administration to spend more money on the B–70. Vinson and President Kennedy compromised, dropping mandatory language in return for a pledge to study the problem again.25 In early September, the Air Force submitted a Program Change Proposal (PCP) about the B-70, now changed to the RS–70 reconnaissance/strike aircraft. According to the PCP, an RS-70 force was “vitaly needed” to fill voids in “reconnaissance, reconnaissance/strike, damage assessment, and combat reporting capabilities during the trans-attack phase of conflict.” The Air Force wanted $591.4 million in FY 1964 to build eight experimental RS–70s, operationally configured so that they could enter the inventory after full production was authorized. (McNamara had limited the B–70 to three prototypes.) On 29 September, the JCS gave the Secretary their advice that “there is a military requirement for an armed reconnaissance capability.” They recommended (1) reorienting the B–70 to the RS–70 concept and (2) approving those portions of the PCP needed to demonstrate feasibility of the RS–70 and its associated subsystems.26

However, Secretary McNamara reached a different conclusion. In a 28 September memorandum, he stated that approving the RS–70 would “waste . . . many billions of dollars that are urgently required elsewhere.” The Air Force estimated that 35 RS–70s would cost $8.2 billion. Recalling the long history of overruns, McNamara put the figure $3 billion higher. He was skeptical of claims that the fleet could stay on 75 percent alert when widely dispersed. The Air Force assumed that system reliability would remain high, that complex route planning and in-flight reprogramming could be accomplished, that reliability specifications for air-launched missiles could be met, that bombing accuracy within 600 feet would be realized, and that RS–70 radar could assess the outcomes of air-launched missile strikes. If even one of these factors was degraded, McNamara believed, the RS–70’s effectiveness would be greatly reduced.

The Secretary believed that less expensive systems than the RS–70 were equally effective in deterring or waging a thermonuclear war. He anticipated that by the early 1970s, satellites would pinpoint nearly all potential targets. The RBX aircraft, an OSD favored project, plus indirect mechanisms (e.g.,
atomic strike recordings of the electromagnetic signals from nuclear detonations) would provide damage assessment. Destroying residual systems, a favorite Air Force justification, struck him as pointless. If the Soviets expanded their fleet of missile submarines, the RS–70 would add little to our counterforce capabilities. If their force consisted largely of bombers and unprotected missiles, the RS–70 would “increase only insignificantly” the effectiveness of a US missile strike. Extremely hard targets, such as nuclear storage sites, could be made unusable simply by radioactivity. Discriminating attacks designed to minimize civilian casualties could be carried out by a special mix of Minuteman warheads almost as well as with RS–70s. Accordingly, McNamara proposed spending not more than $1.3 billion to complete three B–70s, continuing work on some components, looking at alternative applications of manned aircraft (e.g., serving as either a command post or a stand-off missile launcher), and starting development of a much cheaper RBX.27

On 6 November, after lengthy exchanges among themselves, the Service Chiefs gave the Secretary their view that future capabilities should not be “frozen” by current projections; alliances and even enemies might change. The only certainty, they claimed, was that “there is a continuing requirement for flexible and responsive strategic forces, superior to those of the enemy and clearly capable of inflicting unacceptable damage to the enemy, as an essential element of deterrence for the foreseeable future.” McNamara’s position would preclude investigation of the RS–70 concept and terminate the program; the Air Force’s PCP would amount to approval of an operational force before feasibility was proven. So the Service Chiefs settled upon a compromise: Fabricate and test five aircraft to test the RS–70’s effectiveness, leaving the production of additional aircraft for a future decision.28 It is noteworthy that they did not try to rebut, point by point, McNamara’s lengthy list of the RS–70’s supposed shortcomings.

General Taylor agreed with Secretary McNamara rather than the Service Chiefs. He saw a requirement for reconnaissance alone. In his judgment, the ability to send a few score bombers in search of residual targets was simply not worth several billion dollars. Even if the RS–70 did achieve a total technical triumph, the existence of mobile Soviet missiles would stymie the complete success of a “mop-up” mission. Further, Taylor observed that the RS–70 was not a deterrent but rather “a hedge against the failure of deterrence.” For that reason, it lacked the “broad applicability” which alone would justify such an allocation of resources.29

On 5 November, the Secretary circulated his recommendations for FYs 1964–68. The bomber force would stay at 80 B–58s and 630 B–52s, with the last B–52Hs coming off the production line in November. He planned the missile force as follows:
Air Force proposals, argued Secretary McNamara, aimed at achieving a full first-strike capability which he considered extremely costly and “almost certainly infeasible.” In 1968, under very favorable circumstances, a US attack could reduce Soviet forces to 100 ICBMs and 100 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)—yet even these few survivors could inflict 150 million casualties. Also, a full first-strike capability would not deter non-nuclear aggression. So he remained satisfied with a second strike capability, which he defined as a secure, protected retaliatory force able (1) to survive any conceivable attack and then destroy Soviet urban society and (2) deny an enemy the prospect of achieving military victory by attacking US forces. As before, his calculations showed only small differences between the destructive power of OSD and Service forces. For hardened strategic nuclear targets of high urgency, OSD forces would destroy 262 compared to 313 for Service forces. The percentage of industry destroyed would be 55 by OSD and 60 by Service forces. McNamara also looked to cancel the Skybolt which, he said, “combines the disadvantages of the missile with those of the bomber.” Like a bomber, it was vulnerable on the ground and slow to reach its target. Like a missile, it was relatively inaccurate and contained a low payload. Even for suppressing air defenses and opening paths for bombers, Skybolt failed the test of cost-effectiveness. The objective, after all, was to destroy a necessary number of targets at minimum cost and not simply to prolong the lives of bombers.30

In their critique, the JCS denied favoring a first-strike capability “in the sense of indemnifying the United States completely from serious consequences.” But they did favor a first-strike so powerful that the United States and its allies “would emerge with a relative power advantage over the Sino-Soviet Bloc.” Having a pre-emptive option would provide “increased latitude within the total spectrum of military possibilities.” Equally, it could confine and prevent the escalation of lower-level conflicts. Such a capability was “essential,” they argued, if NATO allies were to be convinced that the United States would employ its strategic nuclear forces to prevent the Warsaw Pact from overrunning Western Europe. The JCS challenged Secretary McNamara’s argument that a first-strike capability would not deter limited aggression. Thus far, they argued, the Soviets had shown restraint in their actions and carefully avoided direct involvement in limited aggression. Who could say what they might have done, had not the United States possessed such a powerful arsenal? The Joint Chiefs reasoned that, if a first strike capability was absolutely impermissible, “then we . . . must face fully the costs of other alternatives,” such as matching the Soviets in non-nuclear fields.
where they now possessed a clear superiority. They were attracted by the alternative of a coercive strategy, meaning the ability to threaten such a great destruction of population (after most of the Soviets’ nuclear arsenal had been expended) that the Soviets would be willing to end hostilities on US terms. They wanted that “to be recognized as an available option under pre-emptive circumstances.”

Specifically, the Joint Chiefs repeated their JSOP–67 recommendation for 900 Minuteman ICBMs in FY 1965, 100 more than Secretary McNamara was proposing. The Service Chiefs opposed cancelling Skybolt, denying that 400 Hound Dog air-to-ground missiles and 100 Minuteman ICBMs were equivalent to 1,012 Skybolts. General Taylor, however, agreed with the Secretary. Basically, he doubted whether bombers could play an effective part in the missile age. In responding to a surprise Soviet attack, they probably would contribute little. In a pre-emptive US attack, they would be unnecessary. Bombers might strengthen a retaliatory strike launched with tactical warning, Taylor conceded, but in that case Minuteman would be just as effective as Skybolt. While it is worth noting that Taylor sided fairly often with the Secretary, it is doubtful whether a solid JCS front would have led McNamara to reverse his positions.

McNamara made no changes and, on 23 November, President Kennedy approved his recommendations to deploy 950 Minuteman ICBM in FY 1966, cancelling Skybolt, and starting six Polaris boats, completing the planned total of forty-one. General LeMay made a final, futile protest at the budget wrap-up session on 27 December, but the President sided with the Secretary, so the five-year program came out exactly as McNamara had proposed.

**Force Planning in 1963**

Whatever hopes the Joint Chiefs may have had about influencing McNamara through their next JSOP came to naught. Completed in April 1963, JSOP–68 was weakened by a Navy dissent over Atlas and Titan levels and by a four-way split over Minuteman totals. General Taylor, who stood at the low end of the Minuteman split, justified his position by arguing that the growing Soviet arsenal of SLBMs and hardened ICBMs was fatally weakening the Air Force’s case for counterforce targeting and the ever-higher force levels that it required. Even in a pre-emptive attack, the price of destroying one Soviet ICBM in a hardened underground silo would be four to eight US missiles. In retaliation, US forces could hit only aborts, reserves, and refires. Therefore, “Since we will not know where these residual missiles are found, we will have to attack many empty sites and expend scores of missiles in the hope of killing one residual missile. Clearly, at some point it will become futile to destroy the Soviet missile system either in pre-emption or retaliation.” The Joint Staff, likewise, estimated that larger forces would achieve little in terms of damage limitation. General LeMay, alone once again, assailed the idea that
“no improvement is better than significant improvement, if the latter is not total in effect.” This time, LeMay did try to fortify his argument with a substantial methodological critique.33

In September McNamara circulated a DPM that proposed, by mid-1969, reducing Atlas ICBMs to 72 and retiring half the Titans, keeping 54 Titan IIs with their multi-megaton warheads. Since there were “signs of delay” in developing Minuteman II, which would have greater accuracy and retargeting capability, Secretary McNamara decided to slow the rate of silo-building in FY 1967:

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According to intelligence estimates, Soviet ICBMs in mid-1969 would number between 400 and 800—a serious underestimate, as things turned out.

The Secretary described three possible strategic postures. The first, “assured destruction” of the USSR was predicated on the ability to absorb an attack and then inflict significant losses on USSR cities and industrial capacity. In 1969, even allowing for improved enemy defenses (particularly fallout shelters), larger or more effective Soviet offensive forces, and unanticipated US losses, McNamara and his analysts concluded that about 1,200 Minuteman ICBMs could fulfill assured destruction objectives. The second option, a larger “damage-limiting” force, “saves no lives unless the Soviets delay attacking our cities, and in that case the life-saving potential appears to be less than 10 million.” The third option, a “full first-strike capability,” would cost an additional $84 billion and could reduce US fatalities to 30 million. Yet if the Soviets reacted with a similar buildup, as almost surely they would, the US would have to outspend the Soviets by three to one. Therefore, McNamara concluded, 1,200 Minuteman ICBMs would “provide us with both an ‘assured destruction’ capability under very pessimistic assumptions, and, under the most likely assumptions, a very substantial counter-military force as well.”34 Under an assortment of names, “assured destruction” would influence the planning of strategic retaliatory forces well beyond the 1960s. This probably was Secretary McNamara’s most significant contribution to nuclear strategy and force planning.

Every JCS member endorsed McNamara’s program except General LeMay, who still wanted larger damage-limiting levels. Secretary McNamara’s final DPM contained no changes of any consequence. On 30 December, at the LBJ Ranch, LeMay said that all the Air Force’s studies showed US strategic superiority shrinking rapidly, to the point where a nuclear exchange in 1968 would cause more damage to the United States than to the USSR. LeMay also worried about the shrinkage of research and development (R&D) activities and particularly about the absence of a new manned bomber. President Johnson did express concern over the trend toward exclusive reliance on missiles and asked about alternatives. LeMay admitted that the B–70, now reduced to two prototypes, was “dead.” He recommended
spending $55 million to begin design studies, program definition, and advanced
development of long lead-time items for a new bomber. McNamara remarked
that what the Air Force wanted was not a bomber but an airborne platform from
which to launch missiles. Such a low-level penetrator would be very expensive and
extraordinarily complex. Even if it proved reliable, Secretary McNamara contin-
ued, the Air Force had no plans for its employment. Therefore, he was “absolutely”
against appropriating $55 million. General Taylor added that the JCS had been
unaware of LeMay’s proposal and were not prepared to accept it without careful
study. President Johnson approved McNamara’s program in toto.35

Force Planning in 1964

The JCS completed JSOP–69 in March 1964. It differed from McNamara’s five-
year program in two ways. First, all the Chiefs recommended having 37 rather
than 35 Polaris boats in FY 1966. Second, General LeMay pressed for 1,500 rather
than 1,200 Minuteman ICBMs. A situational analysis, prepared by the Services and
the Joint Staff, examined general war outcomes in 1969 under all conceivable con-
ditions. It concluded that US and Soviet forces each could absorb an attack and
still retain enough power to inflict high levels of damage and fatalities. There was a
lack of agreement among the Service Chiefs—the Air Force foresaw 1,256 ballistic
missile aiming points and wanted to cover them; the Navy anticipated fewer aiming
points; the Army did too, adding that the Air Force’s reliability requirement was
so high because it included in-flight as well as on-launch unpredictability. General
Taylor supported McNamara, largely because he was still “impressed by the uncer-
tainties regarding the value of a more extreme counterforce effort.”36

In his tentative force-planning guidance, circulated on 16 May, Secretary
McNamara recommended that assured destruction could be achieved with fewer
than the programmed number of missiles. Since higher levels must be justified
in terms of damage limitation, they could not be considered apart from bomber,
missile defense, and civil defense programs. But the administration had not
decided whether to deploy the Nike-X and build fallout shelters. And, even if
more Minuteman missiles could be justified as part of a damage-limiting pro-
gram, production would have to be time-phased to match the availability of other
elements. On 5 November, the Secretary issued a DPM that capped the Minute-
man force at 1,000 launchers, slightly reduced B–52 levels, and increased Polaris
boats from 35 to 38 in FY 1966. McNamara intended to retire all Atlas and Titan Is but authorized the retrofitting of Minuteman IIs into Minuteman I silos. He
maintained that, in 1970, about half the planned force of Minuteman and Titan IIs
alone could inflict assured destruction.37

The JCS told Secretary McNamara that his program, in their view, “falls short
of providing a balanced or optimum force mix.” He wanted to retire 45 B–52s; they
recommended phasing out only the aircraft used for crew training. By a separate memorandum, General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, (who had replaced Taylor as Chairman) said that reducing the Minuteman level would dangerously erode the “relative superiority” of the United States. McNamara’s final DPM, circulated on 7 December, contained one concession: he retained two B–52B squadrons through FY 1966, after which the B–52 force would fall to 600. But he held Minuteman at 1,000 launchers.38

Out of the B–70’s funeral pyre emerged the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA). In January and again in March 1964, the JCS recommended proceeding with project definition and starting design work on propulsion and avionics. On 19 August, Air Force officers gave the JCS a briefing that covered cost effectiveness, concept of employment, and specific targets to be attacked. The JCS and the new chairman, General Wheeler, (Taylor having accepted the ambassador’s post to Saigon) then recommended unanimously to proceed with project definition and advanced technology.39

Secretary McNamara remained as opposed to AMSA as he had been to the B–70. The Air Force asked for $15 million in FY 1965 and $77 million in FY 1966; he would support only $5 million and $3 million. Because most B–52s could stay in the force through 1975, he believed that a decision about AMSA’s project definition could be delayed for two years. Instead, he proposed initiating project definition of a short-range attack missile (SRAM), modifying newer B–52 models and retiring older ones. In terms of cost effectiveness, McNamara continued, AMSA would be more expensive than Polaris, Minuteman, or a B–52/SRAM combination. A bomber threat did compel the Soviets to spend more on air defense, he conceded, but they would have to spend about the same amount whether the force was small or large, because they could not know which targets the bombers would attack. A new bomber would not greatly complicate the Soviets’ offensive problem, since they already had to contend with a missile force that was very well protected and substantially larger than their own. McNamara felt sure that Minuteman and Polaris would be ready and reliable. Also, in his judgment, protected ICBMs were more survivable than dispersed bombers. Compared to Polaris, AMSA was much more vulnerable and would have to be committed far sooner.

Turning to damage limitation, Secretary McNamara insisted that buying more offensive missiles along with active and passive defenses would do more to reduce US casualties than buying AMSAs. In an offensive role, bombers were too slow in reaching enemy striking forces while missiles were preferable (or at least competitive) against the whole spectrum of targets. For a demonstrative attack, missiles were faster, could be fired singly, and could penetrate area defenses. In fact, rapid reprogramming of the coded tapes that were put into warheads made missiles more flexible than bombers. As to AMSA’s reusability, dependence on vulnerable tankers, airfields, and extensive ground support made it unwise to leave the destruction of targets to a second mission. As for AMSA’s value in a show of force, McNamara noted two limitations. First, the US might not want to brandish its nuclear weapons very often. Second, the effect of adding a few bombers to the
alert force might be slight. In sum, then, the primary weight of attack during 1965–75 would be best borne by missiles.40

Once more, the JCS recommended proceeding with propulsion and contract definition as well as developing SRAMs. General Wheeler provided a rationale for contract definition. Considering the uncertainty about how long a B–52's life could be extended and the fact that ten years must pass before AMSAs entered the operational inventory, he wanted to minimize the risk of a hiatus in bomber capability. AMSA, in his judgment, had greater speed and dispersal potential than the B–52, and needed less tanker support than would a bomber variant of the F–111 tactical aircraft.41 Secretary McNamara disagreed.

During the wrap-up at the LBJ Ranch, on 22 December, General Wheeler voiced concern about stopping Minuteman at 1,000. Secretary McNamara explained, and the President agreed, that a final decision could be postponed. When General LeMay brought up AMSA, McNamara said “it was the Chiefs' view that it is too early to say that we don’t need a new bomber and it is too early to say that we do need one.” His own approach, he claimed, would delay a decision about project definition by only about five months.42 As before, President Johnson sided with Secretary McNamara on all significant issues.

**Summation**

On 31 December 1964, the US arsenal included: 391 B–47 and 626 B–52 bombers; 128 Atlas, 105 Titan, and 698 Minuteman ICBMs; and 21 Polaris submarines (9 in the Atlantic, 8 in the Mediterranean, 4 in the Pacific) carrying 336 missiles.43 The program projected for FY 1970 contained 600 B–52s, 54 Titan II and 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs, and 41 Polaris boats.

In 1961, the JCS believed that the United States had achieved strategic superiority, which they were determined to preserve. That superiority, in their judgment, was what had deterred and would deter Soviet adventurism. Secretary McNamara agreed in 1961, but by 1963 he concluded that assured destruction would achieve the same end. This was more than a matter of semantics. To the JCS, numbers mattered because numbers shaped perceptions. To Secretary McNamara, what mattered was our destructive capability, which the Soviets surely understood. During the early 1960s, the US numerical lead was clear. The differences between the Secretary and the JCS were mainly about force levels in the later 1960s. As the US numerical edge began to diminish after 1965, the differences between them would widen.
Continental Defense: Still Feasible?

An Outdated Posture

In mid-1960, sizeable assets were dedicated to continental air defense. These included: 52 interceptor squadrons, mainly the “Century” series of F–101s, F–102s, and F–106s; 56 battalions of Nike-Ajax and Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missiles; a Distant Early Warning Line running along the northern edge of Alaska and Canada; a Mid-Canada Line; picket ships in the Atlantic and Pacific; and gap-filler radars in the United States. Intelligence estimates put the Soviet bomber fleet at 135 heavies, much less than predicted a few years earlier, and about 1,000 mediums. Strategic Air Command in December 1960 contained 1,178 medium-range B-47s and 538 intercontinental B–52s. Evidently, the Soviets had de-emphasized bombers in favor of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Their first ICBMs were expected to become operational during 1960.1

Against ICBMs, the United States had as yet no protection at all. Construction of a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) was fairly well advanced. The first station in Greenland began limited operation in September 1960; two more in Alaska and England were supposed to follow. By early 1960, a Nike-Zeus anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system was nearly ready to be tested against moving targets.2 Whether to move Nike-Zeus into production would become the focus of debate within the JCS and then between the Joint Chiefs and Secretary McNamara.

Early in February 1961, the JCS sent conflicting recommendations to Secretary McNamara. General Lemnitzer, Admiral Burke, and General Decker
favored limited production so that some Nike-Zeus units could be deployed by early 1965. Lennitser described ABMs as “an indispensable element in deter-
rence”; Burke and Decker saw “an urgent requirement” for them. Deploying Nike-Zeus would offset the psychological impact of a Soviet ABM system, which might appear as early as 1963–64. Also, Nike-Zeus would protect against accidental attacks and possible threats from Communist China. General White, on the other hand, opposed deploying what he called a costly and inadequate system. Progress in ICBM warheads, he contended, was running several years ahead of ABM development. Indeed, Nike-Zeus might already have reached “the point of maximum technical growth.” White wanted to accentuate the development of sophisticated warheads that could easily penetrate Soviet defenses. Meanwhile, he agreed, research and development for “a truly effective” ABM system should be pursued.3

Concurrently, an OSD task force under Comptroller Hitch reviewed continental defense programs. Fighter interceptors, it found, were deployed mainly to protect urban centers. However, if ICBMs destroyed about ten Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) control centers, those interceptors would be rendered “essentially useless” and follow-on Soviet bombers could penetrate practically unopposed to US missile bases.4 Thus a devastating bomber attack could be delivered directly after a selective missile strike. So, the task force argued, anti-bomber forces should be reoriented to defend against such tactics. On 28 March, President Kennedy asked for and Congress later approved extra funds for improving US ability to cope with a combined attack.5

As one of his 96 questions, Secretary McNamara asked for a “complete reassessment” of ABM projects. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering, who still was Dr. Herbert York, reported that expenditures on Nike-Zeus would total $2.4 billion by the close of FY 1961. Nonetheless, he concluded that the prospect of protecting urban centers effectively “is bleak, has always been so, and there are no great grounds for believing that the situation will markedly improve in the future, no matter how hard we try.” By putting penetration aids on missile warheads, an attacker could ensure success more cheaply than a defender could counter such moves. Without fallout shelters, the Soviets could kill populations through radioactive fallout even if effective missile defenses did exist.6

On 24 April, the JCS sent Secretary McNamara some summary observations about York’s report. First, they all agreed that the United States must try to build an ABM system, regardless of the apparent obstacles, at a pace “commensurate with technological advancement.” Second, they reported that their split over moving Nike-Zeus into production still stood—which explains why their first observation was so carefully qualified. Third, they re-emphasized the importance of BMEWS but described it as a complementary part of a future early warning system rather than a complete solution to the problem.7
Force Planning in 1961

In September, the JCS asked Secretary McNamara to take three major steps. First, produce 200 interceptors, either F–106s or F–4s, as replacements for F–102s which were similar to but less capable and much slower than the F–106s. Second, authorize research and development for an Improved Manned Interceptor (IMI). Third, initiate a “minimum production program” for Nike-Zeus so that twelve batteries would be operational by FY 1967.8 They reasoned that, in the context of the Berlin confrontation and renewed Soviet nuclear testing in the atmosphere, this decision “would have certain psychological impact, and other possible second-order benefits.”9

Secretary McNamara agreed about Nike-Zeus but not about 200 interceptors. Surprise missile attack, he reasoned, had replaced mass bomber raids as the main danger. The largest likely air attack would total only about 200 to 300 bombers. Hence the interceptor forces, control of which was concentrated in 22 unprotected direction centers, should be dispersed, cutting their capability to deal with bomber raids but enhancing their ability to survive ICBM attacks. As for Nike-Zeus, he contemplated twelve batteries protecting six cities and about 39 million people. Technical evaluations, he acknowledged, indicated that any likely missile defense could be defeated by “apparently reasonable” enemy tactics. But he found other arguments in Nike-Zeus’ favor. Soviet ICBMs might display unforeseen shortcomings (as in fact, for the next few years, they did). Missile defenses should complicate the Soviets’ attack strategy and so lower their confidence of success. Deploying Nike-Zeus would offset the psychological impact of a similar Soviet effort, and later technological advances could be incorporated into it. Even a limited ABM capability, he claimed, could inhibit blackmail by secondary powers such as China and Cuba. Finally, Secretary McNamara proposed allocating a major portion of the $400 million budgeted for civil defense to fallout shelters.10

As 1961 ended, Secretary McNamara and the JCS had no significant disagreements about continental defense. Apparently, the topic was not even broached at the final wrap-up with President Kennedy. In the spring of 1962, however, preproduction funds amounting to $76.2 million were cut from the budget, pending a demonstration of Nike-Zeus’ effectiveness.11

Force Planning in 1962

Military planners again focused upon ways to cope with a missile attack followed by bomber sorties against ICBM sites. The Air Force proposed dispersing one-fifth of the interceptor force to 26 bases. The Army recommended repositioning one-third of its Nike-Hercules units. The Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command, wanted to build 200 Improved Manned Interceptors and replace SAGE with a semi-automatic control system called TRACE
Secretary McNamara accepted some of these steps but not others. His DPM, circulated on 13 November 1962, stated that existing systems provided “negligible” defenses against a missile strike followed by a bomber attack. He recommended: adding thirty “dispersal bases” (i.e., recovery or turn-around airfields) and ten austere single-squadron facilities at existing airfields; repositioning twenty Nike-Hercules batteries away from Strategic Air Command (SAC) bomber bases to hardened missile sites and control centers; retiring during FY 1965 eight regular and eleven Air National Guard interceptor squadrons; deferring until 1963 a decision about the Improved Manned Interceptor; retiring ten SAGE centers as more survivable Backup Interceptor Controls (BUIC) became available; and disapproving TRACE on grounds that requirements for the IMI’s control system were not yet thoroughly understood.12

The JCS disputed a number of points. First, they claimed that the statement about defenses being “negligible” was overdrawn. Second, if the temporary dispersal facilities were made permanent, the ten single-squadron bases could be eliminated. Third, the twenty Nike-Hercules batteries should stay at urban-industrial locations. The only ICBM sites requiring bomber defenses would be those held in post-attack reserve. Soon, also, hardened ICBM silos would become too numerous for Soviet bombers to destroy. Fourth, retirement of the 19 interceptor squadrons should be delayed until an IMI began entering the inventory. The JCS was again divided in their advice on the IMI: General LeMay proposed procuring 196 of them by FY 1969; General Wheeler and Admiral Anderson opposed doing so because they believed that lower-performance interceptors could deal with the threat.13

On 3 December, Secretary McNamara circulated a revised DPM that characterized defenses as “inadequate” rather than “negligible.” He accepted the JCS recommendation to eliminate ten single-squadron bases and retain the 19 interceptor squadrons. He still intended, however, to use Nike-Hercules batteries to protect missile silos and control centers. He had doubts, as did several members of the JCS, about the IMI with its limited endurance and dependence on special fuels. Moreover, McNamara foresaw little danger of a mass bomber attack. In order to do that, the Soviets would have to move several hundred bombers to Arctic bases, thus jeopardizing surprise for the missile strike that would precede the bombers’ attack. He calculated, therefore, that a bomber attack probably would involve fewer than 200 aircraft arriving at their targets over a period of several hours. McNamara proposed carrying out (1) a war game evaluating the bomber threat and the effectiveness of defense weapons and control systems as well as (2) a study of surveillance, detection, identification, and control requirements. These would constitute “the appropriate first steps toward a rational long-run air defense system.”14

Secretary McNamara addressed the ABM issue separately, distributing a DPM on 6 October. Three months earlier, a Nike-Zeus missile fired from Kwajalein Island
Continental Defense

in the mid-Pacific had intercepted a target vehicle launched from California. Even so, McNamara concluded that Nike-Zeus should continue only in a restricted manner. Instead, he recommended full development of a more advanced Nike-X which added a high-acceleration Sprint missile for close-in defense and a Multifunction Array Radar able to track many objects simultaneously. A deployment decision could be deferred until mid-1964, with the first batteries becoming operational in 1969 and their numbers growing to 26 by 1972–73.

The significant point, however, was Secretary McNamara's growing pessimism about ballistic missile defense. Manifold technical problems might be overcome but, in his mind, solving them would not justify deployment. The basic stumbling-block was that the cost of building an ABM system would be at least twice the cost of offensive improvements needed to overcome it. Hence, McNamara doubted whether Nike-X would be deployed. He recognized, though, that “anti-missile defense is so important in the strategic equation that we must be willing to make very substantial development expenditures even if the probability of deployment is rather low.”

McNamara's memorandum had been written just before the Cuban missile crisis erupted. The JCS reply was dated 10 November, while the crisis was not yet wholly resolved. It opened what would become a long-running disagreement with the Secretary. General Wheeler and Admiral Anderson labeled lack of missile defense as “the most glaring deficiency in the US military posture.” They wanted to begin deploying Nike-Zeus in 1967, with an advanced capability comparable to Nike-X following by 1971. The Soviets, apparently, had begun to build an ABM shield around Leningrad (now St. Petersburg). Wheeler and Anderson feared that, if the Soviet Union was first in acquiring a missile defense, Moscow would gain a major military advantage and US prestige would suffer enormously. They also brought in McNamara’s earlier argument, now much more relevant, that lack of a missile defense might subject the United States “to significant damage or public humiliation at the hands of minor powers.” General Taylor, using what was for him strong language, agreed that “it is of vital national importance to embark at once upon a production and development program.” General LeMay supported developing both Nike-Zeus and Nike-X but opposed deploying Nike-Zeus until its effectiveness could be fully established.

On 20 November, Secretary McNamara forwarded to President Kennedy his views and those of the JCS. He rebutted the Chiefs’ argument for deploying Nike-Zeus with two points. First, there would “almost surely” be a Soviet reaction. Judging by US experience, penetration aids able to overcome a defense could be produced quicker and for one-tenth to one-half the cost. Second, minor powers “could still threaten cities with a population of around one million that are not defended.” Late in December at Palm Beach, Kennedy, McNamara, Taylor, and Wheeler held a lengthy discussion about missile defense. The President adopted McNamara’s approach—development but no production. Kennedy ruled that, with a $9 billion deficit looming in FY 1964, “it would just be too expensive to buy the proportionate share of $19 billion spread over ten years for Nike-Zeus at this stage.”
Force Planning in 1963

JSOP–68, completed in April 1963, recommended bringing eighteen IMIs and one Nike-X battery into the active inventory during FY 1969. General LeMay dissented, saying that Nike-X needed further definition. More importantly, scientific opinion was lining up against ABM deployment. The President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Dr. Jerome Wiesner, discounted fears about the sudden appearance of a Soviet ABM system. There was a long lead-time involved and US intelligence would supply early warnings. Using calculations even more pessimistic than McNamara’s, he concluded that defense would cost ten to thirty times more than offensive missiles. He warned that, if both sides deployed missile defenses, both might overestimate their opponent’s capabilities and overbuild their striking power.18

In a DPM dated 9 October, McNamara said that the choice lay between creating a balanced defense and relying solely on offensive forces for deterrence. A “low” program would consist, in FY 1969, of 456 interceptors, surface-to-air missiles placed around selected hardened ICBM sites, minimal surveillance, warning, and control, and Nike-X kept in the developmental stage. A “high” program would add 216 advanced interceptors by FY 1970, ABM defense of the 22 largest urban areas by FY 1973, and expanded civil defense. McNamara thought it too soon to make “an intelligent choice . . . between these fundamental alternatives.” The Air Force recently had evaluated five advanced air defense systems, including IMI, and found them about equally effective. McNamara agreed that Nike-X “would be very effective against small attacks and would significantly reduce the damage of a large attack.” Yet Nike-X might provide only “negligible” protection against high altitude, very high yield detonations. Again, therefore, a production decision should be postponed until major uncertainties were resolved. Moreover, he emphasized, strategic defense had to be considered in its totality. Improved air defense, ABM deployments around urban areas, and a nation-wide fallout shelter program all were equally necessary. So he proposed an “interim” program containing only those elements that were common to the “high” and “low” alternatives: reduce interceptors from 829 to 456; relocate some surface-to-air missiles from urban areas to hardened ICBM sites; modernize, to a limited degree, warning and surveillance systems; and maintain ABM research and development near current levels.19

The JCS wanted a war-winning as well as a war-deterring capability. They criticized this “interim” program as “insufficient” because it (1) placed premature reliance upon unproven surveillance, warning, and control systems and (2) postponed the development, procurement, and deployment of ABMs and advanced interceptors. A phase-down of current warning and control systems should await the availability of an improved BUIC system, highly sophisticated airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, and integration with civil radar coverage. They repeated JSOP–68’s position about interceptors, which would mean having in FY 1969 not 456, but 648 aircraft. McNamara assumed that the interceptors could not
escape quick destruction, but the JCS believed that dispersal would give “Century” interceptors as well as IMIs adequate survivability. Finally, they recommended proceeding with Nike-X development “as a matter of priority, with production and operational deployment to follow if justified by R&D progress.” As a result, Secretary McNamara did agree to maintain the FY 1964 force of 829 interceptors, adjusted for attrition, through FY 1969.20

On 30 December, during the budget review with President Johnson, General Wheeler described the absence of ABMs as “the most serious deficiency in our defense posture.” He emphasized that, for the first Nike-X unit to become operational in September 1969, a deployment decision would have to be rendered by the fall of 1964. General LeMay depicted the air defense picture as “dismal,” with capabilities “going downward.” Developing the IMI impressed him as an urgent requirement. McNamara replied that the basic issue was not whether to develop IMI but whether to produce and deploy it. If the administration decided against deploying Nike-X, going ahead with IMI production would be pointless. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric added that a decision about whether to press forward with civil defense preparation also would affect the IMI. Unfazed, General LeMay argued that IMI should be considered independently of these issues. Without IMI, for instance, US air space could not be protected once supersonic transports began flying.21 But the President again supported Secretary McNamara on all major points.

**Force Planning in 1964**

With currently programmed forces, according to JSOP–69’s situational analysis, a Soviet attack in 1968 would cost the United States 34 to 48 percent of its industrial plant and 65 to 73 percent of its population. A larger “intermediate” force, JSOP–69 continued, would bring those figures down to 13 to 25 percent and 37 to 50 percent respectively. With a “high” force level, they would fall to 9 to 23 percent and 33 to 49 percent. Clearly, the gain in capability was greater between programmed and intermediate forces than between intermediate and high forces. Whether SAC bombers survived, for example, was mainly a matter of timely warning and dispersal. Similarly, the number of civilian casualties would be determined by the adequacy of fallout shelters as well as by the efficiency of active defenses.

General LeMay wanted to cut back surface-to-air missiles and establish IMI as the nucleus of bomber defense. General Wheeler, conversely, believed that surface-to-air missiles provided the best protection for strategic retaliatory forces and for command and control facilities. Sole reliance on IMI struck him as unsound; the best interceptor and the best aircraft/missile mix had yet to be determined. General Taylor, Admiral McDonald, and General Greene sided with Wheeler.22

In his tentative guidance, appearing on 21 May, Secretary McNamara voiced doubt about the value of a large interceptor force. He asked the JCS to compare
the damage-limiting effectiveness, in 1967, of 782 versus 372 aircraft. Like the JCS majority, he did not believe that IMI’s superiority over other alternatives had been proven. In any case, he reasoned, IMI should proceed only in conjunction with deployment of Nike-X, construction of nationwide fallout shelters, and the addition of other elements making up a balanced defense. So the Secretary opted once again to postpone major decisions about producing IMI and deploying Nike-X and the building of nationwide fallout shelters. For the time being, he preferred “a somewhat reduced active defense force and an augmented development program.”

Most of the JCS, with the exception of General Johnson, opposed any reduction of interceptors. In justification, they cited studies by the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) and the Joint War Games Agency (JWGA) showing that the larger force might destroy as many as fifty bombers with several multi-megaton weapons apiece, thereby saving up to several million lives. General Johnson, on the other hand, argued that the CONAD and JWGA studies contained major methodological errors. In his judgment, interceptor reductions could be “largely offset” by redeployments, reduced co-locations, efficient use of dispersal bases, and modernization of the Air National Guard.

Secretary McNamara did not alter any of his positions. As he informed General Wheeler, OSD studies indicated that a larger interceptor force would only cut fatalities from 100 million down to 94-99 million. The CONAD exercise, likewise, showed a difference of only 1 to 3 million out of 70 million deaths. True, the JWGA study showed a larger force lowering fatalities by 9.4 million. But, like General Johnson, McNamara believed that faulty assumptions invalidated this finding. The JWGA wrongly assumed that increasing the number of interceptors invariably increased the number of bombers destroyed; that adding megatons always raised the number of fatalities; and that no relocation of the interceptor force would occur. Using “more realistic” assumptions, McNamara’s staff concluded that the difference in the two forces’ overall effectiveness was relatively trivial. It was wiser, therefore, to assure the strategic deterrent’s adequacy and to “reduce our dependence on the first use of nuclear weapons” by raising conventional capabilities. The JCS, in turn, reviewed the issues and reaffirmed their views.

On 5 November, McNamara circulated a DPM that seemed to denigrate, at least implicitly, the very concept of continental defense. Without any protection, he foresaw about 160 million fatalities. A civil defense program costing about $5 billion could cut that to around 120 million. A balanced $30 billion effort might reduce urban fatalities to 80 million. Beyond that, however, the United States would have to spend much more for damage limitation than the Soviets would have to spend for damage creation. McNamara proposed: reducing “Century” interceptors to 330 by FY 1970; phasing out Distant Early Warning Line extension aircraft and radar picket ships; and reorganizing the surveillance system. On IMI, he would spend only $5 million for developing an F–12A. He remained uncertain whether the F–12A or a
modified F–111 was most suitable and whether a new surface-to-air missile might be preferable to a new interceptor. In any case, bomber, missile, and civil defenses would have to proceed in parallel. As to Nike-X, he recommended $390 million for development but only $10 million for production planning because so many uncertainties remained. For civil defense, he urged a major effort at public education but expenditure of merely $51 million for a fallout shelter survey and evaluation.26

In their critique, the JCS stressed that “the measure of cost versus effectiveness cannot portray the full range of essential considerations.” Balanced development, naturally, was the soundest course, but delaying fallout shelters, for example, should not cause deferral of Nike-X or IMI. Again the JCS was divided on the way ahead. Excepting General Johnson, all opposed phasing down the interceptor force. On IMI, they sought enough funds to preserve an option for future deployment. In technical terms, that meant moving beyond the “advanced development” approved by McNamara into “engineering development.” General Wheeler went a bit further, proposing procurement of either 18 F–12As or 18 modified F–111s in FY 1966. As for phasing out Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line aircraft and ships, only Admiral McDonald and General Wheeler agreed. The others recommended retaining them as long as Soviet bombers remained a “sizeable threat.” For Nike-X, they all urged allocating an additional $200 million for preproduction, so that initial deployment could occur in October 1969. General Wheeler, finally, favored a larger appropriation for fallout shelters.27

On one point, Secretary McNamara bowed to the JCS majority, delaying F-102 retirements from 1966 to 1968. He made no further concessions because, according to the latest National Intelligence Estimate, the Soviets evidently were not building a new bomber.28 McNamara also disapproved, as unnecessary, Army proposals to redeploy Nike-Hercules batteries around hardened missile silos and control centers.29 Possibly he was unwilling to challenge Southern members of Congress, from whose districts many of those units would have to be removed.

During the pre-Christmas conference at the LBJ Ranch, General Wheeler requested more money for fallout shelters, claiming that a $5.3 billion program could cut civilian fatalities by more than 50 percent. (That was a good deal more optimistic than McNamara’s calculation, cited above.) The Secretary, in rebuttal, said that shelters would have little value unless accompanied by ABM deployments. So Wheeler argued for $200 million in Nike-X preproduction funds. McNamara asked Generals Wheeler and Johnson whether they agreed that the ABM and fallout shelter programs should move forward in tandem. Wheeler did. Johnson did not; he wanted Nike-X to advance as rapidly as possible. McNamara then said that missile defenses appeared to have value only as protection against Communist China. Against a Soviet attack, he argued, ABMs would not save enough lives to justify their cost. Since the Chinese apparently would not have ICBMs before 1972 at the earliest, he could find no justification for accelerating Nike-X. Lastly, General LeMay urged approval of “project definition” for the F–12A. Secretary McNamara
suggested that fallout shelters should be built first, ABMs deployed next, and IMIs produced last. Since IMI was the most advanced of these three programs, he saw no need for extra effort.30

In sum, Secretary McNamara was holding continental defense programs at the developmental stage. To him, IMI seemed pointless by itself; fallout shelters were valueless without Nike-X, which he rated as being of very doubtful value. As they had with strategic retaliatory forces, the JCS based their case for ABM deployment on the claim that perception was a vital part of deterrence. Secretary McNamara justified his deferrals on cost-effectiveness studies, which by 1964 led him to conclude that the best defense—indeed the only feasible defense—was a powerful offense.
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At the Outset, Small Steps

Although the Eisenhower administration placed main reliance on nuclear weapons, it was prepared to carry out limited, non-nuclear operations. During the summer of 1960, representatives from Defense, State, and Central Intelligence assessed US and allied capabilities to defend South Korea, the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, Southeast Asia, Iran, and West Berlin. They concluded that US strength was sufficient, if buttressed by a partial mobilization, to wage a limited war in any one of these areas. Dealing with two or more crises concurrently, however, would degrade the general war posture “to an unacceptable degree.” The NSC, on 5 January 1961, rejected a “radical reallocation” of resources to strengthen conventional capabilities. President Eisenhower doubted whether it was possible to prevent large-scale conventional combat from escalating into general war. Therefore, maintaining the nuclear deterrent should still be the primary mission, with other forces relegated to supporting roles.¹

The forces relegated to supporting roles were substantial: 14 Army divisions and three Marine division/wing teams; 14 attack and nine anti-submarine warfare (ASW) carriers, 14 cruisers, 225 destroyers, and 112 attack submarines; 55 USAF tactical fighter and 30 transport squadrons.² The Kennedy administration promptly made known that a strategy of massive retaliation would be replaced by one of flexible response. Having no program for translating that strategy into a force posture, it proceeded to create one piecemeal.
Secretary McNamara’s first recommendation was to improve airlift capability. At the time, 90 percent of transports were propeller-driven; jet C–141s would not enter the inventory until mid-1965. McNamara proposed several steps, the most important being to double monthly output of C–130 turboprops to eight, and accelerate the switch in production from C–130Bs to longer-range C–130Es.3

Immediately, the new administration faced challenges in Laos and the Congo that could lead to armed intervention. On 1 February 1961, the Deputy Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs) told the JCS to assume that two aggressions began concurrently: by not more than five lightly armed divisions in Laos and by another five in the Congo. What additions to US forces would be required? The J–5 recommended adding 45,000 personnel in FY 1961 and another 74,000 in FY 1962, the main augmentations being one Army infantry division, two attack carriers, 21 amphibious ships, and 41 transport squadrons. The JCS was divided in their response to the J–5’s report. General Decker, Admiral Burke, and General Shoup endorsed those proposals. General White, however, declared himself “greatly disturbed” by their apparent assumption that the United States should be prepared to wage limited wars at all points of the globe against the full power of the Sino-Soviet bloc. If so, the US military establishment “would have to be quickly and massively reoriented” at a cost of well over $60 billion annually.4 Arguing that preservation of US nuclear superiority still was “the most pressing military requirement,” White claimed that available strength was “more than adequate to the tasks set forth in this study, with the possible exception of some additional airlift.”5

Concurrently, in connection with a reappraisal of the FY 1962 budget, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Paul Nitze asked the JCS to compare deployment capabilities (excluding forces already in place) of the United States and the communist powers at several crisis points. Replying on 9 February, they listed the following figures for 90 days after fighting began: 10 US versus 43 communist divisions in Central Europe; three US versus four communist in the Congo; five US versus 14 communist in Iran; and three US versus 23 communist in South Vietnam. Therefore, they said, “The United States does not have forces in being adequate to cope with large-scale limited war situations. The fact that in any limited war situation there is a requirement to initiate partial mobilization, augment lift capabilities, expand the war production base and to lift expenditure limitations, substantiates this fundamental conclusion.”6

The impact of these JCS findings seems to have been rather slight. Late in January, Secretary McNamara had created a limited war task force headed by Assistant Secretary Nitze. Its report, issued on 17 February, recommended adding 3,000 men to Army Special Forces, 2,000 men to raise the 1st Infantry Division toward combat-ready status, and 2,000 Marines to bring divisional strengths closer to authorized levels. The task force saw no need for additional funding in FY 1961 but did recommend adding $775 million in FY 1962, chiefly to expand readiness and training exercises, improve airlift capabilities, and increase pro-
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curement of ammunition and equipment. President Kennedy put these proposals into a special message to Congress, presented on 28 March.7

A number of Secretary McNamara’s 96 questions, or defense policy projects which he had assigned to the JCS and Service Chiefs on 8 March, pertained to general purpose forces. Two of them are described here because they illustrate how often, at the JCS level, single-service perspectives proved stronger than joint ones. The first was McNamara’s directive to develop a plan for integrating the Strategic Army Corps and the Tactical Air Command into a unified command, “and consider when such a plan should be implemented.” Significantly, the Secretary spoke of “when” and not “whether” a unified command should come into being. The J–5 prepared such a plan. Generals Decker and White endorsed it, provided that the new command eventually included Navy and Marine units. But Admiral Burke favored nothing more than a joint task force that would train air-ground teams for augmenting existing commands. General Shoup argued that simply developing a doctrine for joint Army-Air Force operations would be enough. On 1 May, the JCS (minus General Lemnitzer, who was in Southeast Asia) forwarded their views to Secretary McNamara. He, in turn, asked them to assess several alternatives. This time, Lemnitzer joined Decker and White in endorsing a unified command, while Shoup accepted a joint command with limited responsibilities.8

On 21 August, Secretary McNamara settled matters by telling the JCS to nominate an officer who would head the unified command. Their choice was Lieutenant General Paul D. Adams, USA. President Kennedy approved his appointment on 19 September. One month later, US Strike Command (STRICOM) opened its headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. STRICOM comprised the combat-ready forces of Tactical Air and Continental Army Commands, which by January 1962 amounted to eight divisions, 42 tactical and 19 troop carrier squadrons. Navy and Marine officers were assigned to STRICOM’s staff. Strike Command’s responsibilities included training, developing joint doctrines, providing a general reserve and reinforcements for unified commands, and planning for and executing contingency operations in response to global crisis.9

The second question was Secretary McNamara’s directive to review anti-submarine warfare research projects and determine whether increased emphasis was desirable. The JCS already were addressing one portion of this problem. For many months, General White had worried that Soviet capability to deliver submarine-launched ballistic missiles was increasing faster than US defenses. Early in April, he suggested two steps that would cut across service lines. First, appoint a Director of ASW Planning, who would be provided with a joint staff and directed to develop a national ASW policy. Second, have the Director of Defense Research and Engineering look at the desirability of creating a centralized agency for ASW research and development.10

General Decker disagreed. He wanted to consider ASW in a “world-wide context,” not just as a continental defense problem. Any evaluation should cover all
defenses against SLBMs, including the Army’s ABM systems. Admiral Burke, going farther, argued that the greatest threat stemmed from our reliance on fixed-base, vulnerable retaliatory force, and not from inability to intercept SLBMs. This being so, the best solution lay in “progress toward a preponderance of mobile strike forces [i.e., Polaris submarines] that cannot be targeted by the SLBM or ICBM.” Burke denied that White’s single integrated scheme would prove superior to existing ASW efforts, which he claimed already had achieved “optimum integration” under Navy direction. On 3 May, after discussing their differences at great length, the JCS agreed to await results from the ASW analysis requested by McNamara.11

Separately, at Secretary McNamara’s direction, the Navy Department and a DOD working group assessed ASW capabilities. Currently, in the Navy’s judgment, ASW forces could defeat any effort to close the sea lanes. War games showed close to two submarines being sunk for every ASW or escorted ship lost. Under projected funding levels, however, ASW capabilities would become “inadequate” by 1966 and “more seriously so” by 1971. The DOD working group separately reached roughly similar conclusions.12

After reviewing these reports, the JCS sent Secretary McNamara some summary findings. At present, they said, ASW deficiencies resulted in a “marginal capability” to counter the Soviet submarine force. Correcting those shortcomings depended upon “vigorous implementation of the highest priority currently accorded ASW, including additional funding.” Immediate increases were needed to avert the “serious deficiency” anticipated for 1966–67. The JCS advocated renewed study of management and coordination, which might uncover ways of effecting significant improvements more swiftly.13 Three years later, however, intelligence indicated that the submarine threat had been over-rated.

**Force Planning in 1961**

Spring 1961 proved a grim time for the administration. On 12 April, the Soviets gained a propaganda victory by orbiting the first astronaut around the earth. One week later, at the Bay of Pigs, Fidel Castro crushed an invasion by US-backed Cuban exiles. A worsening situation in Laos made intervention distinctly possible. On 20 April, the President asked for a determination of whether more conventional strength was needed. Secretary of the Navy John Connally, who was given charge of this project, told the JCS that they should not merely submit “a shopping list of new equipment.” Rather, they should provide “an over-all perspective” of available resources, develop “new methods and techniques” for using them, and determine actions needed to create capabilities for applying these techniques. McNamara further instructed the JCS to include specific add-ons for the FY 1962 budget.14

This was a tall order with a tight deadline, so it is not surprising that the JCS response fell short as far as “new methods and techniques” were concerned. On 5
May, they advised Secretary McNamara that available forces were “highly trained, ready and competent to accomplish tasks which are assigned to them by the Basic War Plan.” Eleven Army and three Marine division/wing teams were combat-ready; three more Army divisions could become so between mobilization (M)+60 and M+150. The Air Force had a 382-plane Composite Air Strike Force available for rapid deployment. The Navy had 352 warships either at sea or readily available. Deployment capabilities were adequate, with certain exceptions; available stocks would support combat operations for six months.

Separately, the services proposed sizeable augmentations totaling 104,960 personnel and costing $2.641 billion. The Army wanted 69,260 personnel to form a new division in the continental United States (CONUS) as well as one airborne brigade in Okinawa and one in Europe. The Navy wanted 18,500 more personnel to improve readiness and amphibious lift. The Marine Corps wanted 12,000 more personnel to bring units to full strength. The Air Force wanted 11,500 personnel to retain eleven fighter and five transport squadrons slated for inactivation.15

On 8 May, Secretary McNamara met the JCS and told them that the services’ figures were too high for him to support in full. Two days later, he informed the President that “Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Connally and I” considered conventional forces to be “adequate for their purpose.” They had analyzed service proposals under the following assumptions: more than one large conventional commitment at any one time was unlikely; commitment of more than 250 to 300,000 US troops would reach the threshold for using nuclear weapons; and resorting to nuclear weapons would “stem the requirement for additional combat forces.” Within the framework of those assumptions, “we have a substantial capacity for waging non-nuclear warfare. Our capacity for strategic mobility . . . is satisfactory, except during the first 10–30 days of a large-scale, rapidly developing limited war.”

Secretary McNamara did recommend several steps: form an airborne brigade on Okinawa;16 reactivate 22 transports, increasing amphibious lift from 1½ to 2 Marine divisions; and accelerating production of certain equipment and ammunition. All these things could be done without additional funding, by reprogramming available appropriations. The only FY 1962 addition would be $100 million to begin restructuring Army divisions. The “pentomic” divisions, organized in the late 1950s for mobility and dispersion on tactical nuclear battlefields, would be replaced by ROAD divisions with more firepower, personnel, and flexibility.17

President Kennedy, on 25 May, asked Congress for $100 million to fund ROAD as well as $138 million for Army and Marine equipment. He included a service proposal that McNamara had rejected—raise Marine Corps strength from 178,000 to 190,000 to provide the nucleus for a fourth division.18 While the changes over these first four months were not trivial, they really amounted to adjustments at the margin. A major expansion lay just ahead, but this was entirely unforeseen when Kennedy spoke.

During the summer, as tensions over Berlin rose, having enough conventional strength to avoid rapid escalation into nuclear warfare became a prime concern.
On 26 July President Kennedy asked Congress for another $3.2 billion, the purpose being to “give the US the capability of deploying as many as six additional divisions and supporting air units to Europe at any time after January 1, 1962.” Army strength would grow from 870,000 to about 1,000,000; the Navy and Air Force would add 29,000 and 63,000 respectively.19

The services proceeded to revise and enlarge their force objectives. On 15 September, the JCS informed McNamara that they judged these new objectives to be “fundamentally sound.” The Army should contain 16 divisions through FY 1967. Low funding levels during the Eisenhower years had led to “serious deterioration” vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc, and implementing ROAD would require considerable capital outlays. Therefore, the JCS recommended a $3.5 billion procurement program for the Army in FY 1963, up from Eisenhower’s $2.2 billion. They proposed 15 attack (the Navy wanted 16) and 10 ASW carriers in FY 1963, leaving numbers for later years to be decided during future planning cycles. As for tactical aircraft, they endorsed the service plan to maintain a steady figure of 1,300.20

On 18 September, as the Berlin confrontation neared its peak, Kennedy ordered the activation of two National Guard divisions. Four days later, Secretary McNamara circulated a tentative five-year program for general purpose forces. He proposed steady levels of 14 Army divisions, three Marine division/wing teams, and 15 attack and nine ASW carriers. The number of Air Force tactical fighters would rise from 1,278 in mid-1963 to 1,588 in mid-1966.

In a DPM dated 9 October, Secretary McNamara explained why he had revised several JCS recommendations. The Berlin mobilization, involving unready divisions and aircraft, was yielding “only small improvements in effectiveness.” Consequently, he chose to emphasize quality rather than quantity. For the Army, he intended to improve equipment and reserves’ readiness instead of increasing the number of regular divisions above 14. The six CONUS-based active divisions, plus the priority National Guard divisions, constituted an adequate strategic reserve. An enlarged training establishment would allow rapid expansion. As for procurement, he prescribed $2.6 billion which was $900 million below the JCS request but $1 billion above Eisenhower’s FY 1962 budget.

For the Navy, Secretary McNamara recommended against retaining most of the reactivated ships. Enough should stay in service, however, to be able to transport and assault-land one Marine division in each ocean. He also wanted to begin construction of an oil-fired attack carrier in FY 1963. The Navy wanted a nuclear-powered ship, but he found no increase in effectiveness to justify the added cost.

Those choices made McNamara’s arguments about tactical air power all the more surprising. The Air Force proposed a tactical fighter force of 1,329 by FY 1966; the Secretary wanted 1,588. McNamara noted, in justification, that a Marine division/wing team had about 180 aircraft. The Air Force, by contrast, allocated only 80 aircraft to support an Army division. Besides close air support, furthermore, Tactical
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Air Command had the missions of air superiority and long-range interdiction. McNamara also increased funding for conventional ordnance by $500 million.21

Strategic mobility, on the verge of a great improvement, had become a vital element of conventional capabilities. The services developed and Secretary McNamara, through his DPM, defined ambitious goals: airlift one airborne brigade with its essential combat equipment anywhere within three days; airlift one division (including the brigade) in seven to ten days, followed by another division within four weeks. Sealift then would deliver complete equipment for the two divisions within 45 days. In 1961, the basic tools of the airlift fleet were the piston C–124 and the turboprop C–130. McNamara and the JCS agreed upon FY 1967 goals of 448 C–130s with a range around 1,500 nautical miles (nm) and 160 jet C–141s with about 4,000 nm range. As to sealift, the JCS wanted to start building “roll-on roll-off” cargo ships for handling heavy wheeled and tracked vehicles. They also recommended modernizing the cargo, tanker, and transport fleets. McNamara judged airlift to be quicker and cheaper than sealift; he could not foresee a situation where strategic sealift of troops would be necessary or desirable. He rejected modernizing the cargo, tanker and transport fleets because the heavy expense “completely outweighed” the benefit of faster cruising speed. But he did agree to start one “roll-on roll-off” per year and, as the JCS urged, postponed the retirement of 16 troopships.22

In November, Secretary McNamara reviewed the merits of 14 versus 16 regular Army divisions. General Taylor, working in the White House as Military Representative of the President, strongly supported 16 and had Kennedy's ear. The issue was whether, when the two National Guard divisions were released, two new regular divisions should replace them. On 1 December, the JCS advised McNamara that 16 were required “to conduct contingency operations in two areas simultaneously while maintaining an acceptable general war posture.” Here their unanimity ended. General Decker wanted 16 regular divisions. General Shoup concurred, on condition that the Army’s personnel ceiling did not exceed 960,000. But Admiral Anderson and General LeMay believed there would be enough time to mobilize two well-organized and well-equipped divisions. The Chairman sided with General Decker. Traditionally, Lemnitzer told McNamara, regulars bore the burden “until the imme-diacy or actuality of a shooting war requires declaration of a national emergency.” Highly publicized complaints by recently mobilized National Guardsman were much on General Lemnitzer’s mind (and may have been on the President’s as well): “To mobilize and demobilize significant numbers of reservists with each crisis will, in my view, be considered an unacceptable burden by the American public, the Congress, and eventually by the reservists themselves.”23

A conference on 2 January 1962, attended by Kennedy, Vice President Johnson, General Taylor, McNamara, and Gilpatric, settled the matter. No JCS members were present. Here President Kennedy approved the immediate activation of two new regular divisions. The press statement, he instructed, should stress that organizing these units would permit release from federal service of the 32nd and 49th
National Guard divisions.\textsuperscript{24} Next day, at the last budget review, General Decker assured Kennedy that the Army had been “done well by,” although a ceiling of 960,000 left little leeway. Admiral Anderson said that the FY 1963 budget supported “a better Navy,” although maintenance and personnel would remain “tight.”\textsuperscript{25}

In its final form, the program for FYs 1963–1967 would maintain 16 Army divisions, three Marine division/wing teams, 15 attack and nine ASW carriers, 14 cruisers, a little more than 250 destroyers, and about 100 attack submarines. The tactical fighter force would be 21 wings, with aircraft numbering 1,575 in FY 1963, 1,593 in FY 1964, and 1,545 thereafter.\textsuperscript{26}


**Force Planning in 1962**

The drafting of JSOP–67 witnessed a protracted dispute over the numbers of Army divisions and Navy carriers. The Army advocated 18 divisions; the Air Force and Navy, 16. The Navy wanted 16 attack carriers; the Army, 15. The Air Force would reduce attack carriers to 10 but build ASW carriers up to 16. General Lemnitzer suggested compromises that the other Chiefs finally accepted. On 27 August, the JCS recommended mid-1967 levels of 17 Army divisions, 15 attack and 11 ASW carriers, and 25 tactical fighter wings.\textsuperscript{27}

In mid-August, Secretary McNamara proposed a five-year program with steady levels of 16 Army and three Marine divisions, 15 attack and 9 ASW carriers, and 21 tactical fighter wings, fourteen of which would have F–4C Phantoms by mid-1967.\textsuperscript{28} His DPM of 31 October repeated those recommendations. In justification, he cited findings of the Chairman’s Special Studies Group which had analyzed requirements in Central Europe, Iran, Southeast Asia, and Korea. McNamara interpreted the Group’s findings as follows:

**Central Europe:** A force of 34 NATO divisions (six of them US) could “contain” a Warsaw Pact attack at its outset. A force of 55 to 60 divisions (15 of them US), if available in 30 to 60 days, “could probably hold indefinitely” because air interdiction would prevent the Warsaw Pact from supporting more than 60 divisions in combat. NATO aircraft were equal to the enemy in quantity (4,020 versus 4,000) and superior in quality. NATO ground forces, however, were deficient in equipment, support units, and reserves; active divisions were poorly positioned. McNamara saw no reason to assign more US forces; the allies could and should correct their own shortcomings.

**Iran:** Nine US divisions and 800 aircraft would be needed to hold a line along the Zagros Mountains. Instead of stationing US troops there, McNamara recommended pre-stocking equipment and improving strategic lift.

**Thailand-Vietnam:** Six US divisions, combined with allied and indigenous forces, could stop an attack by 21 Chinese and North Vietnamese divisions.

**South Korea:** Thirteen US divisions, together with the Republic of Korea’s army, could repulse a Chinese-North Korean invasion.
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From this data, Secretary McNamara concluded that there already were enough active divisions to cope with the initial stages of one large contingency outside Europe. Priority reserves would have to be called up, though, to provide non-dissional support and reconstitute the strategic reserve.

The Secretary then dealt with Service proposals. He disapproved the Army’s request for another infantry division, possibly to be stationed in the Philippines. Back in April, however, McNamara had ordered the Army to examine ways of achieving “quantum increases in mobility.” What emerged was the concept of an “air assault” division equipped with 459 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft—enough to lift the entire division in three movements. McNamara agreed to activate a provisional air assault division. If field tests went well, it could either become a permanent division or merge with one of the airborne divisions.29

Many surface warships, particularly destroyers, dated from World War II. McNamara emphasized prolonging their lives through the Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization Program. The Navy preferred more new construction and fewer conversions.

The Air Force again asked for 25 wings. McNamara held the line at 21, up from 16 in mid-1961. Modern munitions, he was convinced, would at least double the number of kills per sortie. The Secretary recommended spending $600 million for aviation ordnance, which was $180 million more than the Air Force proposed and $275 million above the FY 1963 level.30

The JCS critique, sent on 21 November, discerned “fundamental” qualitative and quantitative differences between the Secretary’s force recommendations and those of the Services. Basically, they argued, he had been misled by the findings of the Special Studies Group:

**CENTRAL EUROPE:** The Secretary’s force levels were derived from a strategy of retiring to the Rhine. The JCS, however, believed in containing the enemy well forward and preventing him from seizing substantial amounts of territory before negotiations began. The Group, they believed, had been overly optimistic about allied contributions. Further, they saw no clear support for McNamara’s statements that 34 divisions could “contain” an attack and that 55 to 60 “probably could hold indefinitely.” Most importantly, the JCS calculated enemy aircraft at 4,925 (with 600 more medium bombers probably available) which was well above the NATO figure of 4,020. They saw little likelihood, therefore, that NATO could achieve air superiority and wage an effective interdiction campaign. In that case, the Warsaw Pact could maintain considerably more than 60 divisions in combat.

**IRAN:** Not 800 but 1,650 aircraft would be needed.

**THAILAND-VIETNAM:** Airlift and sealift requirements would be “considerably greater than those programmed.”31

The JCS critique did not sway the Secretary. McNamara’s DPM of 3 December showed no changes in force-level recommendations. He deemed these sufficient to counter “a wide spectrum of likely Sino-Soviet Bloc aggressions in regions outside
of Europe.” He included the Joint Chiefs’ statement that, if simultaneous large-scale attacks occurred, the US would have to choose between nuclear escalation and possibly losing large areas of the Free World. In Europe, conventional forces were inadequate but remedies should lie primarily with the allies. “The Chiefs,” McNamara continued, “state that until adequate forces are available, NATO must be prepared to use tactical nuclear weapons early.”

President Kennedy met with Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs at his Palm Beach, Florida, residence over the Christmas holiday on 27 December 1962, to hear their opinion of the budget. The Service Chiefs took this offering to express their frustration. Admiral Anderson asked for more personnel, more funds for operations, spare parts, and maintenance, and more autonomy in decision-making. Cuts in the Navy’s shipbuilding proposals (e.g., from eight nuclear attack submarines down to six) would leave the fleet in 1970 with a larger percentage of over-age ships than was desirable. General Wheeler also wanted more personnel. A ceiling of 960,000 meant that the Army “would have to depend on the reserves earlier in a war than they would really like to.” General LeMay sought second-source production of F–4Cs as well as 60 more C–130s. It would be wrong, though, to presume that their mood was combative. Wheeler stated that his service “would be in the best shape it has been since Korea.” General Shoup said that the Marines “were the best they had ever been in peacetime.”

President Kennedy responded to LeMay’s request by ordering a review of strategic mobility requirements. Already, McNamara had increased C–141 objectives from 160 in FY 1967 to 208 in FY 1968 and, with reluctance, postponed the retirement of 16 troopships. After the review, he raised the FY 1965 objective for C–130s from 448 to 540.

As finalized, the five-year program listed 16 Army divisions, plus the provision-al air mobile division; three Marine division/wing teams; 15 attack and nine ASW carriers; 14 cruisers; 196 destroyers and escorts in FY 1964, falling to 161 in FY 1968; 78 diesel and 25 nuclear attack submarines in FY 1964, changing to 57 diesel and 48 nuclear by FY 1968; 21 tactical fighter wings, with numbers of aircraft rising slightly from 1,518 in FY 1964 to 1,545 in FY 1968.

**Force Planning in 1963**

This year, McNamara and his staff subjected conventional force planning to unprecedented scrutiny. The Secretary used ten DPMs to set out his views on general purpose forces, each about as long as the single paper that he had circulated in 1961. With far greater amounts of systematically analyzed information at hand, McNamara could delve into details of the force structure. He examined Navy requirements in depth, something that no Secretary of Defense had done before.
The JSOP formally opened the cycle, but its influence bore little relation to the large amount of time devoted to its preparation. Splits in JSOP–68, completed on 13 April 1963, very much resembled those in JSOP–67—a testament to the continuing power of service over joint perspectives. General Taylor told Joint Staff officers that the President and Secretary McNamara wanted enough strength to cope with two simultaneous crises, such as Berlin and Cuba. The Joint Staff concluded that 17 Army divisions would be enough. General Wheeler opted for 18, arguing that two crises would require sending nine divisions overseas and the CONUS general reserve had only seven. Taylor voiced the majority’s view that 16 were enough, under certain conditions: “Will it be necessary to deal with more than one situation with precise simultaneity? If a delay in reaction time of a few months can be accepted, we can rely on mobilizing reserve units.”

Taylor had taken a different view when he was Army Chief of Staff, showing how he adopted a broader, more joint, perspective as Chairman.

In a DPM distributed on 10 October, McNamara argued that 16 divisions (plus the provisional Air Assault Division) could fulfill North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) requirements and cope with one emergency elsewhere. The “key unresolved issue,” he related, was the size and strength of enemy ground forces. McNamara then set out to destroy what was, in his opinion, the myth of overwhelming Warsaw Pact superiority. His tool was the Index of Combat Effectiveness (ICE), which he said was being applied in studies and war gaming of tactical situations. Using the ICE to compare manpower, firepower, mobility, and command and control, he concluded that US divisions were about twice as powerful as Soviet ones. Thus the 58 to 75 active Soviet divisions equated to 29 to 38 US ones. Improved aerial ordnance showed great promise of offsetting Soviet advantages in armor and artillery. With 30 daily sorties per division, for example, 7,500 Soviet tanks could be destroyed over 30 days. These calculations led the Secretary to conclude that, in Europe, the central front’s vulnerability stemmed from the imbalance and inefficiency among NATO forces. Well-equipped and well-stocked NATO forces, with little more than the current number of divisions, should be “quite sufficient to hold a forward position without the use of nuclear weapons.”

The Service Chiefs and the Chairman all took umbrage with use of the Index of Combat Effectiveness. General Wheeler wanted the DPM’s rationale to be extensively rewritten. The ICE, he argued, was unsuited for application on a strategic scale. Granted, a US corps was stronger, more mobile, and could outshoot a Soviet Combined Arms Army. As an average, Wheeler allowed, one US division equaled between 1.2 and 1.7 Soviet divisions. Yet divisions did not fight one another in isolation; weather, terrain, missions, and logistics all would affect the outcome. Hence his conclusion was more restrained, that programmed NATO forces “should be capable of delaying and defending on the line of the Rhine . . . without requiring use of nuclear weapons.”
General Taylor, Admiral McDonald, and General Shoup recommended not revising but completely replacing Secretary McNamara’s 58-page rationale with eight pages that were generally worded, eliminating all ICE references and NATO-Soviet comparisons. They proposed saying simply that US deployments to Europe “have proved over the years to be about right.” Although the Soviets were hobbled by “many deficiencies in equipment and logistical support which offset the somewhat illusory strength of their numbers,” they still could achieve surprise and mass their forces at a desired point.39

Praising this “penetrating and highly informative approach,” General LeMay suggested applying the same methods to other areas of general purpose forces. But he had a number of doubts, particularly whether trying to create conventional parity would be worthwhile, since the Soviets would enjoy the advantages of surprise and selectivity in attack.

Through a separate memorandum, General Taylor registered what probably was the sharpest criticism of his Chairmanship. Bluntly, he told Secretary McNamara that the ICE “has no practical validity” because “no one seriously believes that the outcome of battle is calculable in mathematical terms.” He continued: “If as most soldiers believe, in war the moral is to the physical as three is to one, only about a fourth of the determinants of victory are susceptible to the coefficient approach and they are variables undergoing constant change.” He doubted, in fact, whether Allied Command Europe could conduct a successful defense without early recourse to nuclear weapons: “I believe this to be the unanimous judgment of the military leaders of NATO, US and European, and I would be loath to have the President receive a different impression.” Admittedly, it was difficult to defend the validity of forces that faced an apparently overwhelming enemy. Nevertheless, Taylor concluded, general purpose forces did appear adequate when “placed in the total context of our defense preparations.”40

The final DPM, holding the Army to 16 divisions, incorporated a number of JCS criticisms. McNamara still believed that a US division possessed 1.75 to 2.3 times the combat capability of its Soviet counterpart. Nonetheless, since the Army placed US superiority between 1.2 and 1.7, he agreed to use those figures, “although quite evidently there is room for further study, and I am directing the Army to pursue this matter.” Adopting Wheeler’s words, Secretary McNamara now stated that NATO forces “should be able at least to delay to and defend on the line of the Rhine” without using nuclear weapons. He included, as an appendix entitled “Criteria for the Capabilities Required of General Purpose Forces,” the rationale proposed by Taylor, McDonald, and Shoup. McNamara quoted Taylor’s critique of the ICE in a footnote, without comment. He did not include Taylor’s words about the “unanimous judgment” of military leaders concerning early use of nuclear weapons.41

The Secretary proved ready to increase tactical air wings. The Berlin mobilization had raised the number to 23 in FY 1962. Deactivations lowered the
total to 20 in FY 1963, with a return to 21 planned for FY 1964. On 9 November 1962, before the Cuban missile crisis was fully resolved, President Kennedy asked McNamara to assume that there were concurrent crises in Cuba, Central Europe, and the Far East. Would fighter interceptor and tactical air capabilities be adequate? What about Central Europe alone? Would planned production meet requirements in 1964 or 1965? The JCS proposed saying that air, ground, and naval forces would be inadequate for a three-front crisis. Even in Central Europe alone, NATO’s strength would prove insufficient if the Warsaw Pact chose to commit the bulk of its tactical air forces. Planned production was not designed to provide numerical world-wide superiority, since there were no plans to fight a protracted conventional war in Europe.

McNamara’s staff, however, calculated that the Free World’s tactical air inventory would exceed that of the Sino-Soviet Bloc: by 15,328 to 12,150 in 1963, and by 12,125 to 7,200 in 1968. The JCS protested that measuring numbers alone was not enough. Range might be paramount in one situation, numbers in a second, performance in a third. The circumstances in which an attack occurred—the degree of surprise and the weight of initial effort—also were critical to success. The Defense Intelligence Agency’s figures, furthermore, showed Sino-Soviet superiority in 1963 and a less pronounced Free World lead in 1968.

In May, after a good deal of back-and-forth, Secretary McNamara sent an answer to the President. He began by citing the JCS caveat that many things besides numbers must be taken into account. He believed, however, that it was “fair to say that we have sufficient aircraft programmed to cope with the kind of military conflict that we are likely to encounter anywhere in the world.” McNamara’s numbers now showed a Sino-Soviet edge in 1963 (12,965 versus 11,564) changing to a Free World advantage in 1968 (10,367 versus 6,980).

Meantime, through JSOP–68, LeMay and Anderson recommended expanding to 25 tactical fighter wings, while Taylor and Wheeler favored staying at 21. Wheeler cited the studies above indicating that, by 1968, NATO would be quantitatively and qualitatively superior to the Warsaw Pact. The Chairman considered 25 an inflated figure because it wrongly excluded reserves.

Secretary McNamara opted for increasing to 24 which, like his 1961 jump from 16 to 21 wings, cannot be ascribed to JCS influence. LeMay still wanted 25 but all his colleagues endorsed 24. McNamara’s program provided for 22 wings with 1,599 aircraft in mid-1965, rising to 24 with 1,740 aircraft by mid-1968. With these forces plus reduced vulnerability on the ground and faster deployment, according to his December DPM, “all evidence points to the conclusion that we can gain air superiority in a non-nuclear conflict in Europe or anywhere else.”

As for strategic mobility, JSOP-68 listed an increase to 480 C–130s and 272 C–141s for FY 1969. It calculated that two concurrent crises would create an airlift shortage equivalent to 658 C–141s; one crisis, a deficit equal to 64. Eliminating the two-crisis shortfall obviously was infeasible, but 64 C–141s should be added.
by 1968, raising the total from the 208 currently programmed up to 272. General Wheeler called this increase “questionable,” asking that a decision be deferred until Army levels were determined and airlift organization studies completed.48

McNamara wanted to emphasize airlift at the expense of sealift. Compared to JSOP–68, he projected more aircraft (844 versus 776) and fewer ships (88 versus 102). He proposed acquiring more C–141s, cancelling the procurement of 96 C–130s (thus annulling the additions made a few months earlier), and starting studies for a supercargo CX–4.49 McNamara acknowledged that these steps would slightly reduce deployment capabilities during FYs 1965–67 but claimed that airlift capacity by FY 1969 would be 25 percent greater than previously planned.50

The JCS protested that McNamara’s program put too much emphasis on older equipment and on unproved developments like the CX–4. During FYs 1965–67, under McNamara’s plan, general war requirements for D-Day through D+10 could not be met until D+25. They opposed reducing C–130 procurement because C–130s “would furnish more flexibility and versatility than C–141s in meeting specialized tactical airlift requirements.” In fact, they recommended a small reduction in the C–141 goal. Even if the CX–4 came into extensive use, they did not want to rely upon airlift alone; sixteen troopships should stay in service through FY 1969. McNamara decided to cut only 32 instead of 96 C-130s, slightly reduced C–141 totals, and retained the troopships for another year. Thus there would be 504 C–130s and 16 C–141s in mid-1965, 494 C–130s and 304 C–141s by mid-1969.51

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also split over naval forces. For attack carriers, JSOP–68 became another repetition of JSOP–67. Admiral Anderson wanted to stay steady at 15; Taylor and Wheeler favored a gradual reduction to 13; LeMay would cut down to 10. Anderson based his case upon the Soviets’ growing ability to employ air power against shipping. LeMay, as before, assigned primary importance to destroying submarines; hence, the number of ASW carriers should rise from 10 to 14. Wheeler observed that three US and three UK carriers were slated for water off northern Europe, where the threat consisted of submarine bases and 150 aircraft. Since missiles and land-based aircraft already were targeted against the submarine bases, Wheeler felt that the Navy was assigning a solution to a non-existent problem. Taylor reasoned that the high cost of carrier-based aviation, combined with its shrinking role in nuclear war, justified reducing attack carriers while increasing ASW ones to 11.52

Tentatively, Secretary McNamara proposed keeping 15 attack carriers through FY 1969, then paring to 14 in FY 1970 and 13 in FY 1972. He planned, furthermore, to defer the construction of attack carriers scheduled to start in FY 1965 and FY 1967. His justifications were: the much greater capabilities of the new Forrestal-class carriers compared to the Essex-class they replaced; the introduction of long-range missiles that vitiated a need for dual-purpose carrier aircraft; the growing mobility of land-based tactical aircraft; and the vulnerability of carriers to nuclear attack, meaning that their aircraft could not be part of a protected reserve.53
The JCS agreed that attack carriers should be removed from the Single Integrated Operational Plan, but they remained divided over force levels. All except LeMay recommended advancing up to FY 1967 the carrier construction slated to begin in FY 1969. That way, when the level fell to 13, every attack carrier would post-date World War II. McNamara agreed to move the construction date forward, but cancelled the carrier originally scheduled for FY 1967 and deferred until FY 1970 the start originally scheduled for FY 1969.54

In other naval categories, Secretary McNamara proposed funding six nuclear attack submarines, cutting ASW patrol aircraft from 30 to 25 squadrons, and starting 16 destroyer escorts so that the Navy's plan to build 125 escorts between FYs 1965 and 1969 could be fulfilled if circumstances so required. Except for the Chairman, all of the Service Chiefs advocated building nine submarines, but the Secretary was unchanged in his view. They also wanted to keep all 30 ASW squadrons; McNamara changed his recommendation to 29. Finally, for amphibious assault forces, McNamara recommended and the JCS endorsed funding 67 ships between FYs 1965 and 1967 so that, by 1970, lift would be available for ½ Marine divisions.55

On 30 December 1963, the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with the President at the LBJ Ranch for a last look at the defense budget. General Wheeler voiced concern that Army procurement funds would drop from $2.9 in FY 1964 to $2.08 billion in FY 1965. He particularly wanted higher production rates for M–60 tanks and for rifle and artillery ammunition. McNamara acknowledged "some possibility" that stockpiling standards were not being met but stressed how much had been done to correct the “tremendous” inventory imbalances that he inherited in 1961. Admiral McDonald was unhappy about three things: canceling the conversions of 15 destroyers; stopping the procurement of 48 A–4E attack aircraft; and lengthening to three years the time between ship overhauls. General Shoup supported him on overhauls. Secretary McNamara stood firm on conversions and A–4Es but said he was willing to reconsider overhaul time.56

As 1964 opened, the five-year program showed steady levels of 16 Army divisions, three Marine division/wing teams, 15 attack and nine ASW carriers. Air Force tactical wings would stand at 22 in mid-1965, 23 in mid-1966, and 24 in mid-1968. There would be 77 diesel and 27 nuclear attack submarines in mid-1965, changing to 49 and 53 by mid-1969. ASW escorts would number 215 in mid-1965 and 211 in mid-1969. The corresponding figures for anti-air fleet escorts, cruisers as well as destroyers, would be 58 and 77.57

**Force Planning in 1964**

This year saw the JCS submitting many of the same recommendations—separately more than collectively—and the Secretary repeating many of the same force-level decisions. Thus, for Army divisions, JSOP–69 showed the Army favoring 18, the Air
Force 14, and the Chairman, Navy, and Marine Corps 16. General Wheeler claimed that, in view of increased US mobility and reduced estimates of Soviet ground strength, there was an alternative to nuclear war. General LeMay countered that, in terms of resources expended, more divisions would buy proportionally little time and would not contribute significantly to Western Europe's defense.

The Joint Staff’s situational analysis did nothing to nurture a consensus. It stimulated so much inter-service disagreement that their influence on OSD was minimal. The analysis for a 1968 war in Europe assumed—wrongly, in the eyes of Wheeler, Greene, and McDonald—that a surprise attack would occur thirty days after an invasion of Southeast Asia. Postulating a Soviet reinforcement capability of two divisions daily, 26 divisions would be needed to defend the Weser River line on D-Day and 30 by D+11. In both cases, the US contribution would be five divisions. For a prolonged defense, 51 divisions would be required by D+30; only 42, eleven of them US, were projected as becoming available. Aircraft requirements for the first thirty days totaled 6,661, creating a deficit of 969. Wheeler and Greene challenged many assumptions and comparisons, particularly the continued reliance on the Index of Combat Effectiveness. They made a similar complaint about the analysis for Southeast Asia.58

Early in October, Secretary McNamara proposed maintaining 16 Army divisions, disbanding the Air Assault Division in mid-1965, and providing about $2 billion for procurement. By his reckoning, the Army and Marine Corps could mobilize 1.5 million men in six months and 2.5 million in twelve. Equipment was the main constraint upon the size of combat forces and greater pre-positioning seemed the least expensive solution. The Army, as McNamara saw it, was consolidating improvements made since 1960. These included: increasing combat-ready divisions from 11 to 16; converting from pentomic to the more robust ROAD organization; introducing more armored personnel carriers and self-propelled artillery; expanding aviation and counterinsurgency assets; and improving tactical nuclear capabilities. This large investment had occurred partly at the expense of air defense weapon systems, tactical vehicles, and ammunition reserves. Now the Army should strive for better balance instead of embarking on further expansion.

When comparing combat effectiveness, however, the Secretary was surprised by studies that a US infantry division contained 45 percent more personnel and cost 50 percent more than its Soviet opposite but had only perhaps 20 percent more firepower. In comparing mechanized and armored divisions, the differences were less pronounced but still present. A five-division US corps cost $18 billion over five years. The Soviets, for the same price, could field ten divisions with 30 percent more firepower. As a result, McNamara ordered the Army to examine organizational changes that would produce comparability.

Secretary McNamara’s scheme for deploying 16 divisions ran as follows: five in Germany, two in Korea, one in the Western Hemisphere, four in CONUS as the NATO-committed reserve, and four more to conduct an initial defense of
either South Korea or Southeast Asia. Mobilizing two or three reserve divisions could meet “most of the other contingencies.” In any one of these eventualities, he maintained, several divisions in the theater of operations would not actually be fighting. Reserves could be sent to a quiet sector and complete training there, releasing regulars for combat. Here OSD was extending its reach into concepts of operational employment.

General Johnson held out for 18 divisions, but the other Chiefs accepted 16. LeMay argued that better airlift and air interdiction capabilities, coupled with “a resolution of the current situation in Southeast Asia,” should allow deactivation of one division in South Korea and one in CONUS. Not surprisingly, McNamara’s final DPM stayed with 16 divisions.

The discussion of tactical fighter wings broke along the same service parochial lines as the previous year: Air Force, 25 by mid-1970; Chairman and Navy, 24; Army, 21. By October, Secretary McNamara had found no reason to change his objective of 24 wings. He did reduce the F–4 program from 14 wings to 12, on grounds that the US posture was strong enough to retain F-100s and F–105s somewhat longer. Intelligence now projected for NATO “a substantial margin” of qualitative and quantitative superiority over the Warsaw Pact: 4,100 versus 3,800 in 1965, 5,683 versus 4,520 in 1968. Globally, the Free World in 1965 would have 9,210 aircraft compared to 7,759 for the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The 1968 comparison would be 9,321 versus 6,595.

Secretary McNamara did seek one major change in tactical air missions. He saw no point in holding these aircraft back to conduct nuclear strikes, because conventional capability would be reduced just when it was most needed. Why not release these “Quick Reaction Alert” aircraft and replace them with Pershing tactical missiles?

General LeMay supported the Secretary’s force levels “at this time.” His qualification, presumably, referred to the fact that planning for a bombing campaign against North Vietnam was well under way. Wheeler and Greene agreed to 1,740 aircraft but wanted them organized into only 23 wings. But Admiral McDonald joined General Johnson in seeing no need for more than 21. The Chiefs united, though, in challenging the Secretary’s argument that tactical aircraft were unsafe and unsuitable as tactical nuclear delivery vehicles. They recommended retaining Quick Reaction Alert aircraft until Pershing tests had been completed.

On a broader plane, the JCS used this occasion to make known their unease about tendencies that permeated McNamara’s memorandums. First, the Secretary was judging NATO and Warsaw Pact forces on the basis of cost-effectiveness comparisons. Decisions about reorganization, they believed, should be based instead upon operational criteria. Second, he was becoming ever more prone to making theoretical tradeoffs between basically dissimilar types of forces. The JCS deemed it “a fundamental precept” that forces should be complementary and properly balanced. Third, the Secretary tended to equate differences in levels of training with disparities...
in combat capability. In their judgment, training provided merely a “transient” advantage and was “significantly” affected by such factors as personnel retention, environment, and acceptable personnel and materiel losses. Fourth, Secretary McNamara believed that qualitative improvement of a weapon system assigned an equivalent qualitative advantage to the force possessing it. But this, they countered, would occur only in the unlikely eventuality that the enemy made no comparable advances.64 Judging by subsequent DPMs, these criticisms made little impression upon OSD.

As regards strategic airlift, the JCS agreed that a requirement for the C–5A did exist, alternatives having been reviewed and rated inadequate. Wheeler, Johnson and LeMay wanted the first C–5As available by December 1969. General Greene called the decision premature, and Admiral McDonald would not endorse moving beyond the phase of project definition. The Secretary agreed with Wheeler, Johnson, and LeMay. He judged it “significantly more economical” to stop C–141 production at 208 and apply the $1 billion in savings to the C–5A, bringing the first ones into service during FY 1969. The C–141, he noted, had been conceived in an era when air movement was contemplated only for small rapid reaction forces drawn from airborne divisions. Further, the C–5A could land on a shorter airstrip and so bring its cargo closer to the battlefield—an important advantage in difficult, primitive terrain. In its final formulation, McNamara’s program for mid-1966 envisaged 504 C–130s and 80 C–141s; for mid-1970, 456 C–130s, 208 C–141s, and 32 C–5As.65

The 16 troopships again became a bone of contention. In his tentative guidance, Secretary McNamara proposed retiring them during FYs 1966–67. All the JCS except LeMay opposed that move, on grounds that they were needed to meet the Marines’ follow-on requirements. In his November DPM, the Secretary still favored a phase-out. The JCS again asked for retention, and McNamara agreed to keep them in active and ready reserve status through FY 1970.66

Moving to attack carriers, JSOP-69 contained force levels and supporting arguments that were basically unchanged from those in the last two JSOPs. In October, McNamara proposed: reducing levels from 15 in FYs 1966–69 to 14 in FY 1970 and 13 in FY 1973; modernizing two Midway-class carriers between FYs 1966 and 1969; deferring two carriers from FYs 1970 and 1972 to FYs 1973 and 1975; and planning the FY 1967 carrier to be conventionally powered but build a nuclear power plant to retain that option. Comparing land-based with sea-based air, he could not make a clear-cut case for either side. (This was an issue that put the Navy and the Air Force at loggerheads in every JSOP.) For example, air bases and aircraft carriers appeared to be about equally vulnerable. Land-based air could deploy more rapidly from CONUS, reach more targets, and maintain continuous engagement. Sea-based air was adaptable; a task force could operate as reliably in one ocean as in another. Secretary McNamara also looked upon the utility of nuclear propulsion as “an open question,” with drawbacks that offset every apparent advantage. All JCS members endorsed McNamara’s force levels except LeMay, who recommended the number
be reduced to nine by mid-1970. The Chiefs could not reach consensus about starting a carrier in FY 1967, but they did endorse building a nuclear power plant.67

In assessing antisubmarine warfare, Secretary McNamara programmed substantially lower levels than those in JSOP–69. New intelligence, he said, showed that the threat had been overestimated. The Soviets were building fewer submarines than anticipated. Their submarines were “noisier,” and thus more vulnerable, than supposed. Their ASW aircraft and surface ships did not seem designed for open ocean warfare. Recent studies indicated that, through 1970, we could defeat simultaneous Soviet attacks in the Atlantic and Pacific. For FY 1966, therefore, he proposed: starting only ten destroyer escorts and four nuclear attack submarines, compared to 16 and six in FY 1965; maintaining the patrol aircraft at 30 squadrons; and cancelling plans to modernize 12 diesel submarines.68

The JCS also disputed parts of the intelligence assessment. They detected a qualitative improvement in the Soviet submarine force “as a whole,” and observed that the number capable of reaching the US coast was increasing. They rejected the intelligence community’s assessment of any Soviet submarine more than 14 years old as “second line”; they still represented “a valid military capability” and should be so rated. Consequently, the JCS urged that attack submarine starts continue at six per year. General LeMay excepted, they also recommended starting 16 destroyer escorts annually through FY 1970.69

In his November DPM, the Secretary stated that “successful prosecution of the War-at-Sea is within our grasp” and stood by his recommendations for four submarines and ten destroyer escorts. For mid-1970, therefore, ASW levels would be nine carriers, 49 diesel and 56 nuclear submarines, 138 destroyers, and 63 destroyer escorts.70

The Navy wanted to begin building five nuclear-powered guided missile frigates between FY 1966 and FY 1969. Secretary McNamara disagreed, recommending that a much cheaper solution would be to install surface-to-air missiles on the nuclear carrier USS Enterprise. Effective defense against a nuclear attack, he concluded, was almost impossible. Against a conventional threat, however, available systems would provide good protection for several years.71

All the JCS sided with the Navy. General LeMay apart, they rejected the Secretary’s argument that defense against a nuclear attack was virtually impossible. And even LeMay agreed that weapon systems should not be designed solely to counter a conventional threat. In their judgment, an all-around defense capability should be maintained. But the program that McNamara presented to Congress early in 1965 contained no funds for nuclear frigates.72

The budget session with President Johnson on 22 December devoted hardly any time to general purpose forces. So the last peacetime proposals, it can be inferred, met with JCS approval. For FY 1965, these included 16 Army divisions, three Marine division/wing teams, 22 tactical fighter wings, 15 attack and nine ASW carriers.73
Summation

The Joint Chiefs’ recommendations remained riddled with inter-service splits, which often were the same from one year to the next. After the administration muddled through its first months, Secretary McNamara essentially took charge, and the directions along which the growth of conventional capabilities proceeded were largely his doing. He emphasized tactical air power and strategic airlift, areas in which the US advantage appeared greatest. The Army, he decided, needed reorganization more than expansion. However, the argument over the Index of Combat Effectiveness was a harbinger of future disagreement as the Vietnam War escalated.
Disarmament Gives Way to Arms Control

The Creation of ACDA

“Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate.” So spoke John F. Kennedy in his inaugural address. In his first message to Congress, the President promised that the olive branch and the arrows would receive equal attention. He promptly appointed John J. McCloy, a Republican who had been US High Commissioner for Germany and president of the World Bank, to be his personal adviser on disarmament. In May 1961, McCloy proposed establishing a new agency, considerably larger than the US Disarmament Agency (USDIS) operating within the State Department. He recommended that its head report to the Secretary of State but have a right of direct access to the President. On 25 May, Kennedy informed Congress that he wanted to establish an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).\(^1\)

Meanwhile, McCloy circulated this proposal for interdepartmental comment. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, while generally concurring, wanted ACDA’s director also to prepare recommendations for the President through the NSC. The JCS made more fundamental criticisms. The director of ACDA would be equivalent to an under secretary but his proposals would be coordinated at the cabinet level. They worried that existing arrangements for coordination, which struck them as entirely satisfactory, would be disrupted and DOD views slighted. The Chiefs suggested reorganizing and strengthening USDIS, “pending conclusion of statutory action.” Evidently, though, the JCS knew that their objections were a formality. During the drafting of their memorandum, Admiral Burke had argued
against defending USDIS on grounds that “the JCS should not place themselves in the position of backing a dead horse.”

On 29 June, Kennedy sent Congress a draft bill wherein ACDA’s director would report to the Secretary of State, retain the right of direct access to the President, and attend all NSC meetings dealing with disarmament. Congress acted and, on 26 September, Kennedy signed the legislation establishing ACDA. To be its Director, the President named William C. Foster, a Republican who had headed the Economic Cooperation Administration (1950–1951) and served as Deputy Secretary of Defense (1951–1953). Soon afterward, McCloy returned to private law practice.

However, the JCS did gain a larger voice. The forum for reviewing and debating arms control proposals was a Committee of Principals. Created in 1958, its membership consisted of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology. Kennedy added the Chairman of the JCS as well as the Directors of ACDA and the US Information Agency.

Formulating a Disarmament Plan

A

Ten Nation Disarmament Conference, conducted at Geneva under UN auspices, provided the forum for great-power negotiations. The last US proposal, presented on 27 June 1960, called for balanced, phased reductions down to minimal levels, with on-site inspection applied during each step. The main points in Stage One read as follows: Institute on-site inspection of air bases, missile launching pads, and submarine and naval bases. Fix initial US and Soviet force levels at 2.5 million each; contingent upon verification and the adherence of other militarily significant nations, reduce to 2.1 million. Conditional upon satisfactory progress in conventional disarmament, cease production of fissionable materials and transfer agreed quantities to peaceful purposes. Nothing followed because, in the wake of a failed summit meeting in Paris, the Soviets recessed the Conference.

Early in 1961, USDIS drafted a new proposal, which McCloy organized consultative groups to assess. The groups recommended extensive revisions, many of which USDIS apparently rejected. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric asked for JCS comments. Their reply, dated 10 June 1961, claimed that the new proposal would “confer significant advantage on the Sino-Soviet Bloc.” USDIS proposed, as independent separable steps in Stage One, fixing US and Soviet limits at 2.1 million, placing zonal restrictions on armed forces, reducing the numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs), establishing nuclear-free zones, imposing an uninspected ban on transferring nuclear weapons, ceasing fissionable materials production and shifting quantities to peaceful purposes. The JCS considered these changes a “serious erosion” of the position presented on 27 June 1960, which they
still preferred. The consultative groups, they noted, had suggested an initial ceiling of 2.5 million, opposed nuclear-free zones, and voiced reservations about separately proposing either a cessation of fissionable materials production or a reduction of nuclear stockpiles. Gilpatric passed their comments to McCloy, recommending that interagency representatives discuss redrafting.7

USDIS made changes but the JCS remained unsatisfied, basically because there were independent rather than interrelated measures in Stage One. After the Committee of Principals reviewed a draft on 3 August, the JCS submitted views about three unresolved issues in Stage One. First, arms reductions should precede a stoppage of fissionable materials production. A stoppage would be difficult to verify, hard to reverse, and dangerous unless communists' conventional superiority was reduced. Also, continued production of tritium (excluded under the US definition of "fissionable materials") struck them as being "absolutely essential." Second, Soviet and Chinese men under arms should each be pared to US levels, and so verified, before reductions to 2.1 million began. Third, no limits or prohibitions should be placed upon anti-ballistic missiles. Gilpatric told McCloy that he agreed with the JCS on the first two issues but not the third. On 17 August, when the Committee of Principals discussed USDIS's plan, President Kennedy said he "didn't see why all the fuss" about language linking cuts in SNDVs and fissionable materials with conventional reductions. If serious negotiations got under way, though, he would re-examine that issue.8

The President was planning to address the UN General Assembly in September. Suggestions circulated that, should there be an agreement about Berlin and a reopening of the Geneva talks, he could announce two proposals. First, the United States and the USSR would start transferring medium bombers to a third country for their eventual destruction. Second, the two powers would each transfer 300 kilograms of fissionable material to UN control and later put it to peaceful purposes. The JCS advised that reducing nuclear strength, at a time when the Berlin confrontation was worsening and the Soviets had just resumed atmospheric testing, would be "most inappropriate." That was precisely why B–47 retirements were being delayed. Also, definitions might differ, with the Soviets listing their obsolescent Beagle light bomber as equivalent to our medium B–47. More importantly, the absence of any inspection or control over retained weapons would set "a dangerous precedent." Similarly the fissionable material proposal was "seriously deficient" because it did not require Soviet agreement to a verified stoppage of production. Addressing the General Assembly on 25 September, Kennedy offered eloquence—"Let us call a truce to terror... Together we shall save our planet, or together we shall perish in its flames"—but kept proposals in very general terms. Concurrently, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson did table a draft "Declaration on Disarmament" with specifics. Stage One differed from the 27 June 1960 position mainly in prescribing a separate measure to reduce, through equitable and balanced steps, SNDVs in specified categories as well as agreed types of defensive weapons.9
Meantime, a panel led by ACDA’s Director Foster concluded that “immediate progress” was necessary to reduce and control SNDVs. Foster proposed amplifying the “Declaration on Disarmament” as follows:

**Stage A:** The United States and the USSR each would deposit and destroy 30 medium bombers, continuing to deliver 30 planes per month until the next stage took effect.

**Stage B:** NATO and the Warsaw Pact would reduce their SNDV inventories to 1,000 each, an SNDV being defined as a missile with more than 300 kilometers in range or a bomber of more than 15 or 25,000 kilograms empty weight. Military production of fissionable materials would stop. NATO and Warsaw Pact countries would be divided into zones, and inspectors placed at key points in all of them. Periodically, each side would select one zone in the other’s territory throughout which inspectors would enjoy unimpeded access.\(^{10}\)

On 6 December, the JCS explained why they wanted to retain the “Declaration on Disarmament” and scrap the Foster plan. Unless Soviet conventional superiority was eliminated, giving up the US nuclear advantage could upset the “uneasy balance.” Accepting numerical parity in SNDVs would: prevent the US from delivering a “substantive” second or retaliatory strike, and so tempt the Soviets toward making a pre-emptive attack; raise the threshold of provocations, thereby encouraging aggressive Soviet behavior; and spark a “quality race” in nuclear weaponry. Moreover, before NATO’s nuclear sword was shortened, its conventional shield would have to be made stronger. Gilpatric sent the JCS critique to Foster, along with comments of his own. He agreed that the Soviets must give up their conventional lead if the United States gave up its nuclear advantage. But he believed that, even with nuclear parity, the United States probably would still have a second-strike force adequate for deterrence. Perhaps, he speculated, a “quality race” could be averted by placing limitations not upon the vehicles themselves but upon warheads or megatonnage.\(^{11}\) It is noteworthy that this brief exchange brought up many of the issues that would be debated for the next quarter century.

An Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference was scheduled to convene in March 1962, eight neutrals having been added to the five NATO and five Warsaw Pact participants. Both the JCS and OSD deemed numerical parity in SNDVs an unacceptable proposition. Late in February, ACDA suggested conducting separate negotiations during Stage I for a 30 percent reduction in SNDVs, which it now defined as aircraft of more than 25,000 kilograms empty weight and missiles with ranges exceeding 200 kilometers. Cutbacks could be carried out by types, categories, total numbers of vehicles, and total megatonnage either according to delivery capacity or within certain categories. The JCS still objected to separating SNDVs. They wanted linkage with conventional cutbacks, acceptance of an adequate inspection system, and adherence by Communist China “at a very early stage.” Also, ACDA’s proposal to transfer 40,000 kilograms of fissionable material should
be held in abeyance until renewed US testing permitted a re-evaluation of nuclear stockpile requirements.12

On 1 March, the Committee of Principals debated ACDA’s plan. The broad question, according to Secretary Rusk, was whether to move toward parity or toward proportional reductions. Secretary McNamara brought up another “basic” issue. Should initial US proposals apply to all armaments or to SNDVs alone? If parity was to be sought, he wanted linkage between nuclear and conventional cuts. General Lemnitzer recited the JCS positions above. McNamara stated that a 30 percent cut in all weapon categories would leave the United States in a stronger position than if the Soviets continued closing the nuclear gap. Conferrees agreed that “it would be best to work for an across-the-board cut of about 30 percent” spread over three years. McNamara considered such reductions possible without involving China, but nothing more. On 9 March, President Kennedy approved this approach.13 Thus DOD’s argument for proportionality and linkage won acceptance—or so it seemed.

The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference opened on 14 March. The Soviets tabled a treaty providing for complete disarmament by stages but allowing only for inspection of what armaments were eliminated and not of what armaments were retained. ACDA suggested refinements in the US position to which the JCS “strongly” objected. Despite the President’s decision, they protested, ACDA kept emphasizing SNDV reductions and singling out ABMs for complete elimination. “Our best posture for the present and immediate future,” they reaffirmed, “is one of nuclear superiority.”14

Discussions in the NSC and the Committee of Principals narrowed interagency differences to “the way which we specify for reducing armaments.” All, save ACDA, wanted to organize a draft treaty in terms of reducing by individual types of weapons and limiting production by categories of weapons. ACDA would use categories for reductions as well. Lemnitzer, Gilpatric, and Rusk argued that the military balance was “very sensitive to the boundaries of the force mix”; reduction by types would permit only changes that were small and relatively predictable. At a White House meeting on 12 April, President Kennedy “decided to go ahead with reduction by types.”15

An “Outline of Basic Provisions” was presented at Geneva six days later. During Stage I, parties would reduce armaments by 30 percent in “illustrative” types that included: SLBMs and ICBMs with ranges greater than 300 and 5,000 kilometers respectively; aircraft with empty weight exceeding 40,000 kilograms; anti-ballistic missiles; tanks; artillery, mortars, and rocket launchers with calibers of 100 millimeters or more; and combatant ships with standard displacements of 400 tons and above. Parties would divide their territory into zones and declare the number of armaments and forces within each that were subject to verification. An International Disarmament Organization would enjoy unimpeded access within an agreed

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number of zones. Since the Soviet draft required that all SNDVs and foreign bases be eliminated during Stage I, the two sides were very far apart.\textsuperscript{16}

Nonproliferation became a topic of interagency discussion. After some Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence, ACDA proposed seeking agreement with the Soviets not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. In mid-September 1962, the JCS advised Secretary McNamara that potential disadvantages “far outweighed” possible benefits. Why, they wondered, was ACDA pushing for immediate action?\textsuperscript{17} The Soviets would not want to bestow nuclear arms upon their unreliable allies. Probably, they hoped to foster friction within NATO and weaken western solidarity over Berlin. A non-diffusion agreement would violate the “fundamental principle” that adequate safeguards must accompany disarmament measures. Moreover, many nations eventually would acquire nuclear capability. The United States might wish to assist friendly powers “in such fields as security, storage, permissive links, and alert procedures.” The difficulties involved in abrogating an unenforceable agreement might make such steps impossible.\textsuperscript{18} Nonproliferation remained under active review and high-level exchanges took place, but these years passed without any real progress.

Early in September 1962, the stagnant Geneva conference recessed for two months. ACDA took this opportunity to start a reassessment. Learning of this, the JCS protested to Secretary McNamara that “while the Soviet position on disarmament has remained practically unchanged since June 1960, the US position has been in a constant state of evolution, generally moving towards accommodation of Soviet views.” They cited several examples. First, the “Declaration” of September 1961 singled out SNDVs for reduction during Stage I and abandoned the requirement to balance US and Soviet levels at 2.5 million personnel before proceeding to the 2.1 million ceiling. Second, the “Outline” of April 1962 limited Stage I participation to the United States and the USSR, thereby allowing China to abstain, and introduced the untested system of zonal inspection. Third, in May 1962, the US delegation to Geneva suggested: specifying quantities of SNDVs for Stage I reductions; initiating foreign base reductions during Stage I; delaying zonal inspections until the beginning of Stage II; and reducing Stage I ceilings to 1.9 million. ACDA, they argued, showed a propensity for presenting negotiating positions before they had been properly evaluated—zonal inspection being an outstanding example. This recess should become the occasion for strengthening US positions, not for causing further concessions that would only whet the Soviets’ appetite.\textsuperscript{19}

Responding on 1 October, Secretary McNamara called JCS criticisms “an oversimplification.” The administration had made such “massive” analyses that “it would indeed have been remarkable had no changes occurred.” The key question, he said, was whether such changes had enhanced the opportunity to reach reasonable agreements: “I believe that they have.” McNamara agreed, though, that evaluation procedures could improve. When substantive differences developed, JCS views “would be aired at the Principal and White House level.”\textsuperscript{20}
Soon afterward, ISA sent General Taylor (who was now Chairman) a stinging attack on previous JCS papers. The memorandum was kept informal, to avoid requiring a reply which might have been equally stinging. According to ISA, “the majority of JCS studies are so loaded with caveats as to constitute unreasonable measures which the USSR, even should she become desirous of reaching agreements, could not accept.” Such studies usually showed how reductions would affect the United States but not the Soviet Union. They projected current relationships into the future, “without reasonable consideration of the military implications of political, economic, and sociological trends.” As a result, JCS advice was overruled “on occasions when better studies might have won support.” OSD, by default, had to provide military projections. Evidently, ISA hoped that Taylor would correct these faults. On the issue of a limited test ban treaty, that hope was realized. Otherwise, though, Taylor’s accession to the Chairmanship brought little change.

Some Small Steps

On 23 October 1962, in the midst of the Cuban missile crisis, Assistant Secretary Nitze asked the JCS to assess the desirability and feasibility of a “purple telephone” allowing instantaneous US-USSR contact. Replying on 10 November, they suggested that a teletype circuit would be quicker, more accurate, and more secure than a telephone. They recommended discussions with allies before going ahead, because the missile crisis had made them particularly sensitive about advance consultations. That hurdle was quickly cleared. At Geneva, on 12 December, the US delegation tabled a generally worded proposal to create emergency communications links. Four months later, the Soviets endorsed the idea of a Washington-Moscow “hot line.” A Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 20 June 1963. The Pentagon’s National Military Command Center became the hot line’s major terminal in Washington; it was also connected to State Department and White House communications centers.

The administration sought some way to avoid militarizing outer space. In May 1962, President Kennedy charged an interagency committee with formulating a negotiating position. It opposed a declaratory ban on orbiting weapons of mass destruction and noted a need for adequate verification. Questioning the need for verification, Kennedy asked for a study of reliance upon unilateral means to do so. ACDA supported a declaratory ban, if it allowed (1) use of intelligence-gathering satellites and (2) withholding of pre-launch notification and inspection. The JCS, however, opposed initiating such a proposal. A declaratory ban, they advised Secretary McNamara on 14 September, would inhibit the US space program while allowing the Soviets to go forward clandestinely. ACDA’s proposal also would strike other nations as being inconsistent with the long-standing US position that disarmament measures “must be substantive, balanced,
and subject to some means of verification.” Assistant Secretary Nitze sent these comments to ACDA, adding that he too opposed a “separate measures” approach. When the Committee of Principals met on 15 September, General Decker acknowledged that orbiting weapons was a more difficult way to deliver warheads than launching ballistic missiles. Then the Committee, Decker included, accepted and President Kennedy approved seeking a declaratory ban monitored by technical means. One must conclude that JCS and ISA objections had been pro forma and not deeply felt.

In the spring of 1963, chiefly as a matter of negotiating tactics, Secretary Rusk put off any approach to the Soviets. On 2 October, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko gave Rusk a draft declaration whereby the two nations would agree not to orbit “any objects carrying nuclear weapons.” The JCS opposed either a formal treaty or a joint executive agreement because verification would be inadequate. They wanted the Soviet draft amended to cover “weapons of mass destruction” as well as “objects carrying nuclear weapons.” The Committee of Principals agreed to insist upon “weapons of mass destruction,” which would have to be interpreted as embracing all nuclear weapons. President Kennedy decided that a United Nations General Assembly resolution would avoid the problem of Senate ratification. ACDA circulated a draft with which General Taylor concurred. On 17 October, a unanimous General Assembly summoned all nations “to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any object carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in outer space.”

In mid-November 1962, Director Foster suggested transferring 50,000 kilograms of uranium to peaceful purposes if the Soviets would do likewise with half that amount. Later, he added, a US upper limit of 100,000 could be considered. General Taylor commented that “we might be giving away important resources,” but Secretary McNamara said he was willing to consider trading 100,000 for 50,000 if that also brought about a stoppage of production. When Foster put this in a draft memorandum for the President, though, Taylor protested that he could not recall agreement on 100,000 having been reached. Foster then proposed an initial private approach to trade 60,000 for 40,000. The JCS stressed, and Nitze agreed, that the US public position should call for equal transfers.

In April 1963, US negotiators did make a private approach to the Soviets. Four months later, at Geneva, they presented the trade proposal. President Kennedy established, for exploratory purposes, an upper limit of 100,000 and a maximum US-Soviet ratio of two for one. Ultimately, with JCS concurrence, Washington and Moscow reached a much less ambitious understanding. In January 1964, President Johnson publicly declared that the US was “willing to shut down more plants if and when the Soviet Union does the same, plant by plant, with inspection on both sides.” On 20 April, after correspondence with Chairman Khrushchev, he announced that US uranium production would be cut considerably over a four-year period. Concurrently, Khrushchev announced that the USSR was suspending
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construction of two reactors and substantially reducing uranium production. There was no mention of mutual inspection.26

Examining an SNDV Freeze

In May 1963, with the Geneva talks stalled and about to recess, President Kennedy ordered an examination of new approaches to “significant measures short of general and complete disarmament.” The next several months were taken up by negotiation of a limited test ban treaty. Late in August, General Taylor directed the Joint Staff to delineate suitable terms for a comprehensive treaty and measure them against the “Outline” of April 1962. The result, which the JCS sent to Secretary McNamara on 8 October after much reworking, repeated a familiar catalogue of complaints. The “Outline” was deficient because it: failed to require China’s participation in Stage I; did not specify that an effective control organization must start functioning before Stage I reductions began; described an untested verification system; categorized armaments in a way that highlighted SNDVs and ABMs; introduced Stage I limitations in a way that precluded testing and modernization; and contained no provision for rapid withdrawal. In its totality, therefore, the “Outline” posed “unwarranted risks” and, if implemented, would be “detrimental to US interests.” Forwarding this appraisal to ACDA, McNamara supported most JCS criticisms and proposed focusing on more modest goals.27

Gradually, despite JCS objections, interagency discussions focused upon reducing strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. In December 1963, ACDA proposed spreading over three years a 30 percent reduction of US and Soviet SNDVs. For justification, ACDA observed that a strong and relatively invulnerable US strategic force was nearing its projected peak. The Soviets were just beginning their expansion. This proposal, therefore, would probe Moscow’s intentions and, if accepted, diminish the danger of a Soviet technological breakthrough. Unconvinced, the JCS advised that ACDA’s approach would disrupt NATO and endanger US security. Without a satisfactory inspection system, it could shift the military balance in Moscow’s favor. The US arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons might not be sufficient to offset Soviet conventional superiority. Then, in the eyes of our allies, the United States would lose capability and credibility.28

Secretary McNamara admitted that ACDA’s proposal posed “serious problems.” But, he told General Taylor, “we must in any event develop a firm US position in this area.” The State Department had suggested that a separable first stage consist solely of ceasing to produce SNDVs, ABMs, and fissionable material. McNamara asked the JCS whether freezing alone would eliminate many of the difficulties raised by ACDA’s reduction proposal.29

At that point, on 14 January 1964, the White House circulated a draft statement proposing that both nations “freeze where they are the size and number of
strategic nuclear weapons arrayed against each other.” The JCS opposed it, on grounds that neither side would accept the amount of inspection necessary. Also, they called the categorization of weapons vague and objected to the apparent exclusion of ABMs. The White House made changes, but the JCS wanted only to “explore” a verified SNDV freeze. On 21 January, President Johnson called upon the Geneva Conference to “explore freezing the numbers and freezing the kinds of strategic nuclear vehicles, whether planes or missiles, whether they are offensive weapons or defensive weapons.”

What, Assistant Secretary Nitze asked the JCS, would be the impact of freezing ABMs along with SNDVs? On 15 February, following a tortuous inter-service debate, they submitted a 68-page “preliminary” study. Broadly speaking, deterrence might be maintained under a freeze allowing one-for-one replacement in kind. If modernization was permitted, though, problems of the utmost complexity would arise. Moreover, adequate inspection would require unprecedented intrusions into national privacy. The JCS doubted whether ways could be found to fulfill the conditions that they deemed necessary.

Indeed, when ACDA circulated a detailed freeze plan, the accompanying verification arrangements aroused strong JCS opposition. By relying largely upon US intelligence, the Chiefs argued, ACDA’s plan required neither aerial surveillance nor unscheduled on-site inspections, except where production facilities were involved. The JCS, conversely, insisted upon “resident and random on-site inspection and aerial surveillance.” Reliance on other methods should be limited to validating lists of installations, establishing inspection priorities, and double-checking the data obtained from inspections. Indeed, they saw no point to performing a detailed review of ACDA’s proposal until these basic differences had been resolved. A meeting of deputies to the Committee of Principals showed how deeply the divisions ran. ACDA’s Deputy Director, Adrian Fisher, wondered “whether it would cause a riot” if a freeze proposal was presented at Geneva. “Yes,” other deputies replied, “in the US Government!”

ACDA responded with a revised verification plan. Secretary Rusk suggested, and the JCS supported, confining a freeze to areas where comparable Soviet activities could be adequately verified. Thus the Joint Chiefs wanted ACDA’s latest effort changed to: strengthen the linkage between a freeze and a cutoff of fissionable materials production; freeze not only the numbers but also the hardening and dispersal of missile sites; defer a decision on the degree of ABM inclusion; allow unrestricted prototype testing, as the surest safeguard against a Soviet technological breakthrough; and include random overflights. Generally concurring, Secretary McNamara informed Foster that he did not see overflights as essential but fully agreed that prototype testing should continue unchecked.

On 12 March 1964, ACDA circulated a freeze proposal to be cleared with NATO and then presented at Geneva. Verification would be done by: carrying out continuing inspections of declared facilities; making a specified number of inspections of
undeclared facilities; stationing observers to verify space launchings and missile firings; and witnessing the destruction or replacement of vehicles and launchers. The JCS did not favor exploratory East-West discussions “at this time.” If talks did take place, they should skirt issues that had not been settled within the US government. McNamara agreed to presenting ACDA’s proposal, noting that matters like prototype testing and ABM systems remained unresolved. After gaining the allies’ approval, US spokesmen offered the freeze plan at Geneva on 16 April. The Soviets promptly dismissed it as legalized espionage that would not “get rid of one missile or bomber.”

In mid-May, ISA asked the Joint Chiefs to clarify their position on two points: first, the number of long lead-time subassemblies to be controlled; second, a basis from which to begin negotiations about model-by-model replacement. In reply, they recommended putting production quotas on all major subassemblies, not simply rocket engines and stages as ACDA proposed. The more complete the surveillance, they reasoned, the higher the possibility of catching cheaters. As to replacement, they defined their “real objective” as freedom to substitute improved models of the same missile (e.g., Minuteman II for Minuteman I, Polaris A–3 for Polaris A–1). ACDA, they worried, would foreclose this option by requiring rigid dimension limitations. Secretary McNamara informed Director Foster that he also would list engines, motors, tankage, and stages among the assemblies put under control. He differed with the JCS, though, by excluding guidance packages and re-entry vehicles because he did not believe that reliable inspection was possible. On replacement, he rejected the JCS position “in the absence of knowledge of specific armaments which the Soviets may consider to be generally related.”

Meanwhile, an interagency task force analyzed the problem of prototype testing and concluded that, after all, effective prohibitions could be imposed. The JCS disagreed, but Secretary McNamara decided that four prohibitions were possible: (1) test firings of multiple re-entry vehicles; (2) test firings of ABMs against ballistic missiles; (3) test firings of new types of missiles from hardened or mobile launchers; and (4) repeated launchings of new types of missiles on sub-orbital trajectories exceeding 1,000 kilometers. The JCS repeated their position, but the Chairman (now General Wheeler) later agreed to exclude guidance packages and re-entry vehicles from controls. Finally, McNamara told Foster that among the four prohibitions he still supported (3) and (4), but he was deferring judgment about (1) and (2).

Late in July, the Committee of Principals approved a freeze plan. According to it, the subassemblies limited to one-for-one replacement would include ballistic missiles, liquid rocket engines and fuel tanks, solid-fuel rocket motors, stage assemblies, and mobile launchers. Inspectors would check those facilities and operating areas that had been declared closed, monitor plants still in use, verify accidental losses and planned destruction, insure that limitations on launchers were being honored, and carry out a specified number of inspections.
to check undeclared locations. On 27 August, US spokesman presented this plan at Geneva. Once again, the Soviets disparaged a verified freeze as “inspection without disarmament.” ACDA set to work again but nothing substantive resulted until early in 1965.

It is tempting, but misleading, to see the work of these years as laying foundations for the agreements consummated in 1972. Clearly, the Soviets were not willing to negotiate seriously about an SNDV freeze until they achieved equivalence in strategic nuclear capabilities. The JCS raised objections that sometimes could seem strained or contrived, but they were not the ones blocking movement.

**Summation**

Looking back from the 21st century, one must be surprised at how much time senior officials devoted to arms control and disarmament during years of almost continuous great-power confrontations. Civilian leaders kept seeking ways to ease tensions, damp down the arms race, and—not least—satisfy the public, Congress, and allies that peace was their goal. The JCS, inevitably, approached the problem from a very different perspective. Assuring the security of the United States was their duty. The adversary was crafty, the means of verification by anything less than thorough on-site inspections inadequate. That situation, in their judgment, left very little room for useful agreements.
Nuclear Testing: Start and Stop

How Long to Abstain?

In January 1961, no arms control issue was more pressing than whether to resume nuclear testing. Since 1958, Washington, Moscow, and London had observed an informal moratorium on tests in every environment. By the latter part of 1960, the Joint Chiefs came to favor renewed outer space, underground, and underwater—but not atmospheric—testing. Without verification, they argued, the moratorium amounted simply to a unilateral cessation in which time was “working to our disadvantage.”

The Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests was scheduled to reconvene in mid-March 1961. A position had to be formulated and the President’s adviser on disarmament, John J. McCloy, circulated one on 2 February. He proposed that a treaty banning atmospheric explosions be accompanied by a three-year moratorium on underground tests that would be undetectable without on-site monitoring—for example, those that produced seismic signals registering less than 4.75 on the Richter scale. To verify the atmospheric treaty, seventeen control posts would be sited on US soil and seventeen on Soviet soil. There would be twenty on-site inspections annually (or, as a fallback, ten) in each country.

On 21 February, the JCS reaffirmed their recommendation to renew testing. Their main worry was a major breakthrough by the Soviets. In their judgment, US proposals made in 1958 for verifying a test ban had proven technically inadequate—and “a constant erosion of the [1958] US position has taken place.” Unless the Geneva conferees reached an agreement within 60 days after reconvening, the United States should resume outer space, underground, and underwater testing. The JCS did not ask for renewed atmospheric testing but argued that the health
hazards from radioactive fallout had “assumed importance far in excess of its signif-
ificance in relation to the primary issue, the security of the United States.” Secretary McNamara reserved judgment, pending completion of an interagency review.³

Meanwhile, McCloy had asked a panel chaired by Dr. James Fisk of Bell Labora-
tories to review technical issues. Reporting on 2 March, the Fisk panel concluded
that both countries could maintain “very strong” deterrent postures without further
testing. Under a ban observed by the United States but evaded by the USSR, both
sides’ pre-emptive capabilities would stay constant but the Soviets could develop
high-yield warheads, giving them a superior capability for counterforce strikes.
If both sides engaged in unlimited tests, increases in yields would lead to smaller
weapons, improving mobility and survivability that would make counterforce
attacks more difficult.⁴

At a meeting on 2 March, senior officials settled all questions save one—that
of how many on-site inspections should be allowed. Two days later, a White House
session resolved that as well. McCloy proposed a minimum of ten, adding more for
each unidentified seismic event beyond fifty, up to a limit of twenty. The JCS, Gen-
eral Lemnitzer said, would prefer that the number of inspections be strictly pro-
portional to the number of detected events, with no ceiling. According to Assistant
Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, however, OSD did not see the number of annual
inspections as a matter of “paramount importance.” OSD was more concerned
about the composition of a control commission and the method of certifying an
event for inspection. President Kennedy decided to adopt McCloy’s proposal.⁵

The Fisk panel’s report, apparently, played little part in this decision. The
report itself was not distributed until 3 March. The Joint Staff, writing under a
24-hour deadline, criticized it for failing (1) to emphasize sufficiently that a major
breakthrough could drastically alter the military balance, (2) to stress that testing
and reliability were necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of stockpiled war-
heads, and (3) to accentuate the urgent need for obtaining data on weapons effects
in various environments. All this was done post-haste. As General Lemnitzer wrote
to Admiral Burke afterward, “The traditional highest ‘classification,’ DESTROY
BEFORE READING, has been topped with something new—CONCUR WITHOUT
SEEING!…. My first opportunity to see the Report and the JCS comment on it . . .
was thirty minutes before I was supposed to be at the White House and ready to
defend our position to the last ditch!”⁶

At Geneva, on 18 April, the US and UK representatives tabled a draft treaty
banning all tests except those measuring less than 4.75 seismic magnitude. A
control commission, with equal US and Soviet representation and three neutral
members holding the balance, would supervise a worldwide inspection system. An
administrator would carry out the commission’s decisions. The Soviets countered
with an offer of stations manned almost entirely by Soviet personnel, and three
on-site inspections. The United States and United Kingdom both wanted twenty
inspections. Moreover, the Soviets denounced the concept of a single impartial
administrator, insisting that the control council consist of a three-member “troika” (one pro-West, one pro-Soviet, and one neutral), each of whom would wield a veto. Westerners took this insistence upon what amounted to self-inspection as evidence that the Soviets were not interested in negotiating a treaty.7

McCloy concluded that the Soviets planned to let the talks limp along until they could be merged with general disarmament negotiations. Then US freedom of action would be severely inhibited, and the unenforceable moratorium could continue indefinitely. Clearly, he believed, it was time for deciding whether to resume underground tests and/or seismic research programs. The JCS wholeheartedly agreed. They recommended early and unannounced resumption, contending that, “if detected, these tests, regardless of the type, may be related directly to the seismic research program.” Deputy Secretary Gilpatric informed McCloy that he agreed, with one exception. “In our open society,” he wrote, “I doubt the wisdom and practicality of attempting weapons tests under cover of the research program.”8

Secretary McNamara asked Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, to review the pros and cons of renewed testing. Under a voluntary moratorium, Brown contended, the Soviets “almost certainly” would cheat and thereby pull ahead. If both sides resumed testing, by contrast, the United States should “make a number of advances that are more critical to us than to the USSR.” He favored early resumption and the JCS naturally agreed.9

Dr. Brown briefed the NSC on 19 May. Four days later, the Committee of Principals convened. McNamara argued that “the gross advantage to the US from a resumption of testing was substantial.” The cost of warheads and delivery vehicles might be cut “by tens of billions of dollars over a period of years.” He saw a potential for developing pure fusion and, possibly, effective ABM weapons. General LeMay, attending as Acting Chairman, noted how testing could improve our trouble-plagued first generation of ICBMs. With smaller warheads “and hence, missiles . . . we could afford to test more of them and thus increase their reliability.” Dr. Jerome Wiesner, the President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology, gave his opinion that “the military considerations involved were so long-range in nature that the political considerations should be the determining factor in timing the resumption of testing.” Secretary McNamara agreed to the extent that, provided there was a definite intention to resume testing, “whether the tests were held in July or December would make no difference.”10

The Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting, early in June, showed how far apart the two sides were. Afterwards, President Kennedy told the American people that the Soviet leader “made it clear that there could not be a neutral administrator . . . ; that a Soviet veto would have to apply to acts of enforcement; that inspection was only a subterfuge for espionage, in the absence of total disarmament; and that the present test ban negotiations appeared futile. In short, our hopes . . . for some slowing down of the arms race have been struck a serious blow.” Secretary McNamara reacted by pressing for action to end the moratorium. On 22 June, he circulated
a draft letter asking the President to “make a decision at an early date to initiate preparations to resume nuclear weapons testing.” He characterized as “substantial” the chances (1) that the Soviets were either secretly testing or preparing to do so and (2) that such one-sided testing would lead to “grave consequences” for US security. With a confrontation over Berlin looming, Secretary McNamara believed this decision would display the depth of American resolution: “The US has stated that it could not continue indefinitely under an uncontrolled moratorium. This is an appropriate time to demonstrate that the US means what it says.” The JCS, going further, wanted President Kennedy to “make the decision to resume nuclear testing at an early date and initiate preparations now to resume [them].” McNamara stayed with his original wording, sending it to McCloy on 28 July.11

President Kennedy appointed a panel of scientists, chaired by Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky, to appraise technical issues.12 Reporting on 21 July, the panel found that “none of the specific weapons tests now discussed appear to be of such urgency . . . that a reasonable delay . . . would be critical.” Thus, in the near term, decisions could be based primarily upon non-technical considerations. If neither side tested, the panel believed that US technological superiority would continue for some time. If both resumed, their technologies probably would equalize in the relatively near future. The likelihood of major surprises struck the panel as being small for strategic but great for tactical weapons. If Americans abstained while Soviets tested secretly underground, the Soviets might gain selective technological superiority within three to four years, but such advances would require extensive testing carrying a higher probability of detection.13

Not surprisingly, the JCS challenged these findings. In their judgment, conclusions about Soviet capabilities were based on unconfirmed estimates and thus “subject to gross error.” The nature of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile was “essentially unknown both qualitatively and quantitatively.” Did not the panel’s admission that there could be important surprises in the tactical and weapons-effects fields tend to invalidate their claim that there was little urgency about resumption? Dr. Brown sent their paper to the White House, along with a statement that the Defense Department favored a resumption of underground testing “as soon as it is politically expedient.”14

Some other agencies thought better of the Panofsky report. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission generally concurred with its findings and conclusions. Central Intelligence saw no convincing evidence of Soviet cheating. Mr. McCloy and Acting Secretary of State George Ball favored preparations to test early in 1962 but would delay announcement until a few days before the test. General Maxwell Taylor, who was working in the White House, argued for an immediate resumption of testing “unless the most compelling of political arguments can be adduced against it.” He identified three areas in which testing mattered more to the United States than to the USSR. First, ability to absorb a first strike depended upon having a mobile force with lightweight warheads. Second, the possibility of
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the Soviets being first to deploy ABMs mandated developing decoys and multiple warheads. Third, perfecting very small tactical weapons could allow their use with greater safety for our own forces and populations.\textsuperscript{15}

At the White House, on 8 August, General Lemnitzer said that the Joint Chiefs’ main concerns were over lack of intelligence on what the Soviets were doing and about the character and strength of their weapons and stockpile. The Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, countered that we knew much more than Lemnitzer supposed. President Kennedy ordered an effort to clarify disagreements and narrow them if possible. The result did more to clarify than to narrow. Were the Soviets testing secretly? The JCS saw a “strong possibility” that they were; Central Intelligence found no evidence to support such a conclusion; the Panofsky panel assumed “an unqualified position of uncertainty.” What was known about qualitative aspects of the Soviet stockpile? Central Intelligence and the Panofsky panel believed that reasonable estimates could be reached; General Lemnitzer did not. Lemnitzer, Dulles and Wiesner (representing Panofsky) did agree upon “the need for the United States to resume testing within a reasonable time.”\textsuperscript{16}

Testing Resumed: Who Benefited More?

Abruptly, the argument over possible Soviet cheating became academic. On 30 August, Moscow announced that it would resume atmospheric testing, and forecast explosions running from twenty to 100 megatons. On 5 September, after the Soviets’ third atmospheric explosion, President Kennedy announced a resumption of testing “in the laboratory and underground and with no fallout.” That left the JCS unsatisfied because underground tests were tailored primarily to slow, expensive development of small tactical weapons. They wanted to measure (1) the disrupting effects upon radar and communications and (2) the high-altitude kill radius of an ABM warhead. Here, they believed, the potential impact of surprise breakthroughs was “profound.” On 29 September, they recommended a resumption of atmospheric testing, initiating preparations immediately. Secretary McNamara also urged that preparations be made, and the President approved doing so.\textsuperscript{17}

There were some difficulties about the preparations. In 1958, when the moratorium began, the JCS had urged that the testing task force be kept intact. They were overruled and the organization was dissolved. Now, reconstitution was complicated. The firm that manufactured cables for use at test sites had ceased production; months passed before output began again.\textsuperscript{18}

Soviet atmospheric testing came to a climax on 30 October, detonating a superbomb of colossal yield. In Congress, the JCS faced criticism because the American arsenal contained nothing comparable. General Lemnitzer explained to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that the United States did not need larger warheads. Existing weapons, he testified, were accurate enough to destroy any target and
powerful enough to obliterate any civilian target. Therefore, he concluded, the Soviet superbomb could only be a “terror weapon” for blackmailing the West.¹⁹

In mid-November, President Kennedy established an NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing Policy chaired by Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission; other members included William C. Foster, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Dr. Harold Brown, Director, Defense Research and Engineering; Dr. Jerome Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President on Science and Technology; and McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security. Kennedy gave them stringent guidelines. He would personally review every proposal. Atmospheric tests could take place only when (1) important information was unobtainable any other way, (2) military needs outweighed the desirability of avoiding radioactive fallout, and (3) the resulting fallout was minimized in every possible way. The Committee recommended 27 shots over a three-month period starting in the spring of 1962. The President approved but decided to delay a public announcement until about 1 April, just before the tests would begin.²⁰

The Soviet series ended with at least 45 explosions detected. Preliminary evaluations indicated a “highly successful” effort to achieve greater thermonuclear efficiencies, improve warhead yield-to-weight ratios, and reduce requirements for fissionable materials. Indeed, “in some cases, the Soviet results appear to go beyond present US technology.” Assistant Secretary Nitze asked for a JCS appraisal. Their reply, dated 22 December, stated that Soviet progress potentially changed the positions of the two countries. Without full-scale US testing, the Soviets probably would move “well ahead” in ABM development and yield-to-weight ratios. An early renewal of atmospheric testing thus was “imperative.” They added that, at this point, a test ban treaty would be “most emphatically” contrary to US interests. No amount of inspection could stop the Soviets from capitalizing upon their recent tests and readying a new round. A second series could make their advantage “overwhelming.”²¹

On 29 January 1962, with the Soviets refusing to soften their position, US and UK delegates at Geneva forced an indefinite suspension of talks about a test ban. Since the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference was going to reconvene in mid-March, President Kennedy did not want to give the impression that US policy was still unsettled. When the NSC discussed testing issues on 27 February, General Lemnitzer reported that the Joint Chiefs strongly favored resumption and particularly emphasized the importance of proof-testing complete weapon systems. He also said that the JCS could not approve a test ban treaty like that presented at Geneva on 18 April 1961. Although Secretary McNamara agreed about the tests, he was willing to “sign on to such a treaty.” The President saw some advantages in “updating” the treaty but was ready to start testing. In a televised address on 2 March, Kennedy announced that atmospheric tests would start during the latter part of April and run for two or three months.²²

The initial series, conducted at Christmas and Johnston Islands in the Pacific, lasted from 25 April until 12 July with 26 detonations. A second set, from 2 October
to 4 November, involved ten explosions. One Polaris missile with a nuclear warhead was launched at sea over the water. (Concurrently, the USSR conducted about thirty more atmospheric tests.) President Kennedy authorized preparations for firing an Atlas ICBM with its warhead, but then vetoed the test. Despite a JCS protest that military confidence was “in direct proportion to . . . proven capability”—he did not relent. The Atlas would have been fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, where a malfunction and abort could release radioactive material. Kennedy also may have seen little value in testing an ICBM that was nearing obsolescence. A committee of weapons experts, drawn from the Los Alamos and Livermore Laboratories, concluded that an earlier review of the Soviets’ 1961 tests had significantly overestimated their capabilities. The group also believed that the Soviets’ 1962 tests did not involve any substantial advances over their 1961 series. As for American tests, Dr. Brown informed Secretary McNamara that “an amazingly high percentage of the experiments obtained useful data.” The JCS view was much more guarded. In December, General Taylor (now the Chairman) advised McNamara that more testing was essential. The Soviets, he wrote, “have conducted about five sophisticated high-altitude tests that should make them much better informed than we . . . . Superior knowledge here could be vital to winning a nuclear war.”

More Drafts, More Disagreements

Meantime, ACDA drafted a total or comprehensive test ban that took two developments into account. First, neutrals at the Disarmament Conference had tabled a draft that placed major reliance upon national detection systems. Second, findings from Project Vela indicated that US ability to distinguish earthquakes from underground explosions was better than had been supposed. But the JCS found this draft, too, full of faults. First, the ban should apply to detectable tests alone. Second, detection should be based upon the concept of international administration; ACDA’s solution struck them as being too vague even for comment. Third, on-site inspection ought to be absolutely mandatory; ACDA’s “permissive phraseology” left this open to doubt. Fourth, negotiating obstacles should not be left for later resolution by a commission; ACDA proposed passing so much to the commission that the implementation of verification procedures might be delayed indefinitely. Fifth, the mechanism for withdrawing from the treaty should not be so “highly involved and inhibiting.” Finally, as to requirements for inspection and verification, the JCS denied that “the overall technical situation justifies any significant change in the US position.” In forwarding these comments to Director Foster, the ISA agreed that the verification system was too vague and that on-site inspection must clearly be obligatory. What the JCS were willing to accept was a comprehensive ban, excluding tests below a detectable threshold, with reliable detection and inspection systems. Quickly, ACDA
produced limited and comprehensive treaties with which OSD generally agreed. Draft treaty articles sought by the JCS that authorized underground explosions and preparations for testing were deleted with an understanding that the propriety of doing these things would be made perfectly clear during negotiations.25

At Geneva, on 27 August 1962, US and UK spokesmen tabled two draft treaties. A comprehensive ban required on-site inspections by international teams; an atmospheric-outer space-underwater ban omitted these measures by allowing small underground tests. A futile gesture! The Soviets still insisted upon what amounted to a total but unverifiable ban. Early in September, the conference recessed without recording any progress.26

Perhaps the near-catastrophe of the Cuban missile crisis helped ease this impasse. American and Soviet scientists raised the possibility of using tamper-proof automatic seismic detectors with built-in recorders, dubbed “black boxes,” that would be supplied by the international control commission and put in place by the host country. In December, Chairman Khrushchev wrote President Kennedy that he would accept three black boxes and two or three annual inspections. Unsatisfied, Kennedy replied that black box locations—all outside the areas of highest seismicity—were wrong, and that eight to ten inspections were necessary. Khrushchev agreed to change the sites but not the numbers.27

In New York and Washington, American, British, and Soviet diplomats opened talks about a comprehensive ban. Late in January 1963, Assistant Secretary of Defense Nitze asked the JCS to assess where matters stood. Their reply focused on what they called the “quite radical” changes that ACDA had in mind for the comprehensive draft treaty of 27 August 1962. Shortcomings like too few inspections, too much reliance on black boxes, and allowing the accused state to declare that a suspected explosion lay within a sensitive security area would virtually invite Soviet evasion. At a White House meeting on 8 February, President Kennedy ruled that six annual inspections would be our “rock-bottom” number, a figure with which the Secretary of Defense agreed. By this time, in fact, Secretary McNamara had broken with the Joint Chiefs on key aspects. In his judgment, the United States currently possessed clear strategic superiority and more advanced nuclear technology. A total ban would lock in that technological lead, and evasions would not critically harm US security. Besides limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the superpowers’ agreement to stop testing could set an example that would restrain others. Hence, McNamara was willing to accept a less than perfect treaty.28

ACDA circulated a revised draft in which the JCS again found flaws (e.g., exclusion from inspection of sensitive defense installations, acceptance of a 4.0 detection threshold for underground testing, no abrogation of the treaty for three years). Nitze decided that, although most of the Joint Chiefs’ suggestions were desirable, a proposal containing all of them would be non-negotiable. ACDA’s draft generally conformed to the treaty of 27 August 1962, and its new features had presidential approval. Accordingly, Nitze asked ACDA for only modest revisions such
as cutting the withdrawal period, to which ACDA agreed. On 23 March 1963, ACDA circulated the final version of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Under its terms, each country would allow seven black box sites and seven annual inspections. McNamara declared this draft acceptable.\textsuperscript{29}

Meanwhile, ACDA's habit of rushing drafts through the reviewing process had brought JCS dissatisfaction to a boil. In mid-1962, Director Foster promised that DOD would be allowed seven days to review normal and three to review emergency ACDA papers. However, in the exercises described above, three-day deadlines had become the rule and seven-day reviews the exception. Accordingly, on 4 March, the JCS protested to Secretary McNamara that military views were being slighted. They claimed, also, that the Committee of Principals was being crippled by the press of time and the lack of formal procedures. Improvements should include: making the JCS Chairman a “Principal” rather than just a “member”; circulating an advance agenda; preparing a record of decisions and a recapitulation of unresolved issues; and permitting individual members to comment upon papers sent to the President.\textsuperscript{30}

Secretary McNamara agreed that ACDA's deadlines would be honored only when seven days were allowed. Otherwise, there would be no DOD response and Defense personnel would boycott the next meeting at which that paper was discussed. He communicated these views to Foster, who accepted virtually all the suggestions pertaining to members and procedures for the Committee of Principals. Foster denied, though, that deadlines were too short. Substantive issues, he reminded the Secretary, were discussed at the staff level well before drafts actually circulated.\textsuperscript{31}

Since the shape of a comprehensive treaty now seemed to have crystallized, the JCS decided to summarize the situation as they saw it. So, on 20 April 1963, they told Secretary McNamara once again why a total ban that prohibited testing below the detection threshold would not serve American interests. The United States stood on the verge of developing a spectrum of clean warheads. The Soviets could develop these devices by undetectable underground tests, thereby making major strides in their tactical and ABM capability. They already possessed a substantial lead in very high-yield weapons and more advanced knowledge of high-altitude effects. In these circumstances, they deemed an energetic test program in all environments to be essential.\textsuperscript{32}

No one was more determined to press for a treaty than John F. Kennedy. The President professed himself to be “haunted” by a feeling that, without a ban, there could be ten or fifteen nuclear powers by 1975. At a press conference, he spoke of 1963 as the critical year: “If we don’t get it now... perhaps the genie is out of the bottle and we’ll never get him back in again.” He had backing in Congress. On 27 May 1963, Senators Hubert Humphrey (D, Minn.) and Thomas Dodd (D, Conn.) introduced a resolution co-signed by 32 of their colleagues asking the administration to try again for a treaty banning atmospheric and underwater tests. They urged the administration to abstain from atmospheric and underground testing as long as the USSR did so. But, “bearing the Soviet record of deceit and bad faith in mind,” US testing facilities should remain “in a state of constant readiness.”\textsuperscript{33}
General Taylor anticipated that the Senate Armed Services Committee would ask the JCS to describe an acceptable treaty. That worried him because “we have been against many things but have made no affirmative proposals.” At his request, the Joint Staff appraised the Dodd-Humphrey resolution and tried to produce a positive position—and failed. Their finding, which the JCS approved on 12 June, was that “either a fully effective test ban containing vital and responsible safeguards or continued testing in all environments could be compatible with national security.” Every limited test ban proposal they had reviewed, including Dodd-Humphrey, contained shortcomings “of major military significance.” ISA also drafted a statement for the Senate Committee. When the JCS reviewed it, they found differences ran so deep that even an amended statement could not adequately convey their views. ISA argued that Soviet cheating could lead to progress only at the lower end of the weapons spectrum and that, with or without a test ban, the United States could maintain a second-strike capability but its strategic superiority would erode. The JCS believed that cheating could create advances in all categories, that a ban would make preserving a second-strike capability more difficult, and that ISA was implying abandonment of the counterforce strategy and denigrating what research and development might accomplish.34

About Face

A culmination came much sooner than anyone in Washington expected. Khrushchev had agreed that American and British representatives—Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman and Lord Hailsham, Minister of Science and Technology, were appointed—come to Moscow for talks about a comprehensive ban. Speaking at American University on 10 June, President Kennedy smoothed their path, asking Americans to re-examine their long-held attitudes toward peace, toward the Soviet Union, and toward the Cold War. Moscow negotiations, he announced, looked toward “early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty.” To demonstrate its “good faith and solemn convictions,” the United States would refrain from atmospheric testing as long as other nations did likewise.35

However the American people may have felt about a test ban, the administration remained divided. When the Committee of Principals met on 14 June, Secretary McNamara urged that “a head-on collision be avoided if possible.” It was not. On 26 June, Admiral Anderson read to the Senate Armed Services Committee the JCS statement opposing a comprehensive test ban treaty. Next day, General LeMay testified that testing was necessary in order to keep making technological advances and maintain military superiority. McNamara had suggested rewording the JCS statement, but LeMay rejected any changes apart from grammar and style.36

Secretary McNamara helped organize a series of interagency consultations, from which several White Papers emerged. He believed that they represented a
“broad consensus” but, in order to achieve “a full measure of certainty,” circulated them for comment. The “broad consensus” balloon burst. As an example, Dr. Brown, Dr. Wiesner, and Central Intelligence stated that Soviet cheating could not change the basic US-USSR balance. The JCS, the Defense Atomic Support Agency, and Livermore Laboratory claimed that the contrary was true.37

Speaking in East Berlin on 2 July, Chairman Khrushchev said that he was willing to sign a treaty banning atmospheric, outer space, and underwater testing. There could be no on-site inspection, though, and a nonaggression pact must accompany the treaty.38 Allowing underground testing to continue would finesse the vexed issue of cheating below the detection threshold.

On 9 July, the NSC reviewed Harriman’s instructions for his mission to Moscow. General Taylor noted that the Chiefs, individually, had taken the position that a limited test ban treaty was not in the national interest. He wanted the Committee of Principals to “review the entire proposal again in light of developments during the past year.” Secretary McNamara opposed doing so, “on the grounds that there was wider diversity on the advisability of a treaty this year than there was last year.” Secretary Rusk said that the time for review was past, and that “we must now take the position that an atmospheric test ban is in the national interest.” Later that day, in the Oval Office, Kennedy promised Taylor that the JCS would have their “full day in court before the Senate if and when a formal treaty proposal” came up for ratification.39

On 10 July, the Joint Staff drafted a memorandum calling a limited test ban “militarily disadvantageous,” and stating that “there must be overriding non-military considerations for such a treaty to be in the national interest.” General Taylor suggested a milder statement that “there must be compensating non-military considerations.” But Wheeler and LeMay wanted to say “overriding,” and at a JCS meeting on 16 July they won their way. This draft, which they approved but did not forward to Secretary McNamara, stated that

there are significant military disadvantages to the proposed treaty. To a degree difficult to establish, it could continue the USSR lead in very high yield technology. In addition, there are significant opportunities for cheating which, if exploited, could provide military gains to the Soviets that would be denied to the United States. The test ban treaty would deny the United States the opportunity to conduct important atmospheric effects tests and to eliminate some uncertainties in the survivability of our hardened, fixed base, second strike force and to conduct training exercises with tactical nuclear weapons. . . .

In view of the foregoing, there must be overriding nonmilitary considerations favoring the treaty for it to be in the national interest.40

Meantime, in Moscow on 15 July, Harriman and Hailsham opened negotiations with Chairman Khrushchev and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. The Soviets quickly ruled out a comprehensive ban. Several issues about an atmospheric-outer space-underwater treaty had to be resolved. Americans dropped on-site inspection.
The Soviets agreed to forego a nonaggression pact and accepted an article allowing parties to withdraw upon 90 days’ notice if they decided that “extraordinary events” had jeopardized their “supreme interests.” Withdrawal on short notice was a point for which the JCS had pressed strongly. Negotiators completed their work on 25 July; President Kennedy told the American people that “a shaft of light cut into the darkness.”

On the morning of 24 July, the JCS met with the Chief Executive, who assured them that “we cannot reduce our military readiness if an accord is reached, for the whole situation could turn around in six months.” But he emphasized that, in giving advice about the treaty, “all Chiefs should base their position on the broadest considerations, not just military factors.” Here he was invoking NSAM No. 55, issued in June 1961, which instructed the JCS to be “more than military men” and fit military requirements “into the overall context of any situation.”

The JCS decided to poll knowledgeable officials about the treaty’s technical and political aspects. Those polled included John Mccone, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Dr. Seaborg, Chairman of the AEC; Drs. Wiesner and Brown; Dr. John Foster of the Livermore Laboratory and Dr. Norris Bradbury of the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory. Their answers were generally, although not completely, reassuring and plainly eased JCS concerns. On the issue of clandestine testing by the Soviets, for example, Bradbury, Brown, and Wiesner believed that no major advances could be made without a substantial risk of detection. But Foster and Seaborg felt that small atmospheric effects tests might verify US weaknesses and so be worth chancing.

General Taylor sent the Service Chiefs a draft endorsing the limited test ban treaty, subject to certain safeguards, and recommending its ratification. They spent the day of 12 August discussing, occasionally amending, and then approving the Chairman’s draft. In this remarkable paper, the JCS abandoned a position they had consistently advocated over the past two years and restated as recently as 16 July. It would be very difficult to find another situation in which the Joint Chiefs did such an abrupt about-face.

The JCS began by saying that the USSR must be unable to gain or retain any significant advantage in military technology that the United States would be unable to overcome. Successful Soviet cheating must make no serious difference to the military balance. Failure to fulfill these criteria would require that “adequate compensating advantages” be found elsewhere.

The JCS then compared capabilities in nuclear technology. The Soviets led in high-yield categories (10–100 megatons), were about even in the intermediate range (3–10 megatons), and lagged somewhat in yields below two megatons. The USSR appeared to be further ahead in ABM design, but developing a US system did not depend upon atmospheric testing. Probably, the United States was superior in tactical weapons. Overall, “the US at present is clearly ahead of the USSR in the
ability to wage strategic nuclear war, and is probably ahead in the ability to wage tactical nuclear war.”

If both sides observed the treaty, the Soviets could maintain their high-yield lead and eventually erase the US advantage in low-yield weapons. But the Soviet lead was somewhat spurious—the JCS saw no need to develop 100-megaton weapons—and the American advantage could only be overcome at great cost. What about Soviet cheating? The dangers of detection and the difficulties of outer space testing led the JCS, this time, to dismiss cheating as “a relatively minor factor.” The more probable peril, in their estimation, was abrupt Soviet abrogation followed by a new round of atmospheric testing. Four safeguards could reduce that risk: (1) conducting “comprehensive, aggressive, and continuing” underground tests; (2) maintaining modern laboratory facilities; (3) keeping atmospheric testing sites in readiness; and (4) improving detection capabilities.

In conclusion, the JCS termed the treaty “compatible with the security interests of the US” and supported its ratification. If the treaty restrained proliferation and drove a wedge between Moscow and militant Beijing, “that advantage will compensate for fluctuations in nuclear technology.” Their “most serious reservations” stemmed from fear that euphoria might erode the West’s vigilance and willingness to continue with collective security. Ratification, therefore, must be buttressed by the four safeguards specified above. Then, “the risks inherent in the treaty can be accepted in order to seek the important gains which may be achieved through a stabilization of international relations and a move toward a peaceful environment in which to seek resolution of our differences.” General Taylor carried copies of this statement to Secretary McNamara on 12 August, and to Secretary Rusk and President Kennedy on the following day. The Chairman later described this JCS endorsement as the greatest “diplomatic” triumph of his career.45

Secretary McNamara, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 13 August, awarded the treaty his “unequivocal support.” Next day, General Taylor gave the JCS position described above. The Service Chiefs testified on 19 August. General LeMay, known to be a hard-liner, came under the closest questioning. He—like his colleagues—firmly denied having been put under presidential rack and screw. LeMay claimed that “we examined the military and technical aspects and came up with a net disadvantage”—a conclusion, the historian must add, that could not clearly be deduced from the JCS position above. He insisted that the JCS had a “broad duty” to weigh political factors as well, and these non-military factors accounted for his approval.46

The Joint Chiefs’ testimony was instrumental in dispelling any remaining doubts. President Kennedy assured Congressional leaders that he would continue underground testing, improve detection capabilities, press vigorous research programs, and maintain readiness to resume atmospheric testing. On 24 September, by a vote of 80 to 19, the Senate gave its advice and consent.
In hindsight, the limited test ban treaty looks less significant now than it did in 1963. Certainly, achieving a test-free atmosphere helped to make it worthwhile. Yet the limited treaty did not pave the way for a comprehensive one, any political advantages proved rather ephemeral, and the proliferation of nuclear powers did not stop. But it must also be said that none of the dire consequences about which the JCS warned so forcefully and so frequently ever materialized.
The Cuban Debacle

Overview

What happened at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961—the defeat and capture of anti-communist exiles trying to overthrow the regime of Fidel Castro—had far-reaching consequences. First, failure there blighted relations between President Kennedy and the JCS. Kennedy believed that the Chiefs had given him bad advice on crucial points, and the JCS evidently harbored some doubts about the President’s strength of purpose. This mutual lack of confidence affected how the administration managed challenges during the next eighteen months. Second, a communist victory virtually at America’s doorstep emboldened the Soviet leadership. Khrushchev pressed a confrontation over Berlin and then risked putting missiles into Cuba, triggering the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War.

Conception

Fulgencio Batista, Cuba’s long-time strongman, fled from Havana on New Year’s Day in 1959. Fidel Castro emerged from the Sierra Maestra Mountains to take control of Cuba. He carried out sweeping changes that won support from the lower classes. Soon, he channeled the Cuban revolution into a pro-communist and stridently anti-American course. During 1960, Castro welcomed Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan to Havana, concluded extensive trade agreements with the USSR, expropriated $700 million worth of US assets, and boasted that his communist-inspired “Fidelismo” would sweep Latin America.
By early 1960, the administration had come to see Castro as an enemy. On 17 March, President Eisenhower approved a CIA “paramilitary” plan patterned after the effort which in 1954 had driven the Arbenz regime from Guatemala. Briefly, anti-communist exiles would infiltrate back into Cuba, and arms would be air-dropped to them. Guerrilla bands would grow in strength until they could challenge and ultimately overthrow Castro. Secretly, the president of Guatemala agreed that these exiles could train at remote camps in his country.

In September, the “5412 Committee” approved supply flights from Guatemala by exiles that dropped arms and munitions into the Escambray Mountains, where guerrillas supposedly were operating. But the drops proved ineffective, and Castro's military strength and political control appeared to be improving. On 4 November, the CIA radically changed the exiles' mission. Only sixty men continued guerrilla training. Thirty-eight US instructors began preparing the remaining Cubans, who christened themselves Brigade 2506, to act as airborne and amphibious assault troops.

By December, CIA planners had selected March 1961 as the time to attack the town of Trinidad, on Cuba’s south central coast, as the landing site. Here, after infiltration by guerrillas and strikes by bombers flying from Nicaragua, 600 to 700 lightly-armed exiles could come ashore unopposed. Ultimately, if all went well, disaffected Cubans would rally to the Brigade and a general uprising would ensue. President Eisenhower ordered that everything feasible be done to help the paramilitary project and with all possible urgency. On 3 January 1961, the day on which he severed diplomatic relations with Cuba, Eisenhower agreed that the exile force should be increased as much as possible. Nine days later, the 5412 Committee “reviewed the bidding” and arranged for a State-Defense-CIA working group to assess what additional measures might be required. Eisenhower left the White House without having seen or approved the Trinidad plan, because whatever was done would be executed under a new president.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while not yet involved in the paramilitary plan, were deeply worried about Castro. On 10 January 1961, General White advised his JCS colleagues that he saw scant hope of a successful popular uprising. Castro controlled a 32,000-man army, a police force of 9,000, and a people's militia estimated at 200,000. According to US Air Force Intelligence, Cuba had received from 20 to 25,000 tons of Soviet military equipment, along with many communist bloc technicians and military advisors. Consequently, General White concluded, “decisive interference with the Castro regime must come from outside Cuba.” Without “immediate and forceful action” by the United States, he foresaw “a great and present danger” of Cuba becoming a permanent part of the communist bloc, “with disastrous consequences to the security of the Western Hemisphere.” White outlined a spectrum of actions to oust Castro, running from propaganda through “economic strangulation” to a total blockade and culminating with direct US mili-
The JCS referred White’s paper to J–5, where it would be incorporated into a report on the Cuban situation.³

Meanwhile, Joint Staff officers were being read into the paramilitary plan. On 11 January, CIA representatives gave a full briefing to Major General Charles Bonesteel, USA, Special Assistant to the Chairman, and to Brigadier General David Gray, Chief of J–5’s Subsidiary Activities Division. General Gray became the JCS representative on a State-Defense-CIA working group. Gray evaluated three military methods for ousting Castro, in the event that political and paramilitary operations appeared inadequate. On 19 January, he gave the group an answer that had been approved informally by General Lemnitzer and by Lieutenant General Earle Wheeler, who was Director of the Joint Staff. The only course certain to succeed would involve overt US military intervention, either unilaterally or in conjunction with volunteers.⁴

On 27 January, the JCS sent Secretary McNamara a memorandum that repeated General White’s appeal for immediate and forceful action to prevent the permanent communization of Cuba. The primary objective, they said, should be Castro’s speedy overthrow. The paramilitary plan failed to assure the accomplishment of that objective; it provided neither for the direct action that might be needed to avert failure nor for follow-up efforts to exploit success. They recommended, therefore, that an interdepartmental group develop an overall plan of action.⁵

Next day, in the Cabinet Room of the White House, President Kennedy discussed the Cuban situation with senior officials who included Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lemnitzer. The Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles, said that the basic elements influencing events were (1) a rapid and continuing growth in Castro’s military power and (2) a great increase also in popular opposition to his regime.⁶ McNamara and Lemnitzer advised that none of the actions currently authorized would oust Castro. Kennedy ordered the DOD and the CIA to review the Trinidad plan and report their conclusions. Afterward, at the Pentagon, Secretary McNamara “questioned whether such a small force could achieve a worthwhile objective.” The CIA, he said, should be told that its plan was not good and an alternate one should be developed. Lemnitzer agreed.⁷

On 1 February, the JCS created a working group drawn from J–2, J–3, J–4, J–5, and all the Services. Apart from General Gray, the only officers with complete knowledge of the paramilitary plan were Lemnitzer, the Service Chiefs and their Vice Chiefs, the Operations Deputies, the Director and Assistant Director of the Joint Staff, and the Directors of J–2, J–3, J–4, and J–5.⁸

On 31 January, CIA officers briefed General Gray and members of the working group about their Trinidad plan. Operations would commence on D-1 with aerial attacks aimed at neutralizing Castro’s air force, patrol ships, communications centers, and tank and artillery parks. At dawn on D-Day, Brigade 2506 would carry out an air-sea assault and secure a beachhead near Trinidad.⁹ Avoiding the city itself,
the Brigade would hold a nearby beachhead and attract volunteers. If the beachhead became untenable, it would retire to the mountains for guerrilla warfare.

The working group concluded that, given complete surprise and total air supremacy, Brigade 2506 could hold its ground for four days. Gray presented this assessment to General Wheeler, who insisted upon an overall evaluation of the prospects for success. Wheeler suggested saying “fair” and Gray agreed. But Wheeler wanted something more, so Gray calculated the chances for ultimate success to be “thirty in favor and seventy against.”

On 1 February, Wheeler gave General Lemnitzer a preliminary evaluation that the overall plan was “basically sound.” He did not, however, cite the 30/70 calculation. Two days later, the JCS gave Secretary McNamara their evaluation that the Trinidad plan “would not necessarily require overt US intervention.” The working group, they reported, considered Trinidad to be the best area in Cuba for carrying out this operation. But logistical support for the landing force was marginal at best and probably would prove inadequate against moderate, determined resistance. Trinidad had been chosen because it was isolated, separated by the Escambray Mountains from Havana where the bulk of Castro’s forces were concentrated. The Cuban army probably could not launch a coordinated counterattack until D+4, which the Brigade should be able to resist. Yet, unless there were substantial uprisings or large follow-on forces, the Cuban army eventually could reduce the beachhead. In summary, the JCS rendered “a favorable assessment . . . of the likelihood of achieving initial military success.” Since assessments of the Brigade’s combat worth derived from second- and third-hand reports and because certain logistic aspects were highly complex and critical to initial success, they recommended evaluation by a team of US officers. Still, despite shortcomings, the JCS believed that “timely execution of this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success and, even if it does not achieve immediately the full results desired, could contribute to the eventual overthrow of the Castro regime.” McNamara endorsed these conclusions.

In retrospect, this evaluation was worded in such a way that Secretary McNamara would have focused on “a favorable assessment” of initial success and very likely did not realize that “a fair chance of ultimate success” equated with odds of 30/70 against such success.

During 25–26 February, three Joint Staff officers visited two training areas in Guatemala and the air base in Nicaragua. The ground force evaluator, Colonel John R. Wright, USA, was quite favorably impressed by Brigade 2506. The logistics evaluator, Colonel R. B. Wall, USMC, judged the logistics organization to be neither well defined, solidly constituted, nor adequately trained. He considered it imperative that an experienced US instructor arrive as soon as possible. The air evaluator, Lieutenant Colonel B. W. Tarwater, USAF, concluded the odds were about 85 to 15 against being able to carry out a surprise air strike. Castro’s agents would see when the invasion force moved from Guatemala to Nicaragua. Once this was known, Castro would disperse his planes and alert his antiaircraft batteries. One plane
alone could sink part or even all of the invasion fleet. Therefore, Tarwater urged that serious consideration be given to abandoning the amphibious operation and executing an airborne assault instead.

The JCS, on 10 March, informed Secretary McNamara that they found these evaluations generally valid. However, they disapproved Colonel Tarwater’s argument for an airborne assault. Since only a single airfield was available, any damage to that strip would impede operations for a considerable time. Equally, one hostile plane could interdict the airfield. The JCS repeated their judgment that the initial assault should succeed, but ultimate success would depend on the extent to which it catalyzed action by anti-Castro elements within Cuba. They urged that Secretary McNamara support their views, that a logistics instructor go immediately to the training camp, and that a decision about employing the Cuban Volunteer Force be rendered promptly, so that final preparations could commence. Lieutenant Colonel Wall did return to help correct logistics deficiencies.12

On 11 March, President Kennedy reviewed preparations for Trinidad with people who included Brigadier General Gray and Lieutenant Colonel Tarwater; none of the JCS were present. Richard Bissell, the CIA’s Deputy Director for Plans, outlined the operation. Kennedy said that “he was willing to take the chance of going ahead” but “could not endorse a plan that would put us in so openly, in view of the world situation. He directed the development of a plan where US assistance would be less obvious.” There should be a “quiet” landing, preferably at night.13

On the morning of 14 March, CIA planners presented five alternatives to the JCS working group. By evening, the group had pared the alternatives to three and completed an evaluation of each. The next morning, at 1000, the group presented its evaluations to the JCS in a twenty-minute briefing. The Chiefs immediately approved those evaluations and sent them to Secretary McNamara.14 Their appraisals read as follows:

Alternative I—This was the Trinidad plan, changed to a night landing and stripped of airborne assaults and air strikes. The JCS saw a “fair” chance of seizing initial objectives. However, lack of air support, difficulties of resupplying during darkness, and the danger of daylight air attack indicated that there would be “small chance of ultimate success.”

Alternative II—This targeted the northern coast of Oriente Province at Cuba’s eastern end. An airborne landing in early evening would be followed by night-time debarkation of the Brigade’s main body. Ships would depart before daylight; planes would begin flying from a captured airstrip on the following day. There were numerous shortcomings in this plan. Castro’s troops were too near the landing site; the airstrip appeared inadequate; proper logistical support seemed difficult; and the invasion’s distance from Havana would diminish its psychological impact. All in all, the disadvantages outweighed the advantages.

Alternative III—This was a landing at the Bay of Pigs in the swampy Zapata peninsula, eighty miles west of Trinidad. Two companies would come ashore at night, followed by four more at dawn. Ships would leave the area before daylight. At daybreak, B-26s would land on captured airstrips and
commence operations immediately. The advantages were: two probably usable airfields; a remote and inaccessible area, making reaction slow and difficult; absence of Castro's forces in the area; feasibility of surprise; and proximity to Havana. There were a number of disadvantages: resupply would have to come from outside Cuba and be brought across the beach; exits from the beachhead could be sealed; and no sizeable, immediate help from the local population was possible. Nonetheless, the invasion force could be landed successfully and sustain itself for several weeks, provided that replenishment of essential items could be accomplished.

Among these alternatives, the JCS rated Zapata as “the most feasible and the most likely to accomplish the objective.” But they did not judge any of these three to be “as feasible and as likely to accomplish the objective” as the original Trinidad plan—or, as it was worded in this memorandum, “the basic para-military plan.”

Secretary McNamara misread the Joint Chiefs’ evaluation, believing that they favored Zapata over Trinidad. Like the JCS memorandum of 1 February, this had been phrased and presented in a way that might lead an inexperienced person, which McNamara then was, into making such a mistake. What would later draw the President’s ire was something not mentioned in the memorandum—the fact that the JCS had approved these evaluations promptly after a twenty-minute briefing.

When Bissell briefed Kennedy about the Zapata plan, later on 15 March, the President disliked a dawn landing and wanted ships to clear the area before then, so that the appearance of “an inside guerrilla-type operation” could be preserved. Since the JCS evaluation specified that ships would depart before daylight, the CIA must have given him a slightly different concept of operations. Next day, the CIA presented a revised plan featuring night landings, dawn air drops, and ship departures before dawn. This meeting was attended by Secretary McNamara, Admiral Burke, and Brigadier General Gray. The President asked Admiral Burke how he viewed the operation’s chance of success. Burke gave a probability figure of about 50 percent. Kennedy asked what would happen if the invaders were pinned down and being slaughtered on the beach. By Burke’s account, “It was decided that they would not be re-embarked because there was no place to go.”

Discussion emphasized that the plan depended upon a general uprising, without which the entire operation would fail. President Kennedy approved continued preparation and final planning for a landing at the Bay of Pigs, but he reserved his right to cancel the operation in as little as 24 hours before a landing.

Since the CIA’s support capabilities appeared to be inadequate, McNamara tasked the JCS with preparing a logistical plan for supplying about 30,000 men. Their reply outlined the following concept of operations: a landing phase from D-Day to D+3 to secure the beachhead; a build-up phase from D+3 to D+30; and an offensive phase from D+30 onward. They recommended, and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric agreed, that this effort receive a higher priority than the one for supporting friendly forces in Laos, where communist advances were making US intervention a distinct possibility.
On 29 March, President Kennedy directed that Brigade leaders be informed that US forces would not be allowed to participate in or support the invasion in any way. Did they, he wanted to know, wish to proceed under this restriction and believe their operation would succeed? They answered yes.20

At the State Department, on the evening of 4 April, President Kennedy convened another meeting. General Lemnitzer later recalled that, before it began, he argued vigorously with Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann against Zapata. The Bay of Pigs, he said, was a poor site compared to Trinidad; the JCS did not want the Brigade landing any closer to Havana. Mann replied that the President already had decided for Zapata. Why, Lemnitzer countered, were these things done without JCS consultation and concurrence? Mann answered that political considerations were overriding. In any case, he added, the President had rendered his decision. Lemnitzer, therefore, refrained from raising this issue with the Chief Executive. During the meeting, Secretary Rusk spoke against the plan but McNamara “expressed approval of the general concept.”21

Soon afterward, an air plan was decided upon. The JCS opposed any pre-invasion attacks on the grounds that they would be indecisive and might alert Castro’s forces. CIA also favored a single all-out effort on the morning of D-Day. Nonetheless, presumed political advantages put a D-2 strike in the plan. This would coincide with a diversionary landing by 160 men in eastern Cuba and be attributed to defectors. Still, D-Day sorties were to be the main means of destroying Castro’s air force.22

On 24 March, General Lemnitzer informed Admiral Robert Dennison, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT), what would be the rules of engagement for his forces. CINCLANT was to protect the six ships carrying the 1,500 men of the Cuban Volunteer Force. One destroyer would rendezvous with the ships on D–2 and escort them to a point 40 miles from the Cuban coast. One LSD [dock landing ship] would convoy landing craft with CIA crews to the rendezvous point. A combat air patrol would shield the convoy from dawn to sunset on D-1. These rules underwent several revisions. First, after the 4 April meeting, McNamara asked the JCS to ensure against overt engagement between US and Castro forces. Accordingly, on 7 April, Lemnitzer instructed CINCLANT that the ships would sail independently to a rendezvous point and then proceed in convoy for the last 40 miles. US destroyers would provide area coverage rather than close escort; they were to open fire only if enemy ships actually attacked the convoy. Similarly, the combat air patrol was to intervene only when a hostile aircraft either commenced firing or opened its bomb bays and began a bombing run. If US forces were compelled to intervene, such action would abort the entire operation. Second, the Deputy Director of the CIA, Lieutenant General Charles Cabell, USAF, worried that US escorts might intervene before they were needed. He communicated this to General Lemnitzer and, on 13 April, CINCLANT’s orders were altered again. Hostile ships and aircraft might even be allowed to complete
their initial attacks. Protection was to be withheld until the total destruction of friendly ships appeared imminent. 23

On 12 April, at the White House, Bissell laid out the final plan for Zapata. Hours later, at a press conference, President Kennedy was asked “how far this country would be willing to go” in supporting an anti-Castro invasion. He answered that “there will not be, under any circumstances, an intervention in Cuba by the United States Armed Forces.” This was not quite accurate. The next day, Kennedy ruled that “There will be no employment of US armed forces against Cuba unless quite new circumstances develop.” 24

Death

On the morning of 15 April, which was D–2, eight B–26s flying from Nicaragua bombed three Cuban airfields. A ninth B–26 flew to Miami; the pilot claimed to be a defector who, with several fellow-deserbers, had stolen planes and bombed airfields. Post-attack photos indicated that only five aircraft had definitely been destroyed. But the cover story was not wearing well at the United Nations. On the afternoon of 16 April, Secretary Rusk recommended suspending attacks until the Brigade had captured airfields within Cuba. President Kennedy agreed to cancel the strikes planned for dawn on D-Day. Bissell and General Cabell, of the CIA, warned him that cancellation could endanger unloading and resupply operations. Rusk said they could appeal to the President, but they declined. The JCS, at that point, were neither informed nor consulted. 25

Around midnight on 16–17 April, General Cabell called General Gray to say that, since dawn strikes had been disapproved, combat air patrol (CAP) and early warning ships (EW) were urgently needed. At 0300, after consulting Generals Lemnitzer and Wheeler, Gray replied that CAP and EW could be made available. Secretary Rusk was then contacted; he approved EW but not CAP. This time, Cabell appealed to the President, but Kennedy upheld Rusk’s decision. At 0550, orders went to CINCLANT authorizing an EW mission. The destroyers reached their stations around noon. 26

Brigade 2506 began landing in the early hours of 17 April. Almost immediately, things went awry. The area proved fairly well inhabited and militia units were present; surprise was lost. Unforeseen coral reefs stopped the landing craft and critically delayed embarkation. By daybreak, though, the Brigade had seized Playa Larga (Red Beach, at the Bay’s head) and Playa Giron (Blue Beach, on the Bay’s eastern shore). About 1,400 men landed.

Learning of the invasion at 0315, Castro ordered prompt counterattacks and left for the front to take personal command. Castro’s surviving aircraft struck devastating blows that morning. Piston-driven Sea Furies and jet T–33s sank Rio Escondido, which was carrying the Brigade’s entire ammunition reserve, and hit
Houston, forcing it to run aground. Washington received word of these setbacks at 1017, along with a request for air support. At 1600, Admiral Dennison received orders to establish a combat air patrol no closer than fifteen miles from Cuban territory. He was told to interpret these instructions as establishing a safe haven for friendly ships. Dennison called Lemnitzer to say, “This is the first order I ever got from somebody who found it necessary to interpret his own orders.” Lemnitzer replied, “That order was written at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.”

Early on 18 April, Red Beach’s battered defenders began withdrawing towards Blue Beach. By then, Castro had concentrated tanks, artillery, and about 20,000 troops against the Brigade, which found itself terribly outnumbered and outgunned. At the White House, Admiral Burke told President Kennedy that any “cover” was completely gone and recommended that armed reconnaissance aircraft overfly Red and Blue Beaches. Kennedy first refused, then authorized unmarked aircraft to “fly photo and eyeball reconnaissance,” taking “all possible precautions” to avoid being identified as US aircraft. The JCS so instructed CINCLANT, and two planes flew over; pilots reported Red Beach wiped out and Blue Beach apparently under air attack only. By then, the JCS had passed further White House instructions to CINCLANT: ready unmarked Navy planes for possible use; move an amphibious group within four hours steaming of the landing area; and prepare unmarked boats for possible evacuation of the Brigade. The Chiefs asked Dennison how he viewed the situation; CINCLANT replied that he too was “operating in the dark.”

Around midnight, in the Oval Office, the President convened an ad hoc meeting. Brigade Commander Jose Perez San Roman had just radioed, “All we want is low jet cover and jet close support. Enemy has this support. I need it badly or cannot survive. Please don’t desert us. . . . Tanks will hit me at dawn.” Bissell and Admiral Burke strongly advocated an air strike from the carrier Essex to destroy Castro’s jets and thus allow B–26s to hit Castro’s tanks. Secretary Rusk opposed any use of US military power. Finally, Kennedy authorized jets from Essex to fly escort for a B–26 strike at dawn. So at 0337 on 19 April, the JCS ordered Admiral Dennison to send six unmarked aircraft between 0630 and 0730: “Pilots carry as little identification as possible. If necessary to ditch, ditch at sea.” Further, PHIBRON 2 [amphibious squadron] should be put in position to assist an evacuation “using unmarked amphibious craft with crews in dungarees so that they will not be easily identified from the beach.”

The air strike totally miscarried. Flying by Nicaraguan rather than Cuban time, four B–26s passed over Essex before any of its planes were airborne and reached the beachhead alone at about 0530. Castro’s jets downed two of the bombers, and four Americans aboard were killed. When US aircraft arrived at 0550, aerial action had ended.

The situation at Red Beach grew rapidly worse. “I will not be evacuated,” Brigade Commander San Roman had radioed during the night. “We will fight to the
end here if we have to.” Shortly before noon, San Roman sent a chilling report: “We are out of ammo and fighting on the beach. Please send help. We cannot hold.”

General Lemnitzer, who spent much of 18 and 19 April at the White House, later recalled that many far-fetched ideas for saving the Brigade were floated about. On the morning of the 19th, the Chairman commented to President Kennedy “that this was the time for this outfit to go guerrilla.” To Lemnitzer’s surprise, Bissell replied that the fighters ashore were not prepared to do so. At 1157, the JCS ordered CINCLANT to send two destroyers to Blue Beach and see whether there was any chance of evacuation. President Kennedy now was prepared to risk direct intervention, even combat. At 1312, the JCS sent an order to CINCLANT directing destroyers “to take personnel off the beach and from the water to the limit of their capability. . . . If destroyers [are] fired upon they are authorized to return the fire to protect themselves while on this humanitarian mission. . . . God be with you.”

Too late, too late! At 1417, a US destroyer passed a yacht carrying perhaps 200 people. They said there was nothing left to salvage and that Castro was “waiting on the beach.” Two destroyers pressed within gun range of Blue Beach and found it completely held by Castro’s forces. Their mission ended at 1520 when they were straddled by shore batteries and withdrew at high speed. Warships cruised along the coast until 26 April but rescued only a few people. Practically the entire Brigade was captured and imprisoned.

Post-Mortems

The Cuban debacle stunned the administration—and the entire nation. “Victory has a hundred fathers,” President Kennedy ruefully remarked to reporters; “defeat is an orphan.” On 21 April he asked General Maxwell Taylor, who had been Army Chief of Staff from 1955 until 1959, to come to the White House. Arriving next morning, Taylor found a familiar air—“that of a command post that had been overrun by the enemy. There were the same glazed eyes, subdued voices, and slow speech.” Kennedy persuaded Taylor to lead an investigation of what had gone wrong and why. Accordingly, on 22 April, the Cuba Study Group came into being. Its members were Taylor, Admiral Burke, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and Allen Dulles.

The Group heard some fifty witnesses. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Shoup, gave testimony that appeared inconsistent to some Group members. Shoup recalled saying that “if this kind of an operation can be done with this kind of a force with this much training and knowledge,” then Marine divisions “ought to go on leave for three months out of four.” He remembered spending “a lot of sleepless hours because there was no plan for helping these men” if trouble developed. But he believed that Zapata would have been successful if it had been
executed as planned. The JCS, he argued, were responsible for the operation “only insofar as the Commander in Chief might want to know something about the adequacy of the plan, or the probability of success.”41

General White said he “felt all along that the success or failure of this operation depended almost entirely upon the reaction of the Cuban people.” The problem with Zapata, he testified, “was that there were last-minute changes of which we did not know,” cancellation of the air strike being “a very key factor.”42 While White was not as blunt-spoken as Shoup, his view of JCS responsibility was about the same.

In his testimony, General Lemnitzer described the JCS role as “one of appraisal, evaluation, offering of constructive criticism, and assisting CIA in looking at the training and detailed plans.” The Chiefs regarded Zapata as feasible, but it was not “within our purview to approve the plan.” Taylor asked whether it was fair to say that the JCS had given Zapata “de facto approval on a piecemeal basis?” Lemnitzer replied, “No other solution was feasible at that time”; the rainy season was approaching and 100 Cuban pilots were being trained in Czechoslovakia. Admiral Burke, appearing as a witness, assessed JCS responsibility somewhat differently: “According to what had happened before . . . and in view of the procedures which had been set up, yes, they did discharge their responsibility; but morally, they did not. . . . I regret personally that I did not insist upon things that I felt uneasy about. I felt uneasy about being briefed instead of having something in writing so that I could wrestle with it.”43

Early in June, the Study Group circulated a draft report. General Lemnitzer objected to several passages, particularly what struck him as a focus on the 20-minute briefing of 15 March. Since the time spent by other officials was not cited, he wrote General Taylor, “the implication is that the Chiefs did not give sufficient consideration to the concept.” Lemnitzer noted that “the Chiefs were by this time fully conversant with the overall aspects of the operation and had been pre-briefed on it. He himself had spent “actually hours” studying proposed solutions. “As you know,” he continued, “under such circumstances a well-organized military briefing can cover much detail in twenty minutes. In this particular instance the issues were clear-cut and the time allotted was sufficient to determine that . . . Zapata was the most feasible alternative.” Lemnitzer also challenged a statement that “there is no question as to [the Chiefs’] de facto approval.” The JCS, he insisted, only appraised the plan; approval had to come at the national level. He also objected to a connotation that “approval” meant they believed that Zapata had a strong chance of succeeding. Actually, “the Chiefs never went beyond an appraisal that with control of the air and . . . surprise . . . the force could establish itself ashore, but ultimate success would depend upon popular support.”44

The Study Group’s final report to President Kennedy, dated 13 June, omitted mention of the 20-minute briefing and “de facto” approval. It stated the JCS “indicated a preference for Zapata” on 15 March and “subsequently took active part in
considering changes to the plan as it developed into final form, did not oppose the plan and by their acquiescing in it gave others the impression of approval.” The JCS reviewed the plan as a body four times after 15 March but did not assess the final version because they received it only two days before the landing. “While individual Chiefs gave it considerably more personal attention than the above record suggests, they did not and probably could not give the plan the same meticulous study which a commander would give to a plan for which he was personally responsible.”

What mattered most, of course, was the President’s own judgment. From personal observation, Taylor concluded “there was no doubt that John F. Kennedy felt that they had let him down.” Meeting with the Chiefs on 27 May, the President spoke with restraint, saying he viewed the failure “as one involving all of us” and sought “to improve our ways of doing business together.” On 28 June he issued NSAM No. 55, embodying what he saw as the lessons learned. First, he regarded the JCS as his principal military advisers and expected to receive their views “direct and unfiltered.” Earlier, Kennedy had promised that he would set aside two hours every month to meet with them, alone and without an official record. Second, he expected the JCS to take a role in Cold War operations similar to that which they bore in conventional ones. Third, the Chiefs should “present the military viewpoint in governmental councils in such a way as to insure that the military factors are clearly understood before decisions are reached.” Fourth, President Kennedy regarded the JCS as “more than military men” and expected their help “in fitting military requirements into the overall context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in Government is to combine all assets into a unified, effective pattern.” This was done against a somber backdrop for, as the Study Group warned the President on 13 June, “we feel that we are losing today on many fronts and that the trend can be reversed only by a whole-hearted union of effort.”

Simultaneously, Kennedy recalled General Taylor to active duty and appointed him Military Representative of the President. This was an entirely new position, quite unlike the office of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, filled by Admiral William Leahy between 1942 and 1949. Taylor would neither chair JCS meetings nor place himself between the President and his statutory advisers. He was simply “a staff officer to advise and assist the President.” But he would maintain close liaison with other agencies and watch “the functioning of the intelligence apparatus of the government.” In the “so-called Cold War planning and action,” he would see that all available assets were properly integrated and employed.

Although the JCS Working Group prepared an after-action report, the JCS never carried out a collective critique of what went wrong and why. In July, however, Admiral Burke sent General Lemnitzer some summary observations. First, Zapata was a military operation and should have been planned and controlled by the military. Second, cancellation of the D-Day air strikes should have caused cancellation of the entire operation. Third, the plan itself was not bad; it was failure to
adhere to the plan that was bad. For the JCS, the last point emerged as the most important. During the Berlin confrontation and again during the Cuban missile crisis, there was an undercurrent of worry that civilian leaders might impose last-minute changes upon well-considered military plans.

When interviewed in 1975, Admiral Burke acknowledged that the Chiefs could be faulted (1) for displaying a certain naiveté and (2) for failing to voice their reservations more forcefully. He added, however, that there were important extenuating circumstances. As to the naiveté, they did not appreciate how ignorant the new administration was and how drastically President Kennedy's methods differed from those of his predecessor. When President Eisenhower rendered a decision, all discussion ended. Kennedy, however, conducted business somewhat in the manner of a college seminar; decisions could be reviewed and changed up to the moment of execution. Thus, the JCS thought that matters were settled when, in fact, they were still open to debate and revision. Also, in Burke's opinion, the JCS were hobbled by peculiar procedures for planning and execution. They wanted to undertake regular staffing of CIA plans but were not permitted to do so. They were told many times that this was not their plan; the administration wanted only the Chiefs' personal opinions on various aspects of it. Looking back, Burke believed the JCS should have discerned from such instructions that the White House did not understand how a military organization operated. As to why the JCS did not put forward their reservations more vigorously, Burke noted that the administration had installed below the Secretarial level a group of men who were determined to reduce the military's influence upon foreign policy. In late January 1961, for example, the White House cancelled a speech by Admiral Burke because it purportedly dealt with subjects outside the military sphere. Consequently, in the NSC and other forums, the Chiefs were reluctant to volunteer opinions about matters beyond their professional cognizance.

General Lemnitzer's afterthoughts were less charitable. In a 1976 interview, he stated quite forcefully his conviction that the new civilian hierarchy was crippled not only by inexperience but also by arrogance, arising from failure to recognize their own limitations. He himself was well aware how little knowledge the newcomers possessed. The problem was simply that civilians frequently ignored the military. Thus, without consulting the JCS, they changed the concept from a covert landing to a conventional amphibious assault, switched the landing site from Trinidad to Zapata, cancelled the D-Day air strike—and then blamed the Chiefs because matters went badly.

Major General Chester Clifton, USA, who was Kennedy's Military Aide, related that the President's anger against his military advisers cooled after he had time for reflection. He was particularly impressed when the Chiefs kept silent while anti-JCS stories, possibly leaked by White House staffers, appeared in Newsweek magazine. During a summer sojourn in Hyannis Port, the President remarked to Clifton that, when the critical meetings occurred, he had not been in office long enough to establish a proper rapport with the JCS. So, he said, the Chiefs were not at fault.
that much. He had not known enough to ask the right questions, and they had not volunteered opinions as he thought they should have done.⁵³

Back on 5 May the NSC had agreed that US policy should aim at Castro's downfall and that, since approved measures were unlikely to bring that about, “the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to further action.” On 3 November, President Kennedy authorized Operation Mongoose, a CIA-directed effort to “stir things up . . . with espionage, sabotage, general disorder, run and operated by Cubans themselves.” Mongoose’s purpose was to bring about a revolt by the Cuban people that would overthrow Castro’s regime. The 5412 Committee expanded into a Special Group (Augmented), chaired by General Taylor and with General Lemnitzer as a member, which oversaw covert operations like Mongoose.⁵⁴ So the next round began.
The Laotian Precipice

A Nascent Crisis

Land-locked Laos, with a population of perhaps 2,000,000, was bordered on the east by the two Vietnams, to the south by Cambodia, to the west by Thailand, and to the north by China. For US policymakers, geography plus a long-standing worry about “falling dominoes” combined to make Laos appear as a critical pawn in the struggle for Southeast Asia. The 1954 Geneva Conference established Laos as an independent, neutral nation; an International Control Commission (ICC) drawn from Canada, India, and Poland undertook to enforce the terms of settlement. Nonetheless, the Royal Laos Government (RLG) and the communist Pathet Lao waged a sporadic civil war. The United States bolstered the RLG with arms and money, establishing a small Program Evaluation Office (PEO) in lieu of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).

In November 1957, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma achieved an apparent reconciliation in which two communists gained RLG posts. Souvanna’s half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong, was titular leader of the Pathet Lao. The ICC, considering its mission accomplished, departed in July 1958. Soon, however, Souvanna was ousted by a pro-westerner and hostilities resumed. A complex situation became chaotic when, on 9 August 1960, Captain Kong Le and his paratroop battalion seized the administrative capital of Vientiane. Kong Le declared his goal to be a regime espousing “a true neutral policy” akin to that of Prince Souvanna, who promptly formed a new government.

Although Prince Souvanna’s cabinet contained no communists, his new government was perceived as a threat to US interests and objectives. General Phoumi Nosavan, Minister of Defense in the ousted government and a professed anti-communist, talked with US officials about suppressing Kong Le.
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Mansfield Sprague asked for JCS advice. General White proposed saying that further deterioration “may well result in a complete loss of Laos to communism and encourage tendencies toward accommodation by other nations in Southeast Asia.” Unless Phoumi’s Force Armée Lao (FAL) got adequate support, “the US ultimately may be faced with a far more difficult decision involving the intervention of US combat forces.” The other Chiefs softened White’s wording. On 19 August 1960, the JCS advised Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates that if the situation continued or deteriorated further, “the government of Laos will be Communist oriented if not Communist dominated.” Since matters might very soon turn for the worse, Phoumi should be informed immediately that the United States would provide him with the support necessary “to regain control of the Laos Government.” Four days later, at a State-Defense meeting, Secretary Gates and the JCS stressed that Phoumi was “our only hope in Laos.”

Phoumi joined with Prince Boun Oum and, on 10 September, announced a rival government. The State Department tried to carve a middle ground, working with Souvanna while supporting Phoumi. That effort floundered. Late in October, senior State and Defense officials agreed that Souvanna’s usefulness to the United States was over. On 11 November, by a bloodless coup, Phoumi seized the royal capital of Luang Prabang. One month later, Phoumi attacked Vientiane and Souvanna fled to Cambodia. Kong Le, bolstered by a Soviet airlift, fought back. On 16 December, however, Phoumi’s troops secured Vientiane. The National Assembly dissolved Souvanna’s government and installed a pro-western regime under Boun Oum, with Phoumi as his deputy. Kong Le and his men retreated northward to the Plain of Jars, where they joined with Pathet Lao forces. Soviet aircraft supplied them by parachute drops.

Boun Oum promptly appealed for US military and economic assistance. General White urged “decisive and expeditious action,” in a manner “calculated to demonstrate clearly the will and determination of the United States to support friendly governments in Southeast Asia and throughout the world.” Beyond materiel and airlift support, White was willing to introduce US ground combat forces to help maintain internal security. Also, as a pre-condition for increased military assistance, the RLG should be required to recall all its representatives to Communist Bloc countries and formally protest against further Soviet aid to enemy factions. But Admiral Burke and General Decker opposed, at this point, any proposal for unilateral US intervention. White’s preconditions, they also objected, would put King Savang in the awkward position of protesting against some of the same Soviet assistance which the RLG very recently had accepted. On 22 December, the JCS approved a memorandum that deleted White’s proposal for committing US forces and recommended furnishing military assistance without preconditions. T–6 aircraft—armed trainers—were furnished to Phoumi from stocks in Thailand, where Laotian pilots would be trained.
At an NSC meeting on 5 January, Secretary of State Christian Herter objected to a JCS report criticizing indecision and lack of clear-cut policies and citing State-Defense "conflict of judgment... concerning the proper implementation of US policy in Laos." General Lemnitzer said that "the JCS had experienced for some time a feeling of frustration about Laos." Back in August, when Kong Le rebelled, the Chiefs wanted to build up Phoumi's FAL but State had followed a course of strengthening Souvanna. "This issue was not settled," Lemnitzer observed, "and as a result Kong Le had several months in which to build up his forces." Herter responded that arming Phoumi would have meant arming rebels against the recognized government. President Eisenhower ruled that "indecision" had to be eliminated from the JCS report, but tension between the Chiefs and State would persist.

General Wheeler, who was Director of the Joint Staff, had asked J–5 to review courses of action. On 30 December, J–5 recommended ensuring that the Phoumi-Boun Oum regime would continue to control the main population and communications centers, as well as bolstering the FAL's morale and efficiency by overtly establishing a Military Assistance Advisory Group. As 1961 opened, Kong Le and the Pathet Lao, supported by North Vietnamese troops and an on-going Soviet airlift, carried out an offensive that consolidated their control over the Plain of Jars. Admiral Burke, evidently reacting to the latest news from Laos, proposed much stronger language: "The United States should under no circumstances permit Laos to come under Communist domination. If Laos falls to the Communists it will be only a matter of time until South East Asia falls. The US should be prepared, with or without allies, to take any action necessary to keep Laos from falling to the Communists." The other Chiefs wanted to soften Burke's words: change "under no circumstances" to "not"; delete "with or without allies"; alter "any action" to "those actions." General Decker added an explanatory paragraph tied more closely to geographical factors and stating the US stake in Laos: "If Laos were to fall into Communist hands, a wedge would be driven between Thailand and Vietnam; the Communists would be placed in a position to dominate Cambodia and to outflank the defenses of South Vietnam and Thailand. Therefore, the United States should be prepared to take those actions necessary to keep Laos from falling to the Communists."

In the final version, sent to Secretary Gates on 14 January, the JCS said it is "increasingly obvious that the United States must take immediate and decisive actions to defeat the aggressors in Laos or face the possibility of a neutral or communist dominated Southeast Asia." At a minimum, the Phoumi-Boun Oum regime had to maintain control of the principal population and communications centers. The ultimate objective was emergence of "a viable government, friendly to the United States, and in complete control of Laos." They urged immediate replacement of the PEO with a "legitimate" MAAG, thereby showing that the United States had openly assumed responsibility for supporting Phoumi's FAL.

Probably, the Chiefs continued, expanded overt and covert support would achieve the minimum objectives described above. If not, the United States should
muster support for the Phoumi-Boun Oum regime within the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and, if necessary, seek SEATO’s agreement to intervene.7 Should unanimity by SEATO prove unattainable—Great Britain and France would be very reluctant to act—Washington should press for action by as many nations as possible. Intervention by a third power alone, such as Thailand, struck them as less desirable than a multilateral response. In such an eventuality, North Vietnam probably would provide equivalent support to the Pathet Lao, and Thailand certainly would demand explicit assurances of US support. The JCS described unilateral US intervention as a last resort, to be done only if a multilateral approach collapsed and minimum objectives could not be attained in any other way. North Vietnam probably would react to US or SEATO intervention by full-scale mobilization but would not enter the battle without believing that its troops could “quickly overrun US and/or SEATO forces in Laos, and that such action would not entail a serious risk of involvement in general war.” This being so, increased readiness measures should coincide with any intervention.8

On 19 January, Senator Kennedy came to the White House for a meeting that focused on Laos. President Eisenhower described Laos as “the cork in the bottle”; losing it would mark the beginning of losing much of the Far East. He greatly preferred intervening under SEATO auspices but would consider acting unilaterally as “a last desperate hope.” Secretary Gates voiced confidence that military intervention would succeed; 12,000 troops and their supplies could deploy in twelve days.9

The Alternatives Narrow

The new administration immediately commissioned a State-Defense-CIA task force to chart courses of action. On 23 January, senior officials presented their findings to President Kennedy; their speed in doing so showed that Laos was the top priority item. Immediate military actions should include using PEO personnel as tactical advisers to FAL units, using “silver bullets” and bounties to eliminate Pathet Lao leaders, and establishing a small logistic support group in Thailand where more FAL personnel would be trained. Among possible additional actions were sending Thai and South Vietnamese aircraft as well as unmarked B–26s on combat missions, removing restrictions on Laotians’ use of bombs and napalm, preparing to commit US aircraft if Chinese fighters started escorting Soviet transports, and getting ready to employ two Thai regiments as “volunteers” in Laos. Diplomatically, there should be discussions with Soviets, preliminary moves toward intervention by SEATO, and exploration of a possible Neutral Nations Commission comprised of Cambodia, Burma, and Malaya. President Kennedy approved the immediate military actions, although using PEO personnel as tactical advisers would await advice from the embassy in Vientiane.10
On 24 January, the JCS sent Secretary McNamara a list of recommendations that moved many of the “possible additional actions” up to the “immediate” category. Actions they wanted taken “as soon as reasonably possible” included stepping up overt and covert military assistance, establishing a logistic support group in Thailand, and staffing the Laos Country Team with people who merited the trust of the Boun Oum-Phoumi regime and possessed the experience, resolution, and stature needed to ensure maximum US influence over the government. The last point was a thinly veiled slap at Ambassador Winthrop Brown, whom they felt was willing to accept a neutralist regime that would quickly become communist-controlled.11

The next day, when the JCS met with the President as a body for the first time, Admiral Burke said that he believed that a combination of military and political actions could save the friendly government. The Chiefs, General Lemnitzer commented, “have not been advocating the establishment of major US forces in Laos, but rather the support of indigenous forces.” Kennedy asked how many US troops could be committed in thirty days and what the other side could do in response.12

The Joint Chiefs calculated that 69,000 men (mainly from one airborne division, one Marine division/wing team, and five Air Force squadrons) could deploy to Southeast Asia within thirty days. The communists in that same time could commit 156,000 men, including fifteen North Vietnamese and eight Chinese divisions along with 465 Chinese jet aircraft. Those figures, Lemnitzer advised the President, were not as alarming as they might seem. Military objectives, geographical limitations, and competing requirements affected the equation. The North Vietnamese, for example, could not send their whole army into Laos while they had to reckon with internal security problems and possible attack from South Vietnam.13

For the time being, the administration avoided major, overt military initiatives. On 1 February, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric told General Lemnitzer that installing a Military Assistance Advisory Group was ruled out from fear of political repercussions. Likewise, a request by Admiral Harry Felt, who was the Commander in Chief, Pacific, to fly supplies directly into Vientiane was rejected. Instead, the JCS designated Udorn in Thailand as the terminal point for US transports. However, the PEO was augmented by nine Special Forces teams; funds and equipment were provided for four new FAL infantry battalions, supporting artillery, and special forces detachments.14

American diplomacy drew poor results. King Savang (who would become the last king of the Kingdom of Laos) invited Burma, Cambodia, and Malaya to form a Neutral Nations Commission; the first two countries promptly declined. But the Soviets’ call to convene an international conference and resurrect the ICC bore fruit, as Great Britain and India proved receptive.

Meanwhile, the Pathet Lao and Kong Le’s forces were gathering strength in the Plain of Jars. Without more assistance, Admiral Felt concluded, Phoumi’s FAL could not contain the expected enemy thrusts. In fact, Felt thought it likely that the Pathet Lao soon would try to seize Luang Prabang, the royal capital and seat of
government for the kingdom of Laos. On 3 March, President Kennedy directed General Lemnitzer to (1) prepare a plan for capturing the Plain of Jars and (2) bring Admiral Felt and the Chief of the PEO, Brigadier General Andrew Boyle, USA, to Washington.15

At a White House meeting on 9 March, Secretary McNamara and General Lemnitzer presented the Plain of Jars plan. Preliminary interdiction operations by aircraft and indigenous Meo guerrillas would be followed by a two-pronged attack from east and south, culminating in an FAL airborne assault. Success was contingent upon “additional psychological moves, fire support and logistic effort,” all of which could be accomplished “with little fear of compensatory or retaliatory action by the Communist Bloc.” Since the rainy season opened early in May, speedy implementation was vital. Recalling an earlier plan that was never carried out, President Kennedy asked why this one was better. The response was “that the Laotians probably could not bring off the earlier attack by themselves, but they could bring this plan off if we all supported it.” Claiming that Ambassador Brown had “fought” the earlier plan, McNamara said it was essential that State, Defense, Felt, and Brown “all work on the same set of instructions.” Points were made that “the Laos we are fighting for now should be anti-Communist but neutral—in other words, keep the Laotian government from strong Communist influence. Before, we sought a pro-Western ‘neutral’ Laos.” McNamara and Lemnitzer said that, if preparations began at once, 1 April could be D-Day for the Plain of Jars operation.16

This plan, and most of the assumptions underlying it, quickly became obsolete. The Pathet Lao captured a critical juncture of Routes 7 and 13, only thirty miles from Luang Prabang. On 18 March, General Boyle advised Admiral Felt that Phoumi had grown “rather desperate” and could not be cajoled into assuming the offensive on any front.17

To the Brink—and Back

On 23 March, President Kennedy went on national television to tell the American people about a “difficult and potentially dangerous situation” in Laos: “The security of all Southeast Asia will be endangered if Laos loses its neutral independence.” He favored “constructive negotiation” and backed London’s call for a cease-fire and convocation of an international conference: “We will not be provoked, trapped, or drawn into this or any other situation; but I know that every American will want this country to honor its obligations to the point that freedom and security of the free world and ourselves may be achieved.”18

Concurrently, the SEATO Council of Ministers met in Bangkok. The United States sought a declaration of “firm resolve . . . not to acquiesce in the overthrow of the Royal Lao Government” and to undertake “whatever action may be appropriate in the circumstances.” Other signatories, however, insisted upon adding
paragraphs that stressed the peaceful hopes of SEATO and the allies’ desire for a negotiated solution. Admiral Felt sent the JCS a plan for multilateral operations. The RLG would appeal to SEATO, upon which the United States, the Philippines, Pakistan, Thailand, and possibly Australia would move to intervene. The US contribution would be three Marine battalions and one air group, one Army airborne battle group, and one USAF mobile strike force. Within four days, Felt calculated, these troops could secure the principal cities and river crossings. Upon review, the JCS shortened the time for execution to 48 hours and instructed that “all feasible emphasis” be placed on using Thai, Pakistani, and Filipino units.

Back on 10 March, Secretary McNamara had tasked Lieutenant General T. J. H. Trapnell (Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps) with surveying firsthand (1) the adequacy of the Plain of Jars plan, (2) the extent to which Phoumi had placed his best leaders in command of forward areas, and (3) the relationships among Ambassador Brown, Admiral Felt, Brigadier General Boyle, and Phoumi, determining the degree to which Brown was helping or hindering the approved program. Reporting to General Lemnitzer on 28 March, Trapnell attributed communist successes entirely to the presence of North Vietnamese advisers “who act as stiffeners in Pathet Lao units down to company and lower levels.” He laid out nine steps to bolster Phoumi’s forces. Trapnell also urged that Ambassador Brown be replaced—a recommendation that General Lemnitzer deleted before he released the report for staffing. On 31 March, the JCS asked the Secretary of Defense to approve Trapnell’s proposals for using sixteen B–26s to bomb the Plain of Jars and converting the PEO to a MAAG. As for the others, they decided to wait for comments from Admiral Felt, who soon endorsed almost all of them. By 20 April, the administration agreed to convert the PEO into a MAAG, increase the FAL by seven battalions, and give Phoumi more T–6 aircraft. For the time being, though, any use of B-26s was disapproved.

Resurrection of the International Control Commission had become a real possibility, so the newly appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Paul Nitze asked for JCS views on how the ICC should function. As the Chiefs saw matters, the ICC consisted of one pro-western power, one pro-communist, and one “reluctant to offend either side.” They agreed that Canada, Poland, and India should continue to be its members but wanted the administration to impress upon Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru the importance of Laos as a test case for resolving East-West disputes. The Chiefs sought two changes in the ICC’s terms of reference. First, delete the proviso that field teams must procure the combatants’ permission in order to conduct inspections. Second, substitute a majority vote for unanimity when making recommendations about violations or threats thereof. Even with these improvements, they remarked, the ICC still “could not compel even grudging compliance” with either its own recommendations or those of the international conference. Consequently, the ICC’s responsibilities should be limited initially to confirming the existence of a cease-fire. Until the international conference
improved its terms of reference, the United States should oppose expanding the ICC’s mission into inspection and supervision. On 24 April, Nitze asked Secretary Rusk to accept this advice as the US position.22

Events were accelerating toward a disaster. On 5 April, in the Plain of Jars, Phoumi opened what was described as an offensive; it collapsed within a week. At strong British urging, the administration acceded to calling an international conference without getting prior guarantees of a cease-fire. Accordingly, on 24 April London and Moscow appealed for an armistice, asked Prime Minister Nehru to reconvene the ICC to certify a cease-fire, and issued invitations for a 14-nation conference opening in Geneva on 12 May. All this while, the Pathet Lao were counterpunching so successfully that it looked as though they might seize Vientiane and Luang Prabang before an armistice could take effect. The RLG agreed to a cease-fire on 25 April. Ambassador Brown and General Boyle believed that the FAL was approaching dissolution.23

Shaken only a few days earlier by the Cuban debacle, the administration now confronted another crisis. On 26 April, President Kennedy conferred with senior officials, among whom were McNamara, Nitze, and Admiral Burke as Acting Chairman.24 According to McGeorge Bundy, there was “general agreement” among Kennedy’s advisers that large-scale involvement in Laos would be unjustified. But since the possibility of a strong US response was “the only card left to be played in pressing for a cease-fire, . . . the President explicitly refused to decide against intervention at this time.” Kennedy authorized deploying carrier and amphibious forces into the Gulf of Siam and the South China Sea as well as alerting units earmarked under SEATO plans to move into Laos. The Joint Chiefs directed CINCPAC to prepare for movement into locations in South Vietnam and Thailand from which air strikes could be launched.25

On the morning of 27 April, Secretary McNamara consulted the Service Chiefs. How quickly, he asked, could US troops arrive in Vientiane? About 1,000 men per day during the first three days, they answered, assuming the airfield was not interdicted. McNamara then posed three questions. First, should the United States intervene under SEATO auspices? Burke and White said yes; Decker and Shoup gave vigorous nos. Second, should we try to hold southern Laos? They split the same way, two yes and two no. Decker and Shoup argued that North Vietnam and China would react just as strongly to this as they would to a full-blown intervention. They also cautioned against the likelihood of large-scale losses to tropical disease. Third, if the communists took control of Laos, should we station troops in South Vietnam and Thailand? They all agreed that this should be done.

Later that morning, the NSC reviewed matters without reaching any decisions. The President and Admiral Burke then briefed Congressional leaders. Kennedy told them that Vientiane might fall in 24 to 48 hours, at which time he would have to decide whether US troops should move into Laos’ southern panhandle. The
Chinese, Acting Secretary of State Chester Bowles added, had stated flatly that they would enter Laos if the Americans did. After a short silence, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield said that intervention would be “the worst possible mistake we could make.” Senators William Fulbright and Hubert Humphrey supported him. Admiral Burke argued that the choice lay between “what would likely be a long, tough, hard war”—including use of nuclear weapons—and “losing Southeast Asia” and retreating to the offshore island chain. Everett Dirksen, the Senate Minority Leader, replied that when under pressure a sound military rule was to shorten the line. Richard Russell, Chairman of the Senate Armed Service Committee, called our commitment in Laos “an incredible fantasy from the beginning” and wanted to “write the country off.”

Afterward, Admiral Burke spoke with senators whom he believed to be hawkish. They told him that they had not spoken in his support because they felt that they should not comment upon anything except the President's plan, which Burke’s presentation clearly was not. Admiral Burke again approached President Kennedy, who told him bluntly that there was no point in further discussion. Burke then gave the Chief Executive a one-page memorandum wherein he predicted that losing Laos ultimately would mean losing all of Southeast Asia.

At an NSC meeting on 29 April, the Service Chiefs emphasized escalation through air power. Admiral Burke argued that “each time you give ground it is harder to stand the next time. If we give up Laos we would have to put US forces into Viet-Nam and Thailand. We would have to throw in enough to win—perhaps the ‘works.’” General Decker said that “we cannot win a conventional war in Southeast Asia; if we go in, we should go in to win, and that means bombing Hanoi, China, and maybe even using nuclear weapons.” The terrain in Laos, he pointed out, would negate our advantage in heavy equipment and put us at the mercy of guerrillas. Decker suggested first moving troops into Thailand and South Vietnam; if there was still no cease-fire, “then we should be ready to go ahead.” General LeMay, representing General White, reviewed possible ways of using air power, which he believed could do the job alone. He did not think the Chinese would intervene, but if they did “we should go to work on China itself and let Generalissimo Chiang [Kai-Shek] take Hainan Island” in the South China Sea. [Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek was President of the Republic of China on Taiwan.] General Shoup suggested employing B–26s before troops were committed. Secretary Rusk said that if a cease-fire was not achieved quickly, it would be necessary to get the United Nations to endorse SEATO intervention. Secretary McNamara and Admiral Burke replied that securing approval from the UN General Assembly would take more than two weeks; Burke’s view was that “only the United States could pull its own chestnuts out of the fire.” Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles said that “we were going to have to fight the Chinese anyway” and it was “just a question of where, when, and how.” In that case, LeMay responded, “we should fight soon since the Chinese would have nuclear weapons within one or two years.”
On 1 May, Secretary McNamara circulated a draft memorandum for the President that recommended sending US troops into the Laotian panhandle. If North Vietnam and China intervened, nuclear weapons should be used if necessary to avoid defeat: "In summary, we face the very real danger that a retreat in Laos will trigger the eventual defeat of the West in Southeast Asia, whereas intervention now may very well maintain essentially a continuation of the status quo in Soviet-US relations." Convening later that day, the NSC tasked the Joint Chiefs with preparing "an appreciation of the military implications of various measures that might be taken" in Southeast Asia.29

On 2 May, Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric circulated a revised paper that, after listing pros and cons, advocated intervening if a cease-fire was not achieved very quickly. "We must be prepared for the worst" and "promptly counter each added element brought against our forces with a more than compensating increment from our side." Uncontrolled escalation was "very unlikely," since the Soviets could "hardly wish" to see such an outcome. But achieving a settlement at lower levels "requires us to be willing to conduct ourselves without flinching from such escalation. . . . " A basic assumption in their paper, which hindsight makes questionable, was that Moscow could exercise close control over what happened in the Far East.30

After a long discussion, Secretary McNamara asked the Service Chiefs and Service Secretaries to submit written views that same afternoon. There were those who thought that McNamara, perhaps subconsciously, was assuming the role of JCS Chairman, leading discussions, soliciting individual opinions, and providing off-the-cuff guidance. In any case, the Chiefs' answers ran a wide gamut. Admiral Burke wanted to put troops in Thailand and South Vietnam at once and, within 48 hours, send SEATO troops to protect critical population centers still held by the FAL. If no cease-fire followed, air strikes against targets in Laos should begin and every enemy escalation should be matched forthwith. General Decker also recommended sending SEATO troops into Thailand and South Vietnam. He was circumspect about the next steps: If fighting continued, "then consideration should be given to direct intervention by SEATO ground forces in Laos." Saying that intervention was a political decision, Decker neither opposed nor endorsed it. General Shoup believed that massing forces in Thailand and South Vietnam was the best way to obtain a cease-fire. Washington should say that, unless a cease-fire began within 48 hours, stronger steps would follow. Intervention should then involve ground occupation of given areas and air bombing within Laos. General White went much further than his colleagues. Calling the Asian mainland "a most unfavorable area" in which to wage a land war, he was reluctant to commit any more than token ground forces. If the communists did not accept an armistice within 48 hours, aircraft should strike targets in Laos. Then, if there was still no cease-fire, naval and air forces ought to threaten Hanoi and south China. If the communists kept fighting, White proposed to strike
Hanoi. That probably would ignite conflict with China, but “I believe that war with China is inevitable if we take decisive action in Southeast Asia and I would seize the initiative.”

Admiral Burke had cabled General Lemnitzer, who was in Bangkok, asking for his views. Replying on 2 May, Lemnitzer advised that only immediate military action could prevent losing most if not all the remaining key areas in Laos. Thai and South Vietnamese leaders with whom he had spoken were deeply frustrated and discouraged by developments in Laos and SEATO’s failure to act. The United States should not act unilaterally, he continued, but neither should it delay because Britain and France were unwilling to join. He believed that Pakistan, Thailand, and probably the Philippines would provide troops; they awaited only a SEATO summons and a US airlift. Lemnitzer proposed that the Royal Laotian Government ask for immediate SEATO intervention. SEATO units then should proceed to secure as much FAL-held territory as possible. If communists fought them and attempted further advances, SEATO forces should counterattack strongly.

At an NSC meeting during the late afternoon of 2 May, President Kennedy ordered contingency planning to continue “in the light of the rapidly developing situation.” Hours later, word came that the Soviets had told the Pathet Lao to work out a cease-fire. Next day, the Pathet Lao did announce their agreement to an armistice. On 4 May, State and Defense representatives circulated a draft plan in which 12,000 to 13,000 SEATO troops would occupy crucial points along the Mekong River that were still under RLG/FAL control. Should the Pathet Lao continue a broad offensive, they and their supply lines would be brought under air attack. If a major North Vietnamese attack appeared imminent, Defense wanted authority for immediate air strikes, but State would wait until an attack actually occurred. State and Defense agreed, though, that in case of Chinese intervention “political authorization would be sought for prompt counter-action.”

Secretary Rusk asked whether we could conduct a conventional campaign against North Vietnam and China. The Joint Staff’s Operations Directorate concluded that the only way of countering Chinese intervention was to sever lines of communication from China into North Vietnam and Laos. General White, dissatisfied, drafted a completely new paper stating that the United States was incapable of waging non-nuclear war against China. The other Chiefs agreed. On 12 May, they advised Secretary McNamara that we could conduct “full-scale non-nuclear war” in Laos and North Vietnam—but not against China. Also, conventional combat in Southeast Asia would degrade our capabilities elsewhere until mobilization and other emergency measures took effect. All the more reason, then, for intervention to be preceded by a firm decision to achieve success. CINCPAC, they noted, already possessed enough nuclear power to destroy or neutralize a Chinese threat. By this time, however, diplomats were taking center stage.
Detours along the Geneva Road

On 9 May, President Kennedy approved guidance for US negotiators at the Geneva Conference. The goal should be “a neutral, independent, peaceful, sovereign, and socially and economically viable Laos.” However, “Our position on the ground is weak. We cannot enforce what we would like. The Communists will insist on getting a Communist-dominated coalition government.” The United States should be prepared to have the conference fail. If that happened and communists renewed their offensive, “we will face the ultimate decision: whether or not to introduce US forces into this area through SEATO or with those SEATO members prepared to participate.” Kennedy told advisers that, while he had not ruled out intervention, “for the time being we didn’t want to get large forces tied down in such an out-of-the-way place, particularly with so many other things going on.”

On 11 May, a revived International Control Commission certified the existence of a cease-fire. The Geneva Conference opened five days later. Communist attacks broke the cease-fire several times. On 12 July, the JCS protested to Secretary McNamara that “US determination not to walk out of the Conference is dominating all other considerations.” If current trends continued, Laos would emerge “more communist than neutral” in which case “US prestige will have suffered another serious blow.” They cited “failure to exercise active leadership in SEATO, particularly since August 1960.” They saw a larger issue at stake: “Credibility in the US deterrent is waning. The challenge has been made in Southeast Asia. Khrushchev has indicated that Berlin may be next.” Taking a firm stand over Laos, where the risk of escalating into nuclear war was less than over Berlin, would “enhance credibility in US determination to use its military force wherever needed to protect its interests. Such a course of action need not un hinge our general war posture to a significant degree.” The JCS recommended responding to the next cease-fire violation by (1) withdrawing from Geneva and (2) undertaking operations in Laos either through SEATO, with willing SEATO members, or even unilaterally to “achieve the necessary military position to permit successful political negotiation for a unified independent and neutral Laos.”

There was no change in administration policy. Late in August, the United States, Britain, and France agreed to support Souvanna for the premiership of a neutral coalition government. In return Souvanna would pledge to uphold “the monarchy and the constitution,” deny communists access to critical cabinet posts, and postpone elections until some tranquility was restored and non-communists could organize their political strength. Soon after, President Kennedy also approved measures that included increasing US mobile training teams to 500 personnel and authorizing photo reconnaissance missions over all of Laos.

The JCS remained deeply dissatisfied. On 7 September, they warned Secretary McNamara that preoccupation with the confrontation over Berlin was obscuring important issues in Asia. They reasoned as follows: “In 1948 the Communists
concentrated our attention, resources, and effort in Europe by creating the Berlin blockade. This action effectively diverted United States and world attention from Communist action in Asia which had reached by late 1949 its interim goal of a Communist-dominated mainland China. . . . This same pattern is evident again with respect to Southeast Asia and Berlin.” In their judgment, the Laotian situation had deteriorated so drastically that the United States “must take immediate and positive action to prevent a complete communist takeover of Laos and the ultimate loss of all Southeast Asia to include Indonesia.” Hence, unless an acceptable political solution was achieved before the rainy season ended and fighting resumed, SEATO forces should be sent into Laos.39

Judging by what we now know, the JCS were wrong in thinking that Moscow and Beijing colluded to draw US attention away from communist designs in the Far East. Stalin in 1948 and Khrushchev in 1961 tightened the screws on Berlin for reasons that had nothing to do with events in Asia. But the Joint Chiefs’ belief in a world-wide, coordinated communist strategy would continue to shape their views about Southeast Asia.

In any case, President Kennedy kept following the diplomatic path. He remarked to speech-writer Theodore Sorensen, “Thank God the Bay of Pigs happened when it did. Otherwise we’d be in Laos by now—and that would be a hundred times worse.”40

Contingency planning, of course, moved forward. A State-Defense proposal for dealing with a major resumption of hostilities was completed late in September. Its political objective was restoring RLG sovereignty over all Laos except the northeast area already under communist control. SEATO would send 24,500 troops into Laos, with another 18,300 support personnel in Thailand. If strong North Vietnamese units entered Laos, “friendly forces will take action without waiting for actual engagement and will strike the enemy in Laos.” Thus the earlier State-Defense dispute was resolved in Defense’s favor. To meet a combined Chinese-North Vietnamese invasion of Laos, SEATO would need 278,000 men, including fifteen divisions and eight regimental combat teams. The US contribution would be four divisions, two of them drawn from the CONUS strategic reserve.41

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric advised the JCS that he was particularly concerned by the possibility of simultaneous crises in Laos and Berlin. Would assembling “massive” air power for Southeast Asia “dilute other deployments, including our basic posture for nuclear strikes?” Gilpatric thought that “the President’s decision on the proposed plan may well hinge on the risk of getting into a serious two-front situation.”42

In answering him, the JCS gave no ground. Necessary naval and air forces, they said, could be concentrated in Southeast Asia without crippling capabilities elsewhere. More importantly, they contended that “the time is now past” when actions short of intervention could reverse a rapidly worsening situation and prevent losing Laos, South Vietnam, “and ultimately Southeast Asia.” Intervening in Laos
might well spark escalation and thus compel mobilization beyond what was being done over Berlin. But, they argued, “it is not a question of the desirability of having two limited war situations going at the same time.” Rather, “the fact of the matter is that we may be faced with such a contingency.” The exceptionally strong wording in this paper requires explanation. First, these were days in which tension over Berlin was at a peak. Second, and probably more important, was the residue from the Bay of Pigs. The JCS obviously worried about the administration’s steadiness and will to prevail.

In December 1961, Souvanna worked to assemble a government of national union in which his “neutralists” would get the critical Defense and Interior ministries. The administration supported Souvanna’s effort and, when Phoumi would not accede to it, suspended a $52 million monthly subsidy to the RLG. The JCS protested that, while our military programs were designed to bolster the RLG’s bargaining position, our political decisions were sapping the RLG’s prestige and effectiveness to the point where “the legal government may soon have no tenable position from which to negotiate.” They believed the RLG had so improved its military posture since May that it could and should negotiate from a position of strength. Phoumi should not be pressured into yielding the Defense and Interior ministries to Souvanna’s faction. A “neutralist” Defense minister would bar pro-western officers from high command positions, imperiling “hard-won and very considerable American military assets.” Occasional restraint of the RLG undoubtedly was required, the Chiefs acknowledged, “but encouragement and full assurance of continued US support are equally necessary to the achievement of US objectives in Laos.” Deputy Secretary Gilpatric forwarded this memorandum to Secretary Rusk and President Kennedy. While withholding endorsement of those parts that dealt primarily with political matters, he noted that a Special National Intelligence Estimate recently had confirmed the Joint Chiefs’ assessment of RLG military capabilities. Gilpatric felt reasonably confident that, in the absence of reinforcements from North Vietnam, Phoumi’s troops could hold their ground.

A Crisis Reprised

During January 1962, Phoumi’s troops suffered a series of minor defeats. A new Special National Intelligence Estimate attributed these reverses mainly to an increase of North Vietnamese troops in Laos, from about 5,000 up to 9,000. On 21 March, in Hawaii, Secretary McNamara, Lemnitzer and Decker conferred with Admiral Felt and his staff. McNamara asked about enemy capabilities and was told that the Pathet Lao, with North Vietnamese help, could capture major cities in about thirty days. General Lemnitzer said that a “showdown” was near and doubted that the administration would authorize intervention by either US or SEATO forces. Therefore, “our only recourse is to support Phoumi and make him...
fight” to keep the territory that he still controlled. Lemnitzer vigorously objected to intimations that the MAAG should withdraw, denouncing that as a “devastating” psychological blow that would “hand the country over to the Communists.” All the conferees agreed that the MAAG should remain.46

On 19 April, President Kennedy decided that MAAG mobile training teams should withdraw from forward positions sometime after 7 May. That was done to pressure Phoumi into accepting Souvanna’s distribution of cabinet portfolios, and Phoumi did become more flexible. Against US advice, though, Phoumi had concentrated 5,000 of his best troops at the town of Nam Tha near the Chinese border. During 5–6 May, Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces attacked Nam Tha and sent Phoumi’s men streaming across the Mekong River into Thailand, about 75 miles away. Communists now controlled all northern Laos and were occupying stretches of the Mekong River.47

This time, JCS suspicions about coordinated action by Moscow and Beijing were justified. Khrushchev stopped trying to restrain the Pathet Lao, approving what he was assured would be a “reasonable” campaign that did not widen the conflict. The Chinese deployed 2,149 of their soldiers along with 1,772 civilian workers, 203 vehicles, and 609 horses and mules to supply the Pathet Lao.48

Secretary McNamara and Lemnitzer were in Athens attending a NATO meeting. President Kennedy ordered them to go at once to Southeast Asia and determine (1) whether the Mekong would be an effective barrier and (2) whether Thai forces could prevent the communists from entering northern Thailand. The two men travelled non-stop to Bangkok. After transferring to a C–47, they flew along the Mekong at heights of 100 to 200 feet. They quickly perceived that the river posed no obstacle at all. This was the dry season, and the water level had dropped so low that they saw people wading across the Mekong. McNamara and Lemnitzer then inspected some Thai military posts near the river and concluded that Thai troops, as currently disposed, could not block a crossing.

Lemnitzer decided that the Thais needed to organize an airborne regiment to constitute a rapidly deployable reserve. McNamara urged Prime Minister Thanarat Sarit to create such a unit. Sarit agreed, if the United States would furnish equipment and financial support. McNamara replied that the Thais were perfectly capable of paying the costs themselves, and no agreement was reached.49

In Washington, meanwhile, the Service Chiefs described Nam Tha as “conclusive evidence” of Souvanna’s inability to control the Pathet Lao. State proposed taking steps to undermine Phoumi’s influence; they disagreed. The Chiefs recommended, among other things, moving a US Army battle group then in Thailand up to the Laotian border and making it apparent that SEATO or US troops slated for intervention had been alerted. Unless the pre-Nam Tha cease-fire line was restored, they saw no alternative to intervening with as many SEATO members as proved willing.50

On 12 May, Secretary McNamara and Lemnitzer returned to Washington where they briefed the NSC. President Kennedy authorized what he emphasized were
strictly “precautionary dispositions.” These included: positioning two carriers in
the Gulf of Siam near Bangkok; augmenting and moving the battle group to the
border; alerting airborne units in Okinawa and the Philippines; and putting one
Marine battalion landing team, one Marine and one Air Force tactical squadron into
Thailand. The next day, Kennedy also directed steps to replace Phoumi as a politi-
cal figure and restrict him to a military role. By 22 May, six of the nine thousand US
troops ordered to Thailand had arrived there.51

On 24 May, President Kennedy directed State and Defense to prepare plans for
two contingencies: using Thai forces to hold, with US support, Sayabouri province
in northwestern Laos; and retaking the southern panhandle by Thai, South Viet-
namese, or US forces. The working group’s first effort drew criticism from Secre-
tary McNamara, the JCS, and from General Taylor who, as Military Representative
of the President, was monitoring the situation closely. On 2 June, senior officials
reviewed the group’s revised plan. Initially, nine to ten thousand US troops would
occupy sites along the Mekong River valley. Taylor voiced doubts about occupying
an area so large that we might be drawn into “a massive guerrilla pacification cam-
paign.” The primary purpose, he said, should be to protect South Vietnam and Thai-
land. Lemnitzer “agreed that the issue was basically the security of Southeast Asia
and that the main threat to that security was North Vietnam.” He outlined a plan for
landing at Vinh, just above the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Vietnams, in
order to seal off all the infiltration routes into Laos and South Vietnam. Conferees
reached a consensus that Laotian territory, while unimportant in itself, was impor-
tant for the defense of Southeast Asia.52

On 4 June, the working group distributed another revision that again listed
occupying Mekong sites as the first step but described North Vietnamese aggres-
sion as “the root cause of the problem in Southeast Asia.” Senior officials still were
not satisfied. The Secretary of Defense believed that critical decisions would come
much more rapidly than the group presumed. He could not visualize remaining
long at the stage of merely occupying the Mekong valley; the communists almost
certainly would react in such a way as to make rapid escalation inevitable. The JCS
called for changes that included: shifting emphasis from a response against enemy
moves to initiating offensive actions; expanding consideration of the threshold
beyond which we would find communist activity intolerable; and removing limita-
tions on air attacks in Laos and North Vietnam (e.g., heavy attacks against military
targets throughout North Vietnam rather than a massive strike on Hanoi). The sig-
nificance of this exercise was that the focus of planning shifted from holding parts
of Laos to punishing North Vietnam. In fact, Secretary McNamara and the Chiefs
now opposed intervening in Laos simply for the purpose of achieving a unified,
neutral country under a coalition government. Planning, instead, would proceed to
support whatever expanded political objectives might be approved “as the situa-
tion in Laos continues to develop.”53
On 11 June, Souvanna, Phoumi, and Prince Souphanouvong announced agreement on a Provisional Government of National Union. Cabinet posts were apportioned as follows: seven Souvanna “neutralists” with Souvanna himself as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense; four Pathet Lao figures, with Souphanouvong as Deputy Prime Minister; four RLG members, with Phoumi as another Deputy Prime Minister; and four other right-wing neutralists not tied to Phoumi. Now satisfied with Phoumi’s behavior, the United States resumed its financial support of the RLG.\textsuperscript{54}

On 23 June, the Provisional Government was officially installed at Vientiane. Exactly one month later, the fourteen powers at Geneva subscribed to a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos. They also agreed to a protocol requiring that all foreign troops leave Laos within 75 days and prohibiting the importation of any armaments save those needed for national defense. The ICC was empowered to supervise both the cease-fire and the evacuation. The ICC could investigate alleged cease-fire violations either at the RLG’s request or by a majority vote of its own members. Unanimity was necessary, though, for all conclusions and recommendations.\textsuperscript{55}

Soon, North Vietnam emerged as the real winner. The ICC, of course, proved ineffective. With the Ho Chi Minh Trail down through eastern Laos now secure, Hanoi infiltrated men and supplies into South Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs were right in claiming that nothing short of a powerful intervention, with air attacks extending beyond Laos, could have prevented that outcome. Yet time would show that what was at stake was control of Indochina and not, as the Chiefs believed, of all Southeast Asia.
The Berlin Confrontation

Challenges Repulsed

When World War II ended, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union split the German capital as well as the German homeland into occupation zones. Berlin, divided into four sectors, lay deep within the Soviet zone about 110 miles from any of the western zones. Formal arrangements provided the western powers with access along air corridors, but arrangements for rail and road passage derived from verbal understandings. In 1948, with Europe itself divided by an “iron curtain,” the Soviets halted all ground access to what had become West Berlin. A massive airlift kept West Berlin alive, and the Soviets eventually reopened the ground routes in May 1949.

Two separate German states came into existence but Berlin remained under four-power occupation. Then, on 27 November 1958, the Soviets accused the western powers of using Berlin as a “springboard for intensive espionage, sabotage, and other subversive activities.” Accordingly, Moscow proposed to end the four-power occupation and convert Berlin into a demilitarized “free city.” Unless appropriate arrangements were completed within six months, the USSR and East Germany would conclude a separate peace treaty transferring occupation functions to the East German government.

President Eisenhower’s response was firm yet low-key. He made no concessions but rejected JCS recommendations that would require a large-scale mobilization. What was the point of activating two or three divisions, he asked, when the Soviets could deploy many more? He did not believe war would come but if it did “we must have the crust to follow through” by using nuclear weapons. The Soviets’ six-month deadline passed quietly and tension eased.
In the field, responsibility rested with General Lauris Norstad, USAF, who was Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, as well as US Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR). To prepare for Berlin contingencies, he was directed to create a tripartite planning staff called LIVE OAK. When supervising LIVE OAK, Norstad acted only in his capacity as USCINCEUR. This bypassing of NATO channels was necessary because the North Atlantic Treaty, while it applied to American, British, and French occupation troops, did not cover access and occupation rights in Berlin. In May 1960, Norstad accepted LIVE OAK’s plan for preserving air access. In June, he approved LIVE OAK’s proposal for testing a ground blockade with a battalion-size probe. In January 1961, the three governments instructed Norstad to prepare plans for a division-size thrust along the Helmstedt-to-Berlin autobahn.4

There was unilateral as well as tripartite planning. On 12 August 1960, the JCS sent Secretary Gates a detailed checklist of possible countermeasures for meeting a range of contingencies. If there was a Soviet turnover of control to East Germany, for example, they listed fourteen options that included raising US forces in Europe to full strength, increasing tripartite use of the Helmstedt-to-Berlin autobahn, and establishing an anti-submarine patrol along the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom line.5

**A Looming Showdown?**

Late in February 1961, Moscow again warned that a peace treaty, liquidating the four-power occupation and giving control over access routes to East Germany, was forthcoming. President Kennedy commissioned former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to study the Berlin problem. Replying on 3 April, Acheson argued that since there could be no Berlin “solution” without German reunification, all courses of action open to the United States were dangerous. So, if a crisis came, boldness might be the best course. He concluded that the western powers could neither reopen a ground corridor nor sustain an airlift against determined Soviet resistance. Therefore, the test would be one of will power rather than military power. The Soviets could defeat or capture a battalion-size probe without revealing their depth of commitment. But using an armored division, with another division in reserve, would be wholly different because such a force could deal with East German and token Soviet opposition. He urged more professional study of such a move.6

Secretary McNamara, meantime, asked the JCS to review the adequacy of contingency plans. They replied that their checklist of August 1960 remained a satisfactory framework. As for LIVE OAK, though, they identified important deficiencies including: training of the tripartite battalion force; completion of the concept for a division-size probe; and arrangements for West German participation in LIVE OAK.7

The White House asked DOD to assess outcomes of a probe by one or two divisions, a major effort to maintain air access, and to suggest actions outside
Europe that might pressure the USSR into restoring access. On 28 April, the JCS sent McNamara their views. Any substantial ground probe should be preceded by the arrival in Europe of reinforcements, extensive deployments within the theater, and partial mobilization. The East Germans alone, they said, could stop although not destroy a two-division force. The Soviets could isolate and annihilate the two divisions, but only by massing a large army. Thus the probe would serve political rather than military purposes, setting up a test of wills that offered both sides a wide range of alternatives. The Soviets might choose to restore access rather than risk general war. An airlift, the Chiefs warned, could be broken by either harassment (e.g., jamming and electronic deception) or military measures. If either side resorted to force, counterattacks on airfields and ground installations would be imperative and the area of conflict must rapidly expand. As for countermeasures outside Europe, they were satisfied with those in their August 1960 checklist (e.g., steps against Soviet Bloc shipping).

Writing to President Kennedy on 5 May, Secretary McNamara recommended an early re-examination of policy guidance. Plans from the Eisenhower era, in which repulse of a small probe would be followed by rapid escalation, were “inconsistent with current thinking which proposes the use of substantial conventional force before resorting to nuclear weapons.” From the JCS paper, he concluded that plans must be laid for a large-scale effort to reopen the autobahn, that efforts to restore air access would be most hazardous, and that a wide range of worldwide pressures could be applied against the USSR. Also, plans should be laid for exploiting West Germany’s military potential. McNamara seemed deeply disturbed by the Joint Chiefs’ judgment that East German forces alone could stop a one or two-division probe. A great power, he insisted, should not risk defeat by a puppet regime. Only by overcoming purely East German resistance could a test of wills between the United States and the Soviet Union take place.

Concurrently, the JCS gave Secretary McNamara their appraisal of Acheson’s report, calling it “a realistic analysis of a complex politico-military problem.” They did take issue with it on some points. Launching a battalion probe probably should precede a complete division, since the smaller force might reopen the autobahn. Also, because a ground probe carried less risk of escalation than trying to break an air blockade, vigorous efforts to reopen ground access should be exhausted before an airlift began. Finally, the fact that West Berlin was militarily indefensible meant that, at some point, resorting to general war might become preferable to committing more conventional forces.

After reviewing McNamara’s memorandum of 5 May, the JCS advised that his phrase “substantial conventional military force” was, at this point, undefined and hence unusable. When General Norstad’s appreciation arrived, a better definition might be prepared for inclusion in a broader revision of policy. Before any policy statement left the Pentagon, they wanted an opportunity to assess its implications. The Chiefs also worried that linking nuclear weapons with general war measures
would impair the latitude necessary in nuclear planning. Deputy Secretary Gilpatrick agreed that planning must not be restricted in that way.12

General Norstad’s appreciation showed that he had no liking for flexible response, as the administration conceived it. A small probe, he reasoned, would be enough to show our seriousness of purpose and reveal Soviet intentions. Norstad believed the communists could stop a large probe as easily as a small one, “and the greater the force used the greater the embarrassment which would result from failure.” Successive repulses might simply condition the western powers to defeat. “Nothing,” he reminded McNamara, “would impress the Soviets less than wasting in the corridor forces that are known to be essential to our overall defense.” Norstad also opposed the idea of using West German troops to reopen the autobahn. That would constitute an invasion of East Germany and cause the Soviets to invoke their Warsaw Pact commitments. Under those circumstances, “it is hard to foresee any possibility of disengagement by either the East Germans or by the Russians if West German forces become involved with them.” Finally, Norstad found it difficult to conceive a thrust that would confront East German troops alone. A Soviet division stationed astride the autobahn at Magdeburg could avoid action only by withdrawing. Once a battle began, he predicted, the Soviets could not afford to allow the East Germans to be beaten. The Soviets need not intervene openly; they could provide air, artillery, and logistic support in a covert manner that never could be proven.13 This appreciation marked the opening of a major rift between General Norstad and the civilian leadership.

The JCS, on 21 June, bluntly informed Secretary McNamara that “the basic hypothesis that the opposition will be purely [East German] is invalid.” Although a force of seven divisions and four tactical air wings could open and maintain access against East German opposition, “the concept of operations is so dependent upon assumptions as to be an extreme gamble.” Planning for this possibility formally ended two months later.14

The Credibility Issue Takes Center Stage

On 12 May, Khrushchev proposed to President Kennedy that the two men meet in Vienna during early June. This was agreeable to the President and arrangements were quickly consummated. On 26 May, one week before the meeting, Premier Khrushchev told his Presidium colleagues that he believed the western powers could be pried out of Berlin with hardly any risk of war. He intended to conclude a peace treaty with the East German government and transfer to it control over air and ground access routes. Air traffic would be cut off, then allowed to resume on condition that western planes land at East German airfields. Any allied planes trying to land in West Berlin would be shot down. No other lifelines would be severed, and there would be no interference in the affairs of West Berlin.
Khrushchev assessed the conventional balance in Central Europe as highly unfavorable to NATO and presumed that American and European public opinion would prevent the United States from resorting to force.\textsuperscript{15}

On 27 May, the JCS provided President Kennedy with advice of a kind that rarely appears in the written record:

\begin{quote}
In your conversations with Premier Khrushchev... be assured that you speak from a position of decisive military superiority in any matter affecting the vital interests of the United States and our Allies... It is the considered judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the military forces under your command... can achieve decisive military victory in any all-out test of strength with the Sino-Soviet Bloc to the extent that the United States will retain the dominant power position in the world. Thus, in your discussions, be assured that you may represent the national interest with confidence and without fear or reservation.

The military forces of the United States reaffirm their dedication to your command and wish you ‘Godspeed’ in your mission.
\end{quote}

The phrases “decisive military superiority” and “decisive military victory” are arresting. After the campaign oratory about a missile gap and the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the JCS expected Khrushchev to act aggressively and wanted to be sure that President Kennedy was fully aware of US strength.\textsuperscript{16}

At Vienna, over 3–4 June, President Kennedy did face a forceful, confident adversary. Khrushchev said that his decision to sign a separate treaty by December was irrevocable. Kennedy, conceding nothing, replied that it would be a cold winter. The President then travelled to London, where Prime Minister Harold Macmillan found him somewhat stunned and baffled. Evidently, negotiating with Khrushchev had been rather like talking to Napoleon at the peak of his power. General Lemnitzer, likewise, thought that Vienna had left Kennedy deeply disturbed.\textsuperscript{17}

On 14 June, the JCS reviewed the situation with Dean Acheson, Admiral Den nison (Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic), and General Norstad. Acheson feared that US nuclear power no longer restrained the Soviets from challenging us directly. Agreeing, the JCS on 21 June advised Secretary McNamara that there was “an urgent need to re-establish the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent.” Assuming a D-Day for Berlin of 31 December, they set out a sequence of actions. The more significant ones follow: Between July and December, raise forces in Europe to full strength, declare a national emergency and initiate appropriate mobilization, resume U–2 flights over the USSR, and intervene if necessary in Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. Between September and November, restart nuclear testing, and withdraw non-essential military personnel from Europe. During November and December, seek allied reinforcements, harass communist bloc shipping, and begin a SAC airborne alert. All these measures, the Chiefs stated, were predicated upon “an early political decision... that the United States will resort to general war, if necessary,
in order to maintain its rights in Berlin.” They asked McNamara to give their paper to the President “at the earliest opportunity.”

The United States, in the Joint Chiefs’ judgment, “clearly” could prevail if it struck first. If the Soviets did so, “the degree to which we are successful in prevailing is dependent upon the timeliness of our response.” In summary, “Our strengths are adequate to deter enemy deliberate and rational resort to general war and, if general war eventuates, to permit the United States to survive as a viable nation despite serious losses, and ultimately to prevail and resume progress toward its national objectives.” Their point was that our military power looked more than sufficient; it was our political will that remained in doubt.

The JCS also responded to a series of questions posed by Mr. Acheson. What military preparations would influence Soviet decision-making? What conventional forces would be required (1) to break an East German blockade, (2) to challenge successively higher levels of East German and Soviet resistance, and (3) to continue fighting for five to fifteen days, providing the communists with time and opportunity to restore Berlin access? The JCS replied that measures cited in their memorandum of 21 June should sway Soviet decision-making in the direction desired. Without “a clear-cut Soviet-inspired Berlin incident,” however, they feared that full allied cooperation would not be forthcoming. A balanced force of seven divisions and four tactical air wings could break through an East German blockade and defend itself against Soviet and East German attacks for five to fifteen days. But they held out no hope of matching enemy escalations beyond that time. After thirty days of fighting, the Soviets could concentrate 128 divisions in Central Europe; the NATO powers could muster only 50 divisions in 120 days. As a “viable alternative” to general war, the JCS raised the possibility of using nuclear weapons against purely military targets in order to underline for the Soviets US determination and seriousness of purpose.

On 27 June, General Norstad cabled the JCS his opinion that the new threat was “perhaps even more critical than the blockade in 1948.” Since military measures had to be carefully attuned to political overtures and decisions, he argued that “we must maintain flexibility, freedom of action, whatever we do.” If reserves were mobilized, they should be activated for a stated time and then released or retained as circumstances dictated. Troop movements might be conducted under the guise of training exercises: bring three battle groups to Europe, return two, and replace them with two or more. No actions should be announced on “for the duration” basis, said Norstad, “since this would quickly establish positions of the utmost rigidity on both sides and would lead to escalation at an accelerating rate.” Norstad’s definition of flexibility was not the one conceived by Kennedy and McNamara.

Replying that same evening, General Lemnitzer assured Norstad of his complete agreement about the seriousness of the threat. Secretary McNamara and the Chiefs, Lemnitzer reported, had just agreed that the best recourse lay in substantially
expanding conventional strength. The Chiefs were looking into an increase of perhaps 500,000 personnel.22

The next day, Mr. Acheson gave the President a report stating that the outcome of a Berlin confrontation would “go far to determine the confidence of Europe—indeed of the world—in the United States.” Just like the JCS, he believed the best way to restore the credibility of our deterrent was to consciously accept the hazard of war and prepare for it. Acheson urged military preparations of three distinct types: strengthening conventional forces in Europe; readiness for countermeasures on the high seas; and placing SAC in a suitable state of readiness. Initially, a ground blockade should be answered by a civil airlift and an embargo upon trade and travel. Once the airlift was impeded, however, we would have to try to reopen the autobahn. A battalion probe should be followed by a one-division thrust and then by a seven-division attack. The moment of decision would come when, probably after one or two weeks of fighting, the seven-division force faced defeat. Then the United States must employ nuclear weapons “in order to preserve its army, its allies and itself.”23

On 29 June, Acheson made an oral presentation to the NSC. Admiral Burke made plain his opposition to the scale of the proposed probe and to an airlift unconnected with a probe. President Kennedy directed Secretary McNamara to propose steps that would create capabilities for (1) a garrison and civilian airlift, (2) naval harassment and blockade of communist bloc shipping, (3) large-scale conventional ground action, and (4) keeping SAC at maximum readiness over many months. Additionally, McNamara was to recommend the permanent increases in overall US strength that a prolonged period of greatly heightened tensions would require.24

The JCS, on 6 July, replied that the requirements for airlift, naval harassment, large-scale ground action, and SAC readiness would expand the armed forces by 867,872 personnel at a cost of $17.7 billion. Following up on their 27 June discussion with McNamara, the Chiefs specified, by separate memorandum, that an increase of 559,000 military and 40,000 personnel would allow the services to accomplish the following: Army—activate four reserve divisions and bring three training divisions to full strength; Navy—add one attack and one ASW carrier, 40 ships, 23 patrol squadrons, and amphibious lift for two divisions; Marines—create a fourth division/wing team; Air Force—retain one B–47 and six interceptor wings while adding 21 tactical, eight reconnaissance, and 56 troop carrier squadrons.25

President Kennedy instructed Secretary McNamara to produce a plan for supporting a ground probe, an airlift, and measures for improving our overall military posture. Recommendations should be based upon an assumption that “main reliance will not be placed on the use of atomic weapons at the outset of a military engagement with the USSR in Europe.”26

On 12 July, the JCS gave Secretary McNamara proposals that included: completing LIVE OAK planning for a division-size probe; planning unilaterally for
a corps-size thrust; responding promptly to a ground blockade with a tripartite battalion-size probe; and considering expanded air action as an alternative to larger efforts on the ground. The JCS program was built around a 559,000-man expansion, allocated as shown in their 6 July memorandum. Costs, confined to Berlin-related actions, would come to $7.87 billion for FY 1962. Ten Army and three Marine divisions would be available for European service between Mobilization (M)-Day and M+120 days. The allies would be expected to increase, by M+180, their ground forces in Central Europe from 21½ to 44½ division-equivalents. Allied Command Europe would acquire “sufficient forces to wage non-nuclear war on a scale which will indicate our determination and provide for some additional time to begin negotiations before resorting to nuclear warfare.” Nevertheless, the Chiefs asserted, NATO’s “main reliance” must rest on nuclear weapons.27 Partial mobilization, requiring a declaration of limited national emergency, would not generate enough conventional forces to sustain non-nuclear combat “on a broad scale.” Consequently, the JCS called for collateral actions which would improve the nuclear deterrent and demonstrate our determination to defend Berlin. These amounted, essentially, to the actions listed in the JCS paper of 21 June.28

On 14 July, President Kennedy asked for an interagency evaluation of whether to (1) ask Congress immediately for $1 to $1.5 billion, without any controls or taxes, and (2) request in two or three weeks $4 to $5 billion along with controls, taxes, and a declaration of national emergency. The JCS sent McNamara a quick appraisal of the $1 to $1.5 billion proposal that highlighted its inadequacies. The Secretary then told them to address the $4 to $5 billion proposal. Their answer, dated 18 July, basically repeated what was in their memorandum of 12 July. Yet the JCS worried that basic issues might be hidden in a thicket of studies. Stated “in their simplest form,” they defined these issues as follows. First, a decision to stay in Berlin “at all costs and risks.” Second, a willingness to accept general war and a need to make that clear to the Soviets. Third, a requirement promptly to initiate measures that would deter Soviet trouble-making. Fourth, an understanding that partial mobilization would enhance our credibility and improve our capabilities for conventional and nuclear conflict.29

Within the JCS organization, the question of how to restore US credibility loomed largest of all. On orders from General Lemnitzer, the Joint Strategic Survey Council compared the Berlin situation of 1958 with that of 1961. The military balance, it concluded, had not changed greatly over the past three years. Rather, the difference derived from Soviet perceptions of US firmness in Lebanon and Taiwan versus US vacillation in Laos and Cuba during 1961. Consequently, “the Soviets may now believe they can force the issue on Berlin without undue risk of general war.” Through another paper, the Council cautioned that increasing our conventional capability could damage the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. Therefore, “military preparations should be such as to hold out no hope to the Soviets that they can . . . wage a localized non-nuclear war with profit, or escape mortal damage
themselves.” The JCS agreed that General Lemnitzer should read this latter paper to Secretary McNamara.30

President Kennedy conferred with the JCS on 18 July. He said, and they agreed, that a declaration of national emergency could be postponed. Kennedy asked whether NATO’s air forces were strong enough to follow a ground probe with non-nuclear air action. Yes, General LeMay said, if NATO members acted together and took the initiative. Kennedy also inquired whether additional US divisions could be employed effectively if European allies failed to increase their own forces. No, Lemnitzer acknowledged, but more US forces plus added allied strength would expand the non-nuclear options.31

Next day, at an NSC meeting, Acheson called for a declaration of national emergency and a reserve call-up not later than September. Secretary McNamara, in rebuttal, laid out a flexible timetable. Measures already under way, he advised, would create an active CONUS reserve of six Army and two Marine divisions. By 1 January 1962, without declaring a national emergency or mobilizing major ground units, six divisions and supporting air units could deploy to Europe. On 24 July, through NSAM No. 62, Kennedy adopted McNamara’s approach. He also asked Congress for $3.2 billion in new obligational authority and launched an effort to improve the allies’ readiness. Kennedy outlined his decisions in a televised address the next evening, saying that West Berlin “has become—as never before—the great testing place of Western courage and will, a focal point where our solemn commitments . . . and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation.” On 1 August, Congress authorized the Chief Executive to call up as many as 250,000 reservists and to extend tours of duty for twelve months. Ten days later, the House and Senate completed passage of a $46.662 billion military appropriations bill, giving the administration virtually everything it wanted.32

The Berlin Wall Is Built

I
mportant facets of contingency planning remained unsettled. A meeting of the US, UK, French and West German foreign ministers lay just ahead. Assistant Secretary Paul Nitze drafted a position paper about which McNamara solicited JCS comments. The paper’s purpose was to provide American, British, and French military authorities with a wider range of alternatives. A main objective would be to “dispel any doubts . . . that increasingly large-scale violence could soon bring on the use of nuclear weapons and then general war.” According to Nitze’s paper, a probe force should be strong enough to avert defeat by the East Germans and maintain a penetration for several weeks against Soviet counterattacks.33

The JCS, on 29 July, urged giving greater emphasis to (1) the interrelationship of nuclear with non-nuclear forces and (2) how Berlin fit into the context of worldwide actions. They also asserted that, even by mid-1962, conventional forces could
not reopen ground access if they had to battle the Soviets on a large scale. The Chiefs presented again the sequences outlined on 12 and 18 July. They also sent Secretary McNamara a relatively brief document providing over-all planning guidance and presenting tasks to be accomplished. The rationale underlying Nitze’s paper, which McNamara endorsed, was that military planning in such a dangerous situation must be kept under very close political control, so that a field commander could not by himself precipitate general war. Military men, on the other hand, considered such detailed guidance to be improper and unrealistic.

Concurrently, in Paris, McNamara and Nitze conferred with SACEUR. General Norstad, viewing Nitze’s paper deficient as a directive and worried that it might discourage an allied buildup, wrote a draft that put less emphasis on prolonged conventional combat and more on preserving the general war posture. Ultimately, though, Nitze’s paper was the one used in presenting the US position. A basic difference persisted between the civilian leaders’ search for flexibility and SACEUR’s main reliance on nuclear weapons.

Berlin itself now became the flash point. What was described as a gate-closing panic swept East Germany; during July, more than 30,000 refugees entered West Berlin. Back in May, Secretary McNamara had asked the JCS to assess our capability to support guerrilla operations, should uprisings occur “incident to US military actions in Berlin.” They answered on 29 July that fourteen Special Forces detachments were stationed in West Germany, six in West Berlin, and 23 in the United States; European Command could supply 82,500 rebels for thirty days. But, they warned, a guerrilla campaign could escalate into general war. Since the Soviets almost certainly would intervene, concurrent conventional operations probably would prove necessary. Before attempting anything, therefore, the United States should decide to do whatever was necessary to achieve success.

During the first days of August, the exodus from East Germany neared a flood. During one 24-hour period, 1,926 refugees registered in West Berlin. On 10 August, Admiral Anderson speculated that spontaneous East German uprisings like those in 1953 might take place. The Chiefs had not yet addressed the ramifications of such an event. Now, Anderson cautioned his JCS colleagues, delay in deciding upon a course of action could be “disastrous.”

Already, however, Premier Khrushchev had decided upon a course of action. Between 3 and 5 August, he secured agreement from satellite leaders for building a wall around West Berlin. In the early hours of 13 August, East German troops and police set up roadblocks and barbed wire. Two days later, they began building the concrete wall.

The western powers, taken totally by surprise, did not challenge the wall-builders. General Lemnitzer’s private judgment was that “everyone appeared to be hopeless, helpless, and harmless.” On 16 August, Mayor Willy Brandt warned President Kennedy that continued passivity could provoke a crisis of confidence among West Berliners. Brandt asked for a reinforcement of the US garrison. On their own
initiative, the JCS recommended sending one battle group down the Helmstedt-to-West Berlin autobahn. When General Lemnitzer presented this proposal, at a White House meeting on 17 August, many of the President's advisers assailed it as needlessly provocative. Lemnitzer, in fact, remembered this as one of the worst confrontations of his Chairmanship. Nonetheless, much to Lemnitzer's relief and satisfaction, the President ruled that a battle group would go to Berlin. 39

On 20 August, from dawn to dark, 350 vehicles and 1,600 men of the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry Regiment, traversed the autobahn. At Babelsberg, just outside West Berlin, the Soviets stopped the third of six serials. The US Provost Marshal then relayed a warning that, unless the convoy was released within fifteen minutes, the heaviest vehicle would crash through the barrier. The Soviet officer in charge of the checkpoint quickly released the serial. Otherwise, the battle group's passage was uneventful. 40

The JCS, meanwhile, advised that stopping the refugee flow had increased the possibility of an uprising and told McNamara that they were developing suitable contingency plans. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric replied that, absent a probe or a limited war, US policy precluded overt backing of a rebellion. Planning could continue, though, because that policy might change. The JCS responded by urging McNamara to (1) oppose a policy of determining beforehand not to intervene and (2) support planning and resource development that would provide “a clear option” to intervene. Secretary McNamara agreed, telling Secretary Rusk that a prior decision against intervening would become known to the Soviets, who then could feel free to suppress the insurgency. In December, when the chance of a revolt had diminished considerably, the non-intervention policy was reaffirmed. 41

Accelerating the Buildup

The Soviets seemed to be preparing for a confrontation in the air corridors. On 23 August, the USSR accused the western powers of “clearly abusing” air access arrangements by transporting “all kinds of revanchists, extremists, saboteurs, spies, and diversionists” from West Germany into West Berlin. The 1945 accord, said the Soviets, only provided air corridors to the western powers “temporarily for provision of their military garrisons.” 42

On 24 August, Assistant Secretary Nitze advised Secretary McNamara that recent Soviet actions had so basically changed the situation as to require a “fundamental reappraisal” of the July decision for “restrained, gradual military strengthening.” Next day, in fact, the Defense Department issued orders mobilizing 76,600 men: 46,500 for the Army, to round out six divisions in CONUS and provide support units for US Army, Europe; 6,400 for the Navy to help man 40 destroyers and 18 patrol squadrons; and 23,700 for the Air Force to activate 33 tactical, transport, and reconnaissance squadrons. 43
On 31 August, without waiting for approval by any allies, the administration told General Norstad how impediments to air access should be met. In case of an administrative stoppage, substitute military for civil aircraft. If communist fighters forced civil aircraft to withdraw from the corridor, military transports would fly with fighter escorts. If unescorted military transports were harassed by fighters, pilots would decide whether to proceed or withdraw. If planes came under air attack, fighters sent to their rescue might take “aggressive protective measures,” including immediate pursuit into hostile air space. Planes subjected to antiaircraft artillery or missile fire would take evasive action and withdraw; counterattacks could be carried out only with specific approval from Washington.44

On 1 September, President Kennedy ordered two changes. First, Washington authorities rather than field commanders would decide whether fighter escorts should accompany transports. Some in the White House doubted whether USCINCEUR had this authority. Moreover, General Taylor warned the President that, if transports had been stopped by ground fire or missile salvos, fighter escorts without self-defense capability would simply furnish enemy batteries with additional targets. Second, pilots of unescorted transports should “make every effort to continue on course to destination despite harassment.” Since air crews always had overcome such obstacles in the past, they should not now be encouraged to yield. Taylor and McGeorge Bundy believed the original instructions had been too weak on this point.45

General Lemnitzer told the Service Chiefs that these changes vitiated the “clean cut” decisions of 31 August. State and Defense agreed that authority to provide fighter protection ought to be vested with General Norstad rather than retained in Washington. Accordingly, early in the evening of 2 September, the JCS sent this recommendation to the White House. General Taylor agreed and appropriate orders were issued immediately.46

General Norstad wanted more latitude. “I cannot believe,” he cabled Lemnitzer, “that it is the intention of our Government to permit antiaircraft installations to fire with impunity on allied aircraft in the corridor.” He asked for authority to order, on his own, retaliatory attacks against antiaircraft installations. The JCS “urgently” requested the Secretary of Defense to seek such authority. McNamara contacted the Secretary of State. Rusk replied that he also wanted USCINCEUR to have that authority but would not consider issuing unilateral instructions unless agreement with Great Britain, France, and West Germany proved unattainable.47

Meantime, on 30 August, Moscow announced the resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing. Many in Washington saw this as an effort to intimidate the western powers. Two days later, President Kennedy authorized the movement of additional aircraft to Europe. General LeMay flew to Paris and reached agreement with Norstad (1) to send twenty B-47s to Spanish bases, thereby releasing three F-100 squadrons for non-nuclear missions, and (2) to deploy four F-100 squadrons to bases in France and West Germany. As Norstad wished, the latter step
was announced as part of a training exercise, to preserve flexibility and avoid the appearance of either a Berlin-related buildup or a riposte to Soviet nuclear testing.

President Kennedy also asked Secretary McNamara to “take another hard look,” particularly at the measures they had decided to defer in July. The Joint Staff recommended replying that, since the Soviets were “acting with increasing audacity and confidence,” the United States should quicken “by every possible means” the strengthening of military power. Four regular divisions should be sent to Europe and four reserve divisions activated. Thirty-four air squadrons should be deployed to Europe and thirty-four called up. On 6 September, the JCS agreed to use this as a talking paper in discussions with the Secretary of Defense.48

Already, in fact, McNamara had prepared an analogous program. On 7 September, he proposed to the President a sequence of strong actions: about 15 September—order members of four National Guard divisions to report for duty between 15 October and 15 November and augment European Command with 37,000 personnel; during October—move the 4th Infantry Division to Europe and send another carrier plus supporting ships to the Sixth Fleet. Subsequently, if air access came under challenge, declare a limited national emergency, impose sanctions against the Soviet Bloc, deploy more Army divisions and USAF squadrons to Europe, mobilize the 4th Marine Division, concentrate part of the Second Fleet in the northeast Atlantic, and begin a naval blockade. McNamara described efforts by the European allies as “encouraging though not as yet wholly satisfactory”; he anticipated a definite improvement to their conventional capabilities over the next four months.49

**Divided Counsels**

President Kennedy promptly approved sending 37,000 men to European Command; this was announced on 9 September. But he issued a probing series of questions which General Taylor had composed:

1. What would sending six more divisions to Europe accomplish in terms of meeting the Berlin challenge, galvanizing allied actions, and strengthening the long-term defense of Western Europe?
2. Would increasing conventional capabilities convince the Soviets of our readiness to fight to a finish for West Berlin, or have the opposite effect?
3. Could thirty divisions defend Western Europe against a massive conventional attack? Could a corps-size probe reopen access without stripping overall defense? How long could combat by thirty divisions be supported logistically?
4. Why was mobilizing four divisions necessary?
5. How much of the four-division mobilization would be necessary if Berlin did not appear to be near the flash point?
6. What tactical air support was needed?
7. Would an increase of combat forces lower logistic support capabilities?
8. If we sent six divisions to Germany, might not the Soviets simply add six or more of their own? Would logistical problems, fear of attack by nuclear weapons, and preoccupations in the satellite nations set limits on what forces could be immediately available?50

On 11 September, General Lemnitzer sent Secretary McNamara replies that he emphasized were entirely his own:

1. Six divisions would provide proof of US leadership, strengthen allied determination, and improve NATO’s military and diplomatic posture. Adding them, however, would not create a capability for restoring ground access or for launching offensive operations across a broad front.

2. Such an increase would convey conviction about allied will power. Other ways to show this determination included expanding production, raising budgetary ceilings, mobilizing replacements for units deployed, and intervening in Laos if communists resumed offensive operations there.

3. Thirty divisions could defend for a “significant” time against a massive attack. A US force of eleven divisions could mount a corps-size probe without impairing Allied Command Europe’s overall posture. In fact, probe forces would necessarily be placed near the two most likely avenues of Soviet attack, the Eisenach-Erfurt gap and the North German plain.

4. Both Berlin and Laos might soon boil over. National Guard units would need four months to become combat-ready. Therefore, unless reserves were mobilized before regular units began moving overseas, we could confront two crises without a strategic reserve.

5. The Army needed at least two more active divisions, for a total of sixteen, in order to respond in more than one area and strengthen our initial posture for general war.

6. Tactical air requirements depended primarily upon how many divisions were deployed. Current plans called for as many as 28 squadrons.

7. Existing stockpiles and production levels could sustain approximately sixty days of intensive combat.

8. The Soviets could increase their forces in Eastern Europe “rather quickly” from 26 to 61 divisions. But they probably could not employ more than 55 divisions offensively because of logistical limitations, potentially hostile populations, vulnerable communications, the dispersal made necessary by nuclear weapons, and “the restrictive geography of the European peninsula.” Consequently, “any NATO buildup would reduce the margin of Soviet superiority and make any Soviet offensive proportionally more risky.”51

McNamara prepared tentative answers that followed those of Lemnitzer very closely. The Secretary also solicited General Norstad’s views. Replying on 16 September, Norstad began by claiming that he and McNamara diverged in degree rather than in principle. He then proceeded to chip away practically all the Secretary’s assumptions. “We must not,” Norstad continued, “confuse the wish with the fact.” It was wrong to believe that we could exercise “independent, unilateral control over the battle.” The credibility of our deterrent could be destroyed by accentuating a policy that the Soviets could construe as allowing them to fight
and then, if the risk appeared excessive, to disengage. The enemy always must feel that resorting to force risked general war. Surely, Norstad continued, our allies would object to a policy that implied either “trading large areas of Europe for time in which to avoid the spread of war to the United States” or denying “the use of capabilities and weapons which might divert or destroy the Soviet threat to European lives and territory.”

Comparing the two sides’ conventional capabilities, Norstad believed that a ceiling of 55 divisions clearly underestimated the Pact’s offensive strength. SHAPE intelligence credited it with ability to employ upwards of 100 divisions in Central Europe. Reinforcements could total forty divisions during the first ten days of fighting and sixty more during the next twenty. Non-US reserves did not exceed ten divisions. Additionally, the Soviets would enjoy conventional air superiority from the outset. Consequently, Norstad dismissed as “unduly optimistic” the calculation that a massive conventional attack could be withstood for thirty days. He anticipated, in fact, a quick deterioration in conventional defenses and ability to carry out nuclear defense plans. Norstad concluded by recommending against reinforcing European Command “until we have been able to absorb effectively the 40,000 augmentation now planned.”

On the morning of 18 September, Secretary McNamara put before the JCS proposals to mobilize four National Guard divisions and send one regular division to Europe. That afternoon, he and General LeMay as Acting Chairman attended a White House meeting. At the Pentagon, meantime, the remaining JCS members agreed that General Norstad should be supplied with two divisions “if and when he wants them” and that “in anticipation of such a request . . . two National Guard divisions should be called up on 1 October 1961.” General Wheeler, Director of the Joint Staff, telephoned this recommendation to the White House. LeMay presented their recommendation to the meeting and added that, while Lemnitzer and Decker favored deploying as many as six divisions to Europe, the other Chiefs opposed any overseas movement at this time. President Kennedy approved calling up two National Guard divisions.

At a press conference on 19 September, Secretary McNamara announced that some 73,000 reservists were being summoned to the colors. Two National Guard divisions, the 32nd Infantry of Wisconsin and the 49th Armored of Texas, would be activated on 15 October along with 249 support units. To bring activated units to full strength, 25,500 men from the Ready Reserve would be mobilized. If East-West relations improved, reservists would be released before their twelve-month tours ended. Should the world situation worsen, however, two more divisions might be mobilized at a later time.

Differences over policy and strategy did not diminish; if anything, they grew wider. On 22 September, the JCS informed McNamara that while General Decker concurred with Lemnitzer’s answers, Admiral Anderson, General LeMay, and General Shoup disagreed fundamentally with them. These three officers reported
having “serious reservations” over whether assembling a large ground force in Central Europe was the best way to demonstrate US determination to stand fast over Berlin. Like Norstad, they noted that some allies saw this as “evidence of our intent to avoid the use of nuclear weapons until substantial areas of Europe are overrun.” They answered President Kennedy’s queries of 8 September as follows:

1. As a means of galvanizing NATO and improving its long-term defense posture, deploying six divisions was “unnecessary and too costly in terms of available combat units.” Once committed, they could not be withdrawn without adversely affecting the alliance. A better solution would be to send 40,000 fillers immediately, “followed at an appropriate time by up to two divisions at a maximum on an exercise basis.”

2. Since the Soviets could counter any increases, the Soviets might see a six-division augmentation as an indication of US reluctance to employ nuclear weapons, thereby sapping rather than strengthening the credibility of our deterrent.

3. A 30-division force was incapable of withstanding massive conventional attack for any prolonged period of time.

4. More divisions, beyond the two being activated, should be called up on a one-for-one basis to replace any that might be sent to Europe.

5. Since the Army was being expanded to sixteen active divisions, no additional action was necessary.

6. Available tactical air power was insufficient to support “any large scale conventional operations for any significant period of time against a determined Soviet air effort.” They termed Lemnitzer’s figure of 28 squadrons “only a possibility” and “not now a firm commitment.”

7. Adequacy of supplies depended upon the duration and intensity of combat.

8. “Current intelligence credits the communists with the capability to employ force substantially in excess of that indicated in the Chairman’s views.” There might well be a limit on the number of Soviet divisions available for attack. Nonetheless, “their vastly superior ability to replace combat losses cannot be overlooked.” Seen from this perspective, “the ULTIMATE margin of Soviet superiority in ground strength would appear to provide them with an attractive option for large scale conventional operations.”

The same split viewpoints also permeated the process of contingency planning. At McNamara’s request, the JCS tasked General Norstad with making plans for restoring ground access. His responses left little doubt that he was quite skeptical about their practicality. A three-division probe could reach the Elbe River and remain there for three days, but by doing so ran the risk of complete destruction. A four-division corps could do that for five days, but at the same risk. A force of six divisions could hold, for approximately seven days, a bridgehead 50 kilometers wide and 40 deep; half the force might be lost. Tactical air forces could execute assigned tasks for perhaps fifteen days, on a diminishing scale.

After a discussion with Secretary McNamara, the JCS looked over actions that might influence Soviet behavior over Berlin. On 2 October, Admiral Anderson set out a sequence of graduated responses:
Phase I: Undertake a coordinated buildup of all NATO forces.
Phase II: Respond to denial of access with economic sanctions and, if necessary, an air or platoon-size ground probe. Position forces for general war, and begin maritime reprisal measures.
Phase III: Launch limited ground and air actions, complemented by offensive measures at sea.
Phase IV: Resort to general war.

On 2 October, also, General Norstad spent the whole day conferring with Secretary McNamara and the Chiefs. During their discussion, Norstad referred repeatedly to the high probability of “explosive escalation.” When Admiral Anderson showed his paper, in which some responses to East German or Soviet interference would be delayed as much as thirty or forty days, Norstad reacted violently. He asserted, and everyone agreed, that an early probe was essential: “If we had knocked down the wall in Berlin when it was first put up there would have been strong protest, but probably no other action and the wall would not be there today. It is too late now, however.” As for reinforcements, Norstad requested the 40,000 fillers already promised, heavy equipment, 500 aircraft, and some strengthening of the Sixth Fleet. But the big problem, he insisted, was that the Soviets still doubted the US will to fight and to use nuclear weapons: “We have failed dismally to convince them.”

The next day, at the White House, General Norstad said bluntly that plans for a graduated response, “passing from A to Z without missing a step,” were “completely unrealistic.” He recommended responding to a blockage by: starting with a limited probe by one or more armored vehicles; next, conducting a battalion-size probe; then launching some form of limited action, using nuclear weapons if necessary. Questioned by President Kennedy, he acknowledged that there were no approved inter-allied contingency plans; even a ground probe was “agreed” only in the sense that it was thought worth planning for. McNamara suggested that, after Norstad had ascertained what alternatives were acceptable to the allies, the administration should indicate its preferences. Kennedy and Norstad disagreed; both men wanted Washington to assume leadership. Norstad said again that he wanted no more divisions now, since Soviet reaction might provoke a “snowballing of forces” that would harm negotiations. But he did ask that three divisions be available in ten days, and six to eight divisions within thirty days. McNamara dismissed the latter requirement as impossible.

One week later, the administration authorized more augmentations for European Command. First, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment would go to Germany. Second, eleven Air National Guard squadrons (275 aircraft) would arrive in Europe by 1 November, while seven regular squadrons (126 aircraft) would redeploy to CONUS. Unlike the Guard squadrons, regular squadrons were equipped for aerial refueling and thus could return rapidly to Europe. Third, equipment for one armored and one infantry division would be pre-positioned in Germany. Fourth, battle groups of the 4th Infantry Division would substitute for those from the 101st
Airborne Division in a training exercise, and at least two of those battle groups would remain in Germany indefinitely. Thus the slower-moving infantry units would be brought closer to the crisis area.60

For what proved the final round of contingency planning, ISA and State Department officers drafted a sequence of actions. There were four phases, somewhat akin to those prescribed by Admiral Anderson. It was taken to the White House, revised, and circulated for comment on 12 October.61 At General Lemnitzer's direction, J–5 drafted an alternate sequence. Approved by the JCS and forwarded to Secretary McNamara on 13 October, it took issue with the State-Defense paper on two counts. First, maritime reprisals outside Europe should be complementary to, and not substitutes for, actions to restore access. Second, any interference ought to be opposed “directly and immediately.” The Chiefs objected to the idea of increasing our reliance on air corridors when ground access was blocked, and vice versa. The weaker the force posture and the more indecisive US actions were, the swifter would be the progression from conventional to nuclear conflict. The JCS contended, in fact, that “positive action to oppose aggression in any geographical area” would influence the Berlin situation. Intervention in Southeast Asia would be one way of making US determination “unmistakably clear” to the Soviets. The JCS recommended their own sequence of actions, which described dozens of responses to more than thirty challenges. They wanted these brought before the President when he reviewed the State-ISA paper.62

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric told the JCS that he believed the administration needed a “succinct” paper, completed rapidly. In his judgment, it would be premature to fix too rigidly the details within each major class of action, which was what the JCS paper did. Accordingly, Gilpatric and Rusk urged the President to establish a national position at approximately the level of detail set out by the State-ISA sequence of 12 October.63

On 20 October, President Kennedy approved a policy statement that deemphasized a delayed response and cited the Chiefs' opinion that a naval blockade should complement steps taken in Central Europe. According to it, interference amounting to less than “definitive blockage” would be answered by a platoon-size probe on the ground and fighter escorts in the air. Should significant blockage be maintained, responses would include mobilization and rapid reinforcement along with economic embargo and maritime harassment. But, if substantial reinforcements were already on hand, courses of action would include (1) expanding air action to gain local air superiority and (2) ground operations in division and greater strength. If the Soviets threatened US vital interests, then stronger and steadily escalating measures would be taken.64

The President also sent General Norstad an explanatory letter: “I place as much importance on developing our capacity and readiness to fight with significant non-nuclear forces as on measures designed to make our deterrent more credible. . . . It seems evident to me that our nuclear deterrent will not be credible to the
Soviets unless they are convinced of NATO’s readiness to become engaged on a lesser level of violence and are thereby made to realize the great risks of escalation to nuclear war.”

Kennedy’s line of argument, as he ought to have known, was not entirely “evident” to the JCS and not at all to General Norstad. At a White House meeting on 8 November, Norstad spoke with astonishing frankness, telling the President that his letter “was replete with clichés and jargon which were probably clear to people in Washington but which were not clear to him.” Norstad said the policy statement was “poorly drafted, ambiguous, and contradictory. . . . In its present form, he could not use [it] as a basis for instruction to his planners.”

It was fortunate that, by this time, the crisis atmosphere had eased considerably. The President and General Norstad were completely at loggerheads. The JCS, divided among themselves, proved unable to play a mediating role. In January 1962, Norstad complained to Lemnitzer that the JCS or “higher authority” were communicating directly with the Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe, and the US Commander, Berlin. Lemnitzer replied: “For many weeks I have been resisting strongly the constant hounding and harassment to take these and other actions which I regard as serious violations of the US traditional and tested system of military command relationships. . . . In some cases I have succeeded in resisting but . . . the point was reached where further resistance was impossible without being in direct violation of the specific instructions of the Commander-in-Chief.”

**A Surprising Success**

For all their supposed contradictions and shortcomings, the administration’s actions did revive US credibility. By September, apparently, Khrushchev had decided to damp down the confrontation. On 17 October, he announced to the Communist Party Congress that since the western powers were “showing some understanding of the situation . . . we shall not insist that the peace treaty be signed . . . before December 31, 1961.”

Tranquility did not envelop Berlin immediately, by any means. Harassment of western personnel entering East Berlin came to a dramatic culmination on 27 October 1961. Five jeeploads of US military police, five armored personnel carriers, and five M–48 tanks assembled at “Checkpoint Charlie” on the Friedrichstrasse. The jeeps then escorted one US automobile as it made a four-minute excursion into East Berlin. Moments after this foray ended, ten Soviet T–54 tanks appeared. Ten US tanks came to the western side of the barrier, and more T–54s arrived. After some tense hours, the Soviet armor withdrew.

Between 8 and 19 February 1962, the Soviets tried to reserve space in the air corridors by peremptorily announcing flights at times and altitudes chosen unilaterally. US authorities responded by sending transports through the corridors at
those same times and altitudes. Communist planes occasionally buzzed western aircraft and frequently dropped radar-jamming chaff. Between 20 February and 29 March, the Soviets continued their transport runs but filed flight plans in advance according to agreed procedures. The paths chosen, moreover, were too low to endanger western aircraft and too infrequent to impede allied access. Still, the western powers took care to fly an equal number of transports into West Berlin every day. Then, on 30 March, the Soviets cancelled a scheduled eight-flight plan. With that act, competition in the air corridors ended.69 Sporadic harassment on the autobahn continued, and high-level officials devoted a good deal of time to Berlin issues for months to come. In autumn 1962, Khrushchev hoped that installing missiles in Cuba would allow him to renew the Berlin confrontation under more favorable conditions.70 When that bid failed, the days of danger were past.

In June 1963, President Kennedy visited West Berlin. Speaking at the city hall, he paid a memorable tribute: “Two thousand years ago the proudest boast was ‘civis Romanus sum.’ Today, in the world of freedom the proudest boast is ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’. . . . All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and therefore as a free man, I take pride in the words ‘Ich bin ein Berliner.’”71
The Cuban Missile Crisis

More than “Mongoose”?  

The Joint Chiefs of Staff saw Fidel Castro’s regime as a cancer that must be removed, by whatever means proved necessary. They came to that conclusion in March 1960 and conveyed it repeatedly thereafter to their civilian superiors. Thus, in February 1962, they approved a Joint Staff paper describing communist Cuba as “incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemisphere.” Castro’s ouster, ran the argument, could be accomplished “without precipitating general war, and without serious effect on world opinion,” if it could be justified as responding either to humanitarian needs or to an appeal by Cuban insurgents, and if the United States announced that it would withdraw as soon as a new government was installed by free elections. A military operation should be conducted quickly and with sufficient force, so that the Communist Bloc would not have time to take countermeasures. Invasion also would be politically acceptable if Castro committed “hostile acts against US forces or property,” providing an incident upon which to base overt action.¹

President Kennedy was not willing, at this point, to order an invasion. What he had authorized in November 1961 was Operation Mongoose, a covert program to help Cubans oust Castro. A Special Group (Augmented), of which General Lemnitzer was a member, oversaw Mongoose activities. General Taylor chaired the Group but Attorney General Robert Kennedy was its principal motive force. Brigadier General Edward Lansdale, USAF, who was Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, led an interagency working group that prepared detailed plans for Mongoose and coordinated their execution. The JCS representative on Lansdale’s group, Brigadier General William Craig, USA, transmitted
requests to the Joint Staff. Each directorate of the Joint Staff and each service assigned an officer who worked full time on Mongoose. When more help was needed, Craig passed tasks, without stating their origin or purpose, to staff elements not cleared for Mongoose.²

Mongoose planners soon recognized that an uprising could not succeed without prompt US intervention. Indeed, a firm promise of American assistance might be necessary for persuading Cubans to begin a revolt. Accordingly, in mid-March 1962, General Taylor revised Mongoose guidelines to state that (1) final success would require decisive US military intervention and (2) indigenous resources would be used to prepare for, justify, and then facilitate this intervention.³

At the request of Lansdale’s group, the JCS prepared plans for rapidly inserting forces into Cuba if a revolt occurred. On 5 March, Lansdale asked General Craig to prepare “a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes is desirable for direct military intervention.”⁴ The Joint Staff drew up a list of manufactured incidents: a menu of attacks, riots, and acts of sabotage at Guantanamo⁵; blowing up an unmanned ship at Guantanamo or near Havana or Santiago de Cuba; faked assassination attempts against Cuban exiles and terrorist bombings in Florida and Washington, DC; the sinking, “real or simulated,” of a boatload of Cuban refugees; staging a filibustering expedition against an anti-communist Caribbean or Central American nation that would appear Castro-sponsored; downing a civilian airliner (actually a drone with no one on board) in Cuban air space; and the apparent shooting down of a USAF fighter over international waters. None of these incidents was supposed to involve actual killing, and in the fighter incident no aircraft would really be destroyed. The staff did warn that these actions were feasible only as long as there was “reasonable certainty” that US intervention would not directly involve the Soviet Union. Any action, therefore, should take place within the next few months. Subsequently, the JCS called attention to an obvious fact: Justification for intervention would “probably be more convincing to the rest of the world if it can be related to a real and valid provocation rather than based entirely on manufactured pretexts which entail some risk of compromise.”⁶

On 13 March, General Lemnitzer forwarded the list of pretexts to Secretary McNamara with the Joint Chiefs’ endorsement. He emphasized, though, that it was only a preliminary submission, to be combined with those of other agencies and then considered on a case-by-case basis. In fact, the provocation proposals never moved beyond the discussion stage. On 16 March, President Kennedy informed the Special Group that he foresaw no circumstances in the near future “that would justify and make desirable the use of American forces for overt military action.” He told Lemnitzer that the United States might be “so engaged in Berlin or elsewhere” that it could not spare four divisions that the JCS deemed necessary for a Cuban invasion. A few days later, though, Robert Kennedy told Lansdale’s staff that “this summer, fall and next year may change all this. The President is prepared to do whatever has to be done, we must use our imagination.”⁷
On 5 April, the Special Group concluded that the time had come to re-examine Mongoose’s “basic philosophy with particular reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early... intervention.” General Taylor put two questions before the Service Chiefs: (1) Should the United States invade Cuba?; and, (2) Did we have the capacity to do so?

Five days later, the JCS answered “yes” to both questions. They believed that the Cuban problem “must be solved in the near future” and that a US invasion was the only way to do so. A communist regime would foment subversion and instability throughout Latin America and possibly provide the Soviet Bloc with military bases on our doorstep. Time favored Castro, who could use it to strengthen internal controls and external defenses while deepening the political indoctrination of the next generation. Drawing upon a just-completed study by the Board of National Estimates, they claimed that the United States could invade Cuba without risking general war. Available forces could secure “essential military control” of Cuba before the Soviets could react, although “continued police action” would be necessary. An invasion should take place “as soon as possible,” preferably before the release of Reserve and National Guard units mobilized during the Berlin confrontation. But, at a meeting of the Special Group on 11 April, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara echoed the President’s words that “at this time” there was no way to justify an invasion. We could only “play for the breaks” while taking the “necessary steps to get into a position which would afford... a maximum number of choices of action.”

Missed Opportunities

By then, the USSR was about to seize the initiative. Nikita Khrushchev conceived the idea of turning Cuba into a base for nuclear missiles. He wanted to reduce the strategic imbalance, protect Castro’s regime, and create a more favorable setting for another Berlin confrontation. Between 21 and 24 May 1962, Khrushchev won unanimous agreement from his colleagues on the Presidium. A Soviet delegation then went to Havana and won Castro’s consent. By 10 June, a plan was ready. Secretly, in Operation Anadyr, the Soviets would deploy five missile regiments. Three were equipped with R–12 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), 24 launchers with 36 missiles able to reach Atlanta, Georgia, from Cuba. The other two were equipped with R–14 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), 16 launchers with 24 missiles able to reach the Midwest and Washington, DC. Protecting the missile sites would be about 50,000 Soviet personnel manning four motorized regiments, two tank battalions, one MiG–21 regiment with 40 aircraft, and 12 SA–2 surface-to-air missile batteries with 144 launchers. There also would be 11 conventional and six nuclear-capable IL–28 light bombers, plus two short-range or cruise missile regiments with 80 nuclear-tipped weapons.
The *Maria Ulyanova* arrived in a Cuban port on 26 July, delivering Soviet soldiers who disembarked wearing civilian clothes. She was the first of many. By 21 August, when senior US officials who included McNamara and Lemnitzer reviewed the Cuban situation, the influx of Soviet Bloc personnel and equipment had raised alarms. Conferees agreed that the situation was “critical” and “the most dynamic action” was needed. They reviewed options available in case the Soviets placed MRBMs in Cuba but reached no conclusions. Secretary Rusk and McGeorge Bundy discerned a definite inter-relationship between Cuba and trouble spots like Berlin. A blockade of Cuba, they believed, would automatically trigger a blockade of West Berlin; attacking a missile site in Cuba would bring similar action against Jupiter IRBMs in Turkey and Italy. Two days later, President Kennedy asked the Defense Department, “What action can be taken to get Jupiter missiles out of Turkey?” This was a query and not a directive, from which no action resulted. He also called for a study of alternatives to eliminate installations in Cuba capable of launching nuclear attacks against the United States (e.g., pinpoint or general counter-force attack, outright invasion). Every one of these issues would re-emerge, unsolved, in mid-October.

On 29 August, a U–2 flew over the entire island of Cuba. Even though much of the eastern part was cloud-covered, photos revealed SA–2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and guided-missile patrol boats. A flight over eastern Cuba on 5 September turned up MiG–21s and more SA–2 sites. At a news conference on 13 September, President Kennedy downplayed recent developments but stated that “if Cuba should ever… become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done in order to protect its own security and that of its allies.”

On 14 September, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Claude Ricketts, circulated for JCS consideration a memorandum in which he urged prompt military action. Once a defense system had been completed, Ricketts argued, the Soviets could simultaneously establish offensive bases, introduce nuclear weapons, and declare Cuba to be a member of the Warsaw Pact. (Khrushchev did, in fact, plan to visit Cuba in November after the missile sites had become operational and conclude a defensive agreement with Castro.) At that point, US counteraction might well lead to general war. So Ricketts recommended early military intervention to remove Castro.

Five days later, the Joint Strategic Survey Council submitted a recommendation for blockading rather than invading, on grounds that a blockade would be less dramatic, require smaller resources, cause fewer casualties, and be more plausibly related to upholding the Monroe Doctrine. But the appearance of medium-range ballistic missiles, submarines, or other offensive capabilities would change conditions completely. In that eventuality, the JSSC favored an immediate invasion before the weapons became operational and the Soviets’ vital interests were involved. What were the chances of counter-action against West Berlin? The Council estimated that a Soviet response would be relatively temperate. Because
both sides’ vital interests were engaged in Berlin, the range of actions that could be taken without triggering war was extremely limited. After the JSSC paper was tabled, Admiral Ricketts asked that his memorandum be withdrawn.19

A Special National Intelligence Estimate, issued on 19 September, concluded that the buildup in Cuba was primarily defensive, although the Soviets might be tempted to deploy weapons of an “offensive” character such as light bombers, submarines, and short-range surface-to-surface missiles. However, placing medium- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba would be “incompatible” with Soviet policy and practice.20 One week later, the Joint Chiefs decided simply to acknowledge receipt of the JSSC’s report. At the appropriate moment, they would urge upon the President “adoption of a basic policy decision to supplant Castro-communism in Cuba as soon as possible.” Meantime, they instructed the Council to keep its paper current but delete the sections advocating a blockade. The JSSC submitted a revised report on 1 October, stating that “since the task is that of supplanting Castro-communism with an acceptable successor government, blockade will not ensure these ends and an invasion is thus required.”21

On 1 October, General Taylor became Chairman of the JCS and General Wheeler took the post of Army Chief of Staff. The latter was sworn in at the Pentagon, the former in the White House Rose Garden. “It was a bright fall day,” Taylor remembered, “and the world seemed full of promise . . . .” That afternoon, when Secretary McNamara met with new and old Chiefs, their discussion centered upon the circumstances in which action against Cuba might become necessary. Next day, McNamara sent Taylor a list of such contingencies: interference with access to West Berlin, leading to a retaliatory blockade against Cuba; evidence that offensive weapons were being emplaced in Cuba; an attack against Guantanamo or against US ships and aircraft operating outside of Cuban territory; a substantial popular uprising, the leaders of which asked for US aid; Cuban armed assistance to subversion elsewhere in the hemisphere; and a presidential decision that conditions in Cuba endangered US security. McNamara asked the Chiefs to focus on the latter objective, as being more difficult and perhaps also necessary to accomplish the former.22

Meanwhile, the Soviet buildup had been moving ahead. In mid-September, Poltava and Omsk delivered 36 R–12 missiles to Mariel harbor. Indigirka arrived on 4 October with nuclear warheads for the R–12s; the ship also carried 80 warheads for the cruise missiles, six nuclear bombs for IL–28s, and 12 nuclear charges for the short-range rockets. Aleksandrovsk was at sea with 24 warheads for the longer-range R–14s as well as 40 warheads for the cruise missiles.23

While Soviet merchant ships were photographed en route, their cargoes were down in the holds and unloaded in darkness. After 5 September, U–2s and
other reconnaissance planes flew only peripheral missions around Cuba, largely because the State Department feared a shootdown over the mainland. However, between 20 September and 2 October, refugees and agents within Cuba sent reports of missile sightings plus the creation of a large sealed-off area. Large-hatch *Kasimo* was photographed in mid-Atlantic with sixty-foot crates amid-ships. On 9 October, US experts identified these as ten fuselage crates for IL–28s which were known to be nuclear-capable. Three days later, operational control of U–2 flights shifted from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Strategic Air Command. On 14 October, in clear weather, Major Richard Heyser flew a U–2 over suspected areas on the mainland.24

In Washington, on 14 October, the Joint Staff’s Operations Directorate (J–3) gave the Chiefs a status report on contingency planning. Admiral Dennison, who was the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, oversaw three operational plans (OPLAN):

**CINCLANT OPLAN 312–62**: Approved “in concept” by the JCS and being revised by Atlantic Command, OPLAN 312 would employ air power alone to eliminate air and missile installations and to reduce Cuba’s war-waging capability. In six hours, 152 aircraft would be available; in twelve, 384; in twenty-four, 470. Target priorities were: (1) aircraft, anti-aircraft and radar installations, and airfields; (2) selective disruption of transportation and communications facilities; and (3) troop and armor concentrations, artillery, and naval vessels.

**CINCLANT OPLAN 314–61**: Approved by the JCS, it would bring about Castro’s overthrow by a deliberate, large-scale attack. There would be simultaneous airborne and amphibious assaults around the Havana area. The invasion force would include two airborne divisions, one infantry division, one armored combat command, 1½ Marine division/wing teams, and one Marine Expeditionary Brigade. An 18-day preparatory period would be needed to assemble sufficient shipping for a force this size.

**CINCLANT OPLAN 316–61**: Tentatively approved by the JCS for planning purposes, OPLAN 316 was essentially a quick-reaction version of OPLAN 314. An airborne landing in western Cuba would be carried out after five days of preparation, and an amphibious assault around Havana after eight days.

Many supplies, J–3 reported, had been pre-loaded or pre-positioned in southern states. If more funds were provided, reaction time could be reduced by: transferring an armored combat command from Fort Hood, Texas, to Fort Stewart, Georgia; repositioning four artillery battalions nearer to East Coast ports; reactivating 28 LSTs (tank landing ships) and building an LST ramp at Savannah; reopening Opalacka Air Force Base, Florida; pre-positioning equipment in Key West, Florida; and moving the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) from Camp Pendleton, California, to the Caribbean.

An invasion of Cuba, the J–3 calculated, would make adequate airlift to Europe or the Far East unavailable for eight days, severely restrict airlift within overseas commands unless Reserve C–119s were reactivated, require substantial requisitions
of shipping for about thirty days, and delay full augmentation of the European and Pacific Commands until combat operations ended. The J–3 urged that activation of C–119 squadrons be incorporated into the OPLANs and that funds be provided for training exercises. Already, in fact, the JCS had ordered Admiral Dennison to plan for the prompt strengthening of Guantanamo, in anticipation of an attack. In his reply, Admiral Dennison requested that the 5th MEB be transferred to the Caribbean.

On 15 October, analysts at the National Photographic Interpretation Center in downtown Washington studied film brought back by Major Heyser’s U–2. Photos taken over the Santa Clara and San Cristobal areas in western Cuba revealed long canvas-covered objects and other equipment that the interpreters identified as MRBM sites. By late afternoon, the Center’s director, Arthur Lundahl, had reviewed and confirmed that finding.

Meantime, in the Pentagon at 1430, Secretary McNamara joined the JCS to review contingency plans. He said that President Kennedy wanted, if possible, to avoid taking military measures against Cuba during the next three months. Then, turning to the OPLANs, he stressed that a decision to act should be followed immediately by the initiation of air strikes. McNamara particularly emphasized the importance of avoiding inactivity during the eighteen days preparing to execute OPLAN 314. Here he recalled mistakes made by the British and French in 1956. Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company on 26 July; the Anglo-French attack did not begin until late October.

But OPLAN 314, in fact, was not truly finalized. Conferees noted that an attack against Havana would mean assaulting the enemy’s defenses at their strongest point; invading elsewhere would delay capturing the capital city for three weeks. Should the military danger be reduced and the political risk raised, or vice versa? They agreed that this problem should be brought to the President’s attention as soon as possible. It is surprising that after months of planning, and on the literal eve of crisis, such an important point was still being debated. Secretary McNamara decided that C–119 squadrons should be mobilized when air strikes began—but not before—because this was the type of warning action that he and the President wanted to avoid. The Secretary also allocated $300,000 per month for training exercises.

Air Strike versus Blockade

On the evening of 15 October, General Taylor hosted a dinner party at Fort McNair. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lieutenant General Joseph Carroll, took Taylor aside and told him of the discovery. Around 0800 next morning, McNamara, Taylor, and the Service Chiefs were each shown the photos. McGeorge Bundy briefed the President about an hour later; Kennedy called for a conference at 1145.
The JCS held their first missile crisis meeting at 1000 on Tuesday, 16 October.\footnote{31} A DIA briefer described three sites for MRBMs, with ranges estimated at 700 to 1,000 miles, and said that an all-out effort could make these mobile installations operational within 24 hours. General Taylor wanted to know what preliminary advice he should take to the White House. The Chiefs quickly agreed that these sites must be destroyed by air attacks. Anderson and Wheeler favored a surprise air strike followed by invasion. General William McKee, representing General LeMay who was in Europe, suggested that an efficient air attack and blockade might obviate the need for invasion. Taylor added that invasion and occupation might not be necessary. What threat was Cuba, he asked, once the island was stripped of missiles and aircraft? The JCS agreed that no military action should be taken until more intelligence was amassed about the number and location of MRBMs. The Chiefs’ tentative proposal ran as follows: acquire more information; then launch a surprise air attack against MRBM sites, airfields, SAM sites, torpedo boats, tank parks, and all significant military targets; reinforce Guantanamo at the same time; mobilize reserves and prepare for an invasion. Bearing this advice, General Taylor left for the White House.

At 1145 in the Cabinet Room, President Kennedy gathered advisers who included Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Taylor, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Assistant Secretary Paul Nitze, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Director McCone, UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, and McGeorge Bundy. After a briefing by Arthur Lundahl, Rusk opened the debate by saying that they could either order a surprise attack or employ graduated pressures. But, whatever was decided, several days would be needed to alert US allies. McNamara argued strongly that air strikes had to be carried out before the MRBMs became operational. Taylor laid out the Joint Chiefs’ proposal, but he added that “invasion was the hardest question militarily in the whole business, and one which we should look at very closely before we get our feet in that deep mud in Cuba.” How effective, Kennedy asked, would the surprise attack be? Never one hundred percent, Taylor replied, although the first strike would take out “a vast majority” of Cuba’s military capability and continuous attacks would follow. The President authorized unlimited U–2 overflights, directed fuller development of military and political responses, and called another meeting for that evening.\footnote{32}

The Joint Chiefs, together with all the commanders involved in Cuba planning, gathered at 1630 in the Pentagon conference room known as the JCS “tank.” Taylor summarized the White House meeting, at which he said the question was whether to go for the missiles, or to go for the missiles plus a blockade and invasion possibly following. Secretary McNamara, joining them at 1740, authorized heavy reconnaissance and augmentation of air defenses in the southeastern states. The Secretary stated his preference for open surveillance and a blockade of weapons, saying that going straight to military action might trigger a Soviet response. The military men decided to readjust OPLAN 316, extending from five days to seven the interval
between starting air attacks and launching an invasion. That way, paratroopers and Marines could land simultaneously, reducing the risk of defeat in detail and allowing follow-on forces to arrive two days sooner. The JCS also decided to oppose (1) low-level reconnaissance as tipping our hand and (2) striking only MRBMs, preferring inaction to a surgical strike.

In the next White House meeting at 1830, Secretary McNamara gave his “personal” view that MRBMs in Cuba did not change the strategic balance at all. Taylor countered that the missiles could become a very important “adjunct and reinforcement” to Soviet strike capability because “we have no idea how far they will go.” The main debate, though, was over whether to carry out an all-inclusive attack or a surgical strike confined to MRBMs, nuclear storage sites, and MiGs. Kennedy and McNamara thought that an all-inclusive attack seemed to lead inevitably to invasion. Taylor reported that the Joint Chiefs and the combatant commanders “feel so strongly about the dangers inherent in the limited strike that they would prefer taking no military action. . . . They feel it’s opening up the United States to attacks which they can’t prevent, if we don’t take advantage of surprise.” Taylor added that his personal inclination was “all against invasion, but nonetheless trying to eliminate as effectively as possible every weapon that can strike the United States.”

After this meeting, McNamara directed the JCS to analyze five alternatives:

I: Attack the MRBMs and nuclear storage sites.
II: Attack above, plus MiG–21s and IL–28s
III: Attack above, plus all air capability, SAMs, short-range surface-to-surface missiles, coastal defense missile sites, and missile-firing torpedo boats.
IV: Attack all significant military targets, less those that would be struck as a prelude to invasion.
V: Attack whatever targets should be struck to make possible an invasion of Cuba.

On the Joint Staff, J–3 officers worked through the night and produced the figures shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>104</td>
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<td>III</td>
<td>112</td>
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<td>IV</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>474</td>
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<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>1,397</td>
<td>2,002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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These figures, however, excluded the sorties needed to provide combat air patrol, suppress air defenses, and conduct post-strike reconnaissance. Several days later, the numbers had to be recomputed and raised substantially. General Taylor reacted sharply: “What! These figures were reported to the White House. You are defeating yourselves with your own cleverness, gentlemen.” Perhaps the
numbers for I and II had been kept low to make them appear more attractive to the civilian leadership.

On Wednesday, 17 October, President Kennedy flew to Connecticut for campaign appearances that would preserve an appearance of normality. The Service Chiefs met at 1000. General Taylor, returning at 1120 from a White House meeting, reported that some political action would precede a showdown. Blockade, he added, entered only the minds of those who felt that hitting the missiles alone would not suffice. The JCS decided to declare, for the record, their opposition to attacking only MRBMs and advised Secretary McNamara that a surgical strike would incur "an unacceptable risk." Sparing enemy air power would expose the continental United States and Puerto Rico to air attack and could cause unnecessary casualties among the garrison at Guantanamo and the forces assembling for invasion. They recommended also hitting tactical missiles, aircraft, ships, tanks, and other appropriate targets, as well as imposing a "complete" blockade.34

In an evening session at the White House, senior officials formulated five possibilities:

Course 1: On Tuesday, 23 October, inform Western European and some Latin American leaders of the situation. On Wednesday, attack the MRBM sites, send a message to Khrushchev, and wait to see what would happen. Secretary Rusk opposed this approach.

Course 2: Same as 1, but notify Khrushchev beforehand and wait about three days for his reply. Defense spokesmen argued against doing this.

Course 3: Tell the Soviets that we were aware of the missiles and would prevent any more from arriving in Cuba. Impose a blockade, declare war, and make preparations for an invasion.

Course 4: After limited political preliminaries, attack the targets listed in Categories III and IV above, and prepare for invasion.

Course 5: Same as 4, but omit the political preliminaries.

On Thursday, 18 October, the JCS met at 0930; General LeMay now joined the discussions. The DIA briefer reported an important discovery. U-2 missions covering 97 percent of Cuba had photographed sites for IRBMs. Unlike the mobile MRBMs, these much heavier missiles with a range estimated at 2,200 miles required fixed permanent sites.35 General Taylor saw their appearance as highly significant. In these circumstances, he said, air strikes alone were inadequate; invasion and occupation of the sites would be necessary. After Taylor laid out the five courses above, the Chiefs agreed that the minimum response should be Course 5, coupled with a complete blockade and air strikes against the targets in Category IV.

A White House meeting started at 1110. Secretary Rusk recommended using about five days of discussions with Khrushchev, at the UN, and with the Organization of American States (OAS) before taking military action. General Taylor said that yesterday he had been "far from convinced that the big showdown was necessary." However, air strikes could not remove the IRBM threat—"you can't destroy
a hole in the ground”—and so an invasion was required. But Robert Kennedy was one of several who spoke about avoiding the stigma of a new Pearl Harbor. Virtually all the President’s civilian advisers were convinced the Soviets would respond to an attack by retaliating somewhere, most likely against West Berlin or the Jupiter IRBMs in Turkey and Italy. There was tentative talk of removing IRBMs from Turkey in exchange for withdrawing the Soviet missiles in Cuba. Secretary McNamara now leaned toward beginning with a blockade because it “reduces the very serious risk of large-scale military action from which this country cannot benefit” if we launched a surprise attack.36

When the JCS reconvened at 1400, Taylor summarized the latest meeting, saying the President seemed to feel we should hold back on military action until we got a sense of the Soviet response. Were we really going to do anything except talk, LeMay inquired? Certainly, the Chairman answered. Probably the order of events would be: a political approach; a warning; air attack on the missile sites; blockade; and, if necessary, invasion. The Chiefs now directed that one battalion of the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade be airlifted from California to Guantanamo, that Opalacka airfield in Florida be reopened, and that twenty interceptors deploy to Florida bases.37

At 1700, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called at the White House. Kennedy, revealing nothing of what he knew, said the situation was growing more serious and read his statement of 4 September that “the gravest issues would arise” should evidence of Soviet combat forces, military bases, or offensive weapons appear. Gromyko replied that the Soviets were sending only defensive weapons, none of which could constitute a threat to the United States.38

At 2115, nine men including General Taylor crowded into one automobile and drove to the White House for another strategy session. A majority now favored starting with political approaches plus some form of blockade.39 State was assigned the duty of drafting political approaches to the USSR, Cuba, and NATO allies. The JCS were told to draft plans for a blockade, either selective or total; Taylor assigned that task to Admiral Anderson.

The JCS reconvened at 0900 on Friday, 19 October. A DIA briefer reported that there were four MRBM and three IRBM sites, 21 IL–28s (seventeen still in crates), 35 to 39 MiG–21s, and 22 SAM sites, nine of which were believed to be operational. In just a few weeks, said the DIA briefer, a couple of air defense nets would have real capability. Lieutenant General David Burchinal, USAF, interjected: “God! What are we waiting for?”40

Taylor told the Service Chiefs that the tendency was more and more toward political actions plus a blockade. State, he continued, favored a selective blockade for offensive weapons only. LeMay replied, “It would be pure disaster to try that.” Saying that President Kennedy wished to speak with them that morning, Taylor suggested that they speak in favor of a surprise attack on comprehensive targets,
reconnaissance surveillance, and a complete blockade. Were they willing to advocate an American Pearl Harbor, he asked? LeMay was, but Anderson thought that Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer should be allowed several hours' warning. Taylor also worried that a surprise attack would severely strain the Atlantic Alliance. Reluctantly, LeMay agreed that the British should be informed a few hours beforehand. As for invasion, Taylor endorsed preparations alone at this point. The Service Chiefs, however, saw little likelihood of avoiding an actual occupation. At 0930, the JCS left for the White House.

After Taylor summarized the Chiefs' view, the President replied that “If we attack Cuba... then it gives them a clear line to take Berlin,” just as Kennedy thought the Soviets in 1956 had been able to use the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt as a cover while they crushed the Hungarian uprising. “We would have no support among our allies,” who cared nothing about Cuba. Kennedy believed that taking over Berlin was a “basic” goal of the Soviets, to which Khrushchev was personally committed. Taylor responded that “our strength in Berlin, our strength any place in the world, is the credibility of our response under certain conditions. And if we don’t respond here in Cuba, we think the credibility of our response in Berlin is endangered.” LeMay argued that acting against Cuba actually would deter the Soviets from retaliating against Berlin; Admiral Anderson agreed. Wheeler observed that Khrushchev had not declared Cuba to be part of the Warsaw Pact. Kennedy countered that “[t]hey can’t let us... kill a lot of Russians and not do anything.” General Shoup backed LeMay but added, contradictorily, that “[w]e’ve had a hell of a lot more than this aimed at us, and we didn’t attack it.” After Kennedy left, going on another electioneering visit to avoid any air of crisis, Shoup reacted angrily to what he called the President's preference for gradualism or “escalation”: “If someone could keep them from doing the goddamn thing piecemeal. That’s our problem.”

Virtually all the President's civilian advisers, including veteran “Kremlinologists” like Llewellyn Thompson and Charles Bohlen, were convinced that attacking Cuba would trigger retaliation against West Berlin and perhaps Turkey and Italy. This was a crucial factor in drawing them towards a blockade. Yet, from what we now know, the JCS were correct in downplaying this danger. When the crisis broke, Soviet leaders thought strictly about counteractions in the Caribbean; there is no evidence of preparing a reprisal against West Berlin. Cuba was not a vital interest of the USSR but Berlin was vital to the United States because its loss could have drawn West Germany towards neutralism and so unraveled NATO. Another confrontation over Berlin would draw the NATO allies together as a crisis over Cuba might not. Presumably, the Soviets recognized this and were inhibited accordingly. President Kennedy also was wrong in assuming that the invasion of Egypt had given the Soviets a convenient cover for smashing the Hungarian revolt. Actually, in 1956, Khrushchev had told his colleagues that “[t]he English and the French are stirring up trouble in Egypt. Let’s not fall into their camp.” The Presidium decided against military intervention in Hungary. The leadership reversed itself
solely because a new government in Budapest announced that it was withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact and turning Hungary into a neutral nation.43

Returning to the “tank” at 1050, the Service Chiefs approved directives that: one battalion of Hawk surface-to-air missiles move from Maryland to Key West; one Marine battalion shift from the West to the East Coast; and SAC disperse non-alert aircraft from Florida in an inconspicuous manner.44 General Taylor went to the State Department for another session. There, McGeorge Bundy told conferees that time was short and the President needed recommendations promptly. They split into two teams. The “Blues,” who were to prepare the scenario for a surprise air attack, included Taylor, Robert Kennedy, Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon, Director Mc Cone, Dean Acheson,45 and McGeorge Bundy. The “Reds,” drafting a blockade sequence, included Anderson, Shoup, Secretary Rusk, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, and Theodore Sorensen. The two teams constantly exchanged position papers and critiqued each other’s work. Anderson protested to McNamara that a blockade would lock the barn door after the horse had been stolen. It would bring on a confrontation with the USSR rather than Cuba, risk attacks on Guantanamo and US shipping in the Florida Strait, and leave the possibility of missiles being launched from Cuba.

Taylor came back to the Pentagon at 1400, leaving behind as JCS representative on the Blue team, Brigadier General Lucius Clay, Jr., who was the Deputy Director for Operations, J–3. Taylor told the Service Chiefs about Robert Kennedy’s concern that the administration not be accused of carrying out another Pearl Harbor. Would they, he asked, accept a 24-hour delay to inform allied leaders? All approved a short interval to notify British, French, West German, and Canadian leaders. Then they discussed reserve call-ups and determined that requirements totaled 122,000: Army, 94,000 to fill out the Strategic Army Corps and perhaps two reserve divisions; Navy, 10,500 to operate forty ships and eighteen air squadrons; Air Force, 17,500 to man twenty-one C–119 troop carrier squadrons. The JCS also instructed CINCPAC to collect the shipping needed to transport the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade to the Caribbean. At 1600, General Clay brought back the air strike scenario. Under it, on 22 October, the White House would announce that missiles had been found, an accusatory message would go to Castro, and notices of an impending attack would be given to the British, French, West German, and Italian leaders. Then they discussed reserve call-ups and determined that requirements totaled 122,000: Army, 94,000 to fill out the Strategic Army Corps and perhaps two reserve divisions; Navy, 10,500 to operate forty ships and eighteen air squadrons; Air Force, 17,500 to man twenty-one C–119 troop carrier squadrons. The JCS also instructed CINCPAC to collect the shipping needed to transport the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade to the Caribbean. At 1600, General Clay brought back the air strike scenario. Under it, on 22 October, the White House would announce that missiles had been found, an accusatory message would go to Castro, and notices of an impending attack would be given to the British, French, West German, Italian, and Turkish governments.46 Early on 23 October, an air strike would be executed against MRBM s, SAMs, high-performance aircraft, and nuclear storage sites. Simultaneously, the President would send Khrushchev a message that carefully defined the extent of the operation, emphasized the intensity of the US commitment to West Berlin, and indicate readiness for a high-level meeting.47

Saturday, 20 October, was the day of decision. When the JCS assembled at 1000, Taylor told them that the President might decide to bomb the missile sites the next morning. Opposing a limited and hastily mounted strike, they authorized Taylor to argue for an attack against all offensive weapon and supporting defenses on Tuesday, 23 October, the last day before some missiles sites were expected to
become operational. They also endorsed the air strike scenario above. At 1110, General Clay returned from a meeting at the State Department attended by Cabinet officers and some others. The consensus, Clay reported, was that the United States would have to go through "political shenanigans," followed by a limited blockade and an air strike after three days. UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, he added, had spoken strongly for a blockade less petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL). Taylor said he would tell the President that the proposed air strikes had every reasonable chance of hitting all the missiles.

The climactic conference, formally christened the 505th Meeting of the National Security Council, opened at 1430. Secretary McNamara argued for starting with a blockade and opening negotiations, perhaps exchanging Jupiters in Italy and Turkey for missiles in Cuba. Thus, the United States would remain true to its traditions, cause the least trouble for its allies, act in a manner befitting its position as leader of the Free World, and avoid a sudden move that might prompt Soviet escalation. Taylor recommended an air strike on Tuesday, 23 October. That was the last chance to destroy missiles before some of them became operational; soon the sites would be camouflaged and impossible to find. Robert Kennedy, Treasury Secretary Dillon, Director McCone, and Secretary Rusk all advocated beginning with a blockade and then, after a short wait for Soviet compliance, executing an air strike. That way any perception of a "Pearl Harbor" would be avoided. The President said he was willing to remove the Jupiters. If an air strike became necessary, he favored hitting the missile sites alone. As for the IL–28s, Kennedy said he could live with them. Ambassador Stevenson pressed for a settlement that involved evacuating Guantanamo. The President "sharply" rejected surrendering Guantanamo, adding that the Jupiter issue should be raised only at a later time. He then declared for a blockade—quickly refined to "quarantine"—of offensive weapons and authorized preparations for (1) a surgical strike on Monday or Tuesday and (2) an invasion of Cuba.48

Back at the Pentagon at 1815, Taylor told the Service Chiefs, "This was not one of our better days." The decisive votes, he said, had been cast by Rusk, McNamara, and Adlai Stevenson.49 Pointedly, Taylor told the Chiefs that the President had said, "I know that you and your colleagues are unhappy with the decision, but I trust that you will support me." Taylor continued, "I assured him that we were against the decision but would back him completely."

Late on Sunday morning, 21 October, McNamara and Taylor went to the White House with General Walter Sweeney, who was the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command. As Commander in Chief, Air Forces, Atlantic Command, Sweeney would be directing the air operations against Cuba. The main issue before them was not whether to attack but what to attack. Sweeney advised that a surgical strike on the missile sites would require 250 sorties. According to the latest intelligence, forty-eight missiles were believed to be in Cuba and only thirty had been located; Taylor said that "the best we can offer you is to destroy 90% of the known missiles." Sweeney strongly recommended hitting IL–28s and MiGs, which would
lift the sortie requirement to 500. The President agreed that any attack probably would include those aircraft and ordered that everything be ready by Monday morning or any time thereafter.\(^{50}\)

Simultaneously, the JCS directed Admiral Dennison to reinforce Guantanamo with two Marine battalions and evacuate dependents.\(^{51}\) The Chiefs also gave Dennison temporary operational control over all Army and Air Force units allocated for Cuban operations. Directly under him, Lieutenant General Hamilton Howze, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, became the Commander, Joint Task Force—Cuba.

At their afternoon meeting, the JCS ordered a Marine air group and thirty interceptors deployed to Florida. But the main issue was President Kennedy's concern, communicated through Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, about Soviet counterstrikes against the Jupiters in Turkey and Italy. Was there not some danger of Jupiters being fired without presidential authorization? The Chiefs thought that this question bore little relation to reality. No matter what we might do in Cuba, they advised Secretary McNamara, the Turkish and Italian governments would consider an attack on the Jupiter sites as an attack on them and on NATO, making the United States bound by its treaty obligations.\(^{52}\)

From 1430 to 1650, Taylor and Anderson attended an NSC meeting. President Kennedy told Taylor that he wanted to shorten the seven-day interval between air strikes and landings. Anderson described stop-and-search procedures and rules of engagement. Later that day, the Joint Staff and the Services began studying how to compress the seven days to five. Also, the JCS transmitted detailed instructions to CINCLANT that read in part: “Ships which are to be visited will be stopped. In signifying his intent to stop a ship, a US commander will use all available communications. . . . Failing this, warning shots across the bow should be fired. Failing this, make minimum use of force, taking care to damage non-vital parts of the ship, such as the rudder, and to avoid injury or loss of life if possible.”\(^{53}\)

Monday, 22 October, was the day on which President Kennedy would tell the American people about the discovery of missiles and what actions he would take. When the JCS met at 0900, General LeMay asked that they:

1. Order SAC to put one-eighth of its aircraft on airborne alert, beginning quietly at 1200 and taking full effect by Tuesday afternoon.
2. Direct SAC to move toward maximum readiness, DEFCON 2, commencing at 1200 and reaching completion twenty-four hours later.\(^{54}\)
3. Instruct General Power to implement at his discretion plans for dispersing B–47s to civilian airports.
4. Direct CINCONAD to disperse his interceptors on a very quiet, low-key basis, beginning at noon.
5. Order that a world-wide Defense Condition (DEFCON) 3 take effect at noon.

Approving steps 1, 3, and 4,\(^{55}\) the Chiefs authorized General Taylor to seek Secretary McNamara's approval for 2 and 5. Additionally, LeMay worried about
overcrowding on Florida’s airfields; nearly 500 tactical aircraft had been assembled at Homestead, MacDill, McCoy, and Key West. Air defenses in that area were incomplete. Hence, LeMay suggested that CINCLANT be relieved of responsibility for remaining on six-hour alert, ordered to assume a twelve-hour posture, and allowed to reduce forward congestion accordingly.

Midway through this meeting, General Carroll presented the latest intelligence. Four MRBM sites were rated as operational and two would become so within three to five days. One IRBM site would be available for emergency use by 15 November and completely operational by 1 December; the others should acquire emergency capability by 1 December and full capability two weeks afterward. The JCS adjourned at noon. During lunch, Secretary McNamara talked with Taylor and decided that DEFCON 3 should be delayed until 1900, when President Kennedy would be addressing the nation.56 Generating SAC toward maximum readiness also would await a presidential decision. But McNamara did authorize loading the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade on transports57 and moving an armored combat command from Fort Hood, Texas, to Fort Stewart, Georgia, much nearer to the port of Savannah.

The Secretary and the Chiefs reconvened at 1330. The Secretary said that President Kennedy still worried about Jupiters being fired without authorization—either by US personnel or by locals who had seized control—if the missile bases came under attack. So a message went to General Norstad, telling him that the missiles must be destroyed or rendered inoperable if the danger of unauthorized launches arose.58 Kennedy also wanted the Chiefs’ views on what to do if the Cubans launched a missile against the United States. McNamara suggested warning the Soviets in advance that they would be held responsible, inducing them to send a message to Cuba similar to the one just sent to General Norstad. Anderson disagreed, fearing that a public warning to Moscow would stir strongly adverse allied reactions. The JCS agreed that we should not say exactly what our retaliation would be.

At 1500, all the Chiefs attended a meeting of the NSC. Here President Kennedy formalized the past week’s practice by establishing an “Executive Committee” of the NSC, which would convene daily at 1000 for the duration of the crisis. The “ExComm” consisted of the President and Vice President, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Dillon, McCona, Robert Kennedy, Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, Under Secretary of State George Ball, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Llewellyn Thompson, and Theodore Sorensen.59

The Chiefs reassembled in the “tank” at 1620. President Kennedy had asked them to consider what to do (1) if a U–2 was shot down and (2) if the Soviet build-up continued. For (1), they reviewed a range of responses (accept the loss; begin low-level photography; send drones; strike selected SAM sites; attack all SAMs) and decided that our response ought to depend upon the circumstances. On (2), they favored tightening the blockade and then re-examining whether to launch an
attack. The Chiefs learned that Kennedy had disapproved, for the time being, any overt steps indicating an invasion. Thus they could neither call up reserves nor requisition shipping. Taylor was not worried, remarking that "if we can't lick the Cubans with what we already have, we are in terrible shape." He did not know that US intelligence had grossly underestimated the size of Soviet forces in Cuba.60

The JCS then addressed the dilemma of overcrowded Florida airfields. General Sweeney already had been authorized to assume a twelve-hour, instead of a six-hour, alert posture. The Chiefs now advised Sweeney that he need not disperse tactical aircraft, if he wished to continue taking the calculated risks involved in forward concentration. They ordered Lieutenant General William Blanchard, Inspector General of the Air Force, to fly to Florida and survey the situation.

Meantime, diplomatic and political preliminaries were being completed. British, French, West German, and Canadian governments were advised of the impending action. At 1700, the President briefed Congressional leaders, meeting a rough reception as senators called for stronger action. One hour later, Secretary Rusk gave Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin an advance copy of the President's speech and a letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev.61

Speaking at 1900, President Kennedy declared that this "urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base...constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas." It could not be accepted "if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe." As initial steps, he ordered a quarantine on all offensive military equipment and increased close surveillance of Cuba. Should offensive preparations continue, "further action will be justified." Kennedy stated that any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere would be regarded "as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union." He also asked for immediate meetings of the Council of the Organization of American States and the UN Security Council. Finally, the President called upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt this "clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace," abandon the quest for "world domination," and "join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and transform the history of man."62

"This Is No Time to Run Scared"

Meeting at 0900 on Tuesday, 23 October, the Service Chiefs decided that low-level reconnaissance was necessary. They also agreed that, if a U–2 was downed, one or two flights daily should continue until another U–2 loss occurred. The next step would be to determine whether the projected rate of attrition was acceptable. If so, flights should continue; if not, all the SAM sites should be attacked.
The ExComm convened at 1000. President Kennedy approved preparation of a Proclamation of Interdiction and signed an executive order extending some military tours of duty. He approved a contingency plan for dealing with opposition to U–2 overflights, unaware that the Service Chiefs were discussing the same problem. The ExComm’s plan stated that if there was a clear indication that an incident had resulted from hostile action, the recommendation would be immediate retaliation against the most likely SAM site involved. It was expected, but not firmly decided, that continued interference after a single incident and a single retaliation would require elimination of the entire SAM network. Kennedy also authorized low-level reconnaissance flights. McNamara called the Pentagon to ask how many the Service Chiefs wanted; they said six, and that number was approved. Worried whether all the aircraft assembled in Florida were properly protected against a surprise attack, Kennedy called for photographs of the four crowded airfields.63

When the JCS met at 1400, Admiral Anderson reported that the quarantine would take effect at 1000 next day. The Chiefs directed CINCSAC to begin generating his forces toward DEFCON 2 at that same hour. Subsequently, SAC bombers flew north to the “radar line” where they would be detected by the Soviets.64

Later that afternoon, by a vote of 19-0, the Council of the Organization of American States recommended that members “take all measures . . . including the use of armed force . . . to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the continent.” The ExComm slightly revised the Proclamation of Interdiction, which Kennedy signed at 1906. Delivery of these materials would be prohibited: surface-to-surface missiles; bombers; air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items; and any other classes of materiel hereafter designated by the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of effectuating this Proclamation.65

The quarantine line, drawn 500 miles to the north and east of Cuba, was covered by Task Force 136. Commanded by Vice Admiral Alfred Ward, it had three components. Commander Task Group (CTG) 136.1 with one heavy cruiser, one guided missile cruiser, seven guided missile destroyers, and eleven destroyers formed the quarantine line. Behind it was CTG 136.2 with the ASW carrier USS Essex and four destroyers. CTG 136.3 had two oilers, one ammunition ship and four destroyers. In support was Task Force 135, consisting of two carriers—USS Independence and the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise—plus fifteen destroyers and an underway replenishment group.66

Around 2200 on Tuesday evening, McNamara, Gilpatric, and two OSD civilians entered the Navy Flag Plot, the command center in the Pentagon. Apparently, McNamara asked the duty officer detailed questions about procedures for stopping and boarding. Unsatisfied by the replies, he called for Admiral Anderson. There are drastically different versions about what happened next. By Anderson’s account, Secretary McNamara looked at markers on a map showing where warships were
stationed along the quarantine line and saw one destroyer isolated from the rest. Why, he asked, had that ship left the line? The CNO tried to turn aside his question. When Secretary McNamara became insistent, Anderson took him to a special secure area and explained that the destroyer was shadowing a Soviet submarine, a feat accomplished through highly classified intelligence for which the two OSD civilians were not cleared. As Anderson and McNamara walked down a corridor, the CNO said in what he thought was a joking tone, “Why don’t you go back to your quarters and let us handle this?” By Gilpatrick’s account, McNamara’s questions about stopping and boarding irked Anderson to the point where he snapped, “This is none of your goddamn business…. We’ve been doing this since the days of John Paul Jones, and if you’ll just go back to your quarters, Mr. Secretary, we’ll take care of this.” McNamara reddened, rose, and left. As he walked to his office, he said to Gilpatric, “That’s the end of Anderson. As far as I’m concerned, he’s lost my confidence.”

Moscow, meantime, had sent coded messages ordering most of the Cuba-bound ships (including two with R–14 missiles aboard) to reverse course. Aleksandrovsk, carrying warheads for R–14s as well as cruise missiles, and an escort ship were so close to Cuba that they were instructed to sail on, reaching a port about 100 miles east of Havana early on Wednesday. By late Tuesday, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the National Security Agency had picked up indications of the turn-around but, fearing deception, waited to be sure and did not inform higher authority that night.

When the JCS met at 0900 on Wednesday, 24 October, the Chairman said that Secretary McNamara did not believe we knew enough about movements of the Soviet ships and wanted a recommendation. Since the Secretary had been shown photos of crowded Florida bases, Taylor raised the issue of whether aircraft should disperse. Let’s stay on concrete and not go to the dirt, LeMay replied. The Chiefs agreed to send a memorandum stating that the advantages of forward positioning far offset the risk of losses in a surprise attack.

The ExComm convened at 1000, all of its members believing that ships were approaching the quarantine line. The Soviets’ only communication so far had been a truculent letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy. Secretary McNamara showed pictures of crowded Florida bases to the President. Taylor gave his opinion that the readiness level of aircraft there could be reduced; McNamara recommended scaling back the notice needed for mounting a sizable strike back to twelve hours instead of one or two. McNamara was describing intercept scenarios when Director McCone received word from ONI, now certain about its information that six ships bound for Cuba had stopped or reversed course. This was evidently the time when Secretary Rusk whispered to a colleague, “We’re eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked.” The story of how a potentially catastrophic confrontation was averted at the very last minute would endure for many years.

By dawn on Thursday, 25 October, fourteen ships were steaming away from the quarantine line; five tankers, one cargo ship, and two passenger vessels were continuing toward Cuba. In Moscow, Khrushchev decided to seek a way out. He
would offer Washington a trade, withdrawing the missiles in return for a pledge not to invade Cuba. By “the missiles” he meant R–12 MRBMs, none of the R–14 IRBMs having arrived; presumably nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and battlefield “Lunas” would remain in Cuba. That night, Khrushchev’s colleagues on the Presidium unanimously approved his proposal.71

In the “tank” session at 0900 on Thursday, Secretary McNamara told the Chiefs to work with ISA in studying what to do, at the lowest political and military cost, if construction of the missile bases continued. After he left, General Wheeler reported that requirements for shipping and loading ruled out shortening to five days the time between starting air strikes and launching an invasion. The ExComm focused on which ships to pass, stop, or board and search. At noon, Taylor debriefed the Service Chiefs: Last week they were talking like the blockade would bring down Castro. Now Rusk was saying that if the blockade would keep out offensive weapons we would have accomplished the mission.72

Taylor lunched with McNamara and won the Secretary’s approval to start moving the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (11,000 men in twenty-one ships) from California to the Caribbean. The next JCS meeting began at 1400. General Blanchard, who had just returned from Florida, described aircraft dispersal as good at Homestead and MacDill Air Force Bases, incomplete at McCoy, and crowded at Key West, where he said that aircraft were jammed together and would offer very lucrative targets. Air defenses, however, were formidable. Blanchard said that, if he were in Castro’s place, he would conclude that initiating an attack would be suicidal. The JCS sent Secretary McNamara a summary of preparation times:

Two hours for low-level reconnaissance missions, reprisal against a single SAM site, or strikes against all the SAM sites.

Twelve hours for a full air attack against all military targets.

Seven days for an invasion (OPLAN 316). Because the airborne elements would be so vulnerable in flight, all or most of this time would be devoted to suppressing air defenses.73

Early on Friday, 26 October, the freighter Marucla was boarded, searched, and cleared. Carefully chosen by the ExComm, she was Lebanese-registered, chartered by the Soviets, and manned by a Greek crew. An ominous development was that overflights showed work on the missile sites continuing—four of the six were thought to be operational—and assembly of the IL–28s was accelerating. Exchanges in the ExComm focused on resolution by diplomacy, even discussing ways to monitor dismantling of the missile sites.

In their morning meeting on 26 October, the Chiefs directed Admiral Dennison to stop work on OPLAN 314 and concentrate on 316. They also recommended pre-positioning ten transports and chartering 29 civilian cargo ships; McNamara approved the first step but postponed action on the second.74 At the afternoon session, Taylor reported that civilians on the ExComm felt things were
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off to a very good start. Taylor tabled a query from Secretary McNamara about how many sorties were needed to: (1) render six MRBMs sites inoperable, which he indicated was what McNamara and the White House favored; (2) destroy or neutralize all MRBMs; (3) take out all the SAM sites; and (4) attack all offensive weapons. General Sweeney supplied data which was refined by the Joint Staff, approved by the JCS on the 27th, and provided to Secretary McNamara on the 28th. Sortie requirements rose from 168 for executing (1) to 508 for accomplishing (4). The Chiefs advised that they were completely opposed to (1) and (2), labeled (3) the “least sound of all,” and endorsed (4) because it “moves to the heart of the Cuban problem.”

At their meeting on the 26th, the Chiefs slightly amended and then approved a paper from ISA and the Joint Staff outlining a sequence of steps to take if construction of the missile bases continued. It listed: pressure by the OAS; attempts to goad Cuba into acts justifying reprisal (e.g., round-the-clock surveillance, naval patrols within the three-mile limit, harassment of Cuban shipping); extending the quarantine to include POL; and undertaking overt military action. The last course was deemed best. According to the latest Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), the Soviet reaction would be approximately the same regardless of the scale of attack. Therefore, “all things considered, it appears at this time that the only direct action which will eliminate the offensive weapons threat is an attack followed by invasion.”

The JCS also submitted a pungent appraisal of diplomatic initiatives then under consideration. U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, had proposed and Khrushchev promptly endorsed a standstill period in which the United States would not escalate and the USSR would not challenge the quarantine. Brazilian diplomats floated the idea of denuclearizing all Latin America, which State and ISA were studying. The JCS warned that if the Soviets could “hide behind the endless arguments of often naive neutrals, then we have lost control and may well have lost our objective. . . . The longer we talk, the more diffuse become the inevitable arguments, the weaker becomes whatever may be the final agreement. And when this happens, as it has in the past, we will have lent credence to the impression that we may be a strong country but we are a country unwilling to use its strength.” The Chiefs concluded with a statement that encapsulated their view of how to handle the crisis: “We have the strategic advantage in our general war capabilities; we have the tactical advantages of moral rightness, of boldness, of strength, of initiative, and of control of this situation. This is no time to run scared.”

On Friday evening, Kennedy received a letter from Khrushchev offering to withdraw “armaments” in exchange for a no-invasion pledge. The day before, columnist Walter Lippmann had written about resolving the crisis through a Cuba-Turkey trade. Khrushchev took heart and proposed to the Presidium sending another letter, calling for withdrawal of the Jupiters in addition to the no-invasion pledge. “If we did this,”
he told the Presidium, “we could win.” Moscow Radio broadcast this second letter on Saturday at 1000 Washington time.81

The JCS spent Saturday, 27 October, in almost continuous session.82 The ExComm, convening at 1000, concentrated upon what to do about the Jupiters in Turkey. General Taylor telephoned the Pentagon to report that eight reconnaissance flights had been authorized for the morning, eight more for the afternoon. LeMay then suggested drafting a short paper taking account of the latest intelligence—continuing construction at MRBM sites and evidence of Soviet ground forces as well as Luna missiles—and recommending execution of a full-scale OPLAN 312, followed by 316. At 1330, McNamara joined the Chiefs in the “tank.” The Director, Joint Staff, tabled a memorandum recommending early and timely execution of OPLAN 312, with readiness to execute OPLAN 316. Secretary McNamara directed the Joint Staff to prepare two plans. First, move one Polaris submarine off the Turkish coast before we hit Cuba, informing the Soviets before they could strike Jupiters in Turkey. Second, assume we attacked sites in Cuba and the Soviets retaliated by knocking out the Jupiters. McNamara next asked what was meant by “early and timely execution of OPLAN 312.” Attacking on Sunday or Monday, LeMay answered. Taylor suggested changing the wording to read “after a reasonable period of time,” and the Secretary concurred.

At 1340, Secretary McNamara and the Chiefs were told that a U–2 flying from Alaska on an air-sampling mission had strayed over Soviet territory.83 At 1403, they learned that a U–2 overflying Cuba was thirty to forty minutes overdue. Taylor and McNamara left at 1416 for an ExComm meeting. The Service Chiefs quickly agreed to give the memorandum more precise wording. It read that “delay in taking further direct military action . . . is to the benefit of the Soviet Union. Cuba will be harder to defeat. US casualties will be multiplied. The direct threat of attack on the Continental United States . . . will be greatly increased.” Therefore, they recommended executing OPLAN 312 “not later than Monday, 29 October, unless there is irrefutable evidence in the meantime that the offensive weapons are being dismantled or rendered inoperable.” Execution of OPLAN 316 should follow seven days later. This was sent to the White House, where Taylor summarized it for the ExComm. “Well, I'm surprised,” Robert Kennedy remarked, evoking loud laughter from other members.84

When the ExComm reconvened at 1600, members discussed how to reply to Khrushchev’s letters, and what the modalities of a Cuba-Turkey trade should be. Taylor relayed word that Navy F–8s flying low-level reconnaissance had encountered ground fire.85 The errant U–2 came safely back to Alaska. Around 1740, however, McNamara reported that Cubans had found, near a Soviet-manned SAM site, wreckage of a U–2 and the pilot’s body.86 McNamara argued that, to allow time for discussion with NATO allies, an air attack should not take place until Wednesday, 31 October, or Thursday, 1 November—“but only if we continue our surveillance, and fire against anything that fires against a surveillance aircraft.” He reasoned that an air strike would have to be all-out, almost certainly leading to an invasion
and probably to a Soviet attack against the Jupiters, to which “we must respond.” Taylor said that deferring execution of OPLAN 312 beyond Monday “will be very dangerous . . . unless we can reconnoiter each day.”

Back at the Pentagon, Taylor told the Service Chiefs that President Kennedy had been “seized” with the idea of a Cuba-Turkey trade, and that he seemed to be the only one in favor of it. This was a bit misleading, in that Kennedy evidently wished to conclude a trade fairly quickly while others wanted to proceed more slowly, probing for perhaps better terms. The Chairman then asked, “Should we take out a SAM site?” No, LeMay replied, we would open ourselves to retaliation; we have little to gain and a lot to lose. Wheeler agreed. “Gentlemen,” Taylor responded, “you all recommended retaliation if a U–2 was downed. If this was wise on the 23rd, it should be just as wise on the 27th.” (He was recalling what the ExComm had decided, not what the Service Chiefs had proposed.) Wheeler observed that the latest intelligence showed concrete pads, on which he feared there were nuclear-armed weapons. The JCS agreed that there should be some reconnaissance tomorrow, but no U–2 overflights. At 1945, a DIA briefer reported that photos from today’s missions showed canvas had been taken off the launchers. The missiles themselves were on the launchers, and a reload capability was ready.

Simultaneously, at the President’s direction, Robert Kennedy went to the Soviet Embassy. By the Attorney General’s account, he told Ambassador Dobrynin that “We had to have a commitment by tomorrow that those bases would be removed. . . . He should understand that if they did not remove those bases, we would remove them.” When Dobrynin inquired about removing the Jupiters, Kennedy replied that, while there could be no deal or quid pro quo, “If some time elapsed—and per [Secretary Rusk’s] instruction, I mentioned four or five months—I said I was sure that these matters could be resolved satisfactorily.”

It was long thought that this Kennedy-Dobrynin exchange, implicitly accepting a Cuba-Turkey trade, was crucial in resolving the crisis. Actually, by Saturday, Khrushchev was becoming sufficiently alarmed to accept a no-invasion pledge alone. When Dobrynin cabled that the Americans were willing to withdraw the Jupiters as well, Khrushchev of course embraced that welcome bonus.

The ExComm began its third meeting of the day at 2100. Speaking for the Chiefs, General Taylor proposed sending six low-level reconnaissance flights over undefended sites, without fighter escorts. They could ascertain whether work was continuing and “prove we’re still on the job.” Even if the planes were fired upon, President Kennedy opposed retaliating immediately, not wanting to “begin to sort of half do it.” McNamara proposed, and Kennedy approved, calling up 24 air transport squadrons and 14,000 USAF reservists. Requisition of the shipping needed for invasion was to follow next day.
Winding Down

When the JCS gathered at 0900 on Sunday, 28 October, General LeMay’s thin reserve of forbearance was exhausted. He wanted to see the President later that day and hoped the other Chiefs would accompany him. Monday, LeMay believed, would be the last day to strike the missiles before they became fully operational. Taylor promised that, if they wanted a meeting, he would put in their request. Wheeler added that, according to his information, all the MRBM sites had become operational; if warheads were with the missiles, R–4s could be ready to fire in 2½ to 5 hours. The JCS then turned to the day’s reconnaissance plan. At that point, Moscow Radio began broadcasting Khrushchev’s latest communication to President Kennedy. Taylor read a ticker tape summary to his colleagues: “I appreciate your assurance that the United States will not invade Cuba. Hence we have ordered our officers to stop building bases, dismantle the equipment, and send it back home. This can be done under UN supervision.”

McNamara, Gilpatric, and Nitze promptly joined the Chiefs. There was no talk of triumph. Indeed, LeMay feared that the Soviets might carry out a charade of withdrawal while keeping some weapons in Cuba. Anderson worried that a no-invasion pledge would leave Castro free to make mischief in Latin America. But McNamara, Gilpatric, and Nitze were convinced that withdrawal of the missiles would place the United States in a position vastly stronger than that of the USSR. LeMay still wished to go to the White House, but the other Chiefs now wanted to wait and see whether reconnaissance flights met opposition and what their cameras would reveal. Later that day, Taylor formally advised the Secretary that “we should maintain continuous readiness to execute CINCLANT OPLAN 312 on 12 hour notice . . . [and] CINCLANT OPLAN 316 within seven days after strike. I do not recommend taking the decision to execute now.”

Assistant Secretary Nitze asked the JCS to prepare an outline inspection plan. On 30 October, they submitted a 54-page study in which a 700-man team would enjoy full freedom of access throughout Cuba. Missiles and bombers would be displayed at airfields, then taken out under supervision through the ports of Mariel, Matanzas, and Havana. General Taylor, who was not present when the Service Chiefs approved this paper, advised Secretary McNamara that he did not regard it as “a feasible proposal” but as a useful indication of “the magnitude of the requirements for a complete and thorough verification of fulfillment of Soviet undertakings.”

Overflights on 1 November brought back conclusive evidence that the missile sites were being dismantled. Starting on 7 November, merchantmen carried what were counted as forty-two MRBMs out of Cuba. Castro adamantly rejected any on-site inspection, so US ships and aircraft performed visual and photographic inspections at sea, where the ships’ crews removed tarpaulins covering the missiles.
Interestingly, during these days, President Kennedy raised more detailed questions about OPLAN 316 than he had during the week of crisis. At an ExComm meeting on 29 October, he asked how the advanced Soviet ground equipment spotted in Cuba would affect an invasion. Answering four days later, Taylor assured him that the plan was “adequate and feasible.” Should the enemy take the “foolhardy” step of using nuclear weapons, we “could respond at once in overwhelming . . . force.”

On 31 October, Kennedy told General Wheeler that, for reasons of national prestige, an invasion must succeed swiftly. If more troops were needed, he was willing to risk drawing down our capability to deal with a Berlin contingency. If trouble did develop, he would authorize the use of tactical weapons in Europe immediately. Wheeler reported this at the next day’s JCS meeting. Taylor commented, “The President knows I disagree with him, but he seems very uneasy about it. I will discuss this with him.”

On 5 November, President Kennedy formally made his misgivings known to Secretary McNamara, stating that OPLAN 316 seemed “thin.” There were three uncommitted divisions in the Army’s general reserve. Kennedy wanted to use them in the invasion and, as compensation, activate National Guard divisions. At a JCS meeting on 7 November, Wheeler reported on his visit to Army units in the field. Saying he had never seen more imaginative and impressive training, Wheeler concluded that “we would never be more ready.” Concurrently, in a conference attended by all the commanders concerned with OPLAN 316, Admiral Dennison suggested adding the 5th Infantry Division and a combat command from the 2nd Armored Division to the floating reserve and airlifting two Marine battalions into Guantanamo. On 10 November, he put these recommendations before the JCS. They approved adding the Army units but rejected augmenting Guantanamo as well as CINCLANT’s proposal that two National Guard divisions be mobilized on D-Day. On 16 November, the JCS informed President Kennedy that the armed forces had assumed “an optimum posture” to execute OPLANs 312 and 316 and were in “an excellent condition world-wide” to meet any Soviet countermoves.

An atmosphere of crisis returned in mid-November, because President Kennedy insisted upon prompt removal of the IL–28s. Strictly speaking, bombers were not covered by the 27–28 October understanding, and Khrushchev tried to postpone their withdrawal. On 9 November, General Taylor put a hypothetical question before the Service Chiefs. Would they prefer that bombers be removed and a no-invasion pledge issued, or that IL–28s remain and a pledge withheld? They all favored the latter. Taylor said he suspected that was what would come to pass (i.e., continuing surveillance, lifting the quarantine, and withholding a no-invasion guarantee).

A meeting between Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs was set for 16 November. On the day before, the Chiefs reviewed a talking paper drafted by J–5. The Chairman criticized it as being condescending and full of platitudes: “We’re saying, ‘Now see here, young man, here is what we think you ought to do.’” Taylor tabled his own paper, which in fact was toughly worded. Approved by the Chiefs as a framework
for their presentation to the President, it read in part: “Even if the IL–28s are negotiated out of Cuba, there will remain systems of significant military importance . . . . But more important than this equipment are the thousands of Soviet military personnel who remain in Cuba to man it . . . . When the extent of this presence is known . . . , it will be clear to the Western Hemisphere that it has indeed been invaded and remains invaded by the Soviet Union. Under these conditions, we may anticipate a loud popular demand . . . for the removal of the Soviet personnel and neutralization of their weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the United States should generate now all the pressure possible to get the Soviet personnel out, feeling that their eviction is far more important than that of the equipment.”

The Chiefs’ talk with Kennedy may have bolstered the President’s resolve. Letters were drafted for Prime Minister Macmillan, President deGaulle, and Chancellor Adenauer warning that another crisis could be coming: “I am not yet prepared to make the precise choices among the numerous courses of action open to us, but I do expect to indicate very clearly tomorrow that renewed action will be required very soon unless (1) the IL–28s begin to leave, and (2) our surveillance continues without challenge from Castro.” But no further steps were necessary. On 20 November, Khrushchev informed the President that IL–28s would leave Cuba in thirty days, with Soviet combat units following in due course. Kennedy promptly lifted the quarantine, ended SAC’s airborne alert, reduced the alert status of other forces, and started redeploying tactical aircraft from coastal bases. At an evening press conference, he stated that “if all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean.”

Reflections

The military superiority of the United States determined the outcome of the missile crisis. Aware that the correlation of forces tilted heavily in our favor, the JCS were confident of prevailing at any level of conflict. President Kennedy may not have grasped just how strong a hand he held, but he felt constrained by the necessity of preserving alliances and doing everything possible to avert nuclear war.

The performance of the individual Chiefs was not uniform in quality. Admiral Anderson’s encounter with Secretary McNamara overshadowed the professionalism of the Navy’s work. General Wheeler’s lower profile owed a good deal to being so new to his position. General Shoup was sometimes terse to the point of incoherence. General LeMay damaged himself with his outspokenness. “We’re spending $50 billion,” he remarked during a JCS meeting; “if we can’t take care of Cuba we should go home.” Kennedy may have been as much irritated as assured.
The Service Chiefs looked a bit askance at General Taylor, fearing that he might not be conveying their views to the ExComm. They were mistaken in that Taylor always gave accurate reports. Judging by ExComm transcripts, though, the Chairman did not establish a forceful presence there, deferring to Secretary McNamara's natural tendency to dominate discussions. Back in the “tank,” Taylor’s debriefs of ExComm sessions rarely ran to more than a few sentences. It is noteworthy that General Wheeler, as Chairman, made a habit of providing detailed debriefings about White House meetings. In any case, Taylor did retain his Commander in Chief’s full confidence. Shortly after the crisis ended, newspaper editor Benjamin Bradlee heard from the President “an explosion... about his forceful, positive lack of admiration for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except for Maxwell Taylor, whom he calls 'absolutely first class.'”

The Service Chiefs, although perhaps not General Taylor, kept harboring doubts about the President’s strength of purpose. General Shoup’s worry about “doing the goddamn thing piecemeal” did have some foundation. On 27 October, the peak day of the crisis, transcripts of the ExComm’s afternoon and evening sessions show that decisions about the type of Sunday’s reconnaissance and the scope of retaliation were being kept open as long as possible. Afterwards, civilian leaders concluded that applying carefully chosen gradations of pressure, or “squeeze-and-talk,” was the right way to achieve a limited objective without risking general war. They did not perceive that the circumstances of October 1962 were, in many ways, unique.
NATO: Advocating New Approaches

Emphasizing Conventional Defense

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, created in 1949, formed the centerpiece of a policy that was designed to contain Soviet communism through collective security. Article V of the treaty stated that an attack upon one member, whether in Europe or North America, would be considered an attack against them all. In 1951, the alliance organized an integrated command to defend Western Europe. The United States stationed in West Germany a ground force equivalent to six divisions. Americans held the most senior military positions. In 1961, General Lauris Norstad, USAF, was the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; Admiral Robert L. Dennison was the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT). Alliance strategy was broadly outlined in the Report by the Military Committee on the Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of NATO (MC 14/2), approved by the North Atlantic Council in 1957. According to MC 14/2, NATO would respond with nuclear weapons, regardless of whether the Soviets did so, in all situations except incursion, infiltration, or local hostile action. In no case was there a concept of limited war with the Soviets.

 Early in 1961, the US Seventh Army in Germany contained two armored divisions, three infantry divisions, and three armored cavalry regiments. In the continental United States, earmarked for assignment to the SACEUR, were one infantry and two airborne divisions. The US Air Forces in Europe comprised 21 strike, four air defense, and six reconnaissance squadrons. Earmarked for assignment in CONUS were another 14 fighter and four reconnaissance squadrons. While the
nuclear arsenal was NATO’s “sword,” General Norstad described the non-nuclear “shield” forces under his command as “designed to bridge the gap between an all or nothing response, to give validity to the principle of the deterrent.” Allied Command Europe’s force goals for 1963, prescribed by the Military Committee through MC-70, included 55 active divisions, 34 reserve divisions, and 4,802 aircraft.\(^3\)

The new administration set about applying “flexible response” to NATO. Looking upon MC 14/2 as outdated, civilian leaders wanted to turn conventional forces into Allied Command Europe’s “sword.” Early in February 1961, Secretary of State Rusk informed Secretary of Defense McNamara that he assigned the greatest importance to raising the threshold at which resorting to nuclear weapons would become necessary. Allied Command Europe, in Rusk’s judgment, must be capable of resisting a conventional attack long enough by conventional means to permit an opportunity for negotiations and to allow the Soviets time to consider the wider risks they faced. McNamara asked for JCS views. Creating that much conventional capability, the Chiefs replied, would require modernizing US forces and considerably expanding allied efforts. NATO, they insisted, must not flinch from employing nuclear weapons when necessary. The Joint Chiefs endorsed General Norstad’s judgment that selective use of nuclear firepower need not result in total war.\(^4\)

Rusk appointed Dean Acheson, who had been Secretary of State during NATO’s formative years, to chair a review group. Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary (ISA), represented the Defense Department. In mid-March, Acheson's group circulated a draft report recommending that first priority go to preparing for contingencies short of nuclear or massive non-nuclear attack. The desirable objective would be enough conventional strength to impose a pause of the length described above. This time, the JCS critique was pungent. NATO intelligence, they noted, had judged a conventional attack to be highly improbable during the next ten years. Hence the cornerstone of NATO strategy was still a thoroughly credible deterrent against massive aggression. Conventional capabilities certainly ought to be strengthened, but priorities should provide for “a proper balance between nuclear and non-nuclear forces.” The decision to use nuclear weapons must not be delayed beyond the danger point. While the JCS accepted the desirability of raising the threshold, they could not envisage, “now or in the future, a situation in which an attack by as much as 60 divisions could be held by non-nuclear means for a period of possibly weeks.” An attack of such magnitude would be launched only to gain a major objective and neither side would withhold the means for winning.\(^5\)

Late in March, the JCS reviewed the Acheson group’s final report—recast now as a policy directive—and said they were “generally in accord” with it. Still, the group held that preparing for the “more likely” contingencies (i.e., those short of nuclear or massive non-nuclear attack) deserved “first priority.” The Chiefs wanted that changed to simply “priority” because they did not believe a limited war in Europe to be any more likely than a general war. Norstad, likewise, objected to assigning “exclusive priorities” among tasks that appeared equally necessary. And
he, too, challenged Acheson’s assumption that the more likely contingency was one short of nuclear or massive non-nuclear attack.6

On 21 April, President Kennedy signed a policy directive giving “first priority . . . to preparing for the more likely contingencies, i.e., those short of nuclear or massive non-nuclear attack.” The objective of improving non-nuclear capabilities “should be to create a capability for halting Soviet forces now in or rapidly deployable to Central Europe for a sufficient period to allow the Soviets to appreciate the wider risks of the course on which they are embarked. This program should emphasize raising the manning levels, modernizing the equipment, and improving the mobility of presently projected NATO non-nuclear forces. The US should then press strongly for NATO execution of this program, as a matter of the highest priority.”7 Thus the JCS reservations and recommendations were rejected.

Thomas K. Finletter, Permanent US Representative to the North Atlantic Council, presented these proposals to the Council on 26 April.8 General Taylor, watching from the vantage point of Military Representative of the President, wrote that “relatively junior officials of both State and Defense, fired with a missionary zeal to reverse or at least reform the nuclear-oriented strategy of NATO, took off for Europe on various pretexts. There . . . they undertook to explain the Kennedy strategy and in so doing succeeded in arousing to new levels the ever-latent suspicion of American motives.” Late in May, German officials made their misgivings known to American officials. There could not be a “pause,” Germans argued, unless fighting came to a standstill. But the Soviets would not stop; instead, the allies should so conduct their operations as to compel the Soviets to reveal their intentions as quickly as possible. Also, the Germans argued, the “minimum essential force requirements, 1958–1963,” (MC–70) goals were insufficient to raise the nuclear threshold significantly in the near future. Should a gap appear between NATO strategy and military reality, the enemy might try to exploit the opportunities thus offered. In June, NATO’s Secretary General Dirk Stikker warned that the North Atlantic Council could make no further progress until the United States amplified and clarified Ambassador Finletter’s statement of 26 April.9

Secretary McNamara directed General Lemnitzer to organize a working group that would propose such changes in NATO policy and force structure as were necessary to implement President Kennedy’s directive of 21 April. Chaired by Brigadier General Edward L. Rowny, USA, the group had representatives from the Joint Staff, the Services, ISA, SACEUR, and the OSD Comptroller.10

In mid-July, Rowny presented preliminary findings that lent considerable support to advocates of the new strategy. Previous estimates, the Rowny group argued, had exaggerated enemy strength. Soviet ground forces numbered 147 divisions, but only 90 of them were maintained at 70 to 85 percent strength; the other 57 were kept at 40 percent. Further, a Soviet division slice11 was about 26,000 men, considerably less than the NATO standard of 35,000. Other factors favoring NATO were the confining terrain of Central Europe, the austere levels of Soviet combat
support, and the vulnerability of enemy to air interdiction. Add to that the diffic-
ulty of achieving complete surprise, the necessity of staying dispersed because
of the nuclear threat, and the need to maintain troops on other fronts and in the
satellites. Under those conditions, “the enemy no longer looks like an impossible
adversary. His employable strength against the Allies in Central Europe at any one
time is more like 55 divisions. It must be borne in mind, nevertheless, that once
he has built up to this level he can sustain it indefinitely.” NATO’s ground forces in
Central Europe consisted of 22 active and 18 reserve divisions. The Rowny group
calculated that 30½ ready and 21 reserve divisions could conduct a conventional
defense for as long as thirty days.

General Lemnitzer characterized the Rowny group’s work as excellent, but
the Service Chiefs did not share his enthusiasm. In General Decker’s judgment, the
force levels recommended were not enough to support the concepts expounded.
Admiral Burke noted that the group failed to stress how the defense of Central
Europe depended upon resupply by sea. General LeMay claimed that the 21 April
directive had reaffirmed the importance of a nuclear strategy, not rejected it as the
Rowny group seemed to believe. If the deterrent’s credibility was declining, he attrib-
uted that not to Soviet technological advances (as the group did) but to “inadequate
manifestations of our willingness to use whatever forces are necessary to achieve
our objectives.” Lastly, LeMay observed, the group’s conclusions about a thirty-day
defense were considerably more optimistic than any approved JCS estimate.

The Berlin crisis stimulated an improvement in conventional capabili-
ties. The allies agreed that, by 1 January 1962, there would be 24½ active,
full-strength divisions on the Central Front. This was the backdrop against
which planning NATO’s force goals for 1966 went forward. The Major NATO
Commanders (MNCs), who were SACEUR, SA CLANT, and the Commander in
Chief, Channel Command, set their requirements at 59½ active divisions, 35½
reserve divisions, and 4,095 strike, reconnaissance, air defense, and transport
aircraft. The JCS advised Secretary McNamara that these requirements ought
to be larger but were acceptable as a “broad direction.” McNamara and Rusk
wanted the Military Committee to prepare a priority list, assigning high prior-
ity to the enhancement of non-nuclear ground and air capabilities in forward
areas of Allied Command Europe. When the Chiefs protested that presenting
such a list would delay the Committee’s action, it became simply a set of sug-
gested guidelines.

NATO’s semi-annual ministerial meeting took place in December 1961. A week
beforehand, the JCS were shown a speech to be delivered by Secretary McNamara.
They recommended dropping a statement that NATO forces could create conven-
tional forces “superior” to what the Warsaw Pact could deploy in Central Europe.
McNamara agreed. They also asked him to reword a claim that NATO “can probably
reduce or eliminate” Soviet tactical air superiority to a more modest statement that
“the West can reduce this advantage.” McNamara rejected that recommendation.
The meeting opened on 11 December, in Paris, at a time when the Berlin confrontation was easing but a successful outcome was far from certain. General Norstad informed the Military Committee that Allied Command Europe was nearly ready to begin implementing a true forward strategy. Current war plans contemplated a voluntary withdrawal from half of West Germany to main battle positions behind Hamburg in the north and Augsburg and Munich in the south. With small additions to existing strength and redeployment of certain forces, Norstad believed the defensive line could be moved forward to the border.17

Addressing the Council three days later, Secretary McNamara said that nuclear superiority had to remain a fundamental strength of NATO, but massive retaliation was no longer credible against a range of lesser provocations. The Alliance, he argued, could create conventional forces capable of holding an attack long enough to make the Soviet Union aware how grave was the course on which it had embarked. Afterwards, General Lemnitzer judged allied reactions to be “extremely favorable.” Secretary General Stikker, in fact, said that he had “never before heard such a forceful or important statement in the Council.”18 The Council then approved MC–96, its force requirements for 1966 being close to those listed above. Lemnitzer advised President Kennedy that the session was “more successful than any of the seven I have previously attended.”19

During 1962, the steady diminution of tension over Berlin relegated the debate about strategy to a more detached, intellectual plane. General Taylor, acting as Military Representative of the President, toured European capitals in March. Norstad told him that the surest way to bring about rejection of “our reoriented thinking” would be to present it as something new and extraordinary. Subsequently, Taylor proposed to President Kennedy that NATO undertake a comprehensive review of the force requirements involved in a forward strategy. Thus any debate would occur within “the relatively cool atmosphere of military planning” rather than amid “high temperature political discussions.” Secretary McNamara concurred.20

Norstad directed the Commander in Chief, Army Group Center (CINCENT), to prepare plans for implementing a forward defense. Concurrently, McNamara asked the JCS what redeployments would be required. The Joint Staff, in turn, passed this query to General Norstad and asked his opinion about the chances of defending, with and without nuclear weapons, against a sixty-division attack. Norstad replied that an assault on that scale could only aim at the conquest of Western Europe. General war conditions would exist, with the Soviets making elimination of SACEUR’s nuclear capability their first and highest priority task. If the main thrust came across the North German plain, the allies would have to resort to nuclear weapons almost immediately. If it came in the center, using nuclear weapons could be delayed for “several hours, possibly more.” As for redeployments, Norstad supplied in July a calculation that ten divisions would have to be repositioned over 2½ to five years at a cost of $2.787 billion. The JCS accepted his calculation, and so advised Secretary McNamara.21
Meantime, when the North Atlantic Council met in May, Secretary McNamara argued again for a conventional buildup. He portrayed the Berlin confrontation as an example of “limited but decisive action.” While nuclear weapons did not deter the Soviets, expanding NATO’s conventional capability demonstrated a determination that “may have given [them] second thoughts.” So he declared “a truly forward deployment, along the lines General Norstad has advocated,” to be “a truly urgent need of the Alliance.”

The French and Germans, however, harbored serious doubts about the forward strategy. Even with thirty active divisions in Central Europe, they believed Soviet superiority to be so great that a large-scale attack must be answered by virtually instantaneous nuclear retaliation. They dismissed the idea of enforcing a pause as clouding the American commitment to use nuclear weapons, which MC 14/2 required.

At Secretary McNamara’s suggestion, a US Defense Policy Conference convened in Washington on 11 October. He, Rusk, Ambassador Finletter, Lemnitzer, and Taylor attended. They commissioned a number of studies, including one in which the JCS would estimate how long available forces could resist various levels of enemy effort. All agreed that directly criticizing MC 14/2 could bring on a divisive debate within NATO. The studies, instead, might supply a basis for more fruitful negotiations with the allies. As Finletter reminded Rusk, “we have made very little progress” toward implementing the directive of 21 April 1961: “None of the bilateral talks we have had on the subject with the Allies has changed the mind of any allied government. The Political Directive, the Strategic Concept, and the military policies of the SHAPE forces under SACEUR have remained as they were, unaffected by the US New Conventional Policy.”

On 20 November, the JCS advised Secretary McNamara that their studies “clearly” demonstrated Allied Command Europe’s inability to cope with a massive conventional attack. According to the studies, enemy forces could mass against any part of NATO Europe in “overpowering ratios.” (This, of course, completely contradicted what the Rowny group had stated a year earlier.) The western powers would need 34 active and 22 reserve divisions to defend the Rhine River line and hold Schleswig-Holstein. They had only 23 ready and 12 in reserve, many with shortfalls in manning, training, equipment, and logistical support. In a nuclear battle, where attrition would be extremely high, the Warsaw Pact possessed—and NATO lacked—the replacements and reserves essential for exploitation. Comparing air capabilities only made things worse. The Warsaw Pact possessed 6,515 aircraft, Allied Command Europe 3,816. This imbalance was even worse than it appeared because SACEUR would have to reserve about half his US aircraft for nuclear missions. The enemy enjoyed shorter lines of communication, greater dispersal potential, and a better position from which to initiate attacks. A first strike by NATO could inflict serious damage, but the effort could not be sustained over a long period.
The Joint Chiefs’ conclusions offered scant comfort to those advocating a new strategy. NATO forces could not defend Western Europe by conventional means. Using battlefield nuclear weapons would improve NATO capabilities, although not enough to make possible a successful defense. If all types of tactical nuclear weapons were employed, the outcome would be an enemy superiority “even more pronounced” than at the purely conventional level, due to the Warsaw Pact’s large reserves, rapid mobilization capacity, and greater mobility and dispersal. However, in a general nuclear war, “the external strategic forces available to NATO are clearly superior, and this superiority would be maintained during and after the nuclear exchange. With this residual power mustered for use in concert with residual NATO tactical nuclear strength, the Sino-Soviet Bloc could be reduced to impotence.”

The Defense Policy Conference reconvened on 20 November. Secretary McNamara said that he wanted to make a “strong move” at the forthcoming North Atlantic Council meeting but was uncertain whether “we can be well enough prepared to do so.” Taylor observed, and McNamara agreed, that nuclear forces on both sides gradually would become more invulnerable so that sword/shield metaphor should be reversed, with nuclear strength becoming the shield and conventional forces the sword. It is not readily apparent how Taylor reconciled that view with the Chiefs’ conclusions described above.

Early in December, the JCS looked over a draft of what Secretary McNamara proposed saying to the Council—essentially, that non-nuclear defense was attainable and affordable. General Taylor called it “strong meat” and offered only one criticism. The value of tactical nuclear weapons should not be disparaged; they ought to be portrayed as extending, not replacing, the effectiveness of conventional forces. The Army representative called the draft forthright and realistic. Admiral Anderson made the usual argument for recognizing the importance of controlling sea lanes. General LeMay, unsurprisingly, had deeper criticisms. He considered the judgments about allies’ conventional capabilities to be “overly optimistic” while those about the enemy were “unduly circumscribed and substantially downgraded.” He worried that a formal rejection of MC 14/2, such as the Secretary seemed to be proposing, could prove dangerously counter-productive.

Speaking to Defense Ministers on 14 December, McNamara claimed Soviet and American nuclear forces had neutralized each other during the Cuban missile crisis; US conventional superiority in the Caribbean then became decisive. So, for defending Western Europe, he again stressed non-nuclear capabilities. Worldwide, NATO nations nearly equaled the Pact in numbers of tactical aircraft and surpassed it in quality. McNamara claimed that sixty divisions, active and ready reserve, could conduct “extensive forward operations along the Iron Curtain.” Only American and Canadian units, though, were completely combat ready. He estimated the cost of correcting the allies’ deficiencies at $8.5 billion, spread over five years. “We have a superior nuclear shield,” he concluded, “and we must forge an effective non-nuclear sword.” Other Ministers did not reply directly, Secretary Rusk reported,
“but their remarks indicated continuing basic divergences within the Alliance on military questions.” For Europeans, MC 14/2 still constituted a sound strategy.

A NATO Nuclear Force?

The elements that made up the Alliance’s nuclear arsenal lacked mechanisms for comprehensive coordination and control. By far the greater portion consisted of long-range bombers and missiles under exclusive US control. Europeans, naturally, were unwilling to leave an essential element of deterrence in American hands. In 1957, the NATO Heads of Government authorized a nuclear stockpile regulated by a “two-key” system. Tactical aircraft and missiles that would deliver nuclear weapons were owned and operated by each individual ally; the warheads were under US custody. Thus, for example, West German F–104s could not fly nuclear missions until Americans released the warheads to NATO commanders. But Great Britain and France controlled nuclear forces of their own. The French exploded a fission device in February 1960; President Charles deGaulle made fielding a force de frappe—Mirage bombers carrying atomic bombs—his top priority. The US government gave no help to France, even though the Atomic Energy Act as amended in 1958 permitted assistance to nations that achieved “substantial progress” in this field. Britain, which had been a nuclear power since 1952, did receive American help. A special relationship nurtured during World War II still endured. In March 1960, President Eisenhower promised to make available either air-to-surface Skybolt or submarine-launched Polaris missiles (warheads excluded). The British thereupon halted development of a Blue Streak missile intended to prolong the lives of their Vulcan bombers. In September 1960, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan agreed to provide berthing facilities for US Polaris submarines at Holy Loch, Scotland.

General Norstad very much wanted to deploy a force of land-based, mobile medium-range ballistic missiles operating under the two-key system. The State Department persuaded the Eisenhower administration to promote a sea-based approach. Addressing the North Atlantic Council in December 1960, Secretary of State Christian Herter suggested creating an MRBM force that “would be truly multilateral, with multilateral ownership, financing, and control, and would include mixed manning to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR.” He said the United States would be willing to commit to NATO, before the end of 1963, five fleet ballistic missile submarines carrying eighty Polaris missiles. “In taking this step,” Herter continued, “we would expect that other members of NATO would be prepared to contribute approximately 100 missiles to meet SACEUR’s MRBM requirements through 1964, under the multilateral concepts which I have already indicated.”

Dean Acheson’s review group drafted a policy directive that, after minor revisions, President Kennedy issued on 21 April 1961. It was not a model of clarity,
perhaps deliberately so. The directive stipulated that nuclear weapons would not be withdrawn from Europe without adequate replacement. The United States should suggest that the North Atlantic Council try to work out either general guidelines regarding the use of nuclear weapons or a political method for determining their use. The US Government should announce its intention “to commit, say, five Polaris submarines to NATO, for use by the President in accordance with the procedures outlined above.” More seaborne missiles should be committed as they became available. “Over the long run, it would be desirable if the British phased out of the nuclear deterrent business.” Therefore, if developing Skybolt for US aircraft alone proved unwarranted, the United States should not prolong the British V-bombers’ lives by that or other means. France should not be given assistance in attaining a nuclear weapons capability. If Europeans wished to expand the seaborne missile forces, following completion of the conventional buildup slated for 1963–1966, “the US should then be willing to discuss the possibility of some multilateral contribution by them.”

The directive raised the possibility of putting British-based B–47s under NATO command, so that the British might do likewise with their V-bombers. The JCS saw little merit in this idea. The forty bombers to be stationed there constituted an insufficient inducement, since the V-bomber force was considerably larger. If the British did agree, though, they might demand a substantial voice in the use of US forces. Also, once B–47s were assigned to NATO, we might have to provide replacements when they were retired. The idea was not pursued.

The Acheson group had suggested substituting one Polaris submarine for the fifteen Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles slated for deployment to Turkey. The JCS disagreed. Since $322 of the $388 million allocated for Jupiters in Turkey already had been spent, they observed that cancellation would save little. The Turks recently had rejected Soviet protests about the Jupiters. Stopping their deployment would cause the Turkish government a great loss of face, more so since the United States was about to station thirty Jupiters in Italy. Justifying cancellation on grounds of obsolescence would hand ammunition not only to those British and Italians who had opposed the original deployments but also to those who wanted more modern missiles instead. Beyond these fiscal and political factors, the Chiefs argued that adding Jupiters would improve NATO’s nuclear capability and compound the Soviets’ targeting problems. General Norstad noted that Polaris, while clearly superior to Jupiter, would be in short supply for several years. The issue, he argued, was not whether one Polaris submarine was preferable to fifteen Jupiters but whether Polaris plus Jupiters created greater strength than Polaris alone. Norstad believed that they did. The Jupiters were installed between August 1961 and March 1962.

Meanwhile, on 26 April 1961, Ambassador Finletter informed the North Atlantic Council that “the US reaffirms its intention to commit five Polaris submarines to NATO,” with more to follow. Their availability, he said, “should postpone the time
when it may become necessary to deal with the MRBM question.” Speaking to the Canadian Parliament on 17 May, President Kennedy made the Polaris offer public and raised “the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO seaborne force, which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, if this should be desired and found feasible by our allies, once NATO’s non-nuclear goals have been achieved.”

In mid-June and again late in August, the JCS backed General Norstad’s brief for a NATO force consisting of 45 Jupiters and 450 mobile, land-based missiles. McNamara wanted to delay offering an initiative. Rusk urged concrete action when the Council met in December, immediately committing five Polaris submarines, but he was persuaded to postpone any steps.

In December, after the Council adjourned, Secretary McNamara called for studies of MRBM requirements. The Joint Chiefs responded by characterizing SACEUR’s position as reasonable. They refrained from endorsing a specific mix, saying that would depend upon allied attitudes and intelligence estimates twelve to eighteen months hence. The Chiefs did supply a detailed rebuttal of the “frequently mentioned alternative” that CONUS-based aircraft and missiles could fill in for MRBMs. Such forces were not under SACEUR’s control and thus not responsive to his requirements. The allies might press for a strong voice in planning how to use CONUS-based forces. The MRBM would have a shorter flight time than the ICBM, be more accurate, and contain a smaller warhead thus lessening the possibility of collateral damage. Moreover, failure to build MRBMs could (1) divide the Alliance by ignoring Europeans’ aspirations for a larger role in NATO affairs and (2) induce an attitude of allowing the United States to bear the whole burden.

ISA denigrated the idea of a multilaterally-owned NATO missile force: “It is by no means clear that such a force would effectively stave off pressures for national nuclear forces nor would it necessarily add to European feelings of security.” The Adenauer government had shown much interest in a multilateral force. But the British opposed both a NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF) and German operation of MRBMs, while the French seemed determined to press forward with their force de frappe. A better answer, therefore, might be the earmarking of additional US forces for assignment to NATO—perhaps a combination of ICBMs, Polaris submarines, Thor IRBMs, and B–47s based in Britain.

The US Representative on the NATO Military Committee, General Clark Ruffner, warned the Joint Chiefs that the MLF proposal contained more dangers than were readily apparent. The most exposed nations—West Germany, Greece, and Turkey—wanted a control formula assuring them that nuclear weapons would be used when any of them so wished. Other allies, particularly the British, insisted upon a veto. Ruffner suspected that, “after an agonizing analysis,” all the allies would agree that delegating decision-making powers to the American president was still the best answer. Ruffner could not conceive of a collective control system more credible to Europeans than the existing arrangement of relying upon Strategic Air Command. He added, however, that the requirement for MRBMs remained
constant and should be divorced from the MLF. Absent any MRBMs, an American guarantee of target coverage would be necessary, and that would imply a US desire for monopoly.40

France, of course, opposed nuclear integration. President Kennedy solicited suggestions for sweetening the sour state of Franco-American relations. General Lemnitzer looked at an ISA proposal, found it in accord with previous JCS positions, and voiced confidence that the Service Chiefs “share my unqualified approval of the prospective initiative.” Secretary Rusk was equally emphatic, but in the opposite direction. He thought deGaulle would accept no aid except on the same terms that we had given the British, which ISA did not propose doing. Even limited assistance struck Rusk as inconsistent with the MLF scheme, and liable to misinterpretation as signaling a shift in our attitude toward national nuclear programs. Also, substantial help and not merely the limited aid proposed by ISA would be needed to transform “the present ineffective French program” into an effort of “significant proportions.” In sum, the disadvantages of ISA’s proposal outweighed the advantages by “a very wide margin.”41

On 17 March, the JCS advised Secretary McNamara that full French participation in NATO arrangements was “essential to [the] over-all Free World military posture in Europe.” Resources needed to fulfill NATO’s conventional force goals were being diverted to the force de frappe; other nations might follow France’s example. Therefore, the Chiefs favored entering talks to determine how much US assistance was needed to assure closer French cooperation with NATO. Concurrently, General Lemnitzer sent Assistant Secretary Nitze a rebuttal of Rusk’s argument. Basically, the Chairman contended, State was treating France as an opponent rather than an ally. “One thing is certain,” wrote Lemnitzer, “NATO without France is essentially no NATO. I appreciate the fact that the present may not be propitious for conciliatory negotiations with France. I do feel that we must have an accepted plan and be prepared to initiate negotiations at the earliest possible time.”42

ISA drafted a new plan which, after a few changes, won approval from Secretary McNamara and the JCS and went to the White House. During Step One, the United States would provide assistance in missile technology and fill high-priority French requests for conventional arms. France would equip four divisions and join NATO discussions about command and control over the MLF. In Step Two, the United States would supply additional aid in return for greater French participation in NATO and the MLF.43

President Kennedy decided to deny any help. On 18 April, through a National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 148, he forbade members of the Executive Branch from speaking to French officials about nuclear assistance. Guidance for press briefings made his meaning unmistakable.44 In Congress, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy strongly opposed nuclear sharing with France, because of communist infiltration into the French nuclear program. The Committee’s attitude deeply influenced Kennedy’s decision; he did not want to spend political capital on
this issue. Subsequently, General Taylor found from personal experience that this refusal to extend any help created deep bitterness among the French.45

In mid-March 1962, following a discussion between Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, the State Department circulated a “Suggested NATO Nuclear Program.” The United States would express a willingness to join in creating a sea-based MLF totaling about 200 missiles—but avoid indicating any urgent need to do so, in view of the sizeable US strategic forces that already were available. The JCS registered strong objections, insisting that the need for MRBMs was not purely political, as the wording above seemed to imply. “Exhaustive” studies by SACEUR and by themselves “clearly” showed that a military requirement did exist. MRBMs were an essential element in force modernization, because fighter-bombers had become highly vulnerable to missile attack. Moreover, NATO needed not only a limited number of sea-based missiles but also “mobile land and seaborne forces, with missiles bearing relatively small-yield warheads and high accuracy, responsive to current constraint policies, and which, under conditions of conventional war, would stand as a viable nuclear deterrent.” They also opposed making any commitment to put Polaris submarines under multilateral controls; that should be discussed separately. They wanted to defer decisions about the MLF’s size and character. However, national contributions should take the form of operational units. In their judgment, mixed crews would create more problems than they solved. The Joint Chiefs felt so strongly about this issue that they asked Secretary McNamara for permission to present their opinion to the President, if State contested these conditions.46

On 16 April, nonetheless, President Kennedy approved State’s “Program,” adding only that the part about multilateral control of Polaris should not be volunteered. General Lemnitzer sent Secretary McNamara a two-point protest. First, the types and numbers of MRBMs should be specified. Second, operational units ought not be manned by mixed nationalities. McNamara rejected both points. The Program, he claimed, did not foreclose further measures to meet SACEUR’s MRBM requirement. He viewed mixed manning as necessary to prevent crews of individual countries from controlling ships and weapons.47 Concurrently, Assistant Secretary Nitze asked the JCS to propose a schedule for committing Polaris submarines to NATO. They recommended five forthwith and twelve by December 1966. Instead, the administration settled on twelve—all that would then be available—by December 1963.48

NATO Ministers met at Athens early in May 1962. Secretary McNamara told the allies that, in general nuclear war, “our principal military objectives... should be the destruction of the enemy’s military forces while attempting to preserve the fabric as well as the integrity of allied society.” He identified three “vital” attributes for the Alliance’s deterrent: unity of planning; executive authority; and central direction. Describing the strategic nuclear target system as indivisible, McNamara warned that a failure in coordination might lead to the destruction of Soviet cities just when our strategy of controlled response was on the verge of success. He claimed that weak nuclear forces targeted
against enemy cities—an obvious reference to British V-bombers and France’s force de frappe—actually invited a pre-emptive strike by the enemy. “Effective today,” he announced, five Polaris submarines would be earmarked for assignment to SACLANT, with the number rising to twelve by December 1963. As for mobile, land-based MRBMs, the United States was designing such a weapon without committing itself to production or deployment.49

When Secretary McNamara presented this “spare-the-cities” approach publicly, in an address on 16 June, Europeans reacted angrily. An OSD official reported that the French General Staff was “in despair” about the counterforce strategy, seeing it as evidence of US weakness of will. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan wrote in his diary that McNamara had “put forward with equal vigor and clumsiness a powerful condemnation of all national nuclear forces except, of course, those of the United States.” All the allies, Secretary Macmillan wrote, “are angry with the American proposal that we should buy rockets to the tune of umpteen million dollars, the warheads to be under American control. This is not a European rocket. It’s a racket of American industry.”50

Macmillan assigned the US government too much credit for unity of purpose. President Kennedy discussed the issue with Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, and McGeorge Bundy. On 13 June, he instructed Ambassador Finletter to inform Europeans that MRBMs were not urgently needed for military reasons. If the allies wished to add them, we were prepared to join in creating a seaborne MLF. The force should be seaborne to avoid political problems associated with land-basing, minimize vulnerability and collateral damage, and permit genuine multilateral control and Manning (e.g., three nationalities aboard each ship).51

The issue of land-basing MRBMs would not go away. In September, Rusk warned McNamara about “the sentiment which my people have found among the military” for reopening the matter. Even as General Norstad’s tenure neared its close, he kept pressing his case. On 17 October, Norstad told the North Atlantic Council that 600 targets needed direct coverage and 1,000 more were “of concern to his Command.” He doubted whether US-based forces could be employed “in timely fashion under all circumstances” for direct defense of Western Europe. Most probably, those vehicles would be launched only in conjunction with a general nuclear exchange. SACEUR estimated that his Command’s nuclear capability could be destroyed by fewer than 300 missiles. Therefore, introducing a land and sea mix of MRBMs would “vastly” improve the situation. The German representative asked whether sea basing might move the enemy to spare much of Western Europe. Norstad’s answer, contradicting McNamara’s counterforce theory, was that he could hardly see the Soviets absorbing nuclear strikes on their territory and responding only against sea-based systems. He considered mobile weapons on land more difficult to locate than those at sea, the difference being “that between finding a needle in a haystack and finding one on a billiard table.” Norstad closed by repeating what he had told the Council in 1960: “This is not a matter of choice....
You either have this or you have no defense . . . and that means you have no NATO within a matter of a relatively few years.” Only days later, President Kennedy secretly approved withdrawing Jupiters from Turkey to help resolve the Cuban missile crisis.

In mid-November, the JCS sent Secretary McNamara a memorandum replete with technical data designed to prove that a mix of land- and sea-based MRBMs offered the most effective means of countering the Soviet IRBM threat. Hardening of Soviet IRBM sites, they said, added a new urgency to the MRBM requirement. General Ruffner reported that European members of the NATO Military Committee were dissatisfied. They wanted to deal with the IRBM issue but saw no chance of fashioning a consensus until the contradiction between Norstad’s position and that of the US government was settled. Nitze put this problem before McNamara, who replied that studies had not established, to his satisfaction, a military need for these missiles. Consequently, General Taylor (now Chairman) could only inform Ruffner that the administration’s position, as outlined in April and June, remained unchanged.

The Military Committee, meeting on 10–11 December, heard opposing opinions from Taylor and Norstad. After describing the threat list for 1967–69, by which time the Soviets would have hardened their sites and perhaps deployed ballistic missile defenses, Taylor denied that the United States was guilty of “foot-dragging or ill will.” Rather, there was “real doubt as to the best way to target this particular threat in this particular time frame.” The Committee debated whether it had endorsed Norstad’s requirement for MRBMs and decided, after a long discussion, that it never had “clearly” done so. The Committee called upon its Standing Group (US, UK, France) to submit firm recommendations.

A number of strands now became entangled. Britain had applied to join the European Economic Community, or “Common Market.” DeGaulle professed alarm that the British, acting as US agents, could use this membership to clamp American control over Western Europe. Secretary Rusk warned Secretary McNamara that it was “of the utmost importance to avoid any actions” that would expand the Anglo-American special relationship. Specifically, any commitment to prolong their nuclear delivery capability by acquiring Polaris submarines should be avoided at this time. There was also reason to worry about Franco-German collaboration. Like the French, the Germans had serious reservations about emphasizing conventional defense and sought a larger role in nuclear decision-making. Many thought that Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss had the makings of future Chancellor and German Gaullist.

President Kennedy ordered another assessment of policy toward France. Previous discussions had broached the possibility of selling a nuclear submarine to the French. In return, France would support the forward strategy, participate in an MLF, commit another active division to NATO, and return its Mediterranean Fleet to NATO command. ISA added another enticement: Establish tripartite machinery for tripartite consultation on worldwide strategic and political questions. The JCS
agreed, provided that France was pressed to provide four more divisions and that sale of a *Skipjack*-class nuclear attack submarine undergo further examination. Since *Skipjack* was our most advanced submarine in terms of speed and maneuverability, a compromise of information could prove quite damaging. The State Department endorsed a *Skipjack* sale but doubted whether such an offer would change deGaulle’s firmly held convictions.57

Abruptly, attention shifted to Anglo-American relations. On 7 November, Secretary McNamara advised the President to cancel the Skybolt air-to-ground missile. Next day, he informed the British ambassador, who replied that the news would be “political dynamite” to the Macmillan government. The United Kingdom had decided to base its entire 1960s deterrent force on the purchase of Skybolt which would be dropped from the V-bomber. Cancellation of the Skybolt program, after the British had cancelled all other projects, had severe political ramifications in Britain. On 11 December, McNamara flew to London and offered three alternatives: continue Skybolt on their own; adapt older Hound Dog missiles to the V-bombers; or participate in a seaborne MLF. Defense Minster Peter Thorneycroft rejected all of them, implied a betrayal by the Americans, and pressed for an assurance that Washington favored an independent British nuclear deterrent. Secretary McNamara refused.58

On 16 December, one day after the formal announcement of Skybolt’s cancellation, President Kennedy conferred with senior civilians. After hearing a wide range of views, Kennedy approved “for planning purposes” an offer of appropriate Polaris missile components, on condition that the British eventually commit this Polaris fleet to a NATO multilateral force and build their conventional strength up to agreed NATO levels.59 Two days later, Kennedy flew to Nassau in the Bahamas for a meeting with Secretary Macmillan. The President was accompanied by McNamara, Nitze, Under Secretary of State George Ball, and other civilians. None of the JCS came with them. General Taylor had asked McNamara whether he should accompany the presidential party. The Secretary said he saw no need for that, since he did not anticipate any substantive discussions. This was supposed to be an occasion of reconciliation, not decision.60 Instead, on 21 December, Kennedy and Macmillan issued a “Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems” that moved the MRBM/MLF debate in new directions. The Polaris issue, they declared, “created an opportunity for the development of new and closer arrangements for the organization and control of strategic Western defense.” A start could be made by subscribing to NATO allocations from US strategic forces, UK Bomber Command, and tactical nuclear forces now held in Europe. They also agreed “that the US will make available on a continuing basis Polaris missiles (less warheads) for British submarines . . . . These forces, and at least equal US forces, would be made available for inclusion in a NATO multilateral nuclear force.” Except when Her Majesty’s Government decided that supreme national interests were at stake, British forces
would be “used for the purposes of international defense of the Western Alliance in all circumstances.” There was no mention of a conventional buildup.

President Kennedy and Secretary Macmillan agreed that France should be offered Polaris missiles, minus warheads, under similar but not identical terms. Central Intelligence believed that the French could build a submarine by 1967 but would be unable to produce a nuclear warhead until well into the 1970s. Thus the offer was considerably less useful than might appear. In any case, deGaulle promptly rejected it, repeated his determination to create a force de frappe, and vetoed Britain’s bid for membership in the Common Market.

Just before Nassau, Secretary McNamara had argued that “our current position with respect to a multilateral force simply will not work. . . . There is no way in which we can persuade the Europeans to buy and pay for both a multilateral force and a full compliance with NATO conventional force goals.” Therefore, “it was time to move on to a more realistic arrangement.” The “Nassau Statement” de-emphasized a conventional buildup in order to promote a seaborne NATO nuclear force. Whether such an arrangement was more realistic remained to be seen.

**Change of Command**

General Norstad announced his retirement in July 1962. His disputes with McNamara and Kennedy had deepened well beyond any chance of accommodation. The Secretary and the President informed the general that his health problems—a heart attack in 1955 and another in 1960—made it necessary for him to retire. Norstad, who felt fine, told colleagues that he had been fired. His departure as Supreme Allied Commander, delayed by the Cuban missile crisis, took place on 2 January 1963. General Lemnitzer, his successor, had differences with Kennedy and McNamara but accommodated more to their thinking. Thus tension between SACEUR and the administration eased considerably, but deep-rooted differences between US and European viewpoints remained.
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Rise and Demise of the Multilateral Force

On 10 January 1963, the JCS sent Secretary McNamara their initial recommendations for implementing the agreements reached at Nassau by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan. The best military solution, they said, would assign any requirements that exceeded SACEUR's capability to US-based forces. The Chiefs were wholly satisfied with existing arrangements whereby portions of Strategic Air Command, British Bomber Command, and the missiles in Europe were assigned targets from SACEUR's threat list. In assessing other options, they cautioned, possible political gains should be carefully balanced against the likely loss of operational effectiveness. If new arrangements were deemed necessary, an MLF should be established “in the simplest possible way.” About twenty B–47s, an equivalent capability of Vulcan bombers, and Polaris submarines stationed in the Mediterranean could constitute a separate MLF with a commander or director reporting straight to SACEUR.¹

Concurrently, an interdepartmental steering group was examining the same issue. A sub-group proposed that initial assignments to the MLF consist of 20 B–47s based in Britain, 55 Vulcan bombers, three Polaris submarines, and all the tactical nuclear forces that were included in SACEUR's Strike Plan. The Joint Chiefs told Secretary McNamara that they deemed this overly large for an initial commitment. They “strongly” opposed assigning any tactical nuclear forces at all because doing so would cut into SACEUR's conventional capability (some aircraft being dual-capable), add nothing to his nuclear strength, and disrupt follow-on plans. The sub-group’s purpose, they presumed, was to dull the German’s craving for a national nuclear force by offering them a greater role in planning and targeting, possible
participation by German F–84s and F–104Gs, and eventual inclusion in mixed-manned Polaris submarines. But all that, the Chiefs concluded, “really does not add up to very much.” Close examination would “indicate to any serious European that there has been only a regrouping of forces and no addition of strength or of European freedom of action. Only if the United States and other NATO governments are ready to make serious concessions in the area of political control or to make unqualified assignment of additional weapons . . . will it be possible to convince the Germans and other Western Europeans that this proposal has real worth and attraction for them.”

Chancellor Adenauer informed the President that Germany was prepared to participate in creating an MLF. On 21 February, Kennedy appointed diplomat Livingston Merchant to head a State-Defense negotiating team that would pursue as a matter of urgency the creation of an MLF. As to control of the force, Merchant should propose that any decision about firing nuclear weapons be unanimous, thereby preserving a US veto.

OSD analysts favored using surface ships and Secretary McNamara agreed. Submarines had greater survivability, but surface ships could spend more time at sea, cost half as much to operate, deploy more rapidly, and lend themselves more readily to mixed-manned crews. The JCS also advised that, if mixed manning was deemed necessary, surface ships would ease personnel problems and reduce security risks. However, Admiral Anderson warned that internationalist feeling would not easily displace national pride, which always had been a mainstay of military motivation. Accordingly, he asked that Merchant solicit opinions from military as well as political leaders. If mixed manning was to work, the understanding and support of military men would be essential.

Ambassador Merchant carried the MLF message to Bonn and London. He found the Germans to be “genuinely enthusiastic,” the British more cautious. Kennedy authorized a formal invitation to Adenauer. He also directed the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Claude Ricketts, to lead a technical mission. On 30 April, Adenauer accepted Kennedy’s proposal, provided that control arrangements and exclusion of submarines could be re-examined later. McNamara decided that before the President publicly committed himself, he ought to have a military assessment of the MLF.

On 1 May, the JCS (minus General Taylor, who was attending a meeting of the Central Treaty Organization) tentatively approved a statement that neither the advisability nor inadvisability of the MLF could be “clearly substantiated at the present time.” Therefore, “a more prudent initial course of action would be to proceed with arrangements involving the in-being nuclear capability of NATO-committed national forces.” Next morning, McNamara and Gilpatric met with the JCS. After some discussion, the Chiefs adopted what civilian leaders chose to construe as an endorsement of the MLF. Their memorandum began by stating that they saw no military need for a seaborne force, since this requirement could be better
met “by national forces of appropriate mix committed to NATO.” If the MLF helped to prevent nuclear proliferation and strengthen NATO’s cohesion, such a commitment of resources could be justified. Problems were so complex, however, that inter-allied differences easily could appear. Consequently, proof of unity should be clearly evident before US prestige became irrevocably committed. Nonetheless, “Given the adequate participation and accorded the full support of contributing NATO partners, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that the proposed . . . [MLF] is feasible and will contribute a militarily effective and useful augmentation of NATO nuclear strength.”

With German cooperation apparently assured, Kennedy directed that discussions with the British begin immediately. Signs of trouble already abounded. Arthur Schlesinger reported to the President that reactions “ranged from tepid (government) to baffled (press) to hostile (Labour and Liberals).” The British Chiefs of Staff solidly opposed MLF.

Secretary McNamara looked for ways to make the allies feel that they were gaining a greater voice in nuclear planning. Could they, for example, be represented at Strategic Air Command Headquarters in Omaha? The JCS opposed doing so, largely on security grounds. But Generals Lemnitzer and Power, SACEUR and CINCSAC, believed that political gains would outweigh military risks, and McNamara overrode JCS objections. On 24 May 1963, the North Atlantic Council approved (1) assigning to SACEUR the British bomber force as well as three Polaris submarines, (2) giving SACEUR a Nuclear Deputy, and (3) arranging allied participation in operational planning at Omaha, Nebraska, the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command.

By mid-June, McGeorge Bundy had lost faith in the MLF. Creating such a force, he advised President Kennedy, would make the French more antagonistic, expose the British and German governments to charges of excessive subservience toward Washington, and allow Moscow to portray the MLF as a “militaristic maneuver” that prevented progress toward peace. At home, the President could gain congressional approval of the MLF only by expending much of his personal political capital, “since the State Department has no leverage and the Defense Department will not be able to make the case on straight military grounds.” Therefore, Bundy suggested making clear to the Europeans “our own conviction that this force will work” but taking away “any sense of a deadline.”

President Kennedy did decide to take some action. In July, he asked the Defense Department to appraise the possibility of operating one mixed-manned ship. Admiral Anderson prepared, and the JCS approved, a study showing the project to be feasible and best conducted aboard a destroyer equipped with Tartar anti-air missiles. Secretary McNamara agreed and, on 30 August, the President authorized diplomatic approaches. By the year’s close, West Germany, Greece, Italy, Turkey, and the United Kingdom had agreed to participate in the experiment. The guided-missile destroyer USS Biddle (later renamed USS Claude V.
...Ricketts) began operating as a mixed-manned ship in August 1964 and continued so for eighteen months. 11

Otherwise, the MLF project remained immobilized. Harold Macmillan fell ill and resigned in October; his successor, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, was widely regarded as a caretaker. Concurrently, Konrad Adenauer finally retired. In Italian elections, Socialists who were quite critical of the MLF gained much ground and acquired several cabinet posts. And, in the United States, Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency in the aftermath of tragedy. In these circumstances, major decisions necessarily were deferred.

In April 1964, President Johnson approved a “tentative” negotiating schedule to bring the MLF into existence around July 1965. But everything now depended upon the British, and parliamentary majorities in both the ruling Conservative and opposition Labor parties disapproved the project. Germanophobia, which was particularly prevalent among Laborites, intensified this attitude. In September, the Director, Joint Staff, told General Wheeler that “I personally think the UK will fight the MLF down to the wire.” 12 Next month, the Labor Party won a hairbreadth election victory. The new Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, already had made plain his distaste for the MLF.

The Wilson government proposed, in place of the MLF, an Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) separate from and not subordinate to SACEUR. Its key element would be, as a total substitution for the MLF, a multilateral Minuteman force of ICBMs based in North America. Lemnitzer promptly warned McNamara and Wheeler that European allies would see this as an attempt to strengthen Britain’s position in the NATO command structure and weaken that of the American SACEUR. Also, according to “top-level” British officials, London looked upon the ANF as a device by which to cut NATO’s conventional requirements. 13

During 5–6 December, President Johnson reviewed the MLF’s prospects with senior civilians. The fact that no JCS members attended showed that this had become a political issue. Wilson was about to arrive in Washington, and Americans needed to decide how hard to press him about the MLF. Johnson’s advisers wanted to force the issue, but the President was reluctant: “Aren’t you telling me to kick mother England out the door into the cold, while I bring the Kaiser into the sitting room? How will that look to Americans?” Dean Acheson, no mean hand with metaphors, replied that “We aren’t kicking mother out. On the contrary, we have been trying to get the old dame to come into the house with the rest of us for years but she had insisted on swaying in the gutter, drinking her gin, and wouldn’t answer our call.” The President, however, insisted that “one cannot push a thing if everyone’s against it” on Capitol Hill and in Europe. Remembering how President Franklin Roosevelt had squandered much political capital by persisting in his court-packing scheme, Johnson feared that “the Administration won’t have five cents worth of money in the bank after this.” 14

Predictably, Wilson’s visit produced nothing concrete. On 9 December, just after the talks ended, Johnson sent word to Wilson that he had shown “great
restraint . . . because of his concern to avoid any appearance of running a power play against a weak opponent.” He appreciated Wilson’s political problem but did not want the prime minister misled into thinking that Washington had retreated from its objective. Wilson replied that Her Majesty’s Government still “reserved its position” on the surface fleet.15

During 15–17 December, the North Atlantic Council discussed ANF and MLF. Afterward, General Wheeler told the Service Chiefs that he had detected little support for the MLF but did discern a widespread fear of West Germany getting nuclear weapons. President Johnson decided against pressing matters any further. NSAM No. 322, issued on 17 December, read as follows: “I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time . . . I find nothing in the position of this government or in the posture of the alliance which makes it necessary, from the point of view of the US alone, that there should be final agreement or even agreement in principle within the next three months.”16 That sounded the MLF’s death knell. Washington had promoted the MLF as a means of sublimating German nuclear ambitions, but Europeans’ fear of those ambitions helped kill the idea.

Cutting Conventional Capability

The campaign to improve Allied Command Europe’s non-nuclear strength had stalled, even threatening to go into reverse. Late in December 1962, President Kennedy warned the JCS that US forces in Europe would have to be “thinned out” unless the allies improved their readiness and gave substance to the forward strategy. Two months later, he directed the Chiefs to examine how far US forces could be cut over the next twelve months. Heavy reductions, General Wheeler warned, might tempt the Soviets to seize Hamburg or Munich. Unimpressed, Kennedy replied that Europe was “about eighth on our list of dangers.” Communists might capture all Asia, the President worried, while Washington poured money into conventional defense of Europe. The balance-of-payments drain was much on his mind. Like Eisenhower three years earlier, Kennedy stressed that it was “absolutely essential for us to protect our monetary position. Otherwise, we might be so poor that we would have to withdraw everywhere.”17

Anglo-American discussions, beginning in April 1963, did little to bridge their differences in strategic conceptions. At this conference, US and UK spokesmen discussed their divergent ideas. General Taylor argued that the British wanted what amounted to “a poor man’s forward strategy,” providing too few reserve divisions and tactical nuclear weapons, too little logistical support, and too short a pause prior to nuclear escalation. His British opposite, Admiral Louis Mountbatten, recalled President Kennedy’s remark that NATO could cut ten divisions were it not for the Berlin problem. Secretary McNamara challenged the British claim that
improving conventional capability would make the nuclear deterrent less credible. Defense Minister Peter Thorneycroft countered that none of the European allies believed that a conventional conflict could last more than a week. The USSR, he added, had taken American doctrine to an extreme and equipped itself with all the options. McNamara and Taylor disputed British claims that the enemy could employ 91 divisions during the first ten days of combat and 50 more by D+30; their estimate was 60 divisions over thirty days. Conferees agreed to develop assumptions and parameters for an examination of tactical nuclear weapons, try to reconcile assessments of enemy strength, and study (1) reducing standards for logistical support from 90 to 30 days and (2) eliminating requirements for MRBMS and reserve divisions. ¹⁸

Staff studies failed to narrow the US-UK gap. The British held that MRBMs would be redundant, that 30-day levels were sufficient, and that reserves need only bring M-Day forces to full strength and furnish a few extra units during periods of tension. The JCS claimed that adding 600 MRBMs by 1968 would “significantly” improve Allied Command Europe’s counterforce capability, that 90 days of supply were the minimum needed for sustained operations, and that eliminating reserves would cut from 45 ¹⁄₃ to 31 the number of divisions available in Central Europe by M+30. By their calculations, 56 divisions were required. With only 31 divisions, Allied Command Europe would have to employ nuclear weapons immediately.¹⁹

Late in April 1963, President Kennedy asked the Defense Department to compare the relative preparedness of American and allied forces and report what conclusions ought to be drawn. OSD drafted a reply stating that US Seventh Army was the only ground force with fully-equipped divisions and satisfactory non-divisional support. Seventh Army had supplies for 90 to 120 days of combat, but allied forces were sustainable for only 15 to 30 days. None of the NATO air forces could fight beyond 20 to 30 days; poor basing and deployment rendered aircraft so vulnerable that logistical improvements alone would do little good. Under these conditions, Seventh Army would find itself “engulfed and encircled” due to the lack of sustained air support and the inability of flank forces to hold their positions. Therefore, the administration should either urge allies to improve their posture or “reduce and redesign Seventh Army so that it, too, need only fight 15–30 days at the most.”²⁰

To General Taylor, cutting Seventh Army’s support down to allied levels “suggests that the United States should abandon virtue because it is forced to live among sinners.” In that eventuality, NATO would have to be ready rapidly to resort to tactical nuclear weapons. Escalation would not be advantageous, however, unless NATO’s superiority at the tactical nuclear level was clearly evident—and Taylor did not think that it was. Even if the phase of conventional combat was shortened, he reasoned, stocks should not be decreased because the destruction of stores during a tactical nuclear exchange would be very great. In fact, Taylor argued, the cost of dispersing aircraft and depots would be considerably higher than the cost of enabling forces to carry out existing plans. Taylor opposed any troop withdrawals, largely
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because of the political damage that would be done. NATO, after all, was not merely a military alliance: “It would be a serious mistake to sacrifice the political assets of NATO in frustration over its slow military movement.”

Taylor prepared, and the JCS approved, a revised report to the President. Their paper omitted OSD’s stark alternatives, observing instead that “there is little sign that the Soviets consider the forces facing them weak or inadequate to the point of inviting attempts at aggression.” The “security equilibrium” that existed in Europe should not be jeopardized. The best course, therefore, would keep US combat and support forces at their current levels and urge the allies to act comparably.

On 3 June, Secretary McNamara advised the President that continued allied failure to increase conventional strength must result in a realignment of US forces. But nothing should be done during the balance of 1963. Rather, the coming months should be spent persuading allies to follow the American example. If they did not do so, then “we should promptly investigate alternative force structures and strategies.” McNamara told Taylor that his advice to Kennedy was “virtually the one you transmitted to me” and “served to improve greatly the original draft.”

Concurrently, the North Atlantic Council inaugurated an exercise wherein the major NATO commanders would formulate tentative force goals for 1970. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric asked the JCS to propose adjustments in goals and standards. Their reply, dated 3 September, cited two factors of particular importance. First, the allies’ inability to fulfill force objectives had been “the practice rather than the exception.” Experience indicated that any lowering of standards would induce the allies to lower their own aims even more. Second was the conflict between NATO and national interests. Each nation “would welcome relief in one or more areas.” The United States might wish to reduce its balance-of-payments deficit by pulling troops out of Europe. Such a step, however, would “markedly degrade NATO’s military posture” and “establish a precedent which other nations could adopt on an increased scale.”

Some allies did not wait for a precedent. London reduced the British Army of the Rhine from seven brigades to six. The Belgians brought home four battalions from West Germany, claiming that this step would renew public contact with and support for the military. France announced that, effective 1 January 1964, one aircraft carrier and 18 destroyers would be removed from NATO command.

The United States also altered its NATO assignments. The annual US military expenditures abroad totaled $2.75 billion and contributed heavily to the aggravating balance-of-payments deficit. President Kennedy asked Secretary McNamara to propose ways of cutting $300 to $400 million from overseas expenditures by December 1964. The Secretary proposed steps that included bringing back 23 B–47s and 32 C–130s, consolidating four air bases, and reducing Army stocks and facilities. Reluctantly, the JCS concurred, reasoning that the impact could be offset by using joint depots in France, preserving a capability for quick expansion, retaining appropriate base rights, and ensuring that adequate sea and airlift were readily available.
available. Above all, the United States “must perfect and demonstrate the capability to deploy forces rapidly throughout the world.” McNamara sent his recommendations to the White House with JCS caveats attached; Kennedy approved them on 16 July.26

The Chief Executive wanted to cut overseas defense spending by another $300 million in FY 1965 and an additional $450 million in FY 1966. So, in September 1963, McNamara proposed much larger redeployments. First, return 40 B–47s from the United Kingdom and 40 from Spain, leaving none in Europe. Second, bring home one fighter squadron from France, four from West Germany, and seven from the United Kingdom. Third, reduce Army logistical support forces by 30,000. This time, the JCS strongly objected. Already, in their judgment, the Defense Department had done as much as possible. B–47s should remain because, in some instances, they were the only quick-reaction weapon systems scheduled to strike key nuclear targets. Secretary McNamara justified slashing tactical aircraft from 790 to 354 by claiming that modernization plus periodic movements from CONUS back to European bases would minimize the effect of withdrawals. The JCS supported only redeployments from Britain, keeping 582 aircraft in Western Europe. Otherwise, SACEUR would find himself in “an untenable position” if hostilities began before squadrons could fly back from CONUS. Likewise, stripping 30,000 support personnel would leave Seventh Army with “no sustained combat capability.” Withdrawing one division, while “not recommended,” would be “less unfavorable.” The State Department was also alarmed and supported nothing more than bringing back the B–47s. A massive removal of air power, State warned, might be misinterpreted as the beginning of a major disengagement. Withdrawing support troops might be seen as a shift toward primary reliance upon nuclear weapons. Instead of being completely combat-ready, US forces would need two weeks of strategic warning to correct their deficiencies.27

At a Cabinet meeting on 24 October, President Kennedy ruled that: six US division-equivalents would stay in Germany as long as they were needed; as previously decided, three C–130 squadrons and 5,400 Army support personnel would return from France; DOD should prepare a plan for withdrawing 30,000 more line-of-communication troops over the next two years. B–47s based in Spain and the United Kingdom would come home by spring 1965, a step opposed by the JCS but strongly endorsed by McNamara and Gilpatric. “Roundout” units deployed during the Berlin confrontation—three artillery battalions, two armor battalions, and one armored cavalry regiment—would return to the United States. Finally, Kennedy approved “in principle” the removal, by June 1966, of three squadrons from France and seven from the United Kingdom; Defense and State were to prepare an implementation plan.28

A week later, the President reversed one of these rulings. On 31 October, Kennedy publicly stated that “we intend to keep our combat forces in Germany as they are today.” Specifically, the roundout units would stay “as long as there is a need for them.” Probably, the President was trying to calm the unease aroused by
Exercise Big Lift, in which the 2nd Armored Division was airlifted from Fort Hood, Texas, over to Germany and back again.\textsuperscript{29}

In April 1964, President Johnson decided that those roundout units would come home. Spokesmen stressed that US forces in Germany still would number several thousand more than the 231,000 who had been there in early 1961. Nonetheless, hopes for creating a greater conventional capability in Central Europe had been seriously compromised. The Air Force presented a plan for dual-basing ten squadrons, which meant shifting them permanently to CONUS but periodically flying them back to Europe. The JCS warned that this would incur “substantial risks.” In August, Secretary Rusk advised that the political situation in Western Europe precluded any discussion of dual-basing. Accordingly, action was postponed.\textsuperscript{30} The impetus for expansion was spent; debate now focused on the scope of withdrawals.

**Where to Build a Firebreak**

The administration wanted to replace NATO’s strategic concept, MC 14/2, but Europeans saw no reason why the threat of rapid nuclear escalation would not continue to be an effective deterrent. General Taylor sought common ground with the Germans. When he and Secretary McNamara spoke with their German opposites, on 31 July 1963, Taylor claimed that the only difference might concern the amount of conventional combat considered necessary before an attack was identified as “serious.” Three days later, at Stuttgart, Taylor and McNamara conferred with US commanders. They all agreed that, without tactical nuclear weapons, available conventional forces could not enforce a pause long enough to allow meaningful negotiations.\textsuperscript{31}

Upon returning to Washington, General Taylor tried his hand at prescribing “a concept of defense which will enlist the support of the principal Allies and offer a reasonable chance of success.” Clearly, Europeans would not create enough conventional forces to permit a prolonged non-nuclear defense. The French would remain obstructionist and the British probably would reduce their forces further. Therefore, he concluded, the defense of Western Europe would depend primarily upon American and German efforts. “To assure German support, we must stop talking ‘pause’ and casting doubt [on] our willingness to use nuclear weapons as needed to prevent loss of territory. . . . If the presently planned NATO forces were highly trained, properly deployed, and plentifully equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, they would have the capability of offsetting the superior numbers of the Communist Bloc by forcing the Soviets to approach in widely separated formations, unable to mass their forces.”\textsuperscript{32}

A visit by Chancellor Ludwig Erhard was approaching. The State Department saw merit in President Kennedy’s directive of April 1961, but Rusk expected Erhard to advocate a strategy requiring the early use of nuclear weapons. “Obviously,”
Rusk informed McNamara, “such a strategy would not accord with the US view.” Rusk’s letter caused concern at State-Defense working levels, and General Taylor so informed the White House. On 21 November, the day that Kennedy departed for Dallas, McGeorge Bundy issued an “interim correcting document.” The President wanted to avoid debating strategic concepts with Erhard, because he would review the issue prior to the North Atlantic Council meeting in December. Bundy implied, though, that changes were in the offing: “I think it would be a mistake for officers of the United States Government to assume that a paper of April 1961 is Holy Writ.”

President Johnson, of course, had no time for a review. Consequently, US representatives at the Paris meeting offered no initiatives. What the Council confronted was MC 100/1, a draft entitled “Appreciation of the Military Situation As It Affects NATO Up To 1970.” Perhaps trying to satisfy all parties, MC 100/1 spoke of maintaining credible capabilities at the conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic nuclear levels. Meantime, the JCS had written and McNamara endorsed a parallel paper, “Military Strategy for NATO,” which is summarized below:

**General:** NATO’s deterrent should comprise the following elements: superior tactical and strategic nuclear capability; ready conventional forces able to defend near the border, identify the nature of any aggression, and oppose penetrations into Western Europe before and after a nuclear exchange; and a manifest determination to defend Western Europe for as long a time and with whatever weapons proved necessary.

**Limited Aggression:** NATO should respond “immediately and aggressively” with conventional forces, augmented if necessary by tactical nuclear weapons, to compel the abandonment of aggression without escalation into all-out war. Allied Command Europe must be able to conduct “precise, controlled, discriminatory nuclear operations” against military targets.

**Major Aggression:** The alliance’s objectives should be: to conduct a nuclear offensive necessary to destroy the enemy’s will power and ability to wage war; to stop enemy ground forces as near the border as possible; to minimize the effects of a nuclear attack; and to maintain the “residual power relationship” necessary to survive and pursue postwar objectives.

Believing that this paper possessed “greater utility” than MC 100/1, McNamara solicited Rusk’s comments or concurrence “so that we may seek Presidential approval at an early date.”

Secretary Rusk lodged several objections. First, it focused on deliberate aggression, which he considered the least likely case. More probable in his opinion were unintended conflicts arising from trouble over Berlin, disorders in East Germany, problems along NATO’s southern flank, or sheer miscalculation. Second, it treated the employment of tactical nuclear weapons too ambiguously. These weapons, he wrote, should be used only if substantial nuclear forces faced destruction, access to West Berlin could not be restored, or lost territory could not be recovered promptly. Third, it neglected the necessity for exercising political direction before hostilities opened, so that military and political efforts could be properly coordinated, and after
the battle began “so that the application of force can be efficiently controlled and directed toward accomplishment of political objectives.” In February 1964, Rusk sent McNamara a counter-draft articulating State’s views.

McNamara asked for a JCS assessment. The Director of the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General David Burchinal, USAF, advised General Taylor that State Department officers were “entrenched in strategic doctrine which they developed in 1961, particularly where it supports the development and employment of a large conventional force.” Rusk seemed unaware that the use of tactical nuclear weapons had been examined extensively during the past year and unwilling to admit that conventional force increases by the allies were unobtainable. In the Director’s judgment, interdepartmental differences went too deep to allow a meaningful compromise. Perhaps, instead, State should redirect its energies toward drafting a new political directive for NATO.

On 28 April, the Joint Chiefs told Secretary McNamara that State’s draft addressed overall policies rather than military strategy alone, and might more appropriately be considered in connection with a new political directive. They then rebutted specific points. State had engaged in an “unjustified disparagement” of tactical nuclear weapons. Their categories of “limited” and “major” did not cover the entire range of contingencies. While detailed political control was desirable, it could be carried to excess; control of individual weapons, for example, could be “impractical and dangerous.” The Chiefs suggested that State and Defense review the 1961 directive, as a prelude to developing new guidance.

In June McNamara advised Rusk that, since State and Defense agreed on major aspects of NATO strategy, trying to reconcile residual differences could well prove counter-productive. The fact that US representatives were using MC 100/1 for guidance struck him as sufficient. Rusk agreed to defer a debate but remarked that MC 100/1 was “so broad in language as to lend itself to widely divergent interpretations.” Why not, then, consult over specific issues when required? McNamara agreed.

The next dispute, though, took place within the Pentagon. On 1 October, Secretary McNamara asked the Chiefs to appraise a paper on the relationship between NATO strategy and tactical nuclear weapons. In it, he rejected the idea that a firebreak against escalation could be built at the tactical nuclear level. Since both sides possessed soft and concentrated tactical nuclear forces, the one that struck first would win an enormous advantage. “Like the gambler, the losing side in a nuclear war may find irresistible the temptation to recoup the losses by firing a few more or larger weapons.” McNamara did not see how such a process could stop short of theater-wide and possibly general nuclear war nor did he see how US strategic nuclear superiority could be exerted to any meaningful political end. Similarly, he professed difficulty in understanding what constituted tactical nuclear superiority and how such an advantage could be used to control escalation. Moreover, he was “persuaded that—whatever their declaratory policies—our European allies would not agree to having even a very constrained nuclear
war fought over their territory.” McNamara believed “a major non-nuclear option” to be not only feasible but also eminently desirable, because it would present a substantially smaller risk of escalation. “A well-defined firebreak exists between non-nuclear and nuclear war. It is widely recognized, and it has been observed for nearly twenty years.” He concluded, in fact, that “having a major non-nuclear capability, free for use as such, is the only satisfactory basis on which to rest the defense of Western Europe.”38 Thus McNamara sided with Rusk in wanting to build a firebreak at the conventional level of conflict. The split over strategy was civilian versus military, not State versus Defense.

The Joint Chiefs readily agreed that SACEUR’s conventional posture should be improved. They objected, though, to Secretary McNamara’s thesis that strictly separating conventional from tactical nuclear forces would preserve the firebreak and thus inhibit escalation. Instead, such a separation might delay the employment of tactical nuclear weapons until either the enemy had occupied considerable allied territory or opposing forces had become so intermingled that no “discriminate” targets could be found. Moreover, most tactical nuclear delivery systems were dual-capable, being equally usable in conventional conflict. A decision to commit or withhold them “properly should be determined by the mission of the command, the commander’s estimate at the time, and the technical and tactical characteristics of the delivery systems rather than by the existence of the dual capability.” Finally, the Chiefs observed that our ability to employ any option, whether conventional or nuclear, would in itself constitute a strong incentive for the enemy to avoid initiating or escalating a conflict.39

In preparation for the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council, OSD drafted an address that stressed two “intermediate options.” First, a powerful conventional capability; second, enough tactical nuclear weapons to conduct a demonstration or block an enemy advance. But the Joint Staff wanted to avoid a Council debate over strategy because (1) the French had warned that they would feel compelled to challenge American arguments and (2) the US government did not have an agreed position. The Joint Staff also criticized OSD’s draft because it cited the JCS endorsement of a major non-nuclear option but omitted the JCS argument that tactical nuclear strength would endow the conventional deterrent with added flexibility and credibility.40 OSD did not accept any of these criticisms.

Addressing the NATO Ministers on 16 December, McNamara echoed Rusk in saying that the most probable causes of conflict were unpremeditated military collisions arising from political confrontations. He advocated study of, and not actual preparation for, conflict at the tactical nuclear level because “I must state my lack of confidence that [employment of these weapons] will necessarily make the enemy back down or that a general nuclear war could be avoided.” He repeated all the caveats in his October paper: “In sum . . . I believe the battlefield nuclear option...should not be regarded as a substitute for the major non-nuclear
option. Rather, it should be regarded as an insurance policy against the failure of that option.”

There was no allied consensus about a strategy. The British held that, since war in Europe was extremely improbable, existing defenses would continue to deter the Soviets. The Germans favored building a firebreak “between battlefield and tactical/strategic weapons,” not between conventional and tactical nuclear weapons as Secretary McNamara wished. The complication was that Germans wanted “battlefield” nuclear weapons put into the hands of front-line troops, their own included. Afterward, General Wheeler cautioned Service Chiefs that optimistic press reports did not reflect realities.

A Flawed Strategy?

The administration’s effort to create a credible conventional defense was based upon an assumption that NATO would take the initiative in deciding when and whether to use nuclear weapons. From what we now know, that assumption almost certainly was wrong. Around 1960, the Soviets adopted a doctrine of “all-out nuclear war,” restructuring the Warsaw Pact and its plans accordingly. The Soviet General Staff concluded that the first strikes and the first operations would be decisive. Command post exercise “Buria,” conducted in the fall of 1961, contemplated nuclear strikes and deep armored penetrations. With an attack speed averaging 100 kilometers per day, tanks would cross the Rhine by the fifth day of fighting. Exercises carried out in the following years made it clear that use of nuclear weapons was expected no later than the third day of combat. The Czechoslovak war plan of 1964 specified using 131 nuclear missiles and bombs in the first strike. By the seventh or eighth day of operations, attacking troops were supposed to take control of the areas of Langres, Besancon, and Epinal, well inside France. While senior US civilians contemplated enforcing a pause and thereby creating favorable conditions for negotiations, Soviet planners evidently saw their objective as smashing the enemy. It would seem, therefore, that JCS views about the utility of tactical nuclear weapons were better attuned to operational realities than those of Secretaries McNamara and Rusk.
Paring the Military Assistance Program

FY 1962: An Uncertain Start

The Kennedy administration inherited a military assistance program that, during the later 1950s, had started shrinking in size because the nations of Western Europe no longer needed very much grant aid.¹ For FY 1961, Congress appropriated $1.8 billion worldwide. For FY 1962, the Defense Department wanted $2.4 billion in new obligational authority; President Eisenhower reduced that request to $1.8 billion.

Since 1955, the Secretary of Defense had delegated broad powers for executing the military assistance program (MAP) to his Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs). The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services provided advice and recommendations.² On 25 February 1961, Deputy Assistant Secretary William Bundy urged Secretaries Rusk and McNamara to support the original $2.4 billion program. In justification, he cited preliminary conclusions from ongoing strategic studies. First, limited war and counter-insurgency activities ought to be awarded higher priorities. Second, prosperous allies should be pressured to assume a greater share of the mutual security burden. Third, and most important, underdeveloped countries probably would stay out of the communist orbit only if they achieved self-sustaining growth. Under these conditions, the military role of richer nations might expand and that of poorer allies contract. Countries with sizeable military establishments (e.g., Greece, Turkey, South Korea, and Taiwan) should turn toward “compact” force structures, so that their economic development would not suffer. After all, the “top priority objective” for underdeveloped countries was creating societies strong enough
to resist communist subversion. Bundy envisaged the United States acting as the free world’s arsenal by substantially expanding its export of military equipment and services. Speaking for the JCS, General Lemnitzer endorsed a $2.4 billion program but reserved judgment on Bundy’s supporting rationale, pending further JCS review. McNamara and Rusk agreed that their departments would review the underlying premises for MAP.3

On 22 March 1961, President Kennedy asked Congress for only $1.6 billion in FY 1962, stating that “military assistance will in the future more heavily emphasize the internal security, civil works and economic growth of the nations thus aided.” The President acknowledged, however, that this amount might not meet minimum needs and that new crises and conflicts could compel a more costly effort. The program would provide $428 million for selected force improvements, $1.072 billion for maintenance, training, construction, and overhead, and $100 million for contingencies. The JCS informed Secretary McNamara that, even though it left “many voids” and allowed only minor modernization, this amount was defensible before Congress. Since MAP objectives were being reappraised, they recommended a review before the appropriations bill was passed. Conditions might require supplemental funding and/or changes to country programs.4

OSD conducted its own reassessment without consulting the Joint Staff, the Services, or the unified commands. McNamara proposed adding $532.2 million. After exchanges between Secretary McNamara and Acting Secretary of State Chester Bowles, that figure was cut to $392 million and sent to the White House. Kennedy chose to add only $285 million, entirely for force improvement items. The President informed Congress that a crisis on Southeast Asia, a communist threat in Latin America, and increased arms trafficking across Africa justified the increase to $1.885 billion. His message fell on some deaf ears. Representative Otto Passman (D, LA), chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, was a powerful and vehement critic of MAP. Ultimately, the House and Senate appropriated only $1.6 billion.5

The FY 1963 Program: Changes in Concept

The reappraisal of MAP’s underlying premises, agreed upon by McNamara and Rusk, began during the summer of 1961. An interdepartmental steering group studied programs in six “forward countries” around the Sino-soviet periphery. These were Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan. ISA asked the Joint Chiefs whether smaller indigenous forces, and by implication smaller military assistance programs, could achieve the same objectives. The JCS replied that, in any of the six, the absence of forces strong enough to oppose external attack could lead to either a fait accompli or “an extremely difficult tactical situation.” However, if indigenous forces could contain or at least delay local aggression, the United States would
have enough time “to employ her forces to best advantage.” So they recommended against MAP reductions “either at present or in the foreseeable future.”

Most of the steering group’s members saw matters differently. In December 1961, a majority reported that the military danger facing the six forward nations was “a less serious long-term threat to those underdeveloped countries than the failure of their governments to meet . . . the expectations of their citizens for improved standards of living, education opportunities, and national development.” Consequently, “the main thrust of US aid in the next decade should be directed toward repelling the more likely Soviet threat of indirect aggression by furthering economic development and nation-building.” This meant slowly shifting aid from military to economic programs, stretching out force modernization, and withholding sophisticated materiel from backward nations. The group’s chairman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Jeffrey Kitchen, endorsed these conclusions completely. So did representatives from the White House, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Agency for International Development. The OSD representative, William Bundy, expressed reservations about reducing aid to South Korea while the JCS representative, Rear Admiral Harry Smith, opposed any cuts “at present or in the foreseeable future.”

In fact, the group’s recommendations won no support in the Pentagon. Secretary McNamara disagreed with many points; Assistant Secretary Nitze called the conclusions “arrant nonsense.” The JCS challenged the group’s assumption that a diminished threat of overt aggression justified a reduction in military aid. Rather, improvements in internal security, political stability, and economic development could occur only under the umbrella of military security. It was the existence of strong indigenous forces, they maintained, that had diverted communist efforts from overt to indirect attack. Reducing that array “will serve merely to cause a commensurate rise in Bloc aggressiveness on the military front.” Also, cutting MAP would run counter to the new emphasis on conventional capabilities. Finally, they warned that reductions could upset a recipient’s economy. In South Korea, where unemployment already was a problem, reducing the armed forces from 600,000 to 350,000, as the group proposed, could have drastic consequences.

On 18 January 1962, after an NSC discussion, President Kennedy called for another review, bearing in mind that “while we would like to have enough aid to accomplish all of our military and economic aid objectives, we are likely . . . only to get enough to accomplish a portion of them.” He told the JCS to reconsider their position, “recognizing that decreases in military aid would be compensated by increases in economic aid.” But the JCS did not come to the conclusion that Kennedy obviously desired. Experiences with Congressional budget-cutting led them to dismiss as “tenuous” any premise that MAP reductions would be offset by AID additions. A genuine tradeoff would occur “only when the increased economic aid is applied in direct support of Armed Forces Programs. The Steering Group proposals, however, do not indicate that any portion of the increased economic aid would be applied in this manner.” Usually, economic aid was planned
for individual countries and could be altered without affecting neighboring nations. Military Assistance Programs, on the other hand, were prepared from a wider perspective; changes would have far-reaching ramifications. For these reasons, the JCS reaffirmed their position.9

Nonetheless, the administration did shift emphasis to economic aid at MAP’s expense.10 Late in 1961, Secretary McNamara tentatively set the FY 1962 MAP request at $1.7 billion. The JCS cautioned that even the $1.885 billion originally sought for FY 1962 contained substantial shortfalls. If deliveries were to continue at an annual rate of $2.4 billion, new obligational authority of $2.2 billion would be necessary.11 When the President held his budget wrap-up with the Chiefs on 3 January 1962, General Lemnitzer noted that the FY 1963 program had been shaved again, down to $1.5 billion. At Kennedy’s suggestion, General Taylor telephoned Budget Director David Bell, who said he had personally reviewed MAP funding and concluded that the latest cuts would not compel any reductions in planned programs. That satisfied the President, who determined to ask Congress for $1.5 billion. Recoupments and reappropriations would raise the total to $1.7 billion, with the lion’s share going to the Far East ($831 million), the Near East and South Asia ($423 million), and Europe ($321 million). Congress, however, reduced MAP to $1.325 billion.12

The travail of MAP did not end there. Mounting troubles in Southeast Asia drove expenditures above programmed levels. Late in August 1962, OSD proposed to offset these by major reductions for Greece, Turkey, South Korea, and Taiwan as well as smaller ones for Pakistan and the Philippines. The JCS protested that unified commanders had requested $381.3 million for force improvements in those six countries; OSD would allow only $187.5 million. That level of assistance, if maintained over an extended time period, would leave those countries unable to meet the anticipated threat. The Chiefs complained, also, that a major reason for MAP shortfalls was the continuing trend to fund the Agency for International Development’s programs with MAP dollars. Additionally, recurring year-end transfers to AID—$15 million in FY 1961, $23 million in FY 1962—subjected MAP to “a double cutting edge.”13

In mid-September 1962, OSD proposed still more cutbacks. After reviewing them, the Joint Chiefs advised McNamara that “the present reality and future probability of insufficient MAP appropriations” created “a vital need” to reassess and restate the program’s objectives. Specifically, reductions should be borne by more than the seven countries identified by OSD: Greece; Turkey; Iran; Pakistan; the Philippines; Taiwan; and South Korea. Perhaps programs for some neutral countries like Indonesia, Burma, and Cambodia could be cut, and NATO nations (Greece, Turkey, and Portugal excepted) also could absorb reductions.14

OSD circulated its final adjustments on 20 October. The major trims were imposed upon Taiwan, down from $169.8 to $94.5 million, and South Korea, down from $254.2 to $201.3 million. Aid for embattled South Vietnam rose from $158.4 to $176.7 million. Three days later, Congress completed an FY 1963 appropriation of $1.325 billion.15
The FY 1964 Program: Cut More, and Sooner

In revising the FY 1962 program and preparing the one for FY 1963, the administration had taken shortcuts around established procedures. But FY 1964 proposals were put together by regular methods. First, State and Defense drafted a Basic Planning Document (BPD) outlining general objectives and dollar guidelines. Within the Defense Department, this task fell to the Director of Military Assistance, General Williston Palmer, USA, who worked in ISA. Next, the JCS circulated Annex J of their Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, listing missions and force objectives for actual or potential allies. The BPD and Annex J were sent to unified commanders, who used them in preparing country plans. After reviewing commanders’ recommendations, the JCS would advise whether the BPD conformed to their strategic guidance.

In December 1961, General Palmer circulated the BPD for FYs 1964–1968. He assumed that the administration would seek $1.7 billion annually in new obligational authority and that program and delivery requirements averaging $1.9 billion could be adequately funded. The Joint Chiefs judged that, with relatively minor exceptions, the BPD adhered to their recommendations. Secretary McNamara, however, found that greater efficiency could make MAP more effective in almost every case he investigated. He was particularly concerned about the fact that MAP’s undelivered balances approximated almost two years of normal deliveries. Accordingly, he ordered that the current balance of $2.9 billion be cut at least to $1.9 billion by mid-1963. This was easier said than done; the unexpended balance in mid-1963 stood at $2.421 billion.16

General Robert J. Wood, USA, who succeeded Palmer as Director of Military Assistance, recommended $1.7 billion in new obligational authority for FY 1964. The JCS supported him, being particularly pleased to see compensating additions planned for the seven countries that had borne the brunt of FY 1963 reductions. Expecting that even more money would be needed for South Vietnam, Thailand, India, and Latin America, they again suggested taking funds from neutral Cambodia, Burma, and Indonesia.17

A presidential advisory committee headed by General Lucius Clay, USA (Ret.), handed ammunition to Congressional budget-trimmers. In March 1963, Clay’s committee recommended that MAP be reduced to $1 billion “in a few years.” General Wood devised a plan for paring the program back to $1.16 billion by FY 1969. Recognizing what they called “fiscal realities of the present day,” the JCS endorsed Wood’s guidelines. They attached several caveats, the main one being that South Vietnam would require considerably more money in FY 1964, perhaps less in later years if things went well.18

Secretary McNamara asked Congress for $1.405 billion during FY 1964. By September 1963, however, the “fiscal realities” on Capitol Hill were such that General Wood prepared and the Secretary approved a revised program of $1.05 billion. In December, Congress appropriated only $1.0 billion; a $50 million transfer to MAP from the Agency for International Development offset that last reduction. The final
allocations, endorsed by the JCS, followed a familiar pattern. The original request for Greece was cut by $34 million, down to $69.5 million; for Turkey by $41 million, down to $142 million; for Taiwan by $52 million, down to $82 million; and for South Korea by $58 million, down to $147 million. So Greece was denied 54 self-propelled howitzers, Turkey an initial increment of medium tanks, South Korea the delivery of 1,300 jeeps and trucks as well as ten F–5 jet aircraft. Again, South Vietnam was given a $60 million increase, providing more aircraft, helicopters, carbines, and rifles.19

MAP was another area in which OSD had made planning and programming much more centralized, imposing tight deadlines for preparation and review. Consequently, a good many matters no longer were being reviewed by the Joint Chiefs. In March 1963, following a discussion between Generals Taylor and Wood, an ad hoc group drawn from ISA and the Joint Staff studied how the JCS organization might play a larger role. It made four recommendations. First, OSD should coordinate with the JCS all policy, planning, and programming matters having either strategic or operational implications. Second, OSD should put into each Program Change Proposal the detailed information needed to facilitate a JCS review. Third, regular and frequent ISA-Joint Staff-Service meetings should be held. Fourth, the Joint Chiefs should improve Annex J of their Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. This Annex supplied the Services and field commanders with basic guidelines about the “reasonably attainable” forces deemed necessary to support JSOP strategy. In ISA's judgment, past statements about missions and tasks lacked enough detail to establish the parameters for equipping and operating allied forces. Also, some objectives far exceeded those that seemed “reasonably attainable,” JSOP goals for Greek and Turkish forces being prime examples. Accordingly, the group proposed (1) requiring field commanders to submit more detailed mission statements about local forces, (2) providing in Annex J more definitive guidance as regards the “reasonably attainable” feature of recommended forces, and (3) advancing Annex J’s circulation date to synchronize it with the MAP cycle. By September, the JCS had approved and ISA endorsed all these changes.20 Yet MAP had contracted so far, and become so much a hostage to Congressional attitudes, that they had little practical significance.

The FY 1965–1966 Programs: Leveling Off

In mid-November 1963, State, Defense, and AID prepared a preliminary estimate of $1.2 billion for FY 1965. William Bundy urged Secretary McNamara, instead, to support $1.389 billion in new obligational authority. The FY 1964 cut could be cushioned by increasing deliveries of items due from past years’ programs, reducing unexpended balances from $2.4 billion in mid-1963 to $1.7 billion by mid-1964. But since this “delivery cushion” would be considerably smaller in FY 1965, Bundy foresaw a danger of severe psychological reactions among key recipients. He also
urged that the FY 1965 proposal contain some “cut insurance,” since Congress would eliminate $100 million and perhaps more.21

Early in December President Johnson consulted Senator Richard Russell (D, GA), the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who said that $1.2 billion was the most Congress would approve. In fact, there was no assurance the administration could “obtain anything close to that amount.” Accordingly, the President requested $1 billion (with recoupments and reappropriations, $1.160 billion). To strengthen the rationale, ISA replaced strictly regional groupings with fresh categories. These were: “forward defense,” covering eleven countries along the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, $745 million; “Alliance for Progress” countries in Latin America, $66.2 million; “military base rights” applicable to Spain, Libya, and Portugal, $24.4 million; “grant aid phase out” in Denmark, Norway, and Japan, $54 million; “free world orientation” for seven countries, $15.2 million; and “US force support and MAP administration,” $256.2 million.22

Testifying before Congress in April 1964, Secretary McNamara pleaded his case in the strongest terms: “Anything less than $1 billion a year . . . will inevitably require a reassessment of our entire policy of depending on indigenous forces in preparing our own contingency war plans and, accordingly, of the size and character of our own military forces.” General Taylor followed with similar language. Representative Passman’s influence was diminished by the death of his ally Representative Clarence Cannon, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. The new Chairman, Representative George Mahon of Texas, aligned with the new President. Congress appropriated $1.055 billion for FY 1965, giving the administration an extra $55 million it sought for South Vietnam.23

But even as the threat from Capitol Hill eased, others appeared. In October 1964, William Bundy warned McNamara that there would be a $123 million short-fall, largely due to increases for Southeast Asia and fall-offs in recoupments and reappropriations. Bundy proposed, and McNamara agreed, that offsetting reductions should fall principally upon the “forward defense” countries. The JCS protested that such cuts could have “serious political repercussions.” If some program had to be reduced, why not the one for neutral India? They observed, too, that MAP could not respond to a major crisis in one part of the world without badly hurting programs in other parts. The Chiefs recommended seeking a supplemental appropriation, perhaps in the form of funding for “open hostilities” as in South Vietnam and Laos.24

Meanwhile, in February 1964, General Wood suggested that MAP stay at $1 billion annually through FY 1970, since that was as much as Congress would approve.25 The Joint Chiefs, in April, highlighted two aspects for special consideration. First, the “forward defense” countries should receive priority for improvement and modernization programs. The US Commander in Chief, Europe, had reported that, under projected funding levels, it was “extremely doubtful” whether Greek and Turkish forces could maintain even their currently limited capability to
perform their missions. The Commander in Chief, Pacific, advised that, while coun-
tries in his area of responsibility were reasonably well equipped at the moment, projected budget cuts would lead to slow but sure declines in their effectiveness. The US commander in Korea stated that prospective MAP funding would produce “a substantial change for the worse” in the overall effectiveness of South Korean forces. Five months later, he reported that a process of “slow starvation” had begun. The Chairman, General Wheeler, replied that no relief was in prospect. The Joint Chiefs asked yet again that allies like Greece, Turkey, and South Korea get more money and neutrals like India less. Their second point was that more MAP resources might have to be devoted to internal security. Latin America, for example, should be given enough for governments to modernize internal security forces and to obviate any need to buy arms from other nations. Secretary McNamara agreed that force improvement and modernization should receive the maximum share of MAP resources. He promised, also, to reassess the guidelines for Greece, Turkey, and India. As 1964 ended, however, ballooning demands in Southeast Asia were taking funds from practically every other program.

MAP kept shriveling because the administration emphasized economic development as a better guarantor of security and many in Congress viewed MAP as a relic from the 1950s. Thus the Joint Chiefs’ warnings had practically no effect. As the war in Southeast Asia escalated, MAP funding for Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand as well as some costs for South Korea and the Philippines were transferred to the regular Defense budget. By FY 1969, the MAP appropriation fell to $375 million. Often, sales and credits came to supplant grant aid.
During 1960–61, the concept of hemispheric security underwent a wrenching change. The Rio Treaty of 1947 addressed external threats, stating that “an armed attack by any State against an American state shall be considered as an attack against all the American states.” The Eisenhower administration’s concept, expounded in 1959, was that each Latin American state would contribute to hemispheric defense by insuring its own internal security and by defending its coastal waters, ports, bases, strategic areas, and associated lines of communication. Then Fidel Castro turned Cuba into a communist beachhead in the western hemisphere; his ambitions clearly stretched beyond one island. It was common wisdom in Washington that Latin American governments were fragile, being mostly dictatorships, and that grinding poverty spawned widespread discontent. Thus communist-inspired insurgency loomed as an imminent danger.

In February 1961, the State Department proposed a new concept in which the United States would bear “primary (though not exclusive) responsibility” for external defense, while Latin forces handled intra-hemispheric tasks. An Inter-American Police Force with a US contingent should be organized, with grant aid confined largely to those countries that contributed to it. Countries should be encouraged to undertake partial disarmament and apply the savings to economic development. Also, the United States ought to “start the process of convincing the Latin military...that their most patriotic role, their true defense role, lies in executing a concept of defense through development, with all that this entails.”

Latin America: Containment and Counter-Insurgency

Focusing on Internal Security and Civic Action

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The JCS agreed about the importance of internal security and urged efforts to have Congress remove restrictions against using grant aid for this purpose. But they detected serious flaws in several of State's ideas. The Chiefs believed that "existing rivalry and wide disparity in forms of government" made it unlikely that members could agree upon actual use of an Inter-American Police Force. They saw little likelihood that Latin countries would reduce their armed forces. Military establishments were matters of prestige; they also were essential in protecting internal security and important in preserving political stability. And was it realistic to assume that Latin America would embrace disarmament before the rest of the world did so? Even if State's proposals were adopted, savings would be "relatively insignificant." If Washington tried to coerce the Latins by curtailing military assistance, some countries simply would buy arms elsewhere. The JCS judged hemispheric defense contributions planned by the Latin governments to be "desirable and reasonably attainable."

The administration touted its "Alliance for Progress" as an important agent of social improvement. In March, President Kennedy informed Congress that "military assistance will in the future more heavily emphasize the internal security, civil works and economic growth of the nations thus aided." In May, with the assistance of Joint Staff and Service officers, ISA circulated a draft policy paper on hemispheric security that incorporated Kennedy's statement and softened some of State's more controversial proposals. According to this draft, the Western Hemisphere possessed the greatest capability to deal with the least likely threat, which was external attack, and the least capacity to cope with the most probable danger, which was insurgency. Priorities and programs should be readjusted accordingly. Specific steps should include: making Latin nations aware of the dangers posed by Castro and communism, and of the need for taking prompt multilateral action, when necessary, to eliminate those threats; considering bilateral agreements that would allow the United States to assist countries that asked for help in defeating subversion and indirect aggression; strengthening the Inter-American Defense Board and establishing an Inter-American Security Force; creating an Inter-American Defense College; seeking a modest increase in military assistance, giving first priority to internal security measures and placing new emphasis on programs that contributed to civic improvement and economic development; and encouraging regional arms control agreements.

The JCS assessed these proposals as adequate, subject to several changes. First, include a strategic appraisal of Latin America's military importance. Second, prepare guidance for possible actions to prevent communist takeovers. Third, defer establishment of an Inter-American Security Force until the concept could be tested in the Caribbean. Fourth, speak of "arms limitation" rather than "arms control"; US influence could be exerted far more effectively through the Military Assistance Program than through any regional or bilateral agreements. Fifth, note that bilateral agreements permitting US assistance against indirect aggression appeared
to be militarily undesirable. Why so? Because the United States would be obliged to keep regimes in power; there would be difficulties in determining whether opposition movements actually were communist; and the Latin countries involved in such agreements would be surrendering some of their sovereignty. In any case, the Chiefs observed, one state always had the right to assist another when so requested. Most of these recommendations were incorporated, but the paper was not forwarded to the NSC.

In October 1961, the State Department circulated a draft of “Guidelines for Policy and Operations in Latin America.” State assigned first priority in US aid to internal security programs. In dealing with external attack, the antisubmarine warfare forces of Latin nations would be assisted only if they could effectively engage high-speed submerged submarines. Latin militaries should be encouraged, among other things, (1) to accept internal security as their major mission, (2) participate in inter-American police or patrol forces, and (3) form dual-purpose units with civic action as well as military capabilities. The JCS asked for several changes: add a strategic appraisal of Latin America’s military importance; drop the idea of an inter-American security force; and make the definition of Latin ASW capabilities less demanding. ISA agreed and added several other criticisms. When the “Guidelines” were issued as administration policy, in May 1962, Defense got everything it wanted except a strategic appraisal.

Concentrating on Civic Action

President Kennedy constantly prodded the Defense Department to do more about internal security. In May 1961, he asked how effective civilian police forces were, and what might be done to bolster them. The JCS assured him that programs for strengthening internal security were adequate. Indeed, most Latin nations could not absorb all the out-of-country training that had been offered to them. The Chiefs proposed providing more in-country training along with more materiel.

In October 1961, the President inspected Army Special Forces at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He asked General Decker what more the US military, in conjunction with Latin counterparts, could do. The JCS response, forwarded to the President on 30 November, listed many possibilities. Steps to increase internal security included: easing Congressional restrictions upon using MAP for internal security; persuading the Latin military to accept an apolitical role; expanding technical military assistance; broadening and expanding indigenous capabilities for counter-insurgency, anti-subversion, and psychological warfare; and ensuring that means existed for the rapid provision of training, equipment, and materiel. Among other things, the Chiefs set out ways of establishing a “broad base of information and education for the Latin American military man.” Departing from purely military roles, they cautioned, would “result in some resentment and criticism from certain power groups in Latin America.” However, integrated policy
direction at the national level combined with close coordination of country programs would minimize that risk.9

Through NSAM No. 118, issued on 5 December 1961, the President ordered State to draft policy guidance and Defense to develop specific programs for US-Latin military collaboration. In January, the JCS sent McNamara a list of 46 projects. Two months later, Kennedy approved a brief paper from State and circulated it as NSAM No. 140. Also, at the President’s urging, Congress changed the primary purpose of MAP in Latin America from hemispheric to internal defense.10

Kennedy wanted to include civic action programs within military assistance. In February 1962, the State Department distributed a draft message stating that MAP would fund measures aimed at increasing the Latin military’s ability to undertake civic action efforts. Among these measures were: equipping and maintaining new units whose primary mission would be civic action; supporting existing units when they were performing civic action projects; and providing specialized equipment to enhance civic action capability.11

The JCS lodged reservations that showed their distaste for mingling civic and military missions. Civic action, they argued, should be undertaken not only with MAP-supported units but with a country’s own resources. Such an approach would be consistent with the principles of self-help and with the ceiling on MAP funding for Latin America, about $55 million. New units with the primary mission of civic action should be neither created nor funded under MAP. Rather, MAP-supported units should perform only such civic action tasks as were ancillary to their military mission and lay within their organic capabilities.12

Late in 1961, and again at President Kennedy’s urging, a team drawn from Defense, Caribbean Command, State, AID, FBI, and Central Intelligence travelled through South America. Its task was to appraise the communist threat, the capacity of each country to maintain internal security and effect reforms, the capabilities of US agencies to assist local governments, and the requirements for advice, assistance, and training.

The team concluded that there was still time to take corrective action, even in countries where the problems were most urgent (Colombia and Bolivia, followed by Peru and Ecuador). As a rule, indigenous forces could maintain order and suppress outbreaks of urban violence. The team wanted Latin militaries to shift away from major cities and out of their traditional political roles, but internal security should come first, civic action second. Latins could not convert their conventional units into internal security forces and, simultaneously, divert substantial resources into civic action. The team also recommended revising the entire US military program—force structures, bilateral treaties, intelligence efforts, missions, and Military Assistance Advisory Groups—in order to emphasize internal security and consolidate supervisory authority.13

The Joint Chiefs readily supported increased internal security assistance and more coordinated guidance, but they opposed revising MAP wholesale. A recent
consolidation of Service missions with MAAGs, they believed, would alleviate some of the difficulties. As to bilateral agreements, they feared that the United States might lose more in renegotiation than it would gain. Lastly, and a bit curiously, they criticized the team for failing to stress sufficiently the importance of civic action programs and military participation therein. While agreeing with these criticisms, ISA endorsed all the team's other proposals, including the one that internal security deserved a higher priority than military participation in civic action programs.14

In February 1962, President Kennedy voiced concern about the relatively modest MAP for Latin America and asked a familiar question: “Why not more?” The Chairman’s Assistant, Major General Theodore Parker, USA, suggested that since Congress seemed unlikely to increase MAP appropriations, Latins should be encouraged to employ their armed forces in civic action projects. On 14 March, a message along these lines was sent to the Commanders in Chief, Atlantic and Caribbean. It cited military information and education programs as a field for increased activity. In reply, the Commander in Chief, Caribbean (CINCARIB), noted one possibly insuperable obstacle: the recipients were illiterate conscripts to whom written materials would be incomprehensible.15

By this time, concrete projects were taking shape. In April 1962, General Lemnitzer sent OSD a Civic Action Plan for Ecuador costing about $1.5 million. Phase I involved building roads and supplying water; Phase II emphasized school construction, water supply, and public health; Phase III stressed colonization, advanced agriculture, and education. Phase I would require 41 US and 250 Ecuadoran military personnel along with 4,950 civilian volunteers. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric approved the plan, agreeing that funding would come from the MAP for FY 1962. Significantly, he assigned it a “worldwide priority over all MAP and Army claimants.”16

Concurrently, the Country Team in Bolivia urged US support for a pilot Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), similar to the New Deal program of the 1930s. Secretary Rusk endorsed the idea and recommended drawing funds from MAP. The Joint Chiefs backed the idea but asked that funding come from other sources or through an increase in MAP. Ultimately, without an increase, the Defense Department funded CCC projects in Bolivia and El Salvador.17

In September 1962, McNamara and Lemnitzer flew to the Panama Canal Zone for a conference with the CINCARIB, who was Lieutenant General Andrew P. O’Meara, USA. Also attending were Major General Victor Krulak, USMC, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, and General Robert Wood, USA, Director of Military Assistance. In his briefing, O’Meara identified the chief problem as Congress’ $57.5 million ceiling on MAP for Latin America. Also, he said, there were limits upon how far the Latin military could be prodded into civic action.18 The officer corps would dissipate neither its capacity for maintaining law and order nor its ability to exert pressure upon rulers whom it considered dangerous. Only by allocating the whole $57.5 million to internal security could all requirements be met by FY 1966. But the United States was heavily involved in Latin ASW programs; these would
have to be augmented ($12.5 million was currently planned) to receive a return on earlier investments. Suspending ASW would be risky, O’Meara argued, because the Latin navies wielded considerable political power. At the conclusion of the conference, Secretary McNamara agreed to consider about $3 million worth of civic action projects for the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, Bolivia, and Chile. Lemnitzer subsequently recommended, and the Secretary approved, projects requiring $3.417 million in DOD and $1.2 million in AID funds.19

By the autumn of 1962, action had begun on 39 of the 46 projects recommended by the JCS in January. Four hundred men from the 7th Special Forces Group were sent to Caribbean Command, where they split into thirty mobile training teams. The Air Force dispatched 1st Air Commando Group (eight planes, eighty personnel) to the Canal Zone, where it was training Honduran pilots. US Army intelligence and security advisers were serving in twelve countries. In the area of hemispheric defense, US-Latin commanders’ conferences had become annual events; the Inter-American Defense College was about to open. As for economic development, the military services in all Latin American countries were participating in civic action projects.20

Late in 1964, McGeorge Bundy tasked the Defense Department with drafting a new strategy for dealing with the Latin military. ISA proposed phasing out all grant aid, which Congress was cutting in any case. In its place would come sales and cost-sharing arrangements, supplemented when necessary by “project aid” designed to equip a specific force for a fixed period or to implement a specific program for a fixed sum. In the internal security area, ISA saw no need for a major restructuring of Latin military establishments. ISA also implied that the concept of hemispheric defense had lost validity, because assistance for ASW programs flowed primarily from the need to maintain friendly relations with the Latin nations.21

The JCS claimed that ISA’s study needed “modification.” While acknowledging the danger from “internal disorder and political instability arising out of the social upheaval now under way,” they argued that “it is communist inspiration, sponsorship, and direction of this upheaval that poses the greatest threat.” Latin military establishments were not strong enough to control any widespread insurgencies. So, contrary to what ISA hoped, regular units could not withdraw from their internal security duties until police forces became more effective. Therefore, “the shaky economies of these countries and the continuing insurgent threat will not permit any sizeable shift from grant aid to military sales in the near future.” They insisted, too, that Latin ASW forces served a real need, since no US units could be spared to protect convoys during wartime. That being so, hemispheric defense did remain a valid concept.22

In June 1965, McNamara sent Bundy a revised study that went some way toward meeting JCS objections. McNamara wanted to end grant aid by FY 1971, except for $15 to $20 million annually in training support. The State Department
agreed in principle but urged indefinite delay from fear of disrupting US influence and possibly alienating those Latin military forces upon whom the Alliance for Progress had to rely as preservers of stability. Accordingly, Secretary McNamara decided to proceed “without a rigid time frame,” concentrating upon “prudent management . . . under existing guidance rather than on the initiation of a new strategy.”

Case Studies

In January 1961, no country seemed riper for revolution than the Dominican Republic. Rafael Trujillo, a long-entrenched dictator, faced a failing economy and growing discontent. The JCS were willing to do anything—quite literally, anything—that would avert another Cuba in the Caribbean. On 26 January 1961, they advised Secretary McNamara that “the time is now at hand for the United States to initiate political, economic and, as the ultimate, direct military measures to replace Trujillo and his government with a democratic regime friendly to the United States.” Dominicans who were “capable of taking over the government and furthering US interests in the area should be actively sought out by the United States and actively assisted in their endeavor to overthrow the Trujillo Government.” If chaos threatened after Trujillo fell, the Joint Chiefs favored providing “whatever military support is required,” ranging from naval patrols that would prevent communist interference “up to military occupation of the entire country.”

On 5 May, President Kennedy told the NSC (1) that the United States should not initiate Trujillo’s ouster without knowing what would replace him and (2) that any military action against Trujillo should be multilateral in character. The US Consul General in the capital, which was then called Ciudad Trujillo, kept in contact with pro-American dissidents. On 30 May, some of these men waylaid and killed Trujillo. The next day, the Defense Department ordered seven warships and transports carrying 1,000 Marines to assemble off Ciudad Trujillo. There was worry that Trujillo’s son Ramfis, considered a playboy with a vicious streak, might take power. On 1 June, McNamara issued orders sending two carriers plus escorts and the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade to the Caribbean. Three days later, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James Russell, recommended sending the cruiser Northampton into the harbor of Ciudad Trujillo and moving the rest of the task force close enough to be within plain view. Russell also recommended telling President Joaquin Balaguer, a figurehead until now, that Washington wanted to help him move away from dictatorship and would intervene with “overwhelming forces . . . at the first sign of any Pro-Castro, Pro-Communist influences.” Shortly afterward, however, Vice President Johnson, Secretary McNamara, and Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson decided against taking such steps.

Balaguer stayed in control and slowly began making liberal reforms. In mid-November 1961, Ramfis and his family tried to regain power. The United
States moved warships within sight of the capital and stood ready to intervene on Balaguer’s behalf. Ramfis fled the country, and the difficult transition toward democracy continued.27

Brazil presented another kind of danger when, in 1961, Joao Goulart assumed the presidency. A Special National Intelligence Estimate described Goulart as a leftist with a “long record of collaboration with the Communists.” Early in 1962, CINCARIB warned McNamara that communists occupied key positions in the Brazilian army and government, and that the country might go communist in three years. The culmination came in March 1964 when, according to the US ambassador, Goulart embarked upon a campaign to seize dictatorial power and accepted the Communist Party’s active collaboration. The administration initiated steps to ensure that Brazilian troops in Sao Paulo would have enough fuel to move to Rio de Janeiro. Tankers as well as a naval task force began steaming on 31 March, but events outpaced them. General Humberto Castello Branco directed a military coup and, on 2 April, Goulart fled to Uruguay. Castello Branco, who was conservative and pro-US, assumed the presidency.28

The Special Group (Counter-Insurgency), the State Department, and ISA favored an expression of support for the new anti-communist regime. ISA recommended raising MAP from $9.8 to $12.5 million; the US ambassador proposed $20 million. The Joint Chiefs, on 22 October, criticized ISA’s figure as too small to demonstrate support and likely to offend Brazilian sensibilities. Since Congress had set a ceiling on material aid for Latin America, there would have to be compensating cuts in other country programs—a process that would disrupt orderly planning, deprive countries of critical assets, and shake confidence in US reliability. Therefore, they urged “an early and strong effort” to either remove the ceiling or raise it to $75 million. Once that was done, a $20 million Brazilian program could be approved “for planning purposes.” Credit assistance and cost-sharing proposals also should be prepared. Since Congress was unwilling to raise the ceiling, the administration approved $11.8 million in grant aid and considered credit sales of $8 to $10 million.29

Cuba: Threat and Target

The end of the missile crisis did not mean that Cuba no longer ranked among the administration’s top concerns. On 8 January 1963, President Kennedy created an Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba, chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sterling Cottrell. General Wheeler acted as JCS representative on the Committee; Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance became McNamara’s agent on all Cuban matters. Cottrell circulated a draft that described Castro’s overthrow as the “ultimate objective” but sketched less ambitious “immediate objectives” that included isolating Cuba, promoting internal dissension, and
frustrating Castro’s subversive activities. The JCS found this acceptable as “broad guidance.” Appraising specifics, however, Vance argued that Cottrell’s draft did not make clear whether the administration intended “actively and boldly” to pursue the ultimate objective or whether it would adopt “a substantially less active policy.” If the former, the draft should say that the United States would “apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological, and military pressures until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.” If the latter, it should speak simply of being “prepared, as appropriate opportunities present themselves,” to do these things. Not surprisingly, the JCS favored the ultimate objective of overthrowing Castro and recommended including repeated low-level reconnaissance flights among the courses of action.30

On 20 January, Cottrell circulated a revised paper that proposed first to “create propitious conditions in Cuba” for advancing to the objective of removing Castro. However, “we should not set ourselves on a single track which propels us into an invasion regardless of unforeseen international consequences.” Upon review, the JCS reaffirmed their preference for stronger actions. On 24 January, Cottrell sent the NSC’s Executive Committee a list of objectives that included: preventing aggressive military action by Cuba against other Caribbean states; reducing Castro’s capabilities for supporting subversion and insurrection; supporting developments within Cuba that offered the possibility of replacing the regime with a non-communist government; and preparing for a wide variety of military contingencies. Vance judged these inadequate because they did not make Castro’s overthrow an objective and did not “sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities” to bring about Castro’s downfall. Pursuing the ultimate objective, according to Vance, would involve “a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological, and military actions” that might include: large-scale training of Cuban exiles who would be used inside Cuba; extensive air activity, including both high- and low-level reconnaissance; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; and, ultimately, the use of US military forces.31

On 25 January, Cottrell presented the ExComm with a paper that melded Vance’s objectives and some of his actions with those on Cottrell’s list above. After an ExComm discussion, President Kennedy deemed it unnecessary to endorse “the general parts of the paper” and summarized the specific actions that he already had approved (e.g., covert collection of intelligence and backing of suitable exile groups).32

A month later, Kennedy conferred with the JCS about OPLANs 312 and 316. He directed them to develop plans for inserting troops rapidly in case a general uprising should occur. Late in April, reacting to reports that Castro was receiving more materiel, the President urged that additional forces be allocated to 312 and 316. McNamara replied that reactivating eleven LSTs and planning to acquire extra C–130s would allow the early introduction of more troops and heavy equipment.33

On 8 June 1963, Central Intelligence proposed a more forceful program of actions, “general sabotage and harassment” among them. The types of sabotage
would include externally mounted hit-and-run operations and providing men and materiel to internal resistance elements. On 19 June, at a White House meeting attended by the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, the President approved this program. By the year's end, Central Intelligence had directed four externally-mounted operations that were rated successful. The JCS recommended two other sabotage actions, but the DOD representative (evidently Secretary Vance) did not bring them to the Special Group's attention.34

President Johnson suspended what was termed the paramilitary program. During a White House meeting on 18 January 1964, he “questioned seriously whether these sabotage efforts were the proper thing for the US to be doing.” General Taylor argued that “they kept Castro constantly on the alert and kept his forces heavily occupied running hither and yon.” On 4 March, the President directed the JCS to “give him a list... of everything they think we can do that we are not now doing to put further pressure on Castro.” General Taylor circulated a draft that, with minor additions, won the Service Chiefs’ approval. On 21 April, the JCS recommended “a resumption of the program (which is presently approved but on which no actions are currently being taken) involving the employment of covert assets to conduct interdependent operations, including the covert collection of intelligence, propaganda actions, economic denial actions, and externally mounted sabotage operations against Cuba. As this program unfolds, they would favor intensifying and expanding it....” The Chiefs still believed that our ultimate objective should be Castro's overthrow. “However,... [i]t is a hard fact that little remains which offers promise of real effectiveness in removing Castro short of a blockade or an ascending scale of military action up to or including invasion. They will keep this problem under continuing review and advise you should any new and promising courses of action be uncovered.”35

It must not be supposed that Castro remained a passive target. In northwestern Venezuela, on 3 November 1963, a large arms cache was found buried on a beach. Examination of the weapons showed them to be of Cuban origin. Secretary Vance asked the JCS to propose plans for air and sea surveillance. Answering in mid-January, they advocated a “flexible combination of barrier at destination, with emphasis on Colombia and Venezuela, plus air reconnaissance in waters south of Cuba to identify vessels exiting from Cuba.” They calculated US force requirements as: one carrier, fourteen destroyers, one oiler, and 23 patrol planes for sea surveillance; one fighter squadron and one airborne early warning squadron for air surveillance. On 20 January they directed CINCLANT to monitor all ship movements into Venezuela, in order to obtain a sampling of shipping density. This was done over 24–31 January, using two destroyer escorts and 55 flights.36

CINCLANT reported that, although surveillance could be accomplished, boarding and searching all ships would be such a daunting task that firm intelligence about subversive traffic was absolutely vital. On 17 February, he presented a scheme for interdicting the flow of arms; Secretary McNamara and the Chiefs promptly
approved it as the basis for a detailed plan. In Washington, there was debate over whether the stopping and searching of selected vessels should take place on the high seas or only in territorial waters. General Taylor favored the high seas as deterring the Cubans and giving us a reprisal capability, but he was overruled. On 26 July 1964, the Organization of American States by vote of 15–3 condemned Cuba “for its acts of aggression and intervention” against Venezuela. Subsequently, all members except Mexico severed diplomatic relations with Cuba.37

Castro made Bolivia another target. His lieutenant, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, entered the country late in 1966. Leading a small guerrilla band, Guevara tried to ignite a revolution that would spread across the continent. The Defense Department provided Bolivia with a 16-man training team to help organize a new Ranger battalion. It also supplied ammunition, rations, and communications equipment on an emergency basis under MAP and expedited the delivery of four helicopters. Guevara’s campaign failed. He was captured by Bolivian Rangers on 8 October 1967 and executed the next day.38 This was the signal success of counter-insurgency in Latin America.
Middle East Kaleidoscope

The Middle East was beset by feuds that made it virtually impossible for the United States to pursue a coherent regional policy. Tension between Arabs and Israelis never abated. Arabs threatened and sometimes fought each other, authoritarian populist regimes often pitted against conservative monarchies. The kings of Saudi Arabia and Jordan were pro-western, as was the non-Arab Shah of Iran. Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser, a charismatic leader with pan-Arab aspirations, cultivated relations with the Soviet Union, which became his principal arms supplier. President Kennedy tried to promote a personal tie with Nasser, but their policy differences proved too great.

A summary of US-Iraqi relations during 1963 illustrates the complications and swift reversals that Washington faced in trying to foster stable, pro-Western regimes. In 1958, General Abdul Karim Qassim had destroyed Iraq's pro-western monarchy and seized power. In February 1963, Qassim was himself deposed and executed. The new regime promptly sought to purchase helicopters, light tanks, and tank transporters from the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed sales on a case-by-case basis, “consistent with existing US regional commitments and objectives in the area.” The administration adopted this approach but without becoming “a major supplier of offensive weapons.”

By July, Iraqi requests had lengthened to include supersonic fighters, transport aircraft, eight-inch howitzers, and hundreds of trucks. The JCS recommended responding favorably to requests that fell within the administration’s approach. In justification, they observed that the Baath Party members who now ruled Iraq were anti-Nasser and anti-Soviet. Iraq had just confederated with Nasser's United Arab Republic (UAR), comprised of Egypt and Syria. Since Baathists controlled Damascus and Baghdad, continued disunity between Nasser on the one hand and Iraq and Syria on the other could ease pressures upon Saudi Arabia and other monarchies as well as Israel. The Chiefs even foresaw a “good possibility” that Iraq and Syria would align openly with the West. Moreover, Moscow
was extending political support to Kurdish rebels in northeast Iraq. The Chiefs believed that “a firm Iraqi military position, coupled with a willingness to accommodate legitimate Kurdish grievances,” offered the “most promising avenue” for advancing Iraq’s internal stability.\(^2\)

Unfortunately, that avenue soon closed. In November 1963, pro-Nasserite officers ousted the civilian Baathist leadership. Washington and Baghdad did conclude a modest military sales agreement, but, thereafter, the two governments drew apart.

### Supplying Arms to Israel

Initially, the Kennedy administration intended to continue an even-handed approach toward Arabs and Israelis, assuring Israel’s survival but avoiding a major role as arms supplier. Thus, in February 1962, the State Department proposed maintaining a watch on the Arab-Israeli military balance, declining to supply Israel with “major categories of arms” but being “prepared to consider occasional sales of weapons and equipment of an essentially defensive nature.” Although the Joint Chiefs endorsed these guidelines, ISA proposed a slightly more stringent definition: “Be prepared to consider occasional sale of light weapons and equipment particularly suitable for defensive purposes.” State accepted ISA’s words for its guidelines published in June 1962.\(^3\)

Already, the limits of this policy were being tested. In 1960, the Eisenhower administration had rejected an Israeli bid to purchase a Hawk surface-to-air missile system, largely on grounds that the Soviets might then equip Arab states with surface-to-surface rockets, rendering the Hawks “an expensive waste.” When Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion met President Kennedy in May 1961, he renewed the bid for Hawks. Kennedy was non-committal.\(^4\)

Visiting Washington in May 1962, Israel’s Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres claimed that Soviet deliveries to Egypt of MiG–21 fighters and Tu-16 medium bombers were creating a military imbalance. He therefore repeated the request for Hawks. State and ISA asked for a JCS assessment of Israel’s vulnerability to air attack.\(^5\)

Answering on 12 July, the JCS calculated that Israel’s air force could defeat Egypt’s, if the Israelis were able to protect their air facilities. Israeli radar provided complete high-altitude coverage, but a low-level surprise attack might damage as many as 40 percent of their aircraft. The arrival of more Tu-16s would further increase Israel’s vulnerability. In the Chiefs’ judgment, Hawks would fill an important air defense gap without shifting the regional balance. ISA agreed. Secretary Rusk also concurred, if a regional arms limitation proved unattainable within two or three months.\(^6\)

In mid-August, the administration made a “contingent” offer to sell Israel the equipment for one Hawk battalion with 24 launchers.\(^7\) Production could be completed within 24 months of the order date, but US schools had no training vacancies for
Israeli crews before January 1965. The JCS recommended delaying training for other
countries so Israelis could finish the course by November 1964. They cautioned,
though, that the Hawk sale could have unpleasant repercussions. First, the trend
toward improving relations with Arab states might be reversed, “with consequent
material and psychological benefits to the Sino-Soviet Bloc.” Second, Egypt probably
would try to acquire similar equipment from the Soviets, fuelling an arms race. Third,
President Nasser could “raise anew the standard of Arab nationalism and boost his
flagging prestige,” to the detriment of pro-western Arab leaders.8 Under an agree-
ment signed in June 1963, Israel purchased a Hawk battalion for $23.5 million, credit-
financed over a ten-year period.9

Egypt entered into production of surface-to-surface rockets and intervened
massively in Yemen’s civil war. Israel began pressing Washington for (1) a formal,
public security assurance, (2) some sort of military collaboration and contingency
planning, and (3) freer access to US weaponry. State Department officials won-
dered whether joint contingency planning alone would satisfy Israel. ISA asked for
a JCS judgment.10

Answering early in August 1963, the Joint Chiefs opposed either a security
assurance, joint planning, or changing the existing policy about supplying arms. Major US objectives in the Middle East, they noted, were to promote stability,
maintain access, and ensure the availability of oil to Western Europe. Communist
penetration, in their judgment, posed the main threat to these goals. If the United
States yielded to Israeli pressure, Arabs would lean more heavily upon Soviet sup-
port. Therefore, the Chiefs saw no sense in going beyond President Kennedy’s
recent public statement that “in the event of aggression or preparation for aggres-
sion . . . we would support appropriate measures in the United Nations, adopt other
courses of action on our own to prevent or to put a stop to such aggression.”11

While the Chiefs acknowledged that joint planning would facilitate the entry
of US forces, they believed that Israel’s ability to defeat any combination of Arab
states made such efforts unnecessary. If Arab aggression did occur, the most effec-
tive US support would be to attack the facilities from which air and missile strikes
were being launched. The Israelis were aware of our capabilities and could fill
most of their arms requirements from Western Europe. Therefore, Israeli pressures
upon the United States were “most probably politically motivated.” Their true aim
might be leakage to the Arabs of the nature and extent of joint planning.

Should overriding political reasons require a US-Israel dialogue, the Chiefs rec-
ommended that it take the form of political discussions “in order to avoid any conno-
tation of joint military planning against the Arabs.” The United States could provide
an estimate of Arab strength and generalized information about US capabilities. In
return, Israelis would provide more information about their plans for force devel-
opment as well as “assurances that, in the event of political turmoil in neighboring
Arab states, Israel would not seize the West Bank of the Jordan or undertake other
pre-emptive action without prior consultation with the United States.” The course
recommended by the JCS was “to promote negotiated settlement of lesser issues on a piecemeal basis.” Again, ISA agreed. The administration avoided either offering a security guarantee or engaging in contingency planning.

In mid-November 1963, an Israeli delegation arrived in Washington to make a case for buying weapons that were not strictly defensive. Citing the program for producing ground-to-ground missiles, they claimed that Egypt was expanding her armed forces with all possible speed. In armored strength, the Israelis could accept an Arab advantage between two and three to one, provided that Israeli tanks were qualitatively equal. In 1965, by their calculation, the Arab inventory would reach 3,000. Israel, therefore, needed 1,000 modern tanks. That would mean replacing 300 Shermans of World War II vintage and increasing Israel’s inventory by 100 to 200 new tanks.

The State Department recommended continuing to restrain US arms sales. ISA, however, argued that continuing Soviet aid to the Arabs, growing Egyptian air and missile capability, and the increasing tempo of Western European arms sales to the whole area required a change of policy. First, stop letting the Europeans have the first chance at arms sales. Second, permit selective sales of “so-called” offensive weapons on a case-by-case basis. The JCS agreed that the arms race was accelerating but cited an intelligence estimate that the “substantial military equilibrium” between Israel and the Arabs had not been upset. Therefore, they saw no immediate need to supply major quantities of arms. Rather, highest priority should go to achieving agreement about restricting the flow of arms.

Early in January 1964, Israel urgently sought permission to buy tanks: 200 M-48A3s and 100 M–60s to replace an equal number of Shermans, and 100 M–60s to modernize its inventory. The JCS advised that Arab states, individually and collectively, remained qualitatively inferior to Israel. In fact, Israel could either defeat attacks on all four fronts (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon) or hold on three fronts and mount a successful offensive on the fourth. Moreover, serious differences among Arab governments made combined action against Israel highly unlikely. Tank inventories totaled 1,932 for the Arabs versus 734 for Israel, but the Arab advantage was less impressive than it looked. Lebanese and Saudi Arabian forces would exercise minimal effect on the fighting; Anglo-American influence probably would keep Jordan neutral; Iraqi and Syrian capabilities had been “extensively degraded” by internal upheavals. In these circumstances, the JCS found no justification for increasing Israel’s armored strength. They agreed, however, that replacing 300 Shermans was “militarily sound on the basis of modernization.” If the Israelis insisted on M-48A3s (a diesel-powered model with greater range and a 90-mm gun that could be replaced with a 105-mm), these should be provided by converting M-48s, which then would be replaced in the US inventory by the latest 105-mm M–60A1s. If the Israelis were offered M–60A1s, though, they would have to be provided by expanding production.
In February, Secretary McNamara approved in principle a credit sale of (1) 200 M–48s over the next one to two years and (2) 100 M–60s over the next two to three years. Instead, the administration arranged for West Germany to supply 150 M–48s and for the British to sell 150 Centurions, both outfitted with 105-mm guns. However, when word leaked to Cairo early in 1965 Bonn was pressured into cancelling the contract. Ultimately, the United States sold Israel 210 M–48A3s.

Meantime, nuclear non-proliferation emerged an irritant between Washington and Tel Aviv. With French help, Israel was building a heavy-water reactor with supporting facilities at Dimona in the Negev. In April 1961, two US scientists toured Dimona and found “no present evidence that the Israelis have weapons production in mind.” Soon afterward, a JCS study cautioned that Israel’s acquisition of a nuclear capability “would have a definite and serious impact on US policies toward the Middle East and possibly toward France.” Therefore, the United States should “[a]ttempt by all feasible means, official, quasi-official and private to convince Israel and France” that such acquisition “would be against the best interests of the Free World, the Middle East and of Israel.” In 1963, Israel appeared to back away from a promise to permit more inspections of Dimona. President Kennedy ratcheted up the pressure, warning Ben-Gurion that “this Government’s commitment to and support of Israel could be seriously jeopardized if it should be thought that we were unable to obtain reliable information on a subject as vital to peace as the question of the character of Israel’s effort in the nuclear field.” After Levi Eshkol succeeded Ben-Gurion as prime minister, Kennedy repeated his warning. A US inspection team visited Dimona in January 1964, almost a month after the reactor went critical, and found “no immediate weapons making capability.”

These were not watershed years in US-Israeli relations. Washington sold Hawks because they were defensive, rejected requests for surface-to-surface missiles and naval weapons, and tried to have Europeans supply tanks. The JCS clearly were wary of anything resembling close military collaboration, but they did endorse Hawk and tank sales as special cases.

Supporting the Saudi Regime

Military relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia dated from World War II, when the Dhahran air base was built and leased. In 1957, the Saudis agreed to a five-year extension of the lease; the United States promised to expand its training program. By 1960, however, the situation had become mutually unsatisfying. Although Dhahran was no longer a primary base for the Strategic Air Command, a Middle East air base was still considered essential for logistic support activities. Yet, as the JCS observed in September 1960, Dhahran’s value was “severely limited” by restrictive provisions. Emergency use, for example, was contingent upon Saudi assent. Unless a more flexible agreement could be obtained, the
Chiefs urged that facilities be sought elsewhere. As alternatives, they listed Iran, Kuwait, and Muharraq islet off British-controlled Bahrain.20

In March 1961, King Saud announced that the Dhahran lease would not be renewed. The JCS recommended endeavoring to retain residual rights (a Military Training Mission and landing privileges for in-transit aircraft) as well as base rights in Pakistan and, at Muharraq Airfield, Bahrain, rights for transport aircraft stops and stationing of a small support unit. ISA agreed about residual rights and Muharraq but not Pakistan.21 The State Department proposed that the Military Training Mission continue only if the Saudis granted residual rights. The JCS responded by urging that residual rights be defined more broadly, to include wartime availability as well as peacetime landing privileges for Military Air Transport Service (MATS) aircraft. ISA supported them and State amended its policy guideline accordingly.22

Soon, however, Saudi-American ties were to strengthen dramatically. The cause was civil war in Yemen, a small and backward country in the southwest corner of the Arabian peninsula. When Imam Ahmad died on 17 September 1962, many educated Yemenis had been swayed by liberalizing ideas and Nasserite propaganda. So, on 26–27 September, army officers overthrew the Imamate and proclaimed a republic. The Soviet bloc and many Arab states recognized the new regime; Nasser sent 20,000 of his soldiers to support the “republicans.” The “royalists” rallied behind Ahmad’s son, Imam Badr; Saudi Arabia and Jordan provided material aid. Thus a Yemeni civil war escalated into a confrontation involving much of the Arab world.23

To Saudi Arabia’s rulers, the threat was clear. King Saud was ill, and at his death the Yemeni experience might be repeated. In mid-October, Crown Prince Faisal became prime minister and de facto ruler. Faisal immediately communicated his concern to Washington, even suggesting that the Eisenhower Doctrine (by which the United States pledged to assist victims of communist aggression) be invoked on behalf of Yemeni royalists. The State Department asked Defense to survey what steps might be taken to support the Saudis in defending their own territory.24

The JCS assessment, sent to Secretary McNamara on 9 November, stressed that Saudi Arabia’s real problems were internal. The Chiefs’ specific recommendations were modest in tone. As an example, the Chief of the Military Training Mission should impress upon Saudi military leaders the necessity for ensuring the loyalty of all personnel. More broadly, the JCS urged extracting, as a quid pro quo for US support, an acceptable agreement on the Military Training Mission, continued use of Dhahran, and “at least a promise” to inaugurate internal reforms.25

Working through diplomatic channels, Washington secured public pledges by Yemeni republicans to respect Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity and by Egypt to undertake “a reciprocal expeditious . . . removal of its troops from Yemen.” Then, on 30 December, reports came that Egyptian aircraft had bombed the Saudi village of Nejran, through which arms shipments were passing to the royalists. The Saudis urgently requested a US show of force; the State Department asked for military advice.26
The JCS, answering on 2 January 1963, advised caution. Circumstances surrounding the Egyptian attack, they said, were “clouded considerably” by Saudi support for the royalists and by Faisal’s emotional reaction. The Chiefs favored active employment of US forces only after political efforts had failed, and then only to the minimum extent necessary. If military measures were decided upon, they proposed the following progression of events, each preceded by a major diplomatic effort. First, dispatch a Composite Air Strike Unit (CASU) consisting of eight fighter and two to four reconnaissance aircraft. One destroyer also could visit Jidda. Second, send a carrier task force into the eastern Mediterranean. Third, execute contingency plans that included interdicting shipping and bombing targets in the United Arab Republic and Yemen.27

The administration was prepared to deploy fighters periodically, under orders to fight only in self-defense and on condition that Faisal stopped sending aid to the royalists. But ISA worried that, if this show of support proved ineffective, State would propose stronger measures. Accordingly, Assistant Secretary Nitze asked the Joint Chiefs to assess a “compromise solution” by which American destroyers in the Red Sea would direct US interceptors flying from Saudi airfields.28

The JCS found several reasons why this compromise solution was “militarily infeasible and therefore undesirable.” First, US aircraft would need authority to engage over Yemeni territory and international waters. Second, Nejran’s distance from the Red Sea (120 miles) and its closeness to the Yemeni border meant that destroyer control of interceptors probably would prove ineffective. Third, Egyptian aircraft could approach coastal towns undetected either by flying low or by staging through Yemen. Fourth, available interceptors lacked all-weather capability. In any case, they repeated, the administration ought to apply the “full spectrum” of economic and political measures before resorting to direct military action.29

A White House meeting on 25 February debated whether to offer a “plate glass fighter squadron” if Faisal would suspend aid to the royalists. Assistant Secretary Nitze summed up the DOD position: “Let’s not start down the toboggan until we know where we might land.” The only militarily effective course would be to attack UAR airfields, which might lose the whole Middle East. As for defending Saudi Arabia, General Wheeler observed that it would be almost impossible to locate intruding aircraft without some kind of radar net. President Kennedy decided to send a special emissary to Riyadh, offering to deploy a squadron in exchange for suspending aid to the royalists.30

Nitze next requested JCS views on the size and location of a US air unit. The JCS suggested that it be stationed at Jidda and consist of eight F–100s, one transport, and one control and reporting post. When Nitze asked what military measures lay within US capabilities, the Chiefs stressed difficulties and dangers: length of supply lines; lack of clear national boundaries; how to distinguish friend from foe and soldier from civilian. Again, they urged that all possible non-military measures be employed, and that every effort be made to exploit the potential of
British forces in Aden, Bahrain, and Cyprus. If US military intervention proved necessary, they listed steps roughly similar to those in their memorandum of 2 January. When Nitze forwarded these views to State, he expressed doubt about the wisdom of close Anglo-American collaboration.31

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, acting as the President’s special emissary, worked with UN diplomats to negotiate disengagement. Secretary General U Thant announced an agreement on 29 April. The United States then extended overt military support to Saudi Arabia. An air survey team visited the country between 19 and 24 April, but actual deployment of aircraft awaited proof that the Saudis had stopped supporting the royalists. In fact, President Kennedy vetoed a plan to send Major General Perry Griffith, USAF, to Saudi Arabia. Wanting the mission to be in a very low key, Kennedy ruled that whoever went must be below general officer rank. An advance party from the Composite Air Strike Unit arrived on 3 May. At State’s suggestion, Kennedy modified the CASU’s rules of engagement to ensure that, before US interceptors attacked intruding aircraft, every effort would be made to induce the interlopers’ withdrawal.32

In mid-June, President Kennedy approved deploying a CASU consisting of eight F–100Ds, one support plane, and necessary refueling aircraft. Code-named “Hard Surface,” its arrival was delayed until 5 July, by which time UN observers were on hand and Saudi adherence to the disengagement agreement appeared certain. Hard Surface was supposed to leave by 15 September, but the State Department wanted it to remain until substantial numbers of UAR troops also left Yemen and Saudi-Egyptian tensions subsided. So the CASU stayed through autumn.33

On 7 October, the JCS agreed to extend Hard Surface. The next day, President Kennedy decided to “adopt an aggressive policy to localize and terminate the situation . . . at the earliest possible time.” In the region, Defense counted 201 USAF aircraft against 339 Egyptian ones. Accordingly, Kennedy directed the pre-positioning in Spain of those B-47s earmarked by SAC to support wartime operations in the Middle East. He also shifted two tactical fighter squadrons from Europe and a carrier strike force from the Sixth Fleet. Kennedy “indicated that he was willing to accept the risks inherent in such a policy.”34

Apparently, the aerial buildup made no impact. After promising sizable withdrawals, Nasser kept 30,000 troops in Yemen and resumed bombing Saudi territory.35 Consequently, State wanted the CASU extended through January 1964. This time, General LeMay asked the other Chiefs to join him in filing a formal protest. On 21 December, while a paper was being drafted, President Johnson decided in State’s favor. Nevertheless, three days later, General Taylor sent the completed memorandum to Secretary McNamara, saying that he did so because their reasoning remained valid. The Joint Chiefs rated the CASU as being too small for effective self-defense against UAR forces. When UN observers withdrew, perhaps as early as 4 January, Faisal might resume aid to the royalists and provoke Egyptian reprisals. If Hard Surface was still in Saudi Arabia, the United States would have to respond
militarily or risk losing credibility. But if Hard Surface withdrew after Faisal had resumed aid, its departure would signal a cessation of US support and an invitation to UAR aggression. In either case, the United States might well face “black and white choices” of either fighting the Egyptians or abandoning the Saudis. These being the options, the JCS wanted Hard Surface to leave forthwith. If a military presence still appeared necessary, they suggested either periodically dispatching a CASU or moving Sixth Fleet units into the immediate area.36

Hard Surface finally was withdrawn in February 1964; the UN mission departed in September. Nasser brazenly ignored the disengagement agreement, sending more troops to Yemen. The Saudis kept funneling aid to the royalists and Egyptian aircraft once again bombed Nejran.37 In 1967, after losing the Six Day War, Nasser finally began withdrawing from Yemen. Two years later, the civil war ended with royalists being integrated into the republican regime. From the US standpoint that was a decent outcome, more the result of good fortune than good decisions.

Supporting the Shah of Iran

Geography made Iran a critical front-line state in the global strategy of containing the Soviet Union. Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, whose rule rested primarily on the loyalty of military and security forces, faced growing hostility from conservative clerics and the liberalizing urban middle class. The JCS, in January 1961, advised that any regime replacing the Shah “would be less Western-oriented and would therefore represent a net loss to US interests in the Middle East.” They wanted planning to take account of “the numerous and varied possibilities of political crisis in Iran which may call for US military action of some kind.” While the Shah should be supported “by all appropriate means,” plans were needed for backing a pro-Western successor.38

On 15 May, a presidential task force reported that “the continuing trend toward revolution and chaos in Iran has reached the point where the US must take vigorous action.” Four days later, the NSC decided upon a major effort to back reform-minded Prime Minister Ali Amini and more actively encourage the Shah to “move toward a more constitutional role.” While making no decision about whether or how to react militarily to a Soviet attack, plans would be developed for promptly introducing (1) conventional forces as large as two divisions and (2) nuclear striking power “so that it could be brought to bear in the Soviet border areas of Iran.”39

Assistant Secretary Nitze asked for a JCS assessment. They replied that, although Iran’s strategic importance “cannot be overemphasized,” the United States did not have enough strength to station “permanently significant additional forces” there. Although a temporary show of force was feasible, as was pre-positioning of materiel, delays in obtaining transit clearances and base availability could restrict immediate actions to the dispatch of naval forces. They
rejected a detailed earmarking of units in contingency plans as impractical. In fact, existing plans provided for using more than two divisions, with or without nuclear weapons. But such a commitment would raise the possibility of escalation and general war, in which the Middle East area would have to be defended primarily by indigenous forces.40

During the autumn of 1961, as the Berlin confrontation grew tenser, President Kennedy became concerned about the likelihood of Soviet diversionary pressures upon Iran. He learned that there was no plan for waging a limited war, confined to Iran, which would involve US and Soviet forces. This was so because the old assumption that a Soviet attack would signify general war still applied. Accordingly, on 7 October, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric asked the JCS to assess US capacity for fighting a limited war there. Their reply held out hope of resisting limited Soviet intervention and “probing” aggression, but not of stopping a substantial and determined incursion. In northeast Iran, scanty road and rail facilities would limit US forces to two divisions plus two battle groups. Such a force, together with Iranian units, was simply too small to stop a sizable Soviet attack. Once again, they stated that any commitment of US forces must be preceded by a decision to do whatever was necessary to achieve national objectives. To assure “any chance of success,” there would have to be immediate attacks against air bases in the Soviet Union, using conventional or nuclear weapons as appropriate.41 Fortunately, no such contingency occurred.

In preparation for the Shah’s visit to Washington in April 1962, the administration prepared a five-year military assistance program with a ceiling of $330 million. Major items included 10,250 jeeps and trucks, 100 M–113 armored personnel carriers, two minesweepers, 16 transports, between 26 and 52 supersonic aircraft, airfield construction, and an early warning radar system. Fulfillment would be conditional upon overall strength of the Iranian armed forces falling from 200,000 to 150,000. The JCS described the capabilities of Iranian armed forces as “generally low, although a slow, steady improvement has been made.” But they believed this program would enable Iran to stay ahead of Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which were armed by the Soviets.42

In Washington talks, the Shah insisted on getting the latest and best equipment, which McNamara and Lemnitzer assured him was the case, and seemed to balk at manpower cuts. Secretary McNamara gave a “firm undertaking” about equipment deliveries. A US planning team went to Iran and recommended supporting a level of about 160,000; the JCS endorsed its finding. On 19 September, the Shah accepted a five-year program that added two patrol frigates to the items listed above. Providing equipment was to be dependent upon Iranians reducing their manpower to 160,000 over two or three years.43

During 1963, the Shah carried out a “White Revolution” in which he broke the power of large landowners and, for the time being, of the fundamentalist clergy as well.44 In January 1964, the Shah opened negotiations for more military hardware.
His most pressing demand was for M–60 tanks and M–551 Sheridan armored reconnaissance vehicles to replace 414 obsolescent M–47 tanks. The Joint Chiefs advised Secretary McNamara that they found “military justification” for armor modernization and wanted the United States to remain Iran's principal source of arms. They were willing to supply M–60s, provided production expanded so that the Shah's order would not impinge upon other US needs. The Sheridan, however, should not be considered because it was still under development and had not been operationally tested.45

Through a July 1964 Memorandum of Understanding, Iran agreed to purchase $250 million worth of equipment ($50 million in cash, $200 million through credit) during FYs 1965–1969. The items included 26 F-5 interceptors, 460 M–60s, and one battalion of Hawk surface-to-air missiles. By mid-1970, also, certain categories of deliveries through the Military Assistance Program would increase (e.g., 39 more F–5s, another 1,000 vehicles).46 Thus the United States maintained a close military tie to Iran.

**CENTO Staggers On**

The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) lacked the ingredient most essential to a healthy alliance: a common purpose. CENTO's aim, ostensibly, was to bolster the ability of northern tier nations to resist Soviet pressure. Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom were signatories.47 But the Britons and the Turks considered their NATO commitments more important; Pakistanis worried almost to obsession about attacks from India or Afghanistan; Iranians were attentive to Nasserite subversion as well as Soviet pressures. The United States concluded bilateral executive agreements with regional members but refrained from becoming a CENTO signatory, although participating in its committees and attending its conferences. The JCS Chairman usually acted as US representative at semiannual meetings of CENTO's Military Committee.

In mid-March 1961, the Director, Joint Staff, recommended that the JCS resubmit their previous recommendations that the United States formally join CENTO, support creation of a command structure and appointment of a Supreme Commander, develop unilateral plans for tactical nuclear support of all CENTO forces, and improve solidarity among CENTO, NATO, and SEATO. The State Department had suggested focusing upon how CENTO's goals could relate to popular aspirations for economic and social improvement. If the administration decided to de-emphasize CENTO's military side, the Director suggested that there be: a small permanent staff to develop standardization, training, and communications; semiannual meetings of senior commanders; and annual Chiefs of Staff conferences.48

Late in March 1961, CENTO's Council of Ministers approved “Basic Assumptions for Global War.” Their action meant that CENTO's Combined Military Planning Staff could prepare its plans only within the context of a general nuclear war.

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The United States, insisting that planning be tied to the communist threat, had objected to inferences that CENTO might engage in a limited war against neighboring states. Washington accepted a Pakistani proposal that the Council, after approving “Basic Assumptions for Global War,” consider limited war assumptions as well. But planning for lesser contingencies could not begin until Ministers had issued political guidance, and US-Pakistani differences prevented approval of any “Basic Assumptions for War in the CENTO Region.”

When the Military Committee convened late in April, General Lemnitzer stated that for political reasons the US government deemed appointment of a Supreme Commander undesirable. Pakistanis and Iranians replied that planning without a complete command structure was not worthwhile. The Committee referred this issue to CENTO’s Council of Foreign Ministers which did agree, several days later, that an American or British officer should be appointed “Supreme Commander-CENTO Military Planning Staff.” But when the British nominated General Sir Charles Jones, early in 1962, the Pakistanis indicated that only an American would be acceptable. Since Washington was unwilling to supply a candidate, nothing was done.

A Permanent Military Deputies Group was drafting requirements plans and capabilities plans. The former, roughly equivalent to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, was far from completion. The latter, akin to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, drew sharp criticism from Iranians and Pakistanis on grounds that available forces were hopelessly inadequate for the missions assigned, tactical nuclear weapons were not available, communications were vulnerable, and an effective command headquarters could not be created after hostilities had begun. General Lemnitzer and Admiral Louis Mountbatten, the British representative, responded by emphasizing the allies’ world-wide nuclear power.

Early in June 1961, the JCS advised Secretary McNamara that regional members appeared more concerned about limited war than global conflict. From those members’ perspective, major threats to their security came from uncommitted countries that were being supported overtly or covertly by the Soviet bloc. That being so, “the degree of US participation hinges on the extent to which there is a politico-military requirement to retain Iran as a strong pro-Western ally.” In their judgment, Iran did constitute “a vital part of the Free World collective security system.”

Meetings of the Military Committee in November 1961 and April 1962 accomplished nothing. American, British, and Turkish representatives endorsed a draft capabilities plan but Iranians and Pakistanis rejected it. Why, the Pakistani member asked, should his country belong to CENTO “if all she could expect was to save her own skin with her own forces?” In November 1962, after the United States agreed to discuss intelligence assessments of the Afghan threat, a capabilities plan finally was approved, although Iran and Pakistan attached the criticisms outlined above. But the requirements plan fared less well. Pakistanis insisted that it ignored “basic issues” like protection of West Pakistan and the availability of tactical nuclear weapons. The American representative proposed either approving the plan as guidance
for further efforts or returning it for revision along “more specific and realistic” (i.e., less ambitious) lines. The Committee authorized a revision, after the United States had made available its own appraisal of CENTO force requirements.52

In April 1963, all members of the Military Committee except Pakistan approved the requirements plan. Pakistan’s representative accused the Americans and British of pursuing a policy of “indifference” toward CENTO and said that his country was “completely disillusioned.” American military assistance to India, begun in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war, was undoubtedly the root cause of Pakistani disillusionment. General Taylor, who was now the US representative, replied that strategic nuclear attack would be the main US contribution in case of general war. Clearly, CENTO’s members were following diverging paths. Iran stressed the danger from a confederation of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq; Pakistan was preoccupied by threats from India and Afghanistan.53

This session precipitated a change in JCS attitudes about CENTO. Afterward, General Taylor composed an incisive critique: “A coalition makes military sense only if its combined strength is greater than the sum of its national parts. It is questionable if CENTO passes this test. . . . The coalition has no strategic reserves . . . beyond those which the US (and possibly the UK) might make available in a crisis . . . . Hence, I conclude that CENTO is not a military necessity and the justification for its continued existence must be found in other fields. I am inclined to believe that this justification does exist in political and psychological considerations. A break-up of CENTO would inevitably appear as a serious Cold War defeat for the US. However, the price of continuing CENTO should not be too high. It is not worth paying blackmail to any member—for the moment it appears that the . . . [Pakistanis] are in a blackmailing mood but it has been the Iranians in the past. In any case, we should keep the need for CENTO under continuing review.”54

Concurrently, ISA suggested moving toward a more active US role. First, consider maintaining a floating depot in the area, explore the establishment of an island base in the Indian Ocean, pre-position equipment in exposed countries, and consider bilateral or multilateral plans for US intervention. Second, formally join CENTO, adopting one or more of the measures just listed, and conduct more frequent military exercises. Third, concentrate on alleviating the internal instability of regional members.55

The JCS, however, had undergone a change of heart. The views they submitted on 12 June 1963 ran heavily on the side of restraint. At some point, they acknowledged, the United States might have to contribute forces and designate an American as “Commander-Military Planning Staff.” But the regional members’ desire for plans addressing their individual antagonisms (Pakistan versus India, Iran versus Egypt) could lead to greater demands for specific US commitments. Moreover, the military capabilities of those countries were quite limited. In a major confrontation, the United States and the United Kingdom would have to bear the brunt of any fighting.

Moving to specifics, the JCS endorsed exploring a base in the Indian Ocean but urged that the idea of a floating depot await evaluation of an experimental
ship in Subic Bay, the Philippines. The Chiefs opposed multilateral planning because CENTO planners already could take cognizance of possible aggression from non-Soviet sources, and they cautioned that bilateral planning might create as many problems as it would solve. They did favor frequent military exercises and more assistance for counterinsurgency. As to becoming a CENTO signatory, though, the Chiefs said no. To make that step meaningful, there would have to be a commitment of US forces. Therefore, they recommended continuing the current level of participation for the next several months and conduct frequent re-evaluations thereafter.56

Surprisingly, CENTO's health improved. The Military Committee's meeting in November 1963 witnessed little more than familiar warnings from Pakistan about the Indian threat and from Iran about the Nasserite danger. But in April 1964 the Pakistanis displayed a marked change of attitude. They accepted the requirements plan, although adding that Pakistani forces would not be available to CENTO as long as a threat from India existed. Previously the Pakistanis had insisted that, before a CENTO team could survey their air defense requirements, the United States would have to provide a five-year assistance program for the Pakistani air force. They now withdrew that stipulation. All in all, CENTO veterans considered this meeting to be the most productive ever.57 So while CENTO was not flourishing, it was at least surviving.
“New Africa” and the Congo Entanglement

What Arms for Africa?

The Kennedy administration confronted a continent that was rushing from colonial tutelage into tumultuous freedom. Between 1953 and 1963, the number of independent African states rose from five to thirty-four. During September and October 1960 alone, sixteen African states became members of the United Nations.

Would these fledgling nations become pawns in the Cold War? The JCS perceived a real danger. In October 1960, they made known their concern over accelerating communist penetration of Guinea and Ghana. Guinea, in particular, appeared “well on the way to becoming a Bloc satellite” since it received arms and assistance solely from communist countries. Sited on the western bulge of Africa, those countries possessed air-sea facilities which in unfriendly hands would constitute a “serious threat” to US interests in the South Atlantic and South America. The State Department agreed those countries were drifting “in a pro-communist direction” but did not consider them “hopelessly unredeemable” because neither one wished to become a Soviet satellite.¹

President Eisenhower, in September 1960, proposed that the United Nations explore ways of averting an arms race in Africa. Soon afterward, a group of African states drafted a resolution asking all powers to regard their continent as an atom-free zone. The State Department solicited military advice and, one week after President Kennedy took office, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Paul Nitze asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess proposals for (1) an atom-free zone and (2) regional arms control arrangements. Three months later, they replied that
the acceleration in arms procurement was “mostly attributable to Sino-Soviet subversive activity” and was thus a symptom of Cold War tensions rather than of aggressive African ambitions. Therefore, arms control arrangements would cause the communist bloc to intensify its efforts and to “seize upon any defects in such arrangements . . . to debilitate the power of African national governments and to lessen the external protection now afforded them by the West.” The Cold War, the JCS continued, was “tending to enlarge US military interests in Africa.” A loss of Western base rights, resulting from arms control arrangements, could have “a most serious impact” on the Free World’s defense posture. The JCS hoped to keep available three bomber bases in Morocco, from which the United States had agreed to withdraw in 1963. Consequently, they recommended (1) opposing an atom-free zone and (2) supporting regional arms control “in the lowest possible key,” if such action became politically necessary and could be separated from the atom-free proposal. ISA forwarded this paper to Secretary Rusk. On 24 November 1961, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution requesting members to consider Africa a nuclear-free zone. The United States abstained because the resolution called for an unverified and uninspected moratorium.2

Meanwhile, in May 1961, the State Department circulated draft guidance about supplying arms to sub-Sahara Africa. Basically, the United States should stand ready to meet legitimate requests, “at least in part,” to avoid swift communist infiltration. Such programs, however, should be premised and justified upon political rather than military grounds. Certainly, “we should studiously refrain from any automatic matching of Soviet offers.” Military assistance should be closely correlated with nation-building activities and awarded regardless of political behavior.3

ISA agreed that policy should contribute to limiting African armed forces to internal security needs, but sought “clarification” of several points. The occasional necessity of taking the initiative in eliciting arms requests should be acknowledged, and the implication that recipients’ political behavior was irrelevant ought to be expunged. A State Department directive issued in March 1962 incorporated this advice. Between FYs 1961 and 1964, the United States dispensed $89.6 million in MAP funds to African nations. The main recipients were Morocco, while it still had three SAC bases, and Ethiopia, where a communications relay station operated.4

**Legacies of Colonialism**

President Kennedy was determined to align the United States with black Africans’ aspiration for independence. In the State Department, a “New Africa” group aggressively pursued this approach. Its most forceful expression came through guidelines proposed in November 1961. State depicted Africa as “probably the greatest open field of maneuver” in the Cold War. The largest US asset in this contest was its reputation for “generosity, love of freedom and fair dealings. Our
The greatest liability is our failure to live up to some of our ideals.” The most promising courses involved (1) clarifying the US commitment to freedom in Portuguese-ruled Angola, French-ruled Algeria, and white-ruled South Africa and (2) achieving more racial progress at home. Selected Africans might even be encouraged to study America’s racial problems and suggest ways of solving them.5

Upon review, the JCS characterized this draft as being “infused with an humility not in consonance with the dignity and stature that the United States must establish in our relationships with countries of the area.” Their critique, in fact, amounted to a broadside blast against the “New Africa” approach: “To place all blame upon our NATO allies and upon ourselves overlooks the basic element of the native share in responsibility for the current status of these nations. To engage in excessive self-criticism of ourselves and of the West will stimulate an irresponsible attitude on the part of the Africans, inhibiting their real progress and prejudicing our influence on the continent.” They also wanted greater attention given to the problem of countering communist influence. ISA supported nearly all their suggestions, but State’s final guidelines retained the self-critical tone and contained no significant alterations.6

Trying to formulate policies for Angola and South Africa created conflicts between military requirements and political objectives. On 15 March 1961, in the UN Security Council, the United States supported an Afro-Asian resolution condemning Portugal’s repressive rule in Angola.7 The Joint Chiefs warned Secretary McNamara that they appreciated the reasons for doing so but were “deeply concerned” about the possible impact upon US base rights in the Azores, sited in the mid-Atlantic, and in Spain because Morocco coveted the Spanish Sahara. Noting that the lease on Lajes airfield in the Azores would expire on 31 December 1962, the Chiefs described Lajes as “essential” for executing general war plans and contingency operations. Similarly, Spanish air bases would become more important after use of Moroccan facilities ended in mid-1963. Losing Morocco and the Azores would “remove the last vestiges of flexibility in planning for base utilization in the North Atlantic area.” Winter weather rendered the route through Iceland and Greenland unsatisfactory; long distances and lack of bases in Africa made the South Atlantic route impractical. Accordingly, they asked McNamara to emphasize the “essentiality” of the Azores and Spanish bases in conversations with Secretary Rusk. Subsequently, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric did advise Rusk against pressing anti-colonial efforts to the point of alienating Spain and Portugal. Continued access to the Azores, Gilpatric argued, was “important” in peacetime and “essential” during limited or general war.8

An interdepartmental task force addressed the Portuguese problem. Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams irritated Defense representatives by insisting that the United States press Portugal to institute immediate reforms leading to independence. In mid-July 1961, the task force presented, and President Kennedy accepted, proposals that included sending a special envoy to Prime Minister Salazar with
instructions to plead the case for rapid and far-reaching changes in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. This would be initiated quietly, in order to minimize the risk of losing the Azores. Defense representatives included in the task force's report a statement that "the military air base at Lajes in the Azores is the single most valuable facility which the United States is authorized by a foreign power to use."9

In August 1961, the administration determined that Portugal was diverting some US-supplied equipment to its colonies and imposed major restrictions, holding all Portuguese requests in suspense. Lisbon reacted bitterly. The JCS professed "great concern" that this action had "seriously endangered" extension of the Azores lease. They wanted the State Department promptly to begin preparing for renewal negotiations. If Portuguese demands proved high, the Chiefs favored a "somewhat more liberal" military assistance program.10

Not until June 1962 did the United States ask for a five-year extension of the Azores lease. Negotiations began in November but went nowhere. On 31 July 1963, with the US abstaining, the UN Security Council approved a resolution calling upon Portugal to recognize the right of independence and requesting all States to refrain from supplying arms to Portugal. President Kennedy asked Secretary McNamara how the loss of Lajes might be offset. The Secretary's answer implied that the consequences would not be severe. Tactical aircraft crossing the Atlantic could be refueled in mid-air. Transports could either fly directly to Europe or proceed to Britain via Newfoundland. Shortages in cargo-carrying capacity could be overcome by pre-positioning equipment and later by using C–141 jet transports. Anti-submarine warfare activities could be shifted to Rota, Spain, without any critical loss of capabilities. Major ASW operations undoubtedly would involve NATO, in which case the Azores would become available. The Director, Joint Staff, advised General Taylor that McNamara's appraisal reflected "overly optimistic" assumptions: that the Azores would be opened to NATO use; that facilities in other countries would be available; and that no concurrent crises would drain transport capabilities.11

Under Secretary of State George Ball conferred with Prime Minister Salazar and reported that he was unyielding about the African colonies. Rusk suggested that the Portuguese actually wanted continued use of the Azores base "as leverage on us."12 Ultimately, Portugal allowed US access without renewing the agreement.

In South Africa, a white minority ruled a huge black majority through the rigid segregation of "apartheid." During the winter of 1961–62, the State Department circulated draft policy guidelines with which the JCS took issue. Some sections, they informed McNamara, suggested that pressure to change racial policies be applied regardless of their impact upon US and Free World security interests. There should be a caveat against carrying such efforts to the point of precipitating internal disintegration and anarchy. ISA agreed, but State did not make the desired changes.13

In August 1963, the UN Security Council condemned apartheid and called upon member states voluntarily to stop selling armaments and strategic materials to Africa.
American diplomats had succeeded in removing a call for boycotting all South African goods. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson stated that the United States would complete deliveries of equipment already sold and feel free to sell equipment required for “the common defense effort.” One year later, Lockheed sought permission to sell sixteen ASW aircraft. The JCS “strongly” supported approval; the Deputy Secretary of Defense concurred. Subsequently, though, Secretary McNamara advised President Johnson that this was a political decision because South Africa’s ASW capabilities were not “essential to our national defense.” The aircraft sale was disapproved.

In March 1964, the State Department circulated a draft National Policy Paper suggesting that South Africa be offered an improved international position in return for an internal policy that was acceptable to all races. Rejection of this offer would set in motion selective and graduated pressures, such as preventing petroleum and wool purchases and severing military and scientific ties. The JCS endorsed the offer but objected to the apparent intention of replacing, after a few months, persuasion with pressure. The dialogue, they believed, should be conducted in a “patient and friendly” manner: “As long as racial disorders and Communist penetration in Africa remain active threats to Free World interests, stability in South Africa is desirable under all circumstances, and the United States should do everything that its political and moral position permits to contribute to this.” ISA agreed that pressure should be applied only after persuasion clearly had failed and a new analysis of the alternatives had been completed.

Concurrently, a draft National Security Action Memorandum was circulated. Among other things, it called for urgent diplomatic efforts to delay the creation of separate “homelands” for blacks in South West Africa, which South Africa held as a UN mandate, and directed State to analyze what sanctions could be considered if South Africa went ahead with the homelands. Four tracking stations in South Africa were supporting almost all the major US space programs; Defense and NASA should seek alternative sites if evacuation became necessary. Once again, the JCS pleaded for patient multilateral persuasion “to avoid the loss of significant military capabilities and a key geographic area.” But Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance disagreed, and NSAM No. 295 was issued without modification.

On 22 May, the Joint Chiefs made still another plea for restraint. The provisions of NSAM No. 295, they warned Secretary McNamara, were “reminiscent of attempts made by the United States, with tragic consequences, to influence the domestic policies of the Chiang Kai-shek government in 1946 and the Batista government in 1958. In both of these cases, the political, military, and economic support necessary to maintain in power anti-communist governments was withheld. This should not be permitted to happen in South Africa.” Likewise, ISA informed State that it favored delaying a decision about sanctions until friendly persuasion clearly had failed. A National Policy Paper, issued in January 1965, did focus on diplomatic efforts. But the issue of sanctions would soon resurface.
The Congo: Coping with Chaos

Nowhere were the consequences of independence more disruptive and communist involvement deeper than in the Congo. The Belgian Congo gained its freedom on 30 June 1960, becoming the Republic of the Congo with its capital at Leopoldville. One week later, the native National Army mutinied and went on a plundering rampage; Belgian paratroopers promptly intervened to protect their fellow-citizens. On 10 July, evidently with Belgian encouragement, Moïse Tshombe declared copper-rich Katanga province in the southeast to be independent. The next day, President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba appealed for a United Nations military force. On 14 July, the UN Security Council approved a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and authorizing the creation of a UN Expatriate Force (UNEF). American aircraft promptly started flying United Nation contingents into Leopoldville. By the end of August, Belgian tactical units had departed and the UNEF’s strength reached almost 20,000.18

Prime Minister Lumumba, a fiery nationalist possessed of considerable charisma, sought help from the communist bloc to crush secessionists. The Soviets supplied trucks and technicians. In mid-September, however, Colonel Joseph Mobutu took power in the army’s name, put Lumumba under arrest, and ejected the Soviet and Czech missions. Lumumba later was flown to Elizabethville, Katanga. In Oriental province to the northeast, Antoine Gizenga assumed Lumumba’s mantle and won Soviet backing. Thus three power centers competed: Mobutu’s and Kasavubu’s in Leopoldville; Gizenga’s at Stanleyville in Oriental; and Tshombe’s separatist movement in Katanga.

A few days after President Kennedy took office, the J–5 assessed the situation, predicted alarming developments, and proposed preventive steps. When the JCS reviewed the J–5’s proposals, Admiral Burke suggested adding two tougher measures. First, US fighters might be stationed in the Sudan to prevent overflights by Soviet aircraft delivering arms to Gizenga. Second, if all else failed, the United States should unilaterally offer money, arms, and transportation to Mobutu and Tshombe. General Decker proposed adding a statement that the overall US posture should be improved forthwith, since concurrent interventions in Laos and Cuba might also prove necessary.19 Those were either rejected or watered down. Even so, what the JCS sent to Secretary McNamara on 30 January was a grim evaluation. The UNEF was failing to arrest erosion of the Mobutu-Kasavubu government, and UN authority soon would be weakened by withdrawals of Egyptian, Guinean, Moroccan, and Indonesian contingents. Soviet aid, meantime, was expanding Gizenga’s military strength. Consequently, “unless immediate and strong action is taken now there is the definite possibility that the entire Republic of the Congo will soon be under the control of a Communist-dominated regime.” If that occurred, neighboring states, being too weak to resist subversive pressures, “ultimately” would come under communist rule.
What could be done? The JCS sought approval of measures that included: pressing Secretary General Dag Hammarksjold (1) to instruct the UNEF to restore law and order throughout the Congo and (2) to replace his personal representative in the Congo, Rajeshwar Dayal of India, who patently favored the Lumumba-Gizenga faction; persuading the Sudanese to seek US assistance in stopping the flow of Soviet supplies to Gizenga; and undertaking, unilaterally and immediately, extensive covert operations to weaken and contain Gizenga's Stanleyville regime. President Kennedy ordered an interdepartmental task force to prepare a detailed program of action.20

State, OSD, and CIA spokesmen recommended replacing what they termed “largely discredited” Eisenhower policies with “new” ones: strengthen the UN's mandate; create a broadly-based Congolese government; and establish UN administration for the Congo. The JCS identified what they believed were important weaknesses. First, a firmer UN mandate would be meaningless without the military strength to enforce it. In any case, removing Dayal was a “pre-requisite” to success. Second, a broadly-based coalition would not serve US interests. “The demonstrated demagoguery of Lumumba, coupled with his current appeal resulting from his prison martyrdom, would surely push him to the forefront in any form of government.” While the best solution would be a strong centralized government led by Kasavubu and backed vigorously by the United Nations, a federated government excluding Lumumba’s faction also was acceptable. Finally, as a fallback, the Chiefs noted that the United States could carry out a successful intervention without unduly degrading its general war posture. ISA generally agreed with their appraisals. On 1 February, Secretary Rusk forwarded to President Kennedy a paper outlining the “new” policies, with one change: press for a “middle-of-the-road” cabinet government that would include “Lumumba elements but not Lumumba himself as Prime Minister.”21

Assistant Secretary Nitze solicited “practical” advice from the JCS about strengthening UN and Congolese forces; he also asked them to assess US capability for military intervention. In reply, the Chiefs recommended reorganizing UN forces on a regional basis, deploying them to ensure adequate shows of strength, and giving them a capability for mobile and independent operations. Instruction of Congolese soldiers should stress, first, basic training of ground forces and, second, gendarmerie activities. As for US intervention, two Army divisions and one Marine division/wing team could be committed; a two-division force could conduct “timely, decisive action.” CINCLANT's plan called for occupying Leopoldville and a line of communications to the seacoast.22

Matters took a dramatic turn when, on 13 February, Katangese authorities announced that Patrice Lumumba was dead, allegedly shot while attempting to escape. A UN investigation concluded that he had been murdered almost a month earlier.23 Third World leaders were outraged, and the Soviets made much propaganda mileage. Several communist and Afro-Asian countries extended diplomatic recognition to Antoine Gizenga's Stanleyville regime. On 21 February, after
a vituperative debate, the UN Security Council approved a resolution whose main points—strengthening the UN's mandate, urging withdrawal of all other foreign military and political advisers, calling upon states to prevent such persons from travelling to the Congo, and urging a convening of the parliament—paralleled the Kennedy administration's "new" policies.24

Nonetheless, on 21 February, the JCS warned that "the one factor which is most seriously aggravating the situation is the existence of the Gizenga regime and its actions, made possible by Soviet-backed support from the United Arab Republic25 and other neutrals." The Sudanese, displaying "commendable constancy to the UN," were permitting only UN-approved materiel to pass through its territory. Now, however, Sudanese were coming under "extreme" pressure from Nasser to grant transit rights to the UAR, a step that would be "disastrous to US-UN interests." The Chiefs deemed it "essential from a military standpoint" that the United States (1) provide Sudan with the strongest possible encouragement and support and (2) try to elicit a joint declaration from Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, the Central African Republic, Chad, and Congo-Brazzaville of their determination to prevent the passage of any military equipment, except under UN auspices. OSD agreed and so advised the interdepartmental task force.26

Lumumba's death worked very much to the advantage of the United States. The Soviets, having placed all their hopes upon Lumumba, were left without a rallying figure. Under strong US pressure, Secretary General Hammarskjold removed Rajeshwar Dayal. Kasavubu, Gizenga, and Tshombe engaged in labyrinthine negotiations. For the post of prime minister, Washington supported the moderate Cyrille Adoula. On 1 August, parliament approved a Government of National Unity. While President Kasavubu nominally led this coalition, Adoula as Prime Minister wielded the executive power; Gizenga became a Deputy Prime Minister and formally dissolved the Stanleyville regime.27

The United Nations Battles Moise Tshombe

The Congo remained divided because Tshombe continued running a separatist regime in Katanga. This was intolerable to the Leopoldville government, since Katanga's copper mines generated more than half the whole country's tax revenues and foreign exchange earnings. Allying himself with the Belgian Union Miniere, Tshombe used these funds to hire white mercenaries and mount a propaganda campaign picturing himself as a stalwart anti-communist. He won sympathy in Western Europe and among conservative circles in the United States. To most black Africans, though, Tshombe seemed nothing more than a tool of colonialism.

Pursuant to the 21 February resolution, the UN command tried to compel Tshombe to rid himself of 500 soldiers of fortune. Fighting between UN and
Katangan forces broke out on 13 September in Elizabethville, and UN forces fared badly. One lone Katangan airplane, an obsolescent Fouga Magister fighter, a two-seat French jet trainer, dominated the skies. Secretary General Hammarskjold agreed to meet Tshombe at nearby Ndola, in northern Rhodesia, on 17 September. Flying at night to avoid the Fouga, Hammarskjold’s aircraft crashed and all aboard were killed.

On 18 September, for the first time, Washington authorized using US transports for airlift within the Congo. Three C–130s and one C–124 flew to Leopoldville for this purpose. The next day, President Kennedy authorized the deployment of US fighters, if no other nation would supply such aircraft, to protect US transports and UN ground forces from air attack. A cease-fire was arranged on that same day, so the fighters never deployed. American transports did, however, deliver food and medical supplies to UN outposts.

On 21 November, the Security Council authorized Acting Secretary General U Thant of Burma “to take vigorous action, including the use of requisite measure of force, for the immediate [removal] . . . of all foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisors not under the United Nations Command.” By this time, other countries had provided enough fighters for the UNEF to control the skies over Katanga. When fighting resumed on 5 December, the United States committed twenty-one more transport aircraft.

The Kennedy administration knew that US prestige would suffer if the UN Command met with a military reverse. From the White House, on 11 December, General Taylor put several questions to General Lemnitzer. What was known about UN military plans? Had any US officer appraised their prospect of success? If not, how could the United States acquire more influence over the situation? President Kennedy ordered the JCS to send an officer to the Congo. They selected Major General Mercer Walter, USA, who was Deputy Chief of Intelligence for US Army, Europe. General Walter’s announced mission was to supervise US airlift operations and advise the US ambassador; his real task was to evaluate the UN military plans.

The JCS advised General Taylor that there always had been extreme difficulty in obtaining information from the UN Command. Nonetheless, they were reluctant to recommend drastic remedies. If it became known that US officers were reviewing UN plans, the Secretary General’s position could be seriously undermined and Washington would bear the blame for failures. Absent a US political decision to become more actively engaged and to acquire the authority and resources to influence UN activities significantly, “our present practice of furnishing some counsel to UN officials and practical logistic support to the UN operation should not be altered.”

Reinforced UN troops rapidly occupied Elizabethville; Tshombe agreed to a cease-fire and recognized the Congo’s “indissoluble unity.” General Walter, who reported that the UN Command really possessed no long-range plans,
was released from his Congo assignment late in December. General Lemnitzer advised the State Department that “we already have considerable military intelligence strength in the Congo,” from the attachés, and that the UN Command was unwilling to divulge its plans, “very likely because little if any military planning is being done.”

On 4 January 1962, with matters evidently much improved, the JCS advised Secretary McNamara that, “unless the US intends to become identified as an active participant in the UN Congo force, intra-Congo airlift should be restricted to bona fide emergency conditions.” The existence of such emergencies, moreover, ought to be evaluated at the national level so that all the implications should be fully considered. OSD and State agreed.

Months passed without progress toward Congolese unity. Late in August 1962, UN officials promoted a Plan for National Reconciliation that Prime Minister Adoula accepted while Tshombe remained recalcitrant. Then, when Tshombe became more accommodating, Adoula (under parliamentary pressure) refused to make further concessions. One State Department official likened these negotiations to the game of croquet in Alice In Wonderland, “where the balls were live hedgehogs that took every opportunity to unroll and creep away and the mallets were flamingos that interrupted every stroke by turning back their heads to argue with the players.”

Meantime, in December 1961, American diplomats urged that a small US advisory team go to the Congo; some UN members objected successfully to such unilateral action. Two months later, the offer was repeated to Adoula and U Thant—and again rejected. Finally, in May 1962, Adoula accepted the services of US advisers. A six-man team led by Colonel M. J. L. Greene, USA, visited the Congo during 6–12 July. Upon its return, the team recommended: a training and modernization program under UN auspices; reducing the military establishment to a 14,000-man internal security force plus a small air force for training and liaison missions and a modest navy for river patrol; providing a $2 million grant of vehicles, radios, repair parts, and rations; and maintaining a small US military mission to monitor progress. The JCS judged these steps generally sound, noting that immediate shipment of materiel would provide a political “earnest of US intentions” but do little to improve military effectiveness. But the scope, content, and timing of US assistance should be attuned to the possibility that such aid might “encourage and precipitate a Central Government attack on Katanga, regardless of US policy at the time.” Also, the aid program should proceed on a bilateral basis rather than within a UN framework.

State wanted a swift token shipment. On 14 September, the President authorized deliveries costing $150,000. Shipped on a bilateral basis, these supplies reached the Congo on 8 October. Two weeks later, Kennedy endorsed the Greene team’s recommendations. Contrary to JCS advice, however, he accepted State’s argument that the aid program should be international rather than bilateral in character.
On 7 November, President Kennedy approved a State Department plan aimed at buttressing Adoula, expanding UN military strength, and pressuring Tshombe. Earlier, the US ambassador in Leopoldville had warned Washington that UN inability to achieve reconciliation posed two military problems for the US: one, how would the UN force be extricated, and two, what would replace it? The Joint Staff reported that requirements for intervention under the most unfavorable circumstances included a carrier task force, two airborne battle groups (reinforced), one Army Special Forces group, 1/9th Marine division/wing team, four USAF tactical squadrons, and troop carrier aircraft.38

Some UN officials were beginning to insist upon a showdown with Tshombe. The UN Secretariat sought aircraft from Greece, Iran, Italy, and the Philippines—with scant success. UN headquarters also requested and received US help in airlift- ing vehicles to Elizabethville. On 29 November, the JCS directed execution of an administration decision to deploy three C–124 transports to the Congo. This step was not lightly taken, since standing US policy limited participation in intra-Congo airlift to “bona fide emergencies.”39

The outlook kept worsening. The UN’s mandate would have to be renewed in January 1963, and a large Indian contingent was due to depart in February. Conceivably, the UN effort would collapse and the Congo descend again into chaos. The Soviets, relatively passive spectators since Lumumba’s death, indicated a willingness to supply the Central Government with aircraft and equipment. Prime Minister Adoula, who barely had survived a no-confidence vote, claimed that parliament and the army would accept Moscow’s offer.

Assistant Secretary Nitze asked for JCS advice about whether to offer the UN and the Central Government enough military support to forestall the possibility of Soviet intervention. Answering on 11 December, they defined “the central issue” as whether to keep a pro-western regime in power. They recommended (1) trying to revitalize UN political and military efforts and (2) implementing the approved military assistance program as soon as possible. Direct American intervention, under UN aegis, should be undertaken only when collapse of the central government appeared imminent. In that eventuality, the US commitment should consist of one Composite Air Strike Unit (eight F–100s and two reconnaissance aircraft) accompanied by support elements and two reinforced rifle companies for base security. However, this commitment “should carry with it the recognition that, if necessary, the United States will also furnish under UN auspices any additional forces required to tip the balance of power decisively in favor of the UN forces in the Congo.” ISA concurred that same day and urged State to begin implementing actions as soon as possible.40

In New York, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, spoke with U Thant and found him strongly opposed to introducing US combat forces. U Thant asked, instead, for US equipment (ten F–86s with ground crews, six armored cars, and thirty-two light trucks) along with one engineer battalion. On 16 December,
the Joint Staff advised ISA that this was not enough. American air and sealift already had moved 88,000 personnel and 38,000 tons of equipment. U Thant was suggesting “merely an extension of the considerable support” already provided. The UN Command had enough planes to neutralize Tshombe’s air power, yet these aircraft were not being used to stop sorties against the Central Government’s forces. Consequently, the army’s morale had fallen, Adoula’s effectiveness was being undermined, and Katanga’s spirit of resistance had risen. The Joint Staff favored committing the Composite Air Strike Unit but withholding engineers and ground maintenance personnel, because those men might become involved in combat and in any case could not impart the “dynamic effect” which an entry of US combat forces would provide.41

The ExComm met on the morning of 17 December, followed by the full NSC that afternoon. The State Department presented a plan involving commitment of one fighter squadron. The President, however, approved only the ground equipment U Thant had requested plus some aircraft suitable for UN use along with ground crews, a small engineering unit, and transportation of six Philippine aircraft. If Tshombe initiated fighting or failed to cooperate promptly on reintegration, then the Composite Air Strike Force would deploy.42

On 22 December, the UN Secretariat decided to accept US materiel assistance—namely, F-84 fighters, transport and tanker aircraft, bridging equipment, trucks, and armored personnel carriers. At President Kennedy’s direction, the JCS had ordered Lieutenant General Louis Truman, USA, to lead a military mission that would examine UN and Congolese Army operational plans and determine whether more personnel, aircraft, and equipment were needed. The Chiefs themselves counseled caution, attributing the lack of forceful action by UN units not to insufficient strength but to the mandate itself, or to the manner of executing it, or to poor leadership and management. Consequently, they recommended deferring a decision about introducing US forces until General Truman’s findings could be fully considered.43

As it turned out, the dangers and difficulties had been exaggerated. In Elisabethville, on the night of 27–28 December, Katangan gendarmes began shooting at UN soldiers. UN troops quickly responded by securing roadblocks surrounding the city. Then they seized a military base at Kamina and advanced toward the last centers of resistance, which were Jadotville and Kolwezi at the far southern end of Katanga. U Thant agreed to a standstill on 2 January, but an Indian column occupied Jadotville the next day.

Under these circumstances, General Truman’s report became superfluous. Submitted on 31 December and endorsed by the Joint Chiefs and ISA, Truman’s major recommendations included ferrying ten F–84s to Kamina, loaning three C–124s and enough tankers to support fifty fighter sorties daily, delivering six helicopters, and providing a small number of technicians but no combat units.44 The UN Command asked for Bailey bridges, parachutes, and helicopters to assist its advance on Kolwezi. These proved
unnecessary because Tshombe agreed to end his secession on 17 January 1963 and UN troops entered Kolwezi unopposed.15

At this moment, US policy seemed fully successful. The Congo was unified and communist influence excluded; the UN Command had served Washington’s purposes. The Joint Chiefs viewed the problem in terms of Cold War competition, willing to bolster the UN Command insofar as doing so would prevent Moscow from gaining a foothold. Yet much of the US and UN achievement rested on quicksand. There was more instability, civil unrest, war, famine and bloodshed in the Congo’s future.
South Asia: Contradictions of Containment

As matters stood in 1961, Indians and Pakistanis disliked and distrusted each other more than they worried about threats from the Soviet Union or Communist China. In 1947, independence from Great Britain resulted in the creation of a Moslem Pakistan apart from a mainly Hindu and far more populous India. This partitioning was accompanied by scenes of expulsion and massacre, leaving lasting scars on both sides of the border. The fate of Kashmir aroused the deepest passions. Indian troops occupied this predominantly Moslem land; Pakistanis insisted that nothing except a complete Indian withdrawal would satisfy them.

During the 1950s, India and Pakistan pursued diametrically different domestic and foreign policies. India under Jawaharlal Nehru remained the world’s largest democracy. Pakistan allied itself with the United States, joining the Central and Southeast Asia Treaty Organizations, but it fell into such internal disarray that the army took power in 1958. Pakistan also provided intelligence and communications facilities as well as bases from which U–2s overflew the USSR. India opted for non-alignment and bid for leadership of the Third World; relations between Washington and New Delhi were sometimes prickly.

In mid-1961, President Mohammed Ayub Khan of Pakistan came to the United States with a list of arms requests that included: accelerating the modernization of 5½ divisions; acquiring one submarine and shipboard anti-air missiles; supplying C–130 transports; and replacing aging F–86 interceptors with F–104s. Twelve F–104s were slated to arrive in July; Ayub wanted 32 more. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that, from a purely military standpoint, most requests were justifiable. However, budgetary limitations made a larger military assistance program inappropriate. While deliveries of 58 M–47 tanks could be advanced into FY 1961, other ground force items sought by Ayub were either unavailable or unjustifiable. No
submarine should be supplied, and shipboard anti-air missiles ought to be placed on a very low priority. Four C–130s would be delivered during FY 1964, but the Pakistanis appeared incapable of handling more F–104s. On 15 July, while flying to the LBJ Ranch in Texas, Ayub spoke with General Lemnitzer and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense William Bundy, who said that deliveries under the Military Assistance Program would continue at about the previous level. Some M–47s would be sent during FY 1962 and four C–130s would arrive early in 1963, but neither a submarine nor additional F–104s would be forthcoming.1

Ayub returned to Washington in September 1962 and revisited this issue. To justify increased US aid, he complained to Secretary McNamara that India was consummating a deal whereby the Soviets would sell MiG–21s and help manufacture Soviet engines for Indian planes. McNamara pledged that FY 1963 deliveries would at least double those in FY 1962, attributing the past year’s problems to crises over Berlin and Laos and the need to strengthen CONUS reserves. He promised that 130 tanks (mostly M–48s, which were basically improved M–47s) would be delivered during FY 1963, that enough F–86s and F–104s would be furnished to replace normal attrition, and that one submarine would be supplied in FY 1964. Ayub appeared “highly pleased.”2

The Sino-Indian Border War

Several years of rising Sino-Indian tension reached a culmination during October and November 1962. Ambiguities in the McMahon Line, drawn in 1914 by the British through the Himalayan Mountains, generated conflicting border claims along India’s Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) and in the Ladakh area of Kashmir. Minor incidents accumulated and diplomatic warnings escalated.3

On 20 October 1962, Chinese troops launched attacks in both the NEFA and Ladakh, driving back an Indian brigade in the former and overrunning isolated garrisons in the latter. The Kennedy administration, focused on the Cuban missile crisis, decided not to offer assistance but was willing to respond to Indian requests. On the evening of 25 October, Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith cabled that an Indian request was imminent, probably asking for infantry weapons to equip two divisions.4

The Joint Chiefs, meeting on the morning of 26 October, were preoccupied with Cuba and recommended caution. First, let India’s fellow-members of the British Commonwealth survey requirements and furnish the first measures of assistance. Second, extend “sympathetic consideration” to Indian requests, while General Wheeler surveyed available US Army assets. Third, before completing any commitments, estimate how deliveries to India would affect US air and sealift capability elsewhere.5

As more border posts fell to the Chinese, Nehru declared a state of emergency and publicly admitted that “we were getting out of touch with reality... and living
in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation.” The Indians’ initial “shopping list,”
which reached Washington on 29 October, included 10,000 rifles, more than 1,000
mortars, 800 machine guns, and 1,000,000 anti-personnel mines. With the Cuban
crisis easing, the administration reacted rapidly. On 31 October, Nehru dismissed his
discredited Defense Minister, the outspokenly anti-American V. K. Krishna Menon.
That same day, President Kennedy authorized military aid to India. The first trans-
ports landed in Calcutta on 3 November; Indian troops in the NEFA began receiving
British and American arms twelve days later.6

On 11 November, American, British, Canadian, and Australian representatives
gathered in London. Three days later, they proposed outfitting five Indian divi-
sions during the next three to five months. Equipment should be “strictly limited to
reasonable quantities of items now either lacking or inferior”—for example, there
would be no “major additions” of combat aircraft. There should be an understand-
ing with India, as formal and explicit as possible, that any equipment was intended
solely for use against Chinese aggression.7

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bundy asked for a JCS assessment of these propos-
als. On 19 November, the J–5 defined US objectives over the longer term as: India’s
firm alignment with the West; peaceful resolution of Indian/Pakistani disputes; and
unequivocal recognition of the Sino-Soviet bloc’s inherent hostility and aggressive
intent toward the free nations of the West. Meantime, the J–5 argued, judgment
on the five-division plan should be deferred until Indian requirements had been
adequately assessed. Nations of the British Commonwealth should make maxi-
mum contributions which the United States would only supplement. Later that day,
McNamara and the JCS agreed that a high-level military fact-finding mission should
go to India immediately.8

Just then, the border war escalated dramatically. On 16 November, the Chi-
nese broke a battlefield lull and sent Indian troops reeling back on both fronts. The
situation was most serious in the NEFA where the 4th Division, supposedly one of
the stoutest in the Indian Army, practically disintegrated. Chinese troops advanced
into what indisputably was Indian territory and, by 19 November, stood within thirty
miles of the Assam plains.

Nehru sent two letters to President Kennedy, describing the situation as
“really desperate” and requesting immediate dispatch of twelve US fighter
squadrons to protect Indian cities and assist in any battles over Indian air
space. Nehru also asked for two squadrons of B–47 bombers, sending Indian
pilots and technicians at once for training in the United States. The administra-
tion shied away from what Rusk called “a request for an active and practically
speaking unlimited military partnership” against Chinese invasion. However, on
20 November, Kennedy did announce that a mission headed by Assistant Sec-
retary of State Averell Harriman, whose stature well exceeded his rank, would
visit Pakistan and India. The President also authorized prompt deployment to
India of twelve C–130s.9
Before Harriman’s mission left Washington, the border war ended. At midnight on 20/21 November, the Chinese announced that they would cease firing 24 hours hence and, beginning on 1 December, withdraw 12½ miles behind pre-hostilities positions, provided India did likewise. The Indians pulled back without admitting that they had done so. Ultimately, the Chinese withdrew completely from the NEFA but retained some contested areas of Ladakh.

India then asked for reconnaissance aircraft. Secretary McNamara was “pretty enthusiastic” about providing them and called for JCS views. The Director, Joint Staff, reported that four to six planes could deploy within six days. However, the Joint Chiefs opposed any action “at this time.” Instead, the Harriman mission should assess what India could do with aircraft already on hand or with planes supplied by the United States and the United Kingdom. The State Department feared that India might interpret the arrival of American reconnaissance aircraft as evidence of unconditional support. Accordingly, the JCS advice was adopted.10

The Harriman mission reached New Delhi on 22 November. Its members included Assistant Secretary Nitze and General Paul Adams, USA, who headed the newly-formed Strike Command. Simultaneously, a British mission arrived; it was led by Duncan Sandys, Chief of the Commonwealth Relations Office. The next day, Ambassador Galbraith urged Washington to provide extensive aid at once, without waiting for the missions’ findings. The JCS successfully opposed taking such a step.11

The Harriman mission detected “a fundamental change in Indian attitudes toward China” and “a widespread desire to create a new relationship with Pakistan.” Nehru, under strong pressure from Harriman and Sandys, agreed to open negotiations about Kashmir’s future. The Indian army’s chief of staff, Lieutenant General Jayanto Chaudhuri, presented a plan to re-equip three divisions and organize three new ones by the end of 1963. Proceeding to Pakistan, Harriman and Sandys persuaded Ayub to join with Nehru in announcing that Kashmir talks would start “at an early date with the object of reaching an honorable and equitable settlement.” But the mission also found that US military aid to India had caused “a great emotional shock” in Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, “with the notable exception of President Ayub and his immediate entourage,” still saw India as their primary enemy. Nothing less than a Kashmir settlement acceptable to Pakistan could alter this attitude.

In a report dated 3 December, the Harriman mission discerned a “major national interest” in providing India with “appropriate aid.” But Pakistani sensibilities had to be taken into account and a turn toward China averted. The report recommended providing, as an “emergency” phase over the next two months, $90 million worth of ammunition and replacement equipment to forward units. Erecting a radar net would cost $40 million more. As an “intermediate” phase, in 1963, three divisions should be re-equipped and three new ones outfitted for mountain warfare—essentially the Chaudhuri plan. On 10 December 1962, President Kennedy authorized a $60 million program of emergency aid, on the assumption that Great Britain and the Commonwealth countries would provide a like amount.12
On 2 December, Ambassador Galbraith had proposed bolstering India’s air defenses by making US aircraft and crews available, with India supplying ground personnel and equipment. Three days later, President Kennedy suggested to Prime Minister Macmillan that Britain and the Commonwealth commit to sending fighter squadrons, with the United States providing radar and ground equipment.\footnote{13}

During the morning of 14 December, the JCS conferred with Harriman, Galbraith (who was in Washington for consultations), and senior State Department officials. Galbraith claimed that India was now “the most militantly anti-Communist, pro-Us country in the world.” Harriman also saw “a real opportunity for moving India to the side of the Free World,” but urged that any long-range aid program be attuned to India’s willingness to make concessions over Kashmir.\footnote{14}

Formally, that same day, the Joint Chiefs advised against stationing US aircraft, crews, and supporting personnel in India. There was an obvious danger of combat losses, and US participation would prompt adverse reactions from Pakistan. The JCS wanted Britain to take over-all responsibility for implementing an air defense program, with the United States and Commonwealth countries furnishing materiel and training assistance. The United States’ role during 1963 should be limited to supplying three fixed radars and, over a longer term, three mobile radars along with enough Sidewinder air-to-air missiles for three fighter squadrons. Britain, Canada, and Australia ought to provide command and control communications as well as modernization for three fighter squadrons, together with training support and operational assistance. A US-UK team should go to India and “refine requirements within this commitment.” Recognizing the inadequacies of these measures, the Chiefs wanted the administration to urge Britain and Commonwealth countries to “assure” India that they would provide interim air defense forces against renewed Chinese aggression. But, in their opinion, the US Government should reserve its own decision about providing air defense.\footnote{15}

Since President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan planned to meet at Nassau during 18–21 December, a precise position had to be prepared. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric noted that the Joint Chiefs’ appraisal of air defense focused on deploying radars during 1963. Might any radars be installed in the next one or two months? The Joint Staff reported that this could not be done without seriously degrading US capabilities. There were only five mobile radar posts in the United States, and three of them were committed to Cuban coverage. Secretary McNamara told the Chiefs that action should be initiated immediately to expend as much as $100 million in obtaining more mobile radars.\footnote{16}

On 18 December, at a meeting attended by Taylor, Rusk, and Galbraith, three proposals were discussed: (1) an Indian plan to deploy eleven radars along the entire Himalayan front; (2) a plan by General Adams to limit radar coverage to Ladakh and the NEFA; and (3) a JCS plan to emplace radars in the NEFA alone. A “general feeling” emerged that the British should be asked to agree in principle upon a US–UK survey of air defense requirements. Such a survey would consider:
relocating Pakistan-oriented radars to face China; modernizing the Indian air force’s command and control; rotating US and UK fighter squadrons to Indian airfields; and visibly pre-stocking some US Air Force equipment at Indian air bases.¹⁷

At Nassau, Macmillan remarked that “unless we are careful the Indians will slide back into their same old arrogance and beautifully detached view toward . . . the West.” The prime minister believed that “we have to get them to face up to the fact of Kashmir.” Agreeing, Kennedy called it obvious that Nehru sought to persuade them not to couple Western aid with compromises over Kashmir. He and Macmillan decided to commit $60 million each during the next two months. Since air defense was the most important leverage for a Kashmir settlement, they agreed that a decision about it would await the findings of a US–UK team. At a session attended by Americans alone, the President stated “firmly” that if four fighter squadrons went to India, the mix should be two US and two British/Commonwealth. Deputy Assistant Secretary William Bundy argued for a 1-3 ratio, but Kennedy apparently was persuaded by the argument that “this would be the most visible element in whatever was done and that we should not be outnumbered in it.”¹⁸

India Courted, Pakistan Offended

A US–UK survey team, led by Air Commodore C. J. Mount, RAF, and Brigadier General James Tipton, USAF, spent most of February 1963 in India. Reporting to the JCS in mid-March, Tipton characterized Indian fighters as ineffective and Indian night/all-weather capability as negligible. Until these weaknesses were corrected, there appeared to be no alternative to providing outside forces. He recommended that the United States furnish, as first priority, radars for New Delhi and Calcutta. The British should provide replacement aircraft, air-to-air missiles, and three squadrons of night/all-weather fighters.¹⁹

The JCS still wanted the British to assume overall responsibility for implementing an air defense program. In justification, they cited the Commonwealth’s relationship with India, the fact that most Indian equipment was of British origin, and the circumstance that Indians had patterned their force development and operational procedures according to British advice. Should overriding political reasons make a US commitment necessary, the Chiefs wanted it to be couched in general terms, specify the conditions for termination as Indian capability improved, and reserve to the United States a determination about whether and how much to deploy. If Sino-Indian hostilities resumed and city bombing appeared imminent, the United States should be prepared to dispatch one fighter squadron and ground control intercept (GCI) radar. As to long-term aid, the Chiefs endorsed Tipton’s proposals. For security reasons, they added, India must ensure that any assistance from the communist bloc excluded Soviet advisory and inspection personnel.²⁰
President Kennedy asked State, Defense, and Central Intelligence whether they saw any prospect that China would attack when spring arrived. If so, was the United States doing enough—quickly enough—to help India? Answering on 9 March 1963, the JCS rated the danger of another border war as “relatively low.” China would not wish to make India even more pro-Western or to antagonize the USSR, which also was assisting India. In any case, no crash program could enable India to overcome years of neglect. For example, improvements in road, rail, and airlift capability could not be effected until late 1963. In these circumstances, the current scale and pace of US aid struck them as appropriate. The Chiefs also believed that full employment of Indian air power would “greatly” enhance defensive capabilities. There was some chance of Chinese counteraction, but city bombing would risk UN or US–UK intervention. Additionally, Chinese air forces would face formidable logistical problems in operating over the Himalayas. Consequently, the Chiefs concluded that “the Indians with outside assistance could hold their own for a much longer time than a comparison of the overall India–Chinese Communist air strength would indicate.” OSD generally agreed but advised the State Department that it favored expediting action on items costing $20.5 million.

Concurrently, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bundy told the Chiefs that there was an “urgent requirement for a fundamental determination of the US political and military policy toward the subcontinent.” Bundy asked for a strategic appraisal of the area and a determination of its military importance to the United States “in the context of our worldwide aims and commitments.” On 29 March, the JCS replied that the countries of South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan, possessed “significant strategic importance to the Free World. If India were to be effectively neutralized by communism, or defeated in armed conflict, the whole strategic balance of Asia would be upset. It is, therefore, in the US interest to buttress India against communism in the same way that it has been in our interest to do so in Thailand and South Vietnam.” Should India and Burma join the Sino-Soviet Bloc, the flanks of CENTO and SEATO would be turned and communists would gain easier access to Africa. But the Chiefs noted the Indian subcontinent was shielded by formidable natural barriers—the Himalayas, the Bay of Bengal, and the Arabian Sea—which would obstruct any large-scale aggression. Also, South Asia possessed scant economic wealth; the Middle East’s oil and Southeast Asia’s food surpluses made those areas more tempting targets for overt attack.

Obviously, the Chiefs’ words about South Asia’s “significant strategic importance” did not square with their reluctance to support more than minor military commitments there. Whenever generalities gave way to specifics, this sort of contradiction was not rare. The Joint Chiefs looked upon Pakistan as an ally but were never sure about India. By 1964, while reviewing military assistance programs, they would classify India as a neutral. Their words notwithstanding, the Joint Chiefs never contemplated buttressing India in the same way as South Vietnam.

Again, Ambassador Galbraith urged that India be offered substantial military aid in exchange for concessions on Kashmir. Convinced that the opportunity
was fleeting, he was not reticent: “May I have, for God’s sake, reasonably prompt reply?” The JCS saw no merit in his proposition. In their judgment, an aid package large enough to constitute “a reasonable lever” would have to include: defense production support of $34 million annually for the next four years and raw materials costing $20 million per year; ground equipment, air-to-air missiles, and three night/all-weather squadrons for air defense; and underwriting the creation of nine new divisions during 1964–67. Militarily, Galbraith’s proposal ignored the important part that the UK–Commonwealth should play. Politically, it failed to address the issue of whether Pakistan would accept an Indian concession involving only part of the Vale of Kashmir. There was nothing to indicate that India was willing to yield a substantial portion of Kashmir, and no evidence that Pakistan would settle for anything less than complete possession. Thus the United States might commit itself to aiding India yet fail to advance Kashmir negotiations. Pakistan might demand similar aid, placing the United States in a position of paying both sides to achieve an agreement which they ought to conclude in their own national interests. At a White House meeting on 1 April, President Kennedy rendered decisions that amounted to a rejection of Galbraith’s proposal.23

By late April, Nehru was taking a hard line on Kashmir and the British appeared reluctant to commit themselves to anything beyond the emergency $60 million. Secretary Rusk was preparing to visit India and Pakistan; the question was how far to condition US aid upon progress over Kashmir. At a White House meeting on 25 April, Secretary McNamara downplayed the military danger to India. He thought American and British aid should not exceed $300 million over three years, “and perhaps only half that.” President Kennedy, however, decided against being “penny wise” because he failed to see “how we could stop China without India.” He did not want to be limited by what the British would do and was ready to move ahead without requiring concessions over Kashmir.24

Upon returning, Secretary Rusk outlined what he called a “holding operation” to strengthen ties with the Indian military without antagonizing Pakistan or reducing our leverage on Kashmir. He recommended concluding an executive agreement to consult with India about using US air power in case of a Chinese attack and, in collaboration with the United Kingdom–Commonwealth, being prepared to deploy three interceptor squadrons to defend New Delhi and Calcutta, to station mobile radars as well as communications and navigation aids there, and to participate in intermittent peacetime air defense exercises. Although the Director, Joint Staff, strongly urged non-concurrence, the JCS gave a highly qualified endorsement. Again, they cautioned that a commitment involving US combat units should be made only for overriding political reasons. Periodic rotation of fighters to India constituted “a de facto commitment of US forces . . . and could involve the United States in combat action at a time, place, and under circumstances not of our choosing.”25

At an NSC meeting on 9 May, General Taylor emphasized that defending India involved a very heavy commitment for which no additional forces had
been provided. The basic issue, he argued, was not air defense of India but how to defend all Asia against Chinese aggression. He and Secretary McNamara believed that nuclear weapons would be required. President Kennedy wanted to consider “a flat guarantee of the territorial integrity of India.” If we were prepared to defend Korea and Thailand, why not India? Remembering our failure in 1950 to include South Korea in the US defense perimeter, Kennedy hoped that a guarantee to India would deter Chinese attack. Accordingly, the President approved Rusk’s recommendations described above.26

The JCS prepared and the State Department approved a plan for air defense exercises involving one US fighter squadron and one mobile radar. At Kennedy’s urging, Macmillan contributed one British squadron. Air defense exercise “Shiksha” took place between 1 and 30 November. Afterward, the Joint Chiefs reported that Shiksha had “served to unveil dramatically many inadequacies of the Indian Air Defense System.” Airfields were operational only in good weather; ground equipment was deficient; radars needed to be re-sited; major improvements in organizational structure, communications, and the systems for filtering information and identifying aircraft were imperative. They recommended against any repeat of Shiksha until Indian air defenses improved to a point where such exercises would prove remunerative. OSD agreed.27

Meantime, in August, the JCS reviewed the military assistance program for India and recommended an FY 1964 ceiling of approximately $50 million. The proper objective, they told McNamara, was not expansion of Indian forces but qualitative improvement of them. Areas best suited for US assistance were roads, airfields, logistics, communications, training, radar, and force improvement. Yet again, they asked that the British Commonwealth be encouraged to make the greatest possible contribution. Also, India should not be awarded priority over “those countries now firmly committed to the United States.” Hence, aid to Pakistan ought to remain roughly in balance with assistance to India. McNamara approved everything except the argument that India’s priority should be no higher than that of countries firmly committed to the United States.28

Also in August, ISA completed an analysis of aid requirements for Pakistan, aiming at a three-year funding commitment. The Pakistanis apparently hoped to acquire more supersonic aircraft in return for allowing expansion of the US intelligence facility at Peshawar. Pakistan had received one F–104 squadron of twelve aircraft. ISA proposed providing 24 more F–104s, instead of 24 F–5s that lacked air defense capabilities. The JCS concurred but voiced concern that an attempt to placate Pakistan would stimulate Indian demands for equal treatment. They foresaw a vicious cycle, in which acceding to Indian requests would generate fresh unhappiness in Pakistan. Therefore, the manner of presenting a three-year aid program to the Pakistani government was most important. Pakistanis should be assured that military aid to India had been inspired entirely by the communist threat. The JCS believed that, once Pakistanis learned that aid to India was not the “massive” assistance alleged by the news media, much of their apprehension would be allayed.29
Under Secretary of State George Ball was the next high-ranking official scheduled to visit Pakistan. In preparation, State and ISA proposed that he indicate US willingness to (1) discuss a multi-year MAP commitment, (2) undertake a joint large-scale exercise, (3) study the threat to Pakistan, without mentioning India by name, and (4) consider pre-stocking supplies. The JCS objected to (3). Excluding India from the study would hurt US–Pakistani relations, particularly at the military level. But if the threat from India was discussed, US planners would have to admit India’s overall superiority. Talks then would revolve around India’s intent, over which Americans and Pakistanis differed, and upon the chance of India attacking Pakistan while the threat from China persisted, which would tend to confirm Pakistanis’ view of China as their primary protector.30

The Under Secretary’s trip, from 3 to 6 September 1963, was not a success. Ball reported that officials “from Ayub down are filled with deep fear of potential Indian military action to destroy Pakistan. . . . Against this background the Paks are unwilling to accept, as meeting their security requirements, any military guarantee that the US is presently willing to propose. . . . Accompanying this fear bordering on despair is a growing doubt in Pak[istani] minds whether their policy of alliance with the US is viable for the future.” Ball urged that, while Pakistanis were going through their agonizing reappraisal, the administration consider giving Pakistan more MAP and accelerating the phase out of MAP for India.31

Courtships Cool

Chester Bowles, who replaced Galbraith as ambassador to India,32 proposed trading a five-year MAP commitment, about $65–75 million annually, for an understanding that India would not exceed reasonable force goals, limit its purchases from the Soviets, and take a more active role in containing China. Significantly, there was no longer any mention of Kashmir concessions. Early in December, Rusk, McNamara, and AID Administrator David Bell advised President Johnson that such an arrangement “would be well worthwhile.” Instead of putting their cards on the table at the outset, though, they recommended proceeding cautiously to gauge Indian and Pakistani reactions. The JCS had set India’s requirements at twelve divisions and 35 squadrons. Rusk, McNamara, and Bell recommended preparing a five-year plan calling for $50 to $60 million annually in MAP funds. Willingness to proceed would depend on achieving the understanding outlined by Bowles. For Pakistan, there should be a three- to five-year plan running around $40 million annually.33

Just before Christmas, General Taylor visited New Delhi and Karachi. The Indians had more ambitious force goals: 16 divisions and 45 squadrons, perhaps rising to 64. The Chairman concluded, however, that the Indians were “prepared to view themselves, implicitly at least, as part of a regional security community with the
common objective of containing China.” Taylor discerned a justifiable requirement for continuing US aid, “held within bounds proportioned to the limited nature of the military threat.” Going on to Karachi, Taylor listened to Ayub orate about how America was arming India against its supposed ally, Pakistan. Taylor did allow that “a certain type of operational planning could be engaged in,” but “without concentrating attention exclusively on anyone.” Ayub responded that, while planning need not be oriented to one direction, “all contingencies should be considered.” As the meeting ended, Ayub remarked that the United States seemed to be applying a reverse order of priority, with communist countries getting the most attention, then neutrals, and finally friends and allies—if anything was left. Taylor replied that we could do little “if we confined ourselves to helping those who did not criticize us or follow policies divergent from ours.” He then questioned Ayub about Chinese foreign Minister Chou En-lai’s forthcoming visit to Pakistan. Ayub answered “heatedly” that he would be performing a service to the West by ascertaining China’s intentions and discerning any move by New Delhi toward an accommodation with Peking.34

Upon returning to Washington, Taylor recommended offering India a one-year interim program of about $50 million and indicating willingness to embark upon parallel military planning, once India produced a satisfactory five-year plan that met Bowles’ conditions. Pakistan should be given a similar five-year proposal. Taylor was willing to include two squadrons of supersonic aircraft and a joint mobility exercise involving a proposed Indian Ocean Task Force. Subsequently, the JCS specified three conditions. First, India and Pakistan should understand that there were no firm fiscal commitments. Second, in light of declining MAP appropriations, a planning ceiling of $50 million per year was preferable. Third, any F–104s for Pakistan should not be taken from the US Air Force’s inventory.35

Early in February 1964, President Johnson approved exploratory approaches to both countries. India presented its five-year plan in March. The JCS advised Secretary McNamara that it struck them as having been developed “to meet unstated objectives in response to unevaluated threats.” Apparently, India wanted the capability to cope with simultaneous attacks by China and Pakistan. The plan called for 23 division-equivalents with 564,000 combat troops. Yet, since China could commit no more than 270,000 men and Pakistan another 128,000, these goals seemed “clearly excessive.” Also, fulfilling the plan would require rupee and foreign exchange expenditures far in excess of what India could afford. Therefore, any US response should await a “thorough understanding” with Indian officials regarding “the political and economic basis of Indian military planning.”36

Ambassador Bowles urged that India be provided with F–104Gs to enhance US influence and preclude Indian production of MiG–21s. The JCS disagreed that a rise in US influence would pre-empt that of the Soviets, establish a “meaningful constraint” on India’s behavior, or compensate for a further exacerbation of US-Pakistani relations. If political considerations became overriding, they proposed offering F–5s or F–6As, the latter planned as a high-subsonic fighter costing only
American and Indian officials opened discussions in mid-May 1964. The Indians indicated no intention of reducing their force goals and made known that Soviet aid programs—namely, the furnishing of 80 to 90 MiG–21s to be assembled in India—constituted firm agreements. After a hiatus caused by the death of Jawaharlal Nehru, modern India's founding father, a Memorandum of Agreement was completed on 3 June. Basically, there would be $10 million in credits for FY 1964 and $50 million in FY 1965 for mountain warfare equipment, communications, and defense production, mainly ammunition. Secretary McNamara withheld any five-year promises pending further work on planning, particularly about air defense. The JCS believed that, while 12 divisions and 29 squadrons still constituted desirable levels, Indian plans probably would run above them. They saw no point, though, in trying to establish the limits of acceptability. Without the authority to inspect all units and items, “India will be able to use credit sales equipment to support forces in excess of those stated.”

Dealings with the Pakistanis went even less well. In February 1964, the Commander in Chief of Pakistan’s army, General Mohammed Musa, sent General Taylor a catalogue of the “numerous vital and wide gaps” that still existed in his forces. After reviewing Musa’s lengthy list of requests, the Joint Staff advised Taylor that some of Musa’s complaints were well founded. Most, however, flowed from a lack of familiarity with MAP procedures, an inflated idea of available resources, and insufficient information about specific items. McNamara told the Pakistani ambassador that Musa’s letter contained a number of misrepresentations and was one of the most upsetting he had ever read. “When I make a commitment,” he insisted, “I keep it.”

When Musa visited Washington in April, the Director of Military Assistance, General Robert Wood, told him that the current MAP ceiling would not be raised. Wood cautioned, moreover, that delivery of two F–104 squadrons during 1965–66 would be contingent upon a resolution of political differences with India. Subsequently, Musa told General Taylor that such conditions stripped the “charm and grace” from their relationship. Taylor replied that, since Congressional approval for MAP was necessary, they were simply an acknowledgement of the facts of American political life.

Pakistanis’ efforts to promote joint planning fared no better. General Musa wanted extensive joint planning for the defense of all Pakistan’s frontiers to precede a joint mobility exercise. He spent two days with General Paul Adams and finally took home a scenario for President Ayub. Early in July, Adams asked the JCS whether they still wanted the exercise to proceed. The Chiefs responded that, since Pakistanis evidently aimed at achieving a commitment of US forces, our best course was to let the Pakistanis make the next move. On 1 August, General Wheeler (who had just become Chairman) wrote Musa that too little time remained
to arrange “an orderly and successful exercise” during 1964. On 5 August, General Adams received a letter from Musa dated 31 July (antedated, one may surmise) suggesting that some US officers proceed to Pakistan and participate in detailed planning for the exercise. As instructed by the JCS, Adams answered that all action must be deferred.41

In September, India accepted substantial Soviet military assistance that included MiGs, two surface-to-air missile complexes, and 90 amphibious tanks. President Ayub talked about leaving SEATO. Late in 1964, the White House received information that the Pakistani government had a secret commitment from China establishing a significantly closer relationship than was publicly acknowledged.42

From the US standpoint, two years of effort ended in disappointment. Neither India nor Pakistan had enlisted in a strategy for containing China. Pakistan continued to fear India more than China. India was not willing to align itself with the West or to compromise about Kashmir. Consequently, US military assistance could not be turned to political advantage—an outcome that the JCS predicted. Five-year plans for India and Pakistan, rather nebulous in any case, were undone by the old bugbear of Kashmir. Sporadic fighting began along the border in April 1965 and escalated into full-scale war by August. The United States suspended aid to both belligerents, irritating both countries.

**Entering the Indian Ocean**

In 1961, the British began talking about withdrawing from Hong Kong, Singapore, and all points east of Aden. Foreseeing a power vacuum in the Indian Ocean area, the JCS in January 1962 suggested negotiating long-term agreements for emergency use of strategically located islands. First priority should go to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and Socotra in the Gulf of Aden. The State Department believed Socotra would be a political liability but was willing to talk with the British about detaching Diego Garcia before the latter became independent. Approached in April 1963, the British agreed three months later to preliminary discussions.43

In July 1963, President Kennedy raised the possibility of sending a small carrier task force into the Indian Ocean. Secretary Rusk reacted favorably but the JCS did not. Already, the Chiefs believed, there were enough activities in the Indian Ocean area to supply “substantial evidence” of US interest and intent. While opposing any deployments as militarily undesirable, they were prepared to commit a carrier task temporarily if political needs so dictated.44

Secretary Rusk insisted that more must be done. Accordingly, in mid-November 1963, Secretary McNamara asked the JCS to prepare for deploying an Indian Ocean Task Force (IOTF) during two months out of every six. But, before they could do so, a news leak triggered adverse reactions abroad. China charged that the IOTF was merely an extension of the Seventh Fleet, well known as an agent...
of containment in the Far East. President Ayub told General Taylor that the IOTF seemed like a modern version of “teaching the natives and the heathen how to behave.”

In February 1964, the State Department acknowledged that the IOTF’s itinerary had to change. Visits to India and Pakistan could prove “counter-productive”; port calls to Indonesia and Malaysia might disturb delicate negotiations between those feuding countries. Conversely, stops in East Africa would be “highly desirable,” especially in the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) which, after a pro-communist coup in Zanzibar, might assume an important place in the satellite tracking program. The JCS believed that these changes robbed the cruise of any real value. Nonetheless, they submitted an itinerary without formally registering their misgivings. On 19 March, President Johnson approved the concept of periodic cruises in the Indian Ocean. He considered this a “most appropriate use” of air-sea power “in an area of considerable strategic importance to the United States.”

The voyage of the “Concord Squadron,” consisting of the carrier *Bon Homme Richard*, three destroyers, and one oiler, lasted from 31 March until 13 May. Its ports of call included Diego Suarez in the Malagasy Republic, Mombasa in Kenya, Aden, and the Gulf of Oman, where a weapons demonstration was conducted for the Shah of Iran. Afterwards, Rusk characterized the cruise as “an outstanding success” that “more than lived up” to expectations. Another voyage occurred during July–October, but events in South Vietnam led to cancellation of a third cruise scheduled for the spring of 1965. Nonetheless, the Indian Ocean remained embedded in US planning.
The Far East: Seeking a Strategy

Regional Strategy: A Changing Context

When the Truman and Eisenhower administrations set global priorities, the Far East always ranked below Europe. For Asia, the key concept was holding and defending without committing large US ground forces. Thus JSCP-62, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan approved in December 1960, emphasized protecting the offshore island chain during general war: “In the Western Pacific, the United States and its Allies will hold in Southeast Asia as far forward as possible and along the general line Philippines-Taiwan-Okinawa-South Korea and Japan while maintaining control of the contiguous waters.” South Korea would be defended “to the extent such action will not prejudice the task of securing Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines.” Defense of Southeast Asia would have to be accomplished “primarily by Allied and indigenous forces unless US forces have been previously deployed.”

In February 1961, Secretary Rusk suggested creating a more visible, forward US presence around the Asian periphery. Threatened nations, he said, could combat insurgencies better if they shed some of the burden of defending against external attack. The JCS saw serious flaws in this approach. Shifting this responsibility to the United States would sap Asians’ will to resist and provide excellent themes for communist propaganda. Since Asian countries that reduced their conventional capabilities would become extremely vulnerable to Sino-Soviet blackmail, the United States would have to increase “demonstrably” its power in the Western Pacific.

In May, the Laotian crisis raised the possibility of a direct confrontation between US and Chinese forces. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric asked the JCS to appraise several scenarios. His questions and their answers ran as follows:
Q. What would be the outcome of air battles?
A. With or without sanctuaries and with or without nuclear weapons, American air power probably would prevail.

Q. Could US and allied forces hold a line in Southeast Asia?
A. Without nuclear weapons, nothing more than Saigon and the Mekong River line could be held. With them, a line that ran from Hue and Da Nang down to Kontum and Pleiku in South Vietnam, Pakse and the Bolovens Plateau in Laos, and then along the Mekong River could be defended. Even if the Chinese used Soviet-supplied nuclear weapons, that line could hold as long as the allies maintained air superiority.

Q. Could the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu be held?
A. With nuclear weapons, yes. Without them, no.

Q. Could North Vietnam be defeated and Hainan Island captured?
A. Winning by conventional means would require extended operations accompanied by a major mobilization. Using tactical nuclear weapons, US and allied forces could defeat North Vietnam supported by China. If nuclear weapons were not employed against China itself, the effort involved would be much greater. Unrestricted nuclear attacks, however, could defeat North Vietnam and destroy or neutralize the Chinese threat. If China retaliated with Soviet-supplied nuclear weapons, timely and effective attacks could destroy “major portions” of the Soviet-supplied arsenal, but surviving forces could inflict considerable damage upon US bases.3

General Taylor toured the Far East in September 1962, just before assuming the Chairmanship. He reported that, “for the first time, we sense the need to deter China in a way similar to the deterrence of the USSR.” In appraising air defenses, for example, the entire western Pacific ought to be treated as one entity. He described Chiang Kai-shek’s “most pressing problem” as acquiring modernized air defenses for the Republic of China on Taiwan. He remarked that one US objective for Chiang’s troops was extensively assisting American forces in the event of general war. That concept, however, could justify a force of almost any size. He suggested a three-division expeditionary force, reducing Chiang’s army requirements accordingly.4

Secretary McNamara responded to Taylor’s report by assigning the Joint Chiefs two tasks. First, study how early use of nuclear weapons against large-scale Chinese aggression would affect US and allied force requirements. Second, prepare a plan for coping with the growing threat of Chinese air power. In April 1963, the JCS submitted their air defense study. The USSR impressed them as a decisive factor. In July 1960 the Soviets had withdrawn their advisors from China, opening a momentous split between the two powers. Without Soviet assistance, the Joint Chiefs believed, China might be unable to wage sustained air warfare against first-class opposition or even to maintain the current peacetime effectiveness of its air force. The JCS recommended steps that included: continuing to put primary reliance on nuclear deterrence, avoiding any attempt to deter solely with conventional strength; modernizing and increasing deployments of US fighter and attack aircraft; and stationing Polaris submarines in the Pacific.
McNamara agreed that sole reliance on conventional capabilities would be unwise but opposed putting primary dependence on nuclear deterrence because that would be ineffective against insurgency, subversion, and the like. He agreed about Polaris but questioned whether increased air deployments were necessary, considering the US advantages in quality and mobility.\footnote{In May 1963, the JCS advised McNamara that a strategy of early nuclear response would not affect current US and allied force levels. Chiang's Nationalists on Taiwan could not cut their requirements because they needed forces sizeable enough to compel the communists to launch a large-scale attack and thus present suitable nuclear targets. Nationalist troops also constituted "a continuing deterrent threat," tying down large forces opposite Taiwan, and provided one of the few strategic reserves in the Far East. Similarly, in Southeast Asia, a reduction of indigenous forces “most likely” would lead to increased requirements for US support.\footnote{McNamara found the idea of using Nationalists as a strategic reserve plausible but wondered whether their appearance on the mainland might create major political problems. Secretary Rusk was sure that it would. The Nationalists, he argued, could be employed only against large-scale Chinese Communist aggression. Otherwise, their appearance in Southeast Asia almost certainly would provoke Chinese Communist intervention. The Nationalists, Rusk reasoned, would commit their troops only for a major conflict that might lead to their regaining control of the mainland. So, if the Chinese Communists made a limited probe in Southeast Asia and the Nationalists intervened, Peking might see that as presaging an invasion of China and react violently, thereby turning a limited probe into a major conflict.} Accepting Rusk's arguments, Secretary McNamara tasked the JCS with determining whether, under this more restricted mission, Nationalist forces should remain at their current levels. Their reply, dated 22 October 1963, reminded the Secretary that Nationalist force objectives were tailored to defending Taiwan, the Penghus, and the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu; possible deployments elsewhere did not enter the calculation. The Chiefs did recommend minor adjustments: withdraw MAP support for six light infantry divisions; reduce objectives for destroyers, destroyer escorts, and LSTs but raise them for minesweepers. They opposed cuts in Chiang's air force, because air superiority over the Taiwan Strait was essential in countering a communist attack.\footnote{The availability of a strategic reserve seemed less pressing because, during 1963, the Chairman's Special Studies Group reached, and Secretary McNamara accepted, more optimistic conclusions about what was needed for a successful conventional defense in Southeast Asia. China and North Vietnam could commit 21 divisions but, facing US air superiority and limited by an austere rail and road net, the Group believed they could support only about seven to twelve in combat. The thirteen Thai and South Vietnamese divisions in the area, reinforced by one Commonwealth and five US divisions, could halt the enemy along the general line of the 15th parallel and thence north along the Mekong River. For Korea, an Army study}
indicated that current forces standing along a well-fortified zone could defeat a Chinese/North Korean attack on the scale of 1951.9

The specter haunting strategic planners, civilian ones especially, was that of a nuclear-armed China. In December 1960, General Lemnitzer reminded the Service Chiefs that China might explode a nuclear device “in the not too distant future.” The impact upon Asian and African nations “might well be profound.” He proposed, and they agreed, to assess how Chinese nuclear capability would affect the Free World’s security posture and deployments, and recommend steps to counteract the Chinese achievement.10

The JCS sent their analysis to Secretary McNamara on 26 June 1961. They believed that China might test a nuclear device sometime during 1962–64 and amass a small stockpile of nuclear weapons within two years. China could develop a missile reaching 200 to 500 nautical miles by 1968–70, but no ICBM able to reach the United States until well after 1970. Although US power would remain superior as long as China possessed only a small stockpile of bombs, the price of preserving pro-western orientations among non-communist nations would rise. When China’s arsenal became sizeable, however, the military balance in the Far East would start swinging toward the communists unless US forces there increased. Additionally, China’s acquisition of medium-range missiles would compound the problem.

What might be done? For the short-range period, 1961–64, the Chiefs suggested steps that included: postponing China’s attainment of nuclear capability for as long as possible by “all feasible overt and covert actions”; lessening the psychological impact of the first Chinese detonation by telling all concerned countries that neither the balance of power nor US policy in Asia would change; and exploiting Sino-Soviet differences as well as Chinese weaknesses. For the mid-range period, 1964–70, the Chiefs recommended strengthening US conventional, air defense, and nuclear capabilities. Additionally, selected allies should be supplied with nuclear weapons carriers. For the long-range period, they favored completing a cohesive regional alliance and strengthening the US base complex.11

In November 1962, Secretary Rusk authorized preparation of a program to influence world opinion in the aftermath of a Chinese explosion. The JCS produced a draft minimizing the changes that would occur in China’s behavior and capabilities after the first nuclear test. In June 1963, the US Intelligence Board cleared a sanitized version for dissemination among friendly nations.12 Over the next fifteen months, a fair amount of effort was spent trying to define how much the threat would increase and how Asian nations might be reassured. The JCS argued that “for the indefinite future, . . . the real relations of power among the major states” would not alter. Nor did they see any reason why US responses to aggression should be restricted. In their judgment, China’s willingness to use nuclear weapons would be inhibited not only by fear of US retaliation and doubt
as to Soviet support but also by worry about coalescing Asian nations against them, spurring Japanese rearmament, and forfeiting leadership of the worldwide revolutionary movement. Therefore, our posture before and after a Chinese detonation ought to be one of “calm and assurance,” making clear that US nuclear power far exceeded China’s, demonstrating US will and ability to respond appropriately against any aggression, capitalizing upon a Chinese explosion to stimulate allied defense efforts, and launching a psychological warfare campaign to denigrate China’s international stature.

Apparently, the Chiefs’ approach of “calm and assurance” was not widely shared within the administration. In July 1963, Acting Assistant Secretary Bundy asked the JCS to prepare a contingency plan for attacking China’s nuclear weapons production facilities, using conventional munitions. In December, the Chiefs replied that such an operation was feasible but recommended using nuclear weapons. On 15 September 1964, President Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and Director McCone discussed what actions to take and decided they were “not in favor of unprovoked unilateral US military action against Chinese military installations at this time.” However, they saw “many possibilities for joint action with the Soviet Government if that Government is interested...even a possible agreement to cooperate in preventive military action.” They agreed that Rusk would explore the matter “very privately” with the Soviet ambassador.

Time had run out. At Lop Nor, on 16 October 1964, China exploded an 18-kiloton enriched uranium device. Asked to analyze this event, the JCS described the US military posture planned for the Pacific area through 1970 as “generally adequate.” Certainly, China would try to use its nuclear capability as a weapon for spreading influence and promoting insurgencies. But the likelihood of either a direct confrontation with the United States or a pre-emptive attack against US forces and bases would not increase significantly—at least, not until China acquired an intercontinental delivery system. Obviously, the United States would have to stand firmly behind its Asian allies. The Chiefs suggested: increasing MAP support to South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand; pass a Congressional resolution authorizing the President to retaliate in kind if China used nuclear weapons against a US ally; explore possibilities for strengthening regional alliances; and persuading Japan to increase her defense efforts and permit nuclear weapons to be positioned at US bases there. Although the US military posture needed no adjustment at present, certain areas like air defense did require reassessment. If a missile was launched near the Sino-Soviet border, for instance, the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System was not accurate enough to tell whether it was Soviet or Chinese. Overall, however, the Chiefs reaffirmed their judgment that China’s possession of nuclear weapons “will not, for the indefinite future, alter the real relations of power among the major states, or the balance of military power in Asia.”
Withdrawals from South Korea?

Although the Korean War ended in 1953 with an armistice, tensions on the peninsula remained high. In South Korea, the Republic of Korea (ROK) armed forces numbered about 600,000, including 29 divisions (19 active, 10 reserve) and 195 jet aircraft. The US Eighth Army comprised two divisions and a missile command. The American general who commanded US forces in Korea also acted as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), thereby controlling South Korean and tiny allied contingents as well. North Korea had around 355,000 men under arms. China kept no combat units in North Korea but maintained formidable forces in adjacent Manchuria.

In January 1961, South Korea was burdened by a sputtering economy and ineffective political leadership. On 5 May, the NSC ordered a task force under State Department leadership to review US policy. In Seoul, eleven days later, a group of officers overthrew the civilian government of Prime Minister Myon Chang. The new regime, led by Major General Park Chung Hee, was fiercely puritanical and unmistakably authoritarian. General Carter Magruder, acting in his capacity as CINCUNC, called upon all military personnel in his command to support the Chang government. After a White House meeting, General Lemnitzer cabled Magruder that “the consensus... was that your statement went just about as far as you can possibly go” and suggested that Magruder avoid issuing anything further. Park and his colleagues, who soon consolidated their power, very briefly withdrew ROK forces from Magruder’s command.

General Lemnitzer was embarrassed because he had visited Seoul early in May and spoken with some of the officers who were then plotting Chang’s overthrow. None of them had hinted at what was coming. Subsequently, during a congressional hearing, Senator Albert Gore (D, Tenn.) asked Lemnitzer whether he had known about or played any part in the coup. Lemnitzer answered emphatically that he had not—and added that he resented the question.

On 13 June the NSC discussed a task force report that, among other things, called for reviewing the ROK military’s missions and force levels. In General Lemnitzer’s recollection, a State Department representative argued that US troops should be withdrawn, largely for political and economic reasons. Lemnitzer, amazed that such an important subject would be broached without informing or consulting the Chiefs beforehand, argued strongly against any reductions at that time. First, he said, the war and its 33,000 American dead had given the United States a great stake in South Korea’s future. Second, South Korea’s reconstruction testified to the effectiveness of US economic aid. Third, a non-communist South Korea was vital to Japan’s security. Fourth, the American who acted as CINCUNC was clothed with the symbolic authority of the United Nations, by virtue of which he commanded all forces in South Korea. That arrangement impressed Lemnitzer as the most effective deterrent possible.
under the existing situation. Finally, he forcefully protested against this bypassing of the Chiefs. President Kennedy rejected a withdrawal; the NSC approved further study of alternatives.21

On 2 August, the JCS advised Secretary McNamara that they had reviewed and rejected every possible change. The impact of a US withdrawal would be “immediate and dangerous,” possibly inviting renewed aggression and prompting Japan to reappraise her position. Cutting the Military Assistance Program in order to reduce the ROK armed forces might eliminate inefficiency, but it could also tempt the communists to try another invasion. Reducing both US and ROK strength would worsen a conventional balance that already favored North Korea and China. Augmenting US forces, however, would mean abandoning the policy of supplementing rather than supplanting indigenous ones. If the MAP was increased in order to accelerate ROK modernization, funds would have to be diverted from other critical areas. Expanding both the Eighth Army and the ROK military would strain both countries’ economies and drain US strength that was needed elsewhere.22 Consequently, no changes should be made to US and ROK force structures “at this time” and the MAP should continue at planned levels.23

The US balance of payments deficit worsened, leading the State Department to raise the possibility of shifting one division from Korea to some place in the Pacific where only US dollars were used. On 1 August 1962, State, ISA, and Joint Staff representatives reviewed matters. Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson said that, despite General Lemnitzer’s oft-repeated opposition to any reductions, the issue would have to be reopened. Conferrees agreed that State, Defense, and AID should study the implications of a partial withdrawal.24

ISA asked the Joint Chiefs to assess the implications of transferring one division from Korea to Okinawa. Doing so, they replied, could dilute the deterrent “to an unacceptable degree” and lead to undesirable changes in command relationships. With only one US division in Korea, it would be hard to justify preserving US army and corps headquarters. Koreans might be unwilling to remain under CINCUNC’s operational control. Two ROK divisions would have to replace the US one withdrawn, virtually eliminating the ROK reserve. On Okinawa, moreover, housing, training, port, and airfield facilities already were inadequate. Theater-wide mobility would suffer, because the division on Okinawa would have to be ready for a rapid return to Korea. After assessing this submission, State and OSD agreed that a one-division withdrawal would be inadvisable “at this time.”25

General Taylor’s accession to the Chairmanship precipitated a major change. “In NATO,” he wrote afterwards, “we had undertaken an unqualified commitment to use [nuclear] weapons if essential to the security of the alliance, and the NATO force structure was based upon that undertaking. If we would agree to treat a major Chinese attack in the same way. . . . We would greatly reduce military force requirements and add importantly to the deterrent effect of the forces we had.” After hearing his argument, Secretary McNamara asked the JCS to study how early
use of nuclear weapons would affect force requirements, and whether any changes in the MAP were indicated.26

The Joint Staff’s answer did not satisfy General Taylor, apparently because it concluded that conventional force levels could not be reduced. Accordingly, on 6 March 1963, he ordered the Joint Staff to prepare a study based upon the following assumptions:

1. Nuclear capabilities would be increased by deploying PERSHING and SERGEANT missiles to Korea and by stationing one or more Polaris submarines in the western Pacific.
2. The ROK would be supplied with surface-to-air missiles to protect Seoul as well as the ports of Inchon and Pusan.
3. The US Air Force would keep available, for reinforcing South Korea, up to five interceptor and twelve tactical squadrons.
4. After the above measures had been carried out, the US ground presence would be reduced to CINCUNC headquarters and a nuclear missile command, plus the necessary support and logistical units.
5. Subsequently, the ROK army would be reduced to rough parity with the North Korean army.
6. A political study would seek ways to normalize conditions along the Demilitarized Zone, thus ending the need to man a continuous fortified front.27

Remarkably, Taylor brought the Service Chiefs over to his side. On 20 April, the JCS advised Secretary McNamara that a nuclear strategy did appear feasible. To make it credible, however, “the United States must clearly establish and exhibit the intent to be willing to initiate the use of nuclear weapons without hesitation in the event of a major attack from the north.” Implementing this strategy would involve sending nuclear-capable missile units to Korea, withdrawing the two US divisions, cutting the US presence from 52,400 to 17,250, and reducing the ROK army to about 450,000. The US cutbacks could be completed by December 1965, the ROK reductions by December 1967. Admittedly, there were risks. Unless the new strategy was clearly understood, major US withdrawals could result in ROK reluctance to continue under US operational control, and provoke a withdrawal of other allied contingents. Asian allies, misconstruing the intent of these reductions, might turn towards neutralism or pro-communism. Japan might refuse the base and port rights necessary to support a nuclear strategy. Finally, large-scale cuts in the ROK army might worsen that country’s chronic unemployment problem. Nonetheless, the Chiefs acknowledged that “indefinite maintenance of the present military confrontation in Korea is not desirable, and that there are political and economic considerations which might warrant the assumption of certain politico-military risks.”28 This marked a decisive change from the position stated consistently during Lemnitzer’s tenure.

Assistant Secretary Nitze found serious faults in a nuclear strategy. “If a policy of giving the President maximum options in Europe makes sense,” he wrote to Secretary McNamara, “it would seem also to make sense in the Pacific.... If
a policy of getting our allies to reduce... the conventional imbalance in Europe makes sense, I don't see why a similar policy doesn't make sense in the Pacific." Nitze saw good reasons to keep American troops in Korea. First, a withdrawal would produce no significant balance-of-payments saving because South Korea would have to reduce US imports by roughly the amount of the cutback. Second, resort to nuclear weapons would not necessarily be one-sided. Nitze saw little likelihood that Moscow would passively accept Mao's overthrow—"and exactly this is implied by large-scale nuclear attacks on China." In any case, China probably would explode its own nuclear device within the next few years, "right in the middle of the proposed phase-down." Finally, Nitze postulated, shifting to a nuclear strategy would strike communists as a substantial reduction of the US commitment, shake allied confidence, and possibly renew Sino-Soviet solidarity. He urged that there be no major US withdrawals, and that the ROK army be reduced to about 500,000 but modernized by keeping the MAP near current levels. Whatever cuts were made, the public rationale should cite increased US mobility and China's military weakness rather than a strategy of early nuclear response. "Reluctantly," the State Department also concluded that withdrawing two US divisions was politically infeasible. In a letter to General Taylor the State Department cited many of the same reasons as Nitze. State claimed, also, that a US withdrawal would remove an important check on civil strife—an important point, since a presidential election was scheduled for that autumn.29

Naturally, Taylor took strong exception to many of these arguments, writing a memo for his own use at interagency debates. Politically, he noted, there was no evidence that a US presence in South Korea had affected the course of domestic events. As for UN partners, he could see "no particular reason" to anticipate either objections against, or withdrawals over, a nuclear strategy. Strong conventional capability would not be discarded, but nuclear weapons should be used to defeat a major Chinese attack just as they would be used against a massive Soviet assault in Europe. Lastly, Taylor claimed to see in what Nitze and State were saying "a lack of belief that deterrence of an enemy is ever possible. If the vast US preponderance of nuclear power over Red China—even if assisted by the USSR—is not sufficient to deter that country from major aggression, then our military strategy world-wide needs to be re-examined."30

Secretary McNamara sided with Taylor, against Nitze and State. On 1 June, OSD circulated a draft memorandum for the President advocating a nuclear strategy. Backed by nuclear firepower, it said, South Koreans could handle a Chinese/North Korean attack with the same conventional forces needed for non-nuclear defense against North Korea alone. Consequently, US troop levels could be cut to 17,000 by December 1965 and ROK forces to 450,000 by December 1967. Upon review, the JCS recommended adding that conventional cutbacks must be based upon an assumption that the United States would display clear intent promptly to retaliate with nuclear weapons against any large-scale attack.31
On 4 June, Rusk, McNamara, and Taylor discussed the situation along with Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense William Bundy. They decided that a working group, under Johnson's leadership, would prepare a force reduction plan. In July, ISA and the Joint Staff proposed shifting one division to California by late 1965, pre-positioning equipment for one division in Korea, and reducing the ROK army to 465,000 by December 1965. But the United States would neither announce nor imply that it was adopting a strategy of immediate nuclear response.32

Unsatisfied, Secretary McNamara ordered the plan rewritten to state that withdrawal would be conditional upon an announced intention to use nuclear weapons. He wanted both US divisions withdrawn, starting much earlier than October 1964, and pre-positioning to be severely limited. A revised plan was prepared, under which the first US division would leave by April 1964 and the second by April 1965. The JCS asked that the first division not begin leaving until the outcome of South Korea's presidential election, scheduled for mid-October, could be assessed. Departure of the second division "should be dependent on an assessment of the situation at the time."33

In the October 1963 election, Park won the presidency by a narrow plurality. McNamara told Taylor that he favored carrying out ROK force reductions during 1964–65 and preparing for withdrawal of one US division in 1965: “Apart from the political and budgetary factors pointing in the direction of these reductions, the Chiefs’ papers indicate to me that they believe the moves can be justified. . . . In view of the Sino-Soviet split and the resulting picture of somewhat deteriorating Chinese Communist capabilities.” The rest of the year was devoted to drafting and revising withdrawal plans.34

In January 1964, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk discussed what to do. McNamara argued that troops in Korea did not contribute substantially to the US military posture in the Far East. Rusk, however, opposed withdrawals on political grounds and McNamara conceded that force reductions had become a political rather than a military problem. The JCS looked into the best time spans for accomplishing a withdrawal. They reported that a 24-month span would allow the most orderly US and ROK reductions. If a faster rate was wanted, cutbacks could be completed within 18 months, despite attendant difficulties involving reorganization, equipment shortages, and storage. One US division could depart within twelve months, if no significant amount of its equipment had to be stored in South Korea.35

On 5 May 1964, President Johnson directed a State-Defense-AID study about possibly redeploying one division. While advising against any withdrawals “at this time,” the JCS urged that a redeployed division remain “as far forward as possible on US territory in the Pacific.” Dividing it between Guam and Hawaii would be one answer; the “least expensive and most readily available solution” would be to split it between Alaska and Fort Lewis, Washington.36

According to a draft memorandum for the President, dated 8 June, McNamara believed that a decision to redeploy should be made now and implemented over
the next 18 months, while Rusk held that the risks in withdrawing were “disproportionate to the relatively small balance of payments and military gains (if any).” When McNamara read the draft, however, he concluded that action should be postponed because of the rapidly worsening situation in Southeast Asia. And there, in fact, the debate about reductions ended. The South Korean government was ready and willing to send its troops to fight in South Vietnam.37 As things turned out, part of the price for dispatching ROK units to Vietnam was keeping two US divisions in Korea. Also, of course, the nuclear strategy was aborted. Not until the Vietnam War began winding down would the issue of withdrawing a division be reopened.

Japan and Okinawa: A Sluggish Evolution

In October 1961 the State Department circulated draft guidelines describing Japan as “our principal ally in the Far East, our second world trading partner, the host for vital US forward facilities, and a source of technical skill and capital contributing to the economic development of South and Southeast Asia.” As to the security-military field, State suggested, among other things: de-emphasizing this aspect to US-Japanese relations to ease fears that the presence of US bases might involve Japan in a nuclear war; maintaining necessary US forces and facilities in Japan; avoiding direct pressure upon Japan to increase her military establishment; and retaining over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands only that degree of control necessary to protect vital US security interests. The JCS proposed, and ISA supported, three changes. First, recognize that continued US control over the Ryukyus was “indispensable” for the foreseeable future. Second, encourage Japan to strengthen her military capabilities and assume a greater share of responsibility for defending the western Pacific. Third, try to obtain Japanese agreement to store nuclear weapons at US bases. State’s final guidelines, issued in March 1962, added the first and second points but not the third.38

Into this relatively stable relationship, General Taylor injected some controversy. During his Far East tour of September 1962, Taylor noted how Japanese sensitivity about nuclear weapons limited the wartime value of US bases there. That, plus Japanese apathy about their self-defense requirements, led him to rate Japan “a poor bet as a military ally” and to conclude that military considerations should not shape US-Japanese relations.39

After reading Taylor’s report, President Kennedy asked Secretary McNamara whether dollar spending in Japan—about $350 million annually—could be reduced. McNamara decided that his query raised a more basic issue: How valuable, actually, were these Japanese bases? He asked for JCS views. The J–5 drafted a reply citing only the advantages derived from maintaining US bases. The Joint Chiefs rejected it, calling for a fuller report that listed both debits and credits. On 7 December 1962, they sent McNamara a statement that bases in
Japan “contribute significantly to the overall strategic US posture in the Pacific” and should be retained “in essentially their present form.” Disadvantages included: the infeasibility of bringing nuclear weapons into Japan during peacetime; the treaty requirement for prior consultation before deploying US forces to combat areas; vulnerability to strikes by communist-controlled laborers; the on-going dollar drain; and continued Japanese apathy toward shouldering obligations for their own defense. But the penalties of withdrawing would include: impairing a forward strategy, thereby reducing confidence among allies and non-aligned nations; strengthening neutralism within Japan as well as the communist drive against US bases worldwide; and lessening US capabilities for dispersal, flexibility, and logistic support. Bases in Japan were essential to maintaining the US deterrent posture in the Far East and were required to support US forces in Korea. They made possible rapid tactical deployments to the western Pacific, furnished essential repair, communications, and intelligence-gathering facilities, provided facilities supporting the Single Integrated Operations Plan for nuclear war, allowed dispersal of stocks and bases, complicated Soviet nuclear targeting, and constituted an important link in preserving and improving a range of US-Japanese ties.40

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric informed the President that he agreed with the Chiefs’ assessment. Kennedy worried about the dollar drain; Gilpatric assured him that the Defense Department would try to reduce it, mainly by persuading Japan to purchase sophisticated US equipment. Kennedy replied that, unless the Japanese started offsetting US defense expenditures within the next year or so, changes must be made: relocating Air Force squadrons; reducing Army logistical bases; and ending the home-porting of warships in Japan.41

Gilpatric visited Japan in February 1963 and found little reason to think that the dollar drain would stop soon. Even if the Japanese spent more for defense, he concluded, they could produce most of what they needed and did not require sophisticated US weapon systems. Consequently, Gilpatric asked the JCS to submit plans for reducing the dollar drain, short of a major redeployment, and to analyze Japan’s missions and modernization requirements for 1964–70. After reviewing potential cost-cutting possibilities, the Chiefs opposed all of them. Nothing except returning US dependents home would produce major savings, and that seemed unfair as long as tourism and other government travel remained unrestricted. Instead, the JCS urged vigorous prosecution of a military sales program. By their calculation, Japan would need $1.7 billion in new equipment.42

Civilian leaders were determined to ease the dollar drain. In June 1963, Secretary McNamara told the JCS that he would propose to the President moving the 1st Marine Air Wing (MAW) from Japan to Okinawa and making some smaller changes. The Chiefs, General Shoup excepted, opposed shifting the MAW on grounds that Okinawa would become overcrowded, the alert posture lessened, and SIOP target coverage
reduced. McNamara dropped that idea. On 16 July, President Kennedy approved the smaller steps.43

Early in 1964, the Navy recommended relocating a 58-plane Marine Air Group (MAG) from Japan to Okinawa.44 General Wheeler and Admiral McDonald joined General Greene in supporting this move because: coordination and training with the 3rd Marine Division, stationed on Okinawa, would improve; operating and maintenance costs would be cut; a small balance of payments saving would accrue; and the “extremely sensitive” Landing Ship Tank with nuclear weapons aboard could move from Iwakuni to an area where US dollars were used. Generals LeMay and Johnson objected on grounds that: the MAG would have to drop one-third of its nuclear target assignments; concentrating nearly one-half of Pacific Command’s land-based strike force on Okinawa would create unacceptable vulnerability; Kadena Air Base, the principal marshalling point for air movements, would become overcrowded; and reaction time for emergencies in Korea would lengthen. In June, McNamara authorized relocating the MAG to Okinawa and moving the LST to a dollar area.45 But, when US involvement in Vietnam escalated, execution was postponed indefinitely.

There was one important area where the Japanese sought change while the JCS were quite content with the status quo. The 1951 peace treaty made the United States the administering authority over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, with Japan retaining residual sovereignty. Ten years later, both the Japanese and the Ryukyuans were becoming restive. In August 1961, after a discussion with Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, President Kennedy ordered an interdepartmental task force to examine economic and social improvements for Ryukyuans, bearing in mind both Okinawa’s importance to the United States and the need to continue friendly relations with Japan.46

The task force recommended negotiating an agreement by which Japan would cooperate with the United States in supplying Okinawa with increased economic aid. The Joint Chiefs protested that the Japanese might view such negotiations as a tacit admission of their right to participate in Ryukyu administration, and demand a “far greater” role than the task force was proposing. The Chiefs were convinced that “complete” US jurisdiction over the Ryukyus would remain essential for the foreseeable future. If Okinawa’s internal security was jeopardized by “excessive relaxing of political controls over the citizenry,” there might be “a major disruption of our strategic posture in the Western Pacific.” The task force claimed that US ability to use Okinawa freely depended upon “tacit” cooperation by Japan. That struck the Chiefs as an overstatement. If it was true, the administration would have to carry out “a re-evaluation of the means to implement our basic strategic concepts.”47

McNamara, taking a slightly softer line, advised President Kennedy that he favored a negotiated agreement. The Secretary did follow JCS advice by urging that Okinawa’s internal security not be jeopardized “through excessive relaxing of
political controls over the citizenry.” On 5 March, the President approved negotia-
tions aimed at minimizing interference with US political control and recognizing, “at least tacitly, our intention to administer the Ryukyus for the foreseeable future.” A Japanese-American Consultative Committee came into being two years later,48

The JCS kept worrying about the strength of “reversionist tendencies,” and received assurances that US negotiators intended to limit talks to economic mat-
ters only. “As you know,” the Director of the Joint Staff wrote to the J–5, “the Japa-
nese have tried every dodge known to man to get a toehold on Okinawa.” In Febru-
ary 1963, General Wheeler brought to his colleagues’ attention “the eroding efforts which have been made by various agencies over the years which run counter to US military interests.” The Chiefs raised this issue in meetings with Secretary McNa-
mara and President Kennedy, reminding them that the Ryukyus chain had been developed into “the most important military base complex in the Western Pacific.” Okinawa contained sixteen major installations; forces stationed there included most of the 3rd Marine Division, an Army airborne battle group, an Air Force tacti-
cal fighter wing, and three troop carrier squadrons.49

In May 1963, Ambassador Edwin Reischauer foresaw a trend toward de facto integration between Japan and the Ryukyus. Accommodating to it impressed him as the prudent course; opposing it could forfeit Japan’s cooperation and encour-
age pressure for reversion. He mentioned, as a possible fallback position, returning administrative authority to Japan while retaining unhindered utilization of US bases. The JCS responded that granting greater concessions would in fact fuel reversionist sentiment and “risk undermining the US military position in the Ryuky-
us.” They opposed, even as a fallback, returning administrative control.50

Just as with Korea, the looming crisis over Vietnam put any further movement on hold. By December 1964, the State Department agreed that fundamental policies for the Ryukyus appeared sound and US administration effective. Substantial progress in problem areas had lessened popular pressures for change.51 Here, too, basic deci-
sions would be postponed until the war in Southeast Asia began winding down.

Indonesia: A Falling Domino

U
nder the “guided democracy” practiced by President Sukarno, Indonesia was pursing adventurous and increasingly anti-western policies. Sukarno’s claim to Netherlands New Guinea, or West Irian, was an immediate cause of friction. Although the Papuans who lived there had neither racial nor cultural ties with Indonesia, West Irian had been part of the Dutch East Indies and Sukarno was determined to acquire it. Moscow and Peking supported Sukarno’s claim; the Sovi-
et Union supplied him with considerable military equipment. The United States, on the other hand, backed the Netherlands’ position that West Irian’s future should be decided by self-determination.

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In October 1961, General LeMay let his JCS colleagues know that he was “deeply concerned” about the steady deterioration of US influence in Indonesia. At his urging, the Chiefs made their collective concern known to Secretary McNamara. The USSR, they said, was making “a determined effort” to win Indonesia. Soviet military shipments to date totaled $840 million, making Indonesia second only to Egypt among non-communist recipients. American military assistance, by contrast, came to only $61.6 million. The Chiefs “strongly” believed that a communist or even pro-communist Indonesia would be a “tremendous” asset to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. SEATO would be outflanked, Australia and New Zealand isolated. Communists could launch overt and covert operations against the Philippines and South Pacific islands as well as deny tremendous oil, tin, and rubber resources. Moreover, losing Indonesia to the communists might well begin a “chain reaction” that could lead to forfeiture of the main US bases in the Far East. Conversely, a pro-western or genuinely neutral Indonesia would significantly enhance the US position in Asia. The Chiefs recommended that these views form the basis of the Defense Department position, and that the NSC consider this issue “on a priority basis.” They also recommended, “as a matter of utmost national urgency,” that the administration exert a major effort to salvage Indonesia from communist control, enumerate objectives and determine specific methods for doing so, and develop “a detailed and dynamic national plan” for taking the offensive. Finally, the Chiefs argued that one “fundamental” cause of the erosion in Indonesia stemmed from “our partial failure to gain and maintain a pro-Western orientation of the other countries of Southeast Asia.” Events in Indonesia and the rest of Southeast Asia struck them as being intimately inter-related. The Secretary forwarded their memorandum to the State Department, for use in drafting a policy paper. Since Defense would be afforded an opportunity to comment upon State’s draft, he deemed an NSC discussion unnecessary.52

Already, however, the administration was working toward a diplomatic resolution for West Irian that essentially would give Sukarno what he wanted. In February 1962, the State Department circulated guidelines that clearly aimed at currying Sukarno’s favor. First, remove the West Irian dispute from “communist exploitation” by forestalling hostilities, obtaining the “voluntary departure” of the Dutch, and finding a status for the area that was acceptable to the disputants and consonant with the UN Charter. Second, divest the United States of its image as a protector of colonial interests. Third, develop close personal ties between Presidents Kennedy and Sukarno. Fourth, strengthen the willingness and ability of Indonesians to oppose communist inroads in their country. The army, under General Abdul Haris Nasution, constituted the country’s most effective anti-communist force. The JCS proposed changing the passage about “voluntary departure” of the Dutch to read “consult as frequently and as closely as possible with the Indonesians and the Netherlands.” ISA rejected this recommendation but proposed two others. First, make no mention of a close Kennedy-Sukarno relationship; doing so
could enhance Sukarno’s stature and lessen the likelihood of transferring power to moderate elements. Second, acknowledge US support of the Indonesian “Mobile Brigade,” a strongly anti-communist paramilitary unit. The Brigade was supported by AID money and might receive MAP funds in future years. Ultimately, however, no Defense suggestions were adopted.\textsuperscript{53}

During the summer of 1962, a solution for West Irian emerged. The mediating skills of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker played a part, but so did Sukarno’s threat of imminent invasion. The final settlement, signed on 15 August, stipulated that administration of West Irian would pass immediately from the Netherlands to the UN and then to Indonesia on 1 May 1963.\textsuperscript{54}

Hoping to get a reasonable return on this investment, President Kennedy asked all agencies to identify measures that might be useful in improving US-Indonesian relations. The JCS sent Secretary McNamara a list that included reorienting MAP toward civic action programs.\textsuperscript{55} Unhappily, the administration’s investment yielded no dividend. Sukarno’s appetite was whetted, not sated. Prince Abdul Rahman, prime minister of Malaya and a staunch anti-communist, was organizing a Federation of Malaysia that would include Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah (North Borneo). Denouncing this as a survival of colonialism, Sukarno proclaimed in January 1963 a policy of “confrontation” aimed at stopping the formation of Malaysia.

Admiral Anderson urged that the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan levy additional tasks upon CINCPAC, based on the assumption that Indonesia might well pursue an expansionist course. Such plans could cover: interference with Malaysia; further expansionist attempts on New Guinea; military action against Portuguese Timor; closure of the Strait of Malacca; expansion toward the southeast or toward the Philippines; and Indonesia’s alliance with or bestowal of base rights upon members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The JCS agreed, and CINCPAC received appropriate orders on 9 February 1963.\textsuperscript{56}

Malaysia was formally established on 16 September 1963. Immediately, Sukarno severed commercial ties with the new federation and vowed to “crush Malaysia.” The United States suspended all MAP shipments to Indonesia of aircraft, ships, weapons, and ammunition. Soon afterward, an act of Congress stipulated that no further aid be furnished to Indonesia, unless the President determined that doing so was essential to the national interest.

On 7 January 1964, the NSC discussed whether President Johnson should sign such a determination; General LeMay represented the JCS. All agreed that there should be limited but tightly controlled economic aid; Indonesia ought to be given nothing that would improve her military capabilities. Subsequently, President Johnson decided against signing a determination until the outcome of meetings among Asian leaders was known. Meantime, existing MAP would continue.\textsuperscript{57}

In March, the United States broadened its list of prohibited military items. General Nasution wrote to General Taylor, expressing hope that limited assistance
would continue in two areas: civic action and officer training. Taylor replied that this would depend primarily upon how Indonesia handled its “confrontation” with Malaysia. Without real progress toward a peaceful settlement, he warned, “the immediate future may well be fraught with difficulties.” For the present, Taylor promised that a civic action food production program would continue.58

Meanwhile, several hundred Indonesian guerrillas infiltrated into Borneo; efforts to arrange a cease-fire (by Attorney General Robert Kennedy, among others) ended in failure. In April, at State’s request, OSD considered whether to start a small training mission in Malaysia. The JCS, while acknowledging that a mission could enhance US influence and indicate political support, asked that alternatives like visits by senior officers or military units also be considered. Since Britain and Commonwealth countries had extensive training commitments there, those governments should be asked how the United States could supplement their efforts. After doing that, the administration could decide how to proceed. In July, Prime Minister Abdul Rahman came to Washington asking for arms and advisors. President Johnson agreed that Malaysians would be admitted to US training schools, and he told the Defense Department to give other requests swift and sympathetic study.59

On 17 August 1964, Sukarno seemed to pass the point of no return. During a three-hour speech, he denounced the United States as Indonesia’s main enemy and dedicated his nation to “a year of living dangerously.” Simultaneously, three groups of Indonesian guerrillas made seaborne landings near Singapore. The State Department now concluded that Sukarno “opposes everything we are trying to do and everything we stand for in Asia.” Thus far, US aid had made no discernible impact on Indonesian policy; continued assistance might lead Sukarno to think that Washington was prepared to tolerate actions it actually opposed. As a first step, State urged termination through mutual agreement of military assistance and of AID support for Indonesian police.60

The JCS, unwilling to endorse a complete break, advised Secretary McNamara on 26 August that “a closely monitored Indonesian MAP—limited to civic action and CONUS school training—should be continued for intelligence purposes and for possible future influence upon key Indonesian leaders.” On 3 September, President Johnson approved several recommendations from Rusk and McNamara. First, defer delivery of major military communications equipment and suspend shipment of all military-type equipment to Indonesian police and internal security forces. Second, work quietly toward mutual agreement to reduce or eliminate military training programs. Third, continue economic and technical assistance, civic action programs, and provision of non-military training and equipment for police and internal security forces.61

Concurrently, the Joint Chiefs began sounding alarms about an apparent Indonesian threat to freedom of the seas. The British sent four warships and an antiaircraft regiment to Singapore. After these ships had passed through the Sunda Strait, between Java and Sumatra, Indonesia announced that all ships transiting the Strait
or entering waters claimed as territorial would have to secure permission from the Indonesian Foreign Office. On 8 September 1964, the JCS recommended that Washington “clearly and unequivocally reaffirm” that the United States would not tolerate any interference with its freedom of access to international seas, straits, and air space. As proof, they wanted US ships and aircraft to pass through the waters and air space in question whenever possible. The Chiefs repeated this recommendation three times during the next five months, but the State Department vetoed unannounced transits as politically inflammatory.62

As 1964 ended, Indonesia seemed firmly aligned in the communist orbit. But the autumn of 1965 witnessed a dramatic reversal. An attempted communist coup triggered a massive and bloody reaction, in which the army crushed the communists and took control of the government. Preserving even limited ties with the Indonesian military proved to have been a sound investment.

**Summation**

Although the administration viewed developments in the Pacific basin as closely inter-related, it failed to formulate a single, coherent military strategy for the area. The escalating war in Southeast Asia undid General Taylor’s effort to impose a nuclear strategy. Instead, for Vietnam, civilian leaders followed a formula that worked so well in the Cuban missile crisis: apply graduated pressure, on a scale sufficient to achieve a limited objective without risking general war.63 This time, however, piecemeal escalation would lead to a huge commitment without breaking the enemy’s will to resist.
Conclusion: Appraising Performances

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the early 1960s was a time of almost unremitting crises. The Cold War reached onto practically every part of the globe, as Cuba, Berlin, the Congo, India, Laos, and South Vietnam turned into major flash points. What was far worse, the JCS became convinced that communist powers were prevailing. As the Cuba Study Group advised President Kennedy in June 1961, “We feel that we are losing today on many fronts.”

The Bay of Pigs, the Joint Chiefs were convinced, went well beyond being a local defeat. It was a fiasco that greatly damaged American credibility worldwide. Repeatedly, as tension mounted over Laos and Berlin, the Chiefs warned civilian leaders that forceful measures were required to restore that credibility. President Kennedy’s doubts about the Chiefs’ competence were matched by their doubts about his determination to do whatever might prove necessary to prevail. In a setting where war in some place and at some level seemed more likely than not, the Chiefs could perceive little scope for nuance and compromise. That was why they could see only one solution for Cuba: invade the island and oust Castro. Arms control, in this climate, seemed to them pointless and even dangerous; superior military strength was what communist leaders understood. The limited test ban treaty of 1963 was an anomaly, which they endorsed only with important qualifications. In 1964, the JCS reacted to a looming crisis in South Vietnam by arguing that strong action against Hanoi was imperative because failure there would have far-reaching consequences.

Looking back, the administration’s record after the Bay of Pigs was better than the JCS realized. Europe, and not the Third World, was the crucial arena. Khrushchev perceived that, potentially, West Berlin was the Achilles heel of NATO. After failing to dislodge the Western Powers from there in 1961, Khrushchev hoped that turning Cuba into an offensive missile base would severely shake US credibility in
West European and particularly West German eyes. Then he could reopen the Berlin confrontation under much more favorable conditions. Instead, Khrushchev's forced retreat over Cuba also marked the end of danger to Berlin. The Berlin blockade of 1948–49 had been the first direct confrontation of the Cold War; demolition of the Berlin Wall in 1989 would mark the Cold War's end.

Usually, in times of war and crisis, military influence is enhanced at the civilians' expense. Such was not the case here. What has been called the “McNamara revolution” institutionalized a contraction of JCS influence. Economic analysis, applied to the planning-programming-budgeting system, substantially changed JCS-OSD relationships. Procedurally, the system assured that JCS advice on all major force-planning issues would be heard. Substantively, however, the new approach led OSD analysts to explore virtually every facet of the force structure. When civilians ratified military recommendations, they often did so not out of deference to military wisdom but as the result of their own investigations that coincided with JCS judgments.

The more expertise civilians acquired, the less attention they paid to military advice. This situation became most pronounced in the field of strategic retaliatory forces. Here there was no fund of practical experience; civilians could speak about nuclear warfare with as much authority as senior officers. The OSD analysts prepared draft presidential memorandums buttressed by elaborate and well-expressed rationales. The JCS had no equivalent “think tank” in the beginning, and they were further hobbled by inter-service splits. The Service staffs overshadowed the Joint staffs in the 1960s. This resulted in inter-service competition and infighting among the Chiefs. Services were unwilling to support the needs of other Services. This parochialism and inter-service rivalry affected national security. In 1961 each JCS member submitted a separate set of recommendations instead of a single coherent recommendation, a result that virtually invited OSD intervention. That set a precedent for later years, when the major decisions—adopting “assured destruction” and leveling off the Minuteman force at 1,000 launchers—were OSD and not JCS products. Similarly, in shaping a continental defense posture, Secretary McNamara relied upon his own analysts. Admiral McDonald would later recall that he “learned pretty soon not to raise the issue of experience before certain individuals because . . . that just made you parochial.”

In fashioning general purpose forces, many of Secretary McNamara's decisions ran close to the median JCS recommendations. Again, though, this was more the result of coincidence than of the Chiefs' persuasiveness. Take, for example, the time that Secretary McNamara relied on the Index of Combat Effectiveness to claim that NATO could create a capability to defend Central Europe by conventional means. General Taylor argued that conclusions drawn from the ICE lacked "practical validity" because no soldier "seriously believes that the outcome of a battle is calculable in mathematical terms." McNamara changed some wording but not his basic argument. He was not willing to develop a force structure for a single
service that was separate from a national force structure. Basically, by 1964, most major features of the force structure were decided by OSD.

Inevitably, this resulted in personal and institutional friction. The Navy, never in the forefront of unification, did not warm to his leadership. Very quickly, Admiral Burke began worrying about the Secretary’s predilection for delving into matters of detail. Burke repeated to McNamara a Navy adage that a captain was best measured by how well the ship ran during his absence. If, he advised the Secretary, “you get so immersed in details, operational details particularly, that you have to make these daily decisions, then your policies are wrong or not understood.” McNamara seemed receptive, but Burke soon concluded that he had no intention of altering his approach. “I was completely and absolutely frustrated,” Burke said years later. “I didn’t feel very proud of myself for being in that sort of an organization.” Burke had submitted a request for retirement prior to the 1960 election. During February–April 1961, Attorney General Robert Kennedy pressed him to reconsider. When Burke formally presented his retirement request to President Kennedy in May, the Chief Executive asked him to remain in office. After Burke again declined, the President offered him the ambassadorship to Australia. Burke turned down this and similar posts, primarily because he thought that an ambassador had become a social functionary lacking any real influence and importance.5

Admiral Anderson had a rougher passage. He asked for, and General Lemnitzer arranged, a special meeting late in 1961 between Secretary McNamara and the JCS. At this meeting, Anderson made three points. First, OSD systems analysts were encroaching upon his statutory responsibilities. Anderson particularly resented efforts by budget analysts to usurp his authority by determining how many attack carriers the Navy needed. Second, public affairs officials in OSD were questioning the Navy’s civilian orientation cruise program. Third, Special Assistant Adam Yarmolinsky had been quoted as saying at a dinner party that he “made or broke general and flag officers.” But then the discussion strayed from Anderson’s purpose as General LeMay talked about the future inadequacy of strategic retaliatory forces. Afterwards, as the story filtered back to Anderson, McNamara told several of his people that the Chief of Naval Operations had “put them on report.”6

Although Admiral Anderson had hoped for reappointment, he left his post on 1 August 1963 under particularly unpleasant circumstances. Anderson felt sure that the real reason for his relief was his criticism of the F–111. McNamara was promoting the aircraft as a model of bi-service economy and efficiency. In Congressional testimony, the CNO made clear his belief that the Secretary had selected a design that did not meet the Navy’s needs. After his retirement had been announced, however, Anderson heard that OSD officials were spreading what he considered a wholly inaccurate version of his contretemps with McNamara and himself in Flag Plot during the Cuban missile crisis. So Anderson saw fit to give the Secretary a lecture on integrity—and then returned to his office to find more press releases that, he believed, cast aspersions upon his competence. In September, after retiring
from the Navy, Anderson publicly criticized tendencies to “downgrade the role of the men who may have to fight our country’s battles” and “discredit the voices of dissent” within the military.\(^7\)

General LeMay knew that his views carried little weight with Secretary McNamara and the President, and that he was being tolerated for political reasons. General White, his predecessor, put into print what LeMay felt privately: “In common with many other military men, both active and retired, I am profoundly apprehensive of the pipe-smoking, tree-full-of-owls type of so-called defense intellectuals who have been brought into this nation’s capital. I don’t believe a lot of these often over-confident, sometimes arrogant young professors, mathematicians, and other theorists have sufficient worldliness or motivation to stand up to the kind of enemy we face.”\(^8\) In 1968, after he retired, LeMay published *America Is In Danger*—which he attributed in no small part to McNamara’s approach to defense issues.

Army members of the JCS, General Decker excepted, had the best relations with civilian leaders. This may have been because the Army benefitted the most from the flexible response strategy. Kennedy and McNamara thought well enough of General Lemnitzer to arrange his appointment as SACEUR. The President singled out General Wheeler to be Chief of Staff, and Secretary McNamara in 1964 was sufficiently satisfied to recommend him for the Chairmanship. General Taylor was the officer who most impressed Kennedy and McNamara—and he fully reciprocated their respect. It is illuminating, therefore, to conclude by looking at the letter that Taylor gave to McNamara on 1 July 1964, the day he left the Chairmanship to become ambassador to South Vietnam.\(^9\)

Taylor began by assessing the effectiveness of the Joint Staff. He judged it to be only “marginally adequate,” hampered by “an uneven and sometimes excessively heavy workload, by cramped working conditions, and by inadequate recognition of its members by their Service of origin.” Taylor discerned “some progress in preserving the integrity of the Joint Staff input from distortion by Service views,” but there remained “an inherent slowness” in the process by which JCS memorandums were drafted. Tactfully, Taylor observed that “the Services are still not putting their best people on the Joint Staff—not always.” Instead of distributing important jobs proportionately by Service, he favored calling for nominations from all the Services and choosing the best candidate regardless of Service affiliation. However, strong action to correct these weaknesses would not occur until the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act.

Addressing Army-Air Force relations, which Taylor believed were worse than when he assumed the Chairmanship, he argued that “Army commanders responsible for conducting sustained land combat must always have available under their operational control that indispensable element of air power necessary for the success of the land battle. If necessary, the attachment of Air Force units should be made without hesitation.” Otherwise, an overhaul of roles and missions statements would become “indispensable.” Yet the way in which Taylor defined issues
and adversaries may show that he could not entirely transcend his own service’s attitude. In Vietnam in 1968, General William Westmoreland put Marine aviation under the mission direction of his Deputy, an Air Force officer. The Army Chief of Staff joined the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations in registering strong opposition to a single manager.\(^\text{10}\) This was evidence that, at the JCS level, each service kept interpreting “jointness” to its own advantage. It is worth noting that when General Lemnitzer left the Chairmanship, he publicly described the JCS as needing no statutory change and as being useful precisely because it brought alternatives to the civilians’ attention.

Turning to contingency planning, Taylor remarked upon the “incomplete-ness” of past efforts. Except for Cuba and Southeast Asia, the top priorities of the moment, he rated current plans as “little more than outlines which could not be expanded for implementation other than on a ‘crash’ basis without months of additional staff work both in the field and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” Assuming Taylor was correct, the worries of people like Representative Carl Vinson that the JCS might come to resemble the German General Staff had no foundation. If there was a danger, it lay more in the diffusion and fragmentation of responsibility among the JCS, the Services, the unified and specified commands, and OSD.

Finally, Taylor recalled his “former unhappy days” as Army Chief of Staff when he had “cried out for a decisive Secretary of Defense to end the unending conflicts. I got one and am now content.” However, he spotted “potential difficulties arising from the fatal attraction which some of our civilians find in military planning . . . . I feel it is very important for ISA and the Systems Analysis area of the Comptroller’s office to understand that they are not in the business of military planning and are not a rival source of military advice in competition with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”
Acronyms

ABM  anti-ballistic missile
ACDA  Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AID  Agency for International Development
AMSA  Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft
ANF  Atlantic Nuclear Force
ASW  anti-submarine warfare
AWACS  airborne warning and control system

BMEWS  Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems
BNSP  Basic National Security Plan
BOB  Bureau of the Budget
BPD  Basic Planning Document
BUIC  Backup Interceptor Controls

CAP  combat air patrol
CASU  Composite Air Strike Unit
CCC  Civilian Conservation Corps
CENTO  Central Treaty Organization
CI  Counter Insurgency (Special Group)
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
CINCENT  Commander in Chief, Army Group Center
CINCLANT  Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command
CINCUNC  Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CNO  Chief of Naval Operations
CONAD  Continental Air Defense Command
CONUS  continental United States
CTG  Commander Task Group

DEFCON  Defense Condition
DEW  distant early warning
DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency
DPM  Draft Presidential Memorandum
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>early warning</td>
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<tr>
<td>ExComm</td>
<td>Executive Committee</td>
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<td>FAL</td>
<td>Force Armée Lao</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FYDP</td>
<td>Five-Year Defense Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCI</td>
<td>ground control intercept</td>
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<td>GCA</td>
<td>ground control approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Control Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>Index of Combat Effectiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMI</td>
<td>improved manned Interceptor</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOTF</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRBMs</td>
<td>intermediate-range ballistic missiles</td>
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<td>ISA</td>
<td>International Security Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>JLRSS</td>
<td>Joint Long-Range Strategic Study</td>
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<td>JSOP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Objective Plan</td>
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<td>JSSC</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Survey Council</td>
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<td>JSTPS</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JWGA</td>
<td>Joint War Games Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCP</td>
<td>landing craft, personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCU</td>
<td>landing craft, utility</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>dock landing ship</td>
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<td>LST</td>
<td>tank landing ship</td>
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<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
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<td>MAG</td>
<td>Marine Air Group</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>military assistance program</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>MATS</td>
<td>Military Air Transport Service</td>
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<td>MAW</td>
<td>Marine Air Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEB</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLF</td>
<td>Multilateral Nuclear Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNCs</td>
<td>Major NATO Commanders</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRBMss</td>
<td>medium-range ballistic missiles</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEFA</td>
<td>Northeast Frontier Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>nm</td>
<td>nautical miles</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSAM</td>
<td>National Security Action Memorandum</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSTL</td>
<td>National Strategic Target List</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONI</td>
<td>Office of Naval Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operational plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>Program Change Proposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEO</td>
<td>Program Evaluation Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHIBRON</td>
<td>amphibious squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>petroleum, oil, and lubricants</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPBS</td>
<td>planning-programming-budgeting system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>RLG</td>
<td>Royal Laotian Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROAD</td>
<td>Reorganization Objective, Army Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAACLANT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAGE</td>
<td>Semi-Automatic Ground Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>surface-to-air missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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</table>
SHAPE  Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIOP  Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLBN  submarine-launched ballistic missile
SNDVs  strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
SNIE  Special National Intelligence Estimate
SRAM  short-range attack missile
STRICOM  Strike Command

TRACE  Transportable Control Environment

UAR  United Arab Republic
UNEF  UN Expeditionary Force
USCINCEUR  US Commander in Chief, Europe
USDIS  US Disarmament Agency
USSR  United Soviet Socialist Republic

WSEG  Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
Principal Civilian and Military Officers

*President and Commander in Chief*
John F. Kennedy 20 Jan 61 – 22 Nov 63
Lyndon B. Johnson 22 Nov 63 – 20 Jan 69

*Special Assistant to the President*
*(National Security Affairs)*
McGeorge Bundy 20 Jan 61 – 27 Feb 66

*Secretary of State*
Dean Rusk 20 Jan 61 – 20 Jan 69

*Secretary of Defense*
Robert S. McNamara 20 Jan 61 – 29 Feb 68

*Deputy Secretary of Defense*
Roswell L. Gilpatric 24 Jan 61 – 20 Jan 64
Cyrus R. Vance 28 Jan 64 – 30 Jun 67

*Assistant Secretary of Defense*
*(International Security Affairs)*
Paul H. Nitze 29 Jan 61 – 29 Nov 63
William P. Bundy 29 Nov 63 – 14 Mar 64
John T. McNaughton 01 Jul 64 – 19 Jul 67

*Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff*
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA 01 Oct 60 – 30 Sep 62
General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA 01 Oct 62 – 01 Jul 64
General Earle G. Wheeler, USA 03 Jul 64 – 02 Jul 70

*Chief of Staff, US Army*
General George H. Decker 01 Oct 60 – 30 Sep 62
General Earle G. Wheeler 01 Oct 62 – 02 Jul 64
General Harold K. Johnson 03 Jul 64 – 02 Jul 68

*Chief of Naval Operations*
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke 17 Aug 55 – 01 Aug 61
JCS and National Policy 1961–1964

Admiral George W. Anderson 01 Aug 61 – 01 Aug 63
Admiral David L. McDonald 01 Aug 63 – 01 Aug 67

Chief of Staff, US Air Force
General Thomas D. White 01 Jul 57 – 30 Jun 61
General Curtis E. LeMay 30 Jun 61 – 31 Jun 65

Commandant, US Marine Corps
General David M. Shoup 01 Jan 60 – 31 Dec 63
General Wallace M. Greene, Jr. 01 Jan 64 – 31 Dec 67

Director, Joint Staff
Lieutenant General Earle G. Wheeler, USA 01 Apr 60 – 24 Feb 62
Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley, USN 25 Feb 62 – 23 Feb 64
Lieutenant General David A. Burchinal, USAF 24 Feb 64 – 31 Jul 66

Commander in Chief, Atlantic
Admiral Robert L. Dennison 29 Feb 60 – 30 Apr 63
Admiral Harold P. Smith 30 Apr 63 – 30 Apr 65

Commander in Chief, US European Command
General Lauris Norstad, USAF 20 Nov 56 – 01 Nov 62
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA 01 Nov 62 – 05 May 69

Commander in Chief, Pacific
Admiral Harry D. Felt 31 Jul 58 – 30 Jun 64
Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp 30 Jun 64 – 01 Aug 68

Commander in Chief, Caribbean
(After 06 June 1963, Commander in Chief, US Southern Command)
General Andrew P. O’Meara, USA 01 Feb 61 – 22 Feb 65
General Robert W. Porter, Jr., USA 22 Feb 65 – 18 Feb 69

Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
General Thomas S. Power 01 Jul 57 – 01 Dec 64
General John D. Ryan 01 Dec 64 – 01 Feb 67

Commander in Chief, Strike Command
General Paul D. Adams, USA 09 Oct 61 – 01 Nov 66
Notes

Chapter 1. Entering the New Frontier: Men and Methods

1. Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, DC; GPO, 1962), pp. 103. (Hereafter referred to as Public Papers: Kennedy.)
3. Major General C. V. Clifton, USA (Ret.) interviewed by W. S. Poole on 14 Aug 79, JHO.
5. “Memorandum of Conversation with the President, November 29, 1963–10:00 A.M.,” Att to CM-1050 to JCS, 30 Nov 63, Chairman’s File (hereafter CJCS) 031.1 (Meetings with the President).
11. Henry E. Glass interviewed by W. S. Poole on 17 July 1979. Since McNamara was not yet in office, Colonel E. F. Black (Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense) carried his request to them and brought their answers back.
12. Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 229–240. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 8 Mar 61, JCS 2101/413, Joint Master File 5000 (8 Mar 61) sec. 1. Even more questions were added later. Joint Staff officers joked that the exercise should bear the same title as a current television show: “Youth Wants To Know.” Annually, during 1962–64, McNamara issued similar but somewhat smaller lists.
15. Kapal, The McNamara Ascendancy, pp. 77–78. Memo, ASD (Compt.) to AsstSvcsSecys, 13 May 61, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 1. Hitch listed I and II as “Central War” Offensive and Defensive Forces, but for the sake of uniformity, the terms later adopted are used here.
17. CSAFM-130-61 to JCS, 24 Apr 61, same file.
18. SM-508-61 to Service Chiefs & JCSM-308-61 to SecDef, 10 May 61, JCS 1800/414; JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 2.
20. Memo, SecDef to Dir, BoB, 7 Dec 61; Memo, ASD (Compt.) to CJCS et al., 4 Jan 62; JMF 7000 (21 May 62). Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Dec 61 & JCSM-848 to SecDef, 5 Dec 61, JCS 1800/483; JMF 7000 (9 Oct 61).
22. The Joint Program for Planning was outlined in JCS 2089/13, JMF 3100 (13 Apr 59) and JCS 2143/102, JMF 3130 (3 Feb 60). The JSCPs are in the following files: SM-67-62 to CINCAL et al., 16 Jan 62, JCS 2143/141, JMF 3100 (9 Jan 62). SM-1402-62 to CINCAL et al., 15 Dec 62, JCS 2143/179, JMF 3130 (5 Dec 62). SM-1082-63 to CINCAL et al., 5 Sep 63, JCS 2143/205-1, JMF 3130 (15 Aug 63) sec. 2A.

23. Memo, A. D. Suttle to BG Evans, “Comments on First Draft of JLRSS-73,” 20 Apr 64; Memo for Record by CAPT Henderson, J–5, “Discussions Between the ODDR&E and the R&D Division, J–5, Personnel Concerning the JLRSS and the JSOP,” 9 May 64; JCSM-613-64 to SecDef, 18 Jul 64, JCS 1920/15, JMF 3130 (24 Oct 63). The body of JLRSS-73 is in the same file, sec. 1A.


26. The term originally employed was “Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program.” The usage later adopted, “Five-Year Defense Program,” is used here for convenience.


33. CM-109-62 to Director, Joint Staff, 14 Nov 62, JCS 2143/177, JMF 3130 (14 Nov 62) sec. 1.

34. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 15 Nov 62, JCS 188/651; CM-141-62 to SecDef, 27 Nov 62, JCS 188/651; JMF 7000 (23 Nov 62). Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 4 Dec 62, JCS 1800/656 (reissued as JCS 2143/194, 21 Feb 63); CM-289-63 to SecDef, 19 Feb 63, Encl to 1st N/H of JCS 2143/194, 26 Feb 63; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 Mar 63, Encl to 2nd N/H of JCS 2143/194, 4 Mar 63; JMF 7000 (4 Dec 62) sec. 1.


36. “JSOP Presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 March 1963,” JMF 3130 (14 Nov 62) sec. 2. CM-524-63 to SecDef, 17 Apr 63, JCS 2143/201, same file, sec. 2B.

37. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 30 Nov 63, JCS 1800/795; JCSM-952-63 to SecDef, 6 Dec 63, JCS 1800/795-1; JMF 7000 (30 Nov 63). “Memorandum of Conference with the President at the LBJ Ranch, Texas, on Monday, 30 December 1963, at 11:45 EST,” by Secretary, JCS, CJCS 031.1 (Meeting with the President). Also in *FRUS: 1961–63*, vol. VIII, pp. 587–596.

38. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 13 Dec 63, JCS 1800/799; JCSM-997-63 to SecDef, 20 Dec 63, JCS 1800/799-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 21 Dec 63, JCS 1800/806; JMF 7000 (13 Dec 63) sec. 1. Kaplan, *The McNamara Ascendancy*, pp. 489–490.
Chapter 2. Strategic Priorities Undergo Major Change


2. Memo, SecDef to CJCSEt al., 20 Feb 61, JCS 2101/409; JCS 2101/412, 8 Mar 61; CSAM-111-61 to JCS, 10 Mar 61; JCSM-153-61 to SecDef, 11 Mar 61, JCS 2101/412; JMF 3001 (4 Feb 61) sec. 1.


4. Project Solarium was a comprehensive strategy and policy review conducted during the first year of the Eisenhower administration.

5. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCSEt al., 19 May 61, JCS 2101/429, JMF 3001 (14 Apr 61) sec. 2.


8. Note to Control, “BNSP,” 7 Aug 61, JMF 3001 (14 Apr 61) sec. 3.


13. FRUS: 1961–63, vol. VIII, p. 330. Memo, DepUSecState to SecDef, 15 Oct 62, JCS 2101/491, JMF 3001 (26 Mar 62) sec. 4. JCSM-952-62 to SecDef, 7 Dec 62, JCS 2101/493; CM-165-62 to SecDef, 7 Dec 62, JCS 2101/493; same file, sec. 5. In The Uncertain Trumpet, pp. 82–83, Taylor wrote that Eisenhower BNSPs were “so broad in nature and so general in
language as to provide limited guidance in practical application. The ‘Basic National Security Policy’ means all things to all people and settles nothing.”


15. CM-414-63 to JSSC, 18 Mar 63, JCS 2101/501; Note to Control, “BNSP,” 15 Apr 63; JCS 2101/507, 7 Jun 63; Notes to Control, “JCS 2101/507,” 2, 5 & 17 Jul 63; “Policy Considerations Affecting Planning,” tabled by CJCS on 17 Jul 63; JMF 3001 (23 Jan 63).


23. During a 1977 conversation with W. S. Poole, General Lemnitzer recalled President Kennedy saying that he wanted principals to do some of their own research.


28. NSAM 56 to SecDef, 28 Jun 61, JCS 1969/215; Memo, DepSecDef to Pres, 8 Jun 62, Att to 2nd N/H of JCS 1969/215, 13 Jun 62; JMF 3330 (28 Jun 61) sec. 1.


31. In December 1963, Strike Command was assigned planning responsibilities for the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.


35. Information provided by Mr. Dale Andrade of the US Army Center of Military History.


37. “Extract from a Memo for the President from the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology,” 25 Nov 60, JCS 2056/208; Memo, SecDef to JCS, 20 Jan 61, JCS 2956/208; JMF 3205 (17 Aug 59) sec. 9.

38. JCSM-252-61 to SecDef, 18 Apr 61, JCS 1899/640; CM-190-61 to SecDef, 18 Apr 61, JCS 1899/640; Decision On JCS 1899/651, 2 June 61; JMF 3020 (3 Apr 61) sec. 2.

39. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 5 May 61, JCS 2101/427, JMF 3001 (5 May 61) sec. 1. JCSM-406-61 to SecDef, 15 June 61, JCS 2101/433, same file, sec. 2.

40. SM-393-61 to CINCAL et al., 13 Apr 61, JCS 2056/236; JMF 3105 (8 Mar 61) sec. 1.

41. JCS 2056/236, 4 April 61, and Dec On, 13 April 61; SM-389-61 to JCS, 13 April 61, JCS 2056/236; SM-390-61 to DSTP, 13 April 61, JCS 2056/236; JMF 3105 (8 Mar 61) sec. 1. Memo, DSTP to JCS, 3 May 61, JCS 2056/251; SM-1266-61 to DSTP, 27 Nov 61, JCS 2056/287; JMF 3105 (8 Mar 61) (4). Memo, DSTP to JCS, 23 June 61, JCS 2056/260, same file, sec. 2. Memo, DSTP to JCS, 23 June 61, JCS 2056/264, same file, sec. 2. The words quoted above are those of the Atlantic Command representative but they apply equally well to the Pacific Command representative.


44. JCSM-23-62 to SecDef, 10 Jan 61, JCS 2101/452, JMF 4700 (1 Jun 61) sec. 1.


46. JCSM-467-62 to SecDef, 20 Jun 62, JCS 2056/230; Msg, JCS 5083 to DSTP et al., 20 Jun 62; CM-986-62 to DSTP, 28 Sep 62; JMF 3105 (8 Mar 61) (3) sec. 4. President Kennedy was briefed on 14 September. CM-975-62 to Pres, “SIOP-63 Briefing,” 22 Sep 62, same file. Secretary Gates had given responsibility for war-gaming the SIOP to the JSTPS in Omaha. Gen. Decker and Adm. Anderson wanted the Joint War Games Control Group in Washington to conduct comprehensive war games; Gen. LeMay proposed restricting the Group to explora-
atory analyses and gaming examination. Gen. Lemnitzer agreed with Decker and Anderson, advising Secretary McNamara that war-gaming by the JSTPS alone “would be a violation of the time-proven principle that for objective results you never depend solely on self-examination.” McNamara authorized comprehensive war-gaming in both Omaha and Washington. CM-892-62 to SecDef, 18 Aug 62, JCS 1948/72; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 24 Aug 72, Att to 1st N/H of JCS 1948/72, 5 Sep 62; JMF 3511 (2 Jul 62) sec. 2.


51. JCSM-867-63 to SecDef, 7 Nov 63, JCS 1800/753-3, same file, sec. 2.

52. Hearings on Military Posture, Senate Com on Armed Services, 88th Cong, 2nd sess, p. 6920.

53. CSAFM-148-64 to JCS, 17 Feb 64; Chairman's Flimsy 117-64 to JCS, 18 Feb 64; Note to Control, “JCS 1844/419,” 18 Feb 64; JCS 1844/419, 10 Feb 64; SM-264-64 to CINCAL et al., 2 Mar 64; JMF 3120 (10 Feb 64). That summer, the drafting of JSOP-70 produced the same service splits and a very similar compromise solution. JCS 2143/233, 15 Jul 64, JMF 3130 (15 Jul 64) sec. 1. CSAM-383-64 to JCS, 24 Jul 64; CM-55-64 to JCS, 28 Jul 64; CF-16-64 to JCS, 30 Jul 64; Note to Control, “JCS 2143/233 (JSOP-70, Parts I–V), same file, sec. 2.

Chapter 3. Strategic Nuclear Forces


3. Figures from the latest NIE are cited in JCS 1924/119, 27 Mar 61, JMF 9177/4700 (23 Mar 61). General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA (Ret.), interviewed by W. S. Poole on 13 Apr 77.


5. This was one of the four task forces described in chap. 1.


9. JCSM-525-61 to SecDef, 3 Aug 61, JCS 1800/445; CM-308-61 to SecDef, 7 Aug 61; JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 3. JCSM-550-61 to SecDef, 15 Aug 61, JCS 1800/455, same file, sec. 4, pt. 1.

10. JCS 1800/455, 31 Aug 61, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 4. The OSD paper of 29 August, on which J–5 was commenting, apparently has been destroyed.


12. JCSM-657-61 to SecDef, 21 Sep 61, JCS 1800/469, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 6.

14. DJSM-1095-61 to General Taylor, 12 Sep 61, JCS 1800/467, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 5.


18. Memo, SJS to CJCS, 1 Nov 61; 1st N/H of JCS 1800/476, 3 Nov 61; 2nd N/H of JCS 1800/476, 15 Nov 61; JMF 7000 (9 Oct 61). JCSM-802-61 to SecDef, 17 Nov 61, JCS 2056/286, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 7.


20. CM-592-62 to SecDef, 18 Apr 62, JCS 1924/135, JMF 2210 (27 Sep 61).


24. JCSM-836-62 to SecDef, 5 Nov 62, JCS 1823/716; CM-84-62 to SecDef, 5 Nov 62, JCS 1823/717; same file, sec. 2.


26. Memo, DASD (Compt.) to SpecAsst for P&B, JCS et al., 10 Sep 62, JCS 1800/614; JCSM-750-62 to SecDef, 29 Sep 62, JCS 1800/616; JMF 7000 (16 Apr 62) sec. 21B.

27. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 28 Sep 62, JCS 1800/619; JMF 7000 (28 Sep 62) sec. 1.


29. CM-94-62 to SecDef, 6 Nov 62, JCS 1800/639, same file.

30. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 Nov 62, JCS 1800/636, JMF 7000 (5 Nov 62).


33. JCSM-300-63 to SecDef, 13 Apr 63, JCS 2143/201; CM-524-63 to SecDef, 17 Apr 63, JCS 2143/201; JMF 3130 (14 Nov 62) sec. 2B. CSAFM-175-63 to JCS, 2 Apr 63, same file, sec. 2A.

34. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, "Recommended FY 1965–1969 Strategic Retaliatory forces," 31 Aug 63, Att to Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Sep 63, JCS 1800/753, JMF 7000 (31 Aug 63) sec. 1.

35. JCSM-867-63 to SecDef, 7 Nov 63, JCS 1800/753-3, JMF 7000 (31 Aug 63) sec. 2. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, "Recommended FY 1965–1969 Strategic Retaliatory Forces," 6 Dec 63, JMF 7000 (3 Jan 64) sec. 1A. "Memorandum of Conference with the President at the LBJ Ranch, Texas, on Monday, 30 December 1963, at 1145 EST," CJCS 031.1 (Meetings with the
Notes to Pages 48–55


36. JCSM-219-64 to SecDef, 16 Mar 64, JCS 2143/204-15; CM-1272-64 to SecDef, 20 Mar 64; JMF 3130 (16 Sep 63) sec. 4A, Vols. I, II, III.

37. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 May 64, JCS 1800/753-4; Amended by Memo, ASD(Compt.) to CJCS et al., 20 May 64, N/H of JCS 1800/753-4, 25 May 64; JMF 7000 (16 May 64) (1). Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 Nov 64, JCS 1800/907, same file, sec. 1.

38. JCSM-973-64 to SecDef, 20 Nov 64, JCS 1800/907-1; CM-267-64 to SecDef, 23 Nov 64, Att to 1st N/H of JCS 1800/907-1, 25 Nov 64; JMF 7000 (5 Nov 64) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 7 Dec 64, JCS 1800/907-2, same file, sec. 3.

39. Enclosure C to JCS 1800/879-1, 9 Sep 64; JCSM-791-64 to SecDef, 12 Sep 64, JCS 1800/879-1, JMF 7000.1 (2 Sep 64) sec. 2.

40. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 19 Oct 64, JCS 1800/900, JMF 7000 (19 Oct 64).

41. JCSM-925-64 to SecDef, 31 Oct 64, JCS 1800/900-1, JMF 7000 (19 Oct 64). CM-267-64 to SecDef, 20 Nov 64, Att to 1st N/H of JCS 1800/907-1, 25 Nov 64, JMF 7000 (5 Nov 64) sec. 2.


Chapter 4. Continental Defense


2. Watson, Into the Missile Age, pp. 381–383.

3. JCSM-64-61 and CM-83-61 to SecDef, 9 Feb 61, JCS 1620/336, JMF 4714 (4 Jan 61).

4. Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) was an automated control system that could track and intercept enemy bombers. This system was used by the North American Aerospace Defense Command from 1959 to the 1980s.


7. JCSM-267-61 to SecDef, 24 Apr 61, JCS 1620/343, JMF 4730 (20 Apr 61).

8. General LeMay had replaced General White, which may explain the Air Force’s change of position.

9. JCSM-639-61 to SecDef, 15 Sep 61, JCS 1800/462, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 5.

10. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 22 Sep 61, JCS 1800/471, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 6. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Oct 61, JCS 1800/474 (9 Oct 61).


Chapter 5. Conventional Capabilities Expand

1. Byron R. Fairchild and Walter S. Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. VII, 1957–1960 (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000), p. 29. “United States and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962,” 28 Sep 60, JCS 2285/22, JMF 3072 (7 Jul 60) sec. 3. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 7 Dec 60, JCS 1800/907-2, JMF 7000 (5 Nov 64) sec. 3. Memo, SecArmy to SecDef, 31 Jul 64, JCS 1800/864; Memo, DASD (Compt.) to AsstSecArmy, 21 Nov 64, At to N/H of JCS 1800/864, 16 Nov 64; JMF 7000.1 (12 Aug 64).

2. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 1 Feb 61, JCS 2285/36, JMF 3072 (1 Feb 61). JCS 2285/37, 5 Feb 61, JMF 4031 (31 Jan 61). JCSM-75-61 to SecDef, 9 Feb 61, JCS 2285/39, JMF 4031 (31 Jan 61). General Lemnitzer was away from Washington and did not file an opinion.

3. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 31 Jan 61, and Memo, DepSecDef to SecAF, 3 Feb 61, JCS 2016/114, JMF 4031 (31 Jan 61). The C–130E is an all-weather, four-engine transport aircraft. It is basically a C–130B with two underwing fuel tanks added to increase its range.

5. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 1 Feb 61, JCS 2285/35, JMF 3072 (1 Feb 61). JCS 2285/37, 5 Feb 61, JMF 4031 (31 Jan 61). JCSM-75-61 to SecDef, 9 Feb 61, JCS 2285/39, JMF 4031 (31 Jan 61). General Lemnitzer was away from Washington and did not file an opinion.

6. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 3 Feb 61, JCS 2285/36, JMF 3072 (3 Feb 61) sec. 1. JCSM-71-61 to SecDef, 9 Feb 61, JCS 2285/38, same file, sec. 2. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 3 Feb 61, JCS 1924/117; JCSM-68-71 to SecDef, 9 Feb 61, JCS 1924/118; JMF 2230 (3 Feb 61). Aircraft deployments are not included because they were listed in numbers of squadrons for the US and in numbers of aircraft for the communist powers. The two sentences quoted come from JCSM-71-61.

8. JCS 1259/533, 21 Apr 61; JCSM-292-61 to SecDef, JCS 1259/535; CM-222-61 to CSA et al., 20 May 61; JMF 3140 (11 Apr 61) sec. 1. JCS 1259/547, 30 Jul 61, same file, sec. 3. JCSM-549-61 to SecDef, 18 Aug 61, JCS 1259/547; CM-335-61 to SecDef, 18 Aug 61; same file, sec. 4.


10. JCS 2250/29, 12 Apr 61, JMF 3350 (11 Apr 61) sec. 2.

11. JCSM-429-61 to SecDef, 23 Jun 61, JCS 2250/35, JMF 3350 (11 Apr 61) sec. 2.

12. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 20 Apr 61, JCS 2285/43; Memo, SecNav to JCS, 25 Apr 61, JCS 2285/44; JMF 3410 (20 Apr 61) sec. 1. Encl B to JCS 2285/46, 5 May 61, same file, sec. 2.

13. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 May 61, JCS 2285/46, JMF 3410 (20 Apr 61) sec. 2.

14. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 May 61, JCS 2285/46, JMF 3410 (20 Apr 61) sec. 2.

15. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Oct 61, JCS 1800/474, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 2. “Summary of General Purpose Forces,” 4 Sep 61, same file, sec. 4A. JCSM-637-61 to SecDef, 15 Sep 61, JCS 1800/465, same file, sec. 5.


24. DJSM-403-62 to JCS, 21 Mar 62, JCS 1800/448, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 6. Between 30 June and 31 December 1961, active duty strength of the armed forces grew from 2.483 to 2.799 million. By activating two National Guard divisions and bringing three regular divisions in CONUS to full strength, the Army increased its combat-ready divisions from 11 to 16. The Navy activated 18 ASW squadrons and 40 ASW ships; amphibious lift capability grew from 1½ to 2 divisions. The Air Force activated 21 tactical fighter, 4 reconnaissance, and 11 transport and troop carrier squadrons.


30. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 31 Oct 62, JCS 2285/85, JMF 7000 (17 Feb 62) sec. 3.

31. JCSM-922-62 to SecDef, 21 Nov 62, JCS 2285/89, JMF 7000 (17 Feb 62) sec. 3.


33. During the Cuban missile crisis, 24 C–119 and C–123 squadrons were mobilized in

anticipation of a large-scale airborne assault. Those aircraft could not operate over extended

distances. C–130Es, by contrast, could serve in either an assault or a strategic airlift role.


2285/85, JMF 7000 (16 Apr 62) sec. 3. JCSM-922-62 to SecDef, 21 Nov 62, JCS 2285/89, JMF

7000 (16 Apr 62) sec. 5.

35. “Department of Defense Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program,” 7 Jan 63,

JMF 7000 (16 Apr 62) sec. 25B.

36. These were: Army and Marine Corps General Purpose Forces; Air Force Tactical

Aircraft; Airlift and Sealift Forces; Attack Carrier Forces; Antisubmarine Warfare Forces;

Amphibious Assault Forces; Naval Mine Warfare Forces; Fleet Air Defense Systems; Navy

Shipbuilding and Conversion; and Underway Replenishment Forces.

37. CM-109-62 to DJS, 14 Nov 62, JCS 2143/177, JMF 3130 (14 Nov 62) sec. 1. JCSM-300-

63 to SecDef, 13 Apr 63, JCS 2143/201, same file, sec. 2B. During the summer, the Army

submitted Program Change Proposals asking for 18 divisions or at least more units to beef

up existing ones. The JCS repeated their JSOP-68 recommendations, and McNamara disap-

proved the Army's PCPs. JCS 1800/744-1, 8 Aug 63; JCSM-616-63 to SecDef, 10 Aug 63, JCS

1800/744-1; JMF 7000 (16 Apr 62) sec. 43. Memo, DASD(Compt.) to AsstSecArmy, 10 Sep 63,

JCS 188/744-2, same file, sec. 45.

38. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, 10 Oct 63, Att to Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 Oct 63, JCS

1800/775, JMF 7000 (10 Oct 63) sec. 1.

39. JCSM-873-63 to SecDef, 12 Nov 63, JCS 1800/775-1, JMF 7000 (10 Oct 63) sec. 3.

40. CM-1009-63 to SecDef, 12 Nov 63, JCS 1800/775-2, JMF 7000 (10 Oct 63) sec. 3.

41. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, “Recommended FY 1965-1969 Army and Marine Corps

General Purpose Forces,” 19 Dec 62, JMF 7000 (3 Jan 64) sec. 1A. Relevant parts are printed


43. Memo, Pres to SecDef, 9 Nov 62, JCS 2427; JCSM-924-62 to SecDef, 27 Nov 62, JCS

2427/2, JMF 3230 (24 Sep 62).

44. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 Dec 62, JCS 2427/5; JCSM-1024-62 to SecDef, 26 Dec 62,

JCS 2427/5; JMF 3230 (24 Sep 62).

45. JCSM-314-63 to SecDef, 19 Apr 63, JCS 2427/10; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 27 May 63, JCS

2427/11; JMF 3230 (24 Sep 62) sec. 4.

46. JCSM-300-63 to SecDef, 13 Apr 63, JCS 2143/201, JMF 3130 (14 Nov 62) sec. 1.

47. JCSM-782-63 to SecDef, 15 Oct 63, JCS 1800/759-1, JMF 7000 (13 Sep 63). Draft Memo,

SecDef to Pres, “Recommended FY 1965-FY 1969 Air Force Tactical Air Program,” 12 Dec 63,

JMF 7000 (3 Jan 64) sec. 1A.

48. JCSM-300-63 to SecDef, 13 Apr 63, JCS 2143/201, JMF 3130 (14 Nov 62) sec. 2B.
49. The CX–4 later became the C–5A.


51. JCSM-757-63 to SecDef, 12 Oct 63, JCS 1800/760-1, JMF 7000 (14 Sep 63).

52. JCSM-300-63 to SecDef, 13 Apr 63, JCS 2143/201, JMF 3130 (14 Nov 62) sec. 2B, vol. I. The ASW carriers were Essex-class, dating from World War II, with decks too short to handle jets.

53. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, 6 Sep 63, Encl to Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 27 Sep 63, JCS 1800/765, JMF 7000 (6 Sep 63) sec. 1.

54. JCSM-786-63 to SecDef, 10 Oct 63, JCS 1800/765-3; Memo, SecDef to ASD(Compt.), 14 Oct 63, JCS 1800/765-4; JMF 7000 (6 Sep 63) sec. 1. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, “Attack Carrier (CVA) Forces,” 18 Dec 63, JMF 7000 (3 Jan 64) sec. 1A.


56. “Memorandum of Conference with the President at the LBJ Ranch, Texas, on Monday, 30 December 1963, at 11:45 EST,” CJCS 031.1 (Meetings with the President).

57. “DoD Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program,” 10 Jan 64, JMF 7000 (3 Jan 64) sec. 1A.

58. JCSM-219-64 to SecDef, 16 Mar 64, JCS 2143/205-15; CM-1272-64 to SecDef, 20 Mar 64; JMF 3130 (16 Sep 63) sec. 4A, vol. I.

59. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 7 Oct 64, JCS 1800/893, JMF 7000 (7 Oct 64).

60. The Army’s justification was that nine divisions were needed to meet fixed requirements in Europe, Korea, Hawaii, and the Western Hemisphere, six to reinforce NATO, and three to defend South Korea.

61. JCSM-913-64 to SecDef, 30 Oct 64, JCS 1800/893-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 7 Dec 64, JCS 1800/893-2; JMF 7000 (7 Oct 64).

62. JCSM-219-64 to SecDef, 16 Mar 64, JCS 2143/205-15; CM-1272-64 to SecDef, 20 Mar 64; JMF 3130 (16 Sep 63) sec. 4A.

63. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 15 Oct 64, JCS 1800/898, JMF 7000 (15 Oct 64).

64. JCSM-924-64 to SecDef, 31 Oct 64, JCS 1800/889-1, JMF 7000 (15 Oct 64).

65. JCSM-219-64 to SecDef, 16 Mar 64, JCS 2143/205-15, JMF 3130 (16 Sep 63) sec. 4A. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 16 May 64, JCS1800/760-2, JMF 7000 (16 May 64)(2). JCSM-852-64 to SecDef, 8 Oct 64, JCS 1800/888-1, JMF 7000.1 (24 Sep 64) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to JCS, 9 Nov 64, JCS 1800/908, JMF 7000.1 (9 Nov 64).

66. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 11 May 64, JCS 1672/298, JMF 4114 (11 May 64) sec. 1. JCSM-709-64 to SecDef, 17 Aug 64, JCS 1672/298-2, same file, sec. 2. Memo, SecDef to JCS, 9 Nov 64, JCS 1800/908; JCSM-964-64 to SecDef, 17 Nov 64, JCS 1800/908-1; 1st N/H of JCS 1800/908-1, 15 Dec 64; JMF 7000.1 (9 Nov 64).

67. JCSM-219-64 to SecDef, 16 Mar 64, JCS 2143/205-15; CM-1272-64 to SecDef, 20 Mar 64; JMF 3130 (16 Sep 63) sec. 4A, vol. I. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 Oct 64, JCS 1800/895;
Chapter 6. Disarmament Gives Way to Arms Control


2. Memo, McCloy to Pres, 23 May 61, JCS 1731/456; Ltr, DepSecDef to McCloy, 2 Jun 61, JCS 1731/459; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 1 Jun 61, JCS 1731/456; CNOM-77-61 to JCS, 5 Jun 61; JCSM-386-61 to SecDef, 6 Jun 61, JCS 1731/458; JMF 3050 (9 May 61).


5. That was about the US total; Soviet personnel numbered perhaps one million more.

6. While there would be debate over exactly what qualified as an SNDV, the broad categories were intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles, and bombers. Cruise missiles, because their ranges varied so widely, later became a particular subject of controversy.

7. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 6 Jun 61, JCS 1731/461; JCS 1731/462, 7 Jun 61; JCSM-395-61 to SecDef, 10 Jun 61, JCS 1731/463; JMF 3050 (6 Jun 61) sec. 1. Memo, DepSecDef to McCloy, 14 Jun 61, JCS 1731/468, same file, sec. 3.


10. CM-376-61 to SecDef, 4 Oct 61, JCS 1731/487; Ltr, Dir, ACDA, to SecDef, 14 Oct 61, JCS 1731/491; JMF 3050 (4 Oct 61) sec. 1.

11. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 20 Oct 61, JCS 1731/491; JCSM-850-61 to SecDef, 6 Dec 61, JCS 1731/500; Memo, DepSecDef to Dir, ACDA, 28 Dec 61, 2nd N/H of JCS 1731/500, 4 Jan 62, JMF 3050 (4 Oct 61) sec. 1.


17. One reason was that the Soviets apparently had backed away from their position that there must first be agreements concerning West and East Germany. NATO then was considering creation of a multilateral nuclear force, West Germany included. FRUS: 1961–1963, vol. VII, p. 570.

18. Memo, ActgASA(IS) to CJCJS, 15 Sep 62, JCS 1731/624; JCS 1731/626, 19 Sep 62; JCSM-727-62 to SecDef, 18 Sep 62, JCS 1731/625; Memo, Dir, ACDA, to SecDef, 26 Sep 62, JCS 1731/630; CM-1-62 to SecDef, 3 Oct 62, 1st N/H of JCS 1731/630, 4 Oct 62; Memo, ASA(IS) to McGeorge Bundy, 5 Oct 62, 2nd N/H of JCS 1731/630, 9 Oct 62; JMF 3050 (23 Aug 62).

19. JCSM-732-62 to SecDef, 19 Sep 62, JCS 1731/621, JMF 3050 (20 Aug 62). In 1977, Gen. Lemnitzer remembered zonal inspection as having emerged from discussions between Soviet and American scientists. Lemnitzer recalled saying at an NSC meeting that the JCS believed zonal inspection could be evaded by assembling equipment at the edge of a zone, then moving it into the next zone before inspection began. General Lemnitzer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 31 March 1977.


22. Memo, ASA(IS) to CJCJS, 2 Oct 62, JCS 1731/637; JCSM-876-62 to SecDef, 10 Nov 62, JCS 1731/639; Ltr, ASA(IS) to DepDir, ACDA, 23 Nov 62, N/H of JCS 1731/639, 27 Nov 62, JMF 3050 (23 Oct 62) sec. 1. N/H of JCS 1731/641, 27 Dec 62, same file, sec. 2. Memo, ASA(IS) to CJCJS, 23 Apr 63, JCS 1731/698; JCSM-341-62 to SecDef, 26 Apr 63, JCS 1731/698-1; JMF 3050 (23 Apr 61) sec. 1. NSAM No. 255 to SecState and SecDef, 30 Jul 63, JCS 222/714; same file, sec. 2. Dept. of State Bulletin, 8 Jul 63, pp. 50–51.


Chapter 7. Nuclear Testing—Start and Stop

1. JCSM-347-60 to SecDef, 26 Aug 60, JCS 1731/221; JCSM-528-60 to SecDef, 21 Nov 60, JCS 1731/222; JMF 4613 (28 Apr 60).


3. JCSM-99-61 to SecDef, 21 Feb 61, JCS 1731/223; N/H of JCS 1731/223, 28 Feb 61; JMF 4613 (3 Feb 61).


5. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 3 Jun 61, JCS 1731/430; JCSM-133-61 to SecDef, 4 Jun 61, JCS 1731/431; JMF 3050 (2 Mar 61). Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test

6. Memo, CJCS to CNO, 8 Mar 61, Chairman’s File 471.94. This may explain why Dr. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, wrote that Lemnitzer presented the JCS view “not very forcefully, I thought.” FRUS: 1961–1963, vol. VII, p. 11.


8. Memo by McCloy, “Memorandum on Possible Courses of Action Relating to Negotiations with the Soviets on Test Ban Negotiations,” 22 Apr 61, JCS 1731/442; JCSM-275-61 to SecDef, 26 Apr 61, JCS 1731/442; N/H of JCS 1731/442, 30 Apr 61; JMF 3050 (22 Apr 61).


12. Dr. James Fisk, who chaired the panel described above, was a member.


18. General Lemnitzer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 31 March 1977.

19. Ibid.


21. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 30 Nov 61, JCS 2101/448; JCSM-880-61 to SecDef, 22 Dec 61, JCS 2101/451; JMF 2210 (30 Nov 61) sec. 1.


25. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 7 Aug 62, JCS 1731/606; JCSM-614-62 to SecDef, 9 Aug 62, JCS 1731/607; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to Dir, ACDA, 10 Aug 62, N/H of JCS 1731/607, 17 Aug 62; JMF


29. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 20 Feb 63, JCS 1731/670, JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63). JCSM-160-63 to SecDef, 22 Feb 63, JCS 1731/672; Ltr, ASD(ISA) to DepDir, ACDA, 23 Feb 63, N/H of JCS 1731/672, 5 Mar 63, same file, sec. 4. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 Mar 63, JCS 1731/683; JCSM-234-63 to SecDef, 19 Mar 63, JCS 1731/684; Ltr, SecDef to Dir, ACDA, 22 Mar 63, N/H of JCS 1731/684, 25 Mar 63; same file, sec. 5. Memo, Dir, ACDA to Cmte of Principals, 23 Mar 63, JCS 1731/688; Ltr, SecDef to Dir, ACDA, 5 Apr 63, 2nd N/H of JCS 1731/684; same file, sec. 6.

30. SAACM-57-62 to ASD(ISA), 26 Feb 63; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to ActgDir, ACDA, 27 Feb 63, JCS 1731/679; JCSM-172-63 to SecDef, 4 Mar 63, JCS 1731/662; JMF 3050 (7 Apr 62).

31. Note to Control, “Formulation of US Position Regarding Arms Control and Disarmament Matters,” 4 Mar 63; Ltr, SecDef to Dir, ACDA, 15 Mar 63, 1st N/H of JCS 1731/662, 16 Apr 63; Ltr, SecDef to Dir, ACDA, 10 Apr 63, 1st N/H of JCS 1731/662; Ltr, Dir, ACDA, to SecDef, 30 Apr 63, 2nd N/H of JCS 1731/662, 14 May 63; JMF 3050 (7 Apr 62).

32. JCSM-327-63 to SecDef, JCS 1731/696, JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63) sec. 7.


34. CM-643-63 to DJS, 4 Jun 63, JCS 1731/707; JCS 1731/707-3, 11 Jun 63, and Decision On, 12 Jun 63; JMF 3050 (11 Jun 63) sec. 8. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 7 Jun 63, JCS 1731/709, JMF 3050 (6 Jun 63) sec. 1. JCSM-462-63 to SecDef (Appendix, pp. 18–19, 23–25), 17 Jun 63, JCS 1731/709-1, same file, sec. 2.


37. Drafting of the White Papers was prompted by the Committee of Principals meeting on 14 June. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 26 Jun 63, JCS 1731/714, JMF 3050 (26 Jun 63) sec. 1. JCSM-514-63 to SecDef, 5 Jul 63, JCS 1731/714; DJSM-146-63 to CJCS, 9 Jul 63; same file, sec. 2.

38. NY Times, 3 Jul 63, p. 4.


42. “Memorandum of Conference with the President, July 24, 1963—10:00 AM,” CJCS 031.1 Meetings with the President.

43. Note to Control, “Limited Test Ban Treaty,” 24 Jul 63; CM-760-63 to DJS, 25 Jul 63, JCS 1731/714, JMF 3050 (26 Jul 63) sec. 2. Ltr, CJCS to SecState, 27 Jul 63, JCS 1731/711-7; Ltrs, CJCS to Dr. Brown, Dr. Wiesner, and Chmn Seaborg, 30 Jul 63, JCS 1731/711-8, -9, & -10; JMF 3050 (26 Jul 63) sec. 1. JCS 1731/711-27, 8 Aug 63, same file, sec. 2.

44. CM-802-63 to JCS, 10 Aug 63; Notes to Control, “CM-802-63,” 12 Aug 63; JMF 3050 (26 Jul 63) sec. 3. General Taylor interviewed by W. S. Poole on 16 Oct 78.

46. Hearings, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, S. Com on Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., 1st sess, pp. 109, 272–277, 354–359. In subsequent testimony, Dr. Brown, Dr. Bradbury, and Chairman Seaborg endorsed the treaty while Dr. Foster criticized it. Among former Service Chiefs, Admiral Anderson spoke for and Admiral Burke spoke against the treaty.

Chapter 8. The Cuban Debacle

1. The Committee drew its name from a presidential directive, NSC 5412, that dealt with covert activities. The Committee consisted of a Deputy Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It convened regularly to review covert operations being conducted by the CIA.


3. Although his phrasing is unclear, General White apparently was offering options for consideration and not actually recommending their execution. JCS 2304/16, 10 Jan 61, and Dec On, 13 Jan 61; SM-41-61 to Dir, J–5, 13 Jan 61; JMF 9123/9105 (10 Jan 61).

4. “Chronology of JCS Participation in Bumpy Road,” CJCS Special File.


6. In the “Discussion” accompanying the draft of what became JCSM-44-61, J–5 assessed the internal situation quite differently: “In view of the rapid buildup of the Castro government’s military and militia capability and the lack of predictable future mass discontent [emphasis added], the possible success of the Para-Military Plan appears very doubtful.” Encl C to JCS 2304/19, 24 Jan 61, JMF 9123/9105 (10 Jan 61).


8. CM-261-61 to JCS, 6 Jul 61, CJCS Special File.

9. The Cuban Volunteer Force consisted of (1) an infantry battalion of 826 personnel armed with mortars, recoilless rifles, and 5 light tanks, (2) an air force of 17 B–26 light bombers and 15 transports, and (3) a navy with 2 LSTs, 3 LCUs, 4 LCPs, and 1 LSD.


17. At a meeting on 29 March, however, Bissell “indicated that if the operation failed, the force would probably have to be withdrawn.” FRUS: 1961–1963, vol. X, p. 177.

19. JCS 2304/24, 24 Mar 61; JCSM-210-61 to SecDef, 4 Apr 61, JCS 2304/25; 1st N/H of JCS 2304/25, 12 Apr 61; JMF 9123 (24 Mar 61).


27. A CIA Command Post had been set up in Washington. Information was passed by messenger and telephone from the CIA to the Pentagon's War Room; Service liaison officers then briefed their respective Chiefs. *FRUS: 1961–1963*, vol. X, pp. 599, 542.


30. Adm. Burke interviewed by W. S. Poole on 26 Oct 75. Msg, JCS 994309 to CINCLANT, 181340Z Apr 61, JMF 9123 (24 Mar 61) sec. 2. Msgs, CTG 81.8 to CINCLANTFLT, 182142Z & 182142Z Apr 61, same file, sec. 3; the JCS were information addressees. Msg, JCS 994317Z to CINCLANT, 181949Z Apr 61, same file, sec. 2. Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 182306Z Apr 61, same file, sec. 2. Practically all the message traffic for 18 and 19 April is printed in the *FRUS* volume.


32. Msg, JCS 994379 to CINCLANT, 190837Z Apr 61, JMF 9123 (24 Mar 61) sec. 2.


34. Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 190701Z Apr 61; Msgs, CTG 81.8 to CINCLANT, 191340Z & 191618Z Apr 61; JMF 9123 (24 Mar 61) sec. 3. The ammunition-carrying freighters *Atlantico* and *Caribe* had headed south on 17 April. They were brought back by the US Navy but held sixty miles offshore, because CIA Headquarters decided that they would certainly be lost in a daylight run. *FRUS: 1961–1963*, vol. X, pp. 592–594.
35. Afterwards, Lemnitzer testified: “It was our understanding...without any doubt that moving into the guerrilla phase was one of the important elements of the plan, and any idea that the Chiefs considered that they were making an indefinite lodgment on the beachhead is not right...This Zapata area is not much different from that in Vietnam, where they’re having the devil’s own time chasing the guerrillas through the swamps.” *FRUS: 1961–1963*, vol. X, pp. 534, 535. However, “moving into the guerrilla phase” was quite different from the build-up and offensive phases outlined in the Chiefs’ logistical support plan above.


37. Msg, JCS 994392 to CINCLANT, 191812Z Apr 61, JMF 9123 (24 Mar 61) sec. 2. The heading read “from General Gray” but other hands presumably did a good deal of the drafting. Lemnitzer remembered what a British officer had said during a crisis in the Salerno landing of 1943—no operation was more difficult than withdrawal from a beleaguered beachhead. Lemnitzer Interview, 12 Feb 76.

38. Msgs, CTG 81.2 to CINCLANTFLT, 191917Z & 192020Z Apr 61, JMF 9123 (24 Mar 61) sec. 3.

39. The survivors were ransomed and brought to Florida in December 1962.


42. Ibid, pp. 502, 505.


44. CM-235-61 to General Taylor, 7 Jun 61, CJCS 091 Cuba.


46. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 188.

47. Untitled draft with Notation by General Taylor, “This was read by President Kennedy to the JCS about 27 May, 1961,” Box 12, Taylor Papers, National Defense University. This draft also contained a biting critique of the JCS: “I must say frankly that I do not think the JCS gave me the support to which the President is entitled. My impression is that as a body you did not study the plan with the thoroughness which so important a matter deserved.” But, when interviewed separately by W. S. Poole in 1980, General Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke firmly denied that the President used those words in speaking to them.


50. Memo, CNO to CJCS, 17 Jul 61, CJCS Special File.

51. Admiral Burke interviewed by W. S. Poole on 28 Oct 75.

52. Lemnitzer Interview, 12 Feb 76.

53. Major General Chester V. Clifton, USA (Ret.), interviewed by W. S. Poole on 14 Aug 79.


**Chapter 9. The Laotian Precipice**

1. Note to Control Div., “Situation in Laos,” 17 Aug 60; CSAFM-390-60 to JCS, JCS 1992/839; JCSM-373-60 to JCS, 19 Aug 60; JMF 9155.2/9105 (12 Aug 60). US Ambassador Winthrop Brown argued for a coalition government, headed by Souvanna but excluding communists and Pathet Lao. Adm. Burke promptly warned Secretary Gates that Souvanna was a “weak sister” and not inclined to resist communists. Robert J. Watson, *Into the Missile Age*


3. CSAFM-473-60 to JCS, 20 Dec 60; Briefing Sheet for CJCS, “JCS 1992/882,” 20 Dec 60; JCSM-580-60 to SecDef, 22 Dec 60, JCS 1992/882; N/H of JCS 1992/882, 6 Jan 61; JMF 9155.2/9105 (20 Dec 60). Watson, Into the Missile Age, p. 654. By 31 December 1960, US assistance to the RLG over the years totaled $214.1 million in economic and $63.4 million in military aid. Memo, SecDef to BG Clifton, 30 Mar 61, CJCS 091 Laos.


5. CNOM-7-61 to JCS, 10 Jan 61, JMF 9155.2/9105 (30 Dec 60).

6. At an interagency meeting on 17 January, Gen. Lemnitzer said that “the principal concern of the JCS was that we were not winning on the ground because we were not able to train and support the FAL fully. French responsibility for training was not good enough. We had no indication of lack of equipment.” FRUS: 1961–1963, vol. XXIV, p. 14.

7. SEATO signatories were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan. A protocol designated Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam as additional areas where armed aggression would be recognized as a threat calling for action under the treaty. In 1959, SEATO’s Military Planning Office started work on Plan 5 for intervention in Laos.

8. JCSM-13-61 to SecDef, 14 Jan 61, JCS 1992/894, JMF 9155.2/9105 (30 Dec 60).

9. Several accounts, contradicting each other on key points, are printed in FRUS: 1961–1963, vol. XXIV, pp. 19–25, 41–42. The quotes come from p. 19 and fn. 5 on p. 25. Eisenhower’s exact words and their meaning have drawn a good deal of scholarly attention, none of it conclusive.


13. Memos, CJCS to Pres. Kennedy, 6 and 16 Feb 61, CJCS 091 Laos.

14. Msgs, JCS 990154 to CINCPAC, 3 Feb 61, and State 868 to Vientiane, 14 Feb 61, summarized in the “Laotian Crisis” Chronology, JHO.

15. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 012300Z Mar 61; CM-223-61 to JCS, 6 Mar 61; CJCS 091 Laos.


17. Msg, Chief, PEO, to CINCPAC, DA IN 94444, 18 Mar 61, JHO.


Notes to Pages 127–131

20. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 240658Z Mar 61; Msg, JCS 992897 to CINCPAC, 29 Mar 61, JCS 1992/381; JMF 3146 (21 Mar 61). It is noteworthy that no one expected Britain or France to participate in a SEATO intervention.


24. Gen. Lemnitzer was in Europe, finishing the first part of a round-the-world trip. After talking long-distance with McNamara and Burke, he decided to continue the journey. Since his travel plans were known, allies might interpret his return to Washington as a sign of panic within the administration. Also, Lemnitzer wanted to visit US troops and missions in the Far East at this time of rising tension. Gen. Lemnitzer made these comments to W. S. Poole after reading an early draft of this chapter.

25. *FRUS: 1961–1963*, vol. XXIV, pp. 142–144. It seems questionable whether the “general agreement” described by Bundy included Adm. Burke. Msg, SecState 1172 to Vientiane, 26 Apr 61; Msg, JCS 994935 to CINCPAC, 26 Apr 61; summarized in “Laos Chronology,” JHO.

26. “Memorandum on the President’s Meeting with Congressional Leaders on April 27, 1961,” Att to Memo, U. A. Johnson to BG Clifton, 4 May 61; Box 345, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library.

27. Admiral Burke interviewed by W. S. Poole on 28 Oct 75.


31. Note to Control Div., “Laos,” 2 May 61, CJCS 091 Laos. Memos, CNO, CSA, CMC, and CSAF to SecDef, 2 May 61, Laos 381, RG 330. These are summarized in *FRUS: 1961–1963*, vol. XXIV, pp. 169–170. Secretary of the Army Elvis Stahr went beyond Decker in recommending ground intervention. Conversely, Secretary of the Air Force Eugene Zuckert appreciated that air attacks alone might prove ineffective but “the difficulty with ground intervention is that from the standpoint of the [Soviets] it may be exactly what they wish. The result will be to tie us up, perhaps for years, in an occupation misty as to its objective.” By limiting itself to air action, the administration would preserve “a much better position to cut our prestige loss.” Hindsight makes Zuckert’s advice look soundest of all. “Proposal of Secretary of the Army” and Memo, SecAF to SecDef, 2 May 61, Laos 381, RG 330.

32. Gen. Lemnitzer’s message is contained in his papers at the National Defense University.


34. JCS 1992/976, 5 May 61; CSAFM-149-61 to JCS, 9 May 61; JCSM-319-61 to SecDef, 12 May 61, JCS 1992/976; 1st N/H of JCS 1992/976, 29 May 61; JMF 9150/3072 (5 Apr 61).

36. Secretary Rusk attended the opening sessions. Thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State Averell Harriman usually headed the delegation. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze represented DOD.


39. JCSM-611-61 to SecDef, 7 Sep 61, JCS 2344/10, JMF 9155.2/3100 (9 May 61) (2).


41. JCSM-688-61 to SecDef, 29 Sep 61, JCS 2344/14, JMF 9155.2/3100 (13 May 61).

42. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 3 Oct 61, JCS 2344/17, JMF 9155.2/3100 (13 May 61).

43. JCSM-704-61 to SecDef, 5 Oct 61, JCS 2344/18, same file.


**Chapter 10. The Berlin Confrontation**

1. The Soviet zone became the German Democratic Republic while the western powers’ zones became the Federal Republic of Germany. Here, for convenience, the two states are labeled East and West Germany.


4. Ltr, USCINCEUR to JCS, 22 May 60, JCS 1907/270, JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (26 Jun 59) sec.

2. Ltr, Dep USCINCEUR to CJCS, 20 Jun 60; Ltr, USCINCEUR to CINC, British Army of the Rhine, 31 Jan 61, JCS 1907/290, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (20 Jun 60).

5. JCSM-349-60 to SecDef, 12 Aug 60, JCS 1907/274, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (28 Mar 60 sec. 2.


7. JCSM-237-61 to SecDef, 13 Apr 61, JCS 1907/191, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (1 Apr 61) sec. 1.

8. Memo, McGeorge Bundy to SecDef, 17 Apr 61, JCS 1907/294; JCSM-287-61 to SecDef, 28 Apr 61, JCS 1907/295; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (3 Apr 61) sec. 1.


10. JCSM-196-61 to SecDef, 4 May 61, JCS 1907/296, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (3 Apr 61) sec. 2.

11. They were referring to a reworking of Basic National Security Policy described in chap. 1.

12. JCSM-353-61 to SecDef, 25 May 61, JCS 1907/302; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 25 May 61; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (1 Apr 61) sec. 1.

13. Msg, USNMR to SecDef, 291747Z May 61, DA IN 117306; Msg, DEF 996578 to USNMR, 30 May 61; Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 041730Z Jun 61, DA IN 118966-S; Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 041800Z Jun 61, DA IN 119006Z Jun 61; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (15 Jun 61).

14. JCSM-419-61 to SecDef, 21 Jun 61, JCS 1907/308, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (3 Apr 61) sec. 3. J3M-732-61 to DJS, 1 Sep 61, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (19 May 61).


16. JCSM-360-61 to Pres Kennedy, 27 May 61, JMF 5410 (25 May 61). Gen. White wanted to say that “it is the unequivocal opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” At Gen. Decker’s urging this was softened to “considered judgment.” Memo, CASF to DJS, n.d.; Memo by CSA, 26 May 61; same file. Interviews, Adm. Arleigh Burke, 28 Oct 75, and Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, 25 Jan 77, with W. S. Poole.


18. JCSM-423-61 to SecDef, 21 Jun 61, JCS 1907/309, JMF 9172 Berlin/3070 (15 Jun 61). The Chiefs also passed their paper to Acheson.

19. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 12 Jun 61, JCS 1907/305; JCSM-430-61 to SecDef, 24 Jun 61, JCS 1907/313; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (12 Jun 61) sec. 1.

20. Memo, McGeorge Bundy to SecDef, 12 Jun 61, JCS 1907/306; JCSM-431-61 to SecDef, 26 Jun 61, JCS 1907/311; Memo, ASD(ISA) to Bundy, 26 Jun 61, 1st N/H of JCS 1907/311; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (12 Jun 61).


22. Msg, JCS 998202 to USNMR, 27 Jun 61, CJCS 091 Germany. JCS 1725/391, JMF 9172 Berlin/3070 (1 Jul 61).


25. JCSM-464-61 to SecDef, 6 Jul 61, JCS 1907/316, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (30 Jun 61) sec. 2. JCSM-463-61 to SecDef, JCS 1725/391, JMF 3170 (1 Jul 61).


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27. This statement was added at Gen. LeMay’s suggestion. CSAFM-228-61 to JCS 12 Jul 61, JMF 3170 (1 Jul 61) sec. 2.
28. JCSM-461-61 to SecDef, 12 Jul 61, JCS 1907/321, JMF 3170 (1 Jul 61) sec. 2.
30. JSSC Memo 45-61 to CJCS, 20 Jul 61, CJCS 091 Germany. JCS 1907/322, 13 Jul 61, and Dec On, 20 Jul 61, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (13 Jul 61).
33. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 27 Jul 61, JCS 1907/337, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (27 Jul 61) sec. 1.
34. JCSM-508-61 to SecDef, 29 Jul 61, JCS 1907/338, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (27 Jul 61) sec. 1. JCS 1907/334, 26 Jul 61; JCSM-515-61 to SecDef, 3 Aug 61, JCS 1907/334, JMF 9172 Berlin 3100 (26 Jul 61). After long study, State and Defense disapproved, claiming mainly that a short paper could not capture all the ramifications of a fast-moving crisis and that some critical policies had not yet been adequately elaborated. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 21 Oct 61, N/H of JCS 1907/334, 24 Oct 61, same file.
36. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 19 May 61, JCS 1907/299; JCSM-502-61 to SecDef, 29 Jul 61, JCS 1907/350, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (1 Apr 61) sec. 1.
37. Memo, CNO to JCS, 10 Aug 61, JCS 1907/350, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (10 Aug 61).
38. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, pp. 375–376, 381–382.
41. JCSM-570-61 to SecDef, 18 Aug 61, JCS 1907/363; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 1 Sep 61, N/H of JCS 1907/363, 5 Sep 61; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (17 Aug 61) sec. 1. JCSM-651-61 to SecDef, 20 Sep 61, JCS 1907/402; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 30 Sep 61, 1st N/H of JCS 1907/402, 4 Oct 61; Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 8 Nov 61, 2nd N/H of JCS 1907/402, 13 Nov 61; same file, sec. 2. Msg, JCS 2442 to USCINCEUR, 2 Dec 61, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (29 Nov 61).
44. Msg, JCS 1329 to USCINCEUR, 31 Aug 61, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (31 Aug 61) sec. 1.
45. “CJCS Debriefing of JCS,” 1 Sep 61, summarized in “Berlin Question,” JHO. Memo, Gen. Taylor to Pres, 1 Sep 61; Msg, JCS 1334 to USCINCEUR, 1 Sep 61; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (31 Aug 61) sec. 1.
46. “CJCS Debriefing of JCS,” 1 Sep 61, summarized in “Berlin Question,” JHO. Msg, JCS 1362 to Pres, 2 Sep 61; Msg, JCS 1363 to USCINCEUR, 3 Sep 61, JMF 9172 Berlin/4031 (28 Jul 61).
47. Msg, USNMR ALO 809 to JCS, 18 Sep 61, DA IN 151916; JCSM-666-61 to SecDef, 22 Sep 61, JCS 1907/417; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 30 Sep 61, 1st N/H of JCS 1907/417; Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 4 Oct 61, 2nd N/H of JCS 1907/417; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (31 Aug 61) sec. 1.
48. Memo, Pres to SecDef, 31 Aug 61, Box 35, Maxwell Taylor Papers, National Defense University. JCS 1907/386, 6 Sep 61, and Decision On, 6 Sep 61, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (5 Sep 61).
49. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 7 Sep 61, JCS 1907/390, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (7 Sep 61). Gen. Norstad reported that, by 1 January 1962, combat-ready forces in Central Europe would grow from 21 ²⁄₃ to 24¹⁄₃ divisions. Additionally, the US, UK, France, and Canada had agreed to assemble a strategic reserve of 12 5/3 divisions. But Norstad did not consider these steps to be enough. Ltr, SACEUR to Pres, SHAPE 188/61, 15 Sep 61, summarized in “Berlin Question,” JHO.
51. CM-358-61 to SecDef, 11 Sep 61, JCS 1907/395, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (8 Sep 61). The statements in paragraphs 3 and 8 were based upon conclusions by the Chairman’s NATO Working Group, described in chap. 13.
52. Msg, JCS 1495 to USCINCEUR, 12 Sep 61; Msg, SecDef to USCINCEUR, 13 Sep 61; Msg, USCINCEUR PRS 232 to SecDef, 16 Sep 61; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (8 Sep 61).
55. “Current intelligence” presumably referred to the SHAPE figure cited in Gen. Norstad’s message above.
56. JCSM-641-61 to SecDef, 22 Sep 61, JCS 1907/396, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (8 Sep 61).
57. Msg, JCS 1227 to USCINCEUR, 24 Aug 61; Ltr, USCINCEUR to JCS, Ser 4414, 21 Sep 61, JCS 1907/412; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (18 Aug 61) sec. 1.
60. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 10 Oct 61, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (18 Aug 61)(1) sec. 2. Msg, JCS 1848 to USCINCEUR, 11 Oct 61, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (9 Aug 61) sec. 3. The French sent 10,000 men to augment their units in Germany and moved two divisions from Algeria to northern France. West Germany lengthened its period of conscription from 12 to 18 months and held 36,000 men in service for three additional months.
61. JCS 1907/426, 8 Oct 61; JCS 1907/432, 12 Oct 61; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (6 Oct 61) sec. 1.
62. JCS 1907/433, 12 Oct 61; JCSM-728-61 to SecDef, 13 Oct 61, JCS 1907/433; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (18 Aug 61) sec. 2.
64. FRUS: Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, pp. 521–523. This was issued on 23 October as NSAM No. 109. Gen. Lemnitzer remembered going to the White House and telling the President about all the contingencies for which responses were prescribed. He thought that, after the briefing, Kennedy was much relieved. Lemnitzer Interview, 25 Jan 77. This probably was a meeting on 10 October described in ibid, pp. 487–489.
67. Robert S. Jordan, Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 195. By communicating directly, Norstad meant that messages to him also listed CINCUSAREUR and USCOCB as information addressees, leaving him no opportunity for exchanges with Washington before his subordinates were informed.
69. Daily events are summarized in “Berlin Question,” JHO.
70. See chap. 11.

**Chapter 11. The Cuban Missile Crisis**


2. BG Craig was a member of J–5, the Plans and Policy Division. In July 1962, he was succeeded by BG Benjamin Harris, USA, who worked in the recently created office of Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities. “Briefing for Robert Kennedy,” 21 Mar 62, RG 273, File 145-10001-101183, JFK Project.


5. In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, General Shoup had made a similar proposal.


11. According to US terminology, the R–12s and R–14s were SS–4s and SS–5s respectively.


13. In the service of Anadyr, eighty-five merchant, freight, and cargo ships would make some 150 round trips in the next three months. Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, p. 29.

14. In July 1961, when the Soviets were threatening West Berlin, Kennedy had told the JCS that Berlin and Cuba were closely inter-related, giving the clear impression that moves against West Berlin would trigger action against Cuba.


18. Memo, VCNO to JCS, 14 Sep 62, JCS 2304/57, JMF 9123/3020 (14 Sep 62). The memo contains no evidence of participation by the CNO but, in a 1980 interview with W. S. Poole, Adm. Anderson said that it would have been cleared with him beforehand.
19. JCS 2304/58, 19 Sep 62, JMF 9123/9105 (19 Sep 62). JSSC members were: MG J. S. Holtoner, USAF; MG David W. Gray, USA; and RADM J. D. Wylie, USN. Note to Control Div., “JCS 2304/57,” 19 Sep 62, JMF 9123/3020 (14 Sep 62).


27. Except where other sources are cited, the rest of this chapter draws upon “Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October-November 1962, Dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis”; “Secretary’s Notes on Joint Chiefs of Staff Actions During the Cuban Crisis, 1962”; and “Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis,” 4 Jan 63; all in JHO.

28. The solution, applied to OPLAN 316, is described in fn. 73.


31. Vice Chiefs and Operations Deputies often attended as well.


33. The Kennedy Tapes, pp. 53–72; the Taylor quotes come from p. 65.

34. JCSM-794-62 to SecDef, 17 Oct 62.

35. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 251, 276–278, 281. U–2 photos also showed evidence of three Soviet armored combat groups; a fourth was found later. Ibid, p. 306.


37. Msg, JCS 6833 to CINCONAD, 211920 Z Oct 62.


40. Burchinal was Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs. In 1976, W. S. Poole read his remark but did not include it in the “Notes Taken From Transcripts.”


42. See Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, pp. 468–474, 476–486. Near the height of the crisis, a Soviet deputy foreign minister did propose increasing the pressure on West Berlin. Khrushchev responded, “We are just beginning to extricate ourselves from one adventure, and you are suggesting that we jump into another.” Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, p. 218.


44. Msg, JCS 6779 to CINCONAD, 191723Z Oct 62; Msg, JCS 6780 to CNO et al., 191726Z Oct 62.

45. Just as he had during the Berlin confrontation, Acheson favored strong measures—in this case, a surprise air strike.
46. The scenario was written this way because McNamara told the Blue team that the JCS were willing to accept a delay of 12 to 24 hours. Actually, Taylor had said only that they were willing to listen to arguments for that much advance notification. He and the Service Chiefs had discussed a shorter period of two hours.


49. Presumably, Taylor named Stevenson because the President’s decision coincided with what General Clay had reported earlier in the day as being Stevenson’s position. In fact, there is much evidence that the President and Robert Kennedy did not hold Stevenson in high regard.


51. Msg, JCS 6827 to CINCLANT, 211630Z Oct 62. They also instructed unified and specified commanders to prepare for all contingencies. Msg, JCS 6830 to CINCLANT, 211814Z Oct 62.

52. JCSM-800-62 to SecDef, 21 Oct 62.


54. Defense Conditions ran from the lowest alert status, DEFCON 5, up to the highest, DEFCON 1, when hostilities were under way. DEFCON 2 meant that hostilities were considered imminent.


57. Msg, JCS 6863 to CINCPAC, 221805Z Oct 62; Msg, JCS 6891 to CINCPAC and CINCLANT, 230311Z Oct 62.

58. Msg, JCS 6866 to CINCUSNAVEUR, 221821Z Oct 62.


60. Until 22 October, US intelligence estimated Soviet personnel at 8 to 10,000. By 24 October, that figure had been revised to 22,000. But the actual number was almost 42,000. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, p. 308. Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, p. 28.


64. Msg, JCS 6917 to CINCSAC, 232906Z Oct 62. General Taylor interviewed by W. S. Poole on 21 Nov 78. They also ordered that one Hawk battalion and one Nike-Hercules battalion be positioned in the Miami-Homestead area. Msg, JCS 68913 to CINCONAD, 232121Z Oct 62.


67. Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, pp. 70–72; fn. 72 on p. 373 establishes that the incident occurred on Tuesday, not on Wednesday as most accounts placed it. Admiral Anderson interviewed by W. S. Poole on 7 Nov 78. Roswel Gilpatric Oral History Interview, pp. 59–62, John F. Kennedy Library. In 1980, Adm. Anderson told Poole that Gilpatric’s account was grossly erroneous and stressed that the words about John Paul Jones did not originate with him.


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72. Judging by the transcript of that meeting, in *The Kennedy Tapes*, pp. 246–260, Taylor was drawing inferences rather than reporting conversations.

73. JCSM-821-62 to SecDef, 25 Oct 62, JCS 2304/83, JMF 9123/3100 (25 Oct 62). The assault elements in OPLAN 316 were the 2nd Marine Division(-) and the 5th MEB, the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, one combat command from the 1st Armored Division, and one brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division. The floating reserve would consist of one combat command of the 1st Armored Division and one brigade from the 2nd Infantry Division. On call would be the rest of the 1st Armored and 2nd Infantry Divisions. Marines would land a few miles east of Havana, Army units at Mariel about twenty miles west of the capital. Initially, they would skirt Havana and head for the missile sites. Apps A and B to Encl B to Rpt, CINCANT to JCS, 10 Nov 62, JCS 2018/508, JMF 9123/3105 (5 Nov 62) sec. 1. Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight*, pp. 104, 177. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Kitchen told Rear Adm. D. L. Kauffman (Deputy Director, J–5) that the OPLANs displayed a “typical G. I. approach.” He wanted them revised to include (1) a response to genuine or simulated insurrection and (2) probable political restraints such as “free cities” and “no deep interdiction.” Kauffman persuaded Kitchen that a new set of OPLANs was not needed. Memo, RADM Kauffman to MG Reynolds, 29 Oct 62, Box 15, Maxwell Taylor Papers, NDU.

74. JCSM-822-62 to SecDef, 26 Oct 62.


76. This was a rather loose interpretation of the SNIE, which is printed in *FRUS: 1961–1963*, vol. XI, pp. 122–125.

77. JCSM-831-62 to SecDef, 28 Oct 62, stated that “the only direct action which will surely eliminate the offensive weapons threat is air action followed by invasion and is, in the long run, the best course of action.”

78. Kaplan et al., *The McNamara Ascendancy*, p. 211.

79. JCSM-828-62 to SecDef, 26 Oct 62, JCS 2422/1, JMF 3050 (22 Oct 62).


82. Adm. Anderson, however, spent most of the day in Norfolk attending the Navy-Pitt football game. Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight*, pp. 262–263. The Vice CNO, Adm. Claude Ricketts, represented him at the Pentagon.


84. *The Kennedy Tapes*, p. 351. Taylor added that his “personal view is that we should be ready to go in Monday [with OPLAN 312] and also ready to invade, but make no advance decisions [to execute OPLAN 316].” Ibid, p. 353. The memo was formally submitted the next day as JCSM-844-62 thru SecDef to Pres, 28 Oct 62, CJCS 091 Cuba (Oct 62).

85. President Kennedy had wanted to “obtain some feeling” for problems posed by low-level attack. Accordingly, the day before, he had directed that pilots flying low-level reconnaissance “be encouraged to maneuver their planes as a fighter bomber pilot might be expected to do in hitting a site.” CM-85-62 to DJS, 26 Oct 62.

86. The shootdown, which had occurred at 1119, is described in Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight*, pp. 232–233, 236–237, 241–242. The pilot was Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., USAF. He and Major Heyser had been flying as many as two missions a day.

88. At McNamara’s direction, ISA drafted a letter from Kennedy to the President of Turkey proposing that Jupiters be disarmed prior to an attack on Cuba, that the Soviets be so notified, and that Polaris submarines carrying equivalent numbers of missiles be stationed in the eastern Mediterranean. The ExComm was going to discuss this on Sunday morning. Draft Ltr, Pres Kennedy to Pres Gursel, with attached note, CJCS 091 Cuba (Oct 62), filed under date 28 Oct 62.

89. According to General Gribkov, who was on the scene, only about half the R–12s were ready to be fueled—an eighteen-hour process—and none had been programmed for flight. Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, p. 63.


93. Actually, the warheads were still in separate storage. Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, p. 62.


95. CM-61-62 to SecDef, 28 Oct 62, CJCS 091 Cuba (Oct 62).


99. Memos, Pres to SecDef and SecDef to CJCS, 7 Nov 62, JMF 9123/3100 (5 Nov 62) sec. 1.

100. JCSM-910-62 to Pres, 16 Nov 62, JCS 2304/110, JMF 9123/3100 (5 Nov 62) sec. 2. JCSM-910 is printed in *FRUS: 1961–1963*, vol. XI, pp. 472–474. On 20 November, the Chiefs advised McNamara that two National Guard divisions could be activated, but only one could be equipped for combat. Both divisions, however, could be employed in less demanding occupation duties. JCSM-913-62 to SecDef, 20 Nov 62, JCS 2018/511, same file.


104. The recently mobilized Air Force reservists were released before Christmas.


106. By 27 October, there were 850 tactical aircraft and 183 interceptors concentrated in southeastern states; 172 Atlas and Titan ICBMs and 1,200 bombers with 2,858 weapons were on 15-minute alert. “Cuba Fact Sheet,” Att to Memo for Record by BG Clifton, 27 Oct 62, Box 36, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library.

107. In 1976, W. S. Poole read but did not record these remarks in the JCS Minutes.

110. The *Kennedy Tapes*, pp. 324–400. As the last meeting ended, McNamara said that “We have two major decisions we have to make quickly at eleven [tomorrow]. We can wait on both of those until eleven.” Ibid, p. 398.

**Chapter 12. NATO: Advocating New Approaches**

1. For the full text, see Dept. of State *Bulletin*, 20 Mar 49, pp. 339–342. Members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany (formally, the Federal Republic of Germany), Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

2. MC 14/2 is printed in Gregory Pedlow (ed.), *NATO Strategy Documents: 1949–1969*.


4. Memo, SecState to SecDef, 4 Feb 61, JCS 2101/407; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 20 Feb 61, JCS 2101/409; JCSM-153-61 to SecDef, 11 Mar 61, JCS 2101/412; JMF 3001 (4 Feb 61) sec. 1.


8. In preparing Finletter’s statement, the same issues had been reargued with the same outcome. Msg, USNM to CJCS and SecDef, ALO 390, 20 Apr 61; JCSM-271-61 to SecDef, 26 Apr 61, JCS 2305/461; Msg, State to Paris, TOPOL 1526, 26 Apr 61; Msg, Paris to State, POLTO 1494, 26 Apr 61; JMF 9050/3070 (19 Apr 61) sec. 1.


10. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Jun 61, JCS 2305/565, JMF 9050/9105 (2 Jun 61). A division slice is the figure obtained by dividing the total number of army personnel by the number of army divisions. Consequently it is considerably larger than the number of personnel assigned to a division.

11. Since some allied units were undermanned, there were only 19 active division-equivalents.

12. Ltr, SACEUR to Pres, SHAPE 188/61, 15 Sep 61, summarized in *Germany and the Berlin Question*, vol. III, p. 54, JHO. Memo, General C. L. Ruffner to JCS, 8 Aug 61, JCS 2305/561, JMF 9050/9105 (2 Jun 61) sec. 3. "TP for General Lennitner’s Use with Mr. McNamara on NATO Force Requirements,” n.d. [c. 1 Sep 61], JCS 092.2 NATO. JCSM-594-61 to SecDef, 30 Aug 61, JCS 2305/578; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Sep 61, JCS 2305/601; Msg, State to Paris,
TOPOL 365, 16 Sep 61; Msg, Paris to State, POLTO 348, 19 Sep 61; JCSM-667-61 to SecDef, 25 Sep 61, JCS 2305/602; Memo, General Ruffner to ASD(ISA), 2 Nov 61, JCS 2305/643; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, “NATO 1966 Force Requirements,” 3 Nov 61; SM-1200-61 to General Ruffner, 3 Nov 61, 2nd N/H of JCS 2305/602, 8 Nov 61; JMF 9050/3410 (25 Aug 60) sec. 3.

16. JCS 2305/668, 4 Dec 61; JCSM-853-61 to SecDef, 14 Dec 61, JCS 2305/677; JMF 9050/5410 (3 Nov 61) sec. 1. McNamara’s reactions can be ascertained by comparing the 4 Dec draft with his 14 Dec address.


18. “Remarks by Secretary McNamara, NATO Ministerial Meeting, 14 December 1961,” Encl 1 to Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 19 Dec 61, JCS 2305/698; CM-476-61 to CINCAL et al., 22 Dec 61, N/H of JCS 2305/698, 2 Jan 62; JMF 9050/5410 (3 Nov 61) sec. 2.


21. Msg, USNMR to SecDef and JCS, ALO 388, 211145Z Apr 62; Memo, BG Brown to CJCS, 30 Apr 62, JCS 2305/850; Msg, JCS 4332 to USINCEUR, 2 May 62; Msg, JCS 4364 to USINCEUR, 3 May 62; Msg, USNMR to CJCS, ALO 434, 101805Z May 62; JMF 9050/3440 (30 Apr 62) sec. 1. CM-755-62 to USINCEUR, 29 Jun 62, 3rd N/H of JCS 2305/896, 5 Jul 62; Msg, USINCEUR to JCS, 131628Z Jul 62, DA IN 247050; JCSM-566-62 to SecDef, 2 Aug 62, JCS 2305/944; same file, sec. 2.

22. “Remarks by Secretary McNamara, NATO Ministerial Meeting, 5 May 1962,” Encl 1 to Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 10 May 62, N/H of JCS 2305/859, JMF 9050/5410 (23 Mar 62) sec. 2. The draft of his speech, with JCS concurrence, is in Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 24 Apr 62, JCS 2305/830; JCSM-322-62 to SecDef, 26 Apr 62, JCS 2305/833; same file, sec. 1.


24. By this time, Taylor was Chairman and Lemnitzer had been appointed to succeed Norstad.

25. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 11 Aug 62, JCS 2305/976; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 29 Oct 62, JCS 2421/84; Ltr, Amb. Finletter to SecState, 24 Oct 62, JCS 2421/118; JMF 9050/9105 (11 Aug 62).


28. “Mr. McNamara’s Speech: Draft,” n.d.; CM-159-62 to SecDef, 7 Dec 62; Memo, LTG T. W. Parker to DJS, 6 Dec 62; Memo, CNO to DJS, 6 Dec 62; Encl II to CSAFM-418-62 to DJS, 6 Dec 62; JMF 9050/5410 (15 Oct 62).


32. The Acheson group recommended withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons from exposed forward positions. At the Joint Chiefs’ urging, this was deleted.


34. JCSM-288-61 to SecDef, 25 Apr 61, JCS 2305/460, JMF 9163/3410 (21 Apr 61).

36. Msg, Paris to State, POLTO 1494, 26 Apr 61, JMF 9050/3070 (16 Mar 61) sec. 3.

37. JCSM-406-61 to SecDef, 15 Jun 61, JCS 2305/408, JMF 9050/4720 (4 May 61) sec. 2. “TP for General Lembitter’s Use with Mr. McNamara on NATO Force Requirements,” n.d., CJS 092.2 NATO. Memo, General Ruffner to JCS, 8 Aug 61, JCS 2305/561; JCSM-594-61 to SecDef, 30 Aug 61, JCS 2305/578; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Sep 61, JCS 2305/601; JCSM-667-61 to SecDef, 25 Sep 61, JCS 2305/602; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Nov 61; DJSM-1356-61 to CJCS, 6 Nov 61; JMF 9050/3410 (25 Mar 60) sec. 3. Memo, SecState to SecDef, 27 Nov 61, JCS 2305/660; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 Nov 61, JCS 2305/660; JCSM-841-61 to SecDef, 1 Dec 61, JCS 2305/664; JMF 9050/4720 (4 May 61).

38. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 22 Dec 61, JCS 2305/700, JMF 9050/5410 (3 Nov 61) sec. 2. JCSM-822-61 to SecDef, 31 Jan 62, JCS 2305/722, JMF 9050/4720 (25 Jan 62) sec. 2.


40. Memo, General Ruffner to JCS, 23 Feb 62, JCS 2305/742, JMF 9050/4720 (25 Jan 62) sec. 3.

41. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Mar 62, JCS 2278/43; CM-586-62 to ASD(ISA), 9 Mar 62, JCS 2278/43; Memo, SecState to SecDef, 10 Mar 62, JCS 2278/43; JMF 9164/9105 (2 Mar 62) sec. 1.

42. JCSM-199-62 to SecDef, 17 Mar 62, JCS 2278/44; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 14 Mar 62, JCS 2278/46; CM-615-62 to ASD(ISA), 17 Mar 62, JCS 2278/46; JMF 9164/9105 (2 Mar 62) sec. 1.

43. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 4 Apr 62, JCS 2278/50; JCSM-270-62 to SecDef, 10 Apr 62, JCS 2278/51; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 11 Apr 62, N/H of JCS 2278/51, 18 Apr 62; JMF 9164/9105 (2 Mar 62) sec. 2.

44. NSAM No. 148 to SecDef et al., 18 Apr 62, JCS 2305/821, JMF 9164/4610 (18 Apr 62). Soon afterward, speaking to his West German and Canadian counterparts, Rusk justified the decision on grounds that the French had shown their “contempt” for NATO by withdrawing their Mediterranean Fleet from NATO command, denying the US nuclear storage rights in France, making integrated air defense less effective, and making clear that the force de frappe’s purpose was to ensure France’s independence from the US and NATO. *FRUS: 1961–1963*, vol. XIII, pp. 690–691.

45. McGeorge Bundy made the statement about the JCAE during a colloquium at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, on 3 Mar 83. General Maxwell Taylor interviewed by W. S. Poole on 29 Oct 79.

46. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 16 Mar 62, JCS 2305/772, JMF 9050/4720 (25 Jan 62) sec. 3. JCSM-250-62 to SecDef, 4 Apr 62, JCS 2305/780, same file, sec. 4.


48. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 18 Apr 62, JCS 2305/820; JCSM-320-62 to SecDef, 25 Apr 62, JCS 2305/820; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 27 Apr 62, JCS 2305/846; N/H of JCS 2305/846, 27 Apr 62; JMF 9050/4720 (18 Apr 62). Arrangements were made to create a replenishment anchorage at Rota, Spain, for the Polaris squadron that would start deploying late in 1963.


57. CM-54-62 to JCS, 26 Oct 62, JCS 2278/60; JCSM-879-62 to SecDef, 12 Nov 62, JCS 2278/61; Memo, DepUSecState J. C. Kitchen to DepSecDef, 4 Dec 62, N/H of JCS 2278/61, 11 Dec 62; JMF 9164/9105 (26 Oct 62).


60. General Taylor interviewed by W. S. Poole on 29 Oct 79.


### 13. NATO: Initiatives Falter

1. JCSM-20-63 to SecDef, 10 Jan 63, JCS 2421/184, JMF 9050/3410 (3 Jan 63) sec. 2. Concurrently, fulfilling but never acknowledging the Cuba-Turkey trade, Washington conducted delicate negotiations with Ankara to remove the Jupiter IRBMs by 1 April. As compensation, three Polaris submarines were stationed in the Mediterranean. *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968*, vol. XVI (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1994), pp. 738–756.

2. JCS 2421/202, 9 Jan 63; JCSM-45-63 to SecDef, 15 Jan 63, JCS 2421/222; JMF 9050/3410 (3 Jan 63) sec. 2. SACEUR, who was now Gen. Lemnitzer, made a similar assessment in Msg, USNMR to JCS, ALO 108, 261230Z Jan 63, same file, sec. 4.


5. *FRUS: 1961–1963*, vol. XIII, pp. 529–533. Ltr, Chancellor Adenauer to Pres Kennedy, 30 Apr 63, JCS 2421/426; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 May 63, JCS 2412/421; JMF 9050/3410 (3 Jan 63) sec. 10. Later, the JCS suggested basing a control formula on a US veto plus a majority vote of other major participants and a vote for any other smaller country that actually was under attack. That would partially answer French demands for a triumvirate, ease German worries about a British veto, and allay British fears of German domination. Memo, ASD(ISA)
to CJCS et al., 15 Apr 63, N/H of JCS 2421/396, same file, sec. 9. JCSM-384-63 to SecDef, 1 Jun 63, JCS 2412/435, same file, sec. 10.

6. Memo, Maj. W. Y. Smith to CJCS, 1 Jun 63, Box 39, Maxwell Taylor Papers, National Defense University. JCSM-350-63 to SecDef, 2 May 63, JCS 2421/434, JMF 9050/3410 (3 Jan 63) sec. 10. Later, in congressional testimony, McNamara quoted only the last sentence.


8. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Feb 63, JCS 2421/277; JCSM-221-63 to SecDef, 15 Mar 63, JCS 2412/307; Msg, USNMR Paris to SecDef, ALO 334, 201410Z Mar 63; Msg, JSTPS to JCS, 282227Z Mar 63; JCSM-326-63 to SecDef, 20 Apr 63, JCS 2421/407; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 May 63, JCS 2421/432; JMF 9050/3100 (9 Feb 63) sec. 1.

9. Dept. of State Bulletin, 10 Jun 63, pp. 895–896. McNamara proposed reorganizing the SHAPE staff into conventional and nuclear planning sections. Lemnitzer rejected the idea, on grounds that dual-capable weapon systems made a separation impossible. In Paris he and McNamara had a heated exchange, after which the Secretary settled for adding a Nuclear Deputy. Subsequently, the office of Deputy for Nuclear Affairs had an unhappy history. According to Lemnitzer, the Council conceived this office as serving a window-dressing function. The first appointee, Gen. F. V. P. van Rolleghem of Belgium, suffered considerable frustration. The second, Gen. Nino Pasti of Italy, proved so inefficient that SACEUR asked for his removal. In 1976, Pasti won election to the Italian Senate on the communist slate. Gen. Lemnitzer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 18 Mar 77. The position was abolished in 1968.


11. NSAM 253 to SecDef et al., 13 Jul 63, JCS 2421/545; JCSM-569-63 to SecDef, 27 Jul 63, JCS 2412/545-1; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 26 Aug 63, JCS 2421/545-2; Memo, McGeorge Bundy to Holders of NSAM 253, 30 Aug 63, JCS 2421/545-2; JMF 9050/3100 (13 Jul 63).


13. Memo for Pres, “The Wilson Visit,” 4 Dec 64, Doc. 34a, United Kingdom, P. M. Wilson Visit, 12/7–8/64, Box 214, National Security Files, Lyndon B. Johnson Library. Msg, Gen. Lemnitzer to CJCS and SecDef, PRS 3151, 051319Z Dec 64, JCS 323.3 SACEUR.

14. Memos of Conv, “Wilson Visit and MLF,” 6 Dec 64, Docs. 60 and 61, United Kingdom, P. M. Wilson Visit, 12/7–8/64, Box 214, National Security Files, Johnson Library.


18. Memo for Record by Col. B. W. Rogers, 17 Apr 63, JMF 5410 (17 Apr 63).

19. “United Kingdom Study of Modifications to MC 264 NATO Force Requirements,” 21 Aug 63, JMF 9050/3100 (16 May 63) sec. 5. JCSM-662-63 to SecDef, 27 Aug 63, JCS 2421/501-6, same file, sec. 3. JCSM-675-63 to SecDef, 5 Sep 63, JCS 2421/501-8, same file, sec. 4. JCSM-676-63 to SecDef, 3 Sep 63, JCS 2421/501-8, same file, sec. 3. The substance of these JCSMs was transmitted to the British via SM-1183-63, 11 Sep 63, same file, sec. 4. At McNamara’s direction, the Chairman’s Special Studies Group made an estimate of requirements for 1966–69. It concluded that, in Central Europe, 55 divisions would be needed by D+7. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 14 Jan 63, JCS 2412/217; CM-225-63 to DJS, 21 Jan 63, JCS 2421/233; JMF 5410.
9050/3410 (14 Jan 63) sec. 1. “NATO Conventional Force Requirements, 1967: Projects I-L, I-N, I-O. These were summarized in DJSM-1633-63 to CJCS, 27 Sep 63, same file, sec. 2. The Group’s findings were sent to the Secretary via CM-920-63 to SecDef, 1 Oct 63, JCS 2421/615, same file, sec. 2.

20. Memo, Pres to SecDef, 29 Apr 63, JCS 2421/425; Memo, MilAsst, SecDef to CJCS et al., 1 May 63, JCS 2421/425; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 8 May 63, JCS 2421/425-1; JMF 9160/3410 (1 May 63) sec. 1.

21. CM-659-63 to DJS, 10 Jun 63; CM-574-63 to DJS, 14 May 63; CM-578-63 to DJS, 15 May 63; CJCS 092.2 NATO.

22. CM-579-63 to JCS, 15 May 63, JCS 2421/425-3; JCSM-386-63 to SecDef, JCS 2421/421-4; JMF 9160/3410 (1 May 63) sec. 1.

23. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Jun 63, JCS 2412/425-5, JMF 9160/3410 (1 May 63) sec. 2.

24. Dept. of State Bulletin, 10 Jun 63, pp. 895–897. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 13 Jun 63, JCS 2421/508, JMF 9050/3100 (30 Nov 62) sec. 2. JCSM-678-63 to SecDef, 3 Sep 63, JCS 2421/508-2, same file, sec. 3. In August 1964, major NATO commanders submitted replies to the 1970 force planning exercise. They presented two sets of goals: Alpha, calling for 90 active and reserve divisions, which they recommended; and Bravo, calling for 80½, based on a continuation of current spending rates and which they believed would incur “unacceptable” risks. “1966 NATO Defense Planning Survey and Country Defense Summaries,” Jan 67, p. 9, JMF 806 (2 May 67) sec. 1A. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Sep 65, JCS 2450/77, p. 28, JMF 9050 (11 Sep 65) sec. 1. As things turned out, even Bravo levels proved unattainable.


26. JCSM-494-63 to SecDef, 3 Jul 63, JCS 1800/703-2; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 16 Jul 63, JCS 1800/734; Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., 16 Jul 63, JCS 1800/734; JMF 9700 (19 Jun 63) sec. 2.

27. JCSM-737-63 to SecDef, 23 Sep 63; JMF 9700 (19 Jun 63) sec. 3. Memo, U. A. Johnson to SecState, 16 Sep 63, same file, sec. 1.


30. NY Times, 11 Apr 64, p. 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 24 Apr 64, JCS 2147/317-9; JCSM-456-64 to SecDef, 1 Jun 64, JCS 2147/317-10; Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 5 Aug 64, 2nd N/H of JCS 2147/317-10, 25 Jan 65; Memo, OSD(ISA) to SJS, 19 Jan 65, 2nd N/H of JCS 2147/317-10, 25 Jan 65; JMF 9700 (10 Sep 63)(E) sec.2.


32. CM-840-63 to DJS, 23 Aug 63, CJCS 092.2 NATO. The Chairman’s Special Studies Group had submitted a report, which the JCS endorsed, detailing the need for small-yield, short-range nuclear weapons. Chairman’s Special Studies Group, “Further Study of Requirements for Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Apr 63, JMF 4610 (20 Dec 62) sec. 2A. JCSM-374-63 to SecDef, 15 May 63, JCS 1832/777, same file, sec. 2.


34. CM-1034-63 to JCS, 26 Nov 63; CM-1044-63 to SecDef, 29 Nov 63; Memo, SecDef to SecState, 3 Dec 63, JCS 2421/659-1; JMF 9050/3100 (26 Nov 63) sec. 1.

35. Memo, SecState to SecDef, 20 Feb 64, JCS 2421/659-3, JMF 9050/3100 (26 Nov 63) sec. 1.

36. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 29 Feb 64, JCS 2421/659-4; DJSM-474-64 to CJCS, 17 Mar 64; DJSM-637-64 to CJCS, 11 Apr 64; CM-1324-64 to JCS, 16 Apr 64; JCSM-357-64 to SecDef, 28 Apr 64, JCS 2421/659-5; JMF 9050/3100 (26 Nov 63) sec. 1.

37. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 19 Jun 64, JCS 2421/445-6, JMF 9050/3100 (30 Nov 62) sec. 6. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 13 Aug 64, JCS 2421/659-6, JMF 9050/3100 (26 Nov 63) sec. 1. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 31 Aug 64, JCS 2421/659-7, same file, sec. 2.
38. Memo, SecDef to CJCS 26 Oct 64, JCS 2421/897, JMF 9050 (26 Oct 64) sec. 1.
39. JCSM-961-64 to SecDef, 17 Nov 64, JCS 2421/897-4, JMF 9050 (26 Oct 64) sec. 1.
40. DJSM-1948-64 to CJCS, 12 Dec 64, JMF 9050 (15 Oct 64).
41. “NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 16, 1964, Comments by Secretary McNamara...,” Att to Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 19 Dec 64, JCS 2421/925, JMF 9050 (19 Dec 64).
42. Encls 1 and 10 to Memo, Gen. Strother to JCS, 23 Dec 64, JCS 2421/927, JMF 9050 (23 Dec 64). Note to Control, “NATO Meetings in Paris,” 21 Dec 64, JMF 9050 (19 Dec 64). Wheeler was referring mainly to the MLF but his observation applied to this area as well.

Chapter 14. Paring the Military Assistance Program

1. As an example, France received $2.933 billion in grants during FYs 1953–57 but was allotted only $68.8 million in FY 1960. House Foreign Affairs Committee, US Overseas Loans and Grants: July 1, 1945—June 30, 1966, p. 125. Military Assistance Facts, 1 May 66, p. 7. Military and other forms of assistance comprised the Mutual Security Program, which was supervised by a semi-autonomous International Cooperation Administration in the State Department.
2. Watson, Into the Missile Age, p. 658.
3. Memo, ASD(ISA) to Dir of MilAsst, 23 Dec 60, JCS 2315/52, JMF 4060 (23 Dec 60). MemCon, “Meeting Between SecState, SecDef, and Dir BOB on MAP,” 25 Feb 61, JMF 4060 (15 Mar 61).
6. Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Aug 61, JCS 2315/95, JMF 4060 (2 Aug 61) sec. 1. JCSM-677-61 to SecDef, 29 Sep 61, JCS 2315/109, same file, sec. 3.
7. Memo, DepAsstSecState Kitchen to SecState and SecDef, “Report of the Military Assistance Steering Group,” 12 Dec 61, JMF 4060 (2 Aug 61) sec. 3A.
8. CM-485-61 to SecDef, 29 Dec 61, JMF 4060 (2 Aug 61) sec. 3. Memo, RADM Smith to CJCS, 9 Jan 62, JCS 091.3 (MAP). Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Jan 62, JCS 2315/130; Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to DJS et al., 11 Jan 62, JCS 2315/129; DJSM-43-62 to ASD(ISA), 11 Jan 62, N/H of JCS 2315/129, 12 Jan 62; JMF 4060 (2 Aug 61) sec. 3. JCSM-43-62 to SecDef, 17 Jan 62, JCS 2315/133, same file, sec. 4.
9. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 26 Jan 62, JCS 2315/139; JCSM-122-62 to SecDef, 17 Feb 62, JCS 2315/145; JMF 4060 (2 Aug 61) sec. 4.
10. Congress, in 1960, appropriated about $2 billion for economic aid; that figure rose to $2.3 billion in 1961 and $2.6 billion in 1962.
11. JCSM-769-61 to SecDef, 7 Nov 61, JCS 1800/477, JMF 7000 (9 Oct 61).

14. JCSM-753-62 to SecDef, 29 Sep 62, JCS 2315/219, JMF 4060 (22 May 62) sec. 7.


17. MJCS-1432-62 to DirMilAsst, 10 Nov 62, N/H of JCS 2315/228; DJSM-137-63 to CJCS, 30 Jan 63, JMF 4060 (2 Nov 62).

18. Kaplan et al., The McNamara Ascendancy, pp. 431–433, 435. Memo, General Wood to SecDef, 3 Jan 63, JCS 2315/249; JCSM-173-63 to SecDef, 6 Mar 63, JCS 2315/257; Memo, General Wood to DepAsstAdmin, AID, 30 Apr 63, N/H of JCS 2315/257, 3 May 63; JMF 4060 (3 Jan 63).

19. Kaplan et al., The McNamara Ascendancy, pp. 435–438. Memo, General Wood to SecDef, “FY 1964 Revised Program, 20 Sep 63; Memo, General Wood to CJCS et al., 24 Sep 63, Att to Memo, General Wood to CJCS, 25 Sep 63, JCS 2315/297; Memo, DASD(ISA) to SecDef, 21 Nov 63, Encl to Memo, General Wood to CJCS, 29 Nov 63, JCS 2315/297-3; JMF 4060 (20 Sep 63). Memo, Admin AID to SecDef, 24 Jan 64, JCS 2315/314; JCSM-271-64 to SecDef, 31 Mar 64, JMF 4060 (24 Jan 64) sec.1.

20. CM-424-63 to DJS, 20 Mar 63, JCS 2315/262; JCSM-576-63 to SecDef, 30 Jul 63, JCS 2315/288; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 10 Sep 63, JCS 2315/296; JMF 4060 (27 Dec 62).


24. Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 2 Oct 64, JCS 2315/335-2; JCSM-877-64 to SecDef, 15 Oct 64, JCS 2315/335-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Nov 64, 1st N/H of JCS 2315/335, 19 Nov 64; JMF 4060 (16 Sep 64).

25. Memo, General Wood to DJS, 4 Feb 64, JCS 2315/316, JMF 4060 (24 Jan 64) (A).

26. Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 221350Z Feb 64; Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 180208Z Feb 64; JMF 4060 (24 Jan 64) (A). Ltr, CINCUNC to JCS, 2 Apr 64, JCS 1776/691; Ltr, CJCS to CINCUNC, 27 Apr 64, N/H of JCS 1776/691, 29 Apr 64; Ltr, CINCUNC to JCS, 12 Sep 64, JCS 1776/691-1; Ltr, CJCS to CINCUNC, 13 Oct 64, JCS 1776/691-1; JMF 9144/9920 (2 Apr 64).

27. JCSM-324-64 to SecDef, 14 Apr 64, JCS 2315/316-3, JMF 4060 (24 Jan 64) (A).


Chapter 15. Latin America: Containment and Counter-Insurgency

1. The text of the treaty is in Dept. of State Bulletin, 21 Sep 47, pp. 565–572.


4. JCSM-110-61 to SecDef, 28 Feb 61, JCS 1976/357, JMF 9120/3000 (27 Feb 61).


11. NSAM No. 119 to SecState and SecDef, 18 Dec 61, JCS 1735/627; Memo, Dep DMA to DJS, 2 Feb 62, JCS 1735/635; JMF 3310 (18 Dec 61).

12. JCSM-107-62 to SecDef, 10 Feb 62, JCS 1735/636, JMF 3310 (18 Dec 61).


16. CM-671-62 to SecDef, 28 Apr 62, 1st N/H of JCS 1976/444, 8 May 62; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 8 May 62, JCS 1976/446; JMF 9138.2/3700 (26 Apr 62) sec. 1. CINCARIB sent the JCS bi-monthly status reports on these projects.


18. According to Gen. Lemnitzer, the Latins deeply resented, as gross interference in their internal affairs, US efforts to tell them how large their military establishments ought to be. Gen. Lemnitzer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 13 Jun 1977.


22. JCSM-64-65 to SecDef, 27 Jan 65, JCS 2339/339-3; JMF 9105 (26 Oct 64) sec. 1.

24. JCSM-40-61 to SecDef, 26 Jan 61, JCS 1976/352, JMF 9128.4/9105 (23 Jan 61). The words “up to military occupation of the entire country” were added at Adm. Burke's instigation. The J–5 and the Director, Joint Staff, had spoken only of establishing “a naval patrol in the area.” Memo, CNO to JCS, “JCS 1976/352—The Dominican Republic,” 24 Jan 61, same file.

25. President Kennedy was in Europe on a state visit.


29. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 12 Oct 64, JCS 2315/338; JCSM-896-64 to SecDef, 22 Oct 64, JCS 2315/338-1; Msg, DEF 1399 to USCINCSO, 28 Oct 64; JMF 4060 (12 Oct 64).

30. NSAM No. 213 to SecState, 8 Jan 63, JCS 2304/134 (printed in FRUS: 1961–1963, vol. XI, pp. 656–657); Memo, SecArmy to Chairman, ICC, 11 Jan 63, 1st N/H of JCS 2304/134, 14 Jan 63; 2nd N/H of JCS 2304/134, 29 Jan 63; Memo, LTC Fairfield to SJS, 14 Jan 63, JCS 2304/135; JCSM-54-63 to SecArmy, 16 Jan 63, JCS 2304/136; CSAM-19-63 to JCS 17 Jan 63, JCS 2304/138; JCSM-67-63 to SecArmy, 19 Jan 63, JCS 2304/138; JMF 9123/3100 (8 Jan 63 sec. 1.


33. Ibid, pp. 791, 802–803. The ExComm frequently reviewed the schedule of U–2 overflights. At an NSC meeting on 20 April, President Kennedy said that “we could hardly continue to carry out a mild policy in Cuba at the time the Communists are carrying out an aggressive policy in Laos. He thus approved certain U–2 flights over Cuba.” Ibid, p. 773.


35. FRUS: 1964–1968, vol. XXXII, pp. 548–549, 606–607, 618–619. Memo, ActgCJCS to DJS, 6 Mar 64, JCS 2304/218; JCS 2304/218-2, 10 Mar 64; CSAM-159-64 to JCS, 11 Mar 64; CSAFM-243-64 to JCS, 11 Mar 64; Chairman’s Flimsy 128-64 to JCS, 18 Mar 64; JCSM-253-64 to Pres, 21 Mar 64, JCS 2304/218-3; JMF 9123 (6 Mar 64). At a White House meeting on 7 April, Gen. Taylor said the JCS favored the covert program in its entirety, believing that it “has never been given a fair test and that we should move forward with it in the interests of making Castro’s life as hard as possible.” Ibid, p. 629. In November, the JCS sent Secretary McNamara a plan for attacking Cuba’s sugar industry which, they thought, merited “serious consideration.” JCSM-942-64 to SecDef, 9 Nov 64, JCS 2304/244-1, JMF 9123 (1 Sep 64).

36. FRUS: 1961–1963, vol. XII, p. 352. Memo, SecArmy to CJCS, 2 Dec 63, JCS 2304/207-2; Memo, SecArmy to CJCS, 13 Dec 63, JCS 2304/207-3; JMF 9123/3100 (22 Oct 63)(1) sec. 1. JCSM-34-64 to SecDef, 16 Jan 64, JCS 2304/207-4, same file, sec. 3.


Chapter 16. Middle East Kaleidoscope


5. JCS 2369/3, 5 Sep 62; Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecArmy, 19 Jun 62; Ltr, DepAsstSecState(NESA) to DASD(ISA), 25 Jun 62; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 Jun 62, JCS 1887/657, JMF 9183/9105 (22 Aug 62).

6. JCSM-507-62 to SecDef, 12 Jul 62, JCS 1887/658; JMF 9183/9105 (22 Aug 62). Israel was believed to have 139 fighters and 24 bombers, mostly French-supplied. Egypt’s inventory was estimated at 160 fighters (mostly MiG-15s and MiG-17s, 3 MiG-21s), 46 IL–28s, and 8 Tu-16s. FRUS: 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, pp. 8–9, 27–32.

7. FRUS: 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, pp. 54–58, 64–66. The offer was loosely linked to Israeli cooperation on a UN-sponsored plan for resettling Palestinians who had become refugees during the 1948–49 war. Subsequently, the plan failed to win support from either Israelis or Arabs.

8. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 22 Aug 62, JCS 2369/2; JCS 2369/5, 5 Sep 62; JCSM-698-62 to SecDef, 11 Sep 62, JCS 2369/3; JMF 9183/9105 (22 Aug 62).

9. JCS 2369/5-1, 1 Aug 63, JMF 9183/9105 (15 Jul 63). Early in 1965, the first elements of the Hawk battalion became operational in Israel.

10. Ltr, AsstSecState(NESA) to DASD(ISA), 15 Jul 63, JCS 2369/5; JMF 9183/9105 (15 Jul 63).


14. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Dec 63, JCS 1887/677; JCSM-953-63 to SecDef, 7 Dec 63, JCS 1887/677-1; JMF 9183 (18 Mar 64) sec. 2. Printed in FRUS: 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, pp. 818–819, 833–834. It is noteworthy that a situation of Israeli superiority was characterized as “substantial military equilibrium.” Later administrations would continue this practice.


16. Ltr, DepSecDef to DepUSecState, 8 Feb 64, JCS 2369/9, JMF 9183/9105 (8 Jan 64). The JCS restated their position via JCSM-207-64 to SecDef, 12 Mar 64, JCS 2369/9-1, same file. Printed in FRUS: 1964–1968, vol. XVIII, pp. 66–68.


19. Warren Bass concludes that the Hawk sale was a “watershed,” representing “the birth of the US-Israel alliance.” *Support Any Friend*, pp. 185, 169. A better choice would be the sale of high-performance F–4s in 1968.

20. JCSM-398-60 to SecDef, 8 Sep 60, JCS 1881/67; Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 13 Oct 60, JCS 1881/68; JCSM-60-61 to SecDef, 9 Feb 61, JCS 1881/69; JMF 9186/4960 (12 May 60) sec. 1.

21. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 16 Mar 61, JCS 1881/71; JCSM-492-60 to SecDef, 21 Jul 61, JCS 1881/76; JCSM-559-61 to SecDef, 18 Aug 61, JCS 1881/77; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to DepUSecState, 28 Sep 61, 1st N/H of JCS 1881/77-1, 3 Oct 61; JMF 9186/4960 (12 May 60) sec. 2.


23. The Yemeni civil war and its ramifications are described in Bass, *Support Any Friend*, pp. 98–143.


29. JCSM-55-63 to SecDef, 18 Jan 63, JCS 1881/88, JMF 9180/3100 (31 Dec 62).


32. *FRUS: 1961–1963*, vol. XVIII, pp. 457–459. DJSM-837-63 to ASD(ISA), 18 May 63; TP-42-63 for State-JCS Mtg on 16 Aug 63, 15 Aug 63; Msg, Jidda 864 to SecState, 22 Apr 63; Memo, BG Ewell to DJJS, 22 Apr 63; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 9 May 63, JCS 1881/97; JMF 9180/4060 (16 Apr 63).

33. *FRUS: 1961–1963*, vol. XVIII, pp. 577–581, 587–588, 614–615, 621–622, 675–680. Concurrently, for Saudi Arabia, an air defense survey team outlined a system consisting of three interceptor squadrons and three Hawk batteries, located around Jidda, Riyadh, and Dhahran. The JCS and ISA concurred. In 1965, the Saudis purchased Hawks from the United States and interceptors, radar, and communications equipment from the United Kingdom. Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecAF, 20 Jul 63, 1st N/H of JCS 2370/2, 24 Jul 63; JCSM-863-63 to SecDef, 7 Nov 63, JCS 1887/676-3; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to DepUSecState, 18 Nov 63, JCS 1887/676-4; JMF 9180/3100 (25 Feb 63) sec. 1.


36. CSAFM-791-63 to JCS, 14 Dec 63, JCS 1881/101; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 21 Dec 63, JCS 1881/102; JCSM-1003-63 to SecDef, 24 Dec 63, JCS 1881/101-1; CM-1094-63 to SecDef, 24 Dec 63, JCS 1881/101-2; JMF 9180/3100 (27 Feb 63) sec. 2. JCSM-1003-63 is printed in *FRUS: 1961–1963*, vol. XVIII, pp. 856–858.


40. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Jun 61, JCS 1714/132; JCSM-443-61 to SecDef, 28 Jun 61, JCS 1714/133; JMF 9181/9105 (9 May 61) sec. 2.

41. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 7 Oct 61, JCS 1714/134, JMF 9181/9105 (9 May 61) sec. 2. JCSM-741-61 to SecDef, 20 Oct 61, JCS 1714/135, same file, sec. 3.


46. JCSM-421-64 to SecDef, 16 May 64, JCS 1714/170-1; Memo, DASD(ISA) to SecDef, 3 Jul 64, Att to Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 15 Jul 64, JCS 1714/170-2; JMF 9180/3100 (22 Apr 64). Ann B to “Report of the United States Military Survey Team to Iran, 16 Feb–3 Mar 66,” JMF 9181 (17 Jan 66) sec. 1A.

47. Iraq, an original member, withdrew after the 1958 coup overthrew the Hashemite monarchy.


49. JCS 2273/304, 28 Mar 61; Dec On JCS 2273/304, 29 Mar 61; JMF 9070/9105 (13 Mar 61).

50. JCSM-383-61 to SecDef, 8 Jun 61, JCS 2273/310, JMF 9070/5410 (7 Mar 61) sec. 2.

51. Its name was changed from the Joint Campaign Plan to the Emergency Defense Concept.


53. JCSM-441-63 to SecDef, 10 Jun 63, JCS 2273/383, JMF 9070/5410 (5 Jan 63).


55. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 24 Apr 63, JCS 1887/669, JMF 9180/3100 (24 Apr 63).

56. JCSM-450-63 to SecDef, 12 Jun 63, JCS 1887/669-1, JMF 9180/3100 (24 Apr 63). Gen. Lemnitzer, who was now SACEUR and USCINCEUR, still wanted the United States to join CENTO. Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 211740Z May 63, same file.

57. JCSM-138-64 to SecDef, 20 Feb 64, JCS 2273/389-4, JMF 9070/5410 (28 Jun 3) sec. 1. JCSM-620-64 to SecDef, 21 Jul 64, JCS 2273/401-3, JMF 9070/5410 (14 Jan 64) sec. 2.

Chapter 17. “New Africa” and the Congo Entanglement


3. Ltr, USecState to DepSecDef, 3 May 61, JCS 2121/95, JMF 9110/9105 (3 May 61) sec. 1.


5. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 Nov 61, JCS 2121/113, JMF 9110/9105 (15 Nov 61) sec. 1.

6. JCSM-837-61 to SecDef, 1 Dec 61, JCS 2121/114; Ltr, ActgASD(ISA) to USecState, 19 Dec 61, N/H of JCS 2121/114, 15 Feb 62; JCS 2121/134, 9 Apr 62; JMF 9110/9105 (15 Nov 61) sec. 1.


8. JCSM-258-61 to SecDef, 22 Apr 61, JCS 570/529, JMF 4920 (4 Apr 61). 2nd N/H of JCS 2125/9, 25 May 61, JMF 9166.2/4920 (28 Feb 61) sec. 2.


13. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 Dec 61, JCS 2121/115; JCSM-876-61 to SecDef, 21 Dec 61, JCS 2121/116; Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to USecState, 5 Jan 62 N/H of JCS 2121/116, 15 Feb 62; JCS 2121/147, 8 Jun 62; JMF 9110/9105 (5 Dec 61) sec. 1.


15. “Dept. of State National Policy Paper: South Africa,” 2 Mar 64, JMF 9110.1/9105 (16 Nov 63) sec. 1. JCSM-290-64 to SecDef, 8 Apr 64, JCS 2121/172-2; Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to Walt Rostow, 23 Apr 64, JCS 2121/172-3, same file, sec. 2.

16. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 3 Apr 64, JCS 2121/176; JCSM-292-64 to SecDef, 7 Apr 64, JCS 2121/176-1; Memo, DepSecDef to McGeorge Bundy, 10 Apr 64, JCS 2121/176-2; NSAM No. 295 to SecDef et al., 24 Apr 64, JCS 2121/176-3; JMF 9110.1/9105 (3 Apr 64). *FRUS: 1964–1968*, vol. XXIV, pp. 971, 979–981, 984–986.

17. JCSM-439-64 to SecDef, 22 May 64, JCS 2121/176-4; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 7 Jul 64, JCS 2121/176-5; JMF 9110.1/9105 (3 Apr 64). *FRUS: 1964–1968*, vol. XXIV, pp. 989–991, 1007–1019.

18. During 1960–62, major contributors to the UNEF were India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tunisia, Ghana, Sweden, Malaya, Ireland, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Morocco. Force commanders were

19. JCS 2262/72, 26 Jan 61, and Dec On, 27 Jan 61; JCS 2262/70, 24 Jan 61, and Dec On, 27 Jan 61; CNOM-8-61 to JCS, 27 Jan 61; CSAM-36-61 to JCS, 26 Jan 61; JMF 9111/9105 (23 Jan 61).

20. JCSM-46-61 to SecDef, 30 Jan 61, JCS 2262/72; N/H of JCS 2262/72, 17 Feb 61; JMF 9111/9105 (23 Jan 61).


22. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Feb 61, JCS 2262/76; JCSM-92-61 to SecDef, 17 Feb 61, JCS 2261/77, JMF 9111/9105 (30 Jan 61). CINCLANT Contingency OPLAN 330-61, “Africa (South of the Sahara),” JMF 3142 (13 Feb 61) sec. 1. After a JCS review, the plan was altered to assign a high priority to seizing airfields. Subsequently, State turned down Defense requests that it try to obtain advance approvals for basing and overflight rights. SM-432-61 to CINCLANT, 18 Apr 61, JCS 2018/243; same file, sec. 2. JCSM-712-61 to SecDef, 10 Oct 61, JCS 2018/297; Memo, ASD(ISA) to DepUSecState, 26 Oct 61, JCS 2018/298; same file, sec. 1. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 Dec 61, JCS 2018/334; JCSM-92-62 to SecDef, 5 Feb 62, JCS 2018/332; same file, sec. 3.


24. Ibid., pp. 74–75.

25. The UAR was comprised of Egypt and Syria, under the leadership of President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt.

26. JCSM-95-61 to SecDef, 21 Feb 61, JCS 2262/79; N/H of JCS 2262/79, 7 Mar 61; JMF 9111/9105 (23 Jan 61).


30. Memo, Gen. Taylor to JCS, 11 Dec 61, JCS 2262/100; Msg, JCS 2587 to USCINCEUR, 13 Dec 61; JCSM-871-61 to SecDef, JCS 2262/102; Msg, JCS 2616 to USARMA Leopoldville, 160010Z Dec 61; JMF 9111/2010 (11 Dec 61).


33. Msg, Leopoldville 1635 to SecState, 23 Dec 61; Msg, JCS 2714 to CINCUSAREUR, 262257Z Dec 61; Msg, CINUSAREUR to JCS, XX 7791, 271322Z Dec 61, DA IN 187502; Memo, CJCS to SecState, 29 Dec 61, 2nd N/H of JCS 2262/102; JMF 9111/2010 (11 Dec 61).

34. JCSM-4-62 to SecDef, 4 Jan 62, JCS 2262/104; Msg, SecState 1271 to Leopoldville, 16 Jan 62; JMF 9111/4031 (17 Sep 61).


39. JCS 2262/119, 16 Nov 62, JMF 9111/3100 (6 Nov 62). Msgs, Elizabethville 733 to State, 9 Nov 62; SecState Circular 909, 14 Nov 62; USUN 1853 to State, 16 Nov 62; SecState 763 to Leopoldville, 24 Nov 62, JCS 7623 to USUCINCEUR, 29 Nov 62.

40. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 7 Dec 62, JCS 2262/120; JCSM-983-62 to SecDef, 11 Dec 62, JCS 2262/121; Memo, ASD(ISA) to USecState, 11 Dec 62, 1st N/H of JCS 2262/121; JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec. 1.

41. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to DJS and SecDef, 15 Dec 62; VDJSM-1-62 to DASD(ISA), 16 Dec 62; JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec. 1.


45. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 10 Jan 63; JCSM-35-63 to SecDef, 10 Jan 63, JCS 2262/130; DJSM-52-63 to JCS, 14 Jan 63; Note to Control, “DJSM-52-63,” 14 Jan 63; Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 15 Jan 63, 1st N/H of JCS 2262/130; JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec. 2. FRUS: 1961–1963, vol. XX, p. 832.

Chapter 18. South Asia

1. Memo, Col. W. F. Jackson to SecDef, 14 Jun 61, JCS 2315/80; JCSM-453-61 to SecDef, 1 Jul 61, JCS 2315/84; Memo of Conv, “Discussion of Military Assistance with President Ayub of Pakistan,” 17 Jul 61, JCS 2347/1; Aide Memoire, DepUSecState to US Chargé d’Affaires, 4 Aug 61, JCS 2347/2; JMF 9157/4060 (14 Jun 61).


8. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 16 Nov 62, Encl C to JCS 2271/31; JCS 2271/31, 19 Nov 62; Note to Control, “Aid for India,” 19 Nov 62, JMF 9154/4060 (22 Oct 62) sec. 1. By 14 November, equipment airlifted to India included 200 machine guns, 54 mortars, 750 radios, and 100,000 anti-personnel mines. DJSM-1467-62 to CJCS, 19 Nov 62, same file.


Message to New Delhi, n.d.; Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 23 Nov 62, 2nd N/H of JCS 2271/33; JMP 9154/4060 (22 Oct 62) sec. 1.


20. JCSM-256-63 to SecDef, 29 Mar 63, JCS 2271/57, JMP 9154/3210 (12 Dec 62) sec. 3. Since the United States had assumed general responsibility for providing airlift support, the JCS agreed that 24 C–119 transports should be withdrawn from USAF reserves and provided to India. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 6 Mar 63, JCS 2315/260; JCSM-225-63 to SecDef, 16 Mar 63, JCS 2316/261; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 27 Mar 63, JCS 2315/263; JMP 9154/4060 (22 Oct 63) sec. 3.

21. NSAM No. 223 to SecDef et al., 26 Feb 63, JCS 2271/50; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 2 Mar 63, JCS 2271/51; JCSM-185-63 to SecDef, 9 Mar 63, JCS 2271/52; Memo, DASD(ISA) to 23 Mar 63, JCS 2271/56; JMP 9154/3100 (26 Feb 63). State’s reply to the President is summarized in FRUS: 1961–1963, vol. XIX, pp. 524–526.

22. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 6 Feb 63, JCS 2339/104; JCSM-254-63 to SecDef, 29 Mar 63, JCS 2339/106; JMP 9150/9105 (6 Feb 63).


27. JCSM-371-63 to SecDef, 11 May 63, JCS 2271/64, JMP 9154/3210 (12 Dec 62) sec. 4. Memo, AsstSecState Talbot to ASD(ISA), 8 Aug 63, JCS 2271/64-3, same file, sec. 5. Note to Control, “Air Defense Ground Environment for India,” 13 May 63, same file, sec. 4. FRUS: 1961–1963, vol. XIX, pp. 590–591, 607–608. Under an agreement concluded in July, the US would station two mobile radars and periodically introduce one fighter squadron. Subsequently, India asked for a third Ground Control Intercept (GCI) radar and two Ground Control Approach (GCA) radars. The JCS advised McNamara that, while no GCIs were currently available, the request should be reconsidered when the two GCIs already in India were replaced by
permanent radars. As for GCAs, four were scheduled for delivery under the FY 1964 MAP; the
delivery of two could be expedited. Ltr, New Delhi A-106 to State, "Transmittal of US-Indian
Air Defense Agreement," 30 Jul 63, same file, sec. 5. Msg, USMSMI to SecDef, 150802Z Aug 63;
JCSM-792-63 to SecDef, 11 Oct 63, JCS 2271/77-1; JMF 9154/4530 (20 Sep 63).

28. Memo, DASD(ISA) to SecArmy et al., 10 Jun 63; CM-691-63 to DJJS, 27 Jun 63; JCSM-545-63 to SecDef, 10 Aug 63, JCS 2271/71-2; JMF 9154/4060 (27 Jun 63).

JCSM-631-63 to SecDef, 14 Aug 63, JCS 2347/18-1; JMF 9157/4060 (2 Aug 3). MAP for India came
to $58.7 million in FY 1963, compared to $50.3 million for Pakistan. TP for CJCS for Mtg with
USecState, 11 Sep 63, JMF 9157/9105 (13 Aug 63) sec. 2.

30. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 10 Jun 63, JCS 2271/80; CM-666-63 to SecDef, 27 Aug 63, JCS 2347/20-1, same file, sec. 2.


32. Bowles had been ambassador to India, governor of Connecticut, and Under Secretary
of State. So, like Galbraith, he had unusual influence with and access to top officials.

JCSM-918-63 to SecDef, 23 Nov 63, JCS 2271/79-1, JMF 9154/4060 (16 Nov 63).

34. Encls E, F, and G to CM-1089-63 to SecDef, 23 Dec 63, JCS 2271/80, JMF 9154 (28 Apr 64). Memo, J. D. Stoddart to Gen. Wood, 9 May 64, JCS 2271/83-2, JMF 9154/3100 (30 Mar 64) sec. 2.

35. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 Apr 64, JCS 2271/86; JCSM-396-64 to SecDef, 1 May 64, JCS 2271/86-1; JMF 9154 (28 Apr 64). Memo, J. D. Stoddart to Gen. Wood, 9 May 64, JCS 2271/83-2, JMF 9154/3100 (30 Mar 64) sec. 2.


37. Ltr, Gen. Musa to CJCS, 20 Feb 64, JCS 2347/29; DJSM-517-64 to CJCS, 21 Mar 64; JMF
9157/406 (20 Feb 64). Memo, J. D. Stoddart to Gen. Wood, 9 May 64, JCS 2271/83-2, JMF 9154/3100 (30 Mar 64) sec. 2.

38. Memo for Record by Col. R. M. Tuttle, 16 May 64, Att to DJSM-834-64 to CJCS, 18 May

39. JCS 570/548, 28 Dec 61; JCSM-26-62 to SecDef, 11 Jan 62, JCS 570/548; Ltr, DASD(ISA)
to DepUSecState, 2 Mar 2, 1st N/H of JCS 570/548, 6 Mar 62; Ltr, DepAsstSecState to
DASD(ISA), 28 Mar 62, JCS 570/556; JMF 4920 (19 Dec 61). When ISA asked the Chiefs to
specify types of facilities, they stressed the need for communications facilities at Diego Garcia.
Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 May 62, JCS 570/556; JCSM-592-64 to SecDef, 3 Aug 62,

40. JCS 570/548, 28 Dec 61; JCSM-26-62 to SecDef, 11 Jan 62, JCS 570/548; Ltr, DASD(ISA)
to DepUSecState, 2 Mar 2, 1st N/H of JCS 570/548, 6 Mar 62; Ltr, DepAsstSecState to
DASD(ISA), 28 Mar 62, JCS 570/556; JMF 4920 (19 Dec 61). When ISA asked the Chiefs to
specify types of facilities, they stressed the need for communications facilities at Diego Garcia.
Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 May 62, JCS 570/556; JCSM-592-64 to SecDef, 3 Aug 62,

41. Msg, CINCSRKE/MAFSA to JCS, 061700Z Jul 64; Msg, JCS 7335 to CINCSRKE, 10
Jul 64; Ltr, CJCS to Gen. Musa, 1 Aug 64; Msg, CINCSRKE to JCS, 061610Z Aug 64; Msg, JCS
7882 to CINCSRKE, 12 Aug 64; Ltr, Gen. Adams to Gen. Musa, 14 Aug 64; JCS 091 Pakistan.


43. JCS 570/548, 28 Dec 61; JCSM-26-62 to SecDef, 11 Jan 62, JCS 570/548; Ltr, DASD(ISA)
to DepUSecState, 2 Mar 2, 1st N/H of JCS 570/548, 6 Mar 62; Ltr, DepAsstSecState to
DASD(ISA), 28 Mar 62, JCS 570/556; JMF 4920 (19 Dec 61). When ISA asked the Chiefs to
specify types of facilities, they stressed the need for communications facilities at Diego Garcia.
Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 May 62, JCS 570/556; JCSM-592-64 to SecDef, 3 Aug 62,

44. JCS 2347/19-6, 31 Aug 63, JMF 9157/9105 (13 Aug 63) sec. 2. Ltr, SecState to SecDef,
17 Aug 63, JCS 2347/19-3, same file, sec. 1. JCSM-735-63 to SecDef, 24 Sep 63, JCS 2347/19-6;
CM-918-63 to SecDef, 26 Sep 63, N/H of JCS 2347/19-8, 27 Aug 63; Ltr, DepSecDef to Sec-
State, 2 Oct 63, JCS 2347/19-9; same file, sec. 3.

45. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 17 Oct 63, JCS 2347/19-10; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Nov 63,
46. Ltr, DepAsstSecState to DASD(ISA), 14 Feb 64, JCS 2347/24-4; CSAFM-134-64 to JCS, 12 Feb 64, JCS 2347/28; Note to Control, “JCS 2347/28,” 26 Feb 64; JCSM-200-64 to SecDef, 16 Mar 64, JCS 2347/24-5; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to DepAsstSecState, 18 Mar 64, JCS 2347/24-6; NSAM No. 289 to SecDef et al., 19 Mar 64, JCS 2347/30; JMF 9157/9105 (13 Aug 63) sec. 4.

47. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 4 Jun 64, JCS 2347/30-1, JMF 9157/9105 (13 Aug 63) sec. 4.

Chapter 19. The Far East: Seeking a Strategy

1. SM-1310-60 to CINCAL et al., 27 Dec 60, JCS 1844/324, JMF 3120 (24 Aug 60).

2. Memo, SecState to SecDef, 4 Feb 61, JCS 2101/407; JCSM-153-61 to SecDef, 11 Mar 61, JCS 2101/412; JMF 3001 (4 Feb 61) sec. 1.

3. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 8 May 61, JCS 2118/153; JCSM-405-61 to SecDef, 15 Jun 61, JCS 2118/156; JMF 9141/3072 (8 May 61).


5. Memo, BG Brown to CJCS, 28 Sep 62, JCS 2270/16; Memo, Col. J. J. Ewell to DJS, n.d.; JMF 5000 (28 Sep 62). JCSM-276-63 to SecDef, 6 Apr 63, JCS 2118/201; JMF 9141/3210 (7 Jan 63) sec. 3. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 May 63, JCS 2118/206, same file, sec. 4.

6. JCSM-387-63 to SecDef, 23 May 63, JCS 2118/205; JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 5.


10. CM-46-60 to JCS, 7 Dec 60, JCS 2320; Dec On JCS 2320, 7 Dec 60; JMF 9141/4610 (7 Dec 60).

11. JCSM-425-61 to SecDef, 26 Jun 61, JCS 2320/2, JMF 9141/4610 (7 Dec 60).


13. By this time, the Sino-Soviet split appeared to be irreparable.

14. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 9 Jan 63, JCS 2118/190; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 Nov 63, JCS 2118/217; JCSM-33-64 to SecDef, 17 Jan 64, JCS 2118/217-1; JMF 9141/3100 (9 Jan 63). State, JCS, and ISA continued working on a “Draft Program of Action.” Later iterations and critiques are in JMF 9141 (2 Jul 64).


16. Support for South Vietnam was being shifted to the regular DOD budget.

17. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 Oct 64, JCS 2118/225; JCSM-1013-64 to SecDef, 3 Dec 64, JCS 2118/225-2; JMF 9141 (17 Oct 64). JCSM-1013 was transmitted to the State Department via Ltr, ASD(SA) to AsstSecState for Far East, 21 Dec 64, JCS 2118/225-3, same file.


20. General Lemnitzer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 29 Jun 77.

21. Lemnitzer interviews on 31 Mar and 29 Jun 77. The substance of the task force's report is given in *FRUS: 1961–1963*, vol. XXII, pp. 475–479. Material on 479–481 cites Lemnitzer's notes of the NSC meeting, which mention a few of his arguments described above but not the possibility of withdrawing US forces.

22. The Berlin confrontation was nearing its peak and intervention in Laos seemed possible.

23. JCSM-512-61 to SecDef, 2 Aug 61, JCS 1776/652, JMF 9144/9105 (5 Jun 61) sec. 2. These findings were basically repeated in JCSM-265-62 to SecDef, 10 Apr 62, JCS 1776/656, JMF 4060 (2 Aug 61) sec. 7; DASD(ISA), “Korea: A Political-Military Study of South Korean Forces,” Apr 62, same file, sec. 7A; and JCSM-450-62 to SecDef, 15 Jun 62, JCS 1776/660, same file, sec. 7.


25. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 2 Aug 62, JCS 1776/663; JCSM-622-63 to SecDef, 15 Aug 62, JCS 1776/664; Memo, DepSecDef to SecState, N/H of JCS 1776/664, 31 Aug 62; JMF 9144/3410 (31 Jul 62) sec. 1. Ltr, SecState to DepSecDef, 19 Sep 62, JCS 1776/667, same file, sec. 2. The arguments in JCSM-622 derived largely from Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 009203Z Aug 62, same file, sec. 1.


27. JCS 2118/195, 26 Feb 63; Note to Control, “JCS 2118/195,” 1 Mar 63; CM-367-63 to DJS, 6 Mar 63, JCS 2118/198; JMF 9143/5920 (24 Sep 62) sec. 2.

28. JCSM-312-63 to SecDef, 20 Apr 63, JCS 2118/202, JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 4.

29. Memos (2), ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 11 May 63, JCS 2118/207; Ltr, DepUSecState to CJCS, 28 May 63, JCS 1776/683, JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 5.

30. CM-634-63 to DJS, 3 Jun 63, CJCS 091 Korea. The same file has the original copy of State’s 28 May letter, on which Taylor penciled comments that became the basis for CM-634.

31. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, 1 Jun 63; JCSM-425-63 to SecDef, 4 Jun 63, JCS 1776/684; JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 5.

32. Memo for Record, “Proposed Realignment of Ground Forces in the ROK,” 5 Jun 63, CJCS 091 Korea. DJSM-1403-63 to CJCS, 20 Aug 63; DJSM-1550-63 to CJCS, 14 Sep 63; JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 6. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 Sep 63, JCS 1800/757, JMF 9700 (10 Sep 63) sec. 1. JCSM-737-63 to SecDef, 23 Sep 63, JCS 1800/757–1, same file, sec. 3.

33. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Nov 63, JCS 1776/687; JCS 1776/687-1, 13 Nov 63, and Dec On, 16 Nov 63; JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 6. J–5 TP 129-63, 16 Nov 63; Note to Control, “Force Reductions in Korea,” 18 Nov 63; JCS 1776/689, 13 Dec 63; JCSM-989-63 to SecDef, 16 Dec 63, JCS 1776/689; same file, sec. 7.

34. Note to Control, “Reduction of Forces in Korea,” 6 Jan 64, JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 8. Note to Control, “Force Reductions in Korea,” 22 Jan 64; JCSM-101-64 to SecDef, 4 Jun 64, JCS 1776/690-1; same file, sec. 9.

35. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Nov 63, JCS 1776/687; JCS 1776/687-1, 13 Nov 63, and Dec On, 16 Nov 63; JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 6. J–5 TP 129-63, 16 Nov 63; Note to Control, “Force Reductions in Korea,” 18 Nov 63; JCS 1776/689, 13 Dec 63; JCSM-989-63 to SecDef, 16 Dec 63, JCS 1776/689; same file, sec. 7.


38. “Japan—State Dept. Guidelines for Policy and Operations,” Oct 61, Att to Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 Nov 61, JCS 2180/159; JCSM-380-61 to SecDef, 30 Nov 61, JCS


43. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 19 Jun 63, JCS 1800/703, JMF 9700 (19 Jun 63) sec. 1. JCSM-494-63 to SecDef, 3 Jul 63, JCS 1800/703-2; Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., 16 Jul 63, JCS 1800/734, same file, sec. 2. The smaller steps were accelerating deactivation of a B–57 wing, sending back to the US 16 transports from Japan and 16 from Okinawa, and also returning 46 instead of 26 F–102 interceptors.

44. Several Groups comprised a Marine Air Wing.

45. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 17 Jan 64, JCS 2147/322, JMF 3440 (17 Jan 64) sec. 1. JCSM-303-64 to SecDef, 9 Apr 64, JCS 2147/322-8; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 3 Jun 64, JCS 2147/322-10, same file, sec. 3.


49. DJSM-533-62 to OpsDeps, 20 Apr 62, JCS 1231/55; Dec On JCS 1231/55, 30 Apr 62; JMF 9147/9105 (11 Aug 61) sec. 2. DJSM-206-63 to Dir, J–5, 4 Feb 63; TP for JCS/SecDef Mtg, “US Military Position in the Ryukyus,” 26 Feb 63; Note to Control, same subject, 27 Feb 63; JMF 9147/3100 (4 Feb 63).

50. Airgram, Tokyo A-1677 to State, 24 May 63; JCSM-749-63 to SecDef, 27 Sep 63, JCS 1231/60-3; JMF 9198/9105 (24 May 63). These views were sent to the State Dept. via Ltr, DASD(ISA) to AsstSecState Hilsman, 4 Oct 63, JCS 1231/60-4, same file.

51. Memo, Rear Adm. Blouin to DJS, 26 Dec 64, JCS 1231/62; JCSM-1091 to SecDef, 31 Dec 64, JCS 1231/62; JMF 9198 (26 Dec 64).


56. Memo, CNO to JCS, 29 Jan 63, JCS 2357/10; “Decision on JCS 2357/10,” 8 Feb 63; Msg, JCS 8565 to CINCPAC, 9 Feb 63; JMF 9156/3100 (28 Jan 63).


58. JCS 2357/22-1, 24 Aug 64, JMF 9156 (21 Aug 64). Msg, Djakarta 1989 to State, 26 Mar 64; Ltr, CJS to Gen. Nasution, 9 Apr 64, JCS 2357/19; JMF 9156/9105 (9 Apr 64).

59. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 1 Apr 64, JCS 2365/11; JCSM-330-64 to SecDef, 15. Apr 64, JCS 2365/11-1; JMF 9153.3/3500 (1 Apr 64). Memo for Record, “Conversation Regarding Military Sales and Training for Malaysia,” 28 Jul 64, Att to DJSM-1292-64 to CJCS, 30 Jul 64, JMF 9153.3/9105 (1 Apr 64).


61. JCSM-743-64 to SecDef, 26 Aug 64, JCS 2357/22-1; Memo, SecState to Pres, 30 Aug 64, App to Memo, M. W. Roche to SJS, 11 Sep 64, N/H of JCS 2357/22-1; JMF 9156 (21 Aug 64). A sanitized version of JCSM-743 is printed in FRUS: 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, pp. 141–142.

62. JCSM-779-64 to SecDef, 8 Sep 64, JCS 2357/23; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to AsstSecState for Far East Aff, 10 Sep 64, JCS 2357/23-1; JCSM-951-64 to SecDef, 10 Nov 64, JCS 2357/23-2; JMF 9156 (2 Sep 64). JCSM-1003-64 to SecDef, 1 Dec 64, JCS 2357/25; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 17 Dec 64, JCS 2357/25-1; DJSM-64-65 to ASD(ISA), 18 Jan 65, JCS 2357/25-2; Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 27 Jan 65, JCS 2357/25-3; JMF 9156 (17 Nov 64).

63. This is described in a separate series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam.

Chapter 20. Conclusion: Appraising Performances


4. CM-1009-63 to SecDef, 12 Nov 63, JCS 1800/775-2, JMF 7000 (10 Oct 63) sec. 3.


6. Admiral George W. Anderson interviewed by W. S. Poole on 7 Nov 78, JHO.

7. NY Times, 7 May 63, p. 1, and 5 Sep 63, pp. 1, 19. Admiral Anderson Interview, 7 Nov 78.


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