Volume XI covers a tumultuous time that witnessed war in the Middle East leading to an embargo on oil shipments to the United States as well as a Soviet-American confrontation, the defeat of anti-communist regimes in South Vietnam and Cambodia, the arrival of a Cuban expeditionary force in Africa, a stalemate in strategic arms limitation talks between Washington and Moscow, and the decline of détente between the two superpowers. Domestically, the U.S. economy was wracked by high inflation and recession while, politically, the Watergate scandal culminated with the resignation of President Richard M. Nixon. During four years, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to work with two presidents and three secretaries of defense which made stable, productive relationships more difficult.

In the wake of public disillusionment over the Vietnam War and overseas commitments generally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their civilian superiors faced a hard task in revitalizing the military establishment, an effort they deemed imperative in light of evidence about an on-going Soviet buildup. Gradually, as the rancor over Vietnam faded, Congress became willing to support growing defense budgets. Strategically, while Western Europe claimed primary attention, the JCS had to refocus priorities away from Asia, thanks to the opening with mainland China, and toward securing access to oil-exporting states around the Persian Gulf. This new requirement lent unprecedented importance to improving strategic mobility and maintaining access to overseas bases. The latter task consumed an ever-larger share of the Joint Chiefs’ attention.

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy
1973–1976
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1973–1976

Walter S. Poole

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff were established in the early days of World War II to advise the President on the strategic direction of the US armed forces. They continued after the war as military advisers and planners and have played an important role over the years in devising US national policy. An understanding of their relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense provides an essential basis for understanding their current work. The story of their activity during peacetime and in times of crisis, moreover, provides an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written “for the record.” Its value for instruction purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the Joint Staff, and as a source of background information or staff studies will be readily recognized.

The series, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, treats the activities of the JCS since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the volumes of the series are prepared initially in classified form.

This volume, the eleventh in the series, describes JCS activities, apart from Vietnam, during the years 1973-1976. Dr. Walter S. Poole wrote the original drafts for all chapters and updated them after declassification. Ms. Penny Norman prepared the sanitized manuscript for publication. The volume is an official publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, insomuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.

Washington, DC
February 2015
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Brigadier General, USA (Ret.)
Director for Joint History
Preface

This volume covers a period of upheaval that had several dimensions. Politically, the Watergate scandal led to unprecedented turnovers in the civilian leadership. Economically, a temporary embargo by Arab oil exporters combined with huge price increases badly disrupted western economies. Militarily, the focus of US concern shifted from the Far East to the Middle East. By contriving to stop the flow of oil, the Soviet Union could put a stranglehold on Western Europe, Japan and the United States. Consequently, how to protect petroleum supplies by projecting military power into the Persian Gulf became an urgent concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For primary documents, the author relied on three sources: the Joint Master File (cited in footnotes as “JMF”) that covered corporate JCS activities; the Chairman’s File (cited as “CJCS”); and the daily diary kept by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer until his retirement on 1 July 1974. While the original version was being written, Admiral Moorer read and clarified a number of points in the manuscript. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., also read and commented upon the opening chapter. When the author revised and updated his original manuscript, all the new chapters were critiqued in the Joint History Office by Drs. Edward J. Drea and Steven L. Rearden who suggested further improvements. Colonel Kenneth R. Foulks, Jr., USA, coordinated the final publication and used his deft eye for pictures to enrich the book’s content and appearance. Finally, the author needs to thank Brigadier General John F. Shortal, USA (Retired), the Director for Joint History, for all manner of kindness and assistance. In no sense, however, did any of these individuals approve what they read. The author alone bears full responsibility for the final product.

Walter S. Poole
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History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy
1973–1976
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaks during his retirement ceremony at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, on 2 July 1974. (US Navy Photograph)
Leaders Change, Methods Continue

On 20 January 1973 President Richard M. Nixon began his second term believing that his hopes for achieving a “generation of peace” lay within reach. During February 1972, President Nixon had travelled to mainland China where he conferred with Chairman Mao Tse-tung, easing a quarter-century of Sino-American enmity. In June the President flew to Moscow, where he concluded a strategic arms limitation agreement with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. On 27 January 1973 the Paris peace accords ended the US combat role in Vietnam. The last troops left South Vietnam on 16 March 1973, ending a venture that had cost 58,000 American lives and bitterly divided the American public. Quickly, however, a domestic scandal enveloped the White House. Accusations about the President’s role in obstructing investigation of the June 1972 Watergate burglary, a break-in at the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee in Washington, DC, gained increasing credence. Thereafter, with each passing month President Nixon found his influence weakened and his denials more battered. Finally, on 9 August 1974, when proof of his obstruction became known and impeachment looked certain, President Nixon resigned. Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, confronted with evidence of accepting payoffs from contractors, had previously resigned in October 1973. The Honorable Gerald R. Ford, the Republican leader of the House of Representatives who had replaced Mr. Agnew as Vice President, became the nation’s first unelected chief executive.

In the meantime, a wave of troubles abroad raised doubts about the durability of détente between the superpowers. In October 1973 a new Arab-Israeli war erupted. Open US support of Israel triggered an embargo by oil-exporting Arab states. Dramatic increases in the price of oil led to “stagflation”—a unique combination of economic stagnation and high inflation—that would hobble Western economies throughout the 1970s. But the Soviet Union, as an oil exporter, reaped large profits that financed an
arms buildup and a more adventurous foreign policy. In 1975 communist forces armed by Moscow and Beijing overwhelmed the US-backed regimes in South Vietnam and Cambodia. With Soviet assistance, a Cuban expeditionary force secured victory for the pro-communist faction in Angola’s civil war. Portugal, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally, at one point appeared likely to go communist. In the words of one Soviet official, it seemed that “the world was going our way.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) worked in an environment that could not avoid being deeply affected by the fast-moving events of the early 1970s. For the nation as a whole, there was a shrinking back from any new situation that risked military involvement. The American public stopped being willing, in President John F. Kennedy’s words, to “pay any price, bear any burden. . . .” Three developments indicate how much things had changed since 1961. First, at President Nixon’s initiative, conscription ended. The last draft call occurred in December 1972; the All-Volunteer Force became a reality eleven months later. Second, late in 1973 Congress passed the War Powers Act over President Nixon’s veto. Among other provisions, it limited to sixty days the time during which US forces could operate in a combat area without congressional approval. Third, late in 1975 Cuban combat troops began arriving in Angola to bolster a Marxist faction. The administration was providing covert aid to anti-communist groups. Majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate, accepting a communist victory over the danger of being drawn into another Vietnam-style conflict, voted to cut off all such aid.

Trends during the mid-1970s were not all adverse. Efforts on Capitol Hill to mandate substantial troop withdrawals from Europe failed. Senior officials in the executive branch anticipated moves by Congress to impose substantial cuts on their defense budget requests. Instead, budgets rose about enough to keep pace with inflation. But was that sufficient? Defense officials sought, yet often did not get, real increases to match an accelerating Soviet buildup.

Turmoil at the Top

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1973 comprised an unusual mixture. The Chairman, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, had held his position since 2 July 1970. A naval aviator, he commanded the Atlantic (1964-1965) and Pacific (1965-1967) Fleets before becoming Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) on 1 July 1967. Every day during his chairmanship, Admiral Moorer dictated a candid and increasingly detailed diary. From its pages, he emerges as direct and incisive yet perhaps not eager to grapple with ambiguities. His diary provides many accounts of decisionmaking but relatively few reflective passages. One well-placed Army officer, for example, felt that Admiral Moorer “could not appreciate the deeper subtleties of the [Vietnam] war.” The admiral never wavered in his belief that US intervention there was right and that the enemy would respect only superior force, unhesitatingly applied.
Leaders Change, Methods Continue

Watergate, combined with Vietnam’s legacy, strained relations between Congress and the executive branch. Here is one vivid illustration. Late in September 1973 Admiral Moorer telephoned Senator William L. Scott (R-VA), to persuade him to vote against a bill requiring large withdrawals of overseas forces. Instead, Senator Scott dealt him a sharp rebuff:

When I vote I don’t just . . . shoot from the hip . . . . I wrote the President four years ago suggesting that there be a troop reduction—and I have yet to receive the courtesy of a reply . . . . I represent five million people . . . . How many people voted for you to become an Admiral? As a matter of fact, I resent calls like this . . . . I know what I am doing, Admiral, and I hope you know your job as well!

Such language was unusual even in the Watergate setting, but it would have been unthinkable some years earlier.

Inquiries spawned by the Watergate investigation made the last months of Admiral Moorer’s tenure tense and unpleasant. On 10 January 1974 Admiral Moorer learned that the Chicago Tribune was about to publish a story, “Probers Charge Pentagon Spied on Kissinger in ’71.” It alleged that Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, had excluded Admiral Moorer from policymaking so much that the Chairman set up his own spy system to purloin White House documents. Admiral Moorer immediately telephoned Dr. Kissinger; the two men agreed that charges of spying and exclusion were false. Then, Admiral Moorer briefed the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Service Chiefs, and the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

As Admiral Moorer related it, the story had unfolded as follows: When the Indo-Pakistani war began in November 1971, Yeoman First Class Charles Radford was working in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison Office at the White House. That office, headed by Rear Admiral Robert Welander, USN, served to keep the Joint Chiefs abreast of National Security Council (NSC) activities. Earlier, while serving at the US Embassy in New Delhi, Yeoman Radford had become very pro-Indian. Also, while there he met columnist Jack Anderson. After being reassigned to Washington, Yeoman Radford apparently thought the administration was tilting toward Pakistan. On 12 December 1971 he dined with Mr. Anderson. Starting the next day, excerpts from Top Secret documents that discussed the pro-Pakistani tilt appeared in Mr. Anderson’s column. Admiral Welander, Yeoman Radford’s superior, noticed that one article described a ship called the “USS TARTAR-SAM.” The Tartar was actually an anti-air missile, not a ship; Yeoman Radford had typed a memorandum which Jack Anderson might easily have misunderstood. So, concluding that Yeoman Radford was responsible for the leaks, Admiral Welander changed the combination on his safe; no more documents appeared in the newspaper. The Secretary of Defense conducted an investigation; so did the White House. Yeoman Radford admitted that since 1969 he had been covertly acquiring White House documents and passing them to his JCS superiors because he “sensed” that was what they wanted. Admiral Moorer wanted to have Yeoman Radford
court-martialed. Instead, at President Nixon’s order, he was transferred abruptly to Oregon. Dr. Kissinger then closed the JCS Liaison Office.

For more than a month thereafter, Admiral Moorer had to spend several hours every day dealing with the spy ring story. He told Representative F. Edward Hebert (D-LA), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, that “this idea of my spying on HAK [Dr. Kissinger] is such great nonsense but it is indicative of the sickness in the country these days.” Unknowingly, he continued, he had received White House documents that he was not authorized to see. “I just wasn’t as alert as I should have been,” he admitted to Dr. Kissinger; “I failed the 1974 Sensitivity Test in 1971.” Although Admiral Moorer appeared on televised news programs to rebut these charges, public criticism continued. Accordingly, on 22 January 1974, Admiral Moorer told Dr. Kissinger that he was “having a personal as well as an institutional problem and that [Kissinger] must emphasize that our exchange of information has always been outstanding.” Hours later, at a press conference, Dr. Kissinger did exactly that.4

Slowly, Admiral Moorer convinced skeptics that he had not condoned “spying.” On 26 January 1974, he met with Senator Howard Baker (R-TN), who was Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (the “Watergate Committee”). At the outset, Senator Baker told Admiral Moorer, he had received reports indicating a military conspiracy. Now, though, he had “come a long way towards changing his mind.” On 6 February 1974, Admiral Moorer testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee and firmly denied any impropriety. Several weeks later in his diary Admiral Moorer recorded, “I still often wonder if I was right in telling the Committee everything I knew right off the bat. I have convinced myself that I was, because my statement has stood up throughout this whole business.” On 25 June 1974, just before he retired, the Senate Committee exonerated Admiral Moorer, concluding that he was “not culpable” in the unauthorized transfer of White House documents.5

General George S. Brown, USAF, succeeded Admiral Moorer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 July 1974. No previous chairman came to the job seemingly so well prepared. As a major during the 1943 raid on Ploesti, he took command of his B-24 group after the lead plane was shot down and brought the group over the target. As a colonel, from 1959 to 1963, he was Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. As a lieutenant general, from 1966 to 1968, he served as Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Next, he commanded Seventh Air Force in Southeast Asia from 1968 until 1970. After heading Air Force Systems Command, he became Air Force Chief of Staff on 1 August 1973. As JCS Chairman, General Brown mostly avoided Admiral Moorer’s practice of bypassing the Service Chiefs to work directly with the President and his National Security Adviser. Almost every day, at 0800, General Brown would meet with the heads of the Joint Staff directorates; he usually lunched with the Director, Joint Staff. Thus, to an unusual degree, he kept abreast of everything being done within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and attracted the loyalty of his subordinates.6 However, in the public mind, General Brown’s stature was diminished by his remarks about Israel that are described in chapter 10.
The Service Chiefs

General Creighton W. Abrams, USA, was serving as Army Chief of Staff. The post-Vietnam Army needed a hero, and legends grew around “Abe” Abrams. During World War II his accomplishments as a tank commander reportedly led General George Patton to call him “the world’s champion.” As Army Vice Chief of Staff from 1964 to 1967, he helped manage the Vietnam buildup. During 1968-1972, General Abrams served as Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), managing the drawdown of American forces. Here his public image was that of a wise, canny leader. General Brown and Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, who had served under him earlier in his tour, held General Abrams in very high regard. A different picture, however, emerges from the pages of Admiral Moorer’s diary. In 1971 General Abrams’ handling of the Laotian incursion left Admiral Moorer—and President Nixon as well—deeply troubled. During the spring of 1972, when South Vietnamese forces buckled before a North Vietnamese offensive, General Abrams’ response struck President Nixon, Admiral Moorer, and Dr. Kissinger as lethargic and petulant. The Commander, Seventh Air Force, (Lieutenant General John W. Vogt, USAF, who very recently had been the Director, Joint Staff) gave Admiral Moorer a harsh appraisal of General Abrams’ performance: “Boss, he has been out here too long. The whole ground war is screwed up.”

In 1969, Nixon granted Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird full freedom to make appointments within the Department of Defense (DoD). Secretary Laird admired General Abrams as a loyal, efficient executor of the “Vietnamization” policy and insisted upon his selection. President Nixon agreed, and chose Major General Alexander M. Haig, USA, (who then skipped the rank of Lieutenant General) to be the Vice Chief of Staff as a four-star general. General Haig had had a rapid series of promotions. After commanding a battalion and then a brigade in Vietnam, Brigadier General Haig in 1969 joined the NSC Staff where he rose to become Dr. Kissinger’s deputy. In 1972 President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger signed letters portraying General Haig as “the most outstanding officer . . . in any service.”

General Abrams’ appointment as Army Chief of Staff became effective on 12 October 1972. He told the outgoing Vice Chief, General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA, that he planned to have General Haig attend all JCS meetings in his stead. “We finally talked him out of it,” General Palmer recalled, “pointing out that [attending JCS meetings] was his primary duty under the law and that it would be unfair to the Chairman and the other Chiefs, not to mention the Army.” Still, according to General Palmer, General Abrams remained hostile to the joint system and preferred to work directly with the other Service Chiefs. General Abrams’ experience in Vietnam colored his thinking. He deeply resented what, to him, had been unjustified intrusions from civilians in Washington and the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), in Hawaii. Admiral Moorer, whose opinion of General Abrams did not improve upon closer acquaintance, spoke to CINCPAC about this issue in March 1974: “You’ve got to realize that Abrams is emotional about this and he doesn’t understand strategy in a global sense. He wants
to draw lines around everything and give each little sub-commander his own little toys to play with. . . . [H]e doesn't like anybody else telling him what to do.”

If the President intended General Haig to be the power behind the throne, Watergate destroyed his scheme. In May 1973, after senior White House aides had to resign, President Nixon appointed General Haig to be his own chief of staff. General Abrams then chose one of his protégés, General Frederick C. Weyand, USA, to be the new Vice Chief. In Vietnam, General Weyand had commanded the 25th Infantry Division and II Field Force, served as General Abrams’ deputy, and followed him as the last COMUSMACV. General Abrams quickly developed a very congenial relationship with Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, who greatly respected General Abrams and concluded that he should not become Chairman only because the Army needed him more.

During the spring of 1974 General Abrams fell ill with cancer complicated by phlebitis; he died on 4 September 1974. Discussions about who should be General Abrams’ successor began before his death. General Haig was among those who hoped to take his place. Dr. Schlesinger concluded that General Weyand enjoyed the most solid backing within his Service, and President Ford decided that General Haig should become the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). Becoming Chief of Staff on 3 October 1974, General Weyand elected to follow other four-star officers who retired around age sixty. When he left active service on 1 October 1976, General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, succeeded him.

Between 1973 and 1976, for more normal reasons, three men also filled the post of Air Force Chief of Staff. General John D. Ryan, USAF, retired on 31 July 1973. Somewhat like General Abrams, he did not feel entirely comfortable in the joint arena. General George S. Brown served only eleven months as Air Force Chief of Staff, then moved up to the JCS Chairmanship. The next Chief, General David C. Jones, USAF, came to the post with comparatively little Washington experience. During the Korean War he flew twenty-nine bomber missions. In Vietnam, during 1969, he served briefly as Vice Commander, Seventh Air Force. From September 1971 until June 1974, as Commander in Chief, US Air Forces, Europe, General Jones devoted much effort to negotiating with other NATO members about creating a new headquarters, Allied Air Forces Central Europe. He also concurred with Secretary Schlesinger’s plans for acquiring a mixed force of F-15s and F-16s.

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, seemed almost to relish controversy. In 1965, at age forty-four, he had been the youngest man ever promoted to rear admiral. On 1 July 1970, at age forty-nine, he became the youngest CNO. His Pentagon experience consisted of three years with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ISA), followed by two years as director of the Navy’s new Systems Analysis Group. Next, as Commander, US Naval Forces, Vietnam, he won high marks from Secretary Laird for pressing that part of Vietnamization.

After becoming CNO, Admiral Zumwalt launched wide-ranging and often controversial reforms within the Navy. His “Z-grams,” promulgating what he saw as long
overdue changes, became notorious. For one of these, Admiral Zumwalt proposed the title “Mickey Mouse, Elimination of.” Shortly before it circulated as Z-57, this was altered to “Demeaning and Abrasive Regulations, Elimination of.” So many changes created a sense of unease among a good number of senior officers, Admiral Moorer being one. In February 1973, Admiral Moorer met with a group that included Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr., (but not Admiral Zumwalt) to discuss “the need to turn the Navy around with respect to discipline, military bearing, etc.”\(^{15}\) Judging by evidence from the Chairman’s diary, the Moorer-Zumwalt relationship was less than comfortable during 1973-1974.

In his JCS role, Admiral Zumwalt may have been the most active Service Chief, if the number of actions that he initiated is a reliable guide. Yet activity did not always translate into influence. His advocacy of smaller, cheaper warships such as a sea control ship and a mini- or midi-carrier won plaudits from Secretary Schlesinger but not from senior flag officers. Admiral Zumwalt’s briefings, built around what he called “Jimmy the Greek” odds\(^{16}\) that showed worsening chances for a victory at sea, convinced neither Admiral Moorer nor Secretary Schlesinger. Admiral Zumwalt remained in the spotlight of controversy until his retirement on 30 June 1974.\(^{17}\)

The next CNO, Admiral James L. Holloway, III, USN, was the son of a four-star admiral. Originally an aviator, Admiral Holloway had commanded a carrier division in the Mediterranean and had been Deputy Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, and Commander, Seventh Fleet, in the western Pacific. He took a more traditional approach toward “discipline, military bearing, etc.” Admiral Holloway repeated neither Admiral Zumwalt’s more strident warnings about the maritime balance nor his advocacy of smaller, cheaper warships.

General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) from 1 January 1972 until 30 June 1975, had a career of distinctive assignments. Between 1957 and 1961 he was Vice President Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs. In Vietnam from 1967 to 1969 he led the III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), the largest combined combat unit yet commanded by a Marine. After that he served for two years as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. General Cushman’s tenure as Commandant witnessed a post-Vietnam rebuilding of the Marine Corps. When General Cushman retired, he was replaced as Commandant by Lieutenant General Louis H. Wilson, USMC, who won the Medal of Honor in World War II and in 1975 headed the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

**Civilian Leadership**

Among the Joint Chiefs’ civilian superiors, turnovers were just as frequent and more spectacular. During President Nixon’s first term, direction over foreign policy had become centralized in the White House. The President and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, controlled the course of negotiations and the
JCS and National Policy

decision-making process to an unprecedented degree. But beginning in March 1973, the Watergate scandal absorbed the President’s attention. Early in June Acting Secretary of Defense Clements told General Haig that he and Admiral Moorer were concerned about the apparent paralysis in the White House. Was there anything, Secretary Clements asked, that they could do to help? General Haig, who had just taken over as the President’s Chief of Staff, characterized the situation as “disorganized” but said he was “trying to pull the staff together.” Some days later, after hearing reports that the President no longer conferred with his staff, Secretary Clements and Admiral Moorer paid a call on General Haig. This time, General Haig said the situation was “clearing,” with the President participating continuously in day-to-day problems. On 22 September 1973 Dr. Kissinger became Secretary of State while retaining his White House job. Early in November, shortly after the Arab-Israeli War had ended in a cease-fire and the President’s firing of Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox had caused a public outcry, Admiral Moorer recorded in his diary that “HAK is really acting as captain of the ship if the truth be known.”

As President Nixon found himself more ensnared by Watergate, senior Defense officials—notably Dr. Schlesinger, Secretary Clements, and Admiral Zumwalt—worried that he might make unwise concessions to the Soviets in hopes of scoring another diplomatic triumph. That did not happen, but the depth of distrust can be seen in reactions to a meeting between President Nixon and the Joint Chiefs on 22 December 1973. Admiral Zumwalt thought the President was trying to find out whether he could count on military support for “fascist” courses of action. As he left the meeting, Admiral Zumwalt asked General Abrams, “Did you get the same general impression I got?” General Abrams answered, “I don’t want to talk about it, I don’t want to make a minute about it, and I don’t want to have heard it.” Yet Admiral Moorer, perhaps familiar with President Nixon’s complaints about Georgetown liberals and the media, dictated in a memorandum four days later that the President “was very comfortable with the Chiefs and was more relaxed than I have seen him in a long time.”

Gerald Ford brought to the presidency some praiseworthy personal qualities but no reputation as a statesman. Dr. Henry Kissinger continued to play the central role in shaping national security policy. In November 1975 the President relieved Dr. Kissinger of his position as national security adviser and appointed Dr. Kissinger’s deputy, Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, USAF, in his place. But General Scowcroft acted mainly as an efficient facilitator and coordinator; Dr. Kissinger still held the helm.

Why, during these years, did secretaries of defense wield far less influence than Secretary of State Kissinger? In some part because of turnover: in four years, three men passed through that office. Secretary Elliot L. Richardson served only from 29 January until 27 May 1973, when he transferred to the troubled Justice Department. “He was doing superbly . . . ,” Admiral Moorer recorded in his diary, “and I hated to see him go.”

Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary Richardson’s successor, had earned a Ph.D. in economics at Harvard, worked at the RAND Corporation as director of strategic studies, and then joined the Bureau of the Budget, where he focused on defense issues. He
next served as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission before assuming the secretaryship on 2 July 1973. Dr. Schlesinger's intellect was powerful, his detailed grasp of defense issues impressive. But his personality could be difficult. In one official's words, he “seemed in a perpetual state of condescension.” Admiral Moorer rendered a mixed verdict. Witness, for example, this diary passage from early 1974: “I think these meetings we have with Jim are so far superior to the meetings we had with other [secretaries] because we can get down and find out what the general thinking is—which hasn't always been the case at all.” Yet, shortly before Admiral Moorer retired, a New York Times article stated that Dr. Schlesinger was “hoping . . . to reinvigorate the intellectual caliber” of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Secretary and the Chairman, it alleged, “never talked on quite the same intellectual wavelength.” Admiral Moorer saw a germ of truth in the story. “I don’t think there is any question,” he told Admiral Zumwalt, “about the fact that Schlesinger is uneasy with you and me and he had wanted to have a clean slate.”

While Dr. Schlesinger worked to strengthen the defense posture, his directness struck many as offensive. He and his Deputy Secretary, William P. Clements, Jr., were constantly at loggerheads. Worse, Secretary Schlesinger’s relations with Dr. Kissinger turned sour. Admiral Moorer recorded how, after a sharp exchange with Dr. Kissinger, Secretary Schlesinger instructed his subordinates as follows: “We will accept no guidance ‘under the sun’ from State on any subject. Anyone receiving guidance will report it to me and we will develop our own policy here in this building.” Increasingly, too, Dr. Schlesinger appeared to be at odds with President Ford. The President confided to Dr. Kissinger that “Jim . . . thinks I am stupid, and he believes you are running me, which he resents. This will not end until I either fire Jim or make him believe he is running me.” On 2 November 1975, President Ford called Dr. Schlesinger to the Oval Office and asked for his resignation; President Ford later described their meeting as “one of the most disagreeable conversations I have ever had.”

The new Secretary of Defense, 43 year-old Donald H. Rumsfeld, had been a member of the House of Representatives, US ambassador to NATO, and assistant to President Ford with cabinet rank. His fourteen-month tenure proved too short for him to make a major impression. Continuity came from the man who served, from 30 January 1973 until 20 January 1977, as Deputy Secretary of Defense. William P. Clements, Jr., a forceful and ambitious Texan, shouldered more than the deputy’s normal responsibilities.

During Secretary Rumsfeld’s short tenure, he adroitly defused an unpleasant situation. In April 1976 General Brown was interviewed by reporter Alison Lurie. After the session ended, but while tape recorders still ran, General Brown remarked that the Shah of Iran harbored outsize ambitions, described Britain's armed forces as “pathetic,” and labeled Israel a “burden.” In mid-October, King Features Syndicate prepared to release an article that included those remarks. Aware that such remarks could hurt his election prospects, President Ford asked Secretary Rumsfeld’s advice. “This fellow is a warrior, he’s not a staff man,” Mr. Rumsfeld replied. “You don’t end a man's career for saying something wrong.” He suggested, and President Ford approved, a Rumsfeld-Brown press
conference. At their joint appearance, a reporter asked General Brown whether there was “any suspicion at all in your mind that there may be something political about the timing in all this?” General Brown replied, “I’m not in a position to judge. I do think it’s a little strange that if this guy had a story in April—.” Secretary Rumsfeld immediately intervened: “He’s not in a position to judge. . . . I agree with him completely.” There was laughter in the room, and the episode faded away.28

Summing up, Dr. Henry Kissinger came to symbolize continuity in the administration’s foreign policy. His prominence, however, made him a target for critics of détente. Some, Admiral Zumwalt being prominent among them after his retirement, portrayed Dr. Schlesinger as resisting Dr. Kissinger’s willingness to accommodate with and even appease the Soviets.29 Secretary Rumsfeld also did not share Dr. Kissinger’s supposed complacency about growing Soviet strategic power or his confidence about the ameliorating effect of arms control accords.30 By late 1976 the Joint Chiefs of Staff shared Secretary Rumsfeld’s skepticism about moving forward with strategic arms limitation talks, a process which Presidents Nixon and Ford and Dr. Kissinger viewed as the centerpiece of détente.

White House Methods

The formal decision-making apparatus created by President Nixon resembled a pyramid, with the National Security Council at its apex. At the bottom, Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRGs), each chaired by an Assistant Secretary of Defense and having a Joint Staff representative, served as first-line forums for policy and analysis. Above them, an Under Secretaries Committee, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State and including the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, considered matters pertaining to overseas operations and ensured the execution of foreign policy decisions. During President Ford’s tenure, IRGs fell into disuse,31 so a Senior Review Group, chaired by Dr. Kissinger and including the Deputy Secretary of Defense as well as the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, conducted interdepartmental deliberations and assessed policy studies before they went to the White House. Finally, at the apex, was the National Security Council. Neither the National Security Adviser nor the JCS Chairman were statutory members, but they often attended NSC meetings. The President would direct studies through National Security Study Memorandums (NSSMs) and circulate his choices via National Security Decision Memorandums (NSDMs). Under President Ford, the decision-making process turned more collegial, with NSC meetings becoming forums for debate rather than ratifications of choices made elsewhere.

Dr. Henry Kissinger’s on-going prominence can be demonstrated through his chairmanship of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) and the Verification Panel (VP). During crises, the WSAG coordinated policy and assessed contingency plans. The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, were members of the WSAG, along with the Deputy Secretary of State and the Director of
Central Intelligence. During the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, the WSAG met frequently. Afterwards, Dr. Kissinger asked Admiral Moorer to appraise its performance. WSAG meetings had been excellent, Admiral Moorer replied, producing not only goals and tasks but also nuances that made US actions timely, precise, and effective. He added, however, that too many details had been handled at too high a level. The same criticism might be made of the Verification Panel, which formulated positions for arms control negotiations. Unavoidably, though, the VP had to settle differences that involved highly technical issues.

Finally, the Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) discharged a function, albeit a minor one. Once again, Dr. Kissinger served as Chairman; the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman were members. The committee assessed programs from the standpoint of overall national priorities. Thus its members came not only from State, Defense, and Central Intelligence but also from the Office of Management and Budget and from the Council of Economic Advisors. Dr. Kissinger hoped that DPRC meetings would allow the White House “to influence strategic doctrine and force-level decisions at an earlier stage than had been customary.” Instead, he wrote later,

The White House saw the outlines of the detailed defense program only during the summer before it was put into final form in October. By then the services had made their various tradeoffs. . . . The unresolved issues were kept to a minimum and were usually highly technical, satisfying Presidential insistence on having the last word without enabling his staff to undertake a serious strategic review. The interagency Defense Program Review Committee, prominent during President Nixon’s first term, appraised Service and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) proposals from the standpoint of overall national priorities. The DPRC met once during August 1973 and never assembled again. To Secretary Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that was a welcome outcome. They had not wanted outside agencies to assess DoD programs until they had been fully formulated, and now that goal was achieved. Dr. Kissinger was a willing accomplice in the DPRC’s demise, having concluded that the committee could not accomplish his and President Nixon’s goal of gaining control over defense planning and programming.
Pentagon Methods

The Joint Chiefs of Staff served as principal military advisers to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense. They were charged by law with preparing strategic plans and providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces. Their Joint Strategic Planning System, as it existed in January 1973, worked as follows:

1. For the short-range period, which covered the coming fiscal year, an annual Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) assigned tasks to unified and specified commanders and allocated the forces to accomplish them. On 31 January 1973 the Joint Chiefs issued a JSCP covering Fiscal Year 1974, which ran from 1 July 1973 until 30 June 1974. In 1974 the JSCP's publication changed from annual to biennial. Off-year revisions were kept to the absolute minimum necessary to maintain the integrity of strategy and tasking.

2. For the mid-range period, which covered the seven fiscal years after the JSCP, there were:
   a. An annual Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). Volume I, Military Strategy and Force Planning Guidance, stated national security goals and the military objectives derived therefrom. It also provided the specific military appraisals and strategic concepts needed to develop basic military objectives; it contained basic guidelines by which to plan the force structure; and it evaluated the risks associated with the strategy and force planning guidance. Volume II, Analyses and Force Tabulations, detailed the forces deemed necessary to carry out the strategy outlined in Volume I and in the Defense Policy and Planning Guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, Volume II assessed the adequacy of forces projected by the administration's Five-Year Defense Program and made possible a comparison between fiscally unconstrained JSOP forces and those listed in the Joint Force Memorandum which stayed within the administration's budget guidelines. Nearly always, settling upon the major force tabulations proved contentious and resulted in inter-Service splits. Volume I of the JSOP for FYs 1975-1982 had been circulated in May 1972; Volume II appeared late in December 1972. Volume III recommended levels for “Free World Forces.” But the effort expended in preparing JSOPs was not proportional to the influence they exercised. From the standpoint of OSD officials and the NSC staff, the JSOP’s crippling weakness was that it amounted to an unattainable wish list.
   b. A yearly Joint Force Memorandum (JFM) furnished judgments about the balance and mix attainable within a fiscal ceiling established by the Defense Secretary’s Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum (PPGM). Also, the JFM appraised the ability of these fiscally constrained forces to execute the strategy described in Volume I of the JSOP and in the Secretary's PPGM. The JFM covering FYs 1975-1982 reached the Secretary of Defense in May 1973. Military departments were supposed to use the JFM in developing their own Program Objective Memorandums.

3. For the long-range period, ten to twenty years hence, a Joint Long-Range Strategic Study (JLRSS) addressed the implications of worldwide economic, political, social, technological, and military trends. The JLRSS was intended to stimulate more sharply focused strategic studies and to be useful in developing military policies, plans, and programs having long-range implications. A JLRSS covering FYs 1985-1994 appeared in August 1974.

How did these documents fit into the planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS)? On 5 December 1972 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) issued
Leaders Change, Methods Continue

a tentative PPBS schedule. The planning phase, already near completion, consisted of submitting Volume I of JSOP 75-82 in May 1972, followed by the DPPG and Volume II of the JSOP in December. The programming phase called for issuing the PPGM on 15 February 1973, followed by the JFM for FYs 1975-1982 on 7 May and the Services’ Program Objective Memorandums for FY 1975-1979 on 14 May. On 6 July, the Secretary would begin circulating his Program Decision Memorandums, spend the balance of July considering JCS and Service reclamas, and then issue amended PDMs. For the budgeting phase, the Secretary would give the Services fairly detailed guidance on 10 August and begin distributing his Program/Budget Decisions (PBDs) on 22 October. Remaining differences would be resolved through the Secretary’s discussions with the JCS and Service Secretaries in December.37

Every PPBS cycle witnesses some snags, and the one for FYs 1975-1979 was no exception. The DPPG did not appear at its appointed time, 15 December 1972. Perhaps uncertainty over how long the Vietnam War would continue caused this delay—peace accords were not signed until 27 January 1973. When the PPGM finally circulated on 26 March 1973, one month behind schedule, the DPPG made its first appearance as part of that document. This, in turn, forced compressions and delays throughout the cycle. On 11 March 1973, the Secretary of Defense asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to suggest ways of improving the DPPG. Their reply, dated 1 June 1973, recommended emphasizing “broad national policy, objectives, and strategy guidance.” Then, unbound as yet by fiscal constraints, the Joint Chiefs could propose force levels that satisfied strategic demands. Past DPPGs, they claimed, had emphasized excessively specific force guidance, thereby preventing them from developing a full range of options. Yet the DPPG for FYs 1976-1980, published late in 1973, was in some ways even more specific than its predecessor. To guide the sizing of general purpose forces, Secretary Schlesinger delineated six “cases” and directed that the combined requirements for Case 1 (war with the Soviet Union, focused in Europe) and Case 4 (unilateral US action, unopposed by the Soviet Union or China) would determine the overall program.38

An effort to make the JFM more influential led only to an inter-Service deadlock. Late in 1973 Joint Staff officers in the Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5) recommended that the JFM be submitted four weeks after the Service POMs and that the JFM be compressed into a short paper appraising the Service POMs, proposing changes, and stating risks. Among Service staffs, these proposals found little favor. The Air Force suggested writing the JFM without regard to fiscal constraints. The Army did not think that the JFM should respond to service POMs. The Navy and Marine Corps argued that scheduling the JFM after the POMs would interpose the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a reviewing body between the Services and the Secretary of Defense, contrary to the 1958 Department of Defense Reorganization Act.39 These criticisms blocked any further progress.

Other reforms were considered but not adopted. In June 1974 Admiral Zumwalt suggested eliminating the JFM and expanding Volume II of the JSOP by identifying risks, prioritizing them, and specifying the additional forces and funds needed to reduce them. The Joint Chiefs of Staff referred this proposal to a Service-Joint Staff
study group. These officers voiced concern about the methods being used to develop force levels in Volume II of the JSOP. During the first half of 1975, J-5 reviewed the Joint Strategic Planning System but recommended only minor revisions to the JSOP. Volume II was restructured into an executive summary and three (rather than six) books: one on strategic forces; one on general purpose forces; and one on allied and friendly forces. At least, then, the JSOP's formidable length would be lessened. The Chief of Naval Operations, who was now Admiral Holloway, argued for eliminating the JFM, but without success.40

Meantime, in August 1974 the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation in OSD proposed advancing publication of the DPPG/PPGM package from late February 1975 up to mid-October 1974. The Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff objected, on grounds that circulating the PPGM before Volume II of the JSOP would scramble the cycle's planning and programming phases. Writing to Secretary Schlesinger on 24 September 1974, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended instead that the policy dialogue during the planning phase be improved and expanded, to be sure that it received equal emphasis with programming. Nonetheless, late in October 1974 the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued both the DPPG and the tentative PPGM.41

One noteworthy change did take place. The Joint Chiefs of Staff put an end to the JLRSS. Back in November 1972 they had decided to publish it every four years, rather than every two.42 This study, almost all Service and Joint Staff planners agreed, was not widely read. It was too long. Its judgments were too speculative, often seemed empirically indefensible, and tended to be little more than extensions of mid-range projects. In its place, a new Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA) would consolidate estimative intelligence, strategic forecasts, broad force structuring implications, and probable issues. Preparing a JLRSA was intended to stimulate more sharply focused strategic studies and provide a better framework for planning and programming.

The Defense Department had not reviewed the PPBS fully and carefully since 1967. In September 1975 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) created a PPBS Improvement Group drawn from OSD and the Joint Staff. This group began moving in a radical direction. Early in 1976 J-5 members of the group suggested eliminating Volume I of the JSOP and combining Volume II with the JFM. The Chief of Staff, Air Force, took alarm and urged that any changes be evolutionary, building upon past strengths and improvements. For example, the submission of Volume I might be advanced from May to January-February. Then the DPPG, expanded to include a threat assessment, could be drafted during March and April.

On 30 March 1976 Joint Staff officers briefed the Armed Forces Policy Council43 about a concept for combining Volume I of the JSOP with the DPPG into a single document. Soon afterward, General Brown emphasized to Secretary Rumsfeld the need for reviewing and improving PPBS procedures. The Secretary responded by authorizing yet another study.44 In mid-April 1976 OSD and Joint Staff conferees agreed that Volume I of JSOP 79-86 would appear on 1 May 1976, and that OSD would circulate a new single guidance document on 1 July 1976, replacing the DPPG and the PPGM. When a draft of
this new Defense Guidance (DG) appeared, it acknowledged that Volume I of the JSOP had a role as a vehicle for providing advice but not that its advice should be accepted as authoritative. Consequently, on 23 August 1976 the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld urging that the DG's strategy guidance be derived from the JSOP. Already, though, the Comptroller had circulated proposals to eliminate the JSOP, the JFM, and the DPPG. They would be replaced by (1) a comprehensive policy, strategy, and planning guidance paper from the Secretary and (2) a Joint Force Document from the Joint Chiefs. General Brown reacted sharply: “The JCS can't be relieved of their statutory responsibilities by the OSD Comptroller! We must do at least what was done in Volume I of past JSOPs.” On 20 September 1976 the Joint Chiefs of Staff pressed Secretary Rumsfeld to take steps that would protect their primary role. The first major milestone of the PPBS, they contended, should be submission of JCS advice about strategy. Also, they wanted more prominence given to their force recommendations and risk assessments. Secretary Rumsfeld agreed that, while the DG would provide “the authoritative basis for Defense planning, programming and budgeting,” it would not replace Volume I. He circulated the first DG, in its final form, on 9 November 1976.

The fiscal year changed during 1976. No longer would it run from 1 July until 30 June. Instead, after a “transition quarter” running from 1 July until 30 September 1976, Fiscal year 1977 would start on 1 October 1976 and end 30 September 1977. This change came about because Congress had proved chronically unable to pass appropriations bills by 30 June. Allowing three more months, it was hoped, would eliminate the problem.

In October 1976 Secretary Rumsfeld tasked still another ad hoc group, drawn from OSD and the Joint Staff, with recommending PPBS improvements. A month later, this group made two major proposals. First, shorten the planning phase by doing a zero-base planning review every four years and simply updating the analysis every year. Second, improve the narrowly focused military “feedback.” In the group’s judgment, JCS reports did not show how war plans executed national strategy, whether they achieved national objectives, and sometimes whether they were based on actual capabilities. For example, a program to improve the readiness of Army Reserves by affiliating them with active units had been in effect since 1973, yet the JSCP for FY 1976 showed no improvement whatever in Reserves’ deployment times.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 27 December 1976, advised Secretary Rumsfeld that they found little merit in the group’s suggestions. The proposal to conduct a planning review every four years assumed timely receipt of presidential and NSC guidance, but past experience gave no assurance that this would occur. Thus, in their judgment, an annual review remained essential. As for “feedback,” they believed that the JFM and Volume II of the JSOP did reveal the degree to which PPBS objectives had been achieved. But using operational plans to assess the adequacy of approved programs struck them as illogical, since those programs were tailored to available resources. Although the PPBS contained some shortcomings, these were correctable without any major departures. They did cite three deficiencies. First, unified and specified commanders needed more JCS guidance about how to deal with planning excur-
sions emanating from the DG. Second, issuing the DG in July would allow the Joint Chiefs of Staff added time to develop force recommendations and risk assessments. Third, there should be a JCS appraisal of whether fiscally constrained forces could accomplish the strategy outlined in the DG. At that point, the baton passed to the Carter administration.

Between 1968 and 1973, as withdrawals from Vietnam proceeded, the number of active duty personnel fell from 3.547 to 2.28 million. Accordingly, in August 1973 Admiral Zumwalt proposed that planning begin for a 25 percent reduction in the Joint Staff, Defense agencies under JCS cognizance, and the headquarters of unified and specified commands. But Admiral Moorer’s assistant, Vice Admiral Weinel, advised the Chairman that Admiral Zumwalt’s proposal related staff size to force levels. Unfortunately, wrote Admiral Weinel, “this is no longer a real consideration.” Staffs, he believed, had grown because of:

1. The insatiable demand for information, plans, studies, etc. by the high, higher, highest levels.
2. The communications explosion which makes the exchange of information unlimited in quantity and instantaneous in time.
3. The highest level deals in details—therefore all subordinate staffs must deal in details.
4. Everyone wants to make his own independent evaluation rather than take the advice of his subordinate experts.
5. Military organizations are, by nature, conservative and usually overmanned if possible.

Admiral Weinel calculated that, simply from the standpoint of efficiency and workloads, headquarters staffs could be cut by perhaps 40 percent. However, “the future holds little hope for lean, highly efficient staffs. . . . Predictably, we will go through an orgy of staff/headquarters reductions followed by a period of gradual increases until all staffs are larger than before the reductions took place.” Time would prove him right. Headquarters reductions in 1973 and again in 1976 compelled the Joint Chiefs of Staff to abolish two directorates of the Joint Staff—J-1 (Personnel) and J-6 (Communications-Electronics), spreading their functions among the remaining directorates, J-3 (Operations), J-4 (Logistics), and J-5 (Plans and Policy). Between 1979 and 1982, however, J-1 and J-6 were re-established. And two new directorates, J-7 (Operational Plans and Interoperability) and J-8 (Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment), were created in 1986.

The strength of an established bureaucracy lies in its ability to continue functioning despite turmoil at the top. That strength was demonstrated during 1973-1976. But did the status quo serve JCS interests well? The JSOP’s long-standing weakness and limitations as an instrument of influence remained unchanged. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought remedies, they proved unreceptive to nearly all the proposed reforms. The idea of a more fundamental reform of the JCS organization was beginning to gestate, but had yet to mature.
General George S. Brown, USAF, is sworn-in as the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Mr. Martin Hoffman, the DoD General Counsel on 1 July 1974. (USAF Photograph)
Rebuilding Conventional Capabilities

A Shift in Regional Priorities

For unexpected reasons, 1973 marked a watershed in planning for conventional operations. On 15 August 1973, when US aircraft flew their last missions over Cambodia, the American combat role in Southeast Asia finally ended. Only two months later, however, massive US arms deliveries to Israel during the latest Arab-Israeli war triggered an Arab oil embargo that starkly revealed how much the United States and its allies depended upon petroleum from the Persian Gulf area. Necessarily, strategic priorities underwent a major shift. How to ensure the availability of oil supplies became a critical requirement.

When President Nixon approved a “1½ war” strategy in October 1969, the Middle East did not rate any specific mention. Instead, attention still focused upon Europe and the Far East. Being able to wage 1½ wars meant having enough conventional strength to conduct either an initial defense of Western Europe, lasting about ninety days, or a sustained defense against major aggression in either Northeast or Southeast Asia. Additionally, US forces should be able to assist allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia and to carry out a minor contingency operation elsewhere.¹

Eroding public support for the Vietnam War sharply confined what future role US forces could play on the Asian mainland. On 26 March 1973, Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson issued a Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum covering Fiscal Years (FYs) 1975 to 1979. Security assistance, it stated, should be planned so that after FY 1974 the United States should supply only tactical air, naval, and materiel support to any Asian ally confronting non-Chinese aggression. “All concerned parties,”
the memorandum stressed, “must recognize that we are in earnest in assuming that our Asian allies will do more and sacrifice more in their own defense.”

On 13 August 1973 the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed strategic priorities with the new Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer argued for taking new concerns into account. Past presidential decisions, he argued, were not sacrosanct and should be revised where appropriate. As he had throughout his tenure, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., questioned whether programmed forces could carry out the 1½ war strategy. General Frederick C. Weyand, representing General Creighton W. Abrams, discussed political, psychological, and economic aspects of threats to US security and reminded conferees that competition for Middle East oil could turn a conflict in Europe into a global war. He added that Congress dictated a force structure and the military had to make strategy fit the force structure, not vice versa, as the military wished.

On 31 August 1973 the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) circulated a draft of Defense Policy and Planning Guidance (DPPG) for FYs 1976-1980. It recast 1½ wars into six “cases” that were designed to guide force planners. The combined requirements for Case 1 (war with the Soviet Union, focused in Europe) and Case 4 (unilateral US action, unopposed by the Soviet Union or China) would guide the sizing of general purpose forces. In a critique dated 13 September 1973, the Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated their belief that a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-Warsaw Pact war probably would become global in scope.

On 17 December 1973, after the Middle East war and imposition of the Arab oil embargo, Secretary Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed worldwide priorities. Admiral Moorer maintained that the 1½ war guidance was unrealistic because, around the globe, the Soviets could mount more threats than the United States could withstand. He wanted to improve flexibility by modifying force structures, deployment patterns, and acquisition procedures. Secretary Schlesinger replied that, since the world itself had become a single strategic theater, “we have to neglect a given area for a given period of time in a given crisis.”

In January 1974 Admiral Zumwalt began to suspect that OSD might recast the 1½ war strategy to make it conform to the DPPG criteria described above. Admiral Zumwalt asked his JCS colleagues to unite in rejecting any idea that diminishing forces still could carry out global commitments. In fact, Admiral Zumwalt warned, available forces might not be capable of accomplishing even a “one war” strategy. Subsequently, OSD officials assured Joint Staff officers that no revisions were planned.

On 6 February 1974 OSD circulated a Policy and Planning Guidance Memorandum (PPGM) for FYs 1976-1980 with cases identical to those in the previous DPPG. Nine days later the Joint Chiefs of Staff called the new DPPG an improvement over the old guidance but warned against the “high risk” created by an inability to meet the DPPG’s requirements. When this guidance was published on 25 February 1974, as part of the PPGM, it did not mention the Joint Chiefs’ concerns. Consequently, through a Joint Force Memorandum dated 21 May 1974, the Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated these warnings.
Rebuilding Conventional Capabilities

The DPPG for FYs 1977-1981, circulated late in September 1974, did make an effort to address JCS concerns. Its reworked Case 1 read as follows:

A worldwide non-nuclear war with the Soviet Union and its allies which has the following characteristics:
—Conventional conflict with the Warsaw Pact focused in Europe but with requirements elsewhere such as the Middle East, the Persian Gulf area, or the Far East.
—Important sea and air lines of communication throughout the world threatened to the extent of Soviet capabilities.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff compared the requirements of this DPPG (new Case 1 plus Case 4) with those of the 1½ war strategy. In some respects, they advised Secretary Schlesinger, this DPPG described the threat more realistically but it outlined a strategy that would be more ambitious, demanding, and costly than 1½ wars. In 1969, for example, studies had calculated that a sustained conventional defense of Western Europe would cost $10 billion per year more than an initial ninety-day defense. Additionally, as the Soviets became better able to project their power and grew more confident about their strategic nuclear strength, defending against their aggressive initiatives would become more expensive. They therefore recommended a basic review, similar to the one that had produced the 1½ war strategy in 1969. On the Joint Staff, the Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5) did launch such a review; its outcome is described below. Early in 1975 Secretary Schlesinger circulated a PPGM for FYs 1977-1981 that contained a revised scenario for sizing forces: worldwide conflict with the Soviet Union preceded by unilateral US military action in the Middle East (i.e., the same Case 1 but with a Case 4 attesting to the region's new prominence).

Was Western Europe, despite the latest PPGM, receiving too much attention? The Joint Strategic Objectives Plans (JSOPs) for FYs 1976-1983 and 1977-1984, written in 1973 and 1974 respectively, stated that “the Soviets may be willing to undertake somewhat greater risks of limited confrontation. . . , particularly in the Third World.” But in 1975, during the drafting of JSOP 78-85, major differences surfaced about whether planning should remain focused on Europe. Navy spokesmen maintained that, while the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had grown into a global power, the United States remained “mesmerized with NATO.” Marine Corps representatives held similar views. Army and Air Force officers rejected this criticism on grounds that Soviet ability to project forces over long distance still remained limited. They feared, too, that making statements such as the Navy and Marine Corps proposed would damage the JSOP’s credibility. Additionally, while Navy and Marine Corps representatives pressed for a high-level review of global strategy, their Army and Air Force counterparts doubted that the time was right for doing so. As so often was the case, competition for dollars underlay this dispute. Concentrating upon war in Europe would relegate the Navy and Marine Corps to supporting roles, weakening their claim upon resources.
Their dispute ended in a solution which is quoted below because it conveys the flavor and the limitation of inter-Service compromises. As approved in May 1975, Volume I of JSOP 78-85 stated that

The Soviets continue to develop their means to project conventional military power. Although their ability to employ General Purpose Forces at long range against significant opposition is currently limited, a continuation of this trend against a backdrop of strategic nuclear equivalence could be destabilizing . . . . Thus, while continuing to emphasize the defense against a Warsaw Pact attack in all areas of Europe, the United States must recognize the increasing possibility in the mid-range period of a confrontation between the United States and the USSR outside of Europe and the likelihood that such a confrontation could expand to a major war with global dimensions.

JSOP 78-85 characterized 1½ wars as “a relatively high risk, low cost strategy” that was acceptable in 1969 “while the United States retained a preponderance of military power.” But because the Soviet buildup had created a “current perception of overall military balance,” the administration should consider an overall strategy review.

During the latter part of 1975, J-5 officers started work on a wide-ranging study titled “Strategic Alternatives.” The Director, Joint Staff, noted that “the ultimate objective [of this exercise] is to pre-empt such an effort in the interagency arena.” In the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ISA), Assistant Secretary Robert F. Ellsworth reviewed and critiqued their successive drafts. By January 1976 the study had reached a stage where General George S. Brown wanted comments from the Service Chiefs. The study that he sent them outlined four “resource alternatives”:

Alternative A: Continue current policies, providing a 1½ war capability.
Alternative B: Significantly improve conventional capabilities, and set about reducing the vulnerabilities of the strategic nuclear force.
Alternative C: Over the next ten to fifteen years, restructure NATO to free US general purpose forces for use as a worldwide strategic reserve.
Alternative D: Recognize a possibility that the US defense effort might have to be significantly reduced.

The study then described two “military strategy options”:

Option 1: Continue the strategy of forward deployments. Simply continuing the status quo, however, would ignore the danger that Soviet nuclear and conventional capabilities were growing while those of the United States were not.
Option 2: De-emphasize forward deployments and eventually make Western Europe responsible for its own defense. According to J-5, the advantages of this approach would include more US conventional force flexibility and a less rigid coupling of US strategic forces, thereby lessening the chance of a major nuclear exchange.

The Service Chiefs’ comments on these alternatives and options, submitted during April and May 1976, ran the gamut from implicit approval to outright rejection.
Admiral James L. Holloway, observing that Alternative C/Option 2 (de-emphasize forward deployments and withdraw most conventional forces from Europe) would allow greater flexibility, thought the study merited further consideration. But General Louis H. Wilson voiced two reservations about C/2. First, definite progress toward European unity must precede any firm decisions about withdrawing US forces. Second, the impact of C/2 upon mobility and naval requirements needed closer attention. General Weyand considered current strategy sound but acknowledged that a review might be useful. Perhaps, he observed, nothing more than a shift in emphasis was needed. General David C. Jones, however, dismissed the study as simply a “polemic” for C/2. Since C/2 rested upon what struck him as several debatable assumptions, General Jones recommended that it be “fundamentally rewritten.”

For a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict alone, he advised, the Air Staff had identified thirty-six strategic alternatives.13

This study, in any event, failed to pre-empt an interagency exercise. Early in September 1976 President Ford ordered a thorough review of the US defense policy and military posture, covering alternatives for both strategic nuclear and general purpose forces. Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) James Wade headed an interagency panel, on which Vice Admiral P. J. Hannifin (Director, J-5) served as the JCS representative. By mid-November the panel had created a fairly well-polished product outlining the following alternatives for strategic nuclear forces:

\textbf{S-1}: A basic retaliatory capability, modernizing bombers and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) but not Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) forces, thereby cutting costs $2 billion per year below the existing program.

\textbf{S-2}: Continue essentially the current program.

\textbf{S-3}: Add an “offsetting” capability dealing with Soviet improvements, which would raise annual costs by $1 billion.

\textbf{S-4}: Create a capability “comparable” to that of the Soviet Union, assuring overall equality by developing a survivable M-X ICBM and a more accurate Trident II SLBM. Those steps would cost $5 billion annually.

\textbf{S-5}: Seek a strategic advantage, which meant emerging from a war in an advantageous position no matter how the conflict began. That would cost an extra $8 billion annually.

The group also delineated alternatives for general purpose forces:

\textbf{G-1}: Be able only to defend Western Europe for thirty days, achieving an annual saving of $6 billion.

\textbf{G-2}: Be able to defend Western Europe for ninety days and retain a limited capability for unilateral action elsewhere.

\textbf{G-3}: Spend an extra $2 billion annually to permit a ninety-day defense of Western Europe plus improved capabilities for acting elsewhere.

\textbf{G-4}: Achieve a high assurance of losing no territory during a war in Europe, while cutting back capabilities elsewhere. This would cost $1 billion less than the current program.

\textbf{G-5}: Spend an extra $2 billion annually to expand ground forces in Europe, allow more pre-positioning of equipment, and improve strategic mobility.
G-6: An additional $17 billion per year would permit a defense of Western Europe, either for 180 days or indefinitely, and fund initiatives to exploit worldwide Soviet vulnerabilities.

From all these possibilities, the group formulated six “national strategy alternatives”:

**Option A:** Combining S-4 with G-1 and costing $1 billion per year less than the current budget would de-emphasize conventional forces by assuming a short war in Europe but stress strategic deterrence, significantly improving the ability to destroy hardened silos by bringing an M-X ICBM into service by 1984 and moving faster to deploy Trident IIs.

**Option B:** Combining S-2 with G-4 and also costing $1 billion less would continue the current strategic posture but improve conventional capabilities in Europe.

**Option C:** Combining S-2 with G-2, which constituted the current program.

**Option D:** Combining S-4 with G-2, costing $6 billion extra per year, would improve strategic nuclear but not general purpose forces.

**Option E:** Combining S-3 with G-3, at an extra yearly cost of $3 billion, would moderately improve the strategic deterrent as well as increase conventional capabilities outside Europe.

**Option F:** Combining S-2 with G-5, at an added annual cost of $2 billion, would accept current strategic forces and worldwide postures as adequate yet place increased emphasis on strengthening US capabilities in Europe.14

On 15 December 1976 the National Security Council (NSC) debated all the strategies and options. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger believed that “the overwhelming strategic problem we will face over the next ten years is the Soviet capability for regional attack—in Europe and elsewhere.” Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld said that “we should go with strategy S-3 and some elements of S-4, strategy G-3 with elements of G-4 or G-5.” Essentially agreeing, General George S. Brown said that “the JCS . . . come out somewhere between three and five in each case.” Since the current programs amounted to S-2 and G-2, Secretary Rumsfeld and General Brown were calling for both conventional and strategic increases. Noting that Option E recommended a moderately increased emphasis on strategic forces, President Ford inquired, “Haven’t we done that?” General Brown responded, “Yes!” Vice President Nelson Rockefeller commented that all the Services were “way behind on training.” General Brown agreed that “[y]ou are going in the right direction, but the problem is a little overstated.” Then General Brown raised an issue that the alternatives and options had not addressed:

> We have talked about two things: our muscle and our will. But there is a third thing. That is our relationship with others. How can we talk about a contingency in the Middle East and have no base agreements in Turkey?15 This is true around the world.

Just before the meeting ended, Dr. Kissinger said that he wanted to conclude a strategic arms limitation agreement because the United States “could never have enough for an overwhelming capability in strategic forces. This is why we should
build up our conventional capability.” General Brown added: “This is why the JCS are 100 percent for SALT.” His statement was somewhat disingenuous because, at that point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were blocking the revision of a negotiating position for SALT.

On 20 January 1977, his last day in office, President Ford signed National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 348. The overriding aim of defense policy, it said, must be to maintain the following: a strategic balance guaranteeing that the United States would never be in an inferior position; an adequate US contribution to defense of the NATO area; and a global capability to meet challenges outside the NATO/Warsaw Pact area that threatened vital US interests. Chapter 3 describes the conclusions pertaining to strategic nuclear strength. As for conventional forces, NATO could keep pace with Soviet expansion and improvements through appropriate modernization and adjustments, without altering agreed strategy. United States and allied forces in Europe should be prepared to cope not only with an assault launched after a short warning time but also with attacks begun after long periods of preparation by larger and better prepared forces. To do so, pre-positioned stocks of equipment and supplies should be increased as the situation warranted. Also, US forces in Europe should become able to fight for ninety days and allies encouraged to do the same. Finally, Allied Command Europe should maintain a strong theater nuclear capability. Outside Europe, NSDM 348 foresaw “a considerable, and perhaps growing,” potential for crises. Therefore, strengthening worldwide capabilities had to be an objective. That meant focusing on requirements for a wide variety of conflicts, improving strategic mobility, and attaining the necessary base and access rights.

NSDM 348 was as much a political document as a strategy one, creating a template against which to measure what the Carter administration would do. Real changes had occurred earlier. East Asia had become much less of a factor in strategic planning, the Middle East a good deal more so. Yet, at the climax of the Arab-Israeli War, when a superpower confrontation seemed possible, Admiral Moorer believed that “the Middle East is the worst place in the world for the US to get engaged in a war with the Soviets.” Strategic mobility had improved by 1976 but, as General Brown warned the NSC, base availability remained a critical problem.

**Force Planning in 1973**

As 1973 opened, active general purpose forces included 13 Army and 3 Marine divisions, 22 Air Force tactical wings, and 15 carriers. According to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) for FY 1974, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had just approved, active units could conduct small scale, short duration contingency operations, maintain forward deployments, and provide limited assistance to allies as well as limited reinforcements to the unified commands. With an effort up to full mobilization, the armed forces could carry out one of the following tasks:
1. Conduct an initial defense of Western Europe while providing limited assistance to other allies.

2. Defend against Chinese aggression in one area of Asia while furnishing limited assistance to other allies and preserving a marginal capability to reinforce European Command.

3. Conduct a major contingency operation (e.g., seize Cuba), extend limited help to allies who were being attacked by non-Soviet, non-Chinese forces, and restore through mobilization a capability to carry out either (1) or (2) above.\textsuperscript{21}

Withdrawing from Vietnam ended much of the overstrain on conventional capabilities. The budget crunch of 1970-1971, which had sparked bitter inter-Service controversies, was a thing of the past. Volume II of JSOP 75-82, completed in December 1972, contained no splits between the Services about proper force levels. Admiral Moorer jokingly told the Director, Joint Staff, that he deserved a gold star for this achievement.\textsuperscript{22}

The administration’s Five Year Defense Program covering FYs 1975-1979 would hold active ground forces steady at 13 Army and three Marine divisions. More ambitiously, JSOP 75-82 recommended increasing Army divisions to 14 by mid-1975 and 18 by mid-1982. Adding one Marine and eight Army divisions from the Ready Reserve would raise the total force to 28 divisions in FY 1982. Naturally, the requirements for defending Western Europe dominated these calculations.

For tactical air power, which had not suffered any sizable reductions during the Vietnam drawdowns, the Five Year Program would continue 22 wings through FY 1978, then raise the number to 24. Again, JSOP 75-82 prescribed more ambitious objectives: 23 active wings in FY 1978, 24 in FY 1977, and 26 in FY 1978. The number of tactical aircraft would grow from 1,572 in FY 1975 to 1,908 in FY 1982. As with ground forces, JSOP calculations showed shortfalls in what would be required to meet worldwide emergencies.\textsuperscript{23}

Sizing naval forces presented perhaps the most difficult problem. Even as many surface combatants built during World War II reached the limits of their useful lives and had to be retired, Vietnam priorities cut into shipbuilding funds while the costs of new construction escalated sharply. The Five Year Defense Program would provide 13 multipurpose carriers, 78 attack submarines, and 176 surface combatants in FY 1975. The JSOP’s objectives ran a good deal higher:

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
 & 30 June 1975 & 30 June 1982 \\
\hline
Multipurpose Carriers & 15 & 18 \\
Attack Submarines & 87 & 112 \\
Surface Combatants & 187 & 309 \\
Amphibious Assault Ships & 67 & 102 \\
Division Lift & 1+ & 2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
The table below shows how, if Warsaw Pact aggression occurred in FY 1982, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to allocate JSOP and Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JSOP/FYDP</th>
<th>Atlantic</th>
<th>Mediterranean</th>
<th>Pacific</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multipurpose Carriers</td>
<td>8/4</td>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>4/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Submarines</td>
<td>45/39</td>
<td>17/12</td>
<td>4/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Combatants</td>
<td>189/138</td>
<td>76/54</td>
<td>109/86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the outset, according to JSOP 75-82, carrier groups in the Mediterranean probably would have to be repositioned to protect the Atlantic lifeline conveying reinforcements to Europe. Thus, unless anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations in the Atlantic achieved significant results rather quickly, Allied Command Europe’s northern and southern flanks would receive no reinforcements.24

On 26 March 1973 Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson circulated a PPGM for FYs 1975-1979 that specified the requirements for general purpose forces. First, defend NATO Europe for ninety days without a major loss of territory. Second, retain a reserve of not more than 2 divisions, 2 tactical air wings, and 2 carrier groups. If additional forces were needed to meet NATO and Asian requirements, these should be provided “to the extent that they can be accommodated within a balanced program.”25

In mid-May the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a Joint Force Memorandum (JFM) prescribing the best force mix attainable within the PPGM’s fiscal ceiling:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 1975</th>
<th>30 Jun 1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Divisions</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Division/Wing Teams</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Tactical Wings</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Tactical Aircraft</td>
<td>1,572</td>
<td>1,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multipurpose Carriers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Submarines</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Combatants</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Assault Ships</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division Lift</td>
<td>1+</td>
<td>1³/₃</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These forces, in their judgment, provided “less than a marginal capability” to execute approved strategy. In some areas, they believed, an extremely high degree of risk would be incurred. The assumption that NATO would begin mobilizing twenty-three days before a Warsaw Pact attack struck them as excessively optimistic. That assumption had guided planning since the mid-1960s, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff never had endorsed it. Even if it proved true, they contended, the Army could deploy to Europe only 16 of the 19 divisions they considered necessary by D+90 days. The Air Force could put 19 wings into Europe by M+30 days. Theoretically, the 31 wings which they calculated to be the total
requirement could be made available by assigning all 22 active and nine reserve wings. Practically, of course, that was impossible since nothing whatever would remain to meet other contingencies. The Navy could provide, by M+30, 10 carriers for Atlantic and Mediterranean operations, but doing so would leave none for rotation and replacement of combat losses. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff protested the “high-risk assumption” involved in setting NATO’s stockpile objective at only ninety days. They had been protesting the ninety-day objective ever since President Nixon established it, late in 1970.

Dr. James Schlesinger came to the secretaryship with ambitious goals. He made strengthening the conventional defenses of Western Europe his top priority. As the costs of complex weapon systems rose rapidly and seemingly inexorably, combining superior quality with sufficient quantity posed an ever more serious problem. Each Service was promoting programs that looked very promising but were proving quite expensive. The Air Force prized the F-15, its premier air superiority fighter nearly ready to enter service, and a breakthrough Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). The Navy was building Los Angeles-class attack submarines and, to modernize carrier air wings, F-14 fighters armed with long-range Phoenix missiles. The Army was pressing ahead with its “Big Five”: the M-1 tank; the M-2 mechanized infantry combat vehicle; the Blackhawk utility helicopter; the Apache attack helicopter; and the SAM-D air defense system that evolved into the Patriot. Nothing but the best, in Secretary Schlesinger’s view, was a dangerously unrealistic ambition, well beyond what was realistically affordable. Consequently, he pressed the Services to fill their inventories with “high/low” mixes. Dr. Schlesinger insisted that the Air Force continue developing a light-weight fighter. Acquiring only F-15s, he warned the Chief of Staff, would preclude equipping the programmed 22 wings, let alone reach the Air Force’s objective of 26. Still, General Brown preferred only F-15s. As for the Navy, nuclear-powered carriers and submarines were devouring a good portion of its shipbuilding budget. Dr. Schlesinger found a low-end ally in Admiral Zumwalt, who advocated building 17,000-ton Sea Control Ships and designing midi- or even mini-carriers instead of starting more 90,000-tonners. For the Army, Secretary Schlesinger aimed to create more fighting power through tail-to-tooth, or support-to-combat, conversions. General Abrams agreed whole-heartedly with that goal.

In mid-August Dr. Schlesinger distributed Program Decision Memorandums that set priorities among general purpose forces. For the Army, he reduced the drill strength of Reserve units and applied the savings toward improving the readiness of those Reserve battalions that would flesh out regular divisions in the event of mobilization. He also proposed buying F-5E fighters, which were comparatively cheap and normally sold to foreign governments, for the Air Force Reserves. The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed doing so, arguing that F-5Es possessed only “marginal” capability against MiG-21s and could not contend with later Soviet fighters. Instead, the Reserves should be stocked with supersonic F-4s fighter-bombers and subsonic A-7 attack aircraft as soon as F-15s and A-10 tank killers replaced them in the active wings. Secretary Schlesinger discarded his F-5E proposal and, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished, dropped his plan to reduce active wings from 22 to 20 during FYs 1977 to 1979. For
the Navy, he responded to JCS recommendations by raising the procurement of Sea Control Ships to 1 in FY 1975, 3 in FY 1976, and 2 each in FYs 1977 and 1978. Additionally, he advanced the funding of a large multipurpose carrier ("CVX") from FY 1980 to FY 1979 and increased the construction of attack submarines to 3 in FY 1975, 2 in FY 1976, 3 in FY 1977, 2 in FY 1978 and 3 in FY 1979. In October the Arab-Israeli War quieted many congressional critics of defense spending, but the spike in oil prices triggered bouts of inflation that would badly disrupt budget calculations. On 18 December 1973, as program requests for FY 1975 were being finalized, Admiral Moorer urged Secretary Schlesinger to postpone plans for retiring two carriers. He recalled that five times during the past three years extra carriers had been sent to augment the ones operating in crisis areas. Moreover, restrictions imposed by the War Powers Act highlighted carriers' flexibility, since the President need not report when he sent them to areas where hostilities seemed imminent. Accordingly, Admiral Moorer recommended retaining fifteen carriers “at least until we have an opportunity to see how the present unsettled condition shakes out.” Secretary Schlesinger agreed to keep fifteen carriers operating through FY 1975. Thus, in its final form, the proposed Five Year Program read as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 June 1975</th>
<th>30 June 1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Divisions</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Submarines</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Combatants</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division Lift</td>
<td>1+</td>
<td>1(1/3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The appearance of stability or modest growth in numbers was deceptive, because a number of the programs under development—M-1, F-15, and particularly AWACS—promised quantum jumps in capability.

**Force Planning in 1974**

The Arab-Israeli War raised major questions about base availability, an indispensable element in non-NATO operations. Most European allies distanced themselves from the US airlift to Israel. Late in November 1973 Admiral Moorer recommended a review of base availability, political alignments, and force deployments worldwide. On 22 December 1973, during a wrap-up meeting with the President about the FY 1975 budget, Admiral Moorer again stressed the “tremendous deficiency” in bases. Two months later President Nixon did commission a study of base requirements during the next ten years and how political restrictions might affect US ability to use facilities.
In May 1974 an NSC ad hoc group concluded that a forward basing structure of substantial proportions remained “vital” and that the general pattern of requirements was not likely to undergo any marked change. The group outlined three options:

**Option 1:** Continue current planning, which presupposed that problems were not severe enough to warrant any special steps to improve the base posture.

**Option 2:** Enhance warning and planning activities. This would mean alerting the administration to basing problems in a more systematic manner and beginning coordinated planning aimed at the early identification of possible solutions. While this course would be relatively inexpensive, it might prove “a half-speed solution to a possibly full-speed problem.”

**Option 3:** Take urgent but costly steps to develop plans for alternative sites, accelerate the development of large tanker aircraft as well as in-flight refueling and fuselage “stretch” programs for C-141s, step up research and development efforts to find alternatives for the existing communications and intelligence facilities, review artificial airfield and island technology, and look for real estate in critical areas.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended, and on 30 July 1974 Deputy Secretary William P. Clements, Jr., approved, initiating the measures outlined in Option 2. Mr. Clements also authorized some steps from Option 3:

- Accelerate the development of wide-body tankers.
- Give C-141s aerial refueling capability as soon as possible and increase their load capacity.
- Press before Congress the case for multipurpose logistic ships.
- Conduct a cost/benefit analysis of whether additional investments in carrier, amphibious, and other naval forces could provide a cushion against the denial of base rights.
- Examine opportunities to support smaller contingency operations by using forces from CONUS and units afloat.

Meanwhile, in December 1973, through JSOP 76-83, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended major force levels to be attained in FY 1983: for the Army, 16 active and 8 Reserve divisions; for the Marine Corps, 1 Reserve and 3 active division/wing teams; for the Air Force, 28 active wings with 2,052 aircraft plus 10 Reserve wings with 720 aircraft; for the Navy, 18 carriers, 108 attack submarines, 309 surface combatants, 100 amphibious assault ships, and a two-division lift capability. Compared to JSOP 75-82, the requirements for defending Western Europe had increased to 20 Army divisions by D+90, 2 Marine division/wing teams, 13 carriers, and 37 Air Force tactical wings. These increases responded to qualitative and quantitative improvements by the Warsaw Pact.

Overall, the JSOP’s “prudent risk force” would cost 19.5 percent more than the administration’s Five Year Defense Program. According to Admiral Moorer, including everything the Services wanted would have raised the JSOP’s cost to 33 percent above the Five Year Program. The Chairman considered that “much more than is needed for a prudent risk.”

Sharp inter-Service divisions appeared in JSOP 76-83. Admiral Zumwalt and General Robert Cushman justified twenty-five carriers on grounds that, unlike air bases on land, ships were moveable and politically invulnerable. But General Abrams implied
that even eighteen carriers might be excessive, in light of planned allied improvements and NATO’s program to build shelters for reinforcing as well as in-place aircraft. General Brown contended that a large carrier force failed the test of cost-effectiveness. Furthermore, Generals Abrams and Brown saw no justification for a major increase in funds to build attack submarines. If more were needed, the allies ought to supply them.

Admiral Moorer had no doubt about what had sparked this round of inter-Service squabbling. Early in March 1974 he warned Admiral Holloway, who had been nominated to succeed Admiral Zumwalt as Chief of Naval Operations, that “[w]hen you come in you are going to inherit kind of a . . . confrontation with the Army and Air Force which has been built up since Christmas because Bud [Zumwalt] has taken some pretty hard positions with them . . . . I wouldn’t prolong this built-in confrontation because it is not good.”

Did the Navy’s condition justify a bruising fight for more funds and ships? During 1971 and 1972, Admiral Zumwalt had calculated the odds on retaining sea control against a Soviet challenge to be “less than 1 in 5.” During 1973 the Navy staff prepared an elaborate net assessment of US and Soviet naval strengths. Admiral Zumwalt then advised Secretary Schlesinger that, if Congress funded all his requests, 1973 would be “the last year when our chances of winning would be as low as 30 percent.” By the early 1980s, he predicted, the likelihood of victory would rise above 50 percent. The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, chaired by a former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral George W. Anderson, USN, came to somber conclusions about the maritime balance. But Admiral Holloway did not share that view. When Secretary Schlesinger asked for his assessment, in January 1974, Admiral Holloway replied as follows:

Mr. Secretary, the greatest mistake that I feel everybody makes when they are talking about the Sixth [Fleet] versus the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron or the US [Navy] versus the Soviet Navy, is that it is simply the wrong context and that it should be a war between the US and Soviet Russia and could the US [Navy] carry out its commitments? In some areas I think yes, we could be quite successful but, in others, it would be more difficult.

Secretary Schlesinger largely agreed with Admiral Holloway. However, the Zumwalt-to-Holloway transition cost the Secretary of Defense a key ally in his push for low-end warships. Secretary Schlesinger asked Admiral Holloway whether he preferred more but cheaper ships or fewer expensive ships. Admiral Holloway opted for the latter, particularly favoring large nuclear-powered carriers.

In OSD, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation closely reviewed JSOP 76-83 and made three major criticisms. First, it contained no “significant analytical base” through which its force proposals could be examined. Not so, the Director, Joint Staff, rebutted; JSOP 76-83 used and examined the latest analytical studies. In considering Case 1, for example, the JSOP cited estimates of D+90 requirements for Western Europe ranging from seventeen to twenty-five divisions. Second, force-level development had been presented simply as a statement of assumptions, collective judgments concerning those assumptions, and a tabulation of the aggregate results. Third, JSOP
76-83 did not allocate any forces to Case 4, even though the DPPG stated that requirements for Cases 1 and 4 would determine the overall program. Actually, the Director countered, JSOP 76-83 stated that fiscal constraints allowed only enough forces to cope with Case 1. Consequently, adding Case 4 would simply create a higher level of risk.39

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their JFM late in May 1974, they warned of an increasing divergence between approved strategy and the strength available to support it. The table below displays their view of the best affordable force structure:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 June 1976</th>
<th>30 June 1983</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Divisions</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Tactical Wings</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Tactical Aircraft</td>
<td>1,584</td>
<td>1,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Submarines</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Combatants</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Assault Ships</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division Lift</td>
<td>1+</td>
<td>1 1/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The increase in Army divisions requires explanation. Secretary Schlesinger and General Abrams reached an agreement that the Secretary would protect an active-duty level of 785,000 and the Chief of Staff would press ahead with support-to-combat manpower conversions. General Abrams set a goal of fielding fourteen divisions in FY 1976 and sixteen by FY 1978. Thirteen of those divisions would manned at full strength, the remaining three at two-thirds strength, each to be “rounded out” by a Reserve brigade upon mobilization. Army leaders wanted to avoid a repetition of what happened early in the Vietnam War, when the administration refused to mobilize Reserves. Such a mobilization, they believed, would have triggered a political debate and either halted US intervention or unified the country in striving for victory.40

Yet the JFM observed that, even with this unprecedented reliance on Reserves, the Army’s twenty-four active and Reserve divisions still could not respond to Case 1 (conflict in Europe and possibly worldwide) and simultaneously fulfill Case 4 (unilateral action, probably in the Middle East). That was so because carrying out Case 4 would mean sending three divisions to the Middle East, maintaining one division in Korea, and keeping one division as a CONUS reserve.

Under JFM constraints, also, the Air Force could not assemble in Western Europe the thirty-seven wings required for Case 1, even by committing all its resources to Europe. During FYs 1976 through 1978, moreover, the turmoil caused by major modernization programs—particularly the introduction of F-15s—actually would lower the Air Force’s ability to carry out Case 1. Admiral Zumwalt questioned whether the necessary base and overflight rights would become available. Even if they did, he doubted whether allied air bases could accommodate the flow of reinforcements. Finally, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff characterized JFM naval forces as only “marginally adequate” to control the North Atlantic sea lanes, even if the Pacific Fleet was stripped and operations in the Middle East were conducted without loss.

Taking all these things together, the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw “significant risks” in assuming that JFM forces could act unilaterally in either Asia or the Middle East and still remain able to fight in Europe. In the past, they said, US technological superiority had partially offset the Soviet Union’s greater numbers. Now, however, the Soviets were bringing to bear quality as well as quantity, raising serious doubts about whether US conventional forces could counter major aggression successfully. The possibility of simultaneous Sino-Soviet attacks in Europe and Asia, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not willing to discount entirely, made this risk “especially pronounced.”

Secretary Schlesinger circulated tentative Program Decision Memorandums (PDMs) late in July. The Army would augment European Command’s combat capabilities by converting 20,000 spaces from support to combat and moving two-thirds of a division from CONUS to Germany, reversing the withdrawal made in 1968. Several years, Secretary Schlesinger believed, would be required to restore “the necessary esprit and cohesion” which the Army had lost during the Vietnam War. For the Air Force, he and General Jones reached an agreement to procure low-end F-16s and apply the savings to funding twenty-six wings, with F-15 output continuing. The Navy PDM cut the carrier force from thirteen to twelve, just as the JFM had projected. To make more carriers available during crises, routine forward deployments would be held to two in the Mediterranean area—perhaps to one later—and two in the western Pacific. Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) ships, carrying troops as well as vertical/short take-off and landing aircraft, soon would join the fleet. Secretary Schlesinger hoped to use LHAs interchangeably with carriers, starting in the Mediterranean. He also proposed to operate 158 fully manned surface escorts, plus a smaller number—10 in FY 1976, 27 by FY 1980—manned at only 80 percent.

The JCS critique, forwarded on 9 August, recommended allowing the Army to rely more on support-to-combat conversions and less upon transfers from CONUS. The Secretary agreed; the Army settled on a combination of converting 12,000 spaces in Europe and sending over two mechanized brigades from CONUS. As for carriers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that thirteen stay in service through FY 1976. In their judgment, LHAs were not adequate substitutes. Besides, twelve carriers could fulfill the requirements of the PPGM’s Case 6, protection of maritime interests, but not of the crucial Cases 1 and 4. Secretary Schlesinger agreed to operate thirteen carriers through FY 1976 by keeping the aging Franklin D. Roosevelt in service. After that, however, he intended to use LHAs interchangeably in forward deployments, beginning with the Mediterranean. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also wanted to maintain 168 fully manned escorts in FY 1976 and 185 in FY 1980. In order to make partly manned ships fully combat worthy, they argued, twenty-three days of warning time would be needed to mobilize and train reservists. They worried that warning time might be limited to one week or less and that reservists’ capabilities remained unproven. Secretary Schlesinger met their objections in part by
agreeing to operate 163 fully manned escorts and 172 by FY 1978. During FYs 1976-1978, as an experiment, five escorts would sail with 80 percent manning. If they proved successful, 80 percent manning would be extended to twenty-seven ships by FY 1980. So the administration’s Five Year Defense Program took this form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Planning in 1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JCSOP 77-84 recommended attaining the following force levels by mid-1984: 16 Army and 3 Marine divisions; 29 Air Force tactical wings with 2,088 aircraft; 18 carriers, 109 attack submarines, 309 surface combatants, 97 amphibious assault ships, and a two-division lift. Service splits recurred. General Jones argued that only 15 carriers were needed to control the sea lanes. He and General Weyand wanted the Navy to place much more emphasis on protecting the Atlantic lifeline. The most effective means of doing so, they claimed, lay in putting substantially more ASW and proportionately fewer attack aircraft aboard carriers. Admiral Holloway, for his part, would not support more than 26 Air Force wings. As he saw matters, the enemy air threat had not significantly increased, planning guidance assumed that lines of communication to allies would remain open until hostilities began, and the expansion of Allied Command Europe’s shelter program would improve aircraft survivability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The JFM, which appeared early in May 1975, recommended the best mix attainable within fiscal ceilings set by OSD:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For FY 1977 the JSOP’s proposals differed from the JFM only in recommending 15 carriers and 82 submarines. More significantly, the JSOP proposed reaching 26 wings in FY 1982, while the JFM recommended acceleration to FY 1981. Soon afterward, the administration did adopt this JFM goal. Nonetheless, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff enumerated all the risks incurred by adhering to fiscally constrained levels, their assessment was just as gloomy as the previous year’s JFM.47

Through his tentative PDMs, issued late in July, Secretary Schlesinger proposed transferring to conventional programs $5 billion that had been allocated for strategic forces during FYs 1977 to 1981. With its share, the Army was to create six maneuver battalions, convert two CONUS-based infantry divisions into either armored or mechanized divisions, and considerably increase its procurement of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery. This was a lesson drawn from the Middle East war, where Israelis as well as Arabs had suffered unexpectedly heavy armored losses in intense combat.

Secretary Schlesinger applied savings from delays in the Trident missile submarine program to pay for surface ships, increasing the procurement of small and medium tonnage combatants and of support ships. He intended to fund low-end guided missile frigates as well as a nuclear-powered strike cruiser that would carry the Aegis air defense system. Since Congress had refused to fund the Sea Control Ship, the Navy suggested seeking money for a ship to carry very short takeoff and landing aircraft, but the Secretary preferred further study. For naval aviation, Dr. Schlesinger firmed up a low-end legacy. Admiral Holloway wanted to procure more of the expensive F-14s. Instead, Secretary Schlesinger capped F-14 output and proceeded with developing the F-18, estimated to be more than one-third cheaper, which would become a mainstay of carrier aviation. Finally, for the Air Force he set a goal of 26 fully equipped wings with 1,872 aircraft by FY 1981.

As for aircraft carriers, the nuclear-powered USS *Nimitz*, displacing about 90,000 tons, joined the fleet during 1975; the similar USS *Eisenhower* would follow in 1977; and USS *Vinson* in 1981. Yet these additions simply offset the retirements of World War II-vintage carriers. The oldest of six 60,000-ton USS *Forrestal*-class carriers dated from 1955; the first replacement would be needed in 1985, followed by more at two-year intervals. Dr. Schlesinger directed the Navy to start designing a new class of 50,000-ton medium carriers, funding the lead ship in FY 1979. They would complement the four nuclear-powered carriers and preserve a thirteen-carrier force without requiring “imprudent extensions” in the lives of *Forrestal*-class ships.48 Many officers disliked the idea of a medium-size carrier, and Dr. Schlesinger’s removal took away its most important advocate.
All in all, the proposed Five Year Program incorporated expansions of the Army and Air Force along with retirements of Navy surface combatants:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 June 1977</th>
<th>30 June 1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Divisions</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Submarines</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division Lift</td>
<td>1+</td>
<td>1 1/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Force Planning in 1976**

JSOP 78-85, completed on 30 December 1975, recommended force levels quite similar to those in JSOP 77-84. In it, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made major changes to Case 1 requirements for Western Europe. First, they recommended raising the Army’s contribution from 13 to 17 divisions by D+30 and from 20 to 24 by D+90. They now characterized as “essential” the arrival in Europe, by D+30, of 4 divisions that would form a regional reserve in Central Europe. This four-division corps would probably reinforce the comparatively weak Northern Army Group in defending the North German plain.50 Second, they raised the Air Force’s requirement from 37 to 39 wings because more US divisions would need more air support and a new intelligence forecast gave the Warsaw Pact 165 more aircraft than the projection used to size JSOP 77-84 forces. Once again, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assailed OSD’s assumption that NATO could count on twenty-three days of mobilization before an attack began.51

Back in December 1973, immediately after the large US airlift to Israel, Generals Abrams and Brown had proposed that the Joint Staff evaluate all aspects of strategic mobility and identify the most pressing problems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that this be done. Early in 1976 the Joint Staff completed an analysis of FY 1980 requirements for a war in Europe, preceded by unilateral action in the Middle East (i.e., Cases 1 and 4). Assets in FY 1980 would total: for airlift, 70 supercargo C-5As, 234 “stretched” C-141s, 84 Boeing 747-equivalents, and 199 planes from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet; for sealift, 305 ships from the Military Sealift Command, the US flag inventory, and the National Defense Reserve Fleet, plus 198 more from NATO allies. In the Middle East, by M+30, aircraft and transports could deliver only 2 of the 3 1/3 Army divisions required and 5/6 rather than 1 full Marine division. For Europe, the D+30 figure of 1 Marine and 13 Army divisions could be met or exceeded—provided NATO began mobilizing twenty-three days before hostilities began. If mobilization time was limited to seven days, there would be a three-division shortfall by D+30.52
The Joint Force Memorandum, dated 5 May 1976, outlined the force levels shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Component</th>
<th>30 Sep 1978</th>
<th>30 Sep 1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Divisions</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Submarines</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Combatants</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Assault Ships</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division Lift</td>
<td>1+</td>
<td>1 1/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For FY 1978 the JSOP differed only in recommending 15 carriers, 83 submarines, and 186 surface combatants. The Air Force would fall short, by 264 planes, of the 1,872 aircraft needed to equip 26 wings. By mobilizing Reserves, the Army could deploy 20 divisions in Europe by D+90. Such a force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed, provided a reasonable assurance that Allied Command Europe could defend against 86 Warsaw Pact divisions, the number specified by the PPGM. Still, they saw a serious risk if attackers numbered significantly more than 86 divisions. As before, they rated JFM naval forces as “marginally adequate” for Case 1, provided no significant losses occurred while accomplishing Case 4. And again, they described Air Force strength as too small to meet “the total Case 1 requirement.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff used the JFM to restate their worry about over-reliance on Reserves and their belief that NATO might have only seven rather than twenty-three days for mobilization. They also mentioned several new concerns, such as the Soviets’ impressive capability for chemical warfare and a rapid decline among the US Army’s Individual Ready Reserves. Mainly, though, they argued that the 90- and 180-day logistical planning factors for Case 1 were unrealistic. Conventional combat in Europe might be protracted, “cyclically intense and reduced in nature”; fighting outside Europe could continue indefinitely. Currently, though, the US training and industrial base could not support a lengthy conflict. Also, since the wartime interdiction of sea lanes would restrict imports of critical materials, they urged that stockpile requirements be whatever was thought necessary for the first three years of a prolonged war.53

In his tentative PDMS, Secretary Rumsfeld proposed increasing FY 1978-1982 funds about 5 percent above JFM levels. For the Army, he allocated extra funds to accelerate the conversion of two infantry divisions into mechanized divisions, to outfit all active and Reserve units with critical initial equipment, to build toward ninety days of war reserve stocks, and to store in Europe, by the end of FY 1982, the equipment for another heavy division. For the Navy, he substantially increased shipbuilding funds but cautioned that specific decisions would emerge from the NSC study of alternatives described below.
For the Air Force, he approved Service initiatives aimed at fully equipping 26 wings in FY 1982, when there would be 729 expensive F-15 air superiority fighters, 695 cheaper multipurpose F-16s, and 733 A-10 ground attack aircraft intended primarily to be tank killers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff made no significant criticisms, and the final PBMs showed no changes.\textsuperscript{54}

The administration spent much of 1976 reassessing its shipbuilding program. Since 1968 the fleet’s size had fallen from 976 to 480 ships. Several hundred destroyers, submarines, and amphibious ships built during World War II had to be decommissioned during Admiral Zumwalt’s tenure. Rising construction costs, combined with fiscal pressures during the Vietnam War, prevented anything like one-for-one replacement. The Navy accepted substantial reductions during the 1970s, judging that the risks would be less than during the early 1980s. Admiral Holloway believed that in 1976 the Navy still held a slim margin of superiority in vital areas. Nevertheless, Navy leaders thought the time had come to set more ambitious goals for the next decade.

Congress required the administration to prepare a five-year program for shipbuilding. When 1976 opened, the administration presented a plan to build 111 ships over five years, so that the fleet would not fall below its current size. Secretary Rumsfeld further directed the Navy to “prepare your most reasoned arguments for national acceptance of a prudent risk shipbuilding program.” After a review in DoD, the National Security Council and the President would assess its proposals.\textsuperscript{55}

In February the Navy gave Secretary Rumsfeld its “prudent risk” plan to build 166 ships over the next five years, creating a fleet of 570 ships in 1985 and 628 by 1990. Secretary Rumsfeld then directed a working group, subordinate to the Defense Review Panel, to appraise the Navy’s needs. Headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) James Wade, the group would look ahead as far as 1999 but focus on the next five years. As a first step, Wade asked the Joint Staff to outline alternatives. Its answer, submitted on 12 March 1976, listed four:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Construction</th>
<th>Total Fleet in 1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JSOP</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration Proposal</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For FY 1977 Secretary Rumsfeld asked Congress for $6.29 billion to build 16 ships: 1 Trident missile submarine, 3 attack submarines, 1 cruiser carrying the Aegis air defense system, 8 frigates, 3 support ships, and long lead-time funds for a nuclear-powered strike cruiser. Instead, the House Armed Services Committee voted $7.378 billion for 21 ships. This was not the windfall it might appear because the committee disrupted the administration’s balanced high/low approach by emphasizing high, expensive nuclear-powered ships. Dr. Wade’s working group suggested several ways of allocating these additional funds among carrier, cruiser, and destroyer construction.\textsuperscript{56}
At this point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff entered the exercise. On 30 March 1976 they advised Mr. Rumsfeld that shipbuilding increases should not be funded at the expense of other programs. Instead, the overall budget ought to be raised. Writing to Secretary Rumsfeld two days later, they criticized the working group for diverting money from other programs to finance a naval buildup, giving too much emphasis to carriers and the air threat, slighting the submarine danger and the role of amphibious forces, and claiming that even with only ten carriers the Navy could perform all basic sea control functions in a NATO war.57

On 21 April 1976 Dr. Wade’s working group circulated a revised paper with the options shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1A</th>
<th>1B</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Carriers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Carriers</td>
<td>12-14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12-13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Shipbuilding, FYs 1977-1981</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ships, FY 1985</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ships, FY 1990</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The group concluded that, in a NATO war, Option 1 would provide sea control in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean, and at an austere level in the Pacific as well. Option 1A de-emphasized large carriers and put more money into anti-air systems aboard destroyers and frigates. Option 1B envisaged a less drastic shift away from carriers toward anti-air escorts. Option 2 would add more capability for projecting sea power, provide greater flexibility, and reduce the degree of risk. Option 3, the Navy’s preference, would increase these margins of safety.58

After assessing these options, General Jones readily acknowledged the danger posed by Soviet naval expansion. Yet, he said, the US fleet still greatly surpassed its adversary in tonnage, air power, anti-submarine warfare capability, resupply at sea, and “overall technical sophistication.” Moreover, he reasoned, “the US Navy is part of a combined arms package whose aggregate range, striking power, and technological base far surpass those of any other nation.” Reliable allies and far-flung bases widened the American advantage. General Jones looked upon the maritime balance as “a national, not strictly a naval issue.” For example, the “explosion” in electronic technology had created a new generation of surveillance and intelligence-gathering instruments. Cruise missiles, capitalizing upon advances in miniaturized guidance and propulsion systems, could vastly increase the effectiveness of low-cost warships. Therefore, “The broader question should not be whether new ships are needed . . . but rather what combination of naval capabilities, combined with what collective national capability . . . will best serve
the long-term national interest for maintaining maritime superiority through the end of the century.” Accordingly, General Jones advocated building “a larger number of smaller, capable, more maneuverable combatants rather than relatively few large platforms of high complexity and cost.” Then the fleet’s flexibility would rise, while its vulnerability would decline. Hence, he favored Option 1A (12 carriers, 560 ships by FY 1990). Citing the same reasons, so did General Weyand. The Joint Chiefs of Staff as a whole rated the working group’s draft a generally acceptable portrayal of issues and alternatives, suitable for interagency consideration. Generals Jones and Weyand asked that it be amended to portray potential contributions by the other Services, based on their arguments above.59

Before the working group’s paper circulated outside the Pentagon, the Navy added Option 4, substituting Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (V/STOL) ships and aircraft in place of another large carrier. On 1 May 1976 the NSC reviewed the shipbuilding program for FY 1977. Admiral Holloway and General Brown favored either Option 3 (16 carriers, 630 ships by FY 1990) or Option 4, each of which would require supplemental funding of $1.3 to $1.4 billion in FY 1977. President Ford decided to seek such a supplemental. Three days later, Secretary Rumsfeld asked Congress for $1.174 billion to build 4 frigates and another support ship and to begin another Nimitz-class carrier, raising FY 1977 construction to 21 ships.60 Apparently, the administration was offering Congress a compromise, including a high-end nuclear-powered carrier to protect low-end oil-fired destroyers and cruisers.

Meanwhile, in response to a request from Senator Patrick Leahy (D, Vermont), General Brown supplied information indicating that between 1960 and 1975 the United States had built 122 major surface combatants displacing 3,000 tons or more, while the USSR had produced only 57. True, the Soviets had built many 1,200-ton escorts, but they were of a size which the US Navy considered unsuitable for open-ocean duty. This tabulation undercut Secretary Rumsfeld’s testimony that during the past decade the Soviet Union had outbuilt the United States in major surface combatants by 206 to 165. Partly in consequence, Congress rejected a supplemental and appropriated $6.2 billion to build 15 ships (1 Trident, 3 attack submarines, 8 frigates, and 3 auxiliaries), begin a Nimitz-class carrier, and add an Aegis capability to the nuclear-powered cruiser Long Beach, commissioned in 1961.61

At last, in mid-November, Dr. Wade’s working group completed its study, “US Strategy and Naval Force Requirements.” The group presented three options that by 1990 would create fleets of the following sizes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Option 1</th>
<th>Option 2</th>
<th>Option 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large Deck Carriers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/STOL Carriers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/STOL Support Ships</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike Cruisers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Surface Combatants</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Submarines</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Rebuilding Conventional Capabilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Option 1</th>
<th>Option 2</th>
<th>Option 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Ships</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ships</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipbuilding Costs (billions)</td>
<td>$34.6</td>
<td>$40.0</td>
<td>$42.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Option 1*, the low-end alternative, would forego further *Nimitz*-class construction and apply the savings to guided missile destroyers and frigates.

*Option 2*, the intermediate choice, would include one *Nimitz*-class carrier as a hedge against delays in V/STOL technology and to ensure that twelve carriers would always be available.

*Option 3*, the high-end alternative, would build four *Nimitz*-class carriers plus four V/STOL support ships.

General Brown advised Secretary Rumsfeld that he supported Option 2.\(^62\)

On 18 January 1977 President Ford approved a shipbuilding program that ran close to Option 1 except for omitting a *Nimitz*-class carrier:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 78</th>
<th>FY 79</th>
<th>FY 80</th>
<th>FY 81</th>
<th>FY 82</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V/STOL Carriers</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Submarines</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike Cruisers</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegis Destroyers (DDG-47)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates (FFG-7)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Warfare Ships</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Ships</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Ships</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>147(^63)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yet, with Ford about to leave office, this decision did not settle matters. Already, the Carter team was working out its own solution.

**Conclusion**

To summarize, US conventional capability increased during these four years, and programs were under way to expand it even further. The Joint Chiefs of Staff took little satisfaction because they believed that threats were growing at an even faster pace. Consequently, the JFM’s risk assessment remained just about as pessimistic in 1976 as in 1973. However, the appraisal presented by General Jones during the 1976 study of shipbuilding is worth highlighting. Like Admiral Zumwalt, General Jones promoted low-end weapon systems. Unlike Admiral Zumwalt, though, General Jones was
upbeat about which side could control the sea lanes. Admiral Zumwalt worried a good deal about the Soviet anti-ship Styx missile, knowing that a comparable US Harpoon would not enter the inventory for several years. But General Jones viewed the maritime balance as “a national, not strictly naval issue.” For him, cruise missiles, AWACS, F-15s, and F-16s represented critical areas of US advantage. From that perspective, the US Navy was “part of a combined arms package whose aggregate range, mobility, striking power, and technological base far surpass those of any other nation.”
Rebuilding Conventional Capabilities

Forces in Being

**Army**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Divisions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airmobile Divisions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized Divisions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tri-Cap Divisions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Navy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multipurpose Carriers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel Attack Submarines</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Attack Submarines</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Division/Wing Teams</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Air Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-7 Attack Aircraft</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4 Aircraft</td>
<td>1281</td>
<td>1252</td>
<td>1252</td>
<td>1252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-111 Aircraft</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-15 Aircraft</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Force Tables in Books III, IV and V of Volume II, JSOPs 75-82 through 79-86.*
A view of the launch of a Trident I (C-4) fleet ballistic missile (FBM) from the submerged nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarine USS FRANCIS SCOTT KEY (SSBN-657).
Strategic Forces: Modernizing the Triad

Nuclear Planning Becomes More Adaptable

Deterring nuclear war requires a perceived ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon the enemy under any circumstances. However, the definition of what constituted unacceptable damage kept evolving throughout the Cold War. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations defined it as the ability to destroy 20 to 30 percent of the Soviet Union’s population, 150 of its largest cities, and 50 percent of its industrial capacity. National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 16, issued by President Richard Nixon in June 1969, retained existing missions and added new ones. US strategic forces—intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers—should be sufficient to accomplish current tasks: maintain high confidence that our retaliatory capability could deter an all-out surprise attack on US strategic forces by ensuring that the Soviets would have no incentive to strike first during a crisis and denying the Soviets an ability to inflict significantly greater urban/industrial damage than they would suffer; and, in a departure, deploy defenses that would limit damage from small attacks or accidental launches to a low level.¹

In 1972 the President called for an evaluation of possible changes to the policy for employing nuclear weapons. As matters stood, a National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP) emphasized large damage-limiting attacks against Soviet nuclear forces and the destruction of war-supporting industries. The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) contained five attack options, the smallest of which would use 2,500 warheads. An interagency group, chaired by the Director of Defense Research
JCS and National Policy

and Engineering and with representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Intelligence, and the National Security Council (NSC) Staff, carried out the review. Its report, completed in June 1973, observed that the Soviets now possessed a highly capable deterrent. The changed strategic balance and America’s withdrawal from Vietnam had altered perceptions among America’s allies, especially in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), raising doubts about the US deterrent’s strength and credibility. Consequently, the threat of large-scale retaliation to deter anything except a massive attack upon the United States was losing its credibility.

The group recommended a number of important changes to employment policy which included:

- Applying uniform guidance to all theater nuclear offensive forces as well as strategic offensive ones.
- Controlling escalation and terminating a war with minimum damage, while protecting vital US interests and maintaining a capability for further escalation.
- To the extent that escalation could not be controlled, destroying those political, military, and economic targets critical to the enemy’s postwar power and recovery.

The current NSTAP provided for Major Attack Options (MAOs) and a smaller number of Selected Attack Options (SAOs); the new guidance would add Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs) and Regional Nuclear Options (RNOs), comprising four types of nuclear options:

1. Major Attack Options provided for massive strikes against either the Soviet Union and its allies or China and its allies. Attacks against some or all of the allies of an enemy might be withheld. In contrast to the NSTAP, which frequently measured a favorable outcome by the number of strategic forces remaining on each side, the new concept would focus on those political as well as military and economic targets critical to an enemy’s postwar power and recovery.

2. Selected Attack Options prescribed moderate-scale attacks upon particular regions or classes of targets, designed to control escalation by adding provisions for flexibility. Each SAO would be a subset of an MAO, able to be executed separately from it.

3. Limited Nuclear Options, keyed to local conflicts and created to meet unforeseen circumstances, generally would be of lower intensity and intended to send signals to the enemy, respond in kind, or win local advantage.

4. Regional Nuclear Options would employ resources that were immediately available within the theater of operations and clearly be committed for the defense of that area.

The group concluded that defining damage limitation in the purely military sense of counterforce attacks against nuclear threats had little hope of holding damage to a low level. By contrast, a political-military concept of showing restraint while seeking to convince an adversary that persistence would invite escalation appeared more promising.²

In January 1974, with interagency agreement, President Nixon promulgated through NSDM 242 what he called “an elaboration of existing policy” rather than a major new departure in strategy. Since deterring nuclear war remained the fundamental mission
for US nuclear forces, operational employment plans had to support that objective. Should deterrence fail, early termination on acceptable terms and at the lowest level of conflict possible would be the most critical objective. Therefore, employment options should aim to limit the level, scope, and duration of violence “in a manner which can be clearly and credibly communicated to the enemy.” That would entail holding some vital targets hostage to later destruction as well as controlling the timing and pace of attacks. In case general war did ensue, plans should provide for: maintaining survivable strategic forces in reserve for protection and execution during and after a major nuclear conflict; destroying political, economic, and military resources critical to the enemy’s power, influence, and ability to recover as a major power; and limiting damage to those political, economic, and military resources critical to the continued power and influence of the United States and its allies.3

On 10 April 1974, Secretary James R. Schlesinger circulated guidance that detailed the objectives and weapons allocation priorities for MAOs, SAOs, LNOs, and RNOs. In preparing SAOs, as an example, one objective would be neutralizing the Soviet nuclear threat to the United States. For that particular task, representative target categories were: ICBM sites; homeport locations, bases, and shipyard facilities for missile-launching submarines; bombers’ home bases, dispersal bases, and Arctic staging bases; national and regional nuclear storage facilities; sensors and associated communications that would allow Soviet leaders to execute timely launches of their strategic nuclear forces; and Soviet national and civilian and military controls, including alternate command centers, regional military headquarters, and control over those nuclear delivery forces not colocated with those forces. Urban targets remained a prohibited category.4 Subsequently, overall, the task of deploying survivable, adaptable weapon systems and matching them against what was in some ways a more complicated target base proved difficult and prolonged.

Making the Triad More Powerful and Survivable

During the 1960s strategic nuclear strength was measured by the number of long-range missiles and bombers that each superpower possessed. This method of calculation changed in 1972. On 26 May 1972, President Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed a five-year Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. It stopped one aspect of the arms race but probably spurred another. The agreement froze launchers for ICBMs at the number already operational or under construction: 1,054 for the United States; 1,618 for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). It also fixed the number of SLBM launchers at 710 for the United States and 950 for the USSR. Beyond a baseline of 656 US and 740 Soviet SLBM launchers, new missiles would have to be traded for older types. The two leaders also signed a Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems limiting each side to two widely separated ballistic missile defense sites, one to shield its capital and the other to defend an ICBM field.
The United States accepted inferiority in launchers mainly because, by technologically outstripping the Soviets in developing multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), it likely would hold a commanding lead in warheads during the interim agreement’s lifetime. First flight-tested in 1968, Minuteman III ICBMs and Poseidon C-3 SLBMs were developed originally to provide a swarm of warheads that could saturate ballistic missile defenses. Now all would be MIRVed, so that a single re-entry vehicle could deliver one or more warheads upon each of several widely separated targets. During the early 1970s this advanced technology created a US advantage in numbers of re-entry vehicles. The United States opted for smaller but more precise payloads, while the Soviets preferred heavier, less accurate ones.

As 1972 ended, the ICBM force consisted of 54 large payload but older Titan IIs and 20 Minuteman squadrons with 50 missiles each: 150 Minuteman Is and 450 Minuteman IIs with single warheads, as well as 250 Minuteman IIs, each carrying a Mark 12 MIRV with three warheads. Another three squadrons were converting—one into Minuteman IIs and two into Minuteman IIs. The seaborne force totaled 656 SLBM launchers aboard 41 fleet ballistic missile submarines, 31 of which would be modified to carry bigger MIRVed Poseidons. At this point, 5 submarines were equipped with single-warhead Polaris A-2s, 10 with A-3s that had multiple re-entry vehicles which were not independently targetable, and 15 with MIRVed C-3s. Of the remaining submarines, three were being or would be converted to carry A-3s and eight to carry C-3s. The bomber force included 397 B-52s and 66 FB-111As.

In July 1973 the Soviets conducted their first flight test of a MIRVed ICBM. The question then became how long the American lead in re-entry vehicles would offset a projected Soviet advantage in megatonnage deliverable by their Modern Large Ballistic Missiles (MLBMs). The Joint Chiefs of Staff worried that parity between the superpowers might turn into US inferiority if the Soviets acquired a “counterforce” capability by deploying high-yield ICBMs that the US arsenal lacked. Particularly, Minuteman ICBMs in hardened silos could become vulnerable to large megaton warheads by the early 1980s. Under those conditions, the Soviets might stage a Cuban missile crisis in reverse, pressuring the United States and its allies into major concessions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly believed that each leg of the triad—land, sea, and air—needed to be modernized. They favored converting the ICBM force to Minuteman IIs, fielding an Advanced ICBM by FY 1982, and bringing into service a B-1 bomber with much improved capabilities to survive and penetrate Soviet defenses. They also wanted the first Trident submarine, outfitted with twenty-four tubes instead of sixteen and carrying C-4s with considerably longer ranges than Polaris/Poseidon, to be commissioned in FY 1979. A more powerful Trident D-5 should follow in FY 1982. The administration planned to put the first Trident into service by 1978 but had made no decision about either deploying a B-1 force or proceeding to develop an Advanced ICBM.

Between July and September 1973, the Trident program survived a critical test on Capitol Hill. The administration asked for $1.7 billion in new obligational authority for
FY 1974, much of it for long lead-time items. The Senate Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Research and Development, chaired by Senator Thomas McIntyre (D-NH), unanimously cut $887 million of that total, which would push Trident’s availability back by two years. Members argued, among other things, that much money could be saved by retrofitting C-4 missiles into Poseidon hulls. The full Armed Services Committee endorsed that reduction by a vote of 8 to 7, then restored the funds again by an 8 to 7 vote. The reversal took place because Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), arranged a proxy vote from Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) who was fishing off California. On 25 September, a day before the Senate opened floor debate, Admiral Zumwalt lobbied senators and thought he had won over two or three. However, NBC News reported him as saying that “Soviet agents have lobbied on Capitol Hill against Trident”—correct, except that he had not used the word “agents.” Several anti-Trident senators professed to believe he meant that Soviet agents were effectively lobbying them. OSD promptly prohibited the Navy’s Trident experts from speaking with reporters or senators until the floor debate ended. On 27 September 1973, by a vote of 47 to 49, the Senate rejected Senator McIntyre’s proposed cut and Trident stayed on track for an initial operational capability in 1978.7

Concurrently, the B-1 bomber survived a round of scrutiny. Secretary of the Air Force John McLucas appointed a panel of experts headed by the Deputy Director, National Science Foundation, to review the program. They reported that no major technical problems would preclude the B-1’s development and production. The B-1’s rollout timetable seemed unrealistic, though, and no funds had been allocated to overcome unforeseen difficulties. General George S. Brown, Secretary McLucas, and the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, concluded that “even under the most adverse estimates of performance the B-1 would be operationally effective against the full target spectrum.” Early in 1974 the Secretary of Defense informed Congress that, following two years of flight testing, a production decision could be made late in 1976. A study of equal-cost alternatives (e.g., B-52s carrying air-launched cruise missiles) demonstrated, to the Department Department’s (DoD’s) satisfaction, that those with B-1s would be the most cost-effective weapon system.8

One area where Secretary Schlesinger insisted upon drastic reductions was continental air defense. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff objected, he overruled them. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer asked the Secretary to reconsider. The “real issue,” Admiral Moorer argued, was whether levels recommended in the Joint Force Memorandum—491 interceptors and 756 surface-to-air missiles in FY 1975, 311 and 372 in FY 1982—“would be valuable in view of the added destruction that the [Soviet] bombers could cause. Once again, analyses indicate that such defenses would be worthwhile.” The Chairman also argued that uncertainties about the performance of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs—such as destruction through “fratricide” when warheads exploded as a result of hot X-rays or electromagnetic pulses—could increase the bombers’ value.

Admiral Moorer further cautioned that sweeping reductions might bring about a “collapse” of Canadian participation in North American air defense. But Secretary
Schlesinger did not budge. He countered that Soviet bombers would not enjoy a free ride, since a force that was adequate for surveillance and control of air space could provide a limited defense against small bomber attacks, especially when reinforced by a mobile pool of aircraft in times of crisis. The Secretary doubted, too, that US reductions would affect Canadians’ “basic willingness” to continue their air defense cooperation.9

Secretary Schlesinger had assessed Canadian attitudes correctly. Full cooperation continued, culminating in renewal of the North American Air Defense Agreement in May 1975. Noteworthy, too, is the fact that the Secretary’s concept for a mobile pool of interceptors soon came into being. At OSD’s request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed alternatives and then recommended that 160 F-4s in tactical training units be cross-trained for air defense as well and be so assigned when needed. OSD approved that approach in June 1974.10 And in 1975, by direction of Congress, the sole anti-ballistic missile site at Grand Forks, North Dakota, was deactivated.

At President Nixon’s request, DoD and the Atomic Energy Commission reviewed warhead stockpiles and found the level adequate under current criteria. They acknowledged that the stockpile would benefit from a modernization program, but congressional budget-cutting later created some serious complications. One part of the stockpile received special attention. Did tactical nuclear weapons for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) still serve a worthwhile purpose? In November 1973 Secretary Schlesinger told Admiral Zumwalt that he did not believe US forces could use such weapons advantageously. Three months later the CNO informed Admiral Moorer and Secretary Schlesinger that he agreed. The United States stood more to lose in such an exchange because much of US naval power was concentrated in a few carriers that could not survive a tactical nuclear exchange, while maritime transportation mattered little to the Soviets. Admiral Moorer, in turn, advised the Secretary that he always had viewed ASW nuclear weapons primarily as a deterrent.11

On 20 December 1974, through Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) 77-84, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed bomber objectives similar to those in JSOP 76-83 (255 B-52s, 65 FB-111s, and 210 B-1s in 1984) and recommended small adjustments to the mix of ICBMs and SLBMs. These particular levels occupy a unique niche because they became obsolete even before winning JCS approval. The Vladivostok Understandings, reached by President Gerald Ford and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev on 24 November 1974, provided the general framework for negotiating a comprehensive agreement intended to last through 1985. Each side’s strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) would be limited to 2,400, of which only 1,320 could be MIRVed. By contrast, JSOP 77-84 envisioned 1,710 MIRVed SNDVs—the whole Minuteman and Poseidon/Trident force—by 30 June 1984.12 Consequently, in May 1975 the Joint Force Memorandum (JFM) proposed slowing the pace of missile modernization at practically every point. To stay within the Vladivostok ceilings, all Poseidons would remain in service but every Polaris boat would be retired by June 1984. In the Joint Chiefs’ judgment, however, this JFM force would not provide enough Tridents to offset the block obsolescence of Poseidons during the late 1980s.13
The stockpile of nuclear warheads began to shrink, for reasons entirely apart from the Vladivostok ceilings. The major reductions would occur in nuclear bombs and in air-to-air, air-to-surface, and ASW warheads. Commenting upon OSD’s recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced concern over delays in modernizing the stockpile. Often, they said, the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) seemed to be programming changes and delays with or without Defense Department concurrence. They urged that JCS, OSD, and ERDA representatives explore ways of meeting their concerns.

In April 1975 Deputy Secretary William P. Clements and ERDA Administrator Robert C. Seamans sent their FYs 1976-1978 stockpile recommendations to the White House. General Frederick C. Weyand commented that, unlike his colleagues, he did not look upon full four-bomb loadings of older B-52Ds as an “indispensable element” of “perceived essential equivalence.” All JCS members worried, though, that ERDA’s inability to introduce more than one new weapon each year limited its long-term capacity to twenty systems and thus imposed “a very inflexible development and production schedule.” Consequently, they strongly supported giving ERDA more money.

Meanwhile, literally the whole tactical nuclear stockpile came under special review. General Brown, who now held the post of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, had grown increasingly concerned about the tactical utility of several types of weapons: “We may have become tradition-bound in our thinking, and fixed on the idea that because a weapon provides a ‘big bang’ it continues to be useful.” Accordingly, on 7 December 1974 he asked the Joint Staff to take a “hard look” at each element of the arsenal. On 15 May 1975, while work was still under way, Admiral James L. Holloway sent Secretary Schlesinger a Navy study concluding that some nuclear weapons should remain aboard all nuclear-capable combatant ships. A member of General Brown’s staff group wondered whether this was a Navy attempt to pre-empt Joint Staff recommendations. “In this regard,” he advised the Chairman, “you should note that your copy . . . comes to us through the courtesy of the OSD mail room.” On 20 June 1975 General Brown asked Secretary Schlesinger to take no action until the Joint Staff study had undergone a JCS review.

In July 1975 the Joint Staff study reached completion. It recommended replacing, with improved weapons, the current inventories of 8-inch and 155 mm artillery rounds, Pershing I surface-to-surface missiles, and two types of tactical bombs. Barrier-creating atomic demolition munitions should be retained while new earth-penetrating technologies were being explored. The Navy’s Terrier, a shipboard anti-air missile, should be replaced by an SM-2 Standard missile. The Astor wire-guided ASW torpedo should be retired. However, warheads for Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missiles should continue to be deployed with US and NATO units. The JFM’s Nuclear Annex contained almost all these recommendations, which may explain why the Joint Staff study did not undergo a JCS review.

During a January 1975 news conference, Secretary Schlesinger revealed that the Soviets either had started or were about to begin deploying ICBMs carrying MIRVs.
The SS-18, larger than any American land-based intercontinental missile, had been tested with five to eight warheads, each believed to have explosive power equal to one megaton, or one million tons of TNT. With an accuracy estimated at one-quarter to one-third of a nautical mile, the SS-18 should be able to destroy hardened Minuteman silos. A smaller SS-19 could carry perhaps six warheads, each with a yield of 300 kilotons. On the US side, deployment of 550 Minuteman IIIs should be completed by the end of FY 1975 and a higher-yield Mark 12A re-entry vehicle could enter production during FY 1977. Of 31 Polaris-to-Poseidon conversions, 23 had been completed by January 1975 and 6 more submarines were undergoing conversions.20

On 30 December 1975 the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded JSOP 78-85 to Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Matching its recommendations against those in JSOP 77-84, the pace of MIRVing had been cut back considerably to comply with Vladivostok limits. As a consequence, a large number of non-MIRVed Minuteman IIs and even one Polaris submarine with first-generation A-3 SLBMs still would remain operational in mid-1985. Admiral Holloway insisted that the Soviets, by MIRVing and improving the accuracy of their missiles, could offset US efforts to improve Minuteman's survivability. Accordingly, he recommended putting a larger proportion of the missile force at sea.21

In the Joint Force Memorandum submitted on 5 May 1976, Admiral Holloway, joined by General Louis H. Wilson, repeated the case for more sea-based missiles. For the first time, the JFM contained a section titled “Strategic Force Assessment.” In it, the Joint Chiefs of Staff calculated that their JFM force would maintain a constant advantage over the Soviets in total weapons. The USSR gradually would increase its lead in total megatonnage until 1986, when the introduction of M-X ICBMs should reverse this trend. The Soviets would continue to hold a sizable superiority in missile throw-weight, while US forces should widen their lead in bombers’ payloads.22

On 10 August 1976 Deputy Secretary Clements and senior DoD officials reviewed basing options for the M-X ICBM. John Walsh, Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and James Wade, Director of DoD’s SALT Task Force, wanted to give equal priority to developing a silo-based as well as a mobile M-X, whose constant movement theoretically would offer greater survivability. Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Reed and Lieutenant General William Y. Smith, USAF, Assistant to the Chairman, countered that a mobile program was not yet clearly defined, that a crash effort would be very costly, and that the US arsenal needed the greater yield and accuracy that silo-based M-Xs could supply. Deputy Secretary Clements decided that the first silo-based M-Xs should deploy in December 1982, followed as soon as possible by mobile M-Xs. It was also agreed that the Air Force should prepare a plan to start deploying mobile Minuteman IIIs during FY 1980.23

Simultaneously, through tentative Program Decision Memorandums (PDMs), Secretary Rumsfeld showed how he hoped to preserve a full triad through the early 1980s. First, he reaffirmed the mobile and silo-based M-X recommendations described above. Second, he approved the concept of a mixed bomber force containing B-1s that could penetrate to their targets and B-52s that would launch stand-off cruise missiles
from beyond the range of the enemy’s air defenses. The Joint Chiefs of Staff lodged no objections, and in September the final PDMs showed no changes. In December Secretary Rumsfeld approved moving the B-1 into production. Nonetheless, the triad’s composition would remain unsettled; M-X basing was tentative, and President-elect Jimmy Carter had criticized the B-1 as wasteful and unnecessary.

**Conclusion**

Early in September 1976 President Ford commissioned a thorough review of the nation’s defense policy and military posture. He read a final report and then, on his last day in office, approved general principles that should guide the planning of strategic nuclear forces. The triad must be maintained, so programs to modernize each element of the triad were “indispensable.” These forces should be able to conduct a controlled response, meet NSDM 242’s targeting requirements to impede an enemy’s postwar recovery, and provide a strategic reserve. They also should be capable of denying the Soviets military advantages by maintaining the “unqualified assurance” to deliver a retaliatory strike against an opponent’s strategic and peripheral attack forces, as well as against other military targets. The US posture was not intended to provoke Soviet fears of a disarming first strike—provided the Soviets did not appear to be seeking a first-strike capability of their own. Last, because stability during a crisis was so critical to deterrence, measures must be taken to assure the survivability of American ICBMs.

In December 1976 the US strategic arsenal included 54 Titan IIs, 450 Minuteman IIs, 550 MIRVed Minuteman IIs, 316 B-52s, and 66 FB-111s. At that moment, the US strategic posture satisfied the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But they worried about preserving a nuclear balance in the early 1980s, when the Soviets would likely gain an advantage in missile throw-weight and widen their lead thereafter. In that case, US ICBMs would become vulnerable, while Soviet ICBMs might not.

Just as they had with general purpose forces, individual Services played the central part in deliberations about strategic forces. The main contributions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their JSOPs and JFMs, offered little more than summary descriptions of desired characteristics and capabilities for the major systems. They barely touched upon a question that would bedevil the Carter and Reagan administrations: what was the best mode for basing the M-X? As chapter 4 will show, the Joint Chiefs of Staff played a central role in negotiating SALT II, appraising all elements of the current and future triad.
President Gerald R. Ford and Soviet General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev depart from the train upon their arrival at the Okeansky Sanatorium on 23 November 1974.
(Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Library)
SALT II Recedes from Reach

What Is “Essential Equivalence”?

In 1972 strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) between Washington and Moscow culminated on 26 May with the signing by President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and an Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The ABM Treaty stipulated that neither party could build more than two ABM sites, one to shield its capital and one to protect an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) field. The Interim Agreement froze ICBM launchers at the numbers that were already operational or under construction: 1,054 for the United States and 1,618 for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Similarly, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers were limited to 710 American and 950 Soviet; beyond a “baseline” of 656 American and 740 Soviet launchers, new SLBMs must be traded for older types either deployed before 1964 or placed aboard older submarines. The Interim Agreement would remain in force until 1977; President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev pledged that they would try to conclude a comprehensive agreement “as soon as possible.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1969, had pressed for “equal aggregates” of ICBM and SLBM launchers. They accepted a different outcome largely because US superiority in numbers of warheads and re-entry vehicles would offset Soviet superiority in launchers. Looking ahead, however, their calculations about what constituted essential equivalence grew more complicated. The US lead in warheads would grow during the mid-1970s because the United States would be first to deploy multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The Soviets, however, would widen their lead in missile throw-weight as it deployed Modern Large Ballistic Missiles (MLBMs), for which there were no US counterparts. If the Soviets deployed MIRVed MLBMs, perhaps...
during the late 1970s, Minuteman ICBMs in hardened silos would become vulnerable and the definition of equivalence would change.

Hardly had SALT I been consummated when preparations for SALT II began. Responsibility for preparing US negotiating positions lay with the Verification Panel, a high-level subcommittee of the National Security Council (NSC). Dr. Henry Kissinger, in his capacity as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, chaired this panel. It included representatives from the State Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the NSC Staff. As 1973 opened, the JCS representative was Lieutenant General Royal B. Allison, USAF, who had served as Assistant to the Chairman for Strategic Arms Negotiations (ACSAN) since 1968. Lieutenant General Allison's duties included supporting the Chairman, working with the Joint Staff in SALT preparations, monitoring the activities of other agencies, and preparing studies that helped to amplify positions and guide US negotiators.

When the Verification Panel met on 11 August 1972, its members heard a disturbing forecast. Sooner than expected, according to the CIA, the Soviets would begin deploying MIRVed missiles, more accurate and in larger numbers than US intelligence had predicted. With the premise of essential equivalence that underlay SALT I being undermined, Dr. Kissinger cautioned the panel that, conceptually, SALT II might prove more difficult than SALT I. How should strategic equality and parity be defined: by numbers of vehicles, launchers, throw-weight, or megatonnage? An interagency working group would have to address these points.³

When the working group began its task, the Joint Staff officers serving on it were not assigned any initial input, apparently by their own choice, because they considered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to have only advisory and review roles. But on 16 August the Chief of Naval Operations urged the Chairman to consider taking some initiatives. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer promptly tasked the Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5) to recommend approaches and objectives.⁴

On 11 September 1972, after slightly amending J-5's draft, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird a broad outline of their objectives. Seeing no urgent military necessity for SALT II, they deemed it imprudent to “leap frog” ahead toward reductions and qualitative restrictions. The United States should deal instead with limitations on both sides' buildups; deliberate, gradual progress would create confidence and ultimately lead to more durable agreements. They listed specific objectives as follows: provide for strategic equivalence, which would involve not only numbers of warheads but also such factors as accuracy, throw-weight, reliability, survivability, and national will; make sure that an agreement appeared to ensure strategic equivalence in the eyes of other nations, so alliances would not be undermined; accept only provisions that were verifiable by either national means or a combination of national methods and on-site inspection; try to impose numerical limits on Soviet systems posing the greatest actual or potential danger to US missiles, particularly MLBMs; exclude such issues as forward-based systems (e.g., theater missiles and fighter-bombers stationed in
Western Europe) that would undermine security arrangements with other nations; and as a general rule, seek quantitative ceilings alone, avoiding those qualitative constraints “which will restrict flexibility to conduct research and development or modernization and replacement of systems.”

In October the opening round of SALT II took place at Geneva. Soviet negotiators proposed that US missile submarines be withdrawn from forward bases in Scotland and Spain and that mutual restraints be placed upon the development of new weapons. On 19 October 1972 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved—with one exception—a set of positions proposed by Lieutenant General Allison:

1. For “central systems” (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) there should be equal aggregates totaling between 2,200 and 2,500 per side, a sublimit of 300 MLIBMs per side, and freedom to mix between ICBMs and SLBMs. The United States planned to deploy 2,146 systems, compared to an estimated 2,558 for the USSR. Lieutenant General Allison had proposed either an aggregate of 2,500 or one as low as 2,100, but General Creighton W. Abrams observed that 2,200 would meet US requirements. Fixing the aggregate at 2,500 would require a major US buildup at a time when General Abrams deemed conventional improvements essential. He did not believe that 2,500 could be justified before Congress and the public on any grounds except Soviet intransigence in SALT II.

2. For heavy bombers, limitations should apply to B-52s and Soviet “Bears” and “Bisons.” Whether to include new types (the US B-1, the Soviet “Backfire”) should be decided on a case-by-case basis, but US-based FB-111s should be excluded.

3. For land-mobile ICBMs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored a total ban, which the Soviets probably would reject. If permitted, they must be counted in the aggregate.

4. No constraints should be imposed upon air defenses. Tactical and strategic air defenses were indivisible, but confident verification of the latter appeared to be impossible.

5. While there should not be any specific limitations on forward-based systems, a generalized formula stating that such systems would not circumvent the terms of SALT II could be supported.

On 28 October 1972 Lieutenant General Allison conferred with senior OSD officials, who suggested offsetting the Soviet lead in ICBM throw-weight by significantly reducing the total number of launch vehicles, particularly those with heavy payloads such as the B-52 and the Soviet SS-9 ICBM. The ACSAN responded by stressing the verifiability of throw-weight limitations, the non-negotiability of such a proposal, and the dangers of starting down a “slippery slope.” OSD representatives replied that verification which was accurate within 50 percent might be sufficient.

On 31 October 1972 and again on 2 November 1972, the Verification Panel grappled with what was becoming a crucial and divisive issue: whether to seek MIRV limitations. At the latter meeting, Dr. Kissinger mentioned the possibility of banning land-based MIRVed missiles. Other members opposed a ban as unverifiable. Why, Dr. Kissinger countered, would a ban which the USSR violated be worse than permitting the Soviets to deploy as many land-based MIRVs as they wished? A discussion about throw-weight followed; Lieutenant General Allison stressed that US verification capabilities could be changed dramatically by the loss of one “prime factor.”
At the panel’s next meeting on 14 November 1972, Dr. Kissinger asked how imposing a ceiling of equal throw-weights could possibly be disadvantageous. Yet, he understood, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did oppose it. Admiral Moorer answered by describing the JCS position as favoring equal aggregates of launchers with full freedom to mix. As a corollary of that basic position, they would support equal throw-weight levels. Dr. Kissinger saw difficulty with defending a flat position that forward-based systems (FBS) were not a proper subject for SALT II. Admiral Moorer acknowledged that, although discussing forward bases for missile submarines would be dangerous at this point, matters would change when US-based Tridents entered service.9

On 18 November 1972, through National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 197, President Nixon issued negotiating instructions that generally accorded with JCS views. Its critical paragraphs can be summarized as follows: Make the overall objective a permanent agreement based on essential equivalence in central strategic systems (ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers). Place priority on negotiating a limit to those systems, with “a high degree of equivalency” overall. Stress the strong US concern over the unique capabilities derived from greater throw-weight of Soviet ICBMs as well as the potentially destabilizing effect of the Soviet advantage in MLBMs. Emphasize that a fundamental principle of any permanent agreement should be overall numerical equality in central systems, with equality in ICBM launchers and throw-weight. Avoid specifying numerical limits for the overall aggregate; instead, indicate a preference for establishing equal aggregates through reductions. Mention freedom to mix between land- and sea-based systems as a characteristic of a permanent agreement. Agree to discuss forward-based missiles and aircraft but deny that they are either strategic or an element in the overall aggregate.10

Lieutenant General Allison urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff to go on record as opposing any throw-weight limitations. Soviet acceptance might have to be traded for US acceptance of constraints upon modernization and freedom to mix. He also recommended rejecting a recent Soviet proposal to prohibit the development and testing of new destabilizing types of weapons. The US aim, he argued, should be an overall agreement and not a series of side arrangements. Moreover, differences in the two nations’ political systems would make “restraint” more binding upon Washington than upon Moscow. Going beyond their positions of 19 October 1972, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided on 9 February 1973 to oppose this Soviet proposal.11

At Geneva, concurrently, Soviet negotiators proposed prohibiting the development and deployment of intercontinental-range cruise missiles (CM) as well as sea-launched CMs designed to strike land targets. At that point, the Soviets had deployed a variety of short-range land- and sea-launched CMs. The US Air Force was moving to develop long-range CMs, although its operational inventory included only bomber-launched Hound Dogs. The US Navy was working on an anti-ship Harpoon missile and had a long-range CM under study. Lieutenant General Allison suggested, and on 3 March 1973 the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed, the following positions: oppose constraints on either air-launched or surface ship-launched CMs; support equal limits for submarine-
launched CMs at or below the current Soviet level of 450 to 460; support a ban on intercontinental land-based CMs; and keep any CM limitation separate from the aggregate ceiling or central systems.\textsuperscript{12} Limitations on cruise missiles, a secondary issue at this point, would assume primary importance within a few years.

On 5 February 1973 the Verification Panel debated whether the gravest threat to Minuteman came from the Soviets’ superior throw-weight or from the forthcoming MIRVing of Soviet missiles. After restudying throw-weight issues, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 February 1973 decided to support a throw-weight limit of equal aggregates for ICBMs and SLBMs as part of an agreement limiting central systems somewhere between 2,200 and 2,500. The Soviets, they reasoned, would hardly be willing to surrender their leads in numbers of delivery vehicles as well as in throw-weight. Initially, therefore, American negotiators should concentrate on reducing Soviet systems down to current or projected US levels. Throw-weight, after all, was only one factor among many. Even limiting throw-weight to 50 percent of the current total would produce no permanent change, because qualitative Soviet improvements soon would negate the US gain.\textsuperscript{13}

**An Unusual Appointment**

At this point, an important personnel change occurred. Lieutenant General Allison had been ACSAN since July 1968. But Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) now insisted that he play no further part in arms talks. Senator Jackson maintained that Lieutenant General Allison had proven weak and ineffective. In February 1973, during a conversation with Admiral Moorer, the Senator claimed that, during 1972 hearings on the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, Lieutenant General Allison “couldn’t answer a lot of stuff, my God, I was really shook!” But the Chairman, in a later conversation with Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, traced the trouble to an exchange in which the ACSAN “set about to refute” Senator Jackson’s argument that, without ABMs, the Soviets could destroy practically all Minuteman silos.\textsuperscript{14}

When Lieutenant General Allison asked Mr. Jackson why the Senator was insisting upon his removal, he replied that “[y]ou became one of the . . . crowd of disarmers in the SALT delegation and failed to contribute strong military advice.” Lieutenant General Allison sent Senator Jackson a detailed letter of rebuttal, insisting that he had been “maligned and unjustly judged.” Admiral Moorer read a draft of his letter and decided that “although [the excerpts] do make Allison look strong, they have passed the buck to me and the Chiefs. This is not so good. Because they are out of context and don’t show the whole thing . . . I don’t feel that I am going to bless it.”\textsuperscript{15}

Senator Jackson had a chosen successor: Lieutenant General Edward Rowny, USA. Selecting a neutral Army officer, the Senator explained to Admiral Moorer, would help avoid another Navy-Air Force fight over whether missiles should be land- or sea-based. Believing that Senator Jackson’s support would be essential for ratifying SALT II, President Nixon inclined to appoint whomever he favored. Between 5 and 7 February 1973
the Service Chiefs submitted their nominations for ACSAN. General George S. Brown proposed the Inspector General of the Air Force, Lieutenant General Louis L. Wilson, USAF. Admiral Zumwalt’s choice was Vice Admiral Frederick H. Michaelis, USN, a former Deputy Director of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. General Abrams nominated Lieutenant General Rowny. On 8 February 1973, Secretary Elliot Richardson advised the President that either General Rowny or Admiral Michaelis would be “equally suitable and effective,” although detaching General Rowny in the middle of his assignment on the NATO Military Committee would cause some difficulties.16

On 23 February 1973 Dr. Kissinger told Admiral Moorer that the President was perfectly willing to accept Admiral Michaelis. The Chairman promptly met with Senator Jackson. But, Admiral Moorer wrote afterward, “It was clear from the very outset that Jackson would not change his position since he is using this to make a point with the President. . . . Jackson even went so far as to say that he needed ‘his man’ . . . on the Delegation.” The next day, the Chairman advised Secretary Richardson that “I couldn’t shake him so I wouldn’t think there would be any point in your expending any of your political capital.” Thus General Rowny’s appointment became certain. Admiral Moorer made his own irritation plain during a meeting with General Rowny on 1 March 1973. “I read the riot act to Rowny,” the Chairman recorded, “and explained to him exactly who he was working for, in no uncertain terms. I told him he was working for me, and that he was not working for Jackson . . . or anyone else.”17 One week later the White House formally announced General Rowny’s appointment. He brought with him a new title: JCS Representative for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The ACSAN staff, until now a separate entity, was incorporated into the International Negotiations Division of J-5.18

Debating a MIRV Freeze

The question of whether to seek a freeze on MIRV development and deployment took center stage. When the Verification Panel met on 2 March 1973, State Department spokesmen suggested putting a two-year freeze upon the flight-testing of MIRVs that were still in the developmental stage. Five days later, though, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to oppose any kind of MIRV moratorium. They foresaw severe definitional and verification problems. What was a MIRV system, as opposed to a mere multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV) that could not hit separate targets? Where should the line be drawn between a new MIRV system and the modernization of an existing one? Could each component of a MIRV system be tested separately? They feared, too, that the Trident program without MIRVs would lose its rationale and be cancelled by Congress.19

During an NSC meeting on 8 March 1973, Dr. Schlesinger (in his capacity as Director, Central Intelligence) said that superior US technology had created a very large number of small, accurate MIRVs that compensated for Soviet leads in launchers and throw-weight. However, in about ten years the Soviets could deploy many MIRVs which, coupled with large throw-weights, would provide them with a substantial coun-
terforce capability. So, said Dr. Kissinger, the true choice lay between pressing for real equivalence and trading US technological advantage for Soviet numerical superiority. Admiral Moorer noted that a one-year moratorium on MIRV testing would hurt the Soviets most, making their acceptance unlikely. Dr. Kissinger observed, and Deputy Secretary William P. Clements agreed, that much tougher throw-weight limits would have to be imposed if MIRVing could not be controlled. During the meeting, Admiral Moorer gave Dr. Kissinger a memorandum for delivery to the President. Its main points are quoted below:

a. There is no way that the US can get the Soviets to dismantle their SS-9 type [large payload] missiles or to agree not to MIRV these missiles.
b. We simply cannot get there from here.
c. It is far more realistic to achieve an agreement which, in effect, results in an equal aggregate of delivery vehicles with freedom to mix.  

Three days later, through National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 206, President Nixon instructed US negotiators to make a vigorous effort to elicit more specific Soviet views. They should seek agreement to the principle of a permanent agreement providing essential equivalence, emphasizing sublimits on ICBM numbers and ICBM throw-weight. The President postponed a MIRV decision in order to await Soviet reaction. But he did tell US negotiators to reject, as premature, the Soviet proposal to exercise “restraint” over new programs.  

Although Admiral Moorer was encouraged about the White House taking “a harder line,” he saw danger in the portion of NSDM 206 directing US negotiators to “raise the issue of how SALT can enhance the survivability of strategic deterrent forces.” That, he told Deputy Secretary Clements, could justify limitations on MIRVing and improved missile accuracy. Qualitative limitations were hardest to verify and, “if we are not careful, we can be led down the primrose path on this one.”

Admiral Moorer also felt apprehensive about any discussion of forward-based systems. The chief negotiator at Geneva, Ambassador Alexis Johnson, wanted to counterattack by raising the subject of “non-central systems,” meaning particularly the Soviet IR/MRBMs stationed in Eastern Europe. Secretary Richardson thought there might be advantages in doing so. Admiral Moorer warned, however, that this “could become the first step on the slippery slope.” He instructed General Rowny at Geneva to “hold fast on the theme of equal aggregates of central systems—stonewall all else.”

Meantime, Admiral Zumwalt proposed allowing only 2,000 central systems per side. At that point, US plans for 1973-1979 projected between 2,051 and 2,137 systems. If the ceiling was set around 2,500—the level of Soviet systems in being—he saw little chance that Congress would vote the funds for a buildup to that level. The J-5, however, argued against proposing any total lower than 2,500 for the time being. Only after the Soviets had accepted the principle of equivalence should the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider, as a follow-on phase, reducing to about 2,000 systems. Admiral Zumwalt countered that, if the negotiating record showed no JCS effort to hold programs at or
below those programmed, military credibility would suffer and Congress would grow less willing to fund approved force levels. General Abrams declared his willingness to endorse equal aggregates between 2,200 and 2,500. However, if the administration did not plan actually to reach those levels, he would support a slightly more rapid phase-out of older systems to reach equal aggregates around 2,000. General Brown also endorsed a level of approximately 2,000. On 23 April 1973 the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the issue and decided to defer further consideration of it.24

On 30 April 1973 Admiral Moorer and Mr. Clements presented the Verification Panel with a four-step proposal. First, achieve agreement in principle about equal aggregates for central systems, full freedom to mix, and an MLBM sublimit of 313 per side. Second, be willing to discuss reductions, down to about 2,200 systems at first. If the Soviets insisted on 2,500, build up to that ceiling perhaps by retaining or de-mothballing B-52s, keeping Polaris boats in service, and increasing Trident and B-1 procurement. Third, indicate willingness to ban air-mobile ICBMs and/or long-range air-to-surface missiles, if the Soviets would refrain from MIRVing or MRVing their MLBMs. Should they refuse, offer to MIRV only 550 Minuteman IIs if the Soviets would put MRV or MIRVs on only 550 of their light ICBMs and none at all on their MLBMs. Fourth, following agreement on the first three steps indicate, a willingness to discuss forward-based systems—but not in the SALT forum. Admiral Moorer advised the panel that he supported a MIRV ban “if the price was zero or very low, since militarily a MIRV ban was desirable but not essential.” Dr. Kissinger did not believe the Soviets would give up MIRVing, since doing so would oblige them to admit technological inferiority.25

On 3 May 1973, through NSDM 213, President Nixon issued instructions in which, Dr. Kissinger wrote later, “Everyone’s pet project was included.” The US delegation should state its willingness to accept equal aggregates of 2,350 central systems per side, with freedom to mix. In this context, the United States would consider: placing qualitative limitations on strategic ballistic missiles; prohibiting the development, testing, and deployment of air-to-surface missiles with ranges exceeding 3,000 kilometers; concluding a non-circumvention agreement, as a way of dealing with forward-based systems; discussing Soviet proposals to ban the development, testing, and deployment of intercontinental cruise missiles, among other things; and proceeding with a program for reducing strategic force levels. American negotiators should say that they were prepared promptly to conclude a provisional agreement prohibiting the development, testing, and deployment of new and modified MRV/MIRV systems for ICBMs. “New” systems meant those that had not been flight-tested as of 1 January 1973. Deployments of other MRV/MIRV systems would be limited to numbers operational or under construction/ conversion as of 1 July 1973. Finally, negotiators should state that (1) a throw-weight ceiling would be acceptable in the context of MIRV controls and (2) the Soviet proposal for “restraint” could not be addressed in specific terms until the provisions of a concrete agreement became clear. Four days later NSDM 216 instructed that two elements in the existing Interim Agreement should become part of a permanent
arrangement: no construction of additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers; and no conversions of light, older ICBM launchers into launchers for MLBMs.26

These two NSDMs provoked protests from DoD. On 9 May 1973 Admiral Moorer and Deputy Secretary Clements advised Dr. Kissinger of their concerns. First, Soviet acceptance of equal aggregates should precede any extended discussion of a MIRV freeze. But NSDM 213, as it stood, could lead to a MIRV freeze alone. Second, equal sublimits on MLBMs ought to be part of the US position. Otherwise, the Soviets eventually could amass an enormous lead in ICBM throw-weight. Third, the freedom to mix provision should be amended to allow replacement of SLBMs or bombers with ICBMs, thereby helping to avert a permanent US inferiority in ICBM launchers.27

The White House made no immediate response. So on the very next day, 10 May 1973, the Acting Chairman drafted and Mr. Clements sent Dr. Kissinger another memorandum repeating the recommendations above. A provisional MIRV freeze, they insisted, must be preceded by Soviet agreement on essential equivalence. Since the US delegation at Geneva apparently stood ready to table a freeze proposal on 11 May 1973, they warned that “if the linkage we desire is not made at that time, it will be very difficult to establish later.” The following day Dr. Kissinger warned President Nixon that “we have a massive problem with the Chiefs and Clements.” After venting about “these goddamn Chiefs,” the President ordered Dr. Kissinger to draft a toughly worded directive, adding that “I’m placing personal responsibility on everyone who gets the memorandum to see that there is no undercutting, no playing members of Congress, or with the press. . . .” The Geneva delegation did propose a MIRV freeze alone but made clear that a permanent agreement must result in essential equivalence.28

On 15 May 1973 Ambassador Johnson asked for permission to tell his Soviet opposites that, if a permanent agreement contained MRV/MIRV limitations, it should be possible to achieve essential equivalence without precise equality in ICBM launchers and missile throw-weight. This, he reported, was how the delegation interpreted NSDMs 213 and 216.29 Once again, Admiral Moorer and Acting Secretary Clements voiced strong objections. NSDM 213, they reminded Dr. Kissinger on 17 May 1973, clearly cited numerical equality as a central provision in any permanent agreement. Instead, linking MIRV inducements to ICBM totals could produce an agreement containing unequal ICBM ceilings. They wanted full freedom to mix with equal MLBM ceilings or, at a minimum, equal ICBM and MLBM subceilings. Two days later the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Mr. Clements that they still opposed seeking MIRV constraints. If the administration decided otherwise, a freeze should be conditional upon equal aggregates of 2,350 systems, full freedom to mix, and an equal MLBM sublimit. They objected to negotiating specific constraints upon forward-based systems but did endorse a non-circumvention assurance. On 18 June 1973, a Nixon-Brezhnev meeting being imminent, Mr. Clements forwarded these views to the White House.30 With the President increasingly ensnared in Watergate, there was concern in DOD that he might make risky concessions to reach an agreement.
The MIRV Controversy: Draft and Counterdraft

On 21 June 1973, at the Washington “summit,” President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev set an objective of signing a permanent agreement during 1974, toward which they set out very broad principles. Emphatically, however, General Secretary Brezhnev stated that he had no intention of stopping MIRV development. During July, in fact, the Soviets started flight-testing MIRVed ICBMs. Since the United States had first flight-tested a MIRV in 1968 and began installing MIRVs on Minuteman III in 1970, the appearance of operational Soviet MIRVs could not be too far distant. Briefing Admiral Moorer in October 1973, Air Force intelligence officers predicted that the Soviets would flight-test one new SLBM in 1974, two new ICBMs in 1976, and two new ICBMs in 1978. The first generation of Soviet MIRVs, currently being tested, could destroy only soft, unprotected targets. A second generation, operational perhaps by 1978, would be able to knock out hardened targets. Moreover, the Soviets evidently intended to have pop-up canisters for all their launchers. Refiring from undamaged silos could occur within four to twenty-four hours.31 The prospect of SS-18 MLBMs, combining MIRVs with massive throw-weight, was deeply unsettling.

At Geneva, on 9 October 1973, the Soviets tabled a draft treaty that US officials saw as designed to do away with areas of American superiority while perpetuating Soviet ones. Forward-based systems, for example, would be virtually eliminated. Even though Soviet negotiators indicated that their terms were not cast in concrete, the OSD spokesman at one interdepartmental meeting suggested terminating the talks and advising Congress that Moscow had failed to bargain in good faith. On 22 October 1973 Ambassador Johnson sent Washington a counter-draft that called for: placing equal sublimits on ICBMs; freezing MRV/MIRVs and prohibiting tests of the SS-18; phased elimination of all MLBMs; banning sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) that exceeded 150 kilometers in range;32 including the new Soviet Backfire in the heavy bomber category, qualifying it as a central system; and accomplishing drastic, rapid reductions down to 1,800 vehicles. Nonetheless, Admiral Moorer advised Ambassador Johnson that he thought this draft conceded too much, too soon over MIRVs, SLCMs, and ICBM reductions. In mid-November the Chairman informed General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA, that “[t]he mood across the river on SALT is somewhat gloomy. The State, ACDA, and NSC Staff people now are coming to the realization that SALT will probably not stop the Soviets from MIRVing—something I’ve been telling them, unconvincingly, for more than two years.”33

The State Department and the NSC Staff kept crafting proposals to limit MIRVed ICBMs, which Admiral Moorer privately derided as “tactics of desperation.” Admiral Zumwalt also observed that, instead of dropping MIRV constraints from consideration, “current interagency study efforts are almost exclusively concerned with them.” To combat this trend, he urged that JCS views “be presented in the strongest possible terms.” Accordingly, on 4 December 1973 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Schlesinger of their “deep and growing concern.” Interagency studies focused upon
trading MIRV constraints (including a moratorium on testing MIRVed MBLSMs) for a suspension of Trident construction, flight tests of B-1s, air-launched ICBMs, air-to-surface missiles, and conversions to MIRVed Poseidons and Minuteman IIs. Even if such trading did prevent the deployment of MIRVed MBLSMs, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff seriously doubted, the Soviets still could MIRV their SS-17 and SS-19 ICBMs. So, once again, they recommended: that studies of MIRV constraints be discontinued; that any agreement ensure equal aggregate ceilings on central systems, plus full freedom to mix and an equal subceiling on MBLSMs; and that the administration re-emphasize to Congress the urgent need to maintain the momentum of US strategic programs.34

While the Geneva talks recessed from mid-November 1973 until mid-February 1974, there were many discussions in Washington, but clarification proved elusive. Witness the words of Dr. Kissinger at an NSC meeting on 24 January 1974: “As my confused presentation has probably indicated, the main point is that SALT II is conceptually much more difficult than SALT I. There is no disagreement regarding the desirability of essential equivalence, but there is disagreement on what that might mean.”35 Lieutenant General Rowny, who attended the meeting, feared that Dr. Kissinger was willing to pay an unduly high price to stop Soviet MIRVing. Dr. Kissinger had doubts about Congress’ willingness to match Soviet increases; Lieutenant General Rowny and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger did not share his apprehensions.36

Precisely what sort of MIRV constraints could be verified? On 8 February 1974, at Admiral Zumwalt’s instigation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reminded Secretary Schlesinger of his judgment that a freeze on MIRV testing was not worth the price of a slippage in US programs. Adding whatever constraints were necessary to ensure high-confidence verification might require abandoning Trident and the M-X ICBM. Yet failing to adopt such constraints might turn a ceiling on MIRVed throw-weight into a unilateral restraint upon the United States. Again, therefore, they opposed tabling any specific proposal about MIRV constraints. If the administration decided otherwise, an actual offer should be postponed until the intelligence community decided precisely what constraints were required, whether they were verifiable, and how they would affect long-term US programs and security. Moreover, there must be collateral constraints ensuring not only adequate verification but also minimal impact on US programs. The Soviets would have to be made aware that these collateral constraints were “an integral part of the MIRV package and cannot be rejected without rejecting the entire MIRV package.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that their views be made known to Dr. Kissinger and President Nixon.37

At this point, all agencies broadly agreed that the best way to constrain MIRVs was to limit the aggregate throw-weight of MIRVed ICBMs. Secretary Schlesinger suggested proposing a throw-weight ceiling around 4.8 million pounds, which would eliminate all the launchers for non-MIRVed ICBMs. The Soviets would reject this offer, he believed, because they would be allowed only 610 launchers. Another US proposal could follow. Admiral Zumwalt endorsed the Secretary’s strategy. General Brown, on the other hand, deemed a ceiling of 4.8 million pounds “extremely dangerous and inappropriate,” even
as a negotiating tactic. He pointedly recalled a recent warning by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush about how “the quid takes on a life of its own.”

Ultimately, on 11 February 1974 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Schlesinger that they recognized the advantages of proposing a throw-weight ceiling below 6 million pounds. The Soviets undoubtedly would object to either a 4.8 or a 6 million pound ceiling, since both would compel them to make substantial and asymmetrical reductions. But Moscow’s intransigence, they predicted, would help generate public support for building up to whatever levels were agreed upon. If later analysis satisfied them, they were willing to support 4.8 million pounds as an initial position. Such a proposal, though, would have to be consistent with the “block” approach, which meant that if a MIRV was deployed in a silo, then for treaty purposes it must be assumed that every silo of that type housed a MIRVed missile.

Eight days later, through NSDM 245, President Nixon issued new negotiating instructions: Re-emphasize the primacy of establishing equal numerical limits for central systems (initially 2,350) and a “substantially equal” throw-weight ceiling for them. Next, seek phased reductions consistent with equal aggregates. Reaffirm the importance of controlling the “qualitative aspects of the strategic relationship”—particularly, MIRVs on ICBMs. Propose that discussion focus on establishing throw-weight limitations, applying solely to systems with a true MIRV capability, not to any existing MRV missiles. Give each side the right to deploy essentially the same aggregate throw-weight for MIRVed ICBMs. Do not discuss specific throw-weight levels, but be aware that the administration would reject any that exceeded the potential represented by the Minuteman III program, and that the administration wanted to achieve a level much below that. If the Soviets did agree to an acceptable throw-weight ceiling for MIRVed ICBMs, then be ready to discuss MIRVed SLBMs.

Several days before NSDM 245 appeared, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided to oppose reducing central systems below 2,000. But on 19 February 1974 the Chairman’s Assistant, Vice Admiral J. P. Weinel, urged them to avoid “fighting” Secretary Schlesinger. So, the next day they rescinded their decision and directed the Joint Staff to continue analyzing alternatives. Subsequently, the JCS Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency (SAGA) reported that equal aggregates as low as 1,700 would be acceptable, as long as the United States possessed a significant bomber force. Also, when criteria existed for equal throw-weight and payloads, the allowance for bombers and the number of Soviet MLBMs would go far to determine whether a strategic balance was attainable. Since the bomber allowance interacted with MLBM levels, a tradeoff could be in order.

Meanwhile, on 22 February 1974 Admiral Zumwalt informed his JCS colleagues that he found many faults with NSDM 245. It failed, in his judgment, to require: exactly equal throw-weight limits; prior Soviet acceptance of equal aggregates for central systems; full freedom to mix between ICBMs and SLBMs, since discussions about SLBMs might lead to requiring separate ceilings for them; phased reductions that would eliminate Soviet MLBMs; and a block approach on MIRVs that would enhance
verification. The J-5 prepared a draft Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum (JCSM) along these lines. On 25 February 1974 the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed NSDM 245 with Secretary Schlesinger. After that meeting, Admiral Moorer withdrew J-5’s draft from consideration. Instead, the Joint Staff started working with Dr. Fred Wikner (Director, DoD SALT Task Force) on a memorandum crafted to avoid confrontation with President Nixon. Rather, it would form a backdrop against which DoD positions could be crystallized as specific issues arose.42

Secretary Kissinger soon would be going to Moscow to pave the way for another summit meeting. The Joint Chiefs of Staff worried about what understandings he might reach there. With impeachment proceedings under way in the House of Representatives, senior Defense officials feared the President might try to bolster his standing by accepting a risky agreement. But on 11 March 1974 Dr. Kissinger assured them that no Soviet proposal was worth talking about and that he was in no position to accept anything the Soviets might offer him. Consequently, he said, “the Chiefs should not suffer nightmares. . . .” General Abrams said afterwards that “after this fulsome revelation by Dr. Kissinger . . . it would be offensive to send a letter criticizing him.”43

Meanwhile, NSDM 245 remained a topic of debate. On 5 March 1974 the Operations Deputies approved three concepts in principle: First, equal aggregate ceilings of 2,000 central systems, achieved through phased reductions; second, an overall throw-weight ceiling comprised of ballistic missile throw-weight plus an allowance for heavy bombers, based primarily on a bomber payload factor that took stronger Soviet air defenses into account; and third, an equal sublimit of about 2.4 million pounds on the throw-weight of MIRVed ICBMs. On 8 March 1974, after much discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided Secretary Schlesinger with JCSM-72-74, which they asked that he convey to President Nixon. In it they endorsed, as key elements of essential equivalence, the three concepts approved by the Operations Deputies. Admiral Zumwalt at first opposed JCSM-72-74 but on 21 March 1974 changed his mind and concurred. An NSC meeting would take place that day, and he wanted unified JCS advice to have the greatest possible impact.44

When the NSC met on 21 March 1974, Secretary Kissinger said the main problem was boiling down to a tradeoff between US bombers and Soviet missile throw-weight. The Soviets, he reported, were still far from accepting equal aggregates, and forward-based systems remained a stumbling block. Thus a comprehensive agreement seemed distant. Perhaps, though, an interim agreement with equality in MIRVed throw-weight could be attained. The President pointedly remarked, “I know the JCS is concerned that we will give away the store. We will make a deal only if it is in our own interest.” Secretary Schlesinger then presented the Chief Executive with JCSM-72-74, described above. President Nixon made no comment.45

Already, at Geneva, Ambassador Johnson had let it be known that the United States supported a substantially equal aggregate covering ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. What, the Soviets inquired, might that allowance be? At the NSC’s request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff studied that question but failed to find any analytical technique that would
satisfactorily define bomber throw-weight while taking account of the asymmetries in US and Soviet air defenses. The best approach, they decided, lay in establishing a ceiling indirectly, “as an implied result of other limits; i.e., through equal limits on the aggregate of central systems launchers, [MLBMs], and overall ballistic missile throw-weight.”

On 25 March 1974 Secretary Kissinger flew to Moscow where he met a rough reception. The Soviets rejected his suggestions for putting sublimits on MIRVed ICBMs and for placing ceilings on MIRVed throw-weight. Instead, they handed him four proposals: extend the Interim Agreement until 1980; limit the United States to 1,100 and the USSR to 1,000 MIRVed launchers; prohibit the second ABM site allowed by the 1972 treaty; and de-nuclearize the Mediterranean Sea. Secretary Kissinger publicly announced that no comprehensive, permanent agreement would be achieved during 1974.

What to do? An interagency working group considered several MIRV limitations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff examined them and then, on 27 April 1974, advised Secretary of Defense Schlesinger that none appeared to be acceptable. Among other things, in their judgment each would create an unacceptable strategic risk, make only a minimal impact upon Soviet programs, “enhance and further codify” inequalities of the existing Interim Agreement, and reduce US negotiating leverage in working out a permanent agreement. They could see only two ways to maintain essential equivalence: either obtain a permanent agreement requiring the USSR to move by phased reductions toward equivalence in central systems or begin the buildup necessary to achieve essential equivalence, should the Interim Agreement expire before a permanent one came into force.

When the Verification Panel reconvened, Dr. Kissinger struck back at his Pentagon critics: “During the Interim Agreement the gap in warheads between the US and the USSR doubled [in our favor]. . . . It was not the Russians who made us build small missiles. This was a Defense Department decision. We would be in a different situation now with 1,000 large missiles.” Admiral Moorer answered indirectly: “Nothing has been added to US force levels for the five-year period of the Interim Agreement. We really should get some quid. . . . Just to slip the Agreement to 1980 would degrade the rationale we used for SALT I and would create a problem in the Congress. We would have to tie it to something.”

Admiral Zumwalt foresaw “a distinct possibility that we may soon be faced with a national decision to negotiate a separate agreement on MIRVs which will probably also provide for an extension of the Interim Agreement.” Accordingly, on 15 May 1974 he urged his JCS colleagues to help the Defense Department develop a MIRV proposal which would: allow the United States to emerge advantageously from a nuclear exchange; reduce the rate of Soviet MIRV deployments below what otherwise would be reasonably attainable; impose no restrictions on programmed US forces; rectify significantly the Interim Agreement’s numerical imbalances; ensure that a permanent agreement provided essential equivalence in the numbers and destructive power of central systems; and allow either side to terminate the Interim Agreement in 1977.
These terms were so one-sided that he probably tabled them in hopes of forestalling any weakening by the White House.

Early in June, as the Moscow summit drew near, Lieutenant General Rowny predicted that Secretary Kissinger would return claiming a victory because the USSR accepted, in principle, a 10 to 20 percent inferiority in MIRV launchers. In exchange, he speculated, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger would make an informal commitment to slow the Trident, B-1, and Minuteman Improvement programs. He urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff to “make it clear that all MIRV options fail to prevent the Soviets from achieving strategic superiority by 1984” and to “stand firm against any extension of the Interim Agreement.”

Writing to Secretary Schlesinger on 10 June 1974, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did reaffirm their opposition to any extension of the Interim Agreement and to all MIRV constraints currently being considered. Adopting a number of Admiral Zumwalt’s positions but phrasing them in less provocative language, they contended that the USSR had embarked upon impressive modernization programs while US initiatives remained modest in scope. Coupled with improved MIRV technology, the Soviets’ numerical lead in launchers and their advantage in throw-weight would enable them to surpass US capabilities. Therefore, the administration must make totally clear its insistence upon an equitable permanent agreement and its refusal to be deflected by “excursions which essentially perpetuate the imbalances of the Interim Agreement.” They asked Secretary Schlesinger to approve their views as the Defense Department’s position. Although JCS papers never explicitly linked SALT with Watergate, it seems clear that they recorded their objections to a separate MIRV agreement so frequently and forcefully because they worried more and more that a beleaguered President might be tempted to pay a high price for an apparent diplomatic success.

On 17 June 1974 Admiral Zumwalt took the unusual step of writing directly to President Nixon. He stated familiar arguments against either perpetuating the Interim Agreement or limiting MIRV deployments. The admiral also wanted to see SALT placed in a broader framework so that the Soviets' failure to negotiate in good faith would jeopardize the benefits they hoped to reap from détente in trade and technology. He even argued that “in the face of unquestioned US economic and technological superiority, an offer of agreed, permanent strategic equality is no insignificant thing. We can legitimately represent this as a significant concession in itself; . . . and as something that requires a Soviet response in kind if détente is to remain viable.”

Concurrently, Secretary Schlesinger formulated a new proposal. Extend the Interim Agreement until 1979; allow each side as many as 2,500 central systems, with freedom to mix, but make a commitment to reduce these to 2,000 by mid-1984; limit the United States to 550 and the USSR to 360 MIRVed ICBMs, with each side permitted 60 MIRVed MLBMs; and establish a throw-weight ceiling for MIRVed ICBMs of 3 million pounds per side. The Secretary decided, though, that this proposal should be attributed to the Joint Staff. Accordingly, on 19 June 1974 it was circulated for JCS consideration.
as Talking Paper (TP) 51-74. Admiral Zumwalt promptly concluded that it “fell far short of the quality of previous JCS positions.”

When the NSC convened on 20 June 1974, Secretary Schlesinger presented the proposal described above as DoD’s position, arguing that it would provide approximately equal MIRV throw-weights and help reduce instabilities. The Soviets, Dr. Kissinger replied, already had rejected that proposal, mainly because it placed no limit on MIRV submarine launchers. Secretary Schlesinger disagreed, telling the Chief Executive that “[y]ou can be very persuasive—you have great forensic skills.” Admiral Moorer added that the Secretary’s proposal “offers a means for breaking our deadlock.” What, President Nixon asked, did the Chief of Naval Operations recommend? A permanent agreement, Secretary Schlesinger answered. The President was unimpressed: “When he suggests something that has no chance of success that means he wants no agreement. He has now written his letter for the record and I’m sure he will go out and say it publicly” after retiring. Dr. Kissinger added that “no level of forensic ability . . . could sell this program.” Secretary Schlesinger again urged the President to “put your forensic ability to the test.” President Nixon closed the meeting on what he hoped was a reassuring note: “Worse than an arms race would be agreeing to freeze us in a position of inferiority. We won’t do that. But somewhere there’s a middle ground. That is what we will look for.”

At the Moscow summit, lasting from 27 June 1974 until 3 July 1974, Secretary Kissinger presented a variant of the Schlesinger proposal. The Soviets promptly said no, General Secretary Brezhnev claiming it would allow the United States roughly 4,000 more warheads than the USSR. The Soviet counterproposal would permit each side 1,000 MIRVed missiles. American negotiators rejected this because the United States would have to stop MIRVing within one year while the USSR could continue for another four. But an opening was created when Dr. Kissinger suggested, and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko agreed to consider, choosing either “equal aggregates” or “counterbalancing asymmetries.”

A Threshold Test Ban Is Stillborn

The Moscow summit’s concrete achievement appeared to be agreement upon a “threshold” test ban (TTB), whereby nuclear weapons could be tested underground only if they did not exceed a certain level of size and force. In May 1974 the Soviets had proposed technical talks, to which Washington agreed. On 3 June 1974 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recorded their opposition to such a ban “at this time,” on grounds that it would restrict the development of such systems as the Mark 12A re-entry vehicle delivering higher yield, a full-fuzing option bomb, and the Trident D-5 warhead. Over time, also, a ban would lower confidence in the stockpile’s reliability. Three days later they recommended: allowing tests that measured up to a design yield of 150 kilotons, which would require a threshold around 195 kilotons, corresponding to 5.8 on the Richter scale; permitting five tests to exceed the threshold annually over
five years, providing that any threshold treaty also covered the subject of peaceful nuclear explosions; and ensuring compliance through “unambiguous monitoring,” probably involving at least five collocated seismic stations. Deputy Secretary Clements and Dixie Lee Ray, Chair of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), promptly endorsed these recommendations as well as one that accommodated JCS warnings against restricting warhead development: delay a threshold test ban until 1 July 1976. Conversely, the ACDA favored the following: limit the threshold to 100 kilotons for actual yield and 150 for collateral yield, allow each year two tests between 100 and 150 kilotons, and make the ban effective on 1 January 1975.58

On 10 June 1974, through NSDM 256, President Nixon approved seeking a threshold ban—in principle. Accepting ACDA rather than DoD-AEC advice, he agreed to set the threshold at a 100-kiloton yield, if the Soviets would supply enough geological information to aid verification and restrict their testing to specific sites. There could be an allowance for “no more than two unintended and slight breaches of the threshold per year”—although not, as the Soviets had proposed, a quota between an upper and a lower threshold. Peaceful nuclear explosions, with the same threshold limitations, would be permitted only if the Soviets furnished enough information to allow verification. Finally, a ban should take effect no earlier than 1 January 1976. He ordered DoD and AEC to develop a program that would finish essential testing above 100 kilotons before that time.59

On 14 June 1974, after examining NSDM 256, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned President Nixon that they saw in it a “potential to do serious harm to US security interests” and to impair the prospects for satisfactory SALT negotiations. The Soviets, they suspected, had a well-thought-out negotiating strategy, crafted to slow US qualitative advances after they themselves had finished developing a new generation of strategic weapon systems. Restraints at or near the levels specified in NSDM 256 would affect US more than Soviet weaponry and “significantly restrict if not preclude” efforts to develop the flexible response required by NSDM 242.60 For these reasons, they asked the President to look again at DoD-AEC recommendations.61

During the NSC meeting on 20 June 1974, Admiral Moorer and Secretary Schlesinger repeated the arguments above. The USSR, they noted, possessed an excess of throw-weight and was working with high-yield weapons while the United States was not. The Soviets had proposed two thresholds, one below three kilotons and the other at 100 to 200 kilotons, with a high quota in the “sandwich” and no restraint below three kilotons. Dr. Kissinger called a “sandwich” approach unacceptable because the Soviets could detonate, in series, tests which monitoring instruments would record as only one.62

On 3 July 1974 President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed a Threshold Test Ban Treaty prohibiting underground tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons, beginning 31 March 1976; a separate protocol provided for exchanges of data about test sites. Thus, at Moscow, President Nixon largely followed the DoD-AEC line. Additionally, the two leaders agreed to seek an agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) at “the earliest possible time.” Secretary Kissinger, in fact, told the Soviets
that the administration would oppose Senate ratification of the TTB Treaty unless a satisfactory PNE agreement accompanied it.\textsuperscript{63}

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff set about defining their position on PNEs, General Brown (who had just become Chairman) criticized a draft JCSM for overstating Soviet “hunger” to get an agreement, for wrongly claiming that airtight verification could prevent the Soviets from gaining military benefits, and for proposing verification criteria so stringent that the United States could be accused of trying to prevent an agreement. On 19 July 1974, after making several revisions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Schlesinger that the Soviet Union hoped to reap manifold gains from an extensive PNE program. The United States should “take advantage of this situation, to the degree possible, in PNE as well as in other arms control measures.” A first priority goal should be Soviet agreement to give prior notification of PNEs and to accept observer exchanges.\textsuperscript{64} While on-site inspection “possibly” would prevent gross violations, the Soviets would gain some military benefit from each PNE. An observer, watching the explosion without instrumentation and seeing neither pre- nor post-shot activities, would have only “marginal” value. Consequently, US negotiators should ensure the fullest possible exchange of equipment and information.\textsuperscript{65}

Evidently, the Soviets hoped to conduct PNEs with yields above what a TTB would allow. In May 1975 Deputy Secretary Clements, General Weyand (as Acting Chairman), and the Administrator, Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA),\textsuperscript{66} all recommended to Dr. Kissinger: that individual shots be limited to 150 kilotons; that multiple shots be limited to a combined yield of 500 kilotons, provided that no individual device exceeded 150; and that excavation salvos not exceed one megaton in total yield, as long as individual devices could be verified as being less than 150 kilotons. President Ford approved and US negotiators were so instructed.\textsuperscript{67}

On 11 March 1976 the President authorized changes in the US position. First, for individual explosions above 1,000 kilotons, observers should be permitted whenever the side wishing to verify the explosion so wished. Second, if the Soviets would agree to negotiate more accurate methods of determining a salvo’s yield, US negotiators could accept a limit on aggregate yields as high as 1,500 kilotons.\textsuperscript{68}

By 5 April 1976 only two issues about PNEs remained unsettled: Soviet insistence upon exceptions to the 150-kiloton limit for individual explosions; and US insistence that observers attend explosions in the 100- to 150-kiloton range. Two days later the Verification Panel’s Working Group received from the NSC Staff proposed guidance for American negotiators. Objections by the JCS representative led to dropping a statement that, if tradeoffs proved necessary, the United States would prefer to preserve observers’ attendance. However, on 8 April US and Soviet negotiators reached an agreement that kept the 150-kiloton limit but, in effect, allowed the Soviets to veto the presence of observers. Apparently, the NSC Staff had worked through back channels to overrule JCS views. Nonetheless, on 22 April 1976 General Brown endorsed the proposed PNE Treaty and Protocol. He concurred because ERDA voiced confidence that verification procedures were adequate.\textsuperscript{69}
In Moscow, on 28 May 1976 President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev signed the treaty. An accompanying protocol specified, in elaborate detail, advance exchanges of the technical data that would help verify the size of proposed shots. But the Senate took no action. As Dr. Kissinger wrote later, the TTB Treaty “simply had no constituency, except possibly for a small group of professional arms controllers interested in the principle of on-site inspection. Most liberals preferred a comprehensive test ban; thus they mocked the 150-kiloton ceiling, fought against the agreement, and thereby killed the first breakthrough toward on-site inspection. It was a classic case of the best being the enemy of the good.” Also, particularly among American conservatives, the pursuit of détente had fallen out of favor. The treaty would not be ratified until the Cold War itself ended.

The Vladivostok Understandings

The 1974 summit left the vital MIRV issue unsettled. The administration had to decide whether it should seek “equal aggregates” or “compensating asymmetries.” When the Verification Panel met on 30 August 1974, a CIA spokesman estimated that the Soviets would deploy 800 MIRVed missiles by 1980. Gerald Ford, unschooled in the intricacies of arms control, had just assumed the presidency; Dr. Henry Kissinger acted as his main mentor. NSC discussions on 14 and 24 September 1974 exposed the new Chief Executive to SALT II’s issues and options. On 24 September 1974, through NSDM 271, President Ford reaffirmed the objective of seeking an equitable agreement covering both quantitative and qualitative limitations. As before, that meant: achieving a high degree of equivalence in central systems, preferably through phased mutual reductions; placing a ceiling upon throw-weight and applying some standard of measurement to bomber payload as well; and limiting the number of MIRVed missiles, taking into account both their throw-weight and the numbers of re-entry vehicles.

By 18 October 1974, after another NSC meeting, the Verification Panel had distilled four options:

A: Establish equal aggregates of 2,500, reduced to 2,000 by 1980. Place an equal ceiling of 300 upon MLBMs but none on MIRVs, throw-weight, and freedom to mix.
B: Add to A equal throw-weight limits of eight million pounds, lowered to six million by 1985; an equal ceiling on MIRV throw-weight of four million pounds per side; and an equal limit of 500 on “heavy delivery systems” (meaning heavy bombers and ICBMs), lowered to 250 by 1985.
C: Using “compensating asymmetries,” set initial aggregates at 2,250 US and 2,500 Soviet systems, brought down by 1985 to 2,000 and 2,200, respectively. MIRV levels would be 1,300 US and 1,050 Soviet launchers, with no MLBMs permitted.
D: Initial aggregates would be equal. For 1985, each side would choose either 2,000 central systems with 1,300 MIRV launchers or 2,200 with 1,050. No MIRVed MLBMs would be allowed; medium and light missiles would be limited to 7.5 million pounds of throw-weight.
and 10,000 re-entry vehicles. As in B and C, heavy delivery systems would be fixed first at 500 and finally at 250.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored Option A—equal aggregates—but could support Option B. Before the Verification Panel, General Brown stressed Option A’s advantages: simplicity and avoidance of verification problems. Dr. Kissinger, however, advised the President to reject DOD’s argument for absolute equality: “I do not believe the Congress, the American people, or our Allies have such a simplistic view of the strategic balance that they ignore all considerations other than bombers and missiles. At a minimum, it is difficult to see how the Soviets can ignore British and French SLBMs. . . .” In Moscow, during 23 to 27 October 1974, Dr. Kissinger proposed ceilings of 2,200 central systems (keeping 2,500 as a fallback) and 1,320 MIRVed launchers. The Soviets indicated some flexibility, offering a ten-year agreement with a 2,400 limit, restricting the United States to 2,200 (including British and French forces) until the tenth year.72

After returning to Washington, Dr. Kissinger drafted and the President approved a counter-offer of 2,400 launchers and 1,320 MIRVed missiles per side. Through 1983 the United States would stay 200 below 2,400 and the Soviets 200 below 1,320. This cleared the way to a Ford-Brezhnev summit at Vladivostok where, on 24 November 1974, the two leaders agreed that:

1. The Interim Agreement would remain in force until 3 October 1977, when a new agreement running until 31 December 1985 would replace it.
2. Beginning in October 1977, each side would be limited to 2,400 central systems (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) and 1,320 MIRV launchers. There would be full freedom to mix, along with a right to modernize and replace systems.
3. Any mobile, land-based ICBMs would be counted in the 2,400 aggregate; so would air-launched ballistic missiles with ranges above 600 kilometers.
4. No additional fixed, land-based ICBM launchers would be allowed.
5. Forward-based systems would not be included in the new agreement—an important Soviet concession.

The President cabled Secretary Schlesinger and General Brown that he expected their “full and unqualified support,” which they gave.73

Cruise Missiles versus Backfires

The Vladivostok understandings were so worded as to create one major ambiguity. Moscow claimed that each air-to-surface missile with a range above 600 kilometers, whether “ballistic” or “cruise,” must be counted as a separate system within the 2,400 aggregate. When the Verification Panel met on 10 January 1975, its members favored counting each bomber but not each air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) as a separate system. That, of course, would require another concession by the Soviets. What, Dr. Kissinger asked, should the United States be willing to yield
in return? General Brown suggested prohibiting ALCMs from being carried on any aircraft other than bombers. Dr. Kissinger responded by instructing a working group to study the strategic requirements for cruise missiles. The group’s report emphasized the importance of long-range ALCMs.74

On 24 January 1975 the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted for their own use a comprehensive set of SALT positions, in which the problems of cruise missiles and Backfire bombers loomed large:

1. B-1s and B-52s along with Soviet Bisons, Bears, and Backfires should count as heavy bombers in the 2,400 aggregate. So should mothballed heavy bombers, provided tanker and reconnaissance variants in the active forces were included, but not US-based FB-111s. New types should be counted as soon as they were observed, even in production facilities. According to US intelligence, there would be 100 Backfires by mid-1977 and 375 by 1985. Soviet spokesmen claimed Backfires lacked intercontinental range and were intended to strike targets around the Eurasian periphery. However, US intelligence estimated that Backfires could strike the United States and then land in Cuba.

2. No option to deploy mobile missiles should be sacrificed without gaining a significant quid pro quo from the Soviets. Land- and air-mobile versions of an M-X ICBM were being studied, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff might be able to support banning land-mobiles through 1985, if research and development programs were adequately funded.

3. Each land-mobile ICBM and each surface-ship launcher should count as one in the aggregate. Whether air-mobile missiles exceeding a range of 600 kilometers ought to be counted would depend upon the carrying and launching capacity of the associated platforms.

4. No constraints should be placed on air-launched and surface ship-launched cruise missiles. If any CM limitations were imposed, they should remain separate from the ceiling on central systems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did support (a) a ban on intercontinental land-based CMs and (b) a quantitative ceiling, at or below current levels, for sea-launched cruise missiles.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also decided to oppose an interagency effort to ban new MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs that were compatible with launchers not counted against the 1,320 MIRV ceiling. The M-X, for example, would be larger than Minuteman silos.75

At Geneva, on 1 February 1975 the Soviets tabled a draft treaty that would: bar the deployment of air-mobile ICBMs; count each air-to-surface missile (ASM) with a range exceeding 600 kilometers as one in the 2,400 aggregate; ban intercontinental CMs and sea-based CMs with ranges above 600 kilometers; and link negotiations for reducing central systems with cutbacks in forward-based systems.

Five days later, through NSDM 285, President Ford sent Ambassador Johnson instructions that mainly endorsed, or at least did not reject, JCS views:

1. Define B-52s, B-1s, Bears, Bisons, and Backfires as heavy bombers. Any Soviet argument against including Backfires should be challenged in light of the bomber’s technical capabilities and characteristics.

2. On ASMs, state the US understanding that the 600-kilometer limit set at Vladivostok applied only to ballistic ASMs carried on bombers. In principle, further ASM and CM
limitations could go as far as (a) counting all CMs with ranges above 3,000 kilometers in the 2,400 aggregate and (b) extending ASM provisions to cover all aircraft, not bombers alone. Nothing should actually be proposed, though, until Washington so authorized.

3. Avoid raising the issue of whether to limit land- and air-mobile ICBMs. If the Soviets argued for banning air-mobile ICBMs, reply that this was related to the broader issue of strategic aircraft and their armaments and to other types of mobile ICBMs.

4. Solicit Soviet views of how to verify the 1,320 MIRV ceiling. State the “block” position that, if a MIRVed missile was placed in a silo, then for treaty purposes it must be assumed that every silo of that type contained a MIRVed missile.

After reviewing NSDM 285, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that it be modified to make the outcome more acceptable from the US standpoint. Such changes must be judiciously chosen, they acknowledged, avoiding accusations that the United States was bargaining in bad faith.76

Negotiations made practically no progress. From Geneva, in mid-April Lieutenant General Rowny reported that some US delegates were discussing the “need” to soften US positions and so induce Soviet movement. A one-month recess was scheduled from 7 May 1975 until 2 June 1975. Late in April the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw fit to warn Secretary Schlesinger against “the belief by some that the cruise missile (CM) issue forms the primary obstacle to achieving more progress in the current round of SALT II.” NSDM 285 mentioned counting cruise missiles with a range greater than 3,000 kilometers in the 2,400 aggregate. They opposed actually tabling that position at Geneva, since it could be seen simply as a unilateral concession requiring no comparable Soviet action. Instead, they recommended an interagency review of the CM problem during the recess. That was approved.77

When the Verification Panel met on 17 May 1975, Dr. Kissinger said it was “obvious” that the US position must be altered. Did the other panel members, he asked, prefer to count CMs in the 2,400 aggregate or actually ban them? CIA Director William Colby and Fred Ikle, Director of ACDA, preferred a ban—Mr. Colby because it would aid verification; Mr. Ikle because it would close a channel of competition. But Deputy Secretary Clements and General Brown favored counting, on grounds that a ban would make Congress less likely to fund CM research and development. General Brown also argued for a 4,000-kilometer ceiling, so that Navy programs would not be affected. The United States enjoyed a ten-year lead in CM technology, Mr. Clements observed, and that advantage should be preserved. Yet, Dr. Kissinger replied, “we had begun the cruise missile program for bargaining purposes and we were becoming enamored with them.” He ordered a working group to review the entire CM problem.78

On 20 May 1975, in the midst of this review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Schlesinger that they preferred to avoid the CM issue entirely during SALT II. If some limitations did seem necessary, they should be kept separate from any limits imposed upon central systems. And should separation prove infeasible, they could support counting in the 2,400 aggregate CMs with ranges greater than either 4,000 or 3,000 kilometers, in that order of preference. However, since such constraints would
work in the Soviets’ favor, no movement should occur unless Moscow offered a major quid pro quo.79

The Soviets, meanwhile, indicated that they might raise the CM ceiling to 2,500 kilometers. Reassembling on 24 May 1975, the Verification Panel examined three possibilities: first, either ban CMs exceeding 3,000 kilometers or count them in the aggregate; second, lower the threshold to 600 kilometers; third, establish separate ceilings for ALCMs and SLCMs. Most panel members favored the first alternative but still disagreed about the merits of counting versus banning.80

Should the Joint Chiefs of Staff give any more ground over CMs? According to one officer on the Chairman’s Staff Group, the answer was far from clear. The Air Force wanted long-range ALCMs to improve bombers’ capabilities but would not push this project too forcefully from fear of jeopardizing congressional support for the B-1 which, able to get much closer to targets, would need only short-range attack missiles. The Navy was pressing for a long-range SLCM, but no other agency judged SLCMs preferable to additional Poseidon and Trident missiles. In sum, arguments for opposing any limits on long-range CMs struck this officer as “shaky.” Opposing CM limits on the basis of strategic requirements ran into the fact that excluding them from SALT II would leave a significant loophole. Opposing CM limits on the basis of tactical requirements ran into the fact that neither Navy nor Air Force programs were designed for such employment. Perhaps, he concluded, the best justification lay simply in the need to hedge against unforeseen developments.81

During an NSC meeting on 25 July 1975, Secretary Schlesinger advised the President that “it is clear Brezhnev is anxious for this agreement. We would be inclined to give only a little ground, showing a considerable degree of firmness.” He strongly urged sticking with 1,500 kilometers as the minimum range for SLCMs and 3,000 for ALCMs. General Brown concurred, but he cautioned about “a problem concerning the commonality of SLCMs and ALCMs. In our program, they are basically the same missile. We put a SLCM in a can which falls off when it is launched. Once it flies out, it is very similar to the ALCM. This is their verification problem, but there is a chance we are going to be accused we were cheating.”82

At Helsinki, on 30 July and 2 August 1975 President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev tentatively decided to ban intercontinental CMs as well as CMs with a range above 600 kilometers on surface ships and on aircraft other than heavy bombers. But the Soviets, alleging that 12 ALCMs could be loaded on each B-52 and 32 on each B-1, claimed that the United States might deploy as many as 11,000 warheads, far above the 2,400 aggregate. General Secretary Brezhnev bluntly insisted, moreover, that Backfire was not a strategic bomber and must not be counted in the 2,400 aggregate. The President replied, “Well, Mr. General Secretary, here is what our people tell me the Backfire can do”: by using tankers and Arctic bases, fly two-way missions covering the entire United States.83 Secretary General Brezhnev seemed “almost shocked.” After a brief recess, he returned and angrily insisted, “Our figures [about its range] are
right. . . . Your figures are wrong.” President Ford replied, “Our people have been right in most instances in the past. I have to use our figures.” Neither side would yield.84

Lack of progress at Helsinki led Secretary Schlesinger, early in August, to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff what could be done if the Soviets failed either to negotiate realistically or to restrain their strategic buildup. To deal with the former, they recommended steps costing $13 billion over FYs 1976 to 1980; to counter a lack of restraint, actions amounting to $17 billion. In both cases, the main measures would involve expanding ballistic missile defenses and accelerating the Trident, M-X, and B-1 programs. On 15 August 1975 Secretary Schlesinger sent the President contingency proposals to increase DoD and ERDA budgets by $760 million in FY 1976 and by $2.2 billion in FY 1977. Nearly all the money would be spent strengthening strategic offensive forces; increasing missile mobility and accuracy; improving command, control, and communications; expanding intelligence; and adding nuclear weapons—but not, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed, accelerating ABM development. Thereafter, if necessary, Secretary Schlesinger recommended spending $5.4 billion during FYs 1978 to 1980.85

On 20 August 1975, through NSDM 303, President Ford supplied the Geneva delegation with the limited fruits of Helsinki. US negotiators should seek to ban development, testing, and deployment of (1) land-based CMs with intercontinental range, (2) ballistic missiles exceeding 600 kilometers in range which were carried on waterborne vehicles other than submarines, and (3) installations for the seabed launching of ballistic missiles. The Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly told Secretary Schlesinger what further concessions they could support, if concessions seemed essential to break the “apparent impasse”: count Backfires in the 2,400 aggregate only after the number of Backfires exceeded 70; and count ALCMs above 2,000 kilometers and SLCMs above 800 kilometers. They also urged two modifications of NSDM 303. First, its definition of CMs should be changed from “armed” to “nuclear armed” so that conventional CMs and drones would be unaffected. Second, its ban on “missiles” carried by waterborne vehicles other than submarines should be changed to a ban on “launchers.” Otherwise, unlimited numbers of launchers could be installed as long as the missiles themselves were not aboard. Secretary Schlesinger already had sent the President an identical warning about “armed” versus “nuclear armed” CMs. As a result, the Geneva delegation was directed to refrain from tabling a CM definition, pending further review. Subsequently, the “missiles” versus “launchers” issue was resolved according to JCS wishes.86

On 10 September 1975 the Verification Panel reviewed outstanding issues. With regard to CM definitions, Dr. Kissinger noted that the weight of opinion supported “armed,” largely because the interchangeability of warheads would pose insurmountable verification problems. General Brown said the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored counting SLCMs over 1,500 kilometers if the definition was “nuclear armed” and over 3,000 if the definition was “armed.” The Soviets, he believed, would accept ceilings of 2,500 kilometers for ALCMs and 1,500 for SLCMs, because Secretary General Brezhnev was committed to getting a treaty and would pay a price to achieve it. As for Backfire, a CIA spokesman reported that the latest assessment had reduced its range by 200 miles but
still awarded the bomber a “fundamental” intercontinental capability. Was Backfire, Dr. Kissinger inquired, a “marginal” aircraft for performing unrefueled round-trip missions? No, General Brown replied; Backfires could fly one-way missions and then land in Cuba, just as B-52s could bomb the USSR and then refuel before returning to the United States. In that case, Dr. Kissinger observed, F-4s and F-111s also could be classified as heavy bombers, thus strengthening the Soviet case for counting forward-based systems in the 2,400 aggregate.87

Stalemate—or Sabotage

On 17 September 1975 President Ford exhorted the NSC that the administration must make basic decisions requiring new answers. Secretary General Brezhnev, Dr. Kissinger reported, believed he had made major concessions (agreeing to equal aggregates, dropping FBS, and accepting US counting rules on verification) which Washington had not reciprocated. Four days later, in Moscow, Dr. Kissinger learned how true that was. After rejecting the latest US proposals (ban ALCMs over 2,500 kilometers and limit those between a range of 600 and 2,500 kilometers to what could be carried on heavy bombers), Foreign Minister Gromyko countered that Backfires should not be constrained while CMs had to be banned. On 23 September 1975 Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Schlesinger discussed a possible tradeoff: allow about 200 Backfires and nuclear-armed SLCMs up to 600 kilometers outside the aggregate; limit SLCMs with a range between 600 and 2,000 kilometers to 200 and ban those above 2,000 kilometers; and leave ALCMs unconstrained up to 2,500 kilometers but prohibit them above that range. The Air Force, however, preferred limiting Backfires to 100 while increasing the SLCM threshold to 2,500 kilometers. The Navy also objected: either exclude both Backfires and CMs from SALT II or include Backfires and constrain cruise missiles to 600 kilometers for SLCMs and 2,500 kilometers for ALCMs.88

On 23 September 1975 Secretary Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed on a position that largely accommodated Air Force and Navy wishes. First, equate Backfires with ALCM-equipped US bombers, permitting around 200 of each. As a fallback, include 75 FB-111s, which would raise the Backfire total to 275. Second, seek a threshold for nuclear-armed SLCMs below 600 kilometers. As a fallback, allow them below 600 kilometers but ban them above 2,500 kilometers. Third, if necessary, impose a separate sublimit of 300 on ALCM-equipped heavy bombers. Fourth, exclude non-nuclear CMs from any limitations.89

Among themselves, on 16 October 1975 the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the desirability of deferring Backfire and CM limitations until SALT III. They then consulted Lieutenant General Rowny, who replied that “we cannot postpone the Backfire issue.” Secretary General Brezhnev, he was convinced, needed a SALT deal and would not let Backfire stand in the way. A reasonable approach, he argued, might be to require verifiable indicators that Backfires could not fly intercontinental missions.90
General Brown asked the Service Chiefs to appraise Lieutenant General Rowny's reply. General Jones thought little of it, judging by his own proposal: include all Backfires and nuclear-armed CMs, and possibly FB-111s as well, in the 2,400 aggregate. As a fallback, exclude 100 Backfires and 100 US heavy bombers from the aggregate while leaving ALCMs unconstrained. Finally, if necessary, defer the Backfire and CM issues for SALT III. More discussions led to a culmination on 25 November 1975, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the Secretary of Defense a brief recommendation that the Vladivostok understandings “should be formalized at an early summit meeting.” If the Backfire-CM impasse eluded an early solution, “these two issues should be deferred until a subsequent phase of SALT TWO negotiations.”

Meanwhile, Dr. James Wade and his SALT Task Force were preparing their own set of SALT options. When the Verification Panel considered them on 26 November 1975, Dr. Kissinger focused on one that (1) counted in the 1,320 MIRV sublimit those CMs above a range of 600 kilometers but below the intercontinental range and (2) neither counted Backfires in the 2,400 aggregate nor let them go entirely free. Dr. Wade refined this option to ban submarine-borne SLCMs above 600 kilometers but to allow, outside the aggregate, SLCMs up to 2,500 kilometers aboard surface ships. When the panel reconvened two days later, General Brown said the Navy probably could endorse this option, provided that only nuclear-armed CMs were counted. Dr. Ikle suggested excluding Backfires from the aggregate. Instead, Moscow would give assurances against deploying them in a strategic (i.e., intercontinental) role; Washington would do the same for cruise missiles. Dr. Kissinger liked the idea of excluding Backfires, because he saw no possibility that the Soviets would agree to count them in the aggregate. General Brown reminded him, though, that not letting them go free was the basic premise of Dr. Wade's option.

By this time The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld had replaced Dr. James Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense. On 5 December 1975, General Brown told the Service Chiefs that “the ‘SALT Train’ is beginning to move rapidly” and voiced concern about the direction in which it appeared to be heading. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, he feared, were “standing increasingly alone in attempting to constrain Backfire while resisting cruise missile limitations in the absence of Backfire constraints.” The next day, therefore, they advised Secretary Rumsfeld that Backfires and not CMs alone must be constrained.

Dr. Wade's group formulated two alternatives that attracted agencies' attention. In the first, Backfires would not be counted but the Soviets would give assurances about their limitations; heavy bombers carrying ALCMs in the 600 to 2,500 kilometers range would count in the 1,320 MIRV subceiling. In the second, Backfires would count in the 2,400 aggregate and ALCM-equipped heavy bombers in the 1,320 subceiling. Bans would be placed upon submarine-launched CMs above a range of 600 kilometers, ALCMs, surface-ship launched CMs, and land-based CMs above 2,500 kilometers. General Brown asked the Service Chiefs to join in supporting the second alternative and, as a fallback, the first. The Army and Marine Corps complied, although the latter urged “an approach reflecting greater flexibility.” General Jones gave the second his full
support. Admiral Holloway endorsed the first, saying he would endorse the second if an impasse developed but would do so reluctantly and strongly recommended excluding ALCM-equipped bombers from the 1,320 subceiling. At a Verification Panel meeting on 19 December 1975, General Brown and Secretary Rumsfeld recommended offering Soviets the second alternative and then, if necessary, falling back to the first. Dr. Kissinger replied that the Soviets would reject the second because Backfires were included in the 2,400 aggregate and the first because Moscow wanted the Backfire issue resolved and CM development restrained. He recognized that "we are reaching the end of the era of détente and . . . we should make up our minds whether we are willing to let this last opportunity pass us by." But, Secretary Rumsfeld responded, Congress would reject any arrangement that failed to constrain Backfire. In fact, Backfire struck him as only the first among a number of "gray areas." If Backfire could not be resolved satisfactorily, neither could similar issues thereafter.

As 1976 opened, SALT proposals were undergoing constant change, the alterations becoming so abstruse that political and psychological considerations probably drove them more than military and technological ones. Meeting on 8 and 13 January 1976, NSC members assessed the four options summarized below:

**Option I:** Defer Backfire and CM issues  
**Option II:** Place collateral constraints on Backfire in exchange for moderate limitations on cruise missiles.  
**Option III:** Declare Backfires and surface ship SLCMs to be hybrid systems, outside the aggregate, balancing 300 Backfires against 25 surface ships carrying 10 to 15 SLCMs each.  
**Option IV:** Count Backfires in the 2,400 aggregate, ALCMs and surface ship SLCMs above 600 kilometers in the 1,320 sublimit, and ban submarine-launched SLCMs and land-based CMs above a range of 2,500 kilometers.

Dr. Kissinger called Option III as "at the margin of what the Soviets can agree to." Secretary Rumsfeld and General Brown inclined toward Option IV, with the Secretary submitting a "Variant IV" and then a "Modified IV." After an NSC session on 19 January 1976, Dr. Kissinger left for Moscow carrying instructions to start by presenting Modified IV and then Variant IV. After the expected Soviet rejection, he would cable Washington for permission to table Option III.

The Moscow negotiations went as expected, with the Soviets rejecting Modified and Variant IV. On 21 January 1976 Dr. Kissinger asked permission to present a slightly revised Option III. With Secretary Rumsfeld and General Brown in Europe, Admiral Holloway as Acting Chairman attended an NSC meeting late that afternoon. Assuming there was a consensus behind Option III, President Ford asked Admiral Holloway about the Navy's plan to install SLCM launchers aboard surface ships. When the Admiral replied that no plan existed for surface ships, only for submarines, President Ford declared himself "dumbfounded." Admiral Holloway explained that DoD supported Option IV, not Option III. In that case, the President asked, why did DoD back Option IV if it also had surface ship SLCMs? "We in the Navy," Admiral Holloway replied, "didn't think much about SLCMs on surface ships since they are not that good." The President
could only respond, “Well, you can’t have it both ways.” Admiral Holloway stood his ground, defining the “fundamental problem” as pitting 250 Backfires versus 25 surface ships with SLCMs, the Backfires carrying 1,000 warheads against 200 on US ships. President Ford closed the meeting by noting that Backfires were in production while cruise missiles were not. Afterward, Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft cabled Dr. Kissinger that “the President was angrier than I have ever seen him. He ranted about the total inconsistency with previous Defense positions, said that Rumsfeld and Brown could god damn well try to get the extra money necessary when we failed to get a SALT agreement, and stormed out. . . . It was a complete debacle, and I don’t know where we stand now.”

Secretary Rumsfeld and General Brown cabled the White House, essentially backing Admiral Holloway: “In view of factual differences outstanding [with the Soviets] regarding Backfire capabilities, the new elements which have been raised in Moscow, . . . and the fact that time is not pressing on the US side, our feeling is that SecState could politely say that he wishes to discuss these new ideas personally with the President and come home.” Dr. Kissinger returned to Washington with practically nothing to show for his trip.

SALT II had been derailed. President Ford still hoped to conclude an agreement, but the differences among US agencies were at least as great as those between Moscow and Washington. Secretary Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Clements, and General Brown preferred deferring the Backfire and cruise missile issues. Dr. Kissinger, Secretary Rumsfeld, and General Scowcroft prepared still another variation: an interim agreement running until January 1979 would ban the actual deployment of CMs (no US missiles would reach this stage before then) and prohibit Backfire production beyond the current rate as well as improvements to its capability. President Ford transmitted the proposal to Moscow. Secretary General Brezhnev rejected it, on the familiar grounds that it constrained Backfire while allowing cruise missile development to go forward. In the Oval Office, on 24 March 1976 General Brown said he had “heaved a sigh of relief” because even this latest US proposal contained “some problems.”

An NSC meeting on 30 July 1976 became President Ford’s final effort to move SALT II forward. After Secretary Kissinger restated the January and February proposals, General Brown presented the JCS position. “Clean the slate” of everything prior to the February proposal: “We believe we should capture the Backfire [in the aggregate], with the cruise missile providing the necessary leverage.” He and Secretary Rumsfeld made clear their unwillingness to move beyond a position that the Soviets already had rejected. On 1 December, as the Ford-to-Carter transition began, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided Secretary Rumsfeld with an uncompromising assessment they had begun drafting back in September. They began by warning about an “unfavorable trend” in nuclear capabilities, pointing toward “a serious challenge to our ability to maintain credible strategic equivalence and warfighting capability.” They wanted an agreement to assure rough equivalence, preferably at lower force levels. The United States, of course, was relying on its qualitative edge to offset the Soviet Union’s quantitative lead. Now,
however, the advent of Backfires, SS-20 IRBMs, and a new generation of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs “cannot be counterbalanced if US technology is constrained by a SALT agreement.” Specifically, cruise missiles could be “potentially very significant” in preserving the balance. For that reason, they opposed offering any important concessions over strategic CMs unless the Soviets agreed to count Backfires in the 2,400 aggregate.\textsuperscript{101}

Turning to tactical CMs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could find no justification for any limitations at all. Additionally, they wanted the administration to keep insisting on the “block” rule for counting MIRVed missiles (“once a MIRV, always a MIRV”). Soviet negotiators recently had claimed that resolving MIRV verification was linked “inseparably” to US acceptance of cruise missile limitations. To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, though, verification was “a neutral issue for which neither side should be required to pay.” Finally, they described data exchange as an increasingly important concept, on which US negotiators ought to insist but not one which could substitute for verification through national technical means. In forwarding this assessment to the White House, Secretary Rumsfeld particularly stressed their view that US proposals should be treated as an inseparable package.\textsuperscript{102}

From Geneva, near year’s end, Ambassador Johnson sent a mildly upbeat assessment of SALT’s status. He cited nine “significant issues” that had been resolved (e.g., ceilings on the throw weight and launch weight of light and heavy ICBMs). Of the nine still being negotiated, he believed agreement was not far distant over ICBM launcher definition and MIRV verification. However, he did not mention one critical issue—Backfire—because it was not being discussed at Geneva.\textsuperscript{103} Add that, and SALT II could not see a clear track ahead.

Conclusion

In SALT II, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discerned more dangers than opportunities. Theirs gradually became the dominant view for two reasons. First, détente fell out of public favor as many decided it was serving Soviet rather than US interests. By January 1976 President Ford and Secretary Kissinger found themselves beleaguered, unable to impose their will within the administration. Second, negotiating positions became too complicated and multifaceted. Unlike SALT I, where numerical limits could be readily understood, arguments about Backfire capabilities and cruise missile limitations exceeded the comprehension of most lay persons. The emerging issues of telemetry encryption—deliberate concealment of test data—added an even more arcane element.\textsuperscript{104} These problems would persist through the Carter administration.
An aerial starboard bow view of the aircraft carrier USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64) underway. (US Navy Photograph)
Seeking a New Law of the Sea

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, negotiations over a law of the sea treaty proved unique because the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were never the main antagonists. Rather, an extremely diverse group of nations arrayed themselves against the major maritime and industrial powers. Instead of Cold War confrontations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves coping with “rich-versus-poor” issues and other divisions. The issues discussed below—how far to extend the limits of territorial seas; whether to permit free transit through and over archipelagic passages as well as other international straits; whether coastal states could exercise control over maritime scientific research; and how to regulate the mining of resources taken from deep seabeds—created a range of novel alignments among nations.

Technological advances had rendered obsolete the concept of three-mile territorial waters, which dated from the days of sailing ships and cannon ranges. In 1958 and again in 1960, the United Nations (UN) sponsored conferences dealing with maritime issues, but they accomplished nothing. The United States, while reluctantly supporting the extension of territorial seas out to six miles, still continued to recognize the three-mile limit.

In 1967 Washington and Moscow began talking about a conference limited to establishing a maximum breadth for territorial seas; guaranteeing free transit through, over, and under straits; and providing coastal states with preferential fishing rights on the high seas. Concurrently, in the United Nations delegations began discussing how an international authority over deep seabed mining, providing equitable sharing of benefits, might be established. A UN Seabed Committee came into being.

On 23 May 1970 President Nixon publicly proposed that all nations renounce their sovereign claims to seabed resources lying beyond a depth of 200 meters. Such resources, instead, would be exploited by an international regime and regarded as “the common heritage of mankind.” He also urged that a new law of the sea treaty fix a twelve-mile limit for territorial waters and provide for free transit through international straits. As things stood, fifty-one countries claimed a twelve-mile territorial sea;
another fourteen claimed even more. The United States previously had refused to go that far, mainly because a twelve-mile sea would overlap straits less than twenty-four miles wide, thereby affecting more than 100 straits, including Gibraltar. Free transit, including aircraft and submerged submarines, would eliminate the old criterion of “innocent passage” that gave some discretionary authority to coastal states. In 1971 the UN General Assembly voted to convene a comprehensive law of the sea conference two years hence. The Seabed Committee, having grown to eighty-six member states, went ahead with preparatory work. The State Department’s legal adviser, John R. Stevenson, headed the US delegation.

In April 1971 President Nixon commissioned a study of ways to achieve the objectives he had outlined above. He wanted particular attention paid to how actual or potential claims by coastal and archipelagic states could affect US strategic interests. Brazil and Peru recently had extended their territorial sea claims out to 200 miles. Spain asserted a right to control ships carrying “dangerous cargo” through the Strait of Gibraltar. Indonesia and the Philippines, which were archipelagic states, had drawn straight lines connecting their islands’ outermost points and declared the waters inside them to be internal or territorial.

An interdepartmental group, working under State Department chairmanship, circulated a response in June. Existing law revolved around “freedom of the high seas,” a doctrine permitting each nation to act as it saw fit, with reasonable regard for the interests of others, and bound only by restrictions which that nation accepted. This doctrine had served US interests well, but current trends were running against “high seas” and hence against US interests. Without a new international agreement, US forces could preserve their strategic mobility only by either risking a conflict or resorting to a host of unreliable and expensive arrangements with individual nations.

Looking ahead to the UN Preparatory Committee’s next session, the group outlined five options:

1. Hold firmly to the positions outlined by President Nixon on 23 May 1970.
2. Send military units to exercise rights of navigation and overflight on the high seas, including international straits (i.e., straits that were more than six miles wide). That would mean, for example, resuming overflights between 12 and 200 miles off the Peruvian coast and discontinuing courtesy notifications to Indonesia before transiting the narrow straits claimed by Djakarta as territorial waters. This option was included at the Department of Defense (DoD) insistence.
3. By executive action, exert pressure on states that had made or might make claims contrary to US interests. For instance, reverse the decision to supply Brazil with vessels capable of patrolling a 200-mile zone.
4. Undertake a high-level diplomatic offensive aimed at demonstrating the importance Washington attached to achieving its objectives.
5. Offer fresh, substantive initiatives calculated to appeal to Third World countries. As one possibility, expanding the outer limits of a seabed trusteeship zone from a depth of 200 meters out to 200 miles would strongly signal US willingness to accommodate the interests of coastal states.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged this paper adequate and generally responsive to President Nixon's request. Writing to Secretary Laird on 9 July 1971, they emphasized “the importance of having national security aspect recognized as the paramount US interest in law of the sea matters.” Preserving mobility and secrecy of movement by US strategic and general purpose forces were their primary concerns. These objectives could be protected by ensuring (1) freedom of navigation and overflight beyond a twelve-mile limit and (2) freedom of passage through and over international straits.

Predictably, then, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended adopting and pursuing Option 1. They also supported Options 2, 3, and 4, but urged that an interagency review precede any implementation of 2 and 3. Pursuing Option 5, however, would cast doubt upon the credibility of current US proposals and confuse other nations. Specifically, they opposed a 200-mile limit for seabeds because, among other reasons, it would encourage other claims for resource control and for 200-mile territorial seas.4

Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard backed the JCS position only in part. Writing to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger on 9 July 1971, the same day that he received their memorandum, Mr. Packard argued for what amounted to “a slight variation” of Option 1. If necessary, he suggested, US negotiators should either propose or support a 200-mile seabed limit. When the Senior Review Group met three days later, Mr. Stevenson warned that “we're facing the greatest Law of the Seas crisis in three and a half centuries.” Already, nine Latin American countries and one African country claimed continental shelf rights for 200 miles out; five other African states pressed claims beyond twelve miles. According to US geographers, Mr. Stevenson continued, accepting 200 miles would mean that 25 percent of the oceans, including all straits, would cease to be high seas. The United States had proposed a new right of free transit through international straits, as a condition for US agreement to a twelve-mile territorial sea. Over ninety countries, Stevenson noted, supported a twelve-mile sea. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer recommended that the US delegation “test the water initially,” bearing in mind that “the number one objective is to maintain freedom of the seas—on and over.”5

Through National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 122, issued on 22 July 1971, President Nixon decided to seek twelve-mile territorial seas as well as free transit through and over international straits. After a majority of concerned agencies had given their approval, the US delegation could initiate or support a seabed limit presented either in general terms or not exceeding 200 miles in breadth. As for Option 2, he deemed unilateral steps premature. Option 3, involving sanctions, needed further study. However, he did approve the high-level diplomatic campaign outlined in Option 4. As for seabeds, the delegation could respond to other nations’ concern by making non-substantive changes in the US position.6

During the UN Preparatory Commission's summer session, many nations responded enthusiastically to the US proposal for twelve-mile territorial seas. Free straits transit, by contrast, won hardly any backing. States opposed either called “innocent passage” adequate or argued that “innocent” could be suitably redefined. Spain, in particular, worked to exclude any possibility of overflight from the straits discussion.
In October Admiral Moorer met with his Spanish counterpart, Lieutenant General Manual Diez-Alegria, and emphasized the essentiality of free passage through the Strait of Gibraltar. “The United States,” he said, “will not accept any restrictions on the conduct of naval operations in the Mediterranean.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 13 November 1971 reminded Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird that they would support a twelve-mile limit only in conjunction with free transit through and over international straits. Extending territorial seas from three miles out to twelve, they noted, would place many important straits wholly within the control of coastal states. Movement then would be subject to the limitations of “innocent passage.” According to that doctrine, submarines must transit on the surface and overflight required the coastal state’s permission, but some states defined “innocence” according to a ship’s flag, cargo, or destination. Extending the limit to twelve miles would affect about one hundred straits. The Joint Chiefs of Staff rated the majority important to US security interests, either now or in the foreseeable future. The right of free transit, they stressed, had to be based upon a principle of international law and not be dependent upon the consent of coastal countries.

The United States, as well as other maritime nations, had rejected expansionist claims by archipelagic states because they would deny freedom of navigation and restrict international oversight in vast areas of the oceans. Indonesia or the Philippines might barter free straits transit in exchange for support of their respective archipelagic claims. The Joint Chiefs of Staff labeled any such tradeoff premature. First, they wanted to know how many countries would support the US position on straits transit, what worldwide implications archipelagic claims might have, and what options might be available to protect vital US rights of navigation and overflight. Summing up, they worried about the lack of international support for free straits transit. Unless such support could be assured, they preferred continuing the three-mile limit for territorial seas.

President Nixon wanted more precise information about the problem of straits passage. In March 1972 he asked DoD to list (among other things) which straits were considered militarily essential, which ones were deemed only important, and how many were of marginal or no interest. Last year, he asked, how many warships had sailed through straits identified as essential or important? The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Laird a detailed response in mid-April but let him know that they disliked emphasizing past usage. To them, “strategy, not statistics, is the central point. The basic point of a forward strategy is mobility of action, and that mobility loses its credibility when there is not a sound basis in international law for the United States to assert its rights. A strait which today, and for several years past, has seldom been utilized by US forces could tomorrow be the crucial point in a crisis action.”

In past years, the Joint Chiefs of Staff related, the USSR had promoted a concept of “closed seas” under which littoral powers could control their bordering seas and exclude or severely limit access by all others. Now the Soviets appeared to be shifting toward a limited right of free transit, which would keep some straits open but permit the closing of others. Accepting that approach, they argued, would constitute a severe
loss for the United States and a net gain for the Soviet Union. Secretary Laird whole-
heartedly endorsed their views and on 1 May 1972 so informed Dr. Kissinger.\(^9\)

Back in March 1972, as the Preparatory Committee’s next meeting drew near, 
President Nixon ordered the interagency task force to recommend negotiating posi-
tions. Its draft reply three months later provoked a controversy over how to deal with 
the archipelago issue. Option One would grant a state exclusive resource jurisdiction 
in its archipelagic waters, but otherwise treat such waters as high seas. Option Two 
would treat archipelagic waters as territorial but subject to a right of free passage 
under, through, and over suitable corridors. Commenting in July, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff still defined agreement upon a twelve-mile territorial sea coupled with free transit 
through and over international straits as the “paramount” US objective. Consequently, 
for archipelagoes, they preferred Option One. In their judgment, Option Two had such 
far-reaching implications that its presentation by US negotiators should await further 
study and developments.\(^{10}\)

Writing to Dr. Kissinger on 8 July 1972, Secretary Laird strongly endorsed the JCS 
position and warned that other countries’ intransigence was casting doubt upon the 
very wisdom of having a law of the sea conference. He considered it “abundantly clear,” 
for example, that supporting Indonesia’s archipelagic claim would not induce Indonesia 
to accept, without prior notice, submerged transit through the straits. Thus Option 
Two held little, if any, prospect of proving advantageous to US security interests. 
On 18 July 1972 President Nixon ruled against any public recognition of archipelago 
claims. Privately, though, the US delegation should explore possible formulations with 
Indonesia and other states.\(^{11}\)

During July and August 1972 negotiators in the Seabed Committee worked over 
issues that would form the conference’s agenda. By mid-August the committee stood near 
agreement about how to define the straits issue. The language proposed read as follows:

Strait Used for International Navigation:
1. Innocent passage.
2. Other related matters, including the question of the right of transit.

The head of the US delegation, supported by all other members of the delegation except 
the Defense representative, strongly backed the proposed language. Defense, on the 
other hand, argued that omitting “free” before transit would reveal US willingness 
to compromise on this “vital” issue. Why surrender an existing right to transit freely 
through vital straits? On 15 August 1972 President Nixon did approve the majority’s 
language but emphasized that its acceptance in no way detracted from US insistence 
upon free straits passage.\(^{12}\)

As 1973 opened, the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no evidence of serious efforts to 
narrow national differences or to negotiate compromises. Accordingly, for Secretary 
Laird’s benefit, they restated fundamental objectives. First, seek agreement on narrow 
territorial seas, no greater than twelve miles, coupled with free straits transit and the 
preservation of all existing high seas freedoms relating to military operations. Second,
take steps to assure rights of high seas and straits transit, regardless of how the law of the sea conference might deal with these issues. Third, protect military rights to use the seabed.  

Seabed mining emerged as a pivotal issue. The deep ocean floor contains commercially attractive quantities of copper, nickel, manganese, and cobalt. The US government anticipated that an International Seabed Authority would grant licenses for mining operations whenever an applicant conformed to the rules and conditions specified by a treaty. The US Treasury Department worried, though, that DoD hoped to trade economic concessions for transit rights. Through NSDM 225, a review of US economic interests took place.  

During July and August 1973 the Seabed Committee held another session. Rear Admiral H. B. Robertson, Deputy Judge Advocate of the Navy, served on the US delegation as JCS representative. Afterward, he reported that many states now seemed willing to accept free straits transit. In exchange, they wanted greater control over coastal seabed resources and some assurance that straits transit would not harm their own security interests. Consequently, Rear Admiral Robertson recommended minor changes in the US position. On seabed mining, however, differences among the national delegations actually deepened. Africans and Latin Americans advocated for an “Enterprise” that would enjoy exclusive power to exploit the seabeds.  

In December 1973 the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to support minor modifications of free transit: continue the regime of innocent passage for straits as much as six miles wide; and apply innocent passage to straits leading only from high seas to territorial seas (e.g., the Strait of Tiran). As a final fallback position, they proposed designating waters outside the normal territorial seas but within the baselines drawn by archipelagic states as “archipelagic waters,” subject to exclusive economic jurisdiction by the archipelagic states. But deep sea mining, evidently, allowed little room for compromise. In February 1974, answering NSDM 225, an interagency task force advised against accepting any Enterprise or Authority that could deny access or impose inhibiting conditions on the exploitation of resources.  

The Law of the Sea Conference convened in December 1973 for an organizational session. The head of the US delegation, John R. Stevenson, held ambassadorial rank. Admiral Moorer still worried that the Department of State’s commitment to such goals as free overflight and submerged transit might be less than whole-hearted. At his urging, the White House named Professor John Norton Moore to be vice chairman of the US delegation as well as chairman of an interagency task force on law of the sea. Also, on 19 November 1973 Rear Admiral Max K. Morris, USN, became JCS Representative for Law of the Sea matters.  

Late in March 1974, before the conference’s first substantive session, the interagency task force circulated proposed instructions for the US delegation. Three of its recommendations provoked some interagency disagreements:  

1. For archipelagoes, the task force recommended accepting transit through “a passage area not less than 75 percent of the area between the nearest point of land or
100 miles, whichever is nearer. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were willing to support this concession if it served as a key ingredient in achieving their straits and high seas objectives. However, they wanted an opportunity to review any potential resolution beforehand.

2. On scientific research, the main US objective was avoiding a requirement that coastal states give their consent for research beyond the territorial seas. That would supersede the Continental Shelf Convention, which already required such consent. Coastal states currently possessed with respect to seabeds, and would acquire with respect to fisheries, very substantial resource jurisdiction beyond their territorial seas. Thus far, the US argument that coastal states need only be notified about scientific research had attracted little international support. Accordingly, the task force proposed a carefully qualified consent regime. Under this approach, coastal states would have to permit research once specific criteria had been fulfilled. Even so, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave this proposal their “unequivocal disapproval.” For them, notification alone was quite enough. The US juridical position, they argued, held that a treaty would constitute an agreed granting of coastal-state rights not currently enjoyed under international law. “Even private indications of a potential disposition to consider a consent regime would signal a radical departure of the United States from the juridical tenets on which not only scientific research but most other aspects of its overall position depend for viability.”

3. On deep seabed mining, the task force formulated options running the gamut from an Authority with complete power to one with none at all. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed one designed to ensure access by US firms under reasonable conditions. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements fully agreed with JCS views and so advised the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee. The recent Arab-Israeli War, he said, further demonstrated the essentiality of free straits transit. Under a regime such as innocent passage, Spain could have prevented US aircraft en route to Israel from flying over the Strait of Gibraltar. Without a treaty, though, the twelve-mile territorial sea could become customary international law. In that case, provisions for straits transit would be the same as those which prevailed in territorial seas (i.e., submarines must travel on the surface and aircraft must gain permission for overflight). Mr. Clements also protested a proposal that would allow the chairman of the US delegation to offer concessions after “consulting” the senior representatives of concerned agencies. He urged, instead, that unanimous approval from senior Defense representatives be required.

President Nixon, on 24 July 1974, rendered decisions that mostly met JCS wishes. Subject to “consent” by senior Defense representatives, the US delegation could accept a regime of non-suspendable innocent passage through straits which were not more than six miles wide (or which, if wider than six miles, did not connect two parts of the high seas). As for scientific research, the President ruled against accepting a requirement for consent from the coastal states. On seabed mining, he settled upon the option favored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Direct exploitation of resources by the Authority could be approved only as part of a final package that satisfied US concerns about nondiscriminatory access and operating rules.

The Law of the Sea Conference’s first substantive session ran from June until August 1974. Many Third World countries, Admiral Morris reported afterward, proved
willing to accept a twelve-mile territorial sea and free straits transit if the treaty's economic provisions satisfied them. On archipelagoes, all principal elements of the US position won tentative agreement, except for the width of sea lanes. Over the key issue of deep seabed mining, however, Third World countries rejected US proposals.20

Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff eased their specifications about archipelagic passage. In August 1974 they proposed defining a channel as comprising 75 percent of the area between the nearest points of land or only 50 kilometers, whichever was less. Three months later they relaxed the definition to 50 percent and 25 nautical miles, if “firm and unambiguous agreement” could be reached about free air, surface, and underwater passage through archipelagic corridors. As for scientific research, they suggested no more than cosmetic concessions.21

Early in January 1975, as the conference prepared to reconvene, the interagency task force recommended three small retreats. First, for archipelagic passage, accept lanes based on a percentage of the distance between main islands and a specific distance for maximum breadth. Senior State and Defense representatives on the task force concurred, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged some rewording to emphasize more strongly the linkage between archipelagic and straits passage. Second, if absolutely necessary, accept a provision that scientific research require the consent of coastal states. Such consent would have to be given, though, whenever certain reasonable and uniform requirements were met. The Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no reason to make this concession, since seventeen states publicly supported notification without consent. Third, on seabed mining, try to accommodate both an International Authority and private enterprise by proposing such options as joint ventures or a parallel system of exploitation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff lodged no objection. Once again, Deputy Secretary Clements endorsed JCS views about straits passage and scientific research. He also voiced concern about the broad flexibility being envisioned for the US delegation's chairman and vice chairman. On deep seabeds, for example, their discretionary power was so broad that Mr. Clements could not determine what kind of an Authority might emerge. Why not use this discretion sparingly and privately, he asked, until a treaty appeared to be achievable?22

President Ford decided to give US negotiators a good deal of latitude. Through NSDM 288, issued on 24 March 1975, he authorized presentation of the archipelago proposal above. For scientific research, the delegation’s chairman could present the regime described above—while bearing in mind the importance of avoiding “any system which would require the consent of the coastal state for marine scientific research.” Thus, on this point, he rejected the JCS recommendation to stay with notification alone. On seabed mining, as the task force proposed, the President approved a parallel system of exploitation, on condition that access to resources could be guaranteed.23

As the conference wound through its spring 1975 session, there was general acceptance of a 12-mile territorial sea, a 200-mile economic zone with broad jurisdiction by coastal states over resources, free transit of straits used for international navigation, and a reasonable archipelago regime. Deep seabed mining remained the greatest
obstacle, the US objective being a guarantee of nondiscriminatory access. Delays or
even collapse of the conference became a real possibility. Accordingly, in February
1976 the Acting Assistant Secretary, International Security Affairs (ISA), asked the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine how US interests could be protected if negotiations
failed to produce an acceptable treaty. Their reply, one month later, suggested how to
deal with the most sensitive issues. First, assert that transit through, under, and over
international straits would remain unaffected by any extension of territorial seas. Sec-
ond, support (in some cases) the development of customary law recognizing a 12-mile
territorial sea and the right of coastal states to resources out to either 200 miles or the
limits of the continental shelf. Third, cite the lack of consensus about establishing an
International Seabed Resources Authority, but keep seeking some form of agreement
about deep seabed mining. Fourth, reject restrictive claims by archipelagic states, on
grounds that the conference had failed to support them. These recommendations could
be put into effect by presidential declarations, congressional resolutions, bilateral or
multilateral agreements, scheduling military operations and maritime activities within
contested waters (particularly through and over international straits), and rejecting
all claims deemed contrary to US security interests.24

Meantime, in May 1975 Ambassador Stevenson resigned. To succeed him, President
Ford chose Mr. T. Vincent Learson, who had spent his career with the IBM Corporation.
To the Joint Chiefs’ chagrin, Mr. Learson soon engineered Professor Moore’s resigna-
tion. Friction developed within the delegation over what Admiral Morris saw as Mr.
Learson’s willingness to act without consulting Defense representatives and even to
exceed presidential instructions.25

At the conference’s session in spring 1976, a text emerged endorsing “transit pas-
sage” rights through and over international straits, with carefully defined exceptions
(e.g., the Strait of Tiran, where a non-suspendable right of innocent passage would
apply). Since “transit passage” contained all elements of the US proposal for free
passage, a major victory had been won. On scientific research, though, the outcome
remained uncertain. Admiral Morris doubted whether mandatory consent, once certain
conditions were met, would attract much support. Finally, for seabed mining, most
Third World countries strongly opposed any weakening of the International Authority’s
exclusive right to control access. The United States, of course, insisted upon assured
access by states and private parties. A late summer session yielded only further dead-
lock. In December Admiral Morris advised General Brown that, due to the differences
over seabed mining, “the odds are now strongly against a comprehensive treaty in the
foreseeable future. In such case there will be only customary law in the oceans and
the outlines are patent: a 12-mile territorial sea; a prescriptive right of straits transit
(the Soviet position); coastal jurisdiction over seabeds to the very utmost edge of the
continental margins; and a 200-mile Economic Zone.”26

As the Ford administration ended, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could feel satisfied
with the way US negotiating positions had evolved. Unimpeded passage through and
over international straits was their overriding objective—and the President gave it
his full support. The archipelago issue remained unsettled. So, too, did the subject of scientific research. Negotiations had moved toward giving coastal countries even greater discretion—exactly the opposite of what the United States wanted. There was broad agreement that coastal states should have rights over resources and economic installations within a 200-mile zone, but not about how to define a continental shelf beyond 200 miles. Looming over everything, however, was the impasse about deep seabed mining.\textsuperscript{27} On 10 December 1982, 117 nations signed a Law of the Sea Treaty. The United States refused, on grounds that the powers granted a global authority over deep seabed mining would inhibit free enterprise. Economic advantage, rather than national security, had become the conference’s sticking-point.
NATO celebrates its 25th anniversary on 4 April 1974. (NATO photograph)
Between 1973 and 1976 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was buffeted by squalls that sprang up in unusual places. The Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974, triggered by US aid to Israel during the October war, had repercussions for NATO. President Nixon and Dr. Henry Kissinger wanted to maintain Western solidarity against economic disruption and Soviet opportunism. Europeans, however, blamed the US policy of seemingly unqualified support for Israel. No meeting of minds proved possible.

As the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw matters, Allied Command Europe needed accelerated modernization and even some augmentation. But European allies, convinced that a threat of swift nuclear escalation was the surest deterrent, proved loath to pay for major conventional improvements. Members of Congress, irritated by the allies’ attitude, called for reducing the number of US troops stationed in Western Europe. Paradoxically, on-going talks between NATO and Warsaw Pact nations about mutual and balanced force reductions became the means of deflecting congressional demands for unilateral US reductions. Although it was not evident at the time, simply preserving the status quo worked in the West’s favor.

The “Year of Europe”

Nineteen seventy-three is the year of Europe because the era that was shaped by the decisions of a generation ago is ending. The success of these policies has produced new realities that require new approaches.” So spoke Dr. Kissinger on 23 April 1973 before an audience of newspaper editors.1 Already, in fact, President Nixon had begun a comprehensive review of US policies and programs. National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 168, circulated on 13 February 1973, assigned the highest
priority to “a comprehensive study of NATO strategy, US policy choices and programs supporting the NATO allies.” It should identify weaknesses in defense capabilities and develop alternatives to correct them. Within the Department of Defense (DoD), the Office of International Security Affairs (ISA) became the focal point for this effort.2

According to the Military Committee (MC) 14/3, the strategic concept adopted by NATO in January 1968, the threat of escalation constituted the main deterrent to Warsaw Pact aggression. Therefore, NATO needed to maintain a full spectrum of capabilities. Conventional forces should be able to counter a limited assault and, if a larger attack occurred, confront an aggressor with the prospect of non-nuclear hostilities on a scale large enough to pose a grave risk of nuclear escalation if he persisted. Tactical nuclear capabilities ought to be sufficient either to deter their use by an enemy or to respond by raising the threat of escalation to all-out nuclear war. Strategic nuclear forces, still NATO’s backbone, should remain strong enough to inflict catastrophic damage in a retaliatory attack.3

Considerable ambiguity lay concealed within this seemingly straightforward description. How long, for example, should Allied Command Europe be able to defend with conventional capabilities alone, without a major loss of territory? According to President Nixon’s directives, non-nuclear US forces should be able to fight for about ninety days against a full-scale attack and possess an enhanced capability for the first thirty days of such a defense. But European allies, viewing the threat of rapid nuclear escalation as the surest means of deterrence, had equipped their conventional forces to fight for two or three weeks at most.

On 31 December 1972 there were 256,711 personnel assigned to the US European Command. Late in February 1973 Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson’s special assistant, Mr. Jonathan Moore, raised the question of the minimum number of US troops needed in Europe to provide an effective deterrent. According to Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, General Creighton W. Abrams criticized such thinking as “the hostage concept” and advised his JCS colleagues that “we have to draw the line somewhere” against cutbacks. President Nixon had ruled that no reductions would occur, provided the Europeans did their part to keep non-nuclear defenses strong. Nonetheless, Admiral Moorer cautioned his principal staff officers that “we are going to cut over there sooner or later we know.”4

What were the requirements for a successful conventional defense? An Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)/Army review indicated that between thirty-four and seventy-three armored division equivalents (ADEs) were needed to hold, for varying amounts of time, the Weser-Lech River line in West Germany. Currently, Allied Command Europe could deploy forty-four ADEs in Central Europe. Systems analysts in OSD concluded (1) that NATO’s programmed forces could prevent West Germany from being overrun completely during the first ninety days of conventional combat and (2) that DoD must counter a widespread view that theater nuclear forces constituted the only viable deterrent. After being briefed, Secretary Richardson expressed interest in using the Army/OSD study to develop a NATO consensus about conventional force
levels. But the Army opposed making this study a basis for NATO consultations, on grounds that many areas of uncertainty remained unresolved.5

Preparing a response to NSSM 168 created a split between OSD and the Joint Staff. Officials in OSD, evaluating the threat according to a range of estimates, concluded that a credible conventional defense in Central Europe was attainable without vastly increased effort. Also, according to OSD, sustainment capability should be sacrificed in favor of front-line strength to defend successfully during the first weeks of war. And, by OSD’s reckoning, programmed air forces should achieve superiority over the battle area, while naval forces ought to be able to keep the sea lanes open for reinforcement convoys.

The Joint Staff, by contrast, centered upon one “best estimate” placing the threat at eighty-six Warsaw Pact divisions. In that case, US ground forces would have to increase by 25 percent and those of the allies by 15 percent to create a credible conventional defense. Also, according to Joint Staff calculations, the US Air Force would have to strip all its other commands in order to reinforce Europe adequately. The US Navy could safeguard the North Atlantic lifeline but could not, at the same time, mount amphibious operations on the flanks of Allied Command Europe, secure the Mediterranean, and protect sea lanes in the Pacific. Moreover, contrary to OSD’s opinion, a sustaining capability seemed essential since the allies were not furnishing enough forces to assure success in any specific period.6 After all, tactical nuclear weapons should be used only if NATO had the conventional means to capitalize upon the temporary advantages thus gained. But the allies, significantly, believed that NATO’s land forces contained only half the combat potential of the Warsaw Pact and estimated that enemy troops could reach the Rhine in five to seven days.

In mid-May an executive summary responding to NSSM 168 reached completion. It described NATO as having made, during 1969-1972, substantial efforts to correct deficiencies. Chiefly, the arsenal of antitank weapons had been increased and aircraft shelters built. There were the first fruits of the Defense Planning Committee’s Alliance Defense AD-70, a five–year effort launched by member states in December 1970. Yet NATO’s mobilization capacities showed little improvement, and national logistic objectives still differed widely: ninety days of supply for US forces versus about thirty for the Europeans. A central question involved how far to clarify and resolve the differences over strategy and force planning.

What of the future? The summary cited steps that might be taken: coordinating and further strengthening antitank defenses; expanding the aircraft shelter program; improving low-level air defenses; and effecting improvements in logistics, integration of efforts, and the standardization of armaments. Probably, though, public opinion would not permit increases in defense spending. Experience showed, moreover, that discussions with the allies about improving reserves, logistics, and standardization quickly would uncover basic differences over strategy and the balance of forces. Still, all in all, NATO had experienced in the early 1970s a “substantial but unquantifiable” increase in conventional capabilities.7
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., considered some aspects of the summary too optimistic. In conventional combat, he argued, Allied Command Europe would face a “high risk” of collapse due to lack of adequate reinforcement and resupply from the United States. As he saw matters, the Warsaw Pact intended to wage an intensive anti-shipping campaign while, at the same time, preventing aerial interdiction of its own supply lines. He claimed that, according to recent studies, as much as 50 percent of military shipping might be lost during the first thirty days of fighting. Consequently, “there is considerable danger that NATO would be forced to negotiate or escalate from a position of conventional force exhaustion.”

Meanwhile, through National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 211 issued on 26 April 1973, President Nixon emphasized “the importance of an allied commitment to further improvements” and asked the Secretary of Defense to propose appropriate undertakings. A draft reply focused on five issues: make the methods for measuring progress toward force improvements more detailed and precise; coordinate more fully NATO’s force planning process; increase the degree of cooperation in standardization, development, and procurement; make a common effort to accomplish improvements, mainly those specified in the summary; and, for the longer term, try to capitalize upon innovative technology and the inherent strengths of the North Atlantic community.

Concurrently, there began the process of drafting Ministerial Guidance for the major NATO commanders, applicable between 1975 and 1980. On the most contentious matter—how long a non-nuclear defense should last—an April 1973 draft stated that “most military assessments point to a short period of hostilities. This might differ from area to area of Allied Command Europe, but in the Central Region is likely to be measured in terms of days.” Upon review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared it “essential” that such guidance “neither state nor imply a strategy of a war of short duration and early escalation.” On 19 May, they so advised Acting Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr. As Admiral Moorer added separately, “I believe that a short war strategy is in reality a strategy for early defeat.”

General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA, served as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). He used the responses to the annual Defense Planning Questionnaire, through which all alliance members who were part of the integrated command structure regularly updated their commitments, to determine the NATO Force Plan for 1974-1978. On 28 June 1973 the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted what became the US response. The Army’s contribution would come to 4 1/3 divisions and 2 armored cavalry regiments (ACRs) in West Germany. Two-thirds of the 1st Infantry Division and one ACR were dual-based in the Continental United States (CONUS), returning to Germany periodically for “Reforger” exercises. Another 3 Army divisions, 1 brigade, and 1 ACR constituted a strategic reserve in CONUS, able to reach Europe thirty days after mobilization began (M+30). One Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) was slated to reach Europe by M+45, another by M+60. Thus the debilitating effects of the Vietnam War, during which the CONUS strategic reserve had been severely depleted, finally disappeared. The US naval commitment amounted to ten aircraft carriers, including
ships normally stationed in the Pacific or scheduled for overhaul in Atlantic ports, and thirty-one Poseidon missile submarines. Amphibious ships could provide 20-knot lift for slightly more than one MAF. Thirty-six surface ships—twenty-seven destroyers of World War II vintage and nine submarines—were being retired and so removed from the US commitment. The Air Force would maintain twenty-one tactical fighter squadrons (eighteen F-4, three F-111) in Europe and keep ten more in CONUS, earmarked as a Rapid Reaction Force to be available by M+3.\footnote{11}

Meeting jointly on 25 May 1973, the Senior Review Group and the Defense Program Review Committee addressed differences among allies. Dr. Kissinger argued that Europeans “have got to face up to the linking of political, economic and defense factors. . . . We can’t have a trade war [with the Common Market] and keep troops in Europe.” He emphasized the need for a consensus: “We don’t want to change the strategy of flexible response, but we [do] want a complete concept.” Admiral Moorer wanted greater allied efforts at force improvement but opposed any radical initiatives in the realm of strategy.\footnote{12} Yet, Dr. Kissinger countered, “The only way to avoid a radical initiative is to get a concept which we share.” He worried that, without visible progress, Congress might vote a 75,000-man troop cut by September. Admiral Moorer observed that NATO had only two options: use nuclear weapons immediately or try to stem the tide with conventional forces. True, said Dr. Kissinger, “but which one we decide on determines deployments.” That led to a stark delineation of alternatives:

Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush: How can they not use NATO troops for a conventional defense?
Dr. Kissinger: How can they use them in their present state? It’s like the French army in 1940—there are too many weak spots, too many anomalies. It may be that the best way out is a substantial defense with the fixes needed to make it more effective. Then we could defend [before Congress] the need for forces in Europe as being essential for political reasons. But we can’t keep 300,000 American troops in Europe so that [West German Chancellor Willy] Brandt can use them to bargain with the Soviets.
Under Secretary of the Treasury Paul Volcker: And create a monetary system so that we can’t pay for them.
Admiral Moorer: I don’t disagree. We should tell them that unless they are willing to take the actions necessary to correct the deficiencies, we can no longer provide the forces required for the present strategy.

Finally, Dr. Kissinger asked how a single US commander, guided by military logic alone, would defend Central Europe. That, he believed, “would be a good yardstick against which to measure what we’re doing.” Admiral Moorer agreed to undertake such a study.\footnote{13}

The Joint Staff studied Dr. Kissinger’s question and concluded that, while current plans were valid, NATO needed to take several steps: increase the standardization, centralization, and integration of national efforts; recognize the likely need for emergency use of tactical nuclear weapons; improve the sustaining capability of conventional forces; and carry out force improvement programs. An American commander, acting
from military motives alone, had two alternatives. First, develop a more porous defense concept and create a hard-hitting reserve, which would require the steps cited above as well as expensive force restructuring. Second, continue the linear defense concept but redeploy some armored and mechanized divisions in Germany northward. Doing so would call for extremely costly restructuring along the entire central front.\textsuperscript{14}

Dr. James Schlesinger came to the post of Secretary of Defense convinced that his top priority must be revising the alliance’s strategy and strengthening Allied Command Europe. In his judgment, the advent of strategic nuclear equality between the superpowers meant the threat of nuclear escalation had lost its credibility. Consequently, conventional capabilities must be improved. On 7 June 1973, before he had won Senate confirmation, Dr. Schlesinger prepared to address NATO’s Defense Planning Committee. A few hours before he was scheduled to speak, Admiral Moorer and General T. R. Milton, USAF, the US Representative on the NATO Military Committee, reviewed his text. It referred to a ninety-day war. Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff had succeeded in eliminating short-war references from the Draft Ministerial Guidance, Admiral Moorer objected to having the Secretary’s statement mention a specific length of time. He also doubted whether reviewing guidelines for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons, as the text suggested, would be worthwhile. Germans particularly lacked enthusiasm for these weapons. Therefore, Admiral Moorer told General Milton, “The more we discuss this problem the worse off we become. Our best scheme is simply not talk about it and the intellectuals fail to perceive this. They claim we have no doctrine for tactical nuclear warfare. But the problem is that we cannot pre-plan tactical nuclear targets to their satisfaction.”\textsuperscript{15}

When Dr. Schlesinger spoke, he mentioned both a ninety-day war and tactical nuclear weapons. But, he continued, “The United States simply cannot go it alone in supporting the conventional deterrent. . . . Indeed, and I am sorry to say this, I doubt that Congress will long continue to appropriate the funds for large conventional forces in Europe if the US remains the only consistently serious advocate of non-nuclear deterrence.” Before Dr. Schlesinger could proceed to outline force improvements, Secretary-General Joseph Luns intervened and the discussion moved in other directions. Afterwards, the British and West German Defense Ministers as well as Mr. Luns let it be known that they much disliked certain of Dr. Schlesinger’s remarks. Concurrently, The Washington Post published a story about a US Army study suggesting that NATO could handle the most likely threat with fewer ground forces. Taken together, the speech and the story made Europeans worry that some US withdrawals were imminent.\textsuperscript{16}

Significant disparities between NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces needed early correction,\textsuperscript{17} and the United States believed that most national economies could afford the much needed improvements specified in AD-70. Despite the Warsaw Pact’s advantage of initiative and Allied Command Europe’s need to defend as far forward as possible, a large-scale conventional attack probably would be followed by intensive fighting likely to require an early decision on the use of nuclear weapons. Yet, NATO continued to equivocate on increasing funding. In short, NATO’s strategic
thinking was still mired in ambiguity and cross-purposes. No foundations had been laid for making major improvements to Allied Command Europe's conventional posture.

France, which had withdrawn from the integrated command in 1967 and evicted US forces from its soil, continued to pose special problems. In April 1973 Admiral Moorer talked with his French opposite, General François Louis Maurin, about reconstituting a NATO line of communications through France. General Maurin replied that storing many supplies would give the appearance of readiness to fight a long conventional war, which France would not tolerate. However, he did agree to have US and French staffs study some preparatory steps that did not involve fixed installations. In December 1973 Admiral Moorer suggested broadening the scope of these talks to cover such topics as dual use of French air bases. General Maurin agreed but emphasized that these talks focus on procedural matters rather than policy.18

On 30 June 1973, at San Clemente, California, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger briefed ambassadors from NATO nations. A Nixon-Brezhnev summit had just ended, and allied governments worried that the resulting Soviet-American “Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War”19 might lead to their being ignored by the superpowers. After a quick read, Admiral Moorer felt the agreement would create more problems than it solved. He warned National Security Council (NSC) Staff members that, among other things, many in Congress would use it to justify further force reductions. To the ambassadors, President Nixon emphasized that “for us the Alliance comes first.” But Dr. Kissinger also warned them against complacency: “In this country there is no public demand for the Year of Europe and certainly no Congressional demand.” He stressed, too, that NATO needed a rational defense concept. Some European allies had only enough supplies to fight for fourteen days, some for thirty. The United States supposedly had enough for ninety days. “If the Congress ever catches on to these problems,” Dr. Kissinger warned, “we cannot defend our position.”20

Secretary Schlesinger hoped that West Germany would set an example for other allies by building up its Bundeswehr. Yet when Defense Minister Georg Leber came to Washington in mid-July, he told Dr. Schlesinger that “a 90-day war in [West Germany] was inconceivable . . . because of the space involved.” Secretary Schlesinger countered that a ninety-day capability demonstrated NATO’s resolve, while the risk of war would be raised if the Soviets saw a chance for quick success. Mr. Leber simply repeated that “the first 30 days of war were most important. . . . While the first phase can be conventional, the US must then cross the nuclear threshold.” Admiral Moorer cautioned that debating how long a war might last would be unproductive. If conventional forces could hold only for a short period, congressmen would ask why so many US troops needed to stay in Europe.21

Meanwhile, on 5 July 1973 Secretary Schlesinger established in DoD a NATO Task Force chaired by Assistant Secretary (ISA) Robert Hill. Its first order of business became the examination of a proposed NATO Action Program. The program’s purpose was “to adapt NATO forces and planning for an effective conventional option, which we believe is militarily possible and strategically and politically necessary.” The
vehicles for achieving this goal would be detailed reports, prepared by NATO agencies and forwarded to defense ministers, analyzing antitank measures, air defenses, munitions stockpiles, and mobilization capabilities. Initial decisions might be taken at the November and December ministerial meetings.

On 31 July 1973 the NATO Task Force commissioned wide-ranging studies that would engage the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the next several months. Secretary Schlesinger told Chairman Hill to “move forward expeditiously on the tasks outlined in your NATO Action program.” Dr. Schlesinger intended to give the Central Region primary attention, leaving the northern and southern flanks until later. On 8 August the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged him not to slight the flanks, the sea lines of communication, and the interdependencies among various elements of the action program. At this point, hopes were high. Admiral Moorer assured General Goodpaster that “Dr. Schlesinger is working full tilt on NATO problems, and it might turn out that he will prove to be one of NATO’s all-time best friends.”

The NATO Task Force directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in cooperation with OSD’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, to propose ways of improving antitank defenses. Armor was an area in which the Warsaw Pact enjoyed great numerical superiority: more than 17,000 medium tanks available in Central Europe on M-Day, compared to 6,745 for NATO. After examining only ground weapons, the JCS Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency (SAGA) recommended expanding the weaponry available by M+23 days by adding 1,517 M-60A1 tanks, 1,373 TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) missiles mounted on M-113 armored personnel carriers, and 4,117 shoulder-fired Dragons. Costs would come to $1.092 billion. Commenting on 15 October 1973, the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized the complexities surrounding a tank battle. There were many means by which, and phases in which, an attacking armored force would suffer attrition. Consequently, SAGA’s static analysis “cannot be considered as representative of the dynamic interaction of land and air forces on the battlefield.” They did recommend, though, that data on weapons and capabilities be forwarded to NATO’s Executive Working Group (EWG). In April 1974 the EWG did receive a briefing on US air and ground antitank weapon systems. Lessons from the latest Arab-Israeli war, in which early battles proved more intense and tank losses much higher than expected, were being applied.

The task force also studied steps to improve aircraft survivability. In 1970, General Goodpaster had called for constructing about 2,100 shelters, which would protect about 70 percent of the tactical aircraft programmed to arrive in Europe by M+30 days. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested broadening this program, at a cost of $658 million, to protect 100 percent of the M+30 aircraft. They also urged immediate action to increase the number of collocated air bases and to begin steps to reduce the vulnerability of
heavy lift aircraft. This proved to be an area in which the allies moved quite slowly. Europeans argued that the advent of a revolutionary Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), housed in a modified Boeing 707 and providing coverage over extremely wide areas, might obviate a need for more shelters.

The remaining JCS responses, forwarded during October, dealt with desirable levels of munitions reserves and benefits from restructuring, rationalization, and standardization. For war reserves, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported Secretary Schlesinger’s belief that NATO’s levels should exceed those of the Warsaw Pact, which apparently amounted to about thirty days. Consequently, they endorsed an Italian proposal that the allies build a 37-day stockpile. Beyond that, they called for consideration of 44-day levels to help bridge the gap between the outbreak of fighting and the beginning of resupply. For US forces, of course, they continued to favor ninety-day levels.

“Restructuring” offered a promising way to improve efficiency. Early in October the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed at possible ways of enhancing reinforcement capability: create more rapid call-up procedures among European allies; designate those NATO ships and perhaps those allied aircraft that would transport US reinforcements; acquire wartime operating rights at twenty-eight collocated bases to improve reception and dispersal arrangements; and schedule more movement and training exercises. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also claimed that specialization in air defense, logistics, and support functions could bring about “modest” economies and improvements to effectiveness. They cautioned, though, that extensive specialization efforts “should not be allowed to detract from the basic and more urgent problems which appear susceptible to reasonably rapid improvements: e.g., aircraft survivability, stock levels, anti-tank capabilities and utilization of air assets.”

Early in December 1973 the NATO Task Force asked for proposals to increase combat effectiveness by “rationalization.” The Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) circulated suggestions that included: employing civilians to perform certain administrative, police, supply, transportation, and communications functions; using West German reservists, rather than US personnel, to man fixed surface-to-air missile sites and emplace barriers; consolidating communications and pilot training; halting Dutch and Belgian procurement of reconnaissance aircraft; inducing West Germany to buy US A-7s rather than the much more expensive European Multi-Role Combat Aircraft; and persuading Germany, Greece, and Turkey to replace their aging ocean escorts with cheaper patrol craft.

Answering seven months later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that imprecise data and questionable assumptions rendered PA&E’s proposals useful only as a starting point. Specifically, civilianization posed problems of security risks, labor disputes, and assured wartime availability; it also could hurt NATO’s bargaining position in talks about mutual and balanced force reductions. Additionally, reducing the number of US engineers could impair an ability to implement tactical plans and repair bomb-damaged runways. They rated as exaggerated the hope of saving by consolidating communications and, citing unilateral US requirements, opposed any
total integration of communications. Finally, they advised, the proposal to replace ocean escorts would jeopardize a “tenuous” naval balance; NATO needed more, not fewer, of these ships. Admiral Moorer, in fact, had limited faith in rationalization and specialization. Suppose, he told a US officer several months later, Europeans manned all the support activities as well as all the ammunition and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) storage facilities and poured concrete for all the aircraft shelters. From these savings, the United States might be able to provide one more squadron of aircraft.27

This mountain of labor produced little more than the proverbial mouse. In December 1973 small steps were agreed upon within NATO by individual nations on the procurement of anti-armor weapons, construction of aircraft shelters, and improvement of war reserve stocks. Subsequently, however, inflation and recession combined with Europeans’ unwillingness to de-emphasize the threat of prompt nuclear escalation to preclude major conventional improvements.

The administration’s efforts to orchestrate a Year of Europe were knocked further askew by differences arising from an unexpected quarter. On 6 October 1973 Egypt and Syria attacked Israeli forces along the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights. One week later the United States launched a sizeable airlift of arms to Israel—and found itself at odds with European allies. The Arab oil embargo, applied against the United States and the Netherlands, created more strain within NATO than anything since France’s secession. In November 1973 Saudi Arabia threatened to withhold from ESSO A.G., Hamburg, a percentage of fuel equivalent to the proportion of POL going to US forces in Germany. Admiral Zumwalt saw that as an oil embargo against NATO which, he told Secretary Schlesinger, “sets a precedent I do not believe we should let go unchallenged.” Europeans, the admiral said, should be encouraged to warn the Saudis that actions threatening NATO’s capabilities would raise entirely new issues which were “bound to affect the Europeans’ attitude toward the oil problem, and which can do no good for Saudi interests generally.” Also, US diplomats should caution the Saudis that an embargo would give the Soviets greater leverage over NATO—something that the conservative, anti-communist monarchy surely did not want. Subsequently, ESSO Germany took steps to circumvent the impact of cuts dictated by Arab pressure.28

Within the Joint Staff, the Logistics Directorate (J-4) proposed and OSD agreed that the State Department should examine having European allies procure fuel, which then would be allocated to NATO forces in the same proportion that POL became available to the host nation concerned. Ultimately, fuel supplies for US forces in Europe and Asia were maintained approximately at normal levels. This was done by transferring to them some of the fuel that had been allocated to forces in CONUS.29

Returning to force improvement issues, might cost-effectiveness initiatives serve as a partial substitute for higher spending? Streamlining command structures would allow a more efficient use of air assets. A new headquarters, Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE), began operating in June 1974. Americans had hoped AAFCE would replace the 2nd and 4th Allied Tactical Air Forces (ATAF). Instead, largely because the
British would not give up command over 2nd ATAF supporting the British Army of the Rhine, AAFCE was superimposed over the two ATAFs. Likewise, US officials presented a new method for tracking tradeoffs and consolidations aimed at ensuring that sacrifices in one area would be compensated by gains in another. The allies generally approved this approach, but comparatively little came of it.30

As Dr. Kissinger had emphasized, costs of the US presence in Europe required corrective action. During 1967–1968, a sizeable balance-of-payments deficit in military spending had helped trigger some withdrawals. During FY 1972 this deficit totaled $1.5 billion. President Nixon ordered an investigation into ways of cutting this deficit and thereby preserving current US troop levels. In May 1973 he directed efforts to (1) make a multilateral effort at covering troop costs and (2) renew an offset agreement between Washington and Bonn.31

Before fiscal corrections could be agreed upon, congressional efforts to bring US troops back home took center stage. On 31 July 1973 the House of Representatives defeated by 242 to 163 a motion to reduce overseas Army and Air Force personnel by 100,000. On 26 September 1973 the Senate narrowly rejected Majority Leader Mike Mansfield’s motion requiring that overseas Army and Air Force personnel be cut by 40 percent over three years. There still remained a proposal by Senators Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) and Alan Cranston (D-CA) requiring a 110,000-man reduction in all overseas forces by 31 December 1975. The Senate approved this amendment by 48 to 36, but House and Senate conferees later dropped it.32

For the administration, rescue came in the form of an amendment sponsored by Senators Henry Jackson (D-WA) and Sam Nunn (D-GA). Approved overwhelmingly by both chambers in October, it stipulated that US strength in Europe would be reduced by the same degree to which allies failed to offset the military balance-of-payments. The law set a date of 16 May 1975 for offsetting the deficit in full. According to administration calculations, an annual increase of 1.5 percent in allied defense budgets and more procurement from the United States would fulfill the Jackson-Nunn requirements. In April 1974 West Germany concluded an FY 1974–1975 offset agreement that it spend $224 million to modernize barracks housing US soldiers, $844 million on low-interest US Treasury bonds, and $1.03 billion on arms purchases from the United States.33 Thus the Jackson-Nunn requirements were fulfilled. After South Vietnam’s collapse in the spring of 1975, it became impolitic to press for withdrawals from Europe, and the US presence there survived virtually unscathed.

Improving US Capabilities in Central Europe

Secretary Schlesinger assigned first priority to bolstering conventional forces in the Central Region. Were there in 1974 enough to defend, at least initially, by non-nuclear means? In April, when Secretary Schlesinger spoke with General Michael S. Davison, Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe, that officer said he had “much confidence
in the ability of his commanders to hold.” General David Jones, CINC, US Air Forces, Europe, and soon to become Air Force Chief of Staff), argued that NATO must “level its guns” on “the image of hopelessness” that either caused or excused inactivity among the allies and, even worse, perpetuated “a tenacious adherence to parochial interests.” The answer, he believed, lay in a sophisticated and balanced NATO-Warsaw Pact assessment covering qualitative as well as quantitative aspects. While NATO’s well-known deficiencies were always taken into account, the Warsaw Pact was “credited with near-perfect intelligence, logistics, command and control, and many other unrealistic assumed advantages, largely because of the lack of hard information to the contrary.” General Jones pointedly observed how, in the recent Arab-Israeli war, an outnumbered defender had blunted multiple armored thrusts and bought precious time for mobilization “through flexible and responsive direction of superior quality resources against known enemy capabilities.”

In 1973, Dr. Kissinger had tasked an all-civilian ad hoc NSC panel, chaired by physicist Dr. Charles P. Slichter, with examining the technical aspects of possible improvements over the next two to five years. Early in 1974, after agency consultations and extensive Service briefings, the panel recommended remedial steps in three priority areas. First, greatly increase the number of antitank missiles. Second, take steps to protect pre-positioned supplies, air and sealift forces, and European harbors. Also, since timely mobilization was so important, improve intelligence capabilities to detect an enemy buildup. Third, strengthen aerial capabilities so as to reverse an apparent shift of the overall air balance in the Warsaw Pact’s favor. In OSD, Program Analysis and Evaluation judged this assessment of the air balance too pessimistic. The Joint Staff, however, agreed with the panel. On 1 August 1974 the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the “main thrust” of the panel’s report, considering it “to be in consonance with their views on the subject.”

During the summer of 1974 Secretary Schlesinger asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to help develop a long-range defense concept that NATO could adopt as Ministerial Guidance. Their answer, submitted on 21 August 1974, characterized Soviet forces as formidable but hobbled by a number of significant weaknesses. Centralized control, for example, could slow their reaction time; long supply lines appeared vulnerable to interdiction; satellite forces might prove unreliable. The concept should endorse MC 14/3’s dictum that NATO needed a full spectrum of military capabilities and should state that the Atlantic Alliance “is now providing or has included in its force goals most of the ingredients for a credible conventional capability, adequate to deter effectively any major clash for the foreseeable future.” But, since a massive conventional attack would aim at achieving decisive results before NATO’s “immense” resources could be mobilized, the alliance should give greater emphasis to improving its standing forces and early reinforcements. For the “long haul,” adequate strength could be maintained only if all members made steadfast commitments to maintain the forces already bought and equipped; devoted the necessary resources to improve those forces; and rendered “conscious political decisions . . . to avert the restraints and constraints which [militate]
against full effectiveness.” In this last category, “NATO must begin to move from mere coordination of national forces and doctrine to conscious cooperation and closer integration.” Priority of effort should be directed toward rationalization, standardization, flexibility, force improvements (centering on the familiar areas of air defense, aircraft protection, and war reserve stocks), infrastructure, and civil emergency planning. In May 1975 the Defense Planning Committee approved a Long-Range Defense Concept that contained these statements but included carefully worded escape clauses that allowed European allies to continue pretty much on course.

Some improvements resulted, in no small measure because they were mandated by the US Congress. In June 1974 the Senate rejected by 46 to 44 Senator Mansfield’s motion to compel an overseas troop reduction of 76,000 personnel. Senator Sam Nunn then tabled an amendment which, while requiring an 18,000-man reduction in US European Command’s support personnel by mid-1976, allowed a corresponding increase in the number of combat troops (called “tail-to-tooth” conversions). In August the Nunn Amendment became part of Public Law 93-365. Consequently, during the next two years US Army Europe acquired two brigades deployed from CONUS: one from the 2nd Armored Division was designated Brigade 75, while one from the 4th Infantry Division became Brigade 76. The two brigade headquarters were placed permanently in Germany; their infantry, artillery, and engineer units rotated from CONUS on six-month tours.

Where could these new brigades best be employed? Defenses seemed weakest across the North German Plain, an area with much less depth that was covered by Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). The stronger Central Army Group (CENTAG), defending the Bavarian Plain and the Fulda Gap, contained the US Seventh Army. It was to CENTAG that reinforcements of five or six divisions from CONUS were programmed to come.

Secretary Schlesinger wanted to demonstrate US capabilities for rapid reinforcement by deploying some CONUS-based units to NORTHAG. In May 1974, even before the Nunn Amendment became law, he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to describe the most effective means of doing so. In October, after querying Commander in Chief, US European Command, and Commander in Chief, US Readiness Command, they recommended that all or part of the Reforger 75 units take part in a NORTHAG exercise. Alternatively, during FY 1976 a brigade from CONUS, perhaps accompanied by Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps units, could participate in NORTHAG exercises. They added, though, that “certain political considerations” seemed germane. First, some allies might seize upon the arrival of US reinforcements “as an excuse to reduce their already weak efforts.” Second, while a NORTHAG exercise could counter the complaints about “maldeployment” heard on Capitol Hill, Congress might see this as a widening of US commitments. Secretary Schlesinger agreed that an Army brigade, plus perhaps a Marine battalion, would exercise in NORTHAG as part of Reforger 75.

General Alexander M. Haig, USA, who became SACEUR on 15 December 1974, assigned great emphasis to strengthening NORTHAG. In September 1975 he proposed
to General Frederick C. Weyand and Deputy Secretary Clements that Brigade 75 move from CENTAG to NORTHAG, in the Bremerhaven/Garlstedt area, as the advance element of a three-division corps that would be coming from CONUS as wartime reinforcement. General Weyand observed that the current force structure, levels of theater stockage, and lift capacities precluded committing three divisions by M+30. By FY 1981, perhaps, lift might be large enough to meet the requirements for CENTAG and to move two divisions to NORTHAG. Nonetheless, ISA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the brigade/corps concept as “basically sound.”

In October 1975 Secretary Schlesinger tasked the Joint Chiefs of Staff with preparing a plan for moving Brigade 75 northward. However, they recommended retaining the unit in CENTAG until FY 1977, when all facilities in the Bremerhaven/Garlstedt area would be completed. Subsequently, at General Haig’s suggestion, they endorsed a slightly different approach that involved stationing Brigade 75 at Garlstedt alone by December 1977. The West Germans agreed. On 17 July 1976 President Ford and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt announced a financial arrangement by which Germany would bear about two-thirds of the cost of new facilities at Garlstedt, to be ready by mid-1978.

Back in September 1975 General Haig had proposed to US authorities that an Army corps of three divisions, based in CONUS, be designated for deployment to Europe in time of emergency. This corps would become a regional reserve for the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), with primary employment in the NORTHAG area. On 8 December 1975 the Joint Chiefs of Staff reminded newly installed Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that current plans called for sending the initial reinforcements to CENTAG, where most of their equipment had been prepositioned. These forces could be diverted to NORTHAG, but only at the sacrifice of CENTAG’s immediate needs and after their equipment had been repositioned in the north. More realistically, therefore, initial reinforcements should remain assigned to CENTAG, with the next wave going to NORTHAG. In fact, apart from those forces already committed to NATO, only one airborne and one infantry division could reach Europe by M+30. During FY 1980, after two infantry divisions had been converted into mechanized divisions, the heavy corps sought by SACEUR might be organized. Yet, even then, major increases to strategic mobility forces would be required. In these circumstances, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed it “premature for the United States to make a formal commitment of the corps.”

In October 1975 General Haig urged that the CONUS-based 1st Cavalry Division’s assignment be shifted from the SACEUR Strategic Reserve (SSR) down to the AFCENT reserve, as the first step toward creating an additional corps for AFCENT. He further asked that the 82nd Airborne Division as well as an airborne brigade, both of which had been earmarked temporarily as SSR substitutes while the 1st Cavalry Division was being reorganized, be permanently earmarked for the SSR. The Joint Staff opposed earmarking the 82nd Airborne Division, believing that it should remain available for world-wide emergencies. General Brown inclined the same way but, since the problem had political aspects, queried Deputy Secretary Robert Ellsworth. Mr. Ellsworth, however, favored
earmarking both airborne units for Allied Command Europe, as a means of demonstrating US interest in maintaining the military balance.\textsuperscript{45}

Agreeing with Deputy Secretary Ellsworth, General George S. Brown told the Director, Joint Staff, to “see what you can do to support Haig.” In February 1976 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the CONUS-based 9th Infantry Division, more powerful than the airborne units, be earmarked for assignment to the SACEUR Strategic Reserve. That, in turn, would release the 1st Cavalry Division for the AFCENT Reserve, where it could become “a first step” in creating the corps sought by General Haig. Moreover, increasing the formal US commitment from eight to nine divisions “would demonstrate the US national resolve in support of NATO and could provide an opportunity for leverage to solicit appropriate contributions from US allies.” Secretaries Kissinger and Rumsfeld supported earmarking the 9th Infantry Division as part of the SACEUR Strategic Reserve; President Ford approved doing so in mid-May 1976. This marked the first division-size increase in the Army’s NATO commitment since 1952.\textsuperscript{46}

Public Law 93-365 directed a study of the steps needed to develop a rational and coordinated nuclear posture in Europe. On 1 April 1975 Secretary Schlesinger sent Congress a report which, while acknowledging a “potential for some downward adjustments,” described tactical nuclear forces as still being essential. Very soon afterward, General Haig apprised General Brown of his concern about the proliferation of ill-coordinated studies treating theater nuclear problems. General Brown replied that two factors underlay these initiatives. First, fiscal constraints had prompted the Services to change some of their operational commitments. Second, OSD feared that “the sand is running out rapidly on our hopes of obtaining Congressional support for needed nuclear modernization programs.” The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy apparently believed that “we are stonewalling all efforts to change the status quo.” So General Brown thought that the tactical nuclear posture needed “a rigorous re-evaluation” and that many of the initiatives promoted by all these studies were “not without merit.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended reducing the stockpile of 7,000 warheads by 1,600; General Brown persuaded the Service Chiefs to accept a cut of 2,000.\textsuperscript{47}

Reductions were proposed, but the administration took steps to see that many tactical aircraft would remain nuclear capable. Between 1976 and 1980 dual-capable F-4s were to be replaced by F-15s and A-10s designed to carry only conventional ordnance. One nuclear-capable F-111 wing was stationed in the United Kingdom. In May 1975 General Haig argued that putting a second wing there would be “the single most compelling action we might take in enhancing theater combat capability and achieving the Nunn objectives.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff supported his recommendation but did not press their superiors for action. The State Department voiced concern about an approaching decline in numbers of nuclear-capable aircraft.\textsuperscript{48}

In November the Joint Chiefs of Staff responded by reducing from 144 to 90 the number of F-15s that would be stationed in Europe by 1980 and postponing the deployment of 72 A-10s from 1980 until 1981. That would permit the retention of 126 F-4s and limit the reduction of nuclear-capable aircraft to only 12. Additionally, Secretaries
Rumsfeld and Kissinger agreed that F-15s should be modified to make them nuclear-capable. In June 1976 the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally recommended stationing another F-111 wing in the British Isles. Secretary Rumsfeld ruled (1) that this F-111 wing would go in the spring of 1977 and (2) that an equal number of F-4s would return to CONUS.49

In 1973 the administration had set out to effect major improvements in Allied Command Europe. How far, if at all, had the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance changed? In November 1975 SACEUR gave the Defense Planning Committee a troubling appraisal. Dealing with theater nuclear forces, an area where NATO traditionally had taken comfort, General Haig described the situation as “highly dynamic,” particularly since the Soviets were developing the SS-20, a mobile IRBM with multiple warheads. Conventionally, the Soviets were “thickening up” their combat and support structures, enormously increasing their naval capabilities, and changing the mission of their tactical air force from defensive to offensive. As for NATO’s non-nuclear capacity, he highlighted manpower shortages on the northern flank, where British budget-cutting moves were reducing the availability of reinforcements. In Central Europe, however, he described the situation as “more mixed and far more promising.” He wanted to correct weaknesses in NORTHAG, which offered the Warsaw Pact “the shortest slide for the greatest gain.” The southern flank, chronically an area of comparative weakness, struck SACEUR as a “political shambles,” with Greece and Turkey at swords’ points over Cyprus and communists bidding for power in Italy and Portugal.50

Early in 1973 the Secretary of Defense had ordered a study of how the air battle in Central Europe might proceed. In June 1976, after what must have been an exhaustive study, the Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency reached rather pessimistic conclusions. In all cases studied, SAGA reported, Warsaw Pact forces would drive NATO units from their initial defensive positions. While NATO’s tactical air forces could delay this dislodgement by as much as seven days, they could not prevent it from occurring. In September the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Rumsfeld that SAGA’s Air Battle Study could be useful, when used “in conjunction with other studies and supporting data.” But they cited some factors that could lead to more optimistic conclusions. First, the introduction of F-15s and A-10s would increase conventional capabilities more than SAGA allowed. These and other advanced systems could “substantially” affect the military balance. Second, SAGA had not considered the new generation of tactical nuclear weapons. These, too, might have made SAGA’s findings “substantially different.” Third, the weather, which SAGA believed would affect both sides equally, might prove instead to be a decisive factor because of surface US avionics.51

Meantime, in mid-1975 the Slichter Panel reconvened to review the latest information. A JCS representative briefed panel members about numerous actions taken in the areas of armor weapons, reinforcement and resupply, and air attack and defense. In April 1976 the panel submitted a final report that highlighted one problem area above all others. Members felt, even more acutely than in 1974, that the crucial matter of acquiring adequate warning about a Warsaw Pact mobilization was “not adequately under control.”52
All in all, these four years witnessed little more than marginal changes and improvements. Europeans might believe a ninety-day conventional defense to be feasible and theoretically affordable, but none deemed it the least bit desirable. Consequently, the most prominent additions came from the United States, through the deployments of Brigades 75 and 76. A large American presence remained the essential element in Allied Command Europe.

**MBFR Talks Start—and Stall**

The administration pursued negotiations with the Soviets about mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) mainly in order to discourage Congress from legislating unilateral US withdrawals. In September 1972 Washington and Moscow agreed that talks would begin in January 1973, followed by the convening that autumn of a formal conference in Vienna. The countries covered by MBFR, labelled the “NATO Guidelines Area,” were Belgium, the Netherlands, East and West Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Concurrently, the United States took part in a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at Helsinki, from which the Soviets hoped to obtain a ratification of the territorial status quo. Implicitly, Soviet continuation with MBFR depended upon US participation in the CSCE.

Dr. Kissinger wanted to present NATO allies with a concrete program for MBFR by the spring of 1973. Reporting to the Verification Panel, a working group developed six “illustrative” options:

- **Option A** involved a 10 percent reduction in NATO’s “stationed” ground forces accompanied by a cut in the Warsaw Pact’s “stationed” ground forces that would be large enough to leave the two sides with the same number of personnel. For MBFR purposes, “stationed” forces were defined as those on foreign soil, such as US troops in West Germany and Soviet forces in East Germany. “Indigenous” units were those deployed on their own national territory.

- **Option B** called for common levels of 6,000 tanks and 1,200 tactical aircraft per side, which would require minimal NATO and major Warsaw Pact cutbacks.

- **Option C** entailed a US withdrawal of tactical nuclear warheads in return for a reduction in Soviet tank armies.

- **Option D** involved a 19,000-man US reduction and a 60,000-man Soviet one.

- **Option E** would pare each side’s ground forces to a common ceiling of 597,000.

- **Option F** involved a 20 percent reduction in US and Soviet air as well as ground forces.

The JCS Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency concluded that: Option A offered “a pragmatic method for maintaining military stability in the Central Region”; Option B “would improve NATO's military security by the widest margin of all the options examined”; Options C and D contained positive elements; Option E seemed a poor risk because NATO’s mobilization and reinforcement capability could not compensate for the “excessive” reduction; and Option F appeared disadvantageous because, unless the...
withdrawn Soviet forces were inactivated, there would have to be “a major restructur-
ing of NATO’s residual forces.” Writing to Secretary Richardson on 6 April 1973, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended forwarding SAGA’s findings to the Verification
Panel. They noted, though, how sensitive such analyses were to underlying assump-
tions—particularly to the premise that withdrawn Soviet units would be inactivated,
while redeployed US forces would remain on active, dual-based status.54

Congress was the administration’s immediate worry. When the Verification Panel
met on 15 March 1973, Dr. Kissinger said that a US pullout would be a political disas-
ter. Turning MBFR into a complex technical issue might help defuse congressional
pressure for unilateral withdrawal. The next day Secretary Richardson advised Dr.
Kissinger that he favored Option A. Some reductions, at that point, seemed unavoid-
able. As Admiral Moorer told an officer several days later, “Inevitably we are going to
be pulling troops out of NATO. . . . The war has been over 27 years and we still have
300,000 troops over in Europe which is a little ridiculous. . . . They really have plush
living over there, there is no doubt of that.”55

On 23 March 1973 the Verification Panel’s working group circulated a draft that
refined six options into three:

Option 1: Phased reductions of stationed and then of indigenous forces, leading to a
common ceiling. The first phase would witness agreement on “appropriate pre-
reduction constraints,” the second a 10 percent cut in stationed ground forces
(34,000 NATO; 83,000 Soviet), and the third a 10 percent reduction of indigenous
personnel (NATO by 46,000 West Germans, Dutch, and Belgians; the Pact by 29,000
East Germans, Poles, and Czechs).

Option 2: An equal percent reduction in US nuclear systems with Soviet armored attack
capability.56

Option 3: A 20 percent reduction in both US and Soviet ground and air forces (44,000 US
versus 88,000 Soviet), again producing approximate parity.57

By this time Admiral Zumwalt had become increasingly concerned about the direction
in which he thought MBFR preparations were being driven. He believed NATO was
passing through crises of confidence and that MBFR issues were exacerbating divi-
sions among the allies. So, on 22 March 1973 he told JCS colleagues that he favored an
approach “consistent with the principles of undiminished security, such as a common
ceiling of personnel and major combat equipment items in which Western reductions
would be modest and Warsaw Pact reductions would be significant, without regard to
this option’s acceptability to the East.”58

General Abrams worried that the working group would produce options that pre-
aturally focused allied attention on specific weapon systems and force levels, “rather
than on those negotiating approaches which will preserve undiminished security.” He
proposed proceeding by phases: first, “an informal arrangement on force limitations”;
second, “discussion of symmetric, asymmetric or mixed package reduction alternatives
involving those perceived as threatening by both sides”; and third, “hard negotiations”
aimed at achieving a military equilibrium.” (A “symmetrical” cut would be the same size for NATO and the Warsaw Pact; an “asymmetrical” cut would be larger for the Pact.)

The General Abrams and Admiral Zumwalt papers became the basis for a memorandum that reached Secretary Richardson on 27 March 1973. In it, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared themselves “increasingly concerned” over the course into which MBFR arrangements were “being driven.” Any US approach, they stressed, must maintain NATO’s solidarity and military security. They repeated Admiral Zumwalt’s warning that NATO was experiencing crises of confidence, which MBFR had aggravated. In their judgment, the basic purpose of exploratory talks should be simply to acquire a clear perception of the Pact’s objectives. Therefore, no illustrative or specific proposals should be tabled at this time. Instead, “the first part of MBFR negotiations should be devoted primarily to broad and general explorations without commitment to any conceptual scheme for reductions.” They asked Secretary Richardson to support these views and transmit them to Dr. Kissinger.

The JCS approach was not adopted, most likely because civilian leaders realized that pressure from Congress ruled out mere exploration. Instead, the working group slightly revised and then recirculated its three options of 23 March 1973. These, they suggested, should be given to NATO allies without any indication as to US preferences. Options 1 and 2—the “common ceiling” and the “mixed package” warheads-for-tanks trade—remained essentially unaltered, but Option 3 had been scaled back from a one-fifth to a one-sixth reduction of US and Soviet ground forces (32,000 versus 64,000). The Director, Joint Staff, and Acting Assistant Secretary Lawrence S. Eagleburger called Option 1 “the best position.” They opposed telling the allies about Option 2. Tabling it at the start of MBFR talks, they believed, would divide NATO, permit negotiations about the overall US nuclear posture, and fail to meet congressional demands for sizeable troop withdrawals. Similarly, they did not consider Option 3 the best initial proposal because it would foster fears of a Soviet-American deal, establish early the principle of symmetrical reductions, and commit negotiators to a “complicated and relatively inflexible” scheme. Yet the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) representatives preferred Option 3, on grounds that it would appear more negotiable to the Soviets and more attractive to Congress.

At an NSC meeting on 12 April 1973, Dr. Kissinger presented two main options: either reduce in two phases to a common ceiling or reach approximate parity by pulling out 32,000 US and 64,000 Soviet ground troops. President Nixon acknowledged that “any reduction is probably to our detriment.” Without some movement on MBFR, however, he feared that “the structure of NATO will come apart because of the lack of US support. . . . We are just one jump ahead of the sheriff.” Admiral Moorer suggested starting with a US cut of 10 percent and a Soviet cut of 18 percent. On 16 April 1973, through NSDM 211, the President directed that an approach to MBFR be built around three options. Option 1 involved 10 percent cuts of stationed (34,000 NATO and 83,000 Soviet) and then of indigenous ground forces (46,000 NATO and 29,000 Pact), ending in common ceilings. Option 2 would require one-sixth US and Soviet ground force
cuts (32,000 US and 64,000 Soviet), creating an overall ground parity. Option 3 called for an equal percent reduction in US nuclear systems and Soviet armored capability, leading to more defensively oriented postures and rough parity in stationed ground forces. Once the allies’ views became known, US preferences about an initial approach would be provided to them.62

On 24 April 1973 the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided the Secretary with their assessment of the three options. None of them, they noted, would redress NATO’s conventional weaknesses. Indeed, the long-term commitment to a common ceiling implied by Option 1 held “potentially unacceptable outcomes for NATO.” The composition of reduction packages, and not merely the numbers involved, would be crucial. Also, they speculated, long-term negotiations might foster a pan-European arrangement that could supersede NATO. They recommended, therefore, that cuts be limited “at least initially” to US and Soviet ground forces, with US withdrawal not exceeding 19,000 personnel. Reductions of indigenous forces could be considered in “undefined, follow-on” talks, with the allies themselves developing and presenting proposals. They wanted Option 2 presented to NATO allies “in a manner which will show clearly its principal disadvantages.” By removing more US and less Soviet forces than Option 1, it would produce equality only if the withdrawn Soviet tank and artillery units were deactivated. Any conceptual changes would work to NATO’s disadvantage. As for Option 3, they supported its presentation to the allies only as a later, follow-on concept. It would, they contended, raise “difficult and divisive issues” in NATO while failing either to create conventional equality or to satisfy congressional demands for sizeable US withdrawals.63

Secretary Richardson forwarded the JCS memorandum to Dr. Kissinger, but nothing changed because of it. Speaking to the North Atlantic Council on 2 May 1973, Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld, the US Permanent Representative to NATO, described the three options without expressing a preference among them. Option 1, he said, would imply a long-term commitment to MBFR, beginning with a reduction by 10 percent of stationed forces and then proceeding to 10 percent of indigenous ground forces. (Thus the JCS recommendation to present the indigenous cuts in nebulous terms had been rejected.) While Option 2 might require some readjustments of US and allied forces, Ambassador Rumsfeld continued, analyses indicated that “no significant degradation” of NATO capabilities would occur. (Thus the JCS recommendation to emphasize Option 2’s disadvantages also fell by the wayside.) Ambassador Rumsfeld argued that Option 3, while not satisfying congressional critics, would make “a major change . . . in the direction of more defensive postures, greater stability and rough parity in stationed manpower.” Thus Option 3 could illustrate either a mixed package that might be added to other options at a later stage or an effort to concentrate upon reducing Soviet armored superiority at the outset of MBFR. US observers reported that the Belgians and West Germans leaned toward Option 1, the British and Italians toward Option 2.64

In mid-July the Verification Panel split Option 1 into two phases. Phase I would involve US and Soviet cuts of 10 to 15 percent, aimed at removing a Soviet tank army.
A late July draft specified 15 percent US and Soviet reductions: 29,000 US troops plus perhaps some nuclear elements; a Soviet tank army consisting of 68,000 troops and 1,700 tanks. Phase II would be neither defined at this time nor presented to the Soviets. According to the draft, a 10 percent cut in Phase I:

is simple, plausible and would lead to an asymmetrical result. However, it has the weakness of not containing any broader explanation or rationale making the proposal convincing to public opinion, no provision for a follow-on phase and no self-evident reason why the reduction is set at 10 percent and not higher. It then would leave us particularly vulnerable to Soviet counter-proposals for a much higher percentage reduction or to Soviet efforts to apply the 10 percent cut to all NATO forces across the board.65

Commenting on 24 July 1973, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged breaking Phase I into increments of 10 and 5 percent and offering to remove some nuclear elements “only to achieve the withdrawal of the Soviet tank army.” Nonetheless, Secretary Schlesinger approved the revised Option 1. He believed that splitting Phase I into two increments, as they wished, “would weaken the rationale for our position and make it more difficult to achieve reduction of the Soviet tank army.” He did agree, though, that JCS proposals could be considered as “tactical courses” if negotiations over Phase I proved difficult.66

At this point, new intelligence appeared to make nonsense of manpower figures in the options. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, there were not 390,000 but 460,000 Soviet ground troops in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. As experts on the NSC Staff observed, this data “effectively wrecks both the stationed force common ceiling and the US-Soviet percentage parity proposals” developed by the working group. Under a 10 percent ceiling, the Soviet reduction would have to be 153,000. To achieve parity with equal percentages, the US cut would have to reach between 60,000 and 100,000.67

In September 1973, while Congress debated and finally rejected unilateral US reductions, the administration published its proposal for withdrawing 29,000 US and 68,000 Soviet ground personnel with 1,700 tanks in Phase I. In Vienna, on 30 October 1973, NATO and Warsaw Pact representatives formally opened the MBFR conference. Mr. Stanley R. Resor, a former Secretary of the Army, headed the US delegation; the Deputy Director (International Negotiations), J-5, acted as the JCS representative. Opening proposals revealed no common ground. The Soviets contended that any reduction formula should draw down both sides either by an equal percentage or by the same number; that way, the Pact would preserve its numerical advantage. The Western powers sought a common ceiling on ground forces, which naturally would require greater, asymmetrical Soviet reductions.68

On the Western side, a debate running from August 1973 until February 1974 focused upon what units should comprise the 29,000-man US reduction. Secretary Schlesinger wanted enough strength left to defend against surprise attack and support the first thirty days of a buildup. General Goodpaster recommended, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly supported, withdrawing both combat and support forces, so
as to preserve an optimum balance between them. Specifically, that meant merging or relocating headquarters and redeploying nine maneuver battalions. Dr. Schlesinger, however, criticized the JCS response as failing to answer his request and simply rubber-stamping General Goodpaster’s views. The Secretary preferred to take reductions from support units alone. After reconsideration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again recommended—and this time Dr. Schlesinger accepted—a balanced alternative that included: withdrawing one brigade from West Germany and one battalion from West Berlin; redeploying 6,350 support personnel; consolidating headquarters and support elements; and civilianizing 7,650 spaces. That was simply a general concept; actual negotiating proposals would remain flexible about the details.69

A year passed without any progress at Vienna.70 The US delegation, fearing that a stalled MBFR might no longer prevent the allies from reducing their defense budgets and thereby revive congressional calls for a unilateral pullout, suggested two initiatives:

First, a “nuclear hint” that some US nuclear capability might be included in Phase I withdrawals under Option 1, if the Soviets would agree to asymmetrical reductions of their ground troops and tanks. During a Verification Panel meeting in January, Dr. Kissinger had said that he saw “no chance whatever” of getting an agreement without adding nuclear elements.

Second, a “scale-back” of Phase I reductions to 34,000 Soviets versus 15,000 Americans plus token numbers of British and Canadians.

Writing to Secretary Schlesinger on 6 September 1974, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that the introduction and rejection of Option 3, trading a Soviet tank army for US nuclear elements, take place before the “scale-back” proposal came under consideration. They recommended, also, that two other proposals be introduced prior to the presentation of Option 3: include Air Force personnel within a common ceiling, and place a numerical ceiling of finite duration on both sides’ nuclear elements.71

Concurrently, the Verification Panel debated whether to seek equipment ceilings as part of Option 3. When OSD and JCS representatives differed, the panel asked them to provide an agreed position on two issues. First, should equipment ceilings be explicit or implicit within manpower ceilings? Second, what degree of reciprocity (e.g., trading tanks for warheads) was desirable? The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed either explicit or reciprocal understandings. While explicit constraints would be very difficult to construct, negotiate, and verify, implicit ceilings would avoid these problems and so allow negotiators to remain focused on the reduction packages. In fact, implicit ceilings plus non-circumvention provisions could prove more restrictive than explicit constraints. As to reciprocity, they observed that shorter distances would make air and nuclear warhead ceilings less meaningful for the Warsaw Pact than for NATO. Moreover, agreed definitions and equipment levels would prove almost impossible to negotiate. If the Pact did accept air and nuclear ceilings, NATO in return would have to accept tank ceilings that would freeze the Western powers’ inferiority. A flexible “room at the top” formula would ease this disparity, but the Soviets probably would reject it for precisely that reason. So here, too, non-circumvention provisions seemed
suitable, because they could be written to allow moderate adjustments in equipment levels but prevent substantial and destabilizing increases.\textsuperscript{72}

Disagreeing completely, Secretary Schlesinger did not see how an explicit equipment ceiling could create undue risk, particularly if it resulted in substantial Soviet reductions and limitations. He wanted to get a “firm grasp” on the size of the Pact’s tank forces and could not conceive of any generalized non-circumvention that would be strict enough to prevent destabilizing increases. He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reconsider the problem and provided them with an illustrative proposal containing common ceilings in the major categories, but with “room at the top” for NATO in tanks and for the Pact in nuclear warheads and missiles.\textsuperscript{73}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff stood their ground, still opposed to explicit, reciprocal equipment ceilings and deeming asymmetrical reductions in Phase I essential to achieving a common ceiling. Requiring a reciprocal ceiling on the Warsaw Pact’s nuclear elements, they worried, would move discussions away from the disparity in ground manpower, probably create pressure for a reciprocal ceiling on NATO tanks, and have little effect on Soviet nuclear capability, most of which was stationed in the USSR. They still preferred a non-circumvention approach, which meant (1) either stating broadly that “parties agree not to take actions to undermine or circumvent the letter intent of this agreement” or (2) limiting the reintroduction of specific or similar elements in the reduction package.\textsuperscript{74}

On 21 September 1974, through NSDM 269, President Ford authorized several changes in the US position. First, US negotiators could discuss withdrawing 15 percent of US and Soviet air manpower during Phase I and consider including air manpower within a common ceiling. Second, post-reduction Phase I levels could be exceeded once annually for 60-day exercises involving as many as 20,000 personnel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that this exception be confined to US and Soviet personnel and apply only to large-scale exercises.\textsuperscript{75} Third, and most important, the President approved in principle Option 3 but deferred discussing it with either NATO or Pact delegations.\textsuperscript{76} To Secretary Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reducing the Pact’s advantage in armor was most important. What they were willing to give up in exchange—tactical nuclear weapons—came from a stockpile they considered excessive and in some cases obsolete.\textsuperscript{77}

Any need to drive ahead with MBFR greatly diminished during 1975. The collapse of South Vietnam convinced clear majorities in Congress that a unilateral withdrawal from Europe would be exceedingly ill-timed. Thus, the administration no longer had to seek modest mutual reductions in order to forestall larger unilateral ones. After gaining approval from the North Atlantic Council, Ambassador Resor presented Option 3 at Vienna on 16 December 1975. He cited NATO ground and air strength in Central Europe as 921,000, French forces excluded. Two months later, the Soviets replied by (1) repeating their proposal for US and Soviet cutbacks in Stage I of equal percentages (2 or 3 percent), while all other participants froze their levels and all of them reduced by an equal percentage in Stage II, and (2) advocating that equipment levels be reduced
by equal amounts, which would improve the Warsaw Pact’s advantage in armor. An even greater obstacle arose in June 1976, when the Pact stated that its ground and air personnel in Central Europe numbered 987,300. By NATO’s estimate, though, they totaled 1,162,000. Obviously, until this difference could somehow be settled, progress was impossible.78

Meanwhile, at Helsinki, the CSCE culminated on 1 August 1975, when representatives from thirty-five nations signed a Final Act affirming respect for national sovereign equality and individuality, promising to refrain from the threat or use of force, and pledging to respect not only “the frontiers of all States in Europe” but also “human rights and fundamental freedom.” The act’s major military provision, which had JCS approval, required that twenty-one days’ advance notification be given for “major military maneuvers exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components.”79

The Ford administration came under criticism at home for seeming to ratify, at Helsinki, Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Over a longer term, though, the act’s human rights provisions helped undermine Moscow’s control of its satellites. As for MBFR, the administration had reason to be content with a stalemate at Vienna. Continuing the status quo appeared preferable to changes that, inadvertently, might shift the military balance in an unfavorable direction.
President Richard M. Nixon, (Left), Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird visit aboard the attack aircraft carrier USS SARATOGA (CVA-60) off the coast of Naples Italy. (US Navy Photograph)
NATO’S Southern Flank: A Series of Challenges

During 1974-1975 countries lining the Mediterranean basin—Greece, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Italy—seemed likely to become the Achilles heel of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A long-simmering feud between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus culminated with the Turkish army occupying almost half the island. The US Congress, rejecting pleas by the executive branch, suspended military aid for Turkey—an action that angered Ankara as being unduly severe and Athens as being too mild. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retaining base rights in the region loomed as a major concern. Home-porting ships in Greece proved infeasible, and the Spanish government wanted US forces to leave some of their facilities. The phenomenon of “Euro communism” gained ground in Italy and particularly in Portugal, which cast doubt upon the continued availability of airfields in the Azores Islands.

Collision over Cyprus

Twice during the 1960s Greece and Turkey had come to the brink of war over Cyprus. Greek Cypriots, many of whom openly espoused “enosis” or political union with Greece, comprised roughly 80 percent of the island’s population. Turkish Cypriots saw themselves as victimized and endangered. The 1960 agreement granting Cyprus its independence limited the powers of the Greek majority and gave its guarantors—Britain, Greece, and Turkey—a right to intervene if any one of them believed that the status quo was under threat. Three years later Archbishop Makarios in his capacity as President of Cyprus imposed measures that changed the island into a unitary state with majority rule. In 1964 and again in 1967, communal violence triggered threats of intervention from both Greece and Turkey. Geographically, Cyprus is much closer to
Turkey than to Greece—a fact that gave Turkey a decisive advantage in any military showdown. The United States undertook mediation efforts both times, particularly cautioning the Turks against precipitate action. Strategically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff rated Turkey more valuable than Greece because, by bordering the Soviet Union, it hosted valuable US bases and intelligence facilities that monitored Soviet missile and nuclear testing.²

Many NATO members did not look upon Greece as a member in good standing. Since 1967 a military junta led by Colonel George Papadopoulos had ruled the country. Perhaps to ease congressional criticism, the junta in January 1973 chose to end grant military assistance from the United States, receiving sales credits instead. Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannides, viewed by the State Department as an anti-democratic hard-liner, became junta leader late in 1973. Although the administration postponed plans to home port warships at Athens, the Navy very much wanted to keep using facilities at Souda Bay in Crete.³

Turkey remained a recipient of grant aid. During 1972 the Turks launched a ten-year modernization program estimated to cost $2.9 billion, 52 percent of which was to be funded by foreign—principally US—sources. In August 1973 Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger asked for a JCS-Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) appraisal of Turkey’s military and economic position, focusing upon security programs for FYs 1975-1980.³

Replying early in 1974, a study group drew heavily upon a report by the US European Command, which in turn used data provided by the Joint US Military Mission in Ankara. It concluded that the Turkish army equipped at current levels could stop a Warsaw Pact attack short of the Black Sea Straits. Regional air power appeared relatively weak, due to obsolete aircraft, shortages in munitions reserves, and lack of Turkish aircraft shelters. Many of these shortcomings were being corrected, however, and by 1980 there should be at least aerial parity against aggressors. The Turkish navy, finally, should concentrate on defending the straits and make no effort to match the Soviet Black Sea fleet. The study group recommended measures costing almost $1.1 billion, with the United States furnishing $150 million in grant aid and $725 million in sales credits over FYs 1976-1980. First priority should go to building aircraft shelters and creating a thirty-day munitions reserve; second priority should go to aircraft modernization, communications facilities, and improved antitank capabilities.⁴

The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged these findings unacceptable without major revisions. Faulty methodology, they told their superiors, had led the group to overstate Turkey’s defensive capabilities. Moreover, the uncertainty of political warning prior to an attack, combined with NATO’s institutional shortcomings, might preclude effective preparations against a surprise attack. They also urged that aircraft and antitank programs be awarded a higher priority, and that the Turkish navy receive six replacement minesweepers and sixteen amphibious craft. Deputy Secretary William P. Clements, Jr., reviewed their recommendations but followed the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs’ (ISA) advice to reject them, instead approving the study group’s proposals as a basis for FY 1976-1980 programs.⁵
An upheaval on Cyprus put all these plans into limbo. Dissatisfied with President Makarios, General Ioannides worked to undermine him through the Cyprus National Guard, which was led by officers from the Greek Army. President Makarios planned drastic reductions in the force and demanded that Greek officers return home. On 15 July 1974, in a coup evidently master-minded by General Ioannides, the National Guard seized the presidential palace; Mr. Makarios escaped. Nikos Sampson, a fervent advocate of enosis who bore a most unsavory reputation, began running a “Government of National Salvation.”

The Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) convened daily to deal with Cyprus issues. On 16 July 1974 the WSAG decided that two task forces in the Mediterranean—one built around the carrier USS America off Spain, the other with the carrier USS Forrestal between Crete and Athens—would stay in holding patterns. On 18 July 1974, as troops massed in southern Turkey to board ships for a landing on Cyprus, General George S. Brown advised the WSAG that one or two battalions could be flown from North Carolina to Cyprus in eighteen hours. An amphibious unit carrying 1,800 Marines was ordered to take station 150 miles off Cyprus. During 20 July 1974 Turkish soldiers landed on the island’s north coast and promptly carved out an enclave. Three days later the junta in Greece surrendered power and Constantine Karamanlis returned from exile to head a democratic government in Athens. Nikos Sampson also resigned. A cease-fire took effect and, at Geneva under British chairmanship, Greek-Turkish talks about the island’s future began.

Concurrently, the Defense Department warned the White House that crimping or cutting off military assistance would (1) destroy relationships between the US and Turkish militaries and (2) forfeit leverage that could be used to curtail Turkish opium production, much of which was finding its way to the United States. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger decided that shipments to Turkey should continue. As to Greece, only F-4 deliveries and a sales contract for A-7s would be held back.

Considering what a worst-case outcome might be, the National Security Council’s (NSC) Cyprus Planning Group asked for a general appreciation of how the loss of all US military facilities in Greece and Turkey would affect plans and operations. On 25 July 1974 the Director, Joint Staff, advised that such a loss would: weaken NATO’s southern flank and make the Mediterranean more vulnerable to Soviet penetration; encourage other allies to reassess their positions “and probably precipitate a major divisive move within the alliance”; diminish US influence in Greece and Turkey, perhaps changing their pro-Western attitudes; possibly induce Greece and Turkey either to leave NATO, adopt a passive attitude, or deny use of facilities to the alliance; severely degrade US communications and navigation support; and probably result in the denial of Greek and Turkish facilities for US contingency operations.

Domestic troubles also severely constrained the US government. The Watergate saga reached its climax on 9 August 1974 when President Richard Nixon resigned and Vice President Gerald Ford became President. Concurrently, talks at Geneva collapsed and the Turks, after reinforcing their bridgehead, resumed their advance on 13 August
1974 and rapidly occupied more than one-third of the island, including the port of Famagusta on the southern coast where hardly any Turks lived. Within the occupied area, the Turks soon expelled many Greek Cypriots and confiscated their property.

Ties between the United States and Greece worsened immediately. The new democratic government in Athens was infuriated by NATO’s—and particularly by Washington’s—failure to halt the Turkish thrust. Accordingly, on 14 August 1974 Prime Minister Karamanlis announced that Greece was withdrawing from military participation in NATO. Two weeks later he informed the allied heads of government that Greece intended to “recover full exercise of sovereignty over her territory”—an obvious allusion to US and NATO bases. In mid-September the Greek government removed from NATO control those forces that had been earmarked or assigned to Allied Command Europe; it also withdrew from major activities being pursued by the Defense Planning Committee, the Executive Working Group, and the Nuclear Planning Group. However, Greece remained a full member of the Military Committee and continued with staff participation in Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and its subordinate commands.10

The Navy had hoped to home-port a carrier task group at Piraeus, the harbor for Athens. Without those facilities Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., believed the Sixth Fleet would have to be reduced from two carriers to one. Nonetheless, when the Greeks began severing some NATO ties, the US Navy informed the administration that facilities in Greece were not indispensable. As the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy) told the Director, Joint Staff, on 22 August 1974, “In essence, Greece is a convenience to the US Navy and not a necessity. Whatever the US status may be in Greece, the US Navy will be able to meet its NATO and national commitments in the Mediterranean area.”11

In January 1975 President Ford ordered a review of US security policy toward Greece. The response, by an interagency group chaired by Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, presented alternative approaches to negotiations that included letting the Greeks set the pace and play for time, taking the lead by offering to end home-porting and other nonessential activities, and confining negotiations to status-of-forces issues. Early in April, through National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 251, President Ford defined the principal US objective as “basically conservative,” preserving “to the extent possible the existing security arrangements in Greece while encouraging Greece’s return to full participation in NATO.” American negotiators sought to regain full, effective use of the most important military facilities, including Athenai Air Force Base near Athens, the Souda Bay complex in Crete, and the NATO Missile Firing Installation on Crete. If concessions proved necessary, they should agree to curtail nonessential activities such as home-porting in return for Greek support of the principal US objectives.12

If relations with Greece seemed bad, those with Turkey grew even worse. Many in Congress believed that Turkey had violated provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act that restricted the use of US-furnished equipment to national self-defense. An
influential pro-Greek lobby on Capitol Hill led a strong congressional effort to suspend Turkish aid during the last months of 1974, which the administration staved off. The House and Senate allowed arms shipments to continue until 5 February 1975, provided the President could state that such action furthered progress toward a Cyprus settlement. Archbishop Makarios returned to his position as president of Cyprus, but his authority did not extend beyond the territory that Greeks still controlled.

In January 1975 the Defense Department informed Congress that it planned to sell Turkey $230 million worth of M-48 tank modernization kits. However, Secretary Kissinger failed to persuade key Senators and Representatives that “substantial” progress in negotiations over Cyprus had taken place—and indeed, none had. Accordingly, on 5 February 1975 the suspension took effect, stopping $86 million in grant aid and $178 million in sales credits. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimated that the Turkish air force would be ineffective in six months, the navy would experience “major degradations” in nine months, and the army could keep units in operational status as long as nine months by sacrificing sustaining capability.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff feared that an extended suspension would gravely damage relations and thereby seriously harm US security interests. The administration devoted great effort to securing repeal. On 19 May 1975, by 41 to 40, the Senate voted to resume most military aid, but five days later, despite vigorous lobbying by the executive branch, the House rejected by 206 to 223 a partial lifting of the embargo. Immediately, Turkey abrogated the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), halted activities at all American installations except Incirlik Air Base, and cut back the privileges allowed for US Armed Forces personnel. At President Ford’s direction, an interagency group (chaired again by Under Secretary Sisco) reviewed matters. It recommended that, since the Turks’ ultimate intentions remained uncertain, “the US should for now retain maximum negotiating flexibility by keeping its options completely open.” During the next few months, “watchful waiting” would allow congressional attitudes as well as Turkish intentions to clarify. General Brown and Deputy Secretary Clements endorsed that approach.

On 2 October 1975, by a vote of 237 to 176, the House joined the Senate in allowing commercial purchases and credit sales for Turkey. Enough members concluded that the suspension had damaged US security interests and failed in its principal purpose of extracting Turkish concessions over Cyprus. Four months later Ambassador William Macomber advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Turks considered themselves “completely blameless” about Cyprus; American negotiators, the Turks felt, were “holding a knife at their throat” while discussing a new DCA. Negotiations about base rights, which began in October, culminated on 26 March 1976 when Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Ihsan Caglayangil signed a new DCA that allowed activities to resume at various sites upon ratification and provided for: Turkish participation in all activities at US installations; sharing of intelligence; reduced privileges for US personnel; and $1 billion in sales and grant aid over a four-year period.

As for Greece, American negotiators agreed to abandon home-porting at Athens. On 15 April 1976 Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Dimitrios Bitsios agreed
in principle that their governments would draft a new DCA similar to the US-Turkish document. Greece would gain $700 million in aid; the United States would continue somewhat truncated operations at Iraklion, Athenai (sometimes called Hellenikon), the Nea Makri communications station, and Souda Bay. But subsequent talks struck many snags and by the year’s close there was no agreement. That blocked ratification of the US-Turkish DCA, since the Senate would not approve it ahead of a US-Greek arrangement.\(^{17}\) Nonetheless, the Defense Department’s primary goal of keeping Turkey in the Western camp and preserving the use of facilities had been achieved.

**An “Increasingly Jagged” Alliance?**

A string of political problems along the southern flank highlighted the importance of maintaining a strong US naval presence in the Mediterranean. Plans had been laid for reducing the Atlantic Fleet from seven carriers to six. The need to keep four of these six quickly available for NATO assignment harmed training, maintenance, and rapid reinforcement capability. Consequently, in June 1975 the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed ending the constant assignment of two carriers to Mediterranean duty. Instead, one would stay continuously on station; another would be there about half the time and otherwise readily available in the Atlantic. However, late in November 1975 Secretaries Kissinger and Rumsfeld ruled that two carriers would be kept continuously in the Mediterranean; exceptions should be avoided when at all possible. To ease operational strains, the thirty-year-old USS *Franklin D. Roosevelt* would stay in service as the Atlantic Fleet’s seventh carrier.\(^{18}\)

In April 1975, when the region’s troubles seemed at their worst, President Ford called for a review of US and allied security policy in southern Europe and along the southern tier. An NSC ad hoc group, which included JCS representatives, responded in December 1975 with a report that mixed optimism with pessimism. Despite growing Soviet naval power, restrictions on NATO forces, and other constraints, “the military balance of power in the Mediterranean still rests with the West.” Although the political environment in southern Europe appeared to be “ambiguous and in flux,” the group saw some prospects for improvement. Ties with Spain could improve in the aftermath of General Francisco Franco’s recent death; Greek-Turkish tension might abate; and other European countries could begin playing a larger role in the southern region. “Nevertheless,” in the group’s judgment, “US influence is in decline in all of the area countries, in different degrees and for different reasons.” Over the long term, access to military facilities would come under continuing pressure. NATO risked becoming “an increasingly jagged alliance in the southern flank,” with Portugal, Greece, and possibly others joining France in a less-than-full type of membership. Some allied governments might include communists or others hostile to NATO.

The group outlined four possible strategies: (1) a hard line to preserve all facilities and require rigorous fulfillment of NATO obligations; (2) a flexible line accepting
some erosion and ambiguity; (3) devolution that would shift most of the US burden to European allies; and (4) a more radical strategy of “redefinition” that might end the US military presence if costs appeared to outweigh benefits. The first two options would continue current policy; the third and particularly the fourth would change it very substantially. General Brown and Deputy Secretary Clements asked that, as negotiations with Greece, Turkey, Spain, and Portugal proceeded, alternative strategies undergo periodic review.\textsuperscript{19} With hindsight, the worries were exaggerated. Some reductions in the US presence did occur, but not enough to bring about a major shift in the region's politico-military balance.

**Losing Some Spanish Bases**

A n Agreement of Friendship and Co-operation, signed in 1970 and lasting five years, allowed the United States to continue operating a complex of bases in Spain. Rota provided a naval base, while Torrejon near Madrid, Moron, and Zaragoza furnished facilities for tactical aircraft, tankers, transports, and weapons training.\textsuperscript{20} When negotiations to renew the agreement began in April 1973, Spanish officials stated that the price of renewal must include a mutual security guarantee along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty. Previously, Spaniards had made political concessions in order to obtain US economic and military aid. Now Spain was becoming prosperous enough to buy whatever military hardware it needed. President Nixon ordered a review of alternatives and tasked the Defense Department with assessing the strategic importance of Spanish bases.\textsuperscript{21}

In August 1973 the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe concluded that US bases remained valuable and that a close military relationship with Spain must continue. The group defined two broad possibilities; first, decline to extend the agreement and relocate US assets; second, maintain important bases but accept some curtailments on their use. Should the second alternative be selected, as seemed most likely, the group outlined four options:

- **Option 1:** Change the current agreement into a bilateral treaty containing a security guarantee.
- **Option 2:** Turn the agreement into a treaty accompanied by a joint declaration instead of a security guarantee.
- **Option 3:** Transform the agreement into a treaty but without any security guarantee.
- **Option 4:** Extend the agreement in its current form.

On 10 August 1973 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger that they believed “the present base posture must be maintained through the 1970s.” Besides the factors cited above, Spanish facilities could allow the United States to launch unilateral operations independent of NATO. Although another executive agreement could not be ruled out, they felt that “on balance” a treaty with
security provisions (i.e., Option 1 above) appeared to offer “the most feasible and least costly approach to successful base rights negotiations.” In mid-October, preparing for a possible meeting of the Senior Review Group, the Assistant Secretary (ISA) and the Director, Joint Staff, endorsed a treaty embodying a limited security guarantee.22

A US-Spanish Joint Committee consisting of the Spanish Foreign Minister and the American ambassador, with General Andrew J. Goodpaster and the Chief of the High General Staff, Lieutenant General Manuel Diez-Alegria, assigned as their military advisers, approached negotiations very gingerly. When 1973 ended, in fact, no date had been set for starting formal talks. The Spanish did ask, though, that KC-135 tankers at Torrejon relocate to Zaragoza.23

On 7 May 1974 at the Pentagon, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer met with Lieutenant General Diez-Alegria, who suggested awarding Spain an “associate membership” in NATO. Admiral Moorer indicated that A-4 Skyhawks and communications equipment could be made available in exchange for a renewed agreement. Supplying equipment, Lieutenant General Diez-Alegria replied, did not deal with the problem posed by US bases. Returning Torrejon would be “a very visible signal which the Spanish Government could use to persuade its people that real benefits were coming to them as a result of the US presence.”24

In July Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Cortina started the negotiating process by signing a joint declaration of principles. The two countries would “consolidate their defense cooperation” and continue “reciprocal support of their defensive efforts.” While stopping well short of an automatic commitment, they did state that “a threat to or an attack on either country would be a matter of concern to both and each country would take such action as it may consider appropriate within the framework of its constitutional processes.” Thereafter, Ambassador-at-Large Robert J. McCloskey headed the US delegation; Rear Admiral P. J. Hannifin, the Vice Director of J-5, acted as his military adviser.25

In September 1974 President Ford decided to seek a simple extension of the agreement and gave guidelines to US negotiators. First, try to retain the use of all facilities, provided the price was not too high. Second, answer questions about a formal security commitment by saying that the July declaration of principles responded to Spanish desires. Third, attempt to avoid relocating tankers from Torrejon.26

During the first round of negotiations, in November 1974, the Spanish placed “very great emphasis” on expanding the scope of mutual defense cooperation. ISA explored ways to increase US-Spanish coordination, define roles and missions for Spanish forces, and improve the exchange of intelligence information. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that combined planning was the only option that Spain likely would accept. To carry out such planning, geographical areas of mutual interest must first be identified; then a US-Spanish group could undertake joint contingency planning. Most likely, problems would arise over making a threat assessment and over whether to release US plans for using Spanish bases to support NATO. Roles and missions for Spanish forces could be developed through bilateral studies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also suggested
ways to make more US intelligence available, conduct bilateral training exercises, and cooperate regularly in maritime or air defense operations.\textsuperscript{27}

Initially in early 1975 the Spanish dropped their demand for a security guarantee. They rejected combined planning as inadequate, however, because it contained no provision for command. General Brown suggested, and his JCS colleagues agreed, that a US-Spanish Defense Staff with a wartime command function should be created. In April, however, the Spanish again stiffened their negotiating position. Washington would have to provide them with a security guarantee and admission to NATO. Otherwise, the tankers at Torrejon and some naval assets would have to withdraw, and the remaining facilities could not be used for NATO purposes. Additionally, the Spaniards wanted a command and staff reporting to US Commander-in-Chief Europe (USCINCEUR) as well as “real and effective” US assistance for a major effort at modernization.

Ambassador McCloskey asked for DOD’s advice about possible responses. On 23 May 1975 the Joint Chiefs of Staff supplied Secretary Schlesinger with their recommendations. Among other things, losing Torrejon would have a “severe” impact on military operations. Still hoping to retain all US facilities, they suggested some initiatives which could help do so: revise the Agreement of Friendship and Co-operation; agree in principle to form a US-Spanish defense staff with wartime command functions; offer $500 million in sales credits to support a five-year modernization program; propose to deploy an F-5 air defense squadron; and agree to relocate tankers from Torrejon to another Spanish base. Until these initiatives had been exhausted and US efforts to gain backing for Spain’s entry into NATO could be evaluated, they urged that the basic negotiating objective remain unchanged. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then listed ways to reduce the US presence, beginning with the most desirable solution and ending with the least: withdraw certain naval assets over five years, roughly coinciding with the time when US-based Trident should start entering service; remove KC-135 tankers from Spain; remove naval assets and KC-135s over two years; and place Torrejon on standby status over three years, while shifting the tanker, tactical, and airlift wings to other bases.\textsuperscript{28}

If the Spanish could not obtain a US security guarantee, they wanted Washington at least to arrange some form of relationship with NATO. On 8 May 1975 the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that, during forthcoming meetings of the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee, and the Defense Planning Committee, US spokesmen make “a strong and convincing intervention” to “secure meaningful and visible association between Spain and the Alliance in the near term, leading to full membership in the future.” They believed that the military balance in the Mediterranean stood in jeopardy because of Middle East developments, Greek-Turkish tension, political upheavals in Portugal, and reductions in British and Italian defense budgets. Forging closer bonds with Spain could help to arrest the erosion of NATO’s southern flank, demonstrate the US commitment to NATO, and discourage governments that might want to escape their NATO obligations by substituting bilateral agreements with the United States.\textsuperscript{29}

The European allies refused to approve a communique containing any favorable statement about Spain. In their eyes, General Francisco Franco’s fascist leanings
during World War II still outweighed any possible strategic benefits Spain could offer. The Defense Planning Committee’s communiqué mentioned Spain’s contribution to the defense of Western Europe but pointedly observed that it “remains outside the NATO context.” When General Brown raised this issue before the Military Committee, its chairman, Admiral Sir Peter Hill-Norton, replied that he intended to do nothing about Spain until instructed otherwise by political authorities.30

On 23 May 1975 Ambassador McCloskey proposed that his negotiating instructions be amended to allow: a new agreement, rather than a mere extension of the old one; arrangements for combined military planning; some base closings or consolidations in order to retain the most important ones; and an offer of $500 million in sales credits over a five-year period. General Brown and Deputy Secretary Clements agreed; Dr. Kissinger revised the instructions accordingly. But the Spanish indicated again that, unless they acquired a NATO association, the United States could retain only those bases that contributed to bilateral defense interests.31

Early in July Ambassador McCloskey asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a more detailed list of possible reductions, in order of priority. General David C. Jones worried that US initiatives were being presented “in piecemeal fashion with a consequent dilution of effect.” On 13 August 1975, at his suggestion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Schlesinger “a fully developed package proposal” designed to meet Spanish desires for a closer bilateral relationship and for coordination with NATO. A Spanish response to this package should be developed before the administration began considering withdrawals.

Since all US forces in Spain were connected with NATO in some way, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed it “essential that an understanding be reached with the Government of Spain on this issue.” If Spain still insisted on denying bases for NATO purposes, Washington’s relations with Madrid would have to be reassessed. The complete JCS “package proposal” included: using the joint declaration of principles as the basis for an agreement; committing one of the four F-4 squadrons at Torrejon to the air defense of Spain; sending an F-5 squadron to Spain; making available $1.5 billion in sales credits; assisting in an extension of coverage for aircraft warning and control; and relocating KC-135s from Torrejon to Zaragoza. Should Spanish negotiators reject this package and demand major base reductions, “the entire proposal should be withdrawn and reduced proportionately.”32

Spanish negotiators brusquely rejected the package proposal, insisting that the tankers leave Torrejon and that, in the whole country, only one NATO support activity could remain. They asked for a loan of two F-4 squadrons, a sale of four F-16 squadrons (two to be delivered before 1980), and $500 million in grant aid. General Brown and Secretary Rumsfeld thought this price was too high. They opposed loaning F-4s, accelerating F-16 deliveries, or giving anything more than token grant aid. General Brown believed, moreover, that if only one NATO base survived, “the deal was not worthwhile.” He also believed that, as a minimum, a naval facility had to be temporarily retained.”33
On 5 September 1975 the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed a final negotiating position. There should be a five-year agreement with provisions that included: retaining Zaragoza while withdrawing all tankers from Spain except for a small detachment there; vacating Torrejon, if that seemed to be a deciding factor in reaching an agreement and if two other major bases could be retained; and offering up to $1.5 billion in concessionary sales credits and $50 million in grant aid. Assistant Secretary (ISA) Robert Ellsworth agreed about Zaragoza but cut the credit total to $500 million plus “a small component of grant aid.”

Somewhat surprisingly, the impasse came to a quick end. When the Spanish government executed several persons charged with being anti-Franco plotters, angry protests erupted throughout Western Europe. The demonstrations may have shown the regime how isolated it was, and how much it needed American friendship. On 3 October 1975 Secretary Kissinger and his Spanish counterpart completed a tentative agreement.

General Franco died on 20 November 1975. His designated successor, Prince Juan Carlos, took the oath as King two days later, and Spain began a transition toward democracy. On 24 January 1976 Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Jose Maria de Areliza signed a five-year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation. The US Senate ratified the treaty in June, and it went into force on 21 September 1976. The treaty established a combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff. It also preserved all US facilities, the main exception being that tankers would have to leave Spain, except for five KC-135s stationed at Zaragoza. Over five years Spain would receive $600 million in sales credits, $75 million in grant aid, $10 million for grant training assistance, and $50 million to modernize the country’s aircraft control and warning system. Additionally, the United States agreed to facilitate purchases of four F-16 squadrons, lease 42 F-4Es while buying back 34 F-4Cs, and sell four minesweepers and one tender at “substantially favorable prices.” Still, Admiral Hannifin assured General Brown that, when the final terms were compared with original Spanish demands, “It is apparent that the security interests of the United States in Spain have been preserved.”

Portugal and the Azores

For the Nixon administration, Portugal was both an asset and a liability: an asset because it controlled the Azores Islands in the mid-Atlantic; a liability because its leaders stubbornly fought to preserve their African colonies. In 1973 Portugal ruled the last European empire in Africa: Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. The Portuguese tried to parlay US need for Azores airfields into US support for their policies in Africa.

Since 1943 US forces had been using the Azores. In 1969 the Portuguese proposed negotiations about their continued use in peacetime. Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard solicited JCS views about the Azores’ importance in war and peace, the cost of relocating facilities, and how long an agreement should last. Replying on 25
September 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that the Azores would possess “major strategic importance for the foreseeable future.” Unless the Azores could be used in peacetime, full utilization in wartime would be delayed. In March 1970 ISA forwarded these conclusions to the State Department. Four months later Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird found them still valid and so advised Secretary of State William P. Rogers. On 23 December 1971 President Nixon signed a determination granting Portugal $1.5 million worth of defense articles and services. The Portuguese also received nonmilitary excess equipment having a replacement value of $6 million. Lisbon then agreed to renew the Azores agreement through 1974.

The Middle East War, which triggered a US airlift of arms to Israel, demonstrated the Azores’ value. Under strong US pressure, Portugal made Lajes airfield available for non-NATO purposes. They wanted material compensation for an agreement allowing the Azores to be used that way again. On 14 November 1973 President Nixon commissioned an interagency study whose March 1974 recommendation clearly linked any compensation to non-NATO uses, in order to preserve the principle of burden-sharing among NATO allies. Some equipment could be transferred by executive action, but the difficulties and disadvantages of doing so were such that new legislation should be sought. Congress ought to be informed that Portugal wanted equipment not only for NATO purposes but also for use against African insurgents. When Deputy Secretary Clements reviewed this response, he opposed even mentioning the possibility of acting without congressional approval. Admiral Moorer agreed that Congress would have to be consulted, but he thought it inappropriate to insist upon deleting any options.

Spring 1974 brought an unexpected catharsis. Portuguese officers grew weary of the long, wasting campaigns against indigenous insurgents. In Lisbon, on 25 April 1974 the military overthrew the government of Marcello Caetano. Three months later this new regime recognized the colonies’ right to total independence. No longer, therefore, would US military aid to Portugal carry any taint of helping colonialism. Portuguese requests at this point totaled $260 million. In October 1974 Ambassador Robert McCloskey prepared to renew negotiations over access to the Azores and asked the administration to provide him with more modest options. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Schlesinger such a list:

- Army options, over a five-year period, ranging from $1 million for training to $41.4 million for equipment.
- Navy options, ranging from coastal minesweepers at $25,000 each to six P-3 anti-submarine warfare aircraft costing $89.3 million.
- Air Force options, ranging from $700,000 for T-4 trainers to $68 million for eighteen F-5E interceptors.

Significantly, they rated Portugal’s freedom and security so important that continued access to the Azores should constitute only one element of US strategy.

By this time Portugal had plunged into political turmoil. The collapse of an attempted right-wing coup in March 1975 opened the way to a temporary Communist
ascendancy. On 8 April 1975 Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves announced that US aircraft could not use Lajes for refueling if another Middle East war erupted. But the Portuguese pendulum soon swung rightward. Prime Minister Goncalves lost power in September 1975. An abortive coup in November further discredited the left. Finally, in May 1976 Portuguese elections put moderate socialists into power. The United States continued enjoying access to the Azores, without offering an explicit quid pro quo. In March 1976 the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed a multinational plan to enhance Portugal's NATO contribution. Basically, it involved equipping one infantry brigade that would be partially transportable by air, as well as one tactical fighter squadron. These units would serve primarily as a reserve for NATO's Southern Region and also be available to protect the Azores. Numerous problems slowed progress, but the danger of a communist takeover in Portugal had vanished. More broadly, the erosion of the southern flank was easing and even being reversed.
USS ARKANSAS and USS TEXAS transitting the Panama Canal. (US Navy Photograph)
Nearing a New Panama Canal Treaty

Starting Over

When 1973 opened, nine years of US-Panamanian negotiations appeared to have reached the proverbial dead end. Panamanians were determined to undo the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, which permitted the United States to build, operate, and defend a lock canal and to control a Canal Zone in perpetuity with “all the rights, powers and authority . . . which the United States would possess as if it were the sovereign . . . to the entire exclusion” of Panama. A Canal Zone approximately ten miles wide, running from sea to sea, completely divided the country. In 1964, after Panamanian mobs entered the Canal Zone and precipitated bloody disorders, the US Government agreed to negotiate an entirely new treaty. By 1967 US and Panamanian diplomats had agreed upon draft treaties dealing with the lock canal and the possible construction of a sea-level canal. The State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) endorsed both drafts. But political opposition, by Panamanians as well as Americans, became so great that progress stopped. In 1968 a military coup put Lieutenant Colonel (soon Brigadier General) Omar Torrijos in control of Panama; his consolidation of power further delayed a renewal of discussions.1

When negotiations resumed in June 1971, Panamanians insisted that a new treaty bear a fixed date on which US rights to operate and defend the canal would end. The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly preferred an open-ended treaty. Nevertheless, in September 1971 President Nixon authorized Ambassador-at-Large Robert B. Anderson to propose a long-term treaty with a formula for terminating US rights. If such a formula proved unattainable, then Ambassador Anderson could discuss a fixed termination
date. In either case, the US objective should be a treaty lasting about fifty years, plus
an additional thirty to fifty years should the canal's capacity be expanded.

This new approach led nowhere. In December 1972 the Panamanians set forth an
“uncompromising” position that, in Ambassador Anderson's judgment, “wiped out almost
all of the progress of 1971.” Panama wanted US control over the canal to terminate in
1994, about thirty years earlier than President Nixon had specified. Also, Panamanians
demanded that the Canal Zone disappear within five years; the only lands allotted to the
United States would be very limited and noncontiguous. The US position, by contrast,
called for keeping control over land areas along the canal's whole length. Moreover, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized the need for an indefinite US military presence.²

On 12 March 1973 Ambassador Anderson advised the President that he saw two
possibilities. First, keep trying for a general treaty. He saw little hope of achieving one
without moving substantially toward Panama's position. Second, give Panama vari-
ous rights and properties in order to blunt criticism and maintain a more harmonious
relationship.³ The second course looked necessary because the US presence was com-
ing under worldwide, and not merely Panamanian, criticism. During March 1973 the
United Nations (UN) Security Council held a session on Panama. There, on 21 March
1973, thirteen of the fifteen members voted for a resolution urging prompt completion
of a treaty giving Panama sovereignty over the Canal Zone. The United States, for only
the third time since 1945, cast a veto to prevent the resolution's passage.⁴ Obviously,
though, the status quo attracted hardly any support abroad.

In May, the National Security Council (NSC) Under Secretaries Committee started
reviewing the prospects for fruitful negotiations in the near future and appraising the
desirability of making concessions over rights and property. Early in September the
committee circulated four options for consideration:

Option A: Try to conclude a treaty by accommodating Panamanian demands as much
as possible. Among other things, such a treaty would have to terminate around
2015, and limitations would have to be placed upon US military activities in the
Canal Zone.

Option B: Continue negotiating within the 1971 guidelines.

Option C: Pursue Option B, but make minor concessions designed to improve the negotiat-
ing climate.

Option D: In addition to Option C, send Congress a program of unilateral actions involving
some substantial changes (e.g., apply Panamanian law to some Canal Zone matters, allow
wider Panamanian use of Canal Zone land, and increase the annuity paid to Panama).

When the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Latin America reviewed these options, only
the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ISA) favored C; all
the others supported D. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 5 October, advised Assistant Sec-
retary (ISA) Robert Hill that they too favored C. Option D, they felt, involved excessive
concessions which could provoke major opposition in Congress, thereby endangering
prospects for the comparatively minor concessions prescribed in C.⁵
Meantime, in July 1973 Ambassador Anderson resigned. His successor, Mr. Ellsworth Bunker, had helped bring about a political resolution to the Dominican Republic intervention of 1965-1966 and then served as ambassador to South Vietnam. On 2 December 1973, after talking with Panamanians, Ambassador Bunker sent Secretary of State Henry Kissinger an encouraging assessment. The Panamanians had proved flexible, he reported, and agreement on a declaration of principles seemed near. General Torrijos even said that “for the first time he has faith and hope that all will turn out well.”

To maintain momentum, Ambassador Bunker urged legislation transferring Old France and New France airfields, both now abandoned, to Panamanian control. (Transferring Old France was one of the concessions listed under C, above.) The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred on condition that, until Fort Sherman airfield had been upgraded to handle C-130 transports, New France remained available for use in a “military emergency,” which would be defined solely by the United States. Late in December 1973 President Nixon initiated legislation for the transfer.

Was the lock canal still militarily vital? Had it become obsolete and too vulnerable to survive a modern war? Some “important and influential personages” were saying that it had. Ambassador Bunker wanted an appraisal of the canal’s strategic importance. On 8 January 1974 Assistant Secretary Hill asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to produce one. Replying on 13 February 1974, they described the canal as still being “a major defense asset. . . . Its strategic advantage lies in the economy and flexibility it provides to accelerate the shift of military forces and logistic support by sea between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and to overseas bases.” In a new Korean conflict, for example, closure of the canal would start affecting fuel and ammunition deliveries around D+45 days. Only one port on the West Coast could handle ammunition shipments; a good deal of the petroleum, oil, and lubricants would have to come from the Caribbean. For a conflict in Europe, the impact of closure would be far less. Still, without the canal, deliveries would be reduced during the early phase of a European war, a period which could well prove critical. On the other hand, supertankers and large aircraft carriers were too wide to pass through the locks. What about threats to the canal itself, and to alternate routes around the Capes? Sabotage by Panamanians seemed unlikely, but the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) did have a limited capability to interdict sea routes around Africa and South America—a danger which added to the canal’s strategic importance.

**Narrowing the Focus**

By this time, the logjam over negotiations had broken. On 7 February 1974 Secretary Henry A. Kissinger and Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack issued an agreed Statement of Principles that would guide the diplomats. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had given it their concurrence. Basically, the concept of US control in perpetuity would disappear and the new lock-canal treaty would have a fixed termination date. All territory
would revert to Panamanian jurisdiction, but Panama would grant the United States, for the treaty’s duration, “the right to use the lands, waters, and air space which may be necessary for the operation, maintenance, protection and defense of the canal and the transit of ships.” Upon termination of this treaty, Panama would assume total responsibility for the canal’s operation. However, the United States would be granted those rights necessary to regulate ship transits; to operate, maintain, protect, and defend the canal; and to undertake such related activities as might be specified in the treaty.9

Late in May 1974 Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., warned his JCS colleagues that he had become “increasingly concerned” about US negotiating positions. The United States, he believed, should accept “nothing less than the right of effective US control over the canal’s defense and the right of US vessels to use it, in perpetuity.” That meant “retaining sufficient attributes of sovereignty in Panama, de jure and de facto, to preserve those rights in perpetuity.” On 28 June 1974 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger a memorandum containing many, but not all, of Admiral Zumwalt’s arguments. They recognized that Latin American nationalism and worldwide trends had fundamentally altered the means by which US objectives could continue being achieved at reasonable cost. A new treaty would help greatly to secure Latin American participation in collective security undertakings. Nonetheless, they deemed it “imperative” for US negotiators to know that “national security interests indefinitely require the right of US vessels to use the canal.” That, in turn, rendered necessary “effective US control of canal defense for the longest possible term and explicit guarantee of use thereafter.” Expanding the canal’s capacity, a possibility recognized in the February Statement of Principles, would offer opportunities to gain extended US rights. Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted US negotiators to:

1. Seek a treaty with the longest possible duration.
2. Seek the longest possible term for exercising options to extend the canal’s capacity.
3. Seek the longest and broadest expansion of US control over operations and defense, following any expansion of the canal itself.
4. Require a joint guarantee that, after the treaty terminated, the canal would remain open to all shipping.

On 12 August 1974 Dr. Schlesinger informed Secretary Kissinger that he fully endorsed the JCS position.10

**How Long Should a Treaty Last?**

By February 1975 negotiators had resolved some of the easier problems and were coming to grips with the toughest ones. US and Panamanian representatives had reached agreement “in principle” about three major issues:
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Jurisdiction: The Canal Zone would disappear over three years, with jurisdiction passing to Panama.

Operation: The United States would bear primary responsibility for canal operation during the treaty’s lifetime, but with growing Panamanian participation.

Canal Defense: Panama would not only give the United States rights to maintain land, sea, and air forces but also accept a Status of Forces Agreement for their effective operation. A Combined Board would coordinate US-Panamanian plans and actions. Significantly, Ambassador Bunker had secured a US right to defend the canal unilaterally for the treaty’s lifetime—even against an attack from Panama, if need be.

But key points remained unsettled. Panama wanted more lands and waters than the United States was willing to return. Much more important, Panama would accept neither a fifty-year treaty nor an exclusive US right to expand the canal’s capacity.

The duration of a new treaty was the issue over which the two sides stood farthest apart. Ambassador Bunker proposed discarding the US objective of a fifty-year treaty, which would run another thirty to fifty years should canal capacity be expanded. He wanted authority to seek, instead, the longest possible period between twenty-five and fifty years covering both operation and defense of the canal. Alternatively, there might be separate periods for operation and for defense. The ambassador also recommended seeking, in principle, a right to maintain a post-treaty military presence. As a fallback position, to obtain either a post-treaty US presence or a defense period lasting longer than twenty-five years, the operation period could be cut to twenty years. Ambassador Bunker also wanted to obtain, for the longest period possible, a US right to either add a third lane of locks or construct a sea-level canal.

The NSC Staff circulated a draft memorandum for the President endorsing Ambassador Bunker’s proposals. On 27 February 1975 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Schlesinger that they concurred, with one critical exception. In their judgment, US security interests required a military presence on the isthmus “for the longest possible time.” Hence, for canal defense, the treaty’s duration “must remain at 50 years.” Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr., agreed. Writing to Dr. Kissinger, he cited several justifications. First, the canal’s importance in supporting war plans had not and would not diminish. Second, Panama’s history of political instability suggested the need for a long-term political safeguard. Third, the Soviets and the Cubans posed “potential security problems” for Panama and for the canal.

On 28 March 1975 Ambassador Bunker asked the President to grant him more flexibility at the bargaining table. Believing that land/water and treaty duration issues must be negotiated together, he urged being more forthcoming about returning lands and waters in the hope of gaining Panamanian assent to a fifty-year treaty. Superficially, he admitted, the prospects for Senate ratification of those terms seemed dim. During the summer of 1974, Senator Strom Thurmond (R, South Carolina) had set about organizing opposition to a new treaty and had collected thirty-eight signatures—enough to ensure its defeat. Still, the ambassador believed that a treaty could pass if it amply protected US interests and enjoyed strong Defense Department (DoD) and White House support.
Otherwise, in Panama, he foresaw a growing potential for serious trouble—even fighting between US troops and Panamanian civilians.\textsuperscript{13}

Strong support from DoD seemed unlikely. As the Director, Joint Staff, wrote early in April 1975, “I have only about 10% confidence that I could persuade the Services to concur in anything less than a firm 50-year minimum treaty duration.” On 14 April 1975 the J-5 proposed that senior DoD officials meet to discuss crucial issues. First, assuming a treaty was unlikely to reach fruition, how could a failure of negotiations be brought about in the least damaging way? Second, should the Defense Department reconsider its position on either lands and waters or treaty duration? But the Director, Joint Staff, rejected that approach: “The JCS position is clear and is known to OSD and State. If the JCS are to receive the blame for the failure of the negotiations—that’s OK. It is better to be blamed for giving correct military advice than to be guilty of selling out just to get a treaty.”\textsuperscript{14}

On 22 April 1975 the NSC Senior Review Group directed the State and Defense Departments to recommend, if a treaty proved unattainable, steps that would accommodate some of the Panamanians’ most strongly felt needs. Their reply listed thirteen possible actions. Without congressional approval, for example, US and Panamanian flags could be flown jointly over military installations and transiting ships. With congressional approval, Panama could be offered (1) civil and criminal jurisdiction over Panamanians in the Canal Zone and (2) greater involvement in canal operations.\textsuperscript{15} In hindsight, steps of this scope probably would have done little good.

Internationally, the status quo enjoyed hardly any support. On 15 May 1975, after hearing reports from US and Panamanian representatives, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution expressing hope that negotiations for “a new, just, and fair treaty” would reach “a prompt and successful conclusion.” On that same day, just after the Mayagüez rescue,\textsuperscript{16} the NSC discussed what to do next. Ambassador Bunker said that a treaty lay within reach, if he was granted flexibility about the land/water and duration issues. He proposed separating operation from defense, cutting US control over operation down to about twenty-five years in the hope of keeping US control over canal defense as close to fifty years as possible. But Secretary Schlesinger opposed any further “erosion,” arguing that “when the US shows strength and determination, it receives respect. When it recedes from its position, it whets appetites.” What Ambassador Bunker called flexibility struck him as “reducing our requirements to what we think Torrijos will accept.” Dr. Kissinger countered that holding firm would mean facing hostility from the whole hemisphere, not just General Torrijos. He suggested trying to sign a treaty but delay submitting it to the Senate until 1977, after the 1976 presidential election.\textsuperscript{17}

On 20 June 1975 Mr. Clements informed the President that the Defense Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had reassessed their position and would accept twenty-five year control of operations and defense provisions lasting at least forty years. On lands and waters, though, DoD’s existing position constituted “the bare minimum.” The Defense Department, he reiterated, had doubts about the reliability and stability of General Torrijos’ regime. Once the canal came under Panamanian control, the United States could be denied its use “at any time under any conditions”
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and US citizens could be subjected to the “whims of an illegally spawned and dictatorial regime.” Lands adjacent to Panama’s population centers would provide mobs and rioters with “unlimited avenues of approach . . . to vital US installations.”

At the next NSC debate, on 23 July 1975, Secretary Schlesinger said frankly that he was “reluctant to give up sovereignty.” He argued that “once they control operations, they can stop the Canal. Defense would be moot.” Asked by the President for his views, General George S. Brown equivocated a bit: “We need 40-plus years on defense. Personally, I agree with Jim . . . . Everyone who has communicated with us about this is dead-set against it, but we’ve already started down the road and we can’t back out now.” As for lands and waters, he continued, “we need to be forthcoming. The management of lands at the turn of the century required lands that we don’t need now. But we don’t want to give any more than the Ambassador has already been authorized.”

Over the next few weeks Defense did soften its position somewhat. Early in August the Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense sent President Ford a draft National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) to which General Brown personally, and not the Joint Chiefs of Staff corporately, had given his concurrence. On 18 August 1975, through NSDM 302, the President issued new instructions summarized below:

1. Propose separate durations for US control over canal operation and canal defense. The operation period should not terminate earlier than 31 December 1999—that is, twenty-five years hence. The defense period should last fifty years; as a fallback, forty. Negotiators should make efforts to obtain, in principle, a post-treaty US right to participate in canal defense. As a fallback, to achieve either an extended defense period or other critical objectives, negotiators might reduce the operation period to twenty years.

2. Seek an option, for the longest possible period, giving the United States exclusive rights to expand canal capacity. As a fallback, try to obtain commitments (a) giving the United States a right of first refusal in building a sea-level canal, (b) prohibiting any country except the United States and Panama from having responsibility for building or defending a new canal, and (c) applying to a new canal the same neutrality guarantee that covered the existing lock canal.

3. On land and waters, add to the existing offer as many of the following as appeared necessary: Cristobal Piers; Gatun Lake; some of the jungle training area in Fort Sherman; Coco Solo, Fort Randolph, and access to them via Randolph Road; and portions of the Allbrook/Clayton training areas. If agreement still proved impossible, then request further instructions from the President.

Thus President Ford, in effect, accepted Ambassador Bunker’s recommendations.

The Last Obstacles

On 3 September 1975, at Contadora Island off Panama, General Brown, Deputy Secretary Clements, Assistant Secretary of State William D. Rogers, and Ambassador William Jorden conferred with General Torrijos. Mr. Clements said that US political
problems rendered completion of a treaty impossible before the end of 1976. General Torrijos appeared sympathetic, replying that a one- or two-year delay posed no problem because “two years are nothing in the fight for the liberation of the Panamanian people, who count the time beginning in 1903.” General Brown observed that, while in the past the Joint Chiefs of Staff had opposed a new treaty, they no longer did so. They had a different attitude, they were unified, and they could help educate the American public. Both General Brown and Mr. Clements emphasized, though, that any breach of the peace in Panama would trigger an unfavorable reaction in the United States. General Torrijos told them he could virtually guarantee peace, if he could point to some “conquests” as evidence of US good faith. Leasing France Field back to Panama had bought six months’ time; now he needed similar “small conquests.”

Two days later in Washington, Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives approved a draft Threshold Agreement covering treaties on the canal’s operation, expansion, neutrality, and defense as well as a status of forces agreement. It cited only the most ambitious objectives prescribed by NSDM 302 (e.g., a fifty-year defense treaty and an exclusive US right to expand canal capacity) without disclosing any fallback positions. On 8 September 1975 Ambassador Bunker presented this draft to the Panamanians. Then it was thought necessary to gain a JCS endorsement before the latest round of talks ended. The Joint Chiefs of Staff formally endorsed this draft on 12 September 1975.

Soon afterward Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC), a staunch defender of the status quo, asked General Brown how a new treaty would protect US security interests. The Chairman’s reply, dated 29 September 1975, expressed “no doubt” that US forces could defend the canal and essential bases against any threat posed by Panamanian guerrillas or terrorists. But doing so would be costly. There would be US casualties; Washington would face worldwide criticism; a conflict could drag on for years. “Based on the experience of the British in the Suez, the French in Morocco and Algeria, and the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, in the face of rising Panamanian nationalism, we could expect to find little comfort in legal or historical justification of our position, substantial though they may be.” The alternative, sharing in canal operation and defense, required a cooperative and friendly relationship with Panama, which was unlikely as long as the current treaty remained in effect. Thus, in General Brown’s judgment, US interests would be best served by a new treaty providing the United States with those lands, facilities, and rights needed for effective operation and defense.

In October 1975 the Director, Joint Staff, asked the Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency (SAGA) to assess the canal’s importance, describing the military impact of closure or denial and the suitability of alternatives. The agency’s February 1976 report contradicted much conventional wisdom. Militarily, SAGA noted, the canal’s importance had diminished because larger aircraft carriers could not pass through it. During peacetime, convenience and lower costs were the canal’s main advantages. In a European war, twenty-one surface combatants and twenty-two amphibious ships from the Pacific Fleet would be transiting the canal; blockage would postpone their arrival in the Atlantic by approximately twenty-one days. Assuming that North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) nations began mobilizing twenty-three days before an attack, a twenty-one day delay in the arrival of II Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) would not be crucial, because II MAF was part of Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) Strategic Reserve. The late arrival of warships slated for convoy protection seemed more crucial; allied surface combatants might be employed in their place. As for resupplying the forces fighting in Europe, canal closure would cut the availability of US cargo ships about 30 percent between M-Day and M+30 days. By M+60 days, that shortage would be largely overcome.

In a Middle East operation, SAGA continued, closure would delay the arrival of a full MAF. Moving to a renewed Korean conflict, SAGA noted that the latest Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum limited US reinforcements to tactical air and naval units. If China intervened, of course, ground reinforcements would go to Korea. Canal closure would cause a twenty-one day delay in transferring amphibious ships from the Atlantic, but the III and I MAFs were not required to be in Korea until D+38 and D+63 days respectively. The real impact would fall upon ammunition resupply, because 82 percent of all out-loading capacity lay on the East Coast.

According to SAGA, steps could be taken to ease any harm done by the canal’s closure. These included: seeing that allied escorts and Sealift Readiness Program ships could become available sooner; chartering larger ships; increasing the use of airlift; pre-positioning equipment; and relying more upon transportation systems within the United States. As for US commercial interests, SAGA assessed the impact of closure as neither major nor long-term. Most trade would continue without significant interruption, quickly adapting to other routes.

In sum, SAGA concluded, neither the canal nor the Canal Zone were militarily or economically vital. However, “the waterway and contiguous shore facilities do provide advantages in military flexibility and in continuing traditional commercial shipping arrangements.” Passing control of the canal to Panama, under conditions which Panamanians found acceptable, would enhance the canal’s security and continued availability by removing it as a rallying point for nationalists. Indeed, considering the degree of nationalistic fervor and the ease of sabotage, SAGA expressed “serious doubt” that the status quo could be maintained indefinitely.

These iconoclastic conclusions, unsurprisingly, did not meet with ready acceptance. The J-5, in mid-March, recommended rejecting them. For a European conflict, J-5 pointed out, the Joint Chiefs of Staff often had warned against assuming that twenty-three days of warning would precede an attack. A fifteen-day delay in the arrival of nine brigades, reducing combat potential by 11 percent at M+30 days, could prove significant under some conditions. Late in April the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked five unified commanders with assessing SAGA’s study.

When 1976 ended, a number of US-Panamanian differences were unresolved. Panamanians insisted that a treaty terminate after twenty-five years. However, according to US intelligence reports and some unofficial indications, they might accept a compromise ending the US military presence at the year 2000 in return for a defense agreement...
running beyond that time. The final US position on canal defense was forty years with a follow-on agreement. Panama wanted to regain 90 percent of lands and waters in the Canal Zone; the United States was willing, at that point, to return 35 percent. Finally, Washington sought a unilateral right of re-entry if the canal’s neutrality or security was threatened. Panama proposed, instead, relying upon a multinational guarantee. Residual defense rights were the last important sticking point.28

To summarize: The Joint Chiefs of Staff separated themselves from Secretary Schlesinger to side with President Ford and Secretary Kissinger. The strategy outlined in NSDM 302, shortening US control over canal operations in exchange for prolonged US participation in canal defense, did point the way to a final agreement. By December 1976 US-Panamanian negotiations were nearly complete; consent by the Senate loomed as the principal problem.
Cuban and Angolan troops, members of the Soviet backed MPLA, get together for a weapons practice session at a training center of St. Vincente, near Cabinda, Angola, 1976. (AP Photo)
Africa: No More Neglect

Continuing Restraint

In 1969 sub-Saharan Africa was an area wracked by tensions but fairly far down on the list of US strategic priorities. The process of de-colonization and self-determination was far from complete. Whites in the Union of South Africa held a monopoly of wealth and power, confining the black majority through the rigid segregation of apartheid. In Southern Rhodesia, the tiny white minority thwarted a transition to black rule by declaring that British dominion to be independent but still loyal to the crown. Under Portuguese rule, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique constituted the last European empire. In Angola, black insurgents held 65,000 Portuguese troops to a military stalemate. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a cautious, carefully controlled response to the potentially explosive situation. To some extent, of course, their attitude reflected the fact that American public opinion, bitterly divided over Vietnam, would not countenance intervention in Africa.

On 10 April 1969 President Nixon commissioned a review of policy toward southern Africa. Four months later a National Security Council (NSC) interdepartmental group circulated a draft response characterizing US interests there as “important but not vital.” Militarily, South Africa could offer ship repair and logistical facilities available nowhere else on the African continent, and the Defense Department was operating a missile tracking station there. Group members disagreed, however, over major points of policy: whether there was any prospect for nonviolent change; whether any external influences or internal developments could induce moderation about racial and colonial issues; and whether US interests in the white-ruled states might appreciably damage American standing with black nations.
The group saw only a limited range of options. At one extreme, US interests did not justify military intervention against white regimes. Economic sanctions were excluded because they probably would prove ineffective and efforts to enforce them could escalate into US military involvement. At the other end, the United States could neither accept the white regimes’ colonial and racial policies nor identify with violent, repressive solutions by either race. The group articulated five options:

1. Closer association with white regimes to protect and enhance US economic, strategic, and scientific interests.
2. Broader association with both black and white states, in order to encourage white moderation, enlist black cooperation in reducing violence, and improve relations among states in the area.
3. Limited association with white states and continuing association with black ones.
4. Dissociation with white-ruled states and closer association with black ones.
5. Dissociation from both black- and white-ruled states, in order to limit US involvement in the area’s problems.

The Deputy Director, J-5, and G. Warren Nutter, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Security Affairs (ISA), advised that Defense interests would be adversely affected by Options 4 and 5, less so by Option 3. However, those interests would be enhanced by Option 2 and even more by Option 1.1

In mid-October the NSC Senior Review Group discussed options with one interesting result. A revised paper circulated on 12 December 1969 no longer ruled out economic sanctions. The options, reworded and expanded, now read as follows:

1. Seek to normalize relations with white regimes.
2. Broaden associations with both black and white states.
3. Increase identification with and support for black states.
4. Limit the nature and scope of association with white states while maintaining present levels and types of aid to black ones. This would amount to a codification and extension of current policy.
5. Dissociate from white regimes and move closer to black ones.
6. Move to active measures of coercion, short of armed force, aimed at changing the racial policies of white regimes.

In preparation for an NSC meeting, Assistant Secretary Nutter and Vice Admiral Nels Johnson, the Director, Joint Staff, advised Secretary Melvin Laird and General Earle Wheeler that they deemed Option 1 preferable and Option 2 adequate.2

calling at South African ports except for emergencies. As for Portugal, nonlethal equipment having dual military and civilian uses would be exempted from the UN embargo.3

Starting in 1920 South Africa had administered South West Africa under a League of Nations, and after that a United Nations, mandate. Then, in 1966 the UN General Assembly terminated that mandate, declaring South West Africa to be the UN's direct responsibility. Early in 1970 the UN Security Council charged one of its subcommittees with recommending steps to carry out the UN resolutions. President Nixon promptly commissioned a review of US policy about South West Africa.

Replied on 2 April 1970, the NSC interdepartmental group characterized US policy as favoring racial equality and self-determination but opposing forcible measures to implement them. It outlined three options:

2. Take additional selective actions (e.g., publicly discouraging US investment) to dissociate the US Government from South Africa's illegal administration.
3. Join international efforts to implement direct UN responsibility over South West Africa.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff worried that the United States would be expected to carry out the burden of sanctions against South Africa. They anticipated, and opposed yielding to, UN pressure for escalatory steps. Accordingly, they advocated adopting Option 1. Options 2 and 3, they feared, would fail to prevent additional demands and encourage expectations that the United States would accept or be pressured into stronger measures. Assistant Secretary Nutter agreed and so informed Dr. Kissinger.4

Through NSDM 55, issued on 22 May 1970, President Nixon adopted Option 2. Among other things, he decided to: continue current restrictions on official visits to South West Africa, as well as military contacts and overflights; officially discourage private US investment; and support but not propose UN action to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice about the legality of South Africa's on-going administration of South West Africa. President Nixon stressed, though, that these decisions did not set a precedent for dealings with either South Africa itself or Portugal's colonies. The United States would continue opposing either mandatory sanctions or any use of force in southern Africa.5

Concurrently, President Nixon ordered the NSC Under Secretaries Committee to review the implementation of arms embargoes against South Africa and Portugal's colonies. Three months later the committee recommended continuing to adhere to UN Security Council resolutions. But, in the “gray area” of items having civilian as well as military uses, it urged a more liberal approach. Light civilian aircraft—Lear jets and Cessna twin-engine 401s and 402s—should be sold to South Africa. Cessna single-engine 180/185s should not, since they might be used for bush patrol and counter-insurgency operations. The State Department flatly opposed selling South Africa either Lockheed's P-3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) patrol aircraft or its L-100, a civilian version of the Air Force's C-130 transport. Defense agreed for “now” but noted that cir-
circumstances might change. On 17 August 1970 the President approved licenses for Lear jets and Cessna 401/402s. He did not, however, allow licenses where there would be a clear and direct application to combat or internal security operations; that prohibition covered Cessna 180/185s, P-3s, and L-100s.6

The Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974 gave Admiral Thomas H. Moorer hope that the administration would stop holding South Africa at arm's length. Naval facilities there, he believed, would help protect oil tankers travelling around the Cape of Good Hope. South Africa's Chief of Defense Staff, Admiral H. H. Bierman, met with Chairman Moorer on 8 May 1974, and Admiral Bierman offered the use of his country's ports and airfields for sea control purposes. Could the United States, he asked, “see its way clear to assist South Africa in the purchase of purely maritime equipments” such as P-3 patrol planes, torpedoes, and sonar buoys? In reply, Admiral Moorer explained what strong domestic opposition the President would face for such a decision. The next day Admiral Moorer telephoned Senator John Tower, ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee, who would also be talking with Admiral Bierman. “I'm glad you're going to see him,” said Admiral Moorer, “because I wish we could get our heads out of the sand.” Despite further discussions, nothing changed.

In August 1975 General R. F. Armstrong, Acting Chief of the South African Defense Staff, approached Admiral James L. Holloway, III, about obtaining US assistance in designing and constructing an improved maritime command and control system. Such involvement, he claimed, would be limited to issuing export licenses for commercial equipment and technical advice. The Defense Department supported moving toward a closer military relationship, but Secretary Kissinger opposed a change that he believed Third World countries, especially those in Africa, would see as “an abrogation of moral responsibility.” President Ford agreed with Dr. Kissinger but still decided to “approve the equipment on a very low key basis.” In January 1976 Admiral Holloway informed General Armstrong that Munitions Control would view favorably an application by a US company for a license to study ocean surveillance needs.8 By then, however, events in Angola—and South Africa's role in them—had taken center stage.

Angola: Enter the Cubans

What South Africa did, in fact, was provide communist powers with a justification for intervening in Angola's civil war. Chapter 7 describes how, in 1974, Portugal's new leaders decided to dissolve a 400-year-old empire. In two of Portugal's three colonies, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, whites transferred power to blacks in an orderly way because, politically, the black insurgents presented united fronts. In Angola, by contrast, three independence movements were competing for power:
The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) led by Agostinho Neto, a Marxist intellectual, had obtained arms and cash from the Soviet Union during the years of insurgency.

The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) under Holden Roberto, based largely in neighboring Zaire, had been receiving quite modest subsidies from the United States since 1962. Joseph Mobutu, the President of Zaire, had loose family ties with Mr. Roberto and had long supported him with funds, arms, and training.

The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), under the charismatic Jonas Savimbi, constituted the smallest group and had no clear ideological slant.

In January 1975 these three factions reached an agreement with the Portuguese that Angola would become independent on 11 November 1975. Soon, though, the factions began fighting among themselves. In March the MPLA received shipments of Soviet infantry weapons. On 26 May 1975 President Ford commissioned a study of US policy. Reporting two weeks later, an NSC interdepartmental group rated political and strategic interests there as “important but by no means vital” and defined three possible courses of action:

A: Maintain neutrality in the civil war.
B: Promote a peaceful solution through diplomatic and political measures, in which Mr. Roberto and Mr. Savimbi could better compete with Mr. Neto.
C: Actively back one or more of the liberation groups. Positively, this course could prevent an MPLA takeover and signal that the collapse of South Vietnam had not sapped American will power. Negatively, US resources and prestige would be committed to a course where the outcome was doubtful and American influence would be limited at best.9

In preparation for an NSC meeting on 27 June 1975, the Assistant Secretary (ISA) and the Director, Joint Staff, recommended that Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger and General George S. Brown support the following position: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) should assess the feasibility of Option C, an intensive program of covert support to strengthen Mr. Roberto and Mr. Savimbi. If Option C was judged infeasible, they favored Option B. If Option B appeared to fail, revert to Option A so as to avoid damaging relations with whatever faction finally won.10

When the NSC convened, Secretary of State Kissinger broke with his own department in opposing Option B: “If we appeal to the Soviets not to be active, it will be a sign of weakness; for us to police it is next to impossible.” Secretary Schlesinger doubted whether Holden Roberto had the tenacity to win, but Deputy Secretary William P. Clements, Jr., wanted to keep Mr. Roberto and Mr. Savimbi viable. On 14 July 1975, just after Neto’s MPLA drove Roberto’s FNLA forces from the capital city of Luanda, the 40 Committee11 discussed a covert plan to aid Mr. Roberto. Seven days later President Ford approved funding for that purpose. The Defense Department helped ship to Zaire armored cars, purchased by cash sales, which President Mobutu then transferred to Roberto’s FNLA. American arms deliveries were going mainly to replace what President Mobutu already had issued to the FNLA. South Africa purchased arms from Israel.
which it passed to Roberto’s troops. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia permitted shipments to reach Savimbi’s UNITA.12

The communist bloc was providing Neto’s MPLA with much more substantial assistance: Soviet materiel and Cuban trainers. In mid-October a South African column about 1,000 strong entered southern Angola. Fidel Castro responded by airlifting a special forces unit into Angola; a Cuban artillery regiment followed by sea. Apparently, he acted without consulting Moscow. Turboprops flew the Cubans through Barbados; Bissau in Guinea; and Brazzaville, the Congo, into Luanda, where they arrived on 7 November. Cuban troops quickly drove Neto’s forces away from Luanda and the oil-rich Cabinda enclave. Late in November they also turned back the South Africans’ push from the south toward Luanda.13

Meantime, on 21 November 1975, the 40 Committee considered three options: keep to diplomacy; support the South Africans; or provide substantial increments of hardware. At that point the Cubans in Angola numbered about 3,000. CIA Director William Colby predicted that once the Cubans made their full influence felt, perhaps in January, “the direction of the fight will go all the other way.” Deputy Secretary Clements was belligerent: “I’ve visited there and these [FNLA and UNITA] people want to fight . . . Leadership is the main factor.” However, General Brown sounded notes of caution. President Mobutu had asked for aircraft, and the French would be providing him with Mirages, but General Brown warned that “the last thing we want is to get Mirages in there before any MiGs show up. Then we would be accused of escalating things.” One week later the White House released money from the CIA’s Contingency Reserve Fund and approved sending Redeye and TOW missiles if SA-7 surface-to-air and French antitank missiles were not available.14 At the 40 Committee meeting, General Brown had observed that TOWs were sophisticated and “hard to handle, even with good troops.” He preferred sending the LAW, a shoulder-fired light antitank weapon. Before deploying either weapons system, the danger of compromising advanced technology would be reviewed, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished.15

On 13 December 1975, as more Cuban ships and transport aircraft came to Luanda, President Ford ordered another review of US interests and objectives in Angola. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been calling for such a study. Work had hardly begun, though, when Congress erected a roadblock. Since the CIA Contingency Fund for FY 1975 had been fully obligated, President Ford asked Congress to approve $28 million for FY 1976.16 When that request leaked to the media, fear of being drawn into another Vietnam dominated the public’s reaction. On 19 December 1975, by vote of 54 to 22, the Senate passed an amendment that prohibited either using or reprogramming funds for Angola.17

At the next NSC meeting, on 22 December 1975, Secretary Kissinger argued that “if the Soviets . . . taste a local advantage, it would be a dangerous situation. . . . [W]e don’t want to whet the Soviet appetite.” But General Brown did not relish a confrontation over Angola. When CIA Director Colby said the Soviets might send a guided missile destroyer to an Angolan port, President Ford raised the possibility of moving US warships into the area. “Not now,” General Brown advised, “based on projected military scenarios. We must
also think about the will of Congress. . . . If we send a ship, people will recall . . . the Gulf of Tonkin affair which led to the Senate resolution to deploy forces.”

Early in January 1976, while three Soviet warships steamed off Angola, the White House began studying military countermoves. ISA and the Joint Staff provided Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld with a bleak assessment of what could be done:

A naval show of force off Angola: This could prove counterproductive. Nothing less than the sight of an aircraft carrier would impress the Soviets, but sending one in would raise the specter of US intervention. In fact, many moderate African states would view this as an attempt to upset a legitimately constituted government. All told, “the adverse factors clearly predominate.”

Pressures on Cuba: Neither a naval demonstration in the Caribbean nor an increase in reconnaissance flights over the island seemed likely to trigger a turnaround in Cuban policy. Moreover, US military posturing would deflect growing Latin resentment against Castro’s actions in Angola. So this option too was most unattractive.

Air and sea surveillance of Soviet ships near Angola: This response appeared to have some value. Navy P-3s flying from the Azores, Spain, or Ascension Island could cover the area quickly. Between two and six destroyers could track the three Soviet ships currently off Angola.

About 4,500 Cuban soldiers arrived in Angola during January, raising the total to around 12,000. Soviet long-range AN-22s began airlifting Cubans across the Atlantic after Barbados and Guyana, under US pressure, withdrew landing permission. The administration looked for military measures that might halt or reverse this flow. But Acting Assistant Secretary (ISA) Amos Jordan recommended against doing anything that could be branded as meddling or interventionism. If other considerations dictated some kind of action, he proposed raising the number of SR-71 reconnaissance flights over Cuba. General Brown concurred, but State Department spokesmen voiced reluctance to go beyond the diplomatic efforts already under way.

South Africa had decided late in December to start withdrawing its soldiers, who by early February had pulled back to the extreme south of Angola. US intelligence judged that South Africa’s intervention had seriously weakened the credibility of the FNLA and UNITA as legitimate nationalist groups and made it emotionally impossible for most black African states to remain neutral in Angola’s civil war.

In his memoir, Dr. Henry Kissinger described the outcome as “a debacle” that saw the United States, for the first time in the Cold War, capitulating to a Soviet-sponsored military adventure. No one in the Defense Department, and clearly not General Brown, considered the stakes so large or the outcome so dire. Over the long run, Angola proved a drain on Cuban and Soviet resources. The Cuban expeditionary force became more like an occupying army spread throughout the country, its numbers exceeding 50,000 by 1983.
How Much Help for Zaire?

During the early 1960s the United States played a crucial part in keeping Zaire23 unified and noncommunist. So in 1974, when President Joseph Mobutu sought to create a modern military force, he turned to Washington for help. The Soviets, President Mobutu argued, might be trying to isolate and encircle Zaire by giving military aid to selected neighbors. The administration agreed to dispatch a Military Technical Assistance Team headed by Brigadier General James Rockwell, USA. When Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and State Department spokesmen briefed this team, they stressed two points. First, Zaire's airfields, mineral resources, and potential as a regional power justified maintaining a close, “special” relationship. Second, the team should not indicate a willingness to increase aid beyond the $300,000 in grants and $3.5 million in sales credits tentatively allocated for FY 1975. With only $40 million available for all of Africa, nothing more could be expected.

The Rockwell team toured Zaire between 29 January and 20 February 1975. It found, as far as ground forces were concerned, only a minimal capability to maintain internal security and virtually none to defend against an external attack. Air defenses were almost nonexistent, although France was supposed to deliver seventeen Mirage fighters during 1976. The team responded by preparing plans for a force that could meet Zaire's “minimum deterrent needs.” It would cost $150 million over eight years and include:

On the ground, one infantry division consisting of three mobile combat groups.
For air defense, 9 radars and 168 automatic weapons, which would be integrated with the Mirage fighters.
On the water, a coastal squadron with 6 patrol boats and a river squadron with twenty-two boats.

Brigadier General Rockwell feared, though, that the two objectives of preserving a special relationship while avoiding any aid increase were mutually exclusive. Zairians, he believed, had taken the team's visit as prima facie evidence of a US decision to provide more aid. Simply providing them with the team's report, and then failing to act upon it, would cause a deterioration of relations. Brigadier General Rockwell thus strongly recommended that Washington indicate a willingness to supply more aid.24

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not nearly so forthcoming. Their assessment, sent to Secretary Schlesinger on 18 April 1975, urged caution. They found it unclear, for example, whether existing Zairian communications could support the proposed air defense system. If not, the cost of a new communications net could be considerable. They also voiced concern that team visits would precipitate immediate requests for aid, which the administration could not fulfill.25

By autumn 1975, as Angola's civil war attracted an international cast, President Mobutu provided the conduit for aid to Roberto's FNLA and Zaire became an active player in this Cold War battleground. Early in September Ambassador Sheldon Vance conveyed an urgent Zairian appeal for $19 million in grant aid for FY 1976, twice the
amount being sought by the administration. Secretary Kissinger agreed to ask for the larger amount in FY 1976 and for $28 million in FY 1977. On 23 September 1975, at OSD’s direction, the Joint Chiefs of Staff identified which of Zaire’s new requests had not been recommended by the Rockwell team but would enhance the force structure recommended by that team. They found that 70 percent of Zaire’s requests already had been proposed by the Rockwell team. Of the eighteen major items that had not, 90 percent involved ground transportation or mobility equipment. These add-ons would help create a mobile combat group with M-48 tanks to defend southwestern Zaire, where there were numerous vital installations, as well as the capital city, Kinshasa. The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted, though, that the team had not identified any threat which would require the M-48s requested by Zaire. Last, they recommended releasing the team’s report, so Zairians could compare it with their own wish list.26

Agostinho Neto’s triumph in Angola greatly alarmed President Mobutu. Having backed the loser, Holden Roberto, he now feared the victor’s vengeance. In the spring of 1976, when Secretary Kissinger made a well-publicized tour of African capitals, he stopped in Zaire and found President Mobutu obsessed by “an intense siege mentality.” Across the southern border, the President claimed, he now faced 350 tanks and 50 heavy-lift helicopters. He also worried about the 5,000 to 6,000 Katangans who had fought against him during the 1960s and had now taken refuge in Angola. After returning to Washington, Dr. Kissinger warned the NSC on 11 May 1976 that “[i]f Zaire goes, every African state will draw the conclusion that the Soviet Union . . . is the wave of the future.” President Mobutu had told him that sending a senior military officer “just to look” would make a difference. Deputy Secretary Clements offered to go along with General Brown. Instead, a team led by the newly promoted Major General Rockwell visited Zaire between 19 and 28 May 1976. Before it departed, the team learned that Secretary Kissinger wanted to be responsive to Zaire’s needs.27

American and Zairian intelligence estimated that within two to three years Angola would be capable of launching large-scale attacks against Zaire, using tanks and armored personnel carriers supported by artillery and jet aircraft. There were 5,000 to 6,000 Katangan exiles who still possessed “a certain mystique for Zairians at all levels” and who would be more than willing to punish President Mobutu if the Soviets armed them.

Upon returning, the Rockwell team reported that the communist takeover in Angola had changed things dramatically. President Mobutu now faced “a well-defined potential threat which will mature in one to three years.” Accordingly, the team recommended providing an immediate “impact package,” in order to create the nucleus of a ground deterrent. This package, costing $40.1 million in FY 1977, would include 36 helicopters, 10 M-60 tanks, 12 armored personnel carriers, and 16 anti-aircraft guns. For the longer term, the team proposed a force costing $640 million ($418 million during FYs 1978-1982) and comprising:

On the ground, one mechanized infantry division.
On the water, 14 coastal patrol craft, 110 small boats for river patrol, and 20 lake patrol craft.
For air defense, six ground control intercept radars, four air defense artillery battalions, and a squadron of T-37s.

Major General Rockwell argued that Moscow had “a grand design to control Southern Africa . . . . Accordingly, it seems entirely plausible to me for the Soviets to use surrogates (Angolans and ex-Katangese gendarmes) to overthrow Zaire’s pro-Western government. He predicted that, if Washington failed to furnish substantial aid, then “in about three years” it would find that only direct intervention could prevent Zaire from falling into the Soviet orbit.28

The Joint Chiefs’ assessment of this report, forwarded to Secretary Rumsfeld on 14 October 1976, was a good deal less alarming. They doubted whether Angolans would be able to launch an offensive so soon. They also dismissed as “overdrawn” Major General Rockwell’s talk of a Soviet grand design. Moscow’s opportunistic approach struck them as “sporadic and not without pitfalls and dramatic reverses.”29 The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) did not look upon Zaire as the focal point of Soviet objectives in Africa. Instead, the strongest potential threat facing President Mobutu appeared to be internal. Economic decay could provoke unrest, which outsiders might then be tempted to support.

Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a much more modest response. They suspected Zaire lacked enough trained manpower to absorb so much equipment in so short a time. In fact, they deemed it “essential” that no specific program, except a $15.9 million effort to equip one armored car cavalry squadron, be undertaken until a comprehensive survey could be completed. They preferred spreading a modernization program over fifteen years and, at this point, opposed waiving liability to repay loans and credits.30

Soon, though, events seemed to vindicate Major General Rockwell. In 1977 and again in 1978, Katangan exiles invaded Zaire. President Mobutu had to be saved by Moroccan troops in 1977 and then by French Foreign Legionnaires in 1978. However, as DIA perceived, the threat posed by internal weaknesses remained critical and uncorrected.

Ethiopia: Losing an Ally

The United States enjoyed a closer relationship with Ethiopia than with any other sub-Saharan African nation. Since 1953, under a twenty-five-year lease, US personnel had been operating a communications relay and intelligence collection facility at Kagnew Station, near Asmara in the province of Eritrea. Among other things the Asmara facility, known as Stonehouse, handled naval tactical communications and “Mystic Star” for presidential and VIP support. In 1973, however, a separatist rebellion wracked Eritrea. Eastern Ethiopia lay under a separate threat, Somalia having laid claim to those parts of the Ogaden region in which fellow Somalis lived.
Ethiopia relied upon American weapons for its armed forces. Emperor Haile Selassie, the 83-year-old “Lion of Judah,” came to Washington in May 1973 with a large list of arms requests. Grant aid had really been rent for using Kagnew, which the Nixon administration planned to close sometime during FYs 1976-1978, depending upon how soon facilities on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean could be completed. But budgetary constraints compelled faster action. In April 1973 Deputy Secretary Clements (acting upon advice from four assistant secretaries of defense and from Vice Admiral J. P. Weinel, USN, Assistant to the Chairman) decided that all military personnel should leave Kagnew by 30 June 1974. A few functions, such as Mystic Star, would remain somewhat longer. These cutbacks would save $12 million annually.31

The State Department wanted to delay a withdrawal, and President Nixon decided to reconsider the issue. On 5 May 1973 Mr. Clements advised the President that delay would neither improve Emperor Haile Selassie's security situation nor lessen his appetite for US aid. In the past, he noted, the Emperor had used US reliance on Kagnew as a lever to gain increased assistance. The Defense Department, Mr. Clements continued, did not believe that Somalia posed a direct, serious threat to Ethiopia; neither did the Soviet support base at Berbera, Somalia, nor Soviet naval vessels in the Indian Ocean. Mr. Clements added that keeping Ethiopians on the payroll at Kagnew while eliminating Americans' jobs at CONUS installations “would expose us to the risk of the most serious kind of criticism in Congress.”32

In the Oval Office, on 15 May 1973, Emperor Haile Selassie argued that expanding Soviet influence had radically changed the balance of forces throughout the region. President Nixon replied by citing the great difficulty of persuading Congress to support grant aid. But he decided that grants, supplemented by sales credits, should be planned at or above the level requested for FY 1974. Subsequently, the Departments of State and Defense proposed $17.4 million in grant materiel and $5 million in credits. In mid-August the President directed that most DoD functions be withdrawn from Kagnew by 30 June 1974. However, in January 1974 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended keeping an austere facility to handle tactical naval communications until FY 1977-1978, when satellites would fill that role. The Department of State and the Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed.33

An internal upheaval changed all these plans. Ethiopia's revolution began in January 1974 with an army mutiny. Haile Selassie replaced his entire cabinet and accepted a constitutional monarchy. Late in March, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., cautioned his superiors that the United States had a strong interest in keeping Ethiopia stable and pro-Western. One cause of the current trouble, he felt, lay in the fact that Haile Selassie had lost prestige by visibly failing to maintain his “special relationship” with Washington. While the United States was phasing down Kagnew and postponing arms shipments, the Soviet Union had been delivering new weapons to Somalia. China also stood ready to extend Ethiopia large credits, but the US Congress seemed unlikely to appropriate substantial amounts. So, Admiral Zumwalt suggested, why not persuade Iran and Saudi Arabia to provide aid? King Faisal of Saudi Arabia would
see the Emperor as his natural anti-communist ally. The Shah of Iran would be even more strongly opposed to radical inroads that might threaten the passage of Iranian oil through the Red Sea.34

Late in April 1974 the Saudis asked for a US analysis of the Ethiopian situation, to help them decide whether they should offer aid. Admiral Zumwalt argued that “the critical point to get across to them is that the regime has made some progress toward greater stability in recent weeks.” What happened next, he maintained, would depend in part on whether the regime’s friends were willing to provide it with assistance. To the DIA, conversely, Ethiopia’s prospects for political stability appeared very dim. Vice Admiral Weinelt predicted that the Saudis would act cautiously because “there is not much point in giving Haile millions only to see him deposed and a grandson take over.”35

The administration decided to be as forthcoming as possible in answering Ethiopian aid requests. At a Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) meeting on 24 April 1974, Dr. Kissinger framed the issue: “Do we want to remain passive and just accept the new government that emerges, or do we want to shape it?” Three days later he announced decisions that promised an active approach:

Provide Ethiopia $11.3 million worth of Military Assistance Program (MAP) materiel during FY 1974.
Increase military sales credits for FYs 1974-1975 by as much as $6 million, and offer them on concessionary terms.
Propose cash sales up to $25 million, perhaps including such sophisticated items as Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, to offset Soviet aircraft deliveries to Somalia.
Make every effort quickly to deliver an “impact package,” using airlift when feasible to underscore the positive US response to Ethiopia’s requests.

The administration also increased FY 1974 credit levels and offered cash sales totaling $25 million, but Ethiopians insisted that $30 million represented their irreducible minimum.36

Meanwhile, the Ethiopian revolution moved steadily leftward. A military committee, or Derg, led by Colonel Haile Mariam Mengistu came to power and formally dethroned the Emperor on 12 September 1974.37 In Eritrea, the long-running rebellion snowballed. By the beginning of 1975 rebels controlled all Eritrea except Asmara and its environs (where Kagnew operated) and the port cities. On 30 January 1975, the State Department informed Ethiopian officials that (1) FY 1975 sales credits would raise to between $20 and $25 million and (2) F-5E fighters, M-60 tanks, Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, and Vulcan air defense systems could be purchased for cash. On 12 February 1975 Ethiopia’s defense minister appealed to Washington for an emergency resupply of ammunition, to be used against the insurgents. At a WSAG meeting two weeks later, CIA Director Colby said that refusing to provide arms could trigger a coup bringing to power “people even more inimical to our interests than the present bunch.” Deputy Secretary Clements suggested providing some arms “as a symbolic gesture and let the situation sort itself out.” Between April and September, 11 M-60s, 28 armored personnel carriers, 12 howitzers, 12 Vulcan systems, and 6 TOW launchers were taken from US stocks and shipped to Ethiopia by air and sea.38
In May, meantime, the Derg declared Marxism-Leninism to be the government’s official ideology. Nonetheless, over DoD and Air Force objections, the State Department concluded an agreement for $25 million in sales credits covering seventeen F-5Es. Eight were delivered before a worsening political situation in Ethiopia led to the remaining F-5s being transferred to the US Air Force.

Why was the administration willing to arm what appeared to be an avowedly communist regime? Worry that people worse than the Derg might take control, plus a hope that something better might emerge, were two reasons. What happened in neighboring Somalia provided another. At Berbera, on the northwestern coast, the Soviets constructed a facility for storing cruise missiles. Smaller cruise missiles had to be emptied and refueled every sixty to ninety days. Soviet ships could come to Berbera where, instead of needing to return to Soviet ports, they could refuel missiles and return to sea. Berbera also was the only place, apart from Warsaw Pact countries, where the Soviets had established a command headquarters capable of controlling tactical units.

Meantime, how had internal upheavals affected Kagnew? On 6 February 1975 the National Security Agency asked for JCS authorization to close a communications facility known as Stonehouse within three months. In the agency’s judgment, intelligence benefits no longer warranted either risking American lives or possibly compromising equipment and personnel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff worried, though, that removing Stonehouse equipment would imply lack of confidence in the central government and thus jeopardize the continued operation at Kagnew of naval communications. Writing to Secretary Schlesinger on 12 February 1975, they said that maintaining the naval communications unit until 1977-1978 was “essential for command and control of US forces operating in the Middle East, Africa, or South Asia, including the contiguous waters of the Indian Ocean.” Consequently, they recommended retaining Stonehouse until the time came when its complete cessation would not unduly harm US-Ethiopian relations.

From Addis Ababa, around mid-year, Ambassador Arthur Hummel warned that the Derg might call for a quick US departure from Kagnew. Could the Navy comply, he queried? Also, the Ambassador voiced concern that some contingency plans apparently contemplated staging US forces through Ethiopian ports and airfields. Yet, as matters now stood, the granting of such rights struck him as highly unlikely. The State Department queried the Department of Defense (DoD) about these points. Early in August 1975 the Joint Chiefs of Staff assured Secretary Kissinger (1) that US Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), had plans for relocating from Kagnew in either 30, 90, or 180 days and (2) that no contingency plans depended upon access to Ethiopian ports and airfields. They still wanted the naval communications unit to remain, either until permanent replacements became available or until the risks outweighed the operational benefits.

The risk quotient rose rapidly. On 12 September 1975 insurgents attacked the area at Kagnew Station called Tract D, destroyed its transmitter, and kidnapped two Americans. Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth promptly called for a re-evaluation of Kagnew’s operations. Tract D had to be closed, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to keep Tracts B and E operating. Without Kagnew, they contended, communications
coverage of the area would be "severely degraded." Substitute methods were either unreliable or unavailable. Specifically, Congress' suspension of aid to Turkey made continued access to the base at Incirlik doubtful; tenure of a station at Nea Makri was still being negotiated with the Greek government; and the launch of a satellite intended to cover the South Atlantic had just failed. Taken together, these developments "paint a dim picture of the US communications posture in the Middle East." Thus, in the Joint Chiefs' judgment, the benefits from operating Kagnew still outweighed the risks. Of course, if the central government failed to provide for Kagnew's safety, an orderly withdrawal should be carried out. Meanwhile, efforts should be made to obtain rights for facilities elsewhere. The Joint Chiefs of Staff listed alternatives in order of preference: Tehran; Bahrain; Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; Masirah Island; or any other location found technically acceptable by DoD and deemed politically feasible by the State Department.43

The Ethiopian government placed guards around Kagnew but wanted the United States to agree, within twelve months, upon a date for closing the station. So, late in October 1975 President Ford appointed an NSC ad hoc group that concluded either closing Kagnew or negotiating a relocation of its facilities would strain US-Ethiopian relations less than continuing to operate at the station. Some alternative site did seem necessary. With Kagnew and all other stations operating, communications reliability generally exceeded 90 percent. However, without Kagnew station, that figure would decrease to between 70 and 80 percent. But the group saw little chance of gaining access elsewhere on attractive terms. Moreover, a precipitous evacuation might be interpreted as a capitulation to terrorism, with serious implications for American facilities and personnel elsewhere. Finally, the group worried that a withdrawal from Kagnew could be perceived as signaling a reduction of US interests in the area.44 The Defense Department, commenting on the group's conclusions, strongly recommended: first, staying at Kagnew "as long as we can safely do so"; second, pressing for the latest possible departure date, preferably after 1979; and third, seeking an alternative site. On 12 February 1976 the NSC Senior Review Group discussed Kagnew's future and decided to accept Defense's recommendations.45

During 1976 the risk-versus-benefits calculus changed radically. First, the Derg started down a path of radical socialism that triggered nationwide unrest. Second, satellites combined with other assets became able, without Kagnew, to provide satisfactory naval tactical communications. Still, no alternative existed for Kagnew's Priority 1 missions for Mystic Star, which required simultaneous voice and data channel capability. Accordingly, on 6 December the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged prompt diplomatic efforts to establish a Mystic Star facility elsewhere. If a new site was found and opened, they said, Kagnew could be closed on 30 September 1977. The new facility had to become operational, however, before Kagnew shut down. Secretary Rumsfeld endorsed their proposal and asked the State Department to start negotiations with Iran. Unfortunately, events moved too rapidly. By March 1977 Ethiopia's instability was such that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended withdrawing without waiting for an alternate Mystic Star site to become available. The Carter administration accepted this
advice, and the last Americans left Kagnew on 29 April 1977. The Ethiopian government had hastened them on their way by setting a five-day deadline for withdrawal.46

Earlier, in mid-November 1976, President Ford had called for a brief study of policy options toward Ethiopia. Answering one month later, the NSC interdepartmental group listed reasons to trim back efforts: the Derg’s hostility reduced the likelihood of gaining access to ports and airfields; Kagnew’s importance had declined; supertankers, unable to use the Red Sea or Suez Canal, had to take the long route around the Cape of Good Hope; and Kenya and Sudan seemed more suitable than Ethiopia for projecting US influence. Still, the group identified arguments against adopting a lower profile. First, neighboring Somalia had become a Soviet client with a Soviet naval presence. Second, other nations might see US disengagement as demonstrating “unwillingness to hew to a difficult course.”

How, then, should the administration handle Ethiopian requests for $56 million worth of ammunition and equipment? During FY 1975 security assistance amounted to $12.2 million in grant aid, $25 million in sales credits, and $6.2 million in cash sales. In FY 1976 Congress cut grant aid to $6.6 million and the administration stopped offering sales credits at concessionary rates. Ethiopians rejected an offer of $10 million in nonconcessionary credits but sought $118 million worth of cash sales. In December 1976 the NSC interdepartmental group outlined three possible responses:

1. Continue the current policy, allowing unlimited cash sales and offering $10 million in sales credits in FY 1977 and again in FY 1978.
2. Disengage.
3. Follow a middle course, fulfilling only part of the Ethiopian request for cash sales and offering $10 million in credits only for FY 1977.

The Defense Department favored (3), “under which we can deal quickly and imaginatively with the still fluid situation in the Horn.” Defense held, though, that the group’s study fell short of being complete and comprehensive. Chiefly, it lacked an explicit listing of US policy goals (e.g., regional stability, access, degrees of Western and Soviet influence). Also, the study did not address what strategic consequences would follow if the Soviets attained a dominant position on the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.47 These points were well taken. Grants, credits, and cash sales failed to sway the ideologically driven Derg. In December 1976 the Ethiopian government concluded a military assistance agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The Horn of Africa had become a region of Cold War rivalry, with Moscow at this point enjoying an advantage.

An Upswing of JCS Interest

How far within sub-Sahara Africa might Soviet military presence spread? Even apart from Ethiopia and Somalia, there were grounds for worry. Take Guinea, a nation located on the bulge of Africa’s western coast. Six times between July 1973 and
January 1974 the Soviets sent long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft to Conakry. In January 1974 a convoluted intelligence report indicated that Guinea might have concluded a defense agreement with the USSR, allowing the Soviets to use facilities on Tamara Island, off Conakry. General Brown (who at that time was still Chief of Staff, Air Force) feared Soviet bases could pose a serious threat to lines of communication linking the industrialized world. He wanted the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally to express their concern over expanding Soviet military activity. An immediate remedy, he believed, lay with diplomatic initiatives aimed at influencing Guinea to deny the Soviets increased access. Army, Navy, Marine, and J-5 representatives concluded that General Brown's arguments were not wholly accurate, because the same intelligence report had expressed doubt whether President Sekou Touré would allow the Soviets to use Tamara Island, because Touré wanted to remain non-aligned and friendly with China. At that point, discreet diplomacy remained the preferred US method.

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff revised their Unified Command Plan in June 1975, they left the whole of sub-Sahara Africa unassigned. But matters began changing after Cuban troops entered Angola. In 1975, as the law allowed, President Ford waived the $40 million ceiling for Africa; FY 1976 proposals totaled $86 million in sales credits and $12 million in grants. In August 1976 the Operations Deputies directed the Joint Staff to assess US military interests in sub-Saharan Africa. The J-5, in December, submitted a lengthy report highlighting two matters of strategic interest. The first was mineral resources. South Africa, Rhodesia, and Zaire contained an abundance of six minerals that were essential to modern society: chromium, cobalt, industrial diamonds, manganese, platinum, and vanadium. The United States drew 45 percent of its chromium and 55 percent of its manganese, for which there were no economically feasible substitutes, from this area. (Existing US stockpiles, however, could last several years.) The second matter was lines of communication. The advent of supertankers too wide to pass through the Suez Canal meant that most of Western Europe's oil had to come around the Cape of Good Hope. Such a long, exposed route was highly vulnerable to interdiction. In fact, on 24 September 1976 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved an outline of Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic's (SACLANT's) contingency plan for protecting North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shipping in the South Atlantic, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Indian Ocean.

Moving to US military interests, the J-5 noted (among other things) that reduced US access to bases had effectively eliminated one way of responding rapidly to regional crises. By contrast, the Soviets' quest for facilities in Guinea and Somalia had "paid off handsomely." Was Moscow guided by opportunism or by a grand design? To the J-5, Soviet activities bore "the mark of a relatively and carefully modulated test of American intentions, as well as experimentation in a new mode of expanding [Soviet] influence through proxy war by surrogate forces."

In these circumstances, the J-5 recommended:

1. Reviewing the low strategic priorities accorded sub-Saharan countries in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. JSOP 78-85 had listed only five of the forty-seven
countries—Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, and Zaire—as being of strategic interest,\textsuperscript{52} a number that struck the J-5 as being “somewhat unrealistic.” The major constraint, though, lay in a lack of means to support increased US involvement. More effort in sub-Sahara Africa might mean less effort elsewhere.

2. Reconsidering intelligence priorities. The DIA now placed most sub-Saharan countries in its Category 2, meaning that intelligence about them would not be required in order to carry out current military strategy. The number of Category 1 countries, for which intelligence was necessary, should be increased. To make that possible, “increased funding would most likely be required,” since reducing intelligence elsewhere appeared unwise.

3. Consider giving a unified commander clear responsibility for planning in sub-Sahara Africa.

On 13 December the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved using J-5’s study to formulate military plans and programs. Also, they directed the Joint Staff to review JSOP documents, intelligence papers, and the Unified Command Plan to determine whether any strategic priorities should be upgraded.\textsuperscript{53}

The stage was set for sub-Sahara Africa to assume a somewhat larger place in JCS calculations. It must be noted, though, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approached troubles in Africa with a large dose of caution. They shied away from confronting Castro and the Soviets over Angola; they rejected most of the Rockwell team’s recommendations about aiding President Mobutu; and they valued Ethiopia only until satellites could take over the functions being performed at Kagnew Station.

The death throes of European colonialism in Africa, the rise of African independence movements, and the influence of Marx-Leninist ideology among certain African leaders placed the United States in a difficult position. Sub-Saharan Africa policy became a contradiction. American public opinion and congressional sentiment, stung by the Vietnam experience, opposed military intervention or meddling in Africa. Yet US withdrawal from the tumultuous region was unacceptable because it would demonstrate weakness to African, Cuban, and Soviet rivals. Policy review after policy review produced the same inconclusive results, and by the mid-1970s the Soviet Union seemed to have capitalized on Washington’s inability to craft a meaningful strategy for the region.
An Israeli pontoon bridge across the Suez Canal during the October 1973 War. The three bridges built by the Egyptians for the invasion were blown up by the Israelis, thus cutting off the Egyptian retreat line. (AP Photo/Spartico Bodini)
Repeatedly between 1973 and 1976 the Arab-Israeli conflict consumed the attention of US policymakers. Militarily, the October War of 1973 and its aftermath required the United States to act as Israel’s arsenal. Economically, Arab states briefly embargoed oil shipments to countries that armed and supported Israel. Diplomatically, after fighting stopped, the United States acted as an intermediary in bringing about Arab-Israeli disengagement agreements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff exercised only a peripheral part in crucial decisions. Traditionally opposed to taking sides in Arab-Israeli disputes, they did not see how a policy of almost unstinting support for Israel could promote US security interests. Domestic political pressure, they felt, was pushing the administration in a dangerous direction.

The Eve of Conflict

The Six Day War of June 1967 had given Israel victory but not peace. In that conflict, Israel had occupied the Sinai as far as the east bank of the Suez Canal, the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Golan Heights, and all of Jerusalem. According to United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 242, adopted on 22 November 1967, the road to a “just and lasting” peace lay through “(1) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (2) termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”

Was Israel willing to trade territory for a peace treaty? And were Arabs willing to accept a Jewish state in their midst? In 1971, during a UN mediation mission,
Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat endorsed trading a treaty for a full withdrawal, but Israel insisted that it would not pull back to the pre-war borders. At that time, Israel was seeking to buy sizeable numbers of US combat aircraft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported by the Secretary of Defense, wanted to use the prospect of these sales as a lever to pry diplomatic concessions out of Israel. Instead, President Nixon decided to sell the aircraft without attaching any political conditions. Israel remained unyielding about withdrawal, and the UN initiative ended in failure.\(^1\)

Early in 1973, with the Vietnam War apparently behind him, President Nixon resolved to renew peace efforts. He told Dr. Henry A. Kissinger how he hoped to proceed: “We are now Israel’s only major friend in the world. I have yet to see one iota of give on their part—(even) conceding that Jordan and Egypt have not given enough on their side. This is the time to get moving—and they must be told firmly.” Dr. Kissinger met with his Egyptian opposite, Hafiz Ismail, who said that Israel must agree to reestablish all pre-war borders, except for some West Bank adjustments. Egypt, in return, would end the state of war (i.e., open the Suez Canal to Israeli ships, stop hostile propaganda, and terminate the boycott of foreign companies trading with Israel). Full peace would have to await a comprehensive settlement with all other parties, including Syrians and Palestinians. Such a sequence, however, seemed to hold little appeal for the Israelis, who saw no reason to agree upon final boundaries before negotiations with the Arabs had even begun. Prime Minister Golda Meir’s 1 March 1973 visit to Washington offered another opportunity to link aircraft sales with diplomatic concessions. Israel was seeking permission to buy thirty-six of the latest model F-4Es, as well as thirty subsonic A-4 attack aircraft during 1974-1975. Such requests were reviewed by a Middle East Task Group (METG) consisting of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Service representatives and headed by Major General Gordon Sumner, USA, who was then working in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ISA). The Defense Department (DoD) concluded that Israel already possessed enough up-to-date aircraft. At the White House on 1 March 1973, Prime Minister Meir remarked that Israel “never had it so good.” She insisted that a continued stalemate posed no risk because the Arabs were too weak to attack. Nevertheless, President Nixon said he would “look sympathetically on the number you suggested [thirty-six F-4Es and thirty A-4s] . . . on the basis of no linkage.” Late in May, without consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he approved providing forty-eight F-4s and forty-two A-4s between 1974 and 1977.\(^2\)

**A New War Begins**

All this while, Egypt and Syria were preparing a surprise attack. In hindsight, Dr. Kissinger concluded that President Sadat “aimed not for territorial gain but for a crisis that would alter the attitudes into which the parties were then frozen—and thereby open the way for negotiations.” Neither US nor Israeli intelligence believed
war was imminent. On 30 September 1973 State Department analysts decided that “the political climate in the Arab states argues against a major Syrian move against Israel at this time.” Likewise, three days later the Defense Intelligence Agency advised that “the movement of Syrian troops and Egyptian military readiness are considered to be coincidental and are not designed to lead to major hostilities.” Even on 5 October 1973, mere hours before the attack began, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) found no indications “that any party intends to initiate hostilities.”

Around midnight on 5-6 October 1973, the Israeli cabinet ordered a partial mobilization but ruled out a pre-emptive air attack against Egyptian and Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. At 1400 hours on 6 October 1973, Egyptians stormed across the Suez Canal and soon overwhelmed the Bar Lev Line, a series of strong points along the east bank. Simultaneously, Syrian forces attacked the Golan Heights. Initially, the Arabs enjoyed a large numerical superiority.

When the Washington Special Activities Group (WSAG) met at 0901 hours, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer advised against making “any move now. The Sixth Fleet will go on alert and could move quickly.” Major General (later Lieutenant General) Brent Scowcroft raised the possibility of an Arab oil embargo, but Admiral Moorer saw “no real problem as long as we have access to Saudi Arabian oil.” At 1039 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed all unified commands that the situation was still “confused as to who is doing what.” The administration, he advised them, intended to follow an even-handed approach, calling for a cease-fire and a return to pre-hostilities positions. The White House ordered a recall, without publicity, of Sixth Fleet personnel on shore leave; a JCS message went out to US Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), at 1424 hours. While this was occurring, Admiral Moorer was out for a Saturday golf game. After returning to the Pentagon, he called the White House to caution that recalling sailors on a Saturday night would generate a good deal of speculation. Secretary Kissinger, however, considered the recall a correct “signal.” Reconvening that evening, the WSAG decided to move a carrier task force from the port of Athens to the eastern end of Crete. Israel already had submitted requests for materiel, but Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger urged delay: “Our shipping any stuff into Israel blows any image we may have as an honest broker.” At this point, US officials expected fairly prompt, successful Israeli counterblows.

On 7 October 1973 the Syrians scored a breakthrough in a sector of the Golan Heights. Responding with massive air strikes, the Israelis suffered painful losses. In Washington, at 1150, the Israeli Embassy presented an urgent appeal for 200 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. Later that day it submitted much larger requests: 300 M-60A1 tanks; 40 F-4Es; and electronic systems to jam the SA-6 surface-to-air missiles that had downed perhaps thirty-five Israeli planes. That evening a WSAG meeting led to a presidential decision that Israel be supplied with eighty-four Sidewinders.

As 8 October 1973 began, CIA and DIA analysts still expected a rapid Israeli success. By the day’s end, though, prospects had changed dramatically. In the Sinai, a counterattack by two Israeli armored divisions failed, with serious losses. Consequently,
at 0820 hours on 9 October 1973 Ambassador Simcha Dinitz informed Dr. Kissinger that losses so far totaled 14 F-4s, 28 A-4s, and “something like 500 tanks,” including a number on the way to the front.8 When Dr. Kissinger briefed the WSAG about Israeli losses, his colleagues voiced skepticism. “They are crying wolf,” Secretary Schlesinger argued, “maybe because they want to lock us in.” F-4s could be added to scheduled deliveries from McDonnell-Douglas, he said, but 300 tanks would have to be taken out of the Army’s inventory. That evening President Nixon decided to be “overtly niggardly and covertly forthcoming.” Israelis were told not to conserve ammunition; they would be resupplied and all their tank and aircraft losses replaced. Except for laser-guided bombs, President Nixon approved the entire Israeli request for consumables. Preparations also began for transferring five F-4Es to Israel. In his diary, Admiral Moorer recorded a somber prediction: “We are headed downhill on a toboggan that will drive a permanent wedge between the United States and the oil-exporting Arab states.”9

By this time the Israelis were taking their rapidly expanding lists directly to the Joint Staff and the Service staffs. Accordingly, on 9 October 1973 the Director, Joint Staff, created a Middle East Task Force (METF) headed by Brigadier General L. R. Leavitt, USAF, with members drawn from the Operations Directorate (J-3). The METF would process requests, assess their impact, and supervise shipments. Already, for example, the Navy had stripped its shore stock of Sidewinders. Major General Maurice F. Casey, USAF (Deputy Director, J-4), became the point of contact for all materiel and logistic matters with OSD and the Services.

For Israel, the battlefield situation brightened during 9 October 1973. On the Golan Heights, Syrians were driven into full retreat. The following day the Soviets began a major airlift of materiel into Syria. In Washington, on the morning of 10 October 1973 the Israeli Embassy delivered a new list of requests that included 40 F-4Es (raising the total to 80), 80 A-4s, 270,000 rounds of 105 mm ammunition, chaff loads, Rockeyes, and cluster bombs. Early that afternoon, the White House authorized loading one transport plane with anti-tank weapons and two more with 105 mm artillery rounds. Efforts to charter US commercial carriers had proved unsuccessful, because airline executives feared for the safety of their crews and planes and worried about Arab retaliation. Therefore, the materiel was loaded aboard unmarked El Al aircraft. Admiral Moorer now expected the worst outcome. He did not see how President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger could carry out their strategy of acting as peacemakers uniquely able to mediate between Arabs and Israelis after the fighting stopped. “The Israelis,” the Chairman told Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., “are trying to paint us into a corner as their sponsor. . . . The Russians are posing as the Arabs’ sponsor which puts them in the catbird seat. . . . It is at best a disaster and at worst a catastrophe. We cannot win this one no matter what.” Admiral Zumwalt agreed that “we are about to lose . . . the Middle East.” Under no circumstances, the Chairman added, would he allow any Joint Staff officers to continue to talk directly with the Israelis.10

On 11 October 1973 the Joint Chiefs of Staff responded to growing Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean by reinforcing the Sixth Fleet. They ordered that, by about
13 October 1973, the carrier USS *John F. Kennedy* (then at Edinburgh, United Kingdom) would steam with its escorts to a holding position 100 miles west of Gibraltar. Also, the amphibious assault ship USS *Iwo Jima* would sail from Norfolk, Virginia, for the Mediterranean on 15 October 1973. Early that same afternoon the Israeli Embassy submitted still more “immediate” requirements: 40 TOW launchers and 2,000 TOW missiles; 25 CH-53 cargo and 25 AH-1G attack helicopters; and 10 C-130 transports. The White House decided that ten more F-4s were to be drawn from US forces in Germany, flown to Lajes airfield in the Azores, and there turned over to McDonnell Douglas pilots for delivery to Israel. This transfer plan apparently originated with Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA), who wanted to “teach the [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] NATO nations” that they had responsibilities outside Europe.

On 11 October 1973, also, Admiral Moorer and Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr., emphasized to Secretary Schlesinger, who needed no convincing, that “we just can’t tolerate” having Saudi Arabia or Jordan join the war. Later that day, between themselves, Admiral Moorer and Mr. Clements discussed the importance of achieving a cease-fire within three or four days. “The only way to solve it,” Admiral Moorer argued, lay in a cease-fire guaranteeing the Golan Heights to Israel and allowing Egypt to reoccupy the east bank of the Suez Canal. Israel's military attaché, Major General Mordechai Gur, paid a call on Admiral Moorer at 1710 hours. “For all practical purposes,” said General Gur, Syria's army had been destroyed. How much time the Israelis needed to redeploy against Egyptian forces would depend upon the supplies available. Still, according to General Gur, Israelis felt confident they could handle the situation.

On 12 October 1973, at 1845 hours, General Sumner informed the METG that a massive airlift of equipment might begin in the very near future. By now, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were beginning to feel ill-used. Secretary Schlesinger, they noted among themselves, was making supply decisions without consulting either the Service Chiefs or the Joint Staff. (Most times, in fact, he was implementing instructions from the White House.) General George S. Brown, for example, had been directed to take F-4s out of Germany. But General Brown's own view, which Secretary Schlesinger did not seek, was that it would be cheaper and more sensible to fly them from the United States. As if this was not enough, the Joint Staff's METF seemed to be going beyond its logistics mission and getting involved in policymaking. That very morning, Secretary Schlesinger had talked with Major General Casey about troop movements and operating considerations.

Early in the evening of 12 October 1973, Ambassador Dinitz discussed resupply plans with Secretary Schlesinger, who failed to satisfy Israel's wishes. At 2320 hours Ambassador Dinitz came to the White House, where he warned Dr. Kissinger that the Israelis would exhaust their ammunition stocks within two or three days and complained that Secretary Schlesinger was creating obstacles. Dr. Kissinger promptly telephoned Dr. Schlesinger, who countered that “they simply cannot be that short of ammo, Henry. It is impossible that they didn't know what their supply was—and suddenly they've run out of it.” The two men did agree that action must be taken. At 0230 hours in the Pentagon, Dr. Schlesinger presided over a conference attended by Deputy
Assistant Secretary (ISA) James Noyes, General Sumner, and several Israeli officers. Dr. Schlesinger ordered that three C-5As be loaded with 105 mm ammunition; three El Al 747s would carry 175 mm rounds. During their meeting, the Israeli Embassy called to relay a promise by Secretary Kissinger that ten F-4s would reach Israel by the evening of 14 October 1973. Two already had reached Lajes; eight more would come from the continental United States (CONUS). The Israeli spokesman claimed that they had ships available for cargo hauling. But after the Israelis left the meeting, Dr. Schlesinger remarked that the war would not last long enough for sea deliveries to become important.17

Secretary Kissinger believed DoD was dragging its feet about deliveries, despite Dr. Schlesinger’s denial. Consequently, when WSAG principals gathered in mid-morning on 13 October 1973, Dr. Kissinger began by conveying the President’s warning that “if there are any further delays in carrying out orders, we want the resignation of the officials involved.” Then he outlined White House strategy:

We had two objectives in the war; [first], to maintain contact with both sides. For this the best outcome would be an Israeli victory, but it would come at a high price, so we could insist that they ensure their security through negotiations, not through military power. Second, we attempted to produce a situation where the Arabs would conclude the only way to peace was through us. But during the war we had to show the Israelis they had to depend on us to win and couldn’t win if we were too recalcitrant.

By this point, sizeable transfers had been approved: 16 F-4s and 30 A-4s; 12 C-130Es; 125 tanks; 2,000 TOW missiles; and 270,000 105 mm and 103,000 175 mm rounds. At 2055 hours on 13 October 1973 the first of three ammunition-laden C-5As left Dover Air Force Base in Delaware bound for Lod Airport in Tel Aviv. The White House ordered that, after these emergency flights ended, deliveries should proceed at a daily rate of four C-5As and twelve C-141s. Additionally, 65 M-60 tanks and 74,000 rounds of 105 mm ammunition would be transferred from the stocks of US Army, Europe.18 This latter order would cause the military some anxiety.

President Nixon put heavy pressure on the Portuguese to allow Lajes’ use by American aircraft en route to Israel, despite Prime Minister Marcello Caetano’s reservations that there could be “grave consequences.” On the morning of 14 October 1973, after strenuous efforts to arrange a charter achieved nothing, WSAG principals agreed to rely on and expand the US military airlift that already had begun. The first C-5As were supposed to arrive and depart Lod during darkness, but crosswinds at Lajes delayed departures from Dover so that they landed in daylight on 14 October 1973, welcomed to Lod by cheering Israelis.19 Simultaneously, on the Sinai battlefront, 14 October 1973 proved a decisive day. Lunging out of their SAM-protected bridgehead, Egyptians suffered heavy tank losses. The next day the Israelis began a spectacular
counter-thrust across the Suez Canal, striking just above the Great Bitter Lake at the boundary between Egypt's Second and Third Armies.

When the WSAG met on 16 October 1973, Secretary Kissinger said that the US airlift must exceed that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) by 25 percent, to show that the Soviets could be outperformed and the Arabs could not win a war of attrition. “Get massive aid to Israel now,” he instructed, “because we will start a diplomatic program [Israelis] won’t like.” Admiral Moorer reported that four C-5As and twelve C-141s were arriving in Israel every twenty-four hours. Fourteen F-4s had been delivered, and A-4s were being leapfrogged from Lajes to carriers positioned down the Mediterranean. Later, the Chairman told his staff officers that beating the Soviet airlift by 25 percent “is a dumb thing to do but we will try. The Israelis will take everything we can send them, of course.” Daily flights, General Casey advised, could rise as high as six C-5As and thirty-six C-141s.20

On 17 October 1973 President Nixon ordered a sealift to begin immediately, saying that “we had already paid the price for it so far as the Arabs were concerned.” Admiral Moorer reminded him that, although the airlift was going well, Lajes was “the only place to land and the crosswind can halt everything. Ten years ago we had bases everywhere.” The President agreed that “we need to look at our base structure overall after this is over.”21

More and more, worries about the availability of oil hovered over WSAG discussions. On 17 October 1973 President Nixon promised a delegation of Arab foreign ministers that, after a cease-fire, he would work for a peace settlement within the framework of UN Resolution 242. That same day, though, Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) agreed to cut their oil production by 5 percent each month until Israel agreed to withdraw from all occupied territories. The next day Saudi Arabia announced a 10 percent reduction. But the real catalyst came on 19 October 1973, when President Nixon asked Congress for $2.2 billion to pay for the arms that were being rushed to Israel. The timing, Dr. Kissinger admitted afterward, “could not have been more unfortunate. Until that point we had maneuvered so that our airlift appeared as a response to the Soviet buildup. . . . But now . . . while Egypt’s army was in difficulty and Israeli forces were close to Damascus, the announcement . . . set up a target for mounting Arab frustrations.”22 The following day Saudi Arabia embargoed oil shipments to the United States; other Arab governments promptly followed suit.

A Superpower Confrontation

Events rapidly moved toward a climax. By 19 October 1973 the Israelis had carved out a large bridgehead on the west bank of the Suez Canal, moving south to sever the Cairo-Suez City road and surround the 35,000-man Egyptian Third Army. That morning, Admiral Moorer briefed the WSAG that twenty-eight F-4s were in Israel and another eight were standing by at Lajes. Soviet supply ships were coming into the Syr-
ian port of Latakia, but Admiral Moorer said that the Syrians lacked trained personnel and would need months to restore their pre-war competence. Just after the meeting ended, Dr. Kissinger received from Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin an invitation to fly to Moscow for “appropriate negotiations.” In his diary, Admiral Moorer voiced a new optimism: “Despite the fact that the Israelis have crossed the Suez [Canal] and placed the Egyptians in considerable jeopardy, they are undoubtedly suffering heavy losses. . . . I feel that this effort will . . . leave the Israelis in a weakened position—with the Arabs even weaker. This is not a bad situation upon which to base negotiations.” The Soviets, he believed, could make their arms deliveries effective only by providing technicians and, in some cases, operators to run their equipment.23

On 20 October 1973, while Secretary Kissinger was flying to Moscow, Israeli tanks cut the Cairo-Suez road. The White House directed that daily flights rise to six C-5As and seventeen C-141s if necessary, in order to deliver 8,000 rounds of 155 mm artillery shells as a matter of highest priority. Secretary Kissinger saw those as bargaining chips to use in stopping the Soviet airlift. New procedures for handling Israeli requests were put in place. Major General Sumner (with the Director, Joint Staff’s, concurrence) could approve shipments of repair parts and consumables. However, if a Service thought any shipment would affect its capabilities significantly, Admiral Moorer and that Service Chief also had to agree. Finally, the sending of major items would require Secretary Schlesinger’s approval.24

On 21 October 1973 the Soviets speedily accepted a US proposal that all parties agree (1) to cease firing within twelve hours, (2) to begin implementing immediately afterward Resolution 242 “in all its parts,” and (3) to start negotiations “under appropriate auspices” aimed at establishing “a just and durable peace.” At 0050 hours on 22 October, the UN Security Council adopted this as Resolution 338. Meanwhile, late on 21 October the Joint Chiefs of Staff received authority to send eight F-4s at Lajes on to Israel, raising the total to forty. Since an armistice seemed near, no more F-4s were to be pre-positioned at Lajes.25

On 23 October 1973 a cease-fire took effect but then fell apart. The Israelis, claiming that there had been Egyptian violations, plunged ahead and completed the encirclement of Third Army. Moscow angrily protested “this treachery” to Washington; President Sadat called on President Nixon to consider US military intervention to ensure Israel’s compliance. Later that day the Security Council passed Resolution 339, urging that all sides “return to the positions they occupied at the moment the [first] cease-fire became effective”; UN observers should supervise compliance. Israel, Egypt, and Syria agreed.26

On 24 October 1973 the WSAG decided that once the sealift started functioning, the airlift could be cut back. Subsequently, WSAG members agreed to approach Moscow for a deal whereby the United States and the USSR would ease off their resupply efforts.27 Simultaneously, at the Pentagon, the Operations Deputies reviewed matters and concluded that the Israelis now were making heavy demands with an eye to the future. Consequently, they wanted their Service Chiefs to “start screaming.”
Almost immediately, things turned sour. Alleging Egyptian cease-fire violations, the Israelis renewed their attack. At 2135 hours, Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin gave Secretary Kissinger, who had returned from Moscow, what seemed like a Soviet ultimatum. General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev proposed using US and Soviet forces not only to guarantee a cease-fire but also to carry out what he called the Security Council’s “decisions” about a peace settlement. Then came the critical passage: “I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally.”

At 2230 hours, Secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger, Admiral Moorer, and CIA Director Colby gathered in the White House Situation Room. Admiral Moorer pointed to evidence that might indicate pre-meditated action by the Soviets: a continuous alert of seven airborne divisions; an abrupt stand-down of airlift which could be reconfigured to carry troops to Cairo; and heavy sealift activity which could have delivered weapons available for the airborne forces when they arrived in Egypt. The Chairman warned, though, that any direct ground confrontation with the Soviets would prove “very difficult” since it must involve unilateral US action outside NATO, with Lajes providing the only link between the United States and Israel: “In short, the Middle East is the worst place in the world for the US to get engaged in a war with the Soviets.” But the conferees agreed to send a tough reply because, in Dr. Kissinger’s words, “The overall strategy of the Soviets now appears to be one of throwing détente on the table since we have no functional President and, consequently, we must prevent them from getting away with this.” Quick decisions were needed because daylight in Egypt was only a few hours away, and that would be the best time to land Soviet airborne units. Conferees decided upon several measures:

1. Set Defense Condition (DefCon) III worldwide.
2. Move the carrier USS *John F. Kennedy* from a point near Gibraltar into the Mediterranean; send the carrier USS *Franklin D. Roosevelt* from a point near Sicily to join the carrier USS *Independence* south of Crete; and get the Amphibious Ready Force under way from Crete.
3. Alert the US European Command and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Dr. Kissinger asked if setting DefCon III would result in recalling personnel. Yes, Admiral Moorer replied, and that meant the alert immediately would become public knowledge.

In the National Military Command Center, at 0200 hours on 25 October 1973, Secretary Schlesinger and Deputy Secretary Clements met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the Service Chiefs had been briefed about the latest developments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized further measures. First, move one of the Seventh Fleet’s carriers to a point near Singapore, so it could transit the Malacca Strait. Second, delay for seven days the 1st Infantry Division’s return from a REFORGER exercise in Germany. They also discussed what steps would be necessary to implement Defense Condition II, meaning that war was imminent.
In 1975, after he retired, Admiral Zumwalt publicly claimed that the United States, because of its military weakness, had backed down before a Soviet ultimatum and forced Israel to stop. Admiral Moorer, in a private interview with historians soon afterward, said that Admiral Zumwalt was “way off the track.” The administration wanted to avoid Arab humiliation as well as Israeli defeat; it “levered” the Israelis but did not “force” them to do anything. Moreover, Admiral Zumwalt’s statement about American weakness struck Admiral Moorer as defensible only if it applied to conventional forces alone.32

To return to the crisis: At 0540 hours on 25 October 1973, Ambassador Dobrynin received President Nixon’s reply to General Secretary Brezhnev that “we could in no event accept unilateral action.” At 0915 hours the Middle East Task Group received instructions that US airlift operations must be prepared to surge on short notice. When the WSAG assembled at 1000 hours, Dr. Kissinger asked the Department of Defense (DoD) to prepare a plan for positioning US forces in the Middle East. Admiral Moorer recorded how, after Dr. Kissinger had left the meeting, he, Secretary Schlesinger, Mr. Clements, and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush “held a long discussion on the diddling that the Israelis are giving the US. We all agreed that we must make it absolutely clear to the Israelis that we will not permit them to profit from this and we would, for instance, stop all airlift—or take other means available to us—if they continued to cause disruption in the peace efforts.” But he cautioned the Director, Joint Staff, afterward, “I do not like US troops in Arab countries or Israel either.”33

A catharsis followed. That afternoon the UN Security Council approved Resolution 340, submitted by eight non-aligned nations. It set up immediately a United Nations Emergency Force drawn from member states—excluding permanent members of the Security Council, among which were the United States and the Soviet Union. “Mr. President,” Dr. Kissinger assured President Nixon, “you have won again.” As the danger of a direct superpower confrontation rapidly diminished, US commands were released from Defense Condition III during 25 and 26 October 1973.34

Evidently, the Israelis still hoped to starve the Egyptian Third Army into surrender. On 26 October 1973 they defeated an Egyptian effort at resupply. At 2045 hours, Secretary Kissinger bluntly warned Ambassador Dinitz that resupply of beleaguered Egyptian forces must proceed: “Israel will lose everything. . . . You will be forced (to open the resupply route) if it reaches that point.” At 0930 hours the next morning, Admiral Moorer instructed the Joint Staff to study the possibility of having US transports fly supplies from Europe to Third Army. At 1130 hours he contacted US Air Forces, Europe, and inquired about using C-130s to drop water and supplies. Moments later, though, he learned that Israel had agreed to let a convoy pass through.35

All this while, US materiel kept flowing into Israel. On 24 October 1973 the WSAG decided not to cut back the airlift until a sealift got under way. Two days later the WSAG authorized stretching the airlift, if necessary, to avoid any visible gaps. It continued until mid-November. The purpose was to pressure the Soviets by showing continuing US resolve.36
On 27 October 1973 Deputy Secretary Clements altered arms transfer procedures. In the future, he ordered, all items would first be reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\(^{37}\) (As will be shown, though, this order was honored more in the breach than in the observance.) On 31 October 1973 Admiral Moorer asked each Service Chief to provide within twenty-four hours an assessment of how diversions to Israel had affected his Service. As the Chairman asked, they sent these directly to the President. General Creighton W. Abrams considered a supplemental of almost $800 million essential to guarantee high readiness. Admiral Zumwalt reported that replacing all items, notably 46 A-4s and 200 Sidewinders, would cost $73.2 million. Without a supplemental, he felt grave concern about US ability to meet naval needs. General Brown wanted a $328.7 million supplemental. Normally, he explained, such diversions would not cause a serious problem. But the Air Force relied heavily on F-4s and had commitments in Southeast Asia as well as Europe. He urged, therefore, that any new Israeli requests be met by increasing or extending production, not by transfers from existing inventories. The Marine Corps wanted $135 million for research and development to cope with Soviet anti-air and antitank missiles that had proved so effective during the October War. Secretary Schlesinger immediately sent President Nixon his own memorandum highlighting those transfers that most affected readiness: 172 M-60 tanks drawn from war reserves and pre-positioned stocks in Europe, in conjunction with existing shortages, reduced mobilization capability by over seven battalions; 34 F-4Es, the only type capable of delivering Maverick air-to-ground missiles, left the Air Force about six squadrons below authorized strength; 400 Mavericks halved the inventory; 46 A-4s amounted to 17 percent of the Navy’s inventory. Dr. Schlesinger later submitted, and the President agreed to seek, an FY 1974 readiness supplemental.\(^{38}\)

In the aftermath of the war, the Israelis obviously put pressure on the administration for assistance. On 1 November 1973 Prime Minister Meir arrived at the White House bearing a very large list of arms requests. Later that day Admiral Moorer attended a dinner at the Israeli embassy. Guests included President Nixon, Secretary Kissinger, and Senators from both parties. In her after-dinner remarks, Prime Minister Meir said that “Israel was a small country placed in a peculiar position where she could not afford to lose the war and was not allowed to win it and that sometimes, Israel had more difficulty with her friends than she did with her enemies.” In Admiral Moorer’s opinion, “she more or less implied that it was the support of the Senators in the room that had really made the Israeli success possible.”\(^{39}\)

On 2 November 1973 the WSAG decided to continue the sealift and resume deliveries of two F-4s per month; thirty-eight F-4s delivered during the fighting would be considered replacements for battle losses and not count against the total previously agreed. Secretary Kissinger began his first essay into Middle East shuttle diplomacy, focusing on President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Meir. What emerged by 13 November 1973 was a six-point agreement that replaced Israeli with UN checkpoints along the Cairo-Suez road, through which daily convoys would pass carrying food, water, and medicine.\(^{40}\)
Meantime, an effort to evaluate Israel's needs through first-hand observation had begun. Tanks were a particularly sensitive subject. Back on 17 October 1973 General Abrams had called attention to US inability to measure Israel's tank losses. On 26 October 1973, just after fighting stopped, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that a Military Equipment Validation Team go to Israel. The administration, they argued, should neither promise nor deliver any more major items until Israeli losses and repair capabilities became known. Led by Major General Casey, the team visited Israel between 28 October and 6 November 1973. Reporting on 16 November 1973, it computed Israel's tank losses at 369.4 However, if the Joint Chiefs of Staff were seeking ways to curb Israel's appetite, the Validation Team gave them little support. It recommended providing Israel with: enough tanks, artillery, and aircraft to ensure a strong deterrent; more M-113 armored personnel carriers, so that infantry could accompany armor; help in establishing repair facilities for M-113s; quantities of trucks so that requisitioned Israeli vehicles could revert to civilian use; and greater stocks of mortar, artillery, antitank, and aerial munitions.42

The administration intended to link US willingness to furnish arms with evidence of diplomatic flexibility by Israel. At a WSAG session on 29 November 1973, Admiral Moorer observed that, in terms of tonnage, “the Syrians (had) lost, (had) destroyed or (had) captured, more than the Israelis did, so the balance is now a little more in favor of the Israelis.” Secretary Kissinger said that Israel should receive only “quick morale building” items for the time being. “Eventually,” he explained, “we will have to pay off Israel with equipment for territory.”43

On 7 December 1973, at the Pentagon, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan put before Deputy Secretary Clements the list that Prime Minister Meir had given the White House on 1 November 1973. Assistant Defense Minister Zur specified Israel's priorities: first, equipment for suppressing SAMs; second, armored personnel carriers (APCs) and helicopters to increase troop mobility; third, tanks; and fourth, artillery. Mr. Clements replied by emphasizing that “political issues tied to the peace negotiations will be the operative factors and the President will make the decisions concerning the supply effort based on political considerations.” The next day Defense Minister Dayan told Dr. Kissinger Israel was “disillusioned” that it could not get more than 200 tanks and 150 APCs. Dr. Kissinger replied that “[w]e could give Israel 150 more tanks,” but APCs would have to be taken off the production line and away from US reserve units. On 9 December 1973, Secretary Schlesinger advised Mr. Dayan that most requests would be met.44

In his next round of shuttle diplomacy, Secretary Kissinger won agreement to open a Middle East peace conference, which opened at Geneva on 21 December 1973. Representatives from Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the United States, and the USSR attended. The Israelis also agreed to present, immediately after their year-end elections, a proposal for disengaging Israeli and Egyptian forces along the Suez front.45 Dr. Kissinger truly occupied the catbird seat; dire predictions by Secretary Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff early in the war had proved wrong.

proposal for Secretary Kissinger and new arms requests for Secretary Schlesinger. The latter included: 200 M-48A3 and M-60 tanks; 700 M-13 APCs; six RF-4Es; 30 A-4s; and 62 UH-1 utility helicopters. Dr. Schlesinger instructed the METG to prepare two packages: one for $200 million, bringing the total for aid to Israel to $1.5 billion; the other for $700 million, raising that figure to $2.2 billion. On 11 February Mr. Clements approved the $200 million package (200 M-48A3 and M-60 tanks, 700 APCs, and 48 UH-1s) and accepted “in principle” the $700 million one (400 M-60s, 3,000 APCs, and 26 A-4s).46

Secretary Kissinger’s next venture in shuttle diplomacy culminated on 18 January 1974, when Israel and Egypt signed a complicated disengagement agreement. Israeli forces withdrew from the Suez Canal’s west bank. On the east bank, three narrow zones were created: a zone for limited Egyptian forces; a United Nations buffer zone; and a zone for limited Israeli forces. Soon afterward, to monitor compliance with these limitations, high-flying US aircraft began overflying these zones every ten to fourteen days. This surveillance operation bore the code name OLIVE HARVEST.47

The administration now turned to a far harder diplomatic task. “Everything,” Dr. Kissinger wrote afterwards, “turned on the perception of our ability to negotiate between [Israel and Syria] a disengagement of forces on the Golan Heights.”48 Here, with no desert stretches, even small patches of territory seemed strategically vital. Secretary Kissinger undertook an exploratory mission late in February. Enough groundwork was laid for the Arabs to end their oil embargo on 18 March 1974. The real test began on 29 March 1974, when Defense Minister Dayan arrived in Washington with another disengagement proposal. As before, he also delivered a large list of arms requests: 200 tanks and 500 APCs from existing stocks rather than from future production as had been promised; F-14s or F-15s during 1976-1977 and F-16s in the 1980s; laser-guided bombs; attack helicopters and missiles; plus a wide variety of other items.

On 1 April 1974 Dr. Schlesinger told Defense Minister Dayan that, while the administration wanted to be as forthcoming as possible, “the cupboard was almost bare” of tanks and APCs. Later that day General Abrams warned Mr. Clements that meeting Israel’s wishes would reduce pre-positioned stocks in Europe to 40 percent of the tanks and 50 percent of the APCs authorized. Consequently, accelerating the production of replacements appeared indispensable. Mr. Clements promised to press US manufacturers about reducing production lead times. Nonetheless, he approved providing Israel with 200 tanks and 500 APCs, saying that this “might be a sufficient signal to the Syrians to deter them from a possible resumption of hostilities, which the [recent artillery duels] on the Golan Heights indicated they might be planning.”49

On 4 April 1974 Admiral Moorer reminded Secretary Schlesinger of a legal requirement that, before the last $700 million in emergency aid to Israel could be spent, President Nixon had to certify that such action was in the national interest. Moreover, the Chairman voiced concern that tank and APC transfers might weaken the readiness supplemental and strengthen congressional calls to bring troops back from Europe. He urged, therefore, that Congress promptly be informed about the impending transfers. This was done. On 23 April 1974 President Nixon signed the necessary certification,
informing Congress that the additional aid to Israel would promote stability and help avert a Soviet-American confrontation.50

On 2 May 1974 Secretary Kissinger started a shuttle between Jerusalem and Damascus that assumed almost epic proportions. Not until 18 May 1974 did a breakthrough over where to draw the line of separation take place. Three days later, when a consummation seemed near, Dr. Kissinger’s deputy asked ISA to list the major items requested by Israel but not yet released as well as equipment for suppressing SAMs. Major General Sumner of the METG promptly warned that, since the number of these bargaining chips was rapidly dwindling, “It would seem prudent to be as parsimonious as possible with our remaining quid.” Dr. Kissinger’s shuttle ended triumphantly on 31 May 1974, when Israel and Syria signed a disengagement agreement. It created areas of restricted forces for both sides and, in between, a narrow and labyrinthine area of separation, policed by UN observers, which included the highest point of Mount Hermon. On 5 July 1974 high-flying US aircraft began surveillance of the Golan Heights, similar to the missions being flown over the Suez Canal and Sinai.51

During mid-June 1974, in the afterglow of this success, President Nixon toured Middle Eastern capitals. He pointedly told Israeli leaders that a policy of “just give us the arms and we can lick all of our enemies” simply was not viable because “time will run out.” Nonetheless, he left the door open for further arms requests. When Defense Minister Shimon Peres, who had replaced Mr. Dayan, visited Washington soon afterward, Secretary Schlesinger endorsed “in principle” the release of some more equipment. On 18 August 1974 Deputy Secretary Clements approved a list that included trucks as well as some sensor and electronic warfare equipment. But he omitted the most advanced items sought by Israel, such as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), forward-looking infrared radar, and encryption equipment.52 The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not formally consulted. Yet their Joint Long-Range Strategic Study, circulated in October 1974, contained an illuminating observation: “Perhaps the primary change required in US commitments and security policies is that the very extensive US support for Israel provided since World War II be more carefully circumscribed.”53

Disengagement Talks Stall

In June Israel presented the US government with MATMON-B, a huge list of requirements spanning the next ten years. An Urgent List detailed what Israel wanted in the short term. The JCS organization took steps to ensure that it would not be bypassed again. The Policy and Plans Directorate (J-5), calculating that MATMON-B would require $1.5 billion annually in grant aid, recommended a detailed interagency review. Meeting with Secretary Schlesinger on 22 July 1974, the Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced concern that commitments might be made before the impact upon US readiness had been thoroughly analyzed. On 10 August 1974—only a day after Gerald Ford became President—the National Security Council (NSC) discussed MATMON-B. Two days
later, through National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 207, President Ford charged an NSC ad hoc group drawn from State, Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency with assessing MATMON-B “in the context of its implications for the situation in the Middle East, the peace settlement process, US foreign policy, and US military readiness, including international security interests and defense production.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were pleased by NSSM 207 and promptly told Secretary Schlesinger so. But they also voiced “immediate concern” about Israel’s Urgent List. Earlier arms transfers to Israel and Southeast Asia had reduced US stocks to the minimum prudent level; any more diversions would increase that risk. Moreover, they foresaw serious fiscal and procurement problems in rebuilding depleted US inventories. Therefore, they deemed it “imperative” to define the parameters of the US commitment to Israel.

On 27 August 1974 the NSC ad hoc group circulated a draft report. It defined US goals as follows: attaining a lasting peace and a secure Israel within recognized boundaries; enhancing US influence; protecting American economic interests in the Arab world—particularly, assuring access to oil at substantially lower prices; and containing and reducing Soviet influence. Israel wanted to double its combat forces during the next ten years, apparently in order to strengthen its negotiating position, slow the “warming” trend of Arab-American relations, and protect itself against any disruption in US supplies.

The group calculated that filling requests in the Urgent List would cost $950 million, while filling those in MATMON-B would cost $1.5 billion per year. Increases in US production would be required, thereby cutting unit costs and preserving production bases. The group also believed, though, that fulfilling MATMON-B would fuel the Middle East arms race, divert a large portion of US defense capacity to Israel, polarize the area again (Israel-United States versus Arabs-USSR), and possibly precipitate another war. Israel, the group wrote, seemed to base its program on a “worst case threat” and to aim for absolute security, which was “an impossible goal for any nation.”

The group then outlined military assistance options. For the Urgent List, it cited four possibilities:

IA: $200 million, which would give Israel limited satisfaction while minimizing the impact upon US readiness.
IB: $290 million, which would “round out” Israeli capabilities by providing a bit more of everything than IA.
IC: $335 million, which would require diversions and so hurt US reserves.
ID: $950 million, which would withhold only highly sensitive items.

As for MATMON-B, the group offered five responses:

IIA: Entertain Israeli requests only on an annual basis.
IIB: Require the Israelis to reassess their priorities and establish a force structure compatible with lower US funding levels—$300 million, $750 million, or $1 billion per year.
IIC: Restrict Israel to a mobile defense strategy, without a capability for counterattacking.
IID: Reduce MATMON-B’s requirements by relying on a “most likely threat” instead of a “worst case” threat.
IIE: Support MATMON-B in its entirety.
The group recommended concentrating upon the Urgent List and deferring consideration of MATMON-B until after the next round of negotiations. If MATMON-B had to be discussed, the group preferred Option IIB because it recognized fiscal constraints to be the controlling factor in any US response. After reviewing this report, Assistant Secretary Robert Ellsworth and Vice Admiral Harry D. Train, the Director, Joint Staff, recommended (1) providing $200 million worth of equipment from the Urgent List—i.e., Option IA—and (2) postponing discussion of MATMON-B.56

On 30 August 1974 the NSC Senior Review Group discussed alternatives. Subsequently, the range of responses to the Urgent List rose to seven: $62 million, $164 million, $207 million, $279 million, $374 million, $379 million, and $950 million. Mr. Ellsworth and Vice Admiral Train favored $164 million, arguing that Israel now was stronger than she had been before the October War and possessed “a marked edge” over the Arabs. They also recommended: postponing discussions with Israelis about MATMON-B pending further review; finding other forms of “quid” to supplement military aid; linking the US response to territorial concessions by Israel; and subjecting to “especially intensive review” Israeli proposals about research and development, communications, and co-production.57

Yitzhak Rabin, Israel’s new prime minister, met Secretary Schlesinger on 11 September 1974. Prime Minister Rabin took the position that, while movement toward peace could include some withdrawals, “Israel must feel strong or there will not be any negotiations.” After conferring with President Ford and Secretary Schlesinger, Mr. Rabin announced publicly that “we reached an understanding on our on-going military relationship in a concrete way with concrete results.” On 16 September 1974 an officer serving on the Chairman’s Staff Group recorded that “the final decision will be made at the White House with limited DoD input and even more limited participation by the JCS. Perhaps it is just as well. [Secretary Schlesinger] is reported to have said that he does not want Defense to be out in front on this issue.” On 24 September 1974, through National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 270, President Ford announced his decision about the Urgent List. He went beyond the ISA-Joint Staff recommendation in approving $207 million worth of equipment, including 100 M-60 tanks, 300 APCs, and 92 155 mm howitzers to be delivered by 1 April 1975. The President deferred any response to MATMON-B.58

The administration’s next objective was Israeli-Jordanian disengagement on the West Bank. In mid-August King Hussein of Jordan visited Washington and publicly endorsed negotiations for that purpose. But Prime Minister Rabin refused to join in any such talks. He had a very slender majority in the Knesset and had promised to hold elections before negotiating about the West Bank. For religious and ideological reasons, members of the right-wing Likud Party strongly opposed any pullbacks from the West Bank. On 28 October 1974 Arab heads of state (King Hussein included) decided to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as sole representative of the Palestinian people, on whatever part of the West Bank might be “liberated” from Israeli
occupation. Israel refused to talk with PLO representatives because the PLO remained formally committed to Israel's destruction.

By early November 1974, amid PLO raids from Lebanon, war clouds seemed to be gathering again. On 5 November 1974 General Brown took the unusual step of advising Secretary Schlesinger that the administration should promptly start seeking ways to either forestall or contain hostilities and prevent any great-power confrontation. The Soviets should be told, through diplomatic channels and at the approaching Ford-Brezhnev meeting,

a. That the United States will not sacrifice the freedom of its people and its Allies, nor its standard of living, that the continued flow of Middle East oil is essential to these ends, and that the United States must take those actions that are necessary to ensure the preservation of these values.

b. That should hostilities occur, our objective will be to limit our aid to Israel to those measures which will enable Israel to survive, and to constrain our support to Israel such that it is not able to subject the Arab States to humiliating defeat.

c. That we will press all of our efforts to the early attainment of a cease-fire to restore peace and stability in the region.

d. That we would hope that the Soviets in their actions would be similarly concerned and would seek to restrain the Arab States from acts which would provoke conflict and risk jeopardizing détente, so carefully nurtured between our two countries.

On 18 November 1974 Secretary Schlesinger ordered DoD to give Middle Eastern problems “priority attention.”

Meanwhile, General Brown became enmeshed in a controversy of his own creation. On 10 October 1974, while talking to students at Duke University, he delivered a tirade against “Jewish bankers” and speculated that another oil embargo might create animosity toward Israeli supporters. When his remarks were publicized one month later, a furor followed. Several influence groups called for General Brown’s resignation. President Ford promptly let it be known that he considered the Chairman’s remarks “ill-advised and poorly handled,” that they “in no way” represented either his views or those of any other official, and that he had communicated his very strong feelings on this matter to Secretary Schlesinger.

On 13 November 1974 General Brown publicly acknowledged that his remarks “were both unfortunate and ill-considered—and certainly do not represent my convictions. . . . What are called pressures lie at the very heart of democracy.” But criticism kept pouring in. On 25 November 1974, speaking to the Comstock Club in Sacramento, General Brown delivered an address that may have lightened the atmosphere:

More than anything else, I am awed and appalled by the divisiveness this incident has caused. . . .

There are two lessons that I have learned. First, I have learned a good deal about the corporate structure of banks and newspapers and, in addition, I have learned how little I previously knew about this subject. Second, I have learned that
the strategic direction of the Armed Forces in the defense of America is my forte and is a full-time job. With this in mind, I intend to avoid even the appearance of dealing with anything else.62

Concurrently, the Director, Joint Staff, raised a sensitive subject by instructing the J-5 to re-examine Israel's strategic importance for the United States. (The Chairman deliberately chose not to sign this directive, probably because of the fracas described above.) Late in February 1975, after investing “an enormous amount of work,” the J-5 completed a strategic appraisal of the Middle East. Its broad conclusions, in part, ran as follows. First, the best option would involve Israel's neutralization, with the United States and the USSR (under UN auspices) mutually guaranteeing Israel's internationally recognized borders. Second, the United States could exercise immense influence over Israel, if it so chose, but little over the Arabs. Third, in the absence of any prospect for a reasonably timely solution, the scenarios for disaster were so numerous that realization of at least one became virtually certain. Fourth, continuing the current situation served no one's interest.63

Simultaneously, a minor operational mishap generated some interagency friction within the US Government. On 10 November 1974 a U-2 reconnoitering the Golan Heights strayed off course and flew close to a very sensitive Syrian military area. Claiming that “under only slightly different circumstances this could have been a very serious incident,” CIA Director Colby asked General Brown to review flight procedures. The Assistant to the Chairman, Lieutenant General John W. Pauly, USAF, thought Mr. Colby's protest symptomatic of long-standing friction between CIA and Joint Staff action officers. Perhaps, Lieutenant General Pauly speculated, the Central Intelligence Agency resented military management of an intelligence-gathering operation. Replying to Mr. Colby, General Brown said he was “troubled” not only by the “implication” that he had not fully understood this mission's sensitivity but also by the Director's decision to share that “implication” with Dr. Kissinger. Why, he asked, could the matter not have been settled by a Colby-Brown telephone conversation? General Brown described the U-2 pilot's deviation as undesirable but, under such difficult navigational conditions, not excessive; flight plans were being adjusted toward less sensitive areas. The Chairman pointedly remarked that he would not “compound what was probably an inadvertent exposure on your part of our operational crosstalk” by sending Dr. Kissinger a copy of his own reply.64

**A Pause, Then Some Progress**

Arms for Israel re-emerged as a major issue in January 1975. On orders from the White House, Major General Sumner asked the Israelis to submit a prioritized list of requirements, limited to one year and $1.5 billion. The Director, J-5, described their reply as a planning tool rather than a commitment to be fulfilled. The administration
intended its response to be guided by diplomatic developments. President Ford and Secretary Kissinger had started working toward a second Sinai accord. Broadly, they wanted Israel to return the Gidi Pass, the Mitla Pass, and the Abu Rudeis oil fields in exchange for an Egyptian declaration of nonbelligerency. Secretary Kissinger undertook two shuttles between Cairo and Jerusalem, the first on 10 through 15 February 1975 and the second during 8 through 22 March 1975. He came home empty-handed.

President Ford had no doubt about who should bear blame for this diplomatic impasse. As he saw matters, President Sadat had been forthcoming while Prime Minister Rabin remained inflexible. As President Ford wrote later, “Once an agreement had been reached in principal, the Israelis insisted that they wouldn't move back past the crests of the (Gidi and Mitla) passes. That seemed fair enough, except that they couldn’t... say where the crests were... [A]s the talks dragged on, Rabin... fought over every kilometer. ... Their tactics frustrated the Egyptians and made me mad as hell.” Accordingly, on 26 March 1975, the President ordered a reassessment of regional policy and suspended weapons sales. He made sure that both the reassessment and his dissatisfaction with Israel became public knowledge. General Brown advised the President, “Israel’s army is very good. We know that. But don't count out the Arabs.” At that point, Israel’s requests amounted to $1.5 billion worth of new arms and $2.59 billion in financial assistance.

Washington and Jerusalem waged what President Ford later called a “test of wills.” On 21 May 1975 seventy-five senators sent President Ford a letter stating that they expected the administration’s aid request “will be responsive to Israel’s urgent military and economic needs.” Negotiations began getting back on track when, during a Ford-Sadat meeting on 1 June 1975, the Egyptian President suggested creating a buffer zone around the Gidi and Mitla passes, within which US civilians would be stationed to monitor troop movements. President Ford passed the proposal to Prime Minister Rabin. Secretary Kissinger started shuttling again on 20 August 1975. However, before the Israelis would sign an agreement, they insisted upon gaining greater access to American arms. As Gerald Ford wrote afterward, they asked for “more military equipment than our experts thought they needed and for more than I thought they could afford... Their shopping list included sophisticated weaponry that even our own forces hadn't received yet.”

Finally, though, the administration met most of Israel’s wishes. Through a Memorandum of Agreement, the US government pledged every effort to be fully responsive, within the limits of its resources and congressional authorization and appropriation, on an on-going and long-term basis to Israel’s military equipment and other defense requirements, to its energy requirements, and to its economic needs. Specifically:

The United States is resolved to continue to maintain Israel’s defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft. The United States Government agrees to an early meeting to undertake a study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with a view to giving
a positive response. The US Administration will submit annually for approval by the US Congress a request for military and economic assistance in order to help meet Israel’s economic and military needs.68

With that hurdle cleared, diplomats rapidly reached agreement about the next phase of withdrawal. On 1 September 1975 President Sadat, Prime Minister Rabin, and Secretary Kissinger initialed a new disengagement agreement, popularly labeled Sinai II. Under its terms Egypt and Israel pledged that neither party would resort to “threat or use of force or military blockade” against the other. Egypt would allow nonmilitary cargo coming from and destined for Israel to pass through the recently reopened Suez Canal. Israeli forces would withdraw to a line between twelve and twenty-six miles behind the old one, thus yielding the Gidi pass, the Mitla Pass, and the Abu Rudeis oil fields. The vacated area would become part of a UN buffer zone; two surveillance stations, one operated by Israel and one by Egypt, would work within it. The US contribution lay in having American civilians man three watch stations around the passes, setting up several unmanned electronic sensor fields, and continuing aerial reconnaissance over the expanded buffer zone. The United States also agreed, for five years, to guarantee Israel’s oil supply.69

On 15 September 1975 Washington released the Memorandum of Agreement concerning US military assistance. Secretary Kissinger told the press that items withheld during the reassessment now would be released. There is no evidence that JCS advice was sought. Several days later, a New York Times story accurately reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned about the “large scale” of aid offered and “somewhat miffed” about not being consulted before a commitment was given.70

Paying the Price—Again

The bill for Sinai II now came due. On 10 September 1975 Ambassador Dinitz submitted a formidable list of FY 1976 requirements. Among other things, Israelis now sought 250 F-16s, above the 25 requested in February. On 7 October President Ford ordered a review of both the FY 1976 list and the overall MATMON-B program. To do this, Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) James Noyes chaired an ad hoc group drawn from State, Defense, Central Intelligence, and the NSC Staff. On 23 October 1975, as part of this task, ISA asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1) to compare Arab against Israeli capabilities and (2) to assess the impact of releasing equipment withheld during the reassessment as well as items in Israel’s FY 1976 list.71

In their reply the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the amount of aid provided since October 1973 would enable Israel to defeat any Arab combination in approximately three weeks.72 When they looked four and ten years ahead, fulfilling MATMON-B seemed warranted only if a “worst case” threat was accepted. But using a “probable” threat, the same criterion that was used in planning US force levels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested “a
response somewhat more limited than MATMON-B.” In the early 1980s, they predicted, Israel still would enjoy a “decisive advantage.” Even facing the “worst” case, Israel could defeat a combined Arab offensive. And in the “probable” case, Israel could mount an attack on one front while defending successfully along the others.

Turning to ISA’s second query, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that stoppages during the reassessment really had not affected Israel, because MATMON-B requests were so broad that clarification would have been required in any case. In their judgment, Israel’s “medium term” wish list had no military justification. As for Israel’s ambitious proposals about co-operating in research and development and joining in co-production, these went beyond what was involved even in the close and long-standing Anglo-American relationship. Consequently, they favored simply continuing current policies and procedures.73

On 10 November 1975 the Noyes group circulated a report that closely paralleled JCS recommendations. Given Israel’s superiority, her forces need not attain MATMON-B levels; previously approved US deliveries plus Israeli production would satisfy major requirements. For most items, Israel should stand “normally” with other countries in the production queue. As for R&D and co-production, they wanted to avoid sweeping commitments, offering case-by-case co-operation instead. There should be an annual joint review of requests for equipment. Last, Mr. Noyes’ group recommended that the administration produce a general arms policy with “sufficient definition” to permit systematic responses to Israeli requests.74

Meeting in mid-December, the Senior Review Group endorsed Noyes’ report. On 8 January 1976, just before the NSC was scheduled to discuss this subject, Israel presented a “corrective” list for FY 1976. Gone were the 250 F-16s. Added, though, were projections for the next three years that included an additional 250 M-60s and 1,950 M-113s, raising the requests to 430 and 3,000, respectively. The J-5 computed annual costs at $1.5 billion, the same as the original MATMON-B. The Joint Staff and ISA, preparing DoD’s position for an NSC debate, endorsed Noyes’ report and recommended limiting annual aid to $1.5 billion.75

President Ford on 31 January 1976 approved a package of $2 billion in aid. Current procedures for R&D, technology transfers, and co-production should remain in force, with new requests being decided on a case-by-case basis. To carry out supervisory tasks and annually appraise Israel’s requests, the President created a Middle East Arms Transfer Panel drawn from State, Defense, Central Intelligence, and the NSC Staff. Mr. Noyes, who became its chairman, invited a JCS representative to attend all panel sessions.76

Lieutenant General Casey (Director, J-4) visited Israel during 8 to 10 May 1976, inspecting many installations there. “To our surprise,” he reported, “the Israelis did not ask for anything except understanding. They indicate they will not pre-empt (against the Arabs), and at present, they are capable of accepting a first blow and going on to victory.” They worried, though, about US arms sales to Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and they expressed fear that the military balance might shift during the 1980s.77
On 11 October 1976, as Election Day drew near, President Ford announced that he was lifting the ban on some items and expediting the delivery of others, such as M-60 tanks to Israel. Nine days later Deputy Secretary Clements let it be known that Washington and Tel Aviv were discussing co-production of F-16s. Late in December the Israelis presented a large list of requests for FY 1977, but that became a problem for the new President, Jimmy Carter.

Before the year ended, General Brown again became ensnared in controversies. Late in June, after being nominated for a second term as Chairman, he testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Senator Robert Taft (R, Ohio) recalled General Brown’s comment about Israel’s influence. The Chairman replied that his statement about “undue influence” over Congress was “inappropriate,” not inaccurate:

Senator Taft: “Do you still feel that is true?”
General Brown: “In all candor, I do. But I feel that is not unusual. There are other special interest groups that have influence or seek to achieve influence.”

The following day General Brown clarified that he should have characterized Jewish influence as “unusual” rather than “undue,” meaning that it was “absolutely proportionate to the energy which they put into the effort.” On 1 July 1976 the Senate confirmed him for a second term.

Back in April 1976 General Brown had given an interview to free-lance reporter Ranan Lurie. Its publication in mid-October raised another minor storm:

Mr. Lurie: “Speaking about the Middle East, are Israel and its forces more of a burden or more of a blessing to the US from a military point of view?”
General Brown: “Well, I think it’s just got to be considered a burden. I had this same conversation with [Senator Jacob] Javits [R, New York]. . . . He said to me: ‘Can’t you see the great strategic value of Israel to the United States?’ And I said, ‘Frankly, no.’ Now, if the trends were reversed, then I could see in the long run where it might be a tremendous asset, where they would gain power and bring about stability in the area.”

Subsequently, at a Pentagon press conference, General Brown said that by “burden” he was referring to the 1973-1974 drawdowns of Service stocks and stressed his “full personal commitment to the security and survival of the state of Israel.” Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld characterized him as “a fine officer” but added that “the absence of a reprimand should not be taken as an endorsement of inelegant phraseology.” President Ford publicly criticized “the general’s poor choice of words,” then called the matter closed.

Crafting Assistance to Arab States

King Hussein of Jordan stood out as a moderate leader to whom the United States provided modest amounts of grant aid. In January 1975, with King Hussein apparently looking for alternate sources of arms, President Ford directed a prompt
appraisal of Jordan’s air defense requirements. The implicit assumption that Israel would provide such a defense, most likely against Syria, obviously had become obsolete. A US military team toured Jordan during February 1975; because of political sensitivities, it was headed only by a colonel. The team found that Jordan, although facing formidable threats from Israel, Syria, and Iraq, had neither SAMs nor anti-aircraft guns larger than 40 mm. It recommended: providing short-range Chaparral missiles and Vulcan anti-aircraft guns to protect four army divisions, air bases, and prime radar installations; putting improved radars on thirty-two F-5Es that Jordan had purchased as well as selling sixteen more F-5Es so equipped; and protecting the Amman-Zarqa complex with medium-range Improved Hawk missiles. Costs would range between $350 and $550 million, depending upon what combinations of weapon systems were chosen. Forwarding these findings to Secretary Schlesinger, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called the team’s proposal “feasible” but refrained from recommending a US commitment to supply specific equipment. Lead times, costs, and contributions to overall air defense should be evaluated. If the administration did proceed, they urged that equipment be furnished from normal production, not taken from Service stocks, and that funding be drawn from “other than US Government resources.”

On 22 March 1975 Secretary Schlesinger asked President Ford to approve a $300 million sales package containing: two Chaparral and two Vulcan batteries for each army division; two composite Chaparral-Vulcan batteries to protect one air base and one radar site; and improved radars for the thirty-two F-5Es. More of these weapons, and some Hawks as well, might be sold later. The Jordanians should be informed, though, that no US grant aid was available, and while there might be objections in Congress, the State and Defense Departments believed that Israel would recognize the necessity for a loyal and effective Jordanian military to keep that country stable and moderate.

In mid-April, after the Sinai negotiations collapsed, President Ford authorized a $300 million sales offer. Hoping to avoid a Hawk sale, which would provoke opposition in Congress, he proposed accelerating Chaparral and Vulcan deliveries and selling some shoulder-fired Redeye missiles. But King Hussein insisted on having Hawks. So on 14 May President Ford approved sales of 14 Hawk batteries and 100 Vulcans. Members of Congress raised strong objections about the supposed danger to Israel. King Hussein had to agree that his Hawks would be permanently emplaced, primarily in the Amman/Zarqa area and at airfields and radar installations east and south of Amman. In September 1976 agreement was reached on a $540 million sale financed by Saudi Arabia. Meantime, McDonnell-Douglas representatives asked whether the administration would approve selling A-4 Skyhawks to Jordan. In January 1976 the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised against doing so. Since the Jordanians already possessed twenty-one F-104 interceptors and would be getting another twenty-six F-5s through grant aid and transfers from Iran, they neither could nor should try to absorb another aircraft system.
Toward Egypt, even though President Sadat clearly sought closer ties, the administration acted cautiously. A fact-finding team drawn from the Joint Staff, the Services, DIA, and ISA visited Egypt between 14 and 23 July 1974. “You have one last chance with us,” the Egyptians told them. “Don’t ruin it.” Upon returning to Washington, the team recommended undertaking more such visits and bringing Egyptian officers to the United States for training. In December 1974 Congress lifted the prohibition against aid to Egypt. Two months later, at Admiral James L. Holloway’s urging, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that Secretary Schlesinger press for (1) an interagency study of security assistance for Egypt and (2) a Presidential Determination legally required to render Egypt eligible for military aid. But President Ford took no action. In July 1975 the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that one Egyptian officer be allowed to attend the Naval War College. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) disapproved, citing “the present stage of Middle East negotiations.”

Strategically, of course, the Suez Canal constituted Egypt’s most important asset. Who would benefit most by its reopening? The Soviet Union would, in Admiral Zumwalt’s opinion. On 15 November 1973 he had advised Secretary Schlesinger that reopening would reduce the Soviets’ transit time from the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf by 70 percent; US transit time from the East Coast to the Persian Gulf would be cut by only 30 percent. Moreover, the Soviets could send their Mediterranean Fleet to the Persian Gulf and then replace it with their Black Sea Fleet; the United States could not do the same with its Sixth Fleet. In sum, wrote Admiral Zumwalt, strategic gains for the USSR would outweigh “significantly” any political, economic, or military gains for the Western powers. Recognizing that the Suez Canal probably could not remain closed, he recommended pressing for restrictions on transits by warships. In January 1974, however, the J-5 opposed placing any restrictions on military passage. To do otherwise, it reasoned, would harm US objectives in the ongoing Law of the Sea negotiations. (See Chapter 5.)

The disengagement agreement of 18 January 1974 brought the Suez Canal back under Egyptian control. The administration considered how far to help in reopening it. Writing to Secretary Schlesinger on 27 February 1974, Admiral Moorer recommended that any US commitment be limited to minesweeping the canal’s waters. Egyptian teams, trained and equipped by Americans, should remove unexploded ordnance. Agreeing, President Nixon decided that US personnel would carry out helicopter minesweeping and train Egyptians to remove ordnance. Operation NIMBUS MOON, clearing ordnance, ran from May until December 1974. NIMBUS STAR, the minesweeping, took place from April to June. These were international operations by Task Force 65, combining US, French, Canadian, and Egyptian units under an American commander. The Suez Canal formally reopened on 5 June 1975, without explicit restrictions on the passage of warships.

In June 1975 President Sadat asked permission to purchase US transport aircraft. Early in March 1976 the administration announced that it would sell Egypt six C-130s. President Ford, on 25 March 1976, signed a Presidential Determination that selling
transports and training Egyptian personnel would strengthen US security and promote world peace. The next day the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Rumsfeld a memorandum recommending the broad parameters that should govern sales to Egypt. These included: providing nothing that would significantly alter the military balance; furnishing no equipment that was still under research and development or that would compromise technology; supplying nothing beyond what the Egyptians could absorb; and placing Egyptian orders in the normal production queue.89

President Ford hoped to defuse opposition by acting first on aid to Israel. Nonetheless, strong objections from Capitol Hill compelled Secretary Kissinger to pledge that there would be no more sales to Egypt during 1976. President Sadat did his part by formally denouncing Egypt’s Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR. Consequently, congressional opposition faded away and C-130 deliveries went forward in 1977.90 Egypt had shifted from an adversary into a quasi-ally of the United States.

Conclusion: The “Burden” of Israel

Plainly, during this period relations between the United States and Israel underwent a momentous change as any linkage between US arms aid and diplomatic flexibility by Israel disappeared. By 1976 deliveries of US military materiel became massive and continuous, although the Defense Department saw no military justification for MATMON-B and its sequels. The Joint Chiefs of Staff watched with dismay. If anything, General Brown’s characterization of Israel as a “burden” understated their feelings. The rapid and sizeable transfers from Service stocks during and immediately after the October War created intense concern about the effect on US military readiness. DoD’s one success lay in lightening the burden somewhat by ensuring that subsequent deliveries would come from future production.
The Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, CJCS, aboard the aircraft carrier USS *KITTY HAWK* (CV-63) during the Shah's visit 8 April 1974. (US Navy photograph)
Emergence of the Persian Gulf States

Among Western nations, the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974 triggered the greatest economic turmoil since the depression of the 1930s. A new military problem also emerged. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had to find ways of assuring access to oil supplies. What had been a leisurely search for base rights suddenly became an intense, wide-ranging undertaking. Fiscal and political constraints existed, of course. Intruding into the Persian Gulf area presented unique problems. “Never in our history,” Admiral Thomas H. Moorer cautioned the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), late in December 1973, had “political-military-psychological factors” become so interrelated.1 His words, which look exaggerated with the benefit of hindsight, reflected the urgency of the moment.

Indispensable Oil?

Months before the embargo, the Nixon administration had begun exploring how to cope with cutoffs or shortages. As US oil imports steadily increased, so did the Persian Gulf’s importance to the United States. In March 1973 President Nixon commissioned a study of how problems caused by energy supply and distribution would affect US national security. What, for example, would be the impact abroad of policies aimed at either minimizing or maximizing US dependence on oil imports? How might the effect of producer boycotts be reduced? What consequences would flow from US actions intended to either weaken the cohesion of, or offset price increases decreed by, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)?2

In August 1973 a National Security Council (NSC) ad hoc group circulated a draft reply. In 1970 the United States had imported 20 percent of its oil; by 1985 that figure
might rise to almost 60 percent. World demand, the group predicted, would undergo a very large increase which would have to be met mainly from Middle Eastern sources. Saudi Arabia, in 1985, should be the largest single source of foreign oil for the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Then, erring on the side of optimism, the group predicted only a 60 to 100 percent price increase by 1980. Actually, by December 1973 OPEC’s price had leaped upward by almost 400 percent!

How might a stoppage of oil imports affect US military operations? The group calculated that, while military requirements would prove greatest in a conventional war involving the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), these needs totaled only 10 percent of US domestic production. Imposing World War II-type rationing would cut civilian consumption about 30 percent. Yet, because some US output probably would have to be diverted for allied needs, US and allied “staying power” could not last more than several months.

How might the impact of a cutoff best be anticipated and minimized? The group saw stockpiling as perhaps “the most important single action that the US can take” and among the few major steps that might be substantially completed during the 1970s. Also, a number of nations could conclude oil-sharing arrangements. To reduce vulnerability over the long term, the group suggested diversifying foreign suppliers, increasing domestic production, and launching an energy conservation program.

In a critique written for Admiral Moorer and Deputy Secretary William P. Clements, Jr., the Director of the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General George M. Seignious, II, USA, and Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ISA), Robert Hill made several points. During periods of petroleum shortages, they stressed, military requirements must be awarded priority. Exploiting the Naval Petroleum Reserves for short-term civilian consumption would run counter to national security objectives. The best solution, they emphasized, lay in developing alternative sources and more efficient use of energy. Last, they drew attention to the vulnerability of the long sea lanes leading from the Persian Gulf—and of the Middle Eastern oil fields themselves—to air attack and sabotage. When the NSC Senior Review Group (SRG) met on 16 August 1973 to discuss energy policy, no easy solutions emerged. According to Admiral Moorer’s account of the discussion, “If we start right now results will not become apparent until 1980. By 1980, despite actions to produce fuel, the rate of increase of consumption will absorb the increased production.” Meanwhile, deteriorating relations with Libya gave impetus to the studies. Libya supplied only 3 percent of US oil imports but 13 percent of the oil imported by Common Market countries. Actions taken by the radical regime of Muammar Kadaffi led to mounting tensions between Washington and Tripoli. In March 1973 Libyan fighters fired at a US reconnaissance plane flying within what Libya claimed to be an offshore “restricted zone.” In June Libya nationalized the Bunker Hunt oil company, citing US support of Israel as a reason. Concurrently, President Nixon called for a study of how to deal with Kadaffi.

Early in July, responding to the President’s request, an interdepartmental group chaired by Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom presented four options:
1. Explore the possibility of improving relations by, among other things, sending a high-level emissary to Tripoli, suspending reconnaissance flights, and approving the delivery of eight C-130 transports for which contracts had been signed in 1972.

2. Maintain a low profile and take no direct action against Libya. This option would include running infrequent reconnaissance flights and taking no action about C-130 deliveries.

3. Maintain a low profile but signal willingness to counter Libyan actions. Among other measures, fly regular reconnaissance missions, disapprove export licenses for the C-130s, and join in court action to block Libya’s sale of nationalized oil.

4. Confrontation: In addition to Option 3, break diplomatic relations and publicly highlight Libya’s subversive and terrorist actions.⁵

The Director, Joint Staff, and Assistant Secretary Hill urged Admiral Moorer and Mr. Clements to support a combination of Options 1 and 2, continuing reconnaissance flights and (unless relations grew significantly worse) delivering the C-130s. Option 4, confrontation, had no advocates in the Department of Defense (DoD). As Admiral Moorer advised Mr. Clements, “Getting tough with the Libyans is likely to be counterproductive with the Saudi Arabsians and everyone else.” On 14 August, the SRG discussed policy toward Libya. “Not a very productive meeting,” the Assistant to the Chairman recorded afterwards. The interdepartmental group proceeded to reformulate Libyan options as follows: “Stall,” neither inflaming the situation nor making special efforts to improve it, which was the current policy; “Trade Off” by sending a special emissary to see whether the remaining US interests in Libya could be preserved; and “React” by measured, overt retaliation. The administration adopted the last option. During August and September Libya nationalized 51 percent of the other US oil companies. Full nationalization came in 1974, followed in 1975 by a US ban the next year on exporting the C-130s. Regular reconnaissance flights were resumed in 1974 without provoking any Libyan reaction.⁶ Nonetheless, relations between Washington and Tripoli continued to worsen, and the broader issue of oil supply remained uncertain.

Admiral Moorer took a gloomy view of what the future held. In mid-August 1973, at an SRG meeting on energy policy, he predicted—wrongly, as it turned out—that “there would be a supertanker every fifty miles between the Persian Gulf and Western Europe, and the US by 1980. This gives the Russians a great opportunity to cut the jugular vein of all of NATO. . . . You could take three submarines [in] the Malacca Strait and starve the Japanese to death from an oil standpoint. . . . The President of the 1980s is [going to be] very limited in his options.”⁷

An oil cutoff came much sooner than anyone expected. The Arab-Israeli War began on 6 October 1973; a US airlift to Israel started one week later. On 16 October six Persian Gulf states raised their oil price by 70 percent. The next day OPEC’s Arab members agreed to reduce production by 5 percent each month until Israel withdrew from all occupied territories. On 20 October Saudi Arabia embargoed petroleum exports to the United States; other Arab countries followed suit.⁸ Not until 18 March 1974, after Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger had negotiated an Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement and started working toward a similar Israeli-Syrian arrangement, did the
The embargo end. The United States survived this stoppage without great economic harm; OPEC’s staggering price hikes would inflict far greater damage.

What part did the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in coping with the embargo? Contingency planning moved forward promptly. On 8 November 1973 Deputy Secretary Clements instructed the military departments, Defense agencies, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to find ways of cutting petroleum consumption 35 percent below FY 1973 levels. Further, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess what the impact of such reductions would be and immediately to establish procedures for preventing war reserve stocks from falling to unacceptable levels. Late in January 1974 Admiral Moorer asked his JCS colleagues to estimate how the embargo was affecting each Service. Their replies, the Chairman advised Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger on 6 February 1974, indicated that “the Services are weathering the crisis well.” Admiral Moorer worried, though, that continued shortages would have an increasingly severe impact upon readiness. Furthermore, without budgetary relief, higher fuel costs would require an even greater reduction in training and, hence, in readiness.

Back in September 1973, President Nixon had asked for legislation that would permit production at Naval Petroleum Reserve (NPR) No. 1 at Elk Hills, California. Just after the embargo began, Representative F. Edward Hebert (D-LA), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, asked for the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about whether to exploit Elk Hills and how the cutoff might affect US military requirements. Their reply, forwarded to Secretary Schlesinger on 5 November 1973, stated that the situation, “while extremely serious, has not yet reached the level of a national emergency.” The coming years, they cautioned, might present “much more severe and far-reaching” energy crises. Basically, therefore, the NPR should remain untapped. The Services, they noted, relied on Middle East oil for 37 percent of their requirements. Only one month later, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed emergency measures. They recommended increasing production at Elk Hills for one year, with two provisos. First, NPR No. 4 in Alaska should be explored and developed. Second, a one-time use of Elk Hills would not constitute a precedent, except for national defense requirements created by major international conflict. The embargo ended in March 1974, so legislation opening Elk Hills never passed Congress. On 13 December 1973 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Schlesinger that they no longer considered such a step justifiable but did fully support measures taken to improve the readiness of the Naval Petroleum Reserves.

How would a disruption of oil supplies, combined with simultaneous torpedoing of tankers, affect US and allied military capabilities? In mid-November 1973, as part of an effort to improve DoD’s management of energy resources, Deputy Secretary Clements commissioned a JCS study of this question. Interestingly, eleven months passed before an answer appeared. The Joint Chiefs conclusion: Given the growing US dependence on oil and the Arabs’ solidarity about embargoing oil for political objectives, steps should be taken to improve the levels of peacetime operating stocks and the availability of US-controlled tankers. Without any Middle East oil, but by sharing supplies in the Western Hemisphere, NATO could “barely” sustain a war for 180 days.
With domestic rationing, the United States could continue indefinitely at 76 percent of its pre-embargo consumption. The Europeans could go for fourteen months, provided that a full sharing of Western Hemisphere assets took place. (This estimate was far more optimistic than those made by the ad hoc group in August 1973.) In fact, a total stoppage of Middle East oil would release enough tankers to permit such sharing. The Joint Chiefs of Staff made two recommendations. First, the Defense Supply Agency should re-examine the proper levels of peacetime operating stocks, so that a peacetime cutoff would not require drawing upon war reserves. Second, the Maritime Administration should develop, in conjunction with US owners of Panamanian- and Liberian-registered ships, procedures for reporting those vessels’ availability in a national emergency. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) replied that action on these two recommendations already had begun.11

Early in 1973 President Nixon had decided to reduce the National Stockpile of Strategic and Critical Materials. Among other things, he issued planning guidelines that lowered the expected duration of a conflict in Europe from three years to one, and cut stockpile requirements accordingly. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in June, judged these changes acceptable. However, in February 1974 they advised Secretary Schlesinger that the assumptions justifying stockpile reductions might no longer be valid. Friendly nations’ refusal to support the US airlift to Israel might set a precedent for their non-cooperation. The Arabs’ concerted action might be repeated by major exporters of other critical materials. The selfish actions of oil importers might recur if sudden, acute shortages of other materials developed. In peacetime, moreover, the American public might not accept highly visible diversions of critical materials to military use. So the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a review of stockpiling policies and assumptions in order to minimize the harm that foreign actions might inflict.

The administration did carry out such a study, which DoD found inconclusive. Accordingly, in October 1974 Deputy Secretary Clements ordered a DoD analysis of the stockpile’s size and composition. The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that materials for the production of energy, particularly oil, now be included in stockpile planning. They strongly urged setting new, higher stockpile objectives and deferring the sale of any more items from the existing stockpile. Late in March 1975 Mr. Clements forwarded their recommendations to Dr. Kissinger. A strategic petroleum reserve was created in 1975, but filling of the sites did not begin until 1977.12

Enlarging a Military Presence

The embargo focused US policymakers’ attention on how to project military power into the Persian Gulf area. Just after the October War ended, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., raised the possibility of establishing an independently operating nuclear task force. The war, he told Admiral Moorer, demonstrated again that a carrier task group had “no equal as a flexible, credible instrument of national policy.” On 16 November the
Chairman conferred with his Assistant, the Director of the Joint Staff, and the Directors of J-3 and J-5. Admiral Moorer told them that “it is time for us to change our policy so that we can get freer access to places like Rhodesia, Angola, South Africa, Mozambique, etc.” He wanted to eliminate fixed deployments (e.g., two carriers in the Mediterranean, three in the Western Pacific) and create a roving task force like the one suggested by Admiral Zumwalt.

In 1973 the only permanent US presence in the Persian Gulf area was the Middle East Task Force (MIDEASTFOR) based at Bahrain. MIDEASTFOR, which had been operating in the area since 1948, consisted of one command ship and two destroyers. This no longer sufficed. On 28 October 1973 the Joint Chiefs of Staff relayed to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, an order moving the carrier USS *Hancock* from the Western Pacific to the Arabian Sea. Task groups led successively by the carriers USS *Oriskany* and USS *Kitty Hawk* remained in the Indian Ocean continuously until April 1974.

Meantime, Admiral Zumwalt’s staff concluded that the best way of increasing MIDEASTFOR involved adding six to eight destroyers for more than sixty days and deploying four to six P-3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) patrol planes to Iran for thirty days. The Joint Staff J-3 commented, though, that augmenting MIDEASTFOR would compel commensurate reductions elsewhere. Consequently, the permanent MIDEASTFOR did not grow.

On 20 October 1973, when Arab states announced their oil embargo, the Government of Bahrain announced that it would end MIDEASTFOR’s homeporting privileges one year hence. However, when Admiral Moorer visited Bahrain in April 1974, he recorded that the attitude of the Amir, the Minister of Defense, and leading businessmen “was one of complete friendliness and expressed appreciation for the contributions made by US forces to the stability in their area. It was clear to me that the Americans are most welcome and . . . there is very high probability that a way will be found to save face and save the American position as it stands.” The Amir ultimately postponed MIDEASTFOR’s exit until mid-1977.

In May 1975 Assistant Secretary (ISA) Robert Ellsworth asked the Joint Staff to evaluate the impact of withdrawing MIDEASTFOR. Answering on 27 June 1975, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that, although homeporting at Bahrain was politically sensitive and costly, alternative sites would be even more restrictive, expensive, and sensitive. Only three other locations impressed them as possible sites: Karachi, Pakistan; Mombasa, Kenya; and Massawa, Ethiopia. By excluding facilities for dependents, Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago and Port Victoria in the Seychelles Islands could be added to this list. Additionally, an all-afloat MIDEASTFOR might be attainable.

**The Search for Bases**

Without an array of bases, there was no way that the United States could make its military power felt throughout the Persian Gulf area. On 17 December 1973
Admiral Moorer asked the Joint Staff to appraise basing priorities in the Indian Ocean. The result, a JCS memorandum dated 1 February 1974, informed Secretary Schlesinger that continued access to Middle Eastern oil might hinge upon US ability to “communicate effectively an unmistakable resolve” to oppose threats against regional stability. They wanted Secretary Kissinger to undertake diplomatic initiatives aimed at obtaining base and overflight rights for protecting the oil route. The most desirable Indian Ocean sites, in their judgment, were:

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<th>Ports</th>
<th>Air Force Bases</th>
<th>Maritime Air Patrol Facilities</th>
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<td>North</td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Masirah, Oman</td>
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<td>Bandar Abbas, Iran (and Chah Bahar, Iran, when completed)</td>
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<td>the Chagos Archipelago</td>
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<td>Simonstown, South Africa, and Perth/Fremantle, Australia</td>
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They also wanted NATO facilities in Italy, Greece, and Turkey made available during Middle East operations.

Access to some sites proved readily obtainable, albeit for very limited purposes. The United States had begun dredging and airfield construction in Diego Garcia. In October 1972, the US and UK governments had signed an agreement providing for joint operation of the facilities there. Early in November 1973, Admiral Moorer asked Lord Carrington, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defense, whether Diego Garcia could be used for ocean surveillance missions and logistical support of task groups. Accordingly, Lord Carrington now informed Admiral Moorer that he had no objection whatsoever: “After all, you paid for it.”

On 8 November 1973 P-3s began flying out of Diego Garcia on ASW missions. Simultaneously, the Shah of Iran agreed that Bandar Abbas, by the Strait of Hormuz, could be used for three or four P-3 flights per week. The P-3s arrived under a cover story claiming that they were there to familiarize Iranians with the aircraft and to participate in joint naval exercises.

Twice during January 1974 General George S. Brown proposed that Strategic Air Command (SAC) begin flying periodic surveillance missions over the Indian Ocean using B-52s based in Thailand. Recently, Soviet “Bear” bombers based in the Trans-Caucasus had been overflying the northwest portion of the Indian Ocean. These Bears not only collected intelligence but also carried air-to-surface missiles with which they might attack carrier task forces. Therefore, General Brown argued, SAC flights would demonstrate US resolve and develop the B-52’s ability to conduct similar surveillance and attack missions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting more cautiously, directed Admiral Noel A. Gayler, USN, and General John C. Meyer, USA—CINCPAC and CINCSAC, respectively—to address the proposal’s feasibility and submit plans.
The prospect of deploying B-52s to the Indian Ocean stirred unease on Capitol Hill. In mid-March 1974 some Senators voiced alarm over reports that a 12,000-foot runway would be built on Diego Garcia. Admiral Moorer stated publicly that there were no plans for basing B-52s there. During a telephone conversation on 18 April 1974, he and Admiral Gayler agreed that B-52s should not carry out surveillance operations. In Admiral Moorer’s view, “It is the Air Force pressing that and . . . looking for a mission.”

Expanding the US Presence

Exactly how far the United States should intrude into the Persian Gulf area was a complex question. In December 1973 General Brown suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff thoroughly study US military and security objectives in the Indian Ocean, the Red and Arabian Seas, the Persian Gulf, and contiguous countries. Previously, he argued, these objectives had been stated “only in the most general way.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, and on 9 January 1974 approved a paper defining the terms of reference for that project.

General Creighton W. Abrams urged that the problem be studied from a wider perspective. How, for example, would US actions affect local populations? The Soviets tended to be high-handed and clumsy in dealing with client states, he believed, while the Chinese worked in ways that were more subtle and thus more effective. In his judgment, preventing conflict had to be the most important US objective. Geography alone made this paramount, since the advantage of interior lines lay with the Soviets. Peacetime application of military power, General Abrams continued, “should be orchestrated in a delicate manner.” Any US presence in the Indian Ocean, for example, ought to be justified by the Soviet threat rather than by developments among the littoral states. Finally, he cautioned that a great power confrontation in the Middle East could lead to fighting with global implications. Any strategy that envisioned transferring US forces solely from the Pacific ought to take into account the “tenuous availability” of Singapore and the possible blockage of choke-points like the Strait of Malacca. The United States required base and overflight rights in Greece, Italy, and Turkey so that US forces could enter the region from the Mediterranean flank. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred.

On 5 March 1974 the J-5 submitted a draft report outlining four options, each of the last three building on the preceding one:

**Option 1:** Maintain a military presence at the pre-October 1973 level. Take steps to assure the high quality of security assistance programs. Try to keep Bahrain open for US warships. Place greater emphasis upon combined regional exercises, thereby demonstrating US capability and commitment at a modest cost.

**Option 2:** In addition to (1), send US forces into the Indian Ocean briefly and intermittently. Give MIDESTIFOR newer, more capable ships. Accomplish much of this increased effort in conjunction with either bilateral or Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) exercises.
Option 3: Besides the above, carry out B-52 flights and larger deployments of tactical aircraft. A naval task group, including a carrier, could make larger or more frequent sorties, but no overall force increases need occur.

Option 4: Permanently establish air bases, a ground presence, and a naval task group. Doing so, of course, would contradict President Nixon’s stress upon regional self-reliance as well as congressional directives to reduce the US presence overseas. Without a clearer threat, funds would be hard to obtain and the reactions from littoral nations would be severe, making facilities hard to obtain.26

General Abrams favored Option 1. The United States, he repeated, would not win respect as a world power and peacemaker unless littoral nations perceived a military threat to either their interests or ours. But, as J-5 had just concluded, current Soviet activities posed no such danger. General Brown, however, supported Option 2. By emphasizing security assistance and regional exercises, he argued, the United States would demonstrate its capability without either diverting resources from more important areas or risking counterproductive reactions. The Navy and Marine Corps inclined toward Option 3. Since the President had just initiated an interagency review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided against sending this report to Secretary Schlesinger and made no choice among the four options. Instead, on 28 March 1974, they simply circulated it to Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT), Commander in Chief, Europe (CINCEUR), CINCPAC, and Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC).27

In mid-March 1974, through National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 199, President Nixon commissioned an interagency review of US strategy for the Indian Ocean area. The NSC’s Political-Military Interdepartmental Group set about examining the implications of: Soviet naval activities; the prospective reopening of the Suez Canal; political developments; and arms limitation proposals. Late in May a draft was circulated. Most of the group’s members saw no need to halt Soviet progress everywhere in the Third World. The Soviet Union, after all, had no interests in the Indian Ocean comparable to the dependence of Japan and the Western powers upon Middle East oil. A minority disagreed, stressing the importance of checking unrestrained Soviet military power and offering an alternative to Soviet domination. Turning to arms limitation, the group believed that accepting a proposal by the littoral states to make the Indian Ocean an “international zone of peace” could be construed as a victory for the non-aligned nations over the great powers. Thus, acceptance would have repercussions elsewhere, unless clearly set in a Soviet-American context.

Finally, the group presented broad alternatives for projecting US military power. These fell between the extremes of complete withdrawal and permanently basing sizeable land, sea, and air forces:

A: A low presence, comprising the three ships of MIDEASTFOR plus occasional participation in regional exercises. Assurances of US restraint might persuade the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) also to limit its deployments to pre-October 1973 levels.
B: A moderate presence that was “optimized for contingencies,” involving larger, more frequent naval deployments and expansion of Diego Garcia’s facilities. Soviet-American restraints would be achieved either tacitly or through mutual announcements.

B1: A “contingency” US presence, as specified in B, combined with tacit Soviet-American restraints. Some increase in Soviet force levels probably would have to be accepted.

B2: A “contingency” presence plus declarations of mutual restraint, perhaps with a clause allowing surges by either side in unusual circumstances.

C: Any force level that was combined with a formal arms limitation agreement. If an agreement was reached, the United States could maintain a vigorous, visible presence within the prescribed limits. If not, the administration could say that Soviet intransigence compelled it to a force level necessary to protect vital interests.

On 19 September 1974 Mr. Clements told Dr. Kissinger that he and the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported Alternative B1, which centered around the expanded use of Diego Garcia.28

A US-United Kingdom (UK) agreement allowing greater American use of Diego Garcia was signed on 25 February 1976. But Congress, meantime, had thrown up several roadblocks. Some members worried that building a large base at Diego Garcia would spark Soviet-American competition in the Indian Ocean. In December 1974 the House and Senate appropriated $18 million for construction, a figure well below the President’s request, and required the chief executive to certify that Diego Garcia’s facilities were essential to US national security. President Ford signed this certification on 12 May 1975. Secretary Schlesinger warned Congress that the Soviets were building an assortment of facilities at Berbera on the Gulf of Aden, helping South Yemen manage its port of Aden, and assisting in the construction of a port at Uum Qasar, Iraq. The Senate and House, in July and October 1975, respectively, approved construction of a naval base at Diego Garcia.29 But then, in December, they delayed further financing until 15 April 1976, to allow time for Soviet-American arms limitation talks.

Problems arose, too, over using Bandar Abbas, Iran, for maritime air reconnaissance. The Shah had approved P-3 flights in the context of the Middle East emergency, but he did not want Bandar Abbas to assume the appearance of an American base. The administration was sympathetic. In April 1974 Secretary Schlesinger directed that US naval deployments become regular but not continuous, so as to avoid establishing any fixed commitments. Thus there would be a gap between the carrier USS Kitty Hawk’s departure in April and the cruiser USS Chicago’s arrival on 1 July.

In July 1974 Assistant Secretary Ellsworth learned that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted P-3 flights from Bandar Abbas to continue indefinitely. He asked them whether (1) a military need for these flights existed, even when no carrier group was present, and (2) other ways of supporting P-3 operations might be found. Flights ran as high as twenty per week when major naval units were present but fell to about two per week when they were not. Answering late in August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained why regular P-3 flights were valuable. Once a P-3 spotted a ship and determined its speed and heading, subsequent sightings within a day or two were easily effected. However, if no flights occurred for a week or more, this process would have to begin entirely anew.
The Navy needed acoustic and oceanographic information, best collected when no US task force was present, as well as general statistics on shipping. As for alternative sites, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered Chah Bahar, also in Iran, to be the best long-term solution. Five months later, Mr. Ellsworth recommended to Secretary Schlesinger that P-3 flights continue.30

By June 1975, however, the US Ambassador in Tehran, Richard Helms, suggested that US Navy support personnel leave Bandar Abbas. Secretary Schlesinger, likewise, deemed it essential that this base not take on the character of a permanent US facility. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that P-3 flights still were desirable, particularly because the reopening of the Suez Canal, combined with base construction at Berbera,31 gave the Soviets a potential for rapidly increasing their presence in the region. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did agree, though, to cut the number of permanent US personnel. If permission could be obtained, they proposed staging two flights monthly from Djibouti, Masirah, or Karachi, Pakistan, as well as four or five from Bandar Abbas. Meanwhile, monthly flights could be reduced in frequency and made irregular—but increased whenever major US naval forces entered the Indian Ocean. In August 1975 OSD decided to withdraw all permanent personnel; limit flights to between six and eight monthly, except during surge operations; and continue seeking alternate bases. These steps were taken in order to (1) make criticism of the Soviet facility at Berbera more plausible and (2) respond to growing talk by the Iranians, Saudis, and Iraqis about limiting “great power” presence in the Gulf.32

To replace the reduced operations from Bandar Abbas, Assistant Secretary Ellsworth sought the State Department’s support in seeking rights to make two flights monthly from Masirah Island, two from Karachi, and two from Djibouti. Early in 1975, through NSSM 217, President Ford had ordered a review of US security interests in Oman, located by the Strait of Hormuz. After assessing four options, an NSC interdepartmental group settled upon one involving the occasional use of Masirah airfield, then being used by the British, in return for a modest program of arms sales. Secretary Schlesinger and General Brown concurred. In October 1975, however, the White House suspended action on NSSM 217. Three months later the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that a decision be rendered. Before that happened, in March 1976, the British announced that they would soon leave Masirah. Since Sultan Qaboos had granted them use of Masirah in exchange for military and political commitments, he would want similar American promises in exchange for US access. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the British be strongly encouraged to continue operating Masirah airfield, possibly on a cost-sharing basis. Robert Ellsworth, now the second Deputy Secretary of Defense, asked the State Department to seek either a one- or two-year postponement of the British withdrawal. If London refused, as seemed likely, Washington's aim should be to preserve the operational capability of Masirah airfield, so that the Sultan might later be approached about allowing American access. The British set 31 March 1977 as their evacuation date, but Sultan Qaboos agreed to occasional US use of Masirah. The first P-3 landed there on 14 July 1976.33
Indian Ocean Rivalry?

A military presence could be established in the Indian Ocean using ships alone. Carrying out Secretary Schlesinger’s directive of 2 April 1974, the Navy started making four cruises there per year. Each would last forty-five to sixty days, alternating between carrier and cruiser task groups. Three groups—two carrier, one cruiser—sailed the Indian Ocean during 1975. In December 1975 Admiral Gayler recommended switching to one carrier and two cruiser groups. Since the number of carriers in the western Pacific would be falling from three to two, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved. CINCPAC also argued that, since the Pacific Fleet’s operating and maintenance fund had been cut by $50 million, the carrier cruise scheduled for April through June 1976 should be cancelled. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and OSD agreed to this step as well.

In March 1976 the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconsidered exactly where the task groups should sail. While Arab-Israeli tensions remained high, ships had gone to the northernmost regions of the Arabian Sea, as close to the crisis scene as possible. Now, though, the advent of friendlier governments in Australia and New Zealand offered opportunities to strengthen ANZUS relationships and revitalize military cooperation.34 Accordingly, they proposed that one of the three task groups deployed between July 1976 and September 1977 might sail into the southeastern Indian Ocean and visit Australian ports. The White House agreed.35

The stage seemed set in the Indian Ocean for great-power competition, and perhaps for steady escalation of the rival powers’ military commitments. Was there any possibility of a Soviet-American agreement about arms limitation in the Indian Ocean? Late in 1975 the Verification Panel ordered an interdepartmental working group to analyze alternatives. Answering early in April 1976, the group outlined four approaches:

1. Leave matters as they were and take no new initiatives.
2. Make a unilateral declaration of restraint, conditional upon Soviet reciprocity.
3. Indicate to the Soviets a desire for a joint, generalized declaration of mutual restraint.
4. Try to negotiate specific constraints such as: freezing or reducing deployment levels and facilities for one year; limiting surface ship deployments to an average of eighteen per day; banning land-based strike aircraft and construction of new facilities.

On 15 April 1976 Mr. Clements informed the President’s National Security Adviser that he and the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed taking any initiatives. Seen in the context of Cuba’s intervention in Angola and Soviet interference in regional politics, arms control initiatives would suggest that the United States was either condoning these activities or reacting from weakness to a Soviet show of force.36

Concurrently, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) in OSD studied whether Iran and Australia alone could defend the sea lanes leading from the Persian Gulf. PA&E concluded that they could protect shipping against a moderate Soviet threat (six to twenty submarines plus Badger and Backfire bombers based in
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Somalia), thereby allowing US forces to be redeployed elsewhere. The J-5 drafted a paper containing detailed criticisms. The Army and Air Staffs wanted J-5 to go further and make its own analysis of the problem. The J-5, however, wanted to avoid setting a precedent for redoing OSD studies—there were so many of them! The Marine Corps added that a corporate JCS commentary would give undue importance to OSD studies.

Ultimately, no JCS memorandum appeared. Instead, the J-5 informed PA&E that, while its work “had the potential to be a valuable and thought-provoking reference,” certain of its assumptions “could significantly skew the outcome if proven inaccurate.” The study assumed, for instance, that Iran would face no other threats, that major improvements to Australian and Iranian capabilities would occur, and that Soviet forces limited in their size and mission would operate in a specific area. Moreover, the J-5 saw little point in talking about freeing US forces for employment elsewhere, since only token units currently were earmarked for assignment in the Persian Gulf area.37

Iran: Policeman of the Gulf

Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi stood out as America’s firmest friend in the Persian Gulf region. After attempting to promote Saudi-Iranian cooperation, President Nixon decided to rely principally upon Iran. In May 1972 the President told the Shah that he was “willing in principle” to sell F-14 and F-15 aircraft to Iran and to provide laser-guided bombs as well as military technicians. Serial production of Navy F-14s had just begun, and the Air Force’s F-15 was still under development. President Nixon further directed that, “in general,” decisions about acquiring equipment should be left primarily to the Iranian government and not “second-guessed.” Accordingly, during the last months of 1972 and the first of 1973, the Iranian government signed contracts for almost $2 billion worth of F-4Es and F-5Es (the latest models of both aircraft), helicopters, and C-130 transports.38

Iran’s location bordering the Soviet Union made her critical yet vulnerable. The Joint Strategic Objectives Plans (JSOPs) prepared during 1973 through 1976 awarded Iran a General Strategic Priority of “2,” except for JSOP 77-84, published in December 1974, where Iran received the highest rating (in strategic importance to the United States) of “1.” What could the United States do if Iran faced communist or communist-inspired aggression? In November 1973 USCINCEUR submitted the following plan:

Situation I: If Iran was either threatened or attacked by communist-supported Arab radicals, the United States could respond rapidly without resorting to mobilization. “Assigned” forces, which could be drawn from the European, Pacific, and Readiness Commands, amounted to one airborne battalion, an attack carrier strike force with a Marine battalion embarked, and two tactical air wings plus tactical airlift. Five C-130 squadrons could provide “augmentation” forces. Listed as “on call” were 1 infantry and 1 airborne brigade, 2 Special Forces battalions, and 3 tactical fighter squadrons.
Situation II: Should the Soviets threaten or attack Iran, the US reaction could be partial mobilization plus a rapid commitment of available forces in order to defend Tehran and the Khuzestan strategic area. “Assigned” forces totaled 1 infantry brigade, 1 airborne division, 1 mechanized division, 1 attack carrier strike force, 1 Marine brigade, and 7 tactical fighter squadrons. For “augmentation,” there were ten C-130 squadrons; for “support,” five heavy bomber squadrons. Logistically, the Soviets appeared able to support ten divisions in Iran.

Meantime, US-Iranian cooperation steadily increased. In August 1973, at Admiral Zumwalt’s instigation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended expanding exercises involving MIDEASTFOR and the Iranian Navy. Guidelines issued in 1970 had forbidden local commanders from scheduling exercises involving more than one ship, and then only under restrictive conditions, because the State Department worried about political repercussions. Now, though, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed those concerns were unjustified. Since US arms were flowing to Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, those nations presumably would be seeking joint training exercises. Therefore, they proposed new guidelines allowing a wider scope for bilateral exercises (e.g., an upper limit of five ships and/or twelve aircraft in one exercise) that could be coordinated directly between the Commander, MIDEASTFOR, and the Iranian Navy. State and ISA agreed, provided only that one week’s advance notice be given.39

Iran had abstained from the embargo but helped lead the way in raising oil prices. As the Shah’s oil revenues swelled, so did his ambitions. Iran already was acquiring large numbers of F-4E fighter-bombers and F-5E interceptors, but the Shah wanted the most up-to-date aircraft. Accordingly, in January 1974 Iran contracted for purchases of thirty F-14s; in June the number rose to eighty. When Admiral Moorer visited Tehran in April 1974, he and the Shah had an extensive discussion about the latest weapon systems. More contracts followed: in June, for six Spruance-class destroyers; in October, for thirty-six more F-4Es. Admiral Moorer had reservations about providing Spruances. “I guess I oversold the Iranians . . . ,” he told Admiral Zumwalt. “I think it is more than they can swallow.” Yet, in December Iran proposed to pay for reopening Lockheed’s C-5A production line and to buy ten of the supercargo planes.40

The administration proposed to “broaden and deepen” relations with Iran. The Shah reacted favorably. In April 1974 Secretary Kissinger directed Ambassador Richard Helms to set the stage for discussions that would be “very much an equal partnership exchange.” On political and security matters, “we are prepared to continue and expand the consultations and close ties which already mark our relations and which we value greatly. . . . We contemplate remaining in the closest touch,” the Secretary continued, “on the Shah’s concerns regarding Iran’s security and how we can continue to cooperate through our sales and training programs in helping to build up Iran’s defensive capability.”41

The Shah wanted to build as well as buy advanced weapon systems. During 1973 and 1974, he pressed for permission to assemble or co-produce utility and attack helicopters, air-to-ground rockets and missiles, antitank missile systems, and lightweight fighters. In October 1974 Dr. Kissinger ordered the NSC Under Secretaries Committee
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to study the long-range implications of large-scale co-production. The following month the committee reported that the Shah clearly intended to create his own arms industry, regardless of what actions the United States might take. Therefore, co-production could bolster US “pre-eminence” in Iran’s security affairs and “give us increased influence—and potentially longer-term leverage—should the Shah or his successors embark on policies contrary to US interests.” A “forthcoming” policy on limited co-production would be “politically advantageous in the near term,” although technical and managerial problems would have to be resolved. Beyond that time, issues seemed more complex and benefits less clear. The committee proposed (1) approving a limited number of projects for the next one to three years on a case-by-case basis and (2) considering requests that would stretch over the next four to ten years on a case-by-case basis.42

Secretary Schlesinger and General Brown endorsed the committee’s recommendations. Dr. Kissinger, however, directed that the study be revised (1) to show the relationship of co-production to overall US-Iranian dealings and (2) to devise guidelines for assessing co-production proposals. The committee drafted more detailed guidelines and recommended that written US approval be required if Iran contemplated selling co-produced items to third countries. But it decided not to address whether (1) the United States should use arms supply as a lever to change Iran’s oil pricing policy and (2) creating an arms industry would foster Iranian adventurism. Secretary Schlesinger and General Brown endorsed these revised conclusions and recommendations; President Ford approved them in May 1975.43

The usefulness of all these advanced systems would depend upon computers and rapid communication. That, in turn, raised problems of interoperability among Iranian units as well as between US and Iranian forces. ISA requested advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff about formulating an appropriate policy. Their reply, dated 5 July 1974, characterized US-Iranian compatibility and interoperability as “fundamental” to enhancing both countries’ security. Consequently, whatever equipment the United States sold to Iran “should be inherently compatible and interoperable.” Secretary Schlesinger concurred, but added that attainment of that goal should be limited to a “reasonable” standard. Interoperability, by itself, should not be used to justify either broadening existing intelligence exchanges or rationalizing new ones.44

A steady increase of Iran’s military capabilities was in prospect, which would make her the major power in the Persian Gulf region. JSOP 76-83, appearing in December 1973, listed mid-range objectives of 6 divisions, 3 destroyers, and 21 tactical fighter squadrons (8 F-5, 10 F-4, and 3 F-14/F-15). JSOP 79-86, issued in December 1976, specified much higher objectives: 8 divisions; 7 destroyers, 4 of them Spruance-class; 3 submarines; and 37 ultra-modern squadrons (8 F-14, 16 F-16, and 13 F-18L).45

Doubts grew about the wisdom of selling Iran so much sophisticated weaponry. Between 1972 and mid-1975 Iran had contracted to purchase approximately $10 billion in weapons, equipment, support, and training. On 2 September 1975 Secretary Schlesinger warned President Ford that “Iran has an almost limitless appetite and has so much on its plate that it can’t digest it. We have tried to slow them, but we have
given in when the Shah really wanted it. Our problem is that we are building up an American population in Iran—it’s now about 10,000. It could provoke anti-Americanism and terrorism. If the political situation turned sour it could leave us very vulnerable.”

The Defense Department did impose tighter controls. In September 1975 Erich von Marbod was appointed Special US Defense Representative in Iran, with the task of supervising and coordinating all DoD activities there. Several months later Deputy Secretary Clements declared it “absolutely essential that Iranian requests, and the scope and character of our own potential involvement, be rigorously examined to ensure that we and the Iranians both understand the ramifications of any given case or project.”

A sharp drop in oil revenues prompted the Shah to cancel Spruance purchases and to tell Ambassador Helms that Iran would be obliged to become entirely “inward looking.” Nevertheless, during August 1976 Secretary Kissinger’s visit to Tehran resulted in wide-ranging agreements, one of which projected $10 billion worth of arms purchases during the next ten years. Among other items, the United States would sell 160 F-16 fighters and deliver them between 1979 and 1983.

How far, in fact, were the Shah’s aims and interests identical with those of the United States? Early in 1975 the Joint Staff noted that the Shah, who felt “extremely protective” about the Strait of Hormuz, had moved forces away from the Soviet border and toward the gulf, where he seemed intent upon creating an “overwhelming” superiority. The Shah considered the Strait of Hormuz vital because Iran’s oil exports had to pass through it. During a 1976 interview with a freelance reporter, General Brown raised what he called

the puzzling question of why [Iran] is building such a tremendous military force. She couldn’t with her population do anything that would provide protection from the Soviet Union . . . She’s got adequate power now to handle Afghanistan and Pakistan . . . She’s a little better than a match for Iraq now. And, my gosh, the programs the Shah has got coming up. It makes you wonder whether he doesn’t someday have visions of the Persian Empire. They don’t call that the Persian Gulf for nothing.

After the publication of these remarks caused a minor furor, General Brown issued a clarifying statement: “I have no reason to believe that [the Shah] has any aspirations beyond continuing to ably lead his country and contribute to stability in that part of the world.”

A National Intelligence Estimate issued in May 1975 foresaw “little prospect during the next few years for a serious challenge to the Shah’s authoritarian control” but noted “growing alienation and dissent, including terrorism, on occasion with anti-US overtones.” No senior administration officials, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognized the regime’s growing fragility. They strongly supported the Shah, seeing no alternative to arming Iran so that it could act as policeman of the Persian Gulf.
CENTO: A Breaking Reed

Superficially, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) appeared well suited to help advance US politico-military objectives. Its regional members—Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan—formed a “northern tier” to deter Soviet aggression. The United Kingdom also had joined CENTO. The United States had not, although it participated in CENTO meetings and exercises. Thus, theoretically, CENTO enjoyed great-power support and links to NATO. In reality, though, these five governments acted like horses pulling in different directions. First and foremost: What military danger faced CENTO’s members? According to the British and Americans, planning for limited war should deal only with a direct Soviet threat. Pakistanis, however, insisted that the threat they faced from India be taken into account. Iranians, less forcefully, urged that planning address the danger from radical Arab states. These clashes over political assumptions left military planning hamstrung. CENTO, in fact, possessed neither a supreme headquarters nor permanently assigned forces. Its only full-time body, the Combined Military Planning Staff, consisted of thirty people working in Ankara, Turkey. The staff’s main tasks were preparing for and conducting five annual exercises and about ten yearly seminars for a Military Development Program.

The United States kept a fairly low profile. Since 1968 US financial aid to CENTO had been minimal. However, the Nixon administration had no desire to jettison the organization. Early in 1973, amid preparations for the Military Committee’s annual meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed guidance for the US representative stating that “CENTO still represents a significant political and psychological link between the United States and regional members of the organization.” They reasoned that, unless the US government itself sponsored CENTO’s dissolution and then took the lead in creating a new security organization, CENTO’s demise could be interpreted as a blow to US prestige and a sign of weakening US influence in the area. The State Department and the Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed with that assessment.51

At the next CENTO meeting, in March 1974, Secretary Kissinger stressed that the Arab-Israeli war and the oil embargo had made CENTO even more important to the area’s stability. He urged regional leaders to look ahead five or ten years and then discuss with Washington and London what their relationships should be. Subsequently, military representatives did seem extremely interested in establishing closer ties with NATO. Early in 1975 the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed an interagency study assessing CENTO’s current status, its value to the United States, and the future US role. But, with the Arab-Israeli situation in such turmoil, neither the State Department nor the NSC Staff favored such an undertaking. Later that year ISA did endorse small steps to improve communications, exercises, and the like. Major initiatives seemed inappropriate, though, until the strain in US-Turkish relations abated somewhat52 and US dealings with Pakistan became a bit friendlier.53

Meanwhile, the United States increased its participation in CENTO exercises, initiated efforts to raise from 65 to 90 percent the efficiency of a high-frequency radio
system (the CENTO Military Communications System—CMCS), and took the lead in cryptographic improvements. In April 1975 CENTO’s Secretary General made a plea for additional US assistance. The Chief, US Element, CENTO, Lieutenant General Devol Brett, USAF, outlined three possible responses:

1. Expand and upgrade CENTO’s civilian-owned microwave system that connected Ankara, Tehran, and Karachi.
2. Increase US training support.
3. Upgrade further the aging CMCS, which linked the Combined Military Planning Staff in Ankara with Iranian and Pakistani staffs as well as with the British Near Eastern Air Force, based in Cyprus.

Endorsing only the last of these proposals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluated each as follows:

1. DoD assistance would be inappropriate in view of the microwave system's almost total civilianization.
2. Since no forces were regularly assigned to CENTO, training would have to be arranged with each nation individually. Turkey could not participate because of the congressionally imposed arms embargo; Iran and Pakistan would have to pay cash.
3. Upgrading the CMCS did seem appropriate, since CENTO owned the system.

In May 1975, at the CENTO Ministerial Meeting, Secretary Kissinger offered to make $5 million available for CMCS upgrading. But in December 1976, at the urging of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), President Ford removed this $5 million from the State Department’s FY 1978 budget request. General Brown pressed for a reversal, and the President agreed to restore these funds. However, General Brown was concerned that Congress might still eliminate the appropriation unless one of CENTO’s regional members also made a financial contribution. He recommended, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld agreed, that Iran should be approached about contributing possibly 20 percent of the initial outlay. Then the new Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, decided to delete these funds after all.

A Final Review

In February 1976 President Ford commissioned an assessment of key factors likely to influence US policy toward the Persian Gulf region as a whole as well as toward critical individual states, particularly Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. On 19 January 1977 the White House approved and circulated an “Executive Summary.” Its major points were:

1. Security assistance relationships: Extensive US involvement, particularly with Iran and Saudi Arabia, posed risks as well as opportunities. The influx of sophisticated
weapons and American technicians was creating social as well as economic strains throughout these societies. While no fundamental shifts in US policy seemed necessary, procedures should be put in place for carefully and systematically reviewing arms requests.

2. **Arms sales to the lower Gulf states:** Requests from these governments were growing more insistent, and some quid pro quos would be needed to keep using Bahrain and Masirah. However, greater arms sales could trigger a mini-arms-race as well as spark vigorous objections from Congress.

3. **Military presence and access to facilities:** Concerning Iran, the State Department opposed submitting projects piecemeal for the Shah's approval. Soon, therefore, a policy decision about the desirable level in the Gulf area must be made.

The Soviets would keep trying to increase their influence and diminish that of the Western powers. To traditionalist Gulf regimes, the impact of modernization could prove seriously destabilizing. Given the great extent of US involvement, any difficulties could easily spark an anti-American backlash.

The summary then addressed “broad security policy postures for the next decade.” The alternatives appeared to be:

1. **Continue the current policies and procedures:** For arms sales, that meant being forthcoming toward Iran and somewhat less so toward Saudi Arabia, while providing only non-sophisticated or internal security equipment to the lower Gulf states.

2. **Reduce US regional involvement:** Toward Iran, that would mean cutting back the levels and types of sales, as well as suspending co-production proposals for an indefinite period.

3. **Expand the US role:** Maintain the scope of weapons and technology sales to Iran and liberalize the policy on equipment transfers to all friendly Gulf countries. Also, seek to establish more support and intelligence facilities in Iran, try to secure increased use of Iranian ports, and seek Omani approval for more extensive activities on Masirah Island.

 Naturally, the summary concluded, “given the diversity and complexity of these issues, . . . there are a great number of possible permutations and combinations. This strongly suggests that decisions on some issues might involve a selection of options from more than one ‘package’.”

With hindsight, these years witnessed some solid achievements that were weakened by a major miscalculation. Admiral Moorer observed late in 1973 that the Persian Gulf would be “the worst place in the world to fight because it is tough to get logistic support.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff pushed hard for base rights but recognized the problems that a sizeable, permanent US military presence could create. Achievements included the development of a base at Diego Garcia, regular P-3 flights from Bandar Abbas, access to the airfield on Masirah Island, and periodic cruises into the Indian Ocean. But the centerpiece of US strategy—a friendly Iran—rested on quicksand. The Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 turned an ally into an adversary. If the military task seemed hard in 1973, the Shah's fall would make it infinitely more difficult.
Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones, USAF, points to a map of the Cambodian coastal region at a late night meeting on the seizure of the American merchant ship S.S. MAYAGUEZ by Cambodian gunboats. (Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Library)
The Far East: Containment Becomes Accommodation

Mainland China: No Longer a Foe

During President Nixon’s first term, no US policies changed more dramatically than those for East Asia. Withdrawal from Vietnam and rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China signaled the end of “close-in” containment. What should come in its place? On 13 February 1973, through National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 171, the President commissioned a wide-ranging review of US strategy for Asia. By that time US strength in the Western Pacific area had fallen to 143,000 personnel. There was one Army division in South Korea, two-thirds of a Marine division on Okinawa, and three tactical fighter wings in South Korea, Okinawa, and the Philippines. At sea, the Navy was maintaining three carrier battle groups with 30,000 personnel. Responding to NSSM 171, an interagency group outlined four possible postures for FYs 1974-1978:

Alternative I: 148,100 personnel would continue the deployments described above, except that there would be four instead of three tactical fighter wings.
Alternative II: 120,000 personnel, reducing the division in South Korea to one brigade.
Alternative III: 88,200 personnel.
Alternative IV: 69,000 personnel.

The State Department opposed making any reductions during FY 1974, except in Southeast Asia. For FYs 1977-1978, though, State favored Alternative IV, which would withdraw all ground forces from Korea and Okinawa. Deputy Secretary William P. Clements, Jr., then solicited the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Replying on 23 May
1973, they recommended for FY 1974 land deployments totaling 150,000 personnel, plus another 31,800 afloat. Basically, all Army and Air Force units would remain in place. For FYs 1976-1978 they favored Alternative I because it came closest to the objectives outlined in Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) 75-82. They added, however, that “significant improvements” in the politico-military situation would render Alternative II acceptable. That would involve reducing Army forces in Korea but keeping the Marines on Okinawa.

On 9 August 1973, through National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 230, President Nixon rendered decisions that appeared to continue the status quo: US and allied conventional forces should remain strong enough to defend either Northeast or Southeast Asia against attack by the Chinese and their local allies and to defend against a non-Chinese attack in the other theater. The United States should continue planning on sending reinforcements to its allies, “including the full range of land, naval and tactical air forces.” Planners ought to assume that, for the next five years, deployments in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines would remain essentially at current levels. For Taiwan and Thailand, though, troop levels would remain under constant review. Finally, security assistance should focus upon helping allies meet indigenous and non-Chinese threats.

As Chapter 3 explains, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer believed that the requirements in NSDM 230 well exceeded US capabilities. But political changes, as dramatic as any thus far in the Cold War, went far toward making such concerns obsolete. During the 1960s the US government had worried much about the consequences of China becoming a nuclear power. Now senior civilian leaders stopped seeing China as an enemy and began to view her as a potential partner. The fact of Sino-Soviet enmity meant that China’s leaders might prefer a visible US military presence as a counterweight against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

The focus of US strategists kept shifting away from the Asian mainland. In August 1974 Secretary Schlesinger projected cutting the number of carriers in the Western Pacific from three to two, a change that took effect late in 1976. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to keep a limited war with China on their list of contingencies. By late 1975, however, they concluded that the rapprochement between Washington and Peking, together with the fall of South Vietnam, had reduced the potential for conflict to a point where no plans need be laid either for waging a major war with China or for meeting a simultaneous Sino-Soviet attack. Thus vanished the specter of a war against two major powers, which had bedeviled US policymakers since 1949. The deaths of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975 and Mao Tse-tung in 1976 aptly symbolized the passing of an era.

When 1976 ended, American deployments in the Western Pacific area amounted to slightly more than 116,000 personnel ashore and 25,500 afloat. This approximated Alternative II in the 1973 study, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had said they would accept if “significant improvements” in the politico-military sphere occurred. Such improvements had taken place.
Of course, the diminution of force levels did not herald their disappearance. The Soviet threat loomed as large as ever. Early in 1976 President Ford asked for an assessment of US security interests, issues, and objectives in the Asia-Pacific area during the next three to five years. A response, drafted by the National Security Council (NSC) Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and the Pacific, was amended after a State-Defense review and then circulated late that year “as a useful reference.” The impact of South Vietnam’s collapse, the group believed, had been limited largely to accelerating regional trends that already existed. The group interpreted their impact as requiring:

...greater subtlety, more reliance on riding the waves of existing trends in the area, greater use of our diplomatic and, hopefully, economic tools, and greater flexibility in tactics... Nonetheless, it remains of vital importance that the US retain a flexible and strong military posture in the Asia-Pacific area. In this regard, increases in military deployments, particularly to counter [growing] Soviet naval strength, must not be ruled out.  

### Taiwan: A Fraying Tie

President Nixon’s trip to mainland China during February 1972 suggested that full diplomatic relations between Washington and Peking could not be many years away. What would be the consequences for Chiang Kai-shek and his refuge regime on Taiwan? In the Shanghai communique, issued at the end of Nixon’s trip, the United States acknowledged that “Taiwan is part of China,” affirmed its interest in “a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves,” pledged to “progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as tension in the area diminishes,” and defined a total withdrawal from Taiwan as its “ultimate objective.”

At the beginning of 1973 there were nearly 9,500 US military personnel on Taiwan. On 6 February 1973 Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson advised Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, who was about to visit Peking again, that only about 4,000 of them would be needed to perform “essential” functions. He recommended withdrawing the entire transport wing of C-130s, redeploying two squadrons in September 1973 and the remaining three by June 1974. Forty-eight F-4s, sent to substitute temporarily for forty-eight Taiwanese F-5s that had been hastily transferred to South Vietnam shortly before the cease-fire, posed a more difficult problem. Replacing the F-5s by drawing upon US and Taiwanese production would take at least forty months.

Secretary Richardson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan C-130 redeployments, starting them in July 1973 and completing them by March 1974. Replying late in April 1973, they recommended returning two squadrons to the Continental United States (CONUS) “as soon as the tenuous situation in Southeast Asia permits.” The remaining squadrons should stay on Taiwan until Japanese-funded facilities on Okinawa were finished, probably two years hence. Sending them sooner to the alternate site, Clark
Air Base in the Philippines, would mean splitting the wing, thereby raising operating expenses while reducing readiness. However, if political considerations became overriding, they suggested redeploying two squadrons to CONUS when Southeast Asia seemed stabilized, sending one to Okinawa in February 1974, and moving two to Clark Air Base by 31 March 1974, where they would stay until construction on Okinawa had been completed. The Secretary of Defense supported this latter plan. But in July 1973 President Nixon decided to accelerate withdrawals considerably: one squadron would leave by 15 August 1973, the rest by the year’s close.\textsuperscript{11}

Removing two F-4 squadrons would reduce the US presence to about 2,800 logistics, support, and communications personnel. Early in 1974, the Departments of State and Defense recommended withdrawing one squadron promptly but keeping the second until 31 May 1975. The Taiwanese could not be fully trained on the replacement F-5E interceptors any sooner. As Dr. Kissinger cautioned the President, having F-4s leave before then “could be interpreted in Taipei as forcing on them an agreement made in Peking.” President Nixon chose withdrawal dates of 31 July 1974 for the first squadron and 31 May 1975 for the second. F-5As earmarked for Korea would be diverted until F-5Es co-produced in Taiwan became available there.\textsuperscript{12}

President Nixon also requested a review of ways to reduce and restructure the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and the Taiwan Defense Command (TDC). Initially, General George S. Brown suggested disestablishing the TDC; General Creighton W. Abrams thought the Commander, Seventh Fleet, could take over this role. However, in mid-April 1974 the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger that the MAAG and the TDC should be retained as separate headquarters, because Taipei might see their elimination as abrogating either the mutual defense treaty or the security assistance agreement. They did recommend, though, reducing the MAAG by 71 percent (down to fifty spaces) and the TDC by 20 percent (down to eighty-three spaces) by the end of FY 1975. Deputy Secretary Clements endorsed and President Nixon approved these cutbacks. Mr. Clements also recommended replacing 50 percent of the communications-electronics personnel with civilian contractors. The President, in mid-June, approved only those reductions made possible by the departure of operational units such as the C-130 wing and the F-4 squadrons.\textsuperscript{13}

Only four months later the White House began pressing for further withdrawals. The NSC Staff asked for plans to reduce the 4,000 non-intelligence personnel either 25, 50, or 100 percent by October 1976. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 9 November 1974, said they were willing to endorse a 25 percent reduction, which would require hiring civilians on contract, reducing an Air Force communications group, and eliminating the 327th Air Division. A total withdrawal, they noted, would mean bringing depot maintenance and war reserve materiel back to the United States, thereby incurring considerable expense and a serious loss in capability. Mr. Clements agreed with these conclusions and, on 20 November 1974, so advised the White House.\textsuperscript{14}
Even greater withdrawals followed. In February 1976 the NSC Senior Review Group discussed whether to cut the US military presence from 2,200 to 1,100 by the year's close. "We are proceeding backwards," General Brown complained. "We are considering a series of administrative steps which will box us into policy positions instead of the reverse. . . . What does the US want to do on Taiwan?" Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft answered bluntly that "we are talking about . . . getting all our troops out."15

In mid-May the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that they were thinking about civilianizing several functions. They needed to know, first, whether civilianization was an acceptable solution, and second, what defense commitments would remain "as we move toward achieving the objectives of the Shanghai Communique." In response, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ISA), Eugene McAuliffe asked them to delineate the smallest possible US military presence on Taiwan. Their reply, dispatched on 21 September 1976, stated that 556 personnel were needed for the TDC, the MAAG, war reserve materiel stockpiling, base support, and communications. The time that would be needed to reintroduce all these activities, except perhaps the TDC, might unacceptably delay the arrival of reinforcements during times of crisis. They wanted to retain the TDC, though, on grounds that it was politically significant, provided much better peacetime continuity, and answered the need for an on-site commander if the mutual defense treaty had to be invoked.16

Those views were somewhat academic because on 20 September—one day earlier—President Ford had ruled that Department of Defense (DoD) military and civilian strength on Taiwan should fall to 1,400 by the year's end. The Joint Chiefs of Staff protested that Asian observers would see this as a mass exodus, not simply a continuation of gradual and carefully planned withdrawals. Swift departures also would inflict personal hardships upon US personnel. They recommended delaying completion of the cut until 31 March 1977, when a new communications facility would become fully operational. Deputy Secretary Robert Ellsworth supported them, and the White House agreed to an extension.17

In deciding about arms transfers, the administration had to meet Taiwan's defense needs without unduly aggravating the Chinese government. Early in October 1974 President Ford commissioned a study of what arms supply policy should be applicable for 1977-1978, under the assumptions that normalization of relations between Washington and Peking would move forward, that no radical changes in Sino-Soviet tensions would take place, and that the US defense commitment to Taiwan would continue. In November the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and the Pacific circulated a response. Severely restricting access to US arms, the group reasoned, might produce not only weakness but also political and social upheaval on Taiwan. If an invasion came, Taiwan's defenders would face two major handicaps. First, even though Taiwanese were about to begin producing F-5Es, they still would have to depend on 100 older aircraft into the early 1980s. Second, their naval forces were not only outnumbered but also outclassed. They possessed, for example, only limited defenses against the
mainlanders’ Styx anti-ship missiles. If opposed only by Taiwanese forces, most group members concluded, the Chinese could win air supremacy over the Taiwan Strait within two or three weeks.\textsuperscript{18} With control of the air, they could then land 30,000 well-equipped and 75,000 lightly-equipped troops on Taiwan.

The group articulated several options for arms supply policy:

\textit{Option 1:} Impose a complete cutoff, either immediately or over the next three to five years.

\textit{Option 2:} Confine access to the replacement of current types and level already in the Taiwanese inventory.

\textit{Option 3:} Allow limited access to new weapons. A “lower range” policy would permit either replacement of or modest increases in existing stocks as well as the acquisition of noncontroversial new equipment. Antitank missiles, some electronic countermeasures, and Harpoon anti-ship missiles were among the items rated as being controversial. An “upper range” policy would release some controversial items like Harpoons and C-130 transports.

\textit{Option 4:} Authorize substantial access to new weapons.

General Brown and Deputy Secretary Clements recommended Option 3’s “upper range” as the best way to maintain Taiwan’s stability while not impeding normalization with mainland China. They singled out Harpoons as particularly important in offsetting the mainlanders’ Styx missiles.\textsuperscript{19}

In October 1975 the White House approved transferring to Taiwan 1,000 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, 4 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) patrol aircraft, and 2 minesweepers. Early in 1976 agencies reviewed their positions on arms sales. Mr. Clements informed the White House that DoD still favored the “upper range” of Option 3. According to recent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) studies, China could not mount a successful invasion of Taiwan much before 1980. While there seemed little likelihood of a major confrontation, Mr. Clements advised that mainland China’s military advantage would continue to increase. Subsequently, the administration approved raising Taiwanese co-production of F-5Es from 100 to 200 but postponed decisions on releasing Harpoons and laser-guided bombs. Thus President Ford had chosen Option 3’s “lower range,” allowing the Taiwanese to maintain and even slightly improve their arsenal.\textsuperscript{20}

Increasingly, meanwhile, China’s leaders grew dissatisfied with Washington’s cautious approach. In October 1974 CIA Director Colby forwarded to Dr. Kissinger an analysis that spotlighted “a shift to harshness in Peking’s policy toward the US.” Principally, Mao had expected a phased American disengagement from formal diplomatic ties with Chiang’s regime. Just before the Ford administration left office, a Chinese diplomat told Secretary Kissinger and Secretary-designate Cyrus Vance that, before relations could improve, the United States must sever diplomatic relations with the regime on Taiwan, withdraw its troops, and abrogate the mutual defense treaty.\textsuperscript{21} In other words, the current balancing act could not continue.
South Korea: Arrested Withdrawals

One country on the Asian mainland still held a sizeable US military presence: the Republic of Korea (ROK). Since the start of the Korean War in 1950, US troops had been standing guard there. An American officer exercised operational control over both US and ROK forces. In 1973 the US military presence in South Korea totaled 42,000 personnel. Major units included the 2nd Infantry Division, an F-4 wing with fifty-four aircraft, an air defense brigade, and a Hawk surface-to-air missile battalion.

The 7th Infantry Division had withdrawn from South Korea in 1971, as part of President Nixon’s effort to promote regional self-reliance. Simultaneously, Washington agreed to a Five-Year Modernization Program under which South Korea would receive during FYs 1971 to 1975 $1.5 billion worth of grants, sales, and arms transfers. Would fulfilling that program allow the 2nd Infantry Division to leave also? In April 1972, through NSSM 154, President Nixon initiated a policy review that would identify US interests and objectives, potential issues, and options open during the next three to five years. That meant examining all aspects of the balance between North and South Korea, the impact of improved Sino-American relations, and the probable effects upon Japanese-American ties.22

Early in May 1973 the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and the Pacific completed a response to NSSM 154. Its reply, which was rife with optimism, discerned “a possibility of genuine détente.” The group presented four options for US policymakers:

I: Let South Korea take the lead in seeking an accommodation with the North. Washington would pursue only those initiatives that had been approved by Seoul. American ground and air units would remain at roughly current levels.

II: Retard the pace of accommodation if North Korea did not seem seriously interested in détente or if Moscow and Peking were not prepared for long-term cooperation in normalizing relations in that area. Maintain substantially the same US force levels.

III: Encourage accommodation between the two Koreas by acting in concert with, but sometimes separately from, Seoul. After FY 1974, consider reducing US ground forces to brigade size, depending on progress in talks between the two Koreas and on continued regional stability.

IV: Launch negotiations involving the major powers. Possibly, after FY 1974, use US forces as bargaining chips with Moscow, Peking, or Pyongyang to encourage accommodation between the two Koreas.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred the diplomatic strategy outlined in Option I. As to US force levels, they believed Option III came closest to the position they had described back in March for another exercise. Option II they rated unacceptable because it assigned Washington the role of political manipulator, a role they deemed unrealistic and not in consonance with current policy. Option IV they considered premature, since it presumed that Seoul and Pyongyang would be unable to work out an accommodation on their own.23 In mid-July President Nixon decided to avoid either trying to force the
pace of any talks between the two Koreas or reducing US forces “except in the context of the overall security situation on the Peninsula.”

Concurrently, an interagency steering group assessed the Five-Year Modernization Program. The President accepted its findings and in July, through NSDM 227, ordered appropriate agencies to:

1. Emphasize South Korea’s capabilities for air defense. But before funding any high-performance aircraft, beyond replacements for one F-4 and nine F-5 squadrons, thoroughly review requirements and submit recommendations to the President.
2. Crimp South Korean plans for fielding eighteen active divisions by assigning low priority to modernizing any more than sixteen.
3. Avoid setting any termination date for grant aid; plan neither for a precipitous reduction in grants nor for a rapid switch to sales.

In November 1973 Secretary Schlesinger asked Admiral Noel A. Gayler, the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), to provide an estimate of the air threat and of how many more high-performance aircraft South Korea would need. Three months later CINCPAC’s subordinate commanders who were directly involved with defending South Korea held a conference. Their conclusions proved a bit startling. Since North Korea’s air force had been designed for air defense and battlefield superiority, its ability to threaten targets in South Korea had been overestimated. With funds in short supply, these commanders decided that allied air defenses actually were “relatively adequate.” Instead of the air battle, “the outcome of the ground battle and the successful defense or loss of Seoul is apt to be decisive.” By their reckoning, the requirements for close air support came to 400 sorties per day. South Koreans, who could not provide close air support while performing other aerial missions, needed another wing of dual-purpose aircraft.

Late in April 1974, Seoul informed Washington that it wanted to buy fifty-seven F-4E fighter bombers and eight A-7 attack aircraft. South Korea’s inventory at that point consisted of 34 F-4s, 62 F-5 interceptors, and 101 obsolescent F-86s. Two months later the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Schlesinger that South Korea needed another eighteen F-4s and fifty-four F-5Es. Selling some F-4s, they argued, would prevent South Korea from turning to another country for its aircraft. The request to acquire A-7s, however, struck them as neither “prudent” nor “propitious.” Assistant Secretary Ellsworth agreed that North Korea’s air threat had been exaggerated but rejected the commanders’ contention that 400 daily sorties for close air support were required.

On 8 October 1974 President Ford commissioned another review of security assistance programs. He asked whether the shift from grant aid to sales could be accelerated. What numbers and types of high-performance aircraft should be supplied? Replying in November, the Interdepartmental Group concluded that, as long as some US troops stayed in South Korea and the Mutual Security Treaty remained in force, Seoul would agree to substantial adjustments in US aid. The group voiced confidence that South Korea, even with only limited US air and naval support, could defend itself against a North Korean attack. Next, noting that almost $500 million from the Five-Year Modernization Program remained unfunded, the group outlined four options covering
FYs 1975-1977 that contained varying proportions of grants and sales. Finally, the group agreed that South Korea needed more high-performance aircraft but recommended that a high-level review precede any decision. General Brown and Deputy Secretary Clements endorsed the group’s findings, saying that the modernization program required no modification and should be completed as quickly as possible. Among the four options, they favored Option 3, under which grant aid would total $150 million, falling from $75 million in FY 1975 to $25 million in FY 1977. Conversely, sales would total $350 million, rising from $52 million in FY 1975 to $175 million in FY 1977. President Ford decided to complete the Modernization Program at an early date. While shifting from grants to sales more slowly than General Brown and Deputy Secretary Clements preferred, he did reduce grant aid to $10 million after FY 1977.29

The collapse of South Vietnam stopped what seemed like an inexorable trend toward further withdrawals. In 1974 a House-Senate conference committee recommended changing US deployments in several ways. Among other things, the committee asked whether the 2nd Infantry Division, stationed twenty miles below the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North and South Korea, might move either south of Seoul or leave Korea completely. Assistant Secretary Ellsworth asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to restudy the requirement for a US presence. Their reply reached Secretary Schlesinger on 28 July 1975, three months after the communist victory in South Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff saw “a continuing politico-military requirement” for retaining the entire division, not only to deter a North Korean attack but also to preserve the status of the United States as a regional power. They also opposed moving the 2nd Infantry Division south of Seoul “in the near term.” Politically, both allies and adversaries would see this as a weakening of US resolve. Economically, relocating the division below Seoul would be costly because real estate was scarce and expensive.30 The 2nd Infantry Division remained in place.

The 2nd Infantry Division always kept one of its companies on the DMZ. Late in 1973 the Joint Chiefs of Staff began studying the advisability of withdrawing that company from the DMZ and reducing the 175-man Army Support Group that bore responsibility for the Joint Security Area (JSA) at Panmunjom, where the Military Armistice Commission met. Admiral Gayler recommended withdrawing troops from the DMZ but keeping them in the JSA. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in February 1974, sent Secretary Schlesinger identical advice. He approved, and in May 1974 the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave him a detailed plan for accomplishing a turnover to the South Koreans. But matters moved no further. Here too, apparently, South Vietnam’s collapse raised a psychological barrier against the appearance of another American retreat. In May 1976, after a discussion with Mr. Clements, Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft conveyed a decision that a company would stay on the DMZ “for the time being.”31

Somewhat the same fate overtook an effort to “Koreanize” the I Corps Group. This joint command, headed by an American officer, covered the approaches to Seoul and controlled not only the 2nd Infantry Division but also ten ROK divisions and three ROK corps headquarters. Early in 1973, to replace I Corps Group, the South Koreans
organized their own Third Army Headquarters. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in March 1974, recommended completing the Koreanization of I Corps Group by 31 December 1975; Mr. Clements decided to advance that date by six months. But, once again, events in Southeast Asia intruded. On 23 April 1975, one week before Saigon surrendered, US Ambassador Richard Sneider spoke with President Park Chung Hee and then urged Washington to postpone the deactivation of I Corps Group. General Brown concurred. On 7 May Secretary Schlesinger ordered a Pacific-wide halt to major realignments. Not until August 1976 did his successor, the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether disestablishment ought to proceed. Answering in October, they recommended retaining I Corps Group: (1) as long as significant US ground forces remained or until a reassessment dictated change; and (2) until the United Nations Command had been dissolved and new arrangements decided upon. So I Corps Group remained intact.

Just as South Vietnam was collapsing, a debate over the best strategy for defending South Korea began. Late in April 1975 the commander of I Corps Group, Lieutenant General James F. Hollingsworth, came to Washington. In 1972, during North Vietnam's spring offensive, Lieutenant General Hollingsworth had played a key role in the successful defense of An Loc. Now, he briefed Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation [PA&E]) Leonard Sullivan and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) about his concept for “winning the first battle in a short war” with intensive firepower. Lieutenant General Hollingsworth firmly believed that I Corps Group could not only prevent North Koreans from making any major penetration but also “break their back” in five to seven days. President Park, having full confidence in this concept and mindful of how retreats had wrecked South Vietnamese morale, discarded plans to evacuate Seoul, which lay only twenty-five miles south of the DMZ. “I can’t help but wonder why … the Chiefs are not involved,” wrote Lieutenant General John Pauly, Assistant to the Chairman. General Brown commented, “Good [Question].”

The Joint Chiefs’ chance came in October 1975, when Secretary Schlesinger asked that the entire strategy for defending South Korea be carefully reviewed. The US and UN commander in Korea, General Richard W. Stilwell, USA, had developed a “forward defense” plan that called for halting the enemy near the DMZ during the first ten days of hostilities, then ejecting him from South Korea during the next thirty. Admiral Gayler strongly supported a forward defense strategy but warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff that implementing it would require, among other things, pre-positioning another 163,000 tons of artillery ammunition and providing the South Koreans with 30,000 tons of materiel and spare parts.

In May 1976 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Rumsfeld that they considered a forward defense “highly desirable,” even though they anticipated significant operational and logistical problems. The new concept did, in fact, prove difficult to translate into an operational plan. When General Stilwell submitted a plan for review, three inter-Service controversies emerged:
1. Should the plan be approved before its logistical feasibility had been evaluated? The Army said yes; the Joint Staff, Navy, Air Force, and Marines said no.
2. Should some alternatives to forward defense be prepared? The Army said no, but all the others said yes.
3. Should the chain of command run from General Stilwell through CINCPAC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or from General Stilwell directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff? The Army favored the latter solution, all others the former.

When 1976 ended, these disputes remained unresolved. 

The debate over forward defense, combined with the impact of South Vietnam's collapse, prodded the administration into being more forthcoming about arms sales. A series of steps, described below, significantly increased South Korea's capabilities.

Late in 1974 South Korean officials inquired about the availability of “smart” or laser-guided bombs (LGBs) and of air-to-ground Shrike missiles used to hit radar sites. The State Department opposed even giving them a briefing, but ISA thought it imprudent to reject their request out of hand. Accordingly, Assistant Secretary Ellsworth asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess potential benefits and problems and to design an illustrative sales program. Answering in July 1975, they recommended briefing the Koreans on both LGBs and Shrikes. Based on combat use in Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff characterized LGBs as “outstanding” weapons; 60 percent of LGB attacks had destroyed or damaged one or more targets. Shrikes had proved much less effective; the North Vietnamese effectively neutralized them by either shutting down the threatened radar or dissipating its power in a dummy load. As an initial step, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored selling an LGB “designator” system, two-seat aircraft with rear seat illuminators.

Mr. Ellsworth also had asked whether providing Shrikes and LGBs would (1) give South Korea a significant margin of tactical superiority and/or (2) escalate the regional arms race by sparking an action/reaction cycle. The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded:

1. Allowing South Korea to acquire LGBs and Shrikes was not so much a matter of achieving tactical superiority as of redressing a major imbalance in tactical aircraft vis-à-vis North Korea. The North Koreans had no means of countering LGBs, and the Soviets apparently lacked enough smart bombs to give them some.
2. Judging by the timing of past aircraft deliveries to the two Koreas, which had occurred independently of each other, no action/reaction cycle seemed likely. The Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed North Korea's buildup as a deliberate, long-term effort to achieve air superiority over the South.

In August 1975 Secretary Schlesinger approved the release of LGBs and the Maverick A, a TV-guided air-to-ground missile that could hit small targets moving as fast as 50 miles per hour. 

Simultaneously, the South Koreans revealed their own Five-Year Force Improvement Plan, aimed at creating enough strength to repel a North Korean attack without relying on US support. In October 1975 President Ford authorized (1) selling South Korea eighteen F-4Es as well as sixty F-5Es and (2) determining whether South Korea
would be interested in acquiring eight of the twelve Hawk battalions that would be stationed there during FY 1979. He delayed a decision, though, about whether ROK forces should be brought to the point where, with only US logistic support, they could stop a North Korean attack. In June 1976 the Koreans agreed in principle to accept eight Hawk battalions; their transfer would take place during FY 1980, after completion of the Force Improvement Plan.38

The South Koreans wanted to turn their mix of gasoline-engine M-47 and M-48A1 tanks into a force composed entirely of diesel-engine M-48A3s. Spare parts for the aging M-47s would not last beyond 1980. Early in 1976 General Stilwell and Admiral Gayler proposed selling 421 M-48A1s to the Koreans, who would convert them into M-48A3s and retire an equal number of M-47s. The US Army concurred. In the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation opposed such a sale, mainly because it would delay converting all the US Army’s 3,060 M-48s into M-48A5s mounting 105 mm guns. But in May 1976 other OSD offices—ISA along with Installations and Logistics—endorsed the sale; so did a Joint Staff representative. On 21 May 1976 Deputy Secretary Clements approved selling 421 M-48A1s. Three days later, somewhat superfluously, the Joint Chiefs of Staff added their endorsement. The sale, they stated, would not impair US ability to deal with worldwide contingencies. It would, however, discourage the South Koreans from what Washington considered less desirable options, such as co-producing M-60s. Secretary Rumsfeld approved the sale.39

On 18 August 1976, at the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom, a bizarre and frightening incident occurred. A work party of Americans and South Koreans began pruning a poplar tree in the JSA. After some time, a North Korean officer warned them to stop and threatened death unless they did so. Pruning continued. Suddenly, North Korean guards wielding clubs and axe handles attacked the work party. In a four-minute melee, two US officers were beaten to death.40

In Washington, on the morning of 19 August, the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) decided upon a measured response. First, seek presidential approval of (1) action to cut down the tree in such a way as to avoid confrontation and (2) start Guam-based B-52s on a radar bombing exercise, so the aircraft would overfly Korea at the time of the tree-cutting. Also, a naval task force would begin moving into either the Sea of Japan or the Yellow Sea; one F-4 squadron on Okinawa and eighteen F-111s from Idaho would begin deploying to Korea; and a contingency plan for hitting North Korean barracks near the JSA would be prepared. At 0700 hours on 20 August the National Military Command Center activated a Crisis Action Team; Mr. Clements arranged to be in continuous voice contact with General Stilwell. At 1030 hours the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved General Stilwell’s tree-cutting plan. Admiral James L. Holloway, III, the Acting Chairman, cabled rules for employing artillery: If a firefight occurred, the target would be North Korean guards’ barracks in the JSA. At 1730 hours three B-52s made a “dry” bombing run over the Joint Security Area. Around 1800 hours, US Army engineers began working. The North Koreans watched but did nothing. Down came the tree, without incident.43
One major issue—overall command in South Korea—remains to be considered. The United Nations Command (UNC) had existed since July 1950. The American officer who served as Commander, US Forces in Korea, also acted as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. In his latter capacity, he exercised operational control over South Korea’s armed forces. President Nixon feared that the UN General Assembly, dominated by a Third World majority, would vote to terminate the UNC. Accordingly, in December 1973 the President ordered a study of diplomatic initiatives that might forestall unwelcome changes. He wanted to review prospects for preserving the UNC, propose alternative arrangements, look into future US-ROK command relationships, and explore the related issue of supporting bases in Japan. This was not a matter in which either pressure from Congress or events in Southeast Asia played any significant part.

The NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and the Pacific prepared options for each of these issues. On 1 March 1974 Admiral Moorer told Dr. Kissinger which ones he would choose:

1. Replace the UNC, preferably with a combined US-ROK command. Additionally, the United States should attempt to gain the communists’ tacit acceptance of an interim American military presence, pursue a non-aggression pact between the two Koreas, and seek the UN Security Council’s endorsement of all these steps.
2. Renegotiate the Status of Forces Agreement with Japan, in order to make bases there immediately available if hostilities in Korea resumed.

Deputy Secretary Clements supported the Chairman on (1) and (3) but believed that negotiations with Japan would prove fruitless. Ultimately, he cautioned Dr. Kissinger, the availability of bases would depend on whether the Japanese saw aggression in Korea as a threat to themselves. On 29 March, through NSDM 251, President Nixon ruled in favor of pursuing the approaches outlined in (1). He also decided to make no changes in US force levels and missions during the transition to new command arrangements.

On 17 December 1974, by a vote of 61 to 43, the UN General Assembly upheld a decision by its Political Committee to maintain the United Nations Command. But on 18 November 1975 the UN General Assembly passed two mutually exclusive resolutions. One called for immediate dissolution of the UNC and withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Korea. The other, sponsored by the United States, would disband the UNC only after negotiations among “the parties directly concerned” to find an alternative mechanism for continuing the provisions of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Nonetheless, sentiment seemed to be shifting in North Korea’s favor.

Already, on 12 November 1975, Assistant Secretary Ellsworth had asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider, among other alternatives, replacing the UNC with separate US and ROK commands. Each would retain operational control of its own forces, coordinated in peacetime by a combined planning headquarters. Efforts to establish a true Combined Command, Mr. Ellsworth feared, could arouse much congressional opposition.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored a single Combined Command. The Joint and Service staffs split, though, over two related issues. First, should the Commander in Chief, Combined Command, exercise operational control over air defense forces in peacetime? Second, should CINCPAC be interposed between the Commander in Chief, Combined Command, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Numerous inter-Service exchanges ensued. Finally, in March 1976 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Rumsfeld that they opposed establishing separate US and ROK commands. If that occurred, they said, air defense procedures might have to be changed; operational control, and hence some restraining influence over ROK forces, would be lost; existing command channels for wartime would not be fully used; and the psychological impact upon both Koreas might harm US interests. Instead, they preferred a single Combined Command with the following features:

1. Eighth US Army’s air defense elements and any aircraft on air defense alert would come under the operational control of the Commander in Chief, Combined Command. During hostilities, all air defense units would do so.

2. A Military Committee would carry out staff planning for the US and South Korean defense ministers and coordinate with the Combined Command. Its permanent members would be the Commander in Chief, Combined Command, and the Chairman of South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. The US representative would communicate through CINCPAC on matters that concerned US forces alone; on bi-national matters, he would go directly to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus the chain-of-command issue was settled by a compromise.

3. The Commander in Chief, Combined Command, should be an American as long as the United States kept making a “significant contribution.”

No action resulted, because ISA decided that interagency agreement had to be achieved before General Stilwell could begin discussions with the South Koreans. Early in July 1976, apparently hoping to force ISA’s hand, General Brown urged Secretary Rumsfeld to support starting discussions with South Korea. The Chairman presented what he called “cogent reasons” for doing so. First, Washington and Seoul had stated publicly their willingness to dissolve the UNC once they had received assurances from their adversaries that the armistice would continue. Second, the UN’s Third World majority seemed increasingly receptive to North Korea’s call for abolishing the UNC and consummating a peace treaty. These countries resented the annual US lobbying efforts and believed that the UN no longer played a valid peace-keeping role in Korea. Third, South Koreans were dismayed that the US government, after twice proposing that planning begin for a Combined Command, still had failed to open discussions. Fourth, since arranging a new command structure surely would prove to be a time-consuming business, the task was best begun soon. But General Brown failed to achieve his aim. Since the NSC had initiated an interagency study of this problem, Secretary Rumsfeld decided against approaching the South Koreans until it was finished. Consequently, command reorganization became a task for the Carter administration.
Between 1973 and 1976 little changed in Korea; the hopeful possibilities raised in NSDM 251 did not materialize. More might have happened, but South Vietnam’s collapse deterred Congress and the administration from doing anything that might seem like a weakening of US resolve. Modernization programs moved forward but had not reached the point where South Korea clearly could defend itself without US combat forces. Maintaining the status quo satisfied the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The most noteworthy shift, that of giving greater emphasis to forward defense, was one which they considered “highly desirable.”

The Mayaguez Rescue

The Vietnam War ended on 30 April 1975, when General Duong Van Minh unconditionally surrendered what remained of the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam. Almost two weeks earlier, in Cambodia, communist Khmer Rouge overran the capital of Phnom Penh. But, for the United States, one last spasm lay just ahead. Early in the morning of 12 May 1975, the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon received a report that Cambodians had boarded and seized the SS Mayaguez, an American container ship with a crew of thirty-nine, near Puolo Wei island about sixty miles from the Cambodian port of Kompong Son. When the NSC convened just after noon, General David C. Jones attended as Acting Chairman because General Brown was in Europe. Members quickly agreed that this was an act of piracy requiring a prompt and forceful response. No one wanted a repetition of the 1968 USS Pueblo episode, in which the captured ship and crew were taken to Wonsan and the prisoners subjected to eleven months of harsh captivity. The carrier USS Coral Sea and two destroyers, then steaming off the southeastern coast of Indonesia, received orders to take their station off Cambodia’s coast.

Early on 13 May Washington time, the Mayaguez was located at Koh Tang Island about thirty miles from the mainland. At 0617 hours the J-3, Joint Staff, directed CINCPAC to maintain constant tactical air and gunship coverage over the site and granted authority to fire in the vicinity of but not at small boats. For the next NSC session, DoD drafted a rescue scenario which Joint Staff officers judged “limited and very conventional.” Basically, if diplomacy failed and intelligence appeared adequate, helicopters should execute a raid once the USS Coral Sea was in position. When the NSC met later that morning, General Jones assured the President that the Mayaguez very likely could be stopped and disabled with a minimum loss of life. At 1210 hours the Joint Chiefs of Staff communicated the following NSC decisions to CINCPAC: isolate Koh Tang by intercepting all boats but do not sink them without orders from Washington; move helicopters in Thailand to Utapao near the coast; airlift Marines from Okinawa and the Philippines to Utapao.

At 2012 hours on 13 May, when a patrol craft was spotted leaving Koh Tang for the mainland, President Ford ordered it destroyed if it could not be stopped any other
way. The craft was promptly sunk. At 2152 hours, shortly before the NSC reconvened, an A-7 pilot saw another boat, apparently with Caucasians aboard, heading for the mainland. Aircraft fired warning bursts and dropped tear gas, but the boat continued on course and carried the *Mayaguez*’s crew to the mainland. When the NSC adjourned shortly after midnight on 13-14 May 1975, General Jones sent orders to Admiral Gayler in Hawaii and to Lieutenant General John J. Burns, USAF, in Thailand to: prepare for Marines to board the *Mayaguez* and secure Koh Tang Island while B-52s and tactical aircraft, based in Thailand and from the USS *Coral Sea*, struck Kompong Som and the adjacent Ream Airfield. Secretary Schlesinger objected that using B-52s would raise a “red flag” on Capitol Hill and might inflict many casualties outside the target area. President Ford elected to defer to the Joint Chiefs’ judgment. Execution was set for first light on 15 May Cambodian time, which would be the evening of 14 May in Washington.52

By mid-afternoon on 14 May, all forces were ready: Marines, helicopters, and attack aircraft at Utapao; the destroyers USS *Holt* and USS *Wilson* very near the *Mayaguez*; and the aircraft aboard the USS *Coral Sea* within range of Kompong Son. At an NSC meeting that ran from 1532 hours to 1742 hours, General Jones said the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended landing that evening on the ship and the island: “We can do it with high assurance of success.” They opposed using B-52s as “overkill,” however, and the President accepted their judgment.53

General Brown, who had returned to Washington, worked with Secretary Schlesinger to oversee the rescue. Trying to orchestrate a fast-moving and far-away operation from the Pentagon and the White House led to some problems. Around 1900 hours (0600 hours, Cambodian time) helicopter-borne Marines began landing on Koh Tang Island. Resistance proved much tougher than expected, and three of the first five CH-53s were shot down, but the Marines won a foothold. (Altogether, eight helicopters assaulted the island. Three were destroyed and four so severely damaged that they could not continue operations.) At 1945 hours, Cambodians in Phnom Penh broadcast their willingness to return the *Mayaguez* but said nothing about the crew. At 2025 hours the White House suspended a strike by the first of four waves planned by the USS *Coral Sea*. Nothing more precise was heard from Phnom Penh, so at 2047 hours General Scowcroft relayed the President’s order for the first wave to proceed. Also, an assessment of bomb damage was to be provided before any later waves were launched. Four minutes later, however, Lieutenant General Scowcroft called to say that the second, third, and fourth waves should go forward without pausing. Targeting restrictions resulted in the first wave expending no ordnance, and hence no assessment, but the second and third waves proceeded to hit mainland targets. At 2105 hours Marines boarded and secured the *Mayaguez*. Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge had released the *Mayaguez* crew members, and a Thai boat brought the ship’s crew out from the mainland; the USS *Wilson* took them aboard at 2341 hours. With ship and crew recovered, General Brown and Secretary Schlesinger shifted air power to help the embattled Marines extract themselves from Koh Tang Island. Secretary Schlesinger wanted to keep hitting the mainland, but General Brown argued that US
objectives had been achieved, no worthy targets remained, and the carrier needed to prepare for service as a helicopter platform during the Marines' extraction. Admirals Holloway and Gayler supported the Chairman, so at 0035 hours Secretary Schlesinger informed the White House that the fourth wave from the USS Coral Sea would not fly. The Marines completed their evacuation from Koh Tang at 0915 hours. US battle casualties totaled eighteen killed and fifty wounded. Afterward, President Ford wrote that Secretary Schlesinger had changed White House orders and cancelled the fourth wave without informing him. A chronology prepared by the Joint Staff showed that those charges lacked any merit; however, President Ford and Dr. Kissinger remained convinced they were correct.54

Years later, General Jones reflected candidly on his performance:

It was a very confused situation. . . . Admiral Noel Gayler . . . was in town, and he and a few of his people sat down and developed a basic plan. . . . I had been acting chairman only a few times; I really didn’t know the people in the Joint Staff well or understand the networking in the Pentagon. We got a lot of bad information to start with, on which we based some plans, and then had to change them. It brought home to me many of the weaknesses we had in the system at the time.55

Japan: Aiming for More “Complementarity”

By January 1973 a sensitive problem that had bedeviled US-Japanese relations during the 1960s no longer existed. Returning Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty in 1972 disposed of one of the last World War II US legacies in the Pacific. In March 1973 President Nixon initiated a review of US policy toward Japan, paying particular attention to potential conflicts and the means for resolving them. When the Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and the Pacific replied in June 1974—this particular task having a low priority—its draft stated that security issues seemed to be straining US-Japanese ties less than in past years. The onset of détente and American withdrawal from Vietnam had dissipated Japanese fears of being drawn into a war against their will. In fact, most Japanese wanted to preserve a US presence in their country and prevent too precipitate an American withdrawal from East Asia. General Brown and Deputy Secretary Clements endorsed these conclusions.56

In September 1974, as he prepared to visit Japan, President Ford ordered a fresh review. After conducting the review, the Interdepartmental Group stated that defending Japan and preserving the US-Japanese alliance still enjoyed “the highest priority in our Asian policy.” The group recognized that domestic pressure to cut US military spending was growing but deemed it unrealistic and undesirable for Japan either to shoulder regional defense responsibilities or to create offensive forces. Improved joint planning, taking full advantage of the “complementarity” between US and Japanese forces, appeared attractive. However, any Japanese government would face strong
popular resistance at home against “offensive” or “regional” planning. Since US forces and bases in the home islands were not directly concerned with Japan’s defense, the Japanese public (perceiving no military threat to Japan) would see extensive planning as unnecessary at best and provocative at worst. Therefore, “under most likely circumstances Japan will continue its established policy of a slow build-up of its defensive, conventional capability,” committing about 1 percent of its gross national product to military spending. Assistant Secretary Ellsworth and the Director, Joint Staff, Vice Admiral Harry D. Train, agreed with that assessment. By a separate memorandum, dated 13 November 1974, Deputy Secretary Clements advised Dr. Kissinger of several DoD “concerns.” The Japanese government was doing little to educate its people about that nation’s defense role; inflation and lack of public support were eroding Japan’s modest military effort; and the rising cost of American military activities in Japan could impair the US ability to operate there.57

In mid-1975 the Director General of Japan’s Defense Agency suggested that US-Japanese military cooperation increase. Assistant Secretary Ellsworth thought the time might be ripe for the two nations to start specific discussions about “complementarity.” If you agree, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 June, submit some suggestions. Answering in mid-August, they agreed that complementarity offered long-term gains toward “stretching the defense dollar.” Broadly, the United States would protect vital air and sea lanes at extended distances from Japan and augment the air defense of, as well as air support for, Japan. The Japanese would be responsible for base protection, internal security, and “realistic defense” against conventional attacks. They also should move toward assuming total responsibility for their own air defense and develop forces for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) protection around the home islands along with the appropriate portions of vital sea lanes.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that specific goals for complementarity include: improving compatibility and interoperability between the two nations’ forces; delineating areas of cooperation and shared responsibility (e.g., air defense, airborne early warning, ASW, and mine warfare); and increasing joint exercises and exchanges. They proposed “a combined effort in lower-level channels to identify and prioritize specific force structure, equipment requirements, and logistic support, using 1980 as the initial target date for achieving complementary force structures.” Washington should support new trends in Japanese thinking, but allow Tokyo to set its own pace.58

In August 1975, during discussions in Tokyo, Secretary Schlesinger pressed the Japanese to improve their logistical, air defense and ASW capabilities. Soon, Japanese officials began asking for specific suggestions; Assistant Secretary Ellsworth asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for advice. Answering in December, they pinpointed several areas. In anti-submarine warfare, for example, the Japanese lacked sensor platforms and technology. In air defense, they had only enough air-to-air missiles for two sorties per plane. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff were aware of important inhibitions: Japan’s constitutional restraints; her self-imposed ceiling of 1 percent of the gross national product; and the Japanese government’s unwillingness publicly to acknowledge bilateral defense
spending. So, before proposing any specifics, Washington first should seek agreement about the principles and thrust of complementarity.\footnote{59}

In October 1976 the Japanese Cabinet approved a five-year defense plan that, among other things, stressed qualitative improvements and called for “maintaining [the] credibility of security arrangements with [the] US and consolidating arrangements for its smooth operation.”\footnote{60} Yet, to American eyes, these promises would remain only partly fulfilled; Japan’s reluctance to shoulder a larger burden remained a constant irritant throughout the Cold War.

**Micronesian: “Free Association” for the Marianas**

The end of “close-in” containment rekindled US interest in Central Pacific bases. If forward positions became untenable, alternatives would have to be found. One possibility stood out: Micronesia, which covered more than three million square miles of ocean embracing the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands. Since 1947 the United States had held most of Micronesia as a “strategic trusteeship” from the United Nations. Under its terms, the US government could establish military bases in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and close all or part of the territory for security reasons. The terms of this trusteeship, however, obliged the United States to direct Micronesia toward either self-government or independence. The Nixon administration proposed that Micronesia permanently associate itself with the United States as a commonwealth. After Micronesians rejected that solution, US negotiators offered a compact of free association, giving the US government full authority over defense and foreign affairs. In 1972, however, Micronesians asked that independence and free association be discussed concurrently.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff fully endorsed a free association, on condition that “those essential elements of sovereignty involving foreign affairs, defense, access, and denial [to third countries] must be firmly retained by the United States.”\footnote{61} But independence was another matter. In November 1972, responding to an informal request from ISA, they rated the Trust Territory as “an area of high strategic interest and importance.” That being the case, there must be absolute guarantees against any foreign military presence, free and full access for US forces, and assurance that any changes in the US-Micronesian relationship would protect US military interests. They pointedly recalled how agreements with Panama, Cuba, and the Philippines had been altered to the detriment of the United States after those countries became independent. Under free association, the availability of Micronesian bases still would allow a defense in depth. Independence, however, could lead to a string of bad results: loss of base rights; significant degradation of the US strategic posture in a large portion of the western Pacific; difficulties in defending Guam and Tinian; encroachments upon Micronesia by nations whose interests diverged from those of the United States; vulnerability of the sea lanes between Australia and Japan; and Micronesian claims to vast areas of the
western Pacific. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted DoD to take a “strong position” against offering independence.62

Concurrently, Dr. Kissinger asked Ambassador F. Haydn Williams, who was President Nixon’s Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations, to reassess the US position. Ambassador Williams responded by asking the NSC Under Secretaries Committee to approve a dual approach, seeking a permanent union with the Marianas (where pro-US sentiment ran strong) and a free association with the other districts. On 1 December 1972 Admiral Moorer and Deputy Secretary of Defense Kenneth Rush informed the committee that they opposed any further negotiations until the administration decided how to deal with a demand for independence. Also, they sought a guarantee that DoD’s minimum requirements for real estate would be met. They worried, too, because Micronesian politicians representing the Palau District had opposed allowing any US bases there. Ambassador Williams suggested examining Ulithi Atoll, with its fine anchorage, as an alternative. But, late in December, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., informed Secretary Melvin Laird that he rated rights in the Palaus indispensable and urged that efforts be made to “sell our position” to Palau residents and Micronesian politicians.63

Finally, the State and Defense Departments worked out a negotiating strategy for the Marianas alone; President Nixon received it on 13 April 1973. Initially, the Marianas would be offered commonwealth status akin to Puerto Rico. The alternatives would be either unincorporated territorial status or integration with Guam, which already was unincorporated US territory. As for military land requirements, the maximum objectives ought to include: acquiring the whole island of Tinian and relocating its population; jointly using Isely Field on Saipan; and buying or leasing 320 acres around Tanapag Harbor on Saipan. Among the minimum requirements would be buying or leasing 18,515 acres on Tinian and relocating inhabitants elsewhere on that same island. President Nixon approved these positions, with one exception: the maximum objectives should not include removing Tinian’s population.64

In September 1973 the NSC Under Secretaries Committee proposed seeking a compact of free association with the rest of Micronesia. Two critical points had to be referred to President Nixon for decision. Should Ambassador Williams:

1. Offer independence, if he thought it necessary? Ambassador Williams as well as the State, Interior, and Justice Departments said yes. Of course, such an offer would be carefully qualified. The United States would maintain its lease on a missile testing range at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands. It also would view military access to Micronesia by any third country as a hostile act and take the steps necessary to protect US interests. The Defense Department still said no, because of the remote possibility that Micronesians might accept. Admiral Moorer and Mr. Clements believed that other agencies had unduly emphasized foreign pressure to offer independence, thereby subordinating Micronesia’s “underlying importance” in maintaining a Pacific power balance.

2. Limit to a period of ten to fifteen years the moratorium upon unilateral termination of free association? Defense, along with Ambassador Williams, held out for fifteen but other
agencies argued that a ten to fifteen year offer would make Micronesians more willing to protect US military interests if they did decide to break the compact.

President Nixon, in November, decided against the Defense Department on both counts. He instructed Ambassador Williams as follows:

1. Make every effort to conclude a compact of free association, but offer independence if it seemed desirable. This offer, however, must preserve US rights at Kwajalein and deny third countries military access to Micronesia.
2. Accept a ten to fifteen year moratorium on unilateral termination, provided that base rights and denial of access to third countries would survive termination by fifty years.

Already, a solution satisfactory to DoD was in sight. After a round of negotiations in December 1973, Ambassador Williams reported that the results “exceeded our expectations. . . . There is clear acceptance of full US sovereignty over the proposed new Marianas Commonwealth, giving the federal government undisputed control in foreign affairs and defense. There is no question of any right of unilateral termination of the new arrangement.” By April 1974 agreement had been reached over a Compact of Free Association for the Marshalls and Carolines, allowing Washington full authority over defense and foreign affairs. The Defense Department obtained its maximum real estate requirements through a fifty-year lease, with an option for fifty more. The compact could not be terminated unilaterally for fifteen years, and then only after a two-year waiting period and the conclusion of an agreement preserving US base rights and denying access to third countries. Thus, from the JCS standpoint, the best possible outcome had been achieved.

Among the Mariana Islands, Tinian seemed the most promising site for a multipurpose base. In March 1972 the Joint Chiefs of Staff envisioned port and logistics complexes, facilities for B-52s and cargo aircraft, and a maneuver area for training ground forces. The Air Force, acting as executive agent for DOD, circulated a development plan in September 1973. Secretary Schlesinger, on 5 December, stated that the US government was “committed” to proceed with it.

On 30 January 1974 the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that Tinian’s development proceed in seven stages. In June they approved an additional requirement for conducting the training of carrier aircraft there. Then, in September 1974 they asked the Services, CINCPAC, and Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), to review their requirements through 1980. Surprisingly, the Army and Navy replied that they now had none; the Air Force reduced its needs; the Marines still wanted a training area; and CINCPAC recommended going no further than planning and land acquisition. The main change, however, came from CINCSAC, who sought an alternative to Andersen Air Force Base on Guam but not necessarily using Tinian.

Accordingly, on 19 November 1974 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that activity on Tinian be limited to planning, land acquisition, and modest harbor improvements—only two of the seven phases needed for full development. This was a major
reversal, and they cited several reasons for not going further. First, Okinawa’s reversion to Japan had not compelled the relocations that they originally anticipated. Apparently, for the next few years, Tokyo was willing to accept current US force levels on Okinawa. Second, no significant base denials had occurred in the western Pacific. Third, the military budget had grown tighter. In February 1975 Deputy Secretary Clements approved their recommendations about Tinian.68

At Saipan, on 15 February 1975, negotiators signed a “Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States.” For $19.5 million, the US government acquired a fifty-year lease to two-thirds of Tinian and a portion of Tanapag Harbor on Saipan.69 On 24 March 1976 President Ford signed the covenant; the Northern Marianas then became administratively separate from the rest of the Trust Territory.

**Conclusion**

The decision not to make Tinian a multipurpose base flowed from a larger development. As things turned out, neither the reversion of Okinawa nor the withdrawal from and the ensuing defeat in South Vietnam did serious damage to the US position in the western Pacific. The worries voiced frequently and forcefully by the Joint Chiefs of Staff proved to be exaggerated. By 1976, in fact, the US position seemed more secure and war less likely than during the preceding generation.
A formal group portrait of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Left to Right (Top): Admiral James L. Holloway, III, CNO; General David C. Jones, CSAF; General Bernard W. Rogers, CSA; General Louis H. Wilson, Jr., CMC; Left to Right (Bottom): Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles W. Duncan, Jr.; Secretary of Defense Harold Brown; General George S. Brown, CJCS. (JHO Files)
Conclusion

In their memoirs, Dr. Henry Kissinger wrote about “years of upheaval” followed by “years of renewal” while President Gerald Ford described “a time to heal.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff probably would have stressed upheaval over renewal or healing.

Around the world, the Joint Chiefs of Staff faced one crisis after another. The Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 strained the NATO alliance, depleted US tank and aircraft inventories through transfers to Israel, and triggered a brief superpower confrontation. Admiral Moorer did not see how President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger could make good their promise to have the United States appear, in both Arab and Israeli eyes, as the indispensable peacemaker. In fact, through adroit diplomacy, Dr. Kissinger did establish US primacy in that role. The war and the Arab oil embargo also forced a reorientation of strategic priorities, with the Middle East displacing the Far East. But creating ways of projecting US military power into the Middle East, and particularly the Persian Gulf, raised almost insuperable obstacles. As Admiral Moorer warned at the moment when Soviet intervention in the Arab-Israeli war seemed possible, the Middle East would be the worst place in the world for the United States to fight a war. Without access to Lajes airfield in the Azores, which Portugal granted reluctantly under strong pressure from Washington, the airlift to Israel could not have proceeded. Three years later, General Brown again emphasized how crucial base rights had become: “How can we talk about a contingency in the Middle East and have no base agreements in Turkey?” The Turkish problem soon was resolved but dilemmas about the Persian Gulf would grow worse. Conversely, how much the Far East had lost prominence as a potential area for major conflict can be deduced from one example about base construction. In 1972, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted Tinian Island in the Marianas to house a multipurpose base. Late in 1974, however, they recommended scaling back those plans considerably because the repercussions from the reversion of Okinawa to Japan and the withdrawal of US troops from South Vietnam proved far less harmful than they had anticipated.
Sub-Saharan Africa was another region where the Joint Chiefs of Staff counselled restraint. Cuban and Soviet intervention in Angola’s civil war threatened to create a new Cold War battleground. Among senior policymakers, though, Secretary Kissinger stood out as the sole hawk calling for a vigorous response. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shied away from any measures, even naval deployments, which might lead to direct military involvement. Likewise for the Congo, where the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been quite hawkish in the early 1960s, their successors disapproved recommendations that President Mobutu’s regime be given sizeable quantities of equipment.

Western Europe stands out as an area where the Joint Chiefs of Staff, OSD and the White House proceeded in complete accord about major issues: maintain troop levels; improve qualitative aspects of Allied Command Europe; and formulate positions about Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions that would fend off pressure from Capitol Hill for unilateral withdrawals. Unexpectedly, in fact, a key senator cleared the way for an augmentation of US Army, Europe. Tail-to-tooth conversions permitted by Public Law 93-365, which was the handiwork of Senator Sam Nunn, made possible the deployments of Brigades 75 and 76 which reversed the withdrawals carried out during 1967-1968.

The key strategic issue facing the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the deteriorating military posture of the United States, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The Joint Chiefs closed ranks to support proceeding with B-1 and Trident development, raising the number of Air Force tactical fighter wings to 26, and expanding the active Army to 16 divisions. However, concern with the Soviet Union’s increased capabilities did not put an end to inter-Service rivalries. During March and April 1974, for example, Admiral Moorer recorded in his diary acrimonious debates over how to revise the worldwide Unified Command Plan. Typical entries in his diary read: “The Army has vowed that they will never again fight a war for an Admiral, and the Air Force has vowed to regain supreme authority over all future air wars. . . . It is obvious that the Army and Air Force are ganging up on [Admiral Zumwalt and me].” The Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff pressed for replacing the single Pacific Command, where the top position traditionally had been a Navy preserve, with four commands: Northeast Asia; Southwest Pacific; US Forces, Japan; and Pacific Fleet, responsible for water areas in PACOM’s current area of responsibility. The issue had to be passed to Secretary Schlesinger who decided, as Admirals Moorer and Zumwalt wished, that the Pacific Command should remain unchanged. The drafting of strategic guidance provoked a somewhat similar dispute. When OSD prescribed the scenario of a worldwide conflict with the Soviet Union preceded by unilateral US action in the Middle East, the Navy and Marine Corps spokesmen objected to what they perceived as an overemphasis on Europe. Consequently, JSOP 78-85 contained a finely crafted compromise that could be read as supporting either side.

Finally, on arms control, the Joint Chiefs of Staff performed a vital role in concluding SALT I but played a crucial part in preventing SALT II from reaching fruition. During 1973-1975, interagency debates revolved around increasingly convoluted issues like prescribing equal ceilings on the throw-weight of MIRVed ICBMs and defining
“compensating asymmetries” that would trade limitations on US cruise missiles for those on Soviet Backfire bombers. At an NSC meeting on 21 January 1976, Admiral Holloway, as Acting Chairman, effectively vetoed what looked like the most negotiable proposal put forward by the White House. But the Chiefs basic reason for doing so was not disagreement about technical points. Believing that the global balance was shifting in Moscow’s favor, they sided with critics of détente. Thus they no longer viewed SALT as serving US security interests. Essentially, therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had become skeptical of détente as practiced by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger.
Acronyms

ABM  Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACDA  Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACR  Armored Cavalry Regiment
ACSAN  Assistant to the Chairman for Strategic Arms Negotiations
ADM  Atomic Demolition Munitions
AEC  Atomic Energy Commission
AFCENT  Allied Forces Central Europe
ALCM  Air-Launched Cruise Missile
ANZUS  Australia, New Zealand, United States
APC  Armored Personnel Carrier
ASD  Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASM  Air-to-Surface Missile
ASW  Anti-Submarine Warfare
ATP(NSA)  Assistant to the President (National Security Affairs)
AWACS  Airborne Warning and Control System

BP  Briefing Paper; Bulky Package

CENTAG  Central Army Group (NATO)
CENTO  Central Treaty Organization
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
CINCEUR  Commander in Chief, US European Command
CINCLANT  Commander in Chief, Atlantic
CINCPAC  Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCSAC  Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
CJCS  Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CM  Chairman’s Memorandum; Cruise Missile
CMC  Commandant, Marine Corps
CNO  Chief of Naval Operations
CONUS  Continental United States
CSA  Chief of Staff, Army
CSAF  Chief of Staff, Air Force
CVA  Aircraft Carrier, Attack

DCA  Defense Cooperation Agreement
DCI  Director, Central Intelligence
DDG  Guided Missile Destroyers
DEFCON  Defense Condition
DG  Defense Guidance

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<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<td>FUFO</td>
<td>Full Firing Option</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Interdepartmental Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRG</td>
<td>Interdepartmental Regional Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>International Security Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCSM</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCSREPSALT</td>
<td>JCS Representative, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFM</td>
<td>Joint Force Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLRSA</td>
<td>Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLRSS</td>
<td>Joint Long-Range Strategic Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMF</td>
<td>Joint Master File</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSA</td>
<td>Joint Security Area (Panmunjom)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Objectives Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSTPS</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KT</td>
<td>Kiloton</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Acronyms

LGB  Laser-Guided Bomb
LHA  Amphibious Assault Ship
LOC  Lines of Communication

MAF  Marine Amphibious Force
MBFR  Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MC  Military Committee (NATO)
MEF  Marine Expeditionary Force
METF  Middle East Task Force
METG  Middle East Task Group
MFR  Memorandum for Record
MIDEASTFOR  Middle East Force
MIRV  Multiple Independently-Targeted Reentry Vehicle
MLBM  Modern Large Ballistic Missile
MRBM  Medium Range Ballistic Missile
MRV  Multiple Reentry Vehicle
MT  Megaton

NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA  National Command Authorities
N/H  Note to Holders
NIE  National Intelligence Estimate
NMCC  National Military Command Center
NORTHAG  Northern Army Group (NATO)
NPR  National Petroleum Reserve
NSC  National Security Council
NSDM  National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM  National Security Study Memorandum

OJCS  Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OPEC  Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense

PACOM  Pacific Command
PA&E  Program Analysis and Evaluation
PBD  Program Budget Decision
PDM  Program Decision Memorandum
PLO  Palestine Liberation Organization
PNE  Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
POL  Petroleum-Oil-Lubricants
POM  Program Objective Memorandum
PP  Point Paper
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Planning-Programming-Budgeting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPGM</td>
<td>Policy and Planning Guidance Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRES</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RV</td>
<td>Reentry Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACLANT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAGA</td>
<td>Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCS</td>
<td>Sea Control Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>Secretary’s Memorandum</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNDV</td>
<td>Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOSUS</td>
<td>Sound Surveillance System</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRG</td>
<td>Senior Review Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>Submarine, Ballistic Missile, Nuclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>SACEUR Strategic Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDC</td>
<td>Taiwan Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOW</td>
<td>Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracking Wire-Guided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP</td>
<td>Talking Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTB</td>
<td>Threshold Test Ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTPI</td>
<td>Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAREUR</td>
<td>United States Army, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPRES</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/STOL</td>
<td>Very Short Takeoff and Landing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSAG</td>
<td>Washington Special Actions Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Principal Civilian and Military Officers

President and Commander in Chief
Richard M. Nixon 20 Jan 69 – 09 Aug 74
Gerald R. Ford 09 Aug 74 – 20 Jan 77

Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Henry A. Kissinger 20 Jan 69 – 03 Nov 75
Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, USAF 03 Nov 75 – 20 Jan 77

Secretary of State
William P. Rogers 22 Jan 69 – 03 Sep 73
Henry A. Kissinger 22 Sep 73 – 20 Jan 77

Secretary of Defense
Elliot L. Richardson 30 Jan 73 – 24 May 73
James R. Schlesinger 02 Jul 73 – 19 Nov 75
Donald H. Rumsfeld 20 Nov 75 – 20 Jan 77

Deputy Secretary of Defense
William P. Clements 30 Jan 73 – 20 Jan 77

Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)
Lawrence Eagleburger (Acting) 31 Jan 73 – 10 May 73
Robert C. Hill 11 May 73 – 05 Jan 74
Vice Admiral Ray Peet (Acting) 06 Jan 74 – 01 Apr 74
Amos A. Jordan (Acting) 02 Apr 74 – 04 Jun 74
Robert Ellsworth 05 Jun 74 – 22 Dec 75
Amos A. Jordan (Acting) 23 Dec 75 – 05 May 76
Eugene V. McAuliffe 06 May 76 – 01 Apr 77

Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation
Leonard Sullivan 21 May 73 – 11 Feb 74

Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Program Analysis and Evaluation)
Leonard Sullivan 11 Feb 74 – 13 Mar 76
Director, Planning and Evaluation
E. C. Aldridge 18 May 76 – 11 Mar 77

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN 02 Jul 70 – 01 Jul 74
General George S. Brown, USAF 01 Jul 74 – 20 Jun 78

Chief of Staff, US Army
General Creighton W. Abrams 12 Oct 72 – 04 Sep 74
General Frederick C. Weyand 03 Oct 74 – 01 Oct 76
General Bernard W. Rogers 01 Oct 76 – 21 Jun 79

Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. 01 Jul 70 – 01 Jul 74
Admiral James L. Holloway, III 01 Jul 74 – 01 Jul 78

Chief of Staff, US Air Force
General John D. Ryan 01 Aug 69 – 31 Jul 73
General George S. Brown 01 Aug 73 – 30 Jun 74
General David C. Jones 01 Jul 74 – 20 Jun 78

Commandant, US Marine Corps
General Robert E. Cushman, Jr. 01 Jan 72 – 30 Jun 75
General Louis H. Wilson 01 Jul 75 – 30 Jun 79

Director, Joint Staff
Lieutenant General George M. Seignious, II, USA 12 Jun 72 – 31 May 74
Vice Admiral Harry D. Train, II 01 Jun 74 – 30 Jun 76
Lieutenant General Ray B. Sitton, USAF 01 Jul 76 – 30 Jun 77

Commander in Chief, Atlantic
Admiral Ralph W. Cousins 31 Oct 72 – 31 May 75
Admiral Isaac C. Kidd 01 Jun 75 – 19 Sep 78

Commander in Chief, US European Command
General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA 05 May 69 – 31 Oct 74
General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., USA 01 Nov 74 – 30 Jun 79

Commander in Chief, Pacific
Admiral Noel Gayler 01 Sep 72 – 29 Aug 76
Admiral Maurice Weisner 30 Aug 76 – 30 Oct 79
**Commander in Chief, US Readiness Command**

- General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA  
  01 Feb 73 – 08 Dec 74
- General John H. Hennessey, USA  
  09 Dec 74 – 31 Jul 79

**Commander in Chief, US Southern Command**

- General William B. Rosson, USA  
  17 Jan 73 – 31 Jul 75
- Lieutenant General Dennis P. McAuliffe, USA  
  01 Aug 75 – 30 Sep 79

**Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command**

- General John C. Meyer, USAF  
  01 May 72 – 01 Aug 74
- General Russell E. Dougherty, USAF  
  01 Aug 74 – 31 Jul 77
Financial and Personnel Summaries

DOD Financial Summary (in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1974</th>
<th>FY 1975</th>
<th>FY 1976</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Forces</td>
<td>6,798</td>
<td>7,202</td>
<td>7,275</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Purpose Forces</td>
<td>27,541</td>
<td>28,077</td>
<td>33,050</td>
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<tr>
<td>Airlift and Sealift Forces</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>1,365</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Obligational Authority</td>
<td>85,061</td>
<td>87,902</td>
<td>97,511</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outlays</td>
<td>78,400</td>
<td>86,000</td>
<td>88,537</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: The Consumer Price Index rose 8.9% from FY 1973 to FY 1974, 11.1% from FY 1974 to FY 1975, and 7.3% from FY 1975 to FY 1976. Thus, when adjusted for inflation, Defense spending (or outlays) actually declined.

Active Duty Military Personnel (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 73</th>
<th>30 Jun 74</th>
<th>30 Jun 75</th>
<th>30 Jun 76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,252</td>
<td>2,161</td>
<td>2,129</td>
<td>2,081</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the Secretary of Defense
Notes

Chapter 1. Leaders Change, Methods Continue


3. TelCon, Admiral Moorer with Senator Scott, 1402 hours, 26 Sep 73, Diary of Admiral T. H. Moorer. Later that day, Senator Scott was among the few Republicans who helped pass a compromise measure requiring the withdrawal of 110,000 personnel.

4. TelCon, CJCS with Rep. Hebert, 10 Jan 74; TelCon, CJCS with Kissinger, 21 Jan 74; MFR by CJCS (M-8-74), “Debrief of Meetings with SecDef Schlesinger and SecState Kissinger, Tuesday, 22 January,” 22 Jan 74; Moorer Diary. Dept. of State Bulletin, 11 Feb 74, 138-139.


8. TelCon, CJCS with General John W. Vogt, USAF, 0751, 6 Jun 72, Moorer Diary. When Admiral Zumwalt read this passage in 1992, he expressed strong disagreement and characterized Abrams as “an outstanding theater commander in all respects” and an officer whom he held in the highest esteem.


10. TelCon, CJCS with CINCPAC, 22 Mar 74, Moorer Diary. Upon reading this passage in 1992, Admiral Zumwalt commented that he “found Abrams far more dedicated to supporting the C-in-C objective and Moorer much more inclined to fiddle with the President’s guidance.”


12. President Ford later characterized General Weyand as “a fine officer,” adding that “[h]is retirement was not precipitated by me at the White House.” Ltr, Pres Ford to W.S. Poole, 26 Mar 92, JHO.


15. MFR by CJCS (M-11-73), “Situation Existing in the United States Navy,” 14 Feb 73, Moorer Diary. Upon reading this passage in 1992, Admiral Zumwalt commented, “Clements never took me on after this meeting! Moorer never reported it to me!”

16. “Jimmy the Greek” Snyder was a Las Vegas bookmaker and sports commentator.


18. MFR by CJCS, “Meeting Between DepSecDef Clements and General Haig on 4 June 1973,” 22 Jun 73, P.S. to M-51-73, 4 Jun 73, Moorer Diary.
19. Entry for 3 Nov 73, Moorer Diary


21. “Resume” for Apr 73, Moorer Diary. President Nixon announced Richardson’s switch on 30 April.


23. TelCon, CJCS with MG John A. Wickham, 25 Feb 74, Moorer Diary. General Wickham was Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

24. TelCon, CJCS with CNO, 6 Jun 74, Moorer Diary. NY Times, 6 Jun 74, p. 29.

25. Secretary of the Air Force John L. McLucas later recalled “[t]here was a joke . . . that if you didn’t like the answer you got from Clements you could go to Schlesinger and he would overturn it every time. If you thought you’d get a no from Schlesinger, you could wait until he was out of town and then ask Clements.” Reflections of a Technocrat (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 2006), p. 85.

26. MFR by CJCS (M-33-74), “Breakfast with SecDef Schlesinger and DepSecDef Clements, 0720-0840, Thursday, 6 June 1974,” 6 Jun 74, Moorer Diary.


29. This is a recurring theme in Zumwalt’s memoir On Watch (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1976).


31. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 171.

32. Ltr, CJCS to Dr. Kissinger, 28 Nov 73, CJCS 091 File (Middle East) Folder #2.


34. Memo, VADM Weinbel to CJCS, “Acting Chairman WSAG, DPRC, SRG etc.,” 26 Jul 73, Moorer Diary.

35. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 266.

36. JCSM-466-72 to SecDef, 7 Nov 72, JCS 2089/37, Joint Master File 500 (24 Oct 72). Minor revisions were promulgated in JCSM-71-73 to SecDef, 26 Feb 73, JCS 2089/38, JMF 500 (17 Feb 73).

37. After reviewing this schedule, the JCS asked for and received an opportunity to comment upon the draft DPPG. Memo, ASD(Compt.) to CJCS et al., 5 Dec 72, JCS 2458/843; JCSM-533-72 to SecDef, 19 Dec 72, JCS 2458/843-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 24 Jan 73, JCS 2458/873-2; JMF 570 (5 Dec 72). The 1974 schedule, promulgating only slight changes, is in Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 4 Jan 74, JCS 2458/875-2, JMF 570 (9 Nov 73). Since the PBDs numbered more than 200, senior officials could not have personal familiarity with the issues in more than two or three dozen cases and largely relied on staff judgments about the rest.

38. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Mar 73, JCS 2458/851; JCSM-233-73 to SecDef, 1 Jun 73, JCS 2458/851-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 28 Sep 73, JCS 2458/872; JMF 555 (11 Mar 73). In 1973, a fiscal year ran from 1 July until 30 June. The Budget Control and Impoundment Act of 1974 moved the
start of the fiscal year back to 1 October because Congress had proved chronically unable to pass appropriations bills by 30 June. The change took effect in 1975.


40. CNOM-164-74 to JCS, 19 Jun 74, JCS 2458/895; DJSM-915-74 to CNO, 27 Jun 74; JMF 511 (19 Jun 74).

41. JCS 2458/909-2, 23 Sep 74; CSAM-83-74 and CSAFM-192-74 to JCS, 13 Sep 74, JCS 2458/909; JCSM-386-74 to SecDef, 24 Sep 74, JCS 2458/909-2; JMF 550 (13 Sep 74).

42. JCSM-466-72 to SecDef, 7 Nov 72, JCS 2089/37, JMF 500 (24 Oct 72).

43. AFPC members included the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Service Secretaries.

44. Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense for FY 1977, p. 235. Decision On JCS 2089/39, 19 Feb 75, JMDF 500 (17 Feb 73), JCS 2089/42, 2 Jun 75; SM-339-75 to DJS, 23 Jun 75, JCS 2089/42; Memo, ASD(Compt.) to CJCS et al., 24 Sep 75, JCS 2089/42-1; JMF 500 (2 Jun 75). CSAFM-33-76 to JCS 16 Mar 76, JCS 2458/956; DJSM-651-76 to CNO, 8 Apr 76; JMF 557 (16 Mar 76).

45. MFRe, “Preparation of DPPG,” 19 Apr 76, JMF 557 (19 Apr 76). JCSM-281-76 to SecDef, 23 Aug 76, JCS 2458/963-10, JMF 555 (8 Jul 76). Routing Slip by Admin Asst to CJCS, “JCS 2458/956-4,” 10 Sep 76; JCSM-326-76 to SecDef, 20 Sep 76, JCS 2458/956-4; JMF 557 (16 Mar 76). Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 9 Nov 76, JCS 2458/974, JMF 555 (8 Jul 76).

46. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 19 Oct 76, JCS 2458/969; Memo, Dir PA&E (OSD) to CJCS et al., 23 Nov 76, JCS 2458/969-1; JMF 500 (19 Oct 76).

47. JCSM-424-76 to SecDef, 27 Dec 76, JCS 2458/969-2, JMF 500 (19 Oct 76).

48. CNOM-140-73 to JCS, 17 Aug 73, JCS 2458/664-1; Memo, VADM Weinel to CJCS, “Military Manpower Reductions,” 21 Aug 73, Moorer Diary.


Chapter 2. Rebuilding Conventional Capabilities


2. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 26 Mar 73, JCS 2458/856, Information Management Division, Joint Secretariat.

3. MFPr by DJS and Dir, J-5, “Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Secretary of Defense on 13 August 1973,” 17 Aug 73, Moorer Diary.


5. Memo, ASD(PA&E) to CJCS et al., 31 Aug 73, JCS 2458/869; JCSM-409-73 to SecDef, 13 Sep 73, JCS 2458/869-1; JMF 555 (11 Mar 73). A revised DPPG, issued on 28 September, showed no changes. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 28 Sep 73, JCS 2458/872, same file.

6. DJSM-2044-73 to CJCS, 17 Dec 73, Moorer Diary.

7. CNOM-2-74 to JCS, 7 Jan 74, JCS 2101/599; JCS 2101/599-1, 1 Feb 74; Note to Control Div., “JCS 2101/599-1,” 13 Feb 74; JMF 373 (7 Jan 74).

8. Memo, Dir (PA&E) to CJCS, 6 Feb 74, JCS 2458/884; JCSM-54-74 to SecDef, 15 Feb 74, JCS 2458/884-1; JMF 555 (6 Feb 74) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 25 Feb 74, JCS 2458/884-3, same file, sec. 2. JCSM-162-74 to SecDef, 21 May 74, JCS 2458/885-2, JMF 557 (20 Feb 74) sec. 2.
9. Memo, ASD(ISA) and ASD(PA&E) to CJCS et al., 26 Sep 74, JCS 2458/909-3; JCSM-402-74 to SecDef, 4 Oct 74, JCS 2458/909-4; JMF 550 (13 Sep 74). Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 17 Feb 75, JCS 2458/912-3, JMF 555 (18 Oct 74).


13. Memo, CNO to JCS, “Strategic Alternatives,” 24 May 76; Memo, CMC to JCS, same title, 23 May 76; Memo, CAS to JCS, same title, 30 Apr 76; CSAFM-65-76 to JCS, 3 May 76; CJCS 500 Plans (General).


15. In 1975, Congress suspended military assistance, Turkey declared its Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States null and void, suspending US operations at four sites. Late in 1976, the administration was still trying to negotiate a new DCA. See chap. 7.


17. See chap. 4.

18. During the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, some pre-positioned stocks—tanks and APCs particularly—had been drawn down by transfers to Israel and not entirely replaced. See chap. 10.


22. Entry for 15 Dec 72, Moorer Diary.


25. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 26 Mar 73, JCS 2458/856, Information Management Division.


27. The E-3 AWACS, housed in a Boeing 707, carried radars and equipment that could detect low-flying aircraft across a wide area.

28. An SCS, displacing 17,000 tons and with an estimated price of $100 million, was intended to carry 14 helicopters plus three vertical and/or short takeoff and landing aircraft. Zumwalt, *On Watch*, p. 75.
29. Schlesinger Interview, 22 August 2012, pp. 6-8, 10, 12.
30. Memos, SecDef to SvcSecys, 13 Aug 73, JCS 2458/868; JCSM-374-63 to SecDef, 21 Aug 73, JCS 2458/868-2; JMF 556 (13 Aug 73) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to SecAF, 31 Aug 73, JCS 2458/868-12; Memo, SecDef to SecNav, JCS 2458/868-11; same file, sec. 3.
32. Ltr, CJCS to Kissinger, 28 Nov 73, CJCS 091 (Middle East) Folder #2. CJCS Memo M-112-73, “Breakfast Meeting with the PRESUS, Saturday, 0900, 22 December 1973,” 26 Dec 73, Moorer Diary. NSM 196 to SecDef et al., 25 Feb 74, JMF 570/628, JMF 471 (25 Feb 74) sec. 1.
33. “Response to NSSM No. 196: Overseas Military Base Structure,” May 74, Att to Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to CJCS et al., 7 Jun 74, JCS 570/628-1; JCSM-262-74 to SecDef, 21 Jun 74, JCS 570/628-2; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 30 Jul 74, JCS 570/628-3; JMF 471 (25 Feb 74) sec. 2.
34. JSOP 76-83, Vol. II, Bks. III, IV and V, 28 Dec 73, JMF 511 (11 Dec 73). JSOP 76-83, Bk. V, 2 Jan 74, JMF 511 (14 Dec 73) sec. 1A.
35. Entry for 17 Dec 73, Moorer Diary.
36. Service dissents appeared as footnotes in Book II, Vols. IV and V, JSOP 76-83, JMF 51 (11 Dec 73) sec. 1A.
37. TelCon, Admiral Moorer with Admiral Holloway, 7 Mar 74, Moorer Diary.
38. JCSM-226-72 to SecDef, 17 May 72, JCS 2458/818-3, JMF 557 (24 Jan 72) sec. 1F. Zumwalt, On Watch, pp. 462-466. TelCon, Admiral Holloway with Admiral Moorer, 10 Jan 74, Moorer Diary. Holloway related to Moorer what he had told Schlesinger. Schlesinger Interview, 22 Aug 12, p. 10.
39. DJSM-196-74 to Dir PA&E, 5 Feb 74, JMF 511 (1 Dec 73) sec. 1.
41. CNOM-116-74 to JCS, n.d.; JCSM-162-74 to SecDef, 21 May 74, JCS 2458/885-2, JMF 557 (20 Feb 74) sec. 2.
42. Public Law 93-365, crafted by Senator Sam Nunn (D, Ga.) and which became law on 5 August 1974, required support to combat conversions of 18,000 personnel by mid-1976.
43. Schlesinger Interview, 22 Aug 12, p. 6.
44. Memos, SecDef to SvcSecys, 29 Jul 74, JCS 2458/902-1, JMF 557 (25 Feb 74) sec. 2.
45. JCSM-374-74 to SecDef, 9 Aug 74, JCS 2482/902-5, JMF 557 (25 Feb 74) sec. 2. Memos, SecDef to SvcSecys, 22 Aug 74, JCS 2458/902-6; Memo, Actg SecArmy to SecDef, 2 Jan 75, JCS 2458/902-9, same file, sec. 4. FYDP figures are taken from the force tables in Books III, IV and V of Vol. II, JSOP 77-84.
46. JSOP 77-84, Vol. II, Bk. III, 23 Dec 74, JMF 511 (5 Dec 74) sec. 1A; Bk. IV, 30 Dec 74, JMF 511 (6 Dec 74) sec. 1A; Bk. V, 15 Jan 75, JMF 511 (9 Dec 74) sec. 1A.
47. JCSM-162-75 to SecDef, 6 May 75, JCS 2458/921-1, JMF 557 (16 Dec 75) sec. 2.
48. Memos, SecDef to CJCS et al., 29 Jul 75, JCS 2458/935, JMF 556 (29 Jul 75). Memo, Dir, PA&E to CJCS et al., 25 Jun 75, JCS 2458/932, JMF 555 (25 Jun 75).
49. Figures are taken from force tabs at the end of Bks. III, IV and V of Vol. II, JSOP 78-85.
50. This is further explained in chap. 5.
51. JSOP 78-85, Vol. II, Bk. II, 30 Dec 75, JMF 511 (8 Dec 75) sec. 1A.
52. CSAM-88-73 and CAFM-204-73 to JCS, 14 Dec 73, JCS 2466/28; SM-129-74 to JCS, 6 Mar 74, JCS 2466/28-1; JMF 442 (14 Dec 73) sec. 1. SM-49-76 to JCS, 19 Jan 76, JCS 2466/28-2, same file, sec. 2.

53. JCSM-164-76 to SecDef, 5 May 76, JCS 2458/950-1, JMF 557 (12 Jan 76) sec. 1. Stockpile requirements are also discussed in chap. 11.

54. Memos, SecDef to SvcSecys, 9 Aug 76, JCS 2458/964; JCSM-299-76 to SecDef, 18 Aug 76, JCS 2458/964-2; Memos, SecDef to SvcSecys, 7 Sep 76, JCS 2458/964-12, 14 Sep 76; JMF 556 (13 Aug 76). Aircraft figures are drawn from USAF POM FY 1978-1982, 7 May 76, pp. V-4 thru V-6; JMF 557 (7 May 76) sec. 1G. These figures represent total inventories, including spares, trainers, etc.

55. Memo, SecNav to SecDef, “Alternative Five-Year Shipbuilding Program—Action Memorandum,” 9 Jan 76; Memo, SecDef to SecNav, same title, 13 Jan 76, Atts to JCS 1454/154-1; JMF 465 (13 Feb 76) sec. 1.

56. Memo, SecNav to SecDef, 13 Feb 76, JCS 1454/154; Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 1 Mar 76, JCS 1454/154-2; DJSM-401-76 to ASD(ISA), 12 Mar 76, JCS 1454/154-4; JMF 465 (13 Feb 76) sec. 1.

57. JCSM-115-76 to SecDef, 30 Mar 76, JCS 1454/154-6; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 30 Mar 76, JCS 1454/154-7; JCSM-125-76 to SecDef, 2 Apr 76, JCS 1454/154-8; JMF 465 (13 Feb 76) sec. 2.

58. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 21 Apr 76, JCS 1454/154-13, JMF 465 (13 Feb 76) sec. 3.

59. Memo, CSAF to CJCS, “US Strategy and Naval Force Requirements,” 28 Apr 76; Memo, LTG Vessey to DJS, same title and date; JCSM-148-76 to SecDef, 29 Apr 76, JCS 1454/154-14, JMF 465 (13 Feb 76) sec. 3.

60. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 30 Apr 76, JCS 1454/154-161, JMF 465 (13 Feb 76) sec. 4.


63. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., “Navy Shipbuilding Program (NSDM 344),” 19 Jan 77, JMF 001 (CY 1976) NSDM.

Chapter 3. Strategic Forces


7. Zumwalt, *On Watch*, pp. 156-163. In a telephone interview with W. S. Poole on 22 May 1992, Admiral Zumwalt said that Senator Henry M. Jackson (D, Wash.) deserved the major credit for this outcome. Subsequently, though, budgetary pressures and technical problems slowed the construction pace of submarines and the development of missiles.


9. CM-2910-73 to SecDef, 24 Sep 73, JCS 2458/868-13; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Nov 73, JCS 2458/868-14; JMF 556 (13 Aug 73) sec. 3. The SAM and interceptor figures are taken from JFM 1975-82 in App B to JCSM-204-73 to SecDef, 17 May 73, JCS 2458/846-1, JMF 557 (24 Jan 73) sec. 3.

10. Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 12 Feb 74, JCS 1541/351-1; JCSM-238-74 to SecDef, 11 Jun 74, JCS 1541/351-1; JCSM-137-75, 16 Apr 75, JCS 1541/354-1; JMF 803 (5 Feb 74) sec. 1. Memo, Dir PA&E to DJJS, 2 Jan 74, JCS 1899/851-1; JCSM-119-74 to SecDef, 9 Apr 74, JCS 1899/851-1; Memo, Dir PA&E to DJJS, 17 Jun 74, JCS 1899/851-2; JMF 303 (2 Jan 74).

11. Memo, DepSecDef and Chmn, AEC to ATSP(NSA), sgd 14 and 27 Nov 73, JCS 2501/27-1, JMF 720 (8 Nov 73). Memo, CNO to SecDef via CJCS, “Tactical Anti-Submarine Warfare Nuclear Weapons,” 12 Feb 74; CM-3127-74 to SecDef, 15 Feb 74; Moorer Diary.


13. JCSM-162-75 to SecDef, 6 May 75, JCS 2458/921-1, JMF 557 (6 Dec 74) sec. 2.


15. Memo, ATSD(AE) to CJCS et al., 16 Jan 75, JCS 2430/256; JCSM-41-75 to SecDef, 28 Jan 75, JCS 2430/256-1; JMF 720 (16 Jan 75).

16. Debates over what exactly essential equivalence involved and the degree to which it existed are described in chap. 4.

17. Memo, DepSecDef and Admin ERDA to Pres, 2 Apr 75, JCS 2430/256-3, JMF 720 (16 Jan 75). JCSM-268-75 to SecDef, 20 Jun 75, JCS 2458/921-3, JMF 557 (16 Dec 74) sec. 3.

18. CM-181-74 to DJJS, 7 Dec 74, JCS 2430/255, JMF 701 (7 Dec 74). Memo, CNO to SecDef, “Navy Tactical Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 15 May 75; Memo, CAPT Prindle, Chairman’s Staff Group, to CJCS, 15 May 75; CM-478-74 to SecDef, 20 Jun 75, Chairman’s File 710 (Nuclear Weapons and Systems) 1 Jan-30 Jun 75.

19. JCSM-268-75 to SecDef, 20 Jun 75, JCS 2458/921-3, JMF 557 (16 Dec 74) sec. 3. DiJSM-1244-75 to CJCS, 21 Jul 75, Chairman’s File 710 (Nuclear Weapons and Systems) 1 Jul 75-30 Jul 76.


21. JSOP 78-85, Vol. II, Bk. I, 30 Dec 75, JMF 511 (10 Dec 75) sec. 1A.

22. JCSM-164-76 to SecDef, 5 May 76, JCS 2458/950-1, JMF 557 (12 Jan 76) sec. 1.

23. MFR by LTG W. Y. Smith, ACJCS, “Meeting with DepSecDef on Strategic Programs, 10 Aug 76,” 12 Aug 76, JCS 500 Plans (General), 1 Aug-31 Dec 76.

24. Memos, SecDef to SvcSecys, 9 Aug 76, JCS 2458/964, JMF 556 (13 Aug 76). The 10 August meeting has been described first because, according to General Smith, its “principal purpose was to reach agreement on what the tentative PDM should say about the M-X and mobile
Minuteman.” Despite its date, apparently, the 9 August PDM incorporated the 10 August decisions. JCSM-299-76 to SecDef, 18 Aug 76, JCS 2458/964-2; Memos, SecDef to SecSecys, 7 Sep 76; same file. Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1978, pp. 130, 134.

25. NSDM 348 to SecDef et al., 20 Jan 77, Ford Library On Line.


Chapter 4. SALT II Recedes from Reach

1. Dept. of State Bulletin, 26 Jun 72, pp. 918-921.

2. Throw-weight can be defined as the maximum weight of warheads and re-entry vehicles that could be carried in the powered stages of a ballistic missile.

3. ACSAN-135-72 to CJCS, 14 Aug 72, Moorter Diary.

4. Memo, CNO to JCS, “Preparations for SALT Phase II,” 16 Aug 72; CM-2124-72 to CNO, 17 Aug 72; CJCS 388.3 SALT (Jan-Dec 72).

5. JCS 2482/164, 2 Sep 72; JCSM-405-72 to SecDef, 11 Sep 72, JCS 2482/164; JMF 751 (2 Sep 72); ACSAN-156-72 to CJCS, 8 Sep 72, Moorter Diary.


7. Memo, DASD(ISA) to VP Wkg Gp, 27 Oct 72, JCS 2482/175; ACSAN-195-72 to CJCS, 28 Oct 72; JMF 751 (3 Aug 72) sec. 2. Also MFR by ACSAN, “SALT Meeting with DepSecDef,” 31 Oct 72, CJCS 388.3 SALT (Jan-Dec 72).


9. The day before, Admiral Moorer and Assistant Secretary (Systems Analysis) Gardiner Tucker reached a tacit agreement that the JCS would support OSD in seeking an equal throw-weight level, with JCS provisos that this applied only to aggregates and would be in the context of equal aggregates for the numbers of delivery vehicles. MFR by Capt. Swarztrauber, “Chairman’s Meeting with Dr. Tucker, 13 November,” 14 Nov 72; ACSAN-211-72 to CJCS, 15 Nov 72; Moorer Diary.


11. ACSAN-39-73 to DJJS, 30 Jan 73, JCS 2482/184; SM-61-73 to ACSAN et al., 9 Feb 73, Att to 1st N/H of JCS 2482/184, 9 Feb 73; JMF 752 (8 Feb 73) sec. 2.

12. ACSAN-60-73 to DJJS, 28 Feb 73, JCS 2482/188; SM-107-73 to ACSAN, 3 Mar 73, Att to 1st N/H of JCS 2482/188, 3 Mar 73; JMF 752 (8 Feb 73).


14. TelCons, CJCS with Senator Jackson, 2 Feb 73, and Admiral Zumwalt, 16 Feb 73, Moorer Diary. Apparently, this would be the exchange in Hrgs., Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, S. Com on Armed Services, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., p. 368.

15. Ltr, Lieutenant General Allison to Senator Jackson, 22 Mar 73; Entry for 9 Mar 73; Moorer Diary.
16. TelCon, CJCS with Senator Jackson, 2 Feb 73, Moorer Diary. Memo, CASF and SecAf to SecDef, “Air Force General Officer Action,” 5 Feb 73; Memo, CNO and SecNav to SecDef, “Reassignment—Flag Officer of the Navy,” 7 Feb 73; Memo, SecArmy to SecDef, “Army General Officer Nomination,” 6 Feb 73; all filed under 23 Feb 73, Moorer Diary. TelCon, CJCS with DJS, 7 Feb 73, Moorer Diary. Memo, SecDef to Pres, “Nomination of New Assistant to the Chairman . . . for Strategic Arms Negotiations,” 8 Feb 73, filed under 8 Mar 73, Moorer Diary. General Allison was slated for promotion to full general and assignment as US Representative on the NATO Military Committee, but Senator Jackson blocked his promotion and he had to retire.

17. In his memoir, Rowny recalled a different episode. Admiral Moorer told him that “[o]ver my dead body will you be my representative” but next day when Rowny came to his office Moorer “leaned back in his chair, extended his arms, and said, ‘I’m dead.’” *It Takes One To Tango* (London: Brassey’s 1992), p. 19.

18. MFR by CJCS (M-16-73), “Assignment of JCS Representative for SALT Matters,” 23 Feb 73; TelCon, CJCS with SecDef, 24 Feb 73; Moorer Diary. The President also allowed Senator Jackson to select senior officials for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Jackson chose Rear Admiral Thomas D. Davies to be an Assistant Director. Admiral Moorer objected forcefully, telling a White House staffer that “I had given my pint of blood when Rowny was forced on me. . . . I was not going to give in on the Davies nomination. I said if Davies wants to retire and take the job be my guest.” Entry for 1 Jun 73, Moorer Diary. Admiral Davies was nominated to be Assistant Director in July, confirmed by the Senate in December, and retired from the Navy in 1974.


22. Msg, JCS 7400 to USNMR, 24 Mar 73; Memo, CJCS to DepSecDef, 12 Mar 73; JCS 388.3 SALT (Jan-Jun 73).

23. Memo, ASD(SA) to CJCS, “SALT 102 Response,” 29 Mar 73; CM-2600-73 to ASD(SA), 32 Apr 73; Msg, SAL 077 to CJCS, 311125Z Mar 73; Msg, JCS 3131 to LTG Rowny, 4 Apr 73; JCS 388.3 SALT (Jan-Jun 73). Earlier, General Allison had employed still another metaphor: “we should avoid putting even our little toe in that kind of water.” ACSAN-41-73 to CJCS, 1 Feb 73, Edward L. Rowny Papers, Box 5.

24. CNOMp-33-73 to JCS, 9 Mar 73, JCS 2482/191; JCS 2482/191-1, 14 Apr 73; CNOMs 68 and 69-73 to JCS, 18 Apr 73; AF Flimsy 69-73 to JCS, 23 Apr 73; Note to Control Div., “JCS 2482/191-1,” 23 Apr 73; JMF 751 (9 Mar 73).


28. CM-2686-73 to DepSecDef, 10 May 73; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 10 May 73; Msg, JCS 1028 to USNMR, 5 Jun 73; JCS 388.3 SALT (Jan-Jun 73). *Foreign Relations: 1969-1976*, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 83-84. It does not appear that a tough directive actually was issued.

29. Msg, USDEL 193 to SecState, 151700Z May 73, JMF 751 (9 Mar 73).


32. The range was kept so short because, unlike most Soviet cities, many US urban centers were fairly close to the coasts.


34. Entry for 29 Nov 73, Moorer Diary. CNOM-200-73 to JCS, 30 Nov 73, JCS 2482/223; JCSM-513-73 to SecDef, 4 Dec 73, JCS 2482/223; JMF 750 (30 Nov 73).


37. CNOM-19-74 to JCS, 1 Feb 74, JCS 2482/227, JCSM-34-74 to SecDef, 8 Feb 74, JCS 2482/227; JMF 756 (16 Jan 74) sec. 1.

38. CNOM-21-74 to JCS, 1 Feb 74, JCS 2482/228; CSAFM-29-74 to JCS, 4 Feb 74; JMF 756 (16 Jan 74) sec. 1.

39. JCSM-39-74 to SecDef, 11 Feb 74, JCS 2482/228-1, JMF 756 (16 Jan 74) sec. 2.


41. JCS 2482/228-2, 14 Feb 74, and Decisions On, 15 and 20 Feb 74; Memo, VADM Weinel to CJCS, “Equal Aggregate Levels—1,700 Vs 2,000,” 19 Feb 74; SM-104-74 to DJS, 20 Feb 74; DJSM-525-74 to Dir, J-5, 15 Apr 74, JCS 2482/228-4; JMF 756 (16 Jan 74) sec. 2. Rpt by SAGA, “An Analysis of Aggregate Levels of Central Systems,” Jun 74, JMF 756 (16 Jan 74) filed separately.

42. CNOM-46-74 to JCS, 22 Feb 74, JCS 2482/230; JCS 2482/230-1, 25 Feb 74, and 1st N/H, 28 Feb 74; Bfg Sheet for CJCS, 5 Mar 74; JMF 756 (16 Jan 74) sec. 3. MFR by LTG Seignious, “Discussion of NSDM 245,” 25 Feb 74, “Robinson-Grams” Folder, Moorer Papers.


44. Supplemental Bfg Sheet for CJCS, 6 Mar 74, JMF 756 (16 Jan 74) sec. 3. JCSM-72-74 to SecDef, 8 Mar 74, JCS 2482/233, with final page revised by 1st N/H, 21 Mar 74, same file, sec. 1. The original page of the JCSM mentioning Admiral Zumwalt’s non-concurrence is filed separately in sec. 1.


46. Msg, JCS 4881 to USNMR, 8 Mar 74, CJCS 388.3 SALT (Jul-Jul 74). JCS 2482/236-2, 15 May 74; Memo, Jan Lodal to BG Georgi et al., “SALT Work Program,” 8 Apr 74; JMF 756 (16 Jan 74) sec. 4. SM-214-74 to CSA and CSAF, 15 Apr 74, JCS 2482/236-3, same file, sec. 3. JCSM-189-74 to SecDef, 28 May 74, JCS 2482/236-4, same file, sec. 4.

47. MFR by Col. Clyne, “Meeting of the SALT VP Working Group,” 9 Apr 74, JMF 750 (19 Apr 74).

48. CNOM-96-74 to JCS, n.d., JCS 2482/239; JCSM-143-74 to SecDef, 27 Apr 74, JCS 2482/239; JMF 750 (19 Apr 74).
49. In the mid-1960s, DOD chose to deploy large numbers of small-yield re-entry vehicles that would be able to overwhelm ballistic missile defenses.


52. Memo, LTG Rowny to CJCS, “Moscow Summit on SALT II, June 1974,” 3 Jun 74, JMF 750 (19 Apr 74).

53. JCSM-236-74 to SecDef, 10 Jun 74, JCS 2482/248, JMF 750 (19 Apr 74).


58. Memo, General Scowcroft to CJCS et al., 6 May 74, JCS 1729/723-2, JMF 730 (20 Feb 74) sec. 1. Memo, Kissinger to SecDef et al., 28 May 74, JCS 2482/246, same file, sec. 4. JCSM-211-74 to SecDef, 3 Jun 74, JCS 2482/247, same file, sec. 3. JCSM-226-74 to SecDef, 6 Jun 74, JCS 2482/250; Memos, CJCS, DepSecDef and Chmn, AEC to Kissinger, 6-7 Jun 74, 1st N/H of JCS 2482/250, 10 Jun 74; Memo, Dir, ACDA to Kissinger, 8 Jun 74, JCS 2482/250-1; same file, sec. 4.

59. NSDM 256, 10 Jun 74.

60. NSDM is described in chap. 3.

61. JCSM-249-74 to Pres, 14 Jun 74, JCS 2482/2503, JMF 730 (20 Feb 74) sec. 4. Admiral Zumwalt had wanted JCSM-249 to say that there was “no persuasive national security rationale” for a threshold test ban, and to express concern that NSDM 256 had been issued without first attempting to reconcile ACDA’s position with that of DOD and the AEC. CNOMs 157 & 158-74 to JCS, 13 Jun 74; “Dec On DF-81-74,” 13 Jun 74; same file.


64. The draft that General Brown had criticized lacked a qualifying phrase, “to the degree possible,” and stated that the US should “insist” upon prior announcement and observer exchanges.

65. DJSM-961-74 to Dir, J-5, 9 Jul 74, JCS 2482/252; Draft JCSM-297-74 to SecDef, 12 Jul 74, JMF 704 (9 Jul 74). CM-21-74 to DJS, 15 Jul 74, CJCS 756 SALT (1 Jul-31 Dec 74). JCSM-297-74 to SecDef, 19 Jul 74, JCS 2482/2652-1, JMF 704 (9 Jul 74).

66. Legislation had replaced the AEC with ERDA and a Nuclear Regulatory Agency.


68. NSDM 321, 11 Mar 76, circulated via Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 13 Mar 76, JMF 001 (CY 1976) NSDMs.

69. MFR by Col. F. J. Murray, “PNE Negotiations,” 9 Apr 76; DJSM-726-76 to CJCS, 22 Apr 76; Memo, CJCS et al. to DepSecDef, “Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and Protocol,” 22 Apr 76; CJCS 710 (Nuclear Weapons and Systems). General Brown's Assistant, Lieutenant General
Notes to Pages 73–79

William Y. Smith, USAF, actually signed this memorandum. JCS 2482/320, 14 Apr 76; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 23 Apr 76, JCS 2482/320-1; JMF 730 (13 Apr 76).


74. MFRs by LTG Rowny, “VP Meetings on SALT, 10 and 20 January 1975,” 13 and 22 Jan 75, Rowny Papers, Boxes 19 and 14.

75. JCS 2482/271, 8 Jan 75, and Dec On, 24 Jan 75, JMF 756 (8-Jan 75). As collateral constraints to verify the 1,320 MIRV ceiling they wanted to: allow each side one complex containing both MIRVed and non-MIRVed ICBMs; count any booster that had been flight-tested with either a MIRV or a single RV payload as being MIRVed as soon as it was deployed; ban the development and deployment of MIRV systems, to prevent them from being covertly upgraded into MIRVs; and establish separate limits for launchers used in testing and training.


77. MFR by Capt. Pollack, “Telephone Conversation with General Rowny,” 11 Apr 75, JCS 756 SALT (1 Jan-30 Jun 75). JCSM-148-75 to SecDef, 24 Apr 75, JCS 2482/280; Memo, Dir, DOD SALT Task Force to DJS, 6 May 75; JMF 756 (7 Jan 75).

78. MFR by LTG Rowny, “VP Meeting on SALT, Saturday, 17 May 75,” 20 May 75, JCS 756 SALT (1 Jan-30 Jun 75).

79. JCSM-207-75 to SecDef, 20 May 75, JCS 2482/272-3, JMF 756 (7 Jan 75).

80. MFR by LTG Rowny, “VP Meeting on SALT, 24 May 1975,” 27 May 75, JMF 756 SALT (1 Jan-30 Jun 75).

81. DJSM-947-75 to CJCS, 9 Jun 75, w/att Note by Capt. Charles O. Pringle, USN, 10 Jun 75, CJCS 756 SALT (1 Jan-30 Jun 75).


87. MFR by LTG Rowny, “VP Meeting on SALT, Wednesday, 10 September 1975,” CJCS 756 SALT (Jul 75-Feb 76).

89. Memo, MG Wickham to LTG Scowcroft, 23 Sep 75, CJCS 756 SALT (Jul 75-Feb 76).

90. Msg, CJCS 1139 to LTG Rowny, 16 Oct 75; Msg, USDEL SALT 698 to LTG Smith, 171747Z Oct 75; CJCS SALT (Jul 75-Feb 76).

91. CM-665-75 to CSA et al., 21 Oct 75, JMF 756 SALT (Jul 75-Feb 76). CSAFM-211-75 to JCS, 23 Oct 75, JCS 2482/298; DJSM-1821-75 to Dir, J-5, 31 Oct 75, JCS 2482/297-1; JCS 2482/297, Rev. 4 Nov 75; CSAFM-225-75 to JCS, 11 Nov 75, JCS 2482/298-1; JCS 2482/302, 18 Nov 75, JCS 2482/304, 26 Nov 75; JCSM-417-75 to SecDef, 26 Nov 75, JCS 2482/304; JMF 756 (18 Nov 75).

92. Dr. Wade had succeeded Dr. Wikner as Director in September 1974.

93. Ltr, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 13 Nov 75; Msg, CJCS 12631 to General Rowny, 15 Nov 75; CJCS 756 SALT (Jul 75-Feb 76). MFR by LTG Rowny, “VP Meeting on SALT, Wednesday, 26 November 1975,” 28 Nov 75; Rowny Papers, Box 19. MFR by LTG Rowny, “VP Meeting on SALT, 28 November 1975,” 28 Nov 75, CJCS SALT 756 (Jul 75-Feb 76).

94. CM-733-75 to JCS, 4 Dec 75; JCSM-425-75 to SecDef, 5 Dec 75, JMF 756 (18 Nov 75).

95. Memo, Roger Molander to BG Serio et al., “SALT Options Paper,” 3 Dec 75; CM-479-75 to CSA et al., 18 Dec 75; Memos, VCSA and Asst CMC to CJCS, “Preferred SALT II Options,” 19 Dec 75; CJCS 756 SALT (Jul 75-Feb 76). Memo, CSAF to CJCS, “Preferred SALT TWO Options,” 19 Dec 75; Memo, CNO to CJCS, same subj., 18 Dec 75; Rowny Papers, Box 34.

96. MFR by LTG Rowny, “VP Meeting, 19 December 1975,” 19 Dec 75, CJCS 756 SALT (Jul 75-Feb 76). Central Intelligence now believed that, while Backfires could strike the United States, they most likely would be used against targets in Europe and Asia and for open-ocean missions. Probably, by 1985, 450 Backfires would be in service. “Key Points of NIE 11-3/8-75 Related to SALT,” 24 Dec 75, same file.


Chapter 5. Law of the Sea

1. Innocent passage was defined as uninterrupted transit which did not prejudice the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state. That concept had undergone somewhat arbitrary interpretations by coastal states.


3. NSSM 125 to CJCS et al., 21 Apr 71, JCS 2150/355; Rpt by NSC Ad Hoc Group, “NSSM 125: US Oceans Policy,” Att to Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to CJCS et al., 29 Jun 71, JCS 2150/355-3; JMF 546 (21 Apr 71).

4. JCSM-323-71 to SecDef, 9 Jul 71, JCS 2150/355-6; JMF 546 (21 Apr 71).


8. JCSM-502-71 to SecDef, 13 Nov 71, JCS 2150/355-16, JMF 546 (21 Apr 71).

9. Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef, 8 Mar 72, JCS 2150/371; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 14 Mar 72, JCS 2150/371-1; JCSM-170-72 to SecDef, 17 Apr 72, JCS 2150/371-2; Memo, SecDef to ATP(NSA), 1 May 72, JCS 2150/371-3; JMF 546 (8 Mar 72). Two members of the NSC Staff advised Kissinger that they rated failure to identify alternative negotiating positions as JCSM 170’s principal weakness. A distinction might be drawn, for instance, between straits less than six miles wide and those six miles or more. Foreign Relations: 1969-1976, Vol. E-1, Doc. 429.

10. NSSM 157, 13 Mar 72, JMF 001 (CY 1972) sec. 1. Memo, Chmn, Inter-Agency Task Force to ATP(NSA), 20 Jun 72, JCS 2150/377; JCSM-306-72 to SecDef, 5 Jul 72, JCS 2150/377-1; JMF 546 (20 Jun 72). In April, the JCS designated Rear Admiral James M. Doyle, Jr. (Chief, International Negotiations Division, J-5) to serve as their representative during preparations for, and sessions of, Law of the Sea conferences. MJCS-139-72 to SecDef, 25 Apr 72, 1st N/H of JCS 2150/374, 27 Apr 72, JMF 546 (12 Apr 72).

11. Memo, SecDef to ATP(NSA), 8 Jul 72, JCS 2150/377-3, JMF 546 (20 Jun 72). NSDM 177, 18 Jul 72, JMF 001 (CY 1972) NSDMs, sec. 1.

12. Memo, ActgSecState to Pres, 14 Aug 72 and Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef et al., 15 Aug 72, JCS 2150/377-4, JMF 546 (20 Jun 72).

13. JCSM-31-73 to SecDef, 18 Jan 73, JCS 2150/391, JMF 546 (5 Jan 73).


16. Memo, Staff Dir, USecysCmte to CJCS et al., 29 Jun 73, JCS 2512, JMF 546 (29 Jun 73). Memo, RADM Morris to CJCS, “Farewell Call by Professor John Norton Moore,” 12 Feb 76, JCS 546 (Law of the Sea). RADM Morris’ previous assignment had been Deputy Director, Politico-
Military Division, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He also held a Ph.D. degree in international politics. Memo, RADM Flanagan to Dir, J-1, 19 Oct 73; CM-2966-73 to CNO, 26 Oct 73, CJS 388.3 (Law of the Sea). JCS Info Memo 50-73, 21 Nov 73, JMF 130 (20 Nov 73).

17. Memo, Staff Dir, USecysCmte to CJCS et al., 27 Mar 74, JCS 2512/14, JMF 546 (27 Mar 74) sec. 1. JCSM-113-74 to SecDef, 2 Apr 74, JCS 2512/15, same file, sec. 2.4

18. Memo, DepSecDef to Chmn, USecysCmte, 9 Apr 74, JCS 2512/15-1, JMF 546 (27 Mar 74) sec. 2.


21. JCSM-353-74 to SecDef, 16 Aug 74, JMF 908/546 (4 Jan 74). JCS 2512/24, 13 Nov 74, and Dec On, 21 Nov 74, JMF 546 (13 Nov 74). JCS 2512/22, 7 Nov 74, and Dec On, 15 Nov 74, JMF 546 (7 Nov 74).

22. Memo, Staff Dir, USecysCmte to CJCS et al., 6 Jan 75, App B to JCS 2512/15-5; JCSM-14-75 to SecDef, 10 Jan 75, JCS 2512/15-5; Memo, DepSecDef to Chmn, USecysCmte, 15 Jan 75, JCS 2512/15-10; JMF 546 (27 Mar 74) sec. 3.


Chapter 6. NATO

1. Dept. of State Bulletin, 14 May 73, pp. 593-598. The text of the North Atlantic Treaty is in Ibid., 20 Mar 49, pp. 339-342. Signatories were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

2. NSSM 168, 13 Feb 73, JCS 2502/337; Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., “NSSM 168,” Part I, 26 Feb 73; JMF 806/530 (13 Feb 73) sec. 1.


5. J-5 BP 41-73 for DJS, 3 May 73, JMF 806/530 (13 Feb 73). The figure of 44 ADEs is mentioned in “Supporting Rationale for Assumptions Analysis,” Att to J-5 M-594-73 to IN Div., J-5 et al., 11 Apr 73, same file.

6. DIA and J-3 concluded that, unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact would use most of its mobilized reserves in major combat units. Thus, fifteen days after mobilization began (M+15), the Pact’s superiority in combat manpower would peak at 328,000. DIA Bfg to JCS, “Mobilization Capabilities of Warsaw Pact/NATO Allies,” 21 Nov 73, JMF 806/075 (CY 1973).


8. Memo, CNO and SecNav to SecDef, 29 May 73, JCS 2502/337-2, JMF 806/530 (13 Feb 73) sec. 1.


10. Msg, SACLANTREPEUR to SACLANT, 171645Z Apr 73, CJCS 092.2 NATO (Jan-Jun 73). JCSM-210-73 to SecDef, 19 May 73, JCS2502/377, JMF 806/520 (16 May 73). The JCS as well as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, recommended delaying ministerial consideration of this guidance until autumn. CM-266-73 to SecDef, 24 Apr 73; Msg, JCS 5386 to USNMR SHAPE, 18 May 73; CM-2705-73 to SecDef, 21 May 73; CJCS 092.2 NATO (Jan-Jun 73).

11. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 29 May 73, JCS 2502/390; JCSM-287-73 to SecDef, 28 Jun 73, JCS 2502/390-1; JMF 806 (29 May 73). General Goodpaster wanted seven more US-based squadrons earmarked for his SACEUR Strategic Reserve. The JCS agreed in principle but noted that unilateral increases in US commitments would contradict the administration’s goal of making the allies do more. They were willing to transfer seven squadrons from the M+3 Rapid Reaction Force to the SSR, but General Goodpaster decided against pressuring the matter further. JCSM-224-73 to SecDef, 26 May 73, JCS 2502/361-1; JCSM-41-74 to SJCS, 5 Feb 74; JMF 806/373 (12 Apr 73). In April 1974 the JCS did recommend earmarking seven squadrons for the SSR, provided that serious basing problems in Europe could be solved. This became part of the US response to the 1974 DPQ. DJSM-932-73 to CJCS, 6 Jun 73; DJSM-932-73 to CJCS, 6 Jun 73; JCS 2502/485-3; JMF 806/535 (14 Jan 74). JCSM-315-74 to SecDef, 22 Jul 74, JCS 2502/544-1; JMF 806/395 (16 May 74) sec. 2.

12. The Joint Staff/ISA position was “essentially one [supporting] moderate innovations structured to meet our immediate needs while keeping our options open for the near term.” TP, DJS and ASD(ISA) to CJCS and DepSecDef for SRG Mtg of 25 May 73, JCS 2502/337-1, JMF 806/530 (13 Feb 73).


14. J-5 TP 40-73 to CJCS, 6 Jun 73; DJSM-932-73 to CJCS, 6 Jun 73; CJCS 092.2 NATO (Jan-Jun 73).


17. At this point, active NATO-assigned forces in Central Europe included 24 divisions and 90 tactical squadrons.
18. MFR by Col. Nutting, Chairman’s Staff Group, “Meeting with the Chief of Staff, French Armed Forces, 0930 hours, 26 April 1973,” 30 Apr 73; Msg, USDAO Paris 9140 to JCS, 21 Dec 73 (filed under 12 Dec); Moorer Diary.


22. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 5 Jul 73, JCS 2502/403; Memo, SecDef to ASD(ISA), 1 Aug 73, JCS 2502/429; JCSM-350-73 to SecDef, 8 Aug 73, JCS 2502/415-1; JMF 806 (5 Jul 73) sec. 1. Ltr, CJCS to SACEUR, 9 Aug 73, CJCS 092.2 NATO (Jul-Oct 73). The J-5 formed a working group, drawn from J-3, J-4, J-5 and the services, to monitor the activities of external agencies, coordinate efforts within DOD, and develop Joint Staff positions on Year of Europe initiatives. DJSM-1188-73 to Dirs, J-3 and J-4, 19 Jul 73, JMF 806 (5 Jul 73) sec. 1.

23. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 31 Jul 73, JCS 2502/423, JMF 806 (5 Jul 73) sec. 1. JCSM-441-73 to SecDef, 15 Oct 73, JCS 2502/423-2; Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 6 Feb 74, JCS 2502/423-2; MJCS-138-74 to ASD(ISA) “Anti-Armor Weapons Briefing,” 22 Apr 74, same file, sec. 3.

24. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 31 Jul 73, JCS 2502/422, JMF 806 (5 Jul 73) sec. 1. JCSM-440-73 to SecDef, 10 Oct 73, JCS 2502/422-2, same file, sec. 5.

25. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 31 Jul 73, JCS 2502/424, JMF 806 (5 Jul 73) sec. 1. JCSM-447-73 to SecDef, 16 Oct 73, JCS 2502/424-1, same file, sec. 5. A “promising discussion” with West Germans about raising war reserves is mentioned in JCSM-446-73 to SecDef, 16 Oct 73, JCS 2502/420-2, same file, sec. 2. Most of that promise did not materialize.

26. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 31 Jul 73, JCS 2502/419, JMF 806 (5 Jul 73) sec. 1. JCSM-430-73 to SecDef, 2 Oct 73, JCS 2502/419-2, same file, sec. 2. Technical recommendations about logistics specialization appear in JCSM-387-73 to SecDef, 31 Aug 73, JCS 2502/432-1, same file, sec. 4.

27. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 5 Dec 73, JCS 2502/475; Memo, ASD(PA&E) to DJS, 3 Jun 74, JCS 2502/475-1; JCSM-320-73 to SecDef, 25 Jul 74, JCS 2502/475-2, JMF 806 (5 Jul 73). TelCon, CJCS with VADM Ray Peet, 11 Feb 74, Moorer Diary.


31. NSSM 170 to SecDef et al., 13 Feb 73, JCS 2502/336; TP, DJS and Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS and DepSecDef for SRG Mtg of 26 Apr 73, JCS 2502/336-1; JMF 940/585 (13 Feb 73). The SRG meeting was cancelled. Extracts of NSDM 214, 3 May 73, JMF 001 (CY 73) NSDMs.

32. *NY Times*, 1 Aug 73, p. 15; 26 Sep 73, pp. 1, 10; 27 Sep 73, pp. 1, 41; 1 Oct 73, p. 46.


34. MemCon, “SecDef Visit to AFCENT (18 April 1974),” CJCS 092.2 NATO (Jan-Jun 74). “Challenges for NATO,” pp. 1-8, Att to Ltr, CINCUSAFe to CJCS, 13 Apr 74, JCS 2502/556, JMF 806/520 (4 Feb 74).
35. DJSM-1930-73 to Dir, PA&E, 27 Nov 73, JCS 2502/464-1; Memo, MilAsst to DepSecDef to DepATP(NSA), 6 Feb 74, JCS 2502/464-2, JMG 806/530 (13 Feb 73) sec. 1. “Final Draft Report of the Ad Hoc NSC Panel on NATO Force Improvement,” Feb 74, Att to Memo, Dr. Kissinger to SecDef, 10 Apr 74, JCS 2502/464-3; JCSM-328-74 to SecDef, 1 Aug 74, JCS 2502/464-4; same file, sec. 2.

36. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 24 Jul 74, JCS 2502/563; JCSM-350-74 to SecDef, 21 Aug 74, JCS 2502/5563-1; JMF 806/300 (24 Jul 74).


39. 4th Allied Tactical Air Force supporting CENTAG had about five times as many aircraft as 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force supporting NORTHAG. That mismatch underlay the creation of HQ Allied Air Forces Central Europe, which would facilitate a much more flexible use of air assets.

40. Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 1 May 74, JCS 2502/533; JCS 2502/5331, 24 May 74; JCSM-385-74 to SecDef, 17 Oct 74, JCS 2502/533-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Dec 74, JCS 2502/533-3; JMF 806/520 (4 Feb 74). Units selected were the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 36th Marine Amphibious Unit.

41. A SAGA study done during 1975 estimated that in FY 1980, with 23 days of warning, 24 brigades could reach Europe by D-Day when fighting began, 52 brigades by D+30. The Joint Chiefs of Staff commented that these conclusions “must be applied cautiously,” since much would depend upon what actions US allies took and against what targets the Soviets used their submarines. SAGA, “A Study of the Capabilities of the United States to Reinforce NATO Europe,” Jul 75, JMF 806/520 (4 Feb 74) sec. 2A. JCSM-349-75 to SecDef, 3 Sep 75, same file, sec. 2.

42. Memo, PDASD(ISA) to DJS, 18 Sep 75, JCS 2502/718; JCSM-364-75 to SecDef, 22 Sep 75, JCS 2502/718-1; JMF 806/374 (18 Sep 75).

43. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 7 Oct 75, JCS 2502/725; JCSM-390-75 to SecDef, 30 Oct 75, JCS 2502/725-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 25 Nov 75, JCS 2502/725-2; JMF 806/374 (7 Oct 75). Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 161115ZMar 76; JCSM-116-75 to SecDef, 1 Apr 76, JCS 2502/784-1; JMF 806/374 (5 Mar 76).

44. JCS 2502/751, 2 Dec 75; JCSM-424-75 to SecDef, 8 Dec 75, JCS 2502/751; JMF 806/372 (2 Dec 75).

45. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 29 Dec 75, CJCS 808 SACEUR. Ellsworth spoke of “going along with Haig’s idea” about earmarking the airborne units “as a first step in constituting the new Corps for AFCENT Reserve.” He was wrong; General Haig wanted to use the 1st Cavalry Division for that purpose.

46. Msg, SACEUR to JCS, 101425Z Oct 75, JCS 808 SACEUR. J-3 SM-335-75 to OpsDeps, 25 Nov 75; JMF 806/292 (2 Feb 76). DJSM-2066-75 to CJCS, 15 Dec 75; Memo, CJCS to DepSecDef Ellsworth, 23 Dec 75; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 29 Dec 75; Memo, CJCS to DJS, 10 Jan 76; CJCS 808 SACEUR. JCSM-37-76 to SecDef, 11 Feb 76, JCS 2502/771; Memo, SecDef to ATP(NSA), 27 Apr 76, JCS 2502/771-1; Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef, 17 May 76, JCS 2502/771-2; JMF 806/292 (2 Feb 76). JCSM-208-76 to SecDef, 9 Jun 76, JCS 2502/787-2, JMF 806 (1 Apr 76). In 1974, tank shortages led to substituting the 9th Division for an armored division and listing it as “Other Forces for NATO,” so earmarking the 9th Division for the SSR instead could be done at no real cost.


48. Msg, USNMR to JCS and SecDef, 301815Z May 75; CM-461-76 to SecDef, 3 Jun 75; CJCS 044 USCINCEUR/USEUCOM. JCSM-340-75 to SecDef, 21 Aug 75, JCS 2147/578-1, JMF 376 (25 Jun 75).
Notes to Pages 112–118

49. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 21 Nov 75, JCS 2502/655-7; JCSM-414-75 to SecDef, 25 Nov 75, JCS 2502/655-9; JMF 806 (1 Apr 75) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 19 Jul 76, JCS 2502/787-5, same file, sec. 2.

50. Msg, USNATO 6023 to SecState et al., 6 Nov 75, CJCS 808 SACEUR.

51. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 12 Feb 73, JCS 2502/333; JCSM-264-73 to SecDef, 18 Jun 73, JCS 2502/333-2; JMF 806/323 (12 Feb 73) sec. 1. SAGA, “Air Battle,” Vol. 1, Jun 76, same file, sec. 1A. JCSM-333-76 to SecDef, 20 Sep 76, JCS 2502/333-6, same file, sec. 1.

52. A JCS briefer had told the Panel that the Pact needed 96 hours to complete an accelerated mobilization and predicted that such a mobilization would be detected 24 to 48 hours after it began. JCS 2502/464-5, 25 Jul 75, JMF 806/530 (13 Feb 73) sec. 2. “Final Report of the Ad Hoc Panel: Review of the Status of NATO Force Improvement,” Apr 76, Att to Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef, 17 May 76, JCS 2502/814, JMF 806/372 (17 May 76).


54. JCSM-152-73 to SecDef, 6 Apr 73, JCS 2482/195, JMF 757 (15 Mar 73) sec. 1.


58. CNOM-45-73 to JCS, 22 Mar 73, JCS 2482/192, JMF 757 (22 Mar 73).

59. CSAM-24-73 to JCS, 23 Mar 73, JCS 2482/192-1, JMF 757 (22 Mar 73).

60. JCSM-124-73 to SecDef, 27 Mar 73, JCS 2482/192-2, JMF 757 (22 Mar 73).

61. TP, Actg ASD(ISA) and DJJS for SecDef and CJCS (NSC Mtg, 12 Apr 73), MFR, n.d., JCS 2482/196, JMF 757 (15 Mar 73) sec. 5.


63. JCSM-175-73 to SecDef, 24 Apr 73, JCS 2482/197, JMF 757 (15 Mar 73) sec. 2.


66. JCSM-328-3 to SecDef, 24 Jul 73, JCS 2482/207; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 30 Jul 73, JCS 2482/207-1; JMF 757 (24 Jul 73).


69. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 22 Aug 73, JCS 2482/209; JCSM-399-73 to SecDef, 10 Sep 73, JCS 2482/209-1; JMF 757 (22 Aug 73) sec. 1. Memo, VADM Weinel to CJCS, “MBFR: US Reduction Alternatives,” 19 Sep 73; Moorer Diary. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 Oct 73, JCS 2482/209-2; JCSM-452-73 to SecDef, 18 Oct 73, JCS 2482/209-3; JCSM-489-73 to SecDef, 7 Nov 73, JCS 2482/209-6; JMF 757 (22 Aug 73) sec. 1. Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to DJJS, 11 Feb 74, JCS 2482/209-8; same file, sec. 2. In 1975, after the Nunn Amendment compelled the removal of some support units, the
JCS approved for planning purposes a combat-heavy package. JCS 2482/300, 14 Nov 75, JMF 757 (21 Oct 75).

70. In January 1974, President Nixon approved tabling Phase I, discussing specific language linking Phase I with Phase II, and advising the Soviets to assume that West German forces would be included within a common ceiling. However, any sub-ceilings in Phases I and II would apply solely to US and Soviet forces, and a commitment to German reductions would require a Soviet commitment to accept a common ceiling as the outcome of Phase II. Foreign Relations: 1969-1976, Vol. XXXIX, pp. 1011-1012.

71. JCSM-370-74 to SecDef, 6 Sep 74, JCS 2482/261, JMF 757 (25 Apr 74) sec. 1. The JCS opposed explicit service sub-ceilings, so that air/ground ratios could accommodate changes in force structuring and technological developments. JCS 2482/262-1, same file, sec. 2.

72. JCSM-374-74 to SecDef, 11 Sep 74, JCS 2458/258-1, JMF 757 (21 Aug 74).

73. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 20 Sep 74, JCS 2482/258-2, JMF 757 (21 Aug 74).

74. JCSM-412-74 to SecDef, 15 Oct 74, JCS 2482/258-3, JMF 757 (21 Aug 74).

75. Memo, PDASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 Jul 74, JCS 2482/254; JCSM-416-74 to SecDef, 18 Oct 74, JCS 2482/254-1; JMF 757 (15 Apr 74).


77. General Brown, as noted above, persuaded the service chiefs to support a reduction by 2,000 of the 7,000 warheads in Europe; Schlesinger said that putting nuclear elements into Option 3 “permits us to remove an albatross from our necks.” Foreign Relations: 1969-1976, Vol. XXXIX, p. 1017.


Chapter 7. NATO’s Southern Flank


2. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 192.


5. JCSM-89-74 to SecDef, 19 Mar 74, JCS 1704/195-3; Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 22 Apr 74, with DepSecDef approval, 2 May 74, JCS 1704/195-4; JMF 970/495 (26 Dec 73) sec. 3.


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10. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 16 Sep 74, JCS 2502/586; DJSM-1742-74 to ASD(ISA), 4 Dec 74, N/H of JCS 2502/586, 27 Feb 75; JMF 954/470 (8 Dec 74).

11. NY Times, 9 Jan 73, p. 6. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 31 Dec 72, JCS 2445/40; Memo, SecNav to SecDef, 13 Feb 74, JCS 2445/41; JMF 954/479 (11 Jun 73). Memo, VCNO(P&P) to DJS, 22 Aug 74, JCS 2445/43, JMF 954/378 (22 Aug 74).


14. JCS 1704/200, 21 Feb 75, JMF 970/470 (21 Feb 75). Memo, DepDir, DIA to DJS, “Assessment of Turkish Armed Forces Degradation,” 31 Jul 75, CJCS 820 Turkey. But DIA also concluded that the suspension was not hurting Turkish armed forces as badly as the Agency had anticipated.


18. JCSM-278-75 to SecDef, 30 Jun 75, JCS 2502/655-1, JMF 806 (19 Mar 75) sec. 1. JCSM-401-75 to SecDef, 10 Nov 75, JCS 2502/655-5, same file, sec. 2. Memo, CJCS to DepSecDef, “Mediterranean . . . Commitment,” 26 Nov 75, same file, sec. 3.


21. DJSM-832-73 to ASD(ISA), 17 May 73, JCS 1821/247-1; NSSM 179 to SecDef et al., 9 Apr 73, JCS 1821/247; JMF 967/530 (9 Apr 73). DJSM-832-73 became part of the Report cited in the next footnote.


26. NSDM 268 to SecDef et al., 10 Sep 74, JMF 967/532 (3 May 75).

27. Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 Nov 74, JCS 1821/256; JCSM-457-74 to SecDef, 30 Nov 74, JCS 1821/256-1; JMF 967/532 (20 Feb 74).

28. CM-314-75 to JCS, 21 Mar 75; Memo, CNO to CJCS, “Spanish Base Negotiations,” 25 Mar 75; Memo, CSAF to CJCS, same subj., 1 Apr 75; Memo, ActgCMC to CJCS, same subj., 11 Apr 75; Memo, CSA to CJCS, same subj., 14 Apr 75; CJCS 820 Spain. Ltr, Ambassador McCloskey to ASD(ISA), 21 Apr 75. Tab B to Bfg Sheet for CJCS, “JCS 1821/259-2,” 22 May 75; JCSM-213-75 to SecDef, 23 May 75, JCS 1821/259-2; JMF 967/532 (3 May 75).
29. JCSM-183-75 to SecDef, 8 May 75, JCS 1821/258, JMF 967/532 (3 May 75).

30. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 15 May 75, JMF 967/532 (3 May 75). USEUCOM Historical Report: 1975, pp. 181-182. CM-389-75 to SecDef, 7 May 75; Msg, USDELMC to JCS, 161552Z Jul 75; CJCS 820 Spain.

31. Memo, ActgSecState to ATP(NSA), 23 May 75, JCS 1821/259-3; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 11 Jun 75, JCS 1821/259-4; JMF 967/532 (3 May 75). Memo, ATP(NSA) to DepSecState, “US-Spanish Base Negotiations,” 12 Jun 75, JMF 001 (CY 1975) NSDMs.

32. Msgs, Madrid 4591 and 4592 to SecState, 2 Jul 75; DJSM-1239-75 to Dir, J-5, 18 Jul 75, JCS 1821/259-5; CSAFM-161-75 to JCS, 31 Jul 75, JCS 1821/259-6; JCSM-324-75 to SecDef, 13 Aug 75, JCS 1821/259-7; JMF 967/532 (3 May 75). JCSM-324 was sent to US negotiators via Ltr, ASD(ISA) to Ambassador McCloskey, 14 Aug 75, same file.

33. Ltr, JCS 10016 to USCINCEUR, 12 Sep 75, CJCS 820 Spain.

34. The JCS originally recommended moving these tankers to Rota but later selected Zaragoza for operational reasons. JCSM-451-75 to SecDef, 31 Dec 75, JCS 1821/262-1; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to Ambassador McCloskey, 7 Jan 76, JCS 1821/262-2; JMF 967/472 (2 Sep 75).

35. JCSM-351-75 to SecDef, 5 Sep 75, JCS 1821/260; Ltr, ASD(ISA) to Ambassador McCloskey, 8 Sep 75; JMF 967/472 (2 Sep 75).


37. Memo, DASD(ISA) to R. I. Spiers, 30 Mar 70, JCS 2125/30-3; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 Aug 69, JCS 2125/30; JCSM-587-69 to SecDef, 25 Sep 69, JCS 2125/30-1; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 16 Jul 70; JMF 964/472 (28 Aug 69). Subsequently, the JCS estimated relocation costs at $2.7 million, increased annual operating costs elsewhere at $1.6 million. JCSM-90-70 to SecDef, 5 Mar 70, JCS 2125/30-2, same file. They provided technical data about the Azores’ importance for various functions via JCSM-495-70 to SecDef, 23 Oct 70, JCS 2125/30-6, same file. Memo, R. I. Spiers to SecState, 15 Nov 71, JCS 2408/12; Pres Determination 72-9, 23 Dec 71, JCS 2408/12; JMF 964/499 (15 Nov 71).

38. Chapter 10 describes the airlift.

39. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 520.

40. NSSM 189 to SecDef et al., 14 Nov 73, JCS 2125/35; Draft Memo, NSC USecysCmte to Pres, 5 Mar 74, JCS 2125/35-2; Memo, DepSecDef to Chmn, NSC USecysCmte, 13 Mar 74, JCS 2125/35-3; Memo, Chmn, NSC USecysCmte to Pres, 21 Mar 74, JCS 2125/35-4; JMF 964/533 (6 Jun 73) sec. 1.

41. Memo, Ambassador McCloskey to Alan Lukens, 7 Oct 74, JCS 2125/36; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 12 Oct 74, JCS 2125/36; JCSM-423-74 to SecDef, 25 Oct 74, JCS 2125/36-1; JMF 964/530 (12 Oct 74).

42. JCSM-98-76 to SecDef, 19 Mar 76, JCS 2408/16, JMF 964/496 (16 Mar 76).

Chapter 8. Nearing a Panama Canal Treaty


3. Ltr, Ambassador Anderson to President, 12 Mar 73, JCS 1778/226, JMF 933 (12 Mar 73).


5. Memo, Chmn, USecysCmte to Pres, 20 Mar 73, JCS 1778/226; Memo, Chmn, USecysCmte to AsstSecState(ARA), 14 May 73, JCS 1778/226-1; JMF 933 (12 Mar 73). Draft Memo, Chmn,
UsecysCmte to Pres, “Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations,” n.d., Att to Memo, Staff Dir, UsecysCmte to CJCS et al., 5 Sep 73, JCS 1778/227-2; JMF 933/533 (23 Jul 73). TP for DepSecDef, CJCS, and UsecArmy at USC Mtg, 4 Oct 73, Att to CM-2928-73 to ASD (ISA), 5 Oct 73, CJCS 091 Panama.

6. Msg, Panama 6482 to SecState, 2 Dec 73, JMF 933 (2 May 73).


8. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 8 Jan 74, JCS 1778/232; JCSM-46-74 to SecDef, 13 Feb 74, JCS 1778/232-2; JMF 933 (8 Jan 74). In October 1975, the JCS drafted a very brief, unclassified version for release to Senator Ernest F. Hollings (D, SC). MJCS-361-75 to ASD(ISA), 17 Oct 75, JCS 1778/241, same file.


10. CNOM-134-74 to JCS, 20 May 74, JCS 1778/234; JCSM-272-74 to SecDef, 28 Jun 74, JCS 1778/234-1; JMF 933/533 (7 Feb 74). Admiral Zumwalt tried, and failed, to have JCSM-272 contain language about retaining US control “in perpetuity” and exercising “the essential attributes of sovereignty.” CNOM-175-74 to JCS, n.d. [28 Jun 74], same file. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 12 Aug 74, same file. The JCS also provided Secretary Schlesinger with a proposed concept for canal defense. JCSM-326-74 to SecDef, 30 Jul 74, JCS 1778/235, JMF 933 (2 May 74).


12. JCSM-78-75 to SecDef, 27 Feb 75, JCS 1778/238-2; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 27 Feb 75, JCS 1778/238-1; JMF 933/533 (20 Feb 75) sec. 1.


14. Memo, DJS to Asst to CJCS, 3 Apr 75; Draft Memo, CJCS to ASD(ISA), “US-Panama Treaty Negotiations,” n.d., Enclosure A to J5M-602-75, 14 Apr 75, with handwritten comment by DJS, CJCS 820 Panama, Jul 74-Dec 75. The Director was Vice Admiral Harry D. Train, II.

15. Memo, Dep ATP (NSA) to Ambassador Bunker et al., n.d., JCS 1778/238-3; Memo, Ambassador Bunker and Henry Koren to ATP(NSA), 2 May 75, JCS 1778/238-4; JMF 933/533 (20 Feb 75).


18. Memo, DepSecDef to Pres, 20 Jun 75, JCS 1778/238-5, JMF 933/533 (20 Feb 75) sec. 1.


20. General Brown had recommended deleting the words “make efforts to.” DJSM-1349-75 to CJCS, 5 Aug 75, with handwritten notations by Brown, CJCS 820 Panama, Jul 74-Jun 75.

21. Memo, DepSecDef and DepSecState to Pres, “US-Panama Treaty Negotiations,” 7 Aug 75, Att to DJSM-1362-75 to CJCS 7 Aug 75, with handwritten note by Colonel Bunnell, CJCS 820 Panama, Jul 74-Jun 75. Extracts of NSDM 302, 18 Aug 75, Attachment to Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 20 Aug 75, JMF 001 (CY 1975). The Clements-Ingersoll draft had recommended that US negotiators begin by repeating the existing offer on land and waters. Then, if no agreement resulted, they should seek further instructions.
22. Draft Msg, AsstSecState W.D. Rogers to Panama, “Secretary Clements’ and General Brown’s Meeting with General Torrijos,” CJCS 820 Panama. In his *Panama Odyssey* (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1984), pp. 292-294, Ambassador Jorden quotes General Brown as telling Torrijos that “you have my word as a soldier that we will work for a fair and just treaty.”

23. JCS 1778/239, 11 Sep 75, and 12 Sep 75, JMF 933/533 (20 Feb 75) sec. 1. In November, State and Defense agreed to establish a new position of Deputy Negotiator chosen from the Defense Department. The man selected was Lieutenant General Welborn A. Dolvin, USA (Ret.). General Brown had first recommended MG George S. Beatty, USA (Ret.), a recent Commandant of the Inter-American Defense College. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 6 Nov 75, JCS 1778/242, same file. Memo, CJCS to DepSecDef, 15 Aug 75, CJCS 820 Panama, Jul 74-Jun 75. Back in 1971, Ambassador Anderson had adamantly and successfully opposed adding a military representative to the negotiating team. *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: 1969-1972*, p. 151.

24. There were about 9,500 US military personnel in the Canal Zone. US commanders estimated that, if small guerrilla units attempted infiltration, 6,000 to 8,000 reinforcements would be required. A threat from well-trained guerrillas, joined by terrorist gangs and backed by the Panamanian National Guard, would require 30,000 to 36,000 reinforcements. To cope with the worst case, a three-division force of 100,000 would have to be committed. Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, p. 322.

25. Ltr, Senator Thurmond to CJCS, 11 Sep 75; Ltr, CJCS to Senator Thurmond, 29 Sep 75, JMF 933/533 (20 Feb 75) sec. 1.


27. JCS 1778/243-1, 19 Mar 76; DJSM-788-76 to CINCLANT, CINCEUR, CINCPAC, CINCSOUTH and CINCRE, 30 Apr 76, JCS 1778/243-1, JMF 933/520 (19 Feb 76). JCS records in 1976 do not contain any replies from the unified commanders.

28. DJSM-1908-76 to CJCS, 11 Nov 76; Memo, LTG Dolvin to CJCS et al., “October 1976 Negotiating Round, Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations,” 27 Oct 76; CJCS 820 Panama, 1 Jan 76-31 May 77.

**Chapter 9. Africa**


7. Entry for 10 Nov 73; MFR by CJCS (M-29-74), “Call by ADM H. H. Bierman, Chief of the Defense Staff, South Africa,” 8 May 74; TelCon, CJCS with Senator John Tower, 9 May 74; Moorer Diary.


10. TP, ASD(ISA) and DJS for DepSecDef and CJCS for Meeting of NSC, 27 Jun 75, JCS 2515-3, same file, sec. 2.

11. The 40 Committee, so named in 1970 after NSDM 40, approved or rejected covert actions. Its members included the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (chairman), the Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS.


14. The Redeye was a shoulder-fired anti-tank missile, similar to the Soviet-made SA-7. The TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) was an anti-tank missile fired from a vehicle.


16. That amount could be provided through reprogramming, allowing amounts less than $50 million to be switched from one account to another within a department’s overall budget, conditioned on approval by the chairmen of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.


19. Memo, ATP(NSA) to President, n.d.; Memo, Acting ASD(ISA) to SecDef, “Angolan Policy Options,” 8 Jan 76, CJCS 820 Angola.

20. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 367. Memo, Acting ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 13 Jan 76, CJCS 820 Angola.


22. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 831.

23. Mobutu had changed “Congo” to “Zaire” as part of his policy of “authenticity.” In 1997, after Mobutu’s ouster, Zaire reverted to Congo.


25. JCSM-136-75 to SecDef, 18 Apr 75, JCS 2262/177-2, JMF 892/495 (24 Mar 75) sec. 2.


29. They were referring to Soviet failure in the Congo during 1960-61. This is described in The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: 1961-1964, Vol. VIII, pp. 256-258.
30. JCSM-359-76 to SecDef, 14 Oct 76, JCS 2262/178-2, JMF 892/496 (17 Jun 76) sec. 1.
31. Ltr. DepSecDef to DepSecState, 17 Apr 73, JCS 2469/998-8, JMF 832/630 (26 Oct 72) sec. 2.
32. Memo, DepSecDef to President, 5 May 75, JCS 2469/998-9, JMF 832/630 (26 Oct 72) sec. 2.
34. Memo, CNO thru JCS to SecDef, “Ethiopia,” 29 Mar 74, JCS 091 Ethiopia.
35. Memo, CNO thru JCS to SecDef, “Ethiopia,” 29 Apr 74, with covering notes by Colonel Bunnell and VADM Weinel, CJCJ 091 Ethiopia. Admiral Weinel wrote “disposed” when, presumably, he meant “deposed.”
36. Foreign Relations: 1969-1976, Vol. E-6, Doc. 108. Memo, Dr. Kissinger to DepSecDef and DepSecState, 27 Apr 74, JCS 2449/24; Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to MG Wickham et al., 6 Jun 74, JCS 2449/21-1; Memo, MG Wickham to MG Scowcroft, 16 Jul 74, JCS 2449/24-2; JMF 832/495 (27 Apr 74).
41. Message, NSA to JCS, 6 Feb 75, JCS IN 30370; Memo, ASD(ISA) to DJS, 8 Feb 75; JCSM-56-75 to SecDef, 12 Feb 75, JCS 2449/27-1; JMF 832/630 (8 Feb 75).
42. Letter, George S. Vest to ASD(ISA), 30 Jun 75, JCS 2449/31; Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 22 Jul 75, JCS 2449/31; JCSM-323-75 to SecDef, 8 Aug 75, JCS 2449/31-1; JMF 832/403 (22 Jul 75).
43. Memo, ASD(ISA) to DJS, 15 Sep 75, JCS 2449/31-2; JCSM-360-75 to SecDef, 18 Sep 75, JCS 2449/31-2; JMF 832/403 (22 Jul 75). The two Americans were released on 9 January 1976.
44. NSSM 233, 23 Oct 75, JCS 2449/32; “NSSM 233 Study,” 11 Nov 75, Attached to Memo, Staff Sec, NSC to ActgSecDef et al., 17 Nov 75, JCS 2449/32-1; JMF 832/475 (23 Oct 75).
45. Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 4 Dec 75, JCS 2449/32-2; Memos, Staff Sec, NSC to CJCS et al., 3 Feb and 1 Mar 76, JCS 2449/32-3 and 32-4; JMF 832/472 (23 Oct 75). NSSM 233 and the SRG meeting are printed in Foreign Relations: 1969-1976, Vol. E-6, Docs. 150, 154 and 156.
46. JCSM-401-76 to SecDef, 6 Dec 76, JCS 2449/31-5; Letter, SecDef to SecState, 23 Dec 76, JCS 2449/31-6; JCSM-63-77 to SecDef, 2 Mar 77, JCS 2449/31-9; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 15 Apr 77, JCS 2449/31-13; JMF 832/403 (22 Jul 75). United States European Command 1977 Historical Report, p. 218.
47. NSSM 248, 13 Nov 76, JCS 2449/34; “US Policy Toward Ethiopia,” Dec 76, Attached to Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to CJCS et al., 11 Dec 76, JCS 2449/34-1; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 16 Dec 76; JMF 832/532 (13 Nov 76).
48. CSAM-17-74 to JCS, JCS 2121/224, JMF 837/531 (22 Jan 74).
50. SM-356-75 to CSA et al., 27 Jun 75, JCS 1259/758-43; JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec. 11. If directed, Readiness Command would provide the plans, headquarters and forces to carry out contingency operations.
Chapter 10. US-Israel Alignment


5. The time in the war zone was six hours later than the time in Washington. Hereafter, only Washington times are used.


8. According to the METG Draft Log, the Israelis listed their first requirements as including light antitank weapons (LAWS), cluster bombs, 105-mm and 175-mm artillery ammunition, and TPS-43 radar. In November, a US Military Equipment Validation Team calculated Israel’s total tank losses at 369, so presumably most of the tanks that broke down en route to the battlefield were recovered and repaired.


11. Msgs, JCS 7129 and 7396 to CINCLANT, 111833Z and 112203Z Oct 73. Worry that Americans might have to be evacuated or rescued from Libya lay behind the Iwo Jima’s sailing.

12. METG Draft Log, 11 Oct 73. Four F-4s flew directly from West Germany to Italy, but on 17 October Bonn’s concern apparently led Washington to cancel further movement.

13. TelCons, CJCS with CNO and DepSecDef, 11 Oct 73; MFR by Col. Bunnell, “Visit of Israeli Military Attaché,” 11 Oct 73, Moorer Diary.

14. METG Draft Log, 12 Oct 73.

15. Concurrently, Senator Jackson told Deputy Secretary Clements that Israel should be given 50 F-4s, 50 A-4s, 100 tanks (including 65 M-60s) and 10 C-130s. In his diary, Admiral Moorer
wrote, “That’s wild.” But he added in a later notation, “It turns out that this was not so wild. It is about what we are doing.” Entry for 12 Oct 73, Moorer Diary.

16. Perhaps the Israelis were not greatly exaggerating. A US Military Equipment Validation Team, visiting Israel early in November, reported that the Israelis at that point had only a five-day supply of ammunition, with virtually nothing left for their artillery.


29. After firing Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox, the President faced a veritable firestorm of public outrage.


32. MFR, “Meeting with Admiral Moorer on 17 March 1975 Concerning the 1973 Arab-Israeli War,” 21 Mar 75, CJCS 820 Middle East (1 Jan-30 Jun 75).


37. The Joint Staff’s METF was dissolved on 13 November, but OSD’s METG survived. DJSM-1861-73 to Dir, J-3 et al., 13 Nov 73, JMF 898/532 (18 Jun 73).


41. The Israelis claimed that 495 tanks had been destroyed 326 more damaged.

42. J-4 DM-578-73 to DJS, 18 Dec 73, CJCS 091 Israel. CSAM-82-73 to JCS 17 Oct 73, JCS 2369/47; SM-488-73 to Dir, DIA, 26 Oct 73, JCS 2369/47; JMF 889/432 (17 Oct 73). JCSM-470-73 to SecDef, 26 Oct 73, JCS 2369/49; USMETVI, Trip Report, Nov 73, Att to Memo, MG Casey to CJCS, 16 Nov 73, JCS 2369/49-2; JMF 889/432 (26 Oct 73).


44. Foreign Relations: 1969-1976, Vol. XXV, pp. 1032-1033. MemCon, “Meeting with Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan,” 7 Dec 73; Memo, by Col. Bunnell, 12 Dec 73, Att to J-4 DM-56973; Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to DepSecDef, 6 Dec 73, with handwritten DepSecDef approvals dated 11 Dec 73; CJCS 091 Israel. Schlesinger gave Dayan a verbal commitment for 150 tanks; Clements formally approved 150 to 200. Soon afterward, Kissinger insisted that Israel get 200. The US Army argued that diversions would hinder its modernization of reserve units and seriously degrade readiness to fight in Europe. J-4 DM-578-73 to DJS, 18 Dec 73; Memo, Col. Bunnell to BG Beckner, “Military Equipment for Israel, 26 Dec 73; CJCS 091 Israel.

45. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, chap. 17.

46. NY Times, 27 Dec 73, p. 14. J-4 DM-15-74 to DJS, 9 Jan 74; Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to DepSecDef, “Additional Support for Israel,” 6 Feb 74, with handwritten DepSecDef approval dated 11 Feb 74; CJCS 091 Israel.

47. Memo, DCI to CJCS, “Disengagement Violation Detected by SR-71 BUSY PILOT Missions,” 7 Mar 74; Memo, SecState to DCI, “Aerial Reconnaissance of Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement,” 11 Mar 74; Msg, JCS 5953 to CINCSAC, 182313Z Apr 74; CJCS 091 Middle East.

48. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 935.

49. Atts to J-4 DM-158-74 to DJS, 29 Mar 74; “Summary of Meeting with Israeli Defense Officials,” Atts to J-4 DM-163-74 to DJS, 1 Apr 74; Memo, CSA to SecDef, “Material for Israel,” 1 Apr 74; “Summary of Meeting with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 011815 April 1974,” Encl to J-4 DM-169-74 to DJS, 2 Apr 74; CJCS 091 Israel.

50. CM-3178-74 to SecDef, 4 Apr 74, CJCS 091 Israel. Pres. Determination No. 74-17 to SecState and SecDef, 2 Apr 74, JCS 2369/54, JMF 889/495 (23 Apr 74).

51. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1032-1110. Memos, MG Sumner to General Scowcroft, “Israeli Requirements,” 21 and 23 May 74; DJSM-741-74 to CJCS, 28 May 74, with covering memo
by Col. Bunnell; CJCS 091 Israel. J-3 M-1145-74 to CJCS, 27 Jun 74; Msg, JCS 8174 to CINSAC et al., 4 Jul 74, CJCS 820 Middle East (1 Jul-31 Dec 74).

52. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1137. Memo, ASD(ISA) to DepSecDef, “Additional Support for Israel,” 7 Aug 74, with handwritten DepSecDef approval dated 16 Aug 74, OASD(ISA) Files.

53. SM-535-74 to SecDef et al., 24 Oct 74, JCS 1920/26, JMF 512 (30 Sep 74).


55. JCSM-349-74 to SecDef, 16 Aug 74, JCS 2369/57, JMF 889/499 (13 Aug 74). TP, ASD(ISA) and DJS to SecDef and CJCS for NSC Mtg on 6 Sep 74, JCS 2369/56-3, same file.

56. “Israeli Future Military Requirements,” Att to Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to DepSecDef et al., 27 Aug 74, JCS 2369/56-1; TP, ASD(ISA) and DJS to DepSecDef and CJCS for SRG Mtg on 30 Aug 74, JCS 2369/56-1; JMF 889/499 (13 Aug 74).

57. OASD(ISA), “Urgent List Options,” n.d., JCS 2369/56-2; TP, ASD(ISA) and DJS to DepSecDef and CJCS for NSC Mtg on 6 Sep 74, JCS 2369/56-3; JMF 889/499 (13 Aug 74).


59. CM-126-74 to SecDef, 5 Nov 74; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., “DOD Activities Related to the Middle East,” 18 Nov 74, CJCS 820 Middle East.

60. Washington Post, 13 and 14 Nov 74.

61. In response to his remarks at Duke, General Brown received from private citizens thousands of letters, mailgrams and postcards that fill three boxes of his Chairman’s File. Perhaps surprisingly, a majority praised him for “telling the truth.”


63. Memo, DJS to Dir, J-5, “Strategic Appraisal of Israel,” 22 Nov 74, JMF 889/499 (13 Aug 74). “Strategic Appraisal of Middle East,” Att to Memo, DJS to Asst. to CJCS, 25 Feb 75, CJCS 820 Middle East. This document is only a summary; the full report is not in the file.

64. Memo, DCI to CJCS, “Olive Harvest Reconnaissance Program,” 5 Dec 74; DJSM-1780-74 to CJCS, 10 Dec 74, with handwritten comment by LTG Pauly; Ltr, CJCS to DCI, 20 Dec 74; CJCS 820 Middle East (1 Jul-31 Dec 74).


66. NY Times, 22 May 75, p. 1.

67. Ford, A Time To Heal, p. 308.

68. “Memorandum of Agreement Between the Governments of Israel and the United States,” 1 Sep 75, JMF 889/460 (17 Dec 76).

70. *NY Times*, 16 Sep 75, p. 1; 20 Sep 75, p. 1.

71. Ltr, USecState to ASD(ISA), 12 Sep 75, CJCS 820 Israel. NSSM 231 to SecDef et al., 7 Oct 75, JCS 2369/66; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 23 Oct 75, JCS 2369/66-1; JMF 889/499 (7 Oct 75) sec. 1.

72. By this time, the war scare had diminished.

73. JCSTM-399-75 to SecDef, 6 Nov 75, JCS 2369/66-2, JMF 889/499 (7 Oct 75) sec. 1.

74. Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to SecDef et al., 10 Nov 75, JCS 2369/66-3, JMF 889/499 (7 Oct 75) sec. 2.

75. TP, ASD(ISA) and DJS to SecDef and CJCS, “Israeli Military Requests (NSSM 231),” 13 Jan 76, JCS 820 Israel. J-5 Supplemental Paper for NSC Mtg on 13 Jan 76, J-5 Files.


77. J-4 DM-248-76 to DJS, 17 May 76, JCS 820 Israel.


79. Much later, President Ford wrote that General Brown “had performed extremely well overall so it was logical that I submit his name for a second term. . . . As I recollect, there were no other individuals considered for the appointment.” Ltr, Pres Ford to W. S. Poole, 26 Mar 92, JHO.


82. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS Rep, METG, 22 Jan 75, JCS 1887/819, JMF 891/323 (22 Jan 75) sec. 1. The JCS were somewhat irritated because in OSD the METG, instead of working through General Brown, directly ordered the Joint Staff to provide personnel and prepare the report. Memo by Col. Bunnell, “Air Defense Analysis Team,” 23 Jan 75, JCS 820 Jordan.

83. JCSTM-79-75 to SecDef, 27 Feb 75, JCS 1887/819-1, JMF 891/323 (22 Jan 75) sec. 1. Saudi Arabia was the obvious source of funding.

84. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 22 Mar 75, JCS 1887/819-2, JMF 891/323 (22 Jan 75) sec. 2.


86. Memo, LTG J. A. Hennessey to CJCS, 31 Jul 74, JCS 1887/813, JMF 865/080 (31 Jul 74). CNOM-7-75 to JCS, 13 Jan 75, JCS 2513/3, JCSM-48-75 to SecDef, 5 Feb 75, JCS 2513/3-1; Memo, ASD(ISA) to DJS, 21 Feb 75, JCS 2513/3-2; JCSM-302-75 to SecDef, 18 Jul 75, JCS 2513/3-4; Memo, ASD(ISA) to DJS, 24 Jul 75, JCS 2513/3-5; JMF 865/495 (13 Jan 75).

87. Memo, CNO to SecDef, “Impact of the Suez Canal Reopening on US Interests,” 15 Nov 73; J-5 BP 3-74, 10 Jan 74; CJCS 091 (Middle East).


Chapter 11. Emergence of Persian Gulf States

1. Msg, CJCS 12724 to CINCPAC, 28 Dec 73, Moorer Diary.
2. NSSM 174 to SecDef et al., 8 Mar 73, JCS 2101/595, JMF 680 (8 Mar 73). OPEC members included all the oil-rich countries of the Middle East, Indonesia and Venezuela. On 18 April 1973, the President sent Congress a special message dealing with energy policy. Among other things, he replaced the tariff on imported oil with a license-fee quota system. The tariff, he argued, had not allowed enough flexibility to deal quickly and efficiently with import requirements. *Public Papers of the Presidents: Nixon*, 1973, pp. 302-319.


5. NSSM 185 to ActgSecDef et al., 5 Jun 73, JCS 2264/46; NSC Ad Hoc Group Rpt, “US Policy Toward Libya,” 6 Jul 73, Att to Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to CJCS et al., 14 Jul 73, JCS 2264/46-1; JMF 842/530 (5 Jun 73).

6. TP, ASD(ISA) and DJS to DepSecDef and CJCS for Mtg of NSC SRG, n.d., JCS 2264/46-2, 6 Aug 73, JMF 842/530 (5 Jun 73). Entry for 14 Aug 73; MFR by VADM Weinel, “SRG, 14 August—Policy Toward Libya,” 14 Aug 73, Moorer Diary. Memo, AsstSecState to ATP(NSA), 17 Sep 73, JCS 2264/46-3; CM-69-74 to DepSecDef, 6 Sep 74; JMF 842/530 (5 Jun 73).

7. TelCon, CJCS with CNO, 1635 hours, 17 Aug 73, Moorer Diary

8. On 27 October, Schlesinger spoke to Alexander Haig, the President’s Chief of Staff, about “putting troops in crucial states to get oil.” In mid-November, Schlesinger told the British ambassador that “it was no longer obvious to him that the US could not use force.” *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1969-1976*, Vol. XXXVI (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 2011), pp. 690-691.

9. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., “Petroleum Conservation,” 8 Mar 74, Moorer Diary. CM-3112-74 to SecDef, 6 Feb 74, Moorer Diary, filed under 11 Feb 74.

10. Ltr, Representative Hebert to SecDef, 26 Oct 73, JCS 1741/197; JCSM-483-73 to SecDef, 5 Nov 73, JCS 1741/197-1; JCS 1741/197-2, 6 Dec 73; JCSM-516-73 to SecDef, 7 Dec 73, JCS 1741/197-2; JCSM-574-73 to SecDef, 13 Dec 73, JCS 1741/197-4; JMF 452 (25 Oct 73).

11. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 17 Nov 73, JCS 1741/200, JMF 452 (19 May 73) sec. 1. JCSM-415-74 to SecDef, 18 Oct 74, JCS 1741/200-6; Memo, ASD(I&L) to CJCS, 6 Nov 74, JCS 1741-200-7; same file, sec. 2.

12. NSDM 203, 6 Feb 73, JMF 001 (CY 1973) NSDMs. CM-2674-73 to SecDef, 30 Apr 73, JCS 626/75-1; JCSM-259-73 to SecDef, 15 Jun 73, JCS 626/75-5; JMF 416 (12 Apr 73). JCSM-25-74 to SecDef, 4 Feb 74, JCS 626/78; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 26 Feb 74, JCS 626/78-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 30 Oct 74, JCS 626/82; JCSM-468-74 to SecDef, 10 Dec 74, JCS 626/82-1; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 28 Mar 75, JCS 626/82-2; JMF 419 (21 Jan 74).


15. MFR by CJCS (M-25-74). “Visit to Tehran, Iran; Bahrain, and Kuwait during the period 5-16 April 1974,” 16 Apr 74; MFR by CJCS, “Audience with His Highness the Amir . . . on 14 April 1974,” 22 Apr 74; Moorer Diary.
16. Memo, ASD(ISA) to DJS, 9 May 75, JCS 1887/822; MJCS-229-75 to ASD(ISA), 27 Jun 75, Att to 1st N/H of JCS 1887/822, 2 Jul 75; JMF 898 (9 May 75). JCS views were sent to State via Ltr, DASD(ISA) to DepAsstSecState, 14 Jul 75, JCS 1887/822-1, same file.

17. Australians were building a naval base at Cockburn Sound, south of Fremantle.

18. Entry for 17 Dec 73, Moorer Diary. JCSM-28-74 to SecDef, 1 Feb 74, JCS 1887/804; JCSM-31-74 to SecDef, 7 Feb 74, JCS 1887/804-1; JMF 898/472 (24 Jan 74). The response to NSSM 196, described in chap. 2, addressed the force planning aspects of this issue.


20. MFR by CJCS (M-93-74[sic]), “Discussions with Lord Carrington . . . on the Subject of Bases in the Indian Ocean,” 8 Nov 73, Moorer Diary, filed under 6 Nov 73.

21. Entry for 8 Nov 73, Moorer Diary. Msg, Tehran 7860 to SecState, 8 Nov 73, CJCS 091 Iran. Msg, JCS 89941 to CINCPAC, 10 Nov 73, Moorer Diary.

22. CSAFM-6-74 to JCS, 9 Jan 74, JCS 2294/79-2; CSAFM-24-74 to JCS, 25 Jan 74, JCS 2294/79-3; Note to Control Div., “JCS 2294/79-3,” 28 Jan 74; JMF 982/502 (7 Dec 73) sec. 1.

23. Entry for 12 Mar 74; TelCon, CJCS with CINCPAC, 18 Apr 74; Moorer Diary.

24. CSAFM-201-73 to JCS, 7 Dec 74, JCS 2294/79; N/H of JCS 2294/79, 14 Dec 73; JCS 2294/79-1, 8 Jan 74, and Dec On, 9 Jan 74; JCS 982/502 (7 Dec 73) sec. 1.

25. CSAM-10-74 to JCS, 30 Jan 74, JCS 2294/79-4; N/H of JCS 2294/79-4, 31 Jan 74; JMF 982/502 (7 Dec 73) sec. 1.


28. NSSM 199 to SecDef et al., 14 Mar 74, JCS 2449/85; NSC IG Study, “Indian Ocean Strategy,” Att to Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to CJCS et al., 23 May 74, JCS 2449/85-1; Memo, ASD(ISA) and DJS to DepSecDef, n.d.; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 19 Sep 74, JCS 2449/85-4; JMF 982/520 (15 Mar 74).


31. Reportedly, the Soviets were stockpiling cruise missiles with 200 to 700-mile ranges. NY Times, 7 Apr 75, p. 2.

32. Bfg Sheet for CJCS, “JCS 2294/90,” 25 Jul 75; Memo, ASD(ISA) to DJS, “P-3 Operations from Bandar Abbas,” 8 Jul 75; JCSM-311-75 to SecDef, 29 Jul 75, JCS 2294/90; Memo, ASD(ISA) to DJS, 26 Aug 75, JCS 2294/90-1; JMF 887/378 (8 Jul 75). Ltr, ASD(ISA) to USecState, 9 Sep 75, JMF 905/532 (6 Feb 75).

33. Memo, ASD(ISA) to USecState, 9 Sep 75; NSSM 217 to CJCS et al., 6 Feb 75, JCS 2514; NSC IG Study, “Security Policy Toward Oman,” Att to Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to CJCS et al., 6 Mar 75, JCS 2514-1; Memo, SecDef to ATP(NSA), 19 Mar 75, JCS 2514-2; Ltr, USecState to ASD(ISA), 24 Oct 75; JCSM-2-76 to SecDef, 6 Jan 76, JCS 2514-4; JMF 905/532 (6 Feb 75). Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to DJS, 13 Mar 76, JCS 1887/829; JCSM-102-76 to SecDef, 24 Mar 76, JCS 1887/829-1; Memo, DepSecDef to USecState, 18 May 76, JCS 1887/829-2; JMF 975/471 (13 Mar 76). Concurrently, London advised Washington that it leaned toward returning Aldabra, Farquhar, and Ile Des Roches.
Islands to the Seychelles, which became independent in 1976. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were agreeable, provided that Mahe airfield on Seychelle Island became routinely available to US aircraft. JCSM-431-75 to SecDef, 10 Dec 75, JCS 2294/93-1, JMF 975/4771 (24 Nov 75).


35. CINCPAC Command History: 1975, Vol. I, pp. 276-278. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 151842Z Dec 75; Msg, JCS 5590 to CINCPAC, 12 Feb 76; JMF 982/378 (11 Dec 75). Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 182245Z Dec 75; MJCS-8-76 to SecDef, 7 Jan 76, JCS 2294/95; Memo, W. H. Mitchell to VDJS, 14 Jan 76, JCS 2294/95-1; JMF 982/378 (7 Jan 76). JCJM-73-76 to SecDef, 8 Mar 76, JCS 224/98; Memo, ATP(NSA) to DepSecDef, 4 Aug 76, JCS 2294/98-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 31 Aug 76, JCS 2294/98-2; JMF 982/378 (20 Feb 76).

36. Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to CJCS et al., 13 Nov 75, JCS 2294/92; Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to CJCS et al., 7 Apr 76, JCS 2294/92-1; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 15 Apr 76, JCS 2294/92-2; JMF 982/92-2, JMF 982/751 (13 Nov 75). The Navy asked that a senior naval officer be assigned as JCS representative on the interdepartmental working group. Instead, the Director, Joint Staff, appointed an Army colonel who would be assisted by a Navy captain. Memo, DCNO(PPO) to DJS, 26 Nov 75; DJSM-1999-75 to DCNO(PPO), 1 Dec 75; same file.

37. OASD(PA&E), “Allied Defense of Persian Gulf-Indonesian Sea Line of Communication,” Att to Memo, DASD(PA&E) to CJCS et al., 23 Apr 76, JCS 2294/100 JCS 2294/100-1, 9 Jul 76; Bfg Sheet for CJCS, “JCS 2294/100-1,” 12 Jul 76; Note to Actions Mgmt. Div., “JCS 2294/100-1,” 13 Jul 76; J-5 M-1295-76 to PA&E, 23 Jul 76, N/H of JCS 2294/100-1, 17 Aug 76; JMF 982/432 (23 Apr 76).


39. CNOM-97-73 to JCS, 29 May 73; JCSM-376-73 to SecDef, 23 Aug 73, JCS 1714/203-1; Memo, ASD(ISA) to DJS, 4 Oct 73, JCS 1714/203-1; JMF 887/385 (29 May 73).

40. MFR by Col. Bunnell, “Audience with the Shah of Iran, 10 April 1974,” 18 Apr 74; Msg, CARMISH-MAAG Tehran to SecDef, 232231Z Apr 74; TelCon, CJCS with CNO, 24 Apr 74; Moorer Diary. The C-5A purchase never materialized.


43. Memo, SecDef to Chmn, USecysCmte, 3 Dec 74, JCS 1714/210-4; Memo, Staff Dir, USecysCmte to CJCS et al., 3 Jan 75, JCS 1714/210-5; Memo, ATP(NSA) to Chmn, USecysCmte, 8 Feb 75, JCS 1714/210-6; Memo, Staff Dir, USecysCmte to CJCS et al., 6 Mar 75, JCS 1714/210-7; Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 13 Mar 75, JCS 1714/210-8; Memo, Chmn, USecysCmte to Pres, 22 Mar 75, JCS 1714/210-9; JMF 887/415 (10 Oct 74) sec. 2. Memo, ATP(NSA) to Chmn, USecysCmte, 2 May 75, JCS 1714/210-10, same file, sec. 1.
44. Memo, Actg DASD(ISA) to DJS, 1 May 74, Att to JCS 1714/204; JCS 208-74 to SecDef, 5 Jul 74, JCS 1714/204-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Jan 75, JCS 1714/204-2; JMF 887/499 (1 May 74).


51. MJCS-62-73 to SecDef, 27 Feb 73, JCS 2273/509; Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 9 Mar 73, JCS 2273/509-1; JMF 804/075 (27 Feb 73).

52. See chap. 7.

53. JCS 2273/535, 28 Jan 75; JCSM-51-75 to SecDef, 5 Feb 75, JCS 2273/535; Memo, MG Wickham to ACJCS, 3 Apr 75; Memo, PDASD(ISA) to Dir, J-5, “Future US Role in CENTO,” 14 Oct 75; JMF 804/533 (28 Jan 75).

54. See chap. 7.

55. App B to JCS 2273/538, 12 May 75; JCSM-195-75 to SecDef, 19 May 75, JCS 2273/538; JMF 804 (12 May 75).

56. CM-1219-76 to SecDef, 11 Dec 76; CM-1232-76 to SecDef, 30 Dec 76; Memo, SecDef to USecState, 20 Jan 77; CM-1306-77 to SecDef, 15 Feb 77; CJCS 804 CENTO. DOD funds could not be applied to CMCS upgrading, because they were appropriated for military functions in support of US forces. Memo, ASD(Compt.) to ASD(ISA), “CENTO Military Communications System Upgrade,” 11 Apr 77, same file.

57. NSSM 238 to SecDef et al., 13 Feb 76, JCS 1887/828, JMF 898/532 (13 Feb 76) sec. 1. “Executive Summary, NSSM 238: US Policy Toward the Persian Gulf,” 19 Jan 77, JCS 1887/828-3, same file, sec. 2. The Joint Staff had urged, instead, that the Executive Summary be retitled and presented to the Carter administration as a synopsis of current policy and a vehicle for identifying immediate and long-term problems. DJSM-191-77 to ASD(ISA), 17 Jan 77, same file, sec. 2.

58. Entry for 3 Nov 73, Moorer Diary.

Chapter 12. The Far East: Containment Becomes Accommodation

1. This area embraced South Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines and Guam.

2. NSSM 171 to SecDef et al., 13 Feb 73, JCS 2339/363; Draft Rpt, “US Strategy for Asia,” 25 Apr 73, JMF 875/300 (13 Feb 73) sec. 1.

3. This total included 5,000 Air Force personnel in Thailand, a country not included in the four alternatives above.
4. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 16 May 73, JCS 2339/368; JCSM-215-73 to SecDef, 23 May 73; JMF 907/374 (16 May 73).
5. NSDM 230 to SecDef et al., 9 Aug 73, JMF 001 (CY 73).
6. Memo, SecDef to SecNav, 22 Aug 74, JCS 2458/902-6, JMF 557 (25 Feb 74) sec. 4.
7. JCSM-359-75 to SecDef, 18 Sep 75, JCS 2458/937-2, JMF 555 (12 Aug 75).
8. NSDM 235 to SecDef et al., 15 Jan 76, JCS 2339/385, JMF 903/472 (15 Jan 76) sec. 1. Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef et al., 5 Nov 76, pp. 52-53, JCS 2339/385-5, same file, sec. 2.
10. Memo, SecDef to ATP(NSA), “US Forces on Taiwan,” 6 Feb 73, JCS 091 Taiwan.
11. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 7 Mar 73, JCS 1966/194; JCSM-178-73 to SecDef, 26 Apr 73, JCS 1966/194-3; JMF 882/501 (7 Mar 73). Staffing procedures for JCSM-178 were unusual because General Jones argued that this was an Air Force responsibility. He prepared a paper which then was reviewed by the JCS in coordination with CINCPAC. CSAFM-39-73 to CINCPAC to JCS, 16 Mar 73, JCS 1966/194-1, and Dec On, 20 Mar 73; Memo, MG Loving to 2 Apr 73, JCS 1966/194-2; Memo, SecAF to SecDef, 4 May 73, JCS 1966/194-4; Memo, SecDef to CJCS and SecAF, 7 Jul 73, JCS 1966/194-5; Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef, 23 Jul 73, JCS 1966/194-6; same file.
13. CSAFM-98-74 to JCS, 9 Apr 74; CSAM-40-74 to JCS, 16 Apr 74; JCSM-135-74 to SecDef, 18 Apr 74, JCS 1966/196; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 11 May 74, JCS 1966/196-1; Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef, 20 Jun 74, JCS 1966/196-2; JMF 045 (Apr 74).
14. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 18 Oct 74, JCS 1966/200; JCSM-442-74 to SecDef, 9 Nov 74, JCS 1966/200-3; Memo, DepSecDef to Dep ATP(NSA), 20 Nov 74, JCS 1966/200-4; JMF 882/372 (18 Nov 74).
16. JCSM-198-76 to SecDef, 24 May 76, JCS 1966/210; Memo, ASD(ISA) to DJS, 21 May 76, JCS 1966/210-1; JCSM-344-76 to SecDef, 21 Sep 76, JCS 1966/210-2; JMF 882/372 (5 May 76).
17. NSDM 330 to SecDef et al., 20 Sep 76, JMF 001 (CY 1976); JCSM-361-76 to SecDef, 18 Oct 76, JCS 1966/211; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 22 Oct 76, JCS 1966/211-1; Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef et al., 3 Nov 76, JCS 1966/211-2; JMF 882/376 (12 Oct 76).
18. More pessimistically, the Air Force and DIA believed that an initial Chinese attack would be heavy enough to overwhelm Taiwan’s defenses. Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to SecDef et al., “Footnote for Response to NSSM 112,” 14 Jan 75, JMF 882/202 (8 Oct 74).
22. NSSM 154 to SecDef et al., 6 Apr 72, JCS 1776/913, JMF 892/520 (6 Apr 72) sec. 1.
24. Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef and SecState, 18 Jul 73, JCS 1776/913-8, JMF 892/520 (6 Apr 72) sec. 2.


26. These officers were: General Richard Stilwell, USA, Commander, US Forces, Korea; General Donald Bennett, Commander in Chief, US Army, Pacific; and General John W. Vogt, Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces.


28. JCSM-257-74 to SecDef, 20 Jun 74, JCS 1776/942-2; Memo, ASD(ISA) to DJS, 3 Sep 74, JCS 1776/942-3; Joint Secretariat.

29. NSDM 211 to SecDef et al., 8 Oct 74, JCS 1776/945; Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to SecDef et al., 15 Nov 74, JCS 1776/945-1; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 11 Dec 74, JCS 1776/945-2; JMF 892/495 (8 Oct 74). NSDM 282, 9 Jan 75, Ford Library On Line.


31. Bfg Sheet for CJCS, “JCS 1776/931,” 12 Feb 74; JCSM-47-74 to SecDef, 13 Feb 74, JCS 1776/931; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Apr 74, JCS 1776/931-1; JCSM-167-74 to SecDef, 13 May 74, JCS 1776/931-2; JMF 891/932 (28 Nov 73). Msgs, CJCS 5191 to CINCPAC and CINCUNC, 14 May 76, JCS 820 (1 Jul 74-30 Jun 76).

32. JCS 1776/938; JCSM-85-74 to SecDef, 1 May 74, JCS 1776/938-1; JCSM-378-74 to SecDef, 18 Sep 74, JCS 1776/938-3; JMF 892 (16 Feb 74). DJSM-718-75 to CJCS, 24 Apr 75, CJCS 820 Korea (1 Jul 74-30 Jun 76). Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 4 Aug 76, JCS 1776/975; JCSM-184-76 to SecDef, 17 May 76, JCS 1776/979, JMF 892/492 (4 Aug 76).

33. Memo, SecArmy to SecDef, “Visit by the I Corps Group, Korea, Commanding General,” 1 May 75, with notations by Gens. Pauly and Brown, CJCS 820 Korea (1 Jul 74-30 Jun 76).


35. Many senior Army officers resented that Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, had reported to CINCPAC in Hawaii rather than directly to Washington.


37. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 4 Feb 75, JCS 1776/948; Memo, DASD(ISA) to DepDir, DIA, 4 Feb 75, JCS 1776/948-1; JCSM-279-75 to SecDef, 2 Jul 75, JCS 1776/948-2; Record of Action, “Exception to the National Disclosure Policy—Korea,” 2 Apr 76; JMF 892/481 (4 Feb 75).


39. Memo, Actg ASD(PAE) to Dir, DSAA, “ROK Tank Improvement Program,” 22 Apr 76; Memo, DepSecDef to Sec Army, 21 May 76, JCS 1776/970-1; JCSM-193-76 to SecDef, 24 May 76, JCS 1776/970; JMF 892/292 (10 Oct 75) sec. 3. *CINCPAC Command History: 1976*, p. 327.

40. *Annual Historical Report, HQ, UNC, US Forces, Korea, Eighth US Army, 1976*, pp. 9-15. General Stilwell provided an explanation of why the work party was surprised and no...
immediate retaliation made in Msg, CINCUNC to CJCS, KRA 3791, 251141Z Aug 76; Msg, CINCUNC to CJCS, 131357Z Sep 76; CJCS 820 Korea (1 Jul 76-28 Feb 77).

41. In this paragraph, all hours represent Washington time.

42. In Korea, it was the early morning of 21 April.

43. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Docs. 282 and 285. “Chronology of Significant Actions by the JCS/Joint Staff,” Tab B to J-5 BP 33-76, 1 Sep 76, JMF 892/800 (25 Sep 72) sec. 2. Msgs, JCS 2514, 2374 and 3144 to CINCPAC, 19 Aug 76; Msgs, JCS 3135 and 3567 to CINCREDS, 19 Aug 76; Msg, CINCUNC 3665 to Dir, J-5, 191350Z Aug 76; Msg, JCS 4019 and 8940 to CINCUNC, 20 Aug 76; CJCS 820 Korea (1 Jul 76-28 Feb 77). On 21 August, only a few hours after the tree went down, the North Korean government stated its regret that the episode had occurred and urged steps by both sides to ensure against similar incidents in the future.

44. NSSM 190 to SecDef et al., 31 Dec 73, JCS 1776/932; Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to CJCSE et al., 8 Feb 74, JCS 1776/932-2; JMF 892/520 (31 Dec 73) sec. 1. CM-3141-74 to ATP(ASA), 1 Mar 74, JCS 1776/932-5; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(ASA), 7 Mar 74, JCS 1776/932-5; same file, sec. 2. NSDM 251, 29 Mar 74, JMF 001 (CY 1974).


46. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 12 Nov 75, JCS 1776/958, JMF 892/800 (25 Sep 75) sec. 2.

47. JCS 1776/932-8, 2 Aug 74, and Dec On, 6 Aug 74; Revised Bfg Sheet for CJCS, “Revised 1776/956,” 12 Dec 75; JCSM-89-76 to SecDef, 1 Mar 76, JCS 1776/956; JMF 892/800 (25 Sep 75) sec. 1.

48. Memo by Col. Graham re DJSM-1056-76, 15 Jun 76, CJCS 820 Korea (1 Jul 76-28 Feb 77). CM-991-76 to SecDef, 2 Jul 76, and Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 15 Jul 76, JCS 1776/973, JMF 892/800 (25 Sep 75) sec. 2.


50. All times are Eastern Standard Time. Cambodian time was eleven hours ahead.


54. These paragraphs are based on materials in JMF 880/318 (18 May 75) secs. 1A and 1B. Ford, A Time To Heal, pp. 275-284.

55. General David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.), interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, 26 Aug 87, p. 29, OSD Historical Office. Intelligence reports several times placed the Mayaguez and its crew in the wrong locations, and grossly underestimated the number of Cambodians defending Koh Tang Island.

56. NSSM 172 to SecDef et al., 7 Mar 73, JCS 2180/285; Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to SecDef et al., Ann C, pp. 3-5, 29 Jun 74, JCS 2180/285-1; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(ASA), 19 Jul 74, JCS 2180/285-2; JMF 890/530 (7 Mar 73). A special study addressing multilateral problems (e.g., the inter-relationship of economic and security affairs) was completed in August 1973. It predicted that, among the great-power centers, none would grow as fast as Japan economically during the next decade. None, however, appeared less certain of its rightful position and the role it wished to play. Memo, DepATP(ASA) to ExecSecy, NSC, Dept. of State, 12 Jul 73, JCS 2180/287; Memo, Chmn, Ad Hoc Group to ATP(ASA), n.d., JCS 2180/287-1; JMF 890/530 (12 Jul 73).
57. NSSM 210 to SecDef et al., 11 Sep 74, JCS 2180/291; Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to CJCS et al., 5 Nov 74, JCS 2180/291-1; TP, ASD(ISA) and DJS to DepSecDef and CJCS for SRG Mtg, n.d., JCS 2180/291-4; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 13 Nov 74, JCS 2180/291-5; JMF 890/530 (11 Nov 74).

58. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 19 Jun 75, JCS 2180/295; Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to CJCS et al., 5 Nov 74, JCS 2180/295-1; JCSM-326-75 to SecDef, 15 Aug 75, JCS 2180/295-1; JMF 890/053 (19 Jun 75). CINCPAC wanted Japan ultimately to assume all air defense tasks, including defense of US bases. The Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected his proposal, on grounds that it would severely reduce US operational flexibility.

59. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Oct 75, JCS 2180/297; JCSM-433-75 to SecDef, 10 Dec 75, JCS 2180/297-1; JMF 890/053 (19 Jun 75). Early in 1976, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation concluded that, through 1980, Japan's air defenses would be capable of inflicting enough losses to make sustained, repeated raids unattractive. The J-5 did not consider these conclusions “totally justified,” however, because PA&E had (1) restricted the Soviet attacking force to those Badger medium bombers that already were stationed within range of Japanese targets and (2) failed to consider the attrition suffered by Japanese assets and the disruption of air defenses. Memo, DASD(PA&E) to DJS et al., 19 Jan 76, JCS 2180/300; J-5 M-193-76 to DSAD(PA&E), 1st N/H of JCS 2180/300, 17 Feb 76; JMF 890/323 (19 Jan 76).


61. JCSM-77-72 to SecDef, 24 Feb 72, JCS 2326/92-1; JMF 998/530 (10 Feb 72).

62. JCS 2326/101, 6 Nov 72; JCSM-477-72 to SecDef, 13 Nov 72, JCS 2326/101; JMF 998/472 (6 Nov 72) sec. 1. J-5’s draft spoke of opposing an independence offer “at this time.” Admiral Zumwalt successfully urged that this qualifying phrase be dropped. CNOM-258-72, 9 Nov 72, same file.

63. Memo, Dr. Kissinger to Ambassador Williams, 1 Nov 72, JCS 2326/101-1; Memo, Ambassador Williams to Chmn, USecysCmte, 22 Nov 72, JCS 2326/101-4; Memo, DepSecDef to Chmn, USecysCmte, 1 Dec 72, JCS 2326/101-5; CNOM-343-72 to JCS, 29 Dec 72, JCS 2326/101-10; JMF 998/472 (6 Nov 72) sec. 1.

64. Memos, ActgStaffDir, USecysCmte to CJCS et al., 23 and 27 Mar 73, JCS 2326/101-12 and 101-14; Ltr, AsstSecState Green to Ambassador Williams, 27 Mar 73, JCS 2326/101-15; Memo, Dir, J-5 and Actg ASD(ISA) to DepSecDef, 2 Apr 73, JCS 2326/101-16; Memo, Chmn, USecysCmte to Pres, 13 Apr 73, JCS 2326/101-17; Memo, ATP(NSA) to Chmn, USecysCmte, 9 May 73, JCS 2326/101-18; JMF 998/472 (6 Nov 72) sec. 2.

65. Memo, StaffDir, USecysCmte to CJCS et al., 11 Sep 73, JCS 2326/101-19; Memo, DepSecDef to Chmn, USecysCmte, 28 Sep 73, JCS 2326/101-20; JMF 998/472 (6 Nov 72) sec. 3. Memo, Chmn, USecysCmte to Pres, 4 Oct 73, JCS 2326/101-21; Memo, ATP(NSA) to Ambassador Williams, 14 Nov 73, JCS 2326/101-23; same file, sec. 4.

66. Ltr, Ambassador Williams to Pres, 25 Jan 74, JCS 2326/101-27, JMF 998/472 (6 Nov 72) sec. 3. For DOD’s endorsement of new negotiating instructions is in Memo, ASD(ISA) to DepSecDef with approvals by DepSecDef and CJCS, 14 Feb 74, JCS 2326/101-29, same file, sec. 4. Ltr, Ambassador Williams to Pres, 12 Apr 74, JCS 2326/101-31, same file, sec. 5.


68. JCSM-448-74 to SecDef, 19 Nov 74, JCS 2326/114; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 11 Feb 75, JCS 2326/114-3; JMF 998/470 (24 Apr 74).

69. Ltr, Ambassador Williams to Pres, 31 Dec 74, JCS 2326/101-41, JMF 998/472 (6 Oct 72) sec. 6. A copy of the Covenant was attached to JCS 2326/101-44, same file. Because most of the
Tinian base plan had been shelved, about one-third of the land acquired was leased back at a nominal price.

**Chapter 13. Conclusion**

3. Entries for 1, 7 and 4 Mar 74, Moorer Diary. JCSM-81-74 to SecDef, 19 Mar 74, JCS 1259/758-5; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al, 3 Sep 74, JCS 1259/758-8; JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec. 2. Moorer’s remark about the Army “having to fight a war for an Admiral” refers to Generals Westmoreland and Abrams (as successive Commanders, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) having been subordinate to Admirals Sharp and McCain, who were the Commanders in Chief, Pacific Command.
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