THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE:
THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMED FORCES, 1990-2010

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DESCRIPTION: On a dark blue disk the bust of a minuteman (Captain John Parker) in cocked hat on a pedestal, between two branches of olive or within a dark blue designation band with gold inner and outer borders inscribed UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE in gold.

SYMBOLISM: The minuteman has traditionally been used to represent the citizen Soldier. The wreath signifies achievement and accomplishment. Gold is symbolic of honor and excellence and dark blue signifies loyalty.

BACKGROUND: The emblem was approved for use as a plaque in 1972 and is used as an unofficial identification device of the United States Army Reserve. (U.S. Army Institute of Heraldry)
THE SOLDIER’S CREED

I am an American Soldier.
I am a Warrior and a member of a team.
I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values.
I will always place the mission first.
I will never accept defeat.
I will never quit.
I will never leave a fallen comrade.
I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my Warrior tasks and drills.
I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself.
I am an expert and I am a professional.
I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.
I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.
I am an American Soldier.
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Medium tents used as enlisted quarters, XVIII Airborne Corps Main Command Post, Rafha Airport, Northern Province, Saudi Arabia, February 5, 1991...

Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock

Major General Max Baratz

Example of a prayer cap and shawl provided to Kurdish refugees during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT...

An Army veteran and Brigadier General Peter S. Lennon, commanding general of the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, dedicate a wreath to the 14th Quartermaster Detachment monument in Greensburg, Pennsylvania, during the unit’s 20th anniversary memorial ceremony of the SCUD missile attack, held at the unit’s reserve center on February 25, 2011...

Two U.S. soldiers walk past a pile of G.I. duffle bags, decorated with small American flags, following a SCUD missile attack on the U.S. military barracks at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, February 25, 1991...

Major General Roger W. Sandler

C-141 aircraft...

General Carl E. Vuono

Major General William F. Ward, Jr.

John O. Marsh, Jr.

Congressman Bill Chappell, Jr. first raised the issue of the Army Reserve’s command and control with Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr.
In February 1989, Congressman John P. Murtha, who had replaced Chappell as the chairman of the HAC’s Defense Subcommittee, wrote Marsh, “perhaps it is time we completely reexamine the entire question of command and control of the Army Reserve.”

Major William F. Ward, Jr. (left) and Major General Roger W. Sandler show the colors of the USARC flag at a change of command ceremony on August 1, 1991, at Fort McPherson, Georgia.

Shoulder sleeve insignia of the U.S. Army Reserve Command. The double eagle reflects the unit motto “Twice the Citizen.”

Distinguished unit insignia of the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC).

General Colin L. Powell.

William J. Clinton.

Les Aspin.

General J.H. Binford Peay III.

General Gordon R. Sullivan.

Richard B. Cheney.

William J. Perry.

The 205th Infantry Brigade, 6th Infantry Division (Roundout) soldiers practice “helocasting” in 1990 at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.

A former member of the 101st Airborne Division (airmobile), now an IRR member of the Army Reserve, instructs other IRR soldiers on the fine points of the LAW anti-tank weapon, 1991.

General Frederick W. Franks, Jr.

Operation BRIGHT STAR is a multinational exercise that is designed to improve readiness, interoperability, and strengthen military and professional relationships between the Third Army-led U.S. contingent, Egypt, and nine other nations.

Checking for bacteria and minerals, Major John C. Lewis examines water from a village well in Thailand during Operation COBRA GOLD, ’93.
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Barack H. Obama

Then stationed at Forward Operating Base Leatherneck, the 287th Transportation Company, 143d Expeditionary Sustainment Command, hauls several U.S. military vehicles, including a RT rough terrain container handler (Kalmar), on the unit’s M1070 heavy equipment transporters (HET) and M1000 trailers around May 2010, down highway 1 to Forward Operating Base Leatherneck after a mission to Forward Operating Base Shindand, Afghanistan.

General Tommy R. Franks

Lieutenant General James R. Helmy

445th Medical Detachment (Veterinary Services)

A soldier and his military working dog, Ali, search vehicles at an entry control point

Port of Shuaiba, Kuwait

Oil pipeline fire near Hadithah

A guard with the 320th Military Police Company from St. Petersburg, Florida, mans a makeshift outpost at Tallil Air Base in central Iraq, watching as prisoners of war are transferred onto buses for transport to the coalition’s internment facility near Umm Qasar.

Specialist Jose Lopez, a sheriff’s deputy in Broward County, Florida, and a colleague put up some concertina wire along a yet-to-be built fence line as Army Reserve soldiers with the 724th Military Police Battalion find themselves pitching in to build the new enemy prisoner of war facility they will be guarding.

Soldiers from the 459th Engineer Company (Multi-Role Bridge) lower a bridge section toward the water before launching and unfolding.

Soldiers with the 632d Maintenance Company, 110th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, 224th Sustainment Brigade, 103d Expeditionary Sustainment Command, line up their mine resistant ambush protected vehicles before a mission in 2010 at the convoy staging lanes at Contingency Operating Base Adder, Iraq.
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Sergeant First Class Gerald Kjornes, Regional Training Site-Maintenance instructor, trains Specialist Michael Lambach on how to use schematics to troubleshoot and diagnose faults with a 30kw generator...

The 84th U.S. Army Reserve Readiness Training Command has outfitted five standard Humvees with steel kits which simulate the weight and physical characteristics of an actual up-armored Humvee...

Soldiers from the 652d Engineer Company, Ellsworth, Wisconsin, constructed this bridge across the Arkansas River at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, during their annual training...

Fort Hunter Liggett, California. Brigadier General Alton Berry, commander, 70th Training Division (Functional Training), left, and 70th Command Sergeant Major Derrick Simpson check out a rocket propelled grenade launcher used by OPFOR at Regional Training Center-West...

Soldiers from the 783d Military Police Battalion participate in pre-mobilization training under the guidance of Fort McCoy’s RTC-North by firing crew-served weapons...

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KATHRYN ROE COKER, Ph.D.
Deputy Director of History
U.S. Army Reserve

“TWICE THE CITIZEN”
ARMY STRONG
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded their neighboring country of Kuwait. U.S. forces began deploying to Saudi Arabia on August 9 as Operation DESERT SHIELD commenced. As a drilling Reserve Soldier, I remember telling my wife, Laura, I will probably have to go and hearing her response, “they don’t call up the Reserves for something like this.” In November 1990, I deployed along with thousands of other mobilized Reservists in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. As a young major, I did not realize the significance of this event but I believe it became a seminal point in the history of how our nation and our military viewed the role of the Reserve in our national defense.

Sixteen years later I had the tremendous privilege and honor of being sworn in as the chief, Army Reserve and commanding general of the Army Reserve Command. During the next six years as I observed Reserve Soldiers performing magnificently in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, Europe, Korea, the Continental United States, and many other locations, I came to understand and appreciate what had occurred during the past twenty years. The Reserve forces of the United States had transformed from a Strategic Reserve Force into an Operational Reserve Force. I believe the importance to this transformation is yet to be fully understood by many. It has huge implications for our future National Defense Strategy with regard to force size, structure, and force mix.

Throughout history, Revolutions in Military Affairs have occurred which changed the nature of battle and military strategy: the introduction of the submarine in naval warfare, aircraft in air warfare, and the tank in ground warfare. I view the transformation of our Reserve Forces into an Operational Force as another Revolution in Military Affairs. During my six years of service as the chief, Army Reserve, I engaged with military leaders around the world during conferences and visits to their countries. One question that I constantly received was “tell us how you have built such a viable and competent Reserve Force.” Whether I was in the United Kingdom or Korea with significant militaries or in countries such as Kenya, Uganda, or Ethiopia with much smaller armies, they all envied the force that we had developed and wanted to start down the path to replicate it in some fashion.

The book, Twice the Citizen, by James Currie and Richard Crossland, is a magnificent work that chronicles the inception of the Army Reserve as a small medical reserve force in 1908 to what it had grown to by 1995, a force of over
205,000 men and women. As chief, Army Reserve, I felt it was our responsibility to document the next period of history, the transformation to an Operational Reserve. Our great men and women who serve our nation in uniform have earned a place in history. They serve on the shoulders of those who came before them and laid the foundation. From those medical professionals who put their lives on hold in World War I to the young mother who leaves a small baby at home to deploy to Afghanistan, they are a national treasure and we cannot forget their service and the sacrifices they, their families, and in the case of the Reserve Soldier, their employers have made.

To stand in front of Soldiers in Iraq or Afghanistan on Christmas Day, away from their spouses, children and family, getting ready to go on a mission where they may be asked to make the ultimate sacrifice, looking them in the eye as they raise their hands and volunteer to take an oath of re-enlistment, you understand how the term Hero is defined. Their dedication and commitment have built the finest fighting force this world has ever known and has changed forever the role of the Reserve Component in our National Defense. My hope is that this book will help preserve for their children and grandchildren the history that they have made.

A special thanks to Dr. Kathryn Roe Coker and Dr. Lee Harford for their dedication and efforts to make this book a reality.

JACK C. STULTZ
Lieutenant General (Retired), USA
PREFACE

The history of how the operational Army Reserve concept developed over the twenty years from 1990 through 2010 is a story of revolutionary change for the citizen-soldier. In the past, the part-time citizen army was by national policy and doctrine not as prepared as the professional Army for war. During the twentieth century, militia or reserve soldiers required months, sometimes a year, of pre-deployment training before being committed to the battlefield. The new operational concept for the twenty-first century arose to solve a problem for the Army’s global peacekeeping mission. How could the Army accomplish this task during times of relative peace with reduced budgets and less full-time manpower? Congress answered the challenge by more effectively utilizing the Army Reserve (together with the other reserve forces) and new technologies. Army Reserve units were maintained at comparable readiness levels and standards with active Army units. The Army Reserve and the active Army would now deploy together and then function as one team on the modern battlefield. To put it in sports terms, the Army Reserve no longer existed as the “second string” sitting on the bench. It was now a part of the “first string” playing important positions on the field, from the start to the finish, in the most serious of all contests.

A famous quote of Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, “I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me,” seems to hold true for the fate of the United States Army Reserve (USAR) over the last twenty years. During this period, international relations changed dramatically from a divided world poised on the brink of total (nuclear) war to one that increasingly sought economic integration as part of a global community of trading partners. Throughout history, first empires and then nations had reverted to war to resolve disputes and for economic gain, especially in the conquest of territory and resources. By 1990, however, the leaders of most countries believed that wars or the threat of war had become too destructive and costly. Rejecting expansionist policies as the road to prosperity and security, the modernized states of the world instead sought harmony through economic
cooperation. As a result, the Cold War Army Reserve mission evolved from one of providing forces held in “strategic reserve” for a possible World War III, with the massive armies of the communist bloc, to one of providing units to the contemporary Army’s “operational force” for peacekeeping, nation building and security missions across the planet.

The second half of the Twentieth Century witnessed the evolution of a new global economic system. The emergence of “multinational corporations” in the 1960s, as a result of the collapse of the old European colonial empires, quickly morphed into “transnational networks” in the 1990s, following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. Economic growth and national power no longer depended on unilateral military might and territorial expansion. Instead, the centuries old “nation-state” became the new “trading-state” where cooperation and multilateral participation in the international marketplace best served the interests of modern societies. International relations based on peacekeeping provided a secure environment for economic development and growth. By the Twenty-first Century, in a world where capital, labor, and technology had become mobile across national boundaries, wealth and power based on the size of a nation’s “market share” was just as important, if not more, than the size of its borders. Thus, a primary theme in United States foreign policy since the end of World War II has been to actively promote the continued growth of an interdependent multinational economic community. The success of this diplomacy eventually materialized as the “New World Order” for both international politics and economics. Existing as the sole superpower in the Post-Cold War era and mentor of globalization, the United States also assumed the leading role of protecting the trade routes and maintaining the security of this world-wide free-market trading system. For the last twenty years, the Army Reserve has played a fundamental “frontline” role in this new mission.

The responsibilities for preventing and deterring conflict had always been important duties for the Army and for citizen-soldiers. Silver-screen Hollywood glorified the experience as common knowledge in such films as *Santa Fe Trail, Stagecoach, She Wore a Yellow Ribbon, and They Died with Their Boots On*. These movies depicted domestic peacekeeping and security enforcement on the United States frontier in the Nineteenth Century, helping to develop the emerging American economic structure. The new global community can be viewed as an extension of this “American System” as envisioned by Alexander Hamilton in 1791 for a North American “continental-sized market” of reciprocal trade between the states. Such a network promised strength, harmony and prosperity for the young nation over time by encouraging the states to first integrate economically (as territories) and then unite politically (as states). Hamilton’s revolutionary multilateral concept was based on the principles of a free market
trading process, where all participants (states of the Union) were recognized as equals. The federal government fostered its growth by financing “internal improvements” (roads, canals and eventually railroads) to unify communications and military forces to protect and secure the marketplace. The United States free market economy became a key element in the “patch-work” approach forquilting the American nation across the continent, one state at a time. Standing in opposition to this new economic arrangement was the world’s dominant economic system at the time called “imperialism” or the mercantilist system. These unilateral models existed since the beginning of civilization, in which the most powerful empires conquered other political entities and turned them into vassal states, satellite states or colonies. For Hamilton's system, the United States Army, supported by local militia units, played a critical role on the frontiers in providing security for developing communities, the transportation infrastructure, and the trade routes as the American System spread west and eventually reached the Pacific Ocean, with the closing of the frontier in 1890. (Captain Abraham Lincoln commanded one of these militia companies from Illinois during the Black Hawk War.) One hundred years later, following the collapse of imperialism and communism, the Army and the citizen-soldiers of the Army Reserve rediscovered this security mission when they accomplished the tasks of providing security for communities and trade routes across the earth, as the American System evolved into the Global Economy of the New World Order.

Logic and necessity dictated that the Army Reserve performed a key role in protecting the new global economy for the benefit of the United States and the world family of new trading states. The enduring strengths of the Army Reserve well suited the organization to provide support to expeditionary forces operating in the complex security environments across the earth. Its citizen-soldiers possessed an abundance of skills garnered from their normal civilian jobs which could be leveraged by the Army to support missions for improving infrastructure, security and institutions in nations strategically important to United States interests. This was especially so in areas of civil affairs, medical, transportation, military history and information operations. If properly structured, the Army Reserve could provide medical units for humanitarian assistance, engineer units for facilities (vertical) and transportation system (horizontal) reconstruction, and training units to mentor foreign military forces. Many citizen-soldiers held employment in private companies providing leading-edge technology in the information, communications, and cyber security fields, and could offer these critical skill sets for the management of modern military operations. Although the cost of citizen-soldiers was comparable to the active Army during deployments, when not mobilized, Army Reserve soldiers were maintained at much
lower expense: They were a cost effective means of maintaining the Total Army
necessary for securing the global economic community. Also, reserve soldiers
lived in “grassroots America” and were, thus, uniquely positioned to respond to
the support or defense of the homeland. Specifically, the Army Reserve existed
as a significant “reservoir” of military-civilian specialists available for use in fac- 
ing the proliferating, ongoing contingency operations that emerged around the
turn of the Twenty-first Century.

Using the Gulf War of 1990-1991 as the catalyst for change, this volume tells
the story of the transformation of the Army Reserve from an organization held
in strategic reserve to an “operational-expeditionary reserve” force. Thus, it
traces the component’s significant events and developments during the period
1990 to 2010, from the end of the Cold War through the height of the Global
War on Terrorism (GWOT): A conflict that still has no foreseeable end. The
narrative is based on primary sources, oral history interviews, and facts con-
tained in various command and staff agency historical reports, all located in the
United States Army Reserve Historical Research Collection (ARHRC). The
author, Dr. Kathryn Roe Coker, selected significant source documents intend-
ing to interpret the interplay of those events, forces and policies that shaped the
Army Reserve and to provide a historical perspective in support of the reserve
component’s mission – ensuring the wartime readiness of those forces assigned.
As a permanent historical reference, *The Indispensable Force: The Post-Cold War
Operational Army Reserve, 1990-2010*, contains the institutional memory of
the Army Reserve during a critical period of its history, serving as a guide for
current and future operations. The Office of Army Reserve History (OARH)
produced the volume for the purposes of adding historical perspective to the
decision-making process, and orienting new personnel on the force’s mission,
recent activities, accomplishments and issues. In fact, with the number of Army
Reserve soldiers activated for GWOT reaching 195,707 by December 2010,
this period passed into history as the most significant in the heritage of the
American federal citizen-soldier since the Korean War (1950-1953). I am cer-
tain that all members of the Army Reserve will find this volume an interesting,
useful addition to their professional libraries.

Fort Bragg
North Carolina
December 2011

LEE S. HARFORD, JR., Ph.D.
Director of History
United States Army Reserve
INTRODUCTION

The Army Reserve of today can trace its roots as a “national” or federal citizen-soldier force back to the French and Indian War (1756-1763) on through the Civil War (1861-1865) to the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection (1892-1902). From its birth in 1776 through the nineteenth century, the United States remained a regional power, protected from invasion by the vast expanses of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. A large standing army was not required and the nation’s defense was based primarily on the militia systems of the individual states.

After the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, with the absence of any real foreign threat, a small standing army was all that was needed to maintain peace on the frontier between the settlers and American Indians. Whenever the nation faced a major conflict, the federal government mobilized large citizen-soldier forces and trained them for combat operations. At the close of these conflicts, the soldiers were sent home, again leaving a small standing army. However, by the turn of the twentieth century, the United States emerged as a world power with global trade routes and security concerns beyond the Western Hemisphere.

Consequently, during this transition the United States Congress created an official Army Reserve organization in order to place a major portion of the nation’s citizen-soldier establishment under federal control during times of peace, as well as war. Financially, this was the best option for maintaining and projecting overseas a land-power force capable of facing the military might of the other world powers. Four significant events in United States history shaped the modern Army Reserve: (1) the sinking of the battleship Maine in 1898; (2) the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941; (3) the defeat of communism with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; and (4) the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, that live in infamy as “9/11” for most Americans.

At the end of the Nineteenth Century, a new “manifest destiny” wave carried the Americans beyond the continental United States and into the Pacific and
Caribbean. Consequently, on February 15, 1898, the sinking of the American battleship *Maine* in Havana harbor ushered in the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection (1892-1902). Mobilization problems of the Army during these conflicts, specifically shortages of medical professionals, trained officers, and non-commissioned officers, caused the national leadership to finally establish a formal structure for federal volunteers during peacetime.

Initially in 1908, Congress created the Medical Reserve Corps, the official predecessor of the Army Reserve. Subsequently, using its constitutional authority to “raise and support armies,” through the National Defense Act of 1916 and the sweeping amendment of that law in the National Defense Act Amendments of 1920, the federal government created the Organized Reserve. Redesignated as the Organized Reserve Corps in 1948, the new force served into the 1950s to provide a peacetime pool of trained reserve officers and enlisted men for use in war. This manpower reserve existed as the office cadre for as many as twenty-seven reserve infantry divisions and six reserve cavalry divisions located across the nation. It also included the Officers’ Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps, and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps.

Consequently, the Army mobilized nearly ninety thousand Army Reserve officers for World War I (1917-1919), one-third of which were medical doctors. More than 90,000 enlisted Reserve soldiers served of which 15,000 were assigned to medical units. The individual Reserve soldiers were placed into newly organized units, were trained, and then deployed to the war zone. During the interwar period, the Army planned for an Organized Reserve force of thirty-three divisions, existing either as paper units or in a cadre status.

The years between the world wars were austere, with few opportunities for training. A contingency for service, however, was created during the Great Depression. One of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal programs, the Civilian Conservation Corps, placed young men in barracks and military-style organizations to work in national forests and other outdoor projects. Between 1933 and 1939, more than 30,000 Reserve officers served as commanders or staff officers at the 2,700 conservation corps camps. Reserve participation in the American defense effort began before the United States entered the Second World War in December 1941.

The Army began calling Army Reserve officers to active duty in June 1940. In the year that followed, the number of Army Reserve officers on active duty rose from fewer than 3,000 to more than 57,000. During World War II (1941-1945), the Army mobilized twenty-six Army Reserve (designated) infantry divisions. Approximately a quarter of all Army officers who served were reserve
soldiers, including over 100,000 Reserve Officers’ Training Corps graduates. In total, more than 200,000 Army Reserve soldiers served in the war. World War II signified the beginning of a new era in national security, and from that point to the present, the United States took-on the role as the “arsenal of democracy” and “world guardian,” a new mission in which the Army Reserve would play a major supporting role.

The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, December 7, 1941, woke the American people from the century-old complacency that the United States, as an “island bastion,” was eternally safe behind the “ocean moats” of the Atlantic and Pacific. Air power had changed the strategic paradigm forever. The 1940s also witnessed the emergence of strategic bombing, rocket (missile) technology, and nuclear weapons. After World War II, the world divided into two opposing armed camps: the Soviet Union, China and the Warsaw Pact versus the United States and its allies. The communist nations maintained armies with millions of highly trained soldiers and stood poised to overrun Europe and Asia at a moment’s notice. The entire world and global market lay open to conquest and the spread of communist dictatorships.

To face this new threat, the United States developed a “Containment Policy” to check the growth of communism over the next forty-five years. For the first time in our history, a large military force would be required during peacetime to implement this new grand foreign policy. The units of this military force needed to be manned, equipped, trained, and ready for deployment at all times to a combat zone within a few month’s notice. The Department of Defense established a system of “unified commands” in Europe, the Far East, the Pacific, Alaska, and the Caribbean to provide strategic direction for global operations. The old days of relying on untrained citizen soldiers, which required nine months to a year to mobilize into deployable units, were over. To defray the cost of maintaining such a large military force, Congress placed heavy reliance on establishing and sustaining a more combat ready Army Reserve to deploy together with the Active Army for operations, worldwide.

Recognizing the importance of the Organized Reserve to the World War II effort, Congress authorized retirement and drill pay for the first time in 1948. The Korean War (1950-1953) saw more than 240,000 Army Reserve soldiers called to active duty. That large number reflected the Army’s need for organized, trained personnel in a short period of time. More than seventy Army Reserve units served in Korea. While the Korean Conflict was still underway, Congress began making significant changes in the structure and role of the Reserve. These changes transformed the Organized Reserve Corps into the United States Army Reserve. This new organization was divided into a Ready
Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. Reserve units were authorized twenty-four inactive duty training days a year and up to seventeen days of active duty (called annual training). The president was given authority to order up to one million Army Reserve soldiers of all military specialties to active duty. These congressional actions were directly related to experiences gained during the activation and subsequent service of Army Reserve units in the Korean War. Acting to signify the new vital role of the reserves to the nation’s defense, President Harry S Truman established the *Armed Forces Reserve Medal* by executive order in 1950. For the first time, Army Reserve soldiers received an official award for consecutive periods of service in ten tier increments.

In operations following the Korean War, for the first time, the Army intended to maintain the integrity of mobilized Army Reserve units. As a standard, officers and enlisted men were not stripped out of organized units and sent into operations as replacements. Instead, the Army attempted to mobilize and deploy fully trained and manned reserve units at the outbreak of the conflict. Thus, the lessons learned from the Korean War set the precedent for readiness of all Army Reserve organizations in future call-ups. During the period from 1968 to 1974 and with the end of the Vietnam War (1961-1975), Congress reduced the Army end-strength from 1.5 million to 785,000 Active duty soldiers. The end of the draft coincided with the announcement of the Total Force Policy in 1973. This new policy, also known as the Abrams Doctrine for Army Chief of Staff General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., placed an increased reliance on reserve component units for rapid deployment to military operations. It called for the United States to maintain an active force capable of maintaining peace and deterring aggression across the globe. Those forces
would be reinforced, when necessary, by a well-trained and equipped reserve component within a month’s notice.

The result of an all-volunteer Army and the Total Force Policy was a shift of important responsibilities and resources to the Army Reserve. The intent was to ensure that the Army would never again engage in a major conflict without the reserve components. To support this concept, after 1967 the Army Reserve became increasingly combat support and combat service support oriented, and in that same year, Congress established the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR) within the Army Staff to give Army Reserve soldiers an official spokesman at the Department of the Army level. However, throughout the entire Cold War period, after the Korean War, the Army Reserve was mobilized only twice: over 68,500 Army Reservists for the Berlin Crisis (1961-1962) and nearly 6,000 for the Vietnam War (1968-1969). In reality, it existed as a strategic reserve and the active Army handled most military operations without the reserve components. This would all change with the end of the Cold War and the further draw-down of the active Army in the 1990s.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 marked the symbolic end of the Cold War and a victory of the free world over totalitarianism. The threat from the Soviet Union seemed improbable. The world looked safer. Thus, in the post-Cold War period, the armed forces faced significant reductions in military budgets and manpower levels. Their mission to remain the world’s guardian, however, did not change. In fact, by this time, the unified command system had expanded to include Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. Meanwhile, the late twentieth century experienced a revolution in military affairs through advances in information management (digital technology), which seemed to render past forms of warfare obsolete. This new technology was significant because it allowed soldiers to view the battlefield in real-time and enhanced logistical management to better control supplies. Also, throughout the twentieth century, the demands of modern warfare caused the number of combat support and combat service support specialty branches to multiply and grow in complexity, making the manning of such units more difficult.

Facing implementation of a global peacekeeping mission with a greatly curtailed military budget and active military force, Congress intended to leverage the reserve components and the new technologies to make up the difference.
This required the Army Reserve to be manned, equipped, and trained at levels comparable to the active Army. Such a capability allowed the Army components to be more versatile and function as one team on the battlefield. Nothing signified this change in mission better than the amendments made in the 1990’s for the **Armed Forces Reserve Medal**, which authorized its award for mobilization and later added an “M” Mobilization Device and numbers for each different contingency operation a reserve soldier was called-up to serve. As told in this history, it was from this concept that the “Operational” Army Reserve would evolve over the next twenty years.

Office of Army Reserve History

August 2011
Map 1

MAJOR U.S. COMBAT UNITS AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR
GERMANY 1990
1:5,100,000
CHAPTER 1

POST-COLD WAR
DEFENSE STRATEGY

End of the Cold War

On November 9, 1989, East Germany dismantled the twelve foot concrete Berlin Wall that had surrounded West Berlin for twenty-eight years. It was a symbolic end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union; between democracy and communism; between freedom and totalitarianism. This first breach of the infamous “Iron Curtain” came twenty-nine months after President Ronald W. Reagan made his now famous speech on June 12, 1987, at the Brandenburg Gate. He issued a challenge to Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union’s general secretary of the central committee, stating: “We welcome change and openness; for we believe that freedom and security go together, that the advance of human liberty can only strengthen the cause of world peace. There is one sign,” he continued, “the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization, come here to this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!”

This came at a time of debate over the stationing of short range American missiles in Europe; America’s historic peacetime defense buildup; and the continuing nuclear arms race. But there was progress, as Reagan noted, not only in “limiting the growth of arms, but of eliminating, for the first time, an entire class of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.” It also came amidst the attempted economic reform (perestroika) in the Soviet Union and efforts to lessen the grip of the Soviet bureaucracy (glasnost). Evidence of this change, as Reagan explained, could be seen in the release of some political prisoners and unblocking of certain foreign news broadcasts. Some Communist economic enterprises were allowed to function with more freedom from state control.

There were other historic developments. On November 19, 1990, the United States, the Soviet Union, and twenty other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact signed the Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty limiting conventional, nonnuclear weapons, and equipment.

While this was progress, there was instability on the horizon. The Warsaw Pact began to fall apart the following year with the declarations for independence by the Soviet Union’s satellite states. On July 1, 1991, the Warsaw Pact dissolved. In August, President George H. W. Bush and Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in Moscow limiting each country to 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 strategic delivery systems. That November, Bush announced the CFE Treaty to be the end of the Cold War. Gorbachev opined that START was the end of the arms race. In the face of this progress, there was a coup attempt in the Soviet Union in August 1991. It was quickly quelled with Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Republic, playing a key role. On December 8, Yeltsin and leaders of Ukraine
and Belorussia formed a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On December 25, 1991, eleven of the former Soviet republics joined the CIS. The Soviet Union, Reagan’s “evil empire,” collapsed into fifteen different countries. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the reunification of Germany came a change in the strategic environment.

National Security Strategy

What did this change mean for the United States? Since the end of World War II, the thrust of America’s foreign policy had been the containment of communism with the Soviet Union as the central, monolithic threat. As stated in Bush’s 1991 National Security Strategy, the possibility of the Soviet Union posing the threat it once did seemed “unlikely.” The world seemed safer. That hope was soon shattered by new crises and instabilities. Countries with their regional and ethnic tensions, once held in check by the bipolar superpower struggle, surfaced creating a multi-polar threat. Recognizing this, Secretary of the Army Michael P. W. Stone stated, “Our nation faces a significantly more complex and varied security environment than at any time in our history. The question we now face is whether our Army is properly structured and equipped to meet the emerging strategic requirements of the 1990s and beyond.”

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

As the Cold War was reaching the end, any period of relative calm had been shattered on August 2, 1990, when more than 100,000 of Saddam Hussein’s soldiers invaded Kuwait and rapidly advanced on the capital city. President Bush’s reaction to the aggression of Hussein and its damage to Kuwait’s oil supplies, exaggerated by the possible disruption of Saudi oil supplies, stemmed from his March 1990 National Security Strategy. That strate-
gy called for the promotion of “an open and expanding international economic system with minimal distortions to trade and investment, stable currencies, and broadly agreed and respected rules for managing and resolving economic disputes.”9 It was based on deterrence, strong alliances, forward defense, and force projection.

The United States would strive for “a secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions.”10

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (August 2, 1990 - February 28, 1991) was almost overshadowed by the collapse of the Soviet Union. For the first time in twenty years (since the Vietnam War), the United States Army deployed a significant share of its “actual” forces. These forces were trained to combat Soviet forces in Central Europe or to meet in open warfare a former Soviet “client state.”11 Significantly, this was also the first major call-up of reserve forces in forty years (since the Korean War). Thus, the reserves were used operationally for the first time.
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

The General in the Desert, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
That call to arms came on August 22, 1990, with Bush’s executive order mobilizing up to 200,000 Selected Reservists under Section 673b, Title 10, U.S Code. This allowed the Army to activate 25,000 members of the Selected Reserve for ninety days, with a presidential option for a ninety-day extension. On November 19, Bush increased the authorization to 80,000 and to 115,000 on December 1st. As of November 13, the period of the call-up was extended for an additional ninety days.

On August 25, 1990, Army Reserve units were alerted for activation. Some 13,000 Army Reserve soldiers, from over 100 units, were now on alert. On August 27, the first units were activated and began reporting to mobilization stations.

The reserves were used operationally for the first time.

Table I-1: Timetable
August 2, 1990 - June 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 2, 1990</td>
<td>Operation DESERT SHIELD begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 22, 1990</td>
<td>200,000 Selected Reservists receive mobilization orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 25, 1990</td>
<td>13,000 Army Reserve soldiers from 100 units alerted for activation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 27, 1990</td>
<td>First units activated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 30, 1990</td>
<td>First units report to mobilization station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 7, 1990</td>
<td>First units deploy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early October 1990</td>
<td>150 units alerted and 90 units get activation orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early December 1990</td>
<td>450 units alerted and 401 receive activation orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 16, 1991</td>
<td>50,000 soldiers activated from over 500 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 19, 1991</td>
<td>Bush authorizes a partial mobilization of one million reservists from all the armed services for two years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1991</td>
<td>1,045 units had been activated: 145,000 Selected Reservists and 22,000 Individual Ready Reservists</td>
</tr>
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</table>
stations on August 30. The first units deployed on September 7. An Army Reserve unit was the first reserve component organization to deploy. By early October, about 150 Army Reserve units had been alerted and some ninety had received activation orders. By the first part of December, almost 450 Army Reserve units had been alerted and some 401 had received activation orders. For some units the time from alert to activation was as short as two days; for others as long as 161 days. The average alert-to-activation was 11.7 days.\textsuperscript{15}

The average alert to activation period was 11.7 days.

By the time Operation DESERT STORM began with the aerial bombardment on January 16, 1991, over 50,000 Army Reserve soldiers had been activated in more than 500 units or cells. More than 650 individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs) had been ordered to active duty. Almost 2,300 Army Reserve
soldiers were serving on temporary tour of active duty (TTAD) orders. Due to personnel needs, seventy retired reservists had been involuntarily recalled to active duty. Almost 3,000 volunteers from all parts of the Army Reserve were serving in the continental United States (CONUS) or abroad. At the start of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, Army Reserve soldiers represented over 50 percent of Total Army reserve activations.\(^{16}\)

On January 19, 1991, Bush authorized a partial mobilization of one million reservists from all the armed services for as long as two years. The administration indicated that any call-up would be limited to 360,000 for a maximum of one year. Reserve soldiers provided such crucial specialties in Southwest Asia as fuel and water distribution, medical services, chemical decontamination, and many other combat support functions. Bush’s action made possible the activation of individual reservists from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). On January 19, the secretary of defense issued implementation instructions. By January 23, the first mobilization of over 20,000 members of the IRR was under way.\(^ {17}\)

By the end of June 1991, 1,045 units had been activated. Over 145,000 of those were Selected Reservists and about 22,000 were IRRs. Of those 1,045 units, 294 were stationed in the continental United States. The rest were deployed to Europe and to Southwest Asia.\(^ {18}\) U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) activated Army Reserve units and individual volunteers by issuing orders through the continental U.S. Armies (CONUSAs). The Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) issued orders to individual volunteers from the IRR, Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), and eligible retirees. By the middle of October 1990, ARPERCEN had logged more than 6,000 calls from troop program unit (TPU), IMA and IRR soldiers volunteering for active duty. Over 4,000 members of the Retired Reserve had also volunteered. In the same period, over 450 IMAs had been called to active duty. ARPERCEN worked closely with the Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) to match personnel with requirements.\(^ {19}\)
Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was the first true test of the Army’s Total Force mobilization policy of Army Reserve soldiers since the Vietnam War. In the Vietnam War, only 5,181 Army Reserve soldiers were mobilized and 3,500 actually deployed. In Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, only 300 reservists were activated. In his March 1990 National Security Strategy, Bush had acknowledged the noteworthy role reservists played in the absence of a large peacetime armed force. He referred to the Total Force policy which had “placed a significant portion of . . . [the] total military power in a well-equipped, well-trained, and early-mobilizing reserve component. Various elements of that policy—the balance between active and reserve forces, the mix of units in the two components, the nature of missions given reserve forces—are likely,” he stated, “to be adjusted as we respond to changes in the security environment.” He recognized the “less expensive” nature of the reserve component as “one alternative for reducing costs while still hedging against uncertainties. It is an alternative,” he explained “we must thoroughly explore, especially as we better understand the amount of warning time we can expect for a major conflict.” There had been little warning for Hussein’s aggression.

The Total Force Policy had stemmed from the drawdown in Vietnam, the end of the draft, and lower defense budgets. In August 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird announced the Total Force Policy. As the active Army declined in end strength, there would be increased reliance on the reserves for combat support and combat service support. The reserves would be the first and main source for augmentation of the active forces in national emergencies. In 1973, Laird’s successor, James R. Schlesinger made the concept a policy with the Total Force study.

That study named functions and missions that could be eliminated or transferred from the active component to the reserve components, increasing the active combat strength. By 1973, the
Saudi Arabia, January 1991. The 316th Quartermaster Company distributes water at an XVIII Airborne Corps site in central Saudi Arabia. The 316th, an Army Reserve unit from San Diego, California, distributed 8.4 million gallons of water during the Persian Gulf War and in support of Kurdish relief efforts in northern Iraq. Army Reserve soldiers contributed significantly to the Total Army’s success by providing the bulk of water purification and distribution, civil affairs support, enemy prisoner-of-war handling, postal work, petroleum handling, military history, and psychological operations. Other participating Army Reserve units included chemical decontamination, transportation, military police, maintenance, and engineer. (An Army Reserve Historical Painting.)
reserves provided 66 percent of combat support. The Vietnam War had minimal reserve participation and lacked public support. Army Chief of Staff General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., ensured through the new policy known as the Abrams Doctrine that the active Army could no longer go to war without reserve units and public support. Active forces would be reinforced, supplemented, as needed, by the reserves within a few weeks to a month of notice.23

During the war, when the Army Reserve strength was 335,000, a total of 35,158 were deployed along with 37,692 National Guardsmen. These soldiers were part of the total 227,800 soldiers deployed to Southwest Asia. Six hundred and twenty-six Army Reserve units were called up for Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Over 35,000 (35,158) soldiers were deployed. Over 79,000 (79,118) were activated.
units were called up.\textsuperscript{24} Over 79,000 (79,118) Army Reserve soldiers were activated.\textsuperscript{25}

An example of an early deployed unit was the 318th Transportation Agency (Movement Control) from New York City. It was mobilized on September 20, 1990, and arrived in Saudi Arabia in October. The 318th had a monumental task. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf’s ultimate battle plan called for the mammoth strategic lift of “over 230,000 U.S. and coalition soldiers, 95,000 trucks and other wheeled vehicles, and 12,000 tanks and other tracked armored vehicles.”\textsuperscript{26} The lift started on January 17, 1991. The 318th provided theater movement control throughout Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The unit jaunted across Saudi Arabia scheduling convoys, validating “intra-theater airlift requests,” requiring the control of flights for about 120 C-130 aircraft, and coordinating the daily movement of seventy-one railroad trains (some 4,000 railcars).\textsuperscript{27}

Among the first to be deployed were Army Reserve military police soldiers on August 23, 1990. Jobs included port security in the United States and in theater. Then there was the job of handling Iraqi prisoners of war. The single military police brigade handling Iraqi prisoners of war was the 800th Military Police Brigade (Enemy Prisoner of War), an Army Reserve unit from New York City. It was activated on December 6, 1990, and arrived in Saudi Arabia on December 25. Maximum strength in theater peaked at 7,300 soldiers. The unit was assigned to Lieutenant General William G. “Gus” Pagonis’ 22d Support Command, the Army’s logistical headquarters. Although the alignment was different from Army doctrine, it seemed to work. The brigade was a command and control headquarters. Beneath it were sixty-nine units; twenty-nine were Army Reserve units with the others belonging to the
National Guard. Pagonis noted the success of the units in the face of difficulties. He wrote in his after action report: “Since all engineer assets were totally committed elsewhere... the 800th Military Police Brigade (Enemy Prisoner of War) actually constructed the EPW [Enemy Prisoner of War] Camps they ran. This once again demonstrated the initiative and flexibility of this command.”

In 1991, about all civil affairs soldiers were Army Reserve. They, however, were not among the first units deployed to defend Saudi Arabia. But, when the liberation of Kuwait became part of the mission, civil affairs units were in demand. On December 5, 1990, Central Command (CENTCOM) asked for all Army Reserve civil affairs units. When the ground war began on February 24, 1991, about sixteen of these units had deployed to Saudi Arabia. There were 1,924 Army Reserve civil affairs soldiers in theater.

Service was not only in theater but also backfill for deployed active forces in the states and abroad. The hospital and dental units and cells that were initially activated went to installations in the United States as backfill for medical
Patriot missile site, Saudi Arabia, 1990. Sergeant First Class Sieger Hartgers. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
personnel who had deployed with active component units.

There, the Army Reserve soldiers provided medical support for the families of deploying soldiers. Some units provided headquarters augmentation. Other Army Reserve soldiers worked at mobilization stations around the country aiding in preparing units for deployment. There were a number of infrastructure units such as garrison support units (GSUs). Army Reserve soldiers staffed and mainly ran the National Prisoner-of-War Information Center, part of the Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.30

In addition, there were Army Reserve combat units activated such as the 3d Battalion, 87th Infantry headquartered in Fort Carson, Colorado. The 3d/87th never got beyond Germany. It had a CAPSTONE assignment to the 193d Light Infantry Brigade, meaning it had been paired with its wartime headquarters and aligned according to different war plans (Europe and Korea before the end of the Cold War). The 3d/87th was one of forty-seven deployed to Germany for the build-up. Some of the units expressly supported operations in the war zone. The 3d/87’s mission was to supply security in places, particularly Frankfurt, vacated by active component soldiers sent from Europe to the war zone. Germany was considered a likely site for a terrorist attack.31

Another unit, the 946th Transportation Company (Terminal Transfer) from Lew-
es, Delaware, was mobilized for a CONUS mission. The soldiers “worked twelve-hour-shifts around the clock and on weekends, with airmen at Dover Air Base to support the ongoing flow of materiel to Saudi Arabia in preparation for Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.” By Christmas 1990, some 2.2 million pounds had moved daily through the Dover port. According to Ira Sylvester, air freight general foreman, “We would never have gotten this done without them.”32 Captain Lee Swift, the unit’s commander, remarked, “We’ve been training on cargo for years. Now we’ve been given the opportunity to perform a real-world mission in support of our soldiers in Saudi Arabia. What could be more meaningful...”33

Many activated units such as signal, infantry, theater logistics management, and general officers were ignored or not used. Reserve signal units supplied only 0.6 percent of the total in theater assets. Only four Army Reserve signal units were mobilized. The 335th Theater Signal Command was not among them.34

The failure to mobilize the 335th was amazing to some. The unit was the Third Army’s signal support headquarters, the Army element of U.S. Central Command. It had a “CAPSTONE trace which reflected its potential command of two signal brigades: the 11th, an active component unit... and the 228th, an ARNG [Army National Guard] unit...” Significantly, the 335th
served since 1986 to cultivate “plans on the Southwest Asia mission in support of Third Army.” The decision not to mobilize the unit may have had more to do with “personality clashes than about unit capability.” In any event, Colonel James C. Cannon, Third Army’s G-6, recommended to Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock, U.S. Central Command commander, that the unit not be mobilized. According to Yeosock, personalities played no part in his decision. He just did not require another headquarters. As a result, he formed a makeshift unit known as the 6th Signal Command, whose service resembled the 335th.35

The decision not to mobilize the 335th was similar in some respects to the decision not to mobilize the 377th Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM). The unit had a CAPSTONE “affiliation” with Third Army and Central Command and, therefore, had trained “with the Middle East and Southwest Asia in mind.” It had assisted in drafting “the combat service support annexes of all the contingency operation plans for Southwest Asia and had geared all of its operation plans for Southwest Asia.” Lieutenant General Pagonis was behind the decision. Instead of deploying the 377th, an ad hoc command designated as the 22d Support Command was placed in charge of managing the theater’s logistics. According to Pagonis, about 70 percent of the soldiers were from the Army Reserve. He applauded their capability. Pagonis had not wanted a general officer headquarters. Colonel John Toppé, the Army Reserve advisor at FORSCOM, laid the decision not to deploy the unit partially at the feet of Yeosock. According to John T. Currie and Richard B. Crossland, in Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1995, Yeosock advised General Schwarzkopf that “only ‘shooters’ be brought to the theater in the beginning – not logisticians.”36

Of the thirty-one general officers in Individual Mobilization Augmentee positions, only one was activated. He was Major Gen-
On Guard At Sunset, Sergeant First Class Peter G. Varisano. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
eral Max Baratz, then the deputy commander for reserve affairs at FORSCOM. In February 1994, Baratz became the chief, Army Reserve. He ended up mobilizing the Army Reserve and the National Guard.

A tragic event of the war was the loss of twenty-eight Army Reserve soldiers from a single subsonic cruise unarmed decoy (SCUD) missile attack. Thirteen of the twenty-eight soldiers dead and forty-three of the one hundred wounded were from the 14th Quartermaster Detachment. The detachment was a water purification unit from Greensburg, Pennsylvania. It was mobilized in January 1991 and had been in the desert for less than two weeks when on February 25 the SCUD missile crashed into the Dhahran barracks, exploding its almost half-ton warhead. Only thirteen soldiers escaped injury. According to Currie and Crossland, “The 14th suffered the greatest combat loss of any U.S. Army unit since the Vietnam War, and the percentage of casualties taken by the 14th in the attack-over 80 percent-places it in the tragic first ranks of all American military units in any war.”

In the end, the “Army Reserve provided ninety-four percent of the enemy prisoner-of-war handling (military police), sixty-nine percent of the Adjutant General postal, sixty-five percent of the petroleum handling, sixty-three percent of the psychological operations, and fifty-nine percent of the water-handling capability for the Total Army effort in Southwest Asia.” Army Reserve medical soldiers constituted “twenty-five percent of the total number of Army Reservists activated.” After the end of the hostilities, Army Reserve soldiers remained in theater to “restore services and facilities to Kuwait and to provide humanitarian relief to refugees in northern Iraq and Turkey as part of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.”

Example of a prayer cap and shawl provided to Kurdish refugees during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. (Photo by Timothy L. Hale, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Public Affairs)
An Army veteran and Brigadier General Peter S. Lennon, commanding general of the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, dedicate a wreath to the 14th Quartermaster Detachment monument in Greensburg, Pennsylvania, during the unit’s 20th anniversary memorial ceremony of the SCUD missile attack, held at the unit’s reserve center on February 25, 2011. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Michel Sauret)

Two U.S. soldiers walk past a pile of G.I. duffle bags, decorated with small American flags, following a SCUD missile attack on the U.S. military barracks at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, February 25, 1991. (AP Photo/David Longstreath)
COMFORT.” According to Chief, Army Reserve Major General Roger W. Sandler, “Again it was our soldiers’ unique blend of military and civilian expertise which started electricity and water running in Kuwait and fed and sheltered the Kurdish refugees.”

Unlike the Vietnam War, the war had wide-spread public support. Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe, General Crosbie Saint, believed that “the early decision to call up the reserves [meaning the Army Reserve], while probably motivated by necessity, turned out to be a major catalyst in consolidating American public opinion behind our strategy in the Gulf. The size of the call up meant that everyone had players from their state.”
Desert Storm, 1991, Frank Thomas. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
How had the Army Reserve performed? Sandler thought the accomplishments “proved without a question that we were ready. The involvement of Army Reserve units and individuals showed that we could mobilize and deploy on short notice. Reservists demonstrated that they could do their jobs exceptionally well once they were on station.” He pointed to Pagonis’ comment, in Sandler’s words, that “an observer could not tell a Reservist from an active-duty soldier while they were working because they were so totally integrated and performed so well.” Baratz pointed to the success of small highly specialized units. They were called up, sent to a ten- to twelve-day reorientation course with the Army and then went to the theater and performed well.

Problems arose and lessons were learned. Mr. Tom Welke, a senior civilian readiness officer, said there were “tremendous readiness issues and challenges faced by both the Reserve and the Guard [which] pretty much stretched across the nation’s reserve at that time.” Many believed the country’s reserves were really in strategic reserve and would not be called up except in the case of a major conflict with the Soviet Union. There was a general understanding that the reserves were “a mobilization asset more so than an immediate capability and were to be committed ‘in time of war or national emergency.’” There were issues, for example, with equipment shortages and validation and processing of civil affairs soldiers who were part of the special operations forces. Testing and validation took about two weeks. As a result, reserve soldiers arrived in theater after the supported active Army soldiers had moved to their combat locations. According to Baratz, “to say it was messy was an understatement of the first degree.”
Another problem was the way IRR soldiers were ordered to active duty. IRR use was limited to declared national emergencies and partial mobilizations. The existing mobilization system was “ignored when it came to filling personnel requirements.” The “ad hoc” system the ARPERCEN used resulted in certain “anomalies,” such as not sending soldiers to the nearest mobilization post. The ARPERCEN lessons learned report pointed out a number of issues, such as, not using the mobilization plans in place since 1980, over taxing receiving installations, unnecessary travel by mobilized soldiers, hurried development and transmission of information to mobilization sites, and requiring mobilization personnel to employ untried procedures for information collection on mobilized soldiers.\(^{52}\) There were problems in filling gaps in units with IRR soldiers. A Cold War concept, logistics unit productivity system (LUPS), whereby a family of logistics units organized with a cadre of troop program unit (TPU) soldiers and manned when needed with IRR soldiers, did not work and was scrapped.\(^{53}\) Still, the Army Reserve Personnel Center was able to contact over 95 percent of the 21,000 IRR soldiers it notified for activation.\(^{54}\)

Due to in-theater requirements and for back fill, parts of or cells of Army Reserve units, rather than the entire unit, were sometimes activated, frequently without their senior Army Reserve commanders and staff personnel. These cells were often combined into provisional organizations, which, in many cases, mirrored the units from which the cells had been drawn. Units and personnel especially affected by this practice were Army Reserve hospitals, dental, transportation, petroleum and water handling, military police, chemical decontamination, and linguist units.\(^{55}\) In Army Reserve planning, fillers were thought to be IRR soldiers, but that planning was based on having authorizations to activate the individual soldiers in the IRR. That authorization did not exist during the first six months.\(^ {56}\) In the early phase of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the mobilization process for IMAs was uncertain to some Department of the Army agencies. In the end, 2,364 IMA soldiers, 17 percent of the total IMA force, were called to active duty.\(^ {57}\)

Indeed, the general mobilization process was cumbersome and time consuming. Units and soldiers were brought together at the mobilization station and trained. The process could in some instances take over one hundred days.\(^ {58}\) Training at mobilization stations was uneven and varied. Much of the post mobilization time had been used, for example, for physical examinations and dental treatment. The number of non-deployable, non-mobilization ready soldiers presented problems leading to real personnel shortages. This was not only in the Army Reserve. There were significant gaps in some units and vacancies in critical military occupational specialists, as noted below.\(^ {59}\)
Frank Thomas’ painting, titled “Baghdad Express,” captures a special operations/Delta Force Commando team defending its CH-47 Chinook helicopter from enemy fire during a nighttime operation. This painting was one of several pieces worked on by the Army Reserve combat artist while he was deployed in support of Operation DESERT STORM. (Army Reserve Magazine, Winter 2000)
There were other issues with training and readiness. For instance, there was a low military occupational specialty (MOS) qualification rate for members of the 79th Quartermaster Company (Water Supply), a unit not considered to be a high priority for mobilization before the war. That changed. Consequently, Army Reserve Forces School instructors were placed on active duty to conduct a shortened MOS 77W (Water Treatment Specialist) course. Although awarded the MOS, these soldiers only knew the water purification part of the field. This became a problem when the XVIIIth Airborne Corps cross-leveled 77W MOS soldiers in Saudi Arabia to find they were not entirely qualified. The Army stopped awarding MOSs for shortened courses. There was also a related issue with some Individual Ready Reserve mobilized soldiers.60

There were several issues related to the 200,000 call-up system. Difficulties in granting pay and benefits, processing personnel, and using information systems made for a larger call-up. Cross-leveling could have been simplified if the Army had had access to IRR soldiers, especially for units required very early in the operation. This applied, for instance, to port operations and transportation specialists.

There were equipment issues. The Army Reserve was often using older equipment that was incompatible with active Army systems. Large amounts of equipment were cross-leveled as well as numbers of individuals. There were strategic lift issues, such as, with using the older C-141 aircraft.61 In some cases, units sent soldiers to the factory to pick up the equipment, took it to the mobilization station, and then straight into the desert.62

Another problem was the lack of a system for backfilling units. Sometimes two units would be called up to make one unit. That’s all that could be done.63 And, then there was the problem of units that had been inactivated under Project Quicksilver, a project to downsize the Army and the reserves following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Plans were made in 1990 to inactivate designated units; plans that were put on hold when Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT
STORM began. Some transportation units, for example, had been inactivated in the fall of 1990, but then were needed. The 660th Heavy Equipment Truck unit was inactivated in October 1990. Two weeks later the Army Reserve received an order from the Department of the Army to mobilize and deploy the unit. The unit had disbanded, the equipment had been dispersed, and soldiers had been detailed to other units. The entire unit had to be reconstituted. That occurred numerous times. A lesson learned was to make sure the right units were inactivated in the event of downsizing.64

In 1989, Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono stated, “The Army’s active forces are fully able to meet time-urgent requirements for U.S. land forces around the world without augmentation from our reserve components . . . . The U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard forces supplement the active forces and round out the Total Army for protracted contingencies or general mobilization.”65 This was the strategic role of the Army Reserve.

The fiscal year 1992 National Defense Authorization Act instructed the Department of Defense to conduct a study of the Total Force policy. On December 31, 1990, the Pentagon released the Total Force Policy Report to Congress. The report determined that in the future the active Army “should be able to deploy rapidly to trouble spots and to sustain themselves for the first thirty days with virtually no support from the reserve components. Under the plan, the active component would continue to use National Guard roundout brigades.”66

At the end of fiscal year 1991, the Army observed several trends requiring alterations to the Total Force Policy. Among them was a “reduction in the requirement to maintain sizeable ready forces for rapid deployment to Europe, and the effect of potential demands for immediate deployment anywhere in the world upon the state of Army training.” A smaller active Army meant increased reliance on the integration of the reserves, as evidenced in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Reservists needed to deploy together with the active Army in support of extended contingency operations, to deal concurrently with a second major contingency, and to be prepared for large scale threats. The Army planned to reduce both the active and reserves to a smaller but equally capable Total Force during a period of several years.67
“The Ultimatum – Standoff at Safwan,” painted by Army Reserve soldier Lieutenant Colonel Frank Thomas, displays a run-in between Iraqi and American forces over a piece of desert real estate. The area had been designated as a negotiation site for upcoming peace talks. Shortly after spotting the intimidating U.S. M1 Abrams tanks, enemy troops headed out. (Army Reserve Magazine, Winter 2000)
Establishment of the United States Army Reserve Command

To strengthen the role of the Army Reserve as a strategic force, the Army Reserve’s budget process was transferred from the FORSCOM commander to the chief, Army Reserve. This transfer occurred on October 1, 1990. On that same date, the Army provisionally established the United States Army Reserve Command.68

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The origin for the United States Army Reserve Command can be traced back decades before its actual establishment in 1990. In 1967, Congress passed watershed legislation in the form of the Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act. This act prescribed reserve leadership for reserve units. For the Army, the act created a statutory chief, Army Reserve (CAR) who served as an advisor to the chief of staff of the Army on Army Reserve matters. Command and control of the Army Reserve, however, was under the Continental Army Command (CONARC) until 1973 and after that under FORSCOM. The act also virtually eliminated bitter congressional deliberation over reserve component policy--for awhile.69

The House Committee on Appropriations (HAC)’s Surveys and Investigation staff rekindled the debate in 1988 while reviewing Chief, Army Reserve Major General William F. Ward, Jr.’s command support center concept. The staff uncovered two command and control reporting chains for the Army Reserve: one through the continental Army commands (CONUSAs) to FORSCOM and the other to the Office, Chief Army Reserve (OCAR). Congressman Bill Chappell, Jr., chairman of the HACs’ Defense Subcommittee, raised the issue with Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr. He also raised another issue: the “need for the Chief Army Reserve to become more involved in the problems of the Army Reserve.” Chappell directed Marsh to: “look into the practicality of having the Chief of Army Reserve also function as the reserve component
commander and of establishing a single reporting chain by consolidating the administrative units similar to the other Reserve components. . .” Chappell wanted a report back by January 15, 1989, explaining that the committee planned to turn its attention to this issue during hearings on the Army Reserve for fiscal year 1990.70

Marsh wrote in a February 7, 1989, letter to Congressman John P. Murtha, who had replaced Chappell as the chairman of the HAC’s Defense Subcommittee, that “perhaps it is time we completely reexamine the entire question of command and control of the Army Reserve.” Marsh cautioned, however, that the “wide-ranging ramifications of such an effort demand that we devote requisite time and manpower to ensure that all of the factors affecting this issue are fully considered.”71

What ensued were months of studies, proposals, and concept plans made by FORSCOM; the Army; and the Office, Chief Army Reserve (OCAR). Meanwhile, the HAC’s Survey and Investigations Team (S&I) continued its examination of the Army Reserve’s command and control structure. It was concerned, also, over the chief, Army Reserve’s virtual inability to influence the use of Army Reserve funding. FORSCOM and OCAR signed a memorandum of agreement on January 1990. It marked considerable progress on the establishment of an Army Reserve command. The reserve command was to be organized as a major subordinate command of FORSCOM. FORSCOM was to develop overall policy for the Army Reserve, supporting the Total Army, while the reserve command was to prepare implementation policies, plans, and programs in accordance with FORSCOM policies. The span of control was to be further developed as was the organization of the com-
mand. There were remaining issues to be resolved, such as FORSCOM’s proposal to dual-hat the active component CONUSA deputy commanding generals as Army Reserve command deputy commanding generals.72

More planning, debate and delays continued as Congress monitored the progress. On June 1, 1990, a significant event occurred when Stone signed a memorandum to Ward giving him “direct control over the allocation, distribution, and control of funds for the three Army Reserve appropriations [Reserve Personnel Army (RPA), Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR) and Military Construction, Army Reserve (MCAR)] … effective October 1, 1990.”73

By July 19, 1990, a plan was developed for presentation to Congress. The U.S. Army Reserve Command would be a major subordinate command of FORSCOM; it would be in Atlanta, Georgia; and the chief, Army Reserve would be a lieutenant general (which did not materialize), triple-hatted as the chief, Army Reserve, the U.S. Army Reserve Command’s commanding general, and FORSCOM deputy commanding general for reserve affairs. Control of Army Reserve units for training operations, mobilization, and deployment (TOMD) was to remain with the CONUSAs. On October 1, 1990, General Vuono told FORSCOM Commanding General Edwin Burba that he and the secretary of the Army had approved the plan. Headquarters, FORSCOM Permanent
Order 183-13, dated that day, organized the U.S. Army Reserve Command (Provisional), Fort Gillem, Georgia. A Planning Group, established on March 28, 1990, led by Colonel Topper, continued its work on the details, such as the table of distribution and allowance (TDA) and the organization and functional manual for the new command.74

In October 1990, the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) began planning the assumption of Army Reserve functions from the CONUSAs, while building a staff to execute those functions. In that same month, the USARC became an operational command under FORSCOM and controlled 475 functions from the recently deactivated Fourth U.S. Army.75

Meanwhile, Congress presented its own resolution. The House version of the 1991 Defense Department authorization bill had not included a specific provision on the Army Reserve command. Added in committee was a section providing that the reserve component chiefs were to be “solely responsible for administering and supervising their respective components.” “This provision was part of the bill... reported out of the Armed Services Committee on August 3, 1990, and passed the House of Representatives on September 19, just twelve days before” the Army established the USARC. The Senate bill had no such provision. A conference committee had to be convened. The legislators were not completely satisfied with the Army’s action. It did not go far enough. According to the conference report, “The conferees are pleased... that the Army has initiated actions to establish an Army Reserve Command. The conferees are concerned, however, that command and control relationships between active and reserve forces, which are perceived by many as contributing factors to the relatively low readiness status of the Army Reserve, are not sufficiently changed in the current Army plan to provide actual command and control to the Chief of the Army Reserve. Specifically, the conferees note that the Chief of the Army Reserve should command all non-mobilized reserve units with the exceptions included in the amendment [forces assigned to carry out functions of the Secretary of the Army specified in section 3013 of Title 10, United States Code].”76

On November 5, 1990, The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 required the establishment of an Army Reserve command under the command of the chief, Army Reserve as a major subordinate command of FORSCOM and assigned to command all Army Reserve forces in the continental United States, save forces assigned to the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. There would be a two year test period. The legislation directed the secretary of defense to establish an independent commission to assist him in evaluating the progress and effectiveness of the command. Twenty-three years after passage
of the Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act, the chief, Army Reserve was in statutory command and control of the Army Reserve. And, the Army Reserve Command’s activation ensured that, for the first time in its history, the Army Reserve held complete resource allocation over virtually its entire force structure. The new command managed all Army Reserve funds.78

In the fall of 1992, the USARC became fully operational with a full strength staff of over 810 military and civilian employees. The staff was spread out over ten buildings at Forts McPherson and Gillem. In October 1992, the Independent Commission released its report. Among the recommendations were: making the USARC a major Army command by 1995, elevating the USARC
commander to lieutenant general, and focusing by the Army leadership on such core issues as adequate Army Reserve resourcing levels for full-time support, equipment, sustainment, personnel, and training.  

**Activation of the Regional Support Commands**

To compensate for the cuts imposed by the Off-Site Agreement, discussed below, the USARC began a study in 1994 to reduce the table of distribution and allowance (TDA) overhead to field as many deployable forces as possible. In July, the Army Reserve concluded the study. The study recommended a reduction in the TDA command and control structure as the reductions in the Selected Reserve continued; improved command and control management, competency, and value; and provided for unproblematic access to reserve units and personnel during crises.

In the fall of 1992, the USARC became fully operational.

Shoulder sleeve insignia of the U.S. Army Reserve Command. The double eagle reflects the unit motto “Twice the Citizen.” The eagles, facing both directions, denote vigilance and a wide-ranging scope of ability and experience. The colors duplicate those of the flag of the United States. This insignia was approved on June 24, 1991. (Photo by Timothy L. Hale, U.S. Army Reserve Command Public Affairs)

Distinguished unit insignia of the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC). The tree represents the pursuit and preservation of peace through strength, endurance and growth. The crossed swords symbolize the dual responsibilities of citizenship and military service. This insignia was formally approved on March 7, 1991. (Photo by Timothy L. Hale, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Public Affairs)
This review of the Army Reserve’s command and control structure recommended inactivation of the twenty continental United States Army Reserve commands (ARCOMs) and activation of ten regional support commands (RSCs) and three regional support groups (RSGs). Troop program units were not affected, nor were ARCOMs in Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Germany.

“We’re transforming into a new Army Reserve,” observed Baratz, “not a smaller version of the cold war force.” Restructuring achieved the following:

1. assigned the three RSGs to the three RSCs having the greatest numbers of soldiers or largest geographically, broadened missions at the command level to support readiness and management;
2. streamlined pre-mobilization functions;
3. reduced the USARC’s command and control span from forty-seven direct reporting units to thirty-one;
4. aligned the RSCs to the ten standard federal regions.

The RSC’s mission would be command and control of all assigned units and providing full service support to all Army Reserve units within their region. This reduced the administrative workload for deployable commanders and allowed them to focus on wartime missions. Unit readiness improved by having a higher percentage of full-time support soldiers in fewer headquarters. The RSC alignment with other federal agencies would improve the Army Reserve’s ability to supply military support to civil authorities. Also, this new structure would provide federal planning assets to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) planners and managers at the regional level by establishing state and regional emergency preparedness liaison officers at each RSC. The
structure would also allow the Army Reserve to “provide more efficient military support to civilian authorities and federal agencies in support of domestic support missions.” The ten RSCs would be the 63d, 77th, 88th, 89th, 94th, 96th, 99th, 121st, 122d, and the 124th. ARCOMs scheduled to become reserve support groups were the 90th, 120th, and the 123d. ARCOMS scheduled for inactivation included the 79th, 81st, 83d, 86th, 97th, 102d and the 125th. Restructuring was set for September 1996.

The Base Force

In an effort to reshape the Total Force, there were three major official reexaminations of the U.S. military strategy and the forces requirements. The first was the Base Force. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin L. Powell’s Base Force executed the National Military Strategy (NMS) announced in 1992, which supported the National Security Strategy. According to Powell, the National Military Strategy reflected the new world order in which global war seemed “less likely . . . . Future threats to US interests are inherent,” he wrote, “in the uncertainty and instability of a rapidly changing world. We can meet the challenges of the foreseeable future with a much smaller force than we have had in recent years. Our force for the 1990s is a Base Force ---- A Total Force – A Joint Force - - a carefully tailored combination of our active and reserve components. This strategy provides the rationale for a reduced yet appropriate military capability -- a capability which will serve the Nation well throughout the remainder of the 1990s.” This new policy changed the focus from a “threat based strategy” to a “capabilities based strategy.” The National Military Strategy consisted of a number of military strategic concepts: readiness, collective security, arms control, maritime and aerospace superiority, strategic agility, power projections, technological superiority and decisive force.

The Base Force provided a new military strategy and force structure for the post-Cold War “while setting a floor for force reductions.” This rested on
four foundations: strategic deterrence and defense; forward presence; crisis response; and reconstitution. Although the Base Force recognized the need to fight multiple major wars, the size of the force would be determined mainly by regional needs. Although the Base Force addressed the “full spectrum of threat,” there is not much “evidence that substantial involvement in peacekeeping and other peace operations was anticipated during its development.”

It called for the Army to be reduced between 1990 and 1995 from eighteen active divisions to twelve and from ten reserve divisions to six. Active Army total maneuver brigades would be reduced from fifty-two to thirty-six and from fifty-five to thirty for the reserves.
The Audie Murphy, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
The Bottom-Up Review

The second major force structure review was Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s October 1993 *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*; it shaped defense planning and Army policy through fiscal year 1999. Aspin had been one of the more vocal opponents of the Base Force. The Bottom-Up Review resulted from President William J. Clinton’s comprehensive review of the armed services and American defense strategy. The Bottom-Up Review set the national defense to face two theoretical major regional conflicts, postulating near simultaneous contingency operations in Southwest Asia (Persian Gulf) and Northwest Asia (Korea) as the most likely scenarios.

“The Cold War is behind us. The Soviet Union is no more,” said Aspin. “The threat that drove our defense decision-making for four and a half decades - that determined our strategy and tactics, doctrine, the size and shape of our forces, the design of our weapons, and the size of our defense budgets - is gone.”

The *Report on the Bottom-Up Review* identified four dangers to U.S. security in the post-Cold War: nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction; regional threats; dangers to democracy and reform; and economic dangers. The Bottom-Up Review sized forces needed based on three requirements: major regional contingencies, peace enforcement and intervention, and forward presence. The number of active Army divisions would go from eighteen in the 1990 force to ten; reserve divisions would go from ten to eight. Active total maneuver brigades would go from fifty-two in the 1990 force to thirty-three; reserve maneuver brigades would go from fifty-five to forty-two. Even though the number of divisions in the reserves, including cadre divisions, remained the same between the Base Force and the Bottom-Up
Review force, the number of reserve maneuver brigades increased by twelve.\textsuperscript{93} The Bottom-Up Review set the Army Reserve end strength for table of organization and equipment (TOE) units at 152,000. This totaled 208,000 soldiers.\textsuperscript{94}

This new era would require the enhanced readiness of the Army Reserve. “Our approach,” stated the \textit{Report on the Bottom-Up Review}, “is to seek ‘compensating leverage’: that is, to use the reserve components to reduce the risks and control the costs of smaller active forces.” Compensating leverage meant “making smarter use of the reserve component forces that we have by adapting them to new requirements, assigning them missions that properly utilize their strengths, and funding them at a level consistent with what will be expected of them if we have to use them during a crisis or war.” The roles and mission of the reserves must be “explicitly” defined. The Bottom-Up Review acknowledged the reserves’ supporting role and their need for early deployment. They would “augment and reinforce deployed active forces and backfill for active forces deployed to a contingency from other critical regions.” Guard and reserve forces would play a role in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian assistance operations. Missions would include, among others, strategic airlift, service support, and civil affairs. “During prolonged operations, or when active forces redeploy during a major regional conflict, reserve forces are available to provide a rotational or replacement base.”\textsuperscript{95}

To realize a competent Army total force, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve must adapt, as the Bottom-Up Review explained, “to the new defense strategy, improving and accelerating the process of readying combat forces for deployment, and utilizing . . . [them] in areas where they have performed effectively and responsively in the past.” The some 700,000 Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers would decline to about 575,000 by 1999 to realign the force structure supporting the new defense strategy. The Bottom-Up Review recognized that combat support and combat service support units in the Army Reserve were capable of deploying rapidly and being “integrated effectively into the active force.” Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM proved that. The future “reliance” on combat service and combat service support units “will depend on how quickly we can activate them in a crisis, as well as on the size of the residual active-duty support forces needed for peacetime missions.” The Bottom-Up Review called for expanding the role of the Army Reserve “in key areas to provide additional support for Army combat units and other U.S. forces involved in combat operations.”\textsuperscript{96}

The Clinton administration’s defense blueprint challenged the Army leadership to maximize reserve integration with the active Army, especially for major
peace operations where the mix of forces may require a high density of human intelligence, civil affairs, psychological operations and other support capabilities, which the active component lacked. The shift in military strategy, together with major contributions of the reserves during the Gulf War, offered chances for further developing the Total Force Policy.97

The Off-Site Agreement

As a result of the Bottom-Up Review, on October 29, 1993, Vice Chief of Staff, Army General J.H. Binford Peay III hosted a meeting in which the chief, Army National Guard; the chief, Army Reserve; senior leaders of the active Army; and representatives from concerned reserve professional associations participated. The results became known as the Off-Site Agreement, described as a “dandy” by then Chief, Army Reserve Major General Roger W. Sandler.98 It was the first time the three components worked together on major restructuring. The Off-Site Agreement, a refocusing of the reserve missions, helped define the Army Reserve’s future role in national defense as an element of Force XXI, described below.

The Off-Site Agreement defined reserve end strength. It stabilized and reduced the reserve end strength at 575,000: 367,000 for the National Guard by fiscal year 1999 and 208,000 by the end of fiscal year 1998 for the Army Reserve.

The Off-Site Agreement also resulted in the swap of the majority of the Army Reserve’s combat units for National Guard combat service support units and migration of most of the Army Reserve aviation assets to the National Guard.99 The Army’s final decision was to shift about 14,000 current Army Reserve positions—mostly in the combat arms and aviation—to the National Guard and to move about 10,000 current National Guard positions—in combat support and combat service support—to the Army Reserve. Also going to the National Guard were more than 4,000 soldier slots in aviation units. Remaining were about 2,000 slots in two AH-64 Apache battalions and in a number of fixed wing and CH-47 medium lift forces. Secretary of Defense Aspin announced the plan on December 10, 1993, as a major restructuring initiative. It was unprecedent-
ed in its scope. In short, the agreement stabilized reserve force structure and end strength reductions and led to the National Guard’s focus on combat arms and divisional level combat support and combat service support. For the Army Reserve it equated to a concentration in combat support and combat service support at corps levels and above. This enabled the active Army to sustain higher levels of combat troops and increased reliance on the reserves for support.100 ““These were not easy negotiations,” said Sandler. ““The units we are getting will continue our focus on our core competencies, and are a significant step in keeping all the Army Reserve in the war fight.””101 According to Baratz, ““The swap, or transfer of specialties between the Guard and Reserve, will give us the additional combat service support spaces we need. At the same time, the transfer will straighten out the roles and missions of the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. The Guard will be better equipped to assume its primary mission of providing reinforcement to the active Army’s combat units, and the Army Reserve will be at a higher state of readiness and will provide most of the Contingency Force Pool units [the power projection forces ready to deploy to regional crisis spots around the world].””102

The Army Reserve becomes combat support focused.

The USARC managed the transfer for the Army Reserve with execution by subordinate commands. To effect the transfer, the USARC published Operation Plan 94-1-1, Headquarters U.S. Army Reserve Command Swap/Migration dated June 29, 1994. The transfer of units began in fiscal year 1994. The transfer, to be completed in fiscal year 1996 for all aviation units, was to reduce the Army Reserve’s aircraft total fleet from a high of over 650 to 150. The National Guard planned to turn over 128 combat support and combat service support units (e.g., quartermaster, transportation corps, ordnance, medical, signal and military police) containing 11,062 authorizations to the Army Reserve; the Army Reserve would turn over forty-four units with 14,049 authorizations. Over 8,000 positions were transferred in fiscal year 1995.103 The Army Reserve took these measures essentially to strengthen its core competencies and improve readiness for supporting the power projection force.
Report of the Commission on the Roles & Missions of the Armed Forces

The third major review of the military since the end of the Cold War was Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles & Missions of the Armed Forces, released in May 1995. Largely in disaffection with the Bottom-Up Review, in the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress mandated the Commission on Roles & Missions. The central message for the Department of Defense from the report was that “in the 21st century, every DOD [Department of Defense] element must focus on supporting the operations of the Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs). Everything else DOD does . . . should support that effort.” Congress asked the commission to study “Reserve Component roles and missions in DOD’s future Total Force.” In essence the commission recommended that the reserves be “size[d] and shape[d]
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The commission recommended “five general principles for sizing, shaping, and employing the Total Force to better integrate Reserve Components. . . . First, the Total Force should be sized and shaped to meet the military requirements of the national security strategy. . . . Maximum reliance on the Reserve forces conserves resources for other critical needs and involves the American people more broadly with their Armed Forces,” a lesson learned from the Vietnam War. Second, a system of “tiered resource allocation” should be adopted by the secretary of defense to ensure forces deployed early have “higher priority for training resources, personnel, and equipment.” Third, reserve “forces with lower priority tasks should be eliminated or reorganized to fill force shortfalls in higher priority areas.” The report pointed to the eight National Guard combat divisions that were needed to fight the Soviet Union but not required by the new National Security Strategy. There was a shortage of 60,000 combat support and combat service support personnel to adequately support all services in two major regional conflicts.

As a fourth principle, the armed forces “should ensure that individuals and units of the Reserve Components are fully incorporated into all relevant operational plans and actually used in the execution of those plans . . . . Reserve Components should participate,” the report continued, “in actual contingency operations commensurate with their training, demonstrated readiness, and availability.” The fifth principle called for more “integration and cooperation” between the active and reserve components. “Seamless integration is the key to effective Reserve support of the Total Force.” The report called for training reserve units “to perform specific tasks to the same standards as the Active component units, though they might not train to the same spectrum of tasks.” The report advised that all reserve units in the U.S. be “assigned in peacetime to the unified command responsible for the joint training and integration of U.S.-based forces. . . .” To promote active/reserve integration the report recognized avenues such as “joint training, common management information systems, personnel exchanges for professional development and experience, and making duty with the Reserve Component career-enhancing for active duty members of all Services.” “[W]here significant uncertainties or differences of opinion exist,” the report recommended “that DOD establish a series of tests, experiments, and pilot programs to determine whether Reserve Component units can perform to standards and whether different organizational and training arrangements would be more effective.” The report recognized increased reliance on the reserves.
An Army of One, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
Reshaping the Army

The Army had begun to reshape itself to fit the new strategic environment and had begun to transition from a Cold War forward deployed Army, prepared to fight the Warsaw Pact, to a force projection Army based in the United States with the ability to reconstitute (mobilize, train, and equip) additional forces. These new developments escalated the development of the Army’s AirLand Battle-Future concept during fiscal year 1990 and 1991. There was a shift in AirLand Battle concepts from high-intensity to low-intensity conflicts. This meant a change from “linear,” or a broad front line, to “nonlinear” or asymmetrical combat operations of highly mobile and self-contained forces. “The corps would remain the centerpiece of Army doctrine, but divisions would be lighter and employ combined arms brigades and a simplified logistics system.”

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Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan tried to redesign the Army with Force XXI. Force XXI was the Army’s all-inclusive line of attack to transform an industrial age Army to an information age Army. Digital battle command in the Army was now the focus. The Gulf War had shown the need to quicken the tempo of information sharing on the battlefield. Propagating electronic maps and graphics, for instance, would speed up planning and decision making. Technological breakthroughs suggested what some termed a revolution in military affairs driven by the microchip. Force XXI meant an adaptable Army with new capabilities for the 21st century, termed Army XXI. Army XXI was the intermediate step to the Army After Next discussed below.

Force XXI redesigned a smaller, more lethal and versatile 21st century Army with quality soldiers, flexible doctrine, tailorability and modularity, joint and multinational connectivity, versatility, and shared situational awareness. It called for key changes in philosophy, theory, materiel, and organization. Force XXI “served as the Army’s vehicle for modernization” throughout the 1990s. As General Sullivan explained, Force XXI “will be capable of achieving success - decisive victory - across a very broad spectrum of operations. Force XXI stretches from factory to foxhole, reflecting a focus on the battlefield at every level. Force XXI is about the integration of information-age technology across the entire force. Force XXI is about the seamless employment of active and reserve components’ capabilities.” General Sullivan’s Louisiana Maneuvers with its linked digital battle labs dependent on digital technology provided the “mechanization for synchronizing . . . [these] efforts.” The lighter, high technology-based Force XXI was a significant change from the heavier Gulf War Army of Excellence.

The Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) Task Force took its name from the General Headquarters Maneuvers of 1941 directed by Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall to evaluate readiness concerns in 1940 and 1941, preceding World War II. Launched in 1992, the LAM Task Force was the Army’s process for determining how it wanted to be organized, equipped and trained for the remainder of the 1990s and into the next century. It resulted in a combination of battle labs able to test “adjustments to organization, doctrine, and weaponry using the latest techniques for simulation and modeling.”
General Sullivan cautioned that in an effort to reshape the Army it should not be torn apart. “The Army of today—America’s Army—did not just spring into being,” he told a gathering in 1992 of the Reserve Officers Association. “It is the product of over 20 years of hard work, sweat, and sometimes blood . . . .” The “challenge” he said was “to shape a new and even better Army that firmly retains the essence of what we are all about as soldiers.” His vision: “The Army of the future must be a Total Force, trained and ready to fight; serving America at home and abroad; it must be a strategic force capable of decisive victory.”

Contingency Force Pool

As the Army leadership followed the fundamental shifts in world politics and strategy throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s and developed a National Military Strategy linked to the National Security Strategy, there emerged General Sullivan’s six imperatives to transform the service into an organization capable of executing his vision: “The Army of the future must be a Total Force, trained and ready to fight; serving America at home and abroad; it must be a strategic force capable of decisive victory.” His six imperatives taken generally from General Vuono’s vision were: “quality soldiers; a war winning doctrine; tough, realistic training; continuous modernization; proper force mix; and leader development.”

While implementing the six imperatives, the chief, Army Reserve made the readiness of Army Reserve units in the contingency force pool (CFP) the top priority. The CFP remained an evolving concept in 1993, incorporating the lessons of the Gulf War, the deep reductions in defense spending, and the realities of the post-Cold War era. “The CFP,” as Baratz explained, “is the power projection force that will deploy from the United States when called to regional crisis spots around the world.” The Army implemented the CFP concept for support units needed early in major contingency operations, recognizing the significance of support forces and the “severe constraint on resources for training.” CFP units received priority equipment and resources while non-CFP units were maintained at a reduced state of readiness. The CFP concept was a group of both active and reserve forces which provided highly ready combat support and combat service support units at the echelons above division and corps levels. These units could deploy with the active duty corps and divisions they supported and sustain these corps and divisions while in the theater. Army planners expected the CFP to consist of 59 percent active troops, 22 percent National Guard and 19 percent Army Reserve units. The CFP gave the Army the capability of world-wide deployment of up to two corps headquarters and eight and two-thirds active divisions from CONUS bases. At the close of 1992,
plans for the Army Reserve envisioned four force packages for supporting contingencies. Package I would support two divisions and a corps element. Package II would support units reinforcing the division and corps base. Package III would support the remainder of the corps and the lead theater elements. Package IV would support the remaining theater elements.¹²¹

By 1995, there were some 475 units in the CFP. The USARC managed all CONUS CFP units, except for Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units, managed by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. As a result of their priority management, the CFP units in 1995 received 115 percent full-time support and 100 percent equipping and priority for training, maintenance, force modernization, and recruiting. The program had increased readiness levels by 28 percent since October 1992. The biggest advantage the Army Reserve brought to the CFP was cost savings. The Army Reserve could provide the capability the CFP needed at one third of the cost of fielding a similar active duty unit.¹²² "The Army
General Gordon R. Sullivan, Sergeant Gene Snyder. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
Reserve’s CFP units,” Baratz stated, “will remain our first priority for readiness until we can be assured that they are at the readiness level that they need to be for whatever contingency the Army must meet.”

“The CFP units,” explained Baratz, “were the centerpiece of the Army Reserve’s tiered readiness and tiered readiness concepts.” Tiered readiness was the overall concept for prioritizing and managing the resourcing of Army Reserve units, including those in the CFP. Based on the deployment dates required to support regional operations, the Army Reserve classified its units into four tiers for funding, equipment, training, and recruiting in descending order from tier one through four. Tier 1 included Crisis Response Force units, CFP packages I through IV units with a latest arrival date of fourteen days or less and the force projection platform (ports and installations) to deploy them. Tier 2 included CFP packages V through VII, Early Response Force units with a latest arrival date of more than fourteen days but less than thirty-one days, and divi-
Taking the Point, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
missions (exercise). Tier 3 included U.S. Army Reserve Forces Schools, regional training sites, area maintenance support activities, equipment concentration sites, and the remaining units in the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) sequence. Tier 4 included inactivating units. As a result, the early deploying units received a greater share of training dollars and resources.\(^\text{125}\) By the end of fiscal year 1994, the 209 Army Reserve CFP units in tier 1 were authorized to receive 100 percent of their requirements in force structure program money. Two hundred sixty-nine units in tier 2 were authorized to receive 72 percent.\(^\text{126}\)

**Priority Reserve in Mobilization Enhancement**

The tiered resourcing concept supported the Army Reserve Priority Reserve in Mobilization Enhancement (PRIME) project introduced in 1993. This “deployability enhancement program,” was mainly “used to provide mission-capable troop program units (TPU) and individual volunteers for short-notice Army contingen-
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Hot Wash, Master Sergeant Sieger Hartgers. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
cies.” It increased the readiness levels of CFP units. OCAR managed PRIME through the USARC for CFP units and through the U.S. Special Operations Command for Army special operations forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations units. "During fiscal year 1993, the readiness levels of TPUs managed by PRIME increased by 20 percent. In addition, during the fiscal year, the Army enhanced flexibility in manning fully mission-capable units by targeting MOSs in the CFP for filling by the IRR. ARPERCEN developed a program for the IRR to identify members as replacements or fillers to support contingency operations.”

**Personnel Strength**

The war had been won; Hussein was kept in check by a continued NATO presence. The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The new world order called for the Army and the Army Reserve with its medical, logistics, finance, military police, and civil affairs units to take active roles in domestic support, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and nation building aimed at supporting rising democracies and political reform efforts. The American people and Congress expected a “peace dividend.” What did that mean for the Army and Army Reserve? In short, it meant a drawdown.

In fact, the drawdown had begun in fiscal year 1989. In June 1990, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney had submitted a plan to Congress outlining a 25 percent decrease in the size of the armed services during the next five years. The plan provided for a reduction of the active Army from eighteen divisions to a base force of fourteen divisions by 1995 and reductions in active Army personnel strength from 770,000 to 520,000. President Bush supported the cuts in a speech to the Aspen Institute Symposium on August 2, 1990. But, he warned that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that same day accentuat-
Figure I-6: Reductions in Active Army Strength

- October 1990: 765,287
- September 1991: 706,160
- October 1993: 572,000
Rock Drill, Master Sergeant Sieger Hartgers. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
ed the fact that the world was still far from safe. He wanted the reductions to be “accompanied by a careful and orderly restructuring of America’s armed forces.”

In October 1990, active Army strength was 765,287. By September 1991, it had dropped to 706,160. By September 1993, over two-thirds of the drawdown had been accomplished. By October 1993, there were 572,000 active duty officers, enlisted soldiers and U.S. Military Academy cadets. This was a drop of 38,000 during the year and almost 200,000 since the drawdown began. Expectations called for a continuing decline through 1997. The Department of Defense reported its lowest share of federal outlays in fifty years. The “peace dividend” was realized.

In 1993, Army Reserve end strength for the Selected Reserve was 279,615 personnel and 599,965 for the Retired Reserve. The Selected Reserve end strength continued to fall in 1994.
Securing the Firing Line, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
The overall decrease from strength in 1990 to 1994 was 13 percent across the reserve component. For the Army Reserve, the authorized Selected Reserve end strength of 321,700 for 1990 fell to 260,000 for 1994, a 19 percent decline. Assigned end strength for 1994 stood at 259,856. The authorized end strength for 1995 was 242,000. Each of the reserve components experienced shortages of 10 percent or more in a range of officer, warrant officer, and enlisted skills affecting readiness. Except for the Marine Corps Reserve and the Coast Guard Reserve, each of the reserve components reported noteworthy shortages of flag and general officer positions.134

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table I-2: U.S. Army Reserve Total Strength. September 30, 1990</th>
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<tr>
<td>Source: Army Reserve Magazine, First Issue of 1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ready Reserve 594,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Program Unit 282,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Guard Reserve 13,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Ready Reserve 284,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirees 471,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1,646,376</td>
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</tbody>
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<th>Figure I-7: U.S. Army Reserve Total Strength. September 30, 1990</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total: 1,646,376</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Retirees 471,723</td>
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Army Reserve enlisted paid drill end strength saw a 9,500 person reduction between 1990 and 1991. This reduction met the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Emergency Deficit Control Act reduction goals. Most of the cuts were accomplished through personnel attrition and selectively managing recruiting. Still in 1990, the Army Reserve achieved its Selected Reserve end strength objectives for officer and enlisted soldiers through intensive recruiting and loss management. Congress authorized a 1993 Army Reserve end strength of 279,600, a drop of 23,300 from 1992. Most of the decline came in soldiers assigned to Army Reserve troop program units, a cut of some 22,000. There was a correlating structure cut. Plans had called for cuts by reducing accessions instead of increasing losses. But, the inactivation of significant numbers of TPU units made involuntary separations inescapable. The fiscal year 1990/1991 Army Reserve end strength funding limitations resulted in decreased assignments to the Selected Reserve and increased assignments to the IRR.

The IRR’s size, with no “mandated maximum end strength,” depended on the number of soldiers who left the active Army. Consequently, it grew “dramati-
cally” after 1990. The “overall increase” from 1990 to 1994 was 64.2 percent. At the close of 1994, the “IRR was a robust part of the Army Reserve, larger than it had been since 1973 and much healthier than it had been in the late 1970s when it bottomed out at less than 200,000.”

Like the IRR, the IMA program was strong between 1991 and 1994 as depicted in Table I-3 above. In 1994, 967 IMAs drilled for pay. However, most (12,042) were in a non-drilling category.

There were also decreases in the crucial full-time support program, especially for the Army Reserve and National Guard. In 1991, the Army Reserve’s full-time support end strength was 7.7 percent of the force, the lowest of any of the reserve components. “For FY [fiscal year] 1992, the “Army Reserve had a 71 percent fill rate for its authorized full-time positions.” The National Guard’s full-time support stood at 70 percent. But, the Army Reserve “lacked far behind the [National Guard] in the ratio of Selected Reserve members to FTS [full-time support].” The trend continued for 1993. In fact, the Army Reserve’s “percentage of fill of authorized FTS [full-time support] positions had dropped to 63 percent while its ratio of Selected Reserve strength to FTS had risen slightly to 13.6:1.” Full-time support manpower assigned to the Army Reserve dropped from 23,128 to 20,595. For 1994, “the Clinton administration proposed to cut the Army’s reserve components civilian technician strength by 4,000 and the full-time support for the other reserve components by 6,000.” As for civilian personnel strength, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry “ordered an across-the-board reduction . . . of 4 percent by the year 2001.” For 1994, “the ratio of Selected Reserve to full-time support improved slightly to 12.8:1 due to a

Table I-3: Army Reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentees, 1992-1994
Source: Annual Report, Reserve Forces Policy Board, FY 92, FY 93, FY 94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Officer Budgeted/Authorized</th>
<th>Officer Assigned</th>
<th>Enlisted Budgeted/Authorized</th>
<th>Enlisted Assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>10,155</td>
<td>4,645</td>
<td>2,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>9,738</td>
<td>10,039</td>
<td>3,262</td>
<td>2,970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

William J. Perry

73
decline in Army Reserve manpower. “The actual number of FTS personnel declined by 213 to 20,382.”

For reenlistment, the “rates for first term Army Reservists increased slightly from FY 1991 to FY 1992, rising from 84 percent to 88 percent.” This was higher than the “pre-Desert Storm rate of 60 percent in FY 1988, but Army Reserve retention rates did not remain this high.” First term enlisted retention rates varied between 1991 and 1994.

With the assistance from Congress on issues such as incentive programs and education benefits, the Army Reserve continued to attract and retain quality soldiers. Among the programs were the Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP) and the Montgomery GI Bill. Through SRIP, incentives were used to support early deploying units, to maintain critical shortage skills, and to retain soldiers needed to meet readiness goals. At the end of 1990, 87,715 soldiers were eligible for benefits under the Montgomery GI Bill. Of that total, 58 per-
cent were using the program’s benefits. During 1992, the Army Reserve enrolled 71.2 percent (68,533) of 96,316 eligible soldiers. In 1993, the enrollment rate stood at 80 percent with 78,156 of the 97,400 participating. Save for the Marine Corps Reserve, the Army Reserve’s enrollment rate was “significantly higher than that of the other reserve components. . .”

Fiscal Strength

In 1992, the Army Reserve and National Guard formed 55 percent of the Total Army. However, they had only 13.8 percent (Army Reserve 4.5 and National Guard 9.3) of Total Army funding. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 continued the downward trend in the Department of Defense budget. Indeed, the Army’s budget declined from $77.7 billion in 1990 to $63.5 billion in 1994. In fact, from 1989 to 1993 the Army lost over a third of its effective budget. Its piece of the Department of Defense budget was around 26 percent throughout most of the 1990s. The Army Reserve
Knucklebusters, Sergeant Gene Snyder. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
represented 7 percent of the total obligation authority for the Department of the Army. This compared to 12 percent for the National Guard and 81 percent for the active Army. Army Reserve personnel appropriations fell by 2 percent in 1991. On a positive note, in that same time frame, operation and maintenance funding increased from $810.8 million in 1989 to $935.8 million in 1991 for a 7 percent increase. The Army Reserve experienced a 16 percent increase in military construction. In 1994, the National Guard and Army Reserve saw a shortfall in operation and maintenance funding, logistics support, air operating tempo, and school travel funds. During 1990, full-time support requirements were funded at over 90 percent in all reserve components, except for the Army Reserve and National Guard. The full-time support requirement for the National Guard was funded at 73 percent; 56 percent for the Army Reserve.\(^{152}\)

**Force Structure**

As of September 1990, 44 percent of the Total Army’s combat service support came from the Army Reserve; 26 percent of the combat support and 8 percent of the combat forces. The Army Reserve
constituted 32 percent of Total Army soldiers. One of those combat units was the 205th Infantry Brigade.

By the end of 1994, the Army Reserve had more than forty-seven major commands and two direct supporting units. There were twenty-one ARCOMs, seven divisions (institutional training), (discussed below), five divisions (exercise) (discussed below), one corps support command, three theater Army area commands, three engineer commands, one military police command, two transportation commands, one signal command, one infantry brigade, and one medical command. Additionally, fifty-six units with 8,400 force structure spaces were inactivated. A total of 2,400 spaces were activated. Seven hundred were conversions, updates, and reorganizations.

**BOLD SHIFT**

One of General Sullivan’s four strategies forming part of his vision was strengthening the Total Force. “One example of this strategy,” he said, “is BOLD SHIFT.
Our Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM experience was a great success, but it was also a learning experience. I believe,” he continued, “it is essential for us to capitalize on that experience to improve the readiness of the reserve component.” Referring to the activation of the U.S. Army Reserve Command and the Independent Commission’s study, he stated, “Regardless of what the study ultimately recommends, the underlying purpose is to produce higher levels of training and readiness and that is a positive step.”

In 1991, FORSCOM implemented BOLD SHIFT to improve reserve readiness in response to lessons learned during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The Army expected most reserve units to be ready for rapid deployment after a short and rigorous training session. However, many units lacked leaders with appropriate technical skills. Pre-mobilization training frequently did not ready a unit to fulfill its mission. Most units performed well in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, but preparedness was a problem. This congressionally mandated initiative supported the One Team-One Standard concept. Explaining the “overriding reason” for
BOLD SHIFT, General Burba commented, “we are indeed going into a new war-fighting era, a contingency era and that’s going to require faster deployability—entire readiness for everybody, active and reserve components. That coupled with . . . budget deficits, which are going to require the reserve components to play a more important role in the defense strategy in the future. So two things. A more important role in . . . future strategy and an increased readiness and deployability right along with the AC. That’s the Bold Shift initiative.”"  

It assigned active Army advisors to Army Reserve and National Guard brigades to correct the pre-and post-mobilization training problems. It involved streamlining Army Reserve, National Guard, and FORSCOM command schemes. Under BOLD SHIFT, active Army units developed associations with CFP units and assisted with reserve training and evaluations. The concentration for maneuver unit training was on gunnery and crew/platoon proficiency. Combat support and combat service support units focused on proficiency at the company level. 

BOLD SHIFT consisted of seven interrelated training and readiness programs which:

1. considered the demographics and proximity of schools and training areas for units;
2. set up operational readiness evaluations (OREs), used by the active Army to examine a unit’s wartime performance of its wartime missions more comprehensively than monthly training drills;
3. improved training for military occupational specialties;
4. established accomplisher levels of pre-mobilization collective training for support units;
5. improved skills of reserve unit leaders by following the qualification requirements of the officer and NCO educational system;
6. emphasized training with wartime chains of command, thereby re-identifying CAPSTONE;
7. enhanced support of reserve training and readiness requirements.
The ORE assessed training and readiness in two phases. During phase one, evaluators determined the unit’s compliance with existing policy and guidance in personnel qualifications, supply management, maintenance, and security. In phase two, the unit demonstrated its pre-mobilization and pre-deployment readiness through realistic and intensive training. Evaluation teams composed of Continental United States Army (CONUSA) officers and noncommissioned officers from the active Army, the National Guard, and the Army Reserve administered the OREs.161

During the first year of BOLD SHIFT, 291 company-size units participated; Total Army ORE teams from Army headquarters in CONUS evaluated almost fifty units. During the year, Congress increased the number of active Army trainers.162 Excepting full-time support, the ORE was the second most important element for improving readiness. In 1993, the Army expanded BOLD SHIFT to include all roundout, roundup, and CFP units. In 1994, BOLD SHIFT involved units from every major Army Reserve command.163 In short, BOLD SHIFT was designed to “maintain the war-fighting edge of active and Reserve units and strengthen Total Army cohesion.”164

Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement Training Support System

Closely related to BOLD SHIFT was FORSCOM’s Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement (GFRE) training support system. Picking up where BOLD SHIFT left off, the GFRE assisted commanders in measuring gunnery, lane training, command and staff training, as well as operational and unit readiness. The GFRE organizational structure was programmed to be fully operational by 1998, following a three year transition period (1995-1997), at which time it would assume the collective training mission for all reserve modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) units. It evaluated unit capability and then assisted the unit in training to standard, which included training support from the five newly created Army Reserve divisions (exercise). The GFRE provided active and reserve TDA units that significantly improved pre-mobilization training and post-mobilization collective training.165

Other Training Developments

In 1989, the Army introduced a comprehensive reserve training strategy following a study by the Reserve Components Training Strategy Task Force. The dep-
OPFOR Sergeant Jeffrey Manuszak. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
uty commanding generals of FORSCOM and the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) co-chaired the task force. The training strategy established a reserve goal, supported by major objectives, to improve reserve training. Strategy objectives were based on five dimensions of training: soldier, leader, collective, support, and management. The training strategy focused on task proficiency at battalion level and below. Reserve training strategy enabled commanders to develop and execute training plans designed to meet specific measurable objectives. The Reserve Components Training Development Action Plan, approved by the Army chief of staff, executed the reserve training strategy. It provided the Army with a single strategy to improve reserve training and mobilization readiness. Lessons learned from Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM supported the view that pre-mobilization training was crucial to minimizing post-mobilization training time.

The action plan detailed over thirty issues inhibiting effective training, the conditions required to resolve them, and the milestones for these actions. The action plan pulled together all reserve training initiatives into a balanced, comprehensive effort. It balanced requirements and resources, set priorities for programming and budgeting, and focused training development efforts for attainable goals. In
1991, the focus was on improving MOS qualification levels, leader development, and enhancing TPU inactive duty training. The action plan balanced requirements and resources, set priorities for programming and budgeting, and concentrated training development efforts toward achieving clearly defined, reachable goals. In the face of funding decrements in 1990 and 1991, resourcing of baseline programs supporting the action plan remained a high priority. In 1990 and 1991, some enhancement funds supported the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), MOS qualification training, and officer basic course requirements. In 1992, the action plan funded BOLD SHIFT initiatives.166

Over time, the active Army, Army Reserve and National Guard developed extensive, independent school systems which were hard to manage. These separate school systems gradually developed separate standards and provided inconsistent quality of training. Due to these problems and total force downsizing, it was no longer efficient or economical to operate three school systems within the Army. In response, Army Chief of Staff General Sullivan established in 1992 the Future Army Schools-Twenty-one (FAST) initiative under TRADOC to create a 21st century Total Army School System (TASS) offering cohesive and efficient institutional training that met standards with less resources. TASS objectives included:
1. establishing a tri-component partnership between the three components;
2. developing efficient use of facilities, equipment, personnel and time;
3. establishing one standard for all soldiers and institutions;
4. allowing any soldier to attend any school;
5. functionally aligning facilities and schools to institutional training proponents;
6. fully integrating a catalog-based system using Structure Manning Decision Review and Army Training Requirements and Resources System processes;
7. developing the Total Army training system courses;
8. gaining active component support of reserve component (Title XI);
9. leveraging the reserve component to assist with initial entry training mission execution;
10. making TRADOC the responsible agent for institutional training.  

According to Mr. John Hargraves, a senior Army Reserve training officer, it was TRADOC’s attempt to “integrate all the Army’s disparate schoolhouses.”

TRADOC Commanding General Frederick W. Franks, Jr. issued this guidance: “America’s Army needs a cohesive institutional training system that leverages available resources and investments currently in the Total Army School System. We need a Post Cold War Total Army School System across components. As we reduce the size of components, we must also reduce our institutional training investments.” The goal was: “A future Army school system which leverages AC/RC infrastructure for efficient institutional training that promotes institutional accreditation, instructor certification, standards, regional efficiencies, and sustains relevance and excellence in training and leader development.”

On August 26, 1992, Task Force FAST closed its initial data gathering phase with a briefing to General Sullivan. His guidance was: “TRADOC will lead, with support of FORSCOM, NGB [National Guard Bureau], and OCAR, the effort to establish a first-rate cohesive and efficient Total Army School System of fully accredited and integrated AC, ARNG, and USAR schools capable of providing standardized individual training and education for the Total Army.”
Laying an obstacle course, Sergeant Gene Snyder. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
In late 1992, General Sullivan tasked the deputy chief of staff, operations (DCSOPS) to conduct a close-hold study of the Army’s training structure. DCSOPS formed the Total Army Training Study (TATS) working group and directed it to study training support requirements, develop a concept to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of existing collective and individual training support structure, and identify additional structure needed to satisfy requirements. Its goal was to create a system that trained all soldiers to the same standard and basically in the same tasks and to do so with fewer resources. FORSCOM would be responsible for unit and collective training and TRADOC would be responsible for institutional training. FORSCOM was to continue its NCO Academies. The resulting TATS Concept Plan submitted by TRADOC, initially assigned FAST-structured U.S. Army Reserve Schools (then operating as troop program units and primarily located
in ARCOMs) to Army Reserve training divisions. It incorporated FAST principles such as the Army Reserve assuming responsibility for managing training in officer development courses and combat support, combat service support, and health services courses in each FAST region. The National Guard was to assume responsibility for leadership courses and combat arms courses in each region. The Army Reserve maintained four regional NCO academies while the National Guard maintained academies within seven existing State Military Academy Advisory Council regions. Each NCO Academy managed common core NCOES training within the region and could use instructors from the other component as required. Command and control remained with the component. Coordinating authority was exercised by the component with overall responsibility for leadership training within the region. Nine Army Reserve training divisions were maintained. Army Reserve initial entry training (IET) divisions were to change from production every third year to every year with no additional resources from the Department of the Army and increased capability from 4.5 thousand to 7.4 thousand graduates a year. Title XI soldiers provided active component training support to the reserves. Title XI was a congressionally-mandated program to provide active component support to the reserves for training and education in an effort to increase readiness and effectiveness.

On December 16, 1992, Task Force FAST again briefed General Sullivan. He thought FAST was on the right track. He approved three recommendations: an immediate moratorium on the creation of new training institutions and
Buddy Assist, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
courses; effective January 1, 1993, TRADOC was the sole accrediting authority for institutions conducting training for which TRADOC was the proponent; and beginning January 1993, Task Force FAST established and began testing a prototype Total Army School System (TASS) model.172

Task Force FAST established the prototype in TASS Region C, which included Georgia, South Carolina, Florida, North Carolina, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Its purpose was to test the Task Force FAST TASS concept. Task Force FAST, itself, had been institutionalized into the Total Army School System Coordinating Activity (TASSCA) at Fort Monroe, Virginia. A regional coordinating element was in place at Leesburg Training Site, near Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Its job was to use the existing facilities and manpower within Region C and begin initial operations.173 TRADOC had overall responsibility for the TASS.174

“The prototype sought to improve efficiency by organizing training on a regional basis and by changing schools’ missions from multi-functional (providing a variety of training courses) to specialized (limiting training to selected
The prototype also aimed to lay a foundation for a longer term goal—to establish a cohesive and efficient Total Army School System (TASS) “that would be more efficient and integrated” across the three components. On April 22, 1993, General Sullivan approved the Total Army Training Study for further development. The aim of the study was to develop an integrated Total Army Training Concept. The TRADOC piece was to examine institutional training. FAST was the TRADOC representative. Recommendations were:

1. combine the reserve training divisions and reserve training institutions;
2. designate TRADOC to be responsible for all institutional training;
3. incorporate the Total Army Training Study into FAST;
4. continue the initial entry training mission; and align the nine reserve training divisions (70th, 76th, 85th, 95th, 98th, 100th, 102d, 104th, 108th) with the nine proposed FAST regions.

On September 29, 1993, Task Force FAST updated General Sullivan. He was satisfied with FAST initiatives including Reserve Component Training Institutions (RCTIs) evaluation, evaluator certification, instructor certification, bringing all components onto the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS), resolving the divergent various training regulations, and tri-component cooperation.

The resulting concept plans of the Total Army Training Strategy were the origin of the Army Reserve’s divisions (institutional training) (DIVITs) and divisions (exercise) (DIVEXs). In 1993, the USARC staff finalized organizational design for the exercise divisions. The concept for the training units originated from the lessons learned from Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and the demands for a reduced force structure. The exercise divisions (75th, 85th, 78th, 87th, 91st) consolidated and reorganized the existing two maneuver area training commands, nine maneuver training commands, three training divisions, and the existing battle projection centers into five exercise divisions. These divisions provided training support for company through brigade-sized forces, as well as squad and platoon-level lanes training. The exercise divisions’ reorganization process began in October 1993 with an effective date for full mission execution set for October 1, 1994. Plans called for augmenting the size of each of the five exercise divisions from 5,177 to 12,761 personnel. Also, six regional training brigades were created. These divisions assisted in training Army Reserve and National Guard combat support and combat service support units to include signal, military police, chemical, and engineers during peacetime training. During mobilizations, they helped active Army readiness groups with unit validation. In 1994, soldiers from the 75th and 87th Exercise Divisions participated in ATLANTIC RESOLVE, a JCS exercise whose
OPFOR, Sergeant Gene Snyder. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
goal was demonstrating the United States’ capabilities to establish a multi-national joint task force and rapidly project United States and allied forces into a regional crisis. The 75th deployed twenty soldiers to Germany to support exercise simulation center operations. The 87th deployed sixty soldiers to Germany to support the simulation center as opposing forces (OPOR).\textsuperscript{180}

TASS provided for the realignment and assignment of Army Reserve training institutions within CONUS. The nine training divisions were transformed into nine DIVITs. In October 1994, a two-year test of the institutional training division concept began in the TASS Region C. In 1995, through an internal reorganization, the nine DIVITs were restructured to seven and aligned with TRADOC’s seven regional school systems. Army Reserve school brigades also were established. The seven geographically organized DIVITs (95th, 98th, 80th, 84th, 108th, 100th, 104th) consolidated the U.S. Army Reserve Forces Schools (which collapsed into a number of brigades within the DIVITs), the Regional Training Sites-Maintenance, and Regional Training Sites-Intelligence to provide individual training within one organization, thereby reducing command and control. Plans called to deactivate the headquarters of the 70th Division and the 76th Division. “To protect soldiers and maintain regional Army Reserve presence, one brigade from each division was to be integrated into the seven remaining divisions.” The plan consolidated all individual training into one common
structure and reduced the total number of soldiers assigned to the institutional divisions by 23 percent. Army Reserve initial training and reception battalion personnel authorizations and Army Reserve Forces Schools authorizations were reduced from 43,500 to 27,500. This saved some 16,000 authorizations.\footnote{181}

This multifunctional training included initial entry training, military occupational specialty qualification, professional development, refresher training, and as Hargraves explained, “to a small degree ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corps] adjunct faculty.”\footnote{182} According to Baratz, reorganization of the training units “supports the Total Army Training Study, and it will strengthen our capability to be a trainer for all of the components of the Army providing realistic training exercises for units, and demanding skill and professional development education for individuals.”\footnote{183} “The restructuring,” he added, “expands traditional missions of the divisions to include peacetime and mobilization skill training of individual soldiers... It also saves us money and significantly enhances readiness.”\footnote{184}

A significant event in Army Reserve training during the early 1990s was the establishment of regional medical (RTS-MED), regional maintenance (RTS-MAINT), and regional intelligence (RTS-I) training sites, critical for realistic and hands-on training. The RTS concentrated high-cost technical equipment and expertise at regional sites across the country. Reserve units and personnel went to the sites for sustainment, refresher, and enhancement training. In many instances, the regional training sites provided mobile teams and outreach programs to support units at their home stations and in the field. The Army began the regional training sites program in the 1980s in answer to unacceptable MOS qualification levels among reserve personnel and insufficient home station training facilities. Starting in 1992, the RTS-MAINTs began teaching MOS-producing courses and Phase III of the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) and the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) for maintenance soldiers. By 1993, fifteen RTS-MAINTs were completed.

RTS-I\textsuperscript{184}s trained enlisted soldiers and warrant officers in a sensitive, compartmented information environment, using real-time to near-real-time materials; training was unavailable at military intelligence unit home stations. By 1993, four RTS-I\textsuperscript{184}s were completed and one was under construction. As noted above, the DIVITs consolidated these to provide individual training within one organization.

RTS-MEDs\textsuperscript{185} provided central locations with state-of-the-art diagnostic and treatment training devices and deployable medical systems. Four RTS-MEDs were completed by 1993.\textsuperscript{185}
The capabilities for enhancing reserve training increased in December 1993 when the secretary of the Army transferred control of four FORSCOM installations to the USARC to include Fort Pickett, Virginia; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Fort Hunter Liggett, California, and Camp Parks, California. This first experience in installation ownership allowed the Army Reserve greater control of training. Forts Pickett, Hunter Liggett, and Camp Parks were sub-installations of Fort McCoy. According to Baratz, “Having these installations available to us will greatly enhance our ability to train Active and Reserve Component forces. They provide facilities needed to augment lanes training and Battle Projection Center (BPC) simulation. Camp Parks has its own BPC and the other three have facilities to link electronically over telephone lines with the nearest Battle Projection Center. The connection of live training and simulation gives commanders,” he continued, “the opportunity to observe the effects of their battlefield decisions and to test their combat support and combat service-support systems under realistic conditions. Being able to do this in a garrison situation maximizes the training while minimizing cost.” The Total Army Training Study (TATS) was the foundation for the simulation fielding plan to support the BPCs. The fielding of JANUS, the Army’s battle-focused trainer and brigade/battalion battle simulation (BBS), to the BCPs in 1994 enhanced reserve unit combat readiness.

Another significant training event continued in the early 1990s was the overseas deployment training (ODT) program. The program incorporated current wartime planning and CAPSTONE unit alignments and guaranteed realistic, periodic training in locations where Army Reserve units might be deployed. Many reserve commanders stated in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM after action reviews that overseas training was the pre-eminent preparation for actual deployment. ODT gave reserve soldiers practical training on mobilization, overseas deployment tasks, and wartime functions. Priority for ODT was based on a unit’s presence on a force deployment list, supporting a certain contingency plan, its CAPSTONE alignment, and its required in-country arrival date. The goal was for the earliest deploying units to conduct ODT a minimum of once every three years while later deploying units would train once every five years. In addition to being a training program, ODT was an important factor in enhancing soldier retention as soldiers had a sense of contributing to national security and training where they might actually fight. With the activation of the USARC, most funds for Army Reserve TPU training passed from OCAR to the USARC to the major U.S. Army Reserve Command (MUSARC). The CONUSAs coordinated and scheduled ODT for TPU soldiers in their respective regions. Although ODT was TPU oriented, there were some limited opportunities for IMA and IRR soldiers, which ARPERCEN managed.
During 1990, the Army Reserve sent 18,500 soldiers from 1,350 units or cells to train in more than fifty countries. Due to Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the scope of ODT decreased during 1991. Yet, over 12,000 soldiers from 1,113 units or cells trained in over fifty locations. During 1992, 17,225 Army Reserve soldiers trained in fifty-six countries. During that same year, Army Reserve units deployed to Europe to aid in the permanent withdrawal of active forces. More than 1,150 soldiers provided logistical support. For 1993, the number rose to 19,007 and for 1994 it rose again to 19,476 soldiers. Training included joint exercises such as REFORGER in Germany, TEAM SPIRIT in Korea, BRIGHT STAR in the Middle East, and YAMA SAKUR in Japan. Other types of exercises ranged from engineer to medical readiness exercises (MEDRETEs). MEDRETEs provided medical, dental, veterinary, and preventive medicine training. Among them was a month long MEDRETE in the South American country of Guyana. This was a continuation of Exercise FUERTES CAMINOS in Panama and another Exercise MEDRETE which occurred in Guatemala. Thirty-two Army Reserve soldiers deployed in 1993 for a MEDRETE in Bolivia. The Army Reserve established a field medical training site (FMTS) in Panama. In 1993, the FMTS support cell planned, coordinated and supported ten to twelve OCONUS training deployments of Army Reserve medical units/cells to remote areas of Latin America, providing medical civic action assistance to the indigenous population.

Army Reserve units travelled to Thailand for Operation COBRA GOLD '93, a joint exercise conducted with members of the Royal Thai Army. Medical Army Reserve soldiers treated people and animals; civil affairs and engineer soldiers constructed a community center and a school. Pharmacists filled over 500 prescriptions in one day. “There’s more than 300 different types of medicines there on the table—everything from aspirin to drugs for worming,” said Captain Lynne B. Westlake,” an Army Reserve soldier from the 322d Civil Affairs Brigade, Fort DeRussey, Hawaii.”
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

*M60 Range Instruction*, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
tists yanked decayed teeth from more than 400 villagers. Physical therapists instructed some complaining of a variety of aches on how to alleviate pain.” Major John C. Lewis of the 364th Civil Affairs Battalion from Portland, Oregon, commented, “The physical therapist told them how to squat and use their legs for lifting.” Sanitation engineers from the 351st Civil Affairs Command examined water, “the spilling factor for disease. . . .” Soldiers lived in “spartan conditions.” Sergeant First Class Scott B. Olsen, medical NCO-in-charge from Fort Bragg’s 96th Civil Affairs Battalion remarked, “We’re not here for all the ‘cushies.’ We’re working long days, but no one seems to mind . . . . We’re drowned in patients, but we can all get a good night’s sleep knowing we’re making a difference out here.”

One training initiative having long term affects on Army Reserve training and readiness was regular participation by Army Reserve soldiers in training at the
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

Operation BRIGHT STAR is a multinational exercise that is designed to improve readiness, interoperability, and strengthen military and professional relationships between the Third Army-led U.S. contingent, Egypt, and nine other nations. (Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System)

Checking for bacteria and minerals, Major John C. Lewis examines water from a village well in Thailand during Operation COBRA GOLD, ‘93. (Army Reserve Magazine, Fall 1993)
Looking for OPFOR, Fort Polk, Louisiana, Joint Readiness Training Center, 1995, Sergeant Jeffrey Manuszak. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
National Training Center (NTC) and at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), which began in 1990.191

**Equipment**

A major factor in evaluating the readiness of the Army Reserve was equipment. Department of Defense Directive 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Forces, contained the Department of Defense policy of “first to deploy/employ, first to be equipped.”192 According to a 1993 General Accounting Office (GAO) report, “this philosophy,” as Currie and Crossland put it, “short-changed the combat support and combat service support units, many of which . . . [were] in the Army Reserve.”193 As a plus, the GAO determined that “A limited number of combat and combat service support units in the reserves have been designated part of the Army’s contingency force.” But, the report found that “Some combat forces outside the early deploying force have been given higher equipping priorities in the DAMPL [Department of the Army Master Priority List] than some support forces in the contingency force.”194

During 1990, some 16 percent of reporting Army Reserve units indicated difficulty in accomplishing the bulk of assigned wartime missions due to a shortage of equipment. That represented a 4 percent
improvement over the same reporting period for 1989. In fact, from 1985 to 1990, the Army Reserve reduced the percent of units which could not meet their minimum combat readiness levels, due to equipment shortages, by 28 percent. Despite this progress, in 1992 the Army Reserve was short more than $4 billion of materiel required for wartime. At the end of 1990, the Army Reserve had only 62 percent of its required wartime equipment on hand, lagging behind all other reserves. By 1992, it had risen to 69 percent, yet behind the other reserves. By 1993, major equipment on hand reached 84 percent and 88 percent the following year. Although the Army Reserve seemed to be improving in equipment on hand percentages, “What was happening,” explained Currie and Crossland, “was actually a changing of the reporting methodology, rather than dramatic equipment get-well. Beginning with FY 1994, the reporting was of ‘combat essential’ equipment, which was a sub-set of the ‘major items’ of equipment previously reported.” Still there were improvements in Army Reserve equipment readiness in the early 1990s. As Currie and Crossland concluded, “Even considering the statistical comparison difficulties brought about by the change in reporting methodology . . . , it was evident that the percentage of fill of essential equipment items increased.”
Figure I-14: Army Reserve Wartime Equipment on Hand, 1990-1994

AR Wartime Equipment on Hand
1990-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1990/01</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure I-15: Status of Required Items on Hand, 1992

Status of Required Items on Hand
1992

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Component</th>
<th>1992</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Army</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Guard</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Final Push Through the Rumayiah Oil Field, Marion Acevedo. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
The 1993 GAO report “compared the status of required items of equipment for the active component, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. As of April 30, 1992, the active component had 89 percent of its required equipment, the Army National Guard was at 79 percent, and the Army Reserve brought up the rear with only 59 percent.”

During 1994, there were major equipment shortages, for example, in C-12 aircraft, radio and telephone equipment, and nuclear-biological-chemical equipment. Other overall shortages included “heavy equipment transporters, materiel handling equipment, tactical wheeled vehicles, water purification systems, single channel ground and airborne radio systems (SINCGARS) radios, tool sets, test sets and measuring devices and 2 1/2 and 5 ton trucks.” Even the downsizing of the active component did not help the Army Reserve eliminate its equipment.
Loading the Rail Pre-Board Inspection, Master Sergeant Christopher Thiel. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U. S. Army Center of Military History)
shortages” because as Deputy Chief of the Army Reserve Brigadier General Thomas Kilmartin said, “Traditionally, the equipment we’re short is the same equipment the active component is short.” So, “deactivating active component units . . . did little to alleviate the USAR equipment shortages.”

“A June 1994 report of the Defense Secretary Board Task Force on Readiness” stated, “Of particular concern . . . is the Army Reserve, which because of the nature of its role, has many high-priority support units that suffer readiness decrements because they lack low-visibility equipment (water purification, medical, laundry, decontamination, etc.) on which to train and operate.” “The task force noted that excess equipment from Europe has been combat equipment, while the Army Reserve has need of non-combat items.”

The Reserve Forces Policy Board reported as of the end of fiscal year 1992, “the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve are still experiencing equipment shortfalls as a result of the transfers to deploying units.” Contributing to the problem was equipment left behind in theater. As of the end of fiscal year 1992, “equipment for three Army Reserve units had not completely returned, while the equipment for six units remained in theater for possible use by a stay-behind force in Kuwait.” This, however, was better than the National Guard’s return
of equipment rate. “Sixty-five percent of the 367 pieces of equipment withdrawn from National Guard units had not been returned.”

A large portion of the Army Reserve’s equipment was transferred from the active Army. Often, the equipment and its maintenance mission transferred to the Army Reserve without the test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment (TMDE) and other associated support items. Sometimes, the active Army retained this equipment to support its mission while in others, the quantity on hand was not adequate to both support and train Army Reserve forces. Due to equipment shortages, the Army Reserve trained its maintenance personnel on new TMDE at RTS-Maintenance and high technology centers. While this was a sound and economic method of training in peacetime, it could not provide deploying units essential items of TMDE when those units were activated.

Equipment obsolescence was a problem. In 1990, the Army Reserve inventory included obsolete and non-deployable U-21 and U-8 airplanes and helicopters. Other equipment, such as signal generators and well-drilling machines, required modernization to ensure their compatibility with active component equipment. Among obsolete and incompatible equipment in 1994 were VRC-12 series radios, gasoline-powered generators, and certain older series trucks and trailers. There were incompatibility problems with active Army equipment. As the Reserve Forces
Policy Board reported in 1992, “Overall readiness is degraded because obsolete and incompatible equipment does not integrate with modern Active Army systems.”

As noted before, equipment issues occurred during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. In many instances, equipment cross-leveling began before the mobilized unit left its home station in an attempt to reduce the time needed to attain the Army’s deployment standard.

Many units arrived at the mobilization station without critical pieces of equipment. One of the lessons learned during the mobilization was that the equipping standard for Army Reserve combat and combat service support units did not meet the Army standard for deployment to theater. Most Army Reserve units received new or cross-leveled equipment to achieve the standard. The equipment came from war reserve assets, was cross-leveled from non-deploying and later deploying Army Reserve units, and/or came from Army surged production capacity which produced and delivered Dedicated Procurement Pro-
gram (DPP) equipment. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM proved to the Army Reserve that the DPP funds expended over the last few years had been well spent for the correct type of support equipment.

In order to reduce the time that activated units spent at mobilization stations, the Army adopted a policy for later-deploying Army Reserve units of shipping new or replacement equipment, identified by unit identification code, to the theater for issuance to the unit upon its arrival in theater. Throughout the mobilization process and preparation for deployment, the goal was to ensure that equipment shortages did not delay movement to theater. Due to the significant equipment shortages in the Army Reserve, the process of fully equipping its units required great “flexibility” in the Army’s ability to transfer equipment within its components.215
One More Crank, Heather Engelhart. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
A problem surfaced after the conflict: processing returning equipment and restoring to its pre-go-to-war condition. “At that time,” remarked Mr. John Roe, a senior logistician, “we felt that we should be resourced for that and do that work in our own shops.” But, “even with additional resources,” the Army Reserve simply could not “grow the force for that surge [needed] to that degree.”

The greatest improvement in Army Reserve equipment readiness was due largely to the Dedicated Procurement Program. Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense established the Dedicated Procurement Program in 1981 to provide needed readiness items to units. This supplemental program was over and above the president’s budget request for the National Guard and Reserve equipment appropriations (NGREA). NGREA was the funding appropriation from Congress that resourced the Dedicated Procurement Program. Congress designated some of the funds for certain types of equipment. The reserves may use the rest for discretionary purchases of equipment.

On January 4, 1992, the USARC became the executive agent for this program and submitted its first list of equipment to OCAR in April 1992. The chief, Army Reserve, as the Army Reserve program director, made the final decision on what items and quantities to purchase based on information provided by OCAR, USARC, Army component commands, and the Army staff. In 1992 and 1993, the chief, Army Reserve placed special emphasis on improving the equipment on hand readiness of units in force packages I and II.

Between 1981 and 1993, the Army Reserve’s Dedicated Procurement Program resulted in over 50,500 items of equipment valued at over $870 million distributed to over 1,200 units. OCAR prioritized equipment requirements for training divisions and regional maintenance sites for DPP procurement. Four large tugboats, the first new tugboats in the Army Reserve inventory in at least thirty years, were examples of the type of equipment distributed to the Army Reserve through DPP only. The reserves had procured or were scheduled to procure some $9 billion of equipment during 1989 through 1994 using NGREA funds, which reduced Army Reserve equipment shortages.


Force modernization equipment was usually classified as a new item of equipment, a modernized system, a major product improvement, or equipment displaced from the active Army to the reserves. The Army’s basic moderniza-
tion strategy of distributing equipment in stages and setting priorities for units and activities resulted in significant Army Reserve equipment modernization. Modification and conversion programs diminished archaic and mismatched equipment. The Army Aviation Modernization Plan, for instance, called for replacing the Army Reserve’s dated aircraft systems with more modern aircraft. In 1992, three aviation companies and one aviation battalion received the more up to date, turbine-powered U-21 aircraft, eliminating the last non-deployable, fixed wing piston-driven aircraft (U-8 Seminole and T-42 Cochise). One aviation attack battalion converted from AH-1 Cobras to AH-64 Apache helicopters. The Army Reserve activated two attack helicopter battalions with...
AH-64 Apache helicopter

Close-up of two CH-47Ds, 18th Aviation Brigade operations, vicinity of Logistical Base CHARLIE, Northern Province, Saudi Arabia (southeast of Rafha), February 11, 1991. (XVIII Airborne Corps History Office photograph by Sergeant Randall M. Yackiel, DS-F-170-06)
AH-64 helicopters. Two medium helicopter companies replaced the CH-47C model Chinooks with CH-47Ds as part of the CH-47D Chinook modernization program. Two of five Army Reserve assault helicopter battalions received the remainder of their UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters in 1992. In 1994, the CH-47D program converted ten each of C-47B helicopters to the latest CH-47D configuration. Army Reserve aviation forces became responsive to total Army mobilization needs. Wheeled vehicle modernization continued in all units.

Force modernization efforts in 1993 included reorganizing field artillery battalions equipped with 8-inch self-propelled howitzers to increase the number of howitzers in each of the battalion’s three firing batteries from four to eight. With eight howitzers in each battery, the new 3x8 organization increased the number of howitzers from twelve to twenty-four in each battalion. The Army Reserve also received older Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and UH-60, and AH-64 helicopters. This improved equipment readiness of the Army Reserve.
UH-60 Maintenance, Heather Engelhart. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
Also in 1993, Army Reserve mechanized forces were equipped with the M113A2 and M113A3 armored personnel carriers (APC) to operate as infantry and engineer squad carriers, medical evacuation carriers, maintenance support vehicles, and for other missions. The Army Reserve continued to convert M113A2 APCs to M113A3s to upgrade its resources. Congress directed the upgrades and modification to increase the survivability of the APC. In 1994, the M113A3 program converted eighty-seven M113A2 APCs to the latest M113A3 configuration.

Among the upgrades were armored external fuel tanks, an upgraded engine and transmission to accommodate the added weight, and fixing points for bolt-on power. But, even with these upgrades, the M113A3 had limited mobility, firepower, and armor protection compared to the M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicle, programmed to replace the APCs in mechanized infantry units.

There were developments with medical force modernization equipment. Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS) was a Department of Defense program to standardize military medical facilities and to eliminate shortages in health care equipment required for deployable hospitals. There were seven types of DEPMEDS-equipped Army hospitals, ranging from mobile Army surgical hospitals deployed far forward, close to the battlefield (MASH units), to general hospitals located farther to the rear. Each type of DEPMEDS hospital represented a different configuration of standard modules; for instance, operating rooms, laboratories, x-ray units, and wards. The fielding of DEPMEDS began during fiscal year 1987. During Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, eight Army Reserve hospitals operated DEPMEDS-equipped facilities in Saudi Arabia. By the end of fiscal year 1992, thirty-eight sets had been fielded. Also, fifty-two Army Reserve hospitals received their DEPMEDS equipment for individual and section training during IDT. The reserve components continued to receive their DEPMEDS equipment in one package under the total package fielding concept.
5th MASH, Ad-Damman, Saudi Arabia, Sergeant First Class Sieger Hartgers. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
In communications, the Army Reserve began upgrading its FM radios with the frequency hopping Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), fielding Mobile Subscribe Equipment, and upgrading the digital telephone switch systems of echelons above corps communications units, allowing them to support joint operations in any theater. SINCGARS was fielded to the Army Reserve through the Dedicated Procurement Program only.  

The Army Reserve participated in the Army’s Communications-Electronics Command’s Coordinated Logistics Support Program. Major communications-electronic equipment needing repair was the heart of the program. Items were on quick turn-around. Items not available for immediate exchange were quickly repaired and returned. Unit readiness increased. More equipment was available for training and mobilization. The Army Reserve began cycling communications-electronics equipment through selected depots in 1985, thereby, increasing the overall readiness of the Army Reserve. 

A significant program in 1991 was the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS). One goal of the RCAS program was to design, develop, and field an interactive information system capable of supporting mobilization as determined in Army contingency planning documents. A second goal was to improve the efficiency of administrative processes in the reserve components. RCAS supported Army Reserve command and control and management functions, especially functions for planning, preparing, and implementing mobilization activities. OCAR believed the RCAS would have aided the mobilization process for troop program unit soldiers activated for Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The Army awarded a contract in 1991 to design and deploy the RCAS. As Lieutenant Colonel Arthur House said, “Our computers are a jumble of one-time buys and jerryrigged hook-ups. But all that is starting to change with the long-awaited coming of RCAS.” By 1993, the contractor was installing RCAS off-the-shelf local area networks, office automation and electronic mail in Army Reserve units and their higher headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, and Washington, D.C.
The Army Reserve’s unfunded depot maintenance requirements rose markedly from $1.3 million in 1993 to $52.3 million in 1994. This affected the equipment repair and return program, construction and engineer equipment, communications and electronic equipment, and watercraft vehicles. Increases in unfunded requirements in 1994 were due to transferring the Army’s watercraft-dry-dock mission to the Army Reserve and costs connected with the service wide medium tactical truck improvement plan. The increases in unfunded depot maintenance requirements were owing to programmed maintenance scheduling of the Army Reserve’s equipment and vehicles.

In 1990, the Army Reserve’s equipment on hand dollar inventory experienced a $3.9 billion shortage. As of March 1993, the amount was some $4 billion. Although the Army Reserve was downsizing, the inventory value grew as units modernized and converted to the latest tables of organization and equipment (TOEs). Although the Army Reserve suffered no equipment maintenance backlogs in 1988 and 1989, budget reductions produced a $1.7 million depot maintenance backlog for 1990, producing a reduction of aircraft available for training. Budget constraints had a rippling effect. For example, due to budget constraints in 1990, the Depot Aviation Maintenance program suffered, delaying the repair and maintenance of some aircraft. And, as the Army procurement funding declined, so did the number of new combat service support systems provided to the Army Reserve.

Army Reserve soldiers were heavily involved in RETROEUR, the Return of Equipment from Europe, an operation begun in 1992 to return Cold War materiel to the United States, resulting from the drawdown of European based forces. Through RETROEUR, the USARC was able to receive needed equipment, repair it, and redistribute it at a cost savings to the Army. In 1994, the USARC working, with the Department of the Army and the Army Materiel Command allotted over 140 pieces of equipment for delivery to Army Reserve units. The USARC determined the equipment’s destination point and shipped the piece directly from Europe to an equipment concentration site or an area maintenance support activity for repair, thereby, saving second destination transportation charges. Through the program, the Army Reserve was able to use its maintenance facilities, existing tools and test equipment, and its management structure to add equipment to its inventory. Some of the equipment was prepositioned afloat for contingencies or sold to foreign countries. In 1994, over thirty units and 4,720 Army Reserve soldiers participated in the operation, a 55 percent increase over fiscal year 1993.

One such unit was the 344th Maintenance Company, a heavy equipment outfit from Bogalusa, Louisiana. For their midwinter duty, the soldiers worked in
five shops in an Army maintenance facility in Kaiserslautern, Germany. They trained in over seventeen specialties. “We uncrated, cleaned, inspected, honed, and rebuilt diesel engines,” said Chief Warrant Officer 4 Walter Craig, “going all the way from a block to a finished engine.” Other soldiers modified trailers, transmissions and transfer stands, did welding and body work on vehicles, and worked on electrical generators. Kaiserslautern, Germersheim, and Mannheim were other training sites in Germany. Units deployed to sites in Europe received special three week annual training tours. Another unit, the 143d Transportation Command from Orlando, Florida, worked in 1994 on a special RETROEUR mission out of the ports of Antwerp, Belgium, and Charleston, South Carolina.240

**Liaison and Contingency Operations**

The Army Reserve participated in several liaison and contingency operations overseas. After Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, Saddam Hussein and his forces made several attacks on Kurds who had opposed him. Hundreds of Kurds sought refuge in the mountains of northern Iraq along the border with Turkey. By April 16, 1991, U.S. forces were assisting the Kurds and trying to prevent mammoth starvation in what became known as Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. The 354th Civil Affairs Brigade served as the “on-the-ground civil affairs headquarters.” It took several weeks for the unit to arrive in Turkey. The 354th, under the command of Colonel Robert H. Beahm, became attached to Task Force BRAVO in Zakho, Iraq. The 354th had command and control of the 418th, 431st, and 432d Civil Affairs Companies.
For almost six weeks these units “moved, housed, clothed, and fed the hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees. The 431st Civil Affairs Company moved into Duhok, Iraq, to assist private organizations in the resettlement efforts in that city.” The mission was completed by June 1991 and the Army Reserve soldiers were redeployed. Two of them, Captain Mark Wolfenberger and First Lieutenant Angela Blevins, had developed a software program, the Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System, to track the relief supplies.

In May 1991, Army Reserve soldiers from the 351st Civil Affairs Command together with active Army and marines assisted in the humanitarian relief operation in Bangladesh (Operation SEA ANGEL) after a cyclone had devastated the country. Soldiers from the 364th Civil Affairs Brigade, the 322d Civil Affairs Group, and the 402d and 413th Civil Affairs Companies joined the 351st. The relief operation ended in late May. All soldiers and marines redeployed by June 3.

Also in 1992, a team of twelve Army Reserve soldiers from six civil affairs units across the United States, led by the 353d Civil Affairs Command, deployed to Cameroon. This was the 353d's second trip to Cameroon, a central African country of twelve million people. The 1991 trip was a “meningitis vaccination campaign [which] bore fruit in early 1992 when a particularly severe outbreak of the dreaded annual epidemic took place in the province, but with a slight impact on those villagers vaccinated in 1991.” The 308th Civil Affairs Brigade led the 1991 mission. Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Barrager, the 353d's operations officer recalled, “Transportation, potable water and resupply of heavily used medications for the pharmacy were daily challenges.” Assessing the importance of the mission, Colonel Albert Grupper, mission commander of the American contingent, commented, “Having Army Reserve civil affairs medics familiar with some of Africa’s diverse diseases, medical practices, and cultures will be a big help in a relief or contingency operation in Africa.”

The USARC canvassed Army Reserve units world-wide to form a group of volunteer Army Reserve soldiers from seventeen different Army Reserve units to create the 711th Adjutant General Postal Company (Provisional) to support Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia. The final number of troop program unit soldiers was five officers and forty-three enlisted personnel. These soldiers were placed on a temporary tour of active duty for 179 days. They gathered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, before Christmas 1992. The unit not only faced the task of assembling the soldiers, but also acquiring the proper equipment. The 711th, under the command of Captain Tamara Dozier, arrived in Somalia on January 14, 1993, a relatively quick mobilization and deployment. They joined the 24,000 soldiers and U.S. military personnel serving in Somalia.
The active Army’s 129th Adjutant General Company (General Support) (Postal) had been providing postal services to the thousands of U.S. troops in Somalia until relieved by the 711th on February 1. The unit operated the whole mail system to include post offices at Baledogle and Kismayu. The volume of mail did not necessitate the number of deployed 711th soldiers. Consequently, by the end of March the number of soldiers was reduced to nineteen. The other soldiers had redeployed to Fort Bragg. The 711th remained in Somalia until June 1993, wherein it was relieved by the active Army’s 43d Adjutant General Detachment (GS Postal).246 Reflecting on his experience, Sergeant John Bjork commented, “I saw an opportunity to restore hope. I guess, and that’s why I volunteered.” As First Lieutenant Edith Sneed added, “Something inside me said it was God’s work,’ . . . . That’s why I left my civilian job to do this.”247

Assessments of the 711th’s performance differed. Criticism came from the Department of the Army. An Army Inspector General investigation reviewed allegations of poor mail handling and delivery in addition to other issues. Others thought the unit performed well. Indeed, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Hardesty, the 10th Mountain Division G-1, said the “RC unit could run circles around the AC unit,” a reference to the 129th.248

Although the Army Reserve had in Sandler’s opinion, “great success getting volunteers to man the 71th AG Postal Detachment. [I]t would have been easier to reach into our inventory of units and involuntarily called one to duty. Access to the Army Reserve is not easy, and it should be.” He explained that the Department of Defense was “considering proposing a mechanism to put units and members of the Individual Ready Reserve on active duty without elevating that decision to the President . . . . This will require,” he continued, “a change to the law, giving the Secretary of Defense authority to mobilize a small number of units and individuals - 25,000 - for duty. With that authority the unified and specified commanders-in-chief will know they can count on the Army Reserve to fulfill their contingency requirements.”249
Midday Madness in Mogadishu, Master Sergeant (Ret.) Peter G. Varisano. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
Mogadishu, Somalia, Master Sergeant (Ret.) Peter Varisano. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
Other soldiers deployed to Somalia included volunteers from the 352d Civil Affairs Command from Riverdale, Maryland, who began arriving there in October 1993. The unit worked with the active Army’s 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) until that unit departed in December wherein the Army Reserve soldiers continued the mission. As Sandler adjudged, “The value of our contributions can be seen in the faces of the Somalia citizens who now, for the first time in years, can count on a simple meal and a peaceful home.”

The Army Reserve participated in the Joint Military-to-Military Contact program in June 1993 by sending members and chiefs of military liaison teams to Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and other once Soviet bloc countries. Army Reserve soldiers were members of overseas traveling contact teams, sharing their skill in medicine, engineering, reserve force structure, and civil affairs. The emphasis was on refugee operations, emergency planning, and disaster relief. Over 6,000 Army Reserve soldiers participated in humanitarian assistance and host-nation support missions under the Joint Military-to-Military Contact program. This program and the overseas deployment training program allowed Army Reserve soldiers to participate in operations in Eastern Europe and Central and South America. The Army Reserve conducted several medical readiness training exercises and host-nation support operations in Central and South America. The biggest host-nation support exercise was FUERTES CAMINOS, which included road repair and expansion, water drilling, airport runway repair, and road and bridge construction.

In 1993 and 1994, many Cubans fled their country filling the refugee camp at Guantanamo, Cuba. The United States persuaded Panama to agree to the establishment of a camp at Empire Range near the Panama Canal. While active Army soldiers operated the camp, Army Reserve civil affairs specialists were the main “contact between the Cubans and the American authorities” in what was known as Operation SAFE HAVEN.
Football Army Style, Sergeant. Gene Snyder. Playing an impromptu game of football with Cuban refugees during Operation SAFE HAVEN. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
Engineers, Laying a drain during Operation SAFE HAVEN, Sergeant Gene Snyder. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
Map 3
Reacting to Clinton’s ninety day call-up of Selected Reserve soldiers, the National Guard and the Army Reserve provided support operating in Haiti in what was known as Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (September 19, 1994 – March 31, 1995). It was an intervention to remove the military regime installed by the 1991 Haitian coup d’état, which overthrew the elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The secretary of the Army was authorized to call-up 800 soldiers from the Selected Reserve. Army Reserve soldiers mobilized on September 19, 1994. They were civil affairs and psychological operations specialists along with transporters from nine units. Their mission: “support civil institutions in Haiti and serve as liaisons between military personnel and civil authorities-once civilian authorities are recognized as legitimate.” The initial contribution was 400 National Guard military police soldiers, 270 Army Reserve civil affairs and psychological operations specialists, ninety Army Reserve medical IMAs, and forty Army Reserve transportation specialists. Since 75 percent of the Army’s psychological operations units resided in the Army Reserve, the call-up of these soldiers was “almost a necessity.” Plans calling for continued operations in Haiti in October 1994 led the Army to request an additional call-up; the secretary of defense authorized that call-up on October 17, 1994. Consequently, 2,093 National Guard and Army Reserve personnel were mobilized. Army Reserve Chinook helicopter units were among the last American forces to leave Haiti. More than two thirds of all reserve forces mobilized for the operation were from the Army Reserve.

Due to troop reductions and the high operational tempo, in 1994 the Army decided to form a composite unit earmarked to participate in the United Nations’ Multinational Forces and Observers, which patrolled the Sinai Peninsula separating Egypt and Israel. The unit was designated the 4th Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment. National Guard and Army Reserve personnel were volunteers. Three times more reserve soldiers volunteered than were needed. Forty-one of the volunteers were Army Reserve soldiers from the Individual Ready Reserve. Three hundred and eighty-three soldiers were from the National Guard. The task force began training at Fort Bragg in August 1994 under the supervision of the 82d Airborne Division. It deployed to the Sinai in January 1995 and returned to the United States in July 1995. The active Army commander in theater believed these soldiers had served on par with any other soldiers.
Mobilization Exercises

In addition to these actual “real-life” call-ups, Army Reserve soldiers were involved in several mobilization exercises. Two were OPTIMAL FOCUS ’93 and ’94. OPTIMAL FOCUS ’93 occurred on January 8, 1993. Eight thousand Army Reserve and National Guard soldiers received orders to report to reserve centers and armories. The exercise’s objective was to assess how well the Army reserve components were able to quickly assemble. Optimal Focus ’94 involved 3,000 soldiers. The exercises proved that the reserves “could locate and bring together their unit members on short notice and be prepared to move out if given the order to do so.”

Military Support to Civil Authorities and Homeland Defense

As part of the Army Reserve’s military support to civil authorities, in 1993 state emergency preparedness liaison officers were placed on duty in Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, and Missouri for flood relief operations. Civil preparedness support detach-
Ready to Roll, 1995 HMMWs Ready to Roll, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Sergeant Jeffrey Manuszak. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
ment personnel from Battle Creek, Michigan, and Denton, Texas, supported the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with communications and security. The Army Reserve provided aviation support missions in Illinois and Missouri with units from the Aviation Support Facility on Scott Air Force Base in Illinois and Olathe Air Force Base in Kansas. Missions ranged from aerial reconnaissance and VIP transport to materiel transport for levee repair. The Army Reserve provided support to the Tampa Bay fire fighting operation.266

The domestic disaster relief mission had rested primarily on the National Guard. But, in the 1990s, the Army Reserve came to be used in natural disaster relief. That mission included hurricane relief assistance, such as in February 1990 for Hurricane Ofa in American Samoa. Fifty-three Army Reserve soldiers were ordered to active duty for thirty days and sent to villages throughout the
island to open roads and clear storm damage. Six soldiers were awarded the Army Achievement Medal. In 1992, about 800 Army Reserve soldiers volunteered for duty and assisted in South Florida for Hurricane Andrew relief operations. That same year saw Army Reserve soldiers rendering assistance in the wake of Hurricane Iniki. Army Reserve IMAs directed twelve of fourteen missions assigned to the Corps of Engineers by the FEMA. In 1994, Army Reserve soldiers cooperated with the active Army and the National Guard in a variety of missions including combating western wildfires. Other missions in 1994 included the Northridge earthquake relief operation, flood support from tropical storm Alberto, flood support in Texas, and medical support to the Navajo Nation. The Army Reserve used its aviation assets to reduce the supply of illegal drugs. Under the Department of Defense’s civil-military cooperation program, Army Reserve soldiers became involved in a variety of missions to include providing needed medical assistance to those in inner cities and rural areas. These were signs of broadening Army Reserve mission capabilities.

Soldier and Family Well Being

Taking care of soldiers and their families contributed to a ready Army Reserve. Before Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, there were no requirements for Army Reserve commanders to have family support programs. But, guidance on family assistance during mobilization and the establishment of family support groups was available. Some commanders had developed and operated family support and assistance programs since 1986. Those programs were put in motion during the war offering practical assistance, such as identification cards, benefits information, and extension of variable housing allowances to reservists called to active duty for less than 108 days and the equalization of pay differentials for doctors. Congress supported the designation of Southwest Asia as a combat zone, thereby, exempting the pay of enlisted personnel and a portion of the pay of officers, serving in that zone from federal income tax. The family support system was successful in getting information to soldiers and their families about rights, benefits, and assistance services. The family support coordinators worked mainly at the major U.S. Army Reserve commands. They organized briefings, assembled information packets, and formed support groups for the families of deployed soldiers.

The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act provided assistance and protection for mobilized soldiers. But, it was not meeting the needs of Army Reserve soldiers; changes were needed. A legislative proposal in September 1990 amended the act to make the benefits more in line with the 1990-1991 economic situation and to meet the circumstances of soldiers who had been mobilized for
Dry Goods, Peter Varisano. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Existing provisions were updated and new provisions were added.271

The Persian Gulf Benefits Act of 1991 made several permanent changes to benefits. These changes included increasing Serviceman’s Group Life Insurance, increasing Montgomery GI Bill benefits, providing that retirees be recalled in the highest grade they had held during active duty, improving reemployment rights for disabled veterans, and authorizing eligibility for Department of Veterans Administration housing benefits if a soldier served on active duty for ninety days or more during the war.272

Legislation to change the method “in which reserve officers were promoted and careers managed” came on October 1, 1994, with passage of the Reserve
Officers Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) enacted into law as Title XVI of the Fiscal Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act. It was scheduled to be effective on October 1, 1996. For example, “promotion selections for officers being considered for the rank of captain or above were now to be made on the basis of ‘best qualified’ officers, rather than those who were ‘fully qualified’ as in the past.”

What about job protection? A Supreme Court 1991 case, *King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital*, “seemed to indicate that there was no limitation on the frequency and duration of active duty that a reservist might perform and still retain rights to his job.” But, during the 1990s, employers “became more skeptical of the time off that reservists were requesting for their military duties.”
Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM veterans found themselves “left behind on the promotion ladder by their contemporaries who had not served.” Over 2,200 veterans requested assistance from the federal government in job right claims.

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) signed by President Clinton on October 13, 1994, was a significant improvement over the 1940 Veterans’ Reemployment Rights Act it replaced. This act provided reemployment protection and other benefits for veterans and employees who performed military service. Under USERRA, if a military member left his civilian job for service in the uniformed service, he was entitled to return to the job with accrued seniority, provided he met the law’s eligibility requirements. The act applied to voluntary and involuntary service in peacetime and war time. The law applied to most all civilian employers, including the federal government along with state and local governments and private employers. Size of the company did not matter.

The Army Reserve worked toward its goal of 100 percent pre-enrollment of troop program unit soldiers and their families in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS). Pre-enrollment of individual ready reserve soldiers and their families began on March 1, 1992.
Ministry in the Field, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
The Community and Family Support Center developed standardized video-formatted preretirement and Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) briefings for reserve component soldiers nearing retirement. ARPERCEN developed a software program (REPAY) which allowed soldiers to project their retirement pay and SBP benefits.279 These were only some of the programs aimed at improving the well being of Army Reserve soldiers and their families.

**Base Realignment and Closure**

In the area affecting Army Reserve facilities, on May 3, 1988, the secretary of defense chartered the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) to examine issues surrounding military base realignment and closure in the United States, its possessions, commonwealths, and territories. The secretary of the Army and the secretary of defense approved the commission’s recommendations and forwarded them to Congress; they became law in May 1989. The commission’s recommendations affected over one hundred U.S. Army installations that were to be realigned or closed under the provisions of Public Law 100-526, Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act. The Department of the Army’s national Implementation Plan
dated February 13, 1989, provided guidance and designated responsible agencies, commands, and activities for implementing the action.²⁸⁰

During 1990, Congress passed the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act. It established an independent Defense Base Closure Realignment Commission, which met in 1991 and 1993 and was scheduled to meet again in 1995. The act specified the roles of the Department of Defense, the commission, and the
president together with the implementation process. The under secretary of the Army and the vice chief of staff, Army approved the charter for the Total Army Basing Study on December 19, 1990. The study group included an officer detailed from OCAR.

The study group was to “conduct analyses based on emerging force structure decisions, budget deliberations, and the evolving security environment as it affects the Army.” The study was to “provide a comprehensive package of base realignment, closure and consolidation recommendations to insure that the Army has the ability to train, deploy, support, modernize, and care for its soldiers in the future.”

The study group provided its recommendations (BRAC 91) to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on March 31, 1991. The recommendations were reviewed and consolidated with those from the other armed services and submitted by the secretary of defense to the commission in April 1991. The secretary of defense sent the recommendations to Congress. The Army proposed the closure and realignment of eighteen bases. Those affecting the Army Reserve included:
Night Attack in the Persian Gulf, 1991, Mario Acevedo. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
a. close Fort Benjamin Harrison and Fort Sheridan, but retain a reserve enclave;
b. close Fort Devens but retain a reserve enclave and 4,600 acres for training;
c. close Sacramento Army Depot, but retain fifty acres for the Army Reserve;
d. realign and retain facilities and training areas at Fort Dix and Fort Chaffee to support reserve component training requirements only.

In the end, BRAC 1991 resulted in the closure of twenty-six installations, more than the sixteen closed in 1988.281

The 1992/1993 budget estimates submitted to Congress included a number of projects related to base closure: constructing an administrative building costing $1,500,000 at Fort Sheridan; constructing an assembly hall costing $850,000 at Fort Sheridan; constructing vehicle parking costing $310,000 at Fort Douglas and; constructing an Army Reserve center costing $5,000,000 at Fort Des Moines. Only one construction project directly related to base closure was scheduled for 1993: constructing an Army Reserve center costing $2,100,000 at Fort Sheridan.282

Conclusion

With the end of the Cold War came a change in the strategic environment. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM ushered in a new era. In 1991, General Vuono noted, “the conditions that have undergirded our nation’s security strategy for more than four decades are being rendered obsolete.”283 The general understanding that the reserves were more so a mobilization asset rather than a force of immediate use proved wrong. In order to play a key role in the post-Cold War national defense and make the Army Reserve indispensable to the active Army, the recently formed USARC and OCAR moved to create a niche for the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve would become a full partner in America’s Army and an integral element in the new power projection force of the new world order through the provision of unique core competencies. Those included: being a federal force, always under active Army control and capable of rapid deployment; providing the bulk of the combat support and combat service support forces; providing command and control and combat service units for echelons above corps and echelons above division; and providing the ability to rebuild and reconstitute the force during or after protracted conflict. Thus, the Army Reserve’s core competencies, as defined by the 1993 Off-Site Agreement, revolved around non-combat skills which were interchangeable with the skills in civilian occupations. Some believed this to be the essence of the Army Reserve in the future.
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15 Major General Roger W. Sandler, “Best Investment For Strong USA,” The Officer, February 1992, 42.
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18 Thomas Lippiatt, Michael Polich, Ronald Sortor and Patricia Dey, Mobilization and Train-Up Times for Army Reserve Component Support Units ( Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1992), 6-7.
22 Ibid., 106.
25 Brown, Kevlar Legions, 64.
27 Ibid., 392.


33 Ibid.

34 Currie and Crossland, *Twice the Citizen*, 484, 486.


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38 Interview, Kathryn Roe Coker with Major General Max Baratz, September 27, 2010, Oral History Collection, OARH, USARHRC, USARC.


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45 Sandler, “Best Investment For Strong USA,” *The Officer*, February 1992, 44.

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48 Interview, Coker with Welke.


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60 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 384-385, 494-495.
61 Interview, Coker with Welke.
62 Interview, Coker with Batatz.
63 Ibid.
64 Interview, Coker with Welke.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 6-7.
71 Ibid., 8.
72 Ibid., 8, 16, 18-19, 23-25 and Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 324, 328-329. See these two sources for detailed accounts on these developments.
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75 Major General Max Baratz, “Creating Single Standard,” The Officer, April 1994, 22.
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79 Harford, Coker, Shanahan and Murphy, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1993, 4 and Baratz, “Creating Single Standard,” The Officer, April 1994, 22.
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84 Kaplan and Morai-Young, Department of the Army Historical Summary, 1994, 72-73.
88 Ronald Sortor, Army Active/Reserve Mix: Force Planning for Major Regional Conflicts (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1995), 7.
90 Sortor, Army Active/Reserve Mix:  Force Planning for Major Regional Conflict, 7, 9.
94 Sortor, Army Active/Reserve Mix:  Force Planning for Major Regional Conflict, 17.
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Everett and Kaplan, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1993*, 80. This is virtually verbatim from the source.


Everett and Kaplan, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1993*, 80. This is virtually verbatim from the source.


234 Kaplan and Morai-Young, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1994*, 88. This is virtually verbatim from the source.


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279 Ibid.
The World Scene at a Glance

Worldwide instability continued in the 1990s with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Although Saddam Hussein’s aggression had been checked by open warfare, his failure to abide by provisions of the cease fire agreement still posed a threat in the region and added to its volatility. It meant a continued and expanded United States mission as part of the NATO presence to enforce no-fly zones in the northern and southern regions of Iraq.¹

Coupled with that was the crumbling of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was “a post-World War I construct that artificially conglomerated” a number of ethnic groups such as the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims.² After World War II, Yugoslavia was divided into six republics. Serbia was the largest republic. There was peace until the death of the Yugoslav dictator, Josef Tito, in 1980 and the breakdown of communism throughout Eastern Europe. That led nationalist and ethnic majorities to claim self-determination and their desire to separate from Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in 1991 “in sharp, relatively brief wars of independence.”³ Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia did the same over the next two years.⁴ Ethnic rivalries and a Serb revolution in Bosnia-Herzegovina led to ethnic cleansing. The United States wanted to play no role in the Balkans. It gradually became involved as the United Nations Protection Force, deployed in 1992 to enforce cease fires and assist with humanitarian relief, came under attack from the Bosnian Serbs. In August 1995, the conflict intensified when Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo allegedly fired a mortar round into a crowded market square, killing thirty-seven people. NATO took action with a three week air raid on Serbian held positions; the majority of the sorties were American. The United States also deployed an infantry battalion to Macedonia in what was known as Operation ABLE SENTRY. In the end, the Serbs withdrew from Sarajevo.
Ethnic composition before the war in BiH (1991)
Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Dayton Peace Agreement
and the front lines at the end of 1995

Map 5
The explosive situation in Croatia intensified. Franjo Tudjman built his army, with the assistance of some contracted American advisers, to mount an offensive against Serbs who retained some Croatian lands. On August 4, 1995, he launched a successful attack and then assisted allied Bosnian Muslims and Croats who engaged the Serbs. As a result, the Bosnian Serbs, who had controlled almost three-fourths of Croatia, were driven out and were left controlling less than half of the country.

In an effort to reach a diplomatic settlement between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, in November 1995 the United States hosted peace talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio. A peace agreement was reached (Dayton Agreement or Dayton Accords) on November 19, 1995, followed by a formal signing in Paris on December 14, 1995. This ended the three-and-a-half year old war in Bosnia, but not United States involvement. Code named Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the United States became part of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), initially contributing 20,000 soldiers from the 1st Armored Division. IFOR more than doubled the fire power of the United Nations Protective Force as compared to 1993 and 1994. The mission of IFOR was in Secretary of Defense Perry’s words, “to oversee and enforce implementation of the military aspects of the peace agreement: Cessation of hostilities, withdrawal to the agreed lines, creation of a zone of separation, return troops and weapons to cantonments.” When the IFOR “mandate” ended on December 20, 1996, those involved “agreed to continue the missions with a UN-sanctioned, NATO-led stabilization force (SFOR).”

The Serbian province of Kosovo to the south of Bosnia was another hotbed. Despite its Serbian roots, by the 1990s 90 percent of Kosovo was Albanian. Slobodan Milosevic moved to contain “the local autonomy these Albanian Kosovars had previously enjoyed.” What ensued was brutal violence. By early 1999, over 800,000 ethnic Albanians had fled Kosovo, forced out by Serbian forces under Milosevic, “while as many as twelve thousand may have been murdered in a wave of ethnic cleansing that horrified the world.” Working with European allies, United States forces entered Kosovo in June 1999 in what was known as Operation JOINT GUARDIAN. American involvement ranged from providing humanitarian relief, temporary refugee settlement at Fort Dix, New Jersey, and providing sorties in the Kosovo air campaign to deploying Task Force HAWK. Task Force HAWK consisted of a “brigade-size mix of attack helicopters, rocket artillery, and mechanized forces deployed into Albania.”
The task force became a contingent of the NATO ground forces as part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR). The allies were finally able to enforce a tentative peace by October of 1999.12

National Security Strategy

U.S. involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Kosovo, and in other peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions stemmed from Clinton’s 1994 National Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement. Its “mutually supportive” goals in Clinton’s words were: “to credibly sustain our security with military
Sentry at “Mud” Govern, Colonel Gary Cassidy. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
forces that are ready to fight. To bolster America’s economic revitalization. To promote democracy abroad.” The United States must be engaged “actively abroad . . . to open foreign markets and create jobs . . . .” A revitalized economy would “sustain [America’s] military forces, foreign initiatives and global influence. . . .” Promoting democracy abroad would make for a safer America as “democratic states . . . [were] less likely to threaten . . . [America’s] interests and more likely to cooperate with the U.S. to meet security threats and promote sustainable development.” “Our national security strategy,” he wrote, “is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests.” Democracy must be enlarged while remaining engaged at home and abroad.

The National Security Strategy recognized the need to re-size and posture the military’s capability to win two (nearly) simultaneous major regional conflicts while at the same time possessing the ability to respond to other conflicts, as clearly enunciated in the Bottom-Up Review. It also acknowledged the importance of land forces. Forces must be prepared to combat aggression together with allies, but unilaterally (alone without any allies), if needed. Added to the goals later was the May 1997 National Security Strat-
The increased operational tempo was seen in the fact that Army deployments for missions went from an average of one every four years during the Cold War to fourteen every four years in the post-Cold War era. The division between domestic and foreign policy became more and more “blurred” as the United States lived in a more “global village.”

Quadrennial Defense Review and National Military Strategy

A strategic justification for the president’s defense program and examining the country’s defense needs through 2015 was the focus of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review and National Military Strategy.
al Defense Review. The Commission on the Roles & Missions of the Armed Forces recommended a strategy review at four-year intervals, which came to be known as the quadrennial defense review. Congress made it a statutory requirement with passage of the Armed Forces Structure Act of 1996 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for 1997. 18

The Quadrennial Defense Review scrutinized the national defense strategy, force modernization plans, infrastructure, the budget plan, “and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view towards determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.” 19 According to Senator Joseph Lieberman, a sponsor of the legislation, “Our intent in supporting this legislation was to drive the defense debate to a strategy-based assessment of our future military requirements and capabilities, not to a budget-driven incremental massage of the status quo.” 20

The Quadrennial Defense Review was the fourth comprehensive review of the military since the end of the Cold War. It built on the policy and forces of the 1991 Base Force Review, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, and the 1995 Commission on the Roles & Missions of the Armed Forces. As stated in Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen’s Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, it was “intended to provide a blueprint for a strategy-based, balanced, and affordable defense program.” 21

The Quadrennial Defense Review addressed the global security environment, defense strategy, alternative defense postures, forces and manpower, force readiness, transforming U.S. forces for the future, achieving a 21st century defense infrastructure, and defense resources. The world remained a “dangerous and highly uncertain place,” in which the U.S. was likely to confront a variety of challenges between then and 2015. It was a period likely to be free of a “global peer competitor” given the end of the Cold War. The U.S. was the sole superpower and was anticipated to “remain so throughout the 1997-2015 period.” This “projection” of the security environment rested on two “assumptions:” the country would remain engaged in world affairs and it would “maintain military superiority over current and potential rivals.” 22
As stated in the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, the *National Military Strategy* was one of “shape, respond and prepare now.” The armed forces must be able to shape the international environment and create conditions favorable to U.S. interests and global security. Shaping the international environment involved promoting regional stability where the U.S. had vital interests, preventing or reducing conflicts and threats which meant maintaining forces overseas and conducting “peacetime engagement activities,” and deterring aggression and coercion on a daily basis through peacetime deployment of military forces abroad.\textsuperscript{23} Shaping was not new, but an extension of operations already a vital part of the Army’s missions.\textsuperscript{24}

The U.S. must be able to respond to crises anywhere across the globe and to respond to the full spectrum of crises in an effort to protect the country’s interests. That response could range from “deterring an adversary’s aggression or coercion in crisis and conducting concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations to fighting and winning major theater wars.”\textsuperscript{25} Responding compelled the Army to be “prepared for rapid deployment of its forces anywhere in the world and to sustain them as long as necessary to achieve our national objectives.”\textsuperscript{26}

The country must prepare now, as Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer said for an “uncertain future-to be able to change the Army in a very fundamental way to meet the asymmetrical threats that we will face in the future and to adjust to the world that is changing very rapidly.”\textsuperscript{27} Preparing now had several parts: modernization to replace “aging systems and incorporate cutting-edge technologies into the force;” exploiting the Revolution in Military Affairs; improving the country’s “ability to perform near-term missions, and meet future challenges;” exploiting the Revolution in Business Affairs to radically reengineer DoD infrastructure and support activities;” and taking steps today to position the country to “respond more effectively to unlikely, but significant, future threats . . . in a “resource-constrained environment.” Both active and reserve forces must be “multi-mission capable, proficient in their core warfighting competencies and able to transition from peacetime activities and operations to enhanced deter-
Figure II-1: Projected Army End Strength Reduction, 1989-1998

Army Force Reductions Under QDR
1989-1998

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>AR</th>
<th>Active Army</th>
<th>NG</th>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
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Figure II-2: Projected Army End Strength Reduction, 1989-1998

Army Force Reductions Under QDR
1989-1998

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<th>Year</th>
<th>319,000</th>
<th>300,000</th>
<th>250,000</th>
<th>200,000</th>
<th>150,000</th>
<th>100,000</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1998</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>319,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
rence in crises, to war.” Full spectrum forces needed a “balanced mix of overseas presence and power projection capabilities.”

The defense budget was approximately $250 billion in “constant 1997 dollars per year.” The Quadrennial Defense Review recognized that barring any “deterioration in world events, the nation . . . [was] unlikely to support significantly greater resources dedicated to national defense. . . . Indeed, any slowing of progress in reaching deficit reduction targets could generate pressure to lower DoD spending.” Tensions existed in resource priorities, such as in funds for procurement and funds for operations and support activities.

Among the Quadrennial Defense Review decisions supporting the security environment was the Army’s retention of ten active, combat ready divisions. There would be an acceleration of Force XXI. A reduction of approximately 15,000 active duty personnel was to be implemented though “deactivation, consolidation and realignment of headquarters and support facilities to improve overall support to the combat organizations.”

The Quadrennial Defense Review recognized that the reserves had become an “even larger percentage of the Total Force and . . . [were] essential participants in the full spectrum of operations. . . . No major operation can be successful without them.” The Army would restructure the reserve component. “Elements of the Reserve component, the traditional Cold War strategic reserve can be reduced and transitioned into capabilities that have greater utility across the entire spectrum.” Toward that end, there would be less of a combat structure and the conversion of some units from combat to combat support and combat service support would be quickened. This restructuring would result in an end strength reduction of some 45,000 personnel by September 2001. Under this plan recommended by the Quadrennial Defense Review and directed by the secretary of defense, the National Guard would lose 38,000 soldiers; the Army Reserve would lose 7,000. There would be a reduction in end strength from 208,000 to 205,000 in 2000, with a reduction of 2,000 spaces in 2001 and 2002. Baratz explained “That allocation, based on the power-projection strategy and modernization goals of America’s Army would be sensible and fair-shared.” He referred to the fact that between 1989 and 1998 the Army Reserve was taking a 35 percent reduction in end-strength, going from 319,000 to 208,000. That was compared to the active Army’s 37 percent reduction, but above the National Guard’s 20 percent reduction. According to Baratz, “The Quadrennial Defense Review did more than shape the force. More importantly, it reaffirmed this country’s need for a capable and ready Army Reserve as part of the National Military Strategy. . . . America today cannot go to war without
A Proactive Strategy and Shifting Paradigm

Much of the world embraced democratic ideals. The threat of nuclear war decreased and diplomatic efforts helped create a more stable world. Still, there were uncertainties posed by regional dangers; asymmetric challenges, such as weapons of mass destruction and cyber-terrorism (computer virus attacks); transnational threats, including drug trafficking and terrorism; and “wild card” threats such as the unanticipated loss of key allies or the emergence of new technologies. Shaping the international environment while using a conservative allocation of personnel and funds and at the same time “preparing for worldwide contingencies became as important, conceptually, as responding to major crises after they had already occurred. Shaping and preparing [effecting the National Military Strategy] argued for intense multinational activity during periods of peace or operations other than war and for developing capabilities useful worldwide at all levels of the combat spectrum rather than those focused narrowly on a specific threat.”

What did this proactive strategy, requiring an expanded role for the military, mean for America’s Army and for the Army Reserve? It meant commitments to forward presence operations larger than at any peacetime era during the Cold War. Although the Army was smaller than at any time since before World War II, it was being called upon for more missions. In 1995, the Army had an average of 22,200 soldiers operationally deployed to over seventy countries on any given day. By 1997, the Army was averaging over 31,000 soldiers deployed to ninety-one countries. In fact, by 1997 the country had committed forces in response to crises almost forty times since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Those varied missions included counterdrug operations, noncombatant evacuation, and providing nation assistance along with humanitarian relief. Between 1989 and 1997, the Army had encountered a 300 percent increase in operational deployments. In the forty years between 1950 and 1989, the Army conducted
Logistics at Butmir; Colonel Gary Cassidy. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
ten major deployments; from 1990 to 1997, twenty-five were conducted. As the century ended, the active Army’s and the reserve components’ operational tempo continued to increase and, according to General Reimer, “proved higher than expected” as the Army continued the mission in Bosnia, conducted various domestic operations, provided forces to reinforce the U.S. presence in Southwest Asia, and responded to aid foreign countries.

For the reserves, it meant a shift in the paradigm from a limited-use reserve force to a call for an integrated total force. It was no longer a question of whether or not the reserves would be activated; it was, in the words of an assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs, “a question of how much.” By 1997, no longer would the reserves be called to duty only for national emergencies or World War III type scenarios.

In September 1997, Secretary of Defense Cohen issued a memorandum on the integration of the reserve and active components. He wanted to “create an environment that eliminated all residual barriers, structural and cultural, for effective integration within . . . [the] Total Force.” “Our goal,” he wrote, “as we move into the 21st century, must be a seamless Total Force that provides the National Command Authorities the flexibility and interoperability necessary for the full range of military operations.” Total force integration would become a reality when four basic principles were achieved:
1. senior leaders throughout the Total Force “clearly” understanding “re-
sponsibility for and ownership of the Total Force;”
2. “clear and mutual understanding of the mission for each unit - Active,
   Guard and Reserve – in service and joint/combined operations, during
   peace and war;
3. commitment to provide the resources needed to accomplish assigned
   missions;”
4. “leadership by senior commanders – Active, Guard and Reserve - - to
   ensure the readiness of the Total Force.”

In his April 1997 annual report to the president and Congress, Cohen stated that the “Army Reserve is now a seamless component of the Army.” The following year he reported, “The Total Force increasingly will depend on the Reserve component to serve not only in their traditional wartime role, but also to provide a rotational base to ease operating and personnel tempo for a busy active component.”

Self Study
In the midst of this proactive strategy and shifting paradigm, the armed forces and the Army continued to redesign and reexamine itself. In the spring of 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published Joint Vision 2010, an operationally based model, template for the evolution of the armed forces into the twenty-first century. It provided “direction for developing unique service capabilities within a joint framework of doctrine and programs.” Joint Vision 2010 sought in the twenty-first century “full spectrum dominance – the capability to dominate an opponent across the full range of military operations.” That dominance rested on four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection and focused logistics enabled by information superiority, and technological innovations. Information superiority and technological innovations ensured the ability to collect, process, and disseminate the steady flow of information across the battlefield needed to secure operational objectives and prevent an adversary from doing the same. Joint Vision 2010 foresaw the country’s involvement in a wide range of deterrent, conflict
prevention and peacetime endeavors most often with allies. To effect this, power projection and an overseas presence would most probably remain the basic strategy of the twenty-first century force.50

The Army was key to the success of Joint Vision 2010. Its road map of how the Army would fulfill Joint Vision 2010 was Army Vision 2010, published in November 1996. Army Vision 2010 concentrated on the inferences the concepts in Joint Vision 2010 would have on the Army’s primary ability of “conducting prompt and sustained operations on land across the entire spectrum of military operations.” Army Vision 2010 also recognized the importance of land power “as the force of decision” in future operations. It pointed to Bosnia and the need of ground forces to enforce the peace accords as a testament to that. The Army would implement its responsibilities through six archetypes of operations to be performed in war and other military operations: project the force, protect the force, shape the battle space, decisive operations, sustain the force, and gain information dominance.51

Army Vision 2010 connected the ongoing Force XXI with the Army After Next (AAN), the long term vision (out to 2025) of a capabilities-based, logistically unencumbered, radically different Army. “The purpose of AAN . . . [was] to conduct a broad range of studies of warfare to the year 2025, frame issues critical to the development of the Army during that period, and integrate them into the Force XXI process.”52 Force XXI was the process used to fulfill, as General Reimer said, the third “pillar” of the National Military Strategy: prepare now for future land power.53

Figure 11-3: Army After Next
The first near term product of Force XXI would be Army XXI, “a versatile army with capabilities” the country would need in the twenty-first century to be fielded by 2010. Army XXI would be a flexible, agile, versatile, lethal, power projection and digitized force, evidencing improvements in combat systems and the addition of information technology better able to provide the country full spectrum dominance.54 It would be a technological and cultural transformation, a revolution in military affairs.55 Army XXI would be the “bridge” to the next century. The Army would “design a networked and digitized division--the basic, self-sustaining element of landpower--as its initial Army XXI organization.56

According to General Reimer, “Force XXI, Army Vision 2010 and AAN [Army After Next] work collaboratively to identify the types of capabilities and areas of technology applications that will accommodate their respective environments and the implications for doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers.” These three would “establish a continuum of orderly change, assuring a disciplined approach to meeting the challenges of an uncertain future and maximizing the innovations of the military, academia, and industry.”57

As noted in the Quadrennial Defense Review, Force XXI was accelerated. In 1995, the Army created the Force XXI Experimental Force (EXFOR). The EXFOR would select systems to develop and incorporate into a tactical framework. The EXFOR worked “to experiment with and test new organization designs, warfighting/operational concepts, training, and equipment that produces enhancements in the lethality, survivability, tempo, sustainability, deployability, joint/combined linkages, and versatility of the force.”58 The EXFOR was a “test bed” for Force XXI. It was developed on a brigade combat team from the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized).59

By 1997, Force XXI developments went from concept to reality with advancements in computer and digital communications, which “made possible the goal of building a combat unit whose components shared a common, automatically updated view of the battlefield.” In March 1997, Advanced Warfighting Experiment Task Force XXI illustrated this. At the National Training Center, the task force used a brigade trained on more dependable digital equipment.60

**Personnel Strength**

This call for integration and a proactive strategy came during a period of continued drawdown. The most immediate, visible difference between the Army of 1989 and 1995 was its size. By September 1995, the active Army’s strength stood at 508,559, a reduction of about 32,000 from the final 1994 end strength.61
Figure II-4: Joint Vision 2010
In 1996, the Total Army’s strength of 1,087,200 soldiers was the smallest it had been since the end of World War II. In that year, the U.S. Army dropped to the eighth largest in the world. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and 2000, the number of active forces dropped by more than a third while the reserve forces declined by more than one-fourth. However, the use of the reserves had grown steadily. At the end of the century, actual active Army end strength was 479,426. Deploying a smaller active Army would require greater integration with the reserves for combat units and combat support units.

This call for integration and a proactive strategy came during a period of continued drawdown.

Army Reserve end strength went from a high of 319,000 soldiers in 1989 to 208,000 in 1998, a 35 percent reduction in personnel. Indeed, between 1989 and 1996 the reserves declined by 22 percent; the worst being in the Army Reserve. Yet in 1996, the Army Reserve offset 5.8 million active component man-days, the most of any reserve component. By fiscal year 1999, reserve component man-days of service doubled in five years to 12.5 million man-days.

The Army Reserve declined 12.1 percent in its IRR force, going from 783,514 assigned personnel in 1994 to 688,754 assigned in 1995. By 1998, the Army Reserve constituted 16 percent of the total military force compared to 28.3 percent for the National Guard and 17.7 percent for the IRR. In 1999, the Army Reserve and the National Guard comprised 44 percent of the Army.

Military technician strength fell as did active guard reserve (AGR) strength. In fiscal year 1996, 11,576 AGR soldiers and 4,540 military technicians served full-time in the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve received the lowest level of full-time support of the reserve components, yet some 70 percent of its units were rated as ready for war. In 1997, 9 percent of all Army Reserve personnel were full-time support, the lowest level of any Department of Defense reserve component. In 1999, the Army Reserve’s full-time support personnel authorization fell to 12,895 positions, 37.5 percent short of the number required.

The Army Reserve had an attrition rate of 35.4 percent in fiscal year 1997 for enlisted soldiers compared to 32.6 percent in fiscal year 1998. The attrition rate for officers was 18.9 percent in fiscal year 1997 compared to 17.6 percent in fiscal year 1998. Declining attrition rates were attributed to a number of factors, including a retention office reporting to the chief, Army Reserve; regulations
involving commanders, senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and civilian employees in the retention effort, especially for first timer soldiers; making retention a quantifiable statistic on each commander’s officer evaluation report; increasing the number of retention NCOs in 1998 by some 500; standardizing all retention training through the Army Reserve Readiness Training Center; and updating the U.S. Army’s reenlistment program to include the expanded retention program and making changes to improve the reenlistment process.\textsuperscript{74} One initiative the Army Reserve took to reduce attrition and to improve recruitment was deploying contractors to Europe to tender Army Reserve opportunities to soldiers leaving active duty.\textsuperscript{75} Highest attrition rates occurred among E-1 to E-4 soldiers.\textsuperscript{76}

In 1999, the recruitment and retention of health care professionals became a problem and raised readiness issues. This was in spite of the sizeable increases in the health profession loan repayment program provided in the Fiscal Year
1998 National Defense Authorization Act. But, no funds were appropriated to guarantee the continued financial attraction of Army Reserve service to health care professionals.\textsuperscript{77} Overall, in 1999 the Army Reserve missed its recruiting goal by 10,000; the active Army missed it by 6,000.\textsuperscript{78}

There were a number of programs to boost retention, including the continuing Selected Reserve Incentive Program. Non-prior enlistees could choose to use the Student Loan Repayment Program during their initial contract, providing their loan did not go over $10,000. Other incentives included the Civilian Acquired Skills Program which gave all enlistees a $5,000 bonus. Soldiers who reenlisted or extended their tours were eligible to receive a $2,500 bonus.\textsuperscript{79}

**Personnel Administration and Management**

In the personnel administration arena, in October 1994, Congress passed the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROMPA), effective on October 1, 1996. Its purpose: update and consolidate statutes governing all reserves (except the Coast Guard); standardization for all services and between reserve and active forces; and simplify reserve officer appointments, promotions, separations and transfer to retired status of reserve commissioned officers (excluding warrant officers). Significant changes included:

1. eliminated time-in-service requirements for promotions;
2. eliminated promotions based on position vacancies;
3. eliminated Senate approval of promotions for colonel and below;
4. best qualified policy for promotion replaced by fully qualified;
5. 200 changes to existing laws for management of commissioned officers.

ROMPA included the first significant changes to the laws affecting reserve officers since the 1954 Reserve Officer Personnel Act. ROMPA equated to the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act for active duty commissioned officers.\textsuperscript{80}

In answer to lessons learned from Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, Section 511 of the Fiscal Year 1998 National Defense Authorization Act created the Individual Ready Reserve Activation Authority (IRRAA). During the Gulf War, later deploying units were activated to supply soldiers to fill earlier deploying units. This cross-leveling jeopardized the cohesion and readiness of the later deploying units. The IRAA was intended to foster the availability of certain trained and qualified members of the IRR to fill selected shortfalls in early mobilizing and deploying active component and reserve component units. Section 511 amended Section 10144 of Title 10, U.S. Code
to create a new category of IRR members subject to involuntary call to active duty under a presidential selected reserve call-up. Also, Section 511 amended Section 12304 of Title 10, U.S. Code to authorize the president to call as many as 30,000 members of the new IRR category from all services; there was no definite limit to the number of qualified people who could volunteer. There were certain eligibility requirements and IRR members were not required to attend drills or annual training, although they had priority for available refresher training and training opportunities with units that needed their skills.81

A personnel management tool arrived in May 1996 with the approval of the Reserve Associate Support Program. This improved war fighting capabilities and lowered shortfalls in the active Army. Soldiers could complete initial training in the Army Reserve, serve a required two year active tour of duty and then return to their units as drilling reserve soldiers to finish their four year obligation. While in the active duty stage, soldiers completed Skill Level 1 training tasks. The program supplied the high priority force support package units with well trained and experienced soldiers.82 One hundred Army Reserve soldiers participated in fiscal year 1997.83

Fiscal Strength

Manning and maintaining a robust force and funding shortfalls presented challenges. In 1995, the Army’s Department of Defense modernization budget was 13 percent, as General Reimer said, the “smallest piece of a small pie.”84 Since 1989, reductions in defense spending provided a significant “peace dividend.” He told the Senate’s Committee on Armed Services in March 1991, “More than a decade of decreased defense spending has resulted in more than $750 billion dollars in savings that has helped energize the economy and turn the budget deficit into a surplus for the first time in thirty years. Proportionally, we spend far less on defense today than we have in our recent history. In fact, the total budget for the Department of Defense accounts for less than 3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, the lowest spending on defense since before Pearl Harbor.” General Reimer said the 1999 budget included supplemental funding for the Army of about $1.4 billion for contingency operations and $375 million that addressed near-term readiness issues.85

Between 1989 and 1998, the Army’s buying power declined 39 percent.86 The 1999 budget marked thirteen years of straight decline in real buying power for the Army.87 On a positive note, the 1997 Department of Defense appropriation included an additional $64 million over original Department of Defense budget requests for the Army Reserve. “That’s a good indicator,” said Baratz, “of the
confidence Congress has in the relevance of the Army Reserve, and its commitment to increase USAR readiness.\textsuperscript{88} Still in 1998, the Army Reserve accounted for 5 percent of total Army funding. Its total obligation authority was 7 percent. In 1998, the Army Reserve was underfunded by over $509 million in its operations and maintenance program. There were shortages in civilian pay, real property maintenance, information management, base communications, operational tempo, and depot maintenance. Schools and special training were underfunded in the personnel account. With shortages of school training dollars in the Army Reserve accounts, annul training dollars were spent on sending soldiers to school instead of unit annual training. This was good for individual professional development, but not for unit collective training. Operations and maintenance funds in 1998 were insufficient to support the \textit{National Military Strategy} of fighting two simultaneous major theater wars. There was a shortfall for certain later deploying and support units. The Army recognized this shortfall in planning, programming and budgeting and funded resources on a “first to fight” basis.\textsuperscript{89}
The New Bridge at Mostar, Colonel Gary Cassidy. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
Force Structure

For the Army Reserve, the results of redesigning itself were the command and control reorganization of the Army Reserve, first announced in 1994. This increased the USARC’s training and mobilization of Army Reserve units and reduced the table of distribution and allowance overhead. In 1994, 20,000 soldiers were taken out of the Army Reserve. As Baratz noted, “you just can’t take soldiers down, with that you have to take overhead down.”

Based on the study mentioned in chapter one, in April 1995, ten regional support commands replaced twenty Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs). Regional support commands were based in California, New York, Alabama, Minnesota, Kansas, Arkansas, Massachusetts, Utah, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Three regional support groups, which supported command and control missions of those regional support commands with large troop program units, were in South Carolina, Indiana, and Texas. Three ARCOMs remained in Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Germany. As noted previously, the regional support commands provided command and control for assigned units in their territory. They managed and maintained unit readiness for base operations of Army Reserve units in their region and for the initial management of mobilizing units. This included cross-leveling of personnel and equipment. Plans called for a garrison support unit to be established at each of the seven inactivating ARCOM locations, making a home for many of the soldiers assigned to the inactivating ARCOMs. According to Baratz, “The overhead – the ARCOMs – is expensive, and was based on the old Cold War and the activities that related to the Cold War. By taking down the overhead from 20 ARCOMs to 10 new commands with new missions, we’ve given the Army Reserve a much more robust command structure.” “The reorganization,” he added, “will make us relevant, affordable, and prepare us for the future.”

Functions were restructured between the OCAR and the USARC, the U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center (AR-PERCEN) and the Full-Time Support Management Center. The headquarters level goal was to improve services to Army Reserve units and individuals. OCAR operations, force development,
force integration, and training functions transferred to the USARC. The head- 
quarters restructuring and the command and control reorganization saved over 2,000 civilian and military positions.95

On October 16, 1997, the AR-PERCEN in St. Louis, Missouri, became the U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM). This was in re- sponse to the Bottom-Up Review effort to reduce redundant systems, while improving efficiency. This was done in the face of decreased defense spending. AR-PERSCOM became permanent on October 1, 1998, with the recommenda- tion by an Army Reserve Council of Colonels. The council met in 1994 to determine how the functions and structure of the Army Reserve fitted into Force XXI. The council concluded that Army Reserve policy functions, person- nel management and service could be simplified. The group recommended consolidating these functions, spread across four agencies (OCAR’s Personnel Division, Army Reserve Personnel Center, Full-Time Support Management Center and USARC’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel), into one command.

The AR-PERSCOM became the sole source supporting Army Reserve person- nel management in peacetime and during mobilization. It improved mobiliza- tion support capability between the Total Army Personnel Command and the Army Reserve. The AR-PERSCOM executed business processes to improve personnel readiness for Army Reserve soldiers. The AR-PERSCOM functions included personnel management, strength accounting, personnel actions, per- sonnel system automation, and identification of personnel life cycle require- ments to support total Army Reserve force readiness. The AR-PERSCOM was a personnel management organization more in sync with the Department of the Army’s Personnel Command.96 Innovations included the personnel electronic record management system (PERMS), which converted paper and microfiche records into electronic data. That alleviated the paper bottleneck.97

To increase the readiness of the Army Reserve contingency force base (includ- ing transportation terminal units and medical units), in 1995 the USARC es- tablished more garrison support units (GSUs). The units backfilled installation base operations activities vacated by active Army units deployed to contingency operations. In 1995, twelve new GSUs were established. This was in response to problems which surfaced in the mobilization system for Operation DES- ERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. In June 1996, three GSUs mobilized for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. GSUs also assisted active Army units during peacetime. By January 1996, thirteen of the fifteen power projection platforms had GSUs assigned.98 Two power projection platforms belonged to the Army Reserve: Fort Dix and Fort McCoy.99 They were two of the former eight active component installations operated by the Army Reserve.100
Peacekeepers on the Princip Bridge, Colonel Gary Cassidy. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
The Army Reserve reorganized port/terminal, military intelligence, medical augmentation hospitals, and movement control units. Such units enhanced the Army Reserve’s power projection to be ready on the first day of a contingency.  

On November 1, 1995, the USARC established the Office of Installation Management and Policy. Its mission was to oversee the Installation Management program within the Army Reserve and advise the chief, Army Reserve. This office supported installation operations with planning and execution. An example of the office’s first action was the inactivation on March 31, 1996, of Fort Devens, Massachusetts, in accordance with the Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990. Department of the Army General Order 2, dated April 1, 1996, marked the activation of the Devens Reserve Forces Training Area in Massachusetts. Command and control of Devens became the responsibility of Fort McCoy, an Army Reserve installation already under USARC command and control. In September 1996, the Office of Installation Management became responsible for all reserve issues on installations scheduled for transfer to the Army Reserve. Plans began
to transfer Fort Dix, New Jersey, and the Charles E. Kelly Support Facility in Pennsylvania, to the Army Reserve for command and control. Then, the office broadened command and control from Fort Dix over the Charles E. Kelly Support Facility and the Devens Reserve Forces Training Area and planned to inactivate Fort Pickett. On September 30, 1997, the Virginia National Guard assumed control of Fort Pickett, which was inactivated under BRAC. Regional support commands became responsible for installation management and base operations as the Army Reserve assumed those functions from the active Army.102

The Department of Defense ordered the military services to integrate their active and reserve components into the Total Force to renew its pledge to depend on the reserves. One way to do that was through designing composite units. They were comprised of soldiers from all Army components and other military services. Active Army and full time support Army Reserve personnel assigned to these units provided an instant response cell during mobilization and deployment. An example was the 310th Chemical Company (Biological Integrated Detection), activated in September 1996 at Fort McClellan, Alabama. It was one of the Army’s two biological integrated detection system companies. Four platoons, the company headquarters, and support elements belonged to the Army Reserve, while one operational platoon belonged to the active Army. In another example, on October 16, 1999, the 3d Medical Command activated as a composite unit. The unit was located in Decater, Georgia, and consisted of 200 Army Reserve and twenty-nine active Army positions.103

The U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) was an example of a multi-component unit. It commanded and controlled active and Army Reserve civil affairs and psychological operations units. An Army Reserve general officer led it and most of its assets were Army Reserve. Chief, Army Reserve Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes said the command was “a model for the seamless” multi-component unit concept.104

Another example of the multi-component concept was the integration in 1999 of the reserves into the 4th Infantry Division, de-
signed to offset the reduction of authorized personnel. National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers were to fill the 4th Infantry Division’s modified table of organization and equipment positions that were designated as “required, not authorized.”

After a review of wartime staffing, the Joint Staff created joint readiness units (JRUs) to integrate personnel into unified command staffs to meet wartime mission needs. The Army’s contribution was active, National Guard and Army Reserve personnel, individual mobilization augmentees, and troop program unit soldiers to these units. Soldiers in these units were integrated into the staff of the commanders-in-chief. Army Reserve soldiers in JRUs were subject to presidential selected reserve call-up, augmenting the Army commanders’ abilities to respond to contingency operations. In 1998, there were 1,940 Army Reserve soldiers serving in joint reserve units. They were distributed as follows: 350 in the U.S. Atlantic Command, 373 in the U.S. European Command, 530 in the U.S. Pacific Command, 311 in the U.S. Central Command, 192 in the U.S. Southern Command, 109 in the U.S. Special Operations Command, 1 in the Strategic Command, 34 in the Space Command, and 40 on the Joint Staff.

The Army continued its “first to fight” for funding, personnel, training, and equipment. The force support package (FSP) replaced the contingency force pool (CFP). The FSP included strategic force packages of combat service and combat service support units to support five and one third (5 1/3) CONUS based combat divisions for a regional conflict. The FSP supported one full Army corps with five and one third Army divisions, the headquarters, and major subordinate commands of a second corps together with enough combat service and combat service support units to brace a full theater in a major regional conflict environment. It also included several major subordinate commands to open a second theater, thereby, making the FSP a functional entity supporting the “first to fight” units.

Tier 1 units, including force support package units, special operations support package units, continental U.S. support package units and early deployers, were highly trained and first to receive resources and prepared to deploy by dates designed in commanders-in-chief operations. To make certain that Tier 1 units were at a sharp state of readiness all the time, the Army presented them with 100 percent funding for Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve; 100 percent fill of full-time support personnel, high priority for training school allocations, and equipment enhancements. Tier 2 units and lower received resources coinciding with their mobilization missions or their position on major operations plan time-phased force deployment data lists.
Force Support Package 1 units supported 4-1/3 divisions, 1 full corps headquarters, and 1 theater slice (elements of a theater Army). Force Support 2 units supported 1 division, 1 partial corps headquarters, and 1 theater-opening slice. In 1997, the Total Army had 1,134 FSP units. Of those, 363 were from the Army Reserve; 209 from the National Guard. In 1995, the FSP included 356 Army Reserve units. Two hundred and forty-seven of these were previous CFP units. In 1997, there was a 3 percent decline in FSP readiness attributed to a 2 percent decline in the number of qualified soldiers and a 3 percent decline in equipment on hand resulting from reorganization and modernization.

In 1997, the Army’s two theater-level command and control signal units, two theater Army area commands, the round-out structure for the two active theater Army commands, and the only deployable medical command came from the Army Reserve.

Although much of the Army Reserve’s aviation structure was transferred or inactivated as a result of the Off-Site Agreement, the Army Reserve kept com-
bat support and combat service support core competency aviation units. In 1997, that force included two attack helicopter battalions operating the AH-64A Apache, three medium helicopter companies flying the CH-47C Chinook, and four theater fixed-wing aviation companies flying the C-12 along with the command, control and support organizations. Beginning in 1997, the Army Reserve added the UC-35 jet to its fixed-wing fleet.\footnote{113}

In 1999, the Army Reserve supplied 45 percent of the Army's combat service support units and 26 percent of its combat support units. These were distributed as follows:

1. 100 percent of the Army's individual and collective training support divisions and railway units, enemy prisoner of war brigades and chemical brigades;
2. 97 percent of its civil affairs units;
3. 85 percent of its psychological operations units;
4. 80 percent of the medical brigades;
5. 80 percent of the transportation groups;
6. 69 percent of the petroleum supply battalions;
7. 62 percent of its chemical and biological defense resources.

The Army Reserve had a large proportion of many other critically needed and often used units.\footnote{114}

**Training**

Training continued to be a key factor of force readiness. The reserves used the Status of Resources and Training Systems (SORTS) to give the commander a unit's readiness status. The Army Reserve and National Guard were required to report pre-mobilization training in SORTS. The Army Reserve used several programs to measure and evaluate combat readiness. That included LANES, a process for training smaller units on mission essential task list related functions; the training assessment model; command post and field training exercises; Joint Readiness and Training Center and National Training Center rotations; and battle command training program exercises. Budget constraints and operational tempo affected training evaluations.\footnote{115} Tiered resourcing also affected training seats, additional drill assignments, regular individual duty training, and annual training allocations.\footnote{116} Affecting post-mobilization training was a unit's readiness. This included qualified personnel, equipment on hand, and equipment readiness upon mobilization. Training ranged from fourteen to over forty days based on the unit's readiness status.\footnote{117}
The BOLD SHIFT program continued to improve individual, collective and leader training. The Operational Readiness Evaluation program continued, whereby Army headquarters in CONUS sent teams to examine reserve training and readiness.\textsuperscript{118}

Section 1132 of Title XI broadened the Army’s Active Component Support to Reserve Component Program from 2,000 active duty personnel to 5,000. These were full time advisors to the National Guard and Army Reserve. During 1995, the Army began assigning more personnel to this duty.\textsuperscript{119}

The divisions (institutional training) (DIVITs) as part of the Total Army Training System (TASS) continued to manage individual training within a geographic area, to include initial entry training, one-station unit training, MOS qualification and refresher training, and professional development. The professional development training included the Primary Leadership Development course, the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer course, the Combined Arms and Service Staff School, and the Command and General Staff Officers course. In fiscal year 1997, the Army Reserve prepared for an
Minefield, Colonel Gary Cassidy. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
expanded mission to conduct ROTC basic and advanced summer camps. Army Reserve soldiers from the DIVITs began serving as ROTC instructors at three universities in a trial program.\textsuperscript{120}

As planned, in 1994 the five Army Reserve divisions exercise (DIVEX) more than doubled in size. The increase was to accommodate the divisions’ responsibilities to conduct small unit lane and brigade/battalion staff computer simulation training for the reserve components. During mobilizations, they helped active Army readiness groups with unit validation.\textsuperscript{121}

The DIVEXs used lanes training to enhance the tactics and skills of units. They used the Brigade Command and Battle Staff Training Program to plan, conduct, and implement staff training for combined arms, combat support, and combat service support units.\textsuperscript{122} In 1996, the DIVEXs trained 405 Army Reserve and National Guard units through lanes training and 167 units through battle command and battle staff training.\textsuperscript{123}

In 1996, the USARC provided guidance to establish responsibilities, processes, requirements, and milestones for the exercise divisions, implementing the Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement (GFRE) program mentioned in chapter one. GFRE, an element of the Total Army School System, outlined a training partnership of active and reserve units to accentuate pre- and post-mobilization training.\textsuperscript{124}

In October 1999, the Army Reserve formed five training support divisions, (75th, 78th, 85th, 87th, 91st), entirely integrated active and reserve organizations. These came from the Army Reserve’s five DIVEXs to provide dedicated training support to all components of the Total Army.\textsuperscript{125} Army Reserve major generals commanded the five training support divisions, which were under the operational control of the two continental armies.\textsuperscript{126} The five training support divisions managed synchronized and integrated training support to all component priority units at either their unit locations or designated training locations. Their objectives were to achieve mobilization training goals along with high readiness levels and to reduce the time required for post-mobilization training prior to operational deployment. The Army Reserve commanded the divisions and battalions while the active Army commanded the brigades. The conversion resulted in twenty relocations and inactivation of seven Army Reserve brigades, eight battalions, and four logistics support battalions.\textsuperscript{127}

In 1997, the Army Reserve began the Reserve Associate Support Program (RASP) with one hundred Army Reserve soldiers. The RASP was a training program that enhanced readiness by providing soldiers fully trained in critical
skills. Soldiers who enlisted in RASP completed initial-entry training and then were attached to an active Army unit for the remainder of a two-year active duty for training obligation before serving a minimum of four years with their Army Reserve unit. The extended active duty tour allowed soldiers to complete skill level 1 training tasks before returning to their Army Reserve unit. Through RASP, active Army personnel shortages were reduced, war fighting capabilities were augmented and when the training period was completed, Army Reserve units reaped the benefits of having fully trained, field-tested soldiers.

Regional Training Sites-Medical provided comprehensive, integrated, progressive training tailored to the widely multi-faceted needs of the various medical units within the Total Army. The Quadrennial Defense Review determined that fewer hospitals were required to support America’s Army in the future. The 162 hospitals that were needed to meet the threat during the Cold War dropped 68 percent to just fifty-two hospitals under the Army analysis 2003 threat conditions. In 1994, there were seven training sites (two in the National Guard and
five in the Army Reserve). In 1997, the two National Guard sites converted to medical company training sites. In October 1997, the Army Reserve site at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, established as the last Regional Training Site-Medical in 1994, closed. In March 1997, the Army Reserve chose to close the site at the Devens Reserve Forces Training Area.\footnote{129}

Participation at combat training centers (CTC) was a critical training concept. It was the Army’s most demanding training event. Rotations through the CTC undeniably improved training readiness. The training strategy’s first year focused on crew, squad and platoon; the second year on platoon and company; the third year on the company and battalion; and the fourth year on company through brigade operations. Training for the fifth year replicated the first year; the sixth year replicated the second year; the seventh year replicated the third year and incorporated combat support and combat service support training with augmentation units. The latter training continued in the eighth year. Concomitantly, leader training was conducted throughout the eight-year training cycle.\footnote{130}
Training continued at the joint training facilities available at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana; the Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany; and the Battle Command Training program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1998, nearly 4,000 soldiers provided deployment and redeployment support for two rotations to the National Training Center. Over 5,000 soldiers from more than fifty units provided combat support and combat service support to units at the Joint Readiness Training Center.

Using technological developments, the Total Army School System moved from traditional institutional training to distance learning. The Army Reserve participated in the Total Army Distance Learning program to increase readiness, cost savings, and more time for the soldier. Distance learning facilities covered 95 percent of all soldiers. Distance learning brought crucial training to the active Army and reserve soldier and allowed soldiers to finish training away from traditional training locations.

The Army Reserve continued to mature, incorporate, and improve automation systems for training. In 1998, the Army Reserve fielded the Battle-Focused Training Management System. It assisted training management at company, battalion, and brigade levels. It facilitated the development of the unit mission statement and the mission essential task list. The system was upgraded to work with the Center Level Application System in collecting and transmitting the training assessment model through the chain of command to be forwarded to U.S. Army Forces Command. These were short term steps leading to the Reserve Level Automation System (RLAS). RLAS managed Army Reserve personnel, financial resources, unit and individual training, and official orders production. It embodied the Army Reserve’s business applications for the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS). “RCAS consist[ed] of hardware, software, and technical assistance and was designed to be installed in 4,700 Army Reserve centers and National Guard armories. The contract for RCAS was awarded in October 1991, ending four years of development effort.” The RLAS integrated local and wide area networks to bring current information to decision makers. On September 15, 1999, the Army Reserve fielded RLAS to all regional support commands, direct reporting commands, and subordinate commands and units.

Exercises continued to be a useful training tool. Equipment was sometimes pre-positioned while on exercises, which allowed units to train without degrading their own equipment. In 1996, in Exercise RIFLES MOVE, the Army Reserve planned and carried out transportation support to move the 3d Armored Cavalry from Fort Bliss, Texas, to Fort Carson, Colorado, which re-
lieved active Army units from making the move. For the first time, Army Reserve units were solely responsible for convoy operations and they assisted in rail loading at Fort Bliss. The Army Reserve set up a trailer transport point in Santa Fe, New Mexico, and convoyed 850 loads of cargo, totaling 2,472 pieces (some 13,265.6 short tons) from Fort Bliss to Santa Fe and then to Fort Carson. Three thousand soldiers participated in the exercise, used by battalion and higher headquarters to conduct training under operational conditions. Operational readiness stood at 87 percent.\textsuperscript{139}

Operation REEF-EX in 1995 was an example of the Army Reserve’s involvement in domestic civil-military missions. This Department of Defense program used obsolete military equipment, like tanks, to create artificial reefs off the coastlines. Army Reserve soldiers were responsible for planning and executing the operation. That involved cleaning equipment to Environmental Protection Agency standards, hauling it to a point offshore and placing it on the seabed. The exercise provided Army Reserve transportation, ordnance, and maintenance units valuable training in how to plan for and move major items of equipment.\textsuperscript{140}

In 1997, the Army Reserve’s 143d Transportation Command used rail, boat, and truck units to move the active Army’s 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade from Fort Lewis, Washington, to Fort Bliss, Texas, during Operation
PATRIOTS MOVE. Soldiers used 101 landing craft utility 2000s, the most modern vessel of its type within the Department of Defense. According to Baratz, this exercise showcased just “how Army Reserve force development, training and procurement meld to support America’s Army.”

In 1997, the Army Reserve was involved in Exercise ROVING SANDS, an exercise held every other year since 1989. It was the world’s largest air and missile defense exercise. It emphasized joint and combined interoperability of Joint Forces Air Component Command (JFACC), Joint Missile Defense Command, and Air Area Defense Command. Over 15,000 soldiers participated. Over 3,000 soldiers rotated through the National Training Center and another 3,512 through the Joint Readiness Training Center.

Throughout the year, the Army Reserve deployed 11,091 soldiers to fifty countries to participate in military exercises. Soldiers from the Army Reserve’s 555th Quartermaster Platoon (Mortuary Affairs) stationed in Dover, Delaware, deployed to Puerto Rico to participate in Exercise HEAVEN STORM, a joint training exercise for military morticians. Others participating in the exercise included the active Army’s 54th Quartermaster Company from Fort Lee, Virginia, the Army Reserve’s 246th Quartermaster Company, 331st Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs), and the 551st Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) from Puerto Rico. In the exercise, mortuary specialists processed simulated casualties in a mock chemical environment.

In 1998, there were over thirty major training exercises. Exercise RIO BRAVO, the largest chemical training exercise since World War II, involved Army Reserve chemical unit support to an array of headquarters and maneuver units. Exercise CALL FORWARD, which assessed the ability of Army Reserve installations to accomplish their mobilization missions during a simulated mobilization surge, occurred at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Polk, Louisiana; Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico. In 1998, the exercise consisted of thirteen Army Reserve units; 848 soldiers participated. POSITIVE FORCE was a joint chiefs of staff-sponsored worldwide command post exercise that evaluated national capabilities to conduct mobilization and deployment operations, supporting two regional contingencies. POSITIVE FORCE used...
the presidential selected reserve call-up and the partial mobilization decision process. In 1998, eighty-seven Army Reserve units participated in the exercise.144

Approximately 45,000 reserve soldiers participated in overseas deployment training, annually.145 The chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff directed an engineer and medical training exercise, NUEVOS HORIZONTES, to be conducted in Panama. Since the late 1970s, Army Reserve units have participated in Southern Command exercises in Latin America. They were originally called BLAZING TRAILS in the 1970s, then FUERTES CAMINOS and finally NUEVOS HORIZONTES. Task Force 411 deployed on January 18, 1997, from Fort Dix to Panama by air and sea to conduct humanitarian and civic assistance, engineer related construction, and medical readiness training exercises. Reconstitution occurred at Fort Dix on June 14, 1997, through September 21, 1997. Among the mission accomplishments were: the construction and rehabilitation of six schools and medical clinics; drilling and repairing four wells for potable water; upgrading and repairing five kilometers of farm-to-market roads; preparing local sporting facilities (i.e., soccer and baseball fields); conducting three medical readiness training exercises serving 4,000 patients and 200 livestock; and the interaction of American soldiers with the local Panamanian population.146

In 1999, exercises occurred in El Salvador and in Guatemala. The exercises were in support of hurricanes Mitch and George disaster relief efforts. The deployment window was March 15 to August 27. Missions included base camp upgrades, river crossing operations, dike and bridge repairs, construction of schools and fresh water wells, road fill projects, and potable water wells. Approximately 7,200 soldiers from the Army Reserve participated.147

The USARC participated in constructing a temporary life support base and in performing required exercise related construction in Egypt as part of Exercise BRIGHT STAR. This overseas deployment training was from July 5 to September 25, 1997. The 416th Engineer Command acted as the Army Reserve action agent and developed task force requirements. The 416th also was responsible for supervising the construction and coordinating the task force for deployment and redeployment. The 980th Engineer Battalion (Combat Heavy) from the 90th Regional Support Command planned and administered the mission. The battalion rotated three company plus size construction task forces. Major Army Reserve participants included fifty-five soldiers from the 416th Engineer Command, 440 soldiers from the 980th Engineer Battalion (Combat Heavy), forty-five soldiers from the 728th Engineer Detachment (Utilities), and twenty-three soldiers from the 353d Engineer Group. The active component provided communications and medical teams; the host nation furnished an engineer team. BRIGHT STAR was an excellent collective train-
ing exercise for the deployment, construction, sustainment, and redeployment for both engineer units and support teams.148

Overseas deployment training afforded Army Reserve units the opportunity to simulate operational deployment and to participate in combined and joint exercises. In 1996, 21,132 Army Reserve soldiers from 1,938 cells/units participated in overseas training. That number dropped to 13,347 from 1,297 cells/units in fiscal year 1997. In 1998, the number was 13,654 soldiers from 2,038 cells/units.150

Litter bearers from the 405th Combat Support Hospital, Hartford, Connecticut, move a patient from an ambulance to the triage area during a mass casualty exercise at Fort Bliss, Texas, site of Exercise ROVING SANDS, ’96. (Army Reserve Magazine, Summer 1996)
Between 1989 and 1998, the Army’s buying power declined by 39 percent. The Army took what General Reimer called a “procurement holiday.” From 1985 to 1999, “Army procurement in real terms... dropped 67 percent. The Army... terminated or restructured over 100 programs since 1987.” The Army “deferred and stretched modernization programs and research and development to ensure... [it] maintained minimum essential near-term readiness and the trained and ready forces that have served the Nation so well over the last decade.” General Reimer warned that to maintain “our strategic edge,” soldiers must have the “best equipment available.” Force XXI and advanced war fighting experiments were demonstrating “real world capabilities that... [could be fielded] right now to harness the potential of information age warfare.” Army After Next war games were identifying the “future capabilities” needed for immediate development. Force XXI and the Army After Next were the “roadmap that... [was] focusing the procurement and research and development required to prepare the Army for the 21st century.” There were “pressing modernization shortfalls” including “replacing aging equipment, modernizing the Army’s
Reserve component, implementing . . . Force XXI digitization initiatives, and procuring next generation munitions and combat systems. The longer we delay these key modernization efforts,” he cautioned, “the greater risk the force assumes.” On a positive note, the nearly two-third decrease in procurement since 1989 was being reversed in 1999 with the aid of reinvested savings gained through efficiencies, base closures, and personnel cuts.

Department of Defense Directive 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Forces, required the reserves be equipped to accomplish all assigned missions, including the ability to respond along with the active component in supporting two nearly simultaneous major wars.
Department of Defense Directive 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Forces, required the reserves be equipped to accomplish all assigned missions, including the ability to respond along with the active component in supporting two nearly simultaneous major wars. It established the department’s long range goal of filling the wartime equipment requirements of the reserves in accordance with the Total Force Policy.\textsuperscript{154}

Army Reserve equipment needs were met in the order of precedence set by the Department of the Army Master Priority List, which supported the “first to fight, first to equip” policy. This system helped the highest-priority units field equipment congruent with that of active Army units, but low-priority units did not receive the equipment they required to sustain compatibility.\textsuperscript{155}

There were definite challenges to modernizing the reserves. The reserves depended on redistribution of equipment as a prime source of equipment modernization. Military downsizing slowed redistribution. As Department of Defense budgets remained constant, the pressure on procurement and modernization accounts increased the challenge to adequately equip the reserves.\textsuperscript{156}
In 1995, the Army Reserve experienced significant equipment shortfalls affecting its readiness. About 27 percent of Army Reserve units were not deployable due to shortages. Thirteen percent of the planned early deploying units had major problems. The shortages included communications and electronics equipment, medical equipment, power generation equipment, water purification equipment, combat support equipment, and line haul equipment. Attempted remedies included redistribution of equipment; a dedicated procurement program; and an increase in depot maintenance funding. In 1997, 77.1 percent of equipment was on hand. It had improved by 1998 to 82.8 percent and by 1999 to 87.2 percent.

By 1999, the Army Reserve reported 84 percent of its major equipment needs as met, up from 75 percent in 1998. While this was behind the other reserve components and the Department of Defense reserve component average of 96 percent, the trend was encouraging. Still the high operational tempo and the Army’s mounting integration of the active Army and reserves had a negative effect on equipment and personnel.¹⁵⁹
The active Army continued to provide support for the reserves through new equipment purchases and in-service equipment transfers to reserve units. Also, the reserves procured new equipment through direct purchases using National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA) funds. National Guard and Reserve equipment appropriations for the Army Reserve continued to be uneven: $133 million in 1995; $90 million in 1996; $114 million in 1997; $75 million in 1998 and $20 million in 1999. The decline of funds from 1997 to 1999 was of particular concern in its affect on equipment upgrades, modernization, and equipment training. In 1998, the Army Reserve’s plans for purchasing new equipment were in sync with known Army modernization plans.
These equipment purchases helped to surmount Army funding shortfalls by using NGREA funding to afford new equipment for Army Reserve first-to-fight and first-to-support units, thereby, improving force readiness. When mobilized, reserve soldiers had been trained on equipment used in active units.¹⁶¹

Depot maintenance programs were used to modernize and improve equipment and also lengthen service life in an attempt to extend funds. In 1996, programs included U-21 aircraft modernization, generator and trailer conversions, computer upgrades, trailer and tank modernization, and wheeled vehicle remodeling. Additionally, the Army Reserve placed increased reliance on civilian industry to maintain, repair, and remanufacture equipment. The Army Reserve also pursued vehicle leasing programs, management of satellite maintenance garages, maintenance of vehicles stored for deployment, and vehicle maintenance.¹⁶² Unfunded depot maintenance requirements were $41.2 million in 1996; rising in 1997 to $49.2 million and then dropping to $42.3 million in 1998.¹⁶³

In 1996, the Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, together with the Army Reserve, managed a depot maintenance rebuild and re-warranty program for all D7F bulldozers. Caterpillar, the bulldozer manufacturer, inspected, repaired, and returned each bulldozer with new warranties through its dealers. Dealers within 200 miles of reserve units serviced the equipment. Caterpillar also rebuilt rough terrain container handlers.¹⁶⁴
The Army Reserve benefitted from the remanufacture of 2 ½ ton trucks by AM General Corporation. Under this extended service program, AM General took existing vehicles and disassembled them. Useable components were rebuilt while obsolete components were replaced. Examples included a more powerful, fuel efficient turbocharged diesel engine that met Environmental Protection Agency standards; a four-speed automatic transmission; and super single radial tires with central inflation. The result was a vehicle with a fifteen year life expectancy and improved performance, safety, and reliability.\textsuperscript{165}

A foremost concern for the active Army and reserves was the continuing shortage of funds to fully automate the logistics system. In 1998, the Logistics Standard Management Information System operated in less than 50 percent of the Army Reserve. But, on a positive note, by 1998 the entire Army Reserve was automated in the area of supply support.\textsuperscript{166}

Shop Smart was a major equipping program. Prior to 1991, the Army Reserve’s support from the Army’s installations in CONUS was support in kind; the installation was funded directly for the support level. “So,” said senior logistician Mr. John Roe, “the money was given to the installation directly and the service was provided as a service in kind and we as the consumer didn’t at that time see much of a correlation between resource levels and support levels . . . .”\textsuperscript{167} Then that changed; the money came directly to the Army Reserve as the customer. The Army Reserve would reimburse the installation for service in kind. If the appropriation was not used, the funds reverted to the Army Reserve. This gave the Army Reserve the option to compete. An Army Reserve unit could shop around, either on or off the installation for the best value for services. For example, if the Army Reserve could take a piece of its commercially equivalent equipment “downtown to be repaired at a Caterpillar dealer for less money than

The palletized load system loads and unloads a wide range of cargo without the need for forklifts or other material handling equipment. \textit{(Army Reserve Magazine, Spring 1995)}
at the installation,” the Army Reserve “had that option to do” it under the Shop Smart program. “So we felt,” Roe commented, “that was a big improvement in accountability, efficiency in terms of how the resources were applied.” It also made the installation compete for the work. In 1995, the Army Reserve conducted a limited Shop Smart program at the 125th ARCOM. This showed that the program was a more cost effective and efficient way of doing business. Supplies and services in some cases could be purchased more economically, locally. In other situations, there was a savings in travel, time, fuel, tolls and temporary duty travel.

In 1995, the world’s largest producer of heavy-duty tactical military vehicles, the Osh-kosh Truck Corporation, produced two new generation heavy-duty tactical military vehicles for the Army Reserve. The systems increased mobility and lowered operational costs. They included palletized load system (PLS) vehicles and heavy equipment transporters (HET). The PLS was an innovative handling system which allowed cargo to be transported faster with fewer people and items of equipment. One PLS vehicle with one operator could transport 300 percent more cargo than the Army’s previous heavy cargo handler. The main mission for the HET was to pull trailers carrying the 70-ton M1A1 main battle tank.
There were conversion initiatives such as the 1998 Army Reserve M915A4 program. Through this program, M915 line haul tractors were refurbished with a commercial glider kit. The glider kit program used Army Reserve mechanics from transportation units who worked with civilian staff at Fort McCoy to strip down deteriorated vehicles received from the field. Parts from the glider kit replaced vehicle support systems such as the frame, front axle, brakes, fuel tanks, air-conditioned cab, electrical wiring, and other replaceable parts. The result was a virtually new vehicle, designated as the M915A4. Soldiers received practical experience and training as they upgraded their unit's vehicles. The converted trucks cost approximately $52,000 less than a new one. Plewes wrote in 1999 that the Army Reserve “[was] operating more efficiently by adopting proven business techniques.” One of those he cited was the glider kit program. “By using this kit, he stated, “to replace deteriorated vehicle support systems, we can save 55 per cent of the cost of purchasing a new vehicle.”

Other programs in 1998 included the conversion of seventeen five-ton cargo vehicles to the drop-side configuration and sixteen ¾-ton trailers from the M101A2 model to the M101A3. Thirteen generators were converted from gasoline to diesel engines. One hundred and thirty-three high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) were converted from M1037 shelter carrier models to M998 hard-top models. All the conversions used Army Reserve-owned equipment instead of replacing old equipment with newer models.

In 1999, the Army Reserve converted thirty five-ton cargo trucks to dropside trucks, 139 gasoline-powered generators to diesel, sixty M915 line haul tractors to the updated M915A4 configuration, 295 gasoline-powered compressors to diesel, and twenty-seven heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks to common bridge transporters. Other conversions included forty-three M967A1 fuel tankers to the multifunctional fuel tanker configuration of the same designation, nine M101A1 trailers to the M101A2 model, nine M101A2 models to M101A3 models, and 180 M1037 HMMWV shelter-carriers to the standard M998.

In 1998, the Army Reserve deployed an assortment of new equipment to improve Army strategic and operational mobility. In June 1998, the Army Reserve christened the Army’s first floating crane in Baltimore, Maryland. Its name, the Keystone State, honored the memory of the thirteen Army Reserve soldiers from the 14th Quartermaster Detachment from Greensburg, Pennsylvania, who were killed in an Iraqi SCUD missile attack in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The floating crane had a lift capacity of 115 long tons and a 175-foot reach, sufficient to lift the Army’s heaviest cargo, including the M1 main battle tank.
949th Transportation Company (Floating Craft) based in Baltimore owned the crane.176

In August 1998, the Army Reserve unveiled its new heavy equipment mobile transport (HEMTT) common bridge transporter. The transporter was a re-manufactured truck with improved capability to transport concurrently a float bridge and a fixed bridge. Then float and fixed bridge units could be consolidated into multi-bridge companies. The Army Reserve’s 459th Engineer Company (Multi-Role Bridge) was the first such bridge company in the Army.177

The Return of Equipment from Europe (RETROEUR) program, mentioned in chapter one, which had provided cascaded equipment improving the readiness and survivability of units, ended in fiscal year 1998.178

One concept receiving considerable attention was velocity management. Velocity management re-engineered the Army’s logistics process. Velocity management championed improved speed and accuracy within the logistics system, substituted velocity for mass, and improved the processes to abolish non-value-added activities, replacing them with value-added ones. Velocity management included order and ship time, stockage determination, repair, retrograde, and financial management.179 General Reimer evidenced the importance given by the Department of the Army to velocity management when he stated in Oc-
tober 1998 that “There will not be a revolution in military affairs unless there is a revolution in logistics. This means putting our faith in concepts like velocity management and total asset visibility, giving up the comfort of stockpiling supplies on an iron mountain [huge depots].”

The Department of the Army, under the direction of its deputy chief of staff for logistics, the deputy commanding general of the Army Materiel Command, and the commanding general of the Combined Arms Command were responsible for implementing velocity management. The Department of the Army established four process improvement teams. These teams and the major Army commands, the National Guard, and the Army Reserve were responsible for implementing velocity management throughout the Army.

In December 1995, the USARC’s deputy chief of staff for logistics formed the Army Reserve velocity management process improvement team. The team was responsible for identifying Army Reserve-unique supply and maintenance processes and issues and to reengineer Army Reserve logistics to meet the Army’s goals. In 1996, the team conducted a walk-through of each regional support command and installation to review requisition processes and supply and maintenance support. By 1997, velocity management had reduced order ship time by 20 percent, well below the annual goal. During 1998, the average ship time for the Army Reserve was reduced from forty to twenty-six days, a 35 percent improvement.

On March 31, 1996, the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) (version 2) was re-established in the Army Reserve with the signing of the materiel fielding agreement. The project manager for RCAS, the USARC’s deputy chief of staff for information management, and the information manager at OCAR signed the document. The agreement laid out the fielding plan and priorities and order of fielding within the Army Reserve and enumerated the missions and answerability of each part to the final RCAS solution. As of April 1996, the USARC’s deputy chief of staff for information management represented the Army Reserve in fielding matters, the first time the deputy chief of staff for information management received a tasking to officially support units outside the USARC. The 7th and 9th ARCOMs were included in the fielding. Hawaii’s 9th ARCOM became the first OCONUS command to be fielded. The fielding was in conjunction with a National Guard fielding initiative. In April 1996, the 99th Regional Support Command became the operational site for testing the system for the Army Reserve. The 143d Transportation Command became the pilot command for full installation of the system to its entire command and control structure.
Mobilization

In October 1994, Congress extended from ninety to 270 days the limits of involuntary service for reserve units called to active duty under the presidential selected reserve call-up (PSRC). The extension increased continuity, dependability, and integration of the reserves into military operations. The Army continued to seek congressional authority to bring soldiers of the IRR under the PSRC. Access to the IRR was limited to periods of declared national emergencies and partial mobilization.\(^{184}\)

In another congressional action, the Fiscal Year National 1998 Defense Authorization Act allowed the president to mobilize up to 30,000 members of the IRR to fill vacancies in deploying reserve units. Army Reserve soldiers in this special IRR pool had to be activated under the PSRC authority. The IRR activation authority used individual replacements to bring activated reserve units to full strength without lowering the readiness levels of non-deploying sister units.\(^{185}\)

The Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 enabled the presidential mobilization of reserves for emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction.\(^{186}\)

Every year some 20,000 Army Reserve soldiers deployed to fifty countries to support military operations. The percentage of Army Reserve soldiers mobilized to support Total Army operations increased while that of the National Guard’s decreased.\(^{187}\) During 1998, the Army Reserve provided over 2.2 million person-days to active component missions. About 48 percent of its annual training (AT) and 34 percent of its active duty for training (ADT) supported the active component.\(^{188}\)

On December 8, 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12982, calling to active duty 3,800 reservists for operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was the third mobilization of the Selected Reserve in five years. The Army was tasked with providing most of the reserve force strength. Secretary of Defense Perry signed a memorandum outlining the reserve contribution. The Army would supply not more than 3,388 reserve soldiers. On December 11, 1995, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense released a memorandum for selecting reservists for mobilization. Over fifty Army Reserve units initially were mobilized in the first rotation for what became known as Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Hundreds of volunteers were mobilized from the IRR. At the Army’s request, the number of reservists to be called to duty was increased by 500 to 4,300 on January 16, 1996. By May 1996, the PSRC had been extended to 8,181.\(^{189}\)
Under the PSRC, the Army Reserve provided units to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary, Croatia, and the backfill of units in Europe. The mobilization was characterized by calling up individuals and partial units. In 1996, the Army Reserve mobilized 2,799 soldiers from 104 units for Operation JOINT EN-DEAVOR in two nonmedical and three medical rotations. In January of that year, the Army Reserve deployed fourteen legal support soldiers whose special-
ties were in administrative law, criminal law, legal assistance, tax return preparation, contract law claims, and operational law to European commands and Bosnia. The Army Reserve also provided legal support to the Fort Benning and Fort Dix mobilization stations. In May 1996, the Army Reserve deployed twenty-nine legal support soldiers, most of whom were staff judge advocates, to Germany, Belgium, Hungary, and Bosnia. The public affairs units that had deployed in December 1995 to Bosnia and had established radio support to the soldiers, supplied maneuver brigade commanders with public affairs support and had answered news media requests to travel with or visit reserve units in theater, returned in July 1996. The Army Reserve also provided Serb-Croatian linguists and had to activate the 272d Military Intelligence Company (Linguist) in October 1995 to fill the need. Medical personnel, such as OB-GYN doctors, pediatricians, internists, medical and surgical nurses, optometrists, and medical logistics specialists, were mobilized for 140 days rather than 270, but could extend to 270 days. In December 1995, the USARC's Chaplain's Office staffed twenty-three chaplains and seventeen chaplain assistants for back fill in Germany. Rail units were called up for the first time since World War II.
By 1997, almost three fourths of all reserve forces mobilized for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARDIAN were Army Reserve soldiers.194 On any given day in 1997, about 25 percent of Army forces in Bosnia were from the National Guard and the Army Reserve.195 By the following year, the Army Reserve had provided over 11,000 soldiers in some 437 units to support Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR, JOINT GUARD, and JOINT FORGE.196 By 1997, the Army Reserve had provided 71 percent of all reserve component deployments for Operation JOINT GUARD.197 As of February 10, 1997, the Army Reserve had deployed 928 civil affairs soldiers and 269 psychological operations soldiers.198 Several thousand Army Reserve individual augmentees volunteered during Operation JOINT GUARD between 1996 and 1998.199 By July 1998, almost 17,000 National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers had supported these operations.200 In 2000, the Army Reserve supported Operation JOINT GUARDIAN in Kosovo with 1,935 soldiers and 345,701 man-days. In that same year, the Army Reserve supported Operation JOINT FORCE in Bosnia with 2,913 soldiers and a total of 526,683 man-days.201 Under the PSRC, the tour of duty was for 270 days.

Activities included operating mobilization stations at Fort Benning, Fort Dix, Fort Bragg, and the 7th ARCOM in Schwetzingen, Germany; backfilling active Army units in Germany; deploying soldiers to Hungary to assist in the forward operations of U.S. Army Europe; and controlling traffic over the Sava River. A civil affairs vehicle convoy passes through a section of the zone of separation near Brcko. The zone is often the scene of intense civil affairs effort to relocate refugees and rebuild homes. (Photo by Sergeant First Class Mark Martello)
A U.S. Army M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier prepares to pull an armored Humvee out of the mud in Bosnia and Herzegovina on May 10, 1996, during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. The spring-time mud presented a challenge to the soldiers and their equipment deployed as part of the NATO Implementation Force. (Department of Defense photo by Staff Sergeant Jon Long)
Peacekeeper, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
major portion of medical support for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR came from the Army Reserve. In Bosnia itself, Army Reserve soldiers ran the information bureau and provided civil affairs, psychological operations, postal, and other supporting functions. Psychological operations units published the Herald of Peace, a newspaper printed in three languages to inform civilians on the status of the peace accords, on mine awareness, and other subjects. Units removed mines, improved the road and rail network, did some construction, improved the water quality, and bolstered military authority.

During the initial stages of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Army Reserve C-12R fixed-wing airplanes were the only Army aircraft, active or reserve, with the avionics required to get in and out of Sarajevo during severe weather.

On December 16, 1998, Army Reserve soldiers deployed to the Middle East to support Operation DESERT FOX, the destruction of sites in Iraq related to weapons of mass destruction. About forty soldiers from the 310th Chemical Company (Biological Integrated Detection) and a liaison team from the 490th Chemical Battalion supported this operation by supplying early warning of any probable biological threat. The 310th was one of the most mobilized units in the Army Reserve. Another mission came in 1999 with Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (Kuwait/Saudi Arabia).

What did Army Reserve soldiers think about mobilization? An Army Reserve survey on returning soldiers from Bosnia indicated that some 52 percent would volunteer for future mobilizations while 35 percent said they were unlikely or very unlikely to volunteer. Almost 70 percent said they would not complain if called for future mobilizations. Over 66 percent of those surveyed stated that the maximum period of mobilization should not be more than one hundred and eighty days. Thirty-four percent of physicians mobilized for Bosnia had left the Selected Reserve by 1998. Other mobilized physicians indicted they remained in the Selected Reserve only because time remained on their service contracts.

Military Support to Civil Authorities and Homeland Defense

As part of the Army Reserve’s military support to civil authorities, many tasks included medical evacuation support to ground operations, heavy lift support, and aviation support to the National Guard and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). In addition, the Army Reserve played a role in anti-drug intelligence operations, drug trafficking and money laundering operations, intelligence analysis for the DEA, and linguists to translate foreign documents.
concerning narcotics trafficking and gang activities in the United States. During 1997, the Army Reserve conducted 178 missions with 1,785 soldiers for counterdrug operations. The following year, the Army Reserve conducted 158 counterdrug operations involving over 350 soldiers.

On April 19, 1995, at 9:02 A.M. local time, a truck bomb with about 5,000 pounds of explosives exploded in the front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The explosion killed 168 people (including nineteen children) and injured over 500. It damaged or destroyed an additional 300 buildings. The explosion was heard as far away as 30 miles. President Clinton declared a state of emergency. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) established a disaster relief field office. The Department of Defense designated a defense coordinating officer to correlate department assets and resources in a federal attempt to respond to and direct recovery operations. The USARC staffed the disaster field office with seven officers and two enlisted soldiers for seventy days. The 353d Engineer Group, located in the vicinity of the federal building, supplied ten soldiers along with tents to erect a command post, veterinary shelter, and supply point for a total of sixty days. The Army Reserve served our nation during the worst act of terrorism in U.S. history, to that date.
The Army Reserve served our nation during the worst act of terrorism in U.S. history, to that date.

This photo of fireman Chris Fields and one-year-old Baylee Almon (who later died in a hospital) became a symbol of the most deadly pre-9/11 terrorist attack on U.S. soil.
The Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building two days after the attack.
Pipe Sergeant Kevin M. Donnelly, of the DEA Black and Gold Pipes and Drums, walks past the field of chairs and the reflecting pool at the Oklahoma City National Memorial on Monday, April 19, 2010, to start the 15th anniversary memorial ceremony of the Oklahoma City bombing. (Sue Ogrocki/AP)

Removing debris from what used to be the childcare center. (NASA Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team)
The Army Reserve’s new mission in 1997 came with passage of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996. The Army Reserve had the preponderance of the Army’s chemical and medical units. It also contributed transportation, quartermaster, communications, civil affairs, and engineer resources in the event of a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction. The Army Reserve appointed state emergency preparedness liaison officers, regional emergency preparedness liaison officers for Federal Emergency Man-

agement regions, and emergency preparedness liaison officers to serve with each numbered U.S. Army. The Army Reserve established a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Domestic Preparedness Branch in Atlanta, Georgia, to manage all of the WMD plans. By September 1998, Army Reserve soldiers provided instruction on WMD defense in twenty-two U.S. cities. During fiscal year 1998, Army Reserve teams provided WMD instruction to several federal agencies, including the Department of Veterans Affairs, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Probation Department. The Army Reserve held exercise WMD CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT, simulating a terrorist attack on Augusta, Georgia.

In 1997, 1,010 IRR soldiers were called to active duty to support emergency operations. Water purification units, such as the 370th Quartermaster Battalion (Water Supply) and the 854th Quartermaster Company, supported flood relief operations in North Dakota by supplying purified, potable water. Engineers in New Hampshire helped a town recover from a dam break. Army Reserve dentists provided dental care on the Navajo Indian Reservation in Arizona. When floodwaters threatened the people of Littleton, Iowa, in May 1998, soldiers from the 445th Transportation Group, 89th Regional Support Command, drove to their rescue. Also in May, soldiers from the 95th Division (Institution-
The 7229th Medical Support Unit (MSU) from Fort Lewis, Washington, provided the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation Tribe with medical, dental, and veterinarian care here in Lame Deer, Montana, part of the Innovative Readiness Training (IRT) program. Shown here is Major Dana M. Dobbs with the 7229th. (U.S. Army Reserve photo by Master Sergeant Enid Ramos-Mandell, Army Reserve Medical Command Public Affairs)

Sergeant First Class Scott Matson from the 327th Engineer Company guides the removal of the temporary bridge from the Red Wing Wildlife Preserve on the Mississippi River. (Army Reserve Magazine, Summer 1995)
al Training) helped people recover from tornadoes in Kansas and Oklahoma. In 1998, the Army responded to several crises including Typhoon Paka on Guam; ice storms in the northeastern United States; a large snowstorm in Marion, Virginia; a tornado in Washington, Iowa; droughts in Texas; severe storms in Fort Scott, Kansas; and floods and wildfires in the southern United States. In addition, the Army Reserve assisted in the relief efforts stemming from several hurricanes. Army Reserve units also provided a myriad of community services support, such as erosion control and road construction. In January 1995, the 327th Engineer Company from Ellsworth, Wisconsin, erected a bridge to help the Red Wing Wildlife League support the Red Wing Wildlife Preserve’s bird nesting habitat.
The Civil-Military Innovative Readiness Team (IRT) program resulted from President Clinton’s “rebuild America” initiative and follow-on legislation. The IRT program provided the Army, especially the National Guard and the Army Reserve, with the chance to combine combat service support training, operational deployment, and civil support into one mission within the United States. During 1999, Army Reserve dental teams deployed to the Rosebud Indian Reservation in Rosebud, South Dakota, and to the Crow-Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation in the Crow Agency, Montana, as part of Operation WALKING SHIELD. The Walking Shield of American Indian Society envisioned this deployment.

The deployment, consisting of two teams totaling three dentists and two dental technicians, provided the soldiers with operational and mobilization training and, in the mean time, improved the quality of life among Native Americans. In two weeks, the teams completed about 100 oral surgeries, sixty pediatric dental procedures, forty root canals, 150 extractions, 150 restorations, and over 1,500 dental cleanings and examinations. Other IRT missions included Operation WHITE FANG, a deployment of a dental team to the Arctic Slope region of Alaska, and Operation ARTIC CIRCLE, involving the deployment of the 109th Medical Detachment (Veterinary) from the 63rd Regional Support Command, to provide services to Native Americans in Alaska.

In 1999, Army Reserve Brigadier General Mitchell M. Zais headed Joint Task Force Provide Refuge at Fort Dix. The task force provided assistance to over 4,000 ethnic Albanians who were expelled from Kosovo by Serb forces. Zais commented, “We want to welcome these people to America the way we might wish our grandparents and great-grandparents had been welcomed to Ellis Island.”

The USARC sent eighty Active Guard Reserve soldiers to augment the joint staff. The USARC provided the task force’s logistics officer for this logistics heavy mission. Joint Task Force Provide Refuge’s logistics staff procured more than thirteen million dollars in equipment and services; successfully coordinated the arrival of nine flights from Macedonia to McGuire Air Force Base; provided over 280,000 meals; and drove 2,800 injury-free miles. Four Army Reserve soldiers were activated to support the language requirement of the task force: two Serbo-Croatian linguists and two Albanian linguists. An Army Reserve officer served as the task force’s staff judge advocate, providing legal advice to the task force. The office authored the official documents addressing the task force’s rules of engagement for interacting with the refugees.

In 1999, Army Reserve soldiers provided assistance in the wake of Hurricane Mitch and Hurricane Georges. Between January and August 1999, 20,800 Army
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Reserve soldiers deployed to Honduras and other islands including Puerto Rico. They distributed relief supplies and provided emergency support. Engineer units built medical facilities, repaired roads and bridges, and dug new wells.226

Soldier and Family Well Being

Joint Chiefs of Staff General John M. D. Shalikashvili stated, “No single investment we make is more important than our people . . . . We will not continue to attract quality young people if incentives and benefits subside. If we don’t take care of our people in uniform, our civilians and their families, we will not retain the career professionals we need to lead our forces into the next century.”227 Echoing his sentiments, General Reimer stated, “They deserve to have their entitlements and benefits safeguarded from erosion. They deserve a quality of life equal to that of the society they have pledged their lives to defend. We must never allow our commitment to quality soldiers to diminish.”228
The heart of the Army family quality of life program was the Army Family Action Plan established in 1984. The Army Family Action Plan increased readiness and retention by improving the quality of life for America’s soldiers and their families at the grassroots. Annual forums kicked off the plan. At these forums, delegates raised issues, suggested ways to resolve them, and reported the results to installation commanders. Issues requiring a higher level of authority were forwarded to the major Army command level or the Department of the Army.

In 1998, eighteen delegates attended the USARC’s first Army Family Action Plan process action team. The delegates evaluated issues forwarded from local forums across the Army and briefed the five most critical issues to the vice chief of staff, Army. The chief of staff, Army approved inclusion of new issues into the Family Action Plan. They were: retirement benefits/entitlements; financial planning education; lack of benefits due to geographic location; shortage of professional marriage and family counselors; and lack of choice in the family member dental plan. The process action team voted that the most valuable services were: medical/dental services; housing; child development services; youth services; and commissary privileges. Accomplishments under the Army Family Action Plan in 1998 included an increase from twelve days to twenty-four days of reserve component access to the commissary, an increase to $100 per month in family separation allowance, indexing basic allowance for housing to local housing costs, retiree and reserve dental insurance, expanded use of volunteers throughout the Army, and tuition assistance for spouses overseas.

In December 1994, the USARC held the first meeting of the Army Reserve Family Action Program Advisory Council (FPAC) to promote family well being. The purpose of the FPAC was to advise and assist the chief, Army Reserve in improving policy for family programs. The council amplified readiness and retention by guaranteeing the Army Reserve family program was useful, sympathetic, and meaningful in meeting the needs of the Army Reserve community. In 1995, more than 2,030 volunteers and key personnel received training through the twelve regional family program academies.

The Army Reserve conducted fourteen regional family program academies or workshops in 1996 for 2,600 participants, training volunteers, full time per-
sonnel, and leaders. Each regional support command and the 65th ARCOM conducted one academy. Army Reserve soldiers attended Department of the Army family team building classes and then returned to their installations to train family members. A training program of forty-one classes developed self-sufficient family members with information on basic military terms and customs, community resources, and problem solving techniques.232

The Army Reserve went from nearly zero family support to an extensive system and network. The USARC instituted a Family Support Division at the regional support commands to provide family support for soldier well being.233

The 1994 Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) provided reemployment protection and other benefits to veterans and employees. A 1998 amendment made it applicable to employers outside the United States if they were affiliated with U.S. corporations. This was significant because about 2,000 Selected Reserve members lived outside the country. Another amendment applied to states as employers.234
Base Realignment and Closure

By General Reimer’s March 18, 1999, testimony before the Senate’s Armed Services Committee, over seven hundred bases had been closed or realigned in the United States and overseas. The chief impact of BRAC was on long range major construction planning. Many Army Reserve facilities were over thirty years old and were becoming more costly to repair than to replace. The Army Reserve’s BRAC goal was to obtain good buildings to replace old ones or leased property. The process did a first rate job of obtaining training areas but not quality buildings. One BRAC impact affected readiness if reserve soldiers’ travel to training installations was increased.

Army Reserve command and control of Fort Pickett and Fort Devens ended with their closure. Annual training facilities were to remain available at Forts Indiantown Gap, Pickett, Chaffee, and McClellan through Army Reserve enclaves, with the required training areas and ranges. In 1995, military construction support to Army Reserve BRAC actions was approximately $48 million.

BRAC affected Myrtle Beach Air Force Base. The Department of Defense transferred two buildings on more than three acres at the airbase to the Army Reserve. This eliminated a $66.5 million substandard lease. In 1996, the Army Reserve acquired property at the Dallas Naval Air Station. Long range plans were made for the construction of a new Army Reserve center at the Red River Army Depot. The transfer of command and control of Fort Dix to the Army Reserve was a BRAC action. In addition to Fort Pickett, Fort Indiantown Gap and Fort Chaffee, reserve component enclaves were created at Camp Pe- drickson, New Jersey; Camp Kilmer, New Jersey; McWhethy Army Reserve Center at Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, Colorado; Fort Missoula, Montana; Defense Distribution Depot, Ogden, Utah; Oakland Army Base, California; March Air Force Base, California; and Fort Hunter Liggett, California.
Conclusion

As the twentieth century ended, the United States remained engaged in a more complex post-Cold War world. The country had moved beyond containment to one of global leadership and enlargement. That change was apparent in the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy of shape, respond and prepare. Although smaller, like the active Army, the Army Reserve was to be a full partner in that strategy as it became almost 100 percent combat support and combat service support oriented. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and other conflicts meant no mission belonged exclusively to any single component. The mission now belonged to the forward-positioned, full spectrum, threat-adaptive, capabilities-based, power projection Total Army. Overseas deployment was becoming more of an expectation and a standard. This was evident in the extension of the presidential selected reserve call-up authority from 90 to 270 days. The reserves like the active Army shifted concentration from a single theater to multiple contingencies overseas. The reserves were being called upon to assume selected complex missions. The reserves were more capable and intermingled with the active component than at any time in the past. The Army’s six imperatives remained constant: quality people, the right doctrine, the appropriate force mix, tough training, modern equipment, and leader development. The challenge, according to General Reimer was to “remain trained and ready, while conducting the most fundamental transformation since the end of World War II, in an era of constrained resources.”®40

Figure II-11: The Army’s Six Imperatives
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9. Ibid., 446.
12. Ibid., 446-449.
22 Ibid., 5.
31 Ibid., vii, 29, 32.
33 Major General Max Baratz, “QDR validates USAR as ready, relevant,” Army Reserve Magazine, Volume 43, Number 2 (Fall 1997), 2.


45 Ibid.


51 Ibid.


58 Cameron, *To Fight or Not to Fight*, 339.

59 Ibid.

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66 Brown, Kevlar Legions, 180.
67 Gammons and Donnelly, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1995, 55, 56, 57.
70 No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997, 129.
71 Reeves, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1996, 91.
72 No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997, 129.
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A New Day in Infamy

Throughout the 1990s, the smaller Army was engaged on several fronts. The front lines were geographically distant from the American people. Daily life was largely unaffected. Americans could go about their daily business with little disruption from conflicts and turmoil in such places as Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The world seemed relatively safe and secure for those back home. That sense of security evaporated on September 11, 2001. America and its way of life was changed forever. A new day of infamy dawned.

It was a clear, sunny Tuesday morning on the east coast; just another work day for most Americans. That changed at 8:46 A.M. American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the 96th floor of the 110-story North Tower of New York's World Trade Center, the second tallest building in the country. Twenty thousand gallons of aviation fuel burst into flames at almost 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit. Was this an accident? That question was answered sixteen minutes later when United Airlines Flight 175 smashed into the 80th floor of the twin South Tower. As Americans watched on television, at 9:59 A.M. the South Tower collapsed from one hundred and ten stories to become one hundred and fifty feet of rubble. The North Tower collapsed within thirty minutes. Thousands ran from the dark, foreboding clouds of smoke and the crumbling buildings and chaos surrounding them. White House Chief of Staff Andy Card told President George W. Bush, who was in Sarasota, Florida, “America is under attack.”

George W. Bush
United Airlines Flight 175 smashing into the 80th floor of the twin South Tower. (AP/Moshe Burswek-er)
The scope of that attack escalated when American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the western wing of the Pentagon at 9:38 A.M. Then, within hours, another plane crashed in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, killing the thirty-three passengers, seven crewmembers, and the four highjackers. Later, it was learned that the passengers evidently foiled another terrorist attack. Each plane had been seized by terrorists posing as passengers. They wrestled control of the aircraft and piloted each plane. “A total of 2,435 workers, 343 firemen, and 23 policemen died in the Twin Towers and another 125 employees and servicemen in the Pentagon.” Nine Army Reserve soldiers were killed; seven in New York City and two at the Pentagon. They were: Warrant Officer 1 Ronald P. Bucca; Staff Sergeant Frederick J. Ill; Colonel (retired) Ronald F. Golinski; Captain Michael D. Mullen; Lieutenant Colonel William H. Pohlmann; Sergeant Shawn Powell; Colonel (retired) Rick Rescorla; Colonel David M. Scales; and Captain Mark P. Whitford.

In his first public statement that day, Bush declared “Terrorism against our nation will not stand.” At 9:40 A.M., the Federal Aviation Administration halted all flights at U.S. airports. In what he termed his “first decision as a wartime commander in chief,” Bush authorized the shooting down of any suspicious plane which failed to land peacefully after being ordered. Bush approved Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld’s decision to raise the military readiness level to DefCon Three, the first time since the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.
Colonel (retired) Rick Rescorla used a bullhorn to direct the evacuation of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter’s 2,800 employees on twenty floors of World Trade Center 2, and 1,000 employees in World Trade Center 5. Rescorla reminded everyone to “be proud to be an American,” and sang “God Bless America” and other songs over his bullhorn to help evacuees stay calm as they left the building. Rescorla had most of Morgan Stanley’s 3,800 employees and people working on other floors of World Trade Center 2 safely out of the buildings by the time United Airlines Flight 175 hit World Trade Center 2 at 9:07. After having reached safety, Rescorla returned to the building to rescue others still inside. He was last seen heading up the stairs of the tenth floor of the collapsing World Trade Center 2. He was posthumously awarded the first New Jersey Vietnam Service Medal. (Photo unknown)
Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes and 77th Regional Support Command Commander Brigadier General Richard S. Colt confer shortly after the attack. (Photo by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 311th Military History Detachment)
New York City, September 14, 2001. Soldiers of the 1179th Deployment Support Brigade (DSB), Fort Hamilton, Brooklyn, volunteered to assist in rescue and recovery operations in lower Manhattan from September 14 to 16, 2001. From left to right: Sergeant First Class Harry Bass, Specialists William Schau and Rosa Arrunategui, Sergeants First Class James Farran, Tino Collura, and Captain Joseph Micelotta. In late October 2001, the 1179th mobilized for up to two years for Operation NOBLE EAGLE. (Photo courtesy of the 1179th DSB)
Ground Zero five days after the attack. (Photo by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 311th Military History Detachment)
New York City, October 19, 2001. New York City firefighters continued to douse out fires that smoldered from the World Trade Center rubble for three-and-a-half months after the attacks. (Photo by Major Robert Bensburg, 31th Military History Detachment)
New York City, October 19, 2001. A small part of the structure of one of the World Trade Center towers stood for more than a month after the terrorist attacks. (Photo by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 311th Military History Detachment)
Plan Accordingly, Gary Cassidy. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
October 19, 2001. Recovery workers worked around the clock to clear out the debris from the World Trade Center site. It would not be until May 2002 that the site would be clean. (Photo by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 311th Military History Detachment)
Arlington, Virginia, September 11, 2001. Command Sergeant Major Alex Lackey, Command Sergeant Major of the Army Reserve, communicates on a cell phone outside the Pentagon on September 11. Smoke is still coming from the Pentagon. Inside the building when the plane hit, he exited the Pentagon, then formed a litter team and tried to rescue survivors. Prevented from re-entering the building because of the fire and the threat of an additional attack, he supported the soldiers of the 3d Infantry Regiment ("the Old Guard") who rushed from Fort Myer to the Pentagon. (Photo by Master Sergeant Jacqueline Gopie, OCAR)

Arlington, Virginia, September 17, 2001. Soldiers of the Army Reserve’s 311th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) from Aguadilla, Puerto Rico – along with federal officials like Federal Bureau of Investigation agent Samuel Simon – set up operations in the north parking lot of the Pentagon on the morning of September 17, 2001. The men and women of the 311th had the grim task of searching through tons of debris from the Pentagon attack, searching for remains of victims and personal affects. They deployed and were operational within seventy-two hours of the call for volunteers reaching them. (Photo by Lieutenant Colonel Randy Pullen, OCAR Public Affairs Office)
September 11, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
Arlington, Virginia, September 14, 2001 — Three days after the attack, fire engines surrounded the damaged portion of the Pentagon. At that time, efforts had shifted from rescue to recovery and the 311th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) used its knowledge of mortuary affairs to assist. In the days following the attack, Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes stated that the Army Reserve focused on gaining accountability of its personnel in both New York and Washington, raising security conditions at the reserve sites around the nation and overseas, and examining Army Reserve assets to provide assistance at the Pentagon and in New York. (Courtesy of the Pentagon Renovation Project Collection)
Arlington, Virginia, October 22, 2001 -- Workers tore down portions of the Pentagon's rings that had severe structural damage in order to rebuild those sections. Their work left behind debris including cabling, rods, and piping. (Photo by Specialist Kelly Strand, 46th Military History Detachment)
Arlington, Virginia, October 22, 2001 — An excavator uses a claw to tear down damaged sections and remove debris from the Pentagon. (Photo by Specialist Kelly Strand, 46th Military History Detachment)
The Immediate Response

The Army and the Army Reserve were quick to respond. New York Governor George E. Pataki declared a state of emergency. Then Adjutant General Thomas P. Maguire ordered 8,000 National Guardsmen to report for state active duty. Guard soldiers had been gathering in their armories. By the night of September 11, 1,500 were at Ground Zero, as the World Trade Center attack site came to be known.10 “Among the great heroes of that day,” claimed Plewes, “were Army Reservists. They displayed the highest qualities of courage and selflessness, whether that meant rushing into the World Trade Center, helping injured comrades out of the burning Pentagon or organizing rescue and recovery activities regardless of personal safety concerns.”11 Some died while performing their duty. When the attacks on America took place, the Army Reserve’s measured readiness was at the highest level in history at 77 percent, with 87 percent of its force deployable. According to Plewes, “This readiness -- along with our magnificent soldiers themselves -- is what enabled the Army Reserve to respond immediately and so effectively on September 11...”12

“Among the great heroes of that day were Army Reservists. They displayed the highest qualities of courage and selflessness, whether that meant rushing into the World Trade Center, helping injured comrades out of the burning Pentagon or organizing rescue and recovery activities regardless of personal safety concerns.”

Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes

The 77th Regional Support Command in Flushing, New York, Commanding General Brigadier General Richard S. Colt led the Army Reserve’s response to the World Trade Center attacks. The command identified support items and delivered them speedily to aid in the disaster recovery effort. The command offered other support by providing help to the rescue workers at Ground Zero. Also responding promptly and vital to the rescue and recovery operation were the Army Reserve emergency preparedness liaison officers in the New York City area. They arrived on scene immediately to support operations from civilian agencies. In a short time, crisis action teams were operational in every major Army Reserve command. Military police units were stationed at vital facilities.

The Army Reserve response mushroomed. Army Reserve soldiers stepped forward first as volunteers and then as part of the partial mobilization ordered by
President Bush on September 14, only three days after the attack. In contrast, a partial mobilization was not ordered during the Gulf War until five months after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The first call-ups started on September 22. By that time, and reminiscent of the Gulf War, the Army Reserve had seven units, one installation, six facilities, and some 2,300 personnel supporting operations. Most of the units and personnel were in a training status.\textsuperscript{13}

Past mobilization procedures did not work in Operations NOBLE EAGLE (home front) and ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan). There was no time to allow for thirty, sixty, ninety, or 180 days to mobilize. Hasty mobilizations from twenty-four hours to ten days became the norm. “The way we did business,” said Plewes, “just doesn’t work anymore.” A case in point was the 311th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) from Aguadilla, Puerto Rico. On September 13, the call went out to the 65th Regional Support Command. On September 14, eighty-five soldiers volunteered and mobilized the same day. By the morning of September 17th, they were at work in the Pentagon’s north parking lot. There was only seventy-two hours between the time they were called up and the time they were operational. On September 26, another 105 soldiers were on the scene. “By this time,” explained Plewes, “they were all under partial mobilization orders. The orders had caught up with a unit that had already been ‘at war’ for more than a week.” Other units followed the same example, conducting hasty mobilizations or mobilizing after they deployed.\textsuperscript{14} The majority of those units called up were in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE. Their missions included: force protection and security at installations and facilities, intelligence and investigation support, training and training validation, headquarters augmentation, garrison support, legal support, communications, postal and personnel support, engineer support, military history, logistics, and transportation operations.\textsuperscript{15} One example of a unit deployed for NOBLE EAGLE was the 1880th Medical Detachment (Logistics Support) from St. Louis, Missouri. The unit, alerted on November 23, 2001, provided augmentation to the 32nd Medical Logistics Battalion, 44th Medical Command, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for Class VIII supplies, optical single-vision lens fabrication, and medical equipment maintenance support.\textsuperscript{16} By the end of 2001, over 11,000 Army Reserve soldiers were on duty in the war on terrorism.\textsuperscript{17}

September 11, 2001 was a watershed in the history of the United States. It had a profound effect on the country which “moved,” in President Bush’s address that night to the nation, “A great people . . . to defend a great nation.” Bush set the tone for his evolving doctrine by stating the U.S. “will make no distinction between terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.” On
Waiting to Go to War, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
September 20, 2001 in a joint session of Congress, Bush further defined his policy by stating, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”

The United States “will make no distinction between terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”

President George W. Bush

The Bush Doctrine

On September 17, 2002, Bush released his National Security Strategy, which altered the way the U.S. guaranteed its national security. The National Security
Strategy outlined the threat of terrorists to freedom and the country’s intent to defend the “peace by fighting [those] terrorists and tyrants.” This document addressed an overview of America’s international strategy, aspirations for human dignity, preventing enemies from threatening America and its allies with weapons of mass destruction, global economic growth through free markets and free trade, opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy, and transforming America’s national security institutions to meet the challenge and opportunities of the twenty-first century. American strategy in the past concentrated on defense against tyrants with “great armies and great industrial capabilities.” But, now “shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.” The strategies that won the Cold War, containment and deterrence, will not work against such dangers, “because those strategies assumed the existence of identifiable regimes led by identifiable leaders operating by identifiable means.
from identifiable territories.” Today’s enemies “see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice…. We cannot let our enemies strike first.”

The new National Security Strategy for combating terrorism reformed America’s foreign policy, including preemption to handle rogue states and terrorists with weapons of mass destruction: the “Bush Doctrine.” It was a major shift in military posture from “shape, respond, prepare” to “assure, dissuade, deter forward, and decisively defeat.” Bush said this is “a matter of common sense and self defense….” There was a legal basis for preemption, international law, which recognized “that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.” The National Security Strategy preferred multilateral pre-emption. “The United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community.” But, “we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our coun-

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CHAPTER 3. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

Tracking Bin Laden, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
try.” It reinforced the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance which stated that “the United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated.” The fundamental goal of U.S. strategy must be to spread democracy everywhere, thereby, removing terrorism and tyranny. This proactive strategy set the stage for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It affected how the Army reshaped and transformed itself. Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis said this National Security Strategy “could represent the most sweeping shift in U.S. grand strategy since the beginning of the Cold War.”

**Operation ENDURING FREEDOM**

Military intelligence determined that Osama bin Laden’s Islamic al-Qaeda was responsible for the September 11 attacks. Al-Qaeda’s base of operations was in Afghanistan where the fundamentalist, repressive Taliban regime controlled the country. A loose coalition, the Northern Alliance, opposed the Taliban. On October 7, 2001, less than a month after the September 11 attacks, the U.S., with support from Great Britain, launched an air and naval attack. The campaign pinpointed airfields and air defenses along with command and control centers. In a national address, Bush said the military action was aimed to “cut the military capability of the Taliban regime.” Rumsfeld explained that the assault was intended to “make it increasingly difficult for terrorists to use Afghanistan as a base of operations.” However, this campaign was ineffective in loosening the Taliban control.

The ground war, or “boots on the ground,” began October 19, 2001. Several twelve-man Special Forces Operational Detachment A teams joined the Northern Alliance in fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda. By January 2002, the U.S. and its allies set the stage for tactical Operation ANACONDA which began on March 2, 2002, to destroy al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in eastern Afghanistan. That operation ousted the Taliban. Ground forces included the 10th Mountain Division, 101st Airborne Division, the 3d Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, and Afghan government soldiers. By November, the alliance had 50,000 personnel in combat on the ground, sea, and air. They were in a support mode to the Afghans. Remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda forces finally fled into the Tora Bora Mountains where they were pursued by local anti-Taliban forces with assistance from Special Forces. Many eventually fled through the mountains into Pakistan. Osama bin Laden eluded capture. A mounting number of American ground forces were in theater and secured areas. With U.S. support the alliance had terrorists on the run. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM marked the first commitment of American forces in simultaneous combat operations across multiple theaters of war since World War II.
Map 7
The Hizara Province, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
Army Reserve soldiers were serving alongside active component soldiers from the beginning of the ground war. Army Reserve public affairs soldiers went into the mountains of eastern Afghanistan with the 101st Airborne Division in Operation ANACOND A. The 911th Forward Surgical Team supported the 10th Mountain Division during medical assistance missions in Afghanistan. The 310th Psychological Operations Battalion served in the isolated mountain regions of Afghanistan, determining the needs of the people and organizing the delivery of non-perishable foods, bottled water, and medical aid. Army Reserve engineers improved facilities at Kandahar as medical soldiers treated casualties at Bagram Air Base. The 1863d Medical Detachment combated bacterial and airborne viruses. The 947th Forward Surgical Team built a hospital in the Orgun Valley and trained Afghans in contemporary medical standards. The 345th Military Intelligence Detachment assisted the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in intelligence operations leading to the identification, location, and targeting of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The soldiers’ tasks were “vital to the war on terrorism.” One soldier said, “We helped out the active duty forces that were there and needed the augmentation.” Some
civil affairs units, known for their humanitarian aid and rebuilding projects, found themselves on the front lines in combat together with the infantry.29

In January 2004, the 325th Field Hospital from Independence, Missouri, was activated and deployed to Afghanistan on March 15, 2004. The hospital staffed three locations at Bagram, Salerno, and Kandahar, providing Level III medical care. Soldiers from the unit helped support Task Force 325 Medical comprised of active Army and Army Reserve soldiers along with Navy and Air Force personnel. The mission of Task Force 325 Medical was to provide U.S. coalition service members, Department of Defense civilians, and other qualified personnel outpatient and inpatient care. Medical care spanned from basic family practice medicine to stabilization surgery for traumatic injuries from motor vehicle accidents, gunshot wounds, stabbings, rocket attacks, improvised explosive devices, and other injuries. Task Force 325 Medical also treated Afghan citizens whose injuries were beyond the care of local medical facilities. In the first nine months of operation, the task force treated more than 30,000 patients, admitted almost 1,500 patients, performed over 1,000 surgeries, filled over 50,000 prescriptions, took more than 16,000 x-ray photographs, analyzed more than 18,000 lab tests, and fabricated more than 4,000 pairs of eyeglasses.

Captain Greg Hanley distributes school supplies to the Smail Kail secondary school in the Parwan Province on July 1, 2004. Hanley is attached to the 325th Field Hospital. (DOD photo by Sergeant First Class Sandra Watkinskeough)
In that time, the task force saw approximately 9,000 local nationals. During the first presidential inauguration held in the country, Task Force 325 Medical sent a team to provide medical support for Afghanistan’s first president and for distinguished visitors. Task Force 325 Medical also assisted in humanitarian aid projects, such as distributing shoes, clothing, toys, and school supplies to the populace. The task force adopted a school in Charikar which taught both girls and boys.30

In 2006, soldiers from the 391st Engineer Battalion, York, South Carolina, were the Army’s improvised explosive device hunters in Afghanistan.31 In fighting terrorists, there was no front line. Other units like the 342d Military Police Detachment (Law and Order), which provided security for U.S. forces at Uzbekistan air bases, were not on the front line.32

For the 361st Engineer Battalion, service in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM meant a tour in Afghanistan from February 2005 to April 2006. A Company was from Asheville, North Carolina, while the other three companies were based in South Carolina. The unit totaled 570 Army Reserve soldiers. “Sappers
Their task was eliminating improvised explosive devices (IEDs). According to Sergeant Paul Hardy, “You know you’re making a difference when you are pulling IEDs out of the middle of the road. . . . We’ve saved a lot of lives, so you feel like you’re a part of something that really works well.”

They used Buffalo armored personnel carriers to travel. As squad leader Sergeant Joseph Plant said, “This vehicle has taken a [blast from a] double-stacked anti-tank mine and everybody survived it. . . .” But that was not always the case. In June 2005, Sergeant First Class Dereck Ware, a Persian Gulf War veteran of B Company was in a minefield with three airmen. “One tripped a line mine and one man lost a leg. But Ware’s quick thinking helped save all their lives, earning him a Bronze Star for the sapper.”

Matters proved lethal on another occasion. “On March 12, 2006, in eastern Kunar Province, a roadside bomb claimed the lives of four engineers from A
Company while they were clearing a route west of Asadabad in the Pech Valley. Two of the men were Iraq veterans.”37

One of the units A Company, which was assigned to Combined Task Force Spartan, supported was the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines. According to Marine Sergeant Gerald Calvin of C Company, “‘They have one of the most dangerous jobs in the entire military. . . . What it comes down to is that those four soldiers gave their lives saving the lives of others.’”38
As Base Air Force Chaplain Kerry Abbott told *Stars & Stripes*, “There’s not many of them here, they’re Reservists, they’ve known each other for a long time, they are friends. They know each other’s families.”39 The 361st Engineer Battalion lost a total of five during their deployment in Afghanistan.40

Also serving in Afghanistan was C Troop, 7th Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment. The unit, from Conroe, Texas, was deployed from October 2005 to October 2006. The unit operated from Bagram Airfield. The commander, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Doehring, observed, “Flying in one of the most demanding environments in the world...the unit carried out deliberate attack missions, provided quick reaction and performed armored escort missions. In 12 months,
C Troop’s eight AH-64A attack helicopters flew in excess of 4,979 hours of combat.\textsuperscript{31} In his January 2002 state of the union address, President Bush told the American people “in four short months,” the country had “rallied a great collation, captured, arrested, and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed Afghanistan’s terrorist training camps, saved a people from starvation, and freed a country from brutal oppression.”\textsuperscript{42} But, as seen later, the terrorists rallied, albeit in a weakened state. The U.S. continued fighting in Afghanistan. On December 1, 2009, President Barack H. Obama announced his strategy for escalating the war and committed 30,000 more soldiers to the war fight, thereby, increasing the number of Army Reserve soldiers on duty beyond the 1,528 already there as of June 22, 2009.\textsuperscript{43} The Obama administration’s December 2010 assessment of the war’s progress stated the strategy was succeeding in meeting its two primary military objectives: degrading the leadership of the Pakistani-based al-Qaeda terrorists who attacked the U.S. and breaking the strength of the Taliban militants who once provided them haven in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{44}

**Operation IRAQI FREEDOM**

The other major front in the Global War on Terrorism was Iraq. The concept for what later became Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was long in the making, dating back some viewed to March 1, 1991, the day after DESERT STORM. Based upon the belief that Saddam Hussein had developed weapons of mass destruction, President Bush decided that a regime change in Iraq was warranted. He also based his decision on Iraq’s connection with terrorists and the belief that Iraq posed a danger to the stability of the Middle East. Hussein’s use of weapons of mass destruction in deadly poison gas attacks on Kurdish villages in northern Iraq was another factor. As some of America’s allies questioned the threat of Hussein, Bush was prepared to act alone to crush what he had once included in his “axis of evil” made up of Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Others wanted to wait on the results of recently readmitted United Nations weapons inspectors. Britain sided with Bush as his determination for a regime change in Iraq increased.\textsuperscript{45}
Map 8
In a statement to the United Nation’s General Assembly on September 10, 2002, Bush said:

My nation will work with the UN Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq’s regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the UN Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.46
Into the Hornet’s Nest, Timothy Lawn. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
When Bush made his address to the United Nations, plans were already in the making for a campaign against Iraq. In fact on December 4, 2001, General Tommy R. Franks, commander of the U.S. Central Command, briefed the secretary of defense on the first draft war plan. By February 1, 2002, General Franks had plans for a four-phased war: connecting Special Forces with CIA teams, an air campaign, a ground war, and stabilization.47

In the winter of 2002 and the spring of 2003, National Guard and Army Reserve units mobilized as the ground war began on March 21, 2003. These units were largely combat service support units or logistics units. They provided the majority of soldiers involved in operating ports, hauling fuel, repairing equipment, and supporting the theater on a broad-spectrum. Combat service units such as military police battalions, engineer bridge companies, civil affairs detachments, and psychological operations units mobilized and met vital requirements. Since they were essential to the operation, rapid mobilization and deployment was the objective, one that was not always met. Many Army Reserve soldiers found themselves at mobilization stations different from the prewar plans. The quick paced mobilization sometimes resulted in reduced post-mobilization training of units and soldiers. This was training completed after mobilization and prior to deployment. Individual Army Reserve mobilization was another challenge. Moving through continental replacement centers often proved trying.48

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM had all the characteristics of war in the twenty-first century: the requirements for speed, agility, flexibility and the need for a more robust rotational base. Evidence of that was the 3d Infantry Division’s (Mechanized) ability to move two hundred miles to An Najaf within twenty-four hours.49 According to Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, chief, Army Reserve (CAR), “We didn’t miss one requirement . . . . We [won] at all the missions. But further we didn’t break the force; we don’t have any case of just literally losing everything—soldiers, equipment as well . . . . We met all the operational missions. . . .”50
Numerous Army Reserve units answered the call. The 459th Engineer Company (Multi-Role Bridge), an Army Reserve unit from Bridgeport, West Virginia, built bridges across the Diyala and Euphrates Rivers sometimes under direct enemy fire for the I Marine Expeditionary Force in its successful advance on Baghdad. As a bridge unit, it was common tactics that the 459th be a part of the spearhead elements, charging deep into enemy territory. Engineer assets, particularly bridges, were critically important, assuming the enemy would deny their bridges around Baghdad to coalition forces. After a week in place at the Baghdad bridge sites, the 459th transferred to Camp Dogwood, south of Baghdad, leaving maintenance crews behind to tend the bridges. At Dogwood, the unit’s mission changed dramatically when the unit became one of the prime movers in Task Force BULLET, a military operation to haul captured enemy munitions from around Baghdad to coalition ammunition storage sites to be accounted, used, or destroyed. There were other missions as well, such as directing traffic on the hard bridge across the Diyala and preventing civilians from using it. The 459th exemplified the integration of the Army Reserve into the active Army.51

Another example was the 377th Theater Support Command, which deployed with Third Army under Central Command, providing support services in Southwest Asia for the Southwest Asian Theater. The unit was comprised of active Army and Army Reserve soldiers.52

The 362d Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply) from Kinston, North Carolina, deployed in January 2003, hauling fuel to support the V Corps. The unit successfully accomplished its mission by delivering 61 million gallons of aviation fuel, 6.6 million gallons of diesel fuel and 3.3 million gallons of gasoline, and 124,000 gallons of water.53 For the 802d Ordnance Company (Ammunition) from Gainesville, Florida, combat service support meant recovering, cleaning, packing, hauling, and reissuing enormous amounts of war munitions to coalition forces.54

The 445th Medical Detachment (Veterinary Services) mobilized on February 24, 2003. Upon its deployment to Kuwait on May 6, 2003, the unit began assuming control over an area of operations which included ten countries in two continents, supporting four branches of U.S. services and coalition forces.
The 445th was responsible for veterinary services in Kuwait as well as U.S. camps in Iraq, Qatar, Djibouti, Bahrain, and Kyrgyzstan. The 445th conduct-

A soldier and his military working dog, Ali, search vehicles at an entry control point. Handlers working side by side with their dogs search vehicles for illegal drugs and explosives. The 445th Medical Detachment (Veterinary Services) was one unit responsible for the care of military working dogs. (Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System).
ed additional short term missions in Kenya, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Its mission included maintaining quality assurance of food inspection, providing zoonotic disease control, and caring for over seventy-five U.S. and coalition military working dogs. The 445th inspected over seventy-two million pounds of subsistence amounting to ninety-five million dollars. The volume of subsistence inspected was over eighteen million meals served with no outbreak of food borne illness reported. In the early stages of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, theater conditions were primitive with inadequate storage facilities for Class I and operational rations. The unit provided much needed assistance on this issue to ensure rations were stored in appropriate environmentally controlled facilities, thereby preventing further degradation or condemnation of the rations. Being responsible for the health of military working dogs involved the training and education of their handlers in emergency veterinary medicine. The 445th served in the theater of operations until February 2004.55

The 323d Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting) from El Dorado, Kansas, deployed to Iraq in April 2003. The unit’s duties included extinguishing fires, such as an oil pipeline fire, inspecting structures, and serving as a base fire department and an aircraft crash and rescue team.56

For the 195th Contract Supervision Detachment from Orlando, Florida, supporting the war fight meant supervising longshoremen, stevedores, labor crews, and military personnel contracted to load and off-load military cargo ships at the ports of Shuaiba and Shuwaikh, Kuwait. The 724th Military Police Battalion from south Florida built an enemy prisoner of war facility near Camp Bucca. The 320th Military Police Company from St. Petersburg, Florida, guarded a captured Iraqi air base in Tallil.57

The 369th Transportation Company was ordered to active duty on December 20, 2003. The company’s mission was to support 1st Infantry Division units and the 30th Brigade Combat Team; haul all classes of supply to supported forward operating bases; and provide command and control, force protection (convoy security), and maintain open lines of communication with supported units.58
During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the 459th Engineer Company (Multi-Role Bridge), an Army Reserve unit from Bridgeport, West Virginia, lays an aluminum float ribbon bridge under enemy fire across the Diyala River southeast of Baghdad. The spearhead of the I Marine Expeditionary Force required the crossing in order to expand its dismounted infantry bridgehead with tank support before entering Baghdad. Other missions accomplished by the 459th included bridging the Euphrates River and convoy security. (An Army Reserve Historical Painting)
Sixty-six soldiers of the 1184th Transportation Terminal Battalion from Mobile, Alabama, supported the 101st Airborne’s equipment needs. The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion from Arden Hills, Minnesota, recorded simple instructional messages that helped Iraqi prisoners understand and follow rules of an enemy prisoner of war camp. The 353d Engineer Group from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, worked to restore Iraq’s infrastructure, which included renovating the power grids and waste and sewer systems, and rebuilding housing and commerce.

“By September 2003, 144,000 National Guardsmen and reservists were on duty, with 28,000 of these mobilized for homeland security.”

By October 2003, 35 percent of the Army Reserve’s strength had been mobilized, which accounted for almost half of its deployable units.

By the end of 2003, a total of 2,322 Army Reserve units had been mobilized. Helmly described the mobilization as “for percentage wise the largest mobilization we’ve had since World War II.”

By 2005, the Army Reserve committed nearly 80 percent of its aviation assets to the war fight with
By October 2003, 35 percent of the Army Reserve’s strength had been mobilized, which accounted for almost half of its deployable units.

The arrival of its only two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter companies and one AH-64 Apache Battalion. The three units were D Company, 158th Aviation Regiment; Company C, 159th Aviation Regiment, both Black Hawk; and the 8th Battalion, 229th Aviation Regiment. The Army Reserve was no longer a supplemental force, a force of last resort, but rather one contributing immediately to military operations.
In a 2004 message to Army Reserve soldiers and their families, Helmly told them: “Today the nation is asking Army Reserve Soldiers to be prepared to serve on active duty when called. Just as the generation of World War II answered the call to service,” he continued “we are being called upon to sacrifice in defense of our Nation in the Global War on Terrorism.” As a result of the unstable situation in Iraq, “the Department of the Army,” he explained, “announced that our Soldiers will be on the ground, in the theater of operations for 12 months.”

“Today the nation is asking Army Reserve Soldiers to be prepared to serve on active duty when called. Just as the generation of World War II answered the call to service, we are being called upon to sacrifice in defense of our Nation in the Global War on Terrorism.”

Lieutenant General James R. Helmly
Specialist Jose Lopez, a sheriff’s deputy in Broward County, Florida, and a colleague put up some concertina wire along a yet-to-be built fence line as Army Reserve soldiers with the 724th Military Police Battalion find themselves pitching in to build the new enemy prisoner of war facility they will be guarding. (Army Reserve Magazine, Fall 2003)
Soldiers from the 459th Engineer Company (Multi-Role Bridge) lower a bridge section toward the water before launching and unfolding. A motor boat stands ready to engage the floating section and push it into place. (Specialist Bradley Miller)

Soldiers with the 632d Maintenance Company, 110th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, 224th Sustainment Brigade, 103d Expeditionary Sustainment Command, line up their mine resistant ambush protected vehicles before a mission in 2010 at the convoy staging lanes at Contingency Operating Base Adder, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo by First Lieutenant Seth Church)
Part of that sacrifice was the call up of Army Reserve soldiers often with less than forty-eight hours notice who were mobilized and sent to Iraq or to another theater. In fact, in 2003 more than 50 percent of Army Reserve units had less than a fifteen-day notice. Helmly described 2003 as an “absolutely volatile, tumultuous year.”

Many Army Reserve soldiers along with active Army soldiers were told they would be mobilized longer than expected. This placed stress on the soldier, the family, the employer, and the community, especially since during the Cold War many Army Reserve soldiers believed they would never be mobilized, or if mobilized, it would only be a six month deployment, like those in the Balkans. The active Army seemed not prepared for the new style of rapid mobilization either. Some 8,000 soldiers were mobilized, and then demobilized as not being needed, and a month later remobilized. “The pressures on the institution,” explained Helmly, “were extraordinary.” Soldiers were surprised by the size and speed of mobilization, the long deployments, and as Helmly explained, “the volatility of the mobilizations in terms of having to change the length of time the soldiers would be deployed -- the suddenness.” All this unforeseen change had to be communicated to the soldiers and their families. That meant a “massive command information communications campaign . . . .”

On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared “mission accomplished.” However, as with Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the insurgents were relentless and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and the Global War on Terrorism continued with the nonstop mobilization of Army Reserve soldiers. For the 11th Military Police Brigade, service in the Global War on Terrorism meant taking command and control from June 2008 to June 2009 of Task Force MILITARY POLICE-NORTH. Its mission was to conduct internment and resettlement operations and counterinsurgency operations for over 4,000 detainees, as well as coordinating the release and transfer of thousands of more detainees.

For the 416th Theater Engineer Command, it meant deployment in November 2008 to provide leadership and engineering staff capabilities to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Gulf Region Division supporting Multi-National Forces-Iraq. These and other Army Reserve soldiers provided essential combat support to ongoing operations.

The Army Reserve has been mobilized continuously since December 1995. December 8, 2010, found 12 percent of the force currently mobilized. Figure III-1 represents worldwide Army Reserve commitments. The war entered a new phase when on August 31, 2010, the Army’s 4th Stryker Brigade left Iraq, marking the end of U.S. combat operations. Operation NEW DAWN began
on September 1 with the shift from “combat and counterinsurgency activities to a more limited focus on training and advising the Iraqi security forces, conducting targeted counterterrorism operations, providing force protection for U.S. military and civilian personnel and facilities, and supporting civilian agencies and international organizations in their capacity-building efforts.” As of December 29, 2010, 195,707 Army Reserve soldiers have been mobilized in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM and NEW DAWN since September 11, 2001. (See figure III-2.) The Army Reserve as an integral, operational force continued providing nonstop combat support, calling upon its soldiers to expect routine mobilization and deployment.

As of December 29, 2010, 195,707 Army Reserve soldiers have been mobilized in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM and NEW DAWN since September 11, 2001.

Figure III-1: Army Reserve Commitments, December 10, 2010
Reserve Components
NOBLE EAGLE / ENDURING FREEDOM / NEW DAWN

Unique SSAN Activations as of: December 28, 2010

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<th>Reserve Component</th>
<th>** Current Involuntary Activations</th>
<th>** Current Voluntary Activations</th>
<th>Total Currently Activated</th>
<th>Total Deactivated Since 9/11</th>
<th>Total Activated Since 9/11</th>
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<td>41,326 (+384)</td>
<td>5,408 (+26)</td>
<td>46,734 (-304)</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>70,137 (+689)</td>
<td>21,945 (+214)</td>
<td>92,082 (+778)</td>
<td>701,485</td>
<td>793,567</td>
</tr>
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Notes:
* Includes members placed on Active Duty under 10 USC Sections 688, 12301(a), 12302 and 12304
** Includes members placed on Active Duty under 10 USC 12301(d) and members categorized as unknown in CTS statute code

 Soldiers from the 741st Adjutant General Company (Postal) prepare for Exercise BRIGHT STAR 2004 at Camp Doha, Kuwait. The unit arrived in Kuwait in April 2003 and departed in May 2004.
Specialist Lisa Phillips is at the .50-caliber machine gun of one of the 630th Transportation Company’s gun trucks. The trucks provide force protection on convoys in Iraq. (Photo by Master Sergeant Jack Gordon)
Soldiers from the 362d Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply) conduct a tanker to tanker transfer at a forward operating base east of Fallujah, Iraq. (Army Reserve Magazine, Spring 2006)
Soldiers from the 108th Training Command are patrolling an Iraqi city with the Army. These eleven man teams are assigned with the Iraqi Army as advisors and also serve as liaisons between Iraqi/U.S. forces during critical mission requirements. (Photo by Major Voris McBurnette)
Turret gunner Staff Sergeant Benjamin Moroni, 108th Training Division, conducts pre-combat checks on his equipment and radio before his next convoy security mission. Turret gunners are the eyes and firepower behind convoy security missions. Capable of a 360 degree view of the convoy, truck commanders and drivers rely on the sharp eyes and analysis of the gunner. (Army Reserve Magazine, Spring/Summer 2007)
National Security Strategy

U.S. involvement in the Global War on Terrorism was in sync with the 2002 National Security Strategy. The updated National Security Strategy released four years later on March 16, 2006, was founded on two pillars: (1) “promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity-working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies;” and (2) “confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies.” “Free govern-
ments do not oppress their people or attack free nations.” Goals included ending tyranny and promoting effective democracies. The United States must join with others to “deny terrorists what they need to survive….” Like Bush’s predecessors, the 2006 National Security Strategy adopted a multilateral approach. The U.S. would lead democratic nations in overcoming challenges.

“America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”
President George W. Bush

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates agreed with that approach. “Perchance”, he opined, “the most important component in the war on terror is not the fighting we do ourselves but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries.” Victory is measured in how well the country molds the “behavior of friends, adversaries and most importantly, the people in between” rather than “imposing one’s will on another.”

The 2006 National Security Strategy addressed a number of issues. Those included:

a. championing aspirations for human dignity;
b. strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against the U.S. and its allies;
c. working with others to defuse regional conflicts;
d. preventing the nation’s enemies from threatening us and our allies and friends with weapons of mass destruction;
e. igniting a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;
f. expanding the circle of development by opening societies and building infrastructures of democracy;
g. developing agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of
global power;
h. engaging opportunities and confronting the challenges of globalization
and transforming the nation’s national security institutions to meet the
challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.

That last issue directly referenced the Department of Defense’s war on terror-
ism. The Department of Defense was transforming to meet four types of asym-
metric threats recognized in the *National Security Strategy* and in the 2005
*National Defense Strategy*:

1. traditional (conventional armed forces);
2. irregular (state and non-state agents using methods such as terrorism and
insurgency);
3. catastrophic (weapons of mass destruction, pandemic disasters);
4. disruptive (use of technologies such as biotechnology to counter U.S.
safety measures).

Sustaining transformation was the way ahead.81

With the change in the national administration came an updated *National
Security Strategy* in May 2010. This strategy relied heavily on diplomacy and
engagement, economic development, and other avenues of influence together
with U.S. military capabilities. It identified real and potential security challeng-
es to which the United States would take a multilateral approach. “The bur-
dens of a young century cannot fall on America shoulders alone. . . .” Existing
alliances must be strengthened while they must be “modernized to meet the
challenges of a new century.”82

The document called for U.S. national security strategy to pursue four endur-
ing national interests: security of the country, its people, allies and partners;
prosperity in the form of a “strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an
open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperi-
ty;” “respect for universal values at home and abroad;” and international order
“advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity
through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.”83

The 2010 *National Security Strategy* identified several top security priorities
for American strategy: fortify security and resilience at home; defeat al-Qae-
da and its violent extremist affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the
world; turnaround the spread of nuclear and biological weapons and secure
nuclear materials; promote peace, security, and opportunity in the greater Mid-
dle East; invest in stalwart and capable partners; and secure cyberspace. The National Security Strategy recognized the primary threat to the nation was a nuclear weapon delivered by terrorists. Consequently, the country must be prepared to pursue a campaign aimed at destroying those harboring these weapons and “denying them sanctuary anywhere in the world.”

The United States will continue its global operations to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the transnational terrorist group al-Qaeda and its affiliates. “The frontline of this fight is Afghanistan and Pakistan, where we are applying relentless pressure on al-Qaeda, breaking the Taliban’s momentum, and strengthening the security and capacity of our partners.” In his introduction, Obama stated, “As we face multiple threats—from nations, nonstate actors and failed states—we will maintain the military superiority that has secured our country, and underpinned global security, for decades.” The military must be prepared to protect the homeland and critical interests, meet treaty requirements, stay engaged with our allies and work with other nations for regional stability and assuage future crises. The military then had two distinct roles: to maintain conventional superiority and to “act in an advisory capacity to developing and transnational nations and emerging allies.” Although the 2010 National Security Strategy placed less emphasis on the use of force and more stress on gaining wide support and “isolating problematic regimes from the international scene” than the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies, the continued deployments of the active Army and the Army Reserve was assured.

“As we face multiple threats—from nations, nonstate actors and failed states - we will maintain the military superiority that has secured our country, and underpinned global security, for decades.”
President Barack H. Obama

Quadrennial Defense Review

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review called for more transformation. There must be, stated Rumsfeld, a “transformation of U.S. forces, capabilities, and institutions to extend America’s asymmetric advantages well into the future.” A central objective was replacement of a “threat-based defense strategy” with a “capabilities-based strategy.”

The new strategy concentrated on “how an adversary might fight rather than specifically whom the adversary might be or where a war might occur.” Un-
der this strategy, forces were no longer sized and shaped for two major theater wars. Forces would be shaped and sized to defend the homeland, the highest priority. Forces would thwart aggression and coercion in crucial areas overseas. Wars would be fought in two countries, simultaneously. This would give the president the option to declare victory in one of them. The victory could be either a regime change or occupation. At the same time, forces would be able to conduct smaller, limited worldwide contingency operations. Capabilities would evolve to defeat enemies who used surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare. A paradigm shift occurred in force planning. The global posture of the United States shifted from Western Europe and North East Asia to the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Gulf.

The security environment had changed. As demonstrated by the September 11 attacks, the United States’ geographic position no longer guaranteed “immunity from direct attack on its population, territory, and infrastructure.” While there was no “peer competitor,” there were certain regional security developments stretching from the Middle East to Northeast Asia which potentially could threaten stability in regions critical to U.S. interests. “To secure U.S. interests and objectives despite the challenges of the future security environment . . . [was] the fundamental test for U.S. defense strategy and U.S. Armed Forces.” U.S. forward-deployed and “first to fight” forces were trained and ready. But, other operational units were less ready. “The readiness of the Army’s highest priority units. . . [had been] sustained at the expense of non-divisional and Reserve Component units and the institutional Army.”

The Department of Defense developed a “new strategic framework to defend the nation and secure a viable peace.” That framework depended on four policy goals: “assuring allies and friends; dissuading future military competition; deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests; and if deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.”

The current force structure, active and reserve components, was the “baseline from which the Department [of Defense] . . . [would] develop a transformed force for the future. The department had begun an “ambitious transformation of U.S. military forces to meet” the security challenges. The Quadrennial Defense Review recognized the continued reliance on the reserve components to support the nation’s defense strategy and called for a “comprehensive review of the Active and Reserve mix, organization, priority missions, and associated resources. This review . . . [was to] build on recent assessments of Reserve Component issues that highlighted emerging roles for the Reserve Components in the defense of the United States, in smaller-scale contingencies, and in major combat operations.”
The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review focused on a lighter, more agile, more deployable joint, and streamlined force. It concentrated on fighting the “long war,” (as in Vietnam) reorienting capabilities and forces, reshaping the defense enterprise, developing a twenty-first century total force, and achieving unity of effort. The theme was transforming the military to meet the challenges of the future. According to Rumsfeld, the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review “reflects a process of change that has gathered momentum since the release of its predecessor Quadrennial Defense Review in 2001. Now in the fifth year of this global war, the ideas and proposals in this document are provided as a roadmap for change, leading to victory.”

It validated the strategic direction of the Army Plan.

The strategic foundation of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review was the National Defense Strategy which included its national military strategic requirements. The National Defense Strategy supported the National Security Strategy. It called for the armed forces “to be able to conduct joint, multinational operations anywhere across the spectrum of conflict.” That spectrum extended from accenting “stability and civil support operations” and unconventional warfare to accenting “major combat operations,” concentrating on the more traditional offensive and defensive operations. That National Defense Strategy mirrored the current strategy. Army doctrine in the post 9/11 world reflected this change. The change affected the manning, training, educating and equipping of the Army’s force.

The strategy meant the Department of Defense will confront the twenty-first century challenges. The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review offered a “new direction for accelerating” the department’s transformation to “focus more on the needs of Combatant Commanders and to develop portfolios of joint capabilities rather than individual stove-piped programs.” This was driven by today’s “complex strategic environment” of the “long war.” This atmosphere was more demanding and put pressure on the Department of Defense’s all volunteer, Total Force. “The Total Force of active and reserve military, civilian, and contractor personnel must continue to develop the best mix of people equipped with the right skills needed by the Combatant Commanders.”

In reaching that mix, the total force must be reconfigured. In addition, the reserves “must be operationalized, so that select Reservists and units are more accessible and more readily deployable than today.” The reserves would no longer be a strategic reserve. This was needed in the Cold War, but not for the Global War on Terrorism. The Army Plan called for this basic change in direction. The Quadrennial Defense Review’s call for an operational reserve was not the first use of the term. That had occurred in 2005 when Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Thomas H. Hall testified before Congress that an operational reserve “‘support[ed] day-to-day defense.’”

The reserves “must be operationalized, so that select Reservists and units are more accessible and more readily deployable than today.”

The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review reconfigured the total force. Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted the need “to rebalance military skills between and within the Active and Reserve Components.” Consequently, the military departments rebalanced some 70,000 positions within or between the active and reserve components. The distinction between war and peace was less clear at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The long war called for the United States to “face large and small contingencies at unpredictable intervals. To fight the long war and conduct other future contingency operations, joint force commanders need to have more immediate access to the Total Force. In particular, the Reserve Components must be operationalized, so that select Reservists and units are more accessible and more readily deployable than today. During the Cold War, the Reserve Component was used, appropriately, as a ‘strategic reserve,’ to provide support to Active Component forces during major combat operations. In today’s global contest, this concept is less relevant.”

Accordingly, the Department of Defense would pursue several options, including increasing the period authorized for presidential selected reserve call-up from 270 days to 365 days. It would:

1. focus better the “use of the Reserve Components’ competencies for homeland defense and civil support operations;
2. seek . . . changes to authorities to improve access to Guard and reserve consequence management capabilities and capacity in support of civil authorities;
3. achieve the revision of Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up authorities to allow activation of Military Department Reserve Components for natural disasters in order to smooth the process for meeting specific needs without relying solely on volunteers;
4. allow individuals who volunteer for activation on short notice to serve for long periods on major headquarters staffs as individual augmentees;
5. develop select reserve units that train more intensively and require shorter notice for deployment.”
The reserve component would continue its progression from a strategic reserve to a force of regularly deployed units manned and equipped like the active component.

Like the 2005 *Quadrennial Defense Review*, the 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review* recognized the “critical contribution” of the reserve component to the nation’s defense (twenty-five to thirty percent of U.S. Central Command forces) and called for operationalizing the reserve component. Continued use of the reserve would likely be needed to prevent and deter conflicts. The reserve component had proven their “readiness and ability to make sustained contributions to ongoing operations. . . . The challenges,” read the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, “facing the United States today and in the future will require us to employ National Guard and Reserve forces as an operational reserve to fulfill requirements for which they are well suited in the United States and overseas.” An operational reserve would be “available, trained, and equipped for predictable deployment.” According to the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, the Department of Defense would find ways to “rebalance its reliance on the Reserve Component to ensure the long-term viability of a force that has both strategic and operational capabilities.” The *Quadrennial Defense Review* stated the country needed a “force generation model that provided sufficient strategic depth.” One of the *Quadrennial Defense Review*’s primary objectives was to preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force. It called for a five year demobilization period following every one year of mobilization for National Guard and Army Reserve units and a two year dwell time for one year deployed ratio for the active component. In his formal assessment of the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael G. Mullen wrote: “we could not have accomplished what we have these past eight years were it not for our Reserve and National Guard forces.”

The *Quadrennial Defense Review* was a comprehensive assessment of reserve policies. According to Admiral Mullen, the *Quadren-
nial Defense Review would “consider the proper balance of maintaining the operational capabilities and strategic depth of the Reserve Component as an integrated force to meet requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. Access to the Reserve Component,” he continued, “remains a critical lever for meeting global operational demands without substantially increasing the size of the active force.” The Department of Defense had begun studies to examine “issues associated with employing the RC on a routine, rotational basis as part of the total operational force, changing the AC/RC mix, and/or changing the role of the RC.” One such study was The Independent Panel Review of Reserve Component Employment in an Era of Persistent Conflict, which was released as a for-official-use-only document on November 2, 2010, by its authors, General (retired) Reimer, Lieutenant General (retired) Helmly and Lieutenant General (retired as Army National Guard director) Roger C. Schultz.

“Access to the Reserve Component remains a critical lever for meeting global operational demands without substantially increasing the size of the active force.” Admiral Michael G. Mullen

Army Transformation

The Army continued reshaping itself to the post-Cold War shift in strategy and tactics. Cold War era strategy and tactics focused mainly on the Soviet Union and on large scale, maneuver warfare. This was a bygone era. Post-Cold War campaigns were planned for contingency operations. The Army needed to transform to a force designed for continuous operations in a new era dominated by unconventional warfare (low-intensity, asymmetric conflict). In June 1999, General Eric K. Shinseki became the thirty-fourth Army chief of staff. At that time, he stated that he would transform the Cold War Army into a “nimble, light, lethal” force that could “perform peacekeeping missions or to fight an all-out war against a country like North Korea or Iraq.” He wanted to “wean the Army from the tanks and armored fighting vehicles it loves, and replace them with systems so advanced that they couldn’t be detected by the enemy, using technology not yet invented.” He cautioned unwilling subordinates, “If you don’t
like change, you’re going to like irrelevance a lot less.” He was concerned that if the Army did not move resolutely toward change, the political structure would force change and not necessarily on the Army’s conditions. Four months later in October, he and Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White announced the bold vision of the Army of the twenty-first century: “Soldiers on Point for the Nation . . . Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War.” Transformation became General Shinseki’s uppermost personal priority. As depicted in a popular briefing slide, the transformed Army would be “Responsive, Deployable, Agile, Versatile, Lethal, Survivable, and Sustainable.”

The goal of the Army vision was to evolve the Army into a “force that is strategically responsive and dominant at every point of the spectrum of operations.” The transformation aspect was to be accomplished over three axes: the Legacy Force, the Objective Force, and the Interim Force.

The Legacy or Current Force was in essence the Army XXI that was emerging from Force XXI. The Legacy Force “must be prepared to fight the Nation’s wars and be able to supplement the capabilities of the Objective Force until 2032.” A “trained and ready Legacy Force,” explained General Shineski, “affords The Army the necessary time and flexibility to pursue investments needed to get the Objective Force right.” The Legacy Force must be ready to “fight and win decisively against any threat for the next 15 to 20 years.” This is the Army’s war-fighting force. The Legacy Force meant modernization and recapitalization of selected units and systems. Priority was given to systems for the Objective Force. Yet, there were systems that must be continued (e.g., heavy equipment transporters) regardless of whether they would be part of the Objective Force.

The Objective Force was similar to the Army After Next, yet on a more ambitious timeline. It would feature an array of “sensors, communications nodes, unmanned aircraft, robotics, and other advanced hardware but at its core would
be the common vehicle platform of the future combat system . . . ” \(^{124}\) The Objective Force would “provide the National Command Authority with an increased range of options for regional engagement, crisis response, and sustained land force operations.” “The Objective Force,” said General Shineski, “will be more responsive, more deployable, more agile, more versatile, more le-
The Army had reprogrammed 96 percent of science and technology spending through 2007 to develop the Objective Force platforms and equipment. The Army planned to start production of the future combat system in year 2008 and to field the first unit by 2010. The Objective Force would give the Army the capability to place a combat brigade anywhere in the world in ninety-six hours, put a division on the ground in 120 hours, and put five divisions on the ground in theater in thirty days.

The Interim Force, a new concept, would connect today’s force and the Objective Force. The Interim Force would bridge the gap between existing capabilities of an early arriving force and the later arriving force. Heavy forces slowly deployed and were hard to sustain. Light forces were too light. The Interim Force would “build and deploy brigade-sized units of intermediate weight equipped with the most advanced technologies immediately available.” This began with the interim brigade combat teams (IBCTs), later known as Stryker Brigades. The IBCT, a combat brigade task force, was concentrated on the interim armored vehicle. The first IBCT was the 2nd Infantry Division’s 3d Brigade. It was certified as ready to deploy in May 2003.

The 2001 Defense Planning Guidance required each service to submit a transformation roadmap for review by the secretary of defense. General Shineski and White submitted the Army’s transformation roadmap. The roadmap outlined the Army’s transformation strategy and detailed how this transformation supported six crucial operational goals. Those goals, as stated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review were:

1. protect base operations at home and abroad and defeat the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons;
2. assure information systems in the face of attack and conduct effective information operations;
3. project and sustain U.S. forces in distant hostile environments;
4. deny enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement;
5. enhance the capability and survivability of space systems;
6. leverage information technology and innovative concepts to develop interoperable joint command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

The roadmap described how the Army transformed. Its section titles highlighted the roadmap’s purpose of denoting “timelines in which . . . [the Army] will
develop Service-unique capabilities necessary to meet the defense strategy and DoD’s critical operational goals for Transformation.”

“The [transformation] plan,” wrote General Shineski, “reflects the qualities of a campaign: It is complex, of long duration, phased, with multiple lines of operation driven by multiplicity of participants.” The Global War on Terrorism only strengthened the need for a transformed Army that was more “strategically responsive, deployable, lethal, versatile, survivable, and sustainable than current forces.” Those were the characteristics of the Objective Force—the end result of Army transformation.

The fiscal year 2001 Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in late 2000 and signed by Clinton on October 30, 2000, directed the military services to promote reserve chiefs to three star rank within one year after the act’s passage. On April 27, 2001, Rumsfeld announced that President Bush had nominated Major General Plewes and the Director, Army National Guard Major General Roger C. Schultz, for appointment to lieutenant general. The Senate confirmed these appointments on May 24, 2001.

At the promotion ceremony, Army Chief of Staff, General Erick K. Shinseki, with the help of Elizabeth Plewes, pins on Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes’ third star. (Photo by Master Sergeant Vicki Washington)
General Shineski said:

‘Two years ago, we made a bold declaration -- that we were “The Army -- totally integrated, with a unity of purpose -- no longer the total Army, no longer the one Army.” We acknowledged our components and their unique strengths and made it clear that we would ‘march into the 21st century as The Army.’ Today, that’s exactly what we’re doing, and today’s ceremony is symbolic of the unity our Army has demonstrated over the past two years serving on point for the nation.’

With the promotion came an opportunity to engage in three-star command briefings and be an equal, comparable voice for the Army Reserve. It was another sign of the Army Reserve’s transformation and its integration into the total Army.
Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes flag. Red flags with the appropriate number of stars are routinely flown whenever a general officer is present within the headquarters. This example is crafted of durable nylon. (Photo by Timothy L. Hale, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Public Affairs)

This Battle Dress Uniform or BDU was worn by Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes. The BDU was replaced by the Army Combat Uniform or ACU in 2005. (Photo by Timothy L. Hale, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Public Affairs)
In February 2003, General Shineski and White presented *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army to Congress*. They reiterated the Army’s vision and stated that transformation had “achieved sustainable momentum [and] the framework . . . [was] in place to see the Objective Force fielded this decade.” When the statement was published, there were more than 110,000 reserve soldiers mobilized for Operation NOBLE EAGLE and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

The strategic environment mandated Army transformation. As stated in the posture statement, the force must be properly manned and managed to “fully capitalize” on the “warfighting expertise” of its soldiers. Recruiting and retaining the force were essential to Army transformation. There must be a transformation in the way the Army fights which leads to a transformation across the spectrum of operations --- logistics, personnel, installation management, acquisition, aviation, and business practices. Readiness must be fostered in or-
order to win the nation’s wars. The force must be properly trained. The technological revolution in combat power must be leveraged. Science and technology must be harnessed to meet the demands of a twenty-first century Army. An information enabled Army must apply technology to Army Knowledge Management. That would lead to network centric warfare; the military application of digital technology in the Information Age. Through network centric warfare, computers and communications systems would connect all weapons systems. Network centric warfare together with modern communications, adequate bandwidth, and skilled personnel, provided a “real-time shared battlefield picture by all parties involved.” Two advantages were a smaller logistical footprint in theater and knowledge of enemy locations leading to more exact targeting.

The posture statement recognized that the reserves supplied more than 50 percent of the Army’s soldiers and was key to the success in the war on terrorism and homeland defense. The posture statement addressed transformation ini-
tiatives in the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve provided a technically trained and responsive force that assisted the active Army in conducting extended campaigns in multiple theaters and to sustain joint operations. The Army Reserve had become a totally integrated force, spanning the full spectrum of warfare.\textsuperscript{138} Completing the integration of the reserves was one of General Shinseki’s six objectives. His other objectives were: “increasing strategic responsiveness, developing a clear long-term strategy to improve operational jointness, developing leaders for joint war fighting and change . . . manning warfighting units, and providing for the well-being of soldiers, civilians, and family members.”\textsuperscript{139}

Later in 2003, Army Chief of Staff General Peter J. Schoomaker presented the first annual update to the Army’s transformation roadmap per the secretary of defense’s Transformation Planning Guidance.\textsuperscript{140} The U.S. Army 2003 Transformation Roadmap addressed the transformation of the Current Force (the operational Army of today), the Future Force (the operational force the Army seeks to become), and the Joint Force (an interoperable, inter-dependent force).\textsuperscript{141}

The roadmap detailed the Army’s “actions to identify and build required capabilities now, allowing for better execution of joint operations by the Current Force while developing Future Force capabilities essential to provide relevant, ready, responsive and dominant land power to the Future Joint Force.” The Army’s transformation strategy had three elements: the transformation of Army culture, the transformation of processes using the Current to Future Force construct, and the “development of inherently joint transformational capabilities.” The soldier was the heart of transformation, “the ultimate combat system.” Soldier well being, along with that of civilians, was coupled to Army readiness.\textsuperscript{142}

In 2004, the Army was redesigning its force to respond in the first fifteen days of an operation. The Army depended on both active and reserves to successfully provide “rapid expeditionary capabilities and the ability to conduct sustained land campaigns across the full spectrum of conflict.” The Current Force provided the “correct mix” between the active and reserve forces—to rebalance the force. Adequate active and reserve follow-on forces must provide combat support to reach operational and strategic objectives and to execute continuous land operations. The reserves gave strategic power to strengthen the war fight; underpin stability operations; and provide homeland defense. Active and
reserve forces must be integrated and interchangeable. Both forces must be “modular, tailorable, and capable of coming together in a number of force and capabilities packages.” This would reduce mobilization and training time and give combatant commanders the required forces and means.

*The U.S. Army 2003 Transformation Roadmap* also concerned balancing risk and resourcing the Army’s transformation. Current and projected operational commitments caused the Army to revisit its risk assessment. Force management risk involved the Army’s people, programs, and its force structure.

The Current Force was at a high operational tempo, stemming from the war on terrorism and other obligations. As a result, force management risk was higher than expected. The Army was taking dynamic steps to decrease risk in the near term. One action focusing on reducing risk was the active component/reserve component balance. Force structure operations must be developed to
foster a modular Army and an appropriate blend of the active and the reserve component. According to the *The U.S. Army 2003 Transformation Roadmap*, the AC/RC balance was one of the “smart business decisions or actions” toward increasing the Army’s “flexibility, utility, and effectiveness as part of the joint force.” Achieving that balance was one of General Schoomaker’s initial focus areas as was optimizing the mix between the active component and the reserves.

On July 9, 2003, Rumsfeld issued a memorandum, Rebalancing Forces. The memorandum directed the implementation of force restructuring initiatives. He wrote, “We have too few forces with the skills sets that are in high demand, and too many forces with the skills that are not in high demand.” The armed forces undertook a far-reaching rebalancing or “optimizing” of their make up in order to relieve the pressure on specific high-demand, low-intensity units, especially those available in the reserve forces. There were four imperatives to Rumsfeld’s memorandum and a Department of the Army briefing on Army rotational analysis and planning dated June 4, 2003, which stressed stability and predictability. Those imperatives were: minimize force turbulence, mission flexibility, resource distribution, and force structure supportability.
Approaches to rebalancing the force included improving “early responsiveness, resolving stressed career fields,” and using inventive management practices.\textsuperscript{148} Out dated force structure would be transformed to functional forces to meet current operational requirements. That would lead to a “flexible, optimized and modular Army Reserve that provided stability and predictability.”\textsuperscript{149} As the Army Reserve Transformation Study concluded: “To be fully expeditionary and responsive to mission requirements some high-demand, low-intensity units may need to be shifted to the active force and some select CS/CSS [combat support/combat service support] units may need to be shifted from the active to AR to balance the force requirements as envisioned in Army Transformation.”\textsuperscript{150}

Accordingly, some 100,000 active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve positions were identified for restructuring and rebalancing.\textsuperscript{151} General Schoomaker explained that soldiers in those positions would be “retrain[ed] and reallocate[ed], thereby, converting Cold War structure to more relevant structure.”\textsuperscript{152} Some would simply be eliminated as Cold War over structure. Helmly wrote in \textit{A Statement on the 2005 Posture of the United States Army Reserve}, “Sustained operations will be the norm for the future, so we must optimize our capabilities to meet this reality.”\textsuperscript{153} In answer to those sustained operations, Helmly had warned in December 2004 that certain “past “dysfunctional practices and policies,” “governing mobilization, training and reserve component manpower management,” such as the use of only volunteers, coupled with the high operational tempo and the need to “reset and regenerate forces for follow-on and future missions” placed the Army Reserve in danger of becoming a “broken force.”\textsuperscript{154} Changes were required as evidenced in the Government Accountability Office report issued in July 2005 entitled \textit{RESERVE FORCES: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment Issues}.\textsuperscript{155} General Schoomaker compared transforming the Army in the midst of war like “tuning an engine while the car is moving - - complex and potentially dangerous.”\textsuperscript{156}

Addressing transformation, Secretary of the Army Dr. Francis J. Harvey wrote in 2006, “We cannot be satisfied with the status quo.”\textsuperscript{157} The \textit{National Security Strategy} made that clear. Enemies and threats had changed while the armed forces continued their forward presence and kept the peace in areas of strategic importance. The fight had changed and so must the Army.\textsuperscript{158} According
to Secretary of Defense Gates, the Army had to strike a balance to maintain its advantage in conventional warfare while responding to low-intensity conflicts. For the foreseeable future asymmetric warfare had replaced the linear battlefield.\textsuperscript{159}

Army Chief of Staff General George W. Casey, Jr. supported Gates’ view. The high operational tempo was stressing soldiers, their families, and support services in the face of multiple deployments and insufficient recovery time. The Army was out of balance. The demand for forces over the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan surpassed the supply. The Army was challenged to meet all contingency requirements. Readiness was being expended as quickly as it was being built.\textsuperscript{160} General Casey had four strategic imperatives to restore balance: sustain the Army’s soldiers, families, and civilians; prepare

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\caption{General George W. Casey, Jr.’s Four Strategic Imperatives to Restore Balance}
\end{figure}
forces for success in the current conflicts; reset returning units; and transform the Army to meet the demands of the twenty-first century. He set the Army on a four year plan to reestablish balance. This would allow the all volunteer Army to respond at a predictable and sustainable rate to the high operational tempo.\textsuperscript{161}

He told the Senate Armed Services Committee in November 2007 that the reserves were “performing an operational role for which they were neither originally designed nor resourced.”\textsuperscript{162}

General Casey recognized the need for a paradigm change, a change from a “strategic reserve only mobilized in national emergencies, to an operational reserve, employed on a cyclical basis to add depth to the active force.” The reserves fulfilled their role in the Global War on Terrorism and would continue to fight in an era of persistent conflict. He defined persistent conflict as “protracted confrontation among state, non-state and individual actors that use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.”\textsuperscript{163} The total Army must be thoughtfully transformed while not impeding readiness.

In 2006, Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr., chief, Army Reserve, recognized like Casey a change in the paradigm for the Army Reserve:

\begin{quote}
We’re a federal operational force. The old Army Reserve was a strategic force and we advertised it as such, one weekend a month, two weeks in the summertime. That all changed after 9/11 - we’re now an operational force. Our nation is involved with the Global War on Terrorism on an enduring basis. To support that need we have to be an operational force. We have to be much more active and ready on a regular basis in supporting the war.\textsuperscript{164}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
“The old Army Reserve was a strategic force and we advertised it as such, one weekend a month, two weeks in the summertime. That all changed after 9/11 - we’re now an operational force.”
Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr.
\end{quote}
As an operational reserve, soldiers must revamp their mentality from that of the Cold War to the current long war. Today’s Army Reserve soldiers know mobilization is a probability, not a possibility. That can be seen in the Army Reserve’s total mobilization days and number of mobilization orders between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2010, represented in table III-1.\textsuperscript{165}

As Stultz stressed, “We have to be more active and ready on a regular basis in supporting the war.”\textsuperscript{166} In 2006, Lieutenant General Helmly wrote, “Army Reserve soldiers must be poised and available for active service, as if they knew the hour and day they would be called.”\textsuperscript{167}

As General Casey explained in his statement on the Army’s strategic imperatives before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the U.S. House of Representatives on November 15, 2007, transformation produced evolutionary and revolutionary changes to improve Army and joint force capabilities to meet current and future full-spectrum requirements.\textsuperscript{168} Transformation was critical to the Army’s ability to effectively manage, generate, and sustain a balanced Army for the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{169} Transforming the Army Reserve to an operational force was initiative four of General Casey’s seven initiatives set forth in 2008. Initiative four, Transition the Reserve Component to an Operational Force, included six tasks:

1. adapt pre- and post-mobilization training cycles;
2. adapt the reserve component generating force;
3. adapt incentives for citizen-soldiers, their families, and employers;
4. adapt reserve component pre-mobilization equipping strategies;
5. facilitate a continuum of service;
6. adapt necessary statutes, policies, and processes.\textsuperscript{170}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Total Mobilization Days</th>
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<td>FY 05</td>
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<td>75,484</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 06</td>
<td>11,140,778</td>
<td>64,391</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 07</td>
<td>10,011,840</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 08</td>
<td>9,675,372</td>
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<td>FY 09</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 10</td>
<td>10,476,387</td>
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</table>
He projected transformation of the reserve components to an operational force through changing how units are trained, equipped, resourced, and mobilized for completion by 2012. Stultz believed transformation was the “most dramatic change to Army Reserve structure, training and readiness since World War II.” His six implementation imperatives were:

1. reengineer the mobilization process from one of train, alert, train, and deploy to train, alert and deploy;
2. transform command and control;
3. restructure units;
4. improve human resources staff, technologies, and business practices;
5. build a rotational based-force;
6. improve individual support to combatant commanders.

On October 29, 2008, Gates issued Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force. This revolutionary document unmistakably recognized the reserve component as a strategic and operational force when it stated:

“The RCs [reserve components] provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their respective operational roles, the RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As such, the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles, as needed.”

“Transformation is the “most dramatic change to Army Reserve structure, training and readiness since World War II.”” Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr.

“The RCs [reserve components] provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict.” Robert M. Gates
The directive set forth nine elements of Department of Defense policy:

1. reserve components provide operational capabilities and strategic depth;
2. Total Force concept;
3. recognition of homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities;
4. connection to and commitment to the American public;
5. continuum of service creating variable service options;
6. utilization rules governing the “frequency and duration of activations,” thereby, “enhance[ing] predictability and judicious and prudent use of the” reserve components;
7. voluntary duty;
8. adequate resourcing to meet readiness requirements tracking of those resources;
9. outreach services for reserve component soldiers, their families, and employers throughout the mobilization and reintegration process.176

The directive then tasked the military to implement that policy. The service secretaries were to ensure their reserves “participate across the full spectrum of missions at home and abroad in providing operational capabilities according to the national defense strategy, their service force management plans, and operational requirements.” They were to ensure the reserves would accomplish:

1. force rebalancing and restructuring;
2. unit integrity;
3. operational readiness;
4. depth of unit and individual capabilities;
5. policies, incentives, compensation, and flexible options to sustain volunteerism;
6. the flow of individuals between active military, reserve military, and civilian service defined as the continuum of service;
7. domestic response capabilities;
8. support for the train-alert-deploy construct;
9. resources for medical and dental readiness, legal assistance resources, adequate training facilities;
10. the acceleration of force modernization.

This era of persistent conflict mandated transformation of the reserves. The reserves were to transform to an operational force to comply with the directive.

The white paper, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, published by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
in October 2008, supported the directive. The white paper developed the directive’s nine principles into three groups: roles and characteristics of the ready reserve components, the fundamental philosophy of the total force concept, and management. Its purpose was to simplify how the military managed the reserves as an operational force. It improved active and reserve integration, resource augmentation, and training developments.177

On November 24, a month after issuing the directive, Gates released a forty-one page memorandum on implementing the recommendations from the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. In its January 2008 report, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force*, the commission identified systemic problems which had evolved over time and recommended changes. “At the core of these changes,” the report stated:

> is the explicit recognition of the evolution of the reserve components from a purely strategic force, with lengthy mobilization times designed to meet Cold War threats from large nation-states, to an operational force. This operational reserve must be readily available for emergencies at home and abroad, and more fully integrated with the active component. Simultaneously, this force must retain required strategic elements and capabilities. The Commission concludes that there is no reasonable alternative to the nation’s continued increased reliance on reserve components as part of its operational force for missions at home and abroad.178

Gates called for wide-ranging policy changes in a memorandum sent to every senior uniformed and civilian Pentagon leader, with copies to three cabinet secretaries. Endorsing eighty-two of the commission’s ninety-five recommendations, Gates “directed that the Army and Marine Corps restore their reserve components to the highest readiness levels ‘as soon as possible’ but not later than 2015.” The Congress, the commission, and the Pentagon, he wrote, “all recognize that the National Guard and the Reserves are integral to the Total Force and had assumed a greater operational role in today’s force.”179

Speaking of the integration of the total force, in an address to the Reserve Officers Association on February 2, 2009, Admiral Mullen observed that when visiting soldiers abroad, he could not distinguish just by looking at them which were active duty and which were reserve. He declared, “It is a clarion call to a future that is more and more integrated.”180

In addition to an integrated force, Admiral Mullen emphasized the significance of the operational reserves to the national security when he stated, “The
National Guard and the Reserve are vital to our national security. They represent a key operational reserve capability at the federal level and perform critical state functions. They have been truly brilliant in fighting these wars and transforming themselves in recent years. . . . We couldn’t do without them. . . .”

Stultz said evidence of integration was the fact that the Army Reserve kept from ten to twelve brigade-or-higher level headquarters deployed at any given time. The reserves primarily constituted the senior-level headquarters in theater that were not in the combat arms. Stultz thought the Army Reserve was now more integrated than ever and had the greatest combat experience. On any given day, some 45,000 Army Reserve soldiers were on active duty. The increased demands of combat commanders and the size of the active component required the continued integration and transformation of the reserves as part of the operational force.

Modularity

As stated in The 2003 U.S. Army Transformation Roadmap, force structure operations must develop to a modular Army. The Army’s force structure must change to remain ready and relevant to fight a new kind of protracted threat. The Army and America faced challenges in what General Schoomaker and Secretary of the Army Harvey described in their 2005 Statement on the Posture of the United States Army as “potentially catastrophic.” A new era of combat required rapidity, mobility, nimbleness, and the interoperability of forces: a modular, fungible expeditionary force of active and reserve resources.

The Army changed from a division to a brigade-based force. This was in response to lessons learned in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Greater flexibility was needed to fight asymmetric wars. Brigades were more flexible than divisions. Brigades were designed as modules. They were self-sufficient and standardized. Brigade combat teams were more readily deployed. They combined easily with other Army and joint forces to confront changing tactics. The combatant commander can rapidly adjust fire in a fast-paced fight. The combat commander can get exactly the structure needed for the mission at hand.

The Army restructured its organizations to create stand-alone and modular forces while retaining broad-spectrum capability. The Army was returning to a traditional tactical echelon — the brigade — to restructure today’s Army. The brigade was smaller and more agile than the division. Modular units were more tailorable, deployable, and versatile. Modularity allowed self-sufficient organizations to enter and exit from unit formations with negligible amplification or restructuring. The Army called this its “plug and play mode.” Stan-
standardized units could be readily exchanged with each other, as required. The modular brigade combat team was the fundamental combined arms building block for force projection. A brigade combat team was a “permanently structured, self-contained combined arms team.” The new brigade combat teams were smaller, which allowed more to be organized without a major increase in end strength. The modular redesign increased the number of regular Army brigades, reducing the deployment tempo of each brigade and increasing available training time. Brigades now have capabilities previously found at division level and higher.

The Army Reserve embraced modularity and incorporated it into its restructuring and rebalancing scheme. According to that plan, eight modular modified table of organization and equipment sustainment brigades were activated from existing structure in 2006, 2007, and 2008. Two combat support brigades (maneuver enhancement) were activated in fiscal year 2008. Helmly believed that modularity equated to “sustainability and predictability” and circumvented across-the-board cross-leveling and its associated negative effects on the force. It improved management and concentrated training on skills and specialties the combatant commander required rather than focusing on peacetime needs. The modular Army supported a tailorable and more responsive logistical support structure. The Army Reserve, which handled the greater part of the Army’s theater-level support, profited from modularity. It allowed the Army Reserve to “plug and play” discrete capability packages to meet the combatant commander’s requests.

The Army’s plan called for the conversion of all 302 brigades from Cold War formations to these more deployable, tailorable and versatile modular formations. For example, the 3d Infantry Division, the “vanguard” for the invasion of Iraq, returned to Iraq as a restructured modular force. By October 2010, the Army had completed the conversion of 288 of the brigades. The Army has reached a 98 percent completion of the modular conversion.

Modular heavy, stryker, and light brigades form a versatile mix of forces. These are easily combined to meet a range of warfighting needs from peacetime engagements to major combat operations.

Together with modularity came a program to rebalance skills. The Army converted formations that were appropriate in the Cold War to ones more relevant in the twenty-first century. By October 2010, the Army had rebalanced over 124,000 positions. The modularity conversions and rebalancing was the largest reorganization of the Army since World War II.
CHAPTER 3.  THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)

ARFORGEN (Army Force Generation) was the process used to transform the Army Reserve from a strategic reserve to an operational expeditionary force. In July 2003, Rumsfeld sent a directive to the deputy assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs. The directive called for a thorough examination of the rebalancing of the active Army with the National Guard and the Army Reserve. ARFORGEN was the Army’s response to this directive. ARFORGEN was an Army-wide five year model, or roadmap, for expeditionary deployment of forces on a rotational basis. As stated in the implementation plan (Annex F to the Army Campaign Plan), “ARFORGEN is the structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of civil authorities and combatant commanders requirements. ARFORGEN is an Army process that applies to all components across the operating and generating force. The Army will continue to adapt and improve ARFORGEN over time to generate ready forces to meet operational requirements more effectively and efficiently.”

Full implementation of ARFORGEN was delayed. This delay was caused by increased operational demands and the need to rebalance active component/reserve component capabilities. The overriding purpose of ARFORGEN is “to provide combatant commanders and civil authorities with a steady supply of trained and ready units that are task organized in modular expeditionary force packages and tailored to joint mission requirements.”

In 2006, the secretary of the Army approved implementing ARFORGEN. FORSCOM managed ARFORGEN for the Army. Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh’s and General Casey’s A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2011 said, “ARFORGEN fundamentally transformed the Army’s Cold War-era linear and tiered readiness construct for force generation into a sustainable and more efficient process.”

ARFORGEN is based on three successive force pools or phases of unit capabilities and readiness through which units rotate: Reset, Train/Ready and Available. Each of the three force pools contains a versatile force package, available at varying time intervals based on its readiness levels. Each force pool consists of an operation head-
ARFORGEN (Army Force Generation) was the process used to transform the Army Reserve from a strategic reserve to an operational expeditionary force.

Figure III-8: ARFORGEN Force Pools

quarters (a corps), five division headquarters, twenty brigade combat teams, and 90,000 enablers, about half of which are National Guard and Army Reserve. Each will be capable of full spectrum operations once the ratio of time deployed (“boots on the ground”) to time at home (dwell) of 1:2 for the active component and 1:5 for the reserve component is reached. By fiscal year 2012, the reserve component’s ratio should be 1:4. Many units rotated on cycles shorter than the ARFORGEN goals. Another goal is to provide a unit’s notice of a mission two years in advance with an alert order one year in advance.208
During Reset, the unit’s concentration is on reintegrating soldiers with their families and completing individual education, development, and institutional training. During this phase, the institutional Army focuses on manning and equipping the unit so it can conduct collective training.

The mainstay of the Train/Ready force pool is restoring full spectrum war-fighting capability through unit collective training and on finishing a culminating collective training event. That event guarantees the unit achieves the capability needed for operational requirements. Upon entering the Available pool, a unit may be a deployed expeditionary force with an identified deployed mission or a contingency expeditionary force with a mission to grow full spectrum capabilities in order to respond to a global contingency. Contingency expeditionary forces are ready to engage in combatant commander training exercises and global theater security cooperation events. Army Reserve units can deliver “integral enablers” from this pool for “required surge capability.”

Units in the Available pool are at the highest state of training and readiness. They will be the first to fight. Active component units are primed to deploy. Reserve component units are ready for alert, mobilization, required post-mobilization training, validation, and deployment. The goal is to have a predictable, ready force of units and soldiers prepared for operational deployment.
“Through ARFORGEN synchronization conferences, units are assigned to deployment or contingency expeditionary packages and task organized to either execute planned operational missions as part of Deployment Expeditionary Forces (DEF) or respond to unplanned contingencies as part of contingency expeditionary forces (CEF).”

ARFORGEN increases predictability. Under ARFORGEN, the reserves remain an integral part of the operational force. The inefficient mobilization cycle before ARFORGEN was “alert, mobilize, train and deploy.” Under this old cycle National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers spent months training after mobilization, but before deployment, in preparation for a mission. Under ARFORGEN, units will now use the “train, mobilize, and deploy” cycle. Reserve soldiers would now spend the early years of the ARFORGEN cycle focusing on schools and individual training in their specialties. Later in the cycle, training would shift from individual to collective training. By the last year of the cycle, units are fully prepared for deployment, dedicating nearly all their time on active duty to performing the actual mission.

In 2005, about 75 percent of the Army Reserve’s mobilized units were from the ARFORGEN model. In 2007, 80 percent of Army Reserve forces aligned into ARFORGEN. According to the 2011 Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, “When fully implemented in Fiscal Year 2012, the sup-

Figure III-10: Mobilization Cycle Before and After ARFORGEN

Mobilization Cycle Before and After ARFORGEN

BEFORE
Alert, Mobilize, Train, Deploy

AFTER
Train, Mobilize, Deploy
ply-based ARFORGEN will posture the Army to accomplish both emerging and enduring operational requirements.\textsuperscript{216}

**Army Reserve Expeditionary Force**

With the Global War on Terrorism, enlistment in the Army Reserve implied deployment. Soldiers with civilian careers and employers needed predictability. In answer, the Army Reserve designed the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF). In 2004, Helmly described the AREF as a “dynamic new strategy that revolutionizes our force structure so that we can better mobilize, train and equip Army Reserve units for the fight.”\textsuperscript{217} The AREF used a five year cyclic approach to manage Army Reserve force readiness in answer to the high operational tempo and increased reliance on its capabilities. The AREF applied Army rotational force doctrine to decisions concerning training, equipping, education, and leader development. The AREF, pre-dating ARFORFEN but later in concert with it, altered the way the Army Reserve generated and prepared trained, ready forces to meet the operational requirements of combatant commanders. It was flexible to meet the volatile demands of twenty-first century war fighting. AREF was the comprehensive strategy for the Army Reserve as it strove to fulfill the demand for units and soldiers to support the Global
War on Terrorism. The AREF supported ARFORGEN through a seamless integration effort. As such, the AREF was a major institutional response to the changing nature of war and a significant departure from historical Army mobilization and management models that had not contemplated sustained reserve deployments as an essential feature of military campaigns. The Army Reserve transformed to the modular force centered on the brigade combat team, as previously discussed.

The AREF was based on ten operational packages with planned available one year deployment periods. Units were assigned to one of the packages. Under partial mobilization authority, two operational packages moved into the available pool, annually, beginning October 1 of each fiscal year. Assigning each unit to an AREF package also determined its five year ARFORGEN cycle and when and how much each unit was to be resourced in the next five years of the ARFORGEN cycle. Resourcing was progressive from the beginning to the end of the ARFORGEN cycle. The master list of units was updated, periodically. Updating the AREF list ensured that all Army Reserve units that were previously not included in ARFORGEN were included and units that were previously included, but no longer in the force structure, were eliminated from the AREF master list in support of ARFORGEN.

Each package consisted of units which moved through a progressive readiness cycle. The units that were low density or unique were evenly grouped across the packages. Each packaged unit spent two years in the Reset/Train pool, two years in the ready pool as ready one and ready two, and one year in the Available pool. While package changes could be made in accordance with adopted USARC procedures and directives, they were kept at a minimum to avoid disrupting the established ARFORGEN cycle of the majority of units.

In the first year of AREF, soldiers concentrated on training, professional schools, and qualification courses. In the second and third years, units began to come together as they trained at company and higher levels. In the fourth year, units were engaged in complex collective training, spanning from squad and section level to detachment and platoon level. By the fifth year soldiers were fully trained and became available for missions. This strategy, then, was built upon having trained combat support and combat service support units and soldiers on hand at any given time.

In 2004, the Army Reserve began using the AREF to ascertain the preparation and resourcing of units for deployment. In 2005, some 75 percent of the mobilized units came from AREF packages one and two. That number was 53 percent and 78 percent for 2006 and 2007, respectively. For fiscal year 2008,
31.5 percent of total requirements were sourced from packages seven and eight. For fiscal year 2009, that figure rose to 61 percent, sourced from packages nine and ten. For fiscal year 2010, 58 percent of total requirements were sourced from packages one and two. And for fiscal year 2011, 62.6 percent of total requirements were sourced from packages three and four.\textsuperscript{221}
Mobilization Policy

The Army Reserve was becoming an operational and expeditionary force. The active Army continued to rely more heavily on the reserves in an era of persistent conflict. Mobilization practices and policies needed to change. The time honored automated time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL) was used to reach a suitable ratio of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces. TPFDL proved to be inflexible with meeting the mobilization demands of the Global War on Terrorism. Being unable to deploy through Turkey only complicated an already taxed system. Too many reserve soldiers mobilized under the detailed planning of TFDL found themselves waiting with little to do before deploying and then reaching the theater without the equipment or resources needed to do the mission.\(^{222}\) For the Army Reserve, a unit’s latest arrival date was entered in the Joint Operations Plans Execution System (JOPES) as part of TPFDL. This date was used to plan all backwards movement and training for the mobilizing unit.\(^{223}\)

On December 14, 2006, General Schoomaker told the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves that the current mobilization policies were “not
right.” General Schoomaker said access to the reserve component was crucial to readiness. Policies and practices written fifty years ago were not meeting today’s operational tempo. They may have worked for a conscripted force and a strategic reserve but not for the evolving operational reserve. At that time, many Army Reserve soldiers had been mobilized for active duty between fifteen and eighteen months. He said the Army went to a sixteen month model to get twelve months “boots on the ground” due to the Cold War practice of having soldiers and units re-certified as ready after they arrived at the mobilization station. This made some 90,000 National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers available out of more than 520,000. The deployment cycle in the Global War on Terrorism was running four to five times that of the Cold War, making it unprecedented. This increased the burden on the active Army. Cross-leveling was being used to fully man units with qualified soldiers. The commission’s chairman, Major General (retired) Arnold Punaro, stated that 62 percent of Army Reserve soldiers were being cross-leveled to a deploying unit. General Schoomaker called this “evil.” He explained, “Military necessity dictates that we deploy organized, trained, equipped, cohesive units; and you don’t do that by ‘pick-up’ teams.”

But, there were times when cross-leveling was unavoidable in order to meet the needs of theater commanders. For example, this may be required to fill high demand military occupational specialties or as the former Army Reserve G-3 Colonel Less Carroll pointed out to fill non-structured mission or special requirements. Significant cross-leveling has remained in effect as the Army Reserve endeavored to maintain continuity.

On January 19, 2007, Gates issued a memorandum on utilization of the total force. It made changes to Department of Defense policy. He addressed several issues. First, involuntary mobilizations for members of the reserve components were to be for a maximum of one year at any one time. That meant if, for example, it took six months to get ready, then there was only six months “boots on the ground” left. This period could exclude individual skill training necessitated by deployment and post-mobilization leave. Second, mobilization of ground combat, combat support, and combat service support was to be managed on a unit basis, which would foster cohesion and predictability in how units were trained and deployed. Gates had to approve any exceptions. The third issue concerned “the planning objective for involuntary mobilization of Guard/Reserve units...” The ratio of one year mobilized for five years deployed was to remain in effect as the goal. But, Gates recognized that the high operational tempo would necessitate the mobilization of some reserve units sooner than the objective. For most units, the active Army ratio was 1:1 instead of the 1:2 goal. He wrote, “Just as we are asking the active forces to do more in this time of national need, so we must ask more of our Reserve components.”
These changes affecting reserve mobilization were vital in sustaining the “high levels of strategic demand for Army forces, and to better manage stress across the force” and fulfilled the National Security Strategy, including the transitioning operational Army Reserve.229

**Personnel Strength**

Stultz believed building personnel strength “is the most important priority for the Army Reserve.”230 The Army Reserve’s end strength between fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2011 is depicted in figure III-14.

“Just as we are asking the active forces to do more in this time of national need, so we must ask more of our Reserve components.”

Robert M. Gates

Figure III-14: Army Reserve End Strength, FY 2002-FY 2011
By the end of 2005, the Army totaled 600,000 soldiers on active duty. Of that number, 41,000 were from the Army Reserve; 72,000 were from the National Guard. In January 2007, the president approved and the Congress authorized the Grow the Army plan to restore balance to the force. The 74,200 soldier increase included a growth of 65,000 in the active component, 8,200 in the National Guard, and 1,000 in the Army Reserve. In September 2007, the secretary of defense approved the Army chief of staff’s initiative to accelerate growth. In 2009, the secretary of defense approved an additional temporary end-strength increase of 22,000 soldiers, 7,000 of whom were integrated in 2010.

In 1990, the Army Reserve constituted 20.9 percent of the total Army. By 1992, that number had risen to a high of 22.7 percent. Table III-2 depicts what percentage of the total Army the Army Reserve by military personnel class constituted between 2000 and 2009. Figure III-15 represents total Army Reserve strength as of December 31, 2010.

As recognized in *The United States 2020 Army Reserve Vision & Strategy Statement*, “The Army Reserve must shape the force through targeted recruiting, retention, and transition activities.” Until fiscal year 2000, the Army Reserve had not achieved its recruiting goal in a decade. In the middle of 2001, the Army Reserve exceeded its goals. By the end of 2001, the Army Reserve surpassed the recruiting goal by 102 percent. Part of that was due to the September 11 attacks. The war on terrorism produced a rise in recruiting, especially
among prior service soldiers. For 2002, the Army Reserve recruiting goal was 28,825. A total of 31,319 Army Reserve soldiers were recruited. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command stated the goal for Army Reserve soldiers recruited in 2005 was 22,175. Yet, only 19,400 were recruited. According to the Recruiting Command, in 2006 the goal was 25,500; the actual number successfully recruited was 25,378. In 2007, 39,055 soldiers were recruited. The recruiting goals for fiscal year 2007 were met for the first time since 2004. By 2008, the number recruited had risen to 44,455 soldiers with 16,523 reenlisted for a net gain of 7,142 soldiers, 110.6 percent of the goal. Reenlistment goals were not only met but exceeded. They were among the 290,000 soldiers who enlisted and reenlisted in the total Army in 2008. According to the deputy under secretary of defense for military personnel policy, fiscal year 2009 was the first time all components across the Department of Defense met their number and quality goals since the military became an all volunteer force in 1973. In 2009, the Army met 104 percent of its recruiting goals and achieved both numeric goals and quality benchmarks for new recruits. All components exceeded 105 percent of their reenlistment goals. (See figure III-16 for Army Reserve retention rates between 2002 and 2010.)

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Figure III-15: Total Army Reserve Strength as of December 31, 2010

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Off: 6,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WO: 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Ready Reserve</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enl: 845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Off/WO: 833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>770,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enl: 582,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Off/WO: 188,830</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 31 Dec 10 RCCPDS Strength Summary Report and HQC 307 Report

Figure III-15: Total Army Reserve Strength as of December 31, 2010
While successful recruiting added more soldiers in the lowest three pay grades, thousands of midgrade noncommissioned and commissioned officer vacancies existed in 2010. Overall, the Army Reserve was short some 10,000 officers in the grades of captain and major. Contributing to this shortage was the active Army’s need for these soldiers and the subsequent lack of those soldiers coming from the active Army to the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve was challenged to develop and retain senior midgrade noncommissioned officers (staff sergeants and sergeants first class). Senior grades were over strengthened at 118 percent. These were unnecessary imbalances in the force. One initiative the Army Reserve advocated to combat the loss in midgrade ranks was the continuum of service for a fully integrated force-active and reserve. Recruiting efforts directed incentives to more prior-service recruits who had more experience than most first term soldiers. These experienced soldiers were critical to filling shortages among mid-level commissioned and noncommissioned officers.243

The continuing, persistent Global War on Terrorism and its high operational tempo challenged the Army Reserve to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of quality soldiers to meet immediate personnel requirements. This was part of General Casey's strategic imperative of sustaining the force. He stated, “Our warriors are our ultimate asymmetric advantage, the one thing that no enemy can duplicate now or in the future and we need to keep them with us.”244 Sus-
taining the force meant “transforming quality recruits into Soldiers who are physically tough, mentally adaptive and live the Warrior Ethos.” Stultz said, “Recruiting in this period of protracted war is one of the greatest challenges in the history of the all-volunteer force. . . .”

There were several incentives the Army Reserve used to recruit soldiers, especially those in high demand military occupational specialties. The Army Reserve offered targeted incentives for new soldiers and re-enlisting soldiers. That was based on where the soldier fell in ARFORGEN. Some of those incentives for initial enlistment included up to $20,000 for a six year term under the non-prior service enlistment bonus. The Army Reserve offered the “quick ship payment” for non prior service enlistees, if they agreed to ship within a certain amount of time in an effort to fill nearest training seats first. For prior service, there were, among others, the officer/warrant officer accession bonus and the Active Guard Reserve (AGR) reenlistment bonus. Stultz initiated a twenty-four month stability initiative for soldiers coming from the active Army whereby they remained in a non-mobilization status for that period of time.

On July 1, 2007, the Army Reserve began a new recruiting initiative, the Army Reserve Recruiting Assistance Program (AR-RAP). The Army Reserve G-1 was the proponent of the program and had oversight of it. This was a civilian contracted program which rewarded Army Reserve soldiers who served on a voluntary basis as recruiting assistants. The recruiting assistants acted as liaisons between the prospective recruit, the Army Reserve recruiter, and leadership from the assigned unit. Soldiers could receive up to $2,000 for each recruit. In essence, each soldier could be a recruiter. As of June 8, 2009, the program had generated 77,087 recruiting assistants, 24,919 referrals, and 7,492 total accessions since its inception.

Particular retention initiatives included, for example, the secretary of defense-authorized command responsibility pay bonuses for officers serving in positions of special responsibility. The number of officers eligible for bonuses was capped within each officer grade. Another retention initiative was ARFORGEN designated unit pay. This program was included in the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act. It afforded payment for non-obligated soldiers in key critical skills and units such as those soldiers belonging to ARFORGEN units earmarked for deployment and who made a service commitment. The intent was to lower the need to cross-level soldiers by raising more volunteers and keeping soldiers in high priority units.

One measure to combat a shortage of personnel was through the Critical Skills Retention Bonus-Army Reserve initiative. On February 29, 2008, the Army
Reserve implemented the Critical Skills Retention Bonus-Army Reserve (CSRB-AR) for captains; the CSRB-AR on June 4, 2008, for staff sergeants and sergeants first class; and the CSRB-AR on December 22, 2008, for warrant officers to address shortages of soldiers in critical skills at the selected grades that have been resigning or retiring from the TPU in the Selected Reserve. The bonus was for up to $20,000 for soldiers in specific critical skills who agreed to remain in an Army Reserve TPU in the Selected Reserve for three years. There were some eligibility restrictions. For example, military technicians and Active Guard Reserve soldiers were not eligible for the noncommissioned officer bonus. Accepting the bonus did not increase the likelihood of mobilization. The CSRB-AR was paid at lump sum or an installment rate. There were several conditions under which the entitlement to the bonus could be terminated. The Army Reserve designated a number of Army officer career (AOC) fields for captains as critical for CSRB purposes. Those included, among others, aviation combined arms operations, combat engineer, counterintelligence, patient administration, marine and terminal operations, motor/rail transportation, explosive ordnance disposal, and health services systems management. By June 30, 2008, over 700 captains and twenty noncommissioned officers had committed for three years by accepting the CSRB. As of June 5, 2009, 1,257 agreements had been approved for captains; thirty agreements for chief warrant officer 3s and 275 agreements for staff sergeants and sergeants first class.

According to a 2006 Congressional Budget Office study, factors that service members cited as negatively affecting their intention to remain in the military were stress associated with high workload and long work hours while deployed, uncertainties surrounding deployment dates, short-notice deployments, insufficient downtime between deployments, and family separation.

Crucial to maintaining and improving unit readiness was full-time support. The Army Reserve continued to have the lowest level of full-time support of any reserve component. In fiscal year 2005, the Department of Defense full-time support manning level was 21 percent of end strength. The total for the Army Reserve was just 11.3 percent. As can be seen in Table III-3, there has been progress in the AGR portion of full-time support. Continuing to add more full-time support to include military technicians and civilians was an ongoing goal.

The Army Reserve needed more variable full-time support programs to adequately function as an operational force. As Stultz explained in 2010, full-time support “remains a strategic reserve legacy.” Legislative and policy modification were needed to alter personnel support processes. The Army Reserve was making efforts to “create additional full-time support capability to provide
Table III-3: Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Force, Fiscal Year 2000-2010
Source: USARC-G1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>On Hand</th>
<th>Required</th>
<th>Fill Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>12,855</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>13,106</td>
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<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>13,406</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>14,072</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>14,602</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>15,393</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>15,308</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>15,603</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>16,901</td>
<td>15,870</td>
<td>106%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>16,271</td>
<td>16,170</td>
<td>101%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>16,251</td>
<td>16,251</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
much-needed continuity in the generating forces. Continuing, he remarked, “These changes will allow eligibility for enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, education loan repayment and other incentives. We are also planning to create a new category of non-dual status technician, which allows retention and direct hire from outside the selected Reserve.”

In an effort to increase personnel readiness and training and the well being of soldiers, the Army Reserve initiated in 2003 the transient, trainee, holdee, and student (TTHS) account to manage Army Reserve soldiers while they were in training or otherwise in an unready status. Commanders then could concentrate on improving readiness and training. The ready force was divested of a less relevant structure, unready units, and over structure. The TTHS account fostered readiness, training, and mobilization actions and freed commanders of administrative duties. Soldiers were more easily incorporated into the unit. The desired end state was an increased percentage of duty military occupational specialty qualified soldiers in troop program units, resulting in a higher state of readiness as reflected in unit status reports, less hollow structure, and improved unit capability. In November 2004, seven commands began the TTHS program. About 5,000 soldiers returned to their unit ready and deployable. By 2011, the Army Reserve had programmed 4,000 spaces for the TTHS.

An operational Army Reserve and the Total Force require a continuum of service that manages reserve members over a career.
Fiscal Strength

The fiscal year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act authorized $668.8 million for National Guard and Army Reserve military construction, an increase of $446.8 million above the president’s budget. The 2001 military construc-

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**Table III-4: Army Reserve Appropriations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Operation &amp; Maintenance</th>
<th>Military Construction</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2,240.8</td>
<td>810.8</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>3,137.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2,199.2</td>
<td>868.0</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>3,166.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2,368.7</td>
<td>935.8</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>3,381.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2,314.2</td>
<td>1,017.9</td>
<td>*108.9</td>
<td>*3,441.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2,182.2</td>
<td>1,037.2</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>3,261.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>*2,146.8</td>
<td>*1,072.7</td>
<td>102.0</td>
<td>3,326.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2,161.9</td>
<td>1,240.2</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>3,459.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Data Unavailable</td>
<td>Data Unavailable</td>
<td>Data Unavailable</td>
<td>Data Unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2,059.0</td>
<td>1,140.8</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>3,256.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2,040.0</td>
<td>1,211.1</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>3,325.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>*2,182.9</td>
<td>*1,258.5</td>
<td>102.1</td>
<td>*3,543.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2,318.1</td>
<td>1,481.3</td>
<td>123.1</td>
<td>1,481.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>*2,466,691</td>
<td>*1,561,913</td>
<td>**108,465</td>
<td>4,137,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2,682,391</td>
<td>1,766,544</td>
<td>**165,136</td>
<td>4,614,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3,124,348</td>
<td>2,123,962</td>
<td>**100,554</td>
<td>5,348,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3,358,192</td>
<td>1,993,005</td>
<td>**88,451</td>
<td>5,439,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3,666,180</td>
<td>1,989,559</td>
<td>**92,377</td>
<td>5,748,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3,144,165</td>
<td>1,968,324</td>
<td>**151,043</td>
<td>5,263,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3,279,102</td>
<td>2,164,928</td>
<td>**166,000</td>
<td>5,610,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3,709,968</td>
<td>2,459,040</td>
<td>**148,133</td>
<td>6,317,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4,023,661</td>
<td>2,607,703</td>
<td>**282,607</td>
<td>6,913,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4,286,480</td>
<td>2,617,469</td>
<td>**431,566</td>
<td>7,335,515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*There is a discrepancy between Reserve Forces Policy Board reports. The latest dated report is used. The 2001 data is from the Defense Finance and Accounting System.

**MCAR for 2001 through 2010 is appropriated and not execution amounts only.
tion authorization was $24.2 million more than the previous fiscal year. This increased construction funds for sixty-one new projects for National Guard and Army Reserve facilities. The legislation authorized some $2.3 billion for National Guard and Army Reserve equipment, which included the president's budget request of $1.3 billion along with $1 billion added on by Congress.263

As generally seen in America’s wars, with Operation IRAQI FREEDOM even more funds began to flow. Much of this was through supplements, instead of the base budget. “The Army's base budget in 2005 and 2006 was $100 billion each year, for example, but the Army received supplements of $60 billion in 2005 and $70 billion in 2006.264 Funding for Army Reserve personnel, operation and maintenance and construction between 1989 and 2010 is depicted in Table III-4.265 By 2010, the Army Reserve appropriation of $7.9 billion represented 4 percent of the total Army budget.266

**Force Structure**

A significant force structure action in 2000 was the activation of nineteen multi-component units. Among the multi-component units activated were four engineer platoons as part of the 249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power) Multi-Component unit. The 40th, 360th, and 416th multi-component transportation truck companies activated in 2000. They were composed of 121 active component soldiers and forty-five Army Reserve soldiers. The Army Reserve soldiers were 88M (motor transport operators) driving M915 line haul tractors and operating 7.5K petroleum tankers. The regional support command that managed units located in the same area as the active component unit was to assist and provide guidance on reserve specific personnel, promotion, legal, supply, recruiting, and budget actions and procedures. The 40th Transportation Truck Company was located at Fort Lewis, Washington; the 360th Transportation Truck Company at Fort Carson, Colorado; and the 416th Transportation Truck Company at Hunter Army Airfield, Savannah, Georgia.267

U.S. Army Japan reorganized and activated a multi-component unit formed mostly of Army Reserve soldiers. The 9th Theater Support Command activated on October 16, 2000. It consisted of forty active duty soldiers at Camp Zama, Japan, and 400 Army Reserve soldiers at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. After fifty-three years, the senior logistics headquarters in the Army Reserve, the 310th Theater Support Command, cased its colors and merged with the forty-year-old 9th Theater Army Area Command (the Army’s last theater Army area command) to form the new 9th Theater Support Command headquartered in Japan. The 9th Theater Support Command benefitted from the skills and experiences that
Army Reserve soldiers brought to multi-component units, enhancing mission success of logistics support to the Pacific Command.  

The Army Reserve composition of the total Army in 2001 is depicted in Table III-5.  

In 2007, more than 96 percent of all civil affairs forces were in the Army and 93 percent of those forces were in the Army Reserve.  Over 63 percent of the Army’s psychological operations forces resided in the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve had eighty-eight unique skill sets. By 2010, the Army Reserve contributed to the Army’s Total Force 100 percent of the theater engineer commands, civil affairs commands, training divisions, biological detection companies, railway units, and replacement companies. It contributed more than two thirds of the Army’s medical brigades, civil affairs brigades, psychological operations groups, expeditionary sustainment commands, dental companies, combat support hospitals, Army water craft, petroleum units, mortuary affairs units, and military history detachments. The Army Reserve contributed nearly half of the Army’s military police commands, information operations groups, medical units, and supply units.
The restructure or transformation in command and control was aimed at creating a more flexible, adaptable, and deployable force. That was done partly by transforming the ten regional support commands to ten regional readiness commands. Helmly directed this change on September 6, 2002. The Department of the Army approved the concept plan on April 1, 2004, with an effective date of October 16, 2005. The concept plan provided the reasoning behind shifting the command and control support-based structure found in the regional support commands to more concentrated readiness, training, and mobilization preparedness-focused institutions found in the regional readiness commands. Essentially, the regional readiness commands concentrated on training and readiness of units. Base operations, facilities, and land management transitioned to the assistant chief of staff for installation management. According to Helmly, “The days of TDA (table of distribution and allowances), non-deploying headquarters commanding all of our deployable forces are over.” Command and control of units were to be transferred to operational and functional commands. In short, operational units needed to be under operational commands.

Table III-5: 2001 Army Reserve Force Structure Composition of the Total Army

Source: The 2002 Army Reserve Historical Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Forces</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Support</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatant Commander/Service Support</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Support</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Service Support</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Divisions</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoner of War Brigades</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Units</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Brigades</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Support</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Existence of the regional readiness commands was short lived. In September 2006, four newly-created regional support commands entered carrier status within the Army Reserve. This was done to align them with their mission requirements. This transformation in command and control was directed by BRAC 2005 legislation and conformed to one of Stultz’s six imperatives. In a phased schedule, the regional support commands replaced the regional readiness commands in providing base operations support to Army Reserve units in their respective regions. The Army Reserve disestablished the ten regional readiness commands on September 16, 2008, and designated the new commands as the 63d, 81st, 88th, and 99th Regional Support Commands. Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, was the home for the 88th; Moffett Field, California, for the 63d; Fort Dix, New Jersey, for the 99th; and Fort Jackson, South Carolina, for the 81st. These commands provided personnel, information and resource management facilities, and equipment support to the Army Reserve units in
Regional Readiness Commands Replaced With Regional Support Commands

Figure III-19: Regional Readiness Commands

Figure III-20: Regional Support Commands
their geographic regions. The former missions of command and control and training and readiness oversight shifted to twenty-two operational and functional commands.

The operational and functional commands were created to organize, equip, and administer deployable units and provide available deployable missions. Operational and functional commands were focused on a specific function. All units remaining aligned to the regional readiness commands had to be reassigned. Where possible, units were assigned to the operational and functional commands. Those units without functional alignments were assigned to the U.S. Army Reserve Readiness Command.

Stultz explained that “This shift enables us to source more operational units from the space savings that result from reductions in overhead throughout the Army Reserve.” A lot of low demand or overhead has been taken down to stand up high demand operational forces. He pointed to the deactivation of one of these regional readiness commands and in its place the activation of the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC). The 316th deployed less than twelve months later and “took command of over 20,000 active, National Guard, and Army Reserve soldiers in Iraq, providing logistical support for all U.S. forces, coalition forces, and Iraqi forces from,” as Stultz put it, “beans to bullets, from fuel to parts. The 316th ESC demonstrated the ability of the Army Reserve to quickly transform while at war.”

In repositioning the Army Reserve’s structure from its TDA-type organizations into a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) deployable force, the Army Reserve will increase MTOE structure from some 128,500 to 145,000 positions. These changes were in sync with Decision Point 57 to the Army Campaign Plan, which addressed the overall reduction of tables of distribution and allowance structure in an effort to convert it to operational force structure. Accordingly, the Army Reserve moved its structure from the TDA organizations and placed it under the operational and functional commands. At the beginning of 2008, 78 percent of Army Reserve units had been realigned from a Cold War strategic reserve configuration of geographically based headquarters to operational and functional commands. By May 2009, the realignment was 92 percent complete and by December 2009, Stultz declared transformation was “essentially complete.” The Army Reserve moved from a legacy structure serving a strategic reserve to command and control of an operational, deployable reserve.

Among the operational and functional commands was the Military Intelligence Readiness Command (MIRC). The Army Reserve created this command, pro-
visionally, on July 1, 2003. It was responsible for the “ongoing intelligence requirements of the U.S. Army, combatant commands, combat support agencies, and other services by providing trained and ready soldiers, mission-tailored teams and units, and state-of-the-art intelligence production and training facilities.”284 Command and control of all continental U.S. Army Reserve military intelligence forces transferred from the regional readiness commands and the United States Army Reserve Readiness Command at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, to the Military Intelligence Readiness Command.285

September 15, 2007, marked the activation of the 11th Aviation Command at Fort Knox, Kentucky, another operational and functional command. The Army Reserve transferred aviation command and control from the 244th Aviation Brigade to the 11th Aviation Command in order to execute modular aviation unit conversion. Activation of the 11th was significant as it symbolized the growth and importance of aviation to the Army Reserve. The 11th will oversee transformation of every aviation unit in the Army Reserve. The command supplied air traffic services, airfield management, aero medical evacuation, combat aviation brigade reinforcement, theater aviation support, and coordination of

Figure III-21: Operational Commands
aviation staging and onward movement in order to support corps, Army or joint operations in theater. When deployed, the headquarters operated as a theater aviation command.286

Army Reserve aviation has been a significant force multiplier in the Global War on Terrorism. Elements of Army Reserve aviation have been forward deployed in the Southwest Asia area of responsibility since Operation DESERT SPRING in 1999. Every rotation of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM has involved soldiers from Army Reserve aviation.287

Multiple rotations of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM have involved aviation soldiers to include relief efforts in Pakistan after the earthquake in 2005. Army Reserve aviation not only provided highly qualified and trained soldiers for overseas deployment, but also provided critical aviation support for disasters at home such as hurricanes Katrina and Rita.288

On October 16, 2005, the Army Reserve established another operational and functional command, the Army Reserve Medical Command (AR-MEDCOM).
AR-MEDCOM will remain as a command and control headquarters for all TDA medical units.\(^{289}\) By 2010, AR-MEDCOM included the four Medical Area Support Groups, the Medical Readiness and Training Command, and the Army Professional Medical Command. It encompassed seventy-six units and 9,654 soldiers.\(^{290}\)

Two other operational and functional commands were the 311th and 335th Theater Signal Commands (TSC). Their mission was to provide communications support in the theater of operations to the Army Service Component Commander, Army Forces (ARFOR), joint, and coalition forces. They provided command and control of all assigned and attached signal units and formulated and implemented signal support plans, policies, and procedures.\(^{291}\)

Under transformation, the 311th became the Pacific Command’s theater signal command and had full responsibility for the Pacific LandWarNet. This was the strategic and tactical network for all installations and deployed forces in the region.\(^{292}\) According to the commander, “Our systems and Soldiers have worked superbly during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM. I am very pleased with how our network came together and continues to serve the war fighter.293

The two theater engineer operational commands, the 412th and 416th, conducted theater-level engineer operations in support of assigned theater commanders. These units participated in joint and combined regional contingency operations. They also supported continental U.S.-based engineer requirements, as directed. Like other commands, transformation will be compounded as each command’s structure changes in the midst of meeting its global missions.294

The 200th Military Police Command was another operational and functional command. The command’s force design update received approval on December 13, 2006. The command activated on April 16, 2008. It was the first multi-component military police theater command in the history of the Army. The organization comprised more than 120 subordinate commands, including units transferred from the disestablished regional readiness commands. It
was comprised of over 12,000 Army Reserve military police soldiers and supporting staff from across the nation. Its operational mission was to provide command and control for two to five assigned/attached military police brigades with subordinate units (battalions, companies, detachments) performing military police battlefield functions. During peacetime operations, the command provided command and control and training readiness oversight for organizations under its control. Activation of the command was a direct result of lessons learned during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Properly structured, the 200th Military Police Command was an appropriate mix of reserve and active soldiers to simultaneously support the Global War on Terrorism, major combat operations, and small scale contingencies. The integration of both reserve and active soldiers ensured seamless and rapid transition from peacetime to wartime operation and enhanced readiness through mutually supporting training. The command provided command and control of military police combat support and internment/resettlement brigades and other military police units engaged in theater-level Army, joint and multinational military police operations to support a commander’s priorities.
A CH-47 Chinook helicopter from the Army Reserve’s Company B, 5th Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment, picks up three large sandbags from a staging area along the shore of Lake Pontchartrain. The reserve unit, called to help with the Hurricane Katrina relief effort, dropped more than one million pounds of the sandbags to help repair damaged flood levees around New Orleans. (Army Reserve Magazine, Winter 2005)

The 377th Theater Sustainment Command, another operational and functional command, was the lead integrator of Army Reserve sustainment forces. It provided command and control of all assigned, attached and operational con-
trol (OPCON) units. The command provided sustainment planning guidance and support. This will become the largest command in the Army Reserve. The 377th assumed command and control of the 103d, 143d, 310th, 311th and 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Commands, the Army Reserve Sustainment Command, and the Deployable Support Command. It had command and control of over 500 down trace units throughout the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. The ESCs were a critical component to the Army Reserve's theater sustainment role, designed to forward deploy in an austere theater and provide combat service assets and services.296

In a realignment action, effective October 1, 2006, the Department of the Army realigned command and control of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) and all Army Reserve civil affairs and psychological operations units and soldiers from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command to the USARC. This was a Quadrennial Defense Review
decision and supported the Army Reserve’s plans to create and sustain trained and ready civil affairs and psychological operations forces. Between 2008 and 2011, Army Reserve civil affairs spaces were expected to grow by some 900 spaces and psychological spaces to about 1,230 spaces. Tactical civil affairs will grow from sixty-four to 112 tactical companies. This will increase support to the conventional force and to the ARFORGEN model.297

Perhaps one of the most important restructuring actions was the secretary of the Army’s October 16, 2006 letter and General Order Number Fifteen, designating the USARC as a direct reporting unit to the Army chief of staff. This was in accordance with Decision Point 58 to the Army Campaign Plan and efforts to more effectively administer and support operating forces.298

“Effective October 1, 2010, the Army Reserve Headquarters was realigned internally to better reflect . . . the new management culture [known as the enterprise approach wherein] . . . leaders function for the good of the enterprise, not just their functional area or staff agency. . . . Lines of authority and supervisory
The USARC is designated as a direct reporting unit to the Army chief of staff.

oversight . . . changed to best incorporate senior-level emphasis on the four Core Enterprises: (1) Human Capital, (2) Readiness, (3) Materiel, and (4) Services and Infrastructure (aligned with HQDA [Headquarters Department of the Army] Institutional Adaptation and Army Enterprises).” This “new management culture” “realigns Army Reserve Headquarters assets into one combined enterprise and more fully integrates ‘one headquarters at two different locations,’ . . . OCAR staff . . . and . . . USARC staff . . . .”299 (See figure III-25 for a depiction of the Army Reserve Headquarters internal realignment.)

On August 14, 2008, the Department of the Army, in accordance with the Army Campaign Plan, approved the USARC’s request to transform the existing Army Reserve garrison support unit structure into two CONUS and one OCONUS mobilization support groups. The transformation provided additional struc-
Training

As noted before, “preparing forces to succeed in the current conflict” was one of General Casey’s strategic imperatives. Training soldiers was a priority. Casey told Congress in November 2007, “We will continue to provide tough, demanding training at home stations and in our combat training centers to give our Soldiers and their leaders the confidence they need to succeed.”

The cornerstone of full spectrum training for the Army Reserve was the Army Reserve Training Strategy (ARTS). ARTS outlined how the Army Reserve will...
produce a sustainable force capable of supporting joint and Army operational requirements. This is achieved by means of training and readiness cycles through which all deployable Army Reserve units will rotate. ARTS was based on the train-alert-deploy operational reserve model rather than the alert-train-deploy strategic reserve model, as specified in Stultz’s imperatives for transformation. It used the ARFORGEN cyclic readiness construct, providing the time sequence to train units. ARTS established progressive training and readiness cycles that prioritized resources, managed readiness levels, and provided predictable training. The strategy reduced post-mobilization training time to maximize the time soldiers were deployed. ARTS was the Army Reserve’s application of ARFORGEN. ARTS was the means to providing the framework to create and sustain a trained, ready operational Army Reserve.302

Warrior exercises were an integral part of ARFORGEN and ARTS. They were the first major externally evaluated company level collective training venue for most units. During the warrior exercise, units were required to function in a multi-functional, multi-echelon training environment across the live-virtual-constructive (L-V-C) domain with operational force (OPFOR) pressure.
during a five-day field training exercise. Observer controller/trainers evaluated warrior exercise units. Units were expected to successfully accomplish “P” (practices) proficiency on all core-mission essential task list (C-METL) tasks prior to entering the Train/Ready 3 (T/R3) training year of the ARTS training cycle. The warrior exercise is evolving as the cumulative training event for the Ready 1 phase. These exercises simulated in theater mobilization, deployment, and employment. Lessons learned from the Global War on Terrorism enhanced realistic training. In June 2005, at Fort Bliss, Texas, the 90th Regional Readiness Command executed the first warrior exercise which trained over 3,500 soldiers.

An example of individual soldier training was the ten-week Exercise PACIFIC SURVIVOR conducted in August 2006 at Fort Hunter Liggett, California. It was designed to provide each soldier with the opportunity to participate in a training environment focused on individual combat skills and knowledge. The four training categories were weapons ranges (qualification and familiarization), convoy operations training, selected warrior training tasks (e.g., first aid, land navigation, hand grenade course), and classroom instruction covering law

![Figure III-27: Army Reserve Training Strategy](image)
CHAPTER 3.  THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

of land warfare and cultural awareness training. The latter became one of the most popular training events for soldiers who had been deployed for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM and for those soon to deploy.

One example of the Reset/Train phase of ARFORGEN in 2006 was Exercise QUARTERMASTER LIQUID LOGISTICS for water purification, water production, and petroleum, oil and lubricants units. There were other exercise opportunities for military police, transportation, maintenance, and medical units. An example of the annual medical-based training was Exercise GOLDEN MEDIC, the Army Reserve’s largest annual medical command and control exercise. It culminated the training year’s individual and small unit collective training events. Soldiers set up and managed an improvised medical complex with equipment found in an American hospital. Soldiers learned how to respond to medical situations on a battlefield such as evacuating casualties to a theater hospital.

In 2006, the Army Reserve conducted eight-day Exercise PATRIOT WARRIOR and Exercise RIVER WARRIOR. In June 2006, the 88th Regional
Readiness Command executed PATRIOT WARRIOR at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. Twenty-three of the units participating were ARFORGEN Reset/Train 3 units. This warrior exercise provided year three units with an external evaluation of training and readiness for entry into the ready pool. During the field exercise, soldiers trained collectively at platoon level and concentrated on improving company level readiness. It provided a realistic battle-focused environment, incorporating all the battle operating systems and components/services on the battlefield to enhance battle drill training and sustain technical proficiency.

In June 2006, the 11th Military Police Brigade executed PATRIOT JUSTICE at Fort McCoy. The purpose of the exercise was to provide mission-based training to Army Reserve military police soldiers, officers, units, and support military occupational specialties with theater specific individual and collective METL training. The exercise prepared forces to deploy to any geographical combatant command on order or to perform missions in the homeland supporting civilian authorities.
In July 2006, the 89th Regional Readiness Command planned and executed a river warrior exercise at Fort Chaffee, Arizona. The command’s mission was to improve unit collective training in a tactical environment and prepare ARFORGEN with Ready/Train 3 units for validation and entry into the Ready pool. There was heavy use of engineer units together with boat units engaged in executing a shore-to-shore bridging operation. Another example of ARFORGEN Ready phase training was Operation SAND CASTLE, which simulated engineer operations in a desert environment and implemented anti-terrorism force protection measures.

Before progressing to ARFORGEN’s Available pool, soldiers had to complete a combat training center event or its equivalent and had to certify their combat skills. An example was Operation PLATINUM WRENCH. Operation PLATINUM WRENCH was a USARC G-4/G-7 maintenance initiative to integrate Army Reserve maintenance into the Army sustainment maintenance capability, to provide fully trained, ready, and relevant Army Reserve direct support (DS), general support (GS), and to develop a collection and classification (C&C) maintenance structure. Warrior exercises have continued to be a useful aspect of ARTS.

In 2003, the training structure went from seven divisions (institutional training) (DIVTTs) to six. The extra division, the 84th DIVT, once multifunctional,
became responsible for leader training. It took charge of the three noncommissioned officer academies, the Army Reserve Readiness Training Center, and all officer and professional military education training which at the time consisted of the Commanding General Staff College and the combined service schools. This was in sync with Army Reserve transformation. Each DIVIT was uniquely structured to support its area of responsibility for military occupational specialty reclassification, professional development, and ROTC support requirements. Each DIVIT also had unique initial military training (e.g., drill sergeant) structures. Each DIVIT had a share of the Army
program for individual training mission, provided summer surge capability for TRADOC, and supported both ROTC camps and the U.S. Army Military Academy. DIVTTs provided command and control and trainers for foreign Army training requirements.\textsuperscript{308}

Under Decision Point 74 (Army Reserve Institutional Training Structure) to the Army Campaign Plan approved on February 26, 2006, the Army Reserve modified yet again its institutional training structure. The six divisions and the U.S. Army Reserve Readiness Training Command (ARRTC) were transformed into three training commands and seven training divisions to be realigned under the commands.\textsuperscript{309} This was in an effort to functionalize training and reduce command and control.\textsuperscript{310} The Army Reserve reorganized and re-designated the training divisions and ARRTC to the following:

80th Training Command (Total Army School System), effective September 16, 2008;
108th Training Command (Initial Entry Training), effective September 16, 2008;
84th Training Command (Leader Readiness), effective October 17, 2007.

The Army Reserve reorganized and re-designated four existing training divisions:

95th Training Division (Initial Entry Training), effective September 16, 2008;
98th Training Division (Initial Entry Training), effective September 16, 2008;
100th Training Division (Operations Support), effective September 16, 2008;
104th Training Division (Leader Training), effective October 17, 2007.

The Army Reserve activated three new divisions effective September 16, 2008:

70th Training Division (Functional Training),
94th Training Division (Force Sustainment),
102d Training Division (Maneuver Support).

The 80th Training Command (Total Army School System) has command and control of the 94th, 100th, and 102d Training Divisions. The 108th Training Command has command and control of the 95th and the 98th Training Divisions. The 84th Training Command has command and control of the 70th and 104th Training Divisions. The various brigades within the current divisions (institutional) were to be reorganized by specialty and training opportunities were consolidated at select training sites, while supporting functional alignment.\textsuperscript{311}
Training commands are responsible for routine training of Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard soldiers through classroom and “hands on” training. Organized into entry, advanced individual training schools, leader development and brigade command training organizations, each training command is responsible for specialized units throughout the United States.

More specifically, the 80th Training Command (Total Army School System) (TASS) trains soldiers in twelve career military fields for combat support and combat service support. Under the career military fields, sixty-three military occupational specialties are taught at eight TASS training centers, four Regional Training Sites-Maintenance, and two high tech training centers. The 80th also teaches nine additional skill identifiers, sixteen certifications, twenty-five senior leadership courses, and fifty-three advanced leadership courses. All together, the command teaches 166 individual courses. The career
management fields cover a wide range of instruction from engineering to health services and from quartermaster to civil affairs/psychological operations. The command also provides specified instructor personnel from its school brigades, as directed, to any TRADOC installation to support military occupational specialties-specific training requirements.312

The 84th Training Command (Leader Readiness) plans, coordinates, and conducts: warrior exercises and combat support training rotations; basic and advanced weapons training and training on theater-directed tasks. The command trains and assesses Army Reserve units in ARFORGEN in accordance with USARC and TRADOC directives in support of operational and functional commands. As directed, the command provides training to joint, combined and active Army forces.313

The 108th Training Command (Initial Entry Training) provides highly professional, trained, and ready drill sergeants, instructors, cadre and units to conduct initial military training and leader training in support of TRADOC and the U.S. Army Accessions Command to train, advise and assist joint, multi-component and multi-national forces. The 108th Training Command is the sole nationwide reserve command for initial military training, representing one half of the total basic training capacity of the Army.314

As a result of Army Campaign Plan Decision Point 72, five Army Reserve training support division headquarters and their subordinate units were re-aligned or restructured under several new headquarters. Two were re-missioned and retained due to BRAC (78th and 91st); one was restructured into a battle command training division (75th), and the remaining two (85th and 87th) were restructured to administrative support commands for the many Army Reserve battalions operationally controlled by First Army.315

Training support commands provide customized, realistic, unit-and-operation-specific training. Training support commands plan, conduct, and evaluate training exercises for Army, Army Reserve and National Guard units. Training support commands are organized under the United States First Army into two subordinate units, First Army East and First Army West.
The Army Reserve developed the regional training center (RTC) concept (with provisional execution in 2008) in direct response to the secretary of defense’s twelve month mobilization policy, Utilization of the Total Force, issued on January 19, 2007, referenced above. The memorandum had an immediate impact on Army Reserve “boots on the ground” time available to combatant commanders due to the time necessary to perform post-mobilization training requirements. First Army, together with the Army Reserve and FORSCOM, identified 130 of 160 tasks trained during post-mobilization that would migrate to pre-mobilization training for the reduction of pre-and post-mobilization training for deployment expeditionary force (DEF)-sourced Army Reserve units in the Ready phase of ARFORGEN. Migrating post-mobilization theater specific required training to pre-mobilization training reduced the existing model from seventy days to less than thirty-eight days. Department of the Army codified this requirement in HQDA EXORD 150-08, Reserve Component (RC) Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) Pre- and Post-Mobilization Training (PPMT) Strategy. The RTCs supported the HQDA G-3/5/7 Collective Training Divi-
Soldiers engage in hands-on training as part of the 92W Water Treatment Specialist course taught by the 80th Training Command’s Regional TASS Training Center at Fort Pickett, Virginia, in April 2010. (Courtesy of 94th Division)
Sergeant First Class Gerald Kjornes, Regional Training Site-Maintenance instructor, trains Specialist Michael Lambach on how to use schematics to troubleshoot and diagnose faults with a 30kw generator. (Army Reserve Magazine, Spring 2006).
mission guidance on Army warrior training. Further, the RTC program supported sustainment of associated Army warrior training and warrior tasks and battle drill individual and collective tasks in ARFORGEN Train/Ready 3. The RTCs conducted individual soldier, leader and collective training skills supporting theater specific individual required training and warrior tasks and battle drills. The RTCs used mobilized soldiers and equipment from Army Reserve institutional training divisions (e.g., 108th Training Command) with elements from small arms readiness groups and observer controller/trainer teams.  

The three RTCs located at Fort Hunter Liggett, Fort Dix, and Fort McCoy supported the training strategy and trained individual warrior tasks and some collective training tasks. According to one senior USARC G-7 officer, “RTC is the final catch-all, ensuring individual tasks are accomplished prior to units and soldiers being mobilized in the execution of the train-alert-deploy construct.”  

The regional training centers and the combat support training centers (discussed below) ensured that the contemporary Army Reserve supported the one-year-in-five deployed ARFORGEN cycle.

The 84th U.S. Army Reserve Readiness Training Command has outfitted five standard Humvees with steel kits which simulate the weight and physical characteristics of an actual up-armored Humvee. (Army Reserve Magazine, Spring 2006)
Should the mobilization authority be completely rescinded or restricted, the RTC was a pre-mobilization capability which could be decreased and ramped up as required to support the reserve component deployment expeditionary force. The first RTC rotation began in October 2007 with 6,061 soldiers trained in 2008. That number grew to 12,422 in 2009 and then rose again in 2010 to 13,084.

Combat Support Training Centers (CSTC), aimed at reducing post-mobilization training and increasing “boots on the ground,” were operational at Fort Hunter Liggett, Fort McCoy, and Fort Dix. CSTC capability provided combat training-center like experiences for maneuver support and force sustainment units, similar to the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center training environments for Army maneuver units. The brigade - run exercises focused on company level training with platoon executed LANES where units received training through free play events with opposing force (OPFOR) pressure during an eight-day field training exercise.

Soldiers from the 652d Engineer Company, Ellsworth, Wisconsin, constructed this bridge across the Arkansas River at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, during their annual training. (Photo by Specialist Cory Meyman)
Brigade and battalion staffs received military decision making process training and units received external evaluations from observer/controllers. CSTC rotations targeted Train/Ready 3 units, which were part of the deployment expeditionary force, sourced in support of overseas contingency operations within 180 days of their mobilization dates.320

The Army Reserve was committed to providing appropriate platforms to support crucial home station training for its units. Army Reserve home stationing included reserve centers, local training areas, regional training sites, and installations. Home stations depicted the operational environment in training venues, facilities, constructive live, virtual (simulators), and constructive simulations to include gaming technologies. Modernizing the Army Reserve’s infrastructure through more military construction and retrofitting its facilities with state of the art classrooms and simulator/simulation rooms augmented individual and collective training such as weapons simulator rooms in new Army Reserve centers. Upgrading existing local training areas and regional training sites with ranges and training facilities gave units the ability to master crucial tasks while training near home.321

To support combatant commanders, the Army initiated the Foreign Army Training and Assistance Command (FA-TRAC), the only unit of its kind. “The FA-TRAC concept began as an Army Reserve initiative to fill a U.S. Army need for creating a trained and ready, deployable organization” to train the Iraqi Army.322 Leading its first mission, the Army Reserve’s 98th Division (Institutional Training) (the Iroquois Warriors) from Rochester, New York, deployed to Iraq in late 2004 to train the Iraqi National Army and other Iraqi security forces. Brigadier General Richard Sherlock was the 98th’s assistant division commander for operations who was to serve as the deputy commanding general of the Coalition Military Assistance Team. He stated, “Our Soldiers are looking forward to this opportunity in assisting the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and in helping build an Iraqi Army capable of supporting a stable, sovereign Iraq nation.”323

The main components of the 98th Division’s advisor support team mission in Iraq consisted of the command and control cell and over thirty advisor teams who worked mainly with the 1st, 3d, and 5th Iraqi Divisions. A few worked Army Reserve units deploy to train the Iraqi Army.
with Iraqi Army engineer and logistics units. The teams found the Iraqi units at varying levels of organization, knowledge, experience, training, and readiness partly due to previous advisory teams. While most advisors had believed they were to train the Iraqi forces on a “safe compound,” they found themselves “advising their units on combat missions.”

Living conditions were often Spartan. Describing the often times isolation, one soldier remarked, “We really had no idea what was going on in the outside world. For all intents and purposes, we were in the middle of Iraq on our own, doing what we needed to do. It was a big shock for me.” While the quantity of food was usually not a problem its quality was debatable. Equipment proved to be a foremost concern.

By providing “train-the-trainer” non-commissioned officer and officer training and basic military skills, the division expanded that nation’s ability to build an Iraqi Army capable of stabilizing Iraq. In 2005, 741 soldiers were mobilized for this mission. Twenty-three percent of the soldiers were cross-leveled. Four percent were Individual Ready Reserve soldiers. The unit also fielded a detachment of soldiers to Afghanistan to help with training cadets for the nation’s National Military Academy. While FA-TRAC as a name no longer exists, the mission of providing Army Reserve soldiers to train security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan still does.

There had been some debate and resistance to using a division (institutional training) unit. Still, the 98th Division’s presence was appreciated. Speaking of the unit under his command, General David Petraeus said: “We were happy to have them. We were just glad to get somebody over there to help us out-and the sooner the better. . . . I think they should be justly proud of what they did. In some cases they did missions for which they were completely suited; in other cases, just like everybody else in Iraq, they did missions that were not familiar to them and they responded admirably in each case. . . . To say we couldn’t have done it without . . . the 98th would be a huge understatement, so they ought

“I think they [98th Division] should be justly proud of what they did. . . . To say we couldn’t have done it without . . . the 98th would be a huge understatement, so they ought to look on this episode in their history with pride.” General David Petraeus
to look on this episode in their history with pride.” According to another assessment, “The 98th Division’s performance is a testament to the ever-increasing professionalism of the Army’s Reserve Component soldier and their leaders.”

Fort Hunter Liggett, California. Brigadier General Alton Berry, commander, 70th Training Division (Functional Training), left, and 70th Command Sergeant Major Derrick Simpson check out a rocket propelled grenade launcher used by OPFOR at Regional Training Center-West. (Courtesy of 84th Training Command)
Soldiers from the 783d Military Police Battalion participate in pre-mobilization training under the guidance of Fort McCoy’s RTC-North by firing crew-served weapons. (Photo by Rob Schuette)

Soldiers from the 783d Military Police Battalion conduct MK-19 machine gun launcher training at Fort McCoy’s RTC-North. (Photo by Rob Schuette)
Soldiers of the 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry Regiment test their nerves as they show their combat presence in a small village riot depicted in a training scenario at the Joint Readiness Training Center. (Army Reserve Magazine, Spring 2005)

Captain Ernesto Pinedo, a military policeman with the 382d Military Police Detachment, observes as Iraqi policemen conduct weapons training at a firing range in Baghdad. (Army Reserve Magazine, Spring 2003)
The 80th Division and the 108th Training Division also were deployed to assist in standing up the Iraqi Army, its police, and border police. “In the original concept,” remarked Stultz, “they never had a mission of deploying. Their mission was to mobilize and fill out the training base here in the United States. We’ve changed that. They are deploying forward and doing great work, part of the way ahead is trying to get the Iraqi Army to take responsibility for its own security.”

Three hundred and fifty soldiers from the 108th mobilized for the MNSTC-I mission in March 2005. About 225 were assigned to positions in the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT). CMATT was one of the MNSTC-I’s two subordinate commands. Their main mission was to train and equip the Iraqi Army. “CMATT was essentially the Institutional side of the
American Advisory effort supporting the Iraqi Army, serving in a smaller but similar role for the Iraqi Army. . . .

108th CMATT soldiers were stationed throughout the country. That ranged northward to Zakho, near Syria and Turkey, and southward toward Az Zubayr, near the Kuwaiti border.

Living conditions varied. Some of the soldiers were embedded with the Iraqis, living on isolated far distant bases. Others worked on sizeable combined coalition-Iraqi bases. They had improved facilities and good transportation. And some lived and worked in Baghdad’s Green Zone.334

The 351st Military Police Company of Ocala, Florida, reacts to sniper fire while on a mounted security patrol during mock battles at the Joint Readiness Training Center. (Army Reserve Magazine, Summer 2001)
U.S. Army personnel did the majority of the training while mentoring their counterparts. According to Sergeant Rodney Guinyard, one of the instructor-advisers with the unit at Camp Taji, by 2007 “we’ve gone from standing right over them and telling them what to do, to standing way off to the side and just observing as they conduct all the training. . . . We have a good professional working relationship with the Iraqis.” Training included drill and ceremony, rifle marksmanship, first aid, movement training, and searching and clearing buildings. The 2007 camp had twenty-two advanced courses, ranging from computer training to vehicle and weapon repair, with a capacity for 1,000 students. By 2007, Camp Taji graduated 8,010 commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers.

In 2003, Helmly began a yearlong Army Reserve leadership campaign plan. He set 2004 as The Year of the Leader in the Army Reserve. The plan was Helmly’s “vision and strategy to change the leadership culture.” The plan instituted new methods to train leaders. Among them was the Company Team Leader Development course for company commanders, first sergeants, and unit assistors. Leader development guides for officers and noncommissioned officers stressing leadership instead of a career were part of the campaign plan.

Other features of the plan were a mentorship program and a Senior Leader Training program. The latter program concentrated on entrenching the intellectual proficiency senior leaders require to effect change in the Army Reserve. All general-officer level commands and the Army Reserve staff participated in this part of the program.

The Army Reserve instituted concrete standards to use when selecting leaders. For example, the Army’s transformation of the Officer Education System affected the Army Reserve at a number of professional military education levels. Introduced was an Army Reserve combat leadership validation program and systems to perform command climate assessments. Part of the campaign was to enroll more officers in the Army’s leadership institutions, such as the Army War College.

In 2004, the Army abolished the Combined Arms and Services Staff School. The reserve components were able to convince the Department of the Army that the officers needed the school. The Army Reserve developed the sixteen-day Combined Arms Exercise course conducted in one active duty training period. In July 2005, the 98th Training Division (Institutional Training) completed the Army Reserve’s pilot of the Intermediate Level Education-Common Core course. In 2005, twenty-five Army Reserve officers attended the resident
Army War College. Three officers attended the National Management Course at Syracuse University. In 2005, five Reserve Component-Captains Career courses were operational. The leadership campaign initiated an Army Reserve combat validation program together with systems for command climate assessments. Army Reserve training guidance was recognized for its leadership, warrior tasks, and readiness. The Noncommissioned Officer Education System was the key to developing and preparing those soldiers for leadership roles.338

Overseas deployment training continued to be a vital training resource. In 2000, 3,734 Army Reserve soldiers participated in overseas deployment training; 22,057 participated in exercises. The number of soldiers receiving overseas deployment training rose to 7,488 in 2001 with another 15,004 participating in exercises. By 2006, 9,932 soldiers participated in overseas deployment training in thirty-five countries. The numbers fell to 6,325 soldiers in forty-six countries for 2010.339

Among the exercises was ROVING SANDS, a ten-day exercise in 2000 involving more than 18,000 U.S. and multi-national participants. TRANSLOTS (Transportation Logistics Over the Shore) was a multi-component, multi-service transportation operation conducted in the area around Fort Eustis and Fort Story. More than 2,000 soldiers from forty-six units participated in the exercise. The lead unit for the exercise was the 143d Transportation Command. The 143d Transportation Command from Orlando, Florida, mobilized and deployed to Virginia with war trace units to conduct a tough transportation mission: a bare breach, joint-over-the-shore operation. This operation gave Army Reserve soldiers and active duty soldiers a chance to work together along with the Navy. The operation replicated what would happen in wartime when a port was damaged, closed, or incapable of handling large ships. In this operation, supplies, equipment, and troops could be transported from the larger ships ashore by smaller boats, which could more easily access landing areas.340

The Army Reserve conducted BRIDGEX (Bridge Exercise) in July 2000 at Fort Chaffee, Arizona. The sponsor was the 90th Regional Support Command’s 420th Engineer Brigade. The command’s 493d Engineer Group (Combat) acted as the crossing force engineer with active component, National Guard, and Army Reserve engineer units participating. BRIDGEX was a river crossing field-training exercise focusing on ribbon bridge launching, bridge boat operator training, rafting operations, bridge completion, bridge anchorage, and bridge recovery. Eight units and 1,103 soldiers participated.341

The 335th Theater Signal Command was the USARC action agent in planning and operating a theater-level communications network in the U.S. Army Signal
Command’s GRECIAN FIREBOLT exercise held in 2000. Active and reserve component signal units participated in this worldwide exercise at various continental U.S. locations and in southwest Asia. GRECIAN FIREBOLT provided communications support and connectivity between active and reserve component exercise sites. Thirteen units and 1,542 soldiers participated.342

In 2001, the Army Reserve continued to support exercises, operations, and training worldwide. Among them were BRIGHT STAR, NEW HORIZONES, ROVING SANDS 2001, Operation DANGEROUS WIND 2001, and CONSEQUENCE ISLAND 2001. The latter two were weapons of mass destruction exercises that occurred before September 11. From February 12 through May 20, 2007, thousands of Army Reserve soldiers deployed in seven rotations of two-week increments to conduct engineer and medical support training missions at selected sites in Bocas del Toro Province, Panama, as part of NUEVOS HORIZONTES 2007. The Army Reserve’s participation in these and other exercises and operations demonstrated its relevance and that it no longer was a for-emergency-only organization but rather a vital partner in the Army.343

Specialist Zachary Ritter, from the 362nd Psychological Operations Company in Fayetteville, Arkansas, speaks with actors during a pre-deployment training exercise at Fort Dix, New Jersey. PSYOP instructors from the 1st Training Brigade, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operation Command (Airborne), conducted the exercise. (Staff Sergeant Sharilyn Wells)
Equipment

The Army Reserve continued to coordinate equipment requirements with the Department of the Army, deputy chief of staff, G8, and the Army Materiel Command. Army Reserve priorities mandated equipment distribution, new equipment fielding, cascading of excess equipment, and resetting of equipment. The Army Reserve based these priorities on a unit’s position in ARFORGEN. The Army Reserve Materiel Core Enterprise staff could use its judgment to re-
Sleeping Mechanic, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
move equipment from units to foster training or transfer it to other top priority units to meet readiness aim points.\textsuperscript{344}

In 2001, National Guard and reserve equipment shortages included 19.2 percent for the Army National Guard; 22.6 percent for the Army Reserve; 2.5 percent for the Naval Reserve; 0.7 percent for the Marine Corps Reserve; 0.7 percent for the Air National Guard; and 0.4 percent for the Air Force Reserve.\textsuperscript{345}
December 2004 found the Army Reserve with 76 percent of its required equipment on hand. By 2010, the Army Reserve had 90 percent of its required equipment on hand. Sixty-five percent of the on hand equipment was classified as modernized. For example, while the Army Reserve in 2010 had 75 to 78 percent of the required HUMVEEs on hand, only 13 percent were modernized. Less than 49 percent of the truck fleet was modernized. The Army Reserve projected modernization to increase to 68 percent by October 2012.

The Army Reserve, however, remained short in several areas of crucial equipment. Some 35 percent of required equipment lines were at less than 65 percent on hand. These shortages included tactical communications networks (satellite and terrestrial), command and control systems, and night vision systems. The Army Reserve met current deployment requirements by relying on significant internal cross-leveling and theater provided equipment. Cross-leveling created turbulence and an unsustainable level of friction where a crucial amount of equipment was not immediately available since the equipment was in transit, undergoing maintenance or awaiting deployment. Also, some equipment was already deployed. In fact, between 2001 and 2005, the Army Reserve had to transfer 205,000 pieces of equipment to fill shortages of deploying units. The Army Reserve did maintain its equipment at or beyond the Army standard of 90 percent fully mission capable. That guaranteed obtainable equipment for training and mobilization supporting the operational force within ARFORGEN.

Congressional plus ups and NGREA appropriations helped fill gaps between current unit shortages and Army planned procurement. NGREA funding averaged $112 million per year for 2006 to 2010.

Problems in modernization and equipment on hand stemmed in part from the Cold War strategic reserve policy. This policy categorized combat support and combat service support units as echelon above division or echelon above corps units that operated in the rear. The Army Reserve was challenged by not being originally designed or equipped for prolonged operational capacity, functioning in a combat forward environment. It was not equipped, for example, with the night-vision gear, .50-caliber machine guns, and command and control capability that front line forces were provided. In the post-Cold War era, equipment needs changed along with the battlefield. On today’s nonlinear, asymmetrical
battleground, the rear no longer exists. All soldiers must expect and be prepared to engage the enemy and defend themselves at all times. Army Reserve units spanned the entire spectrum on the battlefield.

Strategic stationing was an essential aspect of Army Reserve transformation. In 2001, that meant the re-introduction of a medium-lift helicopter capability within the Army Reserve, which put Army Reserve aviation on point in the Army Reserve’s transformation. In the fiscal year 2001, National Defense Authorization Act, Congress appropriated over $78 million for eight UH-60L Black Hawk helicopters for the Army Reserve.\(^{353}\) In December 2001, the Army Reserve took delivery of six new UH-60L aircraft. This marked the first return of utility helicopters to the Army Reserve since execution of the 1993 Off-Site Agreement which transferred all rotary wing utility assets to the National Guard.\(^{354}\)

In 2001, the Army Reserve had 100 percent of the fixed-wing theater aviation battalions, 100 percent of all continental United States based theater aviation companies, 63 percent of all fixed-wing theater aviation companies worldwide, and 50 percent of the Army’s theater aviation brigades. It also had 50 percent of the theater and corps heavy helicopter battalions and 50 percent of the theater and corps heavy helicopter companies.\(^{355}\)

On September 7, 2001, the Army announced a major acceleration of the aviation modernization plan, a critical part of Army transformation. The acceleration advanced the retirement of aging aircraft and lowered the number of helicopters in the active Army and reserves by 1,000. According to Plewes, “Aviation modernization is a good news story for the Army Reserve. It brings us...
Drivers, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
the medium-lift capabilities of UH-60 Black Hawk companies, enabling us to more effectively support Army missions, and it also modernizes our Chinooks and Apaches.356 By 2008, Army Reserve aviation modernization continued along two lines: modernization of the utility fleet through a combination of new and recapitalized aircraft and the modernization of the cargo and attack fleet through the cascade of modernized aircraft as the active component fielded new aircraft. By 2010, the Army Reserve had more than 198 rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft, supporting full spectrum operations.357

Four principle aviation systems were partially or fully resourced in 2008, filling critical equipment gaps in new or existing aviation force structure. The Department of the Army’s G-8 coordinated and approved the complete unit set fielding of two Army Reserve air ambulance companies with twelve new UH-60M each, totaling twenty-four UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters in 2010 and 2011 ($451.2 million). The Army Reserve resourced an air traffic control simulation system ($1.5 million) through the 2008 NGREA to meet critical training and readiness requirements. The Army Reserve resourced the initial procurement of five C-12 aircraft ($43.4 million) to replace ten TF ODIN aircraft through the fiscal year NGREA. The procurement of the remaining five aircraft was worked in the fiscal year 2009 NGREA.358

The Army Reserve endeavored to fulfill ARFORGEN requirements while balancing equipment and logistics constraints. That required having the right equipment available in the right place at the right time and having adequate resources. The train-alert-deploy strategy under ARFORGEN and the twelve month mobilization policy required higher levels of equipment use to meet
training and readiness objectives for an operational Army Reserve. Assisting in the location of those resources were the thirty-one equipment concentration sites (ESCs). These were established in the 1970s to help unit commanders store equipment. The Army Reserve has thirty-one ECSs across the United States including Puerto Rico and Guam. A total of 2,004 employees store some 164,353 pieces of unit equipment of 4.5 million pieces of equipment that the Army Reserve has on its books.359

Largely in response to ARFORGEN, AREF, and the Army Reserve training strategy, the Army Reserve developed a new equipment and training strategy, replacing the ARLOG XXI (Army Reserve Logistics for the Twenty-First Century) program, which had served as a readiness enabler for the USARC roadmap to support the expeditionary force. The new strategy included maintaining equipment at four main areas: individual training sites, home station, collective training sites, and strategic deployment sites. The Army Reserve positioned go-to-war equipment at the various sites to provide training to soldiers as

The largest Army Reserve aviation brigade, the 244th Aviation Brigade, gears up to deploy troops and equipment to Haiti. The UH-60 Blackhawk, a four-bladed, twin-engine, medium-lift utility helicopter, is designed for air assault, air cavalry, and aeromedical evacuation. (U.S. Army photo Sergeant Major James Peter Matthews)
they went through ARFORGEN/AREF. In the new strategy, units moved to the equipment located at the training sites instead of moving equipment to the units. Creating these centrally located sites fostered efficient resourcing and maintenance of equipment.\textsuperscript{360} The Army Reserve optimized the distribution of its most modern equipment to maximize the training opportunities for its soldiers and units while resetting its units for missions.\textsuperscript{361}

The lack of depot maintenance was one of the Army Reserve’s major challenges. The Army Reserve’s 2000 depot maintenance program was funded at 80 percent of the force packages (FP I and II) requirements and 60 percent of the remaining force package requirement.\textsuperscript{362} In 2000, the Army Reserve depot maintenance program was funded at acceptable levels for early-deploying units, less trucks. The Army Reserve’s main concern was providing more funding to late-deploying units and maintaining the tactical wheeled vehicle (truck) fleet. Unit readiness, while low in some late-deploying units, was being maintained at efficient levels through equipment redistribution and funding change implementation during program execution.\textsuperscript{363}
Armor on the hunt, Sergeant First Class Darrold Peters. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
Out of Commission, Heather Engelhart. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
Program Budget Decision 813, dated June 22, 2001, adjusted the Army Reserve 2002 depot maintenance program by adding $18.3 million in total obligation authority. This was a Department of Defense initiative to meet optimal depot maintenance funding requirements not later than 2004. The depot maintenance program supported the repair and overhaul of major equipment end items and their return to service for the combat forces. Major changes in the program included performing complete overhauls on end items rather than

Sergeant First Class Gordon, psychological operations specialist with the 346th Psychological Operations Company, an Army Reserve unit from Columbus, Ohio, rides alongside an Iraqi worker on a forklift used to load 500-pound rolls of high-grade paper onto flatbed trucks for transport to a central clearing area. (Army Reserve Magazine, Winter 2003)
the “inspect and repair only as necessary” policy, overhaul of tactical wheeled vehicles, and recapitalization of key war-fighting legacy systems. The total funding of the depot maintenance program for 2005 equated to 74.8 percent of the validated requirement ($95,618 million) and 85.9 percent of the critical requirement ($83,268 million). The total funding for the 2007 program was almost $129.2 million. Late in that year, $15.2 million was reprogrammed from under-executed, lower priority programs into the depot maintenance program, resulting in a $144.373 million execution rate for the year. Over 4,000 pieces of equipment were overhauled as part of the program. In 2006, the USARC inducted 5,337 major end items and 30,725 items for calibration into depot maintenance. In 2009, the Army Reserve leveraged the depot maintenance program to have 4,300 end items overhauled to extend their service life, reduce sustainment costs, and improve safe operations. The Army Reserve tracked the redeployment and equipment reset of 192 units with 32,052 items and tracked 523 turned-in items to automatic reset induction. The total funding for the 2008 program was $130,033,000. Year end plus-up of $27,543,967 increased the program to $157,576,967. The year 2009 was initially funded at $108,191,000. The Department of the Army reduced the funding to $94,555,000. The Army Reserve received additional funding of $14,549,302 and executed a total depot maintenance program of $109,504,302. Major programs (overhaul-rebuild) included electronic and communications equipment, watercraft, material handling equipment-primary forklifts, and the CH-47D Chinook helicopter rotor head. While the Army Reserve improved equipment levels, upgraded, and modernized equipment, shortfalls continued in 2010 due to legacy funding. An operational Army Reserve can ill afford a six month build up time as seen with a strategic reserve. According to Stultz, although the Army Reserve was able to “meet the needs of our deploying units, looked holistically, the Army Reserve faces monumental equipping challenges.”

Medical Readiness

Medical readiness was another element of an operational Army Reserve; it continued to be a major challenge. But, there was progress in successfully managing the medical readiness of soldiers. Improved medical care of soldiers resulted in improved medical readiness. That rose from 23 percent on October 1, 2008, to 60 percent as of September 23, 2010.

The Reserve Health Readiness Program (RHRP), which replaced the former Federal Strategic Health Alliance (FEDS_HEAL) Program, provided medical and dental readiness services to soldiers and units during soldier readiness processing (SRP). The RHRP network has been leveraged to accomplish most
Keeping them clean, Afghanistan, Sergeant First Class Darrold Peters. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
routine and pre-mobilization readiness tasks and in completing dental restorations for deploying soldiers. In the first six months of 2010, the RHRP provided approximately 978,750 individual medical readiness exams and services to Army Reserve soldiers at a cost of some $53,865,275. The total number of services and expenditures was the largest provided in a six month period in the seven-and-one half year history of the program. The significant increase in the number of examinations completed was attributed to several major factors including but not limited to: Department of Defense mandated replacement of the five-year periodic physical examination with an annual periodic health assessment; the Army Selected Reserve Dental Treatment Program and command emphasis on seasonal flu, H1N1 flu vaccinations and overall medical readiness on the whole; and to command emphasis placed on medical readiness by the command leadership. As a result of this increase in examinations completed, the Army Reserve recognized an improvement in six of the eight individual medical readiness requirements (DNA, HIV, immunization, dental readiness, limited duty profile, and PHA), a decrease in one of eight requirements (medically non-deployable) and no statistical change in one of eight requirements (pregnancy). The overall medical readiness classification percentage increased by 10 percent.
As an operational force, the manpower loss related to influenza complications can negatively impact the Army Reserve’s ability to meet mission requirements. Seasonal influenza vaccination was the primary method for protecting the force from influenza infection and its severe complications. As a result, the Department of Defense and the vice chief of staff of the Army required 100 percent seasonal flu vaccination compliance by no later than 1 December 2009. In 2010, the Army Reserve achieved a seasonal flu vaccination rate of 78 percent, the highest vaccination rate ever.  

Major Valerie Godfrey, an Army Reserve dentist, administers a dental exam to a soldier during the 2011 Combat Support Training Exercise, as dental technician Specialist Ashley Bill looks on and records. (Sergeant Crystal Milton)
The H1N1 influenza posed a similar risk to medical readiness. The Department of Defense and the vice chief of staff of the Army required 100 percent seasonal flu vaccination compliance no later than 1 April 2010. In 2010, the Army Reserve achieved a 79 percent compliance rate for H1N1.\textsuperscript{375}
The Army Select Reserve Dental Readiness System (ASDRS) was a successful initiative in the health care arena. Historically, Army Reserve soldiers have reported to the mobilization platform at a dental readiness stature of some 50 percent. Dental deficiencies have prevented soldiers from deploying and receiving adequate mandatory pre-mobilization training. Dental readiness was the single constant factor that has lagged among all fully medical ready determinants. Dental treatment at the mobilization station averaged over 11.5 duty hours and caused less than optimal treatment options for many deploying soldiers. In 2010, overall mobilization dental readiness improved to over 74.1 percent.

The Army Reserve, National Guard Bureau, active component, and the Office of the Surgeon General developed a three-pronged attack to address reserve...
component dental readiness deficiencies. The Army Select Reserve Dental Readiness System was implemented on October 1, 2008. It provided dental class three and class four examinations to soldiers regardless of their unit’s rotation within ARFORGEN. That system combined with the First Term Dental Readiness (FTDR) program, already in place, and the addition of the Mobilization Dental Reset (DDR) initiative on November 16, 2008, will improve readiness. The Army Reserve should no longer lag behind the other services with 52.5 percent dental readiness.379

Soldiers were scheduled to receive care through the RHRP, the major component of the three pronged plan to increase dental readiness. Demobilization Dental Reset, the last part of the attack, reset all demobilizing soldiers. Soldiers were examined and those identified as class three were to receive care to convert to a readiness status.380 In the last six months of 2009, dental readiness increased from approximately 58 percent to 65 percent. The Army Reserve continued to take great strides in bringing awareness to the ASDRS program and benefits available to soldiers through several different initiatives, including for example an Army Reserve dental webpage and newsletter.381

In 2006, the Post Deployment Health Reassessment program (PDHRA), under the guidance of the assistant secretary of defense for health affairs (OSD-HA), began. The program provided education, screening, assessment, and an opportunity to access information for a variety of questions and concerns soldiers may have after returning from deployment. The program enabled soldiers to address their deployment-related health concerns with a health care professional. By completing a questionnaire during the three to six month time period after returning from deployment, soldiers had a chance to report mental and physical health concerns that had occurred or worsened since their return home. This “cooling off” period allowed soldiers to reintegrate into their daily lives and then determine the affects of their deployment. The Army Reserve identified several areas for improvement resulting in steady numbers of PDHRA screenings and improved program operations. PDHRA was available to all soldiers returning from deployments or mobilization since September 11, 2001.382

As of December 31, 2009, 54,553 soldiers required mandatory participation and 51,634 soldiers had been screened. This was 95 percent compliance. Of the soldiers who had completed the PDHRA, 30 percent had been referred for further behavioral health evaluation and 57 percent had been referred for further physical health evaluation. The Army Reserve continued to work closely with Army G-1 to ensure the success of this program by identifying and contacting eligible soldiers and their commanders. The Army Reserve PDHRA
compliance sustained the standards of the vice chief of staff of the Army and continued to meet all requirements.381

The Army Reserve was the last remaining Army component using paper based medical and dental records, which impacted on unit readiness. The Army Reserve pursued a digitized medical record system known as the Health Readiness Record (HRR), a web-based medical record repository and an application of the Medical Operational Data System. Access to HRR was role restricted, ensuring protected health information was accessible to authorized personnel, only. HHR implementation began at the end of fiscal year 2009 and was expected to be fully operational across the Army Reserve no later than October 2011.

Specialist Andrea Gonzalez, a dental technician with the 7223d Medical Support Unit, New Orleans, Louisiana, prepares instruments in the dental clinic during the Task Force Razorback Arkansas Medical Innovative Readiness Training health screening clinic in Marianna, Arkansas. (Timothy Hale)
335th Signal Command was the first command to begin implementing the process.\(^{384}\) The process has involved over 200,000 Army Reserve soldiers.\(^{385}\)

The Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application (AHLTA), a military electronic health record system, gave healthcare providers access to data about soldiers’ conditions, prescriptions, diagnostic tests, and additional information essential to providing quality care. The Army Reserve received an AHLTA trainer in November 2009 and the first AHLTA training class was held on December 16, 2009.\(^{386}\) Remote access to AHLTA was established for the Army Reserve in January 2010. The system was implemented by utilizing a central server with users accessing AHLTA via Citrix. Remote access promoted continuity of care for soldiers, maximized unit and medical readiness, reduced

![Image of Specialist Ga Li with the 5502d working in the pharmacy.](U.S. Army Reserve photo by Captain Michael Condon, Central Medical Area Readiness Support Group, Army Reserve Medical Command Public Affairs)
cost by eliminating duplication of tests and examinations, and improved access to care and benefits for wounded warriors.  

Military Support to Civil Authorities and Homeland Defense

The Army Reserve continued its support to civil authorities and provided homeland defense. By 2002, twenty-five Army Reserve chemical units had been cross-trained and equipped to execute domestic casualty decontamination. Three chemical reconnaissance units were trained and equipped to perform nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance in domestic incidents. Providing federal first response capabilities for domestic operations was one of the chief, Army Reserve’s primary intentions. As a case in point, in 2005 the Army Reserve sent two truck companies and five CH-47 Chinook helicopters and their soldiers to hurricane Katrina relief efforts and ten CH 47s to aid victims of hurricane Rita’s devastation. Army Reserve aviators transported over 2,100 people and more than 5,200 tons of cargo. The Army Reserve provided two military history detachments to document the operations. The ground support units tasked for relief efforts were reportedly the first unit sized elements ever provided to a Continental United States based disaster relief effort. Six units totaling 360 soldiers supported the relief efforts. Army Reserve soldiers, such as those from the 5-159th Aviation Battalion, participated in the hurricane
relief efforts for example by rescuing victims, transporting two million sandbags to rebuild levies, lifting equipment, and transporting food and supplies to victims. Forty-nine emergency preparedness liaison officers deployed for a total of 532 man-days. Accountability of Army Reserve soldiers, civilians, and their families was another crucial aspect of the relief efforts. Responding to the tragedy, Helmly remarked, “The courage and determination of our Soldiers cannot be washed away by floodwaters or blown away by hurricane winds.”

“The courage and determination of our Soldiers cannot be washed away by floodwaters or blown away by hurricane winds.”
Lieutenant General James R. Helmly

In 2000, elements of the 322d Civil Affairs Brigade deployed to East Timor to support a United Nations humanitarian operation. A new unit, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Support unit, coordinated the replacement of military heavy-lift helicopters with civilian contract aircraft to transport refugees and to distribute food, water, and fuel. Soldiers from the unit executed a $10 million contract with a civilian helicopter firm. That released U.S. Marine helicopters and U.S. Navy ships for other missions.

As part of the general plans in preparation for the 2006 hurricane season, the Army Reserve coordinated efforts with regional readiness commands and units in fifteen states. In March 2006, the Army Reserve created regional and state hurricane task forces to prepare equipment and soldiers for hurricane support operations. The Army Reserve positioned over 1,996 pieces of equipment along the eastern seaboard and the Gulf Coast. Testifying before the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Stultz said, “The Army Reserve’s ability to position capabilities, without regard to state borders, and provide neighborhood-based support directly to our communities, states, and federal agencies ensures our commitment to our homeland endures, even as we continue to support operations throughout the world.”

In preparation for the 2007 hurricane season, in April 2007 the Department of the Army directed specific equipment actions to mitigate Army National Guard shortages within the states of Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and U.S. Territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
On October 22, 2007, the combat support training center at Camp Parks and Fort Hunter Liggett, California, received a request to deploy firefighters and equipment in support of the southern California wildfires. Through mutual aid agreements with the California Office of Emergency Services, Camp Parks and Fort Hunter Liggett sent eight firefighters and three pieces of equipment to support various wildfires in the area.396

In February 2010, the 377th Theater Sustainment Command quickly deployed 170 soldiers to Haiti to assume command of the Joint Logistics Command-Haiti
as part of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE to assist that country in hurricane relief operations. The transfer of authority from the 3d Expeditionary Sustainment Command of Fort Knox, Kentucky, to the 377th Theater Sustainment Command became effective March 6. It took place after a one-week transition period coordinated by both organizations at a Logistical Support Area in Port-Au-Prince, Haiti. Major General Luis Visot, commanding general of the 377th Theater Sustainment Command, an Army Reserve unit headquartered in Belle Chasse, Louisiana, worked with the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and non-governmental agencies to help restore Haiti to a pre-earthquake condition. “In addition to bringing their military experience and training to Haiti, many of our Soldiers also bring the heart-felt compassion and empathy of ones who have been affected by a natural disaster. They have experienced this pain and want to help alleviate it for the people of Haiti,” Major General Visot said. “It is that kind of experience and perseverance that makes them perfect candidates for the job.” Assuming the mission, the 377th...
Theater Sustainment Command built on the foundation laid by the 3d Expeditionary Sustainment Command. The command staffed and operated the Joint Logistics Command headquarters, managed the acquisition, transportation and distribution of supplies and commodities, and moved units out of Haiti when their missions were accomplished. The 377th Theater Sustainment Command also provided sustainment to service members.398

The Army Reserve provided a total of thirty specially trained units as part of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive consequence management response force and provided 156 state and regional emergency preparedness liaison officers to support USNORTHCOM/USPACOM in homeland security and defense support of civil authority operations.399

In 2007, twenty-six chemical companies with specialized equipment were on the ready to execute mass causality decontamination and respond to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazardous materials (HAZMAT).
The Army Reserve offered support to the 20th Support Command in its efforts to thwart CBRN. The Army Reserve supported the Special Operations Command in countering terrorism. First Army requested assistance to train and validate the training for the 704th Chemical Company prior to its deployment for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The 392d Chemical Company provided HAZMAT operations training. On January 20, 2007, the USARC’s G-3 Homeland Defense Division conducted a site visit to the 392d Chemical Company in Iraq to review and assess HAZMAT detection and sampling capabilities in theater. A recommendation stemming from this visit was that the Army Reserve and First Army combine interests and identify 392d Chemical Company Army Reserve soldiers willing to volunteer for tours of duty to provide pre-mobilization training to the next Army Reserve chemical units in the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM HAZMAT rotation.

In March 2010, heavy rains and storms hit the Northeastern United States. The Army Reserve responded by deploying members of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) program to support flooding operations.
On May 2, 2010, EPLOs mobilized to support the defense coordinating officer in FEMA Region VI for the Deep Water Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The Army Reserve provided EPLOs for multiple operational periods over the four-month operation to cap the well and reduce the environmental impact. Army Reserve EPLOs mobilized again in the month of August 2010 to assist federal, state, and local agencies during Hurricane Earl, which affected many states along the east coast and caused damage in Massachusetts, Vermont, and Maine.

Calendar year 2010 ended with a major incident which directly affected the Army Reserve. A tornado outbreak on New Year’s Eve in Missouri caused major damage to equipment concentration site 66, located on Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The 88th Regional Support Command managed the recovery operations at the site to include security of sensitive items, assessment of facility and equipment damage, planning and executing movement of operational equipment to other locations, and developing a plan to document destroyed equipment. Members of the 995th Engineer Company volunteered to conduct security operations at the site during recovery operations until fence repairs were completed. Many staff sections from the USARC provided direct support to the 88th Regional Support Command throughout the response and recovery operations.401

**Soldier and Family Well Being**

The Army’s culture evolved with the shift to an expeditionary force, especially regarding family life. In March 2005, Secretary of the Army Harvey said the “well-being of soldiers and their families was his number one priority.”402 Two years later in September 2007, General Casey stressed its importance as part of his strategic imperative on sustaining the force when he testified before the
House Armed Services Committee: “We recognize the strain on Families, and we are aware that Families play an important role in maintaining the readiness of our all-volunteer force. We will, therefore, ensure that their quality of life is commensurate with their quality of service. We will also ensure that our Wounded Warriors are cared for and reintegrated into the Army and society and we will never forget our moral obligation to the spouses, children and Families who have lost their Soldier since September 11th.” He further stated when addressing the need to reset units: “we must also revitalize our Soldiers and Families by providing them time and opportunity to recover in order to reverse the cumulative effects of sustained high operational tempo.” In November 2009, McHugh stated, “Our mission – No. 1- must be to ensure that our Soldiers and their families are provided a quality of life that is equal to their extraordinary sacrifices.” In short, the Army recognized that the well-being of families was critical to the well-being and readiness of soldiers.

This extended to the Army Reserve. According to Stultz, “We need to re-dedicate ourselves to acknowledge the sacrifice and commitment of families and employers. Our military is an all volunteer force that needs a stronger connection with ‘home town America and our ‘Army Reserve Communities’ are critical nodes in that support network.”

“Providing adequate, continuous health care was vital to the well-being of soldiers and their families. Multiple deployments were causing trouble with the Army’s TRICARE coverage. Providing continuous health care was of concern, for example, in treating post traumatic stress syndrome and traumatic brain injuries that may take months to surface and was complicated when the soldier and family moved out of the TRICARE system. The goal was to provide seamless heath care. A more holistic approach was needed. Among the available heath care benefits was one affecting soldiers on active duty service for thirty consecutive days after which they and their families were entitled to comprehensive health care. As of October 1, 2007, Selected Reserve (SELRES) soldiers became eligible for TRICARE health coverage. TRICARE was especially useful to Army Reserve families, given their greater geographical dispersal.”

“We must understand that we’re asking more of our Soldiers today, and we must ensure that the quality of life our Soldiers and their families enjoy matches the quality of service they give the nation.”

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr.
Another development in health care was passage in 2007 of the Wounded Warrior Assistance Act, a part of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. It provided better care and benefits for wounded soldiers and their families and helped the transition of new veterans to civilian life. Section 114 authorized reserve soldiers the option of using medical care facilities closest to home rather than closest to the base from which the soldier deployed.\textsuperscript{408}

Another example of the commitment to the well-being of soldiers was the Army Reserve Warrior and Family Assistance Center. Stultz directed support to Army Reserve “wounded warriors” -- those soldiers (warriors in transition) requiring medical care resulting from military service and others requesting information on existing services. The center, established in October 2007, was the proponent. It enabled subordinate commands to render direct support to soldiers and ensure an accurate and timely relay of information through the Army Reserve chain of command and the families of soldiers in need. The center's slogan, “Soldiers first, Families always,” epitomized its mission and purpose.\textsuperscript{409}

The center’s staff had as their most immediate mission to contact Army Reserve soldiers who were assigned to warrior transition units (designed to improve support to those soldiers and approved by the Department of the Army in Oc-
tober 2007), community-based health care organizations, and Veterans Administration poly-trauma centers. The center assigned a reserve soldier to serve as a caseworker for each wounded soldier.

In addition to medical issues, the center provided assistance on a variety of other issues, such as finance, education, housing, administrative, and pastoral concerns. In essence, the Warrior and Family Assistance Center provided responsive, flexible, and adaptable support to the war fighter, their families, and units.

Another family service was the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration program. The Yellow Ribbon Reintegration program was a national combat veteran reintegration program to provide information, services, referral, and proactive outreach programs to soldiers and their families throughout the deployment cycle. The goal of the program, legislated in Section 582 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, was to prepare soldiers and families for mobilization, sustain families during mobilization, and reintegrate soldiers with their families and community upon redeployment, leading to self-sufficient and resilient soldiers and families. Commanders provided soldiers preparing for deployment of ninety days or more and family members the opportunity to attend a day-long event after alert and again at pre-mobilization. Additional re-
requirements included one-day activities for family members twice during the mobilization, two-day reintegration activities for soldiers and their families at thirty and sixty days after redeployment or release from active duty (REFRAD), and a two-day event for soldiers ninety days after deployment or REFRAD. In 2009, the Army Reserve conducted over 250 Yellow Ribbon events, serving some 12,000 redeploying soldiers and 12,000 family members. That number rose in fiscal year 2010 to 525 Yellow Ribbon events serving 26,000 soldiers and 28,000 family members.

Family life chaplains oversaw the successful Strong Bonds program. Congress approved resources for the program. During 2010, the Army Reserve conducted over 300 Strong Bonds events throughout the United States and its territories. Some 12,500 soldiers and family members participated in these events and received the training, enhancing soldier and family communications and relationship skills.

The Family Programs Virtual Installation/Army Strong Community Center (ASCC) venture was a significant new initiative created to fill gaps in services. Virtual installations brought the services and resources found only on active military installations to geographically dispersed military families of all branch-
Couples at a Strong Bonds event. (USARC Chaplain’s Office)

Laura Stultz, (in pink) wife of Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr., cuts the ceremonial ribbon during the grand opening of the Army Reserve’s second Army Strong Community Center located in Brevard, North Carolina on May 15, 2010. (Sergeant First Class Mark Bell)
es of the armed service. The concept, first initiated in 2007 by Mrs. Laura Stultz, became a reality in September 2009 with the official opening of the first center at the Wadsworth Army Reserve Center in Rochester, New York.414

On May 15, 2010, the Army Reserve opened a second Army Strong Community Center at Brevard, North Carolina. Speaking at the grand opening, Lieutenant General Stultz remarked, “Thank you for hosting us in God’s country. I’m glad to be here to celebrate what America is really about. For me, at least, it brings you back home to places like Brevard, N.C., and to see really what the strength of America is.”415 Located more than 160 miles from Fort Jackson, South Carolina, and more than 250 miles from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Brevard was selected because of its remote location from a major military installation. As Lieutenant General Stultz explained, “If you build it, they will come,” quoting from a famous line from the movie “Field of Dreams.”416

The general credited his wife, Laura, for the community center concept. She said she remembers not being able to attend numerous family readiness group meetings because of the distance to travel and her life as a temporary single
mom. “I knew there was something missing,” she said. “I didn’t feel connected.”

All that changed, she claimed, when her husband was sworn in as Army Reserve chief in May 2006. “I said, ‘This is it. This is my chance,’” she stated about helping families left behind while their spouses deploy overseas. “I wanted to bring a military installation to the communities.”

Mrs. Stultz said she was happy to assist in the opening of the Army Reserve’s second center and hopes there will be many more in the future. She envisions local communities coming together with area military residents to help those in need. “I have every confidence that the people of North Carolina will step up and support their local military families,” she said.

A third center opened in the Technical Sergeant McGarity U. S. Army Reserve Center in Coraopolis, Pennsylvania, on September 18, 2010. The centers offered “hands-on problem resolution and follow-up for a myriad of concerns ranging from military benefits and entitlements to community resources.” Since September 2009, the centers served some 31,689 contacts and people.
On August 1, 2002, the USARC established the Individual Ready Reserve/Individual Mobilization Augmentee Family Program Office. It was responsible for providing information on benefits, entitlements, resources, and referrals to the families of IRR/IMA soldiers. Later, services were extended to the families of the USARC Augmentation Unit. This was in answer to the specialized assistance and communication needs of these families. By 2005, the office had distributed over 10,000 mobilization packets.425

In July 2004, the Army Reserve G-1 implemented and sponsored a training program for Rear Detachment Operations. In that year, over 400 Rear Detachment Operations personnel received training on deployment, redeployment, family support, reunion, information referral, TRICARE/Dental, role of the chaplain, benefits, and other significant areas. “The intended end-state of RDO [Rear Detachment Operations] and family readiness is to develop and sustain Soldiers and have self-reliant families that understand and use Army and volunteer support programs during times of separation.”426

In the realm of educational benefits, the Army Reserve Voluntary Education Services program was of particular importance to the chief, Army Reserve. This

U.S. Congressman Tim Murphy, 18th District of Pennsylvania, explains the importance of the Army Strong Community Center for Pittsburgh during its grand opening at the Technical Sergeant McGarity U.S. Army Reserve Center in Coraopolis, Pennsylvania, on September 18, 2010.

(Sergeant 1st Class Alyn-Michael McLeod)
was a DoD-mandated commanders’ program promoting lifelong opportunities for Selected Reserve soldiers through voluntary education services that enhanced recruiting, retention, and readiness of Army Reserve soldiers. Some major educational programs included the Montgomery GI Bill, the Reserve Educational Assistance program, and the Army/American Council on Education Registry Transcript System.\textsuperscript{427}

The Army Reserve implemented an array of strategies to reduce the rising suicide rate. One such effort was the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program to foster soldier, family, and civilian coping skills. The program aimed to reduce the stigma connected with asking for help. It was available to geographically dispersed soldiers, family members, and civilians. In 2009, the Army Reserve hosted five Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training courses and certified over 120 instructors. As of June 2010, more than 182,000 soldiers had completed stand-down suicide training.\textsuperscript{428}

To honor and recognize those soldiers who have been deployed and returned home, the Army Reserve began the Welcome Home Warrior-Citizen Award program enacted by Congress and signed into law by President Bush in 2004.
The award occurred within ninety days of a soldier’s demobilization. Unit commanders conducted a formal welcome home ceremony. Returning soldiers received an encased American flag, a commemorative coin, a lapel pin for the soldier and spouse, and a welcome home warrior-citizen flag.  

The Army Reserve supported the families of fallen soldiers. By the end of 2010, the Army Reserve had lost 191 warrior citizens in the Global War on Terrorism. One thousand three hundred and sixty-six had been wounded. “We recognize the ultimate sacrifice these Soldiers and their Families have made for the cause of freedom,” remarked Stultz, “and we proudly honor our fallen comrades in ceremonies and personal tributes. By remembering the distinguished service of our fallen,” continued Stultz, “their selfless acts of bravery and leadership in the Army Reserve remains Army Strong.”

The fallen were not only on the battlefield. On November 5, 2009, a soldier brandishing two fire arms entered a soldier processing center at Fort Hood, Texas. He killed thirteen soldiers before being stopped. Among the fallen were five Army Reserve soldiers: Lieutenant Colonel Juanita L. Warman, Major Libardo E. Caraveo, Captain John P. Gaffaney, Captain Russell G. Seager, and Staff Sergeant Amy S. Krueger. Twenty-one of the thirty-seven solders wounded were Army Reserve soldiers.

On November 18, the USARC held a memorial ceremony. Addressing the attendees, Stultz remarked: “Losing fellow Soldiers is among our most difficult of challenges. That is why we are extremely grateful for their lives - for their lives were ones of service to the country, to their community and to their fellow man. . . . Their lives speak to the strength and dignity of all who serve.”
Employer Partnership Program

What did employers think of their reserve duty employees? According to a survey of employers conducted by the Department of Defense between October 1999 and January 2000, most American employers had a favorable attitude toward their employees who served in the National Guard and Army Reserve. Only 6 percent of all businesses in the country employed reserve component members; those employers were generally indifferent to the reserve status of their job applicants. Although 90 percent of those interviewed thought that their reservist-employees kept them sufficiently informed about their military obligations, the survey found that the higher the employee’s level of military participation, the more likely the employer was to report not having received adequate notice. Overall, a majority of employers indicated that absences due to military obligations were too long. Almost one-half thought that absences over fourteen days caused problems, while 80 percent were affected by absences of
more than thirty days. The impact was greater on small businesses, especially in the increased workload on co-workers. Only 45 percent were supportive of employees who volunteered for additional duty, training, or professional development. More than one-third thought that increased reliance on the National Guard and Army Reserve would cause problems in the workplace in the future. When problems did happen, respondents reported that 70 percent of the time the problems were resolved between the employee and the employer without reference to outside employer-employee support mechanisms. But, 44 percent of the larger companies in the survey reported having contacted reserve commanders to resolve a problem. Large companies were much more likely to choose this approach than smaller companies. Eighteen percent of companies that employed reservists indicated having a preference for recruiting and hiring members who served in the National Guard and the Army Reserve. It appeared that it made little difference whether or not those firms had experienced problems regarding reserve service.  

At a ceremony held at the headquarters of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on June 8, 1998, the secretary of defense, the president/CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve national chair signed a statement of support for employee participation in the National Guard and Army Reserve. By the close of fiscal year 2000, 1,070 chambers, representing about 520,000 members had signed statements of support.  

In 2000, the Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) joined in a commitment with the Society for Human Resources, representing 88,000 businesses, to strengthen a long-standing partnership aimed at providing employers and employees with information regarding their rights and responsibilities under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. The Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve became a formal block of instruction at the Army Reserve’s retention noncommissioned officer course.  

Under the leadership of the ESGR national chair and executive director, in 2000 a strategic approach was evolved to manage and minimize the impact on employers of the increased OPTEMPO for the National Guard and the Army Reserve. That included profiling of employers who employed members of the National Guard and the Army Reserve, developing a database of employers of reserve force members, targeting media and marketing efforts toward affected employers, developing and improving partnerships with employer professional associations, and exploring the possibility for employer compensation to offset the burden for the limited number of employers who employed members of the National Guard and Army Reserve and who were being most impacted by the high OPTEMPO.
The operational Army Reserve presented new challenges to employer-employee relationships. To assist efforts in promoting good employer-employee relations, in 2005 the Army Reserve established the Army Reserve Employer Relations (ARER) program. This was a Department-of-Defense-mandated program. The program was intended to build positive and enduring relationships with employers of Army Reserve soldiers in order to enhance readiness and retention and preserve the strength of the Army Reserve. The program sustained readiness and strength by providing a variety of programs and assistance venues to soldiers and their civilian employers. The programs included employer recognition and awards, mediation and intervention services, employer and community outreach, and training and assistance in the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. These programs assisted commanders and supervisors in managing a shared workforce.

“Employers of Army Reserve Soldiers,” stated Stultz in 2009, “remain a key building block in the foundation that supports our Army Reserve Soldiers.” His 2009 posture statement recognized the significance of employer support and highlighted the Employer Partnership Initiative. It was a joint venture
designed to give business leaders real world benefits for employing and sharing soldiers-employees. It was designed to “build a bridge to employers who benefit . . . from Soldier’s training and skills.” This initiative was especially important given the constant deployment and strain on the work force. It was a win-win situation for employers and Army Reserve soldiers as skills were cross-leveled between the battlefield and the civilian sector. The American Trucking Association and Inova Health Systems of Northern Virginia were the first formal partners to sign agreements on April 14, 2008. In 2009, this initiative was expanded beyond serving only Army Reserve soldiers to serving members in all seven reserve components, family members, wounded warriors, and veterans. The change in name to the Employer Partnership of the Armed Forces in 2010 reflected the change in scope. There were over 1,300 participating employers, which represented 95 percent of the 2010 Forbes Fortune 500 companies. “The partnerships forged with civilians build operational capacity for the Army Reserve and the Reserve components.” The partnership program demonstrated a positive investment in America.

Base Realignment and Closure

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations for the Department of Defense, including the Army Reserve, announced on May 15, 2005, became law on November 8, 2005. The Army used BRAC to “increase operational capacity and war fighting capability and to take advantage of the efficiencies presented through consolidation and joint activities. The BRAC process also facilitated efficient and effective utilization of installation infrastructure.” In 2005, the Army plan was to use BRAC as a chance to “streamline installations, enhancing their value to the military through transformation, rebasing overseas units and supporting joint operations and functions.” Previous BRAC actions concentrated on ridding the Army of surplus Cold War capacity. With the 2005 BRAC, the “Army focused its efforts on returning installations that were no longer relevant or effective in supporting the joint and expeditionary Army. The end result of the strategy was to reduce costs and reinvest those savings in the service’s long-term infrastructure.” BRAC provided the main mechanism and foundation for locating forces on installations and aided quick deployment supporting worldwide requirements against would-be adversaries. The Army’s portion was eighteen billion dollars, 47 percent of the overall Department of Defense BRAC program, three times the total of the four previous BRAC actions. BRAC 2005 was historic in that it supported the “Army’s largest organizational transformation since World War II.” It helped the Army in its “move from brigade-centric to modular forces, thus enabling Soldiers to be more relevant and ready to meet future defense missions.”
Senior Army Reserve soldiers were involved in the two years of preparation prior to its formal release. Responding positively to the actions, Helmly equated the importance of BRAC to the AREF. He saw BRAC as a catalyst for change: “BRAC 2005 provides the Army Reserve an unprecedented opportunity for deep, profound and enduring change. . . . it has been visionary, well developed, and consistent with our transformation goals. Throughout the process, every effort has been made to make transitions smooth for affected personnel and their families. The bottom line is that BRAC will generate a stronger, more responsive Army Reserve, now and into the future.”

“BRAC 2005 provides the Army Reserve an unprecedented opportunity for deep, profound and enduring change. . . .”
Lieutenant General James R. Helmly

Among the changes were stationing Army Reserve soldiers in modern facilities, lowering overhead expenditures, and reforming command and control. “BRAC 2005 delivers the engine to accomplish these changes. . . .” The Army Reserve was to close or realign 176 facilities and move into 125 new armed forces reserve centers. These actions were at a higher percentage rate than any other service. They were to eradicate surplus centers and further the reformation of Army Reserve command and control. These centers were to be equipped with distance learning and video teleconferencing resources, fitness centers, family readiness centers, and improved maintenance and equipment storage facilities.

BRAC will transform some Army Reserve facilities into multi-functional installations that enhance unit readiness, increase training opportunities, and generate operational efficiencies for an operational Army Reserve. These facilities will be able to perform soldier readiness processing and home station mobilization. They will lower the number of second-rate and too small facilities and increase anti-terror force protection of units and personnel. Older reserve centers and changes in the population/demographics have altered where the facilities need to be located. These changes should also support effective recruiting and retention while adding Army Reserve capabilities to assist in homeland security and defense.

Obviously, BRAC was not just about changing brick and mortar. Under BRAC soldiers will be better positioned which will lead to better training, mobilization, and readiness. BRAC proposals were an aspect of the essential groundwork of transforming the Army Reserve’s infrastructure to meet emerging mis-
ions and revised defense strategies. As directed by legislation, stationing plans and force structure were incorporated into the BRAC analysis. BRAC played a significant role in how the force was redesigned. It fostered joint operations, advanced readiness, and effected savings. It was a forcing mechanism for profound change.452

Changes involved streamlining command, control and support structure and reinvesting non-deployable units into deployable units. These changes will be to such a degree not evidenced since World War II. Eighteen general officer table of distribution and allowances headquarters were to be reduced to six. In buttressing that initiative, the Army Reserve decided to establish the four regional support commands, as previously discussed, to replace the ten regional readiness commands. The remaining RRC headquarters were converted to deployable, functionally structured command and control headquarters to support modularity.453 “For the first time, Helmly stated, “the Army Reserve will have all of its operational deployable forces commanded by operational deployable command headquarters.”454 This will advance the Army Reserve’s ability to supply “those unique, skill-rich capabilities that the Army Reserve brings to the force.”455 In Helmly’s mind, these BRAC initiated changes made the Army Reserve more pertinent to an “expeditionary Army that is part of the joint American force.”456 He opined: “BRAC 2005 is good for the Army Reserve because it allows us to take better care of our people and set ourselves for the challenges of the future instead of remaining comfortably poised for the past.”457

The Army Reserve has made significant strides in executing BRAC. That included: synchronizing military construction activities with deployment operations and Army Reserve force structure updates; synchronizing 125 Army Reserve BRAC projects worth over $3.1 billion; awarding fifteen projects worth $383.6 million in 2006 and 2007; and establishing the Base Transition Coordinators (BTC) program and twelve BTCs regionally focused to facilitate BRAC property disposals, key to closing the 176 Army Reserve centers. In 2007, the Army Reserve initiated twenty-three BRAC and military construction projects to build fourteen armed forces centers, five centers, and four training support projects.458 Fifty-one facilities have been closed.459 Completing the construction of sixty-one armed forces centers was the major priority for execution in 2011.460

According to General Casey, “As an essential component of Army transformation, BRAC 2005 actions optimize infrastructure to support the Army’s current and future force requirements. The disposal of Cold War era infrastructure,” he asserted, “and the implementation of modern technology to consolidate activities frees up financial and human resource.” As General Casey explained in May 2009, “over 1,100 discrete actions are required for the Army to suc-
cessfully implement our BRAC 2005 requirements. The extent and impact of these actions,” he adjudged, “are far greater than all four previous BRAC rounds combined and are expected to create significant annual savings. In total, over 380,000 Soldiers, Family members, and Army Civilians employees will relocate as BRAC 2005 is implemented. . . . To accommodate the units relocating from the closing National Guard Readiness and Army Reserve Centers, BRAC 2005 authorizes 125 multi-component Armed Forces Reserve Centers and realigns U.S. Army Reserve command and control structure.” The plan “awarded 26 Reserve Component projects in 18 states. . . .”

The largest BRAC transformation project for the Army Reserve affected the USARC and OCAR. OCAR will move from Arlington, Virginia (Crystal City) to a new facility being constructed at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and the USARC will move to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, by September 2011. Stultz broke ground for the new USARC headquarters on December 8, 2008. The USARC and FORSCOM will share the building. Stultz said the two commands “from an operational standpoint are linked at the hip.” At the ground breaking ceremony, FORSCOM commander General Charles C. Campbell remarked, “Today is an important milestone. We’re making a real and tangible step forward.” Combining the two commands at the same headquarters was indicative of the Army Reserve’s integration with the total Army and the evolving operational Army Reserve. The new headquarters building will be certified at the silver level of LEED (leadership in energy and environmental design) by the U.S. Green Building Council. It will use 40 percent less water than standard buildings and 17 percent less energy, among other savings.
Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr, chief of the Army Reserve, left, and General Charles C. Campbell, commander U.S. Army Forces Command, put on their hard hats during the ground breaking ceremony for the Army Reserve and Forces Command headquarters building at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on Monday, December 8, 2008. (Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System)

Ground breaking ceremony for the new USARC/FORSCOM headquarters building at Fort Bragg, December 8, 2008. (Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System)
Conclusion

The wretched events of September 11, 2001, changed the face and destiny of America forever. From that day, the country has been engaged in constant warfare in the Global War on Terrorism. The Army Reserve has been fully engaged and mobilized from the beginning. September 11 accelerated the transformation of the Army Reserve from a strategic to an operational force in sync with Army transformation. The continuing transformation of the Army to a more agile and expeditionary force came in answer to the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, which transfigured America’s foreign policy in combating terrorism. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review calling for transformation of America’s forces as a “capabilities-based strategy” replaced a “threat-based defense strategy.” It and subsequent reviews recognized the critical role the reserves have played in the warfight. The Army Reserve will continue to transform as it meets its global requirements in that fight.


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Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM ended with the expectation of a “peace dividend.” What resulted was a drawdown in the armed forces from a peak in 1989 of 769,741. In 1996, the total Army’s strength of 491,163 was the smallest it had been since the end of World War II. The U.S. Army dropped to the eighth largest in the world. The reserves decreased by 13 percent from 1990 to 1994. Between 1990 and 1994, the Army Reserve’s authorized Selected Reserve end strength declined by 19 percent. Both manpower and budgets were cut. By 1993, the Department of Defense reported its lowest share of federal revenue in fifty years.

The operational tempo rose in a new era of engagement and enlargement that emerged in the post-Cold War era to meet National Security Strategy requirements. The active Army and the reserves assumed increasingly active roles in domestic support, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and nation building aimed at supporting emerging democracies and political reform efforts. The Army had ten major deployments between 1950 and 1989, compared to twenty-five from 1990-1997. Consequently, the Army Reserve “began its transition to an integral component of the Army’s operational force and solidified its role
Big Country, Heather Engelhart. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
as a critical provider of combat support and combat support capabilities to the Total Army.” As the century ended, the active Army’s and the reserves’ operational tempo continued to climb. By 2001, 866,000 reserve soldiers were providing nearly thirteen million man-days of support per year, a drastic contrast to the Cold War contribution. The National Guard and Army Reserve comprised 54 percent of the Total Army.

Smaller budgets, together with the rising operational tempo, saw the reserves used, increasingly, to lessen operational tension on the active force. This meant a shift from a limited-use reserve force to a demand for an integrated total force.

As personnel and funding shortfalls continued, the Army began to reshape itself to fit the new strategic environment. The Army transitioned from a Cold War “forward deployed force,” prepared to fight the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, to a “force projection Army” based in the United States. The Army could now react to crises with the ability to
**Satan's Sandbox**, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
reconstitute additional forces. Large scale, maneuver warfare represented a bygone era. Force XXI and Army XXI were resulting initiatives to modernize the Army with the capabilities the country needed for the 21st century. *Army Vision 2010* connected the ongoing Force XXI with the Army After Next. The Objective Force, the Legacy Force, and the Interim Force were concepts to evolve the Army into a strategically responsive and lighter force. Now, the Army would dominate at every point of full spectrum operations.


The 1993 Off-Site Agreement restructured the post-Cold War Army Reserve. It steadied reserve force structure and end strength reductions. It led to the National Guard’s focus on combat arms and divisional level combat support and combat service support. For the Army Reserve it meant a concentration in combat support and combat service support at corps levels and above. Thus, the active Army increased its own combat troop strength, as its reliance on the reserves grew. The Base Force and other studies had recommended this.

The horrific terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, drew a dividing line in the nation’s history. The Army Reserve was fully engaged from the beginning. Hasty mobilization became the norm. Army Reserve soldiers soon expected mobilization as a probability, not a possibility. Business as usual, one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer, became a dim memory. That was the old legacy, the old solely strategic reserve, not the evolving operational, expeditionary Army Reserve. The seeds of this force were planted in the 1990s. Army Reserve soldiers and their families shared the burden of the new world order with their active Army counterparts. Properly manning, training, equipping, and funding the reserves for greater demands became critical for the Army leadership.

Since those shocking attacks, the country has been at war. The overseas conflicts caused changes in battle doctrine and force generation. The mobilization lead time, for example, would no longer take months. ARFORGEN guaranteed predictable and cyclical reserve readiness.

These changes meant the reserves would become an operational force. This was mandated in Department of Defense directive 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force” and recognized in the Com-
mission on the National Guard and Reserves’ report, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force*. The 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review* called for a “Reserve Component that can serve in an operational capacity-available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine deployment.” The National Guard and Army Reserve would now make sustained contributions to the Global War on Terrorism. The reserves were expecting to function as an operational force then, and into the future. As has been seen, reserve component deployments overseas rose increasingly through the post-Cold War era. With the advent of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, they soared.

In the contemporary strategic environment, victory was possible only with a total, integrated Army. That modular, expeditionary Army must fight in persistent full spectrum operations. It must defend the homeland, defend civil authorities, deter conflict in crucial areas, and react quickly to small scale wars. Thus, the Army Reserve became a full partner with the active Army. No longer a supplemental or a “just in case” after thought; the Army Reserve evolved to a “just in time” operational force.

The challenge now is to continue the Army Reserve’s “institutional adaptation and transformation to an enduring operational force” within the Total Army, as the nation enters the second decade of the twenty-first century in an era of unrelenting, persistent conflict. As U.S. combat forces drawdown in Iraq and in Afghanistan, there still will be a critical need for combat support and combat service support, capabilities resident, in some cases exclusively or predominately, within the Army Reserve. Army Reserve forces are “ideally suited to support missions that improve infrastructure, security, and institutions within foreign nations of strategic interest to the U.S.” In the “absence of assigned DEF or CEF missions,” the Army Reserve will support “steady-state security cooperation missions . . .” allowing it to “retain its operational culture and sustain itself as an element of the operational force, also ensuring utilization during the ARFORGEN Available Year.” Global requirements, both expeditionary and domestic, require an indispensable Army Reserve trained and equipped with ready soldiers and cohesive units. That is its core mission. The Army Reserve has become a “crucial element of the Army’s overall deployable strength and war fighting team,” no longer “supplemental reinforcements,” but “routinely called upon as the force of first choice for ready enablers” to be drawn from the operating force and the generating force. It is a ubiquitous force. Deployment sooner or later is a near certainty. One weekend a month, two weeks in the summer is anachronistic. The Army Reserve vision is to maintain recognition as an enduring operational force drawn into the vortex of an expeditionary
Army. One that is part of the base budget and not solely dependent on contingency funding, accessible to the combatant commander, and serving as America’s premier force provider of military-civilian skills in support of missions at home and abroad. As McHugh and General Casey stated in the 2011 *Army Posture Statement*, “One thing is certain across every echelon of this Army: we cannot relegate the Army National Guard and Army Reserve back to a strategic reserve. The security of the nation can ill afford a reserve force that is under-

“One thing is certain across every echelon of this Army: we cannot relegate the Army National Guard and Army Reserve back to a strategic reserve.” John M. McHugh and General George W. Casey, Jr.

manned, under-equipped or at insufficient levels of training and readiness.”

The Army Reserve is a force of warrior citizens adding strategic and operational depth to the Total Force. Challenges remain in institutional and statutory barriers to a fully operational reserve force with a less unwieldy unit mobilization process. The reserves support the *National Security Strategy*, as they continue to grow and change. As an indispensable operational force, the Army Reserve is always ready, leaning forward to defend America in an increasingly dangerous world.
2 Ibid.
6 Ibid., 13.
7 Ibid., 8.
8 Ibid., 13.
Brothers in Arms, Christopher Thiel. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
APPENDIX A:

SILVER STAR RECIPIENTS
Specialist Jeremy Church

Specialist Jeremy Church of the 724th Transportation Company was the first Army Reserve soldier to earn the Silver Star in Iraq after driving the convoy commander’s vehicle through a four mile kill-zone and rendering assistance to fellow soldiers under an ambush from Iraqi insurgents in Balad, Iraq, on April 9, 2004.

Sergeant James Witkowski

Sergeant James Witkowski of the 729th Transportation Company received the Silver Star, posthumously, after shielding other soldiers in his company from a grenade while conducting a combat logistics mission near Balad, Iraq, on October 26, 2005.

Staff Sergeant Jason Fetty

Staff Sergeant Jason Fetty with the Joint Provisional Reconstruction Team of the 364th Civil Affairs Brigade was the first Army Reserve soldier to earn the Silver Star in Afghanistan after battling with a suicide bomber’s attack at the opening of an emergency room at the Khost hospital on February 20, 2007.
Sergeant Gregory Ruske

Sergeant Gregory Ruske with the Combined Joint Task Force 101 received the Silver Star for battling Taliban operatives and rescuing two Afghan National policemen in Afghanistan’s Kapisa Province on April 21, 2008.

Specialist David Hutchinson

Specialist David Hutchinson (then a Private First Class) with the 420th Engineer Brigade Personal Security Detail received the Silver Star as a gunner who placed accurate and effective fire on insurgents while in a convoy enroute to Afghanistan’s Forward Operating Base Orgun-E on May 21, 2008.
APPENDIX B:

FALLEN WARRIORS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-2012
### SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
<th>OP</th>
<th>Location of Death</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Unit</th>
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<td>Mobilized TPU</td>
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<td>Paktia, Afghanistan</td>
<td>SSG</td>
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<td>87th, 158th Infantry Brigade, Camp Shelby, MS</td>
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<td>SSG</td>
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<td>CPL</td>
<td>Justin D. Ross</td>
<td>Green Bay, WI</td>
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<td>James C. Young</td>
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<td>SPC</td>
<td>Christopher J. Coffland</td>
<td>Baltimore, MD</td>
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# SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION

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<td>SSG</td>
<td>Keith M. Maupin</td>
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## SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION

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<th>Command</th>
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# Soldiers Killed in Action

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### SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION

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OND 1  
OEF 31  
OIF 103  
TOTAL 135
## NON BATTLE DEATHS

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### NON BATTLE DEATHS

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## NON BATTLE DEATHS

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## NON BATTLE DEATHS

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### Non Battle Deaths

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<td>Ryan D. Foraker</td>
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OND 2  
OEF 21  
OIF 51  
TOTAL 74
### CASUALTY SUMMARY

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<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
<td>103</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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#### AR Non Battle Death OCONUS

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#### Grand Total

- **KIA WIA Total**: 209

#### AR Casualties

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<td>OEF</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>415</td>
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<td>OIF/OND</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1563</td>
<td>1667</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>135</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>2082</td>
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The ceremonial flags, combat boots, ID tags, and M4 rifle of a Fallen Soldier.

Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
GLOSSARY OF SELECTED TERMS

AGR: Active Guard/Reserve. AGR refers to National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers serving on active duty or full-time National Guard duty in the AGR program in support of the reserve component. It also applies to active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve headquarters, commands, agencies, and units having active guard/reserve soldiers assigned or attached.

Asymmetric: In the realm of military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action. Asymmetric can be used to refer to unconventional warfare such as weapons of mass destruction and cyber-terrorism.

Cadre Division: The cadre division is the nucleus of trained professional soldiers forming the basis for the training of new units.

Combat Support: Combat support forces provide direct support of the forces on the battlefield by providing intelligence, communications, engineering, and chemical warfare services of immediate impact on the course of the battle.

Combat Service Support: Combat service support forces provide administrative and technical (logistical) services to ensure that the combat and combat support forces are sufficiently manned, fed, fueled, maintained, and moved as required. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield.

Cross-Level: Cross-level refers to a soldier who is voluntarily or involuntarily assigned from one unit/major subordinate command/component to another in order to increase personnel readiness in an alerted or sourced unit. This action can be done between reserve and active components. Cross-leveling between the Army Reserve and National Guard is not authorized. Cross-leveling between Army Reserve and major subordinate commands requires commanding general and USARC approval.
Downtrace: Downtrace refers to units that fall under other units for command and control.

Forward/Main: Forward usually denotes closer to the enemy while main is in the rear.

IMA: Individual Mobilization Augmentee. An IMA is an individual reservist attending drills who receives training and is pre-assigned to an active component organization, a Selective Service System, or a Federal Emergency Management Agency billet that must be filled on, or shortly after, mobilization. Individual Mobilization Augmentees train on a part-time basis with these organizations to prepare for mobilization. Inactive duty training for individual mobilization augmentees is decided by component policy and can vary from zero to forty-eight drills a year.


Maneuver Brigades: Maneuver brigades are major combat units of all types of divisions. They can also be organized as separate units.

MTOE: Modified Table of Equipment. A Modified Table of Equipment is an authorization document that prescribes the modifications to a basic TOE which are necessary to adapt its mission, capabilities, organization, personnel, and equipment to meet the needs of a specific unit or group of units. The Modified Table of Equipment gives the major Army command (MACOM) commander a way to modify the standard TOE for one or more of the TOE units under his command. The Modified Table of Equipment authorizes the reorganization of a specific unit to meet the requirements of the command to which the unit is assigned. A Department of the Army (DA)-published Modified Table of Equipment is the official authorization document for the TOE units and is the authority for organization property on hand in the organization. In short, it is a table of organization and equipment that has been approved and is what a unit uses to determine what personnel and equipment it needs to complete its mission.

MOS: Military Occupational Specialty. The military occupational specialty is a code used to identify jobs in the U.S. Army. MOSs provide a simple way for commanders to identify the personnel needs for their units.

NCO: Noncommissioned Officer. A noncommissioned officer is an enlisted member of the armed forces, such as a corporal, sergeant, or petty officer, appointed to a rank conferring leadership over other enlisted personnel.
**Operational Force:** An operational force is a force of first resort, deployed immediately in an operation. It is a complimentary force.

**OPTEMPO:** Operational Tempo. OPTEMPO refers to the rate of military actions or missions.

**Power Projection Platforms:** Power projection platforms are Army installations that strategically deploy one or more high priority active component brigades or larger and/or mobilize and deploy high priority Army Reserve component units. Their primary function is to train and deploy fully capable and ready forces to combatant commanders.

**Ready Reserve:** The Ready Reserve is comprised of military members of the reserve and National Guard, organized in units or as individuals, both of which are subject to recall to active duty to augment the active component in time of war or national emergency. The Ready Reserve consists of the Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, and Inactive National Guard.

**Selected Reserve:** The Selected Reserve of the Army consists of those units and individuals in the Ready Reserve designated as so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other Reserves. The Selected Reserve includes officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers who are:

1. Members of the Army National Guard
2. Assigned to troop program units of the Army Reserve
3. Serving on active duty (Title 10 USC 12301(d)) or full-time duty (Title 32 USC 502b) in an Active Guard/Reserve status
4. Individual Mobilization Augmentees

**Strategic Force:** Strategic force refers to a force of secondary resort and deployed later in an operation. It is a supplemental force.

**TDA:** Table of Distribution and Allowances. The Table of Distribution and Allowances is a document which prescribes the organizational structure, personnel, and equipment authorizations, and requirements of a military unit to perform a specific mission for which there is no appropriate table of organization and equipment. Army units are divided between table of organization and equipment units that are doctrinally defined operational Army field unit, and table of distribution and allowances non-tactical, non-doctrinal units such as fixed facilities, command and control headquarters, and other Army/joint organizations, both in the continental United States and overseas.
Rock Drill, Heather Engelhart. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
TOE: Table of Organization and Equipment. The Table of Organization and Equipment is a document which prescribes the normal mission, organizational structure, and personnel and equipment requirements for a military unit, and is the basis for an authorizations document.

TPU: Troop Program Unit. A table of organization and equipment or table of distribution and allowances unit of the Army Reserve organization that serves as a unit on mobilization or one that is assigned a mobilization mission. The “unit” in this case is the largest separate unit prescribed by the table of organization and equipment or the table of distribution and allowances.
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