This section contains lists of selected declassified clandestine reports, photographic intelligence reports and finished intelligence publications for the chapters indicated. These documents are generally arrayed chronologically, according to their dates of dissemination within the Intelligence Community (IC), not the dates of publication by the Soviets, which were often years earlier. For every document there is some commentary describing the substance of the report or the analysis. In some cases, there are additional comments, pertaining to customer comments, for example, or describing the impact on US policy, or providing context for a report.

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

- A NOTE ABOUT WHAT YOU ARE READING
- FREQUENTLY USED ACRONYMS
- CHAPTER I:
  - EARLY KHRUSHCHEV PERIOD (1955–60)
- CHAPTER II:
  - THE BERLIN CRISIS, COLONEL PENKOFSKIY, AND WARSAW PACT PREPARATIONS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS (1958-61)
- CHAPTER III:
  - DEBATES ON MILITARY DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY:
  - THE CONTRIBUTION OF CLANDESTINE SOURCE, COL. OLEG PENKOFSKIY (1960–64)
- CHAPTER IV:
  - NEW INSIGHTS INTO THE WARSAW PACT FORCES AND DOCTRINE:
  - THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1962)
- CHAPTER V:
  - NEW ESTIMATES OF THE SOVIET GROUND FORCES (1963–68)
- CHAPTER VI:
  - TURMOIL IN THE SOVIET SPHERE (1962–68)
- CHAPTER VII:
  - CLANDESTINE REPORTING, ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATES (1970–85)

**A NOTE ABOUT WHAT YOU ARE READING**
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE): The highest form of finished national intelligence. It is intended to reflect the consensus of the Intelligence Community regarding some issue of major importance to national security, and it attempts to forecast the future development of present military, political, or economic situations in order to identify the implications for national policymakers. Most NIEs relate to issues of continuing concern, for example, Warsaw Pact forces opposite NATO, and are produced or updated annually or biannually, or on some other regular schedule. A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) is produced when some unforeseen development, for example, the Berlin crisis, requires an immediate ad hoc study of the situation. An Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM) does the same thing as an NIE only on a more narrow issue of interest to a smaller audience.

Clandestine Service Reporting: The following are the titles that the CIA clandestine service used during the period of this paper for disseminated intelligence reports: Information Report/Intelligence Information Report/Intelligence Information Special Report.

Human and Technical Sources provide intelligence information which may be released—disseminated—in varying report formats to readers such as analysts and policy officials. Analysts review many types of information, both classified and unclassified, to arrive at conclusions and judgments. Intelligence information reports may contribute to or form the basis of such analysis. Thus "raw" intelligence information reports support "finished" intelligence products.

Source Information and Documents: The sources of the reports in this release reported verbally or provided full or partial texts—or even summaries—of cables, reports, memoranda, and conversations. Intelligence information reports do not necessarily match their documentary origins. For example, a source may have provided a full-text document that was summarized for dissemination, or translated and disseminated in full, but without the original text. The documents replicated for this study are copies of those actually disseminated to intelligence analysts in the Intelligence Community. They often contain underscoring of passages of interest to that particular analyst and do not usually represent emphasis of the issuing clandestine service.

Directorate of Intelligence Analysis and Products: The DI produces all-source finished intelligence [analysis] on topics of interest to the President, members of Congress, Cabinet members and the military services. All source is based on all relevant photographic, SIGINT, clandestine and open source information. Finished intelligence means that the product has gone through the proper coordination within the office of origin, among other interested DI offices, with the Clandestine Service; and has been reviewed by the appropriate managers including the DDI. The titles the DI used during the period of this paper for disseminating finished intelligence are: Intelligence Assessments, Intelligence Reports, Intelligence Memoranda, Research Papers and Typescript Memorandum. There are also articles taken from weekly magazine reports that are important to the issues of the time and FBIS Propaganda Reports containing analysis of foreign media.

Photographic Intelligence Reports: These are documents that report the "reading" or interpretation of the photographs received from aircraft or satellites. In the first years of the U-2, program preliminary reports were issued sometimes within 24 hours of receiving the photographs to provide an initial "read-out" or interpretation of the photographs of high priority sites including new sites, new construction, etc. These reports were followed by a second report issued to provide more details and additional information on the sites and on sites of lower priority covered by the photography usually within a week of receiving the photographs. Finally, a Photographic Intelligence Report would be published to report all the details for sites of special significance covered by the mission with analysis of the purpose, size, content of the test ranges, launch sites, buildings, and activities discovered or confirmed and additional information.
FREQUENTLY USED ACRONYMS

CPSU/CC  Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee
CSI  Center for the Study of Intelligence
DCI  Director of Central Intelligence
DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency
DI  Directorate of Intelligence (CIA)
DO  Directorate of Operations, 1973-2005 (CIA)
DP  Directorate of Plans, 1950s-1973 (CIA)
FBIS  Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FRG  Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
FRUS  Foreign Relations of the United States (A Department of State History Series)
GDR  German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
IC  Intelligence Community
MBFR  Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
NARA  National Archives and Records Administration
NCS  National Clandestine Service, 2005-present (CIA)
NIC  National Intelligence Council, established December 1979 (DCI)
NIC/WC  National Indications Center/Watch Committee, pre-1979 (DCI)
NIE  National Intelligence Estimate
NPIC  National Photographic Interpretation Center
NSCID  National Security Council Intelligence Directive
NSC  National Security Council
NSWP  Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact [countries]
NTM  National Technical Means
OCI  Office of Current Intelligence (CIA)
OER  Office of Economic Research (CIA)
ONE  Office of National Estimates (CIA)
OPA  Office of Political Analysis (CIA)
ORR  Office of Research and Reports (CIA)
OSR  Office of Strategic Research (CIA)
PCC  Political Consultative Committee (Warsaw Treaty Organization)
Chapter I

Early Khrushchev Period (1955-60)

The documents in this section provide a broad sample of what CIA and IC analysts knew about Soviet military capabilities and intentions, when they knew it, and what sources of information informed that knowledge during the period 1955-60. Significant intelligence documents for the period mid-1953 until the formation of the Warsaw Pact are included because the period following the death of Stalin was so important for developments in Soviet military doctrine during the period 1955-60. The reporting varies from the mundane to the truly significant. It also tells the story of the movement of the Clandestine Service from modest beginnings to increasing accomplishment and the growing sophistication of DI military analysis of Soviet and Warsaw Pact capabilities, intentions, and threat. The clandestine reports were provided by Maj. [later promoted to Lt. Col.] Pyotr Popov while he was operating for the United States, with the exception of five reports provided by Col. Oleg Penkovskiy, which are noted in the catalogue.


This reporting, from late 1953 and after Stalin's death, discusses a "recent" Ministry of Defense order requiring training in the use of nuclear weapons. It illustrated the impetus for catching up to the realities of the employment of nuclear weapons following the end of Stalin's proscription against even discussing the subject. Interestingly, the proposal for training predated the publication of the manual on nuclear warfare described in Document I-31.


The analysis describes Soviet radio propaganda on nuclear weapons as extremely and consistently cautious after the Soviet hydrogen bomb test in August 1953. It describes almost no reporting on Western military plans or developments and preparations and only a few major pronouncements on control and disarmament. The increase in propaganda after the test had dropped back by November 1953, leading to a conclusion that the pattern indicated greater flexibility on the subject than in the past.
Document I-3. Special Assistant Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, W. Park Armstrong Jr., to Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, cover memorandum for *Soviet Manual on Conduct of Atomic Combat Operations*, CIA report 18 March 1954. [The editors have been unable to locate this manual in CIA archives.]
The memorandum forwards the CIA report, stating the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee [JAEIC] is preparing an evaluation of the information it contains. Mr. Armstrong specifically questions the information on radiological warfare and cautions against drawing conclusions about Soviet progress in developing atomic weapons until the information is clarified.

The memorandum advises of a CIA/DP report containing a manual for sergeants on this subject. [Editors' comment: The material from Popov was so much better than that from other human sources that some members of the IC viewed it with a certain amount of skepticism. This memorandum reflects both skepticism and an appreciation of the reporting's potential value.]

This reporting conveys a Soviet military officer's opinion that the Soviet Union was neither prepared to go to war nor interested in doing so and explains the reasons for his position. Standing alone, the report was of little value, but its candid nature bolstered the importance of open-source evidence of coming changes in Soviet military and political policy. The officer proved prescient.

From the vantage point of mid-1954 and without foreknowledge of the Warsaw Treaty, this NIE illustrates the outlook of the Intelligence Community for the formative period of major change in Soviet Bloc relations and military developments. The estimate describes the state and quality of information and understanding IC analysts had about Soviet and East European forces less than one year before the Warsaw Pact Treaty was signed.

In this reporting, a Soviet officer states his disbelief that a West German army should concern the USSR. Evidently, the Soviet military did not universally hyperventilate about West German rearmament.

This reporting lists new assignments for three general officers.

This reporting describes rumored reductions in officers or personnel in the Soviet Army. This and subsequent reports lent credibility to Khrushchev's announcement in 1955 of a major reduction in military manpower.

This reporting describes information gathered from conversations among unnamed Soviet officials regarding
the sovereignty of East Germany and a proposal for an all-European security pact that would be repeated often by Soviet officials and proposed again by Brezhnev in 1967. The latter and proposals from NATO officials eventually led to the Conference on Security and Cooperation and Mutual and Balanced Forces negotiations in the 1970s.

This reporting lists the minimum length of time in grade required for promotions. The lengthening of the periods for promotion probably portended the major force reductions announced in the summer of 1955.

This reporting is about a discussion of possible measures, such as rearming East Germany, that the Soviets were likely to take should the decisions at a September-October 1954 "London Conference" of the Western Allies be ratified."
baseline at the inception of the Warsaw Pact for the estimated size of forces and status of capabilities. It addressed the scale of effort and the trends expected for the period 1955-59 and set the stage for understanding the changes that the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization might bring, and the impact of nuclear weapons on Soviet–Warsaw Pact doctrine, capabilities, plans, and organization.


This is a brief review of a speech and an article by Marshal Konev commemorating V-E Day and includes CIA analysis of the significance of Konev's appointment as chief of the Soviet Bloc military command.


The manual discloses the changes in doctrine and tactics that the Soviets had put in place in 1948, on the basis of their experiences in WW II. According to the order signed by Marshal Bulganin, the manual replaced the Temporary Field Service Regulations of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, 1936. The manual describes how Stalin's army was organized, equipped, supported, and trained to fight a war. Remarkably, although it was released three years after the nuclear bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945, it remained consistent with Stalin's prohibitions against addressing nuclear weapons or how to conduct a war with them.


The manual includes Marshal Bulganin's order announcing that the manual superseded the Combat Regulations of the Army, 1942, part 2 (Battalion, Regiment) and the Combat Regulations for Tank and Mechanized Troops, 1944, part 2, (Battalion, Regiment, Brigade). It was the definitive military doctrine for these levels of command.

The 251 page manual covers the gamut of organizational combinations and combat situations faced by these units. It does not address the problems of own or enemy use of nuclear weapons even though it does address enemy use of chemical weapons. Clearly Stalin's proscriptions against discussion of nuclear weapons still governed this manual that was released slightly after his death.


The DCI briefing is item two of the agenda and is one of at least three issues he addressed. The two texts for his briefing on the treaty are dated 7 and 8 June 1955, respectively.


The FBIS article reviews and analyzes "An Important and Noble Theme," an article in the 28 May 1955 issue of Literary Gazette by General Shatilov. The article was part of the military doctrinal discussion that followed the death of Stalin in March 1953 and continued through the 1960s. According to the analysis, the article raised the possibility of a surprise nuclear attack by the USSR and disputed the Stalinist doctrine that had dismissed surprise as a potentially decisive factor of war, especially in the era of nuclear weapons.


The article presents evidence of military involvement in Soviet politics, factionalism among the military elite, and possible allegiance of military leaders to individual members of the party Presidium. It also chronicles
changes in Soviet military doctrine regarding the role of surprise in nuclear warfare, which some military spokesmen believed required a reassessment of Soviet military-political policy. The paper also examines the differences among the top military leaders on Soviet military-political strategy.

This is an analysis of the activities that led to the signing of the Warsaw Treaty, of the treaty itself, and of Soviet intentions and motivations.

**Document I-26.** "Possible Incorporation of Soviet Troops in Hungary and Rumania into the Carpathian Military District", CIA/DP Information Report, 4 August 1955 [DOI, June or early July 1955].
This reporting includes information on Soviet general officers who were involved in a survey of Hungary for military purposes. It also provides information on rumors that Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania, as well as those to be withdrawn from Austria, were to come under the command of the Carpathian Military District.

This reporting provides limited information about the selection of officers for instruction on guided missiles with the faculty of the Soviet Artillery Academy. It describes the type of officer who received training at the facility and discloses some information about a large Soviet military airfield on Novaya Zemlya. Although far from definitive, such insider information was eagerly sought by the IC at the time.

The article reviews writings of Soviet military leaders indicating an examination of Soviet military doctrine was in progress, beginning with an article in the September 1953 issue of *Military Thought*. These writings attached increased significance to surprise nuclear attacks as a determining factor in war. The CIA analysis shows some of the public statements hinted at the possibility of the Soviets using preventive strikes when faced with the possibility of an imminent attack. A major concern of the articles was defensive measures.

**Document I-29.** "Rumored Destination of Soviet Central Group of Forces Withdrawn from Austria", CIA/DP Information Report, 16 August 1955 [DOI, prior to 9 August 1955].
According to this reporting, the rumor included information that the Soviet Central Group of Forces was to be sent from Austria to the Lvov-Mukachevo area of the Carpathian Military District.

This was a working paper that examined the role of the Soviet military in Soviet politics during 1955, when major decisions were taken on the signing of a peace treaty with Austria and the establishment of the Warsaw Pact. The study includes information about discussions by military leaders on military doctrine for the use of surprise and "atomic" weapons in war.

The manual is either the first or one of the first Soviet field service manuals for nuclear warfare. It provides insights into how the Soviet military prepared its troops and noncommissioned officers for the consequences of nuclear warfare. Although basic, it was intended to acquaint sergeants with technical characteristics of atomic weapons and with operating in a nuclear environment. The text is divided into three parts. The first part deals
with basic technical characteristics of atomic energy, including descriptions of the destructive effects of atomic weapons. The second covers defense against atomic weapons, including the use of trenches, revetments, and other shelters for weapons, equipment, vehicles, and fuel; camouflage; personal protection; reconnaissance; and decontamination. A third describes the peculiarities of atomic warfare for small units, responses to atomic alerts, actions to be taken during and after an atomic blast, and procedures in contaminated areas.


This reporting provides a small amount of information on the Trans-Baykal Military District. It illustrates the limited reporting available at the time but nonetheless was valued by analysts as a means to "fill in" gaps.

This reporting provides basic information on two radar schools. Such information was scarce in the 1950s.

This history covers the operation of the tunnel from planning through termination. It describes the successes of the operation as a prime source of early warning of Soviet intentions in Europe, particularly in Berlin; as a monitor of the preparedness and indecision among Soviet and East German officials; and as a source of useful information about the establishment of the East German army, Soviet plans to implement the Warsaw Treaty, reductions in the strength of Soviet armed forces, the re-equipment of Soviet forces in East Germany, and the order of battle for some Soviet ground forces within the USSR. The paper has four appendices, including analysis of the tunnel's discovery and examples of US and East German press comment. Appendix B, "Recapitulation of the Intelligence Derived", contains a description of the various kinds of intelligence information obtained from the tunnel operation.

The report reviews Soviet and East German official statements and propaganda on the status of Berlin and East Germany and the impact on the four-power agreements. For example, the Soviet propaganda campaign portrayed East Germany as a sovereign, independent state, and, during visits to East Berlin, Soviet leaders referred to the city as the capital.

This is a listing of the 1956 October Revolution slogans, with an analysis of changes made from the previous list for 1955 and the politics behind the new or changed slogans. Slogans for other years are available at NARA.

This reporting contains a candid critique of the unsatisfactory results of training during 1956—including poor combat readiness of the troops—and problems with military and political training for 1957.

CIA issued this reporting approximately one month after the Soviets and Hungarian state security forces suppressed the Hungarian Revolution. The report includes information about terminating the war footing of Soviet troops in East Germany, routine rotation of officers, and permitted travel. The report notes the Soviets halted their plan to demobilize 1.2 million men.

**Document I-39.** "Zhukov address to GSFG Senior Troop Commanders", CIA/DP Information Report, 29 March 1957 [DOI, 12–16 March 1957].

This reporting provides information about Marshal Zhukov's 16 March 1957 speech from someone who attended the meeting. Zhukov [1] addressed international affairs, Soviet military intentions and preparedness, the combat readiness and poor discipline of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany [GSFG], and new Soviet armaments and military strategy; [2] made disparaging remarks on US alertness and nuclear capabilities; [3] advocated Soviet preemption when the West was preparing to start a war; [4] asserted that Soviet forces possessed everything essential for modern warfare and could gain victory over any enemy in a short period of time; [5] asserted the current strategy for the GSFG against NATO was obsolete and the Soviets must plan for their forces to reach the English Channel in two days.

**Document I-39a.** "Correction to Zhukov address to GSFG Senior Troop Commanders", CIA/DP Information Report, 12 April 1957 [DOI, 12–16 March 1957].

**Document I-39b.** "Supplement to Zhukov address to GSFG Senior Troop Commanders", CIA/DP Information Report 17 April 1957 [DOI, 12–17 March 1957].

**Document I-39c.** "Clarification of Zhukov address to GSFG Senior Troop Commanders", CIA/DP Information Report, 21 May 1957 [DOI 12–16 March 1957].


This report analyzes Zhukov's 16 March 1957 speech at an All-Army conference. He gave greater significance than in his previous positions to the role of nuclear weapons in a future war.


The report describes the different themes each Warsaw Pact country emphasized. For example, the East German press did not specify the "temporary" nature of the treaty, the Polish press emphasized the equality of the allies, Hungarian articles were more defensive about the necessity for Soviet troops on Hungarian soil than were articles from other members about this presence on their territories, and the Bulgarian press carried more articles by military officers than did the press in the other countries.


According to this reporting, the date of the expected disorders was related to East German elections and West German army maneuvers.


This reporting relates a Soviet military official's views of Soviet motivations for arms control and Soviet tactics for the talks.


This study examines shifts in Soviet economic policy to determine their meaning for the problems Soviet
leaders encountered before they formally replaced the Sixth Five-Year Plan with Khrushchev's new Seven-Year Plan.

This reporting presents information about how the Soviets viewed the impact to their international image resulting from their actions against the Hungarians.

The reporting discusses the role Marshal Zhukov played in Khrushchev's victory over the Presidium and speculation on Zhukov's future.

This reporting compiles information on the strong position of military officials under Zhukov's leadership. It includes speculation this strong position resulted from Zhukov's friendship with Khrushchev and speculation on why he supported Khrushchev.

This reporting discusses the transformation of two Soviet mechanized armies in East Germany into the First Guards Tank Army and the Twentieth Guards Army; it speculates that the new armies will result in an increase of tanks and technical materiel that will allow a reduction of Soviet personnel in GSFG.

This reporting is derived from information Popov received from his contact in the Soviet Ministry of Defense.

This reporting discusses joint maneuvers of the Soviet GSFG with East German and some Czech army units in late July. The maneuvers were important enough that Marshal Zhukov was expected to attend. Unlike combined operations in the 1960s, there was little basis to judge whether the military substance of the maneuvers was significant or merely for political impact.

This reporting provides speculation about the June 1957 shakeup of the CPSU Presidium and the part played by Kaganovich.

This reporting provides information from sources in the Ministry of Defense (MOD) on the rapidity of technical developments in missiles and bombers, suggesting that they were not to be stockpiled.

The report contains Soviet statements and propaganda on tactical nuclear weapons versus strategic nuclear weapons, beginning with the first Soviet discussion of tactical nuclear weapons made in response to the 1954 NATO decision to defend NATO countries with nuclear weapons. The report includes Marshal Zhukov's 1956 Twentieth CPSU/CC Party Congress speech containing the only published Soviet discussion of tactical nuclear weapons during 1956. The report also examined the Soviet mass propaganda campaign on tactical nuclear weapons introduced in April 1957.

This reporting is about the diminished status of party control and political indoctrination under Khrushchev.

This reporting includes speculation on the meaning of Zhukov's removal and the negative reaction of some Soviet military officers to the announcement.

This reporting summarizes the contents of the CC/CPSU letter criticizing Zhukov's leadership and reinstating the "leading role" of the party.

This reporting describes the circumstances surrounding Zhukov's dismissal and his reaction to Khrushchev's explanation of the unanimous vote at the CPSU plenum. It also includes information on a separate unanimous vote by military leaders in favor of Zhukov's removal and described some of the charges made against Zhukov.


This estimate was written following the ascendency of Khrushchev. It was written just before Popov's forced return to Moscow and the end of his reporting. The NIE saw no change to the basic aims or in the concept of an irreconcilable conflict between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. The IC judged the most significant development during the period had been Soviet progress in developing advanced nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The NIE estimated the USSR would continue to maintain a balanced and flexible structure of strong naval, air, and ground forces, and it reported the Soviets appeared to have reduced considerably their military manpower from the peaks reached during the Korean War. The US military service intelligence organizations contributed the analysis concerning Soviet naval, ground, and air forces to this NIE.

This reporting provides information from a Soviet document containing some unit designations in two military districts and East Germany.

This reporting describes a meeting of all ranking officers of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, military district commanders, and commanders of groups of forces, and the criticisms levied against Zhukov.

The report examines the history of the chronic intrusion of the CPSU agencies and activities into the regular military chain of command. It describes the degree of autonomy the military attained in the post-Stalin period, and the rise in the status and prestige of the professional soldier during the period that propelled Marshal Zhukov in June 1957 to a seat in the Party Presidium, the first professional soldier to gain such a position.

Zhukov's administration of the Ministry of Defense had renewed the emphasis on the principle of one-man command in the armed forces reducing the influence of the Main Political Directorate, which functioned as a department of the Party Central Committee for the armed forces. This contrasted with earlier periods, when political officers either shared full command with the professional soldiers or retained control over political training. Following his efforts to, in effect, subordinate the political officers to military commander, Zhukov was relieved from the duties as Defense Minister and purged from the Party Presidium and the CPSU Central Committee. FYI: in CIA documents we are describing, "party" was capitalized in cases where it was used to modify Presidium and Central Committee.


The reporting relays information from conversations with Soviet military officials, who were stationed in Poland or had served on the Combined Staff of the Warsaw Pact. For example, the information claimed Polish relations with the USSR were not normal, and the situation in Poland and in the Polish Communist Party concerned the Soviets.


This reporting describes the speeches made at the GSFG party conference by Marshal Malinovskiy and Army General Zakharov, commander of the GSFG.


This reporting relays information Popov heard from Soviet military officers, probably reflecting the content of the debate on the role of missiles and heavy bombers during this period.


This reporting describes the Soviet Ministry of Defense [MOD] rumors about why and how Zhukov was removed and Khrushchev's agenda after the fact.


This reporting provides MOD speculation on a new position for Zhukov and Soviet Army attitudes toward him.

The following six documents, provided by Popov, contain the information on TO&Es of Soviet forces that were extremely important to the analysts' understanding the changes to the Soviet forces during the 1950s.


This reporting provides the first description from an inside source of the composition of a new heavy tank division, including definitive TO&Es of Soviet divisions that were not available from any other source.
This reporting describes a Soviet tank division TO&E, circa 1957, after the military was reorganized.

This reporting describes the reorganized TO&E of a Soviet motorized rifle division circa 1957.

This reporting expands on the TO&E information contained in Document I-67.

This reporting provides additional information about the heavy tank division described in Documents I-67 and I-70.

This reporting describes the theoretical composition of a combined-arms army and some of its non-divisional combat and combat-support units, circa early 1958.

The report traces Soviet propaganda during the period mid-May 1957 through June 1958 on major themes related to the likelihood, danger, and consequences of a nuclear world war. Statements by Soviet political and military leaders, Soviet newspaper and journal articles, and routine radio propaganda were examined for the report.

This reporting recounts gossip provided by contacts about a reduction of personnel at the MOD.


This special study describes the origins of the reversal of Soviet bloc policy from extreme centralism under Stalin to decentralization following the February 1956 Soviet Twentieth Party Congress and the consequences of the reversal for Soviet management of its Eastern European "allies." The study describes the return to policies reflecting unity of the bloc and, on the surface, a return to stability after the 1956 Poznan riots in Poland and the Hungarian Revolution, with the dissidents under control and liberalism confined to economics.

This reporting describes a decree stating the Soviet military advisory groups could be dissolved because the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact [NSWP] forces were "now" staffed by reliable cadres.

Document I-77. "CC/CPSU Plenum Decree on the Need for Increased Security in the Handling of Classified Information", CIA/DP Information Report, 13 November 1958 [DOI, 13 September 1958]. This reporting describes a decree concerning the safeguarding of military and state secrets. The decree accused ministry officials, directors of factories, engineers, and workers, particularly those in organizations connected with "visiting foreign delegations from capitalist countries" of not protecting important government secrets.


Document I-78. Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies 1958-1963, NIE 11-4-58, 12 December 1958. The estimate was released one month after Khrushchev announced Soviet intentions to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany that in effect would terminate free Western access to West Berlin. The estimate announced that the lines of conflict with the West had been drawn more sharply and the "reduction of tensions" was no longer the major Soviet foreign policy theme. The IC estimated it was unlikely Soviet planners would count on East European forces in general to make an important contribution to Soviet military operations, except perhaps in air defense. According to the estimate, the Soviets were not evincing a level of trust in the reliability or capability of those forces. If anything, Soviet military planning and operations suggested to the authors a Soviet disdain for the contributions their allies might make, except perhaps in air defense and security for the Soviet lines of communication through their countries. Given the 1956 problems with Poland and Hungary and a certain arrogance forged in the victory over Nazi Germany, the IC judged the Soviets probably deemed it prudent not to trust their allies with important tasks.

Document I-79. "Soviet Elite Statements on Troop Withdrawal from Europe", CIA/DI/FBIS Radio Propaganda Report, 6 February 1959. This report presents in chronological order all references to the withdrawal or reduction of foreign troops from Europe appearing in statements by CPSU Presidium members and top Soviet military leaders, in Soviet Government statements and notes, and in communiqués signed jointly by Soviet and other bloc leaders during the period 17 November 1956 through 29 January 1959.


The following five articles, dated 1958–59, were not actually available until Colonel Penkovskiy's clandestine efforts in 1961–62. The articles reflect the doctrine and organizations of the late 1950s, before Khrushchev's 1960s reorganization of the military.

periodical named above. Other such articles are listed below. This one describes some theory on the use of tactical nuclear artillery and rockets. It also contains some basic rules for calculating optimum yields against certain targets. The information is on a more elementary level than what the US Department of Defense/Atomic Energy Commission (DOD/AEC) provided in the unclassified manual published for the general public in 1962. The information evidently was relatively new to the Soviet military, perhaps reflecting an increasing availability of nuclear weapons for, or soon to be for, the Soviet theater forces.

The article describes how to determine yield, height of burst, and safety standoff distances for the use of tactical nuclear munitions in an offensive operation by an army. The article also describes tasks the army artillery commander and his staff must address in planning the employment of nuclear, heavy rocket, and missile artillery. The calculations are similar to but not as complete as those in the DOD/AEC unclassified publication of 1962. This article is a continuation of the one in Document I-81 above.

The article examines recommendations concerning the assignment of fire missions to missile artillery, the organization of adjustment, and the verification of the results of firing. The omission of nuclear fire missions probably reflected the arrival of new missiles in the forces with available conventional warheads and the lack of widely available associated nuclear warheads.

The article examines the combat use of field and antiaircraft (tube, missile) artillery mainly during preparation for and the beginning of an operation, the organization and planning of artillery reconnaissance, topographical preparation, and photo-grammetric and meteorological support for the combat operations of artillery. The article was published before antiaircraft missiles and guided nuclear-armed tactical missiles were widely available to the Soviet ground forces.

The article probes the differences between fire planning and existing operational doctrine of the heavy rocket artillery being introduced into the forces in the late 1950s. The discussion suggests that the heavy rocket systems did not yet fit comfortably into existing operational doctrine.

This article presents the authoritative opinion of the authors about the use of artillery in support of an army counterattack and covers the use of nuclear, chemical, and conventional munitions. The editor in chief's preface to the article introduces the journal's artillery collection and describes the intended audience. He requests "generals and officers to forward their comments on the contents of the present Collection." His request suggests that, at the time, nuclear doctrine was still in flux, the latest Field Services Manual [also 1959] notwithstanding.
**Document I-86. CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.**

This is CIA's history of the world's first great overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974. It describes the program's technological and bureaucratic aspects, and its political and international context. It tells the story of the struggle between the CIA and US Air Force to control the U-2 and A-12 programs. More importantly, it contains the details of the whole history of U-2 operations over the USSR during the search for information on the Soviet missile program.

**Document I-87. CIA/CIS/History Staff, Center for Study of Intelligence, Cold War Records: CORONA: America's First Satellite Program, edited by Kevin C. Ruffner, 1995.**

This is the story of the Corona program. The concept of this photoreconnaissance system was first broached in late 1957 after the U-2 had proved the value of the photography. The U-2 had limited area of coverage and was only an interim solution to fill the existing intelligence gap: its flights were infrequent and each carried enormous physical risks for the pilot and political risks for the country. But the U-2 photography did show facilities that had never been seen by western intelligence, from the nuclear test sites at Novaya Zemlya and Semipalatinsk to the missile launch facility at Tyuratam. When the Soviets brought down the U-2 in May 1960, it left an intelligence gap that stretched across the 11 time zones of the Soviet Union. The charter of the Corona system was no less than to resolve the great debate over the number and capabilities of Soviet missiles targeted on the United States. The program was approved by President Eisenhower in February 1958 with the first successful recovery of useable film from space on 18 August 1960. The book covers the process that led to the decision to build Corona, the characteristics of the industry-government team that accomplished this goal in a short time and under enormous pressures, and the significance of the first successful satellite reconnaissance mission.9

---

1 Date of information (DOI) for the purpose of this paper is the date a document was published or an event took place. The disseminated date is the date the finished intelligence document was published or the date the clandestine information was disseminated. In some cases we may have the date the publication was sent to press in the Soviet Union, which may be a month or years earlier than the date of the issue.

2 For the purpose of this paper, the editors used the terms "clandestine report" to indicate a document procured by a source; and "clandestine reporting" to indicate factual reporting by the source or an opinion of the source.

3 See Document I-31

4 The London Conference decisions included: ending the occupation of West Germany; restoring its sovereignty and allowing the Allies to remain in the country; the rearmament of West Germany; and giving West Germany membership in NATO.

5 See also Documents I-67, 68, 70, 71, 72.

6 During the early period of missile development, the term missile presumed post-launch guidance; the term rocket presumed no post-launch guidance.

7 GSFG is the abbreviation for Group of Soviet Forces Germany.

8 Photo-grammetric relates to the process of making surveys and maps through the use of photographs.

9 Adapted from remarks prepared for John Deutch, DCI, at the George Washington University Symposium, 23 May 1995: *Corona and the Revolution in Intelligence.*
THE BERLIN CRISIS, COLONEL PENKOVSKIY, AND WARSAW PACT PREPARATIONS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS (1958-61)

The documents in this section include three chronologies of the Berlin Crisis, reporting provided by Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy on Soviet plans for confronting the United States and its allies over Berlin and East Germany during the years 1961–62, and the special NIEs produced during the crisis. There are two documents passed by Penkovskiy, as well as numerous reports from Penkovskiy on the Soviet plans and intentions for Berlin. There are memoranda about Clandestine Service frustration with the failure of the DI to use its reporting without an evaluation of the source and DI analyses based on Penkovskiy's reports that played a major role in the planning process for US and allied responses to the Soviet threat.

**Document II-1.** "Extract of Khrushchev's 10 November 1958 Ultimatum on Berlin", 26 November 1958

**Document II-2.** Probable Soviet Course of Action Regarding Berlin and Germany, NIE 100-2-59, 24 February 1959.
The document provides an estimate of Soviet objectives and tactics for negotiations over Berlin and Germany. The IC looked at the likelihood of Soviet turnover of access controls to the East German regime and probable Warsaw Pact and NATO responses to the Soviet policy.

The memorandum provides the DCI with the ONE analysis of the Khrushchev speech announcing reductions in Soviet armed forces, his acceptance of the doctrine of mutual deterrence, and his view of future war, particularly a war with nuclear-armed missiles. It also provides ONE's view of Khrushchev's intentions to reduce Soviet ground forces and the role of the Soviet navy. The memorandum also provides an analysis of the economic, internal political and foreign policy implications of Khrushchev's speech.

**Document II-4.** The Soviet Attitude and Tactics on the Berlin Problem, Special National Intelligence Estimate [SNIE] 100-5-60, 22 March 1960.
The SNIE presents the information available one year before Penkovskiy began providing insights of Soviet intentions and the preparations of the Warsaw Pact for military action to support Khrushchev's threats. The estimate was intended to provide background for President Eisenhower before his summit with Khrushchev in May 1960.

The report is a thorough analysis of the timing and themes of the Soviet propaganda on the German question from November 1958, when Khrushchev initiated the Berlin crisis, to April 1960. It traces the tactical shifts
that developed during the period leading up to the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit scheduled for mid-May 1960.

The report is an analysis of Soviet strategy and tactics following the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit.

The summary reports East German actions bearing on the Berlin situation between 8 and 13 September that restricted movement of West Berliners travelling into East Berlin, a violation of the four-power agreements guaranteeing freedom of movement within the city. The second article documents the magnitude of the East German and East Berlin refugee flow west for the previous week and compares the figures with those of the previous year.

**Document II-8.** "Moscow and Berlin (Bloc Tactics)", CIA/DI/OCI *Current Intelligence Weekly Summary*, 1 December 1960.
The article reviews the history of Soviet positions on Berlin from 1955 to December 1960 and describes Soviet tactics in pursuit of gaining Western acceptance of "two Germanys."

The IC states that its attempt to forecast developments within the USSR and in Soviet power and policy over the next five years faced very severe limitations. The IC judges that the Soviets have the resources and mechanisms to ensure steady fulfillments of goals, but it is less certain about the development of Soviet military power than the economy. It acknowledges gaps in critical information for estimating future Soviet military capabilities. It addresses Soviet views on the balance of military power and on Soviet strategy and points out the acquisition of intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities was having a profound impact on the Soviet estimates of the balance of military power.


The NIE provides the IC estimate of Khrushchev's probable intentions for the summit meeting with the new US President, John F. Kennedy, scheduled for 3-4 June 1961.

The report provides an overview of the CIA's understanding of Khrushchev's policy and military moves beginning with his November 1958 speech. Although the paper was written after CIA had recruited Penkovskiy in April 1961, he had not yet reported on the Berlin crisis. No significant clandestine sources were providing information on Berlin. That came later—in June 1961.

This reporting contains Penkovskiy's comments on statements by Khrushchev regarding Soviet ICBM tests, production, deployment, and threats, all of which had been occurring simultaneously with the buildup of the
Berlin crisis. Penkovskiy provided the basis for his judgment that Khrushchev was bluffing about the success of the Soviet ICBM program.

The conversations focused on the failure of the DI and other IC analysts to use material from Penkovskiy about Soviet strategic attack capabilities in NIE 11-8-61 of 7 June 1961 and the problem consumers had in using clandestine-source information without an evaluation of the source. This is a particularly relevant illustration of what can happen when the source's reporting does not correlate well with what the customers believe. The matter of describing a source's credibility was a reoccurring problem for the Clandestine Service, which needed to protect its sources, and the DI analysts, who needed to provide the reader with a sense of the source's credibility.

The estimate addresses the question of probable reactions of the USSR, Communist China, and NATO to a set of measures reflecting US determination to preserve the Western position in Berlin. These measures included military, political, economic, and clandestine preparations designed to convey US intentions to undertake steps up to and including general war and to put the United States in a position to carry out those steps.

The analysis addresses Khrushchev's 8 July 1961 speech on a Berlin settlement, the US and Soviet military budgets, and troop reductions.

**Document II-17.** "Comments of a Senior Soviet General Officer concerned with military preparations for Berlin", CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 13 July 1961 [DOI, late June 1961].
This reporting contains opinions and information that Marshal S. S. Varentsov discussed with Penkovskiy on Khrushchev's intentions for a peace treaty with Germany and preparations for Soviet military actions, should they become necessary. The report includes Penkovskiy's recommended reactions to Khrushchev's moves. This is probably the report that Allen Dulles briefed to President Kennedy on 14 July 1961.

The following two documents illustrate the dissemination of Penkovskiy's report, Document II-17.

The memo reports on a meeting to assess current clandestine reporting on the Berlin situation. On 13 July 1961 officers also briefed DCI Dulles on the Penkovskiy report.

**Document II-19.** Pages from the 14 July 1961 calendars of DCI Allen Dulles, his secretary, and from President Kennedy's 14 July 1961 appointment agenda noting Dulles' scheduled and unscheduled meetings with President Kennedy that day when he was to brief President Kennedy on Document II-17 above.  

This chronology begins with an excerpt from Khrushchev's 10 November 1958 speech and pulls together his increasingly menacing rhetoric through 18 July 1961, around the time when Penkovskiy began reporting on the crisis from inside the Soviet government. OCI produced the list for DCI Dulles at his request after he briefed President Kennedy on 14 July 1961. The timing suggests the list was intended as additional background for the President on Khrushchev's intentions.
**Document II-21.** "Meeting No.18 [clandestine meeting with Oleg Penkovskiy]", CIA/DO, 18 July 1961.

This is a transcript of a meeting with Penkovskiy in which he provided important information about the concerns and opinions of the Soviet Generals witting of the meetings of the Soviet Supreme Military Council on the Berlin Crisis. In this meeting, Penkovskiy provided the information about Berlin disseminated in special information reports to the highest levels of the US government. Unfortunately, three of the disseminated reports have not been found in the CIA archives, but were read much earlier by one of the editors of this study. Moreover, they are referred to in other record documents provided in this study. This transcript is provided here to document the receipt of the information by the CIA and to support the other derivative references included in this study. The reader of the transcription of the discussions between the case officer and Penkovskiy will get some appreciation of how important it is to separate a source's opinion based on fact, rumors, relevancy or emotion before writing an official document for dissemination.


The memorandum, with hand written notes by McGeorge Bundy, discusses the need for decisions on the Berlin situation by Monday, 24 July 1961. Those include recommendations for active measures in East Germany, a long-term military buildup, military courses of action in the event access to West Berlin is blocked, and proposals and negotiating positions for possible negotiations on Berlin. McGeorge Bundy's hand written notes indicate the memorandum is for President Kennedy.


During the briefing, General Taylor requested DCI Dulles brief the President on the Penkovskiy reports and that CIA send the general all further reports.


This reporting describes an order from the Soviet government to all embassies in capitalist countries requiring their personnel to use all intelligence means to collect information on the participation of each NATO country in decisions on the Berlin situation.


The OCI analysts stated that the report was plausible, but they had no physical evidence of the "order" to collect intelligence, and that several features of the report departed from normal Soviet operational practices.


The annex addresses the capabilities the Soviet forces had to totally disrupt the electronic navigational aids and communications that would be required by a Berlin airlift operation. The conclusions of the USIB subcommittee address Khrushchev's statements that he will not be deterred from his policy on Germany and Berlin preferring early negotiations on Germany and Berlin and other statements including some private comments indicating a preference for a four-power conference. The document also states there was no convincing evidence that Khrushchev had altered his intention to wait until the West German elections or for the CPSU Congress to conclude in October, and might be satisfied if negotiating began before the end of the year. Finally it points out that the internal situation has produced a serious situation for the East German regime as the situation continues to deteriorate.

**Document II-26.** Text of President Kennedy's Radio and TV address to the American people on the Berlin Crisis, Office of the White House Press Secretary, delivered 25 July 1961.
The memorandum indicates that President Kennedy said he had seen two specific CIA reports on Tuesday in preparation for a speech he delivered on Berlin on 25 July 1961. The editors have been unable to locate the first document mentioned in the memorandum but it is probably a disseminated document based on the material contained in Document II-21. The second document is Document II-24.

**Document II-28.** "Developments re: [Penkovskiy]", CIA/DP Memorandum for the Record from John Maury, Chief SR Division, 3 August 1961.
The memorandum reports dissemination of Penkovskiy's reports to EUCOM and USAREUR had been authorized. Mr. Maury also reports the reactions of the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union to the clandestine reporting contained in Document II-29 about the decree of the CPSU/Central Committee on the Kennedy-Khrushchev summit. The memorandum confirmed that President Kennedy was briefed on this material.

**Document II-29.** "Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU Concerning the Vienna Talks of Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy", CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 7 August 1961 [DOI, 17 June 1961].
This reporting presents Soviet instructions on dissemination of information about the Vienna talks to various echelons of the party and to foreign governments in an attempt to gain support for the Soviet version of events.

**Document II-30.** "Preliminary CIA/OCI Analysis of East German Restriction on Travel to West Berlin", CIA/DI/OCI Cable to White House Hyannis, 13 August 1961.
In the analysis OCI reviews the series of decrees introduced by East Germany introducing severe new control measures designed to stop immediately the flow of refugees to West Berlin and West Germany. OCI judges that it was unusual for the Warsaw Pact to devote its attention to specific domestic problems of a member nation, and that the announcement is bound to increase the already high tensions in East Germany and likely to sharply increase spontaneous outbreaks in East Berlin and East Germany of disturbances such as strikes, riots and anti-regime activities.

The SNIE was published two days after the start of the construction of the Berlin Wall. It examines the lack of popular support for the East German regime, the possibilities of anti-regime activities, East German military capabilities, and support the East German Army would require from the Soviets. It also speculates on possible East German reactions to Western military options and on the reliability and willingness of the East German Army to fight.

**Document II-32.** Memorandum, from General Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to General Norstad, CINCEUR, Paris, transmitting orders for the Berlin Crisis, 16 August 1961.
The memorandum transmits the Secretary of Defense's directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to request General Norstad to "commence more detailed planning on a unilateral US basis as a matter of urgency." General Norstad was to plan to apply nonnuclear military power on a larger scale than heretofore envisaged to induce the communists to reopen access to Berlin. General Norstad also was directed to plan for the use of nuclear weapons.

This is an in depth analysis of the East German decrees issued on 7 August and reported in Document II-30 and a brief analysis in Document II-31. This analysis covers the decrees, the refugee flights, traffic between West Berlin and West Germany and interference with communications linking East Germany, West Berlin and West Germany. It also reports on the Soviet military movements in East Germany and East Berlin, popular
reaction, Soviet position on the East German new controls and the reactions in West Germany and West Berlin.

This reporting states the Warsaw Pact members met in Moscow in August 1961 and convinced Khrushchev and other members of the Soviet and the East German delegations not to set a definite deadline for a final solution of the East German peace treaty and the Berlin problem.

**Document II-34a.** Memorandum, from McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor, to General Godfrey McHugh, Air Force Aide to President Kennedy, 21 August 1961. The memorandum transmits the information in Document II-34 for the 22 August 1961 morning briefing of the President. The information, provided by "an East European source", described an early August meeting of Warsaw Pact members in Moscow regarding the Berlin situation and the CPSU/CC party congress scheduled for October-November 1961.

The SNIIE reevaluates the conclusions upon which SNIIE 12-4-61 (Document II-31) was based in light of additional information eleven days after the start of construction on the Berlin Wall. The estimate projects likely Soviet tactics in the Berlin crisis for the next few months, paying particular attention to what effect possible developments within East Germany could have on those tactics during the same period.

This reporting describes concerns of officials at the Soviet Foreign Ministry about the difficult position in which the Berlin situation had put the Soviet government. They viewed President Kennedy's 25 July speech as the inevitable response to Khrushchev's actions. Penkovskiy claimed the West had achieved a small victory because Khrushchev was once again talking about negotiating with a softer tone. Penkovskiy reported that, although the Berlin problem was not on the agenda for the 22nd Party Congress, it almost certainly would be discussed there.

**Document II-37.** Annex A: "Soviet Military Forces and Capabilities", and Annex B: "Tables of Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Strengths and Characteristics of Selected Weapons and Equipment" to NIE 11-4-61, *Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1961-1966*, with the attachment "Selected Developments of Major Significance to Soviet Military Forces and Capabilities", CIA/DI/ONE, 24 August 1961. The annexes superseded Annexes A and B of NIE 11-4-60 and were to be revised and reissued with the full text of the NIE 11-4-61 scheduled for completion in December 1961. The annexes describe the changes made in Warsaw Pact military strengths and the characteristics of selected forces, weapons, and equipment since the previous NIE was issued on 1 December 1960 [Document II-9 above].

**Document II-37a.** Memorandum, from Acting DCI Cabell for General Taylor forwarding material for President Kennedy, *Current Status of Soviet and Satellite Military Forces and Indications of Military Intentions, 6 September 1961.*
The information for the President is an update of information contained in Annex A and Annex B to NIE 11-4-61 [Document II-37] *Soviet and Satellite forces in Europe facing NATO, published 24 August 1961.* This memorandum describes changes the Soviets had made in their capabilities since the publication of the Estimate 24 August 1961.
According to this reporting, Khrushchev thought a treaty with East Germany would be signed, and he did not plan to add anything to what he had already said during any future negotiations on a Berlin Treaty. Penkovskiy also reported military preparations were under way, including changes to commands and the cancellation of leave for high-ranking officers. Penkovskiy claimed the Soviets had information the United States was making military preparations in Iran and Turkey in connection with the Berlin problem.

INR comments on the veracity of the source, and singles out two significant points: a separate treaty will be signed with the GDR and the USSR will deliver an ultimatum to Iran and Turkey demanding the removal of foreign troops and bases; and threatening to occupy Iran if his ultimatum is not met.

The memorandum is forwarding a 1 September 1961 CIA document analyzing probable Soviet motives for resuming nuclear testing. It appears to be an advance copy of SNIE 11-11-61 published 7 September 1961. The report estimates the motives for the Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing, and its implications for Soviet foreign and military policies during the months ahead.

According to the CIA/DCI National Indications Center/Watch Committee memorandum evaluating this CIA/DP clandestine report, which is the only information we have on it, in this report Penkovskiy predicted that a decision on whether the USSR would launch preemptive hostilities against the West would be made in the near future by the CPSU/CC at its party congress, which was scheduled to begin deliberations on 17 October 1961. Penkovskiy also reported that the real decision on hostilities more likely would be made by the Presidium or by Khrushchev and his closest associates only. Penkovskiy claimed the hostilities would not take place until after the signing of a German Peace Treaty. Penkovskiy also reported a civil defense directive was issued on 18 August in an effort to spur civil defense preparations and that a large exercise involving Soviet forces began in Germany on 20 September. The memorandum states the committee did not evaluate the report as a specific indication of a Soviet intention to launch a preemptive attack in the Berlin situation. The committee viewed the report as a prediction that a decision might be made in the near future when the situation warranted. The committee believed the information did not reflect the political factors or basic strategic concepts of the people around Khrushchev, who would have been involved in the real decisions.

President Kennedy described the Berlin crisis, including threats of the Soviet Union against access to Berlin and the Western response.


The INR analysis calls the CIA report an outline of a Soviet course of action as the Berlin crisis moves along, INR believes the Soviet plans are plausible but more ominous in intention than other reports. The key differences INR sees in this report are the Soviet intentions in the period preceding the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany. For example, using Warsaw Pact military exercises as a cover for preparations for a "first strike, will not, in itself, allow the United States to be certain", bringing uncertainty into what to expect. The report suggests that INR's previous assessment that Khrushchev does not regard nuclear war as a means of achieving his objective was wrong or that he is prepared to run higher risks.


According to the memorandum, in this reporting Penkovskiy "clarifies and considerably expands" the information he provided in Document II-40. Penkovskiy asserted Khrushchev had already decided to sign a German treaty "right after" the CPSU party congress and "to strike first against the West if the situation warrants action after the treaty is signed." The memorandum reported the apparent Soviet readiness to negotiate was designed to keep the situation in hand while the Warsaw Pact ground forces maneuvered (into place) and resumed nuclear weapons tests. The committee memorandum assesses the reported Soviet course of action as plausible and considerably tougher and more ominous than previous reports and predicted a sharp increase in international tensions in the future should it come to fruition.


The brief reports the 25 September 1961 Soviet announcement that the Warsaw Pact would conduct a military exercise on the territory of member countries in October and November 1961.


Maury recounted a conversation with Helms about Penkovskiy’s clandestine reports in Documents II-42 and II-43. The two discussed the validity of the information and the problems of reconciling some of the information with Soviet security and policy positions. They concluded Penkovskiy was in a position to keep the United States posted on the purpose of the maneuvers taking place in East Germany.

Document II-46. Pouch List of clandestine reports sent to Newport, RI, for President Kennedy at the summer White House, CIA/DP, 27 September 1961.

The list includes the two Penkovskiy reports described in Documents II-42 and II-43.


This is a follow-on special estimate to SNIE 11-10-61 that was based on Penkovskiy reporting [Documents II-42 and II-43] regarding Soviet military preparations to be undertaken in advance of a showdown with the West and on Soviet plans to try to influence Western attitudes toward negotiations on Berlin.
The first article describes Soviet tactics and intentions following President Kennedy's 25 July address to the nation on the Berlin Crisis, including the steps Khrushchev had been willing to take to ensure his Berlin strategy was successful. The second article contains the judgment that most East Europeans were nervous about the East-West crisis over Berlin and that East European leaders had had only limited success in reassuring the public. The third reported that the East German Police and militia evacuation of a five-kilometer-wide East German border zone of residents and their families, who were deemed politically unreliable by the Ulbrich regime, went smoothly. The fourth article reported statements by Soviet and East German leaders that did not address the deadline for a German peace treaty, suggesting to analysts that the deadline might be withdrawn. The final article reported Gromyko's 6 October talks with US officials that analysts judged may have been an attempt to resolve the Berlin situation.

Gilpatric made the speech in response to Khrushchev's threats on Berlin and to provide a public warning of the importance the United States attached to the freedom of West Berlin and West Germany.

According to this reporting, an "evolution" had taken place in the policies of Khrushchev and his government toward resolving the Berlin crisis. Because his methods to this end had failed, Khrushchev intended to produce in 1962 enough strategic missiles with nuclear warheads to attack all NATO countries and bases. Penkovskiy also reported that the headquarters of Marshal Kirill Moskalenko, who commanded strategic missile forces, would not be combined with that of Marshal of Artillery Varentsov, who was in charge of tactical missiles. General purpose forces would no longer receive as great attention and appropriations as in 1961. Moskalenko's forces would be built up rapidly. Missiles and other armaments for the ground forces would be scaled back and 400,000 soldiers and sergeants had been demobilized. The resulting savings were to be applied to strategic weapons.
The documents selected for this chapter are mainly those Col. Penkovski provided that contain the debate among Soviet high-ranking military officers on military doctrine conducted during the period 1960-1962. The debate centered on the role of nuclear weapons and missiles in a war with NATO in Europe. The collection includes articles by both sides in the debate, some of which directly attack positions taken by other officers in articles appearing in the special collection of Top Secret Military Thought issues. In addition, there are several Caesar, OCI and FBIS studies addressing those issues. Penkovski also provided copies of current classified Field Regulations the doctrinal debates sought to modify. Finally, there is a copy of a retrospective paper written by a CIA senior analyst for the Center for the Study of Intelligence in 1972 that provides a fairly comprehensive review of the type of information contained in the material Penkovski turned over and how it informed CIA military analysis during the 1960s and into the 1970s.

The paper describes Khrushchev's public statements on policies for the employment of nuclear weapons during the period 1958–60, including his 14 January 1960 report to the Supreme Soviet. Khrushchev's nuclear policies would have a major impact on the general purpose forces and the doctrine for going to war with NATO.


The report analyzes the military responses to Khrushchev's 14 January 1960 Supreme Soviet speech. For example, Soviet military spokesmen credited Khrushchev as a military theorist and his views on war and strategy as a contribution to doctrine. Articles in the Soviet military press endorsed statements in the speech countering long-held doctrinal tenets and were the first revisions of a general strategic nature acknowledged in the open press after 1955. The report concluded "the estimate that seems implicit in the doctrinal position now adopted by the military is that the USSR has now acquired, or will soon have, a sufficient quantity and a sufficiently versatile system of launch vehicles to permit greater overall reliance on these weapons than in the past."


The manual supersedes the *Field Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the Union of SSRs (Corps-Division)* of 1948 and the *Manual on the Characteristics of the Conduct of Combat Operations under Conditions of the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (Corps-Battalion)* of 1954. It includes an order signed by Minister of Defense Marshal Malinovskiy announcing the publication of the manual. According to his remarks, the regulations take into account the threat of nuclear weapons by an enemy and his proposals for their use.


The report compares Khrushchev's 1960 Supreme Soviet Speech with Malinovskiy's October 1961 22nd CPSU/CC Party Congress speech on military doctrine. Aspects covered include surprise attack, nuclear war, the role of conventional weapons and forces, troop cuts, the questions of resource allocation to consumer goods and light industry versus heavy, military industry, and the implications of the U-2 "invasion" of Soviet air space for increased vigilance and forces.


This study of Soviet naval strategy contains a section describing the general development of military strategy in the Soviet military in the 1950s. In the author's words; "All sources of intelligence and, in particular, highly classified articles on Soviet military science and art relating to naval matters, that were published in a TOP SECRET Special Collection series of the principal Soviet military journal Voyennaya mysl' [Military Thought] have been analyzed in this report for the purpose of deriving current Soviet naval mission, strategy, tasks, policies, and future trends and their effect on the development of [Soviet] naval forces."


The article is a verbatim translation of remarks by the editor of *Military Thought* appearing in the initial issue of the special collection. It was released in the USSR in early 1960."
The study is based entirely on open-source Soviet materials, principally the theoretical military journals and textbooks on military science. The articles contain indications of Soviet military thinking on future war, the making of military doctrine in the USSR, strategic doctrine for the first attack, doctrine for war after the first attack, and an appendix on the status of Soviet military doctrine on the eve of WW II.

The article reflects the real challenges confronting the Soviet military as it sought to integrate the military doctrine represented by the 1959 field service regulations with everyday military operational practice.

This document is the second in a series of Caesar reports on problems of Soviet military thought and policy. [For the first report, see Document III-7.] The study addresses a more narrow aspect of the issue, first attack. It draws on classified Soviet documents as well as public materials to examine the thinking and planning of Soviet military leaders for future war and specifically for its initial phase. It covers Soviet attitudes toward the first phase of nuclear war, the case for preemptive attack, and some implications of preemption.

The manual was published with only a short time lapse between the publication of this new edition of the field service regulations and the 1959 edition. The new version reflects the turmoil in doctrinal development in the Soviet Ministry of Defense. The final version of this manual is not available, but it almost certainly reflected this draft and the comments of Marshall Chuykov contained in Document III-11. The clandestinely obtained draft version reproduced here was released in Moscow in 1962.

The article, though not available to US intelligence until 1978, provides an organized and informative discussion of the field service regulations of the armed forces of the USSR. It explains the importance of the regulations to the training and understanding of Soviet doctrine and strategies resulting from the development and introduction of new weapons to forces. This document is included here because it offers documentary testimony of the importance of the field service regulations to the Soviet armed forces, an importance long appreciated by US intelligence analysts.

In the memorandum, Helms reports, "The Penkovskiy case covered the period August 1960 through August 1962 and provided more than 8,000 pages of translated reporting, most of which constituted highly classified Soviet Ministry of Defense documents." During three lengthy sessions with him, every Western intelligence requirement of any priority was covered, and all aspects of his knowledge and access were explored. "Over 90 percent of the approximately 5,000 [sic] pages of Russian-language documentary information provided by him concerned military subjects. Roughly half of the information came from the GRU Library, while the remainder was acquired by him in the missile and artillery headquarters of Marshal Varentsov or at the Dzerhinsky Academy."
The report examines the failure of military spokesmen to even mention Khrushchev's force cuts announced in his 13 December 1963 speech to the concluding plenum of the CPSU/CC and later linked by Khrushchev to a reduction in the military budget in the month following his speech. Instead, according to the report, military spokesmen had gone out of their way to defend the concept of large ground forces under the current military conditions. For example, one week after Khrushchev's speech, an article by Marshal Chuykov in the 21 December issue of Izvestiya presented an argument against cutting troops while the West continued to build up its forces.

This report examines evidence of a renewed interest in conservative military doctrine just three months after the report of conservative agitation in Document III-13. The report could not identify any development that the conservative military elements would regard as a threat to their interests. According to the report, a number of articles had appeared in the military press [again] in just a few weeks time in which some authors openly argued that traditional methods and conventional arms deserved continued attention despite the contemporary revolution in military affairs. According to the analysis, other authors had complained that this time the conservatives had held back the forward movement of military science.

This is the third FBIS report [Documents III-13 and III-14] on the discussions in the military press on the impact of modern technology on strategy ongoing after January 1964. In the past, the predominance of articles supported the traditionalist point of view, but the new entries, including a major article in two parts by Marshal Sokolovskiy and Major General Cherednichenko, reasserted the modernist outlook in August issues of Red Star. According to the report, these two articles "suggested that the modernists were not only holding the line in the debate but were pressing an even more radical formulation of their position than in the past. Sokolovskiy and Cherednichenko stressed the decisive role of nuclear weapons and strategic forces in a future war, emphasized the crucial importance of the initial phase of the war and unequivocally asserted nuclear war could not be protracted." The report compares Sokolovskiy and Cherednichenko's basic propositions discussed in their authoritative theoretical work, Military Strategy, published in 1962, with the positions they took in the issues of Red Star.

This is a retrospective paper written for the Center for the Study of Intelligence that provides a fairly comprehensive review of the type of information contained in the material Penkovskiy turned over and how it informed CIA military analysis during the 1960s and into the 1970s.

The article is about potential Soviet offensive operations in the European Theater.

The article is by two military writers who endorsed Khrushchev's strategy of nuclear war against NATO.
Kurochkin addresses questions raised by three authors in two articles in the special collection of Military Thought, issue No. 1, 1960, on the question of employing various branches of the armed forces in nuclear warfare. He disputes the position of the authors calling for a reappraisal of Soviet military doctrine, strategy, operational art, and tactics to bring them in line with the "new" requirements of nuclear warfare. He argues the authors' solution to modern warfare, nuclear-missile weapons, is simplistic, eliminating any role for ground forces and abolishing the need for strategy, operational art, and tactics by all branches of the armed forces.

Goryainov provides the technical-mathematical bases of future warfare using nuclear weapons and missiles. The author reviews the scientific-technical information about nuclear weapons in a future war and applies his understanding of these data to propose a new approach to a future war with nuclear weapons and missiles. The author takes the position that a small number of large nuclear [thermonuclear] weapons has such a devastating effect over areas as large West Germany and Great Britain that the basic principles of a new military doctrine need to be considerably changed. In addition to his thesis about the destructiveness of large nuclear weapons, he notes that they are: economical; can with acceptable accuracy reach any point on the globe; and wreak such destruction that industrial and other features of a target cannot be reconstituted in a meaningful period of time. Hence, in his view, the primary task of the armed forces in war should not be the seizure of territories, but of depriving the enemy of the possibility of using nuclear/missile weapons—evidently by destroying the whole of the territory where they are based. After painting a picture of utter devastation of the territories of the target countries, he seems to caution that the time [and intensity] limits of a war must be determined [limited] by the power and number of bursts which will not cause a dangerous saturation of the atmosphere and surface of the globe, including that of one's own country with radioactive substances. He does not examine how to get the enemy to agree on acceptable levels of devastation. The article also maintains there are substantial gaps in Soviet military-theoretical thought and a lack of creativity needed to move forward.

Kurasov addresses the rapid changes in Soviet views on warfare and military art consonant with the massive introduction of nuclear weapons and various delivery vehicles, particularly missiles. These include: [1] changes to concepts and goals of front offensive operations, [2] changes in the strength and mission of front forces and weapons, [3] changes in the immediate tasks of the front for destroying the enemy and seizing the entire front, [4] changes in subsequent tasks for destroying the enemy's strategic reserves, [5] changes in the methods of conducting the front offensive operations to the simultaneous destruction of the enemy by strategic and front missile troops in the entire depth of his operational formation. The article concludes that, under the influence of the massive use of nuclear weapons and the increased mobility of the troops, the scope of the operations of a front will be carried out in wide zones and on separate disconnected axes. Missile forces will deliver a powerful strike at the beginning of the offensive, airborne forces will occupy the most important areas of the enemy's territory, motorized forces will overrun tactical and operational forces, and aviation forces will destroy and neutralize the enemy's nuclear weapons and troops. Several paragraphs at the end of the article rather naively address the problems of radiation and fallout from the use of nuclear weapons on the troops.

Shchepennikov addresses the consequences of the armed forces' dependence solely on transportation forces for deploying troops. The article calls for careful consideration of requirements when developing and preparing networks for transporting troops, materiel, equipment, and support functions, particularly during the periods of threat, at the beginning of war and during the course of a war.


**Document III-24.** "On Regrouping a Combined-Arms Army from the Depth of the Country in the Initial Period of a War", by Maj. Gen. P. Stepshin, special collection *Military Thought*, top secret issue No. 6, 1961, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 13 June 1962, footnote 10. Stepshin describes exercises examining the problems of deploying large troop formations to the front while under nuclear attack at the beginning of a future war. The lessons learned from the exercises include: [1] an army's time in the "built-up" area should be limited, [2] all planning must be completed before the enemy's first attack, [3] committing a whole army to a battle must be a rare exception, and [4] mobilization should begin on the eve of war, and never later than the seventh day.

**Document III-25.** "The Fundamentals of Antimissile Defense", by Col. Gen. of Aviation I. Podgorny and Colonels V. Savko and N. Maksimov, special collection *Military Thought*, top secret issue No. 1, 1962, published in the USSR, December 1961, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 24 August 1962, footnote 11. The authors posit the United States will be the enemy whose weapons the Soviets will need to counter in a future war. They argue Soviet antimissile defenses will be successful in repulsing the first missile strikes in the initial period of war only when the Soviets develop capabilities to defeat US countermeasures able to defeat Soviet defensive weapons. He examines US countermeasures and Soviet antimissile defenses in detail, concluding the nature of a future nuclear missile war makes antimissile defense the most serious task in defeating the enemy.

**Document III-26.** "Comments on a Previous Article 'Some Pressing Problems of Antiair Defense of the Country'”, by Lt. Col. Ye. Ryvkin, special collection *Military Thought*, top secret issue No. 6, 1961, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 27 June 1962, footnote 12. Ryvkin examines the problem of air defense addressed in an article by Lt. Col. N. Melnikov, which appeared in *Military Thought* issue No 1, 1961. Ryvkin agrees with Melnikov's main points on the inadequacy of an air defense consisting of a single grouping of antiaircraft missile troops vice dispersing them, or of a defensive perimeter around important objectives to guarantee security. He does not, however, agree with Melnikov's solution for defending the entire national border. He believes it is impractical because the enemy can discover the screen and break through. Instead, he agrees with a proposal by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Biryuzov to use long-range missiles to provide zonal defenses in important areas.

**Document III-27.** "Several Questions on Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Basic Means of Antiair Defense of the Country", by Col. Gen. of Aviation S. Mironov, special collection *Military Thought*, top secret issue No. 6, 1961, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 3 August 1962, footnote 13. Mironov criticizes press reporting that values the role played by one weapon—for example, antiaircraft guided missiles—while deprecating the value of another—in this example, fighter aircraft. The remainder of the article is devoted to examining the combat capabilities of antiaircraft guided missiles and interceptors.
Mamayev seeks to present naval operations during the initial period of a nuclear war as primarily offensive, especially characterized by air and submarine attacks against NATO aircraft carrier strike groups. Two major components of his proposed strategy involve Soviet submarines in constant trail of the carriers from port in peacetime and long-range aviation reconnaissance and aerial strikes. He advocates committing the maximum number of aircraft and submarines in a single strike using almost all the nuclear warheads allocated for the destruction of the carrier task group. According to the author, the more generally held view was to attack in a series of strikes. The author does not address the possibility of war without the use of nuclear weapons. The covering memo transmitting the report from the DDI to the DCI includes the preliminary comments of the DDI on the article.

Kharlamov joined other military writers in highlighting the top priority of combating enemy carrier and missile submarine forces at the expense of other naval missions in the initial period of a war. He disputed the contention of some naval writers that only submarines were needed or capable in most cases of accomplishing the mission. He especially took Admiral Platonov to task for his earlier article about the low utility of combined forces and the level of sophistication of combined exercises. He directed his most biting criticism at Platonov's proposal to separate the fleet commands between an on-scene commander and one ashore.

Kharlamov advocated a single commander of operations positioned ashore and aided by undefined future advances in automation. Like Platonov and others, he only addressed the possibility of war with nuclear weapons.

Zhukovskiy describes, in some detail, the Soviet perception of US Navy shipbuilding and deployment practices for nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). He attempts to portray a methodical antisubmarine warfare [ASW] strategy for defense against the US SSBN threat in which the role of each component of the ASW forces is addressed. The problem of actually locating enemy submarines to destroy them is largely assumed away in the article by focusing on search methods while avoiding mention of the probability of detection of enemy SSBNs. DI comments from 1962 on the article are attached to the rear of the document.

Platonov disputes the arguments of Col. Gen. Gastilovich, a leading proponent of the modernist group, that war in the future would be a blitzkrieg of short duration leaving no major role for the Navy other than the immediate destruction of enemy vessels carrying nuclear missiles. Platonov argues for a major role for the Navy in the longer duration war he asserts as most likely to occur. He especially argues for a dramatic increase in emphasis on the production of nuclear-powered submarines and a broader role for them in naval strategy. Platonov devotes relatively little discussion to the new Soviet nuclear-missile-carrying submarines.

Platonov devotes relatively little discussion to the new Soviet nuclear-missile-carrying submarines.
Panteleyev advocates formations [squadrons] of submarines operating independent of other forces and using nuclear weapons for strikes against aircraft-carrier forces, missile-carrying submarines, and reinforcement convoys. He also advocates assignment of land targets to strategic missiles fired from land-based launchers and specifically argues against using submarines for the purpose. He evidently believes it is necessary to pre-deploy squadrons of submarines to distant defensive locations before war and assumes such large-scale deployments would go unnoticed by the enemy. To support his proposed operational capabilities he notes problems of organization, control, and materiel support need to be solved. He also advocates tailoring navigational charts to the needs of submarine operations.


Zvyagin notes the preeminence of submarines in current and future navies, but, at the same time, he strives to show important roles for future surface forces in the missions of the Soviet Navy. His view of naval operations is less expansive than many of his contemporaries and focuses on combat in areas relatively close to the USSR. Like his contemporaries he evidently assumes that combat at sea will be with nuclear weapons, not a conflict using only conventional weapons. He also addresses some support tasks for the Navy such as coastal defense, convoy protection, and mine clearing, and the kind of ships needed to accomplish those tasks.

The eight clandestine reports below are articles that appeared in the top secret Military Thought special collection provided by Col. Penkovskiy. They assess the place of armor in a future military doctrine, claiming arguments for an important role for tank troops was also, perhaps primarily, meant to bolster the "traditionalists'" position in the doctrine debate.


Babadzhanyan reviews the positions on the nature of modern war taken by five Soviet general officers (Maj. Gen. Goryainov, Col. Gen. Gastilovich, Generals Tolkonyuk and Baskakov, and General of the Army Kurochkin) in articles published in the special collection of top secret Military Thought issues during the period 1960-1961. Babadzhanyan contests the views of Gastilovich et al on the singularly decisive nature of nuclear weapons in modern warfare but sees merit in the arguments of General Kurochkin which seek a more balanced mix of missile and ground forces.


The article is probably the most important of the articles of the special collection of Military Thought articles and seemingly settled many of the contentious issues—at least temporarily. Minister of Defense Malinovskiy spoke with considerable authority, giving, in effect, the answer without foreclosing further discussion. Large ground force formations would continue to be essential to the defeat of an enemy in the Western Theater of Operations.


Poluboyarov describes the debate on the role of ground forces and tank armies in a nuclear-missile war. The article cedes to nuclear missiles and troops the decisive role in attaining the aims of such a war or of individual operations but argues the goal of completing the final defeat of the enemy and seizing and holding territory and
installations belongs to the ground forces, and argues that tank troops are the best equipped of the ground forces to carry out these tasks.

The article contains the following quote summing up this famous military leader's views in the doctrinal debate and in the debate among the ground forces advocates: "We need powerful and well-organized tank troops—all the experience of the last war speaks eloquently of this, and it is demanded by modern conditions of carrying out combat operations arising as a result of the appearance and development of missile troops and nuclear weapons." Rotmistrov also provided good direct evidence of the issues surrounding ground force organizations and equipment during the time of their reorganization and reduction in size. Considered with the Malinovskiy article, [Document III-35]^{24} this article provided substantial evidence for the joint CIA/DIA reassessment of Soviet ground forces discussed in Chapter V.

Shevchenko ostensibly agrees with articles written by Marshal Rotmistrov, advocating increasing the proportion of tanks among the ground forces. Shevchenko nonetheless used the article to propose replacing the tank with a whole new combat vehicle to mount a variety of weapon systems and incorporate troop carrying capabilities. He asserts that anti-tank guided missiles armed with shape charge warheads will comprise the greatest danger to tanks no matter the level of armor protection. The author supports the position taken by General of the Army A.S. Zhadov. For the three articles in order see Document III-34, "The Nature of Modern Warfare", by Col. Gen. A. Kh. Babadzhanyan; Document III-37, "The Paths of Further Development of the Tank Troops of the Soviet Army", by Marshal of Armored Troops P. Rotmistrov; and Document III-42, "Trends in the Development of the Tank Troops of the Soviet Army", by General of the Army A. Zhadov, who proposed arming modern tanks with the most advanced missile weapons to destroy any enemy tank or other targets at great distances.

Sergeyev argues the tank troops are the forces best suited to conduct combat operations in a nuclear-missile war, particularly to exploit the results of Soviet nuclear attacks against an enemy, because they have the best protection from enemy nuclear counterstrikes and have great striking power and mobility. Drawing from the results of a conference held at the Military Academy of Armored Troops in May 1961, he examines the prospects for developing armored combat vehicles to fight a nuclear-missile war.

Zavizion examines the need for organizational reform of tank armies to address the new doctrine for future wars with nuclear weapons and missiles. He derives much of the information for his article from a lecture by Marshal of Armored Troops Rotmistrov at a conference held at the Military Academy of Armored Troops. Rotmistrov addressed the basic direction the reforms should take to improve the organizational structure of tank armies. Other issues addressed include: raising the firepower of tanks; improving the ability of tanks to penetrate enemy lines; increasing protection from the effects of nuclear weapons; improving the capability to make swift strikes with large tank units; providing a constant supply of reserve units and subunits to maintain
the combat effectiveness of tank troops; increasing capabilities to constantly repair equipment; realigning command and control and staffs; and reorganizing the rear services.


Zemskov examines research carried out in 1961 at higher military-education institutes, specialized scientific-research institutes, and directly with the combat forces. The research focused on preparations for offensive operations during the initial period of war, the employment of missile troops, and automated command and control of the armed forces. He discusses the two reports on the results of the research produced during the year by the main staff and the directorates of the commander in chief of the Ground Forces: "The Employment of Missile Troops in front Operations", and "The Organization of Troop Control in front and Army Operations." Zemskov reviews the conclusions and recommendations.


In the context of a nuclear missile war, Zhadov focuses on the continued role of ground forces, sharply differing with the Marshal Rotmistrov, [Document III-37] principally on specific ground force organizations and tank formations. While professing the principal role of nuclear missiles, Zhadov clearly focuses on the continued central role of major ground force formations in a future war.


The authors clearly did not believe the utility of ground forces had ended. Their discussion focuses on the merits of wheeled versus tracked armored-personnel-carriers, a debate still raging today among Western military specialists. The article significantly foretold the development of variants of the BTR-60-class of eight-wheeled armored vehicles produced in the USSR and Eastern Europe in some form beginning in the 1960s and continuing until the demise of the Warsaw Pact.

**Document III-16.** "Penkovskiy's Legacy and Strategic Research," has references to the following two clandestine reports from the collection of secret articles of the journal Military News. The footnote number indicated for the articles is the reference in that document.


Shaposhnikov examines problems with combat against enemy tactical nuclear weapons. The missile troops with operational-tactical designation are also responsible for destroying nuclear weapons deep in enemy territory.


The authors present their evidence that large units and units are not meeting requirements for the study of military science. They claim the reasons for this is that planning for study by the units lacks aim and specificity, and is conducted without regard to the practical tasks of the units. Hence, they maintain solutions to tactical problems continue to lag behind the level of operational art. According to the authors this is
particularly true in the studies on the use of nuclear and missile weapons in a nuclear attack. The article reviews several examples of planning or lack of planning for specific units in specific scenarios and addresses solutions to improve the study by large units.


The memorandum describes the scope of Penkovskiy's effort.


18 GRU is the transliteration of an abbreviation of the Cyrillic for the Soviet Military Intelligence Directorate: Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie.

19 The editors have been unable to locate Marshal Chuykov's 13 December 1963 Izvestiya article.


21 Colonel Melnikov's article is not available.

22 Admiral Kharlamov is referring to the article by Admiral Platanov in Document III-31.


25 For this article, see Document III-37, "The Paths of Further development of the Tank Troops of the Soviet Army," Marshal of Armored Troops P. Rotmistrov.

↑ BACK TO CHAPTER 3

**CHAPTER IV**

NEW INSIGHTS INTO THE WARSAW PACT FORCES AND DOCTRINE: THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1962)

The collection of documents for this chapter contains information and documents Penkovskiy provided to the United States that aided in understanding the forces and materiel the Soviets later delivered to Cuba. The collection also includes specific topical on-site clandestine reporting valuable to the US effort to thwart Soviet intentions to deploy missiles in Cuba. There are two definitive reports of the crisis written immediately
following the resolution of the crisis: one covers military aspects and implications of the crisis for Soviet military prestige and capabilities, and the other addresses the political aspects and implications of the crisis for Khrushchev and the Soviet Union.

**Document IV-1.** "The Organization of Combat Support of a Regiment Equipped with Strategic Missiles", *Strategic Missile Bulletin*, issue No. 2, 1961, CIA/DP, Clandestine Report Special Collection, 5 March 1962. The article demonstrates the military need for local physical security from attacks by enemy airborne or saboteur groups. This article helped military analysts anticipate the Soviet need for greater security for the Cuban excursion, where the Soviets placed a much greater emphasis on protection, and the selected deployment of Soviet regimental armored groups.


The following two articles describe the technical specifications of the surface-to-air-missiles [SAMs] and the vulnerabilities of the Soviet air defense systems and organizations.

**Document IV-3.** "Technical Data on a Soviet Surface-to-Air Missile Designated V-75", CIA/DP, Clandestine Report Special Collection, 24 May 1961 [DOI, early 1959]. The article is a translation of notes taken from a Soviet top secret technical manual. It supplied invaluable information about the V-75 SAM and its capabilities. The information allowed the military during the Cuban crisis to plan lower risk attacks.


The following three documents address the issues of Soviet MRBM employment that were relevant during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. They supplied key information for understanding the photographs taken by the U-2 of missile and air defense sites and troop encampments during the period June through November 1962.

**Document IV-5.** "Regarding two articles from the Strategic Missile Bulletin", CIA/DI, Memorandum for the DDI from Chief, Guided Missile Task Force, 5 March 1962. The memorandum evaluates two *Strategic Missile Bulletin* articles provided by Penkovskiy in Documents IV-6 and IV-7.

**Document IV-6.** "The Preparation for Combat Operations of a Regiment Armed with R-12 Missiles", *Strategic Missile Bulletin*, top secret issue No. 1, 16 July 1961, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 5 March 1962. The article explains the set-up procedures for a Soviet R-12—1,100 nautical-mile (nm) range—missile unit and the time required for different levels of readiness for the missile, which was sent to Cuba in 1962.
The article describes protective measures taken by strategic missile units like those that were sent to Cuba in 1962.

The following two clandestine reports describe Soviet military movements and specific missile installations in Cuba. The sources of the information were not trained military observers, but their information was important when combined with other information about Soviet forces provided by Penkovskiy and technical sources.

This reporting describes two sites the Soviet forces occupied in Cuba. It is reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, page 103-4, edited by Mary S. McAuliffe, CIA History Staff, Washington, DC, October 1992, available on the CIA website, www.cia.gov.

This reporting describes a convoy of Soviet trucks containing black boxes and long transport trailers carrying large missiles, all heading for "Campo Libertad." This report appeared in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 page 107-8 edited by Mary S. McAuliffe, CIA History Staff, Washington, DC, October 1992, available on the CIA website, www.cia.gov.

The following include two documents that are the definitive CIA analyses of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis conducted immediately following the agreement by Khrushchev to remove the missiles. The last two documents were not available until after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They are included here because they are the actual proposed Soviet General Staff's plan for the deployment of forces for the Cuban venture and the list of forces that were to take part in the operation.

The memorandum explains the purpose and status of the two documents that follow.

This is one of the definitive CIA analyses of the 1962 Missile Crisis, conducted immediately following the agreement by Khrushchev to remove the missiles. For information on Soviet ground forces units, see pages 47-49.

This is the study of the political aspects of the Cuban venture and is a companion document to Cuba 1962: Khrushchev's Miscalculated Risk.

This is the proposal to send troops and supplies to Cuba. It includes a timetable for building launch pads and
assembling missiles. The document describes the Soviet plans in terms close to the descriptions in the two DI papers, Documents IV-11 and IV-12 above.

The term "Anadry" is evidently a Soviet military codename for the Cuban venture. The document contains a complete list of the Soviet forces—Missile, Air Defense, Air, Ground and Naval forces, and the Rear Services—deployed to Cuba in 1962.  


26 See Volkogonov Papers, Library of Congress. The papers were translated by Raymond Garthoff, and published in the Cold War International History Bulletin II. The documents are available through the Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center, 1 Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20004-3027, or on its website at www.CWIHP.org.

27 Ibid Volkogonov papers.


↑ BACK TO CHAPTER 4

**NEW ESTIMATES OF THE SOVIET GROUND FORCES (1963-68)**

The documents in this chapter include two letters from the Secretary of Defense requesting two separate joint CIA/DIA studies of Soviet ground forces. The first study sought to define the size of the Soviet ground forces in terms of the number of divisions. The examination of all the Soviet ground forces installations in response to Secretary McNamara's request was made possible by the availability of new clandestine reporting and the accumulation of photography of the USSR and its analysis from the U-2 and the new CORONA satellite reconnaissance programs. The clandestine reporting includes several Military Thought documents pertaining to the capabilities and support of Soviet forces provided by Col Penkovskiy in 1961, some of which were not translated until 1962 or even 1963. All of the documents he had provided on Soviet forces that appear in the previous chapters were available to the members of the panel of analysts from DIA and CIA who participated in the study.

The second study, requested in 1967, addressed the Soviet ground forces in more detail than the first study and sought to provide a more definitive picture of the capabilities of the forces to confront NATO in Europe. This second joint study was possible because high resolution satellite photography was available in the second half
of the 1960s. There are copies of the interim editions of the two studies, of the estimates produced during the period the two studies were underway, and the estimates that were influenced by the joint studies.

- Documents Available before the First Joint Study
- Documents for the First Joint Study
- Documents for the Second Joint Study
- Photographic Interpretation Reports for the First Study
  - Carpathian Military District
  - Baltic Military District
  - Kiev Military District
  - Belorussia Military District
  - Moscow Military District

**DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE BEFORE THE FIRST JOINT STUDY**


The article describes the required evaluations, and the measures to be taken in the first hour by a combined-arms army located in a border region immediately following an initial surprise attack involving the use of weapons of mass destruction. The author discusses additional information that will be required, including chemical and nuclear decontamination at the front, across the country, and in enemy territory, as the combined-arms army regroups and commences operations. He examines in detail possible problems in transporting troops, providing support, and establishing forward command posts in the initial operations.


The author discusses the importance of improving combat readiness for the initial period of a nuclear war. He describes the importance of this period historically and in a future war, relates what combat readiness entails, and characterizes the nature and means of conducting military operations. The author posits the necessity of developing and perfecting weapons and doctrine to achieve victory over an enemy in the shortest possible time, and at the same time, to make preparations for a lengthy war. He assigns achievement of these goals, and objectives in the rear area, first to the missile troops, and second to the air defense forces. He also describes the important roles the ground and naval forces will play in achieving victory.


The article describes the new and different conditions for rear area support in modern warfare for both the Armed Forces and their equipment, and for potential national facilities attached to military commands. The author discusses in detail the implications of the changes in the size of the armies, the introduction of new and sophisticated weapons, the increases in tempo of offensive operations and the intensity of engagements, the increased materiel requirements, and the new requirements for communications and transport for the rear area support service.

**Document V-4.** "The Nature of Modern Armed Combat", by General of the Army A. Gorbatov, top secret special collection of Military Thought, issue No.3, 1960, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 2
March 1962.
The author seeks to stake out a role for theater forces in Soviet military doctrine and strategy. He challenged the views of those who, like Khrushchev, visualized warfare almost entirely in terms of strategic and other nuclear armed missile strikes with little need for ground forces and tactical aviation. General Gorbatov argues it is necessary to physically occupy the enemy's territory no matter how a war begins. He contends when the enemy strikes first the Soviets would be in a defensive situation, probably having suffered significant disruptions and losses, with the enemy advancing into Soviet territory. He concludes surprise can happen and when it does the capability to strike with strategic missiles would be no protection. His article and the following article were significant contributions to the CIA/DIA joint ground forces study.


The article is one of the most important Soviet critiques of a major exercise. It contains information on readiness, army group [front] organization and war planning as of summer 1961. Warsaw Pact documents published later show some of the changes in the war planning following the 1961 Berlin Crisis including the fronts of other Warsaw Pact allies in the overall scheme of operations.


Mernov subscribes to the position that large ground forces will be necessary in a future war. In concentrating on the mechanics of operational-level command-staff exercises, he glosses over the changes in doctrine and modern weaponry until late in his article. Then he notes the conceptual and practical problems posed by the changes of the late 1950s. He states that, when directing the exercises in the context of nuclear missile weapons, "the difficulty lies in the fact it is impossible to calculate the results of each nuclear strike with the authenticity and accuracy required in war. Without these calculations the course of combat operations and actions becomes distorted." Mernov's concept of the impossibility of calculating results when using nuclear weapons set this article apart from the bulk of the available classified writings of his contemporaries.

**Document V-7.** Soviet *Military Thought* on Large-Scale Nonnuclear War in Europe, CIA/DI/Senior Research Staff Typescript Intelligence Memorandum, 18 January 1963.


↑ BACK TO CHAPTER 5

**DOCUMENTS FOR THE FIRST JOINT STUDY**


**Document V-8a.** *Capabilities of the Soviet Theater Forces*, NIE 11-14-62, disseminated December 1962. This is the estimate Secretary of Defense MacNamara discussed in his 13 February 1963 letter.
This SRS memorandum was prepared as a research aid for the analysts involved in the CIA/DIA reevaluation of the estimates of the size and strength of Soviet ground forces. It is a study of information taken from the classified series of *Military Thought* articles provided by Penkovskiy.

The regulations cover the following topics: the principles of combined-arms combat, troop control, political work, intelligence, protection of troops against weapons of mass destruction [WMD], anti-air defense, movement of troops, the meeting engagement, the offensive against a defending enemy, the airborne operation and combat operations of an airborne division, pursuit, defense, combat in encirclement and breaking out of encirclement, withdrawal, disposition of troops in place and their security, materiel, and technical and medical support of troops in combat.31

The memorandum conveys for approval the terms of reference for a joint Soviet ground forces study to be discussed at a 27 May 1963 meeting of CIA and DIA representatives.

The attachment contains the terms of reference for the joint study on Soviet ground forces.

The memorandum reports CIA and DIA representatives agreed the effort should be viewed as a study of the evidence rather than the preparation of another estimate on Soviet ground forces; it should be entered into in the frankest way, uninhibited by past positions or estimates; and it should include a study of the costs of Soviet ground forces.

The memorandum reports the panel decided to structure the study to begin with a description of the structure and mission of the Soviet ground forces, followed by a discussion of Soviet mobilization philosophy. A general discussion of the nature, adequacy, and scope of the information about line units, including organization, manning and equipment would follow. There will be some comparisons with US units particularly on costs. Finally DIA will construct an assessment of the number of such divisions, according to the confidence the task force has in their existence on the basis of available evidence.

A series of reports prepared by NPIC Photographic Analysis Group, the CIA Photographic Intelligence Division and the DIA Production Center 1P1c on Soviet ground forces and logistic installations for the Joint CIA/DIA Study of Soviet Ground Forces requested by Secretary McNamara is at the end of the catalogue for this chapter, beginning with Document V-63. The 447 reports in the series represent the printed version of the PI support provided to the Joint CIA/DIA Panel. Although the availability of satellite photography provided for the first time the identification of military installations throughout the USSR, the low-resolution of the photography did not yield many of the details of the units identified that were necessary to complete the analysis of the Soviet military forces and equipment.
The report relates the progress and interim conclusions of the Joint Study Panel. It noted "the panel has examined the evidence from all sources on the Soviet ground force in terms of its organization, number of major line elements and manpower." The panel found the quality of the evidence varied widely and did not permit high-confidence in single-value assessments of most of the quantitative aspects of the force that were examined. The panel, however, noted there was abundant evidence on the general nature of the force regarding its organization, mission, magnitude, and system for acquiring manpower. The report includes a discussion of how the study defined Soviet ground forces in a footnote to paragraph 1 of the summary and conclusions, page 3.

This is the final version of this estimate. It includes the revised numbers for Soviet forces from the joint CIA/DIA study. This report re-examines the evidence on the inventory of Soviet land-combat equipment and conventional ammunition available to the Soviet ground forces and assesses the level of confidence or range of uncertainty the panel had in its conclusions based on the evidence.

The letter thanks the DCI and the analysts involved in the joint CIA/DIA study for their efforts reflected in the refined information about Soviet general purpose forces contained in NIE 11-14-63. (For text of this NIE, see Document V-14)

**Document V-16.** Contribution to NIE 11-14-64 *Capabilities of Soviet General-Purpose Forces 1964-70*, CIA/DI/ORR, 6 October 1964.
The ORR contribution contains new information developed after the publication of NIE 11-14-63 about Soviet policy and doctrine for ground, naval, and air forces; Soviet tactical and defensive missile systems; the Soviet Naval surface, submarine and Air Forces; and the Soviet tactical missile system. It also reviews evidence about Soviet development of an anti-tactical ballistic missile system and the effects of the low wartime birth rate on the manpower available for military conscription.

In the NIE, the IC judges the general purpose forces remain the largest and most expensive element of the Soviet military establishment despite the rapid and costly development of Soviet strategic attack forces. The information gained during the previous year showed that the manpower levels had declined after 1961 and the IC concludes the numbers are less than the previous estimate and, with the removal of Khruschev, there no longer is an advocate for reductions among the top political leadership.

The annex contains photography of Soviet ground force installations. It explains the IC had devised techniques for analyzing and collating the photography with other forms of evidence about ground forces, the result being a major step forward in the ability of the IC to make judgments on a reasonably current basis about Soviet ground divisions.

The report re-examines the evidence on the inventory of Soviet land-combat equipment and conventional ammunition available to the Soviet Ground Forces and assesses the level of confidence or range of uncertainty the panel had in its conclusions based on the evidence.

This memorandum discusses the history of the CIA/DIA Panel, including the second report, [see Document V-18] for which it seeks approval from the DCI for transmittal to the Secretary of Defense and proposes disbanding the panel.

This estimate had the benefit of the Joint CIA/DIA study of Soviet Ground Forces. It states the new Soviet leadership had modified Khrushchev’s policy of curbing military costs for general purpose forces. It predicted there would be revisions in the forces levels, organization and deployment of the forces in the next ten years, and improved capabilities for nonnuclear war. The estimates of the size of the forces reflect the information from the joint study and a new confidence in the figures the estimate presented.

The document adjusts the judgments of the current estimate by decreasing the number of category I and II line divisions in the order of battle of Soviet Ground Forces.

In this memorandum, OSR military analysts attempted to interpret the often vague and convoluted text of military articles on the doctrine for limited war to clarify the concepts and to gain a better understanding of the evolving Soviet view of limited war.

↑ BACK TO CHAPTER 5

**DOCUMENTS FOR THE SECOND JOINT STUDY**

See Document V-74 for an earlier report on this installation.

**Document V-24.** *Pskov Army Barracks Cherekha, USSR, Baltic MD*, Imagery Analysis Division, CIA/DI Imagery Analysis Division, August 1965.

**Document V-25.** *Probable SCUD* Missile Unit at Mary North Airfield, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Intelligence Report, CIA/DI Imagery Analysis Division, August 1965.


See also Document V-89 for an earlier report on this installation.


Document V-52. "USSR Reinforcement Capability", Secretary of Defense Letter to DCI, 17 May 1967. The Secretary's letter expresses his concerns about IC estimates on Soviet ability to reinforce Central and Southern Europe with forces from the USSR and requests a study to refine the existing estimates.

Document V-53. *Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces*, CIA/DI/OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-67, disseminated September 1967. The analysis concludes, "...the Soviets were taking steps to give their forces the capability to respond to a spectrum of contingencies and were transferring some of the responsibility for forces to Warsaw Pact allies for the contingency of major military operations against NATO." The East Europeans were modernizing their forces, and the Warsaw Pact strategy was increasingly emphasizing national control. However, the analysts concluded, "divergent national interests and national control of forces" were reducing the likelihood the NSWP nations would cooperate in a war against NATO.

Document V-54. This number intentionally left blank.


This is the periodic IC estimate of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. As noted in the conclusions, the section dealing with "Capabilities against the Central Region of NATO" is not included in the estimate, because the Joint Study requested by Secretary McNamara had not been completed in time to be included in the 1967
estimate. It does include some estimates of the strength of Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces in the USSR and in Warsaw Pact Countries.


The study is an all-source study but had a strong basis in material supplied by Penkovskiy. (See Document-56a.) The summary states that the research to date had raised serious doubts concerning previous estimates of the tables of organization and equipment of major units, their actual manning and equipment levels, the extent of their capacity for support in sustained operations, and their ability to achieve early massive reinforce with present forces. The future work of the joint CIA-DIA study group will concentrate on these and related questions.


The memorandum provides details of how the materials supplied by Col Penkovskiy in the early 1960s provided evidence in support of the efforts of the joint CIA-DIA study.


This study is based on analysis of repetitive photographic coverage of two typical Soviet combat-ready divisions in East Germany in an effort to upgrade US estimates of the true TO&E of Soviet Ground Forces divisions. The study concludes a combat-ready Soviet division is smaller and more austerely equipped than previously believed.

**Document V-58.** *OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.*

The estimate has the benefit of the Joint CIA-DIA study of the Soviet forces and material. It includes the revised data on Soviet capabilities to reinforce its forces in Central Europe. It describes the first major changes after 1960 in the Soviet ground forces: increase in the size of forces, alteration of their dispositions and extension of the range and variety of their traditional missions. It describes the observations of the Czech Crisis as a major source of information on the forces and how they operate. The study also describes new insights into Warsaw Pact war planning, combat readiness in peacetime, plans for mobilization, and the need for reinforcements in the event of a war with NATO.

**Document V-59.** *Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, NIE 11-14-68, 12 December 1968.*

This is the final version of this estimate with the results of the multi-year effort by CIA and DIA requested by Secretary McNamara in May 1967. It provided an IC consensus about the equipment levels and associated readiness assessments for Soviet Ground Forces sought by the Secretary.³⁸


The paper is an analysis of articles appearing in the Soviet press by Soviet military officers debating the allocation of resources between strategic forces and conventional forces for the 1970s. The military analysts also discussed the resulting implications for the ABM treaty and the risks and advantages of pursuing other arms limitation talks.

**Document V-61.** *Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Facing NATO, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report, September 1969.* This is the final OSR contribution to the Joint CIA-DIA Study of the *Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces.*
The report is a comprehensive reassessment of the capabilities and status of the Soviet ground forces based on new high resolution satellite photography and a variety of other sources. It covers Soviet ground forces facilities and capabilities acquired in the previous three years. The paper concludes the Warsaw Pact was probably capable of mobilizing—calling-up, assembling, and forming or integrating into units—the men and vehicles required to organize five fronts in Central Europe in about a week if the process is not interrupted by hostile military action. Their integration as combat effective units in the theater of operations, particularly at the front level, probably would require more time. In an emergency, the mobilization and movement into Central Europe of the line divisions and combat support elements of the Carpathian and Belorussian fronts could probably be accomplished in two weeks, although some important elements of the army and front rear services would still be incomplete.

The report assesses the evidence of increases in artillery after the fall of Khrushchev and explores the implications of the changes for Soviet military doctrine and capabilities. It also discusses the mission and strength of Soviet front and army artillery, assesses Soviet artillery doctrine, tactics and gunnery techniques, and compares Soviet artillery capabilities with those of NATO.

† BACK TO CHAPTER 5

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION REPORTS FOR THE FIRST STUDY

CARPATHIAN MILITARY DISTRICT

The 2,850-acre training area contains two moving target tank firing ranges, a wheeled-vehicle driver training course, and extensive combat training areas.

The 3,400-acre military training area has a tracked-vehicle training course, a wheeled-vehicle driver training course, a possible range ammunition storage site with six small buildings, a moving target range, possibly used by vehicle-mounted automatic weapons, approximately six target runs, a moving target tank firing range and a range support facility with 12 permanent support buildings.

The semi-secured 685-acre installation contains 23 multistory barracks, nine multistory administration buildings, six single story administration buildings, two multistory probable maintenance buildings, one probable single story maintenance building, seven vehicle storage buildings, 46 storage buildings, six possible ammunition storage buildings, 24 support buildings, 23 dependent housing quarters, two athletic fields and one drill field and reviewing area.

The 40-acre probable military barracks contains six probable multistory barracks, seven probable combined vehicle storage and maintenance buildings, seven probable storage building and four support buildings. A fenced road-and rail-served petroleum storage area contains approximately 16 vertical petroleum storage tanks.
The partially secured 645-acre installation contains six combined administration and support buildings and 23 revetted or partially revetted ammunition storage buildings.

**Document V-68.** *Kamenets Podolskiy Army Barracks, Southeast Kamenets Podolskiy, USSR, Carpathian MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.*
The 165-acre installation contains four barracks buildings, six probable dependents quarters, two probable administrative buildings, six support buildings, and two athletic fields. There are two barracks within a partially fenced area, 10 storage buildings, three probable vehicle storage buildings and a 350-by-40-foot unidentified obstacle in the ground.

**Document V-69.** *Chernovtsy Possible Infantry Officers Candidate School, Chernovtsy, USSR, Carpathian MD, Photography Interpretation Report, NPIC July 1964.*
The two-acre installation is within the Chernovtsy city limits. It contains housing for about 1,900 troops. The school area contains one combined multistory barracks and administration building and two probable support buildings.

**Document V-70.** *Chernovtsy Army Barracks, Stalina UL, Chernovtsy, USSR, Carpathian MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.*
The partially fenced 60-acre installation is within the Chernovtsy city limits. It contains housing for approximately 2,000 troops. The installation has six probable multistory barracks, two probable multistory administration buildings, seven probable support buildings, three probable storage buildings, of which one is within a fenced area; and one probable drill field. Outside the fenced area there are 10 probable multistory dependents quarters and one multistory administration building. [See also V-30 for another report on this installation.]

**Document V-71.** *Chernovtsy Army Barracks Southeast Chernovtsy, USSR, Carpathian MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.*
The 30-acre secured military barracks area can house approximately 1,500 troops. The installation contains three multistory probable barracks, one multistory combined barracks, one administration building, two probable administration buildings, two probable combined vehicle storage and maintenance buildings, 10 storage buildings [one within a fenced area] and nine probable support buildings. Three kms southeast of the barracks area is a driver training area and four miscellaneous buildings.

**Document V-72.** *Chernovtsy Army Barracks, Roshtshinskaya, Chernovtsy, USSR, Carpathian MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.*
The secured 35-acre installation can house approximately 1,800 troops. The installation contains three probable multistory barracks, one probable combined multistory administration and barracks building, two probable combined vehicle maintenance and storage buildings, two probable storage buildings and five probable support buildings. (See also V-32 for another report on this installation.)

**Document V-73.** *Stanislav Army Barracks South, Stanislav, USSR, Carpathian MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.*
The large barracks complex contains two army barracks areas, a probable air force barracks area and an air force depot. All POL and ammunition storage is located at the airfield and training facilities located three km west. The army barracks contains seven multistory barracks, 11 storage buildings, two administration buildings and eight support buildings. The main Stanislav Army Barracks South contains six multistory barracks, six administration buildings, 17 storage buildings, 15 possible dependents quarters, a vehicle shed, 28
miscellaneous support buildings and an athletic field. The third barracks area probably serves the airfield. It contains an H-shaped administration building, 30 multistory barracks, five single story barracks, 14 probable dependents quarters, 12 storage buildings, two motor vehicle storage buildings and nine miscellaneous support buildings.

**Document V-74. Uzhgorod Army Barracks Southwest Uzhgorod, USSR, Carpathian MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**

This relatively new small army barracks located within Uzhgorod contains eight multistory barracks buildings, four multistory administration buildings, a motor pool and miscellaneous small administration and storage buildings. It may house MVD MOOP [militia] troops.

**Document V-75. Brody Army Barracks, Brody, USSR, Carpathian MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, August 1964.**

The 150-acre facility contains one long U-shaped administration building, six long multistory barracks buildings, one single-story barracks building, nine storage buildings, an athletic field with an oval track and a small, possible civilian, housing area.

**Document V-76. Military Installation North, Brody, USSR, Carpathian MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, August 1964.**

The 230-acre facility contains long, one single-story barracks, 10 multistory barracks, one T-shaped multistory administration building, one possible athletic building or drill hall with an associated oval track, four storage buildings, a small motor pool, one maintenance building, two small arms ranges, a pistol range, a large training area with a figure-8 driver training course and a fenced communications site.

**Document V-77. POL Facilities, Brody, USSR, Carpathian MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, August 1964.**

The installation has two fenced POL facilities. The larger 39-acre facility contains 10 vertical tanks and two rectangular-concrete open-reservoirs. It is served by two rail spurs that form two POL loading docks. Two possible tank foundations are in the open storage area. The smaller facility contains nine tanks and a rail spur that does not appear to have loading gear, and three small probable storage buildings. The smaller facility contains nine tanks and a rail spur with no loading gear and three storage buildings.

**Document V-78. Chernovtsy Headquarters 66th Guards Rifle Division, Chernovtsy, USSR, Carpathian MD, Photography Interpretation Report, NPIC, August 1964.**

The eight-acre installation is capable of housing 500 troops. It contains one multistory possible barracks, a U-shaped, multistory possible administration building, three probable support buildings and four probable storage buildings.

**Document V-79. Mukachevo Army Barracks, West-Southwest Mukachevo, USSR, Carpathian MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, August 1964.**

The report describes a medium-size barracks area located on the western edge of Mukachevo that has not expanded much since WWII because of the civilian residential areas surrounding it. The installation may be the headquarters and major elements of a motorized rifle division. It contains 19 barracks, 6 administration buildings, four probable warehouses, a possible gymnasium, three motor parks with storage and maintenance buildings, an athletic field, and extensive vehicle storage and maintenance areas. See Document V-23 for an earlier report on this installation.

**Document V-80. Uzhgorod Army Barracks North Uzhgorod, USSR Carpathian MD, Photographic Interpretations Report, NPIC, August 1964.**
The installation is divided into three main areas. Area D1 contains a large headquarters building and miscellaneous small administration buildings. Area J contains vehicle and equipment parks with general storage and maintenance buildings. Area D2 is a barracks area with seven large multi-story barracks building and miscellaneous smaller administration buildings.

The installation is a small barracks area near the center of Mukachevo that has not changed much since WWII photography except for a new barracks area. Based on the mainly headquarters-type buildings and barracks the report judges that this installation has an administrative function.

The facility is a support and maintenance-type installation located across the Latoritsa River from Svalyava and 23 km from Mukachevo. It contains approximately 15 barracks, 12 smaller dwellings, 18 combined maintenance and storage buildings and numerous small miscellaneous buildings. It contains a support area and a training area.

The 1,000-acre military training installation contains a tracked-vehicle driver training course, two small arms ranges, four probable flat-trajectory firing ranges and a moving target tank firing range.

The military storage site contains 20 storage buildings, 15 of which show evidence of blast protection. There are four types of storage buildings, designed as A, B, C, and D. Type A buildings have two revetted, gable-roof buildings with five evenly spaced ventilators along the peak of the roof. Type B buildings are two semi-buried buildings with drive-in entrances, one of which is protected on two sides by a blast wall. 14 buildings are designated as type C, of these 11 are revetted.

The medium-size ammunition depot contains 15 revetted storage buildings, five barracks, 11 small administration buildings, several small miscellaneous buildings and a motor pool. It has a rail spur.

The medium-sized military installation located on the outskirts of Uzhgorod has undergone considerable expansion since WWII. It contains troop barracks, warehouses, vehicle maintenance and storage buildings, POL and ammunition storage and a small arms firing range. It reportedly houses AAA, tank and motorized rifle troops.

† BACK TO CHAPTER 5

**BALTIC MILITARY DISTRICT**

The approximately 16,000-acre training installation contains small-arms firing ranges, driver-training areas, tank and assault-gun firing ranges, flat-trajectory firing ranges and two bivouac areas. It is probably used by all military units in Riga and the surrounding areas.

The 123-acre installation includes ten acres of possible open storage at the northern end of the compound. Inside the compound there are 96 buildings, mainly barracks and support buildings.

This 200-acre installation is probably associated with Dobele Army Barracks and probably provides logistic and administrative support for the Dobele Army Training Area. The installation contains eight barracks, 13 administration buildings, 14 vehicle maintenance and storage buildings, two motor parks and four small arms ranges. [See also V-44 for another report on this installation.]

This 250-acre installation contains 34 combined barracks and administration buildings, 19 storage buildings, nine vehicle storage and maintenance buildings, 12 probable support buildings and a small-arms range. [See also Document V-44 for another report on this facility].

Each facility in this 145-acre installation has a single fence. Together they contain five administrative buildings, 56 storage buildings, six revetted ammunition storage buildings, and seventeen support buildings.

This 250-acre installation contains seven administration buildings, nine barracks, 90 storage buildings and 19 support buildings.

This 275-acre installation is secured by a wall and contains the army barracks and probably an air academy. It has six administration buildings, 32 barracks and billeting buildings, 15 storage buildings, 36 support and maintenance buildings and two athletic fields.

This 70-acre installation contains one administration building, five barracks, 15 storage buildings, three vehicle sheds, one vehicle maintenance building and 21 support building.

This 163-acre installation contains two multistory combined administration and barracks buildings, one probable multistory barracks, one probable administration building, seven single story barracks, 27 support buildings, eight storage buildings, six probable storage buildings, two combined vehicle maintenance and
storage buildings and one probable vehicle shed. Training facilities for the installation are a large, wheeled vehicle, driver-training area.

The 110.7-acre installation contains four multistory combined administrative buildings and barracks, six single-story barracks, 20 storage buildings, 36 support buildings and two vehicle Maintenance and storage buildings.

The 100-acre barracks area contains 4 barracks, six administration buildings, 19 storage buildings, one probably vehicle combined maintenance and storage building and nine support buildings.

The 40-acre explosive double-fenced storage depot contains eight storage buildings, one administration building, two bunkered explosives storage buildings and three small support buildings.

This 4,400-acre installation is probably used by the various military units stationed in and around Kaliningrad. The Mendenau I driver training areas include Area M1 with a closed-circuit tracked-vehicle driver-training course. Area M2 contains a closed-circuit tracked-vehicle driver-training course and a probable wheeled-vehicle driver-training area. Area M3 contains a closed-circuit tracked-vehicle driver training course and a probable wheeled vehicle driver training area. The Tank and assault-gun firing range contains six 2,500 foot runs, five moving targets and two stationary earth embankments. There are two training areas that are not a part of the Mendenau I but they are connected by road and probably associated with it. One is a 1,000-acre training area to the south that contains a tracked-vehicle driver-training course and a probable bivouac area. The second is a 2,000-acre training area to the northwest that appears to be primarily used for driver training.

The 100-acre installation contains 30 barracks, 14 administration buildings, 11 combined vehicle maintenance and storage buildings, 17 storage buildings and seven support buildings.

The 60-acre installation contains seven barracks, three probable administration buildings, eight vehicle-and equipment-sheds, two vehicle maintenance buildings, three storage buildings and 10 support buildings.

This 500-acre installation is on the northern outskirts of Kaliningrad. It contains 10 multistory barracks, six administration buildings, three vehicle storage and maintenance buildings, nine storage buildings, nine support buildings, a figure-eight driver-training course and an athletic field. Associated with it is a training area with four small-arms ranges, a tank and assault-gun firing range, a flat-trajectory firing range, a possible tracked-wheel vehicle driver-training course and a small secured ammunition storage area.
The less than 20-acre small barracks area is near the center of Riga. It contains three barracks and a motor vehicle park with approximately 120 vehicles and pieces of equipment parked in the area.

This 150-acre secured barracks installation contains one administration building, seven barracks, 12 storage buildings, five vehicle maintenance and storage buildings, and two motor parks with probable tanks and SP^40 guns and vehicles. There is a small-arms firing range and two sub-caliber firing ranges at the northern end of the installation.

This 300-acre barracks area contains 13 multi-story barracks, 48 single story dwellings, 28 single-story support buildings, 12 single-story storage buildings, one vehicle maintenance building, three athletic fields, one small-arms firing range and one small cross-country driver-training course.

This 700-acre depot contains 30 single-story storage buildings in a heavily wooded area, 17 single-story dwellings at the entrance and an athletic field.

This 680-barracks area contains five multistory administration buildings, 26 multistory barracks, 18 single story storage buildings, 30 support buildings, one athletic field, three small-arms firing ranges and a figure-eight driver-training course.

The report describes a second secured installation located in the northeast corner of Riga. It contains eleven barracks, nine combined administration and support buildings, 29 storage buildings, a tall building, possibly a grain elevator with a conveyer system, two vehicle storage and support buildings and a support building, but no vehicle training facilities.

The depot is secured with a double fence and firebreaks and is divided into three separate sections: a 50-acre general storage area, an ammunition storage area and support area. The PI judges that it probably stores explosives and general supplies for the Riga training area and for the other close-by military installations. The ammunition storage area contains seven large and 45 small revetted and bunkered explosives storage buildings. The general storage area contains 35 buildings including one possible administration building, 26 storage buildings and eight support buildings. The support area, which is not fenced, contains one possible barracks and five support buildings.

The 40-acre installation contains 10 multistory barracks, five administration buildings, three L-shaped
administration buildings, two storage buildings, four support buildings, two vehicle storage buildings and three POL storage areas.

The 200-acre installation contains 16 multistory combined barracks and administration buildings, 10 single-story barracks, 13 storage buildings and 10 support buildings. There are two general storage areas: one contains 12 single story storage buildings, the second contains five single story storage buildings, four support buildings and an administrations building. There are two equipment storage and maintenance and vehicle areas. One contains five vehicle storage buildings. The second area contains five vehicle storage and maintenance buildings, two combined barracks and administration buildings, two storage buildings and four support buildings. There is an athletic field and seven unidentified buildings.

This 8,000-acre training area contains six permanent administration buildings, two storage buildings and approximately 150 tents or tent bases. There are several artillery emplacements, a probable artillery impact area and a tank firing range suggesting that this training area is used both by tank and artillery units.

This 94-acre installation is associated with Aste Airfield and contains barracks, administration buildings, storage buildings, support buildings, combined vehicle storage and maintenance buildings and a motor park.

The 253-acre installation contains multistory barracks, and buildings for administration, storage, support, vehicle storage and vehicle maintenance buildings. A 316 acre infantry or combined-arms field training area adjacent to the installation has three small-arms firing ranges.

The 41-acre installation contains multistory barracks, administration and support buildings, storage buildings, combined vehicle storage and maintenance buildings, a school and hospital. A secured seven-acre POL storage area contains six large cylindrical tanks, five small cylindrical tanks, two support buildings and open storage.

The 70-acre installation contains five barracks, two administration buildings, five vehicle storage and maintenance buildings, one storage-shed and three support buildings. The Kaliningrad SAM site is 3km west of this installation.

The 185-acre installation contains four barracks, four combined barracks and administration buildings, three administration buildings, 10 probable quarters, eight general storage buildings, seven vehicle maintenance and storage buildings, 45 support buildings, and a double-secured possible ammunition storage area with two bunkers. A small training area immediately south contains a possible small-arms firing range. A secured probable explosives storage area contains 35 storage bunker-type structures and 21 probable support buildings.
The 25-acre barracks installation is located 3 km southwest of Kaliningrad. It contains three barracks, two administration buildings, four combined vehicle storage and maintenance buildings, two storage and four support buildings.

The 185-acre barracks area is associated with the Chernyakhovsk Barracks Horstenau III [Document V-120] Area D1 contains 15 multistory combined barracks and administration buildings, two administration buildings, three storage buildings and four support buildings. Area D2 contains four barracks building, two administration buildings, six storage buildings, 25 support buildings, one vehicle maintenance building and two vehicle storage buildings. Area E contains three storage buildings and five support buildings. Area J1 contains seven support buildings, five storage buildings, one vehicle storage building, an athletic field and two large driver-training areas.

This installation is associated with the Chernyakhovsk Army Barracks North [Document V-119]. The 105-acre barracks area contains 20 barracks, five administration building, one multistory administration building, 21 storage buildings and 21 support buildings. The ammunition storage area contains one ammunition storage bunker and one ammunition storage building. There also are five vehicle storage buildings, 3 vehicle maintenance buildings and one probable vehicle maintenance or general storage building, one L-shaped vehicle storage building, one L-shaped combination vehicle storage and maintenance building, one small arms firing range, one tank and assault gun firing range and one flat-trajectory firing range.

The three training areas located in the vicinity of Chernyakhovsk are Chernyakhovsk Training Area Angerlinde, Chernyakhovsk Training Area I and Chernyakhovsk Training Area II. All three are associated with army barracks in the city of Chernyakhovsk. The 1,250-acre Area Angerlinde contains several flat-trajectory firing ranges, two small arms firing ranges and an ammunition storage area. The 8,020-acre training Area 1 contains one tank and assault gun firing range, two flat-trajectory firing ranges, a small arms firing range, a tracked-vehicle driver training course and an ammunition storage area. The 4,955-acre Training Area II contains two probable tank and assault-gun firing ranges, an ammunition storage area, an unidentified support area with several buildings and unidentified tracks.

The report describes a secure 30-acre probable military explosive storage area surrounded by a fence and a firebreak. It contains one administration building and five unrevetted buildings.

The less than 20-acre possible explosives storage installation contains five storage buildings, a guardhouse, a probable explosive storage bunker, a possible secured storage bunker and a possible storage tank. The report states the buildings are not revetted. The blast protection for the storage facilities is provided by the natural terrain.
The secured 50-acre barracks is in the city of Riga. Its housing and administration area contains 11 barracks and 22 other buildings, one motor vehicle storage and maintenance building, a storage area with seven storage buildings and one support building. There are no training facilities.

The 25-acre probable military barracks installation is located in the city of Riga. It has a barracks and administration area with six barracks, seven other buildings and a motor pool with five buildings.

The barracks is located in Riga 2 kms. from a 45-acre secured probable explosives storage area. The barracks area contains six probable barracks, 10 other buildings, an old earthen fort, a probable water tower, and a motor pool with four vehicle storage buildings and a maintenance building. Two additional possible military areas are adjacent to the barracks area: one contains two possible barracks and support building and the other contains unidentified buildings, an athletic field and a probable sports field.

The fenced 50-acre installation is located in the northeast corner of Riga. It appears to be primarily a secured military warehouse and storage facility. It contains 11 barracks, three administration buildings, 42 storage buildings, eight support buildings and four possible POL storage tanks.

The secured 50-acre military installation is located in the city of Riga. The 50-acre installation contains 51 buildings including: seven multistory barracks, three multistory administration buildings, 18 storage buildings, 23 support buildings and possible water tanks. There were no motor vehicles, motor vehicle buildings or training facilities.

The PI was unable to determine the function of the 100-acre installation. It contains two multistory probable barracks, five combined support and storage buildings, a motor vehicle park, a probable combined motor vehicle and equipment maintenance area, a rail transshipment area, a possible POL storage area and five areas of unidentified activity.

The secured installation is in the city of Riga and is divided into two areas: housing and administration area and a training area. The housing area contains four barracks, a combined housing and administration building, a storage shed, a guardhouse, and six support buildings, a secured storage building, four explosive storage bunkers and three other buildings. The equipment storage and maintenance area contains three motor vehicle storage buildings, an administration building and five support buildings. The training area contains an athletic field with an oval track, a small arms firing range and a possible infantry training area.
The 45-acre secured arsenal contains 34 buildings including two multistory administration buildings, a combined administration and support building, six multistory barracks, 24 combined storage and maintenance buildings, and a probable motor vehicle combined storage and maintenance building.

The 180-acre installation is secured by a firebreak. It contains 31 dispersed storage buildings and three other structures, none of which appear to be revetted. The support area contains a motor pool with two support buildings, a vehicle storage building, a vehicle maintenance building and a combined administration and housing sector with three possible barracks, one possible administration building and two support buildings.

This 275-acre installation contains 26 administrative, barracks, storage, and vehicle maintenance and storage-type buildings, 34 support buildings and 20 unidentified buildings associated with an unidentified activity.

The 500-acre installation contains 14 barracks, three administration buildings, four vehicle and equipment storage buildings, three vehicle and equipment maintenance buildings, ten storage buildings, eight support buildings, two wheeled-vehicle driver-training areas, two small-arms ranges, an obstacle course, a six-gun AAA site, an athletic field, a parade field, a possible amphibious training area and three areas of unidentified activity.

This 50-acre installation contains four multistory barracks, four administration buildings, six vehicle storage and maintenance buildings, four storage buildings, four support buildings and an athletic field.

The 50-acre installation contains one large U-shaped barracks, three combined barracks and administration buildings, one vehicle maintenance building, three vehicle storage buildings, three storage buildings and an athletic field.

The secured 1,200-acre installation contains a total of 28 ammunition storage buildings, 12 administration and support buildings.

The 350-acre installation contains three multistory barracks, two combined barracks and administration buildings, 41 general storage buildings, seven ammunition storage buildings and three support buildings.

The 700-acre installation contains 82 probable ammunition storage buildings, two other storage buildings and four probable administration buildings.

This 57-acre barracks area contains three multistory barracks, two single story barracks, one multistory administration building, nine single-story general storage buildings, four support buildings, three vehicle maintenance and storage buildings, and a driver-training course.

The 35-acre barracks installation contains 10 multistory combined barracks and administration buildings, nine vehicle-and equipment-sheds, two vehicle storage buildings, one vehicle storage maintenance building, three support buildings and a wheeled-vehicle driver-training course.

The 150-acre barracks installation contains 16 multistory barracks, three multistory combined barracks and administration buildings, seven administration buildings, 16 combined vehicle storage and maintenance buildings, 11 storage buildings and 12 support buildings. Adjacent to the installation is an area containing tracked and wheeled vehicle driver-training courses. A 350-acre training area is probably associated with the installation. It contains a tank and assault-gun firing range, a probable flat-trajectory firing range and two areas of unidentified activity.

The 160-acre installation contains five administrative buildings, seven barracks, four storage buildings, three vehicle maintenance and storage buildings, 21 support buildings and three small training areas. The northwest training area is being used for driver training.

The 66-acre installation contains 10 barracks, one administration building, two storage buildings, three vehicle maintenance and storage buildings and 32 support buildings. There is a 460-acre driver-training area with a control tower and six small support buildings.

The 142-acre installation contains 10 administration buildings, 41 barracks, 43 storage buildings, four vehicle storage and maintenance buildings, and two storage buildings in a POL storage area.

This 73-acre installation contains two administration buildings, seven multistory barracks, three single story barracks, 23 storage buildings, 16 vehicle maintenance and storage buildings and 11 dependents housing units.

This 83-acre secured storage area is divided into two sections. The main storage area contains one
administration building, two barracks, one probable vehicle maintenance building, 11 storage buildings, two revetted storage buildings and one possible revetted storage building. The second area contains one administration building and possible open storage.

**Document V-148. Kaunas Army Barracks Kipro, Kaunas, Kaliningrad Oblast, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, February 1965.**
The 30-acre installation contains two multistory barracks, two administrations buildings, 19 general storage buildings, three vehicle storage and maintenance buildings and one unidentified building.

**Document V-149. Kaunas Army Barracks Southeast, Kaunas, Latvia, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, February 1965.**
The 655-acre installation includes a 194-acre barracks and storage area containing three administration buildings, 10 multistory barracks, nine single-story barracks, 39 general storage buildings, 22 combined vehicle maintenance and storage buildings, three miscellaneous buildings and three possible bunkered ammunition storage buildings. A secured POL storage area contains two buildings and two tanks. The training area contains two driver-training courses, two small arms firing ranges, and an old fort probably used for storage.

**Document V-150. Gusev Army Barracks Rominte River south, Gusev, Kaliningrad Oblast, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, February 1965.**
The 53-acre installation contains one U-shaped combined barracks and administration building, thirteen barracks, seven storage buildings, two vehicle garages and a small-arms firing range.

This 130-acre installation contains one probable combined barracks and administration building, 14 barracks, 12 general storage buildings, seven vehicle maintenance and storage buildings, a motor park with probable tanks and SP guns and vehicles. There are four firing ranges and a driver-training course with one unidentified building.

**Document V-152. Army Barracks, Kuressaare, Saarema Island, Estonia, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, February 1965.**
The 185-acre installation contains 26 buildings, including six barracks, three administration buildings, nine storage buildings, six support buildings and two combined vehicle storage and maintenance buildings. There is a probable firing range and a small driver training area.

**Document V-153. Storage Area, Kihelkonna, Saarema Island, Estonia, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, February 1965.**
The 120-acre installation contains administration and storage buildings.

The firing range contains three lanes and two moving target tracks.

The 110-acre military installation contains family quarters, multistory barracks, administration buildings, storage buildings, a probable combined vehicle and maintenance storage building and support buildings. The
Monnuste Air Defense Sector Headquarters is located here. A secured 10-acre rail-served ammunition storage area south of this installation contains at least three storage buildings.

**Document V-156. Vilnius Military Barracks Viliya River, Vilnius, Lithuania, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, February 1965.**

This 160-acre road-served, partially secured military area contains 21 barracks, three administration buildings, 13 general storage buildings, 10 support buildings, six unidentified and one possible bunkerized building, 15 vehicle maintenance and storage buildings and two open storage areas.

**Document V-157. Dobele Army Training Area, Dobele, Latvia, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, February 1965.**

The training installation contains several buildings probably used for range support, including an irregular closed-circuit tracked-vehicle driver-training course, several irregular tracked-vehicle driver training courses, several irregular tracked-vehicle driver-training course, a wheeled-vehicle driver-training course, a tank and assault gun firing range and a flat-trajectory firing range. The Dobele Barracks Northwest [see Document V-90] is adjacent to the training area and probably provides logistic and administrative support. Units from the Dobele Army Barracks may also use this training area.

**Document V-158. Jagala Barracks and Training Area, Jagala, Kaliningrad Oblast, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, March 1965.**

The 175-acre installation contains 144 buildings including six combined barracks and administration buildings, five combined vehicle maintenance and storage buildings, seven storage buildings, 58 support buildings and 68 quarters-type buildings.

**Document V-159. Kybartai Army Barracks, Kybartai, Kaliningrad Oblast, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, March 1965.**

This 152-acre installation contains six administration buildings, 23 barracks or civilian housing buildings, 17 support buildings, six storage structures, eight vehicle maintenance and storage buildings with a total of 60 vehicles in the area, one oval track, possible helicopter parking aprons and an associated SAM site.


The 275-acre installation contains 15 barracks, seven administration buildings, 18 support buildings, 30 storage buildings, and 28 quarters for dependents. A storage area two km east contains 19 storage buildings and one support building and is probably associated with this installation.

**Document V-161. Paplaka Army Camp, Paplaka, Latvia, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, March 1965.**

The 125-acre installation contains 88 buildings including 12 storage buildings, 38 support buildings, one vehicle storage building, four combined vehicle storage and maintenance buildings, 11 dependents quarters, 17 barracks and five combined barracks and administration buildings.


This 40-acre supply depot contains 43 buildings including three administration buildings, 19 barracks, 13 support buildings, five storage buildings and three dependent housing buildings. It also contains 15 vertical POL tanks and two athletic fields.
This 40-acre fenced installation contains 11 combined barracks and administration buildings, five storage and support buildings, one combined vehicle maintenance and storage building, 2 vehicle-sheds, two support buildings and one athletic field.

The 300-acre storage area contains three administration buildings, three storage buildings, 34 probable storage buildings and 10 support buildings.

The partially secured-145 acre military area contains 25 barracks, four administration buildings, 12 support buildings, one vehicle maintenance and storage building and 36 storage buildings.

This 55-acre ammunition storage area contains four revetted storage buildings, a storage and support building and a small-arms firing range.

This 100-acre installation is one of two training areas in Gusev [See Document V-160]. It contains two flat-trajectory ranges, a small-arms firing range, a driver-training course and infantry training facilities.

This 1,000-acre area contains two driver-training course [Document V-167], two flat-trajectory ranges, a tank and assault-gun firing range and a range support area with 19 support and storage buildings.

This 51-acre installation contains 21 buildings, including four combined barracks and administration buildings, four storage building, five probable combined equipment storage and maintenance buildings, eight support buildings and one athletic field. [See also V-42 for another report on this installation.]

The 50-acre installation contains three barracks, two administration buildings, nine storage buildings, one vehicle maintenance building, three support buildings, two athletic fields and a small arms firing range.

The 250-acre main barracks area and the 15-acre main storage and receiving area contain 11 barracks, five combination barracks and administration buildings, three administration buildings, eight storage, 13 support buildings, six combined vehicle storage and maintenance buildings and three probable missile-associated drive-through buildings. There are two trackside docks and a small-arms firing range in the main barracks area.
**Document V-172. Palanga Army Training Area Nemirseta, Palanga, Lithuania, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, March 1965.**
The 1,200-acre training area contains one flat trajectory range, one driver-training course, one vehicle park, one combined administration and bivouac area and one artillery training area. There are two administration buildings, 10 support buildings, and four combined barracks and administration buildings.

**Document V-173. Training Area, Marijampole, Lithuania, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, March 1965.**
The 700-acre training area contains a tent area, a support area, a wheeled-vehicle driver-training course and a flat-trajectory range for automatic weapons mounted on wheeled vehicles.

**Document V-174. Klaipeda Army Barracks North, Klaipeda, Lithuania, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, March 1965.**
The 108-acre installation contains 27 buildings including five administrative buildings, eight barracks, seven storage buildings, two vehicle storage buildings and five support buildings. An ammunition storage area is at the north end. It contains six storage buildings.

**Document V-175. Training Area, Kaunas, Lithuania, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, March 1965.**
The eight square-mile training area is probably utilized by the army units stationed in Kaunas. It contains a section with approximately 42 tents, a small secured tract with four buildings, a flat-trajectory range with four moving targets and an unidentified area.

The 700-acre Army Barracks contains one troop housing-and-administration area, two tent areas, a motor pool and equipment maintenance area, a POL storage area and an explosives storage area. Training is conducted in the Jonava Maneuver area.

**Document V-177. Jonava Maneuver Area Southeast, Jonava, Lithuania, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, March 1965.**
The 10,000-acre training area contains a flat-trajectory range, small arms firing range, two driver-training courses, a tank and SP gun range, and one eight 8-gun AAA facility, one infantry training area, a vehicle-mounted weapons range, an electronic facility, rail head and an active SAM site. Two large MRBM complexes are located near Jonava.

The 43-acre ammunition depot contains at least seven, and possibly 10, bunkers and one storage building. The facility is rail-and road-served and possibly fenced.

**Document V-179. Tapa Army Barracks West, Tapa, Estonia, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, March 1965.**
The 290-acre installation contains barracks and driver-training areas. The 80-acre barracks area contains five combined barracks and administration buildings, 13 dependents quarters, 18 support buildings, eight storage buildings, eight barracks, two vehicle maintenance buildings, seven vehicle storage buildings, one vehicle park and one athletic field. The 210-acre driver-training area contains various vehicle obstacles.
The 10,000-acre installation contains one tank and assault-gun firing range, a possible flat-trajectory firing range, a tracked and wheeled vehicle driver-training area, a tracked-vehicle driver-training area, a wheeled vehicle driver-training area, and a support facility with eight buildings.

The 50-acre installation is a combined Army Barracks and POL storage facility. The barracks area contains nine barracks, two administration buildings, four storage buildings, five support buildings, one combined maintenance and support building, a vehicle park or open storage, probable open storage and a drill field. The POL area contains seven vertical tanks and two possible tanks.

This 65-acre Saaremaa Island installation contains two barracks, five administration buildings, nine storage buildings, three support buildings and a maintenance building.

The 4000-acre training area includes an armored vehicle range, a driver-training course, numerous infantry and artillery emplacements, a support area and a probable tent area. A probable vehicle park is near the armor range.

The 200-acre range contains three vehicle runs and five moving targets. There is a small support area with three support structures and a guard building at the entrance.

The 75-acre installation contains barracks, dependents quarters, administration, storage, support, and combined vehicle maintenance and storage buildings.

The 58-acre barracks contains 14 quarters, seven support buildings, seven combined storage and support buildings, four multistory barracks, two multistory administration buildings and combined vehicle maintenance and storage buildings.

The installation contains a 500-acre barracks area and a 740-acre training area. The barracks area contains seven multistory barracks, six other barracks, five quarters, 29 multistory combined barracks and administration buildings, and 35 combined support and storage buildings. The training area contains only a tank and assault-gun firing range.

The three-acre facility contains four multistory combined barracks and administration buildings, three support buildings and nine underground storage bunkers.

The 60-acre depot contains three combined barracks and administration buildings, one administration building, nine storage buildings, nine support buildings, seven probable workshops and one vehicle park.

The 60-acre POL storage installation contains 20 vertical POL tanks in two sections and a probable underground storage area.

The 20-acre vehicle park contains four vehicle storage buildings, two administration buildings, two combined vehicle storage and maintenance buildings and two support buildings.

The 1,000-acre training area is probably utilized by the unit stationed in the Vilnius Army Barracks East. It contains a tank and assault-gun firing range with three runs, a possible ammunition storage area, a possible bivouac area and two infantry training areas.

The 70-acre road- and rail-served ordnance and POL area contains one probable barracks, two combined administrative and barracks buildings, 18 storage buildings, and five combined vehicle maintenance and storage buildings. The POL area contains 24 vertical tanks, one probable horizontal tank and seven combined support and storage buildings.

This 150-acre barracks and training area contains a large multistory multi-wing training building, five support administration buildings, one storage building, two unidentified buildings, one combined vehicle storage and maintenance building and two oval tracks. A large track and a small-arms firing range are outside the barracks installation.

This 65-acre installation contains three combined barracks and administration buildings, 11 storage buildings, four support buildings, an unidentified building, three combined vehicle storage and maintenance sheds and a possible vehicle park or open storage area. A secured possible ammunition storage area contains three buildings. A tracked-vehicle driver-training area is seven km west.

This 90-acre installation contains 43 buildings, including two administration buildings, 11 barracks, seven
storage buildings, five possible combined equipment storage and maintenance buildings and 18 support buildings.

**Document V-197. Explosives Plant and Storage Area, Radviliskis Lithuania, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, April 1965.**
The 360-acre installation contains 39 unrevetted ammunition storage buildings, 17 support buildings and eight ammunition fabrication buildings.

**Document V-198. Panevezys Munitions Factory and Storage, Panevezys, Lithuania, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, April 1965.**
The 65-acre storage area contains 39 non-revetted munitions storage buildings and four storage buildings.

The 80-acre Tallinn Military Barracks contains 23 barracks, four administration buildings, 19 storage buildings, 27 support buildings and one unidentified building. The 80-acre Tallinn Army barracks Kopli contains 22 barracks, two administration buildings, 65 storage buildings, 23 support buildings and two unidentified buildings.

**Document V-200. Tallinn Army Barracks, Tallinn, Estonia, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, April 1965.**
The 660-acre installation contains 92 buildings, including two administration buildings, two combined barracks and administration buildings, 24 barracks, 30 storage buildings, 14 combined equipment storage and maintenance buildings and 20 support buildings. Other facilities include two housing areas, an athletic field and two driver-training areas.

**Document V-201. Tallinn Ammunition Depot Nomme South, Tallinn, Estonia, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, April 1965.**
The 450-acre depot contains 24 revetted storage buildings, 45 other storage buildings and seven unoccupied revetments.

The 250-acre secured installation contains two administration buildings, 40 storage buildings and two possible open storage sections, one of which contains equipment or vehicles and seven support buildings.

**Document V-203. Klaipeda Army Barracks Libauer ST, Klaipeda, Lithuania, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, April 1965.**
The 28-acre installation contains 22 buildings, including one administration building, seven barracks, two storage buildings, three possible combined equipment storage and maintenance buildings and nine support building.

**Document V-204. Military Installation, Ventspils, Latvia, USSR, Baltic MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, April 1965.**
The 500-acre installation contains two housing and administration areas with a total of 22 combined administration and barracks buildings, 22 possible dependent quarters, five storage buildings, seven support buildings and a motor pool with three vehicle combined storage and maintenance buildings. The ammunition storage area contains four storage buildings, a driver-training course, and an armor range. A POL storage and
unloading area has two piers and is located immediately southwest of the installation on the shores of the Baltic Sea. A major POL storage compound is located northeast of the military installation.

↑ BACK TO CHAPTER 5

KIEV MILITARY DISTRICT

Document V-205. Priluki Ammunition Depot Ichnya SSW, Priluki, Chernigovsk Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, November 1964. The 730-acre installation contains a total of 117 buildings, including three administration buildings, five barracks, 61 storage buildings, 46 general support buildings and two probable vehicle maintenance buildings.

Document V-206. Ammunition Storage Area, Priluki, Chernigovsk Oblast, USSR, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, November 1964. The double secured 120-acre ammunition storage area contains one combined administration and barracks building, seven storage buildings and eight support buildings.

Document V-207. Chuguyev Army Barracks West, Chuguyev, Kharkov Oblast, USSR, Kiev, MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, November 1964. This 40-acre installation contains one multistory administrative building, five multistory barracks, 18 general storage buildings, two foundations for probable storage buildings, two vehicle sheds and three support buildings.

Document V-208. Kharkov Army Barracks West Kharkov Oblast, USR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, November 1964. The 115-acre installation contains six multistory combined administration and classroom buildings, one multistory administration building, 13 multistory barracks, 15 general storage buildings, three bunkered explosives storage buildings, 10 quarters, five equipment and vehicle storage sheds, two equipment and vehicle maintenance sheds, an open equipment park and 19 support buildings.

Document V-209. Lubny Army Barracks Sula River, Lubny, Poltavsk Oblast, USSR, Kiev, MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, November 1964. Approximately 6 kms north of the installation is a military training area probably used by the troops housed in the barracks area. The 315-acre installation contains three administration buildings, 14 barracks, seven quarters, 41 storage buildings, three probable ammunition storage buildings, one vehicle shed, one vehicle maintenance building and 20 support buildings.

Document V-210. Training Area And Associated Storage, Baturin, Chernigovsk Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, November 1964. The 3,475-acre installation contains 15 storage buildings and one support building. The training facility contains two administration buildings one bivouac area, one support building, four combined range control and support buildings, one tank and assault-gun firing range, two wheeled-vehicle driver-training areas, one range possibly utilized by vehicle-mounted automatic weapons, one possible infantry field training area, strafing targets and an impact area.

Document V-211. Belaya Tserkov Army Barracks Artillery, Belaya Tserkov, Kiev Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, November 1964. The 75-acre installation contains one administration building, five barracks, 17 storage buildings, 20 support
buildings, three vehicle maintenance buildings, one vehicle park, an athletic field and a figure-eight wheeled-vehicle driver-training course.

**Document V-212.** Explosives Storage Krivoy Rog, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, November 1964.
The 95-acre double-fenced area contains 16 revetted explosives storage buildings, one trans-loading building and one support building. One additional general combined storage and support building is located on the rail spur leading to the secured area.

**Document V-213.** Storage area, Nizhin, Chernigorovsk Oblast, USSR, Kiev, MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, November 1964.
The 220-acre installation contains one administration building, 2 barracks, 32 general storage buildings and 15 support buildings.

The 760-acre installation storage portion is secured and contains 45 probable ammunition storage, 14 general storage and six support buildings. The unsecured administration, troops housing and support area contains two administration buildings, 11 quarters, 4 storage and 28 support buildings.

The 80-acre installation contains four multistory barracks, three multistory combined classroom and administration buildings, 31 storage buildings, five vehicle sheds and 16 support buildings.

The 85-acre barracks installation contains one administration building, four barracks, seven storage buildings, three vehicle storage and maintenance buildings, a probable gymnasium, an athletic field, one support building, a small-arms firing range and a wheeled vehicle driver-training course.

The secured 300-acre double-secured storage area and adjacent support area contain a total of 43 buildings: six barracks, two administration buildings, 25 storage buildings, nine support buildings and a heating plant. The military significance of this installation was not determined.

The double-secured 60-acre double-secured storage area contains 26 general storage building and one support building. An unsecured support area immediately north contains one probable administration building, one probable barracks and one support building. The military significance of this installation was not determined.

A secured 57-acre barracks area contains one administration building, five barracks, 19 storage buildings, 26 support buildings, and two motor pools containing nine vehicle maintenance buildings. An associated 105-acre training area contains an AAA training site, field artillery training emplacements, two small building and a figure-8 wheeled-vehicle driver-training course.
**Document V-220. Artemovsk Army Barracks Central, Artemovsk, Stalinskaya Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, November 1964.**
The 175-acre barracks area contains two administration buildings, 16 barracks, 36 storage buildings, 14 support buildings and a possible athletic field.

**Document V-221. Ammunition Storage Area, Chuguyev, Kharkov Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, November 1964.**
A wide firebreak between double fences surrounds the 280-acre secured installation. It contains 25 ammunition storage buildings and two support buildings. An adjacent support area contains 15 buildings probably utilized for administration, personnel billeting and miscellaneous support.

**Document V-222. Ammunition Storage Area, Rossoshki, Cherkasskaya Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, November 1964.**
The 179 acre-storage area is secured on three sides by a double fence and on the northern side by a single fence. It contains 23 ammunition storage buildings. An adjacent support area contains 8 buildings.

**Document V-223. Balakleya Ammunition Depot NE and Balakleya Army Barracks NE, Kharkov Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, November 1964.**
The double-secured 1,150 acre-depot and barracks area contains 48 revetted and 35 unrevetted ammunition storage buildings, 10 support buildings, a possible ammunition fabrication facility consisting of six probable light fabrication buildings, five road-to-rail transloading buildings and three support buildings. The barracks area is possibly secured by a fence. It contains one multistory L-shaped administration building, two large multistory U-shaped barracks, three small multistory U-shaped barracks, 13 probable quarters, 27 general storage buildings, two possible vehicle sheds, 12 support buildings and 12 possible small vertical POL tanks.

**Document V-224. Kirovgrad Army Barracks Kremlin, Kirovograd, Kirovograd Oblast Kiev, MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, November 1964.**
The 50-acre barracks area is located within the walls of an old fort. It contains three barracks, two storage buildings, seven support buildings, and two possible combined vehicle storage and maintenance buildings.

**Document V-225. Oster Army Barracks Vypolzovo, Oster, Chernigovsk Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, November 1964.**
The 990-acre installation is probably the main support area for the Oster Maneuver Area Chernigovskiy Leiniy immediately north. It contains nine administration buildings, 70 barracks 42 dependents quarters, 26 storage buildings, 12 vehicle-sheds, two range control buildings and 67 support buildings. The training facilities include two moving-target ranges, one closed circuit wheeled-vehicle driver-training course and two athletic fields.

**Document V-226. Probable Barrack Area, Kharkov Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, November 1964.**
The 15-acre probable barracks area is possible associated with the Kharkov Tank OSC and Kharkov Army Barracks West. It contains one multistory administration building, four multistory probable barracks, five general storage buildings, one vehicle shed and five support buildings.

**Document V-227. Military Training Area, Belaya Tserkov, Kiev, Kiev MD, USSR, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, December 1964.**
The 5,370 acre training area contains a combination barracks-administration building, three probable troop quarters, seven storage buildings, 14 fire control towers, six support buildings, three tank and assault-gun firing ranges, a probable vehicle-mounted automatic-weapons firing range, a small-arms firing range, a
probable vehicle-mounted automatic-weapons firing range, a small arms firing range, closed circuit tracked-vehicle driver-training course, a closed -circuit wheeled-vehicle driver-training course and an infantry field training area.

The 205-acre secured installation contains a probable administration building, 12 probable ammunition-storage buildings, three quarters, five storage buildings and a transloading building.

This 325-acre double-secured probable ordnance depot contains 18 ammunition storage buildings, 23 general storage buildings, one monitor-roofed building probably used for repair and maintenance of vehicles and equipment, nine support buildings and two probable inactive small-arms firing ranges. There are numerous groups of probable vehicles and equipment in open storage throughout the depot. An associated administrative support facility adjoins the depot. It contains two multistory barracks, one multistory probable administrative building, one T-shaped probable mess hall, eight support buildings, one probable inactive small-arms firing range and a water tower.

The 255-acre secured installation contains two administration buildings, three large multistory barracks, 32 large storage buildings, 35 support buildings, one small-arms firing range, two motor pools each containing two vehicle maintenance buildings and a possibly associated athletic field.

The 50-acre double secured installation contains general storage buildings and foundations for three additional buildings.

The 57-acre installation contains 11 ammunition storage buildings, two storage buildings and one support building.

The 20-acre installation contains ten storage buildings and one support building. The PI judges that the isolation of the installation and the dispersal of the buildings indicate it probable has an explosives storage function.

There is a probably associated flat-trajectory firing range located 6 km from this barracks installation. The 190-acre installation contains three administration buildings, 14 barracks, 18 quarters, 49 storage building, 36 support buildings, five semi-buried probable POL tanks, a motor park, a vehicle shed, two vehicle maintenance and storage buildings, and a small-arms firing range. The large number of storage buildings indicates a storage function as well as troop housing. Two km north and connected by a direct access road is a probable associated secured storage area containing four storage buildings and two support buildings. Four km north, also
connected by a direct access road, is a probable associated ammunition storage area containing seven unrevetted ammunition storage buildings and a support building. The 100-acre ordnance park northwest contains four large revetted ammunition storage buildings and three support buildings.

**Document V-235. Dnepropetrovsk Army Barracks, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, December 1964.**
The 67-acre installation contains one administration building, four barracks, 11 storage buildings, six support buildings, one vehicle maintenance building, five vehicle storage sheds and a vehicle park.

**Document V-236. Dnepropetrovsk Army Barracks Central, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, December 1964.**
The 50-acre barracks is located in the city. It contains three administration buildings, four barracks, 14 storage buildings, six support buildings, three vehicle maintenance buildings, five vehicle storage sheds and a vehicle park.

**Document V-237. Kiev Ordnance Depot Stalinka East, Kiev Oblast, USSR Kiev, MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, December 1964.**
This 80 acre secured installation contains six probable explosives storage buildings and two support building. It is located in an old earthen fort; the walls serve as revetments for the buildings.

**Document V-238. Bakhmach Petroleum Storage, Bakhmach, Chernigoskaya Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, December 1964.**
This 135 acre, possibly secured, installation contains 14 medium POL tanks, two small POL tanks, a storage facility for small horizontal tanks or POL drums, five low or partially buried buildings for an undetermined type of storage, two open storage areas, a general storage building, an administration building, a possible barracks and nine support buildings.

**Document V-239. Zolotonosha Army Barracks, Zolotonosha, Cherkassakaya Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, December 1964.**
The eight-acre installation contains two combination barracks and administration buildings, four barracks, five support buildings, nine storage buildings, two combined support and storage buildings and two vehicle maintenance buildings.

The 58-acre installation contains combined administration and classroom buildings, four multistory barracks, three probable combined officer and dependents quarters, seven storage buildings, two vehicle sheds, one combined vehicle storage and maintenance shed, two equipment storage sheds, one large hanger-type building and sixteen support building. Training facilities include small arms firing range, an athletic field, and a special training facility.

The 18-acre depot consists of one administration building, one barracks, one combined vehicle maintenance and storage building, six combined vehicle and equipment storage buildings and 12 combined support and storage buildings.

This 45-acre secured installation contains one combined barracks and administration building, three vehicle sheds, five storage buildings and 13 support buildings.

The 45-acre barracks area contains two multistory administration buildings, three barracks, one multistory barracks, nine storage buildings, two probable storage buildings under construction, 12 support buildings and a small-arms firing range.

The 185-acre installation contains two administrations buildings, five barracks, four storage buildings, five vehicle sheds, one vehicle maintenance building, nine support buildings, one possible buried POL storage tank, an athletic field, a small-arms firing range and an infantry field training area.

The 300-acre installation contains one administration building, two probable administration buildings, 10 barracks, six storage buildings, 13 vehicle sheds, one possible vehicle shed, one vehicle maintenance building, two possible vehicle parks, 25 support buildings, approximately 20 small horizontal probable POL tanks, three small arms firing ranges and an athletic field.

This double-secured, 250-acre storage area contains 54 storage buildings, four earth-mounded drive-through buildings, eight support buildings and two fuel storage tanks. The secured support area is adjacent to the NE end of the storage area and contains a multistory administration building, three multistory barracks, eight probable quarters, 24 support buildings, a fenced motor pool with two vehicle sheds and a secured earth-covered building.

The approximately 40-acre installation contains a combined classroom and administration building, nine barracks, six storage buildings, a motor park, and 27 support buildings. There is a small, probably abandoned small arms firing range located northeast of the installation.

The 340-acre installation contains three administration buildings, 10 combined officer and dependents quarters, three equipment storage buildings, nine barracks, three probable barracks, four storage buildings, five combined support and storage buildings, one probable vehicle maintenance building, two ammunition storage buildings, seven combined ammunition storage buildings and bunkers and a probable motor park. Training facilities include two small-arms firing ranges, an athletic field, a probable wheeled-vehicle driver-training course, and a probable infantry or combined-arms training area.

The 490-acre installation contains 37 ammunition storage buildings, three earth-mounded probable drive-in buildings, one drive-through revetted building, and 14 combined support and storage buildings. A support area
contains three probable combined administration and barracks buildings, and 15 combined support and storage buildings.

**Document V-250. Storage Depots, Cherkassy, USSR, Kiev, MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, December 1964.**
There are three ammunition storage depots in the area. They are Cherkassy Ammunition Depot No. 2, Debiyevka; Cherkassy Ammunition Dump No. 3, Debiyevka; and Cherkassy Ammunition Depot India PUG. The proximity of the warehouse-type buildings to each other in the latter depot suggests a general storage rather than ammunition storage function as reported elsewhere. The three installations cover 350 acres and contain three administration buildings, 10 barracks, 22 support buildings, 22 storage buildings, at least 26 probable ammunition storage buildings and 2 probable athletic fields.

This probable 60-acre secured military depot contains two administration buildings, four barracks, six storage buildings, two vehicle maintenance buildings, three vehicle parks, an open storage area, two small-arms firing ranges, a probable drill field, a probable water tower, two probably buried POL tanks and 20 support buildings.

**Document V-252. Krivoy Rog Army Barracks, Krivoy Rog, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, December 1964.**
The 75-acre barracks area contains one administrative building, two administration-type buildings, three barracks, a vehicle shed, two motor parks, four storage buildings and 19 support buildings.

**Document V-253. Belaya Tserkov Army Barracks NW and Associated Storage Area, Belaya Tserkov, Kiev Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, December 1964.**
The 280-acre barracks area contains one administration building, four barracks, two probable vehicle maintenance-sheds, 33 storage buildings, 14 support buildings, two small-arms firing ranges, an athletic field and a figure-8 wheeled-vehicle driver-training course. The 230-acre doubled secured associated storage area contains 33 storage buildings and nine support buildings. The large number of storage buildings and the separate security measures consisting of double fences suggests it has a separate and primary function of a storage depot.

**Document V-254. Ammunition Storage Area Chernigov, Chernigov Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, December 1964.**
The 207-acre probably secured ammunition storage area contains 26 ammunition storage buildings, two barracks, one combined administration and barracks building, 10 support buildings, one small-arms firing range and an athletic field.

**Document V-255. Novomoskovsk AAA Barracks North, Novomoskovsk, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, USSR, Kiev, MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, December 1964.**
The 65-acre installation contains one administration building, two barracks, one vehicle park, one vehicle maintenance building, one vehicle maintenance-storage shed, 17 storage buildings, eight support buildings and one athletic field.

**Document V-256. Shostka Army Barracks, Shostka, Sumskaya Oblast, USSR, Kiev MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, December 1964.**
This 70-acre security installation contains two administration buildings, eight barracks, three storage buildings, 21 support buildings, a motor pool containing a vehicle maintenance building and an athletic field.
The 50-acre installation contains one combined administration and barracks, three multistory barracks, two maintenance buildings, five vehicle maintenance buildings, six support buildings, nine storage buildings, 17 combined support and storage buildings and a small-arms range.

The 110-acre Kiev School of Self-Propelled Weapons contains two administration buildings, 10 barracks, three probable officers quarters, seven vehicle storage buildings, one vehicle maintenance building, 10 storage buildings, 14 support buildings, an athletic field, a probable auditorium, a steam plant a motor pool and an open storage area. The 16-acre probable armored and artillery barracks located just north of the school contains 8 multistory combined barracks and administration buildings and an athletic field. The 26-acre probable artillery barracks contains 3 administration buildings, 10 barracks, one probable officer's quarters and 13 combined support and storage buildings.

The 35-acre installation contains a large multi-wing combined administration and school building, one multistory barracks, two probable vehicle sheds, a motor pool area, four probable maintenance buildings, five storage buildings, one support building and an athletic field.

The 250-acre installation contains 48 probable ammunition storage buildings, seven support buildings and two small-arms firing ranges.

The 560-acre barracks contains three administration buildings, 16 barracks, approximately 100 officers and dependents quarters, nine storage buildings, 50 support buildings, 17 vehicle sheds, two athletic fields, two small-arms firing ranges, and three areas similar to subcaliber-weapons firing ranges.

The 1,300-acre associated installations include a closed-circuit tracked-vehicle driver-training area, a closed-circuit, probable tracked-vehicle driver-training area, a closed circuit wheeled-vehicle driving-training area, a multistory probable administration building, two multistory probable barracks, and six support buildings, a vehicle shed, a vehicle maintenance building and a small arms firing range.

This 12,800-acre installation contains six administration buildings, 32 combined barracks and quarters, 17 support buildings, six vehicle sheds, a probable vehicle maintenance building, and five unidentified buildings, one of which is secured. Training facilities include an athletic field, two small arms firing ranges, two tracked-vehicle driver-training courses, four tank and assault-gun firing ranges with eight support buildings, a combined arms field training area and two probable vehicle-mounted automatic-weapons firing ranges.

A barracks and bivouac area immediately northeast of the training area provides administrative, billeting and other support. The 11,900 acre training area contains one tracked-vehicle driver-training area, seven tank and assault-gun firing ranges, 17 range control and support buildings, a combined-arms field training area, a possible six-gun field artillery battery, a double-secured storage area with 25 storage buildings and approximately nine support buildings.


There are four military installations located in the center of Kiev: Kiev Headquarter, Kiev Military District, Kiev Army Barracks First of May, Kiev Army School First of May and a probable Soviet Air Force aviation school.

- The 120-acre Kiev Headquarters Kiev Military District contains three administration buildings, a combined school and administration building, 12 barracks, seven storage buildings, 16 support buildings, three small-arms firing ranges and a vehicle park with two vehicle sheds, two vehicle storage and maintenance buildings and five support buildings. A separately secured support area contains nine support buildings and an athletic field.
- The 48-acre Kiev Army Barracks First of May contains a combined school and administration building, two administration buildings, 12 barracks; 16 support buildings and a secured vehicle park with a vehicle shed and a support building.
- The 140-acre Kiev Army School First of May contains two combined school and administration buildings, three administration buildings, seven barracks, two storage buildings, 34 support buildings, two athletic fields, and a secured vehicle park with a vehicle shed and two vehicle storage and maintenance buildings.
- The 120-acre probable Soviet Air Force aviation school contains three combined school and administration buildings, three administration buildings, seven barracks, five storage buildings, 16 support buildings, an athletic field, a vehicle park with three vehicle sheds, a vehicle maintenance building and three support buildings.


The 775-acre Barracks installation provides billeting, administrative and other support for the Chernigov Training Area. It contains two administration buildings, 25 barracks, approximately 36 dependents quarters, twelve vehicle-sheds, two high-bay vehicle maintenance buildings, 15 storage buildings and 45 support buildings.


The 1,155-acre installation is eight km west of Krivoy Rog and provides administrative, billeting and other support for a large training area located immediately south. It contains two administration buildings, thirty probable barracks, 19 barracks-type buildings, 17 storage buildings, 49 support buildings, 12 vehicle sheds, three equipment storage and maintenance buildings, seven possible ammunition storage buildings, an athletic field, one ammunition storage building, an athletic field, and one probably abandoned AAA battery. A bivouac area with 24 permanent buildings including two administration buildings, one storage building, 21 support building and extensive tent areas served by an elaborate network of roads.

The 1,900-acre training area contains five tank and assault-gun firing ranges, two driver-training courses, a probable small-arms firing range, six range control buildings and four range support buildings.

The 52,000-acre maneuver area contains a possible tent camp, five tank and assault-gun ranges, a probable tank and assault-gun range under construction, five driver-training areas, one infantry field training area, a range probably for vehicle-mounted automatic weapons, an area for artillery training, a secured storage area, two unidentified areas, and two probable impact areas.

The 56-acre installation contains one administration building, six barracks, 24 storage buildings, 12 support buildings, two vehicle maintenance buildings, a vehicle park, an athletic field and a probable small-arms firing range.

The report describes two military barracks areas: Cherkassy Army Barracks North and Cherkassy Army Barracks South and possibly a storage installation on the western edge of Cherkassy.

- The 100-acre Cherkassy Army Barracks North contains three administration barracks, 16 barracks, 26 support buildings, an athletic field and a parade ground.
- The 465-acre Cherkassy Army Barracks South contains three probable administration buildings, three barracks, ten probable barracks, 69 probable quarters, 27 support buildings, 47 storage buildings, three possible ammunition storage bunkers, a motor park, four vehicle sheds, and a small arms firing range, a driver-training course and an athletic field.
- The 135-acre secured possibly associated storage area contains 19 storage buildings, 12 possible POL tanks and nine support building.

Two barracks areas, both at its western boundary, support the maneuver area. The 55,910-acre maneuver area contains three driver-training courses: 1 tracked-vehicle training course; one wheeled-vehicle training course; one tracked and wheeled-vehicle training course. There are one field training area [possibly combined arms], 12 moving-target tank and assault-gun firing ranges, two bivouac areas, two secured storage areas, three probable small arms firing ranges, one athletic field and 20 miscellaneous support buildings.

The 12,500-acre training area contains a bivouac area with eight combined administrative and support buildings, 40 support buildings, a vehicle park, four small-arms firing ranges, a tracked-vehicle driver-training area, a tracked-vehicle driver-training area, seven tank and assault-gun firing ranges with 23 range support buildings, 31 firing lanes, 29 moving target runs, and two possible infantry training areas. Chuguyev Army Barracks Southeast and a second barracks area four km south of Chuguyev provide administration, billeting and other support for this training area.

The 1,000-acre training facility contains a tracked-vehicle driver-training course with a series of personnel
trenches scattered throughout the area and one administration building. The barracks area contains one multistory administration building, six barracks and six support buildings. Training appears to be limited to driver training and infantry-type training.

The 34,200 acre training area contains five tank and assault-gun ranges, three wheeled-vehicle driver-training courses, one tracked-vehicle driver-training area, two combined-arms ranges, one small-arms range, 15 field gun batteries, one AAA battery, two probable impact areas, three unidentified ground scars or facilities, a possible tent camp, two secured ammunition storage areas, 10 range control buildings, two unidentified structures and at least seven support buildings. The Zheved Army Barracks Chernigov Southwest provides housing and support facilities.

↑ BACK TO CHAPTER 5

**BELORUSSIA MILITARY DISTRICT**

**Document V-276. POL Storage Area Lida, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, May 1964.**
The 11-acre installation contains 15 vertical POL storage tanks and four small associated buildings. The Lida Army barracks is located 4 km NW.

**Document V-277. Myshanka Army Barracks, Myshanka, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, May 1964.**
The 580-acre installation contains four administration buildings, ten barracks, 41 officer and dependents quarters, 25 storage buildings, 54 storage buildings, and ten equipment and vehicle maintenance buildings. It also contains a possible small-arms firing range.

**Document V-278. Novogrudok Barracks Area, Novogrudok, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, May 1964.**
The 75-acre installation contains two administration buildings, five barracks, 15 storage buildings, 13 support buildings, five vehicle sheds, an athletic field and a small-arms firing range.

**Document V-279. Orsha Petroleum Storage Reserve, Orsha, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, May 1964.**
This 125-acre secured installation contains 20 large and 27 small vertical POL storage tanks, and 22 large open pits, 14 of which contain 137 pod-type horizontal storage tanks. Support facilities in the installation include three administration buildings, eight storage buildings, 21 support buildings and five pump houses.

**Document V-280. Osipovichi Army Barracks Lapichi, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, May 1964.**
The 205-acre installation includes three administrative buildings, eight barracks, twelve storage buildings, one vehicle shed and 42 support buildings. The installation also includes an unsecured storage area with three revetted buildings. Training facilities include a small-arms range and two athletic fields.

**Document V-281. Osipovichi Army Barracks Tsel, Lapichi, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, May 1964.**
The 70-acre installation includes one administration building, four barracks, 11 storage buildings and 11 support buildings. [See also V-35 for another report on this installation.]
The 350-acre area contains six administration buildings, four barracks, five storage buildings, 18 support buildings, two vehicle-sheds, a communications tower, a probable swimming pool and an athletic field. Training facilities include a small-arms firing range and a wheeled-vehicle driver training course.

The installation includes a separately secured storage area and a support installation. The 115-acre storage area contains 12 storage buildings and two support buildings. The 90-acre support area contains one administration building, one barracks, two vehicle sheds and 45 small support buildings.

The 140-acre installation contains one administration building, four barracks, seven storage and 18 small support buildings and one small arms firing range.

The 200-acre installation contains five barracks, 10 small storage buildings, 13 support buildings and two motor pools with 12 vehicle sheds. Training facilities include one wheeled-vehicle driver-training course and one athletic field.

The 250-acre installation includes two administration buildings, 10 barracks, 67 storage buildings, two revetted storage buildings, 28 support buildings, 21 vehicle storage and maintenance buildings, one small-arms firing range and a drill field.

The 700-acre installation includes seven administration buildings, 49 barracks, 115 storage buildings, 51 support buildings, two equipment storage and maintenance buildings, 25 vehicle sheds, two athletic fields and two small-arms firing ranges.

A 160-foot wide firebreak encloses the 350-acre secured installation. There is a double secured inner area. The inner area contains 25 storage buildings and an open probable vehicle park. The outer area contains one administration building and 11 support buildings.

The installation has two areas. The 160-acre larger area is secured and contains 23 vertical earth-covered POL tanks and 14 support buildings. The 18-acre smaller area contains 11 vertical POL tanks and four support buildings. A probable double pipeline connects the larger area with the Baranovichi Airfield.

The 80-acre installation contains one administration building, three barracks, seven storage buildings, seven support buildings, eight motor vehicle sheds with five associated support buildings, an athletic field, a water tower and a possible small-arms range.

The secured by double and triple fencing 770-acre installation contains 49 ammunition storage buildings, one bunkered building, one high-bay building and one support building. The support area immediately outside the secured installation contains two administration buildings, six barracks, 14 storage buildings, 14 support buildings, an athletic field, a possible water tank and a parade ground.

**Document V-292. Borisov Supply Depot and POL Storage Area, Borisov, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, May 1964.**
The 15-acre secured POL storage area has one administration building, two storage buildings and 20 vertical POL storage tanks. The 85-acre support area has 50 storage buildings.

**Document V-293. Borisov Army Barracks Novosady, Novosady, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, May 1964.**
The 17-acre secured area of the installation contains four administration buildings, eight barracks, 17 support buildings and two storage buildings. A four-acre area outside the secured area contains one administration building, nine barracks and five support buildings. A possibly associated storage area containing seven storage buildings is just east of the main installation.

**Document V-294. Borisov Army Barracks, Borisov, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, May 1964.**
The 70-acre installation contains two administration buildings, seven barracks, 10 storage buildings, 19 support buildings, two vehicle parks, two vehicle sheds and one maintenance building.

**Document V-295. Selected Storage Installations, Bobruysk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, May 1964.**
The installations covered in this report are Bobruysk Petroleum Storage West, Bobruysk Petroleum storage PUG and Bobruysk Army Depot Northwest. The secured 12-acre Bobruysk Petroleum Storage West has 12 POL storage tanks, one administration building and three small support buildings.

- The secured 48-acre Bobruysk Petroleum Storage PUG contains at least 2 buried POL storage tanks, two storage buildings and four support buildings.
- The secured 43-acre Army Depot Northwest contains 18 storage buildings and five support buildings.

**Document V-296. Gomel Army Barracks Khutoi and Associated Storage Area, Gomel, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, May 1964.**
The 130-acre installation contains both a barracks area and a secured storage area. The barracks area contains one administration building, five barracks, four possible barracks and eight support buildings. It probably has a support function for the storage facility rather than for the Army Barracks. The storage area is secured on three sides with a fence and a firebreak. It contains 20 storage buildings. Four nearby unidentified buildings are possibly associated with the installation.

The 218-acre installation contains one administration building, nine barracks, five storage buildings, 22 support buildings, a small-arms firing range and an athletic field.

The 30-acre installation is double-secured on three sides and undetermined security on the fourth side. It contains seven storage buildings, eight revetted ammunition storage buildings and three support buildings.

The 600-acre installation includes five administration building, 14 barracks, 58 storage buildings, 22 support buildings, and five vehicle parks containing 11 vehicle sheds, three maintenance buildings, and four equipment storage buildings. The installation also includes two revetted ammunition storage buildings, one athletic field, five small-arms firing ranges, a wheeled-vehicle driver-training course, and a probable communications station containing three buildings. A 500-acre training area three km south of the Army Barracks contains three wheeled-vehicle driver-training courses and a possible tank firing range with two target runs.

The 125-acre installation has seven storage buildings and three support buildings. Two small figure-8 driver-training courses appear to be lightly used.

The 70-acre installation secured by a fence and a perimeter firebreak contains seven probable explosives storage buildings.

The 380-acre installation contains an ammunition depot and separate storage area. A fence and a wide firebreak secure the ammunition depot. It contains 28 unrevetted ammunition storage buildings, two probable rail-to-road trans-loading buildings and nine support buildings. The support area is outside the secured area. It has one administration building, two-administration-type buildings, seven multistory barracks, 11 storage buildings and 12 support buildings.

The 570-acre installation includes one administration building, seven multistory barracks, 29 storage buildings, three vehicle sheds, three vehicle maintenance buildings and 43 support buildings. A secured ammunition storage area contains five unrevetted buildings and a secured probable communications site containing a tower and two support buildings. Training facilities include a wheeled-vehicle driver training area and a small-arms firing range.

The 35-acre storage area contains 22 storage buildings, one storage building under construction and five support buildings. A support area located outside the secured area contains 11 buildings.


Document V-308. **Slonim Army Barracks and Headquarters, 8th Tank Division, Slonim, USSR, Belorussia MD**, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, May 1964. The 1,450-acre installation includes eight administration buildings, 23 barracks, three storage buildings, nine support buildings, four equipment storage and maintenance areas containing 26 vehicle sheds, 21 maintenance buildings and six support buildings. The ammunition storage area contains six unrevetted buildings and an athletic field. Training facilities include three small-arms ranges and a probable tracked-vehicle driver-training course.

Document V-309. **Shchuchin Army Barracks, Shchuchin, USSR, Belorussia MD**, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, May 1964. The 375-acre installation contains three administration buildings, 20 barracks, 13 storage buildings, 46 support buildings, 51 officer and dependent quarters and three vehicle parks containing six vehicle sheds and eight maintenance buildings. There are two athletic fields and a probable wheeled-vehicle driver-training course.


Document V-311. **POL Storage Area, Yelsk, USSR, Belorussia MD**, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, May 1964. The 140-acre installation contains 10 large vertical POL storage tanks in an 22-acre diked area, 20 associated support-type buildings, one possible water tower, an unidentified object and numerous small sheds.

Document V-312. **Minsk Army Barracks Uruchye, Minsk, USSR, Belorussia MD**, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964. This 2,200-acre barracks installation is located 11 km northeast of Minsk. It includes 15 administration buildings, 52 barracks, 92 storage buildings, 64 support buildings, 65 probable dependent quarters, a secured transformer substation with a control building, five equipment storage and maintenance areas containing 21 vehicle storage and maintenance buildings and eight vehicle parks. Training facilities within the installation include a wheeled-vehicle driver training area, nine small-arms firing ranges and three athletic fields. [Also see Document V-404 for another report on this installation.]

The 250-acre installation includes 16 administration buildings, 33 barracks, 98 storage buildings, 29 support buildings, a secured combined equipment storage and maintenance area with six combined vehicle storage and maintenance buildings, and one motor park. A double fence secures the west central portion of the installation.

**Document V-314. Minsk Barracks and Artillery OCS, Minsk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The barracks is located on the northeast outskirts of Minsk. The 70-acre main area is probably secured. It includes three administration buildings, one combined barracks and administration building, four barracks, four storage buildings, 22 support buildings, six combined equipment storage and maintenance buildings, a driver training area and a small arms range. A 200-acre open area possibly associated with the main area contains six small-unidentified secured areas and eleven small support buildings. A possible dependents housing area with 17 buildings is located east of the installation.

**Document V-315. Minsk Supply Depot East, Minsk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The depot is located in the central section of Minsk. The 36-acre installation includes two administration buildings, seven barracks, ten storage buildings, two-vehicle storage and maintenance buildings and nine support buildings.

**Document V-316. Selected Military Installations, Minsk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The report describes two military installations located in the center of Minsk. One appears to be Headquarters Belorussian Military District. It is a secured 9-acre installation containing one large, E-shaped, multistory administration building and a parking area. The 12-acre second installation includes two administration buildings, three barracks, four support buildings and one storage building.

**Document V-317. Minsk Barracks Kalinina, Minsk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
This 800-acre installation contains four administration buildings, ten barracks, 19 storage buildings, 21 support buildings, 20 probable dependents quarters, a tent camp area and eight equipment storage and maintenance buildings of which two are located in a secured motor park area. Training facilities within the area include an athletic field, a wheeled-vehicle drive-training course and a small-arms firing range. [See also Document V-404 for another report on this installation.]

**Document V-318. Minsk Ammunition Depot Kanyuchitsy, Minsk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 220-acre installation has a double-fenced storage area and a support area. The storage area contains 17 ammunition storage buildings. The support area contains one administration building, six probable barracks and two support buildings. Two buildings, possibly associated with the ammunition storage area are located adjacent to a scarred clearing in a wooded area south of the ammunition storage areas. A secured storage area 0.7 km southwest surrounded by a firebreak contains four storage buildings. The security, firebreak and dispersion of the buildings indicate it is a possible explosive storage.

**Document V-319. Minsk Army Barracks Northwest, Minsk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 300-acre barracks contains five administration buildings, 22 barracks, six storage buildings, 42 support buildings, and seven vehicle storage and maintenance buildings. Eight possible storage buildings are located in a heavily scarred new construction area on the west side of the installation. There is also an athletic field and a small-arms firing range.
The 1,240-acre installation is probably secured. It contains two administration buildings, 17 barracks, 11 support buildings, four storage buildings, seven vehicle sheds, one vehicle park, and three cleared strips in wooded areas probably utilized as tent areas. The tent areas probably provide temporary billeting for additional troops during the summer months training period.

The 250-acre installation contains one administration building, one combined administration and barracks building, three barracks, eight storage buildings and 12 support buildings. Training facilities include one small arms firing range and a wheeled-vehicle driver training course.

The 1,400-acre installation includes three administration buildings, 21 barracks, 51 storage buildings, 38 support buildings, and 68 officer and dependent quarters. Two vehicle or equipment parks contain a total of 18 associated storage and maintenance buildings. There are three secured ammunition storage areas. One contains 12 revetted buildings, and the other two contain 15 unrevetted buildings and an athletic field. Training facilities within the installation include three small arms ranges, a probable tracked-vehicle driver-training course and a tracked-vehicle firing range. There is a SAM site and an unoccupied AAA site within the general area.

The 15-acre installation is located within the Mogilev city limits. It contains five POL tanks and 12 small support buildings.

The 50-acre secured installation contains four probable storage buildings, five buried POL storage tanks and two buried probable POL storage tanks.

The double-fenced secured 440-acre ammunition storage area contains eleven ammunition storage buildings, three possible explosives storage buildings, a foundation for an additional possible explosive storage building, and eight support buildings. The support area contains one administration building, eight barracks, four storage buildings, one vehicle shed, 29 support buildings and a small-arms firing range.

The 195-acre installation contains one barracks and administration building, six barracks, seven storage buildings, 18 vehicle-sheds, 11 support buildings, two vehicle parks, two troop obstacle courses and two small-arms firing ranges.

The 300-acre installation includes one administration building, 23 single-story and seven multistory barracks,
six storage buildings, 17 support buildings, four vehicle parks, eight vehicle sheds, three troop obstacle courses, five small-arms firing ranges, an athletic field and one probable tower.

**Document V-328. Osipovichi Petroleum Storage, Osipovichi, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 90-acre installation includes three areas: a probable secured POL storage area containing 44 POL storage tanks; a support area containing one storage building and four small support buildings; and an associated barracks area containing six multistory barracks and three small support buildings.

**Document V-329. Barracks Areas, Oshmyany, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 70-acre installation contains one barracks, three probable officers' quarters, seven storage buildings, three support buildings, four vehicle sheds, one maintenance building and a possible water tower. There is a small probable wheeled-vehicle driver-training course located immediately north of the barracks and a wheeled-vehicle driver-training course located west of the equipment storage and maintenance area.

**Document V-330. Storage Area, Osipovichi, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 135-acre installation contains two administration buildings, five barracks, 13 storage buildings, five probable storage buildings, six ammunition storage buildings, 11 support buildings, one small-arms range and one athletic field.

**Document V-331. Polotsk Army Barracks and Maneuver Area, Polotsk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 3,000-acre installation includes 2 administration buildings, 19 barracks, eight small probable officers' quarters, 18 storage buildings, 26 storage buildings, four vehicle and equipment areas containing 19 vehicle and equipment sheds, a secured explosive storage facility with two buildings, a possible tracked-vehicle driver training course and one athletic field.

**Document V-332. Postavy Army Barracks, Postavy, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 50-acre installation contains two administration buildings, eight barracks, eight support buildings, and 43 probable dependents quarters. The following factors indicate this installation is possibly associated with the Postavy airfield: it has a direct road connection to the Postavy Airfield 2 km west; and the absence of facilities such as vehicle storage-sheds, storage buildings, athletic fields or training facilities.

**Document V-333. Postavy Army Barracks [Al-2], Postavy, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 270-acre installation contains three administration buildings, ten barracks, four probable barracks, 27 support buildings, 29 storage buildings, three possible storage buildings, 41 probable dependent quarters, and two vehicle maintenance areas with 12 vehicle sheds, two maintenance buildings and five support buildings. An abandoned tank firing range located 4 km northeast and a probable tracked-vehicle driver-training course located 5.5 km west are associated with this installation. The Postavy Army Barracks described in Document V-337 is located 5 km west.

**Document V-334. Slutsk Ordnance Depot, Slutsk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 180-acre installation contains three administration buildings, six barracks, four storage buildings, five vehicle storage and maintenance buildings, 24 support buildings and a probable water tower. A secured
ammunition storage area with four unrevetted buildings and a small-arms firing range are located immediately east of the installation.

**Document V-335. Slutsk Army Barracks Southwest, Slutsk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 400-acre installation contains three administration buildings, 14 barracks, 20 storage buildings, 57 support buildings, and 10 dependent and officer quarters. There also are three vehicle parks, five vehicle maintenance buildings, two vehicle sheds, two small-arms firing ranges, an athletic field and an open storage area.

**Document V-336. Urechye Army Barracks Southeast and POL Storage, Urechye, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 1,230-acre installation contains seven administration buildings, 30 barracks, 37 storage buildings, two probable ammunition storage buildings, 26 support buildings, 28 dependents quarters, an unidentified building and one vehicle maintenance and storage area containing six vehicle sheds and a maintenance building. Other facilities include four athletic fields and four small-arms ranges. The 7-acre POL area contains 10 POL tanks and five possible buried tanks.

**Document V-337. POL Storage Area, Volkovysk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 30-acre installation contains 15 POL storage tanks, four storage buildings, seven support buildings and a probable vehicle park. Immediately south of the secured area is a closed circuit figure-8 driver training course.

**Document V-338. Staryye Dorogi Army Barracks, Staryye Dorogi, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 275-acre installation contains five administration buildings, 13 barracks, 15 storage buildings, 21 support buildings, one vehicle shed, seven possible buildings, a small-arms firing range and a driver training area.

**Document V-339. Petroleum Storage Area, Brest, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 70-acre doubled-fence secured installation includes 15 semi-buried vertical storage tanks, 100 horizontal storage tanks, one administration building and five support buildings.

**Document V-340. Volkovysk Army Barracks, Volkovysk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 584-acre installation contains three administration buildings, one administration type building, 17 barracks, four vehicle maintenance and storage buildings, 38 storage buildings, 40 dependent and officer quarters, 55 support buildings, an assembly area for vehicles, a small-arms firing range, a flat trajectory firing range, two wheeled-vehicle driver training courses, an unidentified facility and an open area used for tracked-vehicle driver training.

**Document V-341. Bereza Army Barracks Yaselda, Bereza, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 145-acre installation contains 3 separate areas. The main secured barracks area includes one administration building, three barracks, nine support buildings and five storage buildings. An equipment storage and maintenance area contains two vehicle sheds and four vehicle maintenance buildings. A second equipment storage and maintenance area contains four support buildings, five possible ammunition storage buildings, two of which appear revetted. Training facilities include a parade ground, a small-arms firing range and an open area possible for infantry-type training.
**Document V-342. Ammunition Storage Area, Bobruysk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 91-acre secured installation contains 13 ammunition storage buildings dispersed in the woods.

**Document V-343. Bobruysk Barracks and Headquarters 22nd Tank Division Citadel, Bobruysk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 420-acre installation contains seven administration buildings, 24 barracks, 25 storage buildings, 53 support buildings and 21 dependent quarters. Two large and one small vehicle or equipment areas contain 35 associated vehicle storage and maintenance buildings and two athletic fields.

**Document V-344. Borisov Army Barracks, Borisov, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 1,550-acre installation includes ten administration buildings, 36 barracks, 130 storage buildings, seven unrevetted probable ammunition storage buildings, 15 officers’ quarters, one mess hall, ten hospital buildings and three smalls support buildings. Six equipment storage and maintenance areas contain 53 equipment storage and maintenance buildings and sheds with six associated vehicle parks. The training facilities include three athletic fields and three small-arms firing ranges.

**Document V-345. Brest Army Camp Southeast, Brest, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 650-acre installation contains four administration buildings, 31 barracks, 27 storage buildings, 53 support buildings, four range-support buildings, 18 dependent quarters, one probable tent camp area, and five equipment storage and maintenance areas containing 13 vehicle storage and maintenance buildings and eight motor parks. Training facilities include two athletic fields, one wheeled-vehicle driver-training area, and a moving-target tank sub-caliber weapons firing range.

**Document V-346. Barracks Area, Brest, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 90-acre installation contains one administration building, three barracks, three vehicle maintenance buildings, three vehicle sheds, 16 officer and dependents quarters, six storage buildings, ten support buildings and a figure-8 drier-training course.

**Document V-347. Military Barracks and Storage Area Bykov, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 76-acre installation is divided into three separately secured areas. It contains 89 buildings, five administration buildings, 16 barracks, 40 storage buildings, 26 support buildings, two maintenance and storage buildings, a motor pool, an open storage area, one possible small arms firing range and one athletic field.

**Document V-348. Dzerzhinsk Army Barracks Southeast, Dzerzhinsk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The 180-acre installation contains two administration buildings, 10 barracks, 23 storage buildings, seven vehicle maintenance buildings, three vehicle sheds and 52 support buildings. Other facilities include an athletic field, seven small-arms firing ranges and numerous old artillery positions probably used for training.

**Document V-349. Possible Military Storage Area, Dzerzhinsk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1964.**
The secured 25-acre installation contains 12 storage buildings and 19 support buildings.
The 280-acre installation has five separate related areas containing two administration buildings, 10 barracks, six probable quarters, 17 storage buildings, 19 support buildings, one equipment park for open storage of equipment and vehicles, and three equipment storage and maintenance areas containing four vehicle sheds and nine vehicle maintenance buildings. A 175-acre training area contains a small-arms firing range, two towers and a probable ammunition storage bunker.

The 240-acre installation contains three administration buildings, 12 probable quarters, 82 storage buildings, one probable special storage building, two probable storage buildings, one large building under construction, one possible maintenance building, and five support buildings.

The 20-acre installation secured by a double fence contains eight possible ammunition storage buildings.

The 160-acre installation contains six multistory administration buildings, 18 multistory barracks, an equipment storage and maintenance area containing three vehicle and equipment maintenance buildings, one maintenance building, 13 storage buildings, 32 support buildings, two athletic fields, a small-arms firing range and 16 dependents quarters. On the west edges of the installation there are two underground POL storage areas, each directly served by access roads to the Kobrin airfield.

The installation is located in the city of Minsk close to the Minsk Army Barracks Uruchye and the Minsk Army Barracks Northwest. A probable military hospital and administrative area comprises the main part of this installation with a possibly associated quarters and support area located immediately northwest. The 50-acre main area contains five administration buildings, seven barracks, one large multistory, multi-wing probable hospital building, seven storage buildings, three vehicle combined storage and maintenance buildings with an associated vehicle park, and 22 support buildings. The possibly associated 60-acre quarters and support area includes four administrative-type buildings, 38 quarters, eight storage buildings and 34 support buildings.

The installation is located in the southern outskirts of Minsk. The 29-acre secured installation contains 33 vertical POL tanks and eleven support buildings.

The 8-acre installation contains nine semi-buried POL tanks and one support building. Two ground scars from the installation to the Minsk-Machulishche airfield 5 km away indicate a possible pipeline connecting the POL storage area to a rail unloading point at the airfield.

This 35-acre installation is located seven km east-northeast of Minsk. It contains four administration buildings, nine barracks, 31 storage buildings, 31 support buildings, 17 dependent quarters, two motor parks, and eight vehicle storage and maintenance buildings located in two secured equipment storage and maintenance areas. A 30-acre secured ammunition storage area contains three unrevetted ammunition storage buildings and one support building and is located 2 km north-northwest of the barracks area.

**Document V-358. Minsk Army Barracks Southwest, Minsk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 15-acre barracks is located in the southwest section of Minsk. It contains three administration buildings, five barracks, four storage buildings, seven support buildings and two probable vehicle storage and maintenance buildings.

**Document V-359. Minsk Army Barracks, Minsk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 60-acre barracks is located in the northeast section of Minsk. It contains four administration buildings, nine barracks, eight storage buildings, five vehicle storage and maintenance buildings and 21 support buildings.

**Document V-360. Marina Gorka Army Barracks and Depot, Marina Gorka, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
A military training area is located north and east, and a moving-target tank firing range is located southwest. The 420-acre installation includes seven administration buildings, 19 support buildings, 18 multistory barracks, 20 dependent quarters, 23 storage buildings, 24 combined vehicle and equipment maintenance buildings, one possible vehicle shed and three unidentified buildings. Other facilities include an athletic field, three small arms firing ranges, a possible POL storage area, and a secured area containing two unidentified objects.

**Document V-361. Lida Training Area, Southeast Lida, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 3,800-acre installation includes a 200-acre troop billeting camp with five permanent buildings and extensive areas for tents. The permanent buildings include one administration building and four probable mess halls. The training area is relatively flat and predominately wooded. Facilities include an infantry field training area, two probable field artillery four-position battery emplacements, and a probable river-crossing training site.

**Document V-362. Lepel Army Barracks, Zaslonovo Stantsiya, Lepel, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
There is an associated training area to the north of the installation that is covered in a separate report. Other military installations located in the area include the Lepel Army Barracks Northeast, the Lepel Army Barracks, and the headquarters of an unidentified guards tank division and storage area. This 1,825-acre installation contains seven administrative buildings, 19 barracks, 44 storage buildings, 67 support buildings, and 23 combined equipment storage and maintenance buildings with four probable associated motor parks. Training facilities include three small arms firing ranges, an athletic field and a probable tracked-vehicle driver-training course.

**Document V-363. Selected Installations, Mogilev, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
Two secured probable military storage installations are located on the northeast edge of Mogilev. One is the secured 75-acre Mogilev Air Depot Long Range. It contains one multistory administration building, three
multistory barracks, 11 support buildings, 20 storage buildings, one probable vehicle-storage and maintenance building and a large open storage area.

The secured 5-acre Mogilev Ordnance Depot contains one multistory administration building, two barracks, 17 storage buildings and 15 small support buildings. Buildings for repair and maintenance of heavy military equipment that are generally associated with an ordnance depot were not observed in the area.

**Document V-364. Military Barracks and Storage Area, Mogilev, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
This 445-acre installation is 5.7 km northwest of Mogilev. It contains five administration buildings, six barracks, 19 support buildings, five dependent quarters, 21 storage buildings, three vehicle-sheds, four ammunition storage buildings a small arms firing range, a wheeled-vehicle driver-training course, and an area of ground scarring.

**Document V-365. Molodechno Army Barracks, Velikoye Selo, Molodechno, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 100-acre installation includes four barracks, two multistory combined barracks and administration buildings, 21 storage buildings, eight support buildings and two equipment storage and maintenance areas containing nine vehicle sheds and two maintenance buildings. It also contains an athletic field, a small-arms firing range and a probable wheeled-vehicle training course.

**Document V-366. Oranchitsy Petroleum Storage, Oranchitsy, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 75-acre installation contains: 24 semi-buried vertical POL tanks; seven semi-buried probable POL tanks with rectangular covers, of which five appear to be interconnected by pipes; one administration building; five storage buildings; six support buildings; and a large open area, possibly for storage of oil drums.

**Document V-367. Orsha Army Supply Depot, Orsha, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 32-acre secured supply depot contains one administration building, 30 storage buildings and eight small support buildings. A probable fence separates the administrative area in the western end of the depot from the remainder of the storage area.

**Document V-368. Orsha Army Barracks and Training Area Southeast, Orsha, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
This 40 acre partially fenced installation contains one probable administration building, four multistory barracks, one probable multistory barracks, two storage buildings, one vehicle shed, and 11 small support buildings. A fenced vehicle park is situated on the northwest edge of the installation with approximately 42 vehicles, including 22 possible missile transporters within the vehicle park. A probable athletic field is located on the southeast edge of the installation.

**Document V-369. Training Areas, Osipovichi, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 8,050-acre Osipovichi Training Area Northwest includes three administration and support buildings and one possible vehicle maintenance and storage shed. Troop housing and logistical support for the training area are allocated at Osipovichi Army Barracks North and Osipovichi Barracks South [Document V-305]. Training facilities include one moving-target tank and assault-gun firing range, one possible combined-arms field training course, one driver-training area, seven field artillery battery emplacements, two infantry field training
areas, and a small bivouac area that includes two administration and support buildings. The 250-acre Training Area 2 includes one triangular area consisting of three courses for wheeled and tracked-vehicle driver training.

**Document V-370. Military Barracks Area, Pinsk, USSR, Belorussia MD, July 1964.**
The 75-acre secured installation contains 27 buildings including one administration building, one combined barracks and administration building, four barracks, nine storage buildings and eight support buildings. There is a semi-secured maintenance area that contains two vehicle maintenance buildings and a storage building. Training facilities include an athletic field, a small-arms firing range with a possible range house and a parade ground.

The 1,400-acre installation has three main areas. There are two administration buildings, 21 multistory barracks, three vehicle sheds, eight storage buildings, 15 support buildings, three ammunition storage buildings, two four-court athletic facilities, two probable troop obstacle courses, one observer tower, one athletic field and one training area with a probable flat trajectory range and a probable wheeled-vehicle driver-training course.

**Document V-372. Polotsk Army Barracks, Polotsk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 410-acre installation contains two administration buildings, four barracks, eight large storage buildings, 20 support buildings, one secured ammunition storage building and two small-arms firing ranges.

**Document V-373. Military Training Area, Porechye, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 11,500-acre training area contains two possible bivouac areas. Training facilities include a tank firing range, a probable infantry field training area and a possible combined-arms field training area. Artillery emplacements include three AAA sites an18 field artillery emplacements.

**Document V-374. Porechye Maneuver Area Grodno Porechye, Grodnenskaya Oblast, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 12,000-acre training area contains an infantry training area, a combined-arms training course, four tank and assault gun firing ranges, a probable flat-trajectory firing range, a maintenance and support area, ten field artillery emplacements and one AAA site.

**Document V-375. Pruzhan Army Barracks Slobodka Pruzhan, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 830-acre installation includes a barracks area and a training facility. There are four administration buildings, 12 barracks, 23 support buildings, 11 storage buildings, 16 probable dependents quarters, eight vehicle maintenance buildings, six equipment storage buildings, three firing ranges; an obstacle course, a wheeled-vehicle driver-training course, a probable rail-to-road transfer point, an athletic field, a parade ground and an infantry field training area.

**Document V-376. Ammunition Storage Area, Rechitsa, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 225-acre installation is a double-fenced ammunition storage area with an adjacent support area. It contains 11 revetted ammunition storage buildings, two probable barracks and three support buildings.
The 110-acre installation contains one administration building, one large multistory barracks, two single-story barracks, 20 dependent quarters, 23 storage buildings, two vehicle maintenance buildings and 15 support buildings. There also are a small army firing range, athletic field and a parade ground.

The 720-acre installation contains three multistory administration buildings, two combined multistory barracks and administration buildings, eight barracks, 31 storage buildings, 26 support buildings, two equipment storage and maintenance areas with eight vehicle shed and maintenance buildings. There are two secured probable ammunition storage areas with eight buildings (two revetted), and an athletic field. Training facilities include a small-army firing range and a unit training area, which includes a driver training area, personnel trenches and foxholes, and an infantry assault training course.

The installation includes the Vitebsk Petroleum Storage South and a supply depot. The 34-acre petroleum storage area contains 24 storage tanks and six small support buildings. The 59-acre secured supply depot contains five large storage buildings and 25 small support buildings.

The 95-acre installation contains one-multistory administrative building, one combined multistory barracks and administrative building, three barracks, eight storage buildings, 15 support buildings and three vehicle sheds.

The 115-acre installation contains one administration building, seven barracks, five vehicle sheds, 19 storage buildings and nine support buildings.

The 150-acre installation contains four administration buildings, nine multistory barracks, eight storage and seventeen support buildings, six vehicle sheds, one vehicle park, one small-revetted building and an athletic field.

The 70-acre secured installation contains ten POL tanks, two of which are underground; one multistory combined barracks and administrative building; two multistory barracks; 10 support buildings; and an athletic field.

The 15,500-acre installation contains six tank and assault gun ranges, one combined-arms field training course, three wheeled and one tracked driver-training courses, numerous unoccupied AAA and field artillery battery emplacements, one small-arms firing range and a secured support area. Troop housing and logistical support
for the training area are located in Baranovich at Baranovich Army Barracks SW (AL-1) and Baranovich Army Barracks East (AL-2).

The 218-acre installation has a separately secured support area and a storage area. The support area contains one administration building, 10 small personnel quarters, 12 small support buildings, and a vehicle-storage and maintenance area with two vehicle sheds and two support buildings. The secured storage area contains 21 ammunition storage buildings and one small support building within the secured area. Two support buildings are located outside the security fence around the storage area.

**Document V-386.** Bobruysk Army Barracks West and Associated Training Area, Bobruysk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.
The 700-acre barracks area contains three administration buildings, 41 barracks, 36 storage buildings, 41 support buildings, two officers quarters, one probable officers' club, one large gymnasium, two vehicle maintenance and storage areas with 15 vehicle maintenance buildings, an athletic field, two small-arms firing ranges, and a sod aircraft landing strip with a tower. A transshipment facility on the northwest edge of the installation contains two buildings. A large water treatment basin is located west of the installation.

The 630-acre associated training area contains two small-arms ranges, a probable tracked-vehicle driver training area, two tank and assault gun firing ranges and nine support buildings.

**Document V-387.** Bobruysk Army Maneuver Area, Bobruysk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.
The 24,250-acre training area contains a 170-acre bivouac area with nine support buildings, an irregularly shaped, closed-circuit driver-training course, three tank and assault-gun firing ranges, a small-arms firing range which may be used as a sub-caliber range for tanks, two combined-arms training areas, three infantry field training areas, and a water crossing site on the Berezina River on the southern edge of the training area.

The 165-acre area contains 34 gable- and quonset-roofed ammunition storage buildings and one bunkered and six support buildings. The ammunition storage buildings are located on individual hardstands and are dispersed throughout the installation in wooded areas. A security fence with sentry towers at each corner encloses the ammunition storage area. A probable gate and a guardhouse are located on the north side of the storage area.

Military installations in the southeast section of Bobruysk include an Air Force Depot, the Headquarters 5th Guards Mechanized Army and the Army Food Depot South.

- The 74-acre Air Force Depot includes three administration buildings, 22 storage buildings, 12 support buildings, three barracks, and three vehicle maintenance buildings in a vehicle maintenance and storage area.
- The 27-acre secured Headquarters 5th Guards Mechanized Army includes three administration buildings, two barracks, three storage buildings and five support buildings.
- The 40-acre Army Food Depot contains three administration buildings, 24 storage buildings, six possible storage buildings, six support buildings and four barracks. There is also a probable vehicle maintenance and storage area containing three vehicle maintenance buildings.
**Document V-390. Borisov Army Barracks South, Borisov, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 1,200-acre installation has seven administration buildings, 23 barracks, 31 storage buildings, 118 support buildings, 44 office and dependent quarters, three vehicle storage and maintenance areas containing a total of 10 storage and maintenance buildings, and an additional eight vehicle or equipment maintenance buildings. There is also a secured ammunition storage area with 10 unrevetted buildings, a POL storage area with six tanks, and two athletic fields. Training facilities include six small arms ranges, a probable wheeled-vehicle driver-training course, and a wheeled and tracked-vehicle training area.

**Document V-391. Brest Army Barracks Central, Brest, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 100-acre installation contains three administration buildings, 11 barracks, 13 storage buildings, 24 support buildings, five vehicle storage and maintenance buildings, and two motor parks in two equipment storage and maintenance areas.

**Document V-392. Storage Area, Chemernoye, Chemernoye, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 41-acre secured storage area includes 20 large and five small storage buildings, two large, well ventilated buildings with firewalls, which are probably used for special storage, one administration building, two barracks, and eight support buildings. Located separately are an open storage area of approximately two acres and a loading area of 7.2 acres.

**Document V-393. Dretun Army Training Area, Dretun, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 21,500-acre training area includes two support areas with two probable administration buildings, five barracks, 16 storage buildings, six support buildings, two bivouac areas, and a possible secured storage area with 10 unrevetted buildings. Training facilities are two moving-target tank and assault gun firing ranges, one tracked-vehicle driver-training course, a wheeled and tracked-vehicle driver-training area, and a probable combined-arms field training area.

**Document V-394. Gomel Army Barracks, Gomel, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 290-acre installation includes two administration buildings, 13 barracks, 33 support buildings, 18 storage buildings and two small-arms firing ranges.

The 190-acre double secured installation includes 21 storage buildings, one L-shaped administration and support building, and four guard towers. Six other support buildings are located outside the secured area.

The 140-acre installation includes four administration buildings, 16 barracks, 35 storage buildings, 15 support buildings, and four equipment storage and maintenance areas containing eight vehicle sheds and nine maintenance buildings. There are two athletic fields.

**Document V-397. Grodno Army Barracks North, Grodno, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.**
The 83-acre secured barracks area contains two administration buildings, eight barracks, six quarters, 20
storage buildings, 16 support buildings, a possible armory or large gymnasium, two wheeled-vehicle training courses, a vehicle park and a vehicle storage and maintenance area with five vehicle maintenance and storage buildings. The 36-acre secured POL storage area contains six large POL tanks, 17 small POL tanks and three support buildings.

**Document V-398.** *Kobrin Petroleum Storage Area, Kobrin, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.*
The 30-acre secured installation contains three large vertical POL tanks, five medium vertical POL tanks, one small vertical POL tank, six small horizontal tanks and three support buildings. Within the secured area there are five unidentified circular ground scars in a wooded area.

The 167-acre secured installation contains 32 vertical POL storage tanks, 13 large rectangular revetments containing 96 horizontal POL storage tanks, three administration buildings, three barracks, four quarters, 14 storage buildings, and four support buildings. Outside the secured area are four revetted rectangular probable waste basins connected by a probable underground pipeline to a pump house at the installation.

**Document V-400.** *Krupki POL Storage Area, Stantsiya Krupki, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.*
The 50-acre installation contains six medium and two small POL storage tanks. An associated barracks and support area contains six single story barracks, one L-shaped administration building, one storage building and 10 support buildings.

**Document V-401.** *Lepel Army Barracks and Headquarters, Unidentified Guards Tank Division and Lepel Ammunition Storage Depot, Lepel, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.*
The 600-acre installation contains an ammunition storage depot and barracks area. The barracks area contains four administration buildings, 11 barracks, 13 storage buildings, 27 support buildings, 15 equipment storage and maintenance buildings, and associated parking areas. There are small-arms ranges and one athletic field. An area probably associated with the barracks area contains 10 support buildings and one large E-shaped administration and barracks building. The secured ammunition depot also is separated from the barracks area by a firebreak. It contains 24 unrevetted ammunition storage buildings, six small storage buildings, 14 support buildings and one administration building.

**Document V-402.** *Training Area, Lepel, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1964.*
The 5,260-acre installation contains six tank and assault-gun firing ranges, one driver-crew training area, one range control building, a four range control buildings and two possible small-arms firing ranges. Troop housing and logistical support for the training area are located at AL-3 and AL-4.

**Document V-403.** *Borisov Army Training Areas, Borisov, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, August 1964.*
The 36,300-acre Training Area I has an ammunition storage area containing four bunkers. Driver training facilities include one circular and one figure 8 driver-training course for wheeled vehicles, three irregularly shaped closed-circuit courses, and two irregularly shaped areas where heavy scarring, probably by tracked vehicles, may obliterate other individual courses. There are 11 tank and assault-gun firing ranges. Artillery emplacements identified in the training area include five-gun AAA battery emplacements, and four three-
five-gun field artillery battery emplacements. Troop housing and logistical support for the area is at Borisov Army Barracks West and South.

The 3,900-acre Training area II includes an elliptical driver-training course for tracked vehicles, an irregularly shaped closed-circuit course for wheeled vehicles, and a possible river-crossing site for engineer training.

**Document V-404. Minsk Army Training Area Kalinina, Minsk, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, August 1964.**

The 28,280-acre largest portion of the training area is in a heavily wooded area. The smaller, 3,400-acre area is on level ground in a largely wooded area with the major training facilities in generally cleared areas. The Minsk Army Barracks Uruche [Document V-312] and Minsk Barracks Kalinina [Document V-317] provide troop housing and logistical support. Two bivouac areas are in the southeast portion of the larger area. All driver-training facilities are in the larger area and include a two tracked-vehicle driver-training course and a one wheeled-vehicle driver-training course. An equipment storage and maintenance area is adjacent to one of the tracked-vehicle driver-training courses. Five tank and assault-gun firing ranges and a flat-trajectory range are in the overall training area. There are also 10 field artillery battery emplacements. Two probable impact areas are located near the center of the larger area. Two infantry field-training areas and a combined-arms field-training course are located in the larger area. There are two unidentified training facilities located near the combined-arms course, which are possibly firing facilities. There is a probable wheeled-vehicle-mounted automatic weapons firing range, a probable automatic weapons firing range, and a third firing range, which is a combination of the other two in the smaller area.

**Document V-405. Training Area Brest, USSR, Belorussia MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, August 1964.**

The 49,675-acre training area includes a small bivouac area, a possible secured support area containing nine support buildings, two open vehicle and equipment parks, a wheeled-vehicle driver-training area containing one large closed-circuit course and five figure-8 courses, and a probable tracked-vehicle driver-training course. There are six tank and assault-gun firing ranges, two flat-trajectory firing ranges, two AAA battery emplacements, four 6-gun field artillery battery emplacements, and two large combined-arms field training areas with three areas of unidentified activity.

**Document V-406. Marina Gorka Training Areas I and II, Marina Gorka, USSR, Belorussian MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, August 1964.**

The 5,930-acre training area I includes two secured storage areas associated with the army barracks. Troop housing and logistic support for the training area are located at the army barracks. Training facilities include one irregular-shaped area for wheeled and tracked-vehicle driver training, three probable moving target runs for probable automatic weapons training, and one possible small arms range. The 2,965 acre training area II contains troop housing and logistic support located at the army barracks. The area has four tank and assault-gun firing ranges.

**Document V-407. Slonim Army Training Area Southeast, Slonim, USSR, Belorussian MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, August 1964.**

The 3,100-acre training area contains a wheeled-vehicle driver-training course, a tracked-vehicle driver-training area, two tank and assault-gun firing ranges, a possible flat-trajectory range near one of the tank and assault-gun firing ranges and an infantry field-training area.

↑ BACK TO CHAPTER 5

MOSCOW MILITARY DISTRICT
The 60-acre Gorkiy Army Barracks Okha River East contains two administration buildings, 22 barracks, three vehicle sheds, 1 probable vehicle maintenance building, 24+ storage buildings and a possible athletic field. The 24-acre Officer Candidate School contains two administration buildings, two classroom buildings and four support buildings. A secured 8-acre explosives storage area contains three revetted explosive storage buildings, six probable storage buildings and one support building.

The Army Barracks and the Army Depot are on a 250 acre-installation. It contains one possible and one probable administration buildings, three administration buildings, 32 barracks, six barracks and quarters, 27 quarters, 71 storage buildings, two maintenance buildings, one vehicle maintenance building, eight vehicle sheds and 33 support buildings.

The 52-acre installation contains two administration buildings, six barracks, seven officer and dependents quarters, eight storage buildings, 17 support buildings, a vehicle maintenance building, 2 small-arms firing ranges and an athletic field.

The 182-acre installation includes three administration buildings, four barracks, five combined barracks and quarters, 51 storage buildings, 18 support buildings, two vehicle sheds, a vehicle maintenance building, an athletic field and a probable small-arms firing range.

The 38-acre installation includes one administration building, two probable barracks, storage buildings and five support buildings.

The 125-acre secured storage area includes four revetted possible explosives storage buildings, two storage buildings, and four clearings which contain probable construction activity. Seven support buildings are located immediately north of the secured area. The probable support area contains one administration building, four barracks, nine support buildings and an athletic field.

The 25-acre installation contains an administration building, three probable storage buildings, three vehicle sheds, eight support buildings and an athletic field.

The 800-acre installation contains a double-secured storage depot and a support area. The storage depot contains one unidentified bunkered building, five earth-mounded probable arch-roofed storage buildings, two earth-mounded probable arched-roofed storage buildings under construction, 46 probable ammunition storage
buildings, 18 storage buildings, 17 support buildings, and one unidentified building under construction. The support area contains one administration building, one possible barracks, 12 storage buildings, 16 support buildings and a small-arms firing range 0.5 km south.

Two military installations are located within the walls of Gorkiy Kremlin: Gorkiy Headquarters Barracks and School Kremlin and a barracks area. The 24-acre Gorkiy Headquarters Barracks and School contains one classroom, one administration building, three barracks, one storage and maintenance building and 11 support buildings. The 20-acre associated barracks area contains one administration building, three barracks and one storage building. [See Document V-27 for a later report on this installation.]

The 215-acre installation has a number of adjacent but separately secured areas. The depot contains 87 storage buildings, four large maintenance buildings, four probable administration buildings, seven vehicle sheds, a heating plant, 55 support buildings and three possible overhead cranes.

The 35-acre explosives storage area is doubled secured and surrounded by a firebreak. It contains 13 explosives storage buildings, two transshipment sheds and seven probable storage buildings.

The 168-acre installation contains 14 barracks, four administration buildings, 67 storage buildings, 38 support buildings, 22 combined officers and dependents quarters, three vehicle maintenance buildings, an open storage area, one athletic field, one small-arms firing range, a water tower and a possible radome.

The 310-acre installation contains a barracks and administration building, nine barracks, 19 quarters, 12 storage buildings, 28 support buildings, three vehicle maintenance buildings, an athletic field, three small-arms firing ranges and a possible wheeled-vehicle driver-training area.

The 700-acre installation contains three administration buildings, 26 possible barracks, seven quarters, 47 storage buildings, 38 support buildings, three vehicle maintenance buildings, an athletic field and a possible bivouac area.

The 70-acre installation has a secured storage area and a support area containing one administration building, a possible barracks and administration building, six barracks, 27 storage buildings and 10 support buildings.

The 340-acre installation contains two possible administration buildings, one multistory barracks, 31 probable explosives storage buildings, 10 storage buildings, nine support buildings and one small-arms firing range.

The 210-acre installation contains one administration building, two barracks, 10 combined barracks and quarters, five quarters, 34 ammunition storage buildings, seven storage buildings, 22 support buildings and an unidentified facility.

The 65-acre installation contains two combined barracks and administration buildings, three probable combined barracks and administration buildings, 10 barracks, two storage buildings, 17 support buildings, one maintenance building, a possible maintenance building, four vehicle sheds and a building under construction.

The double-fenced 135-acre installation contains one probable administration building, one combined barracks and administration building, three probable barracks, two possible vehicle maintenance buildings, 27 storage buildings and 13 support buildings.

The 30-acre installation contains one administration building, one combined barracks and school building, two vehicle-maintenance sheds, two vehicle storage sheds and 11 support buildings.

The 250-acre installation contains a secured storage area and a support area. The storage area contains 71 storage buildings, two U-shaped storage buildings, nine support buildings and five open storage areas. The support area contains two administration buildings, four barracks, six barracks and quarters, five storage buildings and 25 support buildings.

The 485-acre installation contains 64 ammunition storage buildings, two rail-to-road transfer buildings, and two support buildings. A support area immediately north contains an administration building, three barracks, ten possible storage buildings and 14 support buildings.

The 500-acre installation contains a barracks and administration building, two multistory barracks, 12 probable quarters and barracks, 27 explosives storage buildings, 22 support buildings and an athletic field.

The secured 200-acre installation contains a support area with two administration buildings, four barracks, and 12 support buildings, a doubled-secured storage area with 16 storage buildings, three support buildings and an open storage area.
**Document V-432. Kalinin Army Barracks Volga, Kalinin, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1965.**
The 100-acre installation contains two administration buildings, three barracks, 20 storage buildings, 24 support buildings, two vehicle maintenance buildings, five vehicle sheds, one vehicle park and a small-arms firing range.

**Document V-433. Kalinin Army Barracks Northwest, Kalinin, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1965.**
The 41-acre installation contains three administration buildings, six barracks, 10 storage buildings, 12 support buildings, four vehicle maintenance buildings and three probable vehicle sheds.

**Document V-434. Kalinin Training Area Chapayevka, Kalinin, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1965.**
The 31,190-acre installation contains four administration buildings, three bivouac areas, 16 storage buildings, 35 support buildings, 21 ammunition storage buildings, 6 small-arms firing ranges, two probable small-arms firing ranges, numerous personnel trenches, an athletic field, a probable wheeled-vehicle-mounted automatic weapons firing range, three tank and assault gun firing ranges, two field artillery batteries, a figure-eight wheeled-vehicle driver-training course and a combination track and wheeled-vehicle driver-training course.

**Document V-435. Barracks Area, Torzhok, Kalinin Oblast, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1965.**
The 40-acre installation contains five multistory barracks, a combined barracks and administration building, one vehicle shed, one vehicle maintenance building, nine support buildings and an athletic field. A 10-acre probably associated area immediately west contains eight multistory barracks.

**Document V-436. Storage Area, Staraya Toropa, Kalininskaya Oblast, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1965.**
The 70-acre installation one probable administration building, 22 storage buildings, one probable vehicle shed and five support buildings.

**Document V-437. Playsk Army Barracks, Plavsk, Tulskaya Oblast, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1965.**
The 30-acre installation contains one administration building, six barracks, three probable quarters, six storage buildings, one vehicle storage and maintenance building, one vehicle shed and seven support buildings.

**Document V-438. Storage Area, Orekhovo-Zuyevo, Moscow Oblast, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1965.**
The 220-acre double-secured installation contains 45 storage buildings, one probable maintenance building, one probable transloading building, a support area with one possible administration building, four possible barracks, 10 quarters and seven support buildings.

**Document V-439. Buy Ammunition Depot No 50, Buy Kostromsk Oblast, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1965.**
The 1,000-acre installation contains one storage area and one support area. The storage area contains 64 ammunition storage buildings, three possible ammunition storage buildings, one possible ammunition-storage building under construction, and five support buildings. The support area contains one administration building, three multistory barracks, 29 support buildings and an athletic field.
The 410-acre installation contains one combined barracks and administration building, five barracks, nine combined barracks and quarters, nine quarters, one vehicle shed, 64 storage buildings, a possible explosives storage building, 12 support buildings and a small-arms firing range. A possibly associated tank and assault-gun firing range is located nine km southwest of the depot.

The 160-acre installation contains two multistory administration buildings, five multistory barracks, 23 storage buildings, 25 support buildings, one vehicle maintenance building, three vehicle sheds, five probable vehicle-sheds, a vehicle park and a probable athletic field.

The 7,050-acre installation contains three combined barracks and administration buildings, three barracks, three bivouac areas, four storage buildings, 26 support buildings, a subcaliber weapons firing range, two small-arms firing ranges, two athletic fields, two figure-eight wheeled-vehicle driver-training courses, four unidentified cleared areas and an infantry field-training area.

The double secured storage area contains 14 probable explosives storage buildings, 21 storage buildings, five support buildings and nine guardhouses and towers. The single-secured support area contains two multistory barracks, eight quarters, four probable storage buildings, 10 support buildings, two guardhouses, a water tower and an athletic field.

The 197-acre installation contains three administration buildings, nine barracks, three probable quarters, 93 storage buildings, 30 support buildings, two heavy repair shops, one separately secured motor park, a steam plant, two rail-served unloading areas [one with a traveling overhead crane], one storage areas and a small-arms firing range.

The 100-acre installation contains one administration building, seven barracks, seven quarters, nine probable storage buildings, three hangers which are probably used for vehicle and equipment storage, three probable vehicle-sheds, a probable open-air theater, six support buildings, two athletic fields and a small-arms firing range.

The 400-acre installation contains one administration building, four multistory barracks, nine storage buildings, 21 support buildings and an athletic field.

The 20-acre installation contains a secured administration building, 17 small barracks, five probable quarters, two storage buildings and four support buildings.

**Document V-448.** Probable Barracks Area (54-47N 032-01), Smolensk, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1965.
The secured 20-acre installation contains two multistory combined barracks and administration buildings, one probable barracks, three probable storage buildings and four support buildings.

The 55-acre installation is partially secured. It contains one administration building, one probable administration building, three barracks, 10 large storage buildings, two possible ammunition storage buildings, two possible vehicle sheds, one possible vehicle maintenance building, 17 support buildings, 21 probable quarters and an athletic field.

**Document V-450.** Barracks Area (54-46N 032-00E), Smolensk, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1965.
This 100-acre small barracks area contains one combined barracks and administration building, one probable administration building, one barracks, five storage buildings, seven support buildings, two unidentified buildings, 10 probable dependents quarters, a probable swimming pool and an athletic field.

The double-secured 580-acre installation has a storage area and a support area. The storage area contains 32 ammunition storage buildings, one rail-to-road transfer building and one support building. The support area contains 27 quarters, 13 support buildings and an athletic field.

**Document V-452.** Kolomna Ammunition Depot Southwest, Kolomna, Moscow Oblast, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1965.
The 150-acre installation has a double-secured ammunition storage area and an adjacent support area. The storage area contains 15 ammunition storage buildings, two small explosives buildings and five support buildings. The support area contains one administration building, four barracks, nine quarters and nine support buildings.

The 165-acre installation contains two administration buildings, 12 barracks, 29 officers and dependents quarters, 36 storage buildings, 26 support buildings, eight vehicle sheds, four vehicle maintenance buildings and a athletic field. An ammunition storage area that contains eight ammunition storage buildings, one support building, tracked-vehicle driver-training course is located immediately east of the installation.

The double-secured 600-acre installation contains 39 ammunition storage buildings, 11 probable ammunition buildings, one probable bunker, one probable munitions loading building and two support buildings. The support area contains two combined barracks and administration buildings, 13 quarters, two probable storage buildings, six support buildings, an athletic field and a probable small-arms firing range.
The 2,560-acre installation contains a bivouac area with one administration building and 10 support buildings. There is a double-secured storage area with 16 storage buildings, 2 support buildings and one vehicle maintenance building. In a secured probable ammunition storage area there are three buildings. Training facilities include an athletic field, a small-arms firing range, a tracked-vehicle driver-training course, two tank-and assault gun-firing ranges, a probable combined-arms field-training course, an infantry field training area, two probable wheeled-vehicle-mounted automatic weapons firing ranges, and a subcaliber moving target firing range.

The 550-acre installation contains two possible combined barracks and administration buildings, two possible barracks, nine storage buildings, 16 ammunition storage buildings, 11 support buildings, one probable vehicle maintenance building, an athletic field and a small-arms firing range.

The 1,435-acre installation contains five administration buildings, 20 barracks, 55 quarters, 33 storage buildings, 51 support buildings, 75 ammunition storage buildings, a probable vehicle shed, a small arms firing range and an athletic field.

The 1,050-acre installation has an ammunition depot and support area. The double-secured ammunition depot contains 10 large revetted ammunition storage buildings, 148 medium revetted ammunition storage buildings, 28 small-revetted ammunition storage buildings and four support buildings. Three support buildings are located outside the security fence. The support area contains two administration buildings, four barracks, five storage buildings, 31 support buildings, a water tower and a small-arms firing range.

The 250-acre installation contains two administration buildings, 21 combined support-and quarters-buildings, 30 ammunition storage buildings and seven support buildings.

The 200-acre installation contains two administration buildings, six barracks, 23 quarters, two storage buildings, three vehicle sheds, one vehicle-park and 22 support buildings. Training facilities include an athletic field, a small-arms firing range and one wheeled-vehicle driver-training course.

The 45-acre installation includes a storage area and a vehicle park. The storage area contains 20 storage buildings and three support buildings. The vehicle park contains five probable vehicle sheds and four support buildings.

The 200-acre installation contains three separate areas. A small secured support area contains two support buildings. The storage area contains 24 explosive storage buildings, six storage buildings, two probable transshipment buildings and four support buildings. The housing area contains one possible administration building, seven quarters, four storage buildings, two support buildings and an athletic field.

**Document V-463. Vladimir Army Barracks and Training Center, Vladimir, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1965.**
The 336-acre barracks installation contains three combined administration and classroom buildings, six administration buildings, 18 barracks, four combined barracks and quarters, 28 combined officers and dependents quarters, 63 storage buildings, 96 support buildings, one vehicle maintenance building, four vehicle sheds, two athletic fields, a possible prison with one prison barracks, two storage buildings and three support buildings. The driver-training area contains four tracked-vehicle driver-training courses, one combined barracks and administration building, one storage building, five support buildings, one vehicle maintenance building and four vehicle sheds. The double-secured ammunition storage area contains seven ammunition storage buildings and two support buildings.

**Document V-464. Dzerzhinsk Ammunition Depot West, Dzerzhinsk, Gorkiy Oblast, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1965.**
The 1,820-acre installation contains a large double-secured storage area and a support area. The storage area contains 123 ammunition storage buildings, four semi-revetted special storage buildings, 17 horizontal probable storage tanks, nine rail-to-road transfer and support buildings, four storage buildings, one probable administration building and three support buildings. The support area contains three administration buildings, three barracks, 45 combined barracks and quarters, 16 storage buildings, 32 support buildings and an athletic field.

**Document V-465. Toropets Ammunition Depot South, Toropets, Kalininsk Oblast, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1965.**
The 480-acre installation contains four administration buildings, seven barracks, six quarters, 77 storage buildings, 31 support buildings and a possible motor park.

**Document V-466. Toropets Ammunition Depot Northeast, Toropets, Kalininskaya Oblast, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1965.**
The 850-acre installation contains two administration buildings, three barracks, 54 ammunition storage buildings, 12 storage buildings, a probable packing and shipping building, 29 support buildings, a motor park, a vehicle shed and a vehicle maintenance building.

**Document V-467. Ryazhsk Ammunition Depot Northwest, Ryazhsk, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1965.**
The 300-acre installation contains a double-secured storage area and a support area with a total of two administration buildings, six barracks, four storage buildings, 64 ammunition storage buildings, 40 support buildings and three rail-to-road transloading buildings.

**Document V-468. Tula Ammunition Depot Khomyakovo Southwest, Tula, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, June 1965.**
The 300-acre installation contains a double-secured storage area with 51 ammunition storage buildings and an adjoining support area with an administration building, two barracks, 14 quarters, six storage buildings and 14 support buildings.

The 165-acre Kaluga Ammunition Depot contains 29 ammunition storage buildings and five support buildings. The 320-acre Kaluga Army Barracks and Depot contain two administration buildings, six barracks, 55 probable quarters, 31 storage buildings, seven combined vehicle and equipment maintenance buildings, 37 support buildings, a small-arms firing range and an athletic field.


The 1,130-acre installation contains one administration building, seven combined barracks and quarters, 11 quarters, six storage buildings, 20 support buildings and 33 ammunition storage buildings.


The 450-acre installation contains a storage area with 79 ammunition storage buildings and a support area with an administration building, a barracks and 17 support buildings.


The doubled secured 35-acre installation surrounded by a firebreak contains nine probable explosives storage buildings and two support buildings.


The 280-acre installations contain seven administration buildings, 21 barracks, one probable barracks under construction, 42 quarters, 23 storage buildings, eight probable explosives storage buildings and 38 support buildings. Six vehicle storage areas contain four vehicle sheds and three vehicle maintenance buildings.


The 2,500-acre installation contains three administration buildings, three probable combined barracks and administration buildings, four probable barracks, a bivouac area, 26 quarters, 11 vehicle sheds, two combined vehicle storage and maintenance buildings and 29 support buildings.

A double-secured probable explosives storage area contains seven storage buildings and two support buildings.

Training facilities include two athletic fields, two small-arms firing ranges, a tracked-vehicle driver-training course, a wheeled-vehicle driver-training course, an infantry training area and a probable vehicle-mounted automatic-weapons firing range.

Another training area six km north-northeast contains a tracked-vehicle driver-training course and a combined tank and assault-gun firing range, both of which appear to be abandoned.


The 615-acre installation is double secured and surrounded by a firebreak. The depot contains 134 revetted ammunition storage buildings, 15 support buildings and one transloading building. The 40-acre support area contains two administration buildings, 15 barracks, 35 support buildings and two storage buildings.

The 1,200-acre installation contains five administration buildings, one probable administration building, nine combined barracks and administration buildings, 25 probable barracks, 12 probable quarters, 27 storage buildings, two revetted explosives storage buildings, three equipment and vehicle maintenance buildings, two probable transloading buildings, 54 support buildings and two athletic fields. A 900-acre training area contains five small-arms firing ranges, two wheeled-vehicle driver-training courses and six support buildings.


The 12,800-acre installation contains a possible bivouac area and two other bivouac areas with a total of five barracks, 25 quarters and 14 support buildings. A possible ammunition storage area contains three possible bunkers and two vehicle parks. Training facilities include three athletic fields, two small-arms firing ranges, wheeled vehicle and tracked-vehicle driver-training areas, a tank and assault-gun firing range, a field artillery training area, a combined-arms field training course, two probable infantry field training areas and an area of unidentified ground scarring.


The 165-acre barracks area contains three administration buildings, 11 barracks, eight combined barracks and quarters, eight combined officer and dependents quarters, 34 storage buildings, 38 support buildings, two vehicle maintenance buildings, seven vehicle sheds, nine probable vehicle-sheds, a small-arms firing range and one athletic field.

The ammunition storage area contains 10 ammunition storage buildings, five support buildings, a storage area containing six storage buildings, one support building and a tracked-vehicle driver-training course. A probable wheeled-vehicle-mounted automatic-weapons moving-target firing range is 95 km south of the barracks area. To the rear of the range are located one storage building and 11 support buildings.


The secured 140-acre installation contains eight probable explosives storage buildings. A support area contains an administration building, four quarters and three support buildings.


A large military training area contains the 182,400-acre Gorokhovets Artillery Training Center, the Gorokhovets Army Barracks, and contains seven troop-billeting areas.

- Area I, the Gorokhovets Army Barracks, contains a bivouac area with one administration building, 35 support buildings, four vehicle parks with three vehicle sheds, two support buildings, a probable water reservoir, an unidentified area with three buildings and an athletic field.
- Area II contains three administration buildings, 25 barracks, 71 quarters, 56 storage buildings, 14 probable storage buildings, three explosives storage buildings, 15 possible explosives storage buildings, three vehicle parks with five possible vehicle sheds, five possible equipment sheds, seven vehicle sheds, 56 support buildings and an athletic field.
- Area III is a bivouac area.
- Area IV contains three administration buildings, seven probable barracks, 26 barracks, 12 quarters, 47 storage buildings, three possible semi-buried buildings, three vehicle sheds, 33 support buildings, an
athletic field, and a POL area with 13 large and six medium tanks and a large number of possible horizontal POL tanks.

- **Area V** contains two bivouac areas, two administration buildings, 15 barracks, six combined barracks and quarters, 19 quarters, one storage buildings, four vehicle parks with five vehicle sheds, one vehicle maintenance building, 28 support buildings and two athletic fields.

- **Area VI** is a bivouac area with approximately eight support buildings.

- **Area VII** contains one administration building, three barracks, three storage buildings, a vehicle park with three vehicle sheds, a vehicle maintenance building and two support buildings. This area is probably a support area for the range area located immediately north.

- There are four probable explosives storage areas with a total of 31 buildings and two general storage areas with a total of 29 storage buildings, three probable storage buildings, three possible storage buildings and three support buildings located in the overall area.

- The training facilities are seven small-arms firing ranges, five athletic fields, a tracked-vehicle driver-training area, a probably wheeled vehicle driver-training area, 10 tank and assault gun firing ranges, three areas of artillery training, a combined-arms field training course, a probable wheeled-vehicle-mounted automatic-weapons firing range and four unidentified training facilities.

**Document V-481. Probable Explosives Storage Area, Kirzhach, Vladimirskaya Oblast, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1965.**

The 560-acre installation contains one administration building, a possible combined barracks and administration building, 10 barracks, 24 quarters, 34 probable explosives storage buildings, two arch-roofed buildings, one vehicle shed, one vehicle maintenance building, 11 support buildings, an athletic field and two clearings.

**Document V-482. Dorogobuzh Army Training Area, Dorogobuzh, Smolenskaya Oblast, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1965.**

The 40,000-acre installation contains a bivouac area with one administration building and 23 support buildings. A probable ammunition storage area contains eight buildings, three vehicle parks and a possible vehicle park with a total of six vehicle sheds. Training facilities include three athletic fields, two small-arms firing ranges, a tracked-vehicle driver-training course, two tank and assault gun firing ranges, two field artillery training areas, a probable combined-arms training course, a possible infantry-training area, two probable engineering water crossings, an impact area and an unidentified training facility.

**Document V-483. Kosterevo Training Area Boldino, Kosterevo, Vladimirskaya Oblast, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1965.**

The 30,700-acre installation contains three administration buildings, one probable administration building, five barracks, three probable barracks, six combined barracks and administration buildings, three combined barracks and quarters, 34 combined officers and dependents quarters, seven bivouac areas, 55 storage buildings, 92 support buildings, 20 ammunition storage buildings, one vehicle maintenance building, three probable equipment maintenance buildings and a possible prison. There are four vertical POL storage tanks, approximately 22 horizontal POL storage tanks, seven small-arms firing ranges, an athletic field and approximately 558 AAA positions.

**Document V-484. Balki Ammunition Depot, North-Northwest, Volki, Gorkovskaya Oblast, USSR, Moscow MD, Photographic Interpretation Report, NPIC, July 1965.**

The 1,450-acre installation contains a secured storage area and a support area. The storage area contains 64 ammunition storage buildings, two long transshipment buildings and five support buildings. The support area contains an administration building, seven barracks, six probable quarters, four probable storage buildings, 26 support buildings and an athletic field.
The 4,400-acre installation contains a large bivouac area with an administration building, 34 quarters and 163 support buildings. Two secured storage areas contain seven storage and two support buildings. A secured ammunition storage area contains three revetted buildings and two support buildings. The training facilities include three athletic fields, seven small-arms firing ranges with three support buildings, an artillery battery, an infantry field-training area and a probable infantry field-training area, seven support buildings, a possible mortar training area, two subcaliber weapons moving-target firing ranges with seven range-support buildings, and a possible jump tower with an associated support building. Also located in the training area are three other range support buildings, two combined barracks and administration buildings, two support buildings, a secured area with three support buildings and a large U-shaped revetment area.


30 See Document II-51 for text of this document.

31 See Document III-11 for a 1964 Military Thought article on the value of the Field Service Regulations by Marshal Chuykov, "The New Field Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR."


33 The CIA/DI Office of Strategic Research (OSR) was established in July 1967.

34 SCUD is the name given by NATO to the short range surface-to-surface ballistic missile that travels 150-300 n.m.

35 MECZD is a military abbreviation for "mechanized."

36 The term "FROG" appears in the text of this document. It is the acronym for "Free Rocket Over Ground," a large unguided missile.

37 NSWP is the abbreviation for "Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact."

38 See Document V-20, Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces, NIE 11-14-65.

39 AAA is a military acronym for Anti-Aircraft Artillery.

40 SP is a military abbreviation generally for "self-propelled" artillery.

↑ BACK TO CHAPTER 5
The documents selected for this period range in content from political analysis of Khrushchev's ouster and the early policies of the Brezhnev-Kosygin team to an end-of-decade look back at the accomplishments and style of Brezhnev's leadership. They include the coverage in clandestine reporting and finished intelligence of the growing restlessness of the NSWP members toward the dominance of the Soviet Union over all aspects of the Warsaw Pact, their continued resistance to a unified command for Warsaw Pact forces, and their reactions to the 20 August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and to the declaration of the Brezhnev Doctrine. These documents also address Soviet war planning for the Warsaw Pact against NATO and the organization of the invasion force to overthrow the “Prague Spring” reformers of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

**Document VI-1.** "Increasing Strain in Albanian Relations with Moscow and the European Satellites", CIA/DI/FBIS Radio Propaganda Report, 5 May 1961. The report documents signs of deteriorating relations between Albania and other members of the European communist bloc since the February 1961 Albanian Party Congress during which Albania's defiance of Moscow was underscored. The report also lays out the strong Albanian ties to China and the efforts of the European communist parties to isolate Albania.


**Document VI-3.** "Factors in the Fall of Khrushchev and the Behavior of the New Soviet Regime", CIA/DI/FBIS Radio Propaganda Report, 22 October 1964. The report covers the history of Khrushchev's rise to power, the policies that brought him to power, and those that were controversial throughout his tenure. It reviews the Pravda report of the attack of the new regime on Khrushchev's "commandism", "personality cult", and decisions reflecting his use, or misuse, of power and radical policies. It also examines the issues that the new regime believed needed to be addressed, including a retrenchment in resource allocations and a modified approach toward the Chinese and other parties in the bloc.

**Document VI-4.** New Look in Satellite Armies, CIA/DI/OCI Special Report, 30 October 1964. The report describes the evidence about equipment and organizational developments in the Warsaw Pact armed forces that indicated a major upgrading of their capabilities was under way.

**Document VI-5.** The Soviet Political Scene, CIA/DI/OCI Intelligence Memorandum, 31 December 1964. The memorandum reviews the reasons for Khrushchev's ouster and some of the problems the new leadership faced, including the status of the military and KGB and the prospects for the creative intellectuals.

**Document VI-6.** "The First Year after Khrushchev: Soviet Leadership Politics and Policy Issues", CIA/DI/FBIS Radio Propaganda Report, 1 March 1967. The report describes the issues left over from Khrushchev that the new regime faced including party-government tensions, economic priorities and resource allocations, the military doctrine debate, and the implications of the Vietnam War on that doctrine.

This paper describes the understanding in 1965 of the development of Soviet doctrine for war with NATO in Europe with an emphasis on the role of ground forces, particularly the use of East European forces.

**Document VI-8.** *Soviet Military-Political Relations Six Months after Khrushchev*, CIA/DI/ORR Intelligence Memorandum, June 1965.
This is the first in a series of memoranda assessing the status of military issues that were being debated during the Khrushchev era. It addresses how the new regime might resolve the issues of the size and role of ground forces, the role of the military in making policy and the military share of national resources.

The memorandum discusses the evidence of Romania's growing interest in altering its relations with the Warsaw Pact.

The report reviews various problems Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary had with the Warsaw Pact that had become evident to the West and their impact on the effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact.

This is the second in a series of three memoranda assessing Soviet military policy and strategy after the ouster of Khrushchev. The paper describes dramatic changes in Soviet policy in 1965: a halt in reductions in Soviet ground and tactical air forces; new, larger military budgets; and a new economic plan that would make a heavy military drain on national resources.

**Document VI-12.** *Soviet Military Theorists Reappraise Nuclear War*, CIA/DI/ORR, Intelligence Memorandum, September 1966.
This is the third in a series of three memoranda assessing the status of the military following Khrushchev's removal. The paper presents the evidence from Soviet military writings of a new debate reappraising nuclear war.

**Document VI-13.** *The Warsaw Pact: Its Role in Soviet Bloc Affairs from Its Origin to the Present Day*, CIA/DI/OCI Study for the Jackson Subcommittee, 6 May 1966. There is no evidence the study had further external dissemination.
The document includes a memorandum conveying the study to the DDI for forwarding to the subcommittee. It was produced in response to a request made in 1965. The report examines in detail the changing role of the Warsaw Pact from its origin in 1955 to mid 1966. In the view of the authors, the Warsaw Pact was initially intended primarily to provide Russia's post-Stalin leadership with a less obvious mechanism for maintaining Soviet armed forces in Eastern Europe. In 1966 the authors maintain that the Pact is one of the few remaining effective political devices available to Moscow for holding the bloc together in the face of rising national self-interest in Eastern Europe. The document includes charts of organizational structure and personnel strength. It also includes a comparison of the Pact and NATO treaties.

This document is one of the more important clandestinely obtained documents of the 1960s. It provides information on wartime organization of the Warsaw Pact. The article is one of the primary documents CIA military analysts used in their analysis of Soviet and Warsaw Pact war planning.

This paper discusses the adverse effect on Soviet–East German relations resulting from the improvement in Soviet–West German relations following the West German election of Willi Brandt in October 1969 and the initiation of Brandt's new policy toward the East.


The report [a translation of a Russian-language Warsaw Pact document classified secret] contains information presented at the annual meeting of Warsaw Pact military intelligence services held in East Berlin. The document discusses NATO combat capabilities and intentions in the Central European Theater of Operations. It was based on the NATO Fallex exercises and discusses the tactical and strategic strengths and weaknesses of the West in detail. It was intended to provide the Warsaw Pact with a basis for examining intelligence coordination and exchanges among the Warsaw Pact armed forces. Although heavily laden with propaganda, the document reveals how the Warsaw Pact members portrayed NATO and what that meant in the event hostilities broke out on the continent.


The report examines evidence from the mid-1960s indicating the Soviets were in the process of creating new institutions for national security. The military press carried a debate on the role of the military leadership and how it would be represented in the new command structure. The articles came against the background of persistent military-political tensions since the beginning of 1965 over the general question of the respective roles of the military and political leaders in the determination of national security issues.


The memorandum describes the changes in the Soviet strategic situation over the previous year brought about in part by the growth of the country's offensive and defensive strategic forces that were raising new questions for Soviet military policy. Specifically, the memorandum portrays the maturing of Soviet nuclear-missile forces to where the Soviet leadership would need to make decisions on what kinds of additional military power it required, how to improve the efficiency of its management of military power, and how to translate its power into effective political influence in world affairs. It describes the actions the Soviets had been taking that could affect future Soviet military policy decisions, the dependence of those decisions on expert technical knowledge and the impact of the resulting influence of experts with technical knowledge on continuing dominance of political considerations in military policy decision-making.


This is an analysis of the underlying motives and reasons for policy decisions during the first three years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin collective leadership and the impact of the decisions on the Warsaw Pact and its relations with the United States and NATO.


The memorandum reviews the history of Romania's movement away from participation in the Warsaw Pact. The author judges that, despite the objections of Romania to some Warsaw Pact policies, it was unlikely to abandon its membership but would insist that decisions about its armed forces would be made by the Romanian Government.
The report traces the history of changes in Polish circumstances after 1956, including its retreat from domestic innovations instituted at that time and the change in the status of Gomulka. The analyst judged Gomulka's goals were being met because Poland was more secure and influential in the communist and Western worlds.

**Document VI-22.** *Operational Plan for an Attack on NATO Forces in Northern Europe by the Missile and Artillery Forces of the Polish Maritime Front, CIA/DP Intelligence Information Special Report, 11 March 1968* [DOI, before November 1967].
The documents consist of a chart titled, "Plan for the Use of the Missile Forces and the Artillery of the Maritime Front", a schematic diagram of the North Sea coastal area and eight accompanying tables. The chart describes the primary and secondary missions of the front, including the composition of the forces, the distribution of missiles and artillery for the missions, and plans for a first strike and for a first nuclear strike. The information was probably developed for or during a war game that notionally involved the Maritime front of the Warsaw Pact force facing NATO in the central region of Europe.

**Document VI-22a.** Memorandum for DCI from Director of Plans, disseminated 11 March 1968.
The memorandum transmits the Clandestine Intelligence Information Report, explaining that the material outlines a Polish operational plan for an attack on NATO forces stationed in northern Belgium, the Netherlands and West Germany.

The report was written one month before the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and covers propaganda during the "Prague Spring" and the lead-up to the invasion. It compares the propaganda with past Soviet treatments of Warsaw Pact anniversaries, meetings, and maneuvers and discusses the importance in Soviet propaganda of the need to boost socialist unity against the threat of ideological subversion from the West.

**Document VI-24.** *Public Warning Indicators of the Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia a Retrospective Review, CIA/DI/FBIS, Special Memorandum, November 1980.*
Although the memorandum was not written until 1980, it is included here to provide the reader an overview of the open-press treatment of the Czech Crisis. The document covers the period March–August 1968. An annex contains the Warning Statements, Justification for the Intervention, and the Brezhnev Doctrine.

This memorandum contains an analysis of the economic burdens caused by the expansion of the Soviet military.

**Document VI-26.** *Czechoslovakia in Transition, CIA/DI/OCI, Intelligence Memorandum, 23 April 1968.*
The paper was written after Alexander Dubcek's party had taken over the government from Antonin Novotny. It describes the difficulties that Dubcek faced in bringing about a change internally and in Czech relations with Moscow. The paper predicts that the differences between Moscow and Prague in interpreting their relations were likely to cause problems.

The document contains the reassessments of the reinforcement capabilities of Soviet ground forces from the special CIA/DIA joint study.
Document VI-28. "Conclusions Drawn from a Tactical Exercise of an Operational-Tactical Missile Brigade Conducted by the Rocket and Artillery Troops Command of the Pomeranian Military District", Military Thought [Poland quarterly] issue No.3, 1967, CIA/DP, Intelligence Information Special Report, 22 May 1968. The article is about the lessons learned from the exercise, including the need for better communications equipment, training under field combat conditions to shorten the time to achieve combat readiness, more effective use of data transmission systems, better camouflage and improved reconnoitering.

Document VI-29. Warsaw Pact War Plan for Central Region of Europe, CIA DI/OSR, Intelligence Memorandum, June 1968. This report describes Soviet war planning for a Warsaw Pact invasion of Central Europe. It differs from the previous plan by assigning the initial offensive missions to the forces already deployed in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Other differences include giving the Czechs and Poles command over their national forces and moving Soviet forces from the western part of the USSR into the Central Region to take over the offensive against NATO, but only after the initial objectives had been gained by the forces deployed normally in peacetime in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland.

Document VI-30. "Experiences from the 'Rajd' Exercise Conducted by the Warsaw Military District Staff", Military Thought [Poland], issue No. 2, in the spring of 1967, CIA/DP, Intelligence Information Special Report, 18 June 1968. The article provides details about a training exercise in June 1966 involving the movement of a short-range ballistic missile [(Scud] brigade to a forward launch site. The article reveals there was confusion in the departure from garrison, inadequate command and communications, poor security and antiaircraft cover, significant breakdown of equipment, and other deficiencies. The article concludes with recommendations.

Document VI-31. The Crisis in Czechoslovakia, CIA/DI/ONE Memorandum for the Director, 12 July 1968. The memorandum is a warning document about the deterioration of the Czech situation, including the moving of Soviet military troops into the country, establishing Soviet General Staff communications links, and beaming Soviet propaganda to Czechoslovakia. The author judges the heightened pressure constituted a demand for the Czech leadership to halt or reverse the situation.


Document VI-33. "The I Aleksandrov Article in Pravda: Inception of a New Stage in Pressure on Czechoslovakia", CIA/DI/FBIS Special Report on Communist Propaganda, 18 July 1968. This is an analysis of the authoritative Pravda article that increased the propaganda pressure on Czechoslovakia and provided CIA military analysts with an "early warning" of the 20 August 1968 Soviet-Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Document VI-34. Polish Critique of the 'Lato-67' Command Post Exercise, CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Special Report, 7 July 1967 [DOI, 27 May–6 June 1967]. The report was disseminated in two documents. The report is a translation of an official Polish Ministry of Defense critique of the exercise. The critique describes the exercise as an unopposed, large-scale, multilevel and multistage "skeleton exercise" of the higher staffs and commands of five Warsaw Pact armies. Its goals were the examination of problems created by the probable outbreak of a military conflict in Europe. To begin, the exercise assumed hostilities had broken out in
Europe on a limited scale involving conventional weapons and developed into nuclear warfare. The exercise was considered successful in uniting the defenses of Polish, East German, and Soviet armies and their readiness for combined actions. It revealed, however, that many elements at the district levels were not well integrated or capable of efficiently accomplishing their assigned combat missions. Other shortcomings included unskilled use of nuclear weapons, inadequate exploitation and evaluation of incoming information, ineffective antiaircraft support, unsatisfactory air command and airport mobility, an overestimation of enemy capabilities, failure to standardize basic military documents, and a continuing language barrier.


The document is a translation of four charts from a Polish document, *Polish Critique of the "Lato-67 Command Post Exercise* [Document VI-34]. It contains the charts used in the critique including data pertaining to the TO&Es of divisional units of the Polish, East German, and Soviet ground forces divisions.


The document is a translation of a secret critique prepared by the Polish General Staff in the Ministry of National Defense. It reports on the integrated, multilevel maneuvers conducted by the Polish armed forces in Poland during September–October 1966. The maneuvers were designed to give a full picture of the functioning of the commands and forces of the Polish military system as a whole. The report included a scenario in which Western forces provoked a crisis under the pretext of expanding their rights in West Berlin and planning an invasion of East Germany.


The memorandum describes the military situation just before the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. It reports that the scale of mobilization and movement of Soviet forces facing Czechoslovakia was greater than at any time after WW II and states the forces were probably prepared to invade Czechoslovakia once given the order to do so.41


This memorandum addresses the Soviet preparations opposite Romania in case there were problems following the Czech invasion.42


The memorandum describes Romania's assertive path against the Warsaw Pact, which it had resumed following the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The analyst judges Romania was speaking out again to ensure that neither its neighbors nor its populace would conclude it had abandoned its independent course.


The article provides historical background about the Brezhnev Doctrine.


The article reviews an exercise that took place in September 1966 involving movement of an air army and its
commitment to defend ground forces deployments. It provides little information on actual events of the exercise but identifies problem areas and makes recommendations for improving air army exercises.

**Document VI-41.** Soviet Exports of Military Hardware to Eastern Europe, CIA/DI/OER Intelligence Memorandum, July 1969.
The memorandum provides dollar value estimates of Soviet shipments of military hardware to East European countries. According to the analysis, the amount of equipment had dropped to about three-quarters of what it was in 1964. The analysts judge this was because the shipment of equipment to East European forces began in 1959 and was probably completed by 1964. East European production then was able to satisfy a larger share of requirements for most types of military equipment.

The contribution examines Soviet tactical air forces with brief sections on tactical missiles and air defenses. Part I of the contribution discussed naval issues, which were not a subject of the NIE.

This report was perhaps the most important analysis on this subject at this time. It is a comprehensive reassessment of the capabilities and status of the Soviet Ground Forces. It describes the state of information and analysis of those forces as of September 1969. [See V-61 for text of this document.]

The report examines combat training in Soviet tactical fighter elements, including the amount and nature of training and the distribution of training emphasis between primary and secondary missions. It also summarizes the available information on Soviet standards of combat proficiency in ground support operations. Finally the analyst judges that both standards and performance were below those of comparable US forces.

This paper presents a comprehensive review of Brezhnev's political goals and his method of manipulating the Soviet leadership to achieve those goals.

This is additional analysis of Brezhnev's policy goals and his mode of operation.

The memorandum provides analysis of the Soviet loss of political control over Czechoslovakia and how it was restored. The analyst judges the Soviet leadership emerged from the crisis as fallible in its tactics, certain in its objectives, and unrelenting in pursuit of them. It concludes Moscow paid less of a political price than it expected from its actions to bring the situation under control.

The source provides general information about the processes of approval and amendment of Soviet-Czech operational directives. The reporting also provides information about Czech operational doctrine, command
and control, offensive and defensive operations, airborne operations, and order of march, as it was stated in operational directives.

The source provides information about the organization of the Warsaw Pact headquarters in Moscow before and after its reorganization in 1969. It also covers the preparation of operational intent statements and operational plans by front operations staffs. The source also provides information about the Soviet concept of war with NATO, Warsaw Pact operational plans, and the view of Warsaw Pact planners of the strengths and weaknesses of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

The source reconstructs the day-by-day progress of the Southwestern Front in an attack against NATO forces in West Germany. The reconstruction was a simulated Southwestern Front operations order created by the source to illustrate the essential features of that front's war plans in one of the six variants to the operational intent of Warsaw Pact Main Headquarters.


42 See Document V-55, *Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces*, pages 3-4, for a discussion of how likely it was the Soviets would rely on their Warsaw Pact allies in crises following the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

↑ BACK TO CHAPTER 6

**CHAPTER VII**

**CLANDESTINE REPORTING, ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATES (1970–85)**

The large selection of clandestine reporting and CIA finished intelligence contained in this chapter reflects the much increased success of clandestine operations during this period as well as the increased sophistication of all-source analysis and the availability of high-resolution photography. The documents are grouped in general but overlapping categories such as war planning, ground forces, air forces, exercises, Soviet management of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces, etc.

The first six documents, taken together, reflect the IC's successes during the 1960s in assembling the better evidence from clandestine and technical sources to assess the size of the Warsaw Pact's main combat forces and the nature of the Warsaw Pact's plans for war with NATO. NIE 11-14-1969 reflects IC understanding of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose forces at the beginning of the 1970s, and the NSC-related documents reflect the importance of the intelligence to the national security process. The first four documents illustrate how far
the intelligence had advanced during the 1960s. The following two documents illustrate the state of intelligence on the Warsaw Pact's planning and capabilities in 1979. The rest of the documents chronicle the advances in the IC's understanding of the Warsaw Pact forces and plans from 1970 to 1985 or so.

Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, a Polish Staff officer, was perhaps the most important clandestine source for information on the Warsaw Pact. In 1973 he began supplying material that continued to flow years after he left Poland for the United States in 1981. The selection of clandestine reporting below reflects his efforts as well as those of many other sources.

- Documents about Soviet Planning for Warsaw Pact-NATO War in Europe
- Documents about Ground Forces
- Documents about Air Forces
- Documents about Formal Mechanisms to Manage the Warsaw Pact
- Documents about General Staff and Other Senior Military Academy Lectures and Manuals
- Documents about Warsaw Pact Exercises

**THE VALUE OF COLONEL R. KUKLINSKI'S REPORTING**

Colonel Kuklinski, a principal planning officer of the Polish General Staff, had access to much of the secret planning and documents of the Warsaw Pact military listing the ground forces' strengths. In addition to the classified Warsaw Pact documents, he was personally able to answer important questions relating to the intent of the Warsaw Pact planners. Through his various professional military training experiences in the USSR he had access to and passed classified Soviet military documents and other classified information to the United States. There were other good sources at that time, but Kuklinski was the most prolific military source of the era.*


**Document VII-1. Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, NIE 11-14-69, 4 December 1969.**

This estimate represents the IC state of knowledge about the Warsaw Pact forces at the end of the 1960s, after new assessments of Soviet ground forces and the acquisition of new information following the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. It describes the trend toward larger and more flexible general purpose forces, a result of the military buildup along the Sino-Soviet border and improved capabilities. The deployment, structure, readiness posture, and equipment reflected concern for both Central Europe and the Sino-Soviet border. The estimate reported the Soviet ground divisions in Eastern Europe and opposite China appeared to be ready for combat without further mobilization. Forces in Eastern Europe and some of those along the Sino-Soviet border also had increased fire-support and lift capabilities available. Other forces supporting the Ground Forces had increased their strength and ability to carry out reconnaissance and detect and track aircraft at low altitudes, deliver a higher rate of air sorties, and defend against attacks at medium and high altitudes.

**Document VII-1a. Memorandum for Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, from DCI Helms, transmitting, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, NIE 11-14-69, CIA/DCI, 12 December 1969.**

DCI Helms describes the progress the IC made during 1969 on assessing Soviet Ground Forces through new evidence and in-depth analysis. These, he said, enabled assessments in some detail of the advantages and disadvantages of Soviet divisions in East Germany, Soviet antisubmarine capabilities, and the impact of the Soviet buildup along the Sino-Soviet border on Soviet capabilities vis-à-vis Europe. He also noted some
answers required net evaluations of Western and Warsaw Pact forces and equipment, a comparison that was not the province of National Intelligence Estimates.

The Working Group issued its first report on this subject in February 1970, and this document is the final one. Parts I and II are devoted primarily to the capabilities and composition of the Warsaw Pact. Part III considers contingencies in which the Warsaw Pact might use force, and Part IV estimates Warsaw Pact military reactions to alternative US-NATO force structures and strategies. This was the first comprehensive attempt to prepare the basis for the proposed Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction [MBFR] talks. It galvanized the IC to begin assembling the information necessary for NATO and the Warsaw Pact to carry out mutual and balanced reductions in forces and weapons.

This NSC document reflects the official views of the IC on Warsaw Pact forces and includes the conclusions contained in Documents VII-1 and VII-2. It presents the pros and cons of an agreement to reduce forces and the history leading to the approach to the MBFR talks in the 1970s. It attempts to define the balance of forces in the Central Region on the basis of intelligence assessments of Warsaw Pact forces and lists of NATO forces. It describes the balance as "highly uncertain." Later analysis would find the balance, as presented, faulty for both blocs. The paper does, however, reflect the state of information and analysis available at the beginning of the 1970s.

This was the first comprehensive estimate of the Warsaw Pact forces opposite NATO after 1971. It benefited from the major qualitative and quantitative improvements in collection and analysis during the 1970s. The estimate addresses ground forces, air and air defense forces, naval forces, Soviet ballistic missile forces for peripheral attack, and military support functions. It also discusses Warsaw Pact policy, doctrine and strategy for theater warfare.

This volume of NIE 11-14-79 contains a more detailed discussion of the issues contained in Volume I.

↑ BACK TO CHAPTER 7

**DOCUMENTS ABOUT SOVIET PLANNING FOR WAR WITH NATO IN EUROPE**

During the 1970s, the IC learned much more about Soviet–Warsaw Pact war plans and war planning. It collected enough intelligence information from clandestine and technical sources in the 1960s to reconstruct the main features of the Soviet plans for conflict with NATO in the central region of Europe. As the decade wore on, and especially after Colonel Kuklinsky began reporting, the IC gained more details about planning for offensive operations into Western Europe. Provided below are related Clandestine Services intelligence information reports and finished intelligence derived from them. The first one is representative of the doctrinal information available at the beginning of the 1970s.

The article, published in Polish, may have been from a classified Soviet edition of Military Thought. Glebov addresses Soviet military doctrine as it was undergoing scrutiny for change. He addresses the questions of whether, when, and how theater nuclear weapons would be used in a war in Europe or for intercontinental attack.


This reporting appears to be taken from classified lecture notes. It addresses the preparation for and conducting strategic theater war operations, including the employment of various kinds of forces. It describes staff assignments at front and army levels. It provides information on NATO and Warsaw Pact forces during offensive operations and related intelligence organization and collection. It includes specific data on numbers of units and weapons planned for employment by Warsaw Pact forces and, in general, their missions in both conventional and nuclear war.


The paper assesses the organization, operation, and size of a Soviet and East European mobilization and reinforcement in anticipation of imminent hostilities against the Central Region of NATO.


The memorandum describes a CIA series of CIA/NCS Intelligence Information Reports on Warsaw Pact exercises and concepts for war.


The report discusses the evolution, capabilities, and future trends of peripheral-strike forces that would provide theater-strategic punch in any Soviet ground campaign against Western Europe or China.


The memorandum examines military theories on the evolution of a war with NATO. It reviews NATO and Soviet doctrines and analyzes Soviet concepts of the principal phases of such a conflict. The author gives particular attention to the Warsaw Pact concept for the transition from the conventional phase to the nuclear phase of a war in Europe and to Warsaw Pact evaluations about the intensity and scope of an initial nuclear strike.

**Document VII-12.** Blue Streak Intelligence on Warsaw Pact Exercises, Plans, Organization and Concepts of War in Central Europe, NSC Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger from K. Wayne Smith, 8 June 1971.

The memorandum describes a series of CIA clandestine intelligence information reports on Warsaw Pact exercises and concepts for war.


The author notes the new CIA study describes Soviet military thinking on war in Europe as depicted in official
Warsaw Pact documents [Polish postmortem critiques of major Warsaw Pact exercises], lecture notes taken by Bloc officers at what was probably a Soviet course on strategy and doctrine, and articles from the Soviet classified journal, *Military Thought*.

The NIE describes the structure, weaponry, and doctrine of the Soviet armed forces. The IC judges the Soviets had successfully assimilated nuclear weapons and doctrine and improved the military effectiveness of their Warsaw Pact allies.

The report presents the CIA analysis of the peacetime posture of Soviet divisions. It describes the different CIA and NATO categorization of the Soviet divisions, the three distinct manning levels of Soviet divisions, and the mobilization and availability of Warsaw Pact divisions for combat use.

**Document VII-16. This number intentionally left blank.**

**Document VII-17. This number intentionally left blank.**

**Document VII-18. Warsaw Pact Buildup Capabilities, A Review of Work in Progress and Analysis to Date, CIA/DI/OSR, Special Project, October 1972.**
The project was produced in response to a 25 September 1972 memorandum from Dr. Kissinger requesting more information on MBFR. The paper describes the research under way about various aspects of the Warsaw Pact buildup problem. Estimates of Soviet, Polish, East German and Czech planning and procedures for mobilizing and moving equipment to the central region of Europe are summarized and assessed. The report also characterizes how Warsaw Pact divisions could be ranked before and after mobilization.

The article discusses the view of other writers, who appeared previously in the journal, on this subject and presents the author's opinion. The author concludes Soviet troops must continue to be deployed for, and to base their operations on planning for, nuclear war. They also must have alternate plans and logistic support permitting the achievement of combat goals by conventional means.

**Document VII-20. Sensitive New Information on Soviet War Planning and Warsaw Pact Force Strengths, CIA/DI/OSR memorandum for J. David Linebaugh, chief, Plans and Regional Affairs Division, IR, ACDA, from Bruce Clarke, Jr., director, Strategic Research, transmitting an appraisal of new intelligence bearing on MBFR, 10 August 1973.**
The memorandum forwards an OSR analysis titled, *A Soviet View of the Balance of Theater Forces in Central Europe and of the Ground Campaign against the NATO Center Region*. The OSR document was a preliminary analysis of new intelligence from reports relating to Warsaw Pact exercise scenarios in counteroffensives against NATO in the central region of Europe. Detailed Warsaw Pact and NATO deployments and comparisons of NATO–Warsaw Pact force elements bearing on MBFR are included in the information.

The article is based on war games conducted by the Frunze Academy stressing the need to conduct
conventional operations to provide the greatest advantages in the event of a transition to the use of nuclear weapons: for example, reconnaissance of targets for nuclear weapons and destroying the enemy's nuclear capability.


Shcherbakov summarizes the experience of exercises conducted in Soviet Central Asia to study the advance of troops from their garrisons to the southern border of the USSR. The author concludes troops should move under their own power and not rely on civil transportation. He recommends further study of the terrain in the theater with a view to building roads to allow an increased rate of advance to a possible combat zone.


Muzychenko conducts a thorough examination of logistic support of large-scale offensive operations in nuclear warfare. According to the study, the major distinction between support of large-scale operations in WW II and those in contemporary general warfare was the extensive mechanization of both combat units and rear services elements.


Gudz attempts to cover the entire sphere of strategy and tactics on the contemporary battlefield. He characterizes modern combat, both nuclear and conventional, with definitions of standard terms in a modern context. New factors include increased speed of movement and greater ranges of fire.


The authors discuss the commitment of an army to an engagement during conventional warfare conditions, but with the constant threat of an enemy nuclear attack. They focus on the creation of army strike groupings and their timely advance to selected axes during the initial period of war.


The report describes the Warsaw Pact plan to mobilize within three days virtually the entire force with which it planned to fight a war in Europe. The plan was based on the Soviet experience in WW II and lessons learned from the military history of continental Europe. The report analyses the Warsaw Pact plans, systems, and mobilization exercises, and the analyst judges the alliance could assemble the majority of its forces within about three days. The paper also assesses that only those forces stationed in Eastern Europe would be ready and in position to enter combat by the third day. Formations in the USSR would complete mobilization within that period, but their entry into combat would be delayed and their initial combat effectiveness once mobilized probably would be low compared with that of a full-strength professional standing force.


The document is a translation of a "Secret of Special Importance" Polish document on mobilization. The document contains lists of units by subordination, type, location, and true unit designation and states when and
by whom they were to be mobilized. Although all the units mentioned are Polish, it provides a documentary view of the mobilization scheme for one of the Warsaw Pact's three fronts facing NATO in the central region of Europe. The implications for the time phasing of the other two fronts seemed likely to be consistent by necessity.

The report evaluates indications suggesting the Soviets were attempting a more flexible posture for nuclear contingencies for a war in Europe.

The PRD review highlights the importance of the clandestine reports to the CIA/OSR analysis in the paper.

Povally states the existing concept of the initial period of war had become archaic and bereft of all practical meaning. The author enthusiastically builds a theoretical case for a doctrine dividing war into "periods", leading to the full employment of all nuclear weapons of the two opposing sides. He paints a picture of the destruction following a strategic nuclear exchange and somehow skips to conventional forces, after "horrific" losses, successfully concluding the conflict. In all, he gives an interesting, if logically puzzling, presentation of war in the modern world.

Glebov posits several principles relating to the planning and conduct of offensive operations of fronts based on the experience acquired through the conduct of war games by the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1964–65. The article includes a discussion of problems related to the development of one overall plan for a front offensive operation, plans for the use of nuclear weapons, the participation of the fronts in the first nuclear strike, and methods of destroying large enemy groupings.

The document is a top secret publication of the Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. It presents the reports of the CINC and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces at the critique of a war game for senior Soviet, Bulgarian, and Hungarian command and staff officers on the conduct of combined operations using both conventional and nuclear weapons against NATO forces in Turkey, Greece, Austria, northern Italy, and adjacent waters. The report contains the scenario of the war game, the lessons learned, deficiencies, and the organization, dispositions and axes of action for both sides. The report includes 11 diagrams depicting the respective orders of battle, the situation at various phases, and the course of events.

The paper surveys the evolution of the basic types of units in the Soviet armored forces, how they are structured, and how they are to be used in the event of war. CIA produced it for the benefit of those engaged in the MBFR negotiations.
The author reviews Soviet military writings from the late 1950s and finds the Soviets had consistently portrayed US and NATO command facilities as high-priority targets for nuclear attack, second only to nuclear forces. At the strategic level in the late 1960s, CIA Soviet military analysts gave priority to nuclear strikes against command and communications as US intercontinental and submarine-launched missile forces expanded. However, because of the difficulty in locating SSBNs and destroying silo-based ICBMs, some Soviet writers advocated increased attacks on control facilities to neutralize these forces. At the theater level, the Soviets appeared to have left open the possibility of intra-war bargaining. For example, the Soviets contemplated withholding attacks on national authorities in France and possibly other NATO countries.

The document provides details about wartime strengths and deployments of Polish forces as part of the total Warsaw Pact deployment for war with NATO. It also presents some important warning indicators in the event of impending Warsaw Pact hostilities against NATO.

The authors attempt to aggregate qualitative and quantitative indices of the combat potential of the Soviet forces and compare them with analogous indices of NATO forces by calculating coefficients of comparability.

Nikitin reviews provisions of the 1963 Field Service Regulations for ground forces that, because of developments in modern weapons and combat equipment after its publication, required updating. The author cites specific chapters he believed needed major revisions.

The paper addresses in detail the basis for the judgment in the NIE 11-14-75 that a Warsaw Pact offensive in Central Europe would not necessarily be preceded by a large-scale reinforcement from the USSR. The focus of the paper is Soviet concepts for organizing and initially committing the Warsaw Pact ground armies in a general offensive against NATO in Central Europe, with particular attention paid to the question of Soviet intentions regarding the timing of reinforcement from the USSR.

Memorandum for Colonel William E. Odom, NSC Staff, from Philip Waggener, Acting Director, Office of Strategic Research, 15 March 1977.
The Director of OSR sent this paper in response to Odom's questions about Soviet military preparedness. Based mainly on previously published reports, the paper for the NSC Staff, nonetheless, presented several new judgments reflecting the receipt of new information from collectors and analysis. The memorandum describes the Soviet system alerts, the command and control system capabilities, and the time required to reach full alert status.
Documents VII-39 through VII-49 provide a wealth of evidence about overall Warsaw Pact strategy, command relationships, reinforcement, and movement for war against NATO in Western Europe. They are arrayed in the order in which events occurred, not by the date of dissemination.

The document describes information appearing on two Polish maps. Map 1 shows the wartime routes of march for the Belorussian and Carpathian Fronts of the Soviet Armed Forces to transit Poland for Exercise "West-77". Map 2 shows the routes of march to be followed by the two units in exercise "West-77." Map 2 also shows the locations of Polish troop movements, control and command, the troops, and deployment areas for other participating units.

The document provides rules for placing telephone calls through secure and high-frequency long-distance communications channels and lists the call signs and main Warsaw Pact force headquarters for the exercise.

The document provides the concluding scenario for the exercise Zapad [West]-77. It describes the general situation of the opposing sides at its conclusion, with both sides poised to initiate nuclear actions, including the specific situation of Polish forces and installations and actions in the Poland and supplementary reconnaissance data.

The document provides the general background scenario for the 31 May 1977 exercise and the specific status and composition of the forces under Polish command and of the "Westerners."

The document provides the midpoint scenario for this exercise. It describes the general situation on the third day of combat and the specific situation of the Polish forces.

The document describes the participants and the initial scenario of the strategic command staff exercise, comparing the scenario with war plans for moving troops from the Belorussian and Carpathian Military Districts into Poland.

The exercise was intended to test the establishment of a high command in the Western theater. The critique was contained in two comprehensive and candid reports that provided an indication of the level of proficiency of the commanders and staffs taking part in the exercise. The critique also provided information about the state of troop control and combat readiness in the Polish, Czech, East German, and Soviet military units allocated to the Combined Armed Forces in the theater.
The document is a comprehensive summary of the highlights and shortcomings of Polish participation in the two exercises.

The letter outlines problems with mobilization, coordination, equipment, and preparations that became evident during the exercise and requested suggestions for resolving these problems.

The document contains some information about then current and future means of military communications linking the East German, Polish and Soviet forces.

**Document VII-49.** "Bulgarian Request in connection with Exercise Soyuz [Alliance]-78, for Polish information on Exercise, Zapad [West]-77", CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 17 November 1977 [DOI, 3 August 1977].
The top secret letter from Col. Gen. Semerdzhiyev, chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army, to Gen. Siwicki, chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, requests more details about how the exercise was conducted and about the problems that occurred during the exercise.

The paper reviews the various ways the Warsaw Pact commentaries viewed NATO concepts for war in Central Europe. For example, in the early 1960s Pact commentaries stressed a massive NATO nuclear offensive by strategic and theater forces at the start of fighting. Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, CIA analysts of the Warsaw Pact assessed, based on the commentaries, the Soviets expected that hostilities would commence with a massive nonnuclear air attack by NATO. The analysts did note that although the commentaries might reflect genuine concern over NATO, they appeared intended to propagandize the Pact's forces and justify continued Soviet control over Eastern Europe.

The paper concludes the improvements the Soviets had made in recent years to their tactical nuclear forces in Central Europe had eroded much of the NATO nuclear advantage. The analysts had assessed the Soviets would attain nuclear parity in Central Europe should the trend continue, and the basis of deterrence would shift more to conventional forces. The assessment describes the Warsaw Pact and NATO programs to improve their forces, draws implications for nuclear parity, and concludes Warsaw Pact confidence would be tempered by projected NATO improvements.

This memorandum provides OSR's preliminary observations regarding the Warsaw Pact view of the use of nuclear weapons in a war. OSR derives conclusions from how Warsaw Pact military exercises involving conflict with NATO addressed the question. OSR assesses that after 1970 the Soviets had concluded the period of fighting with only conventional weapons was likely to occur before either side employed nuclear weapons.
During this conventional period, a primary goal would be the destruction of NATO nuclear capabilities. The Soviets believed they had the advantage during the conventional phase, when NATO preparations for nuclear strikes might be taking place. Planning for employment of nuclear weapons would be flexible, but the Soviets were concerned about problems of reconstitution, decontamination, and human psychology accompanying the use of nuclear weapons. The degree of linkage between intercontinental and theater nuclear operations was unclear.

The IC concludes the Soviets regarded the risks involved in a war with NATO to be extremely high, perhaps including an escalation to massive nuclear strikes that Moscow viewed as a major threat to its existence. The estimate also concludes the Soviets took a conservative view of NATO capabilities and believed NATO's defense might prevent a quick Warsaw Pact victory. That belief, coupled with Soviet concerns that its East European allies might not fight, further constrained Soviet planning for aggressive war. For these reasons, the estimate assesses war in Europe would occur only when the political, military, or economic situation changed profoundly. The estimate discusses Soviet military objectives in a war, Soviet doctrine and readiness for war, and the Warsaw Pact way of going to war. The IC analysts are confident they are able to monitor the civilian and military activity in peacetime and will notice significant early changes in a wide range of civilian and military activities as they move to a posture for war.

Gabor asserts that, although the Western powers and the Soviet Bloc had both acquired nuclear weapons, it was still possible that a war between the two blocs could be fought with only conventional weapons. The author was of the opinion conventional weapons would continue to play a decisive role in any future war.

Document VII-55. *Indications and Warning of Soviet Intentions to Use Chemical Weapons during a NATO-Warsaw Pact War*, CIA/DCI/NIC Interagency Intelligence Memorandum [IIM], August 1978.
Under Secretary of the Army Walter B. LaBerge requested this IIM. It discusses the problems of identifying unambiguous indicators of Soviet preparations and intentions to use chemical weapons during a conventional war, with a focus on the first use of these weapons. The IC judges that the likelihood of getting warning of an impending chemical attack was low because the indicators of such activity would look like conventional operations or preparations for nuclear warfare.

The estimate addresses the portion of Soviet strategic forces intended for use primarily against land targets in Western Europe, China, the Middle East, and other areas on the periphery of the USSR. The relevant targets were generally beyond the immediate area of ground force engagements but at less than intercontinental range.

The directive appraises accomplishments and weaknesses revealed in the course of high-level operational training of Soviet forces. It focuses on the results of major exercises as it either praises or castigates the staffs and commands of fronts and fleets for their performance in the exercises.

Document VII-58. This number intentionally left blank.

Document VII-59. This number intentionally left blank.
Document VII-60. "Warsaw Pact Perceptions of NATO Strengths and Weaknesses", CIA/DO Intelligence Information Report, 19 August 1982 [DOI, late 1981]. The reporting describes the Warsaw Pact's view of NATO as a politically weak organization, particularly on its flanks, because there is no firm commitment to defend Europe. The strategic forces of the United States, United Kingdom and France are highly regarded, but NATO ground forces are considered to be a major weakness.

Document VII-61. Soviet Planning for Front Nuclear Operations in Central Europe, CIA/DI/SOVA Intelligence Assessment, June 1983. The assessment concludes the Soviets planned to divide responsibility for nuclear operations between strategic forces and front tactical forces in a war in Central Europe. It describes Soviet plans to use nuclear weapons on a large scale and describes the most important front targeting objectives during both conventional and nuclear operations. It assesses front nuclear operations would not be significantly affected by the deployment of Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-based cruise missiles to Europe because most of them would probably be deployed beyond the front forces' area of responsibility.

Document VII-62. Employment of Warsaw Pact Forces against NATO, CIA/DCI/NIC Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, 1 July 1983. The IIM provides a detailed discussion of general Soviet concepts for front-level operations and Soviet planning for theater nuclear operations. It discusses Warsaw Pact options for campaigns against NATO in the Western, Southwestern and Northwestern Theaters of Military Operations and reviews options for employment of Warsaw Pact forces.

Document VII-63. "Concept of Operations for the Polish Front", CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Report, 14 March 1984 [DOI, late 1981]. The reporting contains a concept of operations for a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact during which the Polish front would be committed by the sixth hour of the third day of combat from Luebeck to Wittenberg, operating on diverging axes along the North Sea coast to Brussels and the French border, at the same time supporting one of the three Polish armies in an offensive to seize Jutland and the Danish islands. The foregoing offensives are to be completed within 12 days. Senior Polish military leaders, however, believe the front will be unable to accomplish its assigned tasks.

Document VII-64. Soviet Strategy and Capabilities for Multitheater War, NIE 11-19-85/D, June 1985. The estimate assesses the capability of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies to fight a multitheater war during the period 1995-2000. The estimate focuses on three principal regions in which the Soviets appeared to be prepared to undertake military operations: Europe, East Asia and Southwest Asia. It addresses likely Soviet wartime objectives in the theaters and the capabilities of Warsaw Pact forces to accomplish them. It presents the Soviet view of the interrelationship of the three regions and the part each played in overall Soviet strategy and military planning. It also assesses the Soviet capacity to control, sustain and coordinate simultaneous military campaigns in three widely separated areas.

Document VII-65. Warsaw Pact: Planning for Operations against Denmark, CIA/DI/SOVA Research Paper, April 1989. The paper describes the Warsaw Pact plan for a coordinated, phased offensive operation against Denmark in support of the main offensive against the NATO center. The operation would not begin before late in the first week of the war because of the heavy demands of the plan on Soviet airlift, sealift, and naval mine-clearing and the risks and uncertainties associated with initiating airborne and amphibious operations before gaining air and sea supremacy. The analyst also judges that unilateral reductions and reorientation of forces toward defense could lead to a less threatening and less capable array of Warsaw Pact forces opposite Denmark.
DOCUMENTS ABOUT GROUND FORCES

The documents chosen for this section focus on the characteristics and capabilities of Warsaw Pact ground forces. They include: manuals on conducting operations; articles covering recruiting and training of personnel; readiness of ground forces; and doctrine and strategy for ground forces, including chemical and nuclear warfare in a war with NATO in Central Europe. Rear services are also covered as well as Soviet views of NATO capabilities.

The paper addresses the paucity of information and evidence about the Soviet chemical weapons program. It provides an approach for assessing the quantity of stocks the Soviets could have available and outlines the state of CIA knowledge concerning Soviet chemical warfare capabilities in general.

This report discusses the state of information about and the analysis of Polish forces in the fall of 1970 and their role in the first echelon of fronts confronting NATO. The report focuses on the details of the peacetime combat preparations and evaluates the wartime capabilities of Polish mechanized and tank divisions.

The analyst evaluates evidence in articles in the Soviet military press and from scenarios of military exercises indicating changes in Soviet military doctrine. These changes included acceptance of a doctrine that hostilities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact could be nonnuclear but that NATO would probably initiate tactical nuclear strikes when a Warsaw Pact nonnuclear offensive achieved initial success. The report also evaluates changes in organization and strength of representative divisions of the GSFG and their logistic capabilities.

The report contains information about Soviet research for new munitions and new ground force weapons, including two new tanks and a heavy armed vehicle designed to carry a mounted infantry squad.

The analyst reviews the 1967 changes in Soviet regulations, including reductions in terms of active service, institution of compulsory pre-military training and semiannual call-ups, and demobilizations.

The analyst concludes the total Soviet military manpower increased from 2.8 million men in 1961 to 3.7 million in 1971, as Soviet concern over growing Sino-Soviet tensions and US strategic capabilities increased. During the period, Soviet general purpose forces expanded by about 345,000 men, the largest increase of any Soviet military component.

**Document VII-72.** Tactical Nuclear Capabilities of Warsaw Pact Ground Forces in the Reduction Area, CIA/DI/OSR Special Project, October 1972.
The report is a response to a White House memorandum of 25 September 1972 requesting additional data for
the initial MBFR discussions. The paper addresses tactical nuclear missile capabilities in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

The NIE addresses Soviet positions on MBFR in Europe. It provides judgments about Soviet negotiating posture, the probable stance of the East Europeans, and possible Soviet positions on several issues.

The paper describes the characteristics of Warsaw Pact forces and assesses their capabilities for mobilizing and reinforcing forces facing NATO in the central region of Europe. The paper also compares US and allied assessments of Warsaw Pact capabilities.

**Document VII-75. Logistic Posture of Soviet Forces in East Germany, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report, July 1973.**
The paper describes the state of supplies for Soviet forces in East Germany, including motor transport and stocks of ammunition, petroleum, oil and lubrication. The analyst judges Soviet capabilities for conventional offensive operations could be seriously limited by the status of logistics, particularly the lack of motor transport necessary to support rapid advance.

The article contains a speech by the former chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Zakharov, to the editors, authors and readers of Military Thought. Marshal Zakharov emphasized the ideological foundation of Soviet military doctrine and expressed some generalities about the future work of the journal. He viewed the unclassified version of the journal as a forum for the study and understanding of military doctrine and experience, and the classified version as an exchange of views by Soviet command personnel on the principal military problems. Zakharov also addressed the need to perform research into conducting "air operations to rout the enemy's aviation" at the "very beginning of a war."

This analysis was prepared for the MBFR talks and was also applicable to other forces-related defense requirements. The revisions were based on new evidence of the aggregate strengths of some Warsaw Pact force elements in the NATO Guidelines Area.

Volkotrbenko presents some simple formulas for establishing the amounts of artillery ammunition to be stockpiled for each type of gun, including emergency reserves. It is primarily a statement of stockpiles and expenditure data for WW II. A later article in Military Thought [Document VII-82] criticizes the assumptions and calculations made by Volkotrbenko. Both articles probably are symptomatic of the state of discourse about the general question of ammunition stockpile requirements and expenditure rates at that time.

The memorandum addresses the Soviet and Warsaw Pact insistence that any MBFR agreement provide for the reduction of nuclear as well as conventional armaments. On 8 November 1973, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact presented a draft agreement specifically requiring the parties "to reduce their ground and air forces and armaments, including nuclear weapons." The analysis notes the term "nuclear weapons" was used in a way to make clear the Soviets viewed them as part of "ground and air forces armaments."

In the article, Zakharov summarizes Soviet weapons and military equipment developed after WW II. It focuses on hardware for the Ground Forces, but it also describes some fighter aircraft and major transport aircraft. It provides major characteristics for most items of equipment, including armored vehicles, anti-aircraft missiles, tactical ballistic missiles and rockets, and major pieces of engineer equipment.

The memorandum defines the composition of a tank army and examines the Soviet concepts for the use of a tank army in general and for two tank armies in the NATO Guidelines Area with respect to MBFR. It discusses the impact of the withdrawal of a Soviet tank army on Soviet capabilities and how the Soviets might compensate. It also compares the effects of a reduction of a combined-arms army with that of a tank army.

Yefimov attacks the premise of the article in Document VII-78 that Soviet industry had satisfactorily fulfilled ammunition requirements during WW II. It attributes Soviet setbacks and defeats to the absence of ammunition or severe restrictions on its use. It is pessimistic about the capability of industry to supply sufficient artillery ammunition during nuclear warfare and recommends careful correlation of targets, gun calibers, range of fire, and ammunition costs.

These estimates were based on new analysis of the increase in the number of tanks per division during the previous four to five years. In these estimates, the total number of Soviet tanks assessed in the NATO Guidelines Area was increased by about 500 over the preceding estimates.

The paper addresses questions raised by the director of Net Assessments, Office of the Secretary of Defense. The director asked for an analysis of what in the Soviet view were the characteristics and activities of US general purpose forces making the greatest impact on the Soviet national security community. The paper analyzes explicit Soviet statements appearing to reflect perceptions and evaluations of US general purpose military capabilities from open-source and classified Soviet publications.

The paper provides a brief overview of the composition and capabilities of the Warsaw Pact tactical nuclear forces for the US policy and negotiating teams involved in the MBFR deliberations.

The article contains the four officers’ comments on a 1965 book by Maj. Gen. of Tank Troops N.I. Batalov on various aspects of a tank army operating independently on deep and rapid strikes on the nuclear battlefield. Much of the article weighs the respective merits of tank and combined-arms armies in these roles. The authors note that many of the details about those operations such as how to support them still need a thorough examination.


The analyst judges, in addition to the growth of the Soviet ground and tactical air forces, that the changes of the previous 10 years had resulted in more balanced and operationally flexible theater forces with substantially improved capabilities for conventional as well as theater nuclear war. The report describes the buildup of Soviet forces opposite China as the prime factor in the expansion with an addition of more than 300,000 men. The report concludes Soviet forces opposite NATO following the invasion of Czechoslovakia had increased by almost 140,000 men and over 2,600 tanks in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The analyst also judges that extensive production of new, more sophisticated equipment would continue to the end of the 1970s, and, despite the slowdown during the period 1974–75, the expansion and modernization would continue unless new political leaders with changed priorities came to power.


This report addresses two articles in the Soviet press by Army Gen. V.G. Kulikov, chief of the General Staff, on control of the armed forces and whether that mission should remain centralized in the General Staff. The article explores why, after the principle apparently had been accepted in recent years, the controversy continued.


The paper discusses the extent of current training for reservists and the impact on the ground force divisions to which they would be sent when mobilized. The report presents evidence that the implementation of the 1967 Military Service Law was spotty. For example, most reservists did not receive prescribed periodic refresher training; some reservists with certain technical skills were called up, officers more frequently, and generally reservists did not train with their wartime units. A large body of recently trained manpower, however, was always available for mobilization because of the release of conscripts each year.


This reporting describes the organization and equipment of a Soviet motorized rifle division in useful detail.


The document corrects and supplements the information contained in Document VII-90. This version represents the full strength, wartime TO&E for a motorized rifle division.

The paper reviews the history of the major changes in the structure of Soviet Ground Forces, beginning in 1957, to determine how their organizations developed at all levels and on what principles the development was based. The report estimates possible directions of future development.

The briefing concentrates on four topics: why the Soviets were deterred from attacking NATO; the Soviet offensive plan for the contingency of war with NATO—intentions to complete preparations quickly should deterrence fail; the trend toward qualitative improvements in military equipment for both sides; and the rough balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact military capabilities.

Khaych explores actions peculiar to a tank division separated from a combined-arms army to penetrate farther into the depth of an offensive. Accordingly, the author outlines the tasks of the tank division, the numbers of nuclear warheads required and how they should be supplied, the special problems of air defense, reconnaissance, protection against mass destruction weapons, materiel supply and control.

The paper describes the increasing morale and discipline problems in the Soviet military. The analyst judges they were a result of the indifference and ineffectiveness of the officers.

Shtemenko outlines and explains several measures carried out to implement the Universal Military Service Law and improve the system of manning the Soviet Armed Forces. It lists basic categories in which youth should receive training prior to call-up and suggests ways in which this training will be carried out. It describes the procedure for the registration and evaluation of conscripts in a two-year period prior to call-up, the call-up itself and assignment of conscripts to the troops. Finally it examines problems of training noncommissioned officers, junior specialists, officers and students of civilian institutions of high education.

**Document VII-96.** Combat Potentials of the Armament and Combat Equipment of the Ground Forces and Aviation of the USSR and of the Armies of the Probable Enemy, and Table of Combat Potentials of Large Units, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, original report was issued on 2 August 1977; This document includes an addendum (correction) to the original report, 25 August 1980 [DOI, 1977].
The report is a translation of two secret Soviet documents consisting of tables comparing the combat potential of USSR and NATO tanks, self-propelled artillery, infantry combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers, field artillery and mortars, antitank weapons, air defense weapons and aircraft. It also compares the combat potential of Warsaw Pact and NATO ground force divisions. [See Documents VII-97 and VII-98 for analysis of these documents.]

The memorandum is an analysis of Document VII-96. The Soviet document contained two lists of comparative numerical ratings for the combat potential of military equipment and division size combat units for the Warsaw Pact and various potential enemies. The lists also included some new items of combat equipment not yet available to operational units. The memorandum examines the choices made by the Soviet authors of the combat potential of various equipment and units.

This memorandum is a second analysis of Document VII-96. The memorandum examines Soviet and US analyses and concludes that US and Soviet planners had a similar appreciation of the balance of forces at the divisional level in Central Europe expressed in equipment equivalencies, employed generally similar definitions for determining the relative power of opposing forces, and had nearly identical results.


The document is a translation of the Soviet General Staff authoritative guide for officers serving in command or staff positions at the front, army or corps level. The manual contains an introduction and eight chapters dealing with general principles, political work, principles of ground forces operations, offensive operations, airborne landings, defensive operations, regroupings, and rear services support.


The manual, in this clandestine report, prescribes rear services support of the Ground Forces for commanders and staff officers at the front, army and corps level. It contains seven chapters addressing: the general principles of the rear services support; the organization and deployment of units and facilities; transportation lines and the delivery of materiel; the specific features of materiel, technical, medical, and veterinary support; rear services support in offensive operations; rear services support in defensive operations; and special problems of support under various geographic and climatic conditions. It describes the integration of civilian motor transport into the force and the integration of the transportation infrastructure into the whole of the rear services support plan. The manual clearly affixes personal command responsibilities and the requirements in all aspects of support.


The manual, in this clandestine report, is intended for use by generals and staff officers of Ground Forces formations. It is a comprehensive study of the theory and practice of reconnaissance in its application to a front offensive operation, beginning with conventional weapons and proceeding to the use of nuclear means. Chapter 2 describes various types of reconnaissance and some of the equipment used. Other chapters address indications of enemy preparations for attack, the planning, performance and control of reconnaissance, and other targets of interest at different stages of an operation.


The paper is the result of a study of Soviet Ground Forces non-divisional artillery units. It was intended to improve the IC understanding of Soviet efforts to expand and improve the quality of these ground forces. The analyst judges the Soviets had nearly tripled the amount of conventional artillery assigned in direct support of army- and front-level commands during the period 1970–78. It describes how the buildup was accomplished and with what units, new and reassigned, and where newer models of weapons were assigned. The analysts use non photographic sources to glean more meaning from the photography.


The document was especially important because the lists of Polish wartime and peacetime force strength and illustrative Soviet deliveries of nuclear weapons to Polish forces in wartime were analogous for the wartime
situations for all NSWP forces in the Central Region of Europe. It also contains valuable information on rear services and support.


The article is from a journal published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow and is part of a new series of articles from this publication. Grozev sets forth concisely and comprehensively the purpose of committing the second echelon of an army and its tasks. He describes, analyzes and evaluates the methods of committing the second echelon, dwelling on actions in mountainous and forested terrain. He also outlines the basic requirement for the commitment and downplays the effect of enemy nuclear strikes.


Mitronin discusses the general aspects of cooperation between ground air defense units and fighter aircraft, depending on whether they had separate zones of action or took action in the same zone. It focuses on the complexities of having all three operate within the same zone. It discusses tactical air control, but not air operations.


The analyst presents information about the size of the amphibious forces and judges their successes would depend on air and sea control and on the forward progress of ground forces. The analyst also judges in certain circumstances the amphibious forces would be capable of limited intervention in Third World countries.


The paper assesses the Soviet military buildup during the Brezhnev era, including in nuclear delivery vehicles, strategic and civil defense programs, battlefield nuclear forces, artillery firepower, the weight of ordnance tactical air forces could deliver deep into NATO territory, and the quality of tank armor. The paper assesses the introduction of new heavily armed surface ships, nuclear-powered submarines and naval aircraft, and the quadrupling of the number of missile launchers on ships and submarines. The paper addresses the broadening of Soviet military activities in the Third World, the near doubling of defense spending, and the increase in military R&D and manpower.


The memorandum is the response to a request by Secretary of Defense Weinberger for an in-depth analysis of the readiness posture of the Soviet Ground Forces. The memorandum compares the capabilities of Soviet and US forces to provide a framework for viewing Soviet readiness. It does not address in detail the readiness of NSWP forces or problems of coalition warfare.

The paper describes the differences between an operational maneuver group (OMG) and a tank army. The analyst describes why an OMG could be a significant step in the evolution of Soviet combined-arms doctrine and judges there was a wide gap between Soviet theory of what an OMG would do and the capability of the Warsaw Pact.

This IA addresses manning, conscription, and quality of the reserve forces and their roles during peacetime and crisis. Based on a statistical analysis of the experience of hundreds of former reservists in the Soviet army, the author concludes peacetime training for individual Pact reservists was inadequate to maintain skills after active duty or to develop cohesion in the many units manned largely by reservists. The author points out that trained conscripts replaced reservists in Afghanistan before Soviet units were committed to offensive operations and that the reluctance to use reservists in real operations suggested the Soviet military leadership had a low opinion of their combat proficiency. Quality issues notwithstanding, the Soviet reserve system made millions of former soldiers available for mobilization.

The paper examines Soviet manning practices in detail and the resulting impact on the ground forces divisions and other units in peacetime. The author concludes the Soviets intended to provide a well-trained, well-equipped and highly manned ready force of about 75 divisions capable of combat operations on short notice and a far larger, poorly trained, low-manned not-ready force of about 130 divisions to provide the basis for mobilizing a large wartime force. Of the 75 ready divisions at high strength, 40 were located outside the USSR. The other 35 were usually located near the Soviet borders, such as the border with China. The author describes the composition of the ready and non-ready forces and the different manning practices among units.

The paper describes the features of the reorganization of Soviet Ground Forces in East Germany that began in 1980. The intent of the reorganization was to give the forces a more balanced combined-arms capability. The reorganization included an equipment expansion and modernization program to enhance the capability of Soviet forces to overrun NATO forward defenses in Central Europe and maintain the momentum of offensive operations. The changes demonstrate the Soviet belief that the tank cannot operate alone in operations. Instead the Soviets supported combined-arms formations to protect tank dominance in battlefield operations.

The paper describes the conversion of two or three Soviet ground force divisions into a larger, reconfigured combat formation called an independent army corps. The paper describes information indicating the corps may be better able to conduct limited, self-contained actions, making them useful for economy-of-force, forward detachment, counter-penetration, rear-area protection, and operational maneuver group missions.

The paper describes the results of a review of the Soviet buildup of reserve logistics for the Western Theater of Military Operations during the 1970s as adequate to support more forces than the Soviets then had in East
Germany. The analyst judges that pre-positioned logistics would allow the Soviets to reinforce East Germany with combat troops coming from the USSR without clogging their lines of communication with materiel supply trains, and that those supplies could sustain the Soviet forces through the initial period of a war.

**Document VII-116. Soviet Doctrine for Offensive Chemical Warfare Against NATO, CIA/DI/SOVA Intelligence Assessment, June 1984.**
The editors review available intelligence for the period mid-1960 through 1984 for the paper. The results show there was a clear doctrinal emphasis on offensive use of chemical weapons when nuclear weapons were used until about the mid-1970s. Thereafter, the emphasis on using chemical weapons against NATO declined sharply.

**Document VII-117. This number intentionally left blank.**

**Document VII-118. Soviet Ground Forces Trends, CIA/DI/SOVA CIA-DIA-Army Assessment, October 1984.**
The paper summarizes the findings to date of the Land Armaments and Manpower [computer] Model, an ongoing CIA, DIA, and DOD/Army assessment of Soviet and Warsaw Pact ground forces. The paper presents the results of the reassessment of those forces from 1960 onward and projects future developments in size, disposition, equipment, and readiness status through 2000.

The analyst judges that before the outbreak of a war in Europe with NATO, should the Soviets believed war was imminent, they would order the Warsaw Pact tactical and theater nuclear forces to complete plans and preparations for theater nuclear war. The author also judges the preparations could be completed in two or three days. The paper lists two situations during which the analysts believed the Soviets would consider using nuclear weapons even though NATO had not used them: when the Soviets believed NATO was about to use nuclear weapons and when Warsaw Pact reverses in the conventional phase of the war threatened a decisive defeat. The analyst lists the actions that the Soviets believed would indicate a NATO decision to use nuclear weapons but judged Soviet reconnaissance systems through the 1980s would be inadequate for the Soviets to predict with confidence a NATO nuclear attack and preempt it.

**Document VII-120. Readiness of Soviet Forces in Central Europe: Implications for a Rapid Transition to War, CIA/DI/SOVA Intelligence Assessment, September 1987.**
The paper focuses on the peacetime readiness posture of Soviet Air and Ground Forces in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Warsaw Pact forces opposite NATO considered to be the most ready. The assessment was based on a review of all-source intelligence on the military preparedness of Soviet air and ground forces stationed in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and drew from IC studies published over the five years preceding the study.

**Document VII-121. Warsaw Pact Ammunition Logistics in the Western Theater: Sustainability for Offensive Operations, CIA/DI/SOVA, Intelligence Assessment, June 1989.**
The paper focuses on the changes to Warsaw Pact logistics planning resulting from a mid-1970s Soviet reassessment that NATO forces had become more sustainable and thus more difficult to defeat. Coupled with the new assessment was the belief NATO no longer believed it was practical to resort to the early use of nuclear weapons because the Warsaw Pact had attained nuclear parity, which threatened a devastating response to such attacks. The authors of the assessment examined the logistic implications and limitations for the Soviets in two scenarios of war in Europe covering a range of possibilities from a quick Warsaw Pact victory to the more likely intense conventional war lasting longer than 30 days. The assessment compares the implied
requirements with existing ammunition stocks, concluding, in the case of a short conflict involving early offensive success by the Warsaw Pact followed by less intensive fighting, that Warsaw Pact forces had adequate ammunition stocks stockpiled in Eastern Europe. The authors also conclude that, should the Warsaw Pact forces not be successful in defeating NATO defenses, sometime between 15 and 30 days after the beginning of intensive fighting, the Warsaw Pact forces would need to draw on ammunition stocks in the Western USSR. Ultimately, the authors conclude, once forward ammunition was basically exhausted, the Warsaw Pact would need to transport 40,000 to 100,000 metric tons per day into the forward area. The analysis exposes potential vulnerabilities in the Warsaw Pact structure of ammunition logistics.

DOCUMENTS ABOUT AIR FORCES

The documents in this section include two Soviet Ministry of Defense manuals on doctrine for air war and air defense and the capabilities and strategies needed. There are clandestine reports including classified *Military Thought* articles, and DI analyses of various Warsaw Pact air operations. Several documents address the air operations planned for war with NATO in Central Europe focusing on the initial period of war and others evaluate the air operations of the Vietnam and 6-day Middle East Wars.


The document is a translation of the antiaircraft defense section of a report classified secret, made by a Polish military delegation that toured North Vietnam in July 1967. The delegation reports the mission, organization, operations and equipment of the North Vietnamese antiaircraft defense system. It includes the delegation's comments on the strengths and weaknesses of the system and an evaluation of the degree of success it had attained by mid-summer 1967.


Lassota summarizes the results of an exercise held in September 1967. The exercise employed ground observers and standard artillery and early warning radars to detect air targets. The conclusion derived from the exercise was that the low-altitude defense problem remained unresolved, but some improvement was possible.


This paper discusses the probable changes to Soviet Front Aviation [tactical air forces] to support changing concepts of modern warfare that Soviet theorists had been discussing following the ouster of Khrushchev from office. Those changing concepts brought new requirements for conventional warfare capability in a force designed under Khrushchev for nuclear war. The paper examines some likely new trends involving the procurement of new aircraft to satisfy requirements of warfare using only conventional weapons.

Document VII-125. This number intentionally left blank.


The report examines trends in the growth of Soviet military air transport forces and assesses their capabilities to support theater forces with long-and short-range airlift. It discusses mission and subordination, reviews the
strength and disposition of helicopters and small utility transports assigned to ground force elements, and examines trends in the use of armed helicopters.


The paper discusses Soviet doctrine for the tactical air forces originating in the 1950s. The doctrine envisioned a war in Europe as nuclear from the outset. It also examines the changes occurring after the 1950s, including the possibility of an initial period of conventional war. The resulting Soviet air operation described in the paper was intended to enable the Warsaw Pact air forces to carry out a mission for which they were not originally intended and for which at the beginning of the 1970s they were not well suited.


Bukhantsev addresses most aspects of tactical air operations in support of ground and naval forces involved in conventional warfare on a maritime front.


Grebish discusses the complexities of airborne landings conducted during offensive operations by the ground troops against NATO.


The authors define the operational profile of airborne operations in conditions of nuclear, chemical, or conventional warfare and recommend measures for overcoming air defenses up to the drop zone.


The authors state airborne operations were likely to fail without the described special measures to protect transport aircraft from air defense missiles and fighters. They note the inadequacy of existing Soviet fighter aircraft to fulfill the required role.


The editors criticize the article in Document VII-129, "Airborne Landing in Operations of a Non Nuclear Period." They characterize the earlier article as superficial, claiming Col. Grebish provided no calculations to support his statements. They also accuse him of having ignored or glossed over aspects of neutralizing air defenses and dropping troops at night.

Sidorenko discusses ways to increase long-range aircraft capabilities and effectiveness in support of conventional ground warfare.


Graznov describes the operations of North Vietnamese air defense and air forces against US aircraft from 1965 to 1967. Even were the successes of the North Vietnamese air defenses by their reckoning true, extrapolations to conditions in the European theater would not be comforting for the Soviets.


Gorbatyuk discusses the planning and procedures for rebasing tactical air units from the interior of the country to a combat theater. Although generally approving of the tactical air redeployments in the maneuvers, he describes lost time in the logistic evolutions and delays in readiness to support the front. He disagrees with those who prescribe intermediate basing intended to provide air coverage of transiting forces. Instead, he encourages moving directly to bases within range of the forward edge of the battle area.


Lebedev discusses the tactics of the Soviet long-range air force against enemy air bases in the first days of a conventional war in Europe under conventional warfare conditions. He advocates focusing long-range bomber attacks along a few corridors, at the expense of broader initial attacks. He maintains there were not enough bombers to strike all the enemy targets in a single raid because so many bombers were required for each target. He disagrees with the proposals of Maj. Gen. G. Yarotskiy, who advocated a broader initial air operation in the *Military Thought* article reported in Document VII-137, "The Defeat of Enemy Aviation Groupings in a Theater of Military Operations during a Non-Nuclear Period."


Yarotskiy advocates all-out air supremacy operations. He emphasizes the necessity of the maximum participation of all combat aircraft that could be brought within range of the enemy and committed to a massive surprise attack. He seemingly believes only a surprise attack would accomplish the initial necessary tasks. His opinions were disputed in part by subsequent authors in 1969.


Umnov attributes the Israeli victory in the 1967 Six-Day War largely to Israeli air superiority. He judges that the factors leading to that air superiority were Arab countries' lack of coordination, faulty deployment practices, inadequate protection of aircraft and air-defense missile sites, and poor training. The author identifies the major factors leading to Israeli success as surprise, radar jamming, and refined flight and bombing techniques.

Gatsolayev discusses factors affecting field air defense performance, citing some lessons of the 1967 Six-Day War. His major points concern the necessity of moving radar and weapons often without disrupting the continuity of cover, careful selection of sites, and the strain exerted on personnel and equipment when they are kept in combat-ready status.

The report reviews the history of Soviet doctrine on war in Europe in the early 1960s, when Soviet air forces were designed for air defense and delivering nuclear strikes, which in turn led to changes in Soviet doctrine in the mid-1960s, which increased the ability of their air forces to conduct conventional war as well as nuclear attacks. The report assesses the time frame within which Soviet frontal aviation could attain capabilities, an operational plan, and advanced equipment similar to those of the United States, and it assesses the impact this would have on Western planning.

The authors describe characteristics of the struggle for air supremacy in both conventional and nuclear warfare. They state the concept of air supremacy had not been worked out in Soviet doctrine, and it was not fully accepted as appropriate to nuclear warfare.

This is a translation of a document classified "Secret of Special Importance" published by the Polish Ministry of National Defense in 1972. It provides detailed information and projections on organizational and equipment matters for the Polish Air Force, Air Defense Force, and Naval Aviation during the period 1971–75, and major changes up to 1980. Equipment figures remained rather static during 1971–75, except for increases in MiG-21s and helicopters and decreases in native aircraft holdings. Costs are provided for imported and domestic equipment, without the decision on the purchase of the MI-8 helicopter, which was still pending.

Shimanskiy describes the role of long-range aviation when it is called on to support offensive operations of ground forces. He provides a simplistic view of its role in nuclear scenarios and does not consider combined air operations.

Rykachev asserts the rebasing of an air army of a reserve front may take place simultaneously with the forces of the reserve front or separately when the air army has to conduct combat actions before the reserve front is committed to an engagement. He only addresses the first case, but some of the rebasing planning factors seem likely to apply to both cases. The rebasing of the air army, according to the author, would take about five days and probably involve considerable ground transportation for its support equipment.

The analyst concludes the wartime role assigned to the tactical air forces in Central Europe during war was based on their early reinforcement from bases in the western USSR. The study asserts force requirements for some air operations exceed the number of aircraft located in Central Europe during peacetime and would require reinforcement during hostilities, which the analyst judges could probably be accomplished. The reinforced air forces are assigned roles in massive coordinated air attacks targeted primarily against NATO air forces and tactical nuclear assets during the initial phases of a conventional conflict in Europe.


Krasovskiy examines aviation capabilities and the problems of allocating air forces in conventional operations during which escalation to nuclear action is threatened. He defines the tasks of long-range and front aviation. He asserts the volume of tasks for aviation in the early stages of a war exceeds its combat capabilities. The author recommends increasing the strength of the air army of the front "within reasonable limits" and changing the relative proportion of types of aviation. He asserts the main efforts of aviation should be directed toward hitting enemy tactical aviation on basing airfields and enemy missiles. Air support of the front evidently would take a back seat until the foregoing efforts were completed. The author briefly examines problems of control from the standpoint of maintaining readiness for nuclear actions during a conventional operation. He does not discuss theater-strategic air operations as such.


This reporting discusses the role of air forces and air defense forces in the first days of a war. It describes readiness levels for an air army and its subunits and gives performance characteristics for the Su-20 [Fitter] and MiG-23 [Flogger] aircraft. Corrections to two charts are attached.


The authors examine three methods by which aviation may negotiate enemy air defenses, assess each, and make recommendations on the advisability of their employment. Lt. Col. Mezentsev discusses the establishment of flight corridors in the Western Theater for executing deep air strikes during initial operations of a war. Air supremacy is not addressed as such; rather the article focuses on striking key targets and avoiding exhausting Warsaw Pact air forces in the process.


The manual consists of an introduction and six chapters dealing with the overall organizational structure and general fundamentals of air and antimissile defense, the organization and planning of air defense operations and combat support, the conduct of combat actions, and the fundamentals of rear services support.


The manual contains an introduction and chapters dealing with general fundamentals of air transport
operations, preparing and conducting air operations of long-range aviation, combat operations of front aviation, and military transport aviation, all at the air army, corps, and division level.

The document is a nearly complete copy of a critique of a major combined Polish-Soviet multi-front-level exercise focusing on a Polish-led multinational front in conflict against the NATO Central Region forces. It reflects Warsaw Pact capabilities and problems as presented by Maj. Gen. Florian Siwicki, the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. The critique also offers a glimpse into some future equipment and organizational developments in the Polish forces. The title notwithstanding, most of the exercise addresses the challenges of nonnuclear warfare. For the first time [for the Poles], the exercise included the problem of committing an air army to air operations in the theater of military operations. Citing the effectiveness of Israeli air operations in the 1967 Six-Day War, the critique asserts a theater "air operation is the initial extremely important act of a conventional armed conflict" and described its inclusion in the exercise.

Bogza describes Soviet perceptions of the extent air defense will probably be encountered in a European operation. He discusses the methods of negotiating enemy air defenses as they apply to long-range, fighter and military transport aviation.

The lesson is the first of a new collection of 29 lectures, classified top secret, for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. This lecture is the first of 19 dealing with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons. It instructs students acting as air army commanders in the transition to offensive operations using conventional ordnance after preemptive NATO air strikes in East Germany. The scenarios include the target areas notionally struck by NATO and the main targets to be attacked by the Warsaw Pact air army. The lesson specifies the German airfields to be used by the air army and lists the hypothetical air army squadrons, regiments, groups and divisions of aircraft.

The report is a translation of a Polish document classified "secret, of special importance", from the Polish Ministry of Defense. The document specifies new arrangements for the inclusion of the aviation of Warsaw Pact fronts in the theater-wide strategic air operation directed by a Soviet theater commander. The report specifies forward bases for the Polish aviation of the front, the likely duration, area of coverage, size of the theater air forces involved, and projected number of sorties. The report further specifies that the Soviet 16th Air Army based in East Germany would support Polish air units when they redeployed to that country. Interestingly, the Polish commanders were denied permission to coordinate these arrangements directly with the commanders of the Soviet 16th Air Army.

The DCI-directed production of the IIM was in response to a request by the Secretary of Defense for an in-depth analysis of the readiness of the Soviet air forces. The memorandum examines a number of issues,
including the quality of personnel and equipment and the effectiveness of training. It focuses on those air force elements that would support theater operations.

Document VII-156. This number intentionally left blank.

The IC judges the Soviets considered the early attainment of air superiority and the destruction or neutralization of NATO theater nuclear forces critical to the Warsaw Pact's chances for victory in Europe. Focusing on NATO airbases as targets, the estimate describes the Soviet plan for the air war against NATO in Europe to include multiple, successive front operations supported by Strategic Air Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, and the Baltic Fleet, with a single high command. It also notes the Soviets would carry out attacks in the NATO Northern and Southern regions, to prevent NATO from shifting forces to Central Europe, with simultaneous air operations against key NATO airfield complexes in Norway in order to establish air superiority over the Norwegian Sea and reduce vulnerability of air and naval operations in the area.

Document VII-158. This number intentionally left blank.

The paper describes evidence from Soviet military writings showing the Soviets believed NATO air forces constituted the greatest threat to the success of a Warsaw Pact ground offensive in a conventional war in Central Europe. This, according to the writings, required establishing theater-wide air supremacy at the outset of war. The paper then describes the history of the Warsaw Pact plans to defeat NATO air forces, beginning in the mid-1970s, continuing through changes in those plans in the late 1970s, and through the changes in their force employment concepts and the reorganization of their forces in 1980–81. It assesses the problems the Soviets continue to face and projects future initiatives.

Document VII-160. This number intentionally left blank.

Document VII-161. This number intentionally left blank.

↑ BACK TO CHAPTER 7

DOCUMENTS ABOUT FORMAL MECHANISMS TO MANAGE THE WARSAW PACT

The following documents are clandestine reports and CIA analytic papers that focus mainly on the military issues relating to the Soviet management of the combined forces of the Warsaw Pact. Some analyses of political issues are also included because of obvious relevance to the Soviet's control of their Warsaw Pact allies.

The paper reports on the substance of the treaty, which was a renewal of a 20-year-old agreement, and describes the differences among the similar individual treaties of the other Warsaw Pact member nations.

The paper discusses Soviet control over the Warsaw Pact members. In particular, it addresses the significance of the organizational structure of the Warsaw Pact's Unified Command after the March 1969 meeting in Budapest when the "accords were agreed." Although evidence was more plentiful about the Unified Command in 1970, it was ambiguous and led to several alternative appreciations of the form of Soviet control in the Warsaw Pact. This paper is an alternative analysis that later evidence did not support.

**Document VII-164. The USSR and the Changing Scene in Europe, NIE 12-72, 26 October 1972.**
The IC describes the Soviet policy of détente and judges the policy had produced expectations in Eastern Europe of better relations with Moscow. The IC also judges the Soviets could face a choice between their objectives in Eastern Europe and those they envisioned with the West, particularly attempts to reduce the US presence in Europe versus their efforts to improve relations with the United States. The NIE concludes Moscow would have problems with the military aspects of its détente policy, particularly reducing its forces while maintaining its security.

The article is a comprehensive assessment of Soviet military communications. Stishkovskiy examines basic communications principles such as reliability, security, and survivability in the nuclear environment, and then makes recommendations for achieving these goals. He treats both procedural and technical improvements in practical terms, including sophisticated techniques such as molecular frequency stabilization and laser communications.

The report contains translations of Russian secret documents issued following the ninth meeting of the Warsaw Pact Military Council in Prague from 30 October to 1 November 1973. The documents are a good example of how the Soviets centralized and controlled the planning. They include a review of 1973 training and a directive for 1974, a schedule of combined exercises for 1974, and a report on the organization of rear services support for combined exercises.

The report is a translation of a secret Polish document about construction of Warsaw Pact command posts and a summary of the status of Polish mobile command posts.

The report is a translation of a secret Polish Ministry of National Defense document. It provides an outline of the mission and principal tasks of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces and its command elements. The attachment lists the institutions subordinate to the chief of the General Staff.

The document is a translation of a draft directive of the Polish Minister of National Defense. The directive describes the channels of command to be used in times of emergency and in wartime, including instructions for communication with the armed forces of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and East Germany.
The document is a translation of what appears to be an incomplete official draft by Directorate I of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, classified "secret of special importance." The proposals provide detailed information on existing and planned [1975–90] command and communications facilities, current and recommended budget figures, construction locations and schedules, equipment and staffing requirements, and conversion of peacetime installations to predesignated wartime roles.

The paper describes the history of Soviet-Polish relations after WW II and the Soviet policy for intervention in Polish internal affairs. It reviews past Soviet-Polish crises and concentrates on Soviet political and military reactions to them. It outlines how the past might shape Soviet decisions to intervene militarily in a future crisis.

The document contains translations of the official reports of the 16th session of the Warsaw Pact Military Council, including the draft agenda and recommendations covering topics of operational and combat training, the status of air reconnaissance and field air defense, and the standardization of weapons and equipment. The reports indicate that progress had been made in unification and standardization, but some delays in production of new weapons had occurred.

The document is a translation of a secret decision adopted by the Political Consultative Committee. The decision approved four statutes establishing the principal military organizations of the Warsaw Pact: the Committee of Defense Ministers; the Combined Armed Forces and the Combined Command; the Military Council and the Unified Air Defense System; and the Staff and Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces.

The document is a translation from Russian of one of four secret statutes establishing the military organizations of the Warsaw Pact governing peacetime activities. This statute establishes the Military Council as a consultative organ composed of the senior command personnel of the Combined Armed Forces. The function of the Military Council is to develop recommendations on the organization, training, combat readiness, and control of the Combined Armed Forces and on the development and introduction of weapons and equipment. It includes the functions of the council officials and a brief description of the procedures for adopting proposals within the Military Council and putting them into effect in the individual member countries.

The document is a translation of one of four secret statutes approved by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact on 17 March 1969 establishing the Committee of Defense Ministers and listing its functions.
The document is a translation of a secret statute approved by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Organization on 17 March 1969. It establishes the Unified Air Defense System of the Warsaw Pact member states and outlines the overall organization of the system.

The document is a translation from Russian of a statute defining the organization and functions of the Combined Armed Forces; delineates the authority and responsibilities of the CINC, deputy, and chief of staff; and outlines the activities of the Military Council, Staff, and Technical Committee. It also provides brief guidelines on the financial responsibilities of the members, with both manpower and contributions based on proportional representation.

The document is a translation of excerpts of a top secret speech delivered by the Combined Armed Forces First Deputy Chief of Staff, Gen. Semen Fedorovich Romanov, regarding the preparation of the draft of a statute to govern the wartime activities of the Combined Armed Forces and Combined Command. The statute recognizes two high commands in the western and southwestern theaters, delineates the authority and responsibilities of the respective CINCs and their staffs in centralized control, and defines their relationships with the national commands involved. Provisions were to be made for the coordination of troop control with staff work through the exchange of operations groups and representatives. Romanov's speech represents an extension of discussions on the reorganization of the Warsaw Pact military command structure approved at the 10th session of the Committee of Defense Ministers in November–December 1977.

The document is a translation of an official report of the 10th session of the Warsaw Pact Committee. It contains three Russian documents classified top secret or secret that include an agenda and resolutions on the unified air defense system, control organs of the ground forces, an improved structure of the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces, civil defense, and the standardization of weapons and equipment. The report of the Commander of Air Defense Forces provides the current status of the unified air defense system and plans for updating its weapons and equipment. The report of the CINC outlines the basic proposals for improving the organizational structure of the staff and other control organs of the Combined Armed Forces. The report also covers the current status of the unified air defense system and plans for updating its weapons and equipment.

The document is a translation of an official Polish memorandum classified secret. The memorandum provides the status and employment of Soviet tropospheric communications equipment and the construction and costs of the planned network. It refers to the information in Documents VII-180 below and should be read in conjunction with them.
The reporting is a translation of a Polish memorandum classified secret and addressed to the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. The memorandum outlines plans for the construction of a tropospheric communications network composed of 10 stations and six multiplex facilities that will connect Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces Headquarters and improve Polish military communications.

The key judgment of the assessment is that the Warsaw Pact had no permanent multinational command system similar to that of NATO. Each member nation controlled its own forces in peacetime, and in wartime the forces would come under the ultimate control of the USSR. The analyst was uncertain about how the transition would be accomplished and what command structure would be activated. The paper presents evidence about the development of the theater command concept, the Warsaw Pact command structure for war, Soviet proposals for peacetime theater commands, East European concerns, and military implications.

The memorandum is based on classified Warsaw Pact documents containing Soviet proposals for modernizing and standardizing the organization and weaponry of the Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces. The memo summarizes the proposals, assesses the likelihood of their implementation, and discusses the potential impact of the plans on Warsaw Pact ground forces and weapons development and procurement.

The letter describes the structure, content, and preparation deadlines for the proposed statute to govern the forces and their commands in wartime. The statute was to be ready for consideration by the Committee of Defense Ministers later in 1979. It tentatively consisted of at least five sections defining the wartime composition and mission of the Combined Armed Forces and Combined Naval Fleets, the roles of the theater high commands and the national commands, their functions, their relationships with the national commands, and logistic and technical support arrangements. The defense ministers were requested to provide their input by 1 March 1979.

The document is a translation of a secret Polish General Staff memorandum containing comments on a draft statute of the Combined Armed Forces for wartime. The comments of the Polish General Staff and Ministry of Foreign Affairs were critical to the point where many provisions were considered unacceptable. They strongly recommended that the provisions be excluded or revised. Polish objections mainly reflected deep concern over loss of party, political and economic control of the Polish Armed Forces during wartime subordination to the Soviet-dominated Supreme High Command. They also objected to the proposal that all political activity was to be centralized at the Combined Armed Forces level, rather than by national military and political organs.

The document is a translation of two "secret of special importance" Polish documents. The report provides information on requirements pertaining to construction, technology, utilization and operation of hardened control post installations.
The report contains a translation of a Polish document regarding the statute addressing the Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces. The document discusses the High Command directive on combat readiness, mobilization and expansion of Polish Armed Forces command structure, satellite reconnaissance, deliveries of new equipment, and communications problems.

The report contains a translation of top secret and secret documents of the 12th annual meeting of the Warsaw Pact Committee of Defense Ministers on 3–6 December 1979. It includes the agenda and summarizes the decisions adopted by the committee regarding the Romanian dissent to the draft statute governing the wartime organization and activities of the Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces. Other major decisions dealt with the establishment of a unified warning system of nuclear attacks, the allocation of industrial plant capacity for the wartime rehabilitation of weapons and combat equipment, and military-technical assistance to developing countries.

**Document VII-188. The Draft Statute on the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States and Their Command Organs for Wartime, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 11 April 1980 [DOI, 3-6 December 1979].**
The report is a translation of three top secret documents pertaining to the wartime organization and activities of the Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces. The first is the comments by CINC Kulikov on the contents of the statute, which the 12th session of the Warsaw Pact Committee of Defense Ministers approved over Romanian objections. The second document is the "Theses", which summarizes the main points of CINC Kulikov's report. The final document provides the legal basis for establishing two theater high commands under the overall leadership of a Supreme High Command based on the Soviet General Staff. The theater high commands were to control the committed forces in the western and southwestern theaters.

The paper describes the reorganization and newer weapons of the Czech and Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia. The analyst assesses that Soviet confidence in the reliability of the Czech forces had grown.

The document is a translation of a secret policy document by CINC Kulikov describing the structure of participating allied forces and the objectives of the exercise. He pointed out several weaknesses in the command and control systems, including delayed transmission and problems with reception and execution of combat orders that indicated deficiencies in training. Language barriers were persistent problems during the exercise.

The document is a translation of four top secret documents conveying the final ratified versions of the Wartime Statute for the Combined Armed Forces and associated Warsaw Pact memoranda. The documents showed the continuing dissatisfaction of Romania with the status quo in the Warsaw Pact: it failed to sign the statute; its ratification; and the decision to appoint Brezhnev as supreme commander.
The paper describes the political controls of the Soviet armed forces and the problems they created, including the impact on promotions, the failure to prevent discipline problems, and the gradual decrease in the percentage of party members.

The document is a Polish request to the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff for clarification of methods and forms of Warsaw Pact operational plans. The Poles raise questions on the role of the Combined Armed Forces Staff, the extent of coordination between the General Staffs of the Polish and Soviet Armed Forces and the Combined Armed Forces on command and control, storage of ammunition, and basing of Polish aircraft in East Germany. It seems strange that these questions were still relevant 25 years after the formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and implies that the Soviets never gave up a quest for control. Specifically it is emblematic of the problems posed by arbitrary Soviet moves to consolidate firm control of their allies’ armed forces.

The memorandum describes Soviet concern about the Polish situation. The author judges Moscow was seriously considering military intervention in Poland should a situation develop that the government could not control.

The report is a translation of a secret Polish document about conversations between Edward Giererek, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, and the Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces. The two men discussed the Combined Armed Forces wartime statute, the Polish proposal to hold a CSCE conference in Warsaw, the plan for developing the Polish Armed Forces during 1981–85, a bilateral protocol for Polish forces assigned to the Combined Armed Forces, and production of new types of weapons and equipment. The USSR was considering granting Poland a low-interest, long-term loan of over 1 billion rubles for weapons purchases from the USSR. Poland was interested in entering the Libyan arms market together with the USSR.

The paper was intended to warn the policy community that there might no longer be a full range of warning indicators during the one to two weeks before an actual Soviet invasion of Poland. This was because Soviet leaders might emphasize the need for tactical surprise when they lost confidence in the Polish regime and might feel pressured to react rapidly and forcefully. In that case, there might only be a day or two of advanced warning of an invasion.

The document is a translation of two secret letters. In the first, Marshal Kulikov advises that the portion of the cost assigned to Poland for construction of a command post in the USSR was to be used instead to build a hardened command post in Poland. In the second, Polish Minister of Defense Jaruzelski requests from Premier Pinkowski an affirmative answer to Kulikov's letter.
The report is a translation of a Polish document classified secret of special importance. Deriving its general legal status from a 1956 treaty, this accord provided for stationing of 62,000-66,000 Soviet troops temporarily in Poland—the Northern Group of Forces [NGF] of the Soviet Armed Forces—and stipulates how the Soviet commander was to report to the Polish Ministry of Defense on changes or movements.

This reporting describes the types of Soviet forces that had been stationed outside Warsaw for 15 years and the two lines of contact between the Soviet forces in Poland and Polish officials. The Soviet forces did not have good relations with the Polish General Staff but did have good relations with the staff's chief. The report describes a close working relationship between the Soviet forces and the Polish military districts.

The document is a translation from a Russian top secret memorandum to Marshal Kulikov from his military representative in Hungary, Col. Gen. Silchenko. It contains the views of Hungarian Minister of Defense Czinege and the issues he wanted to discuss with his Soviet counterpart during a visit to the USSR. The memorandum contains a list of Soviet-approved weapons the Hungarians were asked to purchase during the period 1982–85. Czinege believed the Hungarian military was being pressured to accept this list, and it included weapons that were too expensive and not modern enough. He also wanted to discuss the possibility of greater Hungarian input in drawing up armed forces development plans, a reorganization of the Hungarian troop control structure, increased bilateral contacts between various Warsaw Pact armies, and a more independent role for Hungary in military assistance cooperation with developing countries.

This reporting describes the organization of the Warsaw Pact, with explanatory comments provided by the source.

The report is a translation of a Polish document classified confidential. The report provides information on the goals, directions, tasks, and authority of party-political organs of Poland's Ministry of National Defense, military districts, and military units down to regiment and battalion levels.

This is the first estimate to address the subject of the reliability of Warsaw Pact forces after 1966. The IC examines the military reliability of the Warsaw Pact allies in the event of a major external crisis or war with NATO. The IC considers the roles of the NSWP armed forces in Soviet plans for war and assesses these forces. Annexes provide details on specific Soviet control measures, the importance of the NSWP allies in a European war, and implications for Western planners, including a selected list of NSWP vulnerabilities.

The source categorizes the Polish war games and drills by the level at which they were directed, the objectives, the methodology used, and the scale of participation. He describes strategic war games, strategic-operational exercises, front-level staff drills, operational and tactical exercises, the level of direction, participants, objectives, procedures, and the number to be held yearly, biannually, and in other time frames. He also describes national air defense exercises, "specialists" exercises, and a series of combined exercises with Warsaw Pact forces such as Soyuz, Zapad and Tarza.

This reporting discusses the leadership, tasks, and success of the party and political organs within the Hungarian People's Army during the period 1977–78.

This assessment is based on the Warsaw Treaty and the subsequent statutes on peacetime and wartime structures. The paper describes the history of the Warsaw Pact alliance as an instrument of Soviet control over the armed forces of Eastern Europe. It also describes the absolute control of Combined Armed Forces by the Soviet Supreme High Command and the possibility that it could deny the East Europeans a full voice in later stages of a crisis. The analyst judges that the Supreme High Command was not intended to expand Soviet control of the Warsaw Pact during peacetime. The paper describes similar organizations exercising control in the Western and Southwestern Theaters of Military Operations, including fleets and air defense units.

**Document VII-207.** This number intentionally left blank.

The article describes the procedures followed by a front political directorate in planning for front offensive operations. The author delineates the authority and responsibilities of political organs vis-à-vis the troops and the command structure throughout the planning and execution of a large-scale exercise.

This is an analysis of General Secretary Gorbachev's statement rejecting Soviet intervention in communist states. It includes Brezhnev's statement in *Pravda* on 13 November 1968 as well as Gorbachev's renunciation in its several forms in 1988. The report also describes the reactions of the Warsaw Pact countries and China to the announcement.

This is the author's reconstruction of the history of the IC's efforts to address one of the central analytic questions of the Cold War—whether and how well the NSWP military forces would fight for their Soviet masters in the event of a conflict.

↑ BACK TO CHAPTER 7

**DOCUMENTS ABOUT GENERAL STAFF AND OTHER SENIOR MILITARY ACADEMY LECTURES AND MANUALS**
This section contains a collection of classified Soviet information including some General Staff manuals and notes and copies of lectures at senior Soviet military academies, especially from the General Staff Academy. The manuals reflect the accepted military doctrine at the time they were published and served as the theoretical foundation of the formal lectures at the academies. Military doctrine evolved relatively fast in the 1960's and the later lectures reflected the changes perhaps even before new manuals were issued. Taken together, these reports offered invaluable insights into Soviet operational doctrine, tactics, organization for combat, and management of forces in war.

The lecture deals with requirements for automating control systems to increase the combat readiness and capabilities of the armed forces while increasing the efficiency of control and reducing the labor expended by command personnel. It provides a summary of possible areas for the application of automation. It specifically examines the use of computers in military districts, particularly in command-staff exercises.

The lecture is an overview of radioelectronic warfare and countermeasures applied to army and front offensive operations in the Western Theater. It emphasizes the importance of combining jamming with destruction by nuclear and conventional weapons. It provides details on organizing and planning radioelectronic warfare, the units involved, and their capabilities.

The lecture is a comprehensive presentation of prevailing views and principles for employing rocket troops and artillery in an offensive theater of military operations. Suntsovyy's main points were bringing rocket troops to full combat readiness, organizing and using rocket troops in a front offensive with an initial nuclear strike, and employing artillery in an operation. The lecture provided details on the role and tasks of rocket troops and artillery in nuclear and conventional operations, their targets, centralization of operational planning, and various deployment and attack procedures.

The lecture deals with organizing the rear services to provide timely and continuous support to front and army combat operations. The author discusses materiel, technical, and medical support procedures and capabilities, the organization of control, and the composition of rear service elements.

The lecture deals with preparing and conducting offensive operations without employing nuclear weapons. The lecture also covered general concepts and methods, procedures for planning and support, and organizing control.

The lecture covers the fundamentals of an army defensive operation, including the objectives and nature of defense, preparation and planning procedures, and the disposition of a defense.


The manual is intended as a basic guide for command personnel. It consists of an introduction and seven chapters detailing general principles, political work, principles of naval operations, the preparation and conduct of various naval operations, joint operations with ground forces, and fundamentals of rear services support. It reflects the established Soviet military doctrine under Khrushchev in the early 1960s which posited that war with the West would begin with a massive nuclear strike.


The document is a translation of a notebook of an officer who attended a course at the General Staff Academy. The topics covered include: strategic operations in a theater of military operations; the artillery of a front; TO&E of air defense units of a front; forces and means of the rear of a front; chemical defense troops of a front; ground forces, air forces, and nuclear warheads of the notional First Western Front; Air Defense Forces of the notional First Western Front; forces and operations of the Baltic Fleet in cooperation with the notional First Western Front; premise of war exercises; and defensive operations of an army.


The training document describes various combat operations of a combined-arms army, including the meeting engagement, the assault, crossing of water obstacles, breakthrough of an enemy defense, and border operations. The document also includes steps in planning and conducting these operations in nuclear and nonnuclear variants.


Petrenko describes the new curriculum that was implemented in the academy at the beginning of the 1965–66 academic year. The basic subject was general tactics and combined-arms combat, with more time devoted to modern strategic and operational weapons, equipment and techniques. Both nuclear and conventional warfare would be covered. A new subject would be warfare against enemy means of control, stressing automated troop control, cybernetics, and the use of computers. Training methodologies would be improved, and ideological training would retain its importance.


The document is a translation of a lecture prepared by Col. Gen. I.S. Glebov. Glebov assumes nuclear weapons would be employed in any future war on a limited or an unlimited basis. He addresses the importance of surprise and the need for preemptive nuclear strikes in Soviet planning. He sets forth the objectives, characteristics, and methods of conducting modern-day offensive operations at the front and army level.
The document is a translation of top secret 1977 lecture materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy. The materials comprehensively and systematically describe the organization and capabilities of the basic components of a Soviet front in an offensive operation in the Western theater. The document is a major contribution to the evolution of Soviet offensive doctrine. It reflects military plans for dealing with the perceived strengths and capabilities of opposing NATO theater forces at the operational and strategic levels. It provides a valuable and candid appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of a front in both nuclear and conventional environments. It also has a nontechnical assessment of the performance of missiles, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance forces and a detailed treatment of command and control.

The document is a General Staff Academy textbook prepared by approximately 20 members of the faculty. It deals systemically with all aspects of an offensive operation that are the direct responsibility of the front command. It is oriented toward the Western Theater of Operations and has no radical departures from previous doctrine. The offensive was expected to advance at a rate of 40 to 60 kilometers a day. Nuclear operations are discussed separately from conventional operations, but constant nuclear readiness is stressed. Logistics and control are subjects of entire chapters. There are statements on the offensive use of chemical and biological weapons and references to airborne assault units that are distinguished from the airborne landing forces and are associated with helicopter landings.

The lesson is for instruction of students acting as front chiefs of staff in planning an initial nuclear strike with 376 nuclear warheads in the area of NATO Northern Army Group.

The lesson instructs students acting as front chiefs of rocket troops and artillery in planning an initial nuclear strike with 360 nuclear missiles in the area of NATO Northern Army Group. It outlines tasks, NATO targets, the main axes of attack, Soviet missile and artillery strength, and allocation of nuclear missiles. It also outlines tasks, allocations and densities of artillery, and the time factors affecting the movement, deployment, and launch preparations for missiles units.

It presents a General Staff Academy lesson about the task of the nuclear planning group of a front staff to process computerized calculations and prepare and submit the conclusions and proposals needed by a commander to decide how to use nuclear weapons.

The lesson is on the role of front chiefs of staff in preparing and developing the operational directive for an offensive operation. It outlines the study references, the content of the directive, and the function of the lesson director.

The lesson involves the planning by the commander of the front air army for the initial nuclear strike, first massed conventional strike, and support for ground forces during a front offensive operation in the northern area of West Germany.

The lesson is a group exercise by students acting as front chiefs of rocket troops and artillery. They planned, including preparation and time factors, for initial and subsequent nuclear strikes in the northern area of West Germany.

The lesson involves planning for the electronic neutralization of NATO reconnaissance, communications, and control systems during a front offensive against the NATO Northern Army Group. It provides the types of electronic warfare targets that would be selected for nuclear attack and for electronic neutralization.

The lesson covers an assessment of NATO nuclear, ground, air, air defense and naval forces; Warsaw Pact covering forces and their functions; the role of the Combined Baltic Fleet; radioelectronic warfare; engineer preparation of the terrain; bridging and roads; air, air defense, and antitank forces and actions; movement and readiness time factors; camouflage; and force control measures.

The lesson deals in general terms with the formulation, development, content, electronic computer processing, evaluation, and employment of the mathematical model of a front offensive operation in its nonnuclear and nuclear stages.

The lesson addresses overall planning by a front chief of staff for an offensive in the area of the NATO Northern Army Group.

The lesson is a combination of individual study and a group exercise, the substance of which was the planning for reconnaissance in support of the front offensive against the NATO Northern Army Group.

**Document VII-235.** "General Staff Academy Lesson No. 1b: The Organization of the Work of the Front Field Headquarters in the Preparation of an Offensive Operation", CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 25 July 1980 [DOI, 1977]. The lesson is intended to instruct students about the role of directorate chiefs in front operations, emphasizing the organization, time factors, personnel allocation, and coordination of the planning for a front operation.

**Document VII-236.** "General Staff Academy Lesson No. 5: Study and Critique of The Decision of the Commander of the Combined Baltic Fleet on the Combat Actions of the Fleet's Forces in the Front Offensive Operation", CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 7 August 1980 [DOI, 1977]. The lesson broadly addresses, in the context of a front offensive operation, the overall mission; the strength in submarine, surface, and naval aviation in those areas; the specific tasks and NATO targets; the allocation and targeting of nuclear munitions; and the location of fleet control posts. The students acted as commanders of the Combined Baltic Fleet in an offensive in the Baltic and North Seas in cooperation with the Coastal Front.

**Document VII-237.** "General Staff Academy Lesson No. 8: Study and Critique of the Plan of the Amphibious Landing Operation, disseminated 14 August 1980 [DOI, on 1977]. The lesson deals with the content of a plan for an amphibious assault to be included in a front operation.

**Document VII-238.** "General Staff Academy Lesson No. 7b: Preparation and Critique of the Plan of the Combat Employment of the Rocket Troops and Artillery in the Front Offensive Operation: Planning the Combat Employment of Artillery", CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 14 August 1980 [DOI, 1977]. The lesson lays out the tasks of the artillery during the repulse of a NATO breakthrough of defensive lines and a subsequent deep offensive into the operational depth of NATO forces. It provides details about Warsaw Pact artillery densities and which NATO areas and combat units to attack.

**Document VII-239.** "General Staff Academy Lesson No.1d: Operational Calculations with the Use of an Electronic Computer to Determine the Capabilities of the Air Defense Forces and Means of the Front to Repel Massed Enemy Air Attacks", CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 22 August 1980 [DOI, 1977]. The lesson provides instructions in the use of the MINSK-32 computer to calculate air defense capabilities needed to repel a mass air strike from two different axes.

**Document VII-240.** "General Staff Academy Lesson No. 10: Preparation and Critique of the Plan of Air Defense in the Front Offensive Operation", CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 22 August 1980 [DOI, 1977]. The lesson outlines the steps to be followed by the front chief of air defense troops in planning and organizing the air defense of the front troops in an offensive operation in the northern area of West Germany.

**Document VII-241.** "General Staff Academy Lesson No. 20b: The Transition of Front Troops to the Offensive with the Simultaneous Repulse of the Enemy Invasion", CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 29 August 1980 [DOI, 1977]. The lesson describes a conventionally armed NATO air strike and ground invasion of East Germany and the actions taken and proposals made by a Soviet front commander, his army commanders, and important staff officers to repulse the invasion and initiate offensive actions in the northern part of West Germany.

The lesson involves the decision-making, planning, and instructions of a front commander for a front offensive operation with both conventional and nuclear weapons across the north German plain to the Netherlands and Belgium.


The lesson describes the condition and disposition of front forces in an offensive operation in the northern part of West Germany at the time of the commitment of the front second echelon to the battle. It focuses on the composition and use of forward and airborne control posts to control the commitment.


The lesson outlines the material covered by the chief of the front air defense troops in planning and organizing the employment of air defense troops when the front second echelon is to be committed to battle in an offensive operation against the NATO Northern Army Group.


The lesson outlines the tasks to be accomplished by engineer troops in support of the movement forward and commitment to battle of the tank army constituting a front second echelon in an offensive in the northern area of West Germany.


The lesson outlines the activities and contributions of a front commander, his key staff officers, and his air army and tank army commanders to develop an offensive operation for the second-echelon tank army when it is committed to battle across the northern area of West Germany.


The lesson is the first of a series. It outlines the overall situation, opposing orders of battle, and tasks to be dealt with by a Soviet front commander, his principal staff officers, and air army commander in conducting an offensive operation, with both conventional and nuclear weapons, across the North German plain to the Netherlands and Belgium against the NATO Northern Army Group.


The lesson provides details of a typical rocket troop and artillery order of battle for a front and the nuclear and fire destruction tasks to be accomplished when a second-echelon army is committed to battle in a front offensive across the northern area of West Germany.

The lesson involves a front deputy commander for the rear and his rear chief of staff in planning and organizing the transportation of supplies, treatment and evacuation of wounded and sick, movement forward of supply bases, and the ammunition, fuel, and food stuffs required to support the commitment to battle of a second-echelon tank army in the development of a front offensive across the northern part of West Germany.


The document contains reference materials used by students in planning and organizing reconnaissance in front offensive operations against the NATO Northern Army Group.


The lesson outlines the measures to be considered by a front operations directorate chief and chief of chemical troops in organizing and implementing the radiation, chemical and biological protection of the troops in a front offensive across the northern area of West Germany and into the Netherlands.


The lesson outlines the steps to be taken by an air army commander for the nonnuclear air preparation and support of a breakthrough of NATO defenses during a front offensive operation in West Germany.


The lesson outlines the tasks and resources of a front air army in supporting the first two days of battle in an operation against NATO's invading Northern Army Group. The main tasks were to reconnoiter for and destroy NATO's missile and nuclear means and to support and cover front ground forces.


The lesson sets forth the various tasks to be accomplished by front engineer troops: for example, the preparation of routes, river crossings, troop and firing positions, obstacles, and radar deception and camouflage measures in a front offensive operation across the northern area of West Germany.


The lesson involves students acting as the chief of a front's operations directorate in planning and organizing troop control in a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons against NATO forces.


The lesson provides details of the organization of the command and control organization of the command and
control communications facilities, units, and the equipment used by a **front** headquarters to control its major subordinate elements in a **front** offensive operation across the North German Plain to Belgium.

The lesson provides details about the conditions prompting the delivery of a front's initial nuclear strike, the proposals of the front chief of staff, and the front commander's modifications and amplifications of these proposals as they pertain to the allocation of nuclear missiles and bombs, the targets for the initial nuclear strike, and protective measures to be taken by front troops to lessen or counteract the effects of NATO's possible use of nuclear weapons in an offensive operation across the northern area of West Germany.

The lesson outlines the steps and factors involved in organizing the logistic support of a front in an offensive operation, including its materiel and fuel requirements, estimated combat casualties, and tank and vehicle repair and evacuation capabilities.

The lesson describes the procedures, time and distance factors, and aircraft and motor vehicles used in relocating a front's command, alternate command post, and rear control post during a front offensive operation in West Germany.

**Document VII-260.** "General Staff Academy Lesson No. 22a: Developing an Offensive Operation with the Commitment to Battle of the **Front**'s Second Echelon", CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 6 March 1981 [DOI, 1977].
The lesson outlines the points covered by a front chief of staff and front commander in estimating a situation, drawing up balances of forces, submitting proposals for the commitment to battle of the second echelon to encircle and destroy a major grouping of NATO ground forces, and in allocating conventional fire and air support for these combat actions in northern Germany.

The lesson outlines the decisions a front commander would make after hearing the reports of key staff officers on the order of battle of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

The lesson provides details about the organization and content of a front's initial nuclear strike with 167 missiles in the first launch against NATO forces in an offensive in northern West Germany.

**Document VII-263.** "General Staff Academy Lesson No. 25a: Restoring the Combat Effectiveness of the Troops, Eliminating the Aftereffects of the Employment of Weapons of Mass Destruction by the Enemy, and Developing the Operation", CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Special Report, 24 April 1981
The lesson describes the losses sustained by a front and by one of its armies after a NATO nuclear and toxic chemical agent strike, and the losses of NATO's Northern Army Group after the front's initial and follow-up nuclear strikes.


Document VII-265. "General Staff Academy Lesson No. 16: Preparing the Plan and Organizing Cooperation of the Front Troops in an Offensive Operation", CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Special Report, 1 May 1981 [DOI, 1977]. The lesson lays out the steps taken by a front commander; his chiefs of rocket troops, artillery and air defense troops; and air and ground army commanders in coordinating their actions, both nuclear and nonnuclear, in repulsing a NATO invasion, preempting a NATO nuclear strike, breaking through the defense of NATO's Northern Army Group, and committing a second-echelon army to battle.

Document VII-266. "General Staff Academy Lesson No. 27b: Engineer Support for the Front Troops' Assault Crossing of Water Obstacles from the March", CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Special Report, 15 May 1981 [DOI, 1977]. The lesson is a translation describing the tasking and allocation of front and army engineer units for reconnaissance, route preparation, and assault crossing of the Rhine, Maas, and Ijssel rivers for an offensive drive into The Netherlands. Of interest is the stress placed on the neutralization of NATO's radio control over nuclear and land mine detonations by front radioelectronic warfare units and jamming helicopters. Also worthy of note is the measure to prepare 13 dummy bridges, indicative of the importance of deception.


Document VII-268. "General Staff Academy Lesson No. 27a: Making the Decision for the Assault Crossing of a Wide Water Obstacle from the March", CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Special Report, 12 June 1981 [DOI, 1977]. The lesson provides an estimate of the situation and the tasking of a front's major ground and air elements, electronic neutralization units, and engineer troop units in an offensive drive against NATO's Northern Army Group, an assault crossing of the Rhine and Ijssel rivers in or close to the Netherlands, and the capture of the North Sea coast and northern Ruhr industrial area.

The lesson provides supplementary material for the lesson concerning the development of an offensive to encircle and destroy NATO ground forces in the northern area of West Germany.

The lesson is one of a new collection of 29 lectures, classified top secret, for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. It is the first of 10 of those lessons dealing with conducting an initial offensive employing only conventional weapons, with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. The lesson provides supplementary material used to instruct students acting as a front commander, his chiefs of intelligence, operations, and air defense troops, and his air army commander in presenting reports covering data on the enemy's situation and probable actions.

This is the second of ten lessons dealing with conducting an initial offensive employing only conventional weapons, with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This lesson was intended to instruct students acting as senior officers of a front operations directorate and as chiefs of the intelligence directorate in the preparation of the front's air operational summary.

The lesson contains seven short reports by the commander of the Coastal Front and his principal staff officers on initiating an offensive operation with both conventional and nuclear weapons against NATO's Northern Army Group.

Document VII-274. "General Staff Academy Supplementary Material for Lesson No. 1s: Reports by the Commander and Chief of Staff of the Combined Baltic Fleet", CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 8 February 1982 [DOI, 1977].
The lesson contains two reports by a Soviet naval commander and the chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact's Combined Baltic Fleet on proposed actions for the fleet in the North and Baltic Seas in support of the Coastal Front's ground forces offensive operation in northern Germany.

↑ BACK TO CHAPTER 7

DOCUMENTS ABOUT WARSAW PACT EXERCISES

This section contains a selection of military-exercise or war-game-related reports. In the aggregate this information forms the basis for many important analytic judgments about the organization and management of the Warsaw Pact forces arrayed against NATO and the essence of Warsaw Pact war plans. Some singularly important war game information is listed in the Warsaw Pact war planning section. For an authoritative and exhaustive presentation about the importance of Warsaw Pact exercises by a source in a position to know, see Documents VII-324, VII-325, VII-326 and VII-328 at the end of this section.
The document is a translation of a secret Polish General Staff schedule of national and Warsaw Pact exercises involving Polish military forces in 1974.

The reporting is a translation of two secret Polish Ministry of National Defense documents. One is a memorandum from the Polish Minister of Defense to the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party [the Polish Communist Party] on the general participation of Soviet and East German forces, the areas included in the exercise—both conceptual and actual—and some of the tasks related to the movement of Soviet forces and supplies through Poland. The memorandum also provides details about Polish participation and designates a Polish officer as deputy to the chief of the training exercise for Polish Army "matters" and who actually participated in the exercise. The second document is a translation of the end-of-exercise report to the Polish Minister of Defense from the Polish officer who participated in the exercise. It recommends incorporating a new "organizational structure" of rear services for Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces by Polish forces. Both the shortcomings in Russian language competence by Polish troops and in collaboration among the various forces continued unresolved during the period, the rosy ending of the report notwithstanding.

The document is a translation of a secret Polish Ministry of National Defense document. According to the critiques, the first phase of the exercise, which took place 16-19 April 1973, involved the progression through states of readiness of both the military and civilian components of the forces and infrastructure. The period lasted for 11 days. The second phase, military operations including movement to the front, began the next day and was accomplished while ground conflict in Germany was under way and Poland was under air attack. The exercise examined likely disruptions in the national economic system and the mobilization process. Unfortunately the details of the exercise were not discussed.


The document consists of summaries of Warsaw Pact exercises: Soyuz-72, Val-72, Vesna-72, and Elektron, a joint Soviet-Polish exercise, and ATKA-72, an East German Exercise.

Stakh examines several aspects of the planning, organization, and provision of communications in the combined operational-tactical exercise Shield-72. A unified communications system was used, which involved
civilian facilities and personnel, but did not require exchanging military communications personnel and equipment with participating allies.


The article reviews eight exercises held in different Warsaw Pact countries in early 1971.

**Document VII-282.** Discussion of "Jesien II-73" Exercise by Chief of the Polish General Staff, Major General Florian Siwicki, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 21 May 1975 [DOI, September 1973].

General Siwicki reviews the threat to the socialist system and the requirement of the Polish armed forces to protect the transit zone for the support of the combat operations of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. He then used his critique of the "Jesien II-73" exercise, which was designed to test the effectiveness of the coordinated command of all Polish air defense forces, to demonstrate where improvements should be made.


The article reviews the results of the Soyuz-73 war game for ground forces, air defense, and naval staffs of Romanian, Bulgarian and Soviet forces. The game included planning an initial nuclear strike, the restoration of combat effectiveness, and the development of an offensive in the operational depth.


The article reviews the results of seven exercises held by Warsaw Pact forces in 1973: Bashty-73 command-staff exercise in Hungary; Sever-73 combined two-stage army command-staff exercise in East Germany; Fevral-73 multilevel command-staff exercise involving elements of the Polish armed forces and Belorussian Military District; the Neytron-73 combined front command-staff exercise with communications in Czechoslovakia; a combined-arms tactical exercise in the Silesian Military District of Poland; an allied naval exercise and roadstead assembly in the Black Sea; and a combined naval exercise in the Baltic.


This article summarizes the results of recent combined tactical exercises involving communications troops. The author reviews typical problems, such as the setting up of lines, distribution of frequencies, training requirements, radio camouflage and protective measures, proper installation and operation, jamming and countermeasures.

Semerdzhiyev describes the Tundzha-72 combined exercise held in Bulgaria with the participation of Romanian ground and air elements. The exercise included combined long-distance marches, the crossing of a forward security zone, a breakthrough of a fortified area, reconnaissance, and night combat actions.


Khupalovski deals with various aspects of command-staff exercises conducted on maps and in the field with communications means. He explores the advantages of using skeleton troops in exercises in the field and ways of improving cooperation in combined operations with other Warsaw Pact forces.


The exercise, described in this report, includes skeleton forces from East Germany, Poland and the USSR. The objectives were to gain supremacy in the Baltic Sea and to assist a coastal front. The report identified the specific targets, examined the organization and cooperation among the participating fleets, and described the situation and the decisions of the commanders involved at the three stages of the exercise. It also provided a brief outline of combat actions and stressed the need to master control under radioelectronic warfare conditions and to automate the entire control process.


The document is a translation of a Polish military document. Part I lists the themes of Polish armed forces training exercises. Part II is the schedule for exercises to be conducted during 1976 by the Polish armed forces and by Warsaw Pact forces with Polish participation.


The authors review the Soyuz-74 command-staff exercise held in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in May 1974 covering defensive operations, an assault-crossing of the Danube River, and restoration of the combat effectiveness of troops following a nuclear attack. Tactical exercises repaired and rehabilitated military equipment, restored and decontaminated railroad installations and equipment, reconstructed a rail line, and assembled a highway bridge. Another exercise dealt with the seizure and destruction of nuclear land mines.


Remek criticizes the lack of field firing and jamming experience among the inadequacies of air defense training, which caused the training to fall short of requirements. To remedy the situation, future plans called for conducting regular exercises under complex conditions.

Rusov reviews the Shield-72 combined operational-tactical exercise held in Czechoslovakia in September 1972 with forces from East Germany, Poland, Hungary and the USSR. He outlines the political and operational-tactical training goals and describes a combined conference to determine preliminary groundwork and the planning and preparatory work. The exercise was two-sided and conducted in three phases. Problems worked out included an assault crossing of the Elbe River, negotiation of obstacles, operations with nuclear weapons, and airborne landings.


The exercise was held in central and western Poland in early September 1976. The theme of the one-sided, multilevel command staff exercise was to repel an enemy invasion and conduct an offensive, including repelling a counterthrust, encircling an enemy group, assault crossing water obstacles, and landing airborne forces. The "Eastern" forces were the Northern Front with forces from Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany and the USSR in opposition to the Northern Army Group with the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force.


The document is a translation of a Polish General Staff report, *Attaining Full Combat Readiness in an Alert Area by the 13th Mechanized Regiment*. The exercise, which took place on 6 June 1975, was apparently a "tragically" confused, ineptitude, and a lack of discipline. The report has a detailed TO&E of a Polish mechanized regiment.


The report is a translation of a secret Russian message dated 25 August 1976 that conveys the comments of the CINC of the Combined Armed Forces on command-staff exercises held in Hungary and East Germany in July 1976. He describes the training problems covered in the exercises and the deficiencies revealed in maintaining cooperation between air and ground forces and in assessing the balance of forces.


The report is a translation of a September 1976 Polish Ministry of National Defense document classified secret. The exhaustive report included scenarios and schedules for the exercise and details of the Polish, Czech, East German and Soviet units, including locations, TO&Es, and operations plans.


The document is a translation of a Polish document classified secret. It reviews the scenario and recounts the specific "episodes" to be played out at various training areas. The document describes the use and effects of nuclear weapons by and on both sides.

The document discusses the ideological and political context within which the exercise was conducted. It also provides a review of the purposes of the exercise, how the exercise was conducted, and the results of the various operations carried out in the exercise. The author compares Warsaw Pact capabilities with those of NATO and emphasizes efforts to counter anticipated NATO moves and advantages. The Minister concludes the exercise demonstrated the success of efforts to unify the Warsaw Pact armies and standardize their equipment.


The document is a translation of the title and unit abbreviations appearing on a Polish military map used in the ZIMA-75 exercise. The map is titled "Plan for Control of the Combat Readiness of National Air Defense, Antiaircraft, Air and Naval Forces Participating in the Exercise 'ZIMA[winter]-75'."


The document provides information about the Soviet General Staff's planning for a major strategic command-staff exercise in mid-March 1977. The exercise was to involve the armed forces staffs of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany and commence on 21 May 1977. It was intended to be on an unprecedented scale, with Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov in charge. The report also provides information on the Combined Baltic Fleet exercise conducted 27 June to 7 July 1977.


Shtrelets describes East German experience in conducting and participating in combined exercises with other Warsaw Pact forces.


The document is a guide classified secret and approved by the CINC of the Combined Armed Forces in November 1975 for the instruction of those forces. It describes how to organize and conduct combined exercises involving ground, airborne, naval, air defense, tactical air forces, and communications troops. It was intended to serve as a handbook for senior personnel and their staffs who set up and directed the exercises beginning 1 January 1976.


The article provides a brief review of the guide contained in Document VII-302.

The article describes the success the Bulgarian Army had in increasing efficiency in training commanders and staffs to meet present-day demands through theoretical investigations and experimental command-staff exercises at various levels.


The article, in this clandestine report, examines a variety of tactical-special exercises carried out by the Bulgarian Army during the Tranzit-74 command-staff rear services exercise aimed at ensuring the successful accomplishment of tasks involving materiel, medical, transport, and technical support of troops in an offensive operation involving a nuclear attack by the enemy and its aftereffects.


Morots provides the chronology and methodology involved in preparing and conducting command-staff and tactical exercises in the Hungarian Army.


Mitev discusses the role of the operations groups in combined operations. He covers, for example, some of the difficulties of control, forms, and content of combat documents and the organization of communications.


Tanev discusses several basic problems with the methodology for preparing and conducting a combined command-staff exercise of socialist armies based on the experience accumulated to date.


Pastushenko outlines the functions of the road troops and the role they played in the tactical special exercise of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District of the Soviet Army in June 1972.

publication, *Information Collection of the Headquarters and Technical Committee of the Combined Arm-

Blagut describes tactical exercises with field firing conducted by the Czechoslovak People's Army. He provides some detail on methods and equipment.


Komarov addresses communications problems that occur during combined exercises of the Warsaw Pact allies resulting from the different systems and equipment and from the language differences among the Warsaw Pact allies. The author proposes possible solutions including using a common communications system, leasing channels of state communications networks, and inserting personnel who know the appropriate language in the crews of terminal stations.


The document reveals some important high command relationships in the Warsaw Pact in the context of multitheater military operations.


The document is a written notice from Marshal of the Soviet Union N. Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to General of Arms F. Siwicki, chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, alerting him to the Warsaw Pact combined staff training exercise, 5-7 April 1978. The purpose of the exercise was to practice control of the armed forces between H-hour and H+12 hours.


The document is a scenario developed by the Directing Staff of the Polish Ministry of National Defense. It describes a large-scale NATO attack on the Warsaw Pact using conventional means. It describes a Warsaw Pact combined-forces counterattack with heavy losses. A situation map outlines NATO and Polish dispositions, orders of battle, and movement of forces. Loss statistics are included for the Polish forces and industrial plants engaged in defense work.


The secret memorandum is from the CINC of the Combined Armed Forces to Warsaw Pact defense ministers reporting on the SOYUZ-78 operational-strategic command-staff map exercise held in Romania in March 1978. The exercise involved the Bulgarian and Romanian Defense Ministers and staff officers and Combined and Soviet Armed Forces personnel, who worked on the control and support of coalition groupings within the context of a strategic operation, centrally directed by a high command in the Southwestern Theater. The lessons learned from the exercise were that improvement was needed in operational training, particularly for joint airborne-amphibious landings, the employment of nuclear weapons, and radioelectronic warfare.

March 1977].
Arsenyev sets out the broad details of the large-scale Soyuz-77 command-staff exercise held in March 1977 in Hungary and Czechoslovakia with the participation of Soviet, Hungarian, and Czech commanders and staffs. It describes the thorough preparation for the exercise, training of commanders, staffs, umpires, and research groups; conducting the exercise; playing out enemy and friendly air actions; and research on controlling coalition forces.

Siwicki examines the Shield-76 combined operational-tactical exercise of the Combined Armed Forces. He outlines the exercise theme and the play-out of its stages and discusses the conclusions drawn from the exercise.

Molczyk describes the methods used in exercises by the Polish Armed Forces for the preparation, insertion, and flow of realistic intelligence information on the probable enemy.

The memorandum addresses combat readiness, re-equipment of forces, airfield construction, assignments to front and army levels, operational command point system, linkage of military communications with the national networks, introduction of a uniform automated command system, coordination of rear services support, theater air operations, and supporting fires.

The document is a translation of extracts from a Polish document describing a Warsaw Pact exercise codenamed Center. It was conducted in East Germany under the direction of Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov in November 1978. It includes information about a new system of command introduced with the appointment of General Petrov to the position of CINC of the Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations. It describes the expansion of the Albatross installation, a hardened command center, being built for the commander of the Western Theater of Operations in Poland.

Sarychev summarizes the purpose, preparation, organization, general features, conduct, and analysis of a number of large-scale combined-command-staff exercises conducted in 1977 by Warsaw Pact ground, naval, air, and air defense forces. He describes the value of the exercises.

Document VII-322. "Features of the Preparation and Conduct of Tactical Exercises on Mountain-Forest Terrain", a Warsaw Pact journal article, by Col. C. Basalic from a secret Soviet publication, Information
Basalic provides comprehensive recommendations for the conditions, troop composition, and training required to prepare for and conduct tactical exercises in mountain forest terrain.

The authors outline and draw conclusions about the organization and methods involved in rear services support to the national armies and individual large units comprising a coalition front during the Tranzit-77 operational rear services command-staff exercise. They describe some continuing serious difficulties performing support for a multinational front. They recommend levels of materiel necessary to continue operations at the front, army, and division levels.

The document explains that Warsaw Pact military exercises contain important elements of actual operational war plans, but many aspects of the exercises are deliberately distorted. Large-scale exercises of the type announced under the Helsinki Accords are carefully rehearsed demonstrations of Warsaw Pact unity and strength and bear little relation to war plans. The Wiosna-69 [Spring-69] scenario, however, did accidentally include information from Soviet war plans.

This reporting contains information about the war plans of the Polish Armed Forces. The source describes the security precautions taken to protect the war plans, including limiting access to the National War Plan, and describes the procedures for implementing the plans.

This reporting describes the Soviet plan to employ at least six fronts under the direction of the CINC of the Strategic Grouping of Forces within the Western Theater of Military Operations for a war with NATO in the Central European region. The Soviet and national forces based in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany will comprise the first-echelon fronts, and the second-echelon fronts will be formed by forces in the western military districts of the USSR.

The article is a translation from the Russian. Zemskov describes the basic functions, content, and problems of the principal open-source and classified journals published for the Soviet armed forces. He explains the journals are important for raising military professionalism and for ideological indoctrination of Soviet military personnel. The journals focus on all aspects of military science, including military doctrine, tactics, operational art, strategy, troop control problems, World War II experiences, and military training theory.

The source provides an in-depth study of long-term and short-term planning, preparation, operation, and evaluation of Warsaw Pact exercises. The second section describes the various exercise series. A subsection
discusses large-scale exercises and explains the purpose and nature of each exercise series. The paper also includes an explanation of the purpose and nature of each exercise series.

43 The National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) have been produced with input from throughout the Intelligence Community for the Director of Central Intelligence. During the period 1977-1981 they were produced in the National Foreign Assessment Center of CIA.

44 The NATO Guidelines Area includes the territory of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

↑ BACK TO CHAPTER 7