The National Military Strategy of the United States of America

2011
Redefining America’s Military Leadership
The **purpose** of this document is to provide the ways and means by which our military will advance our enduring national interests as articulated in the 2010 National Security Strategy and to accomplish the defense objectives in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 charges the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the responsibility of assisting the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction for the Armed Forces. In consultation with the geographic and functional Combatant Commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we prepared this document to provide my best military advice.

Our **vision** is a Joint Force that provides military capability to defend our Nation and allies, and to advance broader peace, security, and prosperity. Our military power is most effective when employed in support and in concert with other elements of power as part of whole-of-nation approaches to foreign policy. This strategy is designed to meet the expectations of the American people that their military reflect the best of this great Nation at home and abroad.

This **National Military Strategy** emphasizes how the Joint Force will redefine America’s military leadership to adapt to a challenging new era. It identifies trends in the strategic environment, explains how we will address them, and articulates regional and functional capability priorities. This strategy will serve as the foundation for the annual Chairman’s Risk Assessment. While acknowledging that hard near-term choices must be made in light of broader economic constraints, it places a clear priority on our people and their families as they are the truly indispensable elements of any strategy.

This strategy advances three broad themes. First, in supporting national efforts to address complex security challenges, the Joint Force’s leadership approach is often as important as the military capabilities we provide. Second, the changing security environment requires the Joint Force to deepen security relationships with our allies and create opportunities for partnerships with new and diverse groups of actors. And third, our Joint Force must prepare for an increasingly dynamic and uncertain future in which a full spectrum of military capabilities and attributes will be required to prevent and win our Nation’s wars.

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I. Introduction.

The ongoing shifts in relative power and increasing interconnectedness in the international order indicate a strategic inflection point. This requires America’s foreign policy to employ an adaptive blend of diplomacy, development, and defense. While the strength of our military will continue to underpin national security, we must continuously adapt our approaches to how we exercise power. Leadership is how we exercise the full spectrum of power to defend our national interests and advance international security and stability.

Our Nation’s security and prosperity are inseparable. They are sustained by our values and leadership in the international order. In this interdependent world, the enduring interests of the United States are increasingly tied to those of other state and non-state actors. The complexity of this global system and the challenges therein demand that we – the Joint Force – think anew about how we lead.

In support of our civilian-led foreign policy, this strategy acknowledges the need for military leadership that is redefined for an increasingly complex strategic environment. Our leadership will emphasize mutual responsibility and respect. Accomplishing this strategy will require a full spectrum of direct and indirect leadership approaches – facilitator, enabler, convener, and guarantor – sometimes simultaneously.

Leveraging our capabilities and forward presence, we must play a supporting role in facilitating U.S. government agencies and other organizations’ efforts to advance our Nation’s interests. In some cases, we will serve in an enabling capacity to help other nations achieve security goals that can advance common interests. As a convener, our relationships, values, and military capabilities provide us, often uniquely, with the ability to bring others together to help deepen security ties between them and cooperatively address common security challenges. Lastly, we will be prepared to act as security guarantor – preferably with partners and allies, but alone if necessary – to deter and defeat acts of aggression. For all of these leadership approaches, we will pursue wider and more constructive partnerships.

Let us not forget, the Nation remains at war abroad to defend against and defeat threats to our homeland. Our foremost priority is the security of the American people, our territory, and our way of life. In the current operational environment, this means each component of our Joint Force will remain aligned to achieve success in our ongoing campaign in Afghanistan and security cooperation efforts with Pakistan, and against violent extremism worldwide. We must continue to prevent attacks against the United States and its allies, strengthen international and regional security, and be prepared to
deter and defeat aggression that would undermine international stability as we fight these campaigns.

We must carefully manage the impact of the wars on our military – especially our people – and shape our military for the future. Defense budget projections indicate that leaders must continue to plan for and make difficult choices between current and future challenges. We underestimate at our peril the stresses of sustained combat operations on our equipment and people. Likewise, potential adversaries who underestimate our continued military strength and will to protect our national interests do so at their peril.

II. Strategic Environment.

Overview – The United States remains the world’s preeminent power, even as a growing number of state and non-state actors exhibit consequential influence. This changing distribution of power indicates evolution to a "multi-nodal" world characterized more by shifting, interest-driven coalitions based on diplomatic, military, and economic power, than by rigid security competition between opposing blocs. There are global and regional powers exhibiting nationalism and assertiveness that tests our partners’ resilience and U.S. leadership. There exist in Asia two rising global powers and a large number of consequential regional powers. The Middle East features a number of emerging and influential regional powers. Dynamics in Asia and the Middle East, in particular, may challenge regional stability.

Demographic Trends – The world will become more populated and urbanized. Global population will increase by approximately 1.2 billion and there will be more than a billion new urban dwellers by 2025. Most population growth will occur in the developing world. Conversely, in Europe and parts of Asia, populations are projected to decline and age with long term impacts to the global share of their economic output. Population growth and urbanization in the Middle East, Africa, and South Central Asia will contribute to increased water scarcity and may present governance challenges. The uncertain impact of global climate change combined with increased population centers in or near coastal environments may challenge the ability of weak or developing states to respond to natural disasters.

Prosperity and Security – The United States will remain the foremost economic and military power for the foreseeable future, though national debt poses a significant national security risk. Asia will increase its regional share of global wealth. Though it faces a number of domestic challenges, continuation of
China’s decades-long economic growth is expected to facilitate its continued military modernization and expansion of its interests within and beyond the region. Other states in Asia, too, are becoming more militarily capable as they grow more prosperous. NATO will remain the most powerful military alliance, though some of its states are reducing defense spending as part of broader austerity measures. These reductions may impact partner nations’ contributions to our collective security. Energy-state relationships will intersect geopolitical concerns as state-run companies will control an increasing share of the world’s hydrocarbon resources and the persistent challenge of resource scarcity may overlap with territorial disputes.

**Weapons of Mass Destruction** – The intersection between states, state-sponsored, and non-state adversaries is most dangerous in the area of WMD proliferation and nuclear terrorism. In Asia, North Korea’s nuclear capability and potentially unstable transition of power poses a risk to regional stability and international non-proliferation efforts. In the Middle East, a nuclear armed Iran could set off a cascade of states in the region seeking nuclear parity or increased conventional capabilities; that could lead to regional conflict. The prospect of multiple nuclear armed regimes in the Middle East with nascent security and command and control mechanisms amplifies the threat of conflict, and significantly increases the probability of miscalculation or the loss of control of a nuclear weapon to non-state actors.

**Global Commons and Globally Connected Domains** – Assured access to and freedom of maneuver within the global commons – shared areas of sea, air, and space – and globally connected domains such as cyberspace are being increasingly challenged by both state and non-state actors. Non-state actors such as criminal organizations, traffickers, and terrorist groups find a nexus of interests in exploiting the commons. States are developing anti-access and area-denial capabilities and strategies to constrain U.S. and international freedom of action. These states are rapidly acquiring technologies, such as missiles and autonomous and remotely-piloted platforms that challenge our ability to project power from the global commons and increase our operational risk. Meanwhile, enabling and war-fighting domains of space and cyberspace are simultaneously more critical for our operations, yet more vulnerable to malicious actions. The space environment is becoming more congested, contested, and competitive. Some states are conducting or condoning cyber intrusions that foreshadow the growing threat in this globally connected domain. The cyber threat is expanded and
exacerbated by lack of international norms, difficulties of attribution, low barriers to entry, and the relative ease of developing potent capabilities.

Non-state Actors – State-sponsored and non-state actors complicate deterrence and accountability by extending their reach through advanced technologies that were once solely the domain of states. They are using technology to coordinate and operate globally to spread extremist ideologies and attack the United States and our allies. States with weak, failing, and corrupt governments will increasingly be used as a safe haven for an expanding array of non-state actors that breed conflict and endanger stability, particularly in Africa and the broader Middle East. Terrorists, criminal networks, and pirates undermine the rule of law, perpetuate and accelerate violence in the international system, and challenge states’ ability to respond.


U.S. foreign policy and the international security architecture must continue to adapt to this dynamic security environment. The 2010 National Security Strategy reaffirmed America’s commitment to retaining its global leadership role and defined our enduring national interests:

- The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;
- A strong, innovative and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
- Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and
- An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) took an important step towards institutionalizing reform in the Defense Department and rebalancing the urgent needs of today with preparation for future challenges. The QDR also defined the main elements of U.S. force structure and provided a construct for sizing and shaping the Joint Force to accomplish the Nation’s defense objectives. The Nuclear Posture Review addressed these areas with respect to nuclear forces.

The NSS and QDR guide the establishment of our National Military Objectives:

- Counter Violent Extremism
- Deter and Defeat Aggression
- Strengthen International and Regional Security
- Shape the Future Force
In pursuing these objectives, America’s Joint Force makes critical contributions to U.S. leadership and national security. The United States, allies, and our partners will often compete with others for influence in an environment where persistent tension is the norm. In conjunction with U.S. diplomatic efforts, we seek to prevent this tension from escalating into conflict. This requires America’s Joint Force possesses the reach, resolve, and ability to project decisive military power.

However, military power alone is insufficient to fully address the complex security challenges we face. Military power and our Nation’s other instruments of statecraft are more effective when applied in concert. Trends in the strategic environment do not suggest this will change. In this multi-nodal world, the military’s contribution to American leadership must be about more than power – it must be about our approach to exercising power. And regardless of our leadership approach, we must always demonstrate our core values through the persuasive power of example.

A. Counter Violent Extremism.

There are no more vital interests than the security of the American people, our territory, and our way of life. This is why we are at war in South Central Asia, the epicenter of violent extremism. Afghanistan is where al Qaida, given sanctuary by the Taliban, planned the attacks that murdered more than 3,000 innocent people on 11 September 2001. Al Qaida senior leadership remains in Pakistan and intends to continue to attack the United States, allies, and our partners.

The Nation’s strategic objective in this campaign is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaida and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan and prevent their return to either country. Success requires the Joint Force to closely work with NATO, our coalition partners, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. We will continue to erode Taliban influence, work with the Afghan government to facilitate reintegration and reconciliation of former insurgents, continue to strengthen the capacity of Afghan security forces, and enable Pakistan to ultimately defeat al Qaida and its extremist allies.
The threat of violent extremism is not limited to South Central Asia. Groups such as Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and others emanate from Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere around the globe. Terrorists’ abilities to remotely plan and coordinate attacks is growing, sometimes facilitated by global illicit trafficking routes, extending their operational reach while rendering targeting of their sanctuaries more difficult. Undeterred by the complexity of terrorist networks and in concert with our Allies and partners, we will be prepared to find, capture, or kill violent extremists wherever they reside when they threaten interests and citizens of America and our allies.

While such operations disrupt in the short-term, they cannot be decisive and do not constitute a viable long-term strategy for combating extremism. We must continue to support and facilitate whole-of-nation approaches to countering extremism that seek and sustain regional partnerships with responsible states to erode terrorists’ support and sources of legitimacy. Military power complements economic development, governance, and rule of law – the true bedrocks of counterterrorism efforts. In the long run, violent ideologies are ultimately discredited and defeated when a secure population chooses to reject extremism and violence in favor of more peaceful pursuits.

We will strengthen and expand our network of partnerships to enable partner capacity to enhance security. This will help reduce potential safe-havens before violent extremism can take root. We will nest our efforts to build partner capacity with broader national security priorities, consolidate our institutional processes, and improve coordination across agencies. Military-to-military relationships must be reliable to be effective, and persevere through political upheavals or even disruption.

We will adapt deterrence principles to our efforts in countering extremists. Though terrorists are very difficult to deter directly, they make cost/benefit calculations and are dependent on states and other stakeholders we are capable of influencing. When directed, we will provide capabilities to hold accountable any government or entity complicit in attacks against the United States or allies to raise the cost of their support. And we must take further steps to deny terrorists the benefits they seek through their attacks. We will, on order, be prepared to respond to any attack across the full spectrum of military capabilities with an appropriate and measured response at a time and place of our Nation’s choosing.
As we conduct this difficult campaign, we will employ military force in concert with other instruments of power and in a precise and principled manner. Precise does not mean perfect, and principled does not mean uncompromising. But we must recognize the inherent complexity in war among peoples. The risk we assume by minimizing collateral damage to innocents is balanced by a reduction of risk to turning even more people against our broader mission. Thus, the disciplined application of force is consistent with our values and international law, increases our chances of strategic and operational success, and more effectively advances national policy.

**B. Deter and Defeat Aggression.**

Preventing wars is as important as winning them, and far less costly. A prosperous and interconnected world requires a stable and secure environment, the absence of territorial aggression or conflict between states, and reliable access to resources and cyberspace for stable markets. Conventional or unconventional conflict between states interrupts commerce and triggers market volatility. Instantaneous information systems and the global economy’s interconnectedness exacerbate and amplify these effects. In our role as security guarantor, and in concert with our allies and partners whenever possible, the Joint Force will be prepared to deter and defeat regional aggression that would threaten our national interests.

*Deter Aggression:* The United States seeks the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. However, as long as nuclear weapons exist, deterring nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners will continue to be the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons. In support of the President’s vision, we will reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons, while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent. The Joint Force will provide capabilities to deter aggression and assure our allies and partners through our nuclear arsenal and overseas missile defense capabilities. We will continue to lead in advancing Ballistic Missile Defense capabilities against limited attacks and we seek opportunities for cooperation with allies and partners in this area.

We will counter WMD proliferation as it presents a grave and common threat to our Nation and others. Working through institutions, alliances and coalitions, we will dismantle proliferation networks, interdict movement of materials, further improve nuclear forensics capabilities, and secure nuclear, chemical, and biological materials.
worldwide. We will help allies and partners to develop WMD detection and elimination capabilities to protect their own populations. Combatant Commanders shall conduct prudent planning and be prepared to eliminate sources of WMD, providing the President with an array of options for military action when and where necessary.

We must also maintain a robust conventional deterrent. Deterrence and assurance requires the ability to rapidly and globally project power in all domains. In turn, force posture – both rotational and forward based – shall be geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable through visible partnering efforts.

We will support whole-of-nation deterrence approaches that blend economic, diplomatic, and military tools to influence adversary behavior. Denying an aggressor the benefits of achieving its objectives can be just as effective as in altering its strategic calculus through the threat of retaliation. The most effective deterrence approaches make use of both techniques, while also providing potential adversaries acceptable alternative courses of action.

We must also adapt deterrence principles to 21st century security challenges. We will enhance deterrence in air, space, and cyberspace by possessing the capability to fight through a degraded environment and improving our ability to attribute and defeat attacks on our systems or supporting infrastructure.

Defeat Aggression: The core task of our Armed Forces remains to defend our Nation and win its wars. To do so, we must provide capabilities to defeat adversary aggression. Military force, at times, may be necessary to defend our Nation and allies or to preserve broader peace and security. Seeking to adhere to international standards, the United States will use military force in concert with allies and partners whenever possible, while reserving the right to act alone if necessary. Across a wide range of contingencies, military leaders will provide our Nation’s leadership with options of how the military can help achieve the Nation’s objectives.

Defeating adversary aggression will require the Joint Force to support National approaches to counter anti-access and area-denial strategies. Anti-access strategies seek to prevent our Nation’s ability to project and sustain combat power into a region, while area denial strategies seek to constrain our Nation’s freedom of action within the region. Defeating these strategies will require Joint Force doctrine to better integrate core military competencies across all domains and account for geographic considerations and constraints. These core military competencies include complementary, multi-domain power
projection, joint forcible entry, the ability to maintain joint assured access to the global commons and cyberspace should they become contested, and the ability to fight and win against adversaries.

Joint assured access to the global commons and cyberspace constitutes a core aspect of U.S. national security and remains an enduring mission for the Joint Force. The global commons and globally connected domains constitute the connective tissue upon which all nations' security and prosperity depend. The maritime domain enables the bulk of the joint force's forward deployment and sustainment, as well as the commerce that underpins the global economic system. The interlinked domains of air, space, and cyberspace allow for the high-speed, high-volume exchange of people, ideas, goods, information and capital that are equally critical to the global economy. These collective domains are essential and interdependent mediums for the Joint Force's projection and sustainment of power and ability to deter and defeat aggression.

In support of our Nation's interests, the Joint Force will take a strong role in international efforts to safeguard access, sustain security, provide oversight and accountability, and promote responsible norms in the global commons and cyberspace. The Joint Force will adhere to conventions, laws, and regulations our Nation supports to underpin collective security and govern conduct. We will also facilitate cooperation in the commons and cyberspace with transparent, routine, and predictable practices as part of our theater strategies.

Our ability to operate effectively in space and cyberspace, in particular, is increasingly essential to defeating aggression. The United States faces persistent, widespread, and growing threats from state and non-state actors in space and cyberspace. We must grow capabilities that enable operations when a common domain is unusable or inaccessible. Space and cyberspace enable effective global warfighting in the air, land, and maritime domains, and have emerged as war-fighting domains in their own right.

- **Space** - We will support whole-of-nation approaches to establishing and promoting norms, enhancing space situational awareness, and fostering greater transparency and information sharing. We will work with allies and partners to enhance space capabilities enabling coalitions and improving space architecture resiliency. We will also train for power projection operations in space-degraded environments that minimize the

The Soyuz TMA-17 spacecraft approaches the International Space Station, Dec. 22, 2009, carrying Russian Cosmonaut Oleg Kotov, Soyuz commander and Expedition 22 flight engineer, along with NASA Astronaut Col. T.J. Creamer and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency Astronaut Soichi Noguchi, both flight engineers.
incentives to attack space capabilities, and will maintain a range of options to deter or punish such activities.

- **Cyberspace** – Cyberspace capabilities enable Combatant Commanders to operate effectively across all domains. Strategic Command and Cyber Command will collaborate with U.S. government agencies, non-government entities, industry, and international actors to develop new cyber norms, capabilities, organizations, and skills. Should a large-scale cyber intrusion or debilitating cyber attack occur, we must provide a broad range of options to ensure our access and use of the cyberspace domain and hold malicious actors accountable. We must seek executive and Congressional action to provide new authorities to enable effective action in cyberspace.

C. **Strengthen International and Regional Security.**

As a global power, U.S. interests are deeply intertwined with the security and stability of the broader international system – a system of alliances, partnerships, and multi-national institutions. The disposition, strength, and readiness of our Joint Force form a global defense posture that provides unsurpassed capabilities allowing us, uniquely, to lead efforts that strengthen security across all regions. Our approach to leading will differ according to the unique combination of challenges we face. We must address immediate challenges and posture ourselves to account for long-term trends.

Strengthening international and regional security requires that our forces be globally-available, yet regionally-focused. Missions can change rapidly and we will continue to shape our joint force to be able to aggregate capabilities quickly. We will improve synchronized planning and force flow between regional theaters. With partner nation support, we will preserve forward presence and access to the commons, bases, ports, and airfields commensurate with safeguarding our economic and security interests worldwide. We must thoughtfully address cultural and sovereignty concerns in host countries. Global posture remains our most powerful form of commitment and provides us strategic depth across domains and regions.

**North America** – Our Nation’s most vital interests are the safety and security of our people and territory and our way of life. We will defend the homeland and play a critical role in supporting homeland security. We will work with the Department of Homeland Security, particularly the Coast Guard, to improve air, maritime, space, cyberspace and land domain awareness to help secure the approaches to our continent and Nation. In response to an attack, cyber incident, or natural disaster, we will focus on rapidly providing planning,
command and control, consequence management, and logistics support to the Department of Homeland Security, state and local governments, and non-governmental organizations. We will continue to dedicate, fund, and train a portion of the National Guard for homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities.

Working with Canada and Mexico, we will remain prepared to deter and defeat direct threats to our North American homeland. We will also partner with Canada on regional security issues such as an evolving Arctic, and look to build an increasingly close security partnership with Mexico. As part of our shared responsibility to ensure security on both sides of our border, we shall assist Mexican security forces in combating violent transnational criminal organizations. Efforts to disrupt illicit trafficking sources and transit zones must be coordinated across North, Central and South America, and the Caribbean.

**Caribbean, South and Central America** – Our Nation seeks progress on bilateral, hemispheric and global issues with South America. In support of this, the Joint Force will help build regional security cooperation in South and Central America and the Caribbean to enhance security and stability in the Western Hemisphere. We welcome efforts by Brazil and our other regional partners to establish economic and security mechanisms, such as the South American Defense Council. These efforts can help build interdependence and further integrate partner states into a South American security architecture that will improve regional stability.

**Broader Middle East** – Our Nation has important interests in the greater Middle East. The most significant threat to regional stability remains an Iranian regime that continues to seek the development of nuclear weapons, as well as continuing to provide support to terrorist organizations throughout the broader Middle East. To support and advance our Nation’s interests, the Joint Force will pursue security cooperation and help strengthen the defense capabilities of our allies and regional partners. We will support efforts to counter transnational and sub-state militant groups, and combat the spread of WMD and related materials. We will maintain an appropriate presence capable
of reassuring partners and allies and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear arms.

Our Nation seeks a long-term partnership with Iraq, including in security affairs. The Joint Force must continue to transition well as we shift the focus of our assistance from Iraq’s internal domestic security to its external national defense. We will help build an Iraqi defense force while carefully considering the interests of all Iraqis as well as Iraq’s neighbors. We will help to further strengthen security relations between Iraq and its neighbors.

Africa – Our Nation continues to embrace effective partnerships in Africa. The United Nations and African Union play a critical role in humanitarian, peacekeeping and capacity-building efforts, which help preserve stability, facilitate resolutions to political tensions that underlie conflicts, and foster broader development. To support this, the Joint Force will continue to build partner capacity in Africa, focusing on critical states where the threat of terrorism could pose a threat to our homeland and interests. We will continue to counter violent extremism in the Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia and the Trans-Sahel. We will work in other areas to help reduce the security threat to innocent civilians. We must identify and encourage states and regional organizations that have demonstrated a leadership role to continue to contribute to Africa’s security. We will help facilitate the African Union’s and the Regional Economic Communities’ development of their military capacity, including the African Stand-by Force, to address the continent’s many security challenges.

Europe – NATO will remain our Nation’s preeminent multilateral alliance and continue to drive our defense relations with Europe. The Joint Force will continue to cooperate to combat violent extremism, focusing on our mission in Afghanistan and support to Pakistan. We will also support the new strategic concept including space and cyberspace security, Ballistic Missile Defense, counter-trafficking, and nonproliferation – and pursue mission specialization that contributes to complementary capabilities. We will pay close attention to how this institution adjusts to its members’ reductions in defense expenditures to ensure the Alliance maintains the capability for full spectrum operations.

NATO members act as a stabilizing force on its perimeter, which ranges from the Middle East and the Levant, Northern Africa, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. Turkey can play a uniquely critical role in this regard. We will actively support closer military-to-military relations between the Alliance and
Europe’s non-NATO nations, some of which have reliably contributed to trans-Atlantic security for decades. As we strengthen our European alliance, we will increase dialogue and military-to-military relations with Russia, building on our successful efforts in strategic arms reduction. We seek to cooperate with Russia on counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, space, and Ballistic Missile Defense, and welcome it playing a more active role in preserving security and stability in Asia.

Asia and Pacific – The Nation’s strategic priorities and interests will increasingly emanate from the Asia-Pacific region. The region’s share of global wealth is growing, enabling increased military capabilities. This is causing the region’s security architecture to change rapidly, creating new challenges and opportunities for our national security and leadership. Though still underpinned by the U.S. bilateral alliance system, Asia’s security architecture is becoming a more complex mix of formal and informal multilateral relationships and expanded bilateral security ties among states.

We expect to maintain a strong military presence in Northeast Asia for decades. We will work with the Japan Self-Defense Forces to improve their out-of-area operational capabilities as the nation adjusts its defense posture. The Republic of Korea has proven a steadfast ally supporting U.S. security efforts around the world; our commitment to the Republic of Korea is unwavering as North Korea remains a provocative threat to regional stability. We will retain operational control over combined forces on the Korean peninsula through 2015 and provide assistance to South Korea as it expands its security responsibilities. We will continue to work with Japan and South Korea to help improve security ties between them, enhance military cooperation, and preserve regional stability.

As our presence and alliance commitments remain the key to preserving stability in Northeast Asia, we must also invest new attention and resources in Southeast and South Asia. We will look for security opportunities to support our Nation’s increased emphasis on its relationship with ASEAN and other multilateral forums. Bilaterally, Australia’s leadership in regional security affairs, and our shared values and longstanding historical ties provide the basis for an increasingly important relationship. We will make our alliance a model for interoperability, transparency, and meaningful combined full-spectrum activities.
As military capability and capacity increases in Asia, we will seek new ways to catalyze greater regional security cooperation. Leveraging our convening power, we will expand the scope and participation of multilateral exercises across the region. We seek expanded military cooperation with India on nonproliferation, safeguarding the global commons, countering terrorism, and elsewhere. We will expand our military security cooperation, exchanges, and exercises with the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Singapore, and other states in Oceania – working with them to address domestic and common foreign threats to their nation’s integrity and security. This will also help ensure we maintain a sustainable and diversified presence and operational access in the region. Lastly, we strongly encourage the development of security ties and commitments that are emerging among our allies and partners in the region. This helps strengthen regional norms and demonstrates increased responsibility and cooperation in addressing regional security challenges.

Our Nation seeks a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China that welcomes it to take on a responsible leadership role. To support this, the Joint Force seeks a deeper military-to-military relationship with China to expand areas of mutual interest and benefit, improve understanding, reduce miscalculation, and prevent proliferation of WMD, and using its influence with North Korea to preserve stability on the Korean peninsula. We will continue to monitor carefully China’s military developments and the implications those developments have on the military balance in the Taiwan Strait. We remain concerned about the extent and strategic intent of China’s military modernization, and its assertiveness in space, cyberspace, in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. To safeguard U.S. and partner nation interests, we will be prepared to demonstrate the will and commit the resources needed to oppose any nation’s actions that jeopardize access to and use of the global commons and cyberspace, or that threaten the security of our allies.
Transnational Challenges – In combination with U.S. diplomatic and development efforts, we will leverage our convening power to foster regional and international cooperation in addressing transnational security challenges. Response to natural disasters and transnational threats such as trafficking, piracy, proliferation of WMD, terrorism, cyber-aggression, and pandemics are often best addressed through cooperative security approaches that create mutually beneficial outcomes. Working to address these threats provides a rough but adaptable agenda Combatant Commanders can tailor to their region and coordinate across regional seams.

Theater Security Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance – The Joint Force, Combatant Commanders, and Service Chiefs shall actively partner with other U.S. Government agencies to pursue theater security cooperation to increase collective security skills with a wider range of partners. We seek to facilitate interagency and enable international interoperability before crises occur. Preparation is indispensable when conditions demand collaboration. In turn, we must plan and exercise extensively across Combatant Commanders’ seams of responsibility for full spectrum contingencies to support U.S. diplomatic and development efforts and help mitigate and contain the human and economic impact of crises. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities employ the Joint Force to address partner needs and sometimes provide opportunities to build confidence and trust between erstwhile adversaries. They also help us gain and maintain access and relationships that support our broader national interests. We must be prepared to support and facilitate the response of the United States Agency for International Development and other U.S. government agencies’ to humanitarian crises.

Security Sector Assistance – Security assistance encompasses a group of programs through which we provide defense articles and services to international organizations and foreign governments in support of national policies and objectives. To improve the effectiveness of our security assistance, our internal procedures need comprehensive reform. To form better and more effective partnerships, we require more flexible resources, and less cumbersome processes. We seek authorities for a pooled-resources approach to facilitate more complementary efforts.
across departments and programs, integrating defense, diplomacy, development, law enforcement, and intelligence capacity-building activities.

D. Shape the Future Force.

Our focus on leadership, not simply power, necessitates that we emphasize our values and our people as much as our platforms and capabilities. The all-volunteer force will remain our greatest strategic asset and the best example of the values we represent. In addition, we must continue to find innovative and affordable ways to provide the full range of capabilities necessary to fulfill this strategy while making difficult tradeoffs between modernization, capacity, capability, posture, and risk.

Our People

To shape the future force, we must grow leaders who can truly out-think and out innovate adversaries while gaining trust, understanding, and cooperation from our partners in an ever-more complex and dynamic environment. The enduring challenges we face and the whole-of-nation approaches they require demand leaders that have the qualities of flexibility, agility, and adaptability, and the ability to build unique teams of teams to accomplish missions.

We must think and engage more broadly about the civil-military continuum and the commitments embedded within. Just as our Service members commit to the Nation when they volunteer to serve, we incur an equally binding pledge to return them to society as better citizens. We must safeguard Service members’ pay and benefits, provide family support, and care for our wounded warriors. We will place increased emphasis on helping our Service members master the challenging upheavals of returning home from war and transitioning out of the military back to civilian life. Through the power of their example, the success of our veterans can inspire young Americans to serve. In all these endeavors, we must constantly reinforce our connection to U.S. values and society.

We will maintain the trust and confidence of our elected leaders and the public by providing frank, professional military advice; being good stewards of public resources; and vigorously executing lawful orders. The military’s adherence to the ideals comprised in our Constitution is a profound example for other nations. We will continue to affirm the foundational values in our oath: civilian control of the military remains a core principle of our Republic and we will preserve it. We will remain an apolitical institution and sustain this position at all costs.
An all-volunteer force must represent the country it defends. We will strengthen our commitment to the values of diversity and inclusivity, and continue to treat each other with dignity and respect. We benefit immensely from the different perspectives, and linguistic and cultural skills of all Americans. We will develop leaders who are capable of operating in interagency and multinational environments and providing liaison to other U.S. agencies, allies, and partners.

Our leaders are the strongest advocate for our Nation’s commitment to caring for our wounded veterans and their families. We will build greater resilience into our Service members and their families from the first day they enter the military. But we must balance this commitment by better managing the increased costs of health care. We will focus on early preventive actions to diminish the tragic risks of suicide, traumatic brain injury, substance abuse, homelessness, domestic violence, and other challenges. Despite increased attention, suicide remains a severe challenge for every service. Traumatic brain injury and post traumatic stress have become similarly devastating, affecting hundreds of thousands of service members and veterans. In many ways, these issues are the greatest threat to our people and present a strategic risk to our institution.

We must work to end the stigma that prevents our service members, veterans, and their families from seeking help early, and simplify the number and complexity of programs we currently offer to help. This is a difficult, vexing, and complex problem that only leadership can reverse. To do so, we will tap into the capabilities of other government agencies and civil organizations (community, state, and national) to improve care for veterans. We must focus on and expand those programs that work best and eliminate those that do not perform. While we must and will do more, we can only effectively move forward by establishing care that includes public and private partnerships.

We will carefully review legacy personnel systems, particularly whether we have the appropriate balance between uniformed, civilian, and contract professionals, and active and reserve components. The emerging war-fighting domain of cyberspace requires special attention in this regard. The Reserve component, too, is essential as it provides strategic and operational depth to the Joint Force. In turn, preserving it as an accessible, operational force also requires sustained attention.
We have made significant progress in the readiness of our reserve component, and this will remain a key focus area. The missions we undertake are growing more diverse as we work more with our civilian counterparts. In turn, the skills and experiences of our Reserve and National Guard forces have become ever more relevant. To capitalize on the progress made, we must continue to utilize the Reserve Component and National Guard in an operational capacity as a trained, equipped, ready, and available force for routine, predictable deployments.

Capabilities and Readiness

Both our Nation and military will face increased budget pressures and we cannot assume an increase in the defense budget. As we adjust to these pressures, we must not become a hollow force with a large force structure lacking the readiness, training, and modern equipment it needs. Instead, we will maintain a whole, Joint Force that retains quality people, sustains and develops the right capabilities, and maintains a sustainable tempo to effectively mitigate operational, institutional, force management, and future challenges risk. We must continue to maintain our margin of technological superiority and ensure our Nation’s industrial base is able to field the capabilities and capacity necessary for our forces to succeed in any contingency. At the same time, we will pursue deliberate acquisition process improvements and selective force modernization with the cost effective introduction of new equipment and technology.

Capabilities – Our strategy, forged in war, is focused on fielding modular, adaptive, general purpose forces that can be employed in the full range of military operations. Joint Forces will improve their ability to surge on short notice, deploy agile command and control systems, and be increasingly interoperable with other U.S. government agencies. Forces will operate with an aptitude for precise and discriminate action and increasingly possess security force assistance expertise. Joint Forces must become more expeditionary in nature and will require a smaller logistical footprint in part by reducing large fuel and energy demands. Additionally, Joint Forces must train and exercise in degraded air, sea, cyber, and space environments.

The Joint Force must ensure access, freedom of maneuver, and the ability to project power globally through all domains:

- **Land** – Joint Forces will be capable of full spectrum operations, and be organized to provide a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations operating on a sustainable rotational cycle.
Maritime – Joint forces will include an appropriate mix of small, mission-tailored and large, multi-mission capable units, formations and platforms. This will provide the ability to conduct the full range of naval operations across the spectrum of maritime environments.

Air – Joint Forces will perform full spectrum operations to secure, maintain, and assure unhindered domain access, global strike, rapid global mobility, globally integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), command and control, and retain the ability to project power into distant, anti-access environments.

Space – Joint Forces will pursue resilient architectures, space situational awareness, provide options for self-defense and reconstitution, maintain symmetric and asymmetric capabilities to deter adversaries, and train for operations in space-degraded environments.

Cyberspace – Joint Forces will secure the ‘.mil’ domain, requiring a resilient DoD cyberspace architecture that employs a combination of detection, deterrence, denial, and multi-layered defense. We will improve our cyberspace capabilities so they can often achieve significant and proportionate effects with less cost and lower collateral impact.

Joint nuclear forces will continue to support strategic stability through maintenance of an assured second-strike capability. We will ensure our nuclear forces remain effective, safe, and secure. We will retain sufficient nuclear force structure to hedge against unexpected geopolitical change, technological problems, and operational vulnerabilities.

Joint special operations forces will remain decentralized and flexible, have regional expertise, and maintain a wide range of capabilities to support our Nation’s counter-terrorism efforts and other missions that require their unique attributes. We will increase enablers critical for the success of special operations forces.

In today’s knowledge-based environment, the weight of operational efforts is increasingly prioritized not only by the assignment of forces, but also by the allocation of ISR capabilities. The ability to create precise, desirable effects with a smaller force and a lighter logistical footprint depends on a robust ISR architecture. Across all domains, we will improve sharing, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information to better support decision makers. We will make our command and control more survivable and resilient through redundancy, and improve human intelligence capabilities. To do so, we must change our mindset from simply increasing the density of ISR capabilities to evaluating our
methodologies for employing and integrating ISR assets. Joint Force processes must efficiently employ and allocate all ISR assets from across the Services, and strengthen the linkage between ISR and cyberspace operations where they leverage each other or operate in the same space.

No other military can match the Joint Force’s strike, logistics, strategic mobility, planning, and command and control capabilities. We will explore joint operational concepts leveraging mobile and more survivable bases, sea-borne mobility, and innovative uses of space. We will maintain this superiority and the capacity to extend these competitive advantages to others – our unique capabilities amplify their efforts.

Lending these niche capabilities to partners, or surging them in times of crisis, is the right partnering investment, and builds long-lasting goodwill.

Readiness – Readiness, too, must remain a top priority, as our forces, systems, and capabilities will continue to be under extraordinary stress. Readiness is the ability to provide and integrate capabilities required by Combatant Commanders to execute their assigned missions. Restoring readiness will help improve our strategic depth to conduct full-spectrum operations, which has been degraded by sustained combat.

Short term efforts to improve readiness will focus on resetting equipment and reconstituting units, in some cases--most notably rotational and expeditionary forces--this will be in stride. As we reset, we will conduct more full-spectrum joint, combined, interagency, and multinational training, exercises and experimentation. Forward presence and engagement will take on greater importance during this time. Long-term modernization efforts will improve readiness by developing essential capabilities and capacity to outpace emerging threats. A further degradation of readiness for the full range of military operations would undermine our ability to fulfill our national defense objectives – an unacceptable risk.

We will develop more effective ways to assess joint and unit readiness that emphasize “joint” capabilities and concepts. While accounting for missions that require continual readiness, we must develop strategic concepts that measure joint readiness across the services to deter conflict and respond promptly during contingencies. We will streamline the requirements-to-capabilities process, synchronizing force-providers with force-commander needs.
IV. Conclusion.

This strategy is derived from a thorough assessment of the strategic environment and how to advance our national interests within it. It describes how the Joint Force will redefine America’s military leadership by enabling whole-of-nation approaches to address national security challenges. It calls for a broad portfolio of leadership approaches – facilitator, enabler, convener, and guarantor - to address problems that are truly international in nature. Our leadership approaches magnify the capabilities we possess, making them just as important to assuring favorable outcomes. Our ability to lead will determine how well we advance America’s interests through this strategic inflection point.

This strategy also sets a vector toward transition from a force that has been engaged in sustained combat operations to a Joint Force that is shaped for the future. As the challenges we face require a Joint Force that is flexible, agile, and adaptive, it emphasizes people as much as platforms. It recognizes that the unique character of our Service members, working hand-in-hand with other government agencies and in support of public-private partnerships, is a formidable advantage. We must continue to care for Service members and their families, and set conditions for their continued success – in and out of uniform. This will require significant support from Congress, the American people, and a thoughtful, reflective military leadership. By successfully contributing to America’s security and prosperity, we will continue to advance our Nation’s enduring interests well into the 21st Century.